Soviet-North Korean Relations During the Cold War: Unruly Offspring [1 ed.] 9781003413332, 9781032537306, 9781032537313

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Soviet-North Korean Relations During the Cold War

This book explores Soviet–North Korean relations during the Cold War (1945–1991). Based on many primary documents and sources (including Russian and Korean), it reveals how the influence of the Soviets on Pyongyang diminished during the course of the Cold War, from overwhelming at the time of the foundation of North Korea to negligible at the time of the collapse of the USSR. The book delves into the early history and foundation of North Korea, the August Plenum and the strategy employed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the Sino-Soviet split. It covers topics previously neglected in previous studies on North Korea, such as the preparation and waging of the Korean War, Kim Il-sung’s road to political independence, the widespread mockery of North Korean propaganda by Soviet citizens and the Soviet origins of the design of the North Korean flag. This book will be a valuable resource to students and scholars of North Korea, Russian Studies, the Cold War and Communism. Fyodor Tertitskiy is Leading Researcher at the Institute for Korean Studies at Kookmin University, South Korea. He studies North Korean military, social and political history and is the author of The North Korean Army: History, Structure, Daily Life (2022) and two Korean-language books on Kim Il-sung and his era.

Routledge Research on Korea Series Editors: Niki Alsford and Sojin Lim, University of Central Lancashire, UK.

The Research on Korea series surveys key topics in the study of North and South Korea (both on the peninsula, and in the diaspora). It is a prestigious series that is multidisciplinary, covering the social sciences and arts and humanities. The series seeks to publish best new research from both senior and junior scholars. 1. South Korean Popular Culture in the Global Context Beyond the Fandom Edited by Sojin Lim 2. The North Korean Army History, Structure, Daily Life Fyodor Tertitskiy 3. Korea and the Global Society Yonson Ahn 4. Politics, International Relations and Diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula Edited by Sojin Lim 5. International Aid and Sustainable Development in North Korea A Country Left Behind with Cloaked Society Sojin Lim 6. South Koreans and the Politics of Immigration in Contemporary Australia David Hundt 7. Soviet-North Korean Relations During the Cold War Unruly Offspring Fyodor Tertitskiy

Soviet-North Korean Relations During the Cold War Unruly Offspring

Fyodor Tertitskiy

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Fyodor Tertitskiy The right of Fyodor Tertitskiy to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Tertitskiy, Fyodor, 1988– author. Title: Soviet-North Korean relations during the Cold War : unruly offspring / Fyodor Tertitskiy. Description: First Edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2024. | Series: Routledge research on Korea | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023014812 (print) | LCCN 2023014813 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032537306 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032537313 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003413332 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Soviet Union—Foreign relations—Korea (North) | Korea (North)—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. | Korea (North)— Politics and government—1948–1994. | Soviet Union—Politics and government—1953–1985. | Cold War—History. Classification: LCC DK68.7.K62 T47 2024 (print) | LCC DK68.7.K62 (ebook) | DDC 327.4705193—dc23/eng/20230606 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023014812 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023014813 ISBN: 978-1-032-53730-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-53731-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-41333-2 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332 Every effort has been made to contact copyright-holders. Please advise the publisher of any errors or omissions, and these will be corrected in subsequent editions. Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Acknowledgements List of Figures Introduction to the English Edition 1 The Beginning: Captain Kim Il-sung of the Red Army

vii

viii

x

1

2 The Week That Reshaped East Asia: The Soviet-Japanese

War of 1945

10

3 The Soviet Governors of North Korea: Ivan Chistyakov

and Terentiy Shtykov

17

4 Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power: How a Junior Officer Ended

up Leading a Nation

25

5 The North Korean Flag and Other Symbols: Made in the USSR

34

6 The Korean People’s Army: Forged in the Soviet Image

48

7 The Korean War Through the Eyes of Pyongyang

53

8 The Famine of 1954–55: A Forgotten Tragedy

61

9 The Last Days of Summer: The Story of the August Plenum

69

10 Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy

103

11 Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparison

114

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Contents

12 Playing Scylla and Charybdis: North Korea and the Sino-Soviet Split

124

13 Why North Korean Propaganda Was Immensely Popular in the USSR

134

14 The Father State Dies: North Korea and the End of the Soviet Union

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Index

150

Acknowledgements

The very first person to be mentioned in this section is Han Gwon-hui, a former journalist for Wolgan Pukhan. The content of this book is loosely based on a series of columns I wrote for this magazine, and it was Han Gwon-hui who suggested that I write for them. It is not an exaggeration to say that without him, this book would have never been written. As the readers may see, in this book I often reference interviews by Andrei Lankov. In the late 1980s–early 2000s, he conducted a few dozen interviews with former members of the North Korean elite. Andrei kindly shared the texts of these interviews with me, for which I am deeply thankful. Another important person in the creation of this book is Igor Selivanov, a professor at Kursk National University. I am thankful to him for all the help he has provided. Aida Zujo kindly took her time to proofread the manuscript, and I am grateful to her. This book was published thanks to the efforts of my editors at Routledge – Dr Sojin Lim, Ms Stephanie Rogers, Prof Niki Alsford and Mr Andrew Leach. I would like to thank them and also the anonymous reviewers who kindly took their time to read my manuscript and provided many valuable comments and suggestions. Last, but not least, my father, Konstantin Tertitski, and my friends – Elizaveta Semyonova, Peter Ward, Pak So-hye, Alek Sigley and Yo Hyon-jun – all gave me a lot of valuable advice when I was writing the book, for which I am very grateful.

Figures

1.1 Manchurian partisans in the Soviet Union, 1941. 1.2 Map of the Soviet Far East showing the location of the two

Soviet camps (Camp A and Camp V) for Manchurian guerrillas

in the 1940s. 3.1 Ivan Chistyakov. 3.2 Terentiy Shtykov. 4.1 14 October 1945. Major Mikhail Kan, the interpreter, stands

beside Kim in the front. 4.2 The doctored photo of Kim Il-sung’s first public appearance (14 October 1945). 4.3 14 October 1945. Kim Il-sung’s first appearance. 5.1 North Korean film shows South Korea being “imprisoned” by

the American flag. 5.2 The first parade of the Korean People’s Army featured the Flag

of Great Extremes. 5.3 Head emblem of the KPA (February–July 1948). 5.4 Head emblem of the KPA (February–July 1948). 5.5 Soldier of the KPA at the Army’s first parade. 5.6 The flag used by both Germanies until 1 October 1959. 5.7 The flag used by East Germany from 1 October 1959. 5.8 The ceremony of replacing the traditional Korean flag with the

flag of the DPRK. 5.9 The coat of arms from the provisional constitution. 5.10 The coat of arms used in July–September 1948. 5.11 The coat of arms used from September 1948 to 1992. 5.12 The coat of arms proposed on 15 April 1948. 5.13 Changes to North Korean rank insignia and passport per the

adoption of a different coat of arms in 1992. 6.1 Positions and position insignia in the early KPA. 9.1 The Third Congress of the WPK. 9.2 Kim Il-sung stands next to Leonid Brezhnev. 9.3 Delegates at the Third Congress of the WPK. 9.4 The North Korean elite after the Third Congress.

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Figures 9.5 Kim Il-sung meets with Nikita Khrushchev. 9.6 Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet premier, shakes Kim Il-sung’s

hand. Leonid Brezhnev is standing behind Bulganin. 9.7 Kim Il-sung returns to Pyongyang after his trip. 9.8 So Hwi. 9.9 The first page of the resolutions of the August plenum. 9.10 31 August 1956. The four escapees in China. 9.11 1957. The four escapees visit the Great Wall of China. 9.12 Photo of Kim Il-sung meeting Khrushchev, published by North Korea in September 1956. 10.1 Bulgarian poster hailing Chervenkov. 10.2 Hungarian poster hailing Rákosi. 10.3 Choe Yong-gon. 10.4 Kim Il. 10.5 Aleksandr Puzanov. 10.6 Kim Il-sung’s second cabinet. 11.1 Special travel permit. The red line indicates that it permits

visiting the capital. 12.1 Number of mentions of Mao Zedong in Rodong Shinmun in

1951–1993. 12.2 Zhou Enlai’s statue in Hamhung. 13.1 Koreya, March 1981 issue. 14.1 Moscow, 1991. A crowd prepares to demolish the statue

of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police. 14.2 A photo showing the name plate being removed from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR following the Union’s dissolution on 26 December 1991. 14.3 Map of Asia from the Korean Central Yearbook of 1992. 14.4 Map of Europe from the Korean Central Yearbook of 2006.

