Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments: Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and the US in the 2020s 3031337751, 9783031337758

Citation preview

Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and the US in the 2020s Edited by Wei-chin Lee

Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments

Wei-chin Lee Editor

Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and the US in the 2020s

Editor Wei-chin Lee Wake Forest University Winston-Salem, NC, USA

ISBN 978-3-031-33775-8 ISBN 978-3-031-33776-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

The initial idea of this project started with the escalation of tension in both US-China relations and cross-Strait interactions with the regime changes in both Taiwan and the US in the 2016 presidential elections. Then, the eruption of Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill protests in 2019 and the widespread COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 shaped the project’s structure. The severity and duration of the pandemic and the implementation of various quarantine policies disrupted the normality of administrative process and scholarly regularities. The project’s implementation was subsequently affected. Therefore, first and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to chapter contributors for making this project possible under the difficult circumstances. Their contributions are the cornerstones of this work for intellectual dialogues and knowledge enhancement. Certainly, a previous grant awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, D.C., facilitated the execution of the book project. We all are deeply indebted to their unwavering support of scholarly programs. Throughout the entire process, Emily Young offered her valuable editorial service with patience. The editors, Alina Yurova and Abarna Antonyraj at Palgrave Macmillan, deserve our appreciation for their assistance in the preparation and publication of this book. Special thanks go

v

vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

to Dr. Kevin G. Cai, co-editor of the series Politics and Development of Contemporary China, for his encouragement to submit the proposal to the series. All these people make this project a rewarding experience.

Contents

1

An Introduction: Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments in Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and the US Wei-chin Lee

1

Part I Hong Kong: Waves of Protests for Democracy and Rights 2

3

Contesting Identities: Hong Kong’s Protests, Taiwan’s Concerns, and China’s Challenges Wei-chin Lee

33

Authoritarian Crackdown Without Bloodshed: China’s Securitization in Post-NSL Hong Kong Yan-ho Lai

75

Part II Taiwan: Riding the Anti-China Tide 4

5

Threat Perception and Taiwan’s 2020 Presidential Election T. Y. Wang and Su-feng Cheng

121

Taiwan Can Help: The Political Impacts and Lessons of Taiwan’s Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Huang-Ting Yan

147

vii

viii

CONTENTS

6

Taiwan Amid the US–China Rivalry: From the Perspective of a Two-Level Game John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Yi-Tzu Lin

187

Part III China: Coping with the Turbulent Currents of Challenges 7

The Pandemic Further Sickens US-China Relations Denny Roy

211

8

China’s Policy Toward Taiwan in the Xi Era Ruihua Lin and Shu Keng

251

9

A Pyrrhic Victory? The Political Economy of US-China Competition from Trump to Biden Zhiqun Zhu

277

Will Taiwan Become the Next Ukraine? Xi Jinping’s Preparation for Armed Reunification Suisheng Zhao

311

10

Part IV The US: Breaking the Grip of the Rip for Hegemonic Status 11

12

Competitions and Coalitions: An Emerging US Domestic Nationalist Consensus, Executive Branch Prerogatives, and the Taiwan Strait Tensions Dean P. Chen America Counters China: Congress, Resolve, and Constraints Robert Sutter

Index

347

397

431

Notes on Contributors

Dean P. Chen is Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Humanities and Global Studies, Ramapo College of New Jersey, USA. He is the author of U.S. Taiwan Strait Policy: The Origins of Strategic Ambiguity (Lynne Rienner, 2012), U.S.-China Rivalry and Taiwan’s Mainland Policy: Security, Nationalism, and the 1992 Consensus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), and U.S.-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden: Towards a Nationalist Strategy (Routledge, 2022). His articles have appeared in Asian Survey, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Security, Asian Politics & Policy, and Pacific Focus. Chen is a recipient of the 2014 Taiwan Fellowship from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) and a Fulbright US Scholar in the People’s Republic of China in 2017–2018. Su-feng Cheng is Research Fellow at the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. Her research interests include voting behavior, public opinion, and survey method. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh is currently Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. His teaching and research interests include rational choice theory, constitutional choice, electoral systems, electoral behavior, political parties, democratization, and foreign policy. His works appeared in many journals and numerous book chapters. He is the author

ix

x

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

of Party-list Proportional Representation [in Chinese] and Positive Political Theory [in Chinese] and editor or co-editor of Confucian Culture and Democracy, How Asia Votes, and Democratic Governance in Taiwan. Shu Keng is University Research Fellow at the School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, China. He has previously taught at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and has guest-lectured at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, University of Tübingen, and University of Heidelberg. His research interests include comparative political economy, government-business relations, Chinese local governments, and crossStrait relations. In the past several years, he has published on journals like The China Quarterly, The China Journal, and top journals in Chinese. He also authored and/or edited 10 books including the biannual series of Selections from Chinese Political Studies, and the well-acclaimed textbook Comparative Politics. Yan-ho Lai is Visiting Researcher at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, and Non-resident Fellow at Center for Asian Law of Georgetown University Law Center. He received his Ph.D. degree from SOAS University of London. His research focuses on authoritarianism, law and politics, law and social movement, legal activism, and international human rights. He is also a convenor of Hong Kong Studies Association in the UK and serves as the country expert on Hong Kong in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. He has written extensively on national security, judicial politics, and human rights under China-Hong Kong relations. Wei-chin Lee is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27106, and Editor of American Journal of Chinese Studies. He has published several books, including The Mutual Non-Denial Principle, China’s Interests, and Taiwan’s Expansion of International Participation (2014), and National Security, Public Opinion, and Regime Asymmetry (co-edited, 2017), Taiwan’s Political Re-alignment and Diplomatic Challenges (edited, 2019). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals, such as American Journal of Chinese Studies, Asian Affairs, Asian Perspective, Asian Security, Asian Survey, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Comparative Communism, Journal of Economics and International Relations, Journal

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xi

of Northeast Asian Studies, The Nonproliferation Review, Ocean Development and International Law, Pacific Focus, SAIS Review, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, and World Affairs. His teaching and research interests are foreign policy and domestic politics of China and Taiwan, US policy toward East Asia, international security, and international institutions. Ruihua Lin currently Assistant Professor in the Department of International and Mainland China Affairs, National Quemoy University. Her research interests include the study of social and political identity, comparative political economy, and especially the study of Taiwanese businesspeople in China. She has taught at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and Sun Yat-sen University (PRC) and has also served for several think thanks in China. In the past five years, she has published articles on journals like The China Journal, China Information, and among others, and has written a book and edited another book, both on Taiwanese businesspeople in China. Yi-Tzu Lin is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Tunghai University in Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of South Carolina in 2020. His research and teaching interests include comparative political economy, political development, and regime change. Denny Roy is Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, who specializes in Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. Roy is the author of Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (Columbia University Press, 2013), The Pacific War and its Political Legacies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), Taiwan: A Political History (Cornell University Press, 2003), and China’s Foreign Relations (Macmillan and Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), co-author of The Politics of Human Rights in Asia (Pluto Press, 2000), and editor of The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (Macmillan, 1997). He has also written many articles for scholarly journals such as International Security, Survival, Asian Survey, Security Dialogue, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Armed Forces & Society, and Issues & Studies. Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University (2011-). He also served as Director of the School’s main undergraduate program involving over 2000 students from 2013 to 2019. His earlier full-time position was

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University (2001– 2011). A Ph.D. graduate in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, Sutter has published 22 books (four with multiple editions), over 300 articles and several hundred government reports dealing with contemporary East Asian and Pacific countries and their relations with the United States. His most recent books are Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy of an Emerging Global Force Fifth Edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021) and US-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain Present Fourth Edition (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022). Sutter’s government career (1968-2001) saw service as senior specialist and director of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific at the US Government’s National Intelligence Council, the China division director at the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. T. Y. Wang is University Professor and Chair of Politics and Government at Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, U.S.A. He currently serves as the co-editor of the Journal of Asian and African Studies and was the coordinator of the Conference Group of Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) of the American Political Science Association. He is the co-editor of the Taiwan Voter (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017) (with Christopher Achen). Huang-Ting Yan is Academia Sinica Postdoctoral Scholar in the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS). He received the Ph.D. in Government from the University of Essex (2020). He is a political scientist and a social epidemiologist interested in the link between political institutions, socio-economic outcomes, and public health, with a specific focus on semi-presidentialism, comparative authoritarianism, health expenditures and policy, and geriatric epidemiology. Dr. Yan’s work has appeared in political science and public health journals including International Political Science Review, European Political Science Review, International Journal of Public Health, and European Journal of Public Health. Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xiii

of Denver. He is the founder and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China and the author and editor of more than two dozen of books, including A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Chinese Nationalism. His forthcoming book from Stanford University Press is titled The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. A Post-Doctoral Campbell National Fellow at Hoover Institution of Stanford University, he received his Ph.D. degree in political science from the University of California-San Diego, M.A. degree in Sociology from the University of Missouri, and B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from Peking University. Zhiqun Zhu is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University, USA. He was Bucknell’s International Relations Department Chair (2017–2021), inaugural Director of the China Institute (2013–2017), and MacArthur Chair in East Asian politics (2008–2014). In the early 1990s, he was Senior Assistant to Consul for Press and Cultural Affairs at the US Consulate General in Shanghai. Dr. Zhu is the author and editor of a dozen books, including A Critical Decade: China’s Foreign Policy 2008–2018 (World Scientific, 2019); China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and US-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2005). He has received many research fellowships and grants, such as a Fulbright US Scholar award to Australia, two POSCO fellowships at the East-West Center in Hawaii, and three senior visiting fellowships at the East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore. He has held visiting professorships in Japan, China, and Korea. Dr. Zhu is a member of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and is frequently quoted by international media on Chinese and Asian affairs.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2

Tsai Ing-wen’s presidential approval rating: June 2016–January 2020 (Data sources: Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study 2012–2016, 2016–2020; Cheng 2020) Support for 1992 consensus by party ID: 2005–2019 (Data Source: Taiwan National Security Survey, 2005–2019) Taiwan citizens’ confidence in Xi’s Pledge & concerns about Hong Kong (Data Source: Cheng 2019) Support for the 1992 consensus by confidence in Beijing’s Pledge: 2020 (Data Source: Cheng 2019) Support for the 1992 consensus by concern about Hong Kong (Data Source: Cheng 2019) Electoral support by threat perceptions (Data Source: Cheng 2019) Theory testing process-tracing: how the COVID-19 crisis affects subsequent anti-China tide in Taiwan Public supports for President Tsai Ing-wen, 2016–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the TVBS Poll Center and the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF). pos.TVBS indicated positive support for President Tsai, based on public opinion polls of the TVBS Poll Center. Source The author)

126

127 128 131 132 132 154

159

xv

xvi

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.3

Fig. 5.4

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Fig. 6.3

Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 8.1

Public supports for Premier Lin, Lai, and Su’s cabinet, 2016–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the TVBS Poll Center and the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF). pos.TVBS indicated positive support for the cabinet, based on public opinion polls of the TVBS Poll Center. Source The author) Public supports for KMT and DPP, 2020–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) and the FORMOSA (美麗 島電子報). DPP.TPOF indicated support for the DPP, based on public opinion polls of the TPOF. Source The author) A typology of Taiwanese attitudes toward the US and China Distribution of various types of voters, 2004–2022. Note Based on the questions about whether to strengthen economic ties with China and whether the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if China attacks Taiwan while Taiwan does not declare independence. The percentages refer to the proportions of the total number of respondents (Source Taiwan National Security Studies surveys, various years) a Balancing Supporters by Partisanship. b Hedging Supporters by Partisanship. c Bandwagoning Supporters by Partisanship. Note Based on the questions about whether to strengthen economic ties with China and whether the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if China attacks Taiwan while Taiwan does not declare independence. The percentages refer to the proportions of the total number of respondents who are classified as balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning supporters (Source Taiwan National Security Studies surveys, various years) US–China–Taiwan Relations (2008–2016) US–China–Taiwan Relations (2016–present) Changes in the Party Identification of the Taiwanese Public (Source The Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/ Detail?fid=7802&id=6964 [Accessed January 8, 2023])

160

162 192

195

198 201 202

253

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10.1

Beijing vs. Taiwan military power (Graphic Pranay Bhardwaj, Explainers, “Just How Strong is China’s Military Compared to Taiwan?” Firstpost, August 5, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/just-howstrong-is-chinas-military-compared-to-taiwan-11014921. html)

xvii

326

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Taiwan citizens’ support for the 1992 consensus Taiwan citizens’ electoral decision in the 2020 presidential election A typology of Taiwanese voters, 2022 Partisanship and types of voters in Taiwan, 2022

134 135 196 200

xix

CHAPTER 1

An Introduction: Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments in Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and the US Wei-chin Lee

“May you live in interesting times!” apparently fits well for both individuals and states in recent tumultuous periods of protests, pandemic, and security predicaments in the East Asian region. In fact, the ground laid out for interstate competition and confrontation had started in 2016 with the electoral victory of Trump, whose unilateral, provocative, and transactional leadership style not only accelerated populist sentiment and political polarization domestically but also unfolded a series of US-China diplomatic discords and trade disputes. Concurrently, the independenceleaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the electoral mandate in 2016 against the China-friendly Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). By riding the anti-China fervor in Taiwan, the DPP defied the unification-minded Chinese Communist (CCP) on multiple fronts and threw

W. Lee (B) Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_1

1

2

W. LEE

cross-Strait relations into despair and disarray. Under the tenacious geopolitical competition since 2016, any issues involving China would, therefore, be employed by China’s security adversaries to amplify the issue’s latent negatives for maximum domestic benefits and international advantages. The interstate contest and bickering manifested in the tackling of Hong Kong protests in 2019–2020, the control and prevention of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020–2022, and the maneuvering of Taiwan security within the delicate US-China-Taiwan triangular framework with various interest priorities in calculation. Then the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 added an impetus for each triangular party to think long and hard about future cross-Strait scenarios. Against the backdrop of these climactic developments, this edited volume plans to examine how these countries responded to persistent challenges and the effect of issue linkage in policy planning and execution. The volume is thus arranged by localities crisscrossed with themes and issues. The section on Hong Kong focuses on the protests, 2019–2020, to see its intersection with identity and generational shifts along with the legal, political, and economic changes before and after the adoption of the Hong Kong National Security Law on June 30, 2020. The investigation of Taiwan’s policy choices brings in the factors of electoral calculations, identity reconstruction, cross-Strait stalemate, and alliance maneuvers within the US-China-Taiwan triangular relations for an overview of its domestic development and external policies. As historical experiences, cultural construct, and the prerogative of territorial sovereignty have deeply embedded in China’s “cognitive propensities” in dealing with the Hong Kong protests, the Taiwan issue, the pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, China’s strategic choices of accommodation or confrontation still need to steer clear of the change of circumstances for regime stability and economic sustainability in a gameplay between major powers.1 The section on China highlights how China reconciled its competing national interests and ideological beliefs by trying to pursue rational and reasonable policies to alleviate severe risks and heavy loss. In the end, it is imperative to examine the US role and policy consideration in dealing with both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Hegemonic power transition has been a primary concern in the US-China interactions with the US hegemonic status encountering daunting challenges from China, which has long been perceived as an ascending revisionist power waiting to overtake the US in the future.

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

3

Hong Kong: Waves of Protests for Democracy and Rights Chapter 2 starts with the protest in Hong Kong, tracing, and dissecting Hong Kongers’ joint efforts to preserve their civil and political liberty after the territorial transfer of sovereignty in 1997 with China’s pledge of the “One country, Two systems” in governance for fifty years in Hong Kong, the “Jewel of the Orient.” Regrettably, a series of indigenous endeavors in the past to sustain and expand their rights and civil liberties persistently failed to gain China’s approval. Public despair and anger culminated in a large movement against the government-proposed Extradition Bill in 2019 to vent their long-simmered frustration. It seemed to be a last-ditch effort to prevent China from encroaching on their preferred way of political life. The chapter describes the logic of connection through social media platforms, the inter-group disputes about protest tactics and purposes, the responses of the masses, and the generational distinction of participants in this volcano-like anti-government and anti-China movement. The protest occurred halfway through the timeframe of Hong Kong being absorbed as an undistinguishable part of China by 2047. It received sympathetic endorsements and enthusiastic support in spirit and rhetoric from states worldwide, including Taiwan, a democratically self-governing country under China’s security threats since 1949. Taiwan’s empathic support of the Hong Kong protests coincided with the island’s anti-China attitudes that manifested since its own 2014 Sunflowers movement. The Hong Kong protest also added pressure on the US amid US-China’s feuds in trade, technological rivalry, and contestation in geopolitical influence. Thus, China’s deliberation of its appropriate response to the Hong Kong protests had to be placed on the perimeter of cross-Strait relations, the US-China-Taiwan strategic framework, and the four-year cycle of presidential elections in both the US and Taiwan around 2019–2020. The rising tide of anti-China fever offered candidates in both countries ample ammunition for issue framing for electoral gains. Between contingent responses to circumstantial developments and full-scale military crackdown, China adopted the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) in 2020 to stem the tide. Like precedents of national security laws in Macau (2009) and China (2015), HKNSL became a convenient tool to reign in unruly opponents and protesters within the legal confines of the party-directed normative values

4

W. LEE

for social stability and political legitimacy.2 Although the judiciary in an authoritarian system is unlikely to exercise its independent role, the legal codes serve as an instrument for the party-state to govern and the rule-based court to legitimize its verdict to control unsanctioned behavior.3 Armed with the coverage of four broad and ambiguous offenses— secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with foreign or external force in endangering national security, the enforcement of HKNSL is largely subject to politically tinted interpretation by police and prosecutors in charges and harsh jail sentences for relatively light violations by a court with increasingly diminished judicial autonomy as described in Lai’s Chapter. The principle of “presumption of bail” for defendants yielded to “presumption against bail” in more and more cases, and the principle of proportionality was neglected in the delivery of punishment vis-à-vis the crime charged under the provisions of the HKNSL. Lai points to China’s securitization effort to eliminate any mobilization opportunities to protesters and opponents, to interfere in the court’s authority in case deliberation, to streamline media outlets to be pro-government voices, to silence critical views of civil society organizations, public intellectuals, and student activists, and to standardize teaching materials for school teachings, and others. The HKNSL clearly accomplished its mission in incentivizing public self-censorship to ensure Chinese authority over Hong Kong. It is distressing to see Hong Kong, which always prided itself to be a free and capitalist paradise for decades, turned into a city losing its autonomy in governance without much democratic life.4 The power asymmetry between China and Hong Kong along with the unfavorable institutional setup of the Basic Law largely predestined China’s heavy-handed control over Hong Kong’s fate. Foreign support in rhetoric, diplomatic protest, immigrational accommodation for dissidents’ exit, and visa and financial sanctions against political elites in China and Hong Kong could not reverse the fait accompli of China’s decisions. Even so, the protest sent a strong tidal wave to Taiwan, in which the ruling pro-independence party just suffered from a devastating defeat in the 2018 local and mayoral elections. The image of young protesters’ brave resistance and police crackdown incited public concerns and fears of China’s unification scheme. Taiwan’s ruling party’s vocal support of the Hong Kong protests successfully reversed its defeat in the 2018 local elections into a

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

5

resounding victory in the 2020 presidential election by frequently humming the mantra-like slogans of “Today Hong Kong, tomorrow Taiwan” ( jinri xiangkang , minri taiwan) and “resist China and protect Taiwan” (kangzhong , baotai) for public support. However, the crossStrait tensions with China’s persistent military coercion, particularly the missile tests after the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 and multiple Chinese incursions by ships and aircraft into Taiwan’s security perimeters, prompted a heightened public fear of imminent war with China. The public began to doubt the wisdom of the DPP’s staunch anti-China position and preferred to ease cross-Strait tension. The DPP’s chanting of anti-China slogans appeared to lose it magic to secure an electoral victory in Taiwan’s local and mayoral elections in November 2022.

Taiwan: Riding the Anti-China Tide Wang and Cheng in their chapter aim to show how the vivid image of Hong Kong’s powerless resistance affected Taiwanese voters’ perception of China’s security threat and their collective fear of subjugation under China’s autocratic rule. With the support of survey data, they show higher than 60% of Taiwanese respondents worried that Taiwan might encounter a similar fate to Hong Kong. With the DPP’s constant reminder of antiChina messages, their public anxiety of China’s threat made Tsai’s job approval rating rebound from a low 21.9% in December 2018, after the party’s miserable loss in Taiwan’s local elections, to more than 40% in June 2019, when Hong Kong’s large-scale breakouts gained momentum and escalated the protest’s severity and scope of participation. The protest also linked the Hong Kong protest to Xi’s initiative in January 2019 of adopting the “1992 Consensus” for cross-Strait interactions. The consensus claimed “one China” with respective interpretations of what “one China” is supposed to be by either side. It has been a convenient formula to “agree to disagree” in dealing with crossStrait practical issues without being bogged down in political disputes of sovereignty.5 While Tsai refused Beijing’s overture and shut down the channels of cross-Strait mediation and collaboration in resolving problems of mutual concern, the DPP successfully propagated that Xi’s proposition of the 1992 Consensus was Beijing’s unification plot of “one country, two systems” in disguise and Tsai was the only candidate to safeguard Taiwanese sovereignty and democracy. Tsai and the DPP successfully

6

W. LEE

constructed the Hong Kong protests to be a future crisis of Taiwan’s democracy by justifying the claim’s believability with constant narrative reminders and empathetically emphasizing the audience’s desire for cognitive aspiration for security and comfort. Even though the Hong Kong crisis was not fully analogous to Taiwan’s context, the discourse-created crisis became one key factor contributing to the DPP’s victory in 2020.6 Any partisan dissent from the ruling party’s anti-China narratives would be denounced as unpatriotic to the country. The internalization of an external event in Hong Kong enabled the Tsai government to brush aside any criticisms of its lackluster record of governance in the 2020 presidential election. The burst of COVID-19 cases in China became a daunting challenge to all governments in crisis management, and Taiwan was not an exception with its close geographic proximity to mainland China and dense personnel exchanges. The chapter by Yan investigates Taiwan’s initial response to the pandemic and the ensuing political impacts at the earlier stage in 2020. By employing the process-tracing method, Yan discloses the influence of the DPP’s anti-China view on Taiwan’s pandemic prevention and control mechanism, the unique power-sharing feature of Taiwan’s semi-presidential system between the president and the primer for inter-agency coordination in pandemic crisis management, Taiwan’s effort in global image promotion in pandemic diplomacy, and the augmentation of public trust in public health protocols. Still, Tsai as the president on a few occasions had to step in to respond to public discontents by fixing bureaucratic and legal barriers for the purchase and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines by non-government organizations, such as Foxconn, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and Tzu Chi Charity Foundation, the setup of sufficient virus screening stations, and the sufficiency of rapid testing kits and prescription drugs in May 2021 and May 2022. The DPP government also arranged numerous medical donations to friends and allies worldwide through the “Taiwan Can Help and Taiwan Is Helping!” campaign. Taiwan’s multilateral diplomatic efforts solidified its formal and informal ties with allies. While the government’s domestic pandemic policy in the first half of the three-year period (2020–2022) won public support and high praise, public criticisms surged in mid-2021 over the government’s seemingly blocking Taiwanese NGO’s acquisition of BioNTech vaccines, whose regional dealer in East Asia happened to be the Shanghai-based Fosun Pharma. Any purchase through the Chinese dealer

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

7

would contradict the DPP’s anti-China stand. The refusal to grant the purchase would imply that the DPP was willing to put its ideological belief above public yearning for the availability of mRNA vaccines in a catastrophic health crisis. The BioNTech vaccine controversy became a tipping point for the DPP’s luck, and it proved to be its opponent’s trump card to remind voters of the DPP’s inerasable stigma of ideology over human life in Taiwan’s local and mayoral elections in November 2022. The DDP ability to recuperate from the 2022 electoral loss to prove the party’s resilient capability in the throat-cutting presidential elections in 2024 partially will depend on how it will moderate its crossStrait discourse away from its non-negotiable and non-compromising anti-China policy.7 Ultimately, the geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances have constantly evolved with each actor’s temporal and spatial modifications in strategic visions and economic interests. Taiwan as a relatively weaker power squeezed between two major powers, the US and China, with diverse demands walks a tightrope for Taiwan’s security and prosperity. The DPP adamant anti-China policy seems to create a vicious cycle in an action-reaction spiral to heightened military tension across the Strait without any sign of relief. For example, the tally of sorties by Chinese fighter jets and bombers into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (AIDZ) increased from 380 in 2020, 960 in 2021, to 1,727 in 2022.8 The anti-China policy in words and non-military deeds has not caused any significant impact on China’s policy. Contemplating the triangular interactions among Taiwan, China, and the US, Hsieh and Lin probed Taiwanese public attitudes of a proper approach to cross-Strait stalemates and a feasible balance between two major powers to suffice their security needs. By plowing the Taiwan National Security Survey conducted in various years, they constructed a typology to examine public attitudes toward the US and China considering Taiwan’s security dependency on the US and its economic dependence on China as reflected in voters’ leverage preferences, partisan affiliation, and elites’ policies in Putnam’s two-level game.9 In brief, Taiwan expected US military assistance if an unprovoked attack by China were to occur and at the same time felt tormented by the lucrative profits generated from its economic ties with China. Taiwan’s juggling act in strategic policy between these two powers—balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging—will depend on partisan identification and the temporal sentiment of the public in their sense of and sensitivity to security concerns and profit calling in domestic politics. Naturally, the

8

W. LEE

amity or hostility of the US-China relations will affect public perception and elite decision in Taiwan’s domestic political game. As Hsieh and Lin pointed out, Taiwan’s relations with the two hegemonic contenders remain volatile in Taiwan’s four-year electoral cycle and inevitable pressures coming from both China and the US as explained in the analysis of Xi’s strategic consideration by Zhao and the scrutiny of US domestic consensus and foreign policy maneuvers by Chen and Sutter in later chapters.

China: Coping with the Turbulent Currents of Challenges The cross-Strait relation has deteriorated due to mutual distrust and suspicion of either side’s political intent behind any olive branch gestures since 2016. Even during the pandemic, Taiwan rejected Chinese vaccine offering not only because of its concerns about the Chinese vaccine’s efficacy in immunity protection but also because of the hidden political agenda and international implications in China’s “goodwill” initiative in vaccine aid. In Taiwan’s view, it is a typical practice of China’s united front tactics. Likewise, China’s pandemic diplomacy through a spinoff of the Belt and Road Initiative, known as the “Health Silk Road,” did not fare well in US-China relations. Indeed, as Roy elucidates in his chapter that China’s officious and highhanded damage-control diplomacy during the pandemic years, 2020– 2022, not only proved unsuccessful to repair the pre-pandemic US-China tensions on multiple fronts of thorny issues, including the unmerciful suppression of Hong Kong protesters, ongoing threats to Taiwan, and China’s unjustified and illegal claims of the South China Sea, but also exacerbated their bilateral relations. China’s excessive measures in the control of virus spread and contamination at the initial stage of the outbreak might be an appropriate contingency plan for disease containment and social stability. However, China’s non-transparency and secrecy in information sharing at the initial stage of the pandemic imposed a severe test on most countries to ensure sufficient medical supplies and staff for prevention and treatment to reduce significant loss of human life, not to mention the spillover effects on their socioeconomic sustainability and political stability. The culmination of US concerns and criticisms of Beijing’s missteps at the “Chernobyl moment” induced China to shift from the diplomatic

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

9

imperative for damage control in early 2020 to aggressive rhetoric and tones in response to foreign criticisms. China’s rebuttals also blended with anti-imperialist remarks at later periods to stretch Western criticisms within the Global North v. Global South dichotomy. The bilateral bickering over the alleged source of the virus, Taiwan’s appropriate role and profile in the global health front against the pandemic, and China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy in rebuttal discourses and gestures only aggravated bilateral tension and deepened mutual distrust. China’s harsh mechanism vis-a-vis less restricted practices in other countries also generated debates about the efficacy and suitability of regime type— democracy versus authoritarianism/autocracy—in pandemic control and prevention. In any way, US-China relations since 1979 have traversed in a cyclical pattern of downturns to lower points and swings back. The pandemic-caused bilateral animosity, in Roy’s observation, will take some time for political elites to restore the cyclical dynamic and recover their collaborative spirit. The cost of the pandemic caused higher mortality, economic slowdown, widespread poverty, and socioeconomic inequality in education, gender, labor, and race.10 The US-China bilateral antagonism on the pandemic front added further obstacles to the already complicated trade disputes and economic sanctions between them. For all that, Zhu remains optimistic about US-China economic interactions with a conviction that liberalist ideas of economic interdependence and comparative advantage in trade would resolve bilateral disputes. It is unfortunate that the geoeconomic competition was tangled with the geopolitical consideration proclaimed in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Other than rhetoric charges of US deviation from normal market practices, China adopted several self-preservation policies to mitigate its reliance on global supply chains by focusing more on domestic sectors under the theory of “dual circulation.” Stated differently, China concentrated on both export growth for continuous international circulation and rising internal consumer’s needs to jointly sustain domestic manufacturing bases for economic development. The hope was to rely on the immense consumption demand to compensate for the export loss caused by external sanctions to keep the economy floating as a backup measure.11 Although it is hard to judge the practicability of China’s dual circulation theory, the effects of the pandemic, US-China trade disputes, the disruption of global production supply chains, and the war in Ukraine significantly dragged down China’s GDP growth rate from 8.1% in 2021

10

W. LEE

to 2.8% in 2022, in the World Bank’s estimate.12 In Zhu’s final assessment, both countries in the intensifying US-China economic and trade rivalry are losers, even though either side might claim relative gain or loss in a realist mindset. Still, the widely anticipated US economic decoupling strategy remained unfulfilled. Such a pull and push move for an optimal median between realist zero-sum calculations in politics and liberalist non-zero-sum claims in the US-China interactions are also reflected in China’s policy toward Taiwan in the Xi Era in the chapter by Lin and Keng. The consolidation of power under Xi’s paramount leadership, China’s Taiwan policy, has marched substantially from the “promotion of unification by economic means” mostly through bottom-up efforts to a top-down absorptive approach to “integrated development” dictated by China’s central authority in crossStrait interactions. The obvious changes were the central government’s multiple standardized measures and policies, rather than local initiatives, to push forward cross-Strait economic transactions, financial investments, education, and residential status requirements. As a result, cross-Strait economic interactions lacked local contingency plans, creative spirit, and locality-based initiatives for functional integration. The purpose of China’s Taiwan policy change to the central government was to offer a coherent unification program against the US role adjustment from a security “balancer” of the cross-Strait relations to an active supporter of an “informal ally” of Taiwan since 2016. By the same token, Zhao in his chapter warns that Xi precipitated China’s unification timetable and prepared a military option to coerce Taiwan to accept China’s terms of unification instead of waiting patiently for the eventual unification of Taiwan by peaceful means. Taiwan’s separation from China’s administrative domain becomes a missing piece of Xi’s China Dream of territorial integrity. China’s substantial accumulation of wealth and ascension of power status also boldened Xi’s unification ambition even when China encountered US military interference and Western economic sanctions. Furthermore, Beijing’s dual-track strategy of political and diplomatic containment and selective socioeconomic accommodation failed to bring Tsai to endorse the 1992 Consensus. A huge majority of Taiwanese had identified themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese as shown in various political campaign slogans and numerous surveys of Taiwanese political attitudes.13 Correspondingly, the CCP’s tacit approval of urgings for armed unification of Taiwan among China’s political elites, public intellectuals, and military specialists in policy circles

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

11

and public media forums in recent years cultivated a collective sentiment of China’s intention, capability in the undertaking, and likely timeframe and scenarios of military adventures. Zhao’s analysis of the lessons of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine adds an additional dimension to his skillful dissection of Chinese elite’s concerns and calculations in China’s preparation for armed unification of Taiwan. Although every war is different in geographical locality, topography, land size, force training, equipment sufficiency, combat spirit, assistance from allies, leadership quality, and others, Chinese media and policy commentators claimed that the Ukraine war was much like a rehearsal of various battle scenarios, including blockade, missile attacks, energy resource supply, Western sanctions, the availability of military aids, and others for China’s armed unification plan.14 China is expected to put efforts toward strengthening its armed forces and minimizing any possible setbacks on economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s motto of “the fog of war” remains a worthwhile reminder for China to realize the realm of uncertainty in any military operation.15 Any leader’s rationalist and self-legitimized military operation, like what Putin called Russian action into Ukraine as “a special military operation,”16 might be rationalized as unjustified and unprovoked armed aggression by non-belligerent third parties. One clear implication from the Ukraine war to Taiwan’s resistance to China’s threat of armed unification is to seek sufficient military support and aids from the third parties and secure their unwavering commitment throughout the duration of military conflict.17

United States: Breaking the Grip of the Rip for Hegemonic Status The US has been the major security benefactor of Taiwan’s defense against China’s security threat after the ROC government retreated to the island in 1949, though the US started its de facto relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972 and established de jure relations with the PRC in 1979 and simultaneously broke official ties with the ROC in Taiwan. Taiwan’s relations with the US afterward have been subject to the up-and-down whirlwind of US-China relations. According to Dean Chen, the US started to reverse its previous policy of engagement with China and hardened its strategic and economic policies toward China under the Trump administration and the Biden administration. By examining US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan on

12

W. LEE

August 22 and Biden’s several statements of his administration’s Taiwan policy, Chen carefully combed through the US executive and legislative branches’ stands on the “One China” policy, commitments to the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, adherence to three US-China Joint Communiques separately in 1972, 1979, and 1982, and the reconfirmation of the Six Assurances in 1982. While there were growing policy convergences between the White House and the Congress in questioning the continuous utility of decades of US engagement policies and adopting sanctions and counter acts to push back on China’s unfair trade practices, authoritarian practices with human rights abuses, and external coercive behavior destabilizing regional security, bipartisan legislative efforts in the Congress have stressed the importance of Taiwan’s security and supported its democracy and freedom from China’s threat. In alignment with the Congressional sentiment, the White House and the State Department even carefully employed the Six Assurances to distinguish US One-China policy from China’s One-China principle by specifying that the US agreement “not to take any position regarding sovereignty of Taiwan” as stated in one of the six assurances resisted China’s assertion of its “sovereignty over Taiwan” in Beijing’s principle. Despite the domestic consensus and inter-branch coordination and collaboration in mapping out policies to ward off China’s incessant advances and challenges, the Executive branch still adopted a pragmatic or realist perspective of the US-China relations to prevent the bilateral relationship from locking into an irrevocable path to direct military confrontation or from incurring irreparable damages on the execution of important global or regional agendas that were considered essential to US interests and required China’s non-obstruction or support. In the end, the White House had to proceed in a careful and cautious manner in official statements to delicately maintain bilateral relations. A case in point is the frequent inquiry of possible change of the US long-held “strategic ambiguity” policy in dealing with cross-Strait relations after Biden’s repeated vague proclamations of US intent to respond militarily if China attacks Taiwan. The State Department or the White House had to announce subsequently that the US “one China” policy remained unchanged.18 While Chen claims that US nationalist consensus paved the way for inter-branch collaboration, Sutter further analyzes how US Congressional members became more unified and resolute in bipartisan efforts than past congresses and more articulate than the administration’s prudent

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

13

policy execution. Such a rarely consolidated bipartisan Congressional majority and active participation in issue framing, agenda setting, and policy sustaining of US foreign policies toward China has been unusual in the past. Sutter thus explores its root causes and investigates the success, shortcomings, and gaps of US policy competition with China. Sutter also underlines the Biden administration’s renouncement of Trump’s combative rhetoric and populist style for a reasonable approach to China and embrace of the “new normal,” perceiving China as a daunting challenge to US power primacy and the international liberal order. Interestingly, the movement started with the release of the National Security Strategy in December 2017, singling out China as a strategic rival to challenge US power, influence, and interests and affecting future American security and prosperity. The report gave momentum to Congressional members to roll out a series of countermeasures and even gained attention as campaign agendas in the 2020 presidential election.19 The chapter details the collaboration of the Congress even with the unorthodox Trump’s leadership, inter-agency interest bargaining, the impact of presidents’ performance ratings, and electoral impacts on the bipartisan coalition in the formulation of China policy since 2017. Considering the interlinkage of domestic politics and external policies, Sutter brings up major issues of the past five-year period in his systematic survey of US policy toward China. These include the virus control of the COVID-19 pandemic, deliberate setup of alliances (e.g., Quadrilateral Dialogue—US, Australia, India, and Japan or AUKUS—Australia, UK, and US) for the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the impact of the rushed US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the uneasy negotiation of the release of Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer, the US boycott campaign of China-hosted winter Olympics, the long-standing concern over Taiwan’s security, and the dealings of the Russian invasion of Ukraine within the setting of US-China-Russian interactions. Undoubtedly, partisan divides and interest variation affected US-China policy deliberation and implementation.20 Despite the fact that US allies and partners might not align well with US intended policy goals and refused to adopt hard measures against China as any collective action would encounter, the US Congress and the Biden Administration have remained steadfast in their joint effort to counter China’s challenge pointedly.

14

W. LEE

Thematic Implications A survey of these chapters in this volume calls attention to several thematic features of the period of protests, pandemic, and security predicaments in the interactions of concerned parties. First, there is a recurrent pattern of the gap between public expectation and political reality and the unintended consequence of policy maneuvering for both proponents and opponents of each issue. For example, protesters in Hong Kong wished to gain concessions from the Hong Kong government for their legitimate rights of democratic participation and autonomy in governance, which resulted in China’s moving forward to end the “One Country, two systems” pledge in political reality and preemptively promulgating the HKNSL to restrict their political and civil rights further. On the other hand, China’s strong show of force to quell the protest and harsh treatment of dissidents ruined China’s painstakingly cultivated image as a reasonable and reliable stakeholder in the international liberal order. Additional ill effect was the loss of credibility and support of China’s proposal of “one country, two systems” among Taiwanese, with 65.6% of respondents in December 2022, an increase from 61.2% in 2020, rejecting the formula.21 Furthermore, China’s ironfist crackdown and passing of the HKNSL made 57.6% of Taiwanese more likely to support Taiwan independence as a future possibility.22 Additionally, 48.7% of survey respondents to the Taiwan National Security Survey in December 2022, in contrast to 47.5% in 2020, remained steadfast to foresee the possibility of Taiwan independence in contrast to a smaller group of respondents—30.1% in 2022, an increase from 27.1% in 2020—viewing unification a future possibility.23 Second, public opinion changes surely caused the government to reconsider its policy preference and the degree of bearable costs in policy implementation for regime stability. This leads to the scholarly debate about the functional suitability between democracy and authoritarianism/ autocracy in crisis management. China’s high-handed intervention in the protest proved Hong Kong’s democratic deficiency after 1997 and its belief in resolving any crisis with its commitment and willingness to pay a high price for regime survival as an authoritarian regime. During the pandemic, China also demonstrated its administrative efficiency by enforcing its quarantine and lockdown policies with Chinese characteristics by casting a tightly knit weblike system for enforcement to achieve its “zero-Covid” goal. While its pandemic control policy might

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

15

be a sensible response to prevent unbearable burdens on its health and care system and insufficient preparation of protective equipment and medical supply, China’s draconian procedure was distinctively in sharp contrast to the quarantine practice in other countries, including Taiwan and the US. While most political elites yielded their authority to health professionals for science-driven decisions officially, the multiplication and mutation of virus in speed and scope sometimes outpaced experts’ suggested guidelines and made politicians always worry about socioeconomic vulnerabilities and the thresholds of public endurance of public health restrictions. Thus, the proclamation of heeding the health expert’s advice became a convenient pretext for policy legitimacy of political decisions in both democratic and authoritarian regimes in balancing public health prerogatives and political mandates for regime stability.24 The long, repeated waves of virus subvariants in the COVID-19 pandemic era have offered ample room for proponents and opponents of specific governmental policies to assess and assert the superiority of one specific political system or the other in virus control. The US relatively moderate countermeasures with heavy loss of lives to COVID-19 in contrast to China’s full-scale, tightly sealed control of citizens with a low death rate in the incipient stage of COVID-19 spread seemed to suggest the beneficial effect of authoritarian control in a public health crisis in 2020. However, once widespread vaccination, human adaption to virus subvariants, and public adjustment to the pandemic in mindset and measures flattened the curve of virus infection and hospitalization rate and the society resumed normal interactions in most countries in 2022, China’s determination to keep its “zero-COVID” policy encountered domestic challenges of the “White Paper” (or “Blank Paper”) movement in late November 2022, demanding an end to the “zero-COVID” policy and easing quarantine restrictions. Although the Chinese government was reluctant to concede its three-year “zero-COVID” policy a grave mistake publicly, its abrupt reversion to opening in early December 2022 as a response to public protests instantly threw China into a mega-crisis of a catastrophic surge of COVID-19 cases beyond its healthcare capacity and its supply of medicine for virus treatments.25 Ironically, China’s failure or incapability in advanced pandemic preparations was very much like what other Western countries had been through in 2020, when China ridiculed the West for the lack of thoughtful preparations and proudly declared its regime-specific advantage in disease preparation and prevention.26 Regardless of regime characteristics, there is no easy way for any

16

W. LEE

country to escape the pandemic torment. Perhaps rather than a debate exclusively on regime type, as Fukuyama claimed, the analysis of a state’s handling of the pandemic crisis requires careful examination of the state’s competent capability in crisis management, public trust of state decision, and attentive and effective leadership to minimize policy mistakes.27 Nationalism and ideology also interfaced with the ostensible sciencebased policy as seen in China’s prioritization of “Made-in-China” vaccines, including Sinovac and Sinopharm available for vaccination and indigenous efforts in developing mRNA vaccines, and its refusal to approve and import foreign Pfizer BioNTech and Moderna vaccines. Likewise, Taiwan’s active support promotion of homemade Novavax-like vaccine called Medigen with a Chinese name called “Gao-duan” (literally means “high-end”) was a nationalistic drive to exhibit Taiwan’s biotech accomplishments in pandemic research.28 Because Medigen required time for elaborated testing process to ensure its safety, Taiwan desired to acquire foreign vaccines to meet domestic vaccination needs. Among all foreign vaccines, Pfizer BioNtech ran into difficulty for import permission because its regional dealer in the “Greater China” area, Shanghai Fosun Pharma, was based in China. Any commercial deal with BioNtech would need to go through Fosun Pharma commercially, but the Taiwanese government extrapolated that such a deal might be interpreted as political engagement with China. Later when Taiwanese NGOs, including two corporate giants (Foxconn and TSMC) and the Buddhist Tzu Chi Charity Foundation, initiated private deals of BioNtech purchases to bypass the political labyrinth, their deals still encountered bureaucratic stalling. Widespread public uproars criticizing the government’s anti-China policy as the supreme guideline over human lives in a public health crisis pressured the DPP government to concessions at the NGOs’ request.29 At the same time, Taiwan’s opposition parties criticized the government’s nontransparent and non-accountable process in handling these controversial deals of Medigen and BioNtech purchases. These controversies became opposition parties’ campaign issues in the 2022 elections to remind voters of the DPP’s ideological stigmatization in handling public health crises.30 Stated differently, the pandemic offered easy justification to suspend or restrict cross-Strait economic and personnel exchanges. The approach of “my country first” in the protection and preservation of the physical well-being of its own citizens and socioeconomic sustainability was commonly anticipated in realist claims of state behavior in a world of anarchy. Concerns about relative gains prompt domestic constituencies in

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

17

a national emergency to resist the idea of international cooperation.31 The “me first” attitude was also vividly shown in the form of vaccine nationalism when vaccines were initially limited in supply and largely accessible in the Global North in stark contrast to the unavailability in the Global South.32 Thus, on the diplomatic front, as Roy and Huang testify in the volume, the pandemic provided the US, China, and Taiwan a competing ground for international image enhancement and alliance consolidation by donating vaccines, masks, and other personal protective equipment to developing countries in dire situations. Put simply, “Not all health policy is about health” in Fazal’s words.33 States conducted health diplomacy for the pursuit of national interests, including the mitigation of health risks from neighboring countries with close interactions, winning hearts and minds of the recipient country for diplomatic ties like what Taiwan intended, a supplemental health investment to boost other economic and political initiatives as evidenced in China’s health aid to sub-Saharan African countries in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and other multiple strategic purposes. While most countries touted that global public health should be treated as a public good for collective action, it is inevitable for states to inject short-term self-interests in their long-term pursuit of collective good in the long-haul pandemic fight by mixing and matching humanitarian concerns with strategic and ideological interests.34 Third, the prominence of self-interest is obvious in matters associated with national security and alliance manipulation. One primary cause of the contemporary US-China tensions is the perceived hegemonic transition in the international system with great US anxiety over China’s rapid rising to unsettle the international liberal order. Numerous quantitative and qualitative studies in different periods have propagated a variety of theoretical claims since the early 1990s to explain why, when, and how China as a rising power might take a confrontational approach to accelerate the speed of the great power’s decline, choose an accommodative approach to partner with the US, or adopt a mixed approach to consider China as a “frenemy” of the US in a sense of “China-mania.”35 As a result, US-China relations have been depicted as a zigzag process of alternative approaches of containment, engagement, and “congagement” with doubts of each side’s true intent, long-term strategic objectives, appropriate contingent responses, and the likelihood of the Thucydides’ trap.36 It is exactly what Zhu’s chapter elaborates: the competition between the proposition of liberal interdependence for mutual benefits and the realist tenets on power and status preponderance.

18

W. LEE

The development in US-China relations has been strained since 2016. With each side’s highly negative public perception toward the other, leaders became unlikely to ignore the public sentiment for political legitimacy. As one Chinese survey pointed out, 75% of respondents in China perceived worsening US-China relations before the 2020 presidential election, and the negative view of the bilateral relations still remained at 64% after Biden took office.37 Similarly, American unfavorable view of China in the Pew public opinion survey hovered in the range of 76–82% in 2020–2022 in comparison with 60% in 2019.38 The high percentage of China-unfriendly views surely reinforced American public anxiety of China’s rise and bipartisan consensus in the legislature since 2017 as meticulously analyzed by Sutter and Chen. Among issues of mutual concern, such as the cross-Strait tension, China’s human rights abuses, global climate change, the war in Ukraine, and unresolved economic competition and the disruption of supply chains, the Biden administration might need to find ways to lower the tension and collaborate whenever the issue-specific circumstance demands bilateral cooperation to protect US interests. In response to US coercive measures and sharp rhetoric, China under Xi has adopted a dual-pronged approach. On the one hand, it would deliver soft and kinder messages suggesting its non-threatening rise by reiterating its “peaceful coexistence” mantra and reminding the world of its inevitable role in global and regional governance. On the other hand, China would vigorously defend its core interests as exclusively defined by China by the swaggering of its military might and raucous “war wolf-like” proclamations to employ force or other coercive measures without reluctance to protect its core interests of territorial integrity.39 While the US-China interaction is in a two-player game requiring wise moves for tension reduction, the Taiwan issue is far more complicated in a three-player game with power asymmetry and divergent interests among players. China has repeatedly upheld a stern and non-compromising position on the unification of Taiwan. Although economically engaged with China and intertwined in markets and investments, Taiwan’s preference is to not be unified with China by force politically. While the US officially claims that the Taiwan issue should be resolved by both sides across the Strait peacefully, the incorporation of Taiwan into China’s domain would severely undermine the US-orchestrated East Asian regional security order since 1945. Herein lies a three-player security predicament for each. China would prefer peaceful initiative for unification as the

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

19

priority to the maintenance of status quo as the second choice because it believes that time will be on China’s side with its economic progress and status enhancement. Military unification of Taiwan would be as the last resort should Taiwan continue to show no interest in accepting the peaceful initiative of unification and constantly challenging China’s principle of sovereignty territorial integrity. On the Taiwan side, its majority preference seems to move toward independence as expressed in surveys and electoral mandates through years and the maintenance of status quo as a backup option. For all consideration, the maintenance of crossStrait status quo appears to be the currently acceptable policy to prevent imminent cross-Strait conflicts. The US policy preference is to keep the cross-Strait status quo because the US would not like to engage in a military conflict with China—a great nuclear power. Meanwhile, the US does not want to see the loss of Taiwan to China because the US would lose a key fortress-like leverage to check China’s ambition in the Western Pacific. By offering security assistance through the 1979 TRA and Six Assurances to deter a Chinese threat to Taiwan, the US has accomplished a second-best result for endorsing neither Taiwan independence nor China’s unification of Taiwan. With its political inclination for independence and weaker material power to champion its cause, the DPP government had adopted a “leaning to the US” policy for its suboptimal interest in status quo maintenance for sovereign autonomy, if not outright independence as the DPP had hoped. The convergence of US-Taiwan national interests hinged on the US dual-deterrence policy of strategic ambiguity, in which the US declined to specify what move it would respond to either Taiwan’s rush to independence declaration or China’s reckless and unjustified invasion of Taiwan. The increase of China’s wealth and military advancement in the past decade uplifted its self-perception of its prominent role and status vis-à-vis the US in world politics and its nationalist drive for the unification of Taiwan as Zhao, Lin, and Keng delineate Xi’s cross-Strait policy tilting from largely peaceful initiatives to focus on military options corresponding to the evolutionary status quo of Taiwan’s identity construct further shifting toward the independence end of the independence-unification spectrum. The US handling of the cross-Strait tension hinges on the effectiveness of the US “strategic ambiguity” policy, which has been a frequent topic among pundits and politicians. The idea to wish for an explicitly stated policy, a policy of “strategic clarity,” is that a clear-cut statement would

20

W. LEE

easily allow the security provider or arbiter of conflicts to assess, arbitrate, conclude, sanction, protect, and punish. It would explicitly forewarn both concerned parties of the consequence of their heedless moves. In earlier crises, including the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, both sides across the Strait had usually anticipated that the US would clearly specify the when, why, and how of US responses and became disappointed later because Washington apparently realized it was hard to know exactly what would happen in the future. It would be premature to be an ultimate arbiter of the independence-unification tug-of-war except the goal of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.40 Since the US is unlikely to predict the context and eventuality of a conflict due to evolving circumstances, the strategic ambiguity approach maintains a flexibility for US action about the process, not the outcome, of the Taiwan issue in US-China-Taiwan relations in Tucker’s view.41 Should the policy be revised to strategic clarity, the challenging task would become how to specify clear, satisfactory, and well-prescribed conditions to all concerned parties to tackle the future unknown crises. Such a clarification of US strategic conditions for intervention might be better reflected in amendments of the Taiwan Relations Act to achieve a legal binding effect to meet its intended purposes. Moreover, one of the most difficult conundrums for the US is how to prevent China from attacking Taiwan and how to avoid direct conflict with China. The cold reality is that the US, like most countries, will weigh its own interest above its counterpart’s interest. When push comes to shove, the US would have to rebalance the competing interests, either supporting Taiwan as a separate entity from China or concurring with China’s assertion of Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory. Such debates occurred among Washington’s top strategists, for example, at the end of the World War II about Taiwan’s sovereign status and the Eisenhower administration’s policy change from a “neutralization” (or “leashing” the KMT government) to “de-neutralization” (or “unleashing” the KMT) of the Taiwan Strait in 1953 by removing constraints on Taiwan’s military operation against China.42 In an alliance between a strong power and a weak counterpart, the strong power has the strategic luxury of “abandoning” the weak in need, and the weak counterpart could willfully “trap” the strong ally into a conflict against the weak state’s rival. The cohesion, reliability, and sustainability of an alliance become a complex web among diverse factors, including the contextual alignment of identical interests, strength of commitment, elite perception, and

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

21

domestic politicking.43 The recent US-China competition and confrontation naturally prompt Taiwan to display goodwill and loyalty to side with its security provider—the US—on contested issues as Glenn Snyder called the “halo effect” of alliances.44 It would be interesting to see how Taiwan maneuvers its informal alliance dynamics when the US-China tensions decrease in intensity and magnitude. Fourth, the Taiwan issue has been a thematic thread appearing in most chapters. An earlier criminal case committed by a Hong Konger in Taiwan was the genesis of Hong Kong’s extradition bill, and Taiwan’s passionate rhetoric campaign benefited the Tsai government’s stunning victory in the 2020 presidential elections. Taiwan’s moderate approach to the pandemic was raised as a reference point to highlight the advantage of a democratic system in contrast to China’s autocratic practices. Taiwan’s locality has long been a crucial geo-strategic breakpoint, while China views the island as the gateway to the Pacific, and the US considers it as a citadel to choke China’s own maritime ambition in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s logic in maritime access and hegemonic competition.45 In geo-economy, Taiwan’s innovative technological excellence in global supply chains of advanced chips, exemplified by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC) supply of 90% of 5-nanometer chips for use in weapons, smartphones, and others, has attracted incredible attention from both China and the US.46 Although Taiwan’s chips production had earned a “silicon shield” of US security protection, the US still wanted Taiwan’s chips factories to expand their footprint and commitment to the US to secure domestic long-term supply of chips by adopting the CHIPS and Science Act in August 2022.47 The US even invited the TSMC to invest two chip factories in Arizona in 2022 to mitigate the collateral effect of China’s potential invasion of Taiwan affecting world chip supply.48 The “silicon shield” naturally offers some sense of relief, though it is not a guarantee that the US would send forces to Taiwan’s rescue in crisis because of the US-Taiwan informal alliance setting. Without the legal biding effect of a formal alliance agreement, America’s overwhelming concern over a direct conflict with a nuclear-armed great power aggressor might comparatively supersede its heartfelt interests in defending Taiwan democracy. Even if the US continues to support Taiwan with defense articles for a porcupine strategy to make China’s adventurism unbearable in human and material costs, Taiwan does not even fare better. Public morale and soldiers’ combat spirit might decline when the island encountered extraordinary human suffering and loss, severe infrastructure damages,

22

W. LEE

and significant economic losses. Without the direct participation of US forces, Taiwan’s military conflict with China might be a proxy war staged by the US to weaken China the same as the US proxy war effort in Ukraine to debilitate Russian power and status. The rousing discussion of Taiwan’s contingency responses to China’s military invasion drew public attention as well as the government’s decision to extend the compulsory service from four months to one year in late December 2022 and a total of $17.3 billion of Taiwan’s defense budget in 2023—a nearly 15% increase in 2022.49 Nonetheless, Taiwan National Security Survey showed that 66.4% of Taiwanese in 2022, an increase from 59.6% in 2020, had no confidence in Taiwan’s military capability against China’s invasion.50 On the question of China’s attack after Taiwan’s independence declaration, 53.2% of respondents in 2020 expected that the US would send troops to defend Taiwan, but only 19.3% thought so in 2022. Perhaps considering the lessons of the war in Ukraine, 44.4% of them in 2022 expected that the US would only deliver weapons to Taiwan in a scenario of China’s invasion after Taiwan’s independence declaration. On the other hand, 33.8% of Taiwanese anticipated US troop assistance and 34.7% for US arms transfer in a scenario of nonTaiwan provoked Chinese attack in 2022.51 The vivid reality of the war in Ukraine in 2022 apparently influenced public perception in Taiwan of the cross-Strait stalemates and utterly transparent incapability of the government to have breakthroughs to lower the risk of war. A great reckoning of Taiwan’s strategic dealings with China and the US is needed to find a way out of its security predicament.

Notes 1. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 5–27; Jack L. Snyder, “Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence,” World Politics 30, no. 3 (1978): 345–365. 2. Susan H. Whiting, “Authoritarian ‘Rule of Law’ and Regime Legitimacy,” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 14 (2017): 1907–1940. 3. Iza Ding and Jeffrey Javed, “The Autocrat’s Moral-Legal Dilemma: Popular Morality and Legal Institutions in China,” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 6 (2021): 989–1022; Benjamin L. Liebman, “Legal Reform: China’s Law-Stability Paradox,” Daedalus 143, no. 2 (2014): 96–109.

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

23

4. Ching Kwan Lee, Hong Kong: Global China’s Restive Frontier (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022). 5. Wei-chin Lee, The Mutual Non-Denial Principle, China’s Interests, and Taiwan’s Expansion of International Participation (Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland), Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2014. 6. Robert Spector, Constructing Crisis: Leaders, Crises and Claims of Urgency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 110–121. 7. David Chandler, Resilience: The Governance of Complexity (London: Routledge, 2014), 107, 155. 8. Agence France-Presse, “China’s Warplane Incursions into Taiwan Air Defense Zone Doubled in 2022,” January 1, 2023. https://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2023/jan/02/chinas-warplane-incursions-into-taiwanair-defence-zone-doubled-in-2022. Accessed January 3, 2023. 9. Robert D. Putnam, “Democracy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427– 460. 10. World Bank, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022), https://www.worldbank.org/en/ publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity, accessed December 20, 2022. 11. Michael Pettis, “Will China’s Common Prosperity Upgrade Dual Circulation?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 15, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/85571, accessed December 20, 2022. 12. World Bank, “The World Bank in China,” September 22, 2022, https:// www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#:~:text=Amid%20mult iple%20domestic%20and%20external,weather%20have%20weakened%20e conomic%20growth, accessed December 20, 2022. 13. “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06~2022/06),” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, July 12, 2022, https://esc.nccu. edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961, accessed December 21, 2022. 14. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “China’s Response to War in Ukraine,” Asian Survey 62, no. 5–6 (2022): 751–781. 15. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), Book One, Chapter 3, 101. 16. Andrew Osborn and Polina Nikolskaya, “Russia’s Putin Authorizes ‘Special Military Operation’ Against Ukraine,” Reuters, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-author ises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/, accessed December 21, 2022.

24

W. LEE

17. Steve Chan, “Precedent, Path Dependency, and Reasoning by Analogy,” Asian Survey 62, no. 5–6 (2022): 945–968. 18. Jacques deLisle, “Deterrence Dilemmas and Alliance Dynamics: United States Policy on Cross-Strait Issues and the Implication of the War in Ukraine,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 29, no. 2 (2022): 161– 162. 19. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/upl oads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, accessed December 22, 2022; Josh Rogin, Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the 21st Century (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2021), 35–38, 79–80. 20. Baogang Guo, “Sino-US Decoupling: The Role of US Congress,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 27 (2022): 543–565. 21. Taiwan National Security Survey, Duke University, Question C11 (2022), Question C18 (2020), https://sites.duke.edu/tnss/, accessed December 28, 2022. 22. Ibid., Question C22 (2020). 23. Ibid., Question C12 (2022), Question C11 (2020). 24. Arjen Boin, Allan McConnell, and Paul’t Hart, Governing the Pandemic: The Politics of Navigating a Mega Crisis (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 33–36. 25. Benjamin Mueller and Alexandra Stevenson, “As Officials Ease Covid Restrictions, China Faces New Pandemic Risks,” New York Times, December 2, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/health/ china-covid-lockdowns.html?searchResultPosition=65, accessed December 28, 2022. 26. Sarah Repucciand Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule,” Freedom House, February https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/FIW_ 2022, 2022_PDF_Booklet_Digital_Final_Web.pdf, accessed December 29, 2022; Nick Paton Walsh, “Democracy Has Its Flaws, but It Has Emerged from the Pandemic in Much Ruder Health Than the Alternative,” CNN, December 23, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/23/world/aut ocracies-democracy-pandemic-analysis-intl-cmd/index.html, accessed December 29, 2022. 27. Francis Fukuyama, “The Pandemic and Political Order: It Takes a State,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (2020): 26–32. 28. BBC, “Covid: Taiwan Rolls Out Homegrown Vaccine amid Criticism,” BBC News, August 23, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia58301573, accessed December 28, 2022. 29. Jin Yu Young, “Taiwan Receives Its First Batch of Pfizer-BioNTech Vaccines After a Monthslong Delay,” New York Times, September 2,

1

30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

25

2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/world/asia/taiwan-rec eives-its-first-batch-of-pfizer-biontech-vaccines-after-a-monthslong-delay. html, accessed December 28, 2022. Dimitrios Lampropoulos, Konstantina Chatzigianni, Xenia Chryssochoou, and Thémis Apostolidis, “Ideology and the Stigma of Schizophrenia: Applying the Dual-Process Motivational Model in the French and Greek Contexts,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 31, no. 3: 326–340. Jon C. W. Pevehouse, “The COVID-19 Pandemic, International Cooperation, and Populism,” International Organization 74 Supplement (2020): E191-E212. Thomas J. Bollyky and Chad P. Bown, “The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 5 (2020): 96–108. Tanisha M. Fazal, “Health Diplomacy in Pandemical Times,” International Organization 74, Supplement (2020): E78. For multiple issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, please see Giovanni Agostinis, et al., “Forum: COVID-19 and IR Scholarship: One Profession, Many Voices,” International Studies Review 23, no. 2 (2021): 302–345. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers,” International Security 45, no. 1 (2020): 90–126; Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/1998): 36–73. Randall Schweller, “Three Cheers for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 5 (2018): 133–142. Ketian Zhang, “Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019):117–159; Tongfi Kim, Andrew Taffer, and Ketian Zhang, “Correspondence: Is China a Cautious Bully?” International Security 45, no. 2 (2020): 187–193; Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Avoid the Thucydides’s Trap (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). Songying Fang, Xiaojun Li, and Adam Y. Liu, “Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 15 (2022): 35. Laura Silver, “Some Americans’ Views of China Turned More Negative After 2020, But Others Became More Positive,” Pew Research Center, September 28, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/ 09/28/some-americans-views-of-china-turned-more-negative-after-2020but-others-became-more-positive/, accessed December 30, 2022.

26

W. LEE

39. Avery Goldstein, “China’s Grand Strategy Under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance,” International Security 45, no. 1 (2020): 164– 201. 40. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity,” in Dangerous Strait, ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 186–187. 41. Ibid., 209. 42. Hsiao-ting Lin, Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 23–34, 217. 43. Iain D. Henry, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security 44, no. 4 (2020): 45– 83. 44. Glenn Herald Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 8. 45. Geopolitical Futures (GPF) team, “China’s Maritime Choke Points,” April 26, 2016, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-maritime-chokepoints/, accessed December 31, 2022; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 7–18. 46. Jeff Sommers, “How Silicon Chips Rule the World,” New York Times, September 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/09/business/ silicon-markets-china-taiwan.html, accessed January 1, 2023. 47. “The CHIPS and Science Act (Pub. L. 117–167),” the 117th US Congress, August 9, 2022, https://science.house.gov/chipsandscie nceact, accessed January 1, 2023. 48. Emma Kinery, “TSMC to Up Arizona Investment to $40 Billion with Second Semiconductor Chip Plant,” CNBC, December 6, 2022, https:/ /www.cnbc.com/2022/12/06/tsmc-to-up-arizona-investment-to-40billion-with-second-semiconductor-chip-plant.html, accessed January 1, 2023. 49. Sungmin Cho, Kei Koga, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Yisuo Tzeng, Huong Le Thu, and Andrea Chloe Wong, “Regional Voices on Escalating Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” National Bureau of Asian Research, December 5, 2022, p. 4, https://www.nbr.org/publication/regional-voi ces-on-escalating-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait/, accessed December 15, 2022. 50. Taiwan National Security Survey, Duke University, Question C16 (2022), Question C12 (2020), https://sites.duke.edu/tnss/, accessed December 28, 2022. 51. Ibid., Question C14 (2020) and Question C14 (2022).

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

27

Bibliography Agence France-Presse. “China’s Warplane Incursions into Taiwan Air Defense Zone Doubled in 2022,” January 1, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2023/jan/02/chinas-warplane-incursions-into-taiwan-air-defencezone-doubled-in-2022. Accessed January 3, 2023. Agostinis, Giovanni, et al. “Forum: COVID-19 and IR Scholarship: One Profession, Many Voices.” International Studies Review 23, no. 2 (2021): 302–345. Allison, Graham T. Destined for War: Can America and China Avoid the Thucydides’s Trap. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. BBC News. “Covid: Taiwan Rolls Out Homegrown Vaccine Amid Criticism,” August 23, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58301573. Accessed December 28, 2022. Boin, Arjen, Allan McConnell, and Paul’t Hart. Governing the Pandemic: The Politics of Navigating a Mega Crisis. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Bollyky, Thomas J., and Chad P. Bown. “The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism: Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic.” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 5 (2020): 96–108. Chan, Steve. Precedent, “Path Dependency, and Reasoning by Analogy.” Asian Survey 62, no. 5–6 (2022): 945–968. Chandler, David. Resilience: The Governance of Complexity. London: Routledge, 2014. Cho, Sungmin, Kei Koga, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Yisuo Tzeng, Huong Le Thu, and Andrea Chloe Wong. “Regional Voices on Escalating Tensions in the Taiwan Strait.” The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 5, 2022. https://www.nbr.org/publication/regional-voices-on-escalating-ten sions-in-the-taiwan-strait/. Accessed December 15, 2022. deLisle, Jacques. “Deterrence Dilemmas and Alliance Dynamics: United States Policy on Cross-Strait Issues and the Implication of the War in Ukraine.” American Journal of Chinese Studies 29, no. 2 (2022): 151–171. Ding, Iza, and Jeffrey Javed. “The Autocrat’s Moral-Legal Dilemma: Popular Morality and Legal Institutions in China.” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 6 (2021): 989–1022. Election Study Center. “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06~2022/06).” National Chengchi University, July 12, 2022. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/Pag eDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961. Accessed December 21, 2022. Fang, Songying, Xiaojun Li, and Adam Y. Liu. “Chinese Public Opinion about US–China Relations from Trump to Biden.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 15 (2022): 27–46. Fazal, Tanisha M. “Health Diplomacy in Pandemic Times.” International Organization 74, Supplement (2020): E78–E97.

28

W. LEE

Fukuyama, Francis. “The Pandemic and Political Order: It Takes a State.” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (2020): 26–32. Guo, Baogang. “Sino-US Decoupling: The Role of US Congress.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 27 (2022): 543–565. Geopolitical Futures (GPF) team. “China’s Maritime Choke Points,” April 26, 2016. https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinas-maritime-choke-points/. Accessed December 31, 2022. Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival.” International Security 22, no. 3 (1997/1998): 36–73. Goldstein, Avery. “China’s Grand Strategy Under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance.” International Security 45, no. 1 (2020): 164–201. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. “China’s Response to War in Ukraine.” Asian Survey 62, no. 5–6 (2022): 751–781. Henry, Iain D. “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence.” International Security 44, no. 4 (2020): 45–83. Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. Kim, Tongfi, Andrew Taffer, and Ketian Zhang. “Correspondence: Is China a Cautious Bully?” International Security 45, no. 2 (2020): 187–193. Kinery, Emma. “TSMC to Up Arizona Investment to $40 Billion with Second Semiconductor Chip Plant.” CNBC, December 6, 2022. https://www. cnbc.com/2022/12/06/tsmc-to-up-arizona-investment-to-40-billion-withsecond-semiconductor-chip-plant.html. Accessed January 1, 2023. Lampropoulos, Dimitrios, Konstantina Chatzigianni, Xenia Chryssochoou, and Thémis Apostolidis. “Ideology and the Stigma of Schizophrenia: Applying the Dual-Process Motivational Model in the French and Greek Contexts.” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 31, no. 3 (2022): 326–340. Lee, Ching Kwan. Hong Kong: Global China’s Restive Frontier. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Lee, Wei-chin. The Mutual Non-Denial Principle, China’s Interests, and Taiwan’s Expansion of International Participation. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. Baltimore, MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2014. Liebman, Benjamin L. “Legal Reform: China’s Law-Stability Paradox.” Daedalus 143, no. 2 (2014): 96–109. Lin, Hsiao-ting. Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States and the Making of Taiwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. Mueller, Benjamin, and Alexandra Stevenson. “As Officials Ease Covid Restrictions, China Faces New Pandemic Risks.” New York Times, December 2, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/health/china-covid-loc kdowns.html?searchResultPosition=65. Accessed December 28, 2022. Osborn, Andrew, and Polina Nikolskaya. “Russia’s Putin Authorizes ‘Special Military Operation’ against Ukraine.” Reuters, February 24, 2022. https:/ /www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operat ions-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/. Accessed December 21, 2022.

1

AN INTRODUCTION: PROTESTS, PANDEMIC …

29

Pettis, Michael. “Will China’s Common Prosperity Upgrade Dual Circulation?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 15, 2021. https://car negieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/85571. Accessed December 20, 2022. Pevehouse, Jon C. W. “The COVID-19 Pandemic, International Cooperation, and Populism.” International Organization 74 Supplement (2020): E191– E212. Putnam, Robert D. “Democracy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460. Repucci, Sarah, and Amy Slipowitz. “Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule.” Freedom House. February 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/FIW_2022_ PDF_Booklet_Digital_Final_Web.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2022. Rogin, Josh. Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the 21st Century. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2021. Schweller, Randall. “Three Cheers for Trump’s Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs, 97, no. 5 (2018): 133–142. Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. “Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers.” International Security 45, no. 1 (2020): 90–126. Silver, Laura. “Some Americans’ Views of China Turned More Negative After 2020, But Others Became More Positive.” Pew Research Center, September 28, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/28/some-ame ricans-views-of-china-turned-more-negative-after-2020-but-others-becamemore-positive/. Accessed December 30, 2022. Snyder, Glenn Herald. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. Snyder, Jack L. “Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence.” World Politics 30, no. 3 (1978): 345–365. Sommers, Jeff. “How Silicon Chips Rule the World.” New York Times. September 9, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/09/business/silicon-marketschina-taiwan.html. Accessed January 1, 2023. Spector, Robert. Constructing Crisis: Leaders, Crises and Claims of Urgency. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Taiwan National Security Survey. Multiple Years, Duke University. https://sites. duke.edu/tnss/. Accessed December 28. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity. In Dangerous Strait, edited by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 186–211. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. US Congress. “The CHIPS and Science Act (Pub. L. 117–167).” The 117th US Congress, August 9, 2022. https://science.house.gov/chipsandscienceact. Accessed January 1, 2023.

30

W. LEE

von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1989. Walsh, Nick Paton. “Democracy Has Its Flaws, But It Has Emerged from the Pandemic in Much Ruder Health Than the Alternative.” CNN. December 23, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/23/world/autocracies-democr acy-pandemic-analysis-intl-cmd/index.html. Accessed December 29, 2022. White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/upl oads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed December 22, 2022. Whiting, Susan H. “Authoritarian ‘Rule of Law’ and Regime Legitimacy.” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 14 (2017): 1907–1940. World Bank. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Correcting Course. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2022. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/pov erty-and-shared-prosperity. Accessed December 20, 2022. World Bank. The World Bank in China. Washington, DC: World Bank, September 22, 2022. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/ove rview#:~:text=Amid%20multiple%20domestic%20and%20external,weather% 20have%20weakened%20economic%20growth. Accessed December 20, 2022. Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. Red Star over the Pacific. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010. Young, Jin Yu. “Taiwan Receives Its First Batch of Pfizer-BioNTech Vaccines After a Monthslong Delay.” New York Times. September 2, 2021. https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/world/asia/taiwan-receives-its-firstbatch-of-pfizer-biontech-vaccines-after-a-monthslong-delay.html. Accessed December 28, 2022. Zhang, Ketian. Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing’s Use of Coercion in the South China Sea. International Security 44, no. 1 (2019):117– 159.

PART I

Hong Kong: Waves of Protests for Democracy and Rights

CHAPTER 2

Contesting Identities: Hong Kong’s Protests, Taiwan’s Concerns, and China’s Challenges Wei-chin Lee

The Hong Kong turmoil started in 2019 with a simple murder case: a crime committed by a Hong Kong tourist against his travel companion in Taiwan, where law enforcement lacked jurisdictional authority for prosecution. In response, the proposed Hong Kong Extradition Bill aimed to close this legal loophole through extraditing its citizens to an appropriate locale, including China, for a trail. The likelihood of facing China’s party-controlled court system provoked a series of local protests, chain reactions, and subsequent impacts on concerned parties and states. This chapter plans to examine the policy paradox in process tracing of each actor’s moves to highlight several theoretical claims.1 While the study focuses mostly on the state level, the analysis will stretch into the domestic level. First, each party’s decision is a mediated result of the push and pull of external demands and internal constituencies. Second, with several players in a situation full of uncertainties, the rule of thumb is

W. Lee (B) Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_2

33

34

W. LEE

risk aversion. While Hong Kong protesters have taken risks and tested nerves, Taiwan and China have been cautious to avoid huge negative impacts. Each actor’s goal setting, rhetoric discourse, and solution assessment are hence politically constructed and carefully crafted. Third, the primary driver of the three-party interactions has remained a contested game of identity affiliations. The event has been a competing ground for Hong Kong people’s yearning for an autonomous identity under China’s political domination, Taiwan’s desire for a separate national identity from China’s assertion, and China’s uncompromising stand on its sovereignty declaration over Taiwan and Hong Kong. Finally, the Beijing government, rather than its local proxy—the Hong Kong government, will be most likely to deal with any future dissention in a fast and furious way through the National Security Law enacted in 2020. Even so, China’s follow up moves remain to be conditioned by the level of socio-political stability, the threat of pandemic, and the changes of external circumstances, such as cross-Strait interactions and the interplay of US-China relations.

Storm Gathering in Hong Kong Hong Kong caught world attention in 2019–2020. The Qing Dynasty ceded Hong Kong to the British after its defeat in the Opium War in 1842. Then in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, the United Kingdom agreed to render its colonial control over Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China, hereafter) in 1997. China pledged to leave the legal, social, and economic systems of Hong Kong intact for 50 years under the principle of “One Country, Two Systems.” In April 1990, Chinese National People’s Congress formally adopted the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), called Hong Kong’s mini constitution, for the governance of Hong Kong autonomy under China’s oversight.2 Prior to 2019, China’s supervisory and dominant role had encountered several major protests in Hong Kong. As a precautionary move in 1999 to prevent the spread of the Falun Gong religious sect into Hong Kong, China pressured the government of Hong Kong to propose a National Security Bill based on Art. 23 of the Basic Law, which aimed to prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion, and other harmful activities against the Chinese Government.3 The bill’s unpopularity provoked more than half a million residents to march on the street to oppose the legislation on July 1, 2003. Even after a legislative marathon of more

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

35

than 180 hours, three revisions, and 51 amendments, the bill still lacked sufficient votes for its passage in the Legislative Council (LegCo) and was tabled indefinitely.4 China had its first lesson in the ill effect of indirect and hands-off policy over the administration of Hong Kong. Cause lawyers had attempted to use cases in the 1980s and the 1990s to consolidate the autonomy of Hong Kong’s rights-receptive judicial system in the post-1997 era. However, China’s Standing Committee of the NPC (NPCSC) had asserted its judicial supremacy overriding a unanimous decision delivered by Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal in the Ng Ka Ling case concerning the right of abode under Art. 24(2) of the Basic Law in 1999.5 The NPCSC pre-empted the cause lawyers’ precedent-setting moves. In China’s view, the Hong Kong judicial branch should serve as a collaborator, rather than an independent “balancer and checker,” of the executive and legislative branches, though the Basic Law guarantees the judicial branch’s independence and autonomy from other branches. The NPCSC proved its undisputable interpretive authority again on Hong Kong’s electoral methods of selecting the Chief Executive and LegCo members in 2004–2005 by unequivocally declaring that “the Central Government has the power to determine the constitutional development of Hong Kong.”6 China asserted itself as the hierarchically dominant supreme “center” vis-a-vis the locality of Hong Kong to delineate inter-branch relations. Regardless of the interpretation of “One Country, Two Systems” made by politicians and pundits, the political reality is that the PRC holds the interpretive axis of “one China” to set the confines, direction, and motion of the utility of “two systems.” China was fully aware of the intersection of internal demographic shifts and identity construction molded by waves of immigrants in Hong Kong at the end of World War II, the era of the Cultural Revolution, and the 1989 Tiananmen movement, as well as the fluidity and momentary presence of foreign workers, the British legacy in social and cultural norms, and international influence. For instance, in a 2006 survey, 32% of the respondents were born in China, and 35% lived in China for some years with an implication that the influx of immigrants and close cross-cities interactions have alternated the social composition and identity conceptualization in Hong Kong.7 Hence, China’s task has been to find a medium point between the centrifugal force and the centripetal force in Hong Kong’s temporal progress to 2047, 50 years counting from 1997, without

36

W. LEE

allowing Hong Kong to spin away, ultimately untethered from Beijing’s political orbit. It is unsurprising that the NPCSC announced on August 31, 2014, that the election mechanism of the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive and the 2016 LegCo members would be a framework of “universal suffrage with Chinese characteristics,” with selective committee-vetted patriotic candidates in support of Beijing.8 The announcement was a shocking blow to Hong Kong pro-democracy activists’ expectation of unconditional universal suffrage, because the 2014 announcement was contrary to their understanding of the NPCSC’s 2007 promise of an electoral timetable for the 2017 Chief Executive and a deliberate stalling tactic. It revealed Beijing’s unwillingness to implement the “ultimate aim… by universal suffrage” as stated separately in Art. 45 and Art. 68 regarding the separate election of the Chief Executive and the LegCo members in the Basic Law. It was a bad omen of Hong Kong’s democratic future.9 Endless delays without a precise time frame for universal suffrage led to public frustration. Dissatisfied demonstrators launched a massive “Occupy Central” civil disobedience campaign, or the so-called Umbrella Movement, from late September to mid-December 2014.10 The antiChina sentiment of the Umbrella Movement was almost identical to the sentiment of Taiwan’s earlier anti-China Sunflower Movement, March 18April 10, 2014, organized by Taiwanese civic organizations and student groups in opposition to a service trade deal between Taiwan and China. The Umbrella Movement explicitly challenged China’s presumptuous mandate of heaven over Hong Kong.11 Demonstrators confronted the police’s riot techniques, boycotted classes, disrupted local traffic, and inconvenienced daily business functions and people’s livelihoods in the city. Although physical skirmishes occurred, the Occupy Central movement was a comparatively calm movement illustrating the spirit of civil disobedience. It served as a social platform for the aggregation of local public opinion and a plea to the international community to understand their miserable fate.12 They called for genuine universal suffrage for the selection of the Chief Executive, the abolishment of functional constituencies of the LegCo election, and the resignation of then Hong Kong Chief Executive Chun-ying Leung. According to a CUHK (Chinese University of Hong Kong) survey in mid-December of 2014, 55.7% of the 15–24 age group and 36.1% of the 25–39 age group supported the movement as compared to 32% of the 40–59 cohort group and 22.3% of those above age 60. The survey also

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

37

illustrated that 46.2% of all respondents had a college degree or higher. While pro-democracy factions and pro-establishment factions had opposite views about the movement, slightly more than 50% of respondents were dissatisfied with the government’s handling of the situation and favored making concessions to the protesters’ demands. Out of all respondents, 39.1% considered police responses inappropriate, though 48.5% still trusted the police in its mission fulfillment. Nonetheless, 41.3% of respondents distrusted the Beijing government in contrast to 34.7% of respondents who still had faith in the PRC.13 There was a rise in localism—a commitment to preserving the unique identity and interests in civil liberties and the rule of law. To some younger pro-democracy activists, through the Umbrella Movement Hong Kong had thrived into a vividly conceived community aspiring to selfdetermination.14 Meanwhile, the Chinese Public Security Bureau secretly abducted in China a Hong Kong bookstore staff, including one Chineseborn Swedish citizen, for their publication and trafficking of banned and politically sensitive publications in 2015 and 2016. While most Hong Kongers might otherwise never have heard about the bookstore,15 the abduction incident reminded the public of China’s willful disregard of the Basic Law’s stipulation of Hong Kong’s autonomy and protection of residents’ basic civil and political rights. The abduction case was an outright neglect of the “One Country, Two Systems” promise.16 Then, the 2016 LegCo election illustrated not only the ideological split between the pro-Beijing establishment forces and the liberal democratic forces, but also the generational division between pan-democrats and the newly emerged localist legislators. These localist legislators harvested 19% of popular votes. They utilized polished political tactics and skilled community activism in the wake of the 2014 mass protests. At the same time, the nearly 60–40% popular vote split between pro-establishment parties and liberal democratic parties in the 2016 LegCo election still resulted in the pro-Beijing camp gaining most seats from both functional and geographic constituencies together. This indicated China’s deliberate design of a disproportional representational LegCo electoral system.17 Thus, the pro-democracy activists stressed the need for genuine universal suffrage in electing the LegCo and the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. In April 2019, nine accused leading activists were found guilty and sentenced for launching the 2014 pro-democracy civil disobedience movement that occupied central Hong Kong for 79 days.18 As political entrepreneurs, e.g., the legal scholar Benny Tai, and young student

38

W. LEE

leaders, e.g., Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and their affiliated group, Scholarism, led the charge, the masses reverberated with their persistent appeals for Hong Kong’s genuine autonomy.19 On the contrary, Beijing and the Hong Kong government chose not to give dissenters any political opportunities for substantial advantages.20 With the police’s forceful responses to weaken demonstrators’ employment of contentious repertoires, including sit-ins, hunger strikes, hacking, traffic disruptions, and social media activism, the hardline approach adopted by the NPCSC and the Hong Kong government in previous protests had foreshadowed the Sisyphean fate of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests.

Hong Kong: The Beat of the Storm in 2019–2020 Who would guess that a murder case in Taiwan and the Hong Kong government’s legal remedy would have so easily sparked a strong reaction from the Hong Kong public? In February 2018, a Hong Kong tourist killed his pregnant girlfriend in Taiwan and returned to Hong Kong. The victim’s body was found after her parents sought assistance from Taiwanese authorities. With indisputable criminal evidence in hand, Taiwanese authorities requested an extradition of the suspect for a trial in Taiwan. Without a bilateral extradition agreement in effect, the Hong Kong government declined Taiwan’s multiple extradition requests. Hong Kong then charged the murder suspect for money laundering because of his theft, use, and disposal of the victim’s credit cards, which carried a jail sentence of 29 months. The suspect’s inability to stand for a trial led to Taiwan’s issuance of an arrest warrant which would remain outstanding for years to come. With China considering both Hong Kong and Taiwan as lower administrative units under Beijing, Hong Kong could not have formulated a bilateral extradition agreement with Taiwan without China’s nod. Alternatively, Taiwan would not accept an agreement to imply Taiwan’s status on par with Hong Kong’s local government status under Beijing. Even if Taiwan was willing to negotiate with Hong Kong directly for a special arrangement for mutual judicial assistance on a case-by-case situation, the deterioration of cross-Strait relations after the DPP’s stunning electoral victory in 2016 made China’s approval most unlikely. Therefore, the proposed Extradition Bill in February 2019 aimed to close the legal loophole by permitting the extradition of its residents to an appropriate locale with criminal jurisdiction, including China and

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

39

Taiwan, for prosecution and trail. The bill intended to tackle 37 offenses committed by Hong Kong residents eligible for extradition to other governments or territories without mutual extradition arrangements. The extradition proceeding would require the Hong Kong government to issue a provisional arrest upon receiving the request from another government or territory. Then, a Hong Kong court would determine the merits of the case for the Chief Executive (CE) to make a final decision of rendition. However, Taiwan vehemently opposed the proposed bill for worrying that the bill could put Taiwanese travelers and residents in Hong Kong at an unforeseeable risk of extradition to China for trials. Even if the LegCo adopted the proposed bill, Taiwan still declined Hong Kong’s goodwill gesture to extradite the murder suspect to Taiwan for a trial after the end of his money laundering prison term.21 Distrust and frustration accumulated in previous movements, economic disparity caused by the inadequate supply and demand of real estate properties, generational shifts in identity constructs, and the possible rendition risk the bill imposed to residents and foreigners in, or transiting through, Hong Kong for alleged crimes proclaimed by China based on the Extradition Bill draft, all compounded to form the genesis of the 2019 protests. The proposed Extradition Bill undermined Hong Kong’s perceived reputation globally as a safe and secure haven for business dealing, financial operation, and enjoyable life. The proposed bill, hence, narrowed its scope of “white-collar offenses” to fraud, bribery, and regular conditions listed in most extradition treaties. China’s record in accountability, judiciousness, and transparency in legal proceeding and rights protection remained an insurmountable obstacle to the bill’s acceptance by the Hong Kong people and other countries. Previous Hong Kong discontents served as meaningful guidelines for protesters in goal setting, coalition building, urban guerrilla tactics, discursive maneuvering, and social media mobilization for domestic support and international endorsement. After the initial sit-in on March 15 and the mass demonstration beginning March 31, tension escalated with protesters’ constant skirmishes with police, the storming of the LegCo, the siege of universities, and the paralyzation of the airport. As the civil unrest went on, so was the list of protesters’ demands, including the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, amnesty for all arrested protesters, an independent commission for police brutality investigation, the resignation of the CE, Carrie Lam, and ultimately direct elections of all lawmakers and the CE. On October 23, 2019, the government

40

W. LEE

officially withdrew the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill proposed in February and suspended on June 15, 2019. The Hong Kong government refused to meet other demands. In sum, the 2019–2020 movement went far beyond previous ones in its scale of violence, strength of mobilization, and participants’ perseverant energy in spatial and temporal dimensions. Several notable features highlighted the uniqueness of the 2019– 2020 protests in Hong Kong. First, while previous protests deserved credit for mainly peaceful demonstrations, the acts in 2019 represented a mass wakeup to consider an alternative approach to achieving the goal of universal suffrage. Unlike past peaceful protests, “peaceful, rational, and non-violent” activists (he-li-fei faction) chose to stay back for logistics supply for the “liberation of Hong Kong, revolution of our times” (guangfu xianggana, shidai geming ). Instead of taking charge, they were willing to support the radical “brave” or “valiant” advocates (Yongwu pai) who were leading a game of brinkmanship by crossing the redlines of nonviolence. At this moment, discontent appeared focalized, coordinated, and collective, rather than sporadic and individualistic, in action.22 The “valiant” activists’ moves provoked both the Hong Kong government’s authority and law enforcement on the front line in a strategy of “lam chau” (literally, “embrace fry” in Cantonese), mimicking the nuclear doctrine of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) or the “scorched earth” military tactics. Such aggressive moves thrust all parties into a spiral escalation of confrontations. The eruption of violence added justifications to both sides in a game of chicken on a collision course. Since China has been the oversight authority behind Hong Kong’s administrative autonomy, the stalemate between the demonstrators and police resided on China’s deliberation of when, what, and how to intervene for a tolerable equilibrium in China’s favor. Second, the protests routinely turned violent in an urban guerrilla mode, with bricks and Molotov bombs, trashcan roadblocks, university occupation, and train station disruptions to paralyze the daily function of government and business. Riot police responded with water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and multiple brute force methods. Unconfined to the central districts of the city as in the past, protests outspread to suburban regions. Young protesters embraced the martial arts legend Bruce Lee’s “Be water” philosophy to adapt their methods and mobility to changing circumstances for the effects of exhausting and demoralizing

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

41

both the police and the government. This was akin to Mao’s proposition of CCP guerrilla warfare and the analysis of asymmetric warfare.23 Physical confrontations caught media coverage with vivid images of anger, bravery, and resistance of younger protestors mostly born during or after the 1997 Hong Kong turnover and having hardly any dense identity marks in association with the Beijing government. The Extradition Bill symbolized a serious threat to their way of life and their beliefs in individual liberty and civil rights. A survey at the early stage of the movement revealed that more than 80% of protesters between June and August 2019 felt that it was very important to seek the fulfillment of most of their demands in the 2019 movement.24 On October 11, 2019, police pleaded for assistance from parents and teachers to dissuade teens from engaging in violent and illegal acts, because 750 out of the 2,379 arrested (31.5%) since June 2019 were under age 18, and 104 were below age 16. Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam even mentioned in October that 40% of those arrested were below age 18, since the school year had started in September 2019.25 A high percentage of protesters, 67–89% of them surveyed at different times from June to December of 2019 have had higher education.26 Apparently, youngsters were fighting for their political and economic future against a dictator-like regime perceived by them. In the end, according to Hong Kong police arrest records, there were 9,113 arrests from June 9, 2019, to June 15, 2020, with 1,385 of them charged and 62 convicted.27 Third, the image of desperate youngsters in street combat with the police powerfully evoked viewers’ sympathy, empathy, and reflection. Hong Kongers’ willingness to endure the inconvenience and disruption caused by the protests displayed a community in solidarity. If the 2014 Umbrella Movement encountered division between the pro-establishment and anti-Beijing coalitions, the 2019 Movement showed a crack in the formerly pro-establishment coalition and made some pro-Beijing elites unusually silent toward the protests.28 The public sentiment appeared to identify with the movement’s slogans and discourse, tolerated disruptions, and helped quietly. The movement’s multiple social media platforms, like Instagram, Telegram, Twitter, and LIHKG, were widely utilized by heterogeneous and horizontal social movement groups in information gathering, agenda transmission, and strategic deliberation. These platforms facilitated an inclusive, leaderless, and participatory form of the Hong Kong protests in 2019–2020 with a “prefigurative” vision of an egalitarian and democratic society in Hong Kong.29 Protest networks of

42

W. LEE

postings and sponsorship for newspaper endorsements sustained their visibility and continuity.30 Supporters’ emulation of Prague’s Lennon Wall in Hong Kong was tantamount to a contemporary pursuit for freedom and liberalism in opposition to the Leninism embedded in the Chinese party-state’s failure in preaching its “One county, Two systems” pledge. Fourth, the repeated caroling en masse of the “Glory to Hong Kong” and the chanting of “liberate Hong Kong” on various occasions marked the drifting of Hong Kong’s indigenous identity away from China. Local, regional, and international factors directly or indirectly contributed to the identity reconstruction. For example, the population of Hong Kong had increased from 5.52 million in 1986 to 7.34 million in 2016, with an upward trend in median age from 28.8 to 43.4 during the same period.31 Concerns about skyrocketing real estate prices, family well-being, and wealth inequality had not only generated social activism in the younger generation but also provoked frustration and despair among the public, particularly those non-asset holders. Hong Kong’s investment and trade advantages in the global and regional economy had led to its real estate hikes, housing affordability, and wealth inequality and added burdens to the middle and lower classes with a register of Gini Coefficient at 0.539 in June 2017, the largest in 45 years.32 China’s financial omnipresence and cross-border influx of new immigrants and tourists had caused antiimmigrant and anti-mainland sentiments in the society.33 Hong Kong’s lack of political autonomy in dealing with China’s integration-driven policies had driven the youngsters to subvert the status quo and the political establishment for the “Hong Kong First” assertion.34 Regardless of the flaunting of localism or national identity, Hong Kong people’s identity has been evolving as more and more people feel different from their compatriots on the mainland. This trend was almost predestined by the 1997 transfer. The guarantee of Hong Kong’s autonomy had permitted Hong Kong to proceed in its own way in economic, legal, and political dimensions. Institutional diversity in multiple circumstances became a natural incubator of separate habitual sets of understandings of self and others across the border. Given time, accidental disputes only widened the objective disparity of legal rules, administrative behavior, and social norms between Hong Kong and China and made Hong Kong people increasingly perceive those compatriots on the mainland as “others” who are “more stranger than kin,” in Elaine Chan’s words.35 For instance, longitudinal studies have shown that Hong Kongers had developed a strong affinity toward the locality vis-à-vis their weak

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

43

political identification with China, though Chinese cultural and historical linkages remained. Respondents of self-perceived “Chinese” identity had seen a steady decline from 25.7% in 1996 to 18.6% in 2006, while those perceiving themselves as Hong Kongers fluctuated from 25.2% in 1996 to 22.8% in 1999, 24.8% in 2002, and then dropped to 21.5% in 2006. Respondents with strong dual identities of “Hong Kongers but also Chinese” and “Chinese but also Hong Kongers” combined increased from 47.6% in 1996 to 59.3% in 2006.36 China’s political restraint in interference in local matters and the local economy might have contributed to identity mediation between national and local levels. However, the survey in June 2019 conveyed that 53% of “Hong Kongers” identifiers and 23% of “Hong Kongers in China,” combined to reach a muscular 76% majority of “Hong Kongers” in contrast to the 23% of “Chinese” identifiers—a total of 11% of “Chinese” and 12% of “Chinese in Hong Kong.”37 Hence, the pro-democracy candidates’ landslide victory in the November 2019 election of District Councilors was unsurprising. Pro-democracy candidates won a 385–59 majority of elected seats, including the eight independents, and overturned the proBeijing’s 292–120 seating majority, which existed before the election. The victory gave pro-democracy activists a chance to expand and deepen their grassroots community influence, expand their representation in the LegCo, and assert their potential influence in the 1,200-member selection committee of the CE.38 Even so, no one would naively believe that China’s institutional harness of Hong Kong would accept pro-democracy proponents’ ballot-box revolt willingly and sit on the sideline watching the endless unfolding street turmoil. Therefore, the NPCSC has engineered an electoral bill in April 2021 to have a deliberate plan to make it hard for democracy activities to run for election and to ensure future pro-Beijing electoral results.39 The result was the NPCSC’s passage of a 66-article Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) in 2020, following the precedents of Macao’s national security law in 2009 and China’s own law in 2015. The Hong Kong national security law grants Beijing broad powers to crack down on a variety of political crimes with the maximum sentence of life imprisonment for “grave” offenses, such as secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces listed in Chapter 3, Art. 20–30.40 By listing the HKNSL in Annex III as stipulated in the Basic Law, China has accomplished its unfinished mission of 2003, when

44

W. LEE

the LegCo failed to pass its own legislative bill. From China’s perspective, the law permits its national security agencies to operate in Hong Kong and carries an extraterritorial effect on non-Hong Kong residents committing crimes stipulated in Art. 38 of the law. Art. 36 of HKNSL also extends to any offenses committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered in Hong Kong.41 Through the HKNSL, China has intended to end the calamity of the Hong Kong protest and reassert its unwavering sovereign right to ensure Hong Kong’s “second return” back to China’s irreproachable authority. While proponents have cheered the restoration of law and order, dissenters have viewed the law as a final blow to Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms as evidenced in the arrest of Jimmy Lai in August 2020 and the closure of his pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily in June 2021 on charges of violating the National Security Law.

Taiwan: Surfing on the Storm Wave The proposed Extradition Bill in 2019 and the massive protest follow up, for example, certainly affected residents, travelers, and professionals of different nationalities working in Hong Kong. For instance, there were an estimated 85,000 US citizens working in Hong Kong, and over 1,300 US firms’ branches operated there in 2019. Nearly, 300 of those firms had their regional headquarters in the city.42 Hong Kong’s role as a USChina entrepôt claimed around 8% (US$ 37 billion) of China’s exports to the US, and around 6% (US$ 10 billion) of China’s imports from the US through Hong Kong. Likewise, Hong Kong has been an entrepôt for Taiwan’s merchandize trade, reportedly with 75,000 Taiwanese residing and working there in 2020. According to Hong Kong’s 2018 trade statistics, re-export trade volume between China and Taiwan through Hong Kong valued around HK$ 401,485 million (US$ 51,807 million), claiming 94.6% of the total Taiwan-Hong Kong trade value of HK$ 424,617 million (US$ 54,792 million). Hong Kong was Taiwan’s fourthlargest trading partner; Taiwan was Hong Kong’s third-largest trading partner behind the US, which placed as the second. Certainly, Hong Kong’s total value of all trade in goods in 2019 had dropped 5.4% to HK$ 8,404 billion (US$ 1,084 billion) from its 2018 record, presumably affected by the protest.43 In addition to its role as a cross-Strait trade hub, Hong Kong serves other functions. It has been a convenient and mutually acceptable location for cross-Strait negotiation with low political sensitivity and media

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

45

limelight. Although the DPP vehemently opposed the 1992 Consensus cemented in a Hong Kong meeting, none could deny the city’s obvious contribution to numerous cross-Strait negotiations on matters of mutual concern. With tacit permission, Taiwan initially set up a self-effacing office, “Zhonghua” Travel Agency in Hong Kong. The office was then upgraded into a formal “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Hong Kong” in 2011 under the “1992 Consensus,” an intentionally vague principle that implied the existence of “one China” with divergent content interpretations across the Strait.44 Second, China had hoped the “One Country, Two Systems” framework for Hong Kong’s post-transfer era could be a model to lure Taiwan back into its territorial fold. China’s decision on the Hong Kong protests naturally put Taiwan into a resistant mode by supporting Hong Kong protestors to ward off China’s contrived scheme of unification of Taiwan based on the “One Country, Two Systems” idea.45 A poll conducted by Taiwan National Security Survey in late October 2020 clearly displayed that China’s adoption and implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law prompted 57.9% of Taiwanese to support Taiwan independence.46 Third, along with other Chinese diaspora, Hong Kong remains a place wherein Taiwan could have better maneuverability by taking advantage of its autonomy in local governance and easy access to Chinese society. However, the 1989 Tiananmen movement has become a recurring reminder for Hong Kongers to contest the institutional setup jointly supported by the pro-Beijing politicians and business conglomerates since the 1990s after the British neglect in democratic transition.47 In comparison, democratic rules in Taiwan were already a fait accompli and moved into consolidation. Taiwan’s political developments, hence, have offered ample lessons for Hong Kong’s struggle for democratic governance. And Taiwanese DPP’s struggle strategy of “confrontation-compromiseprogress” (chongtu-tuoxie-jinbu) against the Nationalist Party’s (Kuomintang, KMT) past dominance has become pertinent to Hong Kong. Some observers have expressed concerns about the potential effect of radicalization of Hong Kong politics among its young activists.48 Taiwan’s consideration of the Hong Kong issue has been subject to the political stands of all concerned actors at the temporal conjunction and contextual situation. Under the KMT’s rapprochement policy based on the 1992 Consensus, the Ma Ying-jeou government expressed its support of the 2014 Umbrella Movement and made a strong plea for

46

W. LEE

Hong Kong’s democratization. Yet, Ma’s rhetorical tone and narratives were relatively moderate in comparison to the harsh criticisms made by the DPP and pro-DPP supporters on social media platforms and TV network talk shows. The Hong Kong issue showed partisan difference between the China-friendly KMT and the China-hostile DPP in 2014. The DPP slogan of “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” portrayed Hong Kong as Taiwan’s canary, not golden goose, in China’s coal mine. The KMT challenged such a misleading analogy because of Taiwan’s sovereign independence and defensive capability in contrast to Hong Kong’s incapacitated status.49 The Ma government’s approach paralleled the Obama administration’s balancing and cautious action in dealing with the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The US understood its policy constraints on the Hong Kong issue and China’s adamant concern with its territorial sovereignty. With an intent to safeguard its golden goose—Hong Kong, Beijing had accused the US of being a “black hand” behind the 2014 Umbrella Movement. China accused the US backed pro-democracy think tanks of offering large grants to nurture and promote local civil society organizations and hosting conferences and workshops for political agenda setting, the dissemination of liberal ideas, and the instigation of protests in Hong Kong.50 By the same token, in July 2020, news outlets reported that the US Agency for Global Media had earmarked US$ 2 million for Hong Kong protests in 2019.51 Even so, the policy principle adopted in 2014 by both Taiwan and the US was to urge China to follow reasonable enforcement protocols and respect people’s right to protest to prevent unnecessary harm. US foreign policy then focused heavily on the Ukraine crisis and the surge of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The political necessity of bringing China onto the US side in the fight against ISIS and the resolution of the Ukraine dispute induced US National Security Advisor Susan Rice to acknowledge that the Hong Kong issue was an internal Chinese matter in early September 2014.52 In brief, the countermeasures taken by China and the Hong Kong SAR government seemed to be on equivalent and reciprocal terms in an action-reaction process. All actors in 2014 appeared to respond proportionally, leaving each side sufficient room for compromise. Nevertheless, the political context changed in 2016 with the antiChina DPP regime in Taiwan and the Trump administration preaching the “America first” mantra. The Hong Kong radical valiant faction at the helm of the movement wanted to exploit the circumstantial change

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

47

to reignite the movement’s dynamic momentum. The DPP government took a multi-layered approach to answer protesters’ summons in 2019 partially to mobilize its supporters after its electoral loss in the 2018 mid-term local elections. First, the ruling DPP applied the logic of the coal mine canary in domestic discourses to divert public attention to the Hong Kong protests. The canary analogy salvaged the DPP’s poor domestic performance rating and aligned itself with the Trump administration’s provocative frictions with China in trade and global status competition. It reiterated the slogan of “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan,” employed in Taiwan’s 2014 local elections following the anti-China Sunflowers Movement with the aim to achieve an equivalent effect in the 2020 election.53 Fully aware that the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to relinquish its grip on Hong Kong; the DPP was convinced that the Hong Kong issue would recapture its supporters’ passion with daily news coverage of the protesters’ sacrifice in blood and tears as a grim suggestion of Taiwan’s future in electoral preferences. Second, China’s President Xi Jinping’s re-issuance of the “One Country, Two Systems” proposal for Taiwan in January 2019 offered the DPP a god-sent opportunity to hinge its electoral campaign on crossStrait relations for identity mobilization. When the Hong Kong protests started in March and escalated in steam and violence in May and June, the Tsai government grabbed every opportunity to reinforce Taiwan’s full support. A survey released by Taiwan’s Academia Sinica indicated the shift of public opinion regarding respondents’ priority assessment between national security and cross-Strait economic gains in March 2019, showing 58.3% of respondents prioritized Taiwan’s sovereignty over cross-Strait economic benefits in contrast to 31.3% emphasizing economy. Such a public attitudinal change reversed all previous findings found in the period of 2013–2018.54 This surprising turnout could be coincidentally associated with the impact of Hong Kong’s sit-ins and mass demonstrations starting in March 2019 on Taiwanese public sentiment. Even so, one could not resist noticing President Tsai’s favorable rating continued to swing upwardly and surpassed the KMT candidate on June 25, 2019, in Apple Daily’s weekly poll tracking. From that point, Tsai enjoyed a comfortable lead.55 On November 28, 2019, another polling, Pin View, revealed that Tsai had gained a double-digit lead, 18.4%, an indication pretty much validated in most surveys at that time.56 In brief, the timely eruption of the Hong

48

W. LEE

Kong protests revamped the DPP’s electoral direction and dynamics in the 2020 presidential election. Third, the Hong Kong protest was not the sole factor putting Tsai ahead of other candidates in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential campaign. Yet, one could confidently claim that the DPP surely attracted young voters by surmising the impact of the protest on those below age 40, a group of 6.81 million, approximately one third of the 19.34 million Taiwanese voters in 2018.57 Although the young people turnout rate was usually below the national average, the Hong Kong student protest struck a sympathetic chord among them for its echoes of Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflowers Movement and encouraged youth to support the DPP government. Hence, the DPP branded itself as the guardian of Taiwan’s sovereignty and Hong Kong’s liberty far better than other contenders in multiple social media networks through their opinion postings, recruitment of followers, and accumulation of Facebook “thumbs ups.“ For instance, since Hong Kong’s massive demonstration on June 9, 2019, Taiwan’s Google search volume skyrocketed for timely information about President Tsai’s postings of her firm support of Hong Kong protests in vivid contrast to her KMT contender Han Kuo-yu’s evasive answers.58 Likewise, the term of “mang-guo-gan” (meaning dried mango, but phonetically pronounced like wang-guo-gan in Chinese, which means a sense of state collapse, and used as slang to imply “a sense of the end of the Republic of China”) suddenly surged 20 times more in internet search tallies starting in May 2019.59 Taiwan’s reaction to the Hong Kong protest represented a convergence of identity mindsets of these two places with a growing convergent identity calling for a departure from China’s political orbit. Fourth, Taiwan’s identity evolution to an indigenous identity saw a drastic surge in 2019–2020. The ratio of Taiwanese identifiers rose from 54.5% (2018), 58.5% (2019), to 67% in June 2020. Such a rise of selfperceived Taiwanese identity dwarfed the level of “both Chinese and Taiwanese” identifiers from 38.2% (2018), 34.7% (2019), to 27.5% in June 2020. The change of the identity landscape chipped away at the pretense of identity coexistence by upgrading the identity with Taiwan as the core and exclusive domain.60 The inevitable result was the reconfiguration of the “status quo” context with an increase of “maintaining status quo and move toward independence” from 15.1% (2018), 21.8% (2019), to 27.7% in June 2020. Conversely, the share of “status quo supporters, and move toward unification” with China dropped from

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

49

12.8% (2018), 7.5% (2019), to 6.8% in June 2020, and the decline of those “status quo supporters and decide at later date” from 33.4% (2018), 29.8% (2019), to 27.7% during the same period.61 The rising trend of Taiwanese indigenous identity appeared to correspond to the rise of Hong Kong localism and separatist moves. Undoubtedly, the DPP supported the Hong Kong protesters as comrades-in-arms in their joint resistance to China’s unification pressure. Finally, the Tsai government’s policy of cooling off cross-Strait relations with China since 2016 moved increasingly closer to the US Trump administration in Taiwan’s security calculation. Accordingly, when the US and China engaged in a tenacious strategic rivalry in trade, diplomacy, intellectual property, and human rights protection, the corollary has been Taiwan’s limited room of policy autonomy and flexibility for Taiwan’s best interest.62 Naturally, the Hong Kong issue has been a less daunting task than the territorial disputes in either the East China Sea or the South China Sea. Still, there has been no assurance that Trump’s transactional style in alliance politics would not bargain, link, and mix initially unrelated issues, such as the South China Sea disputes, trade disputes, and the Hong Kong protests, for best business practice to maximize the “America first” yields at the expense of allies’ interests, including Taiwan’s. Subsequently, the DPP government has had a delicate task responding to the Hong Kong protests without provoking a strong Chinese reaction and thereby endangering Taiwan’s trade dependency on the mainland and giving ample ammunition to the opposition KMT party in partisan fights. As for Taiwanese investors and firms in China, they have been part of the collateral damages of the US-China trade disputes and a cost for which Taiwan has hardly had any remedy. When Hong Kong was under siege by protests, Taiwan was virtually under siege by both China and the US. Taiwan had to decide how and when to comply with the US overall policy demands, such as the request for Taiwan’s expansion of semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the US for secured supply of highly sophisticated chips, without bleeding its economic ties with China and arousing unnecessary security risk to Taiwan.63 In such a delicate move, the DPP supported Hong Kong protest through official media and press conferences. Media reported that some Taiwanese student activists under the tutelage of Taiwanese scholars with expertise in social movements during the 2014 Sunflower Movement quietly traveled to Hong Kong in 2019 to offer protest assistance in individual capacities. The government firmly denied the report and

50

W. LEE

asserted Taiwan’s official position of non-intervention in Hong Kong protests.64 The official denial did not prevent some Taiwanese churches and NGOs from supplying protective gear, helmets, and gas masks, to Hong Kong youth travelers as couriers transporting them back to Hong Kong protesters. These NGOs offered protesters coming to Taiwan with temporary safe havens when the Hong Kong situation deteriorated. When the situation in Hong Kong worsened, the Taiwanese government exercised its executive authority to offer timely assistance to Hong Kong residents “whose safety and liberty are immediately threatened for political reasons” on a case-by-case basis, as Article 18 of Taiwan’s “Law and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong and Macao Affairs” stipulated.65 The government declined the call for adopting a refugee law to assist embattled Hong Kong protesters later to avoid political sensitivity, when Hong Kong student leader Joshua Wong openly made such a request. After all, “refugees,” defined in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, are persons who are forced to cross borders to flee one’s country due to persecution, war, or violence and are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin.66 Should Taiwan enact a law for refugees or asylum seekers, it would suggest that Hong Kong residents be citizens of a political entity independent from Taiwan, the Republic of China, whose constitution still regards Hong Kong as part of the ROC nominal territorial domain. In a nutshell, the refugee law tailored for Hong Kong protesters would arouse a constitutional debate, China’s nationalistic countermeasures, Taiwan’s capability in economic accommodation and social assimilation of “refugees,” and difficulties in ways of distinguishing Chinese spies from Hong Kong refugees.67 Taiwan’s refusal of a refugee bill caused a Hong Kong student leader to criticize the DPP’s of using protesters’ blood for electoral gains in the 2020 election.68 As of December 2019, more than 200 Hong Kong protesters had reportedly arrived in Taiwan through a clandestine network of sympathizers for safe exits and temporary stays in Taiwan. The official number has been lower than what the public had expected. They have usually received renewable visas suitable for long-term stay for appropriate arrangements.69 Overall, the Tsai government was trumpeting the noble cause of the Hong Kong protests and sensationalizing the protests as an indication of Taiwan’s immense vulnerability and China’s imminent threat for its electoral gains. In the case of the Hong Kong protests, the political reality dictated Taiwan’s capability deficiency, except legal maneuvers, logistics supply, and democratic image amelioration and humanitarian

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

51

assistance. By the end of May 2020, the Taiwanese government had granted no political asylum requests from Hong Kong rights activists, including the previously high-profile case of the abducted Hong Kong bookstore keeper, who acquired Taiwan’s residency permit through the immigration track of business investment instead of political asylum.70 Even for a daring few fleeing to Taiwan across the open sea in a speedy boat in July 2020, they eventually arrived at the US to seek asylum.71

China: Weathered the Storm When Hong Kong was under siege by relentless protests, China as its guardian encountered the same fate and tried to maintain a façade of Hong Kong autonomy to deal with its social unrest. China’s experience with Western imperialism has fostered an undisputable drive to recover and retain those territories, like Taiwan and Hong Kong, formerly ceded to imperialists. Territorial possession is thus a distinctive marker of China’s nationalist calling, identity consolidation, and legitimate governance,72 not to mention that Hong Kong has been a frequent historical reminder of China’s beginning of the nineteenth century humiliation. Even during the age of globalization, cross-border economic, and social transactions still reside on “the major bindings holding the territorial-polity-society package together,” in Buzan’s view.73 Consequently, most observers and analysts, though supportive of and sympathetic to the causes of the Hong Kong protests, would not believe that China would compromise its sovereign right over Hong Kong and treat the island as a piece of negotiable real estate property. The clear message was that China was unlikely to retreat from its firm stand on the Hong Kong issue, regardless of any outsiders’ extraordinary attempts to harden their countermeasures or to humiliate China’s policies. Under siege by mostly Western powers with different values and norms, China could go back to the traditional motto of self-reliance (zili gengsheng ) to sustain itself even under immense and intense trade sanctions, cutoffs of sensitive technologies, obstacles to Chinese firms abroad, and military pressures. Beijing had a trench mentality by digging in and holding tightly to its territorial sovereignty. Before the situation deteriorated to an irreversible point for the worst-case scenario of military coercion, China would try ways of restoring order and mitigating tension directly or indirectly in Hong Kong.

