The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong 9789048535248

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The Umbrella Movement

Publications The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a research and exchange platform based in Leiden, the Netherlands. Its objective is to encourage the interdisciplinary and comparative study of Asia and to promote (inter)national cooperation. IIAS focuses on the humanities and social sciences and on their interaction with other sciences. It stimulates scholarship on Asia and is instrumental in forging research networks among Asia Scholars. Its main research interests are reflected in the three book series published with Amsterdam University Press: Global Asia, Asian Heritages and Asian Cities. IIAS acts as an international mediator, bringing together various parties in Asia and other parts of the world. The Institute works as a clearinghouse of knowledge and information. This entails activities such as providing information services, the construction and support of international networks and cooperative projects, and the organization of seminars and conferences. In this way, IIAS functions as a window on Europe for non-European scholars and contributes to the cultural rapprochement between Europe and Asia. IIAS Publications Officer: Paul van der Velde IIAS Assistant Publications Officer: Mary Lynn van Dijk

Global Asia Asia has a long history of transnational linkage with other parts of the world. Yet the contribution of Asian knowledge, values, and practices in the making of the modern world has largely been overlooked until recent years. The rise of Asia is often viewed as a challenge to the existing world order. Such a bifurcated view overlooks the fact that the global order has been shaped by Asian experiences as much as the global formation has shaped Asia. The Global Asia Series takes this understanding as the point of departure. It addresses contemporary issues related to transnational interactions within the Asian region, as well as Asia’s projection into the world through the movement of goods, people, ideas, knowledge, ideologies, and so forth. The series aims to publish timely and well-researched books that will have the cumulative efffect of developing new perspectives and theories about global Asia. Series Editor: Tak-Wing Ngo, Professor of Political Science, University of Macau, China Editorial Board: Kevin Hewison, Sir Walter Murdoch Distinguished Professor of Politics and International Studies, Murdoch University, Australia / Hagen Koo, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii, USA / Loraine Kennedy, Directrice de recherche, Centre d’Études de l’Inde et de l’Asie du Sud, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, France / Guobin Yang, Associate Professor, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, USA

The Umbrella Movement Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong

Edited by Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng

Amsterdam University Press

Publications global asia 9

Cover illustration: © Ernie Tan Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6298 456 1 e-isbn 978 90 4853 524 8 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789462984561 nur 740 © Ngok Ma & Edmund W. Cheng / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2019 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher.



Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 7 Introduction 11 Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng

Part A  Trajectory and Contingency 1 From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience

27

2 Spontaneity and Civil Resistance

51

3 Rude Awakening

77

Hong Kong’s Road to Occupation Ngok Ma

A Counter Frame of the Umbrella Movement Edmund W. Cheng

New Participants and the Umbrella Movement Ngok Ma

Part B  Repertories and Strategies 4 Perceived Outcomes and Willingness to Retreatamong Umbrella Movement Participants

101

5 Praxis of Cultivating Civic Spontaneity

125

6 Creating a Textual Public Space

149

Francis Lee and Gary Tang

Aesthetic Intervention in the Umbrella Movement Cheuk-Hang Leung and Sampson Wong

Slogans and Texts from the Umbrella Movement Sebastian Veg

Part C  Regime and Public Responses 7 From Repression to Attrition

185

8 Protesters and Tactical Escalation

209

9 Mass Support for the Umbrella Movement

233

10 Correlates of Public Attitudes toward the Umbrella Movement

251

State Responses towards the Umbrella Movement Samson Yuen

Yongshun Cai

Ming Sing

Stan Hok-Wui Wong

Part D  Comparative Perspectives 11 The Power of Sunflower

279

12 The Mirror Image

311

13 Hong Kong Now, Shanghai Then

335

The Origin and the Impact of Taiwan’s Protest against Free Trade with China Ming-sho Ho and Thung-hong Lin

How does Macao Society read Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement? Eilo Yu Wing-yat

Jeffrey Wasserstrom

Appendix 347 The Umbrella Movement—Chronology of Major Events

Index 353

Acknowledgements The coming together of this edited volume, perhaps just like the Umbrella Movement itself, was a combination of long-term trends and spontaneous events. For those of us who had been closely watching the political development of Hong Kong since 1997, there was an air of inevitability to the massive outbreak of resistance in 2014. Hong Kong has been trapped in the status of a hybrid regime and embroiled in an extended democracy struggle for so many years. The futility of the democracy movement led to its radicalization and the polarization of political opinions in Hong Kong, which was in turn met with an autocratic turn from the Chinese government. There was an upswing of mobilization in street-level protests since 2003, which accelerated in 2009 and beyond and included more transgressive forms of resistance. The discussion and deliberation about a possible Occupy Central movement since early 2013 enhanced the tension and sense of urgency. The announcement of the August 31 resolution on the 2017 Chief Executive election by Beijing, which fell short of the expectations of most of the pro-democracy masses in Hong Kong, was bound to invite massive protests, probably in the form of a street occupation. Yet no one could have foreseen the student class boycott, the surprise occupation of the Civic Square, the firing of tear gas, the outpouring of anger, that ensued in the massive, spontaneous resistance that touched the world. After the September 28 outbreak, the chess game of the 79-day occupation continued to create many uncertainties for both participants and observers. While the nature of the appraisal and publication game in Hong Kong does not incentivize research and academic writing on Hong Kong politics, there are quite a few scholars who are deeply concerned about the social and political developments of Hong Kong. In recent years researchers on Hong Kong politics and social movements could not but focus on the bourgeoning movement industry and the stuttering and radicalizing democracy movement. To these researchers, including but not limited to the contributors of this volume, the global connection and peculiarity of Hong Kong’s political activism is a promising research agenda. Yet, few (if any) of us could have predicted the scale and scope of the Umbrella Movement and created detailed research plans beforehand. The commonly held estimation was that there might be an occupation, but that it would last only a few days before the hundreds or even thousands of protestors would be removed by the police. When the Umbrella Movement broke out between 26 and 28 September 2014, many of us watched the developments with concern and anxiety,

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without really making plans for “researching” the event. After a couple of weeks, it seemed likely that the occupation would last longer than expected, but nobody was certain about how long it would last. Most of the locally based scholars in this volume devised their own research methods, without real coordination for studying the movement—without even knowing what others were doing in this unprecedented historic event. The research mostly consisted of on-site field studies. The idea of putting together the related research started when the two editors ran into each other in October 2014 in the Admiralty occupation site. With the knowledge that there were a number of scholars conducting fieldwork studies about the occupation, we contemplated the possibility of putting these works together. We then scheduled a small-scale workshop and invited people who had done firsthand fieldwork during the occupation to present their findings. Most of the research papers in this edited volume originated in this workshop held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2015. To enrich the comparative and historical perspectives, we later invited scholars who have been working on social and political movements in other parts of Greater China to also contribute to the volume. Since 2014, a few monographs and edited volumes on the Umbrella Movement have been published. We still believe that we have not learned enough or written enough about this historic event whose significance reaches far beyond Hong Kong. A rich and multi-faceted movement that lasted for so long and in which so many people participated deserves much more attention and academic analysis to assess its causes, processes, and impacts. The publication of this edited volume relies much on the tolerance and hard work of Dr. Paul van der Velde and Mary Lynn van Dijk at the International Institute of Asian Studies, Jaap Wagenaar and Dr. Saskia Gieling at the Amsterdam University Press, and the Global Asia Series editor, Professor Tak-Wing Ngo, who offered much help at various stages of the editing and publication work. We also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who gave valuable advice, which greatly improved the content of our essays. Thanks are also due to Ms. Ernie Tan, who designed the front cover for us, and to research assistants, Wai-yin Chan, Fiona Lok, and Natalie Ngai, who provided editing and administrative help at different stages of the preparation and editing of the manuscript. Last but not least, thanks are due to the countless courageous, selfless, peace-loving, and creative people who had participated in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, without which of course this volume would not exist. The Umbrella Movement may not have brought about any institutional change, but as shown in the chapters in this volume, it had profound effects

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on Hong Kong’s political development and the people involved. It also provided inspiration to many people who participated in and witnessed the event, both in and outside Hong Kong. Events change history. Doug McAdam’s Freedom Summer, for example, details how the experience of a monumental movement left indelible marks on the life histories of those who went to Mississippi in 1964, marks that affected subsequent social movements and the course of American politics and society. Fifty years later, in a different part of the world, we can be sure that “Hong Kong is not the same” after the Umbrella Movement of 2014. Those who experienced the Umbrella Movement were inspired and impacted in diverse ways, which would change the political life of many people in Hong Kong hereafter.

Introduction Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng Abstract Analysis of the 2014 Umbrella Movement speaks to three strands of academic literature: contentious politics and space, hybrid regimes and democratization, and social movements in China and Hong Kong. Based mostly on fieldwork conducted during the occupation, this book brings together 14 experts who studied the Umbrella Movement from different theoretical perspectives with different methodologies. The studies in the book analyze the occupation as a spontaneous and emotional contentious action, which made good use of public space and creative passion. They also show how civil resistance was shaped and constrained by the hybrid regime and situate the Hong Kong movement in a broader comparative perspective in reference to past student movements in China and protests in Taiwan and Macau. Keywords: civil resistance, social movements, China, Hong Kong, hybrid regime, Umbrella Movement

For 79 days in 2014, the Umbrella Movement staged Hong Kong’s most spectacular struggle for democracy and brought the city into the global spotlight. Sparked by disgruntlement over Beijing’s denial of an unfettered, free chief executive election in 2017, the protest began with a class boycott and later morphed into a spontaneous, resilient street occupation of three centralized locations in the city. Roads and pavements were turned into protest sites and tent villages. The label “Umbrella Movement/Revolution” originated from a cover story in TIME Magazine, which showed protesters holding umbrellas aloft to fend off tear gas and pepper spray from the police. The protesters’ actions signified the peaceful and plebeian nature of the

Ma, N. and E.W. Cheng (eds.). The Umbrella Movement. Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, Amsterdam University Press, 2019 doi: 10.5117/9789462984561/intro

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protest—a bottom-up and spontaneous campaign against top-down state control and power. The Umbrella Movement was a significant episode for both new global activism and Hong Kong’s political history. Even by international standards, it was a mass-scale civil disobedience movement spanning nearly three months. University polls showed that 18–20 percent of the city’s population, or 1.3 to 1.45 million people, participated in the movement (CUHKCCPOS, 2014; HKUPOP, 2014). The number of protesters who participated in the Umbrella Movement is similar to other recent monumental events that brought about significant political changes, such as the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in which 18 percent of Ukrainians participated, and the Arab Spring protests in Tunisia and Egypt, which comprised 8 and 12 percent of their respective populations (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur, 2012). However, the Umbrella Movement did not bring about a change of political institutions: no government officials were held accountable or forced to step down; no socio-political reforms have been tabled. Nonetheless, the Umbrella Movement is an unprecedented example of civil resistance in terms of form, nature, and scale. It granted the issue of Hong Kong’s democracy to recapture the attention of the international media, Western governments, and the global community as a whole (Veg, 2015). It also represented a grand-scale political awakening for many generations including the youth. While its apparent failure to bring about full democracy seemed to mark the end of Hong Kong’s long-envisioned gradual transition to democracy (Ma, 2007), the contentious space of the protest served as both a carrier and an amplifier of democratic spirits. The deep plebeian experience and the regime’s reluctance to concede have also given a strong impetus to the currents toward self-determination after 2014, which have fundamentally redefined the China–Hong Kong relationship and led to increasingly severe control over the territory from Beijing. As one of the most dramatic social protests in the twenty-first century, the Umbrella Movement illustrates the multifaceted dynamics of opportunities, frames, and responses toward mass protest in a hybrid regime context (Tilly and Tarrow, 2016). Originating from a fight for democracy, the resilient occupation soon became intertwined with deep social tensions within and beyond the protest sites and across the city’s border. International observers and journalists were impressed by the diversified, innovative, and original expressions of passion in the temporarily liberated urban space, and mostly framed the occupation a peaceful and self-restrained democracy movement. In contrast, the government and pro-regime media framed the mass protests as a violent and illegal occupation orchestrated by anti-Chinese forces. In

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doing so, they tried to undermine the spontaneous and civic nature of the movement, which attracted new participants, organizational forms, and movement repertoires that featured a lack of clear leadership or coordinated strategy. Although protesters were contesting the boundaries of contentious politics in Hong Kong, the leaders in Beijing and Hong Kong, who were wrapped around the context of a hybrid regime or liberal autocracy, opted to neither concede to nor suppress the movement (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Instead, the regime adapted a series of responses, including counter-framing, counter-mobilization, and a mixture of tolerance and the threat of violence, that, in the end, managed to tire out the movement. In this light, the study of the Umbrella Movement as a critical and novel event has implications that go beyond an understanding of Hong Kong politics and social movements. In our view, this study can contribute to at least three strands of the current academic literature, namely, the new contentious politics, hybrid regimes, and China and Hong Kong studies.

