Interest Groups and the New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong 9781138690059, 9781315537184

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Interest Groups and the New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong

A new era in the democracy movement in Hong Kong began on July 1, 2003, when half a million people protested on the streets, and has included the 2012 anti-­National Education campaign, the 2014 Occupy Central Movement and the rapid rise of localist groups. The new democracy movement in Hong Kong is characterized by a diversity of interest groups calling for political reform, policy change and the territory’s autonomy vis-­à-vis the central government in Beijing. These groups include lawyers, teachers, students, nativists, workers, Catholics, human rights activists, environmental activists and intellectuals. This book marks a new attempt at understanding the activities of the various interest groups in their quest for democratic participation, governmental responsiveness and openness. They are utilizing new and unconventional modes of political participation, such as the Occupy Central Movement, cross-­class mobilization, the use of technology and cyberspace, and human rights activities with cross-­boundary implications for China’s political development. The book will be useful to students, researchers, officials, diplomats and journalists interested in the political change of Hong Kong and the implications for mainland China. Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo is Professor and Deputy Director in the School of Professional and Continuing Education at the University of Hong Kong.

Routledge Contemporary China Series

For our full list of available titles: www.routledge.com/Routledge-­Contemporary-China-­Series/book-­series/ SE0768 167 Cyberdualism in China The Political Implications of Internet Exposure of Educated Youth Shiru Wang

172 China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe From “Old Comrades” to New Partners Edited by Weiqing Song

168 Political Mobility of Chinese Regional Leaders Performance, Preference, Promotion Liang Qiao

173 Public Security and Governance in Contemporary China Mingjun Zhang and Xinye Wu

169 Civilising Citizens in Post-­Mao China Understanding the Rhetoric of Suzhi Delia Lin 170 China’s Rise and the Chinese Overseas Bernard P. Wong and Tan Chee-­Beng 171 Competing Economic Paradigms in China The Co-­Evolution of Economic Events, Economic Theory and Economics Education, 1976–2016 Steve Cohn

174 Interest Groups and the New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong Edited by Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo 175 Civil Society in China and Taiwan Agency, Class and Boundaries Taru Salmenkari 176 Chinese Fans of Japanese and Korean Pop Culture Nationalistic Narratives and International Fandom Lu Chen

Interest Groups and the New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong Edited by Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo to be identified as the author of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-69005-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-53718-4 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgments List of abbreviations

  1 Interest groups, intellectuals and the new democracy movement in Hong Kong

vii viii ix xii xiii

1

S onny  S hiu - H ­ ing  L O

  2 Interest groups and the democracy movement in Hong Kong: a historical perspective

14

S te v en  C hung - ­fun  H U N G

  3 Lawyers as an interest group in Hong Kong’s democracy movement

34

K aren  M an  Y ee  L E E

  4 Journalists as interest groups: implications for the democracy movement

62

K enneth  W ai - ­kin  M I N G

  5 The Professional Teachers’ Union as an interest group fighting for democracy

87

S te v en  C hung - ­fun  H U N G

  6 Workers as interest groups: are they fragmented and powerless?  J eff H ai - ­chi  L O O

111

vi   Contents   7 Why are Hong Kong’s business interest groups anti-­democratic? 

127

M inxing  Z H A O

  8 The Hong Kong Catholic Church: endeavor in promoting democracy

140

B eatrice  L E U N G

  9 The emergence of nativist groups and political change

155

S tephan O R T M A N N

10 Student and youth activism: the new youth groups in anti-­National Education policy and Occupy Central Movement

174

E ric K ing - ­M an  C H O N G

11 Environmental governance and the rise of the environmental movement in Hong Kong

206

D ennis L ai H ang  H U I

12 Political interest groups and democratization: the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China

222

S onny S hiu - ­H ing  L O

13 Conclusion: the new democracy movement, interest groups politics and implications for China

243

S onny S hiu - ­H ing  L O



Bibliography Index

257 277

Figures

3.1 Total number of lawyer candidates in Legislative Council elections and their overall percentages (1998–2016) 3.2 Total number of lawyer candidates in District Council elections and their overall percentages (1999–2015) 5.1 Executive Committee of the Professional Teachers’ Union, 22nd term of office (2016–2018)

46 47 100

Tables

  3.1 Highlights of the public pronouncements of the Law Society and Bar Association over major constitutional controversies (1999–2016)   3.2 The four lawyers’ silent marches in Hong Kong since July 1, 1997   4.1 The lobbying activities of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association   4.2 The Annual Report of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association after the 1997 handover   4.3 Political participation of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association   5.1 Participants’ and public donations to the annual June 4 candlelight vigils   5.2 Electoral results of the education constituency in Legislative Council elections, 1985–2016   6.1 Major events of the Labor movement in pre-­1997 Hong Kong 10.1 Civil society’s interest groups in the civil alliance against National Education 10.2 Comparison of youth groups: Scholarism, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Demosisto and Youngspiration 11.1 Major environmental groups in Hong Kong 12.1 The 28th Standing Committee of the HKASPDM in 2016–2017 12.2 Events surrounding the establishment of the HKASPDM in 1989 12.3 The Alliance’s activities in 2008 when the PRC held the Olympics 12.4 Financial reports of the HKASPDM from 1989–2008 12.5 Number of participants in the annual candlelight vigil of June 4, 1990–2016

40 44 65 68 70 97 99 115 185 194 214 227 228 229 231 234

Contributors

Eric King-­Man Chong is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong. He acquired his Bachelor degree and MPhil from the Department of Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, MBA (Public Service) from the University of Birmingham, and PhD in Education from University of York, UK. His research interests include citizenship education, the politics of civic education, identity politics, student politics and the pedagogy of global citizenship. Dennis Lai Hang Hui is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong. His research interests includes the political economy of public health and the security politics of China. Steven Chung-­Fun Hung is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong. He concentrates his studies on Hong Kong’s history, education history, education policy, civic education and socio-­political development. He is expanding his research into the regions of mainland China, Taiwan and Macau. He was a very experienced former secondary teacher before joining the Education University of Hong Kong. Karen Man Yee Lee holds a BA (Political Studies) and an LLB from the University of Auckland and a PhD in law from the University of Hong Kong. Her research spans law and its dynamics with culture, politics and society with topics including human rights discourse, democratization and the rule of law, and legal culture and the rule of law education in Hong Kong and Greater China. Her most recent article is “Beyond the ‘professional project’: the political positioning of Hong Kong lawyers,” International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 2017, available online at www.sciencedirect.com/ science/article/pii/S1756061616301422. Beatrice Leung acquired her doctorate from the London School of Economics and Political Science. From 1989 to 2004 she taught at the University of Hong Kong, the University of Macau and Lingnan University. Now she is a visiting research professor at Wenzao Ursuline University of Languages,

x   Contributors Taiwan. Her research interests include church-­state relations in general and Sino-­Vatican relations in particular. She has published and edited 10 books and more than 60 articles and chapters in academic journals including China Quarterly and Journal of Contemporary China. Her most recent publication is (with Marcus J.  J. Wang) “Sino-­Vatican negotiations: problems in sovereign right and national security,” Journal of Contemporary China Vol.  25, Issue no. 99 (2016), pp. 467–482. Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo is Professor and Deputy Director (Arts and Sciences) at the University of Hong Kong’s School of Professional and Continuing Education. He formerly worked at the Education University of Hong Kong, the University of Waterloo (Canada), the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Murdoch University, Lingnan College and University of East Asia (Macao). He has published 11 single-­ authored books on political development, cross-­border crime and policing in Greater China, particularly Hong Kong and Macao. He is the President of the Hong Kong Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. Jeff Hai-­Chi Loo is currently an MA student pursuing the study of China in the Department of Public Policy at the City University of Hong Kong. He acquired his first degree in Greater China studies from the Education University of Hong Kong. His research interests include Hong Kong politics and central-­local relations in China. Kenneth Wai-­kin Ming is a freelance researcher interested in the study of the relationships between journalists and politics in Hong Kong, especially the role of journalists in governance. He joined a newspaper corporation in Hong Kong as an intern for three months when he was a university student. After earning a Bachelor’s degree in social sciences, he became a Research Assistant in the Department of Social Sciences at the Education University of Hong Kong. Stephan Ortmann is Research Fellow in the Department of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong. He has worked on various issues relating to political change in Hong Kong, Singapore, China and Vietnam. His publications have appeared in many reputable journals including Asian Survey, Administration and Society, Journal of Democracy, Government and Opposition, and Pacific Review. He is the author of Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong (Routledge, 2010) and most recently of Environmental Governance in Vietnam (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Minxing Zhao has successfully defended his PhD thesis in the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong University of Education. He received his MA in political science from the University of Waterloo in 2010. His book chapters include “The USA Patriot Act and the Banco Delta Asia Case in Macao” in China’s Macao Transformed, edited by Eilo Yu and Ming Chan

Contributors   xi (2014), “Combating Cultural Heritage Crimes: Recent Developments in China” in Creativity and Culture in Greater China edited by Chi-­Cheung Leung and Sonny Lo (2014), and “The Death Penalty in China and Its Impact on Sino-­Canadian Criminal Justice Cooperation” in Facing China as a New Global Superpower, edited by Huhua Cao and Jeremy Paltiel (2016).

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the authors for their contributions to this book project. In particular, I thank Kenneth Ming and Jeff Loo for their assistance in the final stages of compiling the manuscript. Except for Professor Beatrice Leung and I, all the other contributors in this book are either very young academics or newly emerging scholars who have been specializing in the study of Hong Kong politics in recent years. I hope that this book provides a golden opportunity for them to share their insights with a new and young generation of Hong Kong specialists, and that it will be useful to all those researchers and students interested in the political development of not only Hong Kong but also mainland China. Although interest groups politics and the democracy movement in Hong Kong are the foci of this book, they do have significant implications for China’s policy toward Hong Kong. Finally, I have to thank Tang ShengBin from Taylor and Francis for his great support and professional work. Two chapters from this book were derived from published articles in academic journals. The editor has to thank Laurence Goodchild from Taylor and Francis for granting me the reprint permission with regard to the chapter on political interest groups and democratization. This chapter was derived from Journal of Contemporary China on May 13, 2013, available online at http://dx. doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.795308. I updated this chapter by adding a section on the late Szeto Wah and his legacies. Furthermore, I have to thank Jenny Lien from Taylor and Francis for granting Karen Lee the permission to use parts of the article from Asian Journal of Political Science for her chapter in this book. Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo April 1, 2017

Abbreviations

ATV BLDC CCP CCPL CE CEPA CFA CIC CRHK CTU DAB

Asia Television Limited Basic Law Drafting Committee Chinese Communist Party Centre for Comparative and Public Law Chief Executive Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement Court of Final Appeal Christian Industrial Committee Commercial Radio Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong DP Democratic Party DPP Democratic Progressive Party ExCo Executive Council FLU Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Unions FTU Federation of Trade Union HKASPDM Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China HKEJ Hong Kong Economic Journal HKFJ Hong Kong Federation of Journalists HKJA Hong Kong Journalists Association HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region HKTV Hong Kong Television Network HKU University of Hong Kong HKUPOP University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Programme ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IFJ International Federation of Journalists JCPDG Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government KMT Kuomintang or Nationalist Party LegCo Legislative Council LSD League of Social Democrats NC Nominating committee

xiv   Abbreviations NPCSC OCLP OCTS PCLL PLG PPO PRC PTU RTHK SAR TUC UK

National People’s Congress Standing Committee Occupy Central with Love and Peace One Country Two Systems Postgraduate Certificate in Laws Progressive Lawyers Group Peace Preservation Ordinance People’s Republic of China Professional Teachers’ Union Radio Television Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Trade Union Council United Kingdom

1 Interest groups, intellectuals and the new democracy movement in Hong Kong Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo

Introduction The objective of this book is to examine the role of interest groups – organizations in which members share common interests and values – in the process of democratization in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It will focus on the linkages between interest groups and the democracy movement, which can be defined as a process through which groups and individuals push for political and constitutional transformations. For some scholars, democracy is defined as a political system in which the top leaders are returned by universal suffrage and competitive electoral politics. Others see democracy as being composed of the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the existence of such institutions as the judiciary and the media to check and balance the power of the executive branch of government. Critics of Western-­style democracy, however, see the concept of democracy as subjective and necessarily biased in favor of parliamentary and presidential types of regimes; they have been arguing that democracy should be developed indigenously and adapted to local circumstances, including political cultures and attitudes that are unique in different places. This book does not focus on the controversies over the definitions of democracy; instead it will center on how interest groups in Hong Kong, formerly a British colony and currently a mainland Chinese territory, have been pushing for democratization, making the political system more accountable, transparent and responsive than before. It will study how different types of interest groups perceive the issue of democracy and contribute to, or hinder, the democracy movement. Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualization of intellectuals as “traditional” and “organic” social groups in different societal strata provides us with an essential tool for our deeper understanding of the political role of intellectuals in various types of interest groups in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), whose sovereignty was reverted from Britain to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997. While this book contains chapters that focus on specific interest groups and their relations with the democracy movement in the HKSAR, this introductory chapter is going to utilize Gramsci’s concepts of “traditional” and “organic” intellectuals to comprehend the evolution and complexities of different

2   S. S.-H. Lo interest groups that have been fighting for democratic change in Hong Kong from the colonial to the post-­1997 era. This chapter will first go through Gramsci’s concepts of “traditional” and “organic” intellectuals, and then discuss how these two types of intellectuals play a crucial role in interest groups, which can be defined as “any collection of people trying to influence government” and which has members sharing their interests and common objectives.1 In the case of the HKSAR, as this book will show, more interest groups composed of “organic” intellectuals have gradually emerged since the early 2000s, particularly after the Occupy Central Movement that took place between September and December 2014. A new democracy movement has taken shape in the sense that many “organic” and young intellectuals have been demanding mass participation and broader representation in all sectors of the society and polity, thereby challenging the HKSAR regime and the central government in Beijing in an unprecedented degree.

Gramsci’s concepts of “traditional” and “organic” intellectuals Gramsci wrote that all men were intellectuals, but not all of them displayed the function of intellectuals who could provide political and moral leadership. He remarked that while every social group created its own “organic” intellectuals who were “homogeneous” and aware of their functions in socio-­political and economic life, it “has also found categories of intellectuals already in existence and which seemed indeed to represent historical continuity uninterrupted even by the most complicated and radical changes in political and social forms.”2 For the latter group of “traditional” intellectuals, they had their esprit de corps and “put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group.”3 Intellectuals are bound to think of themselves as an independent and autonomous group with its own character, according to Gramsci. He argued that, for any group that sought to achieve dominance, it had to create “organic intellectuals” to “assimilate and conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals.”4 Then what was the role of “organic” intellectuals? “Organic” intellectuals, to Gramsci, are situated between the “civil society” and the “political society,” or specifically between the society and the state. In the civil society, the dominant group can exercise its “hegemony” over other groups. In the political society, on the other hand, the state apparatus or “juridical government” exercises direct domination. The intellectuals are “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.”5 These functions include the following aspect:  The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.6

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   3 Moreover, the state had coercive power and enforced discipline on those groups that did not give “consent” to the rulers. Gramsci’s notion of “organic intellectuals” has been interpreted by many scholars as those who work between the society and the state, and who provides the necessary leadership for the civil society to resist any encroachment from the state. As Miguel Herrera-­Zgaib wrote, organic intellectuals accomplish “the function of connecting the mass of population to the leadership of the state through a web of social relationships.”7 They need to publicly persuade the masses for the sake of exercising their hegemony. While Gramsci saw the traditional intellectuals as the functionary of the state, he envisaged Lenin and the Bolsheviks as providing a model for the “organic intellectuals,” who were supposed to lead the proletariat and bring about revolutionary transformations.8 Yet, the proletariat, according to Gramsci, is poor in organizational terms and lacks intellectuals. He tried to build up “a Marxist theory of the intellectuals presenting them as the public leaders and organizers of a counter hegemonic communist tendency within bourgeois civil society.”9 In other words, Gramsci constructed the theory of creating “organic intellectuals” in the society for the sake of liberating the working class, orchestrating revolutionary change and overthrowing the capitalist state. From Gramsci’s perspective, “organic intellectuals” had to emerge to provide the necessary moral and political leadership to transform the political superstructure in the capitalist state. He envisioned that factory councils should ideally be established in the society of Italy so that the “organic intellectuals” would become the vanguard in the transition to socialism.10 According to Maria Pires, Gramsci expected the “organic” intellectuals to be ones who worked for “the interest of liberation, empowerment and democracy.”11 While liberation refers to the need for “organic intellectuals” to organize and lead the working class, as mentioned above, they are also expected to empower the civil society and bring about a new kind of democracy different from the bourgeois one. Indeed, Gramsci hoped that the intellectuals would not only play the role of being “traditional” but also “organic” in connecting the civil society with the state. Even from a non-­Marxist perspective, intellectuals in general are expected by many members of the public to provide their insights, expert views and critical opinions to both the citizens and the state. As Pires wrote:  The dream of democratic mass education has been to make intellectual culture the possession of every citizen, not just of an elite, ending with a culture in which intellectual is still often synonymous with snob or elitist and developments over the last generation.12 In fact, intellectuals play a leading role in the activities of interest groups in which members share their common objectives and vision and where intellectual “creativity” and “courage” constitute the indispensable assets for these groups.13 Public intellectuals, as with Gramsci’s concept of traditional intellectuals, see themselves as autonomous and participate in the society and politics through a

4   S. S.-H. Lo variety of activities, including the act of holding press conferences, lobbying government officials, writing commentaries for newspapers and blogs, partaking in demonstrations and rallies, coordinating with other like-­minded interest groups, arousing the awareness of members of the public, mobilizing supporters and discussing the possibility of taking collective action for the sake of protecting their common interests. They may also adopt an “adversarial culture” to voice their views critical of the establishment, hoping to transform the society in a better way.14 Public intellectuals may not necessarily be the “organic” ones who, according to Gramsci, shoulder the responsibility of liberating the society, empowering the citizens and democratizing the political system; instead, they have the conscience of alerting the ordinary citizens and like-­minded people on the urgency and importance of some issues. Marc Lamont Hill has argued that educational researchers in the United States make their research findings accessible to the public, sharing their observations with administrators and policy-­makers, and choosing to become public intellectuals who are culturally critical, engage the members of the public, and shape policy-­makers.15 Although some researchers are resisting to the role of being public intellectuals as they vow to maintain value neutrality and rationality, many have been embracing the ideas that their findings can be made more publicly accessible, more interactive with the non-­ academic community, and that their work can be promoted through professional organizations and institutions. As such, a balance between academic work and engagement with policy-­makers and members of the public is arguably feasible. Pires and Hill’s discussion of public intellectuals has similarities with Gramsci’s notion of traditional intellectuals, both having the autonomy to express their views and ideas in the society, and possessing the esprit de corps to be independent of any dominant social group.

Interest groups, intellectuals and the new democracy movement Traditionally, interest groups in many places have been promoting democratic reforms in various ways, such as lobbying the government, holding press conferences, staging strikes and petitions, organizing mass rallies and mobilizing citizens to articulate their interests. Some interest groups are pro-­government, some critical of the regime, and some are ad hoc organizations which spring up because of sudden issues and policies that affect their self-­interests. The conventional mode of interest group participation embraces the act of approaching law-­makers, lobbying the administration, making appeals to the public, utilizing such legal channels as the court and legal aid system, and participating in demonstrations and even violent protests.16 Interest groups do not participate in elections, although they may influence the nomination of candidates who are supportive of their cause, and who may be affiliated with political parties that seek to grasp political power through electoral participation.17 In general, interest groups “overrepresent the better-­off and businesses” because the relatively

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   5 a­ ffluent organizations tend to be well-­connected and more politically influential.18 On the other hand, the poor and the needy tend to be relatively slow and less skillful in organizing themselves into groups to lobby the government over issues and policies affecting their interests, unless intermediaries such as social workers and human rights activists assist them in the process of group formation and mobilization. However, the poor and members of the lower class may “act explosively” instead of the pro-­establishment groups that work within the existing political system.19 In the era of globalization, interest groups can promote democracy through new modes of political participation. Citizens can be mobilized very easily and rapidly by any loose groupings and more organized interest groups through the use of social media and the Internet, including Whatsapp, Instagram, Twitter and Facebook. Interest groups can network, coordinate and communicate among themselves much better and more quickly through the social media. Civil disobedience actions can be taken collectively but in a speedier manner without the easy detection from the government authorities, including the police even though some police forces in the world are penetrating social media in order to conduct surveillance over protest organizations and political interest groups. Moreover, the new activities of interest groups in promoting democratization through the utilization of social media may have cross-­border or transnational impacts. People in various parts of the world, including neighboring cities and states, can be stimulated by the new modes of participation of interest groups and take similar action to influence, oppose and change government policies. The legitimacy of governments in the globalized world can be easily challenged by these new methods of interest articulation by groups and citizens, unless they impose censorship over the Internet and conduct close surveillance over social media. Given the breadth and depth of social media, the authoritarian regimes in the world cannot completely control the Internet and social media. As such, interest groups that adopt new modes of participation in the globalized world have the potential of challenging any regime and its legitimacy, carrying transnational or cross-­boundary political implications. Some political science textbooks have already failed to capture the dynamics of change in the modes of interest groups participation; social media and the Internet can become powerful tools through which these groups can utilize to influence, oppose, shape and de-­legitimize the government.20 Arguably, while the “old” democracy movement in many parts of the world was characterized by the mobilization of political parties and interest groups to change government policies through collective action, the “new” democracy movement has been characterized by the utilization of social media and the Internet to oppose the government and propel political transformations.

The special case of Hong Kong: from colonial era to the special administrative region The HKSAR provides a special case for us to comprehend the operation of interest groups in a mainland Chinese territory. The study of interest groups

6   S. S.-H. Lo and politics in the HKSAR is academically and practically significant in several aspects. First and foremost, as the PRC remains a one-­party dominant system in which interest groups are bound to be controlled by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the special administrative region of Hong Kong deserves our study as the territory has the rule of law and a relatively more liberal-­minded government compared with mainland China. As such, the operation and lobbying activities of Hong Kong’s interest groups are protected by the HKSAR’s legal and political framework under the “one country, two systems” principle. If interest groups can operate relatively autonomously from the influence of the government of Hong Kong, unlike their counterparts in the PRC where interest groups are required to observe political correctness, their activities are arguably indispensable in sustaining a relatively pluralistic polity of the HKSAR. One cannot expect that interest groups in the HKSAR have any demonstration effects on the mainland in the short run, but in the event of the PRC’s liberalization and democratization, interest groups in Hong Kong would perhaps provide lessons to be learnt by some mainland Chinese groups. Second, as the HKSAR capitalist city-­state persists, it has systemic bias in favor of the interests of the rich and the powerful, or the capitalist class. From a Marxist perspective, the Hong Kong city-­state is structurally biased in favor of the rich landlord and capitalist class, whereas the working-­class interests are bound to be put on the backburner. If the Marxist vantage point does shed some light on the reality of interest groups in Hong Kong, then the role of the business and working-­class groups deserve our close attention. The powerful landlord class can form business groups with extensive influence on government policy, whereas the working-­class groups are perhaps destined to be relatively less influential and powerful. Third, if the HKSAR is marked by the persistence of some degree of civil liberties, especially the freedom of assembly and of expression, then those activities of interest groups that oppose government policies are politically significant. For example, interest groups formed by teachers, lawyers, journalists and religious priests may resist unpopular government policies that they see as undermining their perceived societal interests. On the other hand, ironically, some of them may support the government for the sake of protecting their interests. Those pro-­government and pro-­Beijing groups tend to support the policies of the HKSAR government, but the relatively liberal-­minded and pro-­democracy groups tend to be more critical of the HKSAR administration. Fourth, from a comparative perspective, students have traditionally played a critical role in initiating, reviving and sustaining the momentum of the democracy movement in many parts of the world. Arguably, Hong Kong is no exception to this rule. More importantly, the rise of localist or nativist student groups has become the most important factor shaping a new democracy movement in the HKSAR. Students tend to be politically idealistic, harboring their own version of democracy especially in a society and polity that are undemocratic or authoritarian. The case of Hong Kong deserves our attention as the HKSAR government has, since July 1, 1997, been politically sandwiched between the

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   7 central government in Beijing and the interest groups that are composed of a variety of citizens, ranging from professionals to students, and from the capitalist class to the working-­class members. Under these circumstances those policies of the HKSAR government that need the support of Beijing, such as political reform and the National Education policy, are bound to be highly sensitive, triggering relatively swift and strong reactions to societal interest groups. Fifth, interest groups are reflective of the strength of a civil society and, as such, their activities illustrate the state-­society interactions. A strong and authoritarian state, as with the PRC, can clamp down on interest groups activities and maintain a relatively compliant or obedient civil society. A relatively liberal state may, however, tolerate those interest groups’ activities that are politically defiant and incorrect. Under the sovereignty of the PRC, where the state is comparatively more authoritarian and less liberal than the HKSAR city-­state, the study of Hong Kong’s interest groups is obviously a significant academic endeavor. It also demonstrates the degree of political tolerance on the part of the HKSAR government toward all sorts of interest groups in the territory. Sixth, in the era of globalization, interest groups’ activities can be cross-­ boundary or cross-­border in their nature, advocating political change not only in one territory but also in its neighbors. The case of Hong Kong is a good example in illustrating this phenomenon. Some political interest groups in the HKSAR are not only fighting for democratization in the territory, but also calling for democratic change in mainland China. These pro-­democracy groups are actually advocating issues that can easily alienate the PRC regime. Their persistence in the HKSAR is practically important, reflecting not just the tolerance of the local government but also testing the bottom line of the PRC regime. Seventh, another dimension of globalization is the popular use of the Internet in the activities of interest groups, which can use mobile phones, Internet radios and digital means to publicize their issues, to mobilize public participation, and to fight against democracy. The case of Hong Kong can illustrate how interest groups have been making use of technology in the new era of globalization in promoting democracy in both the HKSAR and mainland China. In short, from a comparative perspective of studying Hong Kong politics and also reflecting the mainland Chinese political arena, this book can and will help us shed light on at least seven dimensions in the role of interest groups in promoting the democracy movement: (1) the relatively pluralistic society and politics of Hong Kong versus mainland China; (2) the structural political bias of the HKSAR’s capitalist city-­state; (3) the persistence of civil liberties for the operation of both pro-­democracy and pro-­government interest groups; (4) the traditionally significant role of students in sustaining and rejuvenating the democracy movement; (5) the interactions between the post-­colonial state and society; (6) the cross-­border nature and implications of the demands and activities of some political interest groups; and (7) the utilization of technology by interest groups in their activities during the era of globalization. All these dimensions in the interplay between interest groups and the democracy movement will be seen in the following chapters.

8   S. S.-H. Lo

Chapter organization and arguments Chapter 2, by Steven Hung, will examine the evolution of interest groups in Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese rule. He adopts a historical perspective in arguing that corporatism was the most important strategy of the British colonial government in ruling Hong Kong before July 1, 1997, and that corporatism co-­opted different interest groups into the policy-­making and consultative processes. The objective was to share political power with some selected elites and groups to govern the colony. On the other hand, however, interest groups played their political roles prominently in Hong Kong’s political history, such as the strike against the French invasion of China in 1884, the support of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 and the participation in the General Strike in 1925. After the Second World War, Hong Kong saw new challenges; various interest groups were formed to represent and articulate different interests for the residents of Hong Kong, ranging from the business to labor, from teachers to lawyers, and from professionals to fishermen. Democratization was gradually accepted in the society from the 1980s to the 1990s as an inevitable process in dealing with the problem of Hong Kong’s future after 1997. Since July 1, 1997, democratization has remained the most important agenda for the social and democracy movements in Hong Kong. It has stimulated the political participation of various interest groups. In short, interest groups had long existed in Hong Kong under British rule, but some of them, such as the business ones, were co-­opted into the colonial political institutions, while other excluded groups used other methods of interest articulation, such as strikes, to oppose the colonial government. As a matter of fact, this pattern of politically co-­opting some interest groups while excluding others has remained a continuity in the politics of Hong Kong. Chapter 3, by Karen Lee, focuses on the role of lawyers as an interest group in the HKSAR. She contends that lawyers function as both private and public interest groups as they have a shared professional background but varying political ideologies. Hong Kong’s divided legal profession sees barristers and solicitors as respectively two distinct groups vying for status and privileges on the one hand, and collectively as “public’s spokespersons” on the other. The former British colony’s retrocession to Chinese rule in 1997 and its stalled democratization – despite being promised under the Basic Law – heightened lawyers’ roles and consciousness as the defender of the rule of law while also exposed their conflicting visions. Some of the lawyers are politically liberal and advocate democratic change in Hong Kong, while others are politically conservative and side with the PRC government. The politically liberal and pro-­democracy lawyers have seen Beijing as intervening excessively in HKSAR affairs, encroaching on the “one country, two systems.” They have resorted to peaceful protests and silent marches to express their anger at the perceived Beijing interference with Hong Kong affairs. They also join the democracy movement to fight for democratic change and maintain the rule of law in the HKSAR. On the other hand, a pragmatic fragmentation of the lawyers who are pro-­government and

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   9 pro-­Beijing can be seen, illustrating the profound division in the legal profession in Hong Kong. Chapter 4, by Kenneth Ming, shows that political fragmentation can also be seen among journalists. However, he argues that journalists as interest groups play an important role in shaping the democratic movement in Hong Kong regardless of their different political stances, ranging from pro-­democracy to pro-­Beijing. There are two major journalists interest groups in Hong Kong, namely the Hong Kong Journalists Association and the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists. They have been trying hard to safeguard the freedom of expression and the press freedom in Hong Kong by participating in various political activities, such as lobbying the government, and submitting proposals and reports on government policies. Still, political intervention in the media industry has been growing since the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty on July 1, 1997. With the clash of ideologies between mainland China’s propaganda journalism and Hong Kong’s liberal journalism, journalists in Hong Kong are yielding to the political pressure from the CCP, as Ming argues. Yet, the utilization of cyberspace journalism has become the last resort through which some journalists are determined to retain and even augment their political space. At the same time, the watchdog journalism of some pro-­Beijing journalists is also essential to sustaining the momentum of the democracy movement in Hong Kong since it has continued to arouse public awareness of the abuse of power by politicians and officials in Hong Kong’s political institutions. As such, journalists from varying interest groups continue to contribute to the democracy movement in different ways. Chapter 5, by Steven Hung, contends that the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (PTU) is the most important societal and political interest group in Hong Kong. It was established in 1973, first fighting for the interests of the teaching profession, and then participating in the social and democracy movement in Hong Kong. The PTU has also been enhancing the protection of public interests and advocating democratic change, particularly from the political transition of Hong Kong from the British in the 1980s to the period beyond the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China on July 1, 1997. Hung argues that the PTU was under the political pressure of being attacked, infiltrated, subverted, divided and dissolved, but it has been adapting to the changing circumstances resiliently and solved various problems through internal democratization of its organization. All members of the PTU can monitor the operation of the executive committee without arousing controversies while consolidating the union’s unity and perfecting its operation. Arguably, the PTU stands out as the most successful and most adaptive pro-­democracy interest group in the HKSAR. If teachers are imbued with the ideals of fighting for a just and fair society and a democratic political system, their political conscience and persistence are of primary significance in Hong Kong’s democracy movement. Chapter 6, by Jeff Loo, highlights the argument that the working class in Hong Kong remains politically fragmented and relatively powerless. Still,

10   S. S.-H. Lo workers as interest groups play a significant role in the democracy movement of Hong Kong because they are determined to fight for their interests in a highly capitalistic system. In pre-­1997 period, the emergence of working-­class unions brought about a political culture supportive of workers’ interests. However, the working-­class interest groups remain politically fragmented with different interests and concerns, ranging from pro-­democracy to pro-­government and pro-­ Beijing, thus weakening their ability to negotiate with the business sector. Above all, the capitalist class has penetrated deeply into the political institutions of Hong Kong, including the advisory bodies, consultative committees, legislature and the top policy-­making Executive Council. According to Loo, some pro-­government and pro-­Beijing working-­class representatives have been simultaneously politically co-­opted and have become the labor aristocrats supportive of the government rather than fighting for the interests of the working class. Under these circumstances, government policies have been formulated and implemented necessarily more in favor of the interests of the capitalist class, including the abolition of the collective bargaining law, and the delay in the formulation and implementation of the minimum wage and standard working hours. As long as Hong Kong remains a capitalistic city-­state dominated by the capitalist class in various political institutions, the working-­class movement is bound to be relatively powerless, especially as the labor unions are politically and ideologically fragmented. Still, their ideals of fighting for economic and social equity in a capitalist polity will continue to sustain the democracy movement of Hong Kong. Chapter 7, by Minxing Zhao, argues that business interest groups are bound to be anti-­democratic, and that there are strong grounds for believing why they are politically conservative. In Hong Kong’s transition to democracy, business interest groups neither have strong incentives to democratize from above nor are forced to democratize by democracy from below. Three factors explain why they do not support Western-­style liberal democracy in Hong Kong. First, business interest groups enjoy privileged position under the current “indigenous democracy” in which there are rule of law, civil liberties and checks and balances from the media and judiciary against the government. As such, the business class interests are protected and it does not have strong incentives to bring about democracy in Hong Kong. Second, business interest groups are not forced to democratize the HKSAR by fighting for democracy from below. Third, Beijing’s mainland–Hong Kong economic integration strategy hinders Hong Kong’s democratization. Economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China has made the business groups attach even more importance to their mainland market and business interests. Taken together, if the current “indigenous democracy” is beneficial to the protection of the interests of business interest groups, they must try their best to maintain the status quo under the circumstances of both having little incentives to trigger democratic reforms from below and having strong economic support from Beijing. The delay in postponing the progress of political reform in the HKSAR can therefore be seen as partly an outcome of business opposition to the democracy movement, and the

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   11 phenomenon that business interest groups do not and will not support Western­style liberal democracy in the HKSAR. Chapter 8, by Beatrice Leung, argues that the Catholic Church is undemocratic in nature, but it needs a democratically political environment for its operation and evangelization. The Hong Kong Catholic Church was influenced by the Liberation Theology and the Christian social teaching advocated by the Second Vatican Council (1963–1965). It first learned about the need to advocate social justice in the late colonial period of Hong Kong, then later in the transitional period leading up to Chinese rule. During this political transition from 1984 to 1997, Hong Kong Catholics participated in the democratization movement as a means to protect itself and religious freedom. Since 1997, the Hong Kong Catholic Church has been intensifying its democracy movement under the charismatic leadership of Joseph, Cardinal Zen. The participation of Hong Kong Catholics in democratization is closely related to the Holy See’s relations with China. The outspoken Cardinal Zen was replaced in 2009 by the soft-­spoken Cardinal Tong to lead the Hong Kong Catholics. The relatively short reign of Zen from 2003 to 2009 appeared as a bright comet in the dark sky to show the way, but the Hong Kong Catholics will have a long way to tread in the future, according to Leung. Chapter 9, by Stephan Ortmann, argues that the emergence of nativist groups in the HKSAR has promoted the political separation of Hong Kong from the Chinese mainland, either by asserting full autonomy, declaring independence, or even returning to British control. By revisiting the relationship between democracy and nationalism, as Ortmann contends, it is possible to determine that the main reason for the rise of this aspiring interest group in Hong Kong politics is the failure to find a broad-­based compromise on universal suffrage. The history of the former British colony had seen the development of a strong civic identity which sees democratic values as an essential component. This stands in contrast to China’s ethnically-­centered nation-­state that must be ruled by the CCP. According to Ortmann, the rise of the Hong Kong national sentiment demonstrates a failure to instill this uncritical Chinese identity. In terms of politics, while nativists have made gains in the 2016 legislative elections, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments sought to curtail the movement’s development but any repression of the still highly fragmented and leaderless movement could galvanize it further, allowing it to transform into a serious interest group that opposes the current political situation. Chapter 10, by Eric Chong, analyzes student and youth activism by using the examples of anti-­National Education policy in 2012, the Occupy Central Movement in 2014, and the rise of localist interest groups in 2015 and 2016. Many new youth groups have challenged the governance of the HKSAR. Student and youth movements target public policies, constitutional reform, the protection of local interests, and the political directions and future of Hong Kong. This rising tide of youth activism has been led by student and youth groups which have at least two prominent characteristics, notably the popular use of the social media in mobilization over political issues and their very strong

12   S. S.-H. Lo local identity. In 2011, the formation of a new youth group of Scholarism led by Joshua Wong caught the media’s attention. Together with the Hong Kong Federation of Students, Scholarism successfully forced a withdrawal of the government’s moral and National Education curriculum policy in September 2012. The Occupy Central Movement from September to December 2014 further witnessed the mobilization of both Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students through the use of social media. A rising force of localist interest groups and even a few pro-­independence groups exerted tremendous pressures on the HKSAR government, challenging its legitimacy and governance. This phenomenon suddenly changed the political landscape of Hong Kong until November 2016, when the PRC’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress took drastic action to give a more detailed interpretation of the Basic Law provision governing the oath-­taking behavior of legislators. The interpretation was made in response to the provocative action of two young legislators-­elect, Yau Wai-­ching and Baggio Leung, but later the local court disqualified them from being LegCo members on the basis of the Standing Committee’s interpretation of the Basic Law. The localist movement was temporarily terminated by the strong legal action from the central government in Beijing. Chapter 11, by Dennis Hui, analyzes Hong Kong’s environmental governance and the growth of environmental movement. He argues that environmental governance in Hong Kong is characterized by its utilitarian nature and that it has sought to sustain socio-­political stability through the institutional absorption of environmental activists and groups. However, such “residual governance” has brought about its crisis since 1990s when the growth of environmental groups and movement stimulated an increase in public awareness to environmental issues, the assertiveness of civil society, and the successful use of the confrontational tactics in affecting environmental policy-­making processes. In fact, some environmental activists even resorted to using the legal means to challenge the legality of the government’s environmental policies. Hui studies the “radicalization of environmental movement” through an in-­depth examination of the establishment and activities of a new environmental interest group, namely the Land Justice League. He contends that the increasing use of populist and insurgent practices in environmental movement has not only heralded a new episode of local environmental politics, but also presented challenges to the existing approach to handling the political opposition in environmental affairs. Chapter 11, by Sonny Lo, examines the role of a political interest group, namely the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM), in promoting democratization in both Hong Kong and mainland China. Since 1989, the Alliance has been organizing annual activities with cross-­border political implications for the PRC. The Alliance’s existence and persistence in promoting democratic change in both Hong Kong and China remains a crucial factor shaping the democracy movement in the HKSAR, where the “one country, two systems” principle means that Beijing and the Hong Kong government have to tolerate its activities. The late Szeto Wah’s determination of democratizing the Alliance’s internal operation and elections, his appreciation of

The new democracy movement in Hong Kong   13 the work of volunteers, and his insistence to fight for the ideals of building up a democratic and free China that respects human rights and the rule of law have profound impacts on the Alliance’s continual operation in the coming years. Chapter 13 concludes this book by examining the prospects for interest groups and the new democracy movement, and their implications for democratization in Hong Kong’s giant neighbor and motherland, the PRC.

Notes   1 For the concept of interest groups, see Michael G. Roskin, Robert L. Cord, James A. Medeiros, and Walter S. Jones, Political Science: An Introduction (New York: Longman, 2012), p. 177.   2 Antonio Gramsci, “Prison Notebooks,” in Roger S. Gottlieb, ed., An Anthology of Western Marxism: From Lukacs and Gramsci to Socialist-­Feminism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 113–114.   3 Ibid., p. 114.   4 Ibid., p. 116.   5 Ibid., p. 118.   6 Ibid., p. 118.   7 Miguel Angel Herrera-­Zgaib, “The Public Intellectual in Critical Marxism: From the Organic Intellectual to the General Intellect,” Pap. Polit. Bogota (Colombia), vol. 14, no.  1 (2009), p.  145, available online at www.scielo.org.co/pdf/papel/v14n1/ v14n1a07.pdf, access date: February 2, 2017.   8 Ibid., pp. 147–148.   9 Ibid., p. 148. 10 Ibid., p. 157. 11 Maria Laura Bettencourt Pires, “Public Intellectuals: Past, Present and Future,” Communicacao & Cultura, no. 7 (2009), p. 116. 12 Ibid., p. 123. 13 Ibid., p. 124. 14 Ibid., p. 128. 15 Marc Lamont Hill, “Beyond ‘Talking Out of the School’: Educational Researchers as Public Intellectuals,” International Journal of Research & Method in Education, vol. 35, no. 2 (July 2012), pp. 153–169. 16 Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones, Political Science: An Introduction, pp. 187–189. 17 Ibid., p. 178. 18 Ibid., p. 178. 19 Ibid., p. 179. 20 For example, see Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones, Political Science: An Introduction. Also see, for example, James N. Danziger, Understanding the Political World: A Comparative Introduction to Political Science (New York: Pearson Education, 2009).

2 Interest groups and the democracy movement in Hong Kong A historical perspective Steven Chung-Fun Hung

Introduction The significance of Hong Kong civil society has long been overlooked in our study of the territory’s democracy movement, not to mention the central role of interest groups. It is necessary to revisit and reinterpret Hong Kong’s political history and combine the role of interest groups with the movement in support of democracy. Interest groups in Hong Kong have been traditionally misunderstood as being instrumental and utilitarian in protecting their own parochial interests. This chapter will argue that interest groups in Hong Kong have traditionally been fighting for democracy in the territory from the colonial to the post-­1997 era, and that although many interest groups are co-­opted through the mechanism of corporatism, they have been playing a critical role in making the civil society assertive vis-­à-vis the government of Hong Kong from the British era to the post-­colonial period.

Interest groups, corporatism and civil society Interest groups are commonly referred to as organized bodies of individuals with shared objectives, interests and with a common purpose of influencing the public policies of government. They promote their causes and embrace business corporations, charitable organizations, civil rights groups, neighborhood associations, trade unions, religious organizations, and kinship groups. They have been operating in Hong Kong for more than 100 years. After the sovereignty of Hong Kong was discussed between Britain and China from 1982 to 1984, many political interest groups emerged for the sake of promoting human rights and democratic development. Interest groups constitute an important channel for citizens to organize themselves and mobilize like-­minded individuals to participate in various activities. Ideally, they try to ensure that the views of a wide range of citizens are considered by governments in the Western democracies. Some interest groups are, however, not well organized and for those which can exert pressure on governments, they may not represent the views of all citizens. Furthermore, in many

Interest groups and the democracy movement   15 groups tensions may emerge between those members supportive of internal democratic operation and those preoccupied with the issue of professionalization. Interest groups can promote democratization in a civil society where liberties, including the freedom of association, of speech and of assembly, exist. Hence, interest groups can thrive under a liberal society. Without civil liberties, interest groups can become the tool of the government to control the society, especially in authoritarian regimes where groups are usually seen as politically autonomous and “subversive.” Civil society in Western democracies can protect the freedom of assembly, while an independent judiciary can ensure that citizens can form their groups freely to articulate their interests. In authoritarian regimes, however, interest groups are usually under the control of the government, especially labor unions, non-­governmental groups and religious organizations. Any decline in citizen enthusiasm to participate in politics is a challenge to the growth of civil society. Such enthusiasm is shaped by mass political culture. If citizens are politically apathetic, they naturally do not wish to participate in politics. Moreover, if citizens distrust political leaders and elites, public mistrust can also dampen mass participation. In Hong Kong under British rule, the mass political culture was by no means active, but political instability and disorder were rare in the colony except for the 1967–1968 riots. The political transition of Hong Kong from 1982–1984, when China and Britain discussed the colony’s future, to July 1, 1997 stimulated the members of the public to participate in politics, as the principle of “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” would be practiced after Hong Kong’s sovereignty were to revert to its motherland. Since 1997 controversial government policies and problematic governance in the HKSAR have combined as powerful drivers that stimulate citizen participation in politics. In turn, civil society has become even more assertive vis-­à-vis the government since the 1980s, and particularly after 1997. HKSAR civil society is composed of not only interest groups but it is also stimulated by globalization in which the popular use of the Internet has made communications between groups much easier and mobilization among them much faster than ever before. Universal values such as social justice and democracy, no matter how these two concepts are defined, have been providing the impetus for many Hong Kong people to ponder how they can change their society and political system in a much fairer and better manner. As such, the 2014 Occupy Central Movement represented a new democracy movement in the HKSAR because its leaders, supporters and participants strongly believe in a “just” political system with mass participation to select the Chief Executive in 2017. Although the movement failed and terminated in December 2014, it signaled an apex in the growth of civil society in Hong Kong. In view of the rising civil society, both the colonial and post-­1997 governments adopted the strategy of corporatism to co-­opt interest groups into the political system. As a concept utilized by political scientists who are interested in the study of structural functionalism, corporatism can be defined as a sort of triple economic alliance involving negotiations among business, labor and the

16   S. C.-F. Hung state-­sponsored interest groups to formulate economic policy measures. This chapter will review the interrelationships between interest groups, corporatism and the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Writing the history of Hong Kong raises the problem of a “proper” perspective because historians may err on the side of “political correctness.”1 The historical method comprises the need for scholars to study, describe and interpret past events in a relatively objective manner. It is easy for the supporters of British colonialism to stress local people’s contributions to Hong Kong.2 For our deeper understanding of interest groups in Hong Kong’s history the element of ethnic diversity has to be considered, especially as the HKSAR is witnessing many members of ethnic minorities whose families are rooted in the territory. The civil society is composed of various interest groups, ranging from local Chinese to non-­Chinese. Detailed description is essential and fundamental if we wish to reconstruct history in all its complexities.3 To have a full understanding and interpretation of the development of civil society and interest groups of Hong Kong, the history of Hong Kong is examined in the sections below.

The Chinese community of pre-­war Hong Kong, 1841–1941 Hong Kong was a base for fishermen who chased shoals across the Pearl River Delta and for pirates who preyed on trading ships at this gateway to the province of Guangdong. This island became part of the expanding empire of Britain in January 1841 because of the Opium War. Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, mistakenly predicted that this barren island would never become prosperous, but foreign merchants were delighted to have a base where they could outfit vessels and store merchandise.4 The first interest groups formed in the early colonial days were instrumental or utilitarian. They included the neighborhood organizations, business groups and ethnic clans who helped to take care of their communal interests. But the most significant feature was that many of these groups were organized by the Hong Kong government for the sake of maintaining local public security and order. At this very early moment, the local Chinese people did not care for Chinese nationalism; most of them were single men or the workers who immigrated to Hong Kong. Hence, interest groups emerged with a view to protecting their parochial interests, while the colonial government saw them as allies to govern the territory smoothly. The British rulers delegated the power of governing Hong Kong to many local groups and organizations for the sake of managing district order and security. For example, they established temple committees for managing these properties, providing social services and organizing district security forces. Later these organizations got more powers in taking care of community affairs and regional trading. Economic interest groups emerged, representing various interests of local communities and they frequently raised issues and problems to protect their rights and interests. They began to practice their self-­governance at

Interest groups and the democracy movement   17 the district level. At the same time, business and commercial groups were established, being the collaborative partners with the Hong Kong government, acquiring protection from the colonial rulers and getting advantages for their professional sectors. The establishment of the District Watch Force in 1866 further signified the power delegated by the colonial office to the local Chinese elites for the management of public order at district levels. The Force was later expanded to assist the registry work of the Chinese affairs department. Other business and commercial elites were appointed to be the managers of the Tung Wah Hospital and the Po Leung Kuk, which were charity organizations established at the grassroots level to help the poor and the needy, to prevent women and children from abduction and trafficking, and to contribute to the work of conducting population survey and census in 1880. Moreover, the District Watch Force’s power were expanded for the registry works of Chinese affairs. The Legislative Council (LegCo) was established much earlier and the Sanitary Board was founded in 1883. Both had Chinese members appointed by the Governor in the 1880s. Nevertheless, the desire of the local Chinese for more political power might have jeopardized the British governance. Therefore, political power was maintained at preventable boundaries out of the easy reach of the local Chinese elites and masses. Political participation had to be controlled by the colonial rulers so that it could not undermine its legitimacy and governance. The General Strike took place in the very early colonial period when the British Hong Kong government intended to register residents and exact levies on them through the introduction of poll tax. These attempts caused some 3,000 people to leave Hong Kong when Hong Kong did not have more than 20,000 people in 1844. Later, there were protests from the cargo-­boat people in 1862 and rickshaw pullers5 in 1863 because of the government’s enforcement of regulations for licensing cargo boats and public vehicles respectively. In addition, cargo workers took industrial action against the Licensing and Tax of Workers’ Common Lodging Houses in 1872. Once more, it was the resistance activity from interest groups against the governmental enforcement of the by-­law of the Sanitary Board to regulate the workers’ common lodging houses in 1895. During the conflicts between Canton and Britain in 1857, the General Strike meant some 20,000 people left the colony for Canton permanently. The boycott by some Hong Kong people of providing services for the French was a strike against France’s military expedition to China in 1884. These actions signaled the rise of Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong against imperialism. During the Boxer Movement in China in 1900, secret societies emerged throughout the country, including Hong Kong, to combat the superior forces from foreign countries. In fact, the Boxer rebellion was a grass-­roots action that sought to expel the influences of Western nations from China. Perhaps the most important interest group in Hong Kong that contributed to China’s political development was the interest group organized by the Chinese revolutionary father, Sun Yat-­sen, whose Tung Meng Hui was not only

18   S. C.-F. Hung aiming at overthrowing the Qing dynasty but also operating in Hong Kong under the British rule in a clandestine manner. Sun studied in Hong Kong and witnessed the strike against France by the local Chinese. The Hong Kong Branch of Hing Chong Hui (Revive China Society) was established in 1895, working for the Chinese revolution in Hong Kong. Many revolutionaries of the first generation joined the Hing Chong Hui. As a matter of fact, Hong Kong became the most important support base for the revolutionaries to operate, coordinate and orchestrate the revolution against the Qing government.6 The idea for the 1911 Chinese revolution was conceived in Hong Kong, which played a critical role in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Many Hong Kong Chinese elites were intimately involved with the revolution planned in Guangdong, leading to the anxieties of the British Hong Kong authorities over whether such revolutionary sentiment would spread among the ordinary Chinese residents. Another interest group that was influential in Hong Kong was the one organized by the workers. When the local Chinese people changed their jobs, some of them turned from peasants to workers, whose working conditions however were so undesirable that they frequently staged industrial actions. Many of them fought for an increase in their wages, such as the strike of mechanics in 1920 and the other by seamen in 1922. In the mainland, however, many workers were not so lucky as compared to their counterparts in Hong Kong, because many industrial strikes were frequently suppressed by the mainland militaries, especially during the warlord era when local-­level militaries arbitrarily exercised their power. As the conflicts occurring between mainland workers and the British force erupted in Shanghai in May 1925, some workers were killed and wounded. This information stirred up patriotic and nationalistic sentiments in many Chinese cities, sparking demonstrations across China. The Hong Kong workers responded with protests by their labor organizations, making solemn demands to the colonial government. The prominent request of the Canton-­Hong Kong General Strike in 1925 was that the British authorities should ensure that local Chinese could enjoy the right of assembly and association, and the freedom of speech in Hong Kong. Additionally, civil rights were requested for the first time in Hong Kong’s history. By the end of June, the strike garnered the support of 250,000 people. The revolutionary government of Canton immediately took note of the British and French formal complaint and protest. Many Hong Kong workers continued their strike in solidarity, and actively participated in the struggle against imperialism. They were also opposing the warlords in the mainland and became a strong pillar of the revolutionary government in Canton. The Hong Kong government was unable to effectively handle the crisis and the strike deteriorated, thus quickly undermining the Hong Kong economy. The local Hong Kong elites had little choice but to organize themselves and maintain security personnel to maintain law and order. Workers as an interest group continued to exert pressure on the British colonial government in Hong Kong, forcing the employers to recognize their right to participate in the society.7 In the summer of 1926, the revolutionary government

Interest groups and the democracy movement   19 launched the northern expedition to eliminate the mainland warlords. In response, Hong Kong’s striking workers provided the revolutionary government with strong support, including transport teams, propaganda units and medical teams. With the imminent victory of the northern expedition, Hong Kong’s economy and society revived with the support of the colonial government’s leadership and the local Chinese elites’ collaboration. The Chinese middle schools and normal schools were established by various sectors of Hong Kong’s society in order to enhance the local identity and culture. Some local Chinese leaders were rewarded by the colonial government. A good example was Chow Shou-­son8 who was appointed as the first Chinese member of the Executive Council in 1926. As the Nationalist Party became the ruling government in China, the British Hong Kong administration was swift to maintain good relations with it, including the neighboring Canton government. Both the Nationalist government in China and the British Hong Kong administration had a common objective of preventing the rise of communism. Later, as the Japan imperial army invaded China, the Hong Kong Chinese population experienced a rapid re-­emergence of Chinese nationalism. When full-­scale war against the Japanese broke out in 1937, Hong Kong’s society and citizens supported the war of resistance and worked extremely hard to mount several fund-­raising campaigns. The Hong Kong Chinese Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution to set up a Hong Kong Chinese War Relief Association for the purpose of soliciting funds to help wounded soldiers and war refugees in China.9 Interest groups in Hong Kong transformed themselves into nationalist organizations supportive of China’s war against the Japanese intruders.

From apolitical society to Hong Kong identity formation, 1945–1981 After the Second World War, the supporters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT or the Nationalist Party) were antagonistic in Hong Kong, where politics became highly sensitive and where many Hong Kong people shunned politics. The post-­war euphoria was subdued by the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The living conditions in Hong Kong were difficult and many Hong Kong people struggled for their survival. They tried to avoid politics, saw it as partisan struggles and therefore preferred to adopt the refugee mentality, namely seeing Hong Kong as a lifeboat and avoiding rocking it. The two political camps were politicized, however, including the propaganda and the activities of the CCP and the counter-­CCP actions from the KMT in the 1950s. The 1956 rightist riots10 and 1967 leftist riots were highly political, with the former instigated by the KMT supporters and the latter stirred up by the CCP activists. Both riots were suppressed by the British colonial government which had to maintain a delicate balance between the two hostile political forces. While interest groups persisted in Hong Kong during the 1950s and 1960s, they were easily immersed in the factional struggles between the CCP and the KMT.

20   S. C.-F. Hung As a matter of fact, the Urban Council was reformed and the reform facilitated some degree of political participation. The Civic Association and the Reform Club were the two political interest groups formed in the post-­war era to participate in municipal elections. They insisted that constitutional reform in Hong Kong should be implemented, and that universal suffrage should be achieved in the 1950s – a very pro-­democratic position for the two political interest groups at that time. But the British did not respond positively for fear that electoral politics would worsen the partisan struggles between the CCP and KMT. However, the Star Ferry fare increase in 1966 triggered citizens’ protests, showing that the legitimacy of the colonial government was at stake. The protests against the fare increase started as a peaceful demonstration by the youth, but later it resulted in a series of disturbances. The major reason was that the living and working conditions of the general population were quite poor in the 1960s, but the Hong Kong government was not sensitive enough to public sentiments at the grassroots level. Later, the pro-­CCP activists and interest groups triggered the 1967 riots. Conflicts broke out in a factory over wage disputes and the matter was mishandled by the Hong Kong government. Pro-­CCP and leftist unions resisted forcefully and protested against colonialism. Many youths were agitated and mobilized. By the time when the riots subsided at the end of the year, 51 people were killed, including the death of 15 of them in bomb attacks and the injury of 832 people. The aftermath of the 1967 riots was that the colonial government realized there was a huge communication gap with the ruled Chinese. Hence, it implemented reforms, such as the setting up of a new district scheme to listen to the wishes of ordinary citizens, the better delivery of services, and better labor regulations. Strictly speaking, the 1967 riots stimulated Hong Kong society and polity to change to a more localized manner. Moreover, the colonial administration allowed the local Chinese to develop a stronger sense of Hong Kong identity through the organization of the Hong Kong Festivals. A newly generated Hong Kong culture was produced locally and, in the 1970s and 1980s, Hong Kong’s cultural production began to be exported to the overseas Chinese market, including films, songs and other popular cultural products. From the 1970s to the 1990s, interest groups emerged rapidly to promote social, cultural and political changes. The 1970s saw a period of great public activism and optimism for change.11 Yet, such activism among interest groups could be seen as a nascent civil society without democracy. The Yaumatei boat people launched a movement in 1971 to demand that the government should care for their interests, a move that spearheaded the founding of a new social and community organization, namely the Society of Community Organization (SOCO). SOCO later became an interest group championing the interests of the poor and the needy. At the same time, the Hong Kong Social Workers’ General Union was formed to replace a conservative social workers’ association and to lead an urban movement by active social workers. SOCO and Social Workers’ General Union attracted a lot of public intellectuals who were keen to fight for social justice in an emergent civil society. There followed a serious of

Interest groups and the democracy movement   21 memorable social activities, including the Defend Diaoyu Island movement, the Chinese language movement, and a campaign to call for the arrest and extradition of a corrupt official named Peter Godber. All these movements were successful in the sense that they aroused public consciousness and concerns about Hong Kong society. Another interest group emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, but it aroused the attention from the British colonial authorities who set up a secret committee to monitor the activities of pressure groups. The Hong Kong Observers12 organized middle-­class members, including those who were well educated and second-­generation British expatriates, to discuss and comment on current social and political issues from 1975 to 1983. It focused on a critique of the colonial governance and how Hong Kong could become more democratic. The group’s main concern in the 1980s was the Sino-­British negotiations over the sovereignty of Hong Kong. On December 12, 1980, an article written by Duncan Campbell in the British magazine, New Statesman, revealed that a secret Standing Committee on Pressure Groups (SCOPG) was set up by the Hong Kong government to infiltrate pressure groups and monitor their activities. Eleven groups were ranked in order of nuisance value and on top of the list was SOCO.13 The second on the blacklist was Hong Kong Observers.14 The two other major groups were the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union and the Hong Kong Federation of Students. Clearly, the British administration was apprehensive about the political role of interest groups. While Britain decolonized and democratized its former colonies by the late 1960s, Hong Kong remained an exception to this rule even up to the 1980s and 1990s.15 Hong Kong enjoyed a relatively high level of civil liberties but it did not really achieve democratization. The political structures remained colonial, with a governor being appointed by the British monarch, and with a legislature lacking sufficient numbers of directly elected members. Interest groups that were active could influence the colonial administration, which however remained cautious in democratizing the polity for fear of antagonizing Hong Kong’s giant neighbor, China. The colonial administration also chose to respond to the demands of citizens and dissenters.16 In fact, the Hong Kong government gradually implemented a system of advisory bodies by integrating interest groups into the policy-­making process in the absence of democratic legitimacy. Corporatism was a means through which interest groups leader were appointed into these advisory committees, whereas social movement did not really pose a challenge to the legitimacy of the Hong Kong government.

Political transition, 1982–1997 In the early 1980s the territory and its business community grew concerned about the future of Hong Kong. The 1997 problem aroused great anxieties. During China and Britain’s negotiations over Hong Kong’s future, interest groups expressed their concerns and demands to both the British and Chinese governments. For instance, an interest group named the Hong Kong Federation of

22   S. C.-F. Hung ­ tudents declared the sovereignty of Hong Kong as not questionable and as being S part of China to end colonialism. The PRC government welcomed this declaration very much and the student organization protested against the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, at the Hong Kong airport by saying that she should terminate the colonial governance. The hope of many Hong Kong people at that time was to envisage a “democratic return of sovereignty,” meaning that they expected the Chinese leaders to keep their promises for Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy after the end of British rule, and that Hong Kong would become more politically democratic. Interestingly, the British government began to introduce grassroots level political reforms in the early 1980s. Many District Boards were established and Urban Council was reformed whose members were directly elected by popular votes. The British administration published in July 1984 a document named The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, including proposals aimed at developing a system of more localized and democratic government. At the same time, grassroots-­level interest groups emerged to fight for livelihood issues in Hong Kong. The People’s Council on Public Housing Policy was established and the housing movement was view as one of the major forces generating socio-­political changes and training young politicians and political leaders. Many key members of the Council were elected in the 1980s. But unfortunately, this process jeopardized the housing movement itself. The housing movement assumed a marginal role in the political arena after the democratization of the political system.17 The Council’s secretary, Frederick Fung Kin-­kee, was elected as an Urban Councilor and turned to be the political leader of the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood. Many members of the People’s Council on Public Housing Policy enjoyed double memberships as they were members of both the Council and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood simultaneously. Other pro-­democracy interest groups were also established in the 1980s. The so-­called “triad societies”18 were formed, but it did not refer to any criminal organization. Instead, the term was used to include the Hong Kong Affair Society, Meeting Point and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood. In fact, they were three quasi-­political parties as their interest was in electoral participation, apart from their position of supporting democratic political reform in Hong Kong. As the active political interest groups, many of their members were elected in district and municipal elections. The Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union in April 1986 stimulated the participation of many interest groups in Hong Kong as they were concerned about the possibility of another accident in the new Daya Bay nuclear power plant. Many pro-­democracy activists opposed the construction of the nuclear power plant, including legislators Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. A million people, or one fifth of Hong Kong’s population at the time, signed a petition opposing nuclear power plant, while over 100 community groups initiated discussions on the topic. They expressed their concern about environmental safety and the

Interest groups and the democracy movement   23 rights of Hong Kong residents. This event represented another civil society growth in which interest groups cooperated among themselves to oppose the Daya Bay nuclear power plant. The 1980s could be seen as the heyday of the emergence of interest groups in Hong Kong – a testimony to the growing civil society. In September 1986, a Joint Committee on the Promotion of a Democratic Government was established by the democrats, with Yeung Sum as the convener. He was also the chairman of the Meeting Point. The Committee demanded that the government should democratize the political system, care for the welfare of the lower class, and promote human rights.19 It organized various social movements and protests in support for a more rapid pace and larger scope of democratization.20 However, China began to oppose democratization for fear that Britain and the Hong Kong democrats might harbor sinister motive to entrench their political interests in Hong Kong well before July 1, 1997.21 Actually, Hong Kong’s civil society was still relatively weak until June 1989, when the mainland students’ pro-­democracy movement increased the political consciousness of many Hong Kong people. Many concerns groups were formed under this situation and later some of them were transformed to be local residents’ groups at the community level, fighting for Hong Kong’s democratization. After the establishment of Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, the first political party, namely the United Democrats of Hong Kong, was formed by pro-­democracy political leaders in Hong Kong. On the other hand, China’s policy of using the military to suppress the mainland pro-­democracy movement was condemned by international countries. China had little choice but to agree with the British insistence that the pace of democratic reform in Hong Kong could be accelerated by changing the original planned of allowing 10 seats of LegCo to be directly elected to the new pace of having 18 seats of the Council members to be directly elected in 1991. But only the United Democrats could get an upper hand in expanding its elected legislators. The democratic blocs won 16 seats out 18 directly elected seats of the 1991 LegCo elections and there were 12 seats belonging to the United Democrats. It succeeded in becoming an opposition force inside the LegCo, but the development of civil society suddenly halted as the focal attention was on the membership of and politics inside the legislature. Christopher Patten arrived in Hong Kong as the last colonial Governor on July 9, 1992. He announced plans for the 1994–1995 electoral arrangements in his inaugural policy address to the LegCo in October 1992, provoking severe criticisms from Beijing. The constitutional package triggered serious debates and discussion among all concerned political actors. Governor Patten succeeded in introducing a more democratic society to Hong Kong, although at the cost of his relationships with the Chinese leaders. The Sino-­British antagonism over Hong Kong’s political change was serious and strong actions could be seen in the use of protest notes, rejections, denials, public accusations, demands, the act of summoning ambassadors, the threats of serious consequences, and the application of limited boycott and propaganda.22 The pro-­Beijing local communities adopted an

24   S. C.-F. Hung uncooperative doctrine against government policies at the community levels. The pro-­democracy camp experienced the largest victory in the elections following Patten’s reform. District Board elections were held on September 18, 1994 under Patten’s reform package; the newly established Democratic Party won the largest block with 75 seats in 18 District Boards and it also captured 23 of the 59 seats in the municipal (the Urban Council and the Regional Council) elections on March 9, 1995. On September 17, 1995, the pro-­democracy camp won another landslide victory in the fully elected LegCo election. Yet, Patten’s reforms were short-­ lived as they allowed the PRC government to shape, control and recolonize aspects of Hong Kong’s polity immediately after July 1, 1997.23

Civil society growth, 1997–2017 After the establishment of the HKSAR of the PRC on July 1, 1997, the major public concern was not democracy. Citizens did not witness the deterioration of human rights and civil liberty immediately. In fact, the democratic progress was already planned by the enacted Basic Law from 1997 to at least 2004. With the onset of the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and early 1998, many Hong Kong people were deeply concerned about the economy and their livelihoods. However, some interest groups, including political ones and student unions, reacted strongly to the government policy of maintaining law and order, especially the enactment of the Public Order Ordinance in 1997 and the interpretation of the Basic Law in mid-­1999 over the right of abode of mainland Chinese in Hong Kong. Interest groups formed by lawyers expressed their concern about the rule of law and judicial independence in the HKSAR, while human rights groups were concerned about the freedom of associations and of press. Although the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong people were enshrined in the Basic Law, including those that they enjoy under the international covenants on human rights,24 the controversy over the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law stimulated many interest groups to oppose government policy. Article 23 requires the HKSAR government to enact legislation against subversion, sedition, treason and secession. However, the Hong Kong government mishandled the matter and it aroused severe public opposition on July 1, 2003, when half a million people took to the streets to demonstrate against the Tung Chee-­ hwa government. The saga marked one of the most dramatic events in Hong Kong’s political history.25 The aim of legislating on Article 23 in Hong Kong was actually also a move to protect China against any foreign intervention and to prevent the HKSAR government from having any express, actual and potential local opposition.26 An umbrella interest group named the Civil Human Rights Front was founded on September 13, 2002 to galvanize the support of other pro-­ democracy interest groups and oppose the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law. In mid-­2003, the Hong Kong society just survived from the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic and it simultaneously went through political turbulences over the national security law and the mass protests on July

Interest groups and the democracy movement   25 1. The mass protest on that day aimed at not only opposing the national security bill but also expressing deep dissatisfaction with the former Chief Executive Tung Chee-­hwa. The July 1 demonstrations were joined by people from all walks of life and Hong Kong was suddenly and highly politicalized. After the protest in July 2003, the Civil Human Rights Front started to diversify its mandate and to incorporate issues such as equal opportunities and police power. Although the political culture of Hong Kong has traditionally neglected citizen participation and emphasized the need to tackle individual problems through their own efforts,27 various types of interest groups emerged in the 2000s, attracting many young participants and increasingly the radical activists. Their concerns have recently become quite political. Some of them, especially the radical ones, have argued that the HKSAR’s misrule has led to strained state-­society relations, persistent confrontations between the rulers and the ruled, and the weakened capacity, legitimacy and governability of the Hong Kong administration. They argue that if the promise of electing the Chief Executive by universal suffrage was written into Article 45 of the Basic Law, then Beijing and the HKSAR government would have to deal with it effectively. In March 2007, the pan-­democrats published their own blueprint, the “mainstream transitional proposal” was drawn up with the support of 21 legislators in accordance with principles of equal and universal suffrage and of reflecting public opinion. Their push for democratization led to a decision from the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress, which ruled out the election of the Chief Executive in 2007 by universal suffrage; nevertheless, it said that the door for electing the Chief Executive through universal suffrage would still be opened in the years 2012 and 2017, while the selection of all legislators through direct election would still be theoretically possible by the year 2020. Indeed, there were no guarantee for all these possibilities to turn into realities.28 The pro-­democracy camp hoped that the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage would still be possible in 2012. As such, they came up with a plan of the “five constituencies referendum” by having five legislators resign and then triggering a by-­election in which all Hong Kong citizens would participate. Beijing believed that referendum was not legal in Hong Kong. Political parties such as the League of Social Democrats and Civic Party advocated the need to select the Chief Executive in 2017 by universal suffrage and called for an “uprising of the people,” but they alienated Beijing. Students from different local universities formed an interest group called Tertiary 2012, participated in the elections, and argued for the need to have the “referendum.” Their action was countered by the mobilization of pro-­government forces on the one hand, and by the disintegrated pro-­democracy camp that formed a new umbrella group, the Alliance for Universal Suffrage. The Alliance was a coalition formed by 11 pro-­democracy parties and groups. To break the political deadlock, the HKSAR government’s Chief Secretary, Henry Tang, unveiled a political reform in LegCo, saying that it tried to enhance the democratic elements of the LegCo elections in 2012. He urged

26   S. C.-F. Hung legislators to accept this “golden opportunity” because there was no room for further concessions. At this crucial stage, the Democratic Party counter-­ proposed that the five additional LegCo seats for the district council functional constituency should be directly elected by the proportional representation instead of a block voting system. Chief Executive Donald Tsang wrote a letter to the PRC leader Xi Jinping, and finally President Hu Jintao personally approved the revisions proposed for political reform for fear that any persistent deadlock would strengthen the radical pan-­democrats. As a result, the political impasse was broken on June 24 and 25, 2011, when the revised political reform package was approved in the LegCo with 46 votes and with the support from the Democratic Party. But the Civic Party, the League of Social Democrats, and one resigned member of Democratic Party opposed the revised reform package. Since then, the pan-­democratic front has been divided into a moderate wing led by the Democratic Party and a more radical faction led by the leaders of the League of Social Democrats.

The new democracy movement However, Hong Kong’s civil society continued to be more assertive than ever before. Many young people formed interest groups to oppose government policies, including a campaign to preserve the Queen’s Pier, the Lee Tung Street and the Choi Yuen village for the sake of protecting Hong Kong’s collective memories of its historical and cultural heritage from the onslaught of rapid urban and rural development. Meanwhile, the Guangzhou–Hong Kong high-­ speed rail aroused great controversies as the post-­80s generation of young people organized an Anti-­High Speed Rail Movement. The activists were political unknowns, but were determined to engage and educate the public over the issues of sustainable development, to mobilize supporters, and to promote democratic change in an innovative manner. Various types of civic groups emerged, attracting young participants and grassroots activists.29 Student mobilization became far more evident than before; they used mobile phones and the Internet to communicate with each other, discuss politics and criticize various government policies. Television talk shows had been conducted in Hong Kong for more than 20 years but radio stations on the Internet have initiated many political talk shows hosted by the younger generation since the 2000s to severely criticize the Hong Kong government. These Internet radio talk shows were later used as an instrument for young activists to mobilize supporters in political and social movement. Facebook pages have been extensively used; new groups have been formed, and websites have been used to post views critical of the government on all sorts of policy issues. The Internet helped rejuvenate and revive many interest groups and stimulated the further development of Hong Kong’s civil society. Moreover, the activists of the post-­80s generation launched a large-­scale campaign against the National Education policy proposed by the government in 2012. They denounced the new government policy as attempts at “brainwashing”

Interest groups and the democracy movement   27 students. The entire anti-­National Education movement was led by students, including Joshua Wong Chi-­fung who at that time was 15 years old and who later played a crucial role in the 2014 Occupy Central Movement. He and his supporters formed an interest group named Scholarism, working with parents, teachers, intellectuals and democrats to oppose the National Education policy. Protesters besieged the government headquarters for 10 days, enlisting the broad support from many members of the public, who took part in rallies voluntarily and orderly. These rallies represented Hong Kong’s civic quality on display, and Wong said that they also represented “the best civic education” the people of Hong Kong needed. He also vowed to pass the active civil society to another generation, an indication that the younger generation of Hong Kong remade and energized the civil society to an unprecedented level. Young political activists pushed the government of Hong Kong and also Beijing to democratize the local political system further by launching the Occupy Central Movement in September 2014. They argued for the need to have universal suffrage, a model selecting the Chief Executive but a move threatening the central government’s perception of its national security in the HKSAR. Leaders of the Occupy Central Movement, such as sociologist Chan Kin-­man, law professor Benny Tai and religious priest Chu Yiu-­ming argued that they would campaign for universal suffrage through peace, dialogue, deliberation, civil referendum and civil disobedience. They demanded that the government’s political reform proposal should satisfy “international standards” in relation to universal suffrage. This meant that any proposal would have to attach importance to the equal number of votes, equal weight for each vote and the absence of any unreasonable restrictions on the right of candidates to stand for elections. Of course, their demands were seen by Beijing as politically unacceptable, for the central government officials favored a model that would allow an election committee to screen out the candidates and then allow the citizens to elect one of the two to three politically “acceptable” candidates as the Chief Executive. This preferred model from Beijing was indeed rejected by local democrats. The Occupy Central Movement’s leaders commissioned the University of Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP) to conduct a poll on three proposals – all of which involved the need to allow citizens to directly nominate candidates. The poll was conducted in June 2014, when a total of 792,808 people, equivalent to a fifth of the registered electorate, took part in it by either voting online or going to designated polling stations. The proposal tabled by the Alliance for True Democracy, an interest group comprising 26 of the 27 pan-­democratic legislators, won the “referendum” by securing 331,427 votes, or 42.1 percent of the 787,767 valid ballots. A joint blueprint put forward by Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students came marginally second with 302,567 votes (38.4 percent), followed by a People Power’s proposal, which clinched 81,588 votes (10.4 percent). Moreover, 691,972 voters (87.8 percent) agreed that the LegCo should veto any reform proposal put forward by the government if it failed to meet international standards, compared with 7.5 percent who disagreed.

28   S. C.-F. Hung On the pro-­government side, the Alliance for Peace and Democracy was established in July 2014, and it was formerly named Protect-­Universal Suffrage and Anti-­Occupy Central Alliance. This pro-­Beijing political interest group included 40 interest groups and also many members of the pro-­CCP group, namely the Silent Majority for Hong Kong. These pro-­Beijing interest groups were backed by the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions and the New People’s Party. They received widespread media attention when a month-­long signature campaign for people who opposed to the Occupy Central Movement was launched, lasting from July 19 to August 17, 2014. The alliance of all these pro-­Beijing interest groups collected over a million signatures supporting the campaign, although questions were raised over the credibility of the number of signatures collected. The Alliance also organized a “march for peace” in August to undermine the Occupy Movement. On August 31, 2014, the tenth session of the Standing Committee in the twelfth National People’s Congress set the parameter for the 2016 Legislative Council election and 2017 Chief Executive election. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced an electoral framework in which Chief Executive candidates would need to obtain support from more than half of the members of the nomination committee to stand in the popular election. The decision also stated that for the 2017 Chief Executive election, a nominating committee, mirroring the present 1200-member Election Committee, would be formed to nominate two to three candidates, each of whom must receive the support of more than half of the members of the nominating committee. After the popular election of one of the nominated candidates, the Chief Executive-­elect would have to be appointed by the Central People’s Government. The process of forming the 2016 LegCo would be unchanged, but following the new process for the election of the Chief Executive, a new system to elect the LegCo through universal suffrage would be developed with Beijing’s approval. Because China was determined to tightly control the formation of the nomination committee, this framework would effectively allow Beijing to screen out candidates it disliked. The proponents of Occupy Central announced in response that the campaign would proceed in September 2014. Many student interest groups found the proposal too conservative. Two student groups, the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism, initiated a class boycott aimed at students at the 24 higher education institutions and hundreds of secondary schools in late September 2014. They objected to the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and emphasized the need for political accountability to citizens. Yet, the Occupy Central Movement lost its momentum and public support gradually, especially as many citizens witnessed the violent confrontations between police and protestors on the streets. Many students had to protect themselves from the pepper spray and batons used by the police. They used digital media to mobilize their supporters to protest against the government and Beijing, but finally their

Interest groups and the democracy movement   29 c­ ollective action ended in December 2014, when the leaders and core members of the movement surrendered themselves to the police. The Occupy Central Movement, albeit failed, represented a revival of a new civil society and the democracy movement in the HKSAR. It was constituted by a combination of urban physical space and cyberspace, and the participation of individuals was unprecedentedly spontaneous. The protests were initially organized and promoted by the Occupy Central Movement leaders who emphasized the importance of love and peace, but the unprecedented scale of demonstrators and multiple congregation locations soon changed the movement into a non-­ centralized and self-­managed horizontal structure. Many protest groups organized themselves in different protest sites, debating about politics, confronting the police in an imaginative and bold manner and stimulating the political consciousness of the new generation while upholding the core values of Hong Kong, notably the rule of law, tolerance of dissenting views and political pluralism. Public participation in the movement was self-­actualizing and expressive: occupiers grew vegetables and flowers, practiced public arts, erected the Lennon Wall with papers expressing individual demands and dreams for democracy, built temporary temples, churches, self-­study areas, and mobile classrooms, and set up resource sharing centers. The occupiers not only protested but also helped develop the occupied areas into a special lifeworld in accordance with their vision of creating an ideal community.30 Although the movement eventually failed, it triggered unprecedented international attention, awakened many Hong Kong people who were previously politically apathetic, and stimulated the participation of the young generation. Although critics labelled the movement activists as violators of the law, the entire civil disobedience movement did not bring about any death. From the perspective of reactivating the civil society and energizing interest groups, the Occupy Central Movement fully realized their potentiality to the fullest extent. In 2015, the government’s proposed political reform package was vetoed. The pro-­democracy legislators saw it as too conservative, whereas a number of pro-­government law-­makers were disorganized and failed to garner sufficient votes to get the proposal passed. Beijing was relaxed, however. It presented its model to the people of Hong Kong, but somehow many legislators rejected the package. The distrust between the HKSAR government and the pro-­democracy camp was exacerbated. Since the 2014 protests, the popularity of Leung Chun-­ying and his administration was plunged to a historically low point. Although Leung announced in December 2014 that he would not run for the 2017 Chief Executive, and although the pro-­Beijing candidate Carrie Lam eventually won the election on March 26, 2017, the prospects for democratic reform in the HKSAR remains uncertain, for trust-­building on all sides would have to be forged. Most significantly, after the Occupy Central Movement, the localist interest groups took a radical drift. New nativist groups, such as the Hong Kong Indigenous, were involved in violent clashes with the police over the anti-­parallel trading protests in the New Territories in 2015. All these clashes represented a

30   S. C.-F. Hung tension between the Hong Kong people who had strong local identity and those mainland tourists who were perceived as flooding into the HKSAR. The clashes between the localists and the police reached an apex on February 8, 2016, when a riot broke out in Mong Kok over a row about local hawkers. The localists were determined to preserve the hawking activities, but the government tried to remove the hawkers. The attack by some citizens on the police led to the arrests of some localists, who clearly violated the law by resorting to violence. After the riot, seven local university student unions issued statements condemning police action and declaring their support for those who took part in the protests in Mong Kok. Some localists went further, demanding Hong Kong’s “independence.” Needless to say, this position was unacceptable to Beijing. Although the localists did well in the 2016 LegCo election, two young localists who were elected to the legislature showed disrespect to the PRC during the oath-­taking ceremony in October, leading to the high-­handed measure from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in December to interpret the Basic Law on the need to behave properly during the oath-­taking ceremony. In response the Hong Kong government took legal action against the two young localists, Yau Wai-­ching and Baggio Leung Chung-­hang, who eventually were ruled by the court as taking the oath improperly and thus losing their directly elected seats in the LegCo. Yet, some localist groups and young people continue to harbor separatist sentiment. A survey conducted by a pro-­CCP organization, the Silent Majority for Hong Kong, found that the public support for Hong Kong’s “independence” even reached a historically high point of 23 percent of the respondents.31 The survey result was alarming. In the event that hard-­liner measures were adopted against the localists, their separatist sentiment appeared to be even stronger.