52

W. LEE

During the protests, Hong Kong officials repeatedly pleaded with residents for law and order through soft approaches to dismantle radical militants’ violence. They recited patriotic rhetoric, mobilized proestablishment elites and followers for counter rallies and dialogues, and encouraged media offensives controlled or co-opted by pro-government agencies in Beijing and Hong Kong to project a doomed picture of Hong Kong’s economy and society, when protests persisted.74 Alongside the displays of soft power came the delegation of Hong Kong police who utilized harsher methods to intimidate and quell riots by tear gas, rubber bullets, and even lethal firepower. President Xi even explicitly encouraged such methods in November 2019 to end violence, though police ferocity only intensified the cycle of violence.75 Concerns over a prolonged period of violence pitted both sides in a tug of war without any sign of relief. Protesters’ stern refusal to compromise caused China’s frustration and outsider’s speculation of military intervention with reports of gatherings of Chinese Armed Police across the border, videos of the PLA troops rotation in Hong Kong and military exercises, and warnings of severe criminal penalties against protesters. Under such a seemingly deadlocked situation, one could speculate China’s contemplation of various options. The first was to use appropriate force to hold off anti-regime street riots to wear out protestors’ energy and softly persuade regime supporter and moderate opponents to consider Hong Kong’s economic prosperity and social order.76 It is a long game of endurance or attrition with expectation of division within the circle of opponents once they learned China’s unyielding position. China repeatedly re-confirmed “the Center still holds” slogan because any compromises on the Hong Kong issue would imply China’s bowing to external pressures, weakening Xi’s domestic legitimacy and leadership, as well as transmitting misleading messages to other separatist movements in Tibet and the Xinjiang Uyghur area. Most importantly, acceptance of the protesters’ demands, except its reluctant withdrawal of the AntiExtradition Bill, would undercut China’s central dominance over the locality of Hong Kong in past dealings.77 However, a game of endurance might continue without any sight of relief and resolution. The Hong Kong protests had dragged on for months and protesters became more determined than ever. This led to the deliberation of the opposite option of military intervention, which could be executed rapidly with its massive deployment of forces stationed inside the city or surrounding localities.78 The cost might be a déjà vu

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

53

of a wholescale international criticisms and sanctions against China and the Hong Kong government after the 1989 Tiananmen movement.79 Bloody resistance and casualties would demonize China’s reputation as a harmonious, peaceful rising power, and challenge China’s legitimacy as a global power. Hong Kong’s gateway position as a crucial avenue of 70% of China’s total foreign direct investment in the first eight months of 2019 would suffer.80 China’s decision of military intervention would give the US justification to cajole other Western powers into an antiChina coalition on multiple fronts in trade geopolitical disputes in areas related to the South China Sea near Hong Kong, sanctions on Huawei, Xinjiang Uyghur human rights, and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Finally, military suppression would surely be a dark stain on Hong Kong’s collective memory for generations to despise and distrust their ruling authority and cement Taiwanese determination to deny China’s vision of unification. Reversely, the military option would provide an obvious case in point to let Taiwan understand the possible consequence of their denial of China’s peace initiative. Because Hong Kong is close to China and relies heavily on the mainland for daily needs, it is realistically doubtful that Western powers would rush in to aid protesters and resistance fighters. The Russian intervention in the Ukraine case and the Crimea annexation in 2014 was a vivid precedent.81 In China’s best-case scenario, Western powers would only issue harsh rhetoric and impose sanctions without any credible military moves to back up their rhetorical charges. Even so, the military option should be a last resort due to its dramatic cost and repercussions in the scale of operation, the image of brutality, and the timeframe for social recovery and economic reconstruction afterward.82 Ultimately, China proceeded with a moderate option through the reinforcement of law and order. The Basic Law has been the supreme instrument to provide Chinese NPCSC with all conveniences in the passage of a National Security Law and the design of an electoral labyrinth for selecting the Chief Administrator and the LegCo.83 When the LegCo failed its assigned task in 2003, Beijing felt an urgent need to fix it in 2019 as the calamity in Hong Kong warranted such a move. When the public sentiment challenged Beijing’s authority over Hong Kong, the Basic Law authorized the NPCSC to interpret and implement a law for Hong Kong. The “One Country, Two Systems” framework virtually bestows the precedence of one country (China) ahead of any pretense of “two systems” in China and Hong Kong.

54

W. LEE

Therefore, between the alternatives of a game of endurance showing the CCP’s unrelenting resistance to protesters’ demands and a radical scheme of forceful military suppression stood a legislative approach which was more proactive than the former option to permit Beijing to draw redlines for behavior in the locality and more cost effective in scale and tension than the latter. The NPCSC hence followed the Basic Law to draft a National Security Law (NSL) for Hong Kong because the LegCo was virtually legislatively handicapped in 2003 and unable to carry out the mission in 2019–2020. Accordingly, the Chinese Communist Party issued a communique to initiate the legislation on October 31, 2019, and the NPCSC voted unanimously to pass the draft law with Xi’s signature for enactment on June 30, 2020.84 As expected, the new law encountered criticisms for its sweeping coverage of crimes—secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign or external forces. Once, it was included in the Annex III of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong government enforced it accordingly. China’s expeditious move reflected its recent institutionalization drive to pass numerous legal codes to legitimize and legalize the government’s authority to smooth numerous social and economic disputes occurring in China’s economic reforms and market transition. In essence, the passage of various laws presents the state as a “normative state” by translating the CCP’s perceived “correct” political behaviors and social activities into enforceable rules and regulations for the administration of daily and regular matters. Meanwhile, the state assumes the role of “prerogative state” to interpret and implement the same law in deliberation and adjudication to serve the higher calling of the party-state supremacy against those who rise to question the state’s legitimacy.85 In such circumstances, the advantage of the NSL obligates all lawabiding residents to a self-censorship responsibility to avoid inadvertently stepping into the broad legal realm defined by the CCP. Nevertheless, the law’s stipulation permits the state to claim its adherence to the fundamental principle of “no penalty without a crime.” The law’s “extraterritoriality” proviso authorizes the enforcement agency to externalize its elusive domestic law of “xunxin zishi” (the “picking quarrels and provoking troubles”)—commonly referred to as a “pocket” crime with its all-inclusive nature.86 The NSL’s power of external oversight clearly sent a chilling effect to non-Hong Kong residents, with its intent to silence criticism through the potential risk of criminality. If needed, China could

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

55

even place non-resident criminal suspects on its wanted list for subsequent extradition requests to foreign countries. This new security measure generated countermeasures by foreign countries, such as the US termination of Hong Kong’s preferable exemption status in trade, customs, travel, and others, and the British suspension of extradition treaties and granting UK citizenship applications to the nearly three million Hong Kong’s British National (Overseas) passport holders with eligibility.87 The law still needs time and cases to assess its full effect. Upon the enforcement of the law on July 1, 2020, in combination with the rise of COVID19 cases, a noticeable result was the decreasing level of street violence. However, the law appeared to achieve its effect of intimidation with cases of arrests and prosecution of key organizers and activists, though some of them had exited abroad for protection. In China’s view, the legal approach has achieved its intended effect of “the 2nd returning” Hong Kong with its assertion of full control by curtailing almost all political and legal remnants of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework.

Conclusions The examination of the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests until the enactment of the Hong Kong NSL in July 2020 revealed several conclusions. First, Hong Kong protesters have failed to accomplish their intended goals, and Beijing’s imposition of the NSL is surely worse than what the Extradition Bill had covered, though protesters’ beliefs, dynamic momentum, and persevering spirit in defying the state were noticeable. Second, Beijing and Hong Kong survived the tumultuous process of protests, but they have not fully gained Hong Kongers’ hearts and minds as witnessed in the decline of Chinese identity affiliation in polls. By some means, the NSL resembles Freud’s description of the taboo in the protection of something ostensibly “sacred, above the ordinary,” such as the idea of sovereign integrity.88 The taboo-like security law mitigated China’s concealed anxiety of “a demonic power” harbored in protesters’ demands for universal suffrage and genuine autonomy in governance, which subsequently jeopardized China’s party-state integrity. China’s proud declaration to all opponents is that “resistance is futile” against the party-state. Third, one major lesson of Taiwan’s student demonstrators’ success in the 2014 Sunflowers Movement was the ruling elites’ willingness to

56

W. LEE

negotiate with protesters for a compromising solution and the availability of democratic institutions to facilitate a feasible resolution to public demands. Most of these favorable conditions did not exist in the 2019– 2020 Hong Kong protests. Indeed, hardly any Taiwanese elites would have an illusion that Hong Kong protesters would accomplish their protest goals. Even so, Taiwan’s DPP government was a major beneficiary from the protests. The protests in Hong Kong legitimized the DPP’s anti-China policies and boosted its poll rating from March 2019 until its landslide victory in the presidential election in January 2020. However, the catchphrase of “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” has lost its luster in the political market, though Taiwan has continued to reissue its pledge of humanitarian assistance to Hong Kong activists seeking personal safety in Taiwan. At the same time, when Taiwan’s overall export ratio grew only 0.2% in the first half of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic effect, Taiwan’s export trade to China, including Hong Kong, gained an increase of 9.8% during the same period. Taiwan’s export dependence on these two areas reached 42.3% in mid-2020, the highest ratio in the past decade in comparison with 24% in 2000 and 40% in 2008.89 In June 2021, Taiwan’s liaison office, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, suspended its operation due to the Hong Kong government’s refusal to renew work permits to its staff for supporting “people who sabotage Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.”90 Beijing and Taipei will need to find a mediation locality for future cross-Strait negotiations.

Notes 1. Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). 2. Ming K. Chan, “Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1895–1990,” in Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, eds. The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” Under Chinese Sovereignty (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 3–5. 3. Danny Gittings, Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), 68–69. 4. Ibid., 106. 5. Ng Ka Ling and Another v. The Director of Immigration. 1998. [1999] HKCFA 72; [1999] 2 HKCFAR 4; [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; [1999] 1 HKC 291; FACV000014/1998, January 29, 1999. Hong Kong Court

2

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

57

of Final Appeal, https://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfa/1999/72. html, accessed June 18, 2020; Cliff Buddle, “The Right of Abode Cases that Shook Hong Kong,” South China Moring Post, February 3, 2009, https://www.scmp.com/article/668742/right-abode-cases-shookhong-kong, accessed June 18, 2020; Waikeung Tarn, “Political Transition and the Rise of Cause Lawyering: The Case of Hong Kong,” Law & Social Inquiry 35, no. 3 (2010): 679–680. Jie Cheng, “From Beijing: The Story of a New Policy,” Hong Kong Journal, July 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20120107011853/ http://www.hkjournal.org/archive/2009_fall/1.htm, accessed June 17, 2020. Eric K. W. Ma and Anthony Y. J. Fung, “Negotiating Local and National Identifications: Hong Kong Identity Surveys, 1996–2006,” Asian Journal of Communication 17, no. 2 (June 2007): 179. Jermain T. M. Lam, “Political Decay in Hong Kong After the Occupy Central Movement,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 2 (2015): 107. National People’s Congress, Standing Committee (NPCSC), Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Thirty-first Session on 29 December 2007), Instrument 22, https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basicl awtext/index.html, accessed June 18, 2020; US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report, 110th Congress, 2nd Session, October 31, 2008, 205–206, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, http://www.cecc.gov. 44–748 PDF, accessed June 18, 2020. Jermain T. M. Lam, “Political Decay in Hong Kong After the Occupy Central Movement,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 2 (2015): 101–103. Mingxiu Ho, Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2019). Jermain T. M. Lam, “Political Decay in Hong Kong After the Occupy Central Movement,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 2 (2015): 105. Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), “Hong Kong Public Opinion and Political Development: Survey Results,” The Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS), December 18, 2014, http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/TaskFo rce_PressRelease_141218_Chinese.pdf, accessed June 25, 2020.

58

W. LEE

14. Malte Philipp Kaeding, “The Rise of ‘Localism’ in Hong Kong,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 165. 15. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute and Project Citizens Foundation, “Fandui xiuding taofan tiaoli yundong minjiang minqing baogao” (Report of Civil Sentiment of the Anti-Extradition Bill Revision Movement), December 13, 2019, 50, https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/5cfd1ba6a7117c000170d7aa/t/5df326ba04b7db043c7eff25/157 6216258900/PCF_Anti_Extradition_Bill_Stage+3_rpt_CHI_2019dec13_ v1.1_clean.pdf, accessed July 14, 2020. 16. Alex W. Palmer, “The Case of Hong Kong Missing Booksellers,” New York Times Magazine, April 3, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/04/03/magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers. html, accessed July 2, 2020. 17. Malte Philipp Kaeding, “The Rise of ‘Localism’ in Hong Kong,” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 159–161. 18. Benny Tai, Scott Veitch, and Hualing Fu, “Pursuing Democracy in an Authoritarian State: Protest and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong,” Social and Legal Studies 29, no. 1 (2020): 107–145. 19. Nina, Belyaeva, “Exploring Protest Publics: A New Conceptual Frame for Civil Participation Analysis,” in Protest Publics: Toward a New Concept of Mass Civic Action, eds. Belyaeva, Nina, Victor Albert, and Dmitry Zaytsev (Springer Nature Switzerland, AG, 2019), 10. 20. Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Douglas McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 21. Greg Torode, “Why Proposed Changes to Hong Kong’s Extradition Law Fueled Protests,” Reuters, June 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/art icle/us-hongkong-extradition-explainer/explainer-why-proposed-changesto-hong-kongs-extradition-law-are-fueling-protests-idUSKCN1TD0NB, accessed July 2, 2020. 22. Rex D. Hopper, “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movement,” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (March 1950): 273. 23. Zedong Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (NY: Praeger, 1961); Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128. 24. Francis L. F. Lee, Samson Yueh, Gary Tang, and Edmund W. Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising: From Anti-Extradition to AntiAuthoritarian Protests,” China Review 19, no. 4 (2019): 16–17.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

59

25. Verna Yu, “Hong Kong: Arrest of 750 Children during Protests Sparks Outcry,” The Guardian, October 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2019/oct/11/hong-kong-arrest-of-750-children-during-pro tests-sparks-outcry, accessed July 9, 2020. 26. Sum Lok-kei, “Young, Educated and Middle Class: First Field Study of Hong Long Protesters Reveals Demographic Trends,” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3022345/young-educated-and-middle-class-firstfield-study-hong-kong, accessed July 12, 2020. 27. Hong Kong Watch, Protest Prosecution Database, updated July 2, 2020, https://www.hongkongwatch.org/protest-prosecution, accessed July 9, 2020; Radio Television Hong Kong, “Qunian fansiuli shiwei huodong zhi benyue zhong, jingfang jubu 9113 ren” (Police Arrested 9113 People from Last Year’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protest Activities till the Middle of this Month), 2020, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/k2/153 4946-20200630.htm?archive_date=2020-06-30, accessed July 9, 2020. 28. Francis L. F. Lee, et al., 2019, 25. 29. Frank G. A. de Bakker, Frank den Hond, and Mikko Laamanen, “Social Movements: Organizations and Organizing,” in Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines, eds. Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans (Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 218–220; Luke Yates, “Rethinking Prefiguration: Alternatives, Micropolitics and Goals in Social Movements,” Social Movement Studies 14, no. 1 (2015): 3–5. 30. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute and Project Citizens Foundation, “Fandui xiuding taofan tiaoli yundong minjiang minqing baogao” (Report of Civil Sentiment of the Anti-Extradition Bill Revision Movement), December 13, 2019, 33–41, https://static1.squarespace. com/static/5cfd1ba6a7117c000170d7aa/t/5df326ba04b7db043c7ef f25/1576216258900/PCF_Anti_Extradition_Bill_Stage+3_rpt_CHI_ 2019dec13_v1.1_clean.pdf, accessed July 14, 2020. 31. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Demographic Trends in Hong Kong, 1986–2016, December 2017, 8, 12, http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp150.jsp?productCode= B1120017, accessed July 11, 2020. 32. Michelle Wong, “Why the Wealth Gap? Hong Kong’s Disparity Between Rich and Poor Is Greatest in 45 Years. So, What Can Be Done?” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2018, https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/society/article/2165872/why-wealth-gap-hongkongs-disparity-between-rich-and-poor, accessed August 6, 2020. 33. Stan Hok-Wui Wong and King Man Wan, “The Housing Boom and the Rise of Localism in Hong Kong,” China Perspectives 114, no. 3 (2018): 31–40.

60

W. LEE

34. Karl Ho, Stan Hok-wui Wong, Harold D. Clarke, and Kuan-Chen Lee, “A Comparative Study of the China Factor in Taiwan and Hong Kong Elections,” in Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, ed. Wei-chin Lee (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 119–144. 35. Elaine Chan, “Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’—National Identity in Hong Kong,” Government and Opposition 35, no. 4 (2000): 499. 36. Eric K. W. Ma and Anthony Y. J. Fung, “Negotiating Local and National Identifications: Hong Kong Identity Surveys, 1996–2006,” Asian Journal of Communication 17, no. 2 (2007): 174. 37. Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong (HKU POP Site), “HKU POP Final Farewell: Rift Widens Between Chinese and Hongkong Identities, National Pride Plunges to One in Four,” Press Release on June 27, 2019, https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/ release1594.html, accessed July 15, 2020. 38. Jillian Kay Melchior, “After Hong Kong’s Democratic Landslide,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2019, A19. 39. Vivian Wang, “Election Overhaul Plan Threatens to Sideline Hong Kong’s Opposition,” New York Times, April 13, 2021, https://www. nytimes.com/2021/04/13/world/asia/hong-kong-election-law.html, accessed June 28, 2021. 40. Javier C. Hernandez, “Harsh Penalties, Vaguely Defined Crimes: Hong Kong’s Security Law Explained,” New York Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/hong-kongsecurity-law-explain.html, accessed July 16, 2020. 41. State Council Information Office, PRC, “English translation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020, http://eng lish.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2020-07/01/content_76223722.htm, accessed July 16, 2020. 42. Ethan Meick, “Hong Kong’s Proposed Extradition Bill Could Extend Beijing’s Coercive Reach: Risks for the United States,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Issue Brief, May 7, 2019, 3–4, 8. 43. Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department, SAR, “Hong Kong-Taiwan Trade Relations,” July 2019, Various sites: www.tid.gov.hk/english/abo utus/publications/factsheet/factsheet.html, www.tid.gov.hk/english/abo utus/publications/factsheet/taiwan.html, and www.tid.gov.hk/english/ aboutus/publications/factsheet/usa.html, accessed July 5, 2020. 44. “Juqian yizhong, wuo zhugang renyuan huantai” (Refused to Sign the “One China” Affidavits, Official Personnel in Hong Kong Returned to Taiwan), Apple Daily, July 18, 2020, https://tw.appledaily.com/hea dline/20200718/IE5JBMJOKI3YXLL26CVZO3JI4E/, accessed, July 19, 2020.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

61

45. Annett Stimmer and Lea Wisken, “The Dynamics of Dissent: When Actions Are Louder than Words,” International Affairs 95, no. 3 (2019): 519–520. 46. Taiwan National Security Survey, Program in Asian Security Studies, Duke University, October 27–31, 2020, Question C22, https://sites.duke.edu/ pass/taiwan-national-security-survey/, accessed December 1, 2020. 47. Alvin Y. So, Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 270. 48. Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 256; Sonny Lo, “HK Needs to Educate Its Youth,” China Daily (HK edition), January 9, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedit ion/2015-01/09/content_19277314.htm, accessed July 20, 2020. 49. Richard C. Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 233– 237; Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “Hong Kong as Golden Goose and Coal Mine Canary,” Newsweek, October 18, 2014, https://www.newsweek.com/ hong-kong-golden-goose-and-coal-mine-canary-278211, accessed July 23, 2020. 50. Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China, 254–265; Dingding Chen and Katrin Kinzelbach, “Democracy Promotion and China: Blocker or Bystander?” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 409. 51. Alex Lo, “US Has Been Exposed for Funding Last Year’s Hong Kong Protests,” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2020, https://www.scmp. com/comment/opinion/article/3091438/us-has-been-exposed-fundinglast-years-hong-kong-protests, accessed July 28, 2020. 52. Teddy Ng, “Washington Backs off from Pressing Beijing on Hong Kong Political Reform,” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2014, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1591326/washin gton-pulls-back-beijing-clash-over-hong-kong-political-reform, accessed July 24, 2020. 53. Brian Christopher Jones and Yen-Tu Su, “Confrontational Contestation and Democratic Compromise: The Sunflower Movement and Its Aftermath,” in Law and Politics of the Taiwan Sunflower and Hong Kong Umbrella Movements, ed. Brian Christopher Jones (London: Routledge), 16. 54. Keoni Everington, “Taiwanese Now Care More about Sovereignty than Economy: Poll,” Taiwan News, June 19, 2019, https://www.taiwannews. com.tw/en/news/3727591, accessed August 3, 2020. 55. “Pingguo zhouzhou duibi mindiao 2” (Apple Weekly Contrast Poll 2), Apple Daily, June 25, 2019, http://tw.news.appledaily.com/politics/201 90625/EMW7FP62EN6HOEND5UWEV3JNUA/, accessed June 26, 2020.

62

W. LEE

56. Xiangguang zhugong? Tsai-Han zhichidu kuoda dao 18.4 baifendian chuang diaocha yilai xingao (Hong Kong Assisted? The Support Gap between Tsai and Han Widened to 18.4%. It Reached a New High Point since the Survey Started), Pin View (Ping guandian), November 28, 2019, https://www.pinview.com.tw/news/3084, accessed July 26, 2020. 57. United Daily News (UDN), Guanjian xuanmin: nianqingren zuoyou daxuan (Key Voters: Do Young People Decide the Election?), 2019, https://udn.com/newmedia/election2020/youth/, accessed July 27, 2020. 58. Chien-Jung Kao, “QSearch yifenzhong kan shequn: fansongzhong dayouxing” (QSearch One Minute to See the Media Community: The Big Anti-Extradition Demonstration), June 12, 2019, https://blog.qse arch.cc/2019/06/qsearch, accessed July 27, 2020. 59. Lao-lun-shi, “Mangguogan shi shimo yisi? Yizhangtu kan wanlu shengliang chengzhang” baofa jin 20 bei (What Is the Meaning of “Dried Mango”? One Graph Shows the 20 Times Eruption of Internet Volume Growth), Wanglu wenduji (Internt Thermometer; English site name: Daily View), August 26, 2019, https://dailyview.tw/popular/det ail/6036, accessed July 28, 2020. 60. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Taiwanese / Chinese Identity (1992/06~2020/06),” Posted July 3, 2020, https:// esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166, accessed July 27, 2020. 61. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1992/06~2020/06),” Posted July 3, 2020, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167, accessed July 27, 2020. 62. Ashley J. Tellis, “The Return of US-China Strategic Competition,” in Strategic Asia, 2020. U: US-China Competition for Global Influence, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020), 3–43. 63. Syaru Shirley Lin, “How Taiwan’s High-income Trap Shapes Its Options in the US-China Competition,” in Strategi Asia, 2020. U: US-China Competition for Global Influence, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020); Tellis, “The Return of US-China Strategic Competition,” 34–35. 64. “Xiangang shiwei jingwai heshou, meiguo he Taiwan jing dou youfen” (Black Hands in the Hong Kong Protests, the US and Taiwan Were Part of Them?), United Daily News, August 15, 2019, https://udn.com/ news/story/6656/3990868, accessed July 28, 2020. 65. Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, “Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong and Macao Affairs,” 2017, https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/ LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Q0010003, accessed July 29, 2020.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

63

66. United Nations, “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” https://www.unhcr. org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html, accessed July 29, 2020. 67. Elaine Hou, Ku Chuan, Chien-Pang Liu, and Elizabeth Hsu, “Taiwan Insists Existing Laws Serve Well amid Call for Refugee Act,” Focus Taiwan, September 4, 2019, http://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201909 040015, accessed July 29, 2020; Xinjie He, Zhide Li, and Liya Chen, “Xianggangren shi zhonghua minguo de shimo ren? Gangren futai xunqiu zhengzhi bifu de liangzhong moshi” (What Kind of People in the Republic of China Are Hongkonger? Two Types of Seeking Political Asylum for Hongkongers Travelling to Taiwan), Duan Chuan Mei (Initium Media), September 15, 2019, https://theinitium.com/article/ 20190916-hongkong-taiwan-refugee-octs/, accessed July 29, 2020. 68. Yan Wu, “Pi ‘minjindang zhi xiangyong gangrene xianxue huan xuanpiao,’ jinda xuesheng huizhang zhiqian” (Criticize “the DPP only Wanted to Use Hongkonger’s Blood to Exchange for Electoral Ballots”’ Baptist University Students Organization President Apologized), Mirror Media, December 10, 2019, https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20191210e di010/, accessed July 29, 2020. 69. Cora Englebrecht, “‘We Are Fleeing the Law’: Hong Kong Protesters Escaped to Taiwan,” New York Times, December 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/world/asia/hong-kongtaiwan-protests.html, accessed July 29, 20. 70. Yumin, Zhang, “Gangban guoanfa: Tsai Ing-wen Jingji fa shengming, buliao ‘tongle Xianggang yidao’” (Hong Kong National Security Law: Tsai Ing-wen Issued Emergency Announcement, She Unexpectedly “Stabbed Hong Kong”) May 25, 2020, https://www.hk01.com/, accessed July 29, 2020. 71. Chao Deng and Joyu Wang, “How Five Hong Kong Protesters Escaped by Speedboat, Found Freedom in the U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2021, www.wsj.com/articles/how-five-hong-kong-protesters-escapedby-speedboat-found-freedom-in-the-u-s-11624183200, accessed June 28, 2021. 72. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 5–40. 73. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Wivenhoe Park, Colcheser: ECPR Press, 2007), 70. 74. Timothy Mclaughlin, “China Turns to a Failed Plan to Quell Hong Kong’s Protest,” The Atlantic, December 8, 2019, https://www.theatl antic.com/international/archive/2019/12/hong-kong-protests-patriotsbeijing/603241/, accessed July 30, 2020. 75. Chun Han Wong, “Beijing’s New Hong Kong Protest Strategy: Let ‘Em Fight It Out,” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2019, https://www. wsj.com/articles/beijings-hong-kong-protest-strategy-let-em-fight-it-out11574332204, accessed July 30, 2020.

64

W. LEE

76. Daniel C. Mattingly and Elaine Yao, “How Soft Propaganda Persuade,” Comparative Political Studies 55, no. 9 (2022): 1569–1594. 77. Yonghong Han, “Weirao gangfu cheli de luoshengmen” (the Puzzle Surrounding Hong Kong Government’s Decision to Withdraw the AntiExtradition Bill), China Tribune, September 6, 2019, http://uschinews. com/20190906/28769, accessed August 1, 2020. 78. Brenda, Goh and Greg Torode, “In ‘Clear Warning’, Chinese Paramilitary Forces Exercise near Hong Kong,” Reuters, August 15, 2019, https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-pap/in-clear-warningchinese-paramilitary-forces-exercise-near-hong-kong-idUSKCN1V50LV, accessed September 13, 2020. 79. Jean Philippe Béja, The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre (New York: Routledge, 2011). 80. Kimberly Dozier, John Walcott, Amy Gunia, and Charlie Campbell, “Hong Kong Is Caught in the Middle of the the Middle of the Great US-China Power Struggle,” Time Magazine, June 15, 2020, 42. 81. Paul D’Anieri and Taras Kuzio, Public Opinion and Ukrainian Foreign Policy, in National Security, Public Opinion, and Regime Asymmetry: A Six-Country Study, eds. T. J. Cheng and Wei-chin Lee (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2017), 115–146. 82. Erin Baggot Carter and Brett L. Carter, “When Autocrats Threaten Citizens with Violence: Evidence from China,” British Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (2022): 671–696. 83. Michael C. Davis, “Beijing’s Broken Promises,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2 (2015): 102–104. 84. “Timeline of National Security Law for Hong Kong,” Global Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1193126.shtml, accessed August 1, 2020. 85. Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York: Oxford University Press), translation from the German by E. A. Shils, in collaboration with Edith Lowenstein and Klaus Knorr (1941, reprint, Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, Ltd, 2006); Wei-chin Lee, “The Acrobatic Justice on the Marching Order: China’s Fourth Judicial Reform in Perspective,” in Governance Innovation and Policy Change: Re-Calibrations of Chinese Politics under Xi Jinping, ed. Neal Noesselt (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 127–151. 86. Jeremy Goldkorn, “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble,” in Shared Destiny, eds. Geremie R Barmé, Linda Jaivin, and Jeremy Goldkorn (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2015), 288–291; Xinglian Chen, “Image of Crime of Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble in Legal Dogmatics: Centering on Creating Disturbances,” China’s Legal Science 4, no. 1 (2016): 121-144.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

65

87. Patrick Wintour, “Three Million Hong Kong Residents ‘Eligible’ for UK Citizenship,” The Guardian, May 29, 2020, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2020/may/29/three-million-hong-kong-residents-eligiblefor-uk-citizenship, accessed August 2, 2020. 88. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics, translated with introduction by A. A. Brill (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918), 37, 42, Chap. 2. 89. “Taiwan dui dalu shichang chukou yichundu chuang shinian xingao” (Taiwan’s Export Dependence on the Mainland Market Reached the Highest Ratio in Ten Years), Wenhui Bao, July 24, 2020, http://news. wenweipo.com/2020/07/24/IN2007240094.htm, accessed August 2, 2020. 90. Yen-hsi Lai and Emerson Lim, “Taiwan’s Hong Kong Office Left with 1 Staffer as Others Forced to Return Home,” Focus Taiwan, June 20, 2021, focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202106200009, accessed June 28, 2021.

Bibliography Apple Daily. “Pingguo zhouzhou duibi mindiao 2” (Apple Weekly Contrast Poll 2), June 25, 2019. tw.news.appledaily.com/politics/20190625/ EMW7FP62EN6HOEND5UWEV3JNUA/. Accessed June 26, 2020. Apple Daily. “Juqian yizhong, wuo zhugang renyuan huantai” (Refused to Sign the “One China” Affidavits, Official Personnel in Hong Kong Returned to Taiwan), July 18, 2020. https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/20200718/IE5 JBMJOKI3YXLL26CVZO3JI4E/. Accessed, July 19, 2020. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93-128. Béja, Jean Philippe. The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. New York: Routledge, 2011. Belyaeva, Nina. “Exploring Protest Publics: A New Conceptual Frame for Civil Participation Analysis.” In Protest Publics: Toward a New Concept of Mass Civic Action, edited by Nina Belyaeva, Victor Albert, and Dmitry Zaytsev, 9–31. Springer Nature Switzerland, AG, 2019. Buddle, Cliff. “The Right of Abode Cases that Shook Hong Kong.” South China Moring Post, February 3, 2009. https://www.scmp.com/article/668 742/right-abode-cases-shook-hong-kong. Accessed June 18, 2020. Bush, Richard C. Hong Kong in the Shadow of China: Living with the Leviathan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016. Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Wivenhoe Park, Colcheser: ECPR Press, 2007.

66

W. LEE

Carter, Erin Baggot and Brett L. Carter. “When Autocrats Threaten Citizens with Violence: Evidence from China.” British Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (2022): 671–696. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. “Demographic Trends in Hong Kong, 1986–2016,” December 2017. www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp150.jsp?productCode=B1120017. Accessed July 11, 2020. Chan, Elaine. “Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’—National Identity in Hong Kong.” Government and Opposition 35, no. 4 (2000): 499-519. Chan, Ming K. “Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1895–1990.” In The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” Under Chinese Sovereignty, edited by Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, 3–35. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991. Chen, Xinglian. “Image of Crime of Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble in Legal Dogmatics: Centering on Creating Disturbances.” China’s Legal Science 4, no. 1 (2016): 121-144. Chen, Dingding, and Katrin Kinzelbach. “Democracy Promotion and China: Blocker or Bystander?” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 400-418. Cheng, Jie. “From Beijing: The Story of a New Policy.” Hong Kong Journal, July 2019. https://web.archive.org/web/20120107011853/http://www.hkjour nal.org/archive/2009_fall/1.htm. Accessed June 17, 2020. Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). “Hong Kong Public Opinion and Political Development: Survey Results.” Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey (CCPOS), December 18, 2014. http://www.com. cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/TaskForce_PressRelease_141218_Chinese. pdf. Accessed June 25, 2020. D’Anieri, Paul, and Taras Kuzio. “Public Opinion and Ukrainian Foreign Policy.” In National Security, Public Opinion, and Regime Asymmetry: A Six-Country Study, edited by T. J. Cheng and Wei-chin Lee, 115-146. Singapore: World Scientific, 2017. Davis, Michael C. “Beijing’s Broken Promises.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2 (April 2015): 101–110. de Bakker, Frank G. A., Frank den Hond, and Mikko Laamanen. “Social Movements: Organizations and Organizing.” In Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines, edited by Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans, 203–231. Springer International Publishing, 2017. Deng, Chao, and Joyu Wang. “How Five Hong Kong Protesters Escaped by Speedboat, Found Freedom in the US.” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2021. www.wsj.com/articles/how-five-hong-kong-protesters-escaped-byspeedboat-found-freedom-in-the-u-s-11624183200. Accessed June 28, 2021.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

67

Dozier, Kimberly, John Walcott, Amy Gunia, and Charlie Campbell. “Hong Kong Is Caught in the Middle of the Middle of the Great US-China Power Struggle.” Time Magazine, June 15, 2020, 38–43. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. “Taiwanese/Chinese Identity (1992/06~2020/06),” posted July 3, 2020. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/ course/news.php?Sn=166. Accessed July 27, 2020. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1992/06~2020/06).” https://esc.nccu.edu. tw/course/news.php?Sn=167. Accessed July 27, 2020. Englebrecht, Cora. “’We Are Fleeing the Law’: Hong Kong Protesters Escaped to Taiwan.” New York Times, December 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/12/08/world/asia/hong-kong-taiwan-protests.html. Accessed July 29, 2020. Everington, Keoni. “Taiwanese Now Care More about Sovereignty than Economy: Poll.” Taiwan News, June 19, 2019. https://www.taiwannews. com.tw/en/news/3727591. Accessed August 3, 2020. Fraenkel, Ernst. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. Translation from the German by E.A. Shils, in collaboration with Edith Lowenstein and Klaus Knorr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941; reprint, Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, Ltd, 2006. Freud, Sigmund. Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics. Translated with introduction by A. A. Brill. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918. Gittings, Danny. Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013. Global Times. Timeline of National Security Law for Hong Kong, June 30, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1193126.shtml. Accessed August 1, 2020. Goh, Brenda, and Greg Torode. “In ‘Clear Warning,’ Chinese Paramilitary Forces Exercise Near Hong Kong.” Reuters, August 15, 2019. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-pap/in-clear-warning-chineseparamilitary-forces-exercise-near-hong-kong-idUSKCN1V50LV. Accessed September 13, 2020. Goldkorn, Jeremy. “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble.” In Shared Destiny, edited by Geremie R. Barmé, Linda Jaivin, and Jeremy Goldkorn, 288-291. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2015. Han, Yonghong. “Weirao gangfu cheli de luoshengmen” (the Puzzle Surrounding Hong Kong Government’s Decision to Withdraw the AntiExtradition Bill). China Tribune, September 6, 2019. http://uschinews.com/ 20190906/28769. Accessed August 1, 2020. He, Xinjie, Zhide Li, and Liya Chen. “Xianggangren shi zhonghua minguo de shimo ren? Gangren futai xunqiu zhengzhi bifu de liangzhong moshi”

68

W. LEE

(What Kind of People in the Republic of China Are Hongkonger? Two Types of Seeking Political Asylum for Hongkongers Travelling to Taiwan). Duan Chuan Mei (Initium Media), September 15, 2019. https://theinitium.com/ article/20190916-hongkong-taiwan-refugee-octs/. Accessed July 29, 2020. Hernandez, Javier C. “Harsh Penalties, Vaguely Defined Crimes: Hong Kong’s Security Law Explained.” New York Times, June 30, 2020. https://www.nyt imes.com/2020/06/30/world/asia/hong-kong-security-law-explain.html. Accessed July 16, 2020. Ho, Karl, Stan Hok-wui Wong, Harold D. Clarke, and Kuan-Chen Lee. “A Comparative Study of the China Factor in Taiwan and Hong Kong Elections.” In Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges, edited by Weichin Lee, 119–144. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Ho, Mingxiu. Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2019. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute and Project Citizens Foundation. “Fandui xiuding taofan tiaoli yundong minjiang minqing baogao” (Report of Civil Sentiment of the Anti-Extradition Bill Revision Movement). December 13, 2019. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cfd1ba6a7117c000170d 7aa/t/5df326ba04b7db043c7eff25/1576216258900/PCF_Anti_Extradi tion_Bill_Stage+3_rpt_CHI_2019dec13_v1.1_clean.pdf. Accessed July 14, 2020. Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department, SAR. “Hong Kong-Taiwan Trade Relations,” July 2019. Various sites: www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/ publications/factsheet/factsheet.html, www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/pub lications/factsheet/taiwan.html, and www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/public ations/factsheet/usa.html. Accessed July 5, 2020. Hong Kong Watch. Protest Prosecution Database. Updated July 2, 2020. https:/ /www.hongkongwatch.org/protest-prosecution. Accessed July 9, 2020. Hopper, Rex D. “The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movement.” Social Forces 28, no. 3 (1950): 270-279. Hou, Elaine, Ku Chuan, Chien-Pang Liu, and Elizabeth Hsu. “Taiwan Insists Existing Laws Serve Well amid Call for Refugee Act.” Focus Taiwan, September 4, 2019. https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201909 040015. Accessed July 29, 2020. Jones, Brian Christopher, and Yen-Tu Su. “Confrontational Contestation and Democratic Compromise: The Sunflower Movement and Its Aftermath.” In Law and Politics of the Taiwan Sunflower and Hong Kong Umbrella Movements, edited by Brian Christopher Jones, 15–29. London and New York: Routledge, 2017. Kaeding, Malte Philipp. “The Rise of ‘Localism’ in Hong Kong.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 (2017): 157-171.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

69

Kao, Chien-Jung. “QSearch yifenzhong kan shequn: fansongzhong dayouxing” (QSearch One Minute to See the Media Community: The Big AntiExtradition Demonstration). June 12, 2019. https://blog.qsearch.cc/2019/ 06/qsearch. Accessed July 27, 2020. Lai, Yen-hsi and Emerson Lim. “Taiwan’s Hong Kong Office Left with 1 Staffer as Others Forced to Return Home.” Focus Taiwan, June 20, 2021. focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202106200009. Accessed June 28, 2021. Lam, Jermain T. M. “Political Decay in Hong Kong After the Occupy Central Movement.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 42, no. 2 (2015): 99–121. Lao-lun-shi. “‘Mangguogan shi shimo yisi? Yizhangtu kan wanlu shengliang chengzhang’ baofa jin 20 bei” (What Is the Meaning of “Dried Mango”? One Graph Shows the 20 Times Eruption of Internet Volume Growth), Wanglu wenduji (Internt Thermometer; English site name: Daily View), August 26, 2019. https://dailyview.tw/popular/detail/6036. Accessed July 28, 2020. Lee, Francis L. F., Samson Yueh, Gary Tang, and Edmund W. Cheng. “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising: From Anti-Extradition to Anti-Authoritarian Protests.” China Review 19, no. 4 (2019): 1–32. Lee, Wei-chin. “The Acrobatic Justice on the Marching Order: China’s Fourth Judicial Reform in Perspective.” In Governance Innovation and Policy Change: Re-Calibrations of Chinese Politics Under Xi Jinping, edited by Neal Noesselt, 127–151. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, imprint of Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. Lin, Syaru Shirley. “How Taiwan’s High-Income Trap Shapes Its Options in the US-China Competition.” In Strategi Asia, 2020: US-China Competition for Global Influence, edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, 133–160. Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020. Lo, Alex. “US Has Been Exposed for Funding Last Year’s Hong Kong Protests.” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2020. https://www.scmp. com/comment/opinion/article/3091438/us-has-been-exposed-fundinglast-years-hong-kong-protests. Accessed July 28, 2020. Lo, Sonny. “HK Needs to Educate Its Youth.” China Daily (HK edition), January 9, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2015-01/09/ content_19277314.htm. Accessed July 20, 2020. Lo, Sonny Shiu-Hing. The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008. Ma, Eric K. W., and Anthony Y. J. Fung. “Negotiating Local and National Identifications: Hong Kong Identity Surveys, 1996–2006.” Asian Journal of Communication 17, no. 2 (2007): 172–185. Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China. Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong and Macao Affairs. The website of “Laws and Regulations of the Republic of China,” 2017. https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll. aspx?pcode=Q0010003. Accessed July 29, 2020.

70

W. LEE

Mao, Zedong. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. NY: Praeger, 1961. Mattingly, Daniel C. and Elaine Yao. “How Soft Propaganda Persuade.” Comparative Political Studies 55, no. 9 (2022): 1569-1594. McAdam, Douglas. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. McAdam, Douglas, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Mclaughlin, Timothy. “China Turns to a Failed Plan to Quell Hong Kong’s Protest.” The Atlantic, December 8, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/int ernational/archive/2019/12/hong-kong-protests-patriots-beijing/603241/. Accessed July 30, 2020. Meick, Ethan. “Hong Kong’s Proposed Extradition Bill Could Extend Beijing’s Coercive Reach: Risks for the United States.” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Issue Brief, May 7, 2019. Melchior, Jillian Kay. “After Hong Kong’s Democratic Landslide.” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2019, A19. National People’s Congress, Standing Committee (NPCSC). Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage (Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Thirty-first Session on December 29). Instrument 22. 2007. https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index. html. Accessed June 18, 2020. Ng Ka Ling and Another v. The Director of Immigration. [1999] HKCFA 72; [1999] 2 HKCFAR 4; [1999] 1 HKLRD 315; [1999] 1 HKC 291; FACV000014/1998, January 29. Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. 1999. https://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfa/1999/72.html. Accessed June 18, 2020. Ng, Teddy. “Washington Backs off from Pressing Beijing on Hong Kong Political Reform.” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2014. https:// www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1591326/washington-pulls-backbeijing-clash-over-hong-kong-political-reform. Accessed July 24, 2020. Ortmann, Stephan. “The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s Protracted Democratization Process.” Asian Affairs 46, no. 1 (2015): 32-50. Palmer, Alex W. “The Case of Hong Kong Missing Booksellers.” New York Times Magazine, April 3, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/ magazine/the-case-of-hong-kongs-missing-booksellers.html. Accessed July 2, 2020. Pin View (Ping guandian). “Xiangguang zhugong? Tsai-Han zhichidu kuoda dao 18.4 baifendian chuang diaocha yilai xingao” (Hong Kong Assisted? The

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

71

Support Gap between Tsai and Han Widened to 18.4%. It Reached a New High Point since the Survey Started). November 28, 2019. https://www.pin view.com.tw/news/3084. Accessed July 26, 2020. Public Opinion Programme, the University of Hong Kong (HKU POP Site). “HKU POP Final Farewell: Rift Widens Between Chinese and Hongkong Identities, National Pride Plunges to One in Four.” Press Release on June 27, 2019. https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1594. html. Accessed July 15, 2020. Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK). “Qunian fansiuli shiwei huodong zhi benyue zhong, jingfang jubu 9113 ren” (Police Arrested 9113 People from Last Year’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protest Activities till the Middle of this Month). 2020. https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/k2/153 4946-20200630.htm?archive_date=2020-06-30. Accessed July 9, 2020. Snyder, Jack, and Karen Ballentine. “Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas.” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 5–40. So, Alvin Y. Hong Kong’s Embattled Democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. State Council Information Office, PRC. “English translation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” July 1, 2020. http://english.scio.gov. cn/topnews/2020-07/01/content_76223722.htm. Accessed July 16, 2020. Stimmer, Annett, and Lea Wisken. “The Dynamics of Dissent: When Actions Are Louder than Words.” International Affairs 95, no. 3 (2019): 515–533. Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. Sum Lok-kei. Young, “Educated and Middle Class: First Field Study of Hong Long Protesters Reveals Demographic Trends.” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/art icle/3022345/young-educated-and-middle-class-first-field-study-hong-kong. Accessed July 12, 2020. Tai, Benny, Scott Veitch, and Hualing Fu. “Pursuing Democracy in an Authoritarian State: Protest and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong.” Social and Legal Studies 29, no. 1 (2020):107-145. Taiwan National Security Survey. Program in Asian Security Studies, Duke University, October 27–31, 2020. https://sites.duke.edu/pass/taiwan-nat ional-security-survey/. Accessed December 1, 2020. Tarn, Waikeung. “Political Transition and the Rise of Cause Lawyering: The Case of Hong Kong.” Law & Social Inquiry 35, no. 3 (2010): 663–687. www. jstor.org/stable/40783687. Accessed June 18, 2020. Tellis, Ashley J. “The Return of US-China Strategic Competition.” In Strategic Asia, 2020. U: US-China Competition for Global Influence, edited by Ashley J.

72

W. LEE

Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills, 3–43. Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020. Torode, Greg. “Why Proposed Changes to Hong Kong’s Extradition Law Fueled Protests.” Reuters, June 12, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/ushongkong-extradition-explainer/explainer-why-proposed-changes-to-hongkongs-extradition-law-are-fueling-protests-idUSKCN1TD0NB. Accessed July 2, 2020. United Daily News (UDN). “Guanjian xuanmin: nianqingren zuoyou daxuan” (Key Voters: Do Young People Decide the Election?). n.d., 2019. https:// udn.com/newmedia/election2020/youth/. Accessed July 27, 2020. United Daily News (UDN). “Xiangang shiwei jingwai heshou, meiguo he Taiwan jing dou youfen” (Black Hands in the Hong Kong Protests, the US and Taiwan Were Part of Them?). August 15, 2019. https://udn.com/news/ story/6656/3990868. Accessed July 28, 2020. United Nations. The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/enus/1951-refugee-convention.html. Accessed July 29, 2020. United States, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Annual Report. 110th Congress, 2nd Session, October 31, 2008. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. http://www.cecc.gov. 44–748 PDF. Accessed June 18, 2020. Veg, Sebastian. “The Rise of ‘Localism’ and Civic Identity in Post-handover Hong Kong: Questioning the Chinese Nation-State.” The China Quarterly no. 230 (2017): 323-347. Wang, Vivian. “Election Overhaul Plan Threatens to Sideline Hong Kong’s Opposition.” New York Times, April 13, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/04/13/world/asia/hong-kong-election-law.html. Accessed June 28, 2021. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. “Hong Kong as Golden Goose and Coal Mine Canary.” Newsweek, October 18, 2014. https://www.newsweek.com/hong-kong-gol den-goose-and-coal-mine-canary-278211. Accessed July 23, 2020. Wenhui Bao. “Taiwan dui dalu shichang chukou yichundu chuang shinian xingao” (Taiwan’s Export Dependence on the Mainland Market Reached the Highest Ratio in Ten Years). July 24, 2020. http://news.wenweipo.com/ 2020/07/24/IN2007240094.htm. Accessed August 2, 2020. Wintour, Patrick. “Three Million Hong Kong Residents ‘Eligible’ for UK Citizenship.” The Guardian, May 29, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/may/29/three-million-hong-kong-residents-eligible-for-uk-cit izenship. Accessed August 2, 2020. Wong, Michelle. “Why the Wealth Gap? Hong Kong’s Disparity Between Rich and Poor Is Greatest in 45 Years. So What Can Be Done?” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/society/article/2165872/why-wealth-gap-hong-kongs-disparity-bet ween-rich-and-poor. Accessed August 6, 2020.

2

CONTESTING IDENTITIES: HONG KONG’S PROTESTS …

73

Wong, Chun Han. “Beijing’s New Hong Kong Protest Strategy: Let ‘Em Fight It Out,’” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2019. https://www.wsj. com/articles/beijings-hong-kong-protest-strategy-let-em-fight-it-out-115743 32204. Accessed July 30, 2020. Wong, Stan Hok-Wui, and King Man Wan. “The Housing Boom and the Rise of Localism in Hong Kong.” China Perspectives 114, no. 3 (2018): 31–40. Wu, Yan. Pi “‘minjindang zhi xiangyong gangrene xianxue huan xuanpiao,’ jinda xuesheng huizhang zhiqian” (Criticize “the DPP only Wanted to Use Hongkonger’s Blood to Exchange for Electoral Ballots.” Baptist University Students Organization President Apologized). Mirror Media, December 10, 2019. https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20191210edi010/. Accessed July 29, 2020. Yates, Luke. “Rethinking Prefiguration: Alternatives, Micropolitics and Goals in Social Movements.” Social Movement Studies 14, no. 1 (2015): 1-21. Yu, Verna. “Hong Kong: Arrest of 750 Children during Protests Sparks Outcry.” The Guardian, October 11, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/oct/11/hong-kong-arrest-of-750-children-during-protests-spa rks-outcry. Accessed July 9, 2020. Zhang, Yumin. “Gangban guoanfa: Tsai Ing-wen Jingji fa shengming, buliao tongle Xianggang yidao” (Hong Kong National Security Law: Tsai Ing-wen Issued Emergency Announcement, She Unexpectedly “Stabbed Hong Kong”) HK01 site, May 25, 2020. https://www.hk01.com/. Accessed July 29, 2020.

CHAPTER 3

Authoritarian Crackdown Without Bloodshed: China’s Securitization in Post-NSL Hong Kong Yan-ho Lai

Introduction Hong Kong, a global metropolis and a most famous Asian financial center, has long been well known for its outstanding economic development amid the Cold War and the rise of China’s economic power in the world. Based on the Fraser Institute’s assessment, up to 2020, Hong Kong has remained the world’s freest economy for twenty-eight consecutive years (Fraser Institute 2022).1 The dazzling economic achievement of Hong

Part of the findings and arguments draws on the author’s recent article, “Securitization or Autocratization? Hong Kong’s Rule of Law under the Shadow of China’ Authoritarian Governance” in the Journal of Asian and African Studies, first published online on October 8, 2022. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/00219096221124978. Y. Lai (B) Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_3

75

76

Y. LAI

Kong was also affirmed in 2019 when the World Bank ranked Hong Kong’s GDP per capita, measured in purchasing power parity, thirteenth in the world from the top. The aspiration of Hong Kong’s economic achievements is partly built on its “one country, two systems” policy under the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (China). Signed between the British and PRC governments as well as registered as an international treaty of the United Nations in 1984, a Joint Declaration in light of Hong Kong’s sovereignty transfer from Britain to China set out the governing framework of Hong Kong after its political transition in 1997, including the preservation of the colonial administration to a large extent, of its capitalist market economy, and of an independent judiciary. The “One Country, Two Systems” formula in Hong Kong used to be an experiment for China to promote reunification with Taiwan.2 Although the Joint Declaration did not specify political reform as an essential component of Hong Kong’s political transition package, the Basic Law of Hong Kong, that is, its “mini-constitution,” promises Hong Kong a path to universal suffrage in electing the Chief Executive (CE) as well as the legislature. Such constitutional arrangement also appeared to present an optimistic picture to Taiwanese people with regard to the PRC’s reunification agenda. That said, Hong Kong’s democratization has been repeatedly reversed and blocked by its sovereign master since the sovereignty transfer of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997. There has been repeated procrastination by Chinese authorities to make this a reality, and its rule of law and civil liberties have been diminished.3 The degree of self-government, political freedoms, and the rule of law in this semi-autonomous city has drastically deteriorated since China imposed the national security law (NSL) in 2020. As of 2022, Hong Kong continues to be classified as a partly-free regime worldwide.4 This chapter explains how the national security law and its enforcement eco-system become the primary tool for both Chinese and Hong Kong authorities to weaken independent courts, disable political participation, and foster a chilling effect as well as ideological indoctrination in society. Considering the findings from official records, published materials, and the author’s interviews with stakeholders in civil society and the education industry of Hong Kong, this chapter argues that the NSL has been applied by the executive government to exercise greater interference in the court, to eliminate the significant mobilizing forces from the

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

77

political opposition, and to further incentivize self-censorship in different sectors by an enhanced censorship regime. Without provoking or exerting political violence, the NSL and its eco-system have effectively encroached independent institutions, eradicated most of the political opposition, and dismantled the free and open society of Hong Kong since 2020.

Establishing a National Security Regime in Hong Kong: Why and How? Safeguarding national security in Hong Kong has been one of Beijing’s policy priorities for Hong Kong ever since the pre-handover period. This was partly due to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military crackdown on the Tiananmen student movement of 1989.5 The CCP regarded Hong kongers’ support for the Chinese students as a threat of subversion.6 On the other hand, the people of Hong Kong believed that democratization was the only path of defending their ways of life and of resisting China’s harsh governance after the handover in 1997.7 Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which is a mini-constitutional document for implementing the “one country, two systems” policy after the handover, provides that the local government shall legislate national security laws on its own. Before its promulgation in 1990, China revised the final draft of the Basic Law by prohibiting foreign political organizations from conducting “political activities” in the region and banning political organizations establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.8 In 2002, the Hong Kong government attempted to introduce a national security bill according to Article 23 of the Basic Law. Yet, the government finally withdrew the bill ten months after, as more than 500,000 citizens protested against the bill that was alleged to undermine protections of civil liberties and political freedoms in the city.9 When Xi Jinping commenced to be the leader of the CCP in 2012, he began placing national security as the top priority in governing mainland China as well as Hong Kong. He introduced new state apparatus and legislations which masqueraded under a national security narrative and “rule-based governance” propaganda.10 Examples included the establishment of a National Security Commission of China in 2013, which serves as an oversight body in the CCP structure and the promotion of the “holistic view of national security” agenda in 2014.11 In the following year, the Chinese authorities adopted a new national security law, which unprecedently brought Hong Kong and Macau into China’s national

78

Y. LAI

security framework.12 Furthermore, the passage of an international NGO law in 2016 further centralized the regulatory power of the CCP to control local and overseas civil society organizations stationed on the mainland, in order to securitize the Chinese regime.13 Xi’s national security narrative became more pertinent to Hong Kong, as the State Council released a White Paper in 2014 to re-interpret the relationship between Hong Kong and the central authorities. The White Paper declared that China has “overall jurisdiction” over Hong Kong, despite the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law’s promise that the city would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The document also asks administrators in Hong Kong, including judges, to be patriotic by safeguarding “the country’s sovereignty, security, and development interests.”14 Such a narrative prioritizes national security over other goals of the “one country, two systems” policy and imposes political duties for judges, even though they are expected to perform their role of checks and balances against other branches of government independently and apolitically. Despite the repeated call for safeguarding national security in Hong Kong by the Chinese authorities, the Hong Kong government never tabled any national security law since its failure in 2003. As scholars predicted, when the local government was unable to establish a legal framework for national security in Hong Kong, the sovereign state would take the lead to do so.15 In May 2020, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a motion to introduce the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (National Security Law, NSL) and its enforcing institutions in Hong Kong. The decision to impose the NSL over Hong Kong was a measure of the central authorities to strike back against the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in 2019, when citizens protested against the Hong Kong government’s attempt to legislate ad hoc extradition agreements with China.16 Beijing perceived the citywide protests as an attempt of the opposition to take over Hong Kong, and thus broke the “bottom line” of the sovereign state.17 Without local consultation and legislation, the NSL was promulgated by the Standing Committee of NPC (SCNPC) on June 30, 2020. The NSL covers four kinds of offenses: secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security. The definition and scope of these offenses are broad and ambiguous in the law, and non-violent activities can

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

79

also be counted as endangering national security under the law. Therefore, the four offenses could criminalize almost all kinds of non-violent protest activities during the 2019 Anti-extradition Bill Movement. As the NSL provides, activities of secession and subversion include non-violent speeches promoting separation of Hong Kong from China, as well as acts of disrupting the performance of duties and functions of the Hong Kong government. In February 2021, forty-seven opposition activists and former lawmakers were charged with conspiracy to commit subversion due to their engagement in a peaceful citywide pro-democracy primary before the now-postponed Legislative Council elections.18 In the first national security case, a young man was sentenced to six and a half years in jail for inciting others to secession and eight years for committing a terrorist act, but will serve a total of nine years. The basis of the secession charge was that the convicted man was displaying a flag with the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong. Revolution of Our Times” while riding a motorbike. The display had not incited any imminent violence but resulted in a heavy and disproportionate jail sentence.19 Alleged acts of inciting terrorism, which is one of the four offenses in the NSL, could include public mourning of a citizen stabbing a police officer in Hong Kong, whereas the offense of foreign collusion could be used to charge activists who raised funds for covering expenses of advertisements that supported Hong Kong protests in foreign newspapers.20 Apart from introducing national security crimes, the NSL also brought in new security apparatus in Hong Kong. The Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS), the National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force (NSD), and the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government (OSNS) were established as the key NSL enforcement agencies. The CSNS is led by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong (CE) but also supervised by a Chinese envoy appointed by the central authorities. It functions as an overseeing body to implement the national security regime not only in the legal system but also in various facets of Hong Kong society. The NSD, as a special division of the Hong Kong Police Force, is responsible for investigating national security offenses and enforcing the NSL. National security police are empowered by the Implementation Rules of NSL to search places and extract information from digital devices without judicial warrant. Moreover, the NSD also enforces other national security laws, such as the offense of sedition in the Crimes Ordinance, investigating and arresting suspects allegedly inciting or promoting seditious speeches and

80

Y. LAI

publications. It also operates a national security reporting hotline in the city to receive information or reports in relation to activities endangering national security. Last but not least, the OSNS is a special branch subordinate to the central authorities of China. Its staff and acts are not subject to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. Under the NSL, the OSNS exercises jurisdiction in Hong Kong only when national security cases involve a foreign country and make it difficult for the Hong Kong government to handle those cases, or when the local government is unable to enforce the NSL, or when a major and imminent threat to national security occurs.21 In these circumstances, the OSNS can exercise investigative power in Hong Kong and send suspects to the mainland for criminal trials.22 However, the NSL also provides that the operation of the CSNS, the OSNS, and the NSD is not disclosed to the public. It is difficult to know whether the OSNS operates beyond the laws of Hong Kong. Consequently, the NSL and its enforcing agencies founded a national security regime in Hong Kong that serves to criminalize activities perceived as endangering the national security of China; implement the NSL and national security policies by new institutions that are partly presided by mainland Chinese officials; and create new surveillance apparatus operated by local national security police and mainland Chinese secret police. The next section explains how such de facto national security eco-system impacts the local courts handling national security cases.

A “Circumcised” Independent Judiciary Global ranking agencies, including the World Justice Project and the World Economic Forum, appreciated Hong Kong as one of the top jurisdictions following the universal standards of the rule of law.23 The city’s rule of law, backed by an independent judiciary, has backed its reputation as a global financial hub as well. Hong Kong has followed the British common law tradition of judicial independence ever since colonial times. One of the key features of Hong Kong’s courts refers to its high degree of judicial autonomy, meaning that the judiciary is free from external interference to a large extent. This is a prerequisite for an independent, impartial, and credible judiciary that interprets and implements laws as well as limits the government. Nevertheless, after the enactment of the NSL, the scope of judicial autonomy as well as the local jurisdiction of the courts were diminished when handling national security cases.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

81

According to the provisions in the NSL, any act of the CSNS is not subject to judicial review. The acts of the OSNS are also not subject to the local jurisdiction of Hong Kong court and can override the local courts to take over national security cases in exceptional circumstances. The NSD no longer needs a court warrant for searching when investigating on national security cases. Regarding judicial personnel, the NSL further empowers the CE to designate judges to try national security cases; this is also an executive power to reject any judge who has made any statement or behaved in any manner that endangers national security, from hearing those trials.24 In terms of human rights protection, which was considered as one of the core functions of Hong Kong’s court, even though the Hong Kong law includes the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) that safeguards a variety of civil and legal rights in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the courts could be unable to apply provisions of BORO if they clash with the NSL: the latter provides that the NSL prevails over local laws in the event of any inconsistency between them. The new electoral system, which was established in the name of election security under the national security agenda, further engendered a new executive regime free of judicial review. Prior to the election overhaul, the NPCSC had already empowered the CE to disqualify elected lawmakers on the grounds of safeguarding national security.25 Later on, the idea of safeguarding “election security” became more ostensible when officials from the central authorities openly called for ensuring patriots were elected to administer Hong Kong.26 Wang Zhemin, who is a legal scholar on the mainland and then became the head of the security affairs division in Beijing’s Hong Kong and Macau Office, emphasized the importance of reforming and securitizing Hong Kong’s electoral system.27 In March 2021, the NPCSC introduced a reform of the CE and the Legislative Council (LC) elections. The election overhaul restructured the composition of members in the LC and the Election Committee (EC), which is an electoral college of 1,500 individuals that selects the CE, respectively. Popularly elected seats in the LC and EC elections are sharply reduced under the reform. A new “Candidate Eligibility Review Committee” (CERC) was established to decide whether nominated individuals are qualified to run for elections. The criteria of qualifying candidates rely on the decisions of members from CSNS, who reference the background checks of the NSD on the nominated individuals. Any nomination decisions made by CERC are not subject to judicial

82

Y. LAI

review.28 The securitized electoral system has barred most opposition parties from running for elections, whereas local courts are no longer able to scrutinize executive decision in terms of electoral nomination, enabling the Chinese authorities to further centralize its power and control those bodies.29 The question of fair trials surfaced in NSL cases and national securityrelated trials as well. The arrangement of CE’s designation of national security judges poses a doubt: whether a defendant enjoys a fair hearing is inconsequential, as national security judges could be designated on the basis of ideological bias.30 Combined with the state-sponsored media propaganda shaming certain judges’ handling of political trials in Hong Kong as well as China’s governing agenda of “patriots administering Hong Kong,” judicial appointments and promotions have become much more politicized than before and have favored the executive government to influence national security trials.31 Under the NSL, the CE can certify “whether an act involves national security” when such question arises in a national security trial, and the CE’s decision binds the courts. In other words, instead of the court, the executive authority can now determine the validity and applicability of evidence in national security trial. Another provision in the NSL empowers the Secretary for Justice, who is a political official appointed by Beijing and acts as a general attorney, to remove a jury trial from national security cases if they are tried at the High Court, in cases which a jury trial is normally mandatory in that level of court that can imprison criminals to life. In such cases, a bench of three High Court judges, who are handpicked by the CE, will try those cases and give rulings. The Secretary for Justice used this power to take out a jury in the first national security trial at the High Court, which sentenced a young protestor to 9 year in prison.32 Trial by jury serves to guarantee a fair trial as the general public can engage in a criminal case with their common sense, checking the misuse or dominance of the government’s narrative and interpretation of a criminal activity.33 But now, the Secretary for Justice can exercise such jury removal power under the NSL without checks and balances, creating room for potential abuse. The NSL also replaces the common law tradition of “presumption of bail” with a principle of “presumption against bail” in national security cases. In light of “presumption of bail,” defendants are expected to have bail unless, in most circumstances, the court suspects that the defendants would abscond or reoffend. Prescribed by the NSL, however, no bail shall be granted to NSL defendants lest the judge believes that the

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

83

defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering national security. Although the bail provision in the NSL gives a certain degree of discretion for judges to grant bail, many NSL-designated judges have decided to deny the right to bail for many NSL defendants as the judges have recognized the prosecutorial narratives that defendants’ communications with foreign correspondents or diplomats would endanger national security, and such activities constitute insufficient grounds for bail.34 The application of “presumption against bail” was also found in other non-NSL cases as the court regarded the offenses as being related to national security, such as sedition under the Crimes Ordinance.35 In 2021, the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong, known as the city’s supreme court, ruled that offenses of sedition under the Crimes Ordinance is part of the offenses endangering national security, and thus the NSL bail principle shall be applicable in those cases as well.36 By September 2022, more than 72% of defendants charged with NSL and sedition offenses have been denied bail. Most of them are activists and leaders of the pro-democracy parties in Hong Kong; they have been kept in pre-trial detention for more than a year.37 Even if a NSL defendant was granted bail, the bail conditions could restrict the exercise of basic civil and political rights. For instance, defendants on bail are not allowed to communicate with journalists or envoys of foreign governments, engage in social media, or comment on public affairs. Otherwise, the court could rule the defendants as breaking bail conditions and send them back to pre-trial detention.38 Overall, the NSL expands the executive’s power to intervene in the criminal justice system in national security cases. It narrows the scope of the jurisdiction of local courts to challenge the acts and decisions by new security institutions. Worse still, the exceptional practices under the NSL constitute a new and separate track of criminal proceedings in Hong Kong’s court against political dissents; a de facto special court has been created.39 The next section explains how the NSL regime facilitated government crackdown on Hong Kong’s civic space and political opposition from 2020 onward.

Eradicating Civic Space and Political Opposition Hong Kong’s opposition camp has been strong in terms of public support, plurality of political opinions, and active participation in both mass mobilization and electoral politics. In particular, liberal mass media

84

Y. LAI

outlets, civil society, and political society have played important roles in supporting Hong Kong’s non-violent resistance and the pro-democracy movement since the handover.40 While the COVID-19 pandemic gave excuses to the Hong Kong government to prohibit public protests on public health grounds, the new national security regime has further empowered the local authorities to incapacitate the opposition camp by criminalizing free speech, free political participation, and free association. One noteworthy trajectory of the operation of the NSL apparatus lies in how the NSD has been using the sedition laws under the Crimes Ordinance to punish outspoken activists, journalists, scholars, and ordinary citizens who merely promote or utter peaceful political speech, as ways of diminishing the space for public debate and imposing a chilling effect of “literary inquisition.”41 Introduced in the early twentieth century, the provisions on sedition under the law are overly broad and subjective. For example, anyone who publishes or distributes materials that “brings into hatred or excites disaffection against” the government or the administration of justice or promotes enmity between different classes of people in Hong Kong can be criminally charged and punished with a jail sentence.42 These colonial-era laws have been unused since the 1970s, but returned in autumn 2020. Two months after the NSL was implemented, Tam Tak Chi, an outspoken pro-democracy activist, was arrested by the NSD and then charged with uttering seditious words. He was alleged of chanting slogans shaming the police, diffusing hatred against the government, and promoting disobedience to the law in public. He was denied bail for more than ten months and convicted of fourteen charges of seditious offenses. At the end, he was sentenced to jail for forty months.43 Meanwhile, five unionists who published three picture books narrating sheep defending their villages from the threats of wolves were charged with conspiracy to “printing, publishing, distributing or displaying seditious publication,” as ways of inciting hatred against the government and the court to minors.44 After being remanded for more than year, the court found them guilty and sentenced them to nineteen months in jail.45 Although the unionists got a reduced jail sentence as they had been remanded before the ruling, these criminal trials sent an obvious message to the public that the national security regime is expanding beyond the NSL per se when the law enforcement adopts non-NSL measures to criminalize free speech and to punish citizens who are perceived as endangering national security. If one’s speech or publication was perceived by the government as

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

85

seditious, he or she could lose personal liberty immediately, once one was charged and the court denied one’s bail under the NSL principle. The use of the offense of publishing seditious materials was used to criminalize famous liberal media outlets in the city, including Apple Daily and Stand News. Apple Daily was a for-profit newspaper owned by a prodemocracy activist mogul, Jimmy Lai. The newspaper had been active in mobilizing non-violent mass protests and democratization in Hong Kong for decades.46 Following the criminal charges against Jimmy Lai and several editors alongside three companies related to the management of the newspaper with foreign collusion under the NSL, Apple Daily closed in June 2021.47 Six months later, Jimmy Lai and the editors above faced added charges of publishing a seditious publication, which is part of the sedition law under the Crimes Ordinance. At the same time, the city’s largest independent online media outlet, Stand News, came to a sudden end at the close of 2021 as well.48 Soon after Apple Daily shut down, Stand News had taken preemptive action in response to what it called “the arrival of the literary inquisition” in Hong Kong. 49 The outlet announced the resignations of all but two of its directors, removed opinion articles from its website, and terminated donations. Nevertheless, senior government officials continued to accuse the outlet of inciting public hatred against the police force.50 At the end of December 2021, the national security police arrested seven former directors, columnists, and editors of the outlet, which had never hidden its pro-democracy views, for alleged “conspiracy of publishing seditious publication.” Company materials were confiscated, and its financial assets frozen under the order of the senior national security figures. The current and former editor-in-chief were criminally charged, and the outlet shut down its website and social media accounts and erased all its online content.51 National security defendants from both Apple Daily and Stand News above have been remanded for more than a year before their trials. Worse still, according to an annual report on Hong Kong’s press freedom, at least ten independent media outlets chose to shut down following the closure of Apple Daily and Stand News.52 The chilling effect on the media sector has further extended to civil society organizations. Since mid-2021, more than one hundred rightsbased organizations, trade unions, and social movement organizations have decided to disband due to various considerations, including: direct requests from intermediates who claimed that they represent the Chinese

86

Y. LAI

authorities; investigation by the national security police; and risk assessment in light of criminal liability and sustainability under the NSL.53 The disbanded groups include the Professional Teachers’ Union, the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union, the Civil Human Rights Front, and the Hong Kong Alliance for Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. They were the largest pro-democracy unions and coalitions that organized key labor strikes, million people’s marches against the extradition bill in 2019, and annual commemoration vigils of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in the past three decades, respectively.54 Many leaders and organizers of these disbanded groups also fled Hong Kong for safety reasons. The disbandment of these organizations as well as the loss of manpower and expertise in local movements has inevitably weakened activists and civil society’s capacity to mobilize the public, sustain, and promote human rights and pro-democracy advocacy in the city. Formal political participation is further restricted by the new NSL regime. As aforementioned, the central authorities reshuffled Hong Kong’s electoral system, in the name of election security and ensuring patriots administering Hong Kong, by establishing a new executive-led screening mechanism to bar any politically unwanted individuals from running for local elections. Additionally, the court has no power to overrule the decision of such a mechanism. The local government of Hong Kong further expanded such screening regime to district-level elected bodies, i.e., the District Councils. Under the Basic Law, the District Councils consist of 18 consultative bodies for local governance. 452 out of 479 council members (district councilors) are popularly elected across the city. In November 2019, i.e., five months after the citywide antiextradition bill protests sparked off, candidates from the opposition camp won 86% of the directly-elected seats in the District Council elections. The landslide victory of the opposition had alarmed Beijing, which saw it as a threat. In February 2021, Hong Kong’s Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau introduced legislative amendments to require all district councilors to take an oath that swears to “uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the SAR government.”55 Before, the oath-taking requirement only applied to public officers in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The new amendment proposes that those who violate the oaths will be criminalized and prohibited from election for five years. Following the amendments, the government proposed a list of “dos” and “don’ts” that would be regarded as complying or breaking the oaths.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

87

Anyone who commits acts of endangering national security, advocating Hong Kong independence or self-determination, soliciting foreign forces to intervene in Hong Kong affairs, or forcing the Chief Executive to step down by obstructing government functioning are considered as violating their oaths, and thus will be immediately suspended of their duties.56 The new requirements also apply to all levels of public officers, including lawmakers and judges. The amendments in effect incorporate at least three crimes enlisted in the NSL: secessions, acts of subversion, and collusion with foreign forces. Although the proposal did not specify its retrospective effect, a government official made clear that past behavior may be considered by the commissioner of oath-taking, who would be a senior government official. The commissioner will hold absolute power to determine whether the oath-taker fits the requirement of oath-taking and decides the validity of the oath. Moreover, the Secretary for Justice can bring proceedings against any district councilor at any time during his or her term of office, if he or she is suspected of breaking the oath; his or her office will also be suspended until a verdict is given by the court.57 The NSL only states that one’s public office will only be removed when he or she is convicted of charges of the prescribed offenses. But the proposed bill is tougher against elected public officers as they will be barred from performing duties even before he or she is found guilty. In sum, the introduction of the oath-taking requirement can be read as a way to punish the majority of voters for supporting pro-democracy and even pro-independence candidates, and to engender a chill-effect on future candidates who would have financial and criminal consequences if they are perceived to be breaking the oath by the authorities. After the bill was passed in May 2021, more than 250 pro-democracy district councilors became vacant due to resignation, disqualification by the government, and incarceration for NSL charges.58 Finally, any informal political participation related to a local election could be criminalized. While informal civic voting as a primary for prodemocracy candidates was labeled by the authorities as an activity of subverting state power, the Hong Kong government also introduced a new offense of inciting election boycott in the new electoral reform package. The criminal activity could include writing articles calling for vote-boycott, or simply circulating relevant messages or commentaries on social media platforms. Anyone who incited others to cast blank votes or

88

Y. LAI

vote-boycott during the election period could be criminally charged and sentenced to jail.59 Observed by journalists and analysts, the government use of the NSL, and of its operation of a national security reporting hotline, has instilled a widespread “white terror” in Hong Kong.60 As of November 2021, i.e., sixteen months after the enactment of the NSL, the police reported that its NSD reporting hotline had received more than 200,000 messages, spreading a “white terror” in public.61 The wide disbandment of civil society organizations, unions, and pro-democracy coalitions has caused many former opposition leaders, academics, and cultural activists leaving Hong Kong to avoid being arrested or interrogated by the national security police.

Academic Freedom and Student Activism at Risks The chilling effect of the legal pressure went beyond civil society and political opposition in Hong Kong. It has become ostensible in different facets of Hong Kong society, particularly in two areas, academia and public schools that were assumed as platforms cultivating citizenship, independent, and critical thinking. This is mainly because the NSL requires the Hong Kong government to take initiatives to supervise and regulate matters concerning national security in universities and schools. More importantly, the government has to promote national security education to “raise the awareness of Hong Kong residents of national security and of the obligation to abide by the law.”62 Furthermore, in light of Hong Kong’s protest history, public intellectuals as well as student activists from local universities have played pivotal roles in advocating and leading mass mobilizations, such as university class boycott against the government proposal of patriotic education in 2012, the Occupy Central Campaign and then the Umbrella Movement in 2014, and the siege of university campuses during the Anti-extradition Bill Movement in 2019. Against this backdrop, it is foreseeable that the authorities would target students and teachers at universities in securitizing Hong Kong society. The prospects of academic freedom and educational autonomy, therefore, become more concerning. The definition and elements of academic freedom in Hong Kong have been prescribed by the local court. As highlighted in a judgment in 2007, academic freedom is vested in Hong Kong’s educational institutions as well their faculty and enables educational institutions to determine for

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

89

themselves on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted staying. Additionally, it gives academics freedom to pursue the search for knowledge without fear of external sanction.63 Nevertheless, academic freedom in Hong Kong has always been a public concern ever since its handover to China in 1997. Among twentyone tertiary educational institutions, eight of them are publicly funded by the University Grant Committee (UGC), and the CE of Hong Kong inherited the colonial tradition to serve as the chancellor of these eight universities, where he or she can appoint members of each university’s council.64 Such political structure underpins the limited institutional autonomy, and the fragility of safeguarding academic freedom and free speech on campus. Examples of threats against academic freedom can be found before the NSL was implemented, including the Council of the University of Hong Kong (HKU)’s disapproval of the appointment of Johannes Chan, who was the former dean of the law school, as a pro-vice-chancellor in 2015. It was regarded as political retribution of the pro-Beijing camp against his ties with Benny Tai, an HKU law professor and the key figure in the Occupy Movement of 2014.65 Another example was the prohibition of discussion of Hong Kong independence on campus. One university ordered its student union to remove student banners that expressed pro-independence views in 2017, whereas another university sanctioned four students who protested the officials’ covering of pro-independence messages on the campus’s “democracy wall” in 2018.66 The situation has become more worrying after the enactment of the NSL. Government officials became more active in asking universities to behave under the political authority. Carrie Lam, the 4th CE in Hong Kong, openly criticized local universities being “penetrated by external forces,” and urged university management bodies to be sensitive and “extreme careful” against any brainwashing on students.67 In light of allocation of government funding to universities, the UGC was reported to have issued a start letter to all publicly-funded universities, requiring them to make national security education mandatory for all students, and such implementation would be assessed for future allocation of steppedup funding.68 While the UGC declared that each university should decide their own way of implementing national security education, no single university has revealed its plan so far.69

90

Y. LAI

University managers commenced to silence expression of diverse political views and opinions on campuses in the name of protecting members’ safety. Such practices can be found in areas of international exchange, research environment, and student activities. In February 2021, the annual World Press Photo Exhibition was canceled by the Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU), citing its consideration of campus safety and security; however, the cancelation was regarded as preventing displays of photos taken during the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Finally, the exhibition was relocated to another private venue.70 The World Press Photo Exhibition was supposed to be a valuable opportunity for the university to build its international reputation, but the decision of the HKBU probably went in the opposite way, and thus aroused suspicions about its intention in not holding the exhibition. The Hong Kong-American Center at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), which has been supporting Fulbright Scholars in Hong Kong, was closed in August 2020 amid months of criticisms from proChina newspapers which accused the center of “manipulating general education” and “being funded by Washington,” whereas the same university’s University Service Center, a famous China studies center worldwide, was also closed down in the name of “reorganization of the structure” in December 2020.71 Although the university manager of the CUHK insisted the closure was not an act of self-censorship, experienced scholars in Chinese studies suspected that the university’s decision was politically driven, since the center has been regarded as one of the key hubs for researchers to “understand the nature of the Chinese Communist Party.”72 For academics in Hong Kong, the dismissal of Professor Benny Tai by the HKU’s Council, which happened a month after the enactment of the NSL, probably engendered the greatest chilling effect among themselves. Tai was a tenured associate professor in the HKU law school, and the founder of “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” campaign in 2013, which eventually led to the Umbrella Movement in the following year. In April 2019, he was found guilty of his involvement in the 2014 protest with the charge of public nuisance and was sentenced to sixteen months in jail. He was granted bail in August 2019, pending an appeal to be heard in 2021. Although the Senate of the HKU decided not to dismiss Tai given the insufficient grounds as investigated by an internal committee, the Council, which was headed by Arthur Li, a member of the Executive

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

91

Council of the Hong Kong SAR government, went against the Senate’s rule to sack Tai immediately on July 28, 2020.73 The case of Benny Tai, though not related to any violation of the NSL, was alarming to members of local universities. One of the interviewees commented that the case of Benny Tai was a dangerous precedent, since Tai’s dismissal was decided not by the Senate but the Council, which is composed of many external members appointed by the Chief Executive and should not intervene in staff retention for the sake of safeguarding institutional autonomy. The Council’s rule against the decision of the Senate, therefore, certainly violates institutional autonomy and academic freedom and creates a mass chilling effect that even tenured staff can be dismissed by the Council.74 Following Tai’s case, the fear of violating the NSL was amplified with media attacks against local scholars. Chingkwan Lee, a chair professor in sociology at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) has been repeatedly criticized by the pro-China press which interpreted her social movement research as disseminating “pro-independence” messages and theories.75 It was also reported that a postgraduate student at HKU has reported at least two faculty members to the NSD’s hotline.76 The broad and ambiguous definitions of offenses in the NSL has encouraged many academics to set psychological “red lines” in their teaching and research duties. University teachers have decided to remove topics and case studies related to Hong Kong from their reading lists and teaching materials for students, and to avoid using materials that contain “relatively critical perspectives” on public affairs. Some of them also have stopped inviting politically-sensitive figures as guests in class.77 From the perspective of students, many of them, particularly the local ones, have begun to be reluctant to express their views and comments in class in both physical and online teaching sessions, since students were skeptical of the data security protection of the software “Zoom,” which is owned by a Chinese company and used by most universities in Hong Kong.78 In addition to the sharing of experiences by the interviewees, many local reports also revealed that some professors decided to cancel modules on contemporary China studies, whereas a scholar was asked by the university management to amend a proposal for opening a new module just because the proposal contains wordings like “activist.”79 Student activities engaging in public affairs and public protests were targeted. The management of the CUHK invited NSD officials to investigate an on-campus protest where participants showed pro-independence

92

Y. LAI

banners.80 Student’s political messages on the “democracy walls” of the HKU, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), and the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong (PolyU) were removed.81 Eventually, “Pillars of Shame,” “Sculpture of Tiananmen Massacre,” and “New Goddess of Democracy,” which were three key iconic Tiananmen artworks representing pro-democracy student activism in China and Hong Kong, were removed at the end of 2021.82 The CUHK also cut ties with a newly elected student union whose propaganda was alleged of violating the NSL.83 These actions were problematic as the school prohibited and sanctioned students’ free speech on campuses merely because of its potential violation of NSL, indirectly giving clues to the national security police’s investigation. University student activism has long been a significant part of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement.84 The cutting ties of student unions by university managers was not merely a matter between university stakeholders; it also weakened the liberal and pro-democratic forces in civil society. One member from the abovementioned newly elected cabinet of the student union in CUHK reflected that, after the school’s announcement of cutting ties with the student union, he and his colleague were doxed by the pro-Beijing camp, and he repeatedly received threat messages by phone calls.85 The public “abandonment” of student activists by universities has indeed put student activists at risk of political intimidation and arrests by the NSD. The above incidents have further alarmed the international academic community. According to the Academic Freedom Index released by Global Public Policy Institute of Germany, the respect for academic freedom in Hong Kong has declined from 0.82 in 2010 to 0.47 in 2019, and then 0.35 in 2020.86 Moreover, SOAS University of London, a famous research-oriented institution in Asian and African studies in the UK, was found by reporters of its internal guidance that asks its staff to be cautious of their risks of the use of teaching materials, of recording online teaching, of employing research assistants based in Hong Kong, as well as of traveling to Hong Kong and China given the extra-territorial effects of the NSL.87 Even if global scholars hoped to continue academic exchanges with universities in Hong Kong, there were reports unveiling that their VISA applications were rejected by the Hong Kong government.88 In short, the widening practices of silencing dissenting opinions in university campuses and self-censorship among teachers and researchers after

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

93

the enactment of the NSL have signified its direct and indirect impacts on the development of the higher education sector.

Indoctrinating National Security in Local Schools The ideological agenda of the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities became more apparent after the enactment of the NSL. Although the NSL does not provide an ideological definition of national security, the national security law in mainland China and Xi Jinping’s “holistic view of national security” offer imperatives for how national security education should be in Hong Kong. From Beijing’s eyes, ideological control in Hong Kong’s school system became more necessary, as there was an extensive participation among secondary school students during the Anti-extradition Bill Movement.89 In Hong Kong, compulsory education covers both primary as well as secondary education. The Education Bureau (EDU) enjoys the power to regulate the teaching profession, to decide the general principles and framework of school curriculum, and to scrutinize contents of textbooks through “professional consultancy service.”90 For primary and secondary schools, the government has already established a comprehensive scheme of national security education, which is heavily tied with school management. In 2021, the Education Bureau (EDU) of Hong Kong issued a full guideline for school administration on matters relating to safeguarding national security. The guideline covers issues of staff management and the implementation of national security education; international schools, which usually provide education to children of expatriate families, are not exempted from the requirement.91 Without an independent regulating body for the teaching profession in Hong Kong, the Education Bureau enjoys the power to issue and revoke teaching licenses. Back in 2020, the Education Bureau revoked a teacher’s license due to his alleged promotion of Hong Kong independence by the teaching materials in class.92 Although that teacher has not been charged of violating the NSL so far, the revoking of a license by the government has further amplified the silencing effects among teachers, since teachers can now lose their licenses and jobs because of government censure of their teaching materials.93 School teachers are aware of their teaching materials and performance to avoid being reported by students or parents, who may accuse teachers of

94

Y. LAI

breaking the NSL. The stressful environment in the education sector was intensified in August 2021, when the Professional Teachers’ Union, which has been the largest independent trade union for teachers and has played an active role in supporting pro-democracy mobilization in Hong Kong for several decades, decided to disband due to different forms of political pressures from the central authorities. The loss of a flagship trade union further dwindled possible legal and union supports for schoolteachers facing complaints, allegations, or government investigation. It appears that effective control and regulatory measures against schoolteachers warrant a smooth, citywide implementation of national security education. According to the aforementioned guidelines of national security education, schools are required to integrate national security education with national education, which was suspended in 2012 due to mass protests led by young activists, including Joshua Wong.94 By now, the national security education is not merely a promotion of NSL offenses or provisions. Schools are required to educate students with the “holistic view of national security,” which was promoted by Xi Jinping in 2014. Students are required to understand the multiple facets of national security in accordance with the categories prescribed in mainland China’s national security law, such as the concepts of “cultural security,” “economic security,” and “ecological security,” stretching the idea of national security in different spheres of daily lives.95 In other words, the EDU transplants the concepts of national security from China’s national security law of 2015 into the curriculum of various subjects, such as Biology, Geography, and History. The promotion of the “holistic view of national security,” instead of the NSL per se, was further strengthened in the first citywide celebration of national security education day in April 2021. The government distributed bookmarks and posters that explain multiple kinds of “national security” to students, and the PRC’s Education Department donated 60,000 copies of a reader edited by the former official of Hong Kong’s Liaison Office Wang Zhenmin to Hong Kong schools.96 The reader characterized the anti-extradition bill movement of 2019 as a “color revolution,” argued that national security is a prerequisite for the protection of human rights, and redefined actions previously regarded as free expression but now identified as violating the law.97 The celebration caused concerns as some public opinions expressed worries over the national security education as “brainwashing,” when students were asked to play with toy guns inside a mock subway car as acts of “anti-terrorism.”98

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

95

The public concern over national security education expanded to expatriate communities in Hong Kong, whose children are required to receive national security education at international schools as well. An opinion survey of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong showed that 36% of member respondents considered leaving Hong Kong due to their concern about the impact of the NSL on the city’s education system.99 The finding illustrates that the securitization and ideological indoctrination of Hong Kong’s education considering the NSL impacts both local and expat families who may prioritize the quality of education when considering relocation or economic migration.

Conclusion Hong Kong is facing a deep challenge of remaining as an international city attractive to foreign investment and economic migration. The installation of the national security regime by the Chinese authorities has jeopardized the independent judiciary, a free and open society, institutional autonomy of universities and education institutions, as well as the access to free information, and made them very unlikely to survive. It would be difficult for remaining civil society organizations, media outlets, and the general public to have confidence in the court as a guardian of rights amid the government’s weaponization of laws and courts, like in mainland China. Local surveys have revealed that public trust toward judicial independence, the impartiality of the courts, and fairness of the judicial system has sharply declined after the enactment of the NSL.100 In response to the drastic change of the political and legal environment of Hong Kong, the international community, especially the Western countries, has reacted fiercely in their public statements and policy toward Hong Kong and China. The European Union as well as the “Five Eyes,” the intelligence alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have repeatedly issued statements disapproving the NSL and the government crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy.101 The United States specifically sanctioned several Hong Kong and Chinese officials, who were alleged of committing human rights abuses by implementing the NSL and the election overhaul in Hong Kong, in accordance with the laws and practice related to its Magnitsky sanction regime. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which is an expert-based treaty body overseeing the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

96

Y. LAI

released a strong concluding statement against the Hong Kong government, and demanded the NSL to be repealed.102 Other notable policy reactions include the opening of special visas schemes and settlement policies for Hong kongers by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, as well as the UK Supreme Court’s decision to withdraw their judges from Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, which used to have UK’s serving judges as non-permanent judges for final adjudication.103 Consequently, tens of thousands of local families and individual citizens are leaving Hong Kong or applying for new visa schemes: as of October 2022, more than 142,000 Hong kongers applied for a British special visa that leads to British citizenship.104 Without doubt, the “one country, two systems” formula can no longer be attractive to the people in Taiwan, where the geopolitical tensions continue to hover amid the rivals and struggles between China and the West. Without bloodshed, the crackdown on Hong Kong by the NSL may have achieved China’s political end, that is, to warrant regime security by eliminating the opposition forces in Hong Kong and by cutting ties between the global support for Hong Kong’s defense of its rule of law system, human rights, and democratization and the local community. Yet, after two years of the crackdown, liberal democratic governments, global media outlets, and international human rights bodies remain attentive to the political and legal development of Hong Kong, as many key political trials, including the legal cases against Apple Daily, Stand News, the pro-democracy primaries, and the organizers of the annual commemoration vigil for the Tiananmen crackdown, are still ongoing. Should China’s repression in Hong Kong escalate, geopolitical tensions between China and the West would continue, and Taiwanese people would continue to take China’s aggression in Hong Kong as a model of the future of their island’s reunification with the CCP.

Notes 1. Fraser Institute, “Economic Freedom of the World: 2022 Annual Report,” September 8, 2022, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/stu dies/economic-freedom-of-the-world-2022-annual-report (accessed November 18, 2022). 2. William H. Overholt, “Hong Kong: The Rise and Fall of “One Country, Two Systems,” Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, December, 2019, https://ash.harvard.edu/ files/ash/files/overholt_hong_kong_paper_final.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022).

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

97

3. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of HKSAR, “Speech by Qiao Xiaoyang, Deputy Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,” Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of HKSAR, April 26, 2004, https://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/chi/ media/s042604-1.htm (accessed November 18, 2022); Zhang Zheping and Chung Yiu-wah, eds., Hong Kong Three Years [香港三年] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2016). 4. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2022: Hong Kong,” February 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/fre edom-world/2022 (accessed November 18, 2022). 5. Benny Tai, “30 Years After Tiananmen: Hong Kong Remember,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 64–69. 6. Cora Chan, “Thirty years from Tiananmen: China, Hong Kong, and the Ongoing Experiment to Preserve Liberal Values in an Authoritarian State,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 17, no. 2 (April 2019): 439–452. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz034. 7. Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong,” International Affairs 65, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 443–462. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/2621722. 8. Yash Ghai, “The Past and the Future of Hong Kong’s Constitution,” The China Quarterly 128 (December, 1991): 794–813; Margaret Ng, “A Memo to Chief Executive-elect and the New Generation of Hong Kong: the History of Article 23 Legislation” [給準特首 與新一代的備忘——23條立法的前世今生], Initium Media, March 10, 2017, https://theinitium.com/article/20170310-opinion-margaretngarticle23/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 9. Ngok Ma, “Civil Society in Self-Defense: the Struggle Against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China 14 (2005): 465–482. 10. Susan Trevaskes, “Socialist Law,” in Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi, eds. Christian Sorace, Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere (Canberra: ANU Press; Verso Books, 2019), 251. 11. Sheena Chesnut Greitens, “Domestic Security in China Under Xi Jinping,” China Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2019, https://www.prc leader.org/domestic-security. 12. Fu Hualing, “China’s Imperative for National Security Legislation,” in China’s National Security: Endangering Hong Kong’s Rule of Law?, eds. Cora Chan and Fiona de Londras (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020), 46– 47. 13. Ibid, 47. 14. The State Council of the PRC, “Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘One Country, Two System’ Policy in Hong Kong,” South

98

Y. LAI

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

China Morning Post, June 10, 2014, http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/whi tepapers/2021-12/20/content_77941746.htm (accessed November 18, 2022). Fu, “China’s Imperative for National Security Legislation,” 59–60. Yan-ho Lai and Ming Sing, “Solidarity and Implications of a Leaderless Movement in Hong Kong: Its Strengths and Limitations,” Communist and Post-communist Studies 53, no. 4: 41–67. https://doi.org/10. 1525/j.postcomstud.2020.53.4.41. Minxin Pei, “Investigation of a Death Long Feared: How China Decided to Impose its National Security Law in Hong Kong,” China Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2020, https://www.prcleader.org/pei-2 (accessed November 18, 2022). Candice Chau, “47 Democrats Charged with ‘Conspiracy to Commit Subversion’ over Legislative Primaries,” Hong Kong Free Press, February 28, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/02/28/47-democrats-cha rged-with-conspiracy-to-commit-subversion-over-legislative-primaries/ (accessed November 18, 2022). Yan-ho Lai, “Hong Kong Democracy Protester’s Sentencing Sets a Harsh Precedent for National Security Law,” The Conversation, July 30, 2021, https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protes ters-sentencing-sets-a-harsh-precedent-for-national-security-law-165274 (accessed November 18, 2022). AFP in Hong Kong, “Four Hong Kong Students Arrested for ‘Advocating Terrorism,’” The Guardian, August 18, 2021, https://www.the guardian.com/world/2021/aug/18/four-hong-kong-students-arrestedfor-advocating-terrorism (accessed November 18, 2022); Reuters staff, “Hong Kong Activist Charged with Foreign Collusion under National Security Law,” Reuters, March 24, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/art icle/us-hongkong-security-idUSKBN2BG0Z9 (accessed November 18, 2022). Article 55 of the NSL states that “the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval by the Central People’s Government of a request made by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Office itself, exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, if: (1) The case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country or external elements, thus making it difficult for the Region to exercise jurisdiction over the case; (2) a serious situation occurs where the Government of the Region is unable to effectively enforce this Law; or (3) a major and imminent threat to national security has occurred.” Article 56 of the NSL states that “in exercising jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security pursuant to Article

3

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

99

55 of this Law, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall initiate investigation into the case, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate shall designate a prosecuting body to prosecute it, and the Supreme People’s Court shall designate a court to adjudicate it.” World Justice Project, “Rule of Law Index 2021,” World Justice Project, 2021, https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/doc uments/WJP-INDEX-2021.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022); Klaus Schwab, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2019,” World Economic Forum, 2019, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCom petitivenessReport2019.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022). Lydia Wong, Thomas Kellogg, and Eric Yan-ho Lai, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law and the Right to Fair Trial: A GCAL Briefing Paper,” Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University Law Center, June 28, 2021, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-con tent/uploads/sites/31/2021/06/HongKongNSLRightToFairTrial.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022). Al Jazeera, “Hong Kong Disqualifies Legislators for ‘Endangering Security,’” Al Jazeera, November 11, 2020, https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2020/11/11/hong-kong-disqualifies-four-opposition-legisl ators (accessed November 18, 2022). Tai Kung Pao, “Han Dayuan: Election Security Must Be Guaranteed to Ensure Patriots Administering Hong Kong” [韓大元: 落實「愛國 者治港」必須確保香港選舉安全], Tai Kung Pao, February 19, 2021, http://www.takungpao.com.hk/mainland/text/2021/0219/553676. html (accessed November 18, 2022). Wang Zhemin, “Political security” [政治安全], Speech given on HKSAR’s National Security Education Day, April 15, 2021, https://www.nsed. gov.hk/booklet.php?b=speech_8.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022); William Zheng, “Beijing Appoints vVterans to Its State-level Hong Kong Office to Improve Messaging on National Security Law, Other City Policies,” South China Morning Post, September 21, 2021, https:/ /www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3149861/beijingappoints-veterans-its-state-level-hong-kong-office (accessed November 18, 2022). Eric (Yan-ho) Lai, “Ask the Experts: Has Democracy in Hong Kong Come to an End?” China Dialogues, May 26, 2021, https://blogs.lse. ac.uk/cff/2021/05/26/ask-the-experts-has-democracy-in-hong-kongcome-to-an-end/ (accessed November 18, 2022). Yan-ho Lai, “Securitisation or Autocratisation? Hong Kong’s Rule of Law under the Shadow of China’s Authoritarian Governance,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, first published online, October 8, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221124978.

100

Y. LAI

30. Hong Kong Free Press, “HKFP_Live: UN Human Rights Hearing on Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 8, 2022, live streaming video, 26:00 to 29:01, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE5xPeDzQYQ (accessed November 18, 2022). 31. Jerome A. Cohen, “Hong Kong’s Transformed Criminal Justice System: Instrument of Fear,” Academia Sinica Law Journal, Special (2022): 13– 15. 32. Yan-ho Lai and Thomas E. Kellogg, “Departure from International Human Rights Law and Comparative Best Practice: HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit,” Hong Kong Law Journal 52, part 2: 466–486. 33. Thomas E. Kellogg and Eric Yan-ho Lai, “Death by a Thousand Cuts: Chipping Away at Due Process Rights in HK NSL Cases,” Lawfare, May 28, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-thousand-cutschipping-away-due-process-rights-hk-nsl-cases (accessed November 18, 2022). 34. HKSAR v. Mo Man Ching Claudia, HCCP134/2021; Secretary for Justice v. Tam Man Ho, HCCP114/2021. 35. Thomas E. Kellogg, “How a Ruling by Hong Kong’s Top Court Opens the Door to a More Intrusive Security Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 17, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/17/how-aruling-by-hong-kongs-top-court-opens-the-door-to-a-more-intrusive-sec urity-law/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 36. HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying, FACC1/2021; HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney, FAMC32/2021. 37. Lydia Wong, Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas E. Kellogg, “Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law,” ChinaFile, October 25, 2022, https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongsnational-security-law (accessed November 18, 2022). 38. Peter Lee, “Hong Kong Democrat Owen Chow Awaiting National Security Trial Has Bail Revoked for Violating Terms,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 13, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/2022/01/13/ hong-kong-democrat-owen-chow-arrested-by-national-security-policeagain-for-allegedly-violating-bail-terms/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 39. Kent Roach, “Echoes That Build to a Cacophony: Hong Kong’s Security Law Compared to Illiberal Elements of the Security Laws of Liberal Democracies,” Social Science Research Network (SSRN). January 9, 2021, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3763099. 40. Ma, “Civil Society in Self-Defense”; Ngok Ma, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007); Francis L.F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and the Pro-democracy Protest Movement in Post-handover Hong Kong: The Power of a Critical Event (London: Routledge, 2011).