Contentious Space and its Global (Dis)Connectivity The Umbrella Movement, or at least the original, carefully planned Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement, was inspired by the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, and its spin-off the smaller-scale Occupy Central Movement held in Hong Kong in the same year. With waves of massive occupation movements occurring around the world, most markedly the Arab Spring upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt, a global trend of political activism and social movements in recent years has become apparent. By situating the Umbrella Movement in the historical trajectory of new activism both globally and in Hong Kong, this volume explains how and why spontaneous actions are by no means the antithesis of rationality and organization (Fominaya, 2015; Snow and Moss, 2014; Cheng and Chan, 2017). Specifically, this volume examines the conditions under which networked civil society groups and social media helped to aggregate people from diverse backgrounds into public spaces, through the logic of connective actions (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012), to produce a decentralized protest structure that facilitated the resiliency of the occupation. The prevalence of new protest forms and mediating tools situates the Umbrella Movement within the recent wave of popular mobilizations, through which collective identities have emerged in the struggle for social equality caused by political disenfranchisement and uncompleted decolonization (Dabashi, 2012; Gitlin, 2012).

14 Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng

This volume also goes beyond the traditions of social movement studies that focus on resource mobilization and political opportunities by instead paying more attention to the role of emotions and new agency in the protests (Aminzade et al., 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001; Jasper, 2011; Sewell, 2005). We show how indignation, driven by police violence, helps both stalwart protesters and newcomers to practice direct action and civil disobedience, transgressing the norms of a conservative political culture and lawful protests. This volume also offers a multilateral understanding of contentious space. “Space” here refers to both the varied physical protest sites and the visual communities that emerge from connective actions, from where the dynamics of protest actions are shaped (Juris, 2012; Lee and Chan, 2018). It shows how free expression in contested spaces serve as a praxis of civic collective action. Spontaneous and massive participation evolves its own logic and rationality. New forms of collective and connective actions are path-dependent, conditioned by contingent events as much as by antecedent experiences that shape the protest agency’s cognitive capacity. We need to place the protests in the context of Hong Kong’s protracted democratic struggle as a hybrid regime since the 1980s, to explain how and why structural constraints on civil disobedience and occupy tactics can be overcome.

Civil Resistance in Hybrid Regimes The Umbrella Movement originated from a fight for full democracy, from the aspiration of Hong Kong’s people to shake off their perennial hybrid regime and sub-national status and become a genuine liberal democracy (Ma, 2005; Cheng, 2016). Throughout the occupation campaign, the nature of Hong Kong as a hybrid regime defined, framed, and constrained the process and outcome of the movement, including the possible strategies and responses of state and non-state actors. The Umbrella Movement originated from frustration about the futility of three decades of the democracy movement in Hong Kong. Despite strong public support, the democrats have had no institutional power or channel through which they could draw Beijing into negotiations or force the latter to deliver full democracy to Hong Kong. This drove the democratic leaders and their followers to try more radical, nonconventional, and extra-legal means to fight for democracy, culminating in the mass-scale occupation campaign. In the end, the lack of institutional channels and the power imbalance between Hong Kong and

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Beijing remained an important factor in the 79-day occupation’s inability to force any concessions. However, Hong Kong’s long history and reputation as a free city with a strong tradition of the rule of law also constrains and shapes both protest strategies and state responses. “Damaging the rule of law” has always been the most powerful framing used against the OCLP, whose organizers emphasized the protest’s peaceful nature and the moral nature of civil disobedience. Hong Kong’s long history of freedom, stability, and peaceful protest meant that tear gas and batons were already seen as intolerably violent by many people in Hong Kong, so their use served as enough of a provocation and awakening for many people. Hong Kong’s image as a free city also constrained the use of force by the state, partly explaining their strategy of tolerance and attrition. Thus, this volume adds to our understanding of the source and determinants of protest outcomes under hybrid regimes, as well as the patterns of political change after a transformative event (Guigni, 1998; Hess and Martin, 2006; Calhoun, 2013). Recent literature on hybrid regimes and authoritarian reversals has shown that hybrid regime leaders are quickly learning to adaptively suppress or tolerate protests, thereby reducing the pressure for political concessions and social change (Robertson, 2010; Yuen and Cheng, 2017). Through diverse strategies of elite cohesion, media framing, and counter-movements, these hybrid regimes manage to consolidate their rule. While the innovative performance, ideology, and protest structures of the new movements boosted mobilization, they were deficient in organizational capacity and ultimately failed to effect major political change.

Social Protests in China and Hong Kong It must never be overlooked that the Umbrella Movement was a mass-scale protest on Chinese soil. It took place at a time when China has become more autocratic, increased its international influence and prowess, and grown more confident that the “China model” of governance is superior and capable of standing against the pressure of Western democracies (Nathan, 2015). Nevertheless, international pressure and concern over Hong Kong’s freedom and autonomy continued to be an important constraint for China’s inaction concerning and tolerance of the movement, as high-handed repressions could have brought about political backlash or repercussions from the West.

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Since the idea of an occupy campaign was raised in 2013, Beijing remained the ultimate arbiter of the extent and model of constitutional reform in Hong Kong, as well as state responses to the actual Umbrella Movement. Thoughts and memories of the 1989 Tiananmen protest were invariably invoked, at least at the early stages of the occupation. Fear of a repeat of the brutal 1989 crackdown has always hung over the head of all the protest’s leaders, framing their choice of movement strategies. Within the context of Greater China, the Umbrella Movement inherits a long tradition of student movements, dating to at least the 1919 May Fourth Movement. The Chinese government was wary of the movement’s spillover effects, so people on the mainland who voiced support for the Umbrella Movement were arrested and punished heavily. Activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan have frequently exchanged ideas and learned from each other in recent years, as both communities thought about how to resist China’s control and influence. The March 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, when students crashed the gate of the Legislative Yuan and occupied it for several days, was commonly seen as a twin of the Umbrella Movement. This volume also assesses the peculiarity or generality of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong by referring to other protests in Greater China, including China’s past student movements, Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, and Macau’s responses. In the perspective of Hong Kong studies, the Umbrella Movement dealt another blow to long-held notions that Hong Kong’s people are apathetic, that they only harbored a “partial vision of democracy” or were “attentive spectators” (Lau and Kuan, 1995) and “occasional activists” (Lee and Chan, 2008). The resilience of this massive protest also indicates that the analysis of institutional deficiencies, legitimacy crises, or governance ills alone is insufficient for explaining the outbreak of the campaign (Ma, 2007; Sing, 2009; Ortmann, 2009). By exploring the attitudes and motivations of the participants, this volume takes a deeper look at the psychological orientations of the Umbrella protest cohort (Cf. Lee, 2015), thereby revealing a more complicated picture of democratic aspirations, pragmatism, rethinking the city, praxis, and calculation. Years after the conclusion of the Umbrella occupation, it may be still too early to make conclusions about the effects of the movement on Hong Kong’s future. Although some people have definitely been “awakened” by the experience, its impact on their future participation or the direction of future movements is uncertain. For want of a clear leadership that points to a future path, for many the Umbrella Movement may remain a “moment” and not a “movement” or “revolution” with a clear ideological blueprint. It

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was, nonetheless, a major experience of citizen empowerment, a “plebeian experience”, an eruption of civic energy that did not crystalize into large political organizations, but instead left traces and kept the hope alive that the world can be changed alive (Breaugh, 2013; Krastev, 2014).

Methodology and Origins of the Book Although the original OCLP movement was scripted in detail during a long period of planning and deliberation, the outbreak of the occupation on 28 September 2014 was largely spontaneous and did not proceed as originally planned by the OCLP. The spontaneous nature of the movement meant that almost none of the authors in this book had detailed plans to conduct fieldwork on the occupation movement beforehand. The OCLP was expected to last for at most a few days before the protesters would be removed. During the outbreak from 26 to 28 September, most researchers concerned with political developments in Hong Kong were watching with anxiety, unaware of how long the movement could last. As a result, most of the authors in this volume began to conduct fieldwork at the occupation sites only in October, when it was apparent that the occupation could last for a longer period. Without much coordination, the scholars involved in this volume proceeded based on their own theoretical persuasions and perspectives; designed their own methodology, hypotheses, and questions; and conducted their own research on the movement. They spent much of their time at multiple field sites across time, talking to orga­nizers and protesters, participating in their meetings, and observing their practices and strategies, as well as situating the joys and fears of both casual and stalwart protesters. Some scholars conducted random sample surveys to capture changes in the protest’s claims and attitudes, along with the opinions of non-participating members of the public. Others interviewed protest leaders and politicians to unpack the decision-making process and power dynamics of the so-called decentered protests. This spontaneous order of research efforts has brought an interesting diversity of research methods to this volume, resulting in a thickened understanding of the complex and multifaceted Umbrella Movement. The idea of bringing all of this fieldwork together started when the two editors ran into each other at the Admiralty site in October 2014. We then scheduled a small-scale workshop that invited people who had done firsthand fieldwork during the occupation to present their findings. Most of the

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research papers in this edited volume originated from this workshop at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2015. Thus, a common thread that runs through most of the Hong Kong chapters is the use of first-hand data based on interviews, surveys, and fieldwork conducted during the occupation.

