Summulae de suppositionibus (Artistarium) 9070419408, 9789070419400

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JOHANNES BURIDANUS SUMMULAE DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS

ARTISTARIUM A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar & Semantics EDITORS L.M. de RIJK

Leiden & E.P. BOS Leiden

H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS Nijmegen &

C.H. KNEEPKENS Groningen Secretary of the Series P.J.J.M. BAKKER Nijmegen

JOHANNES BURIDANUS SUMMULAE editor-in-chief STEN EBBESEN

University of Copenhagen

ARTISTARIUM 10-4

JOHANNES BURIDANUS

SUMMULAE DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS

introduction, critical edition and indexes

by RIA VAN DER LECQ

Nijmegen Ingenium Publishers 1998

To my son Derek

ISBN 90 70419 40 8 Copyright 1998 by Ingenium Publishers, P.O. Box 1342, 6501 BH Nijmegen, The Netherlands. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher. PRINTED by KRIPS REPRO MEPPEL, THE NETHERLANDS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Acknowledgements .............................................. .

vii

II.

Introduction ...................................................... .

ix

II. l.

The editorial project .............................................. .

Xl

11.2. II.3. II.3. l.

John Buridan and his Summulae ................................. .

xi

Treatise IV, De suppositionibus .................................. . Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvu xvii

II.3.2.

Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xviii

II.3.3.

John Buridan and Peter of Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxv

II.4.

List of manuscripts hitherto known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv11

II.5.

Description of the manuscripts used .............................. xxvm

II.6.

Stemma codicum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II.7.

Editorial principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxii

xxx

II.8.

The critical apparatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xxxm xxx1v

II.9.

Orthography. Punctuation . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. .. . .

II. l 0.

Headings .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. . xxxv

II. I I.

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxv

II.11.1

Primary literature .. .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . . . xxxv

Il.11.1.1. John Buridan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxxv II.11.1.2. Other primary literature ........................................... xxxvi II.11.2

Secondary literature ............................................... xxxvii

III.

Text and apparatus ....................................... .

III. I.

Index capitulorum et partium ............................. .

3

III.2.

Sigla codicum; signa in apparatu critico adhibita .............. .

5

III.3.

Textus et apparatus .............................................. .

7

IV.

Indexes ........................................................... .

95

IV.I.

Index of Quotations ........................................... .

97

IV.2.

Index of Names and Terms ..................................... .

99

I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors of Buridan 's Summulae have taken great advantage of the preliminary transcription of one of the manuscripts our colleague Professor Hubert Hubien (Liege) has put at the disposal of the Buridan Society, for which we owe him sincere thanks. The Buridan Society would also like to express its gratitude to Professor M. Markowski (Cracow), Dr. Friis-Jensen (Copenhagen) and Dr. L. Valente (Heidelberg) for their help with the description and identification of part of the manuscripts. The initiator and president of the Buridan Society, Professor Sten Ebbesen (Copenhagen) most kindly read through the present fascicle, offering as usual both valuable comments and general agreement. To Professor Gyula Klima (Notre Dame, Indiana), who is preparing a complete English translation of the Summulae, I am grateful for some useful suggestions. The present volume has been edited in TEX with EDMAC-macros. I am grateful to Freek Wiedijk for initiating me into this program and especially to Johannes Rustenburg (Typographica Academica Traiectina) for his invaluable comments and for the great care and accuracy expended on the completion of this edition. Utrecht, November, 1998 Ria van der Lecq

II. INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

II. I. The editorial project

The present fascicle is number four of the first complete edition ofBuridan 's Summulae, which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new edition of his Sophismata. The plan is being realized by an international team composed of scholars from Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. A first and overly optimistic version of the project was discussed in 1975 at the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, which was devoted to the logic of John Buridan. In 1986 The Buridan Society was formed with the explicit purpose of producing an edition of the Summulae, and guidelines for the work were laid down. The following scholars initially joined the Society: E.P. Bos, H.A.G. Braakhuis, S. Ebbesen, H. Hubien, R. van der Lecq, F. Pironet, L.M de Rijk, J.M.M.H. Thijssen. To make the task manageable, it was decided to aim only at an edition based on a handful of manuscripts carefully selected on the advice of H. Hubien, who had made pilot studies of the tradition. Also, considering that all participants in the project were scholars with many other obligations and hence likely to be distracted from the work on Buridan at unpredictable times, it was decided to publish each fascicle of the work as soon as it was finished without regard to regular intervals or an orderly progression from fascicle I to fascicle 9 . 1

II.2. John Buridan and his Summulae

John Buridan - Johannes Buridanus - was one of the most influential philosophers of the Late Middle Ages. He was probably born in the 1290s, but at any rate not later than 1304/5. While there is hardly any evidence to support the common assumption that he was born in Bethune (diocese of Arras), 2 there may be a clue in our best manuscript (Vatican Library, Pal. lat. 994) of the tract De fallaciis, in which Buridan 's comments on one of the lemmas are introduced by the phrase 'sequitur 1

De introductionibus will be edited by R. van der Lecg, De syllogismis by J. Spruyt, De locis by H.A.G. Braakhuis, De fallaciis by J. Rustenburg and De demonstrationibus by L.M. de Rijk. 2 B. Michael, Johann'"s Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des spiiten Mittela/ters, 2 Teile, Berlin 1985, p. 82, n. 6.

xi

Summulae, De suppositionibus

glosa jo. Audr.' (only the first three letters of "Audr" are perfectly clear), in which the topographical indication may be taken to stand for' Johannes Audomarensis', i.e. 'by John of Sint-Omaars' (in Buridan 's life-time, a Flemish town; nowadays, SaintOmer, France). Sint-Omaars is situated in the region that in Buridan's life-time was part of the duchy of Flanders. He was active as a master of arts at the University of Paris from about the 1320s till his death, 1361 being the terminus ante quern, if not the very year of his death, because at that date John's benefice in Saint-Pol-sur-Ternoise went to somebody else. 3 His philosophical production is closely connected to his work as a university teacher and consists primarily of commentaries on Aristotle, some of which have been edited in recent years, 4 as has also his treatise oil consequences. 5 And then there is his Summulae or Summa Logica(e), undeservedly neglected by historians oflogic because it has never been printed. 6 To be sure, there are printed books from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries purporting to contain the work, but in fact they do not. The genuine text consists of: B. Michael, op. cit. I, pp. 401-2. On logic: M.E. Reina, 'Giovanni Buridano: 1/-actatus de suppositionibus ', inRivista critica di storia de/la filosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208 and 323-352. S. Ebbesen, 'The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De fallaciis' (excerpts), in The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, ed. J. Pinborg, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 139-160. N.J. GreenPedersen, 'The Summulae of John Buridan, Tractatus VI, De locis' (excerpts), in ibidem, pp. 121138. J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus' (excerpts), in ibidem, pp. 71-90. Johannes Buridanus, Sophismata. Critical edition with an introduction by T.K. Scott, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1977. R. van der Lecq, 'Buridan on modal propositions' (appendix: Questiones longe in Perihermeneias, liber II, questio 7), in English Logic and Semantics: from the End of the 12th Century to the Time ofOckham and Burley, Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis, C.H. Kneepkens, L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1981, pp. 441-2. Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, hrsg. von J. Schneider, Miinchen 1983. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones /onge super librum Perihermeneias, edited with an introduction by R. van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1984 (Ph. D. thesis University of Utrecht 1983). 'Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii', ed. R. Tatarzynski, inPrzeglr;id tomistyczny 2 (1986), pp. 121-195. 'Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum', ed. S. Szyller, in Przeglr;id tomistyczny, 3 (1987), pp. 135178. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones Elencorum, ed. by R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis, Nijmegen 1994 (Artistarium 9). For editions of Buridan's other works, see: Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters, Hrsgb. von R. Schonberger und B. Kible, Berlin 1994, nrs 14378-14429. In 1996 has appeared: B. Patar, Joannis Buridani Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Caelo, edition, etude critique et doctrinale, Louvain/Paris 1996. 5 Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien, Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976. 6 The following critical editions have been published: Johannes Buridanus, Summu/ae. Jn Praedicamenta. Introduction, Critical Edition and Appendices by E.P. Bos, Nijmegen 1994. Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De Praedicabilibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indexes by L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1995.

4

xii

Introduction

(a) the lemmata of the Summulae proper, i.e. a brief presentation of standard lore, as found in an adapted and interpolated version of Peter of Spain's Summulae or Tractatus, 1 where the material is presented in such a way as to be easily memorized. Peter's work was originally composed about 1230. As Pinborg8 has pointed out, the way Buridan speaks about his choice of Peter's work permits the conclusion that "using Peter of Spain's manual was not the obvious thing to do", and Pinborg may well have been right in his conjecture that Buridan was the first to introduce Peter's manual as a textbook at university level in Paris, where it had earlier been used only at less exalted levels of education. (b) Buridan's own, very extensive comments on the standard material, which he often criticizes or re-interprets in ways its authors could scarcely have imagined. In the Renaissance edition John Dorp's comments have taken the place of John Buridan 's and thus the reader has no means of seeing how original Buridan was. The Summulae consists of eight treatises, as follows: I. On Introductory Items, also called On Propositions 9 II. On Predicables III. On Categories IV. On Suppositions v. On Syllogisms VI. On Topics VII. On Fallacies VIII. On Definitions, Divisions, and Demonstrations. Buridan himself at one time regarded his Sophismata as treatise IX, but there is no genuine formal connection between treatise IX and the rest, which are quite differently organized. 10 Buridan's basic idea was to 'read', i.e. comment on, Peter of Spain's handy introduction to logic, the Tractatus or Summulae. He took over a text that had already been considerably altered in the course of transmission and he himself subjected it to further changes, and major ones at that. Peter's work contains twelve treatises. 7

See Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis), Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972, §6 of the introduction. 8 J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', p. 72. 9 'Introductioncs' covers a broader field than just propositions, though the latter are predominant. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, pp. lxxxix-xci. IO Joel Biard has made a French translation based upon the critical edition to be published soon by Miss Fabienne Pironet: Buridan, Sophismes. Introduction, traduction et notes par J. Biard, Paris 1993.