Conclusion Hong Kong has a long history of interest groups activism. During the British colonial rule, interest groups played a crucial role in both working with and checking the power of the government. In the 1980s, interest groups were even seen by the colonial administration as potentially subversive. The 1990s saw the emergence of more political interest groups in anticipation of the need for the people of Hong Kong to govern themselves after 1997. In the 2000s, however, the civil society went to a new stage as the cyberspace has been used creatively and innovatively by many young people, including the localists, to promote democracy, social justice and sustainable development. In the early period of British colonial rule, local Chinese ethnic groups and foreign religious organizations were the forerunners in providing services and representing local communities while the Hong Kong government was relegated to the backseat.32 The Chinese in Hong Kong were not conquered but they collaborated with the British and acquired this special status in facilitating their patriotic and nationalistic activities for China. The British rule left its mark on Hong Kong in a significant and sustainable way.33 Social movements are

Interest groups and the democracy movement   31 c­ ollective actions that challenge the authorities to address their demands.34 In Hong Kong from the British to the current Chinese rule, local interest groups have been playing a critical role to stimulate the growth of social movement. In fact, Hong Kong’s civil society has been active long before the term becomes popular among local citizens.35 The people of Hong Kong actually have a long-­ standing tradition of fighting for the values of civil society, especially social justice, democracy and human rights. From the 1990s to 2000s, this tradition remains at the heart of civil society and in the psyche of many interest groups. After the HKSAR government was established, the people of Hong Kong, together with many interest groups, have continued to be vigilant of any unpopular government and any misrule. Some interest groups, especially business and labor, have been co-­opted by the government through corporatism, but they continue to play a pivotal role in sustaining the momentum of the civil society and the new democracy movement. The Occupy Central Movement could be seen as a new democracy movement that used civil disobedience to oppose the government’s policy toward democratic reform in the HKSAR. Although it failed, the movement stimulated the growth of civil society and maximized the potentiality of many interest groups, especially localist ones, to the fullest extent. The challenge of the new democracy movement is how to deal with the Basic Law, whose interpretation lies with the central government in Beijing, especially the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Those mainland and Hong Kong experts who can interpret the Basic Law are not elected by the people of Hong Kong, but are appointed by the Chinese government. The protection of existing freedoms in the HKSAR is not easy and the advancement of political rights promised by the Basic Law has recorded no positive achievement.36 Democratization was halted in 2015. As Hong Kong was not, and is not, a Western-­style democratic society, the pro-­democracy movement and the coalitions of opposition parties are structurally constrained to push for democratization. After all, they may continue to squabble among themselves, leading to permanent fragmentation. Their challenge is how to maintain an assertive civil society vis-­à-vis the powerful motherland, China, whose veto power over Hong Kong’s democratic change remains dominant. Hong Kong remains capitalistic in ideology, but politically and hegemonically authoritarian. The emergence of diverse agendas of human rights, anti-­ discrimination, identity and community issues on a broader front is all connected with the struggle for democratic values. Regional conflicts became an anachronism.37 However, the regional conflicts in the HKSAR can be seen in the rapid rise of the localist interest groups and civil society vis-­à-vis not only the HKSAR regime but also the central government in Beijing. The HKSAR provides a battleground for the localists, whose values of human rights and democracy are of universal nature, to contest the political power of the ruling elite and dominant class in Hong Kong and also of the authoritarian PRC state. This political hegemony from both the Hong Kong capitalist regime and the PRC government presents a huge obstacle to the Hong Kong democracy movement in which the

32   S. C.-F. Hung resilience of the civil society and interest groups activism are of critical importance. The growth, adaptation and transformation of Hong Kong’s civil society are inexorable. It will continue to be active in mobilizing the ordinary people, to call for social consciousness and to influence public opinion. It also shapes the local identity in a unique manner. In the foreseeable future, interest groups in the HKSAR will likely play a pivotal role in stimulating the vibrancy of the civil society and the development of the new democracy movement. Their persistence will influence not only the democratization of the HKSAR but also the political attitudes and culture of the PRC elites responsible for Hong Kong matters.

Notes   1 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p. x.   2 Ibid.   3 Tsai Jung-­fang, Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842–1913. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 6.   4 Trea Wiltshire, Hong Kong: The Last Prize of Empire. Hong Kong: FormAsia Books Ltd, 2002, p. 5.   5 The rickshaw, as Westerners pronounce it, originated in Japan where it is known as jinrikisha – jin(man) riki (power) sha (carriage) (cited in http://industrialhistoryhk. org/hong-­kong-rickshaw-­design/).   6 Tsang, 2004, p. 77.   7 Linda Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong. London: Praeger Publishers, 1999, p. 52.   8 Chow was born in a village of Hong Kong. It was a walled village of a Chow lineage. His father was a compradore of the Canton-­based Canton and Hong Kong Steamship Company. His grandfather was the head of a village “Little Hong Kong” and he helped Charles Elliot post the first official proclamation of Hong Kong Island in 1841. Chow left China in 1874 and studied at Phillips Academy, Andover (class of 1880) and Columbia University, one of the members of the third group of Chinese students sponsored by the Qing government to the United States. After his graduation he worked for the Qing government. He left government service after the 1911 Revolution and became director of various companies and charities in Hong Kong.   9 K. C. Fok, Lectures on Hong Kong History: Hong Kong Role in Modern Chinese History. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press (Hong Kong) Ltd, 1990, pp. 118–137. 10 On the Double Tenth (the tenth October), some KMT sympathizers in Hong Kong hoisted the Chinese Nationalist flag on the resettlement blocks at Shek Kip Mei. A Housing Authority officer ordered the flags removed. This caused the Nationalist occupants of the new blocks to go on the rampage, attacking Communists and their sympathizers wherever they could find them. But a trivial incident could lead to 59 deaths and approximately 500 injuries. 11 Linda Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong. London: Praeger Publishers, 1999, p. 25. 12 Christine Loh and Anna Wu, as former members of Hong Kong Observers, played prominent roles in the Patten political reform package. Two appointed members of the Liberal Party resigned from Executive Councils as they did not accept the political reform package. Their positions were replaced by newly appointed Loh and Wu and the political reform package was marginally passed by the Legislative Council. And the Liberal Party’s amendment was defeated by 28 to 29 votes, a mere majority of one vote on 29 June 1994. In 2012, notable members of the group included Chief

Interest groups and the democracy movement   33 Executive Leung Chun-­ying. Christine Loh, the chair of the group, and Anna Wu were both picked up by Governor Chris Patten as the appointed member of the Legislative Council. Wu became a non-­official member in the Executive Council and Loh was appointed as undersecretary for Environment Bureau by Leung Chun-­ying in 2012. 13 Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p. 117. 14 Ibid. 15 Sing Ming. Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 35. 16 Pepper, 2008, pp. 158–159 17 Denny Ho Kwok-­leung. “The Rise and Fall of Community Mobilization: The Housing Movement in Hong Kong.” In Stephen Chiu Wing-­kai and Lui Tai-­lok (eds), The Dynamics and Social Movement in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000, p. 185. 18 It is, of course, not to mean that triad is one of many branches of Chinese transnational organized crime organizations. In Chinese term it is meant they were three organizations. 19 Sing, 2000, p. 25. 20 Ibid., p. 29. 21 Ibid., p. 23. 22 Jermain Lam, The Political Dynamics of Hong Kong Under Chinese Sovereignty. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2000, p. 17. 23 Lo Shiu hing, “An Analysis of Sino-­British Negotiations Over Hong Kong’s Political Reform.” In Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 16, no. 2, September 1994, pp. 178. 24 Margaret Ng, “Participation in the Legislative Council: Changes and Challenges.” In Cheng, Joseph Y. S. (ed.), New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, pp. 118. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p. 120. 27 Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014. 28 See www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JA11Ad01.html. 29 Cheng, 2014, pp. 21–22. 30 Lee Pui-­tak (ed.), Hong Kong Reintegration with China: Political, Cultural and Social Dimensions. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001, pp. 334–335. 31 It refers to their Facebook or website news: www.facebook.com/silentmajorityhk/ and https://hkgpao.com/articles/106138 32 Elaine Y. M. Chan, “Civil Society.” In Lam Wai Man, Percy Lui Luen-­tim and Wilson Wong (eds), Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics (expanded second edition). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012, pp. 181. 33 Tsang, 2004, p. ix. 34 Butenhoff, 1999, p. 5. 35 Elaine Y. M. Chan, “Civil Society.” In Lam Wai Man, Percy Lui Luen-­tim and Wilson Wong (eds), Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics (expanded second edition). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012, p. 181. 36 Ng, 2014, p. 123. 37 Steven Chung-­fun Hung, “Political Participation of Students in Hong Kong: A Historical Account of Transformation.” In Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, pp. 266.

3 Lawyers as an interest group in Hong Kong’s democracy movement1 Karen Man Yee Lee

Introduction Whose interests do lawyers represent? From a functionalist perspective, the law profession represents society’s collective conscience. The classic “lawyer-­ statesman” ideal sees lawyers straddle the realms of the masses and the rulers; they “belong to the people by birth and interest, and to the aristocracy by habit and taste.”2 Their knowledge and judicious temperament allow them to transcend class conflicts and to serve society through public office. On the other hand, lawyers are inherently conservative, they owe their livelihood to the “stability and legitimacy of a given institutional and legal framework.”3 Hence, one may see lawyers as a self-­serving monopoly that operates through social closure and market control. The above conjures up a mixed image of lawyers as the “people’s spokespersons”4 and their clients’ “hired guns.”5 For a highly commercialized society like Hong Kong, there has never been a shortage of corporate lawyers greasing the wheels of finance, but its transformation from a British colony to China’s Special Administrative Region (SAR) in 1997 has seen the legal complex – which includes predominately lawyers but also increasingly the legal academy – play a prominent role in shaping its democracy movement. The concept of the “legal complex” captures the dynamic of the legal profession and encompasses all legally trained professionals who practice law in different arenas, including judges, prosecutors, lawyers in private or public practice, as well as law academics.6 As this chapter will show, the latter group has emerged in recent years as a vital force for political liberalism in Hong Kong. Based on the idea that lawyers collectively may operate as both “private” and “public” interest groups,7 this chapter reviews the history of lawyers’ political activism in Hong Kong, and observes the ways in which they articulate their visions in changing circumstances. It concludes that Hong Kong’s constitutionalized politics after 1997 and Beijing’s perceived encroachment on “One Country, Two Systems” helped heighten the role of lawyers in its tortuous democratization process.

Lawyers as an interest group   35

Lawyers as an interest group Lawyers’ shared and divergent interests An interest group is “a shared-­attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups” in society, and can be classified as a public or private interest group depending on the agenda – altruistic or sectorial – that it pursues. It becomes a political interest group “[i]f and when it makes its claim through or upon any of the institutions of government.”8 On this basis, collectively lawyers constitute a “shared-­attitude” group based on their similar education and professional experiences. Their common interest in preserving the profession’s prestige renders them a “private interest group.” Some lawyers may function as “political interest groups” when their legal work involves, for example, defending fundamental liberties and challenging state power, as in the case of cause lawyers. In Hong Kong where the law profession is divided into the branches of barristers and solicitors, the picture becomes more complex and nuanced. Hong Kong barristers and solicitors belong to the Bar Association (the Bar) and the Law Society, respectively, which, apart from regulating professional conducts, also function as “associational interest groups.” Each represents its members’ interests with a full-­time administrative staff and articulated procedures in interest and demand formulations. Given their organizational structure and professional missions, “their tactics and goals are often recognized as legitimate” in society.9 Despite a shared professional background, the Bar and the Law Society have had a chequered history of unity and division. Their common interests in keeping English as the dominant legal language and limiting the size of the profession once united them in resisting the introduction of Chinese in courts and the admission of foreign lawyers to local practice in the 1980 and 1990s.10 Yet, they have sometimes acted as competing interest groups making claims upon each other. A source of discord has been the perennial “status disparity” between barristers and solicitors.11 First, barristers, which in Chinese reads “big lawyers” (da lv shi) as opposed to the latter “lawyers” (lv shi), have traditionally been seen as having a higher status. Second, in colonial Hong Kong, and for some years after its demise, only barristers could appear in court on a client’s behalf. Whilst solicitors finally won full rights of audience in 2010, the British legacy of allowing only barristers to acquire the prestigious – and lucrative – title of “Queen’s Counsel” (“Senior Counsel” after 1997) still divides the profession.12 In recent years, the two branches have begun to argue over who decides who could join the profession. In January 2016, the Law Society announced it would press ahead with a controversial plan to introduce a “common entrance examination” for solicitors in 2021. If implemented, it would allow the Law Society to oversee the admission process alone and replace the PCLL (Postgraduate Certificate in Laws) – an examination independently run by Hong Kong’s three law schools that all law graduates must pass in order to be admitted as barrister or solicitor. In opposing the unilateral move, the Bar expressed concerns over “potential conflict of interest” between the vested

36   K. M. Y. Lee interest of existing solicitors – who could influence the admission process – and those who aspire to join their ranks.13 The longstanding rivalry between the Bar and the Law Society, as seen in the above incidents, shows that, while collectively constituting an occupational group, barristers and solicitors possess distinct identities that set them apart, professionally and politically. In particular, their different political positioning has arguably earned them social capital from different segments in society that in turn reinforce their respective public images.14 It is this political dimension to which we now turn.

Lawyers and political activism While lawyers’ fondness for legality may make them an inherently conservative force, their adherence to due process, what Amer­ican jurist Judith Shklar called “legalism,”15 remains a thread that binds many lawyers to rally behind the idea of “political liberalism.” More than just a professional trait, legalism signifies an ethos that places rules at the center of the right–duty dichotomy. In a liberal polity, legalism is understood to be a distinct manifestation of liberalism, one that embodies rights and liberties sustained by a functioning legal system. Juridically trained and professionally socialized, lawyers are in general more receptive to a vision of political liberalism that embraces basic legal freedoms, a moderate state, and a free civil society.16 Their shared tradition in this liberal legalism means their professional associations are “peculiarly likely to operate both as interest groups and as political interest groups.”17 For an example, one need look no further than the Amer­ican Bar Association that, since its founding, has consistently stood up for fundamental rights. Yet, one may say it is wishful thinking that “lawyers as a group will, and should be expected to, campaign for positive change in society.”18 As the success of most lawyers is inevitably intertwined with that of their corporate clients, lawyers’ associations – which are never altruistic to start with – need to care for the economic prospects of the majority of their members. That helps explain why lawyers have not always been the most reform-­minded in society. In fact, Hong Kong lawyers have historically been part of the establishment. As the British base to trade with China and the world, Hong Kong embodied “the political supremacy of the British and the economic indispensability of the Chinese.”19 Law was initially a “facade” in a society bent on making money.20 A free market, however, demanded everyone to play by “a regime of rules,” leading to the indispensable role of lawyers in ensuring fair and proper transactions. At the same time, lawyers were crucial to a colonial administration designed to secure British interests. Therefore, from the very beginning, lawyers were part of both the official and private establishments; many of them straddled influentially the two spheres and once operated in both simultaneously.21 They were even seen to have acquiesced in oppressive early colonial rule. For example, a bread poisoning incident that struck the European community in January 1857 resulted in the enactment of the Peace Preservation Ordinance (PPO) that not only banned Chinese-­language government notices unless

Lawyers as an interest group   37 otherwise approved, but also authorized the detention and deportation of individuals who, while not charged, were deemed “dangerous to the peace and good order of the colony.”22 Yet, during the 1880s and Second World War, the legal profession generally sided with the status quo. It was organized labor and liberals within the establishment who stood up for the grassroots.23 The PPO led to a tide of legal activism from the 1950s onward.24 At the urging of liberal government lawyers and judges, a tribunal was set up in 1961 to rein in oppressive emergency measures. Yet, the governor’s refusal to accept its ruling to release six detainees saw a judge resign in 1965 in protest. In the late 1960s, a larger group of liberal lawyers, including factions of the Bar, the judiciary, and legal academia, finally allied with civil society groups to protest against the arbitrary law. The Bar, representing some 50 barristers at the time, openly denounced the government for violating international human rights standards. As an early sign of disunity between the two branches, the Law Society, with a membership of about 200 solicitors, distanced itself from the Bar, with some members openly deploring the Bar’s action. Claiming political neutrality, they argued that the emergency rules were a “political matter” in which the Law Society played no part.

The Bar Association and the Law Society: public interest or professional interest groups? The Bar and the Law Society have since positioned themselves differently in politics. The former has emerged as a defender of the rule of law and not shied away from criticizing even the Chinese government.25 For example, after the signing of the 1984 Sino-­British Joint Declaration (the Joint Declaration), an international treaty registered at the United Nations which formed the basis of Beijing’s rule over Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, the Bar closely monitored the drafting process of the Basic Law, the city’s future constitution. After the 4th June Tiananmen Square military crackdown in 1989 which shook the confidence of Hong Kong people nine years before the handover, the Bar played an active role in securing the passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991 – an important human rights legislation modelled on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as lobbying the British government to implement direct elections for 30 out of 60 seats in the legislature in 1991 and full democratization in 1995.26 As 1997 neared, the Bar remained highly critical of any act that it perceived to potentially threaten Hong Kong’s future rule of law. For example, after Beijing said it might not honor “contracts and agreements straddling 1997 without its prior approval,” the Bar warned that such a move would potentially violate the Basic Law.27 On the other hand, the Law Society appeared to have treaded cautiously over issues that concerned the authority of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Not only did it avoid taking a position on those transitional issues for fear of offending mainland authorities, but it also distanced itself from the Bar’s vocal stance and began to show a willingness to “accommodate” Beijing’s view,28 for example, in the

38   K. M. Y. Lee dispute over the composition of the future Court of Final Appeal (CFA) a few years before the handover.29 As this chapter will show, while the Bar has continued to position itself as a public interest group daring to take on the powers-­ that-be, the Law Society has carefully maintained its image as a “professional” group that focuses on legal technicalities. Associational groups, like the Bar and the Law Society, often articulate their interests through “regular and legal channels.”30 A common way in which lawyers’ associations articulate their interests, which also serves to inform society, is the release of public statements. As articulations of “an official discourse,” such statements are useful in first, shaping public opinion,31 and second, building an image that the professional groups want to impress upon society.32 That could be seen in the different reactions of the Bar and the Law Society to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s (NPCSC) first interpretation of the Basic Law in 1999. Facing the constitutional question whether mainland-­born children of Hong Kong residents should have the right of abode under the Basic Law, the CFA ruled in the claimants’ favor which potentially opened the door to a large number of mainland migrants (Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (1999) 1 HKLRD 315) (the Ng Ka Ling case). Citing its adverse social effects, the SAR government eventually asked the NPCSC to interpret the relevant Basic Law provisions in order to overturn CFA’s ruling. That triggered intense debates in the legal and political circles involving top officials, political parties, rights groups, as well as the two lawyers’ associations.33 The Bar, as the more vocal branch, issued a number of press statements and open letters expressing its strong opposition to Beijing’s interference in Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy, and that “a constitutionally acceptable solution” was for the SAR government to amend the relevant Basic Law provisions to plug the gap.34 On the other hand, the Law Society, in a brief public statement, opined that either the NPCSC interpretation or Basic Law amendment was “lawful” under the Basic Law and deferred to the “political decision” of the government in consultation with the Legislative Council.35 In the process, the Bar fortified its image as a staunch defender of the rule of law whilst the Law Society reaffirmed its self-­proclaimed “neutrality” with a focus on legal technicality. Their position arguably catered to liberals and conservatives/pragmatists, respectively, earning them each social capital on which they could later capitalize, for example, in the debate over relaxation of the rights of audience. While the Bar argued the move might deter law graduates from joining the Bar, thus harming the rule of law, the Law Society stressed it would help people save legal costs. The Bar’s image as “rule of law defender” boosted its case against removing their exclusive rights of audience, whilst the latter’s apolitical stance earned it support from the conservatives and those having business links with China. That had one observer argue the “altruistic” lawyers and “self-­interested” lawyers were in fact “one and the same.”36 As Table 3.1 shows, in the ensuing years, the two professional bodies have continued to use public statements as a way to engage the public and lobby the government over issues including a controversial national security bill in 2013,

Lawyers as an interest group   39 NPCSC interpretations of the Basic Law after 1999, and a controversial 2014 White Paper on the Implementation of “One Country, Two Systems.”

The rise of activist lawyers in Hong Kong’s democracy movement Besides organized groups such as the Bar and the Law Society, activist lawyers began to join politics in the 1980s and became a key force behind Hong Kong’s civil movements. After quelling mass anti-­British riots in the late 1960s, the colonial government introduced a series of social and economic reforms in the 1970s. The ensuing property boom saw most lawyers focus their energy on a thriving economy instead of social issues.37 But China’s 1982 announcement to retake Hong Kong in 1997 turned society’s focus to the city’s future. During Sino-­British negotiations between 1982 and 1984, China, in order to appease a mostly communist-­averse population, proffered the “One Country, Two Systems” (OCTS) model featuring “Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong” and “a high degree of autonomy.”38 The impending change of sovereignty from a liberal colonial to a one-­party authoritarian regime created a critical juncture that foresaw tremendous social changes.39 After one and a half centuries of colonial rule, the prospect of a “democratic and autonomous” Hong Kong galvanized the reform-­minded among an indigenous middle class – many of them graduates from the city’s then only two universities, the University of Hong Kong (HKU) and Chinese University of Hong Kong. As students, they had joined patriotic movements in the 1970s such as the “Protect Diaoyu Island” protest and, on principle, supported the “democratic return” of Hong Kong to China.40 The signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 motivated many activists to form new groups, for example, Meeting Point, founded in 1982 and led by academics Yeung Sum and Anthony Cheung, Hong Kong Affairs Society in 1984 by liberal solicitors Albert Ho and Man Sai-­cheong, and the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood in 1986 by educator Lee Wing Tat and activist Fung Kim Kee.41 Despite a wave of emigration among the middle class in the mid-­1980s, 95 civil society groups formed the Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG) in 1986. Led by barrister Martin Lee and educator Szeto Wah – both would later become Hong Kong’s democracy icons – the JCPDG served as a platform to push for a more democratized legislature in 1988 and direct election for the city’s leader after 1997.42 Later dubbed Hong Kong’s “father of democracy,”43 Martin Lee was among the first local lawyers whom Beijing sought to co-­opt.44 Having represented pro­communist workers taking part in the 1960s anti-­colonial riots, he kept a low profile while serving as chairman of the Bar in the early 1980s. After the Joint Declaration, Beijing began to invite local elites to assist in the drafting of the Basic law which would form the basis of its rule after 1997. Lee, due to his role as counsel for pro-­communist rioters, was one of the only two “liberals” – along with Szeto Wah – appointed to the influential Basic Law Drafting Committee

Hong Kong Bar Association

December 18, 2002: Hong Kong Government has a constitutional duty to legislate Article 23.

Article 23 Legislation (2003)

May 2, 2003: There is no rush to legislate, and a more sensible timetable should be adopted by the Legislative Council.

May 17, 1999: The NPCSC interpretation of Basic Law provisions is “lawful,” and it was up to the government to make a “political decision.”

NPCSC’s First Interpretation of the Basic Law regarding CFA’s decision in Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration (1999)

July 22, 2002: Any legislation of Article 23 should be subject to the Basic Law and related international principles, and existing laws are sufficient to prohibit acts listed in Article 23. December 9, 2002: Disapproved the Consultation Document due to the loose language and ambiguous concepts therein. February 13, 2003: First and second readings of the Blue Bill should be deferred to allow for public debates.

May 5, 1999 (letter to the Chief Executive): The interpretation will seriously and irreversibly damage judicial independence. May 14, 1999 (letter to Hong Kong Citizens): The request will have very far-reaching impacts on the HKSAR. May 13, 1999: A constitutionally acceptable solution is to amend the relevant Basic Law provisions. May 18, 1999: Deeply regretted over the government’s decision to June 8, 1999: Preliminary comments seek NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law. on the establishment of a Mechanism for the NPCSC to exercise its power to May 20, 1999: Responded to Government Paper to the Legislative Council over the NPCSC interpretation. interpret the Basic Law. June 10, 1999: Any “legislative interpretation” of the Basic Law must not undermine the rule of law. June 28, 1999: the legal implications of the NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law. July 2, 1999: Stressed the importance of the “two systems” aspect of “One Country, Two Systems.”

The Law Society of Hong Kong

Table 3.1  Highlights of the public pronouncements of the Law Society and Bar Association over major constitutional controversies (1999–2016)

November 8, 2016: Frequent interpretations give an impression that judicial independence has been undermined. The NPCSC should exercise restraints in invoking its power of interpreting the Basic Law to maintain confidence in “One Country, Two Systems” and Hong Kong’s rule of law.

November 7, 2016: The way in which this matter has been handled gives the impression that the NPCSC is effectively legislating for Hong Kong. It cast doubts on the Chinese government’s commitment to “One Country, Two Systems,” “Hong Kong People ruling Hong Kong,” and Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy.”

November 2, 2016: The NPCSC interpretation at this stage will deal a severe blow to judicial independence. It seriously undermines the confidence of local and international communities in Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy.”

June 25, 2014: Rule of law and judicial June 11, 2014: Rule of Law means far more than “Doing things according to Law” or “Governing according to Law.” And judges independence are essential for Hong and judicial officers are not Hong Kong “administrators.” Kong. There should not be too many interpretations of the Basic Law. But the White Paper should be read as a whole.

White Paper on the Practice of “One Country, Two Systems” in the HKSAR (2014)

NPCSC’s 5th Interpretation of the Basic Law regarding oath-taking (2016)

April 14, 2005: Disappointed with the request for an interpretation April 28, 2005: The interpretation is not necessary and the matter should be of Article 53 of the Basic Law which will undermine rule of law and judicial independence. better left to the court. Any NPCSC interpretation must be used with caution and restraint.

NPCSC’s 3rd Interpretation of the Basic Law regarding the terms of office of the Chief Executive (2005)

42   K. M. Y. Lee (BLDC) in 1985.45 His close relationship with the Chinese government, however, came to an abrupt end in the spring of 1989 at the rise of a student-­ led pro-­democracy protest originated in the capital which later spread nationwide. Lee and Szeto quickly broke ranks with Beijing and co-­founded the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, an organization that would later help many activists flee China after June 4 and has been leading the annual memorial in Hong Kong to date. Having been expelled from the BLDC, Lee turned his attention to democratizing Hong Kong, successfully winning the legal functional constituency seat – exclusively elected by legal sector voters – in the city’s first Legislative Council elections in 1985. In 1990, he co-­founded the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), allegedly Hong Kong’s first political party. UDHK and its allies took part in the 1991 Legislative Council elections which, for the first time, contained 18 geographical constituency seats, winning 16.46 In October 1994, UDHK became the Democratic Party with Lee as founding chairman. He held onto his legislative seat for 14 more years until 2008. During that time and beyond, he has grown to be “a thorn in the flesh” of Beijing47 as he persistently lobbied Western governments to press China on Hong Kong’s democratization and human rights through writing for the international news media48 and meeting foreign politicians.49 Lee’s transformation – from Beijing’s ally to its defector – shows the extent to which some activist lawyers could go in fighting for democracy. What motivated him? Lee recalled telling himself after winning his first legislative seat in 1985: “rule of law is important, but without democracy rule of law cannot survive; it is because judges rule on laws, but who makes the laws?”50 The close link between a democratic system and the rule of law explains why more and more lawyers have stepped out of their professional comfort zone to fight for democracy as Hong Kong’s civil liberties and “high degree of autonomy” appeared to be diminishing.

Lawyers’ activism and Hong Kong’s constitutionalized politics after 1997 The Basic Law, by stating the ultimate goals of introducing universal suffrage for the elections of the Chief Executive (CE) and all members of the legislature (Articles 45 and 68), constitutionalized post-­1997 politics by putting “Hong Kong on a visionary path to constitutional democracy.”51 Its guarantee of fundamental rights (Chapter III) also propelled lawyers to take up the role as defenders of civil liberties. As Kemal Bokhary, currently non-­permanent judge of the CFA wrote, by 2007 the CFA had already decided over 40 constitutional cases involving a wide range of fundamental rights.52 Ironically, the city’s continued democratic deficit makes the court – itself a non-­democratic institution but enjoying a high level of public trust – the epicenter of constitutional deliberation.53 At the same time, the viability of British common law under a socialist regime remains a perennial concern.54 The OCTS model is arguably framed in

Lawyers as an interest group   43 economic terms: socialism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), capitalism in Hong Kong.55 Hence, whilst sustaining its economic system, after 1997 Hong Kong saw the PRC preside over its legal system, its Achilles’ heel lies in the NPCSC’s plenary power to interpret the Basic Law.56 Just a year into reunification, a string of controversial cases including the alleged “selective non-­ prosecution” of a Beijing-­loyalist media mogul and the relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction involving mainland offenders revealed the extent to which the PRC’s jurisprudence had penetrated into Hong Kong’s system.57 Hence, Hong Kong lawyers had reason to protest when Beijing directly interfered in Hong Kong’s judicial independence in 1999 just two years after the handover. In the Ng Ka Ling case, the CFA boldly declared that it has authority to uphold the Basic Law and to review the constitutionality of legislative acts of even the NPCSC – a power that Chinese courts lack.58 Mainland legal experts immediately criticized the CFA’s latter assertion as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty.59 In an unprecedented move, the SAR government asked the CFA to clarify its constitutional position vis-­à-vis the NPCSC. The CFA’s deferential reply that it cannot question the power of the central government to do any act in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law, however, did not stop the NPCSC, upon the SAR’s request, interpreting the relevant Basic Law provisions on June 26. The first NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law, which triggered the SAR’s “first constitutional crisis,”60 concerned not only the two professional bodies but also a whole swathe of Hong Kong’s common law lawyers. In another unprecedented move, lawyers took to the streets on June 30, 1999 in a silent march to protest against what they saw was China’s interference in Hong Kong’s judicial independence.61 In the ensuing years, the legal complex, including lawyers, law students and academics, has continued to turn out in record numbers, in protest against a string of incidents perceived to have eroded the city’s “high degree of autonomy,” from NPCSC’s interpretations of the Basic Law over the CE’s term of office in 2005 and public office holders’ oath-­taking in 2016, as well as the State Council’s 2014 “White Paper on the Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong SAR,” as Table 3.2 shows.

The National Security Bill in 2003 and the mobilization of the legal complex From the Basic Law Article 23 Concern Group to the Civic Party If 1999 raised the alarm bell for the legal complex, 2003 was a political coming of age for activist lawyers. In September 2002, the SAR government published a consultation paper on a national security bill under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which sought to criminalize certain acts including forging links with overseas political organizations. The vaguely drafted bill, which contained Chinese legal concepts such as secession and subversion, and the government’s attempt in pushing it through the Legislative Council aroused widespread suspicions that it

Hon. Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee1

Basic Law Article 45 Concern Group2

Hon. Dennis Kwok Wing-hang and 29 members of the Legal Subsector of the Election Committee3

Hon. Dennis Kwok Wing-hang4

June 30, 1999

April 19, 2005

June 27, 2014

November 8, 2016

NPCSC’s Interpretation of Article 104 of the Basic Law regarding the oaths taken by two elected members of the Legislative Council in 12 October 2016, which led to their eventual disqualification.

The State Council’s White Paper on the Practice of “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in Hong Kong which, among other things, asked Hong Kong judges, who were included as administrators of the SAR government, to be patriotic.

NPCSC’s Interpretation of Article 53(2) of the Basic Law regarding the term of office of incoming Chief Executive Donald Tsang, who was succeeding outgoing Tung Chee-hwa who had resigned in the middle of his second term in 2015.

NPCSC’s Interpretation of Articles 22(3) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law regarding the right of abode after the CFA ruled in the Ng Ka Ling case.

Controversy

3,000

1,800

850

600

Reported number of participants

Sources: 1 Apple Daily (1999). “600 people protested against NPCSC Interpretation of the Basic Law; Lawyers’ silent outcry”, July 1, A01 (in Chinese). 2 http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20050420/4825344. 3 http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20140628/18779886. 4 www.hongkongfp.com/2016/11/08/live-hong-kongs-legal-sector-stages-rare-silent-protest-interference-beijing/.

Organizer(s)

Date

Table 3.2  The four lawyers’ silent marches in Hong Kong since July 1, 1997

Lawyers as an interest group   45 was aimed at curbing civil liberties.62 A group of veteran lawyers and legal scholars from diverse backgrounds, including Prof. Johannes Chan, Prof. Michael Davis, academic and solicitor Eric Cheung, rights lawyer Mark Daly, legally-­trained environmental activist Christine Loh, and barristers Denis Chang, Audrey Eu, Alan Leong, Margaret Ng, and Ronny Tong, formed the Basic Law Article 23 Concern Group. They produced bilingual brochures explaining the problems of the bill and held various public forums on university campuses, mostly with HKU’s Centre for Comparative and Public Law (CCPL).63 The city-­wide “Anti-­Article 23” campaign culminated in a 500,000-strong protest on July 1, 2003, resulting in the bill’s indefinite shelving until today. The saga inspired members of the Basic Law Article 23 Concern Group, many of them political novices, to demand political accountability promised under the Basic Law. They went on to form the Basic Law Article 45 Concern Group to call for the promised CE election by universal suffrage. The lawyers’ professional image and activism in 2003 consolidated the group’s popularity, which eclipsed that of many established political parties. For example, in a public opinion poll by HKU’s Public Opinion Programme, its average score topped the list in August 2004, the first time the group was included in the periodic survey.64 Three core members, Audrey Eu, Alan Leong, and Ronny Tong became directly-­elected legislators in 2004.65 With like-­minded lawyers and professionals, they founded the Civic Party in 2006, a middle-­class political party popularly dubbed the “Barristers’ Party.”66 The huge turnout on July 1, 2003 allegedly took Beijing by surprise.67 In response, it formed the Hong Kong and Macao Coordination Group chaired by then Vice President Zeng Qinghong, which has since become the highest authority in charge of Hong Kong affairs and a sign of Beijing’s increasingly hands-­on approach towards Hong Kong.68 On April 26, 2004, the NPCSC, based on yet another interpretation of the Basic Law, ruled out universal suffrage for the CE and Legislative Council elections in 2007 and 2008 respectively, and imposed additional procedures on electoral reform. While it announced on December 29, 2007 that the SAR’s fifth CE election in 2017 “may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage,” no progress was made in the intervening years.69 In light of the political impasse, founders of the Civic Party decided to participate in the “undemocratic” election they were hoping to reform. Alan Leong became the only challenger of incumbent Donald Tsang in the 2007 CE election, a race decided by 800 (mostly pro-­Beijing) members of the Election Committee. While Leong – predictably – lost the vote, his performance in two Amer­ican-­style pre-­election televised debates soon made him one of Hong Kong’s most recognized politicians.70 On June 17, 2010, Audrey Eu, having earned names such as “Hong Kong’s most popular legislator”71 and “Goddess of Democracy,”72 gave an impressive performance in another televised debate with Donald Tsang over Hong Kong’s stalled political reform.73 The rise of the Civic Party marked a paradigm shift for lawyers who were accustomed to courtroom advocacy than street campaigns. And the election of

46   K. M. Y. Lee Eu, Leong and Tong into the Legislative Council in 2004 saw a rise in the number of lawyers taking part in subsequent contests. In fact, lawyers have traditionally been the most politically active of all professionals, featuring prominently in legislatures from North America to the UK and in many Europe countries.74 Charles S. Hyneman, in his seminal empirical study on state legislatures, found that lawyers were among the most politically effective groups of Amer­ icans.75 Their professional prestige, the natural links between law and politics, and lawyers’ abilities to navigate between legal and political tasks and to be brokers of “ideas as well as interests” have served them in good stead in the legislative process.76 As discussed, as Hong Kong was slated to return to Chinese rule after the Joint Declaration, lawyers like Martin Lee began to join politics in the 1980s. Nearly a decade after the handover, perceived threats to the city’s civil liberties and democratic prospects have seen more lawyers take part in electoral politics, a trend that appears to be more visible at the Legislative Council level than the District Council level. As Figure 3.1 shows, the number of candidates in the 2008 Legislative Council elections who declared their occupation as lawyer shot up, which has remained relatively stable for the next two elections in 2012 and 2016, respectively. In comparison, as Figure 3.2 shows, after peaking in 2007, the number of participants of the District Council elections in 25

12 10.2%

10.1%

10

20

4 7.7%

15

3

6 5

10

5

0

6

6 6.6%

6.7%

6

1 3

17

8

1998

2000

4 13

12

11 8

8 Percentage

Number of participants

10.4%

2

2004

Year Geographical constituencies Functional constituencies Election Committee

2008

2012

2016

0

Percentage of total number of candidates

Figure 3.1 Total number of lawyer candidates in Legislative Council elections and their overall percentages (1998–2016).

Note Ten and six seats were elected by the Election Committee in the 1998 and 2000 elections respectively.

Lawyers as an interest group   47 60

5

4.5% 3.6%

3.5%

3.5%

30

4

3 51

20

38

33

28

34

10

0

Percentage

Number of participants

50

40

6

5.6%

2

1

1999

2003 Number of legal professionals

2007 Year

2011

2015

0

Percentage on total number of candidates

Figure 3.2 Total number of lawyer candidates in District Council elections and their overall percentages (1999–2015). Sources: Registration and Electoral Office (2015, November 24). Introduction to Candidates. Retrieved from 2015 District Council Election, available online at www.elections.gov.hk/dc2015/eng/intro_to_can. html. Registration and Electoral Office (2016, August 12). Introduction to Candidates. Retrieved from 2016 Legislative Council Election, available online at www.elections.gov.hk/legco2016/eng/ intro_to_can.html. Yip, T.  S. (2001). A Collection of Hong Kong Election Materials (1996–2000). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK. Yip, T. S. (2006). A Collection of Hong Kong Election Materials (2001–2004). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK. Yip, T. S. (2015). A Collection of Hong Kong Election Materials (2005–2012). Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK.

approximately the same period saw a drop in the subsequent contests in 2011 and 2015, respectively.

Lawyers and the idea of “civil disobedience” Stalled democratization also saw the rise of “contentious politics,” a form of “collective political struggle” ranging from street protests, riots and strikes, to revolutions and civil wars.77 While Hong Kong’s civil movement has always been on the moderate side of things, political impasse coupled with Beijing’s perceived broken promises propelled new activists onto the political stage and eventually opened a new chapter in the city’s political struggle. For example, in May 2011, a group of mainly secondary school students, led by Joshua Wong who would later become Hong Kong’s poster boy in its struggle for democracy,78

48   K. M. Y. Lee launched a campaign against a proposed National Education curriculum believed to have aimed at “political brainwashing.”79 With substantial support from parents, teachers and civil society groups, they successfully drew tens of thousands of people to join a protest on July 29, 2012 as well as successive mass rallies at a forecourt outside Government Headquarters dubbed “the Civic Square” which, like 2003, resulted in an indefinite shelving of the plan. And student activists like Wong went on to take a leading role in an unfolding political upheaval in 2014. Hong Kong’s invigorated civil society movements provided the backdrop against which some pro-­democracy activists upped the political ante. On January 16, 2013, HKU law professor Benny Tai wrote in his regular column with an elite Chinese-­language newspaper that, to exert pressure on Beijing to honor its promise allowing Hong Kong to elect the CE in 2017 by universal suffrage, at least 10,000 citizens should take part in an act of civil disobedience by staging a peaceful sit-­in at the Central District that is the very symbol of Hong Kong’s prosperity.80 Apparently inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. and their non-­violent struggles against injustice, the hitherto low-­key scholar stressed the peaceful nature of his, then, visionary plan. Civil disobedience,81 an illegal yet non-­violent and conscientious political act seldom discussed in Hong Kong, immediately caught media attention and galvanized civil society. On March 27, 2013, alongside sociology professor Chan Kin-­man and pastor Chu Yiu-­ming, Tai declared the manifesto of “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” (Occupy Central), ushering in an era of contentious politics in Hong Kong.82 The idea of breaking the law to achieve democracy, not to mention all the imaginable disruptions in the international financial hub’s heart, was controversial. All the more so when it was initiated by a law academic, and who as a HKU student activist in the early 1980s supported Hong Kong’s “democratic return” to China.83 The role that the legal academy played in Occupy Central signified its increasing importance as an integral part of the legal complex in Hong Kong’s tortuous democratic journey. Before that, Tai, like Martin Lee, had been on good terms with the government, once serving as a part-­time member of the Central Policy Unit (a top official think tank) and teaching constitutional law to numerous civil servants. His widely known 2010 book, which helped popularize the idea of the rule of law, was once a government-­ recommended text for secondary school students.84 The call for civil disobedience, therefore, was a drastic departure from his otherwise moderate persona. More importantly, it set in motion public discussions over the legality of civil disobedience. In the run-­up to Occupy Central, Tai wrote in his regular column: Civil disobedience entails illegality and criminal liability. Those who join “Occupy Central” must prepare to pay a bigger price [than participating in the 1 July 2003 protest].… We are to sacrifice our freedom to show our overwhelming conviction in democracy.85

Lawyers as an interest group   49 The discourse on civil disobedience widened the political imagination of pro-­ democracy activists, who had for years been accustomed to staging legal yet largely ineffectual occasional protests. Tai’s idea drew support from some of the city’s most prominent lawyers as well as segments of civil society. Shortly after the declaration of Occupy Central, Audrey Eu and Martin Lee, both Senior Counsel and former chairpersons of the Bar, vowed to join, saying, for the sake of achieving “genuine universal suffrage,” they were willing to go to prison.86 The allusion to “true” or “genuine” – as opposed to “fake” – democracy, arose from Article 45 of the Basic Law which mandates the presence of “a broadly representative nominating committee” (NC) in selecting the candidates for the CE election by universal suffrage. Many believed that if the NC would, like the current “Election Committee” that has elected the CE for the past two decades, be again dominated by pro-­ Beijing figures, pro-­democracy politicians would stand no chance of being nominated as CE candidates in future elections by universal suffrage. Margaret Ng, who by then had represented the legal sector in the legislature for 17 years, concurred: “when all legal and undisruptive actions failed, aren’t we obliged to consider actions that may be illegal and disruptive?”87 The Alliance for True Democracy, an umbrella group representing all pro-­democracy legislators, political parties and some civil society groups, was formed on March 21, 2013. Aimed at fighting for “genuine” universal suffrage, it espoused a “three-­track” model for the CE election which would allow ordinary citizens, political parties and the NC to respectively nominate the candidates.88 During the movement, the legal academy played an educational role in enlightening the public on universal suffrage. Campaigners for Occupy Central, led by Benny Tai, solicited submissions of proposals that comply with Article 25 of the ICCPR, leading to an academic roundtable entitled “Universal Suffrage and Nomination Procedures: Imperatives from Article 25 ICCPR” at HKU on March 20, 2014. The event, which featured a host of local and international legal scholars, discussed the requirement of “equal and universal suffrage” under the ICCPR, resulting in the declaration of five “Guiding Principles of the Compatibility of Election Mechanisms and Methods with International Standards” on March 21, 2014 which include “free expression of the genuine will of the people.”89 They became the basis upon which Occupy Central finalized 15 proposals that meet the “international standards” required for electing the CE in 2017 (and all legislators in 2018) by universal suffrage. To foster a culture of deliberation, it organized a series of town-­hall-style meetings – dubbed “deliberation days” as inspired by Amer­ican political scientists Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin90 – between June 2013 and June 2014 that culminated in the Third Deliberation Day on May 6 where participants voted for three universal suffrage models. Occupy Central then presented the three “finalists” for a 10-day “referendum” on June 20. Despite cyber-­attacks of an “unprecedented scale” on its website,91 it reportedly drew nearly 800,000 people to vote either online or in person, and selected the Alliance for True Democracy’s model that would allow 35,000 registered voters, political parties which obtained 5 percent

50   K. M. Y. Lee or more of the vote in the last Legislative Council election, or the NC to nominate a CE candidate.92 In addition, 88 percent of those who voted agreed that the Legislative Council should veto the government’s proposal should it fail to meet the “international standard” for universal suffrage, allegedly giving Occupy Central a popular mandate to negotiate with the government.93 On July 15, 2014, the SAR government submitted a report to Beijing recommending the introduction of universal suffrage for the CE elections in 2017 the arrangements of which, however, did not appear to meet the aforesaid “international standards.”94

The State Council’s “White Paper” and the Law Society’s saga in 2014 In response to the quest for “true universal suffrage,” Chinese officials had, since March 2013, reiterated on various occasions Beijing’s “baseline.” Apart from the requirements of adhering to the Basic Law provisions and related NPCSC decisions, they insisted that only “patriots” who “love the country and love Hong Kong” could become CE candidates.95 Similar utterances from top leaders such as NPCSC chairman Zhang Dejiang indicated Beijing’s aversion to risks of “political confrontation” that a non-­patriotic CE would provoke,96 and hence the unavoidable “pre-­screening” of candidates for the CE election in 2017. On June 10, 2014, the State Council published the White Paper on the Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong SAR (the White Paper).97 It affirmed Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, stating that its “high degree of autonomy” is not full autonomy, and is subject to the central leadership. In a section entitled “The Hong Kong People Who Govern Hong Kong Should Above All Be Patriotic,” it asked Hong Kong administrators, including judges, to “correctly” understand and implement the Basic Law and safeguard “the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests.” The Bar issued a swift response, stating that judges should bear no political accountability and reaffirming the court’s role in interpreting the law under the common law system,98 whilst the Law Society waited two weeks to issue an equivocal statement.99 On June 26, 2014, 15 years after they first took to the streets in protest against the NPCSC’s first interpretation of the Basic Law, 1800 lawyers staged another silent march expressing their disapproval of the White Paper which they believed compromised Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy.”100 The White Paper also unraveled the myth of “political neutrality” of the Law Society. Discontent was brewing over then Law Society president Ambrose Lam’s series of actions in response to the White Paper. First, Lam reportedly sent an email to members of the Society’s council deploring the Bar’s “unequivocal political statement” as contrary to the Society’s long-­held stance that the “legal profession should not get into politics.”101 Next, Lam, who claimed to speak for the professional body, went on to openly praise the White Paper as a “positive document.”102 On a radio programme, he was also quoted as saying

Lawyers as an interest group   51 “I think the Communist Party is great.”103 Lam’s actions so irked a number of solicitors that, in a historic move, they called for an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of the Law Society to table a motion of no-­confidence against him. Kevin Yam, one of the movement’s leaders, said, “The public tends to see solicitors as those who only care about making money and neglecting the core values … but the petition proves that solicitors would stand up at critical moments.”104 Despite reports of political pressure from some senior lawyers, China-­friendly clients and Beijing’s Liaison Office (China’s political presence in Hong Kong),105 the motion was passed by a 2,392–1,478 margin – marking the first time a sitting Law Society president had been removed in such fashion.106

Occupy Central and the rise of new pro-­democracy groups The White Paper turned out to be a prelude to an unfolding political struggle that involved more than the liberal fraction of the legal complex. Amidst continuing controversies over the White Paper, universal suffrage, and Occupy Central, on August 31, 2014, the NPCSC announced its decision regarding the 2017 CE election,107 lifting the curtain on an unprecedented pro-­democracy movement in Hong Kong history. The so-­called “31 August Decision” declared, given the implementation of universal suffrage in Hong Kong concerns China’s “sovereignty, security and development interests,” it must impose strict conditions, including a “nominating committee” (the composition of which is restrictive in nature) to ensure that only those acceptable to Beijing could be nominated as CE candidates. Students responded by launching a week­long university class boycott beginning on September 22, with thousands converging outside Government Headquarters to attend lectures given by pro-­democracy academics and activists.108 The movement escalated on the night of September 26, when student leaders and their supporters stormed the “Civic Square” outside Government Headquarters, which triggered police intervention and the arrests of some prominent activists including Joshua Wong. The ensuing confrontations led Tai to declare the start of Occupy Central – originally scheduled on October 1 – in the small hours of September 28. What followed was a 79-day pro-­democracy movement later known as the “Umbrella Revolution” (or “Umbrella Movement”), which at its peak drew hundreds of thousands of protesters to “occupy” three business areas across Hong Kong.109 The political impasse ended on December 11, 2014, when police moved to evict the approximately 100 diehard protesters from the main protest site, among them, Senior Counsel and past leaders of the Bar, namely Audrey Eu, Martin Lee and Alan Leong.110 Despite its failure to change Beijing’s mind, the movement had mobilized citizens from all walks of life, including many professionals and brought about a fundamental change in their vision for Hong Kong beyond economic prosperity.111 It ushered in a new era of political activism with the emergence of pro-­ democracy groups representing various professions including law, education, finance, medicine, and information technology, to name a few.112 For example,

52   K. M. Y. Lee Kevin Yam, a solicitor who had earlier helped unseat the Law Society president, co-­founded the Progressive Lawyers Group (PLG) in January 2015 with like-­ minded barristers and solicitors. Their mission: to “speak out as lawyers on the upholding of the rule of law, judicial independence, democracy, human rights, freedoms and justice.” The PLG represents an alternative – and progressive – voice in the legal profession, besides the Bar Association and the Law Society, by submitting its own opinion to the government regarding the 2017 CE election which boldly declared the NPCSC’s August 31 Decision as “legally unenforceable.”113 Political awakening sparked by the Umbrella Revolution saw some pro-­ democracy activists score surprising victories in two subsequent local elections. First, Nathan Law, a leading student activist, was elected in the fiercely contested Legislative Council elections in September 2016, along with several political novices who had played an active role in the movement.114 Second, pro-­democracy candidates received strong voter support in the Election Committee Subsector Elections – which would elect the CE in March 2017 – on December 11, 2016. An exercise open only to selected professions and institutionally designed to favor pro-­establishment candidates, a slate led by Occupy Central co-­founders Benny Tai and Chan Kin-­man took all 30 seats in the higher education subsector (out of 14), one of the six subsectors (besides legal, education, health services, information technology and welfare) in which pro-­ democracy candidates – most of them sympathizers or supporters of the Umbrella Revolution – took all the seats. The record voter turnout, 46 percent (compared to 27.6 percent in the 2011 polls), and the 352 votes – out of the 1,194-member Election Committee – that the pro-­democracy camp scored (up from 205 in 2011),115 revealed the lingering influence of the Umbrella Revolution, a movement that marked a turning point for Hong Kong’s struggle for democratization.116 Its epoch-­making significance lies not only in its persistence and creativity but also in its ability to politically awaken a generation of Hong Kong citizens.

The rise of pro-­establishment and moderate legal forces in Hong Kong’s divisive politics But new developments also occurred in the pro-­establishment camp. In particular, after the handover, Hong Kong saw the rise of lawyer-­politicians who unabashedly toed the official line – reflecting the contesting visions of rule of law under OCTS. Because of their British colonial heritage, many people in Hong Kong tend to associate rule of law with liberal democratic values. Yet, reunification with China inevitably brought nuances to its common law system. After 1997, there emerged two competing visions of the rule of law: “fundamentalist” and “pragmatist.”117 The former stresses the “inviolability” of legal principles and condemns any departure from them, whilst the latter, though respecting those ideals, are flexible in their interpretation vis-­à-vis other practical considerations.

Lawyers as an interest group   53 The aforementioned political controversies had, for example, the Bar and lawyers from the Civic Party play the role of “fundamentalist liberals” in defending a liberal reading of the Basic Law in the common law tradition. On the other hand, those who take a “pragmatic” and pro-­Beijing view emerged as a growing political force. A representative figure is Priscilla Leung Mei-­fun, a law professor and legislator who won her first electoral seat in 2008, allegedly with Beijing’s blessing.118 A Chinese law expert, Leung sees the Basic Law as a “crystallization” of common law and Chinese law which allows for judicial autonomy while being essentially a piece of Chinese legislation.119 Therefore, to understand the Basic Law one should heed not only the text but also the context, and that, given the NPCSC’s overriding authority, the Basic Law is not, by nature, common law, but a law used to implement OCTS. And one should not overlook “one country” when asserting “two systems.” Her remarks echoed that of Elsie Leung, vice-­chairwoman of the Basic Law Committee and a former Secretary for Justice, who in 2012 reportedly said that misunderstanding of some judges and lawyers on Beijing-­Hong Kong relationships had resulted in flawed judgments that challenged Beijing’s power.120 After 1997, this pragmatism-­ inspired discourse of rule of law became increasingly prevalent among some quarters of the legal profession, whose clients include state-­backed enterprises and corporates having business interests on the mainland.121 The ideological difference among lawyers also attests to the very contradiction that splits the CCP and local supporters of Western-­style liberal democracy.122 Amid continued antagonism between pro-­Beijing and pro-­democracy forces, a veteran lawyer embarked on an uncharted course of political reconciliation. Ronny Tong, founding member of the Civic Party and one of the trio who won a direct election seat in the Legislative Council in 2004, announced his resignation from both in June 2015 after voting down the SAR government’s proposal for the 2017 CE election. Tong’s parting company with a political party he co-­ founded marked a low point for the pan-­democratic camp – a loose alliance spanning a broad political spectrum which ranges from moderate to radical democrats. Signs of disunity, in fact, appeared in as early as 2010 when the camp was in disarray over whether they should communicate with Beijing on stagnated political reform. Frustration was growing among the pan-­democrats on the government’s procrastination on democratization. The radicals, such as members of the League of Social Democrats (LSD), eventually broke away from the moderates who are willing to compromise in exchange for progress. In November 2010, the government proposed moderate changes to the electoral system but refused to abolish the much criticized “functional constituencies” that exclude the majority of voters. In response, the LSD and the Civic Party proposed a so-­called “five district referendum,” under which one pan-­ democratic legislator in each of Hong Kong’s five “geographical constituencies” would resign, only to re-­enter the by-­elections for the same seats the results of which could be seen as an indication of voters’ disapproval of the government plan.123 Tong, in dissent, chose to side with the Democratic Party in engaging – rather than antagonizing – Beijing. In May 2010, he was one of the seven

54   K. M. Y. Lee members of the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, a coalition of moderates led by the Democratic Party, who met Beijing officials on political reform – and the only member from the Civic Party.124 The only pan-­democratic legislator who did not support Occupy Central in 2014, Tong represents those who consider themselves neither sycophants nor opponents of Beijing. Citing ideological differences as a reason of his departure from the Civic Party, he founded Path of Democracy, a think tank dedicated to exploring a “third way” in democratization and changing the political culture in an extremely divided society.125 Being among a few of pan-­democrats allowed to enter mainland China, Tong was one of the three whom Chinese officials invited to attend the military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Second World War in Beijing in September 2015. His warm relation with the central authority saw him visit the capital twice in the following year. In April 2016, he led an 11-strong delegation from his think tank to Beijing – the first such visit by Hong Kong democrats since the veto of the political reform proposal in June 2015.126 With prominent political scientists – including Prof. Joseph Chan of HKU and Dr. Ray Yep of City University of Hong Kong – in attendance, the group met top Beijing think tanks such as the semi-­official Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies – chaired by former Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office deputy director Chen Zuoer – and the Academy of Macroeconomic Research under the National Development and Reform Commission. In meetings with senior officials, Tong raised thorny issues such as the possible relaunching of the doomed political reform. In October 2016, Tong joined the Hong Kong Bar on a visit to Beijing during which the delegation met Li Fei, chairman of the Basic Law Committee, and discussed legal arrangements after 2047 – when the “50-year unchanged” promise expires.127 Seeing himself neither a pro-­establishment nor a mainstream democrat, Tong aspires to mend rifts in society and improve ties between Beijing and Hong Kong. Tong perhaps subscribes to, as aforementioned, a pragmatic vision of the rule of law that, instead of “all-­or-nothing,” there is room for a middle-­of-the-­road approach which accommodates both the democrats’ yearning for universal suffrage and Beijing’s cautiousness about democratization. At present, society may remain too divisive for Tong to realize his ideal. Just as the 2016 Legislative Council elections saw the rise of a new generation of pro-­democracy law-­ makers, the same also witnessed the pro-­establishment camp gaining new ground, with the election of five Beijing-­loyalist lawyers, including Law Society council member and former president Junius Ho. In an unexpected twist, the Law Society caught another controversy by having well-­posed pictures of the five on the cover of its November 2016 issue of Hong Kong Lawyer, its official monthly magazine, with inside stories detailing their professional and political aspirations. It was reportedly the first time in five years that the journal – whose cover stories usually feature senior legal experts and judges – had featured incumbent legislators.128 For one, Kevin Yam, convener of the PLG, criticized the journal for forsaking its longstanding apolitical stance and, through the

Lawyers as an interest group   55 cover story, helping to promote “the political side of a Law Society council member and his political allies.” This saga, again, shows the difficulty the body faces in maintaining its image as an “apolitical” professional group in a politicized society overcast by Beijing’s alleged political influences.

Conclusion Whether as a private or public interest group, Hong Kong lawyers have – collectively and individually – featured prominently in Hong Kong’s long march for democracy. The division of the two branches of professionals has long seen the Bar and the Law Society take different positions in politics that, intentionally or inadvertently, played to their respective professional interest. On the other hand, Hong Kong’s constitutionalized politics after 1997 heightened the role of the legal complex in defending a liberal vision of the rule of law and the roadmap for democratization under the Basic Law. In recent years, continued political deadlocks amid Beijing’s uncompromising approach have galvanized two groups in particular – barristers and legal academics – whose professionalism traditionally featured in courtrooms and lecture halls, respectively, to take part in more contentious forms of politics. Its culmination of late, Occupy Central (and later the Umbrella Revolution), drastically changed Hong Kong’s political landscape including not only the rise of a new generation of pro-­democracy activists and pro-­establishment lawyers, but also the call for political reconciliation amid deep ideological divisions. Yet, society remains hugely divisive. Lawyers, as traditionally both “the people’s spokespersons” and natural political leaders, will no doubt continue to play a critical role in the city’s tortuous democratization.

Notes    1 This chapter is derived in part from an article published in Asian Journal of Political Science (2017) (copyright Taylor & Francis), available online: www.tandfonline. com/ (DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2017.1307121). Permission has been granted by Taylor & Francis.    2 David Luban, “The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law,” Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 41 (1988), pp. 717–740, 718.    3 Magali S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 168.    4 Lucien Karpik, “Builders of Liberal Society: French Lawyers and Politics,” in Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik (eds), Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 101–124.    5 Michael I. Krauss, “The Lawyer as Limo: A Brief History of the Hired Gun,” The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable, vol. 8, no. 2 (2001), pp. 325–340.    6 Terence C. Halliday, “The Fight for Basic Legal Freedoms,” in James J. Heckman, Robert L. Nelson and Lee Cabatingan (eds), Global Perspectives on the Rule of Law (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 212.    7 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 63.    8 Ibid., p. 37.

56   K. M. Y. Lee    9 G. A. Almond and G. B. Powell, “Interest Articulation Structures: Interest ‘Groups’,” in Jean Blondel (ed.), Comparative Government (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 60–65, 63.   10 Sin Wai Man, “Law, Politics and Professional Projects: The Legal Profession in Hong Kong,” Social & Legal Studies, vol. 10, no. 4 (2001), pp. 483–504.   11 Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai, “The Legal Profession and the Transfer Of Sovereignty: Hong Kong,” Law in Context, vol. 16, no. 1, 1998, pp. 123–150.   12 Thomas Chan and Peter So, “Hong Kong Law Society President Seeks Senior Counsel Status for Solicitors,” South China Morning Post, February 7, 2015.   13 Joyce Ng, “Hong Kong Bar Association Slams Law Society Plan for New Exam,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 2016.   14 Man Yee Karen Lee, “Beyond the Professional Project: the Political Positioning of Hong Kong Lawyers’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 2017. Available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2017.01.003 (accessed March 3, 2017).   15 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).   16 Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik and Malcolm Feeley, “Introduction – The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political Liberalism,” in Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik and Malcolm Feeley (eds), Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 1–40, 10–11.   17 Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 42.   18 Fred C. Zacharias, “True Confessions about the Role of Lawyers in a Democracy,” Fordham Law Review, vol. 77 (2009), pp. 1591–1609, 1599.   19 Linda Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1999), p. 16.   20 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Asian Legal Revivals: Lawyers in the Shadow of Empire (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 212.   21 Cottrell and Ghai, “The Legal Profession and the Transfer of Sovereignty,” p. 125.   22 Butenhoff, Social Movements and Political Reform in Hong Kong, p. 17.   23 Carol Jones, “ ‘Dissolving the People’: Capitalism, Law and Democracy in Hong Kong,” in Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik and Malcolm M. Feeley (eds), Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Studies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism, (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 109–150, 112–113.   24 Ibid., pp. 114–115.   25 Tam Wai-­keung, Legal Mobilization under Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-­ Colonial Hong Kong (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 46.   26 Ming Sing, Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), p. 253.   27 Johannes Chan, “To Change or Not to Change: The Crumpling Legal System,” in Nyaw Mee-­Kau and Li Si-­ming (eds), The Other Hong Kong Report (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996), pp. 13–32, 19.   28 Cottrell and Ghai, “The Legal Profession and The Transfer of Sovereignty,” p. 135.   29 Lo Shiu Hing, “The Politics of the Debate over the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong,” China Quarterly (2000), pp. 221–239.   30 Almond and Powell, “Interest Articulation Structures: Interest ‘Groups’,” p. 60.   31 Andrew J. Harding and Amanda Whiting, “Custodian of Civil Liberties and Justice  in Malaysia: The Malaysian Bar and the Moderate State,” in Terence C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik and Malcolm M. Feeley (eds), Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-­Colony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 247–304, 262.   32 Robert W. Gordon, “The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical Reflections,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 11 (2010), pp. 441–468, 467.

Lawyers as an interest group   57   33 Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000).   34 Hong Kong Bar Association, “A Constitutionally Acceptable Solution,” May 13, 1999, reprinted in Johannes M.  M. Chan, H.  L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 378–382.   35 Law Society of Hong Kong, “Statement of the Law Society of Hong Kong,” 17 May 1999, reprinted in Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds) Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 2000), p. 397.   36 Sin, “Law, Politics and Professional Projects,” p. 498.   37 Dezalay and Garth, Asian Legal Revivals, p. 212.   38 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping on the Question of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1993).   39 Tam, Legal Mobilization under Authoritarianism, p. 11.   40 Alvin Y. So, “New Middle Class Politics in Hong Kong: 1997 and Democratization,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 20 (1990), pp. 384–398.   41 Alvin So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 67.   42 Ngok Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p. 40.   43 Ling Woo Liu, “Hong Kong’s ‘Father of Democracy’ to Retire,” TIME, 21 April 2008.   44 Shiu-­hing Lo, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 212.   45 Sonny Shiu-­hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing on Democracy (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010), p. 97.   46 Ian Scott, “An Overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections of 1991,” Asian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 13, no. 2 (1991), pp. 11–37.   47 R. L. Edmonds, China and Europe Since 1978: A European Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 117.   48 Martin Lee, “Who Will Stand With Hong Kong?,” New York Times, October 3, 2014. Available online at www.nytimes.com/2014/10/April opinion/martin-­leehong-­kongs-great-­test.html (accessed March 3, 2017).   49 Tanna Chong and Stuart Law, “Anson Chan and Martin Lee Meet US Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi,” South China Morning Post, April 4, 2014.   50 Ngok Ma, An Oral History of Democratic Movement of Hong Kong in the 1980s (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2012), p. 141 (in Chinese).   51 Michael C. Davis, “The Basic Law and Democratization in Hong Kong,” Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2 (2006), pp. 165–185, 176.   52 Hon. Mr. Justice Bokhary, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Fifteen Years after the Handover,” Hong Kong Law Journal, vol. 42, no. 2 (2012), pp. 373–384.   53 Yash Ghai, “The Imperatives of Autonomy: Contradictions of the Basic Law” in Johannes Chan SC and Lison Harris (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debates (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law Journal Limited, 2005), pp. 29–44.   54 For example, see Robert C. Berring, “Farewell to All That,” Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 19, no. 2 (1997), pp. 431–447; John McDermott, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong after 1997,” Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 19, no. 2 (1997), pp. 263–292.   55 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law, 2nd edn (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), p. 141.

58   K. M. Y. Lee   56 Yash Ghai, “Hong Kong’s Autonomy: Dialects of Powers and Institutions,” in Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman (eds), Practising Self-­Government: A Comparative Study of Autonomous Regions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 315–348, 341.   57 Bryon S. J. Weng, “Judicial Independence under the Basic Law,” in Steve Tsang (ed.), Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), pp. 48–72, 67–69.   58 Ling Bing, “The Proper Law for the Conflict between the Basic Law and Other Legislative Acts of the National People’s Congress,” in Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 151–170.   59 Johannes M. M. Chan, “Judicial Independence: A Reply to the Comments of the Mainland Legal Experts on the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Court of Final Appeal,” in Johannes M.  M. Chan, H.  L. Fu and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict over Interpretation (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), pp. 61–72.   60 Albert H. Y. Chen, “Another Case of Conflict between the Court of Final Appeal and the NPC Standing Committee?,” Hong Kong Law Journal, vol.  31, no.  2 (2001), pp. 179–187.   61 Mark Landler, “After 2 Years, Hong Kong Looks More Like China,” New York Times, 1 July 1999.   62 Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong, p. 210.   63 J. Currie, C. J. Petersen and Ka-­Ho Mok, Academic Freedom in Hong Kong (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006).   64 Anthony B. L. Cheung, “The Hong Kong System under One Country Being Tested: Article 23, Governance Crisis and the Search for a New Hong Kong Identity,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2005), pp. 33–70, 44.   65 Sonny Lo, “The Mainlandization and Recolonization of Hong Kong: A Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2007), pp. 179–232, 209.   66 Stan Hok-­wui Wong, Electoral Politics in Post-­1997 Hong Kong: Protest, Patronage, and the Media (Singapore: Springer, 2015), p. 75.   67 Helen F. Siu, “Positioning at the Margins: The Infra-­Power of Middle-­Class Hong Kong,” in Andrea Riemenschnitter and Deborah L. Madsen (eds), Diasporic Histories: Cultural Archives of Chinese Transnationalism (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), pp. 55–76, 57.   68 Sing Tao Daily, “Zhang Dejiang Heads the Hong Kong and Macao Coordination Group,” November 29, 2012 (in Chinese).   69 Albert H. Y. Chen, “A New Era in Hong Kong’s Constitutional History,” Hong Kong Law Journal, vol. 38, no. 1 (2008), pp. 1–14, 6.   70 Ambrose Leung, “Chief Executive Campaign Helps Raise Alan Leong’s Public Profile,” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2007.   71 Bloomberg Business, “Audrey Eu,” July 11, 2004. Available online at www.bloom berg.com/bw/stories/2004–07–11/audrey-­eu (accessed June 10, 15).   72 M. Lui, “Dialogues with Prominent Women” (Hong Kong: Cup Magazine Publishing Limited, 2007) (in Chinese), p. 40.   73 Mark Lee and Frederik Balfour, “Hong Kong’s Tsang Loses Democracy Debate, Polls Show,” Bloomberg, June 18, 2010. Available online at www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2010–06–17/hong-­kong-chief-­tsang-says-­opposition-to-­blame-if-­ electoral-proposal-­fails (accessed May 6, 2015).   74 D. Podmore, “Lawyers and Politics,” British Journal of Law and Society, vol.  4, no. 2 (1977), pp. 155–185.

Lawyers as an interest group   59   75 Charles S. Hyneman, “The Legal Profession and Politics,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 55, no. 4 (1940), pp. 556–581.   76 John C. McDonald and James S. Turner, “Lawyers and Legislatures,” Cleveland State Law Review, vol. 18 (1969), pp. 541–548.   77 Sidney Tarrow, “Contentious Politics,” in D. A. Snow, D. della Porta, B. Klandermans and D. McAdam (eds), The Wiley-­Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, vol. 1. (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2013), pp. 266–273.   78 TIME, “The Face of Protest,” October 20, 2014.   79 Stephan Ortmann, “The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s Protracted Democratization Process,” Asian Affairs, vol. 46, no. 1 (2015), pp. 32–50.   80 Yiu Ting Tai, “Civil Disobedience as the Most Destructive Weapon,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 16, 2013 (in Chinese).   81 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1971).   82 Apple Daily, “Manifesto of Occupy Central,” March 27, 2013 (in Chinese).   83 China Times, “Zhao Ziyang Promised Giving Hong Kong Democracy 30 Years Ago,” 9 January 2014 (in Chinese). Available online at www.chinatimes.com/real timenews/20140109007280–260409 (accessed August 13, 2016).   84 Benny Y. T. Tai, The Passion for Rule of Law: Values beyond Legal Text and Legal Institutions (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Co., 2010) (in Chinese).   85 Yiu Ting Tai, “Occupy Central: Why Occupy?,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 25, 2014 (in Chinese).   86 Ming Pao, “Martin Lee Joins Occupy Central Wanting to Become ‘the First Defendant’,” March 17, 2013 (in Chinese) .   87 Apple Daily, “Devoted to the Rule of Law and Willing to Sacrifice for Democracy: Audrey Eu and Martin Lee Vowed to Risk Jail Terms for Genuine Universal Suffrage,” March 25, 2013 (in Chinese).   88 Albert H. Y. Chen, “The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong, 2013–15,” Asian Journal of Law and Society, vol.  3 (2016), pp. 189–207, 193.   89 Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Guiding Principles on the Compatibility of Election Mechanisms and Methods with International Standards: Outcomes of the Academic Roundtable on “Universal Suffrage and Nomination Procedures: Imperatives from Article 25 ICCPR,” held on 20 March 2014 at the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. (Press Release, 21 March 2014)   90 Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).   91 Parmy Olson, “The Largest Cyber-­attack in History Has Been Hitting Hong Kong Sites,” Forbes, November 20, 2014.   92 BBC News, “Hong Kong Democracy ‘Referendum’ Draws Nearly 800,000,” 30 June 2014. Available online at www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-china-­28076566 (accessed January 10, 2017).   93 Apple Daily, “Popular Mandate Provides ‘Bullets’ to Occupy Central,” June 30, 2014 (in Chinese).   94 Chen, “The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong.”   95 Te-­Ping Chen, “Hong Kong’s Future Leader Must ‘Love China’,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2013.   96 Chen, “The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong,” p. 194.   97 Information Office of the State Council, “The Practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” 10 June 2014.

60   K. M. Y. Lee Available online at www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/gsxw/t1164057.htm (accessed March 30, 2015).   98 Hong Kong Bar Association, “White Paper on the Practice of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” June 11, 2014.   99 Law Society of Hong Kong, “Submission on the White Paper on the Practice of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” June 25, 2014. 100 Stuart Lau, Austin Chiu and Brian Yap, “Hong Kong Lawyers March to Defend ­Judiciary in Wake of Beijing’s White Paper,” South China Morning Post, June 27, 2014. 101 Joyce Lam, “Law Society President Criticised for Attacking Bar’s Election Stance,” South China Morning Post, July 14, 2014. 102 Joyce Lam, “Ambrose Lam Courted Triumph, Controversy as Law Society leader,” South China Morning Post, August 15, 2014. 103 Joyce Ng, “Ousted Head of Law Society Ambrose Lam is ‘Better Off Now’,” South China Morning Post, November 24, 2014. 104 Jeffie Lam and Julie Chu, “Solicitors Move for Vote of No Confidence in Lam over white paper statements,” South China Morning Post, June 21, 2014. 105 Jeffie Lam, “Solicitors Under Pressure as Law Society President Vote Approaches,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 2014. 106 Joyce Ng, “Solicitors Vote to Unseat Law Society President Ambrose Lam,” South China Morning Post, August 14, 2014. 107 South China Morning Post, “Full Text: NPC Standing Committee Decision on Hong Kong 2017 Election Framework,” August 31, 2014. 108 R. Lyengar, “Pro-­Democracy Students Gather in Hong Kong, Demand to See Chief Executive,” TIME, September 23, 2014. 109 Hannah Beech, “The Umbrella Revolution: Hong Kong’s Fight for Freedom is a Challenge to China,” TIME, October 13, 2014. 110 Elizabeth Barber, “Hong Kong’s Main Democracy Protest Camp Falls With Leading Protest Figures Arrested,” TIME, December 11, 2014. 111 Ortmann, “The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s Protracted Democratization Process,” p. 48. 112 J. Ng and Z Lai, “Professionals Get Political,” Varsity, March 17, 2015. Available online at http://varsity.com.cuhk.edu.hk/index.php/2015/03/professionals-­getpolitical/ (accessed February 12, 2016). 113 Stand News, “Public Consultation on the Method of Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017: Submissions of the Progressive Lawyers Group,” January 27, 2015. Available online at https://thestandnews.com/politics/2017年行政長官選舉辦法 意見書/ (accessed March 21, 2015). 114 Neil Conner, “Young Anti-­China Activists Victorious in Hong Kong Vote,” Telegraph, September 5, 2016. 115 Jeffie Lam and Kinling Lo, “Hong Kong Tallies Record Turnout Rate and Record Number Of Voters for Election Committee that Picks City’s Next Leader,” South China Morning Post, December 11, 2016. 116 Sonny Shiu-­hing Lo, Hong Kong’s Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), p. 151. 117 Albert H. Y. Chen and Anne S. Y. Cheung, “Debating Rule of Law in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 1997–2002,” in Randall Peerenboom (ed.), Asian Discourses of Rule of Law: Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 250–287, 274. 118 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Maintaining the Political Status Quo? Hong Kong’s Legislative Council Elections, September 2008,” Issues & Studies, vol. 46, no. 4 (2010), pp. 181–216.

Lawyers as an interest group   61 119 Leung Mei-­fan, “Basic Law is the Crystallization of Chinese Law and Common Law,” Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong, April 22, 2015. See website: bpahk.org. 120 Austin Chiu, “Law Groups Fight Back After Elsie Leung Attack,” South China Morning Post, October 11, 2012. 121 Lee, “Beyond the Professional Project.” 122 Chen, “The Law and Politics of the Struggle for Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong,” p. 191. 123 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, “Challenge to the Pro-­democracy Movement in Hong Kong,” China Perspectives, 2011. Available online at http://chinaperspectives.revues. org/5563. 124 Kang-­chung Ng and Gary Cheung, “The Outlier: Hong Kong Lawmaker Ronny Tong Clashed with Civic Party on Political Reform,” South China Morning Post, June 22, 2015. 125 Ellie Ng, “Interview: Ex-­lawmaker Ronny Tong Blazes New ‘Third Path’ to Mend Divisions in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 2, 2017. Available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2017/January 02/interview-­ex-lawmaker-­ronny-tong-­ blazes-new-­third-path-­mend-divisions-­hong-kong/ (accessed March 3, 2017). 126 Kang-­chung Ng, “Former Hong Kong Lawmaker Ronny Tong Urges Mainland Chinese Officials to Relaunch Political Reform,” South China Morning Post, April 22, 2016. 127 Ellie Ng, “Beijing Has No Plan to Interpret Basic Law over Oath Fallout, Says HK Bar Association Chair,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 21, 2016. Available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2016/10/21/beijing-­no-plan-­interpret-basic-­law-oath-­ fallout-says-­hk-bar-­association-chair/ (accessed March 3, 2017). 128 Ellie Ng, “Law Society Journal’s Cover Story Featuring Pro-­Beijing Lawmakers Raises Eyebrows,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 23, 2016. Available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2016/11/23/law-­society-journals-­cover-story-­ featuring-pro-­beijing-lawmakers-­raises-eyebrows/ (accessed March 3, 2017).

