The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon 9789812307071

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ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY LEXICON

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional resear ch centre for sc holars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the man y-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultur al Studies (RSCS). The Institute is go verned by a twenty-tw o-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the v arious Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is c haired by the Director, the Institute’s chief academic and administr ative officer.

•

David Capie Paul Evans

I5ER5 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2002 b y Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614

Internet e-mail: [email protected] World Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html All rights reserved. No part of this publication ma y be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore First reprint 2002

The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Capie, David. The Asia-Pacific security lexicon / Da vid Capie and Paul Evans. (Issues in Southeast Asian security) 1. National security—Asia—Dictionaries. 2. National security—Pacific Area—Dictionaries. 3. Asia—Strategic aspects—Dictionaries. 4. Pacific Area—Strategic aspects—Dictionaries. I. Evans, Paul M. II. Title. UA830 A81 2002 ISBN 981-230-149-6 (soft cover) ISBN 981-230-150-X (hard cover) Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd.

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

CONTENTS

Abbreviations ............................................................................. vii Authors ....................................................................................... xi

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Introduction ................................................................................. 1

Ad Hoc Multilateralism .............................................................. 11 The “ASEAN Way” ..................................................................... 14 Balance of Power ....................................................................... 28 Bilateralism ................................................................................ 39 Coercive Diplomacy .................................................................. 43 Cold War Mentality ................................................................... 45 Collective Defence .................................................................... 48 Collective Security ..................................................................... 53 Common Security ...................................................................... 59 Comprehensive Security ............................................................ 64 Concert of Powers ...................................................................... 76 Concerted Unilateralism ............................................................ 82 Confidence-Building Measures .................................................. 84 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures ............................. 89 Constructive Intervention ........................................................... 92 Co-operative Security ................................................................. 98 Engagement ............................................................................. 108 Ad Hoc Engagement Comprehensive Engagement Conditional Engagement Constructive Engagement v

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Co-operative Engagement Deep Engagement Preventive Engagement Realistic Engagement Selective Engagement Flexible Consensus .................................................................. 136 Human Security ....................................................................... 139 Humanitarian Intervention ....................................................... 147 Middle Power .......................................................................... 161 Multilateralism ......................................................................... 165 Mutual Security ........................................................................ 171 New Security Approach ........................................................... 175 Open Regionalism ................................................................... 179 Preventive Diplomacy .............................................................. 185 Security Community ................................................................ 198 Security Pluralism .................................................................... 207 Track One ................................................................................ 209 Track One-and-a-Half .............................................................. 211 Track Two ................................................................................. 213 Track Three .............................................................................. 217 Transparency ............................................................................ 220 Trust-Building Measures ........................................................... 222

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© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

ABBREVIATIONS

ABAC AFTA AMM ANZUS APEC APSD ARF ASA ASEAN ASEM CAEC CANCHIS CBMs CDE CINCPAC CPM CSBMs CSCA CSCAP CSCE CUA DFAIT DFAT DPRK EAEC EASI FPDA

APEC Business Advisory Council ASEAN Free Trade Agreement ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Australia, New Zealand, United States [T reaty] Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation Canada-China Seminar confidence-building measures Conference on Disarmament in Europe Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Communist Party of Malaysia confidence- and security-building measures Conference on Security and Co-oper ation in Asia Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific Conference on Security and Co-oper ation in Europe concerted unilateral action Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Democratic People’s Republic of Korea East Asia Economic Caucus East Asia Strategy Initiative Five Power Defence Arrangements vii

G7 GATT GDP GNP HR IAEA IISS IMF INCSEA ISG ISIS ISM JCAPS KEDO MBFR MFN MITI MOF MOFA MRMs MST MTCR NAFTA NATO NEASD NGOs NLD NPCSD NPT NSC ODA OSCE PAMS PBEC PBF PECC

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Group of Seven General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs gross domestic product gross national product House Resolution International Atomic Energy Agency International Institute for Strategic Studies International Monetary Fund Incidents at Sea Agreement Inter-Sessional Support Group Institutes for Strategic and International Studies Inter-Sessional Meeting Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks most-favoured-nation Ministry for International Trade and Industry Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs mutual reassurance measures Mutual Security Treaty Missile Technology Control Regime North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northeast Asia Security Dialogue non-governmental organizations National League for Democracy North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Council Official Development Assistance Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Pacific Armies Management Seminar Pacific Basin Economic Council Pacific Business Forum Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference

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Abbreviations

PKO PLA PMC PRC ROK SDF SDSC SEANWFZ SEATO SLOCs SLORC SOM SPDC START TAC TBMs TCOG U.N. UNDP U.S. USSR WMD WPNS WTO ZOPFAN

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peacekeeping operations People’s Liberation Army Post-Ministerial Conference People’s Republic of China Republic of Korea self-defence force Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Southeast Asia Treaty Organization sea lines of communication State Law and Order Restoration Council Senior Officials Meeting State Peace and Development Council Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Treaty of Amity and Co-operation trust-building measures Trilateral Co-ordination and Ov ersight Group United Nations United Nations Development Programme United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Weapons of Mass Destruction Western Pacific Naval Symposium World Trade Organization Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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AUTHORS

David Capie is a P ost-doctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations in the Liu Centre for the Stud y of Global Issues, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies and cross-appointed at the Institute ofAsian Research and the Liu Centre for the Stud y of Global Issues, the Uni versity of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

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INTRODUCTION

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon focuses on the vocabulary of AsiaPacific security, mainly as it developed in the creative decade of the 1990s. The goal is to dissect thirty-four ideas and concepts that have been at the core of debates about multilateral security co-operation. The study of multilateral institution-building in the Asia-Pacific has usually focused on material determinants, especially the relationship between the balance of power and regional institutions. By contrast, the focus here is on ideas. The Lexicon originated from a Canadian project to assist China’ s participation in multilateral security institutions, which dated back to China’s entry into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. As part of w hat became an annual “Canada-China Seminar on Asia Pacific Multilateralism and Cooperative Security”, a team of Canadian academics identified a set of centr al concepts and prepared bibliographical essays on each. Our partner on the Chinese side, the Asian Department of the Ministry of F oreign Affairs, discussed all the entries with us, prepared some, and tr anslated an early draft of the Lexicon into Chinese. In 1998, the first draft was circulated as a working paper by the Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies (JCAPS) in Toronto. It included a Chinese and a J apanese translation, and a note on the J apanese translation.1 Others seem to ha ve found it useful. The draft, in whole or in part, has subsequently been translated into Korean (separate translations in the Republic of K orea and the Democratic People’s Republic of K orea), Mongolian, and Thai. A This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Amitav Acharya, David Capie, and Paul Evans

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

second Chinese translation has also been produced b y academics in Taiwan. The current version of the Lexicon has been rewritten to take into account changes in regional discussion since 1998 and to add several new terms. It does not include tr anslations into other languages, although we hope that this will occur subsequent to publication. While English is the language of Asia-Pacific multilateralism, it is not the language of most Asians. We have observed with interest ho w complex terminology , developed in international processes, moves from English into other languages. From the perspecti ve of diplomac y, this adds an extr a layer of complications and increases the c hance of misunderstandings and distortions. From the perspective of scholarship, the act of translation raises difficult issues of linguistics, conceptual starting points, and world-views that need further , and we hope collabor ative, programmes of study. The objectives are both practical and theoretical. The Lexicon is primarily intended as a handbook to assist polic y-makers and researchers as they participate in multilateral activities. Much of the debate and controversy in regional discussions still revolves around conceptual questions. Is “confidence-building” a Western process involving measures too legalistic and formalistic to suit the Asian context? Does “preventive diplomacy” involve the use of for ce? Is “humanitarian intervention” different from “humanitarian assistance”? Does it involve a challenge to state sovereignty? Is “human security” merely a Western restatement of the old Asian notion of “comprehensive security”? What is the real nature of “engagement”? Is it simply a softer form of containment? We address these questions but can scarcely resolve them. Our purpose is not to offer definitions and interpretations that are fixed and incontestable. The concepts we examine, to borrow T. S. Eliot’s phrase, “will not stay still”. Rather, the aim is to set an intellectual and historical context, and examine how the concepts have evolved. On the theoretical side, the principal objecti ve is to apply and broaden the constructivist approach to international relations. The view that ideas matter in international affairs is hardly new. Yet most

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of the writing about ideas has been explicitly ar tionalist. For example, an influential stud y argues that ideas matter because they help policy-makers pursue their r ational self-interest in more efficient ways. “Ideas affect str ategic interactions”, write J udith Goldstein and Robert K eohane, “helping or hindering joint efforts to attain ‘more efficient’ outcomes”. 2 By contr ast, constructivism takes a more complex view of the impact of ideas on international relations. Ideas do not simply help states to develop more cost-efficient ways of pursuing their interests; they can also redefine these interests and lead to collective identities. Constructivism faces a special problem in looking at ideational debate across cultur al and socio-political di vides in a region as diverse as the Asia-Pacific. Because of an implicit normative bias in favour of collective identity formation, constructi vists have tended to take an o versimplified view of ho w ideas shape interests and identities. Despite a professed sensitivity towards cultural variances, there have been very few empirical studies that deal with the contested ideas informing and shaping co-oper ation in different regional contexts. Asian policy-makers have often treated ideas proposed b y Western scholars and officials with suspicion. A prime example is the idea of “common security”, w hich was the philosophical basis of the Conference on Security and Co-oper ation in Europe (CSCE) and which played an instrumental role in reducing East-West tensions resulting in the end of the Cold War. When common security w as first proposed in the early 1990s as a possible basis for multilater al security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific by policy-makers from the Soviet Union, Canada, and Australia, Asian scholars and government officials were quic k to criticize it. Its emphasis on military transparency, confidence- and security-building measures, and formalistic mechanisms for verification and compliance were seen as reflecting European circumstances and diplomatic traditions that were unsuitable for Asia. The negative reaction w as surprising considering that common security’s emphasis on security with, as opposed to security against, was deemed important by Asian policymakers as a needed shift in approac h in dealing with regional

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

rivalries. The same pattern emerged in regional reactions to “cooperative security” and, a decade later, “humanitarian intervention”. In the case of “prev entive diplomacy”, the ARF agreed to dev elop such mechanisms as part of a three-step process of security cooperation. However, controversies about what preventive diplomacy actually means and ho w it is to be pursued ha ve stymied its incorporation into the ARF’s agenda. Preventive diplomacy was a highly contested notion w hen it was outlined in the ARF Concept Paper as stage tw o of its threestage approach to security co-oper ation (the other tw o being confidence-building and conflict-resolution, or “elabor ation of approaches to conflicts”). Some ARF participants expressed deep misgivings about the notion, apprehensive that the use of force was to be a tool of prev entive diplomacy. However, by the late 1990s, mainly through conceptual debate and discussion described in the Lexicon, it had been made clear that prev entive diplomacy was quite distinct from coercive diplomacy. Asian anxiety about importing security concepts from outside has four foundations. One is essentially linguistic. Man y English words about security relationships simply do not translate into some Asian languages. Chinese writers, for example, have noted that the term engagement has no direct Chinese equivalent. In these situations, policy-makers often use rough approximations and analogues that open the door for misunderstanding and suspicion. A second is more directly political. Man y ideas originating in Europe and North America, such as human rights, humanitarian intervention, and preventive diplomacy, either implicitly or explicitly challenge state sovereignty, which remains the core ofAsian political thought and practice. The precise meaning and scope of these ideas is a matter of intense political debate within individual countries in Asia and on a regional basis. A third centres on the established tr aditions of diplomatic interaction in the region. Man y ideas about security co-operation are expected to require institutionalization. This goes against the grain of informality in time-honoured Asian approaches, especially those associated with the “ASEAN way”. Indeed, the very novelty of

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multilateral security co-oper ation in Asia predisposes its polic ymakers against embr acing new proposals that call for putati vely benign formal procedures and mec hanisms. Finally, the suspicion of imported notions of security is integral to efforts by some Asian élites to construct and project a regional identity. Carefully constructed notions about an Asian identity cover issues ranging from human rights and democr acy to multilater al security co-operation. Ideas from outside the region can become targets to foster an insider/outsider distinction that sustains a sense of Asian exceptionalism. In terms more subtle than a lingering suspicion of Western “cultural imperialism”, there is a widely shared belief that man y security concepts gener ated in the West project external values, beliefs, and practices without realizing how poorly they fit in with local situations. Multilateral efforts to expand security co-operation have involved Asian and non-Asian actors, a debate about fundamental ideas, and attempts to find common understandings of key concepts. Concepts introduced from outside Asia have rarely been accepted and adopted in that region without revision or modification. Rather , they have been adapted to suit local conditions and to support local beliefs and practices. Asian states ha ve not been passi ve recipients of foreign ideas, but active borrowers, modifiers, and in some instances initiators. There are also indications of mutual learning.While many ideas concerning security co-operation have been “Asianized”, some Asian ideas and pr actices (for example, the “ ASEAN way” and flexible consensus) ha ve been “W esternized” or “uni versalized”. Asian notions of comprehensi ve security dev eloped by Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia not only pre-dated trends in Europe and North America to redefine and broaden the meaning of security , they helped promote them. Seen in this light, the contro versies which the Lexicon chronicles indicate the progress made in building an Asia-Pacific region. The Lexicon indicates that the discourse of multilater alism has evolved in the 1990s. Three trends are clear. First, it is too simplistic to treat debates about core security concepts as a matter of East versus West. Understandings of concepts, such as human rights and

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

humanitarian intervention, held b y the democr atic regimes in Bangkok and Manila are often more similar to those in Otta wa or Canberra than in Beijing or New Delhi. Similarly, although Canada and the United States ha ve consistently held very different understandings of “co-oper ative security”, their foreign polic y interests and beliefs are barely distinguishable to many Asians. Nor can one attach the label “Western” to particular notions about AsiaPacific security simply because they were initially proposed b y a Western scholar or official. F or example, human security is not exclusively or even primarily a Western construct even though the Canadian Government has been one of its most enthusiastic proponents. Two advocates of human security are Asian nations: Japan and Thailand. While there are differences between the Canadian and Japanese interpretations of human security (with the former focusing on the human costs of violent conflict w hile the latter stresses economic development to address human needs), the similarities are more striking than the differences. The safety and dignity of the indi vidual remain at the core of both notions, and both seek to move away from a state-centric notion of security . A second trend is the gradual broadening of dialogues to include intra-state issues and participation by groups from civil society. The well-established “track two” process has been supplemented with the creation of a burgeoning “tr ack three”, comprising dialogues between officials and civil society actors. Third, states ha ve changed in their recepti vity to multilater al dialogue and co-oper ation. At the beginning of the 1990s, both China and the United States were lukew arm, even hostile, to the idea of multilateral instruments and fr ameworks. By the middle of the decade, both go vernments offered enthusiastic, if qualified, support. New actors, some coming out of decades of isolation, including Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea, were brought into the multilateral process both at the tr ack one and track two levels. Their participation not only contributed to the relev ance of the multilateral process, but also made the task of reac hing agreement on meanings and interpretation more complicated. Comparing 1990 with 2000, it is obvious how far multilateralism

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Introduction

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has penetrated the rhetoric and reality of regional security analysis. Institutions for multilateral consultation and co-operation have taken root on an ad hoc basis around specific problems, through regularized channels at the governmental level and through numerous track two and track three dialogue processes. While self-help and bilater al arrangements remain the cornerstones of regional security practice, the number of multilater al interactions in the region toda y testifies to the progress that has been ac hieved in moving beyond Cold War structures. In spite of this progress, multilater alism in the Asia-Pacific is now at an important juncture. We share the concerns of many that efforts at promoting multilater alism have reached a plateau. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) does not seem able to produce the energy and leadership that it did before the economic crisis. Middle po wers, such as Australia and Canada, are pla ying less visible roles than they did a decade ago. In addition, with a change of administr ation in the United States, there are signs of increased strategic competition with China, and at least a rhetorical emphasis on bilateral alliances and unilater al action. Nevertheless, harsher critics of Asia-Pacific institutions should remember that multilater alism in the region is still a v ery new enterprise. Mechanisms for official-level security dialogue suc h as the ARF are only slightly more than five years old. Leading regional military figures recognize that the alternati ves to multilater alism offer no greater promise of stability or peace. The challenge for advocates of multilateralism will be to find new ways to build on the foundations laid down in the past decade. We hope the Lexicon will not be just a historical account of the progress made in the 1990s but also a platform for mo ving the discussion to a new stage. Methodology In preparing the Lexicon we consulted more than 2,000 articles, books, and conference papers. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, we have focused on the arguments and positions

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that we feel ha ve been most important in setting the basis for common understandings or in producing important contro versies. We have aimed to strike a balance in selecting writings that reflect differing national contexts, philosophical starting points, and points of view. Our chronological cut off was September 2000. In editing the manuscript we ha ve kept with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ (ISEAS) use of the Oxford Dictionary for Writers and Editors as the standard for spelling in w ords such as “co-operation” and “co-oper ative” rather than the unh yphenated versions more familiar in regional discussions. Similarly, for reasons of consistency with ISEAS standards, in the title and throughout, the copy editors have chosen the hyphenated version of “Asia-Pacific” rather than the unhyphenated “Asia Pacific” employed by many of the authors cited in the Lexicon. Two entries are of a r ather different character than the others. The sections on “Cold War Mentality” and “New SecurityApproach” are based hea vily on ideas gener ated by the Ministry of F oreign Affairs in Beijing. They have not been as widely used as some of the other concepts, at least by analysts outside China, but are included because of their centrality in Chinese thinking and their significance for future regional discussions.

The Lexicon has been a joint v enture from the outset and we o we more than the normal number of thanks. We thank several officials in the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing who have been in volved in the project from its inception. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has provided financial support for the Lexicon for the past five years as part of the Canada-China Seminar on Asia Pacific Multilateralism and Cooperative Security. Brian Hunter at CIDA encouraged the project at every turn. Paul Evans appreciates release time supported b y the Abe Fellowship Programme and the United States Institute of P eace in 1998 and 1999. Sev eral colleagues from Asia and North America

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

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took their time to comment on sections of the Lexicon or to prepare translations of the first dr aft. We especially appreciated the early encouragement of Yukio Satoh, and the careful and thoughtful advice provided by Dr Akiko Fukushima. Amitav Acharya has been a major presence from the beginning. He w as a principal lecturer in the Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS) process from 1997 to 2000 and co-authored the Introduction. Shirley Yue played an indispensable role in managing the complex logistics that made the overall project possible. Finally, Michael Leifer did not have an opportunity to look at the revised Lexicon before his untimely death, but we all benefited from frequent debates with him about the limits and direction of the regional discussion, especially whether multilateralism in the region could move beyond dialogue to substantive co-operation. Disclaimer While we ac knowledge the ad vice and assistance of man y who have been involved in the project, we emphasize that any errors in selection, interpretation, or factual matters are ours alone.

© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Notes 1. David H. Capie, Paul M. Evans, and Akiko Fukushima, “Speaking Asia Pacific Security: A Lexicon of English Terms with Chinese and Japanese Translations and a Note on the J apanese Translation”, Working Paper, University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Security, Toronto, 1998, 320 pp. 2. Judith Goldstein and Robert K eohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and P olitical Change (Ithaca: Cornell Uni versity Press, 1993), p. 12.

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Ad Hoc Multilateralism

Ad Hoc Multilateralism Literally ad hoc multilateralism refers to multilateralism created for “a particular or specific purpose”. 1 Sometimes also called singleissue multilateralism, the term w as used b y Robert Scalapino to describe collaborative mechanisms developed to deal with specific security problems in Eastern Asia before the creation of an effective regional security institution. 2 In particular , it has been used to describe multilateral responses to security problems on the K orean peninsula and in Cambodia. Scalapino’s use of the term focused on North K orea’s threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He argued that in the absence of a permanent peacemaking or peacekeeping institution in Northeast Asia, ad hoc multilateral arrangements limited to particular issue areas had to be organized to deal with this crisis. In the Korean case, this process involved complex shuttle diplomacy between the foreign ministers and leaders of the United States, Japan, China, and the tw o Koreas. Ad hoc multilateralism usually focuses specifically on a single problem or issue area, and membership tends to be restricted to parties with a close link to the matter at hand, although these do not necessarily need to be states. In the Korean situation, ad hoc multilateralism included a key role for institutions suc h as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the K orean Peninsula Energy Dev elopment Organization (KEDO). Scalapino has characterized the inter actions between the parties in suc h a situation as in volving the construction of ad hoc arcs formed in concentric manner over a particular issue. He describes a series of interactions that take place among and between di verse parties, from the most essential to the more peripher al, but in eac h case stemming from a sense of national interest. According to Scalapino, arcs, not circles, represent the most appropriate metaphor since the different levels must be open-ended so that contact can be maintained among and between them. 3 Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr have noted that w hen former U.S. Secretary of State J ames Baker argued in an influential 1991 Foreign Affairs article that security policy in the Asia-Pacific “could take on a stronger multilateral component”, he was actually referring

This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

to ad hoc multilateral co-operation on specific security issues such as Cambodia or the North K orean nuclear issue, and w as not endorsing broader multilateral security dialogues. 4 Baker evidently considered ad hoc multilateralism to be compatible with and complementary to the United States’ bilater al “hub and spokes” strategy in the Asia-Pacific.5 In a more conceptual analysis, Brian Job has argued that ad hoc multilateralism represents one end of a spectrum of possible multilateral arrangements. He claims its exponents see “only an efficiency argument to state security cooper ation … States act in response to their short-term interest, narro wly defined; they collaborate with other states because of a short-term coincidence of interests.”6 This logic, he says, can be contrasted with what he calls the “deeper” multilateralism of institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N ATO) or the Gener al Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where states take on far greater commitments with only the promise of diffuse reciprocity in return (for a more detailed discussion of these terms, see the entry on “Multilateralism”). Job compares the logic of ad hoc multilateralism with the temporary collaboration of great powers, coming together to act in a problemsolving capacity when another state threatens the o verall regional security environment. In a similar vein, Susan Shirk has linked ad hoc multilateralism to her analysis of the prospects for a concert of powers in Asia. Shirk points out that while the supervision of the election in Cambodia in 1993 involved United Nations peacekeeping for ces, and North Korea’s threat to lea ve the NPT in volved the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “the arena for w orking out these problems [was] not … the Security Council, but consultations among the major regional powers: the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, along with ASEAN in the case of Cambodia and South Korea in the case of North Korea”.7 In contrast to the arguments raised by Shirk, Benjamin Miller’s study of concerts unequivocally states that singleissue, ad hoc great power co-operation should not be confused with concert-like behaviour.8

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Notes 1. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 15 2. Robert Scalapino, “T he United States and Asia: Future Prospects”, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (W inter 1991–92): 19–40; Susan L. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?”, Paper prepared for the J apan Institute of International Affairs-Asia Society Conference on “Prospects for Multilater al Cooperation in Northeast Asia: An International Dialogue”, Tokyo, 18–20 May 1995, p. 29. See also, Robert Scalapino, “Northeast Asia in an Age of Upheaval”, Paper prepared for the “Major Powers and Future Security in Northeast Asia” Conference, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 25–26 May 1995, a summary of which is a vailable online at . 3. For a contemporary discussion of ad hoc multilateralism, see Robert A. Scalapino, “Historical P erceptions and Current Realities Regarding Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation”, NPCSD Working Paper No. 20, York University, Toronto, 1992, pp. 10–11. 4. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 21, note 26. 5. James A. Baker, III, “ America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community”, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991–92): 1–18, 5–6. 6. Brian L. J ob, “Bilateralism and Multilater alism in the Asia Pacific Region”, manuscript, p. 3. An earlier version of this paper appears in William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshina, eds., Bilateralism in a Multilateral Era (JIIA and the Centre for the Stud y of Australia-Asia Relations, 1997). 7. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Security”, p. 29. 8. Benjamin Miller, “Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts”, Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 327–48, 329.

Ad Hoc Multilateralism

Ad hoc Multilateralism

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

The “ASEAN Way”

The “ASEAN way” is a style of diplomac y or code of conduct that has evolved in intra-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) relations.1 It has been brought into regional institutions suc h as the ASEAN Regional F orum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) b y virtue of ASEAN’s special role within them. Also presented in par allel formulations as the “ Asian way”, “APEC way”, or “ Asia-Pacific way”, the “ ASEAN way” represents the conscious rejection b y Asian leaders and polic y-makers of w hat they perceive to be imported Western notions of diplomac y and multilateralism.2 In contr ast to a Western, “American”, or ev en “Cartesian” style of diplomac y which some Asians regard as “formalistic” and focused on “legalistic” procedures and solutions, the “ASEAN way” stresses patience, ev olution, informality, pragmatism, and consensus.3 Kusuma Snitwongse calls the “ASEAN way” “a distinct political process” developed by the Association and characterized by “the habit of consultation and accommodation … fostered by frequent interaction”.4 The idea of a distinctively ASEAN or Asian way of diplomac y has not been uni versally accepted, however. Some criticisms, particularly from European scholars, have been strident. The origins of w hat has come to be called the “ ASEAN way” actually pre-date the creation of the Association in 1967. According to Filipino scholar Estrella Solidum, the desire to avoid confrontation and acrimony in international relations and the importance of lowkey, consensus-based diplomac y can be tr aced back to ASEAN’s predecessor, the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).5 In 1961, the founders of the ASA declared that problems in the region should be resolved using “Asian solutions that contain Asian values”. Solidum says the most important of these v alues was the use of “very low-key diplomacy [which] avoids fanfare before an agreement is reached”.6 She stresses the importance attac hed to “in visible ground rules” shared b y ASEAN élites. Typically, scholars identify these shared norms as including a preference for informality and for non-legalistic and, thus, non-binding approaches to diplomacy which allows for consensus, flexibility, and accommodation. 7 A central characteristic of the “ASEAN way” has been its cautious

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The “ASEAN Way”

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attitude towards formal institutionalization. 8 Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. J ayakumar has called this ASEAN’s predilection for “organizational minimalism”.9 Robert Scalapino has described it as a process of “soft regionalism” or “soft dialogue” 10 while Alastair Iain Johnston uses the term “thin institutionalization”. 11 In essence, all these labels suggest that ASEAN is a different regional institution from those that ha ve appeared in Europe since World War II.12 Its member states do not seek to create a political union nor does the institution have any supranational authority. Rather, ASEAN is an example of “so vereignty-enhancing regionalism” w here most decision-making powers continue to reside in the v arious national capitals. ASEAN’s institutional resour ces reflect its preference for informality. Compared with an entity suc h as the European Union (EU), ASEAN has only a modest bureaucratic apparatus, although its Jakarta-based Secretariat has expanded its role in recent y ears.13 Both the ARF and APEC have followed ASEAN’s example. The ARF has no permanent professional staff or Secretariat, and the APEC Secretariat in Singapore is small. 14 The preference for informality is also reflected in the labels used to describe these institutions. Since the establishment of the ARF in 1994, ASEAN representatives have been careful to describe it as a “dialogue forum” r ather than the apparently more formal-sounding “multilater al security mechanism”.15 A similar preference for less formal language has affected the ARF’s inter-sessional process. At the second ARF meeting in 1995, it w as agreed to establish inter -sessional working groups. However, China objected to the use of the termworking groups and opposed an open-ended timetable because “this smacked of thicker institutionalization”.16 The meeting ev entually compromised and designated the groups as inter -sessional support groups (ISGs) and inter-sessional support meetings (ISMs). Many of the same arguments have taken place about institutionalization within APEC. APEC has been referred to as a “consultative mechanism” to clearly distinguish it from an “economic community”, a term that has obvious European connotations. A 1993 Australian proposal to use “community” in the APEC context w as met with consternation b y APEC’s Asian

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members.17 In 1994, APEC’s advisory Eminent Persons Group (EPG) recommended “the progressi ve development of a community of Asia Pacific economies with free and open tr ade and investment”. According to the EPG, “community” w as not meant to imply complete economic integration or even a customs union, but “simply to connote a like-minded group that aims to remo ve barriers to economic exchange among its members in the interests of all”. 18 The preference of the “ASEAN way” for informality can also be seen in the Association’s use of consultati ve processes suc h as “habits of dialogue” and non-binding commitments r ather than legalistic formulae and codified rules. 19 According to Khong Yuen Foong, “ASEAN officials have contrasted their approach to [those] that emphasize legal contr acts, formal declar ations, majoritarian rules, and confrontational negotiating tactics. ”20 Likewise, neither APEC nor the ARF has adopted formal dispute settlement mechanisms. APEC proponents explicitly rejected calls for the establishment of a regional dispute settlement mechanism. They did not see a need for “highly legalistic” procedures such as those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Instead APEC’s Bogor Declaration only calls for the creation of “a voluntary, consultative dispute mediation service”.21 Similarly, for the ARF, the objective of conflict resolution has had a mixed reception. The ASEAN Concept Paper, presented at the second ARF meeting in 1995, initially proposed a three-stage approac h to future security co-oper ation: beginning with confidence-building, then preventive diplomacy, and finally conflict resolution. However, after some discussion the term conflict resolution was changed to “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”, apparently because China found conflict resolution “too formal a category” and opposed an y such role for the ARF, at least in the immediate future. 22 While this is a rather striking example of antipath y for legalistic approac hes, Acharya notes that China’s position would not be inconsistent with ASEAN’s own approach to intr a-mural conflicts w hich is “better described as one of conflict a voidance than conflict resolution”. 23 The importance of personal relations and élite diplomac y between ASEAN leaders is another manifestation of this preference

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for informality. A founding father of ASEAN, Ali Moertopo, has said intra-ASEAN consultations are often successful because its leaders are friends w ho “know one another so well”. 24 Likewise, ASEAN leaders prefer what Tun Abdul Razak called “sports shirt diplomacy” over Western “business shirt diplomac y”. 25 This implies that discussions over dinner or on the golf course are more likely to be effective than sitting do wn to debate a polic y in a meeting. Some analysts have noted, ho wever, that the importance of personal relations has declined as a new gener ation of ASEAN leaders has come to power.26 Despite that, bilater al meetings, especially faceto-face meetings between leaders remain important in building trust. ASEAN uses the Bahasa expression empat mata (literally meaning “four eyes”) to refer to direct one-on-one meetings between leaders, which take place preferably without agendas or interpreters.27 Advocates of the “ ASEAN way” also stress the importance of patience. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has described the first task of an y dialogue process as “the tedious business of getting to know one another”.28 Many Asian participants laud the very existence of the ARF, and emphasize that in dialogue “the process is as important as an y eventual agreement”.29 In an institutional setting such as the ARF, the “ASEAN way” seeks to build a “level of comfort” amongst participants before embarking on ambitious initiatives. The 1995 ARF Chairman’s Statement declared that “the ARF process shall mo ve at a pace comfortable to all participants”.30 An ASEAN Concept Paper discussed at the same meeting described this pace as not “too fast for those w ho want to go slow and not too slo w for those w ho want to go fast”. 31 In practice, this means that an y contentious issues likely to pro voke confrontation or open disagreement are dropped from the agenda. Some Asian leaders ha ve referred to the need for multilater al institutions to “mature” before robust dialogue can take place.32 The need for patience has been recognized b y some non-Asian participants as well. One regional defence official has said of the ARF, “[t]he rate of progress will try the patience of some, but the speed of the train becomes irrelevant if some of the carriages are left behind.”33

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While proponents of the “ASEAN way” are uncomfortable with rapid and formalistic approaches to institution-building, and assert that “process is more important than structures”, this discomfort should not be exaggerated. Although Asia-Pacific institutions usually have small bureaucr acies by European standards, the number of track one officials meetings and w orking groups co-ordinated b y ASEAN, APEC, ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), and the ARF is considerable. ASEAN itself organizes close to 300 officials meetings annually. APEC has ten formal working groups, covering issues from investment to tr ade promotion. ARF inter-sessional meetings have also become commonplace. Since 1999, ARF delegations ha ve been expanded, allo wing defence officials to meet with their counterparts over a working lunch at ARF meetings. In addition, the past few years has seen the emergence of a burgeoning stream of intra-East Asian multilateralism, including sev eral meetings of the ASEAN Plus Three,34 a process which is becoming more regular and formalized.35 Richard Higgott has noted that the region’ s senior officials and ministers now meet regularly and in a systematic way. He argues that w hile there is a tendenc y in the Asia-Pacific to highlight the modesty of institutional arrangements when compared with Europe, “the dev elopment of APEC … compares fa vourably with the early phases of institutional cooper ation in other parts of the world, including Europe in the immediate post World War II era.”36 Another element of the “ ASEAN way” is the principle of inclusivity: bringing both like-minded and non-like-minded participants into dialogue. As early as the 1991 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, it was envisaged that non-like-minded states, suc h as the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Vietnam, should be included in any future regional security dialogue.37 Inclusivity also underpinned ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime in My anmar (Burma) before it was admitted to the Association in July 1997.38 Inclusiveness is an important foundation ofAPEC’s embrace of non-discriminatory open regionalism (see the entry on “Open Regionalism”) and some scholars have used the term to describe ASEAN’s own model of

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regionalism.39 However, despite the preference of the “ASEAN way” for engaging non-like-minded actors, inclusi vity has its limits: for example, neither Taiwan nor Pakistan is a member of the ARF, and India, a member of the ARF, has not been accepted into APEC.40 Similarly, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan were excluded from the inaugur al ASEM meeting held in Bangkok in 1996. 41 Generally, track two groupings such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), tend to be more inclusi ve than their track one counterparts. A third and perhaps the most important element of the “ASEAN way” is its particular use of consensus. Some accounts tr ace the origins of ASEAN’s deeply-rooted preference for consensus to aJ vanese village culture, in particular to its twin notions of musyawarah and mufakat.42 Herb Faith has described musyawarah as a “psychological disposition on the part of the members to gi ve due regard to the larger interests”.43 It is a process of discussion and consultation, which at the village level meant the leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather “should make gentle suggestions of the path the community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his synthesis conclusions”. 44 According to former Indonesian F oreign Minister Subandrio, negotiations in the musyawarah spirit take place “not as between opponents but between friends and brothers”. 45 Mufakat is the consensus reached through the process of musyawarah. In theory , musyawarah goes on for as long as is needed for mufakat to be achieved. Michael Haas has argued that this process eschews what he calls “Anglo-European” tendencies like “power plays, trade-offs, and deals that produce tempor ary compromises”.46 J. N. Mak sa ys the process tries to create an “amalgamation of the most acceptable views of each and every member”47 and Jorgensen-Dahl says it is based on the belief that a “feeling of good will based on feelings of brotherhood and kinship ma y serve the same purpose as oil on rough sea”.48 It is important to note that ASEAN’s approach to consensus should not be confused with unanimity. Former Indonesian Foreign

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Minister Ali Alatas described it as finding a way of “moving forward by establishing what seems to have broad support”.49 Noordin Sopiee has said it means “agreeing to disagree without being disagreeable”.50 Where there is “broad” support for a specific measure, the objections of a dissenting participant can sometimes be discounted, pro vided the proposal does not threaten that member’ s most basic interests. This habit is sometimes also referred to as “flexible consensus” (see the relevant entry) or “Ten minus X”. 51 The need for flexibility has led one sc holar to argue that ambiguity is the “handmaiden of consensus”.52 According to Mic hael Antolik, ASEAN often uses ambiguous language that allo ws “participants to reac h common standards, and subsequently, to hold their own interpretation of socalled common stands”. 53 Critics have described this approac h to consensus-building as “accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator”.54 Within institutions such as the ARF, the consensus approach to decision-making gi ves the key role to the Chair, as it is the one w ho determines when consensus has or has not been reached. It is, therefore, especially important that the Chair is regarded by all the participants as a legitimate figure. 55 The final element of the “ ASEAN way”, and one w hich has received considerable attention, is the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. As relatively young and predominantly post-colonial states, ASEAN’s members have always placed a great deal of importance on the preserv ation of their sovereignty. The principle of non-interv ention is enshrined in all ASEAN’s key documents, including the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-oper ation (TAC), and the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord. In the wake of the regional economic crisis in 1997–99, the environmental problem known as the “haze”, and violence in Cambodia and Indonesia, there were numerous calls for ASEAN to revisit its fundamental norms. Some said it should abandon key aspects of the “ ASEAN way”, particularly the norm of non-interference and the preference for thin institutionalization (for a more detailed discussion of these calls, see the entry on “Constructi ve Intervention”). One sc holar predicted

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that ASEAN’s failure to act collectively in the face of the economic crisis spelled the end for the “ ASEAN way”.56 Another noted that “the ‘Asian way’ of consensus-based diplomacy has suffered greatly — in coherence and prestige — from the financial crisis. ”57 However, while the economic crisis did pro voke heated discussion within ASEAN about its procedur al norms, a debate that is still ongoing, the “ASEAN way” as it has tr aditionally been understood has been largely reaffirmed, at least for the time being, at Ministerial Meetings held in Manila, Singapore, and Bangkok. 58 The “ASEAN way” or “ Asian way” has not been without its detractors. One of its foremost critics w as the late Ger ald Segal of the London-based International Institute for Str ategic Studies (IISS). In a strongly argued essay published in 1996 entitled “What isAsian about Asian Security?”, Segal dismissed claims of a distincti ve East Asian security culture as “ethnic c hic”.59 He argued that there is nothing especially “European” about formal approac hes to multilateralism and arms control. 60 Segal noted that progress has been made in the Middle East using arms control techniques derived from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). He concluded, “rather than any special approac h to security and arms control which has yet to find the appropriately devised, and culturally-sensitive, mechanism … East Asians may simply be suffering from a lack of will.”61 Similarly, Michael Smith and David Martin Jones have said, “ ASEAN’s handling of My anmar and Cambodia’s entry into the Association exposes the limitations of the ASEAN way … In particular, it exposes the limitations of consensus and informality which it is often declared constitutes a particular strength of the ASEAN way.” Smith and J ones conclude unambiguously that “ ASEAN is not really a conflict a voidance organization. It is rather an issue avoidance organization.”62 Michael Leifer has also been critical of some of the claims made about the “ASEAN way”. Responding to one scholar’s suggestion that “cultural tradition in the Asia-Pacific can facilitate greater regional security cooperation”, Leifer described the ARF as “an embry onic, onedimensional approach to regional security among states of

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considerable cultural and political diversity. … To interpret its role in terms of a new paradigm in international relations would be the height of intellectual naivety.”63 A growing number of prominent figures in Southeast Asian security circles have also begun to express reserv ations about the efficacy of ASEAN’s traditional modus operandi. In a July 1998 oped piece in the International Herald Tribune, Singapore’s former ambassador to the United Nations Tommy Koh argued that East Asia could learn muc h from the Western European experience of institution-building. He said, “the currenc y and economic crisis in East Asia has shown that the ASEAN way needs to be supplemented by institutions. … The time has come for East Asia in general, and ASEAN in particular, to strengthen existing institutions and build new ones.”64 The Indonesian analyst Jusuf Wanandi made a similar argument, warning that short of changes ASEAN will surely become irrelevant. He prescribed “a more formal set of principles” for ASEAN and said, “ASEAN needs to institutionalize the w ay it does business. While it would not want to imitate the European Union, increasing institutionalization is vital for ASEAN’s ability to cope with new challenges.” In August 2000, Wanandi repeated his call. In the Straits Times, he said, “basically , the old principles w hich have guided ASEAN in the last thirty y ears — namely a personal, non-legalistic and informal system of cooperation between the states or their bureaucracies and a step-by-step approach — are no longer adequate to cope with fundamental c hanges happening in ASEAN and in each of its member countries. ”65 At the same time, writing about environmental co-operation, Simon Tay argues, “substituting international principles and approaches for the ASEAN way have so far failed, so the best hope is that ASEAN can adapt international practices and so evolve the ASEAN way toward greater effectiveness …”66 Notes 1. The ten member states of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

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2. For a critical discussion of the “Asian way” in a broader sense, examining arguments made by the so-called Singapore school (whose most notable members include Lee Kuan Yew, Tommy Koh, and Kishore Mahbubani) about development and Asian values, see Alan Dupont, “Is there an Asian Way?”, Survival 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 13–33. 3. For an example of this distinction, see S. Mankusuwondo, “APEC Trade Liberalization”, in Indonesian Perspectives on APEC and Regional Cooperation in Asia-Pacific, edited by Hadi Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994); see also Noordin Sopiee, “An Asian Way for APEC”, Japan Times, 19 September 1994, p. 2. 4. Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation”, Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 183–94, 184. 5. Estrella Solidum, “The Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping andArticulating the ASEAN way”, in ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture, edited by R. P. Anand and Purificacion V. Quisumbung (Manila and Honolulu: University of the Philippines La w Centre and the East-W est Center Culture Learning Institute, 1981), pp. 130–48. 6. Ibid., p. 136. 7. This is a paraphrase taken from Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN”, p. 184. 8. Acharya describes this as a preference for the avoidance of ‘“excessive institutionalization”, see Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and InstitutionBuilding: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 319–46, 328–30. 9. Quoted in Lee Kim Chew, “Don’t Discard Fundamentals”, Straits Times, 25 July 1998. 10. Cited in Diane Stone, “Networks, Second Track Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation: The Role of Southeast Asian Think Tanks”, Paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 16–22 Mar ch 1997, p. 20. 11. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum”, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space, by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O . Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1999), pp. 287–324, 299. 12. Liao Shaolian, “ASEAN Model in International Economic Cooperation”, in One Southeast Asia in a New Regional and International Setting, edited by Hadi Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), pp. 83–92.

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13. More information about the ASEAN Secretariat can be found on its website at . 14. Michael Richardson, “Asian Security F orum Gains Support”, International Herald Tribune, 31 July 2000. 15. See, for example, Singapore Defence Minister Yeo Ning Hong quoted in “The Jane’s Interview”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 February 1994, p. 52, cited in Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building”, pp. 333–34. 16. Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?”, p. 311 17. Roslan Ali, “Indonesia: APEC Community Will Be Different from EC — Evans”, Business Times (Malaysia), 10 August 1993. In the article, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans is quoted as saying, “There is no reason w hy we cannot in our regional village, use the w ord community to mean w hat we want it to mean. We can push ahead with building our economic community according to our patterns, our models and our language.” He went on to say, “Community is already embryonically in practice in the ev ery day processes of APEC and is emerging in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) process. That means a community built in the APEC way, the ASEAN dialogue way, founded on the ev olutionary recognition of mutual benefits and interests, open dialogue, consensus-building, and loose but effecti ve arrangements.” 18. Second Report of the Eminent P ersons Group, Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1994). 19. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building”, p. 334–35; Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN”, p. 184 20. Khong Yuen Foong, “ASEAN’s Collective Identity: Sources, Shifts, and Security Consequences”, Paper presented at the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 3–6 September 1998, p. 10. 21. Third Report of the Eminent P ersons Group, Implementing the APEC Vision (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), p. 12. 22. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building”, p. 335. China remains insistent on this wording. An ASEAN Draft on Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy presented at an ARF track two meeting held in Singapore in April 2000, contained a sentence w hich referred to “elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution”. China asked for the word resolution to be deleted, saying “the Chinese side always believes

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23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

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35. 36.