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Introduction to the English Edition

Of all modern nations, North Korea stands as truly unique, as its political system now, in the early 2020s, still exemplifies unreformed Stalinism. It has been more than three decades since most of the world’s Communist regimes collapsed. Four of the remaining five – China, Cuba, Vietnam and Laos – all embraced the way of change. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping, Raúl Castro, Nguyễn Văn Linh and Kaysone Phomvihane resulted in a chance for freer and more prosperous lives for their countries’ people. Yet North Korea was different, as its leadership rejected the way of reform. On the contrary, the people in charge in Pyongyang have done their best to preserve their ultra-Stalinist system. This book’s subject is the interactions of North Korea with its paternal state – the Soviet Union. It is the USSR to which the Pyongyang regime owes its current existence, as the country was born out of the Soviet occupation zone established in 1945. Without the Soviets, we would have never learned the names of Kim Jong-un or Kim Jong-il, and even the country’s founding ruler, Kim Il-sung, was bound to remain nothing but a historical footnote. North Korea originated as a country under complete and total Soviet control. Before the Korean War (1950–1953), the Soviet ambassador was a much more powerful figure than anyone in the local elite, and all important decisions had to be approved by him. Yet, in the 1950s, Kim Il-sung, a masterful political schemer, managed to completely pull the country away from Soviet control. In Eastern Europe, the weakening of Moscow’s oversight usually resulted in a more liberal, reformist direction, as evidenced by Tito’s Yugoslavia or Kádár’s Hungary. Yet in North Korea, things were different. Mirroring the way of Albania (also ruled by a former anti-Axis partisan leader – Enver Hoxha), Kim Il-sung created an even more oppressive regime than Stalin’s USSR. His Singular Thought System was more totalitarian than anything the Soviet Union had ever seen. This is how the North Korea we know today was born. With all of this, one can compare the USSR and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to a parent and their child: with both similarities and differences. North Korea proved quite an unruly offspring for Moscow: After Pyongyang broke free from the Soviet Union, it milked its former patron for economic assistance and political support for decades.

Introduction to the English Edition xi This book originated as a series of columns for the South Korean monthly magazine Wolgan Pukhan. Published by the Institute for North Korean Studies since 1972, of all North Korea-focused magazines in the country, and probably the world, Wolgan Pukhan probably has the longest history. More than two years after the columns were published, I decided to rewrite them in both Korean and English to be published as books. Naturally, a lot of text was added and edited, some mistakes were corrected, and, importantly, endnotes were added to the text. Three columns in this book, dealing with Kim Il-sung’s service in the Red Army, the Korean War and the August Plenum, are completely original. They are not based on any previously published columns. Another column, dealing with North Korea’s false historical narrative, is not included here, as I have already written about this topic in English.1 More than sixty years have passed since North Korea ceased to be a client state of the Soviet Union. The Union itself has been gone for more than three decades. Yet the historic inertia is immense in North Korea. As readers will see, Stalinism continued to influence Pyongyang for many decades after the USSR had rejected Stalin’s ways. This book’s target audience is readers who have a particular interest in the history of North Korea, as the topics raised here may be somewhat specialised for a general reader. Nevertheless, the author hopes that anyone curious about the DPRK – a country with a very unusual and most horrific history – would find something of interest in this book. Note 1 Fyodor Tertitskiy. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?” in Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4, October/December 2021, pp. 164–183, https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf; Fyodor Tertitskiy. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan” in Korea Observer, June2018, pp.219–238, www.researchgate.net/publication/325990388_ A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_liberating_the_country_ from_Japan.

1

The Beginning Captain Kim Il-sung of the Red Army

One could argue that it was on 23 October 1940 that a chain of events was set into motion which ultimately enabled Soviet–North Korean relations to exist. According to Chinese sources,1 it was on this day that Kim Il-sung stepped onto Soviet soil for the first time. At the time, Kim Il-sung was a high-ranking commander of what was left of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NAJUA)–Communist Party of China

Figure 1.1 Manchurian partisans in the Soviet Union, 1941. Kim Il-sung can be seen lying down on the grass in the front. His second wife Kim Jong-suk sits in the front row wearing white. The man in the civilian suit standing next to the tree on the right is likely Mun Il. Source: Photo taken in 1941 by an unknown author. A copy is available here: https://k.sinaimg.cn/www/ dy/slidenews/61_img/2015_06/40602_1172973_345588.jpg/w640slw.jpg DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-1

2

The Beginning

(CPC)’s resistance force in Manchuria. In 1931, the region was invaded by the Japanese army, who then proclaimed it the state of Manchukuo in 1932. In subsequent years, Kim Il-sung and his comrades-in-arms tried to harass and weaken the regime, to no avail. By 1940, the guerrilla force was broken and beaten, and most of the partisans were either killed or chose to flee or surrender. The Japanese won, and the resistance lost. The only option left for Kim Il-sung, apart from surrender and, consequently, death, was to flee northern Manchuria to the Soviet Union. Thus, he, like many others, crossed the Manchurian–Soviet border and was formally interrogated by Soviet officials in January 1941.2 The Communist International’s team which managed the checks of the Manchuria guerrillas consisted of four men. The first was Konstantin Vilkov (1905– 1947), a deputy department chairman in the Comintern Executive Committee (CEC). The second was Aleksei Zyuzin (1903–?), an analyst in the CEC’s Secretariat and Cadre departments. The third was Ivan Plyshevskiy (1907–1996), the Cadre department’s senior analyst. Finally, the fourth was Aleksandr Kogan (1908–?), who worked in the CEC’s international department.3 Kogan had good Chinese skills.4 At the interrogators’ request, Kim Il-sung filled out a form in Chinese, listing his name, birth year and ethnicity, as well as outlining his criminal record and career in the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.5 His comrades-in-arms were to fill out similar forms.6 There are files on 65 partisans from Manchuria kept in Russian archives.7 After the interrogations were done, the Red Army’s Far Eastern Front command settled the guerrillas in two field camps. The first one was called “Northern camp”, or “Camp A” after the Amur River.8 It was located near the Vyatskoye village, not far from Khabarovsk. The second camp was called “Southern camp”, or “Camp V” after the city of Voroshilov (currently known as Ussuriysk).9 This camp was located near the Okeanskaya village in the Far East.10 The partisans were trained in intelligence gathering and sabotage. Their Soviet superiors still entertained the thought of sending them back to Manchukuo.11 After receiving the report from the Comintern team,12 CEC Chairman Georgy Dimitrov made a note in his diary: The situation with the guerrilla movement in Manchuria is “extremely bad”.13 The NAJUA was gone. Japan had prevailed. There was one more thing which concerned the Comintern: Wei Zhengmin, the highest-ranking commander of the partisan movement, was not among those guerrillas who had managed to flee Manchukuo. Ultimately, Kim Il-sung and his friend An Gil were given a task – assemble two search-and-rescue teams and lead them to Manchuria. Kim and An’s teams departed Camp V on 9 April 1941.14 On 28 August, Kim Il-sung came back with only part of his team; the rest stayed in Manchuria.15 Kim reported that Wei Zhengmin had died and, thus, the mission was a failure.16 On 14 September, Kim went back to Manchuria. He met with the rest of the team there and returned again on 12 November.17

The Beginning 3

Figure 1.2 Map of the Soviet Far East showing the location of the two Soviet camps (Camp A and Camp V) for Manchurian guerrillas in the 1940s. Source: Created by the author

Mysteries of Kim Jong-il’s Birth There are quite a few questions surrounding the birth of Kim Jong-il, Kim Ilsung’s first son and future heir. Pyongyang claims that he was born on 16 February 1942 in a “secret camp” on Paektu Mountain. This false claim originated in the 1980s, after Kim Jong-il had been appointed the official heir to his father. The authorities wanted to present him as a “national leader”, and it was deemed preferable if such a leader were born on the nation’s sacred mountain rather than in a foreign land. Another mystery is Kim Jong-il’s birth year. At least from 1982,18 North Korea had been claiming that he was born in 1942. There is also an opposing view, saying that he was born in 1941 and that Pyongyang later altered his

