Summulae in praedicamenta (Aristarium) 907041936X, 9789070419363

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JOHANNES BURIDANUS SUMMULAE IN PRAEDICAMENTA

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics EDITORS L.M. de RIJK Leiden & E.P. BOS Leiden

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS Nijmegen &

C.H. KNEEPKENS Groningen Secretary of the Series P.J.J.M. BAKKER Nijmegen

ARTISTARIUM

10-3----

JOHANNES BURIDANUS

SUMMULAE IN PRAEDICAMENTA

introduction, critical edition and appendices

by E.P. BOS

Nijmegen lngenium Publishers

1994

ISBN 90 70419 36 X Copyright 1994 by Ingenium Publishers, P.O. Box 1342, 6501 BH Nijmegen, The Netherlands. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher. PRINTED by KRIPS REPRO MEPPEL, THE NETHERLANDS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Acknowledgements

vii

II. Introduction II.1. The editorial project II.2. John Buridan and his Summulae II.3. Treatise III, De Praedicamentis: on its general structure and contents II.3.1. John Buridan as commentator of Aristotle and Peter of Spain II.3.2. Buridan' s commentary II.3.3. Philosophical principles II.3.4. A summary of the contents II.4. List of manuscripts used II.5. Description of manuscripts used II.6. Stemma codicum II. 7. Editorial principles II.8. Critical apparatus II.9. Orthography II.10. Headings II.11. Apparatus of quotations II.12. Bibliography II.12.1. Primary literature II.12.1.1. John Buridan II.12.1.2. Other primary literature II.12.2. Secondary literature III. Text and apparatus III.1. Index capitulorum et partium III.2. Sigla codicum; signa in apparatu critico adhibita III.3. Textus et apparatus IV. Appendices IV .1. Additions from MS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale, D III 27 IV.2. Two additions from MSS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27, Wien, Osterreichische Nazionalbibliothek, lat. 5420 (in margine), Krakow, Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksiezy Misjonarzy 171, Erfurt,

v

xi xi XI xvI xvi xix xx xxiii xlii xliii xlv xlv xlvi xlvii xlviii xlviii xlix xlix xlix

1

3 6 7 115

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John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, Amplon., 2° 305, not found in MSS Citta del Vaticano, Bibliotecca Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994 and Vienna, Osterreichische Nazionalbibliothek, lat. 5420 IV.3. Some variant readings from MS Wertheim, Kirchenbibliothek 157

141 145

V. Indexes V .1. Index of Quotations V.2. Index of Names and Terms

149 151 153

vi

I. Acknowledgements

The editor of this fascicle would like to thank Professor Hubert Hubien (Liege) whose preliminary text of the Summulae proved very useful; Professors em. L.M. de Rijk and G. Nuchelmans of Leiden University, and Dr. R. van der Lecq of Utrecht University for commenting on the introduction and edition while they were still in the making; and A.P. Runia (Groningen) and Prof. M. Sirridge (Baton Rouge) for correcting the English. The Buridan Society would like to express its gratitude to Prof. M. Markowski (Krakow), Dr. K. Friis-Jensen (Copenhagen) and Dr. L. Valente (Heidelberg) for their help with the description and identification of manuscripts.

II. INTRODUCTION

II.I. The editorial project

The present fascicle is the first of nine planned. The intention is to issue the first complete edition of Buridan's Summulae, which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new edition of his Sophismata. The plan is being realized by an international team composed of scholars from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. A first and overly optimistic version of the project was discussed in 1975 at the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, which was devoted to the logic of John Buridan. In 1986 The Buridan Society was formed with the explicit purpose of producing an edition of the Summulae, and guidelines for the work were laid down. The following scholars joined the Society: E.P. Bos, H.A.G. Braakhuis, S. Ebbesen, H. Hubien, R. van der Lecq, F. Pironet, L.M. de Rijk, J.M.M.H. Thijssen. To make the task manageable, it was decided to aim only at a critical edition based on a handful of manuscripts carefully selected on the advice of H. Hubien, who had made pilot studies of the tradition. Also, considering that all participants in the project were scholars with many other obligations and hence likely to be distracted from the work on Buridan at unpredictable times, it was decided to publish each fascicle of the work as soon as it was finished without regard to regular intervals or an orderly progression from fascicle 1 to fascicle 9. The present fascicle, N° 3, is the first to appear, but we hope that it will soon be followed by others. II.2. John Buridan and his Summulae

John Buridan - Johannes Buridanus - was one of the most influential philosophers of the Late Middle Ages. Born at Bethune, in the diocese of Arras in Artois, at an unknown date, perhaps in the 1290s, but not later than 1304/5, he was active as a master of arts at the University of Paris from about the 1320s till his death, 1361 being the terminus ante quern of his death 1, or even the very year of his death, because at that date John's benefice went to somebody else. His philosophical production is closely connected to his work as a university teacher and consists primarily of commentaries on Aristotle, some of I See John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super Libras Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, liber III, quaestiones 14-19. An edition with an introduction and indexes by J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Nijmegen 1991, p. xi.

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John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

which have been edited in recent years2, as has also his treatise on conse-

2 On logic: M.E. Reina, 'Giovanni Buridano: Tractatus de suppositionibus', in Rivista critica di storia dellafilosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208 and 323-352. S. Ebbesen, 'The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De fallaciis' (excerpts), in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 139-160. N.J. Green-Pedersen, 'The Summulae of John Buridan, Tractatus VI, De locis' (excerpts), in ibidem, pp. 121-138. J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus' (excerpts), in ibidem, pp. 71-90. Johannes Buridanus, Sophismata. Critical edition with an introduction by T.K. Scott, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1977. R. van der Lecq, 'Buridan on modal propositions' (appendix: Questiones longe in Perihermeneias, liber II, questio 7), in English Logic and Semantics: from the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burley. Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, C.H. K.neepkens, L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1981, pp. 441-442. Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, hrsg. von J. Schneider, Miinchen 1983. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias, edited with an introduction by R. van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1984 (Ph. D. thesis, University of Leiden, Meppel 1983). Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum, ed. S. Szyller, in Przeglad Tomistyczny III (1987), pp. 137-178. There are no modern editions of Buridan's commentary on the Metaphysics, but the latter has been edited as ln Metaphysicen Aristotelis quaestiones argutissimae Joannis Buridani in ultima praelectione ab ipso recognitae et emissae, ac ad archetypum diligenter repositae, recognitae rursus accuratione et impensis Jodoci Badii Ascensii ad quartum Idus Octobris, Parisiis 1518 (reprint with title Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main 1964). There are no modern editions of his works in moral philosophy, but the Ethics commentary is available in an early printed edition: Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum, Paris 1513 (reprint Frankfurt am Main 1968). On natural philosophy: E.A. Moody, 'John Buridan on the Habitability of the Earth', in Speculum 1941 (16), pp. 415-425 (an edition of Buridan's Quaestiones super libris De caelo et mundo, book II, qu. 7). Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, edited by E.A. Moody, Cambridge (Mass.) 1942. V. Zoubov, 'Jean Buridan et Jes concepts du point au quatorzieme siecle', in Medieval Renaissance Studies, 1961 (5), pp. 43-95 (with an edition of Buridan's Quaestio de puncto). F. Scott and H. Shapiro, 'John Buridan's De motibus animalium', in [sis 1967 (58), pp. 533-552. G. Federici Vescovini, Le Quaestiones de Anima di Biago Pelacani da Parma, Florence 1974 (in the introduction, pp. 44-51, a list of questions and part of the first question of the third redaction of Buridan's Quaestiones De anima is presented). P.C. Marshall, 'Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century', in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Mayen Age, 1983 (50), pp. 101-193 (contains portions of book II, qq. 12-13 of the first redaction of Buridan's Questiones de Anima, and book II, qq. 9-10 of the third redaction). P.G. Sobol, John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book ll of his Commentary on Aristotle's Book On the Soul( ... ), Indiana 1984. J.A. Zupko, John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind. An Edition and Translation of Book lll of his 'Questions on Aristotle's De anima' (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays, 2 vols., Ann Arbor (Mich.) 1990 (Ph. D. thesis, Cornell University 1989). B. Patar, Le traite de l' ame de Jean Buridan (Prima lectura). Edition, Etude critique et doctrinale, Louvain-la-Neuve 1991. John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, fiber lll, quaestiones 14-19. An edition with an introduction and indexes by J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Nijmegen 1991 (a revised edition of Thijssen's Ph.D. dissertation, Nijmegen: Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzoek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie, Nijmegen 1988, vol. II). xii

Introduction

quences3. And then there is his Summulae or Summa Logica(e), undeservedly neglected by historians of logic because it has never been printed. True, there are printed books from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries purporting to contain the work, but they do not really do so. The genuine text consists of (a) the lemmata of the Summulae proper, i.e. a brief presentation of standard lore, as found in an adapted and interpolated version of Peter of Spain's Summulae or Tractatus4, where the material is presented in such a way as to be easily memorized. Peter's work was originally composed about 1250. As Pinborg5 has pointed, the way Buridan speakes about his choice of Peter's work permits the conclusion that using Peter of Spain's manual was not the obvious thing to do, and he may certainly be right in suggesting that Buridan's introduction of it was the first time that "using Peter Hispanus was not the obvious thing to do" and Pinborg may well have been right in his conjecture that Buridan was the first to introduce Peter's manual as a textbook at university level in Paris, where it had earlier been used only at less exalted levels of education. Buridan made his choice out of the different versions available then, but did not make a version of his own, as is evident from his frequently criticizing the 'auctor's' text quoted in the lemmata. As for the De Praedicamentis, Buridan's version of Peter's work may have been based, rather than on Peter's original text, upon Aristotle and pseudo-Gilbert of La Porree, Liber sex principiorum6. (b) Buridan's own, very extensive comments on the standard material, which he often criticizes or re-interprets in ways its authors could scarcely have imagined. In the Renaissance edition John Dorp's comments have taken the place of John Buridan's and thus the reader has no means of seeing how original Buridan was. The Summulae consists of eight treatises, as follows: I. On Introductory Items, also called On Propositions 7

3 Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien. Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976. 4 See Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972, § 6 of the introduction. 5 J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', in The Logic of John Buridan. (... ),Copenhagen 1976, p. 72. 6 See also below, § II. 3.1. 7 'Introductiones' covers a broader field than just propositions, though the latter are predominant. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus (... ),ed. L.M. de Rijk, pp. lxxxix-xci. xiii

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

IL On Predicables III. On Categories IV. On Suppositions V. On Syllogisms VI. On Topics VII. On Fallacies VIII. On Definitions, Divisions, and Demonstrations. Buridan himself at one time regarded his Sophismata as treatise IX, but there is no genuine connection between treatise IX and the rest, which are quite differently organized&. Buridan's basic idea was to 'read', i.e. comment on, Peter of Spain's handy introduction to logic, the Tractatus or Summulae. He took over a text that had already been considerably altered in the course of transmission and he himself subjected it to further changes, and major ones at that. Peter's work contains twelve treatises. Buridan fused 8-12 (on relatives, ampliation, appellation, restriction, and distribution) with the treatise on supposition. That left seven treatises, but then he added an eighth to deal with demonstration, and also division and definition, subjects that Peter had neglected, as had other authors of 13th-century handbooks of logic. The basic text underlying Buridan's eighth tract is less easily identified. According to De Rijk it is not found in any interpolated text of Peter's Summulae, it is uncertain if it is by Buridan's own hand9. The first major survey of logic to include a chapter on demonstration was William of Ockham's Summa Logicae, which may be only about ten years older than Buridan's, but it is unknown to what degree, if any, Buridan, or his exemplar, was inspired by Ockham. In any event, by adding treatise VIII Buridan produced a book covering all the main subjects of Aristotle's Organon as well as such medieval additions to logic as the doctrine of the properties of terms. As Buridan commented on Peter of Spain, he seems to have grown increasingly irritated with the text at his elbow, and sometimes simply dispensed with it, using instead an alternative text to comment on (thus IV and VII). In trea-

8 On basis of a critical edition to be published soon by F. Pironet, J. Biard has translated the Sophismata: Buridan, Sophismes. Introduction, traduction et notes par J. Biard, Paris 1993. 9 Cf. the introduction of De Rijk's forthcoming edition of Buridan's commentary (Summulae) on the Praedicabilia. xiv

Introduction

tise III Peter's text still plays a role, though it has been thoroughly revised (see § II.3, below). Buridan's Summulae is a highly structured work. At first glance it presents itself as alternating pieces (partes) of basic text and commentary, but those partes are but the smallest independent units in a strictly hierarchical division of the basic text carried out and presented according to the conventions of literal commentaries ( expositiones). A preface to the whole work announces which treatises the basic text (the revised Peter of Spain, that is) will contain. The commentary on the first pars of each treatise informs the reader about which chapters the treatise under discussion contains; the commentary on the first pars of each chapter announces the partes of that chapter, and, finally, the commentary usually divides each single pars into particulae or clausulae. Buridan numbers his treatises ('tractatus'), chapters ('capitula'), parts ('partes'), and this numbering can be used for purposes of reference. We indicate this by means of such headings as '3.1.3' = 'Treatise 3, chapter 1, part 3', and recommend its use for references (it is a much more durable system than, e.g., referring to our page numbers). Whereas there can be no doubt that the Summulae were composed for didactic purpose at the Arts Faculty in Paris, their date of composition is harder to ascertain. None of our sources simply dates the work in absolute terms. A relative chronology in Buridan's total production is difficult to establish, not only because many works remain as yet unedited, but also because it is known that he 'read' the same authoritative texts several times during his long career, and each 'reading', i.e. teaching course, is likely to have produced its own written version of the lectures. Hence cross-references are of dubious value for establishing the relative chronology. It is perfectly possible for some version of work A to refer to work B while some version of work B refers to work A. Buridan 'read' the Summulae several times and it seems that none of our manuscripts reflects the first 'reading', since, so far as we know at present all manuscripts contain the following editorial remark at 1.1.1: "Istum librum dividemus in novem tractatus, quorum primus erit de propositionibus [... ], nonus erit de practica sophismatum, sed in hac lectura istum ultimum tractatum ego non exsequar cum lectura aliorum octo tractatuum".