Structure of the Volume The aims of this volume are both empirical and theoretical. The occupy tactics and networked actions of the Umbrella Movement were surveyed to demonstrate how contentious space can be the carrier and amplifier for democratic spirits. On the one hand, these voluntary and participatory practices attract a broader populace both within and beyond the city. Life stories and images connect diverse individuals, both at the physical sites of the movement and in virtual communities related to it. Such connections partly explain why public support did not significantly diminish over the 79-day period despite activists’ tactical errors and the regime’s strategic responses. The decentralized movement made contention resilient and variegated while empowering ordinary citizens to express grievances through their own agency and tools, without relying on the intermediation of political parties or movement organizations. On the other hand, the claims and values committed by the protest agency are both old and new. These articulations are old, in the sense that protesters still considered liberal democratic institutions to be the solution to their socioeconomic grievances and disenfranchisement. They are also new, in the sense that the protesters embodied an increasingly collective local identity in their democratic struggle. By subsuming universal suffrage under an identity frame, the Umbrella Movement articulated a claim that synergized the subject of contention between political representation and political belonging. In the face of Beijing’s authoritarian advances, mass mobilization and identity construction are intertwined. The peculiarity of Hong Kong’s new social movements lies in their transgression of stagnant repertoires in an apathetic society performed by rational spectators. This volume brings together 14 experts from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and Macau. Most of the chapters dealing with Hong Kong are based on empirical research conducted during the occupation period. We also draw comparative and historical perspectives by situating the Umbrella Movement in the broader context of social movements in Greater China across space and time. Part A focuses on the impetuses and claims that account for the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. It begins with Ngok Ma’s background chapter

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(Chapter One), which outlines the trajectory of Hong Kong’s social and democracy movements over the past four decades. Chapter One offers the historical context for understanding how conventional protests have evolved into direct actions in the past. Decades of fruitless struggles for democracy and the coming of a new protest agency have sown the seeds for unprecedented civil resistance, as the young generation is determined to seize their own political future. In Chapter Two, Edmund Cheng examines the relationships between the contingent and antecedent origins of the Umbrella Movement. Using data derived mainly from a large-scale onsite survey, he shows how educated youth and stalwart protesters formed the core of the protest, generating preemptive occupations and emotional primaries to spawn and sustain self-mobilized, horizontal, and participatory practices. By situating spontaneity in an eventful analysis, Cheng makes sense of the uncompromising claims and resilience of the occupation. In contrast, Ngok Ma (Chapter Three) is more interested in exploring the motives and thoughts of the committed occupiers at the three sites. His in-depth interviews suggest that many of those committed occupiers were newcomers to protesting and were mostly provoked by police brutality. Their anger enabled them to overcome the threshold of participation and join the civil disobedience movement. This spontaneous nature also partly explains their choice of the form and structure for the movement. Part B focuses on the diversity of protest strategies and repertoires in the 79 days of the occupation. In Chapter Four, Francis Lee and Gary Tang examine how eff icacy and perceived outcomes shaped the protesters’ decisions about strategies and practices. Using survey data obtained from the Admiralty and Mongkok sites, the authors show that instrumental rationality is not necessarily incompatible with new social movements. Lee and Tang conclude that a decentralized movement makes strategic decisions unfeasible—not because all protesters are expressive in spontaneous actions or unwilling to compromise, but because they cannot agree on when and how to dialogue or retreat. In Chapter Five, Cheuk-Hang Leung and Sampson Wong expand the category of repertoires to include expressive and participatory practices of art in the occupied squares, streets, and other urban public spaces. They discuss the overlapping spheres of politics and aesthetics that connect the Umbrella Movement to the global wave of activism since 2011. As diverse forms of artistic participation and creative practices help build emotional attachment to the space, acquire a sense of place, and persuade fellow citizens to join an event of civil disobedience, Leung and Wong’s chapter analyzes how participants also found a mode of personal existence and demonstrated civic and moral identities in the

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collective actions. In parallel, Sebastian Veg (Chapter Six) analyzes the textuality of more than 1000 slogans and texts created by diverse groups and exhibited in the occupied space. He observes a great diversity of historical and cultural references with expressive connotations and communication effects that result in debate and reflection upon the connections and contradictions between the occupy community and the Hong Kong and Chinese political communities. By articulating the deliberative nature and hybrid characters of the Umbrella Movement, Veg differentiates it from other more contentious forms of social movement in China and beyond. The four chapters in Part C analyze the strategies, responses, and attitudes of the movement, the state, and the public. In Chapter Seven, Samson Yuen discusses in detail the state’s choice of strategies and the motives behind them. He shows how the state shied away from repression; instead of concession, they adapted a strategy of “attrition” in order to outlast the protesters. Complemented with counter-framing, counter-movements, and legal intervention, this strategy can be effective in hybrid regimes seeking to avoid massive repression without giving in to reforms. In Chapter Eight, Yongshun Cai analyzes the movement leaders’ strategic decision to escalate the protests through interviews with the student leaders. He shows that the illconceived escalation was a major reason for the gradual loss of public support during the later stages of the movement. The chapters by Sing Ming and Stan Wong deal with the attitudes of the public. From a macro perspective, Sing Ming’s Chapter Nine analyzes how grievances (including socioeconomic ones) against governance, distrust of the Chinese government, and the perceived worsening of the freedom situation fueled the drive for protest. In Chapter Ten, Stan Wong explores what the public thought of the Umbrella Movement through a street survey in November and December 2014. Wong discovered that, instead of a fear of suppression, citizens refrained from supporting the Umbrella Movement because they were skeptical of the capacity of democracy to solve their daily problems; they worried that the campaign was damaging the rule of law. In a way, this showed the effectiveness of the counter-frames the government used against the occupy campaign. In Part D, we bring the Umbrella Movement into comparative perspective with other areas in Greater China and with past student protests in China. In Chapter Eleven, Ming-sho Ho and Thung-hong Lin discuss the origins of the Taiwan Sunflower Movement. They show that it was the economic victims of cross-strait trade liberalization, suffering from rising inequality and unemployment, who formed the major support for the Sunflower Movement. The Sunflower Movement was thus an example of the backfiring of Beijing’s political use of capitalism, as people in Taiwan were concerned that

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deeper economic integration with China would hurt democracy in Taiwan. In contrast, in Chapter Twelve Eilo Yu shows that in Macau, the Umbrella Movement was seen as a negative example of a democracy movement, which hurt relations with Beijing and, hence, affected the economy of Macau. With the pervasiveness of pro-Beijing sentiments and strong social control by pro-government groups, Macau society showed a lukewarm response to the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement. Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s concluding thoughts in Chapter Thirteen take us through time and space to various episodes of student protest in China and elsewhere. These protests and movements at times show remarkable similarities, to the extent that it all sounds familiar to an observer as “outside” as Adam Michnik. Although history may not always repeat itself, a lot can be learned from more detailed studies of comparative and historical episodes of massive protests.

Bibliography Aminzade, Ronald, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Beissinger, Mark, Amaney Jamal, and Kevin Mazur. 2012. “Who Participated in the Arab Spring?” Paper presented at the APSR annual meeting, New Orleans. Bennett, W. Lance, and Alexandra Segerberg. 2012. “The Logic of Connective Action.” Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 15, pp. 739-768. Breaugh, Martin. 2013. The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History of Political Freedom. New York: Columbia University Press. Calhoun, Craig. 2013. “Occupy Wall Street in perspective.” British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 26-38. Cheng, Edmund W. 2016. “Street Politics in a Hybrid Regime: The Diffusion of Political Activism in Post-colonial Hong Kong.” The China Quarterly, Vol. 226, pp. 1-24. Cheng, Edmund W., and Wai-yin Chan. 2017. “Explaining Spontaneous Occupation: Antecedents, Contingencies and Space in the Umbrella Movement.” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 222-239. CUHKCCPOS (Chinese University of Hong Kong Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey). 2014. “Public Opinion and Political Development in Hong Kong Survey Results.” Online: http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/ TaskForce_PressRelease_141218_English.pdf., accessed on 18 December 2014. Dabashi, Hamid. 2012. The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism. New York: Zed Books.

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Fominaya, Christina Flesher. 2015. “Debunking Spontaneity: Spain’s 15-M/Indignados as Autonomous Movement.” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 142-163. Gitlin, Todd. 2012. Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street. New York: Harper Collins. Giugni, Marco. 1998. “Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 24, pp. 371-393. Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. 2011. Passionate Politics: Emotion and Social Movements. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Hess, David, and Brian Martin. 2006. “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events.” Mobilization, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 249-267. HKUPOP (Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme). 2014. “Survey on CE Election and Occupy Central Campaign.” Online: http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/ report/mpCEnOCCw7/index.html, accessed on 1 December 2014. Jasper, James M. 2011. “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 37, pp. 285-303. Juris, Jeffrey S. 2012. “Reflections on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of Aggregation.” American Ethnologist, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 259-279. Krastev, Ivan. 2014. “From Politics to Protest.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 5-19. Kuan Hsin-chi, and Lau Siu-kai. 1995. “The Partial Vision of Democracy In Hong Kong: A Survey Of Popular Opinion.” The China Journal, Vol. 34, pp. 239-264. Lau Siu-Kai, and Kuan Hsin-Chi. 1995. “The Attentive Spectators: Political Participation of The Hong Kong Chinese”. Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 3-24. Lee, Francis L.F. 2015. “Social Movement as Civic education: Communication Activities and Understanding of Civil Disobedience in the Umbrella Movement.” Chinese Journal of Communication, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 393-411. Lee, Francis L.F., and Joseph M. Chan. 2008. “Making Sense of Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-Democracy Demonstrators in Hong Kong.” The China Quarterly, Vol. 193, pp. 84-101. Lee, Francis L.F., and Joseph M. Chan. 2018. Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Ma, Ngok. 2005. “Civil Society in Self-defence: The Struggle against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong.” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 44, pp. 465-482. Ma, Ngok. 2007. Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

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Ma, Ngok. 2011. “Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong Kong.” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 683-712. Nathan, Andrew J. 2015. “China’s Challenge.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 156-170. Ortmann, Stephan. 2009. Politics and Change in Singapore and Hong Kong: Containing Contention. New York: Routledge. Robertson, Graeme B. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Sewell, William H. Jr. 2005. Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sing Ming, ed. 2009. Politics and Government in Hong Kong: Crisis under Chinese Sovereignty. London: Routledge. Snow, David, and Dana M. Moss. 2014. “Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movement.” American Sociological Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, pp. 1122-1143. Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. 2016. Contentious Politics, 2nd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. Veg, Sebastian. 2015. “Legalistic and Utopian: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement.” New Left Review, Vol. 92, pp. 55-73. Yuen, Samson, and Edmund W. Cheng. 2017. “Neither Repression nor Concession? A Regime’s Attrition against Mass Protests.” Political Studies, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 611-630.

About the Authors Ngok Ma is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include political institutions, social movements, electoral and party politics, state-society relations, and democratization in Hong Kong. He has published five books and more than 20 refereed journal articles on Hong Kong, including in The China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy, Economy and Society, and Journal of Contemporary China. Edmund W. Cheng is an Associate Professor at the Department of Public Policy at City University of Hong Kong. His research interests include contentious politics, political sociology, political communication, Hong Kong politics, and Global China. He has published articles in China Quarterly, China Journal, Social Movement Studies, and Political Studies. He received the 2016 Gordon White Prize for the most original article published in China Quarterly.

Part A Trajectory and Contingency

1

From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience Hong Kong’s Road to Occupation Ngok Ma

Abstract The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement in 2014 followed decades of futility in the democracy movement. Years of conventional protests and bargaining had failed to bring about full democracy for Hong Kong. The rise of a new political identity and trends of radicalization in social and political movements fuelled the massive civil disobedience campaign. With Beijing handing down an election formula that allowed popular elections only after a Beijing-controlled committee screened the candidates, the opposition was prepared to launch an occupation campaign. Police violence then triggered the spontaneous participation of the masses, culminating in the 79-day occupation that signified a new stage of contentious movements for Hong Kong. Keywords: Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong democracy, civil disobedience, political identity, social movements, China-Hong Kong relations

Introduction The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement in September 2014 was a result of the futility of decades of democratic struggle in Hong Kong. It also marked a major turning point in the direction of social movements in Hong Kong, as large numbers of activists opted to undertake direct action and civil disobedience in defiance of police power and possible prosecution. This followed the rise of a new political identity among the younger generation, who were determined to have more say in their political future, as well as a more general trend towards radicalization in local movements.

