Securitization of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: The Rise of a Patriotocratic System 9781138370005, 9780429428302

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Securitization of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong

In recent years, the city many hoped would help democratize China has instead become a research setting in which to study China’s increasing intolerance of dissent. Since Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, China’s treatment of Hong Kong could be divided into three stages: non-intervention, intervention, and securitization. If the July 1 march in 2003 is a watershed that marked Beijing’s change from non-intervention to intervention, this book suggests that the Umbrella Movement in 2014 is another watershed that marked Beijing’s change from intervention to securitization. This book is a theoretically driven case study of the Umbrella Movement, a massive sit-in that paralyzed key business and retail districts for 79 days in Hong Kong in 2014. Many Hongkongers believe that they have the right to a fair election of the chief executive, and Beijing’s insistence on vetting candidates prompted the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. Drawing insights from the securitization theory and fear appeal literature, the book proposes the framework of “security appeal.” It argues that the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement resulted from a premature use of hard repression, that is, before the government convinced the general public that the Umbrella Movement was a threat. The eventual successful securitization entails a general acceptance of the threatening nature of the Umbrella Movement and agreement with its crackdown. This book concludes that one of the consequences of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement is Beijing’s eventual switch to the policy of “­patriotocracy” – a system that allocates power and resources based on one’s professed patriotism – in lieu of One Country, Two Systems. The policy implications and theoretical and methodological contributions of this book will be of interest to scholars and students of security studies; ­Chinese politics; and various social science disciplines, including political science, ­psychology, criminology, and sociology. Cora Y.T. Hui completed her PhD in the Department of Social and Behavioural Sciences at City University of Hong Kong. She received her MPhil in Criminology from the University of Cambridge and her MA in Forensic Psychology from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.

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Securitization of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong

The Rise of a Patriotocratic System Cora Y.T. Hui

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Cora Y.T. Hui The right of Cora Y.T. Hui to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-37000-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-42830-2 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by codeMantra

For my husband Danny – you are where home is.

Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface Acronyms and abbreviations 1 Introduction: “One Country” or “Two Systems”? Democrats’ interpretation: emphasis on “Two Systems” 2 Beijing’s interpretation: “One Country” above “Two Systems” 5 From One Country, Two Systems to patriotocracy 7 Emergence of patriotocracy 10 Research questions and chapter guide 11 2 From political control to the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement The CCP’s insistence on control vs. OCLP 15 White paper on One Country, Two Systems vs. referendum 18 8.31 NPC decision vs. class boycott 20 Tear gas vs. the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement 22 Psychological reactance theory 23 Moral shock 28 Reactance and the Umbrella Movement 29 3 From securitization to the end of the Umbrella Movement Copenhagen school: security as speech act 33 Securitization as pragmatic act 36 Literature on fear appeal 38 Security appeal and audience acceptance 42 Securitization in the Chinese context 43 Securitizing the Umbrella Movement 46 Audience acceptance 52 The use of court injunctions: securitization or attrition 53

ix xi xiii xvii 1

15

32

viii Contents

4 Brief note on methodology Case study methodology 56 Three levels of analysis 58

56

5 Securitization context: political culture of Hong Kong 63 Political aloofness in post-war Hong Kong 63 Partial support of democracy in the 1990s 64 Depoliticized notions of “Good Citizenship” 66 Coexistence of depoliticization and political activism 67 Political participation and depoliticization culture post-handover 70 Effects of depoliticization culture on the Umbrella Movement 72 Conclusion from critical literature review 74 6 Securitizing act: a content analysis of news reports Methods 76 Results 78 Conclusion of CA 83

75

7 The security appeal’s audience 85 What predicts opposition to and defiance of the Umbrella Movement? 85 Why would Hongkongers accept or defy the security appeal? 88 Justified authoritarianism or oppressive dictator? 90 Democracy: something to earn or something to demand? 95 Mainlandization: welcomed integration or coerced conversion? 102 What, then, is the threat to Hong Kong? 105 Conclusion 110 8 Patriotocracy: Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong 113 Defiance of political control: increased opportunity cost of dissidence 113 Audience acceptance: moving away from full democratization 115 Patriotocracy: Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong 116 Patriotism with Chinese characteristics 117 Patriotocracy vs. democracy 121 Patriotocracy and the field of security 123 Future directions for social scientists 124 Final word: “China is different” 126 References Index

127 145

List of figures

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 7.1 7.2

Brief timeline of the events leading to the Umbrella Movement 16 Simplified process model of psychological reactance theory 24 Process model showing message acceptance to a fear appeal 41 Process model of audience acceptance 42 Security appeal: three levels of analysis 58 List of themes in the analysis of audiences 90 Percentage of Hongkongers identified as “Hongkongers only” and “Chinese only” since 1997 93 8.1 Political spectrum (democracy vs. patriotocracy) as a function of securitizing and counter-securitizing moves 123

List of tables

2.1 Views of the Occupy Movement in September and October 31 3.1 Percentages of support and opposition of the Umbrella Movement according to public surveys 53 5.1 Voter turnout rates in LegCo elections 70 5.2 Various means Hongkongers used to express concerns or seek help 70 6.1 Content Analysis (CA) of Apple Daily and Wen Wei Po articles 79 7.1 Survey participants’ views of the polity 86 7.2 Interviewee information 88 8.1 Comparison between patriotocracy and democracy 123

Preface

Five years later, I still remember the night of the tear gas (September 28, 2014). Like many Hongkongers, I became politicized overnight. I was born and raised in Hong Kong and have always considered myself a Hongkonger. After spending about a decade overseas studying, I decided to go back to Hong Kong to pursue a PhD in early September 2014. At that time my plan was to examine the anti-corruption strategies of Hong Kong for my PhD. I was watching television at home on the evening of September 28, 2014, and the sight of the police using tear gas to disperse the crowd struck me. My immediate reaction was “What?!” My second reaction was “Why!?” Aren’t Hongkongers known for being politically apathetic? That was when I realized I knew so little about the city I call home. I considered it a responsibility as a Hongkonger to know more about the Umbrella Movement. I spent the next few days reading all the news articles and opeds I could about what happened. I spent the next few weeks talking to as many people as I could about their political views and collecting survey data. I then spent the next few months reading about protest mobilization and suppression in the literature. By the end of the first year of my PhD, I realized the insight I had gathered is enough to write a dissertation. I made the bold decision to switch dissertation topics, and this book is the fruit of my bold decision. Everyone had a different understanding of the Umbrella Movement; this book is my understanding. Countless people have helped me throughout the decade I have been in graduate school. My deepest appreciation goes to all of you. However, some names have to be specifically mentioned because without them I would have never been able to complete my PhD and write this book. First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor T. Wing Lo. Over the last eight years that I have worked with him, he has continuously provided unwavering support of my research and studies. When I didn’t see the potential in myself, he showed me what I was capable of. He challenged me to think more broadly in every supervision session and showed me the kind of scholarly excellence I can only hope to aspire to. I express my deepest gratitude for his time, support, guidance, and resourcefulness. I could not imagine having a better mentor, both as a work mentor and as a life mentor. I also thank my research

xiv Preface teammates Sharon and Gabriel for the stimulating brainstorm sessions, for the data collection efforts, and for the friendship we have cultivated in the last few years. Elizabeth has been of tremendous help throughout the data collection phase, and I cannot imagine how I could have managed without her. I gratefully acknowledge the generous funding received towards my PhD from the Hong Kong PhD Fellowship and Chow Yei Ching School of Graduate Studies Entrance Scholarship. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the survey participants and interviewees for generously spending their time and sharing candidly with me their experiences and thoughts. This book is really their stories. Throughout the data collection phase, I have met some of the most tenacious and committed activists, and have admired their resilience, selflessness, determination, and optimism despite tough circumstances. I would like to thank the rest of my dissertation examiners: Professor Sonny Lo, Dr Marcus Chiu, and Dr Wing Chung Ho. I thank them not only for their insightful comments and encouragement but also for the hard questions that challenged me to think beyond my own discipline. I also thank my qualifying panel, Dr Hui Fang Chen and Dr Shengquan Ye, for their guidance and constructive comments on my progress reports. I am indebted to Simon Bates and ShengBin Tan at Routledge for their assistance in the publication of this book. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewers for the suggestions and constructive comments. Special thanks to Robert for doing a terrific job in copy-editing my drafts. I am extremely grateful to the following people for being in my life. They made me laugh, made me feel loved and supported, made my life more interesting and fun. I thank my PhD cohort, Samuel, Michael and Wing Lok, for the support, solidarity, and encouragement. Samuel has truly been an amazing friend whom I look up to. He taught me that one could achieve anything with hard work, resilience, optimism, persistence, and a big smile. I am thankful to have them go through the PhD journey with me. I also thank the “Tit” brothers and sisters for the intellectual discussions, banters, fun drinking times/meals, solidarity, and friendship. I am indebted to all my colleagues and former colleagues at the Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences at City University of Hong Kong for all their help in the last eight years. I thank Betty and all the ladies at the General Office for the administrative assistance, and Able for the computer assistance. I thank Beck for everything in the last decade, from helping me get adjusted to the workplace to helping me plan a wedding. Special shout-out to Stani, Cyrus, Ricky, Dominic, Natalie, Chung, Alice, Carrie, Kei, Connie, Louis, Cecilia, Oliver, Man, Kat, and Carman. If I had not had so much fun during my first two years at City University of Hong Kong, I might not have pursued a PhD. I also thank Alfred for his friendship, wisdom, and countless meals. I would not be who I am today without the friendship of girlfriends whom I’ve known for 20 years. I wish to thank Florence, Joanne, Euphie, Serena, Bobo,

Preface  xv Marianna, Joanna, Wilma, Enoch, and Michelle for being a constant source of fun, support, comfort, and inspiration throughout adolescence, college, and adulthood. I also thank Wenjuan for instilling positive energy in me every time we meet. Lastly, the love of a family is life’s greatest blessing. I thank Baba and Mama for their unconditional love and support for whatever decisions I make. I also thank them for constantly reminding me that I make them proud. I thank my brother Brian for always making me laugh. I thank my Bak bak Ricky; my Mo mo; and my cousins Patricia, Vivian, Clement, Yu, Winnie, and Janifer for their constant encouragement and for making me feel cool and accomplished for pursuing a PhD. I also thank my parents-in-law, Frankie and Vera, and the Lee family for their encouragement throughout the years. I am indebted for life to my husband, Danny. I dedicate this book to him.

Acronyms and abbreviations

BPA CA CCP CEPA CGLO CNSC CPCCC CPG DAB FTU GDP HKFS ICAC LegCo NGO NPC NPCSC OCLP PMT PRC RTHK SAR SARS

Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong Content Analysis Chinese Communist Party Mainland-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement Central Government Liaison Office Central National Security Commission Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Central People’s Government Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions Gross Domestic Product Hong Kong Federation of Students Independent Commission Against Corruption Legislative Council Nongovernment Organization National People’s Congress Standing Committee of the National People’s Council Occupy Central with Love and Peace Protection Motivation Theory People’s Republic of China Radio Television Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

1 Introduction “One Country” or “Two Systems”?

Opposites attract, but will they last? Hong Kong, comprising Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, became a British Crown colony because of three unequal treaties in the 1800s.1 The British Crown appointed a series of governors to administer Hong Kong, slowly turning it from a fishing village into one of the most prosperous economies in Asia. The British administration introduced the rule of law, a meritocratic civil service, a market economy, civil liberties, and some democratic features. Meanwhile, the mainland has been in turmoil for the last century, having experienced the collapse of the Qing dynasty, an era of warlords, Japanese invasion, a civil war between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, the great famine, Cultural Revolution, etc. By the 1980s, Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were total opposites. The approaching expiry of the 99-year lease on the New ­Territories, however, forced the Chinese and British governments to confront each other regarding the future of Hong Kong. The late Deng Xiaoping rejected Britain’s request to continue its administration of Hong Kong after 1997 and assured Britain that it was “in China’s vital interest to keep Hong Kong prosperous and stable” (Deng, 1984b). Deng was confident that the “marriage” between socialist China and capitalist Hong Kong could work, and his proposal of “One Country, Two Systems” showed China’s commitment to preserving the differences of both systems in this marriage. Deng (1984a) assured ­Hongkongers that “the mainland with its one billion people will maintain the socialist system,” yet “Hong Kong’s current social and economic systems will remain unchanged, its legal system will remain basically unchanged, its way of life and its status as a free port and an international trade and financial centre will remain unchanged.” Deng believed that this “marriage” of opposites would not only work but would also be desirable. First and most important, the smooth transition would set a good example for reunification with Taiwan. Even 35 years after the initial proposal of One Country Two Systems, incumbent President Xi Jinping still maintains that this formula is the best solution for Taiwan (“Highlights of Xi’s speech,” 2019). Second, the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of historical disputes would set a good example for the world. Third, Hong Kong would

2  “One Country” or “Two Systems” continue to enjoy prosperity and stability. Fourth, China’s open-door policy would benefit from Hong Kong’s capitalist economy. Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty and became a special administrative region (SAR) of the PRC on July 1, 1997. Twenty years have passed since the return to Chinese sovereignty. Has One Country, Two Systems, a marriage of opposites, worked as planned? My argument is no. The form of One Country, Two Systems has undoubtedly been implemented successfully. Political and legal systems in the mainland and Hong Kong have remained distinct, and Hongkongers continue to enjoy a more open economy and greater degrees of Western-style liberty than their counterparts on the mainland. Since 1997, however, there have been political struggles over divergent understandings of the substance of One Country, Two Systems. Assimilation and divergence are implied in One Country, Two Systems, and the tension between the two has threatened the governance of the Hong Kong SAR since its beginning. Fong (2017) points out that the model is not sustainable in the long term because it is based on a contradictory set of nationalisms. One Country, Two Systems seemed to be an ideal political compromise that responded to the concerns of major stakeholders, yet this arrangement is gradually losing credence in light of Beijing’s2 increasingly tightened grip and more radical calls for democracy in Hong Kong. The clearest manifestation of such a contrasting interpretation, the Umbrella Movement, a massive sit-in in 2014 that paralysed retail and business centres for 79 days, sought universal suffrage in the election for chief executive.

Democrats’ interpretation: emphasis on “Two Systems” Deng Xiaoping understood that Hong Kong and the mainland were separated by a century of ideological and institutional differences. He once said that imposing socialism on Hong Kong would lead to “turmoil,” and Hong Kong would “become a bleak city with a host of problems” (Deng, 1984b). His solution to this conundrum was to allow two distinctive political systems to coexist within the same country and ensure that Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of autonomy as a SAR. Deng’s promise of a high degree of autonomy was institutionalized in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s regional constitution, and the Hong Kong SAR has been vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power (including that of final adjudication). The Central People’s Government (CPG) could not interfere with local affairs, and Hongkongers have been ruling Hong Kong since the establishment of the SAR (Basic Law Article 22).3 An election committee, composed of elites from various sectors, elects the chief executive of Hong Kong SAR once every five years. The Basic Law also guarantees a variety of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, press, assembly, etc. Pro-democracy activists have interpreted “Two Systems” as a green light for resisting interference from the mainland; in other words, “well water should not interfere with river water.” They believe that the success of Hong Kong rests on a firmly established rule of law, guarantees of freedom and human rights, and a

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  3 capitalist economy – core values and institutions established before the return to Chinese sovereignty – and are determined to preserve Hong Kong’s distinctiveness and autonomy from the designs of the authoritarian regime. Pro-democracy activists have mobilized Hongkongers to resist three major pro-China policies since the handover: The enactment of a national security bill in 2003, implementation of national education in 2012, and chief executive election reform in 2014 (opposition to the policy evolved into the Umbrella Movement).

July 1, 2003, protest The SAR government has a constitutional duty under Article 23 of the B ­ asic Law to enact a law to codify treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the CPG. In 2003, however, half a million Hongkongers participated in a peaceful and orderly demonstration on July 1, the anniversary day of the handover, to protest the proposed national security bill. Not since the rally in support of Tiananmen Square students in 1989 had so many Hongkongers gathered. Many feared that the bill would jeopardize much-cherished civil liberties and act as a gateway to political surveillance and policing. James Tien, chairman of the pro-establishment, pro-business Liberal Party, made it clear that his party would not support the bill in the Legislative Council (LegCo). The public outcry and loss of an important political ally forced Tung Chee-hwa, the first chief executive of Hong Kong, to shelve the proposed bill and the secretary for security to resign.

2012 protest against moral, civic, and national education Days after Chief Executive C. Y. Leung took office, he set a three-year deadline to introduce mandatory national education in all primary schools. The Education Bureau’s curriculum guide for a course of moral and national education was widely criticized for “brainwashing” students into becoming uncritical patriots. The report stated that the course “aims to develop students’ affection for the country and enable them to connect their personal emotions to the country’s development by learning the real situation of the country and [showing] concern [for] their compatriots” (Curriculum Development Council, 2012, p.  153). To add fuel to the fire, the government-funded National Education Services Centre published and freely distributed a teaching reference booklet entitled “The China Model” to primary and secondary schools shortly before the release of the curriculum guide. The booklet praised Chinese rulers as a “progressive, selfless and united ruling group,” criticized multi-party systems such as those in the United States as a “malignant party struggle” that causes people to suffer, and made no mention of China’s darker past such as the Tiananmen Square incident or the Cultural Revolution (Chen & Leong, 2012). Parents, students, educators, and other pro-democracy individuals and groups worried that national education would be used as a tool to brainwash future generations of Hongkongers and protested the policy in various ways:

4  “One Country” or “Two Systems” Signature campaigns, petitions, class boycotts, demonstrations, sit-ins at government headquarters, and hunger strikes. Over 100,000 protesters joined the sit-in at the government headquarters on the ninth day, filling up the forecourt of the government headquarters and spilling over onto roads (Chong, Lee, Ng, Wan, & Lau, 2012). The forecourt has since been popularly termed “Civic Square.” “Occupy Tamar”4 forced C. Y. Leung to cancel the three-year deadline to make national education compulsory and allowed schools to decide what to do with the course. With the continuation of protests, Leung would eventually shelve the curriculum guidelines.

Fight for democratically elected chief executive Hong Kong’s colonial constitutional setup has been described as “executive dominant,” vesting autocratic power in the hands of a Crown-appointed governor. This constitutional setup appealed to Beijing during the drafting of the Basic Law because it avoided party politics, and power was vested in the hands of a bureaucratic entity (N. Ma, 2018). As a result, the Hong Kong SAR inherited major features of the colonial-style, executive-dominant system, with dominant power vested in the hands of a non-popularly elected chief executive. The chief executive of the Hong Kong SAR holds dominant policy-making power and a wide range of appointment powers that are unconstrained by the LegCo or courts. The chief executive also holds the power to dissolve the LegCo if it refuses to pass the annual budget or any important government bills (Basic Law Article 50). Deng Xiaoping believed that the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong could be maintained as long as the constitutional setup of the Hong Kong SAR mirrored that of the colonial era. Furthermore, the chief executive of Hong Kong would be locally elected, which was a great improvement over Crown appointments during the colonial era. This arrangement might have worked well when state and local interests were aligned, yet what Deng failed to predict was the intensity and scale of tensions between state authority and local autonomy. The role of the chief executive embodies such tensions. Constitutionally required to serve two masters, the chief executive is accountable to both the people of Hong Kong and the CPG (Basic Law Article 43). Democrats, however, had little faith that the chief executive would serve the people of Hong Kong, given that the chief executive was selected in a Beijing-engineered, “small-­ circle” election. The election committee is composed of 1,200 members. Chief executive contestants have to be nominated by at least 150 committee members (one eighth of the membership) to be eligible to stand for election. ­Candidates who receive more than 600 votes are elected. As of the election in 2017, the pro-democracy camp held around 300 seats in the e­ lection committee, while the majority of members were pro-establishment elites and business tycoons who have strong business ties with Beijing. The disparity in the number of seats between both camps means that candidates only need the votes of pro-Beijing forces to win the election. Indeed, none of the chief executives

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  5 elected were approved by the pro-democracy camp – C. Y. Leung was elected as chief executive with 689 votes in 2012, and Carrie Lam was elected with 777 votes in 2017. The pro-democracy camp believed that the ultimate safeguard against the influence and intervention from the mainland was a popularly elected chief executive who answered to the local people. The pro-democrats had legal grounds for hope. According to Article 45 of the Basic Law: The method for selecting the chief executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures. (emphasis added) In early 2013, Benny Tai, an associate professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, proposed the use of civil disobedience as a last resort to demand universal suffrage, without unreasonable restrictions. Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) proposed requiring 10,000 participants in a sit-in to paralyse traffic in the financial hub. A series of events in the second half of 2014, which will be elaborated on in later chapters, transformed the initial OCLP proposal into the Umbrella Movement. A phone survey estimated that around 20% of the 7.2 million people in Hong Kong, approximately 1.4 million Hongkongers, took part in the 79-day Umbrella Movement in one form or another (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014c). Despite the scale and resilience of the crowd, the Umbrella Movement ended without winning a single concession from the Hong Kong and Beijing governments.

Beijing’s interpretation: “One Country” above “Two Systems” Deng Xiaoping was concerned with continuing Hong Kong’s success – “the key ingredients for its success in achieving economic prosperity and political stability since the end of the WWII should be ‘deep frozen’” (Lui & Fong, 2018a, p. xviii). Deng famously promised that Hong Kong’s way of life would remain unchanged for 50 years, and the colonial institutional setting – the Executive Council, LegCo, jury, courts, the judiciary, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), etc. – was written into the Basic Law. “Other than a change of the national flag, life would continue as if nothing had happened” (Lui & Fong, 2018a, p. xviii). Indeed, nothing much happened in the first few years, as Beijing leaders exercised self-restraint and engaged in a nonintervention policy (J. Ng, 2014). Something happened in 2003, however, that convinced Beijing to give up its nonintervention policy. Beijing saw that 500,000 people went on the streets

6  “One Country” or “Two Systems” to protest the national security bill (Cheung, 2012; J. Ng, 2014). Since then, Beijing has accelerated the assimilation of Hong Kong into “One Country” through a process of “mainlandization.” Lo (2008, pp. 42–43) defines mainlandization as making Hong Kong politically more dependent on and similar to Beijing, economically more reliant on the mainland’s support, socially more patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Fong (2017) also notes that the repeated emphasis on the supreme power of the CPG, the strengthening of the role of the Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) as the second governing team, the expansion and deepening of cross-border economic activities, the influx of mainland tourists and immigrants, and the expansion of national education showed Beijing’s determination to incorporate and subject Hong Kong to tighter control on political, socioeconomic, and ideological fronts.

White paper on the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” Beijing and the pro-democracy camp have been locked into a vicious cycle since 2003: The political challenge of the national security legislation prompted Beijing to intervene more in Hong Kong affairs, yet Beijing’s active intervention has stirred greater reaction from the pro-democracy camp. Beijing may see itself as helping to stabilize the operation of One Country, Two Systems, yet many pro-democracy Hongkongers see its growing intervention as only threats to and erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy (Lui & Fong, 2018b). The contradiction between Beijing and the pro-democracy camp grew with each passing year until the substance of the arrangement of One Country, Two Systems has fundamentally changed. In recent years, the Beijing government has exerted top-down management through its emphasis on “One Country.” The National People’s Congress (NPC) issued the white paper on the practice of the One Country, Two Systems in June 2014 to promote what it sees as the “correct understanding” of One Country, Two Systems and to ensure that Hong Kong follows the “correct track of development” (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). First, the paper emphasized the supremacy of “one country” over “two systems”: The “one country” is the premise and basis of the “two systems,” and the “two systems” is subordinate to and derived from “one country” … the “two systems” under the “one country” are not on a par with each other… a socialist system by the mainland is the prerequisite and guarantee for Hong Kong’s practicing capitalism and maintaining its stability and prosperity. (Information Office of the State Council, 2014)

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  7 The paper warned Hongkongers that the existing capitalist system and high degree of autonomy are conditional: They are contingent upon having full respect for the socialist system on the mainland and the “One Country” principle. Second, the white paper asserted that the CPG has “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s autonomy is subject to Beijing’s discretion: The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorization. There is no such thing called “residual power.” (Information Office of the State Council, 2014) The Standing Committee of the NPC (NPCSC) decided on August 31, 2014 (“8.31 decision”) that a 1,200-member nominating committee, mainly pro-­ establishment elites, would screen the eligibility of chief executive candidates. The 8.31 decision showed that Beijing was more concerned with political control over Hong Kong than giving Hongkongers a free election. Twenty years after implementing One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong, despite paying lip service to its successful implementation, Beijing does not act satisfied with progress in Hong Kong. Compared to Macau, the “role model” of One Country, Two Systems, Hong Kong fell short of what Beijing anticipated despite Beijing’s active intervention since 2003 (“Macau is a role model,” 2017). Macau SAR, a former Portuguese colony 60 km west of Hong Kong, was returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1999 under the same One Country, Two Systems formula. During his visit to Macau, Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the NPC and state leader overseeing Hong Kong and Macau affairs, praised everything about Macau that Hong Kong had yet to achieve. Zhang praised the city for “effectively safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests” by enacting national security legislation in 2009 (T. Cheung, 2017a). Second, Zhang praised Macau’s education for boosting the cultural identity of its students and teaching them to love the country and Macau (“Macau is a role model,” 2017). Third, Zhang praised the Macau government for being “self-conscious in coordinating with the implementation of Beijing’s comprehensive jurisdiction” (T. Cheung, 2017a). Lastly, Zhang praised the legislature’s insistence on “rational discussion” and the absence of violence and filibustering. Zhang’s comments aimed at lecturing Hong Kong over its failure to pass national security legislation, its failure to implement national education, its outspoken dissent in the LegCo, and its lack of allegiance to the “One Country” concept – four milestones in the implementation of One Country, Two Systems.

From One Country, Two Systems to patriotocracy The white paper on One Country, Two Systems and the 8.31 decision were turning points in Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong – Beijing went from

8  “One Country” or “Two Systems” emphasizing the high degree of autonomy vested in Hong Kong to exercising its comprehensive jurisdiction (K. Cheung, 2017). The gradual breakdown of One Country, Two Systems should not come as a surprise to those familiar with the political situation of Hong Kong over the last two decades. As Jasper Tsang, a veteran Beijing loyalist and founding chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the largest pro-Beijing political party, pointed out: Twenty years after the handover, no date has been set for the legislation of Article 23, national education has not been implemented, constitutional development triggered large-scale protests, [and] the Hong Kong government is constantly blocked in its policies; the central government will naturally ask: ‘Can we still sit with our arms crossed with regards to Hong Kong’s situation? Can we still feel reassured over Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong? (K. Cheung, 2017) Deng had high hopes that One Country, Two Systems would showcase China’s generosity and courage and set an example for the world in how to resolve disputes. After 20 years of execution, however, Hong Kong has shown the world that a political marriage of opposites has not been sustainable.

From intervention to securitization In recent years, the city many hoped would help democratize China has instead become a research setting in which to study China’s increasing intolerance of dissent. The involvement of the NPC meant that, unlike the two previous mass protests that were directed against decisions made at the local level, the OCLP/ Umbrella Movement was directed against a decision made at a national level. Also, unlike the protests against the security law and national education curriculum, the suppression of the Umbrella Movement was unprecedented: The use of tear gas, the “soft” repression initiated by government officials and pro-Beijing elites, the refusal to offer concessions, and the prosecution of Movement leaders and protesters. The Beijing and Hong Kong governments continued their suppression of dissent in Hong Kong after the demise of the Umbrella Movement, as seen in the interpretation of Basic Law regarding proper oath-taking and lawsuits against anti-establishment lawmakers. Increasingly forceful repression reveals China’s determination to eliminate dissent, as if it is, or could become, a national threat.

Chinese national security The Central National Security Commission in China (CNSC) was set up in 2013 to attend to both domestic and external security (“National security,” 2014). The commission is chaired by President Xi Jinping along with the vice-chairman premier and NPC chairman, the PRC’s second- and third-highest-ranked leaders.

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  9 It is not surprising that external security falls under the purview of “national security”; it is perhaps more surprising that domestic security has been given equal weight. Xi’s comment, “domestically, China will pursue development, reform, stability, and foster a safe environment,” clearly indicates that social stability is a matter of national security (“National security,” 2014). The laundry list of areas that are considered under the purview of national security further suggests anything could be a “national security” issue: Politics, territory, military affairs, the economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, nuclear power, and natural resources. “National security” gives the government carte blanche to tackle any issue it sees fit with extraordinary force. This leads to a basic question: What is national security? The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School (represented by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, about which I will elaborate more in Chapter 3) suggests that nothing is inherently a security threat. Rather, an issue is transformed into a security issue (i.e. securitized) when a securitizing actor presents the issue as an existential threat (i.e. securitizing move) and the move is accepted by the audience. If  President Xi considers social disorder to threaten state development, he is securitizing social disorder. The natural question that follows is, why would one want to transform something into a security issue? National security is about survival in the face of an imminent and existential threat (Wæver, 1995). A securitized issue or problem means that the issue is being presented as an imminent and existential threat, and emergency measures are required to handle the threat. The Copenhagen School’s broadened security agenda includes more than military threats. It retains three specific qualities characterizing security problems: (1) An existential threat, (2) the urgency of the issue, and (3) state power claiming legitimate use of extraordinary means. Xi’s securitizing move contained all three of these characteristics.

Existential threat The severity of the situation justifies the use of all necessary means to avert the threat (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995). As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 24) put it, “If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant.” Xi noted that national security was of “prime importance” as China faced unprecedented internal and external complications (“National security,” 2014).

Urgency of the issue Xi explained, “the variety of predictable and unpredictable risks has been increasing remarkably, and the system has not yet met the needs of safeguarding state security. A powerful platform which can coordinate security works is needed.” The international and domestic pressures faced by China thus called for an “urgent need” to establish the CNSC (“Xi Jinping expounds,” 2013).

10  “One Country” or “Two Systems” State power New state power is needed to better tackle potential threats. In this case, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to further centralize power into the hands of the Party’s top leadership, or as Xi noted, to “consolidate the ruling status” of the Party (“Xi Jinping: Jianchi zongti,” 2014). Former President Hu Jintao mentioned in 2012 Beijing’s three core interests: “The underlying goal of the principles and policies adopted by the central government concerning Hong Kong and Macau is to uphold China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests” (Hu, 2012). For the first time, Beijing warned that Hong Kong could be seen as a threat to national security and sovereignty. The 2015 National Security Law explicitly stated that Hongkongers had the obligation and responsibility to maintain national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. A Hong Kong-based pro-democracy anti-Beijing newspaper reported rumours that the CNSC would take charge of all affairs related to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (“Zhonggong chengli,” 2013). Were the CNSC to oversee affairs in Hong Kong it would mean that Beijing considered the democracy movements and protests, including the drastic proposal of OCLP, a threat to national security. Occupy founder Chan Kin-man and other pro-democracy lawmakers believed that Beijing would increasingly use “national security” as an excuse to interfere with Hong Kong affairs and suppress opposition (“Zhonggong chengli,” 2013). Indeed, the rumoured5 oversight of the CNSC presaged political moves to securitize the Umbrella Movement the following year.

Emergence of patriotocracy Wang Zhenmin, legal chief of the CGLO, warned that, “If the ‘two systems’ part … is severely distorted or even [becomes a tool] to confront and damage ‘one country,’ then the reasons and conditions for the ‘two systems’ to exist would be lost” (Lam, 2017). In other words, “two systems” could be scrapped if Beijing considers it a national threat. I propose that one of the consequences of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement is Beijing’s eventual switch to the policy of “patriotocracy” in lieu of One Country, Two Systems. Patriotocracy is a system that allocates power and resources based on one’s professed patriotism. The One Country, Two Systems white paper stated that both national and local interests could only be assured when patriots govern Hong Kong: Loving the country is the basic political requirement for Hong Kong’s administrators. If they are not consisted of patriots as the mainstay or they cannot be loyal to the country and the HKSAR, the practice of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR will deviate from its right direction, making it difficult to uphold the country’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, and putting Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity and the wellbeing of its people in serious jeopardy. (Information Office of the State Council, 2014)

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  11 “Patriotism,” however, has a different meaning in socialist China. The CCP does not consider patriotism to be a personal practice but has instead a set of standards, “patriotism with Chinese characteristics.” Deng (1984a) stated long ago that patriots must form the main body of administrators in Hong Kong, and his three requirements of a patriot are: (1) Respect the Chinese nation, (2) sincerely support the PRC’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, and (3) do not impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. Deng’s requirements were palatable to Hongkongers because he made no mentions of loyalty to the CCP and explicitly stated that one does not have to be in favour of socialism. The white paper on One Country, Two Systems, however, updated the requirement of a patriot to include party loyalty. They must embrace the “correct understanding” of One Country, Two Systems, which, in turn, means accepting the CPG’s comprehensive jurisdiction and oversight over Hong Kong. The policy of patriotocracy is thus an effective national security safeguard as only patriots approved by the CCP could access power and govern Hong Kong. One Country, Two Systems vests a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong and promises that Hongkongers can govern Hong Kong. Patriotocracy, on the other hand, means that Beijing has comprehensive jurisdiction over Hong Kong and only Beijing-approved patriots can govern Hong Kong.

Research questions and chapter guide Since Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, China’s treatment of Hong Kong can be divided into three stages: Nonintervention, intervention, and securitization. If the July 1 march in 2003 was a watershed that marked Beijing’s change from nonintervention to intervention, the Umbrella Movement in 2014 was another watershed that marked Beijing’s change from intervention to securitization. Securitization is a more extreme version of politicization – it is a special type of politics that justifies actions more extreme than the previous rounds of intervention (Buzan et al., 1998). The Beijing and Hong Kong governments’ heightened response towards dissidence and pro-democracy protests raises new questions for both the securitizing side (i.e. the CCP regime) and the receiving side (i.e. Hongkongers): What does the securitizing side (in a non-democratic setting) hope to achieve? How do securitizing moves take place in a Chinese context? What are Hongkongers’ responses to the government’s securitizing moves? What are the consequences of securitization? I suggest that Beijing has two mechanisms at its disposal to maintain security and stability: Political control (see Chapter 2) and securitization of political dissidence (see Chapter 3). Many Hongkongers believe that they have the right to a fair election of the chief executive, and Beijing’s insistence on political control prompted the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. Drawing insights from securitization theory and fear appeal literature, I then propose the framework of “security appeal.” I suggest that the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement resulted from a premature use of hard repression, that is, before the government convinced the general public that the Umbrella Movement was a

12  “One Country” or “Two Systems” threat. Successful securitization entails a general acceptance of the threatening nature of the Movement and agreement with its crackdown, and I suggest that the largely peaceful arrest of protesters in the end was a result of successful securitization. The goal of this book is to understand and analyse first the defiance of political control and then the securitization of the Umbrella Movement. Specifically, I attempt to answer the following three research questions. 1 How should we understand the Umbrella Movement in relation to the history and culture of political development in Hong Kong? 2 How was the Umbrella Movement portrayed in mainstream media, and what securitizing and desecuritizing messages were communicated? 3 Why did Hongkongers accept and defy the security appeal?