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A terminus a quo for either the first or the last version of the work is not really available as we do not know when Buridan started to teach, but anything earlier than the 1320s seems utterly unrealistic. As for a terminus ante quern, the best suggestion so far seems to be 1335. H. Hubien has made a strong case for dating Buridan's De consequentiis to 133510. Now if this date holds, and if certain ideas of the Summulae are on their way to the stage of development evidenced by De consequentiis, we have 1335 as a terminus ante quern. This may indeed be the case 11, and so it may be that no major revision of the Summulae took place after 1335. But did minor revisions take place? Does a reference to the Metaphysics commentary prove anything except that the version(s) of the Summulae we know received their finishing touch after some version of the questions on the Metaphysics? With the great uncertainty surrounding Buridan's production, we must still admit that we are not able to date any version of the Summulae with anything like precision. They all must fall within the approximate limits of 1325 and 1360, and it is likely that the first version was made in the 1320s or early 1330s. It is also probable that later editions were largely identical with the first one. But at the same time it should not be ruled out that such changes as were introduced with each subsequent version may have been of high theoretical importance. We are not in a position now to see the development of Buridan's thought via the different versions of the Summulae. The present edition may help clear the path for relevant research. A fair number of preserved manuscripts (eighteen known to us so far) testify to the popularity of the Summulae during the late 14th century and well into the 15th, especially at the Central European studia (Erfurt, Prague, Vienna, Krakow), cf. II. 4, below. Later, Buridan's work could only exercise its influence indirectly through John Dorp's commentary on it; it was never printed itself. The extent, however, of its direct and indirect influence still awaits exploration.

ll.3. Treatise Ill, De Praedicamentis: on its general structure and contents

10 See Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien. Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976, p. 9. 11 See J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', in The Logic of John Buridan. (... ),Copenhagen 1976, p. 73.

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Introduction

II.3.1. John Buridan as commentator on Aristotle and Peter of Spain As has been pointed out above1 2 , Peter of Spain's Tractatus plays a major role in the text Buridan comments on in his Summulae. However, as we have said before, Buridan did not use Peter's text in its original form as it is known to us in De Rijk's edition13, but a thoroughly revised one. I shall note some differences between the text Buridan had at his elbow and Peter of Spain's original treatise III: 1. The choice of words as well as the construction of the phrases of Buridan's version are different from those of Peter of Spain's text. Here are two examples of

parts that can be compared (in contradistinction to those parts of which the choice of words and construction of the phrases cannot be compared at all, for reasons mentioned below, the present section, items 2 - 6): 3.2 Substantia dividitur in primam et secundam. Prima substantia est que proprie et maxime et principaliter substat. Vel prima substantia est que nee in subiecto est nee de subiecto dicitur, ut aliquis equus, aliquis bos. Secundae substantiae sunt species in quibus sunt primae substantiae et earum genera, ut homo, animal. Peter's text (ed. De Rijk, p. 30, 1. 1 - p. 31, 1. 9): Substantia dividitur per primam et secundam substantiam. Substantia prima est que proprie et principaliter et maxime substat. Vel prima substantia est que nee in subiecto est nee de subiecto dicitur, ut aliquis homo, aliquis equus. Secundae substantiae sunt species in quibus sunt prime substantie et harum specierum genera, ut homo et animal; est enim aliquis homo in homine qui est species, sicut homo in animali quod est genus. 3.4.2 Species relativorum solent distingui tres, scilicet relativa aequiparantiae, relativa superpositionis et relativa suppositionis. Relativa aequiparantiae secundum easdem rationes dicuntur, ideo sunt eorundem nominum, ut simile

12 See § II. 2. 13 Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. (... ). First Critical Edition

by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972.

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John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

simili simile, amicus amico amicus, contrarium contrario contrarium, vicinus vicino vicinus. Relativa superpositionis dicuntur secundum rationem alicuius excellentiae, ut pater ad filium, dominus ad servum, duplum ad dimidium, prius ad posterius, superius ad inferius. Relativa suppositionis sunt quae correlative dicuntur ad relativa superpositionis, ut filius ad patrem, servus ad dominum. Peter's text (ed. De Rijk, p. 34, l. 20 - p. 35, l. 5): Relativorum quedam dicuntur secundum equiparantiam, ut que eodem nomine dicuntur, ut similis simili similis et equalis equali equalis et vicinus vicino vicinus. Alia vero secundum superpositionem, ut dominus, duplum, triplum. Alia vero secundum suppositionem, ut servus, subduplum, subtriplum, quia ista supponuntur aliis et alia superponuntur istis. Dominus enim superponitur servo et pater filio et duplum dimidio; servus vero supponitur domino et filius patri et dimidium duplo. It is clear, I think, that even in these parallel sections many words and phrases

are different. 2. Many sections of the text that Buridan comments upon and that correspond to sections in Peter's text, are shorter (3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.1.7, 3.2.1 [here the examples given by Peter of Spain have been omitted], 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.3, 3.5.3, 3.5.6 may be mentioned). 3. Some sections of the text Buridan comments upon cannot be found in Peter of Spain's text at all, e.g. 3.1.9, 3.3.4, 3.7, 3.8.5. 4. It should especially be noted that Buridan's discussion in section 3.7 (on four of the 'ultimate' categories quando, ubi, situs and habitus ('when, where, being-in-aposition, being-affected-upon') has no counterpart at all in Peter's treatise III. Peter does not discuss these four categories. Buridan's text depends on pseudoGilbert de la Porree's Liber sex Principiorum 5. Peter mentions five properties of the category of relatio ('relation'), Buridan only four. Peter's text (p. 35, l. 22-24) says: 'Relativa se ponunt et perempta se perimunt. Ut si duplum non est, dimidium non est; et si pater non est, filius non est'. Buridan's text makes no mention of this property of relatives. 6. In section 3.6 (on the categories actio and passio ('acting' and 'being acted upon')) these categories are discussed as a whole (actio and passio are being

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Introduction

both defined as mutatio ('mutation')), whereas in Peter's treatise they are treated separately. It is noteworthy that in his treatise Buridan frequently refers to Aristotle by naming him explicitly (76 times). Only once (3.5.6) does Buridan make a reference to an "auctor" which we can probably take as a reference to Peter of Spain. Even at this point, it will strike the reader that he refers to Aristotle in the same breath, saying "auctor et Aristoteles". So at least in this treatise (though perhaps not in any of his other tracts of the Summulae - not, e.g., in the Praedicabilia, as De Rijk concludesl4) Buridan seems to have paid more attention to Aristotle and pseudo-Gilbert de la Porree, rather than to Peter. As De Rijk's investigations have shown, Peter of Spain's Tractatus were revised and interpolated 15 quite soon after publication. I cannot say which of the manuscripts that contain one of the later, interpolated versions of Peter's text, comes closest to the one Buridan used in his Summulae.

JJ.3.2. Buridan's commentary In his commentary Buridan presents an introductory section (3.1), in which the socalled antepredicamenta are discussed: first the definitions of aequivoca ('equivocals') (3.1.1), univoca ('univocals') (3.1.2) and denominativa ('denominatives') (3.1.2); then the division of voces ('words') (3.1.4) and of eorum quae sunt ('of those things that are') (3.1.5). Thirdly, two rules on the logical relations between predicates (3.1.6) and on the relation between genus and species are discussed (3.1. 7). Buridan winds up this section with a division of incomplexa ('things without combination', 'incomplex things') into the ten categories (3.1.8) and the discussion of a property common to the ten categories (3.1.9), viz. that incomplex things cannot form an affirmation or negation. In section 3.2 Buridan discusses the categories in the proper sense. First a division and some characteristics of substance (3.2.1 - 3.2.3), next six properties belonging to the members of this category are treated. Section 3.3 is on quantity: first divisions and species of quantity are discussed (3.3.l - 3.3.4), then three properties (3.3.5 - 3.3.7). Section 3.4 is on relation: first Buridan gives definitions and species (3.4.1 - 3.4.2), then four properties (3.4.3 3.4.6). The section on quality contains a definition of quality and quale, and their four kinds (3.5.1 14 See De Rijk's forthcoming edition. 15 See the introduction to his forthcoming edition.

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John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

3.4.6), then three properties and a note on terms blonging to different categories (3.5.7 - 3.5.10). In section 3.6 Buridan discusses the categories of actio (action) and of passio (being acted upon) are dealt with as a whole; he presents their definitions, kinds and four properties. In section 3.7 he discusses the four last categories: 'when', 'where', 'being-in-a-position' and 'having' (quando, ubi, situs and habitus). Sections 3.8 - 3.10 discuss what are traditionally called the postpraedicamenta: 3.8 is on four kinds of opposition (oppositio), 3.9 is on movement ( motus) and mutation ( mutatio) (their kinds, and what is contrary to these postpraedicamenta); 3.10 is on the meanings of prius ('prior'), simul ('simultaneous') and habere ('to have' in various senses, see below, § III, 3. 4, section IX).

II.3.3. Philosophical principles Insight into the philosophical principles which underlie Buridan's commentary is a precondition for understanding his detailed interpretations of the categories. These principles can partly be gathered from the Summulae themselves, but Buridan has made them especially explicit in other treatises, notably his Praedicabifial6, Suppositiones, Ampliationes and Appellationesl7. I shall try to present them here briefly. I shall not discuss Buridan's position in the history of the theories about tha categories, for this would exceed the proper limits of our introduction. It should be noted that Buridan's view of the categories is more elaborate, and sometimes clearer in his Quaestiones in Praedicamenta than in the treatise from the Summulae discussed here. According to Buridan, the created world outside the mind (human or divine) consists of concrete individual substances and individual qualities. In the view of many fourteenth-century philosophers (e.g. William of Ockham18), qualities have a separate existence (Buridan makes an exception for the fourth species of

16 Buridan's commentary (Summulae) on Porphyry (the Praedicabilia) will be edited shortly by L.M. de Rijk; his Quaestiones in Porphyrium have not yet been edited. 17 ed. M.E. Reina, 'Giovanni Buridano, Tractatus de suppositionibus, prima edizione a cura di Maria Elena Reina', in Rivista critica di storia dellafilosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208; 323-353. In the editorial project of which the present text is a part, Dr. R. van der Lecq is preparing a new critical edition ofBuridan's De suppositionibus. 18 Cf. e.g. M. McCord Adams, William Ockham, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1987, pp. 172-213. xx

Introduction

quality, viz. figural9). Contrary to older opinions, he considers quantities not to be realities in the same sense as qualities, because quantities only exist as a function of a mind that measures substances (though in his Commentary on the Physics, Buridan, in contrast to Ockham, distinguishes dimensional quantity from substance, and so seems to make it a separate reality 20 ). No universals but the logical ones exist in the outside world, 'real universals' existing neither in the concrete things themselves, nor as separate entities in the way Plato had conceived them according to the medievals (not even as separate entities in God's mind21). Fourteenth-century philosophers often ascribed the view of 'real universals' immanent in things to some of their predecessors or contemporaries and criticized them heavily on that account, though the latter themselves would, I believe, have rebutted such a charge22. According to Buridan, universality exists only in the intellect which considers individual things from a universal point of view. The human intellect refers to things outside the rnind by means of language. Words occur in a context,23 which, according to fourteenth-century logicians, in its smallest form is a propositio, translated here, as is usually done, by 'proposition' (in the sense of what in modern useage is often called 'declarative sentence'). A proposition consists of terms. These propositions may be mental, spoken, or written; therefore, the terms may be mental, spoken or written, though not all features of the level of conventional speech have their counterparts on the mental level24. Medieval logicians developed various theories about the way the terms

19 See also below, my analysis of section 3.5.5.

20 He does so on the basis of the experimental fact that a substance can rarify and thicken by heating and cooling whereas the content remains the same. See also J. Schneider, in the introduction to his edition of Buridan's Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, p. 27*. Buridan refers the question whether magnitude is different from substance or quality to his Physics (ed. Paris 1509, liber I, q. VII, II. 1-4, cf. A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spiitscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Roma 1955, pp. 211-218). 21 As early as the thirteenth century (e.g. in Thomas Aquinas) the latter view was denied, because otherwise God's unity could not be preserved. Ideas are usually said to exist as thoughtobject~nly.