Ma, N. and E.W. Cheng (eds.). The Umbrella Movement. Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, Amsterdam University Press, 2019 doi: 10.5117/9789462984561/ch01

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This chapter discusses the social and democracy movements in Hong Kong over the last 40 years to put the Umbrella Movement into perspective. Decades of fruitless struggles for democracy drove Hong Kong’s people onto the road of civil disobedience. The Umbrella Movement was also sparked by a new generation of activists who are more efficacious and empowered. This chapter provides a background for readers unfamiliar with the political history of Hong Kong, to help in understanding the 2014 Umbrella Movement.

Politics in Postwar Hong Kong The dominant narrative concerning the political situation of early postwar Hong Kong describes an apolitical population facing a non-interventionist government. Siu-kai Lau’s famous “minimally-integrated socio-political system” formulation posited that postwar Hong Kong was a refugee society, with most inhabitants settling in Hong Kong after fleeing communist rule (1984). Although Hong Kong had no democracy before the 1980s and social welfare protection was minimal, there was little political participation because the Hong Kong Chinese were characterized by “utilitarianistic familism,” meaning they mostly focused on making a living and resolved life problems through family networks rather than political participation. With the colonial government being least penetrative to the Chinese society, this created a “boundary consciousness” between the colonial state and Chinese society in the early postwar years. The Chinese society had few demands for the colonial government, in exchange for the non-intervention from the regime (Lau, 1984). For many years, Lau’s narrative served as the dominant explanation for the postwar stability of rapidly industrializing Hong Kong. There were a few dissenters. King (1975) claimed that the colonial government maintained stability by “administrative absorption”, with Chinese business and professional elites coopted by appointment into advisory committees and consultative bodies appended to the administrative structure. Lam (2004) showed that there were social and political movements of considerable scope, intensity, and publicity, while others demonstrated that industrial conflicts were not uncommon from the 1950s to 1970s (Turner et al., 1980; England and Rear, 1975). Research by other scholars showed that the non-intervention policy of the colonial state had been overemphasized (Chiu and Hung, 1999; Ngo, 1997). Wong and Lui (2000) pointed out that market mechanisms, instead of family networks, were crucial for solving daily livelihood problems in the postwar era. In the light of these critiques, it appears that Lau’s cultural

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thesis might not, by itself, be sufficient for explaining the relatively low level of political participation in Hong Kong. Yet it is also true that, aside from the 1967 riots instigated by the local pro-CCP masses, there were few direct challenges to colonial rule in postwar Hong Kong. Despite the absence of elections for major public offices, there was relatively little public resistance to the colonial government before the 1970s.

The Coming of the Social Movement Industry The 1970s saw a rise in social movements in Hong Kong, as a result of a combination of factors. Politically, after the challenge of the 1966 and 1967 riots, the colonial government changed its governing strategy to one of “consultative democracy” as networks to collect public opinion were extended, in particular an expansion of government-appointed advisory committees to incorporate more societal opinion. Increased tolerance for public protests in the 1970s created a “political opportunity structure” for new pressure groups (Chiu and Lui, 2000: 7) to step up political participation. Economically and socially, the two decades of postwar economic growth were not accompanied by a similarly rapid development of social services such as in housing, education and labor protection. Social problems abounded, with a new generation of young activists demanding government action to improve the well-being of the lower class. Demographically, the 1970s saw the coming of age of postwar baby-boomers, who were better educated but dissatisfied with the ills of colonial governance (e.g., widespread corruption). Culturally, a new Hong Kong indigenous identity was beginning to ferment. Starting with student movements in the early 1970s, this young generation no longer saw themselves as refugees and had a stronger sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and were willing to fight for its future (Ma, 2009). The movement in the 1970s was a confluence of the various political sentiments of the time. Under the influence of the global trend of radicalism in the 1960s, leftist thought had its fair share of impact on the activists. The movements in the early 1970s were largely characterized by strong nationalist and anti-colonial flavors, including the movement for the Protection of the Diaoyu Islands, the movement to make Chinese an official language, and the anti-corruption movement. These were followed by movements by pressure groups advocating for improvements in housing, education, social welfare, and labor conditions in Hong Kong. With no elected elements in the formal power structure, these movements were limited to petitions and street action aimed at mobilizing public sympathy and pressure on

30 Ngok Ma

the government. The focus was on social reforms instead of change in the political power structure, as people vested little hope in the possibility that the colonial regime would democratize.

The Arrested Democratization The Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD) of 1984, which returned Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, triggered a process of decolonization and democratization. The promise that “Hong Kong people [would be] ruling Hong Kong” after 1997 sparked hopes that a democratic system would be instituted after decolonization. The JD also stipulated that the post-1997 Chief Executive would be selected “on the basis of consultations or elections in Hong Kong” and that “the legislature is going to be borne by elections.” This led to a blossoming of new political groups in the 1980s, which aspired to participate in building the political future of Hong Kong. Many social movement groups and activists who had fought for social reform since the 1970s formed alliances to fight for democratization before and after 1997. To these activists, the democracy movement was a natural sequel to the social movements of the 1970s: after pushing for social reform, the divestiture of political power should be next on the agenda, especially as part of the process of decolonization. The key struggle in the 1980s surrounded the provisions in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution that would govern Hong Kong after 1997. Believing that a democratic system would better defend the rights and lifestyle of the Hong Kong people after 1997, the pro-democracy alliance fought for a progressive transition to full democracy. Their goal was for the Chief Executive (CE) and the full Legislative Council (Legco) to be popularly elected after 1997. Beijing was never sympathetic to the possibility of full democracy in Hong Kong, but they believed some democratic representation would help pacify the Hong Kong people during the political transition. Their major ally was the business conservatives in Hong Kong, who had enjoyed great political influence through their cooptation into the colonial system. Pro-Beijing community groups helped mobilize followers to counter the pro-democracy opinions. Years of bargaining between Beijing, Britain, and advocates of democracy in Hong Kong brought about a partially democratic political structure for the Basic Law. The mini-constitution ensured that both the CE and the full Legco would ultimately be elected through universal suffrage (Article 45 and 68)—the timing of which, however, was not specified. The system laid down for the first ten years after 1997 had the CE elected by an

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Election Committee of a few hundred members, who mostly represented the most influential business and professional groups. Half of the Legco members would be elected by the Functional Constituencies (FCs), which again largely represented the business and professional elites. The proportion of popularly-elected seats gradually increased from one-third in 1997 to one-half in 2004. Changing the electoral method of the CE and the Legco after 1997 requires the approval of two-thirds of Legco members, the CE, and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) of China, which means Beijing holds the key power of veto.

Years of Bargaining The constitutional framework laid down in the Basic Law created an inherent legitimacy problem for the Hong Kong government. The system was obviously biased in favor of the business sector and upper classes, and yet constitutionally Hong Kong was guaranteed a full democracy. By promising universal suffrage as the ultimate constitutional goal, it rendered the EC and FC systems only transitional arrangements. This is a common problem for autocratic or hybrid regimes that have a liberal constitution: the leaders will be called on to deliver democracy (Kuan, 1998: 1444; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 15). The legitimacy problem was aggravated by two features of the Hong Kong political system. As a liberal autocracy (Kuan and Lau, 2002), the Basic Law protects the civil liberties and rule of law of Hong Kong’s people. While they are free to criticize government policies and officials and organize opposition movements, they cannot replace the unpopular leaders through the ballot box. Moreover, since partial elections were introduced into the Legco in 1991, democrats consistently obtained 55-60 percent of the popular vote. Since no more than half of the Legco was open for popular election, however, the democrats were in a “permanent minority” position, although they claimed to represent the majority of public opinion. The government could usually rely on a pro-government, pro-business majority to pass their bills. Their decisions could not command much legitimacy if opposed by the pro-democracy opposition. If the pre-1997 legitimacy of the Hong Kong government was partly based on economic and government performance (Sing, 1996), economic and political changes after 1997 quickly called this legitimacy into question. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 plunged Hong Kong into an economic downturn, with many blaming the government for not doing enough to bring about a swift recovery. The government of the first post-1997 Chief Executive,

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Tung Chee-hwa, was plagued by a series of scandals, administrative mistake, ill-advised reforms, and policy failures. Public dissatisfaction was brought to a trigger point by mid-2003. The economy hit a new low when the city was badly affected by the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in March–May 2003. In a matter of two months 299 people were killed by the deadly virus, and the government was widely criticized of an initial cover-up, slow response, and inability to rescue the economy. Despite the economic recession, the government still tried to push through a National Security legislation that would outlaw secession, sedition, theft of state secrets, and links with foreign political organizations. Legal professionals, human right groups, and democrats generally criticized the proposed bill as too loose and vague in key areas, and therefore threatening to the long-cherished freedom of Hong Kong.1 The 1 July 2003 rally marked a total outburst of political and economic dissatisfaction against the Hong Kong government. While the main goal was the abrogation of the National Security Bill, the 500,000 people who took to the streets chanting “Down with Tung Chee-hwa!” despite the intense summer heat showed deep dissatisfaction with the CE and his governance. The 1 July 2003 rally proved to be a major turning point for democracy and social movements in Hong Kong. The democrats rode the momentum of the demonstration to demand universal suffrage in elections for the 2007 CE and 2008 Legco. As far as social activism is concerned, the rally was a watershed event that empowered the younger generation (Lee and Chan, 2008). Beijing’s quick response to the demand for full democracy in 2007/08 was a vehement propaganda campaign that accused the democrats of being “unpatriotic” Western collaborators. Full democracy in Hong Kong, this propaganda alleged, might put the unpatriotic democrats in power—a theme that would be repeated many times. Without direct dialogue and consultations in Hong Kong, the NPCSC handed down a resolution in April 2004 that stated the 2007 CE and 2008 Legco could not be elected through universal suffrage and that the change to the electoral methods would be minimal. Beijing also redefined the procedures for constitutional change: initiation of changes in electoral methods now needed the approval of Beijing before it could be put to vote in the Hong Kong Legco.2 1 For the debate around the national security legislation, see Ma (2005). 2 The original Annex I and II of the Basic Law stated that changes to electoral methods required the support of the Chief Executive, a two-thirds majority support of the Legco, and the f inal approval of the NPCSC. The reinterpretation of the Basic Law in 2004 added more elaborate procedures.