Chapter guide In Chapter 2, I describe the chronology of events leading up to the Umbrella Movement. Beijing has two mechanisms to tackle the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong: “Controlocracy” (Ringen, 2016) and the securitization of political dissent. These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive; regimes can adapt and shift their responses to maximize effectiveness based on the situation at hand. The 8.31 decision and hard police repression in the initial stages of the OCLP indicated Beijing’s determination to exert brute control. The Beijing and Hong Kong governments’ insistence on political control, however, whipped a rather unpopular proposal into shape. Every repressive move backfired and drew more support for the protests, which is consistent with the predictions of psychological reactance theory. The theory predicts that people are motivated to regain an infringed upon freedom. To reduce the reactance aroused, the government shifted to a softer tactic of mobilizing “patriotic” forces to initiate securitizing moves and persuade the audience to accept the securitizing claims. In Chapter 3, I review original and second-generation formulations of securitization theory and draw attention to the centrality of audience acceptance. I suggest that incorporating insights from the communications literature helps theorize the types of persuasion techniques that increase audience acceptance. In particular, I note that the vast literature on fear appeal offers a promising framework to analyse the components of an effective persuasion and will then describe the theoretical framework of “security appeal.” Security appeal is a type of persuasion strategy that appeals to an audience’s desire for security. I suggest that the grammar of the securitizing discourse during the Umbrella Movement is essentially a fear appeal used in a security setting. Securitizing actors appealed to audience’s sense of security by depicting the Movement as an imminent threat followed by suggestions of protective action that can avert the threat. In Chapter 4, I briefly describe and explain the methodology of my case study. I will study the Umbrella Movement from three levels, and the theoretical frameworks described in Chapters 2 and 3 guide the collection and analysis of data

“One Country” or “Two Systems”  13 in each level. Level 3 is a critical literature review investigating the political and historical culture of political participation in Hong Kong (Chapter 5). Level 2 is a content analysis of news reports investigating how the Umbrella Movement is depicted in pro-government and pro-democracy media (Chapter 6). Level 1 is a mixed-methods explanatory design that contains surveys and in-depth interviews to examine audience response to the security appeals (Chapter 7). In Chapter 5, I argue that understanding the cultural meanings of the referent object and the infringed freedom precedes understanding audience acceptance of the security appeal. Building on Lau’s work on minimal political participation (1982; Lau & Kuan, 1988) and Lam’s (2004) work on the coexistence of political activism and depoliticization, I contend that mainstream depoliticization has continued to affect the repertoire of contentions. Preoccupation with stability and prosperity, functional understandings of political participation, and scepticism of political activism constrain the Umbrella Movement much as the same forces have constrained activism for 50 or more years. In Chapter 6, I report the results of a content analysis of 400 pro-Beijing Wen Wei Po and pro-democracy Apple Daily articles that appeared during the Umbrella Movement to investigate their respective securitizing and desecuritizing moves. Securitizing messages, predominantly reported in Wen Wei Po, focused on the negative consequences of the Movement, the fragility of referent objects, and the government’s capacity to address the threat. Desecuritizing messages, predominately found in Apple Daily, focused on debunking the Movement’s alleged negative consequences and reminding readers of the protest cause. In Chapter 7, I explore what audience acceptance and defiance mean. I find that audience acceptance entailed the belief that the regime’s proposed solution to avert the threat was effective. On the other hand, those who saw the securitizing moves as threats to cherished freedoms were motivated to defy the moves. I also present a thematic analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with Hongkongers of various backgrounds and note that opponents and supporters had opposing worldviews that stemmed from how they saw the relationship between the people and the government. Opponents accepted Hongkongers as colonized subjects of an authoritarian regime and saw the CCP as a legitimate authoritarian ruler, democracy as something that must be earned with good behaviour, and mainlandization as a welcome integration with the mainland. On the other hand, Occupy supporters saw Hongkongers as citizens who were entitled to have a voice. They saw the CCP as an oppressive dictator, democracy as a right, and mainlandization as a means to convert Hongkongers into Chinese. In Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, I elaborate the concept of “patriotocracy” – a system in which power and opportunities are vested in people based on professed patriotism. To lessen the perceived importance of democracy, the CCP must promote and convince its people that its alternative system could serve individual and national interests better. Patriotism with Chinese characteristics differs from patriotism observed in Western societies, and I will describe several unique features of patriotism with Chinese characteristics. The CCP is willing to reward patriotism in a variety of ways, such as greater access to opportunities,

14  “One Country” or “Two Systems” state resources, power, and wealth. Audience acceptance of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement showed that an increasing number of Hongkongers believed that allegiance to the country and to the Party is in their best interests and Hong Kong’s, and I believe that the mainstream patriotocratic mentality is a major reason for the downfall of the Umbrella Movement and subsequent pro-democracy protests. The title of this chapter asks if the emphasis of “One Country, Two Systems” is on “One Country” or “Two Systems.” Beijing has already warned that, it could either be “One Country only” or “One Country above Two Systems” – the emphasis on “Two Systems” would jeopardize Hong Kong’s autonomy. It is now up to securitizing actors to convince Hongkongers that dissent and protests are existential threats to Hong Kong that need to be tackled. It is also up to Hongkongers to ask whether they should accept or defy such security appeals.

Notes 1 The Qing Dynasty ceded Hong Kong Island to the British Empire after the First Opium War in 1842 and the Kowloon Peninsula after the Second Opium War in 1860. The British Empire further obtained a 99-year lease of the New Territories in 1898. 2 Beijing broadly refers to the power holders in the PRC. Under the party-state system, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds supreme power and controls all state organs. 3 Article 22 of the Basic Law stated, “No department of the Central People’s ­Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law.” 4 Tamar is where the government headquarters is located. 5 Due to the secretive nature of the CNSC, I am unable to find official sources to confirm the subsumption of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office under the CNSC.

2 From political control to the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement

In this chapter I examine how the CCP’s insistence on political control backfired and turned OCLP’s unpopular proposal into reality. The planning of OCLP had not been smooth sailing. Democracy supporters began to call for the implementation of universal suffrage soon after the return to Chinese sovereignty, yet the slow pace of democratization since Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty has been a major source of political frustration (J. T. M. Lam, 2014). In 2013, Benny Tai, together with Reverend Chu Yiu-ming and Dr Chan Kin-man, collectively known as OCLP founders, started campaigning for universal suffrage through a series of deliberation days and civil referendums (But & Lee, 2013a). OCLP, a plan that involves 10,000 participants sitting in to paralyze traffic in Central, was advocated as a last resort should Beijing refuse to grant universal suffrage that met international standards. Occupation, an unlawful assembly under the Public Order Ordinance, is an act of civil disobedience. OCLP organizers required protesters to sign an oath pledging non-violence and that they would neither resist police arrest nor hire lawyers to defend themselves. Support for OCLP had been half-hearted since its inception, and its founders noted in mid2014 that they would forgo the plan if only 100,000 voted in the referendum. Support for OCLP, however, received several much-needed boosts when Beijing showed repeatedly that it was more interested in tightening control over Hong Kong than giving Hongkongers a free choice. The Beijing and Hong Kong governments seemingly whipped a rather unpopular proposal into shape through a series of repressive moves. Every repressive move, such as the White Paper on One Country, Two Systems and the 8.31 decision, backfired and drew more support for the OCLP (see Figure 2.1 for a timeline of events leading to the Umbrella Movement). The final straw was the police use of tear gas and pepper spray to disperse the crowd. The counterproductive effect of a repressive move is consistent with psychological reactance theory, which I will examine in greater detail.

The CCP’s insistence on control vs. OCLP The party-state system, or dangguo, has been a feature of China’s political system since the Kuomintang came to power in the 1920s. In a party-state, the party holds supreme power and controls all state organs. The general secretary of the CCP serves consecutively as the president of the PRC, though the latter is merely

16  Political control to the Umbrella Movement June

August

• 10th: White Paper on One Country Two Systems • 20th-29th: OCLP Civil Referendum

• 31st: NPCSC decision

July

September

• 1st: Annual July 1 protest has highest turnout since 2003

• 22th-26th: Class boycott • 26th-27th: Reclaim civic square, arrest of student leaders • 28th: Launch of OCLP at 1:40am, police use of tear gas to disperse crowd at 6pm, protesters spread to 3 sites

Figure 2.1  Brief timeline of the events leading to the Umbrella Movement.

a ceremonial position and holds no decision-making power. The general secretary also heads the Central Military Commission, meaning the CCP has direct leadership of the People’s Liberation Army. The NPC, the national legislature, merely acts as a rubber stamp for CCP decisions and is known for unanimous “yes” votes. Control has always been a hallmark of modern Chinese rule – the CCP exerts dictatorial control over the state, military, police, judiciary, press, Internet, natural resources, the economy, etc. Over the years, however, the CCP has moved away from direct control of its people to indirect forms (Ringen, 2016). Under Mao’s rule, the Chinese people were expected to deliver absolute obedience and devotion to the CCP in all aspects of their lives: From what they owned, what they thought about, what work they did, where they reside, to what kind of entertainment they should enjoy. The decline and collapse of the Soviet Union, however, taught the CCP two lessons about staying in power (Ringen, 2016). First, the CCP must never loosen its grip on the system of control. Second, to maintain domination and legitimacy the CCP must deliver economic growth. In other words, a sophisticated system of direct control alone is simply not enough; the CCP must be able to show that the people are on a trajectory of prosperity. The result of this carrot-and-stick approach is that the people voluntarily toe the Party line because it makes sense for them to do so (Ringen, 2016). The CCP has brought prosperity to many Chinese – the political science student below was able to study abroad, an opportunity not readily available 20 years ago. She understood, however, that she must abide by the Party line to continue living the life she wants. A political science major who just returned to Beijing after studying in the United States was asked about her views regarding the Umbrella Movement protesters in Hong Kong. She merely shook her head and told the reporter, “You just don’t understand China… Sometimes it just makes sense to keep your mouth shut (emphasis added).” (Jacobs, 2014)

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  17 Ringen noted that the modern CCP has reinvented and perfected dictatorship, which he termed “controlocracy.” Unlike life under Mao’s rule, people in a controlocracy are able to live the life they want as long as they understand and accept the Party limits. The CCP has clearly stated what one must not do, and the possible consequences of contravening the rules – detention, harassment, heavy fines, torture, retribution against family members, and even death – were never a secret (A. Ma, 2018). The CCP could thus rely on “managed self-control” to remain in power (Ringen, 2016, p.  137). Nobel Peace Prize laureate Xiaobo Liu, who had been imprisoned from 2009 till his death in 2017 for publishing a charter that called for greater democracy and political reform, received perhaps more public support from outside of than within China. As Foreign Policy senior editor and long-time Beijing resident James Palmer (2017) recalled: There was a time when I was shocked by the disdain middle-class Chinese, even those with relatively liberal views, showed toward dissidents. The first impulse always seemed to be to find a way to blame them. All the agency was placed on the victims, not on the people who arrested, tortured, and imprisoned them; the system was just the system, after all. Chinese people who subscribe to the principles of controlocracy would certainly have little sympathy towards Liu. After all, he crossed a line he should have known about; he must have expected what was going to happen – the CCP is like “a force of nature” and “going up against it is as foolish and pointless as waving an umbrella in a thunderstorm” (Palmer, 2017). A controlocracy allows its people to enjoy certain freedoms, “but only up to a point” (Ringen, 2016, p. 1). In 2007, the 10th NPCSC gave a green light to universal suffrage: “The election of the fifth Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the year 2017 may be implemented by the method of universal suffrage” (Standing Committee of the 10th NPC, 2007). It was also decided at the meeting, however, that chief executive candidates must be nominated by a nominating committee, in accordance with Article 45 of the Basic Law. It should not come as a surprise that the CCP wants to bar open nominations. Yu Zhengsheng, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, warned that Hong Kong could not become a base and bridgehead for subverting the mainland (Lee & Li, 2013). Qiao Xiaoyang, chairman of the Law Committee under the NPC, hinted that a screening mechanism was needed to ensure the chief executive of Hong Kong “loves the country and loves Hong Kong” and will not confront the CPG (But & Lee, 2013b). The pre-screening of chief executive candidates through a nominating committee is a compromise between promising Hongkongers universal suffrage on one hand and ensuring election results are controllable and predictable on the other. In a controlocratic society, people would toe the Party line because it serves their best interest. However, the CCP’s insistence on political control backfired in Hong Kong. The NPCSC has long barred open nomination; however, that did not stop people from fighting for it. In fact, the refusal to open nominations only drove

18  Political control to the Umbrella Movement people to protest more radically. In January 2013, Benny Tai published an op-ed in a local newspaper calling for civil disobedience more radical than demonstrations, referendums, hunger strikes, and occupations of government headquarters to pressure the strong-willed CCP to concede to genuine universal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election (Tai, 2013). He proposed the peaceful occupation of Central, the business and financial hub of Hong Kong (Tai, 2013). In March 2013, Tai, together with Dr Chan Kin-man, a sociology professor at Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, officially launched the OCLP campaign to fight for universal suffrage. Its manifesto stated three convictions: 1 The electoral system of Hong Kong must satisfy the international standards in relation to universal suffrage. They consist of the political rights to equal number of vote, equal weight for each vote, and no unreasonable restrictions on the right to stand for election. 2 The concrete proposal of the electoral system of Hong Kong should be decided by means of a democratic process, which should consist of deliberation and authorization by citizens. 3 Any act of civil disobedience that aims to fight for realizing a democratic, universal, and equal suffrage in Hong Kong though illegal means has to be absolutely non-violent (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, n.d.). The CCP has made it clear that brute control will follow if the OCLP continues as planned. Chief Executive C. Y. Leung called the proposed plan “unlawful activities that disrupt law and order” (But & Lau, 2013). He also said, “once the Occupy action takes place… there will be no possibility of it being lawful or peaceful,” and “the government will not tolerate law-breaking activities.” The police were prepared to mobilize all possible resources to tackle the proposed protest. Police Commissioner Andy Tsang warned that “any attempt to block major thoroughfares in Central will lead to serious consequences and will not be tolerated” (Chong, But, & Lau, 2013). The police reportedly took 18 months to plan Operation Solar Peak, which involved the deployment of up to 7,000 police officers (almost a quarter of the police force) to tackle possible chaos (Srivastava, Browning, Khan, & Li, 2014). To showcase their determination and ability to suppress the large-scale sit-in, the police arrested more than 500 protesters who participated in the overnight sit-in rehearsal after the annual July 1 march (“Charter Road cleared,” 2014). Occupy founder Chan Kin-man admitted that the authorities were sending a clear signal to the OCLP founders that repressive actions would be readily used (Yuen & Cheng, 2017).

White paper on One Country, Two Systems vs. referendum OCLP founders organized three deliberation days and two unofficial referendums prior to the launch of OCLP to encourage Hongkongers to express their opinions. The first referendum organized on New Year’s Day, 2014 attracted

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  19 around 62,000 voters (Public Opinion Program, 2014a). The second referendum in June was set up to decide which of the three 2017 chief executive election models should be endorsed by the OCLP and presented to Beijing. All three proposals shortlisted for the referendum called for varying extents of civil nomination, though civil nomination was dismissed by the Hong Kong government in the early stages of the public consultation (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014a). OCLP founders noted that they would openly declare the campaign a failure and forgo the occupation if only 100,000 people voted in the referendum (T. Cheung, 2014a). Support for the referendum, however, received a muchneeded boost in reaction to the State Council of the NPC’s One Country, Two Systems white paper, which was released a week before the referendum. The white paper, the first since the handover, may have been intended to dampen the heated political debates on the future of Hong Kong. Instead, it added fuel to the fire. It highlighted three points: An emphasis on the “comprehensive jurisdiction” that Beijing has over Hong Kong, an assertion of the supremacy of “one country” over “two systems,” and the requirement that all administrators, including court judges, to be patriotic (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). The authoritarian nature of the white paper has been strongly criticized by democrats, the legal community, citizens, and even Jasper Tsang, a pro-­ establishment heavyweight (Cheung & Cheung, 2014). The white paper engendered what Tai called “the largest scale of expression of public opinion in the city’s history,” with 800,000 Hongkongers voting in the June referendum to express their discontent (Cheung, Lam, Ng, & Cheung, 2014). Furthermore, close to 88% of voters agreed that the LegCo should veto any proposals that failed to meet international standards. The legal community organized a silent march to protest Beijing’s interference in the judicial independence of Hong Kong, and a retired chief justice spoke out: “under the principle of judicial independence, judges should not be pro- or anti- anyone or anything” (A. Li, 2014; Chiu, Yap, & Lau, 2014). Since 2003, the turnout for the July 1 march has become a social indicator of public discontent with the government. The July 1 march in 2014 also had the highest turnout since 2005, with the majority of participants marching to demand genuine universal suffrage in the election for chief executive in 2017 and protesting the white paper (Cheung, Cheung, Ng, Lam, & Fung, 2014). The results of the OCLP referendum, however, were repeatedly denounced by government officials in Hong Kong and Beijing as unrepresentative, exaggerated, meaningless, and illegal (T. Cheung, 2014b; Cheung & Ng, 2014; Cheung, Siu, Lau, & Cheung, 2014). An editorial in Global Times1 noted that the referendum was an “illegal farce,” and the turnout in Hong Kong was negligible when compared with “more than 1.3 billion people [who] have the right to speak on Hong Kong’s political reform” (“Ludicrous to let,” 2014). The Hong Kong government also turned a blind eye to the results of the OCLP referendum. Chief Executive C. Y. Leung submitted a summary of the five-month public consultation to the NPCSC on July 15, kicking off the first stage of the reform process. The report noted that “mainstream opinion” agreed that the nominating committee’s

20  Political control to the Umbrella Movement “power of nomination must not be undermined or bypassed directly or indirectly” (Leung, 2014b, p. 9). Leung also suggested that the nominating committee be modelled after the current 1,200-people election committee. The report briefly mentioned that there was “considerable” support for a civic nomination to be included in the nominating procedures; however, it quickly pointed out that civic nomination was inconsistent with the Basic Law (Leung, 2014b, p. 13). The report infuriated pro-democracy groups. They called it a misrepresentation of public opinion in Hong Kong and threatened a civil disobedience movement should the NPC insist on controlling the nomination process (Lin, 2014). As if to pacify the pro-democracy groups, then Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam hinted that the proposed election system was not set in stone. She noted that the Basic Law principles promised reform would be a “gradual and orderly process.” It “should be possible to further amend the electoral arrangements in the future” (C. Lam, 2014). Many Hongkongers interpreted Lam’s comments as asking the NPC to “pocket it first.”

8.31 NPC decision vs. class boycott On August 31, 2014, the NPC decided on an electoral framework for choosing the chief executive (“8.31 decision”). It gave a second wind to public support for civil disobedience. At this second stage of the reform process, the NPC decided on the following (“Full text of NPC decision,” 2014): 1 Methods for electing the nominating committee should be the same as that of the current 1,200-member election committee. 2 Each eligible candidate must be endorsed by more than half of the nominating committee. 3 The nominating committee should nominate two to three candidates. The decision came as a shock to Hongkongers because it was even more uncompromising than expected. Considering pro-democracy activists were only able to secure 200–300 seats in the election committee in the 2012 and 2017 chief executive elections, the 8.31 framework essentially barred pro-democracy contestants from seeking candidacy. Under this framework, even though Hongkongers were granted “one person one vote” in 2017, they would most likely be able to vote for one of the two or three candidates handpicked by the CCP, via the nominating committee. The third stage of the reform requires the government of Hong Kong to prepare a draft under the framework outlined by the NPC, which must be agreed upon by at least two-thirds of lawmakers in the LegCo. Immediately after the NPC handed down its decision, all 27 pro-democracy lawmakers (of 70 LegCo members) declared that they would vote against any draft based on the endorsed framework (Cheung, Lam, So, & Cheung, 2014). Vetoing the draft, however, would mean that universal suffrage would be put on indefinite hold. The NPC decision thus put Hong Kong’s pro-democracy lawmakers in a difficult position.

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  21 Divided opinions As Beijing rejected the OCLP referendum proposal and made it clear that it would control the nomination process of the chief executive, OCLP declared that Hong Kong had entered “an era of civil disobedience” (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014b). Occupy Central would “definitely happen” because “all chances of dialogue have been exhausted.” It is important to note that the level of public support for the Occupation at this point was still unclear. Two days later, OCLP founders Tai and Chan noted in two separate interviews that they were not optimistic about the turnout for Occupy Central (Li & Tweed, 2014; Yung & Steger, 2014). They noted that Beijing’s uncompromising stance towards universal suffrage might discourage many pragmatic thinkers. Tai and Chan’s pessimism was clear; both admitted that their strategies had failed (Lam & Ng, 2014; Yung & Steger, 2014). Tai noted that many Hongkongers remained uneasy about business disruptions that might hurt the economy and hinted that organizers should pick a public holiday for the massive sit-in so as to “cause minimal damage to Hong Kong’s economy” (Li & Tweed, 2014). Nevertheless, OCLP later released a statement reaffirming that “we do what we say” and that they would continue with the occupation (Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2014c). Three phone surveys, all of them interviewing a random sample of around 1,000 Hongkongers, were conducted within two weeks of the NPC decision (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014a; Public Opinion Programme, 2014b, 2014c). The results showed that the Hong Kong public had not received the decision well – 48% to 53.7% of respondents believed that the LegCo should veto any draft formulated according to the framework laid out in the NPC decision, especially if it barred non-pro-Beijing contestants from standing for election. Disagreement with the NPC, however, did not automatically translate to support for the Occupation, as only 27%–31.3% of Hongkongers supported an occupation to press for universal suffrage. Furthermore, it was unclear at this point whether those who claimed they supported an occupation would participate. The results seem to correspond with what the OCLP organizers had feared. Even though pragmatic Hongkongers opposed the NPC decision, many felt uneasy about disrupting the economy. Support for an occupation was at most half-hearted.

Class boycott Students were the most avid supporters of civil disobedience. They were not, however, encouraged by the OCLP founders to participate in the Occupation because of possible criminal liabilities. Student unions in higher education institutions, operating as Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), organized a week-long class boycott to protest Beijing’s unyielding stance on civil nomination. Thousands of university students from more than two dozen institutions took part in the class boycott that began on September 22 (Lam & Cheung, 2014). The boycott was backed by more than 100 academics who offered to

22  Political control to the Umbrella Movement give public lectures (“civic auditorium”) to the students during their assembly. Scholarism, a student activist group founded by secondary school students, 2 organized a boycott of secondary school classes on September 26, the first ever in Hong Kong. More than 1,000 secondary school students, mostly under the age of 18, skipped classes and took part in the rally (“Up to 3,000,” 2014). Two thousand more students joined the after-school rally. Late in the evening of September 26 Joshua Wong, 17-year-old founder and convener of Scholarism, urged participants who boycotted class to join them in “reclaiming Civic Square.” Civic Square, forecourt of the government headquarters and occupation site of the national education protests, was designed to be a public space. The space had been sealed off with 3-meter barricades in July for security purposes because it would likely be a protest spot (Cheung & Lam, 2014). Hundreds of students responded to the call and scaled security fences to enter the square. Within minutes, the police deployed to disperse protesters from Civic Square and cordoned off the government headquarters to prevent more protesters from entering. Wong was photographed being pinned down by the police, handcuffed and carried away. The situation quickly became chaotic as more police reinforcements were deployed and thousands of protesters tried to block them from entering the government headquarters. The police used pepper spray and batons to evict the crowd. It was estimated that at least 10 clashes between police and protesters occurred within 15 hours (“Gongmin guangchang,” 2014). By around 2 pm on September 27, police had successfully evicted and arrested the protesters inside Civic Square, including student activist leaders of HKFS Lester Shum, Alex Chow, and Scholarism’s Joshua Wong. Later that evening, the two student activist groups, backed by pro-democracy lawmakers and OCLP organizers, called for another rally to urge the police to release the detained student leaders (“Yusan huigu,” 2015). Videos of violent arrests of students, such as police dragging young students across the ground, prompted thousands of outraged Hongkongers to gather outside the government headquarters in support of the release of student leaders (“Jingyuan fengle,” 2014). Protesters also voluntarily brought in supplies such as plastic wrap, masks, goggles, and umbrellas to donate.

Tear gas vs. the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement Showing support for the students and capitalizing on the momentum already unleashed by student protests, OCLP organizers made a surprise announcement on the morning of September 28 at 1:40 am to launch Occupy Central earlier than expected (“Occupy Central is on,” 2014). The early launch sparked friction in the crowd, and protesters criticized the OCLP founders for hijacking the student movement. Many left the site after the announcement, claiming to have come to merely show support for student boycotts and did not approve of Occupy Central. Leung Kwok-hung, a pro-democracy lawmaker nicknamed “Long Hair,” was photographed kneeling down and pleading with the crowd to stay and fight for what was right (“Occupy Central is on,” 2014). Nonetheless, the crowd was already considerably smaller than before as dawn broke.

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  23 Late in the afternoon, the police announced that they had imposed a lockdown in the vicinity of the government headquarters and warned that they would arrest anyone who attempted to forcefully enter (“Lockdown imposed,” 2014). Several pro-democracy lawmakers attempted to deliver audio equipment to the site and were arrested by the police. The police lockdown prompted citizens to come out in support of the Occupation. Furthermore, Joshua Wong’s detention for over 40 hours also galvanized people to join the protest. Wong’s parents released a statement earlier in the morning calling the prolonged detention of their son a “political persecution.” They noted that the lawyers saw no legal justification for the continued detention given the nature of the charges, Wong’s young age and clean record (“Occupy Central is on,” 2014). As thousands of police officers cordoned off roads and bridges leading to the government headquarters, thousands of newcomers spilled onto roads near the government headquarters, blocking traffic within hours. Tai was “surprised at  the sudden swell of support,” considering many had left already after he ­announced the launch of OCLP (“Occupy Central – The first 12 hours,” 2014). Tens of thousands of protesters eventually occupied six traffic lanes outside the government headquarters, and the police realized that pepper spray was insufficient to disperse the increasingly large crowd. The police declared that they would escalate the level of force and fired the first tear gas at around 6 pm. The televised scenes of the use of tear gas on an unarmed crowd – many raising their hands in the air to show that they were not going to attack – shocked the public and drew even more people to the occupied sites (“Occupy Central – The first night,” 2014). The police infamously fired 87 canisters of tear gas to disperse the crowd. Protesters also started a sit-in at Causeway Bay and Mong Kok (Kowloon side) to divert police attention in an impromptu guerrilla warfare. The original OCLP evolved into the Umbrella Movement, named to commemorate the use of umbrellas (symbol of non-­ violence) to fight against pepper spray (symbol of state oppression and violence).

Psychological reactance theory The government whipped an unpopular proposal into shape through a series of repressive move. Every repressive move initiated by the government, such as the white paper on One Country, Two Systems and the 8.31 decision, backfired and drew more support for the protests. The defiant behaviour was consistent with the predictions of psychological reactance theory (hereafter reactance theory), which predicts that attempts at social influence may arouse a motivation to resist or act counter to the influence. Brehm and Brehm (1981) used the example of former US president Lyndon Baines Johnson to initiate discussions on ­reactance – the president did the exact opposite of what the press expected him to do. When the press predicted that Mr. [President] Johnson would get rid of all the Kennedy men in the White House, he invited them all to stay, and when he was later praised for doing so, he gradually let almost all of them resign. (New York Times news report, as cited in Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 1)

24  Political control to the Umbrella Movement The theory assumes that individuals believe they have specific behavioural freedoms. If a freedom is perceived as threatened, the motivation to re-establish that freedom, or “reactance,” will be aroused (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). The motivation to re-establish freedom is so strong that it could even affect important political decisions such as the appointment of a White House cabinet. Other studies have found that high school males were more likely to dive into the shallow end of the school pool when a “NO DIVING” sign was in place (Goldhber & deTurck, 1989), viewers expressed greater desire to watch violent films when the films had warning labels (“viewer discretion is advised”) (Bushman & Stack, 1996), participants expressed a greater desire to eat full-fat cream cheese after seeing the health warning “the U.S. Surgeon General has determined that eating high fat food increases your risk of heart disease” (Bushman, 1998), students were more likely to draw on the walls when they saw the sign “Do NOT write on the walls” (Pennebaker & Sanders, 1976), etc. Because of its broad application to understanding human behaviour, the theory has been frequently called upon to explain resistance to persuasion or boomerang effects (i.e. effects opposite to the intended ones) from its inception to the present (see Ringold, 2002 for a review). The basic premise of reactance theory is that a threat to perceived freedom motivates an individual to protect and re-establish that freedom. The simple structure of reactance theory is freedom, threat to freedom, reactance, and restoration of freedom (see Figure 2.2).

Freedom Reactance theory assumes3 that freedom is a subjective expectancy (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Behavioural freedom for an individual means that the individual “must know, by experience, by general custom, or by formal agreement,” that one may engage in that type of behaviour (Brehm, 1966, p.  4). In other words, if the individual perceives that he or she has the freedom and the competence to do X, the behavioural freedom to do X then exists for the

Threat to Freedom

Reactance

Restoration of Freedom

Figure 2.2  Simplified process model of psychological reactance theory.

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  25 individual. Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 22) state that “it is theoretically irrelevant whether this freedom exists according to some more objective criteria.” The subjective operationalization of freedom belief “implies that there will be considerable variation in people’s beliefs concerning their existing freedom” (p. 22). For example, a boy who was taught at a very young age that he must clean his room every day might not perceive that the freedom to leave his room messy exists. Similarly, citizens in an authoritarian state might not be aware that the freedom to participate in democratic elections exists. Unless an individual perceives that a certain freedom exists, forces limiting the freedom do not arouse reactance.

Threat to freedom Reactance theory does not assume that individuals are motivated to gain or maximize their behavioural freedoms. The focus of the theory is to explain individual reactions to infringement of perceived prerogatives. Given that a person believes he or she has, or is entitled to, a specific freedom, any force that limits the exercising of that freedom constitutes a threat. One freedom threat is the social pressure – commands, persuasion, negative consequences of noncompliance, and even restrictive laws – to change attitudes or behaviours. For example, the US federal decision to raise the minimum age for alcohol consumption to 21 years was clearly enacted to decrease alcohol consumption among younger individuals. Several surveys among college students, however, found boomerang effects in the wake of the legal change – underage students reported more alcohol consumption than their legal-age peers (Engs & Hanson, 1989; Allen, Sprenkel, & Vitale, 1994). This boomerang trend noted in underage alcohol consumption was not observed in the consumption of other types of drugs not affected by the legal change – underage students did not report more illicit drug use (e.g. crack, marijuana) than their legal-age peers (Allen et al., 1994). These results led Engs and Hanson (1989, p. 1085) to conclude that “the legislation may have contributed to increased drinking among underage students through the arousal of reactance motivation.” When individuals are confronted with a potentially negative outcome, they cherish the freedom to avoid that negative outcome. Reactance theory predicts that reactance arousal will occur when avoidance freedom is threatened. Participants in Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, and Greenberg’s (1983) study were randomly assigned to complete an easy or difficult learning task and were led to believe that successful performance was necessary to avoid possible electric shock. The results showed that the participants rated the perceived unpleasantness of the shock higher when they perceived that the difficulty of avoiding the negative outcome had increased. If an individual has a choice between a positive and negative alternative (e.g. universal suffrage vs. appointed leadership), the elimination of the positive alternative will arouse reactance not only because of the loss of freedom to choose the positive alternative but also because of the loss of freedom to avoid the negative.

26  Political control to the Umbrella Movement Reactance Two major elements determine the magnitude of reactance: Freedom and threats. The importance of a freedom depends on the magnitude of need. For example, drinkers would value the freedom to drink more than light- or non-drinkers would, and the theory predicts that drinkers will exhibit reactance by rejecting the message being advocated when the freedom to drink is threatened. Snyder and Blood (1992) found that drinkers exhibited a boomerang effect when presented with the surgeon general’s alcohol warning label. Drinkers exposed to the warning label rated alcohol products as more beneficial and reported more intention to drink in the future than those who were not exposed to the label. Threats do not have to be direct. Threats can be implied or observed. Implications of threats to future freedoms increase the magnitude of reactance. Sensenig and Brehm (1968) found that participants who were led to believe that they needed to write five forced-choice essays displayed greater reactance than those who were led to believe that they only needed to write one. The subjects in the one-essay group displayed lower reactance because they believed that their freedom of expression in the next four essays would not be threatened. These findings suggest that the magnitude of reactance increases with the number of freedoms implicitly eliminated. Furthermore, if an individual sees that loss of freedom could just as well happen to him or herself, then the individual’s perception of freedom will also be threatened. Suppose A and B are both secretaries of the same rank and B saw A lose some freedom at work (e.g. a coffee break). The elimination of this freedom for A would threaten the same freedom for B and invoke reactance in B. If a freedom is of low importance (e.g. a light drinker’s freedom to drink), only minimal reactance is aroused no matter how great the threat to that freedom. Forces inhibiting the exercise of an unimportant freedom will generally result in compliance. Threats to cherished freedoms elicit higher levels of reactance and lead to reduced compliance. A boomerang effect occurs only in rare instances where a freedom is perceived as more important than most other aspects of life. Hence the magnitude of reactance is great enough to overshadow the force of compliance completely. The key to reducing reactance arousal is either through persuading the audience to devalue the freedom or by increasing the force demanding compliance.

Restoration The most obvious manifestation of reactance arousal is direct behavioural efforts to restore the infringed freedom. Suppose an individual experiences reactance after being told not to smoke; the individual could directly restore the freedom by smoking. That reactance, however, does not necessarily lead to resistance. Brehm and Brehm (1981) noted several factors that might restrict direct re-establishment of freedom. One restricting factor is the cost associated with such a direct attempt, either to oneself or another. If freedom is threatened

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  27 by a more powerful party (e.g. boss, legal enforcement, or government), the danger of retaliation from the powerful party might deter direct restoration attempts. Feldman-Summers (1977) also found that participants in her study were more likely to relinquish their freedom in situations where they had to take responsibility for adverse effects on others. The reactance restoration scale developed by Quick and Stephenson (2007) showed that reactance can be manifested via performing a forbidden act (direct restoration), being associated with others who perform the forbidden act or engaging in a similar behaviour to the threatened freedom.

Reactance and protest The findings from the reactance literature and social movement literature share a few similarities. First, action stems from the failure to attain something to which one feels entitled. Protest research over the last 50 years generally agrees that the experience of relative deprivation, not absolute deprivation, motivates people to join protests (Walker & Smith, 2002). The theory of relative deprivation posits that people’s reaction to objective circumstances depends on subjective comparisons made with relevant out-groups. Riots are not necessarily initiated by the most disadvantaged group in society; rather people feel angry and resentful if they perceive that they do not get what they deserve. Tyler and colleagues expanded the theory of relative deprivation and suggested people use principles of justice to identify what is correct, fair, just, or deserved (Tyler & Lind, 2002; Tyler & Smith, 1995). The perception of injustice leads to feelings of anger and resentment. Tyler and Lind (2002) found that all respondents (Caucasian and African American) were concerned about an equal opportunity to succeed. The denial of equal treatment based on race, a group-based relative deprivation, is central to shaping people’s feelings. If people feel that the market is procedurally unjust because it discriminates against members of particular racial groups, they are more likely to support government intervention to correct this unfairness. Because people perceive the freedom to succeed on equal grounds exists, the denial of fair treatment leads to reactance. On the other hand, outcome-based deprivation, the denial of equal outcome to different groups, has little direct impact. Second, both reactance and social movement literature emphasize the role of anger in pushing for action. Reactance is partly anger (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains, 2013), and research on social movements finds that group-based anger and outrage are crucial to many aspects of social movements, from mobilization to sustained participation (Jasper, 1998; Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). van Zomeren et  al. (2004) show that when students are denied an opportunity to discuss a policy that greatly affects them, this perception of procedural injustice leads to group-based anger among the students and increases their tendency to take collective action. Flam (2005, p.  26) even describes anger as a “valued commodity” in social movements. The more “currency” a social

28  Political control to the Umbrella Movement movement has in its possession, the more a movement is able to achieve. After all, social change takes place only when civilians react to injustice with more anger than apathy. Third, the social movement literature notes that it is possible for an individual to experience anger on behalf of the group when the group or group members face a harmful event, even when there is no personal involvement in an event. Similarly, reactance theory notes that threats do not have to be direct – threats can be implied or observed. Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006) find that when participants perceive they are similar to the victims of an extreme tuition increase (i.e. they perceive they are in the same social group), they experience stronger anger and are more likely to take action against a proposed tuition increase than those who only weakly identify with victims.

Moral shock A concept similar to reactance is moral shock, frequently seen as the first step of stranger recruitment into a social movement. Moral shock refers to “an unexpected event or piece of information” that “raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action” (Jasper, 1997, p. 106). Moral shocks are usually unexpected public events, such as a nuclear plant accident (e.g. Three Mile Island), but it could also be based on an individual’s experiences, such as the discovery that one’s drinking water has long been contaminated by a local factory. Jasper (1997) describes how an aging rancher and a group of middle-class housewives, neither fitting popular images of protesters, became the strongest opponents of the proposed Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. They had been minding their own business all their lives; yet one day they were suddenly pushed into activism when they saw that the construction of a nearby nuclear plant could destroy their homes and harm their children. An event is “shocking” because it violates an individuals’ expectancy of rights and freedom. People have moral visions of what ought to be according to perceived blueprints of a utopian society and good life, and protests are efforts to pursue a collective moral vision. “Protest is pre-eminently about moral vision, for participants to make clams about how the world should be, but is not” (Jasper, 1997, p. 135). Moral visions are a subjective expectancy, and not everyone has the same visions. An animal activist believes animals have a right to cruelty-free treatments, yet a butcher might see animals as food. Despite having neither connection with activist groups nor protest experience, passers-by self-recruited into the animal rights movement after seeing visual images of animals suffering, such as stabbed bulls, starved dogs, and caged monkeys (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). As one animal rights protestor said: I remember my first photos of cats being tortured in experiments: It was at a table on Fifth Avenue in 1987. I didn’t know anybody in the movement – in fact I thought they were a bunch of weirdos. But they were right about animal torture. (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995, p. 501)

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  29 Moral shocks play a complementary role in the reactance theory of social movements. Reactance theory predicts that forces limiting perceived freedoms will arouse behaviours that seek to re-establish those freedoms. Public events that contradict people’s expectations may serve similar recruitment functions as an existing activism network because individuals who have been morally shocked often seek social movements to fight for their rights and freedoms. The sight of state-approved repression was clearly a moral shock to many Hongkongers and prompted them to restore theirs and others’ infringed freedom.