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

101

41. Yan-ho Lai, “Hong Kong’s Sedition Law is Back,” The Diplomat, September 3, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/hong-kongssedition-law-is-back/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 42. Yan-ho Lai and Yuen Chan, “Hong Kong: How Colonial-era Laws Are Being Used to Shut Down Independent Journalism,” The Conversation, January 10, 2022, https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-col onial-era-laws-are-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism174375 (accessed November 18, 2022). 43. Lai and Kellogg, “Departure from International Human Rights and Comparative Best Practice,” 486. 44. Agence France-Presse, “Five Arrested in Hong Kong for Sedition over Children’s Book about Sheep,” The Guardian, July 22, 2021, https:/ /www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/22/five-arrested-in-hongkong-for-sedition-over-childrens-book-about-sheep (accessed November 18, 2022). 45. Simone McCarthy and Kathleen Magramo, “Hong Kong Court Sentences Speech Therapists to 19 Months in Prison Over ‘Seditious’ Children’s Books,” CNN , September 11, 2022, https://edition.cnn. com/2022/09/10/asia/hong-kong-speech-therapists-sedition-childr ens-books-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed November 18, 2022). 46. Lee and Chan, Media, Social Mobilization, and the Pro-democracy Protest Movement in Post-handover Hong Kong. 47. Yuen Chan, “Hongkongers Mourn Closure of Apple Daily and Fear for the Future of Independent Journalism,” The Conversation, June 28, https://theconversation.com/hongkongers-mourn-closure-of2021, apple-daily-and-fear-for-the-future-of-independent-journalism-163506 (accessed November 18, 2022). 48. Emma Graham-Harrison, “Speed of Stand News Shutdown Sends Chilling Signal to Hong Kong’s Media,” The Guardian, December 29, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/29/speedof-stand-news-shutdown-sends-chilling-signal-to-hong-kongs-media (accessed November 18, 2022). 49. Stand News, “Literary Inquisition Has Arrived Hong Kong. We Continue to Perform Our Duty for the Sake of Succeeding the Memory of Hong Kong’s Life and Death,” [文字狱已降临香港, 继续为传承 “香 港存亡”记忆紧守岗位], China Digital Times, June 28, 2021, https:/ /chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/667617.html (accessed November 18, 2022). 50. RTHK News, “Chris Tang slams Stand News for ‘Demonising’ Reports,” RTHK, December 3, 2021, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/compon ent/k2/1622662-20211203.htm (accessed November 18, 2022). 51. Lai and Chan, “Hong Kong: How Colonial-era Laws Are Being Used to Shut Down Independent Journalism.”

102

Y. LAI

52. International Federation of Journalists, “The Story that Won’t be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2022,” International Federation of Journalists, October, 2022, https://www.china.ifj. org/chapter-2-en (accessed November 18, 2022). 53. The author shared this analysis in a symposium titled “The Changing Contours of Hong Kong’s Civil Society,” organized by Global Hong Kong Studies at the University of California, November 4, 2022, https://www.globalhks-uc.org/the-changing-contours-of-hongkongs-civil-society (accessed November 18, 2022). 54. Safeguard Defenders, “CCP Crushing Hong Kong Civil Society,” Safeguard Defenders, January 22, 2022, https://safeguarddefenders.com/ en/blog/ccp-crushing-hong-kong-civil-society (accessed November 18, 2022). 55. The bill is called Public Offices (Candidacy and Taking Up Offices) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2021. 56. Selina Cheng, “Hong Kong to Require District Councilors to Swear Allegiance to Gov’t—Violators Face Election Ban,” Hong Kong Free Press, February 23, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/02/23/bre aking-hong-kong-to-require-district-councillors-to-swear-allegiance-togovt-or-face-election-ban/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 57. Kelly Ho, “Hong Kong Lawmakers Pass Bill Requiring Public Officers to Pledge Allegiance to Gov’t,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 12, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/05/12/hong-kong-lawmakers-passbill-requiring-public-officers-to-pledge-allegiance-to-govt-four-districtcouncillors-to-be-ousted/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 58. Jeffie Lam, “Explainer | Hong Kong’s District Douncils: With Opposition Members Resigning in Droves as Oath Looms, What Happens Next to These LocalBbodies?,” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3141388/ why-are-hong-kongs-district-councillors-resigning-droves (accessed November 18, 2022). 59. Hilary Leung, “2 Handed Suspended 2-month Sentences for Inciting Others to Cast Invalid Votes in Hong Kong’s ‘Patriots Only’ Election,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 19, 2022, https://hongkongfp.com/ 2022/04/19/2-handed-suspended-2-month-sentences-for-inciting-oth ers-to-cast-invalid-votes-in-hong-kongs-patriots-only-election/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 60. Steve Vines, “I Covered Hong Kong for Decades. Now I Am Forced to Flee China’s ‘White Terror,’” The Guardian, August 8, 2021, https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/08/i-covered-hongkong-for-decades-now-i-am-forced-to-flee-chinas-white-terror (accessed November 18, 2022); Congressional-executive Commission on China, “Special Report: Hong Kong Civil Society: From and Open City to a

3

61.

62. 63. 64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

103

City of Fear,” Congressional-executive Commission on China, October 2022, https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/ documents/Hong%20Kong%20Civil%20Society%20Report.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022). HKFP Fast News, “Hong Kong National Security Police Hotline Received over 200,000 Tips in First Year,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 5, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/05/hongkong-national-security-police-hotline-received-over-200000-tips-in-firstyear/ (accessed November 18, 2022). Articles 9 and 10 of the NSL. Secretary for Justice v Commission on Inquiry Re Hong Kong Institute of Education, HCAL108/2007. John P. Burn, “The State and Higher Education in Hong Kong,” The China Quarterly 244 (2020): 1033–1034. https://doi.org/10.1017/ S0305741020000958. Joyce Ng and Gloria Chan, “University of Hong Kong’s Council Votes 12–8 to Reject Johannes Chan’s Appointment as Pro-vice-chancellor,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2015, https://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/education/article/1862423/university-hongkongs-council-votes-12-8-reject-johannes (accessed November 18, 2022). Phoenix Un, “Independence Banner Removed from CUHK Campus,” The Standard, September 22, 2017, https://www.thestandard.com. hk/sections-news-print/187758/Independence-banner-removed-fromCUHK-campus (accessed November 18, 2022); Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong Polytechnic University Sees Backlash After Student Expelled over ‘Free Speech’ Protest,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 4, 2019, https:// hongkongfp.com/2019/03/04/hong-kong-polytechnic-university-seesbacklash-student-expelled-free-speech-protest/ (accessed November 18, 2022). Kelly Ho, “Hong Kong Universities ‘Penetrated by Foreign Forces’ Intent on ‘Indoctrinating’ Students, Claims Chief Exec. Carrie Lam,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 8, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/ 2021/06/08/hong-kong-universities-penetrated-by-foreign-forces-int ent-on-indoctrinating-students-claims-chief-exec-carrie-lam/ (accessed November 18, 2022). Mimi Leung and Yojama Sharma, “Universities Pressed to Implement ‘Security Law’ Education,” University World News, March 24, 2021, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=202 10324074153521 (accessed November 18, 2022). Author interview with an assistant professor in Hong Kong, dated in April 2021.

104

Y. LAI

70. Hong Kong Free Press, “Hong Kong Baptist University Cancels World Press Photo Exhibition Citing ‘Safety and Security’ Concerns,” Hong Kong Free Press, February 26, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/ 2021/02/26/breaking-hong-kong-baptist-university-cancels-worldpress-photo-exhibition-citing-safety-and-security-concerns/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 71. Gigi Lee and Cheng Yut Yiu, “Chinese University of Hong Kong to ‘Restructure’ China Study Center,” Translated by Luisette Mudi,. Radio Free Asia, December 24, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/ china/hongkong-china-12242020163515.html (accessed November 18, 2022). 72. Leung Yuet and Chan Sin Yi, “The Death of the Mecca of Chinese Studies on the Hillside of the Chinese University of Hong Kong” [中大半山腰, 一個中國研究聖地的死亡], Initium Media, April 1, 2021, https://theinitium.com/article/20210401-hongkong-cuhk-uschistory-pass-by/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 73. BBC News, “Benny Tai: Hong Kong University Fires Professor Who Led Protests,” BBC News, July 28, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-china-53567333 (accessed November 18, 2022). 74. Author interview with an assistant professor of one local university in Hong Kong, dated in May 2021. 75. Wen Wei Po, “Uncovering HKUST Professor Ching-kwan Lee who Promotes Independence with a Cloak of Academic Freedom” [揭秘科大 教授李靜君 披學術自由外衣行「宣獨」之實], Wen Wei Po, March 18, 2021, https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202103/18/AP60533b42e4b04 e1918cc09d9.html (accessed November 18, 2022). 76. Timothy MacLaughlin, “How Academic Freedom Ends,” The Atlantic, June 6, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2021/06/china-hong-kong-freedom/619088/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 77. Author interview with a university lecturer and an assistant professor in Hong Kong, dated in May 2021. 78. Author interview with a Hong Kong-based assistant professor and a university student, who was also a member of one of the student unions in Hong Kong, dated in May 2021 and April 2021 respectively. 79. Leung Yuet, “More Dangerous than Being Swallowed by a Whale: Hong Kong Scholars Struggling with Ambiguous Red Lines under the NSL” [ 比鯨吞更危險: 國安法後, 模糊紅線下掙扎的香港學者], Initium Media, November 11, 2020, https://theinitium.com/article/20201112-hon gkong-university-campus-academic-freedom/ (accessed November 18, 2022).

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

105

80. Mimi Leung, “‘National Security’ Arrests Follow Protest on Campus,” University World News, December 7, 2020, https://www.uni versityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20201207141926235 (accessed November 18, 2022). 81. Rhoda Kwan, “University of Hong Kong Removes All Posters from ‘Democracy Wall’ and Student Unions Premises,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 12, 2021, https://hongkongfp.com/2021/07/12/universityof-hong-kong-removes-all-posters-from-democracy-wall-and-studentunion-premises/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 82. Guardian staff and agencies, “Two Hong Kong Universities Remove Tiananmen Artworks after Pillar of Shame Dismantled,” The Guardian, December 24, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/ 24/two-hong-kong-universities-remove-tiananmen-artworks-after-pillarof-shame-dismantled (accessed November 18, 2022). 83. Emily Tsang and Danny Mok, “Hong Kong National Security Law: Chinese University Cuts Ties with Student Union, Accuses Body of ‘Exploiting’ Campus, Bringing School into ‘Disrepute,’” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/education/article/3123175/hong-kong-national-securitylaw-chinese-university-cuts (accessed November 18, 2022). 84. Agnes Shuk-mei Ku, “Performing Civil Disobedience in Hong Kong,” in The Civil Sphere in East Asia, eds. Jeffrey C. Alexander, David A. Palmer, Sunwoong Park and Agnes Shuk-mei Ku (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 84; Ching Kwan Lee and Ming Sing, ed., Take Back Our Future: An Eventful Sociology of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement (New York: Cornell University Press, 2020). 85. Author interview with a university student activist, dated in May 2021. 86. Scholar At Risk, “Reverse the Rapid Deterioration of Academic Freedom in Hong Kong,” Scholar At Risk, March 11, 2021, https://www.sch olarsatrisk.org/2021/03/reverse-the-rapid-deterioration-of-academicfreedom-in-hong-kong/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 87. Nicola Woolcock, “Wipe References to China, SOAS Lecturers Told,” The Times, May 7, 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/wipereferences-to-china-to-protect-students-soas-lecturers-told-9bjwlwwvm (accessed November 18, 2022). 88. AFP, “US Law Scholar Says Hong Kong Denied Him Visa to Teach at University,” France 24, February 2, 2022, https://www.france24. com/en/live-news/20220202-us-law-scholar-says-hong-kong-deniedhim-visa-to-teach-at-university (accessed November 18, 2022). 89. Kin-long Tong and Samson Yuen, “Disciplining Student Activism: Secondary School as Sites of Resistance and Control in Hong Kong,” Sociological Forum 36, no. 4: 984–1004, https://doi.org/10.1111/socf. 12744.

106

Y. LAI

90. Kelly Ho, “Hong Kong Teachers’ Union Raises Concerns over Censorship as Publishers Revise Textbooks after Gov’t Review,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2020, https://hongkongfp.com/2020/08/19/ hong-kong-teachers-union-raises-concerns-over-censorship-as-publishersrevise-textbooks-after-govt-review/ (accessed November 18, 2022). 91. Education Bureau of the HKSAR, National Security: Maintaining a Safe Learning Environment, Nurturing Good Citizens (Education Bureau Circular No.3/2021), February 4, 2021. 92. BBC News, “Teacher Disqualified for “Promoting Hong Kong Independence,”” BBC News, October 6, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-asia-54431729 (accessed November 18, 2022). 93. Author interviews with two secondary school teachers, dated in May 2021. 94. Information Services Department of the HKSAR, “Press Release: EDB Announces Guidelines and Curriculum Arrangements for Safeguarding National Security and National Security Education,” The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, February 4, 2021, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202102/04/P20210204 00806.htm (accessed November 18, 2022). 95. Education Bureau of the HKSAR, National Security: Maintaining a Safe Learning Environment, Nurturing Good Citizens. 96. Leung Pak-hei, “Kindy Pupils to Be Schooled on National Security Law,” The Standard, July 14, 2021, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/ section-news/section/4/232082/Kindy-pupils-to-be-schooled-on-nat ional-security-law (accessed November 18, 2022). 97. Wang Zhenmin, et al., eds., The Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Reader [香港特別 行政區維護國家安全法讀本] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2021). 98. Shibani Maltani, “Beijing Won Total Control over Hong Kong. Now, the ‘Brainwashing’ Begins,” The Washington Post, April 20, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hong-kong-nat ional-security-police/2021/04/19/947acc68-9cf5-11eb-b2f5-7d2f01 82750d_story.html (accessed November 18, 2022). 99. Bruce Einhorn, “More Than 40% of Hong Kong Expats in AmCham Survey May Leave,” Bloomberg News, May 12, 2021, https://www.blo omberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-12/more-than-40-of-hong-kongexpats-may-leave-amcham-survey-says (accessed November 18, 2022). 100. Path of Democracy, “‘One Country, Two System’ Index,” Path of Democracy, March 3, 2021, http://pathofdemocracy.hk/wp-con tent/uploads/2021/05/PoD_Index_2021_March_online.pdf (accessed November 18, 2022); Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, “Rule of Law Indicators,” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research

3

101.

102.

103.

104.

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

107

Institute, 2021, https://www.pori.hk/category/pop-poll/rule-law-ind icators-en?lang=en (accessed November 18, 2022). Abhijnan Rej, “Five Eyes Countries Issue Joint Statement on Hong Kong,” The Diplomat, November 19, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/ 2020/11/five-eyes-countries-issue-joint-statement-on-hong-kong/ (accessed November 18, 2022); Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Slams Selection of John Lee as Hong Kong’s Chief Executive as a ‘Violation of Democratic Principles,’” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3176985/eu-slams-select ion-john-lee-hong-kongs-chief-executive-violation (accessed November 18, 2022). United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “UN Human Rights Committee Issues Findings on Hong Kong, Macao, Georgia, Ireland, Luxembourg and Uruguay,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, July 27, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/un-human-rightscommittee-issues-findings-hong-kong-macao-georgia-ireland (accessed November 18, 2022). Robert J Reed, “Role of UK Supreme Court Judges on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal—Update,” The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, March 30, 2022, https://www.supremecourt.uk/ news/role-of-uk-judges-on-the-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal-updatemarch-2022.html (accessed November 18, 2022). Laura Westbrook, “38,600 Hongkongers under 18 Have Applied for Britain’s Special BN(O) Visa Scheme, but Most Requests Come from Residents in Prime Working Years,” South China Morning Post, November 9, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/soc iety/article/3198937/38600-hongkongers-under-18-have-applied-bri tains-special-bno-visa-scheme-most-requests-come (accessed November 18, 2022).

Bibliography Agence France-Presse. “Five Arrested in Hong Kong for Sedition over Children’s Book about Sheep.” The Guardian, July 22, 2021. https://www.the guardian.com/world/2021/jul/22/five-arrested-in-hong-kong-for-seditionover-childrens-book-about-sheep. Accessed November 18, 2022. AFP. “US Law Scholar Says Hong Kong Denied Him Visa to Teach at University.” France 24, February 2, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/livenews/20220202-us-law-scholar-says-hong-kong-denied-him-visa-to-teach-atuniversity.

108

Y. LAI

AFP in Hong Kong. “Four Hong Kong Students Arrested for ‘Advocating Terrorism.’” The Guardian, August 18, 2021. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2021/aug/18/four-hong-kong-students-arrested-for-advoca ting-terrorism. Accessed November 18, 2022. Al Jazeera. “Hong Kong Disqualifies Legislators for ‘Endangering Security.’” Al Jazeera, November 11, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/ 11/hong-kong-disqualifies-four-opposition-legislators. Accessed November 18, 2022. BBC News. “Benny Tai: Hong Kong University Fires Professor Who Led Protests.” BBC News, July 28, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-53567333. Accessed November 18, 2022. BBC News. “Teacher Disqualified for “Promoting Hong Kong Independence.”” BBC News, October 6, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-544 31729. Accessed November 18, 2022. Bermingham, Finbarr. “EU Slams Selection of John Lee as Hong Kong’s Chief Executive as a ‘Violation of Democratic Principles.’” South China Morning Post, May 9, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3176985/ eu-slams-selection-john-lee-hong-kongs-chief-executive-violation. Accessed November 18, 2022. Burn, John P. “The State and Higher Education in Hong Kong.” The China Quarterly 244 (2020): 1031–1055. https://doi.org/10.1017/S03057410 20000958. Chan, Cora. April 2019. Thirty Years from Tiananmen: China, Hong Kong, and the Ongoing Experiment to Preserve Liberal Values in an Authoritarian State. International Journal of Constitutional Law 17 (2): 439–452. https://doi. org/10.1093/icon/moz034. Chan, Holmes. “Hong Kong Polytechnic University Sees Backlash after Student Expelled over ‘Free Speech’ Protest.” Hong Kong Free Press, March 4, 2019. https://hongkongfp.com/2019/03/04/hong-kong-polyte chnic-university-sees-backlash-student-expelled-free-speech-protest/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Chan, Yuen. “Hongkongers Mourn Closure of Apple Daily and Fear for the Future of Independent Journalism.” The Conversation, June 28, 2021. https:/ /theconversation.com/hongkongers-mourn-closure-of-apple-daily-and-fearfor-the-future-of-independent-journalism-163506. Accessed November 18, 2022. Chau, Candice. “47 Democrats Charged with “Conspiracy to Commit Subversion” over Legislative Primaries.” Hong Kong Free Press, February 28, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/02/28/47-democrats-charged-with-conspi racy-to-commit-subversion-over-legislative-primaries/. Accessed November 18, 2022.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

109

Cheng, Joseph Y. S. “The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong.” International Affairs 65, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 443–462. https://doi.org/10.2307/262 1722. Accessed November 18, 2022. Cheng, Selina. “Hong Kong to Require District Councilors to Swear Allegiance to Gov’t—Violators Face Election Ban.” Hong Kong Free Press, February 23, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/02/23/breaking-hong-kong-torequire-district-councillors-to-swear-allegiance-to-govt-or-face-election-ban/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Cohen, Jerome A. “Hong Kong’s Transformed Criminal Justice System: Instrument of Fear.” Academia Sinica Law Journal, Special (2022): 1–20. Congressional-executive Commission on China. “Special Report: Hong Kong Civil Society: From and Open City to a City of Fear.” Congressional-executive Commission on China. October 2022. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinac ommission.house.gov/files/documents/Hong%20Kong%20Civil%20Society% 20Report.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of HKSAR. “Speech by Qiao Xiaoyang, Deputy Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.” Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau of HKSAR, April 26, 2004. https://www.cmab.gov.hk/cd/chi/media/s04 2604-1.htm. Accessed November 18, 2022. Education Bureau of the HKSAR. National Security: Maintaining a Safe Learning Environment, Nurturing Good Citizens. Education Bureau Circular, no.3/2021, February 4, 2021. Einhorn, Bruce. “More Than 40% of Hong Kong Expats in AmCham Survey May Leave.” Bloomberg News, May 12, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2021-05-12/more-than-40-of-hong-kong-expats-may-leaveamcham-survey-says. Accessed November 18, 2022. Fraser Institute. “Economic Freedom of the World: 2022 Annual Report.” Fraser Institute, September 8, 2022. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/ economic-freedom-of-the-world-2022-annual-report. Accessed November 18, 2022. Freedom House. “Freedom in the World 2022: Hong Kong.” Freedom House, February 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/fre edom-world/2022. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ghai, Yash. December 1991. The Past and the Future of Hong Kong’s Constitution. The China Quarterly 128: 794–813. Graham-Harrison, Emma. “Speed of Stand News Shutdown Sends Chilling Signal to Hong Kong’s Media.” The Guardian, December 29, 2021. https:/ /www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/29/speed-of-stand-news-shu tdown-sends-chilling-signal-to-hong-kongs-media. Accessed November 18, 2022.

110

Y. LAI

Greitens, Sheena Chesnut. “Domestic Security in China Under Xi Jinping.” China Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2019. https://www.prcleader.org/dom estic-security. Accessed November 18, 2022. Guardian Staff and Agencies. “Two Hong Kong Universities Remove Tiananmen Artworks after Pillar of Shame Dismantled.” The Guardian, December 24, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/24/two-hong2021. kong-universities-remove-tiananmen-artworks-after-pillar-of-shame-disman tled. Accessed November 18, 2022. Fu, Hualing. “China’s Imperative for National Security Legislation.” In China’s National Security: Endangering Hong Kong’s Rule of Law?, edited by Cora Chan and Fiona de Londras, 41–60. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2020. HKFP Fast News. “Hong Kong National Security Police Hotline Received over 200,000 Tips in First Year.” Hong Kong Free Press, November 5, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/11/05/hong-kong-national-securitypolice-hotline-received-over-200000-tips-in-first-year/. Accessed November 18, 2022. HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying, FACC1/2021. HKSAR v. Mo Man Ching Claudia, HCCP134/2021. HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney, FAMC32/2021. Ho, Kelly. “Hong Kong Lawmakers Pass Bill Requiring Public Officers to Pledge Allegiance to Gov’t.” Hong Kong Free Press, May 12, 2021. https:/ /hongkongfp.com/2021/05/12/hong-kong-lawmakers-pass-bill-requiringpublic-officers-to-pledge-allegiance-to-govt-four-district-councillors-to-be-ous ted/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ho, Kelly. “Hong Kong Teachers’ Union Raises Concerns over Censorship as Publishers Revise Textbooks after Gov’t Review.” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2020. https://hongkongfp.com/2020/08/19/hong-kong-tea chers-union-raises-concerns-over-censorship-as-publishers-revise-textbooksafter-govt-review/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ho, Kelly. “Hong Kong Universities ‘penetrated by Foreign Forces’ Intent on ‘Indoctrinating’ Students, Claims Chief Exec. Carrie Lam.” Hong Kong Free Press, June 8, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/06/08/hong-konguniversities-penetrated-by-foreign-forces-intent-on-indoctrinating-students-cla ims-chief-exec-carrie-lam/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Hong Kong Free Press. “HKFP_Live: UN human Rights Hearing on Hong Kong.” Hong Kong Free Press, July 8, 2022. Live streaming video, 26:00 to 29:01. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE5xPeDzQYQ. Accessed November 18, 2022. Hong Kong Free Press. “Hong Kong Baptist University Cancels World Press Photo Exhibition Citing ‘Safety and Security’ Concerns.” Hong Kong Free Press, February 26, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/02/26/breakinghong-kong-baptist-university-cancels-world-press-photo-exhibition-citing-saf ety-and-security-concerns/. Accessed November 18, 2022.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

111

Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute. “Rule of Law Indicators.” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 2021. https://www.pori.hk/cat egory/pop-poll/rule-law-indicators-en?lang=en. Information Services Department of the HKSAR. “Press Release: EDB Announces Guidelines and Curriculum Arrangements for Safeguarding National Security and National Security Education.” The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, February 4, 2021. https:// www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202102/04/P2021020400806.htm. Accessed November 18, 2022. International Federation of Journalists. “The Story that Won’t be Silenced: Hong Kong Freedom of Expression Report 2022.” International Federation of Journalists, October 2022. https://www.china.ifj.org/chapter-2-en. Accessed November 18, 2022. Kellogg, Thomas E. “How a Ruling by Hong Kong’s Top Court Opens the Door to a More Intrusive Security Law.” Hong Kong Free Press, December 17, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/12/17/how-a-ruling-by-hongkongs-top-court-opens-the-door-to-a-more-intrusive-security-law/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Kellogg, Thomas E., and Eric Yan-ho Lai. “Death by a Thousand Cuts: Chipping Away at Due Process Rights in HK NSL Cases.” Lawfare, May 28, 2021. https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-thousand-cuts-chippingaway-due-process-rights-hk-nsl-cases. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ku, Agnes Shuk-mei. “Performing Civil Disobedience in Hong Kong.” In The Civil Sphere in East Asia, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, David A. Palmer, Sunwoong Park, and Agnes Shuk-mei Ku, 84–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Kwan, Rhoda. “University of Hong Kong Removes all Posters from ‘Democracy Wall’ and Student Unions Premises.” Hong Kong Free Press, July 12, 2021. https://hongkongfp.com/2021/07/12/university-of-hong-kong-rem oves-all-posters-from-democracy-wall-and-student-union-premises/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lai, Eric (Yan-ho). “Ask the Experts: Has Democracy in Hong Kong Come to an End?” China Dialogues, May 26, 2021. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ cff/2021/05/26/ask-the-experts-has-democracy-in-hong-kong-come-to-anend/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lai, Yan-ho. “Hong Kong Democracy Protester’s Sentencing Sets a Harsh Precedent for National Security Law.” The Conversation, July 30, 2021. https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-democracy-protesterssentencing-sets-a-harsh-precedent-for-national-security-law-165274. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lai, Yan-ho. “Securitisation or Autocratisation? Hong Kong’s Rule of Law under the Shadow of China’s Authoritarian Governance.” Journal of Asian and

112

Y. LAI

African Studies (October 8, 2022): 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/002190 96221124978. Lai, Yan-ho. “Hong Kong’s Sedition Law is Back.” The Diplomat, September 3, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/hong-kongs-sedition-law-isback/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lai, Yan-ho, and Ming Sing. “Solidarity and Implications of a Leaderless Movement in Hong Kong: Its Strengths and Limitations.” Communist and Post-communist Studies 53, no. 4: 41–67. https://doi.org/10.1525/j.postco mstud.2020.53.4.41. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lai, Yan-ho, and Thomas E. Kellogg. “Departure from International Human Rights Law and Comparative Best Practice: HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit.” Hong Kong Law Journal 52, part 2: 466–486. Lai, Yan-ho, and Yuen Chan. “Hong Kong: How Colonial-era Laws Are Being Used to Shut Down Independent Journalism.” The Conversation, January 10, 2022. https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-colonial-era-lawsare-being-used-to-shut-down-independent-journalism-174375. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lam, Jeffie. “Explainer | Hong Kong’s District Councils: with Opposition Members Resigning in Droves as Oath Looms, What Happens Next to These Local Bodies?” South China Morning Post, July 16, 2021. https:// www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3141388/why-are-hongkongs-district-councillors-resigning-droves. Accessed November 18, 2022, Lee, Ching Kwan, and Ming Sing, eds. Take Back Our Future: An Eventful Sociology of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement. New York: Cornell University Press, 2020. Lee, Francis L. F., and Joseph Man Chan. Media, Social Mobilization, and the Pro-democracy Protest Movement in Post-handover Hong Kong: The Power of a Critical Event. London: Routledge, 2011. Lee, Gigi, and Cheng Yut Yiu. “Chinese University of Hong Kong to ‘Restructure’ China Study Center.” Translated by Luisette Mudie. Radio Free Asia, December 24, 2020. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hongkongchina-12242020163515.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. Lee, Peter. “Hong Kong Democrat Owen Chow Awaiting National Security Trial Has Bail Revoked for Violating Terms.” Hong Kong Free Press, January 13, 2022. https://hongkongfp.com/2022/01/13/hong-kong-democratowen-chow-arrested-by-national-security-police-again-for-allegedly-violatingbail-terms/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Leung, Hilary. “2 Handed Suspended 2-month Sentences for Inciting Others to Cast Invalid Votes in Hong Kong’s ‘Patriots Only’ Election.” Hong Kong Free Press, April 19, 2022. https://hongkongfp.com/2022/04/19/2-han ded-suspended-2-month-sentences-for-inciting-others-to-cast-invalid-votes-inhong-kongs-patriots-only-election/. Accessed November 18, 2022.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

113

Leung, Mimi. “‘National Security’ Arrests Follow Protest on Campus.” University World News, December 7, 2020. https://www.universityworldnews.com/ post.php?story=20201207141926235. Accessed November 18, 2022. Leung, Mimi, and Yojama Sharma. “Universities Pressed to Implement ‘Security Law’ Education.” University World News, March 24, 2021. https://www. universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210324074153521. Accessed November 18, 2022. Leung, Pak-hei. “Kindy Pupils to Be Schooled on National Security Law.” The Standard, July 14, 2021. https://www.thestandard.com.hk/section-news/ section/4/232082/Kindy-pupils-to-be-schooled-on-national-security-law. Accessed November 18, 2022. Leung, Yuet. “比鯨吞更危險: 國安法後, 模糊紅線下掙扎的香港學者” [More Dangerous than Being Swallowed by a Whale: Hong Kong Scholars Struggling with Ambiguous Red Lines under the NSL]. Initium Media, November 11, 2020. https://theinitium.com/article/20201112-hongkong-universitycampus-academic-freedom/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Leung, Yuet, and Chan Sin Yi. “中大半山腰, 一個中國研究聖地的死亡” [The Death of the Mecca of Chinese Studies on the Hillside of the Chinese University of Hong Kong]. Initium Media, April 1, 2021. https://theinitium.com/ article/20210401-hongkong-cuhk-usc-history-pass-by/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ma, Ngok. 2005. Civil Society in Self-Defense: The Struggle Against National Security Legislation in Hong Kong. Journal of Contemporary China 14: 465– 482. Ma, Ngok. 2007. Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. MacLaughlin, Timothy. “How Academic Freedom Ends.” The Atlantic, June 6, 2021. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/06/chinahong-kong-freedom/619088/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Maltani, Shibani. “Beijing Won Total Control over Hong Kong. Now, the ‘Brainwashing’ Begins.” The Washington Post, April 20, 2021. https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hong-kong-national-securitypolice/2021/04/19/947acc68-9cf5-11eb-b2f5-7d2f0182750d_story.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. McCarthy, Simone, and Kathleen Magramo. “Hong Kong Court Sentences Speech Therapists to 19 Months in Prison over ‘Seditious’ Children’s Books.” CNN , September 11, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/10/asia/ hong-kong-speech-therapists-sedition-childrens-books-intl-hnk/index.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. Ng, Joyce, and Gloria Chan. “University of Hong Kong’s Council Votes 12–8 to Reject Johannes Chan’s Appointment as Pro-vice-chancellor.” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2015. https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/education/article/1862423/university-hong-kongs-council-votes-128-reject-johannes. Accessed November 18, 2022.

114

Y. LAI

Ng, Margaret. “給準特首與新一代的備忘——23條立法的前世今生” [A Memo to Chief Executive-Elect and the New Generation of Hong Kong: The History of Article 23 Legislation]. Initium Media, March 10, 2017. https:// theinitium.com/article/20170310-opinion-margaretng-article23/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Overholt, William H. “Hong Kong: The Rise and Fall of ‘One Country, Two Systems.’” Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School, December 2019. https://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/ overholt_hong_kong_paper_final.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. Path of Democracy. “‘One Country, Two System’ Index.” Path of Democracy, March 3, 2021. http://pathofdemocracy.hk/wp-content/uploads/2021/ 05/PoD_Index_2021_March_online.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. Pei, Minxin. “Investigation of a Death Long Feared: How China Decided to Impose its National Security Law in Hong Kong.” China Leadership Monitor, September 1, 2020. https://www.prcleader.org/pei-2. Accessed November 18, 2022. Reed, Robert J. “Role of UK Supreme Court Judges on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal—Update.” The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, March 30, 2022. https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/role-of-uk-judgeson-the-hong-kong-court-of-final-appeal-update-march-2022.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. Rej, Abhijnan. “Five Eyes Countries Issue Joint Statement on Hong Kong.” The Diplomat, November 19, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/ five-eyes-countries-issue-joint-statement-on-hong-kong/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Reuters Staff. “Hong Kong Activist Charged with Foreign Collusion under National Security Law.” Reuters, March 24, 2021. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-hongkong-security-idUSKBN2BG0Z9. Accessed November 18, 2022. Roach, Kent. “Echoes That Build to a Cacophony: Hong Kong’s Security Law Compared to Illiberal Elements of the Security Laws of Liberal Democracies.” Social Science Research Network (SSRN), January 9, 2021. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3763099. RTHK News. “Chris Tang Slams Stand News for ‘Demonising’ Reports.” RTHK, December 3, 2021. https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/ 1622662-20211203.htm. Accessed November 18, 2022. Safeguard Defenders. “CCP Crushing Hong Kong Civil Society.” Safeguard Defenders, January 22, 2022. https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/ccpcrushing-hong-kong-civil-society. Accessed November 18, 2022. Secretary for Justice v Commission on Inquiry Re Hong Kong Institute of Education, HCAL108/2007. Secretary for Justice v. Tam Man Ho, HCCP114/2021.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

115

Scholar At Risk. “Reverse the Rapid Deterioration of Academic Freedom in Hong Kong.” Scholar At Risk, March 11, 2021. https://www.scholarsatrisk. org/2021/03/reverse-the-rapid-deterioration-of-academic-freedom-in-hongkong/. Accessed November 18, 2022. Schwab, Klaus. “The Global Competitiveness Report 2019.” World Economic Forum, 2019. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetiti venessReport2019.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. Stand News. “文字狱已降临香港, 继续为传承“香港存亡”记忆紧守岗位” [Literary Inquisition Has Arrived Hong Kong. We Continue to Perform Our Duty for the Sake of Succeeding the Memory of Hong Kong’s Life and Death]. China Digital Times, June 28, 2021. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/ chinese/667617.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. State Council of the PRC. “Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘One Country, Two System’ Policy in Hong Kong.” South China Morning Post, June 10, 2014. http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/whitepapers/2021-12/ 20/content_77941746.htm. Accessed November 18, 2022. Tai, Benny. April 2019. 30 Years After Tiananmen: Hong Kong Remember. Journal of Democracy 30 (2): 64–69. Tai Kung Pao. “韓大元: 落實「愛國者治港」必須確保香港選舉安全” [Han Dayuan: election security must be guaranteed to ensure patriots administering Hong Kong]. Tai Kung Pao, February 19, 2021. http://www.takungpao. com.hk/mainland/text/2021/0219/553676.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. Tong, Kin-long, and Samson Yuen. “Disciplining Student Activism: Secondary School as Sites of Resistance and Control in Hong Kong.” Sociological Forum 36, no. 4: 984–1004. https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12744 . Trevaskes, Susan. 2019. Socialist Law. In Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi, ed. Christian Sorace, Ivan Franceschini, and Nicholas Loubere, 251–256. Canberra: ANU Press; Verso Books. Tsang, Emily, and Danny Mok. “Hong Kong National Security Law: Chinese University Cuts Ties with Student Union, Accuses Body of ‘Exploiting’ Campus, Bringing School into ‘Disrepute.’” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/ article/3123175/hong-kong-national-security-law-chinese-university-cuts. Accessed November 18, 2022. Un, Phoenix. “Independence Banner Removed from CUHK Campus.” The Standard, September 22, 2017. https://www.thestandard.com.hk/sectionsnews-print/187758/Independence-banner-removed-from-CUHK-campus. Accessed November 18, 2022. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. “UN Human Rights Committee Issues Findings on Hong Kong, Macao, Georgia, Ireland, Luxembourg and Uruguay.” United Nations Office of the High

116

Y. LAI

Commissioner on Human Rights. July 27, 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/ en/press-releases/2022/07/un-human-rights-committee-issues-findingshong-kong-macao-georgia-ireland. Accessed November 18, 2022. Vines, Steve. “I Covered Hong Kong for Decades. Now I Am Forced to Flee China’s ‘White Terror.’” The Guardian, August 8, 2021. https://www.the guardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/08/i-covered-hong-kong-for-dec ades-now-i-am-forced-to-flee-chinas-white-terror. Accessed November 18, 2022. Wang, Zhemin. “政治安全” [Political security]. Speech Given on HKSAR’s National Security Education Day, April 15, 2021. https://www.nsed.gov.hk/ booklet.php?b=speech_8.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. Wang, Zhenmin et al., eds. 香港特別行政區維護國家安全法讀本 [The Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A Reader]. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2021. Wen Wei Po. “Uncovering HKUST Professor Ching-kwan Lee who Promotes Independence with a Cloak of Academic Freedom” [揭秘 科大教授李靜君 披學術自由外衣行「宣獨」之實]. Wen Wei Po, March 18, 2021. https://www.wenweipo.com/a/202103/18/AP60533b42e4b04 e1918cc09d9.html. Accessed November 18, 2022. Westbrook, Laura. “38,600 Hongkongers under 18 Have Applied for Britain’s Special BN(O) Visa Scheme, but Most Requests Come from Residents in Prime Working Years.” South China Morning Post, November 9, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3198937/ 38600-hongkongers-under-18-have-applied-britains-special-bno-visa-schememost-requests-come. Accessed November 18, 2022. Woolcock, Nicola. “Wipe References to China, SOAS Lecturers Told.” The Times, May 7, 2021, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/wipe-refere nces-to-china-to-protect-students-soas-lecturers-told-9bjwlwwvm. Accessed November 18, 2022. Wong, Lydia, Eric Yan-ho Lai, and Thomas E. Kellogg. “Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law.” ChinaFile, October 25, 2022. https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongs-nat ional-security-law. Accessed November 18, 2022. Wong, Lydia, Thomas Kellogg, and Eric Yan-ho Lai. “Hong Kong’s National Security Law and the Right to Fair Trial: A GCAL Briefing Paper.” Center for Asian Law, Georgetown University Law Center, June 28, 2021. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/law-asia/wp-content/ uploads/sites/31/2021/06/HongKongNSLRightToFairTrial.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022. World Justice Project. “Rule of Law Index 2021.” World Justice Project, 2021, https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJPINDEX-2021.pdf. Accessed November 18, 2022.

3

AUTHORITARIAN CRACKDOWN WITHOUT BLOODSHED …

117

Zhang, Zheping, and Chung, Yiu-wah, eds. 香港三年 [Hong Kong Three Years]. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2016. Zheng, William. “Beijing Appoints Veterans to Its State-level Hong Kong Office to Improve Messaging on National Security Law, Other City Policies.” South China Morning Post, September 21, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/politics/article/3149861/beijing-appoints-veterans-itsstate-level-hong-kong-office. Accessed November 18, 2022.

PART II

Taiwan: Riding the Anti-China Tide

CHAPTER 4

Threat Perception and Taiwan’s 2020 Presidential Election T. Y. Wang and Su-feng Cheng

In a three-way race, Taiwan’s incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected with a landslide for a second term in the country’s 2020 presidential election. The victory has been characterized as a remarkable comeback for Tsai.1 Just one year prior to the election, Tsai’s approval rating reached a historical low of her term. Several DPP elders issued an open letter explicitly requesting Tsai not to run for re-election, fearing that the party could lose the governing power.2 Only a year later, Tsai’s political fortunes were reversed, and Tsai won the presidential race with more than eight million votes, which was the most acquired by any candidate since direct presidential elections started

T. Y. Wang (B) Illinois State University, Normal, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Cheng National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_4

121

122

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

in 1996. How can Tsai’s political comeback be explained? Empirical literature informs us that the perception of threat affects individuals’ policy stands and electoral decisions. The more threatened people feel, the less likely they are cooperative in policy positions, and the more likely they are to choose a strong leadership in response to the perceived threat. It is, therefore, hypothesized that the growing threat perception prior to the election, or a “sense of national subjugation” (wang-guo-gan), played a significant role in the electoral outcome and contributed to Tsai’s political comeback. To assess the above theoretical expectation, this study employs two waves of panel survey data collected from the island citizens with both landlines and cell phones.3 Both surveys are based on national probability samples of Taiwan citizens aged 20 or above. The completion of the first survey was on January 8, 2020, three days before the 2020 presidential election, with a sample size of 1,065. The second survey was conducted between May 29 and June 7. With a success rate of 57%, 604 respondents in the first survey are included in the second wave. The availability of panel data allows us to assess voters’ opinion change over time and ascertain the causal relationship between events. To ensure that nonresponse or overreporting will not bias the results, this study has adjusted the data by a weight proposed by Hur and Achen.4

Threats and Political Behavior To explain Tsai’s big comeback, the literature of threat provides the theoretical underpinning of the analysis. Voluminous studies have been generated since the onset of the Cold War with a focus on how threats or the perception of it affect state actions. Some scholarly research examines the relationship between threat perceptions and international crisis,5 the use of force,6 and governmental repression.7 Other studies analyze the effect of threat perception on alliance defense expenditures8 and on alignment patterns.9 In recent decades, the rise of China also has generated a body of literature focusing on possible threats posed by Beijing to international security and their resulting policy implications.10 In addition to analyzing the relationship between threat perception and state actions, empirical research also assesses its effects on individuals’ attitudes and decision-making. Some studies find that threat is a cause of authoritarian behavior.11 Others show that the more secure individuals are, the more cooperative their policy choices would be.12 Using

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

123

survey data collected in Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the United States, Gordon and Arian13 demonstrate that the more threatened people feel, the more likely their policy choices tend to maintain or intensify the conflict. The lower the perceived threat level they possess, the more peaceful their policy choices tend to be. A number of scholars also examine how threat perception affects individuals’ electoral decisions. McCann and his associates show that during times of societal threat voters tend to respond more favorably to charismatic candidates or to candidates who display strength.14 Similarly, recent research by Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister15 demonstrates that individuals who sense terrorist threat are more likely to seek out strong, charismatic, and hawkish leadership. Donald J. Trump’s unexpected electoral victory in the 2016 US presidential election has further generated studies assessing the relationship between threat perceptions and voting behavior. Mutz16 shows that growing domestic racial diversity and globalization have contributed to a sense that white Americans are under siege. The perceived status threat due to domestic and global changes and Trump’s taking advantage of that trend by positioning himself closer than his opponent to status threat-related issues have led to his electoral victory. However, due to Trump’s anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric in the campaign, Latino voters who perceive their ethnic group under attack and feel a sense of immigrant-linked fate are also more likely to hold negative views toward the Republican candidate.17 The causal linkage between threat perceptions and electoral behavior found in the United States has been identified in other democratic countries as well. In Sweden, low-status immigrants are often depicted as threats. The presence of stigmatized immigrants thereby heightens some voters’ threat level, who then have a higher tendency to support radical right parties.18 Notwithstanding their different research interests, this body of literature echoes the studies on state behavior in that threats or perceptions of threat have a causal linkage with individuals’ political attitude and behavior.

Threats and the 2020 Presidential Election The above discussion is relevant to the current analysis because Taiwan is a democracy under threat. As an immigration society within the Chinese diaspora, the vast majority of the island citizens can trace their ancestral roots in the Chinese mainland as early as mid-seventeenth century. When

124

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

the government of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) suffered a disastrous military defeat in 1949, millions of its supporters followed their leaders to the island. The Communist government in Beijing has since vowed to unify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland, with force if necessary. Although the 1970s saw a shift of China’s strategy away from reliance on “military liberation” to a wave of “peaceful initiatives,” Beijing leaders have refused to renounce the use of military force to resolve cross-Strait disputes. Attempting to compel Taipei to accept its unification formula known as “one country, two systems” (OCTS), Beijing has further isolated Taiwan internationally. Interestingly, cross-Strait interactions have increased exponentially since the early 1990s despite continuing political and military hostility. As China becomes Taiwan’s top trading partner and the principal destination of investment,19 it represents simultaneously a cultural heritage, an economic opportunity, as well as a security threat to many Taiwan citizens.20 The tension between Beijing and Taipei was high during the period 2000–2008, when Chen Shui-bian of the DPP was Taiwan president. Chen has a strong pro-independence credential, and his administration adopted a series of policies that irked Beijing, including holding referenda during the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections and making bids for regular membership in the United Nations (UN) and World Health Organization (WHO). Chinese leaders deemed these efforts pretexts to declaring the island’s de jure independence. When Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT won the 2008 presidential election, he vowed to improve crossStrait relations by adopting a policy of rapprochement toward China. In sharp contrast to his predecessor, Ma embraced the “one China with respective interpretations,” also known as the “1992 Consensus.”21 Presumably reached between Beijing and Taipei in 1992 when the KMT was in power, the Consensus is a tacit understanding that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are parts of “one China” subject to different views of what “one China” really means.22 This “agree-to-disagree” formula nevertheless honored the imagination that Taiwan was a part of China and was thus welcome by Chinese leaders. As tension between Taipei and Beijing attenuated, economic and people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait flourished as a result. Chinese leaders have since considered the 1992 Consensus a synonym for its version of one-China principle and the basis of cross-Strait interactions. With this backdrop, there were three candidates in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election, though only candidates of the two major parties, Tsai of

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

125

the DPP and Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, were considered viable.23 Tsai and Han presented the country with two different visions about Taiwan’s relationship with the Chinese mainland and two distinct approaches toward a rising and threatening China. As their visions and approaches reflected the most important political cleavage of the society, they were supported by their respective political camps: the pan-Green camp for Tsai and the pan-Blue camp for Han. The former consists of the pro-independence DPP and its junior partners, while the latter includes the “China-friendly” KMT and other minor parties. Tsai, who won a landslide victory in 2016 to become Taiwan’s first female president, was running for re-election. During the first term, she adopted a policy of maintaining cross-Strait status quo but nevertheless refused to endorse the 1992 Consensus. Because the Consensus implies Taiwan as a part of a China—however it is interpreted, Tsai views it as an infringement to the country’s sovereignty and autonomy. Since Tsai took office in 2016, Beijing has launched a relentless pressure campaign aiming to force her administration to accept the Consensus. These measures have included the suspension of all official communications with Taipei and a drastic reduction of mainland visitors to Taiwan to hurt the island’s tourist industry. The Chinese government has further lured away Taipei’s few remaining allies. Seven countries switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing during Tsai’s first term, leaving only fifteen nations that officially recognize Taiwan by the end of 2019.24 The island country was excluded from the International Civil Aviation Organization and the World Health Assembly meetings due to Beijing’s objection. To cast a negative image on Tsai and the DPP and help to boost Han’s popularity who was favored by Chinese leaders, Beijing has exploited its growing influence over Taiwan’s media with propaganda and disinformation.25 In addition, the People’s Liberation Army has repeatedly sent military aircraft and ships to circle the island aiming to intimidate the Taipei government and its citizens.26 As critiques blamed Tsai for deteriorating cross-Strait relations, she also encountered setbacks on the domestic front. Taipei’s DPP government under Tsai’s leadership introduced a host of reforms to such hot-button issues as pension reform, long-term care service, a minimum wage, as well as amending the Labor Standards Act and the Electricity Act. These efforts failed to be appreciated by the general public. The DPP’s significant setback in the 2018 local election added insult to injury as the party won only 6 out of 22 special municipalities/county/city mayor races. The

126

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

opposition KMT, which advocates an engagement approach with China, won by a landslide. In particular, Han’s victory in the mayoral race of Kaohsiung, the island’s second largest city and a DPP stronghold, sent shock waves throughout the island. Observers attributed the party’s electoral setback to Tsai’s poor leadership style and bad policies. After she was forced to resign as party chairwoman at the end of 2018,27 her job approval rating declined significantly from 52.7% in June 2016 to a meager 21.9% in December of 2018, as Fig. 4.1 shows. These developments made her less certain to be the party’s candidate in the 2020 presidential election. Meanwhile, armed with his newly found popularity, Han launched his presidential campaign from his mayoral office. His campaign slogan was “safety for Taiwan, money for the people,”28 which advocated for maintaining a peaceful and stable relationship with Beijing while advancing economic exchanges with the Chinese mainland. Expecting that the agree-to-disagree formula could side-step Taiwan’s sovereignty issue, he endorsed the 1992 Consensus and supported an engagement policy toward China—a policy that has been popular on the island. Indeed, there has been substantial support for the 1992 Consensus on the island. The solid line in Fig. 4.2 shows that, between 2005 and 2019, 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 2016/06

2017/03

2017/12

2018/09

2019/06

Fig. 4.1 Tsai Ing-wen’s presidential approval rating: June 2016–January 2020 (Data sources: Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study 2012–2016, 2016– 2020; Cheng 2020)

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

127

roughly 60% of the island citizens believe the agree-to-disagree formula should serve as the basis of cross-Strait interaction. While the support comes primarily from pan-Blue identifiers, the dash lines demonstrate that about 35–40% of Pan-Green identifiers and 45–60% non-partisan citizens also back the Consensus. After taking the mayoral office, Han made a trip to China aiming at selling produce from his city. He met with various Chinese officials, including the director of Beijing’s Taiwan Affair Office, and top Communist officials in Hong Kong and Macau. His charisma, populist tone, and “it’s the economy” message, generated a wave of support, dubbed the “Han Wave,” and made him a formidable contender in the next presidential election. Tsai’s electoral fortune started to change after Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a major policy speech in January of 2019, and Beijing’s subsequent repressive response to Hong Kongers’ quest for democracy. In his speech, Xi gave the impression that he equated Beijing’s version of one-China with the 1992 Consensus and provided no room for different interpretations of what “one China” means. Xi further indicated that Beijing’s OCTS unification model, implemented in Hong Kong and Macau, would be the only viable option, even though he implied that the island country would get a better treatment under a “Taiwan plan.” 90.0

80.0

70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 2005

2008

2011 All Citiuzens

2013 Pan-Blue

2014

2015 Pan-Green

2016

2017

2019

Independent

Fig. 4.2 Support for 1992 consensus by party ID: 2005–2019 (Data Source: Taiwan National Security Survey, 2005–2019)

128

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

While he pledged that Beijing’s effort of unification would be peaceful, he also emphasized that “we make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means.”29 Taiwan citizens’ skepticism and anxiety about Beijing’s offer are fully exhibited in the survey data. When being asked whether, under Beijing’s OCTS plan, they believed life in Taiwan would remain unchanged as Xi assured, 90% of the respondents showed little confidence in the pledge, as Fig. 4.3 demonstrates. Meanwhile, Fig. 4.3 also shows that more than 60% of the respondents in Taiwan indicate that events in Hong Kong since March 2019 worried them. After pro-democracy movement erupted in the former British colony, Beijing’s unyielding position and harsh treatment of protesters alarmed many Taiwan citizens. Since the 1997 handover, Hong Kong has become a special administrative region of China. Under Beijing’s unification framework, the territory “shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy” (Article 12, Basic Law of HKSAR), and “the previous capitalist system

Fig. 4.3 Taiwan citizens’ confidence in Xi’s Pledge & concerns about Hong Kong (Data Source: Cheng 2019)

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

129

and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years” (Article 5, Basic Law of HKSAR).30 Critiques, however, have pointed out that Chinese leaders have undercut such a commitment since 1997.31 Because Chinese leaders insist that the same unification plan be imposed on Taiwan, there is a growing awareness among the island citizens that “today’s Hong Kong” would be “tomorrow’s Taiwan,” if they do not resist. In this context, two moves by Tsai burnished her image as a defender of Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic way of life. First of all, tapping into the public’s anxiety about the island’s fate under the shadow of an aggressive China, Tsai delivered a sharp rebuttal immediately after Xi’s address and firmly rejected Beijing’s overture: “we have never accepted the 1992 Consensus,” and “Taiwan absolutely will not accept one country, two systems.”32 Tsai’s rebuttal essentially offered a new interpretation: the 1992 Consensus is tantamount to Beijing’s unification plan. This new interpretation sharply increased the salience of the Hong Kong prodemocracy movement for Taiwanese voters. Second, to further show her determination to resist Beijing’s repressive moves she took a strong stand to support Hong Kongers’ quest for democracy. As a result, some citizens considered Tsai “very presidential.”33 This chain of events put Han on the defense and made his engagement approach toward China less tenable. In particular, the endorsement of the 1992 Consensus became the Achilles heel of his campaign. For many Taiwan voters, particularly pan-Green supporters, the Consensus is no longer an agree-to-disagree formula between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Instead, it has been characterized as Beijing’s version of one-China in disguise with its OCTS as the intended outcome. Han’s embrace of the Consensus turned into a liability. He had to issue a public statement rejecting Xi’s overture, stating that Taiwan can never accept Beijing’s unification plan “unless it is over my dead body,” more than 6 months after Tsai issued her rebuttal. It was clear by then that the 2020 race in Taiwan had swung away from the economy and toward the issue of sovereignty and security. Han’s and Tsai’s positions on the 1992 Consensus had become the key issue that separated the two candidates. By June of 2019, Tsai’s approval rating surged to 45.5%, as Fig. 4.1 shows, and she was able to defeat her challenger and win the party’s nomination. She then went on to win the 2020 presidential election in a landslide.

130

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

Explaining the 2020 Presidential Election The above analysis shows that Xi’s speech and Beijing’s repressive measures on Hong Kongers’ pro-democracy protests have sensitized many Taiwan citizens’ threat perceptions. As noted, previous literature maintains that high level of threat perception tends to bring about less cooperative policy positions and the selection of a candidate that is considered able to respond to the perceived threat. Two hypotheses are formulated accordingly. First, because the 1992 Consensus was characterized during the election as Beijing’s unification plan in different name, Taiwan citizens who possessed a higher level of threat perception were less likely to support the Consensus. Second, the 1992 Consensus was the most important issue that separated Tsai from the other two candidates. Voters with a higher level of threat perception were also more likely to provide electoral support for Tsai in the election due to their disapproval of the 1992 Consensus. To examine the above hypotheses, two dependent variables are created. Support for the 1992 Consensus is coded dichotomously with 1 for supporting the Consensus and 0 otherwise. Data for this dependent variable are from the first and second surveys so that the public’s position on the issue before and after the election can be analyzed. Vote for Tsai is also coded dichotomously with 1 for supporting Tsai in the 2020 presidential election and 0 otherwise, and the data are from the second survey. Conceptualized as “danger, stressors, or crises of a social, economic, or political nature that are faced by a substantial portion of the electorate,”34 Taiwan citizens’ threat perception is assessed by their no confidence in Beijing’s pledge, and their concern about Hong Kong. To ensure that directions of the measurement are consistent, both variables are coded dichotomously with 1 indicating an individual’s apprehension and 0 otherwise. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present the bivariate relationship between the public’s threat perceptions and their policy positions. Figure 4.4 shows that, before and after the election, more than 80% of the respondents who expressed confidence in Xi’s pledge that life in Taiwan would remain unchanged after unification supported the 1992 Consensus, while only about 30% of them endorsed the Consensus if they had no confidence in Beijing’s promise. A similar pattern can be observed in Fig. 4.5. Roughly 70% of the respondents who showed no concern about events in Hong Kong supported the 1992 Consensus, while less than 30% of those who

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

131

were alarmed by China’s repressive responses to Hong Kongers’ quest for democracy provided a favorable view. Similarly, threat perceptions also exhibit divergent effect on Taiwan citizens’ electoral decisions, as Fig. 4.6 demonstrates. About 70% of the respondents who had a higher threat perception voted for Tsai in the election, but only 20–30% of them supported the Pan-Blue candidate. Thus, Taiwan citizens’ divergent responses to their threat perceptions in policy positions and candidate selections appear to confirm the above theoretical expectations. To ensure that the preliminary findings are not spurious, a multivariate analysis is conducted. In addition to the above two variables on threat perceptions, several independent variables are also included to assess both hypotheses. Previous studies found that Taiwan citizens’ partisan identification and their positions on the independence vs. unification issue are relevant to their political behavior and attitudes.35 Respondents’ party identification is coded as two dichotomous variables, Pan-Green affiliation and Independent, with voters associated

Fig. 4.4 Support for the 1992 consensus by confidence in Beijing’s Pledge: 2020 (Data Source: Cheng 2019)

132

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

80.0

70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 Bef or e Electio n

Af ter E lect ion Concern

No Concern

Fig. 4.5 Support for the 1992 consensus by concern about Hong Kong (Data Source: Cheng 2019) 90.0

80.0

70.0

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 Concern about Hong Kong

No Confidence in Beijing's Pledge Vot for Tsai

Vote for Pan-Blue Candidates

Fig. 4.6 Electoral support by threat perceptions (Data Source: Cheng 2019)

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

133

with opposition parties as the baseline group.36 Pro-independence and Pro-unification are also coded dichotomously with those who take a “wait and see” position as the baseline group. To control the effects of demographic characteristics, individuals’ education level, gender, and age are included. College degree is coded 1 for respondents with college (and above) education. Female is coded 1 for female respondents, and Age is a continuous variable based on the number of years since birth. Finally, the 1992 Consensus was the key campaign issue of the election. Support for the 1992 Consensus is thus included as an independent variable with data from the first survey when Taiwan citizens’ electoral decisions are analyzed. While panel data were employed in the current study, they were used to obtain information related to respondents’ opinions prior to the election. Because data are not pooled across time, the unit of analysis is the individual rather than the individual-time. The data structure is essentially cross-sectional. Because both dependent variables are dichotomous, a binary logit analysis is employed. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the regression coefficients and corresponding adjusted odds ratios.37 First, Panels 1 and 2 of Table 4.1 are the results associated with support for the 1992 Consensus before and after the election. Findings in Panel 1 show that both coefficients related to respondents’ concerns about Xi’s pledge and about events in Hong Kong are statistically significant with negative signs as hypothesized, which demonstrates that Taiwan citizens’ threat perceptions prior to the election are associated with their position on the Consensus. More specifically, for those who have no confidence in Xi’s pledge and who are alarmed by the erosion of rights and freedom in Hong Kong, the odds of supporting the Consensus are 89% and 67%, respectively, smaller than those who did not sense the threat, controlling all other variables. Because data of all variables in Panel 1 are from the first survey and are measured at the same time, these coefficients can only be interpreted as association. To ascertain the causal effect of threat perceptions, data from the second survey are used for the dependent variable. The findings in Panel 2 show that the coefficient related to the island citizens’ concern about Hong Kong is statistically significant with a negative sign as hypothesized. However, Xi’s pledge no longer exerts statistically significant effect. This shows that China’s repressive responses to Hong Kongers’ quest for democracy have exhibited a long-lasting impression in the minds of Taiwan citizens, which led to their continuing disapproval of the 1992 Consensus after the election.

134

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

Table 4.1 Taiwan citizens’ support for the 1992 consensus

Variable Threat perceptions No confidence in Xi’s Pledge Concerns about Hong Kong Party ID Pan-Green Independent Unification-independence Pro-unification Pro-independence Demographic characteristics College education (above) Female Age

Panel 1 (Weighted N = 746)

Panel 2 (Weighted N = 347)

Coef (s.e.)

O.R (% ch.)

Coef (s.e.)

O.R (% ch.)

−2.18*** (0.53) −1.10*** (0.21)

0.11 (−89) 0.33 (−67)

−1.09 (0.69) −1.26*** (0.36)

0.34 (−66) 0.29 (−71)

−1.88*** (0.25) −0.95*** (0.24)

0.15 (−85) 0.39 (−61)

−2.23*** (0.43) −1.89*** (0.45)

0.11 (−89) 0.15 (−85)

0.99 (0.52) −0.68** (0.21)

2.70 (170) 0.51 (−49)

1.00 (0.65) −1.24** (0.37)

2.74 (174) 0.29 (−71)

−0.10 (0.22) 0.36 (0.20) 0.01 (0.01)

0.90 (−10) 1.43 (43) 1.01 (1)

−0.25 (0.41) 1.58*** (0.36) 0.02 (0.02)

0.78 (−22) 4.84 (384) 1.02 (2)

Note Coef. = Logit Regression coefficient; s.e. = standard error; O.R. = odds ratio; % ch. = percentage change in odds; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two-tailed test

Second, treating electoral support for Tsai as the dependent variable, Table 4.2 shows that neither coefficient associated with the two threat variables is statistically significant. However, respondents’ pre-election assessment of the 1992 Consensus exerts a statistically significant effect. The odds of voting for Tsai in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election are 79% smaller for those who supported the 1992 Consensus prior to the election than those who opposed the Consensus. Or, conversely, the odds of supporting Tsai are almost five times larger for those who disapproved the Consensus. Along with the results in Table 4.1, the findings show that perceptions of threat do not exert direct effects on Taiwan citizens’ electoral decisions. Instead, effects of threat perceptions were manifested in

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

135

Table 4.2 Taiwan citizens’ electoral decision in the 2020 presidential election (Weighted N = 354) Variable Threat perceptions No confidence in Xi’s Pledge Concerns about Hong Kong Policy Position on 1992 Consensus Support for 1992 consensus Party ID Pan-Green Independent Unification-independence Pro-unification Pro-independence Demographic characteristics College education (above) Female Age

Coef (s.e.)

O.R (% ch.)

1.23 (0.82) 0.68 (0.46)

3.42 (242) 1.97 (97)

−1.55*** (0.40)

0.21 (−79)

2.85*** (0.56) 0.65 (0.45)

17.33 (1633) 1.92 (92)

0.46 (0.79) 1.03* (0.42)

1.58 (58) 2.81 (181)

0.70 (0.46) −0.47 (0.37) 0.00 (0.13)

2.02 (102) 0.63 (−37) 1.00 (0)

Note Coef. = Logit Regression coefficient; s.e. = standard error; O.R. = odds ratio; % ch. = percentage change in odds; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, two-tailed test

respondents’ policy positions and indirectly affected their electoral decisions. This confirmed the observation that the 1992 Consensus was the most important issue separating Tsai from the two pan-Blue candidates in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election. Third, effects of other control variables in both tables are largely as expected. That is, citizens who are identified with the pan-Green camp and who are pro-independence generally rejected the 1992 Consensus. Non-partisan citizens are also more likely to reject of the 1992 Consensus before and after the election. Like the United States, the partisan divide is

136

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

clearly visible in Taiwan citizens’ electoral decision as the odds of voting for Tsai are 17 times larger for Pan-Green identifiers than for pan-Blue supporters. Those who are in favor of Taiwan independence are also more likely to provide Tsai with their electoral support. Only one of the coefficients associated with demographic variables shows statistically significant effects. These findings further confirm the previous conclusion that the issue of independence vs. unification and its crystallization in the partisan division are the reflection of the political cleavage in Taiwan,38 which largely transcends the public’s demographic characteristics, such as gender, generation, and education level.

Conclusions Threat or the perception of threat has long been recognized as an important determinant of individuals’ behaviors and attitudes. Previous literature has informed us that the more threatened people feel, the less likely they are to be cooperative in their policy stand, and the more likely they are to choose a strong leadership in response to the perceived threat. Building on this literature, this study assesses how threat perception has affected Taiwan citizens’ policy positions and their electoral decisions in the island country’s 2020 presidential election. As a result of Chinese President Xi’s address of January 2019 and Beijing’s subsequent repressive responses to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, there has been a growing apprehension among the island citizens that “today’s Hong Kong would be tomorrow’s Taiwan.” Many of them have worried that they would lose their democratic way of life should Taiwan be unified with China under Beijing’s “one country, two systems” plan, even if a more generous “Taiwan plan” were implemented, as Xi promised. This sense of national subjugation permeated the society before Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election. The net result was that the 1992 Consensus became the most important issue separating Tsai from the other two candidates. Tsai characterized the Consensus as Beijing’s version of one-China in disguise with the implementation of its unification plan as the ultimate goal and thus must be rejected. The other two candidates stressed the importance of the Consensus for cross-Strait relationship, giving the impression that they supported Beijing’s unification plan. Employing panel data collected before and after Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election, the empirical findings show that Taiwan citizens who possessed a higher level of threat perception were less likely to support the

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

137

1992 Consensus. Because the Consensus was the most important issue that separated Tsai from the other two candidates in the election, voters with a higher level of threat perception were also more likely to provide electoral support for Tsai. These findings have important policy implications for cross-Strait relations. First, Tsai’s resurgence demonstrates that history has repeated itself. In Taiwan’s 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, Chinese leaders’ saber-rattling backfired. In both instances, candidates of whom China disapproved won the election as Beijing’s actions only hardened the island citizens’ resistance.39 The Communist government seemed to learn the lesson and has kept a concerned but low-key posture during Taiwan’s 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. As the political campaign ran its course, a China-friendly candidate who was favored by Beijing leaders came out victorious in both elections. However, in Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election, Beijing’s overt actions and rigid policies revived the electoral prospects of its least favored candidate. As one observer concisely pointed out, “In Taiwan, Beijing’s preferred candidates have tended to do best when Beijing does least” because “threats and overt endorsements” have only intensified the voices that are skeptical of Chinese leaders’ true intent.40 Second, the public’s perceived threat from Beijing has also damaged the 1992 Consensus, currently the most important policy tool of maintaining cross-Strait exchanges. As noted, the Consensus has consistently received the majority support of island citizens over the past decade. Although Beijing has never seriously provided room for “different interpretations” of what one-China is, this agree-to-disagree formula has at least provided a façade of ambiguity that allowed both sides of the Taiwan Strait to interact peacefully, as had been demonstrated during the period of 2008–2016. The majority of Taiwan citizens now view the 1992 Consensus as Beijing’s version of one-China in disguise, and Hong Kong is a vivid example of the consequence if the Consensus is not challenged. As a result, it is difficult to expect that the Consensus will be received favorably by the majority of Taiwan citizens again. After more than two decades of trying, Chinese leaders are still not able to understand how to win the hearts and minds of Taiwan citizens. Their unyielding position on the Taiwan issue and tactics of repeated military intimidation and relentless diplomatic isolation toward Taipei only invite resentment. Although common sense tells us that weakness invites defiance, and toughness gets submission, the above empirical findings suggest

138

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

otherwise. A hostile Beijing is quite counterproductive to China’s cause of unification. Unless Beijing leaders can be patient and flexible on their policies toward Taiwan regarding the islanders’ democratic way of life and economic prosperity, cross-Strait relations will continue in a stalemate, regardless of who is the island country’s president.

Notes 1. Anna Fifield, “Taiwan’s President Wins Second Term with Landslide Victory over Pro-Beijing Rival,” Washington Post, January 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwanese-motiva ted-by-the-lessons-of-hong-kong-turn-out-in-droves-to-vote/2020/01/ 11/6543228a-3138-11ea-971b-43bec3ff9860_story.html. Accessed June 22, 2021. 2. Sean Lin, “Tsai Asked not to Run for Re-election,” Taipei Times, January 4, 2019. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/01/ 04/2003707304. Accessed July 18, 2021. 3. Sufeng Cheng, “A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its Political Effects.” Wave 2. Ministry of Science and Technology Research Plan, 2020. MOST108-2410-H-004-153-SSS; Sufeng Cheng, “A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its Political Effects.” Wave 1. Ministry of Science and Technology Research Plan, 2019. MOST108-2410-H-004153-SSS. 4. That is, we dropped all categories of missing vote choices and then post-stratified the remaining sample so that the distribution of vote choices matches the actual ones as reported by Taiwan’s Central Election https://db.cec.gov.tw/ElecTable/Election/ElecTickets? Commission dataType=tickets&typeId=ELC&subjectId=P0&legisId=00&themeId= 1f7d9f4f6bfe06fdaf4db7df2ed4d60c&dataLevel=N&prvCode=00&cit yCode=000&areaCode=00&deptCode=000&liCode=0000. Accessed July 21, 2021. See, Aram Hur and Christopher H. Achen, “Coding Voter Turnout Responses in The Current Population Survey,” Public Opinion Quarterly 77, no. 4 (2013): 985–993. 5. Raymond Cohen, “Threat Perception in International Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 93, no. 1 (1978): 93–107. 6. Benjamin Fordham, “The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (1998): 567–590. 7. Scott Sigmund Gartner and Patrick M. Regan, “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (1996): 273–287.

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

139

8. William Gates and Katsuaki L. Terasawa, “Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1992): 101–118. 9. Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, “Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 587–615. 10. Aileen Baviera, “Accommodation with Hedging: South Asia’s Changing Perspectives towards China,” in China’s Rise—Threat or Opportunity?, ed. Herbert S. Yee (New York: Routledge, 2011), 176–190; Michael G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 169–194; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 149–168; Yitzhak Shichor, “Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick: Non-Traditional Chinese Threats and Middle Eastern Instability,” in China’s Rise—Threat or Opportunity?, ed. Herbert S. Yee (New York: Routledge, 2011), 101–123. 11. Richard M. Doty, Bill E. Peterson, and David G. Winter, “Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991): 629–640; Stephen M. Sales, “Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 28, no. 1 (1973): 44–57. 12. Mark Schafer, “Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security and Image of the Other,” Political Psychology 20, no. 4 (1999): 829–844. 13. Carol Gordon and Asher Arian, “Threat and Decision Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 2 (2001): 196–215. 14. Stewart J. H. McCann, “Threatening Times and the Election of Charismatic U.S. Presidents: With and Without FDR,” The Journal of Psychology 131 (1997): 393–400; Stewart J. H. McCann and L. L. Stewin, “Good and Bad Years: An Index of American Social, Economic, and Political Threat (1920–1986),” Journal of Psychology 124 (1990): 601–617. 15. Mirya R. Holman, Jennifer L. Merolla, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, “Terrorist Threat, Male Stereotypes, and Candidate Evaluations,” Political Research Quarterly 69, no. 1 (2016): 134–147. 16. Diana C. Mutz, “Status Threat, not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 115, no. 19 (2018): E4330–E4339. 17. Angela Gutierrez, Angela X. Ocampo, Matt A. Barreto, and Gary Segura, “Somos Más: How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilized Latino Voters in the Trump Era,” Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 4 (2019): 960–975.

140

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

18. Eva G. T. Green, Oriane Sarrasin, Robert Baur, and Nicole Fasel, “From Stigmatized Immigrants to Radical Right Voting: A Multilevel Study on the Role of Threat and Contact,” Political Psychology 37, no. 4 (2016): 465–480. 19. Mainland Affairs Council, Monthly Report on Cross-Straits Economy (Liang-An Jing-ji Tong-ji Yue-Bao), no. 331 (2020). http://www.mac. gov.tw/. Accessed December 1, 2020. 20. Christopher Achen and T. Y. Wang, “The Taiwan Voter: An Introduction,” in The Taiwan Voter, eds. Christopher Achen and T. Y. Wang, 1–25. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017b. 21. Ying-jeou Ma, “Taiwan’s Renaissance,” Presidential Office of the Republic of China, 2008. www.president.gov.tw/en/. Accessed May 1, 2015. 22. Chi Su, and Cheng An-guo, eds., Yige Zhongguo, Gezi Biaoshu’ Gongshi de Shishi [One China, Different Interpretations: An Account of the Consensus] (Taipei: Guojia Zhengce Yanjiu Jijinhui, 2002). 23. The third presidential candidate, James Soong of the People’s First Party (PFP), was in his fifth attempt for the presidential office since 2000. 24. These seven countries are: Sao Tome and Principle (December 2016); Panama (June 2017); Dominican Republic (May 2018); Burkina Faso (May 2018); El Salvador (August 2018); the Solomon Islands (September 2019); and Kiribati (September 2019). 25. Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan Primaries Highlight Fears over China’s Political Influence,” Financial Times, July 16, 2019. www.ft.com/content/036 b609a-a768-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04. Accessed August 25, 2021. 26. Huileng Tan, “Taiwan’s President Orders Military to ‘Forcefully Expel’ Future Incursions of China Warplanes,” CNBC, April 2, 2019. https:/ /www.cnbc.com/2019/04/02/taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-on-chinawarplanes-crossing-maritime-line.html. Accessed June 15, 2019. 27. Yimou Lee and Macy Yu, “Taiwan President Quits as Party Chair After Local Election Setback,” Reuters, November 23, 2018. https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-president-quits-as-party-chairafter-local-election-setback-idUSKCN1NT001. Accessed June 26, 2021. 28. Han Kuo-yu Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/twherohan/posts/ 2515562305347585/, accessed November 28, 2019. 29. Jinping Xi, “Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan Message Anniversary Event,” China Daily, January 2, 2019. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html. Accessed January 5, 2019. 30. See, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_ 665465/3566_665531/t23031.shtml. Accessed November 24, 2020.

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

141

31. See, for example, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “20 Years Ago, China Promised Hong Kong ‘1 Country, 2 Systems’ So Much For Promises,” The Washington Post, June 29, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/29/20-years-ago-china-promised-a-1-cou ntry-2-systems-deal-for-hong-kong-that-wasnt-to-be/. Accessed August 23, 2019. 32. Ing-wen Tsai, “President Tsai Issues Statement on China’s President Xi’s "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”,” Office of the President, Republic of China, January 2, 2019. https://english.president.gov.tw/ NEWS/5621. Accessed, January 5, 2019. 33. Chris Horton, “Candidate Seeks Closer China Ties, Shaking Up Taiwan’s Presidential Race,” New York Times, June 6, 2019. https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/06/world/asia/taiwan-han-president.html. Accessed November 15, 2019. 34. McCann, “Threatening Times and the Election of Charismatic U.S. Presidents,” p. 394. 35. Szu-yin Ho and I-chou Liu, “The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s,” The American Asian Review 20, no. 2 (2002): 29–74; Christopher Achen and T. Y. Wang, eds., The Taiwan Voter (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017a). 36. Respondents of the pan-Green camp are those who are identified with the DPP and the New Power Party, while respondents of opposition parties are those who support the KMT, the People’s First Party, the New Party, and the Taiwan’s People’s Party. 37. None of variance inflation factors is above five, which is the recommended threshold of multicollinearity. See, John Fox, Regression Diagnostics (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1991). This shows that multicollinearity does not pose a threat to the statistical analysis. 38. Achen and Wang, The Taiwan Voter. 39. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); T. Y. Wang, “Cross-Strait Relations After the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New Reality,” Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 716–736. 40. Karis Templeman, “How Taiwan Stands Up to China,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (2020): 87.

References Achen, Christopher, and T. Y. Wang, eds. The Taiwan Voter. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017a.

142

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

Achen, Christopher, and T. Y. Wang. “The Taiwan Voter: An Introduction.” In The Taiwan Voter, edited by Christopher Achen and T. Y. Wang, 1–25. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017b. Baviera, Aileen. 2011. Accommodation with Hedging: South Asia’s Changing Perspectives towards China. In China’s Rise—Threat or Opportunity?, ed. Herbert S. Yee, 176–190. New York: Routledge. Bush, Richard C. “Taiwan’s Local Elections, Explained.” Brookings, December 5, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/ 05/taiwanslocal-elections-explained/. Accessed November 1, 2019. Cheng, Sufeng. “A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its Political Effects.” Wave 2. Ministry of Science and Technology Research Plan, 2020. MOST108-410-H-004-153-SSS. Cheng, Sufeng. “A Study of Presidential Popularity and Its Political Effects.” Wave 1. Ministry of Science and Technology Research Plan, 2019. MOST108-2410-H-004-153-SSS. Cohen, Raymond. 1978. Threat Perception in International Crisis. Political Science Quarterly 93 (1): 93–107. Doty, Richard M., Bill E. Peterson, and David G. Winter. 1991. Threat and Authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61: 629–640. Fifield, Anna. “Taiwan’s President Wins Second Term with Landslide Victory over Pro-Beijing Rival.” Washington Post, January 11, 2020. https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwanese-motivated-by-the-lessonsof-hong-kong-turn-out-in-droves-to-vote/2020/01/11/6543228a-313811ea-971b-43bec3ff9860_story.html. Accessed June 22, 2021. Fordham, Benjamin. 1998. The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994. International Studies Quarterly 42 (3): 567–590. Fox, John. 1991. Regression Diagnostics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Gallagher, Michael G. 1994. China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea. International Security 19 (1): 169–194. Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Patrick M. Regan. “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 3 (1996): 273–287. Garver, John W., and Face Off. 1997. China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Gates, William, and Katsuaki L. Terasawa. 1992. Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance. International Studies Quarterly 36 (1): 101–118. Goldstein, Avery. 2005. Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

143

Gordon, Carol, and Asher Arian. 2001. Threat and Decision Making. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2): 196–215. Green, Eva G. T., Oriane Sarrasin, Robert Baur, and Nicole Fasel. “From Stigmatized Immigrants to Radical Right Voting: A Multilevel Study on the Role of Threat and Contact.” Political Psychology 37, no. 4 (2016): 465–480. Gutierrez, Angela, Angela X. Ocampo, Matt A. Barreto, and Gary Segura. 2019. Somos Más: How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilized Latino Voters in the Trump Era. Political Research Quarterly 72 (4): 960–975. Hille, Kathrin. “Taiwan Primaries Highlight Fears over China’s Political Influence.” Financial Times, July 16, 2019. www.ft.com/content/036b609aa768-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04. Accessed August 25, 2021. Ho, Szu-yin, and I.-chou Liu. 2002. The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s. The American Asian Review 20 (2): 29–74. Holman, Mirya R., Jennifer L. Merolla, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2016. Terrorist Threat, Male Stereotypes, and Candidate Evaluations. Political Research Quarterly 69 (1): 134–147. Horton, Chris. “Candidate Seeks Closer China Ties, Shaking Up Taiwan’s Presidential Race.” New York Times, June 6, 2019. https://www. nytimes.com/2019/06/06/world/asia/taiwan-han-president.html. Accessed November 15, 2019. Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. “20 Years Ago, China Promised Hong Kong ‘1 Country, 2 Systems’ So Much For Promises.” The Washington Post, June 29, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/29/ 20-years-ago-china-promised-a-1-country-2-systems-deal-for-hong-kong-thatwasnt-to-be/. Accessed August 23, 2019. Hur, Aram, and Christopher H. Achen. 2013. Coding Voter Turnout Responses in The Current Population Survey. Public Opinion Quarterly 77 (4): 985– 993. Lee, Yimou, and Macy Yu. “Taiwan President Quits as Party Chair After Local Election Setback.” Reuters, November 23, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-president-quits-as-party-chair-after-local-ele ction-setback-idUSKCN1NT001. Accessed June 26, 2021. Lendon, Brad. “Chinese Threat to Taiwan ‘Closer to Us Than Most Think,’ Top US Admiral Says.” CNN , March 24, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/ 03/24/asia/indo-pacific-commander-aquilino-hearing-taiwan-intl-hnk-ml/ index.html. Accessed March 31, 2021. Lin, Sean. “Tsai Asked not to Run for Re-election.” Taipei Times, January 4, 2019. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/01/04/ 2003707304. Accessed July 18, 2021. Ma, Ying-jeou. “Taiwan’s Renaissance.” Presidential Office of the Republic of China, 2008. www.president.gov.tw/en/. Accessed May 1, 2015.

144

T. Y. WANG AND S. CHENG

Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). Monthly Report on Cross-Straits Economy (Liang-An Jing-ji Tong-ji Yue-Bao), no. 331 (2020). http://www.mac. gov.tw/. Accessed December 1, 2020. McCann, Stewart J. H. “Threatening Times and the Election of Charismatic U.S. Presidents: With and Without FDR.” The Journal of Psychology 131 (1997): 393–400. McCann, Stewart J. H., and L. L. Stewin. “Good and Bad Years: An Index of American Social, Economic, and Political Threat (1920–1986).” Journal of Psychology 124 (1990): 601–617. Mutz, Diana C. 2018. Status Threat, not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 115 (19): E4330–E4339. Pan, Jason. “DPP Appoints Tsai as 2020 Nominee.” Taipei Times, June 14, 2019.http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2019/06/14/ 2003716894. Accessed July 18, 2021. Roy, Denny. 1994. Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security. International Security 19 (1): 149–168. Sales, Stephen M. 1973. Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An Analysis of Archival Data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 28 (1): 44–57. Schafer, Mark. 1999. Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security and Image of the Other. Political Psychology 20 (4): 829– 844. Shichor, Yitzhak. 2011. Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick: Non-Traditional Chinese Threats and Middle Eastern Instability. In China’s Rise—Threat or Opportunity?, ed. Herbert S. Yee, 101–123. New York: Routledge. Sides, John. “Race, Religion, and Immigration in 2016: How the Debate over American Identity Shaped the Election and What it Means for a Trump Presidency.” Voter Study Group, June 2017. https://www.voterstudygroup.org/ publications/2016-elections/race-religion-immigration-2016. Accessed July 15, 2021. Su, Chi, and Cheng An-guo, eds. Yige Zhongguo, Gezi Biaoshu’ Gongshi de Shishi [One China, Different Interpretations: An Account of the Consensus]. Taipei: Guojia Zhengce Yanjiu Jijinhui, 2002. Taipei Times. “Han Repeats Stance on ‘Two Systems’.” June 17, 2019. http:/ /www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/06/17/2003717087. Accessed November 28, 2019. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2012–2016 (IV) (MOST 1012420-H004-034 MY4). Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2016–2020 (II) (MOST 1052420-H-004-015-SS4). Taiwan National Security Survey. The Program in Asian Security Studies at Duke University, 2005–2020.

4

THREAT PERCEPTION AND TAIWAN’S 2020 PRESIDENTIAL …

145

Tan, Huileng. “Taiwan’s President Orders Military to ‘Forcefully Expel’ Future Incursions of China Warplanes.” CNBC, April 2, 2019. https://www.cnbc. com/2019/04/02/taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-on-china-warplanes-cro ssing-maritime-line.html. Accessed June 15, 2019. Templeman, Kharis. 2020. How Taiwan Stands Up to China. Journal of Democracy 31 (3): 85–99. Tsai, Ing-wen. “President Tsai issues statement on China’s President Xi’s "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.”” Office of the President, Republic of China, January 2, 2019. https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5621. Accessed, January 5, 2019. Wang, T. Y. “Cross-Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New Reality.” Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 716–736. Xi, Jinping. “Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan Message Anniversary Event.” China Daily, January 2, 2019. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/ 02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html. Accessed January 5, 2019. Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. “Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 587–615.

CHAPTER 5

Taiwan Can Help: The Political Impacts and Lessons of Taiwan’s Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Huang-Ting Yan

Introduction The COVID-19 crisis has affected every part of the world. It was predicted that, other than China, Taiwan would be at the highest risk for community transmission, given its geographic proximity to and close people-to-people contacts with China. Yet, at the first 100-day-mark (since the first confirmed case), Taiwan recorded the markedly low figures of 373 cases and 5 deaths, with the majority of cases being individuals returning from overseas. What explains Taiwan’s successful response to COVID-19? What are the effects of Taiwan’s successful response on domestic politics and international affairs? This study presents a coherent theoretical framework that links the COVID-19 crisis to an anti-China tide. We demonstrate that executive coordination and a temporary power shift to the government in

H.-T. Yan (B) Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_5

147

148

H.-T. YAN

response to the crisis mitigated dual-legitimacy problems built into semipresidentialism. The president whose legitimacy rested on the will of the population was then able to play the role of checks and balances in resolving executive overreach, thus raising individual compliance to government policies, which in turn helped the government respond quickly to the crisis. The better responses to the crisis, for one thing, curtailed the opposition’s influence, and for another, allowed more resources to be invested and experience in crisis control passed on to countries with similar states of crisis, thus enhancing the country’s international reputation and constituting a strong bargaining chip when dealing with diplomatic rivals. This study chose Taiwan as the subject to explore the cause–effect link of the outcomes using process-tracing methods. We found that a power-sharing mode between president and government had taken shape during the pandemic that operated with great popularity. Public confidence in the government raised individual compliance to government policies, allowing for quicker crisis response by the Tsai administration. The better responses to the COVID-19 pandemic curtailed the opposition Kuomintang’s (KMT) influence, enabling the Tsai administration to invest more resources and pass on experience in crisis control to countries facing a similar crisis. As a result, the Tsai administration’s public diplomacy toward material and immaterial resource-sharing with other countries has earned them a better national reputation, leading President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to utilize the success of public diplomacy to strengthen her position on cross-Strait policy “to resist China and protect Taiwan.” In sum, Taiwan’s case confirmed the causal mechanism that links the COVID-19 crisis to an anti-China tide. This research speaks to several central studies in comparative politics. First, this paper argues that executive coordination and temporary power shift to the government explains Taiwan’s success in controlling the spread of COVID-19, thereby contributing to existing research on Taiwan’s successful COVID-19 mitigation and containment strategy,1 which has yet to recognize how intra-executive relations have helped the central government tackle this public health crisis. Second, this paper adds to the richness of existing scholarship on the relationship between semipresidentialism and democratic performance,2 implying that the semipresidentialism system, a perilous constitutional design during normal times, may have advantages in a time of crisis. Third, the paper fills a gap in the public diplomacy and nation branding literature in the context of a

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

149

crisis,3 which has yet to focus on COVID-19, proposing that in addition to engaging in nation branding during a pandemic,4 the president can deploy pandemic public diplomacy to triumph over its diplomatic rivals.

Theoretical Framework Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where a popularly elected president exists alongside a prime minister (PM) and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature.5 A popularly elected president derives power from the vote of the people, while a PM leading the government relies on the support of the parliament, which claims to be the citizens’ true representative. Thus, semi-presidentialism often generates dual-legitimacy problems, which means that both the president and the PM have competing claims to constitutional legitimacy. The coexistence of popularly elected presidents and PMs often leads to a gridlock situation under which both actors are not willing to compromise or cooperate. Protsyk explains that popular elections often provide justifications for the president’s willingness to rein in the cabinet, intervene in the sphere where the president’s formal or informal power is exercised, and thus control the executive to a certain degree.6 There are many mechanisms of presidential intervention, such as drawing on the assembly dissolution power to threaten the government to act in the president’s best interest7 or influencing cabinet decisions by invoking public opinion.8 However, the PM may not comply with the president’s requests, instead challenging the president when he is not equipped with sufficient constitutional weapons to turn open confrontation into political suicide for the PM.9 As a result, both sides intend to be in the driving seat, leading to conflict. There are two possibilities where one head determines the executive affairs of the government without the other head’s intervention in the sphere of his personal policy interest.10 One possibility is that the PM can exercise nearly full autonomy over policy-making or personnel appointments; the other is that the president enjoys greater room to maneuver in executive affairs, and the PM is subordinated to the elected president. The first scenario refers to semi-presidential countries such as Austria after 1945 and Ireland after 1937, where the PM manages the government’s day-to-day business independently.11 By contrast, Russia is a case where the president is clearly the dominant figure under the normal politics.12 In these cases, intra-executive competition is rare.

150

H.-T. YAN

Crisis may facilitate executive coordination, thereby reducing intraexecutive competition. The president and the PM are motivated to work together to deal with an imminent social and economic crisis or tackle dangerous forces such as communists, terrorists, or separatist rebels. First, peaceful intra-executive relations signal that a popularly elected president and a government can cooperate in striving to fulfill their citizens’ interests. It reduces the chances of conflict and, consequently, rebuilds public trust in the government. One study indicates that semi-presidentialism exerts a negative influence on citizens’ attitudes toward political institutions as a result of frequent intra-executive conflicts.13 Second, a temporary power shift to the government in response to the crisis can mitigate dual-legitimacy problems built into semi-presidentialism, in which case the president, whose legitimacy rests on the will of the population, can play the role of checks and balances in resolving executive overreach in the crisis, thus enhancing individual compliance to government policies. Social contract arguments typically are that individuals consent, either explicitly or tacitly, to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the government, accept and trust their government in general, and comply with government policies if the government affords them conditions that enhance and protect their human dignity and maintain the social order. Trust in the government is a determinant of whether social contracts can work. A survey of public behaviors and attitudes toward the construction of a hazardous waste incinerator suggested that the nature of opposition is related primarily to trust in government.14 In an investigation of 217 US taxpayers and a sample of 392 independent accounting professionals in Turkey, it was found that trust in government has a significant influence on both the perceived fairness of the tax system and compliance decisions.15 Further, there is evidence that the compliance with COVID-19 containment policies depends on the level of trust in policymakers.16 Another determinant is governmental abuses of power. A trustworthy government requires accountability. Individuals are less likely to comply if they feel that the government is breaking its contract with them, exercising favoritism or revenge through its policies, or is unacceptably corrupt. By contrast, the more a government is effective and fair, the more legitimacy that government is likely to attain, and the more it will be able to elicit compliance.17 In an investigation of over 5,000 firms from 22 former Soviet Bloc transition economies, it was found that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of tax compliance.18 Further, high perceived levels of corruption have been shown to lead to lower

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

151

institutional trust and hence possibly to lower levels of citizen compliance with non-pharmaceutical interventions.19 We, therefore, expect that executive coordination under semi-presidentialism in response to a crisis can restore public confidence in the government and ensure executive branch accountability, thus raising individual compliance to government policies. That in turn will help the government respond quickly to the crisis. For example, public health policy compliance in the COVID-19 pandemic effectively curbs COVID-19 transmission.20 The better responses to the crisis have major political consequences: the government will enjoy greater levels of public trust, while the opposition’s influence will be curtailed. The opposition could have better electoral prospects if it created a multiparty coalition or jointly supported a single presidential candidate from the opposition.21 In other words, a coordinated opposition presents a compelling alternative government, thus making it much easier to mobilize voting against the incumbent.22 However, this depends on government performance: poor performance harms incumbents’ prospects of re-election and makes it more likely for opposition coalitions to form.23 The opposition also uses legislative tools to uncover policy conflicts and ministerial drift within the coalition to expose intra-coalition tensions,24 and poor government performance provides ruling elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections, thus exacerbating intracoalition cohesion.25 The opposition also manipulates public opinion against the government, as voters might bear in mind the obligations that parties are expected to fulfill in their role of opposition and credit opposition parties for maintaining the standards of responsible government.26 High levels of support for the government, however, discourage opposition, as fighting the majority opinion may diminish the opposition’s public image. Thus, we expect that good governance during a crisis can undermine the opposition’s influence. The better responses to the crisis enable a government to invest more resources and pass on experience in crisis control to countries facing a similar crisis, thus enhancing its international reputation and improving diplomatic relations. Public diplomacy arguments refer to an instrument that governments use to mobilize resources to communicate with and attract the public favor in other countries.27 These resources, including ideas, practices, values, culture, media, language, and economic aid, produce soft power to promote national interest28 and nation branding.29 Studies have addressed how public diplomacy

152

H.-T. YAN

can foster a favorable country image. For example, the Web 2.0 Canadian public diplomacy as practiced through Weibo delivered results and enhanced Canada’s reputation in China30 ; China’s aid and large state-led investments in infrastructure have generally made a positive contribution to China’s image in Africa31 ; South Korea’s containment approach against the COVID-19 outbreak and public diplomacy toward material and immaterial resource-sharing with other countries seems to have burnished its national reputation.32 A government with a higher popularity rating and great international support will possess a strong bargaining chip when dealing with diplomatic rivals. First, they increase its chances of signing alliance agreements, which may specify mutual defense33 and economic cooperation.34 That in turn will deter adversaries35 and make the allies less vulnerable to attack by rivals.36 Second, that increases the chances of other countries with which the government has strong informal relations pushing for its participation in international organizations. This is extremely important for small states,37 which benefit the most from joining multilateral organizations by gaining access to information, the exchange of experience, the allocation of resources, and the provision of assistance.38 Multilateral diplomacy also helps small states reduce their dependency on large states and diminishes the power asymmetry between states, thus amplifying their voices in negotiations and bargaining.39 Finally, that increases its chances of consolidating existing formal and informal diplomatic ties with major allies, through which a government may adopt a more confrontational foreign policy toward rivals.40

Methods and Case Selection To address the two research questions, this study utilized a case study approach. A case study is defined as an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.41 It is also an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context.42 Case studies are generally more useful for gaining a comprehensive in-depth understanding of a phenomenon of interest because (1) propositional depth is preferred to breadth, (2) insight into causal mechanisms is more important than insight into causal effects, (3) the strategy of research is exploratory, rather than confirmatory, and (4) useful variance is available for only a single unit or a small number of units.43

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

153

Taiwan is chosen as the subject of the study in light of its constitutional design, party system, and diplomatic relations. First, Taiwan is a semipresidential country where we can observe whether the regular interaction between the executives and intra-executive balance of power changes during a crisis. Second, Taiwan has an institutionalized party system, which implies regular and robust interparty competition, and parties that are highly organized with stable roots in society. Such competition fulfills the fundamental role of opposition in a democracy by presenting alternatives.44 In Taiwan, a clear, critical, and credible opposition makes it possible to identify government–opposition dynamics in times of crisis. Third, over the past two decades, eighteen countries have severed diplomatic links with Taiwan due to military and economic pressure from China in an attempt to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, which has left the island with only fourteen formal allies around the globe. Thus, it is an appropriate case for examining how Taiwan manages its relations with China in the context of crisis. We chose the COVID-19 pandemic as the context of crisis. In December 2019, an outbreak of pneumonia of unknown etiology was detected in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. Since then, the newtype coronavirus has spread to more than 216 countries and territories, causing a total of 608 million confirmed cases and 6.5 million deaths globally. On February 11, 2020, the WHO officially named the disease Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19). Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have applied containment measures based on nonpharmaceutical interventions, and of these, Taiwan has fared better than many other countries. Thus, the COVID-19 crisis enables us to explore how the Taiwanese government turned this health crisis into a diplomatic opportunity through medical outreach to countries facing the COVID-19 outbreak. This study explores the cause–effect link of policy and outcomes using process-tracing methods. Of the four variants of process-tracing, we used theory testing process-tracing, which starts with conceptualizing a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism based on proposed theories and empirical research. More precisely, each of the constituent parts of the mechanism needs to be theorized and subsequently operationalized. We collected and assessed the available empirical record to determine whether there is mechanistic evidence suggesting that the mechanism worked as theorized.45 Figure 5.1 presents the causal mechanism that links the COVID-19 crisis to an anti-China tide.

