Summulae de propositionibus 2503518869

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JOHANNES BURIDANUS SUMMULAE DE PROPOSITIONIBUS

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics

EDITORS L.M. de RIJK

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS

Leiden

Nijmegen

&

&

E.P.BOS

C.H. KNEEPKENS

Leiden

Groningen

JOHANNES BURIDANUS SUMMULAE editor-in-chief STEN EBBESEN

University of Copenhagen

ARTISTARIUM - - - - 10-1 - - - -

JOHANNESBURIDANUS

SUMMULAE DE PROPOSITIONIBUS

introduction, critical edition and indexes by

RIAVANDERLECQ

BREPOLS

© BR.EPOLSl':l:! PUBLISHERS n.v., Turnhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2005/0095.159 ISBN 2-503-51886-9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vn

II. II.l. II.2. II.2.1. II.2.2. II.2.3. II.2.4. II.3. II.3.1. II.3.2. II.3.3. II.4. II.5. II.6. II.7. II.8. II.9. II.10. II.11. II.11.1. II.11.1.1. II.11.1.2. II.11.2.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The editorial project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John Buridan and his Summulae............................. Introductory remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the texts commented upon by Buridan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Composition and structure of Buridan's Summulae...... Date of the Summulae......................................... Treatise r, De propositionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Content of De propositionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prooemium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of manuscripts hitherto known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Description of manuscripts used............................. Stemma codicum . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . Editorial principles............................................. The critical apparatus.......................................... Orthography. Punctuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Headings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primary literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John Buridan: texts and translations of works on logic . . Other primary literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondary literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix xi xn xn xiii xv xvi xix xix xx xxiv xxv xxv xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxn xxxiii xxxm xxxm xxxiv xxx1v

v

Summulae, De propositionibus III. III.1. III.2. III.3. III.4.

Text and apparatus ............................................ . Index capitulorum et partium ............................... . Sigla codicum .................................................. . Signa in apparatu critico adhibita .......................... . Textus et apparatus ........................................... .

1

IV. IV.l. IV.2.

Indices ........................................................... . Index of Quotations .......................................... . Index of Names and Terms .................................. .

119

Vl

3 6 6 7

121 123

I.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors of Buridan's Summulae have taken great advantage of the preliminary transcription of one of the manuscripts our colleague Professor Hubert Hubien (Liege) has put at the disposal of the Buridan Society, for which we owe him sincere thanks. The Buridan Society would also like to express its gratitude to Professor M. Markowski (Cracow), Dr. Friis-Jensen (Copenhagen) and Dr. L. Valente (Heidelberg) for their help with the description and identification of part of the manuscripts. The initiator and president of the Buridan Society, Professor Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen) most kindly read through the present fascicle, offering as usual both valuable comments and general agreement. To Professor Gyula Klima (New York), who has published a complete English translation of the Summulae, I am grateful for some useful suggestions. I am also grateful to Johannes Rustenburg and Iva Geradts (Typographica Academica Traiectina) for the great care and accuracy expended on the completion of this edition. Utrecht, September, Ria van der Lecq

2005

II.

INTRODUCTION

II.

INTRODUCTION

II.I. The editorial project The present fascicle is number one of the first complete edition of Buridan's Summulae, which contains nine treatises, including a new edition of his Sophismata. The plan is being realized by an international team composed of scholars from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. A first and overly optimistic version of the project was discussed in 1975 at the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, which was devoted to the logic of John Buridan. In 1986 The Buridan Society was formed with the explicit purpose of producing an edition of the Summulae, and guidelines for the work were laid down. The following scholars initially joined the Society: E.P. Bos, H.A.G. Braakhuis, S. Ebbesen, H. Hubien, R. van der Lecq, F. Pironet, L.M de Rijk, J.M.M.H. Thijssen. To make the task manageable, it was decided to aim only at an edition based on a handful of manuscripts carefully selected on the advice of H. Hubien, who had made pilot studies of the tradition. Also, considering that all participants in the project were scholars with many other obligations and hence likely to be distracted from the work on Buridan at unpredictable times, it was decided to publish each fascicle of the work as soon as it was finished without regard to regular intervals or an orderly progression from fascicle 1 to fascicle 9. Parts of the introduction to this fascicle are identical with the corresponding sections in previously published fascicles, but with the progress of the editorial work we have had to change our views on certain points. Major changes have therefore been introduced in chapters n.2.4 about the date of the Summulae and n.6 about the filiation of the manuscripts.

XI

Summulae, De propositionibus

II.2. John Buridan and his Summulae II.2.1. Introductory remarks

John Buridan-Iohannes Buridanus-was one of the most influential philosophers of the Late Middle Ages. He was probably born in the 1290s, but at any rate not later than 1304/5. While there is hardly any evidence to support the common assumption that he was born in Bethune (diocese of Arras), 1 there may be a clue in our best manuscript (Vatican Library, Pal. lat. 994) of the tract De fallaciis, in which Buridan's comments on one of the lemmas are introduced by the phrase 'sequitur glosa jo. Audr.' (only the first three letters of "Audr" are perfectly clear), in which the topographical indication may be taken to stand for 'Johannes Audomarensis', i.e. 'John of Sint-Omaars' (in Buridan's life-time, a Flemish town; nowadays, Saint-Omer, France). Sint-Omaars is situated in the region that in Buridan's life-time was part of the duchy of Flanders. He was active as a master of arts at the University of Paris from about the 1320s till his death, 1361 being the terminus ante quem, 2 if not the very year of his death, because at that date John's benefice in Saint-Pol-surTernoise went to somebody else. 3 Buridan's philosophical production is closely connected to his work as a university teacher. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle, some of which have been edited, as has also his treatise on consequences. 4 And then there is his Summulae or Summa Logica ( e), undeservedly neglected by historians of logic because it has never been printed. To be sure, there are printed books from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries purporting to contain the work, but

1

2

3 4

B. Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des Spiiten Mittelalters, 2 Teile, Berlin 1985, p. 82, n. 6. See John Buridan's Tractatus de infinito. Quaestiones super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, fiber III, quaestiones 14-19. An edition with an introduction and indexes by J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Nijmegen 1991, p. xi. B. Michael, op.cit. 1, pp. 401-402. For editions and translations of his works on logic, see the bibliography on page xxxiii For a bibliography of editions and translations of Buridan's other works, see: Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters, Hrsgb. von R. Schonberger und B. Kible, Berlin 1994, nrs 14378-14429. An updated bibliography by Fabienne Pironet is available at: http://mapageweb.umontreal.ca/pironetf/. XU

Introduction in fact they do not, despite their frequently going under Buridan's name. A fair number of preserved manuscripts, however, testify to the popularity of the Summulae during the late 14th century and well into the 15th, especially at the Central European universities (see section 1r.4 below). In its most extensive form Buridan's Summulae consists of the following eight treatises: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii.

On Propositions On Predicables On Categories On Sui JSitions On Syllogisms On Topics On Fallacies On Definitions, Divisions, and Demonstrations

Buridan himself at one time regarded his Sophismata as treatise 1x, but there is no genuine formal connection between treatise IX and the rest, which are organized quite differently. 5

II.2.2. On the texts commented upon by Buridan Buridan's basic idea was to 'read', i.e. comment upon, basic introductory texts. For Tracts I-VII, the basic text was taken from a contemporaneous interpolated version of Peter of Spain's thirteenth-century handy introduction to logic, the Tractatus or Summulae logicales. Buridan himself added a special tract to deal with demonstrative knowledge, which he prefaced with two short expositions on division and definition, subjects that Peter and the writers of the adapted texts had neglected, as had other authors of thirteenth-century handbooks of logic. When dealing with the introductory texts commented upon by Buridan in his Summulae, one has to distinguish between the Tracts I-VII and Tract vm, De demonstrationibus.

5

For more evidence of the independent character of the Sophismata, see: Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De practica sophismatum, edited by Fabienne Pironet, Turnhout 2003, esp. pp. xii-xiv. Xlll

Summulae, De propositionibus [a] As for Summulae 1-vn, it is clear throughout the work that Buridan had a text at his elbow that had already been considerably altered in the course of transmission, and which he himself may have subjected to further changes, and time and again major ones at that. Buridan regularly uses the term 'auctor' when referring to the text he comments on. Peter of Spain's work originally contained twelve treatises. 6 The 'auctor' had fused Peter's Tracts 8-12 (on relatives, ampliation, appellation, restriction, and distribution) with his own version of the tract on supposition (treatise Iv). That left seven treatises. 'Thus Buridan's additional tract De demonstrationibus became Summulae VIII. Buridan's text of tracts I-VII consists of lemmata from the 'auctor's Summulae, where the material is presented in such a way as to be easily memorized, and more extensive comments on those lemmata. As Pinborg7 pointed out, the way Buridan speaks about his choice of Peter's work permits the conclusion that "using Peter of Spain's manual was not the obvious thing to do", and Pinborg may well have been right in his conjecture that Buridan was the first to introduce Peter's manual as a textbook at university level in Paris, where earlier it had been used only at less exalted levels of education ('pro iunioribus'; see also section u.2-4)· Buridan might have made his choice out of the different versions available at the time, but seems to have considered it unnecessary to make a complete version of his own, as may appear from his frequently criticizing that auctor's text quoted in the lemmata. Buridan commented very extensively on the standard material, which he often re-interprets in ways its authors could scarcely have imagined. He certainly makes no secret of his intentions, as can be gathered from the general introduction (Prooemium) prefaced to the whole work: Prooemium: "Propter quod de logica tota volens sine nimis exquisita perscrutatione disserere quaedam communia, elegi specialiter descendere ad ilium logicae tractatum brevem quern venerandus doctor magister Petrus His-

6

7

See Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen i972, ch. 3 of the introduction. J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus r, De introductionibus', in: The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, p. 72. XlV

Introduction panus dudum composuit, exponendum et supplendum, immo etiam et aliter aliquando quam ipse dixerit et scripserit dicendum et scribendum, prout mihi videbitur opportunum."