4 Journalists as interest groups Implications for the democracy movement Kenneth Wai-­kin Ming

Introduction The transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China marked a milestone in the territory’s political history. According to the Basic Law of the HKSAR, the Hong Kong peoples’ living styles should remain unchanged for 50 years, including the provision of freedom and independent judiciary. However, journalists in Hong Kong are worried about the loss of political space under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarianism, even though the HKSAR is expected to operate under the principle of “one country, two systems.” Hong Kong journalists advocate liberalism as the British colonial government allowed Hong Kong to enjoy press freedom and the rule of law. These two elements are the core values of Hong Kong as an international city in Asia. But from the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there is basically no idea of press freedom and the press is the instrument of the Party-­state. In 2016, the General Secretary of the CCP Mr. Xi Jinping announced that the surname of news media in China is the ruling political party (méi tĭ xìng dang),1 which means journalists’ jobs are to propagandize the ruling political party. Any investigations and criticisms deleterious to the authority are prohibited. The clash of ideologies between mainland China and Hong Kong motivated Hong Kong journalists to pursue press freedom and the fight for democracy. This chapter focuses on the journalists’ roles as interest groups in promoting democratization in Hong Kong. Hong Kong journalists hold different political stances but many have the democratic aspiration of transforming Hong Kong into a more democratic system. There are several types of news media in Hong Kong. The first type is press media, which refers to the publication of newspapers and magazines to disseminate information to the public. The second type is television broadcasting, which reports social issues through television programs. The third type is sound broadcasting through radio programs. The fourth type is the Internet media, which refers to the utilization of cyberspace to transmit information to the public. The first three types of news media are called traditional news media or mainstream media as they have a long history.2 The use of television and radio programs requires the government authority to issue licenses for public broadcasting. Internet media is regarded as the new media in Hong Kong where there

Journalists as interest groups   63 are no clear regulations for publications compared to the other three types of news media. Journalists are the operators of these media and shoulder the responsibility of finding and disseminating information to members of the public. As such, the role of journalists is critical to any regime whose legitimacy is shaped by their reports and actions. Journalists recognize that a liberal democratic regime requires the free press to protect their interests. Liberal theorists believe that the mass media can check the power and abuse of politicians to ensure that there is a maximal flow of information within society to create an informed citizenry.3 To go further, liberal journalists play an essential role in democracy as illustrated in two inter-­ related notions of the fourth estate and watchdog journalism. Eric P. Louw has analyzed why liberal journalists adore the role of being the fourth estate: [T]he media are deemed to be “separate ‘estate’ within the political process. This implies that media should be seen to have same “rights” as the other estates – as fully fledged participants in the governance process.… The model grants to journalists the role of watchdogs over the other political participants. So the media … have “special rights” over and above other players, namely the right to have their autonomy protected; the right to monitor the other players; and the right to “free speech.”4 Therefore, according to liberal journalism, journalists have three roles in democracy: first, they should be necessarily critical of politicians; second, they should monitor and expose any power abuse of authority; third, they should provide a platform for debate.5 Liberalism shapes the character of journalists in the political process, making Hong Kong journalists a crucial factor in fighting for democratization in Hong Kong. Journalists also need democracy to sustain their role in a regime. In order to enjoy their independence, journalists require “protections,” which can be regarded as press rights, the political space of media and media accountability.6 A democratic space allows journalists to have press freedom with accountability to the public and to uphold ethical and professional standards. Democratically elected legislatures can enact laws that allow both journalists and ordinary citizens much more access to information on government policy and the actions of politicians than in the past. At the same time, democratization triggers the development of civil society, which gives rise to the public respect of human rights and the rule of law. The growth of civil society in turn strengthens the protection of journalists in scrutinizing their government as the fourth estate. Therefore, the relationship between journalists and democracy is mutually interdependent.

Journalists as interest groups There are several functions for journalists to perform as interest groups. First, they lobby the government in the policy making and implementation process.

64   K. W-K. Ming Second, they keep the public alert to the freedom of expression by holding press briefings and writing commentaries as well as reports to highlight the obstacles faced by journalists. Third, they participate in different political activities, like publishing statements and holding demonstrations to express their views to the public. Fourth, they cooperate with different interest groups to gather strength in pressing the government on specific issues. Fifth, they can be a bridge linking local journalists with foreign ones to promote the local democracy movement and protect their common interests and rights. Sixth, some of them can even take part in elections but play a mostly assisting role, unlike political party members who are keen to grasp power through electoral participation. Journalists have two major interest groups in Hong Kong: the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) and the Hong Kong Federation of Journalists (HKFJ). The HKJA is one of the interest groups at the forefront to represent journalists to strife for democracy and retain press freedom. It launched an active offensive against any barriers to news coverage, such as legislation that infringes on the free flow of information and the public’s right to know the events concerned.7 The HKJA fulfills several functions, as mentioned before, like lobbying the government, holding press conferences to draw public attention to freedom of speech, reactions to political events, holding demonstrations and cooperating with other interest groups. Another major journalists’ interest group, the HKFJ, was founded in 1996 and it has six objectives. First, the organization upholds the freedom of speech and of the press in Hong Kong. Second, it protects journalists’ interests and dignity. Third, it aspires to sustain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Fourth, it encourages Hong Kong journalists to interact with mainland media organizations and other international journalist groups. Fifth, it strengthens cooperation among Hong Kong journalists. Sixth, it enhances the training of journalists to uphold their professionalism. Both HKJA and HKFJ put the mission of upholding press freedom top of their agenda. Still, with different political ideologies – HKJA being more liberal and critical of the establishment while HKFJ being more conservative and pro-­ government – they adopt different approaches in lobbying the government in the protection of freedom of expression. The HKJA tends to be more vocal and politically active, whereas HKFJ more low-­profile and pro-­regime. The HKJA lobbies the government by publishing submissions to influence the government’s policymaking. Table 4.1 shows all the submissions of the HKJA since July 1, 1997. These submissions are all related to press freedom, freedom of expression, editorial independence and the political space of journalists. First, the HKJA is concerned about the suppression of freedom of speech by the government authority. For example, it issued a submission discussing the adverse effect of passing the National Security Bill in 2003 and requested the government to withdraw the bill. The association was also concerned about the abuse of the sedition and subversion law to prosecute journalists and to undermine press freedom by fear. The submission on the HKSAR’s implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2006 demanded that the government should protect Hong Kong people’s basic

Journalists as interest groups   65 Table 4.1  The lobbying activities of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association Date

Incident and position

April 7, 2003

Submission on the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill to the government, arguing that the bill would undermine Hong Kong’s press freedom seriously. Submission on Law on Search and Seizure Needs Urgent Overhaul to the government, arguing that the amendment of Part XII to ensure that production orders and search warrants should be sought and granted in only rare cases and where serious offences were involved. Submission on the HKSAR Region’s Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, urging the UN Human Rights Committee to call for a supplementary report on Hong Kong’s implementation of the ICCPR one year after the March 2006 hearings in New York. Submission on the Review of Public Service Broadcasting to the government, arguing that the government should protect the editorial independence and press freedom of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). Submission on the Review of Public Service Broadcasting to the government, arguing that the government should uphold the independence and integrity of the public broadcaster. Submission on Consultation Paper on Proposed Spectrum Policy Framework to the government, arguing that the government’s new spectrum policy objectives should include a provision that would ensure public service broadcasting and similar services could still play a major role in Hong Kong’s overall broadcasting environment. Submission on Broadcasting Authority’s Action on Gay Lovers Program to the government, arguing that the serious advice related to an RTHK program on gay lovers, which the Broadcasting Authority considered to be “unfair, partial and biased towards homosexuality and having the effect of promoting the acceptance of homosexual marriage,” was not appropriate. Submission on the Review of the Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance to the government, arguing that controls on publications should be as light as possible. Submission in response to the Consultation Paper “The New RTHK: Fulfilling its Mission as a Public Service Broadcaster (PSB),” urging the Hong Kong Government should retract the decision of RTHK’s continual operation as a government department and that it should uphold the editorial independence of RTHK. Submission in response to the Telecommunication (Amendment) Bill 2009 to the government, arguing that the changes failed to satisfy the requirement of protecting the freedom of expression as enshrined in the international human rights conventions. The submission to Legislative Council (LegCo) on the future of RTHK, arguing that the government should enact legal documents to assure the continuity of the editorial independence and press freedom of RTHK.

November 2, 2005

February 24, 2006

March 24, 2006

October 13, 2006 January 22, 2007

February 5, 2007

January 16, 2009 November 19, 2009

November 30, 2009

June 2, 2010

continued

66   K. W-K. Ming Table 4.1  Continued Date

Incident and position

March 2, 2012

Submission to Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB) on the government consultation paper on stalking, examining the implications for legitimate journalistic activities and arguing that any new law could be abused to block genuine investigative activities by journalists. Submission to LegCo by referring to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), arguing that the government should legislate on “The Freedom of Information Act.” Submission to LegCo on the editorial independence of RTHK, arguing that RTHK should be independent from the government in order to uphold the editorial freedom. Submission on the review of the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance, urging the government to uphold the confidentiality of news materials. Submission to LegCo on its Proposed Policy on Public Access to Information & Records, arguing that the government should legislate on the “Archives Act.” Submission to LegCo on Interception of Communications and Surveillance (Amendment) Bill 2015, urging the government to uphold the confidentiality of news materials. Submission on new National Security Law of PRC in relation to principle of “One Country Two Systems,” arguing that the law should not include Hong Kong. Submission on new National Security Law of PRC in relation to human rights protection, arguing that the new National Security Law should take the ICCPR into account to avoid illegal infringement of human rights.

May 24, 2013 June 25, 2013 July 29, 2013 August 26, 2013 April 30, 2015 June 3, 2015 June 3, 2015

Source: See “The Hong Kong Journalists Association: Submissions,” available online at www.hkja. org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=L1–215&lang=en-US (accessed November 11, 2016).

human rights, especially the freedom of expression for journalists. The submission regarding the new National Security Law of PRC also revealed the stance of the HKJA to lobby the government to protect the freedoms listed in the Basic Law. The second type of submission is related to watchdog journalism. For example, the HKJA laid emphasis on the Telecommunication Bill, the regulations on stalking, and the Interception of Communications and the Surveillance Ordinance. To keep an eye on any abuse by the authorities, journalists may rely on stalking and even tapping in order to scrutinize the authority. As an interest group, the HKJA is keen to protect the interests of journalists and pressure the government to clarify the proposed bill against stalking and legislation related to the interception of communications. The third type is about the operation of media organizations. The HKJA pays close attention to the existing space or spectrum for broadcasting in order to maximize the interest of journalists. It demanded that the government should uphold the editorial independence of

Journalists as interest groups   67 journalists, including the character of the Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) as the public service broadcaster and allow the broadcasting of gay lover programs in the media. All the HKJA submissions are vital for journalists to express their views directly to the government so as to protect their interests. Besides lobbying government, the HKJA constantly focuses on the protection of freedom of expression in Hong Kong since 1997. Table 4.2 shows the topics in all the annual reports and the HKJA’s stance in various incidents, expressing its deep concern about the deteriorating freedom of speech over time. The association publishes annual reports that analyze the obstacles and threats encountered by journalists. The association holds press conference immediately after the publication of its annual report every year so as to keep the public aware of whether public interests, especially freedom of speech, are undermined. It uses a slogan as the annual report’s title or main topic to express deep concerns about press freedom. For instance, it expressed its worries about the mainland Chinese media’s propaganda approach that could be seen in Hong Kong in 1999 by using title named “Patriot Game.” It opposed the government’s use of the National Security Law to restrict press freedom in 2003 and adopted a slogan of having “False Security.” Ultimately the HKJA is opposed to the intervention of the Beijing government in Hong Kong’s press freedom. It constantly questions whether the status quo of Hong Kong’s press freedom can be maintained. This anxiety explains why the association must support democratization for the sake of sustaining journalists’ political space. As an interest group, the HKJA reacts to political events and participates in political actions, like publishing statements and holding demonstrations. Table 4.3 shows the HKJA’s active participation in political events. Reacting to political events, the HKJA tends to publish statements and also conducts surveys to assess the worries of journalists. For example, it condemned the use of violence to threaten and undermine press freedom in Hong Kong, like the parcel bomb explosion in Ming Pao office, the assault of Oriental Daily journalists in 2005 and the intimidation of Sing Pao in February 2017. It also pays special attention to the political prosecution of mainland journalists in China, including Liu Xiaobo, Hu Jia and Gao Yu. It held a signature petition calling for the release of Liu in 2010. The association was also concerned about possible political interference with the media industry, such as the appointment of a government official to be the Director of Broadcasting and government rejection of an application from the Hong Kong Television Network (HKTV) to acquire a license. It denounced the violation of press freedom by other groups and individuals, such as the eruption of violence against journalists in the Mong Kok riot in 2016 and the open disagreement with Chief Executive Mr. Leung Chun-­ ying’s legal action against Apple Daily’s editorial comment on him. Beside publishing statements, the HKJA has adopted a more radical way to express their outrage to the political intervention in press freedom. It mobilizes journalists to participate in demonstrations. For instance, the HKJA mobilized its members to join the protest against the speech of Deputy Director of Liaison Office of the Central People Government in the HKSAR (the Liaison Office),

68   K. W-K. Ming Table 4.2 The Annual Report of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association after the 1997 handover Year

Focused topic and position

1999

The Ground Rules Change: Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA expressed its worry about the interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress as the action ruined the rule of law, which might also affect the autonomy of Hong Kong. Patriot Games: Hong Kong’s Media Face to Face with the Taiwan Factor – The HKJA expressed its worry about the government action of prosecuting journalists in the future due to their report on “Taiwan Independence.” Following The Flag: China’s Sensitivities Threaten Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA expressed its optimism that the freedom of expression (and associated rights) was still in large measure enjoyed by the Hong Kong people, but the restriction of Falun Gong in China represented the political pressure on journalists’ press freedom. The Line Hardens: Tougher Stance on Civil Rights Threatens Freedom Of Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA was concerned about the tough stance of Chief Executive Mr. Tung Chee-hwa on the legislation of the Basic Law’s Article 23, which mentioned the need for the local government to enact the legislation relating to subversion, sedition, treason and sedition. False Security: Hong Kong’s National Security Laws Pose a Grave Threat to Freedom – The HKJA expressed its outrage at the attempt at legislating Article 23 of the Basic Law because it would infringe the freedom of expression. Beijing Turns the Screws: Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong under Attack – The HKJA expressed its concern about the political intervention in the dismissal of Commercial Radio Hong Kong’ host Albert Cheng King-hon. A Change of Wind – New Challenges to Hong Kong’s Freedom of Expression – The HKJA expressed its hope to the new Chief Executive Mr. Donald Tsang to protect the editorial independence of RTHK. RTHK Under Siege – Hong Kong Government Takes on the Public Broadcaster – The HKJA expressed its dissatisfaction with the government’s intervention in the operation of RTHK. Shrinking Margins: Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong Since 1997 – The HKJA expressed its anxiety over the trend of selfcensorship in the media industry. Rising Nationalism: A Potential Threat to Hong Kong’s Freedom of Expression – The HKJA expressed its worry about the rise of nationalism that worsened media self-censorship in Hong Kong. Macau Takes the Lead: Dangers for Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA expressed its worry about Hong Kong after the government of Macau legislated on the Basic Law’s Article 23 which according to the Hong Kong journalists would seriously undermine the freedom of speech.

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006 2007 2008 2009

continued

Journalists as interest groups   69 Table 4.2  Continued 2010 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

The Vice Tighten: Pressure Grows on Free Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA criticized the government’s tightened control over the freedom of speech. Two Systems Compromised: Free Expression Under Threat in Hong Kong – The HKJA expressed its concern about the government’s actions of disallowing the mainland’s dissidents to visit Hong Kong and of arresting some protestors without sufficient evidence. New Leader Raises Fears: Challenge for Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong – The HKJA expressed its worry about whether the new Chief Executive Mr. Leung Chun-ying would implement policy that would limit the press freedom further. Dark on Horizon: Hong Kong’s Freedom of Expression Faces New Threats – The HKJA criticized the government for not being friendly to journalists and even prosecuting a few journalists for their editorial stance against the government. Press Freedom under Siege – The HKJA was concerned about the “poor” situation of the freedom of speech in view of the violence against Ming Pao’s former chief editor Mr. Lau Chunto and of the controversy over the issue of Free-To-Air television license. Journalists Caught Between Two Fires – The HKJA expressed its opposition to the action of some protestors who turned violent against some journalists in the Occupy Central Movement from September to December 2014. One Country, Two Nightmares – The HKJA expressed its deep concern about the book publisher incident in which a publisher Lee Po disappeared in Hong Kong and where mainland agents were suspected of “kidnapping” him back to the mainland.

Source: See “The Hong Kong Journalists Association: Annual Reports after the 1997 Handover,” available online at www.hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=L1–170&lang=en-US (accessed November 11, 2016).

Wang Fengchao, who criticized Hong Kong journalists for reporting views on Taiwan that were different from the mainland perspective.8 The HKJA believed it was an intrusion on press freedom. This was the first time the HKJA participating in demonstrations since the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997. The second protest the HKJA took part in was the opposition to the National Security Bill that attempted to legislate on Article 23 of the Basic Law. The HKJA believed that the Bill would seriously infringe upon press freedom. Mak Yin-­ting, the HKJA President, joined the protest in December 2002.9 It was the first time the HKJA President had participated in a protest since 1997. Although some people blamed the HKJA for not being neutral, Mak pointed out that this legislation was directly affecting whether journalists could serve as the fourth estate that checked government power. The HKJA encouraged its members to join the demonstration on July 1, 2003 and there was an unprecedented turnout of over 500 journalists.10 The HKJA also staged several marches

70   K. W-K. Ming Table 4.3  Political participation of the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association Date

Incident and position

May 3, 2002

Issued an open letter to Chief Executive Mr. Tung Chee-hwa on World Press Freedom Day and expressed concerns about the infringement of press freedom by the police. Demanded the police that they should conduct thorough investigation into a parcel bomb targeted at the office of Ming Pao. Demanded the police that they should have thorough investigation into an attack against a vehicle of the Apple Daily. Demanded that the police should look into an assault on a journalist from the Oriental Daily. Launched a signature campaign for the release of mainland dissident Liu Xiaobo. Condemned the decision of South China Media’s Esquire magazine to lay off Daisy Chu, who worked on a feature story about the June 4 incident in China in 1989. Condemned the Sichuan police for their action of restricting the press freedom of reporting on the activities of mainland dissident Tan Zuoren. Urged the Chinese government to release dissident Hu Jia by allowing him a medical parole. Opposed the new RTHK charter which according to the HKJA would negatively affect Public Service Broadcasting. Issued a statement to show the HKJA pleasure with the news that Liu Xiaobo was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize. Strongly protested against the government’s action of undermining press freedom and the freedom of expression during the visit of the PRC Vice-Premier Li Keqiang to Hong Kong. Opposed the appointment of Roy Tang Yun-kwong as the Director of Broadcasting to lead the RTHK. Strongly dissatisfied with the LegCo’s veto on a bill that “safeguarded press freedom.” Felt highly disappointed with action of the Chief Executive to safeguard the rights of the Hong Kong journalists. Published a statement on the government’s action of issuing only two free-TV licenses, which to the HKJA was inconsistent with the idea of allowing the diversification of information through the mass media. Supported LegCo’s motion to call for more information and transparency on the government’s decision on the Free TV License. Condemned in the strongest terms the attack on Kevin Lau Chun-to, the former Chief Editor of Ming Pao. Strongly condemned the “false” accusation against RTHK journalists. Deeply worried about the new National Security Law in mainland China that would undermine the press freedom. Welcomed the appointment of a veteran journalist Mr. Leung Ka-wing as the Director of Broadcasting and hoped that he would safeguard RTHK’s editorial freedom.

November 7, 2005 October 24, 2005 October 31, 2006 July 2, 2009 July 28, 2009 August 21, 2009 April 9, 2010 August 13, 2010 October 8, 2010 August 20, 2011 September 9, 2011 November 24, 2011 October 8, 2013 October 15, 2013

November 5, 2013 February 26, 2014 October 28, 2014 July 1, 2015 August 8, 2015

continued

Journalists as interest groups   71 Table 4.3  Continued November 26, 2015 February 9, 2016 April 20, 2016 July 29, 2016 August 15, 2016 August 27, 2016 September 29, 2016 February 26, 2017

Demanded that the Chinese government should release the independent journalist Gao Yu. Condemned violence during the Mongkok riot in the Chinese New Year. Felt shocked at the dismissal of editor Keung Kwok-yuen by Ming Pao management and doubted why he was dismissed. Expressed its shock at the suspension of commentator Joseph Lien’s column on the Hong Kong Economic Journal. Condemned the “misbehavior” of Ta Kung Po’s journalists in interviewing a localist politician named Edward Leung Tin-kei. Opposed the government’s attempt at “censoring” the Internet media in covering the activities of LegCo elections. Felt shocked at the move of the Chief Executive Mr. C Y Leung to take legal action against the Apple Daily over its editorial comments. Strongly condemned the escalating violence and threats against Sing Pao Daily and its staff members.

Source: See “The Hong Kong Journalists Association: Statements Related to Political Events,” www. hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=L1–218&lang=en-US, access date: March 6, 2017.

to the Liaison Office to submit petition letters against the mainland government’s arrest of reporter Ching Cheong11 and its imprisonment of dissident Liu Xiaobo.12 In 2014, the HKJA held two demonstrations condemning the interference of the HKSAR government with journalists’ editorial independence13 and the use of violence against the former Ming Pao editor Kevin Lau Chun­to.14 Overall, the HKJA resisted any increase in political pressure from the mainland, which to the association is narrowing the political space of journalists in Hong Kong. Cooperating with other interest groups to pressure the government is another method of interest articulation used by the HKJA. It is a member of the Civil Human Rights Front, which been striving for the protection of human rights and the maturity of civil society since 2003.15 The Civil Human Rights Front is active in holding the annual July 1 march to lobby the government on various policy issues. Almost all the pan-­democrats join this umbrella organization in either individual or group capacity. While the HKJA claims itself as being neutral in politics, it expresses its liberal political views through the active participation in the annual rally and march organized by the Civil Human Rights Front. Moreover, the HKJA mobilizes other like-­minded journalist groups to call for the need to preserve press freedom and editorial independence. For instance, it invited the Hong Kong Press Photographers Association, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor and International Press Academy to partake in a joint signature campaign against the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law.16 The International Press Academy is an international journalist association representing over 500,000 journalists around the world. Their cooperation could draw global attention to the infringements of press freedom in Hong Kong.

72   K. W-K. Ming The HKJA also works with the staff associations of different media corporations to express their common interest of defending editorial independence, such as the collaboration with the RTHK Staff Association to protest against the appointment of government official, Roy Tang, as the Director of Broadcasting in 2011.17 The HKJA acts as a bridge between local and foreign journalists to promote and protect the democracy movement of Hong Kong. The HKJA is affiliated with the Belgium-­based International Federation of Journalists (IFJ).18 It shares common values with other journalists around the world through this platform. As such, when there is any political incident posing a threat to press freedom and editorial independence in Hong Kong, international journalists can get access to this information and express their worries and opposition. As mentioned before, the HKJA cooperated with the International Press Academy to oppose the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law. Furthermore, the IFJ published a joint statement with the HKJA showing their concern about the enactment of a new National Security Law in mainland China. The law stated that Hong Kong people had the right and responsibility to maintain the unification and national security of China. The IFJ and the HKJA were concerned about the likelihood that the new law would clamp down on the publications of the Hong Kong journalists, that it would facilitate the act of prosecuting them in the mainland China, and that it would endanger press freedom and the freedom of expression in Hong Kong under the principle of “one country, two systems.”19 Although the HKJA is an interest group supportive of democratization in Hong Kong, it does not support any political parties due to its asserted principle of political neutrality. Indeed, it can be argued that the HKJA is a liberal interest group and that neutrality is a myth. But neutrality, to the association, is defined narrowly as refraining from support of a political party in Hong Kong, Moreover, some journalists in Hong Kong support democratization by giving donations to candidates. Take Apple Daily as an example. The founder of Apple Daily Jimmy Lai Chee-­ying revealed that he donated money to pan-­democrats from April to June 2012.20 Although Lai was and is a media proprietor strongly supportive of the democracy movement, his act of donating money to the democrats might reflect the individual orientations of some journalists as well, because they have the common liberal ideology of supporting the freedom of speech, freedom of the press and democratic change. Other journalists donated money to candidates who participated in the 2016 LegCo election campaign, such as the reporters and members of Passion Times, an Internet media, who sponsored Cheng Chung-­tai with over HK$500,000.21 The Passion Times also donated HK$60,000 to another candidate, Raymond Wong Yuk-­man.22 Beside Passion Times, the founder of the Internet radio named D100, former legislator Albert Cheng King-­hon, provided financial assistance to two candidates in the 2016 LegCo election. They were liberal independent Lau Siu-­lai and Gary Fan Kwok-­ wai from the Neo-­Democrats who received HK$170,000 and HK$230,000 respectively.23

Journalists as interest groups   73 Compared with the HKJA, the HKFJ did not participate in mass political actions to protect the interests of journalists. Having a pro-­Beijing political stance, the HKFJ has frequent meetings with the Liaison Office and the Chief Executive to exchange opinions on the social responsibility of journalists and the protection of press freedom of Hong Kong.24 However, the HKFJ’s pro-­establishment stance does not mean that it does not lobby the government. The federation submitted a proposal on the review of the Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance in 2009, arguing that the government should provide clear statements to regulate the publication of these materials.25 To the HKFJ, the government’s clarification was necessary to prevent journalists from violating the law carelessly and to protect the public’s right to know. The improvement of the ordinance would protect human rights and contribute to the maturity of civil society. The HKFJ also upholds journalists’ interests by denouncing any violent actions against journalists. It published a statement castigating localist politician Edward Leung Tin-­ kei for turning violently against Ta Kung Pao’s journalist.26 Although the HKFJ is politically conservative and pro-­government, its lobbying activities still contribute to the democratization of Hong Kong in general, especially if democratization is defined as a movement in protection of human rights.

Obstacles to the democracy movement Although the HKJA, its like-­minded journalist groups and even the HKFJ try to maintain the political space for journalists, such space seems to be narrowing with the increase in political pressure from the mainland Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong matters. From the perspective of Hong Kong media proprietors, journalists should ideally not participate in interest groups that hinder their companies’ profitability and business development locally and in the mainland. As a result, some proprietors with business interests in Hong Kong and China are vulnerable to political pressure from mainland officials and to the exercise of self-­censorship. Journalists who criticize their superiors for self-­ censorship are susceptible to being pressured and dismissed. Yet, media proprietors and owners see their extracting private benefits and profits as of paramount importance. If they censor politically sensitive news to be published, their media organizations can still survive and even sustain the business.27 Arguably, media proprietors protect their self-­interests and profits at the expense of supporting liberal journalism, thereby constraining the role of Hong Kong journalists from performing as members of the fourth estate to check the political power of the HKSAR government and, particularly, Beijing.

Suspension of outspoken hosts at the Commercial Radio Hong Kong (CRHK) There are several examples showing the increase in political intervention in the media industry. The first case was the dismissal of outspoken host, Albert Cheng, at CRHK which has been operating for over 50 years and well known

74   K. W-K. Ming for its commentary programs in Hong Kong politics. The veteran journalist Cheng was the host of the program “Teacup in a Storm,” criticizing the government constantly. Albert Cheng voiced unique and penetrating criticisms, earning a nickname “the Chief Executive before 10 a.m.” Some government officials at that time were dissatisfied with Albert Cheng’s comments and complained to CRHK. On April 25, 2003, Albert Cheng blamed the acting Chief Executive of the Hospital Authority Ko Wing-­man for the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).28 This aroused the government’s anger at him and the Broadcasting Authority sent a complaint to CRHK.29 Cheng condemned the government for exerting political pressure on CRHK. On June 16, 2003, he announced that he would leave the program for two months.30 At that time, CRHK was waiting for the government to renew the radio broadcasting license which would expire in August 2003. After the suspension of Albert Cheng, CRHK received the government agreement to renew the license for 12 more years.31 Therefore, it was believed that CRHK yielded to political pressure at that time in order to renew the license. Although Albert Cheng returned to CRHK in August 2003, he was suspended again in May 2004 together with another veteran journalist Raymond Wong Yuk-­man.32 Raymond Wong was a famous commentator in CRHK and discussed Hong Kong politics for over 10 years. Both Cheng and Wong constantly lambasted the government for policy failure. In the end, Cheng and Wong were dismissed by CRHK. These incidents could be seen as the media’s vulnerability to political intervention, which undoubtedly infringes upon journalists’ freedom of speech. A similar incident happened in 2013, when veteran journalist Li Wei-­ling was the host of CRHK program “On a Clear Day.” The program was similar to Cheng’s phone-­in program “Teacup in a Storm.” Li‘s criticisms of the government also made some officials angry and the renewal of CRHK’s radio broadcasting license was coincidentally delayed. On November 15, 2013, Li was transferred to host an evening program.33 Albert Cheng described Li’s transferal i as a repeat of history. He predicted that Li would be sacked very soon.34 On February 12, 2014, CRHK terminated Li’s contract.35 Li held a press conference to explain her suspension and she condemned Chief Executive Leung Chun-­ying for intervening in press freedom and freedom of speech.36 Again CRHK appeared to yield to political pressure for the continuity of its business. Not surprisingly, The Executive Council approved the renewal of the CRHK license on March 23, 2016 but specifically depreciated Li’s performance as not being objective.37 The suspension of CRHK’s hosts clouded the freedom of speech of journalists. If journalists want to uphold liberal journalism and become critics of the government, their career runs the risk of being endangered due to the limited political space of Hong Kong.

The saga of issuing free-­to-air television license Apart from radio broadcasting, political intervention can be seen in other mainstream media. The government’s refusal to issue a license to the Hong Kong

Journalists as interest groups   75 Television Network (HKTV) was severely criticized in 2013. HKTV had applied for the license since January 2010 and its president Ricky Wong Wai- kay was positive about the prospect of getting the license, because the HKTV was the first company applying for the license with a well-­developed plan.38 However, the discussion abnormally lasted for more than three years. On October 16, 2013, HKTV was not granted a free television broadcasting license. Another two applicants, the Hong Kong Television Entertainment and the Fantastic Television, were successful. The government claimed that the television market could not accommodate three additional television companies to compete and that it had no choice but to sustain the market’s healthiness.39 Still, some press media revealed that the government’s consultant report suggested issuing all three licenses but the Executive Council did not follow this. Some commentators said the failure of HKTV’s application stemmed from Ricky Wong’s criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2008. Before applying for the Free-­To-Air television license, Ricky Wong had been made the chief executive officer of Asia Television Limited (ATV) in December 2008 to improve ATV’s operation, but he suddenly resigned after 12 days in office. There were rumors saying that Wong would like to reform the news reporting style of ATV. He remarked that ATV should not be using propaganda in news reporting since this would be detrimental to ATV’s reputation. His remarks reportedly made the Liaison Office’s officials upset and then they exerted pressure on the ATV management to dismiss Ricky Wong.40 Hence, HKTV’s failure to acquire the license was described by some commentators as revenge from the Liaison Office. Journalist Ryan Lau Chun-­kong analyzed the reasons for HKTV’s application failure and insisted that there was political pressure from mainland China in the decision-­making process.41 Ricky Wong did not have any business in mainland China, thus making it difficult for the CCP to control the media broadcast. But mainland officials might apply indirect pressure on the ATV management and also the HKSAR government, according to rumors.

Anxiety over the Chief Executive’s action against the media There were anxieties amongst some members of the public over the Chief Executive’s legal action against media professionals. The Hong Kong Economic Journal (HKEJ) writer Joseph Lian wrote an article making accusations against Chief Executive Leung Chun-­ying and it was published on January 29, 2013. The newspaper received a legal letter from the representative of Leung and later it published an apology on February 7, 2013.42 In this incident, Leung was criticized for “interfering” with press freedom. Later, Leung sent a warning letter to Lian for his article’s comment on Leung’s daughter Leung Chai-­yan.43 At last, Lian apologized to Leung in his HKEJ column.44 Sixteen months later, Lian’s column in HKEJ was stopped and he believed that there appeared to be surging political pressure on HKEJ.45 It was the first time a current Chief Executive sent a legal letter to a journalist due to the latter’s comments. Critics of the government were concerned about the possibility that the proprietors of media corporations

76   K. W-K. Ming might be forced by the complex political circumstances to protect their business at the expense of press freedom. Journalists who are working inside these companies can only follow the instructions they are given or they can easily be dismissed because of bold comments critical of the authorities. The mysterious intimidation of Sing Pao journalists who kept on criticizing the Liaison Office revealed political pressure on the media organization which dares to challenge the central government in Beijing. Sing Pao published an editorial blaming Chief Executive Leung Chun-­ying and the Liaison Office for tearing Hong Kong society apart by elevating the issue of Hong Kong independence to an unprecedented degree of importance in 2014.46 On September 1, 2016, Sing Pao published a statement on the front page of the newspaper claiming that the Liaison Office took revenge on its staff and proprietors and such action threatened their personal safety.47 The owner of Sing Pao, Gu Zuoheng, was simultaneously under the arrest warrant of the mainland police for having illegal income over HK$130 million and for engaging in illicit commercial transactions in China.48 These events aroused public suspicion over whether there was political intimidation targeted at Sing Pao’s stance and publications. Still, Sing Pao did not stop its criticisms of Leung and the Liaison Office. On February 27, 2017, it published a statement saying that it called the police four times in a month as it faced severe threats from gangsters. One of its colleagues had his house door smeared with red paint, a sign of triad intimidation. There were other threatening moves, such as the act of putting up threatening posters outside an employee’s home and the influx of hate phone calls and emails to its editorial team members.49 Some members of the public were concerned about the subtle use of intimidation to threaten media corporations critical of the government authorities rather than being a loyal propaganda tool.

Editorial independence of RTHK The controversial role of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) cast a shadow over the media industry in light of the increasing political intervention in its editorial independence. The RTHK operation illustrates the dilemma of journalists in a public broadcasting organization financially supported by the government. Endowed with the ideology of liberal journalism, RTHK journalists are expected to report and comment on socio-­political issues with objectivity. Yet, the RTHK is organizationally part of the HKSAR government. Sometimes RTHK journalists are critical of government policies and this behavior has aroused official displeasure. The controversial role of RTHK was brought to the forefront in 2006, when the government set up a committee to discuss its future character and development. In March 2007, the committee published the consultation report and suggested that RTHK should be reformed into a new public broadcasting institution independent of the government.50 On the one hand, RTHK could enjoy greater political space and editorial independence to produce high quality programs. On the other hand, its staff members would lose their welfare benefits of being employed as civil servants. After two years of

Journalists as interest groups   77 discussion, the government decided to retain RTHK as a part of its administrative arm to provide a public broadcasting service, but it signed a charter named the Charter of Radio Television Hong Kong to ensure that the existing organizational structure, the diversity of programs and its editorial independence would be continuously upheld.51 This charter took the Royal Charter of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) as a reference to retain RTHK’s role of delivering a public broadcasting service. However, as the organizational structure remains unchanged, the Director of Broadcasting has the political power in RTHK to shape the degree of its editorial independence. In fact, RTHK staff members were concerned about the possibility that the government might retaliate against those critical of the administration. In September 2011, the government appointed the former Deputy Secretary for Labour and Welfare Roy Tang to be the new Director of Broadcasting. Tang did not have any working experience in the media industry and some journalists criticized this appointment as a sign of political intervention in the editorial independence of RTHK.52 After Tang joined the RTHK as Director of Broadcasting, within three months a commentator named Ng Chi-­sum was dismissed. There were rumors claiming that Tang was dissatisfied with Ng’s criticisms of the government in his radio programs.53 However, there was no evidence to substantiate the rumors. In September 2015, a veteran journalist Leung Ka-­wing was appointed to succeed Tang, but the political space at RTHK appeared to narrow further as two programs discussing politics were terminated.54

The book publishers incident and press freedom The fear of political interference in the press industry returned in January 2016 when one of the shareholders of the Causeway Bay bookstore, Lee Bo was reportedly kidnapped by mainland Chinese secret agents due to his act of selling prohibited Chinese political books in the mainland.55 As early as November 2015, some Hong Kong Chinese newspapers reported that the shareholder of the bookstore, Gui Minhai, disappeared in Thailand. They guessed that Gui’s disappearance was related to the publication of political books about the Chinese Communist Party and its scandals.56 Strangely, all of his colleagues at the bookstore, including the manager Lui Bo, Cheung Chi-­ping and the founder Lam Wing-­kee, were also reportedly missing. The disappearance of Lee Bo hit the headlines of Hong Kong’s newspapers and aroused public anxiety over the mainland’s direct political interference with press freedom in Hong Kong. The HKJA and the Independent Commentators Association sent a letter to the government and the Liaison Office to ask for explanations of Lee Bo’s disappearance and to question whether secret agents were sent to kidnap Lee without any official permission. Both associations recognized the seriousness of the incident, which constituted an infringement of press freedom in Hong Kong.57 After two weeks, Gui was reported to be detained on the mainland because of his previous record of drunk driving and suspected criminal offences in China.58 Gui claimed on mainland television news program that he had

78   K. W-K. Ming s­ urrendered and felt guilty as to what he had done before. Lee Bo also sent a letter to his wife and said he was on the mainland to assist the government’s investigation. He claimed that he was implicated by Gui. However, the government and the Liaison Office still did not explain to the Hong Kong public why Lee Bo was transferred to the mainland without an official outbound record. In late February 2016, the incident had a new twist. Four of his bookstore colleagues – Gui, Lui, Cheung and Lam – were on Phoenix Television and explained that they had committed the crime of conducting illegal business operations in mainland and felt guilty.59 But their appearance on the television programs did not eradicate the worries of the shrinking press freedom in Hong Kong, especially in view of the mainland agents’ cross-­border “kidnap.” In March, Lee Bo informed the media he had been smuggled to the mainland to assist the investigation and he was safe there.60 At the same time, two members of Causeway Bay Books – Lui and Cheung – returned to Hong Kong and requested that the police close their case files.61 Lee Bo returned to Hong Kong in late March and announced to the public that the bookstore would not be opened again.62 In a media interview, he recommended other booksellers in Hong Kong not to publish and sell political books about the CCP and that the public should recognize that press freedom and freedom of speech did not mean journalists and intellectuals could write whatever they liked. Then he returned to the mainland the next day. It was perhaps clear that Lee was under political duress to moderate his remarks, Even though Lee reappeared in Hong Kong, the rumors of CCP intervention in Hong Kong’s press freedom and freedom of speech continued. The bookstore manager Lam Wing-­kee returned to Hong Kong in June 2016 and he claimed that there was a secret agent team called the “central case examination group,” whose members detained him in the mainland and investigated the sales of political books by the Causeway Bay Bookstore. He speculated that the CCP officials were angry at the publication of many political books about the party and its leaders, not to mention mailing these books to the buyers in the mainland, and that they ordered the team to stop them from further publications. Even though the public did not have solid evidence to prove that there was such a secret organization responsible for “kidnapping” and arresting “troublesome” publishers in Hong Kong, it was widely believed that the CCP would not accept the circulation of any publications against the ruling party in China. The entire book publisher saga cast a dark shadow on press freedom in Hong Kong.

The use of cyberspace in the struggle for democracy Owing to political pressure from the authorities, Hong Kong journalists are now actively finding new channels to disseminate information without political intervention from outside forces. Some of them have chosen to use cyberspace skillfully – a new method of interest articulation and of defending their press freedom. According to Sheila Coronel, the Internet has proven to be a much

Journalists as interest groups   79 more democratic medium than newspapers and television, allowing a freer exchange of views for a variety of social groups.63 Abandoned by the mainstream media, the two veteran journalists in CRHK, Albert Cheng and Raymond Wong, founded their own media corporations. Wong set up an Internet channel named My Radio in February 2007 to comment on global and local politics. He recognized the usage of Internet as a means to pressure the government without any political intervention and cyberspace as an instrument of upholding journalists’ freedom of speech.64 Wong also used this platform to promote his political ideas, like the so-­called referendum movement in the 2010 LegCo by-­election and also the idea of localism. Cheng founded an Internet radio channel, D100, in July 2013. Before the establishment of D100, Cheng was a shareholder of Digital Broadcasting Corporation (DBC) with an amplitude modulation broadcasting license. But the DBC suffered from deficiencies from its foundation. Cheng turned to the Internet, using D100 to criticize the government constantly and participating in political campaigns, like closing his Internet station for three days to support the HKTV in its license application and mobilizing the audience to join political rallies.65 Both Wong and Cheng have seen cyberspace as a safety valve to escape from political intervention and to persist with the practice of liberal and critical journalism. More local journalists are using cyberspace to uphold their freedom of speech and promote democratization than ever before. Politician Wong Yeung-­tat, the former leader of a political group named Civic Passion, was the founder of Passion Times, which is a media organization not only providing current news on the Internet but also sharing political critiques and participating in direct elections. In the 2016 LegCo election, Passion Times donated money to Civic Passion’s candidates in their campaigns.66 Civic Passion finally won a seat in the LegCo. A former Hong Kong Economic Journal deputy editor Yau Ching-­yuen also founded a new media named Post 852, which is seen as pro-­democracy media. He recognized that the political space of the Internet media is larger than that of traditional media. Yau also admitted that the self-­censorship of traditional news media, like newspapers and televisions, made journalists feel frustrated. Consequently, he left Hong Kong Economic Journal and founded the Internet news media Post 852.67 Many of these Internet media are pro-­democracy, critical of the government and provide video commentaries to discuss political issues on YouTube. Most of them are also criticizing the pro-­Beijing camp and even the CCP in the mainland.68 Yau hopes that Post 852 will be able to enhance civic awareness and to deter any political intrusion from mainland officials into local press freedom.69 The rapid rise of the Internet media can be seen as the new democracy movement initiated by many liberal journalists in Hong Kong.

Can pro-­Beijing journalists promote democracy through watchdog journalism? While many journalists are trying different ways to maintain their political space and press freedom, pro-­Beijing journalists tend to hold different views. These

80   K. W-K. Ming politically conservative media include Oriental Daily, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po which constantly carry commentaries and editorials condemning the pan-­democrats. In theory, they serve as an arm of the government and support the status quo. In reality, however, they promote democratic change unintentionally through the role of being a watchdog. Watchdog journalism has been identified and discussed for more than 200 years. According to Gerald Stone, Mary O’Donnell and Stephen Banning, the role of media as watchdog originated from the seventeenth century, when media professionals informed the public and uncovered the governmental abuse of power.70 Scholars such as Steven Clayman, John Heritage, Marc Elliott and Laurie McDonald define watchdog journalism as having the role of proactively denouncing the government or public agencies whenever any discrepancy is discovered.71 They see the media as not only possessing the duty of criticizing governance but also acting as a dog to protect things for its master. When a watchdog discovers any discrepancy, it will bark and alert its master. The same situation can be applied to reality. Journalists should “bark” when they notice any act detrimental to public interest. According to Sheila Coronel72 and Sandeep Singh,73 the formal name of the watchdog function of media is called investigative journalism, which refers to the media role in exposing how laws and regulations are violated by someone in a powerful position. Eric Louw argues that it is muckraking journalism that focuses on how to dig out lurid and titillating stories of the rich and famous.74 This role is critical to fulfill “the public’s right to know” in journalism and goes a long way towards the scrutiny of the integrity of politicians and celebrities in a society. Since 1997, pro-­Beijing journalists have been criticizing and scrutinizing the democrats in Hong Kong. This act can be seen as spectacle or sensationalized journalism, which is a deliberate attempt at undermining their opponents and provoking emotional responses in the audience.75 For instance, Wen Wei Po published a report related to 12 Democratic Party (DP) LegCo members who were suspected of using LegCo’s subsidized consultant fees to run a private company under their party’s control in July 2000.76 In the end, all the DP members involved in this issue returned their entire consultant fees to the LegCo, but the scandal affected public perceptions toward these democrats, especially as the LegCo election would be held in the following month. In the 2000 LegCo election, the votes given to the DP dropped over 8 percent compared to the previous election in 1998.77 Voters naturally questioned the integrity of politicians and paid attention on their behavior and integrity. In August 2004, DP legislator James To Kun-­sun was reportedly suspected of stealing some rental subsidies by renting his own private property as his regional office.78 In April 2009, another DP legislator Wong Sing-­chi’s status as a registered social worker was questioned by the media.79 These scandals were targeted at democrats to minimize their chances of being elected or re-­elected as legislators. This situation, however, can also be regarded as a move by the pro-­Beijing media to enlighten the members of the public about the integrity of pro-­ democracy politicians, thus unintentionally promoting democratic change in the society and politics of Hong Kong.

Journalists as interest groups   81 In 2016, some pro-­Beijing journalists became paparazzi in order to stalk politicians and dig out their private affairs. Localist politicians were the targets of these pro-­establishment journalists. Ta Kung Pao had consecutively published stories about Hong Kong Indigenous spokesman Edward Leung Tin-­kei’s private life on the front page.80 The newspaper revealed that Leung did not have a job but he was able to rent a service apartment for HK$24,000 a month. He also bought a car costing HK$300,000. Ta Kung Pao’s journalists queried whether Leung used the donations to the Hong Kong Indigenous for private use. Leung defended himself, saying that the car was secondhand. But his image appeared to be tarnished by the violent encounter with a journalist from Ta Kung Pao in a subway station. In October and November 2016, the oath-­taking saga erupted when two young legislators-­elect made offensive remarks which were deemed to be politically disloyal to the PRC government; the event hit the headlines of all Hong Kong newspapers. Ta Kung Po sent a team of paparazzi to stalk the two main characters, Yau Wai-­ching and Sixtus Leung Chung-­hang, both from the localist political party, Youngspiration. These two localists were blamed for insulting the Chinese citizens and government when they attended the swearing-­in ceremony at the LegCo. On October 25, 2016, the Ta Kung Po paparazzi team revealed Leung’s dating with his girlfriend.81 A few days later, the same newspaper reported that Yau and Leung were living in a flat in Wan Chai.82 All these “scandals” and gossips were aimed at defaming political enemies while winning the hearts and minds of the citizens to support the pro-­ establishment camp. From the perspective of targeted democrats, their privacy was being invaded. However, it can be argued that all these news stories unintentionally accelerate the democratic change in Hong Kong. Sheila Coronel’s “watchdog role of the news media” recognizes the impact of digging up scandals in watchdog journalism on the engagement of civilians not usually interested in politics.83 She has argued that scandals about well-­known people and sensational details appeal to the public appetite for gossip. But when the scandals are related to public interests, such as human rights abuse and the misbehavior of politicians, the public take them seriously. As Hong Kong’s public trust in politicians has been declining in the past decade, partly due to their performance and partly because of the continuous political squabbles in society, if a politician is not politically trustworthy, some members of the public do worry about whether he or she can defend public interests in the LegCo. Hence, the media revelations about the behavior and integrity of politicians do directly encourage civic engagement, indirectly warn them to choose appropriate representatives in LegCo, and unintentionally buttress the foundations of a liberal and democratic society, even though Hong Kong’s polity is semi-­democratic. Moreover, these journalists help enhance the right of citizens to know more about the various issues pertinent to public interest. Arguably, watchdog journalism in Hong Kong does propel the further development of democratization and liberalization in Hong Kong.

82   K. W-K. Ming

Conclusion Journalists in Hong Kong are promoting the democracy movement both intentionally and unintentionally even though they have different political stances, ranging from pro-­democracy to pro-­Beijing. As interest groups, some journalists are politically neutral in reporting while some advocate the core values of liberalism, notably freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the rule of law.  Some uphold the essence of scrutinizing governance in Hong Kong society. In a liberal society, journalists and democratic institutions are mutually dependent on each other. A higher level of democratization is conducive to the sustainability and expansion of the political space for journalists. As a leading labor union in the media industry, the HKJA has taken the lead in safeguarding press freedom and pressuring the government when there is any sign of infringing the interests of journalists. Even though the HKJA is, relatively, not as influential and a large-­scale political interest group as the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU), it stands in the forefront of local journalists to prevent any contraction of their political space. It submits proposals to lobby the government, conducts regular surveys among journalists and holds press briefings to highlight all the obstacles encountered by journalists, especially those who are under political pressure from the mainland authorities. It also reacts to political events by participating in demonstrations and publishing statements against controversial government bills and policies. It serves as a bridge between local journalists and foreign journalists to report on the progress of the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Some journalists also donate money to pan-­democrats in elections to support their campaigns. All these activities have revealed the liberal political inclination of journalists in supporting the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Another journalists’ interest group, the HKFJ, is regarded as pro-­establishment and pro-­Beijing; nevertheless, it does organize lots of events to lobby the government for the sake of upholding press freedom and freedom of speech as with the HKJA. Overall, journalists as different interest groups have been contributing to the democratization of Hong Kong. Although some media proprietors care more about their business interests than press freedom, more local journalists have found cyberspace as the channel through which they can express their views freely. The establishment of the new Internet media like My Radio,84 D100,85 Passion Times86 and Post 85287 symbolize the use of cyberspace to promote democratization.88 Furthermore, pro-­Beijing journalists, who did not aim to promote political change, unintentionally consolidate the liberal environment of Hong Kong through their sensational and watchdog journalism to check the behavior of the pan-­democrats, especially the pro-­democracy politicians whose integrity has often been challenged and questioned. Although the pro-­Beijing press tries to scandalize the pan-­democratic politicians, its coverage of their scandals has heightened the political awareness of the people of Hong Kong in general and educated the public about the importance of the prevention of abuse of power by politicians. Hence, it can be argued that even the pro-­establishment media

Journalists as interest groups   83 unintentionally carry out the three duties of liberal journalists: being critical of politicians, revealing any abuse of power by politicians and generating a discussion platform to safeguard public interest. On the whole, as members of the fourth branch of “government,” Hong Kong journalists constitute a cornerstone of democratization through their diligent work of curbing the power of the government, defending human rights, advocating press freedom and scrutinizing the behavior of politicians. The indefinite postponement by the government to enact Article 23 of the Basic Law in July 2003 could be attributable to the fierce opposition from local journalists. Overall, however, the situation of press freedom in the HKSAR has deteriorated. In the 1998 annual report, the HKJA did not use any negative adjectives to describe the freedom of speech in Hong Kong, but in the 2016 annual report it used the word “nightmare” to describe the current situation. This made many people believe the current situation is worse than before. With the increase in political intervention from the government and Beijing, such as the HKTV saga and the Causeway Bay bookstore incident, the HKJA has become more pessimistic about upholding press freedom amidst the contracting political space in the HKSAR. It is conceivable that the clash between liberal journalism in Hong Kong and the CCP’s propaganda journalism will persist. Perhaps the continual struggle between the ideology of liberalism of Hong Kong journalists in general and the tradition of CCP-­led propaganda journalism is bound to grow, partly because “one country, two systems” does have its inherent contradictions and partly because many local journalists are determined to uphold their professionalism and core values of defending their freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The path of the democracy movement in Hong Kong is destined to be difficult and protracted in view of the new phenomenon that many local journalists have shifted to using cyberspace as a means through which to fight for their political space, defending their rights and protecting the public interest.

Notes   1 Apple Daily, February 20, 2016, p. A20.   2 Scott L. Althaus and David Tewksbury, “Patterns of Internet and Traditional News media use in a networked community,” Political Communication vol.  17 (2000), pp. 21–45.   3 P. Eric Louw, The Media and Political Process, 2nd edn. (London: Sage, 2010), p. 38.   4 Ibid., p. 48.   5 Julianne Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).   6 Sheila Coronel, “Corruption and the Watchdog Role of The News Media” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 6.   7 See “Hong Kong Journalist Association: What We Do,” available online at www.hkja. org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1–497&lang=en-­US (accessed December 3, 2016).   8 Hong Kong Daily News, April 17, 2000, p. A06.   9 Hong Kong Daily News, December 16, 2002, p. A02. 10 Hong Kong Economic Journal, July 2, 2003, p. P04. 11 Apple Daily, June 3, 2005, p. A10.

84   K. W-K. Ming 12 Headline Daily, July 3, 2009, p. P14. 13 Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 24, 2014, p. A14. 14 See “Hong Kong Journalists Association’s Press Release: Around 13000 People Say ‘No’ to Violence on March 2, 2014,” available online at www.hkja.org.hk/site/ portal/Site.aspx?id=A1–1184&lang=en-­US, access date: December 3, 2016. 15 See “Civil Human Rights Front: Background and Belief,” available online at www. civilhrfront.org/ (accessed November 28, 2016). 16 Apple Daily, November 25, 2002, p. A05. 17 Hong Kong Economic Times, September 16, 2011, p. A30. 18 See “Hong Kong Journalists Association: Who We Are,” available online at www.hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1–496&lang=en-­US (accessed March 6, 2017). 19 See “Hong Kong Journalists Association: Statement of New National Security Law,” available online at www.hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=A1–1362&lang=en-­US (accessed March 6, 2017). 20 Hong Kong Economic Journal, July 23, 2014, p. A12. 21 See “The Stand News: Legislative Council Election Campaign Donation 10 November 2016,” available online at www.thestandnews.com/politics/ (accessed December 1, 2016). 22 Sing Tao Daily, November 11, 2016, p. A16. 23 See “The Stand News: Legislative Council Election Campaign Donation 11 November 2016,” available online at www.thestandnews.com/politics/ (accessed December 1, 2016). 24 See “Hong Kong Federation of Journalists: News,” available online at www.hkfj.org/ index.php?m=list&a=index&id=8 (accessed February 2, 2017). 25 See “Hong Kong Federation of Journalists: Comment on the Review of the Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance,” available online at www.hkfj.org/ view_topic.php?id=53&lang=tc (accessed January 25, 2017). 26 See “Hong Kong Federation of Journalists: Statement,” available online at www.hkfj. org/view_topic.php?id=191&lang=tc (accessed January 25, 2017). 27 Sheila Coronel, “Corruption and the Watchdog Role of The News Media” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 7. 28 Ming Pao, April 26, 2003, p. A03. 29 Ibid., June 15, 2003, p. A08. 30 Ibid., June 16, 2003, p. A08. 31 Ibid., July 23, 2003, p. A07. 32 Ibid., May 14, 2004, p. A10. 33 Ibid., November 16, 2013, p. A02. 34 Ibid., November 16, 2013, p. A05. 35 Ibid., February 13, 2014, p. A01. 36 Ibid., February 14, 2014, p. A01. 37 Ibid., March 23, 2016, p. A03. 38 Ibid., January 1, 2010, p. A04. 39 Ibid., October 17, 2013, p. A02. 40 The Sun, December 16, 2008, p. A02; Sing Pao, December 20, 2008, p. A07. 41 Apple Daily, October 20, 2013, p. E09. 42 Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 8, 2013, p. A10. 43 Ibid., March 19, 2015, p. A21; ibid., March 20, 2015, p. A22. 44 Ibid., March 23, 2015, p. A18. 45 Ibid., August 1, 2016, p. A17. 46 Apple Daily, August 31, 2016, p. A02. 47 Sing Pao, September 1, 2016, p. A01. 48 Hong Kong Economic Times, September 1, 2016, p. A22.

Journalists as interest groups   85 49 Sing Pao, February 27, 2017, p. A01. 50 Hong Kong Economic Times, March 28, 2007, p. A32. 51 Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 23, 2009, p. P13. 52 Ming Pao, September 10, 2011, p. A01. 53 Oriental Daily, November 24, 2011, p. A32. 54 Apple Daily, January 7, 2016, p. A06. 55 Ming Pao, January 1, 2016, p. A12. 56 Oriental Daily, November 7, 2015, p. A02. 57 Apple Daily, January 3, 2016, p. A01. 58 Ming Pao, January 18, 2016, p. A02. 59 Ibid., February 29, 2016, p. A04. 60 Ibid., March 1, 2016, p. A11. 61 Ibid., March 7, 2016, p. A02. 62 Ibid., March 25, 2016, p. A01. 63 Sheila Coronel, “Corruption and the Watchdog Role of The News Media” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 15. 64 Ming Pao, March 10, 2008, p. D04. 65 Hong Kong Economic Journal, November 1, 2013, p. A18. 66 See “The Stand News: Legislative Council Election Campaign Donation 10 November 2016,” available online at www.thestandnews.com/politics/ (accessed December 1, 2016); Sing Tao Daily, November 11, 2016, p. A16. 67 Next Magazine, March 6, 2014, pp. A054–A057. 68 See “Post 852: 852 Channel,” available online at www.post852.com/category/852channels/, (accessed March 6, 2017). 69 Apple Daily, August 4, 2014, p. A06. 70 Gerald C. Stone, Mary K. O’Donnell, and Stephen Banning, “Public Perceptions of Newspaper’s Watchdog Role,” Newspaper Research Journal, vol. 18, no. 1–2 (1997), p. 86. 71 Steven E. Clayman, John Heritage, Marc N. Elliott and Laurie L. McDonald, (2007). “When Does the Watchdog Bark? Conditions of Aggressive Questioning in Presidential News Conferences,” Amer­ican Sociological Review, vol.  72, no.  1 (2007), pp. 23–41. 72 Sheila Coronel, “Corruption and the Watchdog Role of The News Media” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 1. 73 Sandeep Singh, “An Analytical Study of Move from Traditional Journalism to Investigative Journalism,” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Approach and Studies, vol. 1, no. 4 (2014), pp. 353–360. 74 P. Eric Louw, The Media and Political Process (London: Sage, 2010), p. 50. 75 Ibid. 76 Wen Wei Po, July 25, 2000, p. A16. 77 Ming Pao, September 12, 2000, p. A01. 78 Sing Tao Daily, August 23, 2004, p. A02. 79 Oriental Daily, April 7, 2009, p. A27. 80 Ta Kung Pao, August 15, 2016, p. A01; Ta Kung Pao, August 16, 2016, p. A02. 81 Ibid., October 25, 2016, p. A02. 82 Ibid., November 2, 2016, p. A02. 83 Sheila Coronel, “Corruption and the Watchdog Role of The News Media” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Public Sentinel: News Media and Governance Reform (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), pp. 111–136. 84 See “MyRadio: Homepage,” in https://myradio.hk/podcast/ (accessed March 6, 2017). 85 See “D100: About,” available online at www.d100.net/about/ (accessed March 6, 2017).

86   K. W-K. Ming 86 See “Passion Times: Homepage,” available online at www.passiontimes.hk/ (accessed March 6, 2017). 87 See “Post 852: Homepage,” available online at www.post852.com/ (accessed March 6, 2017). 88 Ming Pao, January 1, 2015, p. S07.

5 The Professional Teachers’ Union as an interest group fighting for democracy Steven Chung-Fun Hung

Introduction The Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (PTU) is a labor union organized by teachers from all levels of Hong Kong’s educational institutions, ranging from primary to tertiary levels. The PTU is the largest trade union in the HKSAR and is composed of more than 90,000 members. Basically, it is a professional organization and a political interest group participating in the social and democracy movement in Hong Kong from the colonial to post-­1997 era. This chapter will additionally argue that the PTU also symbolizes the emergence of civil society in Hong Kong in preventing the mainland communist regime from interfering with the territory’s autonomy. The PTU was a remarkable trade union in Hong Kong, operating independently from the colonial and post-­1997 government and directly and successfully fighting for Hong Kong citizens’ interests against the mainland government’s infiltration into the HKSAR. It became very famous in Hong Kong during the early 1970s, when the Certificate Teachers’ Movement was launched by those teachers who held certificates, protecting their interests and actually establishing the PTU. The position of these teachers was to support the nascent democracy movement in Hong Kong under British colonial rule. They created a public image of having an educational conscience and democratic consciousness for Hong Kong. This strong local and Hong Kong identity not only protected the teachers’ jobs but also contributed significantly to the fight for democracy and social justice. The role of certified professional teachers is still crucial in the HKSAR as they remain prominent in the assertive civil society of the HKSAR, acting as a check on the powers of both the HKSAR government and the central government in Beijing. This chapter adopts a historical perspective to examine the PTU’s functional roles and its perspectives on democratic development and transformation. The PTU experienced Hong Kong’s economic boom, the turbulent political transition in the territory from British to Chinese sovereignty, and the increasing interference from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the HKSAR governance even under the principle of the “one country, two systems” formula. The three stages marked the development and transformations of the PTU over time.

88   S. C.-F. Hung

Hong Kong’s labor unions and the role of the PTU There were many other teachers’ unions formerly established in Hong Kong. The most famous pro-­governmental and allied education bloc established in Hong Kong before the Second World War was called the Hong Kong Teachers’ Association. All teachers’ affairs were basically handled by the association together with the British colonial government in the earlier stages of Hong Kong’s history. There was no room for other teachers’ unions to be established for the protection of teachers’ interests. On the other hand, there were other large trade unions in Hong Kong, including the pro-­Beijing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions with 200,000 members and pro-­Taiwan Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council with 37,000 members in 1980. These two unions were respectively pro-­CCP in the mainland and pro-­Nationalist Party in  Taiwan. But the PTU was established in 1973 as an independent trade union  for educators and specifically for teachers in primary and secondary schools. It attracted 20,000 teaching members in 1980 alone. The proportion of labor membership in the PTU was low during the 1970s. The PTU kept the registration fees relatively high and so restricted its membership to the local teaching profession. The other teachers’ unions – like the pro-­Beijing Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers, the pro-­government Hong Kong Teachers’ Association, the Association of Non-­Degree Teachers of Government Schools and the Teachers’ Association of Subsidiary Schools – garnered the support of around 1,000 members only and they were all established in the 1970s. After the June 4 military crackdown of democrats in Beijing in 1989, the political space of Hong Kong was stimulated further. The establishment of the pro-­democracy Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions in 1990 represented a unified force among the independent unions, including half of its members coming from the participation of individual PTU members. During the 1980s, the union participation rate of workers as union members was relatively low – about 15 percent of the total workforce in Hong Kong. Yet, the PTU could keep their participation rate at an exceptionally high level, namely almost 90 percent of educational workers. Undoubtedly, under the influence of pro-­Beijing organizations in the entire labor sector, the PTU was a successful and independent union resisting the deeper infiltration from pro-­CCP or pro-­ Beijing interest groups in Hong Kong.

The PTU’s allies and competitors Trade unions are interest groups with varying ideologies and policies, articulating the interests of employees from different occupational sectors. They also form alliances to compete with other interest groups. For example, the PTU fights for the teachers’ professionalism and their interests, while representing the interests of the civil society in the struggle for the protection of human rights, social justice and democracy.

The Professional Teachers’ Union   89 However, the PTU is surrounded by political enemies with competing ideologies. The Federation of Education Workers was and is a pro-­CCP organization established in 1975. It has been enticing support from many educational bodies for the sake of isolating the PTU’s social and political functions. The Federation can mobilize lots of resources to extend its influences on educational matters, The other interest group, named the Hong Kong Educational Convergence, acts as a teaching professional body and it always attacks the PTU’s activities as being too political and not maintaining teachers’ professionalism. On the other hand, the pro-­democracy Progressive Teachers’ Alliance was formed recently to argue that the PTU is quite conservative and that it cannot fully protect teachers’ rights. As Hong Kong is politically radicalized and fragmentized, once a new teacher interest group is formed, the PTU is bound to be criticized for not protecting the interests of the lower-­level teachers, including new young teachers and teaching assistants who are not guaranteed the opportunities to advance their teaching careers and who are flooded with the schools’ demands for doing all sorts of additional and miscellaneous work, such as administration and logistical support. Interestingly, some members of the two groups – new teachers and teaching assistants – were elected as PTU board members in recent years. They are playing a crucial role in monitoring the work of the PTU and shaping its development and operation. However, their participation has not always been welcomed and fully supported by the PTU core members and leaders. As such, the PTU leadership argues for its own “self-­ determination,” meaning that the flagship organization should ideally be protected from being interfered with or infiltrated by new teachers and teaching assistants, who were forced by the circumstances to form the Progressive Teachers’ Alliance. The PTU’s internal differentiation has given rise to the fragmentation of teacher interest groups.

The PTU’s historical development The origin of the PTU stemmed from a movement in protection of those teachers who held the position of Certificate Masters. A salary review of the teachers at the Certificate Master level was conducted by the Hong Kong government in 1971. The government’s policy process became more consultative after the 1967 leftist riots as the contentious issues at that time were related to labor rights and interests. The influences of the salary adjustment of teachers would be long term and therefore the resistance from the interest groups concerned was foreseeable. The salary adjustment decision would also jeopardize the teaching profession as the career stability and prospects of teachers were affected. In March 1971, the Civil Service Salaries Commission was established to review the rank and salary structure of the civil service. Even before it was formed, the colonial government had first declared it would adjust the salaries of teachers and nurses. The starting point and the maximum scale of the salaries of teachers at the Certificate Master level were adjusted downwards. This move triggered the discontent of the student unions from three normal schools.1 They

90   S. C.-F. Hung criticized the government for insulting teachers’ dignity and giving different salaries to teachers who did the same type of work. Students protested against the government by staging silent sit-­in and boycotting classes. The British Hong Kong government warned the students of the consequences of participation in protest actions, saying that graduation certificates might not be issued. The threat effectively cracked down on the mobilization of student teachers. However, the Salaries Commission’s report did not deal with the controversy over teachers’ pay and benefits in August 1971. The report was criticized by members of the public. Later, the salary of nurses was adjusted, and while the entry point of teachers was increased, the maximum pay scale of teachers was still suppressed. At that moment, many teachers’ unions were alienated and they formed a joint secretariat. In response, many teachers marched onto the streets to oppose their new salary structure. In 1972, the PTU was formed by 13 organizations and a teacher from the Clementi Secondary School, Tsin Sai-­nin,2 was chosen as a convener. The union lobbied the Hong Kong government to re-­evaluate the salaries of teachers. A working group was formed by the government but it recommended a similar salary structure for teachers in February 1973. Teachers’ interests were ignored again by this working group, whose report antagonized the teachers further. The teachers who held Certificate Master qualifications organized a series of assemblies and initiated industrial strikes. The Hong Kong government then slightly adjusted the salaries for teachers on March 29, 1973, but the proposed change was rejected by the teachers. There were two strikes on April 4 and April 13, with 80 percent of primary schools teachers participating in the actions. All the teachers reported for duty in their school on the days when strikes were held – they went into their classes as usual but did not teach. At that time, Hong Kong suffered from world-­wide economic depression because of the oil crisis. As such, the Hong Kong government proposed downgrading certificated teachers and cutting their salaries. Teachers naturally stood up to protect their interests and it was the first time in Hong Kong’s history that so many teachers were united in protecting their professional status, which had been challenged and threatened. Teachers’ representatives confined their actions to peaceful protests for the whole year and they tried to lobby government officials. They gained support from student teachers of the three normal colleges and mobilized them to launch strikes. The Joint Secretariat was formed by 13 educational organizations, but the colonial government miscalculated the reaction of teachers, whose sense of unity grew stronger and stronger as more teachers came to realize the detrimental effects of the salary cut proposal on their profession. During the time of the establishment of the PTU there were internal conflicts. At first, Tsin Sai-­nin, who was the former Vice Chairman of the Hong Kong Teachers’ Association3 and a Urban Councilor from the interest group named Hong Kong Civic Association,4 did not accept the “radical” action of the teachers’ strike. As a result, he was rejected by many teachers. The internal conflicts within the PTU also focused on the formation of its leadership and committees. An internal

The Professional Teachers’ Union   91 competition between two teachers’ groups caused Ip King-­ping and Lai Wing-­ lin to split from the PTU and to form another union, namely the Subsidized School Teachers’ Association. Szeto Wah, the PTU’s core leader, adopted a more radical plan of fighting for teachers’ rights and he gained strong support from the teachers. Later, Szeto Wah helped in planning a strike during the primary school students’ public examination for secondary school places. The teachers’ ultimatum was that they would boycott the Secondary School Entrance Examination by not helping with the marking of the examination scripts. It really forced the colonial government to finally withdraw its salary cut proposal in 1973. The Hong Kong government felt that the situation would worsen and therefore decided to negotiate with Szeto Wah. At last, the colonial administration accepted the PTU’s plan and made the salary structure of teachers at the Certificate Master level the same as that of nurses. The movement of Certificate Master teachers lasted for 26 months and ended up with the decision of 13 educational organizations to accept the finalized salary plan initiated the government in May 1973. The teachers’ industrial actions were so successful that the PTU was formally formed through their strong support. The PTU actions also proved that it was capable of protecting the career interests of its teaching members. It projected an image of being an effective interest group caring about the quality of education in the next generation and fighting for the interests of teachers as well as contributing to the elimination of social injustice in Hong Kong. On the other hand, another trade union for teachers was set up earlier in 1973, namely the Union for Non-­Degree Teachers of the Government Schools, representing the civil servants who held teaching posts in government schools but who were not holders of university degrees. The union had the same objective as the PTU – fighting for teachers’ professional interests. This union sent a congratulatory and greeting statement to the PTU once the latter was formed. After Szeto Wah gained support among PTU members and was then elected as the President of the PTU council, many members of the Union for Non-­Degree Teachers of the Government Schools joined the PTU as well. After the Second World War, the relatively weak Hong Kong labor movement was ideologically spilt into pro-­CCP and pro-­Nationalist Party factions in the 1960s and early 1970s, but the birth of the PTU injected an ingredient of freshness into the development of successful and localized independent unions in the territory.

PTU development In a very short period of time, the PTU grew rapidly and it became the biggest trade union in Hong Kong. It was clear that the PTU realized the importance of protecting the jobs and interests of its members, including their professionalization. Accompanying the introduction of universal mass schooling in Hong Kong during the 1970s, the PTU emerged as not only the largest union in

92   S. C.-F. Hung Hong Kong within 10 years, but it also fought for the interests of other teachers during the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee School incident in which the school’s authorities were criticized for financial mismanagement at the expense of the interests of both students and teachers. The PTU backed up the affected teachers and students, consolidating its role as the flagship organization supporting most of the teachers in society. The Catholic schools in Hong Kong possessed about 25 percent of school places for primary and secondary students. They were run by either the Roman Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong or individual religious institutes and missionary societies. These Catholic groups were basically the biggest educational blocs in Hong Kong. The Precious Blood Golden Jubilee School was established by the Precious Blood Order of the Catholic Church. In 1976, some teachers in the school detected irregularities in the use of school funds. After the irregularities were revealed, a principal resigned. In 1977, a new principal was appointed and she adopted a hostile attitude towards those teachers who exposed the issue; students were reportedly discouraged from having contacts with the related teachers. The controversy became sensitive when teachers received warning letters and as students’ school bags were searched without suitable advanced notice. Students staged a sit-­in strike on the school playground and asked for an explanation. But the principal called the police. The Director of the Education Department issued 28 warning letters to the teachers, accusing them of inciting students to participate in the sit-­in strike and threatening to cancel their registration as teachers. Without conducting a thorough investigation and without presenting sufficient evidence, the government appeared to hold the teachers responsible for the impasse. The Education Department was questioned and challenged over issuing warning letters without concrete reasons. At this stage, the row inside the school was reported by the mass media. Some students marched out of the school campus and conducted a long march, crossing Victoria harbor to the Hong Kong Islands and continued the protest outside the Catholic Cathedral. Students and teachers followed with a second sit-­in action. Their actions aroused public concern, and finally the Education Department announced in a press conference that the school was out of control and should be closed down. However, the news was unbelievable to many teachers – who would lose their jobs – and to many students – who would have their studies interrupted. The school’s controversies developed gradually into a social movement in 1978 when the PTU had no choice but to support the affected teachers and students. The PTU reacted by organizing a mass rally which was attended by 10,000 people at Victoria Park. Community leaders, councilors, businessmen, journalists and even Catholic priests spoke against the closure order. The PTU’s mass mobilization made the authorities concede to its demands. A commission appointed by the Hong Kong government to investigate the incident made a reasonable recommendation, namely establishing a new school to cater for the needs of all the affected teachers and students. Shortly after that, the former principal was arrested and found guilty, while the warning letters issued to

The Professional Teachers’ Union   93 teachers were withdrawn. A time-­bomb was defused after the PTU’s participation. Through this incident, its social and political status was enhanced. The PTU articulated the interests of the teachers effectively, standing up for social justice and fairness. Most importantly, it utilized social actions in an orderly manner, demonstrating for civil rights and maintaining public order. The PTU’s reputation became respectable and constructed a model example of an emerging civil society in Hong Kong. If the “service professionals” participated in the development of civil society,5 the PTU was instrumental in providing a vehicle for them to protect their interests. After the establishment of the PTU, a steady increase in the number of political groups could be witnessed.6 At the same time, the PTU developed a strong sense of social responsibility, participating in a series of collective actions, including a movement advocating the popular use of Chinese language in 1976, the protection of children’s interests during the international year of children in 1978, a campaign against the rise of transport fares in 1980, opposition to the rise of electricity charges in 1982, the mobilization of citizens to join mass rallies in 1982 against the Japanese distortion of its history books about the war history of Japan’s military aggression and atrocities in Southeast Asia, a campaign against price rises and the protection of livelihood interests in 1983, and the campaign for a reasonable adjustment of salaries for civil servants in 1983. All these campaigns included mass mobilization. After PTU participation in all these social actions, it became the most powerful pressure or interest group in Hong Kong under colonial rule. Nevertheless, the rising opposition from all the increasingly assertive pressure groups aroused great concern in the colonial government, which tried to monitor and control their activities.7 The British Hong Kong government set up a secret Standing Committee on Pressure Groups to conduct surveillance on the activities of all pressure groups.8 Any pressure group that was suspected of undermining the colonial regime was subject to secret surveillance in Hong Kong.9 The PTU was defined as a “communist united front target,” but the British investigators concluded that “communist” influences would be inhibited as long as Szeto Wah remained in control as its leader.10 On the contrary, and perhaps ironically, a director of the PRC government’s representative office, the New China News Agency, revealed that Szeto Wah had actually long supported the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China and that he had shown interest in joining the Chinese Communist Party.11 Still, it was reported that the PTU was on the colonial government’s list as which it was “threatened” by “communist infiltration.”12 Szeto Wah had recognized the mainland “agents” and they included Chiu Sin-­ku, Cheung Yee-­ling, Sung Shu-­choi, Law Ping, Lai Fung-­chuen and Fu Pak-­lin. Their role was allegedly aimed at infiltrating and undermining the PTU. The function and status of the PTU appeared to be threatened. However, a new generation of teachers began to participate actively in various social movements and these movement leaders and activists later became the core members of the Hong Kong democratic movement. In addition to Szeto Wah, they included Ha Man-­ho, Cheung Man-­kwong, Poon Tin-­chi and Chan Hung.

94   S. C.-F. Hung Furthermore, political scientist Stephan Ortmann has described labor unions in Hong Kong during the 1980s as acting as “friendly societies.” They were primarily interested in protecting workers’ rights13 and provided many essential social services for their members. The PTU actually offered courses, a kindergarten group, insurances, the full pay for members with maternity leave, paid sick leave, book sales, library services for primary students, and dental care for all members.14 These benefits helped the PTU to raise significant financial resources15 for its own operations. At last the PTU was, and remains, internally stable, allowing members to appreciate its healthy operation and the various, resulting benefits. Many members of the PTU are active, diligent, enthusiastic and dedicated. They gather themselves voluntarily in the PTU office and roll up the PTU’s regular newspapers and mailed them to members. When they work together, they communicate intensively and interact friendly with each other to enhance their mutual understandings. Teachers organize themselves systematically, do voluntarily work and contribute to the further development of the PTU. All these processes commonly enhance the PTU members’ friendship and common understanding. Altogether, the PTU members and leaders really try their best to achieve the mission and visions of the PTU through their own social networks and trust.

PTU development in the political transition During the 1980s, the Hong Kong government introduced representative government into the colony and injected more elected elements into Hong Kong’s political institutions, including District Boards and the Legislative Council (LegCo). In September 1984, there were 89 civil organizations calling for democratization and it was actually led by the PTU. They demanded that the LegCo should have at least 20 percent of its members directly elected in 1988. They also supported the concept of “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong,” but it should be realized in a democratic way. Szeto Wah wrote in his memoirs: As this eve of this history-­making change, it is more important than ever that we should strive to strengthen and expand our unity and solidarity, so that we may continue to protect the labour rights of our members, promote the healthy development of education, and, in co-­operation with all members of the public who are well-­intentioned about the future of Hong Kong, contribute towards its prosperity and stability.16 After the Sino-­British Joint Declaration over Hong Kong was signed in September 1984, the sovereignty of Hong Kong would be transferred from Britain to the People’s Republic of China. The LegCo would have some elected elements in 1985 and it was the first time that 24 of the LegCo members were indirectly elected by various functional constituencies, including an educational functional constituency which contained the highest number of voters in the

The Professional Teachers’ Union   95 election. The PTU chairman, Szeto Wah, participated in the election. He adopted a democratic way to organize his election campaign, mobilizing members through a consultative meeting on his proposed policy platform and through a school hall gathering. Actually, his election campaign was extensive, because in the educational constituency almost 30,000 voters could vote for their educational legislator – a right that had not existed in Hong Kong prior to 1985. Szeto was elected with 68.4 percent of popular votes and gained the great majority of supporters (see Table 5.1). The Urban Council elections were held before the introduction of indirect elections to the LegCo, but the number of voters in the municipal-­level elections was quite limited and the elections were comparatively small in scale. Hence, the 1985 LegCo election was a turning point in Hong Kong’s political history. Szeto Wah’s reputation in educational circles was so strong that he gained the support to be chosen as a member of drafting committee of the Hong Kong Basic Law from 1985 to 1989. His opinion on drafting the Basic Law was important because his stance was generally accepted as being representative of many Hong Kong people, especially the teaching profession. In particular, Beijing knew that Hong Kong’s teachers’ and educators’ position was influential in the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China, especially as the mainland was in the midst of economic reform and an opening-­up process following the end of the Cultural Revolution. The PTU naturally became one of the professional interest groups shaping the development of Hong Kong’s political development after 1997.17

The PTU’s pro-­democracy stance From the early 1980s, the PTU has been playing a crucial role in sustaining the momentum of Hong Kong’s pro-­democracy movement, especially in view of the imminent departure of the British rulers. The Hong Kong people had no choice but needed to prepare to be in charge of Hong Kong’s affairs under the “one country, two systems” formula. The minimal democratic political reform introduced by the British Hong Kong government in the early half of the 1980s, and the promise of a more democratic system by the CCP for the HKSAR after 1997, combined as powerful forces to provide the golden opportunity for a road map of democratization of Hong Kong’s polity. Teachers were allowed to educate Hong Kong students about developmental concepts and the theories and practices of democracy. Civic education was opened up for teachers to educate students in the formal curriculum. In short, political changes in Hong Kong have elevated the political role of teachers, directly paving the way for a more politically active metamorphosis of the PTU. However, there were several main issues during this transitional stage of Hong Kong’s democratization. First, the PTU had to show that its members were patriotic and nationalistic over the issue of the Japanese action to distort the wartime historical reality as depicted in Japanese textbooks. The PTU, on September 18, 1982, organized a mass gathering with the participation of

96   S. C.-F. Hung 30,000 citizens. Second, the PTU needed to maintain momentum in social and political awareness together with the full use of protests, press conferences and public lectures. It organized one of the greatest patriotic social movements in Hong Kong, the movement of protecting the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands in Japanese) in Hong Kong in the wake of the early 1970s. On the other hand, ironically, the CCP government in the mainland was relatively silent on this issue as it received Japanese financial assistance in the process of helping China to open up its economy in the 1980s, while refraining from stimulating mass participation in the Deng Xiaoping era for fear of politicizing members of the public and unintentionally undermining CCP dominance. The PTU’s mass mobilization could be seen in its opposition to the construction of a nuclear power plant at Daya Bay. In 1986, it took part in the anti-­ Daya Bay nuclear plant campaign after the former Soviet Union’s Chernobyl’s accident, where the nuclear explosion and fire released radioactive pollution and reminded the Hong Kong people of the issue of the nuclear plant’s safety and risks, especially as the Daya Bay nuclear power plant was built partly by a Hong Kong company and partly by a mainland Chinese corporation. The PTU mobilized teachers to help collect signatures from students and parents. Consequently, a million people signed a joint petition opposing this nuclear power station. Sensing the strong opposition, China became aware of the PTU’s political role of being ideologically hostile and antagonistic. As a matter of fact, building the nuclear power plant was part of the project for China’s drive toward economic modernization. The Hong Kong democrats adopted an unprecedented populist strategy in opposing the nuclear power plant’s construction, jeopardizing the relations between the PTU and mainland officials and also undermining their mutual trust in the decades to come. Politically, mainland officials tend to be authoritarian, but PTU leaders and members remain pro-­ democratic. During the Hong Kong democracy movement in the 1980s, the pro-­ democratic alliance established a Joint Committee on the Promotion of a Democratic Government. The office of the secretariat was actually located at the headquarters of the PTU. Social work lecturer Yeung Sum was elected as the committee’s convener and he was the chairman of a political interest group named Meeting Point. The PTU provided space and logistical support for the committee’s meetings and press briefings. There were virtually no secrets in the local democratic movement. Their leaders and participants were eager to organize themselves and mobilize the residents to fight for democracy and political change. During the Beijing students’ democratic movement, the Hong Kong Alliance in support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China was established in May 1989 (see Table 5.1 for public participation and donations in the annual June 4 event). Its five operational objectives were to release all dissidents, rehabilitate the 1989 pro-­democracy movement, demand responsibility for the killings, end the one-­party dictatorship and build a democratic China. The elected chairman was, of course, Szeto Wah. The Standing Committee of the Alliance

150,000 (113,000) $1,410 2017 110,000 (18,000) $1,400

150,000 (62,800) $2,100 2016 125,000 (21,800) $1,740

48,000 (18,000) $683 2015 135,000 (46,600) $1,340

55,000 (27,000) $826 2014 180,000 (99,500) $1,720

44,000 (19,000) $617 2013 150,000 (54,000) $1,600

45,000 (22,000) $640

2012

180,000 (85,000) $2,323

82,000 (48,000) $1,125

2011

150,000 (77,000) $1,310

Note The numbers in brackets are the police’s estimated figures and the unit of currency is in Hong Kong thousand dollars.