154

H.-T. YAN CONDITION(X): The COVID-19 pandemic changed intra-executive relations

Part I: A power-sharing mode between president and government had taken shape

Part II: The mode reduced the chances of intra-executive conflict and ensured accountability of the executive branch

Part III: The mode operated with great popularity

Part IV: Public confidence in the government enhanced individual compliance with government policies

Part V: Individual compliance with government policies helped the Tsai administration respond quickly to a crisis

Part VI: The better responses to the COVID-19 pandemic curtailed opposition KMT’s influence

Part VII: The better responses to the COVID-19 pandemic enabled the Tsai administration without hindrance to invest more resources and pass on experience in crisis control to countries with similar crises

Part VIII: The Tsai administration’s public diplomacy towards material and immaterial resource-sharing with other countries has earned Taiwan a better national reputation

OUTCOME (Y): This successful public diplomacy spurred President Tsai to adopt a more distant approach to China

Fig. 5.1 Theory testing process-tracing: how the COVID-19 crisis affects subsequent anti-China tide in Taiwan

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

155

A Case Study Premier Lai Ching-te (賴清德) and his cabinet resigned on January 11, 2019, after the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered a landslide electoral defeat, losing a majority of city, county, and municipal governments. Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) was sworn in on January 14 as the new premier for the Tsai administration. Su was a former premier under President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) from 2006 to 2007, during which time his vice premier was the current President Tsai. An unspoken misunderstanding between Tsai and Su has been an open secret within the DPP. Su had suggested President Chen consider replacing Tsai several times when Tsai served as vice premier from 2006 to 2007,46 and Tsai insisted on refusing the Order of the Brilliant Star (景星勳章) after leaving Su’s cabinet.47 The intrigue between the two became even more intense in the 2010 local elections. Su declared his candidacy for the office of Taipei mayor, disrupting the DPP chairperson Tsai’s layout. Tsai had no choice but to enter the New Taipei mayoral race.48 The feud between Tsai and Su reached a peak when Tsai decided to join the DPP’s primary for president in the following year. On May 19, 2011, Tsai, representing the DPP in the 2012 presidential race, asked for her presidential primary rival Su’s help. However, Tsai was bombarded with such responses as “the chairperson Tsai directly assigned tasks to me, so there was no need to discuss it” and “which job did you want to designate me?,” whereby Su showed Tsai no respect at all, and their relationship instantly soured,49 leaving Su’s cabinet with weak prospects, and Su was likely to be appointed premier to accomplish nothing more than the phased task. The COVID-19 pandemic changed intra-executive relations. Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung (陳時中) was appointed on February 27, 2020, as the commander of the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC, 中央 流行疫情指揮中心) to coordinate and mobilize resources from a crossministry perspective and private stakeholders to fight COVID-19. The Communicable Disease Control Act (傳染病防治法), stipulated strengthening of measures for the surveillance and containment of COVID-19,50 and the Special Act for Prevention, Relief, and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens (嚴重特殊傳染性肺炎防治 及紓困振興特別條例), established to mitigate the impact of the disease on the domestic economy and society,51 granted Chen great power under which county and city mayors, the KMT in particular, were not

156

H.-T. YAN

allowed to make pandemic decisions. For example, in May 2021, when the CECC raised the COVID-19 alert level to Level 3 for Taipei and New Taipei City, the Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu county magistrates had decided to introduce entry screenings at airports requiring all arrivals to take a rapid antigen test.52 However, Chen did not allow compulsory screening on the grounds that “the freedom of movement across counties and cities cannot be restricted.”53 In early June 2021, cluster infections hit some of the dormitories housing Southeast Asian employees at several tech companies based in Miaoli County, and in response, Magistrate Hsu Yao-chang (徐耀昌) imposed a ban on migrant workers leaving their factories and dormitories.54 Chen did not show much solidarity with Hsu, but instead stated, “the value of life is based on human rights and fundamental values.”55 Chen’s containment measures, however, had been repeatedly questioned by legal experts as unconstitutional. For example, in February 2020, the CECC in collaboration with telecom companies built the Digital Fencing Tracking System (電子圍籬系統), which utilized mobile phone positioning to track people’s whereabouts. If a quarantined individual unlawfully left the quarantine area, the system would send an alert to the individual, civil affairs departments, health departments, and local police.56 Later, the CECC further expanded the monitoring object from people in home isolation to those under self-health management.57 These measures infringed individual liberty without a legal foundation. Chen lacked the administrative capacity to implement all these plans and could not directly mobilize resources from across ministries, despite the great power he was vested with. Epidemic prevention meetings chaired by Premier Su had been held several times where consensus-based decisions were made through cross-ministry discussions and collaboration, in which Chen reported his needs and Premier Su acted to direct actions and make decisions, form a consensus, and integrate crossministerial resources.58 A notable example was the Level 3 COVID-19 alert during which Su decided after considering the views of the ministers, to instruct relevant governmental departments to strengthen prevention measures in collaboration with Chen,59 such as shutting down leisure and entertainment venues (in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs), controlling airports and seaports (in collaboration with the Ministry of the Transportation and Communication), prohibiting religious tourism and pilgrimage (in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior), and exercising distance learning (in collaboration with

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

157

the Ministry of the Education).60 Su’s decision-making space was even increased for affairs beyond purely epidemic prevention. With the Level 3 alert that hit many domestic demand-oriented industries, in June 2021 Su gave the green light to a fourth increase in the special budget to fund a “relief package 4.0” (紓困4.0方案).61 The key measures included living allowances, industrial subsidies, COVID-19 relief loans, the suspension of summer electricity fees for households, rent reductions for tenants in state-owned enterprise residential units, and quintuple stimulus vouchers (振興五倍券).62 Thus, the government exercised broad authority during the COVID-19 pandemic with a consideration of significant health, social, and economic consequences as a whole. This does not necessarily mean that government power was wielded in ways that are arbitrary or unreasonable, or that President Tsai is a political lightweight. Tsai played two very significant roles in epidemic prevention. First, as her ruling legitimacy rested on the will of the population, she could answer public opinion discontent by playing the role of checks and balances in ensuring executive branch accountability. On May 13, 2021, Tsai held a press conference following a high-level national security meeting, indicating that more COVID-19 vaccines and other pharmaceuticals would be delivered from abroad from June, and that Taiwan’s first domestically developed COVID-19 vaccine would be available to the public by the end of July, to minimize growing public dissatisfaction with insufficient vaccine supplies.63 Earlier on May 13, 2022, Tsai had convened an advisory meeting on COVID-19 prevention where Vice President Ching-te, former Vice President Chen Chien-jen (陳建 仁), Premier Su Tseng-chang, and Minister Chen Shih-chung participated, directing three major disease prevention principles—prioritizing the establishment of additional large-scale screening stations in the cities of Taipei, New Taipei, Keelung, and Taoyuan, simplifying the procedure and schedule for confirmed cases to see a doctor, and purchasing additional disease prevention supplies such as pharmaceuticals and rapid test kits.64 They aimed to reduce people’s anger against the DPP government because of the long lines and waiting times needed to obtain rapid test kits or take the PCR (polymerase chain reaction) test, after the spread of the Omicron variant contributed to a surge in local COVID-19 infections and a shortage of COVID-19 rapid antigen tests in May. Second, Tsai mainly dealt with cross-Strait relations and foreign policy matters, through which she deployed pandemic public diplomacy to bolster a favorable national

158

H.-T. YAN

image, thereby influencing the government pandemic response plans and policies. A power-sharing mode between president and government, or the socalled Tsai-Su system (蔡蘇體制), had taken shape during the pandemic. When Tsai was re-elected to a second term with a historic record of 8.17 million votes on January 11, 2020, Tsai’s faction (英系) within the DPP advocated that Premier Su be replaced by someone else to form a cabinet to “take back” the power that Tsai should originally have had but which had been granted Su to rescue the crumbling Tsai regime. The COVID19 pandemic changed her mind, facilitating further power-sharing. Tsai remained in charge of foreign affairs and defense but released more discretionary power to Su for making decisions and integrating cross-ministerial resources for epidemic prevention matters to other internal affairs, and Chen was responsible for purely epidemic prevention. The meetings on COVID-19 prevention that Tsai had convened to respond to the needs and interests of the citizenry played a role in coordinating executive affairs and ensuring accountability of the executive branch. Thus, the Tsai-Su system, unlike the earlier mode under which the premier ended up acting as the president’s chief of staff, and cabinet reshuffles acted as a lightning rod by which the president easily shifted blame to the prime minister, operated with power-sharing, and secured great popularity. Indeed, public opinion polls consistently showed overwhelming support for Tsai and Su in 2020 (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3).65 Despite a decline after 2021, the public support for Tsai was higher than in the same period of her first term (Fig. 5.2).66 Public confidence in the government enhances individual compliance with government policies, which in turn will help the government respond quickly to a crisis. A three-wave survey study in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic indicated that 76% (February 4, 2020), 83% (February 12), and 87% (March 25) of people had confidence in the government’s epidemic prevention and control, whereas 86% (February 4, 2020), 83% (February 12), 90% (March 25), and 91% (September 8) of people said they would wear a face mask when going in and out of public places.67 Polls also showed strong support for the government’s other prevention measures: 74% of people favored two-week delays in returning to school (February 4, 2020), and 79% approved of travel restrictions and border control (March 25).68 The public’s willingness to comply with COVID-19 regulations led to several of Chen’s prevention strategies being even more effective. For example, the mask-rationing plan (口罩實

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

159

05

/2 07 01 /2 6 09 01 /2 6 11 01 /2 6 01 0 1 /2 6 03 01 /2 7 05 01 /2 7 07 01 /2 7 09 01 /2 7 11 01 /2 7 01 01 /2 7 03 0 1 /2 8 05 01 /2 8 07 01 /2 8 09 01 /2 8 11 01 /2 8 01 0 1 /2 8 03 01 /2 9 05 01 /2 9 07 0 1 /2 9 09 0 1 /2 9 11 01 /2 9 01 01 /2 9 03 0 2 /2 0 05 02 /2 0 07 02 /2 0 09 0 2 /2 0 11 02 /2 0 01 02 /2 0 03 02 /2 1 05 02 /2 1 07 0 2 /2 1 09 02 /2 1 11 0 2 /2 1 01 02 /2 1 03 02 /2 2 05 02 /2 2 07 02 /2 2 02 2

20

40

60

80

5

pos.TVBS

neg.TVBS

pos.TPOF

neg.TPOF

Fig. 5.2 Public supports for President Tsai Ing-wen, 2016–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the TVBS Poll Center and the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF). pos.TVBS indicated positive support for President Tsai, based on public opinion polls of the TVBS Poll Center. Source The author)

名制), under which the government helped allocate masks to every citizen through purchase at pharmacies using their National Health Insurance cards, ensured that masks were fairly and equally distributed,69 making infection control breaches less likely for those willing to comply with mask policies during shortfalls of mask supplies. Consequently, Taiwan fared better than many other countries during the COVID-19 crisis, as the CECC confirmed 69 COVID-19 cases and 4 deaths per 100,000 population as of October 22, 2021,70 compared to the US (13,825; 224), Sweden (11,336; 146), France (10,346; 172), Japan (1,360; 14), South Korea (675; 5), and Australia (617; 6).71 Effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic curtailed opposition KMT’s influence. The success of the National Epidemic Prevention Team (防疫國家隊), which is frequently mentioned in government press releases, has become a political slogan for Taiwan’s top officials to emphasize the significance of a collective synergy between the central and local governments and the authority of the central government leadership.72

H.-T. YAN

70

160

Su

Lai

05

/2 07 01 /2 6 09 01 /2 6 11 01 /2 6 01 01 /2 6 03 01 /2 7 05 01 /2 7 0 7 01 /2 7 09 01 /2 7 11 01 /2 7 01 01 /2 7 03 01 /2 8 05 01 /2 8 07 01 /2 8 09 01 /2 8 1 1 01 /2 8 0 1 01 /2 8 03 01 /2 9 05 0 1 /2 9 07 01 /2 9 09 0 1 /2 9 11 01 /2 9 01 01 /2 9 03 02 /2 0 05 02 /2 0 07 02 /2 0 09 02 /2 0 1 1 02 /2 0 01 0 2 /2 0 03 02 /2 1 05 0 2 /2 1 07 02 /2 1 0 9 02 /2 1 11 0 2 /2 1 01 02 /2 1 03 02 /2 2 05 02 /2 2 07 02 /2 2 02 2

20

30

40

50

60

Lin

pos.TVBS

neg.TVBS

pos.TPOF

neg.TPOF

Fig. 5.3 Public supports for Premier Lin, Lai, and Su’s cabinet, 2016–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the TVBS Poll Center and the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF). pos.TVBS indicated positive support for the cabinet, based on public opinion polls of the TVBS Poll Center. Source The author)

The central government (or the CECC) is responsible for designing strategies and guiding local governments in the right direction, which serves as a pretext for constraint in local government decision-making. After the outbreak in May 2021, Chen, who headed the CECC, rejected an appeal by local governments held by pan-Blue mayors or county magistrates to procure vaccines on their own,73 claiming that, “vaccine procurements are a national security issue, and the import, production, and use of vaccines is regulated by the central government.”74 Despite allowing Terry Gou’s (郭台銘) FoxConn (鴻海科技)—non-government groups with pan-Blue leanings—to negotiate vaccine purchases with BioNTech on its behalf in June, the TSMC (台積電) was asked to join the vaccine purchase deal, which was perceived as an increase in pan-Green political benefits that reduced the KMT’s ability to appeal to popular opinion against the government.75

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

161

Indeed, the KMT has been at a low ebb during the pandemic, with 10–20% support (Fig. 5.4).76 This has made the KMT’s use of legislative tools to uncover policy conflicts within the DPP ineffective, as merely three legislators expressed dissent within the DPP by abstaining on a series of votes regarding lifting restrictions on imports of pork products containing the controversial leanness-enhancing feed additive ractopamine,77 following which the KMT propagandized the move as a health risk.78 This also had a knock-on effect on the referendum of December 18, 2021, with all four KMT-backed proposals soundly defeated, as the KMT’s decision to respond to the DPP’s slogan of “make Taiwan stronger by voting ‘no’ on all four referendums” (四個不同意, 台灣更有力) with its own motto of “make Taiwan more beautiful by voting ‘yes’ on all four referendums” (四個都同意, 台灣更美麗) caused a battle between the KMT and DPP political bases.79 Further, the similar strategy that the DPP applied to boost its base’s voter turnout and attract voters who disliked the KMT’s black-gold politics (黑金政治) helped the DPP candidate Lin Ching-yi (林靜儀) win the legislative by-election for Taichung Constituency II of January 9, 2022, despite no party rebellion in the pan-Blue camp.80 The better responses to the COVID-19 pandemic enabled the Tsai administration to invest more resources and pass on experience in crisis control to countries with similar crises. A relatively stable COVID-19 situation in Taiwan led to a sufficient supply of epidemic prevention materials. The Tsai administration then viewed the crisis as a strategic opportunity to elevate their national brand by launching the “Taiwan Can Help, and Taiwan is Helping!” campaign.81 First, Taiwan has been donating highquality masks to countries with severe COVID-19 outbreaks since April 1, 2020, when President Tsai pledged to donate a total of 7 million surgical masks to 11 European countries and 2 million masks to the US, with the rest going to other smaller countries that have diplomatic ties with the island.82 Further, the government sent 84 thermal imaging devices and infrared forehead thermometers to further assist diplomatic allies in combating the spread of COVID-19.83 On April 9, 2020, the Tsai administration launched another round of donations of a total of 6 million face masks to countries severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, including some listed in its New Southbound Policy (新南向政策), European nations, and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.84 On April 21, 2020, a total of 2 million face masks donated by Taiwan arrived in Japan to help in its fight against the spread of the coronavirus.85 On

H.-T. YAN

02 /2 0 03 20 /2 02 04 0 /2 0 05 20 /2 02 06 0 /2 0 07 20 /2 0 08 20 /2 0 09 20 /2 0 10 20 /2 0 11 20 /2 0 12 20 /2 0 01 20 /2 0 02 21 /2 0 03 21 /2 0 04 21 /2 0 05 21 /2 0 06 21 /2 0 07 21 /2 0 08 21 /2 0 09 21 /2 0 10 21 /2 0 11 21 /2 0 12 21 /2 02 01 1 /2 0 02 22 /2 0 03 22 /2 0 04 22 /2 0 05 22 /2 02 06 2 /2 02 2

10

20

30

40

162

DPP.TPOF

KMT.TPOF

DPP.FORMOSA

KMT.FORMOSA

Fig. 5.4 Public supports for KMT and DPP, 2020–2022 (Note We used the public opinion data from the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) and the FORMOSA (美麗島電子報). DPP.TPOF indicated support for the DPP, based on public opinion polls of the TPOF. Source The author)

May 5, 2020, the Tsai administration launched a third wave of international humanitarian assistance, donating 7.07 million face masks, 600,000 of which went to Africa and the Middle East to assist medics working with Syrian refugees.86 Second, Taiwan continued to work with the US, Europe, and other countries to exchange and develop disease prevention materials, pharmaceuticals, and the COVID-19 vaccine. On March 18, 2020, the European Economic and Trade Office announced that the EU and Academia Sinica would jointly develop a rapid screening test and vaccine,87 while the US-Taiwan Joint Statement on a Partnership against Coronavirus was signed to further strengthen Taiwan-US consultation and cooperation on developing vaccines and medicine to combat COVID-19.88 On March 30, 2020, Taiwan and Australia reached an agreement whereby the two countries would exchange raw materials to help each other battle the pandemic: Australia agreed to provide 1 million liters of alcohol that could be turned into 4.2 million 300-milliliter bottles containing 75%alcohol hand disinfectant; and in return, Taiwan provided 3 metric tons

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

163

of non-woven fabric to produce surgical masks.89 On April 2, 2020, Taiwan established a partnership with the Czech Republic to manage the COVID-19 pandemic through research, development, and production of rapid screening kits, vaccines, and medicines.90 Finally, public health experts and top officials from Taiwan were invited to international workshops, including the APEC Health Working Group Meeting (February 7 and 8, 2020),91 the Global Cooperation and Training Framework workshop (June 24, 2020),92 and the Global Health Forum (October 23 and 24, 2020),93 to share best practices and lessons learned. Minister Chen Shih-chung also shared Taiwan’s COVID-19 prevention and control strategies, including the preparation of epidemic prevention materials, border control, quarantine measures, and surveillance and monitoring systems, with Slovenia’s Prime Minister Janez Janša (January 6, 2021) and EU representatives from 15 European countries (May 25, 2021) through a virtual meeting.94 The Taiwan Model has been widely perceived by the international community as a model because of its management of the coronavirus outbreak. The Tsai administration’s public diplomacy toward material and immaterial resource-sharing with other countries has earned Taiwan a better national reputation. In addition to sincere gratitude from the EU and US for Taiwan’s donation of surgical masks, in the virtual 73rd World Health Assembly (WHA) countries such as the US, the UK, France, Germany, the Czech Republic Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan voiced their strong support for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization (WHO).95 In the second half of 2020, Taiwan’s appeal to participate in the WHO gained the unprecedented support of more than 1,700 lawmakers from over 80 countries.96 On May 15, 2022, the Group of Seven (G7), together with the EU, unequivocally advocated Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the WHA and WHO technical meetings in the foreign ministers’ communiqué, the second consecutive year that a G7 communiqué included a statement of support for Taiwan.97 This successful public diplomacy spurred President Tsai to adopt a more distant approach to China. Taiwan had faced a critical shortage of vaccines since May 2021 when the Alpha variant of the virus caused more severe disease. Tsai, however, categorically rejected Beijing’s May 24 offer to send mainland vaccines to Taiwan and the invitation on June 11 to send Taiwanese to China for inoculation.98 Before that, the Tsai administration had accused China of blocking a deal with Germany’s

164

H.-T. YAN

BioNTech SE for COVID-19 vaccines,99 as the Shanghai-based pharmaceuticals company Fosun Pharma (復星醫藥) owned the exclusive right to commercialize the vaccine based on BioNTech’s mRNA technology in the Greater China region including mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.100 Fosun had offered to sell the vaccine to Taiwan, but Tsai stated she would reject outside interference in the national efforts to bring vaccines to Taiwan and oppose attempts to exploit the vaccine supply for political purposes.101 Instead, Taiwan, through its close friendship with the US, Japan, and the EU, acquired more than 4.2 million AstraZeneca doses from Japan’s six donations delivered from June to October 2021,102 4 million doses of Moderna from the US donation in June and November 2021,103 and a combined total of more than 840,000 AstraZeneca and Moderna vaccine doses from countries in Central and Eastern Europe including Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia.104 Further, support from its allies helped speed up the delivery of the vaccines that it ordered in 2020, resulting in a total of more than 14 million doses being delivered by the end of 2021.105 In conclusion, the Tsai administration exploited Taiwan’s experience in pandemic control as a strong bargaining chip to protect Taiwan against Chinese pressure, and deepened her position on cross-Strait policy “to resist China and protect Taiwan” (抗中保台) accordingly.

Lessons Learned The findings suggest that a semi-presidentialism system, a perilous constitutional design during normal times,106 may have advantages in a time of crisis. In this case, we demonstrate that executive coordination and a temporary power shift to the government in response to COVID-19 mitigated the dual-legitimacy problems inherent in semi-presidentialism, thus reducing the chances of intra-executive conflict. The president remained in charge of foreign affairs and defense, whereas the prime minister was granted more discretionary power to deal with epidemic prevention measures and other internal affairs. Further, the president, whose legitimacy rested on the will of the population, could play a moderating role by ensuring executive branch accountability. That alleviated executive branch overreach, as the COVID-19 crisis caused some legislatures to be bypassed in favor of greater power concentrated in presidents (presidentialism) and prime ministers (parliamentarism) for more efficient decision-making.107 A federal system may have similar effects; for

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

165

example, in Germany, the COVID-19 crisis led to greater state-level autonomy instead of a centralization of decision-making.108 As Lozano et al. indicate: “whether democracies are able to resist the threat of executive aggrandisement depends on their ability to use existing mechanisms of democratic accountability to adapt to new conditions,”109 and our findings indicate that a semi-presidentialism system is a more resilient constitutional design that can provide political accountability during a crisis. Future research could apply the theoretical framework to a wider range of questions about patterns of pandemic performance across countries with different constitutional designs. The findings also suggest that the opposition may lose the power to hold the government accountable during the pandemic. Parliaments came under pressure with regard to institutional adjustments to handle states of emergency, contributing to reduced scrutiny.110 We further found that a better response to the crisis curtailed the opposition’s influence in the three respects: to present itself as a compelling alternative government in elections; to expose intra-ruling party tensions; and to manipulate public opinion. Future research could apply the framework to analyze the causes and consequences of opposition dynamics for the three aspects in the context of COVID-19. The findings also suggest that pandemic performance is an effective weapon of public diplomacy. Taiwan relied not only on the donation of material goods, masks in particular, to other countries in crisis but exchanged epidemic prevention technologies, practices, and policies to boost its global standing. A very similar case is provided by South Korea. Its public diplomacy strategies in the context of COVID-19 resorted to the concept of mutual benefit, consistent with the collaborative aspects of material and immaterial resource-sharing with other countries.111 Both countries sent epidemic prevention materials abroad: Taiwan had become the world’s second-biggest mask producer with a daily output of over 10 million through the expansion of mask production lines and the expropriation of private production capacity, which made the donation of self-produced masks to allies more likely, whereas South Korea became a reliable provider of COVID-19 test kits to countries around the world. Both countries’ “pandemic diplomacy” was effective in helping each country significantly improve its image and reputation. However, the South Korean government did not utilize political benefits from the success of public diplomacy to dealing with diplomatic rivals, as North Korea’s soft power assets are not as powerful as China’s. Thus, Taiwan

166

H.-T. YAN

is now unique in that it deploys pandemic public diplomacy to triumph over its diplomatic rivals.

Appendix: The Data Used for Process-Tracing Methods A. Historical Archives Control Act). : https://law.moj. gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=L0050001. (Special Act for Prevention, 2. Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with : Novel Pathogens). https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=L00 50039. 3. 衛福部依法撤銷110年5月31日連江縣及6月1日澎湖縣、金門縣 政府之公告 (Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) Revokes Lianjiang County Government Announcement Dated May 31 and Penghu and Kinmen County Government Announcement Dated June 1). 衛生福利部疾病管制署新聞稿. 2021年06月01日, 取自: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/YTxcU07Y6rbbKELiJk 7LCw?typeid=9. 4. 即日起本縣移工除工作外停止外出, 勞青處與警察局全面稽查 (The Miaoli County Government Issued the Stay-at-home Order on June 7, 2021 That Prohibited All Migrant Workers in the County from Going Outside Except for Work). 苗栗縣政府新聞 稿. 2021年06月07日, 取自: https://www.miaoli.gov.tw/News_C ontent2.aspx?n=285&s=418201. 5. 高科技智慧防疫, 檢疫追蹤精準有力 (Taiwan Implements Electronic Security System to Track Individuals Under Quarantine). 衛 生福利部疾病管制署新聞稿. 2020年03月18日, 取自: https:/ /www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/LxV1VKIb689M9Sb1q8 XOcQ?typeid=9. 6. 電子圍籬2.0運作及防疫資料蒐集, 兼顧個資保護 (CECC Takes Protection of Personal Data into Consideration When Using Digital Fencing 2.0 and Collecting Data for Disease Prevention Purposes). 衛生福利部疾病管制署新聞稿. 2021年01月06 1.

(Communicable

Disease

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

167

日, 取自: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/Detail/ZqWqQR7_y ZFRWtl_llJGGg?typeid=9. 7. 政院擴大防疫會議 蘇揆裁示三級警戒管制再延長兩週 (Premier Su Tseng-chang Instructed to Extend Level 3 Restrictions for Another Two Weeks in Executive Yuan’s Expanded Epidemic Prevention Meeting). 行政院新聞稿. 2021年06月07日, 取自: https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F759E41CCD91/0f5513e76a2e-4524-b341-40239d499fdb. 8. 嚴重特殊傳染性肺炎(COVID-19)第三級疫情警戒標準及防疫措 施裁罰規定 (Epidemic Warning Standards, Measures and Related Penalties Adopted Under the COVID-19 Level 3 Alert). 衛生福 利部疾病管制署法令規章. 2021年05月16日, 取自: https://www. cdc.gov.tw/File/Get/OQgL0X5SE3TyxgLzy79-oA. 9. 行政院公布「紓困4.0」方案 蘇揆: 全國一心、守住疫情、紓解困 境 (Executive Yuan Announces COVID Relief Package 4.0. Premier Su Tseng-chang Urges Unified Effort to Overcome COVID Challenge and Quash Virus). 行政院新聞稿. 2021年06月03日, 取自: https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/9277F7 59E41CCD91/c72437bf-5e98-4af4-a535-f2a6c57420fd. 10. 紓困4.0方案+振興五倍券 (Relief Package 4.0 Plus Quintuple Stimulus Vouchers). 行政院重要政策. 2021年09月24日, 取 自: https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/5A8A0CB5B41DA11E/190 318be-c51b-43b5-91ba-5623b242335f. 11. 召開國安高層會議 總統: 團結防疫守臺灣 落實防疫每一個環節 我們一定會戰勝病毒 (President Tsai Ing-wen Convenes a Highlevel National Security Meeting, and Calls on Citizens to Come Together to Fight the Pandemic and Safeguard Taiwan by Following All Disease Prevention Measures and Precautions). 總 統府新聞稿. 2021年05月13日, 取自: https://www.president.gov. tw/News/26099. 12. 口罩實名制2/6上路 國人及外籍人士購買相關規定 (Name-based Rationing System for Purchases of Masks to be Launched on February 6; Public to Buy Masks with Their (NHI) Cards). 衛生福 利部新聞稿. 2020年02月05日, 取自: https://www.mohw.gov.tw/ cp-16-51370-1.html. 13. 口罩實名制1.0、2.0、3.0超級比一比 (Compare Mask-Rationing Plan 1.0, 2.0, 3.0). 衛生福利部新聞稿. 2020年04月30日, 取自: https://www.mohw.gov.tw/cp-4633-53014-1.html.

168

H.-T. YAN

14. 我國疫苗政策兩大原則: 由中央政府與原廠簽約採購並統籌分配 執行 (Two Principles of Taiwan’s Vaccination Policy: Vaccine Procurement Directly from Manufacturers and Overall Arrangements by the Central Government). 衛生福利部疾病管制署新聞 稿. 2021年05月29日, 取自: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/Bulletin/ Detail/PHfk6o4BpcxNWZRfEQ8Hvw?typeid=9. 15. 總統府針對總統會見台積電董事長劉德音及鴻海集團創辦人郭台 銘之說明 (President Tsai Ing-wen Meets with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) Chairman Dr. Mark Liu and Hon Hai Technology Group (Foxconn) Founder Terry Gou to Exchange Views on Planned Negotiations to Purchase Vaccines from BioNTech, and Expresses Thanks for Their Cooperation). 總 統府新聞稿. 2021年06月18日, 取自: https://www.president.gov. tw/News/26114. (Understand Health Risks 16. Associated with Ractopamine Pork in Three Minutes). : https://www.facebook.com/watch/ ?v=1029040300879172. 17. Taiwan Can Help, and Taiwan Is Helping! 衛生福利部重大政 策. 2020年05月14日, 取自: https://covid19.mohw.gov.tw/ch/ cp-4843-53644-205.html. 18. 面對全球疫情挑戰 總統: 我們要打國際盃 發揮關鍵影響力 與國際 社會攜手共度難關 (President Tsai’s Address on COVID-19 Cooperation). 總統府新聞稿. 2020年04月01日, 取自: https://www.pre sident.gov.tw/News/25270. 19. 外交部宣布對美國、歐盟、歐洲國家及友邦捐贈1,000萬片口罩 的國際人道援助 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Announces Donation of 10 Million Face Masks to the US, Europe, Diplomatic Allies to Extend Humanitarian Assistance in Wake of COVID-19). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年04月01日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov. tw/News_Content.aspx?n=8742DCE7A2A28761&s=3795B8 2D1807E1AA. 20. 外交部宣布啟動第二波國際抗疫人道援助行動 (MOFA Announces Second Wave of International Humanitarian Assistance in Wake of COVID-19). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年04月09日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=8742dc e7a2a28761&s=e04f52ea8ba075f0.

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

169

21. 我國捐贈日本口罩合力抗疫 (Taiwan Donates 2 Million Surgical Masks to Japan in a Joint Effort to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年04月16日, 取自: https://www. mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=90792. 22. 外交部宣布啟動第三波國際抗疫人道援助行動 (MOFA Announces Third Wave of International Humanitarian Assistance in Wake of COVID-19). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年05月05日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=8742dc e7a2a28761&s=5fda9d5785e99cd2. 23. Filip Grzegorzewski Twitter. 2020年03月18日, 取自: https://twi tter.com/grzegorzewskif/status/1240212023394422784. 24. 外交部與美國在台協會台北辦事處發表臺美防疫合作聯合聲明 (MOFA and American Institute in Taiwan-Taipei Main Office (AIT/T) Issued a Joint Statement on the Taiwan-U.S. Antiepidemic Partnership). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年03月18日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73& s=90758. 25. 臺澳防疫物資合作 創造雙贏! (Taiwan, Australia to Exchange Raw Materials to Fight COVID-19). 駐澳大利亞臺北經濟文化辦事 處新聞稿. 2020年03月31日, 取自: https://www.roc-taiwan.org/ au/post/27197.html. 26. 臺捷發表防疫合作聯合聲明, 有利雙方開展多面向的防疫醫療合 作架構 (Taiwan and Czech Released Joint Declaration to Fight Coronavirus). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年04月01日, 取自: https:/ /www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=8742DCE7A2A2 8761&s=7601A108CE837742. 27. 參與亞太經合會 (Participate in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC). 衛生福利部國際合作組國際組織. 2021年07月23 日, 取自: https://dep.mohw.gov.tw/OOIC/fp-1525-47450-119. html. 28. 台美日澳合辦線上工作坊, 交流武漢肺炎防治, 部署防範第二波 疫情威脅 (US, Australia, Japan and Taiwan Co-organize Virtual Global Cooperation and Training Framework Workshop on COVID-19: Preparing for the Second Wave). 衛生福利部疾病管 制署新聞稿. 2020年06月24日, 取自: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/ Category/ListContent/EmXemht4IT-IRAPrAnyG9A?uaid=YBl 5wcbMk-tkc54eK2GFJw.

170

H.-T. YAN

29. 2020年臺灣全球健康論壇: 不受疫情限制約400位國外人士參與 線上實體互動分享後疫情時代健康照護策略 (2020 Global Health Forum in Taiwan: Undeterred by the COVID-19 Pandemic, Nearly 400 Foreign Attendees Participated in Online Interaction to Share Strategies on Healthcare in the Post-Pandemic Era). 衛生福 利部新聞稿. 2020年10月23日, 取自: https://www.mohw.gov.tw/ cp-4626-56138-1.html. 30. 斯洛維尼亞總理兼衛生部長楊薩與衛福部長陳時中舉行視訊會談 (MOHW Minister Chen Shih-chung Stages Virtual with Slovenia Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Health Janez Janša). 外 交部新聞稿. 2021年01月07日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/ News_Content.aspx?n=96&sms=74&s=95103. 31. 衛生福利部陳時中部長與歐盟及其15會員國之駐臺代表視訊會議 (MOHW Minister Chen Shih-chung Stages a Virtual Meeting with the EU Representatives from 15 European Countries). 衛生 福利部國際合作組新聞稿. 2021年05月25日, 取自: https://dep. mohw.gov.tw/OOIC/cp-1524-62555-119.html. 32. 外交部誠摯感謝友邦及理念相近國家在第73屆「世界衛生大會」 線上會議強力支持臺灣參與世界衛生組織 (MOFA Thanks Diplomatic Allies, Like-Minded Countries for Strong Support Extended at Virtual 73rd WHA for Taiwan’s Participation in WHO). 外交 部新聞稿. 2020年05月19日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/ News_Content.aspx?n=8742dce7a2a28761&sms=491d0e5bf5f4 bc36&s=c36aeaaee511ad27. 33. 第73屆世界衛生大會復會落幕, 國際支持我案聲量再創高峰, 外交部表示誠摯感謝 (MOFA Expresses Sincere Gratitude for Unprecedented International Support at the Resumed Session of the 73rd WHA). 外交部新聞稿. 2020年11月14日, 取自: https:/ /www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=faeee2f9798a98fd& sms=6dc19d8f09484c89&s=92c5669aeb0c4311. 34. 七大工業國集團外長公報連續二年強調台海和平與穩定重要性, 外交部表示高度歡迎及由衷感謝 (MOFA Welcomes, Appreciates G7 Leaders’ Communiqué Again Underscoring Importance of Peace and Stability Across the Taiwan Strait). 外交部新聞稿. 2022 年05月15日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content. aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=97838. 35. 蔡英文: 疫苗須由中央統籌 已購買近3000萬劑 (President Tsai Ing-wen: The Overall Arrangement of Vaccines Must be Regulated by the Central Government and Taiwan Had Bought Nearly 30

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

171

Million Doses). 民進黨 (影片). 2021年05月26日, 取自: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jwzFoxaIXo&t=166s. 36. Tsai Ing-wen Twitter. 2021年05月26日, 取自: https://twitter. com/iingwen/status/1397498532806885380?cxt=HHwWiICs4 dzg9OQmAAAA. 37. 外交部由衷感謝日本提供疫苗合力抗疫 (MOFA Expresses Heartfelt Gratitude to Japan for Providing Vaccine Doses in a Joint Effort to Combat the COVID-19 Pandemic). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年06月04日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Cont ent.aspx?n=96&s=95920. 38. 外交部由衷感謝日本第二波援贈我國疫苗 (MOFA Thanks Japan for 2nd Donation of COVID-19 Vaccines). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年07月06日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Cont ent.aspx?n=96&s=96096. 39. 外交部誠摯感謝日本宣布第三批疫苗馳援台灣 (MOFA Thanks Japan for 3rd Donation of COVID-19 Vaccines). 外交部新聞 稿. 2021年07月13日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_C ontent.aspx?n=96&s=96126. 40. 外交部誠摯感謝日本宣布援贈台灣第四批AZ疫苗 (MOFA Thanks Japan for 4th Donation of AstraZeneca COVID-19 Vaccines). 外 交部新聞稿. 2021年09月03日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/ News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=96381. 41. 外交部誠摯感謝日本宣布援贈台灣第五批AZ疫苗五十萬劑 (MOFA Thanks Japan for 5th Donation of 500,000 AstraZeneca COVID-19 Vaccine Doses). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年09月14日, 取 自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms= 73&s=96450. 42. 外交部由衷感謝日本第六度援贈我國疫苗 (MOFA Thanks Japan for 6th Donation of COVID-19 Vaccines). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年10月26日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Cont ent.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=96670. 43. 美國捐贈我國250萬劑對抗武漢肺炎疫苗已運抵台灣, 外交部誠摯 感謝 (MOFA Thanks US for 2.5 Million COVID-19 Vaccine Doses Donation That Touches Down in Taiwan). 外交部新聞 稿. 2021年06月20日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_C ontent.aspx?n=95&s=96039. 44. 美國再度捐贈150萬劑對抗武漢肺炎疫苗已運抵台灣, 外交部表達 誠摯感謝 (MOFA Thanks US for 2nd Donation of 1.5 Million COVID-19 Vaccine Doses That Touches Down in Taiwan). 外

172

H.-T. YAN

交部新聞稿. 2021年11月01日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/ News_Content.aspx?n=96&sms=74&s=96711. 45. 外交部誠摯感謝捷克政府宣布捐贈我國3萬劑疫苗 (MOFA Thanks Czech Republic for 30,000 COVID-19 Vaccine Doses Donation). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年07月27日, 取自: https://www. mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=96&sms=74&s=96199. 46. 立陶宛捐贈我國2萬劑AZ疫苗已順利運抵台灣, 外交部誠摯感謝 (MOFA Thanks Lithuania for 20,000 AstraZeneca Vaccine Doses Donation That Touches Down in Taiwan). 外交部新聞稿. 2021 年07月31日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content. aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=96210. 47. 外交部誠摯感謝波蘭政府宣布捐贈我國40萬劑AZ疫苗且已經啟 運來台 (MOFA Thanks Poland for 400,000 AstraZeneca Vaccine Doses Donation That Touches Down in Taiwan). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年09月04日, 取自: https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Cont ent.aspx?n=96&sms=74&s=96395. 48. 外交部誠摯感謝立陶宛政府宣布捐贈台灣第二批疫苗, 展現國 際民主夥伴團結抗疫的精神 (MOFA Thanks Lithuania for 2nd Donation of COVID-19 Vaccines That Underscores the Spirit of Democratic Partners Closely Cooperating in Combating Coronavirus). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年09月22日, 取自: https://www. mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&s=96494. 49. 外交部誠摯感謝斯洛伐克捐贈我國16萬劑疫苗, 深化全球公衛 安全合作 (MOFA Thanks Slovakia for Donating 160,000 COVID-19 Vaccine Doses, Strengthening Global Public Health Cooperation). 外交部新聞稿. 2021年09月24日, 取自: https:// www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=96&s=96523.

B. Newspapers 1. 陳水扁爆料 蘇貞昌兩度要換蔡英文 (Chen Shui-bian Broke the News That Premier Su Had Suggested He Consider Replacing Tsai Twice When Tsai Served as Vice Premier). 華視新聞. 2020年11月03日, 取自: https://news.cts.com.tw/cts/politics/ 202011/202011032019296.html. 2. 蔡英文蘇貞昌裂痕, 豈止五倍券? (The Feud Between Tsai and Su Beyond Their Conflict on the Quintuple Stimulus Voucher Plan).

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

173

風傳媒. 2021年08月14日, 取自: https://www.storm.mg/article/ 3879034. 3. 當年一句話關係急凍9年 揭蔡蘇心結祕辛 (A Word Caused an Unspoken Misunderstanding Between Tsai and Su for Nine Years: Reveal the Secret). 鏡週刊. 2019年03月16日, 取自: https://www. mirrormedia.mg/story/20190305inv010. 4. 蔡蘇會開放尷尬 蘇五度追問「工作」 (Tsai-Su Meeting Turned into an Embarrassing Scene: Su Asked Tsai Five Times What “Job” Tsai Would Assign Him). TVBS. 2011年05月19日, 取自: https:/ /news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/55104. 5. 蔡蘇會 蘇9問: 派我什麼工作 (Tsai, Su Hold Uncomfortable Meeting: Su Pressed Tsai Nine Times on What Type of “Important Position” She Had Planned for Him). 中時新聞網. 2011年05 月20日, 取自: https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/201105 20000429-260107?chdtv. 6. 陳時中人權說是笑話 (Chen Shih-chung’s Theories of Human Rights Is a Joke). 中時新聞網. 2021年08月14日, 取自: https:/ /www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20210814000498-260109? chdtv. 7. 徐耀昌稱「確診命都沒了哪來人權」 陳時中: 生命價值建構在此 (Hsu Yao-Chang Claims That Life Is Prioritized Above Fundamental Human Rights. Chen Shih-chung: The Value of Life Is Based on Human Rights and Fundamental Values). ETtoday. 2021 年06月11日, 取自: https://www.ettoday.net/news/20210611/ 2004523.htm. 8. 跳過陳時中下指導棋? 蘇貞昌喊「誤會啦」: 政院是最高行政機關 (Premier Su Tseng-chang Is Accused of Being a Backseat Driver. Su Argues That It Might Have Resulted from a Misunderstanding of the Policy, Claiming That the Executive Yuan Is the Highest Executive Branch of the ROC Government). ETtoday. 2021年01月27 日, 取自: https://www.ettoday.net/news/20210127/1908148. htm. 9. 防疫與經濟併行! 蘇貞昌拋「新台灣模式」解封 重點曝光 (Premier Su Tseng-chang will Build a New “Taiwan Model” That Balances Pandemic Safety with Economic Growth). 中時新 聞網. 2022年04月01日, 取自: https://www.chinatimes.com/rea ltimenews/20220401002903-260407?chdtv. 10. (Premier Su Tsengchang Requests the Central Epidemic Command Center

174

H.-T. YAN

(CECC) to Determine Whether the Level 3 COVID-19 Alert Will Be Extended After Assessing the COVID-19 Situation). : https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/pol itics/breakingnews/3544275. 11. 總統召開防疫諮詢會議 指示三大防疫原則 (President Tsai Ingwen Convenes an Advisory Meeting on COVID-19 Prevention and Proposes Three Major Disease Prevention Principles). 中央廣 播電臺. 2022年05月13日, 取自: https://www.rti.org.tw/news/ view/id/2132794. 12. 地方政府買疫苗遭阻 徐榛蔚: 台灣人的生命不掌握在行政院手裡 (The CECC Rejects Local Governments’ Call to Procure Vaccines on Their Own. Hsu Chen-Wei: The Lives of Taiwanese are Not in the Hands of the Executive Yuan). 中時新聞網. 2021 年07月12日, 取自: https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/ 20210712003958-260407?chdtv. 13. No Decentralized Purchase of Vaccines. Taipei Times. 2021 年05月14日, 取自: https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2021/05/14/2003757381. 14. Will Foxconn Billionaire Terry Gou’s COVID-19 Vaccine Deal Bring Taiwan Closer to China? TIME. 2021年07月26日, 取自: https://time.com/6083748/taiwan-vaccines-terry-gou-foxconn. 15. 林淑芬、劉建國及江永昌萊豬跑票 民進黨團決議停權3年 (The DPP Legislative Caucus Suspends Three Legislators Lin Shu-fen, Liu Chien-kuo and Chiang Yung-chang for a Period of Three Years as a Result of Ractopamine Vote Abstentions). 自由時報. 2020年12月30日, 取自: https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/ breakingnews/3396193. 16. 4公投全敗 林為洲指策略錯誤: 喊4個都同意造成與侯友宜矛盾 (The Four Referendums Failed: KMT Legislator Lin Wei-chou Says the KMT Committed a Serious Tactical Error in Proposing Two of the Referendums and Supporting All Four. That’s Why There Were Conflicting Views Between the Party and City Mayors Like Hou Yu-ih). 自由時報. 2021年12月20日, 取自: https:// news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3774242. 17. 台灣捐200萬片口罩抵日 安倍晉三感謝蔡總統 (Two Million Donated Masks from Taiwan Arrive in Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Thanks President Tsai Ing-wen). 中央廣播電 臺. 2020年04月22日, 取自: https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/ id/2060821.

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

175

18. 國台辦: 願迅速安排讓廣大台胞有大陸疫苗可用 (China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Said That It Is Willing to Help Taiwan Compatriots to be Inoculated with Mainland COVID-19 Vaccines). 人民網-人 民日報海外版2021年05月25日, 取自: http://tw.people.com.cn/ BIG5/n1/2021/0525/c14657-32112494.html. 19. 國台辦: 搭民航客運航班來大陸台胞可按有關政策接種疫苗 (China’s Taiwan Affairs Office: Taiwan Compatriots Can Come to China to Get Vaccinated Against COVID-19, Provided They Strictly Comply with China’s Pandemic Control Measures). 人民 網-人民日報海外版. 2021年06月11日, 取自: http://tw.people. com.cn/BIG5/n1/2021/0611/c14657-32128806.html. 20. 台灣疫情: 中國大陸稱願意提供疫苗抗疫 台陸委會回應稱 「統戰 手段」 (COVID-19 Pandemic in Taiwan: China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Said That It Is Willing to Provide Taiwan with Vaccines as a Means to Help Solve Its Current COVID-19 Crisis. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Responded That It Is an “United Front” Campaign against Taiwan). BBC. 2021年05月27日, 取自: https:/ /www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-57264880. 21. 新冠疫情: 中國加緊布局mRNA疫苗的考量 (COVID-19: China’s Consideration of Stepping up Its Deployment of mRNA Vaccines). BBC. 2021年09月16日, 取自: https://www.bbc.com/ zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-58555615.

C. Statistics 1. TVBS民調中心 (The TVBS Poll Center). 2022. https://www.tvbs. com.tw/poll-center/1. 2. 財團法人台灣民意教育基金會全國性民意調查摘要報告 (The Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation Public Opinion Poll—Excerpt). 2022. https://www.tpof.org. 3. 美麗島電子報民調 (The FORMOSA Public Opinion Poll). 2022. http://www.my-formosa.com/Topical/formosapollster. 4. 衛生福利部疾病管制署 (Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, Ministry of Health and Welfare). 2022. https://www.cdc.gov.tw. Data on COVID-19 (coronavirus) by Our World in Data. 2022. https://github.com/owid/co.

176

H.-T. YAN

Notes 1. An and Tang, “Lessons from COVID-19 Responses”; Hsieh et al., “A Whole-of-Nation Approach”; Huang, “Fighting COVID-19”; Liu, Wu, and McEntire, “Six Cs”; Yen, “Taiwan’s COVID-19 Management,” etc. 2. Ecevit and Karakoç, “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism”; Elgie, “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism”; Elgie, “Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation”; Elgie, Semi-presidentialism; Kim, “A Troubled Marriage”; Kirschke, “Semi-presidentialism”; Sedelius and Linde, “Unravelling Semi-presidentialism”; Yan, “Comparing Democratic Performance,” etc. 3. Mattingly and Sundquist, “When Does Public Diplomacy Succeed”; Rasmussen and Merkelsen, “The Risks of Nation Branding,” etc. 4. Lee and Kim, “Nation Branding.” 5. Elgie, “The Politics of Semi-presidentialism.” 6. Protsyk, “Politics of Intra-executive Conflict.” 7. Jalali, “The President Is Not a Passenger.” 8. Neto and Lobo, “Portugal’s Semi-presidentialism (Re)Considered.” 9. Yan, “Prime Ministerial Autonomy.” 10. Yan, “Prime Ministerial Autonomy.” 11. Elgie, “Semi-presidentialism in Western Europe.” 12. Baylis, “Presidents Versus Prime Ministers.” 13. Ecevit and Karakoç, “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism.” 14. Hunter and Leyden, “Beyond NIMBY.” 15. Güzel, Özer, and Özcan, “The Effect of the Variables”; Jimenez and Iyer, “Tax Compliance.” 16. Bargain and Aminjonov, “Trust and Compliance”; Nivette et al., “Noncompliance”; Pak, McBryde, and Adegboye, “Does High Public Trust”; Seyd and Bu, “Perceived Risk.” 17. Levi and Sacks, “Legitimating Beliefs.” 18. Alon and Hageman, “The Impact of Corruption.” 19. Alfano et al., “Death Takes No Bribes”; Dincer and Gillanders, “Shelter in Place.” 20. Fischer et al., “Mask Adherence”; Wang, Liu, and Hu, “Examining the Change.” 21. Donno, “Elections and Democratization”; Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes”; Wahman, “Opposition Coalitions”; Ziegfeld and Tudor, “How Opposition Parties.” 22. Selçuk and Hekimci, “The Rise of the Democracy”; Ufen, “Opposition in Transition.” 23. Wahman, “Opposition Coalitions.” 24. Whitaker and Martin, “Divide to Conquer.” 25. Reuter and Gandhi, “Economic Performance.”

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

177

26. Ilonszki, Marangoni, and Palau, “Can Opposition Parties”; Plescia and Kritzinger, “Retrospective Voting.” 27. Nye, “Public Diplomacy.” 28. Nye, “Public Diplomacy.” 29. Anholt, Competitive Identity. 30. Potter, “The Evolving Complementarity.” 31. Morgan, “Can China’s Economic Statecraft.” 32. Lee and Kim, “Nation Branding.” 33. Leeds, “Alliance Reliability.” 34. Long and Leeds, “Trading for Security.” 35. Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression.” 36. Jackson and Nei, “Networks of Military Alliances.” 37. Ingebritsen et al., Small States. 38. Karns and Mingst, International Organizations. 39. Deitelhoff and Wallbott, “Beyond Soft Balancing”; Panke, “Small States.” 40. Yeh and Wu, “Diversionary Behavior.” 41. Gerring, “What Is a Case Study.” 42. Yin, Case Study Research. 43. Gerring, “What Is a Case Study.” 44. Grzymala-Busse, “Authoritarian Determinants.” 45. Beach and Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods. 46. Appendix. The data used for process-tracing methods, B1. 47. Appendix, B2. Citizens of the Republic of China offering honorable services to the nation or society may be awarded an order. 48. Appendix, B3. 49. Appendix, B4–5. 50. Appendix, A1. 51. Appendix, A2. 52. Appendix, A3. 53. Appendix, B6. 54. Appendix, A4. 55. Appendix, B7. 56. Appendix, A5. During home quarantine, leaving the accommodation would result in a fine up to NT$1,000,000. 57. Appendix, A6. People under self-health management were permitted to go about their life normally if they did not exhibit any symptoms, but must wear a medical mask correctly at all times when outside, while those in home isolation must stay in their quarantine sites. 58. Appendix, B8–9. 59. Appendix, A7, B10.

178

H.-T. YAN

60. Appendix, A8. On May 12, 2021, the CECC announced a four-level system of COVID-19 alerts. The alert level would be raised to 3 if more than three community clusters occurred within a week, or more than ten confirmed local cases of unknown sources occurred in one day. A combination of control measures would be imposed in response: masks must be worn at all times when outside, and outdoor gatherings of more than ten people and indoor gatherings of more than five people would be cancelled, and more. 61. Appendix, A9. 62. Appendix, A10. Each eligible individual could receive NT$5,000 worth of vouchers in digital or paper form. 63. Appendix, A11. 64. Appendix, B11. 65. Appendix, C1–2. 66. Appendix, C1–2. 67. Appendix, C1. We used the public opinion data, 3–4 February, 10– 12 February, 20–25 March, 3–8 September 2022, from the TVBS Poll Center. This study analyzed responses to the following question: “Are you currently wearing a mask in public places?” The possible responses were 1 = yes, 2 = no, and 3 = refused. We calculated the percentage of respondents who chose “yes.” This study also analyzed responses to the following question: “Do you have confidence in the government to prevent and control the pneumonia outbreak?” The possible responses were 1 = very confident, 2 = somewhat confident, 3 = not very confident, 4 = not at all confident, and 5 = don’t know. We calculated the percentage of respondents who chose “1” and “2.” 68. Appendix, C1. We used the public opinion data, 3–4 February, 20– 25 March 2022, from the TVBS Poll Center. This study analyzed responses to the following question: “The CECC has announced that the reopening of schools at the high school level and lower following the winter break has been postponed to 25 February due to the coronavirus outbreak. Do you agree or not?” The possible responses were 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = strongly disagree, and 5 = don’t know. We calculated the percentage of respondents who chose “1” and “2.” This study also analyzed responses to the following question: “Do you think that the government should impose international travel bans on all citizens?” The possible responses were 1 = should, 2 = should not, and 3 = don’t know. We calculated the percentage of respondents who chose “should.” 69. Appendix, A12–13. Starting from 6 February 2020, each National Health Insurance (NHI) Cards was entitled to purchase two face masks at the total price of NT$10 within 7-day period. Each adult was allowed to buy 3 masks per NHI card within 7 days on 12 March. The rationing

5

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

81. 82. 83. 84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97.

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

179

system was upgraded again on 9 April, to allow people to buy 9 masks in 14 days by verification via their NHI card. Appendix, C4. Appendix, C5. Hsieh et al., “A Whole-of-Nation Approach.” Appendix, B12–13. Appendix, A14, B13. Appendix, A15, B14. Appendix, C2–3. Appendix, B15. Appendix, A16. Appendix, B16. Referendum results: restarting construction on the fourth nuclear power plant (Yes: 3,804,755/No: 4,262,451), banning pork imports containing ractopamine (Yes: 3,936,554/No: 4,131,203), holding referendums alongside nation-wide elections (Yes: 3,951,882/ No: 4,120,038), and keeping the third liquid natural gas terminal in Taoyuan out of algal reefs (Yes: 3,901,171/No: 4,163,464). The high consistency of vote shares across the different proposals implied a battle of blue versus green. Black-gold politics refer to the obtaining of money (the “gold”) through an illegal method (hence the gold being “black”), see Yan, “The Decision to Go Negative,” for more details. Appendix, A17. Appendix, A18–19. Appendix, A19. Appendix, A20. New Southbound Policy was created on September 5, 2016, to reduce economic overreliance on a single market, China, and to strengthen Taiwan’s relationships with its neighbors to the south, and of these, Southeast Asia and India were as particular focus points for the policy. Appendix, A21, B17. Appendix, A22. Appendix, A23. Appendix, A24. Appendix, A25. Appendix, A26. Appendix, A27. Appendix, A28. Appendix, A29. Appendix, A30–31. Appendix, A32. Appendix, A33. Appendix, A34.

180

H.-T. YAN

98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

105. 106.

107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

Appendix, B18–20. Appendix, A35. Appendix, B21. Appendix, A36. Appendix, A37–42. Appendix, A43–44. Appendix, A45–49. 840,000 vaccine doses: Lithuania (AstraZeneca: 255,900), the Czech Republic (Moderna: 30,000), Poland (AstraZeneca: 400,000), and Slovakia (AstraZeneca: 160,000). Appendix, C4. Ecevit and Karakoç, “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism”; Elgie, “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism”; Elgie, “Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation”; Kirschke, “Semi-presidentialism”; Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs. Gidengil, Stolle, and Bergeron-Boutin, “COVID-19 and Support.” Siewert et al., “A German Miracle.” Lozano, Atkinson, and Mou, “Democratic Accountability.” Pedersen and Borghetto, “Fighting COVID-19.” Lee and Kim, “Nation Branding.”

Bibliography Alfano, Vincenzo, Salvatore Capasso, Salvatore Ercolano, and Rajeev K.Goel. “Death Takes No Bribes: Impact of Perceived Corruption on the Effectiveness of Non-pharmaceutical Interventions at Combating COVID-19.” Social Science & Medicine 301 (2022): 114958. Alon, Anna, and Amy M. Hageman. “The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust?” Journal of Business Ethics 116, no. 3 (2013): 479–494. An, Brian Y., and Shui-Yan Tang. “Lessons from COVID-19 Responses in East Asia: Institutional Infrastructure and Enduring Policy Instruments.” American Review of Public Administration 50, no. 6–7 (2020): 790–800. Anholt, Simon. Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities, Regions. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Bargain, Olivier, and Ulugbek Aminjonov. “Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of COVID-19.” Journal of Public Economics 192 (2020): 104316. Baylis, Thomas A. “Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe.” World Politics 48, no. 3 (1996): 297–323. Deitelhoff, Nicole, and Linda Wallbott. “Beyond Soft Balancing: Small States and Coalition-Building in the ICC and Climate Negotiations.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012): 345–366.

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

181

Dincer, Oguzhan, and Robert Gillanders. “Shelter in Place? Depends on the Place: Corruption and Social Distancing in American States.” Social Science & Medicine 269 (2021): 113569. Donno, Daniela. “Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (2013): 703–716. Ecevit, Yüksel A., and Ekrem Karakoç. “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism: Confidence in Political Institutions in Contemporary Democracies.” International Political Science Review 38, no. 1 (2017): 4–20. Elgie, Robert. “The Politics of Semi-presidentialism.” In: Semi-presidentialism in Europe, edited by Robert Elgie, 1–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Elgie, Robert. “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism. Are They Exaggerated?” Democratization 15, no. 1 (2008): 49–66. Elgie, Robert. “Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of Electoral Democracies, 1990–2008.” Government and Opposition 45, no. 1 (2010): 29–49. Elgie, Robert. “Semi-presidentialism in Western Europe.” In Semi-presidentialism and Democracy, edited by Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and Yu-Shan Wu, 81–97. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Elgie, Robert. Semi-presidentialism: Sub-types and Democratic Performance. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Fischer, Charlie B., Nedghie Adrien, Jeremiah J. Silguero, Julianne J. Hopper, Abir I. Chowdhury, and Martha M. Werler. “Mask Adherence and Rate of COVID-19 across the United States.” PLoS One 16, no. 4 (2021): e0249891. Gerring, John. “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 341–354. Gidengil, Elisabeth, Dietlind Stolle, and Olivier Bergeron-Boutin. “COVID-19 and Support for Executive Aggrandizement.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2022): 342–372. Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic Party Competition: The Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe.” Party Politics 12, no. 3 (2006): 415–437. Güzel, Sonnur A., Gökhan Özer, and Murat Özcan. “The Effect of the Variables of Tax Justice Perception and Trust in Government on Tax Compliance: The Case of Turkey.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 78 (2019): 80–86. Howard, Marc M., and Philip G. Roessler. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2006): 365–381. Hsieh, Chih-Wei, Mao Wang, Natalie W. M. Wong, and Lawrence Ka-ki Ho. “A Whole-of-Nation Approach to COVID-19: Taiwan’s National Epidemic

182

H.-T. YAN

Prevention Team.” International Political Science Review 42, no. 3 (2021): 300–315. Huang, Irving Yi-Feng. “Fighting COVID-19 Through Government Initiatives and Collaborative Governance: The Taiwan Experience.” Public Administration Review 80, no. 4 (2020): 665–670. Hunter, Susan, and Kevin M. Leyden. “Beyond NIMBY: Explaining Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities.” Policy Studies Journal 23, no. 4 (1995): 601– 619. Ilonszki, Gabriella, Francesco Marangoni, and Anna M. Palau. “Can Opposition Parties Be Responsible?” Parliamentary Affairs 74, no. 3 (2021): 722–740. Ingebritsen, Christine, Iver Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Jessica Beyer. Small States in International Relations. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006. Jackson, Matthew O., and Stephen Nei. “Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 50 (2015): 15277–15284. Jalali, Carlos. “The President Is Not a Passenger: Portugal’s Evolving Semipresidentialism.” In Semi-presidentialism and Democracy, edited by Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and Yu-Shan Wu, 156–173. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Jimenez, Peggy, and Govind S. Iyer. “Tax Compliance in a Social Setting: The Influence of Social Norms, Trust in Government, and Perceived Fairness on Taxpayer Compliance.” Advances in Accounting 34 (2016): 17–26. Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst. International Organizations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Kim, Young H. “A Troubled Marriage? Divided Minority Government, Cohabitation, Presidential Powers, President-parliamentarism and Semipresidentialism.” Government and Opposition 50, no. 4 (2015): 652–681. Kirschke, Linda. “Semi-presidentialism and the Perils of Power-sharing in Neopatrimonial States.” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (2007): 1372–1394. Lee, Seow T., and Hun S. Kim. “Nation Branding in the COVID-19 Era: South Korea’s Pandemic Public Diplomacy.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 17, no. 4 (2021): 382–396. Leeds, Brett A. “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties.” International Organization 57, no. 4 (2003): 801–827. Leeds, Brett A. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes.” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (2003): 427–439. Levi, Margaret, and Audrey Sacks. “Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators.” Regulation & Governance 3, no. 4 (2009): 311–333.

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

183

Liu, Li-Yin, Wei-Ning Wu, and David A. McEntire. “Six Cs of Pandemic Emergency Management: A Case Study of Taiwan’s Initial Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 64 (2021): 102516. Long, Andrew G., and Brett A. Leeds. “Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements.” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 4 (2006): 433–451. Lozano, Maritza, Michael Atkinson, and Haizhen Mou. “Democratic Accountability in Times of Crisis: Executive Power, Fiscal Policy and COVID-19.” Government and Opposition (2021): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov. 2021.24. Mattingly, Daniel C., and James Sundquist. “When Does Public Diplomacy Succeed? Evidence from China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats.” Political Science Research and Methods (2022). https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.41. Morgan, Pippa. “Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa? Unpacking Trade, Investment and Aid.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 24, no. 3 (2019): 387–409. Neto, Octavio A., and Marina Costa Lobo. “Portugal’s Semi-presidentialism (Re)Considered: An Assessment of the President’s Role in the Policy Process, 1976–2006.” European Journal of Political Research 48, no. 2 (2009): 234–255. Nivette, Amy, Denis Ribeaud, Aja Murray, Annekatrin Steinhoff, Laura Bechtiger, Urs Hepp, Lilly Shanahan, and Manuel Eisner. “Non-compliance with COVID-19-related Public Health Measures Among Young Adults in Switzerland: Insights from a Longitudinal Cohort Study.” Social Science & Medicine 268 (2021): 113370. Nye, Joseph S. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008): 94–109. Pak, Anton, Emma McBryde, and Oyelola A. Adegboye. “Does High Public Trust Amplify Compliance with Stringent COVID-19 Government Health Guidelines? A Multi-country Analysis Using Data from 102,627 Individuals.” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 14 (2021): 293–302. Panke, Diana. “Small States in Multilateral Negotiations. What Have We Learned?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012): 387–398. Pedersen, Helene H., and Enrico Borghetto. “Fighting COVID-19 on Democratic Terms. Parliamentary Functioning in Italy and Denmark During the Pandemic.” Representation 57, no. 4 (2021): 401–418. Plescia, Carolina, and Sylvia Kritzinger. “Retrospective Voting and Party Support at Elections: Credit and Blame for Government and Opposition.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 27, no. 2 (2017): 156–171.

184

H.-T. YAN

Potter, Evan. “The Evolving Complementarity of Nation-Branding and Public Diplomacy: Projecting the Canada Brand Through ‘Weibo Diplomacy’ in China.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 24, no. 2 (2018): 223–237. Protsyk, Oleh. “Politics of Intra-executive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe.” East European Politics and Society 19, no. 2 (2005): 135–160. Rasmussen, Rasmus K., and Henrik Merkelsen. “The Risks of Nation Branding as Crisis Response: A Case Study of How the Danish Government Turned the Cartoon Crisis into a Struggle with Globalization.” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 10, no. 3 (2014): 230–248. Reuter, Ora J., and Jennifer Gandhi. “Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties.” British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (2011): 83–110. Sedelius, Thomas, and Jonas Linde. “Unravelling Semi-presidentialism: Democracy and Government Performance in Four Distinct Regime Types.” Democratization 25, no. 1 (2018): 136–157. Selçuk, Orçun, and Dilara Hekimci. “The Rise of the Democracy—Authoritarianism Cleavage and Opposition Coordination in Turkey (2014–2019).” Democratization 27, no. 8 (2020): 1496–1514. Seyd, Ben, and Feifei Bu. “Perceived Risk Crowds Out Trust? Trust and Public Compliance with Coronavirus Restrictions over the Course of the Pandemic.” European Political Science Review 14, no. 2 (2022): 155–170. Siewert, Markus B., Stefan Wurster, Luca Messerschmidt, Cindy Cheng, and Tim Buthe. “A German Miracle? Crisis Management During the COVID19 Pandemic in a Multi-level System.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=3637013. Accessed June 25, 2020. Skach, Cindy. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. Ufen, Andreas. “Opposition in Transition: Pre-electoral Coalitions and the 2018 Electoral Breakthrough in Malaysia.” Democratization 27, no. 2 (2020): 167– 184. Wahman, Michael. “Opposition Coalitions and Democratization by Election.” Government and Opposition 48, no. 1 (2013): 3–32. Wang, Siqin, Yan Liu, and Tao Hu. “Examining the Change of Human Mobility Adherent to Social Restriction Policies and Its Effect on COVID-19 Cases in Australia.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21 (2020): 7930. Whitaker, Richard, and Shane Martin. “Divide to Conquer? Strategic Parliamentary Opposition and Coalition Government.” Party Politics 28, no. 6 (2022): 999–1011.

5

TAIWAN CAN HELP: THE POLITICAL IMPACTS …

185

Yan, Huang-Ting. “Comparing Democratic Performance of Semi-presidential Regimes in the Post-communist Region: Omnipotent Presidents and Media Control.” Communist and Post-communist Studies 50, no. 4 (2017): 263– 275. Yan, Huang-Ting. “Prime Ministerial Autonomy and Intra-executive Conflict Under Semi-presidentialism.” European Political Science Review 13, no. 3 (2021): 285–306. Yan, Huang-Ting. “The Decision to Go Negative: Election Types, Candidate Characteristics, and Electoral Competition.” Politics and Governance 10, no. 4 (2022). https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i4.5701. Yeh, Yao-Yuan, and Charles K. S. Wu. “Diversionary Behavior for Weak States: A Case Study of Taiwan.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 55, no. 2 (2020): 221–234. Yen, Wei-Ting. “Taiwan’s COVID-19 Management: Developmental State, Digital Governance, and State-society Synergy.” Asian Politics & Policy 12, no. 3 (2020): 455–468. Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014. Ziegfeld, Adam, and Maya Tudor. “How Opposition Parties Sustain Single-Party Dominance: Lessons from India.” Party Politics 23, no. 3 (2017): 262–273.

CHAPTER 6

Taiwan Amid the US–China Rivalry: From the Perspective of a Two-Level Game John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Yi-Tzu Lin

US–China–Taiwan relations have undergone significant changes lately. On the one hand, tensions between the US and China have heighted drastically since President Obama’s pivot to Asia policy and the Trump and Biden administrations’ trade and technology wars on China. On the other hand, Taiwanese attitudes toward China have changed over time—more hostile now than not long ago. The tensions between the US and China have something to do with the rise of China. As argued by the power transition theory or the socalled Thucydides Trap, when a dominant power is challenged by a rising power, a serious conflict—oftentimes a military conflict—is very likely.1 However, the positions of both the US and China on Taiwan have been relatively stable even though the rising tensions between the two add a

J. F. Hsieh (B) University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA e-mail: [email protected] Y.-T. Lin Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_6

187

188

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

certain degree of urgency to each country’s attitude toward Taiwan. For China, peaceful unification and the threat of the use of force if Taiwan declares independence remain its policy—at least for now. In the US, the hostility toward China is bipartisan, but it does not drastically change its policy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait although it turns out to be more vigilant for the threat posed by China in the region. Thus, it does not distort the picture too much by treating the US and China as unitary actors in the US–China–Taiwan relations. As for Taiwan’s relations with the two big powers, there have always been, on the one hand, tensions between China and Taiwan since the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communists and then fled to Taiwan back in 1949. Occasionally, antagonism has seemed to ease somewhat; yet, beneath the surface, there have always been tensions to a greater or lesser degree. On the other hand, ever since the outbreak of the Korean War, Taiwan has relied essentially on the support of the United States, militarily as well as economically. Indeed, the interactions between Taiwan and mainland China had been kept at a minimum level until the late 1980s when the KMT government in Taiwan decided to lift martial law and to allow its citizens to visit their relatives on the mainland. Since then, cross-Strait interactions have increased significantly. In terms of trade, Taiwan’s exports to China and Hong Kong combined have hovered around 40% since President Chen Shui-bian’s second term in office (2004–2008).2 Now, given the tensions between the United States and China, an increasingly pressing issue for many people in Taiwan is that Taiwan has to maintain good relations with the United States given Taiwan’s security (as well as economic) needs, but at the same time, it also has to consider whether to cultivate reasonably good working relations with China both to ensure that peace and stability can be maintained across the Taiwan Strait and to facilitate business dealings between the two. In actuality, the attitudes of the Taiwanese, at both elite and mass levels—toward the relations with the US and China—have been divided. With different political forces coming to power supported by various segments of the society, Taiwan’s policy toward the US and China may shift—sometimes considerably. In examining the US–China–Taiwan relations, it is thus not suitable to treat Taiwan as a unitary actor, and it is, as a consequence, more appropriate to apply Robert Putnam’s notion of a two-level game to the triangular relations involving the US, China, and Taiwan by taking a look at Taiwan’s domestic political dynamics first before moving to the

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

189

triangular relations at the international level.3 In other words, Taiwan’s domestic politics is a nested game in a larger international game involving the interactions of the US, China, and Taiwan.4 The purpose of this chapter is first to look into Taiwanese attitudes toward the two big powers—being friendly to one side or the other or both—based on the survey data, and then to investigate the US–China– Taiwan relations given the outcome of the game at the domestic level in Taiwan. In the following discussion, we will begin with a brief account of US– China–Taiwan relations over the years, followed by a discussion of the classification of Taiwanese citizens based on their attitudes toward the two big powers. We will use the Taiwan National Security Studies (TNSS) surveys in various years to construct such a typology. The types of voters will then be juxtaposed with their partisanships which can be used to project the government policy toward the US and China. On the basis of possible outcomes of the domestic game in Taiwan, we will turn to the US–China–Taiwan relations with a particular emphasis on Taiwan’s leverage in such relations. The final section concludes.

US–China–Taiwan Relations: An Overview As the KMT was defeated by the Communists and resettled the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan in the late 1940s, the future of the island was uncertain. An attack by the Communists seemed imminent. It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War that the United States decided to help defend Taiwan against a possible Communist attack.5 Finally, in 1954, the US–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was signed, and Taiwan became formally part of the US containment policy encircling the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. Thus, Taiwan had been placed under the US umbrella since the early 1950s in the US-led fight against the expansion of the Communist bloc, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland being an important part of it. However, the situation started to change in the late 1960s as the US was bogged down in the Vietnam War. When Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968, he soon shifted the US policy toward China and Taiwan. He decided to manipulate the split in the Communist bloc between the Soviet Union and China by playing the China card against the Soviet Union, and to seek China’s help to solve the quagmire in Vietnam, resulting in the expulsion of Taiwan from the

190

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

United Nations in 1971 and Nixon’s visit to China and the signing of the Shanghai Communique in February 1972. Finally, in 1979, the US severed its formal diplomatic ties with the ROC on Taiwan and shifted its formal recognition to the PRC on the mainland. In April 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act to help manage US relations with Taiwan. In a sense, the US policy toward Taiwan since the 1970s, often dubbed strategic ambiguity, has been quite stable. On the one hand, the US continues to help Taiwan not only economically but, more importantly, militarily so as to enable Taiwan to fend for itself against a possible attack by China. The US also discourages Taiwan from provoking China by declaring formal independence. On the other hand, the US constantly warns China not to use force against Taiwan but has stopped short of specifying exactly how the US would react to a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait—to come to Taiwan rescue directly or indirectly or in any other possible way.6 The relations between Taiwan and China have fluctuated over the years. During Taiwan’s authoritarian period from 1949 to the late 1980s, tensions remained high with the KMT avowing to recover the mainland and the Communists insisting on liberating Taiwan. The situation started to change as China launched economic reform in 1978–1979. The Chinese Communists toned down their rhetoric by stressing peaceful reunification between the mainland and Taiwan with a proviso that China would use force against Taiwan if Taiwan declares independence. In the late 1980s, the KMT government in Taiwan decided to lift martial law, paving the way for eventual democratic transition on the island. In the meantime, the Taiwanese government also announced it would allow its citizens to visit their relatives on the mainland. The cross-Strait tensions eased significantly as a result of these policy changes. However, tensions were resumed in 1995–1996 as a consequence of ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. In response to Lee’s visit, China launched military exercises and fired missiles targeted at areas close to Taiwan. The tensions have persisted most of the time since the mid-1990s except during the eight years (2008–2016) when Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT took a more conciliatory gesture toward China. Yet, after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a pro-independence party, which won the presidency in 2000 and 2004, regained the governing power in 2016 and again in 2020, a stalemate between Taiwan and China resumed and has continued to this day.

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

191

Nevertheless, although political relations between Taiwan and China have been tense most of the time since the mid-1990s, economic interactions between the two have increased enormously over the years.7 In fact, China is now Taiwan’s largest trading partner with about 40% of Taiwan’s total exports going to China and Hong Kong combined since President Chen Shui-bian’s second term, not to mention the other types of exchanges like Taiwanese businessmen’s investments in China and the huge number of Taiwanese visiting, studying, or residing in China. Now, as a result of the more confrontational US–China relations in recent years, Taiwan as an “informal” US ally has found itself caught between the two big powers. A potential military conflict between China and Taiwan, with the US on Taiwan’s side, has caused a lot of concern not only among the countries in the region but, in actuality, all over the world given the preponderant role played by China in the global economy— and Taiwan, too, in particular, in the semiconductor industry. For those living in Taiwan, how to deal with the US and China is a hotly debated issue: on the one hand, Taiwan needs to secure its borders; but on the other hand, Taiwan has a highly trade-dependent economy and cannot afford to lose any big market. That is, Taiwan needs US support for its security (and economic prosperity as well), but at the same time, has to ensure that China will not attack Taiwan and Taiwan will continue to do business with China, the second largest economy in the world in nominal gross domestic product (GDP) terms and already the largest in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.

Friends or Foes: A Typology of Taiwanese Voters Let us start with the domestic scene in Taiwan. In a nutshell, the dilemma faced by many Taiwanese is how to manage their relations with the two big powers. On the one hand, China poses a threat to Taiwan, and without the US help, it is difficult for Taiwan to defend itself against a possible attack by China. However, on the other hand, the Chinese market is critical for Taiwan’s economic well-being. In 2021, for instance, Taiwan’s GDP stood at $784 billion, while its trade surplus with China amounted to $105 billion, showing an extremely high degree of economic dependence on China (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics 2022; Taiwan Institute of Economic Research 2022).

192

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

More specifically, it means that there is a choice to make for the Taiwanese: maintaining /furthering ties with the United States, fostering cordial or at least good working relations with China, or both.8 In this context, we can construct a typology with two dimensions: on one, to foster good relations with China or stay away from it, and on the other, to maintain/further close ties with the US or stay away from it. In other words, these amount to a choice between “making friends with China” or not and “siding with the US” or not. Figure 6.1 shows the two dimensions with the horizontal axis standing for the relationship with China and the vertical axis for the ties with the US. We can thus identify four types of voters: 1. Siding with the US and staying away from China; 2. Maintaining good relations with both the US and China; 3. Making friends with China and staying away from the US; Siding with U.S.

(Balancing)

(Hedging)

Staying away from China

Siding with China

(Nonaligning)

(Bandwagoning)

Staying away from U.S.

Fig. 6.1 A typology of Taiwanese attitudes toward the US and China

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

193

4. Staying away from both the US and China.9 The first three correspond roughly to the three strategies a small state may take in dealing with the major powers: balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning, respectively.10 The fourth type simply tries not to be aligned with either. Conceivably, we can expect that many Taiwanese belong to the first two types and possibly some in the third group, but very few, if any, in the fourth category. Indeed, it can be argued that many of the supporters of the current ruling party, the DPP, and its allies fall in the first category, i.e., siding with the US and staying away from China, given their advocacy for Taiwan independence which may potentially trigger a military attack by China, and the US backing is pivotal in defending Taiwan against China. As for many supporters of the KMT and its allies, hedging (i.e., to get best from both worlds) sounds a reasonable choice, and they are thus in this category. It is also possible that some supporters of the Pan-KMT camp may go so far as to back the idea of leaning to one side (i.e., China) and can thus be classified as supporters of bandwagoning. To get a real picture of the distribution of voters regarding their attitudes toward the two big powers, we examine the data from the Taiwan National Security Studies (TNSS) surveys which were conducted by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi University on behalf of Duke University, except the 2022 survey which was sponsored by the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica. As far as our study is concerned, these surveys are not ideal given that there are no appropriate questions tapping into the respondents’ attitudes toward the US and China in a direct and comprehensive way. Nevertheless, there are a few questions in the surveys that may be used as proxies for the two-dimensional issue space discussed above. One of the questions is related to the issue of economic ties with China. The respondents were asked whether they felt that economic relations between Taiwan and China should be strengthened or downgraded. If they thought that Taiwan should strengthen its economic ties with China, they were supposedly in support of either hedging or bandwagoning; otherwise, they should lean toward balancing or non-aligning. Given that making friends with China is not based solely on the economic factors, this is not an ideal question to check a respondent’s attitude toward China, but it should capture a major part of the concern about the importance of good relations with the mainland. Indeed, even if a

194

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

voter may cherish the ties with China for other reasons (e.g., avoidance of war, cultural affinity, and so on), it is likely that he or she may feel that the economy should be part of the deal. There are two questions in the earlier TNSS surveys that attempt to find out the respondents’ perception about whether the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if China attacks Taiwan. The two questions are based upon two different scenarios. In one, the attack takes place as a result of Taiwan’s declaration of formal independence, and in the other, no such precondition occurs; that is, China invades Taiwan when Taiwan does not declare independence. Arguably, more people may feel that the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if Taiwan does not provoke China by declaring independence. Thus, the second question, the one without the precondition, may better gauge the respondents’ real assessment of the US commitment to Taiwan. So, we will rely upon the second question in the following discussion to reflect the dimension about the respondents’ attitude toward the United States.11 Obviously, this is not an ideal question, either, to tap into the respondents’ attitude toward the US since, firstly, the respondents may want to make friends with the US for reasons other than the security needs, and secondly, this is a high bar for thinking of getting close to the US. That is, conceivably, some respondents may want to give the US the benefit of the doubt even if they feel that the US may not come to Taiwan’s rescue when the time comes. Yet, even though these questions are not ideal, they may still show the respondents’ perception of the trustworthiness of the US and may thus be taken into account in their assessment of weighing Taiwan’s relations with the US as against China. There is another question in the earlier surveys about whether Taiwan should seek collaboration with the United States and Japan to confront China. The problem with this question is that it involves Japan, and the wordings are vague and hard to know if it refers to military or other types of collaboration. More importantly, it includes China, rendering it in essence a question about balancing as against all other types of strategies.12 Fortunately, in the 2022 survey, the question wording is changed to whether the respondents agree with the notion of strengthening military cooperation with the US. This is a better question since it focuses on military cooperation and it no longer includes Japan, a third party, and more importantly, there is no mention of confronting China, rendering it less a question about balancing against all other options. Consequently, we include this question here as well.

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

195

The next step is to construct a typology classifying the respondents in four types. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the types of respondents over the years. In addition, we also calculate separately the distribution of voters based on the question of military cooperation with the US, along with the question on economic ties with China, in the 2022 TNSS survey (see Table 6.1). As shown in Fig. 6.2, over a majority of the respondents—those who prefer balancing and hedging plus a few others who cannot be classified and are not reported here—believe that the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if Taiwan is attacked by China without declaring independence. Similarly, as Table 6.1 reveals, an overwhelming majority of the respondents also believe that Taiwan should seek military cooperation with the US. As for the business dealings with China, a significant number of the respondents—those who support hedging and bandwagoning plus a few others who cannot be classified—favor strengthening such ties. Table 6.1 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 2004

2005

2008 balancing

2011 hedging

2019

2020

2022

bandwagoning

Fig. 6.2 Distribution of various types of voters, 2004–2022. Note Based on the questions about whether to strengthen economic ties with China and whether the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if China attacks Taiwan while Taiwan does not declare independence. The percentages refer to the proportions of the total number of respondents (Source Taiwan National Security Studies surveys, various years)

196

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

Table 6.1 A typology of Taiwanese voters, 2022 Economic ties between Taiwan and China

Strengthening military cooperation with the US

Yes

No

Other

Total

Weaken

Strengthen

Balancing 543 (53.4%) (89.9%) (36.2%) Non-aligning 45 (11.5%) (7.5%) (3.0%) 16 (17.2%) (2.6%) (1.1%) 604 (40.2%) (100%) (40.2%)

Hedging 315 (31.0%) (48.0%) (21.0%) Bandwagoning 307 (78.5%) (46.8%) (20.5%) 34 (36.6%) (5.2%) (2.3%) 656 (43.7%) (100%) (43.7%)

Other

Total

159 (15.6%) (66.0%) (10.6%)

1017 (100.0%) (67.8%) (67.9%)

39 (10.0%) (16.2%) (2.6%) 43 (46.2%) (17.8%) (2.9%) 241 (16.1%) (100%) (16.1%)

391 (100.0%) (26.0%) (26.0%) 93 (100.0%) (6.2%) (6.2%) 1501 (100.0%) (100.0%) (100.0%)

Source 2022 Taiwan National Security Studies survey Note The figures in the three parentheses in each cell represent the row, column, and total percentages, respectively

shows that a plurality, not a majority, of voters support strengthening economic ties with China. With regard to the types of respondents as defined earlier, Fig. 6.2 shows that the number of voters who support hedging has declined, and those who prefer balancing have increased over time. There are also some who are in favor of bandwagoning. As shown in Table 6.1, 36.1% of the respondents prefer balancing, while about 40% spread between hedging and bandwagoning. Few, as can be expected, belong to the non-aligning type. In the discussion below, we will thus focus on the first three types of respondents.

Types of Voters and Their Partisanships Conceivably, the types of voters should be closely related to their partisan identification: pro-Pan-DPP camp, pro-Pan-KMT camp, proTaiwan People’s Party (TPP), and non-partisans.13 In general, the DPP

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

197

and its allies in the Pan-DPP camp are in favor of Taiwan independence and are naturally poised to take a hostile attitude toward China, given the latter’s long-standing objection to Taiwan independence. Indeed, China even passed an Anti-Secession Law back in 2005 to show its determination to use coercive force if Taiwan declares independence. Hence, the Pan-DPP supporters are expected to display a certain degree of distrust in China, hoping that some external forces, notably the US, would come to Taiwan’s side to help it achieve the goal of establishing an independent Taiwan separated from China permanently. That is, balancing is to be expected for many Pan-DPP supporters in choosing between the US and China. On the other hand, many Pan-KMT camp supporters may believe that Taiwan should get along with China for a variety of reasons including, for example, the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the utilization of the Chinese market to promote the economic well-being of the people in Taiwan, and some may even harbor Chinese nationalism to such an extent that they are in favor of the unification of China and Taiwan sometime in the future, if not right now. Thus, it can be expected that many Pan-KMT supporters are hedging supporters who maintain that Taiwan should make friends with both the US and China, and some may even prefer bandwagoning, believing that Taiwan should side with China instead of the US. Of course, there are many people in Taiwan, who do not identify with either the Pan-DPP or Pan-KMT camp. Some may support the relatively new Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who may stand somewhere between the two major camps on the above-mentioned issue. As for those who are truly non-partisan, they are expected to spread out in various categories. We examine the TNSS data in various years to check whether there is indeed an association between respondents’ party identification and their attitude toward Taiwan’s relations with the US and China. As shown in Fig. 6.3a–c, there is indeed a close association between types of voters and their partisanships: Pan-DPP supporters are, in general, in favor of balancing, while the Pan-KMT voters tend to prefer hedging or even bandwagoning. The non-partisans, along with the TPP supporters, spread out in various categories. This picture largely confirms what we have expected. Table 6.2 shows a similar pattern for the distribution of respondents based on the question about military cooperation with the US in the 2022 TNSS survey.

198

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

a 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2004

2005 pan-blue

b

2008 pan-green

2011 TPP

2019

2020

2022

2020

2022

Non-partisans

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2004

2005 pan-blue

2008 pan-green

2011 TPP

2019 Non-partisans

Fig. 6.3 a Balancing Supporters by Partisanship. b Hedging Supporters by Partisanship. c Bandwagoning Supporters by Partisanship. Note Based on the questions about whether to strengthen economic ties with China and whether the US will come to Taiwan’s rescue if China attacks Taiwan while Taiwan does not declare independence. The percentages refer to the proportions of the total number of respondents who are classified as balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning supporters (Source Taiwan National Security Studies surveys, various years)

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

199

c 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2004

2005 pan-blue

2008 pan-green

2011 TPP

2019

2020

2022

Non-partisans

Fig. 6.3 (continued)

US–China–Taiwan Relations: A Two-Level Game As noted above, the US and China have maintained relatively stable policies toward the Taiwan issue even though their bilateral relations have deteriorated over time. In the meantime, Taiwan’s policy has been more volatile, depending on which political force gains the governing power. A two-level game is thus warranted in investigating the US–China–Taiwan relations. We have already looked into the domestic dynamics in Taiwan and will now turn to the triangular relations involving the US, China, and Taiwan. We can depict the triangular relations based on the graph displayed in Fig. 6.1. First, Taiwan’s policy choice, as mentioned earlier, may shift depending on which political force is in power. In 2008–2016, for instance, the KMT gained the governing power, and under President Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan took a “making friends with both the US and China” policy. Figure 6.4 attempts to capture the KMT government’s position in the quadrant we have identified as hedging. But since 2016,

200

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

Table 6.2 Partisanship and types of voters in Taiwan, 2022 Party identification

Type of voters

Bal

Hed

Band

Non-align

Other

Total

Pan-DPP Pan-KMT TPP camp camp

Non-partisans

Other

Total

339 (62.4%) (75.5%) (22.6%) 52 (16.5%) (11.6%) (3.5%) 7 (2.3%) (1.6%) (0.5%) 9 (20.0%) (2.0%) (0.6%) 42 (14.4%) (9.4%) (2.8%) 449 (29.9%) (100%) (29.9%)

149 (27.4%) (24.7%) (9.9%) 127 (40.3%) (21.0%) (8.5%) 121 (39.4%) (20.0%) (8.1%) 21 (46.7%) (3.5%) (1.4%) 186 (63.9%) (30.8%) (12.4%) 604 (40.2%) (100%) (40.2%)

5 (0.9%) (29.4%) (0.3%) 2 (0.6%) (11.8%) (0.1%) 2 (0.7%) (11.8%) (0.1%) 0 (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 8 (2.7%) (47.1%) (0.5%) 17 (1.1%) (100%) (1.1%)

543 (100%) (36.2%) (36.2%) 315 (100%) (21.0%) (21.0%) 307 (100%) (20.5%) (20.5%) 45 (100%) (3.0%) (3.0%) 291 (100%) (19.4%) (19.4%) 1501 (100%) (100%) (100%)

28 (5.2%) (8.5%) (1.9%) 98 (31.1%) (29.6%) (6.5%) 153 (49.8%) (46.2%) (10.2%) 11 (24.4%) (3.3%) (0.7%) 41 (14.1%) (12.4%) (2.7%) 331 (22.1%) (100%) (22.1%)

22 (4.1%) (22.0%) (1.5%) 36 (11.4%) (36.0%) (2.4%) 24 (7.8%) (24.0%) (1.6%) 4 (8.9%) (4.0%) (0.3%) 14 (4.8%) (14.0%) (0.9%) 100 (6.7%) (100%) (6.7%)

Source 2022 Taiwan National Security Studies survey Note The figures in the three parentheses in each cell represent the row, column, and total percentages, respectively. The types of voters are based on the results of Table 6.1

the DPP government under President Tsai Ying-wen has adopted a divergent policy by “siding closely with the US and staying away from China,” a clearly balancing strategy (see Fig. 6.5).14 Second, we can also use the same graph to locate the positions of the other two players, the US and China. But here, of course, the notions of balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning do not apply since these notions refer essentially to the policy of the small states vis-à-vis the big powers. With regard to the preferences of the US and China, they would, by definition, “side with” themselves. The question will then boil down to

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

Siding with U.S.

201

US

Taiwan

China Siding with China

Staying away from China

Staying away from U.S.

Fig. 6.4 US–China–Taiwan Relations (2008–2016)

how they treat each other and how they see their relations with Taiwan. From 2008 to 2016, the US–China relations were relatively cordial even though the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia policy already showed the US concern over a rising China. Under the Trump and Biden administrations from 2016 onward, the US–China relations have deteriorated abruptly with the trade and technology war launched by the US against China. China also witnessed the change of hand from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping with more assertive foreign policy gestures under Xi. It thus seemed reasonable to assume that the US may move from a more friendly to a more hostile position from the period of 2008 to 2016 (Fig. 6.4) to that of 2016 to the present (Fig. 6.5). By the same token, China may have made a similar move from the first to the second period. Then, given the positions of the three players as shown in Figs. 6.4 and 6.5, it is likely that Taiwan might be a median voter in all directions in 2008–2016 but not afterward.15 This means that Taiwan was likely to have more leverage during the earlier period, and its ideal point was

202

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

US

Siding with U.S.

Taiwan

Staying away from China

Siding with China

China

Staying away from U.S.

Fig. 6.5 US–China–Taiwan Relations (2016–present)

potentially the equilibrium of the game. But in the later period, no such equilibrium exists. However, the above discussion neglects the weights of the players. If one of the three players is truly dominant, the median voter in all directions may be in actuality part of that player. It will then determine the result of the game. Take a voting game with majority rule as an example. If there are 100 votes, and the distribution of the votes is 55, 35, and 10 controlled by players 1, 2, and 3, respectively, then, player 1 will determine the outcome no matter what. But if the distribution is 45, 40, and 15, then the outcome of the game depends on the positions of all three players in the game. That is, Taiwan was likely to be a median voter in all directions in 2008–2016 if the US was not too dominant, and Taiwan happened to occupy the position as shown in Fig. 6.4. Whether the US lost some clout at that time is debatable, but it is true that Taiwan might

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

203

enjoy some leverage during that period. Nonetheless, it is no longer the case after 2016. If the gap between the weights of the US and China continues to shrink, and Taiwan is able to catch up with a rising China in a relative sense, it is possible that Taiwan may play a pivotal role—but then much also depends on the policy choice of the Taiwanese government.

Conclusion As noted from the beginning, the US and China have maintained relatively stable policy toward the Taiwan issue despite the fact that tensions between the two have heightened significantly over the years. As a result, it does not distort the picture too much by regarding the two as unitary actors in the US–China–Taiwan relations game. However, Taiwan’s policy toward the cross-Strait relations has been more volatile depending on which political force gains the upper hand in the domestic political game. It is thus not appropriate to treat Taiwan as a unitary actor, and it is essential that we look at Taiwan’s internal political dynamics first before turning to the triangular relations involving the US, China, and Taiwan. That is, Robert Putnam’s notion of a two-level game is more appropriate in dealing with the US–China–Taiwan relations.16 In Taiwan, the public attitudes toward the two big powers, as revealed in the TNSS surveys, are divergent. In general, the Pan-KMT camp is more willing to accommodate China while the Pan-DPP camp is much less willing to do so. Both camps, more so in the Pan-DPP camp than in the Pan-KMT camp, cherish the relations with the US, particularly the security needs that have been provided by the US. In a nutshell, the Pan-DPP camp is more likely to favor a balancing strategy in dealing with the two big powers while the Pan-KMT camp tends to support the notion of hedging and for some members, even bandwagoning. Given that Taiwan is a democracy now, politicians have to pay close attention to what their constituents ask for in order to win the governing power.17 Since the elites and the masses are divided over the issue of Taiwan’s relations with the two powers, as seen in the distribution of the different types of voters, Taiwan’s policy may shift, depending on the political fortunes of the various political forces.18 Volatility is the name of the game in Taiwan.19 In a sense, how to deal with the US and China becomes a dilemma for many Taiwanese: lean toward one side or the other, or strike a balance between the two? Our analysis indicates that Taiwan’s policy, along with

204

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

the policy choices of the two big powers, matters in terms of the leverage Taiwan may enjoy in the three-player game. In 2008–2016, Taiwan’s ideal point was the equilibrium of some sort, but after 2016, Taiwan does not have much say in the triangular relations as the case involving the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) uncovers.20 Down the road, how much leverage Taiwan may have depended on not only the relative strengths of the three players but also Taiwan’s own choice concerning how to deal with the two big powers.

Notes 1. There is a huge literature on this topic. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) and Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Mariner, 2017). 2. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Yi-Tzu Lin, “Butter or Guns: Taiwan’s Economic Policy Toward China,” Journal of Contemporary China (forthcoming). 3. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1988): 427–460. 4. For the notion of a nested game, see George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990). 5. See Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005) and Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 2007). 6. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 22, no. 1 (March 2017): 1–15. 7. See Yi-Tzu Lin and John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Change and Continuity in Taiwan’s Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Economic Interactions,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52, no. 8 (December 2017): 1103–1116, and Hsieh and Lin, op. cit. 8. For a similar study on Taiwan’s choice between the US and China but with a different way of looking at the issue, see Alex Min-wei Lin and Chungli Wu, “Please Be My Friends: The Taiwanese Public’s Ally Preferences Between the United States and China,” Journal of Electoral Studies 26, no. 2 (November 2019): 87–112. 9. For a similar approach to constructing a typology, see Chien-wu Alex Hsueh, “Bandwagoning, Hedging, Balancing, or Isolationism? Probing

6

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

205

Taiwanese Public Opinion Toward These Four China Policy Alternatives [in Chinese],” Taiwan Democracy Quarterly 19, no. 1 (March 2022): 83–133 and Ja Ian Chong, David W.F. Huang, and Wen-Chin Wu, “’Stand Up Like a Taiwanese!’: PRC Coercion and Public Preferences for Resistance,” Japanese Journal of Political Science (Forthcoming). There is a huge literature on this topic, see, for example, David C. Kang, China Rising : Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) and David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). For the case of Taiwan specifically, see Charles Chong-han Wu, “Taiwan’s Hedging Strategy Under the Influence of US–China Competition and Cooperation [in Chinese],” EurAmerica 48, no. 4 (December 2018): 513–547; T.Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging: Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a Rising China,” Political Science 73, no. 1 (September 2021): 66–84; and T.Y. Wang, “David vs. Goliath: Taiwan’s Policy Toward China,” in John Fuhsheng Hsieh and Robert Henry Cox, eds., Democratic Governance in Taiwan (London: Routledge, 2022), 181–196. We have looked at the data based on the question under the condition that China attacks Taiwan as a result Taiwan’s declaration of independence. The results are similar. Many countries in East and Southeast Asia are said to adopt a hedging strategy so as to do business with China and to get US help if their security is threatened. See, for example, Kang, op. cit. and Shambaugh, op. cit. For any observers of Taiwanese politics, it is a no-brainer that these variables are, in general, closely related to such issues as ethnicity (Minnan Taiwanese, Hakka Taiwanese, and Mainlanders), national identity (support for independence, unification, or the status quo), ethnic identity (selfidentification of being Taiwanese, Chinese, or both), and the like. See, for example, Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and Studies 40, no. 1–2 (April 2005): 13–28; and Dafydd Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991–2004 (London: Routledge, 2005). The ideal point taken by each player in Figs. 6.4 and 6.5 is for pedagogical purposes only. An important point here is not the exact location of each player, but rather the relative positions of all the players involved. For the notion of median voter in all directions, see Charles R. Plott’s classic work, “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule,” The American Economic Review 57, no. 4 (September 1967): 790–792. See also William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A

206

16. 17.

18.

19. 20.

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Feeman, 1982), 185–186. Putnam, op. cit. The notion of constituency influence and accountability has been a timehonored concern in the study of democratic politics. See, for example, Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) and G. Bingham, Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000). One of us has argued about the existence of the different equilibria in the US–China–Taiwan relations resulting, in particular, from Taiwan’s domestic politics from a different perspective. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Relations,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 55, no. 2 (March 2020): 187–200. See Wu, op.cit., Wang and Tan, op.cit., and Wang, op. cit. TSMC is one of largest semiconductor manufacturers in the world. It was asked by the US government to invest in the US and to limit the sale of its advanced chips to China. This has obviously put TSMC in a difficult position. And given the preponderant role played by TSMC in Taiwan’s economy, it has also caused concern about Taiwan’s economic well-being down the road. See Paul Mozur, John Liu, and Raymond Zhong, “‘The Eye of the Storm’: Taiwan Is Caught in a Great Game over Microchips,” The New York Times, August 29, 2022, https://www. nytimes.com/2022/08/29/technology/taiwan-chips.html.

Bibliography Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Boston: Mariner, 2017. Bush, Richard C. Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005. Chong, Ja Ian, David W.F. Huang and Wen-Chin Wu. “‘Stand Up Like a Taiwanese!’: PRC Coercion and Public Preferences for Resistance.” Japanese Journal of Political Science (Forthcoming). Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan). “National Statistics, R.O.C. (Taiwan).” https://view.off iceapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.stat.gov.tw%2Fp ublic%2Fdata%2Fdgbas03%2Fbs4%2FStatistical%2520Tables%2Ftable(043). xls&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK. Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.

6

TAIWAN AMID THE US–CHINA RIVALRY: FROM ...

207

Fell, Dafydd. Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991–2004. London: Routledge, 2005. Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken. Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 2007. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. “Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan.” Journal of Asian and Studies 40, no. 1–2 (April 2005): 13–28. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. “Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 22, no. 1 (March 2017): 1–15. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. “Continuity and Change in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Relations.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 55, no. 2 (March 2020): 187–200. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng and Yi-Tzu Lin. “Butter or Guns: Taiwan’s Economic Policy Toward China.” Journal of Contemporary China (forthcoming). Hsueh, Chien-wu Alex. “Bandwagoning, Hedging, Balancing, or Isolationism? Probing Taiwanese Public Opinion Toward These Four China Policy Alternatives [in Chinese].” Taiwan Democracy Quarterly 19, no. 1 (March 2022): 83–133. Kang, David C. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Lin, Alex Min-wei and Chung-li Wu. “Please Be My Friends: The Taiwanese Public’s Ally Preferences Between the United States and China.” Journal of Electoral Studies 26, no. 2 (November 2019): 87–112. Lin, Yi-Tzu and John Fuh-sheng Hsieh. “Change and Continuity in Taiwan’s Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Economic Interactions.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52, no. 8 (December 2017): 1103–1116. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001. Mozur, Paul, John Liu, and Raymond Zhong. “‘The Eye of the Storm’: Taiwan Is Caught in a Great Game Over Microchips.” The New York Times, August 29, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/technology/tai wan-chips.html. Plott, Charles R. “A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule.” The American Economic Review 57, no. 4 (September 1967): 790– 792. Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–460. Rigger, Shelley. From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

208

J. F. HSIEH AND Y.-T. LIN

Riker, William H. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W. H. Feeman, 1982. Shambaugh, David. Where Great Powers Meet: America and China in Southeast. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Taiwan Institute of Economic Research. Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, no. 347 (March 2022). https://ws.mac.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS 9VcGxvYWQvMjk1L2NrZmlsZS9jYzYzNzMxOS04YzlhLTRmMjgtYjFhNy0 0MmNlNDUxNTc0NTMucGRm&n=MzQ35YWo5paHLnBkZg%3d%3d. Tsebelis, George. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. Wang, T. Y. “David vs. Goliath: Taiwan’s Policy Toward China.” In Democratic Governance in Taiwan. Edited by John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and Robert Henry Cox. London: Routledge, forthcoming. Wang, T. Y., and Alexander C. Tan. “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging: Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a Rising China.” Political Science 73, no. 1 (September 2021): 66–84. Wu, Charles Chong-han. “Taiwan’s Hedging Strategy Under the Influence of US–China Competition and Cooperation [in Chinese].” EurAmerica 48, no. 4 (December 2018): 513–547.

PART III

China: Coping with the Turbulent Currents of Challenges

CHAPTER 7

The Pandemic Further Sickens US-China Relations Denny Roy

The US-China relationship had pre-existing health problems prior to the onset of COVID-19, but the pandemic of 2020–2022 worsened these problems to a near-fatal level. By early 2020 the Chinese government had seemingly weathered the COVID-19 storm at home, but Beijing’s overbearing damage-control diplomacy largely failed to gain respect for China in the developed world. The continued foreign criticism of China, especially from the United States, prompted Beijing to launch a series of shrill rhetorical attacks against the US government. The ruling political party in the USA reciprocated by making China-bashing a prominent feature of America’s November 2020 elections. The increased bilateral acrimony exacerbated previous US-China economic, political, and strategic tensions. Taiwan’s pandemic experience was the opposite; its international prestige unambiguously increased, and it enjoyed an upgraded relationship with Washington.

D. Roy (B) East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_7

211

212

D. ROY

The pre-pandemic strains in the Sino-US relationship had developed from longer-term tensions. China, awash in triumphalism and discussions of America’s imminent decline, was frustrated with continued US opposition to Beijing’s agenda. Washington worked against China’s irredentism in several ways: by announcing that the US-Japan security treaty applied to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; by regularly sailing US warships near PRC-claimed features in the South China Sea; and by supporting the Taiwan government through arms sales and the unstated promise of likely military intervention if China attacked. The US government was also highly critical of Beijing’s erasure of civil liberties in Hong Kong and mass persecution of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Chinese widely believed the United States was committed to suppressing the growth of China’s power and influence. For their part, Americans perceived that China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping was becoming more authoritarian internally and more aggressive externally. This seemed to disprove the assumption, on which rested two decades of bipartisan US foreign policy, that China would become more politically liberal and cooperative with the USA as it became wealthier and more enmeshed within the global economy and international institutions. Many Americans were increasingly uncomfortable with the level of their economic dependence on China. The Trump Administration defined China as a strategic competitor that sought to expel US influence from Asia. Trump attempted to redress the lopsided balance of trade in China’s favor and to cut back China’s access to advanced US technology. Underlying this pre-pandemic downturn in US-China relations was an important structural change. By 2019, China had overcome much of the previously vast gap between its own economic and military power and influence and those of the United States. This change from a superpowermajor power relationship to a superpower-near superpower relationship was recognized by analysts in both China and the United States.1 The usual dynamics of a rising challenger and a mature hegemon began to apply.2 The United States began to worry more about US-China cooperation contributing to China’s ability to disrupt the US-sponsored regional order, and China began to chafe under a system of rules and norms largely written by the Western countries. The US government had taken several concrete actions prior to 2020 that reflected the new disillusionment with China. Washington restricted the use of some information technology hardware and platforms owned

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

213

by Chinese corporations and pressured allies to follow suit; sought to reduce the Chinese government’s ability to propagandize American society through US media and academic institutions; and tightened the opportunities for PRC nationals to access advanced US scientific and engineering research. With the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2019, the United States sanctioned Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong officials accused of oppressing civil liberties. The door to reconciliation, however, was not completely shut. The Trump Administration’s “trade war” with China, focused mostly on addressing the USA’s huge and chronic trade deficit with the PRC, had begun in 2018 but was actually in a lull as the pandemic began because the two countries agreed to the “Phase One” deal on January 15, 2020. As late as February 2020, Trump was praising China as “very professionally run” and Xi as “extremely capable.”3

Deterioration of the Atmospherics The most consequential effect of the pandemic on US-China relations was to poison the bilateral political atmosphere. Each of the two countries’ narratives about the other devolved toward extraordinary levels of criticism and hostility. The pandemic not only imperiled the health of China’s people, it also forced China into an unexpected test of its international citizenship. Xi’s government had been touting both the merits of his country’s political system and the positive consequences of China having greater influence in global affairs. The early international media reports announcing the arrival of the pandemic included allegations of incompetence and deception by the Chinese government. PRC authorities delayed revealing the seriousness of the disease.4 They also reportedly instructed Chinese government-linked organizations overseas to buy supplies of medical equipment and ship it to China.5 The government commandeered medical masks manufactured in China intended for export to fulfill contracts with foreign firms. This contributed to shortages of masks in other countries.6 The government punished citizens who shared information about the pandemic and lockdowns.7 Such reports contributed to the widely held view that China was responsible for the pandemic.8 These missteps were serious enough for outside analysts to speculate that the pandemic might be the Beijing regime’s “Chernobyl

214

D. ROY

moment,” an event that so clearly exposes the structural weaknesses of an authoritarian regime as to threaten the regime’s sustainability.9 Consequently, China’s earliest diplomatic imperative was damage control. From January to early March 2020, PRC government external messaging made four main points. The first was that Chinese authorities handled the outbreak correctly: moving without delay to contain the outbreak in China, giving infected citizens proper care and treatment, and freely sharing information about COVID-19 with the international community. A new mantra repeated by Chinese media and officials was that China acted with “openness, transparency, and a high sense of responsibility.”10 They said foreign governments and organizations were praising China’s effort as heroic.11 The second point made by Chinese government-linked commentators was to condemn “stigmatization,” by which they meant foreigners “smearing” China by associating it with the disease—calling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus” or the “Wuhan virus,” even though “Wuhan Pneumonia” was the name Chinese domestic media originally used for the virus. It was wrong, said Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Zhao Lijian, to make “connections between the virus and certain places or countries.”12 (Fun fact: throughout the pandemic, PRC media continued to refer to two other diseases as “African Swine Fever” and “African Horse Plague.”)13 The third point of emphasis was to decry “overreaction.” By this the PRC government meant that foreign governments should not restrict travel from China into their countries and should not advise their citizens against traveling to China. This began happening in January. The Chinese government saw this as embarrassing and pushed back. Travel bans and advisories, said Chinese officials and media, were an “overreaction,” and “rumors and panic” were worse than the virus.14 In late January the US government decided to remove personnel from the US consulate in Wuhan and to restrict entry into the USA of people who had been in China during the previous fourteen days. MFA spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that Washington had “inappropriately overreacted” and was “violating civil rights.”15 By late February, however, China itself, fearing additional infections from abroad, had imposed restrictions on foreigners traveling to China. The MFA argued that China’s travel restrictions were not objectionable because “these measures are science-based, professional and appropriate.”16

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

215

Finally, the Chinese government played up China’s generosity in providing medical equipment to other countries suffering from the pandemic. PRC media termed these supplies “donations,” but in fact ninety-nine percent of the personal protective equipment that exited China in 2020 was sold, not donated.17

Increased American Ill-Will Toward China Despite these efforts at diplomatic damage control, China suffered considerable criticism from other countries: for allegedly causing the pandemic; for the partial cover-up; for selling shoddy medical equipment18 ; and for ham-fisted attempts to elicit foreign praise.19 The negative commentary from the United States was most consequential because of the quantity of criticism and also because of the global influence of the US government and media. Unfavorable views of China among the US public, which had been rising slowly since 2018, soared in 2020. Americans increasingly saw Chinese power and influence as threatening.20 A Gallup survey showed two-thirds of US respondents had a negative view of China, while Pew found it to be three-quarters of Americans.21 By 2022, Pew found that 82% of Americans had an unfavorable opinion of China.22 Pandemic-fueled animosity toward China significantly affected the 2020 elections in the United States. Bashing China became a touchstone. In a leaked memo, the Republican Party urged its candidates to blame China for the pandemic, accuse their Democratic Party opponents of being soft on China, and promise to “stand up to China.”23 Politicians from both major US political parties debated with each other over who was tougher toward China.24 Many Americans objected to the relative ease with which the Chinese government accessed US media to disseminate its propaganda, when there was no comparable US government access to Chinese audiences. Chinese officials posted abroad took countless opportunities to present their government’s positions by giving televised interviews and submitting editorials to foreign newspapers.25 Chinese diplomats outside of China freely used Twitter and Facebook, which are banned in China, to advance the Chinese pandemic narrative. Beijing-linked computer technicians reportedly opened huge numbers of Twitter and Facebook accounts that posted messages deflecting blame for the pandemic away from China.26 Politically conservative commentators in the USA lamented that

216

D. ROY

US media organs often repeated official Chinese narratives.27 America’s critical free press also supplied Chinese propagandists with an endless fount of useful open-source material. For example, a single China Global Television Network report in May quoted US scholar Noam Chomsky, The Atlantic, Dr. Anthony Fauci, a Canadian newspaper, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, US media network CBS, and a California state legislator to support its thesis that the United States is responsible for the global spread of the virus.28 This contributed to the US sense that the bilateral relationship was fundamentally non-reciprocal in China’s favor.29 US politicians and media commentators were among those who began calling for reduced dependence on China for vital products such as medicine and medical equipment.30 This connected with and intensified pre-existing demands for the USA to more generally economically decouple from China.31 Americans also talked about demanding compensation from China for starting the pandemic. By May, the US state of Missouri and several groups of private US citizens had filed lawsuits against China; Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo) had introduced a bill to strip China of its sovereign immunity; and Trump had said repeatedly he planned to seek compensation from China. The culmination of US animosity came with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calling for the countries of the world to rally to overthrow CCP rule. Pompeo said the US policy of engaging China had failed, called the CCP the “primary challenge” to “our freedoms” and “the rulesbased order,” and implored world leaders to oppose the CCP’s agenda.32 From the PRC government’s standpoint, openly calling the CCP a pariah regime was perhaps the most hostile American act imaginable short of war. Asked to respond, Zhao said, “This US politician has been a lying blabbermouth. It’s a waste of time to comment on his fabrications.”33

China Hits Back Aggressively PRC diplomacy shifted from defense to offense. Three factors contributed to the change in tone. Xi had already encouraged Chinese diplomats to be more aggressive in responding to foreign criticism. Chinese officials were frustrated that their campaign to elicit foreign praise of China, including China’s delivery of medical supplies to other countries, was not drowning out negative media reports about the PRC.34 Finally, the CCP

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

217

has inherited the burden of pre-modern Chinese monarchies. In traditional Chinese political culture, a leader’s authority stemmed from his superior virtue.35 While occasionally punishing individual officials, the Party itself and its sitting paramount leader must demonstrate infallibility, competence, and moral superiority. Criticism challenges the leader’s mandate and authority to rule. The result is the PRC government’s oversensitivity to criticism, even from foreigners. In April 2020 the US pandemic death toll began to soar above China’s official tally of dead. This invited a new argument from Chinese officials and media: that due to their own “incompetence” in dealing with the virus, US politicians were “trying to shift the blame to China.”36 In the more colorful versions of this notion, PRC officials protested that “The US, like a thief crying stop thief, has played such a cheap trick of slander and smear”37 and “Like octopuses emitting toxic ink as soon as they encounter a threat, US politicians are using their poisonous ideas to shield themselves, besmirch China, and muddy the entire world.”38 Mentioning the high pandemic death toll in the USA became a routine part of Chinese reaction to US criticism of China over issues unrelated to the pandemic, such as the persecution of Muslim Chinese in Xinjiang.39 PRC spokespersons and media said the idea of suing China was not only unjustified and legally impossible, but also that foreigners should sue America over AIDS (because it was “first reported in the United States”), the H1N1 outbreak of 2009, and the 2008 financial crisis.40 On February 3, Wall Street Journal published US academic Walter Russell Mead’s article, “China is the Real Sick Man of Asia.”41 The article was mainly about the fragility of China’s financial markets but drew the ire of the Chinese government because of its sensational headline, which many Chinese thought insulting because it invoked an imperialist-era image of China as impoverished and diseased. In response to Mead’s article, MFA Spokesman Geng Shuang said the title “use[s] racially discriminatory language and maliciously slander[s] and attack[s] China.”42 On February 19, the Chinese government expelled three Beijing-based Wall Street Journal reporters; the official explanation was punishment for the Journal’s refusal to apologize for the Mead article.43 MFA spokeswoman Hua scolded, “Walter Russell Mead, you should be ashamed of your words, your arrogance, your prejudice and your ignorance.” Hua’s only substantive criticism of the article was to note that flu and H1N1 had killed more people in the USA than COVID-19 had

218

D. ROY

killed in China. The implication was that the USA is sicker than China, a direct refutation of the phrase to which China took offense. Initially, Chinese commentaries did not criticize Trump by name, as if hoping he would de-escalate the bilateral acrimony. By May, however, they abandoned this restraint.44 One editorial accused Trump of “a blatant indifference to life.”45 Another opined that America’s “plutocracy” presented a sorry contrast with China’s “meritocracy,” adding, “it is difficult to imagine that China will select a leader like Donald Trump, who has no political experience and relies on showmanship.”46 Beijing escalated its rhetoric with a sustained critique of America’s fitness for global leadership.47 Of all Beijing’s attacks, the argument that the world should consider the USA an outlaw actor rather than a leader had the deepest and longest-term ramifications. It could be called the rhetorical nuclear option. In support of this line of attack, commentators relied heavily on outside sources. MFA Spokesman Geng cited a Pew Research Center survey as well as “some US media, experts and scholars” to back his argument that “the country posing the biggest geopolitical threat to the US is precisely the US itself.”48 A People’s Daily house editorial quoted former US President Jimmy Carter, UN officials, and a US scholar while asserting the United States was a “warlike,” mass-murdering country that created a “hell” in Central America and is generally “making troubles in the world under the guise of human rights.”49 Another People’s Daily commentary made reference to the “slaughter” of native Americans “by white people,” the “black people who were enslaved and oppressed by the white people as recorded in the Chicago History Museum, and the Black Lives Matter campaign against violence and racism towards black people” to conclude that “the US, which treats lives with indifference, is not qualified to be called a ‘defender of human rights.’”50 Yet another People’s Daily commentary, again abundantly quoting from Western media and scholarship, argued that US “egoism” and “selfishness” make the United States “unqualified to lead the world.”51 Global Times editorials said “the world’s sole superpower is degenerating” and characterized America’s foreign policy as “pure international hooliganism.”52 This stance set the tone for the frosty meeting between senior US and PRC officials in Anchorage, Alaska in March 2021. During this meeting, among other criticisms, the PRC’s top-ranking foreign affairs official Yang Jiechi told the US side, “the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.”53

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

219

During the same month, the Chinese government published a report criticizing “Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2020,” which covered the “incompetent” US pandemic response, racial injustice, gun violence, income inequality, political dysfunction, and a foreign policy that made the USA “the biggest troublemaker to global security and stability.”54 The PRC published a similar report in February 2022,55 suggesting this will now be an annual exercise paralleling the US State Department’s yearly reports on China’s human rights performance.