37.

38.

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it is crucially important to strictly follow the consensus reached by the ARF ministers”. F or more details on these papers, see the entry on “Preventive Diplomacy”. Ibid. Quoted in Mic hael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomac y of Accommodation (New York: East Gate Books, 1990), p. 95. Quoted in Michael Haas, “The Asian Way to Peace”, Pacific Community, No. 4 (1973), p. 504. Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s Future at Stake”, Straits Times, 9 August 2000. Antolik, ASEAN and Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 90. Quoted in J usuf Wanandi, “Pacific Economic Coooper ation: An Indonesian View”, Asian Survey 23, no. 2 (December 1983): 1272. Jose T. Almonte, “Ensuring Security the ‘ASEAN Way’”, Survival 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98): 80–92, 81. ASEAN Regional Forum, Chairman’s Statement, 1995, p. 2 “ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper”, para. 21, reproduced in Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Appendix 2. Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 June 1994, pp. 1, 6. Former New Zealand Secretary of Defence Ger ald Hensley, “AsiaPacific Security: A Balance Sheet”, Speech given by the New Zealand Secretary of Defence in Honolulu, 27 J uly 1995 (author’s copy). ASEAN Plus Three is made up of the ten ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, and South Korea. Foreign ministers from these states held their first meeting in July 2000. See Edward Tang, “’ASEAN Plus Three’ Move Closer”, Straits Times, 27 July 2000. Kamarulzaman Salleh, “Enhancing Multilateral Ties”, New Straits Times, 24 July 2000, p. 22. Richard Higgott, “Free Trade and Open Regionalism: Towards an Asian International Trade Strategy?”, Paper presented at the Conference on “Europe in the Asia Pacific”, Bali, Indonesia, 28–31 May 1996, p. 27. Explanatory text for the 1991 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, cited in Stewart Henderson, “Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: RecentTrends”, NPCSD Working Paper No. 1, York University, Toronto, 1992, p. 12. The SLORC was re-named the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on 15 November 1997; see Jose Manuel Tesoro and Dominic Faulder, “Changing of the Guard: SLORC Fixes Its Name — and Purges

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39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Some Faces”, Asiaweek, 24 November 1997; “A SLORC by Any Other Name”, Washington Post, 6 March 1998, p. A24. Mohammed Ariff, “Open Regionalism à la ASEAN”, Journal of Asian Economics 5, no.1 (1994): 99–117. “’Lack of Consensus’ Keeps Pakistan out of ARF”, Hindu, 26 July 2000. David Lague, “Evans Plays Down Our ASEAN Snub”, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August 1995; “As Europe Meets Asia”, Economist, 2 March 1996, pp. 16–17; Phar Kim Beng, “Wh y Australia Still Left out of East Asia”, Straits Times, 27 July 2000. Arnafin Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 166. Herb Faith, The Decline of Constitutional Democr acy in Indonesia , (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 100, note 58. Ibid., p. 40. Cited in Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization, p. 166. Michael Haas, “Asian Culture and International Relations”, in Culture and International Relations, edited by Jongsuk Chay (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 179. J. N. Mak, “T he ASEAN Process (‘Way’) of Multilater al Cooperation and Cooperative Security: The Road to a Regional Arms Register?”, Paper presented at the MIMA-SIPRIWorkshop on “ASEAN Arms Register: Developing Transparency”, Kuala Lumpur, 2–3 October 1995, p. 5. Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization, p. 167. Straits Times, 13 No vember 1994, p. 17, cited in Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building”, p. 331. Emphasis added. Michael Richardson, “Alliance Prefers Informal Consensus”, Globe and Mail (Toronto), 7 June 1997, p. A19. Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN”, p. 191. Generally, it is accepted that the “Ten minus X” formula applies to economic issues, suc h as aspects of ASEAN’s liberalization agenda, but does not apply to political or security issues. Antolik, ASEAN and Diplomacy of Accommodation, p. 157. Ibid. Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”, in International Political Communities: An Anthology (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 95, cited in J orgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization, p. 168. See also, Snitw ongse’s comment about “‘meat grinder wisdom’ based on the lowest common denominator”, in “Thirty Years of ASEAN”, p. 184.

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55. Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?”, p. 299. 56. For example, see Kay Möller, “Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN Way Ends Here”, Asian Survey XXXVIII, no. 12 (December 1998): 1087– 104. 57. Amitav Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?”, Survival 41, no. 3 (A utumn 1999): 84–101, 84. 58. For a summary of these dev elopments, see J urgen Haacke, “The Principles of Non-Interference and Quiet Diplomacy in the International Politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Late 1990s: What is Really Changing?”, Paper presented at the Fortieth Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 16–20 February 1999. See also, Robin Ramcharan, “ASEAN and NonInterference: A Principle Maintained”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (April 2000): 60–88. 59. Gerald Segal, “What Is Asian About Asian Security?”, in Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific, edited by James Rolfe (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 107–20, 107. 60. Ibid., p. 114. 61. Ibid. 62. M. L. Smith and D . M. Jones, “ ASEAN, Asian Values and Southeast Asian Security in the New World Order”, Contemporary Security Policy 18, no. 3 (December 1997): 126–56, 147. See also Tobias Ingo Nischalke, “Insights from ASEAN’s Foreign Policy Cooperation: The ‘ASEAN Way’, a Real Spirit or a Phantom”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (April 2000): 89–112. Nisc halke concludes that “put starkly, the ‘ASEAN way’ has proven to be a m yth”, p. 107. 63. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security , Adelphi Paper No. 302 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 59. 64. Tommy Koh, “East Asians Should Learn from Western Europe,” International Herald Tribune, 10 July 1998, p. A4. 65. Wanandi, “ASEAN’s Future at Stake”. 66. Simon Tay, “Fires and Haze in Southeast Asia: Challenges to Regional Cooperation in ASEAN and Asia Pacific”, in Community Building in Asia Pacific: Dialogue in Okinawa (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2000).

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Balance of Power

According to Kenneth Waltz, “if there is an y distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of po wer theory is it. ”1 While the idea of the balance of power is often taken for granted in writings on security, as Waltz himself notes, it has alw ays been a strongly contested and contro versial notion. It is seen b y some as being akin to “a la w of nature; b y others, as simply an outr age. Some view it as a guide to statesmen; others a cloak that disguises their imperialist policies. Some believ e that a balance of po wer is the best guar antee of the security of states and the peace of the world; others, that it has ruined states b y causing most of the w ars they have fought.”2 While some writers imply the term has a “common sense” meaning, there are several distinct ways in which balance of power can be used, although man y scholars tend to confuse and conflate them.3 Ernst Haas unco vered eight different definitions in his work and Martin Wight found nine. 4 Han Morgenthau, the paterfamilias of American realism, used four different meanings. This confusion prompted Haas to entitle his seminal 1953 essay on the subject: “Balance of P ower: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?”.5 According to Inis Claude, the term balance of power has two principal meanings. First, “a situation of equilibrium”, and second, “a system of states engaged in competiti ve manipulation of po wer relationships among themselv es”. 6 Likewise, Morgenthau distinguishes between the balance of power as “a policy” aimed at creating a certain state of affairs, and “an actual state of affairs”. 7 Despite these clear distinctions, Claude laments that “champions of balance of po wer rarely bother to define their crucial terms. ” He argues that unless scholars state which definition is being used, “we cannot be certain whether we are being asked to welcome a result or to accept the claim that a certain mechanism is reliably conducive to that result.”8 As a condition, state of affairs , or situation, the balance of power refers to a roughly equal distribution of power existing between two or more states. It can be broken down further into what Hedley Bull called “simple” or “complex” balances. A simple balance of power is one made up of just two powers, while a complex balance

This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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involves three or more. According to Bull, the important difference between the two is that while a simple balance requires equality of power between the actors, a complex balance does not. In a system with three or more actors, the dev elopment of gross inequalities in power among them does not necessarily put the strongest in a position of preponder ance because the others ha ve the ability to combine against it. 9 Bull also distinguishes between w hat he calls the “gener al balance of power” and “local” or “particular” balances of power. A general balance exists w hen no one actor has a preponder ance of power in the international system as a w hole. In some areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, a local balance of po wer exists. In other areas — Bull gives the Caribbean as an example — there may actually be a local preponder ance of po wer. However, neither situation belies the fact that there can be a general balance of power across the entire international system. 10 There is no precise w ay to determine w hether a balance of power exists in a given international order. Measuring the distribution of relative power among states is not an exact science and there is no sure way to determine whether power is balanced or unbalanced at any given time. Ho wever, as Arnold Wolfers notes, “it makes sense to speak of an existing balance of po wer — or of a fair approximation to such a balance — whenever there are indications that two opposing nations, or blocs of nations, are being deterred from putting their opponents’ total power to the test.”11 In a study of the balance of po wer in the Asia-Pacific, Paul Dibb refers to a balance existing when “no one power is in a position to determine the fate of others”. 12 Bull says that it is not enough for a material balance to exist “objecti vely”. He sa ys there must also be an intersubjective “general belief” among the powers that such a balance exists.13 While “a situation of balance or equilibrium” sounds desirable, this definition also aptly describes the situation during the ColdWar when both East and West were deterred from putting eac h other’s total capabilities to the test b y what Lester P earson called “the balance of terror”. It is also w orth noting that ev en if the gener al

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balance of power among the superpower prevented global war, its success in prev enting regional conflicts w as questionable at best. Similarly, because the idea of the balance of po wer centres on preserving the status quo, it has been criticized by some for ignoring questions of justice.14 Despite this, Wolfers argues that parity between two blocs ma y be better (in terms of preserving the peace) than giving hegemony to one supposedly “peace-loving” bloc. He argues that a balance of po wer enforces a sense of restr aint among the actors, preventing adventurism and temptations, as well as the abuse of power.15 In contrast, some have argued that because a balance of power requires a relatively equal balance of capabilities between states, it is incapable of adequately deterring a w ould-be aggressor. They argue that only an opposing for ce of overwhelming capability can dependably deter. One of the more prominent criticisms of the ability of the balance of po wer (understood as a situation of rough parity) to keep the peace came from Sir Winston Churchill in his famous “Iron Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. Churchill said if the English-speaking Commonwealth were to join forces with the United States, “there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or ad venture. On the contrary, there will be an o verwhelming assurance of power.”16 The second way of thinking about the balance of po wer is to consider it as a policy or as behaviour pursued by states. Scholars who take this interpretation often refer to a balance of po wer system, or to balancing behaviour on the part of states. As a policy, states following the edicts of balance of po wer theory use both internal and external efforts to ac hieve their goals. Internal efforts, often simply referred to as “self-help”, include “mo ves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, and to dev elop clever strategies”. External efforts include “entering alliances, strenthening existing alliances or weakening the alliances of one’ s opponents”.17 This kind of polic y or str ategy is also sometimes called “power politics”. Critics of balance of po wer policies argue that they can exacerbate the security dilemma, and can lead to arms r acing and

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even war. Indeed, Robert J ervis notes that one prerequisite for the existence of a balance of po wer is that “w ar must be a legitimate instrument of statecraft ... states must believe they can resort to the use of force if they believe it to be useful.”18 According to Brian Job, historically, balance of po wer systems ha ve a poor record of maintaining system stability. They have not tended to accommodate rapid change well, and are “not necessarily peaceful subsystems”.19 In perhaps the most systematic critique of po wer politics and balancing behaviour, John Vasquez concludes that “the attempt to balance power is itself part of the v ery behaviour that leads to war.”20 Henry Kissinger says there are two situations where the balance of power works best. 21 The first is when states are free to form and re-form alliances and coalitions depending on the circumstances of the moment. Instead of relying on ideological ties, states calculate and act according to their o wn perceptions of self-interest or realpolitik. They recognize that, in J ervis’ words, “today’s enemy may be tomorrow’s ally and vice versa.”22 An example of this during the Cold War was the “triangular” diplomacy practised by the Nixon administration, which after 1972 used relations with its former adversary China to balance against the So viet Union.23 The second situation is a modified form of the balance of power system in which one power plays the role of the “balancer”. 24 The balancer is usually a po werful state that can stand apart from the others (often it is separated geographically) and has the capability of playing a determining role in alliances or conflict. In essence, it is charged with ensuring that “no one state or alliance is able to exercise a hegemon y over the others, or ev en to establish an imperium.”25 Richard Rosecrance describes the balancer as a “regulator”, a force for stability that counters disruptive elements to maintain order consistent with the norms of the system. 26 Palmer and Perkins note that is “the most desirable role for a great power to play”.27 According to some sc holars, Great Britain pla yed this role in Europe from the late seventeenth century to the nineteenth century in seeking to prev ent French hegemony. In the ev ent of F rench

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expansionism, Britain threw its weight behind the weaker and more threatened side. These scholars claim, in many ways, Britain was the ideal European balancer state: it was the one country that sought no more for itself than to prevent the domination of Europe by any one power. It also had the best incentive to balance: as a small island off the coast of Europe it would have been completely at the mercy of a single hegemonic Continental empire. Some writers have suggested the United States could act as a similar balancer in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. There is no doubt that, like Britain during the nineteenth century, the United States has sufficient military and economic strength to tip the balance in an y future con ventional conflict. It also has the advantage of geographical detachment. Not surprisingly then, some go vernments have made reference to the United States as a balancer in the region.The 1992 U.S. Department of Defence Report, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, says that the country’ s forward-deployed presence “has made the United States the key regional balancer”. 28 Likewise, the South Korean Defence White Paper 1996-97 states that, “U.S. forw arddeployed forces in Northeast Asia play the crucial balancer role in the region and supplement the defence of the Republic of K orea and 29 Japan.” However, a point o verlooked by many advocates of a balancing role for the United States is whether it would be compatible with the country’ s existing alliance commitments, including the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. To be a genuinely independent balancing force, the United States w ould presumably ha ve to abrogate its obligations to individual Asian powers. Critics of the idea of the balancer argue that it rests on the flawed assumption that one state will someho w be moti vated by different aspirations than the others. Organski argues, “there is no such thing as a ‘balancer’ and there nev er has been. No single nation is motivated primarily by a desire to maintain the balance.”30 Sterling has also noted the high correlation between admirers of traditional British foreign polic y and admirers of the balance of power system; a correlation w hich may have influenced the importance they attach to the role of the balancer .31 So how are these two notions of the balance of power applicable

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to contemporary Asia-Pacific security? The condition of a balance of power (understood as a lack of hegemony by a single power) is seen as desirable by most scholars and officials in the region. Ho wever, concerns remain about the possibility for misunderstanding or miscalculation as the particular shape of this post-Cold War “new balance” emerges. A great deal of literature, particularly that informed by realist or neorealist theories of international relations, is dominated by concerns about the changing distribution of power in the region caused by the “rise” of China, and the possible emergence of a “power vacuum” in the ev ent of a U.S. withdr awal.32 Often suc h accounts rely on specific historical analogies, likening the rise of China to the c hanges in po wer distribution that occurred w hen Wilhemine Germany, and later J apan, entered the international system.33 If there is gener al agreement about the need for ac hieving a balance of power as a goal, there is no consensus about the utility of some tr aditional balance of po wer policies. While arms modernization and “self-help” str ategies have been embraced b y many states, Michael Leifer notes: there is a conspicuous absence of a regional constituenc y for moving beyond individual force modernization towards multilateral defence cooperation. This absence stems from a number of factors, but above all from the judgement that the traditional instrument of balance of power, if expressed in a new multilater al form, is more likely to pro voke than protect, particularly regarding China. 34 While some realists, suc h as Charles Kr authammer, explicitly advocate the dev elopment of alliances b y the United States to “contain” Chinese power, they are in the minority.35 Most advocates of balancing behaviour seem to argue for a “hedge” strategy against future uncertainty, based partly on arms modernization and the continuation of close relationships between the United States and its friends in Asia, and partly on the use of multilater al institutions such as the ASEAN Regional F orum (ARF). As was noted abo ve, balance of po wer policies usually hinge upon self-help or the

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formation of alliance or collecti ve defence relationships. Because balance of po wer policies are predicated on the centr ality of competitive power politics, they are also gener ally not considered to be hospitable to co-operative multilateral organizations. Indeed, balance of power theorists such as John Mearsheimer have dismissed what they call the “false promise” of multilateral attempts to prevent conflict and promote co-oper ation. Mearsheimer argues suc h institutions either are ineffective, or impose unwarranted constraints on individual national strategies.36 The relationship between multilater alism and the balance of power is complex. Realists suc h as Mic hael Leifer believ e that institutions such as the ARF inevitably only reflect the realities of power distribution in the region. Leifer describes the ARF as “a valuable adjunct to the workings of the balance of power in helping to deny dominance to a rising regional po wer with hegemonic potential”. He concludes, “it is more realistic to regard the Forum as a modest contribution to a viable balance or distribution of po wer within the Asia-Pacific by other than traditional means.”37 In contrast, social constructivists argue that institutions suc h as the ARF can actually help shape state behaviour and change state interests through processes of socialization and b y promoting norms of acceptable conduct.38 They argue that over time the ARF can contribute to the goal of a balance of power in the region. Amitav Acharya says that this is the hope the ASEAN states have for the ARF. He says ASEAN’s enthusiasm for the ARF reflects its deep and long-standing distrust of major po wer security guarantees that are integr al to a balance of po wer mechanism. This reflects not only a declining faith in the credibility of the American military presence and security umbrella, but also a realization of the limitations and dangers of a balance of po wer approach.39 He acknowledges that ASEAN has not completely rejected balance of power behaviour. Some developments — for example, patterns of arms modernization, Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, and the now-suspended Australia–Indonesia security agreement —

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no ASEAN country sees the ARF as a substitute for balance of power mechanisms in the short term ... [they] also recognize that military balancing is not an adequate guarantee of regional security . Since [they] cannot individually or collectively aspire to defence self-reliance, a policy of military balancing will amount to increased dependence on external military powers. To prevent this, a balance of po wer approach must be supplemented b y multilateral security dialogues and cooper ation.40 Finally, some scholars have argued that the notion of the balance of power may not be an appropriate concept for use in the AsiaPacific at all. Making the case that the concept emerged in the historical and cultural milieu of Renaissance Europe, Nicola Baker and Leonard Sebastian have questioned the relevance of the balance of power in a region such as the Asia-Pacific. They argue that there are enough important cultural, geographic, and strategic differences between the Asian and European security en vironments to suggest that caution should be used before the concept is imported w holesale 41 into analysis of the region. Soedjati Djiwandono agrees, arguing Europe makes a poor geopolitical analogue. He sa ys Asia is a unique strategic environment where there is no simple “balance”, but rather what he calls a “mosaic” of po wer.42 Notes 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 117. 2. Ibid. 3. Dibb notes that in his experience, “the concept of the balance of power is muc h less contested among foreign polic y and defence practitioners than among academics and intellectuals.” See Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of P ower in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (London: International Institute for Str ategic Studies, 1995), p. 75, Chapter 1, note 1. 4. Martin Wight, “The Balance of P ower”, in Diplomatic Investigations:

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could also be viewed as balance of po wer policies. But while

5. 6.

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7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Essays in the Theory of International Politics, edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966). Ernst B. Haas, “T he Balance of P ower: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?”, World Politics 5, no. 4 (J uly 1953): 442–77. Inis L. Claude, Jr ., “The Balance of P ower Revisited”, Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 77–85, 77. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 173. Claude, “The Balance of Power Revisited”, p. 77. Hedley Bull, “The Balance of Power and International Order”, in The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 97–121, 98. Ibid., pp. 89–99. Arnold Wolfers, “The Balance of P ower in Theory and Pr actice”, in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, edited by Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 117–31, 118. Dibb, Towards a Balance of Power, p. 6. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 99. Wolfers, “The Balance of Power”, p. 119. Ibid. Cited in William Safire, Safire’s New Political Dictionary: The Definitive Guide to the New Language of P olitics (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 38. For another Churchill quote along these lines and one by Richard Nixon, see Claude, “The Balance of Power Revisited”, p. 79. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation”, World Politics 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 58– 79, 60. Brian L. Job, “The Evolving Security Order of the North Pacific Subregion: Alternative Models and Prospects for Subregionalism”, Paper presented at the Ninth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1995, p. 4. John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 220. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Sc huster, 1994), pp. 17–21. Jervis, “From Balance to Concert”, p. 59. Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 703–32.

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24. Martin Sheehan, “T he Place of the Balancer in Balance of P ower Theory”, Review of International Studies 15 (1989): 123–34; J ervis, “From Balance to Concert”, p. 60. 25. Sheehan, “The Place of the Balancer”, p. 124. 26. Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), p. 229. 27. N. Palmer and H. Perkins, International Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 312. 28. U.S. Department of Defence Report, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., 1992. 29. Defence White Paper 1996-97, Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Korea, p. 39. On the United States as a balancer , cf. Douglas T. Stuart and William S. Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (London: International Institute for Str ategic Studies, 1995), pp. 8–11. 30. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 288. 31. Richard Sterling, Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society (New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 55, cited in Sheehan, “T he Place of the Balancer”, p. 126. 32. See, for examples, Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Ri valry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia”, International Security 18, no. 3 (W inter 1993–94): 5–33; Ric hard Betts, “W ealth, Power and Instability”, International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94): 34–77; Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’ s Threat to Asia-Pacific Security”, International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149–68. 33. Gerald Segal, “The Giant Wakes: The Chinese Challenge to East Asia”, Harvard International Review XVII, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 26–71; J ohn Garver, Will China Be Another Germany? (Carlisle Barracks, U.S Army War College, National Str ategy Institute, 1996); see also F riedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry”, p. 30; Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper No. 302 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 53–54. 34. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 53. 35. Charles Krauthammer, “Why We Must Contain China”, Time, 31 July 1995, p. 72 36. John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security 19, no. 3 (1994–95): 5–59. 37. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p. 57. 38. For a sampling, see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of

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39. 40. 41.

42.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization 41 (Summer 1995); also “Constructing International P olitics”, International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 71–81; “Collecti ve Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (J une 1994): 381–96; and Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests”, European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3 (1996): 275–318. Amitav Acharya, Avoiding War in Southeast Asia, manuscript. Ibid. Nicola Baker and Leonard C. Sebastian, “The Problem with Parachuting: Strategic Studies and Security in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1995), Special Issue on “T he Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region”, edited b y Desmond Ball, pp. 15–31. Soedjati Djiwandono, “Non-provocative Defence Strategy”, in Nonoffensive Defence: A Global Perspective, by UNIDIR (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990), p. 120.

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Bilateralism

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The adjective bilateral is usually used to describe a relationship, event, or institution involving just two parties. It can be contr asted with multilateralism, which usually refers to a situation in volving three or more actors. In this sense, bilateralism grows out of a belief that inter-state relations are best organized on a one-on-one or dyadic basis. F or example, ev en if B and C are per ceived to be friends, A will find the prospect of sustaining A-B and A-C ties more efficacious than forming an A-B-C (nominally multilater al) arrangement. In this sense, bilateralism is by definition, an exclusive relationship. While the nominal definition of bilater alism is an association involving two parties, this does not tell very much about the typical characteristics or qualitati ve nature of a bilater al relationship. According to Diebold, in its narro west sense, bilateral is neutral to the qualitative dimension of the particular relationship.1 John Gerard Ruggie argues there are sev eral examples in history of bilater al relationships that have involved more than two parties: for example, the Nazi trading system devised by Hjalmar Schacht. The Schactian system co-ordinated economic relations between Nazi German y and several states in the Balkans, Latin America, and East Centr al Europe. However, according to Ruggie, “it had no inherent limit; it could have been geogr aphically universalized to co ver the entire globe, with an enormous spider web of bilater alist agreements radiating out from Germany.”2 He argues it is the qualitative character of the relationships involved that tells the most about the meaning of terms such as bilateralism and multilateralism. There are two substantive characteristics that made the Schactian system bilateral — despite its numbers — and which Ruggie argues are attributes of bilateralism generally. First, irrespective of the total number of actors in volved in a relationship, bilater alism segments relations into multiples of dyads and compartmentalizes them. The Schactian system was in essence based on a series of “reciprocal” agreements negotiated between Germany and an individual foreign trading partner. The system w as inherently discriminatory. All the arrangements were held only on a case-b y-case and product-b yproduct basis. A trade deal negotiated with a partner w as not

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extended to all the others, as it w ould be, for example, under a most-favoured-nation (MFN) multilateral system such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The second characteristic of bilateralism is that it is premised on the assumption of a specific exc hange between the tw o parties in each dyadic relationship. K eohane calls this kind of tr ansaction “specific reciprocity” or the “simultaneous balance of specific quid pro quos by each party with ev ery other at all times”. 3 It can be contrasted with multilater alism which requires only “diffuse reciprocity”, an expectation that a rough equi valence of benefits will be yielded to all the members o ver time. In the Asia-Pacific region, bilateralism was the hallmark of Cold War security relations. Through a series of bilater al security arrangements from Japan to New Zealand, the United States sought to provide a network of extended deterrence to contain the spread of communism (for a more detailed discussion, see the entry on “Collective Defence”). In contrast to the failed multilateral alliance SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), the so-called “hub and spokes” system was a durable arrangement that suited the needs of the United States. In eac h bilateral relationship, the United States was clearly the dominant partner, allowing it to mould each alliance to suit the particular str ategic environment. As one version of the U.S. military’s East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) ac knowledged, bilateral treaties are “more manageable” than multilater al arrangements.4 Brian Job has drawn a distinction between bilateral arrangements which are seen as an end in themselv es, and those w hich suggest the possibility of acting as a stepping stone towards multilateralism. He says those who advocate “narrow bilateralism” see no virtue in multilateralist institutions. In contr ast, proponents of “expansi ve bilateralism” anticipate and view as positi ve, the tr ansition from bilateral to multilater al institutional forms. F or the latter, bilateral relations are the product of a specific set of historical cir cumstances, notably the Cold War. With the remo val of ideological barriers, expansive bilateralists argue there can be mo vement towards multilateral frameworks.5 Job describes a system where bilateralism

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We now need to enrich [our] bilateral ties. No longer is it sufficient to consult only South K orea on American policy toward North K orea, we need also to w ork very closely with Japan, and consult with China and Russia. Consulting with security partners on bilateral relations regarding third countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming more important. From enriched bilateralism, it is a relatively small step towards bringing all parties working on the issue together for consultation and coordination. The approach that Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. used for coordinating their policies regarding North Korea is a template for building upon enriched bilateralism.7

Notes 1. William Diebold, Jr ., “The History and the Issues”, in Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy, edited by William Diebold, Jr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988). 2. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organization 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 561–98, 569. 3. Ibid., pp. 572–73. 4. Douglas T. Stuart and William S. Tow, A U.S. Str ategy for the AsiaPacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), pp. 16. 5. Brian L. J ob, “Bilateralism and Multilater alism in the Asia Pacific Region”, Paper presented at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998, pp. 2–3. An earlier version of this

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is the primary structure for security relations but it is supplemented by multilateral mechanisms as “extended bilater alism”. He argues this term best describes the Asia-Pacific security policies of the Clinton administration.6 The administration itself used the terms “enriched bilateralism” and “security pluralism” (see the entry on “Security Plur alism”) to describe this set of complementary bilater al and multilater al arrangements. In a speech in Malaysia in 1999, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, said:

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paper can be found in Brian L. Job, “Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific Region”, in Bilateralism in a Multilater al Era, edited by William Tow, Russell Trood, and Toshiya Hoshina (JIIA and Centre for Australia-Asia Relations, 1997). 6. Ibid., p. 5. 7. Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Institute of Str ategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8 September 1999.

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The term coercive diplomacy is used to describe the use of limited force or the threat of for ce to achieve a specified diplomatic goal. According to Alexander George, it is a political strategy which seeks to use threats and limited force to get an adversary “to stop short of his goals … [or] undo his action”.1 It differs from deterrence, in that deterrence uses the threat of for ce only to “dissuade an opponent from doing something he has not y et started to do”. It is also different from “quic k, decisive military str ategies”. According to Barry Blechman and Stephan Kaplan, “the difference is that with coercive diplomacy, military units themselv es do not attain the objective; goals are achieved through the effect of the for ce on the perceptions of the actor.”2 In an article in Political Science Quarterly , Bruce J entleson identifies five instances where coercive diplomacy was employed during the Reagan administr ation: the 1982–84 deplo yment of marines to Lebanon; the military and diplomatic pressures against Libya culminating in the 1986 bombing; the 1987–88 reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers; the deployment of the U.S. Navy against Iran in the Persian Gulf; and the supply of co vert assistance to the mujahideen forces in Afghanistan and the contras in Nicaragua during the 1980s. 3 Coercive diplomacy has also been used recently to describe several incidents in the Asia-Pacific. Former U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry described the combination of w hat he called “diplomatic action and defence measures” used b y the United States to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme as “coercive diplomacy”.4 China sc holar David Shambaugh used the term to describe Chinese military exercises held prior to the 1996Taiwanese presidential election. He called the firing of missiles into the sea around Taiwan a “resort to coer cive diplomacy”.5 More recently, John Hillen, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, described China’s acquisition of U.S. nuclear warhead technology as adding “a la yer of complexity to China’ s diplomacy and especially its coer cive diplomacy”.6 Finally, in a February 2000 article in the Straits Times, Patrick Cronin described

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the release of the China White Paper on Taiwan as the mainland’s “latest exercise in coercive diplomacy across the strait”.7

1. Alexander George, The Limits of Coer cive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 18. 2. Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 13. 3. Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coer cive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than Remaking Governments”, Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 57–82. 4. William Perry, “Defense in an Age of Hope”, Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6 (November/December 1996): 64–79. 5. Quoted in Tony Walker, “China’s Uncomfortable Embrace”, Financial Times, 6 February 1996, p. 15. 6. Quoted in Bill Getz, “U.S. MissileTechnology Gives China Advantage”, Washington Times, 10 March 1999, p. A1. 7. Patrick Cronin, “Seize the Moment”, Straits Times, 25 February 2000, p. 68.

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Notes

Cold War Mentality

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Cold War mentality refers to the security per ception conceived and prev alent during the Cold War era. It in essence stemmed from the confrontation of the tw o blocs and the competition of the two superpowers to seek world hegemony. Rooted in such a rivalry, this perception regarded the growth of strength of an ad versary as a threat to one’ s own security and even more so if an ad versary followed a different social v alue. It suggested that national security should be attained through military superiority and considered security a zero-sum game.Two approaches were thus adopted: one w as to increase military capability b y expanding military build-up or strengthening military alliance, the other was to pursue a policy of containment of an adversary or competitor. Such a security perception led to four decades of Cold War characterized by confrontation and rivalry between the USSR and the United States. This afore-mentioned security perception is therefore called Cold War mentality. Since the 1970s international relations have undergone profound changes. The rise of the Third World countries and the development of the Non-Aligned Mo vement kept on shaking the bipolar system, with a call of a new international order growing ever stronger. Meanwhile, the USSR disintegrated and the United States weakened muc h as a result of their competition and confrontation. These developments of the w orld situation eventually brought about the end of the Cold War. However, Cold War mentality has not been eliminated with the end of the Cold War. Legacies of suc h mentality

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Chinese officials and academics have increasingly begun to refer to what they see as a “Cold War mentality” evident in some states’ security postures in the Asia-Pacific region. The following definition of the expression w as offered b y the Chinese participants at the second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS) held in Toronto, in January 1998:

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While the abo ve definition does not explicitly identify an y examples of the Cold War mentality in practice, elsewhere Chinese officials and academics ha ve often used the term to criticize the United States, in particular U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific. This criticism grew especially strident following the release of the revised guidelines governing security co-oper ation between the U.S. and Japanese forces in the “areas surrounding Japan” in 1996. People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts accused the United States and Japan of redesigning their security relationship in order to better contain China. They have suggested that the U.S.–J apan alliance “like all alliances, does not provide a basis for security in a region in which interdependence and cooper ation are no w the dominant trends” and have called upon regional po wers — including the United States — to “create the conditions under w hich alliances can 1 eventually disappear”. The term has also been used to criticize U.S. plans for a missile defence system. Speaking at the United Nations in September 2000, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan described U.S. polic y as “essentially aimed at seeking unilater al

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are still lingering in the Asia Pacific. The region is not y et free from hegemonism and po wer politics. There are still attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The unjust and irrational old international economic order is still infringing upon interests of dev eloping countries. Such out-of-date methods as containment ha ve not y et faded out. Terms like prev entive containment, constr aint, conditional engagement, etc., are all reflections of the Cold War mentality. Nevertheless, peace and dev elopment have become the main themes of our times and economic cooper ation and trade transactions have increased the interdependence among countries in the world. The trend of history calls for the nurturing of new security perceptions which emphasize mutual respect for so vereignty and territorial integrity , dialogue and mutual beneficial cooperation and settlement of disputes through peaceful means.

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military and strategic supremacy and thus a typical example of the Cold War mentality”.2 The term Cold War mentality has also found its w ay into American political discourse. Ironically , it w as used b y then Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush to make the case for the dev elopment and deplo yment of a national missile defence system. In a speech in Washington, D.C., on 23 May 2000, Bush excoriated the Clinton administr ation for its failure to press ahead with such a system, saying its concerns about not upsetting Russia or revising the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were evidence that the administr ation was still “loc ked in a Cold War mentality”. He also accused the administr ation of relying on an outdated “Cold War logic”.3 This approach was described b y the noted conservative commentator and language maven William Safire as “a remarkable rhetorical twist”. 4

1. Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, “PLA Views on Asia Pacific Security in the 21st Century”, Strategic Forum No. 114, National Defense University, June 1998. A summary of the meetings is also available online at . 2. “China Slams U.S. on Missile Defence”,Associated Press, 13 September 2000. 3. Governor George W. Bush, “New Leadership on National Security”, Washington, D.C., 23 May 2000, text available online at . 4. William Safire, “Cold-War Mentality”, New York Times, 25 May 2000.

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Collective Defence

Collective defence, or collecti ve self-defence as it is sometimes called, has historically been one of the most important elements of states’ national security policies, second only to “self-help”. Put most simply, the concept refers to the practice where states agree to collaborate to ward off a threat from an identified enem y (whether actual or potential). This collaboration is usually in the form of alliance relationships, coalitions, or pacts of mutual assistance which aim to deter the w ould-be aggressor. The best-known collective defence arrangements during the Cold War were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N ATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” is recognized inArticle 51 of the United Nations Charter .1 While collective defence is a very simple idea, in practice it is often confused with collective security. This is not surprising, for as well as having similar names they share some common ground in terms of content. In the case of both collective security and collective defence, states commit themselves to assist others in the event of an attack. In both instances, the victim of aggression expects its defensi ve strength to be supplemented b y the strength and support of other states. However, the essential difference between the two concepts is the way the states concei ve of the enem y. According to Arnold Wolfers, nations enter collective defence arrangements to ward off threats to their national security emanating from some “ specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential”. 2 In contrast, collective security arr angements are directed against “any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included”. 3 In other w ords, while collective defence arrangements are focused against a particular (albeit often unnamed) external enemy, collective security targets aggression itself, from w herever it might come, including from within the group, with the threat of all against one. The development of the modern series of collecti ve defence agreements in the Asia-Pacific began with the end of World War II. After 1945 the United States rejected a return to the pre-war policy of isolationism. Instead, after a period of enthusiasm for collecti ve security symbolized b y the launc hing of the United Nations, it This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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began to build a collecti ve defence structure designed to contain the spread of communism. The so-called Truman Doctrine, promulgated in March 1947, pledged that the United States w ould assist friendly nations that faced either external aggression or threats from “armed minorities”. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, bringing collecti ve defence to Western Europe. N ATO subsequently became the prototype for other U.S.-sponsored multilateral defence arrangements, including several in Asia and the Pacific. The foundation of non-communist Asia’s collective defence framework with the United States was the “San Francisco system”.4 This was inaugur ated in August and September 1951 w hen the United States signed a Mutual Security Treaty (MST) with Japan, a Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines, and entered ANZUS with Australia and New Zealand. While none of these agreements matched NATO’s breadth of membership, eac h agreement made mention of the goal of forming a wider regional security arr angement in the Pacific. In a 1954 speec h, the U.S. Secretary of State J ohn Foster Dulles said that the collecti ve defence treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand “were only initial steps toward the dev elopment of a more comprehensi ve system of collective security [sic] in the region”.5 The United States expanded its alliance netw ork to include South K orea (in 1953), Taiwan (in 1954, until its revocation in 1979), and Thailand (in 1962, with the Rusk-Thanat communiqué). In addition, the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (also known as the Manila Pact) led to the creation of the ill-fated SoutheastAsia Treaty Organization (SEATO).6 SEATO was the largest of the Asia-Pacific collective defence agreements. Its members were the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. It was also arguably the least successful, being formally w ound up in 1977. The only other significant non-bilateral alliance, ANZUS, also came into trouble in August 1986 when the United States suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand in protest of that country’s ban on visits b y nuclear-armed or propelled v essels.7 As nominally multilateral agreements, ho wever, SEATO and ANZUS were

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exceptions in the region. Most collecti ve defence arrangements in the Asia-Pacific were bilateral in form and the United States continues to maintain formal bilater al defence relationships with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. During the Cold War, the series of agreements that linked the United States withAsia were often described as a metaphorical w heel — with the United States as a centr al “hub” from w hich many “spokes” emerged — hence the term “hub and spokes” system .8 The goal of all these agreements was to ally a number of Asian states with the United States to deter and contain an identified adversary. This adversary was usually some variation of communism, and collective defence w as directed b y the United States and its allies at different times and with differing lev els of success, against the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and North (and subsequently, the Socialist Republic of) Vietnam. Fear of communism was not the only catalyst for collective defence, however. ANZUS was signed in 1951 at least in part to assuage Australian and New Zealand fears of a resurgent J apan.9 The Communist po wers also maintained their own collective defence and alliance relationships.The Soviet Union and China signed a mutual defence pact in 1950 that operated until the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. The Soviet Union also maintained formal alliances with Vietnam and Mongolia. While the end of the Cold War has led some to question the salience of bilateral collective defence arrangements,10 they continue to have appeal for many states. As has been noted, the United States continues to maintain bilateral military ties with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and several Southeast Asian nations.11 In addition, on 18 December 1995, the Australian and Indonesian Governments signed an “Agreement on Maintaining Security” which they had negotiated in secret.12 Among other things, the treaty (in Article 2) committed the two parties to “consult each other in the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures w hich might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each Party”.13 The language used was strikingly similar to that used in the ANZUS treaty and, in substance if not in name, the Agreement on

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Maintaining Security certainly could be described as a collecti ve defence arrangement.14 The agreement w as short-lived, however. Relations between the tw o countries deterior ated in 1999 as the situation in East Timor fell into crisis and the Indonesian Government subsequently suspended the agreement. 15

1. The text of the United Nations Charter is reproduced in Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 463–94. 2. Arnold Wolfers, “Collective Defence Versus Collective Security,” in Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, edited by Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 183. Emphasis added. 3. Ibid. 4. Douglas T. Stuart and William S. Tow, A U.S. Str ategy for the AsiaPacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 4. 5. Address by the U.S. Secretary of State J ohn Foster Dulles on the Geneva Conference, reproduced in Robert L. Br anyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, The Eisenhower Administration: 1953–1961 — A Documentary History, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 336–43, 336. 6. The text of the treaty is reproduced in American Foreign Policy 1950– 1955, vol. I, Parts I–IX (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1957), pp. 912–15. 7. For a variety of perspectives on the ANZUS dispute, see Jacob Bercovitch, ed., ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs (London: Macmillan, 1988). 8. In his 1992 article in Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Baker used the slightly different metaphor of a fan to describe the U.S. security posture in Asia. According to Baker, the base of the fan was in North America and it radiated west across the Pacific. Each of the United States’ core alliances (Japan, South K orea, Philippines, Thailand, and Australia) constituted one spoke in the fan. Connecting the spokes, Baker said, was “the fabric of shared economic interests no w given form by the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) process”. James A. Baker,

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9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

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15.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community”, Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (W inter 1991–92): 4–5. For an account that stresses the U.S. role as instigator of ANZUS, see David MacLean, “ ANZUS Origins: A Reassessment”, Australian Historical Studies 24, no. 94 (April 1990): 64–82. China has been particularly critical of alliances in the region it sees as anachronistic remnants of a “Cold War mentality”. See comments b y Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Chen Jian cited in Mary Kw ang, “ARF Talks End with No Consensus on Bilateral Alliances”, Japan Economic Newswire, 10 March 1997. Jacqueline Rees and Nigel Hollo way, “Cold Comfort”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1996, p. 18. Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Maintaining Security , reproduced in Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Appendix 5, pp. 143–44. F or a discussion on the agreement’s origins, see Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Bebas-Aktif Foreign Policy and the ‘Security Agreement’ with Australia”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (July 1997): 231–49; For an analysis of the Agreement and what it means for the ARF, see Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security, Adelphi Paper No. 302 (London: International Institute of Str ategic Studies, 1996), pp. 50–51. Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 144. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said of the Agreement, “This is not defence cooper ation. This is security cooper ation. There is a difference.” John McBeth, Mic hael Vatikiotis, and J aqueline Rees, “Personal Pact”, Far Eastern Economic Review , 28 December 1995, pp. 18–19, and 4 J anuary 1996, p. 18. Chua Lee Hoong, “Can the U.N. F inish What It Has Begun?”, Straits Times, 18 September 1999.