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The Upswing of Mobilization, New Social Movements, and Radicalization The years after 2003 saw a change in the direction of social and political movements in Hong Kong. Empowered by the 2003 triumph, starting in 2005 a younger crop of activists began to actively participate in social movements with a focus on heritage protection and environmental concerns. The protest against the demolition of Star Ferry was a landmark event in this regard. In December 2006, the government tried to demolish a historic pier at Central to allow the construction of new transportation networks. A group of young activists occupied the worksite, trying to stop the workmen from demolishing the clock tower. This move aroused great sympathy from the public and triggered similar heritage protection movements in the years that followed. These movements were different from the traditional social movements, as they invariably pointed towards post-materialist goals instead of livelihood issues. In hailing the importance of heritage protection, activists tried to rewrite and redefine the historical narrative of Hong Kong—and in the process fostered a new political identity for Hong Kong. These movements were seen as “post-modernist movements” (Chan, 2005; So, 2008), as they were spontaneous, loosely-organized, mostly joined by young people, and mobilized through the new social media—quite different from traditional tightly organized forms of social movement. On the other hand, there was a trend towards radicalization and more confrontational tactics in these social and political movements. This grew out of long years of frustration over the lack of progress in both democratization and social reforms. After 2003, 1 July became a designated date for the massive mobilization of anti-government protests, during which various civil society groups mobilized to state their plethora of demands to the government—including the annual reinstatement of the demand for full universal suffrage for the CE and Legco. The turnout at the annual 1 July rally became a barometer of the public’s dissatisfaction with the government. Starting in 2007, a group of young protesters began to refuse to leave the government headquarters after the demonstration, thus staging a small-scale occupation movement that lasted overnight, forcing the police to remove them before dawn to free the entrance to the government headquarters. The trend towards radicalization was also witnessed in party politics. In 2006 the League of Social Democrats (LSD) was formed, comprising social activists and radical elements split from the mainstream democrats. In the 2008 Legco election, the LSD advocated the use of more confrontational struggles in the Legco chamber should they be elected. They criticized the

34 Ngok Ma

mainstream democrats for being too moderate to make any headway in the fight for democracy. In the 2008 election, the LSD obtained 10 percent of the popular vote and had three candidates elected, showing newfound support of more radical stands among Hong Kong’s voters. Starting in 2008, the three LSD legislators staged more dramatic confrontation acts in the Legco chamber, including the throwing of objects, verbal insults to officials and political rivals, disruptions to the procedure, and filibustering by putting in countless amendments and making long speeches to delay the passage of bills. These confrontational actions stretched people’s imagination and helped LSD consolidate a hard core of supporters. The new social movements reached a peak in 2009–2010, with the anti-Express Rail Link (XRL) movement and the “de facto referendum” campaign. The proposed XRL links Hong Kong to major mainland cities, enabling faster integration between China and Hong Kong. The construction process, however, would cut through villages and cause disturbances to urban households in Hong Kong, with an astronomical estimated price of about US $857 million.3 The government justified the project on the grounds of the economic benefits of faster integration with China, a view supported by various business sectors, including tourism, retail, and real estate, who expected more “hot money” from mainland tourists and investors. For young activists, the project was a big “white elephant” that was wasteful, only benefitting pro-Beijing businessmen and the sectors and enterprises that did business with China. They questioned why the interests of village inhabitants and urban dwellers should be sacrificed in favor of these business interests, not to mention whether the project represented value for money. The battle against the XRL became an ideological struggle between post-materialist values and neoliberal principles (see Ma, 2011a). Public opinion was deeply split. Networking through the internet, thousands of young protesters surrounded the Legco building on consecutive Fridays in December 2009, trying to stop Legco from approving the funding for the project. In the end the government forced the proposal through after lengthy sessions due to the support of the pro-business conservative majority. The undemocratic and business-dominated nature of the FCs was all too apparent, sensitizing the young generation to the impact of this constitutional setup on their lives. The democracy movement also took a radical turn in 2009–2010. In December 2007, the NPCSC handed down a resolution that ruled out full democratic elections for both the CE and Legco in 2012. However, the 3 Years later it turned out that this figure was still an underestimation of the construction costs of the XRL.

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resolution also stipulated that in 2017 the CE “can be elected by universal suffrage,” after which full popular election of the Legco would be implemented. By 2009–2010, the democrats were split over which strategies to pursue. The mainstream democrats, led by the Democratic Party (DP), hoped to engage Beijing in direct dialogue. To them, the major problem with the past struggle for democracy was mistrust and the absence of institutional channels of negotiation between Beijing and Hong Kong’s democrats, and they were convinced that they needed to narrow the political gap with Beijing to initiate dialogues. The radical parties, led by LSD, claimed that all of the conventional means of rallies, petitions, and hunger strikes had failed, and that the problem was the moderate stance of the mainstream democrats. From this perspective, more dramatic means were needed to put pressure on Beijing. In 2009, the LSD proposed a movement of “de facto referendum.” The idea was for five pro-democracy popularly elected legislators, one in each of the five geographical constituencies of Hong Kong, to resign from their seats. The five by-elections would cover the whole geographical district of Hong Kong, requiring all voters to cast a vote, which could then be taken as a “referendum on democracy” in Hong Kong. If all the resigned legislators were re-elected with a strong margin, the LSD argued, the demonstrated public opinion support would create immense pressure for Beijing. The proposal received the support of the Civic Party (CP) but was opposed by other democrats, who thought that, instead of pressuring Beijing, it would merely antagonize them—thereby hurting Hong Kong’s chances for future dialogues. They preferred to adopt a more compromising position so as to entice Beijing into negotiations for democracy. The LSD/CP alliance kicked off the “de facto referendum” campaign in early 2010, with the strong support of young activists and civil society groups. The Chinese government denounced this as a violation of the Basic Law, a waste of public money, and even an act that smacks of separatism. 4 The pro-Beijing parties boycotted the by-elections and refused to field candidates, rendering a weak election atmosphere. In the end, the de-facto referendum got a very poor turnout of only 17 percent. Leading a temporary alliance of democrats in favor of negotiating with Beijing, the DP started dialogues with Beijing convoys. The DP managed 4 In official communist ideology, the CCP represents the 1.3 billion Chinese people, including the seven million in Hong Kong. The “high autonomy” of Hong Kong was delegated by the Central government by the Basic Law, and all the constitutional decisions of Hong Kong lie within the sovereign rights of China. Beijing therefore saw claims that Hong Kong could self-determine its political future, or acts like referendums, as challenges to their sovereignty.

36 Ngok Ma

to strike a compromise with Beijing in June 2010, which brought minimal progress to the Legco election in 2012 (Ma, 2011b). This deal was more symbolic than substantial: it marked the first time since 1989 that Hong Kong democrats had negotiated directly with Beijing officials concerning democracy in Hong Kong, with both sides making political compromises. The radical democrats and young activists, however, saw this as a cynical betrayal, and accused the DP of stitching up closed-door deals with Beijing. This brought relentless attacks against the DP as “traitors of Hong Kong” and collaborators with the CCP in later elections. The “de-facto referendum” episode led to a deep mistrust among various factions of the democrats after 2010.

The Coming of a New Political Identity The years from 2009 to 2014 saw a rise in social and political movements, invariably involving mass mobilizations on an unprecedented scale (see Table 1.1). This testified to a change in the political efficacy and sense of participation of Hong Kong’s people, especially among the younger generation. The period also saw the rise of more hostility against the Chinese government and mainlanders and the birth of a new political identity for Hong Kong. This paved the way for the occupation movement in 2014. The inhabitants of early postwar Hong Kong were mostly immigrants from mainland China, who might detest communist rule but still had strong nationalist sentiments. A new Hong Kong identity began to ferment in the 1970s (Lui, 1997), as the baby-boomers who were born or brought up in Hong Kong had a stronger sense of belonging. Better-educated and more receptive to western values of freedom and the rule of law, and with a much superior standard of living, these baby-boomers had a superiority complex towards their mainland compatriots. In general, however, they still identified themselves as ethnically Chinese, and were still concerned about developments in China. Events in China such as the 1989 democracy movement or natural disasters could trigger outpourings of sympathy or patriotism, with Hong Kong’s people eager to donate money or assist the mainland’s cause. In the early post-1997 years there was a stronger identification with China. This has at least partly to do with the increased economic integration with and assistance received from the mainland. Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998, the Hong Kong government sped up integration with China to make the best use of Hong Kong’s edge in port and financial services

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From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience

Table 1.1 Large-scale Demonstrations or Rallies in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2014 Year Demonstration

Number of Participants

2009 June 4 Vigil July 1 March 2010 New Year’s Day Protest March Anti-XRL Rally (16 Jan) June 4 Vigil Support Government’s Electoral Reform Proposals Rally (19 Jun) July 1 March 2011 Protest against the Budget (6 Mar) June 4 Vigil July 1 March 2012 Protest against Beijing’s Interference in Hong Kong Affairs (1 April) June 4 Vigil The Li Wangyang Incident (10 Jun) July 1 March Protest against National Education (29 July) Rallies against National Education Rally (1 Sep to 9 Sep) 2013 New Year’s Day Protest March New Year’s Day Support CY Leung’s Governance Rally June 4 Vigil July 1 March Protest against Stamp Tax (7 Jul) Protest against Government’s Decision on HKTV License (20-27 Oct) Anti-Hong Kong government’s TV License Decision Rally (6 Nov) 2014 New Year’s Day Protest March Protest against Violence to Journalist (2 Mar) June 4 Vigil July 1 March

200,000 76,000 30,000 13,000 150,000 120,000 52,000 10,000 150,000 218,000 15,000 180,000 25,000 400,000 90,000 >15,000 daily 130,000 60,000 150,000 430,000 23,000 >30,000 daily 50,000 30,000 13,000 180,000 510,000

Note: Only rallies above 10,000 participants are recorded here, with the number of participants provided by the organizers. Source of information: press reports.

and feed on the phenomenal growth of China. The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed in 2003, giving Hong Kong enterprises and professionals an edge in doing business or practicing in the mainland (Qu, 2007). After 2003, concerned that economic dissatisfaction might fuel anti-government sentiments to the democrats’ advantage, the Central government stepped up its economic assistance measures to Hong Kong. These included cross-border infrastructure projects, which were supposed to enhance integration and create jobs. “Individual tourism” was introduced in 2003 to help tourism and consumption in Hong Kong, as residents of

38 Ngok Ma

mainland cities were now allowed to freely travel to Hong Kong (previously they could only join state-licensed group tours). Major mainland enterprises were floated on the Hong Kong stock exchange, and there were further relaxation of restrictions on mainland capital investments in the Hong Kong market. All of these dovetailed nicely with the government’s propaganda that its relationship with the motherland was all for the good of Hong Kong. However, since 2008 the identification of Hong Kong’s people with China quickly declined, especially among the young generation (see Table 1.2). First, heightened integration with the mainland began to backfire after a few years, as Hong Kong’s residents began to feel the effects of the massive influx of mainland capital, tourists, consumers, and immigrants. Millions of travelers splashed Renminbi lavishly on luxury goods, consumer goods, real estate property, and daily basic necessities. This led to a mushrooming of chain stores for extravagant goods and stores that catered mostly to mainland consumers.5 The massive influx of capital and tourists was seen as responsible for pushing up consumer prices, shopping mall rents, and housing costs, in the process driving out small shops that catered to local consumers. Immigrants from the mainland were also seen as a social burden that would drain local resources, including welfare money, school places, and hospital beds (Ma, 2015). While at the beginning Hong Kong’s people welcomed the influx of mainland capital and tourists, by 2010 they were increasingly skeptical of the benefits of rapid integration. Just as in the case of the XRL, Hong Kong people were worried that the economic policy and resource allocations would only cater to the interests of mainlanders instead of to Hongkongers (see Table 1.3). Politically, the ideological gap between Beijing and Hong Kong grew ever bigger after 2008. After the Beijing Olympics the Chinese government clamped down on political dissidence with a heavy hand. With corruption scandals and human rights violations in China widely reported in the Hong Kong media, the image of the Chinese government was quickly impaired. The NPCSC resolutions of 2004 and 2007, and the Central government’s choice to take direct charge of the negotiations with democrats in 2010, showed the Hong Kong people that Beijing was the chief obstacle preventing Hong Kong’s move towards full democracy. Since 2003, Beijing had increased their 5 For example, visitors may be surprised by the number of drug stores in Hong Kong’s most populous districts. Because of the ubiquity of false drugs in mainland China, different kinds of medicines were favorite purchase targets for mainlanders when they travelled in Hong Kong. Milk powder, a chief merchandise in Hong Kong’s drug stores today, is also hotly sought after the poisonous milk powder scandal in China in 2011.