xiii

Summulae, De suppositionibus

Buridan fused 8-12 (on relatives, ampliation, appellation, restriction, and distribution) with the treatise on supposition, That left seven treatises, but then he added an eighth to deal with demonstration, and also division and definition, subjects that Peter had neglected, as had other authors of 13th-century handbooks oflogic. The basic text underlying Buridan's eighth treatise is not easily identified. It is not found in any interpolated text of Peter's Summulae and it is uncertain if it is by Buridan's own hand. The first major survey of logic to include a chapter on demonstration was William of Ockham 's Summa logicae, which may be only about ten years older than Buridan 's, but it is unknown to what degree, if any, Buridan, or his exemplar, was inspired by Ockham. In any event, by adding treatise VIII Buridan produced a book covering all the main subjects of Aristotle's Organon as well as the usual medieval additions to logic, such as the doctrine of the properties of terms. As Buridan commented on Peter of Spain, he seems to have grown increasingly irritated with the text at his elbow. In the present treatise he has simply dispensed with it, using instead an alternative text to comment on (see §IL3, below). Buridan's Summulae is a highly structured work. At first glance it presents itself as alternating pieces (partes) of basic text and commentary, but those partes are but the smallest independent units in a strictly hierarchical division of the basic text carried out and presented according to the conventions of literal commentaries (expositiones). A preface to the whole work announces which treatises the basic text will contain. The commentary on the first pars of each treatise informs the reader about which chapters the treatise under discussion contains; the commentary on the first pars of each chapter announces the partes of that chapter, and, finally, the commentary usually divides each single pars into particulae or clausulae. Buridan numbers his treatises (tractatus), chapters (capitula), parts (partes), and this numbering can be used for purposes of reference. We indicate this by means of such headings as '4.1.4' = 'Treatise 4, chapter 1, part 4', and recommend its use for references (it is a much more durable system than, e.g., referring to our page numbers). Whereas there can be no doubt that the Summulae were composed for didactic purpose at the Arts Faculty in Paris, their date of composition is harder to ascertain. None of our sources simply dates the work in absolute terms. A relative chronology in Buridan's total production is difficult to establish, not only because many works remain as yet unedited, but also because it is known that he 'read' the same authoritative texts several times during his long career, and each 'reading', i.e. teaching course, is likely to have produced its own written version of the lectures. Hence cross-references are of dubious value for establishing the relative chronology. It is

xiv

Introduction

perfectly possible for some version of work A to refer to work B while some version of work B refers to work A. Buridan 'read' the Summulae several times and it seems that none of our manuscripts reflects the first 'reading', since so far as we know at present all manuscripts contain the following editorial remark at I. I. I: "Istum librum dividemus in novem tractatus, quorum primus erit de propositionibus [... ], nonus erit de practica sophismatum, sed in hac lectura istum ultimum tractatum ego non exsequar cum lectura aliorum octo tractatuum." A terminus a quo for either the first or the last version of the work is not really available as we do not know when Buridan started to teach, but anything earlier than the I 320s seems utterly unrealistic. As for a terminus ante quern, the situation is rather complicated. In his introduction to the edition of the tract on the Categories E.P. Bos has given some arguments for I335 as a terminus ante quem. 11 H. Hubien has made a strong case for dating Buridan's De consequentiis to I335. 12 Now if this date holds, and if certain ideas of the Summulae are on their way to the stage of development evidenced by De consequentiis,13 we have 1335 as a terminus ante quern. On the basis of a reference in Treatise VIII of the Summulae (8.5.2 of the planned edition), L.M. de Rijk argues for a date around I336. 14 There Buridan dearly refers to the epistemological position held by Nicholas of Autreeourt cum suis concerning the unique role of the principle of non-contradiction, and especially Autrecourt's thesis that from the existence of A one cannot infer that of B with proper evidence. He ascribes this position ('error quorundam ') to sheer ignorance of logic. 'Et ex istis dictis manifestus est error quorundam nunc legentium qui dicunt nullam posse esse evidentem probationem secundum quam concludimus per aliquid esse aliud esse, ut si per motum esse volumus probare motorem esse vel per domum esse parietem esse. Dicunt enim non posse esse evidentem probationem esse nisi sit reducibilis ad primum principium complexum. ( ... ) Isti ergo supponunt falsum, puta quod illud sol um principium sit evidens et quod omne aliud principium possit et indigeat probari per illud. Et haec sunt absurda et dicta ex ignorantia logicae' . 15 Convincing as these arguments may seem, the conclusion cannot hold for the Summulae as a whole. Anyhow, the version of De suppositionibus which we have 11

See Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. In Praedicamenta, ed. Bos, p. xvi. See Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. Hubien, p. 9. 13 See J. Pinborg, 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', p. 73. 14 See Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De Praedicabilibus, p. xYi. 15 For the date (c. 1336) of this Parisian controversy at the Sorbonne, see Zenon Kaluza, 'Nicolas d' Autrecourt. Un amide la verite', in Histoire litteraire de la France (t. XLII, fasc. 1), Paris 1995, and L.M. de Rijk, Nicholas of Autrecourt. His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo ( ... ),Leiden 1994, pp. 5 and 121.

12

xv

Surnrnulae, De suppositionibus

at our disposal, is clearly of a later date. In 4.5.3 Buridan explicitly proposes a revision of an opinion he had advocated in the Sophismata on the topic of verbs signifying cognitive acts. He explicitly refers to the sixth sophism of chapter four (De appellationibus) of the Sophismata. 16 The reference itself is not conclusive, but the revised opinion is. De suppositionibus contains various references to the Sophismata, some of which concern parts of the work that are unknown to us: for all we know they may never have been written. So the conclusion may be justified that Buridan had finished the part of the Sophismata that is known to us before he made the final version of De suppositionibus, and that he had the intention to finish the Sophismata sooner or later. In the fifth sophism of chapter one Buridan criticises the theory of the complexe significabile. Michael has argued that this theory was not known in Paris before 1342, which would make it a terminus post quern for the Sophismata. 17 But even if Michael's arguments were not to hold, 18 there is strong evidence for a date not much earlier than 1340, the year of the Statute against the Ockhamists. Since Michalski various scholars have confirmed that there are some doctrinal and verbal parallels between the text of the Statute and certain passages in De suppositionibus. 19 Notably in 4.3.2 Buridan defends the position advocated in the Statute, namely that propositions should be taken as they are meant by the author, although he adds the important qualification that in the proper sense (secundum propriam locutionem) such a proposition may be false (see below p. xxi). As a logician Buridan defends a position that is more sophisticated than the one advocated in the Statute. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that he had no serious problem with the content of the Statute. With our present state of knowledge it is impossible p. 861 9- 23 : Verum est tamen, prout mihi videtur, quod illud corrigendum est quod ego dixi quantum ad sextum sophisma, scilicet quod ego vidi Petrum et Robertum, vel etiam quod videbo vel possum videre omne astrum, nam istae propositiones forte non sunt concedendae, propter appellationem rationis, eo quod 'videre' significat actum animae cognoscitivae. 17 See B. Michael, op. cit., pp. 272-3 and 527. 18 Michael argues that Buridan's criticism concerns Gregory of Rimini's version of the theory of the complexe significabile rather than Adam Wodeham 's. Recently Jack Zupko has defended the same view with different arguments. See: B. Michael, op. cit., p. 272 and J. Zupko, 'How it played in the RUE DE FOUARRE. The Reception of Adam Wodeham 's Theory of the COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century' in Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997, pp. 211-225. 19 K. Michalski, 'Les courants philosophiques a Oxford et a Paris pendant le XI Ve siecle.' Bulletin international de / 'Acadernie des sciences de Cracovie, 1920. Cf. M.E. Reina, fl Problerna de! Linguaggio in Buridano, Vicenza 1959, esp. pp. 93-107 (also in: Rivista Critica di Storia deUa Filosofia 15 (1960), pp. 251-264) and Z. Kaluza, 'Les sciences et leurs languages. Note sur le statut de 29 decembre 1340 et le pretendu statut perdu contre Ockham' in L. Bianchi, Filosofia e Teologia nel Trecento. Textes et Eludes du moyen age I, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, esp. pp. 235-9. See also the discussion in the introduction to Johannes Buridanus, Questiones elencorurn, esp. pp. 16 4.5.3,

XIX-XXX.

xvi

Introduction

to decide whether Buridan has written the Statute himself copying his text of De suppositionibus, or that he has used the text of the Statute writing the passage in De suppositionibus, but, anyhow, it is likely that De suppositionibus as it has been handed down to us should be dated not much earlier or later than 1340. With the great uncertainty surrounding Buridan's production, we must confess that we are still unable to date any version of the Summulae as a whole with anything like precision. They must all fall within the approximate limits of 1325 and 1360, and it is likely that the first version, of a part of the work at least, was completed in the 1320s or early 1330s. It is also probable that later editions were partly identical with the first one. But at the same time it should not be ruled out that such changes as were introduced with each subsequent version may have been of high theoretical importance. A fair number of preserved manuscripts (eighteen known to us so far) testify to the popularity of the Summulae during the late 14th and well into the 15th century, especially at the Central European studia (Erfurt, Prague, Vienna, Cracow), cf. §II. 4, below. Later, Buridan's work could only exercise its influence indirectly through John Dorp 's commentary on it; it was never printed itself. The extent, however, of its direct and indirect influence still awaits exploration.

JI.3. Treatise IV, De suppositionibus 11.3.I. Structure The present edition contains the fourth treatise De suppositionibus. As can easily be gathered from the index capitulorum (below, p. 3), it consists of six chapters, which deal with various aspects of supposition. 20 Each chapter consists of several parts containing a lemma followed by an exposition and commentary. Unlike the lemmata of tracts I, II and III, the lemmata of De suppositionibus are not taken from Peter of Spain's Tractatus. Buridan discusses the topics of Peter's chapters VI (De suppositionibus), VIII (De relativis), IX (De ampliationibus), X (De appellationibus), XI (De restrictionibus) and XII (De distributionibus), but he has used an alternative text. He does not even refer to Peter of Spain. 21 An indication that Buridan may have written the basic text himself is found in the lemmata of 4.3.7.5 and 4.3.8.4, which contain a reference to another

°For an excellent introduction to Buridan's theory of language see: M.E. Reina, fl problema de!