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The concept of collective security came to prominence during and immediately after World War I, partly as a reaction against the perceived failings of the balance of po wer system. The concept’s best-known early advocate was Woodrow Wilson. Appalled by the outbreak of war in Europe, Wilson decided by the end of 1914 that nations must be “bound together for the protection of the integrity of each, so that any one nation breaking from this bond will bring upon herself w ar; that is to sa y punishment, automatically.”1 He called for a League to Enfor ce Peace, and publicly committed himself to “an association of nations”. 2 In his famous 1917 “peace without victory” speech to the U.S. Senate calling for w ar against Germany, Wilson lashed out at the “crude mac hinations” of the balance of power and its failure to keep the peace in Europe. 3 He pledged that once the war was over, he would work to replace the balance of power with a “community of po wer”.4 It was this idea which would eventually grow into the modern notion of collecti ve security and lead to the creation of the ill-fated League of Nations. While the United States turned its bac k on collective security when it rejected participation in the League, the idea resurfaced under President Roosevelt. In 1943, Cordell Hull, one of the architects of the successor to the League, the United Nations, declared that the creation of an international collecti ve security organization meant there would be “no need for spheres of influence, for balance of power, or any other of the special arr angements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations stro ve to safeguard their security”. 5 Speaking to the Senate following the 1945 San Francisco conference, Senator Arthur Vandenberg declared that he would support ratification of the United Nations Charter, saying “peace must not be cheated of its collective chance … We must have collective security to stop the next war, if possible before it starts; and we must ha ve collective security to crush it s wiftly if it starts; and we must ha ve collective action to crush it s wiftly if it starts in spite of our organized precautions.”6 The fundamental basis of collecti ve security is the idea of all against one.7 States that participate in a collecti ve security system, while retaining consider able autonomy in their foreign relations, 53

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commit to join a coalition to confront an y would-be aggressor. An attack against an y of the members is treated as an attac k against them all. In one description, collecti ve security is a “permanent potential alliance against the unknown enemy … in behalf of the unknown victim”.8 Inis Claude has said collective security “purports to provide security for all states, by the action of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order b y the arbitrary unleashing of their po wer”.9 The aim of suc h a system is more effectively to deter aggression than w ould be possible through “balancing” forces in a purely anarchic environment. Advocates of collective security argue that because an y would-be aggressor will be met with an o verwhelming preponderance of power, over time the use of force will decline, and international relations will become more co-operative and less conflictual. 10 Examples of collecti ve security organizations v ary from w hat Claude calls “ideal collecti ve security systems” to concert-based arrangements.11 An ideal collective security system w ould involve all the states of the world, cover all regions of the world, and require a legally binding and codified commitment on the members to respond against aggression whenever and wherever it might appear. Such a system ob viously assumes a v ery high degree of common interest among states. In pr actice, there has nev er been an organization that has met the requirements of an ideal collecti ve security system, although the League of Nations and the United Nations come closest.12 A concert-based system lies at the other end of the spectrum. Though also predicated on the idea of all against one, concert membership tends to be more restricted, usually to the great powers in a system. Concert members consult informally on a regular basis to discuss events and if necessary, to organize collective action. Decisions are made based on consensus. Competitive power politics is not completely eliminated, but a concert system assumes that its members’ o verriding concern about preserving peace will prevent jockeying for influence from becoming actual conflict. 13 According to Charles and Clifford K upchan, there are three preconditions for the creation and effective functioning of a collective security system. First, no single state can be so po werful that even

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the strongest opposing coalition w ould be unable to marshal preponderant force against it. In other w ords, “all states in the system must be vulnerable to collective sanctions.”14 This necessarily requires that the nations subscribing to the collective security system are not only able to resist an aggressor but also willing to do so. Secondly, all the major powers must share a fundamentally common view of what constitutes a stable and acceptable international order. In practical terms, notes K enneth Thompson, “the peace w hich a collective security system must defend is the territorial status quo existing at the time the system is brought into being.”15 A collective security system cannot w ork where there is one major revisionist power committed to o verturning the international order for either ideological or power-related reasons. The third (and related) condition is that the major powers must share what Thompson calls “a minimum of political solidarity and mor al community”.16 Decision-makers must hold a common vision of the international system and believe that efforts “to protect and promote political solidarity” are needed to make the vision a reality . In addition, élites in one state must believe that élites in the others share the value they place on mutual security and co-operation.17 The meaning of c ollective security has become increasingly confused and indeterminate o ver the past few decades. Man y of even the most kno wledgeable scholars now use the term as synonymous with collective defence (see the entry on “Collecti ve Defence”). Inis Claude lamented this “semantic debasement” in his book, Swords into Plowshares , observing that “collecti ve security has been appropriated as an honorific designation for virtually an y and all multilateral activities that statesmen or scholars may regard, or wish to ha ve regarded, as conduci ve to peace and order .”18 He noted that it was a “particularly ironic twist of fate”, that the label ”collective security” was being used to describe alliances, “in flagrant disregard of the fact that the notion of a collecti ve security system was originally dev eloped in reaction against and in the hope of providing a substitute for the tr aditional system of competing alliances”.19 In another famous essa y comparing collecti ve security with Collective Security

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collective defence, Claude concluded that the misappropriation and debasement of collecti ve security w as probably part of a deliberate strategy. One can see why American statesmen should be particularly inclined to use the two terms as synonymous, often applying the term “collecti ve security” to suc h collective defence arrangements as NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] or even to such bilateral military pacts as the ones concluded with South Korea or Nationalist China. Consciously or unconsciously, they are seeking to make these arrangements more palatable to a people they believ e to be ad verse to alliances as the “po wer-political” instrument Woodrow Wilson condemned as the c hief cause of war.20 It might be argued that this debasement is so widespread and so well-established that the term collective security has lost its original meaning.

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1. Richard N. Current, “The United States and Collective Security: Notes on the History of an Idea”, in Isolationism and Security, edited by Alexander DeConde (Durham: Duke Uni versity Press, 1957), p. 36. 2. Ibid., p. 37. For a discussion of other contemporary notions of collective security, see Martin David Dubin, “Toward the Concept of Collecti ve Security: The Bryce Group’ s ‘Proposals for the Avoidance of War’, 1914-1917”, International Organization 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 288– 318 3. John Gerard Ruggie, “Contingencies, Constr aints, and Collecti ve Security: Perspectives on United Nations Involvement in International Disputes”, International Organization 28, no. 3 (Summer 1974): 493– 520 4. John Gerard Ruggie, “T he Past as Prologue: Interests, Identity , and American Foreign Policy”, International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 89–125, 95; an expanded version of this discussion is presented in John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order

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in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 5. Alfred Vagts, “The Balance of Power: The Growth of an Idea”, World Politics 1, no. 1 (October 1948): 82–101, 82. 6. Kenneth W. Thompson, “Isolationism and Collective Security: the Uses and Limits of Two Theories of International Relations”, in Isolationism and Security, edited by DeConde, p. 172. 7. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collecti ve Security, and the Future of Europe”, International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 114–61. 8. John Gerard Ruggie par aphrasing Sir Arthur Salter, cited in Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organization 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 569. 9. Inis L. Claude, Jr ., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 110. Emphasis in original. 10. Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security”, pp. 118, 125. 11. Claude, Power and International Relations , pp. 110, 168. 12. Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security”, pp. 120–23. 13. Ibid., pp. 119–20. 14. Ibid., p. 124. See alsoThompson, “Isolationism and Collective Security”, p. 175–76. 15. Thompson, “Isolationism and Collective Security”, p. 175. 16. Kenneth Thompson, “Collective Security Re-examined”, American Political Science Review 47, no. 3 (September 1953): 753–72, 758– 62, cited in Kupchan and Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security”, p. 124; see also Ho ward Johnson and Gerhart Niemey er, “Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal”, International Organization 8 (February 1954): 19–35. 17. Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes”, International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 173–94, 176–78, cited in K upchan and K upchan, “Concerts, Collective Security”, p. 125. 18. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 247. 19. Ibid. 20. Claude, “Collective Defense v ersus Collective Security”, p. 185. Cf. Ruggie, who argues that N ATO “reflects a truncated v ersion” of a collective security system. He points out that internally N ATO was based on two multilateralist principles which make it more similar to a traditional collective security arrangement than most alliances. First, Collective Security

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NATO was based on the “indivisibility of threats to the collecti vity — that is, it did not matter w hether it w as Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, or Norway that was attacked, nor in theory by whom — and the second w as the requirement of an unconditional collecti ve response.” See Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, pp. 570–71. Under the 1954 Manila P act, SEATO did not require the same “automatic” response to aggression from members.

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The concept of common security, in its contemporary form at least, was conceived in Cold War Europe. It w as first set out in detail in the 1982 report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme.1 Egon Bahr, a West German member of the Commission and a former adviser to Willy Brandt, has claimed credit for in venting the term.2 According to Geoffrey Wiseman, “common security is designed to be a long-term and pragmatic process that will eventually lead to peace and disarmament b y changing thinking that has created the superpo wer arms r ace, prevented arms control and disarmament, and w hich has seen continued high lev els of conventional conflict.”3 The Palme Commission’s report, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, described common security as underpinned b y the assumption that security is best assured through co-operation rather than competitive power politics. The report set out six principles of common security: all nations ha ve a legitimate right to security; military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations; restr aint is necessary in expressions of national policy; security cannot be attained through military superiority; reductions and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security; and “linkages” between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided.4 The Commission’s report dismissed notions of security as a zero-sum phenomenon that can be attained unilaterally. It recognized that “inadvertent” war could arise from the dynamics of a reciprocal security dilemma, in which the defensive preparations of one state are seen as offensi vely intended b y rival states.5 To avoid such a scenario, common security emphasizes the importance ofreassuring potential adversaries. According to Palme, “states cannot ac hieve security at each other’s expense”; security must be ac hieved “not against the adversary but with him”. Common security , the report went on, “must replace the present expedient of deterrence”. 6 The Palme Commission also called for arms control, multilater al cooperation and the enhancement of the collective security functions of the United Nations. 59

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Common security is also closely associated with the development of specific confidence-building measures (CBMs) intended to reduce tensions between the East and West. These include the presence of observers from both sides at large military exer cises, increased transparency, and information-sharing. Together these measures have the broad aim of reducing the fear of a surprise attac k. There is, however, a certain tension at the core of the concept. As Andrew Mack notes, common security “must both avoid ‘security dilemma’ risks by reassuring potential adversaries, while also deterring wouldbe aggressors. Achieving an appropriate balance between the requirements of deterrence and reassur ance is extr aordinarily difficult.”7 The Palme Commission also viewed “security” as a multidimensional concept — a fact that has been overlooked in some of the more recent references to the concept.8 The Commission’s report suggested that security must be conceived in broad terms to include economic issues as well as military threats. It stressed the linkage between common security and common prosperity. It declared that “security requires economic progress as well as freedom from fear”, and urged a more just distribution of global resour ces between the North and South. 9 In the Asia-Pacific region, common security first came to prominence when it w as linked with So viet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok and Kr asnoyask proposals for an Asian equivalent of the Helsinki (CSCE, or Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) process.10 These proposals were bluntly dismissed by the United States and some of its allies at the time as an attempt by the Soviet Union to introduce naval arms control into what was then the U.S. Na vy-dominated North Pacific.11 The concept was taken up again by the Australian and Canadian Governments in 1990. F ormer Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans used the concept in sever al speeches and a no w-famous article in the International Herald Tribune, entitled “What Asia Needs is a Europe-Style CSC A [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia]”. In it, Ev ans said unambiguously “it is not

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unreasonable to expect that new Europe-style patterns of cooperation between old ad versaries will find their ec ho in this part of the world.” 12 While Evans’ proposal was perhaps more cautious than the article’s headline suggested — he acknowledged the need for a “gradualist” approach and called for the establishment of a “similar institutional framework”, not the wholesale importation of the CSCE structure13 — it was greeted with antipathy in the region. 14 Despite the rejection of the CSC A idea (which was actually referred to as APSD [Asia Pacific Security Dialogue] by its supporters), the concept of common security nonetheless found some resonance. Speaking in 1992, the Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Tun Razak referred approvingly to the principles of common security , saying that “although the Palme Commission’s major preoccupation w as with nuclear confrontation, I am of the opinion that these principles are equally valid in the non-nuclear context. ”15 At about the same time that Ev ans was advocating his CSCA proposal, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark was using the language of common security to argue “the time has come to develop institutions of dialogue in the P acific”. In a series of speeches in Canada, J apan, and Indonesia, Clark urged the establishment of a “P acific adaption” of the CSCE. 16 Like Ev ans’ proposal, however, the Canadian call w as rejected outright b y the United States, Japan, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A common complaint among Asian scholars and officials was that both the Australian and Canadian proposals were based on inappropriate “Eurocentric” models of security.17 The Australian and Canadian foreign ministers went on to embrace the concept of co-operative security (see the entry on “Cooperative Security”) which had the advantages of not being perceived as “imported” from outside the region and not being associated with calls for a CSC A. The influence of common security , however, continues to be clearly evident in the security concepts that ha ve become established in the region, and in specific processes such as confidence-building measures that have received the endorsement of the region’s multilateral security institutions.

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Notes 1. Palme Commission, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme — Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). (Hereafter referred to as Common Security.) 2. Bahr claimed credit for coining the term in an interview with Geoffrey Wiseman, perhaps the leading sc holar of common security , in an interview at Oxford in 1987. See GeoffreyWiseman, Common Security and Non-Provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1989), p. 5, note 41. 3. Ibid., p. 7. 4. Common Security, pp. 8–11. 5. For a succinct definition of the concept of the security dilemma, see John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, in The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, by John Herz (New York: David McKay, 1976), pp. 72–73. 6. Common Security, p. xiii. 7. Andrew Mack, “Concepts of Security in the P ost-Cold War World”, Working Paper No. 8, Department of International Relations,Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, p. 9. 8. For example, Mack says, “‘Common security’ policies do not deal with economic, political or social issues as causes of insecurity, still less with such issues as dimensions of security or insecurity .” Ibid., p. 8 (emphasis in original). Cf. Common Security, which notes “pressures stemming from economic under-development and the maldistribution of resources and wealth produce stresses and str ains both within and between nations. Hunger, malnutrition, pov erty, and ill-health on a massive scale all w ork to spur political c hange, sometimes through violent means.” See Common Security, p. 11, see also p. xv; Geoffrey Wiseman, “Common Security in theAsia-Pacific Region”, Pacific Review 5, no. 1 (1992): 42–59, 43. 9. Common Security, p. xvi. 10. For a discussion of the Gorbac hev Vladivostok Initiative, see Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok Initiative (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987). Wiseman also emphasizes the role pla yed by the Australian and New Zealand peace mo vements and “social

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democratic” political parties in taking the European liter ature on alternative defence policies and gi ving them a regional relev ance. Wiseman, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, p. 43. Andrew Mack, “Why the Navy Hates Arms Control”, Pacific Research (November 1989). International Herald Tribune, 27 July 1990. In a speech Evans made to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Jakarta the day the article appeared in theInternational Herald Tribune, he referred to the possibility of “w holly new institutions” ev olving in Asia. See Gareth Evans, “ASEAN’s Past Success a Prelude to the Future”, reproduced in Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s The Monthly Record, July 1990, p. 430. In a book he co-authored with Bruce Grant, Evans says the idea of the CSCA is better thought of as a “metaphor” for a process of dialogue and mutual confidence-building, Gareth Evans and Bruce Gr ant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), p. 117. For example, see the statements b y Indonesian F oreign Minister Ali Alatas and Singapore F oreign Minister Wong Kan Seng in “ ASEAN Wary of Pacific Security Plan”, Australian, 8 October 1990, p. 8; The United States was also strongly opposed to the proposal.A leaked copy of a letter written by Secretary of State James Baker to Foreign Minister Evans on 19 November 1990 was published in the Australian press in 1991. See, “Security, In Letter and Spirit”, Australian Financial Review, 2 May 1991, p. 12. Datuk Seri Mohammed NajibTun Razak, Minister for Defence, Malaysia, “Regional Security: Towards Cooperative Security and Regional Stability”, Speech at the Chief of the General Staff Conference, Darwin, Australia, 9 April 1992. Joe Clark, “Canada and Asia Pacific in the 1990s”, Speec h at the Victoria Chamber of Commer ce, Victoria, British Columbia, 17 J uly 1990; Speech at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Tokyo, 24 July 1990; Speech at the Indonesia-Canada Business Council and the Canada Business Association, Jakarta, 26 July 1990. For a discussion of the Eurocentric framing of common security discourse during the late 1980s, see K evin Clements, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific: Problems and Prospects”, Alternatives XIV (1989): 49–76, 52–54.

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Comprehensive Security

Comprehensive security is one of the most widely used security concepts in the Asia-Pacific region. According to Muthiah Alagappa, the term w as first formally coined in Japan during the Ohir a Administration in the 1970s, but it has also found strong support among Southeast Asian states, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.1 Since the end of the Cold War, interest in inclusi ve approaches to security has spread to other parts of the Asia-Pacific region. For example, Mongolia’s concept of national security, which was officially articulated in 1994, also embr aces much of the substance of comprehensi ve security.2 The central premise of comprehensive security is that security must be concei ved in a holistic way — to include both military and non-military threats to a state’s overall well-being. The concept also stresses the importance of non-military polic y responses. Like man y security concepts, however, the term comprehensive security is used and interpreted in very different ways in different parts of the region. The Japanese interpretation of “comprehensive national security” (Soogoo anzen hoshoo ) was developed as an alternati ve to the concept of “national security” which was widely associated within Japan with the period of w artime expansionism and aggression. 3 Following a series of government studies on the subject, the “Report on Comprehensive National Security” w as submitted to the government of Acting Prime Minister Masa yoshi Ito in J uly 1980.4 The so-called Inoki Report defined security in a very broad way: it stressed the need to maintain military preparedness and alliances, identified the less orthodox goals of attaining energy and food security, and also set out measures for dealing with major earthquakes. At the core of the J apanese idea of comprehensi ve security lies the multidimensional nature of contempor ary threats: challenges to a state can come in the form of economic problems, the disruption of trade or natural disasters, as well as from an armed enemy.5 In stressing the multidimensional nature of threats, the Japanese interpretation of comprehensi ve security recognizes that military power, in itself, is not sufficient to guar antee a nation’s security. It, therefore, also emphasizes a wide v ariety of non-military polic y

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responses. These include the full use of political, economic, diplomatic, and military resour ces. The primary instrument J apan uses to attain comprehensi ve national security is its enormous economic power. For example, Japan targets its Official Development Assistance (ODA) largely to secure a stable supply of food and energy; in the w ords of Anny Wong, it pursues “comprehensi ve security through aid”. 6 While the Japanese approach to comprehensive security expands the language of security to cover a broader range of less traditional security goals, it also includes an important role for con ventional military security. In 1984 a second report, entitled “Comprehensive Security Policy for the International State, J apan” was submitted to Prime Minister Nakasone b y the P eace Issues Resear ch Council. This echoed many of the findings of the Inoki Report, but added that the relative decline of American power meant Japan would need to increase its military expenditure. The report recommended a review of the 1 per cent ceiling of gross national product (GNP) on defence spending. The ceiling was subsequently abolished by Prime Minister Nakasone in J anuary 1987. Some sc holars have suggested that comprehensive security helped the J apanese Government draw attention away from the more tr aditional military aspects of its security policy. They argue that it helped facilitate the development and modernization of the J apan Self Defence F orce (SDF) and allowed a less polemical debate about defence issues and the role of the SDF to ev olve.7 In practice, the use of comprehensive security also led to changes in the way Japan formulates its defence policy. In 1986, the Nakasone government created a po werful new National Security Council (NSC) to be the principal security polic y-making body. The NSC is charged with maintaining military preparedness and co-ordinating security policy, but it also deals with emergencies of a non-military nature, including natur al disasters. P eter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara suggest another key aspect of J apanese comprehensive security is the habit of cross-posting staff between go vernment departments involved in the formulation and execution of security policy. Officials from the Ministries of F inance (MOF), F oreign

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Affairs (MOFA), and International Trade and Industry (MITI) are regularly posted to positions inside the J apan Defence Agency, allowing them input to the polic y-making process at its core, and helping to create a broader notion of security .8 The concept of comprehensive security has also been taken up with enthusiasm in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to David Dewitt, “at least threeASEAN members — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore — have developed distinctive notions of security w hich go bey ond military objecti ves and instruments, while the Philippines also has ... dev eloped a similar doctrine to guide its approac h to security .”9 More recently , Thai scholars have offered their o wn interpretation of a comprehensi ve security approach.10 The ASEAN member states’ interpretations of comprehensive security, however, have been historically quite different to that of Japan. While Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore emphasize non-military threats and policy instruments, their policy has had, at least until recently , a different orientation from the Japanese concept. While the J apanese notion of comprehensi ve national security deals almost exclusi vely with the possibility of external threats, the ASEAN member states ha ve traditionally used comprehensive security to focus predominantly on internal concerns.11 Indonesia’s notion of comprehensive security, expressed in the idea Ketahanan Nasional or national resilience, originated at the beginning of the New Order regime. The concept w as discussed and debated by Indonesia’s National Defence Board between 1968 and 1972 and w as formally promulgated as a national doctrine in 1973 in the “Guidelines of State Policy”. Its importance is evidenced by its formal position in Indonesian State Law where it is described as a dynamic condition of will-po wer, determination, and firmness with the ability to dev elop national strength to face and o vercome all manner of threats internal and external, direct or indirect, that may endanger the Indonesian national identity and the total way of life of the nation and its people.12

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Like many security concepts in the developing world, Indonesia’s interpretation of comprehensive security can be seen as part of a broader policy of state-building.13 Muthiah Alagappa has linked the origins of national resilience to the mo vement against Dutc h colonialism and the subsequent desire to build a united Indonesian state.14 He says this explains the central role of the military (ABRI, or Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) and its dual functions in the Indonesian political system. Alagappa says, while ABRI believed the likelihood of a direct military attack on Indonesia was low, they were concerned at the possibility of “w ar by proxy”. The emphasis of comprehensive security is, therefore, “on maintaining internal security and stability to den y opportunities for infiltr ation and subversion. The focus has been on internal threats suc h as ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup conflicts … drug addiction and trafficking, and criminal acts.”15 The means through which resilience was to be attained included “ideological, political, economic, political, socio-cultural, and security-cum-defence” policies with “top priority” being accorded to economic dev elopment.16 While Alagappa argues “the doctrine of national resilience does not address the international environment”, the development of the policy also had the effect of easing tensions created b y Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi in the 1960s. During Konfrontasi, Indonesia’s relations with its neighbours reached an unprecedented low. National resilience’s more introspective security posture assuaged the fears of neighbouring states by focusing primarily on economic development and the preservation of internal stability. Malaysia’s concept of comprehensi ve security places a similar priority on economic development, national homogeneity, and the amelioration of non-military threats, although on the surface at least, the concept has a more outward-looking appearance. According to Noordin Sopiee, the country’ s interpretation of comprehensi ve security was first outlined in a speech entitled “Malaysia’s Doctrine of Comprehensive Security”, given by Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Musa Hitam in Singapore in Mar ch 1984.17 The Deputy Prime Minister compared comprehensive security with a house built on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar consists of ensuring

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a secure Southeast Asia. The second is to ensure “a strong and effective ASEAN ‘community’”, and the third, which he described as “most basic”, is the necessity to ha ve “a sound, secure and strong Malaysia”. Sopiee has summarized the concept as “ensuring national security in substantial part through regional security (and ensuring regional security in substantial part through national resilience and security)”.18 The Malaysian interpretation of comprehensi ve security has been more colourfully summarized b y Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who noted at a conference on national security in J uly 1986, that When we talk about national security , the picture that usually comes to mind is that of armed soldiers manning border posts or fighting in the jungle … But security is not just a matter of military capability . National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success, and social harmony. Without these all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being o vercome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot. All they need to do is to subvert the people and set up a puppet regime. Clearly economic difficulties are serious threats to national security. Failure to understand this threat ma y result in a c ycle of recession followed by political instability, security threats and ev en greater recession. The skillful management of the economy and clear thinking are therefore an integr al part of the strategy for national security.19 The origins of Mala ysia’s approach to comprehensive security were at a time when the government was fighting a war of insurgency against the for ces of the banned Communist P arty of Mala ysia (CPM). The government was worried that although communist ideas had only limited appeal in relati vely affluent Mala ysia, and the guerrillas were too weak to win a military victory , they might be able to exploit latent ethnic, religious, and social clea vages within Malaysian society to their advantage. The development of a domestic

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political consensus w as, therefore, a centr al goal for successi ve Malaysian governments. After independence, this consensus w as forged through a delicate compromise based on a trade-off between special rights for indigenous Mala ys in return for citizenship rights for non-Malays and economic dominance for the Chinese community. Despite being set bac k by racial riots in 1969, the establishment of the New Economic P olicy (NEP) with its goals of eradicating poverty and increasing Mala y participation in the economy sought to further this goal b y eliminating “internal contradictions”.20 While this approach undoubtedly reflected a multidimensional concept of security, there was no attempt to fashion a formal national security doctrine along these lines until the 1970s. Alagappa claims that it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that terms suc h as national resilience and comprehensive security crept into the Malaysian vocabulary, and these were not officially endorsed until sometime later. Indeed, he notes that these concepts were viewed with some scepticism at first by Malaysia’s armed forces and police, who believed they would downgrade their role in the defence of the state.21 Other specific threats to comprehensive security that have since been identified b y Malaysian scholars and officials include: drug addiction, religious extremism, illegal immigr ation, crime, and economic stagnation. In a speech in 1986, Tun Hussein Onn noted that the threats to Mala ysian security “tr averse political, sociocultural, psychological, and economic dimensions”. 22 While the internal dimension of Mala ysia’s comprehensive security policy is often stressed, it has alw ays had an important external and regional focus as well. 23 In a 1984 article, Noordin Sopiee stresses the need for Mala ysia to ensure comprehensi ve regional resilience through “a resilient ASEAN community of nations”.24 He says comprehensive security requires “commitment to the territorial integrity of the Philippines and Thailand” (which like Malaysia were fighting insurgencies at the time); the strengthening of ASEAN; and “the building of mutual trust, confidence, and goodwill between the ASEAN states”. He argues these latter goals require

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adherence to the principle of not in viting external intervention in the region and “the dev elopment of institutions, con ventions, procedures, and practices for the peaceful resolution of conflict”. 25 In the ev ent of armed aggression against Mala ysia, Deputy Prime Minister Musa Hitam articulated a notion similar to the Maoist strategy of People’s War. He said: Any foreign aggressor will … ha ve to face the fury of Malaysian civil resistance … I can assure an y potential aggressor that Malaysians will fight for ev ery inch of our soil. What any aggressor will find is that we are like a lump of steel — possible to s wallow, but impossible to digest. 26 Singapore has also pursued a comprehensi ve approach to its security through the concept of “Total Defence” (sometimes referred to as “Total Security”), an idea which is associated with Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong. 27 Similar to resilience, Total Defence emphasizes internal stability through the fostering of a unified national identity and continued economic dev elopment. According to a Singapore defence policy statement presented at the 1996 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the concept works to make sure “every sector of society is mobilized and has a part to play in Singapore’s security”.28 Total Defence has fi ve constitutive elements. The first is “psychological defence” or the dev elopment of a collecti ve will among Singaporeans to defend their country. The second is “social defence” which stresses the importance of homogeneity, demanding conformity from citizens regardless of their race, language, or religion; third is “economic defence” w hich connotes the ability to resist specific economic threats such as boycotts, sanctions, or sabotage; fourth is “ci vil defence” or co-ordinated responses to be able to protect the population in the event of a state of emergency. The final element is “military defence” which includes the maintenance of a well-equipped and professional armed forces.29 Like the Malaysian idea of the “lump of steel”, Singapore’s deterrence posture has been compared to a “poisonous shrimp”.

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The ASEAN member states’ articulation of comprehensi ve security was largely internally focused during the ColdWar. However, since the ad vent of multilater al security dialogues in the AsiaPacific, there has been a growing interest in making comprehensive security more relevant at the regional level. One possibility that has been discussed is through some connection to the concept of cooperative security. In a Sydney Morning Herald article in June 1994, Jusuf Wanandi was quoted as saying the creation of the ARF marked “a transformation of ASEAN’s idea of comprehensive security based on the so-called doctrine of the 1971 zone of peace, freedom and neutrality”. He said that reaching out to northern Asia and non-likeminded states is part of the Association’s new “cooperative security approach”.30 This position is shared b y Dewitt and Acharya who have argued “cooperative security can be viewed as the means to achieve the goals embedded within the notion of comprehensi ve security.”31 The Working Group on Comprehensi ve and Co-oper ative Security of the Council for Security Co-oper ation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has also explored a regional role for comprehensive security. The Working Group, which is co-chaired by Malaysia, New Zealand, and China, held its first meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, in 1995.32 In 1996, it produced CSCAP Memorandum No. 3 on Comprehensive and Co-oper ative Security.33 The memorandum reiterated many of the elements of comprehensi ve security set out above, but in some important respects significantly enlarged the concept’s meaning. It noted a desire to set out “an ov er-arching organizing concept for the management of security in the region which might be agreeable to all states”. It contrasted comprehensive security with other approaches to regional security, saying: Neither collective security nor balance of power approaches are of themselv es adequate organizing principles for the region because security of vital interests and core v alues extends beyond the military sphere and comprehensi ve security can only be attained through cooperation based on

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common interests. Collective security and balance of power therefore need to be complemented, or at times, superseded, by comprehensive security approaches.34 The memorandum set out sev en principles which it said were the “distinctive features” of comprehensive security as an “organizing concept”. These are the Principle of Comprehensiveness; the Principle of Mutual Interdependence; the Principle of Co-oper ative Peace and Shared Security; the Principle of Self-Reliance; the Principle of Inclusiveness; the Principle of Peaceful Engagement; and the Principle of Good Citizenship. It explicitly embr aced confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy, and the peaceful resolution of conflict and differences, and argued that “military capabilities should as far as possible be ‘defensive’ and ‘non-threatening’ in nature”. It added, “arms control and tr ansparency measures are an important element of comprehensi ve security.”35 In this respect, the CSC AP memorandum’s understanding of the concept is v ery similar to common security. In terms of implementing comprehensive security at the regional level, the memorandum called for the use of both tr ack one and track two mechanisms and recognized the role co-ordinating institutions, such as the ARF, could play at the regional level. It also argued that comprehensi ve security issues also “need not be addressed in ostensibly ‘security’ processes alone. They can be handled in forums suc h as APEC, or in bilater al and subregional economic cooperation processes when consistent with their basic purposes.”36 It concluded that the ARF “will have to be strengthened incrementally. Its agenda … will ha ve to be broadened, to gi ve greater room to non-military issues. ” The memorandum, however, was ambiguous about the relationship between comprehensi ve security and bilater al defence structures in the region. Under the Principle of Self-Reliance, it ac knowledged that “non-threatening, mutually beneficial defence cooperation among states may comprise a relevant ingredient of comprehensi ve security”. However, under the Principle of Inclusiveness, it argued, “alliance systems, including those which, since the end of the Cold War, have no clearly defined

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adversary, are a diminished option for comprehensi ve security management in the region.”37 In some important w ays the interpretation of comprehensi ve security set out in the CSCAP memorandum goes beyond the concept that evolved in Japan and ASEAN. Answering the question “if security is comprehensive, where do we draw the line?”, the report argued, “a problem may be regarded as a comprehensive security problem when it is perceived as threatening, or as having the clear potential to threaten, the security of the vital interests or core v alues of the person, the community or the state.”38 This breadth of scope, including regarding the indi vidual as one potential referent object, w ould seem to place the CSCAP interpretation of comprehensive security close to the nascent idea of “human security”. This takes it some considerable distance from the interpretation originally set out in Japan and the ASEAN member states.

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Notes 1. Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries”, Research Paper and Policy Studies No. 26, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, n.d. 2. The concept of national security adopted on 30 June 1994 by the State Great Hural (or Parliament) includes in addition to orthodox security concerns, references to economic independence, ecological development, cultural, scientific, tec hnological, and educational elements. It also mentions the importance of information security and the security of Mongolia’s population and gene pool. See ambassador J. Enkhsaikhan, “Human Security Factor in Mongolia’s National Security Concept”, Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalizing World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, May 2000. The paper is a vailable online through the UNDP’ s Mongolia website at . 3. J. W. M. Chapman, R. Drifte, and I. T. M. Go w, Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence-Diplomacy-Dependence (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. xi v. The authors are v ery grateful to Akiko Fukushima for sharing her insights on the history and dev elopment of Japanese conceptions of comprehensive security.

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4. A summary of the report is gi ven in Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan’s Concept of Comprehensi ve National Security (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), pp. 1–6. 5. David B. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security”, Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994): 1–15, 2. 6. Anny Wong, “Japan’s Comprehensive National Security Str ategy and Its Economic Cooper ation with the ASEAN Countries”, Resear ch Monograph No. 6, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991, pp. 54–70, 54. 7. Chapman et al., Japan’s Quest for Comprehensive Security, p. xvi. 8. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Oka wara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies”, International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 84–118, 92–95. 9. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensi ve and Cooper ative Security”, pp. 3–4. 10. See Panitan Wattanayagorn, “Thailand: The Elite’s Shifting Conceptions of Security”, in Asian Security Pr actice: Material and Ideational Influences, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 417–44. 11. Ibid. 12. Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security”, pp. 57–58. 13. Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective”, in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 121–46, 131–32. 14. Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security”, p. 58. 15. Ibid., p. 60. 16. Ibid., pp. 60–61. 17. Noordin Sopiee, “Mala ysia’s Doctrine of Comprehensi ve Security”, Journal of Asiatic Studies XXVII, no. 2: 259–65. 18. Ibid., p. 259. 19. Speech by Mahathir Mohamad at the First ISIS National Conference on National Security, Kuala Lumpur, 15 J uly 1986, cited in Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security”, p. 4. 20. Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security”, pp. 63–65, 68. 21. Ibid., p. 67. 22. Ibid. 23 . K. S. Nathan, “Mala ysia: Inventing the Nation”, in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford

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24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32.

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University Press, 1998), p. 515. Sopiee, “Malaysia’s Doctrine of Comprehensive Security”, p. 262. Ibid. Cited in ibid., p. 261. Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security”, p. 75. Republic of Singapore, “Defence Policy Statement”, Paper prepared for the Third ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 10–11 May 1996. Ibid., pp. 1–2. Lindsay Murdoch, “Australia: Towards Peace in Our Neighbourhood”, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 1994. David B. Dewitt and Amitav Acharya, “Cooperative Security and Developmental Assistance: The Relationship between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia”, Eastern Asian Policy Papers No. 16, Uni versity of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Toronto, 1994. The papers presented at this conference are reproduced in ames J Rolfe, ed., Unresolved Futures: Comprehensi ve Security in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for Str ategic Studies, 1995). The text of the memor andum is reproduced in an appendix in Da vid Dickens, ed., No Better Alternative: Towards Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 161–67. P age numbers gi ven here refer to this edition. Ibid., p. 163. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid. Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., p. 165.

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The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Concert of Powers

an international institution or security regime for high-level diplomatic collaboration among all the great powers of the day. It is a relatively durable, wide-scope, multi-issue, and institutionalized framework of cooperation. This cooperation is the result of a con vergence of long-term, stable, and deliberate collaborative approaches or str ategies on the part of the great po wers.1 Concerts bring together a small group of major powers in order to regulate relations among themselv es, to promote norms of cooperation, and to prev ent conflicts between smaller states from provoking a larger war. Rosecrance and Schott describe a concert as a “club or group of powers that agree collectively to lower security costs for a gi ven geographic (regional or w orldwide) area”.2 They should be clearly distinguished from ad hoc single issue diplomacy, “less institutionalized forms of great power diplomatic cooperation such as détente and entente”, and alliances of several major powers balancing against another power or powers.3 An essential requirement for a functioning concert system is an agreement among concert members not to act unilaterally. Instead, decisions are made b y consensus after consultation, and action to implement decisions is taken collectively. The central objective of a concert is to maintain stability , in effect the status quo of an international order. Because of this, the second important prerequisite for the establishment of a concert of po wers is the acceptance of a set of common norms of behaviour by its members. Concert members must share compatible views of a stable international order . They must acknowledge one another’s security interests and respect one another’s domestic affairs. Members must agree not to act unilaterally against one another with for ce, or without consultation. Because concert systems can be informal, they have the additional advantage of not requiring complex institutional or bureaucratic mechanisms.4 The best-known example of a functioning concert is the Concert

This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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Concert of Powers

The idea of a concert of po wers has been likened to a security management system “b y committee”. In the w ords of Benjamin Miller, a concert is

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of Europe which was established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and which managed inter-state relations in Europe between 1815 and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. 5 The Concert’s members were the great European po wers of the da y: Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, and Russia. (France also joined in 1818.) The example of the Concert of Europe has inspired sev eral scholars to suggest that suc h a model might be appropriate in the post-Cold War world: Charles and Clifford K upchan have argued that a new concert made up of the United States, Russia, Britain, F rance, and Germany could bring a stable collective security regime to Europe.6 Richard Rosecrance has similarly called for a global concert, with the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the European Community as its members.7 Some have argued that the G7 (now known as the Summit of the Eight) alread y fulfills this kind of role. 8 Miller has argued that tw o quite different types of concert can be discerned by looking at the Concert of Europe. One conception focuses on the mutual restr aint which typifies the relationship between major powers in a concert. Here the po wers define their own interests, to some degree, in the terms of a larger common good. He calls this a “passi ve concert”, in which each of the great powers still beha ves as an indi vidual actor, but acts in a more moderate way, even without reaching agreements and co-ordinating their actions with the other concert members. 9 The second type focuses on great powers as more active regulators of the international system, and on their relationship with smaller powers in the system. This “regulatory concert” stresses the great powers’ “co-managerial responsibilities for maintaining peace and stability and resolving disputes”.10 It is more collective in emphasis and more demanding: the members consult and exchange views on problems that involve smaller powers. They may also co-ordinate joint actions (including the use of collecti ve security measures) as part of their “policing” and managerial role. A number of scholars have discussed the utility of a concert of powers in the Asia-Pacific.11 Among the first was Susan Shirk, a State Department official in the Clinton administration. Shirk argues that because concerts recognize some states as leaders and great powers,

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they have to overcome the initial obstacle that they are not “politically correct”.12 Therefore, to a void offending regional sensiti vities, the objectives of an Asia-Pacific concert would have to be modest, at least initially. Shirk suggests a regional concert could ha ve two goals: first, to “regulate relations between the major po wers”. This would be done through the sharing of information about each state’s military capabilities and intentions in order to reduce the risk of security dilemmas arising. The second goal w ould be to prev ent conflicts between other regional states from pro voking a major conflict between the great powers. Shirk argues that “at a minimum” the concert w ould establish a norm that the po wers would not intervene militarily in conflicts between smaller states. She also suggests that the concert might engage in collecti ve mediation efforts or undertake limited peacekeeping acti vities in w ar-torn states.13 Shirk acknowledges, however, that an Asia-Pacific concert would not attempt to provide security for all the states of the region. Some conflicts among small and middle po wers might erupt without precipitating a response from the concert. 14 This appears to be an important difference between Shirk’ s model and that of “classic” concerts such as the Concert of Europe.While the powers that made up the Concert of Europe could dictate terms to their less po werful neighbours, Shirk’s contemporary Asian concert w ould have to recognize the muc h greater autonom y of middle po wers in the international system today.15 As Paul Dibb has noted, it is difficult to imagine that formidable states such as the members of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, or South K orea would permit a concert to prescribe their national policies. 16 According to Acharya, the Japanese Go vernment has been an enthusiastic promoter of a concert for Asia. On the eve of a visit by Boris Yeltsin to Tokyo in April 1998, the then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto discussed a proposal advanced by his government calling for the region’ s four major po wers — the United States, China, Japan, and Russia — to hold summit-lev el talks on security issues. Since President Bill Clinton’s visit to Beijing in June 1998, the Japanese Government has also expressed interest in dev eloping a

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“triangular” security arrangement with the United States and China.17 Similarly, while the Chinese Government has officially rejected the idea of a concert of po wer, it has apparently expressed willingness to engage in “four po wer” talks on regional security. According to Acharya, “the development of a concert not only suits China’s quest for enhanced international status, but it also reduces China’ s fear that ARF-style multilateral approaches could become a w ay for smaller powers to gang up against it. ”18 Numerous practical problems facing an y concert ha ve been broached by scholars. Some raise the potentially troubling issue of membership. Who should be included and who left out? Most plans envisage a role for China, Japan, the United States, and Russia, but some leading regional figures — such as Lee Kuan Yew — argue that stability in the region “still boils do wn to the relationship between the United States, Japan, and China”. 19 According to some writers, China believes that only two states — itself and the United States — can guarantee the region’s stability.20 Other writers highlight the importance of a minimum of shared inter -subjective beliefs among concert members. Leif Roderic k Rosenberger has argued that, at present, there are insufficient shared cultur al values between East Asia and the rest of the Asia-Pacific (in particular the United States). Without the kind of shared beliefs and v alues found, for example, among the states of Western Europe, an Asian Concert of P owers will not be attainable.21 Rosecrance and Schott also note the lack of a “single ideological basis for a concert agreement” in the EastAsian region, but suggest that as China and Russia are brought increasingly into the world trading system, they “are likely to respond to w orld problems and trouble spots in ways similar to Japan and the United States”.22 Notes 1. Benjamin Miller, “Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts”, Review of International Studies 20 (1994): 329. 2. Richard Rosecrance and P eter Schott, “Concerts and Regional Intervention”, in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World,

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The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon edited by David A. Lake and P atrick M. Morgan (P ennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997), pp. 140–63. Miller, “Explaining the Emergence”, p. 329. Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collecti ve Security and the Future of Europe”, International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 114–61, 123–24. For a survey of the literature on the Concert of Europe, see ibid., p. 122, note 23. Clifford Kupchan and Charles K upchan, “After NATO: Concert of Europe”, New York Times, 6 July 1990; see also Philip Zeliko w, “The New Concert of Europe”, Survival 34, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 12–30. Richard Rosecrance, “A New Concert of P owers”, Foreign Affairs 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 64–82. John Kirton, “T he Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G-7 and the Halifax Summit”, Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 1 (Spring 1995). Miller, “Explaining the Emergence”, pp. 329–30. Ibid., pp. 330–31. See, for example, the testimony of Susan Shirk before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the P acific, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, 20 J uly 1995; see also Rosencr ance and Schott, “Concerts and Regional Interv ention”, p. 148; Susan L. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?”, Paper prepared for the J apan Institute of International Affairs-Asia Society Conference on “Prospects for Multilater al Cooperation in Northeast Asia: An International Dialogue”, Tokyo, 18–20 May 1995, passim. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Security,” p. 18. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid. Holsti notes that while the Concert of Europe was successful in averting war between major po wers, it could not prev ent conflicts between major and minor powers, or intervention by major powers in the affairs of smaller states. See Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 142–43. Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of P ower in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 8; Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Security”, p. 19. Amitav Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?”, Survival 41, no. 3 (A utumn

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1999): 85. 18. Ibid., p. 97. 19. Cited in Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?”, p. 87. 20. Acharya, “A Concert of Asia?”, p. 87; see also Banning Garett and Bonnie Glaser, “Beijing’s View on Multilater al Security in the AsiaPacific Region”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (J une 1994): 18. 21. Leif Roderick Rosenberger, “The Cultural Challenge for a Concert of Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, no. 2 (September 1996): 135– 62. 22. Rosecrance and Schott, “Concerts and Regional Intervention”, p. 148.