. 2 So e.g. William of Ockham, Summa logicae, I, 15, in his criticism of John Duns Scot. 23 See e.g. L.M. de Rijk, 'The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982, pp. 161-173, esp. p. 162 f. 24 Ockham e.g. did not accept participles, differences in conjugation andfigura (whether or not a word is composite or simple) on the mental level. They belong to conventional verbs. Gender is a feature of conventional nouns only. He hesitates about comparatives and superlatives. See e.g. his xxi

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possessed significatio (the meaning as such of a term) and suppositio (its reference)25. E.g. a term like 'homo' ('man') was said to have both meaning i.e. 'humanitas' ('humanity') and, when used in a proposition, a reference, according to which it could refer to individual men belonging to the species 'human being'; in Buridan's view, an abstract term of the first category does not have connotation. The relation assumed between significatio and suppositio varied according to philosophers. According to Buridan, the different categories are not words as such (a view advocated by the sixth century philosopher Boethius, at least according to Buridan and others26), nor things27, but words in the sense of conventional (spoken or written) signs having significatio, and, in a proposition, having primarily reference to things in the outside world. This significatio is imposed on them by man 28. The medievals found the starting-points for these different views in the text of Aristotle's Categories. Significative terms of the first category, viz. 'substance' (e.g. 'homo'), when used in a proposition refer to individual things. They do not have connotatio, i.e. they do not signify something else apart from their reference to things. Buridan emphasizes that the assignment of a term to an accidental category (e.g. 'album' as member of the category of quality) depends on the modus significandi it has relative to a primary substance or the ratio29 according to which it is used; one

Quodlibeta septem V, qu. ix, ed. J.C. Wey, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1980 (Opera theologica IX), pp. 513-518. 25 See e.g. L.M. de Rijk, 'The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, pp. 161-173, esp. p. 154 f., and J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter, ein Uberblick, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1972, p. 127 f. 26 See e.g. the argumentum principale primum in Johannes Duns Scotus, In libros Praedicamentorum Quaestiones, in Opera Omnia, editio nova iuxta editionem Waddingi ( ... ), Parisiis 1881, p. 437. 27 For categories as things one might cite thirteenth-century philosophers for whom the subject of the categories was ens dicibile, ordinabile in genere. So Radulphus Brito (d. 1320) in his Quaestiones super arte veteri, ed. Venetiis, s.d., qu. 3 (no foliation); or one might think of Walter Burleigh in his Expositio super artem veterem, cited in E.A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, London 1935, p. 131, n. 1, or of pseudo-Campsall and Thomas Aquinas, to whom J.C. Wey refers in his edition of Ockham's Quodlibeta septem, Quodlibet V, 22, p. 564, n. 2. 28 For a survey of the nature of members of the categories, see J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Uberblick. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1972, § 2.3.l. 29 For this use of 'ratio' see L.M. de Rijk, 'On a Special Use of 'ratio' in 13th and 14th Century Metaphysics', in M. Fattori, M.L. Bianchi (eds.), Ratio( ... ), 1994, pp. 197-218. The terms 'connotatio' and 'ratio' are not synonymous. A term of the first category (that of substance) has a ratio, but not a connotatio.

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cannot assign a term beforehand to a specific category. E.g. the attributive noun 'senex' may belong either to the category of quality or that of time, according to its connotation ('having a grey complexion', or 'having lived a long time', respectively). It is typical of Buridan's view as found in his commentary that words may belong to different categories30. He takes the conventional character of spoken and written words seriously. Terms of different categories (e.g. 'album', and 'senex') can have suppositio for (i.e.: reference to) the same reality (e.g. Socrates), though under different aspects or rationes. In Buridan's view, the anonymous author of the treatise Liber sex principiorum31 was wrong in thinking that different realities should correspond to terms of different categories, e.g. actio and passio. Two fundamental ways of predicating should be distinguished according to Buridan. First, essential or quidditative predication: in this case the essence or substance of a thing is sigD_ified, e.g. 'animal' in 'homo est animal'. Secondly, denominative predication, in which a predicate belonging to one of the nine accidental categories is used, e.g. 'albus' in 'homo est albus'. In this case 'albus' connotes32 albedo which inheres in the thing to which the subject term refers. The order in which the terms occur in propositions is important. When a term precedes the verb and thus stands in subject position, its reference is to the thing, and then the ratio by which it is named, is of minor importance. When it follows the verb, and thus stands in predicate position, it connotes, or has appellatio, of the form inhering in the thing to which the subject term refers. This is true in e.g. 'cognosco venientem', where 'venientem' has appellatio rationis and 'venientem cognosco', where 'venientem' has suppositio determinata33. There is also a difference between the meaning of the propositions 'album fit' ('something that happens to be white, comes to be') and 'fit album' (' becomes white'). In the first something comes to be unqualifiedly, in the second qualitative change is expressed. 30 and also: primarily or secondarily, see below,§ II. 3.4, my analysis of 3.5.10. 31 Sometimes, though wrongly, ascribed by the medievals to Gilbertus Porretanus (Gilbert of La Porre). Edition by L. Minio-Paluello, in Aristoteles Latinus I, 6-7, under the title: Anonymi Fragmentum vulgo vocatum 'Liber de Sex Principiis ', Bruges/Paris 1966. On the erroneous ascriptions and on the possible author, see pp. XLIII-LV. 32 L.M. de Rijk, 'On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation', in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 91-100. 33 Cf., e.g., E.P. Bos, 'Mental Verbs in Terminist Logic', in Vivarium XVI (1), 1978, pp. 56-69. xx iii

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To appreciate Buridan's commentary one should bear in mind that in his view knowledge is not only about actually existing things, but also about possible things. So terms denoting some act of knowledge refer not only to objects of the present, but also to a broader range than the present things alone, viz. the past, present and future or, in Buridan's words, these terms have ampliatio34.

II.3.4. A summary of the contents Buridan starts with a discussion on aequivocatio, univocatio and denominatio. Sometimes, he says, aequivocatio is attributed to a word having signification, sometimes to things signified. Here (3.1.1) Buridan attributes aequivocatio to things insofar as they are all signified equivocally by one and the same word. This signification is not matched by one concept ('ratio', 3.1.2), but by two, or more, one for each thing. E.g. a dog, a star and a fish are signified by the word 'canis' ('dog') which may thus have supposition for them under different concepts. There is univocation when the several things signified are united, not only by a common designation, but also by a common definition35. Buridan emphasizes (3.1.2) that both aequivocatio and univocatio are on the level of conventional terms and propositions, and are not properties of mental terms and propositions36. Equivocation and univocation are mutually opposed in an exhaustive division. The third item of the antepraedicamenta, denomination ('denominatio'), is different. For a term to be denominative it must satisfy both a morphologicalcum-semantical criterion and a purely semantical one. First, (l.a) it must be a concrete term (a term signifying concrete entities), and (l.b) it must be morphologically related to the corresponding abstract term; 'album' ('white [thing]') satisfies (1.a-b), having 'albedo' ('whiteness') as its abstract counterpart. Second, (2) the term must have appellation. This, Buridan explains, means that it must 'evoke' or 'connote' some disposition which is extrinsic to the nature of that for which the term supposits. 'Album' ('white [thing]') satisfies this condition; it may supposit, say, for a man, but it also connotes something which is extrinsic (non-essential) to man, namely whiteness. By contrast, 'homo' ('man') only

34 See the before-going note, and the analysis below, § II.3.4, my analysis of 3.4.5. 35 Univocatio in a strict sense is, according to Buridan, praedicatio essentialis, see below, this paragraph. 36 Cf. the interesting discussion on Ockham's position in P.V. Spade, 'Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham's Mental Language', in The Journal of the History of Philosophy 18, 1980, pp. 9-22. xxiv

Introduction

satisfies criteria ( l.a-b ); it is a concrete noun with a morphologically related abstract counterpart, viz. 'humanitas'. Criterion (2) remains unsatisfied because humanity is essential to all supposits of 'homo' and thus cannot fulfil the role of an extrinsic disposition connoted by the term. He distinguishes (3.1.5) between praedicatio quiditativa ('essential predication'), which is his explanation of dici de subiecto, and praedicatio denominativa ('denominative predication'), by which he explains the phrase of the text he is commenting on: esse in subiecto. Consequently, he distinguishes between the following kinds: a) a term such as 'homo' ('man') is predicated quidditatively, not denominatively; b) terms such as 'album' ('something white'), 'coloratum' ('something coloured') are predicated both quidditatively (e.g. 'album est coloratum') and denominatively (e.g. 'Socrates est albus'); c) a complex whole like 'hoc album' is not predicated quidditatively, but is only predicated denominatively; d) a term like 'Socrates' or 'hie homo' is neither predicated quidditatively nor predicated denominatively. So terms of the last kind can only be subject-terms in a proposition, whereas terms of the three other kinds can both act as subjects and as predicates. Next Buridan comments on two well-known Aristotelian rules. The first is (3.1.6) quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicuntur ('when something is said of something else: whatever can be said of the predicate, can be said of the subject'). Buridan remarks that this is only valid of universal and quidditative predication. So the following argument is fallacious: 'homo est bipes, et bipes est avis, ergo homo est avis', because in the minor premiss 'avis' is neither predicated universally nor essentially of 'bipes'. The second rule (3.1.7) is that the species and differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different, whereas nothing prevents genera that are subordinated one to the other from having the same species and differentiae. Buridan explains that when two genera are subordinated one to the other then not only is there no obstacle to their sharing differentiae and species, it is necessarily the case that they do so, though, of course, the species and differentiae are not equally directly had by a superior and an inferior genus. He winds up this introductory section (3.1.8) by saying that terms that are said without combinations signify one of the ten categories: substance, quality,

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quantity, relation, where, when, situation, disposition, acting and being acted upon. Quite remarkably, Buridan notes that Aristotle never said that there should be just ten categories. It all depends, he seems to mean, on the various aspects according to which things are considered by the mind. According to Buridan, the number is open, but in his text he sticks to the usual ten. In 3.1.9 Buridan states the rule that no simple term constitutes a proposition (whether affirmative or negative) by itself. He then adresses two objections. (a) A single word like 'lego' ('I read') may express a truth or a falsehood. Buridan agrees, but, he says, only because we understand the unexpressed 'ego' ('I'). (b) Even a single letter may have a truth value, for we might e.g. stipulate that the letter 'B' signify exactly the same as 'homo currit' ('(a) man is running'). This, says Buridan, is no valid objection, for supposing 'B' has the stipulated sense, it is no longer a term, no more than 'homo currit', in fact. It is only a single term in the trivial sense in which any sequence of sounds may be a term by being used to represent itself (in material supposition); thus 'B' and 'homo currit' will be terms in the sentences 'B is a proposition', "'homo currit" is a proposition'.

I. Substance (3.2) I shall now consider the separate categories discussed in sections 3.2 up to and including section 3.7. The members of the category of substance, as has been said, are not substances as existing in the outer world, but terms that signify substances in the first mode of signifying, without any connotation, such as 'animal', 'homo', 'Socrates'. 'Substantia' derives from 'substare', which, according to Buridan, is to be interpreted as 'to be subject in a proposition'. Traditionally, substances are divided into primary and secondary substances (3.2.1). Buridan's interpretation is that primary substances are singular terms, like 'Socrates' and 'Plato', whereas secondary substances are universal terms, like 'homo', 'equus', 'albedo' etc. Both kinds of terms refer to concrete individual things, but an individual term like 'Socrates' is 'more a primary substance', Buridan says, than a general term like 'homo', which refers to individuals communiter and indifferenter. Primary substances are characterized by being subjects of propositions, (a) that is, affirmative and true propositions, and

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by being so (b) properly, (c) primarily, and (d) most of all. The purpose of the four qualifications, Buridan says, is to distinguish primary substances from: (a) terms signifying fictitious entities, 'chimera', e.g.; no affirmative proposition is true if its subject refers to nothing; (b) secondary substances occuring as subjects in indirect predication, as does 'homo' in 'homo est Sortes'; (c) accidental terms, which occasionally function as subjects one of another, as in the propositions 'album est dulce'; (d) secondary substances in general - not they but primary substances function 'most of all' as subjects. A special problem is raised by the so-called differentiae specificae, such as 'rationale', or 'rudibile' (3.2.1). Are they primary or secondary substances as opposed to accidents? When 'primary and secondary substance' is taken in a strict sense, they are not, Buridan says, because when it is said 'Socrates est rationalis' the predicate 'rationalis' is connotative; when 'primary and secondary substance' is taken in a broader sense, however, these dif.ferentiae belong to the category of substance, Buridan argues, because they are not predicated denominatively (which is characteristic of accidental terms). In 3.2.5 he adds that, when 'univocally' is taken strictly, viz. in opposition to equivocal and denominative predication, only secondary substances and dif.ferentiae are predicated univocally. He gives no examples, but he must have had such propositions in mind as (a) 'Socrates est homo', (b) 'Socrates est rationalis ', (c) 'Socrates est animal rationale'. In 3.2.1 he declares that in a case like (c) the dif.ferentia is predicated in quid truly, essentially, and in the proper sense. A well-known logical rule runs (3.2.2): de quocumque praedicatur definitum, de illo praedicatur definitio meaning 'of whatever that which is defined (e.g. 'homo') is predicated, thereof the definition37 ('animal rationale') is predicated'. But does this rule apply when an individual term like 'Socrates' is the subject of which a species (e.g. 'homo') is predicated? It does, Buridan says, although as an individual Socrates does not have a definition. Socrates can only be defined 'quodammodo' ('in a certain way', i.e. mediately), in so far as the species homo can be defined. In the fourth clause of 3.2.3 Buridan discusses the claim that if primary substances were destroyed nothing else would remain. He interprets this to mean that if, per impossibile, no singular term of the category of substance would