Sources: The data were derived from Hong Kong Chinese news reports one day immediately after the June 4 candlelight vigil from 1990 to 2016.

2010

50, 000 N/A $760

2009

45,000 N/A $603

2008

48,000 N/A $736

2007

45,000 N/A $833

2006

70,000 N/A $1,255

2003

2005

40,000 (16 000) $676

2002

45,000 (16,000) $742

1996

2004

55,000 N/A $1,974

2001

1998

1997

2000

35,000 (16,000) $569

40,000 (12,000) $480

40,000 (12,000) $330

80,000 (28,000) $439

100,000 (60,000) N/A

150,000 (80,000) N/A 1999

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

Table 5.1  Participants’ and public donations to the annual June 4 candlelight vigils

98   S. C.-F. Hung has 20 members and its secretariat is also located at the main office of the PTU. Many council members of the PTU joined the Alliance and have been participating in the Alliance as executive committee members. In fact, the PTU’s headquarters is the operational center of the Alliance, which holds the annual candlelight vigil at the Victoria Park every year since 1989. Table 5.1 shows the estimated participants and received donation during the annual commemorative event. The Alliance’s annual activities demonstrate to the mainland Chinese citizens and authorities that Hong Kong can remain as an informational entrepot helping to raise the awareness of the world and mainland Chinese to the plight of mainland political dissidents.18 The annual activities require many volunteers and they help build up and arrange the sports pitch at Victoria Park, distribute the published materials and clean the place after the political gathering. Many of them are teachers from the PTU and many students help the organization of annual activity as volunteers. In a sense, the candlelight vigil serves to educate the members of the public, and mainland tourists too, of the tragedy of Chinese politics in June 1989. The late Szeto Wah’s leadership of the PTU was charismatic and pivotal after June 1989. He led the Alliance and the PTU prior to the transfer of his leadership to Cheung Man-­kwong, another teacher. They were many PTU council members simultaneously belonging to the members of the pro-­democracy United Democrats of Hong Kong in 1990. They played a prominent role in various stages of democratic development in Hong Kong, ranging from the 1980s to the 2000s. The strategy of the PTU from the 1980s to 1990s was to expand its political influences at a time when Hong Kong saw the first direct elections for selecting the members of LegCo in 1991 (see Table 5.2 for LegCo’s education constituency elections). At that juncture, the PTU was strategically separated into two teams, with Cheung Man-­kwong participating in the election of education functional constituency and Szeto Wah taking part in the first initiated geographical direct election in the Kowloon East District where the underground CCP mobilization and organization was very strong. Both won the elections without difficulties, demonstrating their personal appeal and, most importantly, the influence of the PTU. The PTU was and is also a major source of opposition to the Hong Kong government and they were and are politically aligned with the Democratic Party. On the contrary, the Federation of Education Workers was and is forming an alliance with the pro-­Beijing political groups. The outcome of this scenario is that the relationships between government and teachers have been politicized.19 In the LegCo functional constituency elections, the PTU has been keeping the educational functional constituency seat for a long period of time since 1985, an indication that it remains the most popular teachers’ political interest group in Hong Kong. In recent years, the pro-­Beijing teachers have tried to challenge the dominance of the PTU in the educational functional constituency seat for LegCo, but it has failed to do so. However, it is observable that the PTU margin of political support is narrowing and declining. Its public support in the coming LegCo elections will not be

Ip Kin yuen

Ip Kin yuen

Cheung Man kwong

Cheung Man kwong

Cheung Man kwong

Cheung Man kwong

Cheung Man kwong

Cheung Man kwong

Szeto Wah

Szeto Wah

2016

2012

2008

2004

2000

1998

1995

1991

1988

1985

12,706

Uncontested

15,193

19,558

34,864

35,793

44,517

37,876

46,535

45,984

Votes gained

Source: PTU News, the websites of elections and the Election Committee.

PTU Candidates

Year

Ip King ping Ko Kay yu Chan Yat tong Wu Siu wai

Ho King on Ng Chung wang

Leung Siu tong

Li Sze yuen

Lee Kit kong

Yu Kai chun

Ho Hon kuen Yu Yee wah

Ho Hon kuen

Choi York lin

Opposition candidates

Table 5.2  Electoral results of the education constituency in Legislative Council elections, 1985–2016

2,655 2,165 577 409

886 836

4,495

5,319

5,686

9,155

12,272 2,746

15,170

18,158

Votes gained

100   S. C.-F. Hung questioned, but the sustainability of its political support will be a long-­term challenge, especially in view of the changing political identity of some Hong Kong people to a more pro-­Beijing orientation. On the other hand, the PTU organization is undergoing an internal process of democratization. The council members of the PTU were formerly elected by representatives from schools (members). They have been fighting for universal suffrage on the one hand, and have transformed the PTU’s internal election mechanism to the principle of “one person one vote” system on the other hand (for the PTU Executive Committee, see Figure 5.1). They have to handle their changing term of office in PTU’s internal elections every two years and this manpower-­ consuming mechanism has to be followed in order to demonstrate the PTU’s internally democratic nature. While regular internal elections have to be held, the election results must be audited. The result is a very tiring internal exercise. In addition, the PTU has a Board of Supervisors to monitor its council operation. In the past, a member of the pro-­government Education Convergence was once elected as the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors and this severely interrupted the operation of the PTU. Interestingly, Szeto Wah adopted democratization as an effective means of expelling the Education Convergence’s member from interrupting the operation of the PTU. As the democratic “one person, one vote system” was adopted, members must be elected openly and competitively. This election mechanism can effectively prevent any pro-­CCP or other antagonistic elements from secretly infiltrating the PTU. Most importantly, the PTU’s internal election reform democratized itself significantly. Many other interest groups and even political parties dare not adopt direct elections in electing their executive committee members, because they are aware of the irony that democracy can be a long term force in checking their own internal operations. Yet, according to the late Szeto Wah and his supporters, internal democratization of the PTU can and will prevent the organization from being penetrated and sabotaged by pro-­CCP and hostile political forces, while simultaneously projecting a high degree of legitimacy to teachers and voters.

President

Vice-President Secretary General Chief Treasurer

Organization Department Computer Department Publication Department Recreation Department Travels Department Rights and Complaints Department Welfare Department Academic Department Education Research Department

Figure 5.1 Executive Committee of the Professional Teachers’ Union, 22nd term of office (2016–2018).

The Professional Teachers’ Union   101

Professionalism threatened after 1997 In 1984, the Education Co-­ordinate Committee was officially established by the government to review education policy. Numerous initiatives were aimed at improving the internal operations of schools, including school management, teachers’ quality, curriculum design, teaching methods, evaluation approaches, facilities and the environment for teaching.20 During Hong Kong’s political transition period, the PTU was busy in coping with educational reform as the Committee issued a total of seven reports, which were so significant that the PTU had to respond promptly to defend the interests of teachers. Since the transfer of sovereignty in 1997, the PTU has become even busier, partly because the HKSAR education system has been blamed for the failure to produce sufficient local talent and to enhance economic competitiveness, especially after the Asian financial meltdown in 1997–1998 and then the rapid rise of China as well as the corresponding economic decline of Hong Kong. Many students, both at the secondary and university levels, have not been well equipped to compete in the globally competitive market – many have a problematic standard of English compared to the earlier generation of local students whose language ability was generally impressive. Education reforms have become inevitable under these rapidly changing circumstances. Hong Kong society has been experiencing huge transformations due to the political transition from a decolonized British colony to a Special Administrative Region. Critics have said that the HKSAR is now “re-­colonized” by the PRC. At the same time, the Hong Kong polity has been undergoing structural changes and education has experienced inevitable changes. The HKSAR government revised the overall development of education. A policy of education reform was developed by the colonial administration in 1998 and its blueprint was published in 2000. Yet, the colonial government was hostile to the PTU due to the latter’s oppositional activities. Similarly, educational reform in the HKSAR has carried a new ideology by reconstructing discursive power. Subsequently, education policy changes were made with relatively little government consultation with the teaching profession, including the PTU, which has been charged with the responsibility of implementing them.21 The HKSAR government formulated top-­down initiatives to change nearly every key aspect of the school system, ranging from the administrative structure to the curriculum organization, from school governance and management to classroom teaching and learning, from the application of information technology to the examination system, and from the external and internal evaluation of schools to the accountability to stakeholders.22 The actions and policies adopted by the Education Bureau were especially controversial for teachers. Bureaucrats were anxious about whether the education system could correctly nurture students with the right technical and professional qualifications to sustain the transformations of the HKSAR. To cater for the need to increase the competitiveness of Hong Kong in the globalized world, education has been expected to provide talented young people who can be

102   S. C.-F. Hung ­ i-­literate, tri-­lingual, proficient and well-­equipped with the application of b information technology. On the other hand, some teachers have been criticized for their teaching competence and standard, and yet they encounter tremendous work pressures. In other words, to improve the teaching quality, teachers are required to sit for examinations, testing their English teaching competence and their ability to apply information technology in teaching. Under these circumstances, some school managers have exerted pressure on many teachers rather than supporting and encouraging them. As a result, the morale of some teachers was and is low, and the teaching profession at the primary and secondary levels has seen considerable mobility, for they do not see teaching as a profession but a means to pursuing other careers. The soft strategy of enhancing teaching professionalism embraces training, while the harder strategy utilizes re-­examinations. In the HKSAR, many English teachers had and have to pass a language proficiency attainment test. If teachers fail in the examinations, schools must redeploy them to teach other subjects, and some schools even dismiss them.23 The PTU resisted strongly the authorities’ hazardous approach to improving the teaching profession. Demonstrations were used by the PTU to mobilize 10,000 teachers against these hardline measures. Since 1997, the executive-­led government of the HKSAR has also marginalized the democrats by excluding them from participation in most consultative committees. Moreover, the legislature has become an arena of political exclusion. In the LegCo, half of the members are directly elected and the other half are elected by functional constituencies. Democrats who are mostly elected through the direct election mode are checked by legislators elected from the functional groups. There is also a splitting vote system between the geographical group and the functional group. Under the rule, the two groups must have their votes counted separately and any motion initiated by legislators must be approved simultaneously by the two groups of members returned from direct election and functional groups. Since pro-­government and pro-­Beijing legislators dominate the functional constituencies, they constitute an effective check against the democrats. Therefore, the manipulated political system of the HKSAR cannot witness a phenomenon in which legislators can initiate bills and motions that can check the executive branch’s power. Beijing is keen to maintain the executive-­led polity, too. As such, education policies and changes introduced in a top-­down manner by senior educational bureaucrats have met fierce resistance from many teachers, including indeed the PTU. The political predicament of the PTU is its political powerlessness and, therefore, it is determined to play the role of a permanent opposition to the pro-­Beijing HKSAR regime.

Surrounded by enemies in the era of political radicalization Hong Kong was radically politicized under the largely undemocratic system. Many controversial HKSAR government whose legitimacy has been opinion cannot be reflected directly through

institutional constraints of a policies were adopted by the constantly challenged. Public the so-­called representative

The Professional Teachers’ Union   103 ­ overnment in Hong Kong. It was observable that mass mobilizations are common g and frequent in Hong Kong where teachers are encountering tremendous work pressure from the government, school authorities and even parents. Political reform was initiated in the HKSAR in December 2009, when the government published a consultation document on the methods for selecting the Chief Executive and forming the Legislative Council in the year 2012. The democrats insisted on having universal suffrage in Hong Kong in 2012, but they were divided into different factions. The League of Social Democrats and the Civic Party triggered the LegCo by-­elections by having five members resign and stand for re-­election in a self-­claimed “de facto referendum.” They tried to use public opinion and the “referendum” to fight for universal suffrage. Nevertheless, the Democratic Party and the PTU did not take part in the “referendum campaign” and decided to go for dialogue and negotiation with the CCP officials stationed in Beijing’s representative office in the HKSAR, namely the Liaison Office. In fact, they formed a group called the Alliance for Universal Suffrage, which was a coalition formed by 13 pro-­democracy parties at first, but later, two of them withdrew.24 The key organizations behind the Alliance were the Democratic Party, the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood, the Confederation of Trade Unions, the Social Workers General Union, Power for Democracy, Professional Commons and Synergynet. But they could not be compared with the PTU in terms of the numbers of members and representativeness. The Chairman of the PTU, Fung Wai-­wah, was elected internally as the convener of the Alliance for Universal Suffrage. As a matter of fact, the Alliance for Universal Suffrage did not really fight for universal suffrage. It was nothing but, arguably, a pseudo-­democratic movement. Its standpoint was questionable and its mobilizations were suspicious and dubious. However, the PTU was seldom questioned and challenged by its members over this matter. Only the Democratic Party bore the brunt of being criticized as “undemocratic,” unrepresentative, and “betraying” the pro-­ democracy camp by negotiating with Liaison Office officials. The Alliance secretly received HK$2 million for its campaign via a so-­called “red” or pro-­ Beijing merchant named Lew Mon-­hung25 who was a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at that time. The campaign tried to mobilize the masses to support democracy. The democratic march attracted 4,000 people on January 1, 2010. It did not look like a true pro-­democracy movement, unlike the scale of participation triggered by the PTU in the 1980s. Perhaps, in the 2000s, the democracy movement in the HKSAR was very different. With the participation of the Social League of Democrats and the Civic Party, the democrats vowed not to give up the so-­called people’s referendum. For the PTU, voting is the right of ordinary citizens but it did not actively participate in the referendum movement in the LegCo by-­election in 2010. As a result, the by-­elections were conducted with a low voting rate (17.1 percent) and the five legislators who resigned were re-­elected. The campaign could not be seen as successful but it did not appear to fail either. The government felt that its original political reform proposal could be tabled for deliberation in the

104   S. C.-F. Hung LegCo without any amendments and without concessions. The Democratic Party counter-­proposed to the government, as Cheung Man-­kwong was both a member of the Democratic Party and the PTU. The central government quickly accepted the adjusted political reform proposal made by the Democratic Party and the Alliance in June 2010. Unfortunately, the move by the democrats was seriously criticized and questioned by the radical democrats, especially the League of Social Democrats. The role of Szeto Wah was perhaps instrumental in the entire development; he was seen as an invisible hand steering the direction of the PTU. The decision for the counter-­proposal for political reform made the Democratic Party unpopular. In March 2010, Szeto Wah was diagnosed with lung cancer but he was re-­elected as the chairman of the Alliance. He remained the undisputable leader until his death on January 2, 2011. His leadership was symbolic of the Alliance’s persistence in justifying the rightful cause of denouncing the June 4 incident in China, an event that involved the sacrifices of many mainland Chinese citizens who struggled for democratic change.26 On the other hand, the shadow of Szeto’s influence persisted due to his invaluable contributions to the PTU. Nobody could challenge his status when he was alive but, since his death in early 2011, the pro-­democracy camps have fallen into a situation of political radicalization. Political discourses in Hong Kong are hardly dominated by the diversification of political opinions and ideas. Instead, the radicalization of political views has begun to target individual democrats. Political attacks have focused on individuals, leading to profound fragmentation in the pro-­democracy camps. The so-­called “red” capitalists took the opportunity to penetrate the pro-­democracy movement, leading to a messy situation in which the democracy movement lacks a charismatic and respectable leader such the late Szeto Wah. Still, the PTU is contributing to Hong Kong’s democracy movement through its emphasis on patriotism, Chinese national identity and traditional Chinese cultures. Its Chinese identity is, however, not equated with the identification with the CCP in the mainland. The PTU stance on the reversal of the official verdict in the 1989 Tiananmen incident remains a thorn in the flesh of the CCP. The PTU also contributes to Hong Kong’s democracy movement by energizing local civil society, educating the young generation of Hong Kong and engendering the practices of critical thinking and participative citizenship. These contributions to the democracy movement have not been really recognized by members of the local community which, on most indicators, can be viewed as liberal and characterized by a vibrant civil society.27 The more politicized society of Hong Kong has been affected by the implementation of an education policy with the national mission of inculcating patriotism in the psyche of young Hong Kong students. On the other hand, the HKSAR government is no longer tolerant of political dissent. The implementation of the National Education curriculum signified very much the desires of the CCP and its authoritarian tendency over Hong Kong matters, trying to change the mentality of the young generation.

The Professional Teachers’ Union   105 In 2012, this National Education curriculum policy sparked public outcry and protests. Proposing that schools should consider implementing this policy, the government stimulated and politicized many students, parents and intellectuals, who were deeply concerned about the communist and nationalist ideology of the PRC regime. Scholarism was originally an interest group established by secondary school students. Its convener, Joshua Wong, was later transformed when he was just shy of his eighteenth birthday, appearing on the cover of the Time Magazine. He managed to organize a political rally against the National Education policy, attended by over 100,000 people. In July 2012, the Civil Alliance Against the National Education was formed by 15 organizations, including Scholarism, Parents’ Concern Group, the PTU, the Hong Kong Federation of Students, the Alliance Youth, and the Civil Human Rights Front. Students organized the opposition movement together with teachers and parents, successfully forcing the C. Y. Leung government to shelve the curriculum just one day before the direct election was held for the LegCo in September 2012. In the minds of PTU members, the objective of school curriculum reform is to develop students into knowledgeable, responsible and law-­abiding citizens who respect the pluralism of cultures and views, as well as the tolerance of critical, reflective and independent thinkers who can understand the background and development of various issues from different perspectives. In short, any educational reform should ideally maintain the principle of respecting pluralistic and different ideas and adopting an open-­minded and accommodating attitude toward opposing views. Similarly, students should ideally be educated to give due consideration to the appropriateness and the legality of the means through which they can express their views to the government authorities. To the PTU, primary and secondary students might observe and express their support for the Occupy Central Movement. Yet, students who observed the movement on-­site might have to consider the possible political risks to their own personal safety.

The PTU and the new democracy movement Democracy movements in Hong Kong took a new form in September 2014, when the Occupy Central Movement began, to December of the same year. The movement was ignited by pro-­democracy activists after the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made a decision in August 2014 on the nomination and election method of the Chief Executive in 2017. The candidates for the Chief Executive election would be screened out by a 1,200 member Election Committee and would then be directly elected by ordinary citizens who were eligible as voters. Many students rejected this model of political reform, called for mass participation in selecting the future Chief Executive, and participated actively in the Occupy Central Movement. They boycotted classes at the university and secondary schools. Many teachers were also active participants in the movement, including some university professors and lecturers. During the Occupy Central Movement, many students were fighting against elite rule, political monopolization, police crackdown on protests and against

106   S. C.-F. Hung any move by the government to conduct surveillance on politically active students’ groups. The driving forces behind the new democracy movement were the commitments to having social justice and political pluralism. Students and their teachers tried to develop their new political influence and solidarity through the fight against an “unfair” political system biased in favor of the rich and the powerful elites. In a sense, youth participation in the Occupy Central Movement served to educate other young people on political issues and controversies, to develop their critical thinking and to stimulate their political awareness. Many parents and other students, however, felt that the new pro-­democracy movement would undermine the HKSAR economy and radicalize society. Some conservatives put the blame on the failure of the education system to instill a sense of nationalism among the psyche of young Hong Kong students. The PTU has maintained its pro-­democracy stance on controversial political issues. For instance, the PTU, the University of Hong Kong’s Concerns Group, the Academic Staff Association of the University of Hong Kong, and the Scholars Alliance for Academic Freedom jointly organized a march on January 3, 2016 and demanded that there should be an amendment to the University Ordinance in which the Chief Executive should no longer be the Chancellor of various local universities. The reason was that there was a fear of possible political intervention by the Chief Executive, who could use the power his or her appointment to shape the composition of the university councils at the top level. The PTU can be analyzed as an interest group with multiple dimensions. It is a trade union, a professional body, and a social concern group with more than 90,000 members, consisting of teachers and practitioners from all levels of schools in Hong Kong. As a trade union, the PTU aims at uniting teachers, protecting their rights and providing them with various services. As a professional body, the PTU strives to improve the quality of education and teachers’ professionalism in Hong Kong. As a social concern group, the PTU actively participates in social actions fighting for the justice, well-­being and democratic rights of the people in Hong Kong and China.28 It is increasingly difficult for the PTU to maintain its reputation in the currently controversial society. Its position and standpoints can easily be challenged by pro-­Beijing politicians and critics, who have seen the PTU as a political organization biased in favor of civil disobedience and Western-­style democracy. Nevertheless, as a political interest group, the PTU has a tradition of supporting and participating in the democracy movement. Its position in support of teachers’ interests, political pluralism and liberalism and democratic change remains constant and persistent. Its educative impacts on the young generation of Hong Kong on the values of tolerance, human rights, and democracy will continue to be a hallmark in the coming decades.

The Professional Teachers’ Union   107

Conclusion Arguably, the PTU has remained a very significant pro-­democracy interest group in Hong Kong from the colonial era to the post-­1997 period. The colonial government was concerned about whether education policy might stimulate any political or “subversive” activities that could undermine its legitimacy and governance. In fact, the legitimacy of the colonial administration was challenged by the PTU’s active participation in protecting the interests of teachers at the Certificate Master level. In the 1980s, the colonial regime expected a compliant, disunited and uncritical teaching sector, but the emergence of the PTU constituted the first powerful challenge to its legitimacy as it could unify the powerful, qualified and professionalized teaching force.29 Above all, teachers rallied around the PTU as it fought for the democratization of the colonial political system from the 1970s to the 1990s. The HKSAR government is no better than the colonial regime. It insists on an authoritarian governing approach and believes that the executive authority, backed up by the central government in Beijing, should neither be challenged nor altered. The controversy over the election method for the Chief Executive in 2017 was a case in point, leading to intense debate, fierce confrontations and the new democracy movement from September to December 2014, when the Occupy Central Movement attracted the participation of many students and teachers at all levels of educational institutions. Beijing was shocked and alarmed by the degree of participation by students and teachers. As such, both the HKSAR government and Beijing hope to instill a greater sense of Chineseness, or mainland Chinese national identity, among the younger generation. Yet, as long as Hong Kong people tend to separate their cultural Chineseness from the political identification with the CCP in mainland China, any move to re-­ introduce the National Education curriculum policy would be destined to encounter resistance from teachers, students, parents and, of course, the PTU. The PTU remains the driving force of Hong Kong’s democracy movement, both old and new. Teachers and students are active participants promoting democratic change in not only Hong Kong but also mainland China. Indeed, democratization in the HKSAR is bound to be protracted and difficult. But its active participants will not change, especially the dedicated teachers and ordinary students whose sense of belonging in Hong Kong is strong, and who have a strong commitment to fight for a better and a more democratic place for both Hong Kong and the mainland Fortunately, and unfortunately, student activism is the hallmark of new democracy in Hong Kong with the leadership of PTU. The fortunate aspect is the outstanding performance and defiant attitude of many students in their leadership of the new democracy movement.30 The unfortunate aspect is that some people still believe that the student activists have been encouraged by teachers and the international intervening force in Hong Kong’s internal affairs. This conspiracy theory is exacerbated by the rise of China, whose officials responsible for Hong Kong matters adopt a politically authoritarian and defensive

108   S. C.-F. Hung mindset, and also an anti-­foreign attitude toward the HKSAR. The pro-­Beijing media also perpetuate news reports that some students and democrats have gained outside financial support for their new democracy movement. In an era of globalization, however, democracy and human rights, as well as social justice, are universal values seeping through the HKSAR even without any foreign intervention. The root of student activism and radicalism in the HKSAR is actually the failure and malfunctioning of the education policies. Policy changes were made without consulting teachers sufficiently, without respecting the right and views of parents and teachers, and without a democratic style embracing tolerance and dissent. The bureaucrats responsible for education reform and policies have failed the people of Hong Kong. Ironically, education will continuously be blamed by society, by the government and by Beijing and yet more top-­down pressure continues to be exerted on the teachers, who shoulder the responsibility for all the so-­called problems in the education sector. Education in the HKSAR has already been damaged by conflicts from 1997 to 2017, leading to profound social distrust.31 In the midst of this pessimistic scenario, the PTU still projects an image of optimism towards Hong Kong’s new democracy movement. It helps to improve the livelihood of the underprivileged, and supports the development of a democratic, free and just society. The PTU has been participating in (1) activities calling for a more democratic political system, (2) the annual June 4 memorial activities, (3) commemorative activities against the Japanese invasion of China in the Second World War, (4) pro-­workers activities of the Confederation of Trade Union, (5) the Alliance for True Democracy, and (6) international conferences and activities in support for educational and social affairs. It has become both a local and transnational education interest group, with tremendous contributions to the democracy movement in Hong Kong and also mainland China. The battleground is in Hong Kong, but democratization in the territory does have demonstrable impacts on the mainland, at least in the southern part of China. In terms of leadership, the late Szeto Wah played a pivotal role in the development of the PTU and its expansion. His vision of using internal democratization to prevent the pro-­CCP elements from infiltrating and sabotaging the PTU was a significant one, with ramifications for the organization in the coming years. Szeto Wah’s major concerns were not really the pro-­democracy party, the Democratic Party, and the other political interest group – the Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China – but he was truly concerned about the future of the PTU, which remains the largest trade union in the HKSAR. Under the sovereignty of China and the principle of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR, it is even more important for the PTU to continue to fight for democracy, fairness, justice, equity and the openness of Hong Kong. Perhaps the PTU is destined to be the target of political attacks, infiltration and sabotage in the HKSAR, but its long-­standing tradition of fighting for the interests of teachers and the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong will surely remain for the years leading to 2047 and beyond.

The Professional Teachers’ Union   109

Notes   1 The three normal schools were Northcote College of Education (established in 1939), Grantham College of Education (established in 1951) and Sir Robert Black College of Education (established in 1960) respectively with the names of former Governors of Hong Kong. The other two normal schools were the Hong Kong Technical Teachers’ College and Institute of Language in Education, and were established in 1974 and in 1982 respectively.   2 It was reported that Tsin Sai-­nin was a teacher at the government school and a member of the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants’ Association. He planned to establish the PTU and found Szeto Wah as his assistant (Apple Daily, January 2, 2011 (in Chinese) http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20110102/14828380). Moreover, he was an elected member of Urban Council that indicated him being quite active politically at that moment. This pro-­government position made him lose the support of some teachers.   3 The Hong Kong Teachers’ Association was a government-­supported teachers’ association established in 1934. At first, its members were dominated by foreigners and governmental officials and the meetings were conducted by English. After the Second World War, the growing number of Chinese teachers participation as members. Tsin Sai-­nin was an executive member of the Association starting from 1955. See www. hkta1934.org.hk/pass_group_representatives.htm. However, the association’s status was lost as it showed support but did not directly participate in the certificate teachers’ movement in the early 1970s.   4 He was first elected as a member of Urban Council on March 7, 1973.   5 Stephan Ortmann, Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong. London: Routledge, 2010, p. 39.   6 Ibid., p. 131.   7 Ibid., p. 98.   8 Ibid., p. 99.   9 Ibid. 10 Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008, p. 178. 11 Ibid. 12 Ortmann, 2010, p. 100. 13 Ibid., p. 136. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Wai Kwok Benson Wong, “Teacher Participation and Democratization: A Comparatively Study of Hong Kong and Taiwan,” Journal of Comparative Asian Development, vol. 4, no. 2 (2005), p. 434. 18 Sonny Lo Shiu-­hing, “The Role of a Political Interest Group in Democratization of China and Hong Kong: The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol.  22, no.  84 (2013), p. 941. 19 Paul Morris, “Teaching in Hong Kong: Professionalization, Accountability and the State,” In Research Papers in Education, vol. 19, no. 1 (March 2004), p. 109. 20 Cheng Yin Cheong, “Hong Kong Educational Reforms in the Last Decade: Reform Syndrome and New Developments,” International Journal of Educational Management, vol. 209, no. 1 (2009), p. 66. 21 Paul Morris and Ian Scott, “Educational Reform and Policy Implementation in Hong Kong,” Journal of Education Policy, vol. 18, no. 1 (2003), pp. 73. 22 Cheng, 2006, p. 66. 23 Morris, 2004, p. 114.

110   S. C.-F. Hung 24 The two groups were Concerns for Hong Kong led by Kwok Ka-­ki and Neighbourhood Workers’ Service Centre led by Leung Yiu-­chung. The reason for withdrawing from the Alliance was that they had different ways of fighting democracy. 25 The standpoint and position of this person were controversial. He was born in Taishan in Guangdong province. He sneaked into Hong Kong by swimming in 1973 and maintained his business mainly with high risk stock market activities and foreign currency exchange. He was formerly the deputy chairman and executive director of Pearl Oriental Oil Limited and a member of the Chinese People’s Political consultative Conference from 2008 to 2013. It was questionable that he donated such large amount of money to the pro-­democracy movement in Hong Kong. This action might start to divide the pro-­democracy camps, as some critics suggested. 26 Lo, 2013, p. 939. 27 Morris and Scott, 2003, p. 82. 28 Cited in Professional Teachers’ Union, Come, Join the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, August 2014. 29 Morris, 2004, p. 110. 30 Tatiana Siegel, “Sundance: Netflix Nabs China Doc ‘Joshua: Teenager Vs. Superpower’,” The Hollywood Reporter, January 23, 2017, available online at www. hollywoodreporter.com/news/sundance-­netflix-nabs-­china-doc-­joshua-teenager­superpower-967749 31 Cheng, 2008, pp. 80–81.

6 Workers as interest groups Are they fragmented and powerless? Jeff Hai-Chi Loo

Introduction In the study of contemporary political science, labor is seen as one of the significant interest groups playing a role in the social movement that shapes mass political culture. Quite often, working-­class organizations, particularly labor unions, can exert influence on a government policy-­making and implementation process. In Britain, the Labor Party has particularly represented the rights of the working class. It has generated impacts on British politics since 1900s through the use of strikes, protests and demonstration.1 Similarly, working-­class organizations in France and Canada launched general strikes in the 1990s to express the rights of working-­class people.2 As a matter of fact, Hong Kong is another example, showing that workers have been playing a key role in both governmental policy processes and social movement since 1950s, when more labor groups emerged to fight for workers’ interests. The workers’ movements in 1950s and 1960s were a struggle between different working-­class organizations and have significant influence on the political culture. In the 1970s, different working-­class organizations unified and sought better workers’ benefits, while in the 1980s working-­class organizations tried to extend its influence to the political sphere so as to obtain more interest. However, the role of labor diminished after the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997. The government of HKSAR implemented a far more business-­oriented policy than the colonial regime, marginalizing the power of workers. Although there have always been workers’ representatives in the Executive Council (ExCo) and Legislative Council (LegCo), the power of workers has been significantly curbed by the business sector. For some controversial labor issues, like the minimum wage and standard working hours as will be discussed later, the workers still need to negotiate with business sectors. This chapter seeks to understand the evolution of labor as various ideologically fragmented interest groups by using a Marxist perspective of the relationship between labor aristocracy and the dominant capitalist class. It will argue that under the dominance of the capitalist class in the HKSAR polity, labor representatives who have coopted into the existing institution are actually labor aristocrats without genuine political power and influence.

112   J. H-C. Loo

Marxist theory of labor aristocracy In contemporary political science literature, the power of workers can be understood through the study of working-­class behavior, its relationship with the dominant class, its dynamic interactions with social movements and the power relations with the state. These are the factors that shape whether labor is powerful or powerless in society. Marxists scholars have articulated the concept of ‘labor aristocracy’ to explain the conservatism of the working-­class leaders. The labor aristocracy is referred to upper tier of the working class.3 It constitutes unions leadership and activists who are politically representation the interests of the proletariat as a whole. Many Marxist scholars believed that the theory of labor aristocracy described the working class in Britain during the 1880s.4 Others believe that this concept could help us understood the complexities of class struggle and class formation. The concept of labor aristocracy as articulated by Marx and Engels is related to the socioeconomic situation in the 1880s. According to Marx and Engels, the working class in England during the early nineteenth century had derived a movement that emphasized the significance of class. The original argument on “labor aristocracy” was derived from Engels’ classic essay The Condition of Working Class in England. He argued that the emergence of labor aristocracy was due to the ability of skilled workers in England to form working-­class organizations, regulate the labor market and secure their wages and employment stability.5 As industrialization proceeded rapidly in the nineteenth century, the capitalist class in Britain produced the super profits that allowed a small minority of the working class to acquire special privileges in welfare and wages.6 Moreover, industrialization produced huge differences between a small portion of working-­class members and its own majority. However, this small portion of the working-­class movement became more conservative in Britain during the late nineteenth century as the minority looked after their own interests. In fact, the establishment of working-­class organizations, such as labor unions, could easily neglect the majority’s interests, particularly the unskilled workers. The labor aristocracy was not only disconnected from the majority but they were also integrated into the capitalist system of management through entering the management stratum.7 Engels argued that those workers acquired advantages in economic positions, were absorbed into the capitalist polity and became ‘petty bourgeoisie’ who had profound impact on the labor struggle.8 He also contended that the rise of the labor aristocracy was due to the monopolistic nature of industrialization in Britain, and that it would finally disappear and be replaced eventually by the proletariat.9 Lenin’s argument on labor aristocracy was based on insights from Marx and Engels, but he developed a more updated version. Lenin argued that labor aristocracy constituted a minority of the working class, particularly the leaders of working-­class organizations or labor unions. It had to form an alliance with the national bourgeoisie during the workers’ movements as it had to negotiate for better and special privileges.10 Hence, the workers’ movement marginalized

Workers as interest groups   113 working class whose power and influence would decline. Lenin also pointed out that the labor aristocracy would allow working-­class leaders to obtain job security, and to acquire more benefits from having access to different sources and social welfare.11 In other words, the labor aristocracy would enjoy far more relative privileges than the majority. Lenin warned that the existence of labor aristocracy could not solve the basic problems confronted by the working class, especially the reducing number of unskilled workers. In reality, the labor aristocracy could easily be absorbed by the bourgeoisie and the workers’ movement would be more politically conservative. In short, the rights of the working class could be easily swept under the carpet and the effectiveness of the working-­class movement could be undermined. Although Marx, Engels and Lenin argued that the emergence of labor aristocracy would finally terminate the monopoly of the bourgeoisie, their arguments appeared to predict this scenario in an idealistic way. The labor aristocracy persists and helps the capitalists to consolidate the management of capitalism while curbing the power of labor and the effectiveness of the workers’ movement. In the case of Britain, the leaders in the labor unions and working-­class organizations did not consider the needs of the masses, but rather themselves. The establishment of the Labor Party demonstrated that the interests of the working­class became more significant in the eyes of their leaders. The power of the worker could be seen in strikes. However, the Labor Party ignored the mass interest in some labor issues – such as wage levels, working hours and retirement plans – when they took over political power from the Conservative Party in 1964. The Labor politicians still sought for individual and party interests instead of fighting for the interests of all workers. The HKSAR has a similar situation to Britain. The working class in Hong Kong has relatively less power compared with other business interest groups. In fact, there are some working-­class representatives who have been elected to LegCo and ExCo, but they have failed to achieve workers’ demands. Arguably, the effectiveness of the Hong Kong’s workers’ movement is relatively limited because trade unions or working-­class organizations are politically divided in the working-­class movement. As will be discussed later, these divided workers’ movements can be seen in the Pro-­Beijing and pro-­democracy camps.

Dominance of capitalist class According to Ralph Miliband, the ruling class in capitalist society has controlled all the means of production that impact the state.12 The ruling class, namely the bourgeoisie, has tremendous influence on the state by exploiting the rights of the working class, and by dominating the economies and manipulating the state.13 Miliband asserts that the power of the business sector exists because it has special privileges inside or outside the state system compared with the working class in capitalist society.14 He argued that business has far more political power than other stakeholders. Miliband observed that government finds it difficult to intervene in the business sector.15 The state needs to engage with the

114   J. H-C. Loo business sector rather than containing it. Besides, he elaborated that government is dependent on the business sector no matter what the ideology of the government is.16 The state’s dependency on the business sector makes the bourgeoisie become the dominant class in the capitalist society. Miliband witnessed the relative powerlessness of the working class in contrast to the bourgeoisie.17 It means that the power of working-­class is no match for the bourgeoisie. He explains labor’s relatively weak power in terms of its lack of decision-­making influences on production. In Miliband’s terms, the decision-­making influence on production is an indicator of economic power.18 It is clear that the capitalist state has less care and consideration for the working class than the bourgeoisie. In other words, the working class is bound to be inferior in the capitalist society due to its lack of economic power compared with the ruling bourgeoisie. Miliband insisted that bourgeoisie possessed the economic power that can hamstring state behavior. On the other hand, the working class cannot compete with the bourgeoisie politically. Miliband’s Marxist perspective clearly explained the failure of the workers’ movement. The divisions of trade unions could also undermine their political influences. He further argued that the role of trade unions could easily be shaped by their internal interests.19 It also meant the common working-­class interests were actually unclear among the trade unions. Trade unions could attach importance only to their particular interests and neglect the interests of the masses. Miliband’s insights can be applied to the Hong Kong context as the HKSAR government has been forming an alliance with the business sector since July 1, 1997. This alliance has allowed the business elite to enter the various institutions – such as ExCo, LegCo and other advisory committees – to influence government policies and to dominate the economic decision-­ making processes.20 The most typical example was the abolition of collective bargaining of the Trade Unions in November, 1997 as will discuss about later. The institutional design of the HKSAR also benefits the business sector, with the most typical example being the Chief Executive elections and the Functional Constituencies in LegCo. As will be argued later, the alliance between state and the capitalist class emasculates the influences and power of the working-­class.

Workers as interest groups in pre-­1997 Hong Kong In the pre-­1997 era, the workers’ movement tried to fight for the benefits, rights and other welfare aspects of the proletariat (see Table 6.1). However, the ideological struggle in the movement between the leftists and rightists could be seen. Different working-­class groups sought to dominate the labor movement and many disputes drove them to compete for different interests. The workers’ movement in Hong Kong emerged from the Canton-­Hong Kong general strike/boycott in 1925.21 It marked the inception of the workers’ movement led by an independent trade union, namely the Chinese Engineers’ Institute. The workers’ movement became politicized after the establishment of

Workers as interest groups   115 Table 6.1  Major events of the Labor movement in pre-1997 Hong Kong Year

Events

Groups involved

1925

Canton-Hong Kong General Strike-Boycott – an anti-imperialist strike supported by both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party Tramway Workers’ Labor Dispute – a strike that involved the leftist and rightest ideological struggle Hong Kong 1967 Leftist riots – a labor dispute that was stimulated by the PRC Cultural Revolution and that undermined the stability of Hong Kong’s society Reform the Labor Department and Enacted the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) The establishment of Joint Secretariat of the Hong Kong Trade Unions – a working-class umbrella union that was composed of left, right and independent working-class organizations The promotion of labor functional constituency in LegCo

Chinese Engineers’ Institute

1952 1967

1968 1980

1985

FTU and TUC FTU and TUC

Colonial Government Leftist and Rightist Unions Christian Industrial Committee Colonial Government, FTU and TUC

Sources: Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu. A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong 1946–1989. Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Occasional Paper, University of Hong Kong, 1991, pp. 15–16, 34–35, 40, 50.

the pro-­Beijing Federation of Trade Union (FTU) and the pro-­Taiwan Trade Union Council (TUC) in 1948. The FTU was pro-­Chinese Communist Party and the TUC was pro-­Kuomintang. Their competition marked the struggle in different workers disputes. They mobilized workers in different disputes and both sought political dominance in the workers’ movement. In the 1950s, Hong Kong’s political environment was fragmented and divided between pro-­Beijing and pro-­Taiwan forces. Different working-­class organizations changed their focus from collective bargaining to political struggles. Their competition emerged and they were involved in different workers’ disputes. A typical example was the tramway workers’ labor dispute in January 1952. This labor dispute not only focused on the protection of the rights of labor but also the opportunities provided for different trade unions to dominate. The strife between FTU and TUC in the struggle for various disputes was a testimony to the fact that Hong Kong workers were by no means politically apathetic or indifferent.22 The labor movements was more like a tool for each camp to compete with each other and mobilize supporters against the claims of the opposite camp. The FTU and TUC also sought to gain more members and support from public through the provision of various welfare benefits to members, such as medical services, education programs and special discount on basic necessities.

116   J. H-C. Loo In the early 1960s, the scarcity problem of workers led to greater bargaining power for the working-­class organizations.23 The general public was dissatisfied with the ideological and political struggles between left-­wing and right-­wing unions.24 Many workers rejected any help from trade unions and sought to solve problems on their own. However, the workers tended to be more radical after the mid-­1960s. The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in May, 1966 stimulated the nationalistic emotions of the Hong Kong leftists. The left-­wing FTU started to mobilize supporters for strikes, challenged the colonial government through workers’ dispute and struggled with the right-­wing TUC. In May 1967, the FTU even established the All-­Circle Struggle Committee and people from different background were involved in the dispute, including students and teachers and workers from public transport and utilities. Unluckily, the dispute erupted into a riot that undermined the social stability and economic development of Hong Kong. The major aim of the dispute was to challenge the legitimacy of the colonial government and sought its response to their demands.25 In reality, the riots disrupted many enterprises and businesses. It raised public concern about workers’ issue. The colonial government responded by reforming the Labor Department and setting up a new division of labor relations. In September 1968, the colonial government enacted the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) that enshrined the rules and regulations in accordance with the International Labor Organization.26 The colonial government also attempted to reduce the influence of left-­wing trade unions by making the Labor Department a middleman in labor disputes. In the 1970s, the labor movement involved the left-­wing FTU, right TUC and some independent interest groups. These interest groups emerged and cooperated with the trade unions but they did not have political party affiliation. The most typical example was the Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), which played the role of negotiator between labor, management and the government.27 The workers’ movement transformed from political struggles to the quest for solutions to workers issues, such as demands for better wages and benefits. These interest groups not only provided assistance for workers but also trained up new union leaders through education programs. They also tried to empower workers by mobilizing them in workers’ movements and coordinating with different political groups. Therefore, the unified trade union – namely the Joint Secretariat of Hong Kong Trade Union – was established in 1980 by the  CIC and it comprised left-­wing, right-­wing and independent unions. The founding of this united union symbolized a phenomenon – the metamorphosis from a political struggle to the quest for more negotiation space in the struggle of working-­class polities. In the 1980s, when the negotiation on Hong Kong’s sovereignty began between the British and the Chinese governments, labor unions tried to adopt a new strategy and sought the government’s support for their demands for better benefits and wages. The colonial government responded to their demands through the introduction of a labor functional constituency in LegCo and the consultation with trade unions during the Basic Law drafting process from

Workers as interest groups   117 1985–1990.28 In 1985, the LegCo functional constituency election witnessed two labor representatives being elected, including pro-­Beijing FTU and pro-­ Taiwan CTU. On the other hand, many workers participated in the elections for the advisory District Boards and LegCo and some candidates were elected such as Tam Yiu-­chung, Chan Yuen-­han and Lau Chin-­shek. When Hong Kong approached the year 1997, FTU leaders Tam Yiu-­chung, Chan Yuen-­han and Cheng Yiu-­tong were invited to join the Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, a body set up by the PRC government to prepare for a smooth transition. They also represented the workers to elect the first Chief Executive in the Election Committee. After the 1989 June 4 incident, in which the Chinese military suppressed mainland democrats, the working class was divided into two camps: pro-­Beijing and pro-­democratic. The pro-­Beijing camp was led by the FTU and the pro-­democratic camp led by the independent Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union (CTU). The pro-­ democracy CTU boycotted the Provisional LegCo, which was formed by the PRC government to ensure a smooth political foundation for Hong Kong from 1996 to the period beyond 1997. Nevertheless, the Provisional LegCo revoked a very influential bill against collective bargaining in July 1997, which was surprisingly rejected by the pro-­Beijing FTU. This move of revoking collective bargaining power weakened the power of trade unions and marked the beginning of an uneasy negotiation between the working class and the bourgeoisie in the post-­1997 era.

Workers as interest groups in post-­1997 Hong Kong The post-­1997 era has become the most turbulent period for Hong Kong workers. The growth of civil society could be seen in the rise of various interest groups, including workers’ movements. Although the first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-­hwa, invited the FTU legislative councilor Tam Yiu-­chong and FTU vice-­ president Cheng Yiu-­tong to join the ExCo, it did not mean that the government took workers’ issues seriously. Nor did Cheng and Tam fully articulate the interests of all workers effectively. In fact, the workers’ interests were neglected partly due to the onset of the Asian financial crisis and the economic downturn in Hong Kong from 1997 to 1998. The government protected the interests of the business sector more than those of the workers. The most controversial issue was the implementation of the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme in 2000. This issue harmed workers’ interests because they expected a better and more comprehensive retirement plan, but the business sectors refused to make concessions. Another controversial issue was the civil service reform in the 1999 and it aroused debate among members of the public. Some workers were civil servants who hoped that civil service reform would also protect their interests and benefits. However, as it turned out, the reform disappointed many of them. During Donald Tsang’s administration from 2004 to 2012, the government responded to demands from workers. It marked the implementation of

118   J. H-C. Loo minimum wages in May, 2011. A committee on the Statutory Minimum Wage was set up and it was composed of workers, business people, government officials and some community leaders. However, other resolved issues included working hours and retirement plan issues still in the process of ongoing negotiation between workers and the business sector. The Committee on Standard Working Hour was established in the C. Y. Leung administration in April 2013. The issue of the MPF hedging mechanism had been raised in the last policy address in the last half year of C. Y. Leung’s administration. Two important strikes broke out in 2007 and 2013, connecting the working class with civil society in an unprecedented manner. The first was the 36-day bar-­tenders’ strike in 2007 and the Hong Kong dockers’ strike was in 2013. The bar-­tenders had received low wages over 10 years and their wage was determined by the union that was affiliated with the FTU. Many workers felt dissatisfied with the wage level and they were concerned about the role of FTU in the wage negotiation process. The workers sought the help from the CTU and organized the strike on August 6, 2007. The strike lasted for 36 days and mobilized public sympathy and support. The workers’ demonstrated and staged a sit-­in to express their demands as a kind of civil disobedience. After a long process of negotiation, the strike ended with a deal with the contractors.29 The wages of the strikers were raised to a more acceptable level. Most importantly, this strike raised the public awareness of workers’ interests and the many interest groups in civil society supportive of the rights of workers. It even represented a new trend of workers’ movements and heightened public participation. The Hong Kong dockers’ strike in 2013 was another movement that interacted with the civil society. The 40-day strike was the longest one in post-­war Hong Kong. It involved the largest company, Hutchison Whampoa Hong Kong, and the working-­class demand for better treatment in terms of wages and working hours. The strikes raised public concern about working-­class benefits and social inequality. Many activists participated in the strike and supported the dockers such as Joshua Wong, Leung Kwok-­hung and Willis Ho. These two strikes in 2007 and 2013 transformed the workers’ movement from passive involvement to active engagement with civil society. In both cases, an unpreceded move in the HKSAR’s democracy experiencing of democracy was directly related to the advancement of labor interests. Other interest groups in civil society formed a coalition with the labor movement. A new phenomenon in the Hong Kong democracy movement is the triple alliance between trade unions, political parties and electoral politics. The most typical examples were the FTU leaders Chan Yuen-­han and Tam Yiu-­chong, who also affiliated with Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) and the former CTU leader Lau Chin-­shek who affiliated with Democratic Party. These affiliations allowed them to gain more support and capture the seats in direct elections. In fact, these affiliations ended in the 2010s as the workers hoped to capture more seats in the LegCo. The FTU candidates used its name as a political party affiliation in the LegCo election and District Council election. The CTU members Lee Cheuk-­yan, Cyd Ho Sau-­lan,

Workers as interest groups   119 Fernando Cheung Chiu-­hung and Peter Cheung Kwok-­che who established the Labor Party in December 18, 2011. The party represented the workers’ interests in the LegCo and they sought to influence the government’s policy-­making and implementation process in the LegCo. However, the 2016 LegCo election marked the failure of workers because many labor candidates were defeated in the election, including FTU members Wong Kwok-­hing and Tang Ka Piu, and Labor Party members Lee Cheuk-­yan and Cyd Ho Sau Lan. The symbol of the workers’ interest in the LegCo was lost and it seems that working-­class interests are of secondary importance in legislative politics.

Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) The FTU was established in 1948 and it is the left-­wing workers’ organization, supportive of both Beijing and local workers’ interests. As of 2017, it has 251 affiliated unions, representing such sectors as transport, governmental organizations, public utilities, clericals and professionals, tourism, catering and retailing industries, service industry, manufacturing, shipbuilding and machinery manufacturing, and construction.30 It claims to be the largest workers’ union in the HKSAR. Members of the FTU participate in different elections, including the District Council, the LegCo and the Election Committee election that selects the Chief Executive. Cheng Yiu-­tong has been the honorable president of the FTU and the non-­official member of ExCo since 2002. The FTU also participates in different government advisory bodies and committees, including the Minimum Wage Council, Labor Advisory Board and the Standard Working Hours Committee. It representatives are expected to provide recommendations and suggestions on labor policy. In the following three cases, the FTU position has been criticized by the public. Critics of the FTU argued that they could not represent the rights of all workers. Often, the FTU position was ambiguous on labor issues in the eyes of its critics. The most typical example was paternity leave. FTU members refused to support a bill proposed by Kenneth Leung due to government pressure on its labor aristocrats in the ExCo.31 The FTU had connected to civil society since its establishment. The FTU has passive connections with civil society. They cannot mobilize supporters from different ages and different backgrounds. In reality, the FTU can only obtain support from new immigrants, grassroots and elderly people in elections. The emergence of labor aristocrats in the ExCo also constrains their behavior in different workers’ movement. The FTU action on workers’ movement obstructs the workers from fighting for their own interests and allows the dominance of the bourgeoisie.

Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) The CTU was established in 1990 and is recognized as a pro-­democratic workers’ union. The CTU is affiliated with more than 90 trade unions with

120   J. H-C. Loo more than 170,000 members. It claims to be the second largest trade union in Hong Kong. Most significantly, the major political party affiliation of the CTU is the Labor Party. The major principles of the CTU are to unify the workers, promote their rights, fight for benefits and to promote justice and democracy. The representatives from the CTU have participated in different elections since 1990s. They seek to promote different labor issues in the legislature. Examples include the minimum wage, standard working hours and retirement plans. Due to institutional constraints and their numerical inferiority in the LegCo, most of the bills proposed by the HKCTU could not be passed, such as the amendments on statutory minimum wage, collective bargaining rights and standard working hours. Unlike the FTU, the CTU actively connects with civil society. In fact, it can mobilize civil society groups to take part in different labor disputes. A typical example is the Hong Kong dockers’ strike in 2013. It raised public awareness on labor issues and dared to confront the government and employers unlike the FTU which appeared to be pro-­establishment and politically cautious. Educating people on labor rights and labor issues is another task of the CTU, which provides many programs to enlighten ordinary people on issues pertinent to the working class.

The Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions (FLU) The FLU was established in 1984 and is a pro-­establishment union in Hong Kong. The FLU is affiliated with 90 trade unions, with more than 90,000 members. It claims to be the third largest trade union in Hong Kong. As with other trade unions, the FLU also fights for the rights of workers and seeks for better working environment. It provides a lot of welfare, services and education programs for the union members. Lee Kai-­ming who was the former president of the FLU led the FLU to participate the political sphere in the 1990s. Under Lee’s leadership, the FLU tried to change its stance to pro-­Beijing and pro-­ establishment. The FLU’s member joined the Preparatory Committee and Provisional LegCo. Lee, as the FLU representative in the Provisional LegCo, supported the abolition of collective bargaining in November, 1997. In fact, the FLU is far more passive than the FTU in engaging with civil society. Its passive involvement in civil society makes difficulties for them in participating in direct election. Although the FLU are the labor aristocracy, their influence on workers is relatively low.

The Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council (TUC) The TUC was established in 1948. It is the right-­wing workers’ union. It is now the only pro-­Kuomintang workers’ union. It claims to be the fourth largest workers’ union in Hong Kong with more than 20,000 members. The TUC

Workers as interest groups   121 played a crucial role in the workers’ movement in 1950s and 1960s when it had an ideological struggle with the left-­wing FTU. The TUC was the second largest workers’ unions at that moment. In 1980s and 1990s, the HKTUC participated in legislative elections. For example, the leader of the TUC, Pang Chun-­hoi, was elected in the labor functional constituencies. However, since the departure of the late Pang Chun-­hoi, the TUC has lacked political leadership. Thus, the political influence of the TUC has declined. The HKTUC had minimal links with civil society groups and the TUC leadership has also been involved in fiscal disputes with affiliated trade unions. Thus, its role has been relatively marginalized in the 2000s. In the following section, I will use three cases to show the emergence of the labor aristocracy and the struggle between the dominant class and the workers. In particular, the weakness of working-­class power will be shown, as it fails to push for the workers’ movement in Hong Kong. Case study 1: abolition of the Collective Bargaining Law The collective bargaining law was a typical example of the competition between business and the workers and demonstrates the existence of labor aristocracy that emasculates the power of workers in the working-­class movement in the HKSAR. If the democracy movement embraces the working-­class movement, it is a constrained one due to the political powerlessness of the workers. Before 1997, the colonial legislature had passed a collective bargaining law that provided a legal role for trade unions in negotiations with the management. It was difficult to find a collective bargaining agreement in Hong Kong as it covered only 5 percent of the workforce.32 The Collective Bargaining Law protected the interests of workers and it could increase the power of workers during their negotiations with business sector. In fact, it stimulated the business sector which believed that the legislation hindered their interest. This law was finally abolished in the Provisional Legislative Council (LegCo) where the business sector was dominant and when the PRC government had to woo the business support by agreeing to its abolition. Due to pressure from the business sector, the HKSAR government is unlikely to propose and enact another Collective Bargaining Law. The FTU was also criticized by the public for its relatively pro-­ government stance on the issue of collective bargaining. In fact, the abolition of the Collective Bargaining Law reflected a retrogressive step in the working-­class movement. This fallback was a typical example that illustrated the perpetuation of the labor aristocracy, because the politically co-­opted pro-­government labor unionists and leaders were silent over the abolition of workers’ collective bargaining power. The Provisional LegCo was treated by Beijing as a rubberstamp to abolish “undesirable” laws and regulations that were legislated in the pre-­1997 era, particularly those policies that violated Beijing’s interest. After all, the close relationships between Beijing and Hong Kong’s business classes meant that they formed an alliance to curb the working-­ class movement. Ordinary workers found it impossible to compete with the dual

122   J. H-C. Loo alliance between Beijing and the business class. Nor were the democrats able to influence the Provisional LegCo as they were all politically excluded from the temporary law-­making body. Actually, the role of FTU representatives in both the Provisional LegCo and Executive Council was very crucial to the repeal of the Collective Bargaining Law. The FTU was pro-­Beijing and its co-­opted members were like labor aristocrats willing to bow to the commands of the PRC officials. The FTU representatives, Tam Yiu-­chung, Chan Yuen-­han and Cheng Yiu-­tong, supported the abolition of the Collective Bargaining Law so as to maintain their political interest and influence. There was no evidence to show that Tam and Cheng fought for the retention of the Collective Bargaining Law inside the Executive Council. Case study 2: statutory Minimum Wage The implementation of Statutory Minimum Wage was another example to illustrate the persistence of the labor aristocracy and the failure of the working class in the competition with the dominant capitalist or business class in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Hong Kong experienced rapid economic growth from the 1960s to the 1990s due to rapid industrialization. This experience encouraged the colonial government and even the HKSAR government to have more consideration for economic development and prosperity. Under the structural confines of the capitalist city-­state, the HKSAR government policy is bound to be more pro-­business and working-­class welfare issues are destined to be marginalized. Therefore, it was difficult to implement the statutory minimum wage in the past as it violated the ideology of “positive non-­ interventionism” and undermined the interests of the capitalist class. The minimum wage became a contentious social issue in Hong Kong from the late 1990s to early 2000s. The opposition parties in the Legislative Council (LegCo) have tried to support the minimum wage in election campaigns since 2000. In 2001, the media exposed the low wages, high working hours and low standard of living in Hong Kong.33 The public started to realize the importance of labor protection, but the response from the government was one of indifferent due to the dominance of the business elites in LegCo’s functional constituencies where the capitalist class could often exercise veto powers to block private member’s bills initiated by directly elected democrats. This institutional constraint hindered the discussion of the minimum wage in the legislature. Yet, due to the pressure from different political parties and labor interest groups, the Donald Tsang administration started to respond by considering legislation on the minimum wage. In fact, the negotiations between the government, employers and employees over the issue of the minimum wage revealed a persistent deadlock in the struggle between the capitalist class and working-­class representatives. Both sides failed to reach any compromise, especially as the capitalist class gained an upper hand over the working-­class representatives in terms of political power and influence. The capitalist class dominated almost all aspects of the political institutions, including advisory committees, LegCo and Executive

Workers as interest groups   123 Council. One political party that speaks for the interests of the capitalist class is the Liberal Party. With strong affiliations with the business sector, it vehemently opposed the legislation on statutory minimum wage. Its representative, Tommy Cheung, strongly argued that legislation on minimum wage undermined the interest of employers and that it would be detrimental to Hong Kong’s economic development.34 He even claimed the minimum wage should be HK$24 per hour, a level far behind the wage level that workers proposed.35 The Liberal Party asserted that the implementation of a minimum wage would violate the laissez-­faire ideology of the HKSAR government. However, some pro-­ democracy political parties, like the League of Social Democrats, believed that the minimum wage level should be higher at HK$33.36 The negotiation process was really difficult as the government gave more consideration to the business sector. The first minimum wage level was established by the government at HK$28 after a long debate in the LegCo. Finally, the bill on the statutory minimum wage was passed in 2010 with effect from May 1, 2011. Although the implementation of the statutory minimum wage appeared to demonstrate a balance of interests between the employers and employees, the reality was that the minimum wage level of HK$28 was slightly biased in favor of the interests of the capitalist class to the detriment of the working class. As the CTU lawmaker Lee Chuk-­yan argued, it was not a real victory for workers and he felt regret.37 The workers’ demand for a better wage level was rejected due to the institutional privilege and political power enjoyed by the capitalist class, whose agents have penetrated the entire political system of capitalistic Hong Kong. Both the CTU and the FTU sought to move amendments on activating the minimum wage law earlier and to protect low-­income employees.38 Due to the dominance of business in LegCo’s functional constituencies, the proposed amendment was vetoed. The long delay in the formulation of the minimum wage demonstrated the political co-­optation of the labor aristocracy in the top policy-­making Executive Council. On the other hand, the level of minimum wage in 2011 was by no means satisfactory from the perspective of working-­class interests. The FTU leader, Cheng Yiu-­tong, was appointed to join the Executive Council in 1997, but he has maintained his pro-­government position. Cheng did not respond to the media on the question about whether the FTU would withdraw its support for Jasper Tsang’s electoral participation in 2006, when Tsang called for the enactment of the minimum wage legislation.39 Indeed, as the Executive Council was dominated by the business sector, Cheng found it very difficult to articulate the interests of the working class. As a labor aristocrat, he treated the Executive Council as a platform to help the FTU gain more political power and influence rather than fighting for working-­class interests. Case study 3: standard working hours The issue of long working hours emerged in the 2000s. Different political parties sought to introduce standard working hours. In fact, the business sector opposed the formulation and implementation of legislation on standard working

124   J. H-C. Loo hours, because its members believed that it would undermine business interests and hinder Hong Kong’s economic development. In the 2012 Chief Executive election, candidate Leung Chun-­ying sought support from the FTU by proposing legislation on the standard working hour. He won the election and eventually became the Chief Executive. Due to pressure from the FTU, which had to demonstrate that it was not completely the puppet of the capitalist class, and other working-­class unions, the HKSAR government decided to establish the Standard Working Hours Committee in November 2012. The Committee included representatives from the business sector and trade unions. Again, the business class dominated the committee membership. The business sector’s representative, Stanley Lau Chin-­ho, asserted that the legislation on standard working hours would derail Hong Kong’s economic development and bring about social unrest, while the workers’ representative Ng Wai-­yee from the FLU argued that the business sector should not object to the legislation so quickly.40 The workers–business conflicts emerged during the committee discussions. It failed to reach a consensus on the issue and the working-­class representatives snubbed the committee meetings.41 The legislation on standard working hours encountered great difficulties and delay due to the boycott of the meetings by the labor side. The struggle between the working-­class representatives and the business sector on standard working hours again demonstrated the failure of workers in their competition with the capitalist class, which dominated the committee and expected the government to side with its interests. Stanley Lau Chin-­ho was the deputy chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries and had close relations with the government. Moreover, a co-­opted pro-­Beijing unionist, Stanley Ng Chau-­pei, was reportedly raising a white flag during the discussions on the issue of private employment contracts in the Standard Working Hour Committee meeting.42 His pro-­establishment position was even criticized by the honorary president of the FTU, Chan Yuen-­han, who according to commentators is far more pro-­worker than many labor aristocrats, and who saw Ng as ignoring the rights and plight of workers. In fact, this incident demonstrated the fragmentation within the pro-­government unionists and their relatively disorganized and disunited nature. In fact, only the FTU and FLU were represented in the committee, while the more pro-­democracy CTU was politically excluded. The political co-­optation of working-­class representatives into the HKSAR political system has succeeded in adopting a divide-­and-rule tactic, fragmenting the working-­class movement and rendering it relatively powerless.

Conclusion It is an undeniable fact that the working class in the HKSAR is both fragmented and powerless, mainly due to the structural constraints of the capitalist city-­ state, where the dominant capitalist class has penetrated into various political institutions, and partly due to the fragmentation of working-­class unions into pro-­democracy, independent, and pro-­Beijing/pro-­government interest groups. The institutional design of the HKSAR polity has made the business sector relatively

Workers as interest groups   125 politically powerful and influential, while marginalizing the pro-­democracy unions and co-­opting the pro-­government labor aristocrats. Under these circumstances, the working-­class representatives and activists are no match for the business class in terms of political influence and power. The long delay in the formulation and implementation of both the minimum wage and the standard working hours have illustrated the failure of workers to compete with the capitalist class. On the other hand, the persistence of labor aristocracy also reduces the influence and power of the entire working-­class movement. The labor aristocracy in the HKSAR is characterized by the co-­optation of FTU leaders into the Executive Council and other advisory committees; they sought to protect their political interest, status and power rather than fighting for the interests of the working class. For the pro-­ democracy trade unionists who are critical of both the government and the central government in Beijing, such as the CTU leaders, they are politically excluded from the top-­policy making body – the Executive Council. Nor were they co-­ opted into the standard working hours committee. Hence, from the Marxist perspective, the HKSAR remains a capitalist city-­state where the political institutions and government policies are necessarily biased in favor of the capitalists at the expense of the interests of the working class. Therefore, the working class remains both fragmented and powerless in Hong Kong.

Notes   1 Charles Post. “Exploring Working-­Class Consciousness: A Critique of the Theory of the Labor Aristocracy,” Historical Materialism, vol. 18, no. 4 (2010), pp. 6–8.   2 Ibid., p. 4.   3 H. F. Moorhouse. “The Marxist Theory of the Labor Aristocracy,” Social History, vol. 3, no. 1 (1978), pp. 61–82.   4 Max Elbaum and Robert Seltzer. The Labour Aristocracy: The Material Basis for Opportunism in the Labour Movement. Newtown: Resistance Books, 2004, p. 8.   5 Post, 2010, p. 8.   6 Ibid., pp. 8–9.   7 John Foster. Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns. Methuen: London, 1974.   8 Friedrich Engels. The Condition of the Working Class in England. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, originally published in 1892.   9 E. J. Hobsbawn, “Lenin and the Aristocracy of Labour,” Marxism Today (July 1970), pp. 207–210. 10 Post. 2010, p. 11. 11 Vladmir Lenin. “The Collapse of Second International,” in Lenin Collected Works, Volume 24. Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1974, originally published in 1915. 12 Ralph Miliband. The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1969, p. 23. 13 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 14 Ibid., p. 146. 15 Ibid., p. 147. 16 Ibid., pp. 154–155. 17 Ibid., p. 155. 18 Ralph Miliband. Marxism and Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 22.

126   J. H-C. Loo 19 Ralph Miliband. 1969, p. 159. 20 Brian C. H. Fong. Hong Kong’s Government under Chinese Sovereignty – The Failure of the State-­Business Alliance after 1997. New York: Routledge, 2016. 21 Leung Benjamin and Chiu Stephen. A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong 1946–1989. Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Occasional Paper, University of Hong Kong, 1991 pp. 15–16. 22 Lam Wai Man. Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization. London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 80–81. 23 Leung and Chiu, 1991, pp. 34–35. 24 Ibid., pp. 34–35. 25 Ibid., p. 40. 26 Rohan Price and John Kong Shan Ho. “Implementing a Statutory Minimum Wage in Hong Kong: Appreciating International Experiences but Recognizing Local Conditions,” Common Law World Review vol. 40 (2011), pp. 95–118. 27 Leung and Chiu, 1991, p. 50. 28 J. N. Henderson. “Trade Unionism in an Open Society.” In Y. C. Jao, D. A. Levin, S.  H. Ng and E. Sinn (eds), Labour Movement In A Changing Society, pp.  81–83. Hong Kong: Center of Asian Studies University of Hong Kong, 1988. 29 “Hong Kong: 36-day historical bar-­bender strike ended on September 12 after settling a deal with contractors. Human and trade union rights,” September 14, 2007, available online at www.ituc-­csi.org/hong-­kong-36-day-­historical-bar?lang=en (accessed February 16, 2017). 30 See “The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions: Introduction,” www.ftu.org.hk/ en/about?id=12 (accessed February 16, 2017). 31 Phila Siu. “LegCo passes law granting three days of paternity leave at 80 per cent of pay,” South China Morning Post, December 19, 2014. 32 Catherine C. H. Chiu. “Labour Relations and Regulation in Hong Kong: Theory and Practise.” Working Paper Series No. 37 (2002) Southeast Asian Research Center, City University of Hong Kong. 33 Matthew Y. H. Wong. “The Politics of the Minimum Wage in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 44, no. 4 (2014), pp. 735–752. 34 Tanna Chong. “Tommy Cheung stirs the minimum wage pot one more time.” South China Morning Post October 29, 2010. 35 Martin Wong. “Tommy Cheung joins the call for HK$24 minimum.” South China Morning Post, April 21, 2010. 36 Martin Wong, “LegCo passes HK$28 minimum wage law after marathon debate.” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2011. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid 39 “Sort out minimum wage, Tsang urged,” August 9, 2006, available online at www. scmp.com/article/559676/sort-­out-minimum-­wage-tsang-­urged (accessed February 16, 2017). 40 “Standard working hours could derail Hong Kong’s economy, warns government adviser,” December 23, 2012, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/ article/1096048/warning-­standard-working-­hours-could-­derail-hong-­kongs-economy (accessed February 16, 2017). 41 “Labour unions in Hong Kong must participate in formulating law on standard working hours,” January 2, 2016, available online at www.scmp.com/comment/insight-­opinion/ article/1897363/labour-­unions-hong-­kong-must-­participate-formulating-­law (accessed February 16, 2017). 42 “Hong Kong’s biggest trade union is failing workers by giving up on working hours legislation,” April 2, 2015, available online at www.scmp.com/comment/insight-­ opinion/article/1754294/hong-­kongs-biggest-­trade-union-­failing-workers-­giving (accessed February 16, 2017).

7 Why are Hong Kong’s business interest groups anti-­democratic? Minxing Zhao

Introduction While pro-­democracy forces have attracted worldwide attention for their indefatigable fight for a more democratic Hong Kong, few have thought about the role of business interest groups in Hong Kong’s transition to democracy. For the past two decades, since Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, pro-­democracy forces (also known as pan-­democrats) in Hong Kong have been fighting an uphill battle to reform the territory’s electoral institutions in a political system dominated by business interest groups. Despite numerous efforts made by the pan-­ democrats, business interest groups neither have strong incentives to democratize from above nor are forced to democratize by democracy from below. In Hong Kong’s turbulent transition to democracy, business interest groups are generally believed to be anti-­democratic due largely to their conservative attitudes towards the Western-­style liberal democracy advocated by the pro-­democracy camp. Despite the sporadic positive comments made by economic elites about Hong Kong’s democratization, Lynn White suggests that “elites that in these cases in effect remain anti-­democratic despite some rhetoric to the contrary.”1 Few would doubt the important role of business interest groups in Hong Kong’s transition to democracy and few would disagree about the conservative attitudes of business interest groups towards Hong Kong’s democratization. It is often suggested that business interest groups and pro-­democracy forces share no common ground on Hong Kong’s democratization. Since Hong Kong’s democratization drive was triggered by sovereignty transfer from Britain to China, the purpose of pan-­democrats is to reduce or eliminate Beijing influence in Hong Kong affairs under the “one country, two systems” arrangement and achieve the greatest degree of autonomy. Since pan-­democrats are fighting for autonomy in the name of democratization, democracy transition theory is weak in explaining the Hong Kong case. In fact, it is the unique characteristics of Hong Kong politics that are more appropriate to explain why business interest groups are anti-­democratic. People’s perceptions of the role of business interest groups in Hong Kong’s democratic transition are largely shaped by their own knowledge and understanding of democracy. There have been many studies on people’s perception of

128   M. Zhao business interest groups’ anti-­democratic attitudes. However, what makes people believe business interest groups are anti-­democratic and what makes business interest groups anti-­democratic are two different issues. In some sense, the latter is more important in understanding Hong Kong’s constitutional development. This chapter explores the factors that explain why business interest groups are anti-­democratic. The idea of democracy in Hong Kong is a very complicated issue and it has been developed into an all-­inclusive concept by pan-­democrats and their supporters. Over the past two decades, Hong Kong’s social movements have shown that, for Hong Kong people at least, democracy is more about anti-­authoritarian rule and the autonomy of Hong Kong than about increasing social, economic and political equality. There is no consensus on what democracy is, and what democracy is not. Any issue can be associated with democracy and any unsatisfactory constitutional arrangements, laws and government policies can be regarded as undemocratic. Even court judgements, which Hong Kong people valued as the safeguard of democracy, have been, sometimes, challenged as undemocratic. The supporters of undemocratic things, or those social groups that do not express their objections to undemocratic things, are generally viewed as anti-­democratic. Defining what is democratic and who is democratic often depends on one’s perceptions. There are no objective standards. Therefore, this chapter will not discuss how business interest groups are perceived. Instead, this chapter will discuss institutional, political and economic factors that make business interest groups anti-­democratic. In a regime’s democratic transition, business interest groups are the target and main roadblock on its path to democracy. Over the years, political reforms have been centered on when and how to change the election institutions in Hong Kong’s political system. Despite the increased attention paid to Hong Kong’s political reforms in the past 20 years, there is still little research on the topic of business interest groups and Hong Kong’s democratic development. This chapter examines and evaluates the role of business interest groups in Hong Kong’s democratic development since the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 1997. Apart from the often-­heard concerns that democracy may threaten business interests,2 this chapter argues that three unique factors in Hong Kong politics constitute challenges to business interest groups’ attitude towards democratization. First, Hong Kong’s indigenous democracy hinders democracy from above. As the economic ruling class in Hong Kong, business interest groups do not have the incentives to fully democratize because their interest has been well protected under the existing “indigenous democracy.” That is, current democratic institutions discourage business interest groups from seeking full democracy. Second, Hong Kong’s bottom-­up democratic movements cannot force business interest groups to join their fight for democracy because the pan-­ democrats’ ultimate aim is to reduce the mainland Chinese influence in Hong Kong, not to address Hong Kong’s democracy deficit. Third, Beijing’s economic support for Hong Kong has made Hong Kong’s business interest groups

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   129 heavily influenced by Beijing’s attitudes toward Hong Kong’s democratization. Because of Beijing’s economic support, Hong Kong’s business interest groups have concerns when they are facing the option of full democracy. Taken together, if the current “indigenous democracy” is good for, or beneficial to, business interest groups and if business interest groups can maintain the status quo in the context of weak democracy from below and strong economic support from Beijing, it is reasonable to believe that business interest groups will not support Western liberal democracy in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy” hinders democracy from above Hong Kong is a business dominated society but it is not undemocratic. Hong Kong has been equipped with almost all the democratic institutions commonly found in Western liberal democracy. Most of the potentials of democracy have been achieved except for electoral democracy. Sonny Lo calls Hong Kong’s form of democracy an “indigenous democracy” because of the “existence of substantive civil and political rights, the persistence of the rule of law and judicial independence, and the checks and balances from agencies of horizontal accountability.”3 The substantive, non-­electoral dimensions of democracy that have been established in Hong Kong’s political system are the core of the “indigenous democracy” argument. Other scholars have the same evaluation of Hong Kong’s democracy. For example, Bob Beatty argues, “Hong Kong could possibly be considered a local democracy even before universal suffrage for LegCo and the Chief Executive (CE) are instituted.”4 Although the designation of Hong Kong as an “indigenous democracy” is but another form of “Democracy with Adjectives,”5 Lo’s theoretical contributions to Hong Kong political studies are very useful in explaining why Hong Kong’s business interest groups are anti-­democratic. In fact, Hong Kong’s rule of law, human rights protection, judicial independence and anti-­corruption agency are not rhetorical embellishments. They provide real protections for business elites as well as Hong Kong people. The relatively democratic nature of Hong Kong’s political system reduces business interest groups’ incentives to democratize. Business interest groups are confident of the certainty and predictability of Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy.” Economic elites do not feel the kind of uncertainty and unpredictability typically found in undemocratic regimes.6 Business interest groups have reliable institutions to protect their rights and property under “indigenous democracy.” Western liberal democracy is often referred as “a system of ruled open-­ endedness, or organized uncertainty”7 in which political actors follow the rule to compete for their interests. Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy” has already offered a system of organized certainty where business interest groups have more confidence than under “organized uncertainty.” Therefore, Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy” has virtually foreclosed the possibility that business interest groups may wish to democratize from above.