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Concerted Unilateralism

According to Yoichi Funabashi, the term concerted unilateral action (or CUA) originated at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where he says it had the pejor ative connotation of “big bo ys doing what they want to do”.1 Its meaning in the Asia-Pacific security discourse is quite different. The term w as used extensi vely in discussions leading up to the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Bogor and w as formally introduced in the Osaka Action Agenda in 1996. Concerted unilateralism is a process w hereby states gather together in concert to identify specific common objecti ves, but subsequently take steps to pursue those goals unilaterally and voluntarily. This distinguishes it from other modes of economic liberalization such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the Gener al Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which rely on concessions made through complex and binding multilateral negotiating processes. Hidehiro K onno, the senior Ministry of International Trade and Industry official for APEC, has described CUA as “a new type of trade liberalization process … on a peer pressure basis”. 2 An example of concerted unilateralism in practice can be seen in discussions seeking tr ade liberalization leading up to the Bogor APEC Leaders’ Meeting in 1994. These discussions reac hed an impasse when parties were unable to agree on the pace of liberalization, or the need for co-ordination and review to prev ent free-riding. A solution of sorts was found in concerted unilateralism, where, while long-term target dates for ac hieving liberalization were set out (2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing economies), the pursuit and pace of liberalization policies was to be determined by APEC members according to their national economic and political situation. With CUA, the objecti ves are non-binding and are set out only in “aspir ational” terms. This is in keeping with the supposed style of the “ ASEAN way” or “Asia-Pacific way” (see the entry on “The ‘ASEAN Way’”).3 It is notable that the concept has been generally supported more strongly b y Asian states than the United States. The United States has expressed concerns about the comparability of individual liberalization plans and has argued the 82

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process is “impr actical in the long term and could set bac k the region’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the European Union”. As American ambassador Sandra Kristoff put it, “basically the ‘C’ and the ‘A’ of CUA are not con vincing, leaving only ‘U’. The United States doesn’t see too much value in the ‘U’ alone. ”4 During the Sapporo Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the United States stated that while it recognized unilateral action within APEC was necessary, it opposed the term CUA. The United States initially advocated substituting concerted unilater alism with “concerted individual actions”. Subsequently CUA was replaced with the term concerted liberalization, although as Funabashi notes, the basic concept has remained intact. 5 Concerted liberalization simply split liberalization into two separate tracks. The first covers areas such as standards harmonization that can be handled collectively. The second track covers areas such as deregulation and tariff reduction, w hich are to be done in an indi vidual and v oluntary manner. This twotrack approach was explicitly set out in the Osaka Action Agenda.

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Notes 1. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), p. 98. 2. Ibid., p. 96. 3. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: F rom the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 337. 4. Straits Times, 1 April 1995. 5. Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 98.

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Confidence-Building Measures

The formal concept of confidence-building measures (CBMs) w as first put forward in January 1973 in proposals by Belgium and Italy at the Helsinki preparatory consultations to establish an agenda for the Conference on Security Co-oper ation in Europe (CSCE). After prolonged discussions and muc h disagreement, the idea w as ultimately agreed upon in the follo wing general terms:

At the CSCE negotiations in Genev a that follo wed between 1973 and 1975, three distinctive approaches to CBMs were set out. The Western bloc states saw CBMs in political rather than military terms. They argued for greater “openness” in military acti vities in Europe. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact states, in the few submissions they made on the subject, attac hed military significance to CBMs and rejected calls for “openness”, seeing it as a means of establishing a form of “legal espionage”.2 A middle path was taken by the neutral and non-aligned states (together with Romania). They endorsed the spirit of the West’s position but advocated additional specific CBMs, including the making of military budgets public; the imposition of constraints on military acti vities; specific disarmament measures; and the creation of a link between the CSCE and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. Ho wever, most of the Western states and all of the Warsaw Pact members (again, the latter with the exception of Romania) were hostile to the inclusion of disarmament issues, and reference to them w as diluted in the final draft.3 The final product of the negotiations, the “Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament”, states that the gener al objective of CBMs is to eliminate the causes of tension and to strengthen peace and security . 84

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In order to strengthen confidence and to increase stability and security, the Committee/Sub-Committee shall submit to the Conference appropriate proposals on confidencebuilding measures suc h as the prior notification of major military manoeuvres on a basis to be specified b y the Conference, and the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions.1

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More specifically, it recognizes “the need to contribute to the reduction of the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military acti vities which could gi ve rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation w here the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of suc h activities”.4 Only tw o CBMs are explicitly identified in the final draft: the exc hange of observ ers at military exer cises; and the requirement for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres — the latter being the key CBM of the Helsinki regime. In her analysis of the European process, Cathleen Fisher divides the European confidence-building experience into four distinct phases. She calls these phases “pre-CBMs”, and then first-, second-, and third-gener ation CBMs. Pre-CBMs include the agreements made between the United States and the USSR prior to the Helsinki Accords. The first-generation CBMs, w hich she calls “the ground breakers” originated in the Helsinki regime.The secondgeneration CBMs, which she labels “security-building mechanisms” had their origins in the Stockholm and Vienna Accords. Finally, the third-generation CBMs describes those “cooper ative security measures” that were enacted in the twilight and immediate aftermath of the Cold War.5 It is evident from the “Document on Confidence-Building Measures” that the participants in the Helsinki Process believed the greatest risk of war in Europe came from the possibility of escalation caused by error or misjudgement. Because the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific is quite different to that of ColdWar Europe, it has been argued by some writers that formal and intrusive CBMs of the European variety are not appropriate. Yukio Satoh has noted that CBMs originated in an en vironment where there were clearly identified adversaries. This is not the case in Eastern Asia where the “complex feelings and concerns w hich Asians hold to wards each other are more ambiguous”.6 Satoh has argued in favour of the idea of “measures for reassurance” instead of CBMs, an idea used by the Japanese Government in its preliminary paper to theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).7 In a similar v ein, Paul Dibb has suggested “trustbuilding measures” (TBMs) as a practical alternative. Despite these

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reservations and proposed alternatives, the term confidence-building measures has stuck in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, at least for now. It has received the endorsement of the ARF, which designated confidence-building measures as the subject of Stage One of its agenda and the focus of one of its inter -sessional meetings.8 Even if the term CBMs has stuck, some Asian scholars and officials suggest it has a narro wer meaning in the Asia-Pacific than elsewhere. An Indonesian paper presented to an ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on CBMs in December 1995 suggested that the choice of terminology (CBMs, CSBMs [confidence- and securitybuilding measures], or TBMs) was not particularly important, but noted that CBM has a different meaning in the Asia-Pacific than it does in Europe. It stated “a CBM is not to be concei ved as an institution, but r ather as a stepping-stone or building bloc k.” The paper also emphasized the importance of personal contacts and relationships in promoting confidence. It went on to say that CBMs “do not include mechanisms for conflict resolution or other attempts to redress or deal with ongoing crises, for which preventive diplomacy is needed”.9 Likewise, in a 1995 paper presenting a Chinese perspective on CBMs, Liu Huaquin stressed that w hile Asian states can draw much from the European experience, what they learn has to be adapted to suit the “unique cultur al, historic, political, and economic conditions of [the] region”.10 This, he suggested, strongly supports an incremental approach to confidence-building. Among the specific types of confidence-building measures pursued in Stage One of the ARF agenda were: a dialogue on member states’ security perceptions, including voluntary statements of defence polic y positions; greater tr ansparency through the publication of defence documentation such as Defence White Papers; the encouragement of participation in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register; and the creation of an annual seminar for defence officials and military officers. 11 At the meetings of the ARF’s CBM Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) in November 1998 and March 1999, three additional confidence-building measures were discussed. The ISG recommended that ARF members should be encouraged to exchange visits of their na val vessels as a useful

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means of promoting tr ansparency and confidence; they should exchange visits to military establishments; and they should compile national lists of publications and experts on confidence-building measures and circulate them to other ARF members. The meeting also noted that a number of proposed CBMs remained to be considered in the “medium term”.These included proposals for ARF liaison with other regional organizations; a second ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and a Counter -Narcotics/Port Interdiction seminar (all proposed by the United States); preventing and combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (proposed b y the EU), and a “Shootfest” among ARF riflemen (proposed b y the Philippines). In addition, China put forward five new CBM proposals for discussion. These dealt with the use of force against civilian ships or fishermen; defence conversion; military environmental protection exchanges; co-ordination of mutual legal assistance; and co-operation against international terrorism and crime. At the 2000 ARF in Bangkok, the Ministers asked the ISG on CBMs to continue exploring the o verlap between CBMs and preventive diplomacy (PD) (see the relevant entry) and strengthening the four proposals already agreed upon, namely, an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent P ersons, an Annual Security Outlook, and v oluntary background briefing on regional security issues. They also requested the ISG on CBMs to intensify its efforts in developing further the concept and principles of PD, and to submit recommendations to ARF SOM and ARF Ministers at their next meetings.

Notes 1. Paragraph 23 of the “F inal Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations”, cited in Victor-Yves Ghebali, Confidence-Building Measures within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes (New York: UNIDIR, 1989), p. 3, note 5. As its name suggests, Ghebali’s monograph is a detailed study of the origins and dev elopment of confidence-building measures and confidence- and security-building measures. The work also includes

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5.

6. 7.

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The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon an extensive bibliography on the subject. Muc h of the analysis in the section that follows is drawn from this work. Ghebali, Confidence-Building Measures, p. 5. Ibid., p. 14, note 28. “Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament”, paragraph 4, cited in Ghebali, ConfidenceBuilding Measures, p. 6. Cathleen S. Fisher, “The Preconditions of Confidence-Building: Lessons from the European Experience”, in A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, edited by Michael Krepon (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimon Center, 1993). Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan”, Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 267–82, 273. See “Japan’s View Concerning the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)”, in the Summary Record of the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM), Bangkok, 23–25 Ma y 1994, Annex I. The paper referred to the need for “measures to increase mutual reassur ance (Mutual Reassurance Measures [MRM]), sa ying that “‘CBM’ is too narrow a concept to co ver all the measures needed”. “ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper”, para. 8, reproduced in Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Appendix 2. “Confidence-Building Measures”, Indonesia’s Paper prepared for the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures, Jakarta, December 1995, pp. 2–3. Liu Huaquin, “Step-by-Step Confidence and Security Building for the Asian Region: A Chinese Perspective”, in Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures , edited b y Ralph A. Cossa (W ashington, D.C.: Center for Streatgic and International Studies, 1995), pp. 119– 36, 120. See Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 29.

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While there is widespread agreement that the aim of confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs) is to reduce uncertainty , misperception, and suspicion, and thus help lessen the possibility of armed conflict, there is no commonly accepted definition of w hat constitutes a confidence- and security-building measure. To add to the confusion, the term is also often used inter changeably with confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other similar expressions. For example, a Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) report on the subject said that CSBMs encompass and embrace “the spirit and intent of proposals calling for trust-building measures, mutual assurance measures, mutual reassurance measures, community-building measures, and other related confidence-building concepts”.1 Like confidence-building measures, the origins of the term confidence- and security-building measures lie in Cold War Europe. Confidence-building measures was first used during the negotiations which culminated in the publication of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). In 1983, the Conference on Security and Co-oper ation in Europe (CSCE) states met in Madrid as a follo w-up to the Helsinki Process to discuss con vening a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). It was in the Madrid meeting’s ”Concluding Document” that the term confidence- and security-building measures was first used. According to Victor-Yves Ghebali, the genesis of the term lies in a Yugoslav proposal put forward during informal discussions on military issues.2 The proposal suggested that “security-building measures” could be added (as a separ ate concept) alongside “confidencebuilding measures”. However, this dichotomy was unacceptable to the West, and it w as finally decided to use the consolidated term confidence- and security-building measures to describe the new measures set out in Madrid process. These measures were intended to extend the CBMs agreed upon as part of the Helsinki Process. CSBMs, in contrast with Helsinki’s CBMs, were not independent of each other but were supposed to be a series of mutually complementary measures.3 According to Ralph Cossa, definitions of CSBMs v ary, “ranging

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from the very narrow (looking almost exclusively at military measures) to much broader interpretations encompassing almost anything that builds confidence”. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been described as a “classic” CSBM. 4 The CSCAP Working Group on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures put forward its preferred definition of CSBMs as including “both formal and informal measures, w hether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, that address, prev ent, or resolve uncertainties among states, including both military and political elements”.5 A 1995 U.S. CSCAP paper on CSBMs used almost exactly the same language, adding that CSBMs included “both military and political elements relevant for the larger and longer -term task of creating a Security Community”. The U.S. report explicitly distinguished CSBMs from other relationships that can generate confidence and security among nations, saying “alliances and security guarantees … are not properly defined as CSBMs”. 6 Most accounts stress a number of common elements which are needed if CSBMs are to work successfully in the Asia-Pacific region. First, CSBMs require participants who want to co-operate. Put simply, there must be a shared belief among regional actors that the advantages of taking part in confidence- and security-building measures outweigh any risks or disadvantages. CSBMs must be seen as a “win-win” option for all participants. Second, CSBMs are most effective where they are guided by regional norms. Concepts cannot be simply “parachuted” in from other parts of the w orld. Particular CSBMs must be consistent with the geopolitical en vironment and strategic culture of a region. Gi ven the tremendous diversity of the Asia-Pacific, this has led some scholars to suggest that a subregional approach to CSBMs might be the most fruitful.Third, military CSBMs in particular should ha ve realistic, pr agmatic, and clearly-defined objectives on which there is common agreement. They should not be too ambitious. Most analysts agree that gr adual, incremental, and informal approac hes seem to pro vide for the best c hance of building consensus.7

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1. Ralph A. Cossa, “ Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures: A CSCAP Working Group Report”, P aper presented at the Ninth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Plenary Session F our, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1995, p. 7. 2. Victor-Yves Ghebali, Confidence-Building Measures within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes (New York: UNIDIR, 1989), p. 28. 3. Ibid., p. 30. 4. Cossa, “Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures”, pp. 6–7. 5. Ibid., p. 6. 6. Brad Roberts and Robert Ross, “Confidence and Security Building Measures: A USCSCAP Task Force Report”, in Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, edited by Ralph A. Cossa (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 138. 7. Ibid., pp. 7-11; Liu Huaquin, “Step-b y-Step Confidence and Security Building for the Asian Region: A Chinese Perspective”, in Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, edited by Cossa, pp. 124– 25.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Constructive Intervention

Following the violent disintegration of the coalition go vernment in Cambodia in J uly 1997, the Deputy Prime Minister of Mala ysia Anwar Ibrahim called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to play a more proactive role in solving the region’s security problems.1 In an article published in Newsweek, he said ASEAN should consider initiating what he called “constructive interventions” and “constructive involvement” before simmering regional problems erupt into full-blown crises.2 He gave as examples of constructi ve involvement “among other things, direct assistance to firm up electoral processes, an increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms, the development of human capital and the general strengthening of civil society and the rule of law”. He added that he thought ASEAN was already moving towards such an approach, citing its willingness to ensure the conduct of free and fair elections in Cambodia and the engagement of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime in My anmar.3 Anwar’s comments prompted a great deal of debate and discussion in Southeast Asia, in particular about ho w to reconcile constructi ve intervention with ASEAN’s long-held principle of non-interference or non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. 4 While the Newsweek article fuelled consider able debate, the term constructive intervention is not a wholly new one. In an article published in the New York Times in 1983, the former U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, William H. Sullivan, called for President Ronald Reagan to use a sc heduled visit to Manila as “an opportunity for constructive intervention” to facilitate a peaceful and democr atic transition in Philippines politics.5 Constructive intervention also has something in common with ideas suc h as “humanitarian intervention”, “peacebuilding”, and “constructive engagement” that have a more established pedigree in international politics. One report described constructive intervention as a “compromise between constructive engagement and sanctions”. 6 In its most recent manifestation, the term seems to ha ve its origins with academics and policy analysts connected to the track two security and strategic studies community in Southeast Asia.7 While Anwar was instrumental in giving the term constructive 92

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intervention prominence at the official lev el in Southeast Asia, he did little to dev elop or ad vance the concept in the w ake of the Newsweek interview. Rather, it w as Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and his deputy, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, who became its strongest advocates. Speaking at the 1998 Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur, Surin said the economic crisis offered the region a unique opportunity to rebuild its economic and political foundations. In particular , he suggested that the newer member states of ASEAN might find this “an opportune moment to reassess their respective processes of economic and political development in the face of rapid and far-reaching changes in the global arena”. He asked “whether the time has come forASEAN to rethink its decadesold policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States”, saying “ASEAN members can perhaps no longer afford to adopt a non-commital stance and a void passing judgement on events in a member country , simply on the grounds of ‘noninterference’. … if domestic events in one member’s territory impact adversely on another member’ s internal affairs, not to mention peace and prosperity, much can be said in favour of ASEAN members playing a more proactive role.”8 He continued his c hampioning of the concept in a speech at his alma mater, Thammasat University in Bangkok, on 12 June 1998, saying that when “a matter of domestic concerns poses a threat to regional stability , a dose of friendly advice at the right time can be helpful”. 9 Surin’s comments were apparently a personal initiati ve. He inserted the sentences into the K uala Lumpur speech without first informing the Thai foreign ministry officials. 10 After consultations with those officials, ho wever, the meaning and use of the term began to evolve. According to a report in the Nation, Surin told a meeting of the ministry’ s director-generals on 22 J une 1998 that “constructive intervention was needed for Thailand whose government respects an open society, democracy and human rights. … We must be true to ourselv es. Our membership in ASEAN and ASEAN’s principle of non-interference should not hamper us from expressing our views on w hat we respect. ”11 Shortly afterw ards, however, the language being used to describe the Thai proposal

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in today’s globalized w orld, the issues ha ve become so complex and multi-dimensional that a new vision is needed … it is not a matter of interfering in the internal affairs of another country. Rather it is a matter of being more open with one another on issues that impact on the region. It is rather a matter of taking a more proacti ve concern about one another and about being supporti ve of one another whenever needed. It is a matter of enhancing our interactions for the benefit of all. 15 In his address, Philippines F oreign Minister Domingo Siazon said, “we should be able to speak more freely on issues occurring in one member country that affect others, with a view to building more solid ground for regional action. ”16

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changed. Foreign ministry officials decided that constructi ve intervention sounded “too radical” and the apparently more palatable term “flexible engagement” was coined.12 This concession was made after concerns were expressed by ASEAN ambassadors in Bangkok and after Thai diplomats in Yangon and Vientiane were called in and quizzed about the Thai policy.13 Debate about constructive intervention and flexible engagement reached a peak at the Thirty-first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila in July 1998. Thailand tried to raise the issue at the meeting but was opposed b y Malaysia and Singapore. A solution to the impasse was apparently put forward by the then Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who while also strongly opposed to any change in the principle of non-interference, suggested that the compromise wording “enhanced interaction” might be acceptable. A number of the speeches at the subsequent meeting addressed the subject of intervention. Filipino President J oseph Estrada’s opening speec h called for the ASEAN member states to be “open to one another” and to “freely and candidly exc hange our views no matter ho w controversial the issue”. 14 Surin’s speech at the meeting marked a notable softening from his previous position. Without mentioning either constructive intervention or flexible engagement, he couched his call for change by saying,

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While both Surin and Siazon had dropped the use of the terms flexible engagement and constructive intervention, and framed their proposals in less confrontational terms, strong opposition w as also expressed at the meeting. The Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi devoted almost his entire address to the issue, arguing that calls for c hange were mistaken. “T o abandon the consensus principle”, he said, “w ould be to usher in a di vided and fractious ASEAN and consequently an enfeebled ASEAN”. However, Badawi also suggested that the Association’s traditional injunction on interference was mostly about the style and way in which concerns were expressed. He denied that the norm of non-interference had prevented governments in the past from commenting on the actions of others. He said,

In yet another linguistic twist, Bada wi concluded b y saying that “Malaysia believes that the imperatives for constructive interactions are most persuasi ve and compelling for making c hanges among us.”18 Singapore Foreign Minister S. J ayakumar also addressed the question of constructi ve intervention. He said that w hile “noninterference does not mean indifference to eac h other’s well-being … internal political developments will remain a particularly sensitive area with the potential to set up centrifugal for ces that can pull ASEAN apart.” He called the Thai proposal “the surest and quickest way to ruin for ASEAN”.19 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was also blunt, contr asting Anwar and Surin’ s approach with established ASEAN policy. He told one wire service that constructive intervention “is not an ASEAN policy. ASEAN continues to pursue

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we have commented and criticized, we have even expressed reservations when necessary. But we do all of this quietly , befitting a community of friends bonded in cooper ation and ever-mindful of the fact that fr actious relations undermine the capacity of ASEAN to w ork together on issues critical to our collecti ve well-being. We do it this quiet way because criticizing more loudly , posturing adversarially and grandstanding bring less results and does more harm than good. 17

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the same polic y — constructi ve engagement.” He added, “Don’ t make it bigger than it is. It’ s only a view expressed b y Anwar Ibrahim, not ASEAN.”20 A distinction between Anwar’s use of constructive intervention and constructive involvement has been dr awn by some regional scholars and officials. In a Straits Times interview, several leading regional politicians and analysts argued that the w ord intervention should be dropped, as it carried the connotation of forced action.21 This would appear to be in keeping with the intent of Anwar’s original proposal. Despite the use of the term intervention, his article assumes that governments facing a serious internal crisis will request help from their ASEAN neighbours. He also implies that such assistance will not take a military form, but will r ather consist of political and economic support. 22

1. At the time he made the call for constructive interventions, Anwar was officially Acting Prime Minister while Mahathir Mohamad was out of the country. 2. Anwar Ibrahim, “Crisis Prevention”, Newsweek, 21 July 1997, p. 13. 3. Ibid. 4. For a discussion of constructive intervention in the context of ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention, see Amitav Acharya, “Sovereignty, NonIntervention, and Regionalism”, C ANCAPS Papier No. 15, Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS), York University, Toronto, 1997. 5. William H. Sullivan, “Applying to Manila the Lesson of Teheran”, New York Times, 3 October 1983, p. A23. 6. Oon Yeoh, “Myanmar a Test for ASEAN’s ‘Constructive Engagement’”, Kyodo News Service, 26 J uly 1997. 7. According to a regional sc holar, Sukhumbhand Paribatra was the first to use the term. Interview with K usuma Snitwongse, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 8 September 1998. 8. Surin Pitsuwan, “Currency Turmoil in Southeast Asia: The Strategic Impact”, Speech delivered at the Twelfth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1 June 1998.

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9. Surin Pitsuwan, “Thailand’s Foreign Policy During the Economic and Social Crises”, Keynote Address at the Seminar in Commemoration of the Forty-ninth Anniversary of the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 12 June 1998. 10. Interview with K obsak Chutikul, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman, Bangkok, 20 September 1998. 11. “Thailand Opposes ASEAN Non-Interference Policy”, Nation, 23 June 1998. 12. Interview with K obsak Chutikul, Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman, Bangkok, 20 September 1998; “T hais Retract Call for ASEAN Intervention”, Straits Times, 27 June 1998. 13. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Good Ideas Need Discreet Lobb ying”, Nation, 29 June 1998, p. A4. 14. Joseph Estrada, “Towards an ASEAN Community”, Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Thirty-first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 July 1998. 15. Opening Statement by Surin Pitsuwan, Minister for F oreign Affairs of Thailand, at the Thirty-first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 July 1998. 16. Domingo Siazon, Jr., “Winning the Challenges of the 21st Century”, Address of the Chairman of theThirty-First ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 July 1998. 17. Opening Statement of Abdullah Badawi, Minister for F oreign Affairs, Malaysia, at the Thirty-first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 July 1998. 18. Ibid. Emphasis added. 19. Cited in “ ASEAN Ministers Urge Making All Members Prosperous”, Kyodo News Service, 28 J uly 1997. 20. “Indonesia Says No to ‘Constructi ve Intervention’”, Kyodo News International, 4 August 1997. 21. Brendan Pereira, “Time for ASEAN to Pla y a More Active Role in Members’ Affairs”, Straits Times, 24 July 1997, p. 26. 22. Acharya, “Sovereignty, Non-Intervention, and Regionalism”, p. 13; Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation”, Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 193.

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The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Co-operative Security

Co-operative Security

Of the security concepts in use in Asia-Pacific security discourse, one of the most ambiguous is co-oper ative security. While the origins of the concept are unclear and the term is used in v ery different ways around the region, this has not stopped numerous scholars and v arious government officials from claiming to ha ve coined or “introduced” the concept. Along with comprehensi ve security, co-operative security is now the most commonly in voked security concept in the Asia-Pacific region. One of the earliest references to co-oper ative security in the Asia-Pacific region w as in the title of the 1988 P acific Basin Symposium.1 This work used the term as more or less synon ymous with security co-operation (it is hardly surprising that the words cooperative and security should find themselves together), and did not advance any new interpretation of w hat the words meant together, nor did it consciously discuss co-oper ative security as a security concept. In a 1988 article, J ohn Steinbruner, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, offered a more substanti ve discussion of the concept. 2 Steinbruner consciously coined the term co-operative security to differentiate it from common security .3 His article focuses on the need to create strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States, and looks almost exclusi vely at Europe. It does not shed much light on co-operative security as a concept, but instead prescribes security policies to promote stability. The most important of these include the adoption of essentially defensi ve military postures. Interestingly, Steinbruner claims that the United States has “long promoted abstract ideas of cooperative security” although he provides no specific examples.4 While Steinbruner went on to develop his ideas in a series of w orkshops and a conference with other leading American academics and senior officials (see below), leading to the publication of the monograph, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, in 1992, co-operative security was not immediately picked up by Asia-Pacific scholars in the United States. 5 Instead, it was a Canadian Government-sponsored project, the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) which made most of the early running developing the substance of the concept. 98

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The NPCSD, which ran from 1990 until 1993, w as one of the first track two unofficial security dialogues in the region. It brought together scholars and officials from across theAsia-Pacific to discuss a wide range of traditional and non-conventional security issues. 6 The Canadian interpretation of co-oper ative security set out b y Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark represents an attempt to reconceptualize security to take into account the end of the Cold War and the new complexity of regional security issues.7 The broad objective of co-oper ative security w as to replace the Cold War conception of security based on bipolarity , deterrence, and the balance of power with a multilateral process and framework based on reassurance (a goal it shares with common security). According to Dewitt and Acharya, there are three ideas at the heart of co-operative security.8 The first is the importance ofinclusivity — in terms of both participants and subject matter . In terms of participants, co-operative security argues for the inclusion of both like-minded and non-like-minded actors in security arr angements. This is “regardless of a gov ernment’s defining c haracteristics, its place in the international hierarchy of states, its allegiances to other multilateral fora or processes or its position on any one of a host of international issues”. Similarly, while the concept accepts that states are central to global political life it does not assume they are the only relevant actors. Co-operative security recognizes that non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses, and other transnational entities have a critical role to play in managing and enhancing security. Dewitt and Acharya stress that inclusivity does not simply refer to the question of participants. Co-oper ative security also requires inclusivity in terms of subject matter . Like comprehensi ve and common security, it argues security should not be conceived simply in narrow military terms, but should also incorporate less traditional concerns such as environmental degradation, demographic issues, and transnational criminal activities that can exacerbate inter -state relations and potentially lead to conflict. Second, co-operative security believes in the importance of establishing habits of dialogue between regional actors. States should Co-operative Security

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an approach which emphasizes reassur ance rather than deterrence; it is inclusi ve rather than exclusi ve; favours multilateralism over unilateralism or bilateralism; does not rank military solutions over non-military ones; assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system but accepts that non-state actors have an important role to play; does not particularly emphasize the creation of formal security institutions, but does not reject them either; and which, above all, stresses the v alue of creating habits of dialogue.11

Co-operative Security

Evans’ understanding of co-operative security is a conceptual hybrid, its virtue lying in what he has described as its embrace of “the whole

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take part in regular consultations with one another and, ideally , should acknowledge the long-term benefits of establishing formal processes for discussion. The third ideal at the heart of co-operative security, as its name suggests, is that many contemporary questions of security (such as transnational crime, environmental degradation, and disease) are no longer amenable to unilateral action, but require co-operative action between states, as well as among relevant actors within a state. Co-operative security has also been used b y former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Evans’ interest in security concepts began with common security , which he used as the basis of his unsuccessful proposal in 1990 for an Asia-Pacific equivalent of the Helsinki process.9 However, by the 1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Singapore, Evans had dropped common security and begun to use co-operative security as his concept of preference. Despite claims b y Kerr and Mac k that co-oper ative security w as “developed in a stud y by Evans”, and that Ev ans’ speech to the United Nations in 1993 “introduced” co-oper ative security, his early use of the term bears a remarkable resemblance to the concept set out in the NPSCD and subsequently expounded by Joe Clark and David Dewitt.10 Evans’ address to the United Nations Gener al Assembly in September 1993 described co-operative security as

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content of both ‘common security’ and ‘collective security,’ neither of which by itself tells the whole story: at the same time, ‘cooperative security’ picks up some of the multidimensional fla vour of ‘comprehensive security’ as well.”12 To further complicate matters, two well-connected Australian scholars, Andrew Mack (who helped author Evans’ book, Cooperating for Peace) and Pauline Kerr, have written that “[t]he elements of cooperative security which are most relevant at the national lev el are common security and prev entive diplomacy”, although they note that in official Australian policy “neither … has thus far recei ved more than rhetorical attention”. 13 Cooperating for P eace further emphasizes the importance of pursuing a multidimensional approach to security; recognizing that factors such as economic underdev elopment, demographic challenges, environmental degradation, transnational crime, and human rights abuses constitute threats deserving attention.The book stresses the centrality of inclusive multilateralism to the co-operative security ideal. Mechanisms ranging from the creation of dialogue processes, transparency, and confidence-building measures as well as more orthodox military exchanges and formal institution building are prescribed as the means to attain co-operative security’s goals.14 Not surprisingly, given their origin, the Australian and Canadian notions of co-oper ative security ha ve a great deal in common. Where Evans’ notion of co-operative security seemed to part w ays with the concept used by Canadian scholars and officials, however, was in its early embr ace of the indi vidual as security’ s referent object. In an essa y in the American journal Foreign Policy, Evans links co-operative security to the nascent notion of “human security” arguing “security … is as muc h about the protection of indi viduals as it is about the defence of territorial integrity of states.”15 Ball and Kerr say, “the extent to which the [Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)] is guided b y and adheres to these conceptualizations of security is sometimes difficult to assess. ” However, they note the possibility of tensions existing between the different concepts adopted b y Evans, and between DF AT and the more traditional stance of the Australian Department of Defence. 16 While the Australian and Canadian notions of co-oper ative Co-operative Security

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Co-operative Security

security share muc h with common security , proponents of cooperative security have argued it is more pr agmatic and stresses a more gradualist, incremental approach to the creation of multilateral institutions. Co-operative security allows formal and informal, and bilateral and multilateral means to be used together to deal with a wide range of security concerns. This aspect w as particularly important when the concept was first put forward because it meant co-operative security offered a way in which multilateral processes could move forward alongside the bilateral “hub and spokes” system that was important to the United States and some of its key allies in the Asia-Pacific.17 However, while co-operative security is without doubt pragmatic and gradualist, the sharp distinctions dr awn with common security are exaggerated. The Palme Commission referred to common security as “a gr adual process” to promote peace and disarmament.18 Geoffrey Wiseman, an authority on common security, has likewise said, “common security is designed to be a long-term and pragmatic process that will ev entually lead to peace and disarmament by changing thinking.”19 Proponents of co-oper ative security are on stronger ground when they claim the concept has the advantage of being “indigenous” to the region. It is not viewed as imported from outside the region and it does not attempt to impose “European” goals or ideas on the Asian strategic environment. Here again, a contr ast is often dr awn with common security, which was tarnished by its association with (what were per ceived to be) unpopular Canadian and Australian calls for a ”Conference for Security and Co-oper ation in Asia” (CSCA) in 1990. 20 Evidence of co-oper ative security’s greater acceptance in the region can be seen in the naming of a Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group to explore comprehensive and co-oper ative security, although it is notable that the recent publications of the Working Group ha ve tended to give greater emphasis to comprehensi ve security. A third interpretation of co-operative security has been offered by scholars at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., developing the ideas first set out b y John Steinbruner. While the concept outlined in J anne Nolan’s edited collection, Global

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Engagement, shares with its Canadian and Australian counterparts the realization that “the character of security has changed in recent years”, its concern is primarily with creating an American global strategy to deal with new security c hallenges.21 According to the authors, “cooperative security is a model of interstate relations in which disputes are expected to occur , but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed-upon norms and established procedures.”22 They suggest that co-oper ative security differs from collective security “much as preventive medicine differs from acute care. Cooperative security is designed to ensure that organized aggression cannot start or be prosecuted on an y large scale.”23 In practice, the Brookings Institution’ s idea of a co-oper ative security system is based on “mutual acceptance of and support for the defence of home territory as the exclusi ve national military objective”. The authors suggest that a fully dev eloped co-operative security system “w ould set and enfor ce appropriate standards for the size, concentr ation, technical configuration, and oper ation practices of deployed forces. Reassurance would be the principal objective, as distinct from deterrence and containment. ”24 Of particular interest to the authors are regimes and institutions designed to limit the spread of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems; references to the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Non-Prolifer ation Treaty (NPT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are ubiquitous.25 In its use of arms control and confidence-building measures to achieve the goal of mutual reassur ance, the Brookings idea of co-oper ative security is similar to the notion of common security advanced by the Palme Commission. In his chapter in Global Engagement, “Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific”, Harry Harding outlines a concept of co-operative security that is sensiti ve to both military and non-military security issues.26 Harding applauds the creation of mechanisms for dialogue in the region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and CSCAP. However, his interpretation of co-oper ative security differs in important ways from its use b y Canadian and Australian scholars and officials. For example, Harding argues that dealing with Asia’s Co-operative Security

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role in international regimes to limit the spread of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, is one of the most pressing issues in the region. He claims that securing the full compliance of China and North Korea with arms control regimes such as the MTCR and NPT will be “an important priority” for ad vocates of co-operative security.27 Similarly, while he endorses the spread of second tr ack dialogue, he also suggests the creation of a “compar able forum” to the ARF for Northeast Asia. Such forum should engage w hat he argues is the “core issue” in regional security , “the emerging arms race in the Asia-Pacific”.28 This interpretation can be contrasted with the Canadian and Australian notions of co-operative security which at the time stressed a more incremental and gr adualist approach to fostering security dialogue in the region. 29 They also downplay the kind of formalist approac h to institution-building that Harding embraces. In this respect, the Canadian and Australian concepts seem to be more in tune with the strategic culture of the region, one in which there is a widely held antipathy towards dealing with arms control issues.30

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1. Dora Alves, ed., Cooperative Security in the P acific Basin: The 1988 Pacific Symposium (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Uni versity Press, 1990). 2. John D. Steinbruner, “The Prospect of Cooperative Security”, Brookings Review (Winter 1988/89), pp. 53–62. 3. E-mail communication with the authors, Ma y 2000. 4. Steinbruner, “The Prospect of Cooperative Security”, p. 53. 5. Ashton Carter, William J. P erry, and J ohn D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooper ative Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992). 6. For a summary of the acti vities of the North P acific Co-operative Security Dialogue, see Da vid Dewitt and P aul M. Ev ans, eds., The Agenda for Cooper ative Security in the North P acific: Conference Report (Toronto: York University , NPCSD, July 1993). 7. David B. Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security”, Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994): passim.

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8. David B. Dewitt and Amitav Acharya, “Cooperative Security and Developmental Assistance: The Relationship between Security and Development with Reference to Eastern Asia”, Eastern Asian Policy Papers No. 16, Uni versity of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Toronto, 1994, pp. 9–10. 9. See Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), pp. 79–81, 116–17. 10. See Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack, “The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia”, in Studying Asia Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities, edited b y Paul M. Ev ans (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), p. 38. According to K err and Mac k “Evans’ concept is not dissimilar to the Canadian, but places greater stress on collective security and preventive diplomacy”, p. 57, note 14. La wler says, “in so far as the idea of cooper ative security can claim an y distinctive place of origin, it is … more plausibly Canada thanAustralia.” See Peter Lawler, “The Core Assumptions and Presumptions of ‘Cooperative Security’”, in The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Bey ond, edited b y Stephanie Lawson (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1995), pp. 39–57, 39. 11. Compare this with Andrew Mack, “Concepts of Security in the P ostCold War World”, Working Paper No. 8, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, p. 15, and Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security”, pp. 7– 9. Dewitt is obviously the source of the quotation. His work is listed in the bibliography in Cooperating for P eace, although the length y paraphrase is not footnoted. See K err and Mack, “The Future of AsiaPacific Security Studies in Australia”, p. 57, note 15. 12. Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 16. 13. Kerr and Mack, “The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia”, pp. 33–59, 38. Indeed, according to Mac k, “my view is that the concept was never clearly articulated ... On the one hand there w as the idea of ‘security with’ other states — on the other the idea of deterrence was preserved. So Australia found itself arming itself against the very states it also sought to cooperate with.” E-mail communication with the authors, 15 J une 2000. 14. Evans, Cooperating for Peace, passim.

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Co-operative Security

15. Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intr astate Conflict”, Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 3–20. 16. Desmond Ball and Pauline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 77. 17. For example, in 1992 a Canadian gov ernment official involved in the NPCSD noted that the “application of the concept of cooper ative security to the North Pacific is not an alternative to traditional security arrangements (collective and mutual defence arrangements will remain central to the preservation of national sovereignty); it is intended first to address all issues of concern and then to focus on those areas where it is agreed that progress in developing multilateral approaches is possible.” See Stewart Henderson, “Canada and Asia Pacific Security: The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: RecentTrends”, NPCSD Working Paper No. 1, York University, Toronto, 1992, p. 1. 18. Palme Commission, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme — Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. xiii. 19. Geoffrey Wiseman, Common Security and Non-Provocative Defence: Alternative Approaches to the Security Dilemma (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1989), p. 7. 20. U.S. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) also called for an Asian equivalent to the Conference on Security and Co-oper ation in Europe (CSCE) process. See his comments in “U.S. Security Policy in Asia”, Hearings before the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 30 0ctober 1991. 21. Janne Nolan, ed., Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 5. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. See especially Chapters 3 and 5. 26. Harry Harding, “Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, in Global Engagement, edited by Nolan, pp. 419–46. Interestingly, Harding says that he w as introduced to the idea of co-oper ative security b y David Dewitt and Paul Evans during the NPSCD, p. 419. 27. Ibid., p. 427. 28. Ibid., p. 443.