The Rise of Wolf Warriorism The pandemic saw not the genesis, but the blossoming of PRC “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. The name refers to two blockbuster Chinese movies in which a Rambo-like maverick super-soldier character defeats enemies led by evil Americans. The poster for Wolf Warrior 2 included the line, “Anyone who offends China, no matter how remote, must be exterminated.”56 Prior to the pandemic, both Xi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had encouraged Chinese officials, including diplomats, to demonstrate a “fighting spirit” in defending China’s interests.57 The pandemic provided abundant opportunities. The government-owned People’s Daily published a story in February 2020 about a Japanese report alleging that Americans introduced the virus into China. The idea continued swirling on Chinese social media. On March 12, MFA spokesman Zhao published tweets that repeated a conspiracy theory that Coronavirus started in the United States in 2019 and that visiting US Army personnel brought the virus to Wuhan and caused the first infections there. Chinese government-owned media reported Zhao’s tweets, which seemed to give the content official endorsement.58 Zhao’s assertions quickly gained wide notoriety. His two fellow MFA spokespeople, however, refused to back him up, giving evasive answers when asked if Zhao’s Tweets represented Beijing’s official position. China’s ambassador to the USA, Cui Tiankai, told a US journalist he considered “crazy” the theory that the virus came from a US military laboratory.59 Although apparently tolerated if not fully embraced by his superiors, Zhao’s Wolf Warriorism appears to have backfired. Previously Trump had said “Great discipline is taking place in China, as President Xi strongly leads what will be a very successful operation,” and “[Xi] is strong,

220

D. ROY

sharp and powerfully focused on leading the counterattack on the Coronavirus,”60 which aligned perfectly with Beijing’s propaganda. A few days after Zhao’s tweets, however, Trump began calling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus,”61 infuriating Beijing (and also many in the USA, who feared Trump was enabling hate crimes against Asian-Americans). Trump explained that he began using the term “Chinese virus” in response to the PRC blaming its outbreak on US soldiers. In one case Trump attributed the accusation to “China,” and in another case to Chinese state media.62 Trump was likely referring to the Zhao episode.

The Wuhan Laboratory Theory In January 2020, the conservative US newspaper Washington Times had conjectured that COVID-19 came from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a Chinese government laboratory allegedly engaged in biological warfare research.63 A few US politicians subsequently repeated the theory, but the scientific and intelligence communities largely dismissed it. The Chinese government addressed the claim on February 20, saying it was a “conspiracy theory” and citing a statement by twenty-seven experts published in the prestigious British medical journal Lancet saying the virus originated in wildlife.64 Chinese media went on to reprint Western media reports casting doubt on the Wuhan Institute of Virology theory, present a thorough refutation of the accusation, and introduce the world to the institute’s director, who denied the lab could be responsible for the virus. On May 3, however, Pompeo said there was “enormous evidence” the virus started in the Wuhan lab. He added that “China has a history of infecting the world, and they have a history of running substandard laboratories.”65 Beijing responded in kind: it drew attention to American biowarfare, accused the United States of dangerously mismanaging its bioweapons program, and demanded more transparency. The MFA told foreign journalists that the United States military “used germ weapons during the Korean War and Agent Orange during the Vietnam War,” accused the United States of impeding an international agreement to limit biological weapons, and cited a report in the US publication USA Today that “hundreds of lab incidents have occurred in the US biological laboratories where humans had accidental contact with deadly pathogens.” Chinese officials and media focused in particular on what they called worrisome activity at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

221

in Fort Detrick, Maryland. “I wonder,” asked Hua, “if the US can be as open and transparent as China to open its biological base at Fort Detrick … for international investigation?”66 PRC media chimed in with reinforcing stories, such as reports of Americans demanding more information about Fort Detrick. A People’s Daily editorial asked, “Why was the main biological warfare laboratory at Fort Detrick, which the US media called ‘the center of the US government’s darkest experiments,’ suddenly shut down? What kind of shady tricks took place there?”67 The Chinese press pounced on the claim by the mayor of a New Jersey city that he was sick with the virus in November 2019, well before China reported its first case. China Global Television Network even interviewed the mayor.68 Demanding an international investigation into the activities inside Fort Detrick, which echoed demands from the USA about the Wuhan Institute of Virology, became a standard feature of Chinese commentary on Sino-US relations. Said one editorial in a CCP-owned publication, “The US should respond to the international community’s call for lab transparency” because “it is reasonable to be highly suspicious that the security at the US’ vast biological laboratories is substandard, and that there are a lot of ‘dirty tricks’ going on inside.”69 The accusation of “substandard” laboratories repeated the wording of one of Pompeo’s previous statements about the Wuhan lab. In March 2021, a World Health Organization (WHO) report on the origins of the virus drew criticism as incomplete. WHO planned to undertake a deeper investigation, but the PRC government announced in July it would not participate. Seemingly as a defense mechanism, Chinese government-owned media released a new round of assertions that the pandemic started in the Fort Detrick lab.70 During the Russian invasion of Ukraine beginning in February 2022, the continuing PRC effort to deflect blame for the pandemic from China overlapped with a Russian government propaganda campaign that alleged Ukraine had been developing biological weapons in US-funded labs and was preparing to use these weapons against invading Russian forces. The Chinese government took advantage of the opportunity to reprise the accusation that the USA started the pandemic by creating COVID-19 in a US military-run biological warfare laboratory.71

222

D. ROY

Taiwan and the Pandemic The US government was already increasing its support for the Taipei government prior to the pandemic. In 2016, a newly elected Trump accepted a congratulatory telephone call from Republic of China (ROC) President Tsai Ing-wen. The leaders of the ROC and the USA had not spoken to each other since the severance of normal diplomatic relations in 1979. In 2018 Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which endorsed bilateral contact between high-level officials. At the end of 2019 the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, which committed the USA to advocate for greater Taiwan participation in international organizations, was close to passage. The number of US Navy vessels that sailed through the Taiwan Strait dramatically increased in 2019 to nearly one per month. The year 2019 also saw the Trump Administration approve the sale of new F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan, something the previous Barack Obama and George W. Bush Administrations decided against. This trend of enhanced US support for Taiwan continued through the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021, proceeded seamlessly as the Trump Administration gave way to the Biden Administration. Members of Congress introduced more legislation to promote international recognition of Taiwan. These bills reached such a level of granularity as to include a proposed law prohibiting the US State Department from purchasing maps that depict Taiwan as part of China.72 Senior US government officials visited Taiwan. The US government acknowledged that US Marines and Special Forces soldiers had recently been in Taiwan,73 an extraordinarily sensitive issue to Beijing. US armed forces joined those of the United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, and New Zealand to hold unusual joint exercises east of Taiwan in October 2021. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner told a Senate committee that a Taiwan outside of PRC control is “a critical node within the first island chain … anchoring a network of US allies and partners,” and is “critical to the defense of vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific.”74 This suggested that the US government opposed Taiwan-China unification for strategic reasons, a departure from the stated US policy of openness to unification if it was “peaceful” and had the assent of Taiwan’s people.75 The US government reportedly considered changing the name of Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington, DC, from “Taipei Economic

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

223

and Cultural Representative Office” to “Taiwan Representative Office,”76 which China would have interpreted as a tacit recognition of Taiwan statehood. On three occasions in 2021 and 2022, Biden said publicly that the USA would militarily intervene if China attacked Taiwan.77 Observers immediately wondered if these statements meant Washington was abandoning “strategic ambiguity” (not publicly committing to defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack). In each case either Biden or other officials quickly said US policy had not changed, but Beijing was left rattled and angry.78 Noting the trend, Chinese media said in 2021, “the United States is intensifying its efforts to play the ‘Taiwan card’” to “allow Taiwan to act as a ‘pawn’ to contain China” and to “divert attention from issues such as political antagonism and racial division in the United States.”79 The pandemic may have had no effect on the pre-existing trend in USTaiwan relations, but alternatively it may have helped grease the wheels for a marginal acceleration of that trend. The additional worsening of Sino-US relations caused by the pandemic reinforced a US view of China as an adversary. This reduced the perceived importance of keeping Taiwan at arm’s length to avoid offending China. If relations with China were already poor, the gain of treating Taiwan with due respect and dignity outweighed the cost of making Beijing angrier. Furthermore, visualizing China as a potential military opponent made Taiwan seem more valuable as a close security partner. The pandemic allowed Taiwan to further positively distinguish itself from the PRC. Both countries arguably handled the pandemic relatively well, but Taiwan kept its numbers of infected and dead relatively low through more humane methods than China’s often callous lockdowns, in keeping with Taiwan’s liberal democratic political culture. Taiwan earned international praise for its COVID-19 response,80 and President Tsai gained international acclaim. This undercut Beijing’s goal of suppressing Taiwan’s positive global profile. Taiwan also attracted sympathy as the victim of a PRC isolation campaign that seemed especially unreasonable in the midst of a global fight against a disease that cared nothing for political boundaries. This criticism centered on the WHO. Taiwan is blocked from attending most WHO technical meetings and, at China’s insistence, has been excluded even from observer status in the World Health Assembly (the WHO’s decision-making body) since the election of Tsai as ROC president in 2016. Tsai represents the Democratic Progressive Party, which does not

224

D. ROY

consider Taiwan to be part of China. In 2020, only 13 the WHO’s 194 member delegations backed accepting Taiwan as a member. It became clear during the pandemic that the WHO was coordinating its policies and messaging with the Chinese government.81 This included the WHO counting Taiwan as part of China for informational purposes and relying on Beijing for data related to Taiwan. WHO officials intentionally and sometimes awkwardly refused to discuss Taiwan’s relevance to the counter-pandemic effort. The WHO’s official Facebook page allegedly blocked visitors from posting comments that mentioned Taiwan.82 In April 2020, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus refused to answer a journalist’s question about the value of an early report on the virus from Taiwan, leaving it to one of his staff to argue that the early reports that mattered came from China.83 During a web-based interview in March 2020, WHO Assistant Director-General Bruce Aylward responded to an interviewer’s questions about Taiwan by claiming he did not hear the question, asking for another question, hanging up, and finally abruptly ending the interview.84 Adding to the drama, Tedros, who is Ethiopian, claimed in May 2020 that he was the victim of “personal attacks … racist comments” that “came from Taiwan.” Taipei quickly shot back that the allegation was false and stemmed from PRC disinformation.85 With the pandemic, there was renewed international condemnation of the exclusion of Taiwan from international health regimes because of Beijing’s insistence that foreign governments and international organizations not treat Taiwan as an independent state.86 In 2021, the Group of Seven countries jointly supported Taiwan’s membership. American demands that Taiwan be included in the WHO increased.87 A Republican senator introduced in Congress a bill that would prohibit the US government from funding the WHO unless its 2020 leadership was replaced and Taiwan was admitted as a member.

The Pandemic’s Impact on Chinese Domestic Politics The pandemic likely reinforced the trend of expanding authoritarianism in CCP governance under Xi. As discontent inside China with the regime’s early handling of the outbreak had led some experts to speculate that the pandemic could topple Xi’s regime,88 the fear of Chinese officials that the Party’s legitimacy at home was damaged likely contributed to

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

225

the later overreaction of PRC government commentators to foreign pandemic-related criticism.89 The pandemic provided additional impetus for the Party to move more quickly to wall itself off from foreign ideas and influence that might threaten continued CCP rule, something Xi’s government was already doing.90 Along with drastic efforts to control the spread of COVID-19, the Party protected the top leadership from public criticism. It scapegoated lower-level officials such as the Party chief of Wuhan, while governmentcontrolled media portrayed Xi as heroically leading a vigorous and competent national effort to contain the virus.91 The general narrative was that the state is competent, efficient, and knows what is best for the people. The Party was largely successful in selling this message. In a poll of citizens’ approval of their own government’s pandemic response through April 2020, China scored the highest of twenty-three countries surveyed. The United States and Western European countries ranked in the middle, and Japan ranked lowest.92 A survey of Chinese public opinion showed that trust in the PRC central government was higher months into the pandemic than it had been before the pandemic.93 China’s “zero-COVID” approach, however, carried political risks. By early 2022, with much of the rest of the world seeing Omicron Variant cases dropping rapidly and a return to normalcy within sight, China remained vulnerable to another large wave of infections because two years of lockdowns had left the Chinese population with almost no antibody defense against Omicron and because the Chinese-produced vaccines afforded little protection. China was in danger of ultimately being remembered for a failed counter-pandemic policy. A Eurasia Group report in January 2022 anticipated that “China’s policy will fail to contain infections, leading to larger outbreaks, requiring in turn more severe lockdowns. This will in turn lead to greater economic disruptions, more state intervention, and a more dissatisfied population at odds with the triumphalist ‘China defeated Covid’ mantra of the state-run media.”94 Chinese cities, most notably Shanghai, saw the authorities react overzealously to small numbers of cases, sometimes erecting barriers imprisoning residents inside their homes without adequate food supplies. Analysts feared China’s zero-COVID policy could cause a global recession.95 Of even greater direct concern to the CCP government, the lockdowns threatened to tarnish Xi’s prestige prior to the 20th Party

226

D. ROY

Congress, at which he hoped to secure a third term as General Secretary.96 As the pandemic increased pressure on the US side for decisive movement toward at least partial economic decoupling from China,97 it also accelerated China’s own gradual economic decoupling from the West.98 Xi Jinping announced his “dual circulation strategy” in May 2020, as US-China relations were cratering amid pandemic acrimony. PRC officials describe dual circulation as a push for China to reduce its dependence on key foreign supplies that might be threatened by bilateral tensions with the United States. It largely parallels the US rationale for decoupling.

Unvarnished Rivalry The pandemic had ramifications for the contest between China and the United States for regional and global influence. As we have seen, the pandemic intensified Beijing’s diplomatic campaign to de-legitimize US-style liberal democracy and US worthiness of global leadership and admiration. Correspondingly, the Chinese government stepped up its efforts to portray China as the exemplar of a superior form of international citizenship.99 Nevertheless, neither China nor the United States achieved a clear victory relative to the other. The provision of medical supplies and assistance helped China improve its image in several nearby countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Indonesia, and a few farther afield such as Chile, Serbia, Hungary, Zimbabwe, Comoros, and the Congo. Some of these gains quickly paid off. Hungary, for example, nixed a draft European Union statement critical of China in April 2021 shortly after purchasing a large amount of Chinese vaccines.100 At the same time, however, China lost prestige101 in many important countries due to its role in the initial outbreak, its Wolf Warrior diplomacy, and its attempts to use coercive diplomacy to save face for the CCP.102 On balance, the pandemic was a setback to the PRC’s aspirations to achieve world prominence because the increased suspicion and disapproval of China likely outstripped the gains Beijing made through its low death toll and supply of medical goods to other countries. The pandemic had consequences for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), another point of tension with the United States. The BRI was a rubric for hundreds of Chinese-built transportation and energy production infrastructure projects in Eurasia, South Asia, the Middle East, and

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

227

Africa. By 2021 these projects encompassed 140 countries, with China providing loans and much of the labor. The BRI’s original objectives were to provide work for China’s excess manufacturing capability, to spur prosperity in China’s less wealthy interior, and to solidify China’s position as the world’s main economic hub. Beijing pitched it as a massive campaign of economic assistance, particularly to the developing world. Washington worried it would make BRI partner countries economic satellites of China; create deep indebtedness that would increase PRC influence over their governments; position China to set global technical standards; set back efforts to protect the environment, ensure fair treatment of workers, and combat corruption; and enhance China’s strategic reach by establishing infrastructure usable by Chinese military forces.103 The BRI was already encountering headwinds before 2020, but the pandemic accelerated its decline. The closure of borders made some projects difficult or impossible to complete. China’s tarnished prestige in some countries, especially in Europe, soured them on participating in the BRI. Both China and BRI partners prioritized basic services and general economic damage control over infrastructure upgrades. China’s BRI investment dropped by over 50% from 2019 to 2020.104 The pandemic also provided Washington an opportunity to counter a spinoff of the BRI called the “Health Silk Road.” The PRC government began using the term in 2015, with Xi personally endorsing it in 2016. The Health Silk Road was a hodgepodge of commitments to provide medical equipment and to fund disease prevention programs for BRI partner countries. The pandemic gave the Health Silk Road focus and increased prominence. It served as the marketing vehicle for China’s delivery of masks, biohazard suits, and anti-COVID vaccines to other countries. The revitalized Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the USA, India, Japan, and Australia) announced in its March 2021 meeting a goal to donate 1.2 billion vaccine doses to countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Through the end of 2022, China supplied a larger total number of COVID-19 vaccine doses to other countries (1.65 billion), but the USA supplied more donated doses (about 700 million to about 330 million).105 And because the US vaccines proved superior, some countries that originally bought Chinese vaccines changed their suppliers when US vaccines became available. The pandemic was an opportunity for the United States to gain in global prestige relative to China. The United States, however, largely squandered this opportunity by handling the pandemic extraordinarily

228

D. ROY

badly, quickly establishing itself at the world’s worst-hit country in terms of the absolute numbers of COVID-19 infections and deaths. The USA regained some of this ground during the second year of the pandemic by quickly producing highly efficacious vaccines. Overall, the world saw the pandemic highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both China and the USA. China’s strong state moved quickly to impose draconian but successful containment measures upon Chinese society. Yet much of China’s effort both internally and externally was oriented toward saving face for the CCP. Like the people in several other countries with strong societies and liberal democratic political systems, Americans were divided over whether communitarianism should be prioritized above individual rights, a situation made much worse by Republican Party opinion leaders politicizing counter-pandemic measures as government overreach.106 The superiority of US over Chinese vaccines, however, reaffirmed America’s technological strength and capacity for innovation. The pandemic pushed a troubled US-China relationship to perhaps its lowest point since the normalization of relations in 1979.107 PRCUS relations have typically followed a repeating cycle: downturns cause elites in both countries to fear losing the substantial benefits of bilateral cooperation, leading to eventually successful efforts by both governments to reconcile. The recovery dynamic is weakened if elites see decreased value in maintaining cooperation or see political advantage in displaying a willingness to play hardball. The pandemic contributed to movement away from the assumption, widely held on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, that deep integration and cooperation between China and the United States was inescapable. The strength and even the likelihood of a recovery in bilateral relations seemed less certain than during any period since the end of the Cold War.

Notes 1. Yuan Peng, “Zhongmei Guanxi Xiang Hechu Qu?” Waijiao Pinglun, no. 2 (2010): 2–7; John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest, October 25, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/ commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204. 2. Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 3. Myah Ward, “15 times Trump Praised China as Coronavirus Was Spreading Across the Globe,” Politico, April 15, 2020, https://www. politico.com/news/2020/04/15/trump-china-coronavirus-188736.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

229

4. James Palmer, “Chinese Officials Can’t Help Lying About the Wuhan Virus,” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2020/02/03/wuhan-coronavirus-coverup-lies-chinese-officials-xi-jin ping/; Julia Belluz, “China Hid the Severity of Its Coronavirus Outbreak and Muzzled Whistleblowers—Because It Can,” Vox, February 10, 2020, https://www.vox.com/2020/2/10/21124881/coronavirus-out break-china-li-wenliang-world-health-organization; Jonathon Gatehouse, “Why Some Experts Are Questioning China’s Coronavirus Claims,” CBC News, February 24, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/ china-coronavirus-cover-up-claims-1.5471946; Javier C. Hernández, “China Detains Activist Who Accused Xi of Coronavirus Cover-Up,” New York Times, February 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 02/17/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xu-zhiyong.html; Shawn Yuan, “Inside the Early Days of China’s Coronavirus Coverup,” Wired, May 1, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-the-early-days-of-chinascoronavirus-coverup/?src=longreads&mc_cid=d17f9b7649&mc_eid= 9528811089; “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO,” Associated Press, June 2, 2020, https://apnews.com/3c0617 94970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae; Michael D. Swaine concluded “the system failed,” causing a one-month delay in an effective Chinese government response, but found “no proof that the more extreme charge of a deliberate cover-up.” Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Decision Making—Managing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Part One: The Domestic Component,” China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, June 1, 2020. 5. For example, in the Czech Republic. Lukáš Valášek, “Confiscated Face Masks Imported by an Influential Chinese Representative in Czechia,” Aktuálnˇe.cz, March 26, 2020, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/con fiscated-face-masks-imported-by-an-influential-representa/r~560650326 f6611ea842f0cc47ab5f122/. 6. Liz Alderman, “As Coronavirus Spreads, Face Mask Makers Go into Overdrive,” February 6, 2020, New York Times, https://www.nyt imes.com/2020/02/06/business/coronavirus-face-masks.html?action= click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article; Karen M. Sutter, et al., “COVID-19: China Medical Supply Chains and Broader Trade Issues,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, https:/ /crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46304. 7. Chun Han Wong, “China Jails Citizen Journalist for Her Accounts of Covid-19 in Wuhan,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2020, https:/ /www.wsj.com/articles/china-jails-citizen-journalist-for-her-accountsof-covid-19-in-wuhan-11609158353?mod=article_inline.

230

D. ROY

8. Paul D. Miller, “Yes, Blame China for the Virus,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/25/blame-china-andxi-jinping-for-coronavirus-pandemic/. 9. Jamil Anderlini, “Xi Jinping Faces China’s Chernobyl Moment,” Financial Times, February 10, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/6f7fdbae4b3b-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5. 10. Foreign Ministry spokesperson press conference, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, January 23, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1735680. shtml. Hereafter “MFA.” 11. MFA, February 10, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1743009.shtml. 12. MFA, March 4, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/fyrth/ t1752172.htm. 13. “China Reports Fewer Outbreaks of African Swine Fever This Year: Official,” Xinhua, March 5, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/2020-03/05/c_138846494.htm; Lu Yang, “Debate Swirls Online in China: African Horse Plague—Yes? Wuhan Pneumonia—No,” Voice of America News, April 30, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/a/ covid-19-pandemic_debate-swirls-online-china-african-horse-plague-yeswuhan-pneumonia-no/6188504.html. 14. MFA, February 14, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv//eng/zyw jyjh/t1744621.htm. 15. MFA, February 3, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_6 65399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202002/t20200203_693069. html. 16. MFA, February 27, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgmb/eng/ fyrth/t1750155.htm. 17. Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Hannah Price, “China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-adv ance-its-interests-mixed-results. 18. David D. Kirkpatrick and Jane Bradley, “U.K. Paid $20 Million for New Coronavirus Tests. They Didn’t Work,” New York Times, April 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/world/europe/cor onavirus-antibody-test-uk.html. 19. Melanie Conklin, “Chinese Government Asks Wisconsin Senate for a Commendation,” Wisconsin Examiner, April 10, 2020, https://wiscon sinexaminer.com/2020/04/10/chinese-government-asks-wisconsin-sen ate-for-a-commendation/. 20. Kat Devlin, Laura Silver, and Christine Huang, “U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak,” Pew Research

7

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

231

Center, April 21, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/ 04/21/u-s-views-of-china-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-out break/. “Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19,” Pew Research Center, July 30, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/glo bal/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-cov id-19/; Gallup, “China,” https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china. aspx. Laura Silver, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy, “Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights,” Pew Research Center, June 29, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/glo bal/2022/06/29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-itspolicies-on-human-rights/. Alex Isenstadt, “GOP Memo Urges Anti-China Assault over Coronavirus,” Politico, April 24, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/ 2020/04/24/gop-memo-anti-china-coronavirus-207244. Asma Khalid, “Biden and Trump Battle over Who Is ‘Weak on China,’” National Public Radio, April 22, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/04/ 22/840558299/biden-and-trump-battle-over-who-is-weak-on-china. Examples: “Transcript: NPR’s Interview with Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai About the Coronavirus,” National Public Radio, February 14, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/02/14/805997445/transcriptnprs-interview-with-chinese-ambassador-cui-tiankai-about-the-coronavi; “Chinese Ambassador in France Has No Right to Give Lessons in Coronavirus Coverage,” Reporters Sans Frontiers, March 20, 2020, https:/ /rsf.org/en/news/chinese-ambassador-france-has-no-right-give-lessonscoronavirus-coverage; “Chinese Embassy Spokesman Wang Xining Speaks to Media About Coronavirus,” 7News Australia, February 4, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2xErOTG7sjI; “China’s Ambassador to Canada Claims ‘China Is a Victim’ of Coronavirus Disinformation Campaign,” Global News, May 15, 2020, https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=xrR8ZXbgJ4Q. “China’s Disinformation Campaign Targets Coronavirus and Businessman,” Bloomberg, May 13, 2020, https://www.straitstimes.com/ world/europe/chinas-disinformation-campaign-targets-coronavirus-andbusinessman; Kate Conger, “Twitter Removes Chinese Disinformation Campaign,” New York Times, June 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes. com/2020/06/11/technology/twitter-chinese-misinformation.html. Rich Noyes, “Study: China Escapes Scrutiny in TV’s Coronavirus Coverage,” Media Research Center NewsBusters, March 23, 2020, https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/nb/rich-noyes/2020/ 03/23/study-china-escapes-scrutiny-tvs-coronavirus-coverage; Helle C. Dale, “Western Media Falls into China’s Propaganda Trap,” Heritage

232

D. ROY

28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

Foundation, April 1, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commen tary/western-media-falls-chinas-propaganda-trap. “U.S. Politicians Responsible for Spread of COVID-19 Beyond Borders,” China Global Television Network, May 13, 2020, https:// news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-13/U-S-politicians-responsible-for-spr ead-of-COVID-19-beyond-borders-QsZvCT4kO4/index.html. Owen Churchill, “US Lawmakers Urged to Put ‘Reciprocity’ at Heart of China Relationship,” South China Morning Post, December 1, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/311 2055/us-lawmakers-urged-put-reciprocity-heart-china-relationship. Ana Swanson, “Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on Drugs,” New York Times, March 11, 2020, https://www.nyt imes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trumpdrugs.html. Kenneth Rapoza, “Overwhelming Majority Say Time to ‘Decouple’ from China,” Forbes, April 27, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ kenrapoza/2020/04/27/overwhelming-majority-say-time-to-decouplefrom-china/?sh=6ee9a6dd77a2. Pompeo speech in Yorba Linda, CA, July 23, 2020, https://www.ame ricanrhetoric.com/speeches/mikepompeochinanixonlibrary.htm. MFA, May 18, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_6 65399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202005/t20200518_693213. html. Jia Qingguo, “China’s Diplomatic Response to COVID-19,” East Asia Forum, May 17, 2020, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/17/ chinas-diplomatic-response-to-covid-19/. “Testimony of Dr. Christopher A. Ford,” US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, March 10, 2011, https:// www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Ford.pdf. MFA, March 23, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1759985.shtml; “Fifth Question to American Politicians: Aren’t You Afraid That Passing the Buck to China Will Backfire?” People’s Daily online, May 12, 2020, http:// en.people.cn/n3/2020/0512/c90000-9689455.html; MFA, April 20, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665 401/2511_665403/t1771576.shtml; Xie Wenting, “UK, France Scapegoat China for Epidemic Losses, but Cooperation Still Mainstream: Expert,” Global Times, April 17, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con tent/1185926.shtml. MFA, March 23, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_6 65399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202003/t20200323_693145. html.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

233

38. “US Trick of Shifting Blame to China Sure to Backfire,” China Daily, May 12, 2020, http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/12/ WS5eba66f5a310a8b241155283.html. 39. MFA, March 22, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202203/t20220322_106 54171.html. 40. “U.S. Politicians’ Lawsuit Farce Against China a Shame of Civilization: People’s Daily Commentary,” Xinhua, May 2, 2020, http://www.xinhua net.com/english/2020-05/02/c_139026504.htm. 41. Walter Russell Mead, “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-thereal-sick-man-of-asia-11580773677. 42. Teddy Ng and Wendy Wu, “China Expels Three Wall Street Journal Reporters over ‘Racist’ Commentary as Media Becomes Latest Battleground in Rivalry with US,” South China Morning Post, February 19, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/305 1386/china-bars-three-wall-street-journal-reporters-over-sick-man?mod ule=inline&pgtype=article. 43. The actual motivation might have been more complicated. The three expelled reporters had no involvement with Mead’s article, but all had reported on the Chinese government’s persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The day before the expulsions, the US government had designated five PRC media organizations operating in the USA as “foreign missions.” 44. “Second Question to American Politicians: Is This What You Call ‘Human Rights’?” People’s Daily online, May 8, 2020, http://en.peo ple.cn/n3/2020/0508/c90000-9688155.html; Yuan Jiang, “COVID19 Governance: An Issue Between Plutocracy and Meritocracy?” China Daily, May 13, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/13/ WS5ebb6d1aa310a8b24115561c.html. 45. “Second Question to American Politicians: Is This What You Call ‘Human Rights’?” People’s Daily, May 8, 2020, http://en.people.cn/ n3/2020/0508/c90000-9688155.html. 46. Yuan Jiang, “COVID-19 Governance: An Issue Between Plutocracy and Meritocracy?” China Daily, May 13, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/202005/13/WS5ebb6d1aa310a8b24115561c.html. 47. MFA, March 17, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_6 65399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1757063.shtml; Zhong Sheng, “U.S. Is the Creator of Human Right Disasters,” People’s Daily Online, March 23, 2020, http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0323/c90000-967 1210.html; “World Left in Shock over US Sabotage of Global Cooperation Against COVID-19,” People’s Daily online, May 12, 2020, http:/ /en.people.cn/n3/2020/0512/c90000-9689593.html; “US Loses to

234

D. ROY

48. 49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

Virus Because of Politics,” Global Times, May 13, 2020, https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1188276.shtml; “World Health Assembly Slaps US Hooliganism,” Global Times, May 19, 2020, https://www.global times.cn/content/1188805.shtml. MFA, March 17, 2020, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cecy//eng/fyrth/ t1757063.htm. Zhong Sheng, “U.S. Is the Creator of Human Right Disasters,” People’s Daily, March 23, 2020, http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0323/c900009671210.html. “Second Question to American Politicians: Is This What You Call ‘Human Rights’?” People’s Daily online, May 8, 2020, http://en.peo ple.cn/n3/2020/0508/c90000-9688155.html. “World Left in Shock over US Sabotage of Global Cooperation Against COVID-19,” People’s Daily, May 12, 2020, http://en.people.cn/n3/ 2020/0512/c90000-9689593.html. John Hayward, “China: Federalism, Lack of ‘National Tracking’ Mean U.S. Cannot Defeat Coronavirus,” Breitbart, May 14, 2020, https:/ /www.breitbart.com/national-security/2020/05/14/china-federalismlack-of-national-tracking-mean-u-s-cannot-defeat-coronavirus/; Ram Madhav, “The Heat in Beijing,” Open, May 22, 2020, https://openth emagazine.com/columns/the-heat-in-beijing/. “How It Happened: Transcript of the US-China Opening Remarks in Alaska,” Nikkei Asia, March 19, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Pol itics/International-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happened-Tra nscript-of-the-US-China-opening-remarks-in-Alaska. “China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights Violations,” March 25, 2021, Xinhuanet, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/24/c_ 139832298_2.htm. Xinhua, “China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights Violations,” February 28, 2022, https://english.news.cn/20220228/b7efbe957102 49f2ad049fb0b613e3a8/c.html. Anthony Kuhn, “Chinese Blockbuster ‘Wolf Warrior II’ Mixes Jingoism With Hollywood Heroism,” National Public Radio, August 10, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/08/10/542663769/chinese-blockb uster-wolf-warrior-ii-mixes-jingoism-with-hollywood-heroism. Xu Wei, “Xi Calls for Fighting Spirit in Face of Risks,” China Daily, September 4, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/04/ WS5d6ed007a310cf3e35569835.html; John Ruwitch, “China Demands ‘Fighting Spirit’ from Diplomats as Trade War, Hong Kong Protests Simmer,” Reuters, December 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/art icle/us-china-diplomacy/china-demands-fighting-spirit-from-diplomatsas-trade-war-hong-kong-protests-simmer-idUSKBN1Y80R8.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

235

58. “US Army Might Have Brought Epidemic to China, Says Chinese FM Spokesman in Tweet,” People’s Daily, March 13, 2020, http://en.peo ple.cn/n3/2020/0313/c90000-9668143.html. 59. Jonathan Swan and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Top Chinese Official Disowns U.S. Military Lab Coronavirus Conspiracy,” Axios, March 22, 2020, https://www.axios.com/china-coronavirus-ambassador-cui-tia nkai-1b0404e8-026d-4b7d-8290-98076f95df14.html. 60. Reuters, “Trump Says ‘Great Discipline’ in China to Tackle Coronavirus outbreak,” February 7, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-health-trump/trump-says-great-discipline-in-china-to-tackle-cor onavirus-outbreak-idUKKBN2011A5. 61. Dylan Scott, “Trump’s New Fixation on Using a Racist Name for the Coronavirus Is Dangerous,” Vox, March 18, 2020, https://www.vox. com/2020/3/18/21185478/coronavirus-usa-trump-chinese-virus. 62. Bhavan Jaipragas, “Defying Beijing, Donald Trump Doubles Down on Use of ‘Chinese Virus’ Label for Covid-19,” South China Morning Post, March 19, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplom acy/article/3075854/defying-beijing-donald-trump-doubles-down-usechinese-virus; Maegan Vazquez, “Trump Says He’s Pulling Back from Calling Novel Coronavirus the ‘China Virus,’” CNN, March 24, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/24/politics/donald-trump-pull-backcoronavirus-chinese-virus/index.html. 63. Bill Gertz, “Coronavirus Link to China Biowarfare Program Possible, Analyst Says,” Washington Times, January 26, 2020, https://www.was hingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/26/coronavirus-link-to-china-bio warfare-program-possi/. 64. Charles Calisher et al., “Statement in Support of the Scientists, Public Health Professionals, and Medical Professionals of China Combatting COVID-19,” The Lancet 395, no. 10226 (March 7, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(20)30418-9/fulltext. 65. Ken Bredemeier, “Pompeo: ‘Enormous Evidence’ Coronavirus Originated in Chinese Lab,” Voice of America News, May 3, 2020, https:// www.voanews.com/a/covid-19-pandemic_pompeo-enormous-evidencecoronavirus-originated-chinese-lab/6188639.html. 66. MFA, May 8, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgmb/eng/fyrth/ t1777215.htm. 67. “Fifth Question to American Politicians: Aren’t You Afraid That Passing the Buck to China Will Backfire?” People’s Daily, May 12, 2020, http:/ /en.people.cn/n3/2020/0512/c90000-9689455.html. 68. Marlene Lenthang, “China Uses New Jersey Mayor’s Claim He Had COVID-19 in November to Suggest the Virus Originated in the US, as War of Words Between the Superpowers Continues,” Daily Mail, May 7,

236

D. ROY

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

2020. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8299359/China-usesNew-Jersey-Mayors-claim-COVID-19-November-blame-virus.html. “US Should Make Bio-labs More Transparent,” Global Times editorial reprinted by China Daily, May 16, 2020, https://www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/202005/16/WS5ebff150a310a8b24115631a.html. Nectar Gan and Steve George, “China Doubles Down on Baseless ‘US Origins’ Covid Conspiracy as Delta Outbreak Worsens,” CNN, August 6, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/china/ china-covid-origin-mic-intl-hnk/index.html. MFA, March 14, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202203/t20220314_106 51590.html; “Russia Says Pentagon Directly Involved in Bioweapon Development in Ukraine,” Xinhua, March 25, 2022, http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/20220325/9d3fefef98e9437e8207b9263b1 d9c46/c.html; Chinese scholars such as Jin Canrong also made this connection. Douyin video, March 22, 2022, https://www.douyin.com/ video/7078185574753914126. Keoni Everington, “US House Passes Bill Barring Maps Depicting Taiwan as Part of China,” Taiwan News, March 10, 2022, https:// www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4468061. Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Troops Have Been Deployed in Taiwan for at Least a Year,” Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2021, https://www. wsj.com/articles/u-s-troops-have-been-deployed-in-taiwan-for-at-leasta-year-11633614043. “Statement By Dr. Ely Ratner Assistant Secretary of Defense for IndoPacific Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense Before the 117th Congress Committee on Foreign Relations,” Washington, DC, December 8, 2021, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf. Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, “U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 11, 2014, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41952.pdf. Demetri Sevastopulo and Katherine Hille, “Washington Risks Beijing Ire over Proposal to Rename Taiwan’s US Office,” Financial Times, September 10, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/07810ece-b35b47e7-a6d2-c876b7b40444. Phelim Kine, “Biden’s Taiwan Defense Pledge Inflames U.S.-China Relations,” Politico, May 23, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/ 2022/05/23/bidens-taiwan-defense-pledge-inflames-u-s-china-relati ons-00034588. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: China Expresses Strong Dissatisfaction and Firm Opposition to the Remarks by the US Side,” web site for the Chinese Embassy in the USA, May

7

79.

80.

81.

82.

83. 84. 85.

86.

87.

88.

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

237

23, 2022, http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202205/ t20220523_10691539.htm, accessed June 30, 2022. “Shùpíng: Mˇeif¯ang biànbˇenji¯alì dˇa “táiw¯an pái” de shìshí yù zh¯enxiàng,” Xinhua, November 11, 2021, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/tw/ 2021/11-11/9607095.shtml. Wayne Soon, “Why Taiwan Is Beating COVID-19—Again,” The Diplomat, July 29, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/why-tai wan-is-beating-covid-19-again/; Ryan Hass, “The COVID-19 Crisis Has Revealed Taiwan’s Resilience,” Brookings Institution, June 15, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/ 15/the-covid-19-crisis-has-revealed-taiwans-resilience/. Michael Collins, “The WHO and China: Dereliction of Duty,” February 27, 2020, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/ who-and-china-dereliction-duty. Chao Deng, “Taiwan Stopped Covid-19’s Spread, but Can’t Talk About It at WHO Meeting,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-stopped-covid-19s-spreadbut-cant-talk-about-it-at-who-meeting-11605182401. Formosa TV news report, April 16, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=h43S34daX-U. Formosa TV news report, March 29, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=UlCYFh8U2xM. Samuel Lovett, “Coronavirus: Taiwan Rejects ‘Baseless’ Allegation It Subject WHO Chief to Campaign of Abuse and Racism,” The Independent, April 9, 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/asia/taiwan-who-coronavirus-tedros-adhanom-ghebreyesus-rac ism-abuse-a9456926.html. Mark Harrison, “Taiwan’s Exclusion from World Health Assembly Threatens Global Pandemic Response,” ASPI Strategist, November 12, 2020, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, https://www.aspistrategist. org.au/taiwans-exclusion-from-world-health-assembly-threatens-globalpandemic-response. Colum Lynch, “China Launches Counterattack Against U.S. Effort to Restore Taiwan’s Status at WHO,” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/15/china-taiwan-united-sta tes-world-health-organization-observer/; Keoni Everington, “EU Backs Taiwan’s Inclusion in WHO,” Taiwan News, January 31, 2020, https:/ /www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3867764. Minxin Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of Xi Jinping,” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-0403/chinas-coming-upheaval; Doug Bandow, “Why Chinese Communism Could Be the Final Casualty of the Coronavirus,” Cato Institute,

238

D. ROY

89. 90.

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

97.

98.

February 22, 2020, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-chinesecommunism-could-be-final-casualty-coronavirus. Nadege Rolland, “China’s Pandemic Power Play,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (July 2020): 30. Edward White, James Kynge, and Tom Mitchell, “China Turns Inward: Xi Jinping, COP26 and the Pandemic,” Financial Times, November 5, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/17314336-b7df-453a-b2ca-25a 58e26ca3e. “Full Text: Fighting COVID-19: China in Action,” Xinhua, Xinhuanet, June 7, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/07/c_1 39120424.htm; Chun Han Wong, “Beijing Portrays President Xi Jinping as Hero of Coronavirus Fight,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-portrays-president-ashero-of-coronavirus-fight-11583678054. Dewey Sim, “From Hong Kong to Britain, Governments Ranked Poorly for Their Response to Covid-19,” South China Morning Post, May 6, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3083185/cor onavirus-mainland-chinese-impressed-their-leaders-hongkongers. Josephine Ma, “Chinese More Trusting of Government Months into Pandemic, Survey Finds,” South China Morning Post,” May 11, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3132965/ chinese-more-trusting-government-months-pandemic-survey-finds. Ian Bremmer and Cliff Kupchan, “Risk 1: No Zero Covid,” Eurasia Group, January 3, 2022, https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/toprisks-2022-1-no-zero-covid. Andy Xie, “How China’s Zero-Covid Policy Is Tipping the World into Recession,” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2022, https:// www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3177606/how-chinas-zerocovid-policy-tipping-world-recession. Guoguang Wu, “The Ukrainian Challenge to China’s Leadership Politics: An Emerging Divergence in Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the 20th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor 72 (Summer 2022), June 1, 2022, https://www.prcleader.org/wu-3. Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “The Great De-coupling,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/chinaus-pandemic-economy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-wareconomics-the-great-decoupling/; https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/ Comment/U.S.-China-tensions-threaten-great-financial-decoupling. Vivian Wang, “In Xi Jinping’s China Gradual Disconnect from the World Defines Nationalism,” New York Times, February 24, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/world/in-xi-jinpings-china-gra dual-disconnect-from-the-world-defines-nationalism-10403661.html.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

239

99. Wang Yi, “China’s Diplomacy in 2021: Embracing a Global Vision and Serving the Nation and Its People,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, December 20, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_6 65385/zyjh_665391/202112/t20211220_10471930.html. 100. Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Hannah Price, “China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-adv ance-its-interests-mixed-results. 101. James Pasley, “An Influential Chinese Think Tank Warned China Its Global Image Is the Worst It’s Been in 31 Years and That a Worst-Case Scenario Could Mean Armed Conflict with the US,” Business Insider, May 5, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-report-globalimage-worst-in-three-decades-2020-5. 102. Kristy Needham, “Australia Rejects Chinese ‘Economic Coercion’ Threat amid Planned Coronavirus Probe,” Reuters, April 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-australia-china/ australia-rejects-chinese-economic-coercion-threat-amid-planned-corona virus-probe-idUSKCN2290Z6; Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, “What COVID19 Reveals About China-Southeast Asia Relations,” Observer Research Foundation, April 26, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/exp ert-speak/what-covid-19-reveals-about-china-southeast-asia-relations65208/. 103. Jennifer Hillman and David Sachs, “China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021, https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implic ations-for-the-united-states/. 104. “One Belt One Road Project Stalls as China’s Economy Fights out Covid-19,” Business Standard, March 14, 2021, https://www.businessstandard.com/article/international/one-belt-one-road-project-stalls-aschina-s-economy-fights-out-covid-19-121031400951_1.html. 105. “U.S. COVID-19 Global Response & Recovery Framework,” The White House, Washington, DC, September 2022, https://www.whi tehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/U.S.-COVID-19-GLO BAL-RESPONSE-RECOVERY-FRAMEWORK-_clean_9-14_7pm.pdf; “China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker,” Bridge Consulting, Beijing, November 23, 2022, https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/ourpublications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/#Top_10_Doses_Delive red_Purchased_and_Donated. 106. Jonathan Rothwell and Christos Makridis, “Politics Is Wrecking America’s Pandemic Response,” Brookings Institution, September 17, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/17/ politics-is-wrecking-americas-pandemic-response/.

240

D. ROY

107. Deirdre Shesgreen and Kim Hjelmgaard, “Dangerous Dynamic: Coronavirus Threatens New ‘Cold War’ Between US and China,” USA Today, May 5, 2020, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/ 2020/05/05/us-china-coronavirus-covid-19-donald-trump-xi-jinpingtensions/3068501001/.

Bibliography Alderman, Liz. “As Coronavirus Spreads, Face Mask Makers Go into Overdrive.” The New York Times, February 6, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 02/06/business/coronavirus-face-masks.html?action=click&module=Relate dLinks&pgtype=Article. Accessed November 25, 2022. “Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19.” Pew Research Center, July 30, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/ 30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Anderlini, Jamil. “Xi Jinping Faces China’s Chernobyl Moment.” Financial Times, February 10, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/6f7fdbae-4b3b11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5. Accessed November 25, 2022. Bandow, Doug. “Why Chinese Communism Could Be the Final Casualty of the Coronavirus.” Cato Institute, February 22, 2020. https://www.cato.org/ commentary/why-chinese-communism-could-be-final-casualty-coronavirus. Accessed November 25, 2022. Belluz, Julia. “China Hid the Severity of Its Coronavirus Outbreak and Muzzled Whistleblowers—Because It Can.” Vox, February 10, 2020. https://www. vox.com/2020/2/10/21124881/coronavirus-outbreak-china-li-wenliangworld-health-organization. Accessed November 25, 2022. Bredemeier, Ken. “Pompeo: ‘Enormous Evidence’ Coronavirus Originated in Chinese Lab.” Voice of America News, May 3, 2020. https://www.voanews. com/a/covid-19-pandemic_pompeo-enormous-evidence-coronavirus-origin ated-chinese-lab/6188639.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Bremmer, Ian, and Cliff Kupchan. “Risk 1: No Zero Covid.” Eurasia Group, January 3, 2022. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/top-risks-2022-1no-zero-covid. Accessed November 25, 2022. Calisher, Charles, et al. “Statement in Support of the Scientists, Public Health Professionals, and Medical Professionals of China Combatting COVID19.” The Lancet 395, no. 10226 (March 7, 2020). https://www.thelancet. com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30418-9/fulltext. Accessed November 25, 2022.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

241

Chao Deng. “Taiwan Stopped Covid-19’s Spread, but Can’t Talk About It at WHO Meeting.” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2020. https://www. wsj.com/articles/taiwan-stopped-covid-19s-spread-but-cant-talk-about-it-atwho-meeting-11605182401. Accessed November 25, 2022. “China COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker.” Bridge Consulting, Beijing, November 23, 2022. https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/ china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/#Top_10_Doses_Delivered_Purchased_and_ Donated. Accessed November 23, 2022. “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO.” Associated Press, June 2, 2020. https://apnews.com/3c061794970661042b18d5aeaae d9fae. Accessed November 23, 2022. “China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights Violations.” Xinhuanet, March 25, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/24/c_139832298_ 2.htm. Accessed November 23, 2022. “China Reports Fewer Outbreaks of African Swine Fever This Year: Official.” Xinhua, March 5, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/05/ c_138846494.htm. Accessed November 25, 2022. “China’s Ambassador to Canada Claims ‘China Is a Victim’ of Coronavirus Disinformation Campaign.” Global News, May 15, 2020. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=xrR8ZXbgJ4Q. Accessed November 23, 2022. “China’s Disinformation Campaign Targets Coronavirus and Businessman.” Bloomberg, May 13, 2020. https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/chi nas-disinformation-campaign-targets-coronavirus-and-businessman. Accessed November 23, 2022. “Chinese Ambassador in France Has No Right to Give Lessons in Coronavirus Coverage.” Reporters Sans Frontiers, March 20, 2020. https://rsf.org/en/ news/chinese-ambassador-france-has-no-right-give-lessons-coronavirus-cov erage. Accessed November 23, 2022. “Chinese Embassy Spokesman Wang Xining Speaks to Media About Coronavirus.” 7News Australia, February 4, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=2xErOTG7sjI. Accessed November 23, 2022. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson: China Expresses Strong Dissatisfaction and Firm Opposition to the Remarks by the US Side.” Website for the Chinese Embassy in the USA, May 23, 2022. http://us.china-emb assy.gov.cn/eng/zmgx/zxxx/202205/t20220523_10691539.htm. Accessed November 23, 2022. Churchill, Owen. “US lawmakers Urged to Put ‘Reciprocity’ at Heart of China Relationship.” South China Morning Post, December 1, 2020. https://www. scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3112055/us-lawmakers-urgedput-reciprocity-heart-china-relationship. Accessed November 23, 2022.

242

D. ROY

Collins, Michael. “The WHO and China: Dereliction of Duty.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 27, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/blog/who-andchina-dereliction-duty. Accessed November 23, 2022. Conger, Kate. “Twitter Removes Chinese Disinformation Campaign.” New York Times, June 11, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/techno logy/twitter-chinese-misinformation.html. Accessed November 25, 2022 Conklin, Melanie. “Chinese Government Asks Wisconsin Senate for a Commendation.” Wisconsin Examiner, April 10, 2020. https://wisconsinexaminer. com/2020/04/10/chinese-government-asks-wisconsin-senate-for-a-commen dation/. Accessed November 23, 2022. Dale, Helle C. “Western Media Falls into China’s Propaganda Trap.” Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2020. https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/wes tern-media-falls-chinas-propaganda-trap. Accessed November 23, 2022. Devlin, Kat, Laura Silver, and Christine Huang. “U.S. Views of China Increasingly Negative Amid Coronavirus Outbreak.” Pew Research Center, April 21, 2020. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/04/21/u-s-views-ofchina-increasingly-negative-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/. Accessed November 23, 2022. du Rocher, Sophie Boisseau. “What COVID19 Reveals About China-Southeast Asia Relations.” Observer Research Foundation, April 26, 2020. https:// www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/what-covid-19-reveals-about-china-southe ast-asia-relations-65208/. Accessed November 23, 2022. Everington, Keoni. “EU Backs Taiwan’s Inclusion in WHO.” Taiwan News, January 31, 2020. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3867764. Accessed November 23, 2022. Everington, Keoni. “US House Passes Bill Barring Maps Depicting Taiwan as Part of China.” Taiwan News, March 10, 2022. https://www.taiwannews. com.tw/en/news/4468061. Accessed November 23, 2022. “Fifth Question to American Politicians: Aren’t You Afraid That Passing the Buck to China Will Backfire?” People’s Daily online, May 12, 2020. http:/ /en.people.cn/n3/2020/0512/c90000-9689455.html. Accessed November 23, 2022. “Full Text: Fighting COVID-19: China in Action.” Xinhua, June 7, 2020. http:/ Accessed /www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/07/c_139120424.htm. November 23, 2022. Gallup. “China.” https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx. Accessed November 23, 2022. Gan, Nectar, and Steve George. “China Doubles Down on Baseless ‘US Origins’ Covid Conspiracy as Delta Outbreak Worsens.” CNN, August 6, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/china/china-covid-ori gin-mic-intl-hnk/index.html. Accessed November 23, 2022.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

243

Gatehouse, Jonathon. “Why Some Experts Are Questioning China’s Coronavirus Claims.” CBC News, February 24, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/ china-coronavirus-cover-up-claims-1.5471946. Accessed November 23, 2022. Gertz, Bill. “Coronavirus Link to China Biowarfare Program Possible, Analyst Says.” Washington Times, January 26, 2020. https://www.washingtontimes. com/news/2020/jan/26/coronavirus-link-to-china-biowarfare-programpossi/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War & Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Harrison, Mark. “Taiwan’s Exclusion from World Health Assembly Threatens Global Pandemic Response.” ASPI Strategist, November 12, 2020. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/taiwans-exc lusion-from-world-health-assembly-threatens-global-pandemic-response/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Hass, Ryan. “The COVID-19 Crisis Has Revealed Taiwan’s Resilience.” Brookings Institution, June 15, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/the-covid-19-crisis-has-revealed-taiwans-res ilience/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Hayward, John. “China: Federalism, Lack of ‘National Tracking’ Mean U.S. Cannot Defeat Coronavirus.” Breitbart, May 14, 2020. https://www.breitb art.com/national-security/2020/05/14/china-federalism-lack-of-national-tra cking-mean-u-s-cannot-defeat-coronavirus/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Hernández, Javier C. “China Detains Activist Who Accused Xi of Coronavirus Cover-Up.” New York Times, February 17, 2020. https://www. nytimes.com/2020/02/17/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xu-zhiyong.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Hillman, Jennifer, and David Sachs. “China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021. https:// www.cfr.org/report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/. Accessed November 22, 2022. “How It Happened: Transcript of the US-China Opening Remarks in Alaska.” Nikkei Asia, March 19, 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Internati onal-relations/US-China-tensions/How-it-happened-Transcript-of-the-USChina-opening-remarks-in-Alaska. Accessed November 25, 2022. Isenstadt, Alex. “GOP Memo Urges Anti-China Assault over Coronavirus.” Politico, April 24, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/24/ gop-memo-anti-china-coronavirus-207244. Accessed November 25, 2022. Jaipragas, Bhavan. “Defying Beijing, Donald Trump Doubles Down on Use of ‘Chinese Virus’ Label for Covid-19.” South China Morning Post, March 19, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3075854/ defying-beijing-donald-trump-doubles-down-use-chinese-virus. Accessed November 25, 2022.

244

D. ROY

Jia Qingguo. “China’s Diplomatic Response to COVID-19.” East Asia Forum, May 17, 2020. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/17/chinas-diplom atic-response-to-covid-19/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Jin Canrong. Douyin video, March 22, 2022. https://www.douyin.com/video/ 7078185574753914126. Accessed November 25, 2022. Johnson, Keith, and Robbie Gramer. “The Great De-coupling.” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/china-us-pandemiceconomy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-war-economics-thegreat-decoupling/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Kan, Shirley A., and Wayne M. Morrison. “U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues.” Congressional Research Service, December 11, 2014. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R41952.pdf. Accessed November 25, 2022. Khalid, Asma. “Biden and Trump Battle over Who Is ‘Weak on China.’” National Public Radio, April 22, 2020. https://www.npr.org/2020/04/22/ 840558299/biden-and-trump-battle-over-who-is-weak-on-china. Accessed November 25, 2022. Kine, Phelim. “Biden’s Taiwan Defense Pledge Inflames U.S.-China Relations.” Politico, May 23, 2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/23/bid ens-taiwan-defense-pledge-inflames-u-s-china-relations-00034588. Accessed November 25, 2022. Kirkpatrick, David D., and Jane Bradley. “U.K. Paid $20 Million for New Coronavirus Tests. They Didn’t Work.” New York Times, April 16, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/world/europe/coronavirusantibody-test-uk.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Kuhn, Anthony. “Chinese Blockbuster ‘Wolf Warrior II’ Mixes Jingoism with Hollywood Heroism.” National Public Radio, August 10, 2017. https:// www.npr.org/2017/08/10/542663769/chinese-blockbuster-wolf-warrior-iimixes-jingoism-with-hollywood-heroism. Accessed November 25, 2022. Lenthang, Marlene. “China Uses New Jersey Mayor’s Claim He Had COVID-19 in November to Suggest the Virus Originated in the US, as War of Words Between the Superpowers Continues.” Daily Mail, May 7, 2020. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8299359/China-usesNew-Jersey-Mayors-claim-COVID-19-November-blame-virus.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Lin, Bonny, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Hannah Price. “China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2021. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-itsinterests-mixed-results. Accessed November 25, 2022.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

245

Lovett, Samuel. “Coronavirus: Taiwan Rejects ‘Baseless’ Allegation It Subject WHO Chief to Campaign of Abuse and Racism.” The Independent, April 9, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/taiwan-whocoronavirus-tedros-adhanom-ghebreyesus-racism-abuse-a9456926.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Lubold, Gordon. “U.S. Troops Have Been Deployed in Taiwan for at Least a Year.” Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ u-s-troops-have-been-deployed-in-taiwan-for-at-least-a-year-11633614043. Accessed November 25, 2022. Lu Yang. “Debate Swirls Online in China: African Horse Plague—Yes? Wuhan Pneumonia—No.” Voice of America News, April 30, 2020. https://www.voa news.com/a/covid-19-pandemic_debate-swirls-online-china-african-horseplague-yes-wuhan-pneumonia-no/6188504.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Lynch, Colum. “China Launches Counterattack Against U.S. Effort to Restore Taiwan’s Status at WHO.” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/15/china-taiwan-united-statesworld-health-organization-observer/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ma, Josephine. “Chinese More Trusting of Government Months into Pandemic, Survey Finds.” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2021. https://www. scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3132965/chinese-more-trusting-gov ernment-months-pandemic-survey-finds. Accessed November 25, 2022. Madhav, Ram. “The Heat in Beijing.” Open, May 22, 2020. https://openthema gazine.com/columns/the-heat-in-beijing/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Mead, Walter Russell. “China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia.” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-real-sick-manof-asia-11580773677. Accessed November 25, 2022. Mearsheimer, John J. “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest, October 25, 2014. https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-risepeacefully-10204. Accessed November 25, 2022. Miller, Paul D. “Yes, Blame China for the Virus.” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/25/blame-china-and-xi-jinpingfor-coronavirus-pandemic/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. People’s Republic of China, [various dates]. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/. Accessed November 24, 2022. Needham, Kristy. “Australia Rejects Chinese ‘Economic Coercion’ Threat amid Planned Coronavirus Probe.” Reuters, April 26, 2020. https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-australia-china/australia-rejects-chi nese-economic-coercion-threat-amid-planned-coronavirus-probe-idUSKC N2290Z6. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ng, Teddy, and Wendy Wu. “China Expels Three Wall Street Journal Reporters over ‘Racist’ Commentary as Media becomes Latest Battleground in

246

D. ROY

Rivalry with US.” South China Morning Post, February 19, 2020. https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3051386/china-bars-threewall-street-journal-reporters-over-sick-man?module=inline&pgtype=article. Accessed November 25, 2022. Noyes, Rich. “Study: China Escapes Scrutiny in TV’s Coronavirus Coverage.” Media Research Center NewsBusters, March 23, 2020. https://www.newsbu sters.org/blogs/nb/rich-noyes/2020/03/23/study-china-escapes-scrutinytvs-coronavirus-coverage. Accessed November 25, 2022. “One Belt One Road Project Stalls as China’s Economy Fights out Covid-19.” Business Standard, March 14, 2021. https://www.business-standard.com/art icle/international/one-belt-one-road-project-stalls-as-china-s-economy-fightsout-covid-19-121031400951_1.html. Accessed November 22, 2022. Palmer, James. “Chinese Officials Can’t Help Lying About the Wuhan Virus.” Foreign Policy, February 3, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/ 03/wuhan-coronavirus-coverup-lies-chinese-officials-xi-jinping/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Pasley, James. “An Influential Chinese Think Tank Warned China Its Global Image Is the Worst It’s Been in 31 Years and That a Worst-Case Scenario Could Mean Armed Conflict with the US.” Business Insider, May 5, 2020. https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-report-global-imageworst-in-three-decades-2020-5. Accessed November 25, 2022. Pei, Minxin. “China’s Coming Upheaval: Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of Xi Jinping.” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2020. https://www.for eignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-upheaval. Accessed November 25, 2022. Pompeo, Mike. “China Policy Address at the Nixon Library.” American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, Yorba Linda, CA, July 23, 2020. https://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mikepompeochinanixonlibrary.htm. Accessed November 24, 2022. Rapoza, Kenneth. “Overwhelming Majority Say Time to ‘Decouple’ from China.” Forbes, April 27, 2020. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/ 2020/04/27/overwhelming-majority-say-time-to-decouple-from-china/?sh= 6ee9a6dd77a2. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ratner, Ely. “Statement by Dr. Ely Ratner Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense Before the 117th Congress Committee on Foreign Relations.” Washington, DC, December 8, 2021. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120 821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf. Accessed November 25, 2022. Reuters. “Trump Says ‘Great Discipline’ in China to Tackle Coronavirus Outbreak.” February 7, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinahealth-trump/trump-says-great-discipline-in-china-to-tackle-coronavirus-out break-idUKKBN2011A5. Accessed November 25, 2022.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

247

Rolland, Nadege. “China’s Pandemic Power Play.” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 3 (July 2020): 30. Rothwell, Jonathan, and Christos Makridis. “Politics Is Wrecking America’s Pandemic Response.” Brookings Institution, September 17, 2020. https:// www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/17/politics-is-wrecking-ame ricas-pandemic-response/. Accessed November 25, 2022. “Russia Says Pentagon Directly Involved in Bioweapon Development in Ukraine.” Xinhua, March 25, 2022. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ english/20220325/9d3fefef98e9437e8207b9263b1d9c46/c.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ruwitch, John. “China Demands ‘Fighting Spirit’ from Diplomats as Trade War, Hong Kong Protests Simmer.” Reuters, December 3, 2019. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy/china-demands-fighting-spiritfrom-diplomats-as-trade-war-hong-kong-protests-simmer-idUSKBN1Y80R8. Accessed November 25, 2022. Scott, Dylan. “Trump’s New Fixation on Using a Racist Name for the Coronavirus is Dangerous.” Vox, March 18, 2020. https://www.vox.com/2020/ 3/18/21185478/coronavirus-usa-trump-chinese-virus. Accessed November 25, 2022. “Second Question to American Politicians: Is This What You Call ‘Human Rights’?” People’s Daily online, May 8, 2020. http://en.people.cn/n3/ 2020/0508/c90000-9688155.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Sevastopulo, Demetri, and Katherine Hille. “Washington Risks Beijing Ire over Proposal to Rename Taiwan’s US Office.” Financial Times, September 10, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/07810ece-b35b-47e7-a6d2-c876b7 b40444. Accessed November 25, 2022. Shesgreen, Deirdre, and Kim Hjelmgaard. “Dangerous Dynamic’: Coronavirus Threatens New ‘Cold War’ Between US and China.” USA Today, May 5, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/05/05/uschina-coronavirus-covid-19-donald-trump-xi-jinping-tensions/3068501001/ . Accessed November 25, 2022. “Shùpíng: Mˇeif¯ang biànbˇenji¯alì dˇa “táiw¯an pái” de shìshí yù zh¯enxiàng.” Xinhua, November 11, 2021. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/tw/2021/11-11/960 7095.shtml. Accessed November 25, 2022. Silver, Laura, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy. “Negative Views of China Tied to Critical Views of Its Policies on Human Rights.” Pew Research Center, June 29, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/ 29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-its-policies-on-human-rig hts/. Accessed November 25, 2022.

248

D. ROY

Sim, Dewey. “From Hong Kong to Britain, Governments Ranked Poorly for Their Response to Covid-19.” South China Morning Post, May 6, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3083185/coronavirusmainland-chinese-impressed-their-leaders-hongkongers. Accessed November 25, 2022. Soon, Wayne. “Why Taiwan Is Beating COVID-19—Again.” The Diplomat, July 29, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/why-taiwan-is-beating-covid19-again/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Sutter Karen M., et al. “COVID-19: China Medical Supply Chains and Broader Trade Issues.” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46304. Accessed November 25, 2022. Swaine, Michael D. “Chinese Crisis Decision Making—Managing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Part One: The Domestic Component.” China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, June 1, 2020. Swan, Jonathan, and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian. “Top Chinese Official Disowns U.S. Military Lab Coronavirus Conspiracy.” Axios, March 22, 2020. https://www.axios.com/china-coronavirus-ambassador-cui-tiankai-1b0 404e8-026d-4b7d-8290-98076f95df14.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Swanson, Ana. “Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on Drugs.” New York Times, March 11, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/ 2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trump-drugs.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. “Testimony of Dr. Christopher A. Ford.” US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, March 10, 2011. https://www.uscc. gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Ford.pdf. Accessed November 25, 2022. “Transcript: NPR’s Interview with Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai About the Coronavirus.” National Public Radio, February 14, 2020. https://www.npr. org/2020/02/14/805997445/transcript-nprs-interview-with-chinese-amb assador-cui-tiankai-about-the-coronavi. Accessed November 25, 2022. “US Army Might Have Brought Epidemic to China, Says Chinese FM Spokesman in Tweet.” People’s Daily, March 13, 2020. http://en.people.cn/ n3/2020/0313/c90000-9668143.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. “U.S. COVID-19 Global Response & Recovery Framework.” The White House, Washington, DC, September 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2022/09/U.S.-COVID-19-GLOBAL-RESPONSERECOVERY-FRAMEWORK-_clean_9-14_7pm.pdf. Accessed November 25, 2022. “US Loses to Virus Because of Politics.” Global Times, May 13, 2020. https:// www.globaltimes.cn/content/1188276.shtml. Accessed November 25, 2022.

7

THE PANDEMIC FURTHER SICKENS US-CHINA RELATIONS

249

“U.S. Politicians’ Lawsuit Farce Against China a Shame of Civilization: People’s Daily Commentary.” Xinhua, May 2, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/2020-05/02/c_139026504.htm. Accessed November 25, 2022. “U.S. Politicians Responsible for Spread of COVID-19 Beyond Borders.” China Global Television Network, May 13, 2020. https://news.cgtn.com/news/ 2020-05-13/U-S-politicians-responsible-for-spread-of-COVID-19-beyondborders-QsZvCT4kO4/index.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. “US Should Make Bio-labs More Transparent.” Global Times editorial reprinted by China Daily, May 16, 2020. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/ 16/WS5ebff150a310a8b24115631a.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. “US Trick of Shifting Blame to China Sure to Backfire.” China Daily, May 12, 2020. http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202005/12/WS5eba66f 5a310a8b241155283.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Valášek, Lukáš. “Confiscated Face Masks Imported by an Influential Chinese Representative in Czechia.” Aktuálnˇe.cz, March 26, 2020. https://zpravy. aktualne.cz/domaci/confiscated-face-masks-imported-by-an-influential-rep resenta/r~560650326f6611ea842f0cc47ab5f122/. Accessed November 25, 2022. Vazquez, Maegan. “Trump Says He’s Pulling Back from Calling Novel Coronavirus the ‘China Virus.’” CNN, March 24, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/ 2020/03/24/politics/donald-trump-pull-back-coronavirus-chinese-virus/ index.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Wang, Vivian. “In Xi Jinping’s China Gradual Disconnect from the World Defines Nationalism.” New York Times, February 24, 2022. https://www. firstpost.com/world/in-xi-jinpings-china-gradual-disconnect-from-the-worlddefines-nationalism-10403661.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Wang Yi. “China’s Diplomacy in 2021: Embracing a Global Vision and Serving the Nation and Its People.” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, December 20, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/ zyjh_665391/202112/t20211220_10471930.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Ward, Myah. “15 Times Trump Praised China as Coronavirus Was Spreading Across the Globe.” Politico, April 15, 2020. https://www.politico.com/ news/2020/04/15/trump-china-coronavirus-188736. Accessed November 25, 2022. White, Edward, James Kynge, and Tom Mitchell. “China Turns Inward: Xi Jinping, COP26 and the Pandemic.” Financial Times, November 5, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/17314336-b7df-453a-b2ca-25a58e 26ca3e. Accessed November 25, 2022. Wong, Chun Han. “Beijing Portrays President Xi Jinping as Hero of Coronavirus Fight.” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/art icles/beijing-portrays-president-as-hero-of-coronavirus-fight-11583678054. Accessed November 25, 2022.

250

D. ROY

Wong, Chun Han. “China Jails Citizen Journalist for Her Accounts of Covid-19 in Wuhan.” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/ articles/china-jails-citizen-journalist-for-her-accounts-of-covid-19-in-wuhan11609158353?mod=article_inline. Accessed November 25, 2022. “World Health Assembly Slaps US Hooliganism.” Global Times, May 19, 2020. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1188805.shtml. Accessed November 25, 2022. “World Left in Shock over US Sabotage of Global Cooperation Against COVID19.” People’s Daily online, May 12, 2020. http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/ 0512/c90000-9689593.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Wu, Guoguang. “The Ukrainian Challenge to China’s Leadership Politics: An Emerging Divergence in Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the 20th Party Congress.” China Leadership Monitor 72 (Summer 2022), June 1, 2022. https://www.prcleader.org/wu-3. Accessed November 25, 2022. Xie, Andy. “How China’s Zero-Covid Policy Is Tipping the World into Recession.” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/ comment/opinion/article/3177606/how-chinas-zero-covid-policy-tippingworld-recession. Accessed November 25, 2022. Xie Wenting. “UK, France Scapegoat China for Epidemic Losses, but Cooperation Still Mainstream: Expert.” Global Times, April 17, 2020. https://www. globaltimes.cn/content/1185926.shtml. Accessed November 25, 2022. Xinhua. “China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights Violations.” February 28, 2022. https://english.news.cn/20220228/b7efbe95710249f2ad049fb0 b613e3a8/c.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Xu Wei. “Xi Calls for Fighting Spirit in Face of Risks.” China Daily, September 4, 2019.https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/04/WS5d6ed007a310c f3e35569835.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Peng, Yuan. 2010. Zhongmei Guanxi Xiang Hechu Qu? Waijiao Pinglun, 2: 2–7. Yuan Jiang. “COVID-19 Governance: An Issue Between Plutocracy and Meritocracy?” China Daily, May 13, 2020. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/ 202005/13/WS5ebb6d1aa310a8b24115561c.html. Accessed November 25, 2022. Yuan, Shawn. “Inside the Early Days of China’s Coronavirus Coverup.” Wired, May 1, 2020. https://www.wired.com/story/inside-the-early-days-of-chinascoronavirus-coverup/?src=longreads&mc_cid=d17f9b7649&mc_eid=952881 1089. Accessed November 25, 2022. Zhong Sheng. “U.S. Is the Creator of Human Right Disasters.” People’s Daily, March 23, 2020. http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0323/c90000-9671210. html. Accessed November 25, 2022.

CHAPTER 8

China’s Policy Toward Taiwan in the Xi Era Ruihua Lin and Shu Keng

Introduction During the last decade of the so-called Xi Era, the policy of mainland China toward Taiwan has undergone significant changes. According to the author, these changes can be examined from three aspects. First, they reflect the consolidation of the CCP’s decision-making power, and the decision-making paradigm for Taiwan policy has shifted from promoting “local pilot initiative” to fully implementing “top-level design.” Second, the primary approach/practice/plan of mainland China’s policy toward Taiwan has changed from the former strategy of “promoting reunification by economic means,” which was based on promoting economic and trade exchanges to Taiwan’s benefit, to the absorptive “integrated development” centered on the mainland. Lastly, in the international context of

R. Lin (B) Department of International and Mainland China Affairs, National Quemoy University, Kinmen, Republic of China (Taiwan) e-mail: [email protected] S. Keng School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_8

251

252

R. LIN AND S. KENG

Taiwan policy, the United States has gradually shifted from a “balancer” between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to an “ally” of Taiwan, while mainland China has abandoned the prioritized objective of “peaceful reunification” and adopted a two-pronged approach of “carrot and stick,” because of the rising confrontation between China and the United States. Why did the Taiwan policy in the Xi era undergo such drastic changes? This may be observed from three perspectives: the internal perspective of Taiwan; the internal perspective of China; and the international perspective. First, from the internal standpoint of Taiwan, Xi took office as Ma Ying-jeou’s Nationalist Party (KMT) administration was approaching its end, and the adverse reactions caused by overheated cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges (mainly the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement or ECFA, and service trade) were simmering among the Taiwanese people. Polls conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (Fig. 8.1) indicate that the KMT’s support has declined rapidly since 2011, whereas the DPP’s support has continued to climb.1 The attitude of the Taiwanese public toward cross-Strait exchanges, as reflected in these polls, highlights that the “favor-granting policy” formerly maintained by mainland China has reached its limit. In addition, after the DPP came to power, the practice of “promoting reunification by economic means” could no longer be sustained. Secondly, consider the internal situation in China. Since he acceded to power, Xi has consolidated political power within the party and returned the decision-making authority to the central government, in response to various internal and external challenges. As a result, patriotism and nationalism in the mainland are on the rise, and cross-Strait relations have become the target for radical advocates to vent their emotions, making it more difficult to ease cross-Strait tensions. Lastly, from the international perspective, the rise of China’s economic and military might has increasingly posed a challenge to the hegemony of the United States. In recent years, China has established a number of economic schemes, such as the “The Belt and Road” initiative, the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the “Made in China 2025” plan, all of which have threatened the global economic status of the United States. China’s military spending has continued to rise, and the country’s armed forces have become stronger. Although the objective is to protect China’s national unity and break through the confinement of the first island chain, the United States is often seen as an adversary by the PLA.2

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

253

Fig. 8.1 Changes in the Party Identification of the Taiwanese Public (Source The Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. https://esc.nccu.edu. tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7802&id=6964 [Accessed January 8, 2023])

Under the circumstances, the United States has switched from acting as a balancer in the Taiwan Strait to protecting Taiwan against China, prompting mainland China to tilt toward the use of force in the weighing of “peace or force” reunification options. These three factors have contributed to the shift in China’s policy toward Taiwan in the Xi era and the increasing uncertainty in cross-Strait relations. Based on the above views, the second section of this chapter explains how changes in the CCP’s decision-making paradigm affect the implementation of its policy toward Taiwan. The third section describes the transition of the CCP’s united front approach toward Taiwan from “enter the island and into the heart” to “integrated development,” as well as the specific changes that have taken place. The fourth chapter assesses the implications of the developments in the US-China relationship and their respective policies toward Taiwan on cross-Strait relations in the current international context. Finally, the last section offers a conclusion to this chapter.

254

R. LIN AND S. KENG

Change in the Decision-Making of Taiwan Policy: From “Local Pilot Initiative” to “Top-Level Design” The CCP’s overall decision-making structure has undergone substantial changes during the Xi era. Since the inception of its reform and openness policy, China has emphasized decentralizing power to local governments in order to boost regional development. Thus, local governments were encouraged to conduct experiments, from which the central government selected, implemented, and promoted effective initiatives nationwide. This “bottom-up” approach, which is categorized by Heilmann as policy experimentation, has supported the expansion of China’s fiscal contracting system, special economic zones, development/ technology parks, etc.3 Despite the repeated withdrawal of authority from local governments, this structure of “central-local relations” remained. However, with the adoption of “central decision-making and local implementation,” decision-making power in many domains has largely reverted to the central government under Xi’s leadership, and policies must be executed in full compliance with the “top-level design” approach.4 The establishment of “The Central National Security Commission” (also known as “National Security Commission”) and “Leading Group for Central Comprehensively Deepening Reform” (renamed Central Comprehensively Deepening Reform Commission in 2018, referred to as Deep Reform Commission) in 2014 had the most significant impact on these structural adjustments. The National Security Commission is the CCP’s decision-making and coordinating body for the formulation of security policies.5 The Deep Reform Commission is responsible for the major work of the party and the nation, including the design, general framework, and overall coordination of social and economic policies.6 The two commissions, chaired and led by Xi, have become the core decision-making mechanism for China’s political and economic policies. To fully implement the centralized decision-making process, all local governments (below the provincial level) must develop policies that meet the central requirements. In addition, the central government may require local governments to adopt policies through systemic oversight measures. However, the “top-level design” and “top-down” approaches have decreased the space for local autonomous experimentation and the passion of local government officials,7 resulting in a widely discussed “inaction” problem.8

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

255

“Top-Level Design” Provides Guidance to Taiwan Policy The “Top-level design” approach is also evident in the management of Taiwan-related affairs. The CCP’s decision-making on Taiwan affairs has moved from the “principled guideline” to “clear and precise provisions issued by the central government.” Historically, the CCP’s policies toward Taiwan were derived and collated mostly from the major speeches of its leaders. Jiang Zemin’s Eight Propositions, for instance, were outlined in his 1995 address titled, “Continue to Struggle for the Completion of the Great Cause of National Reunification.” And Hu Jintao’s Six Points were first brought up during the 2008 symposium commemorating the 30th anniversary of the publication of “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” These two guidelines, however, emphasize only the fundamental principles, such as adhering to the “one-China principle,” achieving the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, promoting cross-Strait economic cooperation and exchanges, and promoting crossStrait personnel exchanges from all walks of life.9 In other words, these Taiwan policy guidelines mainly address the underlying principles without tackling policy details, leaving local governments room to undertake specific measures. During the Xi era, the central government often issued unified instructions to local governments for direct implementation or the formulation of corresponding measures. For example, since 2018, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the National Development and Reform Commission have successively issued “Measures on Promoting Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation” (“31 Measures” for short), “Measures on Further Promoting Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation” (referred to as “26 Measures”), etc., defining specific policy measures toward Taiwan. The “31 Measures” stipulates that Taiwanese entrepreneurs that build high-end manufacturing, green manufacturing, and other enterprises in mainland China are eligible for the same taxation and investment policies as local enterprises, and Taiwanese talent may apply for national grants from mainland China. The “26 Measures” stated that Taiwan-funded enterprises enjoy trade remedies and protection measures in accordance with the law; Taiwanese business people in mainland China can apply for guaranteed financing from the local government’s financing guarantee funds; and Taiwanese with a Residence Permit for Taiwan Residents are eligible for the same treatment as mainland China citizens when purchasing homes.10

256

R. LIN AND S. KENG

Under the specific requirements of “top-level design,” there is little room for local governments to make autonomous decisions. In the past, despite the central “principled guideline,” local governments were able to determine and define their own objectives, such as whether to introduce a substantial amount of Taiwanese investment. Consequently, policy measures implemented by local governments may differ considerably. Guangdong’s PMACT (processing with supplied materials, manufacturing with supplied drawings and samples, assembling with supplied parts, and compensation trade) rules, for instance, have attracted a significant number of Taiwan OEM manufacturing companies. Kunshan has transformed the city into “Little Taipei” with a businessfriendly campaign that boasts that local officials’ mobile phones are always on. Under the provincial policy of “Developing Western Taiwan Straits Economic Zone,” the city of Pingtan in Fujian Province was well known for recruiting Taiwanese professionals to serve as management committee officials for the comprehensive experimental zone,thereby creating a demonstration zone for cross-Strait relations.11 Furthermore, local governments often demonstrated creativity in promoting cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, such as organizing procurement delegations to Taiwan. The vice governor of Liaoning Province visited Syuejia, Tainan, and bought 130 metric tons of milkfish balls, while the governor of Anhui Province led a group to purchase more than 3 million yuan worth of fruit in central and southern Taiwan. The vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology collaborated with local authorities and formed a nationwide procurement delegation comprised of 22 major high-tech companies to acquire high-tech and electronic products in Taiwan.12 According to interviews conducted by the author with several presidents of Taiwanese business associations, the majority of local government leaders did not have specific procurement plans and figures in mind when visiting Taiwan, except for general directions, such as exploring Taiwan’s agricultural development and attracting technologybased enterprises. The relevant department officials were responsible for formulating purchase plans based on what they saw during the visits. In other words, local governments played a predominant role in the process. Contrary to the past, local governments today can only develop implementation regulations in line with the central government’s “31 Measures” and “26 Measures.“ Examples include “66 Measures” and “42 Measures” from Fujian, “48 Measures” from Guangdong, and “80 Measures” from Guangxi. Based on these specific regulations, it is

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

257

evident that the management of Taiwanese affairs at the local level is moving toward national convergence. For instance, according to the “31 Measures,” Taiwanese compatriots may register for 53 vocational qualification exams for professional and technical personnel and 81 vocational qualification tests for skilled personnel. All provinces and municipalities have mirrored the original text of the central government’s measures, except for additional details. Guangdong added, “Taiwanese compatriots in Guangdong can participate in various vocational skills competitions and obtain the Guangdong Provincial Technical Expert Certificate,” while Fujian added, “launch matching service for professional and technical personnel vocational qualification examination,” etc.13 Moreover, local authorities simply choose to adhere to the norms and regulations. During a visit to the Pingtan Free Trade Zone, for instance, the author discovered that local authorities in recent years have only enforced central regulations and have often refrained from innovative efforts that go beyond the scope of central regulations, in order to avoid making mistakes by doing more. An official from Fujian Province interviewed by the author said that, while Fujian is at the forefront of Taiwan affairs, many departments are merely pretending and showcasing their “performance” to the leaders, since work on Taiwan affairs is not factored into the performance evaluation of government officials. Implications of Enhanced Functional Department Authority The shift in the principal authority responsible for mainland China’s Taiwan policy is an additional factor in the restructuring of the decision-making mechanism. In the past, developing and implementing the CCP’s Taiwan policy were mainly delegated to TAO. In the central political framework of the CCP, however, the TAO lacks the capability to allocate resources and formulate policy and is often seen as a weak organization, since its only responsibility is to coordinate and execute Taiwan policies.14 Particularly at the municipal level, the Municipal TAO must work with the local government’s overall development policy in order to promote cross-Strait exchanges. In 2008, Guangdong Province campaigned for the restructuring and upgrading of the processing trade industry, for which the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Department of Finance, the Department of Public Security, the Local Taxation Bureau, and the Environmental Protection Bureau had respective responsibilities,15 and

258

R. LIN AND S. KENG

the TAO could only serve as an intermediary and relayed the challenge in business operations faced by Taiwanese business people to concerned agencies. As a result of the consolidation of decision-making power during the Xi period, the role of “functional departments” in the implementation of Taiwan policies has enhanced. Since 2018, the TAO has announced the CCP’s policies on Taiwan in collaboration with other functional departments. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and TAO published the “31 Measures” and “26 Measures” concurrently. “Measures to Support Taiwan Compatriots and Taiwan-funded Enterprises in the Mainland’s Agricultural and Forestry Fields” was jointly released by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the State Forestry and Grassland Administration, and the TAO. The NDRC is the most powerful of these organizations,because it is primarily responsible for the policy formulation and resource allocation for China’s development and reform and has the authority to allocate resources and partially evaluate other departments,16 whereas the agricultural department is in charge of agricultural-related policies. In other words, under the “toplevel design” of the central government, these powerful ministries and commissions dictate the formulation of policies on Taiwan and monitor their implementation from the top-down. In summary, the formulation and implementation of Taiwan policy during the Xi era have shifted from “local pilot initiative” to “central decision-making,” and are managed and controlled by “top-level design.” Under the strong leadership of the central government, local governments’ policies toward Taiwan have become clearer and more standardized than in the past, and Taiwanese people are able to identify applicable laws and regulations that stipulate their rights and responsibilities. Nonetheless, as the room for autonomous innovation decreases, local authorities tend to remain passive and inactive for fear of making mistakes by doing more. Under the current institutional context, it is unlikely that cross-Strait exchanges would return to their previous peaks (from 2005 to 2015).

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

259

Change in Dealing with Taiwan Society: From “Exchange and Yield Benefits” to “Integrated Development” In terms of engaging with Taiwan society as a whole, “exchange and yield profits” was substituted with “integrated development” in the Xi era. When Hu Jintao was in office, China employed cross-Strait exchanges and economic incentives, such as permitting Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan and buying and contracting agricultural products, to offer benefits to the people of Taiwan, in an attempt to win their hearts and minds.17 Consequently, economic and trade interactions across the Taiwan Strait were flourishing, and Taiwanese perceptions of the CCP were continuously improving.18 Due to internal and external developments, however, the guiding principle of China’s policy toward Taiwan has shifted to “crossStrait integrated development” since Xi took office.19 This strategy aims primarily to attract Taiwanese to study and work on the mainland by providing ample economic opportunities. Simultaneously, the CCP has granted Taiwanese “quasi-citizen status,” offering the same economic and social rights as Chinese residents.20 Favor-Granting Policy Silently Abandoned China’s new approach to Taiwanese society is driven mainly by two factors. The first factor is the failure of the previous “exchange and yield benefit” strategy. During Hu’s period, the two sides of the Strait signed the ECFA, and the mainland provided Taiwan with a number of preferential tariffs.21 Mainland China also targeted its exchanges and economic incentives at four specific groups in Taiwan (middle and southern region, middle and lower classes, small and medium-sized enterprises, and youth), such as purchasing Taiwanese agricultural products during slow sale seasons and promoting contracted agricultural and fishery production in central and southern Taiwan.22 As much as these efforts have benefited the Taiwanese people, they also widened the gap between the rich and the poor, with young people suffering the most. The Taiwanese youth believed that the major problem with the economic and trade profityielding practice was that “Liberalization only benefits large capitals and enables big corporations to expand indefinitely across the Strait… this is a class issue in which a few large capitals eat up the majority of small farmers, small workers, and small businesses, and all Taiwanese youngsters

260

R. LIN AND S. KENG

will face a grave survival dilemma in the future.”23 In 2014, Taiwanese youth launched the Sunflower Movement, the largest social protest in Taiwan since the lifting of martial law, with around 500,000 participants, according to media accounts. This not only presages the decline of the KMT’s ruling, but also demonstrates that the profit-yielding policy is neither effective nor sustainable. In the following 2016 Taiwan presidential election, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai Ing-wen won. A straightforward “profit-yielding” policy was difficult to execute and generated little impact. Therefore, the mainland must adjust its policy toward Taiwan. Second, and also of equal importance, is the rise of the Chinese economy. In 2010, China became the second largest economy in the world, after the United States. The Fortune Global 500 list published in 2022 included 145 Chinese firms, more than any other country.24 Under the circumstances, mainland China no longer needs Taiwan’s economic contribution, such as the capital, technology, market, and talent offered by Taiwanese companies. This confidence also prompts mainland China to believe both that the mainland market is a massive attraction for Taiwanese businesspeople and individuals, as global firms and talent are already flocking to China due to the magnetic effect of the enormous market, and that Taiwanese people must recognize their future growth is dependent on the prosperity of the mainland. Consequently, not only are the decision-makers more optimistic about the growth of the mainland in all aspects, but they also feel that the opening of the mainland market would have a significant appeal to the Taiwanese. This is the context from which “integrated development” emerged. Full-Speed Implementation of “Integrated Development” The primary distinction between Hu’s “exchange and yield profits” and Xi’s “integrated development” lies in two areas. First, the target demographic is different. The previous policy was designed to support “Taiwanese in Taiwan” in order to win over their hearts and minds. Now, the authorities are using the mainland as the hinterland in an attempt to attract Taiwanese to mitigate and integrate with the mainland. The main objective of the strategy is thus to appeal to “Taiwanese on the mainland” and use them as a model for “Taiwanese in Taiwan.” To attract Taiwanese talent, the mainland authorities have replaced prior preferential treatment with “quasi-national status.” Previously, the

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

261

CCP’s Taiwan policies, such as “superior-national status” based on “benefiting Taiwan” and “sub-national treatment” based on “balancing,” have either purposefully or accidentally increased the identity divide between Taiwanese and mainlanders.25 The “privileges” afforded to Taiwanese by the superior-national status provide them with a sense of superiority, such as when they compare themselves to foreign businesses. On the other hand, the sub-national status has resulted in unfair treatment—exclusion of Taiwanese from the social welfare program and provident fund, difficulty in attending school for their children, and denial of Taiwanese enterprises the tax incentives offered to local enterprises, as well as a sense of discrimination. The superiority and discrimination have created a “sense of alienation” between the Taiwanese community and mainland society. By awarding Taiwanese “quasi-national status” following his ascension to power, Xi has altered the previous policy. In his political report to the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi stated, “Taiwan compatriots should gradually receive the same treatment as Mainland compatriots in regards to studying, starting businesses, working, and residing on the mainland.“26 Since then, concrete measures for “equal treatment” with respect to Taiwanese businesses and individuals have been adopted. According to the “31 Measures,” for example, Taiwanese businesses may participate in government procurement fairly, apply for the same land use policy as mainland enterprises, and enjoy the same preferential tax policies as local high-tech corporations. The Measures also indicated that Taiwanese companies may participate in the “Made in China 2025” initiative with the same treatment as their mainland peers. The “26 Measures” loosened restrictions by specifying that Taiwanese enterprises can enjoy the same trade remedies and protective measures as mainland enterprises, utilize export credit insurance to protect export earnings and reduce foreign investment risks, participate equally in the formulation and revision of industry standards, and take part in the research and development of fifth-generation mobile communication (5G) technology. The CCP has also expanded opportunities for education, internship, employment, and entrepreneurship for the Taiwanese people. Mainland China has lowered entry requirements for Taiwanese high school graduates to enroll in Chinese universities. In 2017, the Ministry of Education of China issued the “Notice on the Enrollment of Taiwan High School Graduates by Colleges and Universities Based on the Results of the Entrance Examination in the Taiwan Area,” allowing Taiwanese students

262

R. LIN AND S. KENG

who took the entrance exam in Taiwan and met the average standard to apply to universities in mainland China.27 And since 2015, the TAO has established 78 “Cross-Strait Youth Employment and Entrepreneurship Bases and Demonstration Sites,” incorporating platforms such as schools, business incubators, enterprises, and social groups and offering internship and employment opportunities, as well as counseling and training for new start-ups.28 Since these entrepreneurship/employment/internship initiatives are replicas of the CCP’s efforts to foster mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation (also known as dual creation) for mainlanders, they are seen as comparable to awarding “quasi-national status” to Taiwanese. Simultaneously, China has broadened the scope of its Taiwan policy to encompass social and political aspects. The former “exchange and yield profits” approach for “Taiwanese in Taiwan” was largely focused on economic benefits and seldom examined other elements, and the guiding principle for cross-Strait exchanges was “just economics, nothing else.” Hence, “integrated development” offers equal social rights to Taiwanese on top of economic benefits, while also imposing political obligations at the same time. Taiwanese may now join the local government’s social security program, apply for provident fund loans to purchase homes, and enroll in various state subsidy programs (such as the “Ten Thousand Talents Program,” the National Social Science Fund, and National Natural Science Fund), as well as obtain a residence identification card (equivalent to mainland identification card). Meanwhile, the Chinese government demands that Taiwanese on the mainland adhere to political correctness. For instance, the author was asked whether she supported “unification” during an interview at a mainland university. Taiwanese on the mainland would always feel the political heat whenever crossStrait relations become relatively tense, especially in the aftermath of the 2019 Hong Kong protests. After Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected president of Taiwan in a landslide victory for her support of the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in Hong Kong, attitudes on the mainland began to shift, and mainland authorities and citizens started to display increased hostility and pressure toward Taiwan and Taiwanese. Despite the fact that “integrated development” has benefited “The Taiwanese on the mainland” and effectively promoted Taiwanese community and local society integration, it has failed to capture the attention of “Taiwanese in Taiwan.” Cross-Strait economic integration has achieved saturation within the current economic structure and policymaking framework, and fewer Taiwanese would move to China merely for

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

263

the “quasi-national status.” In response to the growing antagonism and tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the CCP has grown more ideological and is seeking political segregation, which many Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation, find unacceptable.

Change in the International Context: Cross-Strait Relations Have Gone from Stable to Uncertain Changes in the international context, namely the rivalry between the United States and China, have also exerted a significant impact on the mainland’s Taiwan policy. Prior to the Xi era, the United States and China maintained a partnership that was both competitive and cooperative. During the presidency of George W. Bush, anti-terrorism cooperation with China was essential. Under the administration of President Obama, the United States had to coordinate its strategy with China in order to mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. Washington also needs Beijing’s cooperation, if only passively, on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem and Iran sanctions. Obama visited China and met with Hu Jintao at the beginning of his presidency for this reason, and the US-China relationship was defined as an “essential and competitive partnership.”29 Nonetheless, the situation has progressively evolved over the last decade. China’s national power, both economically and militarily, has continued to grow to the point that it challenges the global standing of the United States. In recent years, China has also abandoned the strategy of “hiding our capabilities and biding our time” in favor of a more assertive stance toward the United States that includes selective confrontation in certain areas, resulting in escalating tensions in the bilateral ties. Following Trump’s inauguration, the situation deteriorated drastically. Trump has used the slogan “America First” throughout his campaign to accuse China of stealing American jobs and causing a trade deficit, appealing to blue-collar workers and conservative farmers. In his address at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in 2020, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo claimed that the US “engaging China” policy of the preceding fifty years had failed. Pompeo highlighted the distinctive ideology of the Chinese Communists and their intention to change the existing international order, noting that “the world cannot be safe until China changes.”30 This marked the end of the United States’ “engagement policy” with China and the official start of a competitive

264

R. LIN AND S. KENG

relationship between the two countries. Both the United States’ position in cross-Strait relations and China’s policy toward Taiwan have changed against this backdrop. United States’ New Position in Cross-Strait Relations As China’s national power continues to grow, it becomes increasingly reluctant to settle for second place, which prompts the gradual changes to United States’ strategy toward China. In particular, the US position in cross-Strait relations has steadily shifted from a “balancer” between two sides of the Taiwan Strait to an “ally” of Taiwan. During the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States maintained concurrent ties with China and Taiwan, serving as a cross-Strait “balancer” by selectively pressuring excessively aggressive action on either side. However, as relations between the United States and China evolved, so did the United States’ position. In light of China’s rise in world politics and economy, Obama proposed the “pivot to Asia” policy and adopted the “reengagement” strategy, which were designed to be soft method to contain China. Moreover, he introduced the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a separate mechanism from the World Trade Organization (WTO), in an attempt to exclude China and prevent China from dominating world trade. Nevertheless, the United States has continued to strengthen its ties with China via the “counterbalancing and courting” strategy. During his visit to China, Obama declared that “the relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century” and signed the US-China Joint Statement with the Chinese government. China emphasized Taiwan’s importance to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the joint statement, while the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the one-China policy and the three US-China communiqués.31 With regard to Taiwan, Obama maintained a positive and stable relationship. During his presidency, Obama granted Taiwanese citizens visa-free entry to the United States and authorized major arms sales to Taiwan, including upgrades to the F-16 A/B fighter.32 The crucial point is that the United States has embraced “strategic ambiguity” in its cross-Strait policy at this juncture, particularly in relation to fundamental security issues, by refusing to express explicitly what action it will take in the event of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The United States believes this is the

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

265

most advantageous approach for stabilizing relations across the Taiwan Strait. The circumstances have changed over the years. China’s economic rise and global expansion have posed significant challenges for the United States. The United States felt threatened and uneasy when Xi Jinping launched “The Belt and Road” Initiative, the AIIB, “Made in China 2025,” and other programs designed to challenge US hegemony. After Trump took office, the United States’ China policy underwent sweeping changes. In an interview with CNBC, Trump said that the “Made in China 2025” policy means, “they’re going to be dominant in 2025. I told President Xi, listen, that’s very insulting to me. Can’t do that. They took it off.”33 In addition, the United States has been engaged in a trade war with China since 2018, and sanctions have been imposed on Chinese technological companies, including the prohibition and termination of purchases against Huawei and ZTE, the banning of SMIC from purchasing chip production equipment, the blacklisting of eight technology companies for investment, including the drone giant DJI and AI start-up Megvii Technology, as well as the addition of thirty-four Chinese companies to the list of export-controlled entities.34 US-China relations have deteriorated in all aspects. Against this background, the United States has modified its roles in cross-Strait relations. President Trump began to play the “Taiwan card” aggressively by reaching out to Taiwan in an effort to contain China. One of the specific actions was Trump’s phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen shortly after his inauguration in 2016, the first direct talk between the leaders from the two sides since the United States severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In addition, the “package review” for arms sales to Taiwan was replaced with the “case-by-case review” applied to other countries. The United States also proposed renaming the “Coordination Council for North American Affairs” under the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the agency that handles Taiwan-US affairs) to the “Taiwan Council for US Affairs.” In the 2019 “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,” the US Department of Defense explicitly stated that Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia are reliable, capable, and natural partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.35 The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 with a significant majority in September 2022, signifying the most sweeping change in US policy toward Taiwan since the termination of bilateral diplomatic

266

R. LIN AND S. KENG

relations in 1979 and the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. The Taiwan Policy Act stipulates those sanctions will be imposed “if China is engaged in a significant escalation of hostile actions against Taiwan…including undermining, overthrowing, or dismantling the Government of Taiwan and interference with Taiwan’s territorial integrity.” Furthermore, the bill proposes to provide Taiwan with $4.5 billion in security assistance over four years, with an additional $2 billion in the fifth year.36 These actions clearly demonstrate the United States’ intention to “court Taiwan and challenge China.” Thus, the US cross-Strait policy has evolved from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity”—a more explicit commitment to Taiwan’s security and proactive support for Taiwan’s resistance to the CCP. China is Heading toward “Strategic Ambiguity” In the meanwhile, mainland China has taken a more assertive and aggressive foreign policy stance. In response to the adjustment of the United States’ position and the active participation of the DPP government, the mainland’s strategy toward Taiwan during the Xi period has shifted from a focus on “peaceful reunification” to a two-pronged “peace-force reunification” approach. Historically speaking, throughout the Jiang and Hu eras, the CCP was able to maintain China-US relations while simultaneously fostering cross-Strait political and economic exchanges. In his speech on the 30th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” Hu emphasized that the CCP “must strive for peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and determination. To this end, we must proactively promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations… deepening exchanges and cooperation, as well as fostering consultation and negotiation are important means of achieving this objective.”37 Similarly, domestic public opinion on the mainland has repeatedly echoed the “peaceful reunification” approach. Although the principle of prioritizing peaceful reunification has not been abandoned in the Xi period, and the authorities have continued to emphasize the principle publicly, there are indications that the CCP has begun to enhance the possibility of reunification by force. David Cohen, the deputy director of the CIA, said that Chinese President Xi Jinping had informed his military that he intends to acquire the capability to seize control of Taiwan by 2027 forcefully. Cohen added, “He (Xi Jinping) has not made the decision to do that, but he has asked his military to put

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

267

him in a position where he could do so if he so chose.”38 As part of his domestic public opinion agenda, Xi not only encourages education in nationalism and patriotism, but also enables citizens to participate in extreme nationalist discourse. On Chinese social media, for instance, a significant number of Internet influencers regularly promote nationalism and emphasize the need to prepare for military reunification, although similar views were often banned in the past. Presently, the term “peaceful reunification” is hardly used in the public discourse of mainland China. During the visit of the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, the aforementioned tensions reached their peaks. Prior to Pelosi’s visit, the former editor-in-chief of the Global Times, Hu Xijin, has repeatedly made extreme remarks through the Internet, such as “the PLA is fully prepared if Pelosi dares to remain in Taiwan, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait will explode like a powder keg.”39 The PLA then conducted three consecutive days of live-fire military exercises surrounding Taiwan, violating the tacit crossStrait agreement over the “Strait median line.” In the following three days after the drills, the PLA continued to cross the median line with twenty-seven aircraft flights and eighteen warship sorties.40 Xi Jinping has declared publicly that “we are willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and our best efforts,” but he has not promised to renounce the use of force and the option of adopting all necessary measures.41 Multiple indicators suggest that mainland China is prepared or at least planning to employ the “carrot and stick” approach. Consequently, the public of mainland China has speculated that policymakers may opt to use force against Taiwan over the next few years. In summary, within the framework of cross-Strait relations, the United States’ cross-Strait policy has shifted from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity,” whereas mainland China’s Taiwan policy has moved from “strategic clarity” (peaceful unification) to “strategic ambiguity.” This trend reflects China’s rise in the world but also causes concern to the United States. In the context of the “hegemony transition,” the Taiwan Strait has become the focal point of conflict between the existing and emerging hegemony. Observers around the globe are increasingly inclined to see the Taiwan Strait as a potentially volatile flashpoint, and it cannot be ruled out that the Taiwan Strait could act as the catalyst for a rupture between China and the United States. Taiwan appears delighted with the US transition from a “balancer” to an “ally.”42 But it should be kept in

268

R. LIN AND S. KENG

mind that the strategic balance between China and the United States is fragile. Taiwan is unlikely to remain neutral as the probability of a crossStrait conflict increases, and if war breaks out, it will inevitably become a scorched earth.

Conclusion Since China has entered the Xi era, significant changes have been made to its Taiwan policy, which may be categorized into three aspects. First of all, in terms of decision-making, the CCP has replaced “local pilot initiative” with “top-level design” to highlight the consolidation of decision-making authority. Second, with regard to the united front approach to Taiwan, the strategy of “promoting unification by economic means” focused on yielding profits to Taiwan via commerce and trade exchanges has been substituted by “integrated development” centered on the mainland. Due to the heightened US-China tensions, the United States has shifted from a cross-Strait “balancer” to an “ally” of Taiwan, whereas China has moved from the “peaceful reunification” priority to the two-pronged “peace and war” strategy. According to the author, the future of cross-Strait relations remains highly unpredictable, in light of the new phase of the mainland’s policies toward Taiwan and the paradigm of cross-Strait interactions. Because of the consolidation of decision-making authority, the policymaking process for Taiwan-related matters has become more restrictive, resulting in passive policy execution. Thus, it will be challenging for cross-Strait exchange to regain its earlier peak. Second, even though the “integrated development” approach encourages the integration of Taiwanese residing on the mainland, it fails to enhance the economy and trade links between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. As the political climate of the mainland grows increasingly conservative, the gaps between the political attitudes and lifestyles of the people living on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will be magnified. Cross-Strait people-to-people exchange is likely to stagnate as a result. Finally, and more importantly, in the context of an escalating rivalry between China and the United States, Taiwan has emerged as the front line of US-China confrontation, causing growing uncertainty to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Based on the above assessment, it is fair to argue that cross-Strait relations face rising risks. Nonetheless, if the political situation in Taiwan

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

269

changes over time, for instance if the KMT, the party in favor of “crossStrait detente,” comes to power or if the United States changes its position to “reconciliation,” the current tension will be alleviated to some extent. Moreover, mainland leaders always allow leeway for interpretation in their official remarks on cross-Strait relations, and time is on the side of mainland China when it comes to resolving cross-Strait issues. The improvement of cross-Strait relations is therefore feasible, despite the increasing uncertainty. The person who tied the bell must untie it (解鈴 還須系鈴人). Whether the two sides of the Strait will move away from the “vicious circle” and enter the “virtuous circle” relies on the wisdom of the leaders and people of the three parties involved.