37 in the sense of definiens, as often in Medieval logic. xx vii

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supposit for anything though occuring in a properly formed proposition, neither would any other term38. Primary substances (i.e. terms of the category of substance) are 'maxime substantiae', as is stated by the text Buridan comments on (3.2.3). In medieval Latin, this expression is ambiguous, because 'maxime' may be interpreted as a feminine adjective (classical Latin 'maximae') or as an adverb (classical Latin 'maxime')39. Buridan rightly chooses the latter and understand the dictum in the sense that more terms may be predicated of a singular term like 'Socrates' than of a general one like 'homo'. Terms of the category of substance have six properties: 1. (3.2.4) The property of not being in a subject (in subiecto non esse), i.e. on Buridan's interpretation, of not being predicated denorninatively. He mentions an objection to the effect that on this account 'white' would be a substance because it cannot be a predicate of a crow. The objection turns on taking X in subiecto non est to mean 'for some subject it is true that X is not predicated of it'. Buridan concedes that de virtute sermonis the objection holds, and so strictly speaking the formulation ought not to be non esse in subiecto instead of in subiecto non esse. Another objection to the effect that this property also belongs to specific differentiae is rejected on the grounds that it falsely supposes that such differentiae are not in the same way substances. But, as Buridan has already pointed out in 3.2.1, they are so in a broad40 sense of the word 'substances'. 2. (3.2.5) Secondary substances and differentiae specificae are univocally predicated of primary substances. B uridan notes that this property does not belong to first substances, like 'Socrates', unless in indirect predication (e.g. in 'album est Socrates'), or in synonymous predication (e.g. 'Socrates est Socrates'). He further notes that genera of accidental terms are univocally predicated of their species (e.g. 'albedo est color'), when 'univocatio' is taken in a broad sense, which seems to be the traditional approach. When taken in a strict sense, 'univocatio' seems to be associated with essential predication only. According to

38 See e.g. L.N. Roberts, 'A chimaera is a chimaera: a medieval tautology', in The Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp. 273-278; S. Ebbesen, 'The Chimaera's Diary', in The Logic of Being. Historical Studies, ed. S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancasterffokyo 1986, pp. 115143, esp. pp. 135-140. 39 As has also been noted in the apparatus criticus, because it follows classical orthography, in the edition the ambiguity does not come to the fore. 40 See also above, my analysis of 3.1.7. xx viii

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Schneider41 this doctrine is not found in Ockham, but nevertheless it may be no novelty. 3. (3.2.6) These kinds of terms signify hoc aliquid ('this something') without connotatio. Substantival terms (e.g. 'homo') signify praecise ('precisely'), in contradistinction to accidental terms (e.g. 'album'). In other words, Buridan distinguishes between 'absolute terms' (terms that signify one kind of thing without further associations, e.g. 'homo', 'albedo') and 'connotative terms' (i.e. terms that have a primary and a secondary signification42, e.g. 'album'). Buridan emphasizes that terms in the sense of secondary substances (e.g. the universal term 'homo') do not signify ideas, as Plato said, but individual things, though generally and indifferenter4 3 , in contradistinction to e.g. 'Socrates'. A demonstrative pronoun like 'hoc' added to a common term, makes it a singular term (e.g. 'hoc album'). 4. (3.2.7) Substances, i.e. substantival terms, have no contrary. Accidental terms like 'album' and 'nigrum' do, because the same thing can first be 'album' and then 'nigrum'. However, the same thing can not be first 'homo' and then 'asinus'. Buridan discusses also the question of whether differentiae are susceptible of contrariety. In some sense they are, e.g. when one says that rationality and irrationality both belong to animal (as a genus term signifying a secondary substance). But Socrates, or a man, is never more or less a man, nor can he ever change into an ass. 5. (3.2.8) Substantival terms do not admit of a more or less. Buridan emphasizes again that he is discussing terms, not things, which can grow or diminish. If one says that an animal is more or less perfect, or more noble than another animal, one should remember that 'perfectum' and 'nobile' are not substantival, but (substantivated) accidental nouns. Further, some terms are more often subject in propositions than others, e.g. 'Socrates' more often than 'homo', for an individual admits of more predicates than a species44. 6. (3.2.9) When propositions change their truth value, this is due to changes in the things signified, not due to a change of the proposition itself. If 'homo sedet' was

41 According to J. Schneider, in the introduction to his edition of the Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, p. 32*. 42 See also above, my analysis of3.l.3. 43 as has been said above, my analysis of 3.2.1. 44 Cf. above, my analysis of 3.2, the beginning. xx ix

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formerly true but is now false, this is because Socrates has begun to walk (not because the term 'homo' has begun to walk). II. Quantity (3.3) The genera of the category of quantity are, as Aristotle said, quantitas continua and quantitas discreta (3.3.1). These are the primary species of quantitas, though not the species specialissimae. Continuous quantity is defined in the text Buridan comments on as that whose parts are joined together; discrete quantity as that whose parts are not. These two kinds of quantity, Buridan notes, can have reference to the same thing, for the same thing can be called 'magnitudo' or 'numerus' ,45 though under a different aspect. The species of discrete quantity are (3.3.2) numerus ('number') and oratio, the latter meaning, in Buridan's interpretation, anything that is not a discrete quantity. Continuous quantity is divided (3.3.3) secundum se ('taken by itself') into the species: surface, line, time, body and place. In this sense, 'bicubitus' in 'Socrates est bicubitus' belongs to the species linea. 'Locus' should be taken in

personal supposition, as in 'locus est quantus', and not as signifying a certain place (e.g. 'in Paris'), for then it would belong to the category of place. 'Tempus', too, can belong to different categories. In the sense of a time-indication like 'eras' it belongs to the category of when; when the question is: 'how long does something last?', 'time' is in the category of quantity46. As elsewhere Buridan points to the fact that terms can belong to different categories, and not, by definition, to just one. 'Quantity' is taken accidentally (3.3.4) in e.g. album multum ('something white, great in number'): here 'album' belongs to the category of quantity because the surface to which it refers to belongs to that category47. Similarly, in 'homo' in 'homo est tricubitus', 'homo' belongs indirectly to the category of quantity. Buridan notes that in his Metaphysics V Aristotle divides quantity secundum se into a) secundum substantiam and b) per se passiones of the substance.

45 Here is an addition in some manuscripts (not in MS E and only in marginal additions to MS B) with a discussion of magnitudo and multitudo, see below, the analysis. 46 Here there is an addition (not in MS E and only in marginal additions to MS B) with a discussion of tempus and mensura, see below, the analysis. 47 Whether a surface is the basis of quality is not unproblematic in Buridan, cf. J. Schneider's introduction to Buridan's Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, p. 27*.

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Examples of (a) are terms which properly belong to the category involved (e.g. 'longus'), and in which there is an essential predication (e.g. 'linea est extensa'); examples of b) are, e.g. 'rectus', 'dimidius', as in 'linea est recta', in which 'recta' is predicated per se et secundo modo, because it does not belong to the substance of line, but is predicated denominatively. Sometimes they are called per accidens48. There are three properties of quantity: 1. (3.3.5) No member of the category of quantity has a contrary. It seems to follow that one cannot hold tha albedo and nigredo are quantities, but actually this does not follow, Buridan says, for the property of non-contrariety is only meant to apply to quantitative terms, not to the things which are bearers of quantity. The noncontrariety of quantitative terms may be illustrated by means of two terms that prima facie look as if they were contraries, such as 'two' and 'three'; in fact they are compatible, as one and the same thing is two and three, namely two halves and two thirds of itself. Again, a relation of contrariety might seem to hold between 'linea', 'superficies' and 'corpus', but in fact it does not, for every line is a surface and every surface is a body, as appears from Book VI of the Physics, Buridan says. Buridan then mentions some problems raised by Aristotle. (a) Don't we find the contraries 'sursum' and 'deorsum' in 'locus'? (b) Are not the quantitative terms 'magnum' and 'parvum' contraries, and similarly 'multum and 'paucum'? (c) What about 'bicubitum' and 'tricubitum'? They can be true of the same thing, but only successively, not simultaneously. Hence they seem to be contrary to one another, and yet they belong to the category of quantity. Buridan answers as follows: (a) 'Locus' does not properly speaking belong to the category of quantity, but to that of place. (b) There are two possible solutions, both adduced by Aristotle himself. (bl) 'Magnum' and 'parvum' do not belong to the category of quantity but to that of relation. (b2) The two terms are not contraries in an absolute sense, but only relative to something. A things can be both big and little, though not big and little relative to the same other thing. (c) In a broad sense of 'contrariety' 'bicubitum' and 'tricubitum' are indeed contraries, but this is not

48 These distinctions are better explained in an interpolation of MS T (see below, appendix IV.l, part I= a text also found in Buridan's Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, qu. viii, ed. J. Schneider, II. 59-183 ). xx xi

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contrariety properly so called, for that requires a maximal distance between the contraries. Such maximal distance may be found between two qualities - there is a natural limit to how blank and how white a thing can be, but there is no similar natural limit to how big and how little it can be - there is no maximum or minimum in quantitate. 2. (3.3.6) No quantity admits of more or less. One cannot say 'hoc est magis bicubitum quam illud'. 3. (3.3.7) It is possible to name things 'aequale' or 'inaequale' according to quantity, e.g. 'omne corpus aequale est omni corpori', viz. qua corpus. 'Aequale' and 'inaequale' do not mean the same as 'simile' and 'dissimile', which signify quality. So one cannot say 'album est aequale albo secundum albedinem'; rather 'album est simile albo etc. is correct.

III. Ad aliquid (3.4) The genus of this category, says Buridan (3.4.1), is ad aliquid, not relatio, because as predicate the genus taken significatively is predicated universally of the species taken significatively. Now it is false to say 'omnis pater est relatio', but true to say 'omnis pater est ad aliquid pater'. The human soul is the faculty that understands things: when it does not compare them, it uses absolute terms; when it does, relative terms. Here 'absolute' and 'relative' are opposed to each other. It should be noted that there is a difference between 'connotative' terms (like 'album') and 'relative' terms. When one gives a nominal definition, a connotative term has the abstract in the oblique case (e.g. 'album albedine album'), but a relative term is defined by its substratum (e.g. 'hemiolium est proportio trium ad duo'). The text commented on gives (in accordance with the tradition) two definitions of 'ad aliquid'. In the first it is said that 'ad aliquid talia dicuntur quecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt, aliorum dicuntur, vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud', in the second: 'ad aliquid sunt quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid se habere'. The first definition is broader, because it applies to both per se and per accidens relations. According to this definition a man can be said to be the cause of another man, if he is his father (a per accidens relation between the terms), or a father can be said to be the cause of his son (a per se relation). The second definition only allows the per se related terms, in which a predicate is essentially said of a subject, Buridan says. In 'manus est alicuius xxxii

Introduction

manus', in which an essential relation seems to be implied, it is said that a hand is possessed by someone, but a hand can exist apart from its possessor, if God wills so, for it is in God's power to do everything except such as would imply a contradiction. So this relation between hand and possessor is per accidens, and the predication is denominative. It is not the essence of a hand to belong to someone. According to the author's text at Buridan's elbow, knowing one of a pair of correlatives implies knowing the other as well. This claim cannot be accepted at face value, Buridan says, nor can it be accepted in the sense that the one correlative is defined by means of the other. What good would it do anyone who was to be told that a father is one who has begotten a son whereas a son is someone whom a father has begotten? Such circular definitions are uninformative. What is true is that the definition of a relative term must state its 'substrate', which is also the substrate of the correlative term, and so it is easy to construct the definition of one correlative as soon as one knows that of the other. What is meant by 'substrate' is illustrated by the definition of 'father' as 'an animal which has begotten another animal out of its semen' and of 'son' as 'an animal which has been begotten out of the semen of another animal'. The species of this category (3.4.2), as stated by the text Buridan comments on, are: relativa aequiparantiae (e.g. 'amicus amico amicus'), relativa superpositionis (e.g. 'pater filii pater') and relativa suppositionis (e.g. 'filius patris filius'). The properties of the category of relation are: 1. (3.4.3) The members of this category admit of contrariety, the text says. Here

Buridan criticizes Aristotle, because contrariety does not belong to all members of the category, nor to members of this category alone; moreover, the terms of this category are not contrary simpliciter. The text gives as examples 'virtus' and 'vitium', but according to Buridan these do not belong to the category of relation in the proper sense, but to the category of quality. Besides, he says, one cannot call 'magnum' and 'parvum', 'simile' et 'dissimile' contrary to each other, because the same thing is both big and small with respect to different things. So, Buridan concludes, Aristotle's words were "secundum famositatem", i.e. for a broad public, or: according to common opinion, and he did not give his true opinion. 2. (3.4.4) The terms of this category admit of more or less ('magis' or 'minus'). Buridan's comment runs: this property, again, does not apply to all relatives, nor

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to relatives alone. He does not give examples, and the reader is better served in his Quaestiones in Praedicamenta (quaestio 12)49. In some cases this property can be admitted, e.g. in 'Socrates est aliquando Platoni magis similis et aliquando minus', but not in 'Socrates est magis bicubitus quam Plato'. So the predicate 'suscipere magis et minus' is not truly a property of this category. 3. (3.4.5) The terms are convertible: if 'servus domini servus', then also 'dominus servi dominus'. Buridan adds that the concrete situation should be considered, because if 'omnis pater est filii pater', then 'omnis filius est matris filius' is also possible and a distinction between the sexes has to be made. Conversion is always according to the same casus, e.g. 'maius maiori maius, minus minori minus'. The case of 'scientia' and 'scibile' is not a counterexample, Buridan says. One could say: 'scientia scibilis [genitive case] scientia', and 'scibile scientia [ablative case] scibilis'. 4. (3.4.6) The terms are simul natura ('simultaneous by nature'). Buridan comments 1) that the relatives need not be simul natura in the sense that the supposita to which the terms refer, are simul natura. 'Causa' and 'causatum' are an example, for a cause can be prior to its effect. Similarly, the earlier and the later ('prius', 'posterius') need noy be simultaneous. 2) Neither is it necessary that the terms be simul natura in the sense that they should be spoken or thought of simultaneously. It is possible that one in fact thinks of duplum without thinking of dimidium. 3) Nor need they be simul natura in the sense that they are defined in terms of each other. Buridan has discussed this point above50. But 4) it is necessary: if there is a father, there is a son. In this sense the terms are simul natura with respect to the verb 'est'. Buridan had logical simultaneity in mind. Further, if something is prior, some other thing is posterior. So, says Buridan in the Quaestiones in Praedicamenta51 (quaestio 13). 'Aristoteles est posterior Antichristo', does not imply 'Aristoteles est', or 'Antichristus est'. 'Posterior' ampliates (ampliatio) the supposition of 'Aristoteles' and 'Antichristus', and in this proposition 'est' does not imply actual existence in the present. Prior ampliates the subject term to supposit for present and future significates. So Buridan uses his theory of ampliatio, and his conception of causality as something which is not linked up with actual existence, to explain the fourth property.