4

The Beginning

official birth year to create a three-decade gap between him and his father (who had been born in 1912).19 To be born on 16 February, one’s mother is most likely to have been impregnated between 18 May and 2 June of the previous year.20 In order for to this happen, Kim Jong-il’s parents – Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-suk – had to be in the same place around this time. However, records place Kim Il-sung in Manchuria between 9 April21 and 28 August 1941.22 There are no records stating that Kim Jong-suk was there with him. Thus, one cannot but start doubting North Korea’s claim. On the contrary, if one supposes that Kim Jong-il was born in 1941, the picture starts to look significantly more logical. It would also provide his wife’s pregnancy as a reason for Kim Il-sung to flee Manchuria. The date he crossed the border would be during the second trimester of his wife’s pregnancy, meaning the pregnancy would have been noticeable. Thus, based on this logic alone, the probability of Kim Jong-il being born in 1941 seems higher. However, there is even better evidence available. In 1976, a research centre closely associated with South Korean intelligence published an encyclopaedic dictionary on North Korea.23 This happened two years after Kim Jong-il had been proclaimed the successor but long before North Korea started publishing his official biographies and made any claims about his birth year. The dictionary mentioned that on 19 February 1974, Pyongyang instructed all organisations, enterprises and factories in the country to have their employees write letters to Kim Jong-il, congratulating him on his 33rd birthday. Hence, at the time North Korea did, in fact, recognise that he was born in 1941. One final note is called for here. Some readers familiar with South Korean customs might suppose that this discrepancy can be explained by the traditional way of calculating one’s age: starting at conception and adding one year at 1 January. This is, however, not an issue, as this custom was completely abandoned in North Korea. Another mystery is Kim Jong-il’s birth name. It is widely known that in his early years, he was known by the Russian name Yura, whilst “Jong-il” wasn’t used until later. Yura is traditionally interpreted as a shorter form of the name Yuriy; hence, nearly every biographical text would say that Kim Jong-il once had been Yuriy Kim. However, in 1940s Russian, “Yura” was a shorter form of not only “Yuriy” but also of “Georgiy”, leaving the question: Was he Yuriy Kim or Georgiy Kim? There is a testimonial that the name Yura was given to Kim Jong-suk’s son by the Soviet doctor who assisted the birth.24 It claims that the name was chosen after a famous Soviet commander. Looking through the contemporary roster of wellknown Soviet generals, one cannot find anyone named Yuriy. However, one can easily find a Georgiy – Georgiy Zhukov. An iconic Soviet commander (maybe even more so in the West), Zhukov’s years of fame still lay ahead of him at the time. Now he is mostly known for his command in the war with Nazi Germany. Yet, in the Far East, he was a well-known figure already as the one who had commanded the Soviet Army in 1939 in the Nomonhan (Khalkhin-Gol) battle with the Japanese. Thus, one can strongly suppose that Kim Jong-il was actually called “Georgiy Kim” at the time – or possibly even “Georgiy Tszin”, since this is how his father’s surname was spelt in contemporary Russian documents.

The Beginning 5 The 88th Brigade and Captain Kim’s First Battalion The summer of 1942 was a crucial period for the Eastern Front. Hitler’s army was about to attack Stalingrad, a city of strategic importance for the Soviet Union. Should Stalingrad fall, the Union would have been cut off from the Caucasus’ oil, making the future war a lost cause. Hence, Moscow did everything it could to defend the city. The Far East Front was continuously receiving new orders to send divisions to fight Germany.25 The Front’s commanding officer, General Apanasenko, instructed his subordinates to replenish the departing divisions with new conscripts. After nearly all manpower in the Far East was exhausted, the general lowered his requirements, demanding a new brigade for each division departing to the West. The Front was forced to scrape the bottom of the barrel: Even prisoners of Stalin’s camps were given amnesty and called to serve. Finally, the general decided to recruit foreigners: the Manchurian partisans were assembled in a Red Army brigade.26 The Soviet Army had a long history. It was founded on 28 January 1918 and ceased to exist along with the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991. In all these decades, this brigade – the 88th Separate Infantry Brigade of the Far East Front – is the only unit to have been staffed with foreigners in the entire Soviet armed forces. The brigade’s commanding officer was Zhou Baozhong, a high-ranking commander of Manchurian guerrillas. The brigade’s core were four independent battalions, and Kim Il-sung, commissioned as a captain, was appointed to command the first one. Apart from him, there were two other high-ranking Koreans in the brigade. The first one was Choe Yong-gon, who led the Brigade’s CPC organisation, and the other was Kang Shin-thae, the commander of the fourth battalion. Kang Shin-thae is better known under the name he adopted later – Kang Gon. Choe Yong-gon. Kim Il-sung. Kang Shin-thae. Out of these three, why was it Kim who was chosen to lead North Korea in 1945? There were many reasons behind it, but the key one might have been the fact that during his years of service, Kim Il-sung invested a lot of effort in learning Russian.27 This, naturally, made it much easier for him to communicate with his commanders. Ultimately, these skills proved crucial in propelling him to the apex of power. Notes 1 “Statistical table of the border crossings of the First Route Army of the Northeast AntiJapanese United Army’s personnel” in A Collection of Historical Documents on the Revolution of East Manchuria, vol. 1. Yanji: The Party History Research Office of the Yanbian Prefecture Committee of the Communist Party of China, p. 862 [东北抗联第一 路军越境人员统计表, 东满地区革命历史文献汇编, 1册, 延吉: 中共延边州委党 史研究室, 第862页]. 2 Jin Richeng’s Personal File, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 495, inventory 238, file 60 [Личное дело Цзин Жи-чена. РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 238, д. 60]. 3 Ibid. 4 A. O. Tamazishvili. “An incident of the East Department of the Institute for Red Professors of History” in Vostok, no. 1, 1991, pp. 160–166 [А. О. Тамазишвили. Инцидент

6 The Beginning

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15

16 17 18

на восточном отделении Института красной профессуры истории // Восток, №1, 1994, стр. 160–166]. Jin Richeng’s Personal File, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 495, inventory 238, file 60 [Личное дело Цзин Жи-чена. РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 238, д. 60]. Lee Dong-hun. “Personal files of war criminals of the Korean War, discovered after 80 years” in Chugang Choson, 13 January 2020 [이동훈. 80년 만에 찾아낸 6·25 전범 들의 이력서, 주간조선, 2020년 1월 13일], http://weekly.chosun.com/client/news/viw. asp?ctcd=C01&nNewsNumb=002591100002. Inventory 238. “Personal files (Manchuria)” in Documents of the Soviet era [Опись 238. Личные дела (Маньчжурия) // Документы советской эпохи], http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/sections/organizations/cards/95441/childs. Fourteen Years of Suffering and Struggle. Beijing: Publishing House “Chinese Encyclopaedia”, 1995, p. 350 [苦难与斗争十四年, 北京: 中国大百科全书出版社, 1995, 第 350页]. Ibid., p. 351 [第351页]. Okeanskaya camp, evidently much smaller than the one at Vyatskoye, is referenced in Andrei Lankov’s interview with Yu Song-chol, 18 January 1991, and in “Current status of Kim Il-sung’s activities” in Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police, November 1944, pp. 76–78 [金日成の活動狀況, 況高月報, 1944年 11月, 76~78頁]. Georgi Dimitrov. The Diary. 9 March 1933–6 February 1949. Sofia: Saint Clement of Ohrid, 1997, p. 244 [Георги Димитров. Дневник. 9 март 1933–6 февруари 1949. София: Университетско издателство “Св. Климент Охридски”, 1997, стр. 244]. Reference Letter of K.F. Vilkov, I.P. Plyshevskiy, A.G. Zyuzin and A.I. Kogan “On the Situation with the Party Organisations and the Partisan Movement in Manchuria”, 23 May 1941. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 514, folder 1, item 944, pp. 14–104 [Справка К. Ф. Вилкова, И. П. Плышевского, А. Г. Зюзина и А. И. Когана “Состояние партийных организаций и партизанского движения в Маньчжурии”. 23 мая 1941. РГАСПИ, ф. 514, оп. 1, д. 944, лл. 14–104]. Georgi Dimitrov. The Diary. 9 March 1933–6 February 1949. Sofia: Saint Clement of Ohrid, 1997, p. 220 [Георги Димитров. Дневник. 9 март 1933–6 февруари 1949. София: Университетско издателство “Св. Климент Охридски”, 1997, стр. 220]. “Kim Il-sung’s report to Zhou Baozhong and Kim Chaek” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, pp. 371–381 [金日成給周保中, 金策的信. 东北地区革 命历史文件汇集, 甲61 册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第371–381页]. “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Wang Xinlin” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, p. 338 [周保中致王新林的信, 东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈 尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第338页]; “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Kim Chaek and Zhang Shoufa” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, p. 347 [周保中 给金策, 张寿筏的信, 东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版 总社, 1990, 第347页]. Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 42. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1991, pp. 393–394 [东北地区革命历史文 件汇集, 甲42册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1991, 第393–394页]. Xu Wanmin. History of Sino-Korean Relations. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 1996, p. 261 [徐万民. 中韩关系史. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 1996, 第261页]. “Let us energetically advance forward to the complete victory of the great deed of Juche under the wise guidance of the Dear Leader Comrade Kim Jong-il!” in Choson inmingun, 16 February 1982, p. 1 [친애하는 지도자 김정일동지의 현명한 령도따라 주체 위업의 종국적 승리를 향하여 힘차게 앞으로!, 조선인민군, 1982년 2월 16일, 1면].