2

linguaggio in Buridano. Cf. also Th.K. Scott's introduction to John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, New York, 1966, esp. pp. 22-49 and J. Biard, Logique et theorie du signe auX!Ve siecle, Paris 1989, pp. 162-202. 21 A negative reference may be found in 4.3.2 (p. 38).

xvii

Summulae, De suppositionibus

work of his, the Sophismata. Moreover, the commentary never indicates that Buridan disagrees with the lemma-text. More than once, e.g. in 4.1.2 and 4.1.4, he expresses some doubts concerning the text, but he subsequently solves them. Finally, in De suppositionibus Buridan does not refer to any auctor, as he frequently did in the previous treatises. One may wonder why Buridan felt he could not go on commenting upon Peter's text the way he had done in the first three tracts. The following summary of the content of De suppositionibus will give us ample information to answer this question.

II.3.2. Content The first chapter distinguishes supposition from signification (4.1.2), verification (4.1.3) and appellation (4.1.4). De difference between signification and supposition is that every part of a proposition can signify, whereas supposition is a property of subject- and predicate-terms only. Verification and supposition differ in that only propositions are true or false whereas only terms have supposition. The mention of truth gives Buridan the opportunity to introduce another important distinction, i.e. the distinction between vocal and mental language. 'True' and 'false', he contends (p. 11), are primarily predicates of mental propositions. If a vocal proposition is true, this is only because it signifies or represents a true mental proposition. The word 'true' said of a vocal proposition is used attributively (attributive), i.e. in an analogical way. 22 Since some terms appear to have supposition and no appellation, such as 'animal' or 'plan ta', some terms have appellation and no supposition, such as 'chimaera' or 'vacuum', and some terms have supposition as well as appellation, e.g. 'album' or 'pater', it is clear that there is a difference between appellation and supposition. Buridan does not use the term 'appellation' as it had been defined by Peter of Spain. In the line of the thirteenth ~entury tradition Peter defines appellation as the acceptance of a common term for an existent thing. 23 Buridan, on the other hand, uses the term as an equivalent of' connotation': the essential feature of an appellative term is that it signifies something for which it does not supposit, e.g. an accident inhering

22

For Buridan's conception of the truth and falsity of propositions see: G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, Leiden 1973,pp.243-250. 23 Tractatus X, ed. De Rijk, p. 197: Appellatio est acceptio termini communis pro re existente.

xviii

Introduction

in the suppositum. Thus, the term 'album' refers to (supponit pro )24 a white object and, additionally, it connotes (appellat) this object's whiteness (albedo). 25 To supposit a conventionally signifying sound (vox significativa ad placitum) has to fulfill certain conditions. The second chapter (4.2) deals with these conditions. Buridan distinguishes various kinds of voces significativae ad placitum, with the apparent intention to eliminate sounds that cannot function as a subject or predicate and, consequently, cannot supposit. In short: ( 1) the vox in question has to be a term, not a proposition, and (2) it has to be a categorematic term. Nouns in an oblique case are excluded. A combination of words, the so called oratio imperfecta, may have supposition, if the combination does not imply a contradiction, as is the case in 'homo hinnibilis '. In the third and central chapter of the work Buridan discusses various kinds of supposition, but he begins by making a preliminary distinction between proper and improper supposition (4.3.1). A term has improper supposition when it is used in a metaphorical sense (transsumptive), as is often the case in poetry and in the Bible; it is not Buridan 's intention to speak about this kind of supposition here, or so he says (p. 38). Supposition is first divided into material and personal supposition (4.3 .2). This, of course, implies that every kind of supposition is personal if it is not material. A term has personal supposition whenever it refers to its ultimate significate or significates. Material supposition is a property of a spoken word (vox) whenever it refers to itself as a sound or to its immediate significate, i.e. the corresponding concept in the mind. In order to understand what Buridan means to say one should take into account his view on the relation between language, thought and reality. Spoken words primarily signify concepts; in other words, concepts are the immediate significates of spoken words. The things conceived by those concepts are the ultimate significates of the corresponding spoken words (p. 39). Spoken words, therefore, signify things, but only by means of concepts (mediantibus conceptibus). Spoken words, concepts (also called 'mental terms'), things and their relations constitute Buridan's semantical triangle. Vocal terms (spoken words) as well as mental terms (concepts), may supposit if they fulfill the conditions mentioned in the second chapter, but from the definitions given above it is clear that only vocal terms can have material supposition. Mental terms always have personal supposition, because they always refer to their ultimate 24

In this context I use 'refer to' as an equivalent of 'supposit for'; it is meant as a translation of the Latin expression 'supponere pro'. 25 See also: L.M. de Rijk, 'On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation', in J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan, ( ... ),pp. 91-100 and A. Maieru, 'Significatio et connotatio chez Buridan', in J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan, (... ),pp. 101-114.

xix

Summulae, De suppositionibus

significates, although sometimes these ultimate significates are concepts as well. E.g. the subject term of the mental proposition 'homo est species' refers to a concept; this concept is its ultimate significate; the term, therefore, has personal supposition. The same term of the corresponding vocal proposition has material supposition (p. 40). Other philosophers, notably Peter of Spain and Ock:ham, would speak of 'simple supposition' in this case, for various reasons. According to Peter of Spain a term has simple supposition when it refers to a universal thing (res universalis), in our case man in general; 26 in Ockham's view a term has simple supposition when it refers to a concept. Buridan does not care about this distinction (p. 39), probably because as a logician he is primarily interested in mental language, where neither material nor simple supposition occurs. 27 The distinction between material and personal supposition gives rise to a relatively long discussion about the question whether vocal propositions such as 'homo est species', in which the subject term can be taken either materially or personally, are either false "by force of speech" (de virtute sermonis) or true by force of speech, or that they should be distinguished (p. 41 ). 28 The first alternative has been defended, he says, by people who argue that the principal supposition is personal supposition and that, therefore, 'homo est species' is false by force of speech. The defenders of this opinion appear to identify the virtus sermon is with the meaning of a proposition the terms of which have personal supposition. The defenders of the second alternative, on the other hand, argue that the virtus of a word depends upon the way it is used, thus identifying virtus sermonis with supposition-as-it-is-intended-by-theauthor. Buridan opts for a third view: like the adherents of the second opinion he contends that the proposition should be taken as it is meant by the auctor, i.e. with the subject term having material supposition, but in the proper sense (secundum propriam locutionem) the subject term has personal supposition (and the proposition is false) because words have an original signification by imposition and are primarily meant to refer to their significates. Personal supposition, therefore, is prior to mate26 Tractatus VI, ed. De Rijk, p. 81. 27 According to Scott (op. cit., p. 32, n. 57), "( ... ) Buridan rejects simple supposition as a vestige of abandoned realism, and replaces it with an extended use of material supposition. His reason is that the concept is nothing but asign, from the point of view of logic, and nothing is gained by a distinction between linguistic and mental signs. Besides an ironic use of Ockham 's Razor, this must be seen as part of a general program against what Buridan regards as undue reification of the concept by Ockham (.. .)." 28 Already in 1959 M.E. Reina (fl problema del linguaggio in Buridano, pp. 93-107) gave a most convincing analysis of this passage and of the relation between Buridan's opinion and the statute of 1340. For the significance of Buridan's answer to this much debated question for the relative date of his works, see the introduction to John Buridan 's Questiones elencorum, ed. Van der Lecq and Braakhuis, pp. xix-xxx.

xx

Introduction

rial supposition. 29 In general, any proposition should be taken in the sense given to it by the author; this might ad placitum be termed the virtus sermonis. Nonetheless, if this is not the proper sense, it should be added that the proposition is false when taken in the proper sense (de proprietate sermonis). 30 Personal supposition is divided into common and discrete personal supposition ('man' and 'this man' or 'Socrates' respectively), as well as into absolute and relative supposition (4.3.3). The supposition of relative terms will be the subject of chapter four. Common supposition, in its tum, is divided into natural and accidental supposition (4.3.4). A term with natural supposition refers to (supponit pro) everything in the present, past or future to which the term can refer on the basis of its signification, whereas accidental supposition is a property of a term, whose reference to present, past or future significates is determined by a verb or a nominal predicate. At first glance the definition of natural supposition is similar to Peter of Spain's; on closer inspection, however, Peter seems to consider natural supposition a property of a term as such, i.e. isolated from a propositional context. 31 Against the opponents of natural supposition Buridan argues that we use it very often, especially in the context of demonstrative science. Scientific proposi tions are supposed to hold not only in the present but in the past and in the future as well. Buridan admits that in the proper sense (de proprietate sermonis) propositions of this kind may be false. In the proposition 'every thunder is a sound in the clouds', for example, the copula taken in the proper sense signifies the present tense.Nonetheless, when the proposition is taken as an abbreviation of: 'every thunder, whenever it was, is or will be, was, is or will be a sound in the clouds', it is true. Although this is using words in an improper sense, it does not imply that the proposition should be denied. Nor is there any obstacle to thinking that we can have a complexive concept that is not limited to one of the three tenses. Buridan shows that it is possible to have mental propositions with untensed copulas; we just have no word that properly expresses such a tense-indifferent concept in spoken language; for lack of better we then use 'is' which properly speaking should indicate the present only (p. 47). Furthermore, just as the concepts of the single species of animal are not given in the concept of their genus, so we can have a general concept of time without this giving us the three 29

Cf. also the passage in Buridan's commentary on Porphyry cited by Reina, op. cit. pp. 100-1. On this point M.E. Reina (op. cit., p. 105) notices a difference between Buridan's opinion expressed in this passage and the statute of 1340, especially the second article of the decree. 3 l op. cit. p. 81: Suppositio naturalis est acceptio termini communis pro omnibus a qui bus aptus natus est participari, ut 'homo' per se sumptus de natura sua supponit pro omnibus hominibus qui fuerunt et qui sunt et qui erunt. Cf. L.M. de Rijk, 'The Development of Suppositio Natura/is in Mediaeval Logic. II: Fourteenth Century Natural Supposition as Atemporal (Omnitemporal) Supposition,' Vivarium 11 (1973), pp. 43-79.