Reactance and the Umbrella Movement Reactance theory assumes that freedom is a subjective expectancy – whether the freedom of unscreened universal suffrage objectively exists is irrelevant to the discussion. If the individual does not consider the freedom to exist, or if the freedom is of low importance, only a small amount of reactance is aroused no matter how great the threat to that freedom is. Politically aloof individuals and government supporters who do not see democracy as a right or democratic values as important will not be motivated to regain the infringed freedom. For those who perceive democracy as an important freedom, the magnitude of reactance is great enough to completely overshadow the force of compliance. Article 45 of the Basic Law promises universal suffrage “in accordance with democratic procedures.” Supporters of the Umbrella Movement interpreted that clause to mean that voters are entitled to a choice in the chief executive election, ideally in the form of open nominations. Beijing’s insistence on vetting political candidates, however, showed that it is more interested in tightening control over Hong Kong than giving Hongkongers a free choice. According to student activist leader Joshua Wong (2014), Hongkongers are entitled to a say in the future. The Beijing and Hong Kong governments are “trying to steal our future.” The public that flocked to the protest scene after seeing the police clashes could be seen as attempting to restore an important freedom directly. Brehm and Brehm (1981) also note that individuals cherish the freedom to avoid negative outcomes, and reactance arousal will occur when such avoidance freedom is threatened. Supporters believed that they had the freedom to say no to the undesirable 8.31 NPC decision to pre-screen candidates, and police use of heavy-handed methods of suppressing unarmed protesters was perceived by supporters as a threat to the freedom to say no. Protesters had originally planned on avoiding the OCLP protest. They left the rally site immediately after the launch of OCLP, 12 hours before the first tear gas. Protesters criticized OCLP founders for hijacking a student movement and claimed that they did not approve of OCLP and were only present to demand the release of student leaders. Police repression, however, generated much sympathy and support for the OCLP. Images and videos of peaceful protesters armed merely with umbrellas to shield themselves, being enveloped in clouds of smoke, and surrounded by riot police with respirators were a moral shock to many in Hong Kong. Protesters were probably angrier about the police actions than they were about the

30  Political control to the Umbrella Movement original grievance (i.e. the refusal of genuine universal suffrage). The powerful images prompted them to set aside their opinions about OCLP and join the crowd outside the government headquarters, despite having no prior activist experience or networks. I was about to go to sleep, but then saw on TV that tear gas was being used and policemen were pointing guns at students and citizens. I just had a feeling I needed to come back out. Mr. Li (Srivastava et al., 2014) Mr. Ho, 31, was eating dinner and did not plan to join the protests. Yet when he saw the scenes on television, he “knew after watching the news that I had to come out and support the students this time.” (Ngo & Kao, 2014) Mr. Kwok, 54, saw the confrontations on television and took his 15-year-old son to join the protest. “These students are peaceful but the police treated them like rioters. At home, while we watched, we were outraged by what we saw.” (Tweed & Lau, 2014a) Four waves of phone surveys were conducted from September to December 2014 by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to assess public opinion on the Umbrella Movement. Each phone survey wave interviewed a random sample of around 1,000 Hong Kong residents (sampling error of around 3% at a 95% confidence level). The survey in September was conducted before the outbreak on September 28, so I was able to compare the before and after results (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey 2014a, 2014b). More people supported the Movement after it had become a reality, as support for the Occupy Movement increased from 31.3% in September to 37.8% in October (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, public support for the Umbrella Movement (37.8%) was higher than opposition (35.5%) in October. Hongkongers also had more negative views towards how the police handled protests after the authorities’ repressive response. Respondents in the September round indicated their views on the police’s handling of protests and assemblies in recent years, and 31.4% of respondents thought it was appropriate. When respondents in the October survey were asked to indicate their views on the police use of tear gas to handle protests, only 22.1% thought it was appropriate. Furthermore, 53.7% of the survey respondents indicated that the use of tear gas to disperse the crowd was inappropriate. Interestingly, Hongkongers seemed more optimistic about the future development of Hong Kong after the launch of the Umbrella Movement (27.6% in October vs. 21.2% in September). Reactance theory would predict that the Umbrella Movement is an attempt to directly restore an infringed freedom, and perhaps the collective action gave Hongkongers grounds for optimism.

Political control to the Umbrella Movement  31 Table 2.1  V iews of the Occupy Movement in September and October September (%)

October (%)

Support of Occupy Movement Support So-so Opposition

31.3 20.5 46.3

37.8 23.2 35.5

Police handling of protests Appropriate So-so Inappropriate

31.4 29.5 36.5

22.1 17.5 53.7

Future development of Hong Konga Optimistic So-so Pessimistic

21.2 32.2 45.6

27.6 33.8 37.7

Figures obtained from Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (2014a, 2014b). a Respondents were asked to rate the future of Hong Kong along a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 being “extremely pessimistic,” 10 being “extremely optimistic,” and 5 being “so-so.” Those who gave a score between 0 and 4 were considered “pessimistic,” and those who gave a score between 6 and 10 were considered “optimistic.”

Notes 1 Chinese newspaper under the auspices of the state-run People’s Daily. 2 Secondary school education in Hong Kong comprises six years of formal education (year/grade 7–12). Students start secondary school at the age of 12. 3 Brehm and Brehm (1981, p. 11) explain that a “theoretical assumption is the ‘given’ that, once accepted, permits construction of theoretical hypotheses that will be subject to empirical test. In and of themselves, assumptions are not tested.”

3 From securitization to the end of the Umbrella Movement

Following the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement, the Hong Kong government had limited options for solving the political gridlock. After the police use of tear gas on September 28, the Hong Kong government and police refrained from hard repression. The continuation of hard police repression was undesirable because it could lead to greater backlash and draw more support for the protest. Chief Executive C. Y. Leung assured the public that the People’s Liberation Army would not be mobilized and promised that the police would treat the rally “with the greatest tolerance” (“Occupy Central – Night five,” 2014; Tsang, Chow, Ngo, Nip, & Kao, 2014). Conceding, however, was “impossible.” The 8.31 framework had been handed down by the NPC and was out of the hands of the local government (Chan, Zhao, Siu, Kao, & Ng, 2014). Gridlock did not mean inaction, though. It meant that the government needed time to disarm the threat. C. Y. Leung admitted that the sit-in “is not a matter of days, but it will last for a relatively long time” (Tsang, Chow, et al., 2014). The government tried to negotiate with protesters to evacuate the protest sites, with the deadlock remaining following the unprecedented and highly anticipated student-government debate on October 21. The two-hour debate produced a standoff between the five senior government officials, led by then Chief Secretary for Administration, Carrie Lam, and the five student representatives. The government team urged the students to accept the 8.31 decision, and the student team insisted on public nomination. Alex Chow, one of the student debaters, described the debate as “vague” and noted that the government failed to offer concrete counterproposals to their demands (“Occupy Central – The debate,” 2014). The debate, which was broadcasted live on television, disappointed many protesters as it failed to bring the sides any closer to a resolution. The CCP has two mechanisms at its disposal to maintain security and stability: Political control (see Chapter 2) and securitization of political dissidence. These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Regimes adapt and shift their responses to maximize effectiveness based on the situation at hand. The backlash against police repression and the unsuccessful attempt at negotiation reinforced the need to move beyond the normal bounds of politics and into security politics. Security is related to survival in the face of existential threats. A “threat” is not necessarily a military invasion; in the present case, the Umbrella Movement

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  33 threatened to erode Hong Kong’s core values, prosperity, and stability. Leung’s warning immediately after the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement is a typical securitizing move, “[the sit-in’s impact] on the people’s daily lives, their personal safety in the event of emergencies, the city’s economic development, as well as the cost [in terms of] international image will also grow bigger and bigger” (Tsang, Chow, et al., 2014). The elevation of the Umbrella Movement to a security threat justified its repression. The security discourse was undoubtedly a powerful instrument that could be conveniently used by power holders to whip up support and mobilize resources. In this chapter, I will review the original and second-generation formulations of securitization theory. The literature on fear appeal emphasizes that the negative consequences of the threat, one’s vulnerability to the threat, and the efficacy of the proposed solution increase message acceptance. The grammar of a persuasive security speech is essentially a fear appeal used in a security setting. I term such a persuasive technique “security appeal.” I apply the framework of security appeal to understanding the government’s securitizing moves and audience acceptance of the Umbrella Movement. During the Umbrella Movement securitizing actors appealed to their audience’s sense of security by depicting the Movement as an imminent threat. They followed that appeal by suggesting protective actions could avert the threat. The Umbrella Movement eventually ended with the majority of protesters peacefully awaiting police eviction, and this ending showed that the government had successfully securitized the Umbrella Movement and legitimized repressive measures to handle the protests.

Copenhagen School: security as speech act Having survived two world wars and the cold war in the last century, we probably live in one of the most secure and peaceful eras in recent history. Paradoxically, instead of being freed from security concerns, scholars have suggested that security has become “the key problematic of our time” (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016a, p. 1049). The prominence of security has also been reflected in the massive growth of the private security market and the proliferation of security literature in social science disciplines over the last two decades (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016a). What are we really worried about? What is threatening our security?

Securitization as self-referential practice The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School postulates that security threats are socially constructed – an issue becomes a security problem not necessarily because an existential threat objectively exists (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995). Security is in fact a speech act, or self-­referential practice. The illocutionary effect of a security speech act means that the security language does not merely describe a reality; the utterance of security creates a new reality, as in giving a promise, naming something, etc. A secure place

34  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement becomes insecure when the government (or other state representative) says so. Any public issue, according to the theory, could be framed along a spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized to politicized to securitized (Buzan et al., 1998). When securitization actors invoke a security discourse, the issue is being put on the security agenda. One overarching theme of the security literature is “the question of what security does politically” (Browning & McDonald, 2011, p.  236). Security is about survival in the face of an imminent and existential threat, and the need for survival justifies the use of extraordinary measures not available under the “normal” bounds of politics. The construction of a threat is thus an effective means to legitimize and confer greater powers and privileges to authorities. Surveillance programs or other secret services that are kept secretive from the public sphere, for example, are legitimized on the grounds of national security. Much of the focus of securitization studies is “when, how, and why elites label issues and developments as ‘security problems’” (Wæver, 1995, p.  57). Researchers have studied a wide range of issues using the securitization framework, from HIV/AIDS (Sjöstedt, 2011) to protests (Wilkinson, 2011) to climate change (Trombetta, 2008) to Chinese qigong practices (Vuori, 2011). Buzan et al. (1998) identified three major units of analysis in a securitization study: Referent object, securitizing actor, and functional actor. Securitizing actors, with the help of functional actors, initiate a securitizing move by presenting an issue as posing an existential threat to a referent object.

Referent object A referent object – sustainability, state sovereignty, national identity, or even humankind as a whole (especially in the face of a nuclear war threat) – is a valued object that holds a legitimate claim to survival. The protection of the referent object is socially agreed upon.

Securitizing actor Securitizing actors are those who declare the referent object as being existentially threatened and claim that extraordinary procedures are needed to avert the threat. They are usually people who have some sort of legitimacy to speak on behalf of the referent object, such as a government speaking on behalf of a state or an environmental nongovernment organization (NGO) (e.g. Greenpeace) speaking on behalf of the environment.

Functional actor Functional actors are people or objects that do not have the capacity to initiate securitizing moves but could significantly affect the dynamic of the securitization process. An example of a functional actor is the media when it relays information necessary to secure audience acceptance (O’Reilly, 2008).

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  35 Securitization as intersubjective process The Copenhagen School, however, cautioned against placing too much emphasis on the acting side. Securitization is an “intersubjective and socially constructed process,” and the key criterion of successful securitization is audience agreement with the claims made by the securitizing actors (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31). ­Buzan et al. (1998) state that: Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value? (p. 31) Discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such. (p. 25) The securitization act is thus negotiated between actors and the audience – s­ ecuritizing an issue and accepting a securitizing move are both political choices. The securitizing actors need to convince the audience of the severity of the threat and the need for extraordinary measures. The audience needs to agree with the state’s proposed use of extraordinary measures or violations of rules.

Self-referential and intersubjective? The biggest criticism of the Copenhagen School conceptualization is the logical flaw of defining securitization as both self-referential and intersubjective. On one hand, defining security as a speech act means that the “utterance itself is the act” (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). In this case, a peaceful protest becomes a subversive riot simply because the government declares so, and there is no need for audience acceptance. The securitizing move (i.e. declaring a peaceful protest as a threat) is already a self-referential security act (i.e. the peaceful protest being treated as a threat), with or without audience acceptance. On the other hand, intersubjectivity requires that both the government and the audience mutually agree that something is an existential threat. If the majority of citizens voted “no” in a public poll regarding a certain security policy (e.g. the need to declare war on a national threat), then the securitizing move would be unsuccessful. The logical contradiction in the Copenhagen School formulation thus requires security researchers to pick sides: Researchers could either argue that security is a self-referential practice and downplay the role of the audience, or they can assume the initiating side does not have absolute power over the situation and focus on the creation of an intersubjective understanding. The Copenhagen School leans more towards the former, as audiences are not included as units of analysis (the three units of analysis are referent object, securitizing actor, and

36  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement functional actor). Second-generation securitization scholars, on the other hand, have reinterpreted securitization theory, tend to emphasize the intersubjective component of securitization, and give audiences a more central role in the analysis framework (Balzacq, 2005, 2011a; Côté, 2016; Léonard & Kaunert, 2011; Stritzel, 2007).

Securitization as pragmatic act Balzacq (2005, 2011a) noted that the major flaw of the speech act conceptualization is the failure to properly incorporate audience and context into its analysis. The speech act conceptualization de-emphasizes the actual context of real-world politics and assumes instead that a linguistic utterance can modify the existing context as long as felicity conditions are met (i.e. the illocutionary effect of a speech act is successful). This assumption, however, is simply not a realistic reflection of modern politics. Without an audience’s moral backing securitizing actors are unconstrained in their ability to label threats. If that is the case, wars or other types of retributive violence should be the global norm, not the exception. Balzacq’s (2005, p.  172) revision of the securitization theory takes a sociological view of securitization and argues that securitization is better understood as a “strategic (pragmatic) practice” aimed at persuading the target audience to accept the securitizing claims. If securitization is only considered successful when the securitizing actor and audience reach a mutual recognition of threat, this intersubjectivity requirement means that threats cannot be simply constructed via a one-sided linguistic presentation. Rather than emphasizing the illocutionary force of language, Balzacq shifts the focus to the perlocutionary, that is to say, the consequential effect of the security statement. The perlocutionary effect includes the intended or unintended feelings, thoughts, or actions evoked by the security act. Securitizing moves are recast as purposive “discursive techniques” aimed at prompting a response from the audience – in this case, the desired response is the successful persuasion of the audience to support a security policy (p. 172). Balzacq (2005, p. 173) defined securitization as “a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it.” Balzacq’s pragmatic act of conceptualization is based on two major assumptions (Balzacq, 2011a): (1) Effective securitization is highly context-dependent, and (2) effective securitization is audience-centred.1

Context dependency Balzacq gave the example of the Popish Plot in 17th-century England to illustrate the importance of context to understanding the success of a security act: Anglican clergyman Titus Oates fabricated a story that Catholics were conspiring to murder King Charles II, a Protestant, to restore England to Catholicism by rebellion. The fabricated plot then led to treason trials and mass executions

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  37 of Catholics. As clearly seen in the Popish Plot, the presence of an objective, realistic threat is not a prerequisite for securitization. The rebellion was merely a fabricated plot, yet real actions were undertaken by the Protestants to tackle the “threat.” The plot prompted Protestants to treat Catholics as threats and tackle the threat because the plot resonated with the historical conjuncture of England at that time. Two types of information are gathered by the audience to understand the security discourse: Textual meaning (knowledge acquired through security utterances) and cultural meaning (historical knowledge gained through previous situations and experiences) (Balzacq, 2005). Many Britons were still traumatized by a recent fire in London, which was believed to be started by Catholics (cultural meaning), and Oates’s plot of a Catholic rebellion (textual meaning) echoed the anti-­Catholic sentiment at that time. Security speech effectiveness is thus highly contingent upon audience feelings, needs, and interests, making contextual factors all the more important to understanding audience agreement with security speech.

Centrality of the audience Given that securitization is achieved through an intersubjective understanding between the securitizing actor and the audience, Balzacq argued that the actor needs to tailor its language to the worldview and experience of the audience in order to effectively persuade the audience to accept its claims.

Who is the audience? Securitization scholars have generally preferred a flexible and encompassing definition of audience, given the diversity of audience groups in securitization studies. For example, other than noting the audience is “those the securitizing act attempts to convince,” the Copenhagen School remains vague on the identity of the audience in a securitizing speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31). The audience can be voters/citizens of a state, elite circles, senators, neighbouring countries etc., depending on the purpose of the securitizing move. The loose definition therefore requires that the identity of the “audience” be clearly defined in each empirical analysis. To offer more guidance to the empirical identification of the audience, second-generation scholars propose a more refined “capabilities” definition of the audience, defining audiences by what they can contribute to the securitization process. Vuori (2008, p. 72) defines audiences as having “the ability to provide the securitizing actor with whatever s/he is seeking to accomplish with the securitization.” Balzacq (2011a) adds the requirement of “empowerment” and notes that an empowering audience has direct causal contact with the issue and has the ability to empower the securitizing actor to adopt extraordinary measures. Côté (2016, p.  8) defines audience as “the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practices.”

38  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement Public opinion Côté’s (2016) meta-synthesis of 32 empirical securitization studies shows that the general public is the most common type of audience. Public opinion is an important basis of government legitimacy; even governance in nondemocratic societies benefits from favourable public opinion. Vuori (2008, p. 71) notes that Chinese leaders appeal to the masses for support of certain extraordinary control measures, even if they are merely a “ritual of conformity.”

Security appeal: a persuasive security speech Côté’s (2016) meta-synthesis of the securitization literature notes that audiences are active participants in the securitization processes and have the potential to produce tangible security effects. Securitizing actors cannot compel compliance from the audience simply by declaring a certain issue a security threat; instead, securitizing actors are frequently interacting with audiences who can agree, reject, challenge, or question the security discourse. As securitizing actors cannot compel compliance, securitizing moves should be seen as purposive discursive techniques aimed at persuading an audience to support a policy (Balzacq, 2005). In other words, securitizing moves can be a form of persuasive communication that conveys information to an audience on the imminence of a threat and the need to use unusual procedures to avert the threat. One important focus in the present analysis is the persuasion techniques that increase the chances of eliciting the desired audience response. Communication scholars and psychologists have long been interested in the study of persuasion techniques that increase audience acceptance. Fear appeal is persuasive communication that attempts to change attitudes and behaviours by appealing to the unpleasant consequences of failing to do something or continuing to do it. Five decades of research on fear appeal shows that emphasizing the severity of a threat and one’s vulnerability motivates audiences to protect themselves and increases message acceptance.

Literature on fear appeal Smoking causes cancer. Quit smoking. If you don’t brush your teeth and floss daily, you will get cavities. We often encounter messages that emphasize the potential harm of ignoring recommendations. Parents use them, so do teachers, politicians, governments, NGOs, public health organizations, religious figures, advertisements, etc. The ubiquitous use of fear appeals makes intuitive sense; after all, would people refrain from smoking if they were unaware of the negative consequences of smoking? A fear appeal is successful if it eliminates behavioural patterns that produce aversive consequences (e.g. quitting smoking) or establishes behavioural patterns that prevent the occurrence of noxious consequences (e.g. regular brushing to avoid cavities). The scientific enquiry into the persuasive effect of fear appeals began over half a century ago when Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) developed the drive

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  39 model. Rogers’s protection motivation theory (PMT) (1975, 1983) advanced fear appeal research by specifying at least three message components that determine the effectiveness of a fear appeal: (1) The magnitude of the noxiousness of a depicted event (“depicted severity”), (2) the probability that the event will occur if no protective behaviour or behaviour modification is performed (“depicted susceptibility or vulnerability”), and (3) the availability and effectiveness of a coping response in averting the threat (“response efficacy”). In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States launched “Tips from Former Smokers,” a national tobacco education campaign featuring testimonials from real people suffering from smoking-related diseases and disabilities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). The campaign was touted as a highly cost-effective campaign that motivated 1.64 million smokers to attempt to quit smoking (Xu et al., 2015). The three key messages advocated by the campaign correspond to the message components specified by Rogers. “Smoking causes immediate damage to your body, which can lead to long-term health problems” depicts threat severity; “for every person who dies because of smoking, at least 30 people live with a serious smoking-related illness” depicts vulnerability to the negative consequences of smoking; and “now is the time to quit smoking, and if you need help, free assistance is available” depicts response efficacy.

Empirical evidence on fear appeal effectiveness The effectiveness of fear appeals has been extensively tested in at least four meta-­ analyses2 over the last two decades (de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007; Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2013; Tannenbaum et  al., 2015; Witte & Allen, 2000). The analyses found that threat and coping information exerted positive effects on persuasion measures. Witte and Allen (2000) conducted a meta-analysis of 98 studies on fear appeals and found that stronger fear appeals resulted in greater message acceptance. All message features in fear appeals, severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy resulted in reliable changes in attitudes, intentions, and behaviours. De Hoog et al. (2007) also found in their meta-analysis of 105 empirical studies on fear appeal that threat severity and vulnerability had positive effects on adaptive intention and behaviour. Response efficacy was also found to effect intentions. Tannenbaum et al. (2015) compiled the largest meta-­ analytic database of fear appeal research and report the average effect of 127 fear appeal studies. They found that fear appeals were more persuasive when the message depicted relatively high amounts of fear, included an efficacy message, and emphasized the susceptibility and severity of the threat.3

Protection motivation theory (PMT) The fundamental assumption of fear appeal is that threatening information effectively motivates people to protect themselves. But why do people change when confronted with threats? For almost every decade since the 1950s, a new theory has been developed to explain fear appeal’s effect on persuasion.4 Although there are important differences between theories, for the application of fear appeal

40  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement in securitization, similarities are more salient than differences. The common element of the theories is that effective fear appeals contain at least two types of information: Portrayal of threat (usually in the form of gruesome content and personalistic language) and recommended protective behaviour. Roger’s PMT has received the most consistent empirical support over the last few decades. Two meta-analyses were conducted to specifically test the validity of PMT and found that PMT components – perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy – facilitated adaptive intentional or behavioural changes (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000; Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). The basic premise of PMT is that the intent to engage in protective actions results from the expectancy of a severe and personally relevant threat coupled with the belief that something can be done to avoid the potential negative consequences.

Threat appraisal Threat appraisal concerns the extraction of information from a source to determine how threatened one feels. The perceived severity of a threat is the assessment of how serious the individual believes the threat to be. Perceived vulnerability is the assessment of how personally susceptible an individual feels about the communicated threat. For example, women would not find a health warning regarding prostate cancer personally relevant.

Coping appraisal Coping appraisal concerns the appraisal of the likelihood of coping with or averting a threat. Response efficacy expectancy is the assessment of the effectiveness of a recommended coping response in reducing a threat to an individual. Self-efficacy expectancy is the individual’s belief of his or her ability to perform the recommended behaviour.

Protection motivation Assessments of threat and coping factors combine to form protection motivation. The intent to accept and adopt the recommended protective action depends on the amount of motivation aroused. Similar to other types of motivation, protection motivation arouses, sustains, and directs one’s activity. Adaptive coping, or intention to follow a communicator’s recommendations, indicates the effectiveness of the persuasion. Protection motivation will not be aroused if the individual depicts the threat as mild (“lung cancer can be easily cured”), personally irrelevant (“I am not a frequent smoker”), about which nothing can be done (“quitting smoking now cannot undo the damage”) or believes that the individual is unable to perform the protective action (“I am unable to quit smoking”).

Message acceptance The PMT predicts that message acceptance will be highest when an individual perceives high threat and high coping efficacy (see Figure 3.1). In experimental

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  41

High Threat • Consquences of STDs are serious

High Coping Efficacy • Condoms are effective barriers against STDs

Protective Motivation • I am able to protect myself against a serious harm

Message Acceptance • I will use condoms to prevent STDs

Figure 3.1  P  rocess model showing message acceptance to a fear appeal.

studies, message acceptance is typically defined as the intent to make behavioural changes. If people appraise the depicted threat as severe and personally relevant (e.g. the consequences of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) are serious, and anyone who engages in unprotected sex is vulnerable), they will be motivated to begin to evaluate the efficacy of the recommended response. If the perceived coping efficacy is high (e.g. condoms are effective barriers against STDs, and I am able to use condoms effectively), people will be motivated to accept the message and control the danger by adopting the recommended strategies to avert the threat (e.g. using condoms to prevent STDs). Outcomes are described as adaptive or protective because individuals respond directly to a threat or danger, not to their fear.

Political applications of PMT Although PMT has been frequently applied to encourage individual protective behaviours that directly avert a threat (e.g. reduced cigarette consumption directly leads to a reduced risk of cancer; the use of seatbelts reduces the risk of fatal accidents), the theory can also apply to situations where coping responses frequently require collective action or the involvement of organizations. Shelton and Rogers (1981) find that threat severity and response efficacy strengthen participants’ intentions to help protect endangered animal species. Participants report greater intentions to save whales and donate to Greenpeace in high-­ noxiousness (gruesome scenes of whales being hunted and slaughtered) and high-response efficacy conditions (Greenpeace crew successfully saving whales). It appears that individuals are willing to donate to and support philanthropic organizations they perceive are effective in delivering aid. Wolf, Gregory, and Stephan (1986) find that threat severity and response efficacy significantly

42  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement predict behavioural intentions in anti-nuclear activities, including active behaviours such as donating to anti-nuclear organizations and passive behaviours such as learning about nuclear war. Similar to Shelton and Rogers’s (1981) findings, response efficacy was also the largest predictor of intention to participate in anti-nuclear activities. Axelrod and Newton (1991) find that respondents who believe that nuclear war is likely, that their chances of surviving a nuclear war are slim (threat severity), and that their actions can effectively help to prevent a nuclear war from occurring (response efficacy)5 are more active as advocates of nuclear disarmament than respondents who do not hold these beliefs. In other words, the components of a fear appeal work not just in persuading individuals to protect themselves but also in persuading individuals to protect society. Axelrod and Newton (1991, p. 38) interpret the findings as supportive evidence of the strategies used by disarmament advocates who “believe that awareness of the potential of occurrence and devastating consequences of nuclear war combined with the availability of effective channels for action can motivate increased participation in anti-war efforts.”

Security appeal and audience acceptance Drawing insights from the fear appeal literature, I propose a framework of security appeal, a persuasion strategy that depicts the issue as an imminent threat followed by suggestions of protective action that can avert the threat. As with all persuasion attempts, the goal of a security appeal is message acceptance, though that is not guaranteed. Security appeal is a persuasive technique that appeals to an audience’s desire for security. Successful securitization occurs when the actors convince enough of the right people, or “critical mass,” to agree with its security appeal. Critical mass depends on the proportion (volume) of the target group and the relevance (calibre) of the audience (O’Reilly, 2008). This critical mass provides securitizing actors with the legitimacy to act because a government can claim to act on behalf of the people. Salter (2011, p. 120) suggests questions to determine the acceptance/failure of a security appeal.6 First, to what degree is the issue-area discussed as part of a wider political debate? The issue must be politically relevant or able to be politicized before it can be securitized. Second, is the description of the threat as existential accepted or rejected? Third, is the solution to the threat accepted or rejected? The solution to the existential threat must be accepted. Successful securitization therefore entails a critical mass of audience to accept that: (1) The issue is politically related, (2) the threat is existential, and (3) the proposed solution is necessary and effective (Figure 3.2).

Securitizing Moves

Threat to referent object

Figure 3.2  Process model of audience acceptance.

Audience Acceptance

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  43

Securitization in the Chinese context Securitization theory, inspired by European forms of democracy, assumes that issues ought to be handled within normal democratic processes. Security politics is a special move beyond normal politics, as securitizing actors claim, for survival’s sake, legitimate use of extraordinary procedures. Vuori (2008), however, suggests that the theory should not be limited to the study of European democracies, as securitization serves useful political functions in authoritarian states such as socialist China. It is wrong to assume that authoritarian states can rule purely by force or coercion. Authoritarian states also rely on political legitimacy, perhaps more so than democratic states, for regime survival. Ringen (2016) argues that the CCP depends on control and purchase of legitimacy through economic growth to sustain its dictatorship. Shue (2004) believes that the CCP’s legitimacy rests on its claimed political capacity to preserve a peaceful and stable social order, which allows the economy to flourish. Maintaining security is a powerful means of establishing legitimacy. The securitization of an issue (e.g. connecting a threat to terrorism) affects public opinion towards the government (Vultee, 2011). Participants in Vultee’s (2011) study reported greater trust in the government when they read about issues such as immigration or political violence being framed as security threats, and this effect is particularly strong among supporters of the government. The logic is similar to politicians declaring a “war on crime” to win votes. After all, maintaining security’s opposite is insecurity or even chaos. If Chinese leaders need legitimacy for “normal rule,” it follows that Chinese leaders would also need a legitimate cause to justify the use of extraordinary, repressive measures. Securitization can justify repression, as in the case of Falun Gong.

The securitization of Falun Gong Li Hongzhi introduced a new type of qigong practice called Falun Gong in 1992. Qigong is a Chinese practice of cultivating qi or cosmic energy for health purposes and is normally allowed by the government. Falun Gong, however, differs from most qigong practices in that it also contains religious beliefs and an ethical code. Li’s teachings include elements of Buddhism, Daoism, traditional folk-lore beliefs, millenarianism, and supernatural beliefs. Practitioners believe that the Falun Gong is the only path to salvation for humanity (Vuori, 2014). The rise in popularity of Falun Gong7 attracted the attention of authorities, who initiated denunciations of Falun Gong. Li’s main writings were banned in 1996, and criticisms of Falun Gong began to appear on television. On April 25, 1999, more than 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners reacted to the denunciation with a protest at Zhongnanhai, the central headquarters for the CCP and the State Council. The protests followed the script of rightful resistance: P ­ rotesters wanted to present a petition to the authorities for official recognition of Falun Gong as beneficial to society and sat quietly outside the compound (Vuori,

44  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement 2014). The organizational capacity and mobilization potential of the group, however, was a cause of concern for the CCP. The New York Times described the protest as follows: To the authorities, who are nervous about any unsanctioned gathering, it can only be deeply unsettling that so many people assembled without warning, essentially walking up to the secretive compound where China’s leaders live and work and sitting silently for an entire day… Unlike student protesters who noisily thronged the streets of Beijing with colourful banners and pungent slogans 10 years ago, the Sunday demonstrators drew no attention to themselves and attracted no notice until there were suddenly many thousands of them sitting quietly in one of the most politically sensitive locations in the nation. (Faison, 1999) The CCP initiated securitizing moves against Falun Gong three months after the Zhongnanhai protest. People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP, was the CCP’s main channel for securitizing moves. The securitizing moves followed the grammar of the security appeal, where both threatening information and coping information were presented. The following editorial depicted Falun Gong as an imminent and dangerous threat to the Party, state, and people. We must fully recognize the enormous danger presented to the Party, state, and people by the development and spread of the Falun Gong organizations, fully recognize the severe, pernicious consequences Falun Gong brings to the physical and mental health of its practitioners, and fully recognize the extreme importance and urgency of solving the Falun Gong issue. (People’s Daily editorial, as cited in Vuori, 2014, p. 91) Commentaries stated actions that must be taken to tackle the threatening situation. The crackdown of Falun Gong was necessary to safeguard social stability, which is of utmost importance to the state and the people of China: We must extricate those who should be extricated, punish those who should be punished, and resolutely crack down on those who should be cracked down on. Only in this way can we push this grave ideological and political struggle forward in a sound and positive manner. (People’s Daily commentary, as cited in Vuori, 2014, p. 97) In solving the Falun Gong issue, we must, by all means, pay attention to safeguarding social stability. Stability is the highest interest of the state and the people; it concerns the overall situation and accords with the will of the people. (People’s Daily editorial, as cited in Vuori, 2014, p. 92)

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  45 Paltemaa and Vuori (2006; Vuori, 2011) suggest that the framework of securitization can be used to understand protest suppression and the interaction between protesters and the government. There are two types of repression: Hard repression involves the use or threatened use of force to suppress oppositional action, and soft repression involves the mobilization of non-violent means such as challenging and stigmatizing to eradicate oppositional ideas (Marx Ferree, 2005). Soft repression often precedes hard repression in China, and this strategy serves a few benefits (Paltemaa & Vuori, 2006; Vuori, 2011). First, framing protesters as threats to society (or other referent objects) raises their cost of joining the protest. Vuori (2008) termed this “securitization for deterrence,” where the deterrent effect of possible extraordinary repression is used to repel threats. By labelling Falun Gong a threat to socialism and the social order, the CCP expected practitioners to heed the warning and withdraw from their involvement before the CCP considered them subversives. The CCP also provided a way out for practitioners by separating the average practitioners from the troublemakers behind this subversive plot. As the editorial below suggests, the average practitioner merely got tricked into participating. The Party was willing to forgive their ignorance and allow them to join the mass of obedient people if they were willing to turn their backs on the organizers: They [the great majority of Falun Gong practitioners] know nothing about the political aims of Li Hongzhi and of that very small number of people. We believe that after they learn the true circumstances, their understanding will be improved, and they will uphold the interests of the whole and support the decision of the Party and government. (People’s Daily editorial, as cited in Vuori, 2014, p. 92) Second, the declarative statement of threat forms a basis for legitimating the use of force against protesters in the future. This type of securitization is the one proposed by the Copenhagen School, and Vuori (2008) dubs it “securitization for legitimating future acts.” Indeed, the hard repression that followed was the most extensive series of arrests, torture, and death since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 (Vuori, 2011).8 The framework of securitization reveals the interaction between protesters and the government as the government’s soft repression forces protesters to respond to and refute threat claims. One way to counteract soft repression is by arguing that the protests are not threatening but are aligned with and conducive to the values of the regime, i.e. desecuritize the movement. For example, Li Hongzhi attempted to desecuritize Falun Gong as follows: I, Li Hongzhi, unconditionally help practitioners improve their moral quality and keep people healthy, and this in turn stabilizes society. Additionally, with their healthy bodies, people can better serve society. Isn’t this bringing good fortune to the people in power? (Falun Gong Practitioners, 2000)

46  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement The need to respond to the securitizing claims of the actor, however, imposes a prime constraint on how protesters could frame their identity and movement. For example, participants of the Umbrella Movement had to firmly uphold the principle of discipline and non-violence (i.e. desecuritizing the Umbrella Movement) to prove that they were not a social threat.

The securitization of One Country, Two Systems Garrett (2017) argues that  the Beijing government has constructed pro-­ democracy Hongkongers and radicalized localist groups9 as potential enemies posing existential threats to Hong Kong and mainland China. The existential threat discourse has been particularly salient on issues related to the Occupation movement. For example, a Global Times editorial warned that if they (pro-democracy forces) don’t stop but organize more drastic street demonstrations, they will push Hong Kong to a dead end [which will] mean a life and death struggle with the Basic Law. In that case, Hong Kong will face dismal prospects. (“Sad moment,” 2015) In light of the extraordinary threats posed by dissident Hongkongers, emergency response measures are necessary, even if these measures violate the essence of One Country, Two Systems and the Basic Law. Garrett (2017) proposes the framework of “One Country, Two Systems Securitization,” which conceptualizes moral panic and the use of enemy images as securitizing moves to compel public acquiescence to the demand for safeguarding the prosperity of Hong Kong (referent object). For example, the Global Times editorial continued: We are concerned that a Pandora[’s] box is being opened in Hong Kong and various devils are [being] released to ruin the region’s future. People who love Hong Kong should work to keep the box tightly closed so that Hong Kong won’t degenerate from the capital of finance and fashion to a total mess. (“Sad moment,” 2015) Garrett’s (2017) analysis is focused on securitizing moves initiated by various securitizing actors. Although my analysis draws many insights from Garrett’s work, my focus is on how securitizing actors tailor their threat claims to the audience and audience acceptance.

Securitizing the Umbrella Movement The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement reveals that an issue does not simply become a security threat when securitizing actors say so. The government labelled the proposed OCLP as an imminent threat to Hong Kong soon after it had been proposed (Garrett, 2017). Wang Guangya, director of the Hong Kong and Macau

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  47 Affairs Office, stated that the Occupy plan would disrupt Hong Kong (Lee & But, 2013). Lau Siu-kai, vice-president of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies, warned that the Umbrella Movement would “start peacefully but end in bloodshed” (Cheung & But, 2013). Jeffrey Lam (2013), lawmaker representing the commercial functional constituency and Executive Council member, warned that the Occupy plan was essentially “economic suicide” and could easily affect the business and reputation of Hong Kong. The government’s threat label and the extraordinary measures used to evict the crowd on September 28, however, failed to elicit acquiescence. On the contrary, the sight of tear gas and pepper spray drew more people to the protest sites than ever intended by the organizers. The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement and the high level of public support it enjoyed meant that the people of Hong Kong disagreed that it was a threat. As suggested in Chapter 2, those who viewed democracy as an important freedom perceived the threat label as a threat to freedom (e.g. democratic values), and the magnitude of the reactance was great enough to completely overshadow the force of compliance. The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement was an attempt to directly restore an infringed freedom restricted by the 8.31 decision. I previously suggested that the CCP has two mechanisms at its disposal to maintain security and stability: Political control and securitization of political dissidence. When attempts at political control and hard repression backfired, the CCP shifted tactics and elevated the Umbrella Movement to a national security issue. Huang and Chen (2014, as cited by G. Cheung, 2014b), mainland academics who advise Beijing on Hong Kong matters, noted that the CPG was constitutionally empowered to securitize the Umbrella Movement. The scholars warned that the Umbrella Movement had elements of a colour revolution and threatened the security of Hong Kong and China, and Article 18 of the Basic Law authorizes the NPCSC to declare a state of emergency or war and apply national laws in Hong Kong should turmoil endanger national security.