130   M. Zhao Business interest groups enjoy legislative privilege under the current political system and their voices can be heard and their demands can be met. Business interest groups can exercise their political power through their representatives in the Legislative Council and Hong Kong government. Because of the existence of functional constituency in the Legislative Council, the interests of business groups in Hong Kong almost always prevail in government policy decisions even such polices are undoubtedly beneficial to the public. Many pro-­business policies were adopted by the Hong Kong government but laws and policies that benefit the public were blocked in the Legislative Council. For example, business interest groups oppose a universal pension scheme because they hate to see Hong Kong drifting toward social welfare state. They oppose the allocation of more land for public housing although some business people donated land to the government. They oppose tax reforms, especially progressive tax, which can make Hong Kong become a welfare state. They oppose the minimum wage and standard working hours which will increase their business costs. By exercising their legislative privilege, they can get the best policy results to suit their economic interest. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the economic elites will start the transition to democracy from above. Business interest groups have fewer incentives to lead Hong Kong to Western liberal democracy than to consolidate the current “indigenous democracy.” For business interest groups, under the current “indigenous democracy” Hong Kong can be both democratic and economically competitive. Any reform initiatives that build on the current system to consolidate “indigenous democracy” are sure to win the support of the business elites. In 2014, Hong Kong’s business interest groups showed their support for the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) decision on Hong Kong’s constitutional reform despite strong opposition from pro-­democracy forces. The fact that business interest groups have low incentives to democratize reflects that they are more interested in “indigenous democracy” than Western liberal democracy. Under “indigenous democracy,” business interest groups enjoy a privileged position to allocate political power and resources. The so-­called “deterioration” of rule of law propagated by pro-­democracy forces may not affect business interest groups’ confidence in Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy.” Since the handover of sovereignty in 1997, the NPCSC has made five interpretations of Hong Kong Basic Law. Such interpretations have been cited by pro-­democracy forces as a sign of the deterioration of the rule of law. Hong Kong’s legal professions, particularly the cause lawyers, have organized many protests to the NPCSC interpretations of the Basic Law. However, the fact that Hong Kong was ranked world number one in terms of economic competitiveness in 2016 proves that none of the NPSSC interpretations have affected Hong Kong’s business environment. In fact, the 1999 NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law over the “right of abode” issue later turned out to be a contribution to Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Experiences of democratic transition in many parts of the world have suggested that electoral democracy may strengthen the existing rule of law and

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   131 other democratic institutions but without electoral democracy these democratic institutions may not be seriously undermined. The substantive, non-­electoral dimensions of democracy – such as rule of law, and free, fair elections through universal suffrage – are the two essential components of liberal democracy. They are not mutually exclusive, but the Hong Kong case has shown that a regime with an established rule of law may hinder the development of universal suffrage. Therefore, the confluence of the rule of law and universal suffrage may lead to democracy but the conflict of them may delay democracy.8 In Hong Kong, if business interest groups move into the vanguard of democracy, Hong Kong will have both rule of law and universal suffrage. Thus, full democracy. But without the support for Western liberal democracy from business interest groups, Hong Kong’s hybrid systems can only be a “liberal oligarchy.” Richard Bush argued in his book Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan that “the liberal side of Hong Kong’s liberal oligarchy includes freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights”9 and the oligarchy side refers to the fact that Hong Kong’s elites constitute an oligarchy and Hong Kong’s political system fosters asymmetric concentration of power. The fact is that Hong Kong’s democratic institutions have reached such a high level, it is very likely that full democracy will not necessarily strengthen them. If the current system has provided almost all the benefits a full democracy can provide for business interest groups, what is the point of fighting for electoral democracy? On the contrary, business interest groups may lose their privileged position under full democracy. Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy” is the key institutional factor that shapes business elites’ choices. Functional constituency in the Legislative Council and members of the Chief Executive Selection Committee are only two channels for their voices in Hong Kong. Even without such direct participation in the political process, business interest groups are still powerful enough to guarantee their interests. Apart from protecting their own interests, functional constituencies in the Legislative Council pay their political allegiance to Beijing. Business interest groups support Beijing’s “constitutional engineering”10 of Hong Kong’s electoral institutions. Even though the Chief Executive and members of Legislative Council are elected by universal suffrage, business interest groups can still protect their interests through their influence in Hong Kong politics. It is the liberal political institutions that serve to limit business interest groups’ support for democracy, rather than encourage their interest in liberal democracy.

Business interest groups are not forced to democratize by democracy from below Although business interest groups may not move into the vanguard of democratization, they may be forced to democratize by threat from below.11 Such a threat, Acemoglu and Robinson argue, is not ordinary threat, but a threat of

132   M. Zhao revolution as a result of increasing inter-­group inequality.12 In Hong Kong, however, great social, economic and political inequality does not translate into violent revolution to redistribute wealth, but translates into political conflict between pro-­democracy forces and the Central Government in Beijing over Hong Kong’s degree of autonomy and constitutional reform. The lack of incentives for revolution testifies that “indigenous democracy” not only hinders liberal democracy but also discourages the emergence of violent revolution. For the past two decades (or even longer), the Hong Kong–Beijing political conflict is the focus of Hong Kong’s democracy from below. Social movements emerged in Hong Kong since 1997 closely related to the political conflicts between pan-­ democrats and Beijing. The business interests represented by the functional constituencies in the Legislative Council that pro-­democrats seek to reform have largely been ignored. Or, at least, they are not the primary target of mass protest in the post-­handover years. There are many theories about the driving force behind Hong Kong’s transition to democracy, but what really triggered Hong Kong’s democratic transition is China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. As a concession to the smooth transition of sovereignty, the Chinese government promised Hong Kong a progressive transition to democracy in the Basic Law. Since the handover of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong’s democratic development has been increasingly constructed as a negotiation, disagreement and confrontation between Hong Kong people and central government in Beijing, especially between Hong Kong’s pan-­democrats and the Hong Kong government. The principal purpose of democracy from below is not to solve the inter-­ group inequality issue (rich versus poor). Hong Kong’s democratic movement focuses on challenging Chinese governance in Hong Kong, especially the legitimacy deficit of the Hong Kong SAR government. As the only “supply-­side” of democratization, the pan-­democrats camp often criticizes business interest groups in the Legislative Council and in street protests for their pro-­Beijing stance. In the post-­handover years, despite the efforts made by Hong Kong governments, policy-­specific legitimacy does not translate into electoral legitimacy. The fact Hong Kong is part of China is not acceptable to some pro-­democrats. From “resisting communism with democracy” to universal suffrage, the goal of Hong Kong’s pro-­democracy forces is to enable Hong Kong people from all walks of life and of all political convictions to rule Hong Kong, not just people from business interest groups favored by Beijing to rule Hong Kong.13 There is strong popular support for democracy but the business elite is not under significant pressure to support the pan-­democrats. For the past two decades since Hong Kong was handed from Britain to China in 1997, Hong Kong’s pro-­democracy movement has centered on demanding universal suffrage from Beijing. Despite the massive social inequality and the high Gini coefficient, the target of the democratic movement is central government in Beijing, not the business interest groups that cause the high social and economic inequality in Hong Kong. The pan-­democrats tend to believe that the lack of universal suffrage produces an unaccountable Hong Kong government which leads to the

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   133 unequal distribution of wealth in Hong Kong society. Through universal suffrage, the pan-­democrats hope to produce a Hong Kong government that is more accountable to the public rather than to business interest groups. The business interest groups are not under strong pressure to negotiate a transition to democracy if the pan-­democrats only demand universal suffrage from Beijing but do not target inequality in Hong Kong. Pan-­democrats benefit from its democratization strategy. Pan-­democrats, however, often equate democratization to anti-­mainland movement, since only through resisting Beijing’s influence in Hong Kong in the name of democracy can the pan-­democrats gain popular support for their movement. Pan-­democrats can win popular support due to the so-­called legitimacy issue of Chinese governance in Hong Kong. This is crucial for pan-­democrats to win seats in the Legislative Council. For pan-­democrats, demanding democracy from Beijing can make Hong Kong both economically competitive and democratic. Pan-­ democrats think the root cause of Hong Kong’s undemocratic system is Beijing. If they target business interest groups, they will not only lose the possible support from them, but may also strengthen the already strong business-­state alliance. In addition, pan-­democrats do not want to destroy Hong Kong’s business environment. Pan-­democrats fight for democracy only to serve their self-­interest, not for the material well-­being of Hong Kong people. When Beijing offered universal suffrage to Hong Kong in the 2014 constitutional reform, pan-­democrats rejected Beijing’s universal suffrage scheme, although it is very likely Hong Kong can have full democracy because business interest groups support such a proposal.14 The 2017 Chief Executive election shows that pan-­democrats can nominate candidates who are popular with the public. If the pan-­democrats had accepted Beijing’s 2014 proposal of constitutional reform, it is very likely that Hong Kong would have its first Chief Executive elected by universal suffrage. Here, it can be argued that pan-­democrats only use democratization as a pretense to realize their own interests. Hong Kong’s democratic deficit can be addressed internally through dialogues with business interest groups. But the pan-­democrats seek to address all the social and economic problems in Hong Kong through universal suffrage. It is not sure whether universal suffrage can be a once-­and-for-­all solution to all the controversial issues in Hong Kong. But pan-­democrats’ approach to democratization may not be helpful to win the support from business interest groups. Although there is less cooperation and more mistrust between pan-­democrats and business interest groups, pan-­democrats never try to demand democracy from business interest groups. In Hong Kong, business interest groups are the ruling class and the pan-­democrats should demand democracy from the ruling class, not from Beijing. It is understandable that if they demand democracy from Beijing, they will win popular support. If they demand democracy from the ruling class, they may win popular support but they will be criticized for damaging Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. In Hong Kong, pressure from below for constitutional reform is not strong enough to win the support of the

134   M. Zhao business elite. Some scholars believe business elites’ support for democracy is determined by their closeness to Beijing. If they have good connections in Beijing, they might not support radical democratic development in Hong Kong. On the other hand, if they are not favored by Beijing, they will support Hong Kong becoming a full democracy.15 It would be wrong to say that business interest groups are not affected by democracy from below. Hong Kong’s constitutional development is not driven by the economic elite. It is still the “mission of class agents and social movement” but they are appealing in the name of governance and they are aiming at “reforming electoral processes.” This chapter argues that business interest groups are conservative on regime-­level democratization but they are supportive on governance-­driven democratization. And there are signs to indicate that some business elites support full democracy. Although there might be divided views on democracy movements among business interest groups, such fissures may not automatically turn some business interest groups into supporters of democracy. In Hong Kong, civil society is the principal force that strives to lead Hong Kong to democracy. This bottom-­up approach to democracy is effective in mobilizing public support for democracy but it is weak in winning economic elite support. Civil society in Hong Kong is strong and autonomous, but they are not powerful enough to secure economic elite support. The problem is that Hong Kong’s democratic forces refrained from becoming a potential challenge to the current political, economic and social order under the “one country, two systems” arrangement. They fight for democracy through legal and peaceful means. A noticeable case is the 2014 Occupy Central Movement which has had no devastating impact on Hong Kong’s economic development. If such large-­ scale sit-­in protests in Hong Kong’s central district have no adverse impact on business interest groups, it would be hard to expect other peaceful means to convince the economic elites to support the pan-­democrats. When civil society cannot mobilize strong opposition to government policy, the business interest group will not feel any pressure to support democracy. Basic Law Article 23 legislation is a noticeable case in point, where business interest groups supported mass movement when they felt the threat to their interests. The failure of Article 23 legislation in 2003 also reveals that Beijing yields to pan-­democrats’ demands only when Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity are affected. The radicalization of Hong Kong politics has little impact on business interest groups. Democracy forces can be divided into traditional pan-­democrats and radical democrats. The radical democrats are also referred as localists. While the localists are becoming radical towards Beijing and Hong Kong government,16 traditional pan-­democrats and localists remain neutral to business interest groups. The emergence of pro-­independence forces after the Occupy Central Movement can be a potential threat to business interest groups, but these insurgent elements are still in their infancy. The Mong Kok riot in 2014 was a serious security threat to Hong Kong stability and business environment, but it does not mean Hong Kong’s pro-­democracy forces are seeking violent

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   135 means to fight for full democracy. The Mong Kok riot is single case and such riots may not often happen in the future. On many occasions, the pan-­ democrats try to avoid direct conflict with business interest groups. In the Occupy Central Movement, protesters maintained peace and order when they occupied the central business district of Hong Kong. They demanded universal suffrage from Beijing, but they tried their best to preserve Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. In Hong Kong, the pan-­democrats have limited capacity to constrain business interest groups let alone to force economic elites to join their democratic fight. There are competition, confrontation and fights between pan-­democrats and pro-­establishment in the Legislative Council, but the pan-­democrats are too weak to challenge the position of the pro-­establishment on many issues. The conflicts (or disagreements) between democratic forces and business interest groups are not solely about the unequal distribution of resources and wealth, they are sometimes located in ideological conflicts. That is, business interest groups are more patriotic than pan-­democrats. “Love China, Love Hong Kong” is a requirement for Hong Kong people who rule Hong Kong. The patriotic requirement is not only a requirement for government, it has been evolved as an obstacle between pan-­democrats and business interest groups. Democracy from below will not be able to force business interest groups to democratize if they do not “love China, love Hong Kong.” The 2016 Legislative Council election was widely viewed as a victory for localist groups. But the fifth NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law made on November 7, 2016 disqualified their seats in the Legislative Council after they fail to take the right oath to become legislators. This shows Beijing tries to control the development of localism or pro-­independence forces. For the time being, localism cannot be strong enough to force business interest groups to democratize. Democracy from below by the pro-­democracy forces will not strengthen business interest groups’ support for Hong Kong’s democratization. If democratization slips into radical politics, democracy from below may make them more anti-­democratic. Democracy from below needs the support from business interest groups to bring liberal democracy to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong’s transition to democracy, the democratic forces seem to have no interest in solving the “distributional conflict over resources” within the constitutional frame of “indigenous democracy.” Their target is Beijing. In this sense, the business interest groups are under no pressure to democratize. Demanding democracy from Beijing will be elusive or impossible without the support of business interest groups.

Mainland-­Hong Kong economic integration constrains Hong Kong’s democratization While strong democratic institutions and weak pro-­democracy forces are the two main internal factors that produce conservative business interest groups in

136   M. Zhao Hong Kong, Beijing’s mainland-­Hong Kong economic integration strategy is the most important external factor that hinders Hong Kong’s democratic development. The general assumption about economic development and democracy is that economic development will lead a society to democracy. But economic competitive and prosperity can make the undemocratic political status quo stable.17 Hong Kong is a society whose economic development hinders democratization. The economic integration strategy has broader and deeper influence on Hong Kong’s democratic development. The strategy may not only affect business interest groups, but may also shape relations between the economic elites and pan-­democrats. First, economic integration between the mainland and Hong Kong strengthens Hong Kong’s economic competitiveness and makes business interest groups less likely to lead the transition to democracy. Second, economic integration has caused waves of mainland-­Hong Kong conflicts led by the pro-­democracy forces. The more opposition pan-­democrats make to the economic integration policy, the less likely business interest groups will be to support Hong Kong’s democratization. It is true that Beijing’s “united front” policy has brought many economic elites in line with Beijing’s version of constitutional development. In fact, many scholars attribute Beijing’s control of Hong Kong’s business elites as the most important factor in slowing Hong Kong’s democratization. But the key factor that discourages business interest groups’ support for democratization lies in Beijing’s economic support for Hong Kong, especially the mainland-­Hong Kong integration strategy. The “united front” strategy only targets certain economic elites in Hong Kong and the benefits are limited in scope and form. This is what Sonny Lo calls “patron-­client politics” in Beijing-­Hong Kong relations.18 In contrast to “patron-­client politics” which targeting key business elites in Hong Kong’s political system,19 Beijing’s economic support for Hong Kong is broader than “patron-­client politics” and the aim of such support is to keep Hong Kong as a competitive international financial center. China uses economic integration to consolidate its sovereignty in Hong Kong and Beijing’s economic integration strategy shapes business interest groups’ choices between economic competitiveness and democracy. The mainland-­Hong Kong economic integration started with the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003 shortly after the SARS epidemic. As an important step of the CEPA, Hong Kong and the mainland introduced the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS). The IVS is a tourism policy intended to boost the Hong Kong economy initiated by the Hong Kong government and supported by Beijing in 2003. Since 2011 and again in 2016, separate Hong Kong and Macao chapters have been included in China’s 12th Five-­Year Plan and 13th Five-­Year Plan. During the Occupy Central Movement, Shanghai-­Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched in November 2014 to bolster business confidence in Hong Kong. In December 2016, Shenzhen-­Hong Kong Stock Connect was launched to give more choices for investors and strengthen Hong Kong’s role as an international financial center. In the press conference held on March 15, 2017, shortly after the

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   137 fifth session of the 12th National Peoples’ Conference, China’s Premier Li Keqiang announced the introduction of China-­Hong Kong Bond Connect in 2017. All these financial integration measures will boost business interest groups’ confidence in Hong Kong economy under the current political system. As Beijing is accelerating its pace to integrate Hong Kong into China’s regional and global development strategy, such as “one belt, one road” and “Chinese Dream,” the economic support in fact amounts to an important bargaining chip to compete for the support from business interest groups for Beijing’s Hong Kong policy. For both Beijing and the pan-­democrats, who wins business elites’ support will dominate the future direction of Hong Kong’s constitutional reform. It is hard to prove the degree and kind of dependence of Hong Kong’s business interest groups on the mainland, but it is easy to find how the Central Government tries to use economic support to influence Hong Kong. Comparative political researches have shown that economic crises have been an important factor in regime transition to democracy. It is natural to think Beijing uses its economic influence to influence business interest groups’ attitudes towards full democracy. The legitimacy of Chinese rule in Hong Kong heavily depends on economic prosperity and the economic well-­being of the Hong Kong people. Electoral democracy may generate the kind of legitimacy that pan-­democrats desire but it may not solve the problems that Hong Kong is facing. Business interest groups are far more sober and realistic than pan-­democrats about Hong Kong’s democracy. Sonny Lo argues,  Most importantly, the economic dependence of Hong Kong on Beijing has strengthened the anti-­democratic bias of the local capitalist class, which narrowly sees every policy associated with the welfare states in the West as negative and entailing high tax that would discourage foreign investment and local business.20 While it is a debatable issue whether Beijing’s integration strategy can increase Hong Kong’s economic competitiveness, business interest groups are constrained by the Beijing integration policy when they are making their choices in constitutional reform. Institutions under “indigenous democracy” and an economic integration strategy may complement each other. To some extent, economic integration can reinforce Hong Kong’s “indigenous democracy” and affect business elites’ incentives to keep the status quo. Beijing’s economic integration strategy may intensify the conflicts between business interest groups and pro-­democracy forces. Since pro-­democracy forces oppose any form of Beijing interference into Hong Kong affairs, economic integration is not accepted as a meaningful measure to increase Hong Kong’s competitiveness. Instead, the pro-­democracy forces view China-­Hong Kong economic integration as Beijing’s strategy to turn Hong Kong into another Chinese city. It is reasonable to argue that closer economic integration will lead to even stronger anti-­China sentiments in Hong Kong. In such a context, business interest groups are less likely to support democracy from below.

138   M. Zhao

Conclusion Due to the internal and external factors discussed in the previous sections, this chapter argues that Hong Kong’s business interest groups are anti-­democratic when the current “indigenous democracy” and its supporting forces are stronger than the pro-­democracy forces. Business interest groups will remain anti-­ democratic when they are facing an unclear prospect of full democracy and predictable stability and prosperity under the current “indigenous democracy.” Low pressure from pan-­democrats and high economic inducements from Beijing to Hong Kong make business interest groups less likely to push for the democratization of the HKSAR. Business interest groups, however, will continue to play a stabilizing role in Hong Kong’s democratization. Without the full endorsement of business interest groups, the future of Hong Kong’s constitutional development can only be a consolidated “indigenous democracy” or a “liberal oligarchy” with dim prospects for full democracy. As long as Hong Kong keeps its stability and prosperity, the business interest groups will not risk their interest to support full democracy. But if the pro-­democracy movement takes an insurgent path to democracy, business interest groups may be compelled to reconsider their attitudes toward full democracy.21 Given the difficulties in consolidating democracy in a highly developed and prosperous society and the pan-­democrats’ weak ability to win business interest groups’ support, the only way to realize electoral democracy in Hong Kong is a compromise between pan-­democrats’ Western liberal democracy and Beijing’s stable and progressive democratic change based on the 2014 NPCSC decision. In this process, business interest groups can play an important role if both Beijing and pro-­democracy forces seek their support and compromise. Western liberal democracies have proven that universal suffrage cannot end the business domination of the political system. A democratic Hong Kong depends on the development of consensus among pan-­democrats, business interest groups and Beijing. Confrontations will make the pace of democracy in Hong Kong difficult and slow. As such, the politics of compromise between the pan-­democratic forces and business interest groups on the one hand, and between the HKSAR government and the business groups on the other, will be a crucial indicator shaping whether the democracy movement in the territory will have a breakthrough in the coming decades.

Notes   1 Lynn T. White III, Democratization in Hong Kong-­and China? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2016, p. 4.   2 Hong Kong legislator Margaret Ng lists six concerns for democracy:  (1) The introduction of democracy will widen disagreements within the community and create social instability; (2) Democracy will lead to welfarism and undermine Hong Kong’s capitalist system; (3) Democracy will encourage people to challenge the “executive-­led” government and destabilize Hong Kong; (4) By politicizing the community, democracy will jeopardize Hong Kong’s economic success which rest on the basis of laisse-­faire government; (5) The persistent

Hong Kong’s business interest groups   139 demand for democracy will upset Hong Kong’s relations with Beijing on which Hong Kong’s economic success depends; (6) Democracy will undermines efficiency and ruin Hong Kong’s prosperity.  (Margaret Ng, “Democratization of the Hong Kong SAR: A Pro-­democracy View,” in Ming K. Chan (ed.), China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008, p. 82) However, Ma Ngok argues that many of the above fears are groundless. See Ngok Ma, “Democratic Development and Business Interests,” in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds), Building Democracy: Creating Good Government for Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003, pp. 95–103.   3 Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo, Hong Kong’s Indigenous Democracy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 13–14.   4 Bob Beatty, Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong: Evaluating Political Elite Beliefs. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003, p. 105.   5 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy With Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics, vol. 49, no. 3 (1997), pp. 430–451.   6 Michael Albertus and Victor Gay, “Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization,” Amer­ican Political Science Review (2016).   7 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 13.   8 See Richard Rose, Understanding Post-­Communist Transformation: A Bottom Up Approach. London: Routledge, 2009, p. 111.   9 Richard Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan. Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2016, p. 48. 10 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes New York: New York University Press, 1994. 11 See Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 12 Ibid., p. 36. 13 Margaret Ng, “Democratization of the Hong Kong SAR: A Pro-­democracy View,” p. 76. 14 Richard Bush notes that although the path to democracy under the 2015 constitutional reform proposal is narrow, the pan-­democrats have a high likelihood to win the Chief Executive election. See Maeve Whelan-­Wuest, “Looming Large: The Future of Hong Kong in the Shadow of China,” available online at www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-­from-chaos/2016/10/07/looming-­large-the-­future-of-­hong-kong-­in-the-­ shadow-of-­china/ (accessed February 25, 2017). 15 Sing Ming, “The Legitimacy Problem and Democratic Reform in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 15, no. 48 (2006), p. 528. 16 Kwong Ying-­ho, “State-­Society Conflict Radicalization in Hong Kong: The Rise of ‘Anti-­China’ Sentiment and Radical Localism,” Asian Affairs, vol. 47, no. 3 (2016), p. 437. 17 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 1. 18 Shiu-­hing Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-­Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan?, p. 32. 19 Ibid., p. 31. 20 Ibid., p. 15. 21 See, for example, Elisabeth Jean Wood, “An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests, and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 34, no. 8 (2001), pp. 862–888.

8 The Hong Kong Catholic Church Endeavor in promoting democracy Beatrice Leung

The Catholic Church with its administrative center in the Vatican is a theocratic political system headed by the Pope who is the head of a sovereign state – the Vatican – as well as the head of Catholics throughout the world. However, the Catholic Church is not, nor ever has been, a democratic institute. It is a transnational religious organization with various local Churches over the whole world whose heads are appointed by the Pope. Since religious doctrine itself cannot be formulated by the will of the majority and the Church’s hierarchical structure is handed down from the Son of God, Jesus Christ, through His 12 disciples, from an administrative point of view the Catholic Church cannot function as a democratic state or institute. However, in the contemporary world, the Church cannot function properly in the political environment of an authoritarian system which does not have democracy allowing freedom of religion. For example, in Communist regimes, without religious freedom, religions including Catholicism have difficulty in surviving, not to mention developing, when the civil authority and the religious authority are in conflict over teaching authority for the citizens who embrace a double identity as citizens of a nation and believers in a religion.1 It explains why contemporary Catholics long for democracy which provides them with religious freedom allowing them to practice their Catholic faith. On the other hand, the Catholic Church is also a transnational organization with knowledge and resources which can be shared among local churches around the world.2 The global flow of knowledge among Catholics implementing the Gospel message in contemporary socio-­political environments provides new ways of interpreting the Bible and enables local Catholic Churches to absorb new ideas vis-­a-vis their own local problems. Although Liberation Theology, which had its orientation in the 1960s, differed from traditional theology, it advocated the liberation of people from exploitation and poverty in the Latin Amer­ican social context. It was attractive to Catholics in the third world. The Hong Kong Catholic Church, although not belonging to the third world, naturally takes up some elements of Liberation Theology such as social justice and peace. At the same time, within the Catholic Church, the Second Vatican Council (Vat II) (1963–1967) was a watershed for the Church to integrate itself into the modern, secular world with new methods in theological teaching to enhance its

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   141 capacity in evangelization. It advocated that the Church should take its social mission seriously. This gave more space for innovation for the Catholic Church  in the third world by emphasizing social justice and caring for the underprivileged. This chapter aims at tracing the origins and development of the Hong Kong Catholic Church’s participation in democracy with its socio-­political involvement during different periods from the 1970s till the present day. First, there is the “Fermentation Period” with the study of Liberation Theology within a small group of Catholic university students led by their chaplains. The second period began in 1984 when the British agreed to return Hong Kong to China after July 1, 1997 thus changing the sovereignty of Hong Kong. The third period began with the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) under “one country, two systems” up to the present. This chapter will trace Catholic participation in political life under the influence of Liberation Theology begun by the group of Catholic university students who became the future social elites of Hong Kong. The initial social fermentation was supported by the establishment of the diocesan Commission of Social Justice and Peace in 1974. Hong Kong Catholics’ political participation during the colonial period growing towards the democratization of Hong Kong became prominent at the beginning of the 1980s, when the future of Hong Kong was negotiated between London and Beijing. Until today, under the political regime of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) which is monitored by the Chinese rulers in Beijing, the political participation of Hong Kong Catholics aiming at democratization has gone through waves of ups and downs, depending on the political environment and the charismatic leaders of the Church.

Theological foundation of Hong Kong Catholics’ political participation The theological foundation was based on the truth that the Church began to take its social mission seriously during and after Vatican II. According to one of the founding advocators of Liberation Theology, Fr. Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian Roman Catholic priest and theologian, Liberation Theology is a theological reflection based on the Gospel and the experience of men and women committed to the process of liberation in the oppressed and exploited sub-­ continent of Latin America.3 It was a theological reflection born of shared experience in the effort to abolish an unjust situation and to build a different society, freer and more human. The Brazilian theologian, Fr. Leonard Boff, described how popular movements and Christian groups came together in the struggle for social and political liberation with the ultimate aim of complete and integral liberation.4 On the other hand, in the 1970s, socialism prevailed in the West while Liberation Theology in Latin America was beginning to gather momentum. To strengthen it, the inculturation of theology advocated by Vatican II gave the

142   B. Leung opportunity for the birth of the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) in 1970. Liberation Theology was the backbone of the ideological orientation of EATWOT. The so-­called Third World Theologians advocated that the Church should identify with the underprivileged class, while committing itself to the struggle for the liberation of the poor from oppression and exploitation as means to achieve social justice and the coming of the Kingdom. Action should be taken for the poor and oppressed leading them to Jesus Christ who is a liberator.5 To a certain extent, its theological orientation was very much influenced by socialism, if not Marxism, especially when engaging in social analysis as a means of theological reflection. Action in the struggle against oppression was very much encouraged but could easily fall into violence.6 The EATWOT had a meeting in Africa in August 1976, and planned two theological meetings in Asia and Latin America because these two continents, like Africa, contained mostly third world countries. Influenced by the Asian meeting of EATWOT in Hong Kong, more than 40 Protestant and Catholic theologians met in a Chinese Theologians’ Colloquium (CTC) from February 2–10, 1979. The participants all had great interest in the sinicization of Christian theology, and the Chairman expressed the message that the aim of the Colloquium was to rethink future Chinese theology after reflecting on developments in China. However, due to different types of political ideology among the participants, different approaches of working on theology emerged. Basically, there were three different approaches to understanding Chinese culture: (1) traditional Chinese culture; (2) contemporary Chinese culture; and (3) the sub-­culture in each cluster group of Chinese people. However, the orientation of the meeting can be identified by the number of participants in the free choice of group discussion. Only two participants opted for the group on Evangelization, seven for Moral and Spiritual theology, six for Culture and Theology, while 13 selected Political Theology.7 During the meeting very diverse views on the current situation in mainland China and its Church-­state relations were expressed. Many of the participants were sympathetic to China under the influence of EATWOT’s pro-­leftist orientation. After the meeting, the CTC meetings during the next decades did not attract numerous participants because of its political bias and its identification with mainland China.8 Furthermore, theological teachers in the Hong Kong Holy Spirit Seminary College did not produce substantial research to support the socialist approach to Chinese theology while the St. Robert Bellarmine Theologate in Taipei steadily and gradually conducted in-­depth research to investigate theological questions of indigenization in the context of modern China.

The fermenting period of the democratic movement of HK Catholics (1970s–1984) With its theological foundation in Liberation Theology since the 1970s, the Hong Kong Catholic Church spearheaded the social teaching of the Church. A

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   143 small group of young Catholic students were trained under Marxist terms called social conscientization in Liberation Theology. As early as August 1971, three Catholic student chaplains, Jack Clancy, Stephen Tam and this author participated in the Catholic chaplains’ formation course in Bangalore, India where the Sri Lankan theologian, Fr. Tissa Balasuriya OMI, a member of EATWOT, and a convinced follower of Liberation Theology organized and delivered the program. The Federation of Catholic Students (FCS) in the Hong Kong Catholic diocese was the platform for the Catholic post-­secondary students to organize activities and to learn about Catholic social teaching originating from Liberation Theology and the Vatican II document on the “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.”9 To simplify theological doctrine and to select what could be easily digested by students, Jack Clancy worked with students to translate and simplify church documents and compile them into a volume called Yichuan (義泉 The Fountain of Justice).10 Yichuan was mainly a translation of some selected passages from the English version of the Radical Bible, itself a translated version from the German Bibel Provokativ. An undergraduate student named Qi Lianming (戚亷明) translated into Chinese the foreign language documents on social justice and democracy which also included abstracts of important church documents and statements of various bishops’ conferences as well as documents published by EATWOT theologians. Maybe because the FCS students were a minority of the Hong Kong Catholic population, the social teaching based on social justice did not attract the attention of the majority of Hong Kong Catholics until 1984 when the problem of its future aroused the attention of society throughout Hong Kong. These social teachings became the seed sown in the hearts of some Catholic students who later became leaders of society in various professions like businessmen, teachers, school principals, university professors, lawyers, writers and estate managers. The fermentation of social justice took some years to solidify within the Catholic diocese of Hong Kong. In 1977, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (JP or 天主教正義和平委員會) was founded. It is one of many local commissions of the Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace which aims to promote social justice in all the Catholic dioceses in the world as one of the essential elements of evangelization. Some former FCS students joined that Commission where they were able to uphold the ideas of Christian social teaching without difficulty but with less support from the public. Catholic authority, under the leadership of Bishop John Wu (1975–2002) (in 1988 he was elevated to the Cardinalate), did not like to have the Church involved in politics because the warm working relationship with the British in Hong Kong did not offer an incentive for him to allow the Marxist approach of Liberation Theology to antagonize colonial rule. At the same time, the Vatican was suppressing Liberation Theology in Latin America because of its implementation through Marxist methods of armed force and revolution.

144   B. Leung

Hong Kong Catholics in the democratic movement during the political transition period (1984–1997) In 1984, negotiations about the return of Hong Kong to China came to the conclusion that, in July 1997, Hong Kong would return to Chinese rule and become a special Administrative Region. From 1984–1997, Hong Kong lived through a period of transition and the British government in Hong Kong began to promote democracy during the final stage of its rule. The Church no longer had to worry that its advocacy of democracy would embarrass the British. The Hong Kong Catholic Church leaders had more political involvement during this period promoting democracy for various reasons. First, in Hong Kong socio-­economic status was singled out as the prime factor behind the pursuit of democracy at the threshold of the territory’s return to Chinese Communist Rule.11 Given that Hong Kong Catholics were mostly middle class and professionals, they pressed church leaders to participate in the democratization which prevailed throughout society during the transitional period as means to protect religious freedom.12 Second, ideological incompatibility between religion and atheistic Communism, as well as the ongoing dispute between Chinese Catholics and the communist Chinese regime, created incentives to defend religious freedom. Hong Kong Catholic authorities had to seek democracy and political participation as means to protect religious freedom through socio-­political autonomy as promised by the “one country, two systems” policy. China’s religious freedom policy with its own dialectic interpretation allows no other ideologies except Marxism-­Leninism and Maoist thought. In practice China’s current Church-­ state relations followed the “political absorption of religion” model13 which was unacceptable to Hong Kong Christians. A religious reason, to protect religious freedom in the post-­1997 period, was one of the major reasons for Hong Kong Catholics to pursue democracy. In the transition period before the coming of Chinese rule to Hong Kong, the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches claimed to pursue a prophetic role. For example, they rallied with some non-­religious political groups in protest actions against the Chinese Communist Party after the Tiananmen Square Incident. They urged their church members to participate in council elections while providing resources to facilitate public debates in those elections and affiliated themselves with “pro-­democratic” movements.14 The 1991, Legislative Council election was regarded as Hong Kong’s first direct elections to the legislature in the 150 years of colonial rule. It was expected to manifest progress towards an accountable and democratic government.15 Catholics in Hong Kong supported the election which was a means of pursuing democracy launched by the Hong Kong government. By doing so they intended to protect themselves from persecution and the loss of religious freedom.16 In this election the “China factor “or the attitude of the voters towards China became an important issue to influence voting behavior.17 This was especially true in the Legislative Council Election in 1991 when memories

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   145 of the of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident with massacre were still strong.18 It explained why Catholics in the 1991 Legislative Council election had a higher voting rate than the general public (86.6 percent vs 39.1 percent).19 Also the Catholics tended to support the Democratic Party led by Martin Lee, a Catholic who advocated democracy in Hong Kong after its transfer to Chinese rule.20 The voting behavior of Catholics showed their inclination of supporting those political values such as democracy and more people’s participation through elections. The Chinese leaders frowned on these Catholics yet could do nothing directly to curb them while Hong Kong was still under British rule.

HK Catholics in the HKSAR: a new Catholic leader in a new political environment After the establishment of the HKSAR on July 1, 1997, decolonization would be the natural endeavor, as with any post-­colonial regime. Decolonization meant the introduction of mainlandization into the HKSAR’s socio-­political scene with more Chinese elements, which in fact would erode the principle of “one country, two systems.”21 When the interests of the Catholic Church were infringed and Christian values were undermined in the process of decolonization, the Catholic Church stood up and fought a battle against the HKSAR government and Beijing. On the other hand, the administrative center of the Catholic Church, the Vatican, had already prepared a Hong Kong Catholic leader for post-­1997 Hong Kong. Fr. Joseph Zen, a native priest from Shanghai, had 10 years’ experience of teaching in Chinese seminaries before he was selected by the Vatican to head the Hong Kong Catholic Church encountering Communist rule. Joseph Zen was ordained a bishop in 1996 and in 2002 he was installed as the bishop of Hong Kong. Once Zen took up the leadership of Hong Kong’s Catholics, he started to stand out as the most strident and high profile critic of the government. His first attempt concerned policies of the HKSAR on the “right of abode” which restricted the reunion of families whose children were born in China, and later on, in the campaign against the legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law which proposed a controversial National Security Law as well as a long struggle with the government on educational reform.

The “Right of Abode” controversy Bishop Zen’s first conflict with the Government was on the issue of the “Right of Abode” controversy. Cardinal Wu’s pastoral letter titled “God is Love” was orchestrated and penned by Bishop Joseph Zen who was the assistant of Cardinal Wu at the time. It directly opposed the HKSAR government’s stance in the right of abode controversy. The verdict of the HKSAR’s Court of Appeal closed the door for the 1.6 million children born of Hong Kong and mainland parents to settle in Hong

146   B. Leung Kong. The pastoral letter called upon the government to shelter these children while criticizing the selfishness of the Hong Kong government which rejected the right of abode of this group of Chinese from the mainland.22 Given that half of the HK population were themselves incomers from the mainland during the 1950s to the 1970s and allowed to settle in Hong Kong, Zen said that it was selfish to shut the door for these later incoming brethren. He had support from lawyers, church leaders and democrats and started his outspoken mission as the critic of HKSAR government policies.

Article 23 of the Basic Law Article 23 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR required Hong Kong to pass its own laws prohibiting acts of secession, subversion, treason, theft of state secrets, sedition, foreign political organizations conduct of political activities in Hong Kong and prevention of local political organizations from establishing ties with foreign political bodies. When the legislation was proposed, Zen issued a long statement opposing it, and he stood behind a group of legal professionals and democrats engaging in the long process of struggle against the legislation. Zen provided them with Catholic teaching on law by explaining the Christian argument that laws should be made for the protection of human beings and the promotion of human rights. If a law is made for political purposes and not for the well-­being of humanity it is bad law.23 According to Zen, if the legislation were passed, the standard of religious freedom which prevails in China might be imported into the HKSAR. Zen’s opposition was based on two fundamental reasons. The first was the undermining of the “one country, two systems” principle, as stipulated in the Basic Law which blocks Chinese infiltration, especially in religious affairs. Second, the erosion of human rights includes the erosion of religious freedom.24 With Zen’s support and the efforts of the democrats, the legislation of Article 23 was suspended; even until now it has not been passed into law.

Education reform The HKSAR government along with its de-­colonialization policy had a strategy of decreasing its dependence on Christian churches in the provision of education. The real open clash in education policy arose between the Catholic Church and the HKSAR over School-­Based Management (SBM), which was the core of the reform introduced by the government to advance openness, accountability and democracy in all of Hong Kong’s schools. Catholic educators together with those of other Christian denominations viewed SBM first and foremost as a direct challenge to religious freedom. Under the SBM system, 60 percent of school managers and members of school governance councils were to be representatives of teachers, parents, alumni or segments of the community who were likely not to be Catholics and who should be appointed by their respective constituencies.25 There were also too few Catholic professionals to fill the majority

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   147 of management positions in the schools run by the Catholic Church. The problem was aggravated by the fact that over 90 percent of the teaching staff were laity and among them 72.6 percent were non-­Catholics. Given such changes in the school management structure, the priority of Catholic religious education could easily be overrun.26 Zen was worried that the government wanted to introduce compulsory teaching requirements that might contradict the tenets of Christianity, or introduce texts on a compulsory-­use basis which included positive views on matters offensive to the Catholic Church, such as support of abortion, a practice to which the Church is diametrically opposed. Thus the government might indirectly force the Catholic Church to distance itself from the HKSAR’s education system.27 Bishop Zen’s anxiety was not groundless; it was confirmed by the former director of the Central Policy Unit, the pre-­1997 Hong Kong government think tank, which perceived that there was a desire within the SAR government to lessen the dependence on religious organizations for the provision of education.28 Some scholars supported Zen’s opinion and remarked that the purpose of the SBM reform was to marginalize schools’ sponsoring bodies, the foundation of each school’s educational philosophy.29 When the government turned a deaf ear to Zen’s request to defer the reform, Zen eventually formulated his request in a petition to the court and sued the government. He lost the legal case, but the government delayed implementing the reform policy and offered a limited number of concessions. The Catholic diocese and several Protestant denominations protested that the controversial regulation would reduce their autonomy in education. The Catholic diocese, the largest school-­sponsoring body in Hong Kong, demanded a judicial review of the SBM regulation which took effect on July 1, 2011. The Court of Final Appeal delivered its decision on October 3, 2011, finding against the appellant, so that the Catholic Church eventually lost its case. The regulation gives the government increased control over Hong Kong’s 200 Catholic schools, thereby putting at risk their autonomy and mission as Church-­run institutions. Cardinal Zen commenced a hunger strike, which he undertook in the open air in front of the entrance to the Salesian House of Studies, his Hong Kong residence, so that everyone could see that he was truly abstaining from food, and only taking water and Holy Communion. During his three days of hunger strike, from October 19 to 22, Zen slept in a tent under the sky at night. He was one of the few cardinals – some say perhaps the only one – in recent history to go on hunger strike. His dramatic gesture touched the hearts and consciences of many people, and was reported worldwide. Students and young people flocked from Catholic schools and parishes to express solidarity with him by conducting a prayer meeting with him on the spot, and three Vicar-­Generals of the Hong Kong diocese went to visit Zen to express the support of the whole Catholic congregation of Hong Kong.30 Hong Kong Catholic participation in politics under the leadership of Bishop Zen was spectacular following his appearance in 1996; he also reactivated the diocesan Commission of Justice and Peace whose members worked with him in

148   B. Leung participating in rallies and organizing seminars and public speakers to promote democracy.31 Bishop Zen had support from the Vatican; not only was he a great fighter for human rights in the HKSAR but also played an important role in Sino-­Vatican relations for the interests of the Catholic Church.32 For these two reasons, Beijing considered Bishop Zen its archenemy. In 2003, the Vatican elevated him to the Cardinalate which was a sign of Vatican approval of his hardline policy towards China and Hong Kong. He retired in 2009 and Bishop John Tong Hon replaced him. Without the outspoken Cardinal Zen as critic of the HKSAR government, political participation and the democratic movement of the Catholic Church turned a new page because the prophetic Zen was like a bright comet in a dark sky – unfortunately it does not have long life.

Catholics’ role in promoting democracy in post-­1997 Hong Kong After 1997, political life in Hong Kong has gone through the de-­colonialization process which to a certain degree gradually introduced the mainlandization of the HKSAR. According to Sonny Lo, a political scientist, the mainlandization of Hong Kong is a policy of the Hong Kong government to make Hong Kong politically more dependent on Beijing, economically more reliant on mainland support, socially more patriotic toward the motherland and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law by the PRC National People’s Congress.33 Thus the “one country, two systems” may be diluted to such an extent that it remains on paper only. Hong Kong’s younger generation in the period between 2000 and 2017 has been becoming more rebellious against the pro-­ Beijing policy in more than one way. Fr. Chan Moon Hung OFM, after Cardinal Zen’s retirement, was assigned to lead the Justice and Peace Commission. He was detailed, together with some members of the Justice and Peace Commission, to write and to speak for Catholics in the Catholic media, both in English and Chinese, but has not aroused public attention.

The Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement However, the Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement (OCLP) in September 2014 was the endeavor of democrats who opposed Beijing’s decision on August 31, 2014 to reject universal suffrage in the 2017 election of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR. In other words, it ruled out the implementation of free elections in Hong Kong and effectively blocked democracy. The three OCLP’s founding members acknowledged that the Occupy Central Movement was affected by the tradition of civil disobedience and applied the principle of non-­violence and the preservation of the rule of law in the course of fighting for justice.34 The OCLP lasted for nearly three months from the end of September to December 2014. According to some socio-­political analysts, the protest was about democracy, but there was an undercurrent of another, much older

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   149 tension, between Christianity and Communist China. According to the observation of a reporter of the Wall Street Journal, who was on the spot during the Occupy Central Movement, the Hong Kong Church was playing a quiet but important role in the city’s protest, offering food and shelter to demonstrators, with some organizers and supporters citing Christian values as inspiration in their fight.35 At least three of the founders of the main protest groups in the OCLP were Christians (Professor Benny Tai, Reverend Pastor Chu Yiu-­ming and Professor Chan Kin-­man). The Catholic Church made prominent contributions by the participation of Cardinal Zen and an Italian missionary Fr. Franco Mella, PIME and some Catholic demonstrators. In addition, Catholic bishop Cardinal Tong sent out an “urgent appeal” prudently asking sides, the government and the protesters, to exercise restraint and the civil authority to listen to the voice of the younger generation and engage in dialogue.36 Cardinal Zen, at the age of 82, joined the protestors and slept on the street overnight as an iconic figure of Catholic participation for democracy. He was interviewed by foreign reporters and expressed his vocal support. Prior to that, he had addressed a rally requesting universal suffrage in the CE election in 2017. The rally took place outside the government headquarters on September 24, 2014, a few days prior to the commencement of the OCLP. He claimed that the fight for democracy was a question of the whole culture, the whole way of living in the city of Hong Kong.37 He also issued some statements to support the OCLP in his own blog. After the OCLP, Cardinal Zen accompanied the three founders of the OCLP when the latter had to report to a police station for committing the “crime” of disturbing public order. Fr. Mella gathered a group of Christians, both Catholic and Protestant demonstrators, in a “prayer house” which was a tent erected in the occupation area to offer religious service for those who needed it, praying for the OCLP or for individual intentions during the time of occupation.

Discussion on Catholic participation in Hong Kong’s democratization The specific case of Hong Kong Catholics’ participation in promoting democracy must not be seen in isolation from the broader spectrum of the Holy See’s relations with China. The challenge Vatican diplomacy now faces is safeguarding a freedom the Church has fought so hard to protect, whilst at the same time ensuring that in doing so, it does not jeopardize its relations with China. This is no easy task, particularly when thousands of people (and a cardinal) have taken to the streets.38 This dilemma has been with the Vatican for years, and it is this dilemma which is in the relationship between the Central Catholic Administration and the Catholic Church in China. The dilemma teeters from leniency to a hardline approach in dealing with China. When the Vatican found it supported the hardline policy, Bishop Zen was elevated to the Cardinalate, Beijing’s request to remove Zen out of Hong Kong in 2003 was not heeded and the Vatican’s support of the democratization of Zen was expressed by giving Zen a

150   B. Leung Cardinal’s red hat in 2003. After a few years of dealing with China, the Vatican decided to be less militant so leadership in the Hong Kong diocese was put into the softer hand of Bishop Tong Hon and Cardinal Zen was asked to retire in 2009. In the termination of Zen’s leadership of the Hong Kong diocese in 2009 and replacement by a soft spoken and milder approach, Cardinal Tong turned a new page of Catholic involvement in pursuing democracy. The charismatic figure of Cardinal Zen is of the prophetic type, showing people the way. He spoke the truth, but truth is not always welcomed by administrators neither in Church circles nor on the government level. Not only did the Beijing government label him as their archenemy, the HKSAR government found him a headache, while many democrats were passionately supportive of him. A couple of democratic leaders who had left the Church for more than 30 years returned to the Church just because of the personal inspiration of Cardinal Zen. Pro-­ democratic business men like Lai Chi Ying quietly donated money for Zen’s religious and civil activities. Zen put the money to good use. For example, he spent a great deal to translate the Vatican’s Pontifical Commission of Justice and Peace official document Compendium of Social Doctrine of the Church into Chinese (教會社會訓導彙編) and sold it at a very cheap price. The Chinese text with 498 pages is a “Bible” for Catholic social teaching which allows Chinese readers round the world to understand Catholic social teaching imbued with democracy. Within the local church in Hong Kong some very traditional Catholic laity and clergy vowed that they would never support Zen’s radically political stance. Even in the Vatican, on China issues Fr. Jeroom Heyndrickx, CICM, a major adviser on the Vatican’s China policy, never agreed with Zen’s militant stance towards the Beijing government and the Communist Party. When the Vatican wanted to take a more conciliatory approach to China, Zen stood in the way as a blockade to Sino-­Vatican negotiations. That was why he was removed from the Hong Kong Catholic leadership as soon as he submitted his resignation according to the regulation of the Vatican which demanded local bishops should automatically submit their request for retirement at the age of 75. Their doing so gives the freedom to allow the Holy Father and the Vatican to appoint more favorable leadership to replace the old one. Zen’s resignation was accepted without delay. His retirement indicated the turning of Vatican policy towards China, and Hong Kong. In fact, his service in Hong Kong had raised the reputation of the Catholic Church on the international level, and he was regarded as the Asian prophet for human rights after Vatican II. Normally Zen’s reputation in the local church and on international level should have prompted the Vatican to retain him to continue to shepherd the Hong Kong Catholics. But the Vatican had other considerations. In fact many local bishops who have done admirably good work in their dioceses have been asked to stay in their diocese and continue their leadership after the Vatican received their resignation letter. The case of the late Cardinal Paul Shan of Hualian diocese in Taiwan is an example. When he submitted his

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   151 resignation at the age of 75 as the bishop of Hualien, not only was the resignation politely rejected but he was promoted, as the only current Taiwan Cardinal, to be the head of the Taiwan Bishops’ conference until he died at the age of 87. It was because the Vatican felt at that time a Cardinal was needed in Taiwan and Shan’s leadership would help uplift Catholic life in Taiwan. The long road in Hong Kong’s search for democracy is indeed a winding path. The Hong Kong Catholic Church’s accompaniment of Hong Kong people in searching for democracy has gone through different stages of development depending on the political landscape and church leaders. The long fermenting period began from 1970 to 1984 when the Catholic leaders in Hong Kong did not like to have political participation to embarrass its contracting partner, the British government. It was because the Catholic Church in the colonial period was a contractor of the Hong Kong British government offering education and socio-­medical services while toeing the government policy line to enhance its evangelization capacity.39 With the change in the political landscape, engaging in the democratic movement with the Hong Kong public was expected to be the way to preserve religious freedom through democratic governance. However, a democratic movement is a social movement, its leadership being one of the crucial factors for its success. A charismatic leader like Cardinal Zen was attractive. His position could not be replaced by anyone within the Church. However, the long struggle for democracy in Hong Kong is an uphill climb. It needs sustainable leaders. The removal of Cardinal Zen from Hong Kong’s Catholic leadership means that Hong Kong lacks a charismatic leader to further lead the endeavor of democratization even though the Hong Kong diocese has many good and capable laity. The new bishop of Hong Kong has asked Fr. Chan Mun Hung to continue to lead the Commission of Justice and Peace. Fr. Chan and the Commission of Justice and Peace had contributed articles to promote democracy and criticism of the HKSAR government’s policy in Catholic papers, both in English and Chinese. Readers can read Catholic opinions on socio-­political issues in Kung Kao Po, the Chinese Catholic Weekly, which provides a column for the Commission of Social Justice and Peace but the Catholic voice is not much heard by the public. Periodically there are socio-­political articles published in Catholic Weeklies, however the statements and criticism do not carry such weight as those of Cardinal Zen.

Conclusion After Vatican II, under Liberation Theology, first a small group of Catholic leaders both church personnel and potential Catholic lay leaders in the 1970s were influenced and received the message. The change of political landscape of Hong Kong from British to Chinese rule prompted Hong Kong Catholics to become involved in a democratic movement to protect religious freedom. In fact, the “China factor” and the long tension between Catholicism and Communist China played crucial role in the pursuit of the democracy movement to

152   B. Leung transform Hong Kong politically. The Hong Kong Catholic Church has actually developed into a pro-­democracy interest group pushing for democratization in the HKSAR. However, the development of the Catholic pursuit of democratization in Hong Kong has a long way to go. The appearance of the outspoken Cardinal Zen was once a bright comet in the dark sky showing the way to go. In the future, his followers may have a long way to tread under the heat of the sun.

Notes   1 Beatrice Leung. Sino-­Vatican Relations: Problems in Conflicting Authority 1976–86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992   2 Ivan Villian.1971. “The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor.” International Organization 3, pp. 479–495.   3 Eddy Muskus. “Liberation Theology: Its Origins And Early Development.” Available online at www.affinity.org.uk/downloads/foundations/Foundations%20Archive/ 29_30.pdf (accessed February 2, 2017).   4 Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff. “A Concise History of Liberation Theology.” In Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987.   5 Luis Gutheinz. “Asian Theologians’ Conference and Chinese Theologians’ Colloquium: Report on Two Theological Meetings.” In Collectanea Theological Universitatis Fujen, vol. 40, pp. 203–229.   6 The author participated the Student Chaplains Training Programmed conducted by some theologians of EATWOT August 1971, Bangalore, India. She was friends with Tissa Balysuriya OMI who is the backbone of the Asian meeting of EATWOT.   7 Luis Gutheinz. “Asian Theologians’ Conference and Chinese Theologians’ Colloquium: Report on Two Theological Meetings.”   8 Ibid.   9 “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.” In Walter Abbott (ed.) The Documents of the Vatican II. London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966, pp. 199–316. 10 Jack Clancy (ed.) Qi Lianming (trans.) Yichuan [The Fountain of Justice]. Hong Kong: Federation of Catholic Students, 1974. 11 Alvin So and Ludmilla Kwiko. “The New Middle Class and the Democratic Movement in Hong Kong.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 20 (1990), pp. 384–398. 12 Beatrice Leung and C. P. Chan. “The Voting Propensity of Hong Kong Christians: Individual Disposition, Church Influence and the China Factor.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39 (September 2000), pp. 297–306. 13 Beatrice Leung and Chan Shun Hing. Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003, pp. 48, 62, 71 and 80. 14 Li Kit-­ming. “Religion and Politics in Hong Kong.” In Weibke Koenig and Karl-­Fritz Daiber (eds) Religion und Politik in der Volksrepublik China. Wurzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2008, pp. 225–250. 15 Rowena Kwok. “Preface and Acknowledgement.” In Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung and Ian Scott (eds) Votes Without Power. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press 1992, pp. xiii–xvii. 16 Chan Che-­po and Beatrice Leung. “The Voting Behaviour of the Hong Kong Catholics in the 1995 Legislative Council Election.” In Hsin-­chi Kuan, Lau Siu-­kai, Louie Kin-­shuen and Wong Kai-­ying (eds) The 1995 Legislative Council of Election in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-­Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996.

The Hong Kong Catholic Church   153 17 Joan Leung. “Political Orientations: Turnout and Vote Choice.” In Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung and Ian Scott (eds) Votes Without Power. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1992, pp. 49–78. 18 Beatrice Leung. “The Catholic Voters.” In Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung and Ian Scott (eds) Votes Without Power. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press 1992, pp. 151–186. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Sonny Lo. “The Mainlandization and Re-­colonialization of Hong Kong: A Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China.” In Joseph Cheng (ed.) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2007, pp. 179–231. 22 Wong Yiu-­chung. “Absorption into a Leninist Polity – A Study of the Interpretations of the National People’s Congress on the Basic Law in Post Hangover Hong Kong.” In Joseph Cheng (ed.) New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, pp. 4–65. 23 Bishop Zen expressed this to the author in an interview in July 2004. 24 Ibid. 25 Debra Brown. “The Roman Catholic Church in Hong Kong: Freedom’s Advocate Struggles with the SAR Government in Electoral Politics and Education.” Amer­ican Asian Review (2001). 26 Beatrice Leung. “Political Participation of the Catholic Church in HKSAR.” In Joseph Cheng (ed.) New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University Press, 2014, pp. 285–309. 27 Joseph Zen, “Can We Still Run Schools According to the Vision and Mission of Catholic Education?” Sunday Examiner, October 5, 2003; Deborah Brown, “The Roman Catholic Church and Hong Kong’s Long March toward Democracy.” Orbis 48, 20, pp. 263–74. 28 Leo Goodstadt. “Introduction: Faith, Citizenship and Colonialism in Hong Kong.” In Leung and Chan Shun Hing, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, pp. xi–xvi. 29 Poon Yuk King, “Xiaobien Tialli = Xiaozheng Minju Hua,” Ming Pao, April 20, 2004. 30 “Growing Solidarity with Cardinal Zen on Third Day of Hunger Strike in Hong Kong,” October 21, 2011. Available online at http://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/en/ inquiries-­and-interviews/detail/articolo/hunger-­strike-zen-­hong-kong-­9217/ (accessed January 20, 2017). 31 Refer to the annual report of Hong Kong Diocesan Commission of Social Justice and Peace Report (1996–2004). 32 Cardinal Zen has been involved in the Vatican’s dealing with China since 1990. The most recent one was: Curt Mills “Cardinal: Vatican Deal With China Would Betray Christ” November 29, 2016. Ucanews. Available online at www.usnews.com/news/ world/articles/2016–11–29/cardinal-­joseph-zen-­says-vatican-­deal-with-­china-wouldbetray-christ 33 Sonny Lo. “The Mainlandization and Recolonialization of Hong Kong: A Triumph of Convergence over Divergence with Mainland China.” In Joseph Cheng (ed.) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2007, pp. 179–231. 34 Chan Kin Man. “Occupying Hong Kong.” International Journal of Human Right 22 (2015) pp. 1–8. 35 Ned Levin. “Hong Kong Democracy Protests Carry a Christian Mission for Some.” Wall Street Journal. Available online at www.wsj.com/articles/hong-­kong-democracy-­ protests-carry-­a-christian-­mission-for-­some-1412255663 (accessed January 20, 2017). 36 “Cardinal Zen joins Occupy Central Protest.” Vatican Insider, September 29, 2014. Available online at www.lastampa.it/2014/09/29/vaticaninsider/eng/world-­news/

154   B. Leung cardinal-­zen-joins-­occupy-central-­protests-Thc0e4byEkfJwRBJEh8oXO/pagina.html (accessed January 20, 2017). 37 Ned Levin. “Hong Kong Democracy Protests Carry a Christian Mission for Some.” Wall Street Journal. Available online at www.wsj.com/articles/hong-­kong-democracy-­ protests-carry-­a-christian-­mission-for-­some-1412255663 (accessed January 20, 2017). 38 “Cardinal Zen joins Occupy Central Protest.” Vatican Insider, September 29, 2014. Available online at www.lastampa.it/2014/09/29/vaticaninsider/eng/world-­news/ cardinal-­zen-joins-­occupy-central-­protests-Thc0e4byEkfJwRBJEh8oXO/pagina.html (accessed January 20, 2017). 39 Beatrice Leung and Chan Shun Hing. Changing Church and State relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003, pp.  16–21; 30–35.

9 The emergence of nativist groups and political change Stephan Ortmann

This chapter deals with a very controversial topic in Hong Kong today: the emergence of so-­called nativist groups which promote the political separation of Hong Kong from the Chinese mainland, either by asserting full autonomy, declaring independence, or even returning to British control. The main reason for the rise of this type of aspiring interest group in Hong Kong politics is the unwillingness of the mainland Chinese government to adhere to its promise of “a high degree of autonomy” and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.” The extent of autonomy has been at the mercy of the interpretation of the PRC government. In recent times, it has sought to assert greater political control over its special administrative region. For instance, a 2014 White Paper on the “one country, two systems” principle stressed that “loving the country is the basic political requirement for Hong Kong’s administrators.”1 The definition of administrators even included judges, which raised concern about the principle of judicial independence, which is at the heart of the Hong Kong system. The most crucial event was the decision to limit candidates for the Chief Executive election to only those who were pre-­selected by a nomination committee stacked with pro-­government members to ensure that only a pro-­Beijing candidate could get nominated. Even though this reform proposal was defeated, the lack of democratic progress has created the sense that Hong Kong’s system needs to be defended from further mainland Chinese intrusion by maximizing the degree of autonomy or even declaring “independence.”2 Under colonial rule, a strong civic identity emerged which was based on the liberal political system and its values. Supporters of democracy in Hong Kong generally saw themselves as better Chinese, who provided a viable political alternative to the repressive dictatorship on the mainland. The newly emerging nativist groups which originate from the declining sense of autonomy seek a Hong Kong-­ centric system, which places the interests of local residents first. In this context, an ethnic identity has arguably emerged that fundamentally challenges the Chinese identity. This chapter will first outline the relationship between democratization and national identity and discuss factors that contribute to the emergence of nationalist movements, which share some aspects with the nativist groups in Hong Kong. Then I will trace the emergence of a strong civic identity which cherishes

156   S. Ortmann the liberal political values underlying Hong Kong’s political system. The existence of a strong identity was met by Beijing with an attempt to instill its own national identity based on a primordial ethnic identity to gain support for the PRC’s Communist regime. As a consequence, there has been a growing rejection of Chinese identity and an emphasis on local culture. Although lacking strong leadership, a growing number of small nativist groups and parties have become increasingly prominent. Particularly after the Umbrella Movement, many of the groups have decided to pursue a more aggressive form of confrontational politics while some have also sought to enter institutional politics. The goal has been to transform the movement into a new powerful political interest group, essentially a third political force which challenges both the existing pro-­ Beijing and the pan-­democratic camps. This development marks a fundamental transformation of Hong Kong politics that will continue to shape the political development as well as relations with the mainland long into the future.

Democratization, national identity and the emergence of nativist movements In Hong Kong, a strong civic identity is driving the democratization process which, to many citizens, is supposed to strengthen the territory’s autonomy. At the same time, the PRC government, however, seeks to assert greater control over the former British colony, which is met with significant resistance in the form of a movement that bears resemblance to nationalist movements elsewhere, although, for political reasons, it can only be called nativism or localism. In order to understand how this has happened, it is important to first recognize that identity is not inborn but rather a political and social construct that is subject to historical shifts, particularly during times of political transition.3 Moreover, even though Hong Kong was never granted independence, its identity bears many similarities with national identities in other countries. Based on a number of definitions, Hong Kong shares the most important elements of a nation. Anthony Smith, for instance, defines it as a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”4 All of these aspects are present in Hong Kong. Moreover, Lowell Barrington argues that a crucial aspect is the “belief in territorial self-­ determination.”5 Even though independence was never an option for Hong Kong, the process of decolonization still raised the hopes about having the decision-­making authority under a high degree of autonomy and “one country, two systems” for at least 50 years until 2047. Despite the development of a Hong Kong nation, many scholars have been reluctant to discuss the issue in terms of national identity, which is reserved for the Chinese state. For instance, Chan Chi Kit argues that “Hong Kong continues to wrestle with the reconfiguration between national identity and local distinctiveness, even though its handover from Britain to China was settled long ago.”6 This frames the Hong Kong identity purely as a “local identity,” which

The emergence of nativist groups   157 neglects both the fact that the Hong Kong people were never consulted about their future and the high degree of autonomy under “one country, two systems” that established a political entity which was clearly distinct from China. Another study claimed that “Hong Kong people in recent decades, unlike people elsewhere in the world, have lacked any sense of national identity.”7 Again, this is based on the technicality that Hong Kong is not an independent state and the fact that most people are ethnic Chinese. However, in regard to the former, the high degree of autonomy creates a political entity that is very similar to an independent state in many regards. The latter would be to support the notion that ethnic group equates a nation, which is the exception rather than the rule. Malte Philipp Kaeding, who finds a resilient civic identity in Hong Kong, also avoids the use of national identity because the city is ruled by China.8 The Chinese definition of national identity thus effectively delegitimizes the development of alternative national identities in ethnic Chinese territories. The identity question has played an important role in the political development of Hong Kong. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to distinguish between a liberal civic and an illiberal ethnic identity.9 The democratization process in Hong Kong has been propelled by a strong civic identity and the desire to protect the territory’s autonomy and way of life. The civic identity refers to the identification with political institutions, such as those in a democracy. It is based on a “daily plebiscite” in which residents choose to be proud of the nation. As such, it is a liberal, voluntaristic and universal form of identity. Hong Kong’s strong civic identity is not the only case in which national identity has been the origin of democracy. It has been the driving factor behind the Amer­ican and French democracies, both of which asserted popular sovereignty as the basis for legitimacy for their new regimes. The liberal thinker Mill believed that a functioning democracy was based on a common “sentiment of nationality.”10 While nationalism can be easily misused for authoritarian rule, all existing democracies are united by a common national community.11 Or, as Wang Shaoguang argues, “democracy is inconceivable without the idea of national identity.”12 This obviously poses a fundamental problem for democratization in Hong Kong within China because it is denied the right to have an independent national identity. Moreover, democracy requires sovereignty, either formal or informal, over a certain territory. The state must have the highest authority in the decision-­making process because “(i)f domestic actors do not have final authority within the boundaries of the political system, and decisions and outcomes are determined by external actors, the channels of representation and accountability required for democracy break down.”13 This very precondition is not fully met as the Chinese government has repeatedly asserted authority over decisions in Hong Kong. The unwillingness to grant full universal suffrage demonstrates that the central government in Beijing is unwilling to grant Hong Kong the necessary degree of autonomy to sustain democracy.14 Moreover, the civic identity faces a strong “Chinese” racial and cultural identity.15 This ethnic identity is an illiberal, particularist and exclusive identity.16 It

158   S. Ortmann is based on aspects over which the individual has no control, such as place of birth, physical features or cultural elements including language, customs and traditions.17 Many people in Hong Kong support this idea, which became evident in the aftermath of the “oath crisis” in 2016 when nationalists accused the newly elected localist legislators of insulting the Chinese race. The Beijing government has thus made use of this form of identity to shore up support for the one-­party regime based on the assertion that Chinese culture is inherently authoritarian. This demonstrates that, for the Chinese government, the ethnic identity is combined with an undemocratic form of civic identity, which seeks support for the Communist institutions and is thus neither liberal nor democratic. The combination of ethnic and civic identity is at the heart of the attempt to equate the Chinese nation with the Communist one-­party regime and anyone opposed to Communist rule then becomes unpatriotic and a traitor to the Chinese nation. There is even support for this idea among pro-­Beijing politicians in Hong Kong, which contributes to the deep societal differences.18 The Chinese government believes that identity is inborn and cannot be changed. The voluntaristic nature of the civic identity is rejected. This is reflected in the Chinese reaction to the frequent Hong Kong University poll on Hong Kong’s identity, which has been called “evil” and an attempt to “incite Hong Kong people to deny they are Chinese.”19 In other words, Hongkongers must abide by their ethnic Chinese identity and may not choose to identify as Hongkongers. In their opinion, asking this kind of “unscientific” question promotes the independence of Hong Kong.20 As the former British colony is perceived to be a natural part of the Chinese nation, the rulers expect the local population to slowly embrace the Chinese national identity. Many nativists have responded to the attempt to control Hong Kong with their own ethnic identity based on the unique cultural elements such as Cantonese, the local film and television industry, local heritage and the combination of traditional Chinese culture with Western influences.21 These cultural traits are juxtaposed to a disfigured Chinese culture on the mainland, which has suffered repeatedly under Communist mismanagement. But before analyzing this in more detail, I will turn first to the development of a civic identity in Hong Kong, which since the handover was met by the Chinese attempt to impose its own identity.

The development of a civic identity in Hong Kong Hong Kong’s distinct political, social and economic development has fostered a strong civic identity which fueled demands for democratization. This identity is revealed in many surveys. In the first survey by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1985, almost 60 percent saw themselves as Hongkonger. There was an overall slow decline until in 1995 when only about 50 percent responded as Hongkonger while 15 percent answered they were both.22 In order to better understand the combined identities, the survey methods were changed in 1996 as researchers sought to distinguish between those who saw themselves primarily as Hongkonger

The emergence of nativist groups   159 and those that saw themselves primarily as Chinese. These surveys show that there is an overall strengthening of the Hong Kong-­centric identity after the handover. While between 17 to 28 percent saw themselves only as Hongkongers, 30 to 40 percent chose their primary identity as Hongkongers but also acknowledged that they were Chinese. Combining the pure identity with the primary one reveals that 68.8 percent preferred Hong Kong over China by 2014, which is more than 10 percent higher than the combined identity in 1996.23 A similar trend can also be observed in a Hong Kong University Survey.24 Although the survey suggests an increase in the Chinese identity until the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, in which many Hongkongers supported the very successful Chinese team, by 2011 a whopping 43.8 percent claimed to be only Hongkongers. This has declined somewhat since as the most recent survey shows that 36.6 percent see themselves only as Hongkonger while the combined Hong Kong-­centric identity stands at 64 percent.25 These surveys reveal that the Chinese identity has weakened significantly in recent times. As China has taken greater control over Hong Kong affairs, resistance to the Chinese regime has grown. The most striking symbolism of this was the booing of the Chinese national anthem at two football matches in 2015 in which Hong Kong competed as a team.26 From the perspective of the fans, Hong Kong should have its own anthem. The fact that so many people could overpower the anthem clearly showed the surge of the Hong Kong identity, which has been particularly strong among younger generations. In order to understand this trend, it is necessary to trace the emergence of the civic identity in Hong Kong. Originally, only very few of the city’s residents were actually born in Hong Kong. Instead, a majority were immigrants from the mainland who either sought a better economic life or were political refugees who tried to escape political violence on the mainland. There was, thus, no Hong Kong identity at the beginning as most immigrants only saw the British colony as a temporary abode. However, a community soon developed as the colony was cut off from the rest of China and the colonial government became increasingly concerned with social issues following two crucial riots in 1966 and 1967. At first, the government introduced City District Officers in 1968, who sought to improve communication between the government and society. This was followed by a trend toward localization which included making Chinese an official language and increasing the number of local Hongkongers in politics. Due to a very high degree of fiscal autonomy, the colonial government spurred economic development that provided people with an increasing degree of social mobility. The great success eventually made Hong Kong one of the four tiger economies, which also included Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Another consequence of the economic boom was the development of the so-­called Lion Rock Spirit which stressed hard work and perseverance while also calling for solidarity. From the mid-­1970s onwards, a growing number of people became active in pressure groups, which sought to influence the government. This new civil society which blossomed in the liberal environment consequently fostered a strong Hong Kong identity based on liberal democratic values such as free speech, freedom of assembly, and a functioning legal system.

160   S. Ortmann The liberal and predictable political system in Hong Kong stood in stark contrast to the repressive dictatorship in China which is based on unfair and arbitrary decisions made behind closed doors. As a consequence, a sense of “Chineseness-­plus” emerged which combined Chinese ethnic features with economic superiority, a more sophisticated version of Chinese culture, and civic values that stress democratic rights and freedoms. Hongkongers thus considered themselves more advanced Chinese in comparison to those on the mainland.27 The sentiment was strengthened in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, which had demonstrated that the Chinese government was willing to kill its own citizens to maintain power. For many democrats, it became their patriotic duty to promote liberal democracy in the mainland, which brought them into conflict with the authoritarian leaders, who would take control in 1997. As a consequence, there were two forms of Chinese national identity: one which saw democratic rule as the final goal and another which equated one-­party rule with the nation.

The attempt to instill a Chinese national identity The Chinese Communist Party naturally could not tolerate the alternative national identity, which threatened its power, and as a consequence, the liberalism in Hong Kong was portrayed as externally imposed through British colonial rule. Democratization was blatantly rejected and pro-­democracy candidates were regarded as anti-­China candidates.28 Recent developments under President Xi Jinping and others reveal a fundamental opposition to the basic principles of the Western governance model. The official discourse argues that “Western ideas” could threaten and even undermine the supposedly superior “Communist” as well as conservative Chinese values. In reality, of course, this rhetoric reflects the attempt to maintain legitimacy for the CCP.29 In this situation, Hong Kong poses a particular challenge because there is widespread support for these Western principles such as checks-­ and-balances, the rule of law, freedom of speech and assembly, as well as the need to hold regular elections to maintain the legitimacy of the elite, while there is great distrust for the Communist Party. It is not surprising that only about one third of the population was happy about the handover in 1997.30 In order to counter the liberal influences, the Chinese government felt the need to promote its own version of national identity which is meant to gain active support from Hongkongers.31 This included a wide spectrum of measures that sought to instill an ethnically centered identity in the population and generate pride in the Chinese nation. Part of this is the attempt to promote national symbols of the People’s Republic such as the anthem and the flag. Instead of resolving the problem, Yew Chiew Ping and Kwong Kin-­Ming argue: “Beijing’s endeavors to foist a Chinese national identity on Hong Kongers has provoked an identity conflict, not least because of the presence of a marked Hong Kong identity distinct from the Chinese national identity.”32 The Chinese identity has been most aggressively promoted in schools. In the past, education in Hong Kong was largely depoliticized and issues of identity

The emergence of nativist groups   161 were left out of the school curriculum.33 After the handover, subjects such as history or civic studies were used to promote the Chinese government’s version of national identity.34 The Chinese government wants teachers to portray its illiberal form of Communism as superior to liberalism even though this is a core element of Hong Kong’s political system. Because of the lack of progress, the Hong Kong government sought to replace the civic education curriculum with so-­called “moral and national education” in 2012, which led to massive protests and was eventually abandoned. Students warned against “brain washing” because the course material indicated a one-­sided perspective of China and its political system. A teaching manual by the National Education Services Centre even sought to portray the Chinese government as a “progressive, selfless and united ruling group.”35 The goal of the educational reform was clearly to garner support for the illiberal Chinese political system. Not surprisingly, students were appalled by the one-­sidedness of the new curriculum. While the proposal was shelved, some schools started to voluntarily introduce the curriculum. Moreover, following the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the government decided to review the liberal studies subject that teaches critical thinking skills because some blamed it for the protests. The attempts to instill a Chinese national identity and any positive messages about China in the classroom are often overshadowed by the experiences of students with the mainland, either directly through visits and the behavior of some visitors or indirectly through the media. The cultural divide between Hong Kong and the People’s Republic, which has been the result of more than 100 years of separation, has become more distinct since the handover. Furthermore, the expectation that Chinese national identity could be simply instilled without regard for facts is unrealistic.36 Not only is the national identity propagated by the CCP blatantly propagandist but the nationalist history that frames Hong Kong as only a short period of foreign domination also neglects the fact that the modern city is entirely the product of the colonial period.

Nativism and the development of a new ethnic identity in Hong Kong Unlike the democracy movement in the past, many nativists seek to create a separate ethnic identity which can be clearly distinguished from the Chinese nation. The reason for this is the growing sense that the local culture as well as the fundamental values in Hong Kong are under threat due to the massive influx of mainland Chinese. Issues that have raised concerns include attempts to introduce Mandarin in schools as well as the neglect of local heritage ranging from remnants of colonialism to the film industry. While there is still a strong civic component in the conception of the Hong Kong identity, nativist groups tend toward constructing an ethnic identity as well. Cultural elements, such as the use of Cantonese, traditional characters or the mixed heritage, are emphasized. The nostalgic element is present in the growing affection for the symbols of British colonial rule such as old buildings and the colonial flag. There is a

162   S. Ortmann belief that Hongkongers have higher moral standards, are friendlier, more sophisticated, more disciplined, sympathetic, tolerant, adaptive, sharp, pragmatic and more willing to speak out and care about society. Finally, they also see themselves as more Westernized.37 Other self-­perceived cultural elements are greater openness to the world, professionalism as well as pragmatism.38 In general, these values are juxtaposed with Chinese society, which is seen as corrupt, lacking professionalism and irrational. Asserting this new ethnic Hong Kong identity is highly contested because of the dominant Chinese ethnic identity, which is promoted in nearly all official venues. The new ethnic identity is exclusionary as it seeks a concentration on the needs of only Hongkongers. Pro-­democracy activists who advocate a universalist cause and seek to reform the political system in China are derided as “left plastic,” a crude Cantonese insult. This has deeply divided the pan-­democratic camp as nativists reject the notion of supporting the democracy movement in China. For instance, in 2013, activists for the first time staged a counter-­event to the annual Tiananmen vigil because the organizers had linked the event to the love of the country, i.e., China.39 This sentiment has increased since then. For instance, the Federation of Student’s mission to “build a democratic China” was at the heart of the decision of the University of Hong Kong Students’ Union to leave the umbrella organization, which since has virtually fallen apart as many other student unions have also left.40 The need for a unique ethnic identity has been deeply influenced by the democratization process of Taiwan, which has been closely linked to the question of national identity.41 The democratic transition was driven by the majority Taiwanese population, which are ethnic Chinese that settled in Taiwan prior to the period of Japanese colonization in 1895. Due to many cultural and political differences, they do not identify with the Chinese nation and rather with Taiwan. At the same time, many of them want to formally declare independence from China. The Taiwanese identity emerged as a resistance to the imposition of the Nationalist Party (KMT), which sought refuge in the former Japanese colony during the civil war in China. In order to exert control, it had used violence against the political elites and consequently imposed its own form of national identity of a unified China under KMT rule. The loss of representing China as a whole in the United Nations in 1971 meant that the ruling party, however, needed to change its approach to gain the support of the local population.42 It eventually elevated Lee Teng-­hui, an ethnic Taiwanese, to its top position in 1988. Despite being a member of the KMT, Lee promoted the Taiwanese cause. Finally, in 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which called for formal independence, won the elections and Chen Shui-­bian became the new president. Under pressure from the US, the new government did not follow up on its promise, although it introduced many policies which strengthened the Taiwanese nation. The development of an ethnic identity is clearly a monumental shift. In the past, scholars such as Lau Siu-­Kai and Kuan Hsin-­chi observed, in 1988, that the Hong Kong identity “does not entail much political overtones in terms of

The emergence of nativist groups   163 ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ or the desire for independence, thus indicating the lingering dominance of the unitary political ideology which is probably the fundamental principle in the Chinese political heritage.”43 Others have argued that there is a “general acceptance that Hong Kong is ‘naturally’ part of China.”44 This makes it clear that the emergence of nativist groups signifies a fundamental challenge to Chinese dominance in the region and they are viewed with great concern by the Chinese government. This has triggered attempts to strengthen the Chinese identity in Hong Kong, in particular through education and culture. However, this can arouse massive opposition as in 2012 when students opposed moral and National Education and in 2017 when opposition to the construction of a Palace Museum, which was announced without any public consultation, grew. This immediately triggered a wave of protests which centered around large advertisements which had been put up in the connecting tunnel between the Hong Kong and Central MTR stations.45 This demonstrates that attempts to force a Chinese identity and repress the Hong Kong identity are unlikely to succeed and will likely strengthen the nativist movement instead. In particular, the crude methods of repression, such as the use of pepper spray and beatings, have converted more activists to the idea that full autonomy or independence are essential for the survival of Hong Kong.