30

xxi

Surnrnulae, De suppositionibus

tenses. So, if the verb of a categorical proposition must be tensed, there is nothing to prevent it from consignifying such a general tense but none of the three tenses in particular. In 4.3.5 personal common supposition is divided into confused and determinate supposition. A term has determinate supposition if for the truth of the proposition in which it occurs it is necessary and sufficient that the term refers to one definite person or object, as 'homo' in 'homo est a/bus'. If the truth of the proposition depends upon the term's referring to more than one suppositum, this term has confused supposition, e.g. 'homo' in 'omnis homo est animal'. In making the distinction between determinate and confused personal supposition Buridan follows the traditional view, also represented by Peter of Spain, but he differs from Peter not only in his definitions, 32 but also in the way he links up supposition with truth. In Buridan's text the truth of a proposition depends upon the supposition of the terms, in this case the subject term, whereas Peter emphasizes the independence of supposition and truth. In 'homo currit' and 'aliquis homo currit ', Peter argues, 'homo ' refers to any man running or not running, but one running man is enough to make the propositions true. 33 In Buridan's view, I take it, in the said proposition 'homo' does not refer to all men running as well as not running for the very reason that a term's supposition depends upon the propositional context in which it occurs. Finally (4.3.6) confused supposition is divided into distributive and nondistributive or merely confused supposition (suppositio confusa tantum ). Distributive confused supposition is a property of a common term owing to which an inference can be made from this term to each suppositum individually, or to all of them by way of a copulative proposition, e.g. 'omnis homo currit; ergo Socrates currit et Plato currit etc.' A term has merely confused supposition when neither such an inference nor an inference to a disjunctive proposition can be made, as is the case with the term 'animal' in 'omnis homo est animal', although an inference to a disjunctive predicate may sometimes be allowed. Thus, an inference from 'omnis homo est animal' to 'omnis homo est hoc animal vel omnis homo est illud animal etc.' is not allowed, but an inference to 'omnis homo est hoc animal vel illud animal etc.' is permitted.

32

Cf. Tractatus, p. 82: Determinata suppositio dicitur quam habet terminus communis indefinite sumptus vel cum signo particulari, ut 'homo currit' vel 'aliquis homo currit'. ( ... ) Confusa suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro pluribus mediante signo universali. 33 ibid.: Et dicitur utraque istarum determinata, quia licet in utraque illarum iste terminus 'homo' supponat pro omni homine tam currente quam non currente, tamen uno solo homine currente vere sunt. Aliud enim est supponere et aliud est reddere locutionem veram pro aliquo.

xx ii

Introduction

A distinction between two kinds of confused supposition can also be found in Peter of Spain's Tractatus, 34 be it in different terms: Peter speaks of supponere confuse mobiliter et distributive on the one hand and supponere confuse immobiliter on the other, though he clearly has some difficulties accepting this distinction. In propositions like 'omnis homo est animal', he argues, in which a genus is predicated, there can be no confusion at all, neither mobile nor immobile: the same common generic essence (essentia generis communis) can be predicated ofmany. 35 The paragraph about confused supposition concludes Peter's chapter on supposition. John Buridan, however, in whose semantics confused supposition plays an important role, pays ample attention to the various causes of distributive (4.3.7) and non-distributive (4.3.8) confused supposition: e.g. universal affirmative signs, negations, comparative terms and verbs like 'scio' and 'cognosco '. 36 Using famous examples such as 'cognosco triangulum 'and 'debeo tibi equum 'and referring to his Sophismata37 he argues that terms falling within the scope of these and similar verbs have merely (i.e. non-distributive) confused supposition (4.3.8.4). 38 In other words, the verbs in question cause the terms that fall within their scope to lose their purely referential function. This mode of merely confused supposition differs from the other modes in various respects owing to the fact that the accusative term following the intentional verb connotes an aspect (appellat rationem) under which the object is known, wanted, promised etc. Somehow, Buridan concludes, such a term seems to have material supposition, because it connotes (appellat) the corresponding concept, though it does not supposit for it. Chapter four is concerned with supposition of relative terms, such as 'illud ', 'se', 'tale' etc. As a rule (4.4.3) a relative term refers to the same thing or things to which the corresponding antecedent refers. Buridan discusses various kinds of relative terms and their properties.3 9 Chapters five and six deal with two items closely connected to supposition: connotation (appellatio) in chapter five, and ampliation and restriction in chapter six. As has been argued above, Buridan's definition of appellation is quite different 34

Cf. Tractatus, p. 83.

35 ibid. p. 87. 36 Some of the distributive signs mentioned by Buridan are discussed by Peter of Spain in Tractatus

XII, De distributionibus, not related, though, to supposition. In Sophismata IV, soph. 9-14 Buridan discusses the same problem more elaborately. 38 Buridan's view on intentionality has been discussed by various scholars. See G. Nuchelmans, ' "Appellatio rationis" in Buridan's Sophismata I\', 9-15', in 0. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-194-:'), Amsterdam 1988, 67-84. This paper contains a bibliography on the subject. 39 Some elements of his treatment can be found in Peter of Spain's eighth chapter of the Tractatus, but in general the structure is quite different.

37

xxiii

Summulae, De suppositionibus

from Peter of Spain's. In Buridan 's view 'appellation' is equivalent to 'connotation'. An appellative term, he contends, connotes something for which it does not supposit, e.g. the term 'album' connotes the whiteness (albedo) of the object to which the term 'album' refers (4.5.1). In 4.5.2 Buridan introduces a distinction between the form and the matter of a term. The matter of a term is that to which the term may refer (supponere); the form of a term is its connotation. Thus the term 'dives' refers to a man, its matter, and it connotes its form, i.e. the man's money and his possessions, in short, his divitiae. This is what Buridan means when he says that an appellative term connotes (appellat) its form. The way in which this happens varies according to the tense of the verb and the position of the appellative term in the sentence (before or after the verb). The relation between appellation and supposition becomes apparent in 4.5.3, when Buridan discusses a special case of appellation: appellatio rationis, i.e. a property of terms following verbs that signify an act of the soul, such as 'cognoscere ', 'intelligere ', 'significare ', 'promittere' etc. The subject was discussed earlier in the context of merely confused supposition (4.3.8.4) and Buridan repeats the arguments he gave on that occasion. At one stage, however, he sees a problem he has not mentioned before. It concerns the verb 'videre '. Videre (to see), obviously, signifies an act of the soul. But that implies, in Buridan's view, that 'seeing a man' means seeing a man under a universal concept, which is impossible, because the senses see things only as singulars. In order to solve the problem Buridan takes refuge to his familiar strategy: the expression 'I see a man' is properly speaking false. It should be taken as 'I see this man' or 'there is a man I see' (hominem video). We are accustomed to using the improper expression, he concludes, because from the sensory know ledge of a singular the corresponding intellectual universal know ledge arises (consurgit) immediately. 4 For the solution of other problems Buridan refers to Sophismata chapter four (De appellationibus) and, finally, he seizes the opportunity to correct something he had said concerning the sixth sophism of this work.

°

The last chapter (4.6) concerns ampliation and restriction. Peter of Spain discusses these subjects in his chapters IX and XI, but, again, Buridan has a completely different text at his elbow. Worth noting is the introduction of the term 'status ' meaning the situation in which a term refers to all its significates in the present; we 40 p.

8640-5: ... ex notitia visiva singulari consurgit statim notitia intellectualis universalis. Cf. Johannis Buridani Questiones super octo Physicorum libros, secundum ultimam /ecturam, Parisiis 1509, I, q. 7. Cited in: Ria van der Lecq, Confused Individuals and Moving Trees. John Buridan on the Knowledge of Particulars, in E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan: A Master ofArts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy, Nijmegen 1993, pp. 1-21, p. 9.

xxiv

Introduction

might consider it the term's standard-reference. Buridan speaks of ampliation when the supposition of a term is widened in comparison with its status (4.6.2), and of restriction when the supposition is restricted in comparison with its status (4.6.3). Ampliation is always tied to a verb and the position of the term in question with respect to the verb, whereas restriction is always caused by a noun: a substantive may be restricted by an adjective or vice versa. If the propositional context causes a term to refer to past or future objects only, Buridan speaks of 'alienation' of the status (4.6.4). Finally some examples are given of terms that are made to supposit for things they do not signify (4.6.5) and of terms that have no supposition at all (4.6.6).

II.3 .3. John Buridan and Peter of Spain

As has been stated above (§11.2), Buridan seems to have grown increasingly irritated with Peter of Spain's standard text. A comparison between the content of De suppositionibus and the 'corresponding' chapters of the Tractatus on some important issues makes it rather clear what motivated Buridan to use another manual or even to write one himself. (1) In Buridan's philosophy the distinction between the vocal and the mental level of language plays an important role, whereas in the Tractatus this distinction does not occur. In Buridan's opinion a spoken word's ultimate significate is the thing in reality, but its immediate significate is a concept, in the speaker's as well as in the hearer's mind. Spoken words signify things indirectly, by means of concepts (mediantibus conceptibus). Signification is, following the Aristotelian definition, primarily a relation between spoken word and concept. Nevertheless, Buridan speaks of things as ultimate significates. It is worth noticing that, speaking of supposition, Buridan does not use this terminology: there is no mention of immediate and ultimate supposita. If truth is primarily a property of mental propositions (4.1.3) and truth depends upon the supposition of the terms, then supposition, notably personal supposition, must be primarily a property of mental terms. This does not mean that ' Buridan disregards spoken language. On the contrary, it is always his starting-point. But time and again he argues that mental language is prior to spoken language, probably because from a logical and epistemological point of view the relation between thought and reality is more important than the relation between spoken language and reality.