Notes 1. From 2016 to 2018, public opinion mostly reflected the policy changes of the mainland (approximately between 2015 and 2016). Subsequently, due to the eruption of the anti-extradition incident in Hong Kong and the worsening of Sino-US ties (and relationship with the West in general), Taiwanese people’s attitude toward the mainland changed dramatically. 2. Nose Nobuyuki, “China’s Rapid Military Expansion! Europe’s Actively Response and Taiwan’s Enhanced Defense!,” nippon.com, October 21, 2021, https://www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00748/, accessed October 7, 2022. 3. Sebastian Heilmann, L. Shih, and A. Hofem, “National Planning and Local Technology Zones: Experimental Governance in China’s Torch Programme,” The China Quarterly 216 (December 1, 2013): 896– 919; Sebastian Heilmann, Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facilitated China’s Rise (The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2018). 4. Baogang Guo, “A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform under Xi Jinping,” Journal of Contemporary China 29, no. 126 (2020): 809–823; Gunter Schubert and B. Alpermann, “Studying the Chinese Policy Process in the Era of ‘Top-level Design’: The Contribution of ‘Political Steering’ Theory,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 24, no. 2 (2019): 199–224. 5. CCP Established National Security Commission Chaired by Xi Jinping, CCTVs.COM , Jan 25, 2014, http://news.cntv.cn/2014/01/ 25/ ARTI1390597439788232.shtml, accessed September14, 2022. 6. For the responsibility of the Deep Reform Commission, please refer to the “Central Comprehensive Deepening Reform Committee Meeting,”

270

R. LIN AND S. KENG

7.

8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18.

Communist Party Member Website, https://www.12371.cn/special/zyq mshggldxzhy19/, accessed September 20, 2022. Jessica C. Teets and R. Hasmath, “The Evolution of Policy Experimentation in China,” Journal of Asian Public Policy 13, no. 1 (2020): 49–59. Jianxing Yu and Biao Huang, “Mapping the Progress of Local Government Innovation in Contemporary China,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Local Governance in Contemporary China, eds. J. Yu and S. Guo (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 119–138. For more information, please refer to TAO Website, http://www.gwytb. gov.cn/zt/. Please refer to TAO website for relevant policies, http://www.gwytb.gov. cn/zt/. “Based on the ‘New High Point’ of Development, Pingtan Strives to Establish a Pleasant Home for Compatriots on Both Sides of the Strait,” Taiwan CN Website, March 23, 2012, http://www.taiwan.cn/tsfwzx/tsr djj/201203/t20120323_2400540.htm, accessed September 18, 2022. Chiao Chun, Fruits and Politics-A Recollection of Cross-strait Agricultural Interaction Over the Past Decade (Taipei: Chuliu Book, 2015), 151–168. For data on Fujian province, please see Fujian’s TAO website, http:// www.fjtb.gov.cn/special/fj66t/201808/t20180801_12042904.htm. Shu Keng, Ruihua Lin, “Institutional Origins of Weak Associations: Taiwanese Business Associations in the Yangtze and Zhu River Delta,” The Taiwanese Political Science Review 11, no. 2 (2007): 93–171. “Notice of the Publication of the Operational Guidelines for Nonstop Production and Transformation of Processing on Order Enterprises to Eleven Provincial Departments Including Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Department,” Department of Commerce of Guangdong Province, June 6, 2008, http://com.gd.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/con tent/post_719364.html, accessed October 2, 2022. For responsibility of NDRC, please refer to NDRC website, https://www. ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/bnpz/?code=&state=123. Shu Keng, Jean Yuzhen Zeng, and Qiang Yu, “The Strengths of China’s Charm Offensive: Changes in the Political Landscape of a Southern Taiwan Town under Attack from Chinese Economic Power,” The China Quarterly 232 (December 2017): 956–981. Shu Keng and Emmy Ruihua Lin, “Bidding for Taiwanese Hearts: The Achievements and Limitations of China’s Strategy to Engage Taiwan,” in New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go?, ed. Richard Weixing Hu (London & New York: Routledge, 2012), 169–189; Shu Keng, “Working on the Identity of the Taiwanese People: Observing the Spillovers from Socio-Economics to Politics across the Taiwan Strait,” in Taiwanese Identity in the 21st

8

19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

271

Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives, eds. Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm (London & New York: Routledge, 2011), 276–321. “Cross-Strait integrated development” was first proposed by Xi Jinping on March 5, 2016, when he participated in the deliberation of the Shanghai delegation at the Fourth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress. See “Xi Jinping’s Participated in Shanghai Delegation’s Deliberation,” CCTV.COM , March 5, 2016, http://m.cnr.cn/news/20160305/t20160 305_521543413.html, accessed October 5, 2022. Relevant policies are available on the website of the TAO, http://www. gwytb.gov.cn/zt/; “Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People’s Republic of China,” Xinhuanet, March 13, 2021, http://www. xinhuanet.com/2021-03/13/c_1127205564.htm, accessed October 17, 2022. See ECFA Website for details, http://www.ecfa.org.tw/ShowFAQ.aspx? id=98&strtype=-1#. See China.com website for the full content of the measures: “Chen Yunlin Announced 15 Policy Measures Adopted by the Mainland to Benefit Taiwan Compatriots,” China.com, April 15, 2006, http://www. china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/ggla/1184690.htm, accessed October 17, 2022. For details, refer to the Facebook Fan Page of the Black Island Nation Youth Front, March 18, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/lslandnation youth/photos/a.178388802344374.1073741829.177308745785713/ 241331436050110/, accessed October 17, 2022. “145 Chinese firms join the Fortune 500,” Sina Finance Website, August 4, 2022, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=174018347046503 0140&wfr=spider&for=pc, accessed October 17, 2022. Shu Keng and Emmy Ruihua Lin, “Mingling but Not Merging: Changes and Continuities in the Identity of the Taiwanese in Mainland China,” in Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 61–74. “Xi Jinping Stresses Adherence to ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Promotion of Reunification of the Motherland,” CPC News Website, October 18, 2017, http://cpc.people.com.cn/19th/BIG5/n1/2017/1018/c41 4305-29594529.html, accessed October 18, 2022. “Education Ministry Relaxes Taiwan High School Graduates’ Exam Score Standard for Mainland Universities,” China Website, China Government Website, July 4, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/04/ content_5207971.htm, accessed October 22, 2022.

272

R. LIN AND S. KENG

28. “TAO appeals to Taiwanese Youth: China Offers More Opportunities than You Can Imagine,” UP Media, March 20, 2020, https:/ /www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?Type=3&SerialNo=141170, accessed October 22, 2022. 29. “Return to Asia: Obama’s Visit to China Opens a New Era for China and the United States,” Trade Magazine, January 2010, https://www.ieatpe. org.tw/magazine/ebook223/b5.pdf, accessed November 29, 2022. 30. “At Nixon Library, Pompeo Declares U.S. Engagement with China a Failure,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2020, https://www.latimes. com/world-nation/story/2020-07-23/at-nixon-library-pompeo-dec lares-china-engagement-a-failure, accessed November 29, 2022. 31. “U.S.-China Joint Statement,” November 17, 2009, The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-chinajoint-statement, accessed November 29, 2022. 32. US Taiwan Watch, Why Should We Care about America? A Comprehensive Assessment of Taiwan-U.S. Relations from the Perspectives of Diplomacy, Institutions, and Major Issues (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 2021), 52– 53. 33. Liang-rong Chen, “Made in China 2025 was defeated by Trump, but China Standard 2035 Is Coming,” Commonwealth Magazine, issue 699, June 2, 2020, https://www.cw.com.tw/article/5100525?template=transf ormers, accessed October 5, 2022. 34. “U.S. Sanctions Chinese Firms Again Via the ‘Double Blacklist,’” Commercial Times, December 18, 2021, https://ctee.com.tw/news/ china/567156.html, accessed October 5, 2022. 35. US Taiwan Watch, 2021, Why Should We Care about America? A Comprehensive Assessment of Taiwan-U.S. Relations from the Perspectives of Diplomacy, Institutions, and Major Issues (Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 2021), 52–53. 36. “U.S. Senate Panel Advances Bill to Boost Support for Taiwan,” Reuters, September 15, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ us-senate-panel-advances-sweeping-taiwan-security-bill-2022-09-14/, accessed October 5, 2022. 37. “Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” TAO Website, December 31, 2008, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/hu/201101/t20110 125_1732427.htm, accessed October 26, 2022. 38. “CIA Deputy Director: Xi Jinping Expects the PLA to Unify Taiwan by Force in 2027,” TVBS, September 17, 2022, https://news.tvbs.com.tw/ world/1908876, accessed October 5, 2022. 39. “Hu Xijin Warns ‘the PLA Is Fully Prepared’, and Pelosi’s Hotel Is Revealed,” Mirror Media, August 1, 2022, https://www.mirrormedia. mg/story/20220801edi032/, accesssed October 17, 2022.

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

273

40. “The New Norm after the PLA Exercise? 27 Planes and 18 Ships Crossed the Median Line in 3 Days,” TVBS, August, 14, 2022, https://news.tvbs. com.tw/politics/1876954, accessed October 5, 2022. 41. “Xi Jinping: Work Together to Achieve the Great National Rejuvenation and to Promote the Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland-Speech at the 40th Anniversary Commemoration of the ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,’” TAO Website, January 2, 2019, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/ xijinping1/201901/t20190102_12128140.htm, accessed November 12, 2022. 42. “The review of ‘Taiwan Policy Act’: Our Government Stays Low Key, Legislators of Ruling Party and Opponent Party All Open Arms,” udn News, September 15, 2022, https://udn.com/news/amp/story/ 123025/6613206, accessed October 30, 2022.

Bibliography Chun, Chiao. Fruits and Politics-A Recollection of Cross-strait Agricultural Interaction Over the Past Decade. Taipei: Chuliu Book, 2015. Guo, Baogang. A Partocracy with Chinese Characteristics: Governance System Reform Under Xi Jinping. The Journal of contemporary China 29, no. 126 (2020): 809–823. Hasmath, Reza, Jessica C. Teets, and Orion A. Lewis. The Innovative Personality? Policy Making and Experimentation in an Authoritarian Bureaucracy. Public administration and development 40, no. 1 (2020): 101–101. Heilmann, Sebastian, Lea Shih, and Andreas Hofem. National Planning and Local Technology Zones: Experimental Governance in China’s Torch Programme. The China quarterly no. 216 (2013): 896–919. Heilmann, Sebastian. Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy Making Facilitated China’s Rise. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018. Keng, Shu. Working on the Identity of the Taiwanese People: Observing the Spillovers from Socio-Economics to Politics across the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives, edited by Gunter Schubert and Jens Damm, 276–321. London & New York: Routledge, 2011. Keng, Shu and Emmy Ruihua Lin. Bidding for Taiwanese Hearts: The Achievements and Limitations of China’s Strategy to Engage Taiwan. In New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations, edited by Richard Weixing Hu, 169–189. London & New York: Routledge, 2013. Keng, Shu and Emmy Ruihua Lin. Mingling but Not Merging: Changes and Continuities in the Identity of Taiwanese in Mainland China. In Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace, edited by Lowell Dittmer, 61–74. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017.

274

R. LIN AND S. KENG

Keng, Shu Ruihua Lin. Institutional Origins of Weak Associations: Taiwanese Business Associations in the Yangtze and Zhu River Delta. The Taiwanese Political Science Review 11, no. 2 (2007): 93–171. Keng, Shu, Jean Yu-Chen Tseng, and Qiang Yu. 2017. The Strengths of China’s Charm Offensive: Changes in the Political Landscape of a Southern Taiwan Town Under Attack from Chinese Economic Power. The China quarterly no. 232 (2017): 956–981. Schubert, Gunter, and Björn Alpermann. Studying the Chinese Policy Process in the Era of ‘Top-Level Design’: The Contribution of ‘Political Steering’ Theory. Chinese Journal of Political Science 24, no. 2 (2019): 199–224. Teets, Jessica C. and R. Hasmath. The Evolution of Policy Experimentation in China. Journal of Asian Public Policy 13, no. 1 (2020): 49–59. US Taiwan Watch. Why Should We Care about America? A Comprehensive Assessment of Taiwan-U.S. Relations from the Perspectives of Diplomacy, Institutions, and Major Issues. Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 2021. Yu, Jianxing and Biao Huang. Mapping the Progress of Local Government Innovation in Contemporary China.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Local Governance in Contemporary China, 119–138. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2019.

Website data "145 Chinese firms join the Fortune 500,” Sina Finance Website, August 4, 2022. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1740183470465030140&wfr= spider&for=pc. Accessed October 17, 2022. "At Nixon Library, Pompeo Declares U.S. Engagement with China a Failure,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2020. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/ story/2020-07-23/at-nixon-library-pompeo-declares-china-engagement-a-fai lure. Accessed November 29, 2022. "Based on the ‘New High Point’ of Development, Pingtan Strives to Establish a Pleasant Home for Compatriots on Both Sides of the Strait,” Taiwan CN Website, March 23, 2012. http://www.taiwan.cn/tsfwzx/tsrdjj/201203/t20 120323_2400540.htm. Accessed September 18, 2022. “CCP Established National Security Commission Chaired by Xi Jinping,” CCTVs.COM, January 25, 2014. http://news.cntv.cn/2014/01/25/ ARTI1390597439788232.shtml. Accessed September 14, 2022. "Central Comprehensive Deepening Reform Committee Meeting,” Communist Party Member Website. https://www.12371.cn/special/zyqmshggldxzhy19/. Accessed September 20, 2022. Chen, Liang-rong. “Made in China 2025 was defeated by Trump, but China Standard 2035 Is Coming,” Commonwealth Magazine, June 2, 2020. https:/ /www.cw.com.tw/article/5100525?template=transformers. Accessed October 5, 2022.

8

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE XI ERA

275

"Chen Yunlin Announced 15 Policy Measures Adopted by the Mainland to Benefit Taiwan Compatriots,” China.com, April 15, 2006. http://www.china. com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/ggla/1184690.htm. Accessed October 17, 2022. "CIA Deputy Director: Xi Jinping Expects the PLA to Unify Taiwan by Force in 2027,” TVBS, September 17, 2022. https://news.tvbs.com.tw/world/190 8876. Accessed October 5, 2022. ECFA Website, http://www.ecfa.org.tw/ShowFAQ.aspx?id=98&strtype=-1. Accessed multiple dates in 2022. "Education Ministry Relaxes Taiwan High School Graduates’ Exam Score Standard for Mainland Universities,” China Government Website, July 4, 2017. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-07/04/content_5207971.htm. Accessed October 22, 2022. Facebook Fan Page of the Black Island Nation Youth Front, March 18, 2014. https://www.facebook.com/lslandnationyouth/photos/a.178388802 344374.1073741829.177308745785713/241331436050110/. Accessed October 17, 2022. Fujian’s TAO website, http://www.fjtb.gov.cn/special/fj66t/201808/t20180 801_12042904.htm. Accessed multiple dates in 2022. "Hu Jintao Delivers an Important Speech to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” TAO Website, December 31, 2008. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/hu/201101/t20110125_1732427. htm. Accessed October 26, 2022. "Hu Xijin Warns ‘the PLA Is Fully Prepared’, and Pelosi’s Hotel Is Revealed,” Mirror Media, August 1, 2022. https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/202208 01edi032/. Accessed October 17, 2022. NDRC website, https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzggw/bnpz/?code=&state=123. Accessed multiple dates in 2022. Nobuyuki, Nose, “China’s Rapid Military Expansion! Europe’s Actively Response and Taiwan’s Enhanced Defense!” nippon.com, October 21, 2021. https:// www.nippon.com/hk/in-depth/d00748/. Accessed October 7, 2022. "Notice of the Publication of the Operational Guidelines for Non-stop Production and Transformation of Processing on Order Enterprises to Eleven Provincial Departments Including Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Department,” Department of Commerce of Guangdong Province, June 6, 2008. http://com.gd.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/content/post_719364. html. Accessed October 2, 2022. "Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Vision 2035 of the People’s Republic of China,” Xinhuanet, March 13, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-03/13/c_1 127205564.htm. Accessed October 17, 2022.

276

R. LIN AND S. KENG

"Return to Asia: Obama’s Visit to China Opens a New Era for China and the United States,” Trade Magazine, January 2010. https://www.ieatpe.org.tw/ magazine/ebook223/b5.pdf. Accessed November 29, 2022. "TAO appeals to Taiwanese Youth: China Offers More Opportunities than You Can Imagine,” UP Media, March 20, 2020. https://www.upmedia.mg/ news_info.php?Type=3&SerialNo=141170. Accessed October 22, 2022. Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Website. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/. Accessed multiple dates in 2022. "The New Norm after the PLA Exercise? 27 Planes and 18 Ships Crossed the Median Line in 3 Days,” TVBS, August 14, 2022. https://news.tvbs.com. tw/politics/1876954. Accessed October 5, 2022. "The Review of ‘Taiwan Policy Act’: Our Government Stays Low Key, Legislators of Ruling Party and Opponent Party All Open Arms,” UDN News, September 15, 2022. https://udn.com/news/amp/story/123025/6613206. Accessed October 30, 2022. "U.S. Sanctions Chinese Firms Again Via the ‘Double Blacklist,’” Commercial Times, December 18, 2021. https://ctee.com.tw/news/china/567156.html. Accessed October 5, 2022. "U.S. Senate Panel Advances Bill to Boost Support for Taiwan,” Reuters, September 15, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-sen ate-panel-advances-sweeping-taiwan-security-bill-2022-09-14/. Accessed October 5, 2022. "U.S.-China Joint Statement,” The White House, November 17, 2009. https:/ /obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement. Accessed November 29, 2022. "Xi Jinping: Work Together to Achieve the Great National Rejuvenation and to Promote the Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland-Speech at the 40th Anniversary Commemoration of the ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,’” TAO Website, January 2, 2019. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/xijinping1/ 201901/t20190102_12128140.htm. Accessed October 5, 2022. "Xi Jinping’s Participated in Shanghai Delegation’s Deliberation,” CCTV.COM , March 5, 2016. http://m.cnr.cn/news/20160305/t20160305_521543413. html. Accessed October 5, 2022. "Xi Jinping Stresses Adherence to ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Promotion of Reunification of the Motherland,” CPC News Website, October 18, http://cpc.people.com.cn/19th/BIG5/n1/2017/1018/c4143052017. 29594529.html. Accessed October 18, 2022.

CHAPTER 9

A Pyrrhic Victory? The Political Economy of US-China Competition from Trump to Biden Zhiqun Zhu

Introduction Cooperation and competition have characterized the nature of the complex US-China relationship for decades. Despite differences in their political systems, values, and national interests, the two countries had been able to work together in dealing with bilateral, regional, and global issues until the relationship sharply deteriorated as a result of recent strategic rivalry. Economic cooperation has served as a bedrock of US-China relations. When political and diplomatic relations are strained, which happens from time to time, it is common economic interests that help keep the relationship cohesive. The business communities on both sides are often the strongest defenders for friendly relations. In the 1990s, for example, as

Z. Zhu (B) Departments of Political Science and International Relations, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_9

277

278

Z. ZHU

China was applying for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, the two countries were in dispute over China’s human rights record. It was the business community that advocated engagement policy and played the leadership role in welcoming China’s inclusion in the world trading system.1 International relations scholars have studied the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. For realists, interdependence is just another word for vulnerability, a condition that states may try to escape by seizing the resources and markets they need for selfsufficiency. Considerable evidence supports both of these claims.2 Dale Copeland argues that interdependence promotes peace when states expect mutually beneficial trade to continue, but creates incentives for war when at least one of the states expects that trade trends will leave it dangerously vulnerable.3 This theory of trade expectations holds policy implications for dealing with Sino-American relations in the contemporary period. Undoubtedly, trade and economic cooperation have been the anchor of this complex relationship since official ties were established in 1979, concurrently with the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s transformative “reform and opening up.” As the Chinese economy continued to expand, which created great opportunities and challenges for US businesses and consumers, economic cooperation grew stronger from the 1980s to 2010s. Despite ups and downs in the relationship, the two countries have been able to manage the relationship largely due to strong common interest in economic cooperation. Major disruptions in the relationship, such as the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 NATO “mistaken” bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 mid-air collision of US and Chinese military aircraft over the Hainan Island, did not erode bilateral economic cooperation. However, as the US-China rivalry has intensified, especially after President Donald Trump (2017–2021) launched the trade war in 2018 as a means to punish China for its alleged illicit trade practices, the overall relationship including economic cooperation has become increasingly difficult. The Joe Biden administration (2021- present) has essentially inherited its predecessor’s policies and continued to use trade and technology as leverage against China. How have rising political tensions

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

279

affected the bilateral economic relationship since the Trump administration? How have disruptions to the economic relationship in turn accentuated political divisions between the two countries? What domestic factors account for the sharp deterioration in the relationship? This chapter aims to shed some light on these questions.

Moving toward Competition The year 2001 was a turning point in US-China relations. On September 11 that year, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and other targets in the United States. Chinese President Jiang Zemin became one of the first world leaders to call President George W. Bush to condemn terrorism and express solidarity with the United States. In October, President Bush traveled to Shanghai to attend the APEC summit. After over ten years of negotiations, China, with the support of the United States, became member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. This heralded a new beginning of the US-China relationship, which finally stabilized after years of disputes on human rights and trade as well as the incidents of the embassy bombing of 1999 and mid-air collision over Hainan in early 2001. With the US focused on fighting terror, China gained a valuable decade to concentrate on economic development from 2001 to 2011. The tide changed in the early 2010s. Following Beijing’s successful hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics and China’s overtaking of Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010, nationalism soared in China. Externally, a more confident China appeared to be assertive in dealing with other countries, as demonstrated in China’s strong handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu row with Japan and its building of military facilities in the disputed South China Sea. China’s growing assertiveness and influence raised concerns in the United States. As it was struggling to get out of the 2008 financial crisis, the United States began to feel threatened by the ever-expanding Chinese power. Barack Obama (2009–2017) came to office calling himself “America’s first Pacific president.”4 The Obama administration significantly accelerated American prioritization of Asia, investing new diplomatic, economic, and military resources there. In a speech in Tokyo on November 14, 2009, Obama promised Asian nations “a new era of engagement with the world based on mutual interests and mutual respect.”5

280

Z. ZHU

The Obama administration began to shift its strategic focus to Asia, with the introduction of a new strategy called the “pivot.” Reflecting upon America’s post-9/11 strategy that heavily focused on combatting terrorism in the Middle East while ignoring the Asia–Pacific region, where China’s power and influence continued to increase, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published an article in Foreign Policy in 2011 titled, “America’s Pacific Century,” which outlined the Obama administration’s plan to shift US foreign policy focus away from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia–Pacific region, widely interpreted as America’s rebalance policy or “return to Asia.”6 For decades, the United States has sought to integrate China into the liberal international order in the belief that this would have a transformative impact on the country and encourage its evolution toward becoming a “responsible stakeholder.”7 At the same time, however, the United States has hedged against the possibility that China might reject the US-dominated international system and would challenge US hegemony through strengthening America’s alliances and maintaining an ever larger military presence in Asia.8 The most tangible outcome of this US approach was China’s accession into the WTO in 2001, leading to a rapid deepening of the country’s integration into the global economy. And China largely followed the international rules upon joining the WTO. The “pivot” to Asia had both economic and security dimensions. The main economic pillar was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was a proposed trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. In military terms, though there was an overall decline in annual US military spending, from $752 billion in 2011 to $634 billion in 2015. This was more a reflection of the scaling down of the large land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Obama administration modernized the US nuclear arsenal and invested in new bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and cruise missiles.9 The Obama administration decided to base 60 percent of US nuclear and high-tech naval vessels, including aircraft carriers, in the Pacific. In addition to consolidating Camp Humphreys in South Korea, the United States opened a new base in Darwin, Australia and negotiated the use of bases in the Philippines. It also conducted military exercises, joined by regional partners, with China as the explicit target.10 The Trump administration ditched the Obama administration’s foreign policy. Notably, it withdrew from the TPP and favored the so-called

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

281

America first policy that shunned multilateralism and cooperation with allies and partners. Meanwhile, the Trump administration initiated stiff competition with China by launching the trade war in 2018. US-China relations entered a stage of free fall. The Biden administration has maintained many of the Trump-era punitive policies toward China but revived alliance politics. While Trump had taken the view that America’s allies were “free riders,” the Biden administration has made the alliance system the cornerstone of its strategy to confront China. This has centered on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and the AUKUS trilateral security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The Biden administration has also developed measures to counter China with G7 allies. The Chinese government has blasted such efforts as “clique politics” and ideological confrontation.11 The Biden administration invited Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea to the NATO Summit for the first time in June 2022. NATO leaders agree that NATO must stand with its partners around the world to preserve the rules-based international order in an era of strategic competition. China has become a new target at the NATO summit. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg remarked, “We see a deepening strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. And China’s growing assertiveness and its coercive policies have consequences for the security of Allies and our partners.”12 As the US administrations have managed to deal with a rising China, China has also adjusted its foreign policy as its interests and power have changed. At the turn of the century, Beijing started to pursue the so-called going out strategy, whereby domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were encouraged to invest abroad to secure cheaper labor and resources and achieve geographical or institutional proximity to markets.13 This growing outward orientation has led China to establish itself as an emerging donor nation. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) adopted in 2013 sought to further establish China’s role in global development through aiding the development of infrastructure in countries across the developing world. China has also sought to increase its influence in existing institutions of global governance while establishing its own alternatives, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Beijing has engaged in land reclamation efforts and made broad claims of sovereignty over large swathes of the South China Sea and its rich resources, while

282

Z. ZHU

taking an increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan that it believes is moving toward independence. In 2016, the Hague tribunal overwhelmingly backed the Philippines in a case on the disputed waters of the South China Sea. China hit out at the ruling as “ill-founded” that was “naturally null and void.”14 During both Trump and Biden administrations, the US government has sought to introduce domestic legislation that seeks to strengthen the capacity of the United States to compete with China. In the 116th Congress (2019–2021), nearly 300 bills concerning China were introduced, and there has been a similar level in the 117th Congress (2021– 2023).15 Indeed, both US political parties are projecting an image of being tough on China, instead of working to improve relations with China. Notably, Congress has passed a series of acts to upgrade US economic and diplomatic relations with Taiwan. From the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act to the 2022 Taiwan Policy Act, Congress has attempted to redefine US relations with Taiwan while insisting that America’s “one-China” policy remains unchanged. The Taiwan Travel Act, for example, allows highlevel officials of the United States to visit Taiwan and vice versa, which the PRC believes has violated US policy of maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Policy Act, if it became law, would bring USTaiwan relations even closer by treating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally and providing military aid and weapons to Taiwan. All this is done in the name of protecting Taiwan’s democracy and security, but one wonders whether Taiwan is more secure as a result of Beijing’s expected retaliations and ever firmer determination to use force to achieve reunification. On the economic front, the Biden administration has not reversed its predecessor’s decision to withdraw from the TPP. The US emphasis on economic openness has become increasingly muted. The United States is not part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a regional free trade agreement taking effect in January 2022 that builds strong ties between China and Southeast Asia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework launched in May 2022 by the Biden administration contains no provisions for greater access for Asian allies to the US market.16 At the same time, China partially shifted toward self-reliance through a policy named “dual circulation” that is aimed at making the economy less reliant on global supply chains.17 However, China remains the largest trading partner of most US allies and partners, and the Chinese economy

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

283

is a crucial part of the global economy. Even those countries that are seeking to counterbalance China militarily, economically, and ideologically recognize that they cannot decouple from the Chinese economy.18 Deepening tensions between the United States and China are increasingly concerning and have highly negative implications for peace in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The United States has responded to China’s rise by strengthening its narrative of “us” versus “them,” which focuses on enlisting the “free world” to confront “authoritarian” nations, or “democracy” against “authoritarianism.” As China’s influence continues to expand and the United States attempts to assemble a coalition of allies and partners to confront Beijing, the two countries are on a dangerous trajectory. A zero-sum US strategy toward China limits space for potential cooperation on a wide range of issues and engenders a cycle of provocations that could easily escalate into a military conflict, especially in the Taiwan Strait. This hardline approach has translated into bloated military budgets across the region while neglecting human security priorities such as reducing poverty and tackling the pandemic.

The Xi Era Xi Jinping took power in 2012, first becoming the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the 18th Party Congress and then assuming the title of the President of the People’s Republic in spring 2013. Xi’s rise to power introduced some fundamental changes to China’s foreign policy and US-China relations. Xi first announced the ambitious “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative during an official visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, and in October 2013, he proposed “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” in a speech in Indonesia. Together called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this massive program has largely defined China’s external relations with much part of the world since then. As Chinese trade, investment, and influence have grown along the Belt and Road, the United States and other Western powers have become increasingly concerned about China’s ability and intention to rewrite the rules for the international system. According to Xi, the world has entered a new era with unprecedented changes unseen in a century, which provides an important period of strategic opportunity for China.19 Xi gradually departed from Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of Taoguang Yanghui (keeping a low profile) and

284

Z. ZHU

shifted to Yousuo Zuowei (get some things done) in foreign policy. Domestically, he has been pushing China toward realizing the “Chinese dream” of rejuvenating the Chinese nation or restoring China’s historical glory as a wealthy and powerful nation. In 2014, Xi started to promote the framework of “New Type of Great Power Relations,” first at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July, and then at the summit with Obama in mid-November. Chinese leaders believe that the “New Type of Great Power Relations” will enable the two countries to establish a new code of conduct in line with China’s interests. However, President Obama cautiously stayed away from the concept. The new framework would require both powers to respect each other’s “core interests.” The United States is suspicions of Chinese intentions and is not fond of Chinese designs to obtain foreign recognition of its “core interests,” which the Obama administration saw as a murky jumble of territorial demands.20 In addition, by using the term “Great Power” to primarily, if not solely, to refer to China and the United States, China aims to elevate itself to parity with the United States. Obtaining US support of the concept would imply Washington’s recognition of China’s strength and power. Apparently, the Obama administration was not prepared to accept “parity and respect between the two countries” implied in the concept.21 Xi’s domestic policies have focused on rooting out corruption, maintaining political and social stability, eliminating abject poverty, and promoting green development. He has succeeded to some extent and has consolidated control at home. However, his high-handed policies in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have been widely criticized. Xi began his third term as the CCP General Secretary at the 20th National Party Congress in October 2022. As a paramount leader, Xi faces enormous challenges, including a declining economy and growing public discontent associated with the pandemic at home, deteriorating relations with other powers (except Russia), and worsening international image. Yet, there is no indication of major changes in domestic and foreign policies under his leadership in the years ahead. Favorable conditions seem lacking in improving China’s relations with Western powers, especially the United States. A man of strong historical mission, Xi may also be taking concrete steps toward achieving reunification with Taiwan.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

285

The Trade War Trump and Xi fundamentally changed the basic structure of the US-China relationship. The Trump administration branded the 2017 National Security Strategy as “an America First National Security Strategy.” The introduction to the document reads, “This National Security Strategy puts America first. An America First National Security Strategy is based on American principles, a clear-eyed assessment of US interests, and a determination to tackle the challenges that we face. It is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology.”22 Under the banner “Make America Great Again,” the Trump administration focused on cutthroat competition with China. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly accused China of “raping” the US economy by manipulating its currency to make its exports more competitive on the global market and claimed that China was “killing” the US on trade.23 He also attributed the US trade deficit with China to its “unfair” trade practices, such as intellectual property theft and lack of access by US companies to the Chinese market.24 In January 2018, Trump began setting tariffs and other trade barriers on China with the goal of forcing it to make changes to its trade practices. The Trump administration claimed that these practices contribute to the US-China trade deficit, and that the Chinese government requires transfer of American technology to China.25 US-China bilateral relations took a nosedive after Trump’s trade war. The tariffs were followed by restrictions on both China’s access to high-tech US products and Chinese investments in the US involving security. Globalization has not brought equal benefits and opportunities to everyone. With a growing wealth gap and political division, it is easy for a politician to look for a scapegoat. China has conveniently become a punching bag of politicians due to its formidable size, undemocratic system, nationalistic policies, and global ambitions. The grievances Trump exploited existed well before he became president and likely will endure after he is gone from the political scene. Economic competition has always been part of the US-China relationship. Before 2018 when Trump launched the trade war, US-China economic relationship had been marked by competition and cooperation, and both economies benefited from the dynamic relationship despite outstanding frictions. Since then, the economic relationship has been

286

Z. ZHU

defined solely by competition, which has added fuel to the fire in the overall deteriorating relationship. In response to US trade measures, the Chinese government accused the Trump administration of engaging in nationalist protectionism and took retaliatory actions.26 At its peak at the end of 2019, the Trump administration had imposed tariffs on more than US $360 billion worth of Chinese goods, while China had retaliated with import duties of its own worth around US $110 billion on US products. After the trade war escalated throughout 2019, in January 2020 the two sides reached a phase one agreement, with China committing to buy an additional US $200 billion of goods and services over the next two years. Those additional purchases would be made up of around US $77 billion in manufacturing, US $52 billion in energy, US $32 billion in agricultural goods, and US $38 billion in services. The latter includes tourism, financial services, and cloud services.27 China also pledged to remove barriers to a long list of US exports, including beef, pork, poultry, seafood, dairy, rice, infant formula, animal feed, and biotechnology. In return, the Trump administration suspended a new 15 percent tariff on around US $162 billion of Chinese goods, with an existing 15 percent duty on imports worth around US $110 billion halved to 7.5 percent. The trade war has hurt the US economy and consumers. As inflation continued to spike in 2022, the Biden administration was facing increasing pressures from the business community and consumers to lift Trump-era tariffs on Chinese imports. In March 2022, the Office of the US Trade Representative reinstated some exclusions from the tariffs imposed on Chinese-made goods that were put in place under the Trump administration.28 Supply chain disruptions and rising inflation forced the Biden administration to reinstate the exclusions. Despite this relief, the Biden administration left tariffs in place on US $350 billion of Chinese goods as of the end of 2022. In addition to taking tit-for-tat measures against US tariffs, China has become more willing to use economic coercion as a tool in foreign policy. It has used economic sanctions against US allies South Korea and Australia during the Trump and Biden administrations. China-South Korean relations took a significant dive in 2017 when South Korea installed a missile battery employing the US Terminal HighAltitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, in response to nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. The decision drew an angry reaction

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

287

from China, which said the anti-missile system could be reconfigured to peer into its territory, threatening its national security. Beijing retaliated by suspending Chinese group tours to South Korea and obliterating the China business of South Korean supermarket giant Lotte, which had provided land for the missile system. Relations did not improve until President Moon Jae-in tried to repair relations with Beijing by pledging the “Three Nos”—that Seoul would not deploy any additional THAAD systems; would not participate in USled missile defense networks; and would not form a trilateral military alliance with Washington and Tokyo.29 Australia and China have had a dynamic and largely friendly relationship since establishing diplomatic ties in 1972. China has been Australia’s largest trading partner since 2007 and its largest export market since 2009. The relationship peaked in 2014, when the two countries reached a free trade agreement. In the same year, Xi Jinping visited Australia and addressed a joint session of the Australian Parliament, praising Australia as a “country of dynamism and innovation.” China-Australia relations began to deteriorate in 2016. After a July 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration against China in the Philippines-China dispute, Australia issued a joint statement with the United States and Japan calling for China to abide by the ruling. Australia became one of the firmest critics of China’s claim to the South China Sea. As China’s investment increases and its influence grows in Australia, some Australians have become alarmed and uneasy. In 2017, Australian media reported alleged Chinese activities to influence Australian politics. It was Australia’s public call in April 2020 for an independent inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus that was the straw that broke the camel’s back.30 China subsequently imposed hefty tariffs on Australian exports including barley and wine while raising barriers to other products including timber, lobster, and coal.

The Tech War Technology competition has become a major part of the US-China rivalry today. During the Biden administration, the United States has tightened control of hi-tech exports to China and beefed-up domestic investment in competition with China.

288

Z. ZHU

On July 29, 2022, Congress passed the US Chips and Science Act (CHIPS Act)—a landmark legislation that earmarked $52 billion in subsidies for America’s semiconductor sector. Around $39 billion will be allocated for building new chip fabrication plants, known as fabs, on US soil. President Biden signed the Act into law in August 2022, in an effort to boost US competition with China’s scientific and technology initiatives.31 The CHIPS Act is part of the American response to a long-running technological competition between Washington and Beijing, as US firms demand more government support to reduce reliance on components produced in Chinese factories. In September 2022, the Biden administration released details of its CHIPS strategy and announced that US technology firms that receive government funding would be banned from building “advanced technology facilities” in China for a decade.32 Recipients of the US $52 billion funding can only expand in China if they make older and cheaper generation of chips. One of the main objectives of the CHIPS Act is to “establish and expand domestic production of leading-edge semiconductors in the United States” to help reduce reliance on foreign producers like China, said Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.33 Apart from focusing on building America’s semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, the Biden administration is planning to cooperate with like-minded allies to build a robust semiconductor supply chain. The United States currently produces about 10 percent of the world’s supply of semiconductors; most chips are manufactured in Taiwan and South Korea. Conceived by the United States, Chip 4 is supposed to be a strategic alliance between major semiconductor powerhouses Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The coalition is viewed as a measure to counter Chinese influence both in the chip industry and in the Indo-Pacific. However, fears of Chinese retaliation and regional tensions may hamper US efforts to rally its East Asian allies behind the proposed Chip 4. The Taiwanese government said in August 2022 it had not been informed about a Chip 4 meeting but added the island has always cooperated closely with the United States on supply chains.34 The South Korean government and its private sector were believed to be wary of the implications and the potential restrictions that might be imposed on them by China,35 South Korea’s largest trading partner and the biggest market for its semiconductor companies.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

289

US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022 raised tensions between the United States and China. Most analysts have focused on the geostrategic implications of Pelosi’s trip. Buried in the sea of news coverage and analysis of this eventful visit was a meeting between Pelosi and leaders of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) in Taipei, including TSMC Chairman Mark Liu and founder Morris Chang. This highlighted how critically important semiconductors are to US national security and what an integral role TSMC plays in making the most advanced chips.36 TSMC is the world’s biggest chipmaker, producing 90 percent of the world’s leading-edge chips. In December 2022, TSMC announced the opening of the company’s second chip plant in Arizona, raising its investment in the state from $12 billion to $40 billion. TSMC has transferred thousands of its scientists and technicians to Arizona and will produce its most advanced 3-nanometer chips in the United States. In August 2022, the United States further restricted shipments to China of high-end graphics processors and AI accelerators used in highperformance computing, a move that has affected Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). Nvidia confirmed that two of its premium AI computing chips and one type of its powerful AI computing system were affected by the new US regulation. AMD confirmed that it had received notification of new licensing requirements from the US Department of Commerce that prevent it from shipping MI250 integrated circuits to China and Russia. In September 2022, Biden signed orders to push more government dollars to the US biotechnology industry, aimed at reducing dependence on China for materials to generate clean energy, weave new fabrics, and inoculate populations against the COVID-19 pandemic. The executive order allows the federal government to direct funding for the use of microbes and other biologically derived resources to make new foods, fertilizers, and seeds, as well as making mining operations more efficient.37 The Biden administration was also considering restricting US chipmaking equipment from being exported to Chinese memory chip makers, which would be the first time the United States restricted shipments to those producers that do not have specialized military applications. The move would hurt global chipmakers like South Korea’s Samsung and SK Hynix, which have memory chip operations in China.38

290

Z. ZHU

China responded to such new restrictions by accusing Washington of abusing export control measures. “The US practices deviate from the principle of fair competition and are a violation of international economic and trade rules,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson Shu Jueting said in September 2022. “They not only damage the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies, but will also seriously affect US companies.”39 In September 2022, Biden signed the first-ever Presidential Directive to define additional national security factors for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to consider in evaluating foreign transactions. Recognizing that certain investments in the United States from foreign persons, particularly those from competitor or adversarial nations, can present risks to US national security, the Presidential Directive says the United States must maintain a robust foreign investment review process to identify and address such risks. China is clearly a target though it is not mentioned in the Directive.40 Chinese investments, like most foreign investments, have to go through national security vetting by CFIUS. The new measure will heighten scrutiny of deals that may give China and other rivals access to critical technologies or may endanger supply chains and personal data. The US government passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) in late 2020, and finalized the Act’s rules in December 2021, which mandate that companies that do not open their books will have trading in their stocks prohibited, potentially affecting 273 Chinese companies including Alibaba, JD.com, and Baidu Inc. as well as state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In August 2022, five of China’s largest SOEs including PetroChina, Sinopec, Aluminum Corporation of China (Chalco), and China Life Insurance announced they would delist from the New York Stock Exchange. Beijing was never willing to allow American auditors to inspect the inner financial workings of its most important state enterprises, particularly those operating in areas with possible national security implications, like the oil and gas industry.41 In late August 2022, American and Chinese officials surprised the world by announcing that they had reached an agreement to allow accounting firms in China to share more information with American regulators about the finances of Chinese companies listed on US stock exchanges. The agreement was a potentially big step toward resolving a

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

291

conflict that had appeared likely to force some of China’s largest companies to leave American stock exchanges starting in 2024. Both Wall Street leaders and Chinese business have opposed removing Chinese companies from US stock exchanges.42 The audit deal shows that the two sides are still capable of working together if they so desire. The Huawei Case Huawei has been at the center of rising US-Chinese tensions over technology and security. Huawei is a Shenzhen-based Chinese multinational technology company and global leader in telecommunications equipment, consumer electronics, and various smart devices. Huawei’s founder Ren Zhengfei was a former People’s Liberation Army soldier. Due to this connection, Huawei has been suspected of espionage for the Chinese military. The Trump administration even claimed, without providing evidence, that Huawei was funded by the Chinese military.43 Since the early 2010s, Huawei has been perceived as a threat to US national security. It has been under US scrutiny with its phones rendered virtually invisible in the US market. In October 2012, the House Intelligence Committee released a report, accusing Huawei and ZTE, two Chinese makers of telecommunications gear, of posing a national security threat and discouraging American businesses from buying their equipment. Since 2012, Huawei has been barred from selling equipment and services in the United States. The Trump administration further tightened restrictions on Huawei, seeking to starve it of crucial components by cutting off all access to US technology. The US Commerce Department rolled out additional rules in August 2020 to block Huawei from accessing chip technology. “We don’t want their equipment in the United States because they spy on us,” Trump told Fox News during an interview in August 2020. “And any country that uses it, we’re not going to do anything in terms of sharing intelligence.”44 Indeed, the Trump administration pressured US allies such as Britain, Germany, and Poland to ban Huawei in their 5G telecom network development.45 On December 1, 2018, Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, was arrested at Vancouver International Airport by Canada’s royal police at the request of the US government. On January 28, 2019, the US Department of Justice unsealed an indictment that charged Meng with bank and wire

292

Z. ZHU

fraud, as well as conspiracies to commit such, in relationship to financial transactions conducted by Skycom, which had functioned as Huawei’s Iran-based subsidiary, in violation of US sanctions against Iran.46 On September 24, 2021, the US Department of Justice announced it had reached a deal with Meng to resolve the case through a deferred prosecution agreement. As part of the deal, Meng agreed to a “statement of facts” that she had made untrue statements about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom and that Skycom conducted transactions through HSBC that cleared through the US, at least some of which supported Huawei’s work in Iran in violation of US law; however, she did not have to pay a fine or plead guilty to her key charges.47 She left Canada free on September 24, 2021, and received a hero’s welcome upon arrival in China.

Impact on Hong Kong The political and economic rows between China and the United States has also affected Hong Kong enormously. Hong Kong is a separate member of the WTO, and under US laws, it used to enjoy special treatment in trade that is different from the rest of China. The US policy changed after Hong Kong passed its National Security Law in 2020. According to Article 23 of the Basic Law that serves as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution” after its handover to China in 1997, Hong Kong was to enact its own national security law to preserve certain freedoms that no other part of China enjoys. But this never happened since such a law was unpopular among Hong Kong people. In February 2019, the Hong Kong government proposed an extradition bill in the aftermath of a criminal case involving a 19-year-old Hong Kong resident who murdered his pregnant girlfriend in Taiwan and returned to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong police were unable to charge him for murder or extradite him to Taiwan because no agreement was in place. The proposed bill would establish a mechanism for transfers of fugitives not only for Taiwan, but also for mainland China and Macau, which were excluded in the existing laws.48 The idea that Hong Kong suspects could be sent for trial in mainland China enraged many Hong Kong residents. Anger over the potential bill erupted into some of the largest protests Hong Kong had ever seen, turning into a broader anti-China, pro-democracy, and sometimes violent

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

293

movement. In response, China passed the National Security Law, which took effect on June 30, 2020, to criminalize acts of: • Secession—breaking away from the country; • Subversion—undermining the power or authority of the central government; • Terrorism—using violence or intimidation against people; • Collusion with foreign or external forces.49 The US government responded swiftly to Hong Kong’s National Security Law. On July 14, 2020, Trump issued Executive Order 13,936 and signed into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act 2020 (HKAA). In the Executive Order, Trump declared that “It shall be the policy of the United States to suspend or eliminate different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong to the extent permitted by law and in the national security, foreign policy, and economic interest of the United States.”50 Hong Kong would hence be treated the same as mainland China for economic and trade purposes. The HKAA imposes sanctions on foreign individuals and entities that materially contribute to China’s failure to preserve Hong Kong’s autonomy. It requires the Department of State to report annually to Congress information about foreign individuals and entities that materially contributed to China’s failure to comply with the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law. “The President shall impose property-blocking sanctions on an individual or entity named in a report, and visa-blocking sanctions on a named individual. The President shall impose various sanctions on a financial institution named in a report, such as prohibiting the institution from receiving loans from a US financial institution.”51 Hong Kong and Chinese officials who crack down on civil rights will be sanctioned. Hong Kong’s appeal as a free port city has sharply declined in the eyes of the US government. Frosty political relations have also affected cultural exchanges. In July 2020, Trump suspended the Fulbright program in the PRC and Hong Kong as part of his punishment of China’s passage of Hong Kong national security law. Despite calls for resumption of the program inside the United States, the Biden administration has not taken any action as of this writing.

294

Z. ZHU

The Indo-Pacific Strategy The Trump administration declared in 2018 in its National Security Strategy that China was a strategic competitor. It also started to use “Indo-Pacific” to replace “Asia–Pacific” in all official statements. Trump himself helped popularize the term “Indo-Pacific” during his first Asia trip as the US president in November 2017. In Vietnam, he delivered a speech declaring a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Hours after being sworn in as President of the United States, Joe Biden began to undo some of Trump’s domestic and foreign policies. In his initial acts as the 46th US president, he signed fifteen executive orders— the first to boost the federal response to the coronavirus crisis. Other orders reversed the Trump administration’s stance on climate change and immigration.52 As expected, he signed an executive order beginning the process of rejoining the 2015 Paris climate agreement, from which the Trump administration had withdrawn. Yet on China policy, he has largely inherited Trump’s practices. A distinct feature of the Biden administration’s China policy is that it abandoned the Trump administration’s “go it alone” approach and worked with US allies and partners to deal with the China challenge together. Whereas Trump preferred confronting China single-handedly, Biden has formed multilateral security groups while strengthening bilateral alliances to counter China. Despite pleas from the US business community to ease tensions, Biden has amplified his predecessor’s policies by strengthening anti-China alliances and implementing additional sanctions.53 Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States increasingly frames the US-China conflict as that between democracy and autocracy.54 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed on November 15, 2020, by 15 Asia–Pacific nations of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries account for about 30 percent of the world’s population (2.2 billion people) and 30 percent of global GDP ($29.7 trillion), making it the largest trade bloc in history at the time. RCEP went into force on January 1, 2022, and is expected to eliminate about 90 percent of the tariffs on imports between its signatories within 20 years, and establish common rules for e-commerce, trade, and intellectual property. As the member with the largest economy, China is poised

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

295

to take the lead in writing trade rules for the group, leaving the United States out of the circle of this free trade bloc in Asia. RCEP also creates an opportunity for economic cooperation between China, Japan, and South Korea as the three countries face challenges to establish a trilateral free trade zone. Not to be outdone, the Biden administration unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes both strategic and economic dimensions. Even as the United States has united the West against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China poses the most serious long-term challenge to international order, according to Secretary of State Antony Blinken. China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it, Blinken said in a major foreign policy speech on China in May 2022.55 To succeed in the future, the Biden administration’s strategy can be summed up in three words—“invest, align, compete”: • The United States will invest in the foundations of its strength at home—competitiveness, innovation, democracy; • The United States will align its efforts with allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause; • And harnessing these two key assets, the United States will compete with China to defend its interests and build its vision for the future.56 On May 23, 2022, President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) during a visit to Asia, involving a total of fourteen countries.57 China is glaringly missing from the list. The four themes of the IPEF are: • • • •

Fair and resilient trade; Supply chain resilience; Infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization; Tax and anti-corruption.58

Taiwan wanted to be part of the IPEF but was not included. Some believe that Taiwan’s exclusion was to appease key “fence-sitter” countries such as Indonesia, whose governments feared angering China.59 To compensate for Taiwan’s “snub,” the United States offered to negotiate

296

Z. ZHU

with Taiwan a twenty-first-century trade initiative, which according to a former Taiwanese official offers nothing new to Taiwan.60 Chinese foreign trade grew rapidly after its ascension into the WTO in 2001, with bilateral trade between the United States and China reaching US $657 billion in 2021. The US trade deficit rose to US $375.6 billion in 2017 before the start of the trade war, from US $103.1 billion in 2002. The deficit rose further to US $378 billion in 2018, before easing slightly to US $345.6 in 2019 after the start of the trade war, according to the Office of the US Trade Representative.61 As inflation kept rising in 2022, Biden was considering lifting some of the tariffs the Trump administration imposed on Chinese imports. While some in the Biden administration have advocated reduction or removal of the tariffs on Chinese products, others such as US Trade Representative Katherine Tai believe that tariffs can serve as “a significant piece of leverage” in the US-China trade relationship.62 She also suggested that the Biden administration should convert this leverage into a strategic program that could strengthen American competitiveness against China and defend US interests in a global economy. With growing pressure from the business community to lift the tariffs, the Biden administration was reportedly considering the best move forward on existing tariffs on China. “We’re discussing that right now. We’re looking at what would have the most positive impact,” Biden said in May 2022.63 The Office of the US Trade Representative also sought comments on the tariffs in May 2022. In early September 2022, the Biden administration announced that it would keep such tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese imports in place while continuing a statutory review of the duties imposed by Trump.64 The review could take months to complete.

A Pyrrhic Victory? In 2020, the United States and China reached an historic agreement on a Phase One trade deal that requires structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange. The Phase One agreement also includes a commitment by China that it will make substantial additional purchases of US goods and services in the coming years.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

297

The Phase One agreement expired in December 2021 with China failing by a wide margin to purchase American goods and services as agreed. By the end of the Trump presidency, the trade war was widely characterized as a failure.65 The tariffs make Chinese imports more expensive for US companies and consumers. High inflation became a major issue in the November 2022 mid-term elections. The Biden administration viewed China as America’s chief rival. Biden made his effort to contain China a personal feud.66 He enjoys claiming that he was the world leader who has spent the most time with Xi Jinping, going back to the days when he was the vice president and Xi was about to be promoted to China’s central government. When Xi became vice president of China and visited the United States, Biden accompanied him across America. Unfortunately, such a long personal relationship failed to create a close bond between the two men. In a 2021 comment, Biden called Xi a “thug” without a democratic bone in his body.67 From Trump’s “America first” and trade war to Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the US government has allocated its diplomatic, economic, and military resources to engage in zero-sum competition with China. However, the United States alone is unlikely to be able to achieve its stated goals. The success of US strategies to a great extent depends on whether US allies and partners will be onboard or not. Many countries derided Trump’s “go it alone” approach and also resisted being dragged into a US-China conflict under Biden. Most countries approach the US-China rivalry with the “hedging” strategy—they want to maintain strong security ties with the United States but develop dynamic economic relations with China. The IPEF is an important part of Biden’s strategy to counter growing Chinese clout in the Asian economic sphere. However, with their own national interests in mind, not all current IPEF members share the US objectives. At the first official in-person IPEF ministerial meeting on September 8–9, 2022, India decided to join three pillars of the IPEF— supply chains, tax and anti-corruption, and clean energy—while opting out of the trade pillar for now, because so far, under the trade track, broader consensus had not emerged on certain issues such as environment, labor, and public procurement.68 India is concurrently negotiating trade deals with the UK, Canada, and EU. Prime Minister Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in September 2022, which was also attended by Russian leader Putin and Xi Jinping. Like

298

Z. ZHU

China, India has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Clearly, India wants to maintain close relations with all major powers. The IPEF is aimed at creating an economic space separate from China, but it will not be easy as participating countries are highly dependent on trade with China. In a time of prolonged confrontation between the United States and China, each country is weighing how much distance it should create between the two competitors. Australia has the highest level of economic dependence, with China accounting for 35 percent of its trade in 2020. New Zealand follows at 25 percent and South Korea at 24 percent. The seven members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that make up half the IPEF participants, including Vietnam and Indonesia, have about 10 to 20 percent of their trade with China. All of the other participants have more trade with China than with the United States.69 China holds a large share of trade of important resources and goods, such as semiconductors, rare earths, and minerals essential for the production of batteries. The United States aims to strengthen supply chains within the framework to weaken this dependence. Against this backdrop, challenges remain in maintaining unity among the participants, despite the agreement to start negotiations. Who is winning in the intensifying US-China rivalry? The short answer is all are losers, including third parties who have not done much to lower tensions between the United States and China. China is the third-largest trading partner of the United States, with a huge bearing on the US economy. The trade war has been detrimental to both countries. According to a September 2019 Moody’s Analytics study, just one year after the trade war started, the US economy had lost approximately 300,000 jobs and 0.3 percent of GDP due to the trade war.70 And China suffered a $35 billion loss due to reduced exports to the United States in the first half of 2019.71 Deteriorating diplomatic and political relations have adversely affected the economic relationship. For example, following Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taiwan in August 2022, the PRC launched unprecedented large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. China’s war games led the Biden administration to recalibrate its thinking on whether to scrap some tariffs or potentially impose others on Beijing.72 In 2020, approximately 378,000 visitors from China arrived in the United States, representing a significant decrease from the previous year. Before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, around 2.83 million arrivals were recorded for the year 2019.73

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

299

American businesses in tourism are disappointed to learn that as the Chinese begin to plan international trips now as the COVID-19 control eases, they are not returning to the United States. Violent crimes, COVID-19 cases, anti-Chinese racism, and tense US-China relations are cited as top red flags for the Chinese who are interested in visiting the United States but decide not to come.74 Scientific cooperation between the two countries has sharply declined since 2019. Since 2013 China has been by far the most frequent international partner for American scholars’ collaborations in the field of life sciences. However, recent studies suggest that initiatives aimed at reducing Chinese access to US technology and cutting-edge research have likely negatively impacted the quality of US scientific publications and, hence, slowed American advancements in some scientific fields.75 The “China Initiative,” which was launched by the Trump administration in November 2018 to prosecute perceived Chinese spies in American research institutions, was widely criticized for being racially biased and unfairly treating Chinese Americans. The Department of Justice eventually ended the initiative on February 23, 2022. The trade war has failed to decouple the two economies. According to the US-China Business Council, US goods exports to China hit an all-time high in 2021. After hitting a trough in 2019 during the peak of tariff escalations, US goods exports continued a two-year growth streak in 2021. That boost was powered by substantial growth in the three largest categories of exports: oilseeds and grains, semiconductors and their componentry, and oil and gas. In 2021, as global trade continued recovering from the pandemic, US goods exports to China grew by 21 percent to an all-time high of $149.2 billion. On the other hand, in 2020, the latest year of services data available, US services exports to China contracted by 33 percent to $37 billion. This was the lowest amount since 2013, reflecting the devastating impact of the pandemic on travel and education.76 As in years past, China remained the United States’ third-largest goods export market in 2021, outsized only by USMCA partners Canada and Mexico. While China fell to the United States’ sixth-largest services export market in 2020, when it comes to combined goods and services exports that year, it was still the top export market for four states, in the top three for thirty-eight, and in the top five for forty-seven. US businesses and farmers across the country benefit from exporting to China, and US exports to China continue to support US jobs across

300

Z. ZHU

the country.77 A frosty political relationship between the two will only jeopardize the mutually beneficial economic relationship. Both liberals and realists recognize the highly interdependent nature of the US and Chinese economies. While realists view this as a source of conflict and try to decouple the two economies, liberals hold the hope that the two powers will be able to mitigate tensions by deepening cooperation. Unfortunately, from Trump to Biden, realism has dominated strategic thinking of Washington’s China policy, with more focus on the competitive dimension of the relationship while downplaying areas of common interests. As a result, the relationship continues to be strained, and the two countries are stuck in this unenviable position.

Conclusion China’s growing authoritarianism under Xi Jinping has fed the narrative in Washington that the US engagement policy toward China in the past few decades has failed, and therefore, the United States has to correct that failure by ruthlessly competing with China and thwart China’s expanding power and influence. This strategy since President Trump has entrenched Beijing’s insecurity and belief that the United States and its allies will not accept China’s legitimate rise as a great power. In return, Beijing has become more assertive in defending its national interests and has answered the US punitive measures in kind. Competition has dominated the bilateral relationship nowadays, and cooperation has become increasingly difficult. Yet, given the interdependent nature of their economies, can the two powers really decouple? How should they rationally manage strategic competition? Are they willing to take the heavy toll with a pyrrhic victory? Strategic rivalry between China and the United States is unlikely to wane in the years ahead due to structural conflicts associated with power transition. President Biden has said the United States is not seeking confrontation or a new cold war with China. But viewed from Beijing, the United States is exactly pushing for confrontation with China, especially on the Taiwan issue. With Congress churning out one bill after another to upgrade US-Taiwan relations, the political foundation of US-China relationship is shaky now. US policies that underscore ruthless competition with China demonstrate no inclination to improve relations with China.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

301

This chapter has suggested that healthy competition between great powers benefits both sides since “a rising tide lifts all boats,” but zerosum competition aimed at knocking out one’s rival is unlikely to succeed and will only hurt both sides. Complete decoupling is also unrealistic since the two economies are joined at the hip, as evidenced by growing trade despite the trade war. The United States faces extraordinary political and social challenges at home. Political polarization and extremism aggravate existing tensions and compromise America’s ability to address major policy problems. Ironically, the two political parties, who disagree on almost everything, find common ground in being tough on China and blaming China for many perennial problems in the United States. Likewise, the return of strongman leadership in China makes the country more nationalistic and less willing to work with the United States on issues that affect both, such as climate change. Looking forward, the prospect of a better relationship is dim. Xi Jinping has further consolidated power after the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, and the Republican Party took control of US House of Representatives after the November 2022 mid-term elections. Hawks within the Republican Party have vowed to take a tougher approach toward China. Washington is unlikely to win the trade war or tech war with China, not least because most US allies and partners do not wish to see confrontation between the two powers. Washington should recalibrate its China policy by balancing its security concerns about China’s rise and its need to work with China on a wide range of issues. Competition without cooperation will lead to confrontation. Beijing, on the other hand, could create more favorable conditions for cooperation by toning down its rhetoric in foreign policy and allay concerns from the United States and others about China’s long-term intentions. The United States should not apply double standards in dealing with China either. Washington cannot expect Beijing and others to abide by international rules if itself violates them. The United States should also refrain from representing the “international community.” In fact, China has many friends in the developing world and non-Western countries, and confronting China is not the approach favored by most countries in the international community. Biden and Xi met in person on November 14, 2022, in Bali, Indonesia, while attending the G20 summit. The two leaders attempted to build

302

Z. ZHU

guardrails for the bilateral relationship, but it is a tall order for them to prevent the cutthroat competition from veering into conflict. For example, the Biden administration is unlikely or unable to stop the new Speaker of the House from visiting Taiwan, which is bound to raise tensions again in the Taiwan Strait and damage the already troubled USChina relationship. Before long, the 2024 US presidential campaign will begin, and China will predictably become the punching bag of most, if not all, presidential candidates. In the final analysis, both sides must reflect upon their own behaviors instead of always pointing fingers at each other. The relationship can be improved if both sides demonstrate political wisdom and courage.

Notes 1. Zhiqun Zhu, “To Support or Not to Support: the American Debate on China’s WTO Membership,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 6 (2000): 77–101. 2. Jack Snyder, “Trade Expectations and Great Power Conflict—A Review Essay,” International Security 40, no. 3 (2016): 179–196. 3. Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton University Press, 2014). 4. Mike Allen, “America’s First Pacific president,” Politico, November 13, 2009, https://www.politico.com/story/2009/11/americas-first-pac ific-president-029511. 5. “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall,” The White House, November 14, 2009. 6. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-cen tury/. 7. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick coined the term during a speech in 2005, https://www.ncuscr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/ 04/migration_Zoellick_remarks_notes06_winter_spring.pdf. 8. Graaf, Naná de, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, “US–China Relations and the Liberal World Order: Contending Elites, Colliding Visions?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 125. 9. “Fact Check: Has President Obama ‘Depleted’ The Military?” NPR, April 29, 2016. 10. Woodward, Jude, The US vs China in Asia: A New Cold War? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), 12. 11. Catherine Wong, “Beijing Hits Back at Joe Biden’s Plans to Put ‘China Challenge’ on G7 Agenda,” South China Morning Post, February 17, 2021.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

303

12. “NATO Leaders Meet with Key Partners to Address Global Challenges, Indo-Pacific Partners Participate in a NATO Summit for the First Time,” NATO News, June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_197287.htm. 13. Yeung, Henry Wai-chung, and Weidong Liu, “Globalizing China: The Rise of Mainland Firms in the Global Economy,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 49, no. 1 (2008): 57–86; Also, Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Routledge, 2013). 14. Tom Phillips, et. al, “Beijing Rejects Tribunal’s Ruling in South China Sea Case,” The Guardian, July 13, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china. 15. Walter Lohman, “Scenarios for the U.S. Congress’s Stance on China,” GIS Reports, April 13, 2021, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/bidenanti-china. 16. Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Challenges Facing Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Policy,” The Japan Times, July 27, 2022. 17. “China’s Dual Circulation Strategy Means Relying Less on Foreigners,” The Economist, November 5, 2020. 18. Ali Wyne, America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), 94–95. 19. For a thorough discussion of foreign policy changes under Xi Jinping, please refer to Zhiqun Zhu, A Critical Decade: China’s Foreign Policy (2008–2018) (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2019). 20. Cheng Li and Lucy Xu, “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’” The Brookings Institution, December 4, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chineseenthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-rel ations/. 21. Ibid. 22. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-con tent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 23. Jeremy Diamond, “Trump: ‘We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country’,” CNN, May 2, 2016, https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/01/ politics/donald-trump-china-rape/index.html. 24. “What Is the US-China Trade War?” The South China Morning Post, April 13, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/ 3078745/what-us-china-trade-war-how-it-started-and-what-inside-phase. 25. Ana Swanson, “Trump’s Trade War With China Is Officially Underway,” The New York Times, July 5, 2018. 26. Keith Bradsher, “With Higher Tariffs, China Retaliates Against the U.S.,” New York Times, May 13, 2019.

304

Z. ZHU

27. “What Is the US-China Trade War?” The South China Morning Post, April 13, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/ 3078745/what-us-china-trade-war-how-it-started-and-what-inside-phase. 28. Katie Lobosco, “Biden Administration Eases Some Trump-era Tariffs on Exports from UK and China,” CNN , March 23, 2022. 29. Kim Tong-Hyung, “China, South Korea Clash over THAAD Anti-missile System,” The Associated Press, August 11, 2022. 30. Zhiqun Zhu, “China-Australia Relations: Downward Spiral as Australia Plays ‘Deputy Sheriff’ to the US?” ThinkChina (Singapore), June 16, 2020. 31. “Biden Signs CHIPS Act to Boost US Chipmakers, Compete with China,” Al Jazeera, August 9, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/eco nomy/2022/8/9/biden-signs-chips-act-to-boost-us-chipmakers-com pete-with-china. 32. Joanna Partridge, “US Bans ‘Advanced Tech’ Firms from Building Facilities in China for a Decade,” The Guardian, September 7, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/07/us-bansadvanced-tech-firms-from-building-facilities-in-china-for-a-decade. 33. Alix Langone, “US Bans Tech Companies with Federal Funding From Building Factories in China for 10 Years,” CNET, September 7, 2022, https://www.cnet.com/tech/computing/us-bans-tech-companieswith-federal-funding-from-building-factories-in-china-for-10-years/. 34. “Taiwan Says It Has Not Been Informed of ‘Chip 4’ Meeting,” Reuters, August 19, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/taiwan-says-ithas-not-been-informed-chip-4-meeting-2022-08-19/. 35. Arjun Gargeyas, “The Chip 4 Alliance Might Work on Paper, But Problems Will Persist,” The Diplomat, August 25, 2022, https://thediplomat. com/2022/08/the-chip4-alliance-might-work-on-paper-but-problemswill-persist/. 36. Arjun Kharpal, “Pelosi’s Taiwan Trip Puts the World’s Biggest Chipmaker Back in the Spotlight of U.S.-China Rivalry,” CNBC, August 3, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/04/pelosi-taiwan-visit-putstsmc-back-in-spotlight-of-us-china-rivalry.html. 37. Trevor Hunnicutt, “Biden Executive Order to Fund U.S. Biomanufacturing Industry,” Reuters, September 12, 2022, https://www.reuters. com/article/usa-biden/biden-executive-order-to-fund-u-s-biomanufactu ring-industry-idUSL1N30I0FL. 38. Yvonne Lau, “Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Trip Has Intensified the U.S. and China’s Chips Showdown. Now the World’s Chipmakers May Be Forced to Pick a Side,” Fortune, August 7 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/ 08/07/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-us-china-chipmaker-pick-sides/.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

305

39. Cheng Ting-Fang, “U.S. Tightens Chip Export Rules to China, Hitting Nvidia and AMD,” Nikkei Asia, September 1, 2022, https://asia.nikkei. com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/U.S.-tightens-chip-export-rulesto-China-hitting-Nvidia-and-AMD?utm_campaign=IC_asia_daily_free& utm_medium=email&utm_source=NA_newsletter&utm_content=article_ link. 40. “FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs Executive Order to Ensure Robust Reviews of Evolving National Security Risks by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,” the White House, September 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/ 09/15/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-to-ensure-rob ust-reviews-of-evolving-national-security-risks-by-the-committee-on-for eign-investment-in-the-united-states/. 41. Dexter Tiff Roberts, “Giant Chinese Companies Delisting from U.S. Exchanges Signals the End of an Era,” SupChina Newsletter, August 19, 2022, https://supchina.com/2022/08/19/giant-chinese-compan ies-delisting-from-u-s-exchanges-signals-the-end-of-an-era/?utm_source= SupChina&utm_campaign=f308227512-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_ 08_19_08_11&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_03c0779d50-f30822 7512-165951838. 42. Ana Swanson and Keith Bradsher, “U.S. and China Announce Deal to Share Audits of U.S.-Listed Chinese Firms,” The New York Times, August 26, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/26/business/uschina-audit-deal.html. 43. “Trump Administration Claims Huawei ‘Backed by Chinese Military,’” BBC, June 25, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53172057. 44. Matt O’Brien, “Trump Administration Imposes New Huawei Restrictions,” AP News, August 18, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/smartp hones-business-china-asia-pacific-us-news-7a01cf8cf13f7681df62094f27b 1bcbc. 45. Toby Helm, “Pressure from Trump Led to 5G Ban, Britain Tells Huawei,” The Guardian, July 19, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/ technology/2020/jul/18/pressure-from-trump-led-to-5g-ban-britaintells-huawei. 46. Gordon Corera, “Meng Wanzhou: The PowerPoint that Sparked an International Row,” BBC, September 24, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-us-canada-54270739. 47. Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Meng Wanzhou Free to Return to China after Cutting Plea Deal with U.S. Justice Department,” The Globe and Mail, September 24, 2021, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/ article-huaweis-meng-to-resolve-fraud-case-in-plea-deal-that-does-not-inc lude/.

306

Z. ZHU

48. “Hong Kong-China Extradition Plans Explained,” BBC, December 13, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-47810723. 49. The full text of the National Security Law can be found at https://www. elegislation.gov.hk/fwddoc/hk/a406/eng_translation_a406)_en.pdf. 50. The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization, The Executive Office of the President, July 14, 2020, https://www.federalre gister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-execut ive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization. 51. The HKAA became Public Law No: 116–149 on July 14, 2020. The text of “H.R.7440 - Hong Kong Autonomy Act” can be found at https:// www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440. 52. “Biden Sets to Work on Reversing Trump Policies with Executive Orders,” BBC, January 21, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada55738746. 53. “Businesses Push Biden to Develop China Trade Policy,” New York Times, September 1, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/01/business/ economy/biden-china-trade-policy.html. 54. Robert A. Manning, “Does Biden’s ‘Democracy v. Autocracy’ Framework Make Sense?” The Hill, June 13, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/nat ional-security/3521187-does-bidens-democracy-v-autocracy-frameworkmake-sense/. 55. Anthony Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” The George Washington University, Washington, DC, May 26, 2022, https://au.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinken-speechthe-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. 56. Ibid. 57. The fourteen members are: Australia, Brunei, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, United States, and Vietnam. 58. “Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,” The White House, May 23, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statemaents-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-eco nomic-framework-for-prosperity/. 59. Kurt Tong, “Congress Should Get Creative on Taiwan,” The Hill, May 11, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3484872congress-should-get-creative-on-taiwan/?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_ 20220523&instance_id=62135&nl=the-morning®i_id=170482098& segment_id=93088&te=1&user_id=a53cca97bfcaace2ac0045d34f39289a. 60. Kao Koong-lian (高孔廉) made this comment during a Zoom discussion of cross-Strait economic ties on August 28, 2022. 61. “What Is the US-China Trade War?” The South China Morning Post, April 13, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/ 3078745/what-us-china-trade-war-how-it-started-and-what-inside-phase.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

307

62. David Lawder, “USTR Tai Calls U.S. Tariffs on Chinese Goods ‘Significant’ Leverage,” Reuters, June 23, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/bus iness/ustr-tai-says-us-tariffs-chinese-goods-are-significant-leverage-202206-22/. 63. Maegan Vazquez, “Biden Says He’s Discussing the Future of China Tariffs Imposed by Trump,” CNN, May 10, 2022. 64. David Lawder, “Biden Administration to Maintain China Tariffs while Review Continues,” Reuters, September 2, 2022, https://www.reuters. com/markets/us/biden-administration-maintain-china-tariffs-while-rev iew-continues-2022-09-02/. 65. Naomi Elegant, “The Centerpiece of Trump’s Trade Deal with China ‘Failed Spectacularly,’” Fortune, February 8, 2021. 66. John F. Copper, “Where Are the Chinese Students Going?” Pearls and Irritations, September 1, 2022. 67. Chris Megerian, “Biden and Xi, Once Travel Companions, Face off in Virtual Meeting,” The Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2021. 68. Shreya Nandi, “India Opts out of Joining IPEF Trade Pillar, to Wait for Final Contours,” Business Standard, September 10, 2022, https:// www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-opts-out-ofjoining-ipef-trade-pillar-to-wait-for-final-contours-122091000344_1.html. 69. SATSUKI KANEKO, “U.S. Carves Path to Indo-Pacific Framework, but Will Others Follow?” Nikkei Asia, September 11, 2022, https://asia.nik kei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-carves-pathto-Indo-Pacific-framework-but-will-others-follow?utm_campaign=Mar keting_Cloud&utm_medium=email&utm_source=USCBC+News+Ove rview+9.12.22&%20utm_content=https%3a%2f%2fasia.nikkei.com%2fPoli tics%2fInternational-relations%2fIndo-Pacific%2fU.S.-carves-path-to-IndoPacific-framework-but-will-others-follow. 70. Mark Zandi, et. al., “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage Done,” Moody’s Analytics, September 2019, https://www.moodysanalyt ics.com/-/media/article/2019/trade-war-chicken.pdf. 71. “Trade War Leaves Both US and China Worse off,” UNCTAD, November 6, 2019, https://unctad.org/news/trade-war-leaves-both-us-and-chinaworse. 72. Jeff Mason and David Lawder, “Exclusive: U.S. Rethinks Steps on China Tariffs in Wake of Taiwan Response,” Reuters, August 12, 2022. 73. Agne Blazyte, “Number of Visitors to the U.S. from China 2005–2020,” Statista, May 13, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/214813/ number-of-visitors-to-the-us-from-china/#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20a pproximately%20378%2C000%20visitors,recorded%20for%20the%20year% 202019. 74. Lindsey Roeschke and Scott Moskowitz, “Concerns About Mass Shootings and Other Violent Crimes May Be Scaring Chinese Travelers Away

308

Z. ZHU

From the U.S.,” Morning Consult, September 12, 2022, https://mornin gconsult.com/2022/09/12/united-states-mass-shootings-violent-crimedeter-chinese-travelers/. 75. Ilaria Mazzocco and Maya Mei, “How U.S.-China Tensions Have Hurt American Science,” Big Data China, CSIS, December 9, 2012. https:/ /bigdatachina.csis.org/how-u-s-china-tensions-have-hurt-american-sci ence/. 76. “US Export Report 2022,” The US-China Business Council, https:/ /www.uschina.org/reports/us-export-report-2022#:~:text=In%202021% 2C%20as%20global%20trade,33%20percent%20to%20%2437%20billion, accessed on September 15, 2022. 77. Ibid.

Bibliography Blinken, Anthony. “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China.” The George Washington University, Washington, DC, May 26, 2022. Bradsher, Keith. “With Higher Tariffs, China Retaliates Against the U.S.” New York Times, May 13, 2019. Clinton, Hillary. “America’s Pacific Century.” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011. Copeland, Dale C. Economic Interdependence and War. Princeton University Press, 2014. Elegant, Naomi, “The Centerpiece of Trump’s Trade Deal with China ‘Failed Spectacularly.’” Fortune, February 8, 2021. Graaf, Naná de, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “US–China Relations and the Liberal World Order: Contending Elites, Colliding Visions?” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 113–131. Hua, Shiping, ed. The Political Logic of the US–China Trade War. Lexington Books, 2022. Lawder, David. “USTR Tai Calls U.S. Tariffs on Chinese Goods ‘Significant’ Leverage.” Reuters, June 23, 2022. Li, Cheng and Lucy Xu. “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations.‘” The Brookings Institution, December 4, 2014. Liang, Guoyong and Haoyuan Ding. The China–US Trade War. Routledge, 2022. Manning, Robert A. “Does Biden’s ‘Democracy v. Autocracy’ Framework Make Sense?” The Hill, June 13, 2022. Mazzocco, Ilaria and Maya Mei. “How U.S.-China Tensions Have Hurt American Science.” Big Data China, CSIS, December 9, 2012. Partridge, Joanna. “US Bans ‘Advanced Tech’ Firms from Building Facilities in China for a Decade.” The Guardian, September 7, 2022.

9

A PYRRHIC VICTORY? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY …

309

Roberts, Dexter Tiff. “Giant Chinese Companies Delisting from U.S. Exchanges Signals the End of an Era.” SupChina Newsletter, August 19, 2022. Snyder, Jack. “Trade Expectations and Great Power Conflict—A Review Essay.” International Security 40, no. 3 (2016): 179–196. “Trump Administration Claims Huawei ‘Backed by Chinese Military.‘” BBC, June 25, 2020. Wong, Catherine. “Beijing Hits Back at Joe Biden’s Plans to Put ‘China Challenge’ on G7 Agenda.” South China Morning Post, February 17, 2021. Woodward, Jude. The US vs China in Asia: A New Cold War? Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017. Wyne, Ali. America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022. Zandi, Mark, et. al. “Trade War Chicken: The Tariffs and the Damage Done.” Moody’s Analytics, September 2019. Zhu, Zhiqun. A Critical Decade: China’s Foreign Policy (2008–2018). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2019. Zhu, Zhiqun. “To Support or Not to Support: the American Debate on China’s WTO Membership.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 6 (2000): 77–101.

CHAPTER 10

Will Taiwan Become the Next Ukraine? Xi Jinping’s Preparation for Armed Reunification Suisheng Zhao

Although Chinese officials have denied their similarities, Taiwan and Ukraine have many parallels. They both are young democracies living next to powerful authoritarian states holding belligerent irredentism. While Vladimir Putin views Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” who should be ruled by Moscow, Xi Jinping sees Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be brought back into the fold of the motherland. Both Putin and Xi are strong leaders with the mission to rebuild their lost empires. They have supported each other in their territorial ambitions. On February 4, 2022, twenty days before Russia’s invasion, they signed a joint statement, which hailed their partnership as “no limits” and “no forbidden areas for cooperation.” China denounced “further enlargement of NATO,” and Russia reconfirmed “its support for the One

S. Zhao (B) Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_10

311

312

S. ZHAO

China principle” and “Taiwan as an inalienable part of China.”1 China then refrained from condemning Putin’s invasion and blamed NATO’s expansion for causing Russia’s military action, tacitly approving Putin’s territorial aggression. As a result, when Russia invaded Ukraine in April 2022, some Western observers predicted that Russia’s invasion could presage China’s imminent attack on Taiwan. Extending support to the prediction, posts like “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” (今日乌克兰, 明日台湾) went viral on Chinese social media. Expecting Russia’s quick victory, Chinese netizens called on Beijing to recover Taiwan when US political and military resources were diverted away from Asia to Europe.2 Xi Jinping, however, did not coordinate with Russia to send the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to invade Taiwan. Chinese ambassador to the US even denied Xi knew in advance of Putin’s invasion because “Conflict between Russia and Ukraine is no good for China. Had China known about the imminent crisis, we would have tried our best to prevent it.”3 The outside world may never know if Putin informed Xi of his plans. But approaching a key moment leading up to his crowning as ruler for life at the 20th Party Congress in the fall of 2022, Xi obviously did not look for any turbulence. Absent a dramatic move by Taiwan toward independence, Xi was not under any urgency to gamble his marbles to settle the Taiwan issue. In this case, Xi Jinping’s use of force to take Taiwan has not been an imminent threat. But the center of gravity in Beijing’s Taiwan policy has moved from peaceful unification to military coercion. Xi Jinping has set a timetable and intensified military preparation to coerce Taiwan into accepting his terms of unification and take Taiwan by force if needed. Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine has not given Xi a pause but offered lessons about the importance of being well prepared to conquer Taiwan. China does not have an independent public opinion. Xi Jinping has tolerated and used online armed unification opinions to support his military threat. Xi has taken steps to enhance the capacity of the PLA for joint operation and logistic support, tried to minimize economic volubility to the Western sanctions if China launches the war, and tried to deter possible US intervention in the Taiwan contingency.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

313

Xi Jinping’s Sense of Empowerment The Taiwan issue has been left from the civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) and the CCP and suspended by the US intervention after the Korean War in the 1950s. Although Mao Zedong never ceased preparing to take Taiwan by force and tried to keep the civil war alive by continuing to shell the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) occupied by KMT troops, his successor Deng Xiaoping inaugurated a two-pronged policy of peaceful offensive to build goodwill through political negotiations and economic and cultural exchanges and military coercion to deter Taiwan’s independence and compel reunification in the 1980s. Later, Deng Xiaoping posed a formula of “One Country, Two Systems” as a viable way for reunification. Emphasizing the desire for peaceful unification, Beijing has never renounced the use of force and continued military threats. But for decades, while Chinese leaders threatened the use of force to deter Taiwan’s independence, they were afraid of the threat would cause military conflict to undermine the regime’s social contract with the Chinese people to make them rich. Therefore, Chinese leaders had been strategically patient. During the negotiation with the US regarding diplomatic recognition in 1978, Deng Xiaoping said Beijing could wait for one hundred years to resolve the Taiwan issue. Jiang Zemin started to articulate that China would not wait forever but lacked the capacity to back up the implicit threat. Premier Zhu Rongji threatened the Taiwan voters in 2000 that Chen Shui-bian’s victory would spark a war, but Beijing did not follow through with the threats after the election.4 Focusing on China’s internal issues, Hu Jintao tolerated the status quo of neither unification nor formal independence and focused on preventing Taiwan’s independence rather than promoting reunification. After more than three decades of rapid growth, China has become the second largest economy in the world and has drawn Taiwan closer into its economic orbit. China’s military modernization over the past three decades has been transformative. The PLA has built the capacity to project power over China’s periphery, including the waters around Taiwan, and break through the “First Island Chain” stretching from Japan to Taiwan and to the Philippines. An integral part of the First Island Chain, Taiwan is not just a “lost territory” to be recovered; it is of critical geostrategic value for the PLA to defend China’s expanded maritime interests. Bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s wing would help improve the PLA’s ability to

314

S. ZHAO

impede US naval and air operations in the Western Pacific and free up many of China’s military assets to pursue other objectives.5 Xi Jinping, therefore, has perceived China’s economy as resilient enough to withstand shocks and capital flight. His forceful imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 provided a window to understand Xi’s modus operandi. Xi has built a new consensus in the CCP that China can assert itself on a broad range of issues beyond those permitted by the “development-first” approach, even at the cost of economic growth. Regime security and territorial integrity trump everything else, including the economy.6 As China’s most powerful leader in generations, Xi has become less patient and made it clearer than his predecessors that he will complete the great task of national unification according to his timetable and terms. Continuing to make efforts to prevent Taiwan’s de jure independence, he has shifted the focus from deterring independence to pushing forward unification and emphasized that he will “reserve the option to use all necessary measures,” not just to stop Taiwan’s independence but also to compel reunification.7 Meeting Taiwan’s envoy at the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in October 2013, Xi felt emboldened enough to push that “The issue of political disagreements that exist between the two sides must reach a final resolution, step by step. These issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”8 Regarding China’s complete reunification as a key component of the China Dream of great rejuvenation at the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017, Xi effectively linked the resolution of the Taiwan issue to the timetable of “two centenary goals” of the China dream: building a moderately prosperous society by the CCP 100th birthday in 2021 and advancing China to cultural, economic, and military prowess in 2049, the 100th birthday of the PRC.9 Commemorating the 40th anniversary of Beijing’s promulgation of its “one country, two systems” formula for unification on January 1, 2019, Xi clearly rejected the position of shelving cross-Strait political differences indefinitely. Speaking on the 110th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty on October 9, 2021, Xi made a blunt threat, “Although peaceful reunification best meets the overall interests of the Taiwanese people, no one should underestimate the Chinese people’s staunch determination, firm will, and strong ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”10

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

315

Making the point earlier, Premier Li Keqiang left out the word “peaceful” in front of “reunification” in his government report to the NPC in 2020, departing from the standard expression that Chinese leaders had used for four decades in government reports. Although he used “peaceful reunification” in his press conference, the absence of the word “peaceful” in the Report caused considerable fluttering among commentators. In his 2021 NPC report, “peaceful” disappeared again before “unification.” One state-run media explained that “due to Taiwan secessionists and US interference, the mainland would have no choice, and must push the process with non-peaceful efforts, including a military one.”11 Xi has sent strong signals of his willingness of using force with PLA’s more frequent and intrusive military activity in the Taiwan Strait. Staging live-fire combat drills in the vicinity and sailing aircraft carriers and warships through the Strait, China’s military airplanes made their first circumnavigation around Taiwan in November 2016 and have conducted “island encircling exercises” regularly since then. In January 2017, the Liaoning aircraft carrier carried out its circling patrol around Taiwan Island. In March 2019, two PLA fighters crossed the median line, which is also known as Davis median line in the Strait, with its origins in the 1954 US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. In August 2020, two Chinese air force fighters crossed the median line again to protest the US Health Secretary Alex Azar’s visit to Taipei. China has sent many airplanes across the median line since then. Although the line carries no legal force as China has never officially recognized the existence of the line, both sides had respected it in the past to avoid conflict. Between 1954 and 2019, there had been only three reported Chinese military incursions across the line.12 Leveraging these exercises for coercive signaling, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman denied the existence of the median line.13 The PLA no longer respects Taiwan’s claims to separate airspace and territorial waters, and Chinese planes and ships have crossed over the median line regularly. During the PLA’s military exercises around Taiwan in 2022, 185 PLA aircraft crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait in one week, from August 3 to 15. Making a new normal of sending fighter jets and bombers to Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and holding military exercises dangerously close to the island, Beijing not only forced Taiwan’s fighters to scramble in response and air defense missile units on alert, to inflict stress on Taiwan’s much smaller force, but also made the island’s status

316

S. ZHAO

among the thorniest points of friction in the tense US-China relationship, ramping up tensions across the Taiwan Strait significantly.

The “Public Opinions” for Armed Unification Demonstrating his impatience and making his points known, Xi Jinping has allowed the urge for armed reunification (武统) to be openly expressed in Chinese media after Tsai Ing-wen’s election as Taiwan’s President in 2016. The statements for armed reunification (武统) such as “peaceful unification already lost” and “better to take military actions earlier than later” went viral in the tightly controlled Chinese media to back up Xi’s timetable and red lines.14 A retired PLA major general urged Beijing to abandon the illusion of peaceful unification because “Historically China’s unification was never accomplished peacefully.”15 Others called Beijing to demonstrate its military capacity to conquer the island decisively and forcefully undermining Tsai’s political support, isolating Taiwan, and hindering Tsai’s promise to revive a slowing economy.16 Speaking in a packed auditorium, Beijing scholar, Jin Canrong, laid out a four-stage strategy of “observation, pressure, confrontation, and war.” Observing Tsai for about a half year, Beijing should increase economic and diplomatic pressure. If Tsai still refused to embrace the 1992 consensus, China should confront Tsai with explicit military threats. If Tsai won re-election and continued the course in 2020, Beijing should wage war in 2021, the year of the completion of the first stage target of Xi’s China dream. At that time, China’s military capacity would have grown to the level that the US would not dare to intervene.17 An article on the TAO official website amid COVID-19 stated that strong public outrage raised the voice for armed reunification. It proposed six triggers for armed unification. In addition to the three red lines in the ASL, the article added three more: organizing an independent referendum; a military attack on the mainland; and large-scale unrest in Taiwan.18 One retired PLAN rear admiral explained that the changing mode came along with the changing military power balance. When China’s military was not only behind the US but also behind Taiwan, Beijing had to avoid talking about the war. Now the PLA obtained full control power over the air and sea and could take back Taiwan within one week, Beijing must “accelerate preparation for armed unification.”19 A retired PLA Major General made the same claim earlier that modern

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

317

warfare was about enduring ability. Taiwan, as an island close to the mainland without a strategic heartland, could not endure the war. The PLA could easily destroy all strategic targets in Taiwan as soon as the war starts.20 Amid heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, a military cartoonist nicknamed “JeffHoly” released seven seasons of Armed Unification cartons on social media. Attracting the attention of many Chinese netizens, these cartons illustrate PLA troops launching blitzkrieg-style offensives on Taiwan beach, the airport, and the Presidential Office. China’s state-run media claimed that many web users “hope this will come true as soon as possible.”21 A music video titled “Traveling to Taiwan in 2035” went viral on Chinese social media. It features landmark tourist attractions in Taiwan alongside landmarks on the mainland and predicts that China’s bullet train railway will reach Taiwan by 2035. In response to the anxiety in Taiwan, a TAO spokesperson said, “The song reflects the good wishes of people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits … this wish will certainly come true.”22 The post-unification prospects have become a sensational topic in China’s scholarly and policy discussions. Liu Junchuan, a Deputy Director of the TAO, triggered a round of hot discussions about post-reunification governance in Taiwan when he said at a public forum in October 2021 that the island’s post-reunification revenue should all be spent on improving the well-being of its residents. A state-run media asserted that “Liu’s words echoed the essence of the mainland’s governance experience that can be applied to Taiwan.”23 The next month, the TAO named Taiwan’s Premier Su Tseng-chang, Parliament Speaker You Si-kun, and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu as stubborn secessionists and made public that it had drawn up a list of people who fall into this category to be pursued criminally for life.24 Chinese media explains that no matter what kind of solution, peaceful or not, Taiwan secessionists will be judged, condemned, and punished according to Criminal Law for splitting the country, destroying the reunification of the motherland, and endangering national security.25 After Xi Jinping called for the exploration of the OCTS framework for Taiwan in 2019, Chinese scholars rushed to design the post-unification political, economic, and social systems in Taiwan with the baselines in mind. The Hong Kong version 2.0 of the OCTS after Xi Jinping forcefully imposed National Security Law in 2020 has become a model for Taiwan. A shorthand for the imposition of the will of the CCP on

318

S. ZHAO

all aspects of life, OCTS was left only in name because it foregrounds the central government’s comprehensive governing authority and patriots governing Hong Kong. Believing that simply delegating power and benefits was not a sound solution, Chinese scholars have urged effective institutional arrangements for state authority and one-China sovereign order at the beginning of the system design to leave no room for Taiwan’s independence. While most scholars proposed sending mainland officials and imposing a national security law on Taiwan to punish opponents of Chinese rule, the reconstruction of mentality and value foundation to eliminate the ideas of Taiwan’s independence is high on the agenda.26 Chinese Ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, explained in a television interview in August 2022 that Taiwanese people had been brainwashed by pro-independence ideas and must be re-educated to become patriots. One scholarly research systematically elaborated that because governing Taiwan would be far more difficult than Hong Kong, whether in terms of the geographic extent or the political conditions, Taiwanese society must be “re-Sinified” as harmonization to embrace official Chinese values and irredentist narratives of great national unification and to fundamentally transform the political environment that has been long shaped by “Taiwanese independence’ ideas.”27 These calls for flexing muscle played an important part in molding public opinion to back up Xi’s timetable and red lines.

The Selective Engagement with Tsai Ing-Wen Enjoying inflated empowerment and “public opinion” support, Xi Jinping has become selective in the engagement with Taiwan because of the poor performance of the peaceful offensive to stem the tide against unification in Taiwan. The election and re-election of independent-minded DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000 and 2004 was a major setback for the peaceful offensive and demonstrated the growing sentiments in Taiwan for the support of the DPP. The peaceful offensive suffered another setback when DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen won the 2016 presidential election and refused to accept the 1992 consensus, now a touchstone term for Beijing. Xi Jinping described the 1992 Consensus as “the greatest common denominator” and “political bottom line” for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.28 Anyone who did not embrace the term was seen as refusing to accept “one China.”29

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

319

Although Tsai refrained from recognizing the 1992 Consensus, she did not bluntly reject it. Tsai has reiterated in public that her cross-Strait policy remains in compliance with the constitution of the Republic of China (ROC), as well as other statutes which rest on the principle of “one China.” She has not pursued de jure independence and promised to maintain the status quo.30 But Beijing has not accepted Tsai and believes she has pursued an incremental independence. Tsai received an unprecedented phone call from President Trump to congratulate her election victory. For Beijing, this was evidence of collusion between Taiwan’s independence force and anti-China foreign forces and the change of the status quo. Beijing accused Tsai of taking actions to eliminate Chinese influence in Taiwan, including culturally de-Sinicization, economic exclusion of China, diplomatic resistance to China, and promotion of democracy against China.31 Before Tsai’s inauguration, Beijing repeatedly reminded her that the 1992 Consensus was the “foundation and precondition” for positive interaction and warned that “when the foundation is not stable, the earth and the mountains would be shaken.”32 In her inauguration speech, Tsai avoided using the word “consensus” but said she respected the “historical fact” that a meeting took place in 1992. Although it could be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgment of the 1992 consensus, Beijing’s TAO had a simple rejoinder: Tsai’s speech was an “incomplete exam.” She must clearly state that she adhered to the 1992 consensus rather than being “ambiguous and evasive.”33 In response, Beijing adopted a double-track strategy of political and diplomatic containment and selective socio-economic accommodation.34 Doubling down on all means short of war to contain Tsai, Beijing suspended TAO’s communications with the MAC and halted the semiofficial channel between the ARATS and the SEF, making it difficult for the Tsai government to fulfill its obligations to its citizens. For example, whereas Beijing had for years quietly obliged requests to deport Taiwanese criminal suspects to face justice in Taiwan, Beijing ignored such requests and implored Kenya to deport some fifty Taiwanese suspects of telecommunications fraud to the mainland after Tsai’s inauguration. Then, Cambodia deported twenty-five Taiwanese suspects to the mainland. The Tsai administration was not able to reach the mainland agencies regarding family member visits and repatriation.

320

S. ZHAO

Beijing also resumed the efforts to deny Taiwan international space and whittle down the already small number of countries that officially recognize Taiwan. Right after the election, Beijing announced on March 18, 2016, that it was establishing diplomatic relationship with the Gambia, an African nation that had maintained ties with Taiwan for nearly two decades. When Nicaragua shifted diplomatic ties to Beijing on December 10, 2021, eight countries severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taipei’s list of diplomatic allies was down to fourteen. Beijing also blocked the WHA and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) from issuing invitations for the Tsai government to participate in their assembly meetings. Beijing also banned DPP-aligned and pro-independence businesspeople from visiting and doing business on the mainland. So were some Taiwan entertainment industry figures who took a pro-independence stance but developed their careers and made their names on the mainland. Beijing also significantly reduced tourist permits to Taiwan. The plummeted mainland tourists and the economic losses suffered by Taiwan’s tourist industry led to the closing of many tourist agencies. But Beijing continued its “silver canon offense” (银弹攻势), including the preferential treatment to transfer benefits (让利) to Taiwanese businesspeople, to integrate Taiwan more closely with the mainland economically and socially. After Xi Jinping promised in October 2017 that people from Taiwan would enjoy national treatment when they pursue their education, start businesses, seek jobs, or settle on the mainland, the Chinese government unveiled 31 preferential measures in February 2018, covering fields of industry, finance, and taxation, land use, employment, education, and health care. The restrictions on high-skilled personnel from Taiwan in 134 professions were lifted. Starting from September 1, 2018, Taiwan residents who live on the mainland for six months or more with stable jobs are eligible to apply for residence permits.35 To counter Beijing’s offensive, the Tsai administration adopted a New Southbound Initiative to diversify Taiwan’s trade relationships and attract visitors from Southeast Asian countries. But such policy measures have not significantly reduced Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland. The value of Taiwan’s exports to the mainland and Hong Kong in 2021 increased 24.8% from 2020 and hit an all-time high of US $188.9 billion. Beijing has remained Taiwan’s largest trading partner and the largest destination of foreign direct investment.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

321

Weaponizing the trade dependence, Beijing suddenly banned the imports of Taiwanese pineapples in February and sugar apples and atemoya in September 2021, claiming they were bringing in pests. More than 90% of the banned fruits were exported to the mainland because of Beijing’s zero tariffs on Taiwanese fruits after 2005 and the simple logistics of shipping them to the mainland. The ban was in fact Beijing’s retaliation to Taiwan’s proposal to change the name of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to the Taiwan Representative Office in the US. China has insisted that countries only allow Taiwan to call its offices “Taipei,” after its capital city as if it were just a province.36 Beijing has hounded any countries that do not toe China’s line in Taiwan mercilessly. Lithuanian allowed Taiwan to use its name on a representative office in 2021. China imposed economic sanctions in response. Beijing’s pressure, however, did not bring Tsai to endorse the 1992 Consensus because it would alienate her supporters in Taiwan. It is to Beijing’s dismay that the peaceful offensive has failed to woo Taiwanese people to identify more closely with China. The Taiwanese identity has gradually taken hold at the expense of the Chinese identity due to the longtime separation, the differences in their political systems, ideologies, and values, and de-Sinicization education by the DPP. Since Taiwan emerged as a democracy in the 1990s, growing numbers of its people have seen themselves as vastly different in values and culture from the authoritarian system on the mainland, although Taiwan’s economic ties to the mainland expanded. It is paradoxical that while the rise of China’s national strength has given Beijing confidence to take back Taiwan on its own terms, China’s rise has not increased its attractiveness to the Taiwanese people to identify with the PRC.37 Each successive generation in Taiwan has found the notion of unification less appealing. Only 2% of Taiwan’s 23.5 million people identified as solely Chinese in 2022, down from 25% three decades ago.38 Support for Beijing’s one country two systems sank to a low point after 2020 when China imposed a crackdown on Hong Kong, eroding the freedoms that the former British colony was promised under its own version of the framework. Taiwan is not Hong Kong. No Taiwanese can accept to be subordinated to Beijing as Hong Kong has been since 1997. Witnessing Hong Kong’s failed experiences of one country two systems, the Taiwanese people re-elected Tsai in 2020. The DPP is well positioned to win the forthcoming elections in 2024 and beyond. As one observer

322

S. ZHAO

suggested, “In the face of continuing pressures, the policy carrots that China has used to entice Taiwan toward unification may carry even less weight.”39 In this case, many people in China no longer see a hope for a peaceful resolution and look toward military threat and armed unification.

Putin’s Ukraine Invasion and Xi’s Military Preparation Putin’s battlefield setbacks in Ukraine and the strength of the Western sanctions could be sources of apprehension. But just like Deng Xiaoping was not swayed by the Western sanctions against his Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, Xi Jinping has not slowed down his preparation for taking Taiwan on his schedule and terms. A Chinese scholar suggested that “The Ukraine war can be seen as a rehearsal of the Taiwan Strait crisis. China can learn a lot from it, such as how to fight militarily, what pressures may be encountered in politics, how to resolve these pressures, and so on.” He advised that “China’s military expenditure is still low and must quickly increase it to 2% of GDP.”40 The military readiness for an aggressive and lethal start to break the heavily fortified Taiwan Strait is crucial. But a quick victory is not guaranteed. An invasion of Ukraine is easier than taking Taiwan. Ukraine is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain, while Taiwan is separated from the mainland by an open water of 130 kilometers (80 miles) wide at its narrowest point. The Russian military invaded Ukraine from the north, south, and east and expected to take control of Kyiv within days. But Ukraine mounted a much stronger resistance than expected. The Russians suffered a series of failures on terrain friendlier than what the PLA would face in amphibious landings to operate on rugged mountainous terrain. The PLA has not experienced a major island landing campaign since it took Hainan Island in 1950. Its last major war was with Vietnam in 1979. The PLA might be more motivated than the Russians as national reunification is a mantra buried deep in its core. But an amphibious invasion could be extremely difficult and bloody. The PLA must prepare various logistical supplies and transport enough forces to the limited number of suitable landing sites for an aggressive and lethal start before moving inland. Taiwan military has fortified the few landing sites and deployed cruise and guided missiles to hammer an exposed invasion force.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

323

Additionally, taking metropolitan areas like Taipei with a population of around 2.6 million, roughly the size of Kyiv, but almost three times as densely populated, and another 4 million live on its outskirts, could be hard. Any military attack would likely result in massive civilian casualties.41 A bloody and protracted war could blow up both the CCP claims that Taiwanese are fellow Chinese and the reunification myth. Liberating the compatriots by killing them in large numbers is embarrassing and could be a threat to the legitimacy of the regime. To present the world with a fait accompli, Xi has long been making military preparation, which may fix many of the problems and minimize the risks that plagued Russia in Ukraine. To mobilize maximum force with great speed and destruct Taiwan’s military infrastructure, the sweeping reorganization of the PLA in 2015 paid special attention to complicate joint operations among sea, air, and land forces and replaced the former Army-dominated system with a series of joint theater commands. The reorganization also modernized the PLA’s logistical system and created the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), a nationwide command whose sole mission is to ensure each of the services, along with the Theater Commanders, is equipped with the right kinds of logistical equipment during a crisis. The “Joint Logistics Support Mission 2018” featured medical drones, helicopter-dropped refueling depots, and operations in harsh and remote terrain.42 Russia’s serious problems with poor logistics to keep its forces supplied with fuel, food, and munitions and effectively conduct combined arms operations have reinforced the importance of these reforms. The JLSF has been a real command that has conducted operational training for the Taiwan contingency. The results of that training were manifest in the military exercises to blockade Taiwan in August 2022. Going beyond the initial amphibious operations, the PLA has accelerated its preparation for urban offensive and island operations. Preparing for the costly and bloody operation that could negatively impact morale at home and prestige abroad, Chinese military discourse has described urban warfare as “battling rats in a porcelain shop” to seize effective control across Taiwan quickly enough to enable a fait accompli that would be difficult to reverse.43 The PLA has been equipped to make long-range destruction; planes, missiles, and the navy could wreak havoc on the island and decapitate the leadership in Taipei.