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From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience

Table 1.2 Self-Identification of Hong Kong People from 1997 to 2015 (half-yearly average) Time of Survey

Hongkonger (%)

Chinese (%)

Hongkonger in China (%)

Chinese in Hong Kong (%)

7-12/1997 1-6/1998 7-12/1998 1-6/1999 7-12/1999 1-6/2000 7-12/2000 1-6/2001 7-12/2001 1-6/2002 7-12/2002 1-6/2003 7-12/2003 1-6/2004 7-12/2004 1-6/2005 7-12/2005 1-6/2006 7-12/2006 1-6/2007 7-12/2007 1-6/2008 7-12/2008 1-6/2009 7-12/2009 1-6/2010 7-12/2010 1-6/2011 7-12/2011 1-6/2012 7-12/2012 1-6/2013 7-12/2013 1-6/2014 7-12/2014 1-6/2015 7-12/2015

35.9 32.2 36.6 41.4 33.5 37.5 36.3 33.8 29 29.9 30 32.6 24.9 28 25.9 24 24.8 24.8 22.4 23.4 23.5 18.1 21.8 24.7 37.6 25.3 35.5 43.8 37.7 45.6 27.2 38.2 34.8 40.2 42.3 36.3 40.2

18 28.2 19.9 17.5 23.6 19 21.3 28.3 28.7 30.4 31.1 30.7 32.5 33 31.6 36.4 30.7 34.6 31.8 26.4 27.2 38.6 34.4 29.3 24.2 27.8 21.1 23.5 16.6 18.3 21.3 23 21.8 19.5 17.8 22.1 18.1

23.6 18.3 23.5 22 22.6 22.5 23 20 24.2 20.7 21.7 20.8 23.4 21.2 23.1 21.2 26.5 25.1 24.3 31.8 31.5 29.6 29.2 32 23.9 31.3 27.6 21.3 25.3 22.8 33.1 24.3 27.6 27.1 24.3 27.4 27.4

19.9 17.4 16.7 13.2 17 15.9 14.2 14.7 14 15.5 14.7 13.5 15.6 14.3 16.2 14.7 16.9 14.9 20.1 16.7 16 13.3 13 13.3 13.1 14.8 13.8 10.3 17.8 11.5 16.1 12 15 11.6 15 13.1 13

Source: HKUPOP, various years.

40 Ngok Ma Table 1.3 Visitor Arrivals from Mainland China (2003 to 2014) Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Number of people 8,467,211 12,245,862 12,541,400 13,591,342 15,485,789 16,862,003 17,956,731 22,684,388 28,100,129 34,911,395 40,745,277 47,247,675

Source: Immigration Department, various years.

control over and intervention in Hong Kong on various fronts, most notably in mass media and elections (Cheng, 2009), with the Central Government Liaison Office, de facto CCP party branch in Hong Kong, laying its fingers everywhere. Hong Kong’s economic dependence on China adds to the political influence of Beijing over Hong Kong’s business and professional elites. Concerns about the loss of Hong Kong’s autonomy were heightened after C.Y. Leung was selected as CE in 2012. Leung was widely suspected of being an underground CCP member. His political views were very conservative, and he has always been in favor of more economic integration with the mainland. His selection was seen as a sign that Beijing was adopting a hardline on Hong Kong, and more observers worried that the long-cherished freedom, rule of law, and autonomy of Hong Kong would be increasingly under threat. The years after the anti-XRL campaign saw the rise of a stronger indigenous identity. Brought up in a more affluent, free, and politicized Hong Kong, the younger generation had more sympathy for post-materialist or self-expressive values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), and were much less convinced by the nationalist or conservative tones preached by the Chinese or Hong Kong government. The new identity was created out of the urge to defend Hong Kong’s core values, resist China’s intervention, and preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy and way of life. It emphasized Hong Kong’s distinctiveness from mainland China and the need to preserve Hong Kong’s freedom from Chinese interference. In 2011, literature professor Chen Yun proposed that Hong Kong should be truly autonomous as a “city-state,” free from Beijing’s political control (Chen, 2011). This was followed by other strands of thought pointing to the

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41

need for self-determination in Hong Kong. Some were reminiscent of colonial times, indicating that the British had delivered better governance, freedom, and rule of law. Some saw the large number of immigrants from the north,6 plus the economic control of mainland enterprises, as a means to “colonize” or “sinicize” Hong Kong. Issues such as the use of simplified characters, the use of Putonghua to teach Chinese in schools,7 the extent of individual tourism, mainlanders’ children taking up school places in Hong Kong, and pregnant mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong all became sensitive political issues that groups and politicians saw as battles to defend Hong Kong’s integrity and way of life. A strong new 本土主義 (“localism”) defending Hong Kong was rapidly on the rise, especially among the younger generation. All in all, the political sentiment after 2008 pointed towards maintaining Hong Kong’s distinctiveness as a free city and resistance to China’s political control and intervention, and economic and social integration. This means that Beijing’s political control and the inability of Hong Kong to decide its own constitutional future became more detestable in the eyes of the new generation. From the perspective of social movements, a new generation of activists had taken center stage. Mobilized largely through the internet, they took to direct action to resist the business-dominated regime and posed a major challenge to traditional movement leaders. These new movements are different in terms of ideology, attitude towards the government, movement forms, and patterns of information. Yet they also have the boldness, novelty, flexibility, and mobilization power to stage massive movements, catch media attention, attract young and energetic followers, and, most importantly, pose a major headache for the regime.

The Road to Occupation As law professor Benny Tai put it, his initiation of the Occupying Central movement was a “political accident.” In January 2013, Benny Tai, commonly regarded as a moderate democrat, wrote in a newspaper column that the democrats should consider “Occupying Central” to force Beijing to deliver 6 Each day after 1997, 150 mainlanders would get a “one way entry permit” to enter and reside in Hong Kong legally. Most of these immigrants were the wives, children, or other relatives of Hong Kong residents. This amounts to more than 50,000 legal immigrants from the mainland every year. 7 Hong Kong schools have been using the native dialect Cantonese as the teaching medium in schools. Starting from the 2000s, more and more schools began to use Putonghua or Mandarin, the common language used all over China, to teach Chinese language classes, claiming that this would help students learn the mainland tongue.

42 Ngok Ma

genuine democracy for the 2017 CE election. Inspired by the Occupy Wall Street Movement in 2011 and the subsequent smaller-scale Occupying Central movement in Hong Kong, the plan included the blocking of the main roads of the central business district (Central) by pro-democracy leaders and protesters for days. If internationally renowned figures (democratic veteran Martin Lee, media tycoon Jimmy Lai, and Archbishop Joseph Zen, and the like) were to join the occupation, it would attract a lot of international attention. To forestall the possible economic loss and embarrassment, the script went, Beijing might give in and agree to full democracy. This casual suggestion was met with enthusiastic responses from activist circles, mainstream democrats, and the media. Even for the radicals, this was seen as a novel non-conventional means that could possibly force something new. Social activists and pro-democracy groups quickly jumped in to make it a real movement. A platform named Occupying Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) was formed, led by Benny Tai, sociology professor Chan Kin-man, and veteran activist Reverend Chu Yiu-ming. The OCLP stressed non-violent civil disobedience as a means of struggle. By 2014, most pro-democracy groups had put their chips on OCLP, seeing it as the only hope for forcing Beijing to offer a genuinely democratic electoral formula for the 2017 CE election. The mainstream democrats more or less admitted that after striking the compromise with Beijing in 2010 there had been little progress in engaging Beijing in further political dialogue. The rise of C.Y. Leung and heightened control by Beijing since 2012 all made the democrats feel that Beijing had grown more conservative, and that they needed to stand firm to fight for full democracy. Tai’s idea grew out of democrats’ disbelief that Beijing would allow free and fair elections for the 2017 CE election, despite the 2007 NPCSC resolution promising “universal suffrage.” Article 45 of the Basic Law reads, “[t]­he ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” For years, the democrats suspected that Beijing’s plan was to control this nomination process through a committee dominated by pro-Beijing figures, which would only allow candidates that were acceptable to Beijing to be put to popular vote. The 2007 NPCSC Resolution also specified that the composition of the Nomination Committee “should refer to that of the 2012 Election Committee.” If the Nomination Committee (NC) had exactly the same composition as the 2012 Election Committee (EC), Beijing could ensure that they could manipulate the nomination through controlling a majority of the members. Since 2013, Central government officials and pro-Beijing figures had repeatedly emphasized that the power of nomination for the 2017 CE lie only

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with the NC. All other methods of nomination were deemed unconstitutional. The democrats insisted that the nomination method should match international standards as listed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They argued that even though the Basic Law vested the nomination power in the NC, it was still possible for the NC to make the nominations based on popular will. Various pro-democracy groups put forward a plethora of methods such as party nomination, nomination by a small percentage of NC members, or citizens’ nomination, with the latter mostly preferred by the more radical groups and civil society organizations. Beijing officials emphasized that the future CE candidates should be “patriotic” and “love Hong Kong” (meaning “be politically loyal to Beijing”), and that the NC was necessary to protect business interests and make sure the candidates are acceptable to Beijing. Beijing was unwilling to bear the uncertainty of allowing free nominations, which would allow pro-democracy candidates to run, and thus be given a chance to win. All they could accept was some form of popular vote after a controlled nomination process. The democrats’ bottom line was that pro-democracy candidates should not be screened out by the NC just because of their political stand. In 2014 the OCLP and other democrats tried to step up their mobilization and public opinion pressure. In the spirit of deliberative democracy, they organized three major rounds of deliberations to discuss reform proposals, which were widely participated in by civil society groups, pro-democracy activists, and people who had committed to civil disobedience should OCLP take place (see Appendix for the chronology of events before the Occupation). In June 2014, the OCLP held a “civil referendum” in which Hong Kong people could vote through the internet, cellphones, or in street booths, on three short-listed election formulas proposed by different pro-democracy groups. A total of about 780,000 people cast their vote, which was taken to be a strong mandate for the democrats’ cause. About 88 percent of those who voted agreed that the Legco should veto any government proposal that fell short of the international standards for providing genuine choice to citizens. The democrats took this as strong public support for their positions. Beijing, however, refused to budge an inch.