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29. Dewitt, in particular , stresses this difference. See “Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security”, pp. 7, 14 note 34. 30. See, for example, the statement b y Indonesian F oreign Minister Ali Alatas, “Alatas Denies Buildup Threat”, South China Morning P ost, Internet Edition, , 3 December 1997. F or a critique of the arms r ace debate, see P anitan Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, “A Regional Arms Race?”, in Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1995), Special Issue on “T he Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region”, edited by Desmond Ball, pp. 147– 74.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon

Engagement

According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the v erb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean “to emplo y busily”, “to hold a person’s attention”, “to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)”, or to “come into battle with an enem y”. The noun engagement can mean “the act or state of engaging or being engaged”, an “appointment with another person”, “a betrothal”, “an encounter between hostile forces”, or “a mor al commitment”. The gerund engaging means to be “attractive or c harming”. In the liter ature on security in the AsiaPacific, engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People’s Republic of China. Ho wever, the term has been used in many different w ays leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. A Business Week interview with the Chinese VicePremier summed this up with the headline: “Li Lanqing: Does ‘engagement’ mean fight or marry?” 1 For one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the AsiaPacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is a remarkable lac k of agreement about the meaning of engagement and a great deal of inconsistenc y in its use. An article in the New York Times noted that “there are man y definitions of engagement” and described the Clinton administr ation’s use of the phrase as a “mo ving target”.2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of sc holars and officials to offer their o wn modified interpretations of engagement — the number of which now exceeds thirty. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity. One theoretical treatment of engagement has been put forward by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross.3 Johnston and Ross argue that engagement has tw o distinct y et complementary meanings. First, it implies adjustment on the part of status quo powers to the legitimate interests of a rising po wer. In this approac h, conflict is minimized and peace maintained because existing powers recognize that balance of po wer requires the rising po wer to be peacefully incorporated into the international system. According to J ohnston and Ross, “stability is maintained because the established po wers This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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‘engage’ the interests of the rising po wer, that is they allocate it enhanced global responsibilities commensur ate with its new capabilities.”4 This approach to engagement is based upon tw o assumptions. First, it assumes that the rising power is engageable — it does not ha ve an insatiable appetite for po wer. Second, the conception assumes that there are no irreconcilable differences between the existing powers and the rising po wer. Johnston and Ross’ s second definition stresses the use of multilateral institutions in the engagement of a rising po wer.5 They argue that engagement can in volve incorporating the rising po wer into a leadership position in existing international organizations and regimes, including arms control and international economic regimes. In doing so, established po wers seek to accommodate the new power’s demands for a “place at the table”. The membership of international institutions allows international norms to ev olve and develop, reflecting the interests of all po wers, including the rising power. This process aims to minimize the interest the rising po wer has in pursuing polices that might destabilize the international order.6 Johnston and Ross suggest this seems to be the meaning of the policy pursued by the Clinton administration, and conclude that at its simplest, this approac h to engagement means tw o somewhat contradictory things: the first is that policy-makers should develop a range of inter-governmental ties such that disturbances in one bilater al or multilateral issue area are offset by stability in another; the second is that the utility of threats to damage one aspect of the relationship are reduced because of the ripple effect on other more profitable aspects.7 They conclude there is “virtually nothing in the polic y that approaches an articulated ‘theory’ of engagement, that is, a logical set of assumptions and propositions about what engagement entails, how it is supposed to affect the decision rules and cost-benefit calculus of the engagee, and what criteria one should use to measure the success or failure of the polic y”.8 In another analysis of the term, Ric hard Haas and Meghan O’Sullivan describe engagement as “a foreign-polic y strategy that

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depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives”.9 They argue that the distinguishing c haracteristic of American engagement str ategies historically, is their reliance “on the extension or pro vision of incentives to shape the beha viour of countries with which the U.S. has important disagreements”. Like many writers on engagement, Haas and O’Sullivan further distinguish between conditional and unconditional forms of engagement. Conditional engagement they argue “entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the U.S. extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country”. In contrast, engagement may be unconditional if it offers “modifications in U.S. polic y towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follo w”. Generally, they sa y, conditional engagement is aimed at changing a government’s behaviour, while unconditional engagement works with a nation’s civil society or private sector in the hope of promoting forces that will eventually pursue co-operation. In the wider liter ature on security , engagement is used in a looser sense. F irst, it is regularly emplo yed to describe a state’ s attitude or posture towards the world at large, or sometimes towards a particular region. While this usage most commonly refers to the disposition of the United States, it has also been used to describe other states’ attitudes. In this context, engagement is often defined by what it is not. It is not “isolationism” or “disengagement”. Speaking soon after the Clinton administr ation came to po wer, National Security Adviser Tony Lake described the “imperative” of continued U.S. engagement in world affairs. He gave as examples the United States’ role in the Middle-East peace process; its role in Haiti; its relations with Russia and Japan; its role in the Group of Seven (G7); as well as in Somalia and Bosnia. 10 Engagement is closer to the school of American foreign policy that usually falls under the label “internationalism”. John Ruggie has said that American Presidents from the turn of the century ha ve “sought to devise str ategies of international engagement for the United States. They have differed little about why such engagement was deemed necessary; differences lie in their preferred means to ward that end.”11 In this sense, as Ruggie suggests, engagement seems to be a

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process as well as a goal. Since the election of the Clinton process part of the administration an important element of the debate about U.S. engagement — one that is particularly relevant to the Asia-Pacific — has been the question of whether unilateralism or multilateralism should be the “presumpti ve mode of engagement” for the United States. 12 While the United States has accepted the need for multilateral institutions in the region since 1993, the use of engagement often seems to be based (at least rhetorically) on assumptions of American primacy. The February 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement calls for American “leadership and engagement in the w orld”. It argues that without “active leadership and engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narro w”, and concludes that the United States “must remain engaged in the world through U.S. leadership”.13 In this respect, it is interesting to contr ast the American use of comprehensive engagement with the Australian policy of the same name set out in 1989, which explicitly stated that engagement was a relationship among equals and partners. Second, engagement is sometimes used in a slightly narro wer sense to describe the political relationship between specific states. Here there are tw o distinctive usages: first, engagement can be described as a kind of loosely defined association.The example that has received the most attention in the liter ature on Asia-Pacific security is that of the United States’ engagement of China. In this sense, engagement connotes a relationship of dialogue and involvement, and is often contr asted with “containment” or “isolation”.14 Nye has said “the attitude that ‘engagement’ implies is important.” He claims the United States’ decision to engage China 15 “means that [it] has rejected the argument that conflict is inevitable”. A related use of engagement is to describe formal state policies or strategies. In the liter ature, with this particular kind of usage, the concepts are often capitalized: for example, the Clinton administration’s “Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” and policy of “Comprehensi ve Engagement” with China. While such policies sometimes go b y similar or ev en the same names they , unhelpfully, can often be v ery different in content. F or example,

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contrast the constructive engagement policy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as it applies to My anmar, with some American usages of the term referring to China (see belo w). The basic premise that underpins the many different policies of engagement towards China is the assumption that incorporating the country in as many international regimes, institutions, and binding commitments as possible, will minimize its potential for “disruptive” behaviour in the future and will maximize the c hances for its smooth integration into the international order. Engagement aims to get China to recognize and abide by the existing rules and norms of the international community. Beyond its broad aim, however, there has often been inconsistency when it comes to the polic y’s details. According to the former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the basis for U.S. engagement of China is the “one-China polic y”.16 While the United States has continuing disagreements with China over human rights, weapons proliferation, and Taiwan, Christopher said these are “an argument for engagement, not for containment or isolation. Neither the United States nor China can afford the luxury of walking away from our responsibilities to manage our differences.” In contrast, in J une 1997, Under-Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, described the gr anting of most-favoured-nation (MFN) status as central to the U.S. strategy of “comprehensive engagement” with China. 17 The United States has not always been a fan of the kind of engagement in multilater al regimes it now prescribes for China. In an article published in Time magazine in 1988, Richard Solomon, a senior Bush administration official with responsibilities that included the Asia-Pacific, complained that the Soviet Union was trying to restrict U.S. flexibility by constantly attempting to “engage” it in multilater al fora.18 Furthermore, the United States’ use of the language of engagement has not been limited to its relations with China. Speaking to the National Press Club in July 1995 on the topic “A Peaceful and Prosperous Asia-Pacific”, the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher described U.S.–Japan relations as “the cornerstone of our engagement in the Asia-Pacific region”. He also discussed the need for the “closer engagement” of Vietnam, as well as the

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“engagement … [of] other leading nations of Asia … Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore”. 19 The United States’ relationship with North Korea has also been described in the language of engagement.20 Similarly, engagement is not a policy or approach pursued solely by the United States. Australia and several ASEAN member states have also set out what they mean b y their policies of engagement. 21 Third, engagement increasingly appears in the liter ature on Asia-Pacific security in qualified, or , to use Kim Nossal’ s term, “adorned” forms. A wide range of adjectives now proceed the word, usually purporting to give it some kind of nuanced meaning. These modifiers include: acti ve engagement;22 ad hoc engagement; adversarial engagement;23 broken engagement; coercive engagement; commercial engagement; Comprehensive Engagement;24 compulsory engagement; conditional engagement; constructi ve engagement; Co-operative Engagement; deep engagement and deeper engagement; defence engagement; destructi ve engagement; Dual Engagement;25 economic engagement; 26 effective engagement; Flexible and Selecti ve Engagement;27 focused engagement; 28 full engagement; 29 Global Engagement; 30 hidden engagement; incomplete engagement; intense engagement; peaceful engagement; Peacetime Engagement; positi ve engagement;31 presumptive engagement; preventive engagement; proportional engagement; 32 pseudo-engagement; realistic engagement; sceptical engagement; selective engagement; sham engagement; 33 Soft Engagement; 34 strategic engagement;35 and sustained engagement. 36 Sometimes, as in the case of the Council on F oreign Relations’ project on “conditional engagement”, the modified concept refers to a carefully thought out and quite complex group of ideas, which together make up a coherent polic y prescription. Where this is the case, a more detailed explanation of the usage has been pro vided below. In other cases the qualifier is used by an opponent to deride and refute a particular government policy. For example, the American journal New Republic has used “destructi ve engagement” several times as a pointed counter to “constructi ve engagement”. 37 Congressman Dick Gephart has likewise referred to the Clinton administration’s China policy as “commercial engagement”.38 More

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often than not, these are terms coined with the headline writer rather than the diplomatic or foreign policy audience in mind. There are exceptions, ho wever, where an author has pro vided a more ad hoc detailed explanation of their idea (for example with “ engagement”); where this is the case, more details are spelled out below. As is apparent from the above discussion, the use of engagement in the r apidly growing literature on the Asia-Pacific security cooperation covers a diverse range of sometimes contradictory ideas, approaches, and policies. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, like concepts of security the different forms of engagement are often used interchangeably by officials or sc holars in their writings and speeches. Even concepts w hich purport to describe specific state policies are often used without consistency or precision. Therefore, it should be remembered that some of the distinctions drawn below are often blurred in pr actice.

Ad hoc Engagement Writing in the conservative American journal National Interest, the former Bush administration Under-Secretary of State Robert Zoellick offered a critique of the Clinton administr ation’s policy towards China.39 Zoellick argued that while “engagement points in the right direction, it is not enough”. He claimed that the Clinton administration’s China polic y has in reality been one of “ ad hoc engagement”. Without an integrated strategy, said Zoellick, ad hoc engagement is likely to lead to “a short-term and short-sighted policy of merely coping with crises, w hich will lead to increased political friction in both [the U.S. and China]”. 40 In terms of economic policy, Zoellick argued the administration has not done enough to make a case for a coherent polic y of economic ties that demonstrate the positive impact of China’s growth on the United States. Zoellick said that without a strategy for engaging China, the current approac h will continue to gener ate a “host of highly specific complaints from U.S. interests” for cing the U.S. Government to make “narro w case-by-case demands through

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bilateral ties” which could ultimately undermine the relationship as a whole.41 He noted that the United States and China face similar risks in the realm of security polic y. While China can influence security issues suc h as proliferation, North K orea, and regional security arrangements, U.S. engagement is not likely to be successful as long as it is equivalent to a “long laundry list of actions the United States would like China to take”. 42

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Comprehensive Engagement Comprehensive engagement is one of the most commonly used forms of engagement in the Asia-Pacific security discourse. Unfortunately, it is also one of the most ambiguous. The term’s origins are unclear, and while it is now usually associated with the Clinton administration’s policy towards China, President George H. Bush also referred several times to his administration’s China policy using the same language. In a March 1992 letter vetoing the United States–China Act 1991 (HR 2212), Bush described “agreements b y the Chinese to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, to abide b y the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by April, and to discuss our human rights concerns — after y ears of stonew alling — [as] clear achievements of m y Administration’s policy of comprehensi ve engagement.”43 He said comprehensi ve engagement “on sev eral fronts invites China’s leadership to act responsibly without lea ving any doubts about the consequences of Chinese misdeeds. Our approach is one of targeting specific areas of concern with the appropriate policy instruments to produce the desired results. ”44 In his 1992 election campaign, then-Governor Clinton strongly criticized Bush’s policy towards China. He promised to pursue a tougher line on human rights issues with China if elected. After taking office in January 1993, Clinton announced a change in U.S. policy. A presidential Executive Order of 28 May 1993 linked approval of China’s MFN trading status with progress on human rights issues. The order required the Secretary of State to certify that China had made “overall significant progress” in a number of human rights

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areas in order to have its MFN status renewed.According to Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and P acific Affairs, immediately following the issuance of the executi ve order the United States initiated dialogue with China on the steps that would need to be taken in order for MFN to be renewed in 1994. 45 By September 1993, however, the Clinton administration became concerned that its str ategy was not ac hieving the desired results. After an extensi ve inter-agency review the U.S. Go vernment announced an “expanded str ategy of comprehensive engagement … designed to engage the Chinese at levels of seniority required to achieve progress in areas of paramount concern”.46 These included “first and foremost” human rights, but also trade and non-proliferation issues. President Clinton’ s meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) leaders’ meeting in Seattle in No vember 1993 was cited as an example of comprehensive engagement in action.47 While some accounts claim that at this time comprehensi ve engagement replaced the tr ade threat as the focus of U.S. polic y, it is more accur ate to say that at first comprehensive engagement supplemented the administration’s primary policy of linking MFN status with human rights. The May 1993 executive order remained in force and the United States kept up its threats to deny MFN status in both public and secret diplomacy until May 1994.48 At that point, the strategy collapsed when President Clinton decided to extend MFN status unconditionally and officially delinked human rights with trade. However, despite this significant shift in policy, and the loss of the domestic political consensus in the United States that had supported the tougher Clinton line, comprehensive engagement continued to be used as the principal label to describe U.S. polic y towards China. Winston Lord has said the r ationale behind comprehensi ve engagement is to ha ve a broad agenda with high-level, as well as working-level, negotiations and exc hanges, to ensure “that w hen we run into trouble on some fronts, we have enough positive areas so that the whole relationship would not suffer.”49 To some critics of the policy, however, the result has been that eac h U.S. official contact with China carries a mixed and sometimes confused menu

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of missions. An article in the International Herald Tribune in February 1995 commented on the contr adictions, noting “Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary will soon visit China to harv est some contracts for private U.S. business, but will also take up human rights and arms proliferation, issues usually handled by the Secretary of State.”50 In his 1994 mid-term review of MFN status, Lord noted that on visits to China, Agriculture Secretary Espy and Commerce Secretary Ron Brown had “articulated firmly and cogently the need for progress on human rights and other non-economic issues of concern”. 51 As Johnston and Ross ha ve identified, a problem inherent in the comprehensive engagement approach is that the utility of threats to damage one aspect of the relationship is reduced because of the ripple effect on other, more profitable aspects. 52 A Chinese perspective on comprehensive engagement has been advanced by Wang Jisi. In an essa y in the Beijing Review entitled “U.S. China Policy: Containment or Engagement?”, he argues that the policy announced by the Clinton administr ation in September 1993 was “tantamount to admitting the failure of sanctions and acknowledging China’s international standing and legitimacy”.53 He does not see comprehensive engagement as a particularly positi ve contribution to Sino–U.S. relations, ho wever. Instead, engagement is viewed as an attempt b y the United States to influence China’ s domestic and foreign polic y. “Engagement does not merely mean closer high-level contacts. It is not a friendly gesture but r ather an attempt to pervade China with U.S. economic, political, cultur al, and ideological influences. Ev entually, the United States hopes China will accept Western-led international norms.”54 Australia has also set out its o wn, quite specific, concept of comprehensive engagement. In a 1989 ministerial statement on regional security, Australia announced that it was adopting a policy of “comprehensive engagement” towards Southeast Asia, along with one of “constructive commitment” to the South Pacific.55 According to the statement, comprehensive engagement was Australia’s “longterm goal” in Southeast Asia. It described the polic y as “‘comprehensive’ in that there should be man y elements in the relationship, and ‘engagement’ because it implies a mutual

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commitment between equals”. It said the polic y “reflects an understanding that our security interests are ad vanced by policies that develop and reinforce a diverse array of linkages. Through these we should seek to con vey a common message: our desire to be a full-fledged partner, and the v alue of inter action with us. ”56 The essential elements of the concept included: building increased linkages with countries in Southeast Asia; continuing to support ASEAN, and working to shape additional regional organizations or arrangements; participating in the development of a regional security community; working for the inv olvement of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and My anmar in the co-oper ative framework of regional affairs; and recognizing Australia should pursue its interests in Southeast Asia as “a confident and natur al partner in a common neighbourhood of remarkable di versity, rather than as a cultur al misfit trapped by geography”.57 Interestingly, around the time that the United States w as attempting to develop its policy of comprehensive engagement with China, Australia was moving away from use of the term. In Ma y 1995, Australian officials announced that they were replacing their policy of “comprehensi ve engagement” to wards East Asia with a new policy of “partnership and integr ation”.58

Conditional Engagement A 1996 Council on Foreign Relations study set up to consider U.S.– China relations coined the term conditional engagement. In his edited volume, Weaving the Net , James Shinn argues conditional engagement is a “moder ate, rules-based” polic y that offers a compromise between unconditionally engaging China and containment. 59 According to Shinn, conditional engagement welcomes China’s integration into the global tr ading and financial systems, and proposes w ays in which the United States and other Asian states can not only acceler ate this integration but amplify its moderating effect on Chinese behaviour. He suggests the concept of conditional engagement could be the str ategic anchor upon which the U.S.–China relationship could be based. 60

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According to Shinn, the general thrust of conditional engagement is “to bring China into the community of nations through an accord on basic rules for international conduct”. 61 He ad vances ten principles which he says will accommodate China’s rise as a world power and protect the vital interests of its neighbours. The ten principles are: no unilater al use of offensi ve military for ce; the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; respect for national sovereignty; freedom of na vigation; moderation in military for ce build-up; transparency of military for ces; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; market access for trade and investment; co-operative solutions for tr ansnational problems; and respect for basic human rights. Achieving respect for these principles is the objective of conditional engagement. 62 To achieve conditional engagement, Shinn urges the adoption of two parallel strategies: economic engagement and security engagement. Economic engagement seeks to promote the integration of China into the global econom y through negotiations on tr ade liberalization, institution-building, and educational exchanges. While Shinn acknowledges that sometimes a carrot-and-stic k approach might be necessary, he is opposed to the use of tr ade sanctions to achieve short-term political goals. 63 The second element of the str ategy is the use of security engagement. Security engagement includes the use of arms control measures, multilateral dialogues, and w hat he calls a “looselystructured defensive military arr angement in Asia”.64 This, Shinn argues, should reduce the risks posed by China’s military expansion, its lack of tr ansparency, the prolifer ation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational concerns such as crime and illegal migration.

Constructive Engagement Constructive engagement was the term gi ven to the Thatcher and Reagan administrations’ policy of maintaining relations with South Africa during the apartheid era. According to the former U.S. National Security Council member Constantine Menges, constructi ve

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engagement meant having “normal economic relations [with South Africa] while quietly using the important American economic presence — specifically in American-owned companies — to apply the principles of equal rights for all w orkers as an example and incentive for positi ve actions b y South African business and government”.65 In theory at least, the policy was aimed at changing South Africa through dialogue, influence, and persuasion r ather than the policies of isolation and sanctions pursued b y most of the international community. The effectiveness and motives behind the U.S. policy of constructi ve engagement have been questioned b y many, leading one sc holar to describe it as “incomplete engagement”.66 This association with apartheid South Africa has given constructive engagement a pejorative connotation for many in the West. It is often seen as simply an excuse for pursuing “business as usual” with pariah regimes. In the Asia-Pacific context, the term is commonly associated with Thailand’s and subsequently ASEAN’s policy of maintaining relations with the military go vernment in My anmar (at the time known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council or SLORC), despite its widely criticized human rights record. According to Leszek Buszynski, the term originated with the Thai Government of Chatichai Chunawan, which was in office from August 1988 to February 1991. Buszynski sa ys the concept w as conceived by the Thai foreign ministry in the period after the SLORC crushed student demonstrations in Yangon in 1988. He says constructive engagement was designed “to bridge a gap between particular Thai interests in Myanmar on the one hand, and Western condemnation of SLORC on the other . As a political device it w as a means of ensuring Thailand’s security as well as economic interests. As a diplomatic device it w as designed to deflect international attention from Thailand’s cooperative policy in relation to SLORC, with the explanation that the regime’s behaviour would somehow improve as a result.”67 The term was popularized by then Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin who used it to defend the Thai policy of dealing with the SLORC in a meeting with the European Economic Community (EEC) officials in Brussels in J uly 1991. In a speec h to the United

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Nations General Assembly on 2 October 1991, he subsequently called for ASEAN to adopt a policy of “constructive management” of Myanmar.68 Buszynski claims that constructi ve engagement w as elevated to the position of an official ASEAN policy at the 1992 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Manila. He says ASEAN used the term “as a defence against its dialogue partners, especially the U.S and the EU, w hich had proposed that pressure be brought to bear upon SLORC”. 69 Various definitions of the term ha ve been offered that link constructive engagement to the “ ASEAN way” (see the relev ant entry), especially the preference for so-called “quiet diplomacy”. In an article in August 1992, the Singapore newspaper Straits Times defined constructive engagement as meaning the use of “gentle persuasion and quiet diplomac y to prod the regime [in My anmar] into political liberalization. This means keeping the dialogue going with the SLORC leaders.”70 An Indonesian foreign ministry official has defined the polic y in the follo wing way: “We are telling them [the regime in My anmar] very quietly, in a Southeast Asian way, without any fanfare, without any public statements: ‘Look, you are in trouble, let us help y ou. But y ou have to c hange, you cannot continue like this.’”71 The official also said it w as part of the policy to avoid steps that might “embarr ass and isolate” the My anmar junta, adding “if their pride is hurt, it won’t help. If they don’t want to talk to you it won’t help any of our efforts. So we keep talking to them.”72 Commenting on the Philippine’ s position on constructi ve engagement, an ASEAN official said, “If you talk to [the SLORC] as a friend and advise them, they are more likely to listen than if y ou lecture from the rooftops as an ad versary.”73 A Malaysian official stressed a preference “to do things quietly, the ASEAN way, so as to give face to the other side”. 74 In practice, the policy of constructive engagement meant ASEAN not only declined to enfor ce sanctions against My anmar but also actually encouraged the development of economic, political, and military links to the SLORC regime. In this respect Thailand has played the leading role. In December 1988, shortly after the SLORC came to power, the Thai Armed Forces Supreme Commander became

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the first foreign leader to visit Myanmar. The visit was followed by a new economic and security relationship between Thailand and Myanmar. This allowed Myanmar troops to cross the Thai border to attack Karen and Mon guerrillas, and also allo wed Thai logging companies to operate along the My anmar border and Thai fishing companies access to the Andaman Sea. This led some analysts to suggest that the polic y of constructive engagement was in effect a quid pro quo between Thailand and Myanmar.75 Thailand also invited Myanmar to attend the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as an observer, although the proposal was vetoed by Malaysia. Myanmar’s admission as a full member ofASEAN on 23 July 1997 has also been explained as advancing the goals of constructive engagement. Indeed, during Myanmar’s admission, the Philippines F oreign Secretary Domingo Siazon said ASEAN’s policy was no longer limited to simply constructive engagement but rather “full engagement” with Myanmar.76 Critics of constructi ve engagement, including My anmar’s opposition leader, Aung San Suu K yi, argue that r ather than encouraging political liber alization in My anmar, constructive engagement may have delayed it indefinitely by giving the SLORC regime time to consolidate its authoritarian rule. While ASEAN leaders were quick to credit constructive engagement for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest in 1995, the Nobel Laureate responded: “The question is for whom has it been constructive? Was it constructive for the forces of democracy? Was it constructive for the Burmese people in gener al? Was it constructi ve for a limited business community? Or was it constructive for SLORC?” 77 In May 1997, Aung San Suu K yi called for ASEAN to extend its polic y of constructive engagement to include her National League for Democracy (NLD). She said “if ASEAN is truly interested in constructive engagement, it should try to engage with both sides, with the SLORC as well as the democr atic opposition, and make sure the engagement leads to something constructive, in the way of development towards democracy.”78 Constructive engagement has also been used from time to time to describe U.S. policy towards China.79 In a major speech on U.S.

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defence policy in the Asia-Pacific in 1996, the then Secretary of Defence William Perry said one of the four pillars of “U.S. preventive defence policy” in the Asia-Pacific was constructive engagement with China. According to a report in the Straits Times, Perry said constructive engagement had been the consistent polic y of the United States for more than twenty y ears under six Presidents from both the Republican and Democr atic parties.80 He contr asted constructive engagement with containment, saying “engagement is not only in our self-interest. I believ e it is also in China’ s selfinterest.” Interestingly, he suggested that to be successful, the policy needed to be reciprocated b y the Chinese leadership, sa ying “It takes two to tango; it takes tw o to engage.”81

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Co-operative Engagement Co-operative engagement has been used by the U.S. military’s Pacific Command to describe American strategy in the Asia-Pacific. It was the heir to several “co-operative” U.S. strategies in the Asia-Pacific, including the policy of “co-operative vigilance” announced under the Bush administration. In his testimon y before the U.S. House of Representati ves’ National Security Committee in Mar ch 1997, the Commander in Chief of United States Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Admiral Joseph Prueher, said the strategy of co-operative engagement was designed to accomplish three major goals: first, in peacetime “to shape the regional environment to render conflicts and crises less likely”; second, in times of crisis, to “resolv e specific situations on terms that advance [the United States’] long-range interests”; and third, in the event of w ar, to allo w the United States to “win quic kly and decisively with minimum loss of life”. 82 The content of co-oper ative engagement emphasizes conflict prevention by promoting security co-oper ation, the clear communication of U.S. interests and commitment, and through more specific policies such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this respect it appears to share some common elements with the Brookings Institution’ s concept of co-oper ative

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security (although it is important to note that this definition of cooperative security is not the one emplo yed by most officials and scholars from outside the United States). According to Admiral Prueher, in practice, co-operative engagement includes the use of bilateral and multilater al activities aimed at resolving security concerns in the region, visits, and exc hanges of military personnel at various levels, multinational exercises, and operations, as well as conferences, dialogues, and seminars. 83 Douglas Stuart and William Tow suggest that the origins of cooperative engagement ma y lie in an influential 1992 RAND Corporation study entitled A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension. The RAND report recommended that the United States adopt a “proportional engagement” posture. Ho wever, as Stuart and Tow note, both co-operative and proportional engagement seem to mean “little more than holding fast to existing bilater al alliances and related security arr angements in the face of str ategic uncertainty”.84

Deep Engagement The concept of “deep engagement” w as put forw ard by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence for International SecurityAffairs Joseph S. Nye in an article in Foreign Affairs in July 1995.85 Nye’s article makes the case for the policy set out in the Department of Defence’s United States Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region. The principal elements of this strategy are an active American interest in Asia-Pacific issues and a substantial forw ard-deployed military presence of about 100,000 troops. Ny e’s article w as intended to send a clear message to Asia-Pacific states of the United States’ intention to remain active and involved in the region. Nye argues that the United States could pursue four alternative strategies rather than deep engagement: it could withdr aw totally from the region and adopt an Atlantic-based defence strategy; it could withdraw from its alliances in Asia to let balance of po wer politics take the place of American leadership; it could replace its alliances with a loose series of regional institutions; or it could

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create a regional alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).86 However, he discounts these alternati ves arguing instead that w hat is needed and desired b y states in the region is “U.S. leadership” which he seems to equate with his policy of deep engagement. 87 While Nye does not spell out what he thinks distinguishes deep engagement from engagement per se, he lists the three parts that make up the American strategy. The first is the reinforcing of America’s bilateral alliances in the region to identify their new basis after the Cold War. The second component is the maintenance of a forwardbased troop presence. As well as deterring a possible threat from North Korea, Nye says these forces also guarantee the United States a voice in the region, secure tr ade routes, and support other U.S. interests as far away as the Persian Gulf. The third dimension of the U.S. strategy is the development of regional institutions to act as a confidence-building measure for the region. Nye gives as examples the U.S. role in strengthening APEC, as well as its support for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and various bilateral dialogues.

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Preventive Engagement In an article published in Harvard International Review in autumn 1993, U.S. Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, the then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, offered the concept of “preventive engagement” as a guide forAmerican strategic planning in the post-Cold War era.88 Dellums argued that a new strategy was needed for American international engagement after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He said that in an increasingly interdependent world, the United States had a responsibility to help meet the challenges of “recognizing, addressing and solving human and man-made disasters”. It should do so in a multilateral fashion, in coordination with other developed nations. “Seldom, if ever”, he said, “will a military response be the best answer to resolve any particular problem”. To avoid the creation of potential crises where armed intervention seems to be the only solution, Dellums called for the United States,

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“along with other democratic allies”, to adopt a strategy of “preventive engagement”. He said the term contains tw o primary assumptions: first, that the United States “must resist isolationist calls” and second, “we must seek to forestall — to head off — a larger potential problem in the future by engaging early and with appropriate nonmilitary efforts.”89 Dellums’ concept appears to be marrying the notion of preventive diplomacy with the much discussed policy of engagement. According to Dellums, preventive engagement is “analogous to good medicine and public health care”. He criticized the Clinton administration’s conceptualization of engagement (as set out b y Warren Christopher and Tony Lake), saying it gave too much weight to military for ce. He argued that before military for ce is used, a range of approac hes should be attempted first: these include diplomacy, conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance. Where countries fail to compel with international la w or human rights norms, Dellums envisaged a gradual ladder of escalation, beginning with economic sanctions. He argued that “there must be a strong bias against an y use of for ce, especially unilater al actions b y a single nation.”90

Realistic Engagement Another modified concept of engagement is offered b y Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick Cronin in the journal Washington Quarterly. Cronin and Cronin call for the United States to pursue a polic y of “realistic engagement” with China. 91 The authors offer realistic engagement as an alternative to what they see as the current “drift” in U.S.–China relations. They are also opposed to a polic y of containment which they dismiss as “ill-advised” and (paraphrasing Omar Bradley) “the wrong polic y, at the wrong time, against the wrong country”.92 At the core of the concept of realistic engagement is a wideranging set of co-oper ative security measures focused on a verting regional crises, stemming the prolifer ation of weapons of mass

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destruction, and establishing military-to-military contacts at all levels. Cronin and Cronin argue that through a policy of realistic engagement the United States can lay down the “indicators [it] will use to form judgments about China’s future aims”. 93 Cronin and Cronin set out three lev els at w hich realistic engagement can be ad vanced: globally, regionally, and bilaterally. At the global level the goal of realistic engagement is to find w ays to incorporate China into existing mechanisms for international cooperation. They support increased economic linkages between the international community and China, claiming these will increase the likelihood that the system will evolve in a mutually advantageous peaceful manner. They also seem to imply support for Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the security realm the authors call for increased co-oper ation between China and the United States at the United Nations. They also urge that China be encouraged to participate more in non-proliferation regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), saying the latter will be “a critical test of [China’ s] intentions to abide b y existing international norms”. 94 Regionally, the agenda for U.S.–China realistic engagement includes economical, political, and military linkages. Cronin and Cronin argue that Asia-Pacific states should use the ARF as an “instrument to build confidence and transparency … by overcoming Chinese objections to discussing such contentious issues as territorial disputes in the South China Sea”. 95 Realistic engagement also calls for deeper bilater al ties between the United States and China. Indeed, given China’s preference for bilateral relations, the authors suggest this may be the most important area in w hich the goals of realistic engagement can be ad vanced. They urge increased exchanges between U.S. officials and military personnel; the establishment of bilateral confidence-building measures such as an Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) similar to that negotiated with the former Soviet Union; as well as using CINCP AC’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies to facilitate positive contacts with Chinese military officials and analysts. 96

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Selective Engagement In a speec h at Rice Uni versity in Houston in 1994, J ames Baker, Secretary of State in the Bush administration, advanced a concept of “selective engagement”.97 According to Baker, the United States is entering a third phase in the history of its foreign polic y. The first phase, which lasted until 1941, with a brief interregnum during World War I, was one of “disengagement”. During this period, the United States tried but failed to isolate itself from threats to peace and prosperity elsew here in the w orld. The second phase, w hich came with U.S. entry into World War II, was one of “compulsory engagement”. This policy was maintained after the w ar ended as a response to “communist aggression”. According to Baker, the third phase — requiring a polic y of “selecti ve engagement” — began with the end of the Cold War.98 Selective engagement recognizes the idea of anAmerica “actively engaged in international affairs. It embr aces the concept of an America not just in the w orld, but of it.” Baker says that in a world of “fierce economic competition, burgeoning instability and renascent fascism … selective engagement recognizes that disengagement is simply not an option.” However, while selective engagement reaffirms an active American internationalism, as its name suggests it also recognizes that a post-Cold War foreign polic y must be about making choices, “selecting w hen and w here we will engage”. Ironically, says Baker, “America can do so muc h today that we are tempted to do ev erything — or do nothing at all. ”99 The key to selective engagement is setting “clear, coherent, and comprehensive criteria for making … vital decisions. Above all, we need to act in proportion to our interests, seek balance in our objecti ves and remain credible in the exer cise of our policies.”100 Among the specific goals that Baker set out were “consolidating democracy and free markets in Eastern Europe and the former So viet Union, containing regional conflicts and stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, strengthening an open global economic system, redefining the Western Alliance, and renewing American leadership”. In pr actical terms, Baker’s policy seems to

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call for a pr agmatic mix of idealism and realism. F or example, on Sino–U.S. relations Baker said “an y list of American interests in China would include protection of human rights, market access for American firms, and Chinese co-operation on a range of international security issues, especially non-proliferation. Yet, given the regime in Beijing, an absolutist American policy on human rights w ould undercut both our commercial interest and … our interest in denying North Korea nuclear weapons.”101 In contrast to Baker, Lawrence Korb has argued that selecti ve engagement accurately describes the Clinton administration’s foreign policy priorities. However, Korb says while Clinton has “chosen and acted [on selective engagement]” he has not made it clear to the American people. Korb likens selective engagement to a polic y of “pragmatic intervention”.102

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Notes 1. Stephen B. Shepard et. al, “Li Lanquing: ‘Does ‘Engagement’ Mean Fight or Marry?”, Business Week, 6 May 1996, p. 33. 2. David E. Sanger , “China F aces Test of Resolv e to Join the Global Economy”, New York Times, 2 March 1997, pp. A1, A8. 3. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, “Engaging China: Managing a Rising Power”, Research Project of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University, unpublished paper, n.d. 4. Ibid., p. 4. 5. Ibid., p. 5. 6. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 7. Ibid., p. 6. 8. Ibid. 9. Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O’Sulli van, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 113–135, 113–114. 10. Anthony Lake, “F rom Containment to Enlargement: Current F oreign Policy Debates in P erspective”, Speech delivered at the Sc hool of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1993. 11. John Gerard Ruggie, “T he Past as Prologue: Interests, Identity , and

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14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon American Foreign Policy”, International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 107. Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, p. 18. The White House, A National Security Str ategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Go vernment Printing Office, 1996), pp. 2, 12. For some arguments fa vouring containment, see Gideon Rac hman, “Containing China”, Washington Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1995): 129–39; A shorter v ersion of this article appears under the same title, but without a b yline, in Economist, 29 J uly 1995, pp. 11–12; Arthur Waldron, “Deterring China”, Commentary 100, no. 4 (October 1995); Charles Krauthammer, “Why We Must Contain China”, Time, 31 July 1995. Joseph S. Ny e, “China’s Re-emergence and the Future of the AsiaPacific”, Survival 39, no. 4 (W inter 1997–98): 65–79, 76. Emphasis added. “American Interests and the U.S.–China Relationship”, Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Council on F oreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 17 May 1996. Stuart Eizenstat, “United States Trade with Asia”, Statement by UnderSecretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, Washington, D.C., 18 June 1997, reproduced in the U.S. Department of State Dispatc h, July 1997, pp. 14–20, 16. Time, 23 May 1988. For a more recent example, seeAddress by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting Nine-Plus-Ten Session, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, reproduced in the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, July 1997, pp. 6–9. See, for example, a speech by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Winston Lord on U.S.–North Korea relations, reproduced in the U.S. Department of State Dispatc h, 1 April 1996, p. 165. See, for example, Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and the Conditional Engagement of China”, in Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, edited b y James Shinn (New York: Council on F oreign Relations Press, 1996), pp. 220–48; J usuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement”, Survival 38, no. 3 (A utumn 1996). See the speech by the Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S.–

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23. 24.

25.

26. 27.

28.

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Russia relations, reproduced in the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 5 June 1995, p. 474. Nigel Holloway, “Making an Enem y”, Far Eastern Economic Review , 20 March 1997, p. 14. For a historical discussion of the emergence of the U.S. polic y of Comprehensive Engagement, see Judith F. Kornberg, “Comprehensive Engagement: New Frameworks for Sino-American Relations”, Journal of East Asian Affairs X, no. 1 (W inter/Spring 1996): 13–44. See James B. Steinberg, Director , Policy Planning Staff, “Dual Engagement: U.S. P olicy Toward Russia and China”, in the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 8 May 1995, p. 392. “Containing China”, Economist, 29 July 1995, p. 11. National Military Str ategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995). Ronald N. Montaperto and KarlW. Eikenberry, “Paper Tiger: A Skeptical Appraisal of China’ s Military Might”, Harvard International Review XVIII, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 28–31, 31. Speaking after Myanmar had been granted membership in ASEAN, the Philippines’ Foreign Under-Secretary, Rodolfo Severino, was reported as saying ASEAN’s policy is no longer constructi ve engagement, but “full engagement” with Burma. See Isagani de Castro, “Southeast Asia: Despite Its Weight, ASEAN Carries Burma”, Inter Press Service, 28 July 1997; On “full engagement” with China, see the U.S. Under-Secretary of Commerce Jeffrey Garten, quoted in “U.S. Policy is to Engage China, Says Commerce Undersecretary”, Straits Times, 22 September 1995, p. 2. Department of the Air Force, “Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force”, mimeographed, November 1996. Richard Lloyd Parry, “EU F ails to Bloc k Burma’s Entry to ASEAN”, Reuters Economic Newswire, 14 February 1997. See note 84 below. “Sham Engagement”, Multinational Monitor 15, no. 10 (No vember 1994): 5. This term has been used in the J apanese press to distinguish J apan’s policy of engaging China from that pursued b y the United States. We are very grateful to Akiko Fukushima for drawing this to our attention. Carnes Lord and Gary J. Schmitt, “Strategic Engagement: Some Modest Proposals”, Comparative Strategy 13, no. 3 (J uly–September 1994):

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253. 36. Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement”, p. 19. 37. “Destructive Engagement”, New Republic 216 (10 Mar ch 1997): 9; “Destructive Engagement II”, New Republic 216 (17 March 1997): 9. 38. Ibid., p. A8. 39. Robert Zoellick, “China: What Engagemet Should Mean”, National Interest, Winter 1996/97, p. 13–22. 40. Ibid., p. 15. 41. Ibid., p. 16. 42. Ibid. 43. “Text of Letter From President Bush to the House of Representati ves”, Federal News Service, 2 Mar ch 1992. 44. Ibid. 45. See Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of U.S. House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee on “Mid-Term Review of Most-Favoured-Nation Status for China”, 24 February 1994, reproduced in the U.S. Department of State Dispatc h, 7 March 1994. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Daniel Williams and Ann Devroy, “China’s Disbelief of Rights Threat Sank Clinton Plo y”, Washington Post, 28 Ma y 1994, p. A1. Shortly before MFN status extension was granted, the United States dispatched a former senior diplomat, Mic hael Armacost, on a secret mission to Beijing to try to win some concessions from the Chinese Government. Armacost returned with a pledge to release from jail tw o prominent dissidents; a list of prisoners; an agreement to permit the emigration of some citizens whose passports had been blocked for political reasons, as well as an agreement to discuss prison labour , and the jamming of the Voice of America. 49. Lord, “Mid-Term Review”. 50. Daniel Williams, “The Fits and Starts of U.S.–ChinaTies; Relations Face Another Test in Dispute over Copyright”, International Herald Tribune, 14 February 1995. 51. Lord, “Mid-Term Review”. 52. Johnston and Ross, “Engaging China”, p. 6. 53. Wang Jisi, “U.S. China Policy: Containment or Engagement?”, Beijing Review, 21 October 1996, pp. 6–9, 7. 54. Ibid.

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55. Australia’s Regional Security, Ministerial Statement b y Gareth Ev ans Q.C., Minister for F oreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989. The Statement is reproduced in full in Greg F ry, ed., Australia’s Regional Security (North Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991), pp. 165–216. 56. Ibid., 213 paras., pp. 173–75. 57. Ibid., 214 para., p. 176. For a critical analysis of the depth ofAustralian commitment to comprehensive engagement, see Peter King, “Australia and Southeast Asia: ‘Comprehensive Engagement’ or Marriage of Convenience?”, in Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by Peter King and Yoichi Kibata (St Leonards, NSW : Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp. 126–36. 58. “Australia Outlines New Policy towards East Asia”, Xinhua News Agency, 5 May 1995. 59. Shinn, ed., Weaving the Net , p. 4. 60. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 61. Ibid., p. 8. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid., p. 9. 64. Ibid. 65. Constantine C. Menges, “Sanctions ’86: Ho w the State Department Prevailed”, National Interest (Fall 1988), p. 66. 66. Alex Thompson, “Incomplete Engagement”, Journal of Modern African Studies 33, no. 1 (Mar ch 1995): 83. 67. Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of Constructive Engagement”, Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 290–305. 68. Ibid., p. 293. 69. Ibid., p. 294. 70. Straits Times, 23 July 1991, cited in Amitav Acharya, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Dilemmas for F oreign Policy”, Eastern Asia Policy Paper No. 11, Uni versity of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Toronto, 1995, p. 16. 71. Paul Jacob et al., “ASEAN Prefers Soft Talk to Threats in Dealing with Yangon”, Straits Times, 26 August 1992, p. 27. 72. Ibid. 73. Unnamed ASEAN official quoted, ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Acharya, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia”, p. 15. 76. de Castro, “Southeast Asia: Despite Its Weight, ASEAN Carries Burma”. 77. Cited in Acharya, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia”, p. 17.

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78. “Engage with Us Too, Suu Kyi Tells ASEAN”, Asia Pulse, 30 May 1997. 79. See for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, “A New China Strategy”, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 6 (No vember/December 1995): 35–49, 47–49. 80. Felix Soh, “US ‘Committed to Engaging China, Not Containing It’”, Straits Times, 15 February 1996, p. 1. 81. Ibid. Similarly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Stanley Roth has also called on the Chinese Go vernment to pursue a policy of constructi ve engagement with the rest of the w orld. See Stanley Roth, “Scenarios for Ensuring Gro wth and Stability in East Asia”, Remarks at Plenary Session, World Economic F orum, Hong Kong, 15 October 1997. 82. Prepared Statement of Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, U.S. Na vy, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command, before the U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee, LEXIS-NEXIS, 6 March 1997. 83. Ibid. 84. James Winnefeld et al., A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension, R-4089/2-USDP (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1992), cited in Douglas T. Stuart and William S. Tow, A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 13. 85. Joseph S. Nye “The Case for Deep Engagement”, Foreign Affairs, July/ August 1995, pp. 90–102. 86. Ibid., pp. 92–94. 87. Ibid., p. 96. 88. Ronald V. Dellums, “Preventive Engagement: Constructing Peace in a Post-Cold War World”, Harvard International Review (Fall 1993), pp. 24–27. 89. Ibid., p. 25. 90. Ibid., p. 27. 91. Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick Cronin, “The Realistic Engagement of China”, Washington Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1995): 141–69. 92. Ibid., p. 165. 93. Ibid., p. 142. 94. Ibid., pp. 159–60. 95. Ibid., p. 160. 96. Ibid., pp. 161–63. 97. James A. Baker, III, “Selecti ve Engagement: Principles for American Foreign Policy in East Asia”, Speech delivered at the International

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Human Genome Summit Meeting at the J ames A. Baker, III, Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 21 January 1994. The speech is reproduced in Vital Speeches of the Day LX, no. 10 (1 March 1994): 299–302. Ibid., p. 299. Ibid., p. 302. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 300–301. Lawrence Korb, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy Woes: A Way Out”, Brookings Review 12, no. 4 (F all 1994): 3.