Security appeal To convince the Hong Kong public that the Umbrella Movement was dangerous and threatening the autonomy, stability, prosperity, and core values of Hong Kong, the government needed to use communicative techniques and language that resonate with the audience. I previously suggested that the government used the logic of fear appeals to persuade Hongkongers to support the clearing of protest sites, which I term a security appeal. Fear appeal emphasizes the potential harm that will befall the audience if they fail to follow the communicator’s recommendations. The security discourse used by the Hong Kong government shares a similar logic: “If the Occupation continues, Hong Kong will become chaotic.” Two types of information are offered in a security appeal: Information on potential harm (“Hong Kong will become chaotic”) and coping information (the Umbrella Movement cannot continue). As predicted in the fear appeal literature, the government’s security appeal should facilitate audience agreement with the presence of a threat and the need to cope with the

48  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement threat. The government eventually convinced a critical mass of the public of the threatening consequences of the movement, and the reversal of public opinion prompted protesters to end the movement largely peacefully.

Potential harm Government and pro-establishment forces have consistently emphasized through the media the far-reaching harm of Occupy: Traffic disruption, disturbance of people’s daily lives, the financial loss suffered by shop owners around the protest area, the damage to the economy in general, and the strained relationship with Beijing. In short, the whole of Hong Kong would suffer because of the protests (see Chapter 6). Chief Executive C. Y. Leung even hinted that the ultimate referent object – the autonomy of Hong Kong – could be jeopardized if the protests continue. He warned: So far Beijing has left it to the Hong Kong government to deal with the situation, so I think we should try our very best—and this is myself, the government and the people of Hong Kong—should try our very best to stay that way… Challenging myself, challenging the Hong Kong government, at these difficult times will do no one any service, will do Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy no service (emphasis added). (Bradsher & Buckley, 2014)

Coping information The fear appeal literature also suggests that information about response efficacy facilitates message acceptance. Indeed, securitizing actors have repeatedly expressed confidence in the ability of the police to handle the situation and supported the police eviction of protesters. C. Y. Leung asserted that the government is equipped with an effective apparatus to suppress the public unrest, as the police force is a “high-quality team that enjoys a high international reputation” (Tsang, Chow, et al., 2014). The government tolerated the protests because they did not want to harm students, not because the police lacked the capacity to evict the protesters.

Resonance The securitization literature defines resonance rather broadly. Effective security speech is contingent upon its resonance with the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests (Balzacq, 2005). The fear appeal literature implies a narrower definition of resonance. PMT (Roger, 1975, 1983) predicts that an audience’s intent to engage in protective actions results from their perceptions of the severity and personal relevance of a threat. As the security appeal framework draws heavily from the fear appeal literature, I prefer to use PMT’s narrow definition of resonance because success securitization is contingent upon public agreement that negative impacts on the economy, rule of law, social stability, people’s everyday lives, etc. are severe and personally relevant. In other words, resonance means that the

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  49 threatening consequences raised by securitizing actors are indeed perceived by the audience as threatening. While civil disobedience in another society might not stir up concerns regarding rule of law, a telephone survey conducted during the Umbrella Movement found that rule of law had been ranked as society’s most important social value (chosen by 22.9% of respondents), and democracy was ranked fourth (chosen by 11.1%) (Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2014). Many Hongkongers would consider erosion of the sacrosanct rule of law as a severe consequence. I will describe in Chapter 5 how the political culture of depoliticization that has existed in Hong Kong since the Second World War undermines radical political participation (Lam, 2004). Context is thus an essential aspect of the success of a securitizing move. The public is more susceptible to a security appeal if its language resonates with the fears and concerns of the public.

Role specification Securitizing actors have legitimacy to speak on behalf of the endangered referent object. In light of this assumption, I focus on the roles of local political elites (e.g. Executive Council members, pro-Beijing lawmakers, leadership in government-­established think-tanks), the Hong Kong government, and the CPG as securitizing actors. Please see Chapter 6 for a description of the political function and background of the pro-Beijing institutions. Similar to second-generation securitization scholars, I adopt a “capabilities” definition of the audience, defining it by what it can contribute to the securitization process. Hongkongers, whom the securitizing actors are trying to convince to support the government and oppose the Occupation, are the audience in the present analysis. Public support is an important basis of legitimacy, as the government tolerated the Movement when public support (according to telephone polls) for it was high and almost effortlessly suppressed it when public support reversed. Functional actors do not have the legitimacy to securitize an issue, yet they have the capacity to affect the dynamic of the securitization process. I wish to highlight the role of two key functional actors in the development of the Umbrella Movement. After the use of tear gas on September 28, 2014, the Hong Kong government and police ceased using hard repression in response to overwhelming pressure from the local and international community. This backlash prompted the government to switch tactics and mobilize non-state, CCP-loyal forces to counter and control the Umbrella Movement. Triad members and anti-Occupy groups were both apparatuses to suppress the Umbrella Movement, and their activities showed the efficacy of having CCP-loyal reserve forces ready to mobilize when need be.

The triads Since it has come to power the CCP has used united front tactics to incorporate opinion deviants into the establishment (Lo, 2010). The united front is an alliance of groups based on shared interests. In other words, “you’re either with us,

50  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement or against us.” Those who chose to be “with” the regime have access to power, wealth, and other opportunities in China. The United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee coordinates and manages relationships with groups inside and outside of China. The CCP still picks united front members according to Deng’s cat theory: It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice. Triad societies are criminal organizations that are involved in a variety of illegal activities: Prostitution, gambling, loan sharking, drug trafficking, and financial crimes (Broadhurst & Lee, 2009; Lo, 2010; Lo & Kwok, 2014; Kwok, 2017). Sun Yee On, the largest and most powerful triad society, reached a deal with the CCP in the early 1990s and was co-opted into the united front (Lo, 2010). The Chinese government faced internal and external challenges over its resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in the early 1990s. Internally, the Chinese government had to rebuild the support of Hongkongers after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Externally, it was burdened by continued conflicts with the British colonial government over Hong Kong’s democratization process. Sun Yee On was recruited to perform security functions. First, the triad had to refrain from disturbing Hong Kong’s law and order and ensure stability before and after the transfer of sovereignty. Second, it could not take part in pro-democratic activities in Hong Kong and the mainland. Third, it would help bar the infiltration of Taiwanese gangs into Hong Kong for anti-CCP purposes. In return, authorities would not only refrain from suppressing triad activities, but Sun Yee On would be certified a “patriotic” triad. “On 31 March 1992, the Minister of Public Security, Tao Siju, remarked that triad members were patriots and they should be respected if they upheld Hong Kong’s prosperity” (Lo, 2010, p. 858). The certificate of patriotism would then act like a passport for Sun Yee On to access licit state business opportunities in China. Mong Kok, one of the occupied sites, has a high level of triad businesses and triad-protected activities such as mahjong parlours, entertainment clubs, and drug dealing. One member claimed that triad business fell 40% in the first week of the Movement (Tweed & Lau, 2014b). In suppressing the Umbrella Movement the triad societies could offer their services to the government. A few days after the occupation, news regarding triad attacks on Occupy supporters and suspicion of police-triad collusion to clear the occupied sites began to surface. On the mid-­ afternoon of October 3, anti-Occupy protesters began forcefully removing barricades, hurling insults, and attacking protesters in Causeway Bay and Mong Kok (“Occupy Central – Night six,” 2014). In Mong Kok, a scuffle escalated into a violent scene between thousands of Occupy and anti-Occupy protesters. Nineteen protesters were arrested that night, eight of them suspected of having triad backgrounds (“Occupy Central – Day Seven,” 2014). Varese and Wong (2018) found that triads behaved as thugs-for-hire and were involved in attacking protesters and clearing the sites. Lo, Kwok, and Hui’s (2015) ethnographic fieldwork with triad members also found that triad members were sent on a political mission to “maintain social stability” (weiwen). The triads were recruited to do the “dirty work” of intimidating protesters and forcing them to abandon the Movement. The police were widely criticized for turning a blind eye to attacks on Occupy supporters. Martin Lee, founding chairman of the pro-democracy Democratic

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  51 Party, claimed that the police used triad members to create a scene and threaten Occupy supporters because they could not use tear gas to disperse the crowd in the presence of the international press (“Occupy Central – Night six,” 2014). The pro-democracy lawmakers called the Mong Kok scuffle “an orchestrated attack by the government and triad gangs on demonstrators” (“Occupy Central – Day seven,” 2014). They also criticized discretionary enforcement: “Some people who attacked others boarded taxis under police escort and were not arrested … But Occupy Central supporters were immediately handcuffed.” The HKFS called off the meeting with Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam after the Mong Kok scuffle, claiming the government used both triads and police to threaten and remove protesters (“Occupy Central – Night six,” 2014). Even though the scuffle was initiated by anti-Occupy protesters, official condemnation of the incidents did not refer to the anti-Occupy faction. C. Y. Leung’s speech to the public hinted that the cause of the scuffle was protesters’ unwillingness to disperse From yesterday afternoon to evening, a conflict happened in Mong Kok between the “Occupy Central” and “anti-Occupy Central” people. It was very chaotic, injuring many people, including members of the press. The SAR government strongly condemns all people’s violent behaviour. If these incidents continue, they are very likely to keep getting out of control, seriously affecting citizens’ safety and social order. Over the past few days, the government repeatedly called for those who rallied in the roads to disperse peacefully. (“Occupy Central – Day seven,” 2014) The police, of course, denied the conspiracy hypothesis. The police blamed the violence on public grievance caused by “serious traffic jams” and “severe impacts on the residents and shopkeepers” in Mong Kok, including the businesses of triads (Hong Kong Police Force, 2014). The police further explained that triads were involved in two different ways (Chan & Lo, 2014). On the one hand, triad members sided with anti-Occupy forces and attacked Occupy supporters. On the other, members posed as Occupy supporters and stirred up trouble by challenging and attacking police officers. The police were still investigating whether triads were hired to “add fuel to the fire” or were just desperate to end the movement so as to protect their businesses. Regardless of who sent the triad to infiltrate the protests, Hui (2015) observed that triad involvement inadvertently helped sustain the protesters’ determination after the initial adrenaline rush had died down. She noted that every episode of violence against protesters, whether initiated by the police or by alleged triad members, “backfired” and drew more support from the public rather than forcing protesters to leave (p. 114). In other words, suppression tactics infuriated more people than they intimidated.

Anti-Occupy figures and groups (blue ribboners) Anti-Occupy civil society groups such as “Alliance in Support of our Police Force” and “Alliance for Peace and Democracy” were formed by pro-Beijing activists to counter OCLP. The Alliance for Peace and Democracy organized a

52  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement campaign over the summer and claimed to have collected 1.5 million signatures opposing OCLP. Even Chief Executive C. Y. Leung, former Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, and other principal officials supported the campaign. Robert Chow, spokesperson for the Alliance for Peace and Democracy, claimed that these groups represent the “silent majority” of Hong Kong, the “nondescript middle-aged and conservatives who prefer change in an orderly fashion” (Chow, 2014). As Occupy used a yellow ribbon to symbolize support for the fight for universal suffrage, a blue ribbon, the colour of the Hong Kong police uniform, symbolized support for the police and authorities. Leticia Lee, one of the founders of the Blue Ribbon movement, said that the blue ribbon camp was composed of ordinary citizens who were frustrated with the disruptions and damages caused by the sit-ins (Iyengar, 2014). The blue ribbon camp organized various rallies, marches, and signature campaigns to oppose the Umbrella Movement and express support for the police. Other key players in the suppression of the protests were taxi and mini-bus operators that applied and obtained an ex parte injunction from the court to order protesters to clear the protest sites. Chiu Luen Public Light Bus Company, the mini-bus operator group that applied for the injunction, operates a commuter route that passes through the Mong Kok occupied site and claimed to have suffered financial losses due to the occupation. Maggie Chan, a lawyer who joined the DAB,  the largest pro-Beijing political party of Hong Kong, helped Chiu Luen obtain the court injunction to clear the Mong Kok protest site.

Audience acceptance Successful securitization of the Umbrella Movement meant that the government must convince a critical mass of the public to accept its security claims (see Figure 3.2). Despite massive mobilization and a resilient crowd, the 79-day Umbrella Movement neither brought about political changes nor won concessions from the Beijing or Hong Kong governments. The movement ended with the majority of protesters (in two of the three sites) peacefully awaiting police arrests. This ending showed that the government had successfully securitized the movement and legitimized repressive measures to handle the protests. The government’s securitizing moves did not need to win over the entire Hong Kong population; it only needed to convince a critical mass of the audience that the protest was an imminent threat. Public disapproval of the Occupy movement increased from 35.5% in October to 43.5% in December (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014c, see Table 3.1). By November, two-thirds (between 64.4% and 68.1%) of respondents in two telephone polls supported the police eviction of protesters (PopCon, 2014). By December, three quarters (76.2%) of the respondents believed that the protesters should evacuate (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014c). Even Chan Kin-man, co-founder of OCLP, urged pro-democracy protesters to end the road blockades and focus on winning the long-term support of the public (Lam & Yu, 2014).

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  53 Table 3.1  Percentages of support and opposition of the Umbrella Movement according to public surveys October

November

December

Support

37.8%

33.9%

Opposition

35.5%

43.5%

6.5% considered protesters should not evacuate 76.2% considered protesters should evacuate

Note: Figures obtained from Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (2014c).

Is the Umbrella Movement really a threat to Hong Kong? I do not intend to examine whether the Umbrella Movement is objectively a threat. In fact, Balzacq’s example of the Popish Plot illustrates the existence of a clear, objective threat is not required for the securitization of an issue. Foreign media, for example, did not portray the Umbrella Movement as a threat. BBC correspondent Dissanayake (2014) commended the “things that could only happen in a Hong Kong protest,” including student protesters doing homework during the sit-in, signs apologizing for the barricade, concerns for fellow protesters’ needs (e.g. hunger, thirst, comfort in the heat), cleaning up garbage and recycling. On the other hand, Hongkongers who were inconvenienced or suffered from the negative consequences of the Occupation saw the Movement as a threat and called for the eviction of protesters. The central issue from a securitization perspective is not whether an objective threat exists or not, but the ways in which an issue could be socially constructed as a threat. The government initiated securitizing moves to persuade Hongkongers that the Umbrella Movement was an imminent, existential threat, and when a critical mass of the public agreed with its security claims it legitimately evicted the protesters.

The use of court injunctions: securitization or attrition Yuen and Cheng (2017) similarly observe that regime responses are strategic and adaptive and argue that the Hong Kong government strategically responded to the protest with attrition, a strategy of waiting the protest out while at the same time using “a proactive tactical repertoire to discredit, wear out, and increase the cost of protests” (Yuen & Cheng, 2017, p. 3). Attrition and securitization use similar means to achieve their goals – through the erosion of protest legitimacy and reversal of public opinion. However, their goals differ slightly. Yuen and Cheng (2017) considered attrition to be a type of regime toleration, which is “the space between repression and facilitation” (Tilly, 1978, as cited in Yuen & Cheng, 2017, p. 3). The goal of attrition is to wait out protests, without using repression or concession. Attrition studies investigate the use of various strategies to shorten the waiting time. They also explore how political solutions depend on the effective implementation of the different strategies. For example, Yuen and Cheng (2017) note that the regime used civil court injunctions to

54  Securitization to the Umbrella Movement evict protesters from the Occupy sites. Because defiance of a court order would further erode the rule of law in the public’s eyes, the protesters had no choice but to comply. On the other hand, securitization focuses on the construction and mutual recognition (securitizing actors and audience) of an imminent threat. From a securitization perspective, defiance of a court injunction was not initially considered a threat to the rule of law (referent object). The court injunction was granted by the High Court on October 20 and was completely ignored by the protesters for weeks. The initial reaction from the protesters was that their civil disobedience sit-ins were illegal to begin with. “It doesn’t matter if one more offence is added” (“Protesters defiant,” 2014). Even when the court extended the injunction and ordered bailiffs to clear the barriers, protesters noted that they would build another barrier to replace the ones taken away (Chan, 2014). Audience acceptance is a distinctive feature of securitization, and the need to appeal to the audience forces securitizing actors to make their language resonate with the context and the audience’s worldview. Rule of law has been one of the most cherished core values in Hong Kong. A phone survey found that the Hong Kong public believes rule of law to be more important than democracy (Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2014). A securitization analysis might focus on how the regime persuades the audience (the public and protesters) to accept that defiance of a court order threatens the rule of law. The Hong Kong Bar Association and Law Society warned that the open defiance of court orders threatened the judicial system and eroded the rule of law (Chan, 2014; Tsang, Lai, & Ng, 2014). Lawyers held a silent gathering outside the High Court to express concern that the rule of law had been undermined by the massive sit-ins (Chan & Ng, 2014). Two judges, former chief justice Andrew Li and Court of Final Appeal judge Kemal Bokhary, also spoke out on the impairment of the rule of law (“Ex-Chief Justice,” 2014; Ng & Yan, 2014). Yuen and Cheng (2017, p.  15) interviewed Chan Kin-man, who admitted the change of heart. “We understood that one must break unjust laws or defy court injunctions to make civil disobedience successful. So we were prepared to ignore the injunctions.” In the end, however, “some highly valued the rule of law and feared that we would lose the last line of defence. That was why we did not defy the court orders.” A tense confrontation broke out in Mong Kok, where the police used pepper spray to evict the crowd, yet protesters in Admiralty and Causeway Bay were evicted without any clashes with the police. The results suggested that the securitizing moves were accepted by at least a critical mass of protesters.

Notes 1 The third assumption proposed by Balzacq (2005, 2011a) is that securitization dynamics are power laden and focus on the nature and function of policy tools used to cope with a public problem. I will not elaborate on this assumption as my focus is on securitizing moves and audience acceptance. 2 A meta-analysis refers to the use of a statistical approach that combines data from multiple empirical studies. Researchers summarize a large body of evidence on a

Securitization to the Umbrella Movement  55 specific topic in a meta-analysis, and the aggregate information provides a more robust estimate than the results of any single study. 3 Significant heterogeneity has been reported in all meta-analyses, which suggests fear appeals perhaps worked better in some cases and not others. Witte and Allen (2000, p. 598) urge readers to be cautious in interpreting the average correlation “because a moderator variable influencing the acceptance of a message may exist.” 4 Examples of fear appeal theories include the drive model by Hovland et al. (1953), Roger’s PMT, the extended parallel process model (EPPM) by Witte (1992), and the stage model by de Hoog, Stroebe, and de Wit (2005). 5 Axelrod and Newton (1991) labelled this item “self-efficacy,” though I believe it more appropriately measures “response efficacy.” Self-efficacy refers to one’s ability to engage in protective action, such as having the time and resources to volunteer. 6 The fourth question suggested by Salter (2011) is, “are new or emergency powers accorded to the securitizing agent?” I will not further elaborate on this question because it does not apply to the present case study of the Umbrella Movement. The securitizing actors of the Umbrella Movement did not require emergency powers to evict the protesters; they merely needed the public’s support to legitimize the eviction. Also note that this requirement is a deviation from the Copenhagen framework, which specifically noted that, “we do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). The Copenhagen framework considered securitization to be a success when the proposed existential threat “gain[ed] enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures.” Salter’s (2011) requirement for an actual policy change to occur is therefore stricter than the one proposed by the Copenhagen framework. 7 The number of Falun Gong practitioners was estimated to be between 70 and 100 million (Faison, 1999). 8 Vuori (2011) notes, however, that it is difficult to estimate the validity and numbers of claims of torture and death. Most of the allegations came from Falun Gong practitioners and the Chinese authorities disputed most claims. 9 Localism is a political movement that centres around the prioritization of local people (as opposed to new immigrants from the mainland) and the preservation of Hong Kong’s autonomy and culture. Several localist groups advocate for Hong Kong’s people right to freely choose their sovereignty, i.e. right of self-determination (e.g. Demosistō, Democracy Groundwork, Land Justice League), and more radical ones even advocate for Hong Kong’s full independence as a sovereign state (e.g. Youngspiration, Hong Kong National Party, Hong Kong Indigenous).

4 Brief note on methodology

I noted in previous chapters that many securitization studies tackle the questions of “when, how, and why elites label issues and developments as ‘security problems’” (Wæver, 1995, p. 57). Despite the empirical focus of many studies, Balzacq noted that there has been little discussion on selecting the appropriate research methods for an analysis. There is considerable disagreement over the rationales for choosing a specific method: Why and when, for example, is discourse analysis preferred, rather than participant observation, let alone process-tracing and content analysis, and what differences these choices ultimately make in grasping policy processes. The peculiarities of these approaches to security are compelling, so much so that the hardest and clearest obstacle which students of securitization face is to simply make sense of this diversity. (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 31) The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief note on the research methods used in the present analysis to offer students of securitization practical experience using certain methods in a securitization analysis. I hope this chapter assists those conducting empirical analyses of securitization to understand the values and shortcomings of the techniques that can be used.

Case study methodology This book is a case study of the Umbrella Movement. A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p.  18). I chose the case study methodology because contextual and historical conditions are pertinent to understanding the Umbrella Movement: How it happened, why the government acted as it did, and why the protesters responded as they did. Two common questions regarding case studies are: (1) Can a single study prove anything, and (2) can findings from a case study be generalized?

Brief note on methodology  57 Prove anything? Can case studies, especially single-case studies, prove anything? Yin (2003, p. 69) answered, “not with the certainty of true experiments,” but case studies and experiments are not comparable. An experiment, especially a lab experiment, enables researchers to artificially examine only a few variables of interest while controlling for all other factors (including the context). On the other hand, researchers choose case study methodologies because they want to derive an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, usually a rarely encountered situation, within its real-world context. This question, therefore, does not offer a fair evaluation of the strengths of a case study because the goal of a case study is not to prove a cause and effect relationship. Because case study researchers rely on multiple sources of evidence, the major strength of a case study is its ability to examine the full extent of relevant contextual conditions. The present analysis, for example, presents evidence from interviews, news articles, survey results, and the literature.

Generalizability Yin (2012) differentiates between two types of generalizations: Statistical and analytical generalizations. Statistical generalization occurs when findings derived from a representative sample can be generalized to the target population (universe). Analytic generalization depends on the use of a study’s theoretical framework to establish a logic that can inform similar situations. The goal of a case study is to produce a new understanding of a real-world behaviour. Case studies focus on the latter type of generalization. For example, Yin (2012) notes that one of political science’s best-selling work has been a single-case study about the Cuban missile crisis, where the author used theoretical propositions to generalize to state responses to international crises (Allison, 1971). Because the primary purpose of a case study is to examine a phenomenon within its context empirically, data collection and analysis strategies need to be delineated early on. Yin noted that the case study inquiry: • •

relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009, p. 18)

Data collection methods Both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods can be used in a case study, depending on the research design. Yin (2012) therefore considered case study research to be a separate methodology that is more flexible than pure qualitative and quantitative research. Data from surveys, interviews, participant observation, archives, etc. are collected when relevant to the theoretical framework.

58  Brief note on methodology Balzacq (2011b) observes that discourse analysis, ethnography (surveys and interviews), process-tracing, and content analysis (CA) are common methods of studying securitization.

Role of theory Even though researchers might be tempted to cover everything about a case, Yin (2009) advises that theory development is an essential part of the design phase. Theoretical propositions serve two purposes. First, a theoretical proposition helps researchers narrow data collection within feasible limits and guides the researcher to logically piece together the evidence. The role of theory development prior to data collection is a major difference between a case study and other types of designs that require the researcher to approach a topic like a tabula rasa (blank slate), using for instance ethnography and grounded theory. Case study researchers collect relevant information about a case from multiple sources to build an in-depth understanding, and the relevance of information depends on the theoretical proposition. The theoretical proposition explains how findings can be generalized to other real-life situations (i.e. analytical generalization).

Three levels of analysis Balzacq (2011b) noted that a comprehensive securitization analysis contains three levels: Context, agents, and acts (see Figure 4.1). Level 3 examines the historical and cultural context under which securitization takes place. Level 2 examines the discursive and non-discursive strategies that securitizing actors use to mobilize an audience. Level 1 focuses on agents, actors who contribute to or resist the emergence of security.

Level 3 – Context • Historical and cultural context under which securitization takes place

Level 2 – Acts • Discursive and non-discursive strategies of securitizing process

Level 1 – Agents • Actors who contribute to/resist the emergence of security

Figure 4.1  Security appeal: three levels of analysis.

Brief note on methodology  59 Balzacq (2005) suggested that security’s semantic repertoire is a combination of cultural (“knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations”) and textual meaning (“knowledge of the concept acquired through language”) (Balzacq, 2005, p. 183). In other words, these two types of meaning form a frame of reference through which the audience understands security arguments. Balzacq argued that Titus Oates successfully securitized Roman Catholics because the plot resonated with the historical conjuncture of England in the 17th century. Britons were still traumatized by the recent fire in London, which was believed to be set by Catholics (cultural meaning), and Oates’s utterance of a Catholic rebellion (textual meaning) echoed the anti-Catholic sentiment of the time. Security appeal, the theoretical framework that I proposed in the previous chapter, guided my data collection and analysis. Following the advice of Balzacq (2011b), my case study of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement has three levels of analysis. Cultural meaning is dependent on the cultural and historical context of Hong Kong, which I will examine in level 3. Textual meaning refers to the security arguments put forth by the securitizing actors, i.e. the securitizing moves, which I will examine in level 2. Both the context and securitization moves determine what meaning the audience acquired during the Umbrella Movement, and I examine in level 1 how the audience perceived and responded to the meaning.

Level 3: context Securitization does not occur in a social vacuum. To understand the meaning of any securitization discourse is to situate it both socially and historically. Balzacq (2005, p. 182) explained the importance of context in the following simple terms: “When the concept ‘security’ is used, it forces the audience to ‘look around’ in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation.” Context could either empower or disempower securitizing actors in the process, as context determines the cultural meaning an audience acquires to understand the security threat being perpetuated. Wilkinson (2011) encourages analysts to extend their investigation to the securitization’s distal context, which includes previous securitizing moves that shaped the socio-cultural setting. Doing so enables “a more nuanced and multi-faceted understanding of security dynamics” (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 101). Under the security appeal framework, one cannot understand why an audience accepts securitizing moves without understanding the cultural meanings of the referent object and the infringed freedom.

Critical literature review A good critical literature review should “tell a story and help to advance our understanding of what is already known” (Jesson & Lacey, 2006, p. 139). In this level, I will conduct a critical review of the literature on the political culture of Hong Kong and explore how the historical and cultural context of Hong Kong predisposed the public to accept the discourse that the Umbrella Movement was threatening.

60  Brief note on methodology Level 2: acts Level 2 focuses on the strategic artefacts a securitizing actor uses to mobilize the audience. The centrality of media accounts in forming and shaping public opinions of events leads to the frequent use of discourse and CA in securitization studies. For Vuori (2011), the state media, due to its role as a government mouthpiece, is a functional actor in the securitization of Falun Gong. The public reads the news to learn the definition of the problem, what is happening, who the protagonists and antagonists are, etc. News accounts, however, do more than merely report factual information to an audience. News accounts also present facts in a wider context. In other words, news accounts inform the audience how they should feel about events, such as whether the public should feel threatened by the Umbrella Movement. As Vultee (2011, p. 78) notes, securitization works as “an effect of media.” My focus in this level is the spread of fear appeal messages in the media.

Content analysis CA is more appropriate than discourse analysis in this theory-guided case study. While discourse analysis makes epistemological and ontological assumptions about language and social reality and is more related to inductive reasoning, CA more flexibly allows for positivist deduction (Balzacq, 2011b). CA assumes that text meaning is constant and stable across time and place and allows for counting and code extraction from materials (words, phrases etc.). Berger (1998, p. 23) notes that CA is “a research technique that is based on measuring the amount of something (violence, negative portrayals of women, or whatever) in a representative sampling of some mass-mediated popular art form.” CA is hence more suitable for the examination of the presence or absence of a securitizing frame or the kinds of cues to which an audience is likely to respond. The main goal of the present analysis is to examine the prevalence of securitizing appeal components in news reports during the Umbrella Movement. I use CA and develop the coding guide to deductively answer research questions that are based on securitizing and fear appeal theories. In addition, Schreier (2012) names three benefits of CA. First, CA enables researchers to systematically describe the meaning of the texts. It involves the same sequence of steps in every analysis, from deciding on the research question to building a coding frame to coding and analysis. Neuendorf (2017) also states that the most distinctive characteristic of CA is its attempt to meet the standards of scientific method. Second, CA reduces the amount of information and focuses analysis on selected aspects. Unlike other methods that require researchers to conduct line-by-line analyses to examine the full meaning of the texts, researchers only focus on materials that fit the coding scheme, which depends on the research questions. Third, CA is a highly flexible method that has been used both qualitatively and quantitatively (White & Marsh, 2006). Researchers can tailor the coding scheme to their research question, either by using past research

Brief note on methodology  61 theory for variables deductively or by allowing the variables to emerge inductively. Following the positivist research tradition, I tried to meet the following five criteria of scientific method in the CA. An a priori design: Neuendorf (2017) notes that the codebook must be constructed a priori. All decisions on variables and measurements must be made before the final coding process. Reliability: Reliability is the extent to which measurements yield consistent results in repeated trials. As the goal of CA is to document relatively “intersubjective” characteristics of texts – “do we agree it is true?” (Neuendorf, 2017, p.  18)  – reliability is of paramount importance. Intercoder reliability refers to the degree of agreement on variable ratings between two coders. Acceptable intercoder reliability provides basic validation of the coding scheme as it shows that more than one individual could yield similar results using the same measurement tool. Validity: Ensuring validity means that coding frames measure what one wants to measure. Schreier (2012) recommends that the qualitative coding frame be (at least) partly data driven. Neuendorf (2017) also stated that thorough exploratory work needs to be done before the final coding of quantitative CA. Generalizability: The generalizability of findings refers to the extent to which the results from a study sample may be applied to a larger population. My search criteria (detailed in Chapter 6) generated 2,321 articles from Apple Daily and 2,420 articles from Wen Wei Po. To ensure that the study sample is representative of the population of cases from these two news sources during the Umbrella Movement, a simple random sample of 200 cases per newspaper was generated using the random number generating formula in Microsoft Excel. Replicability: Neuendorf (2017) strongly advises researchers to provide enough information about methods and protocols so that others are free to conduct replications.

Level 1: agents This level focuses on the agents, such as securitizing actors, audiences, and functional actors, who contribute to or resist the emergence of security issues. Balzacq (2011b) notes that ethnographic methods, such as participant observation and interviews with insiders or participants, are the most sensitive to the sociological variant of securitization. Through direct contact with insiders or participants, the researcher aims to uncover how people make sense of their experiences. I consider the protesters and public of Hong Kong to be the audience, and my focus is on why the audience accepted or defied the government’s security appeal.

Mixed-method sequential explanatory design I employed a mixed-method sequential explanatory design in this level of analysis, where I collected and analysed quantitative data (surveys) followed by qualitative data (interviews) (Ivankova, Creswell, & Stick, 2006). In the present

62  Brief note on methodology analysis, I first collected and analysed two rounds of survey data. Interview data from ten Hongkongers were then collected and analysed to help explain and elaborate the survey results. The rationale for this sequence is that quantitative data first provide a general understanding of the research problem, while qualitative data explain the statistical patterns by exploring participants’ views in more depth (Ivankova et al., 2006). The authors suggest that mixed-method designs take advantage of the strengths of quantitative and qualitative methods and allow for a more robust analysis.

Quantitative phase The quantitative phase of the study focused on how selected variables served as predictors of participants’ support for and opposition to the Umbrella Movement. Two surveys were conducted during the Umbrella Movement, one with college students and one with protesters. I decided to use a college sample because students were at the forefront of the Umbrella Movement. Variables were identified based on the securitization literature and participant observation.

Qualitative phase Qualitative data explain why certain factors were predictive of support for, and opposition to, the Umbrella Movement. The interview protocol was grounded in the survey results. For example, as a negative perception of the police was a strong predictor of support for the movement in surveys, I asked open-ended questions about interviewees’ perceptions of the police.

5 Securitization context Political culture of Hong Kong

Path dependence models contend that options are limited by past events. History matters: Once a society has embarked on a path, the cost of reversing or switching paths is high (Pierson, 2000). Path dependence explains why societies sometimes “lock in” historical arrangements, even if they are suboptimal arrangements and even if they exist in a world characterized by dynamic changes and voluntary decisions (David, 1985). Deterministic “lock-ins” are said to explain why the QWERTY keyboard is used to this day, even though this awkward layout no longer serves an apparent purpose. When Hong Kong was first introduced to representative democracy in the early 1990s, Kuan and Lau (1995, p.  240) predicted that the “revolutionary route to democracy, such as through an uprising, is unthinkable, given the pragmatic and non-participant culture of the Hong Kong Chinese, the paucity of political leaders, and the inferior power of Hong Kong vis-à-vis Britain or China.” Although the Umbrella Movement is generally not revolutionary (Yeung, 2014), thousands of Hongkongers occupying major streets for a common political cause still surprised everyone – some pleasantly and some not. OCLP founders were pleasantly surprised. They initially planned the massive sit-in to take place on a public holiday to convince “pragmatic” Hongkongers the financial consequences would be minimal. Although the 79-day sit-in is in stark contrast to the deeprooted image of politically aloof Hongkongers who just want to make money, the development of the Umbrella Movement was still limited by past events. Lam (2004) notes that the depoliticized mainstream culture has constrained the scope and form of activism since the early post-war days, and the cultural knowledge passed down from prior political developments constrained the development of the Umbrella Movement. In the end the Movement did not create a new path. It could not steer Hong Kong towards democracy, and the public did not evolve into a politically active population. Depoliticized culture and political activism merely became more polarized after the Umbrella Movement.

Political aloofness in post-war Hong Kong Lau Siu-kai is a former sociology professor and incumbent vice-chair of the semi-official Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies, a high-level

64  Securitization context think-tank established by the Beijing government. His early work laid the groundwork for examining the political culture of Hong Kong (Lau, 1982; Lau & Kuan, 1988). According to Lau, political aloofness can be traced to the refugee mentality of immigrants who fled the political turmoil in mainland China after the Second World War. The majority of Chinese in Hong Kong are not indigenous residents with pre-war and pre-colonial historical continuity. The post-war Chinese community was, rather, a new community comprising immigrants from various parts of China (Lau, 1982). The population rose from one to four million in the 30 years after the war, yet the majority had neither “real roots” nor a “true sense of belonging” (Blair-Kerr, 1973, p. 22). Hongkongers understood that they were living on borrowed time in a borrowed place and focused instead on the pursuit of material wealth (Blair-Kerr, 1973; Lau, 1982). Furthermore, a foreign and secluded bureaucratic polity engendered a pervasive sense of political powerlessness among the Chinese. Almost all participants (96.7%) in Lau’s survey in 1977 believed they had no influence on the formulation of government policies (Lau, 1982). Lau (1982) also describes post-war Hongkongers as “utilitarianistic” and “familial-centric” as Hongkongers had the tendency to prioritize family interests and the responsibility to further familial interests above those of society. The primacy of familial interests, desire to maintain social stability at all costs, sense of political powerlessness, and preoccupation with the pursuit of material wealth combined to encourage “passive adaptation to the existing institutional structure” (Lau, 1982, p. 74). Efforts to transform the social order were thus “frowned upon, particularly if they [led] to the disruption of social stability” (Lau, 1982, p. 72). A later survey in 1985 also found that over half of the respondents denounced confrontations with the government in demonstrations and rallies (Lau & Kuan, 1988). Lau concludes that Hong Kong society had very little capacity for political mobilization, as the level of political frustration would be contained as long as the government maintained social stability and prosperity. After all, people considered Hong Kong a “life boat” in a sea of political upheaval, and few wanted to rock the boat (Hoadley, 1970).