The Outbreak On 31 August 2014, the NPCSC handed down the framework for the 2017 CE election, in which they exercised tight control over the nomination to screen out the democrats. It ruled that the NC’s composition should resemble that of the 2012 EC. The NC could only nominate two to three candidates

44 Ngok Ma

to be put to popular vote, and every candidate needed majority support in the NC. In past CE elections, democrats could get about 150–200 seats in the 1200-person EC by winning seats in selected professional sectors (e.g., lawyers, teachers, and social workers). However, a nomination threshold of 50 percent made it impossible for democrats to be nominated. It enables Beijing, by controlling the majority of the NC members, to dictate all of the names on the popular ballot. The democrats all saw this formula as utterly unacceptable and vowed to veto it.8 Even moderate democrats who had been suggesting formulas that accommodated the NC method saw this proposal as the end of the road for all negotiations. For veteran democrats who had been longing for full democracy since the 1980s, this was the ultimate blow, as it seemed what had been promised in the Basic Law was nothing but a manipulated election. The OCLP announced a plan to start occupying Central on 1 October, the Chinese national day holiday. The Hong Kong Federation of Students, who had been active in supporting social and political movements for decades, started a one-week class boycott on 22 September to boost public opinion mobilization to carry the momentum until the October 1 occupation. On-strike students gathered outside the government headquarters to protest the “8.31 resolution” for the whole week. On the night of 26 September, student activists made a surprise raid of the “civic square” outside the government headquarters and occupied the square overnight. Many people came to support the students and clashed with the police who had cordoned off the square. On the morning of 27 September the student activists were removed and detained by the police, driving more people to come out and occupy the public space around the government headquarters. In the small hours of 28 September, Benny Tai announced the start of OCLP at the occupation site of Admiralty, a few minutes’ walk from the Central area. In a bid to stop people from joining the occupation movement, the police sealed off all pedestrian passages to the government headquarters. In the afternoon thousands of protesting crowds swarmed the streets, stopping cars and starting an occupation. By dusk the police threw tear gas at the crowd, which provoked more people to come out to confront the police until midnight. Enraged protesters began to occupy other sites, including Mongkok, Causeway Bay, and (briefly) Tsim Sha Tsui.

8 The passing of the electoral formula needs a two-thirds majority in the Legco. In 2014, democrats held 27 seats in the 70-member legislature. Thus, if they were to vote en bloc against the proposal, they could veto it.

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From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience

Table 1.4 Public Support for the Umbrella Movement during the Occupation Question: Recently Hong Kong broke out an “Occupy Movement” to fight for a 2017 election plan for Chief Executive without screening. Do you personally support the movement or not?

Very supportive Quite Supportive So-so Quite not supportive Very not supportive No opinion/refuse answer

Oct. 8-15

Nov. 5-11

Dec. 8-12

18.6% 19.2% 23.2% 8.7% 26.8% 3.5%

17.2% 16.7% 19.5% 8.1% 35.4% 3.1%

17.9% 16.0% 21.6% 9.2% 33.1% 2.2%

Source: CUHKCCPOS, 2014.

This brought about a 79-day occupation movement that shook the world. It was quickly dubbed the Umbrella Movement by the international media as images of weaponless protesters holding up umbrellas to defend against tear gas and pepper spray become an icon of resistance. The occupation was sometimes confronted with police and mob violence, but most of the time it was a stalemate. The police did not actively use force to remove the occupiers, and protesters began to set up tents in Admiralty and other sites, prepared for a prolonged struggle. There was no unified organization directing the whole movement, but the basic demands of the protesters were genuine democratic elections, and/or the removal of C.Y. Leung as CE. Beijing was never ready to grant any concessions. The logic was simple: if protesters in Hong Kong could exact democratic concessions through an occupation movement, it would serve as a big encouragement to activists to use similar means all over China. About one week after the occupation started, it was reported that Beijing’s position on the Umbrella Movement was “No bloodshed, No concessions” (Apple Daily, 2014). The 21 October public dialogue between Hong Kong government officials and student leaders produced little consensus. After that, the government’s plan was to tire out the protesters. On the other hand, the government’s propaganda and the conservative press mostly stressed the adverse impact of the occupation on the economy and everyday life. The result was a gradual dissipating of public support for the movement starting in November (see Table 1.4). The beginning of the end of the movement came after some groups (including shops and taxi drivers) applied for court injunctions, claiming that their interests had been affected by the occupation. These injunctions were swiftly granted, with the police moving in to evacuate the sites with court warrants. The evacuations in mid-December met with little resistance, as

46 Ngok Ma

the crowd were tired and had failed to find a meaningful next-step strategy. The major occupation site, the Admiralty, was evacuated on 11 December, with the last site at Causeway Bay peacefully removed on 15 December. The Umbrella Movement did little to change the position of Beijing on the 2017 CE election. The Hong Kong government put forward a proposal based on the NPCSC resolution of 2014. The government’s propaganda focused on a pragmatic theme: that it was a historic chance to elect the CE through “one-person-one-vote.” It stressed that there was no guarantee that the democrats would get a better deal later, and that they should “pocket it first.” The democrats claimed the proposal was one of “fake-democracy” that did not offer voters a genuine choice. They feared that if the 2017 CE election were to be held with this formula, Beijing would claim that it has fulfilled its constitutional promise in the Basic Law, and it will be difficult to mobilize the people to fight for genuine free elections in the future. The “one-person-one-vote” election, albeit with controlled nomination, would serve to legitimize the pseudo-democratic system. Public opinion, as reflected in polls, was almost equally split on whether the Legco should pass the resolution. The pro-democracy parties in the Legco chose to stand firm and veto the proposal. On 18 June, a last-minute mix-up made some pro-Beijing legislators walk out of the chamber to try to void the vote, bringing a farcical result of eight votes for, and 28 votes against the proposal. The 2017 CE of Hong Kong was elected by a 1200-member EC, as in the 2012 CE election. The plan to elect the CE by universal suffrage, seemed to be put off indefinitely.

Conclusion The Umbrella Movement grew out of decades of frustration over fighting for full democracy in Hong Kong. Since the 1980s, the Hong Kong people have had high hopes of “democratic repatriation,” meaning that decolonization would be followed by a transition towards full democracy with “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.” However, years of bargaining with Beijing produced only a hybrid regime, with progress painfully slow and the endpoint uncertain. Entering the new millennium, generational changes and the effects of successive movements brought a younger generation of Hong Kong people that is more vocal, more efficacious, and more amenable to confrontational means of struggle. The events since 2008 brought a new political identity and culture of social and political movements. Compared to the older generation, the new

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generation of movements were more innovative and keen on direct action, and posed direct challenges to the conservative governing philosophy and preoccupation with stability and prosperity. The new generation also has a weaker identification with China and a stronger Hong Kong identity, which leads them to advocate for their right to determine their own political future. Disillusioned with the futility of the traditional forms of movement, these new activists boldly challenged the old movement leaders and organizational forms. In contrast, China grew more conservative after 2008, widening its political gap with Hong Kong. The expressive direct action of the new movements thus came into direct conflict with the conservative, controlling, paternalistic governments in Beijing and Hong Kong. In terms of bringing about institutional changes, the Umbrella Movement was unsuccessful. It did, however, signify a new stage of social and political movements in Hong Kong, in which average people take direct action to express their political views through civil disobedience in defiance of regime condemnation, police and mob violence, and possible prosecution. This should have profound effects on civil society and political participation in Hong Kong in the years that follow. In comparative perspective, Hong Kong’s occupation movement falls in the lineage of recent direct-action and occupation movements all over the world, in which critical citizens become disaffected with their governments and take matters into their own hands and onto the streets. While they might not change the power conf iguration immediately, these moments that shook the world have the potential to make a profound impact on society and people in the future.

Bibliography Apple Daily. 2014. “Ying Dui Zhan Zhong, Zhong Gong: Bu Tuo Xie, Bu Liu Xue [Handling Occupy Central, Chinese Communist Party: No Bloodshed, No Concessions],” http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/ new/20141010/485653/, accessed 10 October 2014. Chan, Kin-man. 2005. “Civil Society and the Democracy Movement in Hong Kong: Mass Mobilization with Limited Organizational Opportunity.” Korean Observer, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 167-182. Chen, Yun. 2011. Xianggang Chengbang lun [The Hong Kong City State]. Hong Kong: Enrich. Cheng, Jie. 2009. “The Story of a New Policy.” Hong Kong Journal, http://www. hkjournal.org/archive/2009_fall/1.htm, accessed 15 July 2009.

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Chiu, Stephen W.K., and Ho-fung Hung. 1999. “State Building and Rural Stability.” In Ngo Tak-wing, ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under Colonial Rule, pp. 86-112. London and New York: Routledge. Chiu, Stephen W.K., and Tai-lok Lui, eds. 2000. The Dynamics of Social Movement in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. CUHKCCPOS (Chinese University of Hong Kong Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey). 2014. “Public Opinion and Political Development in Hong Kong Survey Results.” http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/ TaskForce_PressRelease_141218_English.pdf., accessed on 18 December 2014. England, Joe, and John Rear. 1975. Chinese Labour under British Rule. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. HKUPOP (Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme). Various years. “POP Poll on People’s Ethnic Identity.” https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/ popexpress/ethnic/index.html, accessed 23 February 2017. Hong Kong Tourism Board. Various years. “Visitor Arrival Statistics.” https://partnernet.hktb.com/en/research_statistics/latest_statistics/index.html, accessed 23 September 2018. Immigration Department, The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Various years. “Statistics on Incoming Visitors by Country/ Territory of Residence.” https://www.immd.gov.hk/publications/a_report_2015/ en/appendices-08.html, accessed 23 September 2018. Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. King, Ambrose Y.C. 1975. “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grassroots Level.” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 5, pp. 422-439. Kuan, Hsin-chi. 1998. “Escape from Politics: Hong Kong’s Predicament of Political Development.” International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 21, No. 10, pp. 1423-1448. Kuan, Hsin-chi, and Siu-kai Lau. 2002. “Between Liberal Autocracy and Democracy: Democratic Legitimacy in Hong Kong.” Democratization, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 58-76. Lam, Wai-man. 2004. Understanding the Political Culture of Hong Kong: The Paradox of Activism and Depoliticization. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. Lau, Siu-kai. 1984. Society and Politics of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Lee, Francis, and Joseph Chan. 2008. “Making sense of Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators in Hong Kong.” China Quarterly, Vol. 193, pp. 84-101. Lui, Tai-lok. 1997. “Xianggang gushi: Xianggang yishi de lishi fazhan [Hong Kong’s Story: Historical Development of Hong Kong Identity].” In Gao Cheng-shu and

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Chen Jie-sum, eds., Xianggang: Wenming de yanxu yu duanlie [Hong Kong: Continuation and Rupture of Civilization], pp.1-16. Taipei: Linking Publishing. Ma, Ngok. 2005. “Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle against National Security in Hong Kong.” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 44, pp. 465-482. Ma, Ngok. 2009. “Social Movements and State-society Relationship in Hong Kong.” In Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux, eds., Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: The Expansion of Protest Space, pp.45-63. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Ma, Ngok. 2011a. “Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in post-industrial Hong Kong.” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 683-712. Ma, Ngok. 2011b. “Hong Kong’s Democrats Divide.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 54-67. Ma, Ngok. 2015. “The Rise of ‘Anti-China’ Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council Election.” The China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 39-66. Ngo, Tak-wing. 1997. “The Legend of a Colony: Political Role and Historiography in Hong Kong.” China Information, Vol. 12, No. 1/2 (Summer/Autumn 1997): pp. 134-156. O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Qu, Baozhi. 2007. “Mainland China-Hong Kong Economic Relations.” In Joseph Cheng, ed., The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade, pp. 201-244. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press. Sing, Ming. 1996. “Democratization and Economic Development: The Anomalous case of Hong Kong.” Democratization, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 343-359. So, Alvin. 2008. “Social Conflicts in Hong Kong after 1997: The Emergence of a Post-modern Mode of Social Movements.” In Ming Chan, ed., China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects beyond the First Decade, pp. 233-251. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press. Turner, Herbert, et al. 1980. The Last Colony: But Whose? A Study of the Labour Movement, Labour Market and Labour Relations in Hong Kong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wong, Thomas Wai-pong, and Tai-lok Lui. 2000. “From One Brand of Politics to One Brand of Political Culture.” In Lau Siu-kai, ed., Social Development and Political Change in Hong Kong, pp. 309-354. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

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About the Author Ngok Ma is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include political institutions, social movements, electoral and party politics, state-society relations, and democratization in Hong Kong. He has published five books and more than 20 refereed journal articles on Hong Kong, including in The China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy, Economy and Society, and Journal of Contemporary China.