The Beginning 7 19 “Kim Jong-Il’s true nature” in Kyongyang Shinmun, 24 February 1977, p. 3 [金正一의 正體. 경향신문, 1977년 2월 24일, 3면]. 20 Pregnancy Conception Calculator, www.calculator.net/pregnancy-conception-calculator.html. 21 “Kim Il-sung’s report to Zhou Baozhong and Kim Chaek” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, pp. 371–381 [金日成給周保中, 金策的信. 东北地区革 命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第371–381页]. 22 “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Wang Xinlin” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, p. 338 [周保中致王新林的信, 东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈 尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第338页]; “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Kim Chaek and Zhang Shoufa” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, p. 347 [周保中 给金策, 张寿筏的信, 东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版 总社, 1990, 第347页]. 23 Civil Counterintelligence Research Centre. “Letters to congratulate Kim Jong-il on his 33rd birthday” in Grand Encyclopaedia of North Korean Terminology. Seoul: Civil Counterintelligence Research Centre, 1976, p. 311 [國民防諜硏究所. 김정일 탄생 33 주년축하문, 北韓用語大百科. 서울: 國民防諜硏究所, 1976, 311쪽]. 24 Igor Morozov. “The Korean Peninsula: A draw fight” in NKVD. Baltimore: Vesa Vega Incorporated, 1995, pp. 42–49 [Игорь Морозов. Корейский полуостров: Схватка вничью. // НКВД, № 22. Балтимор: Vesa Vega Incorporated, 1995, стр. 42–49]. 25 Pyotr Grigorenko. “Far Eastern Front, 1941–43” in There Is Nothing but Rats in the Underground [Пётр Григоренко. Дальневосточный фронт 1941–43 гг. // В подполье можно встретить только крыс], http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/grigorenko/ 20.html. 26 Ibid. 27 Kim Chan-jong. “Partisans’ dirge: Kim Il-sung and the 88th Independent Brigade” in Shindonga, no. 7, 1992, pp. 360–387 [김찬정. 빨치산만가: 김일성과 88독립여단, 新 東亞, № 7, 1992, 360~387쪽].

Bibliography Chinese Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 42. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1991 [东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲42册, 哈 尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1991]. Fourteen Years of Suffering and Struggle. Beijing: Publishing House “Chinese Encyclopaedia”, 1995 [苦难与斗争十四年, 北京: 中国大百科全书出版社, 1995]. “Kim Il-sung’s report to Zhou Baozhong and Kim Chaek” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, pp. 371–381 [金日成給周保中, 金策的信. 东北地区革命历史文件 汇集, 甲61 册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第371–381页]. “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Kim Chaek and Zhang Shoufa” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province, 1990, p. 347 [周保中给金策, 张寿筏的信, 东北地区革命历史文件 汇集, 甲61册, 哈尔滨: 黑龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第347页]. “Letter of Zhou Baozhong to Wang Xinlin” in Documents of the Revolutionary History of the Northeast, vol. 61. Harbin: General Publishing Company of Heilongjiang Province,

8

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1990, p. 338 [周保中致王新林的信, 东北地区革命历史文件汇集, 甲61册, 哈尔滨: 黑 龙江省出版总社, 1990, 第338页]. “Statistical table of the border crossings of the First Route Army of the Northeast AntiJapanese United Army’s personnel” in A Collection of Historical Documents on the Revolution of East Manchuria, vol. 1. Yanji: The Party History Research Office of the Yanbian Prefecture Committee of the Communist Party of China, p. 862 [东北抗联第一路军越 境人员统计表, 东满地区革命历史文献汇编, 1册, 延吉: 中共延边州委党史研究室, 第862页]. Xu Wanmin. History of Sino-Korean Relations. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 1996 [徐万民. 中韩关系史. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 1996]. Russian Grigorenko, Pyotr. “Far Eastern front, 1941–43” in There Is Nothing but Rats in the Underground [Пётр Григоренко. Дальневосточный фронт 1941–43 гг. // В подполье можно встретить только крыс,]. http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/grigorenko/20.html. Inventory 238. “Personal files (Manchuria)” in Documents of the Soviet Era [Опись 238. Личные дела (Маньчжурия) // Документы советской эпохи]. http://sovdoc. rusarchives.ru/sections/organizations/cards/95441/childs Jin Richeng’s Personal File, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 495, Inventory 238, File 60 [Личное дело Цзин Жи-чена. РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 238, д. 60]. Morozov, Igor. “The Korean Peninsula: A draw fight” in NKVD. Baltimore: Vesa Vega Incorporated, 1995, pp. 42–49 [Игорь Морозов. Корейский полуостров: Схватка вничью. // НКВД, № 22. Балтимор: Vesa Vega Incorporated, 1995, стр. 42–49]. Reference Letter of K.F. Vilkov, I.P. Plyshevskiy, A.G. Zyuzin and A.I. Kogan “On the Situation with the Party Organisations and the Partisan Movement in Manchuria”, 23 May 1941. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 514, Folder 1, Item 944, pp. 14–104 [Справка К. Ф. Вилкова, И. П. Плышевского, А. Г. Зюзина и А. И. Когана “Состояние партийных организаций и партизанского движения в Маньчжурии”. 23 мая 1941. РГАСПИ, ф. 514, оп. 1, д. 944, лл. 14–104]. Tamazishvili, A. O. “An incident of the East Department of the Institute for Red Professors of History” in Vostok, no.1, 1991, pp. 160–166 [А. О. Тамазишвили. Инцидент на восточном отделении Института красной профессуры истории // Восток, №1, 1994, стр. 160–166]. Korean Kim Chan-jong. “Partisans’ dirge: Kim Il-sung and the 88th Independent Brigade” in Shindonga, no.7, 1992, pp. 360–387 [김찬정. 빨치산만가: 김일성과 88독립여단, 新東亞, № 7, 1992, 360~387쪽]. Civil Counterintelligence Research Centre. “Letters to congratulate Kim Jong-Il on his 33rd birthday” in Grand Encyclopaedia of North Korean Terminology. Seoul: Civil Counterintelligence Research Centre, 1976, p. 311 [國民防諜硏究所. 김정일 탄생 33주년축하 문, 北韓用語大百科. 서울: 國民防諜硏究所, 1976, 311쪽]. Lee Dong-hun. “Personal files of war criminals of the Korean War, discovered after 80 years” in Chugang Choson, 13 January 2020 [이동훈. 80년 만에 찾아낸 6·25 전범들

The Beginning 9 의 이력서, 주간조선, 2020년 1월 13일]. http://weekly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp? ctcd=C01&nNewsNumb=002591100002. “Kim Jong-il’s true nature” in Kyongyang Shinmun, 24 February 1977, p. 3 [金正一의 正 體. 경향신문, 1977년 2월 24일, 3면]. “Let us energetically advance forward to the complete victory of the great deed of Juche under the wise guidance of the Dear Leader Comrade Kim Jong-il!” in Choson Inmingun, 16 February 1982, p. 1 [친애하는 지도자 김정일동지의 현명한 령도따라 주체위업의 종국적 승리를 향하여 힘차게 앞으로!, 조선인민군, 1982년 2월 16일, 1면]. Other Languages “Current status of Kim Il-sung’s activities” in Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police, November 1944, pp. 76–78 [金日成の活動狀況, 特高月報, 1944年 11月, 76~78頁]. Georgi Dimitrov. The Diary. 9 March 1933–6 February 1949. Sofia: Saint Clement of Ohrid, 1997 [Георги Димитров. Дневник. 9 март 1933–6 февруари 1949. София: Университетско издателство “Св. Климент Охридски”, 1997]. Other Sources Andrei Lankov’s interview with Yu Song-chol, 18 January 1991.

Pregnancy Conception Calculator, www.calculator.net/pregnancy-conception-calculator.html.