In the Renaissance edition of what was issued as Buridan's Summulae, 8 John Dorp's comments have taken the place of Buridan's and thus the reader had no means of seeing how original Buridan was. This much is certain, as Buridan went on commenting upon the 'auctor', he seems to have grown increasingly irritated with the text at his elbow, and sometimes simply dispensed with it, composing instead an alternative text to comment on (thus 1,8, rv and vn). [b] The basic text underlying Buridan's eighth treatise De demonstrationibus is still more difficult to identify. It is not found in any interpolated text of Peter's Summulae and it is uncertain if it is by Buridan's own hand. The first major survey of logic to include a chapter on demonstration was William of Ockham's Summa logicae, which may be only about ten years older than Buridan's, but it is unknown to what degree, if any, Buridan, or his exemplar, was inspired by Ockham. In any event, by adding treatise vm Buridan produced a book covering all the main subjects of Aristotle's Organon as well as the usual medieval additions to logic, such as the doctrine of the properties of terms.9

II.2.3. Composition and structure of Buridan's Summulae Buridan's Summulae is a highly structured work. At first glance it presents itself as alternating pieces (partes) of basic text and commentary, but those partes are but the smallest independent units in a strictly hierarchical division of the basic text carried out and presented according to the conventions of literal commentaries (expositiones). A preface to the whole work announces which treatises the basic text will contain. The commentary on the first pars of each treatise informs the reader about which chapters the treatise under discussion contains; the commentary on the first pars of each 8

9

Johannes Buridanus, Compendium totius logicae, cum Joannis Dorp expositione. Unveriind. Nachdr. der Ausg.: Venedig 1499, Frankfurt/Main 1965. For more information about Treatise vm, De demonstrationibus, see De Rijk's edition of this treatise, that appeared as part 8 in the present series.

xv

Summulae, De propositionibus chapter announces the partes of that chapter, and, finally, the commentary usually divides each single pars into particulae or clausulae. Buridan numbers his treatises (tractatus), chapters (capitula), parts (partes), and this numbering can be used for purposes of reference. We indicate this by means of such headings as 'I.IA'= 'Treatise 1, chapter 1, part 4', and recommend its use for references (it is a much more durable system than, e.g., referring to our page numbers).

11.2.4. Date of the Summulae Whereas there can be no doubt that the Summulae was composed for didactic purpose at the Arts Faculty in Paris, the date of composition is harder to ascertain. None of our sources simply dates the work in absolute terms. A relative chronology in Buridan's total production is difficult to establish, not only because many works remain as yet unedited, but also because it is known that he 'read' the same authoritative texts several times during his long career, and each 'reading', i.e. teaching course, is likely to have produced its own written version of the lectures. Hence cross-references are of dubious value for establishing the relative chronology. It is perfectly possible for some version of work A to refer to work B while some version of work B refers to work A. A terminus a quo for either the first or the last version of the work is not really available as we do not know when Buridan started to teach, but anything earlier than the 1320s seems utterly unrealistic. As for a terminus ante quern, the situation is rather complicated. In his introduction to the edition of the tract on the Categories E.P. Bos has given some arguments for 1335 as a terminus ante quem. 10 H. Hubien has made a strong case for dating Buridan's De consequentiis to 1335. 11 Now if this date holds, and if certain ideas of the Summulae are on their way to the stage of development evidenced by De consequentiis, 12 we have 1335 as a terminus 10

11

12

See Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. In Praedicamenta. Introduction, Critical Edition and Appendices by E.P. Bos, Nijmegen 1994, p. xvi. See Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien, Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976, p. 9. See J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus 1, De introductionibus' (excerpts), in The Logic of John Buridan ( ... ),Copenhagen 1976, p. 73. XVI

Introduction ante quern. On the basis of a reference in Treatise vrn of the Summulae (8.5.2), L.M. de Rijk argues for a date around 1336. 13 There Buridan clearly refers to the epistemological position held by Nicholas of Autrecourt cum suis concerning the unique role of the principle of non-contradiction, and especially Autrecourt's thesis that from the existence of A one cannot infer that of B with proper evidence. He ascribes this position ('error quorundam') to sheer ignorance of logic: 8.5.2: 'Et ex istis dictis manifestus est error quorundam nunc legentium qui dicunt m m posse esse evidentem probationem secundum quam concludimus per aliquid esse aliud esse, ut si per motum esse volumus probare motorem esse vel per domum esse parietem esse. Dicunt enim non posse esse evidentem probationem esse nisi sit reducibilis ad primum principium complexum. ( ... ) Isti ergo supponunt falsum, puta quod illud solum principium sit evidens et quod omne aliud principium possit et indigeat probari per illud. Et haec sunt absurda et dicta ex ignorantia logicae'.14

Convincing as these arguments may seem, the conclusion cannot hold for the Summulae as a whole. In particular, the version of De suppositionibus which we have at our disposal, is clearly of a later date. In 4.5.3 Buridan explicitly proposes a revision of an opinion he had advocated in the Sophismata on the topic of verbs signifying cognitive acts. He explicitly refers to the sixth sophism of chapter four (De appellationibus) of the Sophismata.15 The reference itself is not conclusive, but the revised opinion is. De suppositionibus contains various references to the Sophismata, some of which concern parts of the work that are unknown to us: for all we know they may never have been written. So the conclusion may be justified that Buridan had finished the part of the Sophismata that is known to us before he 13

See Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De praedicabilibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes by L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1995, p. xvi. 14 For the date (c. 1336) of this Parisian controversy at the Sorbonne, see Zenon Kaluza, 'Nicolas d'Autrecourt. Un ami de la verite', in Histoire litteraire de la France (t. xrn, fasc. 1), Paris 1995, and L.M. de Rijk, Nicholas of Autrecourt. His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezza ( ... ),Leiden 1994, pp. 5 and 121. 15 4.3.5, p. 8516-20: Verum est tamen, prout mihi videtur, quod illud corrigendum est quod ego dixi quantum ad sextum sophisma, scilicet quod ego vidi Petrum et Robertum, vel etiam quod videbo vel possum videre omne astrum, nam istae propos1t1< :s forte non sunt concedendae, propter appellationem rationis, eo quod 'videre' significat actum animae cognoscitivae.

xvn

Summulae, De propositionibus made the final version of De suppositionibus, and that he had the intention to finish the Sophismata sooner or later. In the fifth sophism of chapter one Buridan criticizes the theory of the complexe significabile. Michael has argued that this theory was not known in Paris before 1342, which would make it a terminus post quern for the Sophismata. 16 But even if Michael's arguments were not to hold,1 7 there is strong evidence for a date not much earlier than 1340, the year of the Statute against the Ockhamists. Since Michalski various scholars have confirmed that there are some doctrinal and verbal parallels between the text of the Statute and certain passages in De suppositionibus. 18 Notably in 4.3.2 Buridan defends the position advocated in the Statute, namely that propositions should be taken as they are meant by the author, although he adds the important qualification that in the proper sense (secundum propriam locutionem) such a proposition may be false. As a logician Buridan defends a position that is more sophisticated than the one advocated in the Statute. Nevertheless, it is quit< ossible that he had no serious problem with the content of the Statute. With our present state of knowledge it is impossible to decide whether Buridan has written the Statute himself copying his text of De suppositionibus, or that he has used the text of the Statute writing the passage in De suppositionibus, but, anyhow, it is likely that De suppositionibus as it has been handed down to us should be dated not much earlier or later than 1340. 16

17

See B. Michael, op.cit., pp. 272-273 + 527. Michael argues that Buridan's criticism concerns Gregory of Rimini's version of the theory of the complexe significabile rather than Adam Wodeham's. Jack Zupko has defended the same view with different arguments. See: B. Michael, op.cit., p. 272 and J. Zupko, 'How it played in the RUE DE FOUARRE. The Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century' in Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997, pp. 211-225.

18

K. Michalski, 'Les courants philosophiques aOxford et aParis pendant le XIVe siecle.' Bulletin international de l'Academie des sciences de Cracovie, 1920. Cf.: M.E. Reina, 'II problema de! linguaggio in Buridano', Rivista Critica di Storia delta Filosofia 15 (1960), esp. pp. 251-264 and Z. Kaluza, 'Les sciences et leurs languages. Note sur le statut de 29 decembre 1340 et le pretendu statut perdu contre Ockham' in L. Bianchi, Filosofia e Teologia nel Trecento. Textes et Etudes du moyen age l, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, esp. pp. 235-239. See also the discussion in the introduction to Johannes Buridanus, Questiones elencorum, ed. by R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis, Nijmegen 1994, esp. pp. xix-xxx. XVlll

Introduction

With the great uncertainty surrounding Buridan's production, we must confess that we are still unable to date any version of the Summulae as a whole with anything like precision. They must all fall within the approximate limits of 1325 and 1360, and it is likely that the first version, of a part of the work at least, was completed in the 1320s or early 1330s. It is also probable that later editions were partly identical with the first one. But at the same time it should not be ruled out that such changes as were introduced with each subsequent version may have been of high theoretical importance.

II.3. Treatise I, De propositionibus II.3.1. Structure

The present fascicle contains the first treatise of the Summulae, called De propositionibus. In earlier fascicles we referred to this treatise as De introductionibus, which is the name of the corresponding chapter of Peter of Spain's Tractatus. l9 Buridan himself, however, does not use the term introductiones; in 1.1.1 he announces that the first treatise is going to deal with propositions and their parts and attributes. Therefore, 'De propositionibus' seems to be a more appropriate title. The treatise consists of eight chapters, which correspond with Peter of Spain's Tractatus I (De introductionibus) in the following way: chapter in Buridan 2

3 4 5 6 7 8

chapters in Tractatus

De quibusdam praemittendis De nomine, verbo et oratione De propositione De oppositionibus propositionum categoricarum De aequipollentiis De conversionibus propositionum De propositionibus hypotheticis De propositionibus modalibus

I

l-3 4-6 7-10

ll-14 18

15 16-17 19-25

A closer comparison between the two treatises 20 shows that Buridan elaborated more on the topics of chapters 6 and 7 (conversions and hypothetical 19

20

See for an exposition of the term 'introductiones' by John of Salisbury: Peter of Spain, Tractatus (. .. ), ed. L.M. de Rijk, p. lxxxix. See Jan Pinborg, 'Summulae, Tractatus I De introductionibus,' in Jan Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan, Kopenhagen 1976, pp. 74-75. XIX

Summulae, De propositionibus propositions) than the author of his basic text and that he had an extraordinary interest in modal propositions. He even preferred to write a new text for this chapter, because he considered the auctor's account to be incomplete (1.8.1). The present edition includes the preface (Prooemium) of the Summulae, in which Buridan says some remarkable things about logic as an art (see below 1r.3.3) and in which he warns the reader that he will not follow his author's text in every respect: "occasionally I am going to have to say and write things that differ from what he has said and written, whenever it appears to me suitable to do so." 21