Partial support of democracy in the 1990s Lau (1982) attributes political stability under the colonial regime to a minimally integrated social-political system comprising a secluded bureaucratic entity and politically aloof society. King (1975) suggests a similar concept of “administrative absorption of politics.” Both the polity and society were “boundary-­conscious,” and laissez-faire policy had worked well during the post-war economic boom (Lau, 1982, p. 19). Lau does not consider political aloofness to be the same as political apathy. Political apathy does not take into account the extent to which Hongkongers voluntarily embrace their distance from politics. Political apathy is a “cultural trait of the Chinese” and should “remain more or less constant in its behavioural manifestations” throughout history (Lau, 1982, p. 14). Political aloofness, instead, assumes that the decision to remain uninvolved in politics can

Securitization context  65 be temporary because “this passivity [will] recede into the background whenever structural conditions change to make political activism either possible, appropriate, or necessary” (p. 14). Kuan and Lau (1995; Lau & Kuan, 1995) explain that even with the introduction of direct elections in the early 1990s, public political participation and support for democracy were still half-hearted. Their survey in the early 1990s found that, although the majority of respondents (59.8%) supported democratization of the political system, a substantial minority (30.5%) still preferred the elitist bureaucratic system remain unchanged (Kuan & Lau, 1995). The authors suggest that social class might play a role in the support of democracy. The wealthier class, whose interests in political appointments and functional constituencies were secured in the LegCo,1 were less in favour of further democratization. On the other hand, blue-collar workers, whose interests were under-represented in the elitist system, understood that their interests could be better served in a representative democracy. The authors also report that respondents were only modestly committed to democracy, especially if it conflicted with other core values. They found that more than half of the respondents (58.6%) gave greater priority to prosperity and stability than to democracy, and more respondents preferred “an efficient but insufficiently democratic government” to a democratic but inefficient government (38% vs. 22.1%). Lo (1997, p. 296) also found that appointed and indirectly elected political elites (LegCo members, District Board members, Regional Council members, and Urban Council members) were hard-liners in the democratization of Hong Kong and would act as a “stumbling block” to any introduction of direct elections. For those who supported further democratization of the system, their motives seemed non-ideological and results-oriented. Kuan and Lau (1995) found that the majority of respondents expected democracy to deliver favourable outcomes, such as economic prosperity, higher standards of living, government efficiency, social harmony, etc. Furthermore, a plurality of respondents (40.9%) viewed “democratic government” as a government that is willing to consult public opinion, more so than a popularly elected government (22.7%). It is possible that Hongkongers sought representative democracy, not for the sake of forming a government of the people, but as a mechanism to check on the government’s performance and boost its efficiency. Kuan and Lau (1995, p.  258) thus speculate that Hongkongers would be content with “a form of government that, although not elected, not only consults and delivers, but also is checked in its power.” Indeed, Lau and Kuan (1995) found in another study that respondents were quite supportive of the colonial government and content with their lives under the colonial regime. More than half (52.8%) of the respondents considered their living conditions better than before, and 41.5% hoped that economic conditions for their families would be even better after five years. The authors argue that low levels of political participation (e.g. voter turnout) are not a sign of political apathy. Hongkongers were “attentive spectators” of political developments (Lau & Kuan, 1995). It is possible that political aloofness represents an informed decision resulting from satisfaction with colonial governance coupled with a functional view of democracy.

66  Securitization context This functional view of democracy is not unique to respondents in Lau’s surveys. Kurlantzick (2013) also observes that the middle class are not de facto avid supporters of democracy. Kurlantzick noted that in the last two decades the middle class has played a role in nearly half of the military coups launched in new democracies, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, and Syria. Cases of the disillusioned middle class turning against newly democratic governments send a strong message that many consider social well-being to be more important than a democratically elected government. People perhaps supported democracy in the first place because they expected democracy to deliver better living conditions. Yet, democratization brought about problems such as heightened awareness of economic inequality, a decrease in social welfare, graft, and poor governance that made the working and middle classes worse off than under authoritarian rule (Kurlantzick, 2013). Furthermore, as the middle class is a minority group in these new democracies, its members have the added fear of losing their rights and privileges to populist policies that focus on empowering the poor. Malawi, according to Kurlantzick, became a multi-party democracy in the 1990s. Ironically, Malawians grew nostalgic for the stability and quality of life (e.g. regular meals, access to farm land) during authoritarian rule.

Depoliticized notions of “Good Citizenship” Lam (2005) observes that both the colonial and SAR governments perpetuated a concept of citizenship that emphasizes civic duties rather than political rights. She notes that government publications in 1965 and 1998 both emphasized that good citizens “serve wider interests of the community” and “meet their obligations to society” (p. 312). Good citizens have a duty to maintain social stability, whereas troublemakers who stir up political and social unrest are bad citizens. Political aloofness is therefore a political act, as the deliberate avoidance of politics is considered conducive to the public good. Such a depoliticized conception of citizenship has served to inhibit and confine the development of political participation in Hong Kong. Another attribute of good citizenship the government emphasizes is financial independence: Good citizens can support themselves and their families financially and contribute to the economy (Lam, 2005). Good citizens are expected to focus their time and energy in their youthful days on completing the examination-­oriented education system (Lo, 2001). Students who do well on public exams will then be able to enrol in prestigious universities and eventually be rewarded with careers that promise higher living standards. Lam (2005) notes that the colonial and SAR governments believed that assisting and training youth to find employment could ensure social stability, as unemployment and the lack of upward mobility were the reasons youth stirred up trouble. For example, the secretary for Health and Welfare notes that the government’s mission “is to build a caring community so that people can develop their potential to the [fullest], thereby enabling society to flourish in a stable environment” (emphasis added) (Hong Kong SAR Government, 2000). The secretary also reports that

Securitization context  67 the purpose of the welfare system is to provide those in need “with opportunities to achieve self-reliance and self-betterment and promote social cohesion and harmony” (emphasis added).

Lion Rock spirit The emphasis of good citizens being self-reliant and able to contribute to society resonates with the “Lion Rock spirit,” a core Hong Kong ethos (Lam, 2005; Mak, 2013). The term originated in the dramatic series “Below the Lion Rock”2 produced by government-funded Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) in the 1970s. The dramatic series and the theme song of the same title paid tribute to the resilience of Hongkongers in the face of adversity. The Lion Rock spirit is the ideological story of a community of displaced individuals who transform a barren rock into financial capital through hard work, perseverance, and mutual assistance. Similar to the American dream, the Lion Rock spirit promises upward mobility to those who work hard, regardless of their background. In 2002, former Financial Secretary Antony Leung ended his budget speech with lyrics from “Below the Lion Rock” to encourage Hongkongers to “find a new way out” as Hong Kong entered its fifth year of economic decline (Lau, 2002). Lam (2005), however, criticizes this promotion of self-reliance and colonial laissez-­ faire policy as the government’s grand excuse to shirk responsibility for the economic downturn.

Coexistence of depoliticization and political activism Lam (2004) criticizes Lau (1982) for focusing too heavily on official channels of political participation and neglecting informal channels of participation (e.g. protests, signature campaigns). Examples of large-scale social movements that took place – the reaction to Peter Godber’s absconding in the 1970s, the rally in response to the Tiananmen Square incident in the 1980s, and the July 1 demonstration in 2000s – showed that Hongkongers were not politically aloof. She tallied the number of major social movements from 1949 to 1979 and found that post-war “refugee society” was no less politically active than later generations. However, despite the presence of a fast-expanding and outspoken civil society, Lam (2004) finds that the prevailing culture of depoliticization has constricted mass mobilization and political radicalism since the post-war era. Lam (2004) analysed 13 major events of political participation in Hong Kong from 1949 to 1979 and reports on the major beliefs encompassed in Hong Kong’s depoliticization culture: It assumed that people in Hong Kong were generally disinterested in politics. Political activities took place as a result of the activities of troublemakers. Also, it assumed that stability and prosperity were of fundamental importance. Gradual changes to society were all right, but confrontation

68  Securitization context should be discouraged even though the Hong Kong government was at times deserving of criticism. Furthermore, it was important to observe the law. Any public protest should be conducted in accordance with the law. Last, participation in politics was seen as a threat to stability and as likely to lead to subversion and instability. (Lam, 2004, p. 184) The depoliticization culture sees political protests as potential threats to social order, and Hong Kong people are generally uninterested in politics because they want social stability. Such rhetoric is commonly seen in mainstream newspapers, such as the following Ming Pao excerpt during the 1956 riot: What the Hong Kong people strive for is to keep aloof from political struggle and opt for stability amidst this era of turmoil. The people would not support any events that threaten stability or lead to crisis. (as cited in Lam, 2004, p. 212) Brook Bernacchi, urban councillor at that time, described the people’s desire for stability during the 1967 riot: For the first time we have had to choose. For the first time we have all had to choose where our allegiance lies in such an emergency, and the vast majority of the people of Hong Kong have demonstrated that it lies in support of the conception of Hong Kong as a unit with a Government that does not support disturbances from either right or from left that are engineered from without. Basically, they have chosen to support law and order of the present Government of Hong Kong. (as quoted in Yep, 2008, p. 130) Those who wish to express their grievances to the government should do so though institutionalized channels. Sit-ins and demonstrations are strongly discouraged because these forms of protests are too radical and disruptive. If mass demonstrations cannot be avoided, they must still be conducted within legal boundaries because of the danger they pose to society. Unregulated protests are destructive to peace and order of Hong Kong: Local laws should seriously be observed. In Hong Kong, demonstration of this kind should apply for approval beforehand. To take action without seeking prior approval is against the law and destroys peace and order…. (Ming Pao excerpt during the defend the Diaoyutai Islands movement in 1971, as cited in Lam, 2004, p. 212) The colonial government and mainstream media also downplayed the political and social causes of struggles that took place in the territory and frequently blamed troublemakers and external forces for stirring up trouble. Troublemakers

Securitization context  69 were depicted as not having a stake in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and causing social disruption for self-interests. For example, Wah Kiu Yat Pao blamed the CCP as being “undoubtedly active behind the scene” of the 1956 ­riots, even though left-wing socialist activists were clearly the victims of attacks by Kuomintang supporters (as cited in Lam, 2004, p. 213). The riots were depicted as a socialist conspiracy to enable the CCP to attack Britain for failed colonial rule and intervene in Hong Kong affairs. The Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School in 1977 incident escalated from an in-house financial dispute to a threat to social order when several newspapers hinted that the teachers were related to radical socialist groups. Political participation in support of re-opening the school was attributed to subversive activities. For example, one op-ed from Ming Pao commented: What most of us want is stability, prosperity and a progressive society. We do not want to see the Red Guards coming to Hong Kong to carry out some kind of moderate cultural revolution. (as cited in Lam, 2004, p. 213) The colonial government’s blaming of the protests on troublemakers served another function – to counteract the political influence of socialist political groups during the Cold War. After the return to Chinese sovereignty, the Beijing and SAR governments have continued to blame troublemakers for political unrest, except that now Western countries and democracy activists are depicted as malicious actors with subversive intent. One example was when C. Y. Leung blamed “external forces” for causing the Umbrella Movement (So, 2015). For political activism to coexist with the mainstream culture of depoliticization, activists had to work around the depoliticized culture, not against it. Activists needed to cautiously avoid the label of “troublemakers,” and were frequently divided whether to apply for government permission prior to a rally (Lam, 2004). On one hand, some activist groups refused to apply for police permission to protest the unfair regulation of public expression. On the other, any unlawful activity could easily be framed as disruptive, and activists needed to prove that they were not a social threat to win public support. The Defend the Diaoyutai Islands United Front initially planned to conduct a demonstration on August 13, 1971 without prior police approval (Lam, 2004). Not surprisingly, the plan received mixed public support, including a Ming Pao editorial that cautioned against holding demonstrations without prior permission. The United Front eventually gave in and applied for approval. Lam notes that this paradoxical coexistence of depoliticization and political activism eventually gave rise to government reforms with reform occupying a middle ground between pacifying the public and maintaining the status quo. Since the 1970s, activists have switched their focus from challenging British colonialism to demanding that the government be more responsive to popular grievances (Lui & Chiu, 2002). Social movements began to centre on the allocation of resources and were issue-specific.

70  Securitization context

Political participation and depoliticization culture post-handover The scope and amount of institutionalized (e.g. voting) and non-institutionalized political participation (or street politics such as protests and signature campaigns) have grown since the political transition in 1997. Voter turnout for LegCo elections has increased from 35.8% in 1996 to 58.3% in 2016 (see Table 5.1) (The Hong Kong Council of Social Service, 2018). Hongkongers, though, were much more likely to express concerns via non-institutionalized channels such as demonstrations and signature campaigns (see Table 5.2) (DeGolyer, 2010). Table 5.1  V  oter turnout rates in LegCo elections Year

Voter turnout rate (%)

1996 1998 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

35.8 53.3 43.6 55.6 45.2 53 58.3

Source: The Hong Kong Council of Social Service (2018).

Table 5.2  Various means Hongkongers used to express concerns or seek help Institutionalized channels

Jul 1996 Jun 1997 Oct 1998 Jul 1999 Apr 2000 Apr 2001 Apr 2002 Nov 2003 Jun 2004 Nov 2005 Nov 2006 Apr 2007 Jun 2008 May 2009 May 2010

Non-institutionalized channels

Contact government department

Contact Contact directly elected District Council LegCo rep

Demonstrate or protest

Signature campaign

Donate to political party

 8 10 12 10 17 11 10 10 11 11 10 13 11 12 12

7 6 5 6 5 6 3 3 4 5 3 4 4 5 8

 8  7  4  6  5  2  2 26 35 14 11  8  9 11 15

44 43 52 45 49 36 25 45 42 47 39 40 43 43 59

11 16 20 15 17 15 14 16 15 17 11 13 19 12 –

– – – – – –  6  7  8 10  6  8 – – –

Source: Figures extracted from DeGolyer (2010, Table 99, p. 79). Note: Percentage responding “yes” in a phone survey to the question “within the past 12 months, did you express your concern or seek help from the following group?”

Securitization context  71 Periodic mass protests, such as the annual July 1 demonstration and the annual June 4 Tiananmen Incident vigil, attract tens to hundreds of thousands of participants each year and are an integral part of non-institutionalized political participation in Hong Kong. Table 5.2 shows the percentage of Hongkongers participating in protests grew exponentially in 2003 and 2004. Though the percentage has dropped since then, more Hongkongers reported being involved in protests than pre-2003. Protests before 2006 are characterized by similar forms, organizations, and courses of action. The pro-democratic organizers carefully plan rallies and demonstrations to abide by the self-imposed principles of peace, rationality, non-violence, and no profanity (helifeifei). Organizers would seek prior police approval for the demonstrations and rallies and conduct them within legal boundaries to avoid clashes with the police. The main purpose of the protests is to use the rally headcount as leverage to solicit concessions from the government. Participants are happy to take part in the pre-set routine (e.g. walking to the pre-set destination, yelling slogans, and singing songs) and boost the headcount. Confrontation is considered both costly and unnecessary by all parties (Cheng, 2016). On July 1, 2003, half a million Hongkongers marched in an orderly manner – not a single clash was reported on the streets – to protest the ineffective Tung Chee-hwa government and the national security legislation proposal (“Huge protest,” 2003). The government had nothing much to do other than to wait for the crowd to disperse on its own. Despite the proliferation of demonstrations and rallies since 2003, ­depoliticization  – political powerlessness, mainstream political aloofness, distrust towards politicians and parties, and inclination to see politics as “dirty” and ­“dangerous”  – has continued to constrict protests (Lee & Chan, 2008). Lee and Chan (2008) observed that politically active Hongkongers in their focus group study described themselves as politically apathetic. Politically active participants, who attended the annual July 1 demonstration more than once, perhaps habitually toned down their political involvement to fit in better with the mainstream culture. They understood that many Hongkongers are shortsighted, place a low priority on politics, and are preoccupied with making money. They also expressed fear of being used by movement leaders as bargaining chips. Ironically, this politically active group also expressed feelings of political powerlessness, as they doubted that demonstrations could affect government policies. Even the more optimistic three-timers (i.e. those who attended the three July 1 demonstrations from 2003 to 2005) believed the demonstration was only one of the factors that influenced the government’s decision to shelve the national security legislation. Although the 2003 demonstration was a politically empowering experience, the perceived “dirtiness” of politics and the political aloofness of fellow Hongkongers seemed to have dampened the interests of many to participate in subsequent July 1 protests. Cheng (2016) noted that a more radical form of activism involving occupation and laying siege to a building (such as the LegCo building and government headquarters) has taken place since 2006. Examples of such radical activism include actions to preserve the Star Ferry Pier in 2006, opposition to the

72  Securitization context Guangzhou-Hongkong express railway link in 2009–2010, and protests against the national education curriculum in 2012. These protests were initiated and organized by young and rookie activists who had no party affiliations. New civic groups also emerged from these events such as Scholarism, the Land Justice League, and Local Action. As seen in an interview with young activists, excerpted below, they denounced police-approved protests, such as the July 1 demonstration, as ritualistic and impotent, and they sought alternatives to pressure the government to make real changes. The 1 July rally has become routinized. Constrained by precedent, we felt compelled to brief the authorities on detailed actions and even help the police to disperse the crowd at the end-point. These expectations are absurd. How can we denounce the regime and then work with it with ease? Isn’t protest supposed to be radical, or at least unpredictable? (Cheng, 2016, p. 396) The mainstream population, however, was hardly receptive to radical and disruptive protests despite their rise in recent years. Two telephone surveys conducted in 2016 and 2017 found that around 70% (69.5%–73.4%) of respondents agreed that “when struggling with the government to fight for our demands, we should always stick to peaceful, rational, and non-violent means” (Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2016, 2017). Furthermore, around 60% (57.8%–59.1%) of respondents disagreed that “nowadays in Hong Kong, taking radical actions such as physical clashes or traffic blockage is the only way of making the government respond to people’s demands.”

Effects of depoliticization culture on the Umbrella Movement Context could either empower or disempower securitizing actors in the securitizing process, and in the case of the Umbrella Movement, the context facilitated the securitization process. Recall that the combination of cultural and textual meaning forms a frame of reference through which the audience understands the situation. Through prior political developments and struggles, mainstream Hongkongers have subscribed to elements of a depoliticized culture, which have played a direct and indirect role in the development of the Umbrella Movement. Its direct role is the public pressure that restrained the escalation of the Umbrella Movement. Its indirect role was through its influence on the security arguments propagated by the securitizing actors (see more in Chapter 6). The theoretical concepts of political aloofness, a functional view of democracy, and a depoliticized culture point to a public that does not support political mobilization in Hong Kong, especially radical forms. Even though radical repertoires such as occupation and laying siege to the government headquarters became more common after 2006 (Cheng, 2016), these protests were attended by a small group, and mainstream Hongkongers were unwilling to side with

Securitization context  73 any movement that appeared to disrupt social order. To win public support, the Umbrella Movement protesters and leaders also had to work around the depoliticized culture and refrain from radical protests. Umbrella Movement leaders denied that the Movement was a “revolution” and made a cautious effort to claim the moral high ground and show the public they were neither troublemakers nor had subversive motives (Yeung, 2014). OCLP founders had to convince the public that civil disobedience would not erode the rule of law and turned themselves in to the police near the end of the Movement (Cheung & Sung, 2014). Protesters maintained orderliness and cleanliness at the protest sites and were keenly aware of the critical importance of abiding by the principle of “non-­violence” (Dissanayake, 2014). During the early phases of the Movement, protesters received wide acclaim for their non-violence and orderliness. The insistence on non-violence, although favoured by the public, eventually sparked a divide within the yellow ribbon camp. At around 1 am on November 19, a group of masked protesters responded to a false rumour that the LegCo was about to discuss “Internet Article 23”3 and used metal barricades and bricks to smash the glass doors of the LegCo complex (Lee, Ngo, & Mok, 2014; “Rumour of copyright,” 2014). The police responded with pepper spray and batons and arrested six protesters. Occupy founders and pro-democracy lawmakers condemned the violent episode and insisted that non-violence was the only way to claim the moral high ground. Some protesters, however, resented the indefinite peaceful street occupation and supported stepping up the protests. HKFS and Scholarism’s subsequent decision to call on protesters to charge police cordons and storm the government’s headquarters on November 30 further isolated supporters of the Movement and solidified public support for order and stability. Public support turned sour when the public saw that protesters were unable to remain organized and non-violent. The public perceived them as troublemakers and threats to social stability. A newspaper commentator noted after some protesters attempted to break into the LegCo that: The Occupy protests appear to be entering a new phase with the police stepping up their aggression. The protesters, or at least some of them, have not helped themselves by also becoming more aggressive. Unfortunately, the students are just playing into the hands of the government. They are allowing themselves to be portrayed as law-breaking, destabilising and selfish; while the government is increasingly able to present itself as a force for stability, rule of law, reason and “normality.” As the violence becomes the focus of attention, people are losing sight of what this is supposed to be about, namely political reform. (Winn, 2014) The culture of depoliticization also played an indirect role by shaping the security arguments propagated by the securitizing actors. Resonance is a major focus in securitization analysis with successful securitization requiring securitizing actors to use language that resonates with the historical conjuncture.

74  Securitization context In other words, to securitize the Umbrella Movement the arguments put forth needed to resonate with elements of the depoliticized culture, about which I will elaborate more in the following chapter.

Conclusion from critical literature review Securitization of the Umbrella Movement is contingent upon public agreement that the negative consequences raised by the securitizing actors are indeed negative. Context is an essential aspect to the success of a security appeal because the public is more susceptible to a security appeal if the language resonates with people’s fears and concerns. Rather than encouraging public expression, the colonial government (and later the SAR government) propagated a conception of citizenship that emphasizes civic duties and self-reliance (Lam, 2005): Good citizens should obey the law, maintain social stability, and work hard for society. The government’s depoliticizing approach paid off. Political activists for the last 65 years have struggled to break through the mainstream belief that activism is at odds with social order. Lau (1982, p. 74) suggested that the politically aloof post-war population “frowned upon” efforts to change the social order, particularly if efforts disrupted social stability. Even with the presence of a politically active and fast-expanding civil society, the mainstream culture of depoliticization discouraged large-scale and radical repertoires of contention. Political activism since the 1950s has had to circumvent this mainstream prioritization of order and stability. Activists have had to cautiously avoid the label of “troublemaking,” be aware of legal boundaries, avoid being too confrontational with the government, and deny having any “political” (i.e. subversive) intent (Lam, 2004). Large-scale demonstrations and rallies became more common post-handover, suggesting that the public had higher tolerance and greater support for activism. However, self-imposed principles of peace, rationality, non-violence, and no profanity (helifeifei) showed that activists continued to cautiously avoid appearing as potential threats to social order. The decline of public support for the Umbrella Movement when it became less peaceful, rational, and non-violent showed that decades of efforts at activism failed to change mainstream opinion, which sees politics as a potential threat to social order.

Notes 1 Functional constituencies are professional or special interest groups. Currently, 30 out of 70 seats in the LegCo are elected by 28 traditional functional constituencies including Heung Yee Kuk, social welfare, finance, education, etc. 2 Lion Rock is a mountain in Hong Kong notable for its resemblance to a crouching lion. 3 The copyright amendment bill was dubbed “Internet Article 23” (i.e. an Internet version of national security law) due to widespread fears, especially among netizens, that online freedom of speech and creation and distribution of derivative work (e.g. creating memes, rewriting song lyrics) would be curbed.

6 Securitizing act A content analysis of news reports

Dual-processing models such as the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & ­Cacioppo, 1986) and heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1987) propose that an individual can process persuasive information systematically/centrally or heuristically/peripherally. Judgments made through heuristic processing require minimal cognitive demands, as heuristic processing activates and applies judgmental rules (or “heuristics”) that have been learned and stored in memory (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). A media frame is one way of organizing and channelling information that activates heuristic processing and can be used to facilitate understanding and generalizing across scattered and unfamiliar events. Violent acts such as a nightclub attack in Turkey, hostages held in the Philippines, assaults and bombings in England, or suicide bombings in Nigeria all have something in common. They are acts of terrorism meant to send a message. The terrorism media frames thus allow an audience to “quickly sort out, interpret, categorize, and evaluate these conflicts” despite not “knowing much, if anything, about the particular people, groups, issues, or even places involved” (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003, p. 11). The audience receives different textual meanings depending on the type of media frame used. For example, a car crashing into a crowd of people in a tourist area in broad daylight could either be reported as an alleged terrorist attack or a senseless act of violence. The first option invokes the security frame and would clearly arouse greater public fear than the latter. Framing a car crash as a terrorist attack helps audiences organize the event quickly into a regular pattern: What is the problem; how can the problem be tackled; and most important, who are the heroes, the villains, and the victims (Vultee, 2011)? The government can take note of public sentiment and justify extraordinary procedures (e.g. war on terrorism). The power of the media lies in its ability to form and shape public opinion. Public perception of threat and terror could thus be seen as “an effect of media” (Vultee, 2011, p. 78). Vuori (2011) argues that securitization and desecuritization, especially in non-democratic settings, provide a legitimate basis for protest suppression and resistance. The outcome of the Umbrella Movement thus depends on whether it was framed as a fight for democracy or as an existential threat. Pro-Beijing media would push the issue to the securitized end of the spectrum, while pro-democracy

76  Securitizing act media would defend and push the issue back to the domain of normal politics. The winner of this discourse battle gains significant advantages in subsequent stages of the process of securitization/desecuritization. In this chapter, I examine how two politically divergent newspapers depicted the Umbrella Movement. The security appeal framework in Chapter 3 likens securitizing moves to a fear appeal – a type of persuasive communication that emphasizes the potential threat and harm that will befall an audience if it fails to adopt the recommended coping response. In a typical move, securitizing actors would depict the issue as a dangerous threat to certain referent objects, followed by suggestions of protective action that can tackle the threat. The combination of threat and coping information motivates individuals to accept the message and undertake protective actions. I will show in this chapter that the securitizing frame employed by pro-Beijing media emphasizes the vulnerability of stability, prosperity, and other core values of Hong Kong (referent objects), the negative consequences that would befall if the Occupation continues (threat information), and the capacity of the Hong Kong government in tackling the threat (response efficacy). Securitization of the Umbrella Movement is achieved when the audience accepts that it is a threat that must be tackled. Umbrella Movement leaders and protesters, alleged threats to Hong Kong, would actively resist the threat label and push the discussion back to the realm of normal politics, i.e. desecuritize the movement. I will show in this chapter that the desecuritizing frame focuses on the goal of “genuine universal suffrage” and minimizing the alleged negative consequences of the Movement.

Methods Sample frame CA is “a research technique that is based on measuring the amount of something (violence, negative portrayals of women, or whatever) in a representative sampling of some mass-mediated popular art form” (Berger, 1998, p. 23). I selected two Hong Kong-based Chinese newspapers with divergent political stands for CA. The pro-democracy anti-China paper Apple Daily was founded in 1995 by Jimmy Lai, an avid and long-time supporter of democracy movements. Jimmy Lai stepped down as chairman of Next Media (parent company of Apple Daily) the day after he was arrested for unlawful assembly during the crackdown of the Umbrella Movement (Yiu, 2014). Apple Daily is one of the best-selling newspapers in Hong Kong. The pro-CCP, anti-democracy paper Wen Wei Po was founded in Hong Kong in 1948 after the Shanghai version closed down because of its anti-­Kuomintang stand (Wen Wei Po, 2017). Wen Wei Po is authorized for distribution on the mainland and licensed to publish advertisements from mainland enterprises. I searched on “Occupation” and “Occupy Central” to identify related Wen Wei Po and Apple Daily articles published between August 31 (the release of the 8.31 decision) and December 16, 2014 (the day after authorities cleared the last protest site). These search terms identified 2,321 Apple Daily articles and

Securitizing act  77 2,420 Wen Wei Po articles,1 and I randomly selected a sample of 200 articles per newspaper (N = 400) for analysis.

Coding guide Each article was coded for the presence or absence of the following 13 variables. The design of the coding guide drew on the securitization theory and PMT.

Information source The source is the person or organization that gives information to news reporters and is explicitly identified by a quote or paraphrase. I did not code conversations (even in the form of a quote) that were observed by the reporter, especially during scuffles inside the protest sites. Government: This category represents the “official” view from the Hong Kong and Beijing governments. Those who represent the views from the Hong Kong government include officials from the Hong Kong government and Executive Council members (appointed advisors to the chief executive). Those who represent views from the Beijing government include NPCSC, officials from the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council, officials from the CGLO, and staffers from the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies. I also included political elites from Hong Kong who have been appointed to public office, including delegates to the NPC and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPCCC). Pro-Beijing lawmakers. Lawmakers are elected to office, as opposed to being appointed (placed under the government category). Pro-Beijing lawmakers mainly come from political parties such as DAB, Business and Professionals ­A lliance for Hong Kong (BPA), the New People’s Party, or the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU). Pro-democracy lawmakers: All anti-Beijing lawmakers were included in this category. Pro-democracy lawmakers come from political parties such as the Democratic Party, Civic Party, People Power, or the Labour Party. I also included former lawmakers who hold prominent positions in their political parties such as Audrey Eu (founding leader of the Civic Party) and Martin Lee (founding chairman of the Democratic Party). Emergency service providers: This category included law enforcement (Hong Kong Police, Corrections Services Department, and Department of Security), fire department, and medical services. Civil society organizations and business authorities: Included in this category were civil society organizations such as chambers of commerce, human rights organizations, townsmen fellowships from various mainland provinces, labour unions, religious organizations, etc. Business authorities included business tycoons and public reports from various financial institutions. Umbrella Movement leaders: I included the three OCLP founders, student leaders, and prominent spokespersons such as Jimmy Lai and Cardinal Joseph Zen.

78  Securitizing act Protesters and supporters: I included in this category Occupy protesters and supporters who made donations to the Movement. Blue ribbon camp: I included anti-Occupy groupings such as the Alliance for Peace and Democracy and Alliance in Support of our Police Force. I also included individuals who actively expressed their opposition, such as those who argued with protesters at the Occupy sites and those who attended rallies in support of the police.

Security appeal components I opted for a more conservative strategy and only counted the variable as present if more than two sentences (or at least some sort of reasoning) was reported. For example, a brief mention of the idea that “Hong Kong is governed by the rule of law” was not coded as “referent object.” Referent object: Referent object refers to principles or statuses that have been claimed as necessary for the success of Hong Kong, such as rule of law and status as a financial centre. Authorities have emphasized the vulnerability of the referent object and the need to take action to protect the referent object as securitizing moves. Negative consequences: This variable was adopted from the fear appeal literature. The emphasis on the negative consequences of the Umbrella Movement reinforces its threatening nature. Response efficacy: Response efficacy refers to the availability and effectiveness of the coping response in avoiding or eliminating a threat (Rogers, 1983). Research on fear appeal has consistently found that information on response efficacy facilitates message acceptance. Similarly, I suggest that the insistence on government and police capacity to handle the situation garners support for the government and facilitates audience acceptance of the security appeal. I included in this category mentions of confidence in government and police capacity and support for the police in enforcing the law and evicting protesters. “Genuine universal suffrage”: This is an in vivo code, and I tallied the number of times “genuine universal suffrage” appeared in the sampled articles. Exaggeration of consequences: The securitization literature suggests that one countermove by securitized targets is desecuritization, i.e. arguing that the issue is not a security issue (Vuori, 2011; Wæver, 1995). A desecuritizing move aims at convincing an audience that X is not an existential threat to Y. As the authorities attempt to securitize the Umbrella Movement by emphasizing the negative consequences of the movement, a natural response by the protesters was to downplay the negative consequences. Included in this category were arguments emphasizing the non-threatening nature of the protesters and reports that negative consequences were exaggerated.

Results Apple Daily and Wen Wei Po had vastly different, if not opposite, reporting approaches. Table 6.1 presents the results of the CA.

Securitizing act  79 Table 6.1  Content Analysis (CA) of Apple Daily and Wen Wei Po articles % in Apple Daily % in Wen Wei Po Information source Government

11.5% (n = 23) 10% (n = 20) 3.5% (n = 7) 13% (n = 26) 8% (n = 16) 14% (n = 28) 38.5% (n = 77) 5% (n = 10)

34% (n = 68) 11.5% (n = 23) 15.5% (n = 31) 4.5% (n = 9) 22.5% (n = 45) 5% (n = 10) 2.5% (n = 5) 10.5% (n = 21)

Referent object (e.g. status as financial hub)

3.5% (n = 7) 0

Negative consequences (e.g. slowed economic growth) Response efficacy (e.g. emphasis on police capacity)

13% (n = 26) 1% (n = 2)

36.5% (n = 73) 20.5% (n = 41) 51.5% (n = 103) 19.5% (n = 39)

Emergency service providers Pro-establishment lawmakers Pro-democracy lawmakers Civil society orgs and business Umbrella Movement leaders Protesters Blue ribbon Security appeal components “Unlawful”

Desecuritizing components “Genuine universal suffrage” Exaggeration of consequences (e.g. residents not really affected)

29.5% (n = 59) 11% (n = 22)

2.5% (n = 5) 0

Information source Wen Wei Po: Wen Wei Po acted as a mouthpiece of the securitizing actors. The most frequently cited source was the government, presented in 34% (n = 68) of articles, followed by civil society organizations and business authorities (22.5%, n = 45), and pro-Beijing lawmakers (15.5%, n = 31). Pro-democracy lawmakers (4.5%, n = 9) and Occupy protesters (2.5%, n = 5) were the least cited sources. Apple Daily: The pattern was the exact opposite for Apple Daily, a mouthpiece of the yellow ribbon camp. Occupy protesters and supporters were the most frequently cited source, presented in 38.5% (n = 77) of articles, followed by Umbrella Movement leaders (14%, n = 28) and pro-democracy lawmakers (13%, n = 26). Pro-Beijing lawmakers (3.5%, n = 7) and the blue ribbon camp (5%, n = 10) were the least cited sources.

80  Securitizing act Security appeal content Negative consequences The most frequent securitizing strategy was the indication of the protests’ negative consequences, appearing in more than half of all Wen Wei Po articles (51.5%, n = 103). Negative consequences of the Umbrella Movement were reported in only 13% of Apple Daily articles. To emphasize the “existential” nature of the threat, securitizing actors mentioned the extensive harm to political, financial, or everyday life that either was or might have been caused by the protests. For example, the political consequences of the protests include tightening of control over Hong Kong by Beijing (Zheng, 2014b) and erosion of the rule of law (Wen, 2014b). Financial consequences include weakened economic growth due to the toll on the retail and tourism sectors (Yan, 2014) and impairment of the international image of Hong Kong as a financial centre (Wen, 2014a). Wen Wei Po also included a few narratives from business owners around the protest sites to emphasize the financial losses they had suffered (Guan, 2014a). Charles Yeung, chair of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, complained that Hongkongers were forced to foot the bill for the protests (Z. M. Li, 2014a). Authorities also stressed the disruptions to people’s everyday lives and the social order, such as traffic paralysis (Luo, 2014), emergency service delays caused by traffic disruptions (Ye, 2014), and closing of schools around protest sites (Ouyang, 2014). Securitizing actors blamed the political radicalism for tearing society apart and increasing people’s stress levels (T. J. Chen, 2014b). The police noted an increase in crime rates inside protest sites, and Ip Kwok-him, pro-Beijing lawmaker, criticized the Movement as creating zones of “anarchy” (Zheng, 2014e). Remarks by Elsie Leung, former chief secretary of Justice and incumbent deputy director of the NPCSC Basic Law Committee, summarized the sweeping negative consequences of Occupation as follows: The use of radical means to threaten the Central Government will only backfire. Such means will lose support from the public, undermine social stability and hurt the economy. Frequent strikes and protests will scare off investors and tourists, result in a downgrade of Hong Kong’s credit rating, create a social divide, and even lead to waves of mass migrations… “colour revolutions” would only bring war and disaster to the people. (Zhong & Zheng, 2014)

Referent object The emphasis on the vulnerability of referent objects is another security appeal strategy, appearing in 20.5% of Wen Wei Po articles. The logic is that the emphasis on vulnerability would reinforce the destructive nature of the Umbrella Movement and the need to handle it. Lee Ka-shing, popularly nicknamed ­“Superman” for his business influence, analogized Hong Kong to a beautiful

Securitizing act  81 glass vase – it is beautiful yet fragile (Z. M. Li, 2014b). Banking and finance leaders also issued a joint statement warning that continued protests could ruin generations of hard work and achievement (“Jinrongjie,” 2014). Securitizing actors focused on two referent objects that need to be protected: Hong Kong’s status as a financial centre and the rule of law. Lee Shau-kee, another Hong Kong business magnate, opined that housing arrangements, business environment, living conditions, low tax rates, and budget surpluses make Hong Kong the best place to live in the world and urged people to cherish what Hong Kong has to offer (T. J. Chen, 2014a). He warned that Occupying Central was an act of self-destruction and would make Hong Kong lose its edge. Joseph Yam, former chief executive of the Monetary Authority, also warned that Hong Kong’s revered status as a financial centre is not irreplaceable (Zhou, 2014). If the CPG loses confidence in the operation of Hong Kong’s financial sector, Hong Kong’s role as an intermediary could be marginalized as the CPG considers alternatives. Securitizing actors have stressed that rule of law is the cornerstone of Hong Kong’s success and has been firmly held as one of society’s core values (Zheng, 2014g, 2014h). Anthony Chow, former president of the Law Society of Hong Kong, stressed that rule of law is essential for social stability (Z. M. Li, 2014c). Carrie Lam noted that rule of law forms the basis of democracy (Zheng, 2014h). Most important, rule of law is not a low-maintenance referent object. Rule of law is fragile, and it is vital that all sides abide by the law and court orders and uphold the rule of law. The Law Society warned that protester defiance of court injunctions affects the judicial system and undermines the rule of law (Zheng, 2014g). Wen Wei Po’s strong emphasis on following the law was evidenced by its frequent criticism that the Movement is “unlawful” [weifa]: “Unlawful” was mentioned in 36.5% of articles (n = 73).