xxv

Summulae, De suppositionibus

In Peter's view a term's only significate is the thing in reality, signification being a property of spoken language. 41 Supposition is the acceptance ofa (substantive) term for something. As soon as a sound has some signification, it may have supposition. 42 (2) Peter is a realist, assuming the existence of universal natures in reality. This is apparent in his definition of simple supposition: a term has simple supposition when it refers to a universal thing. 43 Buridan, on the contrary, criticises those aliqui who posit a simple supposition besides material and personal supposition (4.3.2). It is clear that he does not need this notion, because as a nominalist he does not believe that there are universal natures outside the mind. Peter's example of a term with simple supposition is 'homo' in 'homo est species', in which 'homo' refers to man in general. In Buridan's view the term has material supposition, because it refers to its immediate significate, i.e. the concept 'man'. Peter, on the other hand, does not need the concept, because in his view a species, in so far as it is signified, is not a concept, but a thing in reality. (3) In Buridan's view a term does not have supposition if it does not appear in a propositional context. In Peter's account this point is unclear. The first distinction Peter makes is the distinction between common and discrete supposition. 44 His examples, 'homo ' and 'Sortes' or 'iste homo ' respectively, do not occur in a propositional context. Next, common supposition is divided into natural and accidental supposition. 45 If the term 'homo' has natural supposition, it refers to all men in present, past and future, he argues. It does so as such (per se sumptus) and in virtue of its own nature (de natura sua). A term has accidental supposition when its reference is determined by the context. 46 Peter's examples: in 'homo est' 'homo' refers to present men, in 'homo fuit' to men in the past, in 'homo erit' to future men. The third distinction is the division of accidental supposition into simple and personal supposition. 47 From this moment onward the terms in question appear in a propositional context. 48 Peter does not seem to consider the presence of a propositional context necessary for a term to have discrete or natural supposition. Tractatus VL De suppositionibus, ed. De Rijk, p. 79 11 - 12 : Significatio termini, prout hie sumitur, est rei per vocem secundum placitum representatio. 42 ibid., p. 80 14 - 15 : ... supponere vero est termini iam quasi compositi ex voce et significatione. 4 3 ibid., p. 81 11 - 12 : Simplex suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro re universali significata per ipsum. 44 ibid., p. 80 19 . 45 ibid., p. 81 1. 46 ibid., p. 81 5 -6 : Accidentalis autem suppositio est acceptio termini communis pro eis pro quibus exigit adiunctum. 47 ibid., p. 81 11 . 48 Personal supposition is further divided into determinate and confused personal supposition. 41

xxvi

Introduction

Buridan's division differs from Peter's in that supposition is first divided into material and personal supposition, thereby stressing the role of personal supposition as the supposition of mental terms. The division of personal supposition into common and discrete personal supposition follows next. The contextual approach is clear from the beginning. These are the main points of difference between Peter's approach and Buridan 's. Buridan must have had unsurmountable difficulties with Peter's underlying philosophical principles, especially regarding the relation between language, thought and reality. It is, therefore, not difficult to understand that Buridan preferred to write a new manual himself instead of commenting upon a text with which he so profoundly disagreed.

11.4. List of manuscripts hitherto known

The editors are aware of the following manuscripts ofBuridan's Summulae with the author's own commentary. Read the dates as follows: 15.0 = 15th c.; 14.2 =second half of the 14th c.; 15.1 =first halfofthe 15th c.; 14.2/15.1=either14.2 or 15.1.

Date

Summulae

Sophismata

Erfurt, Amp!., 2° 302

14.2/15.l

I'-155ra

155rb_l9lvb

F

Erfurt, Amp!., 2° 305

1378

l'-97v

98'-98' 3 (fr.)

G

Krakow, B. Jag., 662

14.2

lra-126rb

126v3 -l56vb

Krakow, B. Jag., 703

11orb_ 18 JV"

Siglum

14.2

2ra-17ora

Krakow, B.I.T.K.M., 171

1371

3ra-182vb

183ra-219ra

K

Miinchen, B.S., CLM 7708

14.0/15.0

68'-95' (syll.)

missing

H

Oxford, Magdalen, 88

15.0

I'-139

missing

M

Praha, St. Kn., Osek 39

14.2

lra-160ra

missing

0

Torino, BN, D III 27 (462)

1372

1ra_93ra

98ra-117ra

T

Uppsala, BU, C 609

1374

3'-l 12va

missing

u

Vaticano, Pal. lat., 994

14.2/15.l

2'-l 19v

l 20ra-13 7vb

E

Vaticano, Vat. lat., 3020

1384

l'-104ra

missing

D

Warszawa, BN, akc. 1819

1375

l'-96v

97ra-11srb

w

Wertheim, E.K., 157

1363 vel 1384

2ra-135vb

missing

v

Wien, ONB, lat. 5365

14.2

1ra-126ra

l 26v

l 48vb

A

Wien, ONB, lat. 5420

14.2

lra-128'"

128'"-162'b

B

Wien, ONB, lat. 5466

15.0

l'"-140ra

l 40'b- l 68ra

c

xxvii

3-

J

Summulae, De suppositionibus

The Buridan society intends to publish detailed descriptions of the manuscripts on a later occasion. For the manuscripts used in this fascicle, see the next paragraph.

11.5. Description of manuscripts used The Vatican library owns two copies of our tract. One is our best manuscript, Pal. lat. 994 (our E), the other is Vat. lat. 3020, which is among the copies of minor importance. The only other copy of the Summulae found in Italy is Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (our T), which is most useful for the constitution of the text. The 6sterreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna possesses three copies, viz. lat. 5365, 5420 and 5466, of which only cod. 5420 (our B) is of interest, because of the others' frequent erroneous readings and various interpolations. The Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich has only one copy (of minor use), viz. CLM 7708. Another copy is found in the Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek at Wertheim (Baden-Wiirttemberg, Germany), cod. 157 (our V). The University Library ofUppsala has a fourteenth century copy (C 609), which does not rank among our valuable sources. So much for the libraries of Western Europe. In the Eastern European manuscript collections a remarkably great number of manuscripts contain Buridan's Summulae, viz. four in Poland, two in Erfurt, one in Prague. One of the Polish manuscripts belongs to the Biblioteka Narodowa (cod. 1819) in Warsaw. The three others are found in Cracow, two of them in the Biblioteka Jagiellonska (B.J 662 and 703), one in the Biblioteka Instytutu Teologicznego Ksi~iy Misjonarzy, cod. 171 (olim 627, antea 827), which is among the manuscripts used for the present edition (our K). The two copies from the Wissenschaflliche Allgemeinbibliothek in Erfurt are Amplon. 2° 302 and 2° 305 (our G). The Prague manuscript is cod. Osek 39 of the Statni Knihovna. It is of minor use. The edition of this fascicle is based on manuscriptsEBGTK. Some test collations of V have been made. E

Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994, a paper and vellum codex (saec. 14.2115.1), measuring 300x225 mm, ff. V + 160, contains our tract on ff. 28vb-4JVa. It is written in one hand, which also wrote the other tracts of the Summulae. The (relatively few) corrections are all in the same handwriting. We owe the codicological information to Dr. K. Friis-Jensen. In a great many cases, E has what may be taken as the better reading, quite a few times shared by T E is our most important manuscript.

=

xxviii

Introduction

E contains a proper name: Alardus de Wemeldinghe (see. p. 86 of the edition). Nowadays Wemeldinghe is a place in the South-West of The Netherlands near Goes. B = Wien, 6sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vzndobonensis palatinus latinus 5420, saec. 14.2 (ante 1395), chart., mm. 290x210. An ex-libris says: 'Emi hanc summam uno floreno aureo ungarico anno Domini 1395'. 49 The MS contains our tract on ff. 31 13 -41 rb, written by one hand. Although B belongs to our secondary sources, it is more than once of use for establishing the correct text. In many cases B has the preferable reading. G = Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, 2° 305, a paper manuscript (ff. I+ 98), dating from 1373 and measuring 294x224 mm, contains our tract on ff. 24ra _33vb, all written in one hand. The date is given in the colophon, f. 97vb: 'Explicit loyca reverendi magistri Byridani reportata Prage per manus Luce de Wienna. Incepta in vigilia Petri et Pauli et finita in crastino Bartholomei. Anno domini millesimo cccm 0 septuagesimo tercio'. The codicological information about this MS derives from Prof. S. Ebbesen. G is the least reliable of the manuscripts used. The scribe of G, or of its exemplar, is time and again rather careless. In a great many cases the reading of G is not only not preferable, but simply erroneous. T

Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462), anno 13 72. We have no codicological description of this manuscript. It contains our tract on ff. 26rb_36rb written in one hand, the same that also copied the remaining tracts and the greater part of the (relatively few) corrections made to our text. 50

=

Tis one of our better copies. In many cases T has alternative readings that seem quite acceptable by themselves, but are not shared by the other manuscripts. Sometimes T shares a reading, preferable or not, with E but not with any of the other manuscripts we have used, except that in a number of cases V agrees with ET. K =Krakow, Biblioteka lnstytutu Teologicznego Ksi?iY Misjonarzy 171 (olim 627, antea 827; sometimes referred to as the "Stradom MS'', after the street where the Institute is situated) is a paper manuscript of220 folios (measuring 297x2 l 5 mm) written in two columns, (saec. 14.2/15.1). It contains our tract on ff. 49'J72rb in one handwriting. There are many corrections, partly in what seems to be a different hand from the manus principalis. A 15th-century Ex-libris on 49

Private communication by prof. M. Markowski (Krakow).

so For a number of extensive additions to the tract De praedicamentis see the critical edition by E.P. Bos, appendix, §IV. I.

xxix

Summulae, De suppositionibus

the inside of the front cover reads: 'Iste liber est Canonicorum Regularium Monasterii Corporis Christi in Cazimiria'. This means that the manuscript was already in Cracow at that time, and probably stayed there, although its precise location is unknown, until K. Michalski acquired it for the library where it is now kept. We owe this information to Professor S. Ebbesen. Although it contains various erroneous readings, K may be adduced as a useful text witness, in addition to our principal sources E and T. We have used a full transcription of the manuscripts E, B, G, T and Kand, as a rule, their readings are all mentioned in the critical apparatus. V =Wertheim (Germany), Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek (or: Historische Bibliothek in der Stiftskirche) 157 (anno 1362 vel 1384) a paper manuscript of 139 folios measuring 280x2 l 5 mm., contains a copy of our tract on ff. 31 rb_42va. We owe this codicological information to Dr. L. Valente. Vis only incidentally adduced in our critical apparatus. In the present edition the reading of V has been examined and added wheneverthe editor felt some doubts about the preferable reading. Sometimes V contains an interesting alternative, in some cases it is the only manuscript to provide what may be considered the correct reading: p. 33 12-13, 53 3 , 62 11 and p. 6412.