49 ed. J. Schneider, p. 88, I. 49 - p. 89, I. 77.

50 Cf. my comments to§ 3.4.5. 51 ed. J. Schneider, p. 98, IL 177-178.

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In the text commented on, it is said that the property simul natura is not universally applicable to all members of the category of relation, because it does not apply to 'scientia' and 'scibile', and 'sensus' and 'sensibile'. Buridan comments that these terms do not belong to this category. If they did, then only 'scibile' and 'scitivum' are simul natura, and 'sensibile' and 'sensitivum', which terms relate powers (sense, intellect) with objects of those powers. Therefore it follows 'si aliquid est sensibile, aliquid est sensitivum' and vice versa. This again agrees with Buridan's general theory of knowledge, according to which knowledge is not only about actually existing things, but also about possible ones5 2 . IV. Quality (3.5) The text Buridan comments on defines quality nominally: 'qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur, ut secundum albedinem albi et secundum iustitiam iusti.' In his comments Buridan gives (3.5.1) a double definition of quality, one from the point of view of the terms, the other from the point of view of the things signified. From the point of view of terms, the precise definition should be: 'qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur'. Here the terms are concrete terms, that are properly said in quale. The other definition is from the point of view of the thing signified 'qualitas est qua est quale'. There are four species of quality (3.5.2-3.5.5). Not all qualities are on the same level. 1. (3.5.2) The first species are habitus and dispositio. As a habitus a quality is stable in a subject, e.g. health. This quality is not easily lost. As a dispositio a quality is mutable, e.g. a virtue in youthful persons. When they stop their studies, or keep bad company, Buridan remarks, they loose the virtue easily. 2. (3.5.3) The second species: potentia or impotentia naturalis. A potency, Buridan adds, is that according to which an agent can act or resist, e.g. 'aegrotativus', 'disciplinabilis' (as opposed to 'aeger' or 'disciplinatus' which are members of the first species, each being a quality acquired by teaching or custom,

and thus not naturally acquired). 3. (3.5.4) The third species is passio or passibilis qualitas, e.g. 'dulcedo', 'amaritudo'. The text Buridan comments on lists three reasons why some qualities are called passions, viz. (a) because their subjects are more properly said to suffer (pati) when such qualities change than when other qualities change; (b) because 52 Cf. my remark above, § Il.3.3.

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they naturally affect the senses (innatae sunt inferre sensibus passionem); (c) because they naturally follow passions of the soul (innatae sunt sequi passiones animae). In his commentary, Buridan refutes an objection against (a). He adds that 'passio' here belongs to the category qualitas, not to that of passio. Buridan also warns against being mislead by the traditional designation 'species of quality', which suggests that the division of quality into four types, and of each type into subtypes is a regular division of a genus into species, each of which is a genus of its own subordinate species. But this is no regular genus-species hierarchy, for the four 'species' are not mutually exclusive, as is readily seen if one considers the term 'calor'. According to Aristotle 'calor' belongs both to the first and third species of quality, and, Buridan says, one might even add the second species. 4. (3.5.5) The fourth species: forma or figura circa aliquid constans, e.g. 'bicubitum' as predicated of 'corpus', 'concavum' of 'superficies' etc. Buridan turns out to agree with William of Ockham that quality is really distinct from substance. So God could let a quality subsist without a substance53. In his Quaestiones in Praedicamenta54 Buridan says: 'figura autem non est distincta a magnitudine nee paritas a numero pari'. This means that the fourth species of quality has a different status from the other three55. A quale, Buridan continues (3.5.6), is a concrete term which is predicated denominatively, in accordance with the abstract term which is called qualitas. Buridan points out that abstract and concrete terms need not be in the same genus. For instance: the genus scientia has as one of its species musica (an abstract term), whereas the genus sciens has as one of its species musicus (a concrete term). There are three properties of the category of quality. 1. (3.5.7) The members of the category of quality admit of contrariety. Buridan notes that in this respect there is a difference between abstract terms, concrete terms and what are called 'qualia'. The qualia may be contrary to each other on the level of esse, that is: successively; abstract terms have supposition for different contrary forms (succession is not at issue here), whereas concrete terms

53 Cf. L.M. de Rijk, 'On Buridan's View of Accidental Being', in John Buridan, Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy, ed. E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop, Nijmegen 1993, pp. 41-51. 54 qu. xvi, 11. 173-174. 55 Cf. J. Schneider in his introduction to Buridan's Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, p. 27*. xx xvi

Introduction

are contrary in predication, because terms such as 'album' and 'nigrum' can be said of the same thing successively. 2. (3.5.8) Terms of this category admit of more or less, e.g. 'Socrates est minus vel magis albus'. 3. (3.5.9) According to quality things may be said to be 'similis' or 'dissimilis', e.g. 'Socrates est similis Platoni'. Buridan hardly comments on the last two properties56. In a note (3 .5 .10) Buridan says that according to Aristotle some terms belong both to the categories of relation and to that of quality (e.g. 'habitus', 'dispositio', 'scientia'). This seems contrary to the rule diversorum gene rum etc. 57 , but, Buridan says, Aristotle has given this rule according to common opinion, and not according to his own view. Genera and species cannot belong to different categories, because in that case they would have different connotations. 'One term to belong to different categories' is improper and equivocal usage.

V. Acting and being acted upon (3.6) In the beginning (3.6.1) of this section Buridan criticizes the anonymous author of the Liber Sex principiorum. He will not follow his views, because this author failed to see that terms belonging to different categories can supposit for the same thing. The Liber Sex principiorum says that actio ('acting') was one form and passio ('being acted upon') another58. Buridan's commentary on the categories actio and passio is divided into three parts. First he gives nominal definitions: 'actio est secundum quam aliquid dicitur agens', 'passio est secundum quam aliquid dicitur patiens'. The terms 'actio' and 'agens' correspond to each other as the abstract to the concrete, Buridan says. He also notes that the definitions admit of two interpretations, according as 'actio', 'agens' etc. are taken to supposit for the terms that belong to the respective categories, or for the things signified by those terms. But the definitions work equally well on either interpretation. His second question is about what kind of thing actio and passio are. They are kinds of mutatio, Buridan says, and so, to answer the question, one should know what mutatio (change) is. Two kinds of mutatio must be distinguished: (1)

56 'Similis' differs from 'aequalis', cf. above, Buridan's § 3.1.3. 57 Cf. above, 11.3.4, my analysis ofBuridan's § 3.1.7. 58 See also above, Buridan's § 3.1.3. xxxvii

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mutatio naturalis, which requirtes an agent to produce a form or disposition, and a subject to receive it. In this case the form or disposition is the change. (2) Mutatio supernaturalis (=creatio), which requires an agent and a form but no subject to receive the form. In this case the thing created is the 'change' (creation). To exemplify, Buridan says that God could create prime matter or an immaterial intelligence, neither of which would require a subject to be in. It may be added that on Buridan's view God can also produce accidents without substances59, In 3.6.2 Buridan discusses two species of actio and passio. Now 'fieri' can be said in two ways: simpliciter and secundum quid. 'Fieri simpliciter' means produci in esse, and is mutatio as such. 'Fieri secundum quid' means fieri tale, vel tantum etc., and is said, Buridan says, of a subject that receives a form. This distinction is in the propositions 'homo fit' and 'homo fit albus' respectively, and in propositions with different word order: when it is said 'album fit', fieri simpliciter is signified; when it is said 'fit album', then fieri secundum quid. VI. The four last categories (when, where, being-in-a-position, beingaffected-upon) (3. 7) VI.l. When (3.7. I) In his discussion on the four last categories quando, ubi, situs and habitus, Buridan first answers questions (3.7.1) with respect to the category of when. Ad 1. Terms signify or connote certain time distinctions, and these time distinctions belong (Buridan says here 'assistere') to things. Ad 2. Terms of the category of when which are usually (part of) a predicate have supposition for the same as the subject-term in an affirmative proposition. E.g. in 'Aristoteles fuit tali tempore' the subject-term supposits for Aristotle, and therefore the predicate too. An oblique predicate should be completed: 'tali tempore' should be completed to 'ens in tali tempore'. Ad 3. A term like 'heri' is not a syncategorematic term in an unqualified sense, but, in the sense that it has a function of determining a predicate, according to which the whole predicate has a specific mode of predication. Ad 4. That a term is composite (e.g. 'ens in tali tempore') does not prevent it from being predicable.

59 Cf. L.M. de Rijk, 'On Buridan's View of Connotation', in John Buridan, Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy,( ... ), pp. 41-51, esp. pp. 41-42. xxxviii

Introduction

Ad 5. Different terms belong to the same category in different ways: a) as quaesitivum (e.g. 'quid?', 'quale?'); b) as praedicativum (e.g. 'aliquid', 'aliquale' etc.); c) as distributivum (e.g. 'quidquid'); d) as relativum (e.g. 'tantum', 'tale' etc.). Observations 4-5 would seem to apply to all categories, and not only to the category of when, though Buridan does not explicitly say so.

VI.2. Where (3.7.2) With respect to the category ubi ('where') (3.7.2), many things can be said analogously to what has been said of the category of when, Buridan says. He does not specify this correspondence. He notes that members of this category signify not only place in the proper sense (e.g. 'hie'), but also bodies whose places are known to us (e.g. 'in domo Platonis').

VI.3. Being-in-a-position (3. 7.3) As to the category of situs (3.7.3) Buridan comments that e.g. the same man can be said to stand, lie or sit according to the different situation of his limbs. The human mind understands this same man under these various aspects and, accordingly, imposes various names upon it. VI.4. Being-affected-upon (3. 7.4) When discussing (3.7.4) the category of habitus ('having' - in a certain sense), Buridan says that 'habere' has many senses which belong to other categories, e.g. 'habere patrem', to the category relation60. In a strict sense 'habere' is used in expressions like 'calceatus', 'armatus', 'vestitus'. Interestingly, Buridan notes that these participles should be taken nominaliter, not verbaliter, since these participles have lost their verbal meaning and designate a situation that is the result of an actio or passio.

VII. On the four kinds of opposition (3.8) In 3 .8.1 Buridan discusses four ways things are opposed to each other, viz. relative, contrarie, privative, and contradictorie. Buridan gives a proof of the sufficientia of these kinds. The first two kinds are on positive terms ('duplum/dimidium'; 'calidum/frigidum'), the last two on negative terms ('videns/caecus'; 'sedens/non sedens'). 60 See also Buridan' s § 3.10.3. xx xix

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

VII.1. (3.8.2) An example of relative opposition are the terms 'pater-filius' and 'causa-causatum'. The latter pair is interesting in that both terms may apply to one and the same thing with respect to one and the same other thing. Matter, for instance, is both effect and cause witrh regard to the form inhering in it: it is determined by the form, and in turn determines the form by being its appropriate matter. Buridan further notes that 'simile/dissimile' are not members of relative opposition, because they have the same ratio. VIl.2. In 3.8.3 contrary opposition is discussed. This contrariety applies to terms, propositions and things. With regard to terms, Buridan lists four requirements: 1) that both terms be positive; 2) that they be not verifiable of the same thing under the same ratio; 3) that they be verifiable of the same thing in succession; 4) that they be maxime distantes, i.e. be contrary extremes on some scale. An example: 'albissimum-nigerrimum'. With regard to propositions Buridan distinguishes between contrariety according to a contrary way of enuntiatio, e.g. 'omnis homo est animal', 'nullus homo est animal';61 and according to a contrary way of praedicatio, e.g. 'Sortes est albus, Sortes est niger'. With regard to res (things), the contrariety applies to the extremes of a change (albedo, nigredo). Vll.3 and VIl.4. Privative opposition is discussed in 3.8.4, contradictory opposition in 3.8.5, where Buridan's comments do not go far beyond the text. VIII. Motion and mutation (3.9) In section 3.9 motus is discussed. There are six kinds, as the text says (3.9.1): 'generatio, corruptio, augmentatio, diminutio, alteratio, locomotio'. One could, Buridan says, study motion logically and physically. The latter approach is not considered here. Logically speaking, Buridan concludes that motion is sometimes according to substance, sometimes according to quality, sometimes according to quantity, sometimes according to place. All other kinds that could be thought of can be reduced to one of the above mentioned, Buridan says. In another note he

says that every mutatio or motio is either generatio or corruptio, and that simpliciter or secundum quid. In part 2 of section 3.9.2 Buridan notes that motus and quies are mutually contrary. The problem involves physics, he adds, and cannot be discussed here. IX. 'Prior', 'simultaneous' and 'having' (3.10)

61 In a traditional formula: SaP is contrary to SeP. xi

Introduction

Of 'prius' (3.10.1) the text commented on gives five senses, one concerning what is chronologically prior, the other four what is naturally prior. In section 3.10.2 Buridan discusses 'simul', in section 3.10.3 the meanings of 'habere'. The latter term has many senses (e.g. 'habere qualitatem', 'habere membrum' etc.) and should be distinguished from the sense discussed in 3.7.4 ('calceatus', 'vestitus'). According to the different senses, the term belongs to different categories. Buridan's commentary hardly goes beyond the author's text.