324

S. ZHAO

If a quick seizure of Taiwan could not be accomplished, the PLA may siege or blockade the targets, such as Russia’s barbaric siege on Mariupol: batter the place into near-submission and then encircle the trapped population to prevent either escape or life-saving replenishments of food, water, and weaponry. Taiwan is a modestly sized island, compared to Ukraine’s vast land expanse, which would enable the PLA to utilize its forces more efficiently and for a longer duration in a blockade of the entire island. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s missile firings twice closed the Strait to all ocean and air-borne commerce, sending shipping and insurance rates soaring for the duration of the crisis.44 A US Defense Department report admits that given that Taiwan is roughly one hundred miles from the coast of mainland China, it would not be difficult for the PLAN to maintain a large, concentrated naval force surrounding the island and employ kinetic blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. The blockade operations could also combine with concurrent electronic warfare, network attacks, and information operations to further isolate Taiwan and control the international narrative of the conflict to pressure Taiwan into surrender.45 Chinese state media claimed that it was a war plan rehearsal to show its capability of blockading the entire island in the event of a future military conflict when the PLA Eastern Theater Command organized its affiliated Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, and Joint Logistic Support Force and conducted real-time combat-oriented joint exercises in the sea and air space to the north, southwest, and southeast of the island of Taiwan after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. Joint blockade, sea assault, land attack, and air combat drills were at the core of the operation to test the troops’ joint operational capabilities. Two northern exercise areas designated by the PLA were located off the coast of Keelung Port and Taipei Port, the central exercise area was off the Taichung Port, the southern exercise area was off the Kaohsiung Port, and the eastern one was off the Hualien Port. The exercise areas are a “template” for “locking down Taiwan.” From the designated PLA military drills area, the operations could pose a threat to major ports and shipping lanes in Taiwan, forming a complete blockage. This blockage style could be one of the action plans taken in the future for achieving the reunification by force. The PLA’s drills were “comprehensive and highly targeted,” and the operational plans rehearsed could be directly translated into combat operations.46

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

325

The joint operation demonstrated that the PLA had at least some training and preparation to launch ballistic missiles over Taiwan into a closure area while concurrently having naval forces operating east of Taiwan. The demonstration of coordinated PLA Rocket Force, PLAN, and PLAAF deconfliction is the mark of a force that understands the importance of a Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ), something many commentators have criticized the PLA for not having that level of sophistication. After twenty years of military modernization the PLA is demonstrating, they are not only cognizant of this concept but are able to execute them on the world stage with little notice. The demonstration of the PLA’s actual capacity to mount and sustain an effective blockade would put “unbearable” pressure on the people and thus government of Taiwan, so that the latter would do the “sensible thing” and accept a peaceful reunification. Taiwan is not as prepared as Ukraine was to defend itself. Its government has hesitated to invest enough in defense because a majority of Taiwanese had been in an unwavering state of denial about the seriousness of the Chinese threat, and many people believe the US would come to their defense. The government had not committed to improving the Taiwanese military to the point where it could act as an effective deterrent against future Chinese aggression. Taiwan’s military service requirement has been reduced from two years to just four months, which cannot bode well for the defense against the PLA, a well-trained, professional force. With a massive defense budget of $230 billion, China completely outguns Taiwan on the ground, in the air, and at sea. As per 2019 figures, the Chinese military had two million active soldiers. Whereas Taiwan had only 0.17 million active soldiers. China supports its troops with 5,250 tanks, while Taiwan has only 1,110 of them. China also boasts of having 35,000 armored vehicles, while Taiwan has just 3,472. China’s air force has a total of 3,285 aircraft, whereas Taiwan’s force is made up of 741 birds. Of this, China has 1,200 fighter jets, including a fleet of stealth fighter jets. Taiwan has only 288 fighter jets. China also has 450 specialist bomber aircraft and 286 transport aircraft, while Taipei only has 19 transport planes and no bombers. China has the world’s largest navy with a fleet strength of 777. Taiwan lags behind with 117. Beijing also holds a massive naval advantage, with Taipei having no equivalent to its three aircraft carriers. The Chinese can deploy 41 destroyers and

326

S. ZHAO

49 frigates, as against four and 22, respectively, for Taiwan. In submarine warfare, Beijing is utterly dominant, with nine nuclear attack and six ballistic missile submarines. Taiwan doesn’t have any of either and only has two diesel attack submarines versus 56 for China (Fig. 10.1).47 The Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced the Taiwan government and people to rethink over defense. Ukraine’s heroic resistance to Russia’s invasion has led a growing public to support overhauling military reservists’ training and, if necessary, mandatory military service.48 While only 40% of Taiwanese respondents expressed their willingness to go to war in defense of the island in December 2021, that number jumped to 74% in March 2022, two months after Russia’s invasion.49 The will of the local people to defend their territory can never be underestimated if they are motivated enough. The US learned the lesson in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Russia has taken the lesson in Ukraine. The willingness of Ukrainians to risk their lives demonstrates how an overmatched military can be formidable when fighting for saving loved ones and homeland. The seeming military advantages of Russia did not guarantee victory. Ukrainians fought hard when their backs were against a wall.50

Fig. 10.1 Beijing vs. Taiwan military power (Graphic Pranay Bhardwaj, Explainers, “Just How Strong is China’s Military Compared to Taiwan?” Firstpost, August 5, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/just-how-strong-ischinas-military-compared-to-taiwan-11014921.html)

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

327

Chinese propaganda has, therefore, tried to weaken the will of the Taiwanese people to resist invasion by capitalizing on the US avoidance of directly fighting the Russian military or even imposing a “no-fly zone.” Chinese media has been filled with the stories that America is too divided, overstretched, and just plain weary to sustain its far-flung commitments after Biden’s botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. Facing the stiffest domestic and external challenges, the US would abandon Taiwan and not fight directly with the nuclear-armed PLA. Whether it is due to the Chinese propaganda, the share of Taiwanese respondents who did not believe the US would send troops against a Chinese attack doubled from 28.5% in October 2021 to 53.8% in April 2022. In the same survey, 38.6% of respondents said they thought Beijing would invade Taiwan.51

Minimization of Economic Vulnerability The US and some of its allies and partners imposed overwhelming and unprecedented sanctions on Russia in the face of a common threat, seriously damaging Russia’s economy and making Russia an international pariah. China’s economy is far larger and more diversified than Russia’s, making Western sanctions more painful to implement. Russia has successfully leveraged its ties with some close US partners, such as India, to keep them on the sidelines, even after reports emerged of alleged Russian war crimes, which has reassured China that its far greater economic might will prevent many countries from supporting Taiwan. Global support for Taiwan could be more muted than support for Ukraine has been, as few countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.52 But Xi Jinping has prepared for the worst-case scenario because China’s interconnectedness with the world economy could also make it more vulnerable. China has decimated its natural endowments and imports 70% of its oil and 31% of its natural gas. It is the world’s largest importer of food, especially corn, meat, seafood, and soybeans. China’s manufacturing sectors have relied heavily on external markets and technology. It needs unfettered access to global markets, resources, and technology to maintain growth. Western sanctions would deal a devastating blow to the Chinese economy, creating conditions that would threaten domestic political stability and usher in the failure, not the realization, of the China dream. Beijing’s irredentist claims over Taiwan would not shield China from international condemnation or sanctions if the people of Taiwan do not

328

S. ZHAO

accept forced reunification. Beijing’s position that the Taiwan issue is a domestic affair commands less international respect and engenders more suspicion.53 Japan, Australia, and many other countries would join the scansion for their own security and economic interests. Taiwan is of vital importance in the global tech supply chain. About 92% of the world’s supply of advanced semiconductors came from the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation in 2021. A war across the Taiwan Strait would be disastrous for the global economy, not just for China and the United States, and plunge the region and world into chaos. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has repeatedly declared the commitment to boosting cooperation with the US in response to growing concerns of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. Xi Jinping has called for self-sufficiency to minimize vulnerability. Technological self-sufficiency is primary goal of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), and achieving a high degree of self-reliance is the essence of Xi Jinping’s new development dynamic. The US trade war and the threat of decoupling were a wake-up call for the vulnerability of high dependency on the US market and technologies. Huawei Technologies, crippled by sanctions preventing its access to high-end chips, was a cautionary example. Xi Jinping announced the domestic and international Dual Circulation Strategy (DCS) to promote exports and simultaneously encourage stronger domestic demand in a bid to increase other countries’ economic dependence on China and reduce its dependence on others.54 Leveraging nearly 1.4 billion consumers, DCS recalibrated the industrial policy with an emphasis on state-led growth and self-reliance. Setting an urgent agenda to lessen China’s dependence on the US, Xi has pushed hard for basic science and technology investment and Chinese firms to localize key industrial products and systems because “there is no way that China can ask for or rely on buying the key and core technology from foreign countries.”55 Using all the levers of industrial policy to support indigenous innovation, China has moved rapidly in developing key technology sectors and sharpening their focus on the development of the US embargoed and controlled technologies. This strategy is aimed to strengthen the relative integrity and autonomy of the domestic industrial chain, particularly in chokepoint areas, and produce critical technologies such as semiconductors domestically.56 China has ramped-up efforts to develop home-grown technologies, from semiconductors to advanced materials to aircraft, to ease reliance on imports. China has become the only country in the world that owned

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

329

all the industrial categories listed in the UN Industrial Classification, with 39 industrial categories, 191 intermediate categories, and 525 subcategories. The system can independently produce all industrial products from clothing and footwear to aerospace. Some technologies have progressed from “running to follow” to “running parallelly” and then to “running to lead.”57 Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt reveals that China is on a trajectory to overtake the US in the rivalry for AI supremacy. China’s edge begins with its big population, which affords an unparalleled pool of talent, the largest domestic market in the world, and a massive volume of data collected by companies and government in a political system that always places security before privacy.58 If China can maintain its centrality to global supply chains, the US and its allies would be far more reticent to impose wide-ranging sanctions against China. While the trade war forced China to seek greater self-sufficiency in technology and build a complete industrial system, the sanctions on Russia that included curtailment of access to the SWIFT payments system and a freezing of Russian assets are another wake-up call for China to reduce its reliance on the US-dominated global financial system and the dollar-based international payments system. China has been concerned about dollar dominance since the global financial crisis in 2008 and has attempted to internationalize its currency by settling more trade with RMB. Criticizing the dependence on a dollar-based single currency system as one cause of the global financial crisis in 2009, China demanded RMB to be included in the basket of key international currencies (the dollar, euro, pound, and yen), on which the value of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is based. The proposal was approved in 2015, paving the way for Beijing to flex its muscle in the global economy. RMB the weight in the SDR was raised to 12.28% on August 1, 2022, an increase of 1.36 percentage points from the 2016 assessment. Although the RMB’s share of global payments, foreign exchange transactions, and reserve assets are still far below the dollar’s, China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements totaling more than 3 trillion yuan with more than 40 countries, including 400 billion yuan each with Hong Kong and South Korea, 350 billion yuan each with the United Kingdom and the European Central Bank, 350 billion yuan each with the UK and the European Central Bank, 300 billion yuan with Singapore, and 150 billion yuan with Russia. RMB internationalization has also been promoted through the Belt and Road Initiative. On June 25, 2022, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the Bank for International Settlements

330

S. ZHAO

(BIS) signed an agreement to participate in the RMB liquidity arrangement, which is to build a reserve fund pool to provide liquidity support for central banks participating in the arrangement to help meet reasonable international demand for RMB and maintain regional financial security when financial markets fluctuate. The arrangement initially includes a group of central banks in Asia–Pacific, including Bank Indonesia, Central Bank of Malaysia, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Central Bank of Chile. The plan could pave the way for RMB to play an anchor role in the Asia–Pacific region.59 China has promoted RMB internationalization through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While RMB is used as a transaction currency less than 2% globally, RMB usage among BRI economies is about 5%. China made big progress when Pakistan decided to use RMB instead of the US dollar to pay for the surge of capital goods imported from China in January 2018. Russia could turn out to become one of China’s key partners in establishing a yuan-based financial framework. Rather than having been shaken by the Russian aggression on Ukraine, China’s economic ties with Russia have instead been boosted since the beginning of the war. Trade between the two countries has been growing, with China becoming an avid importer of Russian oil, new trade arrangements being signed, and Russia greatly increasing its international use of the yuan, even as it considers buying yuan and other currencies for its wealth fund, after having had its dollars and euros frozen.60 China’s central bank is developing a digital currency, which would have the benefit of further encouraging yuan settlement for trade. China has an alternative system to bypass SWIFT, the Cross Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which saw a 75% increase in processing volume in 2021, although 80% of CIPS transactions still involve SWIFT. The sanction on Russia has accelerated the development of alternative options.61 Worrying China’s vast dollar-denominated holdings range from US Treasury bonds to New York office buildings could be taken by the US and other Western countries in the event of the Taiwan invasion or other crisis, Chinese regulators held an emergency meeting on April 22, 2022, to discuss how they could protect China’s overseas assets from US-led sanctions. Although some bankers doubted whether Washington could ever afford to cut economic ties with China given its status as the world’s second largest economy and huge holdings of dollar assets, the Chinese government was concerned about what could be done to protect the nation’s overseas assets, especially its $3.2 trillion in foreign reserves.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

331

China’s banking system must be prepared for a freeze of its dollar assets or exclusion from the Swift messaging system.62

The US Factor in the Taiwan Contingency Beijing has always factored in the possible US intervention in the Taiwan contingency. It was US President Harry Truman’s order of the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 that forced the PLA to call off the attempt to “liberate” Taiwan, which had been prepared after conquering most of the mainland and Hainan Island. Since the normalization of the diplomatic relationship in 1979, the US policy on Taiwan has been self-contradictory and confusing to China. The US has officially upheld a “one-China” policy and not formally recognized the Taipei government. But it has long held that a final resolution to the Taiwan issue must be peaceful and according to the wishes of the people across the Strait. Regarding any effort to change the status of Taiwan by other than peaceful means as a threat to peace and security in the region, successive US administrations have sold weapons to Taiwan and become ideologically and emotionally attuned to Taiwan’s democracy development. China’s increased military threats in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of US support against unwanted unification with China.63 Washington has maintained a strategic ambiguity policy, which has committed to help Taiwan defend itself but not made it clear how and to what extent the US might respond to China’s military actions to secure peace. The strategic ambiguity has come under siege from political forces determined to take a more belligerent stance toward China. They have advocated strategic clarification of providing security guarantee to Taiwan to avoid strategic miscalculation and prevent Beijing from taking aggressive action.64 Although strategic ambiguity has not been abandoned, the US-Taiwan relationship has strengthened significantly. President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law in 2018 and began sending high-level officials from the departments of state and commerce to Taipei, including a Cabinet member, the highest level American officials dispatched there since 1979. That law was the second piece of legislation to be passed on US-Taiwan relations since Washington severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 1979. The first was the Taiwan Relations Act, which is now often

332

S. ZHAO

invoked by US officials before the three joint communiques between Beijing and the US government that re-established formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Just eleven days before the end of Trump’s tenure, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lifted restrictions on contacts between the US’ and Taiwan’s officials. President Biden wasted no time in showing support for Taiwan. He dispatched Chris Dodd, a former US senator and longtime friend of the president, to the island, along with former US deputy secretaries of state Richard Armitage and James Steinberg, just weeks into his presidency. Sending multiple congressional delegations and policy advisers to Taiwan, he invited Taiwan to his Summit for Democracy. US and Taiwanese officials held a first round of talks on a free trade agreement aimed at boosting trade ties “based on shared values”—formally opening another front on which Biden is trying to counter Beijing’s economic influence. Making a change in the description of the relations with Taiwan, the US Department of State website removed the parts about acknowledging the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China and about “not supporting Taiwan independence” in May 2022. Although the removed parts were restored later, President Biden responded, “Yes. That’s the commitment we made” to the question if the US was willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan during his visit to Japan in the same month. This was the third time Biden did so. In August 2021, Biden said the United States had a similar commitment to Taiwan as it did to NATO allies. He was more explicit two months later and vowed to come to the democratic island’s defense if attacked by China.65 Although a White House spokesman quickly rolled back Biden’s comments to clarify that his remarks did not signify a change in policy, Beijing reacted angrily to Biden’s comments and suspected that Washington edged toward a de facto one China, one Taiwan policy. While Chinese propaganda has told people on both sides of the Strait that the US would not come directly in the defense of Taiwan, Xi cannot assume PLA’s invasion of Taiwan would not trigger a war with the US. Taiwan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” as US Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it, has important value for the US military as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending its allies of Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. If Beijing succeeds in taking Taiwan, it would fatally undermine Washington’s position in the Pacific and challenge its Asian allies to either come to terms with China or prepare to defend themselves without American help.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

333

With the conviction that Taiwan has become an essential strategic asset of Washington for suppressing the rise of China, Xi Jinping warned President Biden one month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine that “If the Taiwan issue is not handled properly, it will have a destructive impact on the relationship between the two countries.” In the conversation, Xi focused more on the Taiwan issue than the Russian invasion that Biden wanted to talk about, showing Xi’s concerns over US intentions.66 At their first meeting on the fringes of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, US secretary of defense Lloyd Austin reiterated to China’s defense minister, Wei Fenghe, that the US stance of recognizing but not endorsing China’s claim to Taiwan was unchanged. The Chinese media reported that Wei responded that “Beijing will not hesitate to start a war no matter the cost and will fight to the very end if Taiwan declares independence. This is the only choice for China.”67 China has asserted the Taiwan Strait as part of its 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and regularly protested US naval vessels sailing through as part of freedom of navigation exercises. In response to the US treating much of the Taiwan Strait as international water, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson raised the stakes in June 2022 that the Taiwan Strait is not international waters, and “China has sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait” and thus potentially laid a legal basis to deny foreign military vessels access those waters.68 In a technical term, Beijing has a point, because the widest dimension of the Taiwan Strait is 220 nautical miles and falls within the EEZ of the mainland and Taiwan. Beijing may limit the activities of foreign military vessels to those waters. But the Taiwan Strait has been an important shipping channel and international waterway, through which many ships—military or civilian—have passed freely. From this perspective, the US has accused of China unilaterally changing the status quo.69 The PLA has invested heavily in advanced aircraft, submarines, amphibious forces, and anti-access/area-denial capabilities—including long-range precision missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes, anti-ship ballistic missiles, cyber tools, and space capabilities—to deter a combattested and technologically advanced US military from projecting power to the region. China has built the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power in a crisis. China’s third aircraft carrier was launched in June 2022 and christened the Fujian, which is a

334

S. ZHAO

province on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. The islands of Jinman and Mazhu are parts of Fujian Province. The new aircraft carrier features an electromagnetic catapult to hurl aircraft off the ship at high speed, the very latest aircraft launch technology, so far seen only on the new USS Gerald R. Ford. China is rapidly catching up with the United States in terms of military technology.70 Beijing has also accelerated its nuclear strike force buildup and expanded its nuclear arsenal to raise the specter of potential nuclear war and deter US military involvement in the Taiwan conflict. No longer contenting with a “minimum deterrent” force of only a few hundred weapons, Beijing has developed a new ICBM capable of being armed with up to ten nuclear warheads and modernized its submarine-launched ballistic missile force and its long-range bomber fleet.71 The Russian invasion of Ukraine has reinforced China’s efforts. If Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States from direct military intervention, the US would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear-armed China over Taiwan. US military deterrence may lose its bite as China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication, and confidence. The posture of the United States’ military presence in the Asia–Pacific has barely changed since the 1950s. Plans to reinvigorate the US presence have been stymied by inadequate budgets, competing priorities, and a lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with China. The Pentagon has increased investments in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But some observers have worried that “the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon.” While the US military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability.72 Whether or not an interservice squabble for resources occurs, a retired US naval officer warned about the strategic mismatch between the US Navy and the PLAN and other services, which continued to build a naval force that would be increasingly capable of achieving sea control in the global maritime commons.73 US Congresswoman Elaine Luria complained that with the current state of the US Navy budget constraints and the culture of the USN’s surface fleet and their unpreparedness to combat the PLAN in a war at sea, America’s stature as a naval power is at great risk when compared to the PLAN.74

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

335

Conclusion China has not allowed Taiwan to become an independent state because this move would threaten the national security interest of China and nationalist credential of the communist regime. While Xi Jinping still prefers peaceful reunification if achievable, the growing consensus among Chinese elites and the public in Xi’s new era is that the Taiwan question can only be resolved military. The danger of the war across the Taiwan Strait has increased more than ever. A Chinese commentator holds that Xi Jinping has set two clear baselines for armed unification. One is the opportunity of peaceful unification cannot be lost and the other is reunification must be achieved before the PRC centenary in 2019.75 Chinese state media and officials have worked to project strength to citizens who have for decades been taught that Taiwan is rightfully theirs and will one day be part of the Chinese motherland. The cultivation of nationalist sentiment has come along with a boosting of PRC capabilities and raised expectations to an unreasonable level, fueling incentives for strong action both among elites and the public. That could potentially result in excessive behavior. An increasing number of observers in the West no longer doubt that China is going to subjugate Taiwan by force. The question is when. From a rational perspective, China is not ready to use force until its national power significantly exceeds that of the US, the international community is limited in its collective motivation to push back, and there is greater certainty of winning the war and retaining the island. But Xi could miscalculate, given the power centralization that prevents him from hearing the truth from his colleagues. Putin’s war shows that what seems rational to an authoritarian leader can be very different from outsiders’ rationalization. Putin’s decision featured multiple miscalculations and revealed the importance of the personality and preference of authoritarian leaders to act in ways that appeared unthinkable to outsiders. Making decisions in an information bubble, Putin took Russia into a poorly thought-out war with extremely severe consequences. Xi’s power grab may be as dangerous. Operating on the cardinal principle of tyranny: it is better to be feared than loved, Xi has successfully centralized foreign and security policymaking power in his own hands and has made decisions in isolation and sycophancy. He does not want to hear anything that contradicts his views, either intentionally or not. Performing only for the audience of the supreme leader, his colleagues tell

336

S. ZHAO

him what he wants to hear or remain silent. They will not counsel against possible mistakes they anticipate or discover, increasing the possibility of intended or unintended consequences of foreign adventure and actions of no return. Building his strongman leadership and cult of personality in which dissenting views are increasingly prohibited, Xi is surrounded by those who are afraid to speak the truth to power.76 Xi has become frustrated not only by the failure of the peaceful offensive but also by the backfire of the military threats that have deepened skepticism in Taiwan that it can ever reach a peaceful and lasting settlement with the CCP. If Xi Jinping believes that peaceful options are exhausted, he may invoke the ASL to “employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” It is a political decision, whether China is ready, despite the costs.

Notes 1. 中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于新时代国际关系和全球可持续发展的 联合声明 (Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development), February 4, 2022, https:// www.pkulaw.com/eagn/100673596.html?isFromV5=1. 2. Michael Schuman, “Is Taiwan Next? Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Makes the Frightening Possibility of China Seizing Control of the Island More Real,” The Atlantic, February 24, 2022, https://www.theatlantic. com/international/archive/2’022/02/vladimir-putin-ukraine-taiwan/ 622907/; No author, “收复台湾迎来三十年一遇的战略窗口期 (The recovery of Taiwan ushered in a strategic window period of once in 30 years), Wangyi, March 5, 2022, https://www.163.com/dy/article/ H1N3EHBG0552JR0A.html. 3. Qin Gang, “Chinese Ambassador: Where We Stand on Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opi nions/2022/03/15/china-ambassador-us-where-we-stand-in-ukraine/. 4. Suisheng Zhao, “Beijing’s Wait-and-See Policy toward Taiwan: An Uncertain Future,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 20, no. 3 (2003): 39–60. 5. Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, “The Consequences of Conquest, Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific?utm_med ium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Consequ ences%20of%20Conquest&utm_content=20220617&utm_term=FA%20T his%20Week%20-%20112017.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

337

6. Howard Wang, “ ‘Security is a Prerequisite for Development’: ConsensusBuilding Toward a New Top Priority in the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of Contemporary China 32 (2023):142. 7. 习近平 (Xi Jinping), “在 《告台湾同胞书》 发表40周年纪念会上的讲话” (Speech at the Commemorative Meeting of the 40th Anniversary of the Publication of “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”), Xinhua, January 2, 2919, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-01/02/content_5354209.htm. 8. No author, “习近平总书记会见萧万长一行” (General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with Siew Wanchang and his party), Xinhua, October 6, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201310/t20131007_4979072.htm]. 9. 李秘 (Li Mi), “习近平国家统一思想初探” (An Exploration of Xi Jinping National University Thoughts), Taiwan.cn, August 16, 2016, http:/ /www.taiwan.cn/plzhx/zhjzhl/zhjlw/201608/t20160816_11539031. htm. 10. “Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at the Meeting Marking the 1911 Revolution,” China Daily, October 9, 2021, https://www.chinadaily. com.cn/a/202110/13/WS6166e9afa310cdd39bc6ebcd.html. 11. Yang Sheng and Xu Keyue, “Two Sessions Release Clearer Signals for Promoting Reunification with Taiwan,” Global Times, March 9, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217765.shtml. 12. Raul “Peter” Pedrozo, “China’s Threat of Force in the Taiwan Strait,” Lawfare, September 29, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-thr eat-force-taiwan-strait. 13. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on September 21, 2020, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www. fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/ t1816753.shtml. 14. Li Mi, “The Deep Game cross the Strait,” China Review, August 20, 2016, https://www.powerapple.com/news/shi-zheng-jiaodian/2016/8/21/2716146.html. 15. “Interview of Zhu Chenhu: Beijing Has to Abandon the Illusion and Use Force to Unite with Taiwan,” CHN.COM , July 3, 2016, http://www. cnqiang.com/junshi/junqing/201607/01284860.html. 16. Guo Zhengjia, “China has Four Cards in Response to Tsai Ing-wen,” China Review, July 24, 2016, http://bj.crntt.com/crn-webapp/mag/doc Detail.jsp?coluid=0&docid=104322355. 17. Jin Cairong, “Four Stage Policy toward Taiwan,” Chinatimes.com, June 1, 2016, http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20160601006743260409. 18. No author, “说透了! “武统”台湾什么时候开始? 解放军专家权威解读” (That’s it! When did the “Wu Tong” Taiwan begin? Authoritative interpretation of PLA experts), Taiwan.cn, April 15, 2020, http://www.tai wan.cn/plzhx/plyzl/202004/t20200415_12265753.htm.

338

S. ZHAO

19. 王海运 (Wang Hairun), “我主张尽快将武力统台提上日程” (I Advocate Putting Military Unification with Taiwan on the Agenda as soon as Possible), Headline Today, July 6, 2020, https://www.toutiao.com/i68 46310697643704845/. 20. 王洪光 (Wang Hongguang), “大陆如何在战争中统一台湾” ( How the Mainland United with Taiwan by War), Hunqiunet, April 10, 2015, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2015-04/6141845.html. 21. Yang Sheng, Liu Xuanzun, and Deng Xiaoci, “Taiwan Secessionists Stage ‘Doomsday Madness’ in Seeking Foreign Support,” Global Times, October 13, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1236157.shtml. 22. Wang Qingchu, “Taiwan-themed Song a Goodwill Tune for a Cross-Strait Rail Link,” Shine, November 11, 2021, https://www.shine.cn/news/nat ion/2111118021/. 23. Wang Wenwen, “Taiwan Island to Benefit from Mainland Governance,” Global Times, November 18, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/ 202111/1239344.shtml. 24. 国台办 (TAO), “台独”顽固分子清单绝不止苏贞昌等3人”( The List of Stubbornly Pro-Taiwan Independence Includes More than Three People), November 24, 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/fyrbt/202111/t20 211124_12392640.htm. 25. Yang Sheng, Liu Xuanzun, and Deng Xiaoci, “Taiwan Secessionists Stage ‘Doomsday Madness’ in Seeking Foreign Support,” Global Times, October 13, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1236157.shtml. 26. 田飞龙 (Tian Feilong), “探索一国两制台湾方案的制度准备与心理建设" (Exploring Institutional Preparations and Mentality Building for the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan Formula), Modern Taiwan Studies, no. 5 (2021), http://rdbk1.ynlib.cn:6251/Qw/Paper/786784. 27. 周叶中 (Zhou Yezhong), 段磊 (Duan Lei), “中国国家统一论纲” (Outline for China’s Unification), 武汉大学学报 (哲学社会科学版, no. 4 (2022), https://web.archive.org/web/20220807024549/http://www. aisixiang.com/data/135452.html. 28. Ni Yongjie, “Holding on the Bottom of Line, Development Together, and Moving Forward Steadily, Elaboration on Secretary-General Xi’s Most Recent Speech toward Taiwan,” People’s Daily (overseas edition), March 12, 2016, 3. 29. 国台办 (The TAO), “事实证明坚持 “九二共识”两岸关系就能改善发 展” (Acts Have Proved that Adhering to the 1992 Consensus can Improve the Development of Cross-Strait Relations), Taihainet, June 15, 2022, http://www.taihainet.com/news/twnews/bilateral/2022-0615/2628385.html.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

339

30. Ryan Hass and S. Philip Hsu, “Beyond Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit: Uncertainties about Cross-Strait Stability, Taiwan-US Quarterly Analysis, Brookings Institution, August 22, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/22/beyond-pelosis-taiwan-visit-uncert ainties-about-cross-strait-stability/?utm_campaign=Center%20for%20Nort heast%20Asian%20Policy%20Studies&utm_medium=email&utm_content= 224399121&utm_source=hs_email. 31. Leng Bo, “The Mainland Maintains Pace to Exchange Time for Space,” China Times, April 29, 2016, http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspa pers/20160429000940-260310. 32. “Taiwan Media Claims that the Mainland Has Issued Ultimatum,” Sino.com, May 5, 2016, http://wap.eastday.com/node2/node3/n403/ u1ai602976_t71.html. 33. No author, “Tsai’s Inauguration Speech ‘Incomplete Test Paper’: Beijing,” Taipei Times, May 21, 2016, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2016/05/21/2003646796. 34. Xin Qiang, “Selective Engagement: Mainland China’s Dual-track Taiwan Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29 (July 2020): 124. 35. Xin Qiang, “Selective Engagement: Mainland China’s Dual-track Taiwan Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29 (July 2020): 124. 36. Dong Xing, “First Pineapples, Now Sugar Apples. Taiwan Threatens to Take China to WTO over New Fruit Import Ban,” ABC News, September 21, 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-21/chinataiwan-fruit-ban-may-jeopardise-application/100479612. 37. Suisheng Zhao, “Beijing’s Wait-and-See Policy Toward Taiwan: An Uncertain Future,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Fall 2003), http://www.springerlink.com/content/g5cgd6thm19rvddr/fulltext.pdf. 38. Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, July 12, 2022, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961. 39. Chris Buckley, Amy Chang Chien, and John Liu, “After China’s Military Spectacle, Options Narrow for Winning Over Taiwan,” New York Times, August 7, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/07/world/asia/ china-taiwan-military-unification.html. 40. 金灿荣 (Jin Canrong), “考虑到现在危险变大,中国军费应迅速涨到GDP 的2%” (Considering the Increasing Danger Now, China’s Military Spending Should Quickly Rise to 2% of GDP), Guancha.net, April 2, 2022, https://www.sohu.com/a/534628065_115479. 41. Tsukasa Hadano, “Russia’s Woes Make China Search for Plan B on Taiwan,” Nikkei Asia, April 20, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ Ukraine-war/Russia-s-woes-make-China-search-for-Plan-B-on-Taiwan.

340

S. ZHAO

42. Thomas Corbett, Ma Ziu, and Peter W. Singer, “What Is China Learning from the Ukraine War?” Defense One, April 3, 2022, https://www.defens eone.com/ideas/2022/04/what-lessons-china-taking-ukraine-war/363 915/. 43. Lisa B. Kania and Lan Burns McAslin, “The PLA’s Evolving Outlook on Urban Warfare: Learning, Training, and Implications for Taiwan,” Military Learning and the Future of War Series, April 2022, https:/ /www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20PLA%20Outl ook%20on%20Urban%20Warfare%20ISW%20April%202022.pdf. 44. Joseph Bosco, “Russia’s War on Ukraine Makes China’s Attack on Taiwan More Likely,” The Hill, April 26, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/ international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-tai wan-more-likely/. 45. Kris Osborn, “Could China Blockade Taiwan into Submission?” National Interest, January 24, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/ could-china-blockade-taiwan-submission-199621. 46. Editorial, “PLA Drills around Taiwan Continue to ‘Rehearse Reunification Operation,’ ‘Exercises Blockading Island to Become Routine,’” Global Times, August 3, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/127 2108.shtml. 47. Explainers, “Just How Strong is China’s Military Compared to Taiwan?” Firstpost, August 5, 2022, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/justhow-strong-is-chinas-military-compared-to-taiwan-11014921.html. 48. Joyu Wang and Alastair Gale, “Taiwan Looks to Ukraine War for Ideas to Defend Against China,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-looks-to-ukraine-warfor-ideas-to-defend-against-china-11648557508. 49. Richard Javad Heydarian, “Russia’s War Fiasco Rattles China, Galvanizes Taiwan,” AsiaTimes, March 19, 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/ russias-war-fiasco-rattles-china-galvanizes-taiwan/. 50. David Zweig, “Will Taiwan be the next Ukraine,” Politico, March 14, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/taiwan-the-next-ukraine/. 51. Hideaki Ryugen, “Half of Taiwanese Don’t Believe the U.S. Would Send Troops if China Invades,” Nikkei Asia, April 27, 2022, https://asia. nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Half-of-Taiwanese-don-t-bel ieve-U.S.-would-send-troops-if-China-invades. 52. David Sacks, “What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine?check_log ged_in=1. 53. Denny Roy, “What the War in Ukraine Means for Taiwan,” PacNet, 14, 2022, https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-14-what-the-war-in-ukr aine-means-for-taiwan.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

341

54. No author, "习近平在省部级主要领导干部学习贯彻党的十九届五中全会 精神专题研讨班开班式上发表重要讲话” (Jinping delivered an important speech at the opening ceremony of the seminar on learning and implementing the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Party), Xinhua, January 12, 2021, http://cn.chinad aily.com.cn/a/202101/12/WS5ffce6d1a3101e7ce973a3f9.html. 55. No author, “习近平在中国科学院第十九次院士大会、中国工程院第十四 次院士大会上的讲话” (Xi speech at the China Academy of Sciences), Xinhua, May 28, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-05/ 28/c_1122901308.htm. 56. 李晓华 (Li Xiaohua), “推进产业链现代化要坚持独立自主和开发合作相促 进” (The Modernization of the Industrial Chain Must Adhere to the Promotion of Independence and Development Cooperation), Guangmin Daily, April 10, 2020, 11. 57. No author, “我国是全世界唯一拥有全部工业门类的国家” (China Is the Only Country in the World with All Industrial Categories), Xinhua, September 20, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-09/20/ c_1125020250.htm. 58. Eric Schmidt and Graham Allison, “Is China Winning the AI Race?” Project Syndicate, August 4, 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/china-versus-america-ai-race-pandemic-by-eric-schmidt-andgraham-allison-2020-08. 59. No author, “去美元化提速! 多国参与建设’人民币资金池’, 人民币初显锚 效应" (Speed up De-dollarization! Many Countries Have Participated in the Construction of ‘RMB Capital Pool’, and the RMB Has Begun to Show the Anchor Effect), Sohu, June 28, 2022, https://www.sohu.com/ a/561809695_115589. 60. Miguel Garrido, “An Increasingly assertive China Moves toward Selfreliance,” Modern Diplomacy, August 27, 2022, https://moderndiplom acy.eu/2022/08/27/an-increasingly-assertive-china-moves-toward-selfreliance/. 61. No author, “Sanctions Response on Russia Shows China What It Can Expect for Taiwan Invasion,” Reuters, March 3, 2022, https://www.dec canherald.com/international/world-news-politics/sanctions-response-onrussia-shows-china-what-it-can-expect-for-taiwan-invasion-1087502.html. 62. Sun Yu, “China Meets Banks to Discuss Protecting Assets from US Sanctions,” Financial Times, April 22, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/ 45d5fcac-3e6d-420a-ac78-4b439e24b5de. 63. Andrew Scobell and Lucy Stevenson-Yang, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine,” US Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, https://www. usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine.

342

S. ZHAO

64. Richard Hass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Affairs, September 2020, https://www.foreig naffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-una mbiguous. 65. Alexander Ward and Quint Forgey, “Biden Beetle Juiced the End of Taiwan Strategic Ambiguity,” Politico, May 23, 2022, https://www.pol itico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/05/23/biden-beetle juiced-the-end-of-strategic-ambiguity-toward-taiwan-00034459. 66. No author, “习近平同美国总统拜登视频通话” (Xi Jinping has a video call with US President Biden), Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, March 18, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202203/t20220319_ 10653187.shtml. 67. No author, “中国防长: 如果有人胆敢把台湾分裂出去, 中国军队必将不惜 一战” (Chinese Defense Minister: the PLA Will Not Hesitate to Start a War No Matter the Cost if Taiwan Declares Independence), Global Times, June 10, 2022, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/48MtCFHsiwV. 68. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on June 13, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/202206/t20220613_10702460.html. 69. Peter Martin, “China Alarms U.S. with New Private Warnings to Avoid Taiwan Strait: ‘We’re Seeing Growing Coercion from Beijing,’” Fortune, June 12, 2022, https://fortune.com/2022/06/12/china-alarms-uswith-new-private-warnings-to-avoid-taiwan-strait-were-seeing-growingcoercion-from-beijing/. 70. Editorial, “China’s Reckless Military Buildup is Needlessly Stoking Tensions,” Asahi, June 23, 2022, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/ 14651315 Thursday 23 June 2022. 71. Andrew F. Krepinevich. Jr., “The New Nuclear Age How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-04-19/ new-nuclear-age?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_ campaign=The%20New%20Nuclear%20Age&utm_content=20220419& utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017. 72. Ashley Townshend and James Crabtree, “The US is Losing it Military Edge in Asia, and China Knows it,” New York Times, June 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/internati onal-world/us-military-china-asia.html. 73. James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (2020): 14–32.

10

WILL TAIWAN BECOME THE NEXT UKRAINE? XI JINPING’S …

343

74. Ryan Morgan, “Congresswoman Catches Navy ‘Manipulating’ Budget Data,” American Military News, May 12, 2022, https://americanmili tarynews.com/2022/05/congresswoman-catches-navy-manipulating-bud get-data/. 75. 廖望两岸 (Laiowang Liangan), “美专家发现 “不对劲”: 台湾问题拖得越 久, 就越对中国有利?” (US Experts Find Something “Not Right”: the Longer the Taiwan Issue Drags on, the Better It Will Be for China), Dolc.de, July 2, 2022, https://www.dolc.de/thread-2248089-1-1.html. 76. Suisheng Zhao, “Top-level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policymaking in Xi Jinping’s China,” Journal of Contemporary China, January 2023, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022. 2052440.

Bibliography Fanell, James E., “China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (2020). Garrido, Miguel, “An Increasingly assertive China Moves toward Self-reliance,” Modern Diplomacy, August 27, 2022. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/ 08/27/an-increasingly-assertive-china-moves-toward-self-reliance/ Green, Brendan Rittenhouse and Caitlin Talmadge, “The Consequences of Conquest, Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-0616/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific?utm_medium=newsletters& utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Consequences%20of%20Conq uest&utm_content=20220617&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%201 12017 Hass, Richard and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Affairs, September 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguou Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr., “The New Nuclear Age How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-04-19/new-nuclear Morgan, Ryan, “Congresswoman Catches Navy ‘Manipulating’ Budget Data,” American Military News, May 12. 2022, https://americanmilitarynews.com/ 2022/05/congresswoman-catches-navy-manipulating-budget-data/ Osborn, Kris, “Could China Blockade Taiwan into Submission?” National Interest, January 24, 2022. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/couldchina-blockade-taiwan-submission-199621

344

S. ZHAO

Qiang, Xin, “Selective Engagement: Mainland China’s Dual-track Taiwan Policy,” Journal of Contemporary China, 29 (July 2020). Sacks, David, “What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/ 2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine?check_logged_in=1 Scobell, Andrew, and Lucy Stevenson-Yang, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine,” US Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, https://www.usip.org/pub lications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine Wang, Howard, “ ‘Security is a Prerequisite for Development’: ConsensusBuilding Toward a New Top Priority in the Chinese Communist Party,” Journal of Contemporary China 32 (2023). Ward, Alexander and Quint Forgey, “Biden Beetle Juiced the End of Taiwan Strategic Ambiguity,” Politico, May 23, 2022. https://www.politico.com/ newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/05/23/biden-beetlejuiced-theend-of-strategic-ambiguity-toward-taiwan-00034459 Zhao, Suisheng, “Beijing’s Wait-and-See Policy Toward Taiwan: An Uncertain Future,” East Asia: An International Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Fall 2003). http:/ /www.springerlink.com/content/g5cgd6thm19rvddr/fulltext.pdf Zhao, Suisheng. January 2023. Top-level Design and Enlarged Diplomacy: Foreign and Security Policymaking in Xi Jinping’s China. Journal of Contemporary China. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2052440.

PART IV

The US: Breaking the Grip of the Rip for Hegemonic Status

CHAPTER 11

Competitions and Coalitions: An Emerging US Domestic Nationalist Consensus, Executive Branch Prerogatives, and the Taiwan Strait Tensions Dean P. Chen

Introduction The 19-hours whirlwind visit to Taipei by the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and her congressional delegation on August 2–3, 2022— as part of their broader trip to the Indo-Pacific region that includes Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan—exacerbated the already heightened tensions between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) across the Taiwan Strait. This episode, marking the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis (the first in 1954–55, second in 1958, third in 1995– 96), could very well be a watershed moment, “when US-China relations shifted from competition for relative advantage to overt confrontation,

D. P. Chen (B) School of Humanities and Global Studies, Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_11

347

348

D. P. CHEN

with a much greater risk of crises and escalation.”1 Hence, this chapter begins with a brief overview of the speaker’s sojourn to Taipei to illustrate the increasingly concerted stance between Washington’s executive and legislative branches of the federal government on a hardened strategy to counter China and deepen ties with Taiwan. Since the Trump presidency, and now with the Biden administration, top decision-makers in the White House have become more inclined to subscribe a nationalist logic to advance a rivalrous and protectionist approach toward Beijing while enhancing the United States’ bilateral relations, albeit unofficial, with Taipei given the latter’s stellar democratic governance, socio-economic achievements, as well as its cutting-edge high-tech prowess in determining the global security of critical supply chains. Still bound by a convoluted One-China policy established since President Richard Nixon’s meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong in February 1972, Washington “recognizes the PRC as China’s sole legal government and ‘acknowledges’ its position that Taiwan is part of a single China.”2 Washington, however, does not recognize Beijing’s sovereignty over Taiwan (as pledged by one of President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taipei in 1982) and maintains unofficial links to Taipei, as obliged by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 to provide Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China or ROC) with defensive arms to maintain America’s own capacity to defend the island. Yet the US has long observed “strategic ambiguity,” not specifying whether or how it would intervene in a war over the island. This is meant to deter either Beijing or Taipei from unilaterally endangering the peace and security of the Taiwan Strait.3 Since 2016, the domestic call within America to replace the US OneChina/strategic ambiguity policy with strategic clarity has become more vocal, citing the arrangement as anachronistic considering the PRC’s escalated coercive and assertive actions toward the island democracy.4 The US Congress is near unanimous in its bipartisan push for more upgraded interactions between Washington and Taipei. Robert Sutter cogently captured the full-scale congressional anti-China sentiments: Long more wary of China than the Executive branch and often skeptical of past administration promises of the benefits of engagement with Beijing, Congress [since 2016], through hearings and investigations, has focused on the warnings of senior administration officials and nongovernment specialists to urge an overall hardening in U.S. policy against the increasingly powerful and dangerous Chinese opponent… [Barring

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

349

major changes] the American Executive and Legislative branches are likely to remain remarkably united on a path of intense rivalry with a powerful and predatory China.5

Thus, the United States’ competition with China and the synchronously upgraded ties with Taiwan cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the US Congress’ longstanding hostile attitude toward Beijing along with the presidency/executive branch’s embrace of a US-centric nationalist paradigm.6 In short, the systemic threat posed by China’s rise interacts with the populist-nationalist anger against China to generate a more aggressive mode of balancing against Beijing.7 Nonetheless, in line with the state-centered realist analysis, the president, secretary of state, national security advisor, and other top executive branch elites, being relatively more insulated from societal interests and parochial concerns, remain dominant in setting and implementing the nation’s foreign policies and national security strategies. Equipped with their constitutional authorities in conducting diplomacy, negotiating treaties and trade agreements, commanding the military and national security infrastructures, and other implied powers in foreign relations, US presidents, especially since the outset of Second World War, have exerted substantial leadership and wielded the power of persuasion, resource-mobilization capabilities to supplant domestic political pressures, neutralize oppositions, and enact strategic policies based on the imperatives of US national interests.8 Both the Trump and Biden administrations, as a result, had resisted some of their domestic and normative constraints, by expanding and proscribing the boundaries of WashingtonTaipei exchanges while calibrating the necessary adjustments to the One-China/strategic ambiguity policy framework. The malleability of the US-Taiwan Strait policy has effectively allowed Washington to move flexibly and creatively between ambiguity and clarity to combat Beijing’s ambitious designs over Taiwan.

Pelosi’s Visit to Taipei in August 2022 The news of Pelosi’s planned trip to the self-governing island, first reported by the Financial Times in mid-July,9 remained unconfirmed and kept from her official itinerary10 until the US Air Force plane carrying the speaker and congressional group finally touched down in Taipei. In

350

D. P. CHEN

the speaker’s statement released soon upon arrival: “Our discussions with Taiwan leadership will focus on reaffirming our support for our partner and on promoting our shared interests, including advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. America’s solidarity with the 23 million people of Taiwan is more important today than ever, as the world faces a choice between autocracy and democracy.”11 Though underscoring the visit “in no way contradicts the long-standing [US] one-China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US-China Joint Communiqués and the Six Assurances,” she called out, in a separate op-ed to the Washington Post, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s brutal crackdowns on human rights, democracy, and freedom in Hong Kong, and Beijing’s accelerating aggressive behaviors toward Taiwan. The United States “must remember that vow [the Taiwan Relations Act], must stand by Taiwan, which is an island of resilience, a leader in governance…[and] a leader in peace, security, and economic dynamism: with an entrepreneurial spirit, culture of innovation and technological prowess that are envies of the world.”12 A stop in Taiwan by the speaker of the United States House of Representatives, as the second person in the order of presidential succession (following the vice-president), isn’t taken lightly by Beijing, which has claimed the island democracy as its own. In 1997, when the then US speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) came to the self-governed island and met with the then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, the Chinese government grumbled but swallowed its irritation because the country needed to maintain a cordial relationship with Washington for its still incipient stage of economic development.13 Today, under President Xi Jinping, the PRC is wealthier, militarily stronger, and less willing to compromise with Washington on Taiwan.14 Beijing’s retaliation to Pelosi’s high-profile interactions15 with Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen, senior government officials, semiconductor business elites, human rights and democracy activists had been vigorous and forceful. The PLA “will by no means sit idly by and strong measures will be taken to thwart any external interference and ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist attempts,” according to the Global Times, a nationalistic mouthpiece newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.16 Following Pelosi’s departure, the Chinese military conducted its largest-scale military exercises, with live-fire ammunitions, closely within the vicinity of Taiwan’s airspace and territorial waters. Those drills, which effectively encircled Taiwan and simulated what a Chinese military blockade would potentially look like in a genuine war,17 shot at least

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

351

eleven missiles into seas north, south, and east of Taiwan (five of them even landed in the EEZ of Japan to warn Tokyo and Washington against intervening in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict)18 and deployed an armada of warships and fighter jets to swarm the island.19 Never announcing an end to these maneuvers suggested that the PLA might be seeking to normalize its military presence and pressure campaigns around Taiwan.20 Moreover, the Chinese foreign ministry slammed the G7 for expressing their collective concerns regarding the PRC’s military actions around Taiwan, while venting outrage over Washington’s “collusion” with the “Taiwan independence forces” in “distorting, obscuring and hollowing out the one-China principle to serve its strategic goal of disrupting and containing China’s development.”21 Beijing, then, not only imposed a series of economic embargoes on Taiwan’s food/ agricultural export products (including citrus fruits, seafood, pastries, etc.) but also announced a suspension of Sino-American military-to-military contacts as well as bilateral discussions on tackling the climate change crisis, trade, arms control, transnational crime, and counter-narcotics.22 (To be sure, the Biden-Xi meeting during the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia on November 14, 2022—their first in-person encounter since Biden became president—helped to ameliorate the US-PRC hostilities and committed both sides to resume contacts on some of the aforementioned transnational issues. But a significant warming up of US-Chinese relations is unlikely given their competitive stances firmly dug in toward each other). Secretary of State Antony Blinken urged Beijing not to “hold hostage cooperation on matters of global concern because of differences between our two countries.”23 The views regarding Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan also galvanized a heated debate: some called the speaker to postpone the trip to avoid a dangerous confrontation,24 while others stressed that backing down in the face of Chinese intimidations is tantamount to admitting America’s retreat in the Indo-Pacific region and yielding Beijing a veto power over US foreign policymaking.25 Mindful of the risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalations into a larger militarized crisis that could further impair USChina relations, the Biden administration initially sought to persuade the speaker to either cancel the excursion to Taiwan or delay it to a later time,26 though recognizing the legislative branch leader must ultimately exercise its own discretion on the matter. As expected, the 20th CCP National Congress in October 2022 solidified an unprecedented third term in office (in the post-Mao era) for Xi Jinping as China’s paramount

352

D. P. CHEN

leader.27 However, back in August, when this political transition process was still unfolding, Pelosi’s visit was perceived by the Chinese government as a deliberate American-Taiwanese affront to Xi’s authority and political legitimacy, thereby requiring Beijing to respond belligerently to avoid appearing weak before their nationalistic citizenry. Aside from Pelosi’s longtime critical position on China’s human rights violations,28 her same party affiliation as Biden’s also caused Beijing to misread that these two separate but coequal branches of the US government were plotting to confront the PRC together. Yet, high-level Biden officials, including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, briefed the speaker on the “facts and analysis, context, geopolitical realities that she’s going to be facing” in a travel to Taiwan.29 Biden even said that “the military thinks it’s not a good idea right now” about the proposed visit.30 Nonetheless, the Biden administration ultimately came around to rally behind the speaker’s Taiwan venture, stressing it was neither unusual nor violating Washington’s One-China policy, and, thus, Beijing was merely acting irresponsibly to “turn this visit into some sort of crisis to increase aggressive military activity in/around the Taiwan Strait.”31 Sullivan added that Beijing is “escalating tensions unnecessarily.”32 The Biden administration had been abundantly clear with its Taiwan Strait policy.33 On May 26, 2022, Blinken unveiled the Biden administration’s China strategy based upon “invest, align, and compete.” 34 He emphasized that “our [Taiwan] approach has been consistent across decades and administrations. As the President has said, our policy has not changed. The United States remains committed to our ‘one China’ policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, the Six Assurances. We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side; we do not support Taiwan independence; and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.”35 In June, Secretary Austin, when meeting in Singapore with his Chinese counterpart, General Wei Fenghe, reiterated the US commitment to its “One China policy as enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, the Three Joint Communiqués…that the United States does not support any unilateral changes to the status quo, and the United States does not support Taiwan independence.”36 Sullivan echoed similar perspectives at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 22.37

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

353

In his call with Xi on July 28, 2022, President Biden “reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to [the US] One China Policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances,” underscoring his strong opposition to any “unilateral efforts to change the status quo or undermine peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”38 In the words of the White House spokesperson John Kirby: “I want to reiterate: Nothing has changed about our One China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint US-PRC Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. And we say it that way every time because it’s exactly consistent. Now, we said that we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. We’ve also said we do not support Taiwan independence and that we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means. We’re also maintaining communication with Beijing. As President Biden told President Xi, the Speaker’s visit was consistent with our One China policy, that she had a right to visit, and that a previous Speaker of the House has also visited Taiwan before without incident. This is how we’re going to defend America’s national security interests and our values.”39 Notwithstanding these US government reassurances, Beijing continued to act intransigently with their bullying tactics. They resisted the fact that the US has its own One-China policy, different from the PRC’s One-China principle. From a senior Biden White House official, the “United States and China have differences when it comes to Taiwan but that they have managed those for over 40 years and that keeping an open line of communication on this issue is essential to doing so.”40 Although Xi sternly warned Biden that “those who play with fire [on Taiwan] will perish by it,”41 the Chinese president also indicated “he had no intention of going to war with the US and said both sides needed to ‘maintain peace and security.’” 42 While Xi needed to appear resolute on Taiwan, he also wanted to avoid an all-out confrontation with Washington. A stable political and international environment remains important for China. To the bipartisan China-skeptics in the US Congress, however, America’s strategic ambiguity/One-China policy framework is an outmoded relic which should be replaced by a more clarified policy approach toward Taiwan. Both parties strongly endorsed Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan.43 With the Republicans’ winning their majority, albeit a narrow one, in the House of Representatives in the 2022 US mid-term election, the new GOP speaker (Kevin McCarthy) is likely to push for a more hard-line

354

D. P. CHEN

China agenda and take a delegation to Taipei as well.44 Indeed, both the Trump and Biden administrations have become more supportive of Taiwan in their competitive strategies with Beijing. The two successive administrations, together, had approved a record-number of arms sales deals with Taiwan, dispatched frequent warship transits and military flights through the Taiwan Strait, lifted previously restrictive American governmental protocols on interactions with Taiwan officials, sent high-level cabinet secretaries and presidential envoys to the island democracy, and provided logistical support and briefings for congressional delegations traveling there. Since 2012, more than 149 US senators and representatives have visited Taiwan, including 35 in Trump’s four years and 33 alone in Biden’s first 20 months in office.45 As the Congress eagerly pushed through a slew of pro-Taiwan legislative bills and initiatives, both Presidents Trump and Biden also signed off on a handful of them. But compared with congressional activism on Taiwan, the White House, on balance, still acted circumspectly. For instance, in the wake of the Pelosi crisis, the Biden White House expressed initial reservations regarding the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 that ultimately was advanced by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2022 Sponsored by Senators Robert Menedez (D-NJ, the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), the bill would authorize $6.5 billion in security assistance for Taiwan and accord the island the treatments equivalent to a “major nonNATO ally”—a “powerful symbol that provides [the US] closest global partners with additional benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation.”46 The senators called this legislation the “most comprehensive restructuring of US policy towards Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.” Asking the senators for reconsideration and revising some of the sensitive provisions embedded in the bill (i.e., renaming Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to the “Taiwan Representative Office”; requiring a Senate confirmation of the director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial US embassy in Taipei, etc.), the Biden administration warned this act, if passed without any modifications, would effectively upend Washington’s One-China policy. It would “contravene” the president’s authorities and efforts at diplomacy.47 “There are elements of that legislation with respect to how we can strengthen our security assistance for Taiwan that are quite effective and robust that will improve Taiwan security,” Sullivan stressed in an interview on the Bloomberg Television.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

355

“There are other elements that give us some concern.”48 Before the bill sailed through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tweaks and revisions were made by its members to quell the White House apprehensions. The Democrats’ razor-thin control of the Senate since 2020 (and again after the 2022 mid-term) certainly buttressed Biden’s case. As of this writing, the legislative actions on the Taiwan Policy Act remain uncertain as it may be put off until the new Congress convenes in January 2023.

US Nationalism and the Taiwan Strait49 For decades after 1979 and especially in the post-Cold War era up until Donald Trump’s inauguration as the US 45th president in January 2017, successive US administrations (whether Republicans or Democrats) had endorsed a liberal constructive engagement with the PRC. The American policy was “rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the postwar international order would liberalize [and democratize] China.”50 To avoid provoking the Chinese on an issue deemed highly sensitive to their conception of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the US had mostly shown deference to the PRC on the Taiwan issue, lest a more explicit stand-up for the ROC would risk damaging the broader Sino-American cooperative relations. The Trump administration called out the ineffectiveness of that longstanding conciliatory approach, contending America’s commercial and diplomatic engagement with the PRC has not “transformed Communist China’s authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce.”51 Instead, China, under President Xi, has become more of a “personalitycentered dictatorship.” Chinese digital autocratic capacity has been accelerated by its “rapid advances in technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, facial recognition, and social credit scores,” providing Beijing with the means for a high-tech totalitarian society.52 Indeed, the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022 not only gave Xi a norm-breaking third term as China’s core leader but also enhanced his Marxist-Leninist visions to consolidate the party-state control domestically and wage “struggles” against the US-led international order.53 Meanwhile, the US has also recognized the irrationality of how a desire to placate China based on a lofty idealism has led to a longtime unfair treatment and banishment of democratic Taiwan from the international community. Xi’s heightened authoritarianism and concentration of political power have appeared

356

D. P. CHEN

unrelenting and focused on strategically displacing Washington’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.54 Beijing’s reticence and tacit support of Putin’s military aggressions on Ukraine since February 2022 further eroded mutual trust with Washington and its like-minded democratic allies and partners. With Taiwan, the Xi government had taken a harsher approach—using various sharp power (including disinformation, united-front, subversive, cognitive warfare) campaigns55 on top of the usual military intimidations, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation—to suppress the Tsai Ing-wen administration, dismissing Taipei’s pledge for keeping the cross-Strait status quo as merely an attempt at promoting the so-called “creeping Taiwan independence.”56 President Tsai, in the opinions of many, is doing her best to satisfy Beijing’s demands, without undermining Taiwan’s democracy and security.57 The PRC, in other words, is perceived to have acted unreasonably in pressuring the Tsai government.58 Whatever the ambiguity China was willing to accommodate in the “1992 consensus” (i.e., “one China, respective interpretations”) during the Ma Ying-jeou era, Beijing has moved the goalposts and tightened its definition by unequivocally insisting that the Tsai government must endorse the “One-China” core connotation.59 When President Tsai brought up the ROC, Beijing has refused to allow for any more wiggle room. On January 2, 2019, for instance, in a speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the issuance of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”60 by the Standing Committee of the PRC’s National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping called for a “peaceful reunification with Taiwan” in accordance with the “One-China principle” of the “1992 consensus.” He explained that the Taiwan issue originally emerged from China’s internal weaknesses dating back to the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. Since 1949, he said, “the Communist Party of China, the Chinese government, and the Chinese people have endeavored to pursue the historic mission of resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification.” “On this basis,” Xi continued, “we have formulated a fundamental strategy of upholding the principle of ‘one country, two systems’ and promoting national reunification. With this, we have responded to the call of our time, namely to promote, in the new era, the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and unite our compatriots in Taiwan to strive for our country’s rejuvenation and peaceful reunification.”61 Xi’s address has been widely interpreted as setting Beijing’s records straight on what the

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

357

“1992 consensus” prescribes—that is both Taiwan and mainland China belong to the same country under the PRC sovereign jurisdiction, and the blueprint for achieving unification is through the “one country, two systems” formula that has been applied to Hong Kong and Macau. In other words, Taiwan would become a special administrative region (SAR) of the PRC. Though promised with a high degree of political and socioeconomic autonomy, Beijing would decide ultimately how much latitude and freedom to delegate to its subordinate units, be they provinces, autonomous regions, or special administrative regions.62 The Taiwanese public opinion has been firmly against China’s “one country, two systems” model, especially in the light of Beijing’s stricter and more repressive crackdowns on Hong Kong since 2019 and, subsequently, China’s National People’s Congress’ passing of the National Security Law in 2020 to more forcefully curb Hong Kong’s democracy movements and their quests for greater freedom, human rights, and autonomy. Moreover, by erasing the ROC from the “1992 consensus,” Xi’s 2019 address not only discredited the KMT’s position but also blunted Tsai’s willingness to handle cross-Strait ties based on the ROC constitutional framework. The campaign against the unpopular “one country, two systems” (and, by extension, the “1992 consensus”) and Hong Kong’s massive democracy demonstration movements throughout 2019–20 ushered Tsai and DPP legislative majority to a landslide reelection victory in January 2020.63 Ideas and Coalitions of Fortress America As the PRC has become more autocratic and assertive, the United States has also experienced an ideational transformation domestically—the rise of a US-centric nationalist perspective—which ultimately has energized the America first movement and impacted Presidents Trump’s and Biden’s changing stances toward Beijing and Taipei. Charles Kupchan, who served in the Obama administration as special assistant to the president on the National Security Council between 2014 and 2017, noted that Trump’s fortress America foreign policy had deep roots in the US national identity and resonated with much of its nineteenth-century strategic approach all the way up till 1941.“The isolationist yearning, the hostility to US participation in international pacts, the aversion to an activist brand of democracy promotion, the economic protectionism, the racially tinged nationalism—these aspects…were in striking alignment with the foreign

358

D. P. CHEN

policy pursued by the United States for much of its history prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.”64 Nonetheless, for the first time since the end of World War II, the US president, Donald Trump, formally championed an America first vision, predicated on commercial mercantilism, unilateralist diplomacy, and conservative nationalism.65 The New York real estate mogul and reality TV celebrity-turned Republican was unique for campaigning against the US-led postwar liberal order, arguing that American leadership and free-trading globalism were hurting the United States.66 In 2016, Trump ran as a furiously populist and antiestablishment nationalist. The image offered “was of a kind of Fortress America, separated from transnational dangers of all kinds by a series of walls—tariff walls against foreign exports, security walls against Muslim terrorists, literal walls against Hispanic immigrants, and with the sense that somehow all these dangers might be interrelated under the rubric of the ‘false song of globalism.’”.67 A great driving force behind the voters’ support of illiberal populists like Trump is a sense of cultural upheaval. The very same rise of post-materialist cosmopolitan, multicultural issues and values that inspire liberals has also triggered a culturally conservative reaction from those segments of the public unpersuaded by the benefit of such changes. Whereas cosmopolitan liberals champion progressive values (environmental protections, gun controls, abortion, LGBTQ rights, and same-sex marriage), populist nationalists embrace traditional and nativist values. Over the past forty years, the Republican Party’s appeals on concerns related to religion, national sovereignty, moral tradition, commercial protectionism, and anti-immigration have attracted strong support from white working class—once the mainstay of the Democratic New Deal coalition. Based in America’s Rust Belt small-town counties in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio, these folks usually are non-college educated, tend to be center-left on economics but reactionary on cultural matters.68 Trump also attacked the seeming weaknesses of presidents from both parties that allowed these foreign abuses of America’s working class to endure while criticizing their venturous military interventions abroad that led to the unnecessary losses of US lives and financial resources.69 The conservative nationalists have found their inspirations from an iconic populist US president, Andrew Jackson, and linked him with Trump’s Fortress America program.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

359

Furies at Globalization and Liberal Trade with China In their detailed comparative politics study, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris70 indicated that voters most drawn to populist-nationalist parties and candidates on both sides of the Atlantic are indeed concerned by issues of economic inequality and globalization. Profound structural changes transforming the workforce and society in postindustrial economies—including the rise of the knowledge economy, technological automation, global flows of labor, goods, people, and capital, the relative decline of traditional manufacturing, and migrant inflow—have encouraged a sense of economic insecurity. That is a reaction toward the sentiments, shared among many middle- and working-class Americans, who think that China, among other countries, has taken advantage of the US-led liberal free trade policies and international institutions, such as the WTO, as well as America’s domestic deregulations of unfettered capitalistic and financial interests to take away jobs, manufacturing opportunities, intellectual property, and other socio-economic benefits that should rightfully belong to hardworking Americans.71 Economic inequalities, then, caused huge dislocations and pains among these actors who are becoming more isolated and vulnerable to the global trend of integration. This, in turn, created an “inward-looking nationalism” in the United States to target external actors, such as the PRC, for undercutting America’s economic well-being, competitiveness, and job opportunities.72 Indeed, international political economists have long stressed the important nexus between global trade and domestic political alignments and interest configurations. The domestic actors’ trade policy preferences and, hence, their political positions are shaped by the income distributional consequences of international commerce and levels of trade protection. The Heckscher-Ohlin trade model has posited that a country “will tend to export goods intensive in the factors it has in abundance, and to import goods intensive in factors in which it is scarce.”73 By extension, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, also known as the factor endowment theory, proposes the following: In almost any society, protection benefits (and liberalization of trade harms) owners of factors in which relative to the rest of the world, that society is poorly endowed, as well as producers who use that scarce factor intensely. Conversely, protection harms (and liberalization benefits) those factors that—again, relative to the rest of the world—the given society holds abundantly, and the producers who use those locally abundant factors

360

D. P. CHEN

intensively. Thus, in a society rich in labor but poor in capital, protection benefits capital and harms labor; and liberalization of trade benefits labor and harms capital.74

The beneficiaries of any such exogenous economic exchanges are likely to be strengthened politically while the economic losers weakened politically. Broadly speaking, the degree of exposure to foreign commerce would foster either an urban–rural (labor and capitalists against landlords) divide or a class (landlords and capitalists against labor) cleavage.75 Thus, for example, in pre-industrial economies of the late nineteenth century, where labor was bounteous and land and capital were in short supply, the right-wing coalition forged among capitalists and landed gentries emerged to counteract the more liberally motivated urban and labor interests. This marriage between “iron and rye,” as empowered politically by the declining global trade and world depression of the 1930s, produced a fascist institutional outlook for countries like Nationalist China, Taisho Japan, and the French colonial regime in Vietnam.76 An alternative approach to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is the Ricardo-Viner model, which emphasizes that because at least one factor is immobile, all factors attached to import-competing sectors lose from trade liberalization while those in export-oriented sectors gain.77 This perspective suggests that many factors of production are quite specialized, so that we often observe sectoral, rather than broad factoral, effects of changes in relative prices and in analogous political behavior.78 As a case in point, the US is in general capital abundant and labor-scarce. Free trade should benefit capital and harm labor; but if both factors within an import-competing sector are specific, both could be economically injured. For most countries, the protection-biased sector of the economy generally consists of import-competing companies, the labor unions representing workers in that industry, and the suppliers to the companies in that industry. Seekers of protectionism, moreover, are often established firms in an aging industry that have lost their comparative advantage, and the high costs may be due to the lack of modern technology, inefficient management procedures, outmoded work rules, or high payments to domestic workers. Their arguments for higher tariffs and other restrictive mechanisms tend to include the following: protection of domestic jobs from cheap foreign labor; maintenance of fairness in trade; defending infant-industry from external competitions; equalization of production costs; and preserving the environment.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

361

In contrast, the free trade-oriented sector is generally comprised of exporting companies, international investors, consumers, wholesalers, and retail merchants of imported goods. Consumers are not organized politically due to collective action problems, and their losses from protectionism are widely dispersed, whereas the benefits from protection are concentrated among well-organized producers and labor unions in the affected sectors.79 Those harmed by protectionism, therefore, absorb individually a small and difficult-to-identify cost and are unlikely to be concerned about trade policy, while protectionist interests are highly concerned about shielding their industries against import competition. Since politicians seek re-election, a nation’s trade policy is heavily influenced by the parochial demands of protectionist coalitions even though economists generally credit free trade for improving national welfare.80 In spite of the relatively well-entrenched preponderance of protectionist interests, however, American top decision-makers, especially the presidency and the executive branch, have been quite consistent in their support for free trade policy going back to at least the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Act, which delegated trade policymaking power to the president.81 Accordingly, US administrations in the post-World War II era have fashioned a steadily robust internationalist coalition to advocate for the deepening of worldwide economic integration. But, there has been a reversal of that as protectionist interests have regained their ascendancy due to the deficient implications of globalization. These populistnationalist furies, fanned by years of open-ended US global commitments, long (as well as the losing) wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic fallout from the international financial crisis of 2008, have culminated in the perception that the Washington elitist establishment (from both the Democratic and Republican administrations) has broken its post-World War II bargain on “embedded liberalism”—that is, subjecting free market globalization to institutionalized political controls at both the domestic and international levels—while allowing for an unrestrained American foreign expansionism to promote overseas democracy, human rights, and various multilateral arrangements and alliance obligations that came at the expenses of American democratic, security, and economic interests.82 The engagement with China is the epitome of US internationalist foreign policy. Trade liberalization is perceived not just an instrument of economic policy but also as a path for the PRC to embrace democratization and perpetual peace. However, the Trump administration has rejected that system of ideas.83 In the words of Robert Lighthizer, the

362

D. P. CHEN

then US trade representative, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 is the “most devastating” to America’s working class. The “US trade deficit with China ballooned to over half a trillion dollars at its peak, and economists have calculated that the loss of at least two million jobs between 1999 and 2011 was attributable to the influx of Chinese imports. At the same time, Beijing increasingly forced companies to share their technology, a policy that resulted in the theft of billions of dollars of US intellectual property and helped China become the world’s top exporters of high-tech products.”84 The strong business lobby groups and free trade coalition within the United States that have long faithfully endorsed continued expansion of the economic relationship with the PRC now has modified their preferences and supported a tougher mercantilist pushback on China. They reflected on their disappointments that Beijing has kept postponing the liberalization of many of its key markets despite its promise in 1999, used its market power unfairly to acquire technologies from foreign firms in China, and exploited the WTO rules to “deploy a wide-range of subsidies and import obstacles to support the survival of inefficient state-owned enterprises producing import-competing goods and boosting the emergence of high-tech giants.”85 And, instead of becoming a model global citizen after entering into the liberal international order, China has utilized its economic and technological gains for massive investments in its military capabilities and territorial expansion in the South China Sea and fostering “subversive sharp power projections” abroad to shape and manipulate policy discourse and programs in favor of the Chinese government.86 So, as the PRC, under the Xi Jinping administration, steps up assertively in challenging and undermining US global and regional interests, that heightened international rivalry helps to reinforce the American domestic nationalist backlashes, which, together, have led to a disenchantment with the China engagement policy. This policy change has received increasing support from both the government and civil society, across bipartisan lines.87 Accordingly, to rectify China’s economically damaging behaviors, the nationalists have eyed using tariffs to hit on Chinese imports. In line with the nineteenth-century Jacksonian traditions, tariffs symbolized what it meant to be an American. A high tariff not only represents commitment to advance domestic marketplace of production and consumption but also protects the integrity of US national identity, independence, and security.88 Thus, the conservative nationalists backing Trump have viewed the protection of US sovereignty as more important than abiding

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

363

to global norms and institutional requirements. Although the United States must stand for freedom internationally, it must focus primarily on defending America’s own distinct national culture, society, identity, traditions, and ways of life as they constitute the “very material, human, and autonomous foundations of the American republic.”89 Therefore, Trump, on several occasions, touted “sovereignty” and “nationalism for all,” rejecting democracy and human rights promotions.90 Echoing the president, David Stilwell, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, noted in December 2019 that “just as our vision of pluralism at home is rooted in the sovereign rights of individuals, so our vision of pluralism abroad is rooted in the sovereign rights of states.”91 The United States’ goal is not to impose democracy, like a Wilsonian crusader, on any country but to show the world that democracy is possible and that it could be chosen by other countries based on their own free will and cultural requirements. The struggle for freedom must be supported and carried out by those countries’ own sovereign initiatives, not by Washington.92 In addition, the nationalists’ instinct is to maintain strong national military defenses, punish severely any direct threat to US security and interests, shun international accommodations, and otherwise remain detached from multilateral obligations.93 The Biden administration has continued to build its foreign policy interests, economic views, and approaches toward China on a trajectory similar to the one set out by its predecessor, though with a much stronger internationalist bent. “There is far more continuity between the foreign policy of [President Biden] and that of former president [Trump] than is typically recognized,” wrote Richard Haass.94 Indeed, the American nationalist approach to China and Taiwan is “the first and most prominent element of continuity between Trump and Biden.”95 “We’ll take on directly the challenges posed [to] our prosperity, security, and democratic values by our most serious competitor, China,” the president stressed in a February 2021 foreign policy speech.96 Whether meeting with the Quad, G7, NATO, or EU members, responding to the PRC’s destabilizing behaviors in the Indo-Pacific region had been the president’s primary talking points. The joint statements and communiqués released all raised the challenges Beijing presented to the rules-based world order. Thus, Biden’s brand of multilateral nationalism,97 predicated on the notion of “a foreign policy for the American people,”98 seeks to bolster US solidarity with its democratic allies and free-society partners around the world while cultivating and renewing American democratic and

364

D. P. CHEN

economic resilience to withstand authoritarian threats from within and without. Biden’s trade representative outlined a “worker-centered trade policy” to determine whether any economic liberalization deals are genuinely benefiting the interests of American middle/working class and protect them from the pernicious effects of globalization.99 During the Biden-Xi meeting of November 2022 in Bali, for instance, the removal of Trump-era tariffs on Chinese imports was not even mentioned, as President Biden merely “raised ongoing concerns about China’s nonmarket economic practices, which harm American workers and families, and workers and families around the world.”100 To beef up America’s high-tech resilience and competitive edge over China, Biden pursued a domestic industrial strategy by signing the CHIPS and Science Act (2022) to provide $53 billion in subsidies and tax credits for companies manufacturing semiconductor chips within the United States while providing more than $200 billion to invest in scientific research and development in artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum computing, and other industrial technologies.101 Ineffective Engagement As discussed, on China, an emerging realization by US policymakers (across bipartisan lines) is that Washington had, for too long, held on to a false democratic peace assumption to constructively engage China, assuming the latter’s strong economic achievements would eventually lead to political opening and democratization while becoming a responsible and peaceful stakeholder of the rules-based world order. Instead, the PRC “did exactly the opposite of what was predicted.”102 Former vice president Pence noted that “we must take China as it is, not as we imagine or hope it might be someday.”103 The US’ increasing frustration at its inability to promote China’s greater openness and a more rules-based international role has led to calls for a “China reckoning” to reexamine US-PRC relations on a more pragmatic basis.104 They critiqued the so-called “liberal naiveté,” or “soothing scenario,” embedded in the US engagement policy, under which Washington assumed that US support for China’s economic development would be acknowledged and appreciated, and would greatly reduce Chinese mistrust of the United States. A more prosperous China would gradually democratize; a China that was integrated into the international community would behave peacefully; a successful China would

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

365

act responsibly.105 Observers have contended that the United States should renounce these “wishful thinking” in order to better advance US national interests in the face of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s forceful consolidation of domestic political power and proactive push for global influence and expansionism to compete with or replace America.106 “For four decades now, [American policymakers] believed that ‘engagement’ with the Chinese would induce China to cooperate with the West on a wide range of policy problems. It hasn’t. Trade and technology were supposed to lead to a convergence of Chinese and Western views on questions of regional and global order. They haven’t. In short, China has failed to meet nearly all of our rosy expectations,” writes Michael Pillsbury, who was one of Trump’s most trusted consultants on China affairs.107 Rather, “deception” is a major part of China’s grand strategy, seeking to mislead the United States and the international community into believing Beijing’s benign and peaceful intentions and providing the latter with economic benefits and technical assistance. In its century-long marathon, China, according to Pillsbury, will “hide their capability and bide their time” while patiently and stealthily building up its power, technology, and wealth to eventually, by the one hundred year anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049, assert dominance in Asia and displace the United States in regional and global affairs.108 Thus, the Trump administration rejected engagement with China, calling it overly idealistic. On July 23, 2020, the then secretary of state Mike Pompeo contended: “President Nixon kicked off our engagement strategy. He nobly sought a freer and safer world, and he hoped that the Chinese Communist Party would return that commitment. American policymakers increasingly presumed that as China became more prosperous, it would open up, it would become freer at home, and indeed present less of a threat abroad, it’d be friendlier… But that age of inevitability is over. The kind of engagement we have been pursuing has not brought the kind of change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce.” Rather, the CCP has sought to “exploit our free and open society” and made China into a “new tyranny.” To preserve a free twenty-first century, Pompeo stressed that “the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done. We must not continue it, and we must not return to it.”109 The secretary’s address illustrated an ideational reconstitution driving America’s new China policy. Not everyone, however, concurred with such a dire assessment. Advocates of engagement contend that it is still too early to tell whether China

366

D. P. CHEN

would become more liberalized,110 that the United States should appreciate the changes that the PRC has already made thus far111 and that Washington should not abandon efforts to shape Beijing’s policy choices and work with the latter for mutual interests and benefits.112 Still, the general outlook embraced by Washington’s policy elites was that the USPRC relationship is, in fact, deteriorating and reaching a tipping point at which their interactions may simply assume a fundamentally competitive and hostile character. In a similar vein, the Biden administration’s China strategy had ruled out the feasibility of using engagement to overhaul the PRC. Secretary Blinken promised that the Biden administration “stands ready to increase direct communication with Beijing on a full range of issues to better understand each other’s intentions and perspectives.”113 However, “we cannot rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So, we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.”114 National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasized in an interview with CNN: “I think one of the errors of previous approaches to policy towards China has been a view that through US policy, we would bring about a fundamental transformation of the Chinese system. That is not the object of the Biden administration. The object of the Biden administration is to shape the international environment so that it is more favorable to the interest and values of the United States and its allies and partners to like-minded democracies. It is not to bring about some fundamental transformation of China itself.”115

Congressional Actions To many China hawks and nationalists in the executive branch and Congress, the United States must step up its support for Taiwan, for both strategic and democratic reasons. Even before Obama left office, a great majority of US lawmakers, the media, left and right-leaning think tanks, and interest groups had strongly advocated change that would allow for a less deferential US Taiwan policy. From a realist vantage point, many urged Washington to pay closer attention to using Taiwan’s strategic location (situated in the so-called first island chain) to counter the PRC’s ambitions to undermine American security interests around China’s rim. Washington could strengthen its military cooperation with Taipei to constrain and deny Chinese naval expansion and activities. They also suggested that as the PRC pursues policies and practices grossly at

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

367

odds with US interests, increasing American support for Taiwan could constitute a “cost imposition strategy” to show Xi that his various challenges to US interests “would not be cost free and actually would be counterproductive for Chinese concerns on the all-important Taiwan issue.”116 In contrast, another school of thought simply recommended dealing with Taiwan “for its own sake, rather than in a contingent way dependent on US interests with China.”117 As a democratic force for good, Taiwan deserves to be treated with greater respect, dignity, and a more pronounced role in American foreign relations and the international community. A substantial majority of members from the US Senate and House of Representatives have voiced strident complaints about Beijing’s incessant intimidations of Taiwan. They are in favor of more frequent US high-ranking official visits to Taipei as well as selling more advanced American military weaponry to the ROC, outfitting the island into a “porcupine” to empower its asymmetrical military capabilities to deter and defend against a Chinese invasion. In the Trump era, Capitol Hill promoted many pro-Taiwan legislations at an “unusually fast pace,” knowing the president would most likely sign off on them amid spats with China over trade and geopolitics.118 Indeed, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), TAIPEI Act (2020), and the Taiwan Assurance Act (2020), which called for an enhancement of official contact between American and Taiwan government officials, the strengthening of Taiwan’s international participation, and the fending off of Beijing’s coercive attempts to interfere with the ROC’s democratic governance.119 These were in addition to the annual National Defense Authorization (NDAA) Acts signed off by the president that included provisions to reinforce US military and security cooperation and coordination with the island democracy. Likewise, Biden signed the NDAA for FYS 2022 in December 2021 that also contained provisions supporting a deeper US-Taiwan military collaboration for the island’s self-defense. In May 2022, Biden signed legislation that directs the secretary of state to help Taiwan regain observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA), from which the island was excluded due to Beijing’s firm opposition since 2017.120 As of this writing, there are many other Taiwan-specific bills in the pipeline of the US Congress, including the Taiwan Policy Act, Taiwan Symbols of Sovereignty Act, Taiwan Defense Act, Taiwan Fellowship Act, Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act, Taiwan Diplomatic Review Act,

368

D. P. CHEN

Taiwan International Solidarity Act, and Taiwan Peace and Stability Act, to name just a few.121

Adding the Six Assurances to the One-China Matrix122 In addition, the US president/executive branch has also fine-tuned the US One-China/strategic ambiguity policy framework to update it with the changing strategic circumstances across the Taiwan Strait.In a CBS 60-minute interview aired on September 18, 2022, Biden posited, “We agree with what we signed onto a long time ago…. And that there’s one China policy.” Asked whether the US forces would defend the island democracy, Biden unequivocally replied, “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.” The CBS host probed further: “U.S. forces, U.S. men and women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion?” “Yes,” the president responded.123 The White House official followed up and reiterated that US policy on Taiwan has not changed, explaining that the president was merely responding to a “hypothetical question.”124 This is the fourth time, as of this writing (the previous three happened in August, 2021, October 2021, and May 2022), that President Biden had allegedly veered off the longstanding official US policy script on the Taiwan Strait—better known as strategic ambiguity—and expressed clearly that Washington would defend Taiwan from Beijing’s aggression. Critics soon took note of the president’s seemingly repeated misstatements and the contradictions coming from his White House officials who repeatedly “walked back” the commander-in-chief’s Taiwan remarks.125 One of their concerns was that although Biden’s gaffes might have reflected his genuine perspective, the “confusion” surrounding US policy could undermine deterrence and provoke China’s attack.126 Yet, Biden and his team did not undercut127 strategic ambiguity. Rather, they were merely continuing the process of upgrading strategic ambiguity/One-China framework that began under the Trump administration. “The US retains the official policy of ambiguity, but Biden’s comments gave it a hawkish lean.”128 It is a commensurate response to China’s growing authoritarianism and aggressiveness toward Taiwan. In August 2020, the US State Department formally incorporated President Ronald Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan (1982) into the Taiwan Strait policy matrix, which previously only included the Taiwan Relations

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

369

Act (1979) and the three US-PRC Joint Communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982). It declassified the Reagan documents explaining the rationales for making these pledges to Taipei. For instance, America has not agreed “to revise the Taiwan Relations Act” or “set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.” The “quality and quantity” of US arms sales to Taiwan would be “conditioned absolutely” upon Beijing’s continued commitment to a “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan-PRC differences” and “threats posed by the PRC.”129 Furthermore, to underline the distinction between the PRC’s One-China principle and the US One-China policy, one of the assurances stated that “the US has not agreed to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” David Stilwell, Trump’s assistant secretary of state for the East Asian and Pacific Affairs, contended then that the “adjustments” to the US One-China policy was imperative given Beijing’s “habit of distorting history” and claiming that the “CCP has sovereignty over Taiwan.”130 The trinary configuration of the US strategic ambiguity/One-China policy—“One Act, Three Communiqués, and Six Assurances ”—has given the United States more latitude as well as wiggle room to deepen its security, political, and economic ties with Taiwan. The Biden administration reaffirmed Washington’s “rock-solid” support for Taiwan and the Six Assurances whenever describing its One-China policy.131 It also endeavored to strengthen the island’s asymmetrical military capabilities and armaments to better fend off a Chinese blockade or outright attack. In May 2022, the State Department updated its fact sheet132 on Taiwan relations by removing the 2018 version which included a phrase “acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”133 While the 2022 fact sheet stated that the US “does not support Taiwan independence,” it gave some substantive treatment to the TRA: “Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available defense articles and services as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability—and maintains our capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of Taiwan.”134 The clause “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion”135 can be interpreted to buttress Biden’s remarks on US military interventions in a Taiwan Strait crisis. The State Department sought to, once again, set the record straight on America’s One-China policy: “Beijing’s ‘one China’ principle is not

370

D. P. CHEN

the same as our ‘one China’ policy. In a May 12th press briefing, the PRC spokesperson stated that we had made a quote/unquote ‘commitment to uphold the ‘one China’ principle.’ That is [in]correct…. We are committed to upholding our ‘one China’ policy, which, again, is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three US Joint China Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The PRC statements attempt to mischaracterize our position and our policy. Our longstanding, bipartisan ‘one China’ policy has not changed…and we are appropriately careful and precise with our language, and we urge the PRC to cease its mischaracterization of US policy and statements from senior US officials.”136 At the May 2022 Tokyo press conference, the president’s rationale was quite deliberate. “Look, here’s the situation. We agree with the One China policy; we’ve signed on to it and all the attendant agreements made from there. But the idea that [Taiwan] can be taken by force is just not appropriate. It will dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. And so, it’s a burden that is even stronger.”137 In November, when meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Biden, reacting to the Chinese leader’s stern “red line” remarks138 on Taiwan, stated again that the US One-China policy hasn’t changed. But the president also clearly underscored “the United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and the world has an interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”139 Strategic ambiguity is ambiguous in means only, not ends—which is to insist on a peaceful and consensual resolution of the Taiwan Strait impasse and considering the democratic preferences of the people in Taiwan. Washington has always left uncertain the specific actions and mechanisms it will take to dually deter Beijing and Taipei from embarking disruptive behaviors. Indeed, Biden has lucidly signaled his intention to respond if the PRC pushes for a military invasion of Taiwan but has remained vague on how he would pursue that. Intervening militarily could very well suggest providing weapons, military training, and logistical assistance rather than putting American troops on the ground and fighting for Taiwan. In December 2021, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told the Council on Foreign Relations that “the Taiwan Relations Act is a unique instrument—we don’t have it with other countries, we don’t have it with Ukraine—that does talk about American commitments to support Taiwan in various ways.”140 Blinken further qualified the implementation of US One-China policy by stressing “where applicable,” implying Washington’s abidance by the policy is premised on Beijing’s peaceful conduct

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

371

with Taiwan.141 In spite of the closer and stronger US-Taiwan ties in recent years, ambiguity still remains.142 That probably prompted Kurt Campbell, Biden’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, to come out and say, “the president’s remarks about defending Taiwan speak for themselves.”143

Revisiting State-Centered Realism: Executive Dominance Over Foreign Policy This chapter has put forward an analysis of how the PRC’s aggressive behaviors toward Taiwan and stepped-up strategic/economic competitions with Washington have fostered an American-centric nationalist consensus within the United States that unites both the Democrats and Republicans from the executive and legislative branches to push back on Beijing. Political elites have agreed that the constructive engagement approach, implemented since Nixon, was ineffective in the US bid to transform Communist China. Thus, both the Trump and Biden administrations, unlike their post-Nixon predecessors who opted for conciliatory interactions with China and treaded cautiously on America’s Taiwan policy, are prompted to harden their stances on the PRC while warming up Washington’s relations with Taipei. To be sure, Taiwan’s growing profile is not only facilitated by the island’s successful democratic governance, effective handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and measured responses toward Beijing’s unrelenting bellicose behaviors, but also its cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing and innovative capacities. The latter attribute is particularly significant for the US-PRC rivalry over dominance in the realms of high-technology and digital economy that are front and center to the twenty-first century world order. However, despite the constraining influences of domestic politics and nationalist determinants, the United States foreign policy and national interest interpretations remain to fall under the sole prerogatives of the White House and executive branch. Irrespective of heightened hostility, central decision-makers in Washington do not desire a complete breakdown of US-Chinese relations. That would be unpalatable to US national interests given the many transnational issue areas requiring their cooperation (such as climate change, pandemic, nuclear nonproliferation, etc.). The Biden team, while following the Trump administration’s liberalization of US-Taiwan official contacts, noted that it would be implemented in accordance with the “One-China” policy.144 Biden officials explained

372

D. P. CHEN

that “there would still be some guardrails.” For instance, though US officials and their Taiwanese counterparts would be able to meet in their respective offices in their formal capacities, Washington would not send representatives to attend formal/official functions at the Twin Oaks (the former residence of ROC ambassadors to the United States before 1979) celebrating major Taiwan holidays that might undercut the US OneChina policy. There will also be a prohibition on displaying ROC flags when US officials meet their Taiwanese counterparts.145 In December 2021, Taiwan was invited, along with other 100 + democratic nations, to join the Biden-hosted Democracy Summit to discuss enhanced cooperation with democratic governments around the world to counter autocratic regimes and their disruptive actions. Yet, Taipei was represented at the venue by the ROC’s Digital Minister Audrey Tang and Hsiao Bi-khim (Taiwan’s de facto ambassador in Washington) instead of President Tsai.146 This showed Washington’s seeking to maintain its strategic ambiguity stance (though with a bit more clarity than before), hence avoiding directly touching upon the sovereign status of Taiwan. It’s interesting to note that during the summit, a video feed showing Tang’s Powerpoint slides was cut and replaced by her audio only, after a map in her slide presentation showed Taiwan in a different color to China. According to a Reuters ’ article, although the State Department clarified that it was an “honest mistake,” the Biden White House was reportedly concerned that the different coloring of Taiwan and China in a colorcoded map displaying the rankings of political openness in Asia could create the impression that the US was endorsing Taiwan independence.147 The Biden administration didn’t invite Taiwan to join the launch of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, in order to not antagonize Beijing.148 But, since bolstering critical supplies chains and the resilience of digital economy—areas where Taiwan excels—remains crucial for American national interests, Washington and Taipei launched, in June 2022, the US-Taiwan Initiative on Twenty-first-Century Trade. Under that arrangement, both sides agreed to “develop concrete ways to deepen the US-Taiwan economic and trade relationship, advance mutual trade priorities based on shared values, and promote innovation and inclusive economic growth for workers and businesses.”149 They also “discussed the development of an ambitious roadmap for negotiations under the auspices of AIT and TECRO to reach agreements with high-standard commitments and economically meaningful outcomes, [covering] a number of trade areas, including trade facilitation,

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

373

regulatory practices, agriculture, anti-corruption, small- and mediumsized enterprises, digital trade, labor, environment, standards, state-owned enterprises, and non-market policies and practices.” This example demonstrates the Biden White House’s attempt to strike a delicate balance between deepening US-Taiwan ties and confine the extent of support for the self-ruled island. Kurt Campbell lashed out at Beijing’s military drills, economic sanctions, retaliatory measures against Taiwan, and suspension of communications with Washington in the wake of Pelosi’s visit as “overreacting, provocative, and destabilizing.” While promising that the Biden administration will continue to dispatch naval ships and military flights through the Taiwan Strait and advance Washington-Taipei economic/trade relations, Campbell reiterated the US commitment to the One-China policy, guided by the TRA, The Three Joint Communiqués, and Six Assurances, adding “we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and we do not support Taiwan independence, and we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means.”150 The Biden administration has called the PRC, in its newly released National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy reports, America’s most “consequential challenge,” the “only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”151 In October 2022, the US has also tightened its control, while persuading and rallying allies and partners to do the same, in restricting Chinese access to cutting-edge semiconductor technology and equipment that are decisive in determining the military and economic dominance in the twentyfirst century. Notwithstanding vigorous competitions between the US and PRC, however, the Biden government repeatedly said that it didn’t want a new Cold War with Beijing, and their rivalries must be carefully managed to prevent veering into greater confrontation.152 Thus, prudently handling relations with Taipei is compatible with Washington’s national interests. Even the Trump administration refrained from overturning the US One-China/strategic ambiguity policy framework, as noted by Pence in his 2019 China address.153 President Trump provided qualifications (as signing statements) when signing bills involving Taiwan. His response to the NDAA FYS 2019 stipulated: “Several provisions of the bill … purport to dictate the position of the United States in external military and foreign affairs. My Administration will treat these provisions consistent with the

374

D. P. CHEN

President’s exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs, including the authorities to determine the terms upon which recognition is given to foreign sovereigns, to receive foreign representatives, and to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy.”154 Toward the end of the Trump presidency, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo became more vocally hostile toward the CCP and their repressive behaviors, even at one point in November 2020 stating that “Taiwan has not been a part of China.”155 In January 2021, he, however, walked back on his earlier remarks: “Everything that President Trump and our administration has done with respect to the Taiwan issue in particular is deeply consistent with a series of agreements over an awfully long time. All we have asked is that the Chinese Communist Party continue to adhere to the ‘one China’ policy and the Three Communiques as well.”156 Richard Bush probably captured the essence of US-Taiwan Strait policy: “People in Taiwan are correct to take heart from the sympathy that members of Congress feel toward them, but they sometimes exaggerate the impact that these measures have on the conduct of US policy.”157 At the same time, the PRC “gets more alarmed than it probably should, fearing that whatever the import or lack of import of each individual measure, together they signal a negative trend in US policy.”158 Ultimately, the president/executive branch continues to weigh their influences heavily in chartering American foreign policy. There are clear changes in their enhanced support for Taiwan, but not yet substantial enough to overturn or realign the overarching US-TaiwanPRC trilateral relations predicated on the Taiwan Relations Act, Reagan’s Six Assurances, and the three US-China Joint Communiqués. This is not to say that US national interest on the Taiwan Strait will be immutable going forward. If Beijing persists with its current course of coercive behaviors or even escalates to militarized actions, strategic ambiguity may very well turn to greater clarity. Biden gave Xi Jinping an opportunity at Bali by downplaying Beijing’s “imminent attempt to invade Taiwan,”159 in contradiction to the assessments from some of his top national security officials. Whether Xi, as China’s most powerful leader since Mao, would moderate his militant stances and charter a more reasonable cross-Strait approach will be a determining factor of America’s future Taiwan Strait policy, including the extent and scope of Washington’s backing for the island democracy.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

375

Notes 1. “How the Crisis over Taiwan Will Change US-China relations,” The Economist, August 11, 2022, https://www.economist.com/china/ 2022/08/11/how-the-crisis-over-taiwan-will-change-us-china-relations, accessed August 21, 2022. 2. Ibid. 3. For a substantive discussion on the origins and development of US strategic ambiguity with Taiwan, see Nancy B. Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 4. For instances, see Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must be Unambiguous: To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China that Force Won’t Stand,” Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/american-sup port-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous; Joseph Bosco, “Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan No Longer Works—It’s Time for Strategic Clarity,” The Hill, September 1, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/ 514503-strategic-ambiguity-on-taiwan-no-longer-works-its-time-for-str ategic; Roger Wicker, “Joe Biden Should Come Out and Say It: America Will Help Defend Taiwan,” The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-biden-should-come-out-andsay-it-america-will-help-defend-taiwan-china-military-xi-11637357925; Joseph Choi, “Lawmakers Call for End to Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan,” The Hill, October 7, 2021, https://thehill.com/policy/def ense/575842-lawmakers-call-for-end-to-strategic-ambiguity-on-taiwan; John Bolton, “It’ll Take More than American Military Might to Shore Up Taiwan,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2021, https://www. wsj.com/articles/american-military-taiwan-china-taipei-diplomatic-relati ons-invasion-11634760999?mod=article_inline; James Stavridis, “The U.S. Risks Catastrophe If It Doesn’t Clarify Its Taiwan Policy,” Time, November 3, 2021, https://time.com/6113253/us-taiwan-strategy/; Accessed August 21, 2022. See also Charles K. S. Wu, Yao-Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen, Horng-En Wang, Austin, “Prospects for US-TaiwanChina Relations under the Biden Administration,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 28, no. 1 (2021): 1–12. 5. Robert Sutter, “Congress and Trump Administration China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy Adjustments and Hardening toward Beijing,” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 118 (2019): 522. 6. Dean P. Chen, “The End of Liberal Engagement with China and the New U.S.-Taiwan Focus,” Pacific Focus 35, no. 3 (2020): 397–435.

376

D. P. CHEN

7. Hoo Tiang Boon and Hannah Elyse Sworn, “Strategic Ambiguity and the Trumpian Approach to China-Taiwan Relations,” International Affairs 96, no. 6 (2020): 1499–1500. 8. On state-centered realism, see Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interests: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 9. Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “Nancy Pelosi’s Plan to Visit Taiwan Prompts Outrage from China,” Financial Times, July 19, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/09669099-1565-4723-86c984e0ca465825, accessed August 21, 2022. 10. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi), “Press Release: Pelosi to Lead Congressional Delegation to the Indo-Pacific Region,” July 31, 2022, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/73122, accessed August 21, 2022. 11. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi), “Press Release: Pelosi, Congressional Delegation Statement on Visit to Taiwan,” August 2, 2022, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/8222-2, accessed August 21, 2022. 12. Nancy Pelosi, “Opinion: Why I’m Leading a Congressional Delegation to Taiwan,” The Washington Post, August 2, 2022, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/02/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-visit-op-ed/ , accessed August 21, 2022. 13. Joe McDonald, “A Richer, Stronger China Warns Pelosi Not to Visit Taiwan,” The Associated Press, July 28, 2022, https://apnews.com/art icle/china-beijing-xi-jinping-hong-kong-2c2b95758dd6faa6eed87a7c5cf 298d4, accessed August 21, 2022. 14. Indeed, when Pelosi expressed the possibility of her coming to Taiwan last April, only scuttled after she tested positive for COVID19, the Chinese government voiced stern displeasure, calling it a “malicious provocation.” See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Makes Clear the Solemn Position on U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Upcoming Visit to Taiwan,” April 8, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_ 665385/wshd_665389/202204/t20220408_10665741.html, accessed August 21, 2022. 15. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi), “Press Release: Pelosi Statement on Congressional Delegation Visit to Taiwan,” August 3, 2022, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/8322-2, accessed August 21, 2022. 16. Zhang Hui and Cui Fandi, “PLA Will Not Sit Idly by if Pelosi Visits Taiwan Island, Chinese Defense Ministry Warns; Indicating PLA ‘Fully

11

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

377

Prepared’ For All Scenarios,” Global Times, July 26, 2022, https:/ /www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1271480.shtml, accessed August 21, 2022. Charles Hutzler, “China’s Drills Around Taiwan Give Hint About Its Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/chinas-drills-around-taiwan-give-hint-about-its-strategy11659633265?mod=series_chinataiwan, accessed August 21, 2022. Ben Dooley, “With 5 Missiles, China Sends Stark Signal to Japan and U.S. on Taiwan,” The New York Times, August 4, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/04/world/asia/chinajapan-taiwan-missiles.html, accessed August 21, 2022. David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Ben Dooley, “U.S. Insists It Will Operate Around Taiwan, Despite China’s Pressures,” The New York Times, August 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/10/us/ politics/taiwan-china-us.html, accessed August 21, 2022. Thompson Chau, “China Drills Show Intent to Normalize Aggression against Taiwan,” Nikkei Asia, August 8, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/China-drills-show-int ent-to-normalize-aggression-against-Taiwan, accessed August 21, 2022. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference,” August 4, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/2511_665403/202208/t20220805_10734891.html, accessed August 21, 2022. Phelim Kine, “Beijing Cuts U.S. Cooperation to Protest Pelosi’s Taiwan visit,” POLITICO, August 5, 2022, https://www.politico.com/amp/ news/2022/08/05/beijing-protest-pelosi-taiwan-00050155, accessed August 21, 2022. The U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo At a Virtual Press Availability,” August 6, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretaryantony-j-blinken-and-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-man alo-at-a-virtual-press-availability/, accessed August 21, 2022. The Editorial Board, “Opinion: Pelosi Should Go to Taiwan—When the Time is Right,” The Washington Post, July 27, 2022, https://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/27/pelosi-visit-taiwan-chinainfluence/. See also Bonnie Glaser and Zack Cooper, “Nancy Pelosi’s Trip to Taiwan Is Too Dangerous,” The New York Times, July 28, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/28/opinion/china-us-taiwan-pel osi.html, accessed August 21, 2022.

378

D. P. CHEN

25. Seung Min Kim and Matthew Lee, “Growing Number in GOP Back Pelosi on Possible Taiwan Trip,” The Associated Press, July 25, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-beijing-nancy-pel osi-taiwan-5a1f96199bdb7467b22837bd271b835d, accessed August 21, 2022. 26. Ellen Nakashima and Cate Cadell, “Administration Fears a Pelosi Trip to Taiwan Could Spark Cross-Strait Crisis,” The Washington Post, July 23, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/ 07/23/biden-pelosi-taiwan-trip/, accessed August 21, 2022. 27. Keith Zhai and Chun Han Wong, “China’s Xi Claims Third Term as Communist Party Leader,” The Wall Street Journal (October 23, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-claims-third-termas-communist-party-leader-11666499842, accessed November 26, 2022. To get a more substantive details on the path towards Xi’s consolidation of political power in China and ultimately pushing for a more nationalistic and expansionist foreign policy, see Susan Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). 28. Andrew Desiderio, “Pelosi and China: The Making of a Progressive Hawk,” POLITICO, July 28, 2022, https://www.politico.com/ news/2022/07/28/pelosi-china-taiwan-00048352, accessed August 21, 2022. 29. The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” August 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/bri efing-room/press-briefings/2022/08/01/press-briefing-by-press-secret ary-karine-jean-pierre-and-national-security-council-coordinator-for-str ategic-communications-john-kirby-2/, accessed August 21, 2022. 30. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden After Air Force One Arrival,” July 20, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ speeches-remarks/2022/07/20/remarks-by-president-biden-after-airforce-one-arrival-5/, accessed August 21, 2022. 31. The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine JeanPierre,” August 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ press-briefings/2022/08/03/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karinejean-pierre-august-3-2022/, accessed August 21, 2022. 32. Mary Louise Kelly, Connor Donevan, and William Troop, “Biden’s National Security Adviser Doubles Down on Taiwan Policy after Pelosi Visit,” NPR News, August 3, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/ 08/03/1115404561/ukraine-taiwan-pelosi-afghanistan-al-qaida-biden, accessed August 21, 2022.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

379

33. Dean P. Chen, “Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit Is Less Than Meets the Eye,” The National Interest, August 1, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ pelosi%E2%80%99s-taiwan-visit-less-meets-eye-203919, accessed August 21, 2022. 34. The U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, https://www.state. gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/, accessed August 21, 2022. 35. Ibid. 36. The U.S. Department of Defense, “Austin Meets With Chinese Counterpart in Singapore,” June 10, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/ News-Stories/Article/Article/3058994/austin-meets-with-chinese-cou nterpart-in-singapore/, accessed August 21, 2022. 37. “U.S. Maintains ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ over Taiwan: Security Adviser,” Nikkei Asia, July 23, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Internati onal-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-maintains-strategic-ambiguity-over-Tai wan-security-adviser, accessed August 21, 2022. 38. The White House, “Background Press Call on President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” July 28, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/ 2022, 2022/07/28/background-press-call-on-president-bidens-call-with-pre sident-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. See also, The White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” July 28, 2022, https://www.whiteh ouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/28/readout-ofpresident-bidens-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republicof-china/, accessed August 21, 2022. 39. The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” August 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2022/08/04/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jeanpierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-5/, accessed August 21, 2022. 40. The White House, “Background Press Call on President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” July 28, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/ 2022, 2022/07/28/background-press-call-on-president-bidens-call-with-pre sident-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/, accessed August 21, 2022. 41. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Speaks with US President Joe Biden on the Phone,” July 29, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202 207/t20220729_10729593.html, accessed August 21, 2022.

380

D. P. CHEN

42. Lingling Wei, “Xi Sought to Send Message to Biden on Taiwan: Now Is No Time for a Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-sought-to-send-message-to-biden-ontaiwan-now-is-no-time-for-a-crisis-11660240698?mod=hp_lead_pos7, accessed August 21, 2022. 43. Alexander Bolton, “McConnell Defends Pelosi Trip to Taiwan: ‘She Has Every Right to Go,’” The Hill, August 2, 2022, https://thehill. com/homenews/senate/3584515-mcconnell-defends-pelosi-trip-to-tai wan-she-has-every-right-to-go/, accessed August 21, 2022. 44. Iain Marlow and Eric Martin, “Hard-Line China Push Is Vowed by Republicans Taking Control of the U.S. House,” Bloomberg, (November 16, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-17/ gop-takeover-of-house-ensures-hard-line-on-china-despite-biden-xi-con ciliation?leadSource=uverify%20wall, accessed November 26, 2022. 45. Sarah Zheng and Kari Soo Lindberg, “US Congress Forces Joe Biden Toward Risky Faceoff With China Over Taiwan,” Bloomberg, August 15, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-15/us2022, congress-forces-joe-biden-toward-risky-faceoff-with-china-over-taiwan? srnd=premium-asia, accessed August 21, 2022. 46. The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Graham Introduce Comprehensive Legislation to Overhaul U.S.-Taiwan Policy,” June 17, 2022, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/ menendez-graham-introduce-comprehensive_legislation-to-overhaulus-taiwan-policy, accessed August 21, 2022. See also Bryant Harris, “Senate Advances $6.5 Billion Taiwan Military Aid Bill,” Defense News (September 14, 2022), https://www.defensenews.com/con gress/2022/09/14/senate-advances-65-billion-taiwan-military-aid-bill/ , accessed November 26, 2022. 47. Andrew Desiderio, “White House Resists Congress’ Bipartisan Bid to Overhaul U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” POLITICO, August 7, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/07/white-house-res ists-congress-overhaul-u-s-taiwan-relations-00050163, accessed August 21, 2022. 48. Jennifer Jacobs, “China Invading Taiwan Is ‘Distinct Threat,’ Biden Aide Jake Sullivan Says,” Bloomberg (September 7, 2022), https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-07/china-invading-taiwan-isdistinct-threat-jake-sullivan-says?leadSource=uverify%20wall, accessed November 26, 2022. 49. For a substantive treatment on the rise of US Jacksonian nationalism and its impact on Trump and Biden’s Taiwan Strait policy, see Dean P. Chen, U.S.-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden: Towards a Nationalist Strategy (New York: Routledge, 2022).