II.3.2. Content of De propositionibus The opening chapter of De propositionibus consists of six parts and covers some preliminaries. In the first part dialectic (logic) is defined in a way that echoes Aristotle's Topics I.I rn1b2-4: dialectic is the art of arts (ars artium), which has access to the principles of all inquiries (methodi). Dialectic should be distinguished from science (scientia). In every science training in logic has to come first, since every science needs to use syllogisms or other types of argument, the doctrine of which is taught by logic. Since logic is mostly exercised in a disputation, and a disputation cannot take place without speech (sermo) nor can speech occur without utterance (vox) or utterance without sound (sonus), sound is the starting point of Buridan's inquiry. Sound is divided into utterance and non-utterance, and utterance (vox) into significative and non-significative. Some significative utterances (voces significativae) are significative by nature, others by convention. Chapter 1 concludes with the division of conventionally significative utterances into complex (expressions or orationes) and incomplex ones (noun and verb). In his comments on this last distinction Buridan mentions Aristotle's division of 'expression' (oratio) into mental, vocal and written expressions. The distinction between mental and vocal language plays an important role in 21

The translations in this introduction come from: John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica. An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima, New Haven & London 2001, p. 4. Although Klima's translation was based on a preliminary version of this edition, the differences between that version and the final one are not so radical as to affect the usefulness of Klima's translation as a translation of De propositionibus as edited in this volume.

xx

Introduction the Summulae and in Buridan's semantics in general. Spoken words and propositions are meaningful only by convention, whereas mental words and propositions signify naturally. Mental propositions are the bearers of truth and falsity. Vocal propositions are propositions only in so far as they designate mental propositions, and vocal propositions are true or false only in so far as they designate true or false mental propositions. 22 Chapter 2 gives the traditional definitions of 'noun', 'verb' and 'expression' (oratio). Thus, a noun is a conventionally significative utterance, without time (vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore). Obviously, this definition does not apply to mental words: mental words are not voces and do not signify ad placitum. Peter of Spain does not intend to define mental nouns, but only spoken nouns, concludes Buridan. This is one of the first signs of Buridan's problems with Peter's text. In chapter 3 we arrive at the core of this treatise: propositions. Peter's definition (a proposition is an expression that signifies something true or false) gives rise to Buridan's repeated warning that this definition applies to spoken language only (r.3.1). A mental proposition does not signify something true or false, it is something true or false. Next (r.3.2), propositions are divided in categorical and hypothetical propositions. In this part Buridan presents his theory that the concepts involved in a mental proposition are its subject, its predicate and a so-called complexive concept. Subject and predicate are called the matter of a proposition, because they are presupposed when a proposition is formed by adding an affirmative or negative complexive concept, i.e. the copula. The following parts discuss the definitions of subject and predicate (r.3.3), and various classifications of propositions: assertoric (de inesse) and modal ( r .3 4), universal, particular, indefinite and singular (J.3.5) and, finally, affirmative and negative (J.3.6). Chapter 4 is about the opposition between pairs of categorical propositions that "share both terms", i.e. in which the same two terms occur. If the shared terms occur in the same order, the propositions are contraries, subcontraries, contradictories or subalterns. This results in a simple square of opposition presented in r.4.2 (page 6r). When categorical propositions are per se true, they are said to be in natural matter ( r.4.3). When they are 22

For the importance of this distinction see my introduction to De suppositionibus, esp. p. xxv and my paper 'Mental Language: A Key to the Understanding of Buridan's Semantics' (forthcoming, now accessible on http://www.phil.uu.nl/-lecq). XXl

Summulae, De propositionibus per accidens true, they are said to be in contingent matter; when they are impossibly true, they are said to be in remote matter. This is the way Buridan explains Peter of Spain's text, although he himself prefers to use the term 'matter' for the subject and predicate of a proposition, as explained in 1.3.2. The fourth and final part of chapter 4 (1.4-4) explains what it means for propositions to be contraries, subcontraries, contradictories or subalterns. Chapter 5 discusses the concept of formal equivalence (aequipollentia or aequivalentia) of propositions. The various relationships between categorical propositions with oblique terms and those between categorical propositions in which the predicate precedes the copula are clarified by means of two diagrams. 23 In addition four rules of equivalence are formulated. Propositions can be converted in three ways: simply, accidentally, and by contraposition. This thesis as found in Peter of Spain's manual is discussed in chapter 6. What is a conversion? According to Buridan a formal conversion is the formal consequence holding between two propositions that share both terms, but in reverse order (1.6.1). In a simple conversion ( 1 .6.2) the quality and the quantity of the propositions remain the same, as in 'some man is an animal; therefore, some animal is a man'. More complicated is accidental conversion (1.6.3), which involves changing the quantity of the proposition, as in 'every man is an animal; therefore, some animal is a man'. Various doubts arise, e.g. how should we convert 'some stone is in a wall' or 'a donkey is dead' or propositions about the future or the past? Buridan solves most of these problems by means of his theory of supposition. Conversion by contraposition (1.6-4) means changing the finite terms into infinite ones, as in 'some man is not a stone; therefore, some non-stone is not a non-man'. Buridan shows that conversions of this kind are not formal. Hypothetical propositions of various kinds are discussed in chapter 7. Buridan denies Peter of Spain's thesis that a hypothetical proposition contains two categorical propositions. It would mean that a true hypothetical proposition like 'if a donkey flies, then a donkey has feathers' would 23

Gyula Klima (in his translation pp. 44-45) presents a summary reconstruction of these figures in which he shows how these two diagrams are related to the modal diagram of chapter 8. For a detailed discussion of Buridan's modal diagram Klima (ibid. p. 43, n. 77) refers to G.E. Hughes, "The Modal Logic of John Buridan," in Atti de! Convegno internazionale di storia della logica: Le teorie delle modalita, ed. G. Corsi, C. Mangione, and M. Mugnani, Bologna 1989, pp. 93-ur.

xx ii

Introduction have its principal parts false, which is absurd. Buridan finally arrives at a definition which is 'safer' (tutior) than Peter's: a hypothetical proposition is a proposition that has several subjects, several predicates and several copulas, but none of these is predicated of the rest by means of one copula (1.7.1). Peter distinguishes six species of hypothetical propositions: conditional, conjunctive, disjunctive, causal, temporal, and local. Buridan points out that some texts do not provide the species 'temporal' and 'local', and with good reasons, as he argues (1.7.2). In Peter's view the truth of a conditional requires that the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent. Given his remarks in 1.7.1 Buridan cannot possibly agree with this opinion, although "for the sake of brevity, and because phrases signify conventionally", he goes along with Peter's manner of speaking (1.7.3). On the topic of causal propositions Buridan corrects Peter, saying that "it is not properly said that the antecedent is the cause of the consequent". One should rather say that "the thing signified by the antecedent is the cause of the thing signified by the consequent" (1.7.6). A similar critical attitude regarding Peter's text can be seen in 1.7.8 (De locali). There Buridan proposes to use a less complicated method to decide whether a hypothetical proposition (be it temporal or local or pertaining to some other Aristotelian category) is true or false. Chapter 8, on modal propositions, is the last chapter of the treatise. Apparently, the topic was very important for Buridan, for not only is it very large, he also wrote almost the entire chapter himself, saying that "the author of the Summulae discusses modal propositions very briefly and incompletely." Only the first line is Peter's: "A mode is a determination belonging to the thing" (1.8.1). Obviously, taken literally, this sentence expresses a realist position, which Buridan rejects. Buridan's ontology and semantics require that 'thing' (res) in this context is restricted to supposit for significative terms. 24 The first eight paragraphs (partes) of the chapter discuss propositions that are modal in the proper sense, i.e. propositions in which the mode ('possible', 'impossible', 'necessary', 'contingent', 'true' or 'false') affects the copula, as in 'every man is necessarily an animal'. These are distinguished from propositions in which the modal term is 24

As I argued in my introduction to Summulae, De suppositionibus (p. xxvi), Peter's realism might be one of the reasons for Buridan's growing irritation with Peter's text. xxm

Summulae, De propositionibus predicated of a dictum, as in 'it is possible that a man runs' (possibile est hominem currere ). The latter are called composite modals, but, according to Buridan, composite modals are in fact assertoric propositions. In proper modals the mode has to be placed between the subject and the predicate (1.8.3); the mode is a part of the copula. In the following parts Buridan discusses the quality (1.8-4) and quantity (I.8.5) of proper modals. Part 7 is about equivalency (equipollentia) of modal propositions, resulting in a magna figura of oppositions (see text: p. 100 ), and part 8 contains some rules regarding conversions of modal propositions, e.g. 'if the antecedent implies the consequent, then the contradictory of the consequent implies the contradictory of the antecedent'. The ninth part (I .8.9) discusses composite modals. Rules regarding their quality, quantity and conversion are the same as the rules for assertoric propositions. The remaining part of the book ( 1.8. IO) discusses propositions that are contingent both ways (de contingenti ad utrumlibet).

II.3.3. Prooemium "Just as the commander is the savior of the army, so is reasoning with erudition the commander of life."

This is Buridan's opening statement of the Preface (Prooemium) of the Summulae. The quotation comes from a "certain letter" of Aristotle to Alexander. The attribution appears to be false, 25 but this is not the place to discuss that question. It is Buridan's interpretation of this statement that concerns us here. The commander of an army, says Buridan, saves the army in two ways: first, by repelling the enemy, second, by leading it in the right direction. Logic is to be called reasoning with erudition (ratiocinatio cum eruditione), because it educates (erudit lit. 'polishes') us in all modes of reasoning and in every science, and it can be compared to the commander of an army, because it eliminates false arguments and it directs us to good arguments. Furthermore, Buridan points out that, according to Aristotle, there are two most eligible ways of life: the vita contemplativa and the vita civilis seu activa: the life of a scholar and a scientist and the life of an active citizen. Training in logic helps the scholar to obtain knowledge and discover the 25

John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, transl. Klima, p. 3, n. XXIV

I.

Introduction truth, and it helps the active citizen to decide what to strive after and what to avoid. In other words, logic is important not only for (future) scholars, but also for (future) politicians. It is the main constituent of a truly liberal education. Il.4. List of manuscripts hitherto known The editors are aware of the following manuscripts of Buridan's Summulae with the author's own commentary. Read the dates as follows: 15.0 = 15th c.; 14.2 = second half of the 14th c.; 15.1 =first half of the 15th c.; 14.2/r5.1 =either 14.2 or 15.r.