X. Appendix I (IV.I) (additions found in MS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale, D III 27) The text in MS Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (siglum: T) has several additions, which for the most part can also be found in Buridan's Quaestiones in Praedicamenta. The exact references to the Quaestiones can be found in Appendix I. I have divided these additions into nine parts. I could not find part II and the final paragraph of part II in the Quaestiones in Praedicamenta as edited by J. Schneider. The additions of MS T fit in very well in the Quaestiones; as found in the Summulae, they can sometimes hardly be understood, because the additions are answers to questions that have been omitted in the Summulae, and the logical order in which the problems should be discussed is lost in T. Part I: 'Praedicamentum', Buridan says, can be either taken as genus generalissimum, i.e. the supreme term in the category, or as aggregatum of all predicable terms of the category. The distinction between the categories is not based on things or on words but on the different intentiones according to which terms have different connotations62. These different intentions correspond to the different ways of signifying by which primary substance is signified. The distinction between the categories does not originate in a deduction from a common ratio, as some have suggested63. He notes in his Quaestiones in Praedicamenta64 that neither 'ens' nor 'res' qualifies as this common concept, because these are equivocal terms. The accidental terms are predicated of 'ens' denominatively, not essentially (e.g. 'ens est album', 'ens est tricubitum'), and 62 See also above, my analysis of§ 3.1.3. 63 Perhaps Buridan had Thomas Aquinas in mind (cf. Thomas' In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, Liber III, lectio v, ed. P. Maggiiilo, Taurini/Romae 1966, § 322). 64 qu. iii, ed. Schneider, p. 96, IL 303-305.

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the connotations of the accidental terms make them find their place in different categories65. The categories are sufficient in number if they consist of terms that are irreducible to each other and if there are no general predicates that neither fall under them nor are reducible to them. Quite interestingly, Buridan notes that Aristotle did not say that there could be no more than ten categories: he did not give proof that there should be just ten. If actio is a most general genus, so are agens and patiens, agere and pati. They form a category in an analogous way. But there is a distinction between qualitas and quale as between different genera (cf. 3.5.6 above), e.g. 'scientia' as distinguished from 'musica', 'sciens' as distinguished from 'musicus'. Different interrogative pronouns ask for different things, e.g. 'quare', 'cuius' etc. Sometimes an interrogative pronoun is used equivocally, e.g. 'quomodo?'; in 'quomodo se habet hoc ad illud?' it asks for a relation, but in 'quomodo se habet Plato', it asks for a quality. Predicates may consist of terms belonging to more than one category. Sometimes one single term has as its counterpart concepts belonging to more than one category, e.g. 'cena' belongs to the category of action as regards the aspect of eating (action) and and to the category of time as regards the aspect of time (viz. early). An attribute like 'senex' should be placed in a specific category according to the connotations it bears; when the connotation is: a tanto tempore vixisse, the term belongs to the categories of quantity and when, but when the connotation is: a complexione, the term belongs to the category of quality. 'Terminum esse in predicamento' can be interpreted in two ways: 1) 'as thing'; 2) 'as sign'. 'As thing' it means that something is in a category that is signified by the first term in that category. As sign, it may be either a) per se or proprie ('properly'), orb) per accidens or improprie ('improperly'). Per se or proprie there are four kinds: 1) concrete terms like 'album'; 2) abstract terms like 'albedo' (here Buridan notes that in the category of quantity there are fewer abstract terms, probably, he says, because abstract terms of the category of quality do not supposit for the same thing, whereas in the case of quantity they do); 3) concrete terms that are predicable quidditatively of other

65 In the Quaestiones (ll. 309-310) Buridan refers the problem to his Commentary on the Metaphysics (liber IV, qu. vi, ad 2, f. 17va). xiii

Introduction

concrete terms (e.g. 'esse bicubitum est esse magnum'); 4) abstract terms of the concreta mentioned in the foregoing three kinds. Per accidens or improprie: the kinds are: 1) opposita (e.g. 'punctus' versus 'linea'); 2) propria of a member of one of the categories (e.g. 'aequale', 'finitum' etc.). These terms as such belong to other categories; 3. subject-terms, e.g. 'Socrates', belong to other categories than 'substance', because something is denominatively predicated of them. In this way, 'Socrates' in 'Socrates est albus' belongs per accidens or improprie to the category of quality. Part II: Buridan gives an explanation of 'quantum', defined by Aristotle as "quod est divisibile", - which is explained by Buridan: because it can be measured - , "in ea que insunt" - Buridan: into integral parts, not into species - "quorum utraque aut singulum" - Buridan: if divisible into two parts, or into more "natum esse hoc aliquid" - Buridan: as opposed to division into essential parts (matter and form). Part III: Three notes are found on the distinctions of when and where. 1. Of the members belonging to the category of when ('quando') those signifying the present (e.g. 'nunc') are better known, the others are known in virtue of their relation to the present. 2. Some terms signifying in their primary signification a temporal distinction can be used improperly, e.g. in 'tempus est carum', where 'tempus' refers to money etc. 3. Some people distinguish between 'esse in loco' and 'esse alicubi'. The first term should apply when something is surrounded by something, e.g. a house, whereas 'esse alicubi' applies e.g. to the last sphere of the heavens. Part IV: A short note on being-in-a-position ('situs'). A man's being seated or being in standing position depends on the ratio in which the parts of his body are related; according to this 'ratio' a man is conceived by someone else, who describes him e.g. as 'homo sedet', or 'homo iacet'. Parts V and VI: These sections again are on situs and ubi. Buridan distinguishes the two and thus supports the traditional number of ten categories, noting that while both 'situs' and 'ubi' connote plce, 'situs' does so without connoting distance as 'ubi' does.

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Parts VII, VIIIa (which is the continuation of part VII) and VIIIb: some short notes on habitus, to be compared with Buridan's commentary in 3.7.4. and 3.10.3, and my remark above, § IX. § IX: This text is on the various kinds of oppositio66 and do not add anything

important to Buridan's comments in the Summulae.

XI. Appendix II (IV.I) (two additions from MSS TBmgKG, not found in MSS E and B) In appendix II Buridan discusses quantitas. Buridan defines 'magnitudo' and 'multitudo'. 'Multitudo' cannot be taken as an actual multitude, which does not exist; it can be taken as a potential multitude, which is divisible. 'Multitudo' taken simpliciter is a member of the category of quantity, taken relatively (as excess) of the category of relation. 'Magnitudo' signifies a finite magnitude, because diversity and mensurability are needed. 'Tempus' can be a member of quantity and motion.

//.4. List of manuscripts used

The editors are aware of the following manuscripts of Buridan's Summulae with the author's own commentary. Read the dates as follows: 15.0 = 15th c.; 14.2 = second half of the 14th c.; 15.1 =first half of the 15th c.; 14.2115.1 =either 14.2 or 15.1.

66 Cf. the edition, § 3.8.3.

xliv

Introduction

Erfurt, Ampl., 2° 302 Erfurt, Ampl., 2° 305 Krakow, B. Jag., 662 Krakow, B. Jag., 703 Krakow, B. Inst. Teol. Ksiezy Misjon. 171 Miinchen, Bay. Staatsbibl., elm 7708 Oxford, Magdalen 88 Osek (Ossegg) 39 Torino, BN, D III 27 (462) Troyes, BM 2005 U ppsala, BU, C 609 Vaticano, Pal. lat. 994 Vaticano, Vat. lat. 3020 Warszawa, BN, akc. 1819 Wertheim, Stiftskirche, 157 Wien, ONB, lat. 5365 Wien, ONB, lat. 5420 Wien, ONB, lat. 5466

Date

Summulae

Sophismata

Siglum

14.2/15.1 1378 14.2 14.2

lr-155ra lr-97v lra-126rb 2ra-170ra

155rb-l 91 vb 98r-va (fr.) 126va-156vb 170rb-181va

F

1371

3ra-182vb

183ra-219ra

K

unknown unknown 14.2

unknown unknown 1ra-160ra

unknown unknown missing

H

1372 15.0 1374 14.2/15.1 1384

lra-98ra unknown 3ra-l 12va 2r-119v lra-104ra

98ra-117rb unknown missing 120ra- l 37vb missing

u

1375

lr-96v

97ra-115rb

w

1362 vel 1384 14.2 14.2 15.0

2ra-135vb 1ra-126ra lra-128ra lra-140ra

missing 126va-148vb l 28ra- l 62rb 140rb- l 68ra

v

G I J

M 0 T

y E D

A B

c

The Buridan society intends to publish detailed descriptions of the manuscripts on a later occasion. For the manuscripts used in this fascicle, see the next paragraph. 11.5. Description of manuscripts used The edition of this fascicle is based on MSS BEGKT. Moreover, some test collations of V have been made (cf. § II.6). B =Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 5420. xiv

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

Saec. 14.2 (ante 1395), chart., mm. 290 x 210. An Ex-libris says: 'Emi hanc summam uno floreno aureo Ungarico anno domini 1395'. We owe the codicological information about this manuscript to Prof. M. Markowski. Tractatus Ill occupies ff. 21 vb-32ra. E Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Pal. lat. 994. Saec. 14.2/15.1, chart. & membr. 300 x 225, ff. V + 160. We owe the codicological information to Dr. K. Friis-Jensen, who inspected the manuscript for us in 1988. Tractatus Ill occupies ff. 18ra-28va. The corrector's hand closely resembles the copyist's hand. This manuscript was also used for H. Hubien's edition of Buridan's Consequences (1976). G = Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek Amplon. 2° 305. Anno 1378, chart., mm. 294 x 224, ff. I+ 98. Information about this manuscript derives from S. Ebbesen, who examined it in 1991. The date given in the colophon, f. 97vb: 'Explicit loyca reverendi magistri Byridani reportata Prage per manus Luce de Wienna. Incepta in vigilia Petri et Pauli et finita in crastino Bartholomei. Anno domini millesimo cccm 0 septuagesimo tercio'. This manuscript contains nothing but Buridan's Summulae (with the Sophismata). Tractatus Ill occupies ff. 14va-24ra. K Krakow, Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksiezy Misjonarzy 171 ( olim 627, antea 827). Saec. 14.2/15.1, chart., mm. 297x215, ff. 220. Information about this manuscript derives from S. Ebbesen, who examined it in 1989. A 15th-century Ex-libris on the inside of the front cover reads: 'Iste liber est canonicorum Regularium Monasterii Corporis Christi in Cazimiria'. This means that the MS was then already in Krakow, where it probably stayed,

xlvi

Introduction

although its precise whereabouts are unknown, until K. Michalski acquired it for the library where it is now kept. This manuscript contains nothing but Buridan's Summulae (with the Sophismata). Tractatus III occupies ff. 30ra-49va.

T =Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462). Anno 1372. We have no codicological description of this manuscript. The MS contains nothing but Buridan's Summulae (with the Sophismata). Tractatus III occupies ff. 25ra-29vb/20va-26ra (after f. 29vb the numbering starts a second time with 20va). V =Wertheim, Historische Bibliothek in der Stiftskirche Wertheim 157. Saec. 14.2 (on f. 24va the manuscript reads '1362 vel 1384', cf. the edition,§ 3.3.3, p. 41, 1. 32), chart., mm. 280x215, ff. 139. Information about this manuscript derives from Dr. Luisa Valente, who examined it for us in 1994. The MS contains nothing but Buridan's Summulae. Tractatus III occupies ff. 21rb-3 lrb. II.6. Stemma codicum The editor's work has been based on the hypothesis that manuscripts BEGKT are related as follows:

xi vii

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

Convincing evidence in favour of this stemma has not emerged during the work on Tractatus Ill, nor have conclusive counter-arguments emerged. The most serious argument against the stemma is the fact that EB share the feature of lacking some non-essential stretches of text found in TKG (and secondarily added in B). This fact suggests that EB represent an earlier version of the text than do TKG. The extra material in TBmgKG is printed in appendix IV.2, below. II. 7. Editorial principles

The edition assumes the correctness of the stemma presented in II.6. The editor's aim is to present the text of~' with two modifications: (a) The text should be purged of errors. This means that deviation from ~ is indicated whenever it is unlikely that Buridan would have wished to write what ~has.

(b) In matters of no consequence the reading of E is preferred even against the consensus of all the remaining manuscripts. This is typically the case when there is a choice between such synonyms as 'igitur' and 'ergo', 'iste' and 'ille' and the like; or between two different word-orders, both of which are impeccable. II.8. The critical apparatus

The apparatus is positive: for every reading reported the manuscripts that have it are listed. A simple entry has this form: 'x TBK: y E: z G', i.e. manuscripts TBK read 'x', E reads 'y' and G reads 'z'. The first reading is always a lemma, i.e. identical with the reading adopted in the text. Minor variants between a group of manuscripts which agree in the main are sometimes indicated in parenthetical additions with an entry, as e.g. 'substantiales ETV: et sic bene convenit eis quarta proprietas add. KG (convenit K: patet G)'.