Nativism as an emerging interest group in Hong Kong politics Worried that the Hong Kong identity is under increasing threat, coupled with concerns about the city’s fledgling economic situation, a growing number of people have asserted Hong Kong centric views. This has given rise to a new political interest group which has called itself the “native faction” (buntoupaai), sometimes also translated as localist faction. The idea was first mooted in the wake of the attempt to introduce national security legislation in 2003, which was eventually dropped after massive protests drew 500,000 people to the streets on July 1. The Hong Konger Front emerged in 2004, although it denies a direct link to the protest movement. However, this was also the time of greater economic integration with the Chinese mainland.46 While this promised to bring economic benefits to Hong Kong, only very few economic elites at the top profited from it while the majority faced increasingly unaffordable living costs. At the same time, the Star Ferry Pier demolition in 2006 and the Choi Yuen Village destruction in 2010 were crucial events that gave rise to new activists. Both of them signified the destruction of local heritage for the benefit of pro-­Beijing economic elites. The greatest increases occurred in the wake of the protests against Moral and National Education in 2012 and the more than two months of street occupation against Beijing controlled electoral reform proposal in 2014.47 The main objective of the nativist groups has become the attempt to oppose the growing mainland Chinese influence in Hong Kong, which is seen as having a negative impact on the territory’s social, economic and political aspects. As

164   S. Ortmann such, they are deeply worried about the immigration from the mainland. There has been a steady inflow reflected in the population increase from 6.2 million in 1996 to 7.2 million by 2014 despite a very low birth rate. About 54,000 people arrive annually. These new immigrants are unlikely to have a strong identification with Hong Kong, which has raised concerns among a growing number of Hongkongers that their identity could become diluted. In a 2012 survey, about half of the respondents indicated that they wanted the number of immigrants reduced while only about 17 percent believed the number should be increased. There is a great deal of concern that the new migrants are a burden to Hong Kong’s welfare system.48 Nativist groups share a strong Hong Kong identity, distrust of both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments, and a need for radical political change. All of them demand liberal democracy with universal suffrage for all. Many of them use the British colonial flag as their symbol, which symbolizes the rejection of the current regime. However, the groups differ in their primary goal. At least three different types of groups can be identified: those that advocate full autonomy as promised under “one country, two systems,” those that demand independence, and finally those who want a return to the British empire. The latter, which includes the Hong Kong-­UK Reunification Campaign, is the smallest because only very few consider this option as realistic, while some are also opposed to the idea. The real independence movement is somewhat larger, despite the fact that promoting actual independence is politically dangerous. Groups that pursue this goal include the Hong Konger Front, Hong Kong Nationalism, Hongkongers Come First, Hong Kong National Party, and Youngspiration. In February 2015, two expatriate Hongkongers registered the Hong Kong Independence Party as a political party in the United Kingdom, while in March 2016 the newly formed Hong Kong National Party was denied registration as a company in Hong Kong because advocating independence is considered an illegal activity.49 Another new party, Demosistō, established by student leader Joshua Wong, even called for a referendum which should include independence as an option although the party opposed the idea and instead promoted self-­determination.50 The idea was also supported by Youngspiration, another localist group. It and the Hong Kong National Party were banned in 2017 from selling their products at the Lunar New Year Fair because the Hong Kong government was worried they might sell items promoting Hong Kong independence.51 In a short period of time, discussing independence was no longer a taboo.52 However, as the Chinese government sees these ideas as a threat to national security, they have been viewed as particularly worrisome by the leadership in Beijing. This means that individuals who promote secession could eventually face arrest and organizations could be dissolved. Alan Hoo Hon-­ching, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, argued that setting up parties with the goal of independence constituted “treason and sedition.”53 Various official statements, moreover, suggest that repression of the movement could be imminent. While, for instance, Wang Zhenmin of the legal department of Beijing’s Central

The emergence of nativist groups   165 Liaison Office in Hong Kong argued existing laws against sedition could be used,54 there has also been discussion of reintroducing the anti-­subversion and secession legislation under Article 23. A pro-­Beijing legislator has even drafted an anti-­independence law, although this has so far been rejected by the Hong Kong government.55 Not unsurprisingly, the Hong Kong National Party declared that it would not disclose the identity of its members because of its almost revolutionary goals.56 The most common form of localist group only promotes full autonomy within the current People’s Republic of China for which they demand democratic self-­determination. A few examples are the Hong Kong Autonomy Movement, Hong Kong Indigenous, Civic Passion (which promotes cultural independence), and Demosistō. The demand for full autonomy was most prominently propagated by Chin Wan, a former assistant professor at Lingnan University, who published two popular books on the Hong Kong City-­State (2011 and 2014) based on the idea of European city-­states.57 Rejecting independence, he sees Hong Kong as a city-­state within a Chinese confederation which would be of mutual benefit to both the Chinese government and Hong Kong.58 Autonomy is generally perceived as more realistic because it does not contradict the Basic Law and at least theoretically constitutes no fundamental threat to national unity. Opponents of the movement have, however, not distinguished between those that support independence or full autonomy as both have received equally harsh criticism from both the Hong Kong and Chinese governments. Although Chin Wan has clearly stated his opposition to independence, the so-­called “godfather of localism” has been portrayed as the ringleader of the independence movement and he blamed his political stance for losing his position at Lingnan University in 2016.59 In general, groups associated with the nativist movement are very small and highly fragmented. There is not a single leader who unites the movement which contributes to the general lack of organization and disarray. Organizations that promote independence such as the Hong Konger Front or the Hong Kong National Party are, moreover, highly secretive to avoid repression.60 Although some of the groups have cooperated in protest activities, they have not formed alliances and thus do not constitute a coherent interest group yet. The lack of a unified organization, however, also has the advantage that it makes repression more difficult. There has been a vast array of different strategies. First of all, nativists have sought to influence the identity discourse. For instance, activists have made use of social media from Facebook to web sites and forums. It has, however, not been limited to the Internet. Besides the publication of books, one of the groups, Civic Passion, is publishing a paper called Passion Times, which is distributed free of charge at central locations. University student papers have also been a major forum for these ideas. Most prominently, the Hong Kong Student Union’s student paper Undergrad published a book titled Hong Kong Ethnic Theory (also translated as Hong Kong Nationalism) in 2014.61 In 2012 individuals even raised HK$100,000 for the publication of a one-­page ad in the

166   S. Ortmann pro-­democratic tabloid Apple Daily, which characterized mainlanders as locusts and thus criticized the corrosive effect of the growing number of mainland immigrants and visitors. Another strategy has been to participate as well as stage mass protests. Since 2012, nativists and localists have become a visible part of the massive pro-­ democratic protests on July 1 by waving colonial flags and promoting their cause with signs, fliers and stickers. Although this has declined since the Umbrella Movement, which is viewed as a failure by nativists, pro-­independence supporters staged a mass protest with at least 1,000 participants on August 5, 2016, following the disqualification of a number of localist candidates for the 2016 Legislative Council elections. Many of the participants waved “Hong Kong independence” banners.62 Since 2014 most of the radical activists prefer frequent small-­scale protests, which are primarily targeted at locations which are seen as places of Chinese encroachment, such as shopping centers, near public transport stations or military bases. The Umbrella Movement has contributed significantly to this change in tactics as a result of the frustration over the failure of the strategies of the movement’s main organizers (the “main stage”). For the first time, a major protest movement in Hong Kong had not succeeded in gaining any significant concession even though thousands of people had poured into the streets and blocked many major roads. Most nativists felt that the unwillingness of the leadership for decisive action was to blame for the lack of a tangible outcome.63 The failed attempt to gain control of Tim Wa Avenue on November 30, 2014, to block access to many government buildings was the final attempt to increase pressure on the government with more assertive means. Since then, there have been more calls for “militant” actions. This has even included arguing for the use of force. For instance, an article written by David Ma, the secretary-­general of the Hong Kong Independence Party, and published in the Passion Times argued that  Hong Kong is “colonized” by CCP, and if we Hong Kong people have to stand on our own feet, then we must declare war on our archenemy and the puppet administration. We cannot afford to be on the chopping block because of the so-­called “peace”!64  While the means of the struggle are not mentioned, it is clear that there is a call for more aggression against the Chinese government. As these small-­scale non-­violent protests have been met with a disproportionately strong response from the police which appeared to be targeting nativists over counter-­protesters, it has raised concern among the activists that the police have become a political tool of the authoritarian government. For instance, this was highlighted when a woman was convicted of attacking a police officer with her breasts, which not only drew attention to biases in the police force but also the courts.65 Moreover, nativists also believe that counter-­protests are supported or even organized by the government and the police.66 This idea dates back to

The emergence of nativist groups   167 the Umbrella Movement when one protester was asked by a journalist what she was doing and responded in Mandarin that she was “shopping,” which triggered a new form of spontaneous protests spilling into the shops along Mong Kok’s Sai Yeung Choi Street.67 Since then, there have been many allegations of paid protesters participating in counter-­protests in Hong Kong. The lack of efficacy of peaceful protests has raised the need for more violent means, a sentiment particularly strong among nativists. The first violent protest in the post-­handover period took place on Lunar New Year in 2016 when protesters clashed with the police over illegal hawkers, which had traditionally been tolerated by the government during this time of year. Already, a year earlier, protesters had tried to protect the hawking tradition but in 2016 the government was willing to crack down as Hong Kong Indigenous mobilized its supporters to protect the hawkers. In response to the government’s forceful attempt to evict the food stalls, protesters were no longer willing to only resist peacefully. Instead, during the increasingly intense confrontation activists started to throw bottles, flower pots and bricks, which had been dislocated from the pavement, as well as set fire to trash bins. The police fired two warning shots and used batons and pepper spray on the protesters. While many derided the event as the “Mong Kok Riot,”68 drawing references to the 1966 and 1967 riots that shook the city,69 sympathetic observers declared that it was a “Fishball Revolution,” which sought to frame the event as a heroic defense of local practices and values.70 In the following year, the hawkers were again able to sell their snacks without disturbance from the government and a repeat of the violence was prevented. Most nativists are aware that the use of violence bears significant risks for the legitimacy of the movement. Similar to the 1967 riots, which had united the Hong Kong people against the leftist troublemakers, the majority of the Hong Kong people remain strongly opposed to the use of violence as a political means. According to a survey by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2016, localists were viewed as negative by 48.2 percent, more than the pro-­ establishment groups which were viewed negatively by 42.2 percent.71 Moreover, many people involved in the protests were arrested and charged with serious crimes. As a consequence, one of the groups involved in the unrest, Civic Passion, decided in early January 2017 to withdraw from social movements because it was worried about double agents while also making clear that there was not sufficient support for its form of resistance.72 Although most activists have preferred non-­institutionalized tactics, many of the nativist and localist organizations such as Youngspiration, which has more than 100 members, or Demosistō with about 30 members, have decided to enter formal politics and contest elections.73 Even Edward Leung, the radical leader of Hong Kong Indigenous, contested the 2016 Legislative Council by-­ election in the Northeast New Territories, where he received over 66,000 votes. By doing so, the groups show their intention to establish a formal interest group that constitutes a “third force” in politics, one which is neither aligned with the pro-­establishment nor the pro-­democracy camp.74 During the 2016 Legislative

168   S. Ortmann Council election, six potential nativist candidates were disqualified by the government after failing to sign an additional document that required candidates to confirm that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China. Despite the controversy, two pro-­independence candidates, Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-­ching, both from Youngspiration, were elected, which led to a crisis during the oath-­ taking ceremony when they swore allegiance to the Hong Kong nation rather than to the People’s Republic of China. After they were asked to re-­take the oath, they sought to delegitimize the current regime by changing the pronunciation of words. The use of “shina” (or cheena) rather than “China” enraged opponents who link the term to the bloody Japanese occupation of China between 1931 and 1945.75 The two elected lawmakers were eventually removed following Chinese government intervention as well as Hong Kong court decisions. The fact that this situation triggered Chinese government intervention and thus circumvented the normal procedures of Hong Kong’s legal system let to concerns about the city’s independent judiciary and the rule of law.76 Despite the massive criticism of radical nativists by many people inside Hong Kong, which included a mass protest with thousands of protesters against independence on November 13, 2016,77 Hong Kong politics has experienced an overall shift toward stressing local concerns which is reflected in the rhetoric of many pan-­democratic parties, such as the Civic Party, which have adopted a more Hong Kong centric stance to retain political support.78 It stated in its 10th anniversary manifesto: “This city is our city. In the face of social and livelihood issues, people are frustrated by policies that do not appear to connect to their concerns, nor address their real and urgent needs.”79 Nevertheless, while it is obvious that support for localism has increased, the growing Chinese central government control over Hong Kong provides many obstacles for nativist groups to coalesce into a coherent interest group that could challenge the current political status quo.

Conclusion A nativist movement which demands full autonomy or even independence has emerged in Hong Kong in response to the increasing control of the Chinese government over the territory which has threatened its liberal core values. Originating in a strong Hong Kong civic identity that stresses liberal participation, activists are seeking to counter the increasing erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy in recent years and the attempt by the Chinese government to impose its own illiberal national identity. Resentment over this trend has resulted in the emergence of an ethnic identity that completely rejects the Chinese identity. Nativists argue that politics should solely focus only on local issues and assert full autonomy. Some even declare that “Hong Kong is not China,” a slogan that was put on stickers and placed throughout the city. Even Ronny Tong, a very moderate pan-­democrat, who is opposed to independence, argued that “If you don’t agree with ‘one-­country, two systems’ and if you don’t have faith in the Basic Law, there is no future, because the only other alternative, as I see it, is either independence or ‘one-­country, one system’ (sic).”80 As the Chinese and

The emergence of nativist groups   169 Hong Kong governments are increasingly worried about the rise of the nativist movement, they will try to introduce measures to curtail its development. However, they should be aware that any repression of the highly fragmented and leaderless movement will likely galvanize it further and thus increase its political power which could propel it to become a serious interest group in Hong Kong politics that challenges not only conservative pro-­Beijing parties but also supporters of liberal democracy. A much more effective method would be to trust Hongkongers with the high degree of autonomy that was promised and develop a truly representative democracy.

Notes   1 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong (2014), available online at www.scmp.com/news/ hong-­kong/article/1529167/full-­text-practice-­one-country-­two-systems-­policyhong-­kong-special (accessed March 11, 2017).   2 Lo, Sonny Shiu-­Hing. 2015. Hong Kong’s Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions. London: Palgrave Macmillan.   3 Lin, George. 2002. “Hong Kong and the globalisation of the Chinese diaspora: a geographical perspective.” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 43:1, pp. 63–91.   4 Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 14.   5 Barrington, Lowell. 2006. “Nationalism & independence.” In Lowell W. Barrington (ed.). After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 7.   6 Chan Chi Kit. 2014. “China as ‘Other,’ ” China Perspectives, 2014:1, p. 25.   7 Mathews, Gordon, Eric Kit-­wai Ma and Tai-­lok Lui. 2008. Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, p. 1.   8 Kaeding, Malte Philipp. 2011. “Identity formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong: how much difference, how many similarities?” In Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (eds). Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 258–280.   9 While this distinction is ideal-­typical because the two forms of identity can rarely be separated, it is useful for understanding the role of identity in the development of nativist groups in Hong Kong. 10 Mill, John Stuart. 1861. On Representative Government. Adelaide: The University of Adelaide, available online at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/ m645r/ (accessed August 15, 2015). 11 Nodia, Ghia. 1992. “Nationalism and democracy.” Journal of Democracy, 3:4, pp. 3–22. 12 Wang Shaoguang. 2003. “Nationalism and democracy: second thoughts.” Unpublished paper, available online at www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Nationalism& Dem.doc (accessed November 3, 2016). 13 Tansey, Oisin. 2011. “Does democracy need sovereignty?” Review of International Studies, 37, p. 1522. 14 Ortmann, Stephan. 2016. “The lack of sovereignty, the Umbrella Movement, and democratisation in Hong Kong.” Asia Pacific Law Review, 24:2, pp. 108–122. 15 Tse, Thomas Kwan Choi. 2007. “Remaking Chinese identity: hegemonic struggles over national education in post-colonial Hong Kong.” International Studies in Sociology of Education, 17:3, pp. 231–248. 16 Kohn, Hans. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan.

170   S. Ortmann 17 Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. 18 Lam Wai-­man. 2013. “Impact of competing values and choices on democratic support in Hong Kong.” Social Indicators Research, 113:1, pp. 213–234. 19 Cited in Simpson, Peter. 2012. “China slams survey that shows rising Hong Kong resentment,” Telegraph, January 12, available online at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/asia/china/9010457/China-­slams-survey-­that-shows-­rising-Hong-­Kongresentment.html (accessed July 22, 2015). 20 Chung, Robert and Edward Tai. 2014. “Ethnic identity of Hong Kong people: an academic question turned political.” In Jenn-­hwan Wang (ed.). Border Crossing in Greater China: Production, Community and Identity. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 219–239. 21 Undergrad. 2014a. Hoenggong Manzuk Mengwan Zikyut [The Hong Kong Nation’s Destiny of Self-­Determination]. February edition. Hong Kong: Undergrad. 22 Lau Siu-­Kai. 1997. “Hongkongese or Chinese: the problem of identity on the eve of resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong.” Hong Kong Institute of Asia-­ Pacific Studies, Occasional Paper, No.  65. In 1985 there was no option to answer both but in 1990 only 12.1 percent saw themselves as both while the Hong Kong only identity stood at 57.1 percent. 23 Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey. 2014. “The identity and national identification of Hong Kong people,” Press release, November, available online at www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/PressRelease_20141110_ Identity.pdf (accessed January 25, 2017). It was 58.1 percent in 1996. 24 Hong Kong University. 2015. “People’s ethnic identity,” Public Opinion Programme, June 23, available online at http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/ eidentity/poll/datatables.html (accessed August 11, 2015). 25 Ibid. 26 Chan Kin-­wa. 2015. “Hong Kong football fans ignore pleas not to boo China national anthem ahead of win over Maldives.” South China Morning Post, June 17, available online at www.scmp.com/sport/hong-­kong/article/1823044/boos-­ringout-­national-anthem-­another-world-­cup-soccer-­qualifier?page=all (accessed August 16, 2015). 27 Ma Ngok. 2015. “The rise of ‘anti-­China’ sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council elections.” China Review, 15:1, pp. 39–66. 28 Sing Ming. 2001. “The handover of Hong Kong and the retrogression of its democratic development.” In Joseph Y.  S. Cheng (ed.) Political Development in the HKSAR. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, pp. 101–117; Newman, David and Alvin Rabushka. 1998. Hong Kong under Chinese Rule: The First Year. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. 29 Lam, Willy Wo-­Lap. 2015. Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression. New York: Routledge. 30 Chan, Elaine. 2000. “Defining fellow compatriots as ‘others’ – national identity in Hong Kong.” Government and Opposition, 35:4, pp. 499–519. 31 Ibid. 32 Yew Chiew Ping and Kwong Kin-­Ming. 2014. “Hong Kong identity on the rise.” Asian Survey, 54:6, p. 1091. 33 Vickers, Edward. 2003. In Search of an Identity. The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s–2002. New York and London: Routledge. 34 Tse, Thomas Kwan Choi. 2007. “Remaking Chinese identity: hegemonic struggles over national education in post-colonial Hong Kong,” International Studies in Sociology of Education, 17:3, pp. 231–248. 35 Ip Iam Chong. 2012. “Waihoh ‘Junggwok Mosik’ wooi chutyin joi ‘Gwokman Gaauyuk’ jung? [Why Does the ‘China Model’ Appear in the “National Education”?] Inmediahk, July 29, available online at www.inmediahk.net/node/1013736/ (accessed August 16, 2015).

The emergence of nativist groups   171 36 Tse, Thomas Kwan-­choi. 2014. “Constructing Chinese identity in post-­colonial Hong Kong.” Studies in Ethnicities and Nationalism, 14:1, pp. 188–206. 37 Chan, Elaine. 2000. “Defining fellow compatriots as ‘others’ – national identity in Hong Kong.” Government and Opposition, 35:4, pp. 499–519. 38 Kaeding, Malte Philipp. 2011. “Identity formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong: How much difference, how many similarities?” In Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (eds). Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 258–280. 39 Chen, Te-­Ping. 2013. “Tiananmen vigil spurs Hong Kong rift,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, available online at www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732406330457 8522913867121682 (accessed August 28, 2015). 40 Fung, Fanny W. Y. and Joyce Ng. 2015. “Federation of students suffers biggest split in 57-year history as HKU quits over Occupy.” South China Morning Post, February 14, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/article/1712860/hku-­unionquits-­federation-students-­over-dissatisfaction-­conduct?page=all (accessed August 16, 2015). 41 Wachman, Alan. 1994. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. New York: M. E. Sharpe. 42 Ibid. 43 Lau Siu-­Kai and Kuan Hsin-­chi. 1988. The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, p. 2. 44 Mathews, Gordon, Eric Kit-­wai Ma and Tai-­lok Lui. 2008. Hong Kong, China: Learning to Belong to a Nation. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, p. 80. 45 Steger, Isabella. 2017. “The world’s most popular museum is at the heart of a political storm between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.” Quartz, January 9, available online at https://qz.com/880945/the-­palace-museum-­the-worlds-­most-popular­is-at-­the-heart-­of-a-­political-storm-­between-china-­hong-kong-­and-taiwan/ (accessed January 27, 2017). 46 Cheung, Alvin Y. H. 2014. “Melancholy in Hong Kong.” World Policy Journal, Winter, pp. 97–106. 47 Lam, Jeffie. 2015. “Is the rise of localism a threat to Hong Kong’s cosmopolitan values?” South China Morning Post, June 2, available online at www.scmp. com/news/hong-­kong/politics/article/1814676/rise-­localism-threat-­hong-kongs-­ cosmopolitan-values?page=all (accessed August 16, 2015). 48 Lai Ying-­kit. 2012. “Hong Kong accepting too many mainland Chinese immigrants, survey finds.” South China Morning Post, November 22, available online at www. scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/article/1088378/hongkongers-­want-fewer-­mainlandimmigrants (accessed June 29, 2015). 49 Wong, Hermina. 2016. “Hong Kong National Party ‘denied registration’ by Companies Registry.” Hong Kong Free Press, March 29, available online at www. hongkongfp.com/2016/03/29/hong-­kong-national-­party-denied-­registration-to­companies-registry/ (accessed April 16/2016). 50 Lewis, Simon. 2016. “Hong Kong independence advocates are risking arrest for sedition, Chinese legal experts say.” Time, April 13, available online at http://time. com/4291738/hong-­kong-independence-­demosisto-sedition-­treason-arrest-­hknp/ (accessed January 30, 2017). 51 Yeung, Raymond and Harminder Singh. 2017. “Hong Kong’s largest Lunar New Year Fair crowded, despite fears of unrest.” South China Morning Post, January 27, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/education-­community/ article/2066074/hong-­kongs-largest-­lunar-new-­year-fair-­crowded (accessed January 30, 2017). 52 Chen, Frank. 2015. “Forget universal suffrage, this is what young people want.” EJ Insight, August 6, available online at www.ejinsight.com/20150806-forget-­universalsuffrage-­this-is-­what-young-­people-want/ (accessed August 16, 2015).

172   S. Ortmann 53 Cheung, Isaac. 2016b. “Pro-­Beijing lawyer says new self-­determination parties are ‘criminal’ and committing ‘treason’.” Hong Kong Free Press, April 14, available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2016/April 14/pro-­beijing-lawyer-­brands-hknp-­demosisto-as-­ criminal-treason/ (accessed April 16, 2016). 54 Lewis, Simon. 2016. “Hong Kong independence advocates are risking arrest for sedition, Chinese legal experts say.” Time, April 13, available online at http://time. com/4291738/hong-­kong-independence-­demosisto-sedition-­treason-arrest-­hknp/ (accessed January 30, 2017) 55 Ibid. 56 Cheung, Isaac. 2016a. “New pro-­independence party will not reveal members as it is ‘close to being revolutionary’.” Hong Kong Free Press, April 12, available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2016/April 12/new-­pro-independence-­party-will-­not-reveal­members-as-­it-is-­close-to-­being-revolutionary/ (accessed April 14, 2016). 57 Chin Wan. 2011. Heung Gong Sing Bong Lun [Hong Kong as a City-­State]. Hong Kong: Enrich Publishing; Chin Wan. 2014. Heung Gong Sing Bong Lun II – Gwong Fuk Boon To [Hong Kong as a City-­State II: Recover the Local]. Hong Kong: Enrich Publishing. 58 Chin Wan. 2015. “A federation for Hong Kong and China.” New York Times, June 14, available online at www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/opinion/a-­federation-for­hong-kong-­and-china.html?_r=0 (accessed August 16, 2015). 59 Chan, Thomas. 2015. “Lawmaker proposes anti-­Hong Kong independence law.” Coconuts Hongkong, April 9, available online at http://hongkong.coconuts.co/2015/April 09/lawmaker-­proposes-anti-­hong-kong-­independence-law (accessed August 16, 2015); Mok, Danny and Gary Cheung. 2016. “Hong Kong’s ‘godfather of localism’ Horace Chin set to lose job at Lingnan University.” South China Morning Post, February 24, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/education-­community/article/1916048/ hong-­kongs-godfather-­localism-horace-­chin-set (accessed January 30, 2017). 60 Interview in 2015. 61 Undergrad. 2014b. Hoenggong Manzukleon (Hong Kong Nationalism). Hong Kong: Undergrad. 62 Fitzpatrick, Liam. 2016. “Hong Kong makes history with first pro-­independence rally.” Time, August 5, available online at http://time.com/44407Augusthongkong-­independence-china-­localist/ (accessed January 23, 2017). 63 Passion Times (ed.). 2016. Jyusaan Satbaai Luk [A Record of the Failure of the Umbrella Revolution]. Hong Kong: Passion Times. 64 Ma, Daniel. 2014. “Heunggongyan, Heung junggung jikman hoijin ba [Hong Kongers, Declare War on the CCP Colonizers].” Passion Times, available online at www.passiontimes.hk/article/02–01–2014/8370 (accessed August 16, 2015). 65 Sung, Timmy. 2015. “ ‘Breast is not a weapon,’ Hong Kong protesters shout as they gather at police headquarters.” South China Morning Post, August 2, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/law-­crime/article/1845867/hong-­kong-protesters-­ shout-breast-­not-weapon-­they-gather?page=all (accessed August 28, 2015). 66 Scotford, Richard. 2015. “Do Hong Kong localists hate dancing? Sunday night’s protest in Mong Kok.” Hong Kong Free Press, June 29, available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2015/06/29/do-­hong-kong-­localists-hate-­dancing-report-­from-sunday-­ nights-protest-­in-mong-­kok/ (accessed August 16, 2015). 67 Chan, Samuel. 2014. “The game changes: as Occupy sites are cleared, Hong Kong’s democracy protesters go ‘shopping’.” South China Morning Post, December 11, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/article/1660225/game-­changes (accessed January 30, 2017). 68 Moss, Daniel. 2016. “Mong Kok streets left in disarray after Lunar New Year night of violence.” South China Morning Post, February 9, available online at www.scmp.com/ news/hong-­kong/law-­crime/article/1910913/mong-­kok-streets-­left-disarray-­afterlunar-­new-year-­night (accessed January 23, 2017).

The emergence of nativist groups   173 69 Wordie, Jason. 2016. “Mong Kok fish-­ball riots point to deeper problems, like the 1966 unrest in Hong Kong.” South China Morning Post Magazine, February 20, available online at www.scmp.com/magazines/post-­magazine/article/1913889/ mong-­kok-fish-­ball-riots-­point-deeper-­problems-1966-unrest (accessed January 23, 2017). 70 Blundy, Rachel and Laura Ma. 2016. “#Fishballrevolution: Hong Kong’s social media users react to violent Mong Kok hawker protest.” South China Morning Post, February 9, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/law-­crime/article/ 1910894/fishballrevolution-­hong-kongs-­social-media-­users-react (accessed January 23, 2017). 71 Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey. 2016. “Public opinion & political development in Hong Kong,” Press release, July 24, available online at www. com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/TaskForce_PressRelease_160722c_English. pdf (accessed January 25, 2017). 72 Tong, Elson. 2016. “Localist group Civic Passion to ‘withdraw from all social movements’, citing increased risks.” Hong Kong Free Press, January 6, available online at www.hongkongfp.com/2017/January 06/localist-­group-to-­withdraw-from-­allsocial-­movements-citing-­increased-risks/ (accessed January 23, 2017). 73 Wong, Hermina. 2016. “Hong Kong National Party ‘denied registration’ by Companies Registry.” Hong Kong Free Press, March 29, available online at www. hongkongfp.com/2016/03/29/hong-­kong-national-­party-denied-­registrationto-­companies-registry/ (accessed April 16, 2016); Ng Kang-­chung. 2015. “Young spiration aims to be ‘third power’ in Hong Kong politics.” South China Morning Post, March 29, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/article/1750442/ youngspiration-­aims-be-­third-power-­hong-kong-­politics (accessed August 16, 2015). 74 Lo, Kinling and Kenneth Lau. 2016. “Rise of third force seen with Indigenous.” The Standard, February 29, available online at www.thestandard.com.hk/section-­news. php?id=166671 (accessed January 30, 207). 75 Ives, Mark. 2016. “How a word, ‘chee-­na,’ renewed a crisis between Beijing and Hong Kong.” New York Times, November 9, available online at www.nytimes. com/2016/11/10/world/asia/china-­hong-kong-­oath.html (accessed January 23, 2017). 76 Bland, Ben. 2016. “What does China’s latest intervention mean for Hong Kong?” Financial Times, November 7, available online at www.ft.com/content/0e69c5a4a4cd-11e6–8898–79a99e2a4de6 (accessed January 30, 2017). 77 Jenkins, Nash. 2016. “Thousands of loyalist protesters rally against independence in Hong Kong.” Time, November 14, available online at http://time.com/4567527/ hong-­kong-anti-­independence-china-­rally/ (accessed January 27, 2017). 78 Cheng, Kris. 2016. “A turn to localism? Civic Party launches 10th anniversary manifesto.” Hong Kong Free Press, March 16, available online at www.hongkongfp. com/2016/03/16/a-­turn-to-­localism-civic-­party-launches-­10th-anniversary-­manifesto/ (accessed January 30, 2017). 79 Civic Party. 2016. “Tenth anniversary manifesto.” Civic Party Homepage, available online at www.civicparty.hk/?q=en/node/7026 (accessed January 30, 2017). 80 RTHK. 2015. “The pulse.” June 19, 2015, available online at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=dJlMWFpTJ_s (accessed March 13, 2017).

10 Student and youth activism The new youth groups in anti-­National Education policy and Occupy Central Movement Eric King-­man Chong

Introduction This chapter attempts to analyze student activism with the examples of anti-­ National Education movement in 2012, the Umbrella Movement in 2014, as well as the advocacy of self-­determination and independence. It aims at exploring the way that student activism has developed and how it affects the policy making in Hong Kong SAR, and the ways in which how these movements affected the Legislative Council election in 2016 . This chapter argues that there has been an increase of student and youth movements which target the public policies and politics of Hong Kong SAR government, in particular against the Chief Executive constitutional reform framework set by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 2014 and promoting a sense of localism and forming themselves into localist interest groups. Indeed, student and youth activism in Hong Kong has been mainly led by upper secondary and tertiary student groups which have several characteristics, including the popular use of the social media in mobilization over political or social issues, support for direct elections of both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council, and participating in political rallies led by the pro-­democracy camps. In 2011, the formation of a new youth group of Scholarism caught media attention and the student movement was landmarked by the anti-­National Education campaign in 2012 which was led by young political activists from Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), together with the Parents’ Concern Group on National Education, successfully forced a withdrawal of the government National Education policy. In turn, the student and youth movements started to exert pressure on the HKSAR’s governance. Later on, youth groups such as Demosisto and Youngspiration were formed with the clear aim of participating in the politics and elections of Hong Kong SAR. The emergence of a pro-­independence party – Hong Kong National Party – further added weight to the claims of localist concerns turning out to fight for independence. In this chapter, the author will focus on the rise of student and youth groups and of localist interest groups to examine their social mobilization, interest articulation,

Student and youth activism   175 impacts on the governance of Hong Kong, and the implications for the social movement in the HKSAR. After the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, and especially since the education reform in 2001,1 Hong Kong society was increasingly faced with government’s attempt to render the school curriculum more “Chinese” by adopting the national identity of the People’s Republic of China. Beginning from 2004, a huge amount of public money was spent on making nationalistic TV advertisements, funding National Education programs such as study tours to China which were organized by the Education Bureau or voluntary associations, and providing training to teachers and students in organizing national flag raising ceremonies, etc. But in 2012, when a mandatory policy required the government and public funded primary and secondary schools to implement a subject of Moral and National Education starting from September 2012, it sparked off huge controversies in terms of the differences between National Education and Civic Education, allegations of ‘brain-­washing’ intentions and producing unquestioning patriots, etc. A wide participation of students, parents and the public throughout the summer of 2012, which was just before the Legislative Council election in early September, finally forced the government to back down on implementing the proposed Moral and National Education subject. Schools were given the autonomy to decide whether to implement this subject. Then, students and youth groups started to press on issues such as the nomination method of Chief Executive and then, since the Umbrella Movement in late 2014, youth groups have become vocal in localist ideas. They sent representatives to take part in both the District Council’s election in November 2015 and the Legislative Council election in September 2016, and they returned several seats in both elections. This has triggered debates not just on their localist ideas, but also on whether students and youths can become the third force alongside the pro-­establishment and pro-­democracy camps. This chapter argues that while the Hong Kong SAR government has been working on cultivating a national identity among the students since the education reform in the early 2000s, students’ civic awareness has been developed and they have formed themselves into student group in order to fight back against what they regard as a “brain-­washing” National Education subject and, later on in 2013 and 2014, this student and youth movement has turned their attention to the constitutional development of Hong Kong SAR government as well as on other social and political issues. Youths and students staged protests on the alleged pre-­selection framework set by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in August 2014, as well as taking part in the elections of District Council and Legislative Council in 2015 and 2016. They advocate many things, such as Hong Kong people first, Hong Kong as a nation, self-­ determination on the future, etc. These have triggered off a new landscape of competing discourses apart from the traditional pro-­Beijing and pro-­democracy camps.

176   E. K-M. Chong

From civic education to National Education in Hong Kong SAR A poverty of political education,2 conservative versus justice-­oriented citizens3 and active citizenship actions could be found in Hong Kong schools.4 But since the return of sovereignty to China in 1997, promoting National Education – which is officially defined as a school curriculum that enhances understanding about China and identification with a Chinese identity – has become a common curriculum goal for primary and secondary schools5 for the Hong Kong SAR government. This National Education can be differentiated from civic or citizenship education in the sense that a major aim of the former is building up the Chinese national identity among Hong Kong students, which is a mass identification in order to build up a “we-­ness” within a nation state.6 This also refers to “we are Chinese” and people will share intimate relationships and profound feelings towards each other. In the process of building up national identification, an individual will realize the commonality with any others who belong to the same nation, therefore building up the nation’s cohesion and commitment to the nation-­state.7 Leung also defines nationalistic education as those educational programs aiming at cultivating people’s knowledge about the nation state and instilling a sense of national identity to the nation state.8 In short, the official conceptualization of national identification can be understood as identification and belongingness in terms of ethnicity, culture and the state. As for school-­level implementation, National Education has been taught in the so-­called pro-­Beijing government schools both before and after 1997.9 These pro-­Beijing government schools teach patriotic education in order to cultivate young people’s patriotism. For other schools, they either implement formal Civic Education subjects according to the Civic Education Guidelines,10 or teach civic education as a kind of informal curriculum in form periods or extra-­curricular activities since the colonial period of mid-­1980s, with topics such as understanding rights and responsibilities, equality and discrimination, voting, etc. commonly found in them. When Hong Kong entered into the 2000s, Moral and Civic Education (MCE) was designed as one of the Four Key Tasks in the education reform by the Education and Manpower Bureau (later renamed the Education Bureau in 2007) in 2001, in which national identity was one of the priority values to be cultivated among the students. In the education reform document of Learning to Learn: Life-­long Learning and Whole-­person Development, the Curriculum Development Institute sets out the goal that Hong Kong students should be able to “understand their national identity and be committed to contributing to the nation and society.”11 Learning elements of moral, civic and National Education have also been embedded in Key Learning Areas (KLAs) such as Chinese and English languages in order to facilitate whole-­person development.12 In The New Academic Structure for Senior Secondary Education and Higher Education – Action Plan for Investing in the Future of Hong Kong, which was published by the Education and Manpower Bureau in 2005, it also

Student and youth activism   177 states that “it is necessary to enable every student, as a citizen in Hong Kong, to have more in-­depth knowledge of modern China and the world.”13 Therefore, educational policies have given much weight to cultivating youth’s national identification. In 2007, at the welcoming banquet which the Hong Kong SAR Government hosted on June 30, 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao earnestly advised that  we should put more emphasis on National Education for the youth in Hong Kong and promote exchanges between them and the young people of the Mainland so that they will carry forward the Hong Kong people’s great tradition of loving the motherland and loving Hong Kong.14 In response to President Hu’s comment, the Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive Donald Tsang announced in his 2007–08 Policy Address that the government will spare no efforts to promote National Education and to deepen teachers and students’ understanding about China.15 In his 2008–09 Policy Address, the Chief Executive announced the creation of a National Education coordination platform to be known as “Passing on the Torch,” coordinating the work of various voluntary groups on National Education.16 Since then, Hong Kong schools have engaged themselves in moral, national and civic education by both subject teaching and informal curricula such as national anniversary celebration events, project learning, extra-­curricular activities and experiential learning about China.17 But survey results on implementing civic education also showed that the teaching of citizenship education in schools has been rather didactic in Hong Kong classrooms.18 Also, many functions of citizenship education were performed through co-­curricular activities19 and so the effectiveness is in question. Finally, while topics of local and national dimensions of citizenship education are usually covered in school’s curriculum, the global dimension of citizenship education needs much more effort to be included.20 The Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, which is a government-­ funded public body responsible for promoting civic education in Hong Kong since the transitional colonial period in mid-­1980s, also changed its priority from civic education to National Education after the education reform in the early 2000s. It produced the controversial TV advertisements of “my heart on family and nation” and broadcasted it on TV channels every night, as well as increasing the funding on student tours going to China for National Education.21 All these testified to the government’s intention of promoting National Education. The Education Bureau, indeed, used millions of dollars to fund students’ exchange tours to China22 which were organized by some pro-­Chinese government associations or tour companies. In particular, there is a “Hong Kong Student Leaders Commendation Scheme: National Education Program” which has been conducted since July 2004.23 This Program is usually composed of a 10-day visit to Beijing and includes lectures, visits and exchanges with Chinese students. Students are expected to increase their understanding of China and cultivate their Chinese national identification after joining such exchange programmes.24 Another

178   E. K-M. Chong s­ ignature National Education program is the “National Education – Mainland Chinese experts talk series” which invited experts on “One Country, Two Systems,” Hong Kong’s mini-­constitution Basic Law, Chinese economic reform, education development, the legal system, technological and aerospace developments and international relations to give talks to Hong Kong Secondary 4 to 6 students and teachers.25 These expert talks were usually supported by Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (Office for Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs), Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong SAR, and Renmin University of China. Other occasional exchange tours to China include public-­funded Hong Kong teachers’ training activities in China. Hong Kong academics, school teachers and students were also invited to visit various Chinese institutions and schools, and to attend nationalistic ceremonies in China.26 Also, several teaching and learning resources were developed by the Education Bureau to assist in teaching National Education.27 Some pro-­Beijing government organizations also got funding to publish teaching resources on National Education.28 There was, indeed, a great amount of public money spent on National Education. For example, the Education Bureau funded 37,000 students to join exchange tours to China through “Passing on Torch National Education Platform” in 2009–2010, and through this platform linking up 45 exchange programs organized by different non-­government organizations to promote National Education.29 Yet, when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the Hong Kong SAR in 2007 to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Hong Kong SAR, he remarked that the local youths should heighten their Chinese national identification. In 2008, Beijing successfully hosted the Olympics Games and a nationalistic fever was found in the Hong Kong SAR as evidenced by flocks of citizens cheering the visits of Chinese Olympic medalists. In 2008, the Moral and Civic Education published the Revised Moral and Civic Education Curriculum Framework, in which students’ learning in national life was given teaching suggestions on aims and themes, as well as enriching the contents of National Education in relevant KLAs and subjects.30 In 2008, the Education Bureau also outlined six main areas that pushed the National Education ahead: (1) Providing a new series of broad coverage and in-­depth National Education training for teachers. (2) Renewing and adding contents to the “Hong Kong Student Leaders Commendation Scheme: National Education Program”. (3) Establishing National Education Service Center. (4) Promoting the training of flag-­raising ceremony in schools actively. (5) Organizing ‘huaxia gardener seminar’31 for promoting Chinese culture. (6) Keep organizing “Military Summer Camp For Hong Kong Youth” with related organizations32 and expanding its scale and targets. The Moral and Civic Education Section of Education Bureau also outlined the following three methods to promote National Education: (1) school subjects

Student and youth activism   179 such as primary school’s General Studies, junior secondary school’s Chinese History and Geography, and senior secondary Chinese language and culture, and Liberal Studies; (2) life-­wide learning such as out of school experiences in order to deepen students’ understanding about Chinese developments; and (3)  professional teaching training such as thematic sharing, expert talks and professional curriculum materials to assist teachers.33 In this, the government has sought to develop the National Education quickly. In October 2010, the Chief Executive Donald Tsang stated in the Policy Address 2010–2011 that Moral and National Education would replace Moral and Civic Education in order to “strengthen national education.”34 The Education Bureau’s Moral and Civic Education Section was also renamed as the Moral, Civic and National Education Section. All these testified a higher priority on National Education. The government then embarked a four-­month consultation in 2011 on a proposed Moral and National Education curriculum. Hong Kong students, however, were usually regarded as not having much interest in politics before 1997. They received a de-­politicized and moralized civic education curriculum in schools in which the discussion of politics was limited.35 The Hong Kong students’ movement was once active in the years of 1960s to 1980s, when student campaigns against colonial rule, anti-­corruption, concerns about Hong Kong’s future after 1997, as well as patriotic sentiments on Chinese military crackdown on students’ movements in 1989 were high. With regard to students’ perception of their identity, a survey also showed that many students believe that they are Hong Kongers even after the handover of sovereignty in 1997.36 But with the idea of civic missions of schools being discussed in citizenship education literature,37 some schools pay particular attention to treating young people as “Here and now citizens,” taking citizenship education more seriously and making the content of citizenship education more directly relevant to young people’s lives.38 In addition, while international research shows a trend in adolescents’ interest in civic participation moving away from formal political systems (especially political parties and national political issues) and towards social movements, and that non-­governmental organizations are concerning with transnational issues such as the environment and human rights,39 Hong Kong SAR students are facing the government’s tremendous efforts to enhance their Chinese national identifications. This re-­depoliticizing policy of increasing nationalistic elements in education seems to fit both the Hong Kong SAR and the PRC governments’ preference to keep Hong Kong as an economic Chinese city.40 Regarding National Education in schools, since the early 2000s, while the so-­called pro-­Beijing government schools work on patriotic or National Education, many primary and secondary schools teach National Education through classroom learning activities and morning assembles,41 or by arranging students to join different kinds of nationalistic activities such as exchange tours, which were either funded by the Education Bureau, Committee of Promotion of Civic Education, or some pro-­Beijing government associations. A few Hong Kong schools have aimed at cultivating students into a “critical patriot” who loves

180   E. K-M. Chong his/her country while embracing critical thinking through deliberating on the issues confronted.42 In an exposition of patriotic education in China,43 the emphasis would start with training students’ ability of independent thinking. The ability to think and act, and to judge right from wrong, is regarded as a significant quality for an individual in becoming a patriotic citizen of a nation. Teachers aiming to develop critical patriots would develop students’ critical thinking abilities and refrain from enforced identification. While teaching political education (i.e., learning about politics, government, election, political systems and institutions, etc.), teachers would avoid indoctrination for fear of committing a professional crime.44 Indeed, the difficulty in implementing political education in Hong Kong is the suspicion of possible indoctrination and partisan influences when politically educating students in schools.45 There was also a good number of tertiary students who went to China on voluntary teaching in the mountainous area and, of course, visiting different Chinese cities to understand the economic, cultural and technological development of China nowadays.46 Yet, a landmark in pushing forward National Education came when the government proposed a consultation draft on a curriculum of Moral and National Education in 2011,47 which did not draw much attention when it was first announced by the Government. The foreword of this consultation draft said promoting National Education and increasing students’ understanding of their country and adoption of their national identity have become the common goals of primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong. Analysis, however, shows this official Chinese national identity project is significantly different from what local people experienced in the political scenes.48 Brewer argued that there were dual identification with region (Hong Kong) and ethnicity (Chinese) forged among local Hong Kong people during the period prior to the transition in 1997. This identity change has implications for political stability after the return of sovereignty in 1997.49 Vickers also found a strong local identification had developed in colonial Hong Kong.50 The conflicts between an officially sanctioned Chinese national identity and a local Hong Kongese identity were further complicated by the impression of the Chinese central government that Hong Kong should be a non-­political, commercial city and so there should be no question over Chinese national identity.51 Another major reason behind the popular resentment of National Education was the fear of indoctrination,52 which implied an enforced understanding without deliberation. With this background, an alliance of secondary students, calling themselves Scholarism, came out to express dissonance over this nationalistic subject of Moral and National Education. As will be discussed below, Scholarism – which is basically an interest group formed and run by young people only – has become a significant force in Hong Kong SAR society which has superseded the traditional political parties and teachers’ unions in spearheading this anti-­National Education social movement.

Student and youth activism   181

Mobilization of student and parent groups in protest against National Education There are a number of student and parent groups which were mobilized in protesting against National education. They escalated their campaigns by using different kinds of mobilization methods such as social media, press conferences and taking demonstrations. Indeed, the discussion of social media for political conversations and the relationship between it and civic engagement is well documented and much debated.53 Meanwhile, because of the common ground of upheaving the government’s plan of introducing National Education, these radical groups could be labelled as “radicals.” “Radical” means “pertaining to a root,” the metaphor being that radicalism is a root-­and-branch reform,54 although this is a bit of simplification and no group in anti-­National Education movement calling themselves as such. Borrowing Michael G. Roskin’s55 classification on radicals and moderates in Chinese politics, though bearing in mind the contextual differences between China and Hong Kong SAR, the author would like to highlight the following attributes of “radicals”: mass-­oriented, anti-­authoritarian, want revolution, and learn from the people. The “radical” label could help one to understand the kind of struggles and campaigns that the youth groups are engaging themselves with. Of the student’s group in anti-­National Education movement in 2012, the most prominent are Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS). Scholarism was a Hong Kong pro-­democracy student activist group active in the fields of Hong Kong’s education policy, political reform and youth policy and it was reported to have 200 members in May 2015 Scholarism was formed by a group of secondary school students who include Joshua Chi-­Fung Wong, who was a senior secondary Form 6 student. He was the Convener of Scholarism and Chairman of the Hong Kong United Commission of Secondary Students. Wong was born into Christian family. They always visit the grassroots families, tenants of subdivided flat and the shops in the community during his childhood. Another founder of Scholarism is Ivan Lam Long Yin, who was responsible for the promotional art work of Scholarism. Lam was also Convener of SchoolWill, and Member of the Chairmen Committee of Hong Kong United Commission of Secondary Students. Lam was born into a family whose father was an instructor in the Police College, and whose mother was the secretary of secondary school principal. HKFS has been established in Hong Kong since 1958, and it has been active in standing for university students in civic participation. Its membership comes from local tertiary institutions. For the parent’s group, there was the newly formed Parents’ Concern Group, which started their anti-­National Education campaign by issuing a public statement to the Education Bureau. The founders did not realize that they would afterwards become a major force in anti-­National Education campaign.56 Meanwhile, Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, as the largest teachers’ union, started slowly in protesting against National Education. It was forced by Scholarism and HKFS to take a proactive stance on anti-­National Education. Next,

182   E. K-M. Chong the Civil Alliance against the National Education was formed by a coalition of student and parent groups. Meanwhile, pro-­National Education groups also staged their support on National Education. The Young Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (Young DAB), which is the youth section of the largest pro-­Beijing government political party (in terms of membership and seats in the Legislative Council) in Hong Kong SAR, has its chairman Mr. Holden Chow supporting National Education. He wrote in a newspaper column that it is one’s responsibility to understand one’s own country and to teach National Education. He felt puzzled that while the colonial government had the British national anthem and Queen’s image broadcast in late night TV programs, why did Hong Kong people protest against National Education after 1997? Also, he queried whether there is too much sensitivity over the issue of National Education because if it was taught in a “brain-­washing” way, emphasizing the merits of China, this kind of National Education would not appeal to the students.57 The following will discuss the campaigns of anti-­National Education groups, in particular how the student groups utilize mass mobilization, such as social media, against the National Education.

Student activism in the anti-­National Education campaign The HKSAR government announced the Moral and National Education (MNE) Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6)58 in April 2012 after public consultation.59 The Education Bureau (EDB) said schools may introduce this subject in a progressive manner of a three-­year “initiation period” – from 2012/2013 to the 2014/2015 school year for government and aided primary schools, and from 2013/2014 to the 2015/2016 school year for secondary schools.60 The Preamble of the MNE Curriculum Guide said cultivating students’ moral and national qualities has always been one of the main objectives of school education in Hong Kong. Also, Hong Kong students need to develop their national belongingness by understanding Chinese traditions and customs, ancestry and origins, as well as their national origin. Teachers will assess students’ knowledge, attitudes and behavior. The ultimate goal of the MNE Curriculum Guide is to nurture positive values among students so that they will become committed members of their families, society, the motherland and the world.61 Thus, a strong sense of cultural and national belonging could be found here. Yet, there was little media attention on it. Scholarism, however, was alerted by the announcement of this MNE Curriculum Guide. In June 2012, Scholarism, together with other youth groups, attended a Legislative Council’s public hearing session to voice their concerns on suspected “brain-­washing” and express their opposition to National Education. Next, they used Internet and social media to stage their opposition. They also held a press conference to address their “brain-­washing” concerns to the public.62 Stepping into 2012, a teaching resource titled as Hong Kong National Education:

Student and youth activism   183 Two-­Party System Makes Amer­ican Suffer, which was published by the Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies of Baptist University of Hong Kong, was criticized as “brain-­washing” by emphasizing the positive sides of China only.63 What made this teaching resource more controversial was that it was funded by the National Education Service Center, which was set up by the first Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa’s administration, and that this teaching resource was delivered to all Hong Kong schools by the government’s funding. Scholarism criticized the teaching resource’s way of presenting political systems of China and the United States, as well as its description of development of Communist China. These criticisms were posted on Scholarism’s website and many young people became members of Scholarism afterwards. Students ticked “like” on Scholarism Facebook, or came across news about anti-­National Education from Scholarism. Most of those who are politically engaged in the Internet, indeed, are usually not new to political engagement,64 but then other youngsters were aware of their campaigns and they took part in the actions of anti-­National Education movement in the summer of 2012.65 According to Chow Ting, who is another main figure in Scholarism, students realized their social identity since the National Education controversies and joined the movements of Scholarism.66 Indeed, the issue is whether nurturing national identity and promoting patriotism could be delivered in schools without indoctrination, which is educationally unsound. The core problem with indoctrination is that it willfully suppresses the development of the critical disposition of students.67 Such critical perspectives and the right to draw up one’s conclusion and give out one’s view is under modern day human rights standards. Literature seems to discuss indoctrination in a negative way, as it is often compared to concepts like brainwashing and robbing others’ due freedom. Green,68 according to Spiecker and Straughan69 said When in teaching, we are concerned simply to lead another person to a correct answer, but are not correspondingly concerned that they arrive at that answer on the basis of good reasons, then we are indoctrinating; we are engaged in creating a non-­evidential style of belief. Brownhill and Smart gave a rather insightful discussion about the meaning of indoctrination.70 A teacher, it was argued, indoctrinates his students by requesting his students to believe in an unquestioning way, resulting in, for example, incomplete exposure to the truth or the use of opinion disguised as objective truth. Leung defined indoctrination as in an unequal power relationship, the stronger one uses authoritarian methods that drills and imposed his beliefs, values, views to the weaker one, with the intention that the weaker one would accept his beliefs, values, views, regardless to the evidence.71 But, of course, whether indoctrination is implied depends on how the aims are developed and pursued. In the process of the MNE consultation, there were

184   E. K-M. Chong views that assessment criteria with heavy stress on nationalistic feelings and national pride etc. can become indoctrination.72 National Education in Hong Kong was seriously criticized as too biased towards arousing students’ emotions without paying sufficient attention to the possible abuse of affective education, which may lead to indoctrination.73 On National Education for Hong Kong, Leung argued that if teachers lack the ability to separate the state from the ruling party and if they have a strong mission to send a positive image of the ruling party to the student, their teaching approach tends to be indoctrinatory.74

The beginning of student and youth activism: anti-­National Education in 2012 New social movements are associated with the rise of new divisions in post-­ industrial society and it usually reflects the interests and identity of groups organized outside of traditional class interests.75 New conflicts usually arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social and political integration, and socialization. They are manifested in sub-­institutional, extra-­parliamentary forms of protest.76 In Hong Kong, apart from the student group of Scholarism, a group of parents also concerned themselves on National Education. The most prominent one is Chan Sik-­Chi, Eva, who is Convener of Parents’ Concern Group. Chan has worked as a reporter for many years, and works as a senior lecturer in a tertiary institution and consultant of U-­Beat Magazine. She has some publications on the neighborhood of Tin Shui Wai and is also the writer of the column “Women’s Heart” at Mingpao. This background has served her well in terms of getting in touch with Hong Kong’s civil society. In the early summer of 2012, the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (PTU) was pressured by Scholarism to take a more pro-­active oppositional stance on the issue of National Education. The PTU was said to be too reactive on anti-­National Education. Scholarism staged a demonstration outside the PTU office in urging the latter to take a pro-­active stance on anti-­National Education. PTU replied that it needed to consult its members on the issue of National Education. But faced with an immense societal movement against National Education, and even a stronger voice coming from within,77 PTU finally took up an opposing stance on National Education by issuing a statement while recognizing teachers can have their judgement on what constitutes “brainwashing,” as well as expressing its worries about the potential effects brought by National Education.78 Then, in summer 2012, the Civil Alliance against the National Education was formed, with 23 pressure groups such as Scholarism, Parents’ Concern Group, Hong Kong Federation of Students, and some independent social activists as the main constituent groups (see Table 10.1).79 This Civil Alliance against the National Education voiced their anger over the government’s plan of National Education by hosting a 90,000 parent, student and teacher protest, which had caught a lot of media attention.80 The political parties, however, were not so much involved at the beginning, but as the Legislative Council election on September 9 drew nearer, various pan-­democratic

Teachers Student unions of local public and private funded universities

Secondary school students

Source of support

Parents

Tertiary student unions

Local secondary school Parents who were students concerned about National Education

Members

Kindergarten, primary and secondary school teachers

Teachers’ Union

Parent group on social Student union issues

Student movement

Nature

Hong Kong Federation Hong Kong of Students Professional Teachers’ Union

Parents’ Concern Group

Scholarism

Groups

Table 10.1  Civil society’s interest groups in the civil alliance against National Education

NGOs and teachers

NGOs which concern about civic education

Non-governmental organization

Alliance of Civic Education

186   E. K-M. Chong political parties showed their support on the anti-­National Education campaign. The following is a summary of the major forces which were involved in the anti-­ National Education campaign. In reply to the government’s saying National Education had been on agenda since the second Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s administration and that the Chief Executive C.  Y. Leung’s administration would not push hard on it, the Civil Alliance against the National Education staged protests at the Government Headquarters, occupying and renaming it the People’s Square. Mass gatherings with speeches, songs and dramas were staged there protesting against National Education. These had attracted thousands of citizens and celebrities of no strong political affiliations every night.81 Hunger strikes against National Education were also staged to call for public attention. “Occupying the Government Headquarters” had become the slogan of the protest and it was found in the conversations of local people when they talked about whether to join that night’s anti-­National Education campaigns. The gathering at government headquarters had the highest record of 40,000 people attending it.82 On the other hand, the government described the hunger strike as a stubborn move. Ethnic minorities also got angry about the proposal of implementing National Education subjects. The 8,000 ethnic minority primary school students and 6,000 ethnic minority secondary school students felt they were being discriminated against by this compulsory subject.83 The Unison group, which has been working on the equality of ethnic minorities in Hong Kong, criticized National Education as violating the Race Discrimination Ordinance because if teachers assess student performance in this subject by adopting the same standard as that of local students – ethnic minority students, who have different cultural backgrounds and who don’t know much about China and Hong Kong SAR – will be disadvantaged in the assessment. Also, conflicts may arise between ethnic minorities and local students if they study National Education together. Hong Kong students may offend the feelings of ethnic minorities if they feel proud to be Chinese.84 Therefore, ethnic minorities criticized the government as failing to consult them before announcing the proposal and neglecting their feelings.85 Unison urged the Equal Opportunities Commission to remind the government that if ethnic minorities are ever forced to receive National Education, it may trigger legal cases from the ethnic minorities. James Lam, a former member of the Committee on Promoting Racial Equality, also said affection cannot be forced, and loving China does not need to be taught but developed by students themselves. He urged the government to give the ethnic minorities a right to decide on receiving National Education.86 The Civil Alliance against the National Education was also eager to put a stop on implementing National Education when it was near the new school year of 2012/2013.87 They escalated their protests in early August 2012 by pressing the government to withdraw the implementation of National Education. The PTU said if the government failed to stop implementing National Education, they would consider initiating class strikes. The Civil Alliance threatened they would stage demonstrations throughout Hong Kong and host gatherings

Student and youth activism   187 outside government and aided schools demanding them not to teach National Education. In order to exert a greater influence on anti-­National Education, the Parents’ Concern Group created a website which showed the schools which had the intention of offering National Education. This move significantly affected schools in offering National Education because of a labeling effect. Also, the Parents’ Concern Group staged road shows on the suspected “red” teaching materials on boards to the public, aiming to educate the public about the prevalence of “red” teaching materials, whether they are published by the pro-­ Beijing government groups or publishing companies. The Parents’ Concern Group criticized these “red” materials as biased and subjective in presenting images and histories of China, and brainwashing students into believing that what the Chinese government does is always correct. The social service centers which joined the Civil Alliance will clean up all the “red” materials in all their libraries. Next, Scholarism organized signature campaign and received 50,000 signatures. Scholarism also chased different legislative council election candidates and asked for their support on National Education. They found that while most pan-­democracy candidates said “no” to National Education, most pro-­ establishment candidates remain unclear on whether to have National Education. Scholarism published this information from the legislator candidates on its website. Finally, the HKPTU called for a dialogue with the Secretary of Education, Mr. Eddie Ng, in late August 2012,88 but it did not reach any promising outcome. Facing with a public outcry over the issue of Moral and National Education curriculum in late August 2012, the Hong Kong SAR government announced establishing a Committee on the Initiation of Moral and National Education, which was chaired by Ms Anna Wu Hung-­yuk. This committee was to allay public concern over the Moral and National Education curriculum and to provide comments to the Education Bureau on the implementation of the Moral and National Education subject in primary and secondary schools.89 The Committee would also review the learning and teaching resources on contemporary China developed by the Education Bureau.90 The Chairperson, Anna Wu, was former chair of Equal Opportunities Commission before the handover in 1997. But Joseph Wong Wing-­ping, a former senior government official, expressed low confidence in the appointment of Anna Wu since she did not enjoy a high social reputation and she had little experience in the education sector.91 In particular, it was curious that in appointing the members of this Committee, the Education Bureau included the Parents’ Concern Group and Scholarism’s Wong Chi-­fung on the invitation list,92 but both of them had already expressed their refusal to join. The Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union and another educational organization, Education Convergence, also did not express any willingness to join even though the government issued a press release saying that they were invited. This inviting act by the government was criticized as political maneuvering and broke the civil service’s long-­standing pragmatic tradition of confirming the members’ participation before making a public announcement.93

188   E. K-M. Chong

Final push before “back to school” On the first school day in the school year 2012/2013, Scholarism continued its protest against National Education by staging protests outside those schools which planned to offer this subject. The Civil Alliance also continued to stage the occupation of Government Headquarters. Representatives of 10 tertiary students, parents and PTU started a hunger strike on September 1, 2012, demanding the government would stop the implementation of National Education.94 Daily night gatherings were held at government headquarters. Scholarism regarded the occupation as an ultimatum, while the Civil Alliance said they would consider a non-­cooperative movement which included class strikes.95 The Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) mobilized local university students to organize a mass protest at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. It was well attended by thousands of local university students and fully packed the “Million Avenue” at the CUHK. The tertiary students demanded government’s immediate withdrawal of the MNE curriculum guidelines. Some primary schools, however, still opted for implementing National Education in September 2012. Leung Kee-­cheong, Principal of Fresh Fish Traders’ School, said although he appreciated the students’ concern about the society, a hunger strike is radical and so instead of proposing class strikes the anti-­National Education movement should discuss this with the government.96 Some other schools such as Baptist (Sha Tin Wai) Lui Ming Choi Primary School, upon inquiry from the press, also said they would continue to offer this National Education subject. The pro-­Beijing teachers’ union, i.e., Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers (HKFEW), said although the government funding of the National Education Service Center had stopped, it would look for other possible funding sources. The HKFEW will not terminate its work on promoting National Education. Chief Executive C. Y. Leung replied to the hunger strike at Government Secretariat saying that he wished the opposition point out the problems associated with the National Education, if any. Leung said that the Hong Kong SAR government would discuss with them and would not push hard on National Education. Leung also restated that the National Education had an initiation period of three years and experiences could be learnt from it. Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam also commented that using radical moves in pressing for a withdrawal of National Education was not acceptable to society. She also said the government was open to discussions with parents and students.97 Scholarism’s Wong Chi-­fung was angered by her comments. He reasoned that the hunger strike at the government headquarters was staged because of the government’s failure to listen to people’s views. People are willing to sacrifice their health in order to force the government’s withdrawal of National Education. He identified himself as Chinese but there was no necessity to be “brain-­washed” into a Chinese. Therefore, there was a deadlock between the government and the students’ groups over the National Education.

Student and youth activism   189

The official decision to withdraw National Education But as the pressures of anti-­National Education built up throughout the summer and continued into the start of another school year, 2012/2013, and especially as the Legislative Council’s election which took place on September 9, 2012, the Government finally backed down. In the face of tremendous pressures from society, the Chief Executive C. Y. Leung announced on September 8, and the EDB further explained on September 10, an amendment to the Moral and National Education (MNE) subject policy. Under the amended policy, the arrangement requiring the full implementation of the MNE subject in the 2015/2016 school year for primary schools, and 2016/2017 school year for secondary schools, at the end of their respective three-­year “initiation period,” was abolished.98 On September 21, 2013, the Education Bureau further published a press release saying that it had issued a memorandum to all schools outlining the amendment to the policy on the MNE subject. An EDB spokesman emphasized that continual learning and teaching support would be provided to School Sponsoring Bodies (SSBs) and schools with deference to the professional discretion of SSBs and schools which may adopt different modes of implementation of MNE.99 The SSBs and schools can, according to their mission, readiness and professional judgment, exercise their discretion in deciding how to handle MNE-­related matters, including whether to develop the MNE subject, whether to implement MNE as an independent subject, and the implementation modes and schedule. The government Press Release also said the EDB took out the parts on contemporary China and the related assessment of the MNE Curriculum Guide. As the parts taken out are small, SSBs and schools could still implement moral education or other sections in the MNE Curriculum Guide. Later on, in early October 2012, the Committee on the Initiation of Moral and National Education Subject convened a meeting. Chairperson Anna Wu reported the Committee’s consensus of suggesting a withdrawal of the NME curriculum guidelines, though this Committee did not have any anti-­National Education parents’ or students’ participation in its meeting. The Committee recommended the Education Bureau not to use this guideline as a basis of any teaching inspection, nor any evaluation or modification of this guideline. Also, this guideline shall not provide reference for any officially approved curriculum. The Chief Executive C. Y. Leung accepted the Committee’s consensus but did not answer any media questions.100 The government formally accepted the recommendation of the Committee on the Initiation of Moral and National Education Subject to formally shelve the MNE Curriculum Guide on October 8, 2012 after months of anti-­National Education campaigns. The Chief Executive and the Chief Secretary for Administration made remarks on the subject of “Moral and National Education” at a subsequent media session,101 and the government also issued a press release102 saying that the Education Bureau would not request the schools to adopt the MNE Curriculum Guide.

190   E. K-M. Chong Scholarism regarded the government’s withdrawal of MNE Curriculum Guide as a small success in their campaign and it would continue to work on public education on guarding against brain-­washing by conducting anti-­ brainwashing among the students. Meanwhile, the Parents’ Concern Group said it would continue looking into the contents of school textbooks and teaching materials in order to see if there are other textbooks or materials that are susceptible to “brain washing.” For example, they looked into the General Studies and Chinese language textbooks of primary schools and found that certain content, especially in relation to the teaching of Chinese culture and identity, are susceptible to “brain washing” or biased teaching.103 Parents’ Concern Group also continued to publicize information about which schools are still offering National Education on its website. There are divisions of labor on anti-­National Education between Scholarism and Parents’ Concern Group so that the former works on raising students’ awareness on attempts at “brain-­washing,” while the latter works on raising the public awareness of the problems in school textbooks and materials. The MNE Curriculum Guide was finally voided. This is a significant government’s drawback given that it adopted a tough stance throughout the summer of 2012. It also demonstrated that civil society has exerted significant impacts on the government’s policy decision. The media session and press release formally shelved the governmental response on the issue of anti-­National education. The Parents’ Concern Group kept on chasing National Education in 2013 by issuing a public letter to the Education Bureau. They found four problems when they reviewed the General Studies textbook and language textbooks, and these problems were: (1) narrowly-­minded ethnicity; (2) emphasis on the positive and neglect of the negative aspects of history; (3) overtone of emotions; (4) no choice in emotion assessment. The Parent’s Concern Group pointed out that these problems originated from the writing of curriculum guidelines.104

After anti-­National Education: Scholarism and student activism Representing those who want the radical transformation of society Scholarism has kept on organizing campaigns since 2012. Whether it is the June 4 anniversary commemoration of protests over military crackdown on student movement in 1989, or July 1 demonstration in staging different protests against the Hong Kong SAR government, or the consultation on selection methods of Chief Executive in 2014, Scholarism’s actions have attracted much media attention. Indeed, having won their fight against a school curriculum of Moral and National Education that they described as “brainwashing,” Scholarism has a bigger target: political reform and universal suffrage of Chief Executive in 2017.105 Their advocacy had, to a certain degree, carried forward to the Legislative Council election in September 2012, especially on how young people vote. Thus, throughout 2014, Scholarism kept chasing the government on the

Student and youth activism   191 consultation of election methods of Chief Executive, not to mention the on-­ going issue of National Education.106 Under the broader political climate of the Beijing government’s campaign to tighten control over China’s most freewheeling city of Hong Kong SAR,107 and in the high tide of controversies over electoral reforms for the 2017 Chief Executive election and the Chinese authorities branding as illegal the Occupy Central with Peace and Love movement, Wong Chi-­fung appeared on several public occasions. He pressed the Chief Secretary of Administration Carrie Lam hard on questions such as civil nominations for the Chief Executive candidate and whether the government would acknowledge the results of the June 22 unofficial referendum, which was organized by the Occupy Central protest organizers and which had about 780,000 people voting over 10 days models for the 2017 Chief Executive election.108 All the models called for the public to be able to nominate Chief Executive candidates. The confrontation between Wong Chi-­fung and Carrie Lam was a media attraction because the dialogue showed a student daring to challenge a senior official. Meanwhile, Chen Jianmin, a sociology professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and one of the founders of Occupy Central, said “The people want to make their voices heard” after the successful turnout of the referendum.109 Pro-­Beijing groups, however, marched through the Causeway Bay district urging people not to vote. Important people in the Communist regime were also aggravated about the referendum. The Global Times, China’s state-­run newspaper, warned, “The oppositions in Hong Kong should understand and accept that Hong Kong is not an independent country. They should not think that they have the ability to turn Hong Kong into Ukraine or Thailand.”110 Adopting civil disobedience in the Umbrella and Occupy Movements As the consultation on political reform drew to a close and before a consultation report was announced, and as a response to the State Council of Beijing government issue of a white paper on Hong Kong’s political development on June 10, 2014 – which reiterates Beijing’s commitment to supporting Hong Kong’s moves towards universal suffrage in 2017 but that all candidates would be selected by a “nominating committee” whose members would be mostly chosen by Beijing and warns against letting an “unpatriotic” Chief Executive take the helm111 – a march for democracy of 510,000 Hong Kong people took place on July 1, 2014. In the name of civil disobedience, tertiary students, Scholarism and other protestors, on the night of July 1, organized a mini-­occupy of Chater Road in Central and the area outside Office of Chief Executive. About 500 sit-­in students and protestors were arrested, with many of them comig from the tertiary student unions. Later, a group of former executives in the student unions under HKFS issued a two-­page statement supporting the students of HKFS and Scholarism during the July 1 protest. The statement urged police to apologize for suppressing the freedom of the right of assembly and using violence during the arrests. It also urged the police to withdraw the charges against the students and that Chief Executive C. Y. Leung should step down, as well as

192   E. K-M. Chong implementing a truly democratic election. This was another step towards an increasing radicalization in the student and youth movements, as they adopted the idea of civil disobedience in tackling the injustice that they found in public policies. After the Hong Kong SAR government announced the report on consultation of political reforms on July 15, 2014, the student group of Scholarism made another protest, charging the political reform report as “You moved the goals.”112 Students prepared mock Diploma of Secondary Education result slips for officials, giving them top marks on “reading the views of the Beijing government,” and physical education for “moving the goals” on public consultation, thus embarrassing the officials for not addressing the demands of the 720,000 people who voted in the June 22 unofficial referendum for public nomination and the 510,000 people who took to the streets on July 1, 2014. The students criticized Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam’s political reform report, which summarized public views gathered during a five-­month consultation starting from December 2013, as changing the yardstick used to measure public opinion. Lam’s report sought to draw a line under the public’s argument for civil nomination of Chief Executive’s candidates for the 2017 election, stating that “mainstream opinion” in Hong Kong was that only the Chief Executive’s nominating committee should have the power to elect Hong Kong SAR’s future top leader.113 But this disappointed some sectors, especially the student and youth groups who opted for expressing their discontent publicly. The public also expressed dissatisfaction over the failure to propose any changes in the Basic Law on the number of direct elected seats of Legislative Council in 2016. There were also worries that voters would not be given a genuine choice on candidates for the Chief Executive in 2017 if there wasn’t any overhaul in the present 1,200 people nominating committee.114 In the aftermath of the mini-­occupy of Chater Road in Central on July 2, 2014, both Scholarism and HKFS further warned the government of a possible Occupy Central protest and class strike starting from late August if the National People’s Congress Standing Committee’s (NPCSC) decision on the framework of universal suffrage in August 2014 means a pre-­selection of the Chief Executive’s candidate, rejection of civil nomination but keeping the current four major sectors of Election Committee in nominating the Chief Executive’s candidate. The Election Committee was criticized as being directly or indirectly chosen by the Chinese Communist government and their local representatives.115 HKFS warned that it would start a series of civil disobediences against the NPCSC’s decision. Scholarism’s Wong Chi­fung also escalated the warning to the Occupy Movement’s initiator Benny Tai of discarding the hope of gaining concessions from the Chinese government but suggested they should take actions to achieve what they wanted.116 Then, a historic moment came when the Occupy Movement broke out in late August and turned itself into a larger scale Umbrella Movement which saw occupations in several downtown areas of Hong Kong. The movement was a response to the ruling by the NPCSC on the constitutional framework of the nomination of candidates for the Chief Executive elections in 2017. The

Student and youth activism   193 Occupy Movement lasted for 75 days and saw the active participation of Scholarism and HKFS in leading the Umbrella Movement together with other NGOs. The final months of Occupy Movement in late 2014 continued to see Scholarism and HKFS fighting for what they saw as important principles of universal suffrage and a civic nomination mechanism for the Chief Executive’s election. They thought that it is unreasonable to adopt a 50 percent threshold in the nomination committee for returning a Chief Executive candidate. On March 2, 2015, Scholarism and HKFS submitted nearly 100,000 letters signed by citizens to the government expressing opposition to the constitutional framework set by the NPC. They wanted the government to listen to their voices for “real universal suffrage” and to start anew the consultation on political reform since the NPC’s framework is not equal and not universal. They also urged the pan-­democrats legislators to vote down in the Legislative Council any reform plan the government presented under the decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.117 But this time, the HKFS received a serious blow when the students of the University of Hong Kong successfully forced a vote for their student union to withdraw its membership from the HKFS, as well as some other tertiary students mobilizing similar withdrawal votes in March 2015. This demonstrated there are some university students who were dissatisfied with the leadership of HKFS during the Occupy and Umbrella Movement and its internal management and coordination style. Another major development came in 2015 which saw more youth groups coming out in society. After the Umbrella and Occupy Movement in late 2014, there emerged two other youth groups – Demosisto and Youngspiration – in Hong Kong SAR’s political landscape, with the former including Joshua Chi-­ fung Wong as one of its prominent founders (see Table 10.2). Rising tides of localism and legislative council controversy As Hong Kong society has become more divided and fragmented in political views between pro-­democracy and pro-­establishment camps, there has been a rising tide of localism and emergence of localist interest groups among some youths and tertiary students. In particular, Hong Kong Indigenous, which was formed in 2015 by youths who were dissatisfied with the pro-­democracy camp and the HKFS during the Occupy Movement in 2014, argued ferociously for Hong Kong’s self-­determination and even went further to argue for adopting an oppositional position to the Chinese Communist Party. They argued for attention to local livelihood problems when facing a huger number of mainland Chinese tourists and put forward demands on self-­determination about Hong Kong’s future and even calls for independence. Hong Kong Indigenous also endorses using force to achieve its aims, as well as justifying using force to protect protestors themselves and others. This youth group represented a big change in the non-­violent nature of Hong Kong’s protest and demonstration. With such rising tides of localism from early 2015, it could reasonably be expected that they would fight for different political and social issues, in particular

Tertiary students 1958 Four tertiary institutions

Students unions of Hong Kong tertiary institutions (Lingnan University; The Chinese University, HKUST, Shue Yan University) Universal suffrage for CE, civil referendum

Secondary school students

2011

Joshua Chi-Fung Wong; Ivan Long Yin Lam; Queenie Chung

About 120 (The Stand News, 2016)

Civil nomination, universal suffrage for CE

Serving targets

Foundation year

Founders

Members

Belief about Hong Kong SAR’s road ahead

Hong Kong independence

About 140

About 100

Self-determination, Hong Kong referendum

Kafka Luk; Yuk- kwo n g Ch i u ; Ke n ; Johnathan Yam-shek Ip; Baggio Chun-hang Leung; Rex Yiu-chun Lai

2015

Hong Kong people and identification of Hongkongers

Youngspiration

Nathan Kwun-chung Law; Joshua Chi-fung Wong

2016

Hongkongers

Demosisto

Polymer (2015) “Youngspiration interview – the foundation of Youngspiration,” available online at http://polymerhk.com/articles/2015/02/24/12357/ (Chinese). The Stand News (2016). “Dismissal of Scholarism – we abandon the organization,” available online at www.thestand.news/politics/%E5%AD%B8%E6%B0%91%E9%80%80%E6%BD%AE-3%E5%85%B6%E5%AF%A6%E5%A4%A7%E5%AE%B6%E9%83%BD%E6%94%BE%E6%A3%84%E5%92%97%E5%80%8B%E7%B5%84%E7%B9%94/ (accessed February 8, 2017) (Chinese). Wong, B. W. K. and Chung, S. (2016). Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students: comparative analysis of their developments after the Umbrella Movement. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations, 2 (2), pp. 865–884. Youngspiration (2015). Available online at www.facebook.com/pg/youngspiration/ about/?ref=page_internal. Youngspiration (2016). “About us,” available online at http://youngspiration.hk/

Sources: BBC News (2016). “Hong Kong election: who are the new faces in politics?”, available online at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37274159?ocid=socialflow_ facebook&ns_mchannel=social&ns_campaign=bbcnews&ns_source=facebook (accessed February 7, 2017). Chan, C. P. (2016). Post-Umbrella movement: localism and radicalness of the Hong Kong student movement. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations, 2 (2), p. 885. Demosistō (2016). “Our mission.” www.demosisto.hk/ mission?lang=en. Design Democracy (2013). “Scholarism pushes for civil nomination, erects 4 street stations,” available online at http://designdemocracy.hk/%E5%AD%B8%E6% B0%91%E6%80%9D%E6%BD%AE%E6%8E%A8%E5%85%A8%E6%B0%91%E6%8F%90%E5%90%8D%E6%99%AE%E9%81%B8-%E5%85%A8%E6%B8%AF4%E5%8D%80%E8%A8%A D%E8%A1%97%E7%AB%99/?lang=en; MingPao Daily (2015). “Youthspiration would like to send Yau Wai-ching as a representative to join legislative council election,” available online at http://news.mingpao.com/pns/dailynews/web_tc/article/20151216/s00002/1450203502031. New York Times (2017). “At Hong Kong new year fair, defiance gives way to resignation,” available online at http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20170203/hong-kong-new-years-fair-election/dual/ (accessed February 2, 2017). Ortmann, S. (2015). The umbrella movement and Hong Kong’s protracted democratization process. Asian Affairs, 46 (1), pp. 32–50.

Hong Kong Federation of Students

Scholarism

Groups

Table 10.2  Comparison of youth groups: Scholarism, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Demosisto and Youngspiration

Student and youth activism   195 on the so-­called “Hong Kong people first” and “self-­determination” ideas. Seeing the Legislative Council election in September 2016, members of Scholarism and the Hong Kog Federation of Students turned to form themselves into Youngspiration with an aim to take part in Legislative Council elections. In a somewhat expected scenario, the 2016 Legislative Council’s election saw a number of young legislative councilors elected based on their ideas of Hong Kong interests coming first, preserving the natural environment and against rampant development, self-­ determination, voicing out the youth concerns, and even calling for Hong Kong gaining autonomy and independence. However, owing to their Legislative Council Oath-­taking row of inserting extra words into the official script of the swearing-­in, as well as an “interpretation” of the Basic Law by The National People’s Congress Standing Committee which interpreted Article 104 of the Basic Law to “clarify” the provision of legislators to swear allegiance to Hong Kong as part of China when they take office and stating that they would firmly oppose Hong Kong’s independence, the oath taking of Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-­ching was declared void and they were removed from legislative council’s offices in late 2016. Leung and Yau called for public donations to help them in a court appeal. Four other popular elected Legislative Councilors also faced voiding their oaths. At the time of writing, the result of such voiding of oaths has not been known.

Student activism The growth of student activism was landmarked by the anti-­National Education campaign in 2012. This was led by young activists from Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students, who had successfully forced a withdrawal of the government’s National Education policy. Since then, the student and youth movements have been exerting tremendous pressures on the HKSAR government, as well as exerting influence on the subsequent summer time movements against the decision of National People’s Congress on Chief Executive nomination method by putting forward claims for open civic nomination. Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students played a decisive role in the Occupy Central Movement which broke out in autumn 2014, separate from the organizers of the Occupy Movement. This Occupy Movement – later also called the Umbrella Movement as the protestors used umbrellas to defend themselves against the police tear gas bombs – marked an increasing radicalization in student and youth movements as they adopted the idea of civil disobedience in tackling the perceived inequality and injustice that they found in society. Subsequently, this rise in youth radicalism, coupled with a rising tide of localism, which expressed itself in the advocacy of self-­determinism and even independence, in order to show their dissatisfaction with the pro-­democracy camp and HKFS. Two other youth groups emerged after 2015, namely Hong Kong National Party and Hong Kong Indigenous, and they put forward claims such as Hong Kong’s self-­determinism and even independence. These claims were first openly found in the by-­election of the New Territories East geographical constituency and another new term of Legislative Council elections of 2016.