Erfurt, Amp!., 2° 302 Erfurt, Amp!., 2° 305 Krakow, B. Jag., 662 Krakow, B. Jag., 703 Krakow, B. Inst. Teo!. Ksiezy Misjon., 171 Mtinchen, CLM 7708 Oxford, Magdalen, 88 Praha, St. Kn., Osek 39 Torino, BN, D III 27 (462) U ppsala, BU, c 609 Vaticano, Pal. lat., 994 Vaticano, Vat. lat., 3020 Warszawa, BN, akc. 1819 Wertheim, Evangelische Kirchenbibl., 157 Wien, ONB, lat. 5365 Wien, ONB, lat. 5420 Wien, ONB, lat. 5466

Date

Summulae

Sophismata

Siglum

14.2/15.1 1378 14.2 14.2 1371

lr-155ra I'-97v lra-126rb 2ra-17ora 3ra-182vb

155'h-191vb 98r-va (fr.) 126va_156vb l7orb_181va 183ra-219ra

F G I J K

l4.o/I5.o 15.0 14.2 1372 1374 l4.21I5.1 1384 1375 1363 vel 1384

68'-95' (syll.) l'-139 1ra-16ora rra-9gra 3'-II2va 2'-r r9v l'-104ra I'-96v 2ra__ 135vb

mJSS!Ilg m1ssmg missing 98ra-117rb missing 120ra-137vb missing 97ra-I l5rb missing

H M 0 T

14-2 14-2 15.0

1ra-126ra I' 3 -I28ra lra-14ora

126va_ 148vb 128ra-I 62 rb 14orb_r68ra

u E D

w

v A B

c

II.5. Description of manuscripts used The Vatican library owns two copies of our tract. One is our best manuscript, Pal. lat. 994 (our E), the other is Vat. lat. 3020, which is among the copies of minor importance. The only other copy of the Summulae found in Italy is Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (our T), which is most useful for the constitution of the text. xxv

Summulae, De propositionibus The Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna possesses three copies, viz. lat. 5365, 5420 and 5466, of which only cod. 5420 (our B) is of interest, because of the others' frequent erroneous readings and various interpolations. The Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich has only one copy (of minor use), viz. CLM 7708. Another copy is found in the Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek at Wertheim (Baden-Wtirttemberg, Germany), cod. 157 (our V). The University Library of Uppsala has a fourteenth century copy (c 609), which does not rank among our valuable sources. So much for the libraries of Western Europe. In the Eastern European manuscript collections a remarkably great number of manuscripts contain Buridan's Summulae, viz. four in Poland, two in Erfurt, one in Prague. One of the Polish manuscripts belongs to the Biblioteka Narodowa (cod. 1819) in Warsaw. The three others are found in Krakow, two of them in the Biblioteka Jagiellonska (B.J. 662 and 703), one in the Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksiezy Misjonarzy, cod. 171 (olim 627, antea 827), which is among the manuscripts used for the present edition (our K). The two copies from the Amplonian collection in Erfurt are CA 2° 302 and 2° 305. Of these, CA 2° 305 has been used in the editions of the other parts of the Summulae (siglum G), but as it has proved rather unreliable it was decided not to collate it for the present fascicle. The Prague manuscript, cod. Osek 39 of the Statni Knihovna, is of limited use. The edition of De propositionibus has been based on manuscripts ETVKB. E = Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994, a paper and vellum codex (saec. 14.2/r5.1), measuring 3oox225 mm, ff. V + 160, contains our tract on ff. rra-13vb. It is written in one hand, which also wrote the other tracts of the Summulae. The (relatively few) corrections are all in the same handwriting. We owe the codicological information to Dr. K. Friis-Jensen. In a great many cases, E has what may be taken as the better reading, quite a few times shared by T or V, but also quite often by B or K. E is our most important manuscript. It is the only manuscript that has all four diagrams referred to in the text: one in 1.4.2, two in 1.5.1 and one in 1.8.7. T =Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462), anno 1372. We have no codicological description of this manuscript. It contains our tract on ff. XXVl

Introduction lra-l lra written in one hand, the same that also copied the remaining tracts and the greater part of the (relatively few) corrections made to our text. 26 Tis one of our better copies, although the beginning of the manuscript is in bad condition and therefore frequently difficult to read. T has no diagrams. V = Wertheim (Germany), Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek (or: Historische Bibliothek in der Stiftskirche) 157 (anno 1362 vel 1384) a paper manuscript of 139 folios measuring 28ox215 mm., contains a copy of our tract on ff. 2ra-16' 8 • We owe this codicological information to Dr. L. Valente. V is also a very good manuscript. Frequently it shares the 'better' reading with E. It contains the first and the fourth diagram. The two diagrams referred to in 1.s.1 are missing. K = Krakow, Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksiezy Misjonarzy 171 (olim 627, antea 827; sometimes referred to as the "Stradom Ms", after the street where the Institute is situated) is a paper manuscript of 220 folios (measuring 297 x 215 mm) written in two columns, (saec. 14.2/15. l ). It contains our tract on ff. 3ra_21vb in one handwriting. There are many corrections, partly in what seems to be a different hand from the manus principalis. A 15th-century Ex libris on the inside of the front cover reads: 'Iste liber est Canonicorum Regularium Monasterii Corporis Christi in Cazimiria'. This means that the manuscript was already in Krakow at that time, and probably stayed there, although its precise location is unknown, until K. Michalski acquired it for the library where it is now kept. We owe this information to Professor S. Ebbesen. Althc ,h it contains various erroneous readings, K may be adduced as a useful text witness, in addition to our principal sources E and T. It contains the first and the fourth diagram. The two diagrams referred to in I.5.1 are missing. B =Vienna, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vindobonensis palatinus latinus 5420, saec. 14.2 (ante 1395), chart., mm. 290 x 210. An ex-libris says: 'Emi bane summam uno floreno aureo ungarico anno Domini 26

For a number of extensive additions to the tract De praedicamentis see the critical edition by E.P. Bos, appendix,§ IV.I.

xx vii

Summulae, De propositionibus 1395'. 27 The

MS contains our tract on ff. lra-13rb, written by one hand. Although B belongs to our secondary sources, it is more than once of use for establishing the correct text. In many cases B shares the preferable reading with E. B has the first and the fourth figure of oppositions. The two figures referred to in I.5.1 are missing.

For the present edition a full transcription of the manuscripts E, T, V, K and B has been made and, as a rule, their readings are all mentioned in the critical apparatus. II. 6. Stemma codicum

The reader should keep in mind that the edition of the Summulae is a project of a team of scholars and that the volumes do not appear in the 'proper' order. In the first volume, the edition of De praedicamentis by E.P. Bos, a stemma codicum was presented by way of hypothesis. Based on more evidence, this stemma has been altered in the following fascicles: De praedicabilibus, De suppositionibus (same stemma as in De praedicabilibus), De demonstrationibus and De practica sophismatum. The unique position of E as a source for our text was argued for by De Rijk in his introduction to De praedicabilibus (section 11.5) and has not been challenged since, but the interrelationships between the manuscripts appear to be extremely complicated. In De praedicabilibus De Rijk argued for a stemma with two families of manuscripts: E on the one hand and TBKG on the other. In De demonstrationibus, however, he abandoned this idea, and constructed a stemma with two branches: T + V on the one hand and E +KGB on the other. 28 Fabienne Pironet, in her edition of De practica sophismatum, had reasons for grouping E and T against B and K (along with some other manuscripts).29

27

Private communication by prof. M. Markowski (Krakow).

2s See page lii of this edition. 29

See page xxxiii of her edition.

xx viii

Introduction

The following observations can be made regarding the present treatise (De propositionibus): [a] In manuscripts E and K chapter 1.7 is De modalibus and chapter 1.8 De hypotheticis. The other manuscripts (T, V and B) have it the other way round. In this edition the order of TVB has been preferred because it is the order in which the topics were treated by Peter of Spain in his Tractatus. It is, however, entirely possible that Buridan himself introduced the order found in EK. We know that he was dissatisfied with the contents of Peter's treatment of modal propositions to the extent that he replaced the old text with a radically different one; he may well have rectified also the order, so that the treatment of the two types of categorical proposition-de inesse and modalis-was not interrupted by a chapter on hypothetical propositions. [b] Paragraph 1.3-4 is missing in T and Band there are many more occasions where T and B share a reading against EVK, to mention the most important: 287-8, 2922-23, 351s-20, 4317, 4320-21, 9913. [c] E's readings are often shared by Band or K, relatively less often by V. [d] In 1.8.10 V has a passage that seems to be an interpolation (n5 1). It is shared by T but does not occur in E, K and B. In the same part, however, V and B share an interpolation that does not occur in E, T and K (n63). Although in the present edition the unique position of E can be confirmed,30 I conclude that there is no evidence in De propositionibus for either of the above mentioned stemmata nor for another one. The stemma codicum appears to be much more complicated than we have assumed up to now. II. 7. Editorial principles

The editor's aim is to present the text of E. This general preference for E to all our other manuscripts is easily supported by what has been remarked about the (relative) qualities of this unique manuscript of the Summulae. This preference also determines our selecting and evaluating the alternative readings occurring in the various manuscripts. 30

E is the only manuscript that has all the figures of oppositions. XXlX

Summulae, De propositionibus E's readings will be set aside only if they obviously do not make sense, or suffer from minor errors, such as apparent omissions or interpolations. In such cases the editor will first turn to T or V, since these manuscripts are remarkably free from errors and mistaken readings that are only due to the scribe's ignorance or negligence, which surely cannot be said of B and K. In cases in which both E and T or V are likely to give incorrect or less probable readings, the remaining manuscripts usually present good ones. Generally speaking, then, E's reading is accepted unless a) it raises unsurmountable problems regarding sense or consistency, or b) the other manuscripts unanimously conspire against E in a matter not entirely devoid of interest. The apparatus given in the present edition is intended to provide the reader with plausible alternatives to our text in matters of consequence, and to enable her to reconstruct the text, not only as it is read by our basic manuscript, but also as it occurs in the four other manuscripts used for the edition. Of course, insignificant variants, such as 'ergo'/'igitur', 'vel'/'aut' (when interchangeable), 'iste' /'ille', and so on, as well as insignificant changes in word-order will not be taken into consideration.