Negative apparatus is used only when all manuscripts except E have the reading adopted in the text. Each entry is complete in the sense that it informs about the readings of all five manuscripts at the place concerned. If some manuscript is not available for comparison, because it has a larger lacuna around the variant place, its 'reading'

xi viii

Introduction

is registered as def = deficit. If a manuscript has a text so deviant that it makes no sense to ask whether it has any of the readings attested in the remaining manuscripts, it is reported to read alia or aliter. The apparatus registers: 1. All cases in which our text deviates from that of E. 2. All cases in which two or more manuscripts carry a different reading from the one adopted. 3. Miscellaneous readings which seem interesting as regards contents or history of the text. Exceptions to (1) and (2) occur: la. When the rejected reading of E is an obvious and insignificant slip like an omission to put a line over 'ro' to make it spell 'ratio'. Also, ante correcturam errors corrected by the scribe himself are not adopted. 2a. When the variation between the manuscripts concern matters generally considered of no consequence (such as choice between 'ergo' and 'igitur'; headings, which are not part of the text to be commented on by Buridan; 'glossa', 'sequitur' and 'textus' to announce the author's text and Buridan's commentaries; 'etcetera' when it is obviously meaningless and merely serves to fill up a line of the manuscript; or between equivalent word-orders) and the text has been established according to the principles described in II.7, above. For the abbreviations used in the apparatus, see our list of the signa, below, p. 6. II.9. Orthography

In matters of orthography and punctuation we have not followed the manuscripts. The punctuation is our own, the orthography is classicizing and differs very little from the one used e.g. by Lewis and Short's well-known Latin Dictionary. Some of the most salient discrepancies between medieval practice and ours are: 1. We always write 'ae' when classical norm requires it; Buridan always wrote 'e' in such cases. This forces us to decide between adjectival and adverbial interpretation of such ambiguous Medieval forms as 'maxime'. Usually this is only a help to the reader, but in one particular place it creates a problem, viz. in 3.2.9, where Buridan is himself uncertain about which way to take 'maxime' in the

xlix

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

collocation 'maxime substantie videtur esse'. We have chosen to print 'maxime substantiae', trusting that the reader will understand from the context that Buridan considers whether 'maxime' could be the adjectival form that we would spell 'maximae'. 2. The distribution of 'ci' and 'ti' in front of a vowel is regulated according to classical norm, meaning e.g. that we always write 'dictio' whereas medieval practice allows both 'dictio' and 'diccio'; similarly we always write 'condicio' when dealing with the noun derived from 'condico', whereas medieval practice allows both 'condicio' and 'conditio' in this case (as well in the case of the derivative of 'condo', which we would write 'conditio'). 3. Some Greek words appear in forms which were rarely or never used in the Middle Ages. Thus we write 'Aristoteles', 'dialectica', 'Coriscus', not 'Aristotilis', 'dialetica', 'Coruscus'. We invariably say 'Socrates' though the mss tend to use the short forms 'Sortes' or 'Sor'. As for the medieval word 'quiditas'/'quidditas' we have chosen the spelling with one 'd' since it is, in our experience, the commonest one in medieval manuscripts, and moreover it is etymologically the sounder: quid-itas is modelled on qual(e)-itas and quant(um)-itas. II. I 0. Headings

As has been said, the headings have not been adopted in the apparatus criticus. It may be noted that e.g. in MS G the headings have words different from those in the text Buridan comments on. MSG itself omits the text of 3.2.7, but the heading has: 'Quarta proprietas est quod substantiae'. In 3.2.9 MS G has the heading 'Difficile est bene exponere' instead of 'Sexta proprietas etc.'. In 3.6.1 the heading curiously gives: 'Actio est quam secundum' in stead of 'Actio est secundum quam'.

II. I I. Apparatus of Quotations

Our apparatus of quotations identify explicit quotations made by Buridan, and no more. Thus we do not identify the numerous tacit quotations or echoes of Aristotle's Categories.

Introduction

Il.12. Bibliography II.12.1. Primary literature II.12.I.1. John Buridan Johannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Questiones, Parisiis 1518 (reprint Frankfurt am Main 1965). Iohannis Buridani in VIII Physicorum libros Questiones, Parisiis 1509 (reprint Frankfurt am Main 1963). Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, edited by E.A. Moody, Cambridge (Mass.) 1942. Johannes Buridanus: in Reina, M.E., 'Giovanni Buridano: Tractatus de suppositionibus, prima edizione a cura di Maria Elena Reina', in Rivista critica di storia dellafilosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208 and 323-352. Johannes Buridanus: in F. Scott and H. Shapiro, 'John Buridan's De motibus animalium ',in Isis 1967 (58), pp. 533-552. Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien. Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976. Johannes Buridanus, Sophismata. Critical edition with an introduction by T.K. Scott, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1977. Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, hrsg. von J. Schneider, Mtinchen 1983. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones Zange super librum Perihermeneias, edited with an introduction by R. van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1984 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Leiden, Meppel 1983). Johannes Buridanus: in P. G. Sobol, John Buridan on the Soul and Sensation. An Edition of Book II of his Commentary on Aristotle's Book on the Soul(. .. ), Indiana, 1984. Johannes Buridanus, Tractatus de dif.ferentia universalis ad individuum, ed. S. Szyller, in Przeglad Tomistyczny, III (1987), pp. 137-178. Johannes Buridanus: in J.A. Zupko, John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind. An Edition and Translation of Book III of his 'Questions on Aristotle's De anima' (Third Redaction), with Commentary and Critical and Interpretative Essays. 2 vols., Ann Arbor (Mich.) 1990 (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University 1989).

Ii

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

Johannes Buridanus: in J.M.M.H. Thijssen, John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, fiber III, quaestiones 14-19. An edition with an introduction and indexes by J.M.M.H.

Thijssen, Nijmegen 1991 (revision of: J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzaek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie. Deel I: studie; deel II: teksten. Nijmegen 1988 (Ph.D. thesis)). Johannes Buridanus: in B. Patar, Le traite de l' ame de Jean Buridan (Prima lectura). Edition, Etude critique et doctrinale, Louvain-la-Neuve 1991. 11.12.1.2. Other primary literature

Averroes, Commentaria in Metaphysicam, Opera omnia, ed. Venetiis 1560. Anonymus, De Sex Principiis, in L. Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus I, 67, under the titel: Anonymi Fragmentum vulgo vocatum 'Liber de Sex Principiis ', Bruges/Paris 1966. Biago Pelacani da Parma: in G. Federici Vescovini, Le Quaestiones de Anima di Biago Pelacani da Parma, Florence 1974. Johannes Duns Scotus, Jn Libras Praedicamentorum Quaestiones, in Opera Omnia, editio nova iuxta editionem Waddingi ( ... ), Parisiis 1881. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972. Radulphus Brito, Super arte veteri questiones subtilissime, Venetiis, s.d. Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, cura et studio P.M. Maggiolo 0.P., Taurini/Romae 1965. William of Ockham, Summa logicae, in Opera Philosophica I, ed. G. Gfil et S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1974. William of Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, in Opera Theologica IX, ed. J.C. Wey, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1980. 11.12.2.2. Secondary literature Biard, J., Buridan, Sophismes. Introduction, traduction et notes, Paris 1993.

Bos, E.P., 'Mental Verbs in Terminist Logic', in Vivarium XVI (1), 1978, p. 56-69.

Iii

Introduction

Ebbesen, S., 'The Chimaera's Diary', in The Logic of Being, Historical Studies, ed. S. Knuuttila and Jaakko Hintikka, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancasterffokyo 1986,pp.115-143. Ebbesen, S., 'The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De fallaciis', in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 139-160. Green-Pedersen, N.J., 'The Summulae of John Buridan, Tractatus VI, De locis', in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 121-138. Lecq, R. van der, 'Buridan on Modal Propositions' (appendix: Questiones Zange in Perihermeneias, liber II, questio 7), in English Logic and Semantics: from the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burley, Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, C.H. Kneepkens, L.M. de Rijk. Nijmegen 1981, pp. 425-442. Maier, A., Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spiitscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Roma 1955. Marshall, P.C., 'Parisian Psychology in the Mid-Fourteenth Century', in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Mayen Age, 1983 (50), pp. 101-193. McCord Adams, M., William Ockham, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1987. Moody, E.A., 'John Buridan on the Habitability of the Earth', in Speculum, 1941 (16), pp. 415-425. Pinborg, J., 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 71-90. Pinborg, J., Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Uberblick, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1972. Rijk, L.M. de, 'On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation', in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 91-100. Rijk, L.M. de, 'On Buridan's View of Accidental Being', in John Buridan, Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy, ed. E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop, Nijmegen 1993, pp. 41-51. Rijk, L.M. de, 'The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982, pp. 161-173. !iii

John Buridan, Summulae, De Praedicamentis

Rijk, L.M. de, 'On a Special Use of 'ratio' in 13th and 14th Century Metaphysics', in M. Fattori, M.L. Bianchi (eds.), Ratio. VII. Colloquio Internazionale (Roma, 9-11gennaio1992), 1993, pp. 197-218 .. Roberts, L. N., 'A Chimaera is a Chimaera: a Medieval Tautology', in The Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), pp. 273-278. Spade, P.V., 'Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham's Mental Language', in The Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18 (1980 ), pp. 9-22. Thijssen, J.M.M.H., Johannes Buridanus over het oneindige. Een onderzoek naar zijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie. Deel I: studie, deel II: teksten. Nijmegen 1988 (Ph. D. thesis). Zoubov, V., 'Jean Buridan et les concepts du point au quatorzieme siecle', in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1961 (5), pp. 43-95.

li v

III.

TEXT AND APPARATUS

III.I. Index capitulorum et partium

loHANNIS BURIDANI SUMMULARUM TRACTATUS TERTIUS

DE PRAEDICAMENTIS

3.1. De praemittendis 3.1.1. De definitione aequivocorum 3.1.2. De definitione univocorum 3 .1.3. De definitione denominativorum 3.1.4. De divisione vocum 3.1.5. De divisione eorum quae sunt 3.1.6. Regula: quando alterum de altero praedicatur, ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur, dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicuntur 3 .1. 7. Regula: diversorum generumnon subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae 3 .1. 8. De di visione terminorum incomplexorum in decem praedicamenta 3 .1. 9. Quaedam proprietas istorum decem praedicamentorum

7 8 10

3.2. De substantia 3.2.1. De divisione substantiae et de declaratione membrorum divisionis 3.2.2. De differentia eorum quae sunt in subiecto et quae dicuntur de subiecto 3.2.3. De comparatione primarum et secundarum substantiarum ad mv1cem 3.2.4. Prima proprietas: substantiae in subiecto non sunt 3.2.5. Secunda proprietas: secundae substantiae et differentiae univoce praedicantur de primis substantiis 3.2.6. Tertia proprietas: omnis substantia prima significat hoc aliquid 3.2.7. Quarta proprietas: substantiae nihil est contrarium 3.2.8. Quinta proprietas: nulla substantia suscipit magis et minus 3.2.9. Sexta proprietas: nulla substantia susceptibilis est contrariorum secundum sui mutationem

20

11 14 14

16 17 18 19

21 24 25 27 29 29 30 32 33

Johannes Buridanus, Summulae

3.3. De quantitate 3.3.1. De divisione quantitatis in continuam et discretam 3.3.2. De speciebus quantitatis discretae 3.3.3. De speciebus quantitatis continuae 3.3.4. De divisione quantitatis in quantitatem per se et quantitatem per accidens 3.3.5. Prima proprietas: quantitati nihil est contrarium 3.3.6. Secunda proprietas: nulla quantitas suscipit magis et minus 3.3.7. Tertia proprietas: secundum earn aequale et inaequale dicitur

35 36 38 39 42 43 45 46

3.4. De ad aliquid 46 3.4.1. De definitionibus relativorum 47 53 3.4.2. De speciebus relativorum 3.4.3. Prima proprietas: in relatione est contrarietas 54 3.4.4. Secunda proprietas: relativa suscipiunt magis et minus 55 3.4.5. Tertia proprietas: omnia relativa ad convertentiam dicuntur cum suis correlativis 56 3.4.6. Quarta proprietas: relativa sunt simul natura 58 3.5. De qualitate 3.5.1. De descriptione qualitatis 3.5.2. Prima species: habitus et dispositio 3.5.3. Secunda species: potentia naturalis et impotentia naturalis 3.5.4. Tertia species: passio vel passibilis qualitas 3.5.5. Quarta species: forma et circa aliquid constans figura 3.5.6. De descriptione qualis 3.5.7. Prima proprietas: in qualitate est contrarietas 3.5.8. Secunda proprietas: qualitati convenit suscipere magis et minus 3.5.9. Tertia proprietas: secundum earn simile vel dissimile dicitur 3.5.10. Notabile de terminis secundum Aristotelem connumeratis tam in praedicamento de ad aliquid quam in praedicamento qualitatis

61 62 63 66 67 69 70 72 73 74

3.6. De actione et passione 3.6.1. De definitione actionis et passionis 3.6.2. De speciebus actionis et passionis 3.6.3. Quattuor proprietates actionis et passionis

75 76 79 82

74

De Praedicamentis

3. 7. De quattuor ultimis praedicamentis 3.7.1. De praedicamento quando 3.7.2. De praedicamento ubi 3.7.3. De praedicamento situs 3.7.4. De praedicamento habitus

84

3.8. De oppositionibus 3.8.1. De generibus oppositionum 3.8.2. De oppositione relativa 3.8.3. De oppositione contraria 3.8.4. De oppositione privativa 3.8.5. De oppositione contradictoria

94 95 97 101 104

3.9. De motu vel mutatione 3. 9 .1. De speeiebus motus vel mutationis 3.9.2. De contrarietate motuum et quietum

104 105 107

3.10. De priori, simul et habere 3.10.1. De modis quibus 'prius' dicitur 3.10.2. De modis quibus 'simul' dicitur 3.10.3. De modis quibus 'habere' dicitur

108 109

85

90 91 91

96

111 112

III.2. Sigla codicum

B = Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 5420 E = Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994 G = Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, Amplon. 2° 305 K = Krakow, Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksiezy Misjonarzy 171 (olim 627, antea 827) T = Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462) V = Wertheim, Kirchenbibliothek 157

Codex semel adhibitus A = Wien, 6sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 5365

Signa in apparatu critico adhibita

add. = addidit (addiderunt) corr.= correctum def.= deficit (deficiunt) del. = delevit (deleverunt) Ee= manus quae correxit textum manuscripti E Emg = manus in margine quae correxit textum manuscripti E exp. = expunxit (expunxerunt) inv. = invertit (inverterunt) iter. = iteravit (iteraverunt) om. = omisit (omiserunt) ? = illegibilis lectio

Ill.3. Textus et apparatus

3.1. TRACT ATUS TERTIUS DE PRAEMITTENDIS

Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen est commune et secundum istud no men ratio substantiae est diversa, ut animal: homo et quod pingitur. 5

Iste est tertius tractatus huius operis, qui est de praedicamentis. Et iste tractatus in multis summulis invenitur et in multis non. Et quia Aristoteles satis ample de eis determinavit in libro Praedicamentorum, ideo intendo de eis brevius tractare recolligendo dicta Aristotelis notabiliora et ponendo textum quantum potero breviorem.