II. 6. Stemma codicum

The unique position of E as a source for our text was argued for by De Rijk in his introduction to De praedicabilibus (§11.5). There are also some striking similarities between E and our second copy of high rank, T. On the other hand, there is a rather close relationship between B, Kand Gas against ET, as is clear from passages in which this triplet presents a common reading which is different from that found in the other manuscripts. In addition to the specimina given by De Rijk in support of both the relationship between B, K and G and that between E and T, some examples from the present text are listed below: p. 13 25 - 6 : E and T have the same omission against all the other manuscripts including V;

p. 18 11 : E and T share the reading 'differunt', where BGK have the better reading 'deserviunt'; p. 68 3 :

ET correctly read 'pertinere ad', while BGK have 'participare'.

Sometimes, however, B disagrees with KG, and then it often agrees with E. The most significant examples are: p. 66 20 , where E and B have 'ilium conceptum' against GTKV: 'illam rationem' and p. 73 4-5 , where E and B share the reading of a whole

xxx

Introduction

phrase, not necessarily better than GTKV but obviously different from GTKV. On the same page (I. 20) GTKV have 'aliquando' which is missing in E and B; it is added by the manus corrigens of B. To make the matter more complicated, there are also some examples of K sharing an omission or erroneous reading with E only: p. 23 20 - 1 and P- 89 2 • In the above mentioned introduction De Rijk gave ample justification for the following claims: 51 [ 1] E shows its unique position by its manifest dissimilarities from all our other text witnesses. As far as we can see at this stage of our research there are two different traditions, that of E (to be labelled the p family) and that of TBKG (the a family). [2] Within the a family, T has its own position, which clearly differs from that of the other members of the family. [3] As to the subdivision BKG, Kand Gare closer to one another than to B. [4] In spite of the common readings, none of the manuscripts used for the present edition was copied from any of the others. Arguments for their mutual independence are the following: First, there is E's unique position among our manuscripts; then, T's independence from the group consisting of BKG should be taken into consideration. On the other hand, there are some unmistakable differences between Band KG that cannot be explained as merely due to scribal errors, and, thus likely suggest that B has not been copied from either Kor G, or the other way round. Finally, despite the close relationship between K and G, the one cannot be taken as deriving from the other. [5] Our oldest text witness, G, definitely does not rank among the better manuscripts. In addition to the mutual independence of all our copies, this fact provides some evidence for a respectable circulation ofBuridan's Summulae in the second half of the fourteenth century, before it was nearly pushed out in the next century by John Dorp's commentary. From the foregoing observations it may be clear that the present editor has not found any convincing arguments against these claims. The present edition confirms the independent position of E and T and the correlation between B, G and K, but in addition to De Rijk's claims the unmistakable similarities between E and B should also be taken into consideration. The question may arise, now, whether the various manus corrigentes have possibly had one of the other manuscripts at their disposal. In order to answer this question one should first distinguish three kinds of corrections: 51

Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De praedicabilibus, p. xxxiii-xxxiv.

xxxi

Summu{ae, De suppositionibus

[a] corrections of the 'on second inspection' type, i.e. those which are made by the same scribe, or the corrector, and are the result of another, more careful reading of the same exemplar. Thus trivial scribal errors are corrected by the same hand most of the time. [b] corrections of the 'on second thought' type, or 'conjectural emendations', i.e. changes which are made to emend obviously deficient or corrupt passages, without another exemplar being consulted. [c] corrections of the 'on second opinion' type, i.e. those made after consulting another manuscript. Only the last type is of concern to us, now. However, in the manuscripts used for the present edition there are no corrections to be found that should be ascribed to a consultation of any of the other four manuscripts. Because of the foregoing observations the following stemma codicum may be established: 52 ffi

B

K

G

II. 7. Editorial principles The edition assumes the correctness of the stemma presented in §II.6. The editor's aim is to present the text of E. This general preference for E to all our other manuscripts is easily supported by what has been remarked about the (relative) qualities of this unique manuscript of the Summulae. This preference also determines our selecting and evaluating the alternative readings occurring in the various manuscripts.

52

In the introduction to his edition of De demonstrationibus (forthcoming) De Rijk presents a stemma that includes V

xxxii

Introduction

E's readings will be set aside only if they obviously do not make sense, or suffer from minor errors, such as apparent omissions or interpolations. In such cases the editor, being left with the a family, will first turn to T, since T is remarkably free from errors and mistaken readings that are only due to the scribe's ignorance or negligence, which surely cannot be said of BKG. In cases in which both E and T are likely to give incorrect or less probable readings, the remaining members of the a family may present good ones. V is only recorded in the critical apparatus if it seems to augment the reader's insight in rather complicated textual situations. In some cases where the readings occurring in our five manuscripts are such that the present editor felt she had to resort to conjectural emendation, the reading of V could be and has been adopted instead. Generally speaking, then, E's reading is accepted unless a) it raises unsurmountable problems regarding sense or consistency, or b) the other manuscripts unanimously conspire against E in a matter not entirely devoid of interest. The apparatus given in the present edition is intended to provide the reader with plausible alternatives to our text in matters of consequence, and to enable him to reconstruct the text, not only as it is read by our basic manuscript, but also as it occurs in the four other manuscripts used for the edition. Of course, insignificant variants, such as 'ergo'/'igitur', 'vel'/'aut' (when interchangeable), 'iste'/'ille', and so on, as well as insignificant changes in word-order are not taken into consideration. 11.8. The critical apparatus

The apparatus is positive: for every reading reported, the manuscripts that have it are listed. A simple entry has this form: 'x] TBK y E z G ', i.e. manuscripts TBK read 'x', E reads 'y' and G reads 'z'. The first reading is always a lemma, i.e. identical with the reading adopted in the text. Negative apparatus is used only when all manuscripts except E have the reading adopted in the text. When V has been consulted, this has been explicitly reported. Each entry is complete in the sense that it informs about the readings of all five manuscripts at the place concerned. If some manuscript is not available for comparison, because it has a larger lacuna around the variant place, its 'reading' is registered as def= deficit. If a manuscript has a text so deviant that it makes no sense to ask whether it has any of the readings attested in the remaining manuscripts, it is reported to read al. = alia or aliter.

xxxiii

Summulae, De suppositionibus

The apparatus registers: 1. All cases in which our text deviates from that of E. 2. All cases in which two or more manuscripts carry a different reading from the one adopted. 3. Miscellaneous readings which seem interesting as regards contents or history of the text. Exceptions to (1) and (2) occur: la. When the rejected reading of E is an obvious and insignificant slip like an omission to put a line over 'ro' to make it spell 'ratio'. Also, ante correcturam errors corrected by the scribe himself are not adopted. 2a. When the variation between the manuscripts concern matters generally considered ofno consequence (such as choice between 'ergo' and 'igitur'; headings, which are not part of the text to be commented on by Buridan; 'glossa', 'sequitur' and 'textus' to announce the author's text and Buridan's commentaries; 'etcetera' when it is obviously meaningless and merely serves to fill up a line of the manuscript; or between equivalent word-orders) the text has been established according to the principles described in §II.7, above. Our apparatus of quotations identifies explicit quotations made by Buridan, and no more. For the abbreviations used in the apparatus criticus, see our list of the sigla, below, p. 5.

II. 9. Orthography. Punctuation

In matters of orthography and punctuation we have not followed the manuscripts. The punctuation is our own, and is not based on the manuscripts, which, like all medieval manuscripts, are rather careless in this matter. The orthography is classicizing and differs very little from the one used e.g. by Lewis and Short's well-known Latin Dictionary. Some of the most salient discrepancies between medieval practice and ours are: 1. We always write 'ae' when classical norm requires it; Buridan always wrote 'e' in such cases. This forces us to decide between adjectival and adverbial interpretation of such ambiguous medieval forms as 'maxime'. 2. The distribution of 'ci' and 'ti' in front of a vowel is regulated according to classical norm, meaning e.g. that we always write 'dictio' whereas medieval practice allows both 'dictio' and 'diccio'; similarly we always write 'condicio' when dealing with the noun derived from 'condico', whereas medieval practice

XXXlV

Introduction

allows both 'condicio' and 'conditio' in this case (as well in the case of the derivative of 'condo', which we would write 'conditio'). 3. Some Greek words appear in forms which were rarely or never used in the Middle Ages. Thus we write 'Aristoteles', 'dialectica', 'Coriscus', not 'Aristotiles ', 'dialetica', 'Coruscus'. We invariably say 'Socrates' though the manuscripts tend to use the short forms 'Sortes' or 'Sor'. Manuscript abbreviations have been solved, except for those still in use, such as 'etc.' ('and so on'), either in the sense of 'et sic de aliis', or when it refers to the remaining words of a text or formula well known to the medieval reader or hearer. 53

JI.JO. Headings Most manuscripts contain clues or marginal headings for indicating new chapters, but not for paragraphing. As a rule, the headings and numbers indicating chapters, parts of them, or so-called 'clausulae' are editorial additions, but, at times, they are based on indications found in (some of) our copies. Most of our manuscripts introduce Buridan 's comments on the preceding lemma with the word 'glosa', either in the text, or in the margin. We have omitted such indications. The headings are not registered in the apparatus criticus.