Jl.8. The critical apparatus The apparatus is positive: for every reading reported, the manuscripts that have it are listed. A simple entry has this form: 'x] TBK y E z V', i.e. manuscripts TBK read 'x', E reads 'y' and V reads 'z'. The first reading is always a lemma, i.e. identical with the reading adopted in the text. Negative apparatus is used only when all manuscripts except E have the reading adopted in the text. Each entry is complete in the sense that it informs about the readings of all five manuscripts at the place concerned. If some manuscript is not available for comparison, because it has a larger lacuna around the variant place, its 'reading' is registered as def. = deficit. If a manuscript has a text so deviant that it makes no sense to ask whether it has any of the readings attested in the remaining manuscripts, it is reported to read al. alia or aliter.

=

xxx

Introduction

The apparatus registers: I. All cases in which our text deviates from that of E. 2. All cases in which two or more manuscripts carry a different reading from the one adopted. 3. Miscellaneous readings which seem interesting as regards contents or history of the text.

Exceptions to ( r) and ( 2) occur: ra. When the rejected reading of Eis an obvious and insignificant slip like an omission to put a line over 'ro' to make it spell 'ratio'. Also, ante correcturam errors corrected by the scribe himself are not adopted. 2a. When the variation between the manuscripts concern matters generally considered of no consequence (such as choice between 'ergo' and 'igitur'; headings, which are not part of the text to be commented on by Buridan; 'glossa', 'sequitur' and 'textus' to announce the author's text and Buridan's commentaries; 'etcetera' when it is obviously meaningless and merely serves to fill up a line of the manuscript; or between equivalent word-orders) the text has been established according to the principles described in 11.7, above. Our apparatus of quotations identifies explicit quotations made by Buridan, and no more. For the abbreviations used in the apparatus critici, see the list of the sigla, below, p. 5. II.9. Orthography. Punctuation

In matters of orthography and punctuation we have not followed the manuscripts. The punctuation is our own, and is not based on the manuscripts, which, like all medieval manuscripts, are rather careless in this matter. The orthography is classicizing and differs very little from the one used e.g. by Lewis and Short's well-known Latin Dictionary. Some of the most salient discrepancies between medieval practice and ours are:

xxxi

Summulae, De propositionibus

We always write 'ae' when classical norm requires it; Buridan always wrote 'e' in such cases. This forces us to decide between adjectival and adverbial interpretation of such ambiguous medieval forms as 'maxime'. 2. The distribution of 'ci' and 'ti' in front of a vowel is regulated according to classical norm, meaning e.g. that we always write 'dictio' whereas medieval practice allows both 'dictio' and 'diccio'; similarly we always write 'condicio' when dealing with the noun derived from 'condico', whereas medieval practice allows both 'condicio' and 'conditio' in this case (as well in the case of the derivative of 'condo', which we would write 'conditio'). 3. Some Greek words appear in forms which were rarely or never used in the Middle Ages. Thus we write 'Aristoteles', 'dialectica', 'Coriscus', not 'Aristotiles', 'dialetica', 'Coruscus'. We invariably say 'Socrates' though the manuscripts tend to use the short forms 'Sortes' or 'Sor'. 1.

Manuscript abbreviations have been solved, except for those still in use, such as 'etc.' ('and so on'), either in the sense of 'et sic de aliis', or when it refers to the remaining words of a text or formula well known to the medieval reader or hearer.31 II.IO. Headings

Most manuscripts contain clues or marginal headings for indicating new chapters, but not for paragraphing. As a rule, the headings and numbers indicating chapters, parts of them, or so-called 'clausulae' are editorial additions, but, at times, they are based on indications found in (some of) our copies. Most of our manuscripts introduce Buridan's comments on the preceding lemma with the word 'glosa', either in the text, or in the margin. We have omitted such indications. The headings are not registered in the apparatus criticus.

31

This use of 'etc.' in the manuscripts should be well distinguished from its use to merely indicate the end of a major part of a tract, where, in fact, it serves as a (very!) full stop. This use is ignored, i.e. not printed in the text nor recorded in the apparatus.

xx xii

Introduction Il.11. Bibliography32 II.II.I. Primary literature II.II.I.I. John Buridan: texts and translations of works on logic Compendium totius logicae, cum Joannis Dorp expositione. Unverand. Nachdr. der Ausg.: Venedig 1499, Frankfurt/Main 1965. Tractatus de suppositionibus, edited by M.E. Reina, in Rivista critica di storia dellafilosofia 12 (1957), pp. 115-208 and 323-352. Sophisms on Meaning and Truth. Translation by T.K. Scott, New York 1966. Johannis Buridani Tractatus De consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien, Louvain/Paris 1976. Sophismata. Critical edition with an introduction by T.K. Scott, Stuttgart/ Bad Cannstatt 1977· John Buridan on self-reference. Chapter eight of Buridan 's Sophismata. An Edition and a Translation with an Introduction and a Philosophical Commentary by G.E. Hughes, Cambridge/London/New York 1982. Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, hrsg. von J. Schneider, Miinchen 1983. Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias. Edited with an introduction by Ria van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1983. Jean Buridan's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition, The Treatise on Consequences. A Translation from the Latin with a Philosophical Introduction by Peter King, Dordrecht 1985. 'Jan Buridan. Komentarz do Isagogi Porfiriusza' [Introduction in Polish and Edition of the Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii], by R. Tatarzynski, in Przeglad Tomistyczny 2, 1986, pp. II1-195. Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum. Edited by S. Szyller, in Przeglad Tomistyczny III, 1987, pp. 137-178. 'Pseudo-Johannes Duns Scotus iiber Induktion. Anhang: Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libris Analyticorum Priorum, quaestio xx', by E.P. Bos, in Historia philosophiae medii aevi. Studien zur Geschichte

32

This bibliography contains texts and translations of John Buridan's works on logic in order of appearance, and other primary and secondary literature as referred to in the introduction in alphabetical order. For an extensive bibliography on Buridan, see Johannes Buridanus, Summulae, De practica sophismatum, ed. by Fabienne Pironet, 2003, pp. xl-xlix and tlie updated bibliography mentioned in note 4.

xx xiii

Summulae, De propositionibus der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift for Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Hrsg. von B. Mojsisch, 0. Pluta. Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1991, Vol I, pp. 71-99, IOO-I03. Jean Buridan: Sophismes. Introduction, traduction et notes by J. Biard, Paris 1993. Summulae, In praedicamenta. Introduction, Critical Edition and Appendices by E.P. Bos, Nijmegen 1994. Questiones elencorum. Edited with an Introduction, Notes and Indices by R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis, Nijrnegen 1994. Summulae, De praedicabilibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indices by L.M. de Rijk, Nijrnegen 1995. Summulae, De suppositionibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes by Ria van der Lecq, Nijrnegen 1998. Summulae, De demonstrationibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes by L.M. de Rijk, Groningen 2001. Summulae de Dialectica. An annotated translation, with a philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima, New Haven & London 2001. Summulae, De practica sophismatum. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes by Fabienne Pironet, Turnhout 2003. II.11.1.2. Other primary literature Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros. Rec. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1953. Nicholas of Autrecourt, His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezza. A Critical Edition from the Two Parisian Manuscripts with an Introduction, English Translation, Explanatory Notes and Indexes, by L.M. de Rijk, Leiden/New York/London 1994. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972. II.11.2. Secondary literature Hughes, G.E., 'The Modal Logic of John Buridan,' in Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica: Le teorie delle modalita, ed. G. Corsi, C. Mangione, and M. Mugnani, Bologna 1989, pp. 93-IIr. xxxiv

Introduction Kaluza, Z., 'Les sciences et leurs languages. Note sur le statut de 29 decembre 1340 et le pretendu statut perdu contre Ockham' in L. Bianchi, Filosofia e Teologica nel Trecento. Textes et Etudes du moyen age 1, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 197-258. Kaluza, Z., 'Nicolas d'Autrecourt. Un amide la verite', in Histoire litteraire de la France. Tome xu1, fasc. 1, Paris 1995. Michael, B., Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des Spiiten Mittelalters, 2 Teile, Berlin 1985. Michalski, K., 'Les courants philosophiques a Oxford et a Paris pendant le XIVe siecle,' in Bulletin international de l'Academie des sciences de Cracovie, 1920. Pinborg, J. (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 1976. Pinborg, J., 'The Summulae, Tractatus 1, De introductionibus', in J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan. (. .. ),pp. 71-90. Reina, M.E., 11 problema del linguaggio in Buridano, in Rivista critica di Storia delta Filosofia (1959) 14, 367-417; (1960) 15, 141-165 and 238264. SchOnberger, R. und Kible, B. (hrsg.), Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters, Berlin 1994. Zupko, J., 'How it played in the RUE DE FOUARRE. The Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century' in Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997,pp.211-225.

xx xv

III.

TEXT AND APPARATUS

III.I. Index capitulorum et partium IOHANNIS BURIDANI SUMMULARUM PROOEMIUM ET TRACTATUS PRIMUS DE PROPOSITIONIBUS PROEMIUM ...................................................

7

DE PROPOSITIONIBUS 1.1. 1.1.1. 1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4. 1.1.5. 1.1.6.

De quibusdam praemittendis ................................ . Quid est dialectica ............................................. . Quare incipiendum est a sono ............................... . De sono ......................................................... . De divisione vocis in significativam et non significativam De divisione vocis significativae in significativam naturaliter et significativam ad placitum ............. . De divisione vocis significativae ad placitum in complexam et incomplexam ........................... .

1.2. 1.2.1. 1.2.2. 1.2.3.

De nomine, verbo et oratione ............................... . De nomine ...................................................... . De verbo ........................................................ . De oratione ..................................................... .

1.3. 1.3.1. 1.3.2.

De propositione ............................................... . De propositione ............................................... . De divisione propositionum in categoricas et hypotheticas .............................................. . De definitione subiecti et praedicati ....................... . De divisione propositionis categoricae penes eius substantiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De divisione propositionum categoricarum penes earum quantitatem ............................................... . De divisione propositionum categoricarum secundum earum qualitatem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.3. 1.3.4. 1.3.5. 1.3.6.

3

9 9

12 12 14

15 15 19 19 23 26

28 28 29 32 36 37

40

Summulae, De propositionibus 1.3.7.

De quodam versu ............................................. .

41

1.4. 1.4.1. 1.4.2.

42 42

1.4.3. 1.4.4.