3.1. E 18ra, B 21vb,T25ra, K 30ra, G 14va. 3 ante aequivoca TBK: ad cognitionem praedicamentorum E: incipit textus tractatus GI 4 pingitur ET: depingitur BKG I 5 et iste tractatus TBKG: om. EI 6 multis ETG: aliquibus BK/ non ET: invenitur add. BG: autem non invenitur Kleis EKG: ipsis B: istis Tl 7 determinavit ETB: determinat KG/ libro ET: suo add. B: suo, scilicet in libro add. K: suo scilicet add. GI 8 recolligendo ... breviorem TBKG (recolligendo

TBG: colligendo Kl dicta ... notabiliora BKG: notabilia T: notabiliora KG: corr. ex notabisa ? Bl textum BKG: exempla T/ breviorem BKG: breviora T): om. E. 7

Johannes Buridanus, Summulae

10

15

20

Et continebit iste tractatus decem capitula. Primum erit de praemittendis ante specialem de unoquoque praedicamento determinationem; secundum erit de substantia; tertium erit de quantitate; quartum de ad aliquid; quintum de qualitate; sextum de actione et passione; septimum de aliis quattuor praedicamentis; octavum de generibus opposition um; non um de generibus motuum; decimum de priori, et posteriori, et simul, et habere. Primum capitulum continet novem partes: tres primae sunt definitiones aequivocorum, univocorum et denorninativorum; quarta et quinta sunt duae divisiones; sexta et septima sunt duae regulae; octava est divisio terminorum incomplexorum in decem praedicamenta; nona est quaedam proprietas istorum decem praedicamentorum. Secundaincipitibi: "univoca"; tertiaibi: "denominativa"; quartaibi: "eorum quae dicuntur"; quinta ibi: "eorum quae sunt"; sexta ibi: "quando alterum"; septima ibi: "diversorum"; octava ibi: "eorum quae etc."; nona ibi: "proprium est". 3. l.1. Circa primam partem notandum est quod aequivocatio aliquando attribuitur voci

significanti, et aliquando rebus significatis. Vox enim dicitur aequivoca quia aequivoce plura significat, et res significatae dicuntur aequivocae quia per aliquam

11 erit BG: est ETK/ praemittendis ETG: (prae B')-mittendis an(!) B: quibusdam add. Kl de unoquoque praedicamento EBK: de unoquoque praedicamentorum T: in hoc loco praedicamentorum G/ 12 erit1 EBG:

om. T: estK/erit2 ET: om. BKG/ 15et1 ETB: om. KG/et2 EB: deT: om. K: adG/ 16 primumBTKG: partes patebunt. Primum E/ continet BK: continebit ETG/ 21 incipit K: om. EBO: pars add. Tl ibi3 TBKG: est

add. El 23 diversorum ET: diversarum generum est B: diversorum generum KG/ etc. EKG: sunt TB I est G: autem ET: est generis BK.

3.l.l. E 18ra, T 25ra, B 2lvb, K 30rb, G 14va. 1-5 textus, usqueadsed (5),illegibilis T/1 aequivocatioBKG: aequivocumE/vociEmgBKG: om.E/2enim KG: om. E: (enim B') universaliter enim B/ 3 significat EB: ex impositione add. KG/ 4 aequivocum EB:

8

De Praedicamentis

vocem aequivoce significantur. Hie autemnon definitur aequivocum, idest: aequivoce significans, sed definiuntur aequivoca, idest: aequivoce significata, idest: iste terminus 'aequivoca' definiturprout supponit pro rebus per aliquam vocemaequivoce

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significatis. Deinde notandum est quod, cum dicitur "ratio substantiae" non accipitur substantia prout distinguitur contra accidens- quia ita bene accidentia significantur 10 aequivoce sicut substantiae - , sed capitur ad placitum substantia pro re significata quaecumque illa fuerit, ita quod per rationem substantiae debemus intelligere conceptum secundum quern res significantur per vocem. Et etiam, quando dicimus "quorum nomen est commune", non debemus accipere nomen prout distinguitur contra verbum et alias partes orationis - quia ita bene est aequivocatio in verbis 15 sicut in norninibus - , sed accipitur nomen large, pro omni voce significativa ad placitum, ita quod est sensus definitionis: aequivoca- idest: aequivoce significata per aliquam vocem - dicuntur quorum nomen significans est commune et ratio substantiae est diversa - idest: quod imposita sunt ad significandum per illam vocem secundum diversas rationes et impositiones. Essent autem univoca- idest: 20 univoce significata-, si secundum unam rationem et impositionem essent imposita

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ad significandum per illam vocem. Et notandum quod per hanc descriptionem aequivoce significatorum potest haberi descriptio termini aequivoci - idest: aequivoce plura significantis - . Sic enim aequivocum dicitur una vox plura significans secundum diversas rationes, et sic etiam, correspondenter, univocum diceretur vox plura significans secundum eandem rationem et impositionem. Et exemplum bene ponitur: quia aliquando substantias viventes et sentientes vocamus animalia, ut homines, equos et asinos, et aliquando etiam picturas in pariete vocamus animalia, et hoc est aequivoce quia

aequivocans add. KG/ 5 definiuntur 'aequivoca' BKG (idest iste terminus BK: et aequivocata G): om. ET/ 6 vocem E: terminum TBKG/ 8 est: EKG: om. BG! 9 accidens TBK: accidentia E: om. GI 11 illa fuerit EB: ilia T: om. K: illa fuit G/ debemus E: sic add. T: hie add. BKGI 16 definitionis E: istius add. T: quod

add. BKGI 17 commune EG: idest: idem add. TBKI 22 et EB: item T: est add. KG! quod ETK: etiam add. 2 BG/ 24 vox TBKG: om. E/26 aliquando ETB: aliquas KG/27 equos TBK: om. EG/ et EG: om. TBK/28

etiam TBK: om. EG I vocamus TBKG: asinos vel add. El quia TB: et EG: om. K.

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Johannes Buridanus, Summulae

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secundum diversas rationes. Ut apparel: quia si quaeratur 'Quare vocas istum asinum vel equum animal?', respondetur quod hoc est quia est substantia viva et sentiens, seu sensitiva. Et si quaeratur 'Quare ista pictura vocatur animal?', non dicetur 'Quia sit viva et sentiens', sed 'Quia est imago seu repraesentatio animalis vivi et sentientis'. ldeo hoc nomen 'animal' est aequivocum - idest: aequivoce significans animal vivum et istam picturam - , sed istud nomen 'animal' est univocum - idest: univoce significans homines vivos et boves vivos - , quia, side utroque quaeras, scilicet de homine et bove: 'Quare vocantur animal?', assignabitur eadem ratio, scilicet quia est substantia animata sensibilis, seu sensitiva. Et ex hoc infertur manifeste quod idem nomen est aequivocum ad aliqua significata et univocum etiam ad aliqua, ut 'animal' est aequivocum ad animalia viva et picturas eorum, et est univocum ad omnia animalia viva, ut homines, equos et asinos. 3.1.2. Univoca dicuntur quorum no men est commune, et secundum istud nomen ratio substantiae est eadem, ut 'animal': homo vel bos vel equus.

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Ista definitio de univocis debet omnino proportionaliter exponi sicut definitio aequivocorum quae iam exposita fuit. Sed debet ex dictis inferri corollarie quod vox non vocatur aequivoca ex eo quod significat plura ad extra, sed quia in significando

29 ut E: quod TBKG/ quaeratur ETG: quaeras BK/ 30 respondetur quod hoc TBG: hoc E: respondebis quia haec Kl et BK: om. ETG/31 seu EKG: om. T: siveB/32diceturEK: diciturT: dicereturB: dicereturquod hoc sit GI quia 1 T: propter hoc quod EG: quod BK/ et1 KG: om. EB: vel T/ 33 et TBKG: seu E/ 34 istud ETB: idem KG/ 35 ides! BKG: et ET/ 35 de EKG: om. BT/ 36 vocantur EK: vocabitur T: vocatur BG/ 37 seu EK: ides! TBG/ 38 hoc ET: etiarn add. BKGI aequivocum TBKG: aequivocus E.

3.1.2. E 18rb, T 25rb, B 22rb, K 30va, G 14vb. 2 vel equus EBG: om. TK/ 3 de univocis E: univoce univocarum B: univocorurn TKG/ 4 quae iam BKG: iarn E: om. Tl fuit E: om T: exponendo definitionem aequivocorum add. B: exponendo definitionem aequivocatorum add. G 10

De Praedicamentis

ea plura apud animam correspondent ei diversae rationes. Ideo terminis aut propositionibus mentalibus non est attribuenda aequivocatio vel univocatio, sed vocibus significantibus diversas res eisdem aut diversis intentionibus. 3.1.3. Denominativa dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo solo casu sunt differentia, et secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, a fortitudine fortis.

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Notandum quod hie describuntur termini praedicabiles de subiectis suis non essentialiter, sed denominative. Ad hoc autem quod terminus proprie dicatur denominativus, unum requiritur ex parte vocis et alterum ex parte intentionis. Nam ex parte vocis terminus denominativus debet esse concretus descendens secundum vocem ab abstracto, ut 'album' ab 'albedine'. Si autem concretum non descenderet secundum vocem ab abstracto, non diceretur proprie denominativum ab isto. Unde licet secundum virtutem aliquis sit studiosus, tamen hoc nomen 'studiosus' non dicitur proprie denominativum ab isto no mine 'virtus'. Hane ergo condicionem ex

6 ea TB: eas E: om. K: ilia G/ plura2 TKG: plures EB/ terminis ETB: in terminis KG/ 7 propositionibus E: orationibus BG: omnibus orationibus T: aut in propositionibus Kl attribuenda ETB: accipienda KG/ sed ETK: in add. BG/ 8 intentionibus ETB: conceptibus KG.

3.1.3. E 18rb, T 25rb, B 22rb, K 30va, G 14vb. 1 quaecumque ET: quae BKG/ sunt ETK: om. BG/ 2 et ETK: om. BG/ 4 notandum E: hie notandum etiam B: est add. TKG/ describuntur TBKG: describitur El termini TBKG: terminus El praedicabiles TBKG: praedicabilis El 5 proprie dicatur TG: praedicatur EB: vere dicatur Kl 6 denominativus KG: denominative EB: praedicari add. Tl 8 descenderet TKG: descendat E: descendit Bl 9 diceretur TBKG: dicitur E/ unde E: om. TBKG/ I 0 licet E: ut licet aliquis B: ut licet TKGI virtutem aliquis TBKG: aliquos EI studiosus TBKG: denominativumadd. El hoc nomen 'studiosus' TBG: studiosus K: om. El 11 proprie E: om. TBKGI isto nomine BKG: hac voce E: hoc nomine T. 11

Johannes Buridanus, Summulae

parte vocis requisitam exprimit dicta descriptio denominativorum: "denominativa dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo solo casu sunt differentia et secundum illud nomen" - idest: secundum vocem -. Oportet enim quod secundum vocem differunt casu, 15 - idest: cadendo seu descendendo unum ab alio, et quod etiam sic secundum vocem differant solum secundum talem casum - , ita quod non totaliter, sine derivatione, sicut de virtute et studioso. Secundo, ex parte intentionis, requiritur quod iste terminus concretus habeat appellationem, - idest: quod appellet, seu connotet, aliquam extraneam dis20 positionem ultra istud pro quo supponit - . Et ideo, licet esset casus secundum vocem, ut 'hominis' ab 'humanitate', 'dei' a 'deitate', 'entis' ab 'entitate' et sic de multis aliis, tamen ibi nihil est praedicabile denominative, et hoc notat dicta descriptio cum