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

381

50. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 18, 2017), 25, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives. gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, accessed August 21, 2022. 51. The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture,” October 24, 2019, https://trumpwhiteho use.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-fre deric-v-malek-memorial-lecture/, accessed August 21, 2022. 52. Thomas Wright, “COVID-19’s Impact on Great-Power Competition,” in COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, eds. Hal Brands and Francis Gavin, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2020), 317–330. See also, in the same volume, Elizabeth Economy, “The United States, China, and the Great Values Game,” 369–387. Andrew Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright, “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2020): 103–115. 53. Kevin Rudd, “The Return of Red China: Xi Jinping Brings Back Marxism,” Foreign Affairs (November 9, 2022), https://www.foreig naffairs.com/china/return-red-china?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_ source=twofa&utm_campaign=The%20Return%20of%20Red%20China& utm_content=20221111&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%201 12017, accessed November 26, 2022. 54. Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein, “Rivalry and Security in a New Era for U.S.-China Relations,” in After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.China Security Relations, eds. Jacques deLisle and Avery Goldstein (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 37. See also Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). 55. Tzu-Chieh Hung and Tzu-Wei Hung, “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars,” Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (2022): 1–18. 56. “The DPP Administration’s Logic and Policy on China,” The Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), https://www.mac.gov.tw/ en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021 B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37, accessed August 21, 2022. 57. Richard Bush, Difficult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021), 153–154. See also J. Michael Cole, Cross-Strait Relations since 2016 (New York: Routledge, 2020), 7–8. 58. Bush, Difficult Choices, 131. 59. Cole, Cross-Strait Relations since 2016, 11–12.

382

D. P. CHEN

60. The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress, “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” January 1, 1979, http://www.china. org.cn/english/7943.htm, accessed August 21, 2022. 61. Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification by Xi Jinping,” January 2, 2019, http://www.gwytb. gov.cn/wyly/201904/t20190412_12155687.htm, accessed August 21, 2022. 62. Bush, Difficult Choices, 211. 63. Ibid., 288. 64. Charles Kupchan, Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 340. 65. David Sanger, “With Echoes of the ‘30 s, Trump Resurrects a Hardline Vision of ‘America First,’” The New York Times, January 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-res urrects-dark-definition-of-america-first-vision.html, accessed August 21, 2022. See also Walter R. Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2017): 2–7. 66. Robert Jervis, Francis Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse, eds., Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 62–63. 67. Colin Dueck, Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 108–109. 68. Ibid., 148–149. 69. Hal Brands, “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and Its Alternatives,” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 77–78. 70. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse,” Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (2017): 443–454. 71. Chen, “The End of Liberal Engagement with China and the New U.S. Taiwan Focus,” 413–414. 72. Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1 (2018): 43–45. 73. Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, eds. Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

383

74. Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3. 75. Ibid., 7. 76. Ibid., 82–83. 77. Michael Hiscox, “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 3–4. 78. Frieden and Rogowski, 38. 79. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 80. Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change,” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, eds. Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 52–53. 81. Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 145–147. See also Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization 42, no.1 (1988): 59–90. 82. Jack Snyder, “The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back,” Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2019): 54–60. 83. On the Trump administration’s trade war with the PRC, see John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir (New York: Simon Schuster, 2020); Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, Superpower Showdown: How the Battle between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War (New York: Harper Business, 2020). 84. Robert Lighthizer, “How to Make Trade Work for Workers,” Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2020): 90. 85. Deborah Swenson and Wing Thye Woo, “The Politics and Economics of the U.S.-China Trade War,” Asian Economic Papers 18, no. 3 (2019): 6–7. 86. Ibid., 80. 87. Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds. China’s Influence & American Interests (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2019), 15–16. 88. William Bolt, Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017), 100–101. 89. Dueck, Age of Iron, 30. 90. Newt Gingrich, Trump vs. China (New York: Center Street, 2019), 3. 91. The U.S. Department of State, “Remarks by Assistant Secretary David Stilwell: The U.S., China, and Pluralism in International Relations,” December 2, 2019, https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-china-and-pluralismin-international-affairs/, accessed December 20, 2020. 92. Walter Mead, Special Providence (New York: Routledge, 2002), 245.

384

D. P. CHEN

93. Brands, “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism,” 79–89. 94. Richard Haass, “The Age of America First: Washington’s Flawed New Foreign Policy Consensus,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2021): 85. 95. Ibid., 88–89. 96. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-onamericas-place-in-the-world/, accessed August 21, 2022. 97. Chen, U.S.-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden, chapter 5. 98. The U.S. Department of State, “A Foreign Policy for the American People, Remarks by Secretary Blinken,” March 3, 2021, https://www. state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/, accessed August 21, 2022. 99. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Remarks of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s ‘WorkerCentered Trade Policy,’” June 10, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/ policy-offices/press-office/speeches-and-remarks/2021/june/remarksambassador-katherine-tai-outlining-biden-harris-administrations-workercentered-trade-policy, accessed August 21, 2022. 100. The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 14, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-rel eases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-pre sident-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/, accessed November 26, 2022. 101. The White House, “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statem ents-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lowercosts-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/, accessed August 21, 2022. 102. Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, 287–288. 103. The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Mike Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture,” October 24, 2019, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-fre deric-v-malek-memorial-lecture/, accessed December 20, 2020. 104. Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Foreign Affairs 97 (2018): 60–70. 105. Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” The Washington Quarterly (2015): 106. 106. Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon; deLisle and Goldstein, “Rivalry and Security in a New Era for U.S.-China Relations,” 13–14.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

385

107. Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon, 7. 108. Ibid., 177–178. 109. The U.S. Department of State, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” July 23, 2020, https://www.state.gov/communist-china-andthe-free-worlds-future/, accessed December 20, 2020. 110. Joseph Nye, “Time will Tell,” Foreign Affairs 97 (2018): 190–192. 111. Stapleton Roy, “Engagement Works,” Foreign Affairs 97 (2018): 185– 186. 112. Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim, “Don’t Abandon Ship,” Foreign Affairs 97 (2018) 188–190. 113. The U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, accessed August 21, 2022. 114. Ibid. 115. “Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interview Transcripts with Jake Sullivan,” CNN , November 7, 2021, https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/ 2021-11-07/segment/01, accessed August 21, 2022. 116. Robert Sutter, U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 223–224. 117. Robert Sutter, “American Policy toward Taiwan-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” in Taiwan’s Political Realignment and Diplomatic Challenges, ed. Wei-chin Lee (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 219–220. 118. Ralph Jennings, “Why U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Bill after Bill to Help Taiwan,” Voice of America, August 4, 2020, accessed August 4, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/why-uslawmakers-introduce-bill-after-bill-help-taiwan. 119. Walter Lohman, “On Taiwan: A Congressional Update,” The Heritage Foundation, December 9, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/asia/com mentary/taiwan-congressional-update, accessed August 21, 2022. 120. “Biden Signs Bill to Help Taiwan Regain WHA Observer Status,” Focus Taiwan News, May 14, 2022, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202205 140004, accessed August 21, 2022. 121. U.S. Taiwan Watch, Why and How the U.S. Matters (Taipei: Linking Publishers, 2021), Chapters 7–8. 122. Revised and updated from Dean P. Chen, “No, Biden Hasn’t Abandoned Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan,” The National Interest, May 27, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-biden-hasn%E2%80% 99t-abandoned-strategic-ambiguity-taiwan-202638, accessed August 21, 2022. 123. “Biden Tells 60 Minutes U.S. Troops Would Defend Taiwan, but White House Says This Is Not Official U.S. Policy,” CBS News (September 18, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joebiden-taiwan-60-minutes-2022-09-18/, accessed November 26, 2022.

386

D. P. CHEN

124. The White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” September 20, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/ 09/20/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nationalsecurity-advisor-jake-sullivan-2/, accessed November 26, 2022. 125. The Editorial Board, “Opinion: Biden’s Statements on Taiwan are Useful, Actually,” The Washington Post (September 19, 2022), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/19/biden-china-taiwan60-minutes/, accessed November 26, 2022. 126. Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, “Analysis: Biden’s Taiwan Remarks Show Conviction to Defend Island but Carry Risks,” Reuters, May 23, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/bidens-taiwan-rem arks-show-conviction-defend-island-carry-risks-2022-05-23/, accessed August 21, 2022. 127. William Mauldin, “Biden Undercuts U.S. ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ Over Defending Taiwan,” The Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-undercuts-u-s-strategic-amb iguity-over-defending-taiwan-11653338453, accessed August 21, 2022. 128. David Leonhardt, “Biden’s Tough Words,” The New York Times, May 24, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/briefing/biden-tai wan-china-strategic-ambiguity.html, accessed August 21, 2022. 129. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), “Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (July and August 1982),” https://www. ait.org.tw/declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982/, accessed August 21, 2022. 130. The US Department of State, “Remarks by David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The United States, Taiwan, and the World: Partners for Peace and Prosperity,” August 31, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/The-United-States-Taiwanand-the-World-Partners-for-Peace-and-Prosperity/index.html, accessed August 21, 2022. 131. The White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” March 18, 2022, accessible at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/press-briefings/2022/03/18/background-press-call-by-a-sen ior-administration-official-on-president-bidens-call-with-president-xi-jin ping-of-china/, accessed August 21, 2022. 132. The U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” May 28, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-tai wan/, accessed August 21, 2022. 133. The U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” August 31, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-tai wan/index.html, accessed August 21, 2022.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

387

134. The U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” May 28, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-tai wan/, accessed August 21, 2022. 135. The AIT, “Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.)” March 30, 2022, https://www.ait.org.tw/taiwan-relations-actpublic-law-96-8-22-u-s-c-3301-et-seq/, Accessed August 21, 2022. 136. The U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing by Ned Price,” May 24, 2022, https://www.state.gov/briefings/departmentpress-briefing-may-24-2022/#post-347035-TAIWANCHINA, accessed August 21, 2022. 137. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” May 23, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/ 05/23/remarks-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishidaof-japan-in-joint-press-conference/, accessed August 21, 2022. 138. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Bali,” November 14, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202211/t20221 114_10974686.html, accessed November 26, 2022. 139. The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 14, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-rel eases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-pre sident-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/, accessed November 21, 2022. 140. Tim Hains, “WH National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan Tells Council on Foreign Relations: The US Remains “Prepared For Dialogue With Russia,” Real Clear Politics, December 17, 2021, https://www.realcl earpolitics.com/video/2021/12/17/jake_sullivan_tells_council_on_for eign_relations_were_prepared_for_dialogue_with_russia_about_natos_ role_in_eastern_europe.html, accessed August 21, 2022. 141. The U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” August 5, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-japantrilateral-strategic-dialogue/, accessed August 21, 2022. 142. Dean P. Chen, “Why U.S. Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan Isn’t Going Away,” The National Interest (April 13, 2021), https://nationalinte rest.org/blog/buzz/why-us-%E2%80%98strategic-ambiguity%E2%80% 99-taiwan-isn%E2%80%99t-going-away-182632. See also Scott Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022), pp. 82–83, accessed August 21, 2022.

388

D. P. CHEN

143. “Biden’s Remarks on Taiwan ‘Speak for Themselves,’-White House Official,” Reuters (September 19, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/ world/bidens-remarks-taiwan-speak-themselves-white-house-official2022-09-19/, accessed November 26, 2022. 144. The US Department of State, “New Guidelines for U.S. Government Interactions with Taiwan Counterparts,” April 9, 2021, https://www. state.gov/new-guidelines-for-u-s-government-interactions-with-taiwancounterparts/, accessed August 21, 2022. 145. Demetri Sevastopulo, “US to Ease Restrictions on Meeting Taiwanese Officials,” The Financial Times, April 9, 2021, https://www.ft.com/ content/beb5280d-6f1e-450c-a948-820e1f06e10b, accessed August 21, 2022. 146. Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. invites Taiwan to its democracy summit; China angered,” Reuters, November 24, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/ world/asia-pacific/biden-administration-invites-taiwan-its-summit-dem ocracy-2021-11-24/, accessed August 21, 2022. 147. Humeyra Pamuk and Michael Martina, David Brunnstrom, “The Curious Case of a Map and a Disappearing Taiwan Minister at U.S. Democracy Summit,” Reuters, December 13, 2021, https://www.reu ters.com/world/asia-pacific/curious-case-map-disappearing-taiwan-min ister-us-democracy-summit-2021-12-12/, accessed August 21, 2022. 148. The White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En Route Tokyo, Japan,” May 22, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2022/05/22/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pie rre-and-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-en-route-tokyo-japan/, accessed August 21, 2022. 149. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “United States and Taiwan Hold Inaugural Meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade,” June 27, 2022, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2022/june/united-states-and-taiwan-hold-inaugu ral-meeting-us-taiwan-initiative-21st-century-trade, accessed August 21, 2022. 150. The White House, “On-the-Record Press Call by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for the IndoPacific,” August 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/press-briefings/2022/08/12/on-the-record-press-call-by-kurtcampbell-deputy-assistant-to-the-president-and-coordinator-for-theindo-pacific/, Accessed August 21, 2022. 151. The White House, National Security Strategy (October 12, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/BidenHarris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. The U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the

11

152.

153. 154.

155.

156.

157. 158. 159.

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

389

United States (October 27, 2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/ Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STR ATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF, accessed November 26, 2022. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference, Bali, Indonesia,” November 14, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-presidentbiden-in-a-press-conference-bali-indonesia/, accessed November 26, 2022. The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture.” The White House, “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515,” August 13, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefi ngs-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-h-r-5515/, accessed December 20, 2020. The U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Hugh Hewitt of the Hugh Hewitt Show,” November 12, 2020, accessed December 24, 2020, https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pom peo-with-hugh-hewitt-of-the-hugh-hewitt-show-7/, accessed December 31, 2020. The US Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With Hugh Hewitt of The Hugh Hewitt Show,” January 12, 2021, https://2017-2021.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-withhugh-hewitt-of-the-hugh-hewitt-show-8/index.html, accessed August 21, 2022. Bush, Difficult Choices, 305. Ibid., 307. The White House, “Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference, Bali, Indonesia,” November 14, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-presidentbiden-in-a-press-conference-bali-indonesia/, accessed November 26, 2022.

Bibliography Bolt, William. Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017). Bolton, John. The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir (New York: Simon Schuster, 2020). Brands, Hal. “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and Its Alternatives.” The Washington Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2017): 73–94. Bush, Richard. Difficult Choices: Taiwan’s Quest for Security and the Good Life (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021).

390

D. P. CHEN

Campbell, Kurt and Ely Ratner. “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Foreign Affairs 97 (2018): 60–70. Chen, Dean. “The End of Liberal Engagement with China and the New U.S.Taiwan Focus.” Pacific Focus 35, no. 3 (2020): 397–435. Chen, Dean. U.S.-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden: Towards a Nationalist Strategy (New York: Routledge, 2022). Christensen, Thomas and Patricia Kim. “Don’t Abandon Ship.” Foreign Affairs 97, (2018): 188–190. Cole, Michael J. Cross-Strait Relations since 2016 (New York: Routledge, 2020). Davis, Bob and Lingling Wei. Superpower Showdown: How the Battle between Trump and Xi Threatens a New Cold War (New York: Harper Business, 2020). DeLislie, Jacques, and Avery Goldstein, eds. After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021). Diamond, Larry, and Orville Schell, eds. China’s Influence & American Interests (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2019). Doshi, Rush. The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). Dueck, Colin. Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). Economy, Elizabeth. “The United States, China, and the Great Values Game,” in COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, edited by Hal Brands and Francis Gavin, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2020), 369–387. Frieden, Jeffry, and Ronald Rogowski. “The Impact of International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25–47. Frieden, Jeff. “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940.” International Organization 42, no.1 (1988): 59–90. Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change,” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 48–75. Gingrich, Newt. Trump vs. China (New York: Center Street, 2019). Goldstein, Judith. Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Haass, Richard and David Sacks. “American Support for Taiwan Must be Unambiguous: To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China that Force Won’t Stand,” Foreign Affairs (September 2, 2020). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/art icles/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

391

Haass, Richard. “The Age of America First: Washington’s Flawed New Foreign Policy Consensus,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2021), 85–98. Harding, Harry. “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 95–122. Hiscox, Michael. “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade.” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 1–46. Hoo Tiang Boon, and Hannah Elyse Sworn. “Strategic Ambiguity and the Trumpian Approach to China-Taiwan Relations.” International Affairs 96, no. 6 (2020): 1487–1508. Hung Tzu-Chieh, and Tzu-Wei Hung. “How China’s Cognitive Warfare Works: A Frontline Perspective of Taiwan’s Anti-Disinformation Wars.” Journal of Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (2022): 1–18. Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse.” Perspectives on Politics 15, no. 2 (2017): 443–454. Jervis, Robert, Francis Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane Labrosse, eds. Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). Kastner, Scott. War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022). Kendall-Taylor, Andrew, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright. “The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2020): 103–115. Krasner, Stephen. Defending the National Interests: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). Kupchan, Charles. Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). Lighthizer, Robert. “How to Make Trade Work for Workers,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2020), 78–92. Mead, Walter. Special Providence (New York: Routledge, 2002). Mead, Walter. “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order.” Foreign Affairs 96 (2017): 2–7. Nye, Joseph. “Time will Tell,” Foreign Affairs 97, (2018): 190–192. Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Pillsbury, Michael. The Hundred-Year Marathon (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2015). Rogowski, Ronald. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). Roy, Stapleton. “Engagement Works.” Foreign Affairs 97, (2018): 185–186.

392

D. P. CHEN

Rudd, Kevin. “The Return of Red China: Xi Jinping Brings Back Marxism,” Foreign Affairs (November 9, 2022). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ china/return-red-china?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa& utm_campaign=The%20Return%20of%20Red%20China&utm_content=202 21111&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017. Schweller, Randall. “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11, no. 1 (2018): 23–48. Shirk, Susan. Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). Snyder, Jack. “The Broken Bargain: How Nationalism Came Back,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2019), 54–60. Sutter, Robert. U.S.-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain Present (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). Sutter, Robert. “American Policy toward Taiwan-China Relations in the TwentyFirst Century,” in Taiwan’s Political Realignment and Diplomatic Challenges, ed. Wei-chin Lee (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 209–244. Sutter, Robert. “Congress and Trump Administration’s China Policy: Overlapping Priorities, Uneasy Adjustments and Hardening toward Beijing.” Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 118 (2019): 519–537. Swenson, Deborah, and Wing Thye Woo. “The Politics and Economics of the U.S.-China Trade War.” Asian Economic Papers 18, no. 3 (2019): 1–28. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). “Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (July and August 1982),” https://www.ait.org.tw/ declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982/. The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). “Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8, 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.)” January 1, 1979. https://www.ait.org.tw/tai wan-relations-act-public-law-96-8-22-u-s-c-3301-et-seq/. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “Remarks of Ambassador Katherine Tai Outlining the Biden-Harris Administration’s ‘Worker-Centered Trade Policy,’” June 10, 2021. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-off ice/speeches-and-remarks/2021/june/remarks-ambassador-katherine-tai-out lining-biden-harris-administrations-worker-centered-trade-policy. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “United States and Taiwan Hold Inaugural Meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade,” June 27, 2022. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2022/june/united-states-and-taiwan-hold-inaugural-meeting-us-tai wan-initiative-21st-century-trade. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Wang Yi Makes Clear the Solemn Position on U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Upcoming Visit to Taiwan,” April 8, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202204/t20220408_10665741.html.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

393

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “President Xi Jinping Speaks with US President Joe Biden on the Phone,” July 29, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20 220729_10729593.html. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference,” August 4, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ 2511_665403/202208/t20220805_10734891.html. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden in Bali,” November 14, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202211/t20221114_ 10974686.html. The U.S. Department of Defense. “Austin Meets With Chinese Counterpart in Singapore,” June 10, 2022. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Sto ries/Article/Article/3058994/austin-meets-with-chinese-counterpart-in-sin gapore/. The U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States (October 27, 2022). https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/ 27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGYNPR-MDR.PDF. The U.S. Department of State. “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” August 31, 2018. https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/index.html. The U.S. Department of State. “Remarks by Assistant Secretary David Stilwell: The U.S., China, and Pluralism in International Relations,” December 2, 2019. https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-china-and-pluralism-in-international-aff airs/. The U.S. Department of State. “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” July 23, 2020. https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-thefree-worlds-future/. The U.S. Department of State. “Remarks by David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The United States, Taiwan, and the World: Partners for Peace and Prosperity,” August 31, 2020. https://2017-2021.state.gov/The-United-States-Taiwan-and-theWorld-Partners-for-Peace-and-Prosperity/index.html. The U.S. Department of State. “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Hugh Hewitt of the Hugh Hewitt Show,” November 12, 2020, accessed December 24, 2020. https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeowith-hugh-hewitt-of-the-hugh-hewitt-show-7/. The U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo With Hugh Hewitt of The Hugh Hewitt Show,” January 12, 2021. https://2017-2021. state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-hugh-hewitt-of-the-hugh-hewittshow-8/index.html.

394

D. P. CHEN

The U.S. Department of State. “A Foreign Policy for the American People, Remarks by Secretary Blinken,” March 3, 2021. https://www.state.gov/aforeign-policy-for-the-american-people/. The U.S. Department of State. “New Guidelines for U.S. Government Interactions with Taiwan Counterparts,” April 9, 2021. https://www.state.gov/ new-guidelines-for-u-s-government-interactions-with-taiwan-counterparts/. The U.S. Department of State. “Department Press Briefing by Ned Price,” May 24, 2022. https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefingmay-24-2022/#post-347035-TAIWANCHINA. The U.S. Department of State. “The Biden Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022. https://www.state.gov/the-adm inistrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. The U.S. Department of State. “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Taiwan Relations,” May 28, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/. The U.S. Department of State. “U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” August 5, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-australia-japan-trilat eral-strategic-dialogue/. The U.S. Department of State. “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo At a Virtual Press Availability,” August 6, 2022. https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-phi lippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-enrique-manalo-at-a-virtual-press-availabil ity/. The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “Menendez, Graham Introduce Comprehensive Legislation to Overhaul U.S.-Taiwan Policy,” June 17, 2022. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/menendezgraham-introduce-comprehensive_legislation-to-overhaul-us-taiwan-policy. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi). “Press Release: Pelosi to Lead Congressional Delegation to the Indo-Pacific Region,” July 31, 2022. https:/ /www.speaker.gov/newsroom/73122. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi). “Press Release: Pelosi, Congressional Delegation Statement on Visit to Taiwan,” August 2, 2022. https:// www.speaker.gov/newsroom/8222-2. The U.S. Speaker of the House (Nancy Pelosi). “Press Release: Pelosi Statement on Congressional Delegation Visit to Taiwan,” August 3, 2022. https://www. speaker.gov/newsroom/8322-2. The U.S. Taiwan Watch. Why and How the U.S. Matters (Taipei: Linking Publishers, 2021). The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 18, 2017). https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

11

COMPETITIONS AND COALITIONS: AN EMERGING US …

395

The White House. “Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515,” August 13, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statem ent-president-donald-j-trump-h-r-5515/. The White House. “Remarks by Vice President Pence at the Frederic V. Malek Memorial Lecture,” October 24, 2019. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives. gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-frederic-v-malekmemorial-lecture/ The White House. “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/spe eches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-placein-the-world/. The White House. “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official on President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” March 18, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/ 03/18/background-press-call-by-a-senior-administration-official-on-presid ent-bidens-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china/. The White House. “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” May 23, 2022. https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/23/remarks-bypresident-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-press-con ference/. The White House. “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan En Route Tokyo, Japan,” May 22, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/ 05/22/press-gaggle-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-national-sec urity-advisor-jake-sullivan-en-route-tokyo-japan/ The White House. “Remarks by President Biden After Air Force One Arrival,” July 20, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-rem arks/2022/07/20/remarks-by-president-biden-after-air-force-one-arrival-5/. The White House. “Readout of President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” July 28, 2022. https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/28/readout-of-presidentbidens-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/. The White House. “Background Press Call on President Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” July 28, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/07/28/ background-press-call-on-president-bidens-call-with-president-xi-jinping-ofthe-peoples-republic-of-china/. The White House. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre,” August 3, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefi ngs/2022/08/03/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-aug ust-3-2022/.

396

D. P. CHEN

The White House. “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” August 4, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/ 08/04/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordi nator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-5/. The White House. “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” August 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2022. 2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-str engthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/. The White House. “On-the-Record Press Call by Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific,” August 12, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/ 08/12/on-the-record-press-call-by-kurt-campbell-deputy-assistant-to-the-pre sident-and-coordinator-for-the-indo-pacific/. The White House. National Security Strategy (October 12, 2022). https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Admini strations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. The White House. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,” November 14, 2022. https:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/ readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peo ples-republic-of-china/. The White House. “Remarks by President Biden in a Press Conference, Bali, Indonesia,” November 14, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-in-apress-conference-bali-indonesia/. Tucker, Nancy. Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Wright, Thomas. “COVID-19’s Impact on Great-Power Competition,” in COVID-19 and World Order: The Future of Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, edited by Hal Brands and Francis Gavin, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2020), 317–330. Wu, Charles K. S., Yao-Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen, Horng-En Wang, Austin. “Prospects for US-Taiwan-China Relations under the Biden Administration.” American Journal of Chinese Studies 28, no. 1 (2021): 1–12. Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

CHAPTER 12

America Counters China: Congress, Resolve, and Constraints Robert Sutter

The remarkable US government hardening against Chinese challenges to American interests represented an unprecedented reversal in the previous fifty years, which had emphasized a growing US engagement with China. The hardening emerged erratically in the first year of the Trump administration and reached a high point of acute competition, repeated confrontation, and tension during the 2020 US presidential election campaign and an array of anti-China initiatives by the outgoing Trump government. The new Joseph Biden government eschewed the strident rhetoric and public posturing accompanying Trump policies and sought cooperation with China on some important issues of mutual interest. But the new president put aside his past dismissive or ambivalent view of the danger posed by China and broadly endorsed the prevailing view in Congress and elsewhere in Washington of China’s policies and practices posing the most important threat to US international interests and

R. Sutter (B) Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5_12

397

398

R. SUTTER

the existing global order.1 Throughout this period, bipartisan majorities in Congress proved to be steady and more resolute than the sometimes erratic or ambivalent presidents. They played an instrumental role, more important than in any other period of American policy toward China, in shaping, directing, implementing, and sustaining the new direction in American policy toward China. Unlike a few earlier episodes when Congress seemed ascendant over the president in making policy toward China, as in the year following the Chinese bloody crackdown on dissent at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, Congress took a leading position on China policy without the benefit of strong support from public opinion, mainstream media, or a wide range of interest groups. It did so on the basis of the calculations of the members themselves. And unlike congressional behavior in previous periods of activism on China policy, as in criticizing and amending heavily the administration’s proposed Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the Congress showed little sign of assertive rivalry with the president over China policy; rather, since 2017 it developed a strong bipartisan symbiosis and comity with an executive branch headed by a very controversial president. The new tough line against China was first articulated clearly in the National Security Strategy in December 2017, almost one year after the start of the Trump administration. At that time, the strategy document’s release was overshadowed by the afterglow of President Trump’s lavish treatment by Chinese President Xi Jinping during the US president’s visit to Beijing in November. In a departure from his normal practice to ignore the efforts of foreign hosts, President Trump was effusive in his public remarks of appreciation throughout the Chinese visit.2 The American government’s targeting China gained momentum and soon featured a wide range of hard-edged measures countering multifaceted challenges seen coming from Chinese government policies and actions. It reached a high point during the heat of the 2020 presidential election campaign as the most important foreign policy issue in the campaign. This fever pitch was sustained to the end of the Trump government. The incoming Biden administration’s more deliberative policymaking gave a lower priority to foreign affairs but sustained and sometimes advanced the countermeasures targeting China.3 Continuity in the new US policy direction came from Congress. From their outset and up to the present, countermeasures against China were strongly supported and often initiated by bipartisan majorities in

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

399

Congress. These congressional majorities generally agreed with Trump administration officials that the Chinese government posed a fundamental danger to American well-being and international interests. The overall danger to America posed by China’s behavior had numerous elements that collectively amounted to fundamental threats to American national security interests in Asia, the existing global economic order and particularly US leadership in key high technology industries, and prevailing global governance supported by the United States. The Congress came to agree with Trump administration leaders, though not the notably erratic, unpredictable, and disruptive president, that the cumulative China danger changed the way American needed to view issues with China. In the recent past, these issues had been treated as problems needing attention in an overall beneficial relationship. These issues—some small as well as many big—were now seen as parts of Beijing’s unrelenting efforts to weaken America in its headlong pursuit of wealth and power at the expense of the United States and many others and the existing international order; China undermined American influence in a headlong quest to attain Asian dominance and global leadership employing coercive security measures, predatory and mercantilist economic practices, and nefarious influence operations.4 Democrats and Republicans in the 115th Congress (2017–2018) and the 116th Congress (2019–2020) worked closely with Trump administration officials in targeting Chinese practices. Past experience in previous decades usually saw the Congress serving as a brake, impeding US administration initiatives in dealing with China. Despite often acute partisanship on many domestic and foreign issues during the Trump administration, these administration-congressional policymakers agreed in creating and advancing China policy ending engagement seen seriously detrimental to US interests. They worked together in seeking ways to protect America from wide-ranging challenges posed by Chinese practices viewed as the fundamental danger facing America in the period ahead. These policy changes came about despite the lack of strong support and understanding of the need for such dramatic change from American public opinion, media, domestic politics, or foreign pressure. For close to two years, Congress was notably more resolved and effective than President Trump and aspiring Democratic Party candidates, including Joseph Biden, in sustaining and building support for the new policy countering China’s challenges. Despite acute partisanship in Washington, opposing China’s various challenges to US interests came to

400

R. SUTTER

represent one of the few areas where both sides of the congressional aisle and the controversial administration agreed. This pattern continued bipartisan congressional support for a hard-line against China’s challenges amid ongoing partisan wrangling on most other issues during the Biden administration.5 This chapter assesses the role of Congress and American domestic politics in driving the hardening of US policy toward China in the past five years. It examines significant successes and shortcomings in US policy in the Indo-Pacific, seeing important gaps in American competition to China. It nonetheless forecasts that US hardening toward China will endure in considerable measure because of strong resolve on the part of bipartisan majorities in Congress in the face of unrelenting challenges posed by the behavior of the Chinese government.

Trump Administration Developments The major shift in policy set forth in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy in December 2017 employed harsh words about China not seen in official administration documents since before the Nixon administration. It viewed Beijing as a predatory rival and the top danger to American national security.6 Congressional Members of both parties saw the wisdom in the administration’s warnings and began to take action, making 2018 the most assertive period of congressional work on China since the tumultuous decade after the Tiananmen crackdown. Extraordinary administration and bipartisan congressional cooperation broke the mold of past practice where the US Congress usually served as a brake and obstacle impeding US administration initiatives in dealing with China. The close alignment of the administration and bipartisan congressional majorities provided the key driver of the new tougher US policy approach to China.7 This alignment of government policymakers “inside the beltway” faced major uncertainties. Most immediate was the absence of a push toward a tougher China policy on the part of the American public and many state and local officials who remained largely ambivalent on China. They disapproved of many Chinese government actions, but they also sought to avoid confrontation and to develop constructive ties. Mainstream US media initially gave less attention to the broad policy change taking place in Washington than they gave to President Trump’s swings from

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

401

approving Chinese leaders to condemning Chinese trade practices. President Trump’s unpredictable discourse on China complicated the broader administration-congressional collaboration on an effective strategy toward China. Finally, when significant costs of the tougher approach toward China materialized with the administration’s punitive tariffs starting the so-called trade war beginning in 2018, they were widely criticized by Democratic presidential candidates.8 Despite such obstacles, bipartisan majorities in Congress proved much more resolute than President Trump and Democratic presidential candidates in establishing as a matter of law a “whole of government” effort countering China’s challenges. Most notably, the National Defense Authorization Act FY-2019, the most important foreign policy legislation in 2018, underlined an array of congressional initiatives hardening US policy toward China.9 Harsh language accused Beijing of using military modernization, influence operations, espionage and predatory economic policy to undermine the United States and its interests abroad. In response, the law directed a whole-of-government US strategy; required the Defense Department to submit a five-year plan to bolster US and allied and partner strength in the Indo-Pacific region; extended the authority and broadened the scope of the Maritime Security Initiative covering Southeast Asia to include the Indo-Pacific region; required a US strategy to strengthen military ties with India; prohibited China’s participation in Rim of the Pacific naval exercises; required a public report on China’s military and coercive activities in the South China Sea; broadened the scope of the annual report to Congress on Chinese military and security developments to now include “malign activities,” including information and influence operations, as well as predatory economic and lending practices; and limited Defense Department funds for Chinese language programs at universities that host Confucius Institutes. The Act’s provisions on Taiwan reaffirmed various aspects of longstanding American commitments to Taiwan. The Act contained a separate set of provisions to modernize, strengthen, and broaden the scope of the interagency body, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to more effectively guard against the risk to US national security seen posed by Chinese and other predatory foreign investment. It also included key reforms in US export controls that would better protect emerging technology and intellectual property from Beijing and other potential adversaries.

402

R. SUTTER

Subsequently, Congress has remained at the center of the so-called Washington consensus to end previous engagement in favor of strong opposition to Beijing. This consensus took two years to become broadly accepted by US media, public opinion, state and local officials, and Democratic presidential candidates, including Joseph Biden.10 President Trump and the administration moderated to some degree public pressure on China during the year-long trade negotiations in 2019. US public opinion, along with Biden and other Democratic candidates were not supportive of the sharp turn against China. But bipartisan majorities in Congress sustained efforts supporting the whole of government pushback against Beijing’s behavior. A turning point came with strong and broad American media and public disapproval of China’s government behavior as the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States during the presidential campaign of 2020. Both Trump and Biden emphasized toughness toward China.11

2021: Biden Administration Developments President Biden’s priorities focused on countering the pandemic, reviving the stalled economy, reducing partisan government gridlock and mass protests undermining democratic process, and protecting minority rights. Coming second, foreign policy involved close cooperation with allies and partners, seeking multilateral solutions on public health, climate change, and nuclear nonproliferation, and a priority to US interests in Asia.12 Biden took office amid a crescendo of anti-China Trump administration actions designed to constrain moderation by the new administration. Congress remained steadfast as it held over many of the 300 legislative proposals targeting China at the end of the 116th Congress. Against this background, Biden within a few weeks for reasons not yet clearly understood put aside past ambivalence seen as recently as his interview with 60 Minutes in the days before his election about the danger to the United States posed by Chinese government actions challenging the United States. In the interview, Biden saw Russia as the primary US threat, with China secondary as a competitor. After a few weeks in office, the new president joined bipartisan majorities in Congress in strongly warning against major dangers posed by China’s challenges. Methodical and well-coordinated Biden government statecraft resulted in sustaining, and sometimes advancing, existing US government tariffs,

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

403

sanctions, and public opposition to Chinese trade, human rights, territorial expansionism, and challenges to world norms and global governance. The new administration prioritized collaboration with allies and partners as key forces allowing the United States to deal with China’s challenges “from a position of strength.” US leaders delayed high-level interchange with Chinese leaders until after high-level US consultations with those like-minded governments. The Biden government delayed any significant change in US China policy until after extensive consultations with allies and partners and reviews of policy toward China during 2021. For its part, Beijing offered no compromises and continued advancing practices challenging American interests.13 Early efforts to counter Chinese challenges saw the first summit meeting with the Quadrilateral Dialogue leaders (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) in March target competition with China with a major agreement of top importance to Asia to provide up to one billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the Indo-Pacific, and beyond by the end of 2022. The developed countries of the G7 meetings in May and June expanded to include key US allies and partners Australia, India, and South Korea and gave top priority to their issues with China. And China figured prominently in high-level US discussions with NATO, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and Australia as the Biden administration leaders repeatedly asserted their intention to deal with China’s challenges with the support of this emerging international united movement.14 At the start of the administration, senior US administration officials led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan worked with allies and partners in directly countering Chinese demonstrations of force targeting Taiwan and claimants in the disputed South China Sea. Such US reassurance saw the Philippines carry out their most prominent rebuke of Chinese pressure tactics in many years, while President Biden sent his close friend and top-level political advisor, former Senator Christopher Dodd, to lead a bipartisan delegation showing support for Taiwan’s president.15 Perhaps of most importance was President’s Biden’s personal assessment of the stakes involved in US competition with China. The president’s rationale for competing with China had changed markedly from his discourse during the presidential primaries when he routinely dismissed dangers China posed to America. And he no longer showed ambivalence about the priority and urgency in dealing with Chinese challenges

404

R. SUTTER

as seen in comments prior to taking office, which saw Russia rather than China as America’s main opponent. In his press statements, a speech to Congress, and various interviews, President Biden put aside past dismissive or ambiguous language, demonstrating his personal focus on the urgent need for America to counter the multifaceted dangers of Chinese behavior. Among other things, he advised that the main inflection point facing America is the fourth industrial revolution with China, confident that its authoritarian system will overtake America because of what Beijing views as the less efficient US democratic decision-making process. He argued “we can’t let them win.”16 Reflecting sustained bipartisan congressional efforts to strengthen America in defense against various Chinese challenges and running in parallel with and reinforcing the President’s new sense of urgency about China was an enormous congressional enterprise led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer to pass multifaceted bipartisan legislation in 2021 to improve US high technology industries and advance other measures to counter China. Echoing Biden’s new rhetoric, Schumer advised, “we can either have a world where the Chinese Communist Party determines the rules of the road [in high technology development]—or we can make sure the United States gets there first.”17 The administration and congressional efforts targeting China enjoyed continued strong bipartisan support in Washington, foreshadowing continued US hardening against Chinese practices for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, mainstream media and public opinion strongly supported tough policy. There was significant opposition to hardening US policy toward China, but it appeared scattered and marginalized for now amid dramatic US government pursuit of acute rivalry with China. The opposition varied and did not coalesce well. Some argued that a onesided tough approach toward China led to counterproductive economic results as a result of the punitive tariffs implemented by the Trump administration and continued by the Biden government. US businesses with a big stake in China suffered negative consequences as a result of these measures.18 Some national security experts judged that strong US support for Taiwan ran a major risk of US-China war, with possibly catastrophic results for all involved.19 Prominent American specialists on China matters and others deeply committed to the past practice of close US engagement with the Chinese government judged that zero-sum competition with China meant the United States would alienate those millions of Chinese who engaged positively with America over the past forty years,

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

405

reducing the opportunity for a workable modus vivendi with globally prominent China.20 The controversy surrounding the rushed US and allied withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 in the face of the unexpected, rapid collapse of the Afghan government resistance and rapid Taliban takeover in the country undermined the United States as a world leader and damaged President Biden’s political standing.21 But the Biden government’s resolve against Beijing’s challenges was underlined by the surprise announcement on September 15 of a new and more rigorous US security relationship with Australia and Great Britain that involved the sale of tightly held US nuclear submarine technology and closer collaboration in dealing with China. In October, the US Trade Representative Katherine Tai announced little change in existing trade policy, disclosing that the Trump government punitive tariffs would be continued. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait rose with unprecedented shows of force by large numbers of Chinese warplanes intruding into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, providing the background for a meeting in Switzerland between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his Chinese counterpart Politburo Member Yang Jiechi, announcing that plans were underway for a virtual summit meeting between the two presidents.22 Biden’s summit meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2021 represented a pause not a breakthrough in sharply competitive relations. Agreements came from mutual compromises. In September, there was the release after three years of US-backed Canadian confinement to her home in Vancouver and monitored nearby activities of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of the Chinese high technology communications and technology firm Huawei, who was arrested for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud to circumvent US sanctions against Iran. In unrecognized reciprocity, China released two prominent Canadians who had been jailed and held hostage by China in retaliation for Canada’s role in Meng’s arrest and proposed extradition to the United States. Later comparatively minor breakthroughs saw China release some detained US citizens in China, allow the stationing of more US journalists in China, and agree to sell some strategic oil reserves to reduce high prices of oil.23 Administration leaders from Biden on down repeatedly sought dialogue with Chinese counterparts to set guardrails on the competition and avoid military conflict and the risk of nuclear war in what was envisioned as a protracted period of US-China struggle over a wide range of sensitive issues.24

406

R. SUTTER

Such limited positive developments were overshadowed at the turn of the year by the US official boycott of the China-hosted winter Olympics; strident Chinese opposition to the Biden administration’s Summit of Democracies, which targeted the adverse practices of authoritarian regimes; and acute US-China rivalry accompanying Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first trips to Africa and Southeast Asia. The US administration also tightened US trade restrictions with a number of Chinese firms on security and human rights grounds and reinforced broad-ranging US cooperation with the European Union and the Quad powers (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) and other allies and partners in Asia targeting Chinese assertive actions in Asia, malign economic practices, and human rights practice.25 Congressional prominence showed in an array of legislative initiatives notably with Congress passing and the president signing the authoritative National Defense Authorization Act of 2022 with numerous anti-China measures. And congressional leaders worked to reconcile Senate and House differences over Senate leader Charles Schumer’s 2,200-page US Innovation and Competition Act targeting China.26 Washington’s Dire View of China’s Challenges By the end of 2021, the so-called Washington Consensus on China policy had hardened. The consensus represented the alignment of views by the administration and bipartisan majorities in Congress on the priority of countering the multifaceted challenges posed by Chinese government practices. And the hardened view garnered increasing support in mainstream US media, while American public disapproval of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Chinese government practices remained at all-time highs.27 The record since 2018 discussed above showed that bipartisan majorities in Congress were especially important in working with changing and sometimes erratic administration leaders in registering an ever-clearer awareness of the challenges posed by China to the interests of the United States and the open world order it supports. Though the wide range of congressional legislation and other actions taken against Chinese practices usually dealt with only parts of the challenges posed by China, overall, those challenges can be grouped in three categories.28 First is the challenge posed by over three-decades of rapid development of Chinese modern military power tipping the balance in the IndoPacific, supporting Chinese territorial expansionism and undermining US

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

407

alliances and partnerships in seeking dominance in the region. The American strategic presence in the Asia–Pacific region has been based since World War II on preventing the region falling under the control of a power hostile to the United States. If that were to happen, that power would pose a direct threat to the United States, comparable to the threat the US faced from imperial Japan’s dominance in Asia and Nazi Germany’s dominance in Europe in the dark days at the start of World War II. Second is the challenge posed by China’s similarly longstanding efforts using state-directed development policies to plunder foreign intellectual property rights and undermine international competitors having increasingly profound negative impacts on US and Western interests. Beijing has done so with hidden and overt state-directed economic coercion, egregious government subsidies, import protection, and export promotion using highly protected and state-supported products to weaken and often destroy foreign competition in key industries. In this way, it recently has sought dominance in major world high technology industries and related military power to displace the United States and secure China’s primacy in Asia and world leadership. Third is China’s challenge to global governance. More than any other major power, Beijing leverages economic dependence, influence operations including elite capture, and control of important infrastructure to compel deference to its preferences. In the Indo-Pacific region, these practices are backed by intimidating Chinese military power. China’s preferences include: legitimating the above predatory Chinese economic practices and territorial expansionism; opposition to efforts promoting accountable governance, human rights, and democracy; opposition to US alliances seen impeding China’s rise; and support for the forceful foreign advances of Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the rule of other authoritarian and often corrupt world leaders unaccountable to their citizens. Since 2018, two challenges have been seen as particularly dangerous, existential threats to fundamental American national security and wellbeing. The first is the Chinese effort to undermine US power and influence in and dominate Asia. The second is the Chinese effort to seek dominance in the high technology industries of the future; such dominance will make America subservient to Chinese economic power, and because such technology is essential to modern national security, subservient to Chinese military power.

408

R. SUTTER

Seeking to avoid Chinese dominance has remained a strong overall driver of the efforts of bipartisan majorities in Congress and administration partners to defend America against China’s challenges.29

2022: Countering China: US Strategies, Implementation, and Gaps Impact of Russia’s War with Ukraine It remained uncertain in mid-2022 what the overall impact of the Russian attack on and war in Ukraine beginning in February would have on the US priority to counter Chinese challenges. On balance, the overall impact appeared to strengthen US resolve to counter China. And, in the wake of the Ukraine invasion and China’s complicity with Russian aggression, the United States found NATO, the European Union, many European powers as well as Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea now more inclined to align with the United States in dealing with the danger posed by China as well as Russia.30 On one hand, American policymakers were preoccupied with substantial diplomatic efforts, wide-ranging economic sanctions, military reinforcements, and major expenses in supporting Ukrainian resistance and NATO resolve in the face of Russian aggression. On the other hand, the announced US Indo-Pacific Strategy and disclosed information on the classified US National Defense strategy featured China as the more important longer-term danger to the United States. The implications of US competition with China were widely seen as paramount as President Biden devoted extraordinary attention to Southeast Asian leaders by hosting an in-person summit with ASEAN member states in Washington and by making his first trip to Asia in May.31 Congressional support for the resistance in Ukraine was prominent, but it came along with strong preoccupation with China’s challenges seen as major Senate and House bills focused on countering Chinese high technology and other economic issues and a variety of other concerns. The Senate bill was The US Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), which passed the Senate in June 2021 and called for advancing American competitiveness through $250 billion in government spending on technology production and research. The House effort advancing domestic high technology competitiveness was the America COMPETES Act, which was approved in January 2022. It preserved the Senate bill’s $52

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

409

billion subsidy for semiconductors but pared the Senate bill’s $200 billion in additional spending down to $45 billion devoted to supply chain resiliency. There were many other differences with the two bills that aroused partisan disagreement as they entered deliberation in conference committee negotiations.32 Meanwhile, Xi Jinping’s strong support for close relations with Russia in a joint statement with Vladimir Putin issued a few days before the invasion of Ukraine, and China’s subsequent strident opposition to USled sanctions against Russia and US-led efforts in support of Ukrainian resistance, deepened antipathy in Washington to China as a malign international actor. The implications of the Russian attack on Ukraine for a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan saw the administration and Congress take stronger steps to support Taiwan in the face of the danger of Chinese attack. And, the Russian attack not only resulted in a remarkable stiffening of European resolve against Russia, it strengthened European and NATO cooperation with the United States and with Japan and other Indo-Pacific countries facing China’s coercive expansionism.33 For their part, President Xi Jinping and his government seemed determined to sustain without letup their wide-ranging challenges to US interests. Maintaining a tough approach to the United States was in line with the Chinese leader’s priority attention to portray strong and effective leadership in foreign and domestic affairs in seeking an unprecedented third term as communist party and state leader at the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress expected in fall 2022. That priority also was seen behind Xi’s continued strong support for Russia despite widespread negative implications for China’s relations with developed countries, and it was seen behind his continued emphasis on extreme COVID Zero measures in major Chinese cities, despite their negative impact on Chinese economic growth and foreign investment in China.34 By mid-2022, the war in Ukraine became a proxy war where the United States avoided debilitating direct combat while sustaining vigorous military, economic, and diplomatic support to a highly motivated Russian opponent with the capacity and will to resist Russian expansionism. It did so while effectively mobilizing a truly united front of NATO powers now joined by Finland and Sweden, heretofore avowedly neutral powers bordering Russia, and other important Asian-Pacific powers, in imposing ever-growing costs on the Russia through economic and other sanctions and restrictions. The ongoing conflict substantially

410

R. SUTTER

weakened Russian military, economic, and international power and influence. The result worked to the advantage of the United States in countering the power and influence of China and President Xi Jinping, closely aligned and significantly dependent on his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin as a like-minded authoritarian endeavoring to undermine the United States and its international influence.35 Biden Administration Strategies The administration’s long-awaited National Security Strategy, which would show the priority of countering Chinese challenges among other US concerns, reportedly was under revision on account of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But other US government strategies went forward providing a fairly clear view of important US priorities regarding China under the Biden government. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States issued in February clearly said China’s behavior posed the primary challenge to US interests in the region and the world. “The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.” China’s “coercion and aggression” was said to be “most acute in the Indo-Pacific.” The US strategy also highlighted that Beijing undermines human rights, international law, freedom of navigation, and other established norms.36 Reflecting the Biden government’s effort to avoid military conflict as competition with China intensifies, the strategy disavowed interest in regime change in China. The US goal was to shape the strategic environment in which China operates in ways creating “a balance of influence” favorable to the interests and values of the United States and its allies and partners. The document also called on Beijing to cooperate in areas such as climate change and nonproliferation. Other challenges noted in the document included climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and North Korea. Russia was not mentioned. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) remained a vaguely defined framework even though it was said to represent the foundation of a yet to be defined Biden administration economic strategy to deal with China’s economic challenges. The IPEF was part of official administration discourse over the past year. President Biden informed his Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) colleagues last December that “the

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

411

United States will explore with partners the development of an IndoPacific economic framework that will define our shared objectives around trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, supply chain resiliency, decarburization and clean energy, infrastructure, worker standards, and other areas of shared interest.” The US officials were informally discussing the framework with regional counterparts. The topic reportedly was discussed at the US-hosted ASEAN summit in May, but it got no mention in the post summit vision statement. The United States discussed the framework once it was announced as a work in progress during Biden’s May visit to Northeast Asia. The target for conclusion of negotiations (and any resulting agreements) reportedly is the US-hosted Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in November 2023.37 The slow US progress on IPEF came as China and regional economies continued pursuing more concrete steps toward greater integration in the recent concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement which went into effect at the beginning of the year. The other salient regional economic agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also was likely to expand. The United States has said it will not join either agreement. Against this background, analysts judged that US failure to make the IPEF substantive risked American economic marginalization in this vital region.38 The Pentagon announced in March that it had transmitted to Congress the classified 2022 National Defense Strategy. According to the unclassified Defense Department’s Fact Sheet on the strategy, “Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine,” but China is “our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge.”39 According to the Fact Sheet, China posed a growing multi-domain threat to the US homeland as well as in the Indo-Pacific. The United States prioritized the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific; next came the Russia challenge in Europe. It further noted that the Department of Defense “will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge.” Other threats, again in order listed, included Russia (where the US will “collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression”), North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations.40

412

R. SUTTER

The Pentagon will advance its goal through three primary ways: • Integrated deterrence, which “entails developing and combining our strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of US national power, and our unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships.” • Campaigning, which will “strengthen deterrence and enable us to gain advantages against the full range of competitors’ coercive actions.” Campaigning “refers to being intentional about the actions you take in your presence, in your posture, all of the things that you do on a more day-to-day basis, especially in the combatant commands, to achieve your strategic ends,” according to DoD Comptroller Michael McCord.41 • Building enduring advantages for the future Joint Force, which “involves undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology we need more quickly, and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department, who remain our most valuable resource.” The most authoritative outline of the administration’s strategy toward China came in Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s speech at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. on May 26, 2022. Blinken’s speech followed the outline of administration actions toward China up to that time. There was a heavy focus on building US capabilities at home and strengthening alliances abroad. Competing directly with China was the last part of the framework Blinken outlined, which he said “can be summed up in three words—‘invest, align, compete’”: We will invest in the foundations of our strength here at home—our competitiveness, our innovation, our democracy. We will align our efforts with our network of allies and partners, acting with common purpose and in common cause. And harnessing these two key assets, we’ll compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.42

Blinken criticized Beijing’s internal repression and Chinese security, economic, and governance challenges to existing international norms.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

413

Special criticism focused on China’s support for Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Despite the criticism, Blinken held out the opportunity to cooperate with China on common interests, notably climate change. Overall, the speech sought to avoid raising tensions with China.43 “Put simply, the United States and China have to deal with each other for the foreseeable future.” He declared that the Biden administration was not seeking conflict or a new Cold War; he also tried to assure governments in Asia and elsewhere that the United States will not force them to choose between China and the United States. As Blinken said “It’s about giving them a choice”; he added that the United States is serious about consulting with allies and partners and taking their advice on how to deal with China. Supporting Administration and Congressional Actions By mid-2022, the various strategies and substantial actions of the Biden administration, working in close cooperation with bipartisan majorities in Congress, showed the foundation of a broad-ranging whole of government effort with strong domestic political backing to carry out for the foreseeable future an acute competition with China. Beijing reinforced American resolve as it pursued a determined march toward ever greater regional and international power and influence at the expense of the United States, its allies and partners, and many others with a stake in the prevailing world order.44 Among salient achievements, the Biden government carried out its commitment to give top priority to the Indo-Pacific region while withdrawing from Afghanistan and giving somewhat less attention to the Middle East. It strengthened coordination with Indo-Pacific allies and partners. The Australia, India, Japan, and US Quadrilateral Dialogue repeatedly galvanized collective action targeting Chinese practices. And the Australia, United Kingdom, US (AUKUS) agreement demonstrated lasting commitment for exceptionally close cooperation among these powers in providing advanced nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, in developing high technology weapons systems, and collaborating in high technology innovation.45 The new governments in Japan and South Korea were increasingly active in support of close relations with the United States. This activism included cooperation with the United States on key military and high technology initiatives counter to Chinese practices and support for other

414

R. SUTTER

Asian states building resiliency in the face of ever-growing Chinese power. Tokyo and Seoul also appeared ready to improve their bilateral cooperation, long sought by the United States as Washington pursued the synergies of closer US-Japan-South Korean relations in dealing with North Korea, China, and other concerns.46 The Biden government also made gains in attracting leading global companies from the Indo-Pacific region to launch significant manufacturing investments in the United States. They included Taiwan’s and South Korea’s leading semiconductor producers building large factories in the United States.47 The US government faced an uphill struggle in advancing its relations with Southeast Asia increasingly under the economic, political, and often coercive influence of China. High-level visits to the region by US cabinet-level officials and Vice President Kamala Harris helped to stabilize US alliance relations with the Philippines, offered meaningful support through donations of effective COVID-19 vaccines and continued development aid and military assistance and cooperation, and set a foundation for prospective advances in cooperation on economic development through the IPEF. President Biden’s in-person summit with ASEAN leaders in May 2022 countered to some degree the charge that the president was preoccupied with other matters and gave low priority to the region. The administration’s formal launch of IPEF in May saw seven Southeast Asian states join the effort. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam were among the twelve nations to sign up to the IPEF, along with New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia.48 While the Biden administration’s strong emphasis on working closely with fellow democracies against international authoritarian regimes and its signature Summit of Democracies in December 2021 solidified relations with many developed and less developed countries, it alienated sought after US partners in Southeast Asia. Most Southeast Asian governments maintained strong domestic authoritarian practices and/or serious shortcomings in democratic governance. Against this background, they tended to view the US emphasis on democracy as counter-productive for their interests. Notably, the US emphasis was an obstacle in ASEAN efforts to get the United States to play a stronger role in dealing with the crisis in Myanmar following the February 2021 coup by a now ruling military junta, which the United States refuses to deal with until the coup is reversed, and democracy is restored.49

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

415

Comment by Chinese officials and official media gave special attention to US advances in supporting Taiwan among a litany of complaints about the Biden government’s evident determination to pursue an array of measures targeting China. It acknowledged the Biden government’s rejection of the Trump administration’s unilateral and bilateral focus in foreign affairs to return the United States to its former prominence though multilateral ties and alliances, seeking “a position of strength” in dealing with Chinese challenges. It depicted the Summit of Democracies as a clear affront to authoritarian China. The Quad, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the AUKUS agreement, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and Blinken’s China policy speech were strongly criticized along with supporting legislation. The latter included the annual National Defense Authorization Act signed by the president in December 2021 and various China provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of March 2022. With increased congressional funding, an active pace of US naval and air exercises, often with accompanying forces from Indo-Pacific and European allies, supported regional allies and partners in contesting Chinese disputed claims along its maritime periphery.50 Chinese commentary took aim at Vice President Harris’ sharp rebuke of Chinese coercion and bullying in the South China Sea during her regional visit in August 2021, recalling negatively the vice president’s record of strong criticism of China over suppression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Chinese commentary featured tough rhetoric and criticism of measures to counter Chinese practices by cabinet officials Antony Blinken, Lloyd Austin, Janet Yellin, Gina Raimondo, and Katherine Tai. An exception to this criticism was John Kerry, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, presumably because Beijing remained interested in appearing constructive in pursuing climate change discussions with the United States.51 Advancing US military, economic, and political ties with Taiwan began in the Trump administration and continued without letup under the Biden government. They were often portrayed as countermeasures to Beijing’s more aggressive coercive tactics seeking to force Taiwan to move toward positions in line with Beijing’s view of Taiwan as a province of China, seeking to reunify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland. Congress endeavored to strengthen US-Taiwan ties with a large number of bills, several giving special attention to strengthening defense ties. Various manifestations of closer US-Taiwan cooperation were sharply criticized by Chinese officials and media, with high points seen with the invitation

416

R. SUTTER

of Taiwan to the US Summit of Democracies in December 2021 and with the visit of a senior Senatorial delegation to Taiwan in April 2022 and a proposed visit at that time of a House delegation led by Speaker Nancy Pelosi. The latter was postponed because Speaker Pelosi tested positive with COVID-19. It took place on August 2, 2022, prompting four days of unprecedented Chinese military shows of force surrounding Taiwan.52 There was strong US debate for several weeks on what should be done. In the end, the administration and Congress remained firm as they advanced support for Taiwan and took other major measures to defend America against China’s challenges. Beijing did not escalate military pressure. It sought to ease tensions with Xi Jinping meeting Biden on November 14 and accepting the longstanding US call for talks to set guardrails to avoid military conflict because of rising tensions. Xi made no mention of China’s previous demand that the US had to change its policies adverse to China before Beijing would agree to such talks. Meanwhile in 2021–2022, the Congress played a unique role in helping to fill gaps in the administration’s efforts to compete with and counter adverse Chinese economic practices. Thus, the USICA and the America COMPETES acts went to extraordinary lengths to mandate and fund very expensive US measures to foster industrial policy targeting China’s egregious economic practices seeking dominance in international high technology. The USICA centered on $52 billion in subsidies for the semiconductor industry to spur domestic production of advanced chips. Another $80 billion would fund the National Science Foundation to create a Technology Directorate to support research on advanced technologies. Space exploration would receive US $23 billion, and the Commerce Department would get $10 billion to develop regional technology hubs beyond Silicon Valley.53 The massive over 2,000-page bill had a mix of other measures countering Chinese practices. $1.5 billion targeted Chinese influence operations abroad, and $500 million more was devoted to support US state controlled media. The State Department would receive $75 million to encourage US companies to remove supply chains from China. The bill required sanctions on Chinese companies undermining US cybersecurity; it banned the use of TikTok on US government devices, and it created new security measures reducing American scientific research with Chinese counterparts. Among significant changes and additions in the House America COMPETES bill were the strong emphasis on supply chain resilience and

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

417

a provision restricting outbound US investment. The bill also included provisions on climate change and environmental issues that were criticized by Republican House members.54 While passing either bill or some compromise bill would add to US efforts to counter Chinese adverse challenges, the passage remained in doubt as partisan politics grew in importance in the leadup to the 2022 mid-term congressional elections.55 Other congressional legislation countered Chinese challenges by restricting Chinese exports to the United States well beyond the scope of the legacy tariffs of the Trump government. And legislation endeavored to staunch the flow of US funding to Chinese enterprises, strengthening Chinese capacity to take the lead in high technology and thereby make the United States economy and military subservient to China. A great deal of media coverage followed a bill proposed by Congress and supported by the President to raise the costs to China of its egregious repression of Uyghur people. News coverage highlighted the bill’s broader economic implications that align with American leaders seeking to further reduce US economic dependence on China and to pursue a wider decoupling of the US economy from the Chinese economy. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) denounced the massive concentration camps, forced indoctrination and labor practices, and related abuses widely seen as genocide against Uyghur people. It passed Congress and was signed by the President in December 2021. The law came into force in June 2022. It prohibited the United States importing goods from what is formally called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwestern China. The scope of forced Uyghur labor could also involve many firms elsewhere in China outside of Xinjiang that use contract labor of Uyghur people and may fall under the jurisdiction of US restrictions on imported goods produced with forced labor.56 The scope of the UPLPA may involve any product that incorporates components or materials from Xinjiang. Such products could be subject to impoundment by US Customs and Border Protection at port of entry. Xinjiang produces most of China’s cotton and polysilicon, so imports of clothing and solar panels were at risk. The legislation required that an interagency task force identify a list of entities and products involved in forced labor. To avoid a ban, an importer dealing with these entities or products would have to prove that it performed due diligence and provide “clear and convincing” evidence that goods were not produced with forced labor.57

418

R. SUTTER

The potential disruption in US-China trade posed by the law was reduced as US importers were preparing for two years as proposed import bans emerged in Congress as a result of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang. And US importers and Chinese firms were often adroit in mitigating the impact on import bans; such US measures in the past had not affected traded goods in major ways.58 Heading the list of legislation endeavoring to staunch the flow of US funding to Chinese enterprises was a provision in the America COMPETES Act, the House bill now under conference consideration along with the Senate passed US Innovation and Competition Act (USICA). The House bill had a provision restricting outbound US investment going to China. Backed by legislation passed in 2018, the US government was effective in blocking Chinese investment in the United States seen advancing Chinese high technology capacities in ways that disadvantaged the United States. Against the background of the acute US rivalry with China over high technology and related economic and security power, congressional frustration grew with US manufacturing firms expanding their presence in China and US venture capital firms and firms controlling large sums of US capital seeking advantageous investment opportunities continuing robust investment in Chinese firms, even those tied to the Chinese military. The trend added to reasons to expect congressional action soon to endeavor to the staunch the flow of American capital enabling China’s rise to high technology dominance. The America COMPETES bill only covered direct investment by corporations. In 2022, prominent Republicans in Congress were particularly motivated to expand outbound investment screening to include portfolio investments by financial institutions, thereby greatly limiting US money supporting advanced Chinese enterprises.59

Impediments, Gaps, Shortcomings in American Competition with China The Biden administration’s approach to counter the challenges posed by Chinese advances at others’ expense emphasizes: first, sustaining and effectively building American military, economic, and political strengths at home and abroad; second, working closely with allies and like-minded partners in protracted efforts to undermine China’s ambitions of coercive dominance; and third, compelling change in Chinese behavior along lines of existing international norms.60 In broad terms, the Biden approach has

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

419

been similar to the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy of December 2017 that signaled the end of America seeking close engagement with Beijing and the start of a remarkable hardening in US policy and practice regarding China that continues up to now. Despite strong resolve in Washington to counter Chinese challenges to American interests and values, the path ahead remains full of obstacles and complications. Expanding Chinese influence represents the most important obstacle to US efforts to compete effectively with China. Chinese leaders have followed a clear strategy using a combination of impressive positive incentives and coercive mechanisms to achieve objectives. Coercive pressures are increasingly on display in China’s assertive expansion at others’ expense in disputed territory in Asia, the widespread use of economic leverage to compel compliance with China’s ambitions, and so-called wolf warrior diplomacy intended to intimidate foreign opposition. Also, there are recent signs of weakness in China’s economy, in China’s rigid COVID Zero strategy, in Beijing’s conflicted handling of relations with Russia following Putin’s attack on Ukraine, and in the Xi Jinping leadership’s preoccupation with the senior leader’s ambitions for an unprecedented third term. Collectively, these circumstances result in an unmoving commitment by the Xi government to righteousness in existing policies and practices even when they heavily disadvantage Chinese interests. This commitment includes continued serious challenges to American interests and values.61 In contrast to Beijing’s consistency and resolve are gaps in US effectiveness. For example, noted above is partisan disagreement complicating the passage of some version of the USICA and America COMPETES bills countering Chinese economic practices. On the one hand, as repeatedly underscored in this assessment, congressional bipartisan majorities have sustained the hardening US posture toward Chinese practices over the past five years and that trend is likely to continue. On the other hand, many Republicans were loathed to give the Biden administration any sort of significant political win in Congress prior the mid-term elections in November 2022. Republicans foresaw gaining control of both the House and the Senate as a result of the 2022 elections, thereby further constraining Biden administration success and improving chances of Republican victory in the presidential race of 2024.62 Against this background, on China issues some Republicans argued that Biden administration measures were not tough enough in meeting

420

R. SUTTER

Chinese challenges and should not be passed; some argued that a Republican controlled Congress after the 2022 election would be stronger and tougher in countering Beijing. Among those complaining about perceived weakness and other shortcomings in Biden China policy were former President Trump and his strong America First advocates making significant gains in the primaries leading up to the 2022 elections. The advocates of an America First policy toward China tended to favor unilateral US measures involving the use of American power. They featured much less concern than recent US policy in building lasting domestic and international support and gaining the endorsement of key allies and partners that were deemed very important to the Biden administration, congressional Democrats, and many congressional Republicans as well. The opposition of former president Trump and his America First associates complicated gaining congressional passage in 2022 of some versions of the USICA and America COMPETES bills. The opposition was not dissuaded by the common assessment that American First unilateral measures had been tried by the Trump administration with mixed results, resulting in continued decline of the US relative to rising China in international influence.63 Partisan divides and related policy differences also showed potentially significant gaps in the effectiveness of US policy in dealing with the serious challenges posed by Chinese behavior in other ways. For example, the Biden administration worked for more than one year to create a viable national security strategy reflecting the fundamental shift from past constructive engagement with China to acute US rivalry. Moving from engagement to rivalry has been underway for over four years, but at various times it was carried out in unilateral and often erratic ways by the Trump administration, thereby resulting in the relative decline of the United States in comparison with China. The Biden government on the one hand has attempted to demonstrate at home and abroad that its recent posture emphasizing strong rivalry with China is here to stay and that a return to the unpredictable and unilateral America First policies President Trump represented an aberration in America’s longstanding regional and international leadership. On the other hand, the Democrats’ poor showing in the November 2021 elections, Biden’s continued low public approval ratings, and resurgence in recent primaries of Trump-backed candidates with America First outlooks similar to the former president raised the specter of a return of Donald Trump to the White House in the 2024 election.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

421

Many US allies and partners had strongly negative experiences in interaction with the former president. They approved the Biden government policies in seeking cooperation with allies and partners and other systematic measures to deal with China’s challenges, but their commitment to align with the United States against China was weakened because they remained uncertain about the durability of the Biden approach.64 Other gaps involve the US businesses, universities and other organizations closely engaged with China along with prominent China specialists who have argued for greater moderation in dealing with China. For example, Chinese authorities are resorting to unprecedented efforts to out-maneuver US-led restrictions on high technology exports to, and acquisitions by, Chinese firms in semiconductor and related software industries. Indirectly or directly cooperative with Chinese authorities in these efforts are a range of US and international firms, advocacy groups, and highly trained specialists pursuing their respective interests. In the process, these groups are assisting Chinese government-led efforts to undermine existing US restrictions; US policy has yet to come to a clear judgment on what the US government should do about this problem.65 Meanwhile, many US firms, universities, and experts that will be recipients of the tens of billions of dollars being proposed in USICA, America COMPETES and other legislation for US high technology competition with China are often well-integrated with Chinese entities and fellow specialists. Many of their high-technology achievements come through cross-border collaborations that, if stopped, are predicted to seriously reduce their capacity for innovation. Under these circumstances, how US government policymakers can be sure that the advances they fund will not quickly come into the hands of Chinese authorities remains to be seen.66 In sum, how US policymakers create a strategy that counters Chinese challenges and also takes account of significant domestic opposition to such tough measures remains a work in progress. Adding to the conundrum, US allies and partners have similar business and other interests that oppose hard measures to counter China. And many of them do not share the sense of danger and urgency about China’s challenges seen in Washington over the past four years.67 For now, a wide array of pending legislation targeting China shows that Congress together with the administration will continue strong efforts to counter China challenges. However, more often than not, the legislation does not propose a sophisticated strategy. The focus in Congress remains on taking action to defend America from particular challenges.

422

R. SUTTER

This trend will endure. How successful the trend will be will depend on how well the United States deals with the shortcomings noted above. This remains to be seen. Evidence of success or failure in dealing with salient obstacles and complications will come most immediately in how partisan considerations override or don’t override broad bipartisan congressional support for hardening US policy toward China to preclude passage of the conference report dealing with the USICA Senate bill and the America COMPETES House bill.

Notes 1. Joe Biden, “My trip is about America rallying the world’s democracies,” Washington Post June 6, 2021 A25; David Brunnstrom, Alexandra Alper, Yew Lun Tian, “China will ’eat our lunch,’ Biden warns after clashing with Xi on most fronts,” Reuters February 10, 2021, https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-china-idUKKBN2AB060, accessed July 9, 2022. 2. Kinling Lo, “Donald Trump Tweets from Beijing about his ‘unforgettable afternoon’ with Xi Jinping,” South China Morning Post, November 8, 2017 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/art icle/2119016/trump-tweets-beijing-about-his-unforgettable-afternoonxi-jinping, accessed July 9, 2022. 3. Bonnie Glaser and Hannah Price, “Continuity Prevails in Biden’s First 100 Days,” Comparative Connections 23, no. 1 (May 2021): 29–42. 4. “Special Report: China and America,” The Economist, May 16, 2019, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/05/16/trade-canno-longer-anchor-americas-relationship-with-china, accessed July 9, 2022; Robert Sutter “Trump, America and the World—2017 and Beyond” H-Diplo/ISSF POLICY Series, January 19, 2019, https://networks. h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/3569933/issf-policy-series-suttertrump%E2%80%99s-china-policy-bi-partisan, accessed July 9, 2022; White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, accessed July 9, 2022; US Department of Defense, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United State, January 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ 2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, accessed July 9, 2022.. 5. Tony Romm, “Senate approves $250 billion to trim China’s ambitions,” Washington Post June 9, 2021 A 18; David Sanger, Catie Edmondson, David McCabe and Thomas Kaplan, “In Rare Show if Unity, Senate Poised to Pass a Bill to Counter China,” New York Times, June 7, 2021 A10.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

423

6. White House, National Security Strategy of the United States December https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ 2017 NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 7. Robert Sutter, “The 115th Congress Aligns with The Trump Administration in Targeting China,” Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet No. 62, August 30, 2018. 8. Robert Sutter “Trump, America and the World—2017 and Beyond” H-Diplo/ISSF POLICY Series, January 19, 2019, https://networks. h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/3569933/issf-policy-series-suttertrump%E2%80%99s-china-policy-bi-partisan; Robert Sutter and Satu Limaye, A Hardening US-China Competition Honolulu HI: East-West Center 2020; Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “China Not Yet Seen as a threat by the American Public,” October 19, 2018, https://www.the chicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/china-not-yet-seenthreat-american-public. 9. Vivian Salama, “Trump Signs Defense Bill to Boost Military, Target China,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2018 https://www.wsj.com/ articles/trump-signs-defense-bill-to-boost-military-target-china-153419 6930; the text of the Act is available at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/ details/BILLS-115hr5515enr/ 10. Yasmeen Serhan, “Consensus Isn’t Always a Good Thing,” The Atlantic, October 5, 2021, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/publicopinion-survey/china-not-yet-seen-threat-american-public. 11. Craig Kafura, “Americans Favor US-China Trade, Split over Tariffs, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 3, 2019, https://www. thechicagocouncil.org/publication/lcc/americans-favor-us-china-tradesplit-over-tariffs; Robert Sutter, “Has US Government Angst over the China Danger Diminished?” East–West Center Washington, Asia–Pacific Bulletin, no. 497 (January 2020); Dan Haverty and Augusta Saraiva, “When It Comes to China, Americans Think Like Trump,” Foreign Policy, July 30, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/30/pewresearch-trump-china-american-public/; Laura Silver, Kat Delvin, and Christine Huang, “Americans Fault China for Its Role in the Spread of COVID-19,” Pew Research Center, July 30, 2020, https://www.pewres earch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-thespread-of-covid-19/. 12. Glaser and Price, “Continuity Prevails in Biden’s First 100 Days,” 29–37. 13. “Bizarre Bills against China Stack up in US Congress,” Global Times, June 18, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1191994.shtml, accessed July 10, 2022; Glaser and Price, “Continuity Prevails in Biden’s First 100 Days”; Bonnie Glaser, “The Descent Continues,” Comparative Connections 23, no. 2 (September 2021): 25–32; Ryan Hass, “How China is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the US,”

424

14. 15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

R. SUTTER

China Leadership Monitor, March 1, 2021, https://www.prcleader.org/ hass; Robert Sutter, “China’s Challenges and Effective Defense: America’s Conundrum,” Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet, no. 47 (October 14, 2021). Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Change in Style, Continuity in Asia Policy,” Comparative Connections 23, no.1 (May 2021): 1–7. Robert Sutter and Chin Hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations,” Comparative Connections 22, no. 1 (May 2021): 70–72; Nick Aspinwall, “Biden Delegation Pledges US Support for Taiwan Self-defense,” The Diplomat, April 17, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/bidendelegation-pledges-us-support-for-taiwan-self-defense/, accessed July 10, 2022. US-China Policy Foundation Newsletter, “US View of China Competition,” May 21, 2021, https://uscpf.org/v3/2021/05/21/us-china-com petition/, accessed July 10, 2022. Tony Romm, “Senate Approves $250 Billion to Trim China’s Ambitions,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ us-policy/2021/06/08/senate-china-science-technology/, accessed July 10, 2022; David Sanger, Catie Edmondson, David McCabe, and Thomas Kaplan, “In Rare Show of Unity, Senate Poised to Pass A Bill to Counter Chin,.” New York Times, June 7, 2021, A1. Simon Lester and Huan Zhu, The US-China Trade War: Is There an End in Sight? CATO Institute (Winter 2020), https://www.cato.org/cato-jou rnal/winter-2020/us-china-trade-war-there-end-sight, accessed July 10, 2022; Yen Nee Lee, “US Businesses Are Bearing the Brunt of Trump’s China Tariffs,” CNBC, May 18, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/ 05/18/us-companies-bearing-the-brunt-of-trumps-china-tariffs-says-moo dys.html, accessed July 22, 2022. Richard Bush, Bonnie Glaser, and Ryan Hass, “Don’t Help China by Hyping Risk of War over Taiwan,” NPR, April 8, 2021, https://www. npr.org/2021/04/08/984524521/opinion-dont-help-china-by-hypingrisk-of-war-over-taiwan, accessed July 10, 2022. “Open Letter: China Is Not an Enemy,” July 2019, https://www.ncuscr. org/news/open-letter-china-is-not-the-enemy, accessed July 10, 2022. “Full Transcript of Biden’s Remarks on Afghanistan,” New York Times, September 1, 2012, A9. The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/, accessed July 10, 2022; David Lynch, “White House Calls for ‘New Course’ on China Trade Ties,” Washington Post, October 5, 2021, A22; David Sanger, “Biden and Xi Agree to Hold Virtual Talks,” New York Times, October 7, 2021, A9.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

425

23. Robert Zoellick, “Joe Biden Must Build on His Dialogue with Xi Jinping,” Financial Times, December 8, 2021, https://www.ft.com/con tent/372ce716-c2d5-42a9-814e-bca5c0c43388, accessed July 10, 2022; Bonnie Glaser, “US-China Relations,” Comparative Connections 23, no. 3 (January 2022): 32–35. 24. Glaser, “US-China Relations,” (January 2022): 32–33. 25. Glaser, “US-China Relations,” (January 2022): 35–39. 26. Institute for China-America Studies, ICAS Trade N Tech Dispatch, December 17, 2021, 3; Daniel Flatley and Anna Edgeton, “House Leaders Near Agreement on Stalled China Competition Bill,” Bloomberg, January 12, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202201-12/house-leaders-assembling-compromise-on-china-competition-bill, accessed July 10, 2022. 27. Glaser, “Putin’s War Further Strains US-China Ties,” 36. 28. Sutter, “China’s Challenges and Effective Defense”; Robert Sutter, “Will Congress be a ‘Spoiler’ in Biden’s China Policy,” The Diplomat s 8, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/will-congress-be-a-spoiler-inbidens-china-policy/, accessed July10, 2022. 29. Sutter, “Trump, America and the World—2017 and Beyond”; USChina Policy Foundation Newsletter, “US View of China Competition,” May 21, 2021, https://uscpf.org/v3/2021/05/21/us-china-com petition/, accessed July 10, 2022. 30. Bonnie Glaser, “Putin’s War Further Strains US-China Ties,” Comparative Connections 24, no. 1 (May 2022): 29–36; Frank Aum,Mirna Galic, and Rachel Vandenbrink, Biden’s Asia Trip Seeks to Revitalize Alliances, Focus on China (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 25, 2022), https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/bidensasia-trip-seeks-revitalize-alliances-focus-china, accessed July 10, 2022. 31. Aum, Galic, and Vandenbrink, Biden’s Asia Trip Seeks to Revitalize Alliances, Focus on China; White House, ASEAN-US Special Summit 2022, Joint Vision Statement, May 13, 2022, https://www.whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/13/asean-u-s-specialsummit-2022-joint-vision-statement/, accessed July 10, 2022. 32. ”The America Competes Act Must Pass—with Strings,” Washington Post, July 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/ 07/02/semiconductor-legislation-china-competition/, accessed July 10, 2022. 33. Sydney Tucker, “2022 NATO Summit: China High on the Agenda,” Washington DC: Stimson Center, July 5, 2022. 34. Ann Scott Tyson, “Ahead of Crucial Party Congress, Xi Faces Doubts over Policies,” Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 2022, https://www. csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2022/0517/Ahead-of-crucial-partycongress-Xi-faces-doubts-over-policies, accessed July 11, 2022.

426

R. SUTTER

35. Glaser, “Putin’s War Further Strains US-China Ties”; Aum, Galic, and Vandenbrink, Biden’s Asia Trip Seeks to Revitalize Alliances, Focus on China; Tucker, “2022 NATO Summit: China High on the Agenda.”. 36. White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U. S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf, accessed July 11, 2022. 37. White House, Fact Sheet: In Asia, President and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Framework for Prosperity, May 23, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/ 2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pac ific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/ , accessed July 11, 2022; Su-Lin Tan, “The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: What It Is and Why It Matters,” CNBC, May 25, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/26/ipef-what-is-the-indo-pacific-fra mework-whos-in-it-why-it-matters.html, accessed July 11, 2022. 38. “Unpacking the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Launch,” CSIS, May 23, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-indo-pacific-eco nomic-framework-launch, accessed July 11, 2022. 39. US Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy, March 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF, accessed July 11, 2022; see review in Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Ukraine Seizes the Headlines amid Mounting Concerns about China,” Comparative Connections 24, no. 1 (May 2022): 5–6. 40. Cossa and Glosserman, “Ukraine Seizes the Headlines amid Mounting Concerns about China,” 6. 41. Greg Hadley, “OSD Sends New Defense Strategy to Hill,” Air Force Magazine, April 29, 2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/osdsends-new-defense-strategy-to-hill/, accessed July 11, 2022. 42. Antony Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-adm inistrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/, accessed July 11, 2022. 43. Shannon Tiezzi, “Blinken Emphasizes Cooperation, Including with Beijing, in China Speech,” THE DIPLOMAT, May 27, 2022, https:// thediplomat.com/2022/05/blinken-emphasizes-cooperation-includingwith-beijing-in-china-policy-speech/, accessed July 11, 2022. 44. Xi Jinping, “Rising to the Challenges and Building a Bright Future Through Cooperation,” Keynote Speech, Boao Forum for Asia, April 21, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202204/t20 220421_10671081.html, accessed July 11, 2022.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

427

45. White House, Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement, May 24, 2022, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/ quad-joint-leaders-statement/, accessed July 11, 2022; White House, AUKUS Leaders’ Level Statement, April 5, 2022, https://www.whi tehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/aukus-lea ders-level-statement/, accessed July 11, 2022. 46. White House, Readout of President Biden’s Trilateral with President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea and Prime minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, June 29, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/06/29/readout-of-president-bidens-tri lateral-with-president-yoon-suk-yeol-of-the-republic-of-korea-and-primeminister-fumio-kishida-of-japan/, accessed July 11, 2022. 47. Debby Wu, “TSMC, Samsung Urge US to Allow Them into $52 Billion Chip Plan,” Bloomberg, March 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2022-03-28/tsmc-samsung-urge-u-s-to-allow-them-into52-billion-chip-plan#:~:text=TSMC%20is%20now%20building%20a,pro duction%20also%20two%20years%20later, accessed July 11, 2022. 48. White House, Fact Sheet: In Asia, President and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Framework for Prosperity. 49. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Growing Influence Overshadows US Initiative,” Comparative Connections 23, no. 3 (January 2022): 71–76. 50. Glaser, “The Descent Continues,” September 2021; Glaser, “US-China Relations,” January 2022; Glaser, “Putin’s War Further Strains US-China Ties”; National Defense Authorization Act, 2022, Congress.Gov, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text, accessed July 11, 2022; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congress.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2471/text, accessed July 11, 2022. 51. Owen Churchill, “US Climate Chief Says Fraught Relations with China Spell ‘Serious Trouble’ for Efforts to Achieve Goals,” South China Morning Post, April 21, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/sci ence/article/3174959/us-climate-chief-says-fraught-relations-china-spellserious, accessed July 11, 2022. 52. Glaser, “Putin’s War Further Strains US-China Ties,” 33–34. 53. United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, Congress.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260, accessed July 11, 2022. 54. Nancy Pelosi, “House Committee Chairs Statement on Unveiling of the America COMPETES Act of 2022,” January 25, 2022, https://www.spe aker.gov/newsroom/12522-0, accessed July 11, 2022. 55. “The America Competes Act Must Pass—with Strings,” Washington Post, July 2, 2022.

428

R. SUTTER

56. Ana Swanson, “Law Fighting Forced Labor to Hit Trade,” New York Times, June 22, 2022, B1. 57. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), Congress.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1155/text, accessed July 11, 2022. 58. Swanson, “Law Fighting Forced Labor to Hit Trade.” 59. “Chinese Investment Curbs Gain Momentum in US Lawmakers Talks,” Reuters, June 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/us-lawmak ers-agree-china-investment-curbs-2022-06-13/, accessed July 11, 2022. 60. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China.” 61. Hass, “How China is Responding to Escalating Strategic Competition with the US”; Sutter, “China’s Challenges and Effective Defense”; Tyson, “Ahead of Crucial Party Congress, Xi Faces Doubts over Policies.” 62. Alayana Treene, “House Conservatives Criticize CHIPS-plus Package as ‘Fake” China Bill,” Axios, July 21, 2022, https://www.axios.com/2022/ 07/21/house-republicans-chips-plus-china, accessed July 25, 2022. 63. Lindsey McPherson, “McConnell Threatens Support for China Bill, Citing Budget Talks” Roll Call, June 30, 2022, https://rollcall.com/ 2022/06/30/mcconnell-threatens-support-for-china-bill-citing-budgettalks/, accessed July 11, 2022; Scott Dawsey, “Many GOP Candidates Bash Each Other for Ties to China,” Washington Post, May 11, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/11/republicanschina-primaries/, accessed July 25, 2022. 64. Michael Scherer, Tyler Pager, and Sean Sullivan, “Biden and Aides Tell Allies He Is Running in 2024 amid Growing Democratic Fears,” Washington Post, November 20, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/pol itics/biden-reelection-2024/2021/11/20/0779469c-4947-11ec-95dc5f2a96e00fa3_story.html, accessed June 20, 2022; Sutter, US-China Relations: Perilous Past: Uncertain Present, 4th ed., 327–320. 65. Janan Ganesch, “America’s Political and Business Elites No Longer Agree on China,” Financial Times, October 19, 2021, https://www.ft.com/con tent/77bb9c77-2e4b-4169-bfd6-615eeb95be23; Congressional Research Service, “China’s 14th Five Year Plan,” (CRS In Focus IF1168, January 5, 2021), 2. 66. Ariana Remmel, “Massive Science-funding Bill Passes US Senate—but China Focus Worries Researchers,” Nature, June 11, 2021, https://www. nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01559-x, accessed June 20, 2022. 67. Sutter & Limaye, 26, 32–33, 35–38, 42–44; “European Firms Unprepared for US-China Breakup,” DW, January 14, 2021, https://www.dw. com/en/china-us-trade-war-eu/a-56212728.

12

AMERICA COUNTERS CHINA: CONGRESS, RESOLVE …

429

Bibliography Allison, Graham et al. The Great Tech Rivalry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Kennedy School, December 2021. Bateman, Jon. US-China Technological ‘Decoupling:’A Strategy and Policy Framework. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022. Cheung, Tai Ming. Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022. Cunningham, Fiona. “Cooperation under Asymmetry? The Future of US-China Nuclear Relations.” The Washington Quarterly 44, no. 2 (Summer 2021): 159–174. deLisle, Jacques and Avery Goldstein, eds. After Engagement: Dilemmas in USChina Security Relations. Washington DC: Brookings Institution 2021. Doshi, Rush. The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Easton, Ian. The Final Struggle: Inside China’s Global Strategy. Manchester, UK: Camphor Press and Eastbridge Books, 2022. Economy, Elizabeth. The World According to China. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. Friedberg, Aaron. “The Growing Rivalry between America and China and the Future of Globalization.” The Strategist (Winter 2021–2022): 95–119. Gill, Bates, ed. Meeting China’s Military Challenge: Collective Responses of US Allies and Partners. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research. January 2022. Hass, Ryan. Stronger: Adapting America’s China Policy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2021. Mazarr, Michael, Timothy Heath, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos. China and the International Order, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. Paul, Christopher, James Dobbins, Scott Harold, Howard Shatz, Rand Waltzman, and Luren Skrabala, A Guide to Extreme Competition with China. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. Rolland, Nadege. China’s Vision for a New World Order. Seattle, WA: National Bureau for Asian Research, January 2020. Rudd, Kevin. The Avoidable War. New York: Public Affairs, 2022. Sandalow, David. China’s Response to Climate Change. New York: The Asia Society, 2020. Schake, Kori and Allison Schwartz, eds. Defending Taiwan. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2022. Shambaugh, David. Where Great Powers Meet. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Sutter, Robert. US-China Relations: Perilous Past, Uncertain Present. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022.

430

R. SUTTER

Tellis, Ashley J., Alison Szalwinski and Michael Wills, eds. Strategic Asia 2020: US-China Competition for Global Influence. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020. Tellis, Ashley J., Alison Szalwinski and Michael Wills, eds. Strategic Asia 2021–22: US-China Navigating Tumultuous Times in the Indo-Pacific. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2022. Thurston, Anne, ed. Engaging China: Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. Wang Jisi. “How and Why China-US Relations have Worsened Since 2012,” The Eighth Annual Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Memorial Lecture. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, April 22, 2022. Wyne, Ali. America’s Great Power Opportunity. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022.

Index

A Academia, 88 Academic freedom, 88, 89, 91, 92 Academic Freedom Index, 92 Afghanistan, US withdrawal from, 13, 327, 405 Air defense identification zone (AIDZ), 7, 315, 405 America COMPETES Act, 408, 416, 418, 425 America first, 46, 49, 263, 281, 285, 297, 357, 358, 420 American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, 95 Anti-China, 1, 3, 5–7, 16, 36, 46, 47, 53, 56, 147, 148, 153, 292, 294, 319, 348, 397, 402, 406 Anti-Extradition Bill Movement, 78, 79, 88, 93, 94 Apple Daily, 44, 47, 85 Asian-Pacific region, 227, 280, 330, 407

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 298, 403, 408, 410, 411, 414 Australia, 13, 95, 96, 159, 162, 163, 227, 280, 281, 286, 287, 294, 298, 306, 328, 403, 405, 406, 413, 414 Australia, United Kingdom, US agreement (AUKUS), 13, 281, 413, 415 Authoritarianism, 9, 14, 224, 283, 300, 355, 368 B Balancing, 7, 15, 46, 193–198, 200, 203, 261, 301, 349 Bandwagoning, 7, 193, 195–198, 200, 203 Basic Law of Hong Kong, 76 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 8, 17, 226, 227, 281, 283, 329, 330 Biden administration, 11, 13, 18, 187, 201, 222, 278, 281, 282, 286–289, 293–298, 302, 348,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 W. Lee (ed.), Protests, Pandemic, and Security Predicaments, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33776-5

431

432

INDEX

349, 351, 352, 354, 363, 366, 369, 371–373, 398, 400, 403, 406, 410, 413, 414, 418–420 Biden, Joseph, 12, 18, 223, 288–290, 294–297, 300, 301, 327, 332, 333, 351–355, 357, 363, 364, 367–374, 397, 399, 402–405, 408, 410, 411, 413–416, 418, 420, 421 Blinken, Antony, 295, 306, 351, 352, 366, 370, 403, 406, 412, 413, 415, 426, 428 C Canada, 95, 96, 152, 163, 222, 280, 291, 292, 297, 299, 405, 408 Candidate Eligibility Review Committee (CERC), 81 Censorship, 77 Challenges to the United States, 409, 419 Chan, Johannes, 89 Chen Shui-bian, 124, 155, 188, 191, 318 Chief Executive (CE), 35, 36, 39, 43, 76, 79, 81, 82, 87, 89, 91, 97 China’s Policy toward Taiwan, 10, 251, 253, 259, 264 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 10, 41, 47, 54, 77, 90, 96, 212, 216, 221, 224–226, 228, 251, 253–255, 257–259, 261–263, 266, 268, 283, 284, 313, 314, 317, 323, 336, 337, 350, 355, 365, 369, 374, 404, 409 Chinese Communists (CCP), 1, 188, 190, 263 CHIPS Act, 288, 304 Civil society, 4, 46, 76, 78, 84–86, 88, 92, 95, 362 Cold War, 75, 122, 228, 300, 373, 413

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 290, 305, 401 Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, 86, 97 Containment, 8, 10, 17, 148, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 189, 228, 319 Cooperation and competition, 277 Court of Final Appeal, 35, 57, 83, 96, 107 COVID-19, 2, 6, 13, 15, 25, 53, 55, 56, 147–159, 161–165, 178, 211, 214, 217, 220, 221, 223, 225, 227, 228, 239, 289, 299, 316, 376, 402, 403, 410, 416 Crimes Ordinance, 79, 83–85 Cross-Strait relations, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 38, 47, 49, 124, 125, 137, 138, 157, 203, 252, 253, 256, 262, 264–269, 318, 356

D Decoupling, 10, 226, 301, 328, 417 Democracy walls, 89, 92 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 1, 5–7, 16, 19, 38, 45–50, 56, 121, 124–126, 141, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 190, 193, 196, 197, 200, 203, 223, 252, 260, 266, 318, 320, 321, 357 Democratization, 46, 76, 77, 85, 96, 361, 364 District Councils, 86 Domestic politics, 7, 13, 147, 189, 206, 371, 399, 400 Dual-deterrence, 19 Dual-track strategy, 10, 319

INDEX

E Education, 9, 10, 41, 76, 88–90, 93–95, 133, 136, 261, 267, 299, 320, 321 Election security, 81, 86 Epidemic prevention supplies, 161 European Union (EU), 95, 162–164, 226, 297, 363, 403, 406, 408 Extradition, 21, 38, 39, 55, 78, 86, 292, 405 Extraterritoriality, 54

F Fort Detrick, 221

G Global supply chains, 9, 21, 282, 329 Government performance, 151

H Hardening, 348, 397, 400, 401, 404, 419, 422 Harris, Kamala, 414, 415 Health Silk Road, 8, 227 Hedging, 7, 193, 195–200, 203, 205, 297 Holistic view of national security, 77, 93, 94 Hong Kong, 2–6, 8, 14, 21, 33–56, 60–62, 75–96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 269 Hong Kong Baptist University, 90 Hong Kong Chief Executive, 36, 37, 79 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), 34, 59, 78, 98, 99, 128 Hua, Chunying, 214 Huawei, 13, 53, 265, 291, 292, 328, 405

433

Human rights, 12, 18, 49, 53, 81, 86, 94–96, 156, 218, 219, 278, 279, 350, 352, 357, 361, 363, 403, 406, 407, 410

I Independent judiciary, 76, 80, 95 India, 13, 179, 227, 281, 297, 298, 327, 401, 403, 406, 413, 414 Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), 282, 295, 372, 410, 411, 415 Indo-Pacific Strategy, 9, 13, 294, 295, 297, 408, 410, 415 Integrated development, 10, 251, 253, 259, 260, 262, 268, 271 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 81, 95

J Japan, 13, 159, 161, 163, 164, 194, 212, 222, 225, 227, 279–281, 287, 288, 294, 295, 306, 313, 328, 332, 347, 351, 360, 403, 406, 407, 409, 413, 414, 427 Jinping, Xi, 47, 77, 93, 94, 127, 201, 212, 226, 265–267, 269, 271, 283, 287, 297, 300, 301, 303, 311, 312, 314, 316–318, 320, 322, 327, 328, 333, 335–337, 350, 351, 356, 362, 365, 374, 398, 405, 406, 409, 410, 416, 419, 426 Joint Declaration, 34, 76, 78, 293 Joshua Wong, 38, 50, 94 Judiciary, 4, 80

K Kuomintang (KMT), 1, 20, 45–49, 124–126, 148, 155, 159–162,

434

INDEX

188–190, 193, 199, 252, 260, 269, 313, 357

L Lai, Jimmy, 4, 44, 85 Lam, Carrie, 39, 41, 89, 103 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong, 78 Lee, Ching-kwan, 91, 104 Lee, Teng-hui, 190, 350 Legislative Council elections, 79 Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times, 79 Lockdowns, 14, 213, 223, 225

M Macau, 3, 77, 81, 127, 164, 292, 357 Magnitsky sanction regime, 95 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 21 Ma, Ying-jeou, 45, 124, 190, 199, 252, 356 Mead, Walter Russell, 217, 233, 382 Meng Wanzhou, 291, 405 Moderna, 16, 164, 180 mRNA vaccines, 7, 16

N National Defense Authorization Act FY-2019, 401 National Defense Strategy, 373, 408, 411 Nationalist Party, 1, 45, 124, 188, 252, 313 National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), 35, 36, 38, 43, 53, 54, 57, 81, 97, 356 National Security Commission of China, 77

National security education, 88, 89, 93–95 National Security Law (NSL), 2, 3, 34, 43–45, 53–55, 63, 76–96, 98, 99, 103, 292, 293, 306, 314, 317, 318, 357 National security reporting hotline, 80, 88 National Security Strategy, 285, 294, 373, 398, 400, 410, 419, 420 New Goddess of Democracy, 92 New Type of Great Power Relations, 284, 303 New Zealand, 95, 163, 222, 265, 280, 281, 294, 298, 306, 408, 414 1992 Consensus, 5, 10, 45, 124–127, 129–137, 316, 318, 319, 321, 338, 356, 357 Non-permanent judge, 96 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 278, 281, 311, 312, 363, 403, 408, 409, 411 North Korea, 165, 286, 410, 411, 414 NSL-designated judge, 83

O Oath-taking, 86, 87 One China policy, 264, 348, 350, 352–354, 368–370, 373 One China principle, 124, 255, 312, 351, 353, 356, 369 One country, Two systems, 3, 5, 14, 34, 35, 37, 45, 47, 53, 55, 76–78, 96, 124, 129, 136, 271, 313, 314, 338, 356, 357 Overall jurisdiction, 78

INDEX

P Pandemic, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13–17, 21, 25, 34, 53, 56, 84, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155–159, 161–166, 211, 213–217, 219, 221–229, 283, 284, 289, 298, 299, 371, 402, 410 Pandemic diplomacy, 6, 8, 165 Pan-DPP camp, 197, 200, 203 Pan-KMT camp, 193, 196, 197, 200, 203 Party identification, 131, 197, 200, 253 Patriots administering Hong Kong, 82, 86, 99 Pelosi, Nancy, 5, 11, 267, 272, 289, 298, 304, 324, 347, 349–354, 373, 376, 416, 427 People’s Daily, 218, 219, 221, 232–235, 338 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 11, 34, 35, 37, 60, 76, 78, 94, 97, 189, 190, 205, 212–228, 230, 233, 239, 282, 293, 298, 314, 321, 335, 337, 347, 348, 350–353, 355–357, 359, 361–366, 369–371, 373, 374, 383, 387, 410, 411 Pfizer BioNTech, 16 Philippines, 280, 282, 287, 294, 306, 313, 332, 403, 414 Pillars of Shame, 92 Pivot, 187, 201, 264, 280 Political freedoms, 76, 77 Pompeo, Mike, 216, 220, 221, 232, 263, 332, 365, 374 Presidential election in 2020, 3, 5, 6, 13, 18, 21, 48, 56, 121–124, 126, 129, 130, 134–137, 398 Presumption against bail, 4, 82, 83 Process-tracing methods, 6, 148, 153, 177

435

Professional Teachers’ Union, 86, 94 Public trust, 6, 16, 95, 150, 151 Putin, Vladimir, 11, 297, 311, 312, 322, 335, 356, 407, 409, 410, 419

Q Quadrilateral Dialogue, 13, 403, 413

R Reagan’s Six Assurances, 348, 368, 374 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 282, 294, 295, 411 Ren, Zhengfei, 291 Republic of China (ROC), 11, 48, 50, 63, 177, 189, 190, 222, 223, 319, 348, 355–357, 367, 372 Resist China, protect Taiwan, 5, 148, 164 Reunification, 76, 96, 190, 251–253, 255, 266–268, 282, 284, 313–317, 322–325, 328, 335, 356 Rule-based governance, 77 Rule of law, 37, 58, 75, 76, 80, 96, 99, 106, 355 Russia, 149, 236, 284, 289, 295, 298, 311, 312, 322–324, 326, 327, 329, 330, 334–336, 341, 387, 402, 404, 407–411, 413, 419

S Schumer, Charles, 406 Sculpture of Tiananmen Massacre, 92 Secretary for Justice, 82, 87 Security issues, 264 Self-censorship, 4, 54, 77, 90, 92 Self-government, 76

436

INDEX

Semi-presidential system, 6 Silicon shield, 21 Six Assurances, 12, 19, 350, 352, 353, 369, 370, 373 SOAS University of London, 92 Southeast Asia, 179, 205, 282, 401, 406, 414 South Korea, 152, 159, 165, 280, 281, 286–289, 294, 295, 298, 306, 329, 332, 347, 403, 408, 413, 414 Special Administrative Region, 34, 78, 98, 128, 357 Stand News, 85, 96, 101 State-Centered Realism, 371 State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 281, 290, 362, 373 Status quo, Taiwan, 19, 188, 205, 319, 352, 373 Strategic ambiguity, 12, 19, 20, 190, 223, 264, 266, 267, 331, 348, 349, 353, 368–370, 372–375 Strategic clarity, 19, 20, 266, 267 Strategic rivalry, 49, 277, 300 Student union, 89, 92, 104, 105 Sullivan, Jake, 352, 354, 366, 370, 385–388, 403, 405 Summit of Democracies, 406, 414–416 Sunflower movement, 36, 49, 61, 260 T Tai, Benny, 37, 58, 89–91, 97 Taiwan and the pandemic, 222 Taiwanese identity, 48, 321 Taiwan independence, 14, 19, 45, 62, 136, 193, 197, 332, 350–353, 356, 369, 372, 373 Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), 196, 197, 200 Taiwan Policy Act, 265, 266, 273, 282, 354, 355, 367

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 12, 19, 20, 190, 266, 331, 348, 350, 352–354, 369, 370, 373, 374, 398 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 6, 16, 21, 160, 204, 206, 289 Taiwan Strait, 2, 20, 26, 124, 129, 137, 188, 190, 197, 222, 252, 253, 255, 259, 263–265, 267, 268, 270, 278, 283, 302, 315–317, 322, 328, 331, 333–335, 347–349, 351–354, 368–370, 373, 374, 380, 405 Tam Tak Chi, 84 Tech war, 287, 301 The Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO), 81 The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), 36, 90–92, 104, 269 The Civil Human Rights Front, 86 The Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS), 79–81 The Education Bureau (EDU), 93, 94 The Election Committee (EC), 81 The Five Eyes, 95 The Hong Kong Alliance for Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, 86 The Hong Kong-American Center, 90 The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Union, 86 The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), 91, 92 The National Security Department of the Hong Kong Police Force (NSD), 79 The Occupy Central campaign, 88 The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s

INDEX

Government (OSNS), 79–81, 98, 99 The Polytechnic University of Hong Kong (PolyU), 92 The United Nations Human Rights Committee, 95 The United States (US), 95, 123, 135, 188–190, 192, 194, 204, 211–213, 215–220, 223, 225–228, 239, 252, 253, 260, 263–269, 279–284, 287–301, 328, 332–334, 342, 347–350, 352, 353, 357–359, 362–366, 369–373, 386, 399, 401–411, 413–415, 417, 418, 420–422 Threat perception, 122, 123, 130, 131, 133–137 Tiananmen crackdown, 86, 96, 322, 400 Tiananmen Square crackdown on 1989, 398 Tiananmen student movement, 77 Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan, 5, 46, 47, 56 Top-level design, 251, 254–256, 258, 268 Trade war, 213, 265, 278, 281, 285, 286, 296–299, 301, 328, 329, 383, 401 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 264, 280 Trial by jury, 82 Trump administration, 11, 46, 47, 49, 187, 212, 213, 222, 279–281, 285, 286, 291, 294, 296, 299, 355, 361, 365, 368, 371, 373, 383, 397–400, 402, 404, 415, 419, 420 Trump administration national security, 285, 291, 294, 399, 400 Trump administration policy toward China, 401

437

Trump, Donald, 1, 11, 13, 46, 47, 49, 123, 201, 212, 213, 216, 218–220, 222, 263, 265, 278, 280, 355, 358, 420 Trump, Donald policy toward China, 13, 398 Tsai Ing-wen, 121, 126, 148, 159, 222, 260, 262, 265, 316, 318, 350, 356 Two-level game, 7, 188, 199, 203

U Ukraine, 2, 9, 11, 13, 18, 22, 46, 53, 221, 294, 295, 298, 311, 312, 322–327, 330, 333, 334, 356, 370, 408–411, 413, 419 Umbrella Movement, 36, 37, 41, 45, 46, 88, 90 Unification, 1, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 18–20, 45, 48, 49, 53, 124, 127–131, 134–136, 138, 188, 197, 205, 222, 262, 267, 268, 312–316, 318, 321, 322, 331, 335, 357 United Kingdom (UK), 13, 34, 55, 92, 95, 96, 163, 222, 281, 297, 329, 413 University Grant Committee (UGC), 89 University of Hong Kong, 36, 57, 60, 89, 90 University Service Center, 90 University student activism, 92 US–China–Taiwan relations, 187–189, 199, 201–203, 206 US–China relations, 191, 201 US business and China policy, 294, 299, 421 US China competition, 21, 62, 205 US China economic issues, 408 US China gaps, 13, 400, 420, 421

438

INDEX

US-China relations, 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 18, 34, 212, 213, 226, 265, 277, 279, 281, 283, 299, 347, 351, 425 US-China-Taiwan relations, 20 US Congress role in China policy, 400 US Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), 406, 408, 416, 418–422, 427 US media, on China, 213, 215, 216, 221, 400, 402, 406 US National Defense Strategy 2022, 408, 411 US One-China Policy, 12, 264, 350, 353, 369, 370, 372, 373 US-PRC Joint Communiqués, 369 US presidential election 2016, 123 US presidential election 2020, 3, 13, 18, 397 US public opinion, on China, 402 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), 417, 428

Vietnam War, 189, 220

V Vaccines, 6, 7, 16, 17, 157, 160, 162–164, 225–228, 414

Z Zero-Covid policy, 225 Zhao, Lijian, 214

W Wang, Zhemin, 81, 94, 99 Washington consensus, 402, 406 White Paper, 15, 78 Wolf Warrior, 9, 219, 226, 419 World Health Organization (WHO), 124, 163, 221 World Press Photo Exhibition, 90 Wuhan, 153, 214, 219–221, 225 Wuhan Institute of Virology, 220, 221

X Xinjiang, 52, 53, 212, 217, 233, 284, 415, 417, 418

Y Yang Jiechi, 218, 405