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Flexible Consensus

Consensus has been identified as a centr al tenet of the “ ASEAN way” or the Asia-Pacific approach to multilateralism (see the entry on “The ‘ASEAN Way’”). The common understanding of consensus in the region does not require unanimity on the part of all the members of an organization. This has been described as “flexible consensus”. According to some accounts, the term w as introduced by the former Indonesian President Soeharto at the 1994 AsiaPacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Bogor.1 Others give credit to the work of the Pacific Business Forum which met prior to the Osaka APEC Leaders’ Meeting in November 1995.2 Both accounts agree that flexible consensus is a w ay of mo ving forward by establishing w hat seems to ha ve broad, r ather than unanimous, support. Where there is broad support for a specific measure, the objections of a dissenting participant can be discounted, provided the proposal does not threaten its most basic interests. According to Yoichi Funabashi, in the Bogor Declar ation, Indonesia proposed full trade liberalization for all economies in the Asia-Pacific by the y ear 2020. Mala ysia objected and refused to abide by any binding time-fr ame. Indonesia found a w ay to get around this b y invoking the notion of consensus and carefully distinguishing it from unanimity. While Malaysia did not approve of the use of a formal, fixed deadline, the sc heduled target date of 2020 did not threaten its basic interest. Consequently, while Malaysia later announced that it regarded an y deadlines for APEC’s trade liberalization as only “indicative” and “non-binding”, it had already planned to make the necessary tariff cuts to meet the target date. 3 Thus, in the words of the Pacific Business Forum, flexible consensus allows “economies that are ready to move forward to do so and ... other economies, w hich are not y et ready, to join later”. Suc h a process, they add, promotes “mutual respect” among APEC members.4 (A link to the concept of concerted unilater alism is also apparent.) This kind of approach will only work in situations where there are no deep or fundamental differences between members. 5 There are, however, problems with the use of flexible consensus in practice. One of its weaknesses is its potential for ambiguity . As Funabashi has noted, when Australia, which was at the time opposed

This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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admitting Chile to APEC, stated along with sev eral other members that there was no consensus on admitting Chile, Mala ysian Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz responded that “there w as no consensus against admitting Chile”.6 Funabashi concludes, “there is no clear definition of the w ord ‘consensus’ among APEC members let alone the concept of ‘flexible consensus’.”7 Alistair Iain Johnston has noted that this approach to consensus gives the key role to the Chair. It is the Chair who determines when consensus has or has not been reached and it is, therefore, especially important that the Chair is regarded as a legitimate figure b y all the participants. 8 The term flexible consensus is also used to describe the “10-X principle” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This modified consensus is sometimes permissible w hen one or more states disagree with a position taken by the other members. In such a case, the majority of the ten members ma y press ahead, provided the new position does not threaten the basic interests of the dissenting state or states. The general rule is that this kind of flexible consensus does not apply to fundamental political or security matters and according to Hadi Soesastro, also “does not apply to AFTA”.9

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Notes 1. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), p. 146. 2. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: F rom the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 337. 3. Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, pp. 146–47. 4. The Osaka Action Plan: Roadmap to Realizing the APEC Vision, Report of the P acific Business F orum 1995 (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), p. 10. 5. An analogous term in European institutional discourse is “v ariable geometry”. See Gerald Segal, “Overcoming the ASEMetries of Asia and Europe”, Asia Times (Bangkok), 19 November 1996. 6. Quoted in Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion, p. 147. Emphasis added. 7. Ibid.

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8. Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum”, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space , by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O . Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1999), p. 299. 9. Hadi Soesastro, “Challenges to AFTA in the 21st Century”, in One Southeast Asia In a New Regional and International Setting, edited by Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), p. 87.

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Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a keen interest in rethinking and refashioning the concept of security . Approaches such as co-operative and mutual security are two examples to come out of this. Another approach which has antecedents at least as far back as 1945, but which has attracted considerable recent attention in the scholarly and policy communities, is the notion of “human security”.1 Human security is based on the premise that for too long the concept of security has been interpreted too narrowly. Traditionally, the nation-state has been the primary referent object of security . Security has been concerned with protecting territory, or advancing the national interests or core v alues of states. Advocates of human security suggest that this emphasis on securing states has been at the expense of the security of people. “F orgotten [are] the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them security symbolize[s] protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and en vironmental hazards.”2 Some writers make the argument that historically the enhancement of a state’s security has often come at the direct expense of the security and well-being of its citizens.3 One major report on the subject claims that “[s]ince the end of the Cold War, security for the majority of states has increased, while security for many of the world’s people has declined.”4 To remedy this situation, proponents of human security argue that “the concept of security must c hange urgently in tw o basic ways: from an exclusi ve stress on territorial security to a muc h greater stress on people’ s security; and from security through armaments to security through sustainable development.” In foreign policy terms, human security requires “a shift in perspecti ve or orientation … taking people as its point of reference, r ather than focusing exclusively on … territory or governments”.5 Some advocates describe the concept as ha ving two goals: freeing people from perceived fears, and from material w ant.6 Ramesh Thakur makes a similar claim using the language of positive and negative freedoms. “Negatively, [human security] refers to freedom from: from w ant, hunger, attack, torture, imprisonment without a free and fair trial, 139

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discrimination on spurious grounds, and so on. Positively, it means freedom to: the capacity and opportunity that allo ws each human being to enjoy life to the fullest without imposing constr aints upon others engaged in the same pursuit. While the first ma y suggest a restrictive role for a limited state, the second calls for a permissi ve role for an acti ve state.”7 Others suggest human security has three components: “human survi val, human well-being, and human freedom”.8 While there are v arious interpretations of the human security concept, a number of common c haracteristics can be identified. First, as w as noted abo ve, all the v arious conceptions treat the individual as the referent object of security (that is, that which needs to be made secure). In doing so, most conceptions do not den y a role for states or for traditional concepts of national security, rather they see human security as complementing them. One definition argues that “human security efforts will not replace national security arrangements — the protection of territory and the life and property of people remain the responsibility of go vernment”, but adds that “national security is [a] prerequisite for ensuring security — that is, the survival and dignity of the indi vidual — it is not the only requirement. … The role of government is to provide a foundation or environment that will enable individuals to take care of themselves and to develop their capabilities without undue restrictions. ”9 Second, because it treats the notion of security in broad terms, human security (like comprehensi ve, common, and co-oper ative security) recognizes a wide range of potential threats. According to a United Nations Dev elopment Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report published in 1994, these include “unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution and human rights violations” as well as the more tr aditional concerns of w ar and organized violence. The report suggests that threats to human security can be considered under seven main categories: economic security , food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security . A Canadian report identifies “a wide r ange of old and new threats … r ang[ing] from epidemic diseases to natural disasters, from environmental c hange

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to economic upheavals”, although it adds that Canada has c hosen to focus its efforts on “protecting people from threats of violence”.10 Third, the concept notes the interdependent nature of security . A threat to people’s security in one part of the world has implications for people everywhere. Contemporary security threats such as famine, disease, pollution, crime, terrorism, ethnic conflict, and social disintegration are not discretely isolated events that respect national boundaries. Therefore, co-operative responses are required to combat them. In a speech to the United Nations in 1996, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy said the concept “recognizes the complexity of the human en vironment and accepts that the for ces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinfor cing. At a minimum human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic dev elopment, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament. ”11 Fourth, human security is essentially proacti ve. It recognizes that it is more effective and affordable to work through preventative measures rather than b y intervening when a crisis has become apparent. To use an example cited b y proponents of the concept, the cost of containing the spread of HIV/AIDS b y investing in primary health care and family-planning education w ould have represented a small fraction of the total cost of managing the disease once it became a pandemic. In this sense, human security can be seen as one element of human development. The absence of human development in terms of access to a decent standard of living, jobs, income, and a stable social fabric ma y result in human insecurity . Ensuring sustainable human dev elopment, therefore, helps ensure human security. The remarkable breadth of the concept of human security has attracted some critics, who argue that it is impossible to operationalize as a concept. According to Acharya, “many Asian scholars argue that the broad r ange of threats constituting the human security paradigm is a rehash of the old Asian notion of ‘comprehensi ve security’ developed by Japan and the ASEAN members.”12 Even

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advocates note that because the concept has a “broad meaning and is ambiguous … the mere existence of the term provides no guarantee that there is any real meaning behind those w ords”.13 Despite its non-statist focus, human security has found support among some governments. Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands have accepted the utility of the human security approac h and argued strongly for its adoption.14 In an article in the journal Foreign Policy, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Ev ans also connected human security with the concept of co-oper ative security.15 The Canadian formulation refers to the “security of the people” and identifies the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Convention as the “core elements” of the doctrine of human security . Although it identifies the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report as the sour ce of the “specific phrase” human security, and as suc h an important contributor to post-Cold War thinking about security , it critiques that Report for focusing too muc h on threats associated with underdev elopment and ignoring “human insecurity resulting from violent conflict”. 16 Governmental interest in human security led to a meeting in yLsøen, Norway, in May 1999 where representatives from ten states gathered to discuss the formulation and implementation of a human security agenda. Among the specific c hallenges that were identified were the scourge of anti-personnel landmines and illegal tr afficking in small arms, the goal of creating an international criminal court, preventing the use of c hild soldiers and exploitati ve child labour, and strengthening international humanitarian la w.17 There has also been growing use of the term human security in the Asia-Pacific region. While Japan did not attend the L ysøen meeting, it has shown a keen interest in promoting human security. In a December 1998 speech, the late Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi referred to the concept in setting out J apanese plans for aiding the economically afflicted states of EasternAsia. He said, “we must seek new str ategies for economic dev elopment which attain importance to human security with a view to enhancing the longterm development of our region.” He said the term “comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survi val, daily life and

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dignity of human beings and strengthens efforts to confront those threats”. In June 1999, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations University in Tokyo hosted a conference on the subject, where State Secretary for F oreign Affairs Keizo Takemi declared that human security would be one of the “essential principles for the conduct of J apanese foreign polic y in the twenty-first century”.18 His approach addressed three areas specifically: health care, poverty eradication, and development in Africa. The Japanese commitment to human security was restated at an international conference on human security and dev elopment in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, in May 2000, where Director-General Yukio Takasu said that “Japan identifies the growing importance of human security concerns as one of the major developments in the globalized world.” Takasu offered his o wn interpretation of human security saying that “in Japan’s view … so long as [the concept’s] objectives are to ensure the survi val and dignity of indi viduals as human beings, it is necessary to go bey ond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting life in conflict situations. ” He said the Japanese interpretation was “very similar to the comprehensive and inclusive concept advocated by the UNDP” which identified goals such as “economic security (or freedom from poverty); food security (freedom from hunger), health security (freedom from disease); environmental security (the a vailability of clean w ater and air, for example), personal security (freedom from fear of violence, crime, drugs), community security (freedom to participate in family life and one’s ethnic group), and political security (freedom to exercise one’s basic human rights)”.19 Takasu also said that human security applies to different concerns in different countries and people. He noted that for some P acific states, the effects of global w arming are the primary threat to their human security . He said, “for the J apanese, the major human security concern is no w job security and the ageing of its population.”20 In Southeast Asia, human security found a strong supporter in the Thai Government under Chuan Leekpai. Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan attended the 1999 L ysøen meeting and called for participants to come up with a “common approac h to address the

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issue of human security in a balanced and comprehensive way”. He said “some might put the emphasis on the political dimension, such as the problems of landmines, small arms, organized crime, violations of human rights and so on, w hile others might argue otherwise b y pointing out the threats of po verty, illiteracy, infectious diseases, famines, natural disasters, social unrest and disintegr ation.” Surin concluded, “whichever way we concei ve it, … fears and w ants must be accommodated to create a real sense of ‘common human security’.”21 The concept of human security also underpinned a 1998 Thai proposal for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to adopt a more people-centred approac h to dev elopment. At the 1998 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) in Manila, a Thai proposal for an “ Asean-PMC Caucus on Human Security” w as discussed. According to Surin, the objecti ve was calculated to recognize that “the social and economic dislocation, poverty, disease, illiteracy, alienation, disorientation among our peoples would surely lead to violence, rebellion, instability and insecurity. All these would impact upon all the ac hievements that we ha ve made together so far. And these w ould inevitably threaten the region as a w hole.” While the plan w as adopted by ASEAN, its name w as changed to the “ASEAN-PMC Caucus on Social Safety Nets”, suggesting that some Southeast Asian states are uncomfortable with some aspects of the concept of human security, notably any mention of human rights.22 A critique, albeit an indirect one, of human security w as given by the Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar, in a speec h discussing the establishment of a Mala ysian Human Rights Commission in October 1999. The minister accused the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan of redefining human rights and fundamental freedoms to create the idea of “indi vidual sovereignty”. This new term, he said means “the individual is more paramount than the state, meaning society as a w hole. By that definition and his contention that the state is the serv ant of its people, it w ould justify the United Nations or an y other country [sic], to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of any nation for the sake of the so vereign individual.”23

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1. “Redefining Security: The Human Dimension”, Current History (May 1995), pp. 229–36. 2. Ibid., p. 229. 3. See, for example, Rudolph J. Rummel, “P ower, Genocide and Mass Murder”, Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 1 (F ebruary 1994): 1–10. 4. Human Security: Safety for P eople in a Changing World (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1999), p. 1. 5. Ibid. 6. “Redefining Security”, pp. 230–34. 7. Ramesh Thakur, “Humanizing the Security Discourse: F rom National Security to Human Security”, Paper presented at the the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, 8 Ma y 2000, pp. 2–3. This and other papers from the conference are available online at . This is similar to the language used by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan is a speec h to the Ministerial Conference of the NonAligned Countries, 8 April 2000. Annan said the United Nations’ founders envisaged the need to fight on two fronts to win the battle for enduring peace: “on the security front, w here victory spells freedom from fear, and on the economic front w here victory spells freedom from want”. 8. The three-part approach belongs to Lincoln Chen,Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation. He is cited b y Japan’s State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Keizo Takemi in his keynote address “New F orms of Development Towards the End of the 21st Century Which Focus on the Dignity of the Indi vidual”, presented at the International Symposium on Development, Tokyo, 24 June 1999, p. 2. The full text of the speech can be found at . 9. Statement by Director-General Yukio Takasu at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, Mongolia, 8 May 2000, p. 4. 10. Freedom From Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2000), p. 3. 11. Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership”, International Journal LII, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 183–96.

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12. Amitav Acharya, “Human Security in Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea, or Peril?”, Unpublished paper, July 2000. The paper is available online at . 13. Takemi’s keynote address at the International Symposium on Development, Tokyo, 24 June 1999, p. 7. 14. See, for example, Freedom From Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security. 15. Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intr astate Conflict”, Foreign Policy, No. 96 (Fall 1994). 16. Cited in Acharya, “Human Security in Asia Pacific: Puzzle, Panacea, or Peril?”, p. 3. 17. Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, p. 10. For the Chairman’s summary of the L yseøn meeting and other materials on human security, see the Canadian Department of F oreign Affairs and International Trade’s website at . The ten states which attended the meeting were Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and Norway. South Africa attended as an observer. 18. Ministry of F oreign Affairs of J apan, International Symposium on Development, “Development: With a Special F ocus on Human Security”. A summary of the meeting is a vailable online at . 19. Takasu’s statement at the International Conference on Human Security in a Globalized World, Ulan Bator, p. 2 20. Ibid. 21. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Surin Calls for Action on ‘Human Security’”, Nation, 20 May 1999. 22. Rita Patiyasevi, “Thai Move on Social Issue Caucus Accepted”, Nation, 29 July 1998. 23. “The Malaysian Human Rights Commission: Aims and Objecti ves”, Speech by Datuk Seri Sy ed Hamid Bin Sy ed Jaafar Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, at the Bar CouncilAuditorium, Kuala Lumpur, 28 October 1999.

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Humanitarian intervention is the idea that in certain circumstances it is permissible under international la w for a state or states to use military force to interv ene in another state’ s territory, in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster from taking place, even without the permission of the go vernment of that state. While the idea has developed an extensive literature, it is strongly disputed b y some governments. Legal scholars also differ over its scope and substance. According to Peter Malanczuk, “the literature shows that there are numerous and often conflicting definitions of ‘humanitarian intervention’, some of w hich appear to be mere de facto ‘working definitions’, and others w hich are meant to be normati ve in the sense that the definition itself purports to establish criteria of legality or illegality.”1 Legal sc holar Wil Verwey attempts to find w hat he calls an “authentic definition” of humanitarian interv ention as a legal concept, but concludes “one is immediately confronted with a major analytical obstacle: it soon appears from a compar ative analysis of relevant instruments and literature that there may be few concepts in international la w today which are as conceptually obscure and legally contro versial as ‘humanitarian interv ention’.”2 He attributes this to the lac k of consensus on the legal meaning of both the terms intervention and humanitarian. Bazyler agrees, concluding that “there is little use in defining the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.”3 Ved Nanda describes the doctrine as “controversial” saying it “suffers from normati ve ambiguities” and notes the “absence of general consensus on the definition …, the set of criteria to judge its permissibility or impermissibility under international law, and the safeguards necessary to prevent its abuse”.4 Among the sc holars who have offered specific definitions, Fernando Téson’s work is often cited.Téson argues that humanitarian intervention is “proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to rev olt against their oppressi ve government”.5 Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley describe humanitarian intervention as a “theory which recognizes the right of one state to exer cise an international control by military force over the acts of another when

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contrary to the la ws of humanity”. 6 This is a definition that has its origins with the French writer Antoine Rougier in 1910.7 Numerous other scholars cite Grotius and ev en classical sour ces among the intellectual pioneers of the concept. 8 In his thoughtful and comprehensive study of the concept, Sean Murph y uses a working definition which assumes that humanitarian interv ention “is the threat or use of for ce by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread depri vations of internationally recognized human rights”. 9 Baxter emphasizes that the for ce used must be “short term”. 10 Verwey argues that to be considered as “humanitarian”, forcible action must be “for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to serious violations of fundamental human rights, in particular threats to the life of persons, regardless of their nationality”. His stipulation that it be solely for preventing these violations is so strict that he does not think there ha ve been any genuine examples so far.11 Other authors stress the importance of form: that any intervention should be multilateral and not unilateral. As Martha Finnemore notes, during the United Nations debates that followed Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, no states spoke in fa vour of the existence of a right to unilater al humanitarian intervention, and sev eral states that had previously supported humanitarian intervention arguments in the United Nations voted for the resolution condemningVietnam.12 Malanczuk suggests that the 1986 decision of the International Court of J ustice in the case Nicaragua v. United States prohibiting the “unilateral recourse to armed force by one state to redress the human rights situation in another state … b y implication rejects the doctrine of unilater al humanitarian intervention”.13 In practical terms, humanitarian justifications for military intervention by countries in the domestic affairs of another state are not new. During the nineteenth century , humanitarian r ationales were advanced for various military interventions by the European powers, including Russian, British, and F rench action during the Greek War for Independence (1821–27), F rench action to protect Maronite Christians in what is now Lebanon (1860–61), and Russian

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intervention in Bulgaria, again to protect Christians from Ottoman Turks (1876–78).14 There is dispute, ho wever, about how man y of these cases were genuine examples of humanitarian-inspired action, and how many were moti vated by other interests. Malanczuk concludes that a “critical examination of state pr actice of the 19th century does not persuasively establish the general acceptance of a principle of humanitarian interv ention”.15 In another analysis, Beyerlin notes that prior to World War I, a majority of writers thought that humanitarian interv ention was lawful “although there was considerable doctrinal confusion with respect to the legal foundation and the extent of that institution”.16 Given the existence of what he calls a “substantial minority” of jurists w ho supported a strict principle of non-intervention, he considers it debatable whether humanitarian intervention existed at customary international la w prior to 1914. Since 1945, it has been possible to make an argument in favour of humanitarian intervention based on the codification of human rights in the United Nations Charter . At first glance, the United Nations Charter contains a number of principles which are difficult to reconcile. Article 2 stresses the basic principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Article 1, on the other hand, emphasizes the fundamental importance of human rights, a focus that is also supported by legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and v arious international treaties. Articles 2(3) and 2(4) call on states to settle their disputes peacefully and also to refrain from the use or threat of use of for ce against the territorial integrity of an y state. With humanitarian interv ention, the centr al question is “how to reconcile the principle of territorial sovereignty of states, still envisaged in legal terms as a cornerstone of international relations, the principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of states and the prohibition of the use of armed force, stipulated in the United Nations Charter, with the effective protection of human rights in extreme situations of their violation and with international peace and security.”17 Under what circumstances does sovereignty give way to the need for the protection of human rights?The answer remains unclear.

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During the Cold War, numerous cases of interv ention were debated by international lawyers. The best-known cases include the British and Belgian intervention in Congo in 1964; India’s war with Pakistan over East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971; the Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1978; Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 1979 to o verthrow the regime of Idi Amin; Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea in 1978; and the U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989.18 In these instances, the interventions were not approved by the United Nations, and were generally unilateral. Tellingly, humanitarian interv ention was often not in voked by the parties involved. With each intervention, the legitimac y of the operation depended significantly on perceptions of the intentions of the state carrying out the intervention. Was it acting to save lives, or simply to advance its own national interests? Legal opinion is strongly divided in all the above cases,19 but the potential for ambiguity and misuse led the noted international jurist Ian Brownlie to conclude in 1973 “that humanitarian interv ention, on the basis of all a vailable definitions, would be an instrument wide open to abuse”. It w ould be “a gener al licence to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial intervention”.20 Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention has featured even more prominently on the international agenda, largely because as East-West tensions declined, it became possible for the United Nations Security Council to pla y a role in authorizing suc h interventions. Some scholars also claim that there has been a change or “evolution” in the notion of state sovereignty that has made some interventions more acceptable. Successi ve Secretaries-General of the United Nations have argued that sovereignty is becoming more narrowly construed. In 1991, J avier Perez de Cuellar wrote that “it is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity .” Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.” More recently, Kofi Annan has written “the sov ereignty

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of states can constitute an essential bulwark against intimidation or coercion, but it must not be allo wed to obstruct effective action to address problems that tr anscend borders or to secure human dignity.”21 Nigel Rodley concludes that w hile “there remain protagonists, especially among affected go vernments, of the traditional strict doctrine that a human rights problem concerns none but the state w here it takes place, this is becoming an increasingly eccentric position”. 22 Discussion about humanitarian interv ention and the limits of sovereignty has revolved around several key cases. In the w ake of the Persian Gulf War, United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (5 April 1991) demanded that “Iraq allow immediate access by humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq”. While this fell short of actually formally authorizing an intervention, in effect the resolution serv ed this purpose. The U.S. and allied military forces were able to occupy part of Northern Iraq and deliver humanitarian assistance to displaced Kurds. Whether the resolution constitutes a precedent for humanitarian intervention, however, is debatable. Resolution 688 did not explicitly authorize coercive measures, nor did it make clear w hether the threat to the peace with w hich it w as concerned stemmed from the domestic situation in Iraq, or from the consequences of massive refugee flows into neighbouring countries. 23 Speaking in the United Nations Security Council, the Chinese delegate said, “the Security Council should not consider or take any action on questions concerning the internal affairs of any State. As for the international aspects involved in the question ... they should be settled through the appropriate channels.” China did not oppose Resolution 688, ho wever, but abstained. Other sc holars argue that there w as insufficient international agreement about any right to intervention, pointing to the significant opposition raised by developing states during General Assembly debates at the time. Some even suggest that the Northern Iraq case does not constitute humanitarian intervention because the Iraqi Government gave its consent to the operation, albeit reluctantly. A second oft-discussed case concerns the former Yugoslavia. While the international peacekeeping for ce UNPROFOR w as

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established in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the consent of the w arring parties, subsequent United Nations Security Council resolutions suggested that the United Nations might require that the parties accept the presence of peacekeepers on a humanitarian mission, whether they w anted them or not. 24 Security Council Resolution 770 (13 August 1992) made it clear that the domestic situation in Bosnia constituted a “threat to peace and international security”. The resolution also authorized the use of “all necessary measures” to facilitate the deli very of aid to victims of the conflict, although this was not interpreted by states at the time as authorizing the use of force. In addition to the question of consent, a number of sc holars also argue that peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance are conceptually distinct from humanitarian intervention, and conclude that UNPROFOR’s presence in Bosnia did not constitute the latter . The third case is the massi ve invasion of Somalia b y U.S.-led forces in 1992. Operation Restore Hope was approved by Security Council Resolution 794 (3 December 1992), the first resolution to authorize a military oper ation in a country without an in vitation from its go vernment. The resolution confirmed that the domestic situation in Somalia could constitute a threat to peace and international security. It authorized states to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure en vironment for humanitarian relief oper ations”.25 Malanczuk calls Somalia “a normative landmark of genuine Security Council pr actice of humanitarian intervention” but cautions that the fact that Somalia had no functioning government “must not be underestimated when evaluating the relevance of this precedent for the future”. 26 Adam Roberts agrees, sa ying this “w as hardly a classical case of humanitarian intervention”.27 Conversely, a British Commonwealth and Foreign Office opinion circulated during the conflict in Kosovo declared that “Security Council authorization to use for ce for humanitarian purposes is now widely accepted (Bosnia and Somalia provided firm legal precedents).”28 According to Catherine Guic herd, the logic of Resolution 794 was subsequently confirmed b y Security Council resolutions authorizing interventions in Cambodia and Haiti, 29 limited French

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intervention in Eastern Zaire and Rw anda (under Operation Turquoise),30 and allowing Italy to assemble a multinational coalition to bring humanitarian assistance to Albania in Operation Alba in 1997.31 However, the most recent case w hich has sparked debate over the bounds of humanitarian interv ention was the military campaign launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Serbia in 1999. NATO launched Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999 with the stated objective of preventing a humanitarian disaster from occurring in K osovo. It did so, ho wever, without first seeking approval from the United Nations Security Council. Roberts argues that despite this, N ATO’s actions were “far from being an unambiguous violation of international law”.32 He refers to Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1999) w hich threatened “further action” if Serbia did not comply with the United Nations’ demands, and also Resolution 1203 (24 October 1998) w hich accepted that NATO had what he calls “direct standing and interest in the Kosovo issue” to argue that “even if the Security Council was not able to follo w these resolutions … with a specific authority to use force, they provided some legal basis for military action. ”33 He also argues that the strong defeat of a Russian-sponsored dr aft resolution condemning NATO in the Security Council on 26 March 1999 confirmed that the alliance’s action was not “manifestly illegal”. He acknowledges, however, that “a failed dr aft resolution is not a strong basis for arguing the legality of a military action. ”34 In addition, Roberts argues that there w as a basis in gener al international law for the oper ation. He sa ys NATO leaders concentrated their arguments on the assertion that for ce could be justified without a Security Council resolution on the grounds of “overwhelming humanitarian necessity”. Suc h right is limited b y three conditions: “that there is con vincing evidence, gener ally accepted by the international community as a w hole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief”; second, that “it is objecti vely clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of for ce if lives are to be sa ved”; and third, that “the proposed use of for ce is necessary and proportionate to the aim (the relief of humanitarian need) and is

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strictly limited in time and scope to this aim — i.e., it is the minimum necessary to ac hieve that end.”35 Despite this, he notes that there are strong polic y arguments against suc h doctrine, not least the potential for abuse. He concludes that “the unique circumstances in which Operation Allied Force took place, and the problems which the campaign exposed, militate against dr awing simple conclusions about humanitarian intervention.… The fact that the campaign failed in the intended manner to avert a humanitarian disaster in the short term … makes it a questionable model of humanitarian intervention.” 36 In another account, gener ally sympathetic to NATO’s actions, Guicherd rejects the “overwhelming humanitarian necessity argument” and sa ys that “the combined right of victims to assistance and the right of the Security Council to authorize humanitarian interv ention with military means do not amount to a right of humanitarian intervention by states, individually or collectively. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of international lawyers consider that such a right cannot be recognized because it would violate the Charter’ s prohibition on the use of for ce.” She argues, however, that “there is no reason w hy this situation should not evolve further in the y ears to come.”37 Even though there is gro wing agreement about some of the essential elements of humanitarian intervention, the notion still has some powerful critics. At a meeting in 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin staunchly opposed the concept, arguing it was simply a “pretext” designed to “destroy the sovereignty of independent states”.38 A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman has said China opposes “using humanitarian intervention as an excuse to interfere in the internal politics of a country. We oppose even more citing humanitarian intervention to use force against a country without first seeking the sanction of the U.N. Security Council.”39 In an interview with French newspaper Le Figaro in October 1999, President Jiang said that “unless a particular country asks the United Nations for help, no countries or international organizations have the right to interv ene.”40 In April 2000, the Southern Summit of the Group of 77 dev eloping nations also condemned humanitarian intervention. The Summit’s joint declaration

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said that humanitarian interv ention lacked any basis in either the United Nations Charter or gener al principles of human rights, and insisted on the “clear need to maintain a difference between humanitarian assistance and other United Nations’ acti vities”.41 The concept has had a mixed reception elsew here in the AsiaPacific. One of the founding norms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the idea of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its member states. Consequently , the idea of sending an intervention force into East Timor in September 1999 w as initially opposed by some ASEAN member states. In discussions that took place at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-oper ation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Auckland, several states insisted that an y force would first have to be in vited in by the Indonesian authorities. 42 Chinese officials emphasized the in vitation in distinguishing the East Timor operation from N ATO’s action in K osovo.43 A certain degree of pragmatism is evident in some ASEAN states, however. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar has said that he finds the principle of humanitarian interv ention “disquietening”. He said that it w as especially “worrisome” that the United Nations Secretary-Gener al had called for humanitarian intervention during a session of General Assembly.44 On another occasion, he said, “we have to be wary all the time of new concepts and new philosophies that will compromise sovereignty in the name of humanitarian interv ention, in the name of globalization which is another form of trying to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country .”45 He took a r ather different position during the war in Kosovo, however. Albar noted that while “Malaysia has repeatedly stressed the importance of adhering to the especially important principle of non-interference in internal affairs … we do make exceptions to the polic y of non-interference in certain extreme situations. The bloody cruelty, genocide, and atrocities perpetrated by the Serbs against the people of K osovo struck our conscience, and made Malaysia support NATO’s military action. The peculiar situation in Kosovo calls for pragmatism on our part in the interest of humanity whilst recognizing the central role of the U.N. in resolving the problem. ”46 In the 1990s, and particularly since the interventions in Kosovo

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and East Timor, there has been a gro wing interest among sc holars and some go vernments in setting do wn the specific conditions necessary to make an armed intervention for humanitarian purposes legitimate.47 Speaking at the United Nations Gener al Assembly in November 1999, Singapore Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar said that the United Nations must devise new rules for interv ention or risk becoming irrelevant.48 “Why Kosovo or East Timor but not Africa? Are the rights of humans everywhere not universal? How to choose when to intervene among the too many conflicts?” Jayakumar agreed with Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s call to urgently establish “objective criteria”.49 In another speech, Singapore’s ambassador to the United Nations Kishore Mahbubani proposed that in cases such as Kosovo where the Security Council is paralysed, then the General Assembly could review the problem. He noted that w hile the “General Assembly’s decisions are not binding … they can be legitimizing and consensus-building — perhaps more so than the Security Council because of the Gener al Assembly’s universal membership”.50 Professor Wang Jie, Director of China’s International Organizations Research Council, has spelled out tw o conditions which she says would make foreign interventions acceptable: first, the country concerned must directly ask the United Nations Security Council to intercede; and second, all peacekeeping actions, ev en by a regional group of nations, must have the approval of the United Nations Security Council. She cited the United Nations operation in Cambodia as an example of a successful interv ention, but called NATO’s action in Kosovo a disaster.51 Notes 1. Peter Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1993). 2. Wil Verwey, “Humanitarian Interv ention Under International La w”, Netherlands International Law Review, No. 31 (1985), p. 357. 3. M. J. Bazyler, “Re-examining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia”, Stanford Journal of International Law, No. 23 (1987), p. 547. 4. Ved P. Nanda, “Tragedies in North Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti:

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5. 6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

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12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

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Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention — Part I”, Denver Journal International Law and Politics, No. 20 (1992), p. 305. Fernando Téson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-Husdon, New York: 1997), p. 5. Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, “After Bangladesh: the Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military F orce”, American Journal of International Law, No. 67 (1973), p. 275. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in International La w”, British Yearbook of International La w, No. 23 (1946), p. 46; Nigel Rodley, “Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal F ramework”, in To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights , edited by Rodley (London: Brasseys, 1992), pp. 14–42, 18. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, pp.11–12. Cited in Ian Bro wnlie, “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen”, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations , edited by Richard Lillich (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), p. 139. Cited in Oli ver Rambotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 8. Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 180. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 27. See also, “Unilater al Military Action Defies U.N. Principles: Annan”, Deutsche-PresseAgentur, 20 September 1999. Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Interv ention”, p. 161. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 11. Cited in Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 11. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 1. For a summary of incidents of interv ention during and after the Cold War on a case-by-case basis, see Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, Chapters 4 and 5. A good summary of the arguments for and against intervention prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter can be

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19.

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20. 21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon found in Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 10-11. F or an assessment of Grenada, see Scott Da vidson, Grenada: A Study in Politics and the Limits of International La w (Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1987); on Panama and Grenada, see Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997). For example, on the India–P akistan conflict over Bangladesh, one of the more widely appro ved instances of interv ention, compare Téson, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 179–88, with Franck and Rodley, “After Bangladesh”, pp. 275–305. Brownlie, “Kind-Hearted Gunmen”, pp. 147–48. Kofi A. Annan, “Peacekeeping, Military Interv ention, and National Sovereignty in Internal Armed Conflict”, in Hard Choices: Mor al Dilemmas in Humanitarian Interv ention, edited b y Jonathon Moore (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 58–69. Rodley, “Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights”, pp. 21–22. Catherine Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 19–34, 22. Adam Roberts, “T he Road to Hell… A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention”, Harvard International Review XVI, no. 1 (F all 1993), Special Issue on Humanitarian Interv ention: 10–13, 11–12. Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, p. 23. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 24. Roberts, “The Road to Hell …”, p. 12. Cited in Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo”, Survival 41, no. 3 (A utumn 1999): 102–23, 106. This can be starkly contrasted with a Commonwealth and F oreign Office memor andum published in 1986 which declared that the “overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes do wn against the existence of a right of humanitarian interv ention, for three main reasons: first, the United Nations Charter and the corpus of modern international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best pro vides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian interv ention, and on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation”, cited in Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 27. Security Council Resolution 940 (31 J uly 1994). Security Council Resolution 929 (22 J une 1994).

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31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

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Security Council Resolution 1101 (28 Mar ch 1997). Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’”, p. 105. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, p. 106. The quotation is from the British Foreign Office document cited above. Ibid, p. 120. Guicherd, “International Law and the War in Kosovo”, p. 23. Conor O’Cleary, “Yeltsin and Jiang Reject West Stance on Human Rights”, Irish Times (Lexis-Nexis), 11 December 1999, p. 15. Mary Kwang, “Country’s Sovereignty First”, Straits Times, 21 November 1999, pp. 38–39. “Jiang Slaps Interv ention under the Pretense of Humanitarianism”, Xinhua News Agency, 25 October 1999. “G-77 Criticizes Humanitarian Interv ention Rights”, Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 2000. Allan Thompson, “APEC Meeting Divided over Peacekeepers”, Toronto Star, 9 September 1999; Seth Mydans, “Indonesia Invites a U.N. Force to Timor”, New York Times, 13 September 1999, p. A1. See “Jiang Slaps Intervention”. “The Malaysian Human Rights Commission — Aims and Objectives”, Address by Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Bin Syed Jaafar Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, at the Bar CouncilAuditorium, Kuala Lumpur, 28 October 1999. “Malaysia Opposes U.N. Probe of EastTimor Atrocities”, Agence France Presse, 7 October 1999. “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy”, Address by Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, at the Strategic Issues Forum (SIF) organized by the Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (ASLI), 22 July 1999. A copy of the speec h is a vailable at the Mala ysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website at . See also the so-called “Providence Principles on Humanitarian Action in Armed Conflict” published by the Humanitarianism and War Project. These are reproduced in “Humanitarian Interv ention: A Review of Theory and Practice”, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Hunger, U.S. House of Representati ves, 102nd Congress, Washington, D.C., 1993; see also Gary Klintworth, “International Community Has a Right and a Duty to Interv ene”, Straits Times, 8 September 1999; Bernard

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48. 49.

Kouchner, “Humanitarian Intervention: New Global Moral Code Must Emerge”, Toronto Star, 20 October 1999. Lee Siew Hua, “UN Intervention Needs New Rules, Jaya Says”, Straits Times, 26 September 1999. Felix Soh, “Walking a Tightrope”, Straits Times, 21 November 1999. For the Secretary-General’s ideas on sovereignty, see Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, Economist, 18 September 1999. A version is also available online at . Ibid. Quoted in Kwang, “Country’s Sovereignty First”.

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There is no single definition of w hat constitutes a middle power . Adam Chapnik argues that “for all its importance, [the term] ‘middle power’ is rarely defined and limited explanations are never specific.”1 According to a major w ork on the subject, there are at least four distinct approaches to defining a middle po wer.2 In pr actice, the term most commonly refers to a state on the basis of its position in an informal international hier archy. In this view , middle po wers occupy the “middle” point on one of sev eral gauges of national power. These include size, geostrategic location, population, gross national product (GNP), military capability , and so on. While measuring precisely what is the “middle” and w hat is not can be highly problematic; the concept satisfies “the intuiti ve desire to differentiate between those states which clearly are not great powers but are not minor po wers either”.3 A second definition is based on geographic position. In this view, middle powers are just that — in the middle between major powers. This approach has tw o variants: one, with ob vious Cold War baggage, suggests middle po wers are in the middle, between ideologically polarized great po wers. An alternative geographic definition argues that middle powers are states which are powerful within their own particular geographic region. A third definition is a normative one. This asserts that middle po wers are “potentially wiser or more virtuous” than either great po wers or small states. Middle powers are viewed as somehow more trustworthy members of the international community because they can exert diplomatic influence without resorting to the use of for ce. Recognizing the limitations of all these approaches, an alternative behavioural formulation has been offered by Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal in their work, Relocating Middle Powers.4 Rather than focus on the tr aditional criteria, they identify middle powers on the basis of the diplomatic beha viour they displa y in common. They focus on the “tec hnical and entrepreneurial capacities” of states, in particular looking at their ability to pro vide “complementary or alternative issue-oriented sources of leadership and enhanced coalition-building in issue-specific contexts”. 5 Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Ev ans described this kind of 161

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behaviour as “niche diplomacy”.6 The definition draws on what the Canadian scholar John Holmes called “middlepo wermanship” — the notion that middle po wers have a unique style of beha viour in international politics. They pursue multilateral solutions to problems, tend to compromise in international disputes, and embrace notions of “good international citizenship” to guide their foreign relations. 7 Chapnik has argued that, at least as far as Canada is concerned, this approach is a “myth” which conceals “a tradition of Canadian rhetoric crafted to justify the disproportionate influence in international affairs”.8 He traces the origins of Canada’ s interest in the term middle power back to wartime correspondence between Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson. According to Chapnik, Wrong advanced the notion of the middle power as an attempt to separate Canada from the other non-great po wers. The principle helped elevate Canada’s status during World War II, and the Minister for Defence Brooke Claxton sought to extend it in the post-w ar world. Chapnik cites Dennis Stairs, who argues, “what the Middle Powers held in common was the view that they ought to have more influence in the United Nations than the very small powers, while recognizing (with various degrees of resignation) that they could not reasonably hope to have as much influence as the great po wers.”9 Robert Cox has offered a historical analysis to go with this behavioural definition. Using a Gr amscian understanding of hegemony, Cox claims the role of middle po wers is to pla y a supportive part in a gi ven hegemonic order. He argues that suc h powers are not new — examples can be seen in sev enteenth century Netherlands or the fourteenth century Catalan middle class. Both “had a strong interest in a stable and tr anquil environment as a condition for the pursuit of goals inherent in their ci vil societies”.10 Cox contends in modern times the middle-po wer role has become increasingly linked to the development of international organization. He says that while middle powers are likely to be in the middle rank of material capabilities, such military and economic indicators are not an adequate predictor of a disposition to play it. He concludes: An ability to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation

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to major powers, a commitment to orderliness and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the world system are the critical elements for the fulfillment of the middle-power role. With apologies to Pirandello, we can say that the middle po wer is a role in sear ch of an actor.11

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Notes 1. Adam Chapnik, “T he Canadian Middle P ower Myth”, International Journal 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 188–206. 2. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Ric hard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), p. 17. 3. Ibid. 4. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, pp. 19–32. 5. Ibid., p. 7. 6. Pauline Kerr and Andrew Mack, “The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia”, in Studying Asia Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities, edited b y Paul M. Ev ans (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), p. 37; for another discussion of this, see Evan H. Potter, “Niche Diplomacy and Canadian Foreign Policy”, International Journal LII (Winter 1996–97): pp. 25–38. 7. Ibid., p. 19.

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Writing in 1990, the Canadian scholar Bernard Wood identified thirty-three states w hich he said, based on a positional analysis, “would likely be proposed as middle po wer candidates according to any criterion”.12 In the Asia-Pacific region, examples of suc h middle powers typically include Australia, Canada, South K orea, and collectively, the states forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).13 In a recent work on the balance of power in Asia, Paul Dibb identifies “the Koreas, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan” as middle powers.14 According to Dibb, “one of the defining characteristics of a middle (or medium) power … is that it will seek to have a credible minimum of defence autonomy or self-reliance.”15

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8. Chapnik, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth”, p. 188. 9. Dennis Stairs, “Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles”, in Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Bey ond, edited by Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 272. 10. Robert W. Cox, “Middlepo wermanship, Japan, and Future World Order”, International Journal XLIV (Autumn 1989): 823–62. 11. Ibid., p. 827. 12. Bernard Wood, The Middle Powers and the General Interest (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1990), p. 18. 13. See, for examples, John McKay, “Australia as an Asian Middle Power: The Search for a New Role”, Korean Journal of International Studies 27, pp. 1, 1-28; John McKay, “Australia, Korea and APEC: Prospects for Middle Power Initiatives”, Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 5, pp. 433– 64. 14. Paul Dibb, Towards A New Balance of P ower in Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (London: International Institute for Str ategic Studies, 1995), p. 74, note 6. While he refers here to “the Koreas” as a middle power, elsewhere in the v olume he describes South K orea alone as an “important middle power”, p. 72. 15. Ibid., p. 58.