Response efficacy The Hong Kong government’s response efficacy in handling the protests was mentioned in 19.5% of Wen Wei Po articles. For example, a Wen Wei Po editorial praised the police for protecting Hong Kong from an existential threat (“Shouhu fazhi,” 2014). The editorial pointed out that the act of premeditated and organized violence was intended to hurt Hong Kong’s role in international finance and paralyze government operations. Had the police failed to take firm and swift action to stop radical dissidents and rioters from entering the government headquarters and LegCo building, chaos similar to “Occupy Taiwan Legislature” and “Occupy Executive Bureau” could have repeated itself in Hong Kong and dealt a heavy blow to the government. The editorial praised the police for evicting rioters in accordance with the law and safeguarding the stability of Hong Kong. The blue ribbon camp, from securitizing actors to civilians, expressed unified support for and confidence in police enforcement of the law. Soon after the release of the 8.31 decision, Li Fei, deputy secretary general of the NPC and chairman of the Basic Law Committee, expressed his confidence in the Hong Kong government’s ability to handle the OCLP (Zheng, 2014a). The state-run People’s

82  Securitizing act Daily assured readers that the CPG had strong faith in Chief Executive C. Y. Leung, was completely satisfied with his performance, would continue its unwavering support of Leung’s leadership, and firmly supported police enforcement of the law (“Zhongyang ‘tingLiang,” 2014). C. Y. Leung praised the professionalism of the police force and assured the public that the government was committed to maintaining social stability, protecting everyone’s rights, and democratizing Hong Kong (Zheng, 2014c). The Executive Council, pro-Beijing lawmakers, and delegates to the NPC all expressed support for police enforcement of the law (Guan, 2014b; Zheng, 2014d, 2014f). The FTU, for example, urged the police to restore social order so that all Hongkongers could return to their normal lives (Guan, 2014b).

Desecuritizing components “Genuine universal suffrage” The in vivo code “genuine universal suffrage” was mentioned in 29.5% (n = 59) of Apple Daily articles. The term was only mentioned in 2.5% (n = 5) of Wen Wei Po articles.

Exaggeration of consequences Mentions of an exaggeration of the negative consequences appeared in 11% of Apple Daily articles. To desecuritize the Umbrella Movement, Apple Daily needed to minimize the perceived negative consequences of OCLP protests. In almost half of the articles that mentioned negative consequences, Apple Daily cited another source to rebut the claims made by the blue ribbon camp (12 out of 26 articles). For example, when Deputy Chief Fire Officer Leung Wai-hung noted that road blockages were causing delays to emergency services and that only 60%–70% of ambulances in Central could meet performance pledges in the first two days of the occupation, Apple Daily quoted an anonymous paramedic as saying that ambulances actually arrived at the scene faster due to the decrease in rush hour traffic (“Jiuhu,” 2014). An anonymous fire fighter also criticized Leung for making a sweeping statement to deceive the public and pointed out that only a small district in Central during one time period experienced a 30% drop in performance (“Qianxian,” 2014). Rebutting an insurance labour union’s claim (“Baoxianye,” 2014) that the sector suffered a loss of HK $10 billion due to the protests, Apple Daily cited another labour union that claimed that the lack of democracy, not protests, was affecting business. Apple Daily also painted a picture of civilians suffering only temporary inconveniences. Students were supportive of the fight for genuine democracy despite the longer commute, and only a handful of students were late for class due to road blockage (“Zhichi zhanzhong,” 2014). Businesses near the protest site sympathized with the protest cause and did not blame protesters for the financial losses (“Zhanling ling shengyi,” 2014). A resident near the Causeway Bay protest

Securitizing act  83 site noted that, even though the protests caused inconveniences, he was “willing to make a little sacrifice for democracy” (“Zhantongzhe,” 2014). To counter claims that the protest sites were “anarchic,” Apple Daily framed protest sites with Hong Kong pride, almost utopic. A French tourist called the peacefulness of the protests “amazing” and applauded the protesters’ discipline and participation in cleaning the streets and collecting trash (“Waiguoren,” 2014). He said that such peaceful and orderly protests never happened back home in France. Apple Daily also reported acts of altruism that were seen throughout the protest sites: A willingness to take up chores, look out for one another, make generous donations, etc. (“Minzhu,” 2014; “Zhongwusheng,” 2014). One protester noted, “This is a Hong Kong I have never seen before.”

Conclusion of CA Both Wen Wei Po and Apple Daily acted as mouthpieces for their respective camps. Wen Wei Po’s most frequently cited source was the government (present in 34% of articles), the major securitizing actors. The most frequently cited sources of Apple Daily were Umbrella Movement protesters and leaders (presented in 38.5% and 14% of articles, respectively), the targets of the security appeal. The one-sided sources of information and the under-representation of views from the opposite camp showed that both newspapers prioritized their role as mouthpieces over offering readers unbiased coverage. Results from this CA further suggest that securitizing actors and targets of the security appeal used the media as a channel to compete and campaign for public support. In this chapter, I have examined how the Umbrella Movement was portrayed in politically divergent media. Wen Wei Po emphasized the negative consequences of the Umbrella Movement (presented in 51.5% of articles), the referent object that is under threat (appeared in 20.5% of articles) and the capacity of the police and government to tackle the threat (appeared in 19.5% of articles) to convince the audience to accept the authorities’ security appeal. I liken the security appeal’s emphasis on the vulnerability of the referent object, negative consequences of the threat, and the efficacy of the government’s response to the fear appeal found in anti-smoking advertisements. Anti-smoking advertisements present the following information: Smoking gives you cancer; save yourself, and quit smoking. The audience is expected to feel anxious about the negative consequences of the threat (i.e. cancer) and more likely to consider ways to avert the threat (i.e. quit smoking). Similarly, the combination of threat and coping information in a security appeal intends to motivate Hongkongers to undertake protective actions for themselves and for Hong Kong. The emphasis on the sweeping public harm caused by the Umbrella Movement, from a sluggish economy to disruptions in everyday life, also reinforces the existential nature of the threat. Security speech is highly contingent upon audience resonance (Balzacq, 2005, 2011a). I found in the present that the information put forth by the actors resonated with the culture of depoliticization’s emphasis on stability and prosperity and its depiction of politics as a threat to stability. The congruence of textual

84  Securitizing act and cultural meaning acquired by the audience suggests a clear message that the Umbrella Movement causes sweeping harm and one should side with the government to avert the threat. Another supposed benefit of invoking a securitizing frame is that the threat of public harm narrows the gap between the elites and civilians. A common threat links the security interests of civilians with political elites. Civilians related to the political elites’ complaints because they were raised on behalf of Hong Kong. For example Charles Yeung, chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, complained that all Hongkongers, including himself, were forced to foot the bill for the protests. Banking and finance leaders issued a joint statement warning that the protests could ruin generations of hard work and achievements, appealing to the generations that have worked hard in Hong Kong. Perhaps, as Vultee (2011) notes, unity in the face of a common threat facilitated audience resonance, and the media’s use of securitization frames increased readers’ trust in the government. When faced with soft repression from authorities, Umbrella Movement protesters and leaders felt compelled to desecuritize the movement. As a mouthpiece for the Umbrella Movement, Apple Daily made an effort to bring the discussion back to the realm of normal politics and debunk the Movement’s alleged harm. The mantra of the Movement, “I want genuine universal suffrage,” reminded the audience that the issue is a political discussion and could only be solved politically. “Genuine universal suffrage” appeared frequently in Apple Daily (mentioned in 29.5% of articles) to remind audience not to get side tracked by the authorities’ security appeal. To convince the audience that the Umbrella Movement was not a threat to Hong Kong, Apple Daily needed to refute negative claims raised by the authorities (refutations of negative consequences of the Umbrella Movement appeared in 11% of Apple Daily articles). The usual attempt was to cite alternative sources to contradict the claims made by the authorities, such as the rebuttal by a frontline medical officer that emergency services were not delayed due to road blockages. Apple Daily also depicted the protest sites as utopic, not “anarchic.” Protesters kept the sites orderly and clean, looked out for one another, generously donated materials, willingly took up chores, etc.

Note 1 Articles were searched and downloaded from WiseNews database. I also specified the section and columns to exclude opinion editorial (Op-Ed), entertainment news, ­fi nance news columns, etc. For Apple Daily, I only included news in the following ­columns: top news (yaowen), local news (gangwen), Umbrella Revolution (yusan geming), the era of disobedience (kangming shidai), and the despairing truth (juewang zhenxiang). For Wen Wei Po I only included news in the following columns: ­important news (zhongyao xinwen), Hong Kong news (xianggang xinwen), NPC passed reform decision (renda tongguo zhenggaijueding), launch of five-step reform process (qidong zhenggaiwubuqu), protect Hong Kong oppose Occupy Central (shouhu xianggang fandui zhanzhong), and protect universal suffrage anti-Occupy signature campaign (baopuxuan fanzhanzhong qianmingdaxingdong).

7 The security appeal’s audience

The decisions to protest or oppose a protest result from a combination of macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, these decisions do not take place in a social vacuum. Political participation is a response to a threat at the macro level. The roles of media, civil society organizations, political parties, movement leaders, etc. are considered the meso level. The micro level concerns the social and psychological factors that drive an individual’s decision to participate. The present chapter focuses on micro-level explanations and explores what predicts one’s attitude towards the Umbrella Movement and why.

What predicts opposition to and defiance of the Umbrella Movement? My colleagues and I conducted two surveys in mid-November, 2014, to explore the views of Umbrella Movement supporters and opponents. Participants in both surveys were eligible Hong Kong voters (permanent residents 18 years and older). In the first survey, we decided to sample university students, who were at the forefront of the Movement and were likely to have an opinion. We recruited 503 university students from two different universities to complete our first survey. Among the student participants, 75% supported (“supporters”) and 25% opposed (“opponents”) the Movement. As noted in Chapter 3, successful securitization entails audience acceptance that (1) an issue is politically related, (2) a threat is existential, and (3) a regime’s proposed solution is necessary and effective (Salter, 2011).1 I assume that the first two criteria are already satisfied – it is not contested that the Umbrella Movement is politically related, and the previous chapter showed that the threat had been depicted as ruining Hong Kong. Thus, the major difference between those who support and oppose the Movement should lie in their views of the regime’s proposed solution. The regime’s proposal to end the threat was simple: Stop the protests and move on with the political reform according to the 8.31 framework. In this case, audience acceptance means acceptance of the 8.31 decision and of strategies to evict Occupy protesters (Table 7.1).

86  The security appeal’s audience Table 7.1  Survey participants’ views of the polity Student Student Occupy supporters (%) opponents (%) protesters (%) Attitudes towards the 8.31 decision Although 8.31 framework is not perfect, it is still better than the current election system I agree with “pocketing” the 8.31 decision first Attitudes towards democracy Democracy may have many problems, but it is better than any other system Having a democratic system is a good way of governing Hong Kong Cultural identity “Chinese identity” is very important to me

29.6

64.7

14.1

12

47.1

4.3

83.5

69.7

91.2

83.2

54.9

93.4

36.1

55

24.6

Views about politics and the constitutional development Even though OCLP founders threatened to protest any “fake” universal suffrage with a large-scale sit-in, the NPC still decided to pre-screen chief executive candidates. As Executive Council member and pro-Beijing lawmaker Regina Ip noted, “It is not as though Beijing were unaware of the potential for controversy” (Ip, 2014). However, pre-screening candidates and barring pro-democracy activists from the race were deemed necessary to ensure that the elected chief executive would answer to Beijing and could safeguard “China’s sovereignty, security and developmental interests” (Ip, 2014). C. Y. Leung also noted that the 8.31 framework was non-negotiable, and Occupy protesters had “almost zero chance” of success (Chan, Zhao, Siu, Kao, & Ng, 2014). The government and pro-­establishment forces made clear that the only way to break the political impasse was to accept the 8.31 decision. We found that opponents in our survey were more likely to agree with the government (see Table 7.1). Opponents were more likely to agree or strongly agree that the 8.31 framework is better than the current election system (65% vs. 30%). Opponents were also more likely to agree to “pocket” the 8.31 decision (47% vs. 12%).2 Opponents generally indicated a more negative view of Western-style democracy. Only 55% of opponents, compared with 83% of supporters, agreed or strongly agreed that democracy is a good way to govern Hong Kong. Furthermore, only 70% of opponents, compared with 84% of supporters, agreed or strongly agreed that “democracy may have many problems, but it is better than any other system.3” Opponents were more likely to value their Chinese identity, as 55% of opponents (compared with 36% of supporters) indicated that their Chinese identity was very important to them.

The security appeal’s audience  87 Attitude towards strategies used in the suppression Survey results showed that opponents of the Movement had a more positive impression of the police and triads, two major actors involved in the suppression of the Movement. Our research team asked participants to indicate their agreement on seven statements related to the police on a 4-point scale (1 = disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree). Statements included: “Police usually act in ways that are consistent with my ideas of what is right and wrong,” “The police use rules and procedures that are fair for everyone,” etc. A scale was formed based on the mean score of all statements (Cronbach’s α = 0.9).4 As predicted, opponents (M = 2.69) had a more positive perception of the police than supporters (M = 2.17). We also asked participants to indicate their tolerance of different activities performed by triads. We asked participants to indicate their tolerance of six of the triads’ lawful behaviours such as operation of licit businesses, seeking law-abiding assistance from triad members, seeking help from triad members to return lost items, etc. A scale measuring tolerance of triad lawful behaviour was formed based on the mean score of all statements (Cronbach’s α = .84). Results suggested that opponents have a more negative perception of triads, as opponents (M = 2.06) indicated a lower tolerance of even their lawful behaviours than supporters (M = 2.23). We also asked participants to indicate their tolerance of political functions performed by triads during the Movement, such as protecting student protesters and maintaining social stability (i.e. weiwen). We found that opponents were more likely to approve of triad assistance in maintaining social stability (e.g. evicting protesters) than supporters, with 12% of opponents indicating agree or strongly agree versus 5% of supporters. In other words, despite the negative perception of triads, opponents seemed more receptive to the use of triads to carry out political missions, as long as triads were part of the anti-Occupy camp. Not surprisingly, opponents also indicated lower tolerance of triads protecting student protesters than supporters, with 17% of opponents agreed or strongly agreed versus 39% of supporters.

Defiance of political control As seen in the literature on reactance, forcing something onto someone can lead to opposition. The 8.31 decision, police suppression, and triad attacks were attempts to force protesters to give up certain freedoms, and threats to cherished freedoms increased the motivation to protect those freedoms. Protesters believed that “genuine universal suffrage” is a fundamental right in a democracy, and the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement is an obvious manifestation of the motivation to protect infringed upon freedoms. For the second survey we recruited 186 participants from two Occupy sites, and the results showed support for our assumptions. Occupy protesters attached an even lower importance to Chinese

88  The security appeal’s audience identity, a more positive attitude towards democracy, and more negative views of the 8.31 decision and the police (see Table 7.1). On the other hand, Hongkongers who neither recognized the freedom to choose their own candidate nor cherished that freedom experienced no reactance. As we saw in the first survey, opponents of the Umbrella Movement clearly would not experience reactance: They were more likely to be proud of being Chinese, accept the 8.31 decision, value democracy less, and find the police fair.

Why would Hongkongers accept or defy the security appeal? The following section explores Hongkonger support for the government’s securitizing moves. I conducted and analysed ten in-depth interviews with Hongkongers from diverse backgrounds to expand upon the survey findings. Data in this section were mainly collected from two sources. First, I conducted in-depth, semi-structured, in-person interviews with each participant. I purposefully selected four protesters (YJ, YC, YY, YS), one Occupy supporter (YF), one green ribboner (GS), and four blue ribboners (BF, BL, BK, BA). All interviewees were recruited through friends or snowball sampling. See Table 7.2 for demographics and the reasons I selected these interviewees. Second, literature, media accounts, and government reports were compared to the interview data to reveal emerging themes. Table 7.2  I nterviewee information Pseudonym

Gender Age

Background information

Blue ribbon camp  1

BK

M

 2

BF

M

 3

BL

M

 4

BA

M

56–60 BK was born in Hong Kong and received his university degree in the United K ingdom in the 1970s. BK works as a civil engineer and frequently travels to mainland China for work. 61–65 BF was born in Hong Kong and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. Before his retirement, BF worked on the mainland for almost 30 years as a successful banking executive. The first protest he ever attended was to protest the heavy sentence of the seven police officers. 71–75 BL was born in mainland China and moved to Hong Kong when he was young. He is a successful businessman with many business ties to mainland China. 26–30 BA is a graduate student from mainland China. He is a committee member in the Fellow Townsmen Association (tongxianghui) in his hometown.

The security appeal’s audience  89 Pseudonym

Gender Age

Background information

Yellow ribbon camp  5

YC

M

21–25

 6

YS

M

21–25

 7

YY

M

21–25

 8

YJ

F

21–25

 9

YF

M

66–70

YC was a full-time student when the Umbrella Movement happened. He stayed at the Occupy sites starting with the night of the tear gas. YS was a full-time student when the Umbrella Movement took place. YS has been a long-time activist and social movement organizer. He stayed at the Occupy site starting with the night of the tear gas. YY was a full-time student when the Umbrella Movement happened. He stayed at the Occupy site since the beginning of the protest. YJ was a full-time student when the Umbrella Movement took place. She stayed at the Occupy site starting on the night of the tear gas. After the Umbrella Movement ended, YJ worked as a reporter for a localist newspaper and a volunteer at a localist party. YF was born in mainland China and has lived there for 20 years. His pro-democracy worldview and anti-CCP sentiments prompted him to swim to Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution.

Green ribbon camp (combination of yellow and blue ribbon stances) 10

GS

M

61–65

GS was born in Hong Kong and decided to immigrate to Canada in the early 1990s after the Tiananmen Square incident. Before his retirement, GS worked in mainland China for 20 years as a successful banking executive.

Overview Blue ribboners and yellow ribboners have opposing worldviews that stem from how they see the relationship between the people and government. Blue ribboners see Hongkongers as subjects of an authoritarian regime (“subjects”), whereas yellow ribboners see Hongkongers as citizens entitled to a voice (“citizens”). Viewing oneself as citizen or subject encompasses fundamentally different modes of reasoning and explains why subjects and citizens could reach opposite conclusions on the same issue. This political divide existed long before the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. One might have hoped that the peaceful protest that has been lauded by the international media would have brought the people together. The reverse happened, and the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement drove subjects and citizens further apart. The following analysis aims to provide a preliminary understanding of the nature of the divide. See ­Figure 7.1 for the list of themes that have emerged in my thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

90  The security appeal’s audience Justified Authoritarianism or Oppressive Dictator? CCP rule works

CCP as oppressive dictator Separation of Chineseness from CCP

Democracy: Something to Earn or Demand? Fragility of granted freedom

Democracy as entitlement

Democracy as something to fight for

Mainlandization: Welcome Integration or Coerced Conversion?

What is the threat?

Dissidents as threat Welcome integration

Hkers unable to seize opportunties Losing the Hong Kong DNA

Regime as threat

Police as hero or villain?

Triad as friend or foe?

Figure 7.1  L ist of themes in the analysis of audiences.

Justified authoritarianism or oppressive dictator? Ignatieff (1994) identified two forms of nationalism: Civic and ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism defines the nation in terms of ethnicity and heritage, and ethnic nationalist regimes are generally more authoritarian than democratic because “an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen” (Ignatieff, 1994, pp. 4–5). “It is the national community which defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community” (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 5). Blue ribboners believe that CCP authoritarianism, the form of governance that history has chosen and has survived through the ages, is most appropriate for China. On the other hand, civic nationalism “envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens” who are united by a shared set of values (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 3). This type of nationalism promotes democracy because it believes that its people create the state as civic equals. Yellow ribboners see Chinese authoritarianism as unjustified – no economic miracle could justify authoritarianism and the suppression of human rights. They see Hongkongers as citizens entitled to a voice in Hong Kong’s future and are determined to push for greater democracy.

CCP rule works Survey results showed that Occupy opponents attached greater importance to Chinese identity. All blue ribboners I interviewed in the qualitative phase also proudly identified themselves as “Chinese” and have always been strongly

The security appeal’s audience  91 attached to the Chinese identity. Blue ribboners understood that the CCP is an authoritarian ruler, yet authoritarianism is seen as the most appropriate form of rule for the vast and developing China for two main reasons. The reason blue ribboners most often noted was that the existing system of rule has worked well. BK noted that China has made significant improvements over the last few decades under the CCP rule. In the past, ten out of ten people were impoverished. Nowadays, out of ten people, one might be mega rich, four are better off than before, and five still remain in poverty. This is not surprising. However, the five poor people are still better off than decades ago. Compared to the poor people I met when I was ten years old, China has made tremendous improvements. (BK) BL found the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in Hong Kong ineffective and injurious to the development of Hong Kong. He resented the time-consuming debates in the LegCo before government policies could be approved and the implementation delays when lay people appealed executive decisions in court. In contrast, BL applauded the efficiency of the authoritarian central-planning administration in China. Once the NPCSC decides on a policy, the government can immediately execute the decision. Incumbent Chief Executive Carrie Lam (who took office on July 1, 2017) urged Hongkongers to be “sympathetic” and “more understanding” towards China as it begins to embrace the rule of law (Griffiths & Lu Stout, 2017). BL is not oblivious to the violations of human rights on the mainland, such as the one-child policy. BL, however, had no problem “sympathizing” and “understanding” the necessity of such oppressive policies to the country’s development. BL believed that there is no way around it – “a country’s gotta do what it’s gotta do.” Such compromises are necessary to develop a vast country with the largest population in the world. The second reason blue ribboners believe authoritarianism is the most appropriate form of rule is that democracy is not the right type of governance for a fast-growing China. As BF puts it, “Western-style democracy is only suitable in the West.” BF believes that the Chinese are not ready for democracy because most Chinese are incapable of evaluating the political calibre of candidates. Even Hongkongers have a long way to go before they are ready for “genuine” universal suffrage. He elaborated, In my primary and secondary schools, only the top-ten-ranked students studied hard. Those ranked below the top ten really did not study hard. If we had one-person-one-vote, those ranked below would never vote for the top ten. The truth is less-bright people always outnumber bright people. There are very few elites in the world. I definitely do not support one-­person-onevote in Hong Kong. Many people in China are unable to identify capable leaders. Their preferences are heavily affected by the media. We currently

92  The security appeal’s audience have four potential candidates for the chief executive election. Many people support John Tsang because of favourable press coverage. The positive coverage merely stems from the fact that he is a man, and many women would select a male leader. I believe elections are affected by press coverage, or who has better public relations strategies. I do not think one-person-one-vote is needed. No system is perfect. (BF) BF did not trust that Hongkongers are capable of picking someone who could govern the city well and believed that granting democracy to people who are not ready results in populism. This distrust is shared widely among the elites in Hong Kong, and even C. Y. Leung made a similar argument during the Occupation. Leung said that, if the public could nominate candidates, then “half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than US $1,800 a month [i.e. HK $13,964.2]” would dominate the electoral process (Bradsher & Buckley, 2014). He noted that the screening process is necessary for the SAR government to retain the current business-friendly policies and help candidates to withstand popular pressure to create a welfare state. Blue ribboners agreed that mainland Chinese enjoy a lot more freedom than before. Despite not embarking on a path towards democracy, socialist China has made significant improvements in terms of human rights and freedoms over the last few decades. BL noted that mainland Chinese could freely travel from Beijing to Guangzhou these days – this type of travel freedom was almost unimaginable a few decades ago. BK also pointed out that both Europe and the United States took a couple hundred years to develop into the countries we see today. If one compared the time it took for Europe and the United States to develop, one could see how far socialist China has already made it in just 60 years.

The CCP as oppressive dictator Yellow ribboners, on the other hand, saw the CCP as an oppressive dictator. The negativity towards the CCP did not stem from ignorance about Chinese affairs. YS’s experience suggested that he had a greater sense of patriotism the less he knew about Chinese affairs. I was in Form 3 [i.e. Grade 9] when the Beijing Summer Olympics took place. I did not feel too negatively about mainland China at that time, or maybe I just didn’t read the news as much. I felt a fairly strong sense of belonging towards China. I was elated when Chinese athletes won gold medals. I felt pride seeing magnificent buildings such as the Bird’s Nest. Yet as I read more about the governance of mainland China, about the corruption and cover-ups, the more I find it ugly. Since then I disapprove of everything the CCP does. (YS)

The security appeal’s audience  93 YS was not alone in losing faith in mainland China. The Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong has conducted telephone surveys to examine Hongkongers’ sense of Chinese identity since the return to Chinese sovereignty (Public Opinion Programme, 2017). See Figure 7.2 for the trend over the last 20 years. Figure 7.2 shows that Hongkongers’ sense of Chinese identity peaked in 2008 and dropped since then. The year 2008 was a year of ups and downs. The ups included the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and the launch of the Shenzhou 7 spacecraft. Beijing Summer Olympics made Hongkongers proud of being Chinese. The pro-Chinese sentiment motivated Hongkongers to donate enthusiastically to the Wenchuan earthquake relief fund. The Hong Kong government raised HK $1 billion (~ US$ 128 million) for the earthquake relief fund within a week (“More quake relief,” 2008). However, two scandals that emerged in the latter half of 2008 dampened the pro-­Chinese sentiment. The tainted infant milk powder incident forced thousands of mainlanders to flock to

Aged 18 - 29 (Chinese ID) Aged 30+ (Chinese ID) Aged 18 - 29 (HK ID) Aged 30+ (HKID) 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00%

0.00%

26-27/8/1997 28-29/10/1997 3-4/6/1998 14/8/1998 21/12/1998 15/4/1999 6/8/1999 13-15/12/1999 6-7/4/2000 21-25/9/2000 22/3-2/4/2001 13-21/9/2001 12-13/3/2002 2-5/9/2002 1-4/3/2003 10-14/12/2003 6-9/12/2004 9-14/12/2005 6-12/12/2006 11-14/12/2007 9-12/12/2008 8-11/12/2009 13-16/12/2010 12-20/12/2011 14-17/12/2012 9-12/12/2013 10-16/12/2014 3-7/12/2015 12-15/12/2016

10.00%

Figure 7.2  P  ercentage of Hongkongers identified as “Hongkongers only” and “Chinese only” since 1997. Source: Public Opinion Programme (2017).

94  The security appeal’s audience Hong Kong to stock up on milk powder. The discovery of “tofu-dreg” buildings (a phrase used in mainland China to describe poorly constructed buildings) in the Wenchuan earthquake sites and the embezzlement of relief funds by local government officials also greatly affected Hongkongers’ trust of mainland China. It appeared that, the more Hongkongers learned of the inner workings of China, the more they thought the CCP was hiding social problems and state oppression behind a façade of affluence and glamour. In the end Hongkongers’ reduced their sense of identification as Chinese. The Tiananmen Square incident that took place in 1989 also affected yellow ribboners’ views of the CCP, even though none of the Occupy protesters I interviewed had been born when it happened: The CCP vehemently denied that there was bloodshed. But how could you explain the mothers who lost their sons? Did their sons just disappear? Everyone knew something happened that day. Yet the CCP still vehemently denied that something happened, that there was bloodshed. This is an obvious black-and-white issue, yet the CCP continued to distort facts. It is hard not to think that the CCP is lying to us, that the CCP is innocent… This is the first time I learned that people lie in politics, that a big government could deceive its people just like this. I started noticing mainland affairs after the Tiananmen Square incident. It is hard not to be biased against the Chinese government. I started to diligently monitor news related to the CCP and became super attentive to negative news coverage. They could tell such a big lie for 20 years, what else could they not do? It’s just hard not to be biased. (YC) The June Fourth Incident alerted us that the CCP is a murderous regime. When the regime inflicts violence, the people must fight violence with violence. The people’s use of violence is justified, because we did not start the violence. Once you know that your opponent is a murderous regime, you have no reason to confront it peacefully. (YJ)

Separating Chineseness from the CCP Figure 7.2 shows that those aged 18–29 have always been more critical of their Chinese identity than those aged 30+, yet the disparity between the two groups grew notably wider after 2012. Only 3.1% of the younger group identified themselves as Chinese in the latest survey in 2017. The significant drop in youth’s sense of Chinese identity coincided with the anti-national education protest that took place in 2012. The Hong Kong government blamed this “identity crisis” and rise of localist discourse on a lack of education about Chinese affairs and history. Incumbent Chief Executive Carrie Lam promised to start national education early and to start instilling the idea of “I am

The security appeal’s audience  95 Chinese” in kindergarten children (J. Ng, 2017). Blue ribboners in my interviews also agreed that the education system in Hong Kong failed to educate youth about China. Interviews with yellow ribboners, however, suggested that the disparity in ethnic identity could not be explained by ignorance of Chinese affairs. YY explained the personal struggle with his ethnic identity: I believe this decision is a dilemma. On one hand, 5,000 years of civilization brought about a lot of good traditions and culture, and I do not wish to dissociate myself from these qualities. If Chineseness merely denotes identification with Chinese history and tradition, then I would proudly admit to being Chinese. Yet on the other hand, China has been equated with the CCP in the last 60 years, and Chineseness entails identification with the CCP. Given how “Chineseness” is framed under the existing regime, I definitely do not want to admit to being Chinese. Other than the rich becoming richer, I think everything else has deteriorated in China under CCP rule. (YY) Given yellow ribboners’ negative impression of the CCP, it is not surprising that they wish to dissociate from the CCP. YY remained attached to his Chinese roots, yet this type of patriotism is clearly not enough for the CCP. The CCP does not consider patriotism to be a personal practice; it has set standards of patriotism. Chen Xiankui (2014), a professor at the School of Marxism at Beijing’s Renmin University, argues that, while political parties in the West represent different classes and interest groups, the CCP represents the “fundamental interests” of all Chinese people and nothing else. Hence, “love of party and love of country are essentially equivalent in modern China” – one need not and cannot choose between the two. Those who challenge the CCP are simply unpatriotic and harming the country. Equating country and party is a requirement for Hong Kong’s chief executive. Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the NPC, made it clear that chief executive candidates must love the country, love Hong Kong, and not oppose the CCP (Wan, 2014). The clear indication that loyalty to the CCP is a requisite of patriotism signalled to young people that the Chinese could not love their country in any way they might like. It appears that young people’s refusal to admit to being Chinese is one way to detach themselves from CCP rule.

Democracy: something to earn or something to demand? Interviews with yellow ribboners showed that they believed democracy is an inherent right and worth fighting for. This pool of “mobilization potentials” would be willing to engage once the level of freedom threat reached a certain magnitude, such as the sight of the tear gas (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Blue ribboners, who believe that democracy must be earned with good behaviour and eventually granted by the CCP, would not be motivated to participate despite the level of regime repression.

96  The security appeal’s audience Fragility of the granted freedom Jasper Tsang, long-time Beijing loyalist and founding chairman of the DAB, urged Hongkongers to know their place: We Hongkongers must ask ourselves whether Hong Kong’s contribution to our country outweighs the trouble we cause. If we don’t… at least set Beijing’s mind at ease that the situation in Hong Kong won’t endanger national security, the new generation of state leaders may rethink whether One Country, Two Systems has really brought benefit to the country. (Cheung, Ng, & Lam, 2014) The blue ribboners whom I interviewed understood that the existing liberty and autonomy were granted by the CCP and can be taken away at any point. The CCP does not owe Hong Kong democracy. As BL warned, CCP might “take back” Hong Kong if Hong Kong continues to be difficult and uncooperative. After all, the international promise of One Country, Two Systems was not meant to be eternally and unconditionally valid. As subjects, blue ribboners have abided by the principle of pragmatism and not seen it as their role to fight. If Hongkongers wish to retain existing autonomy and liberty, they must learn to appease the regime and work within the parameters set by China: Hong Kong is not a place for politics. As a Special Administrative Region, the government should prioritize the improvement of people’s living standard. Officials without much political ambition could just focus on improvement of living standard. Those who are more politically ambitious could think more about how pea-sized Hong Kong could contribute to the development of China. Hong Kong needs to let Beijing know that it is capable of handling itself politically and hopes that Beijing does not hold grudges. Hong Kong must let Beijing know that it is not trying to challenge its rule. Calls for the end of CCP rule and the independence of Hong Kong directly challenge CCP rule. In my honest opinion, if you look at the decades of fights in Taiwan, you would understand that China is willing to go to war over sovereignty claims. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea show that China is willing to fight for every inch of land. How could it let Hong Kong become independent? If you continue to make independence claims, you are directly challenging CCP rule. This is just the simple law of action and reaction. The harder you hit something, the harder it bounces back. The whole situation might spiral out of control. In the end, Beijing has already said that mayhem in Hong Kong might affect the mainland by 1%, yet mayhem in Hong Kong would 100% ruin Hong Kong. (BK) During the inauguration of Chief Executive Carrie Lam in 2017, President Xi Jinping explicitly declared, “Hong Kong needs to improve its systems to uphold

The security appeal’s audience  97 national sovereignty, security and development interests” (Lau & Lam, 2017). Beijing’s insistence at vetting chief executive candidates was just another indicator that it is more interested in tightening control over Hong Kong than giving Hongkongers a free choice. Blue ribboners in the interviews understood that the restricted liberty is a sign that Hong Kong has not yet won the trust of the Beijing government and were receptive of “pocketing” the 8.31 framework first. BK believed Hong Kong must earn democracy from China, not fight for it. If CCP fears that Hong Kong might become a “base for subversion,” Hongkongers must work harder to prove the contrary (Zhao, 2014). One must have faith that, as China is progressing every year, it might eventually accord Hong Kong genuine universal suffrage. The preference, since the post-war days, for gradual reforms corresponds to Lam’s (2004) culture of depoliticization. I believe that reform must be a gradual process. To be honest I accept “pocketing it first.” You must take it one step at a time. The first step is to pocket the 8.31 decision. You would then use your actions to show the country that you only want universal suffrage to voice opinions on housing, senior welfare etc. Candidates who want to stand for election are merely trying to help more people… Once the CCP gains confidence in Hong Kong, perhaps it will lower the chief executive entry requirements. Perhaps 20 years later, we can really choose our own chief executive. (BK)

Democracy as a right A mainland student studying in Hong Kong published an open letter in support of the Umbrella Movement (Yu, 2014). The mainlander wrote: I cannot hide my jealousy of you for having the opportunity to fight. In my twenties, I am one example of so many who are going to be the hard core of our society – again, we never knew there [was] such an option. (emphasis added) CCP supporters and those who received state-run education in mainland China might genuinely not perceive fighting back as an option. Leaders of the Umbrella Movement noted that the biggest legacy of the Umbrella Movement is the “political awakening” of a new generation (Iyengar, 2015; Philips, 2014). Claudia Mo, pro-democracy lawmaker, remarked that “The young have come to the realization that we have to stand up and safeguard our freedoms. Freedoms don’t just come to you out of the blue” (Philips, 2014). Young people who perceived a right to universal suffrage shrugged off political apathy and protested on the streets to voice their wishes. Article 45 of the Basic Law promises universal suffrage in accordance with democratic procedures – Beijing owes this to the people of Hong Kong. “Wenshei wei fasheng,” the Cantonese version of “Do you hear

98  The security appeal’s audience the people sing,” became one of the protest anthems of the Umbrella Movement. The lyrics expressed the political awakening of the protesters Who has still not spoken out? If I don’t protect my city, then who will? We are born with the rights to take charge, and we have the will to do so. We refuse to give in and remain silent … For the future of Hong Kong, we must open our eyes to what is going on around us. According to reactance theory, one must feel entitled to behavioural freedom before sensing the freedom threat. Political awakening, according to reactance theory, means becoming aware that certain freedoms exist and being motivated to restore them if the freedoms are infringed upon. YF shared the story of his political awakening – becoming aware that he is entitled to freely choose for himself and not merely to act as a dutiful subject. Mao’s policy of “up to the mountains and down to the villages” during the Cultural Revolution forced educated urban youth to the rural countryside to do hard labour. President Xi Jinping was sent to a poor village in Shaanxi in his teens. YF also was one of the sent-down urban youth. I had to drop out after finishing middle school because I come from one of the “bad families.” My family was in business, and businessmen were considered bad bourgeois elements. Offspring of businessmen could not go to school. Because of this reason, many urban youth were forced to leave school despite getting good grades. I was also forced out of school and sent to rural farms. I originally had an urban hukou (household registration), but because the government had to alleviate urban unemployment, all urban youth were sent down to rural villages. While working in the village, I started thinking for myself and could not convince myself to farm here for the rest of my life. This is not what I want. It would be a different story if I really wanted to be a farmer. The more I thought about it, the more I thought, this is not the way to go. I decided to escape to Hong Kong. I walked for three days to the shore of present-day Futian and swam for six hours to get to Hong Kong. My only purpose was to escape from CCP rule. I wanted to seek a new lease on life. I believed life would be good in Hong Kong. Hong Kong would be a place of opportunities and no talent would go unrecognized. (YF) YF defied the orders of the CCP because he believed he should be free to decide what he wanted to do in life. YF risked his life and fled mainland China to restore his freedom. A similar revelation of entitlement prompted YS to get involved in activism. He recalled that he began as a sociology student wanting to learn about major social events that were taking place. He did not know much