2

The Week That Reshaped East Asia The Soviet-Japanese War of 1945

The period between 8 and 15 August 1945 was undoubtedly the most important week in the history of East Asia. This short time between two Wednesdays set the fates of China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan on a new trajectory. It all began with the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan, a country already weakened by many years of war against the Allies and the nuclear strike on Hiroshima. The Union’s army quickly occupied Manchuria and the northern part of Korea. Shocked by the USSR joining the war and by the power of the atomic bomb, Japan surrendered. Ultimately, the Soviet attack led to the birth of North Korea and to the nearly complete triumph of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War. The USSR and Imperial Japan in the 1940s The vanguard of the world revolution: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The unchallenged leader of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere: the Greater Empire of Japan. The goals of these two nations were completely incompatible. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the relations between Moscow and Tokyo in the early 1940s were not hostile. Of course, Japan was an ally of Nazi Germany, which was waging a horrific war against the Soviet Union. Communism was illegal in the Empire, and in the 1930s, many Soviet citizens were imprisoned under the false accusation of spying for Japan. The nations’ armies clashed twice in 1938 and 1939, with the Soviet army emerging victorious both times. The situation did not indicate any possibility for a quick change, but the change did come. On 13 April 1941, Tokyo and Moscow signed the Neutrality Pact. Both nations pledged not to attack each other and respect the borders of the counterpart’s satellite states: Manchukuo and Mongolia. Thus, if one would look at, say, Soviet books after the signing of the Pact, one cannot sense any hostility towards Japan in them. The Soviet encyclopaedia of the Pacific nations of 1942 did express regret that Japan had joined the Axis but refrained from calling the Empire an “aggressive” or “imperialist” power.1 Tokyo was not considered an enemy for the time being. DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-2

The Week That Reshaped East Asia 11 It was at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that Britain and America requested that the Soviet Union attack Japan, and Stalin agreed. The plan was that Moscow would declare war two or three months after Germany surrendered.2 At the time, the Soviet leadership had few, if any, plans on what to do with Korea. It was, after all, merely a colony of Japan, even if it was the biggest one. The previously mentioned encyclopaedia of the Pacific nations, for example, spoke in great detail on Japanese history, administration and politics. Korea, however, was only covered in the section “Japanese Colonies”.3 Indeed, the book dedicated more space to it than, say, to Taiwan, but still, Korea received only a fraction of the attention that the whole Empire of Japan did. The connection with the local Communist forces was also lost. In 1928, the Communist Party of Korea had been dissolved, while, notably, Communist Parties of both Japan and Taiwan4 continued their existence. Thus, when the war actually broke out in August, the future fate of Korea remained very uncertain. The War and the Division On 8 August 1945, at 23:00 Tokyo time, the Soviet Union proclaimed that it would be entering a state of war with Japan in exactly one hour. It took some time for the Japanese embassy in Moscow to inform Tokyo and for the Japanese authorities to contact the front. By the time the message reached the army, the Soviet invasion had already begun. The Soviet land forces formed three fronts: the Transbaikal and the First and Second Far Eastern ones. The commander-in-chief of all the forces participating in the war was Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskiy. Manchukuo and Korea were defended by the Kwantung Army of Japan, with the Imperial Army of Manchukuo and the 17th Area Army in Korea reporting to it. The commander of the Kwantung Army was General Yamada Otozo. The Soviet troops were almost twice as numerous as the Japanese were; their weaponry was more modern, and many soldiers had a lot of recent experience fighting Germany. Thus, the war turned out to be a blitzkrieg. On 11 August, the Soviet troops landed in Yuki, on the 12th in Rashin and on the 13th in Seishin.5 As the war began, Marshal Vasilevskiy issued a proclamation in which he promised that “the banner of freedom and independence shall fly over Seoul”.6 However, it never did.7 And on 10 August, the fate of Korea was decided for many decades to come. The two men who decided what would happen to the millions of Koreans were two American colonels: David Dean Rusk and Charles Hartwell Bonesteel III. On 10 August, they received an order from their superiors to compile a draft plan on how to divide Korea and Soviet and American occupation zones.8 The map they had did not have Korean provinces listed on it, but it did have geographical lines – meridians and parallels. Thus, a plan to divide the country by the 38th parallel north was born. After it was duly approved by the entire chain of command, Washington sent it to Stalin. The Kremlin approved the Korean division without arguing.

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The Week That Reshaped East Asia

The day to put the plan in motion was coming. With the Soviet army advancing to the South and Hiroshima and Nagasaki being obliterated by nuclear strikes, the Tokyo leadership – and its symbolic leader, the emperor – accepted the inevitable. On 14 August, hardliners tried and failed to overthrow the government. With their defeat, on the next day, 15 August, the nation heard a broadcast of the emperor’s voice. Hirohito said that the terms of surrender issued by the Allies were accepted by Tokyo. The sudden conditional surrender by Japan came as a surprise to Stalin. By that time, the Soviet army had not yet reached Xinjing – Manchukuo’s capital. The fight in Korea, on Sakhalin island and the Kuril archipelago, was still going on. To seize more land, the Kremlin ordered the troops to continue their advances until the Japanese formally surrendered.9 Naturally, with the surrender being announced, the Japanese troops lost the will and motivation to resist. The front collapsed, and Japanese soldiers and officers started to surrender en masse as the Soviet troops continued their steady advance. On 19 August, Manchurian Emperor Puyi was captured in Fengtian. One may say that this day marked the end of Manchukuo.10 After accepting the surrender of the Japanese armies, the Soviet troops started investigating the territory they had just conquered. Their first impression of Korean cities was more positive than that of the Manchurian ones. In reports on Manchuria, one could read descriptions of low life and hygiene standards. Meanwhile, Soviet officers in Korea noted that the former colony’s industry was rather developed and its harbours were easy to use.11 As the war was coming to an end, the Soviets started to grant the soldiers Bolshevik Party memberships on a large scale.12 It served both as a reward and a means to improve morale for the future for the post-war occupation. These post-war reports also mentioned a large number of Koreans serving in the Japanese army.13 Like their Japanese comrades-in-arms, they were later deported to Soviet labour camps, and those who survived received permission to be repatriated to North Korea in the mid-1950s.14 How Pyongyang Became the North Korean Capital The unit put in charge of North Korea was the 25th Army of the Soviet First Far East Front. Its commanding officer was Colonel-General15 Ivan Chistyakov. Up to early 1946, he was the most important man in North Korea. According to Chistyakov’s official memoirs, on 25 August, he was summoned by the front commander, Marshal Kirill Meretskov, and was given a choice to position his army’s staff. The two options given to him were either Hamhung or Pyongyang. Chistyakov chose Pyongyang. Pyongyang was Korea’s third largest city after Seoul and Pusan, a cultural hub, nicknamed “Jerusalem of the East” for its record number of Christians. It is, however, very unlikely that Chistyakov considered or even knew this when he made his decision. This choice had a colossal impact on North Korean history. This was the reason Pyongyang ultimately became the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of

The Week That Reshaped East Asia 13 Korea (DPRK). This, in turn, is also the reason North Korea claims Pyongyang is the centre of one of the world’s most ancient civilisations – the Taedong River culture. Moreover, the fact that Kim Il-sung was sent to Pyongyang after the war, where the Soviet command was located, contributed to his rise significantly. Who knows how things could have been if Chistyakov had chosen Hamhung instead. Would North Korea have told us about Hamhung’s “Songchon river culture” instead?16 On 25 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Vasiliy Lanin visited Pyongyang and instructed the Japanese forces stationed there on their surrender.17 The next day, 26 August, the commander of the Heijo Defence District,18 Lieutenant-General Takeshita Yoshiharu, formally surrendered to Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov in the Railway Hotel of Pyongyang. Thus, Japanese rule came to an end in North Korea, and Soviet rule began. Books on the Soviet-Japanese war sometimes claim that, during the war, the Soviet army had briefly advanced past the 38th parallel but then retreated back to the North. Even Marshal Meretskov’s official memoirs reiterate this claim.19 However, if one looks at actual Soviet sources of the era, it is clear to see that nothing of the sort ever happened. One could suppose that this rumour originated from future incidents when the inter-Korean border was being established and some units had to retreat to their occupation zones as a result. The War Forgotten in North Korea The Soviet-Japanese war was the event that gave birth to North Korea. There was a time when this was acknowledged by Pyongyang. For more than two decades, until 1967, the DPRK’s press stated how grateful the Korean people were to the “great Soviet army which had liberated Korea from the Japanese yoke”. Perhaps the only remnant of this era is the inscription of the Liberation monument, which hails the Soviet troops for crushing the “Japanese militarists”. However, everything changed in 1967, when Kim Il-sung decided to appropriate the Red Army’s exploits for himself. As will be shown in more detail later in this book, for more than half a century, North Korea claimed that it was Kim Ilsung’s Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA) which had crushed Japan, whilst the Soviets had merely played an auxiliary role to the mighty KPRA. In all actuality, the KPRA never even existed, and Captain Kim Il-sung had not even fought in this war. Yet, ironically, the country born of the war became the one where the memory of it is the most distorted.20 Notes 1 “Japan” in Countries of the Pacific Ocean. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1942, pp. 23–154 [“Япония”, Страны Тихого океана, Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 1942, стр. 23–154]. 2 Robin Edmonds. “Yalta and Potsdam: Forty years afterwards” in International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 2, Spring 1986, pp. 197–216.