11.11. Bibliography III I.I. Primary literature 11.11.1.I. John Buridan

Johannes Buridanus: in Reina, M.E., 'Giovanni Buridano: Tractatus de suppositionibus,' in Rivista critica di storia della.filosofia 12 (1957), pp. 175-208 and 323-352. John Buridan, Sophisms on Meaning and Truth. Translated and with an introduction by Theodore Kermit Scott, New York 1966. Johannis Buridani Tractatus de consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien. Edition critique, Louvain/Paris 1976. Johannes Buridanus, Sophismata. Critical edition with an introduction by T.K. Scott, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1977. John Buridan, John Buridan on self-reference. Chapter eight of Buridan 's Sophis53

This use of 'etc.' in the manuscripts should be well distinguished from its use to merely indicate the end of a major part of a tract, where, in fact, it serves as a (very!) full stop. This use is ignored, i.e. not printed in the text nor recorded in the apparatus.

xxxv

Summulae, De suppositionibus

mata, with a translation, an introduction, and a philosophical commentary by G.E. Hughes, Cambridge etc. 1982. Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones in Praedicamenta, hrsg. von J. Schneider, Miinchen 1983. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones longe super librum Perihermeneias, edited with an introduction by R. van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1984 (Ph. D. thesis, University of Leiden, Meppel 1983). Jean Buridan 's Logic. The Treatise on Supposition, the Treatise on Consequences, translated, with a philosophical introduction by Peter King, Dordrecht 1985 (Synthese Historical Library, 27). Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones in Isagogen Porphyrii, ed. R. Tatarzynski, in Przegl9d tomistyczny, 2 (1986), pp. 121-195. Johannes Buridanus, 'Tractatus de differentia universalis ad individuum, ed. S. Szyller, in Przegl9d tomistyczny, 3 (l 987), pp. 137-178. Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. In Praedicamenta. Introduction, Critical Edition and Appendices by E.P. Bos, Nijmegen 1994. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones elencorum. Edited with an Introduction, Notes and Indices by R. van der Lecq and H.A.G. Braakhuis, Nijmegen 1994. Johannes Buridanus, Summulae. De Praedicabilibus. Introduction, Critical Edition and Indices by L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen 1995. Johannes Buridanus: in B. Patar, Ioannis Buridani Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Caelo, edition, etude critique et doctrinale, Louvain/Paris 1996. II. I I. I.2. Other primary literature Nicholas of Autrecourt, His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. A Critical Edition from the Two Parisian Manuscripts with an Introduction, English Translation, Explanatory Notes and Indexes, by L.M. de Rijk, Leiden/New York/London 1994. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972. Porphyrius, Isagoge, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Aristoteles Latinus 1, 6-7, Categoriarum Supplementa), Leiden 1966. William of Ockham, Summa logicae, in Opera Philosophica I, ed. G. Gal et S. Brown, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1974.

xxxvi

Introduction

JI.11.2. Secondary literature Biard, J., Logique et Theorie du Signe au XJV< Siecle, Paris 1989. Biard, J ., Buridan, Sophismes. Introduction, traduction et notes, Paris 1993. Bos, E.P. and Krop, H.A. (eds.), John Buridan, Master of Arts. Some Aspects of his Philosophy, Nijmegen 1993. Ebbesen, S.,'The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De fallaciis', in J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 139-160. Green-Pedersen, N.J., 'The Summulae of John Buridan, Tractatus VI, De locis', in J. Pinborg (ed.), The Logic ofJohn Buridan. Acts of the Third Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 121-138. Kaluza, Z., 'Les sciences et leurs languages. Note sur le statut de 29 decembre 1340 et le pretendu statut perdu contre Ockham' in L. Bianchi, Filosofia e Teologica nel Trecento. Textes et Etudes du moyen age 1, Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 197-258. Kaluza, Z., 'Nicolas d' Autrecourt. Un ami de la verite', in Histoire litteraire de la France. Tome XLII, fasc. 1, Paris 1995. Lecq, R. van der, 'Buridan on Modal Propositions', in H.A.G. Braakhuis, C.H. Kneepkens, L.M. de Rijk (eds.), English Logic and Semantics: from the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burley, Nijmegen 1981, pp. 425-442. Lecq, R. van der, 'Confused Individuals and Moving Trees. John Buridan on the Knowledge of Particulars', in E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan: A Master ofArts.( ... ), pp. 1-21. Maieril, A., 'Significatio et connotatio chez Buridan', in J. Pinborg, (ed.), The Logic ofJohn Buridan, (... ),pp. 101-114. Michael, B., Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des spiiten Mittelalters, 2 Teile, Berlin 1985. Michalski, K., 'Les courants philosophiques a Oxford et a Paris pendant le XIVe siecle', in Bulletin international de l 'Academie des sciences de Cracovie, 1920. Nuchelmans, G., Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers a/Truth and Falsity, Leiden 1973. Nuchelmans, G., '"Appellatio rationis" in Buridan's Sophismata IV, 9-15', in 0. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-1947), Amsterdam 1988, pp. 67-84.

XXXVlL

Summu/ae, De suppositionibus

Pinborg, J. (ed.), The Logic ofJohn Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 1976. Pinborg, J., 'The Summulae, Tractatus I, De introductionibus', in J. Pinborg (ed.),

The Logic ofJohn Buridan. ( ... ),pp. 71-90. Reina, M.E., fl problema de! linguaggio in Buridano, Vizenza 1959. Also in Rivista critica di Storia della Filosofia (1959) 14, pp. 367-417; (1960) 15, pp. 141-165 and pp. 238-264. Rijk, L.M. de, 'The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Mediaeval Logic, II: Fourteenth Century Natural Supposition as Atemporal (Omnitemporal) Supposition,' in Vivarium 11 (1973), pp. 43-79. Rijk, L.M. de, 'On Buridan's Doctrine of Connotation', in J. Pinborg, (ed.), The Logic ofJohn Buridan. (... ),pp. 91-100. Schonberger, R. und Kible, B. (hrsg.), Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters, Berlin (Akademie Verlag) 1994. Zupko, J., 'How it played in the RUE DE FOUARRE. The Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the COMPLEXE SIGNIFICABILE in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century' in Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997, pp. 211-225.

xxxviii

Ill. TEXT AND APPARATUS

IOHANNIS BURIDANI SUMMULARUM TRACTATUS QUARTUS

DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS

4.1.

De differentiis ............................................................ .

7

4.1.1.

De intentione capituli ........................................................ .

7

4.1.2.

De differentia significationis et suppositionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

4.1.3.

De differentia verificationis et suppositionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

4.1.4.

De differentia appellationis et suppositionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

4.2.

De divisionibus vocum significativarum ad placitum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4.2.1.

De intentione capituli et de divisione voeum significativarum in incomplexas et

4.2.2.

De divisione vocum incomplexarum secundum praedicabilitatem et subicibilitatem ..

16

4.2.3.

De divisione vocum incomplexarum in categorematicas, syncategorematicas et mixtas

18

4.2.4.

De divisione vocum incomplexarum qui bus correspondent conceptus complexi

4.2.5.

De divisione vocis complexae in perfectam et imperfectam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

4.2.6.

De divisione vocum quae possunt subici vel praedicari et quae non

22

4.3.

De communibus modis et divisionibus suppositionum .................. . 37

complexas .......................................................... .

15

ab illis quibus correspondent conceptus incomplexi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

4.3.1.

De intentione capituli et de divisione suppositionis in propriam et impropriam ..... .

37

4.3.2.

De divisione suppositionis in materialem et personalem ......................... .

38

4.3.3.

De divisione suppositionis personalis in communem et discretam ............ .

44

4.3.4.

De divisione suppositionis communis in naturalem et accidentalem ............... .

45

4.3.5.

De divisione suppositionis personalis et communis in confusam et deterrninatam ... .

49

4.3.6.

De divisione suppositionis confusae in distributivam et non distributivam .......... . 50

4.3.7.

De causis confusionis distributivae ......... .

51

4.3.7. I. De signo universali affirmativo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4.3.7 .2. De negatione neganti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

4.3.7.3. De negatione infinitanti ................................................. .

58

3

Ill.I. Index capitulorum et partium 4.3.7.4. De comparatione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.3.7.5. De distributione per dictiones implicantes negationes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.3.8.

De causis confusionis non distributivae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

4.3.8.1. De signo universali affirmativo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3.8.2. De confusione non distributiva per duplex distributivum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.3.8.3. De quibusdam specialibus confundentibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

4.3.8.4. De modo confusionis per ista verba 'scio', 'intellego' etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

4.4.

De suppositionibus et acceptionibus terminorum relativorum . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.4.1.

De intentione capituli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.4.2.

De divisionibus relativorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

4.4.3.

Regula communis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

4.4.4.

Alia regula communis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

4.4.5.

De hac dictione 'ille' vel 'illud' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4.4.6.

De isto relativo 'se' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4.4.7.

De isto relativo 'suus' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

4.4.8.

De istis relativis 'tale' et 'tantum' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4.4.9.

De relativis diversitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4.5.

De appellationibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

4.5.1.

De intentione capituli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

4.5.2.

De differentia appellationis a parte subiecti et a parte praedicati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.5.3.

De differentia appellationis inter verba significantia actus animae cognoscitivae

4.5.4.

De appellationibus quorundam terminorum in speciali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4. 6.

De ampliationibus et restrictionibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

4.6.1.

De intentione capituli et de statu respectu cuius dicitur ampliatio vel restrictio . . . . . .

89

4.6.2.

De ampliatione ultra statum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

4.6.3.

De restrictione citra statum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.6.4.

De alienatione status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

81

et alia verba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

4.6.5.

De alienatione suppositionis vel appellationis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

4.6.6.

De totali remotione suppositionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

4

Sigla codicum

E= B G= T= K=

Citta del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 994 Wien, Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 5420 Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, Amplon. 2° 305 Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale D III 27 (462) Krakow, Biblioteka /nstytutu Teologicznego Ksi(!iy Misjonarzy 171 (olim 627, antea 827) Codex raro adhibitus

V

=

Wertheim, Evangelische Kirchenbibliothek (vel: Historische Bibliothek in der Stiftskirche) 157

Signa in apparatu critico adhibita

=

add. praem. om. def. de!. redupl. al.

=

£C

=

Em codd. ?