De oppositionibus proposition um categoricarum ....... . De diYisionibus ................................................ . De propositionibus participantibus utroque termino secundum eundem ordinem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . De materia proposition um ................................... . De legibus ...................................................... .

1.5. 1.5.1. 1.5.2. 1.5.3. 1.5.4. 1.5.5.

De aequipollentiis ............................................. . De descriptione aequipollentiae ............................ . De prima regula ............................................... . De secunda regula ............................................. . De tertia regula ................................................ . De quarta regula .............................................. .

50 50 54 55 56 56

1.6. 1.6.1. 1.6.2. 1.6.3. 1.6.4. 1.6.5.

De conversionibus proposition um ......................... . De enumeratione triplicis conversionis .................... . De conversione simplici ...................................... . De conversione per accidens ................................ . De conversione per contrapositionem ..................... . De quibusdam notabilibus ................................... .

59 59 61

1.7. 1.7.1. 1.7.2. 1.7.3. 1.7.4. 1.7.5. 1.7.6. 1.7.7. 1.7.8.

De propositionibus hypotheticis ............................ . De descriptione propositionis hypotheticae .............. . De speciebus propositionis hypotheticae ................. . De condicionali ................................................ . De copulativa .................................................. . De disiunctiva .................................................. . De causali ....................................................... . De temporali ................................................... . De locali ........................................................ .

70 70

1.8. 1.8.1. 1.8.2. 1.8.3.

De propositionibus modalibus .............................. . Demodo ........................................................ . De modo qui reddit propositionem modalem ............ . De situ modi et verbi ......................................... .

82 82 83 85

4

43 46 48

62 67 68

73 74 76 76 77 79 80

Ill.I. Index capitulorum et partium 1.8.4. 1.8.5. 1.8.6. 1.8.7. l.8.8. 1.8.9. 1.8.9.1. 1.8.9.2. l.8.9.3. 1.8.9.4. 1.8.10.

De qualitate modalimn ....................................... . De quantitate modalium ..................................... . De quibusdam regulis ........................................ . De aequipollentiis modalium ................................ . De conversionibus modalium ............................... . De modalibus compositis .................................... . De descriptione modalis compositae ....................... . De aequivocatione subiectorum et praedicatorum proposition um modalium compositarum ............ . De qualitate et quantitate propositionum modalium compositarum ............................................ . De conversionibus propositionum modalium compositarum ........................................... .. De modalibus de contingenti ad utrumlibet .............. .

5

88 90

92 98 101 105 105 107 108

112 114

IIl.2. Sigla codicum E = Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994 B =Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 5420 T =Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462) K Krakow, Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksir;ty Misjonarzy 171 (olim 627, antea 827) V =Wertheim, Evangelische Kirchenbibliotheek (vel: Historische Bibliothek in der Stiftskirche) 157

IIl.3. Signa in apparatu critico adhibita add.= addidit (addiderunt) al. = aliter om. = omisit ( omiserunt) def. deficit ( deficiunt) Ee = manus quae correxit textum manuscripti E Em manus in margine quae correxit textum manuscripti E ? = illegibilis lectio

6

(PROOEMIUM) "Sicut dux est salvator exercitus, sic ratiocinatio cum eruditione est dux vitae." Hane propositionem scribit Aristoteles in quadam eius epistola ad Alexandrum quae sic incipit: "Aristoteles Alexandro bene agere". Dux exercitum salvat dupliciter, uno modo per inirnicorum repulsionern, alio s modo per ipsius ad optatum finem directionem. Propter quad septimo Politicorum 1 dicitur quad legislatores qui sunt duces et principes leges, ferunt ad bellum quantum ad primum et ad pacem quantum ad secundum. In hiis autem duobus logica, quae ratiocinatio cum eruditione vocanda est, ex eo quad in omni modo ratiocinandi circa omnem scientiam ad igno- ro torum notitiam erudit nos, duci assimilatur. Habet enim unam partem sophisticam quae est exstirpativa falsarum rationum, et aliam inquisitivam, puta dialecticam, et demonstrativam, quae est directiva verarum rationum. Falsitatis autem exstirpatio ad inquisitionem veritatis se habet sicut inimicorum repulsio ad procurationem pacis civium et tranquillitatis civitatis. 15 Propter quod logica duci rationabiliter comparatur. Dicit iterum Aristoteles septimo Politicorum2 quad honoratissimi ad virtutem, omnes et moderni et priores, duas asseruerunt vitas eligibilissimas, scilicet contemplativam et civilem seu activam. Constat autem, quod logica viam habet ad utramque; primo enim Topicorum3 dicit Aristoteles 20 problema dialecticum speculativum esse contendentem ad electionem vel fugam quantum ad activam vitam et ad veritatem vel scientiarn quantum Prooemium: E lra, V 2ra, T 1ra, K 3ra, B rra 3 hanc ... s bit] V om. EKE istam propositionem describit T 7 politicorum] EB politicae TK politicorum politicae V 9-ro vocanda est] KB vocandum est TV vocamus E 12 rationum] E argumentationum TVKB 16 comparatur] assimilatur et comparatur E r7 politicorum] TVB politicae EK 18-19 eligibilissimas] EVK elongissimas T egibilissimas B 19 autem] enim E 1 Politica vn. 13. 1334a3-6. z Politica v11.2. l324a29-33. 3 Topica 1.r.ro4b1-3.

7

Summulae, De propositionibus ad speculativam. Idcirco bene dictum est: sicut dux est salvator exercitus, sic ratiocinatio cum eruditione est dux vitae, scilicet humanae tam contemplativae, idest speculativae, quam activae. Propter quod de logica tota volens sine nimia exquisita perscrutatione disserere quaedam communia 5 elegi specialiter descendere ad illum logicae tractatum brevem quern venerandus doctor magister Petrus Hispanus dudum composuit exponendum et supplendum, immo etiam aliter aliquando quam ipse dixerit et scripserit dicendum et scribendum, prout mihi videbitur oportunum.

3 idest speculativae] om. E add.E

5 logicae] om. E

8

6 exponendum] et complendum

TRACTATUS I DE PROPOSITIONIBUS

I.I.

(Capitulum primum) (De quibusdam praemittendis)

I.I.I.

(Quid est dialectica)

( 1) Dialectica est ars artium, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. (2) Idea in acquisitione scientiarum dialectica debet esse prior. (3) Dicitur autem dialectica a 'dya' quad est 'duo' et 'logos' quad est 'sermo' vel 'lexis' quad est 'ratio', quasi duorum sermo vel ratio, scilicet opponentis et respondentis.

5

Istum librum dividemus in novem tractatus. Quorum primus est de propositionibus et earum partibus et passionibus; secundus erit de praedicabilibus; tertius de praedicamentis; quartus de suppositionibus; quintus de syllogismis; sextus de locis dialecticis; septimus de fallaciis; octavus apponetur de divisionibus, definitionibus, demonstrationibus, de quibus auctor noster in ro hoc libro suo non tractavit. Nonus erit de practica sophismatum. Sect in hac lectura istum ultimum tractatum ego exsequar cum lectura aliorum octo tractatuum.

1 artium] scientia scientiarum add. E 3 dicitur autem] EVK et dicitur TB 4-5 quasi ... ratio] BTV om. E in disputatione add. B 6 novem] decem E 8-9 syllogismis] consequentiis E 9 locis dialecticis] syllogismis E I fallaciis] locis dialecticis E II octavus] de fallaciis nonus add. E II nonus] decimus E 12 ego] VTB om. E ego non K II octo] novem E

9

Summulae, De propositionibus

5

IO

15

20

25

30

Tractatum primum ego dividam in octo capitula. Primum est de quibusdam praemittendis antequam directe agatur de propositionibus et earum partibus et passionibus; secundum est de partibus integralibus et de genere propositionum, scilicet de nomine et verbo et oratione; tertium de propositione et de divisione propositionum; quartum est de oppositionibus propositionum categoricarum; quintum est de earum aequipollentiis; sextum est de earum conversionibus; septimum est in speciali de propositionibus hypotheticis; octavum est in speciali de propositionibus modalibus. Primum capitulum potest dividi in sex partes. In prima praemittitur quid est dialectica et unde dicitur; in secunda ostenditur quad a sono sit incipienda consideratio; in tertia agitur de sono et eius divisione in vocem et non vocem; in quarta agitur de voce et eius divisione in significativam et non significativam; in quinta de vocis significativae divisione in significativam ad placitum et naturaliter; in sexta de divisione vocis significativae ad placitum in complexam et incomplexam. Secunda incipit ibi: "Sed quia disputatio," tertia ibi: "Sonus est," quarta ibi: "Yocum alia," quinta ibi: "Yocum significativarum," sexta ibi: "Yocum significativarum ad placitum." In prima parte sunt tres clausulae, scilicet descriptio dialeeticae, unum corrolarium et unde dicitur dialectica. ( 1) Circa primam clausulam est notandum quod aliqua littera ha bet quad dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum etc. Sed melius est solum dicere quad sitars artium, quia ista nomina 'ars' et 'scientia' quandoque capiuntur large quandoque stricte sive proprie. Si capiantur large, tune utimur eius permiscue tamquam nominibus synonymis. Idea sic suffieeret in hac descriptione ponere unum illorum nominum. Immo nee logica deberet dici scientia scientiarum, quia hoc notaret quandam excellentiam logicae super alias scientias. Quam non potest habere logica super metaphysicam; immo metaphysica verius quam logica debet dici scientia scientiarum ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Quando autem haec nomina

l dividam] E divido VTKB 8 hypotheticis] TVB modalibus EK I modalibus] TVB hypotheticis EK IO in secunda ostenditur] EB secunda ostendit Tin secunda ostendit Vin secunda K l l in tertia agitur] EVK tertio tangitur T tertio agitur B 14 in sexta] VK sexto ETB 15 et] TVK et in ET"B 16 incipit] om. E II ibi] om. E 23 et] TVB om. EK 24 large] TVK!arge et EB 26 ponere] om. E II deberet] EKB debet TV

IO

I.I.