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3 “Korea (Chōsen)” in Countries of the Pacific Ocean. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1942, pp. 145–149 [“Корея – Chösen”, Страны Тихого океана, Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 1942, стр. 145–149]. 4 On the Communist Party of Taiwan, see Guo Jie and Bai Anna. Taiwan Communist Movement and Comintern (1924–1932): Research and Archival Documents. Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2010 [郭杰, 白安娜. 臺灣共產主義運 動與共產國際 (1924–1932) 研究·檔案. 臺北市: 中央研究院臺灣史研究所, 2010]. 5 The Korean names for these places are, respectively, Unggi, Rajin and Chongjin. Unggi is now located in Sonbong county. 6 Oh Ye, the Korean people!, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 32, folder 11318, item 196, p. 253 [조선 사람들이여!, ЦАМО России, ф. 32, оп. 11318, д. 196. л. 253]. 7 War Journal of the 25th Army. 9–19 August 1945. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 379, folder 11019, item 8 [Журнал боевых действий 25 армии с 9 по 19 августа 1945 г., ЦАМО России, ф. 379, оп. 11019, д. 8]. 8 Lee Wang-bom. How the 38th Parallel Was Drawn: The True Story, 1944–45. Seoul: Knowledge Factory Publishing House, 2001 [이완범, 38선 획정의 진실, 1944~1945, 서울: 지식산업사, 2001]. Judith Munro-Leighton. “The Tokyo surrender: A diplomatic marathon in Washington, August 10–14, 1945” in Pacific Historical Review, vol. 65, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 455–473; Mark Barry. “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea” in NK News, 12 February 2012, www.nknews.org/2012/02/ the-u-s-and-the-1945-division-of-korea/. 9 “An explanatory note of the general staff of the Red Army on Japan’s surrender” in Pravda, 16 August 1945, p. 1 [Раз’яснение Генерального штаба Красной Армии о капитуляции Японии, Правда, 16 августа 1945 года, стр. 1]. 10 Aleksandr Pritula. “In August 1945” in Smena, no. 1159, September 1975 [Александр Притула. В августе сорок пятого. Смена, № 1159, сентябрь 1975], http://smena-online. ru/stories/v-avguste-sorok-pyatogo. 11 War Journal of the 25th Army. 9–19 August (Including Attachment). Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 379, folder 11019, item 9, pp. 35– 37 [Журнал боевых действий 25 армии с 9 по 19 августа 1945 г. Приложение к журналу боевых действий, ЦАМО России, ф. 379, оп. 11019, д. 9, лл. 35–37]. 12 Boris Sapozhnikov. Current Situation in Korea: Briefing, 13 September 1945. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 32, folder 11306, item 692 [Борис Сапожников, Положение в Корее: Информационная сводка, 13 сентября 1945 года, ЦАМО России, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 692]. 13 Ibid. 14 Sergey Kim. “Repatriation of Japanese POWs from the USSR, 1946–1950” in Bulletin of War History, no. 3, 2015, pp. 69–75 [Сергей Петрович Ким, “Репатриация японских военнопленных из СССР в 1946–1950 гг.”, Военно-исторический журнал, № 3 (2015), стр. 69–75]. 15 Colonel-general was the Soviet name for a three-star general. This somewhat unusual name originated from German; it is a direct translation of the Generaloberst rank. 16 Ivan Chistyakov. Serving the Fatherland. Moscow: Military Publishing House [Иван Чистяков. Служим Отчизне. Москва: Воениздат, 1985], http://militera.lib.ru/memo/ russian/chistyakov_im/19.html. 17 War Journal of the 25th Army. 9–19 August (Including Attachment). Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 379, folder 11019, item 9, pp. 35– 37 [Журнал боевых действий 25 армии с 9 по 19 августа 1945 г. Приложение к журналу боевых действий, ЦАМО России, ф. 379, оп. 11019, д. 9, лл. 35–37]. 18 Heijo is the Japanese name of Pyongyang. 19 Kirill Meretskov. Serving the People. Moscow: Veche, 2015, p. 456 [Кирилл Мерецков. На службе народу. Москва: Вече, 2015, стр. 456].

The Week That Reshaped East Asia 15 20 For more information on this topic, see Fyodor Tertitskiy. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?” in Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4, October/December 2021, pp. 164–183, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183. pdf; Fyodor Tertitskiy. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan”, in Korea Observer, June 2018, pp. 219–238, www.researchgate. net/publication/325990388_A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_ Il-sung_liberating_the_country_from_Japan.

Bibliography English Barry, Mark. “The U.S. and the 1945 Division of Korea”, NK News (12 February 2012). www.nknews.org/2012/02/the-u-s-and-the-1945-division-of-korea/. Edmonds, Robin. “Yalta and Potsdam: Forty years afterwards”, International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 197–216. Munro-Leighton, Judith. “The Tokyo surrender: A diplomatic marathon in Washington, August 10–14, 1945”, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 3 (August 1996), pp. 455–473. Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan”, Korea Observer (June 2018), pp. 219–238. www.researchgate.net/ publication/325990388_A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_ liberating_the_country_from_Japan Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4 (October/December 2021), pp. 164–183. https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf Russian Chistyakov, Ivan. Serving the Fatherland. Moscow: Military Publishing House [Иван Чистяков. Служим Отчизне. Москва: Воениздат, 1985]. http://militera.lib.ru/memo/ russian/chistyakov_im/19.html. “An explanatory note of the general staff of the Red Army on Japan’s surrender”, Pravda, 16 August 1945, p. 1 [Раз’яснение Генерального штаба Красной Армии о капитуляции Японии, Правда, 16 августа 1945 года, стр. 1]. “Japan” in Countries of the Pacific Ocean. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1942, pp. 23–154 [“Япония”, Страны Тихого океана, Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 1942, стр. 23–154]. Kim, Sergey. “Repatriation of Japanese POWs from the USSR, 1946–1950” in Bulletin of War History, no.3, 2015, pp. 69–75 [Сергей Петрович Ким, “Репатриация японских военнопленных из СССР в 1946–1950 гг.”, Военно-исторический журнал, № 3 (2015), стр. 69–75]. “Korea (Chōsen)” in Countries of the Pacific Ocean. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopaedia, 1942, pp. 145–149 [“Корея – Chösen”, Страны Тихого океана, Москва: Советская энциклопедия, 1942, стр. 145–149]. Meretskov, Kirill. Serving the People. Moscow: Veche, 2015 [Кирилл Мерецков. На службе народу. Москва: Вече, 2015]. Pritula, Aleksandr. “In August 1945” in Smena, no.1159, September 1975 [Александр Притула. В августе сорок пятого. Смена, № 1159, сентябрь 1975]. http://smena-online.ru/ stories/v-avguste-sorok-pyatogo

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Sapozhnikov, Boris. Current Situation in Korea: Briefing, 13 September 1945, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 32, Folder 11306, Item 692 [Борис Сапожников, Положение в Корее: Информационная сводка, 13 сентября 1945 года, ЦАМО России, ф. 32, оп. 11306, д. 692]. War Journal of the 25th Army. 9–19 August 1945 (Including Attachment). Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 379, Folder 11019, Item 9, pp. 35–37 [Журнал боевых действий 25 армии с 9 по 19 августа 1945 г. Приложение к журналу боевых действий, ЦАМО России, ф. 379, оп. 11019, д. 9, лл. 35–37]. War Journal of the 25th Army. 9–19 August 1945. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 379, Folder 11019, Item 8 [Журнал боевых действий 25 армии с 9 по 19 августа 1945 г., ЦАМО России, ф. 379, оп. 11019, д. 8]. Korean Oh Ye, the Korean People!, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 32, Folder 11318, Item 196, p. 253 [조선 사람들이여!, ЦАМО России, ф. 32, оп. 11318, д. 196. л. 253]. Lee Wang-bom. How the 38th Parallel Was Drawn: The True Story, 1944–45. Seoul: Knowledge Factory Publishing House, 2001 [이완범, 38선 획정의 진실, 1944~1945, 서울: 지식산업사, 2001]. Chinese Guo Jie and Bai Anna. Taiwan Communist Movement and Comintern (1924–1932): Research and Archival Documents. Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2010 [郭杰, 白安娜. 臺灣共產主義運動與共產國際 (1924–1932) 研究·檔案. 臺北市: 中央研究院臺灣史研究所, 2010].