The security appeal’s audience  99 about politics at that time. One major event that happened was the forced relocation of about 500 Choi Yuen villagers, as the village had to be dismantled to make way for the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong express railway. YS recalled his first day in the village: I started chatting with the villagers when I got there and noticed a house near the village entrance. When I was about to leave, I saw that a bulldozer had already torn down the house. I was shocked. Don’t we live in a city governed by the rule of law? Are we not entitled to negotiations and concessions before a plan gets carried out? I couldn’t believe something could be forcefully demolished in Hong Kong. Seeing the house being torn down in front of me was shocking. Everything the villager owned was still in the house, yet everything was gone all of a sudden. I was struck. (YS) YS was shocked because he believed that, in a civilized society such as Hong Kong, everyone had a right to be heard, to express hopes and frustrations, and to receive fair treatment. The demolition of the house was an immense freedom threat to YS. After such a moral shock, YS became an avid activist and participated in almost all major social movements. Blue ribboners had no problem “pocketing” the pre-screened elections because they did not feel entitled to genuine universal suffrage. They saw it as something that must be earned and not demanded. Yellow ribboners, on the other hand, saw themselves as citizens with rights and duties. YJ saw political participation such as voting as both a right and a duty, as citizens are entitled and duty-bound to voice their opinions about the development of the city. ­Yellow ribboners believed in equality with the state and saw the government more as “civil servants” rather than high-up “officials.” Civil servants should answer downwards to the people they serve. YS saw communication between the government and its people as necessary for the city’s development, as “officials” are frequently out of touch with the people. Consensus decision-making is needed for the sustainable development of Hong Kong. College students are more likely to care about social development. They would look around and think of ways to make society a better place to live in. Once you start thinking about efforts that could really impact people’s lives, you inevitably have to deal with government bureaucracy. Government decisions are what impacts society the most. Yet, officials are frequently out of touch with the people and decide on policies based on numeric data. All officials in Hong Kong, regardless of department, seem not to know what life is like in the community. They only look at numbers. Their decisions might not even benefit the local communities. They only think in macro terms and make policy decisions that would benefit the economy as a whole. (YS)

100  The security appeal’s audience Democracy as something to fight for Joshua Wong (2015), student activist leader, repeatedly urged Hongkongers to fight for the “right to determine Hong Kong’s future.” Those who bear a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong believe they have a stake in the development of the city and are entitled to a voice in the future development of Hong Kong. YS explained the motive behind his activism: I have a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong. If it weren’t for that, I would not be organizing social movements to fight hard for changes in Hong Kong… Because I don’t think the northeastern New Territories should develop this way,5 I think my efforts are worthwhile despite how drastic and crazy the protests become. (YS) Yellow ribboners believe that unscreened democratic elections are the only way to ensure citizens are heard and prepared to fight for them. They do not believe that democracy is granted: Democracy must be demanded and fought for. YS explained: A more democratic system is the only way to force the government to implement changes. There is no system in China to either allow the people to voice their opinions or enable the government to respond to people’s opinions. The lack of democracy naturally gives rise to protests, as people have used up all channels of communication and the government still turns a deaf ear to the people. The government has little incentive to change, as it reaps all the benefits of the autocratic system. (YS) Protesters I interviewed understood that civil disobedience would bring about repercussions, both legal and political. Yet, repercussions did not deter protesters. YY and YS mentioned that, out of respect for the rule of law, they are prepared to face criminal charges. The sight of tear gas gave me hope. People are finally doing something, how could I not join them? I made up my mind to go for it despite the consequences. The sight of the teargas just made me think that I ought to go help. I was not thinking too much. I actually think the whole society should think like this. (YC) The use of civil disobedience is to arouse awareness in society. I don’t think civil disobedience could erode the rule of law, as protesters would eventually be prosecuted and sentenced. (YY)

The security appeal’s audience  101 Despite the momentum and scale of the 79-day movement, protesters achieved no tangible results. The main demand of the protesters – genuine universal ­suffrage  – was disregarded by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments. C. Y. ­L eung did not resign.6 Disappointed protesters began to shift their support to more radical advocates. YJ believed that more radical forms of protests to fight for and defend Hongkongers’ values were justified because the government had turned a deaf ear to peaceful protests: I don’t think you’ve heard of calls for the independence of Hong Kong before the Umbrella Movement. During the Movement, people still believed in peaceful protests, that Occupying Central with Love and Peace could get us the so-called “genuine” universal suffrage. That’s why people sat in the streets for so long, being delusional that the government would give us genuine universal suffrage… The failure to gain any concessions made people lose faith in peaceful forms of protest. Even for me, I find myself slowly losing faith in One Country, Two Systems after the Umbrella Movement. Then there comes the Fishball Revolution. (YJ) The government’s intransigence gave rise to radical localism. Some protesters’ demands escalated from merely hoping the SAR administration would be more responsive to popular grievances to outright rejection of the Beijing government. They also begin to advocate for the use of higher levels of force or public disruption, as seen in the Fishball Revolution in early 2016. The major difference I observed between green ribboners and yellow ribboners is their view of democracy as a right. GS saw democracy as a desire, not a right. He applauded the protesters’ courage and commitment to the democratic development of Hong Kong. He also relished the liberty one enjoys in Hong Kong, which allows protesters to voice their concerns. He believed, however, that democracy was not something Hongkongers could or should fight for: No matter how hard one fights, Hong Kong will not gain democracy. GS opposed to radical forms of protest because he believed fighting the CCP would bring about consequences. Radicalism would make the CCP tighten its rule and accelerate the deterioration of One Country, Two Systems to “One Country, One System.” Mainland China would never grant Hong Kong full autonomy. Even though every Hongkonger, including myself, wants autonomy, this could never be attained. I am worried that mainland China would slowly take control over Hong Kong. I worry that CCP would eventually appoint a for-show chief executive to govern Hong Kong. The for-show chief executive would clearly be controlled by the CCP and could never make any independent decisions. Under such circumstances, you’d only have two options. You could either become a nucai (Chinese slave) and accept CCP rule, or you could just flee from the regime, like what I did. (GS)

102  The security appeal’s audience

Mainlandization: welcomed integration or coerced conversion? Mainlandization is the process of assimilating Hong Kong into the mainland. Blue ribboners, identifying themselves as Chinese and supportive of the CCP, see closer ties with the mainland as a positive change to Hong Kong and welcome the integration. Yellow ribboners, on the other hand, see mainlandization as something they need to resist. They feared that the CCP would gradually erase the culture and core values of Hong Kong and convert it into merely another municipality in south China.

Welcomed integration Hong Kong’s economic growth in the latter half of the 20th century was one of the outstanding success stories in East Asia, earning it a place as one of the “four little dragons.” The open economy of Hong Kong, however, made it particularly vulnerable in the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global recession in the early 2000s, and closer economic integration with the mainland was necessary for recovery. The Mainland-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) signed in 2003, a free trade agreement that covers trade in goods and services and the relaxing of travel restrictions for mainlanders, enabled Hong Kong to recover strongly from the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and economic downturn. Since then, Hong Kong has become increasingly reliant on the fast-growing mainland economy to sustain its economic growth, benefiting from policies such as the offshore renminbi market business and stock connections with Shenzhen and Shanghai. BA explained that welcoming integration is the most logical and self-beneficial choice Hongkongers have because the return to Chinese sovereignty is an irreversible process. Hong Kong enjoys many built-in advantages as a Special Administrative Region. The CCP has offered Hong Kong many preferential policies. Hongkongers should take advantage of this privilege to achieve greater economic development and maintain its competitiveness. Hong Kong is already a part of China. No other country in the world would feel obligated to back Hong Kong when it encounters difficulties. (BA) BA also noted that, while the function of democracy remains unknown, one could more easily visualize the benefits of acquiescence. As BA noted: As a special administrative region of China, Hong Kong enjoys preferential treatment. The development of Hong Kong is dictated by macro-­ environmental factors, and having a new leader will not change this fact. Hong Kong will not have better progress just because its leader is democratically elected, nor will Hong Kong deteriorate because its leader is appointed. (BA)

The security appeal’s audience  103 Hongkongers unable to seize opportunities Hong Kong’s economic boom in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from the successful transition from manufacturing (secondary sector) to the provision of financial and commercial services (tertiary sector). BL has always been successful in seizing opportunities, owning businesses in manufacturing and stock brokerage. BL sees himself and Hong Kong as having grown up together and feels disheartened by the current developments with Hong Kong, calling Hong Kong the “prodigal son” [bai ga jai] of China. BL believes that the economy is settling into stagnation. The façade of economic prosperity is only held up with support from the mainland. He explained, that despite being offered many preferential policies, Hongkongers were unable to seize the opportunities. The Kwai Tsing Container Terminal in Hong Kong was once the world’s busiest container port, yet in recent years it has been outperformed by ports in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Hong Kong is not only trailing behind other Southeast Asian countries in fields like finance and electronic manufacturing; it also trails behind other Chinese cities. BL noted that mainlanders are more willing to learn and improve, whereas Hongkongers are not evolving with time and have grown complacent. Talent and capital flows that support the development of Hong Kong are all from the mainland. BL worried that Hong Kong’s increasing reliance on China’s favourable policies will lead to economic stagnation and eventual loss of competitiveness. BF also noted that Hongkongers are being marginalized because they could not keep pace with development. Mainlandization presented Hong Kong with new opportunities, yet only those who can adapt will survive in a world dictated by the survival of the fittest: These youth have all along believed in the superiority of Hongkongers. They have never had a real job, never really seen society, and never met people outside their circles. They have all along believed in the superiority of Hongkongers and the inferiority of mainlanders. They still hold on to this wrong concept. This is why the Umbrella Movement happened. Hong Kong youth is frustrated with society. They also have much less upward mobility compared to our times… You hear mostly Putonghua (i.e. Mandarin) when you walk into any university campus. Why are so many mainland students enrolled in local universities? It’s not that schools are trying to hold local students back. Local students are just not cherishing the opportunity to go to university, enabling many top-notch students from mainland China to enroll. If you walk into any Class A office building in Central, you hear mostly Putonghua in lift lobbies. Twenty years ago you only heard English and Cantonese. Now there are more Putonghua-­ speakers than there are English. Hongkongers are being marginalized. (BF)

Losing Hong Kong’s DNA Yellow ribboners expressed concern that the assimilation process with China wiped out core values and cultural elements that make Hong Kong “Hong Kong.”

104  The security appeal’s audience GS expressed fear that assimilation with China would erode cherished values such as freedom of speech, rule of law, and a high degree of autonomy: The CCP does not hesitate in its exercise of hegemonic power. All types of dissidence would be eliminated if the CCP takes over Hong Kong in the future. Hongkongers would no longer be able to criticize the government in any form. Verbal criticisms would be forbidden, let alone behavioural forms of protest. Do you think Hongkongers could accept that? Hongkongers have all along lived in a society where freedom of speech is guaranteed. Hongkongers have always been able to criticize or even reprimand the government on radio shows or other media outlets. We would no longer have this opportunity when CCP takes over Hong Kong. Hongkongers could only become submissive subjects and adopt the nucai (i.e. Chinese slave) mentality. I have worked on the mainland for 20 years and learned to accommodate to unfair treatments. Even when the regulatory agencies are not doing their job, I could not criticize them. In everyday life, I had to be careful not to provoke the gongan (i.e. Chinese police) and people from the sub-district office. CCP does not allow discordance, let alone criticisms. (GS) I came back to Hong Kong once a week when I worked in mainland China. I only felt safe when I crossed the border in Lo Wu and got back to Hong Kong. I feel much more protected coming back from “rule of man” to “rule of law.” China’s rule of man means that you could be found guilty for saying something wrong. I have lived in societies governed by rule of man and rule of law and definitely noticed the importance of rule of law. I felt insecure in mainland China because I could not predict when and how I might get into trouble. The rule of law meant that I would not get into trouble as long as I did not break a written law. Rule of law really safeguards our rights and freedoms. (GS) Johnny, a young man born in the year of the handover, explained how local elements are being replaced as Hong Kong becomes mainlandized (“Huigui 20 nian,” 2017). His hometown Tuen Mun became a popular shopping spot for mainland tourists in the last decade. He recalled that stationery shops, traditional restaurants, and newsstands were everywhere in his childhood days. In the last decade, however, more and more pharmacies and gold jewellery stores have replaced old shops, selling infant milk powder, herbal oil, diapers, and medical ointments. The increase in demand by mainland tourists also jacked up the prices of groceries in Tuen Mun. He complained that the mainland tourists are not visiting to learn about the culture and history of Hong Kong and are only here to shop for cheap and safe groceries. He believed that mainland tourists are

The security appeal’s audience  105 not only scrounging local resources, but their visits have also changed the local landscape to better suit their needs. YC observed that the Beijing and Hong Kong governments were trying to eliminate the uniqueness of Hong Kong and convert Hong Kong into “just another city in China.” He saw that Hongkongers are responsible for preserving “Hongkongness”: I think it is important to keep the “Hongkongness” of Hong Kong. You really need to think about how to preserve Cantonese. I hear more Putonghua than Cantonese when I walk down the streets. I think the language, culture, and other local characteristics need to be preserved. Most importantly, I think something must be done to give Hongkongers a sense of belonging. The thing Hongkongers would hate to see the most is Hong Kong becoming just another city in China, being no different from other Chinese cities. Other Chinese cities might not have developed a unique sense yet, but this is not the case for Hong Kong. The original Hong Kong has a lot of unique characteristics, yet I saw the uniqueness and many other things slowly worn away as I grew up. I just want to preserve the Hongkongness of Hong Kong, the value of Hong Kong. (YC) YJ expressed fear that the mandatory moral and national education would force students to unlearn critical thinking and learn uncritical acquiescence. The policy is an indicator that the Beijing and Hong Kong governments are trying to convert Hongkongers into Chinese. Mainlandization is thus a threat that Hongkongers must all resist: We have always followed One Country, Two Systems. Education in Hong Kong is a Hong Kong affair, and education on the mainland is a mainland affair. What is the need for moral and national education then? This is like brainwashing Hong Kong students to buy into their ethnic Chinese identity and CCP values. (YJ)

What, then, is the threat to Hong Kong? Both yellow and blue ribboners expressed dissatisfaction with the social and political developments of Hong Kong. The difference lies in whom they blamed for impeding the development. Blue ribboners believed the pro-democracy camp and Umbrella Movement protesters were impeding the development of Hong Kong. The threats to the development of Hong Kong were local – that is, fellow Hongkongers were to blame. As BL lamented, “Hongkongers sent Hong Kong to its doom.” On the other hand, yellow ribboners blamed the Hong Kong and Beijing governments for eroding the core values of Hong Kong. They considered the regime a threat to Hong Kong and thus resisted mainlandization.

106  The security appeal’s audience Dissidents as the threat Blue ribboners simply did not trust that protesters were genuinely trying to do Hong Kong good. Some blue ribboners were hostile towards the pro-­democracy camp long before the Umbrella Movement. BK believed the pro-democracy lawmakers merely oppose and wreak havoc – their sole purpose is to engage in oppositional politics. BK also noted that Hong Kong has the financial resources to do a lot, such as providing medical services, education, and elder care. But the government could not do anything because its hands were tied due to the uncooperativeness of pro-democracy lawmakers. BK mentioned numerous times that the language used by the pro-democracy camp was dogmatic and belligerent. Even if the government had intended to make peace, it would be deterred by the hostility. BA explained that even politically apathetic Hongkongers opposed the Umbrella Movement because the rationale for opposition was not so much about political affinity – it was more about cost-benefit analysis. To them, the choice was between concrete harm and an abstract concept. BA noted: No one could be certain what democracy means. Because there is no clear line to define what behaviour is democratic and what is not, people cannot be sure which side to take. However, they clearly saw that the behaviour of democracy supporters is harming public interest, at least in the short term. This makes people hesitant to support democracy, regardless of how righteous your cause is. People are more inclined to oppose the Occupation because of the tremendous harm it inflicts in the short run. (BA) Because of the animosity towards the pro-democracy camp and/or aversion to political radicalism, blue ribboners were more receptive to the security appeal initiated by the government. Interviews with blue ribboners showed that their viewpoints resonated with the government’s discourse. Blue ribboners saw Umbrella Movement protesters as a threat bringing on a range of negative consequences to Hong Kong. BL agreed that the Occupation took a toll on the economy, especially retail business. He also thought the media unfairly portrayed an undemocratic government bullying young people, and this portrayal worsened the foreign image of Hong Kong. BF expressed a similar concern that the Occupation had a negative impact on people’s everyday lives and the economy and foreign image of Hong Kong. BL also blamed pro-democracy activists for the polarized political climate and feared that it would take a long time for the scars to fade and Hongkongers to unite again. Blue ribboners did not see the CCP as a threat to Hong Kong. All blue ribboners I have interviewed identified with their ethnic identity and saw the CCP as a justified authoritarian ruler. To them, the biggest threat to Hong Kong would be severing its relationship with the Beijing government. BA explained: Occupy opponents do not want Beijing to hate Hong Kong. The CPG could get upset when what it reads in the news every day is Occupation

The security appeal’s audience  107 and opposition to the CCP. The CPG might have wanted to mete out development opportunities and preferential policies, yet it could easily withhold the policies if it gets upset. Mainland immigrants who came to Hong Kong came to seek better business opportunities and want Hong Kong to continue receiving special treatments. They certainly want the Occupation to end as soon as possible and Hong Kong to return to what it was before. They do not care who leads Hong Kong; they only want Hong Kong to look good, even if it just looks good on the outside. Growth in GDP directly benefits them; democratic development does not. Higher growth in GDP brings in more business opportunities. On the other hand, more problems will arise if Hong Kong remains chaotic. Many immigrants think that Hong Kong already receives a lot of special care – why are they still protesting? The more Hongkongers oppose, the more Beijing tightens its control. The CCP might eventually consider Hong Kong as the thorn in its side. (BA) President Xi Jinping explicitly warned that “making everything political or deliberately creating differences and provoking confrontation will not resolve the problems, on the contrary, it can only severely hinder Hong Kong’s economic and social development” (Lau & Lam, 2017). A report released by the Guangzhou-­ based research firm Trigger Trend stated that Hong Kong’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 15.6% of China’s national total in 1997 (Shi, Wang, & Yu, 2014). In 2013, the city’s share shrank to 2.9%. Major municipalities in China have been growing at over 7% per year, yet Hong Kong’s annual GDP growth has remained around 2%. The report extrapolated that Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and other major cities would likely outrun Hong Kong in terms of GDP by 2017. In other words, in less than a decade, Hong Kong might be downgraded to a “second-­t ier city” in China. BF, who has worked in Shenzhen for almost 30 years, praised the incredible capacity of the CCP administration to transform the cities it desires into financial capitals, and BF worried that Hong Kong’s fight for democracy would further harm the territory’s economic competitiveness: Nowadays Shenzhen is likely cleaner than Hong Kong, and the quality of its people is comparable with Hongkongers as well. Even though Shenzhen had a much later start, the development of Shenzhen caught up and surpassed that of Hong Kong. The GDP of Shenzhen already outperformed that of Hong Kong. If you look at the development of the Shenzhen  High-Tech Industrial Development Zone and Qianhai, you can understand that Hong Kong will soon be marginalized. (BF)

Regime as threat Yellow ribboners regard the CCP and the CCP-appeasing Hong Kong government as “the source of the problem” (YY). Interestingly, while blue ribboners

108  The security appeal’s audience were concerned with hampered economic development and financial losses, yellow ribboners did not express these concerns. They were, however, concerned about freedoms and rights, such as the right to elections and freedom of speech. Yellow ribboners expressed how the CCP-appeasing Hong Kong government is eroding core values of Hong Kong, such as the rule of law. YY thought the slow progress investigating former Chief Executives Donald Tsang’s7 and C. Y. ­L eung’s8 conflict-of-interest cases showed inequality before the law. The reluctance to prosecute an incumbent chief executive suggested that the chief executive is above the law. YJ thought that the government “took the lead in eroding the rule of law” when the Electoral Affairs Commission barred localist candidates such as Edward Leung from the LegCo election in 2016. YJ noted that the right to stand for elections was guaranteed by the Basic Law and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and YJ ­believed that the government had no legal grounds for the political screening.

Police as hero or villain? Predictable patterns emerged in survey and interview results: Blue ribboners had a positive evaluation of the police, and the yellow ribboners had a negative impression. Blue ribbon interviewees commended the work of the police: They found the police to be professional, gentle, and restrained. BL had a mediocre impression of the police before the Umbrella Movement but changed his mind after seeing the police’s fair and encompassing treatment of both civilians and protesters. Yellow ribbon interviewees found the police corrupt, brutal, and vengeful. They claimed that police enforcement was arbitrary and believed the police would really hurt them. Interviewees’ views of the police correspond with what they identify as the threat. Blue ribboners see the dissidents as the threat to Hong Kong and the police as a state apparatus to handle the threat. Yellow ribboners saw the Hong Kong and Beijing governments’ policies as a threat to Hong Kong and the police as a state apparatus to restrain their freedom. Blue ribboners support the police in restoring social order, i.e. evict the protesters. BF attended a protest to express outrage at the two-year prison sentence handed down to the seven police officers who were caught on camera assaulting an Occupy protester. BF complained that organizers of the Umbrella Movement, the true culprits of the social unrest, were left unpunished.9 He found the police assault righteous because they were merely helping society punish the protesters. BF believed he would have done the same had he been present, as the protesters’ behaviour could not be condoned. BF applauded the police for exercising maximum restraint throughout the protest and for only fighting back after being provoked to a boiling point. Yellow ribboners interpreted police suppression as the government’s refusal to communicate. YC was angry and could not understand why the government would suppress peaceful protests and restrain protesters with disproportionate violence. He noted that the protesters merely wanted to make a case for change, using “love” and “peace.” Yet the government just slammed the door in their faces. YJ recalled that she was scared when she saw the tear gas – not of the

The security appeal’s audience  109 tear gas per se, but of the government. Tear gas only inflicted temporary physical pain, yet the scar from no longer trusting the government is longer-lasting. YJ believed that if the government could use disproportionate violence to suppress peaceful, albeit law-breaking, protesters, there would be no constraint on what the government might do next.

Triad as friend or foe? Results from the survey suggested that Occupy opponents had a more negative perception of triads than did supporters. Interview results suggested that blue ribboners might not be disapproving of triads per se, they were merely reacting strongly against the accusation of police-triad collusion. BF and BK did not believe that triads were mobilized by the government to suppress the movement. BF said, “This accusation (triad-police collusion) is preposterous. Triads would not be involved in the Occupation, nor would they be involved in anti-Occupy actions. The Hong Kong government would not go so low as to rely on triads.” BK similarly noted that he did not believe the government officials, of such high calibre, would stoop so low as to support triad behaviour. The yellow ribbon camp’s impression was less negative, even though all yellow ribboners believed that triads were recruited by the Hong Kong government. YC explained that he did not feel particular antipathy towards triads because he did not see a difference between triads and police. Both are merely forms of the state apparatus deployed to evict them: I think the triad is a business organization; they are only trying to make money. Just that it is an extralegal organization that sells manpower. I really do not think they are much different. Who hired and paid triads to evict protesters? Those in power. Who ordered the police to evict protesters? Those in power. Did the same group of people order them? I don’t know. But I really do not see a difference between triads and police in this regard. (YC) YJ was also more frustrated at those who hired triads to attack protesters than she was of triads. “You [the Hong Kong government] could not evict the crowd using legitimate force so you asked for help from the triads. This is disgusting” (YJ). The use of triads merely fuelled protester anger against the government, further confirming their view that the government was slamming the door in their faces. YY and YS were primarily stationed in the Mong Kok site and had a much more positive impression of triads. They noted incidents where they received help and support from triad members. I am not too against triad societies. There have been incidents where triad members helped and supported us… They are an intriguing group. They might now know exactly what you are doing. Mong Kok is a complicated place. I met a few “team-leaders” who had several juniors (leng jai) following them. These triad members are against the government simply because

110  The security appeal’s audience they think the government is not doing its job. After all, they are from the working class as well and are not particularly well-off. They simply think the government is not doing enough to improve people’s standard of living. Sometimes these triad team-leaders would send their juniors to help us. Other times they would tell us that since we are not used to police attack and violence, we should quickly run away in case of confrontations and let them face the police. They said that as they have frequently been arrested and also fought back at police before, they are in a much better position to stay behind and take the fall. I am not really against triads – the ones I have encountered are not all that bad. Triads are also politically divided into pro-establishment and anti-establishment camps. The pro-establishment triad bosses are just trying to make money; they are not much different from pro-establishment political elites. (YS)

Conclusion Support or defiance of the government has been an informed decision made by the interviewees – no signs of brainwashing, ignorance, or suggestibility. The present chapter has attempted to answer the question “why would one support/ defy the government’s securitizing claims?” A simple answer I am offering is because it makes sense to do so. I argue that blue ribboners and yellow ribboners have opposing worldviews that stem from how they see the relationship between the people and government. Blue ribboners see Hongkongers as subjects of an authoritarian regime, whereas yellow ribboners see Hongkongers as citizens who are entitled to have a voice. Viewing oneself as citizen or subject encompasses fundamentally different modes of reasoning and would explain why subjects and citizens reach opposite conclusions on the same issue. This political divide existed long before the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. One might have hoped that the peaceful protest that has been lauded by the international media would have brought the people together. The reverse happened, unfortunately, and the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement drove “subjects” and “citizens” further apart. The blue ribboners I interviewed are generally successful baby boomers. Hong Kong has remained generally chaos-free since the 1967 riots, and a stable environment has enabled baby boomers to work hard and improve their living standard. Many of them lived by the Lion Rock spirit and believed this is what a good Hongkonger should do (see Chapter 5). They see the CCP as legitimately authoritarian because it delivers. Blue ribboners I interviewed, with their extensive mainland experience and contacts, are not oblivious to the negative aspects of life and the inner workings on the mainland. In the grand scheme, however, political control of its people, reduced freedom, and corruption are but a small price to pay. Blue ribboners also understand that the prosperity of Hong Kong is mainland-engineered. With immense help from mainland China, Hong Kong slowly recovered from a six-year economic slump in the wake of the

The security appeal’s audience  111 Asian financial crisis, and no one wants to live that nightmare again. Blue ribboners perhaps would ask, “Why couldn’t people respect the limits and persevere like the old times? Why can’t people cherish what we already have and not risk losing everything generations worked hard for?” Blue ribboners see those who disrupt social, economic, and political stability as threats. Since the post-war days, Hongkongers have felt uneasy about direct confrontations with the government (see Chapter 5). Although large social movements in the recent decade have shown that Hongkongers increasingly accept political activism, radicalism, especially when it involves unlawful and disruptive confrontations, is still rejected by the mainstream. The government’s securitizing appeal, examined in Chapter 6, resonated with Hongkongers’ cultural and historical uneasiness with political activism and so facilitated audience acceptance. Yellow ribboners just could not respect the limit, at least not yet. It is not as though YC did not try to understand the pro-establishment perspective – he just thoroughly could not understand the regime. He raised many questions: Why is the party called the “Communist” Party when it has moved away from communist rule for decades? Why is there a “corruption crackdown” every few years when a new political leader takes office? Why is being disrespectful towards the government a reason for political persecution? If yellow ribboners were politically apathetic subjects, they could perhaps disregard these political conundrums. They see themselves, however, as citizens with rights and duties. They see Hong Kong as slowly losing its character and core values since the return to China and believe they have a voice and responsibility in the future of the city they call home. Yellow ribboners I have interviewed saw the CCP as an oppressive dictatorship that has no regard for its people. They used adjectives such as “murderous,” “ugly,” “deceitful,” and “compulsively controlling” to describe the CCP regime, and they wish to remain detached from CCP control. Yellow ribboners blame the CCP regime and the CCP-backed Hong Kong government for the decline of Hong Kong. They believe that democracy must be demanded and fought for because an oppressive dictator would never grant Hong Kong autonomy. The Umbrella Movement is an attempt to claim their right. Wæver (1995) noted that a securitizing attempt is a way to up the ante – the poker player can either win bigger or lose bigger. Interviews from this chapter suggest that a poker game is perhaps not the best analogy for political struggles. Political struggles are not zero-sum games – the winner does not take it all. The government raised the ante and initiated securitizing moves, and a substantial portion of Hongkongers accepted that the Umbrella Movement and dissident camp were a threat. Concomitant with this successful securitization, however, is a society so politically divided it seems beyond repair.

Notes 1 Salter’s (2011) fourth requirement regarding the accordance of emergency powers to the securitizing actors does not apply in the present situation because the Hong Kong government did not need approval of new powers to suppress the protests.

112  The security appeal’s audience 2 Chief Secretary for Administration Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s second-in-command, hinted that the proposed election system was not set in stone. She noted that the Basic Law principles promised the reform would be a “gradual and orderly process.” It “should be possible to further amend the electoral arrangements in the future” (C.  Lam, 2014). Many Hongkongers interpreted this utterance as asking them to “pocket it first.” 3 These two statements about democracy attitudes are adapted from Jackson, Huq, Bradford, and Tyler (2013). 4 These seven statements about police attitudes are adapted from the police procedural justice scale in Jackson et al. (2013). 5 The Northeast New Territories Development Plan is a controversial proposal put forth by the government to address long-term housing demands. The plan involves demolishing a number of traditional villages and farmland in the area. Protesters stormed the LegCo in 2014 to oppose the financial budget voting of the plan, and 13 protesters were sentenced to 8–13 months imprisonment by the Court of Appeal in August 2017. The protesters won the appeal against their sentences and were released in September 2018. 6 C. Y. Leung announced in December 2016 that he would not seek a second term in office to protect his family from “unbearable pressure” (Cheung & Ng, 2016). He is the first Chief Executive not to seek a second term. He was elected as vice-chairman of the CPCCC a few months later. 7 Donald Tsang was charged with three counts of corruption-related offences for his failure to disclose plans to lease a luxury flat in China while in office. The investigation conducted by the ICAC took 3.5 years. 8 C. Y. Leung received a total of HK$ 50 million from UGL Limited in 2012 and 2013 in relation to a takeover. There were concerns of potential conflicts of interest as these payments concurred with Leung’s term as chief executive (2012–2017) and Leung did not declare the income to the Executive Council. After four years of investigation by the ICAC, the Department of Justice concluded in December 2018 that there was insufficient evidence to institute a prosecution against Leung. 9 Student leaders Joshua Wong, Nathan Law, and Alex Chow were sentenced to 6–8 months in prison in 2017 for unlawful public assembly. Their prison sentences were overturned in the Court of Final Appeal in 2018. The three Occupy founders and six other prominent figures of the Umbrella Movement (including student leaders and pro-democratic lawmakers) were found guilty of charges related to public nuisance in April 2019. Tai and Chan were sentenced to 16 months in prison.

8 Patriotocracy Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong

Lui and Fong (2018b, p. 341) observed that the Umbrella Movement is “both a continuity and discounity in Hong Kong’s political development.” The Movement is a continuation of the efforts of the pro-democracy camp to defy Beijing’s political control and fight for democratization. The Movement has also resulted in a discontinuity in the policy of intervention and signals the beginning of Beijing’s securitization of political dissent. The Umbrella Movement completely changed the political landscape of Hong Kong, and this concluding chapter explores the consequences of defying Beijing’s political control and audience ­acceptance of securitization.

Defiance of political control: increased opportunity cost of dissidence Successful securitization of the Umbrella Movement means rejecting ­defiance – the Hong Kong and Beijing governments have won this battle. The Hong Kong government ended the massive sit-ins, arrested and prosecuted key leaders, and offered protesters no concessions. The pro-democratic camp, in contrast, suffered heavy setbacks in the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement. The outbreak of the Umbrella Movement was an attempt of those who believe they have a right to a genuine choice in the chief executive election to restore an infringed freedom, as predicted by the reactance theory. Reactance theory posits that a threat to a cherished freedom arouses reactance, and two major elements determine the magnitude of reactance: Freedom and threat (i.e. forces against the exercise of freedom) (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). If the freedom is of low importance, only a slight reactance is aroused no matter how strong the threat. Alternatively, the threat could be so strong that individuals give up on restoring a freedom of high importance. One can lower reactance arousal by lowering the importance of the freedom or increasing the amount of restrictive force. Since the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement, the Hong Kong government has increased the force demanding compliance from dissidents who refuse to compromise. As of the writing of this chapter, the government has launched legal actions to disqualify six anti-establishment lawmakers for improper oath-­taking.

114 Patriotocracy It has prosecuted and subsequently appealed what it decided were light sentences of 13 protesters who oppposed the northeastern New Territories plan and three student leaders of the Umbrella Movement. It prosecuted prominent pro-­independent activist Edward Leung for his part in the Mong Kok riot (the “Fishball Revolution”) and nine outspoken figures (including the three OCLP founders) of the Umbrella Movement. These government actions have increased the opportunity costs of protesting, costs that include lawsuits, imprisonment, a halt in political careers, and bankruptcy.

Oath-taking saga The act of oath-taking by Sixtus Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-ching, members of the localist party Youngspiration,1 prompted the NPCSC’s fifth interpretation of the Basic Law since the 1997 handover. The interpretation stated that oath-takers “must accurately, completely and solemnly” read out the oath (“Full text: Interpretation of Article 104,” 2016). As a result of the disqualification, Leung and Wai-ching are now on the verge of bankruptcy. The duo face a legal bill of HK $12 million and LegCo repayment bill of HK $1.86 million (Chung, 2017). The other four disqualified lawmakers similarly face hefty bills as a result of government-initiated lawsuits.

Prosecution of protesters The Court of Appeal laid down much stricter sentencing guidelines for unlawful assembly than the three Umbrella Movement student leaders originally received. It asked courts to consider immediate custodial sentences in subsequent cases of large-scale unlawful assembly involving violence to emphasize deterrence and punishment and give little or no weight to the motive of civil disobedience as a mitigating factor. The court also warned that, “if the sentences imposed by this court do not suffice to deter similar offences, the court may need to resort to sentences of even greater deterrent effect to uphold the dignity of the rule of law” (Secretary for Justice v. Wong Chi Fung, Law Kwun Chung, & Chow Yong Kang Alex, 2016). This judgment sent a strong message to would-be protesters that any violent or unlawful protests would be punished heavily. The strict sentencing guideline was subsequently upheld in the Court of Final Appeal. It is unclear, however, whether increasing the freedom threat will induce compliance among activists or arouse more reactance. Judging from the record low turnouts of the annual July 1 marches in 2017 and 2018 and the low voter turnout rates in the two LegCo by-elections in 2018, I lean more towards the compliance side. It is also possible that Hongkongers are toning down their political participation to avoid further irritating Beijing and prompting it to tighten its grip. As one pro-establishment lawmaker noted, the best strategy for Hong Kong these days is to “change from attack to defense to preserve what Hong Kong still enjoys, such as freedom of expression” (Lam, 2018).

Patriotocracy  115

Audience acceptance: moving away from full democratization Securitization theory examines how non-military threats, such as diseases and climate change, can be framed as a “security threat” and what effect this kind of securitization has. Balzacq (2005, 2011a) proposes that to construct a security threat successfully securitizating actors must persuade the target audience to accept such claims. I proposed in Chapter 3 that securitizing actors appealed to the audience during the Umbrella Movement by depicting the Movement as an imminent threat followed by suggestions of protective action that can avert the threat. This security appeal is a type of persuasion strategy that appeals to the audience’s desire for security, in other words, what or how much the a­ udience is willing to do or give up in order to feel secure. The securitization of an issue confers greater power upon power-holders, and more power to power-­ holders translates into fewer rights and less power for the people. Mass surveillance programmes worldwide suggest that people are willing to compromise privacy rights for security purposes. I noted in Chapter 5 that, since the post-war era, Hongkongers have valued stability and prosperity above everything else, and few would disagree that Hong Kong is currently stable and prosperous. Chief Executive C. Y. Leung (2014a) noted on the 17th anniversary of the return to Chinese sovereignty: Our economic success has not come easily. All of us in Hong Kong should treasure what we have accomplished. At present, our economy enjoys moderate growth. Unemployment is low, and the wage levels of the low-income group have increased by a larger extent. Commodity prices are relatively stable and the upward trend of property prices and rentals has been curbed. There is also a small surplus in the government budget. We must work together to maintain this favourable situation. We should avoid doing anything that may undermine Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity. Hongkongers have for a long time associated protests with social disorder, subversive intent, and the malicious planning of external forces, and these qualities make people feel insecure. Lam (2004, p. 221) points out that the uncomfortable relationship between activism and mainstream depoliticization culture frequently traps Hongkongers in “either-or situations.” Many Hongkongers believed that the successful transformation from a barren rock to a world-class financial centre was achieved by repressing politics and that the emergence of politics would make Hong Kong chaotic. “In this perspective, what counts is economic opportunity; it therefore becomes imperative to maintain a stable political environment conducive to economic activities” (Lam, 2004, p. 239). I showed in Chapter 6 that securitizing actors have disseminated a convincing argument via the media that resistance and fighting for democracy harms Hong Kong. The logic of the government’s security appeal, “If the Umbrella Movement continues, Hong Kong will be chaotic,” resonated with the depoliticization culture and reinforced the belief that Hongkongers had to choose between stability and political development.