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There are two distinct definitions of the term multilateralism. In the first, and most commonly diplomatic usage, multilateralism refers to “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions.”1 It is an essentially nominal, or quantitati ve description referring simply to co-operation among a group of (more than tw o) actors. Multilateral actions or institutions in this sense, can be clearly contrasted with unilateral, or bilateral, actions. In K eohane’s view, multilateral institutions are simply “multilateral arrangements with persistent sets of rules”. 2 John Gerard Ruggie takes issue with this minimalist, nominal definition. He argues that multilateralism is a “generic institutional form” and says that the conv entional definition does not tell w hat makes these institutions multilater al. Ruggie argues that multilateralism is not simply a question of numbers: there have been plenty of arrangements in history involving three or more states that have been, in effect, systemic forms of bilater alism.3 Therefore, he concludes, there is an essential qualitative dimension which distinguishes multilateralism from these kind of arr angements or international organizations.4 Ruggie argues multilateral relationships involve three or more states coming together to tac kle a specific issue or set of issues on the basis of specific generalized principles of conduct .5 These principles specify what constitutes “appropriate conduct for a class of actions” irrespective of the particular interests of the participants or the circumstances that may exist.6 Ruggie argues there are several clearly identifiable qualities that constitute multilater alism. These principles are indi visibility, non-discrimination, and diffuse reciprocity. For example, says Ruggie, “it is GATT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] members’ adherence to the MFN [most-favourednation] norm [of reciprocated non-discrimination] which makes the system of tr ade an indi visible whole, not some attribute of tr ade itself.”7 All members agree to treat other members in a similar manner. Analogously, for a collecti ve security arr angement to be multilateral, all its member states are required to respond to aggression wherever and whenever it occurs — not simply when it 165

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suits their interests. Ruggie also argues that successful multilateralism must also gener ate expectations of w hat Keohane calls “diffuse reciprocity” among members. 8 This means that members of a multilateral arrangement can expect to recei ve roughly the same amount of benefit in aggregate o ver a period of time. In contr ast, bilateral relations require a “specific reciprocity”, or specific quid pro quos between parties. 9 Brian Job offers another means of distinguishing between different variants of multilater alism.10 He argues that the qualities of multilateralism can be arr ayed along tw o dimensions: the first, referring to the nature of commitment undertaken b y and for an arrangement’s members, can be characterized as “deep” or “shallow” multilateralism.11 Deeply committed states w ould promise to go to war if one of their fello w members w as attacked or threatened. Shallower commitments might in volve an undertaking of aid or consultation, or a pledge to remain neutral. The second dimension, referring to the number of members, can be characterized as “narrow” or “broad”. A narrowly conceived multilateral arrangement would involve “few states relative to the overall number of states within the region or system with mutual security interests”. Con versely, one that was broadly concei ved “would be inclusi ve of its potential regional or systemic membership”. 12 Until recently, the Asia-Pacific had little experience with multilateralism and had few multilater al institutions, particularly when compared with Europe. Before World War II, the Washington Naval Treaties attempted to manage security in the region on a multilateral basis, but with little success. During the Cold War, the great powers in the region generally preferred to deal with political and security issues through bilater al arrangements. One exception to this rule — the alliance kno wn as Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) — was a failure. While it was nominally a multilateral alliance (that is, it had more than tw o members), in Ruggie’s terms it w as not multilater al as it w as not based on the assumption that the security of members w as indivisible. First, it lacked the “automatic response” provision enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N ATO), which made an

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attack on any of NATO’s members an attack on all the other members, and which consequently required an automatic response. Article IV of the Manila P act merely describes suc h an attac k as a threat to peace and safety. Second, U.S. obligations differed from those of other signatories in an additional w ay. The United States only had an obligation to aid its allies in the ev ent of communist aggression against them, not in all cases of aggression. Third, SEATO was also not multilateral in that there was no unified command and none of the joint planning arrangements that could be found in N ATO.13 The only governmental multilateral institution to thri ve in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War period w as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).14 At the non-governmental level, the Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) were the only successful regionwide economic institutions.15 Over the past decade, however, there has been a significant change in the region’s institutional architecture. In addition to ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific now boasts a significant number of go vernmental and non-go vernmental multilateral for a, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Council for Security Co-oper ation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), and its counterpart the Council for Asia-Europe Co-operation (CAEC). There is also a burgeoning intr a-Asian multilateral diplomacy, one of which is the ASEAN Plus Three process. According to one estimate, in 1995 there were more than 130 multilater al meetings that were related to Asia-Pacific security issues. 16 There has been consider able debate among international relations scholars about the factors that allo w for the creation of multilateral institutions. Some theorists argue that a po werful hegemonic leader is needed in order to set do wn the rules of the international system and to allo w institutions to dev elop.17 Others argue that multilateral institutions are more likely to form w hen a hegemon is in decline — when the shrinking gap in power between states changes the incentives for co-operation.18 The vastly different institutional structures of post-war Europe and post-war Asia would seem to suggest that the mere existence of a hegemon is not sufficient

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for the creation of multilater al institutions. Similarly, explanations based on hegemonic decline cannot explain why multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific did not take off until 1989, w hen decline theorists had identified a diminution in America’s relative power since the mid-1960s. The inadequacy of these approac hes has led some scholars to speculate that cultur al or ideational factors are more important than the distribution of power in determining the creation of multilateral institutions.19 For example, Ruggie argues that it is not hegemony itself that matters, but whose hegemony. He links the spread of multilateralism after World War II to a set of ideas w hich he says have their roots in American political history.20 Some scholars claim that Asia-Pacific multilateralism is developing its own distinctive character. Paul Evans has argued that APEC offers “compelling evidence” that multilateralism in the region is emerging from unique historical circumstances and will proceed in its o wn distinctive fashion.21 This “Asia-Pacific” quality can be briefly summarized: Asia-Pacific multilateralism embraces the inclusive, non-discriminatory principles of open regionalism. That is, it is outw ard-looking and offers to reciprocate its benefits with partners both inside and outside the region. It is informal, esc hewing legalistic or codified rules and commitments, and preferring instead to work on the basis of aspirational statements and through the use of peer pressure. Most importantly , Asia-Pacific multilateralism is consensus-based. While this does not preclude dissent or minority positions, moving forward requires finding a broad level of support without compromising the basic interests of an y member.

Notes 1. Robert Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Resear ch”, International Journal XLV (Autumn 1990): 731–64, 731. 2. Ibid. 3. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organization 46, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 565–66. He gives as examples the trading system established by Hjalmar Schacht, which regulated trade between Nazi Germany and states in East Central

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Europe, the Balkans and Latin America, and the League of the Three Emperors. 4. William Diebold describes this as the difference between “formal” and “substantive” multilateralism, see William Diebold, Jr., “The History and the Issues”, in Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy, edited by William Diebold, Jr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988). 5. Ruggie, “Multilateralism”, p. 567. 6. Ibid., p. 571. 7. Ibid. 8. Robert Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, International Organization 40, no. 1 (W inter 1986): 1–274. 9. Ruggie, “Multilateralism”, p. 572. 10 . Brian L. J ob, “Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Mechanisms”, in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, by David A. Lake and P atrick M. Morgan (P ennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 169. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. George Modelski, “SEATO: Its Functions and Organizations”, inSEATO: Six Studies, edited by Modelski (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1962). 14. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: F rom the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 323. 15. For a discussion of the history of the PECC and PBEC, see Lawrence T. Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), pp. 66–125. 16. Paul M. Evans, “Reinventing East Asia: Multilateral Cooperation and Regional Order”, Harvard International Review XVIII, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 16–69, 18. 17. See, for example, Charles P . Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-39 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). 18. Donald Crone, “Does Hegemon y Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy”, World Politics 45, no. 4 (July 1993): 501– 25. 19. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building”. 20. John Gerard Ruggie, “T he Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity , and American Foreign Policy”, International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring

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1997): 89–125. 21. Paul M. Evans, “The Dialogue Process on Asia-Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis”, in Studying Asia Pacific Security: The Future of Research, Training and Dialogue Activities, edited by Evans (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), p. 303.

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The concept of mutual security had its origins in the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the So viet Union. In the late 1980s, scholars and officials from both superpo wers came together to form several working groups on the topic and in 1990, they published a joint stud y entitled Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations.1 As its name suggests, mutual security has muc h in common with the concept of common security first set out by the 1982 Palme Commission. According to Richard Smoke, for muc h of the 1980s the terms mutual security and common security were used synonymously.2 There is also some similarity to other concepts of security. Smoke and Viktor Kremenyuk add, “the mutual security approach could also be called a ‘cooper ative security’ approach.”3 They contrast it with competitive, unilateral, or zero-sum approaches to security. According to Smoke and Kremen yuk, mutual security is an approach particularly relevant for parties that are, or might be, in conflict with one another. These groups can be states, or alliances made up of sev eral states, suc h as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Warsaw Pact. Mutual security “calls for each of [the parties] to seek to gain security b y seeking more 4 security for both of them”. Mutual security assumes that both sides to a conflict can take actions that make them feel more secure within the same time period. These actions include the use of defence strategies, and trust-building, arms reduction, and verification policies. Within the broad fr amework set out abo ve, Smoke discusses three kinds of mutual security. The first is technical mutual security. This minimalist approach to mutual security acknowledges the interrelationship between the security of one party and that of another . It endorses a moder ate range of confidence- and security-building measures to try and prevent crises from arising. It focuses its efforts on preventing the danger of “inad vertent escalation” between opponents — the idea that a developing crisis will escalate to levels neither side wants. Specific policies given by Smoke include the use

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© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Mutual Security

This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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of the “hotline” between Washington and Mosco w, and the promotion of security dialogue. Technical mutual security advocates, however, do not believe that more far-reaching measures are realistic or practicable. They believe that arms racing and political competition is inherently linked to the nature of the profound differences between the opponents.5 The second concept of mutual security , the “threat-reduction” conception, argues that muc h more must be done than simply removing the risk of inadvertent escalation. Its advocates argue that steps must be taken to reduce, in both degree and kind, the various threats between opponents. They suggest that the superpowers could “defuse (and perhaps disengage from)” potential crisis areas such as “Europe, the Persian Gulf, and the Korean Peninsula”. They support deeper cuts in nuclear weapons than those called for under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement as well as “vigorous” negotiations on the reduction of con ventional forces in Europe.6 The third approac h is the “supporti ve” conception of mutual security. In this conception, the security of one side is diminished and perhaps endangered b y a wide r ange of dangers to the other side. Thus, for example, if one side were threatened with economic collapse, societal breakdown, or on-going terrorism, suc h dangers could not help but diminish the other side’ s security as well. To protect its o wn security, the latter , therefore, has an interest in forestalling the emergence of suc h dangers. At the time the book was published, supporters of this third conception were calling for economic co-operation between the West and the Soviet Union in order to prev ent the collapse of perestroika. They also fa vour exchanges of scientists, artists, and other groups and advocate EastWest co-operation in order to cope with en vironmental and ecological dangers facing both sides. 7 In the Asia-Pacific region, there has been an increase in the use of the term mutual security. For example, according to Chinese officials the 1996 Shanghai Agreement, signed between China, Russia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan is based on the concept of mutual security . This agreement focuses on for ce

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reduction and building confidence in the border area between these states.8 According to one Chinese scholar, mutual security begins with the recognition that security is a right: “all countries involved are on an equal footing and enjo y the same rights to the maintenance of their respective national security .”9 Second, mutual security recognizes that security is also interdependent and demands that no state pursue its national security at the expense of another state’ s security, “nor should it keep or seek unilater al military superiority beyond its reasonable needs”. Third, mutual security calls for the use of unilateral and bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), or a combination of the tw o. In this respect, the country in the “superior” position bears a greater obligation to reassure its neighbours. China’s preference for bilateral CBMs was reinforced in a paper to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on CBMs held in Brunei in No vember 1997, w here mutual security was described under the heading of “related spirit and principles”.10 In many respects the Chinese interpretation of mutual security resembles common security . The formal requirements for force reductions and confidence-building along the border area set out in the Shanghai Agreement bear a striking resemblance to proposals for non-threatening and non-pro vocative defence mooted b y the Palme Commission for Cold War Europe, as well as some of the specific initiatives pursued under the Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna (Organization for Security and Co-oper ation in Europe or OSCE) confidence-building regimes.

Notes 1. Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov, Mutual Security: A New Approach to Soviet-American Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 2. Richard Smoke, “A Theory of Mutual Security”, in ibid., p. 59. 3. Viktor Kremenyuk and Richard Smoke, “Joint Introduction to Mutual Security”, in Mutual Security, by Smoke and Kortunov, p. 6. 4. Smoke and Kortunov, Mutual Security.

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Ibid., pp. 78–79. Ibid., pp. 79–81. Ibid., p. 82. “Agreement between the Russian F ederation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area”, a translation of which is reproduced in “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building”, a Bac kground Paper circulated by the Canadian Go vernment at the Mar ch 1997 ARF ISG on CBMs in Beijing. 9. This definition is based on notes gi ven to the author b y a member of the Chinese delegation to the inaugur al Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS) held in Toronto in January 1996. 10. Keynote Statement, “Chinese Paper at the ARF-ISG-CBMs in Brunei”, mimeographed, 3–5 November 1997, pp. 3–4.

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5. 6. 7. 8.

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The term “new security approach” gradually takes shape in the wake of the end of the Cold War. It reflects efforts particularly by countries in the Asia-Pacific region to seek fresh ways and means to maintain a lasting peace and stability in the region. Proponents of the new security approac h hold that security perceptions should be in keeping with the reality of the Asia Pacific and with the c hange of the security environment. In light of the fact that peace and development have become the order of the da y, the overall situation is developing towards further relaxation and given the diversity of the region, the new security conception emphasises the following: State-to-state relations should be based on the F ive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, i.e. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in eac h other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. This is the political basis and prerequisite for security . In this regard, the cultivation of healthy and stable relations among the world’s major po wers is crucial to peace and security at both the regional and global lev els. Countries should step up mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual opening-up in the economic sphere, do away with inequality and discriminatory policies in economic and tr ade relations, and pursue common prosperity by gradually narrowing the dev elopment gap between them. This is the economic basis for regional and global security. The financial turmoil in SoutheastAsia shows 175

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The term new security approach (or new security concept) has been used by some Chinese officials to describe w hat they believe to be the most appropriate w ay for organizing security relations in the Asia-Pacific in the wake of the Cold War. A definition provided by Chinese participants at a recent meeting in Canada described the concept in the following way:

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that economic security is an important component of stability and development. To maintain a normal economic and financial order requires not only a sound macroeconomic management regime and a sound financial system at the national level, but also greater regional and global financial cooperation and creation of a stable and external economic environment. Countries should enhance mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and cooper ation and undertake to resolve their differences or disputes b y peaceful means. This is the practical way of enhancing peace and security . Security is mutual. Security dialogue and cooper ation should be aimed at increasing trust instead of creating confrontation. It must not be directed at other country/ countries, nor should it undermine the security interests of other country/countries. Security cannot and should not be attained through a contest of military superiority . In the 20th Century, mankind experienced tw o World Wars and a Cold War that lasted for more than four decades, and paid too high a price. History shows that military blocs failed to prev ent wars. Security arr angements based on military alliances and arms r ace [sic] pro ved unable to build peace. Under the new cir cumstances, the expansion of military blocs or strengthening of military alliances only runs counter to the trend of the time. Should lasting peace be secured, it is imperative that a new security concept is to be cultivated.1

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New security approach appears to be the product of an evolving process of thinking about security concepts in China. In J anuary 1997, Chinese officials, academics, and the P eople’s Liberation Army (PLA) representati ves used the nomenclature of “mutual security” to describe China’s preferred approach to regional security co-operation, offering the Shanghai Agreement as an example of this concept in practice. Mutual security (see the relev ant entry) as it was used then, incorpor ated many of the same ideas that no w

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appear in the new security approac h. Indeed the new security approach appears to explicitly incorpor ate mutual security within its ambit. Similarly at a meeting withAmerican academics in Beijing in March 1997, the PLA representatives referred to the need for “an entirely new concept of security”. According to Montaperto and Binnendijk, this concept was based on three overlapping principles of common, co-oper ative, and comprehensi ve security. It also incorporated many of the ideas set out above, including the rejection of military alliances and the need for the gradual building of regional consensus through dialogue. 2 The new concept has the blessing of senior military and political figures. China’s Defence Minister Chi Haotian used the definition outlined above almost word for word in an address to the Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies in February 1998.3 He repeated it in a speech in Singapore in November 1998, saying the “correct way to safeguard security is to enhance trust through dialogues, to seek through cooperation, to respect sovereignty mutually and solve disputes peacefully so that common development could be pursued.”4 In a speech at the Conference on Disarmament in Genev a on 26 March 1999, President Jiang Zemin described the core of the new security concept as mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. On 13 October 1999, the Chinese en voy to the United Nations, Shen Guofang, told the Fifty-fourth United Nations General Assembly that China opposed the “old security concept based on military alliances and arms build up”. He linked the new security concept to China’s opposition to missile defences, modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the military action initiated by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Serbia. 5 Notes 1. The definition of “new security approach” was supplied by the Chinese participants at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998. 2. Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, “PLA Views on Asia Pacific Security in the 21st Century”, Strategic Forum No. 114, National

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Defense University, June 1998. A summary of the meetings is also available online at . 3. “Chi Haotian Introduces ‘New Security Concept’”, FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-CHI-98-035, 4 February 1998. 4. “Chinese Defence Minister in Singapore Calls for New Security Concept”, Xinhua News Agency, 26 November 1998. 5. “U.N. Envoy Calls for New Global Security Concept”, Xinhua News Agency, 14 October 1999.

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Open regionalism represents one of the earliest principles agreed upon for the founding of an Asia-Pacific community. The term’s origins can be traced back to discussions about regional economic co-operation in the late 1970s but the concept became more prominent when it was cited as an ideal for the future economic development of the region by the first Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference (PECC) in Canberra, Australia, in September 1980 and subsequently by the first Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Meeting in Canberra in 1989. 1 Put simply, open regionalism “in volves regional economic integration without discrimination against economies outside the region”.2 As defined by Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, it includes the use of integrative processes and regional co-operation to mutually reduce trade barriers within the Asia-Pacific region without discriminating against outsiders.3 Garnaut contrasts it with what he calls “discriminatory regionalism” w hich describes arr angements such as customs unions, free tr ade areas, and preferential tr ade areas, where trade barriers at members’ borders are lower for trade with members than with non-members. He identifies the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as examples of discriminatory regionalism. 4 According to Andrew Elek, under open regionalism “regional tr ade liberalization is to be promoted, provided it is consistent with GA TT [General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs] principles and not to the detriment of other economies.” Writing in 1992, Elek said that open regionalism w as “unique” to the Asia-Pacific region and “radically different from the discriminatory nature of the EC [European Community]”. 5 According to Garnaut, there are three analytic elements of open regionalism. First, it involves the adoption of open policies in relation to official barriers to tr ade. Second, open regionalism requires that regional co-operation should be pursued with the goal of reducing non-official barriers to trade and increasing the volume of regional trade without any element of discrimination against outsiders.Third, it requires regional market integr ation. This can take place “as a result of governments getting out of the w ay of profit-maximizing patterns of trade; or through the d ynamics of private discovery of 179

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profit maximizing patterns without any change in the policy stance of governments”.6 The first formal discussion of open regionalism in the AsiaPacific took place at the inaugur al PECC meeting in 1980. The principles agreed upon b y the meeting included “that EEC-type discriminatory trading arrangements are inappropriate in the Pacific”; that there was a need to “ensure that existing bilateral, regional, and global mechanisms for cooperation are not undermined by any new regional arrangements”; and the need “to ensure an outward-looking arrangement”.7 According to Hadi Soesastro, the background to the concept came from PECC’s so-called San Francisco Declaration on “Open Regionalism: A Pacific Model for Global Economic Cooperation”. This document w as based on three premises. F irst, that openness w as one of the main reasons for the economic dynamism of the Asia-Pacific. Second, that this openness w as complementary with the global multilater al system; and third, that by making an explicit commitment to a model for open regionalism, the Asia-Pacific region could continue its o wn progress and make an important contribution to a stronger, more open global economic system.8 APEC formally adopted the idea of open regionalism in its Seoul Declaration in 1991 and it set out its specific interpretation of the concept in the Osaka Action Agenda in No vember 1995. According to this document, open regionalism goes bey ond the traditional notion of free tr ade areas w hich espouse nondiscrimination within a regional grouping, stipulating that “the outcome of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region will be the actual reduction of barriers not only amongAPEC economies but also between APEC and non-APEC economies .”9 According to Yoichi Funabashi, “this commitment makes APEC more open than any other trade liberalization body thus far, including the GATT, which restricts its most-favoured-nation (MFN) status only to member countries.”10 In a detailed critique of the concept, Fred Bergsten has described open regionalism as “an attempt to … achieve compatibility between the explosion of regional tr ading arrangements around the world

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and the global trading system”. He says the concept seeks “to assure that regional agreements will in pr actice be building bloc ks for further global liberalization rather than stumbling blocks that deter such progress”. Bergsten argues, ho wever, that w hile open regionalism has been adopted as “a fundamental principle of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation organization since its creation in 1989 … neither APEC or any other official body has defined” the term.11 He argues there are at least fi ve competing definitions of open regionalism and claims “all have been seriously advanced by participants in the APEC process or students of it”. Bergsten’s five possible interpretations of open regionalism are first, “open membership”.12 This interpretation means that any country willing to accept the rules of the institution would be invited to join. This approach would convert a regional arr angement into a muc h larger grouping, perhaps ultimately causing it to give up its regional character altogether. Bergsten notes that no regional arr angement has ever taken such course. His second definition is “unconditional MFN”. He says that this concept of open regionalism is viewed b y its advocates as “the pure, indeed only faithful definition”.13 One of the original advocates of this approach called for APEC to become an “Open Economic Association” based w holly on unilater al liberalization. This, it w as assumed, w ould generate additional openness among members and non-members on the basis of peer pressure and demonstration effects. The downside of this approach, says Bergsten, is that b y “giving away” APEC’s liberalization to outsiders, it gives up the opportunity to use its lev erage to press for greater global liber alization. The risk of major “free riders” also might make APEC’s liberalization politically unacceptable in some member states.14 A third definition — and one designed to counter some of the risks of unconditional MFN — is “conditional MFN”. Under such model, APEC would extend its reduction of trade barriers to any non-members that agreed to take similar steps. Bergsten suggests that APEC has flirted with this option in the past, notably at the Seattle Leaders’ Meeting in 1993, when it was hinted that if the GATT Uruguay Round failed, APEC might create a huge new regional trading bloc that would become a focal point of future liberalization

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efforts, perhaps on a preferential basis. He also notes that at the Leaders’ Meeting in the Philippines in 1996, APEC sent a similar signal to the upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Singapore to globalize the Information Technology Agreement. On both occasions, ho wever, the outsiders responded positively and the threat of conditional MFN status remained no more than a implied suggestion. 15 Bergsten’s fourth definition is “global liberalization”. In essence, this w ould mean the APEC members simply continuing to reduce their barriers on a global basis while pursuing their regional goals. He sa ys, “this could be done by continuing the past pr actices of unilater al liberalization and multilateral negotiations in the WTO. Both approaches avoid creating new discrimination so could be viewed as faithful renditions of ‘open regionalism’.”16 Unlike the previous four interpretations, Bergsten’s fifth possible definition, “tr ade facilitation”, focuses on facilitating trade through non-tariff and non-border reforms. He suggests these initiati ves could be small, suc h as customs harmonization and recognition of common standards, or they could be wide-ranging, including the enforcement of national competition policies and the deregulation of key markets. He says, “steps of both kinds are being discussed within APEC.”17 Bergsten concludes by saying that APEC has pursued a course of “constructive ambiguity” when it comes to its interpretation of open regionalism. It has “espoused ‘open regionalism’ in principle, but it has nev er defined it. It has implicitly threatened to insist on reciprocity but nev er explicitly done so. ” He notes that it is conceivable that this situation could continue “for some time, or even indefinitely”.18 Finally, Bergsten notes that the APEC Eminent Persons Group (EPG) — w hich he c haired — offered its o wn suggested definition of open regionalism in its second report, Achieving the APEC Vision. This document set out a four-step formula for the implementation of open regionalism, calling for “the maximum possible extent of unilater al liberalization”; “a commitment to continue reducing its barriers to non-member countries w hile it liberalizes internally on an MFN basis”; “a willingness to extend its regional liberalization to non-members on a mutually reciprocal

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basis”; and “recognition that an y individual APEC member can unilaterally extend its APEC liberalization to non-members on a conditional or unconditional basis”. The report added that while “in principle, any one of these elements b y itself could effecti vely implement the principle of open regionalism … we believ e that all four will be needed to do so.” Bergsten claims that this formula is a combination of all his fi ve definitions except “open membership”. He concludes that this definition “represents the best way to define and operationalize open regionalism in APEC”. Finally, some scholars and officials have gone further, suggesting that there is a “spirit” of open regionalism. This incorporates broad notions of being inclusive, outward-looking, trade liberalizing, and GATT-consistent. Mohammed Ariff has argued that ASEAN’s model of regional co-oper ation fits the definition of open regionalism. 19 In the words of a minister from Singapore, open regionalism “signals a collective commitment to a d ynamic vision of openness in all facets of economic relationships”. Acharya has extended open regionalism to the security context, identifying it as one of the key norms underpinning w hat he calls the “ Asia-Pacific way” of multilateralism.20

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Notes 1. Ross Garnaut, “Open Regionalism: Its Analytic Basis and Relevance to the International System”, Journal of Asian Economics 5, no. 2 (1994): 273–90, 273. 2. Ibid., p. 273. 3. Ross Garnaut and P eter Drysdale, eds. , Asia P acific Regionalism: Readings in International Economic Relations (London: Harper Collins, 1994). 4. Garnaut, “Open Regionalism”, p. 273. 5. Andrew Elek, “Trade Policy Options for the Asia-Pacific Region in the 1990s: The Potential of Open Regionalism”, American Economic Review 82, no. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the 104th Meeting of theAmerican Economic Association, May 1992, pp. 74–78, 74. 6. Garnaut, “Open Regionalism”, p. 280. 7. Hadi Soesastro, “Open Regionalism”, in Europe and the Asia Pacific,

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8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon edited by Hans Maull, Ger ald Segal, and J usuf Wanandi (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 84–85. Ibid., p. 85. “The Osaka Action Agenda”, in Selected APEC Documents 1995 (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), p. 5. Emphasis added. Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), p. 8. C. Fred Bergsten, “Open Regionalism”, Institute for International Economics, Working Paper No. 97-3, available online at . Ibid., pp. 4–5. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 8–9. Ibid., p. 9. Mohammed Ariff, “Open Regionalism à la ASEAN”, Journal of Asian Economics 5, no. 1 (1994): 99–117, 94–95. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-Building: F rom the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way?”, Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997): 319–46.

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The term preventive diplomacy was coined by the second SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskold, in 1960. According to Simon Tay, the concept is based on public international law, in particular the United Nations’ goal to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace” set out in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter.1 In the context of the Cold War, Hammarskold saw preventive diplomacy principally as a means of keeping regional and local conflicts isolated from the superpower stand-off. He urged the creation of hotlines, risk-reduction centres, and transparency measures with the goal of avoiding “action by one or other of the superpo wers that might lead to escalation and nuclear confrontation”.2 As it is used today, however, the concept of preventive diplomacy is more closely identified with another United Nations SecretaryGeneral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his 1992 book, An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali revi ved and reconceptualized prev entive diplomacy for use in the post-Cold War world. He defined the concept as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter w hen they occur”. 3 His report distinguished preventive diplomacy from other types of diplomatic action, including peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and peacemaking, because of its emphasis on solving disputes before they turn into actual conflict. According to one description, preventive diplomacy differs from ordinary diplomac y in that “it signifies acti ve, rather than reactive, responses to situations that threaten peace. Its scope is more ambitious and immediate.”4 Preventive diplomacy remains a strongly contested term, however, and as one report published in Singapore on the subject noted, “there is no consensus on the meaning, scope and purpose of [prev entive diplomacy] or how it would apply to security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific region.”5 A key area of dispute about the meaning of preventive diplomacy revolves around the question of the means to be used to prev ent conflict from breaking out or spreading. Does preventive diplomacy include acts that go beyond traditional diplomatic methods, such as the use or threat of use of military force? The answer to this question

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seems to hinge on whether the analyst puts greater emphasis on the preventive or the diplomacy component of the definition. In one analysis of the concept in the Asia-Pacific context, Amitav Acharya offers a broad interpretation of preventive diplomacy, which he says is derived from Boutros-Ghali’ s definition. He sa ys preventive diplomacy is diplomatic, political, military, economic, and humanitarian action undertaken by governments, multilateral (the United Nations as well as regional groups) organizations and international agencies (including non-governmental actors) with the aim of: (1) preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states; (2) preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; (3) limiting the intensity of violence resulting from such conflicts and prev enting them from spreading geographically; (4) prev enting and managing acute humanitarian crises associated with (either as the cause or the effect of) suc h conflicts; (5) as part of the immediate response to a crisis or pre-crisis situation, initiating measures that might contribute to the ev entual resolution of the dispute. He says these measures can v ary from “a simple telephone conversation during a crisis” to the “deployment of military units”.6 Acharya further argues there are tw o categories of prev entive diplomacy: peacetime measures and crisis-time measures. Peacetime measures include confidence-building measures (CBMs); institutionbuilding and the construction of norms of acceptable beha viour; early warning; and preventive humanitarian action. 7 He says these instruments are not just c hannels for the state or United Nations action, but can also include participation b y non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional organizations. Crisis-term measures include fact-finding missions; good offices and good will missions; crisis-management; and “prev entive deployment” which Acharya distinguishes from peacekeeping, arguing it “in volves the dispatch of units to trouble spots to prevent the widening or escalation

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of a conflict with or without the mutual consent of the ri vals. Thus, preventive deployment unlike peacekeeping, might not be a strictly neutral exercise. It could be undertaken with a view to support the likely victim by deterring the actions of the likely aggressor .”8 In contrast, Tay advances a narrower definition that focuses more on the diplomatic component of the concept. He argues that “the practice of prev entive diplomacy relies on non-coer cive diplomatic methods”, adding that “acts that require military action or the use of for ce lie outside the scope of prev entive diplomacy. The diplomatic and peaceful tools of preventive diplomacy include negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and conciliation. These are best employed at a relatively early stage of the dispute, before violence has resulted.” Tay argues that because prev entive deployment is a “military response, not a diplomatic effort”, it and similar military approaches “seem to move beyond the essential idea of preventive diplomacy”.9 Like Acharya, however, he also makes a distinction between what he calls “early” (or “pre-crisis”) and “late” (or “crisis”) preventive diplomacy (terms apparently first used b y Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans).10 Japanese scholars also differ on the question of the use of force. Tay’s narrower approach is supported b y a definition used b y the Japanese National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). NIRA has defined preventive diplomacy as “all non-coercive activities by all parties to keep all disputes between whatever parties from turning violent, escalating, and spreading and to keep all armed conflicts from endangering international peace and order”. 11 On the other hand, a paper written by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) describes the NIRA definition as “very narrow” and notes that “coercive action and ev en the use of military deterrence is an accepted diplomatic means for the United Nations and international coalitions”.12 The paper argues that “w hile there are those w ho argue that military action has no place in preventive diplomacy, this is fallacious reasoning. ” The JFIR paper goes on to argue that “preventive diplomacy has a very high probability of success when it is coupled with a clearly demonstr ated willingness to resort to military means and that the tw o aspects of prev entive diplomacy

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and military deterrence are not mutually exclusi ve, but should be seen as highly complementary.” The paper concludes, however, that “the fact remains that the emphasis in prev entive diplomacy must generally be more on non-military than on military means.”13 Perhaps recognizing the intractability of the definitional question, Dino Patti Djalal makes the argument that “prev entive diplomacy is context bound. Different cases of conflict require different methods and doses of preventive diplomacy. There is no panacea, no fixed formula, no set procedures, no single str ategy ...”14 On the question of the participants in prev entive diplomacy, there is more agreement. Acharya argues that w hile “preventive diplomacy need not be an exclusi vely multilateral enterprise, multilateralism enhances the appeal and legitimac y of prev entive diplomacy efforts and hence their prospects for success”. He sa ys the United Nations remains the “c hief multilateral framework for preventive diplomacy” although it can also be undertaken by regional organizations. 15 Tay suggests that the concept “more often presupposes a multilateral setting. While the parties to the dispute can themselves take initiatives for prevention, it is usually a third party that acts to prevent conflict between two or more parties to a dispute.”16 He also distinguishes preventive diplomacy from policies that address issues such as poverty, social inequality, and ethnic and cultural discrimination. He argues that w hile it is necessary to address these problems, it is important to distinguish such efforts as being forms of w hat may be called “crisis prev ention” rather than preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy, he argues, “is more narrowly focused to those situations w here the risk of violence is closer at hand. It selectively targets vulnerable situations where risks of violence are not just possible, but probable or ev en incipient.”17 A Chinese perspective on preventive diplomacy was put forward by Shi Chunlai at a 1997 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) track two seminar in Singapore. His paper noted that prev entive diplomacy was “a concept of recent vintage in Asia” and said that “some more water has still to pass under the ARF bridge before the real utility of preventive diplomacy becomes apparent.” Despite these reservations, Shi identified some Chinese initiati ves in the Asia-Pacific that he

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implied were preventive diplomacy measures. These included the interim settlement of border issues with Vietnam and India; the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area with Russia and three Centr al Asian states; the annual security consultations between China and J apan; and China’ s participation in Indonesia-organized workshops regarding the South China Sea. Shi said that “measures taken by China in the preventive diplomacy field have been successful and effecti ve” and said that together, the initiatives constitute a “new security concept” (see the entry on “New Security Approach”).18 Shi argued that prev entive diplomacy in the region should be underpinned by seven fundamental principles. These were: (1) stateto-state relations should be conducted according to the norms set out in the Treaty of Amity and Co-oper ation (TAC), the United Nations Charter, the Five Principles of P eaceful Co-existence, and other universally recognized international laws; (2) mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; (3) noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs or directing security co-operation against an y third country; (4) “mutual consent b y parties directly relev ant to an issue” should be one of the most important prerequisites to prev entive diplomacy; (5) settlement of international disputes through peaceful means and refrainment from use or threat of for ce; (6) implementation and maintenance of national defence policies of a defensive nature and not threatening or undermining the security and stability of other countries with one’s military forces; and (7) promotion of mutually-beneficial cooperation among countries and friendly exchanges among peoples. In contrast to Simon Tay’s definition, Shi said that “China regards bilateral cooperation as the basis of preventive diplomacy” although he added that “in man y cases bilater al cooperation does not go against multilateral dialogue and cooperation.”19 The ARF agreed that the “development of preventive diplomacy” would constitute the second of its three-stage agenda for building trust and security co-operation in the region (coming as a “natur al follow-up” to confidence-building measures and before “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”). 20 According to Desmond Ball and

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Pauline Kerr, this second stage is guided b y “three existing sets of preventive diplomacy principles contained within the United Nations Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, and (with respect to the Spratly Islands) the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea”.20 An annex in the 1995 ASEAN Concept Paper calls for the development of a “set of guidelines for the peaceful settlement of disputes” based on those principles. Specific proposals r aised included the idea of appointing Special Representati ves (SRs) to undertake “fact-finding missions” and “offer their good services” and to in vestigate the possibility of constructing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre (RRRC). The Concept Paper specially mentioned the importance of the second tr ack process in aiding the tr ansition from Phase I to Phase II, saying it would be useful for it “to consider and investigate a v ariety of prev entive diplomacy and conflictresolution mechanisms”.22 Towards this end, the ARF organized a number of tr ack two seminars on preventive diplomacy. In these seminars, the definitional issue has “pro ved controversial” although most participants ha ve agreed that the conceptualization pro vided by Boutros-Ghali in Agenda for Peace provided a useful starting point.23 The ARF seminars have revealed some interesting interpretations of the concept; interpretations in keeping with some ARF members’ wariness about the use of formal dispute resolution mec hanisms. An ARF seminar held in Seoul in May 1995 agreed that preventive diplomacy “constitutes one end of a continuum that passes from preventive measures to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding”. In particular, the meeting gave broad support to the notion that preventive diplomacy should emphasize “tools to ensure latent disputes do not break into open conflict” 24 and concluded that efforts at preventive diplomacy should remain “where they will likely prove most effective: on the prevention of latent conflicts from developing into open hostility , and on the prev ention of some conflicts from escalating out of control”.25 The meeting also stressed that preventive diplomacy measures depend on consensus-building among parties and noted “[i]mposed solutions were … unworkable”.26 In contr ast with Acharya’s definition abo ve, the

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Seoul seminar also expressed the view that prev entive diplomacy “is not the same thing as crisis-management”. Some concrete suggestions for preventive diplomacy measures have been agreed upon by the ARF track two seminars. The meeting at Seoul in 1995 discussed the creation of a regional conflict prevention or risk-reduction centre, sa ying such a centre “could gather, analyze, and disseminate information, as well as lend its good offices to an y attempt to facilitate dialogue, open third-party mediation, and assist in the post-settlement monitoring of mutually agreed solutions”. 27 Other suggested measures include the establishment of a register of experts by the ARF; official discussion on the principles of peaceful dispute settlement; appointment of a High Commissioner for Maritime Affairs; and establishment of permanent and ad hoc committees or w orking groups on the subject.28 A 1996 seminar in P aris also endorsed the Boutros-Ghali definition as a good conceptual starting point w hile noting “that there were various other understandings of preventive diplomacy”. It also offered some additional proposals for specific prev entive diplomacy measures. These included “an ARF role in prev entive diplomacy through the expansion of the good offices of the Chair , guided by the principle of consensus amongst ARF members”. The seminar agreed on the need for an “annual security outlook” and decided this was an activity appropriate for track two consideration, noting in particular the potential use of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). It also specifically recommended that the ARF members circulate simultaneously among themselves, information about their contributions to the United Nations Arms Register. All these measures, the seminar stressed, were to be “subject to the strict maintenance of consensus amongst all ARF members”.29 A third ARF track two conference on preventive diplomacy was held in Singapore in September 1997. According to a summary of the meeting, while the usefulness of the work completed at the two previous seminars was noted, some participants were cautious about pressing ahead with specific preventive diplomacy measures. Instead,

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“it was accepted that the different cir cumstances and actual conditions in the Asia-Pacific would often call for different approaches from those employed in other parts of the world. With that in mind, some felt that CBMs, as one element of prev entive diplomacy, had the best prospects of success in the immediate future and efforts should be focused on them.”30 China, in particular, has stressed the view that “bilateral and multilateral CBMs should be explored and exploited more fully b y states in the region. ”31 The meeting noted what it called “ongoing preventive diplomacy efforts in the region”, discussing, in particular, the disputes in the South China Sea and Cambodia and specifically referred to “the contribution of the Indonesia-organized workshop on the South China Sea”. 32 The Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) conducted a track two workshop on preventive diplomacy in Bangkok from 28 February to 2 March 1999. The workshop debated a number of definitions and concluded that it w as important “not to be held captive to o verly-specific definitions”. The meeting agreed on a “broadly endorsed” w orking definition. It stated that as a gener al rule, preventive diplomacy is “consensual diplomatic and political action” with the aim of “prev enting severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States which pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability; prev enting such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontations; and limiting the intensity of violence and humanitarian problems resulting from suc h conflicts and preventing them from spreading geographically”. The workshop noted that w hile there w as “some o verlap between Prev entive Diplomacy and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)”, this w as natural and said, “there appears to be little to be gained by trying to precisely define where CBMs stop and Preventive Diplomacy begins. Suffice it to sa y that Prev entive Diplomacy goes well bey ond traditional CBMs in attempting to prev ent conflicts and/or to limit their escalation, spread, or recurrence. ”33 In a statement prepared for the ARF, the workshop noted seven general principles of prev entive diplomacy. These included the principle that preventive diplomacy is “about diplomacy. It relies on diplomatic and peaceful methods suc h as persuasion, negotiation,

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enquiry, mediation, and conciliation. It is v oluntary. Preventive Diplomacy practices are to be employed only at the request of the parties or with their consent. It is a non-coer cive activity. Acts that require military action or the use of force, or other coercive practices, such as sanctions, are outside the scope of Prev entive Diplomacy. … It is based upon respect for so vereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a State.This includes the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.” These recommendations were passed on to the ARF InterSessional Support Group (ISG) on CBMs which deliberated them at a meeting held in Singapore in April 2000. An ASEAN draft paper provided to participants included man y of the recommendations from the various track two meetings mentioned above. It stated that there appeared to be a “gener al consensus that PD is consensual diplomatic and political action with the aim of: (1) prev enting severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States w hich pose a severe threat to regional peace and stability; (2) prev enting such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed conflicts; and (3) prev enting such disputes and conflicts from spreading geographically”.34 The paper also restated the CSCAP principles for preventive diplomacy: preventive diplomacy is about diplomacy; it is non-military and non-coercive; it is based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference; it works on the principles of consultation and consensus; it is v oluntary; it requires trust and confidence; it rests upon international law; and it requires timeliness. 35 Some responses to the ASEAN draft paper took issue with aspects of the definition. Several ARF members argued that the use of the w ords severe and serious were unnecessarily restricti ve in describing the kinds of disputes that might require prev entive diplomacy.36 Australia suggested, “the criterion for a dispute or conflict which warrants preventive diplomacy efforts is properly based on the degree of threat posed to regional peace and security.” Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and J apan also r aised concerns about the requirement that consultations about an y preventive diplomacy response to a conflict should be “extensi ve”, questioning how that related to the principle of timeliness, and

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noting that the requirement to ac hieve consensus among all ARF members could be onerous. 37 The U.S. paper added, “w hen we define ‘consensus’, not no w but some da y in the future, we ma y wish to consider modified consensus approac hes taken b y other multilateral groups.”38 Another concern raised by Canada and others, was the reference in the dr aft that implied prev entive diplomacy only applied to disputes among states. The Canadian submission argued that the concept also needed to be able to deal with intra-state conflicts that have transnational effects, as well as forms of domestic beha viour that threaten peace and stability, for example, “support of criminal activity, damage to a shared environment”.39 It also said preventive diplomacy should address w hat is to be done in the case of an “egregious example of serious mistreatment of people by their own government or by non-state actors”, and suggested revising the aims of preventive diplomacy to include “addressing gross violations of human security and dignity , [and] causing substantial suffering to innocents”.40 The Japanese submission likewise suggested that “the definition and meaning of ‘internal affairs of a state’ should be discussed in accordance with the ev olution of international law.”41 The United States and New Zealand also made the case that declaring that preventive diplomacy was inherently “non-military” as well as “non-coercive” was unnecessary. The U.S. paper asked, “would this preclude the use of military helicopters to help pro vide food and medical assistance in a disaster scenario?” 42

Notes 1. Simon Tay, “Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: Principles and Possibilities”, in The Next Stage: Preventive Diplomacy and Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, edited by Amitav Acharya and Desmond Ball, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 131 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University; Singapore: Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 1999), p. 120. 2. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: Concept, Theory,

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and Strategy”, Paper prepared for the International Conference on “Preventive Diplomacy for Peace and Security in the Western Pacific”, Taipei, 29–31 August 1996, p. 4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992). Tay, “Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, p. 120. CSCAP Singapore, “Review of Prev entive Diplomacy Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in The Next Stage, edited by Acharya and Ball, p. 294. Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: Background and Application to the Asia-Pacific Region”, in The Next Stage, edited by Acharya and Ball, pp. 19–20. He suggests these norms might include the use of multilateralism, noninterference and non-interv ention, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 6. F or more of a discussion of “prev entive deployment” see Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1996). Tay, “Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, p. 121. For Evans’ use of the distinction, see his essay in The Next Stage, edited by Acharya and Ball, pp. 44–45. Japan Forum in International Relations, “Prev entive Diplomacy and Japan’s Role: An Action Menu”, in The Next Stage, edited by Acharya and Ball, pp. 215–77, 220 note 1. Emphasis added. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 224–25. While there is little accord on the question of the use of for ce, it is interesting to note that the separ ate term coercive diplomacy has traditionally been used to describe the combination of diplomacy with the willingness to use military measures. See the entry on “Coercive Diplomacy”. Dino Patti Djalal, “The Indonesian Experience in F acilitating a Peace Settlement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front”, in The Next Stage, edited by Acharya and Ball, p. 207. Amitav Acharya, “Preventive Diplomacy: Concept, Theory and Strategy”, in The Next Stage , edited by Acharya and Ball, pp. 93–115, 103. Tay, “Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional Forum”, p. 120. For a detailed description of a case of prev entive diplomacy in action in the Asia-Pacific, see Djalal, “The Indonesian Experience”, pp. 199–

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17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

36.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon 207. It is notable, however, that Djalal does not seem sure whether the case is better decribed as preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. (p. 199). Tay, “Preventive Diplomacy and the ASEAN Regional F orum”, pp. 121–22. Shi Chunlai, “Preventive Diplomacy and the Asia-Pacific Region”, in The Next Stage , edited by Acharya and Ball, pp. 173–86, 176–78. Ibid., p. 178. “ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper”, para. 14, see also Annexes A and B, reproduced in Desmond Ball and P auline Kerr, Presumptive Engagement: Australia’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy in the 1990s (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1996), Appendix 2. Ball and Kerr, Presumptive Engagement, p. 29. “ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper”, para. 13. Chairman’s Summary, ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy, Seoul, Republic of K orea, 8–10 May 1995, para. 4. Ibid. Ibid., para. 6. Ibid., para. 7. Ibid., para. 14. Ibid. See the ARF statements on preventive diplomacy, reproduced as Chapter 13 of The Next Stage , edited by Acharya and Ball, p. 285. Ibid., p. 288. Ibid. Ibid. Chairman’s Summary, CSCAP Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy, 28 February–2 March 1999, a vailable online at (under the heading “meeting 5”). “Comments from Non-ASEAN ARF Countries on the ASEAN Draft Paper on Concept and Principles of Prev entive Diplomacy”, ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures, Singapore, 5–7 April 2000 (hereafter referred to as “ARF ISG on CBMs”) (author’s copy). ASEAN Draft (6 No vember 1999) “ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, pp. 3–4. See for example, the comments of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the United States. China b y contrast, argued that the reference to

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37.