3

The Soviet Governors of North Korea Ivan Chistyakov and Terentiy Shtykov

Foreign Governors of Korea After more than a decade of reading South Korean historiography, this author may say that its weakest point is the consistent downplaying, sometimes even omission, of the role of foreigners who ruled half of Korea at some point. Resident-general of the Korean Empire, governor-general of colonial Korea, commanding officers of the American and Soviet occupation armies in the 1940s – nearly all of these people are widely neglected in South Korean textbooks and academic papers. Yet, naturally, a ruler, especially an authoritarian one – none of the people mentioned above were elected – is a person of enormous importance to a country. The Soviet army was stationed in North Korea until the end of 1948. Of all the Soviet generals, the two most important ones were the 25th Army’s first commanding officer, Ivan Chistyakov, and the head of the Soviet delegation in the AmericanSoviet Joint Commission for Korea, Terentiy Shtykov. Both held a three-star rank of colonel-general. Contemporary American documents from the South Korean occupation zone presented a highly inaccurate image of their Soviet counterparts.1 Hence, they are hardly reliable for a historian. Fortunately, there are plenty of Soviet sources which allow one to reconstruct the lives of these two generals. Ivan Chistyakov Born in 1900, Ivan Chistyakov joined the Red Army as a teenager in 1918. During the Russian Civil War, he fought for the Bolsheviks. The young solider participated in the crushing of the Tula farmers’ uprising against the Reds and fought against the units of the famous White commander Pyotr Krasnov. In 1920, he graduated from a machine gun command academy2 and was granted a command position. After the death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin, Ivan Chistyakov’s career went smoothly. From 1936, he served in the Far East. In 1938, he reached the rank of colonel, and in March 1941 – without an additional promotion – he was appointed to command a corps. After the USSR was attacked by Germany in June, Colonel Chistyakov was given a fast-track advanced military education and was appointed a commander of the 6th Separate Marine Brigade. His career was steady – DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-3

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Figure 3.1 Ivan Chistyakov. Source: The Central Preparatory Committee to Commemorate the Liberation of 15 August [8·15 해 방 일주년기렴 중앙준비위원회]. A Collection of Photographs Showing the Process of Democratic Construction in North Korea [북조선민주주의건설 사진첩], Pyongyang, 1946. The original is in possession of the National Institute of Korean History (Kwachon, South Korea); this is a high-resolution scan

major-general in 1942, lieutenant-general in 1943 and colonel-general in 1944. This was the rank he held when Germany surrendered in May 1945.3 Soon after Germany’s surrender, Colonel-General Chistyakov was appointed the commanding officer of the 25th Army. This position ended up being the most important one in the general’s entire career, as this eventually put him in charge of North Korea. The Soviet policy at the time was that, while the occupied territories were to be managed by political officers, the ultimate command decisions on the ground were to be made by the occupying formation’s commander: a military man from a combat branch. In North Korea, this man was Ivan Chistyakov. His first important decision, as mentioned earlier, was to choose the place to locate his staff. Being presented with two options – Hamhung and Pyongyang4 – Chistyakov chose the latter.5 One could strongly suspect that his visit to Hamhung a day earlier6 influenced his decision – Chistyakov probably did not take a liking to the city. Despite the USSR being ruled by Joseph Stalin at the time, with all that it implies, it would be very wrong to say that every one of Stalin’s generals was as cruel as he. The most well-known counterexample would probably be Berlin’s first commandant, Nikolay Berzarin. Immediately after his appointment, this general

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took necessary measures to feed the city’s civilians – for which he is gratefully remembered in modern Germany.7 However, the Pyongyang viceroy was nothing like his kind-hearted Berlin colleague. One of the most fascinating documents from the Soviet occupation era in North Korea is the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Georgiy Fyodorov and Major Yuriy Livshits. In autumn 1945, these two officers were sent to the Soviet zone to assess the local agriculture – the Soviets were preparing a land reform. Major Livshits spoke fluent Japanese, which, naturally, was an asset in their assignment – many Koreans spoke the state language of the late Empire. Fyodorov and Livshits were shocked by what they saw in Korea. Through the report that they filed to the command of the Maritime Military District, one could clearly see how incompetent and cruel Chistyakov’s rule was. Left without supervision, the economy of North Korea was collapsing. Factories stopped producing, trains were not moving, farmers were left without fertiliser and their harvest was confiscated by the Red Army almost in its entirety. Chistyakov, meanwhile, not only did not try to help the people but also tried to intimidate those who protested. After the Red Army’s policy resulted in a farmer uprising in Shinchon county, the general threatened that he would “have half of Korea hanged”. The Japanese civilians also did not fare well under Chistyakov’s rule. The new authorities resettled them in ghettos. Horrible hygiene and lack of food led to dozens of deaths every day. To quote the report: “There is a simple saying one can hear a lot amongst the highest circles of the Army command, which relays their attitude to the Japanese civilians: ‘Just let them die’”. Confronting a superior is dangerous in any military and was even more so in Stalin’s army. Yet the officers thought it was their duty to do so, as they could not allow Chistyakov to continue. Their intervention was a success. The report reached Chistyakov’s superior – Marshal Kirill Meretskov – who ordered the general to start helping the starving civilians.8 With the formation of the American-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea in early 1946, Chistyakov was sidelined from power by the chief of the Soviet delegation: Colonel-General Terentiy Shtykov. Chistyakov never truly faced any consequences for his actions. He left North Korea in 1947 and served in several other assignments, including in East Germany. He died in 1979, long before the opening of the Soviet Union, taking his secrets to his grave. The only hint that these events might have actually had an impact on him was in his official memoirs, Serving the Fatherland.9 In this highly censored book, the general did his best to present that he had been a completely apolitical military man. Perhaps after being thrashed by Meretskov back in 1945, Chistyakov understood that this would be the best way for history to remember him? This we will never know. Terentiy Shtykov “Terentiy” is a rather odd name to the Russian ear. It feels like the name of a village peasant back in the Imperial era. And, indeed, this is where Terentiy Shtykov was born. When he was 13, he moved to Petrograd from his home village in Byelorussia. There, in the former capital of the Russian Empire, he became a worker. As such, it

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Figure 3.2 Terentiy Shtykov. Source: https://735606.selcdn.ru/thumbnails/photos/2017/09/15/rg3h4kyjqtvr90qx_1024.jpg Author unknown; photo partially restored by the author. Judging by Shtykov’s uniform, photo was evidently taken before 1942

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was very easy for him to join the Bolshevik Party, which the young man soon did. Eventually, he became an official in the Komsomol – the Party’s youth wing.10 It was there that Shtykov met Andrei Zhdanov, who at the time occupied the city’s highest position of party’s first secretary. Zhdanov was an extremely influential figure in the Soviet elite; some considered him Stalin’s future heir. Zhdanov’s protection enabled the meteoric rise of Terentiy Shtykov. In 1938, at the age of 31, he was appointed the second secretary of Leningrad’s Party Committee.11 When the Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1939, Shtykov served as a member of the Military Council of the Seventh Army: this was the position of a high-ranking political officer. He never received any proper military education, but in 1944, during the war with Germany, he became one of the very few non-combat officers to reach the three-star rank of colonel-general. In April 1945, he was recalled from the front to the Far East, where he served under the First Far Eastern Front and the front’s successor – the Maritime Military District.12 In 1946, Shtykov came to Korea, where he was to become the head of the Soviet delegation in the talks with the United States on the future of the peninsula. He quickly used this position to sideline Chistyakov from decision-making and, thus, became the most important person in North Korea. Decisions on the nascent country’s politics, economy and education were all made by him. He oversaw the nation’s land reform and the adoption of the DPRK’s first constitution. He decided who would be elected to the nation’s legislature and who would occupy Cabinetlevel positions. After the DPRK was formed in 1948, the viceroy was appointed the first Soviet ambassador to the newborn country. Shtykov’s governance was more humane that that of his predecessor. Unlike Chistyakov, he cared about the welfare of the people. Soviet archives have multiple letters of him asking Moscow for more economic assistance to be provided for North Korea.13 However, one definitely cannot say that Terentiy Shtykov was a positive figure in Korean history, as he is also directly responsible for the Korean War. The idea to “liberate South Korea” by an armed invasion was conceived by Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong, yet, without the ambassador’s approval, it would have never been implemented. And Shtykov, who experienced both the Great Purge and the Great War with Germany, evidently concluded that human lives were expendable when it came to painting the map in the right colour. Initially, Stalin strongly opposed the invasion. Only after the embassy started to endorse Kim and Pak’s plan did the Soviet dictator grant his approval. Fittingly, Shtykov’s surname means “bayonet” in Russian, and, truly, this man became a bayonet that started the Korean War. The plan ended as a failure. South Korea did not collapse, and the UN counterattack put the DPRK itself on the brink of defeat. This mistake cost Shtykov his career. After the fall of Pyongyang, the Soviet Politburo enacted the following decisions: • Have comrade Shtykov strictly reprimanded as a Party member. • Reduce comrade Shtykov in rank to lieutenant-general. • Retire comrade Shtykov and have him employed as a civilian.14