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Spontaneity and Civil Resistance A Counter Frame of the Umbrella Movement Edmund W. Cheng Abstract This chapter examines the contingent and endogenous causes that sparked the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. Spurred by two contingent events generating pre-emptive and massive mobilization, the movement was a spontaneous transformation of the long-planned Occupy Central campaign. Networked eff iciently through social media, autonomous individuals from diverse backgrounds rallied in various physical spaces, resulting in a self-mobilized and decentralized protest structure. These dynamics and ecology facilitated participatory practices and sustained a resilient occupation. Using an on-site survey, in-depth interviews, and participant observation, this chapter constructs a counter-frame conceptualizing the Umbrella Movement as a popular civil resistance, thereby contesting the official and media framings that regard the occupation as an illegal assembly, separatist movement, or social justice movement. Keywords: framing, occupation, social media, public space, Hong Kong, Umbrella Movement

Introduction This chapter examines how and why spontaneous events vividly transformed Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), a planned, elitist civil disobedience campaign, into the spontaneous and popular Umbrella Movement. Mainstream literature regards spontaneity as either only important in the early stage of social movements, or impromptu, emotional, unplanned, and hence difficult to conceptualize. However, as Snow and Moss stipulate, spontaneity is “events, happenings, and lines of action, both verbal and

Ma, N. and E.W. Cheng (eds.). The Umbrella Movement. Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, Amsterdam University Press, 2019 doi: 10.5117/9789462984561/ch02

52 Edmund W. Cheng

nonverbal, which were not planned, intended, prearranged, or organized in advance of their occurrence” that routinely shape the occurrence, course, and character of protest events (2014: 1223). Flesher Fominaya (2015) also debunks this understanding of spontaneity by referring to how the evolution and maintenance of collective actions are path-dependent and conditioned by contingent events as much as by antecedent framing. This chapter brings the idea of spontaneity to an examination of the dynamics of an occupation that is unparalleled both locally and globally. According to Snow and Moss (2014: 1122), the triggers of spontaneity involve: (1) an ambiguous moment; (2) emotional priming, (3) non-hierarchical organization; and (4) a specific ecological context—all intertwined in a movement. Unplanned and unintended contingent events are not an antithesis of rationality and organization. Instead, the Umbrella Movement shows that human beings can and do make conscious, on-the-spot decisions in the face of emotion and uncertainty. Spontaneity is thus pervasive and consequential in collective actions, and should be treated as a process rather than as a stage (Cheng and Chan, 2017). The resilient occupation and intensive interactions of the Umbrella Movement also manifest what Jasper (1997) calls the cultural meaning of protests, with new identities constructed, creative repertoires practised, and collective solidarity cultivated. Based on in-depth interviews and an on-site survey, this chapter illustrates the merits of a bottom-up account of a protest to contextualize spontaneity and appreciate the voices of the protesters. This evidence-based study uncovers the democratic claims, voluntary engagements, and decentralized repertoires of the protestors. By referring to the social reality at the protest sites, I contest the official and semi-official framing adopted by the regime and media, which suggests the occupation was caused by socioeconomic grievances, financed by foreign forces, and organized by anti-China organizations. First, I examine how the students’ storming of Civic Square addressed the activists’ leadership vacuum and instigated spontaneity. Second, I explain why the firing of teargas triggered a “moral shock” and the self-mobilization of citizens (Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Lee and Chan, 2011). Third, I discuss how social media and non-hierarchical organizations resolved logistic and leadership challenges and permitted the creation of a resilient occupation. Finally, I analyze the relationship between the ecology of protest sites and the occupiers’ uncompromising attitudes. The result is the drawing of a counter-frame that conceptualizes the Umbrella Movement as a popular civil resistance movement inspired by students aiming for democracy.

53

Spontaneity and Civil Resistance

Figure 2.1 Protest Sites at Admiralty, September–December 2014 Victoria Habour M MTR stations

Lung Wo R oa

Protest podiums Selected supply stations

d

Battery recharge stage Barricades

rt R

oa

d

Tamar Park

Legislative Council Complex

Central Government Offices

Lippo Centre

Tim M

Far East Finance Centre

enue

rco u

Chief Executive’s Office

ei Av

Ha

Tim W a Av

Central M

enue

People’s Liberation Army Central Barracks

M Admiralty Centre

ntral

t Road Ce

Connaugh Harcourt Road

Police Headquarters Wan Chai M

To facilitate a rich and accurate account, this study relies on multiple data sources. First, we conducted a survey between 20 and 26 October 2014 that collected 1681 random samples at the occupied sites in Admiralty, Mongkok, and Causeway Bay. We divided these areas into geographic zones and sampled during three specified timeslots each day to form a representative sample of respondents. Trained volunteers were deployed to randomly select samples after walking a fixed number of steps along an assigned route. The response rate was 97 percent. Second, we conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with (1) organizers and politicians, (2) volunteers and occupiers, and (3) day trippers. The commitment of each of these actors to the protest formed the opposite ends of a spectrum. Third, we observed the daily interactions between different protesters, noted the routines of two spatially peripheral but politically central defense units, and assisted three impromptu volunteer groups that provided supplies to the occupiers, archived art, and conducted surveys (Figure 2.1).

Official and Semi-official Framing Framing involves both selection and salience (Gitlin, 1980). To frame is therefore to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993: 50). Similar to other framing

54 Edmund W. Cheng

exercises, the official and semi-official framing of the Umbrella Movement managed to attribute the problems of and responsibility for the movement to foreign forces and their surrogates, in addition to legitimatizing the regime’s uncompromising attitude and counter-mobilization actions (Snow and Benford, 1992: 138-142). This framing also constitutes a coherent account articulating the origins, claims, and repertoires/impact of the occupation. First, the central and local governments and the state-run mouthpieces constructed a nationalist framing that accused “foreign interference” of causing the movement. Using the term “Occupy Central” with quotation marks, they expressed official disapproval of the occupation and regarded the popular discontent as a malicious scheme orchestrated by foreign forces. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined the movement as a “Hong Kong version of a Colour Revolution,” a result of manipulative politicians and anti-China forces. The Chief Executive supplemented these claims with statements that the authority held proof of “external forces organization” (South China Morning Post, 2015). The People’s Daily and Global Times also identified “western countries such as the US and UK” and “forces for independence in Taiwan” as behind-the-scene manipulators of the movement (Global Times, 2014a; People’s Daily, 2014). Without these external networks, they insisted, such a well-planned, large-scale, and resourceful occupation would not have been possible. The framing of the Umbrella Movement as “an organized separatist movement plotting at regime change” effectively fed growing nationalist sentiments on the mainland and demobilized its diffusion among China’s dissents. This nationalist framing also externalized the cause of the subversive occupation to a kind of conspiracy theory, which cannot be easily verified but can be effective in causing fear and speculation. Second, the local government and pro-regime media created a legalistic framing that attacked the occupation as unlawful, along with its chaos and costs. They negatively depicted protest leaders as the collaborators of foreign conspirators and young participants as victims of the leaders’ illegal and misguided actions. Specifically, Ta Kung Pao, the communist regime’s local mouthpiece, regarded student and OCLP leaders as financed and nurtured by the United States, in collaboration with foreign forces that opposed the Chinese ruling regime (Ta Kung Pao, 2014). Oriental Daily, the most popular local newspaper, accused media mogul Jimmy Lai of followed the “Arab spring” and mobilizing intrigues about Hong Kong’s independence (Oriental Daily, 2014). Further, various media sources have reported and provided statements estimating that the economic costs of the movement had reached billions of dollars (Headline Daily, 2014). The occupation was described as a catastrophe that undermined the economy, social cohesion,

Spontaneity and Civil Resistance

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the rule of law, and the city’s long-standing stability and prosperity (People’s Daily, 9 October 2014; Global Times, 2014b). The legalistic framing of “public disorder causing disrupted livelihoods” diverted attention from the protest’s claims to its immediate consequences, effectively demobilizing support among local populations. The framing also serves to differentiate the average, altruistically motivated students from the ulterior motive-oriented politicians and activists. Third, soft-liners in the hybrid regime stipulated a framing of grievances that recognized deep-rooted causes for the unprecedented occupation. For some, the occupation demonstrated the entrenched governance incapacity of the current administration, while others correlated the youth’s lack of social mobility to their activism and outcry. While this deep-rooted framing justified the attempt to conduct dialogues with protesters, it ultimately aimed to identify a retreat mechanism (South China Morning Post, 2014c). The logic is that an entrenched problem demands patience and a complex solution. The Chief Secretary, for instance, told protest leaders that since the movement had successfully aroused civic and political awareness, protesters should abandon the protest sites to minimize negative impacts and to end the occupation rationally and peacefully (South China Morning Post, 2014c). This framing was more likely to blame movement leaders and protesters for the perceived chaos, and took a realist stance that adopted the central government’s position and conservative opinions instead of concern about the protestors’ claims. The proponents of this framing eventually reached a consensus that strict police action to clear the site was a feasible solution to the prolonged crisis. The tactful interplay between nationalist, legalistic, and conservative language led to an official framing that was discursively discouraging, if not functionally demobilizing, to the occupation. While this official framing and regime attrition strategy was rather effective in demobilizing the public and limiting immediate concessions, it failed to influence the dynamics of the occupation and its participants.

Counter-frame: A Civil Resistance by the Youth for Democracy The tables presented in the following pages report the demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral data from the on-site survey and the data’s breakdown with respect to two sets of event-specific and demographic variables. The first set of tables provides the timing of the participation and experience of protests. “Pre-28/9” and “Post-28/9” respectively refer to protesters who arrived before or after the storming of Civic Square and the firing of teargas

56 Edmund W. Cheng Table 2.1 Demographic Backgrounds Overall

Gender Age

Occupation Education

Class

Male Female 17 and under 18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 and over Student Non-student Primary Secondary Diploma Degree Graduate Upper Upper-middle Middle Lower-middle Grassroots Don’t know n=

Timing of Participation (%)

n

%

862 819 119 490 404 401 117 114 27 427 1240 24 367 320 745 128 7 91 363 647 489 72 1681

51.1 48.9 7.1 29.3 24.2 24.0 7.0 6.8 1.6 25.6 74.4 1.5 23.7 20.7 46.0 8.1 0.4 5.5 21.7 38.8 29.3 4.3

Pre 28/9

Post 28/9

52.6 47.4 8.4*** 37.9*** 21.0*** 16.9*** 6.7*** 7.4*** 1.6*** 34.5*** 65.5*** 1.4** 22.8** 17.8** 47.1** 11.0** 0.5 5.2 21.1 37.7 30.4 5.0 582

50.4 49.6 6.4*** 24.6*** 25.8*** 27.9*** 7.1*** 6.5*** 1.6*** 20.9*** 79.1*** 1.6** 24.3** 22.2** 45.4** 6.5** 0.4 5.6 22.1 39.4 28.7 3.9 1096

** p