196   E. K-M. Chong This development in Hong Kong SAR politics could give rise to contentious perspectives, especially in respect of Hong Kong relations with Beijing. To the Beijing authorities, such claims of self-­determination and independence have crossed the lines, and a reluctance to follow the Basic Law would mean a big and serious constitutional issue to the Beijing authorities. Student activism, radicalism and new social movements In analyzing the ideological orientation of Scholarism, it can be seen to have adopted a kind of radical democracy in which their political actions are out-­ofinstitutions and targeted at some upheaval reforms. The term radicalization refers to the process by which an individual or group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to an extremist ideology with a political, social or religious content that contests the established order at a political, social or cultural level.118 Scholarism started the criticism and discussions on social media and they mobilized participation through social media and the Internet119 to join their protests. Their voices are no longer channeled through political parties or organizations but through loose and decentralized mobilization mechanisms, such as social media of Facebook or their communication networks. It can be said that their values and concerns could no longer be alleviated by compensations that conform to the existing system. Indeed, the former Vice-­Chancellor and President of the University of Hong Kong, Professor Lap-­Chee Tsui (2002–2014) once commented on the student activism after his retirement from office. He thought that young people nowadays have always dared to challenge authority. In the past, young people discussed social issues before and after schools, but now they can discuss with millions of people on the Internet, so the voices of opposition and dissatisfaction can be huge. Tsui suggested students do not just follow other people’s views but study the issue. Also, he worried that information overload could make students unable to digest the information and make them confused.120 But even with such comments, one can possibly speculate that the rise of student activism and radicalism, followed by Youngspiration, could give rise to social fragmentation. They are representing challenges to the existing social order, concerned with issues about local identity and rights in view of national identity and so-­called Chinese encroachment, and they are concerned primarily with individual and group autonomy from the state. Tensions on perceptions of political participation between youths and the institutions Critics of Scholarism, however, did come from society after the anti-­National Education campaign in 2012. First, queries on their actions came from radio programs and public occasions. From the pro-­establishment camp, at a live broadcast roundtable program of City Forum, Ann Chiang, Vice Chair of Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, called Scholarism’s Wong

Student and youth activism   197 Chi-­fung as “a young boy not enough 18,” and this marred criticism of her attitude.121 Later, she clarified that she was just borrowing the metaphor of a social movement movie in which Wong was starring, as well as mirroring Hong Kong Roman Catholic Cardinal Joseph Zen in describing Wong as “not enough 18” to vote. Ann Chiang thus defended her of usage of the metaphor of “not enough 18.” In fact, Scholarism has sparked off criticism from the pro-­ establishment camp thereafter, especially since the Occupy Movement. In response, Scholarism urges adults to treat secondary school students as “here and now” citizens, and regard them as capable of exercising independent thinking when discussing social and political issues. They believe that students have their rights concerning about current affairs and their participation in them. Therefore, their roles should not be stereotyped as just following after their studies.122 Students who are interested in current affairs are not different from other students who love sports, as each student has his/her own interests. Participating in social movements does not necessarily affect academic studies.123 Also, schools should create opportunities for students to discuss social and political issues in an open and safe way, and respect their right to take part in civic actions and adopt an open attitude towards students’ civic participation.124 Given the prevailing conservative orientation of schools, one can reasonably expect that the tensions over whether students should have active participation in society may continue in the years ahead. Tensions between youths and institutions can certainly be found in the political arena too. Youth civic participation means another new page of political participation in Hong Kong SAR, where they see traditional institutional means as inadequate to address their concerns. The existing mechanisms, such as the Youth Commission, do not work well with the rising of radicalism. Youths in the post-­Umbrella movement era took their concerns to the streets, and they advocated their ideas and demands directly on the social media. Youths who are dissatisfied with the current political situation break out by calling for self-­ determination and independence. This may also reflect that they are dissatisfied with the current ways of soliciting their views. Breaking away from the institutional constraints and using new social media It would also be an interesting question to ask how student participation can be sustained given the examination pressures in Hong Kong. For example, the usual school examination period from May to early June would be a problem for students in joining the June 4 memorial event every year. Given that the majority of students are usually politically insensitive and regard their duties as just studying in order to gain entry into the university and find a good job,125 these have meant those active students could not easily join the June 4 or other civic actions. But as social media on the Internet has developed quickly in recent decades, Hong Kong students could openly talk about joining the June 4 candle light vigil on their mobile phones. As more people talked about June 4 on social

198   E. K-M. Chong media, their discussions spread to other topics such as universal suffrage and election methods. Therefore, more secondary school students have started to join the June 4 candle light vigil and the July 1 demonstration in recent years.126 Thus, even under a high degree of study pressure and an examination-­driven education system, students can still develop their civic consciousness either through the mobilization on the Internet, social media such as Facebook, or peer interactions. In short, they have developed a youth discourse on major political and social issues.

Conclusion Scholarism, HKFS, Demosisto and Youngspiration will possibly continue to play a significant role in Hong Kong’s civil society and politics partly because both secondary and tertiary students will most likely continue to develop their civic consciousness, and partly because they are living in such a divisive but information abundant society in Hong Kong. Students and youths will probably continue to transform their political perspectives out of existing ideas and values, and they will transform their deeds and words into actions. Yet, it can be expected that a proliferation of youth groups or individuals can also be foreseen in the future, as evidenced by the dissatisfaction over HKFS’s management and coordination style between different tertiary institutions, and a growing sense of localism. All these are likely to create significant pressures on the governance of the HKSAR government and create troubles for Beijing-­Hong Kong relations. Scholarism, HKFS, Demosisto and Youngspiration have adopted a kind of radical democracy in which their political actions are out-­of-institutions and targeted at some upheaval reform of their political system. Of course, their actions may not be able to bring about their desired outcomes immediately, but they perceive themselves as having an obligation to do something in the HKSAR political arena to make new changes. It could be expected that student and youth activism will shape the public discourse and political pathway ahead and so they will continue to be one of the significant forces in the politics of HKSAR in the foreseeable future. In a nutshell, student and youth groups have been using a variety of methods to articulate their interests, such as social movements, protests and rallies, and active and passive resistance to the HKSAR government and the central government in Beijing. The young activists have also used social media, such as Facebook and their social networks, to mobilize like-­minded young activists to participate in local politics. The recent rise of localist groups has raised political alarm in the central government in Beijing, especially those pro-­independence groups such as Chan Ho-­tin’s political group, the Hong Kong National Party. The new localist groups’ emergence has important implications for the social movement in Hong Kong, namely they utilized the Occupy Central Movement to put pressure on the Hong Kong and Beijing governments on democratic and constitutional reforms. While their efforts have largely failed up till now, the recent emergence of pro-­independence groups has angered Beijing a lot, finding

Student and youth activism   199 them politically unacceptable. Still, the localist interest groups are political and will remain crucial actors in sustaining the momentum of the democratization of Hong Kong in the coming decades. Meanwhile, a series of research questions will be worthwhile investigating, including the profile of those who embark on youth radicalization, how such youth groups constitute themselves and join together for action, how they mobilize their support and take action, how they recruit members, and who are their sympathizers. All these issues will be on the agenda for new research in youth group politics in the future.

Notes    1 Education and Manpower Bureau (2001). Learning for Life Learning through Life: Reform of the Education System in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Education and Manpower Bureau.    2 Tse, K. C. (1997). The Poverty of Political Education in Hong Kong Secondary Schools. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-­Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong.    3 Westheimer, J. and Kahne, J. (2004). What kind of citizen? The politics of education for democracy. Amer­ican Educational Research Journal, 41 (2), pp. 237–269.    4 Leung, Y. W. (2003). Harmony or Conflict: The Role of Nationalistic Education within Civic Education in Hong Kong. Unpublished PhD thesis.    5 Curriculum Development Council (2012). Moral and National Education Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) 19 June 2012. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council.    6 Education Bureau (2008). Celebrating Reunion, Showing National Sentiments – Ideas and Strategies in Implementing National Education and Sharing of School Experiences. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.    7 Ibid.    8 Leung, Y. W. (2003). Use and misuse of affective education in nationalistic education in Hong Kong. Pacific-­Asian Education, 15 (1), pp. 6–24.    9 Lau, C. S. (2013). Comparing colonial and postcolonial nationalistic education in pro-­Beijing schools in Hong Kong. Comparative Education Bulletin, 15 (1), pp.  24–33; Lau, T. (2013) State formation and education in Hong Kong: pro-­ Beijing schools and national education. Asian Survey, University of California Press 53 (4), July/August, pp. 728–753.   10 Curriculum Development Council (1998). Civic Education: Secondary 1–3. Hong Kong: Government Printer.   11 Curriculum Development Council (2001). Learning to Learn: Life-­long Learning and Whole-­Person Development. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council, p. 6.   12 Ibid.   13 Education and Manpower Bureau (2005). The New Academic Structure for Senior Secondary Education and Higher Education – Action Plan for Investing in the Future of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.   14 Press Release, 2007–08 Policy Address by Chief Executive (12) – National Education. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200710/10/P2007101 00124.htm   15 Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive (2007). Policy Address 2007–08: Together We Will Forge a New Direction for Hong Kong. Available online at www.policyaddress.gov. hk/07–August eng/policy.html   16 Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive (2007). Policy Address 2008–09: Embracing New Challenges. Available online at www.policyaddress.gov.hk/08–09/

200   E. K-M. Chong   17 Lee, W. O., Chong, K. M. and Siu, W. L.(2006). National Identity and Global Citizenship Education: The Application of Project Learning, Integrated Humanities and General Studies. Hong Kong: Contemporary Development Ltd. (in Chinese).   18 Lee, W. O. (1999). Controversies of Civic Education in political transition: Hong Kong. In Torney-­Putra, J., Schwille, J. and Amadeo, J.  A. (eds). Civic Education across Countries: Twenty-­four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project. Amsterdam: IEA, pp. 313–340   19 Chai-­Yip, W. L. T., Galloway, D. and Lee, W. O. (2010). The effectiveness of action learning in the teaching of citizenship education: a case study in a Hong Kong primary school. In Kennedy, K. J., Lee, W. O. and Grossman, D. L. (eds). Citizenship Pedagogies in Asia and the Pacific. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong, pp. 53–80   20 Po, S. C., Lo, T. Y. J. and Merryfield, M. (2007). Problems and practices in promoting global education in Hong Kong primary schools: a case study. Education and Society, 25 (1), pp. 39–56.   21 Chong, K. M. (2013) The Controversies from Civic Education to National Education. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-­Pacific Studies (in Chinese).   22 The Pearl Report (2012). National Education. Available online at http://programme.tvb.com/news/pearlreport/video/739/135259 (accessed September 25, 2012).   23 Curriculum Development Institute, Education Bureau (2004). Hong Kong Student Leaders Commendation Scheme: National Sentiment Education Programme – Learning Tour to Beijing. Hong Kong: Education and Manpower Bureau (in Chinese).   24 Ibid.   25 Education Bureau (2008). Celebrating Reunion, Showing National Sentiments – Ideas and Strategies in Implementing National Education and Sharing of School Experiences. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.   26 Law, W. W. (2004). Globalization and citizenship education in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Comparative Education Review, 48 (3), pp. 253–273.   27 Education and Manpower Bureau and Wenweipo (2004). Praise Shenzhou Airship, Love Zhonghua. Hong Kong: Government Logistic Department; Moral and Civic Education Section, Education Bureau (2007). Olympic Little Stories, Inspiring You and Me: Uniting Beijing and Hong Kong To Promote the Olympics Spirit. Hong Kong: Moral and Civic Education Section, CDI, Education Bureau; Moral and Civic Education Section, Education Bureau (2008). Dialogue between famous people and students series. Hong Kong: Moral and Civic Education Section, CDI, Education Bureau; PSHE section, Education Bureau (2008). Reform and Open Door Policy 30 years – National Education Seminar Article Collection. Hong Kong: PSHE Section, Education Bureau; Education Bureau (2008). Celebrating Reunion, Showing National Sentiments – Ideas and Strategies in Implementing National Education and Sharing of School Experiences. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.   28 National Education Service Centre (2008). Reform and Open Door 30 Years – Teachers Special Issue. Hong Kong: Wenweipo; Hexie Hong Kong Foundation (2006). A Centurion of China – Terminologies of Documentaries. Hong Kong: Hexie Hong Kong Foundation.   29 Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive (2010). Policy Address 2009–10: Breaking New Ground Together. Available online at www.policyaddress.gov.hk/09–10/   30 Moral and Civic Education Section, Education Bureau (2008). Revised Moral and Civic Education Curriculum Framework. Hong Kong: Printing Department.   31 This educational exchange event is for education workers from China, Hong Kong SAR, Macao SAR and overseas Chinese education workers. It has attracted hundreds of highly competent teachers to attend it each year and so it provides a mutual learning and exchange platform between primary and secondary school teachers. It has become a famous brand name and is welcomed by education workers.

Student and youth activism   201   32 This is co-­organized by the Education Bureau, the People’s Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison and Concerted Efforts Resource Centre.   33 Education Bureau (2008). Celebrating Reunion, Showing National Sentiments – Ideas and Strategies in Implementing National Education and Sharing of School Experiences. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.   34 Hong Kong SAR Chief Executive (2010). Sharing Prosperity for a Caring Society: 2010–11 Policy Address. Available online at www.policyaddress.gov.hk/10–11/eng/ p158.html   35 Leung, Y. W. and Yuen, T. W. W. (2009). School civic education since 1980s: a brief review of the literature in Hong Kong. Educational Research Journal, 24 (2), pp.  257–292; Leung, Y.  W. and Yuen, T.  W.  W. (2012). Competition between politicized and depoliticized versions of Civic Education curricula: the case of Hong Kong. Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 11 (1), pp. 46–57.   36 Yuen, W. W. T. and Byram, M. (2007). National identity, patriotism and studying politics in schools: a case study in Hong Kong. Compare, 37 (1), pp. 23–36.   37 Gibson, C. and Levine, P. (2003). The Civic Mission of Schools. New York: Carnegie Corporation.   38 Davies, I., Hampden-­Thompson, G., Jeffes, J., Lord, P., Sundaram, V. and Tsouroufli, M. (2013). Creating Citizenship Communities Project: Final Report. York: University of York, Department of Education.   39 Torney-­Purta, J., Lehmann, R., Oswald, H. and Schulz, W. (2001). Citizenship and Education in Twenty-­Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen. Amsterdam: IEA; Kennedy, K.  J., Hahn, C.  L. and Lee, W.  O. (2007). Constructing citizenship: comparing the views of students in Australia, Hong Kong and the United States. Comparative Education Review, 52 (1), pp. 53–91.   40 Leung, Y. W. and Yuen, W. W. T. (2012). Competition between politicized and depoliticized versions of Civic Education curricula: the case of Hong Kong. Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 11 (1), pp. 46–57; Tse, K. C. T. (2010). State and civil society embattled in colonialism, capitalism, and nationalism: civic education and its politics in Hong Kong. In Reid, A., Gill, J. and Sears, A. (eds) Globalisation, the Nation-­State and the Citizen: Dilemmas and Directions for Civics and Citizenship Education. London: Routledge, pp.  97–113; Vickers, E. (2005), In Search Of an Identity – The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2005. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.   41 Curriculum Development Council (2011). Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) – Consultation Draft May 2011. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council.   42 Fairbrother, G. P. (2003). Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.   43 Fairbrother, G. P. (2004). Patriotic education in a Chinese middle school. In Lee, W.  O., Grossman, D.  L., Kennedy, K.  J. and Fairbrother, G.  P. (eds) Citizenship Education in Asia and the Pacific – Concepts and Issues. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong, pp. 154–174.   44 Heater, D. (2000). What is Citizenship? Malden, MA: Polity Press.   45 Brownhill, R. and Smart, P. (1989). Political Education. London: Routledge; Heater, D. (1990), Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education. London; New York: Longman.   46 Education Bureau (2008). Celebrating Reunion, Showing National Sentiments – Ideas and Strategies in Implementing National Education and Sharing of School Experiences. Hong Kong: Government Logistics Department.   47 Curriculum Development Council (2011). Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) – Consultation Draft May 2011. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council.

202   E. K-M. Chong   48 Leung, Y. W. and Ngai, S. K. G. (2011). Competing citizenship identities in the global age: the case of Hong Kong. Citizenship Teaching and Learning, 6 (3), pp. 251–267.   49 Brewer, M. B. (1999). Multiple identities and identity transition: implications for  Hong Kong. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 23 (2), pp. 187–197.   50 Vickers, E. (2005). In Search of an Identity – The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s-2005. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong.   51 Ibid.   52 Leung, Y. W. (2012) A review and preview of the National Education debate. In Y. C. Ip (ed.) Awaken for Next Generation. Hong Kong: Enrich Culture, pp. 74–82 (in Chinese).   53 Andersson, E. (2012). The political voice of young citizens. Educational conditions for political conversation – school and social media. Utbildning & Demokrati, 21 (1), pp. 97–119; Dahlgren, P. (2007) (ed.). Young Citizens and New Media. New York: Routledge; Loader, B.  D. (2007) (ed.). Young Citizens in the Digital Age. London: Routledge.   54 Ian McLean (1996). Radical parties. Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 420.   55 Michael G. Roskin (1992). Countries and Concepts – An Introduction to Comparative Politics (4th ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.   56 An interview with a member of Parent’s Concern Group on July 2, 2014.   57 Holden Chow, National Education is a responsibility, Sing Tao Daily, July 15, 2013 (in Chinese).   58 Curriculum Development Council (2012). Moral and National Education Guide (Primary 1 to Secondary 6) 19 June 2012. Hong Kong: Curriculum Development Council.   59 Press Release, Committee on Implementation of Moral and National Education, 22/8/2012. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2012August 22/ P201208220223.htm   60 Ibid.   61 Press Releases, Committee on Implementation of Moral and National Education, 22/8/2012. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2012August 22/ P201208220223.htm   62 Public hearing of Legislative Council of Hong Kong SAR, 27/6/2011.   63 National Education teaching resource was criticized as “brain-­washing,” Mingpao, July 6, 2012 (in Chinese).   64 Livingstone, S., Couldrey, N. and Markham, T. (2007). Youthful steps towards civic participation: does the Interne help? In Loader, B. D. (2007) (ed.) Young Citizens in the Digital Age. London: Routledge.   65 Quoting Chow Ting, speaking at Schooling & Politics: Civic Mission of Schools. Organized by Centre for Governance & Citizenship Education, Department of Social Sciences, held at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, June 27, 2014.   66 Roundtable meeting discussing role of schools. Kung Kao Po, July 13, 2014.   67 Spiecker, B. and Straughan, R. (eds) (1991). Freedom and Indoctrination in Education: International Perspectives. London: Cassell.   68 Green, T. F. (1964). A typology of the teaching concept. Studies in Philosophy and Education, III, Winter, pp. 284–319.   69 Spiecker, B. and Straughan, R. (eds) (1991). Freedom and Indoctrination in Education: International Perspectives. London: Cassell.   70 Brownhill, R. and Smart, P. (1989). Political Education. London: Routledge.   71 Leung, Y. W. (2004), Nationalistic Education and indoctrination. Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 11 (1), pp. 116–130.

Student and youth activism   203   72 Leung, Y. W. (2012). Competition between politicized and depoliticized versions of Civic Education curricula: the case of Hong Kong. Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 11 (1), pp. 46–57.   73 Leung, Y. W. and Lo, Y. L. (2012). Are Liberal Studies teachers ready to prepare human rights respecting students? A portrait of teachers’ attitudes towards human rights. Intercultural Education, 23 (4), pp. 341–358.   74 Ibid.   75 Lawson, T., Jones, M. and Morres, R. (2001). Advanced Sociology through Diagrams. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   76 Habermas, J. (1981). New social movements. TELOS, 1981 (49), pp. 33–37.   77 The internal voice for stronger anti-­National Education of HKPTU was most prominently led by, among some others, James Hon Lin Shan, who is a Hong Kong senior educator and retired secondary school teacher, Council member of Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Association, Chairman of the Council on Professional Conduct in Education, Spokesman of Defense HK freedom. Hon is Director of the Organization Department of HKPTU, Representative of the Hong Kong Election Committee in education sector in 2006.   78 Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union in urging withdrawal of Moral and National Education subject. Sing Tao Daily, August 18, 2012.   79 “Civil Alliance against the National Education” members include: Scholarism, Parents’ Concern Group, Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Alliance of Civic Education, Children Caring Network, Alliance Youth, Justice & Peace Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese, One Body in Christ, One young shepherd platform, Alliance for Children Development Rights, New School for Democracy, HK Alliance of Youth Group, Keyboard Frontline, Civil Human Rights Front, Social Worker Against Brainwashing, Hong Kong Social Worker’s General Union, Christians for Hong Kong Society, Hong Kong Policy Viewers, Unison, Gapsen, College action, Christian City Mission Church.   80 Wong Wing-­ping, Joseph (2012). “Can Anna Wu protect National Education?” am730, August 8, 2012.   81 Wong Wing-­ping (2012). “National education hit hard on the Leung’s government.” am730, October 12, 2012.   82 “Scholarism’s ultimatum demanding the government to withdraw the National Education.” HK Headline, September 3, 2012.   83 “Queries over National Education subject, ethnic minorities feel being discriminated.” HKHeadline, August 10, 2012.   84 Ibid.   85 “Philippine’s Dad: can’t force I love China.” HKHeadline, August 10, 2012.   86 “Queries over National Education subject, ethnic minorities feel being discriminated.” HKHeadline, August 10, 2012.   87 “Civil Alliance against the National Education plans to organize demonstrations in five main geographical districts.” HKDeadline, August 10, 2012.   88 “Civil Alliance against the National Education plans to organize demonstrations in five main geographical districts.” HKDeadline, August 10, 2012.   89 Press Releases, “Committee on Implementation of Moral and National Education,” August 22, 2012. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2012August 22/P201208220223.htm   90 Press Releases, “Committee on Implementation of Moral and National Education,” 22/8/2012. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2012August 22/ P201208220223.htm   91 Wong Wing-­ping, Joseph (2012). “Can Anna Wu protect National Education?” am730, August 23, 2012.   92 The members of this Committee include Representative of Curriculum Development Council, Representative of Curriculum Development Council, Members of Ad

204   E. K-M. Chong hoc Committee on Moral and National Education, parents from Committee on Home-­School Co-­operation, Parents Concern Group on National Education) (being invited), Federation of Parent-­Teacher Associations, and Parent Member of Curriculum Development Council. For school heads, it includes representatives from Hong Kong Subsidized Secondary Schools Council, Hong Kong Association of the Heads of Secondary Schools, Subsidised Primary Schools Council, and Hong Kong Aided Primary School Heads Association. For teachers from educational organizations, they include representatives from Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (being invited), Teacher from Education Convergence (being invited), Hong Kong Federation of Education Workers, Chief Executive’s Award for Teaching Excellence Teachers Association). Academics are from Faculty of Arts of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Student organizations from Scholarism and another youth group, as well as others. Representative from Education Bureau is also in the committee.   93 Lee Wai-­ling (2012). “Wong Chi-­fung ‘being invited’.” am730, August 23, 2012.   94 “Scholarism’s ultimatum demanding the government to withdraw the National Education.” HK Headline, September 3, 2012.   95 Ibid.   96 Ibid.   97 Ibid.   98 Press Releases, “EDB continues to support schools to enhance Moral and National Education,” September 21, 2012. Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/ general/201209/21/P201209210407.htm.   99 Ibid. 100 Wong Wing-­ping (2012). “National education hit hard on the Leung’s government.” am730, October 12, 2012. 101 Transcript of Remarks on “Moral and National Education subject” by the Chief Executive, Mr. C. Y. Leung and the Chief Secretary for Administration, Mrs. Carrie Lam, at a media session (Chinese version only). Available online at www.info.gov. hk/gia/general/201210/August P201210080509.htm. 102 Press Releases, “Curriculum guide of moral and National Education subject formally shelved.” Available online at www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201210/August P201210080622.htm 103 Wong Chi-­Fung (2012). “National Education split-­up in the market?” am730, October 15, 2012. 104 Parents’ Concern Group (2013). Concerning the bias in teaching materials and recommending a revision of curriculum guidelines, April 2, 2013. 105 “Hong Kong group Scholarism switches focus to 2017 chief executive poll.” South China Morning Post, October 8, 2013. 106 “Red Tours organized by National Education Promotion Association.” Mingpao, July 9, 2013 (in Chinese). 107 Greg Torode, James Pomfret and Benjamin Kang Lim. “Special report – the battle for Hong Kong’s soul,” Reuters, July 1, 2014. 108 “Long and winding road to democracy.” South China Morning Post, July 17, 2014. The unofficial referendum results saw the following proposals presented to Beijing government: candidates should be nominated by 35,000 voters, or any political party that have at least 5 percent of votes in the last election, and by the nominating committee to nominate candidates. 109 “Cardinal Zen doubts Hong Kong cry for democracy will be heeded.” Ecumenical News, July 2, 2014. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid.; “Long and winding road to democracy.” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2014. 112 “ ‘You moved the goals’: Scholarism protest government’s political reforms.” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2014.

Student and youth activism   205 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 “Cardinal Zen doubts Hong Kong cry for democracy will be heeded.” Ecumenical News, February 7, 2014; Long and winding road to democracy, South China Morning Post, July 16, 2014. 116 “Wong Chi-­fung on Benny Tai: discarding the fallacy of concessions from Beijing and taking actions to achieve.” House News, July 16, 2014. 117 “Scholarism Lai: pan-­democrats must fulfill promise to veto government’s reform plan.” NOW TV news, March 4, 2015. 118 Khosrokhavar, F. (2017). Radicalization. New York: The New Press; Borum, R. (2011) Radicalization into violent extremism, part 1, A review of social science theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4 (4), pp.  7–36; Wilner, A. S. and Dubouloz, C-­J. (2010). Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning: an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalization. Global Change, Peace & Security, 22 (1), pp. 33–51. 119 Quoting Chow Ting, speaking at Schooling & Politics: Civic Mission of Schools. Organized by Centre for Governance & Citizenship Education, Department of Social Sciences, held at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, June 27, 2014. 120 “Tsui Lap-­chee: students challenging authority must do some homework.” Mingpao, July 21, 2014 (in Chinese). 121 “Ann Chiang: ‘Not enough18’ is created by Wong Chi-­fung.” Mingpao instant news, July 21, 2014 (in Chinese). 122 “Roundtable meeting on discussing the role of schools.” Kung Kao Po, July 3, 2013. 123 “Wong Chi-­Fung wishes public opinion does not believe that participating in social movements affect academic results.” Mingpao, July 15, 2014. 124 Quoting Chow Ting, speaking at Schooling & Politics: Civic Mission of Schools. Organized by Centre for Governance & Citizenship Education, Department of Social Sciences, held at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, June 27, 2014. 125 “Roundtable meeting on discussing the role of schools.” Kung Kao Po, July 13, 2014. 126 Quoting Chow Ting, speaking at Schooling & Politics: Civic Mission of Schools. Organized by Centre for Governance & Citizenship Education, Department of Social Sciences, held at The Hong Kong Institute of Education, June 27, 2014.

11 Environmental governance and the rise of the environmental movement in Hong Kong Dennis Lai Hang Hui

This chapter uses the existing literature on environmental politics theory to delineate the emergence of environmental governance and the growth of the environmental movement in Hong Kong. It argues that the emergence of the environmental movement in Hong Kong is a syndrome of utilitarian environmentalism in the environmental governance of Hong Kong. Such a governance ethos predisposes the government to adopt a technocratic approach to environmental management and plan making. It also argues that the rise of different environmental movements since the 1990s is the result of the convergence of different factors, including the rise of civil society, the critical role of environmental interest groups and increasing public awareness towards environmental affairs. Finally, the chapter also argues that the radicalization of the environmental movement is increasingly characterized by its populist, insurgent nature. Making use of the example of the Land Justice League, it highlights the challenges of the existing governance approach in dealing with environmental contestation. This chapter has the following structure. It will first address the question of environmental governance in the context of the political economy. It will then review the idea of the environmental movement from the theoretical perspective. The third part of this chapter will identify the principal factors leading to the rise of environmental governance in Hong Kong. The final part looks at the growth of the environmental movement in the 1990s and its subsequent radicalization since the 2010s.

The question of governance in environmental management Environmental governance can be conceptualized as the institutional arrangement where different actors are networked into a policy regime in governing environmental matters. There are two main types of environmental governance that can be identified, namely the democratic mode and the authoritarian mode. The rise of democratic environmental governance is built on the premise that environmental politics is intrinsically a democratic enterprise. Michael Manson suggests that environmental justice and democracy are mutually reinforcing. The need for ensuring community-­based environmental stewardship justifies the expansion of democratic space in managing environmental issues.1 Others also express similar views by

Environmental governance   207 arguing that democracy and environment are closely related to one another, especially where environmental citizenship is concerned. According to this view, resolving environmental problems is a collective undertaking within which environmental citizenship is enacted and performed.2 Democratic environmental governance emerges when civil society collaborates with the state or the local government in governing environmental affairs. The collaboration between the private sector and the public sector gives rise to local knowledge on environmental issues and trusting relationships between different environmental stakeholders.3 Democratic environmental governance is particularly common in advanced Western economies where environmental issues attract substantial community involvement. In the authoritarian mode of environmental governance, “public participation is limited to a narrow cadre of scientific and technocratic elites while others are expected to participate only in state-­led mobilization for the purposes of implementation.”4 In the political economic context of Asia, the ascendency of authoritarian modes of environmental governance can be seen as an expression of technocratic environmentalism where environmental policy outcomes are contingent upon the performance and capability of state bureaucrats.5 Scholars have identified the key dimensions of authoritarian environmentalism as: key policymakers perceive environmental issues as belonging to the domain of the state and technocrats due to such reasons as public ignorance and irrationality, free-­riding, and the need for immediate action; political elites dominate the policy-­making and implementation processes; and leadership and issue perception affect environmental policymaking and implementation.6 Meanwhile, non-­state green groups and networks are co-­opted into the environmental regime and serve only legitimatising role.7 Whilst such authoritarian modes of environmental governance appeal to non-­democratic Asian political regimes,8 we can see that other democratic regimes also adopt them as a governing approach to environmental issues. Using South Korea’s Four Major Rivers Restoration Project as a case study, Han argued that, notwithstanding the democratic nature of South Korea’s political regime, authoritarian environmentalism is practised when its leadership style and its political-­economic development trajectories favor an executive-­led environmental regime over a participatory environmental governance.9 It follows that “there is no simple, predisposed relationship between the modes of environmental policy-­making – democratic or authoritarian – and political variables such as regime types.”10

The rise of the environmental movement: origin and development The rise of global and local environmentalism First, environmental movements in different part of the world have been driven by the rise of both the global environmental movement and local environmentalism.

208   D. L. H. Hui To-­date, grassroots environmental networks are those networks which seek to mobilize the public in different, bottom-­up initiatives. These networks advance different socio-­environmental agendas including the elimination of environmental hazards and the promotion of gender equality.11 They also make use of social movements as a way to cultivate public interest. Grassroots environmental networks have sometimes been associated with green anarchism and resorted to different radical strategies to overcome power asymmetry. Professional environmental groups, meanwhile, seek to make use of their knowledge and capacity for environmental change. These professional groups have exclusive memberships and a high degree of organizational structure. They also make use of policy advocacy and public campaigns as the main strategies for advocating environmental changes. Finally, Green parties have been playing an increasingly important role in green politics. In the European context, Green parties have a powerful presence in different legislatures. They have been advancing different democratic objectives, including, inter alia, promoting inclusive democracy and vindicating social justice. In justifying the promotion of inclusive democracy, the European Greens, for example, argue that “the political and decision-­making processes have to be democratic, inclusive, transparent and fully accessible in a comprehensible to ordinary citizens” in order for sustainable development to be achieved.12 Green parties also contend that social justice has to be achieved through grassroots democracy. All these actors are contributing to the rise of the environmental movement through different strategies of mobilization. The growing acceptance of democratic environmentalism Second, the rise of the environmental movement can be attributed to the growing acceptance of democratic environmentalism. Democratic environmentalism – defined as “a participatory and ecologically rational form of collective decision making: it prioritizes judgments based on long-­term generalizable interests, facilitated by communicative political procedures and a radicalization of existing liberal rights”13 – plays a crucial role in informing governance dynamics. Essentially, democratic environmentalism calls for a departure from a state-­centric regime of environmental decision-­making to a more networked form of environmental governance. Such an approach argues that environmental citizenship is vital to the realization of environmental rights and that every environmental citizen –including networks, groups and parties – should have equal rights to have their voice heard in political and administrative settings. In the perspective of Green politics, democratic environmentalism is an ongoing initiative that calls for governance innovation which can promote the inclusion of civil society in all sectors of socio-­environmental development. It prescribes a new mode of governance based on consensus-­building and communicative rationality.14 Meanwhile, the state no longer adopts a command-­and-control approach to environmental problems; instead, it plays a steering role in facilitating partnership and collaboration with environmental groups. In the European context, as has been discussed previously, Green politics has made its

Environmental governance   209 impact on the dynamics of environmental governance, particularly through party politics. Green parties and mainstream environmental groups and networks are included in the democratic environmental governance.

The emergence of environmental governance in Hong Kong and its features The rise of utilitarian environmental governance since the colonial period Interestingly, the development of environmental governance in Hong Kong follows neither the democratic ideal nor the authoritarian recipe. Instead, its development displays what I call “utilitarian environmentalism.” Utilitarian environmentalism exhibits features of both democratic utilitarianism and authoritarian environmentalism. Utilitarian environmentalism is about how environmental development serves the instrumental use of the governing regime. Knowledge-­ based environmental groups are considered by the state authority to have instrumental values in promoting environmental sustainability. Meanwhile, radical environmental groupings are marginalized from the decision-­making structure. Environmental governance is minimally-­integrated without any predetermined structure of shared responsibility. Utilitarian environmentalism is also premised upon the recognition that coordination amongst environmental players is important only to the extent that it generates mutual, material benefits to both sides and takes place on a need basis. At the same time, environmental policies must not override the developmental objectives of governance. In the following, what I would like to examine is how utilitarian environmentalism was developed in Hong Kong and how it has shaped the environmental policy in Hong Kong. In retrospect, the rise of environmental governance in Hong Kong can be traced back to the 1970s when the colony was experiencing rapid industrialization. It is argued that the 1970s became a decade where environmental issues entered onto the policy radar of the Hong Kong government, in particular relation to the balance between the natural environment and the built environment. Mr J. J. Robson, the former Secretary of the Environment, spoke at an occasion about the logic that informed the colonial environmental policy formulation: the question of preserving the ecology and living environment in Hongkong must therefore be looked at in the context of its geographical limitations and opportunities on the one hand, and the basic needs of its population on the other. Within the small area of land available for building purposes and the comparatively large population which is to be housed, inevitably the population concentrates into small intensively developed pockets. Under these conditions there is bound to be conflict between the need to preserve the ecology and living environment and need to provide basic requirements of the population in terms of housing, jobs, education and leisure.15

210   D. L. H. Hui Likewise, in 1978, Mr Tony Bennett, the former Principal Assistant Secretary for the Environment, noted that “the lack of thought on the environment during the post-­war years and during the intense residential and industrial building of the 1950s and 1960s”16 had led to widespread concern about the quality of life in the colony. The need to develop a set of legislation that could preserve the balance between the natural environment, the quality of life and economic development was very much pronounced by the colonial administration. To explore how pollution could be minimized, the Environmental Protection Advisory Committee was formed in 1977, which was responsible for drafting a set of environmental laws for the colony. The objective of the legislation was not only “to prevent deterioration of the environment by pollution” but also to avoid “the imposition of blanket controls which can have a detrimental effect on the economy.”17 Meanwhile, the need to develop the administrative capacity for governing the environment was being heard.18 In the 1980s, the colonial government’s attention to the environment received fresh impetus. In the first place there were more channels that enabled the public to express their environmental concerns.19 These included the Town Planning Board and the District Board. Emphases were given by the town planner that the public needed to voice their opinions in order for the colonial administrator to react appropriately.20 Meanwhile, the colonial administration was more willing to explore different policy instruments to control environmental pollution. For example, there was an official deliberation as to whether the Environmental Impact Assessment should be adopted in guiding development projects.21 Still, the overriding consideration given by the colonial administrator was that any initiatives must not compromise the economic momentum of the colony. In the late 1980s, however, the colonial government faced increasing pressure, especially from the Legislative Council, to change its policy inertia.22 At the same time, environmental groups, such as Green Power, began to be more vocal in lobbying legislators to adopt a tougher stance on the government.23 Whilst these environmental groups began to exercise leverage, they resisted turning themselves into a political group, as “it will create more competition and confrontation in the political arena and thus destroying harmony.”24 The Government, in response both to the alarming scale of pollution and to the increasing pressure from legislators, published the first White Paper on Pollution which spelt out a more holistic colonial logic towards the environment. The White Paper specifically conceded the limited involvement of the government in the area of the environment: The main reason why our environment is now in an unsatisfactory state is that in the past the Government and the community made choices which gave too little emphasis to the needs of the environment. We now have to recover the lost ground. Government will therefore give greater emphasis to the environment in future, and seek to allocate resources for our major infrastructural projects.25

Environmental governance   211 However, the government also reiterated that “the increased emphasis on improving the environment must not ignore the needs of the economy.”26 In a critical light, whilst the White Paper provided a comprehensive roadmap for the environmental policy making in Hong Kong, it was heavily informed by an expert-­driven managerial perspective as to how environmental problems should be resolved.27 In the 1990s, the policy commitment in the environmental sector took place against the changing political context and the development of different megaprojects. Lord Christopher Patten, the last colonial Governor of Hong Kong, continued the environmental policy of his predecessor Lord Wilson and introduced new policies such as the development of sewage disposal plan. At the same time, Green groups such as Green Power, the Conservancy Association, Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature emerged to be key actors in lobbying the colonial government to take a more proactive stance on environmental issues.28 To be fair, the colonial government did take other initiatives that have enhanced the environment of the colony. Still, the governmental attitude to environmental issues remained piecemeal given the dominance of the growth mentality and the preoccupation with the transition of sovereignty. The government also conceded to the limited progress it has made. In the Third Review of the Progress on the 1989 White Paper published in 1996, the government initiatives were considered to be “little more than halfway through the large and complex 10-year programme of actions set out in the 1989 White Paper.”29 Since the retrocession of sovereignty, the government has turned to sustainability as the novel ethos for governing the environment. The Hong Kong Government released the first Sustainable Development Strategy30 in 2005 and defined the priority areas where Hong Kong should be focussing on in promoting sustainable development. Since then, sustainable development has become a key policy paradigm that defines the socio-­economic development of Hong Kong. Still, a closer look at the debate of sustainability would suggest that, from the government’s perspective, sustainable development should not be achieved at the expense of economic development.31 Institutional absorption of environmental contestation Apart from its utilitarian character, another key dimension of sources leading to the democratic deficit of the environmental governance in Hong Kong has to do with the institutional absorption of environmental contestation. This is characterized by the “progressive incorporation” of Green groups into the consultative machinery. Consultative committees, namely the Advisory Committee on the Environment (renamed as Advisory Council on the Environment) (ACE), the Environmental Campaign Committee (ECC), the Country Park Board (CPB), and the Town Planning Board (TPB) were the institutional platforms where different Green organizations were invited to participate. As argued by Chiu, Hung and Lai, such practice reflects the governmental tendency of

212   D. L. H. Hui i­nstitutional absorption of opposition and served two important purposes.32 On the one hand, the governmental officials believed that the incorporation of Green groups served the instrumental purpose of the government in avoiding mistakes in policy implementation.33 Meanwhile, these consultative organizations “have successfully absorbed the energy of the active members of the green groups and to a certain extent kept them quiet.”34 Potential oppositions to the governmental project were internalized and tuned down.35 On the other hand, environmentalists were able to obtain policy resources without resorting to large scale, sometimes disruptive, actions. At the same time, the environmentalists consider the progressive incorporation a suitable form of cooperation as “environmentalists developed a modus vivendi between themselves and the official.”36 The coordination amongst them allows the environmentalists to know “when to push, retreat, and compromise” and to learn “how to build alliances among themselves to put pressure on the government collectively within the committees.”37 It follows that inter-­organizational coordination became an important mechanism for lobbying. Minimal integration of environmental governance Finally, it should be noted that, until recently, the fragmentation of environmental governance has rendered democratic engagement a difficult exercise. Broadly speaking, environmental governance in Hong Kong covers four main issue areas, namely environmental protection, territorial planning, heritage conservation and urban renewal. What makes studying environmental governance in Hong Kong particularly difficult is the fact that these issue areas have been governed by different policy departments and under different laws and regulations. Essentially, whereas issues related to environmental protection are within the administration of the Environmental Protection Department, those related to territorial planning fall within the remit of the Planning Department. Matters pertinent to heritage conservation are overseen by the Commissioner for Heritage’s Office. Urban renewal is overseen by the Urban Renewal Authority. Coordination amongst policy departments is highly contingent upon the nature of the issue at stake. Meanwhile, the responsibility to engage the public in these government departments and statutory bodies is defined by different sets of laws and regulations, resulting in the heavy fragmentation of policy governance. Cross-­sectoral public participation remains something rare within the contemporary context of environmental governance in Hong Kong. These factors have created an institutional setting of environmental governance which is characterized by the lack of systematic public engagement in environmental affairs. More specifically, they have created an institutional environment in which opposition is disarticulated and cannot accumulate political leverage.

Environmental governance   213 Environmental groups and movements and factors leading to their rises Since the 1990s, the environmental movement began to take root in Hong Kong with a proliferation of environmental groups. To-­date, there are a variety of environmental interest groups that have been operating in Hong Kong, including Civic Exchange, Clean Air Network, Clear the Air, Conservation International Hong Kong, Designing Hong Kong, Earth Care, Friends of the Earth (Hong Kong), Green Council, Green Peace, Green Peng Chau Association, Green Power, Green Sense, Green Technology Consortium, Greeners Action, Hong Kong Dolphinwatch Ltd., Hong Kong Society of Herpetology Foundation, Kadoorie Farm and Botanic Garden, Ocean Park Conservation Foundation Hong Kong, Produce Green Foundation, Sustainable Ecological Ethical Development Foundation, Society for Protection of the Harbour, Tai Po Environmental Association, The Conservancy Association, The Green Earth, The Hong Kong Bird Watching Society, World Green Organisation, World Wide Fund For Nature Hong Kong (see Table 11.1 for their scope of activities).38 At the same time, there are several informal environmental networks and concern groups that adopt a rather “conflictual view” on different environmental issues. These include the Voice for Land Justice, Kwun Tung North Development Concern Group and Civilisation Front. Compared with what had happened in the 1980s and 1990s, what we see is that the administration coordination between Green groups and the government is becoming more complicated, especially when these organizations attach more importance to their organizational identity and autonomy. There are several reasons leading to the rise of environmental groups and movements, including indeed the scope of the issues under the umbrella of the environment. On the one hand, there has been an increasing attention paid towards the environmental implications of different controversial territorial developments. These include new town development, megaproject development and reclamation. The complexity and controversy of the issues that the environmental administration needs to pay attention to has made compromise and consensus even more difficult. On the other hand, there has been a growing concern about how the political structure of Hong Kong has placed limitations on the promotion of environmental sustainability. Environmentalists and environmental groups have been calling for “a more transparent and democratic government.”39 Second, and more importantly, the rise of civil society has also strengthened the environmental consciousness of the public. What is particularly telling was the harbour reclamation movement in which the public and the civil society displayed an unprecedented concern towards environmental issue. Whilst this movement has been documented elsewhere,40 what is significant about the episode is how civil society was able to garner the necessary support from members of the public through the use of innovative strategies of civic engagement. The exceptional degree of mobilization and the concomitant public ­pressure compelled the government to introduce an inclusive institutional

X

X

X

X X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

Energy and climate change

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

Animal rights and biodiversity

X

X

X X

Urban planning and transportation issue

X

X

X X

Sustainable and green consumption

Sources: www.civic-exchange.org/en/; www.hongkongcan.org/hk/; www.conservation.org/global/hong-kong/Pages/default.asp; www.hongkongcan.org/hk/; www.designinghongkong.com/v4/; www.earth.org.hk/en/; www.greencouncil.org/eng/index-2.html; www.greenpeace.org/hk/?gclid=CMPa9Z_AuNICFVUFKgo dFskDcg; http://greenpengchau.org.hk/theme.php?page_id=Aim&lang=e; http://greensense.org.hk/en/about/; www.hkdolphinwatch.com/contact.php; www. hkherp.org.hk/en/about-us; www.kfbg.org/eng/; https://landjusticehk.org; www.opcf.org.hk/en/conservation-research/local-conservation-efforts/seahorse-surveyand-tagging-Project; www.producegreen.org.hk/eng/index_e.htm; www.harbourprotection.org/en/; www.cahk.org.hk/?lang=en; www.hkbws.org.hk/web/eng/ index_eng.htm; www.wwf.org.hk/en/whatwedo/.

Civic Exchange (founded in 2000) Clean Air Network (founded in 2009) Conservation International Hong Kong Designing Hong Kong (founded in 2009) Earth Care Green Council (founded in 2000) Green Peace (founded in 1971) Green Peng Chau Association (founded in 1991) Green Sense (founded in 2004) Hong Kong Dolphinwatch Ltd (founded in 1995) Hong Kong Society of Herpetology Foundation (founded in 2005) Kadoorie Farm & Botanic Garden (founded in 1956) Land Justice League (founded in 2011) Ocean Park Conservation Foundation Hong Kong (founded in 1993) Produce Green Foundation (founded in 1988) Society for Protection of the Harbour (founded in 1995) The Conservatory Association (founded in 1995) The Hong Kong Bird Watching Society (founded in 1957) World Wide Fund For Nature Hong Kong (founded in 1981)

Local pollution issues and waste management

Domestic nature conservation

Table 11.1  Major environmental groups in Hong Kong

Environmental governance   215 arrangement of collaborative planning through the Harbour Enhancement Committee.41 Third, the success of these confrontational tactics has empowered civil society to make use of assertive action in different environmental disputes. There are two types of confrontation that environmentalist have adopted, namely legal means and insurgent means. Whereas legal means refers to the use of judicial reviews to halt controversial development, insurgent means refers to the use of transgressive methods to achieve public awareness. For example, as early as in 1992, the Friends of the Earth and other environmental groups filed a judicial review against the decision by the Country Parks Authority to approve a golf course to be developed at Sha Lo Tung. The Court ruled that the decision of the Authority be quashed on the ground that it had acted ultra vires.42 These groups also filed a complaint to the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints calling for an investigation into the malpractice. The turn to judicial avenues can also be seen in other cases such as the reclamation of the Victoria Harbour and the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Third Runway for the Hong Kong International Airport. On the other hand, environmental groups have resorted to aggressive strategies to mobilize opposition, an issue to which we will turn in the next section.

The radicalization of the environmental movement and groups in Hong Kong: the Land Justice League and its insurgent agenda The radicalization of the environmental movement in Hong Kong has taken place since 2010s and has the following features. First, the radicalization is accompanied by the rise of community-­based networks and organizations. As opposed to the situation in the 1980s when the environmental movement was dominated by several professional environmental organizations, the environmental movement is now driven by different community efforts. Different community concern groups have emerged, especially over different controversial issues. Second, more environmental groups have adopted what can be called an insurgent populist tactic in shaping the outcome of the environmental decision-­ making. Following Miraftab, these insurgent populist practices can be characterized “transgressive in time, place and action” and are associated with a wide range of imaginative practices that are organized around the idea of environmental justice.43 These insurgent practices have also transformed the existing social understanding towards different socio-­environmental issues. The rise of the Land Justice League represents one of the key examples of the environmental movement. The Land Justice League was an environmental interest group formed by 12 concerned organizations, including the People’s Action Plan, the Central and Western District Concern Group, the New Territories Northeast Development Study Group, and the Concern Group for Compulsory Sale. The group was established with an aim to end real estate hegemony, to conserve the natural environment and to defend the right to live.

216   D. L. H. Hui They also aimed to provide support to those who faced eviction and support for conservation activities at the district-­level.44 Whilst the League has been using different social movement tactics such as petitions and public education, what makes it an environmental populist organization is their use of transgressive strategies in challenging the existing ways of spatial planning. In their existing policy platform, the Land Justice League identifies the following five domains of socio-­economic concern.45 First, there could be coexistence between the urban sector and the rural sector. It argues that urban and rural areas cannot be separated, and that urban encroachment in rural areas is not necessarily inevitable. Actions should be taken to end all activities that could undermine the ecology of the rural areas. It also believes that only through the restoration of local agriculture can Hong Kong’s rural life be sustained. Second, territorial development in Hong Kong should pay attention to the imperative of sustainable development. It follows that planning initiatives should be based on the principle of environmental justice. Third, there is a need to vindicate the right to access to living spaces. The commodification of the land has led to opportunistic speculation, creating uneven access to living space. It creates problems such as the misallocation of land resources and deterioration of the quality of life. Fourth, the League seeks to end “developers’ hegemony” and considers the dominance of property developers has led to a monopoly of the economy and the destruction of the community. Fifth, it seeks to end the collusion between the developer, the indigenous community and the government. Such collusion is considered to have led to different problems related to relocation and redevelopment. Sixth, the League calls for the implementation of democratic, people-­centric modes of planning governance. It considers that the existing planning administration is characterized by top-­down, bureaucratic administration and that democratic planning becomes an essential institution that can reclaim spatial justice. All these platform positions point to the need to achieve spatial justice through place-­based mobilization. The Land Justice League made their first appearance in the July 1 protest in 2011 when they sought to protest against the developers’ hegemony and called for democratization of the planning system.46 The public protests related to the Lee Tung Street redevelopment project, the Queen’s Pier relocation project and the High-­Speed Rail project had convinced the members of the League that there was a widespread concern amongst the general public about the territorial and environmental development of Hong Kong.47 The League seeks to capitalize upon the increasing environmental awareness of the public and turn it into a social force that can counteract the institutional hegemony of the planning system of Hong Kong. The League drew members from the network of local activists and environmentalists. Eddie Chu Hoi-­dick, a leading member of the League, had been an active member in various social movements including the protection of Choi Yuen Tsuen and the anti-­High-Speed Rail protest.48 Soon after its inauguration, the League participated into the 2011 District Council election and sent candidates to contest for seats in Pat Heung South, Pat Heung North, Lamma and Po Tai, Main Street and San Tin.49 All the candidates lost in this round of District Council election.

Environmental governance   217 Since the District Council elections, the League has been extensively participating in different environmental protests. In April 2012, the League together with 25 members of Ngau Tam Mei Estate protested outside the Kam Tin MTR station against the construction of Ventilation Building as part of the High-­ Speed Rail system.50 They suggested that the construction had led to the drying-­up of underground wells thereby affecting the livelihood of the villagers. The League played also a significant role in the controversial Northeast New Territories New Development project. On the one hand, they demanded the immediate abolition of the proposed plan as it would uproot the traditional rural way of life which had been practised for decades.51 On the other hand, they questioned the way in which the government engaged with different stakeholders. To them, those public consultation sessions by the government did not allow opportunities for genuine communication between the villagers, the government and other stakeholders. The disappointment with the government’s position in the plan had precipitated the intensification of the struggle. Since 2013, the League has started to intensify its action with a view to contesting the hegemonic land policy. For instance, in June 2013, the League, together with other social organizations and student unions, organized a protest in Mong Kok, calling for an end to “the scramble for land.”52 They also started to draw public attention towards the problem of land hoarding in the development area which further hinted to the collusion amongst parties with vested interest.53 On June 6, 2014, when the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council resumed discussion on the government’s funding application for advance work for two new towns in the northeast New Territories, members of the League together with other young activities organised a mass rally outside the Council. Some members breached the security cordons and occupied the ground floor of the Council. Ho Kit Wang, a member of the League, said that the “occupation” was a planned one and that they were prepared to bear the legal consequence arising from it.54 On June 13, 2014, the League participated in a mass rally outside the Legislative Council again and organized focus group. In the evening Ho and other protestors attempted to break into the Council’s premises with bamboos and umbrellas.55 The League continued its transgressive tactics in other episodes of the struggle. For example, on March 20, 2016, Chu Hoi-­Dick and other eight social activists broke into the high-­speed rail construction site in West Kowloon, climbed up the crane, and unfurled two banners which called for the construction of the project to be halted.56 On March 27, 2016, the League and other environmentalists built a small waste mound outside the government headquarters in Tamar with the waste collected from dumping sites across the New Territories, including Tin Shui Wai, Tai Po, Sai Kung and Lantau, aiming to protest against the lack of law enforcement against illegal dumping in the rural areas of the New Territories.57 The use of transgressive tactics has intended to de-­legitimatize the existing territorial regime in Hong Kong. The above study of the Land Justice League has suggested that the populist character of environmental movement has solicited different forms of radical,

218   D. L. H. Hui transgressive actions. How should we interpret the rise of environmental populism from the democratic perspective? We suggest the following arguments. First, environmental citizenship is being renegotiated through the transgressive moment. Given the lack of democratic opportunites in the existing architecture of environmental governance, the radicalization of environmental actions has opened up new geographies where environmental citizenship can be negotiated. As suggested by Claire Rasmussen and Michael Brown, democratic citizenship emerges not so much as an entitlement but as a contingent subjectivity that is constituted by counter-­hegemonic struggles.58 The growing populist character of the environmental movement in Hong Kong can be seen as a counter-­ hegemonic struggle against the lack of public participation in decision-­making. Second, what we can see is that environmental populism has attempted to counteract the institutional exclusion through the use of insurgent actions. Insurgent actions communicate certain forms of grievance against certain pre-­existing power configurations. Third, the boundary between environmental populism and the democratic movement is rather blurred. We can see that the radicalization of the environmental movement not only calls for the resolution of environmental problems; rather, we can see that the underlying motive for those populist environmental movements is to transform the political system such that democratic planning can be achieved. To quote a remark by the Land Justice League: “Democracy, like the land movement, cannot be compromised.”59 It follows that the democratic movement and the environmental movement should not lose sight of one another.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that environmental interest groups have been playing a pivotal role in Hong Kong’s environmental and democracy movement. It has also shed light on different dimensions of the environmental movement in Hong Kong and argued that the environmental governance of Hong Kong does not fall neatly into an authoritarian mode or a democratic mode of environmental governance. Instead, it displays a unique utilitarian mode of governance based on the strategy of co-­optation and piecemeal forms of consultation. The absence of an environmental and territorial policy that can engage community members in a collaborative fashion remains the very problem that sows the seed for its weaknesses. This chapter has contended that the rise of the environmental movement in Hong Kong is a historically-­contingent process, arising from the proliferation of environmental interest groups, the rise of civil society and the increasing confidence of environmental groups in challenging the state’s policy. Meanwhile, the radicalization of the environmental movement has been fuelled by frustration at the exclusionary practices over environmental issue. Whilst the radicalization of the environmental movement remains a nascent phenomenon, it deserves attention from the policy makers in that it carries important implications for the political legitimacy of the HKSAR government. Essentially, the government will not only have to revisit its existing laws and regulations

Environmental governance   219 regarding public consultation, but also develop a new institutional mechanism in engaging the public in environmental decision-­making. In any case, it can be anticipated that environmental interest groups, such as the Land Justice League, will continue to push for the democratization of the HKSAR governance, particularly its environmental policy, in the years to come.

Notes   1 Michael Mason, Environmental Democracy: A Contextual Approach (London: Earthscan, 1999).   2 James Connelly, “The Virtues of Environmental Citizenship,” in Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell (eds), Environmental Citizenship (London: The MIT Press, 2005), pp. 49–74.   3 Neil Gunningham, “The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Society, vol. 36, no. 1 (2009), pp. 145–166.   4 Bruce Gilley, “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to Climate Change,” Environmental Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (2012), p. 288.   5 Heejin Han, “Authoritarian Environmentalism under Democracy: Korea’s River Restoration Project,” Environmental Politics, vol. 24, no. 5 (2015), p. 811.   6 Ibid.   7 Ibid.   8 Heejin Han, “Singapore, a Garden City: Authoritarian Environmentalism in a Developmental State,” The Journal of Environment and Development, vol. 26, no. 1 (2017), pp. 3–24.   9 Heejin Han, “Authoritarian Environmentalism under Democracy: Korea’s River Restoration Project,” Environmental Politics, vol. 24, no. 5 (2015), p. 824. 10 Ibid. 11 Barbara Epstein, “Grassroots Environmentalism and Strategies for Social Change,” New Political Science, vol. 16, no. 1 (1995), pp. 1–24. 12 European Greens Party, The Charter of the European Greens: European Green Party Guiding Principles, 2nd EGP Congress, October 13–14, 2006. 13 Michael Mason, Environmental Democracy: A Contextual Approach (London: Earthscan, 1999), p. 1. 14 Ibid., p. 53. 15 “Preserving the Environment: The Struggle to Upgrade HK Living Condition,” South China Morning Post, June 12, 1975, pp. 35. 16 “Concern over Environment,” South China Morning Post, June 3, 1978, p. 8. 17 “Environmental Laws to Be Introduced,” South China Morning Post, September 10, 1979, p. 13. 18 “What Price Our Environment,” South China Morning Post, February 28, 1981, p. 17. 19 “Public Urged to Speak on Environment,” South China Morning Post, October 14, 1982, p. 16. 20 Ibid. 21 “Environment Plan ‘Matter of Choice’,” South China Morning Post, January 21, 1984, p. 8. 22 “Environment Lobby Wants Tougher Laws,” South China Morning Post, October 12, 1988, p. 7. 23 “Politicians Now ‘Conscious of Environment’,” South China Morning Post, March 7, 1989, p. 5. 24 Ibid. 25 Hong Kong Government, White Paper: Pollution in Hong Kong – A Time to Act, June 5, 1989, para. 1.5.

220   D. L. H. Hui 26 Ibid., para. 1.7. 27 Peter Hills, “Administrative Rationalism, Sustainable Development and the Politics of Environmental Discourse in Hong Kong,” in Terri Mottershead (ed.), Sustainable Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 13–42. 28 “Green Measures Fail to Satisfy,” South China Morning Post, October 8, 1992, p. 32. 29 Hong Kong Government, Third Review of the Progress on the 1989 White Paper, March 1996, para. 1.6. 30 Sustainable Development Unit, Office of the Chief Secretary for Administration, Hong Kong Government, A First Sustainable Development Strategy for Hong Kong, May 2005. 31 Terri Mottershead, “Sustainable Development in Hong Kong: A Road Yet to be Travelled,” in Terri Mottershead (ed.), Sustainable Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), pp. 89–138. 32 Stephen Wing-­Kai Chiu, Ho-­Fung Hung and On-­Kwok Lai, “Environmental Movements in Hong Kong,” in Yok-­Shiu F. Lee and Alvin So (eds), Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives (New York: ME Sharpe, 1999), pp. 55–89. 33 Wing-­Tat Hung, “The Environment,” in Steven Y.  L Cheung and Stephen M.  H. Sze (eds), The Other Hong Kong Report 1995 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995), p. 358. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Stephen Wing-­Kai Chiu, Ho-­Fung Hung and On-­Kwok Lai, “Environmental Movements in Hong Kong,” in Yok-­Shiu F. Lee and Alvin So (eds), Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives (New York: ME Sharpe, 1999), p. 75. 37 Ibid. 38 The list appeared in the EPD website, available online at www.epd.gov.hk/epd/ english/links/local/link_greengroups.html (accessed February 11, 2017). 39 “Democracy ‘Vital to Sustain Development’,” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2000, available online at www.scmp.com/article/309159/democracy-­vitalsustain-­development 40 Eliza W. Y. Lee, Elaine Y. M. Chan, Joseph C. W. Chan, Peter T. Y. Cheung, Wai Fung Lam and Wai-­man Lam, Public Policymaking in Hong Kong: Civic Engagement and State-­Society Relations in a Semi-­Democracy (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 23–38. 41 Ibid., p. 37. 42 Stephen Wing-­Kai Chiu, Ho-­Fung Hung and On-­Kwok Lai, “Environmental Movements in Hong Kong,” in Yok-­Shiu F. Lee and Alvin So (eds), Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives (New York: ME Sharpe, 1999), p. 65. 43 Faranak Miraftab, “Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South,” Planning Theory, vol. 8, no. 1 (2009), p. 46. 44 The Sun, July 2, 2011, pp. A06. 45 The Land Justice League, “Policy Platform,” available online at http://landjusticehk. org/%E5%AE%97%E6%97%/ (accessed February 11, 2017). 46 Oriental Daily News, July 2, 2011, p. A04. 47 Apple Daily, September 14, 2011, p. A08. 48 Sing Pao, September 23, 2011, p. A04. 49 Ibid. 50 Oriental Daily News, April 20, 2012, p. A20. 51 Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 24, 2012, p. A15. 52 The Sun, June 15, 2013, p. A09. 53 Ming Pao Daily News, July 26, 2013, p. A01. 54 Hong Kong Economic Times, June 17, 2014, p. A17. 55 Finet HK, December 30, 2015, available online at www.finet.hk/Newscenter/news_ detail/568397cde4b0f12cdc09295b (accessed February 11, 2017).

Environmental governance   221 56 Oriental Daily News, March 20, 2016, pp. A23; “Activists Scale Crane at High-­speed Rail Link Site,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2016, available online at www. scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/politics/article/1927609/activists-­scale-crane-­highspeed-­rail-link-­site 57 “Angered by ‘Waste Hill,’ Protesters Build Their Own Mound of Trash Outside Hong Kong Government Headquarters,” South China Morning Post, March 28, 2016, available online at www.scmp.com/news/hong-­kong/health-­environment/ article/1931302/ angered-­waste-hill-­protesters-build-­their-own. 58 Claire Rasmussen and Michael Brown, “Radical Democratic Citizenship: Amidst Political Theory and Geography,” in Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2002), pp. 175–189. 59 Land Justice League’s Facebook page, available online at www.facebook.com/landjusticehk (accessed February 11, 2017).

12 Political interest groups and democratization The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo

While considerable studies on democratization in the PRC have analyzed the role of the ruling party, the dissidents groups and the emerging civil society,1 most of the literature on Hong Kong’s democratic transformations has focused on the activities of political parties, social forces and the interactions between the state and civil society.2 These studies have contributed to our deeper understanding of the processes and actors of democratization in both the PRC and the HKSAR, whose sovereignty was returned from the United Kingdom to the PRC on July 1, 1997. However, the cross-­border activities and role of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM) have been relatively neglected. This chapter aims at filling the existing gap in the literature on Hong Kong’s democratization and will examine how HKASPDM has attempted to promote democratic transformations in both the PRC and the HKSAR. Interest groups, according to David Truman, refers to “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes.”3 In addition, interest group members frequently interact with each other. Unlike political parties which attempt to grasp political power through electoral participation and are concerned about broader policy issues, interest groups tend to focus on “narrower, more specialized concerns which might otherwise be neglected.”4 In the PRC, interest groups are often under the tight grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but they remain relatively independent from the government’s control in Hong Kong.5 Because of the existence of civil liberties and the rule of law in the HKSAR, interest groups that are political in nature, notably the HKASPDM, can exist and organize activities in support of democratization in both the HKSAR and the PRC.6 This chapter will show that the HKASPDM can be seen as a political interest group with the common objectives of promoting democratic development in both the PRC and Hong Kong, lobbying the  CCP to reverse the official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, and organizing as well as funding annual parades, candlelight vigils and other protest activities in support of democratization in the

Political interest groups and democratization   223 mainland. The existence of the HKASPDM has significant political implications for both the HKSAR and the PRC.

The literature on Hong Kong’s democratization Alvin So adopted a mix of descriptive and analytical approaches in understanding the development of the HKASPDM. He believes that the HKASPDM was the predecessor of “a quasi-­political party called United Democrats [of Hong Kong], whose members publicly declared that they were morally committed to promote democratization because they did not trust the Beijing government.”7 So has described the participants of the HKASPDM as “service professionals.”8 He argued that the protest marches after the Tiananmen Incident in June 1989  expanded support for the service professionals among the grassroots population.… Threatened by rapid inflation, growing unemployment, an impending influx of workers from the mainland, and the escalation of real estate prices, the grassroots population was increasingly receptive to the service professionals’ program.9 According to So, the HKASPDM could be seen as a “populist” organization composed of “service professionals and the grassroots population” with the common interests of promoting welfare policies and supporting direct election to the Legislative Council. However, with the victory of the democrats in the 1991 and 1995 Legislative Council elections, they tended to “weaken the populist HKASPDM” because of dwindling public attention on community affairs.10 Overall, the HKASPDM can be seen as a “populist” organization bringing about the birth of the United Democrats.11 Ma Ngok has recognized the important role of the HKASPDM in “sending monetary and material support to the mainland students, and helped smuggle dissidents out of China after 1989,” but he has not seen it as a “populist” organization.12 While Ma focuses on the role of political parties and civil society in the struggle for democratization in Hong Kong, Sing Ming tends to focus on the public pressure, political mobilization and elite bargaining in the processes of democratization in the HKSAR.13 The bargaining perspective on Hong Kong’s democratization has been articulated further by Larry Diamond. According to Diamond, the level of education in Hong Kong is high enough that it is ready for a more Western style democratic system. Diamond advocates a negotiated transition in Hong Kong, a transition which ideally involves bargaining and compromise between democrats and China in six major aspects.14 First, pro-­democracy forces will be more effective in pressing for a genuine transition to democracy to the extent that they can unite in a strong, coherent, political and civic coalition that is capable of negotiating with pro-­Beijing or “pro-­system” forces, including the HKSAR government. Second, if pro-­democracy forces cannot unite for negotiations, a breakthrough might be facilitated if a prestigious fraction of the

224   S. S.-H. Lo pro-­democracy camp were to opt for pragmatic negotiations with their compromise-­seeking counterparts on the pro-­Beijing side. Third, it will help if pro-­democracy forces demonstrate from time to time the capacity to mobilize large numbers of demonstrators in support of democratic change, but the moderate bloc must exercise the moral authority and political discipline to control the scope of mobilization. Fourth, the short-­term tactical goal must be the achievement of an internal agreement in Hong Kong among the main political players: the pro-­democracy forces, pro-­Beijing political forces (including the business community) and the government. If the major actors come to a compromise agreement on the timing and structure of a democratic transition, Beijing would be willing to accept democratization in the HKSAR. Fifth, pro-­democracy forces probably have no choice but to accept in principle the critical years of 2017 and 2020, and focus on an interim electoral arrangement for the Legislative Council in 2012 and 2016, and on how the universal suffrage elections would be structured from 2017 onwards. Sixth, democrats, for Diamond, should focus on practical initiatives to get more concessions from the current political elites in the HKSAR.15 Diamond’s bargaining perspective is illuminating, but he has perhaps neglected the role of the HKAPSDM mainly because it is far more hard-­line than the moderate compromise-­seekers on which Diamond relies in the processes of give and take in Hong Kong’s democratization. Overall, the existing studies on Hong Kong’s democratization have perhaps neglected the role of the HKAPSDM. While Suzanne Pepper believes that Hong Kong’s democratic movement is “leaderless,” Joseph Cheng has maintained that the main challenge of the local democracy movement is “to channel the energy of the awakened people to constructive work.”16 The HKAPSDM, as this chapter will demonstrate, has been playing a leading role in organizing activities in support of the democracy movement in not only Hong Kong but also China. Above all, the HKAPSDM is attempting to “channel the energy of the awakened people to constructive work” supportive of democratization in both places.

The HKASPDM’s origins and its relations with “Operation Yellowbird” On May 21, 1989, one million Hong Kong citizens participated in parade lasting for eight hours in support of the mainland students and the HKASPDM was formed on the same day. Prior to the June 4 military crackdown on mainland student protestors, some pro-­Beijing organizations in Hong Kong participated in HKASPDM activities. Immediately after June 4, they publicly condemned the hard-­line approach adopted by Beijing and the PLA.17 Yet, once Beijing delivered its official verdict on the student demonstrations, the pro-­Beijing groups in Hong Kong gradually withdrew from the HKASPDM, including the Hong Kong ­Federation of Education Workers and Hok Yau Club. The HKASPDM was the mastermind behind the rescue of mainland democrats shortly after the military crackdown of the democracy movement on the Tiananmen Square on June 4,

Political interest groups and democratization   225 1989. Since then, the HKASPDM has been labeled by the PRC government as a “subversive” organization fostering pro-­democracy activities in the mainland.18 Two weeks after the military suppression of the student movement on June 4, 1989, the CCP announced the most wanted list of 21 members who were labeled as “subversive” student leaders, including Wu’er Kaixi, Chai Ling and Wang Dan.19 However, 15 of them eventually managed to escape from mainland China. The rescue plan came to be known as “Operation Yellowbird,” with the extensive help from a triad-­related Hong Kong businessman Chan Tat-­ching and core members of the HKASPDM, such as the Reverend Chu Yiu-­ming.20 This network operated with the tacit support of the British colonial government, which waived normal immigration rules to facilitate the entry of the fugitives and their escape to third countries in the West. Hong Kong businessman Chan Tat-­ching revealed that, between June and December 1989, he had helped 133 mainlanders escape from the PRC. Operation Yellowbird, a term derived from a Chinese proverb, was designed by HKASPDM member, film maker and actor John Shum, who thought that “Yellowbird” could act as a camouflage protecting mainland democrats and who also organized a Hong Kong entertainment group shortly after June 4, 1989 for a 12-hour fund-­raising concert supporting the student movement, mobilizing mass sympathy and receiving public donations for the impending rescue mission.21 The operation’s main objective was to smuggle dissidents out of the PRC to Hong Kong and the West. From the interest group perspective, the HKASPDM became a cross-­border political organization participating in the rescue of mainland democrats out of the PRC after the June 4 incident. According to Chan, Operation Yellowbird had four core members, including a triad member Ko Sai-­cheong, movie star Alan Tang Kwong-­wing, and HKASPDM executive John Shum Kin-­fun.22 The operation utilized the knowledge and expertise of smugglers and employed speed boats to help mainland democrats, such as Wu’er Kaixi and Yan Jiaqi, to escape to the West through Hong Kong.23 One of the most dramatic rescue attempts included the late Premier Zhao Ziyang’s son, daughter-­in-law and granddaughter. His son, Zhao Erjun, used a fake passport to try to escape from Hainan province, but the provincial customs suspected his activities and immediately reported him to the provincial governor Liang Xiang, who fortunately allowed him and his family members to flee the mainland. Most importantly, when Zhao Erjun and his family reached Hong Kong, they met the police at a checkpoint in Tuen Mun district. At this juncture Chan Tat-­ching made a call from a number provided by John Shum and the line was surprisingly connected directly with Governor David Wilson. Wilson questioned the whereabouts of the Zhao family and the police did not interfere. As a result, the Zhao family succeeded in escaping to France with the help of the French consul general in Hong Kong.24 In short, the HKASPDM played a critical role in the rescue of some mainland Chinese democrats. Chan also revealed that four of his subordinates sacrificed their lives in speedboat accidents. Another two of his assistants were arrested by the mainland public security officers during the rescue of two mainland democrats, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao.25 Chan went to the mainland to negotiate with the

226   S. S.-H. Lo police for the release of his two subordinates, and the mainland authorities agreed to do so under the condition that he would no longer participate in the Operation Yellowbird’s rescue attempts.26 Another target of rescue was Chen Yizi, an adviser to the late Zhao Ziyang, who fled from Beijing to Hainan where he hid in the house of a medical doctor. Two members of the underground network put him in the sweltering hold of a 7,000ton freighter, which went to a port in the Pearl River Delta, where a motorboat brought him to Hong Kong. Most of the Yellow Bird operations were kept confidential to protect those involved, especially those who are still living in the mainland. The average cost of an escape was between HK$50,000 and HK$100,000 paid to the snakeheads who smuggle the fugitives to Hong Kong – more than double the normal price to smuggle someone out because of the additional risk.27 The operation expenses were covered by donations from Hong Kong people during the weeks of the protest prior to June 4, an amount coming largely from the HKASPDM.28 Operation Yellowbird began from late June 1989 until the period shortly before July 1, 1997. It rescued about 300 mainland democrats.29 Unfortunately, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were arrested. Chan’s personal diary showed that he and his team rescued 135 mainland Chinese democrats out of the PRC, including notably Wu’er Kaixi.30 Logistically and financially, the HKASPDM role in the rescue operations of mainland democrats was a prominent one. The HKASPDM was regarded as a “subversive” organization funding mainland democrats. This mainland perception could be traced back to the activities of the HKASPDM’s executive Lee Cheuk-­yan, who with other three Hong Kong people carried HK$1 million to Beijing to support the mainland democrats.31 When Lee attempted to return to Hong Kong on June 5 he was arrested by the mainland police and detained for four days until the British Embassy in Beijing rescued him. However, one condition for his release was that he had to sign a “confession letter” admitting his “mistakes” made in the PRC. The three Hong Kong citizens who accompanied Lee to visit Beijing were John Shum, Tam Yee-­ wah and Yau Shuk-­yee.32 It was noteworthy that Lee contacted the Autonomous Federation of Higher Education, the Autonomous Federation of Workers, Wang Juntao and other mainland democrats. Lee also revealed that, during his arrest, he continued to contact the HKASPDM members in Hong Kong, notably Lau Chin-­shek who persuaded to acknowledge “his mistakes” in front of mainland police.33 Albert Ho revealed in his recent memoir that shortly after Lee’s arrest in the mainland, the Hong Kong democrats, including barrister Martin Lee and him, marched to the Governor’s residence on June 5, demanding that the British government should seek the release of Lee from the PRC authorities.34 After some “hesitation,” Governor David Wilson decided to contact the British government for assistance in the attempt to contact Beijing for the release of Lee Cheuk-­yan.35

The HKASPDM’s structure, activities and finance The HKASPDM’s aim was to support the patriotic democratic movement in the PRC. It remains a registered company and is composed of 200 grassroots-­level,

Political interest groups and democratization   227 labor, religious, students and women’s organizations.36 The plenary session is the highest authority of the HKASPDM and its meeting is held once every two months. Twenty members are elected to the Standing Committee responsible for the daily operation of the HKASPDM (see Table 12.1 for the most recent membership in 2016–2017). The Standing Committee and other sub-­ committees have set up various working groups on specific issues, planned activities, conducted meetings, and mobilized funding organizations to support pro-­democracy activities. These sub-­committees include, for example the Executive Secretariat branch, the Organization Department, Finance, Information and Publications Department, Education and Promotion Department, the Department of Human Rights and Aid, and the Overseas Liaison of Anti-­news Blackout.37 The 2016–2017 Standing Committee of the HKASPDM is far more elaborate and complex, with various committees, than its relatively simple structure in 1989–1990, when the Alliance was led by chairman Szeto Wah, vice chairman Martin Lee, secretary Albert Ho, and 19 executive members, including Cheung Man-­kwong, Kwok Siu-­tong, Lee Wing-­tat, Yeung Sum, Reverend Chu Yiu-­ming, Lee Cheuk-­yan, Lau Chin-­shek, John Shum, Mak Ho-­wah and Andrew To Kwan-­hang.38 The HKASPDM was set up on May 21, 1989 with the explicit political objectives of seeking to influence the political development of mainland China. The HKASPDM was founded after a million Hong Kong citizens attended the parade supportive of the mainland students on the Tiananmen Square,. A fund-­ raising concert was held by the Alliance on May 27 and it gathered donations

Table 12.1  The 28th Standing Committee of the HKASPDM in 2016–2017 Chairman: Albert Ho

Vice Chairman: Richard Tsoi and Chow Hang-tung

Secretary: Lee Cheuk-yan

Executive Secretariat: Cheung Mankwong, Tsui Hon-kwong, Leung Kwokwah, Leung Yiu-chung, Lo Wai-ming, Leung Kam-wai, Andrew Wan

Organization Department: Wong Chikeung, Tang Lai-lin, Chiu Yan-loy, Tang Ngok-kwan

Information and Publications Department: Mak Hoi-wah, Richard Tsoi, Tang Ngok-kwan and Tsui Pak-tai

Education and Promotion Department: Leung Yiu-chung, Chan Kwok-kuen, Lo Wai-ming, Albert Ho, Leung Kam-wai, Tang Ngok-kwan, Chow Hang-tung, Yip Wai-keung

Overseas Liaison Department: Lee Cheuk-yan, Richard Tsoi and Tsui Pak-tai

Department of Human Rights and Aids: Chu Yiu-ming, Albert Ho, Lee Cheuk-yan, Richard Tsoi and Chow Hang-tung

Finance Department: Lo Wai-ming, Tsui Hon-kwong and Leung Yiu-chung

Source: The HKASPDM website, https://hka8964.wordpress.com/ (accessed March 21, 2017).