=

= = = =

=

scripsi(t) (scripserunt) addidit (addiderunt) praemisit (praemiserunt) omisit (omiserunt) deficit (deficiunt) delevit (deleverunt) reduplicavit (reduplicaverunt) alia vel aliter manus quae correxit textum manuscripti E manus in margine quae correxit textum manuscripti E omnes codices illegibilis lectio

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TRACTATUS IV DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS

4.1. (Capitulum primum) (De differentiis)

4.1.1. (De intentione capituli) Tractatus sequens est de suppositionibus et quibusdam eis annexis. Et primo dicemus de differentia significationis et suppositionis. Et non intendo loqui de significatione vocis naturaliter, quia ex talibus vocibus non formamus propositiones, sed solum intendo loqui de significatione vocis ad placitum. Nee intendo, quantum ad hoc capitulum, loqui de suppositione materiali, quia sic omnis vox litterata, quamvis non imposita ad significandum, potest supponere, sed solum intendo loqui pro nunc de

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suppositione prout vox secundum significationem sibi impositam potest vel non potest supponere. Quia non est propositionis supponere, sed termini qui est subiectum vel praedica-

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tum, ideo post tractatum de praedicamentis debet sequi iste tractatus quartus, qui est de suppositionibus et quibusdam eis annexis. Et continebit iste tractatus sex capitula: primum erit de differentia inter significationes, suppositiones, verificationes et appellationes; secundum erit de multis divisionibus vocum significativarum, ut appareat quae possint supponere et quae non; tertium erit de communibus modis et divisionibus suppositionum; quartum erit in speciali de suppositionibus termino-

1 est] ET erit BGK 2 de ... suppositionis] EBGK differentiis eius T 3 naturaliter] EBGT materialiter K 5-6 suppositione] EBGK significatione T 6 non] EBK est add. GT 10 quia non est] EGTK non est enim B 11 praedicamentis] EG terminis de praedicamentis B terminis praedicamentalibus T terminis praedicabilibus K 13 significationes, suppositiones] EBT significationem, suppositionem GK 13 -14 verificationes et appellationes] BT om. G verificationes et ampliationesE et verificationem et appellationemK 15 quae non] ETK quando possunt supponere BquinonG 15-16 tertium ... suppositionum] EBGTom. K

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Summulae, De suppositionibus

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rum relativorum; quintum erit de appellationibus; sextum erit de ampliationibus et restrictionibus. Primum capitulum continet quattuor partes: prima proponit intentum; secunda declarat differentiam suppositionis et significationis; tertia declarat differentiam suppositionis et verificationis; quarta declarat differentiam suppositionis et appellationis. Secunda incipit ibi: "Dicto ergo modo"; tertia ibi: "Verificatio autem"; quarta ibi: "Appellatio". Prima pars est satis manifesta: proponit enim intentum tractatus in summa quia de suppositionibus et quibusdam eis annexis, ut quia de significationibus, verificationibus, appellationibus et ampliationibus et restrictionibus. Proponit etiam quod statim erit determinandum in isto capitulo de differentia suppositionis et significationis. Proponit etiam de qua significatione intellegendum sit in isto capitulo et de qua non, et similiter de qua suppositione et de qua non. Et haec plana sunt in textu. Sed etiam addendum est quod non intendimus de suppositione prout est reddere suppositum verbo apud grammaticum, quia sic iste terminus 'chimaera' potest supponere, sicut iste terminus 'homo'. Aeque enim est congrua haec oratio 'chimaera currit' sicut haec 'homo legit', et non est ita prout apud logicum de suppositione intendimus. Etiam si dico 'homo est animal', ita bene 'animal' supponit sicut 'homo', quod non est sic de suppositione apud grammaticum. 4.1.2. (De differentia significationis et suppositionis)

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(1) Dicto ergo modo capiendo 'significationem' et 'suppositionem' dif-

ferunt significatio et suppositio, quia cuiuslibet dictionis quae non materialiter sumpta est pars propositionis, interest significare et audienti earn conceptum aliquem constituere secundum institutionem ad placitum sibi datam. (2) Et non omnis talis dictionis est supponere, quia solus talis

1 pr. de] EBGT comm uni bus modis et divisionibus et aliquid erit de add. K 6 verificatio] 8 enim] om. E I intentum] ET quod B intentionem GK II in summa verificationis E 11 de] ETK quia praem. BG quia] TKV in summo quia E in summa dicens quia G est B 12 proponit] EBT om. GK I intellegendum] EGT intendendum B intentum K 14 etiam] om. E II addendum] BTV advertendum E notandum G attendendum K II intendimus] EBTK intellegendum est G 11 prout est] EK pro eo quod hoc est B pro eo quod est G pro eo quod potest T 14 -15 reddere suppositum verbo] ET suppositum verbo G reddere suppositum B rethoris 15 potest] E possit BG posset TK 15 -16 supponere] dicendo chimaera suppositum vel K currit add. E 16 oratio] Equia add. BG quod add. TK 17 legit] EEK currit G modo praem. T I de suppositione] BTKV de suppositionibus E om. G 18 ita bene] K ita ETB om. G 24 et] ETK sedBG

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4.1. De differentiis: 4.1.2.

terminus est innatus supponere et omnis talis qui, aliquo demonstrate per hoc pronomen 'hoc' vel aliquibus demonstratis per illud pronomen 'haec ', potest vere affirmari de illo pronomine. Ideo iste terminus 'chimaera' non potest supponere, quia quocumque demonstrate falsum est dicere 'hoc est chimaera', et quibuscumque demonstratis 'haec sunt chimaera'. Ista secunda pars continet duas clausulas: unam de significatione et aliam de suppositione. (I) Quantum ad primam clausulam notandum est quod data fuit nobis virtus vociferandi finaliter ut possemus aliis significare conceptus nostros, et fuit nobis datus auditus finaliter ut nobis significarentur conceptus vociferantium. Ita loquitur 10 Aristoteles in fine libri De anima 1 dicens quod auditum habet animal ut significetur aliquid sibi, linguam autem habet ut significet aliquid alteri. Et per 'linguam' intendit virtutem vociferativam, quaecumque illa fuerit. Et sic patet quod vox significativa debet significare audienti conceptum proferentis, et debet in audiente constituere conceptum similem conceptui proferentis nisi frustra vel deceptorie proferatur, aut 15 forte solum propter delectationem quae est in audiendo se ipsum, sicut est de eo qui solitarie cantat aut propter aliquam talem causam. Tamen manifestum est quod omnino disputantes et proferentes hoc intendunt, scilicet quod voces eorum praedicta duo operentur. Sciendum etiam quod voces significativae naturaliter non ponuntur in propo- 20 sitionibus, quia se ipsis sine formatione alicuius propositionis innatae sunt facere sensum perfectum in audiente ad hoc idoneo. Sed etiam nee illa vox quae vocatur 'non significativa' intrat propositionem, scilicet ilia vox quae nee naturaliter nee secundum impositionem sibi ad placitum datam significat aliquid, nisi forte se ipsam vel conceptum sui ipsius, ut 'bu ba'. Talis enim vox nee est nomen nee verbum nee 25 syncategorema. Ideo ad nihil deserviret in propositione nisi sumeretur materialiter. Si enim dico 'baf currit', haec non est propositio, quia non habet significationem haec vox 'baf' nee modum significandi secundum quern posset reddere suppositum 3 idea] TK unde ergo E ergo BG 5 et] EG similiter add. BTK 6 secunda] E om. BGTK 8 clausulam] EV om. BGTK 9 vociferandi] ETK vel loquendi add. B nostra add. G 10 vociferantium] alterius vociferantis E 12 ut] EK quantus BG quatinus T 13 virtutem ... ilia] vocem sive vociferantem quicumque ille E 14-15 et ... proferentis] EGTK om. B 15 proferentis] EBGT vociferationis K II aut] BKT nee E et G 16 propter] EG propriam add. BTK 17 talem causam] EBK cautelam G causam T 18 omnino] EBT omnes G omnis aut omnes K 18 -19 praedicta duo operentur] EKT per dicta eorum paterentur B haec duo operantur G 22 idoneo] ETK idoneum G idioma B 24 se ipsam] EGK seipsas BT 25 vox] TV om. EBGK 26 ad nihil] BK de nullo E nullo modo G de nihilo T 1

Aristoteles, De anima, III, 13, 435b24-6.

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Summulae, De suppositionibus

verbo. Si tamen sumeretur materialiter, bene esset propositio falsa valens istam 'haec vox 'baf' currit'. (2) Quantum vero ad secundam clausulam, quae est de suppositione, apparet mihi quod sit satis manifesta, nisi quod bene poss et dubitari, quia iste terminus 'Deus' potest supponere et tamen, quocumque demonstrato per illud pronomen 'hoc', non verificaretur de illo pronomine, quia oporteret quod Deus demonstraretur, quern demonstrare non possumus. Aliqui respondent quod, licet Deus demonstrari non possit ad sensum, tamen potest demonstrari ad intellectum. Ve! possumus dicere quod ad hoc quod terminus possit supponere, sufficit quod vere possit affirmari vel 10

de tali pronomine vel de relativo referente aliquem terminum priorem. Verbi gratia, vere dicimus: 'prima causa est et ipsa est Deus' et etiam 'omnipotens non est malus et ipse est Deus'. Sic autem non est de chimaera, quia etiam si diceremus 'chimaera non est et ipsa est chimaera', propositio est falsa, ita quod tale pronomen relativum potest in proposito capi virtute pronominis demonstrativi.

4.1.3. (De differentia verificationis et suppositionis) 15

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(1) Verificatio autem differt a suppositione, quia verificatio proprie est propositionis et non termini; suppositio autem est termini et non propositionis. (2) Item, possibile est esse suppositionem terminorum in propositione sine verificatione propositionis, tam in affirmativis quam in negativis, ut 'homo est asinus' vel 'homo non est animal'. (3) Item, potest esse in negativis verificatio sine suppositione, ut 'chimaera non est hircocervus'; sed necesse est in affirmativis veris verificationem propositionis esse pro aliquo vel aliquibus pro quo vel quibus termini supponunt. (4) Et si sit terminus distributus, oportet verificationem esse pro omnibus pro quibus supponit, si propositio debeat esse vera; et si non sit distributus, sufficit pro aliquo vel aliquibus. 4.1.3: E 29rb, B 31 va, G 24rb, T 26'", K sorb, V 31 vb I bene] EBGK currit add. T

3 vero] om. E

4 bene] E iunior BTK minor G omnis (?) V

II dubitari] EG dubitare BTK 5 illud] aliquod E II hoc] om. E 7 licet] EV si BGTK 8 possit] potest E II tamen] bene praem. E 9 possit supponere] EB dicitur supponere G supponit TsupponatK 11 etiam] quodadd. E 13 pr. est] EGTKlapisadd. B II propositio] E haecBGK ipsa T II falsa] EVetipsaestchimaeraadd. etexp.BGK scilicetipsaestchimaeraadd. T II relativum] om.E 15 proprie] om.E 16 est] GTKom.EB 24 supponit] EGsupponunt B suppositio praem. T terminus add. K II vera] apparens vera et praem. E 11 distributus] terminus praem. E

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4.1. De differentiis: 4.1.3.

In hac tertia parte sunt quattuor clausulae. (1) Prima