De quibusdam praemittendis

'ars' et 'scientia' sumuntur stricte, tune sexto Ethicorum 1 distinguuntur contra invicem quinque habitus seu virtutes intellectuales, scilicet intellectus, sapientia, prudentia, scientia et ars. Ideo sic nullus idem habitus est simul ars et scientia; immo sic logica est ars et non scientia. (2) Secundo notandum est quod merito dialectica sive logica dicitur ars artium, secundum quandam excellentiam eius ad omnes alias artes, scilicet secundum utilitatem et communitatem in applicatione eius ad omnes alias artes et scientias. Propter quam communitatem ipsa sicut et metaphysica habet viam ad disputandum non solum circa conclusiones sed etiam circa principia omnium scientiarum, quamvis et ipsa et metaphysica modo potestatis differant, sicut dicitur quarto Metaphysicae 2 , quod illic3 plenius est declarandum. Quantum ad corrolarium quod in secunda clausula infertur, notandum est quod ante logicam grammatica positiva bene primo addiscenda est, qua magister cum discipulo possit conferre sive sit in lingua latina vel gallica, graeca vel hebraica aut quacumque alia. Sed nee grammatica regularis nee ars alia vel scientia ex notioribus nota faciens quae prius erant dubia vel ignota potest sine logica praevia sufficienter acquiri, cum indigeat uti syllogismis vel aliis argumentationibus, quorum logica tradit doctrinam. (3) Tertia clausula satis patet, nisi quod mihi videtur quod licet dialectica proprio nomine distinguatur contra partem logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, tamen largo nomine potest extendi ad totam logicam. Non enim solum est disputatio dialectica vel sophistica, sed etiam doctrinalis sive demonstrativa, ut patet primo Elenchorum.4 Et sic possumus dicere quad hie capitur 'dialectica' communiter pro 'logica'.

3 simul] EB om. TVK 5 sive] T et E idest VKB 6 omnes] om. E 15 possit] ET posset VB potest K 16 graeca] EKE sive teutonica T teutonica vel graeca V 19 syllogismis] syllogismo E 1 2

3

4

Ethicavl.3.1139b15-17. Metaphysica lv.2.roo4b18-28. Questiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Parisiis, 1518, Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964), liber rv, questio 4. De sophisicis elenchis r.2.164a38-b1r. II

5

ro

15

20

25

Summulae, De propositionibus

1.1.2.

(Quare incipiendum est a sono) Sed quia disputatio non potest haberi nisi mediante sermone, nee sermo nisi mediante voce, et omnis vox est sonus, ideo a sono tamquam a communiori inchoandum est. Haec secunda pars ostendit incipiendum esse a sono, nam quia ut plurimum 5 opus logicae exercetur per disputationem, quae quidem disputatio non po-

test esse sine sermone nee sermo sine voce, ideo aliquid expedit dicere de voce. Et quia omnis vox est sonus et non econverso ita quod hoc nomen 'son us' est communius hoc nomine 'vox', ideo incipiendum est aliquid dicere de sono, non quia sonus est dignior voce, sicut aliqui textus habent, sed ro propter dictam communitatem. Magis enim universalia sunt nobis notiora et a notioribus est incipiendum. Propter quod concluditur primo Physicorum5 quod ex universalibus oportet in singularia procedere, idest a magis universalibus ad minus universalia.

1.1.3.

(De sono) ( r) So nus est qualitas sensibilis auditu per se et proprie. (2) Sonorum alius vox, alius non vox. (3) Vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus naturalibus instrumentis formatus. (4) Sonus autem non vox est omnis ille sonus qui non est vox.

15

Haec tertia pars continet quattuor clausulas. ( r) Prima est descriptio soni. Quam sic pono: sonus est qualitas sensibilis auditu per se et proprie, sicut

2 et omnis] EV omnis autern TB def K 3 communiori] EB priori T digniori V def K 4 quia] EBV om. TK 9 aliqui textus habent] ETK aliquis textus habet VB 17 omnis ille sonus] E omnis sonus TB ille V omnis iste K 5

Physica 1.I.r84a24-25. 12

I.I.

De quibusdam praemittendis

etiam sapor est qualitas sensibilis gustu per se et proprie et odor olfactu et color visu, extendendo nomen 'coloris' ad lucem, et B tactu, si ponamus quod hoc nomen 'B' sit genus propinquum ad haec nomina 'caliditas', 'frigiditas', 'humiditas' et 'siccitas'. Sed tamen notandum est quod dubium est magnum an sensus percipit 5 colorem vel sonum distincte a subiecto colorato vel sonoro aut quod solum confuse cognoscit subiectum et accidens simul secundum illos conceptus a quibus sumuntur haec nomina 'coloratum', 'calidum', 'dulce' etc. Sed hoc est considerandum in libro De anima. Haec enim quae hie praemittuntur non sunt de logica sed de altiori philosophia, et secundum illa quae illic IO tenebuntur debent corrigi ea quae hie dicuntur. (2) Secunda clausula dividit sonum quia alius est vox, alius est non vox. Et est divisio generis in species vel propinqua huiusmodi divisioni. Non enim est modo discutiendum an hoc nomen 'vox' sit vera species huius nominis 'sonus'. Sed si ponatur tamquam species 'soni', tune quia speciei 15 oppositae non est nomen impositum, nos pro ea utimur hoc nomine infinito 'non vox' addito huic nomini 'sonus'. (3) Tertia clausula describit vocem secundum istum auctorem quod vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus etc. Quam descriptionem, quia non spectat proprie ad logicam, non intendo verificare hie aut falsificare. Sed 20 Aristoteles secundo De anima ponit aliam descriptionem vocis, scilicet quod vox est sonus aeris respirati percussi ad vocalem arteriam cum imaginatione significandi. 6 Sed haec omnia debent tractari secundo De anima. Notandum est etiam quod auctor ponit in duo bus versibus instrumenta quibus vox formatur dicens "instrumenta novem sunt: guttur, lingua, pala- 25 tum, quattuor et dentes et duo la bra simul" ,7 vel aliquis addidit hos versus in libro meo. Sed hos dimitto, quia formari posset vox sine dentibus et lingua, sed bene requiritur pulmo et arteria per quam fit a pulmone aeris respiratio et inspiratio et in gutture fistula huius arteriae. Sed haec alibi videantur.

3 B]ETBom. VdeK II propinquum]VKBpropriumET 5 est]EVKestbeneTB IO ilia] EV om. Tea VKB 20 aut] EK nee TV vel B 24 est etiam] E ulterius T etiam VB om. K 26-27 vel ... sed] VKB sed E vel aliquis addidit eos sed in libro meo T 28 respiratio] EVK exspiratio TB 6 7

De anima n.8A2ob28-29. Cf. Petrus Hispanus, Tractatus

1, 2

(ed. De Rijk, p. r).

13

Summulae, De propositionibus (4) In quarta autem clausula dicamus hanc esse veram 'omnis sonus qui non est vox est sonus non vox'. Sed non dicamus quod haec sit aliqua definitio.

I. 1-4.

(De divisione vocis in significativam et non significativam)

5

(1) Yocum alia significativa, alia non significativa. (2) Vox significativa est illa quae aliquid auditui repraesentat ut 'homo' hominem, vel gemitus infirmorum dolorem et latratus canum iram vel gaudium. (3) Vox non significativa est illa quae auditui nihil repraesentat, ut 'bu baf'.

Haec quarta pars habet tres clausulas. ( 1) Prima est divisio vocis in signifirn cativam et non significativam. Quod statim videtur esse contra Aristotelem secundo De anima, ubi determinat quod omnis vox sit sonus significativus dicens: "non enim omnis animalis sonus est vox, sed oportet animatum esse verberans et cum imaginatione aliqua; significativus quidem sonus est vox." 8 Et ad hoc breviter est dicendum quod cum non possit proferri vox 15 sine aliquo conceptu, vox omnis est significativa illius quod animal vociferans concipiat. Sed auctor per 'vocem significativam' intendit in proposito omnem vocem quae homini vel animali audienti notificat quam rem vel quas res et quomodo vociferans concipiat. (Dico quod notificat aut per naturam aut per 20 institutionem voluntariam). Voces autem 'non significativas' vocat quae, licet bene designent quod vociferantes aliquid concipiant, tamen audientibus non est per naturam aut per institutionem voluntariam determinatum quid vel quae concipiant.

6 et] E aut TB def VK 13 sonus] EVK enim T enim sonus B 14 vox] EVK uterque idem (?)add. T etc. add. B II possit] EB posset VT potest K 19 quomodo] ETBipsumadd. VK II quod] EK om. TVB 21 designent] EVE significent T designantur K s De anima rr.8.42ob29-34.

14

I.I.

De quibusdam praemittendis

(2) In secunda autem clausula et (3) in tertia describit membra divisionis suae, quod totum exponi debet secundum praedicta.

I. I.5.

(De divisione vocis significativae in significativam naturaliter et significativam ad placitum) ( r) Yocum significativarum alia est significativa naturaliter, alia ad placitum. (2) Naturaliter significat illa vox quae apud omnes idem repraesentat, ut gemitus infirmorum, latratus canum. (3) Yox significativa ad placitum est illa quae ad voluntatem primi instituentis aliquid repraesentat, ut 'homo' hominem. Haec est quinta pars de tribus clausulis. Quae quasi nulla indigent expositione, nisi quod vox significativa ad placitum aliquando est eiusdem significationis in uno toto idiomate magno, ut 'homo' vel 'asinus' apud omnes latinos. Aliquando autem pro aliquo pauco tempore imponitur ad aliquam significationem determinatam ex conventu et concordia disputantium, ut cum dicimus quod A sit homo, B animal, C lapis et huiusmodi, sicut saepe faciunt doctores et disputatores.

5

IO

I.I.6.

(De divisione vocis significativae ad placitum in complexam et incomplexam) Yocum significativarum ad placitum alia complexa, alia incomplexa; complexa ut oratio, incomplexa ut nomen vel verbum.