228   S. S.-H. Lo from the people of Hong Kong to support the PRC’s democracy movement. The HKASPDM has five “operational objectives”: lobbying the mainland government to release dissidents; seeking to rehabilitate the official Chinese verdict on the 1989 pro-­democracy movement; demanding the mainland government’s accountability of the June 4 “massacre”; terminating “one-­party dictatorship”; and building a democratic China.39 Clearly, its activities as a political interest group entail a cross-­border nature that is seen as “subversive” by the PRC authorities. As a matter of fact, the HKASPDM chairman Szeto Wah withdrew from the Basic Law Drafting Committee – a body that drafted the post-­1997 Hong Kong constitution from 1985 to 1990 – together with barrister Martin Lee. Szeto wished to visit the PRC twice in 1995 and 1999 but his applications for the visiting permit to the mainland were rejected.40 In 2004, Szeto revealed on the Radio Television Hong Kong that a number of Hong Kong people had advised him to dissolve the HKASPDM, most notably the former Chief Executive Tung Chee-­hwa, who had actually tried to persuade Szeto three times to do so both prior and after the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to the PRC.41 However, Szeto Wah refused, clarifying that “while we both love our country, we are doing it in very different and meaningful ways.”42 In the eyes of the former Chief Executive, the HKASPDM conducted activities politically unacceptable to the central government in Beijing. Every year the HKASPDM holds various activities to promote the June 4 candlelight vigil and parades, the Democratic Mid-­Autumn Festival lanterns, as well as Lunar New Year stalls and other activities. For example, in 2008 when the PRC held the Olympics, the HKASPDM orchestrated a series of activities, including public donations, the call for the PRC to reverse its official verdict on the Tiananmen incident, the support for the mothers of the dead victims of Tiananmen, and the clamor for human rights improvement in the PRC (see Table 12.3). Since its establishment, the Alliance has supported both the democracy movement Table 12.2  Events surrounding the establishment of the HKASPDM in 1989 May 20: The HKASPDM launched a mass parade in support of the PRC’s democracy movement and it was held under Typhoon number eight was hoisted. About 50,000 people participated in the parade. May 21: One million Hong Kong citizens attended the parade in support of the mainland student democrats. The HKASPDM was officially established. May 24: Protests and demonstrations against the PRC Premier Li Peng were held and an estimated 100,000 Hong Kong citizens attended. May 27: A fund-raising concert organized by HKASPDM members John Shum was held, 200,000 people attended. May 28: About 1.5 million people participated in a parade in support of students in Beijing June 4: Another 1.5 million people attended a major demonstration in response to the democrats protest against the CCP. Source: The HKASPDM website, www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 17, 2010).

Political interest groups and democratization   229 Table 12.3  The Alliance’s activities in 2008 when the PRC held the Olympics January 1: Issued a declaration emphasizing “same world, same human rights, same dream, the rehabilitation of June 4.” January 1 to February 1: Visited different districts and Szeto Wah raised public donations from writing Chinese New Years’ posters. January 13: Participated in Civic Human Rights Front’s parade, emphasizing the “support of double direct elections (elections held for both the legislature and Chief Executive) in Hong Kong in 2012 and the elimination of fake democracy in 2017.” January 14: Activities in support of HKASPDM chairman Szeto Wah and in protest against the government’s “selective prosecution” against him for participating in a radio program of an “illegal” Citizen Radio operated by Hong Kong democrat Tsang Kinshing. February 28: The HKASPDM supported an appeal letter from the Tiananmen Mothers Group which demanded that members of the PRC National People’s Congress and of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference should seek justice and fairness for the victims of Tiananmen, and that the central government in Beijing should initiate dialogue with their concerns. March 19: Issued declaration of “protesting against the suppression of Tibetans and the censorship of the mass media” in the PRC. March 21 to 24: Appeal to the people of Hong Kong for participation in the activities of protecting human rights in China’s Olympics and commemorate the 19th anniversary of Tiananmen so as to establish democratic China. April 27: Holding a press conference at the University of Hong Kong to protest against the governmental refusal of entry to a Danish sculptor, Jens Galschiot, who designed a statue named Pillar of Shame in 1997 in commemoration of the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy. April 28: Parade to government headquarters to protest against the government’s interference with artistic freedom and thus undermining the international image of Hong Kong. May 2: Demanded the PRC government that it should respect human rights during the Olympics game. The HKASPDM members Richard Tsoi, Lee Yew-kei and two members of the Tiananmen Mothers Group led a parade of the Olympics “torch” symbolic of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Their activity was obstructed by some Hong Kong people. May 28: The HKASPDM supported legislator Cheung Man-kwong’s bill of “reversing the verdict of Tiananmen,” but the bill was rejected by members of functional constituencies in the Legislative Council. The HKASPDM also held a candlelight vigil to commemorate the victims of the Sichuan earthquake. June 1: Parade in support of the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen incident and victims of the Sichuan earthquake. June 4: Held forums and a commemorating ceremony to pay tribute to the victims of Tiananmen and Sichuan earthquake. June 13: Parade in support of a “democratic China” and commemorating the 19th anniversary of Tiananmen. The HKASPDM raised public donations amounting to HK$780,000. continued

230   S. S.-H. Lo Table 12.3  Continued July 1: Participated in the July 1st parade organized by a political group named Civil Human Rights Front (which mobilized many groups to oppose the Hong Kong government’s attempt at legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law, an article that bans subversion, sedition, treason and secession in the HKSAR). August 8: Calling for the PRC government to improve human rights conditions and appealing to the world to be more concerned about mainland China’s human rights development. August 24: Protested against the PRC government’s violation of human rights’ promises in Olympics and appealed to the mainland regime to release political dissidents, human rights activists and Netizens (those citizens who use the Internet but who have been imprisoned), to investigate the responsibilities of the Tiananmen tragedy, and to relax the ban of the Chinese Communist Party on media freedom. Source: The HKASPDM website, www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 25, 2010).

in Hong Kong and the pro-­democracy activities of overseas Chinese organizations in other parts of the world. After the PRC government adopted a hard-­line policy toward mainland dissidents, such as the imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo in late 2009, the HKASPDM has held parade and activities in support of them. On December 26, 2009, about 50 members from the HKASDPM, the April the Fifth Action Group and the Tiananmen Mothers Group clashed with the police and security personnel outside the Liaison Office in the HKSAR.43 The police prosecuted five Alliance members, including Leung Keok-­hung, Lee Cheuk-­yan, Richard Tsoi, Leung Kwok-­wah and Lee Yiu-­kei for “illegal gathering.”44 In recent years, it has also become active in protecting the rights (wei quan) of mainland citizens in the PRC.45 Politically, the Alliance remains an active interest group with the objective of democratizing the PRC. The activities of the HKASPDM require financial support. Table 12.4 shows the Alliance’s income from 1989 to 2007, derived mainly from public donations, especially the income that was inherited from the public donations just before the HKASPDM was founded on May 22, 1989. Due to the large sum of donations from the members of the public, the HKASPDM could cope with its relatively huge operating expenses, apart from the sizable departmental expenditure. It is noteworthy that almost HK$2 million was spent on the subsidies given to overseas Chinese group activities. According Albert Ho’s new memoir, when the HKASPDM was established in May 1989, he dealt with the registration issue and the account opening. He wrote: Surprisingly, I got the kind understanding from the chiefs of the Registrar and Inland Revenue Department to help me quickly set up this non-­profit company limited with tax exemption status. Banks were also cooperative in allowing us to open accounts for us before the music concert that solicited public donations [of HK$24,000,000 on May 27].46

Political interest groups and democratization   231 Table 12.4  Financial reports of the HKASPDM from 1989–2008

Donations received Interest income Carried forward payments from the time of the HKASPDM’s registration Activities’ income Regular fees income Revenue from departments Other income Total income Operating expenses Departmental expenditures Regular fees Publicity fees Financial assistance provided for local group activities Subsidizing overseas groups activities Travel expenses of HKASPDM representatives who attended meetings Other expenses Total expenditure Total surplus/deficit Overall surplus from the previous year’s accumulated funds Overall surplus carried forward from this year to next year

June 15, 1989 to June 30, 2007

July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008

$

$

9,080,000 4,230,659 18,847,033

414,290 59,641

1,031,378

490,706

54,290,900

983,320

15,528,476 18,266,302 2,598,503 449,368 478,917

670,755 140,030 1,086

523,970 578,737

-

4,206 14,477

-

2,857,520

-

296,496

-

419,891

850

50,895,473

1,442,721

3,395,427

-

3,395,427

459,401 2,936,026 2,936,026

Source: Hong Kong HKASPDM website, www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 25, 2010).

The Alliance as a political interest group The HKASPDM is a political interest group. First and foremost, its members have the common interest of promoting democratic development in both mainland China and Hong Kong, reversing the official verdict on the Tiananmen tragedy, and attempting to “terminate one party dictatorship.” These political objectives, from the perspective of mainland Chinese officials, are politically “subversive.” Moreover, according to Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law Code, the HKASPDM’s activities are actually fostering “organized activities,

232   S. S.-H. Lo plots, or acts to subvert the political power of the state and overthrow the socialist system”47 Albert Ho revealed that on May 29, 1989, the Alliance and Szeto Wah decided to entrust Lee Cheuk-­yan with the task of bringing HK$2 million donations, which were needed to buy tents and logistics for the mainland students, to Beijing.48 These HKASPDM activities were easily viewed as “organized” action attempting to “subvert the political power of the state” in the PRC. In mid-­2003, the Hong Kong government indefinitely postponed the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which aims at banning subversion, treason, sedition and secession. If Article 23 of the Basic Law were enacted in the HKSAR, the HKASPDM’s survival would be a serious ordeal testing the limits of political tolerance by the central government in Beijing. In 2010, Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang remarked that Article 23 would not be legislated and enacted in his term of office. As long as the Article 23 legislation is postponed, the Alliance continues to enjoy the political space of operating its activities in the HKSAR with the objective of attempting to transform the political system and development in the PRC. Second, the HKASPDM has been cultivating relations with overseas Chinese pro-­democracy groups since its formation in 1989. For instance, it has cooperated with overseas Chinese organizations, such as the Toronto Association for Democracy in China and the US-­based Federation for a Democratic China.49 These groups have been participating in various activities that promote democratization in mainland China. Albert Ho revealed in his memoir that although he and Albert Chan Wai-­yip, another former HKASPDM member, participated in the Federation of a Democratic China’s three-­day conference in September 1989, the Alliance has not established formal organizational links with the Federation.50 But they do have communication. As such, the HKASPDM has been forging a loose coalition with pro-­democracy overseas Chinese groups and sharing a common interest with them to transform the socialist regime led by the CCP in the PRC. Third, the HKASPDM can be seen as a political interest group whose views toward communications with PRC authorities are not internally homogeneous, although they have the common objective of fighting for democratic development in both the PRC and HKSAR. On May 24, 2010, Li Gang, the deputy director of the Liaison Office – the representative agency of Beijing in the HKSAR – started a dialogue with Alliance members, Albert Ho and Cheung Man-­kwong, on the progress of Hong Kong’s democratic reform.51 Other members of the Alliance, notably Andrew To and Leung Kwok-­hung, adopted a hard-­line attitude toward having dialogue with the PRC and they were concerned about any possible “secret” dealings between the Democratic Party (Ho  and Cheung are the party members) and the PRC government. The HKASPDM vice-­chairman, Lee Cheuk-­yan, actually opposed the dialogue between the democrats and the PRC on Hong Kong’s political reform by voting in the Legislative Council against the compromise political models reached by the Democratic Party and PRC officials. Lee had been involved in providing outside financial support for the student democrats on the Tiananmen Square in

Political interest groups and democratization   233 May 1989; he is also the chairman of the Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU), an independent and pro-­democracy union in the HKSAR. Interestingly, while the ailing Szeto supported the dialogue between Ho and Cheung on the one hand and Liaison Office officials on the other, the former Alliance vice-­ chairman Martin Lee tended to be a hard-­liner opposing dialogue with the PRC authorities over Hong Kong’s democratic reforms. For Martin Lee, the Hong Kong democrats should not give excessive concessions to the PRC side, which to him indefinitely postpones the introduction of direct elections for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive and which is keen to prolong the existence of functional constituencies in the legislature. After Andrew To and Leung Kwok-­hung, who opposed any dialogue with PRC officials on Hong Kong’s democratization in 2010 and beyond, did not stand in the Alliance’s Standing Committee election in November 2010, the HKASPDM has been led by moderate elements, such as the late Szeto (who died of cancer in early 2011), Richard Tsoi and Albert Ho. However, the views of the Alliance leaders toward dialogue with PRC officials remain far from being totally united. Szeto, Tsoi and Ho tend to see communications with PRC officials as compatible with the Alliance’s struggle for more democratic reforms in both mainland China and Hong Kong, whereas Lee Cheuk-­yan remains the relatively hard-­line leader rejecting unconditional communications with PRC authorities. After the death of Szeto, the future directions of the Alliance with regard to its policy toward communications with PRC officials remain unclear. Fourth, the HKASPDM has been performing the crucial educational function of reminding the people of Hong Kong and mainland tourists annually of the tragedy of the Tiananmen incident. The annual parades and candle light vigil held by the HKASPDM are politically significant, raising the awareness of tens of thousands of the Hong Kong people about the Tiananmen incident and instilling at least a consciousness among some mainland Chinese tourists on the tragedy (see Table 12.5).52 Some mainland tourists and students attended the annual candlelight vigil held by the HKASPDM in a low-­key manner, avoiding possible identification by mainland authorities and media coverage in the HKSAR.53 Yet, the hidden educational function of the Alliance’s annual candlelight vigil on some mainland tourists and students in Hong Kong persists. From the figures of the HKASPDM, the number of participants in the annual candlelight vigil of June 4 from 1990 to 2017 reached an apex in 2014, when 180,000 citizens joined the event. Shortly after 1989, the number declined to 35,000 in 1995, but it rose to 45,000 in 1996 and 55,000 in 1997. This fluctuation was due to the concern of citizens about civil liberties in Hong Kong after July 1, 1997. The average number of participants was about 45,000 from 1998 to 2008, but it jumped to 82,000 in 2004 mostly because of the concerns about the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law in mid-­2003, and partly due to the fear of civil liberties amidst the resignation of popular radio host Raymond Wong Yuk-­man in 2004. Interestingly, the number of participants showed a drastic rebound to 150,000 from 2009 and 2011, a phenomenon attributable to the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen tragedy. The climax of participation

234   S. S.-H. Lo Table 12.5  Number of participants in the annual candlelight vigil of June 4, 1990–2016 Anniversary

Year

Figures from the HKASPDM

Police estimates

  1st   2nd   3rd   4th   5th   6th   7th   8th   9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

150,000 100,000 80,000 40,000 40,000 35,000 45,000 55,000 40,000 70,000 45,000 48,000 45,000 50,000 82,000 45,000 44,000 55,000 48,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 180,000 150,000 180,000 135,000 125,000

80,000 60,000 28,000 12,000 12,000 16,000 16,000 N/A 16,000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 48,000 22,000 19,000 27,000 18,000 62,800 113,000 77,000 85,000 54,000 99,500 46,600 21,800

Source: Hong Kong HKASPDM website, https://hka8964.wordpress.com/ (accessed March 21, 2017).

was in 2012 and 2014, when the events witnessed the participation of 180,000 people, also indicating that the PRC’s domestic politics was tightening and its political space was narrowing during the Xi Jinping era. Nevertheless, the police estimates from 1990 to 2009 were consistently much lower than the HKASPDM’s figures. Their relatively conservative estimates were due to the different ways in which the police and HKASPDM calculate the number of participants. Sometimes, in 1997, and from 1999 to 2003 the police even refuse to publicize their estimates of participants to the mass media. Yet, in 2010 the police estimate was as close the HKASPDM’s figure – an unprecedented coincidence that appeared to question the validity of either all the previous police estimates or the HKASPDM’s past figures. On June 4, 2010, the candlelight vigil was held in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park to commemorate the twentieth-­first anniversary of the Tiananmen tragedy, showing that the HKSAR remains the only place on the Chinese soil where such activity is politically tolerated. Szeto Wah said during the vigil that although he

Political interest groups and democratization   235 was 79 years old and suffering from cancer, he would continue to attend future memorial activities with supporters. He added that the 2010 candlelight vigil had been precipitated by more governmental interference than ever before. For instance, the Hong Kong police had confiscated two statues, namely the “Goddess of Democracy” and the Pillar of Shame, and arrested 13 staff workers.54 In addition, the authorities of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), who claimed to maintain “political neutrality,” had refused to allow the new “Goddess of Democracy” statue to be shown on its campus. Although the CUHK leadership eventually backed down and allowed the students to erect the statue on the campus, Szeto anticipated more possible governmental interference with the Alliance’s activities in the future, but he insisted that the HKASPDM would be more resolute than ever before to resist any possible “repressive” measure. He paid tribute to the young CUHK students for their efforts at placing the statue and the Pillar of Shame on the campus.55 Szeto regarded this event as a symbol of the older generation’s political will to “pass on the torch to the younger generation” to further the cause in addition to participation in the annual parade and candlelight vigil.56 Eric Lai, the president of the CUHK student union, argued that the CUHK’s refusal to accept the statue was tantamount to a violation of the freedom of speech.57 He appealed to the CUHK authorities to support the statue’s long-­term public display. The CUHK incident in the 2010 Alliance activities perhaps showed that a gradual transition of the older leadership of the HKASPDM to the younger generation has begun, especially since some younger Hong Kong students are sharing the same objectives of having a democratic China and reversing the official verdict on Tiananmen as with the aging leaders of the Alliance. Prior to the withdrawal of Andrew To and Leung Kwok-­hung from the HKASPDM Standing Committee election in November 2010, the Alliance’s activities have been marked by frequent clashes between its hard-­line members and the police. For example, active HKASPDM members such as Leung Kwok-­ hung, Lee Cheuk-­yan, Leung Kwok-­wah, Richard Tsoi, Lee Yiu-­kei and volunteer Koo Sze-­yiu were charged by the police for “participation in illegal assembly” outside the Liaison Office in December 2009.58 The six members were accused of having “disorderly or provocative behavior” and causing possible “destruction.”59 The police sergeant who testified in the court said that the six members were shouting slogans outside the Liaison Office, that Koo climbed up the bars of the gate of the Liaison Office, and that several people were “pushed” onto the ground including a police and a security guard. From the Hong Kong police perspective, the action of the Alliance activists, especially their protests at the entrance of the Liaison Office, was tantamount to a serious political and “illegal” challenge to the authorities. It seems that such confrontations between the Alliance’s activists and the police will persist, regardless of whether Andrew To and Leung Kwok-­hung will continue to be the active members of the HKASPDM. Fifth, the HKASPDM is a political interest group in that its activities have cross-­border or cross-­boundary implications for the political development of

236   S. S.-H. Lo both the PRC and the Macao Special Administrative Region. Since late 2009, the HKASPDM has been actively calling for the PRC government to release political dissident Liu Xiaobo, who was sentenced in December 2009 for his involvement with the drafting of Charter 08, a petition calling for the granting of more freedom and Western-­style democratic reforms in China. Liu had been in and out of prison before, including his involvement in the Tiananmen Square protests, where he tried to convince students to leave the square. However, Liu received the punishment of 11 years’ imprisonment for “inciting the subversion of state power.”60 In October 2010, the Norwegian Nobel Institute announced that Liu had won the Nobel Peace Prize, but its move has been viewed by the PRC government as international political pressure aimed at transforming the socialist regime in the mainland.61 While the PRC government continued to imprison Liu, the HKASPDM submitted petition letters to President Hu Jintao and called for the immediate release of Liu. Lee Cheuk-­yan and Albert Ho also received an invitation from Liu’s wife Liu Xia, who was under house arrest in the PRC when Liu was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, to attend the Nobel Prize award presentation ceremony. Both of them, and other overseas political activists, planned to protest outside the PRC Embassy in Norway on the day of the award ceremony.62 As an active political interest group striving for democratization in the PRC, the HKASPDM announced a series of events to continue to press for the release of Liu Xiaobo.63 After Macao’s return of its administrative rights from Portugal to the PRC on December 20, 1999, the cross-­border participatory activities of the HKASPDM have occasionally encountered resistance from the Macao security authorities. In November 2009, five members of the HKASPDM, including Albert Ho and Lee Cheuk Yan, were denied entry by the security forces into Macao as they called for the PRC government to release political prisoners, namely Liu Xiaobo and Zhao Lianhai.64 Zhao participated in the protests and mobilization of some parents of those children who had kidney stones due to the problematic milk powder produced by the Sanlu company. The attempt of five HKASPDM members to enter Macao coincided with the PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to attend the PRC-­Portuguese Forum in which Beijing cultivated closer economic partnerships with the Portuguese-­speaking countries, such as Angola, Brazil, Mozambigue and Guinea-­Bissau. The HKAPSDM members were barred by the Macao customs and immigration officers from entry and returned to Hong Kong.65 Clearly, while PRC authorities regard the activities of HKASPDM as politically “subversive,” the Macao counterparts also see the cross-­border political participation of its members as affecting its “security.” During the HKASPDM’s twenty-­second Standing Committee election in late November 2010, Szeto Wah, who had been diagnosed with cancer, was absent but was re-­elected as the chairman. As the founding chairman of the HKASPDM, Szeto remained its undisputable leader until his death in early 2011 and his leadership was a symbol of the HKASPDM ‘s persistence in “justifying the rightful cause of the June Fourth Incident” that involved the pro-­ democracy struggle and sacrifices of many mainland Chinese citizens.66 The

Political interest groups and democratization   237 majority of the members from the HKASPDM’s twenty-­first Standing Committee were re-­elected, with the exceptions of Andrew To Kwan-­hang, Leung Kwok-­hung (who were both members of the political party, the League of Social Democrats) and Andrew Cheng (who left the Democratic Party in May 2010 when an internal party dispute erupted over whether its members should support and vote for the revised electoral reform proposals backed by the government and the party itself ). To and Leung have repeatedly clashed with the opinions of the moderate members of the HKASPDM. In June 2010, To criticized the HKASPDM for failing to display the banner of “terminating one-­party dictatorship” in the PRC during the annual June 4 demonstration.67 Although the HKASPDM leadership responded to To’s criticisms, their damaged relationships could no longer be repaired. Leung, on the other hand, antagonized the supporters of Szeto when the former severely criticized the latter for not only turning a blind eye to the “betrayal” by the Democratic Party of the cause of democratization in the HKSAR but also accepting its “secret” compromises with both Beijing and the HKSAR government over the pace and scope of democratic reforms in Hong Kong.68 Replacing To, Leung and Cheng were three new Standing Committee members, Lau Wing-­fai of the pro-­democracy Neighbourhood and Workers Service Centre, Chan Tor-­wai of the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands, and Lo Wai-­ming of the pro-­ democracy Hong Kong Federation of Student Unions.69 While the HKASPDM was preparing for a renewal of its leadership, the succession process is a gradual one accompanied by the dominance of moderate elements in its Standing Committee.

The late Szeto Wah legacy After the death of Szeto Wah, his memoir was published and it revealed some important legacies that he left for the HKASPDM.70 First, the organization’s internal operation is democratic, mainly because Szeto and the founding members installed a democratic system in which the chairperson has to be elected after the presentation of his or her platform. Members of the HKASPDM can also question the candidates for the chair position. Externally and internally, the HKASPDM’s democratic operation has increased its legitimacy. Szeto also argued that such internally democratic mechanisms can prevent the CCP from penetrating the HKASPDM because only those who are trusted by the members would be elected as the chair and executive committee members.71 Second, as a patriotic Chinese, Szeto expressed his shock at the Tiananmen tragedy and he hoped that there would be a “strong, democratic and free China respecting human rights and the rule of law.”72 His identity and political ideals are actually shared by many Hong Kong Chinese, who identity themselves as culturally Chinese but who also hope for a democratic, free and strong China where human rights and the rule of law can be enshrined and entrenched. In a sense, Szeto Wah’s political ideals of making China a modernized political system with the rule of law and the respect for human rights are

238   S. S.-H. Lo universal values shared by not only many Hong Kong Chinese, but also many other overseas Chinese in the world. Third, financially the HKASPDM has been receiving public donations from Hong Kong and overseas Chinese – a phenomenon that testifies to the globalization of the democracy movement for China.73 Szeto’s previous actions of selling his calligraphy during the annual June 4 commemoration so as to solicit more public donations have also become a traditional event for the HKASPDM. Fourth, Szeto emphasized in his memoir that the success of HKASPDM depends on its volunteers, who are not only enthusiastic but also provide the pivotal role in sustaining all the activities of the organization. He saw them as the “unknown heroes” fighting for the democracy movement in China, whose fate according to Szeto is tied to the future of Hong Kong.74 Szeto also revealed that some Hong Kong Chinese volunteers who had incurable illnesses insisted in helping the HKASPDM organize its annual activities and therefore he was emotionally touched by their dedication. Again, the political ideal of some Hong Kong Chinese, and also overseas Chinese, for a democratic China has been providing the momentum to sustain the entire democracy movement. Even though the former Governor David Wilson, veteran politician Alan Lee Peng-­fei and the former Chief Executive Tung Chee-­hwa tried to persuade Szeto to dissolve the HKASPDM, they all failed to do so.75 In spite of the lobbying activities of the powerful elites, Szeto persevered and did not give in to their demands. Hence, Szeto’s legacies, especially his insistence on the maintenance of the HKASPDM as a political interest group to remind the people of Hong Kong, and of the overseas Chinese, of the importance of reversing the official verdict of the Tiananmen Incident in China in 1989, are extremely significant. Even if China may not democratize along the lines of the Western-­style political system, and even though different Chinese people may have varying definitions of democracy, the crux of the matter is that all of them hope for a China with progressive political change, more political space for dissidents, and more respectful of human rights and the rule of law in the coming decades.

Conclusion The HKASPDM is a political interest group dedicated to the continuous struggle for democratization in both the PRC and the HKSAR. It is not only a “populist” organization, as Alvin So has accurately pointed out, but also a group with moderate members who seek to “bargain,” as Larry Diamond has identified, with both Beijing and the HKSAR government over the pace and scope of political reform in Hong Kong. Furthermore, as this chapter has shown, the Alliance is functioning as a political body which was involved in Operation Yellowbird’s bold rescue of mainland democrats out of the PRC shortly after the Tiananmen crackdown, which constantly exerts pressure on the PRC government to release its political prisoners, which actively lobbied the former British Hong Kong administration for the release of Lee Cheuk-­yan in June 1989, which has been influencing the HKSAR government on the scope and pace of

Political interest groups and democratization   239 democratization, which communicates with and subsidizes overseas Chinese groups supportive of democratic reforms in the PRC, which is annually educating the younger generation of Hong Kong and mainland visitors to the HKSAR on the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, and which has attempted to cross the border of Hong Kong to Macao to influence the policy of the PRC government toward political prisoners. As a political interest group, the Alliance has been making full use of the available political space and freedom of assembly in the HKSAR to seek to achieve their ultimate objective of having a “democratic China.” Its existence in the HKSAR is an indication of a certain degree of political tolerance by both the HKSAR government and Beijing, which has to be careful about the image of the “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong, where the persistence of the rule of law and civil liberties mean that the Alliance’s activities are allowed. The important political functions and ramifications of the HKASPDM deserve the further attention of scholars and observers studying the processes of democratization in both the PRC and the HKSAR.

Notes   1 On the role of the ruling party, see Bruce Gilley, China’s Democratic Future: How It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead (New York: Columbia University, 2004); Minxin Pei, “How Will China Democratize?,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 3 (July 2007), pp.  53–57; Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?,” Journal of Democracy, vol.  18, no.  3 (July 2007), pp.  38–52; Dali Yang, “China’s Long March to Freedom,” Journal of Democracy, vol.  18, no.  3 (July 2007), pp.  58–64; Bruce J. Dickson, “Threats to Party Supremacy,” Journal of Democracy, vol.  14, no.  1 (January 2003), pp.  27–35; Qinglian He, “A Volcanic Stability,” Journal of Democracy, vol.  14, no.  1 (January 2003), pp.  66–72; and Andrew Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, vol.  14, no.  1 (January 2003), pp.  6–16. On dissident groups, see Teresa Wright, “The Chinese Democracy Party and the Politics of Protests in the 1980s–1990s,” China Quarterly, December 2002, pp.  906–926; and Ronald C. Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, “The ‘Falun Gong Problem’: Politics and the Struggle for Rule of Law in China,” China Quarterly, September 2003, pp.  623–642. On civil society, see Xiaoling Zhang, “Seeking Effective Public Space: Chinese Media at the Local Level,” China: An International Journal, vol.  5, no.  1 (March 2007), pp.  55–77; Yang Zhong, “Democratic Values among Chinese Peasantry: An Empirical Study,” China: An International Journal, vol. 3, no. 2 (September 2005), pp. 189–211; David Kelley, “Citizen Movements and China’s Public Intellectuals in the Hu-­Wen Era,” Pacific Affairs, vol.  79, no.  2 (Summer 2006), pp.  183–204; and David Yang, “Civil Society as an Analytical Lens for Contemporary China,” China: An International Journal, vol. 2, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 1–27.   2 On political parties, see Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); and Sing Ming, Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A comparative analysis (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). On social forces and civil society, see Alvin So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); and Larry Diamond, “A Comparative Perspective on Hong Kong Democratization: Prospects Toward 2017/2020,” in Ming K. Chan (ed.), China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008).

240   S. S.-H. Lo   3 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1951), p. 33.   4 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 1.   5 On China’s interest groups, see David S. G. Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People’s Republic of China (Cardiff: University Cardiff College Press, 1984); and Victor Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987). On Hong Kong’s interest groups, see Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995). The former Soviet Union, according to H. Gordon Skilling, did not have interest groups parallel to the West. He argued that it was proper to use the term “interest groupings” to discuss the groups operating under the Soviet regime. See H. Gordon Skilling, “Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses,” in Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds), Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 29–31.   6 Another political interest group is the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, which was set up in April 1995 and whose activities include the concern about media censorship, the question of police power, and the fight in 2002–2003 against the enactment of Article 23 of the Basic Law – a mini-­constitution in Hong Kong outlawing “subversion, sedition, treason and secession.” But its activities focus on the HKSAR rather than the PRC. See “Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor,” available online at www.hkhrm.org.hk/ (accessed November 23, 2010).   7 Alvin So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p.  160. The United Democrats of Hong Kong was set up in 1990.   8 So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy, p. 161.   9 Ibid. 10 In 1991, the democrats gained 15 out of 18 directly elected seats in the 60-member Legislative Council. In 1995, they captured 16 out of 20 directly elected seats in the 60-member Legislative Council. See David Holley and Christine Courtney, “Liberals Win in Landslide in Hong Kong Voting,” Los Angeles Times, September 16, 1991. 11 Ibid. 12 Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p. 138. 13 Sing Ming, Politics and Government in Hong Kong (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 112–135. 14 Larry Diamond, “A Comparative Perspective on Hong Kong Democratization: Prospects Toward 2017/2020,” in Ming K. Chan (ed.), China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008), p. 328. 15 Larry Diamond, “A Comparative Perspective on Hong Kong Democratization: Prospects Toward 2017/2020,” in Ming K. Chan (ed.), China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2008), p. 328. 16 See Suzanne Pepper, Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); and Joseph Cheng, “The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong,” International Affairs, vol.  65, no.  3 (Summer 1989), p. 459. 17 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessd October 17, 2010) 18 For a recent attack from the Hong Kong Liaison Office on the Alliance’s “anti-­ government activities,” see a commentary by Ku Yun, “The Soft and Hard Sides of Professional Teachers’ Association,” Wen Wei Po, October 27, 2010. Some key members of the HKSAPDM’s Home Return Permits have not been renewed by the

Political interest groups and democratization   241 PRC authorities, including its leader Szeto Wah and deputy chair Richard Tsoi Yiu-­ cheong. See Ming Pao, June 4, 2010. 19 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 21, 2010). 20 Ming Pao, May 3, 2009. 21 Apple Daily, May 29, 2009. 22 Ming Pao, May 3, 2009. 23 Ming Pao, June 5, 2009. 24 Ibid. 25 Ming Pao, June 5, 2009. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ming Pao, May 3, 2009. 32 Yau participated in the election campaign of Donald Tsang in 2005 when the latter ran for the Chief Executive Election in Hong Kong. Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Albert Ho, A Humble Struggle (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 125. 35 Ibid. 36 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.HKASPDM.org.hk/ (accessed October 10, 2010) 37 Ibid. 38 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 19, 2010) 39 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 11, 2010) 40 Ming Pao, November 25, 2010. 41 Ming Pao, June 5, 2004. 42 Ibid. 43 Apple Daily, December 26, 2010. The April the Fifth Action Group was formed in December 1989 in response to the arrest and detainment of a Hong Kong citizen named Lau Shan-­shing, who had been imprisoned by the PRC government for his involvement in the Democracy Wall Movement in the PRC from 1978 to 1979. The Tiananmen Mothers Group was set up in early 2000 by a group of mothers of the dead victims of the June 4 tragedy in 1989. These mothers had compiled a list of the dead victims, a list published by the Hong Kong-­based magazine, The Nineties, in October 1994. Some Hong Kong people later joined the group and it explained why it participated in the 2010 clash with the police in the HKSAR. See www.tiananmenmother.org (accessed November 30, 2010). 44 Apple Daily, July 24, 2010. 45 Ming Pao, November 29, 2010. 46 Albert Ho, A Humble Struggle (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 121. 47 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, available online at www.colaw.cn/ findlaw/crime/criminallaw2.html (accessed November 27, 2010). 48 Ho, A Humble Struggle, p. 122. Ho also revealed that barrister Daniel Fung Wah-­kin agreed to bring HK$10,000 from Hong Kong to Beijing’s students. 49 See www.newchina.com and www.fdc64.de/index.php (accessed November 30, 2010). The Federation for a Democratic China was set up in September 1989 and was regarded as “the largest opposition in the PRC.” See www.boxun.com/ hero/2007/fdpusae/9_1.shtml (accessed November 30, 2010). The Federation has

242   S. S.-H. Lo its objectives of “safeguarding human rights, protecting social justice, developing an economy managed by private citizens, terminating one-­party dictatorship, and establishing a democratic China.” It claims to be “the largest opposition outside the PRC.” 50 Ho, A Humble Struggle, p. 129. 51 Ming Pao, November 25, 2010. 52 Ming Pao, October 21, 2010. 53 One Hong Kong businessman who participated in the candle vigil said,  The case of people gathering in the Victoria Park is not simply asking the PRC government to admit its mistake, but the purpose is to express our dissatisfaction with the CCP and our hope that China would implement real democracy. He was delighted to see the participation of many young people volunteering in the annual candlelight vigil. Ming Pao, June 5, 2010. 54 The Epoch Times, “June 4 Memorial Vigil in Hong Kong Draws 150,000,” available online at www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/36833/ (accessed November 2, 2010). 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ming Pao, October 21, 2010. 59 Ibid. 60 AM730 (Hong Kong newspaper), November 11, 2010, available online at www. am730.com.hk/article.php?article=31390&d=1324 (accessed November 12, 2010). 61 TVB News (Hong Kong), December 3, 2010. 62 Ming Pao, November 29, 2010. 63 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed October 25, 2010). 64 Ming Pao, November 20, 2010. 65 The HKASPDM website, available online at www.alliance.org.hk/ (accessed November 20, 2010). 66 Sing Tao Daily, November 29, 2010. 67 Ming Pao, November 29, 2010. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Szeto Wah, Da Jiang Dong Qu: Szeto Wah’s Memoir (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 297. 71 Ibid., p. 331. 72 Ibid., p. 309. 73 Ibid., p. 316. 74 Ibid., p. 323. 75 Ibid., pp. 326–327.

13 Conclusion The new democracy movement, interest groups politics and implications for China Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo Similarities and differences between the old and new democracy movements The role of interest groups in sustaining, reviving and rejuvenating the democracy movement in Hong Kong is critical. Interest groups emerged in Hong Kong under the British rule, protecting their interests, but many of them were politically co-­opted by the colonial administration through appointments to various consultative committees and political institutions, including the top-­ policy making Executive Council and law-­making Legislative Council. Those interest groups that were not co-­opted tended to be more assertive and autonomous, utilizing strikes and protests to make their demands heard. Their activities alarmed the colonial rulers, who in the early 1980s set up the Standing Committee on Pressure Groups to closely monitor interest groups. With the inception of the Sino-­British negotiations in 1982–1984 over Hong Kong’s future, new interest groups were formed, expressing their concerns about the territory’s future. In the entire transition period from the inception of the colonial rule to July 1, 1997, interest groups were selectively co-­opted, secretly under surveillance and politically stimulated by socio-­political transformations. Moreover, some interest groups played a pivotal role in sustaining the democracy movement in Hong Kong, such as the Professional Teachers’ Union, the Hong Kong Journalist Association and the Hong Kong Bar Association, to name just a few. From the 1970s to the 1990s, several democracy movements were of tremendous political significance: the teachers’ fight for their salaries and benefits at the Certificate Master level in 1973 stimulated the rise of the Professional Teachers’ Union; the campaign against the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant in 1985 galvanized the support of more democrats than before; the pro-­democracy movement in 1987 in support of the introduction of direct elections to LegCo in 1988 eventually failed but it marked another push for democratization; and the pro-­democracy movement in support of the mainland students in May and June 1989 gave rise to the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China.1 After the PRC assertion of its sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, at least three movements marked

244   S. S.-H. Lo a watershed in the HKSAR’s pro-­democracy campaigns: the protest by half a million citizens against the Tung Chee-­hwa administration on July 1, 2003; the anti-­National Education policy campaign triggered by Scholarism in 2011–2012; and the Occupy Central Movement in September–December 2014 were politically significant. Public intellectuals played a critical role in leading and participating in all these movements, both before and after the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China. The pro-­democracy movements after July 1, 1997 have similarities with the earlier ones in Hong Kong under British rule. While the teaching, legal and journalist professions are politically divided into the pro-­democracy camp on the one hand and pro-­government and pro-­Beijing on the other, they remain persistent in their push for a more democratic Hong Kong. Many lawyers remain critical of the government, especially when Beijing’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress took action to interpret the Basic Law of the HKSAR. Teachers remain politically defiant in opposing unpopular government policies, notably the anti-­National Education policy, and supporting the further democratization of the political system. Journalists remain politically active in their fight against any outside or inside interference with their press freedom, conducting surveys to express their anxiety, lobbying the government, publishing annual reports and exposing public maladministration and governmental abuse of power. All these professional interest groups are playing an essential role in buttressing the democracy movement in the HKSAR. Another similarity is that Hong Kong, as a capitalist city-­state, remains politically dominated by business interest groups, whose political influence and power are not matched by the relatively powerless working-­class organizations. Even though a few working-­class representatives were appointed into the top policy-­ making Executive Council, they have become “labor aristocrats” whose voice and demands for the workers are constantly overshadowed and easily defeated by the dominance of business interests. Under these circumstances, the working­class unions, which are already divided into pro-­democracy and pro-­Beijing/ pro-­government forces, have failed to achieve significant breakthroughs in the protection of labor interests. The introduction of the minimum wage in the HKSAR was long overdue, but the mechanism of setting the appropriate amount of the minimum wage remains biased more in favor of business interests. Progressive tax reform could not be introduced into the HKSAR mainly because of the severe opposition and vested interests of the business class. Nor did the HKSAR leadership have any political will to enforce any progressive tax reform as a means of income redistribution from the rich to the poor. The structural constraints of the capitalist city-­state on the HKSAR regime could easily be seen; business interests and power remain dominant in the entire body politic. Furthermore, as Hong Kong has some degree of local democracy – which is characterized by the rule of law, a certain degree of civil liberties, and the checks and balances from the mass media, courts and other auditing and anti-­ corruption agencies against the executive branch of the government – the business sector is enjoying its interests without the need to democratize Hong

Conclusion   245 Kong’s political system from either above or below. The business interest groups are afraid of a scenario in which the HKSAR would become a Western-­style liberal democracy where the tax system would be drastically reformed in favor of the working class, and where social welfare would be enhanced considerably to the detriment of the business interests. The business interests embrace the protection of their private property, the maximization of profits, the accumulation of capital, the existence of relatively weak trade unions and the maintenance of the socio-­political status quo. Beijing is keen to acquire political support from business groups and elites to govern the HKSAR and to check the power of pro-­democracy interest groups. Both actors have the common interest of forging an alliance to delay the process of democratization. In reality, a triple alliance between the central government in Beijing, the HKSAR leadership and the business interest groups persists for the sake of ruling Hong Kong dominantly without the need to democratize the local political system. Economic integration between the HKSAR and China is presenting tremendous golden opportunities for Hong Kong business people to expand their market into the mainland and to maximize their profits. In the eyes of the business sector, or the capitalist class, democratization has to be stalled and postponed as long as possible. In the mind of the triple alliance, the democracy movement is politically dangerous, potentially subversive and socially disruptive to its common interest of maintaining the political status quo. The differences between the democracy movement in Hong Kong under colonial rule and the new democracy movement in the HKSAR embrace at least five features: (1) the use of populist tactics, (2) the utilization of social media and cyberspace, (3) the emergence of religious leadership, (4) the rise of nativism, and (5) new identity politics. First, environmental groups and individuals have been resorting to legal means to challenge the legality and legitimacy of the government’s environmental policy-­making processes. They utilize populist tactics to appeal to the mass for political support while using the Internet and social media to publicize their stance and mobilize public participation in the environmental movement. Second, participants of the new democracy movement, such as students, environmentalists and journalists, fully utilize the Internet and social media as an instrument in publicizing their position, garnering public support, mobilizing mass participation and staging large-­scale protests. Environmental activists, journalists, and student groups have become the backbone of the new democracy movement in the HKSAR. Third, the new democracy movement has been revived by religious leaders and activists, notably Cardinal Zen from the Catholic Church. Zen had dedication and enthusiasm in making Hong Kong’s polity and society more democratic than ever before, but whether his successors can and will sustain this momentum remains to be seen. On the other hand, there have been signs that some young Buddhists have been questioning their role in Hong Kong’s democracy movement. They are beginning to challenge the existing pro-­government and pro-­Beijing Buddhist groups and leaders who are politically co-­opted, and who enjoyed the privilege of representing the entire Buddhist sector to elect the Chief Executive in 2017.2

246   S. S.-H. Lo Traditionally, the PRC government has seen Buddhist groups and leaders in the HKSAR as allies and targets of political co-­optation. Buddhism stresses the importance of believers who should develop a peaceful mindset and this emphasis fits into the PRC’s focus on socio-­political harmony in both the mainland and Hong Kong. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the young generation of Hong Kong Buddhists will be able to increase the political awareness of more Buddhists, to instill a more critical mindset among them and to involve them in the local democracy movement in the coming years. Fourth, another difference between the old and new democracy movement in Hong Kong is the sudden rise of nativists. Nativists are those local Hongkongers who are imbued with a very strong sense of Hong Kong identity, who dislike Hong Kong’s increasing economic dependence on the mainland and who see the influx of many mainland tourists and immigrants as a move that erodes Hong Kong’s uniqueness. Some of them have gone so far as to advocate Hong Kong’s political separation from the mainland – a position that is politically unacceptable to both the HKSAR government and Beijing. The provocative remarks and action of two legislators-­elect from a nativist group named Youngspiration, Yau Wai-­ching and Baggio Leung, during their swearing-­in ceremony of the Legislative Council in October 2016, led to the swift action of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret the Basic Law on the stipulation regarding oath-­taking behavior, thereby bringing about the local court’s disqualification of the two young localists. Beijing’s speedy and strong reaction meant the central government stopped the localist movement from developing further. The interpretation of the Basic Law by Beijing proved to be the most effective legal tool to suffocate, discredit and undermine the nascent but rapidly growing pro-­independence interest groups in the HKSAR. Fifth, from the perspective of identity politics, similar to the interest groups in British Hong Kong where they developed a strong Hong Kong identity, the new young interest groups in the HKSAR are also imbued with a very strong localist identity, but only a few of them have seen Hong Kong as a “nation” while rejecting the PRC as the motherland of Hong Kong, as Youngspiration and the Hong Kong National Party believe. While Yau and Leung from Youngspiration were disqualified by the local court from being legislators, the National Party was disallowed by the HKSAR government from registering. The identity change of a few radical interest groups was undoubtedly politically unacceptable in the eyes of Beijing’s officials responsible for Hong Kong affairs. The PRC has already been uncomfortable with those pro-­democracy interest groups which identify themselves as culturally Chinese, but which reject the political identification with the ruling CCP in the mainland. However, Beijing has been politically alienated by the new pro-­independence interest groups in Hong Kong as they went so far as to see themselves as culturally and ethnically Hongkongese and to oppose the mainland regime. Authoritarian politics in the PRC is characterized by the need for interest groups and individual citizens to stick to the officially sanctioned political lines. Political allegiance can ensure their survival,

Conclusion   247 but political disloyalty means that they can be suppressed. In the same vein, the new pro-­independence interest groups in the HKSAR have the same fate. Comparatively speaking, a strong Hong Kong identity could be found in many politically active interest groups as they launched the democracy movement in both colonial Hong Kong and the HKSAR. Many students and young people formed youth groups from 2011 to 2015, advocating the cancellation of the National Education policy, and calling for the democratization of Hong Kong’s polity, especially the demand that the future Chief Executive should be directly elected by universal suffrage without the candidates being screened out by the Beijing-­controlled nomination committee. Their political demand of having civic nomination to select the Chief Executive candidates in the 2017 Chief Executive election was rejected by Beijing in August 2014, when the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress interpreted the Basic Law provision on the method of selecting the 2017 Chief Executive. Although the student demands were rejected, one of its their leaders was directly elected to the Legislative Council, notably Nathan Law from a political group named Demosisto. While student activists usually possess the political ideals of fighting for social justice and political democracy, some of them have been learning how to cope with the powerful overlord in the HKSAR, namely the China factor, in a more subtle and skillful manner. Such political learning may eventually turn some formerly young students into more mature professional politicians, but another new generation of young and idealistic student leaders will likely emerge sooner or later, judging from the historical pattern of student movement in Hong Kong. From the perspective of interest groups politics, there are some new features in their methods of interest articulation, and in the relationships between interest groups and political parties. The methods of interest articulation by interest groups have become more radical and yet innovative, utilizing civil dis­ obedience in the Occupy Central Movement, and most importantly using the cyberspace, such as Internet radios and social media, to make their voices heard and to connect with other like-­minded groups and individuals. The concept of democracy, in the minds of many members of interest groups in the HKSAR, refers not just to political reform, social justice, human rights and the rule of law, but also, most importantly, to political space for them to make their demands freely, to express their discontent, to be autonomous from any ideological indoctrination and to gather together for public political discourse. The anti-­National Education movement initiated by students and the Occupy Central Movement triggered by some public intellectuals were typical examples of such action of augmenting the political space for Hongkongers in the HKSAR. These new methods of interest articulation and political expression could not easily be seen in Hong Kong’s old democracy movement. The quest for more political space in the HKSAR could perhaps be explained by the anxiety of many interest groups and individual citizens that their civil liberties, including freedom of speech, of the press, of publication and of assembly, would be eroded in Hong Kong under mainland Chinese sovereignty. The drift in the

248   S. S.-H. Lo PRC politics from a softer authoritarian regime under President Hu Jintao to a harder authoritarian rule under President Xi Jinping provided the contextual circumstances that appeared to have a boomerang effect on the politics of the HKSAR from 2012 to 2016.3 The publication of Beijing’s White Paper on Hong Kong matters in June 2014 was a testimony to such a hard-­line approach to the HKSAR.4 Democracy, in the eyes of Beijing, cannot and should not proceed in such a way as to turn the HKSAR into a base for political “subversion” and to upset the political stability of both Hong Kong and the PRC. With regard to the relationships between interest groups and political parties, some interest groups in Hong Kong under British rule formed a loose coalition with political parties, such as the Professional Teachers’ Union support of the United Democrats of Hong Kong and later the Democratic Party. This phenomenon could be easily seen in the HKSAR on July 1, 2003 when many interest groups under the umbrella of the Civil Human Rights Front cooperated with pro-­democracy political parties to mobilize public protests against the HKSAR government’s unpopular policies, especially the attempt at legislating on Article 23 of the Basic Law that deals with subversion, treason, sedition and secession. Nevertheless, the relationships between interest groups and political parties in the HKSAR tend to be more dynamic and complex. First, pro-­ government interest groups tend to work more closely with pro-­Beijing political parties, such as the Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, in their actions against the Occupy Central Movement and their support of various government policies. These pro-­establishment interest groups also provide the backbone of political support for pro-­Beijing political parties during the election campaigns at the level of Legislative Council and District Councils. Second, the pro-­democracy political parties and their interest groups have much weaker links and are more loosely organized than pro-­Beijing political forces. Pro-­democracy interest groups assist like-­minded political parties during election campaigns, but their relations are not so closely coordinated, unlike the pro-­Beijing side. This phenomenon is attributable to the relatively strong financial support of pro-­Beijing groups, who have paid and regular staff members responsible for all kinds of liaison work with pro-­Beijing political parties. Pro-­ democracy political parties and interest groups tend to lack sufficient funding support to organize themselves regularly and systematically. In short, the relations between interest groups and the democracy movement, both old and new, have undergone significant metamorphoses since the establishment of the HKSAR. Interest groups supportive of the democracy movement in Hong Kong under British rule were more conventional in their methods of interest articulation, using protests, holding press conferences, lobbying government officials and forging coalitions with like-­minded political parties in election campaigns. They tended to have strong local Hong Kong identity, but they rejected political identification with the CCP in the PRC. Interest groups supportive of the new democracy movement in the HKSAR are quite different. They have utilized civil disobedience, cyberspace and social media to maintain and expand their political space in the HKSAR. A few of

Conclusion   249 them even went so far as to identify Hong Kong as a “nation,” leading to provocative actions and remarks that meant they were seen by the PRC and Hong Kong authorities as the political enemies of the mainland Chinese nation-­state. As such, the participation of these new localist or nativist interest groups in Hong Kong’s new democracy movement is bound to be opposed by the pro-­ Beijing and pro-­government alliance of interest groups and political parties. Political polarization in the HKSAR has become the outcome of the ideological conflicts between the pro-­Beijing and conservative political forces on the one hand and the powerful interplay between localist interest groups, the new democracy movement and new self-­identity politics on the other hand.

Revisiting Gramsci’s concept of “organic intellectuals” in the Hong Kong context Public intellectuals who form interest groups to seek to influence and change government policies could and can be easily identified in Hong Kong from the colonial era to the current period of the special administrative region. Many of these intellectuals try to reform the society and politics of Hong Kong in a better manner. Their conscience to fight for social justice, advocate political change and educate the members of the public over various policy issues remains constant and remarkable. It can be said that if public intellectuals are the opinion leaders of the society, they have been playing a significant role in forming interest groups, organizing groups’ activities and sustaining the momentum of the old and new democracy movement in Hong Kong. Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualization of intellectuals as “traditional” and “organic” social groups in different societal strata provides us with a useful tool for our deeper understanding of the political role of intellectuals in various types of interest groups in the HKSAR. While some nativists, who have advocated Hong Kong’s political separation from the PRC, can be seen as “organic intellectuals,” the reality is that, as mentioned before, the central government in Beijing must clamp down on such individuals and interest groups. As such, the nativist groups have a very limited political market in the HKSAR; they were politically attacked, marginalized and legally discredited in 2016. Since the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in November 2016, there has been a trend that the nativist movement has diminished, at least on the surface. Still, its future development deserves our close attention, especially if the HKSAR faces any economic downturn regionally. Any economic downturn or crisis in the HKSAR may plunge the territory’s economy into a period of uncertainty, directly or indirectly stirring up pent-­up frustrations, including the political alienation of some nativists and their interest groups. Gramsci’s concept of “traditional intellectuals” can be witnessed in many pro-­democracy interest groups whose leaders and members are eager to maintain their independence from the dominant forces. Lawyers, teachers, journalists, environmental activists and Catholics who formed their interest groups also

250   S. S.-H. Lo exhibit the tendency of being autonomous from both the government and other political forces, including political parties. They have their esprit de corps, as Gramsci said, and put themselves forward as autonomous organizations with a special character. On the other hand, the categories of “organic” and “traditional” intellectuals as advanced by Gramsci could help us understand the entire development of interest groups politics in the HKSAR. Some organic intellectuals could be seen in the sudden rise of a few local radicals who argued for Hong Kong’s political separation from China. This position was politically unacceptable by China, which saw some radicals, such as the Youngspiration, as “organic intellectuals” who sought to reject the existing political system in Hong Kong. The provocative behavior of two members of Youngspiration, namely Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-­ching, in their oath-­taking ceremony at the LegCo shortly after they were directly elected to the legislature in September 2017, led to the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in November. The end result was that the local court delivered a verdict to disqualify the two from being the legislators – an unprecedented event in Hong Kong’s political history. In short, any genuine “organic intellectuals” in the HKSAR are bound to be regarded as the political enemies of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong government and the PRC state. At the same time, accompanying the Occupy Central Movement, which could be seen as a campaign led by “organic intellectuals,” was the emergence of many new pro-­government and pro-­Beijing interest groups that have been opposing the democrats since 2014. These interest groups have been led by politically conservative intellectuals falling under the united front work of the PRC, which is keen to win the hearts and minds of more Hong Kong people toward its policy of maintaining socio-­political stability and economic prosperity in the HKSAR. The Occupy Central Movement from September to December 2014 was arguably led by moderate rather than radical “organic intellectuals,” notably the three leaders – sociologist Chan Kin-­man, legal expert Benny Tai and religious priest Chu Yiu-­ming. The three leaders were situated between, to use Gramsci’s terms, “civil society” and “political society,” or specifically between society and the state. They did not give “consent” to the ruling elites in the HKSAR over the issue of the scope and pace of political reform. They also provided the necessary leadership for civil society to resist any encroachment from the post-­colonial state in Hong Kong and the central government in Beijing. Strictly speaking, Chan, Chu and Tai were not those “organic intellectuals” who according to Gramsci could attempt to liberate the working class, orchestrate revolutionary change and even overthrow the capitalist state. The three leaders were at best moderate “organic intellectuals” who hoped for a better Hong Kong where the political system would be fairer and where society would achieve social justice. All three of them emphasized the need for love and peace in the Occupy Central Movement, trying to push both the Hong Kong government and Beijing to democratize the method of selecting the 2017 Chief Executive.

Conclusion   251 A closer reading of the writings of Benny Tai and Chan Kin-­man shows that they were moderate “organic intellectuals” during the Occupy Central Movement that aimed at mobilizing public participation to push for the democratization of the HKSAR. Tai wrote that the HKSAR government under the C. Y. Leung government attempted to mainlandize Hong Kong and elevate the role of “one country” in implementing the principle of “one country, two systems.”5 Tai regarded the mainland legal system as having considerable loopholes and said that he was not advocating independence, but that the PRC centralized system would not last very long.6 He even boldly predicted that President Xi Jinping’s strong rule would eventually lead to the downfall of the ruling regime due to complex vested interests, and that China would “eventually collapse.”7 The end result would likely be the dominance of military interests and the drift toward a federal system, which would make China “more stable” and “more prosperous.”8 Tai wrote: China would have constitutionalism to replace the one-­party dictatorship, or China may have internal splits, thus affecting Hong Kong which may be absorbed by the local political military forces in the southern part of China. If Hong Kong wants to escape from this fate, then the international society should be involved.9 He continued to argue that: The Hong Kong people should, if the southern political forces have infighting, exercise the right to have national self-­determination and to realize real autonomy and to establish its constitutional system. In other words, if the conditions are suitable, Hong Kong may go toward independence. But if China is reunited again, whether Hong Kong can be independent is hard to predict. If China goes federal, Hong Kong will be part of China and would realize its positive role to implement democracy under Chinese federalism. Here, Hong Kong needs to implement full democratic universal suffrage as an experiment so as to be adopted in other parts of China.10 Tai’s vision of a federal China and his belief in how Hong Kong can and would adapt to China’s changing political circumstances led to his advocacy of having a democratic HKSAR through universal suffrage. To achieve universal suffrage in the HKSAR, he advocated the Occupy Central Movement, which aims at striving for a fair electoral system and belongs to the right of citizens, but the movement is neither a color revolution to overthrow the CCP nor an opposition to grasp political power. Instead, the movement uses peaceful and non-­violent means to fight for democracy.11 For Tai, democracy means equity, pluralism and deliberation. As such, he advocated the use of Occupy Central Movement to achieve deliberation, which “can

252   S. S.-H. Lo gather accurate information, listen to complete arguments, allow reflections, build mutual trust and reduce conflicts.”12 As with Tai, Chan Kin-­man believes in the activation of civil society to achieve the objectives of having universal suffrage and democracy. Chan argued that the HKSAR government should promote corporate social responsibility, support non-­governmental organizations, and develop programs and policies in collaboration with the business sector.13 He emphasized the importance of citizen participation and competitiveness in the process of achieving universal suffrage, especially the role of citizens in providing inputs to the government. Chan also advocated the formation of political pacts in the processes of reaching compromises with the government and ruling elites over democratization. He called for an inclusive approach to be adopted by the government in dealing with both pro-­democracy and pro-­government forces. While Chan’s political ideals were parallel to Tai’s in the sense that they both hoped for universal suffrage and advocated public participation in democratic deliberation and actions, their ideas were complementary to each other. Chan’s emphasis on the role of civil society and the need for political compromises could not be seen in Tai’s writings, whereas the latter’s vision of the coming collapse of the CCP was not seen in the former’s political thought. Chan also argued that universities could provide a means through which civil society could grow through the process of advocating reforms, participating in delivering social services and forming student organizations. Universities, to Chan, should develop deliberative democracy, civility, social morals and political tolerance.14 Both Tai and Chan became public and moderate “organic intellectuals” who were keen to mobilize like-­ minded interest groups and citizens in the Occupy Central Movement. Chu Yiu-­ming, who had long played a crucial role in the action of some Hongkongers to rescue the mainland democrats out of the PRC shortly after the bloody crackdown on June 4, 1989, was a low-­profile leader of political action that had much in common with the action-­oriented Tai and Chan in planning and executing the Occupy Central Movement. As of March 2017, the HKSAR government took legal action against Tai, Chan and Chu for causing public nuisance during the Occupy Central Movement from September to December 2014. Regardless of the outcome of the legal battle, the Occupy Central Movement had significant impacts on the new democracy movement; it utilized public sites to protest without the prior approval of the police and it mobilized supporters to engage in public political debates, trying to force both the Hong Kong ruling elites and Beijing to make concessions. Unfortunately, the leaders and activists of the Occupy Central Movement might not fully realize that the PRC under President Xi remained an authoritarian regime which became more hard-­line in the face of political pressure from outside forces. Hence, the Occupy Central Movement, which was quickly fragmented into different groups and gradually lost public support, was destined to fail in December 2014. As with the leaders of the Occupy Central Movement, many student and new youth groups that sprung up from 2011 to 2015 could be seen as a phenomenon attributable to the rapid emergence of “organic intellectuals.” Scholarism,

Conclusion   253 for example, sought to oppose the anti-­National Education policy and inspire youths to participate in social and political affairs. It vowed to protect the freedom of thought and oppose any attempt at “brainwashing” the students of Hong Kong.15 It was also determined to protect the young children through the actions of launching hunger strikes, demonstrations and rallies. Scholarism also advocated political reforms to achieve the ultimate objective of universal suffrage in the selection of the Chief Executive. It was composed of moderate and very young “organic intellectuals,” with Joshua Wong as the most representative leader. Many other student groups emerged before and during the Occupy Central Movement, exerting collective pressure on both the HKSAR government and Beijing to democratize the Hong Kong political system. Hence, the new democracy movement in the HKSAR was orchestrated and executed by moderate “organic intellectuals” who sought to change government policies within the existing system rather than toppling the regime. In any case, while public intellectuals are commonplace in the HKSAR where they actively form and join interest groups to lobby the government, to protect their interests and to utilize the traditional and social media to make their views heard, “organic intellectuals” have also emerged in the territory, particularly in the process of advocating a faster pace and larger scope of democratization. If the old democracy movement was triggered and executed by many public intellectuals, the new democracy movement has seen more moderate “organic intellectuals” than ever before. The democracy movement in Hong Kong, old or new, has witnessed the determination of action-­oriented public intellectuals to fight for their vision of a just society and democratic polity.

Hong Kong’s interest groups politics and implications for China Given that interest groups politics in Hong Kong are now closely related to the twin demands for not only the democratization of Hong Kong’s political system and policy-­making processes but also a more relaxed attitude of Chinese officials toward Hong Kong matters, there are arguably significant political implications for mainland China where Beijing’s officials responsible for the HKSAR matters are forced to deal with political pluralism in the special administrative region in a more skillful manner. First and foremost, the rapid rise of nativist groups and their challenge to both the Hong Kong government and China have forced Beijing to adopt a new approach in tackling them. As mentioned before, the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in November 2016 was a legal tool to hinder the further growth of the local nativist, separatist and pro-­independence movements. Nevertheless, in the process of interpreting the Basic Law, the political image of Beijing in the eyes of many young local people was severely tarnished. Beijing was seen to be relatively “hard-­line” in dealing with a nascent but publicly unpopular movement. Indeed, the provocative behavior of Yau Wai-­ching and Baggio Leung in their

254   S. S.-H. Lo swearing-­in ceremony illustrated their “naïve” political action, as critics mentioned, disrespecting the Basic Law and the PRC government and providing a perfect justification for the Standing Committee’s interpretation of the Basic Law. Supporters of Beijing maintained that the action of two young legislators-­ elect failed to show their allegiance to the central government and even the Chinese people. Hence, the interpretation of the Basic Law to stop the arrogance and growth of the local separatists was politically necessary. But from the perspective of some moderate localists, the interpretation should be postponed to a later stage until the local court decided the case on Lau’s and Leung’s behavior, rather than using the Standing Committee to deliver the interpretation just before the court made its decision. The rapid rise of nativist groups was exacerbated by the political attacks on them from the pro-­government and pro-­ Beijing interest groups and mass media. If political tolerance from all stakeholders was relatively weak, as illustrated by the severity of political and personal attacks on the localists and by the highly provocative action of the two young members of Youngspiration in LegCo, the over-­polarized and hyper-­politicized atmosphere deeply divided the society of Hong Kong. It will take time for both Beijing and the HKSAR leadership to heal the political wounds inflicted on many Hong Kong activists. Political pluralism can be regarded as not only the persistence of interest groups in fighting for democracy but also the tolerant attitude of the ruling elites toward dissenting political views. If the principle of “one country, two systems” means that the HKSAR should ideally maintain its political pluralism, where interest groups flourish and where they are tolerated in defying and opposing the ruling regime, then a more inclusive approach in dealing with them, consulting their opinions, respecting their different views and winning their hearts and minds would be more politically desirable. If confrontational attitudes were adopted by all political stakeholders, including the “organic intellectuals” among the localists, the HKSAR ruling elites, and Beijing, then the principle of “one country, two systems” would run the risk of degenerating into “one country, one system” in which Hong Kong’s political pluralism would be politically diluted. It is understandable that Beijing had to punish the “organic intellectuals” in the HKSAR through a rapid interpretation of the Basic Law, but the cost was relatively high; the Standing Committee’s action of interpreting Hong Kong’s mini-­constitution appeared to become a political necessity to stop the tide of nativism and separatism at the expense of letting the Hong Kong courts to deal with the case. Political distrust remained profound between Beijing and the localists, and between Beijing and some Hong Kong legal experts. Second, the future development of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China deserves our attention. Its activities in support of the democracy movement and mainland political dissidents in the mainland have cross-­border implications that really test the bottom line of tolerance on the part of the Chinese officials responsible for Hong Kong matters. Hopefully, the Alliance’s activities will continue to be politically tolerated not only by the HKSAR leadership but also the central government in Beijing.

Conclusion   255 Otherwise, the image of the “one country, two systems” will be undermined. In fact, if some pro-­Beijing politicians had long tried but failed to persuade the late Szeto Wah to dissolve the Alliance, their remarks and action illustrated some degree of political censorship on the part of the political elites in the HKSAR. Such censorship is bound to negatively affect the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Third, from China’s united front perspective, all interest groups, regardless of whether they are political enemies, can become the targets of political co-­ optation. Political inclusion of more interest groups would help consolidate the legitimacy of the HKSAR government, smoothen its policy-­making processes, and bring about the success of China’s united front policy toward Hong Kong. The political exclusion of some interest groups and their activists has undermined the legitimacy of the HKSAR government – a situation that could be seen from the Tung Chee-­hwa leadership (1997–2005) to the C.  Y. Leung administration (2012–2017). The policy of co-­opting some interest groups and excluding others had long been adopted by the British colonial rulers in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, as the society of the HKSAR is becoming more ethnically diverse, and as the political system is riddled with ideological conflicts between conservatism and liberalism – and between populist-­radical politics on the one hand and the stress on stronger governance on the other – the politics of selective co-­optation was bound to generate a crisis of legitimacy for the HKSAR regime. As such, both the HKSAR leadership and the central government in Beijing have to ponder a new style of governance, namely a more inclusive approach to governance by listening to the views of Hong Kong civil society across various political spectrums, classes and identities. If not, the legitimacy of the policies and actions of both the HKSAR government and Beijing will continue to be challenged by the constantly assertive civil society of Hong Kong. The persistence and proliferation of interest groups in the HKSAR has contributed to a vibrant civil society vis-­à-vis the pro-­Beijing ruling elites. The operation, pattern and transformation of interest groups politics in Hong Kong have not only sustained, revived and rejuvenated the local democracy movement, but they also carry tremendous implications for how mainland Chinese officials deal with Hong Kong matters. The question of handling Hong Kong’s interest groups skillfully, tolerantly and inclusively will continue to be a critical factor shaping the success of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR and how both Beijing and the local government of Hong Kong treats political pluralism in the territory. If China is keen to maintain the “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong, it may have to consider a more relaxed approach toward the rapid rise of localist groups, whose emergence was stimulated by Beijing’s increasing hard-­line policy toward the HKSAR. A vicious cycle persists in which Beijing’s hard-­line policy toward Hong Kong in the summer of 2014 triggered the birth of separatist groups, which in turn hardened the reactions of PRC authorities. Finally, it is often assumed that the China factor shapes interest groups politics and the democracy movement in Hong Kong, but the reverse may also be

256   S. S.-H. Lo true. In the long run, if China experiments with political liberalization and democratization, the Hong Kong model of political pluralism, where all kinds of interest groups are tolerated and operate autonomously from the government, can be a lesson for the mainland’s democratization or “the fifth modernization,” a term used by overseas Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng. The Hong Kong model of political pluralism is characterized, as this book and its contributors have shown, by the proliferation of interest groups, the innovative and adaptive methods of interest articulation, the existence of complex self-­identities, and their determination to fight for more political space through cyberspace and civil disobedience. In the PRC, interest groups are constantly under the watchful eyes of the ruling party, which sees autonomous groups as potentially “subversive.” If the PRC experimented with liberalization and democratization, more interest groups financially and politically independent from the CCP would hopefully be allowed to emerge – a crucial indicator of democratic change in mainland China. Although the HKSAR is too small to be politically influential on the giant motherland, its relatively pluralistic polity, which remains punctuated by the persistence and proliferation of interest groups financially independent from the government, will remain a unique feature of the “one country, two systems” with positive lessons for the PRC’s possible political modernization in the coming decades.

Notes   1 For the 1987 pro-­democracy movement in support of the 1988 introduction of direct elections to the LegCo, see Shiu-­Hing Lo, The Politics of Democratization in Hong Kong (London: Macmillan, 1997).   2 A workshop entitled “Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist’s participation in political and civic movement” illustrated these concerns, and it was held by the Center for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, March 7, 2017.   3 An indicator of the Chinese drift toward a harder authoritarian mode was its stricter control over organized crime in the mainland under President Xi’s era. See Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo, The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China (London: Routledge, 2016).   4 See Sonny Shiu-­Hing Lo, Hong Kong’s Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 50–56.   5 Benny Tai, The Future of Two Systems and One Country (Hong Kong: Step Forward Multimedia, 2015), pp. 32–33.   6 Ibid. pp. 186–187.   7 Ibid., p. 187.   8 Ibid., p. 188.   9 Ibid., p. 189. 10 Ibid., p. 190. 11 Benny Tai, The Future of Democracy (Hong Kong: Step Forward Multimedia, 2015), p. 74 (in Chinese). 12 Ibid., pp. 90–91. 13 Chan Kin-­man, Civil Society’s Horizon: From Turbulence to Good Governance (Hong Kong: Roundtable Synergy, 2012), pp. 32–33. 14 Ibid., p. 146 (in Chinese). 15 Scholarism, Calling from an Iron House: We are Scholarism (Hong Kong Ming Pao, 2013), p. 81 (in Chinese).

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Index

activists 112, 118, 125, 218 anti-democratic 10, 127–9, 135, 137–8 anti-national education 11, 27 apolitical society 19 associational interest groups 35 authoritarian 239; hard-line 224; regime 5, 15, 39; softer 248 Bar Association 35–7, 40, 52, 56 barristers 8, 35–7, 45, 52, 55 Basic Law 116 Beijing 113, 115, 117, 119, 120–2, 124–5 broader representation 2 Bourgeoisie 112–14, 117, 119 business 127–39; groups 6, 10, 16, 130, 138, 245; interests 111, 113–14, 116–18, 121–6 Cantonese 158, 161–2 capitalistic 10, 123 capitalist city-state 3, 6, 7 Cardinal Zen 11, 147–52 Catholic Church and Catholicism 140, 151; Christian social teaching: social justice and peace 104, 141; conflict with Communist states 140, 145, 149; teaching authority 140; transnational religious organization 142 central government 125 Chan, Kin-man 27 Chief Executive 114, 117, 119, 124 China 1, 6–9, 11, 13, 15 Chinese: identity 11, 104, 155–6, 158–9; officials 50, 54, 61, 180, 231 Chu, Yiu-ming 27, 48 citizenship 104, 176–7, 179, 200–3 civil disobedience 5, 27, 29, 31, 47, 48 civil society 117, 118–21 collective bargaining law 121–2

colonial government 111, 115–16, 121–2 Committee on Promotion of Civic Education 177 community-based environmental stewardship 206 communism 19, 132, 144, 161 Communist 6, 9, 11; Party 115, 222, 225, 228, 232, 237, 242, 246, 248, 251–2, 256 Confederation of Trade Unions 117, 119 conscience 4, 9, 34, 87, 147, 249 consultation 116 consultative 8, 10, 89, 95, 102–3 co-opt 8, 10, 14–15 co-optation 123–5; selective 243, 255 corporatism 8, 14–16, 21, 31 cyberspace 9, 29–30, 78–9 democracy 208 democracy: movement 121; China 96, 162, 228–9, 232; environmental governance 208 democratization 232–3, 235–7 Demosisto 171–2, 174, 193–4 determination 12, 89, 156 dispute 114–16, 120–1 divergent 35 dominance 113, 115, 119, 122–3 dominant 2, 4, 6, 31, 111–12 Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT) 142–3, 152 economic integration 10, 135–7, 163 editorial independence 64–6, 68, 71–2 Education Bureau 101–2, 175–8 election(s) 114, 117–22, 124

278   Index environmental: governance 209, 212; groups 213; management 206; movement 215–16 ethnic: groups 30; identity 156–8, 161–2, 168 exclusive identity 157 Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions 120 Federation of Trade Unions 115, 117, 119, 120, 124, 126 fragmentation 124 freedom of speech 18, 64, 67–9, 72, 74 fundamental liberties 35 Gramsci, Antonio 1, 13, 249 Grassroots 17, 20, 22, 26, 37, 119 high degree of autonomy 22, 39, 41–3, 50 Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDM) 12, 222–4 Hong Kong Catholic Church: democracy 144–5, 148–52; theological foundation 141–2; fermentation of democratic movement 141, 143; Diocesan Commission of Justice and Peace- 141, 147, 153; democracy protects religious freedom 11, 144; Catholic participation in council elections 144–5; Catholic voting behavior and China factor 144–5; Occupy Central with Love and Peace Movement 148–9 Hong Kong Federation of Journalists 9, 64, 72, 84 Hong Kong Federation of Students 12, 21, 27–8, 105, 171 Hong Kong Journalist Association 9, 64–6, 68–9 Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong 8, 39, 41, 155, 245, 252 Hong Kong National Party 164–5, 171, 173, 175 Hongkongers 158–60, 162, 164, 169 HKSAR 141, 145–53, 244–56; decolonization 145, 156; mainlandization 58, 145, 148, 153, 269 ideals 9–10, 13, 52, 237 ideological 10, 111, 114–16, 121, 249, 255: struggle 114–16, 121 ideology 31, 101, 105, 114, 122 identity 11, 19–20, 30, 32, 88

illiberal 157, 161, 169 inclusive 208, 213, 252, 254–5 independence 11, 12, 24, 30, 40–1 indigenous democracy 10, 60, 128–32, 135, 137–8 indoctrination 180, 183–4 infrastructure 210 intellectuals 1–4, 13, 244, 247, 249–54: organic 1–3, 249–50; public 3–4, 13, 20, 239, 244; traditional 2–4, 249, 255 Internet 5, 7, 15, 26, 62, 71–2 interest articulation 5, 8, 56, 78, 174 interest groups 218: politics 243, 247, 255; and democracy movement 1, 4; and implications for China 243, 253 interpretation of the Basic Law 12, 24, 38, 39, 40–1, 43 journalists 6, 9, 62–6 journalists’ professionalism 63–4, 75, 80, 82 judges 34, 37, 41, 42, 44, 50 judicial independence 24, 40–1, 43, 52 Labor aristocracy 112–13, 120–3, 125 Labor aristocrats 111, 119, 122, 124–5 Land Justice League 216 Law Society 35–9, 50–2 Lawyers 6, 8, 24, 34–7 lawyers collectively 35 lawyers’ political activism 34, 36 legal academy 48–9 legal complex 43, 48, 51, 55–6, 263 legitimacy 5, 12, 245; crisis 12, 255 Left-wing 116, 119, 121 Liberalization 6, 256 liberation theology 11, 140–3 localist 6, 12, 29, 31, 71, 73, 81 localists 30–1, 81, 134, 166 lobbying 4, 6, 9, 37, 210–11 Macao 45, 58, 178, 200, 236 march 28, 43, 50, 55, 71 mass mobilization 92–3, 96, 103, 182 mass participation 2, 15 Marxist 111–12, 114, 125 methods of interest articulation 5, 8, 247, 256 mobilization 5, 11–12, 15, 25–6 national identity 104, 107, 155–8 nationality 157 nativism 156, 161, 163, 245, 254

Index   279 nativist: groups 11, 29, 155–7, 159, 161; movements 156 new democracy movement 5–6, 13, 15, 26, 31 news media 42, 62–3, 79, 81 Occupy Central 2, 11–12, 15 Occupy movement 28, 191–3, 195 old democracy movement 5, 247, 253 one country, two systems 6, 8, 34, 39 opposition 10, 12, 23–4, 31, 38 organic intellectuals 1–3, 249–52 parochial 15–16 particularist 157 participation 2, 4–5, 8, 11, 15, 17, 20 patriotism 104, 176, 183, 201, 262 pluralism 29, 105–6, 251, 253 political: change 7, 20, 22–3, 95–6; co-optation 123–5; development 17, 57–8, 95, 156, 170; dissidents 98, 254; interest group 5, 7, 9, 12, 20, 22; institutions 8, 10, 94, 122, 124; interference 8, 38, 43, 77, 87, 137; neutrality 37, 50, 72, 235; participation 5, 17, 20, 33, 70, 141; pressure 9, 51, 68, 71, 73–4; space 9, 62–4, 67, 71, 73; supremacy 36; tolerance 7, 232, 239, 252, 254; transformations 5, 243 polity 111–12, 124 populist 12, 96, 206, 215–18, 223 powerless 111–12, 114, 121, 124–5 press freedom 9, 62–70 private property 80, 245 pro-Beijing candidate 117, 119, 124 pro-democracy camp 113, 115, 117, 122 pro-establishment camp 113, 115 pro-government 4, 6–8, 10, 25, 28 pro-independence 172 status quo 129, 136–7, 245 Professional Teachers’ Union 9, 21, 87 prosecutors 34 proletariat 3, 112, 114 propaganda 9, 19, 23 protests 4, 8, 17–18, 20, 23–4 public intellectuals 3–4, 13, 20, 239, 244 public interest 8–9, 35, 37–8, 55, 67 interest groups 2–8 radicalism 108, 181, 195–7 radicals 53, 181, 250 resistance 125, 262 right of abode 24, 38, 130, 145–6 rule of law 1, 6, 8, 10, 13, 24, 29, 37–8 right-wing 116, 120

sentiment 11, 18, 20, 30, 137, 139 Scholarism 12, 27, 28, 105, 174, 180–1 school based management 146 social fragmentation 196 social media 5, 11–12, 165, 173–4 social movement 218 solicitors 8, 35–7, 39, 51, 56, 60 standard working hours 10, 111, 119, 120, 123–4 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 12, 25, 280, 30–1, 105 statutory minimum wage 118, 120, 122–3, 126, 212 strikes 4, 8, 18, 47, 90 student: activism 24, 107–8, 174, 182, 190; groups 6, 28, 106, 174, 182, 188; movement 174, 179, 186, 190, 194, 225 students 6–7, 12, 21–3, 25, 27 sustain 10, 12, 64, 73, 75, 101 Tai, Benny 27, 48–9, 52, 59, 149 teachers 9, 21, 82, 87–8, 90–1 teaching profession 9, 88–9, 95, 101 Tiananmen Incident 104, 223, 228–9, 233, 238; tragedy 222, 229–31, 233 tolerance 7, 29, 105–6, 108, 232, 239 tolerant 104, 162, 254–5 trade unions 15, 28, 88, 103, 113–14 Trades Union Council 115–16, 120–1 the fourth estate 63, 69, 73, 83, 272 The Vatican 11, 140–1, 143, 145 universal suffrage 2, 11, 20, 25, 27–8, 42 vital force 34 watchdog journalism 9, 79 Wong, Joshua 12, 27, 47, 51, 105 workers 5, 10, 16–19 working-class organizations 111–13, 115–16 working-class movement 111–19, 121, 124–5 working-class unions 111–19, 121, 124–5 Xi, Jinping 26, 160, 170, 234, 248 youth group 12, 174, 193 youth activism 11, 174, 184, 198 youths 20, 175, 178, 193, 196 Youngspiration 164, 167–8, 173, 196

280   Index Zen Joseph (Bishop, Cardinal) 145, 148–53; critic of the HKSAR government 146, 148, 151; Zen and “right of abode” controversy 24, 38, 44, 130, 145–6; Zen and Article 23 of

the Basic Law 24, 43, 146, 230, 232; Zen and Education reform 101, 105, 108–9, 146, 161; Zen and Holy See’s relations with China 11, 149