38.

39.

40. 41.

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“preventing severe disputes” should be deleted, as “disputes … often … naturally arise due to [the] existence of differences, [and] they could also refer to argument, debating in non-violent means. It is therefore neither realistic nor appropriate to set suc h ambitious mandates of ‘prevent[ing] them [from] arising’; besides, conflicts usually refer to armed actions, hence are not at the same lev el as disputes.” “China’s Comments on the Draft of the ARF: Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, p. 1. “ASEAN Regional F orum: Concept and Principles of Prev entive Diplomacy — Australian Comments on Singapore Draft Paper”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, pp. 1–2. See also the Japanese, New Zealand, and American submissions. “ASEAN Regional F orum: Concept and Principles of Prev entive Diplomacy — United States Comments on Singapore Dr aft Paper”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, p. 2. Letter from Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to Bilahari Kausikan, Deputy Minister (Southeast Asia), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 11 F ebruary 2000, p. 3. See also the submissions of New Zealand. Ibid. “ASEAN Regional F orum (ARF) J apan’s Comments on ‘Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy’”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, p. 1. “ASEAN Regional F orum: Concept and Principles of Prev entive Diplomacy — United States Comments on Singapore Dr aft Paper”, Paper prepared for the ARF ISG on CBMs, p. 2.

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Security Community

The concept of a security community was developed by Karl Deutsch and his co-authors in their 1957 study Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.1 Put most simply, a security community exists when a group of states ha ve forged a sense of community or collective identity, meaning they will settle their differences without resorting to for ce. A security community is not the same as an alliance or a collecti ve defence grouping, although security communities can potentially gro w out of and co-exist with these kind of military relationships. 2 Deutsch identified tw o distinct categories of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic. An amalgamated security community exists when there is a “formal merger of tw o or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common go vernment after amalgamation”. 3 An example would be the United States, in w hich the fifty states ha ve united under a single federal government. In a pluralistic security community, by contrast, the members of the community “retain the legal independence of separate governments”.4 Examples of a pluralistic security community include the relationship between the United States and Canada, Western Europe, and the Baltic states region. Most applications of Deutsch’s concept assume that a security community must meet sev eral requirements. The first, and most important, is there must be a total absence of armed conflict, or prospects for such a conflict among the members who make up the community. This is not to suggest that these states will be without disagreements or disputes. Rather , it means some w ay has been found to prevent the governments involved from resorting to the use or threat of for ce. According to Deutsch, the community of states must share “dependable expectations of peaceful c hange” in their mutual relations and rule out the use of force as a means of problemsolving. A second, and closely related, requirement for a security community is the absence of a competiti ve military build-up or arms race involving community members. Not only must the use of force no longer be considered within a security community , but preparations for it should also no longer be acceptable. More 198

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specifically, states must forego offensive weapons systems and must not engage in contingenc y planning or resour ce mobilization for war against other actors within the community . The third requirement is the existence of “formal or informal institutions and practices” which serve to reduce, prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. This is a stringent requirement. As Amitav Acharya notes, “few regional groupings ha ve performed this task with distinction and stood the test of time.” To meet this prerequisite, the institutions and pr actices must be sufficiently well-established and durable enough to be able to assure peaceful c hange among members of the group, with “reasonable certainty” o ver a long period. Finally, a security community requires a “high degree of political and economic integration as a necessary precondition of peaceful relationships”. This does not necessarily mean an y kind of supr anational political authority, but could involve political co-operation on a range of issues or economic and functional integration, such as that found in free trade areas, customs unions, and economic unions. This requirement is based on the assumption that a high degree of economic and political interdependence increases the costs and reduces the benefits of using for ce between states, and will consequently promote the co-operative handling of security issues. In a book revisiting Deutsch’s concept, Adler and Barnett offer a three-stage model of ho w security communities dev elop.5 They argue that security communities begin in a “nascent” phase in which the peoples and/or governments of two or more states explore how they can co-ordinate their relations to increase their mutual security.6 In the process, they often create “third party” organizations or institutions to monitor and facilitate closer relations. Sometimes closer ties will be prompted b y a cataclysmic ev ent or b y the prospect of war or a common threat, but where states develop close security ties they also often dev elop other institutional and transactional linkages that bind them together (for example, in the areas of economics or the en vironment). Through these ties they come to accept the interdependence of their security . The development of a shared identity in turn can lead to the creation of

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more organizations and institutions, and may even create the desire to forge a security community. The second “ascendant” phase is marked by “increasingly dense networks, new institutions, and organizations that either reflect tighter military coordination and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat”, and the growth of a shared belief in a collective identity and dependable expectations of peaceful c hange.7 As the linkages among the states become more intensive and more extensive, there is a concomitant gro wth in mutual trust. This can be seen in various institutions and organizations that reflect diffuse reciprocity, but according to Adler and Barnett, the key indicators of trust are found in the security sphere. They argue that gro wing evidence of trust in military matters can be found in those instances w hen military procurement decisions reflect interdependent military postures, and states begin to share intelligence information. 8 In this phase, some of the monitoring and v erification mechanisms established during the “nascent” phase of the community become less important and are ev en dropped. In the third or “mature” phase, Adler and Barnett expect to see evidence of a high degree of trust, the dev elopment of a belief in a collective community identity, dependable expectations of peaceful change, and multiple and di verse mechanisms and patterns of interaction that reinforce and reproduce the security community. In this phase, however, they distinguish between “loosely” and “tightly” coupled security communities. 9 In the case of a loosely coupled community, they expect to see indicators of trust including: the increased use of multilateral decision-making mechanisms; unfortified borders between community members; changes in military planning, where contingency planning now excludes other members of the community; common definitions of threat; and the development of a discourse by the state that reflects the norms and the language of the community as a whole.10 In a tightly coupled security community, by contrast, while Adler and Barnett also expect to see man y of these characteristics, they also anticipate a high lev el of military integration; the development of “cooperative security” policies with other community members and a “collecti ve security” approac h

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with respect to external threats; 11 policy co-ordination against “internal” threats; the free movement of populations; and the growing ”internationalization” of authority, decision-making, law, and public policy. There are few groupings of states that meet all the requirements of a pluralistic security community. The most frequently cited is the relationship between the United States and Canada. Despite sharing a 5,000-mile land border , there has been no expectation of w ar between Canada and the United States for almost a century . The border is completely undefended and the last contingency plans for a conflict go bac k to 1931. 12 Other well-established security communities include the relationship between Australia and New Zealand, the Baltic states, as well as the states of Western Europe.13 Andrew Hurrell has also argued that a “loosely coupled, if still imperfect” security community is emerging in the Mercado Commun del Sur (MERCOSUR) region of South America, which is based around a core relationship between Br azil and Argentina.14 In Eastern Asia, discussion about security communities has focused on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While ASEAN’s traditional concept of regional order has centered on the creation of a security community in Southeast Asia, it has been the subject of some debate w hether ASEAN constitutes a security community in the Deutsc hian sense of the w ord. Acharya notes that ASEAN’s experience also does not sit easily with the pathway suggested b y Adler and Barnett. 15 On the one hand, promoting a security community w as undoubtedly the primary objective of the ASEAN founders w hen it w as created in 1967. ASEAN can make the claim that no w ar has been fought between any of its members in the thirty years since then. The Association has adopted a sophisticated discourse of regional community and there is also a high degree of economic and political inter action among the member states (at least at the élite lev el). While military-tomilitary ties are much more uneven, the ASEAN member states have “extensive arrangements for intelligence liaison, exc hange, and cooperation“.16 On the other hand, ASEAN does not meet many of the important indicators set out b y Adler and Barnett. The regional

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community has come about despite the fact that for most ofASEAN’s history, its member states ha ve had di vergent threat per ceptions. ASEAN has also not had intense intr a-community transactions that Deutsch would have expected to see; intra-ASEAN tr ade is significantly lower than trade with non-ASEAN states. The member states continue to emphasize the importance of their indi vidual sovereignty. More seriously, bilateral tensions persist in Southeast Asia. There are high lev els of arms expenditure and long-standing territorial disputes.17 Furthermore, the relative newness and uncertain future of incipient multilater al security-building dialogues in the region means they ma y not meet the requirement of a dur able conflict-resolution institution. These doubts have been strengthened with the expansion of ASEAN to include Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.18 These factors raise questions about ASEAN’s qualification to be a security community. However, the existence of disputes and latent conflicts within the community should not outrightly disqualify ASEAN’s claim. As Acharya notes, “the distinguishing feature of a security community is its ability to manage any conflicts within the region peacefully, rather than the absence of conflict per se.”19 While ASEAN’s experience does not conform to man y of the expectations set out b y Deutsch, and does not meet some of the more stringent requirements in Adler and Barnett’s typology, it can be reasonably described as a nascent security community .20 Interestingly, the language of security communities has appeared in U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee on 7 March 2000, the Commander in Chief of U.S. P acific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, said that his “vision of the way ahead for military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is the promotion of … security communities”. He defined these in an orthodox fashion, as “groups of nations that have dependable expectations of peaceful c hange. They genuinely do not plan to fight one another . They are willing to put their collective efforts into resolving regional points of friction; contribute armed forces and other aid to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to support diplomatic solutions; and plan, tr ain, and

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exercise their armed for ces together for these oper ations.” Blair went on to say security communities may be “alliance signatories, participants in a non-military organization suc h as the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF], or groups of nations joined b y geographic considerations or common concerns. They are committed to policy coordination, including combined military cooperation on specific regional security issues, to ad vance peaceful dev elopment over time without major conflict.” He later added that the U.S. approach to the conflict in East Timor “showed the potential of security communities”.21 In a speec h to the P acific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in Hawaii on 21 March 2000, Blair expanded on his thinking. He said, “security communities are appropriate for the Asia-Pacific region since the members of a security community need not be signatories to a security treaty. They can be based on a non-military organization such as ASEAN or the ARF. They can simply be groupings of nations who share a common geographic concern or functional concerns as they work together.” He said there were a number of key attributes that security communities all share. “They require a shared interest and a basic level of trust. Successful transactions benefit both parties. They are not zero sum, and success builds confidence and encour ages more cooperation. I think this commer cial model is important to keep in mind as we apply the idea of security communities, w here much of our thinking in the past has been ‘great po wer’, ‘national power’, ‘division’, ‘zero sum’, and ‘m y gain is your loss’.”22 Just as the use of the term appeared to be dev eloping momentum in U.S. policy, it disappeared from official speeches. In a meeting in Hawaii on 17 July 2000, some U.S. officials suggested the term was not appropriate for the region’s security architecture at this stage. 23 Their opposition was based on two points. First, they argued that the best example of an existing security community — Western Europe — was created because of the per ception of a common threat, something which is not the case in the Asia-Pacific at present. Second, they also claimed that the term security community was linguistically unacceptable to regional states because of its connotations of Western institutions. Their conclusion was that the

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notion of a security community should not form the theoretical underpinning of U.S. engagement or str ategy planning. The phrase “enhanced regional co-oper ation” appears to be the fa voured reformulation at the end of 2000.

1. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience , (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957). According to both Ronald J. Yalem and Donald J. Puchala, Richard Van Wagenen was the first to use the term security community in his book, Research in the International Organization Field (Princeton, New Jersey: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952): see Ronald J.Yalem, “Regional Security Communities and World Order”, in The Year Book of International Affairs 1979, edited by George W. Keeton and George Scharzenberger (London: Stev ens and Sons, 1979), pp. 217–23; see also Donald J. Puchala, International Politics Today (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), p. 165. Amitav Acharya, the leading authority on security communities in Southeast Asia, argues that the term w as “developed most systematically” by Deutsch and his colleagues. SeeAmitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in SoutheastAsia?”, Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1995), Special Issue on “T he Transformation of Security in the Asia/Pacific Region”, edited b y Desmond Ball, pp. 175–200, 176, 192–93 note 5. 2. For a discussion of the differences between alliances , security communities, and defence communities , see Amitav Acharya, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defence Community?”, Pacific Affairs 64, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 159– 78. 3. Deutsch et al., Political Community, p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 5. 5. Emanuel Adler and Mic hael N. Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1998); see also their “Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Stud y of Security Communities”, Ethics and International Affairs 10 (1996): 63–98. 6. Ibid., p. 86. 7. Ibid., p. 89. 8. Ibid., p. 91.

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9. Ibid., p. 92. 10. Ibid., pp. 92–93. 11. Here Adler and Barnett’s external focus suggests they are usingcollective security as a synonym for collective defence. For a discussion on the theoretical differences between the two, and the decline of conceptual clarity around collective security, see the entries on “Collective Defence” and “Collective Security” in this v olume. 12. See Sean M. Shore, “No F ences Make Good Neighbours: The Development of the U.S.–Canadian Security Community, 1871–1940”, in Security Communities, edited by Adler and Barnett, pp. 333–67; see also Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New J ersey: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 391. 13. See the c hapters by Richard Higgott and Kim Ric hard Nossal on Australia and Ole Waever on Western Europe in Security Communities, edited by Adler and Barnett; see also Emanuel Adler, “Europe’s New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community”, in The Future of European Security, edited by Beverly Crawford (Bekerley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 287–326. 14. Andrew Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in SouthAmerica?”, in Security Communities, edited by Adler and Barnett, pp. 228–64, 260. 15. Amitav Acharya, “Imagining a Security Community: Collective Identity and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia”, Unpublished manuscript prepared as a chapter for “Security Communities in Compar ative and Historical Perspective”, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. p. 5. 16. Desmond Ball, “Building Bloc ks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Resear ch School of Pacific Studies, Australian National Uni versity, 1991, p. 35; on military-tomilitary ties see Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper No. 279 (London: International Institute for Str ategic Studies, 1993), pp. 69–73. The debate about an ASEAN security community w as given a new twist when a line in the 1997 Indonesian Defence White Paper noted that while “ASEAN was not intended to be a joint security organization current conditions encourage the expansion of ASEAN cooperation to include a security dimension”. While some analysts claimed that this

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17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

23.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon could mean the future creation of an ASEAN military pact, Indonesian officials denied the suggestion. One senior Indonesian Defence Ministry official quoted in the Far Eastern Economic Review said the line referred to the fact that ASEAN had become “a security community in the widest sense”. See John McBeth, “Secure Community”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 August 1997, p. 23. Acharya, “A Regional Security Community”, p. 191. For a discussion of some of the problems and c hallenges facing an expanded ASEAN, see Sukhumbhand Paribatra, “From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 3 (December 1994): 243–58. Acharya, “Imagining a Security Community”, p. 20. For a more detailed evaluation of the pros and cons of this debate, see ibid., pp. 25–27. Statement of Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 2001 Posture Statement, 7 March 2000. See also Dennis Blair and John Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing AsiaPacific Security Arrangements”, Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001). In a speec h in Mala ysia in 1999, Blair used the term strategic communities seemingly in place of security communities. Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8 September 1999. The officials concerned were from the National Security Council.

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The 1998 United States Security Str ategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region coined the term security pluralism to describe U.S. strategic policy in the Asia-Pacific.1 According to the report, security pluralism is “an array of cooperative and complementary frameworks in which nations seek to address their security concerns through the establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships and dialogue”. The report says that these fr ameworks include multilateral security dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), subregional confidence-building efforts, smaller “minilateral” groupings, as well as bilateral relations. The Commander in Chief of U.S. P acific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, has frequently referred to security pluralism in speeches delivered around the region. 2 At an address in Singapore in Ma y 1999, he described the concept as “an alternati ve to balancing power”. He said, “it relies on diplomac y and negotiation to make steady progress on disputes. A network of security and military relationships — bilateral and multilateral — develops to maintain peace and allow economic and cooperative development by which all nations prosper and benefit.”3 In the Asia-Pacific, he concluded, “we need more security plur alism thinking and less balance of power thinking. This is true toda y and will become ev en more important in the future.” Notes 1. United States Security Str ategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 1998), pp. 42–44. 2. See for examples, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. P acific Command, Remarks before the P acific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), Honolulu, Ha waii, 21 Mar ch 2000; “Collective Responsibilities for Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 22 May 1999; Remarks prepared for Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, University of California San Diego, Gr aduate School of International Relations and P acific Studies, 13 April 2000; 207

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Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the World Affairs Council, Anchorage Hilton, Anchorage, Alaska, 25 June 2000. An archive with the speec hes and testimony of Admiral Blair and former Commanders in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCP ACs) can be found on the U.S. P acific Command website at . 3. “Collective Responsibilities for Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Remarks by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 22 May 1999.

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Track one represents the official governmental channel for political and security dialogue in the region. Participants in track one meetings attend as representati ves of their respecti ve states. Discussions, though often informal in terms of style or setting, are assumed to be official statements of national polic y. In the Asia-Pacific, track one meetings and organizations include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional F orum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (or 10+3) Process, and Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). In Northeast Asia, the Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) manages relations between the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States at the official level.1 The principal track one security organization in the region is the ARF, which held its first meeting in Bangkok in 1994. The ARF is now composed of twenty-three members: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, My anmar, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. It in volves an annual ministerial-level discussion, and member states are usually represented by their Foreign Minister and two senior officials. As the Forum’s name suggests, ASEAN retains a special position within the ARF. The Chairman’s Statement issued after the Brunei ARF meeting in 1995 noted that “ASEAN undertook to be the driving force”. The ARF has no permanent Secretariat but instead is staffed b y the ASEAN country hosting the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the subsequent P ost-Ministerial Conference in volving ASEAN’s dialogue partners. The Chair of the ARF rotates annually through the ASEAN capitals in alphabetical order. The ARF has a number of smaller track one sub-groups under its auspices, including an annual inter-sessional Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) which prepares the agenda and meeting arr angements for the ARF. In addition to the SOM, the ARF sponsors Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs) on Peacekeeping Operations, Preventive Diplomacy, Disaster Relief and Search and Rescue Co-operation, and an InterSessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures. Lower in profile than theARF meetings are the many multilateral This entry is reproduced from The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, by David Capie and Paul Evans (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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governmental channels that bring together military officials from the region. These include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (P AMS) for military officers. Similarly, annual “quadrilater als” bring together representatives of polic y planning staffs from the so-called likeminded foreign ministries of Australia, Canada, J apan, and South Korea. Note

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1. Reports from the TCOG meetings can be found on the U.S. State Department’s website at .

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Track one-and-a-half (or one-and-a-half track) is a term coined b y Paul Dibb, head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National University in Canberra. Track one-and-ahalf was originally used in the context of a seminar sanctioned b y the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on regional confidence-building that took place in Canberra in November 1994. There are, however, at least two interpretations of the term’ s meaning operating in the region: one focusing on the content of the agendas, the other based on the background of the participants. For those who suggest an interpretation of the term based on content, the question of “who sets the agenda” is key.1 According to this definition, tr ack one-and-a-half meetings are non-official meetings usually attended b y officials (acting in their pri vate capacities) and academics, where the agenda is set b y the officials to focus on specific issues of concern to the official track (track one). Examples of this include the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD) process and (confusingly) meetings that are often referred to as coming under the ARF’s second track. To further complicate matters, at a meeting between Chinese and Canadian officials in 1998, one Chinese participant stated his view that the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was a track oneand-a-half institution. This approach to the term would suggest that regional security institutions have no fixed “track identity”. Whether CSCAP, for example, is a tr ack two or a tr ack one-and-a-half institution, would presumably be a question of who set the agenda at a given meeting.2 A second meaning of the term hinges on the bac kground of a meeting’s participants. In this context, a track one-and-a-half meeting is an unofficial meeting dominated by officials participating in their private capacities. For example, while the 1994 Canberr a seminar was unofficial (the c hannel usually referred to as second tr ack), most of the participants were military personnel or go vernment officials from ARF member states, not academics, journalists, or analysts from regional polic y institutes. The fact that they were mostly, although not exclusi vely, officials attending a seminar sanctioned by a tr ack one organization (the ARF) meant that the 211

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seminar was closer to the official c hannel of dialogue than most track two meetings. Indeed, it w as as close as it could be to the official track without becoming tr ack one. A slightly different interpretation along these lines w as put forward in an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly in 1995. This suggested that “‘track two’ events include the participation of academics and non-governmental organizations, while ‘track one-and-a-half’ events see some government officials added.”3 This interpretation does not quite square with the participation at the Canberra seminar, however, which was made up mostly of foreign ministry officials and defence practitioners and included only “selected academics. ” As a practical matter, the difference between these definitions may be only a question of emphasis. Presumably when the majority of participants at a meeting are officials (ev en if they are there in their private capacities) then it will be very likely that the meeting’s agenda will also be determined b y officials. Moreo ver, the proliferation of “ARF track two” meetings (a non-official channel of dialogue directly or chestrated by the ARF) calls into question the need for the term track one-and-a-half.

1. This point w as made b y Brian J ob during discussions at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998. 2. This definition is based on discussions with Chinese and Canadian academics and officials at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II), Toronto, January 1998. 3. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 June 1995.

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it is difficult to label organizations or indi viduals as “government” or “non-government”. Membership of forums and organizations is usually described as being “mixed” or “blended”, in that the participants include academics, other intellectuals, and government officials, usually from foreign ministries and occasionally from defence ministries, attending in their “private capacities” .... In addition, some “academic” members ha ve a number of identities: also holding government and industry positions or acting as regular policy consultants to governments. Some come from institutes which, despite being labelled non-governmental, are government funded and in some cases the research arm of foreign and defence ministries. 4 The second track process is based upon principles of informality, inclusivity, and non-attribution, in order to encour age frank debate and openness by the participants. It works from the assumption that the unofficial status of the meetings will permit the discussion of 213

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According to Louise Diamond and J ohn McDonald, the term track two was coined in 1982 by Joseph Montville of the Foreign Service Institute to describe “methods of diplomac y that were outside the formal governmental system”.1 According to their definition, tr ack two refers to the “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts, and activities between pri vate citizens or groups of indi viduals, sometimes called citizen diplomats or nonstate actors”. Its basic premise is the assumption that “the expertise for dealing successfully with conflict and peacemaking does not reside solely within government personnel or procedures.”2 In the literature on Asia-Pacific security, track two (or the second track as it is often called) is the “unofficial” c hannel for political, economic, and security dialogue in the region. Second track meetings and organizations are typically made up of scholars, journalists, and occasionally politicians, as well as ci vilian and military officials acting in their “private” or “unofficial” capacities. 3 As Pauline Kerr notes, track two in the Asia-Pacific is better described as an unofficial rather than non-governmental channel, because

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subjects that might be considered too sensiti ve or controversial for official discourse or formal negotiations. Track two encourages the floating of “trial balloon” policy proposals and “has helped establish building blocks for supporting cooperati ve arrangements at the official level”.5 It is also said to help “socialize” the idea of regional co-operation among regional élites. 6 The policy relevance of the subjects discussed is vital. As Desmond Ball has noted, “the prospects for implementation should count for as much as the intrinsic worth of any ideas generated in the second-track process.”7 While individual governments often fund track two events and are involved in shaping their agendas, the leading second tr ack organizations are usually uni versities or pri vate institutions that have an arm’s length relationship with their national go vernments. Despite that, it has been suggested that the close relationship between states and trac k two institutions restricts the autonom y of these groups and their ability to ad vance critical thinking. As Herman Kraft has noted, “this problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between official and non-official tr acks becomes increasingly blurred.”8 According to the Dialogue and Research Monitor: An Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security Issues, second track meetings take place at the r ate of about tw o per week. 9 Some are small, single-issue groups, such as on the security of sea-lanes or the Indonesia-organized workshops on the South China Sea.The largest and most inclusive second track meeting is the annual Asia-Pacific Roundtable hosted b y the ASEAN Institutes of Str ategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) w hich involves hundreds of participants from throughout the region.10 Bunn Nagara has described the strength of the Roundtable as lying in “its seemingly understated and latent potential for influence in official circles … The substance, tenor, and direction of the dialogue filter[s] bac k into the relev ant official circles of eac h country … This mode of oper ation … is a subtle and nuanced mode, consonant with w hat is culturally a highly nuanced region.”11 Perhaps the most ambitious second tr ack organization is the Council for Security Co-oper ation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The

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concept for CSC AP was developed at a conference in Seoul in November 1992 and formally announced in J une 1993 by its ten founding members. According to Paul Evans, CSCAP is “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused, and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters”.12 CSCAP aims to create a more structured security dialogue process, open to all countries and territories in the region. It has sixteen member countries — Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, J apan, North Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam; two associate members — the European Union, and the Indian think-tank IDSA; and an affiliate — the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia-Pacific. Each member committee in turn is supposed to ha ve a “broad-based” national member committee. CSCAP currently has fi ve working groups — Comprehensive and Co-operative Security, Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures, Maritime Security , North P acific, and Transnational Crime. In addition to CSC AP, a number of tr ack two dialogues have taken place under the auspices of the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue (NEACD). The dialogue, founded b y Susan Shirk and organized by the University of California, San Diego, is composed of the United States, Russia, China, J apan, and South K orea. After attending the first preparatory meeting, North Korea has refused to take part. The ARF has also added to the alread y busy tr ack two schedule by holding sev eral second tr ack meetings of its o wn, a development which has further blurred the alread y imprecise line between official and non-official dialogues.

Notes 1. Louise Diamond and J ohn McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to P eace (West Hartford: K umarian Press, 1996), pp. 1–2. 2. Ibid., p. 2. 3. See, for example, Stuart Harris, “T he Regional Role of Track Two

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6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

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The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon Diplomacy”, in The Role of Security and Economic Cooper ation Structures in the Asia Pacific Region, edited b y Hadi Soesastro and Anthony Bergin (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996); Desmond Ball, “A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second Track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Security Dialogue 25, no. 2, (1994). Pauline Kerr, “The Security Dialogue in theAsia-Pacific”, Pacific Review 7, no. 4 (1994): 399. Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor”, Paper presented at the Global Development Network 2000 Conference, Tokyo, 13 December 2000, p. 2. Jusuf Wanandi, “The Future of ARF and CSCAP in the Regional Security Architecture”, Paper presented at the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1994, p. 5. Desmond Ball, “CSC AP: Its Future Place in the Regional Security Architecture”, Paper prepared for the Eighth Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8 June 1994, p. 18. Herman Joseph S. Kr aft, “The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia”, Security Dialogue 31, no. 3 (September 2000): 346. Dialogue and Research Monitor is a available online at or . For more on ASEAN-ISIS’s important role in the dev elopment of track two and official regional dialogues, see K err, “The Security Dialogue” and also Carolina G. Hernandez, “Go vernments and NGOs in the Search for P eace: The ASEAN ISIS and CSC AP Experience”, P aper presented at the Alternative Security Systems Conference, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok, Thailand, 27–30 March 1997, available online at . Bunn Nagara, “Preface”, in The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific, edited b y Bunn Nagar a and K. S. Balakrishnan (K uala Lumpur: ISIS Mala ysia, 1994), p. ii, cited in K err, “The Security Dialogue”, p. 405. Paul M. Evans, “Building Security: The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)”, Pacific Review 7, no. 2 (1994): 125–39, 125.

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While the term track three suggests a natur al link with tr acks one and two, the relationship between them is a little more complex than the name implies. Generally speaking, track three refers to the activities and meetings of groups suc h as non-go vernmental organizations (NGOs), tr ansnational networks, and ad vocacy coalitions. While tracks one and tw o seek to engage and inform policy-makers about specific issues of concern to states, track three is made up of ad vocates claiming to represent “communities and people who are largely marginalized from the centre of po wer”.1 These groups seek to “build constituencies … w hich can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official government positions”. 2 According to Herman Kr aft, their “discussions are based on a critical fr amework with agendas that tend to oppose mainstream go vernment policies”. Consequently, these meetings “are more adversarial than what is usual for a tr ack two forum”.3 The label “trac k three” is a misnomer , in that most of these groups have only an indirect link to the polic y process and some reject outright the notion that they are a “tr ack” in any way linked to state-centred institutional arrangements. As Pierre Lizee has noted, many civil society groups have been “reluctant to involve themselves within structures they per ceive to be too close to the prev ailing centres of power”.4 They fear that they will be co-opted, which will compromise their independence and autonom y. Likewise, some participants in track two have also been w ary in their approach to track three actors. Gi ven that man y track three groups ad vocate causes such as human rights and democratization, their participation in regional security dialogues has often been strongly opposed b y non-democratic regimes. Specific examples of track three actors in theAsia-Pacific include the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Alt-SEAN), the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Dev elopment (known as FORUMASIA), Focus on the Global South, the Council forAlternative Security in the Asia-Pacific (CASAP), the Forum on Alternative Security, the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor (APCET), and P eace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia-Pacific (PDSAP).5 The issues 217

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tackled by these groups typically include socio-economic and gender inequalities, environmental degradation, lack of political participation, and democratization. Such groups have often made their presence felt at the “P eople’s Summits” that par allel official regional gatherings suc h as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-oper ation (APEC) or Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). 6 Track three groups ha ve also articulated critical positions on regional security. While there is no single line of thought, typically they are opposed to the presence of foreign bases in the region, high levels of military spending, and the acquisition and prolifer ation of weapons systems, including missile defences.7 However, as Kraft points out, “it is in the area of human rights that track three networks have been most active.”8 While many track three actors are hesitant about engaging track one or tr ack two channels, there ha ve been some attempts to establish more formal links between them. Perhaps the most important development was the first meeting of the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), which took place in November 2000 in Batam. The idea for a People’s Assembly was first raised at the official lev el during the 1995 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brunei w hen the Thai Foreign Minister proposed a congress of ASEAN peoples and requested that the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEANISIS), through ISIS Thailand, investigate the possibilities for organizing such a gathering.9 According to one Singaporean account, the APA is based “on the rationale that community building in ASEAN must include all sectors of society on a step-by-step basis … ASEAN must be made relev ant to the ordinary citizen of eac h of the member states, as it has become relev ant to man y members of their élite communities, if wider and deeper support for ASEAN among the citizens of the ten member states is to be built. ”10 The inaugural meeting in Batam included more than 300 representati ves from all ten ASEAN member states. 11 The Indonesian think-tank, the Centre for Security and International Studies (CSIS), acted as the APA Secretariat. Participants were in vited by ASEAN-ISIS, on the recommendation of national ISIS members, and their tr avel and accommodation expenses were paid for b y ASEAN-ISIS. The composition of representatives was supposed to be “as di verse as

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possible and should include a few representatives from government and business.”12 It was planned that the APA will be held annually to coincide with informal and regular ASEAN Summits.

1. Herman Joseph S. Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Asia Pacific Coalition for East Timor”, Paper presented at the Global Development Network 2000 Conference, Tokyo, 13 December 2000, p. 2. 2. Navnita Chadha Beher a, Paul Evans, and Go wher Rizvi, Beyond Boundaries: A Report on the State of Non-Official Dialogues on Peace, Security and Cooperation in South Asia (Toronto: University of TorontoYork University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1997), p. 19. 3. Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy”, p. 2. 4. Pierre Lizee, “Ci vil Society and Regional Security: Tensions and Potentials in Post-Crisis Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 3 (December 2000): 551–70, 559. 5. More information about FORUM-ASIA can be found at its website at . Focus on the Global South can be found at . 6. For example, the People’s ASEM Summit in Seoul, October 2000. F or details, see . 7. For an example, see Walden Bello, “Towards a Just, Comprehensive, and Sustainable P eace in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Speec h at the opening session of the Okina wa International F orum on P eople’s Security, Okinawa, 29 J une–2 July 2000, a vailable at . The group maintains a project on security and conflict, which is described on its website, and also a series of bulletins under the heading “Focus-on-Security”. 8. Kraft, “Track Three Diplomacy”, p. 4. 9. “ASEAN People’s Assembly”, Article on the website of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA) available online at . 10. Ibid. 11. John Aglionby, “ASEAN Starts to Rein vent Itself”, eCountries online news service, available at . 12. Ibid.

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Transparency

The term transparency is used in both security and economic discourse in the Asia-Pacific region. In the security discourse, transparency is associated with confidence- and security-building measures. Put most simply, transparency assumes that openness on military matters encour ages trust between states and reduces the suspicions that can lead to miscalculation and conflict. It does not require openness on all defence matters but r ather limited and carefully defined openness about a particular set of military issues. Transparency works primarily b y reassuring states that other governments to do not intend to take military action against them. It can also assure states that potential ad versaries do not ha ve the capability to launc h a major assault against them without taking obvious preparations. While a state’s intentions can obviously change over time, its military capability can only be expanded b y a programme of acquisitions o ver a long period. If tr ansparency is pursued consistently across an entire region, it therefore becomes difficult for an y one state to acquire the capacity to launc h an unexpected attack. Desmond Ball has identified tr ansparency as one of the “first and most basic” building bloc ks for creating confidence in the Asia-Pacific region.1 Practically there are man y different w ays to w ork towards transparency. These include military-to-military contacts, visits b y military delegations, prior notification of military exercises, and the sharing of strategic perceptions, military doctrine, and force structures, right through to the actual physical inspection of military installations. In the Asia-Pacific, it has been generally agreed that intrusive measures such as inspections are unacceptable to most states. More attention has, therefore, been placed on exc hanges of information suc h as encouraging the publication of White Papers by regional governments, or explanations of the rationale behind their defence structure. A second track proposal has called for the publication of a “generic” Defence White Paper by all the states in the region. Another specific transparency measure that has been discussed is the creation of a regional register of arms tr ansfers. While no agreement on this suggestion has yet been possible, regional states

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have undertaken to actively support the United Nations’ Register of Arms Transfers. Transparency has also been used in a similar w ay as a concept in Asia-Pacific economic multilateralism. At the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation) meeting held in Bogor in November 1994, transparency was identified as one ofAPEC’s non-binding investment principles. In its 1995 report, the P acific Business F orum (PBF) described transparency to mean “progr ammes, rules, regulations, guidelines, all these must be clearly documented and easily accessible to all concerned. Guess work, discretion, and double standards should be eliminated. The transparency principle should also apply within indi vidual economies.”2 In its 1996 Report to APEC’s Economic Leaders, the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), which succeeded the PBF, said transparency requires that all APEC member economies make their la ws, regulations, administrative guidelines, and policies pertaining to in vestment “publicly available in a prompt … and readily accessible manner”.3

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Notes 1. Desmond Ball, “Building Bloc ks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region”, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 83, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Resear ch School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1991, p. 29. 2. The Osaka Action Plan: Roadmap to Realising the APEC Vision, Report of the P acific Business F orum 1995 (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), p. 11, para. 8. 3. Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Business Advisory Council, ABAC Report to APEC Economic Leaders (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996), p. 53.

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Trust-Building Measures

The term trust-building measures (or TBMs) refers to a concept closely related to the family of confidence- and security-building measures. While TBMs is not a new term — in fact it w as used as long ago as the Camp Da vid process in the Middle East — some scholars have suggested they offer a “more indigenous” Asia-Pacific alternative to confidence-building measures (CBMs) or confidenceand security-building measures (CSBMs). 1 Trust-building measures were the subject of the first ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) inter-sessional seminar held in Canberr a in November 1994. The term has been used extensively by Paul Dibb, Head of the Str ategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at the Australian National Uni versity, and c hair of the 1994 meeting. According to Dibb, “dialogue and political trust are necessary preconditions for dev eloping specific security measures” in the Asia-Pacific.2 His understanding of TBMs includes both military and non-military measures designed to promote that trust. Dibb argues that “multilateral security dialogue is itself the first and perhaps most important regional trust-building measure. ”3 Dibb suggests that specific TBMs discussed by the ARF and the ARF-Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) fall into tw o groups: those that involve information-sharing; and those that require specific measures of constraint.4 Of these tw o types, he groups TBMs into three baskets. Measures in Basket 1 include exc hanges of strategic perceptions; military-to-military contacts; observ ers at military exercises (on a v oluntary basis); and participation in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. These measures should be “relatively easy” to get agreement on. Basket 2 measures include exploration of a regional arms register; the establishment of a regional security studies centre; the publication of Defence White Papers; and the creation of maritime information databases. Dibb labels these as a “little less easy” and sa ys they w ould need to be implemented in the medium term. Basket 3 measures, the most difficult to implement, include notification of major military exercises and maritime surveillance co-operation.5 Like CBMs and CSBMs, trust-building measures have the broad objective of promoting confidence, reducing uncertainty , 222

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misperception, and suspicion in the region and lowering the chances of armed conflict occurring. According to some proponents, they differ from confidence-building measures in the w ay TBMs tend to place greater emphasis on a gr adual or incremental approac h to building political trust between states r ather than spectacular breakthroughs.6 Others claim they are less formal and more flexible than CBMs and are based upon consensus.William Tow and Douglas Stuart add that TBMs are often “built on personal political contacts and relationships”. 7 Such differences, ho wever, have been exaggerated. It is difficult to see how TBMs offer much in the way of an “indigenous” alternati ve to the CBMs. Use of the term in the Middle East long pre-dates its use in Asia. Even the terminology used by proponents of TBMs, such as Dibb’s “baskets of measures” emulates the language of the Helsinki process. A Chinese perspective presented at a seminar on Canada-China relations in 1997 drew a subtle distinction between the terms trust and confidence. It noted that “in most security writings by Western scholars, the word ‘trust’ is used interchangeably with ‘confidence’. … In Chinese, xinren and xinlai correspond roughly to ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ respectively and have different shades of meaning. Xinlai implies that someone is not only believ able but also dependable. Whereas xinren emphasizes more on the believ ability of someone or something.” The participant went on to sa y, “‘Confidence’ and ‘trust’ also imply different degrees of belief. ‘Confidence’ is the accumulating process towards the final trust. While ‘confidence’ is more procedural and with more psyc hological assurance, ‘trust’ is more conclusive with more assured action. ”8

Notes 1. In his foreword to an Australian paper proposing TBMs, Gareth Evans claims that “as Foreign Minister of Australia for the past six years, I have been a strong proponent of the need for prev entive diplomacy and trust-building measures. At the outset, I recognized that Cold War language and concepts were not appropriate to the entirely different political, cultural and str ategic situation in the Asia Pacific region. I

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon therefore encouraged Professor Dibb to develop a fresh, new approach and language; new but also based firmly on the security pr acticalities and expectations of the region. ” See Gareth Ev ans and P aul Dibb, Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1994), p. 1. Paul Dibb, “Ho w to Begin Implementing Specific Trust-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Working Paper No. 288, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, p. 1. Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 7. Evans, in Evans and Dibb, Australian Paper, p. 1. Douglas T. Stuart and William S. Tow, A U.S. Str ategy for the AsiaPacific, Adelphi Paper No. 299 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 73 note 5. The comments were offered b y Chinese participants at the Second Canada-China Seminar (CANCHIS II) held in Toronto in January 1988. The extent to which the term has been used in this particular sense by Chinese government officials is unclear.

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