3 est significativa] EB significativa T significat V om. K 4 omnes] ETKB homines add. TBrn 5 infirmorum] EB dolorem add. VK ill. T II canum] EB iram vel gaudiam add. VK ill. T 7 repraesentat] ETB significat VK 8 est] EKE om. TV II de tribus clausulis] E in tribus clausulis distinguitur T continetur in quinque clausulis Vet habet tres clausulas Kin tribus clausulis B l l pauco] aut certo add. E 14 et disputatores] TV et sequentes E disputantes Ket disputantes B

15

15

Summulae, De propositionibus

5

ro

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Ad evidentiam dictorum et dicendorum quod voces significativae incomplexae sunt termini orationum, dicenda sunt aliqua de terminis significativis et orationibus modicum disgrediendo. Sciendum est ergo quod triplex potest distingui oratio et triplex terminus vel dictio, prout tangitur in principio libri Peri hermeneias, scilicet mentalis, vocalis et scripta. 9 Mentalis oratio vocatur simplicium conceptuum complexio componendo vel dividendo per secundam operationem intellectus. Cuius orationis termini sunt conceptus simplices quos intellectus componit vel dividit. Sicut etiam conceptus simplices designantur no bis per voces incomplexas quas vocamus 'dictiones', ita complexionem conceptuum designamus per complexionem dictionum. Propter quod oratio vocalis est vox complexa ex pluribus dictionibus significans nobis complexionem conceptuum in mente. Nee aliqua oratio vocalis debet dici oratio nisi inquantum designat complexionem in mente. Si enim haec tota vox 'homo currit' esset imposita ad significandum simpliciter lapidem, sicut haec vox 'lapis', tune 'homo currit' non esset oratio vocalis, sed simplex dictio, sicut 'lapis'. Et ideo non dicitur oratio vel propositio vocalis nisi quia designat orationem vel propositionem mentalem nee dicitur propositio vocalis vera vel falsa nisi quia designat orationem vel propositionem mentalem veram vel falsam, sicut nee urina dicitur sana vel aegra nisi quia designat animal esse sanum vel aegrum. Sic etiam omnis vox ex institutione significans appropriate conceptum simplicem dicitur incomplexa quia ad designandum conceptum simplicem subordinatur. Sed tamen bene notandum est quod, quia voces ad placitum nostrum instituuntur ad significandum conceptus nostros, ideo saepe contingit quod unam vocem totam simul imponimus ad significandum aliquam magnam orationem mentalem, ita quod licet illa vox significet illam mentalem orationem, tamen nulla pars illius vocalis seorsum significaret aliquem conceptuum simplicium illius mentalis orationis. Et tune talis vox apud graml dicendorum] dicendum est add. E 2 sunt] cum sint E 9 etiam] EK om. 12 significans] ETB significantibus VK 13-14 Nee ... T enim V autem B mente] EmVKB om. ET 14 designat] VKB significat Ee def ET 19 orationem vel propositionem] E om. TVKB 21 esse] TVB om. EK II vox] ETB vox quae re K vox est V II significans] E designat TK designans VB 28-29 conceptuum simplicium] EVE simplicem conceptum TK

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De interpretatione r.16a3-8.

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I.I.

De quibusdam praemittendis

maticum dicitur incomplexa et vocatur dictio, quia non dividitur in partes quarum quaelibet aliquid significaret seorsum. Sed non esset inconveniens quad apud logicum vocaretur oratio significativa, ut si hoc nomen 'Ilias' imponeretur ad significandum aequivalenter 'toti historiae Troianae'; et sicut hoc nomen 'vacuum' impositum est aequivalenter ad significandum huic 5 orationi 'locus non repletus corpore', et sicut nos possumus convenire in disputationibus quad per 'A: intelligamus idem quad per 'montem aureum' et per 'B' idem quad per 'equum risibilem' et per 'C' idem quad per 'homo currit' et sic de aliis. Tune ergo C esset propositio vocalis secundum attributivam locutionem quia designaret propositionem mentalem; tamen non w diceretur apud grammaticum oratio sed simplex dictio, quia non esset divisibilis in voces quarum quaelibet significaret seorsum aliquem conceptum. Notandum est etiam quad sicut se habent voces significativae ad placitum ad significandum conceptus mentales, sic se habent scripturae ad significandum voces. Unde voces non significant res extra animam nisi me- 15 diantibus conceptibus quibus subordinantur, nee etiam scripturae significant conceptus aut aliquas res extra animam nisi quia significant voces illos conceptus designantes. Propter quad tu videns litteras hebraeas nescis legere, quia ignoras quas voces significant. Et iterum scientes quas voces nostrae litterae designant ignorantes significationes vocum latinarum bene 20 legunt in psalterio, sed nihil ultra de significatione illarum litterarum apprehendunt, quia ignorant significationes vocum latinarum. Litterae enim scriptae huius dictionis 'homo' non significant hominem nisi ex eo quad significant vocem significantem hominem. Notandum etiam quad scriptura non dicitur oratio nisi quia significat 25 orationem vocalem, nee vocalis dicitur oratio nisi quia significat orationem mentalem. Sed oratio mentalis non amplius dicitur oratio quia significet 1 quia] ETB quae K quia tune talis vox apud grammaticum V 2 significaret] E significet TKB significat V I seorsum] illius orationis mentalis ad quam significandum imponitur add. E 4 aequivalenter] VKB aequaliter ET II et sicut] EB sicut TVK 5 aequivalenter] KB aequaliter ET om. V 7 disputationibus] EKE disputatione TV 8 per] om. E IO designaret] TVK designat E significaret B I tamen] EK sed TVB 13 est] TVB om. EK 14 mentales] ETB simplices idest mentales V om. K 22 significationes] TVK significationem EB 25 etiam] E ergo T etiam igitur Vest K est ergo B I quia] ETB ex eo quia V quae K 27 Em: Nata: terminus mentalis dicitur similitudo obiecti ex primis sensationibus consurgens apud intellectum.

Summulae, De propositionibus

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ultra in re aliam orationem, sed quia est complexio plurium conceptuum in anima quos non oportet significare diversas res. Eadem enim res simplicissima, ut Deus, potest concipi valde multis et diversis conceptibus, quos anima potest in seipsa componere vel dividere et ex eis formare orationem mentalem. Similiter scriptura non vocatur dictio vel terminus nisi quia significat dictionem vocalem. Dictio autem vocalis apud logicum dicitur proprie dictio si significative subordinetur conceptui simplici. Vocatur tamen apud grammaticum dictio, licet non subordinetur conceptui simplici sed uni orationi, si ipsa fuerit imposita secundum se totam simul ad significandum illam mentalem orationem, ita quad nulla eius pars seorsum significet aliquam partem illius orationis mentalis, sicut si haec vox 'Ilias' ponatur significare tantum quantum significat tota scriptura 'Historiae Troianae'. Tamen dicitur una dictio, quia nulla pars eius seorsum, scilicet nee 'i' nee 'ly' nee 'as', significat aliquid de illa historia. Sed statim tu quaeres: "si in rebus significatis vel re significata non sit aliqua complexio, quid ergo significat oratio mentalis qua scilicet intellectus dicit Deum esse Deum vel Deum non esse Deum?" Respondeo quad nihil ad extra plus vel aliud significat una dictarum orationum quam alia. Neutra enim significat aliud quam Deum ad extra; sed alio modo significat affirmativa et alio modo negativa, et illi modi sunt in anima illi conceptus complexivi quos secunda operatio intellectus addit supra simplices conceptus, qui designantur per illas copulas vocales 'est' et 'non est'. Et secundum hoc patet expositio huius sextae partis. Vax enim significativa ad placitum debet dici incomplexa et una dictio, si sit secundum se totam indivise simul subordinata ad significandum conceptum simplicem. Dicitur etiam incomplexa et una dictio apud grammaticum, licet designet orationem longam mentalem, si indivise tota simul sit imposita ad significandum orationem illam, ut haec vox 'Ilias'. Vax autem complexa quae dicitur oratio est composita ex pluribus dictionibus constructionem simul habentibus.

2 anima] ETmente VKB 8 significative] EBV om. TK II simplici] et non orationi add. E 8-9 Vocatur. .. orationi] ETB om. VK 20 aliud quam] EV nisi TKB 21 illi] VB illius TK et illi E 24 hoc] EKB haec dicta TV 27 etiam] VKB enimET

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I.2.

(Capitulum secundum) (De nomine, verbo et oratione)

I.2. I.

(De nomine)

(1) Nomen est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore cuius nulla pars separata est significativa, finita et recta. (2) 'Vox' ponitur in definitione nominis pro genere. 'Significativa' ponitur ad differentiam vocis non significativae. 'Ad placitum' ponitur ad differentiam vocis naturaliter significantis. 'Sine tempore' ponitur ad differentiam verbi, quod significat cum tempore. 'Cuius nulla pars separata etc.' ponitur ad differentiam orationis, cuius partes significant separate. 'Finita' ponitur ad differentiam nominis infiniti, ut 'non homo', quod non est nomen secundum dialecticum, sed nomen infinitum. 'Reeta' ponitur ad differentiam nominum obliquorum, ut 'Catonis, -ni', quae non sunt nomina secundum dialecticum sed casus nominum; unde solus nominativus sive rectus dicitur esse nomen.

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ro

Hoc secundum capitulum est de partibus integralibus et de genere propositionis, scilicet de nomine, verbo et oratione. Quod continet tres partes 15 principales: primam de nomine, secundam de verbo et tertiam de oratione. Secunda incipit ibi: "Verbum est vox"; tertia ibi: "Oratio est vox". Prima pars habet duas clausulas, scilicet definitionem 'nominis' et definitionis expositionem.

l sine tempore] ETcv om. TKB 3 pro genere] EVT tamquam genus K om. B. 5 vocis] £CTVK om. EB 7 partes J EVE partes aliquid TK 13 diciturJ ponitur E I7 incipit] EVK om. TB

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Summulae, De propositionibus (1) Et prima clausula satis manifesta est per secundam. Notandum est tamen quod hie definitur nomen vocale, non scriptum nee mentale. Nomen enim mentale non est vox, sed conceptus in anima, nee significat ad placitum, sed naturaliter. Et ita etiam consequenter determinabitur de 5 verbo et oratione et propositionibus vocalibus. (2) Sed quantum ad secundam clausulam notandum est quod forte non omnia quae hie dicuntur sunt vera de proprietate sermonis, sed indigent expositione sicut indigebat definitio vocis. Si enim 'vox' ponitur in hac definitione per modum generis, tamen non est vere genus nominis. Immo IO istae dictiones 'nomen' et 'verbum' se habent ad istam dictionem 'vox' sicut passiones ad subiectum; supponunt enim pro eisdem pro quibus supponit haec dictio 'vox' et addunt super significationem huius dictionis 'vox' extraneam significationem seu connotationem, scilicet quod sunt impositae voluntarie ad significandum certas res, ad quam significationem illae voces 15 non sunt determinatae ex ratione generali 'vocis' nee ex rationibus specialibus specierum 'vocis', puta 'vocis gravis' et 'vocis acutae'. Et hoc non obstat quin vox debeat poni in definitione nominis, quia passio bene definitur per suum subiectum. Debemus ergo dicere quod ibi non intendit definire nomen mentale vel scriptum, sed solum nomen vocale. Ideo