116 Patriotocracy Setting aside nationalistic sentiments and ideological aspirations, political affinity also becomes a cost-benefit analysis for pragmatic Hongkongers. The alleged negative consequences brought about by the Umbrella Movement convinced a substantial portion of Hongkongers that allegiance to the ­government – and rejecting the protests – could avert the threat. According to the PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), message acceptance is an adaptive response that stems from motivation to protect oneself and Hong Kong. As blue ribboners noted in the previous chapter, people opposed the occupation because of the tremendous harm it was supposed to inflict in the short run, regardless of how righteous the cause was. Opponents of the Umbrella Movement were more likely to support government decisions such as the 8.31 decision and police actions. A survey conducted in December 2014 also found that more people were receptive to the proposed prescreened election than before the Movement (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, 2014c). In September, 29.3% of respondents believed that LegCo should approve the reform draft, and the number rose to 38.3% in December. In other words, many Hongkongers believed it was better to side with the devil you know than the devil you don’t – the same logic people used to explain their allegiance towards the colonial government during the 1967 riot (Scott, 1989, p. 104). Results from content analysis, surveys, and in-depth interviews have led me to conclude that the SAR government successfully securitized the Umbrella Movement because it convinced a substantial portion of Hongkongers that acquiescence and adaptation would pay off more. Accommodation and adaptation to government decisions are more likely to ensure stability and prosperity, whereas a fight for more democracy could be construed as an existential threat to Hong Kong. The violent clashes during the Umbrella Movement were in no way comparable to the 1967 riot – no bombs exploded and no deaths occurred – yet many Hongkongers still chose adaptation and accommodation over the possibility of a system change. It appears that pragmatism is part of Hong Kong’s well worn path of political development. It has endured for the last 50 years, and switching paths would be costly. Hence, until a event that steers future development along a different path, I agree with Kuan and Lau (1995, p. 240) that a “revolutionary route to democracy, such as through an uprising, is unthinkable.”

Patriotocracy: Beijing’s new policy towards Hong Kong Beijing has warned that the promise of “Two Systems” is conditional: “Two Systems” could be scrapped if it becomes a threat to national security (Lam, 2017). Beijing mouthpieces have noted numerous times that the Umbrella Movement had elements of a colour revolution (e.g. G. Cheung, 2014b; Zhong & Zheng, 2014), and the securitization of the Umbrella Movement showed that Beijing is no longer willing to accommodate the diverse paths or dissent that naturally occur when two separate systems co-exist. Beijing is ready to move on from the existing “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement.

Patriotocracy  117 The year 2014 was a turning point in Beijing’s policy towards Hong Kong. Beijing changed from emphasizing Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy to exercising its comprehensive jurisdiction. To ensure that Beijing’s policies and orders are effectively executed, Beijing has required that patriotism serve as a basic political requirement of government administrators in Hong Kong. “One Country, Two Systems,” which emphasizes a high degree of autonomy and “Hongkongers governing Hong Kong,” has been gradually replaced with patriotocracy, a system that allocates power and resources based on professed patriotism.

Patriotism with Chinese characteristics It is important to note that “patriotism” has a different meaning in socialist China. I noted in Chapter 7 that the CCP does not consider patriotism to be a personal practice and has set standards of patriotism. Those who have met these standards are able to yield many perks such as wealth and career advancement. Even President Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th NPC on October 18, 2017, mentioned the need to strengthen and develop the “force of patriotism”2 in Hong  Kong and Macau as patriots play principal roles in the governance of Hong Kong and Macau (“Full text of Xi Jinping,” 2017). I wish to highlight three characteristics of patriotism with Chinese characteristics. 1 One must recognize that personal, state, and national interests are aligned. 2 One must toe the Party line 3 Patriotism is certifiable.

Alignment of personal, state, and national interests As Ringen (2016, p. xii) puts it, China is the “ultimate state-led country, the country is strong as the state is strong.” Although I agree with Ringen’s statement, I believe China is more appropriately described as the ultimate Party-­ led country. State refers to the State Council of China, headed by Premier Li Keqiang, and is synonymous with the CPG, according to Article 85 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Party refers to the CCP, which is the ruling party led by President Xi Jinping. The CCP claims that it represents the “fundamental interests” of all Chinese people (X. Chen, 2014). Patriotism essentially encompasses loyalty to the Party, as Party and country are equivalent. Since Xi Jinping took his position in 2012, it has become more apparent that personal interests, Party interests, and national interests are all aligned in socialist China. Xi has a dream – “Nowadays, everyone is talking about the ‘China Dream’… In my view, to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history” (“Xi Jinping pledges,” 2012). Xi’s vision of national greatness is “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” and “an affluent, strong, civilized and harmonious socialist modern country” (“Xi Jinping pledges,” 2012). The China

118 Patriotocracy dream is markedly different from the American dream (Wasserstrom, 2015), which emphasizes personal fulfilment and individual well-being. The China dream, on the other hand, “is more than just a culmination of individual dreams” – it is a dream of national greatness (“Xinhua insight,” 2016). Individual interests and well-being are important too; yet Xi noted, “history tells us that everybody has one’s future and destiny closely connected to those of the country and nation” (“Xi Jinping pledges,” 2012). In other words, only a strong and prosperous nation can deliver well-being to its people, hence people should prioritize and contribute to national greatness. ­Varrall (2017) observed that the inflated importance of country made the Chinese much more likely than other nationalities to feel personally offended and hurt by outside criticisms of the country. For example, a Chinese university student entered into an argument with his professor because Chinese students in class felt “uncomfortable,” “hurt,” and “terrible” that the teacher mentioned Taiwan as a country and not a territory. The common goal of national rejuvenation thus conveniently equates individual, Party, and national interests, and patriotism is the core of this ideology.

Toe the Party line Xi stressed the vital leadership role of the CCP in realizing the China dream. Xinhua News reported, While noting that achieving the grand goal requires unremitting efforts, Xi called on all political parties, social groups, ethnic groups, social strata and circles in the nation to be more closely united around the CPC (Communist Party of China) Central Committee to fully implement the spirit. (“President vows,” 2013) Ringen (2016) notes that the performance of Chinese government officials are graded annually by their seniors on a point scale in relation to established policy priorities, targets, and other indicators. Not surprisingly, maintenance of social order has, in recent years, been given the most performance points. The CCP still abides by Deng’s cat theory: It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice. Triad societies that helped in the maintenance of stability during the Umbrella Movement are good, black cats that catch mice. A white cat that fails to toe the Party line, on the other hand, is a bad cat. James Tien, businessman and long-time pro-Beijing politician, was expelled from the CPPCC for urging C. Y. Leung to resign during the Umbrella Movement (Luk, Lau, & AnnBenitez, 2014). Tien, son of a textile entrepreneur, has held a long string of public offices: Chairman of the pro-­ Beijing pro-business Liberal Party, lawmaker, non-official member of the Executive Council, and member of CPPCC, China’s top political advisory body. His criticism of Leung, however, made him the first member ever to be expelled from the CPPCC.

Patriotocracy  119 Patriotism is certifiable One of the more unusual characteristics of patriotism with Chinese characteristics is that the CCP can certify patriotism – those who are willing and able to complete political missions can be openly recognized as patriots. In return for their patriotism, the CCP rewards them in a variety of ways, for example, providing greater access to state resources, power, and wealth. There are at least two levels of recognition for patriotism. The first is at the state level, including appreciation made by state leaders (the case of triad society and the case of Robert Chow) and the opportunity to be involved in national affairs (the case of Maggie Chan). The second level is provincial, including the appreciation of provincial leaders (the case of ordinary people). The certification of patriotism and the CCP’s willingness to reward patriotism means that people have a vested interest in professing patriotism and taking on a variety of political missions.

The case of triad society In Chapter 3 we saw that certification was valid even for criminal organizations. Lo (2010) notes that the Ministry of Public Secretary once remarked that triad members could be considered patriots deserving respect if they upheld Hong Kong’s prosperity. The Sun Yee On triad, the largest triad group in Hong Kong, was recruited by the CCP to serve a number of political functions in the years leading up to the handover in 1997 (Lo, 2010). In return for their service, Sun Yee On leaders were officially named patriots, and the certification served as a “passport” to enter China’s state-dominated business world in the 1990s (p. 865). During the Umbrella Movement, the triad played a role in the suppression of protests.

The case of Robert Chow With the successful implementation of One Country, Two Systems, one step in realizing the China dream (Gan, 2017), some Hongkongers professed their patriotism and touted their contributions to Party interests. They hoped to take advantage of opportunities that had arisen during the Umbrella Movement. One patriot who emerged from the Umbrella Movement was Robert Chow, founder of Silent Majority and spokesperson for the Alliance for Peace and Democracy. Chow, a former journalist and radio host, was one of the most vocal critics of the protests and known for organizing high-profile anti-­Occupy rallies and signature campaigns (So, 2014). Chow and Silent Majority members were rewarded with a meeting with Zhang Dejiang, chairman of the NPC and state leader overseeing Hong Kong and Macau affairs (Tam, 2016). Zhang praised the work of the Silent Majority during the protests, and Chow received the opportunity to announce Beijing’s decision to grant travel permits to pro-­democracy lawmakers who had been banned from entering the mainland (­Cheung & Lo, 2016). The meeting between China’s number three leader and a

120 Patriotocracy newly formed local group was unusual. State leaders have rarely met with Hong Kong delegations, except for business tycoons or politicians (Lo, 2016; Tam, 2016). After announcing the 8.31 decision, Xi Jinping and Zhang Dejiang met, in fact, with 70 of Hong Kong’s most influential business tycoons (including Li Ka-Shing, Lee Shau-kee, and Henry Cheng) to gather support for the reform framework (G. Cheung, 2014a). The meeting with Chow was a show to encourage ordinary Hongkongers to side with the government and reassure them that their allegiance and contributions would be favourably rewarded. Indeed, Zhang noted that Beijing was willing to communicate with any person or organization in Hong Kong that supports One Country, Two Systems (Cheung, Ng, & Kwong, 2016). Xi’s assurance that successful implementation of One Country, Two Systems was a component of the China dream sent a message to Hongkongers that their service in safeguarding Party interests would continue to be rewarded (Gan, 2017).

The cases of Junius Ho and Maggie Chan Both Junius Ho and Maggie Chan are solicitors who contributed to the suppression of the Umbrella Movement. Although they were not officially recognized by the CPG as patriots, their political careers advanced greatly with the blessings of the CPG. Ho is a provocative pro-Beijing figure and outspoken critic of the Umbrella Movement and subsequent pro-independent movements. Some of his high profile acts and provocative comments include calling on the police to shoot rioters if necessary (Fung, 2016), saying pro-independence activists should be “killed mercilessly” (T. Cheung, 2017b), and organizing a rally to call for the dismissal of Benny Tai (K. Cheung, 2017). Ho stood for election in the LegCo three times – first time in the legal functional constituency in 2008 and second time in the New Territories West (geographical constituency) in 2012. He did not win a seat in either election, but Ho was backed by the CGLO in the 2016 LegCo election and won a seat in the New Territories West as an independent (Ng, 2016). Maggie Chan was the legal counsel who obtained the injunction to clear the Mong Kok protest site on behalf of Chiu Luen Public Light Bus. She was elected a Hong Kong deputy to the NPC for the first time in 2017.

The case of ordinary people Safeguarding national interests does not mean only joining the military and fighting wars. I noted in Chapter 3 that social stability is a national security issue. Safeguarding national interests could mean more mundane tasks such as, expressing support for government decisions and assisting the government in winning public opinion battles. Tearing down posters advocating Hong Kong independence on university campus was already a commendable act (K. Ng, 2017). Successful securitization of the Umbrella Movement required more than the contribution of a few high-profile patriots. Ordinary citizens also had numerous opportunities to participate in smaller-scale political missions. BA, a blue ribboner whom

Patriotocracy  121 I interviewed (see Chapter 7), explained that participation in anti-Occupy rallies would be favourably rewarded by the Party, and the rewards were more than just monetary: Those who participated in anti-Occupy rallies usually gain some type of benefits, not necessarily monetary benefits. Frankly speaking, monetary benefits could not entice these people to attend rallies. People in the Fellow Townsmen Association who immigrated to Hong Kong are usually quite well-off. They went because they felt that participation in the rallies would bring them closer to people in the “high levels.” Most of them had already established guanxi with people in the “high levels,” hence they showed their support more actively. Participation in these political missions is a way to either establish guanxi or strengthen pre-existing guanxi with high-level government officials and CCP members. Guanxi, roughly translated as “social network,” is a form of social capital in Chinese society. It enables access to resources of wealth, power, and reputation and activates other social networks through direct or indirect social ties (Knight & Yueh, 2002; Lin, 2001). BA further explained that his fellow townsmen were eager to strengthen and maintain the connections they have with senior officials in their hometowns as these ties may be redeemed for a variety of benefits and facilitate their career prospects.

Patriotocracy vs. democracy Audience acceptance of the securitization of the Umbrella Movement suggests that many Hongkongers were ready to accept the governance system of patriotocracy. Ringen’s controlocracy theory (2016) and Lam’s theory of the culture of depoliticization (2004) both explain why people acquiesce to an authoritarian regime, yet both theories imply Chinese acquiesce because they find the regime bearable. Ringen (2016) notes the CCP delivers economic growth to purchase legitimacy while at the same time strengthening its system of control to ensure regime stability. In order words, the people willingly subject themselves to the sophisticated control system to reap the benefits of the booming economy. Lam (2004) indicates that mainstream culture discourages political activities and confrontation with the government, even when the government deserves criticism, because conflict threatens the social order. My argument about patriotocracy differs slightly from Ringen’s and Lam’s. I argue that the stability of the Chinese regime rests on the public perception that it is desirable, not just bearable. Neither Ringen nor Lam can explain the lack of support for democracy on the mainland or in Hong Kong during the Umbrella Movement. Jacobs (2014) reports that some of the fiercest critics of the Umbrella Movement on the mainland were young professionals who studied abroad and had access to unfiltered news. Despite having experience or knowledge of democratic elections, their criticisms of the protests in Hong Kong showed a notable contempt

122 Patriotocracy for, or even fear of, democratization. For example, a young entrepreneur warned, “we have to be wary of democracy turning into anarchy.” Interviews reported in Chapter 7 also suggest that blue ribboners believed that authoritarianism has been, and is still, the most appropriate form of rule and that democracy is not the right type of governance for the vast and fast-growing China. In other words, they were willing to side with an authoritarian regime and its policies because they believed that this side was in their, Hong Kong’s, and the nation’s best interests. The CCP has promoted and convinced its people that the patriotocratic system could serve individual and national interests better: Only when patriots govern Hong Kong could the country’s sovereignty, security, and development interests be safeguarded and Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability ensured (Information Office of the State Council, 2014). In other words, patriotocracy promises security. Crawford and Hutchinson (2016b, p.  1191) explain that, “Feeling secure demands not only the absence of direct harms in the moment but also assurances that the conditions underpinning our security will persist into the future.” While the scenario of a functioning democracy remains unfamiliar, the benefits of patriotocracy are more easily visualized. Patriotism within the CCP context is doubly desirable: It is not only a virtue; it is also a reasonable prerequisite for reaping the benefits of a strong and prosperous nation. Few would disagree that China’s astonishing growth has played a role in sustaining Hong Kong’s prosperity. Since 2003 Hong Kong has benefited from an influx of gifts from the mainland, including CEPA, the individual visit scheme, the offshore renminbi market, stock exchange connections with Shenzhen and Shanghai, etc. Blue ribboners in Chapter  7 welcomed the integration with the mainland, especially when the Hong Kong economy had settled into stagnation. Hongkongers understand that the liberty and economic opportunities granted to Hong Kong have conditions. To continue enjoying the economic benefits such as CEPA and stock exchanges with Shanghai and Shenzhen and more civil liberties than all other Chinese cities, Hongkongers must accept patriotocracy and increasing Beijing interference. They must be willing to forgo the right to freely elect their political leader. Patriotocracy, in other words, is a form of governmental rule that fosters regime stability by promising its people that the conditions underpinning security in the present will persist into the future. The cost of security, however, may include enhanced police authority, reduced tolerance of dissent and criticism, curbed civil liberties (e.g. free speech, election rights), and draconian security laws (Table 8.1). A comparison of patriotocracy and democracy is shown in Table 8.1. Supporters of democracy see themselves as citizens and believe that political decision-­ makers are elected into office and answer downwards to the people they serve. During the Umbrella Movement, the leaders framed CCP interference as a threat to the civil liberties and the autonomy of Hong Kong (i.e. counter-­ securitization) and called for universal suffrage without prescreening to ensure the elected chief executive answers to local people. The Umbrella Movement’s loss of support showed, however, that the audience that believed the Umbrella Movement and other forms of dissent were threats preferred patriotocracy over democracy. Figure 8.1 shows that government-initiated securitizing moves

Patriotocracy  123 Table 8.1  Comparison between patriotocracy and democracy Patriotocracy

Democracy Citizen Election, merit

Officials answer… Supporter’s desire

Subject Professed patriotism, completion of missions Upwards to the Party Stability, prosperity

Supporter’s fear

Bad economy, instability

Threat to Hong Kong Supporters willing to forgo…

Dissidence Civil liberty

Status of people Advancement

Securitizing Moves by CCP

Democracy

Downwards to the people Genuine election, consensus democracy Loss of civil liberty, loss of Hong Kong uniqueness Regime dictatorship Stability, establishment

Counter-securitizing by anti-establishment

Patriotocracy

Figure 8.1  Political spectrum (democracy vs. patriotocracy) as a function of securitizing and counter-securitizing moves.

pushed Hongkongers further towards the patriotocratic end of the political spectrum. Despite counter-securitizing moves pushing the public back to democracy, the force is much smaller than the securitizing moves. In the end, the “right to a secure future” trumps “the right to democracy.”

Patriotocracy and the field of security I proposed that security appeal is a persuasion strategy that appeals to one’s sense of security and that to feel secure an audience accepts the actors’ proposed solutions to avert the threat. This argument echoes a number of themes in the field of security, such as human security (Newman, 2016), everyday security (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016b), and governance through security (Valverde, 2001). Human security relies on the idea that referent objects and the beneficiaries of security should be individuals and securitizes everyday issues that threaten human welfare (Newman, 2016). Human security scholars argue that for many people in the world the greatest threats to security come from hunger, disease, climate change, crime, armed conflict, etc., and a major objective of securitizing such a wide range of issues is to attract the attention of security providers – state agencies to be specific – to invest resources in tackling these non-traditional security challenges. Despite their impact on policy changes that improve welfare,

124 Patriotocracy most notably the work of the United Nations Development Programme, critics of human security point out that the securitization of everyday life can be used as a pretext for hegemonic forms of intervention and control. This is because human security looks to the state as a security provider, thus inherently enlarging the state’s power to make governance decisions in the name of security. Examples of such “governance through security” include stricter immigration policies, punitive criminal justice systems, greater powers of surveillance, enhanced police authority, anti-terrorism bills, and other preventive measures aimed at risk mitigation (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016a; Valverde, 2001). Enabling the state to securitize everyday issues could thus “have pernicious effects upon liberty and the distribution of resources” (Newman, 2016, p. 1176). Crawford and Hutchinson (2016b, p.  1186) propose the concept of everyday security, suggesting that the “everyday lived experiences of security” such as “how they are felt, lived through, sensed, and born by individuals and groups” are vital for understanding security governance. The authors point out that future research into everyday security will ask how people govern their own security and will involve psychosocial research methods that examine how people think about and respond to different security measures. One commonality among these themes is the connection between security and governance. If human security can be used as a hegemonic tool for control and intervention, people who desire security will accept rights and liberty being compromised. Findings from my analyses provide support for this argument. People will acquiesce to Beijing’s comprehensive jurisdiction for the sake of social stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. In other words, one’s political affinity may serve as a tool for governing and fostering security.

Future directions for social scientists The British Journal of Criminology published a special issue on the topic of security in 2016 to encourage social scientists to contribute to this growing interdisciplinary field (see Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016a for the introduction of the special issue). Security threats that affect millions of lives include organized crime, human rights abuse, poverty, financial downturns, climate change, etc. (United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, n.d.). The concept of human security is thus “inherently trans-disciplinary since it sees any threat to the vital integrity of individuals as a security challenge” (Newman, 2016, p. 1165). Crawford and Hutchinson (2016a, p. 1056) called the field of security a “rendezvous discipline” for social scientists from a wide spectrum of disciplines – criminology, sociology, political science, legal studies and international relations. They hope that such cross-disciplinary engagement will “stimulate new lines of conceptual development, new questions for investigation and analysis, and new forms of enquiry” (p. 1059). This book attempts to answer the call. A psycho-criminological analysis of security-­related developments, it examines the securitization and diverse audience responses of the Umbrella Movement. As I delved deeper into the dynamics

Patriotocracy  125 of the Umbrella Movement, I realized, however, that I merely touched the surface of this broad topic. More inter-disciplinary research and analysis of the Umbrella Movement and subsequent democratization struggles will produce a much more comprehensive understanding of the situation in Hong Kong. As I previously noted, the city many hoped would help democratize China has instead become a research setting in which to study China’s increasing intolerance of dissent. Since Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty 20 years ago, Beijing’s treatment of Hong Kong can be divided into three phases: Nonintervention, intervention, and securitization. The securitization of the Umbrella Movement marks the beginning of the securitization phase, where Beijing increasingly intervenes in local affairs and suppresses dissent behind the façade of national security. Future work on security developments should consider factors both on the mainland and in Hong Kong, such as the rise of China as a world leader, tighter control under President Xi Jinping, the declining importance of Hong Kong to mainland China, an increased radicalization of activists in Hong Kong, and an increasingly pro-establishment mainstream. I highlight two areas of research that will be of interest to social scientists. My suggestions are by no means exhaustive but merely meant to start brainstorming about diverse topics. First, this book focuses on pro-Beijing securitizing moves, though Umbrella Movement leaders also initiated their own counter-securitizing moves. Protesters had many fears, most notably the permanent loss of Hong Kong’s identity, civil liberties, and democracy. To draw legitimacy and support for the protests, Umbrella Movement leaders framed mainland interference as an existential threat, i.e. “It’s now or never,” to Hong Kong’s autonomy, hoping their appeal would resonate with the fears experienced by pro-democracy activists. Future work could examine: How did the pan-democratic camp tailor such appeals to resonate with public sentiments? What were the audience’s responses to these counter-securitizing appeals, and why did they react so? How did these appeals and audience responses affect the larger context, in particular the government’s securitizing moves? Second, one limit of securitization theory is its failure to consider the aftermath of securitization. What are the consequences and effects of successful, unsuccessful, and split securitizations? For example, what are the consequences of creating more enemies (e.g. war on terrorism, immigration bans)? Will securitizing actors become more isolated following a securitization attempt (e.g. the case of Tony Blair following his decision to declare war on Iraq)? Will society become more divided following a spilt securitization? Put simply, with the benefit of hindsight, did the securitization of an issue matter for better or worse? Securitization analyses should not stop after a political issue is resolved or shelved. The Umbrella Movement is not a one-off episode – it is more like the first episode of a television series on the political development of Hong Kong. The Umbrella Movement has created ripple effects on subsequent political struggles in Hong Kong. Protests and campaigns after the Umbrella Movement have become more radical, as seen in the rise of pro-independence and self-determination campaigns, the Fishball Revolution in Mong Kok during Chinese New Year, protests

126 Patriotocracy against mainland parallel traders, etc. Some might feel encouraged seeing this political awakening while others might lament this political polarization/radicalization. Following the Umbrella Movement, Beijing and the Hong Kong government have also become more hard-line on dissidence, as seen in events such as the abduction of booksellers, disqualification of anti-establishment lawmakers, and prosecution of protesters. How should we understand and conceptualize these developments after the Umbrella Movement from a “securitization with Chinese characteristics” perspective?

Final word: “China is different” Ringen (2016, p. 170) reminded researchers that, “China is different”: Its state, polity, and economy are all different from the world powers we have seen in the past. He cautioned researchers that the “complacent view that contemporary China is just a regime that happens to be economically successful and effective in delivery” is not enough to analyze the policies and developments of China. The unprecedented case of China raises new questions and calls for new analytical frameworks. Ringen proposed the concept of controlocracy to understand the Chinese polity, and I propose the concept of “patriotocracy” to explain the desirability of Chinese authoritarianism. We can no longer assume that the rise of a middle class in socialist China naturally facilitates democratization, and I believe more bottom-up investigations are warranted to facilitate our understanding of socialist China, Hong Kong as a SAR, and the unique dynamics between authoritarian China and democracy-struggling Hong Kong.

Notes 1 Youngspiration is a political party that emerged after the Umbrella movement. Founded in 2015, the party advocates for the protection of local people’s interests and resources and the right for Hongkongers to determine their own future beyond 2047 (i.e. right to self-determination). 2 I used “force” instead of “rank” because I believe it is a more appropriate translation for liliang. The official English version translated aiguo aigang aiao liliang to “ranks of patriots who love both our country and their regions.”

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Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. acts, level of analysis 60–1 agents, level of analysis 61–2 Alliance for Peace and Democracy 51–2 analytical generalizations 57 anti-Occupy Central 51 anti-Occupy civil society groups 51–2 Apple Daily 76–7, 79, 79, 80, 82–4, 84n1 attrition and securitization 53 audience 37 audience acceptance 12–14, 35, 54, 85; from democratization 115–16; security appeal and 42, 42; Umbrella Movement 52–3, 53, 121 authoritarianism 90, 122, 126; CCP rule 90–2; Chineseness from CCP 94–5; oppressive dictator 92–4, 93 Balzacq, T. 36, 37, 53, 54n1, 56, 58, 59, 61, 115 Basic Law 2–6, 8, 14n3, 17, 20, 29, 46, 47, 97, 108, 114 behavioural freedom 24–5, 98 Beijing 14n2; governments 77, 101, 105, 106; mechanisms 11; One Country, Two Systems 5–10; policy 116–17; Summer Olympics 92, 93; treatment 125 blue ribboners (anti-occupy figures and groups) 51–2, 78, 81–2, 88, 89–92, 95–7, 99, 102, 105–11, 116, 120–2 boomerang effects 24–6 Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong (BPA) 77 business authorities 77 Buzan, B. 9, 34, 35

cat theory (Deng) 50, 118 Causeway Bay 23, 50, 54, 82–3 CCP see Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2012) 39 Central Government Liaison Office (CGLO) 6, 10, 77, 120 Central National Security Commission (CNSC) 8–10, 14n5 Central People’s Government (CPG) 2–4, 6, 7, 11, 17, 47, 49, 81, 82, 106–7, 117, 120 CEPA see Mainland-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) Chan Kin-man 10, 15, 18, 21, 52, 54 China 43; dream 117–20; Falun Gong 43–6; mainland 46, 64, 92–4, 97, 98, 101, 103, 104, 125; One Country, Two Systems 46; treatment 11 “China is different” 126 “The China Model” 3 Chinese: characteristics 117–21; identity 86, 90, 91, 93, 94, 105; securitization in 43–6; sovereignty 2, 3, 7, 11, 15, 69, 93, 102, 115, 125 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 10, 11, 13, 14, 14n2, 20, 43–5, 49, 50, 69, 96–8, 101, 102, 104–8, 110, 111, 117–19, 121, 122; authoritarianism 90; Chineseness from 94–5; control vs. OCLP 15–18, 16; against Falun Gong 44; mechanisms 32, 47; as oppressive dictator 92–4, 93; rule 90–2 Chineseness 94–5

146 Index Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPCCC) 77, 112n6 Chu Yiu-ming 15, 18 civic nationalism 90 Civic Square 4, 22 civil society organizations 77 class boycott 21–2 CNSC see Central National Security Commission (CNSC) comprehensive: jurisdiction 7, 8, 11, 19, 117, 124; securitization analysis 58, 58–62 constitutional development 86 content analysis (CA) 58, 60–1, 76–7, 83–4; Apple Daily and Wen Wei Po 76–7, 79, 79, 80–4; coding guide 77–8; desecuritizing components 82–3; security appeal content 80–2 context dependency 36–7 context level of analysis 59 controlocracy theory 12, 17, 121, 126 Copenhagen School 9, 33, 55n6; functional actors 34; intersubjective process 35; referent object 34; securitization theory 33–4; securitizing actors 34; self-referential and intersubjective 35–6 coping appraisal 40 coping information 47, 48 court injunctions 53–4 CPCCC see Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPCCC) CPG see Central People’s Government (CPG) critical literature review 59 critical mass 42 cultural meaning 37, 59 data collection methods 57–8 democracy 13, 29, 95–101; partial support of 64–6; patriotocracy vs. 121–3, 123, 123 Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress (DAB) 52, 77, 96 democratization 15, 50, 65, 66, 113, 115–16, 125, 126 Deng, X. 1–2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 50, 118 depoliticization 13, 83, 97, 115; and political activism 67–9; and political participation 70, 70–2; on Umbrella Movement 72–4 desecuritizing, Umbrella Movement 78, 82–3 dissidents 106–7 dual-processing models 75

8.31 NPC decision 20, 21, 29 elaboration likelihood model 75 electoral system 18 emergency service providers 77 ethnic nationalism 90 existential threat 9 Falun Gong case 43–6 fear appeals 47, 55n4; effectiveness of 38–9; protection motivation theory 39–42, 41 Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) 77, 82 field of security, patriotocracy and 123–4 Fishball Revolution 101, 114, 125 freedom 24–5; threat 25, 26 functional actors 34 generalizability 57, 61 Global Times 19, 46 good citizenship 66–7 gross domestic product (GDP) 107 hard repression 45 heuristic-systematic model 75 Ho, Junius 120 Hong Kong Bar Association and Law Society 54 Hongkongers 1–4, 93, 115–17; mainlandization 105; security appeal 88–9, 88–9, 90; seizing opportunities 103 Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) 21, 22, 51, 73 “Hongkongness” 105 Hong Kong SAR (HKSAR) 2, 4, 7, 10 human security 123–4 Ignatieff, M. 90 illocutionary effect 33 Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 5, 112n7, 112n8 intercoder reliability 61 intersubjective process 35–6 Kwai Tsing Container Terminal 103 Lau, S. 47, 63–5, 67, 116 Legislative Council (LegCo) 3–5, 7, 19–21, 65, 70, 71, 73, 74n1, 81, 91, 108, 112n5, 114, 116, 120 legitimacy 43 Leticia Lee 52 Leung, C. Y. 3–5, 18–20, 32, 33, 48, 51, 52, 69, 82, 86, 92, 101, 108, 112n6, 112n8, 115, 118

Index  147 Leung, Edward 114 Leung Kwok-hung 22 Leung, Sixtus Baggio 114 Li Fei 81 Li Hongzhi 43, 45 “Lion Rock spirit” 67, 74n2 localism 55n9, 101 Macau 7, 10, 46, 47, 63, 77, 117, 119 Maggie Chan 52, 120 Mainland-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 102, 122 mainlandization process 6, 13, 102–5; assimilation process 103–4; Hongkongness 105; seizing opportunities 103; welcoming integration 102 “malignant party struggle” 3 Mao’s rule 16, 17 Martin Lee 50–1 message acceptance 40–1, 41 meta-analysis 39, 40, 54–5n2, 55n3 Ming Pao 68, 69 mixed-method sequential explanatory design 61–2 Mong Kok 23, 50–2, 54, 109, 114, 120, 125 moral shock 28–9 nationalism 2, 90 National People’s Congress (NPC) 6–8, 16, 17, 19–22, 29, 32, 77, 81, 82, 84n1, 86, 95, 117, 119, 120 national security 3, 6, 8–11, 34, 47, 96, 116, 120, 125 National Security Law (2015) 10 national security legislation 6, 7, 71 Nongovernment Organization (NGO) 34, 38 The Northeast New Territories Development Plan 112n5 Oates, Titus 36, 37, 59 oath-taking 114 Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) 5, 8, 10, 12, 15–19, 21–3, 29, 30, 46, 51, 52, 63, 73, 77, 81, 82, 86, 114 Occupy Movement 30, 31, 52 “Occupy Tamar” 4, 14n4 One Country, Two Systems 1–2, 5–6, 119, 120; Chinese national security 8–9; emphasis on 2–5; existential

threat 9; patriotocracy 10–11, 116–17; securitization 8, 46; urgency of the issue 9–10; white paper on the practice 6–7, 18–20 opponents 86 opportunity cost 113–14 oppressive dictator 13, 92–4, 93, 111 ordinary people case 120–1 patriotism 10, 11, 13, 50, 92, 95, 117–22 patriotocracy: audience acceptance 115–16; Beijing’s policy 116–17; vs. democracy 121–3, 123, 123; emergence of 10–11; and field of security 123–4; oath-taking 114; patriotism 117–21; prosecution of protesters 114 People’s Daily 44, 81–2 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1, 2, 8, 11, 14n2, 15 perceived vulnerability 40 perlocutionary effect 36 persuasive security speech 38 police 108–9 political activism 13, 63, 65, 67–9, 74, 111 political aloofness 63–6, 71, 72 political apathy 64, 65, 97 political control, defiance of 87–8, 113–14 political culture 63; democracy 64–6; depoliticization 67–9, 71; good citizenship 66–7; participation 70, 70–2; political activism 67–9; postwar Hong Kong 63–4; Umbrella Movement, depoliticization 72–4 political participation 13, 49, 65–7, 69–72, 85, 99, 114 political spectrum 123, 123 politics 4, 9, 11, 32, 34, 36, 43, 64, 66–8, 71, 74, 76, 83, 84, 86, 96, 115 Popish Plot 36–7, 53 portrayal of threat 40 potential harm 47, 48 pragmatic act, securitization 36; audience 37; context dependency 36–7; public opinion 38; security appeal 38 PRC see People’s Republic of China (PRC) pro-Beijing lawmakers 77 pro-democracy 2–6, 10–14, 20, 22, 23, 46, 50–2, 73, 75–7, 79, 86, 105, 106, 113, 119, 125; see also democracy protection motivation 40 protection motivation theory (PMT) 39–42, 41, 48, 55n4, 77, 116 protesters, prosecution of 114

148 Index psycho-criminological analysis 124 psychological reactance theory 12, 15, 23–4, 24; freedom 24–5; reactance 26; reactance and protest 27–8; restoration 26–7 public opinion 38 Public Order Ordinance 15 public support 49 Qiao Xiaoyang 17 qigong practice 43–6 Qing dynasty 1, 14n1 qualitative phase 62 quantitative phase 62 radicalism 101 Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) 67 reactance theory 26; and protest 27–8; and Umbrella Movement 29–30, 31; see also psychological reactance theory recommended protective behaviour 40 referent object 34, 78, 80–1 regime 107–8 reliability, content analysis 61 replicability, content analysis 61 repression 45 resonance 48–9 response efficacy 39, 40, 55n5, 78, 81–2 restoration 26–7 “ritual of conformity” 38 Robert Chow case 119–20 Scholarism 22, 72, 73 securitization theory 11, 33–4, 36, 43, 115; audience 37, 42, 42; context dependency 36–7; court injunctions 53–4; Falun Gong 43–6; as intersubjective process 35; One Country, Two Systems 46; public opinion 38; security appeal 38; see also Umbrella Movement securitizing actors 34, 38 security appeal 11–14, 33, 47–8, 59, 61, 74, 76, 83, 84, 106, 115, 123; and audience acceptance 42, 42; components 78; coping information 48; grammar of 44; Hongkonger 88–9, 88–9, 90; negative consequences 80; persuasive security speech 38; potential harm 48; referent objects 80–1; resonance 48–9; response efficacy 81–2; three levels of analysis 58, 58–62 security discourse 47

security politics 32, 43 self-efficacy 40, 55n5 self-referential 35–6 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 102 socialism 2, 11, 45 social movements 69, 111; moral shock 28–9; reactance and 27–8 social stability 44 soft repression 45 Special Administrative Region (SAR) 2–4, 7, 51, 66, 69, 74, 92, 101, 116, 126 Standing Committee of the National People’s Council (NPCSC) 7, 17–19, 47, 77, 80, 91, 114 state power 10 statistical generalization 57 Sun Yee On 50, 119 suppression 87 Tai, B. Y. T. 5, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 120 tear gas 8, 15, 22–3, 29, 30, 32, 47, 49, 51, 95, 100, 108, 109 textual meaning 37, 59 theoretical proposition 58 threat appraisal 40 threat to Hong Kong 105; dissidents 106–7; police 108–9; regime 107–8; triads 109–10 three levels of analysis 58, 58–62 Tiananmen Square incident 3, 45, 50, 67, 94 Tien, James 3, 118 “tofu-dreg” buildings 94 triads 49–51, 109–10 triad society case 119 Tsang, Donald 108, 112n7 Tsang, Jasper 8, 19, 96 Umbrella Movement 46–7, 55n6, 56–8, 76, 85, 86; anti-Occupy figures and groups 51–2; audience acceptance 52–3, 53; coping information 48; depoliticization on 72–4; desecuritizing 78, 82–3; leaders 77; negative consequences of 78; outbreak of 113–14; political control 87–8; politics and constitutional development 86; potential harm 48; resonance 48–9; role of functional actors 49; securitization of 113; suppression 87; tear gas vs. 8, 15, 22–3, 29, 30, 32, 47, 49, 51, 95, 100,

Index  149 108, 109; three levels of analysis 58, 58–62; triads 49–51 United Nations Development Programme 124 “urgent need” 9 validity, content analysis 61 Wah Kiu Yat Pao 69 Wai-ching, Yau 114 Wai-hung, Leung 82 Wang Guangya 46–7 Wang Zhenmin 10

Wen Wei Po 76–7, 79, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84n1 Wong, Joshua 22, 23, 29, 100, 112n9 Xiaobo Liu 17 Xi Jinping 1, 8–10, 96–8, 107, 117–18, 120, 125 yellow ribboners 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 99–105, 107–11 Youngspiration party 114, 126n1 Zhang Dejiang 7, 95, 119, 120