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The demoted general left North Korea, never to come back. Yet he remained an influential Soviet figure. In 1959, after serving as first secretary for several Soviet regions, he became an ambassador to Hungary. Three years had passed since the USSR had invaded the country to suppress any anti-Communist uprisings. There are testimonies that Shtykov passionately disliked Hungary’s reformist leader – János Kádár – and on one occasion told him: “It’s a pity they did not shoot you back in the day”. Such undiplomatic behaviour caused him to become persona non grata.15 He left the country in 1960 and passed away a few years later. After learning about his death from the Soviet ambassador, Kim Il-sung commented: “Shtykov died early, he could have lived for twenty more years”.16 Was Shtykov a better person than Chistyakov? Likely so. Did he cause Korea much more suffering than his predecessor? He did. Chistyakov ruled the North as a viceroy, while Shtykov probably viewed himself as a liberator. And yet the result of this “liberation” was a horrifying one. As C. S. Lewis once put it, “Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies”.17 A boy from a farmer’s family who managed to rise to the top. A man, who, whilst not personally malevolent, was willing to start a war and send millions of people to slaughter. Few people exemplify Stalin’s elite as well as Terentiy Shtykov. Notes 1 A good example is: United States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, “Intelligence summary: Northern Korea, 1 December 1945”, in HQ USAFIK Intelligence Summary: Northern Korea, vol. 1. Seoul: Hallim University, 1989, pp. 1–8. This document has glaring mistakes, such as wrong ranks for most important Soviet generals. Notably, the ranks could easily be learned from their insignia. 2 Normally it would be called “an officer academy”, but at the time, the Soviets were very averse to using the word “officer”, as it was associated with Imperial Russia. The Red Army thus had “commanders” instead. 3 “Ivan Mihailovich Chistyakov” in Great Patriotic War. Army Commanders. Military Biographical Dictionary. Moscow: Kuchkovo Field, 2005, pp. 261–262 [Чистяков Иван Михайлович // Великая Отечественная. Командармы. Военный биографический словарь. Москва: Кучково поле, 2005, стр. 261–262]. 4 Report from the Commander of the First Far Eastern Front to the Commander-inChief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East with Some Thoughts About the Disposition of the Armed Forces for the Post-War Far East, 24 August 1945. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 66, inventory 117499, folder 1, pp. 376–378 [Донесение командующего войсками 1-го Дальневосточного фронта главнокомандующему Советскими войсками на Дальнем Востоке с соображениями о послевоенной дислокации войск на Дальнем Востоке. 24 августа 1945 г. ЦАМО России, ф. 66, оп. 117499, д. 1, лл. 376–378]. 5 Ivan Chistyakov. Serving the Fatherland. Moscow: Military Publishing House [Иван Чистяков. Служим Отчизне. Москва: Воениздат, 1985], http://militera.lib.ru/memo/ russian/chistyakov_im/19.html. 6 For the Amity with the Korean People. Moscow: Nauka, 1965, p. 26 [Во имя дружбы с народом Кореи. Москва: Наука, 1965, стр. 26].

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7 Erich Kuby. The Russians in Berlin, 1945. Munich: Scherz Verlag, 1965 [Erich Kuby. Die Russen in Berlin 1945. München: Scherz Verlag, 1965]. 8 “A decision of the military council of the 25th army of the Maritime Military District”, 15 January 1946. In Decisions of the 25th Army Adopted in 1946. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 25A, folder 532092, item 1, pp. 3–5 [Постановление Военного Совета 25 армии Приморского военного округа // Постановления Военного Совета 25 армии за 1946 год. 15 января 1946 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 25A, оп. 532092, д. 1, лл. 3–5]. 9 Ivan Chistyakov. Serving the Fatherland. Moscow: Military Publishing House [Иван Чистяков. Служим Отчизне. Москва: Воениздат, 1985]. 10 Terentiy Fomich Shtykov [Терентий Фомич Штыков] // Hrono.ru, www.hrono.ru/ biograf/bio_sh/shtykov_tf.php. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Reports on the Situation in North Korea in 1947. Russian State Archive of SocioPolitical History, collection 17, folder 128, item 392, p. 120 [Донесения о положении в Северной Корее за 1947. РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 392, л. 120]. 14 Protocol no. 80.3 February 1951. Item no. 175. On Comrade Shtykov. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 17, folder 3, item 1087, p. 34 [Протокол № 80. От 3.II.51 г. 175. О тов. Штыкове. РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 3, д. 1087, л. 34]. 15 Georgiy Tumanov. “How the Great Leader was manufactured” in Novoye Vremya, 1993, no. 16, pp. 32–34 [Георгий Туманов, “Как изготовляли великого вождя”, Новое время, № 16 (1993), стр. 32–34]; Andrei Lankov’s interview with Ivan Loboda, November 1990. 16 Journal of V. P. Moskovskiy, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1964, vol. 2. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 0102, folder 20, item 101, p. 138 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. П. Московского за 1964 год, том 2. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 20, п. 101, л. 138]. 17 C. S. Lewis. God in the Dock. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014, p. 324.

Bibliography English Lewis, C. S. God in the Dock. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014. United States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. “Intelligence summary: Northern Korea. 1 December 1945”, in HQ USAFIK Intelligence Summary: Northern Korea, vol. 1. Seoul: Hallim University, 1989, pp. 1–8. Russian Chistyakov, Ivan. Serving the Fatherland. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985 [Иван Чистяков. Служим Отчизне. Москва: Воениздат, 1985]. http://militera.lib.ru/memo/ russian/chistyakov_im/19.html. “A decision of the military council of the 25th army of the Maritime Military District”, 15 January 1946. In Decisions of the 25th Army Adopted in 1946, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 25A, Folder 532092, Item 1, pp. 3–5 [Постановление Военного Совета 25 армии Приморского военного округа // Постановления Военного Совета 25 армии за 1946 год. 15 января 1946 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 25A, оп. 532092, д. 1, лл. 3–5].

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For the Amity with the Korean People. Moscow: Nauka, 1965 [Во имя дружбы с народом Кореи. Москва: Наука, 1965]. “Ivan Mihailovich Chistyakov” in Great Patriotic War. Army Commanders. Military Biographical Dictionary. Moscow: Kuchkovo Field, 2005, pp. 261–262 [Чистяков Иван Михайлович // Великая Отечественная. Командармы. Военный биографический словарь. Москва: Кучково поле, 2005, стр. 261–262]. Journal of V. P. Moskovskiy, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1964, Vol. 2, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 0102, Folder 20, Item 101, p. 138 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. П. Московского за 1964 год, том 2. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 20, п. 101, л. 138]. Protocol no. 80.3 February 1951. Item no. 175. On Comrade Shtykov, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 17, Folder 3, Item 1087, p. 34 [Протокол № 80. От 3.II.51 г. 175. О тов. Штыкове. РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 3, д. 1087, л. 34]. Report from the Commander of the First Far Eastern Front to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East with Some Thoughts About the Disposition of the Armed Forces for the Post-War Far East, 24 August 1945, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 66, Inventory 117499, Folder 1, pp. 376–378 [Донесение командующего войсками 1-го Дальневосточного фронта главнокомандующему Советскими войсками на Дальнем Востоке с соображениями о послевоенной дислокации войск на Дальнем Востоке. 24 августа 1945 г. ЦАМО России, ф. 66, оп. 117499, д. 1, лл. 376–378]. Reports on the Situation in North Korea in 1947, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 17, Folder 128, Item 392, p. 120 [Донесения о положении в Северной Корее за 1947. РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 392, л. 120]. Terentiy Fomich Shtykov [Терентий Фомич Штыков] // Hrono.ru. www.hrono.ru/biograf/ bio_sh/shtykov_tf.php Tumanov, Georgiy. “How the Great Leader was manufactured” in Novoye Vremya, no.16, 1993, pp. 32–34 [Георгий Туманов, “Как изготовляли великого вождя”, Новое время, № 16 (1993), стр. 32–34]; Andrei Lankov’s interview with Ivan Loboda, November 1990. German Erich Kuby. The Russians in Berlin, 1945. Munich: Scherz Verlag, 1965 [Erich Kuby. Die Russen in Berlin 1945. München: Scherz Verlag, 1965].

4

Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power How a Junior Officer Ended up Leading a Nation

Kim Il-sung rose to power months after Imperial Japan was defeated. Few events impacted Korean history as dramatically as his appointment to the position of supreme leader. Naturally, should Stalin have chosen a different person, we would have never leaned the names of Kim Jong-il or Kim Jong-un, and Kim Il-sung himself would have ended up being an historical obscurity – a commander in the failed partisan movement of Manchukuo. Without Kim Il-sung, the North Korean elite would have been very different, as his comrades – Vice-Marshal Choe Yonggon; Marshal O Jin-u; and many, many others – would not have ended up in power. Why did it happen? Why was it Kim Il-sung who was favoured by Stalin? This chapter aims to answer this question. The Way of Ascension In the spring of 1945, Stalin chose to accept the British-American request to attack Japan in the near future. As it seemed likely that Korea would end up being conquered by the Soviet Army, Moscow started to think about a potential leader for the peninsula after Japan’s surrender. In order to appease the locals, the candidate would have to be an ethnic Korean – otherwise, Moscow’s control would have been impossible to conceal. As testified by Pak Il, a vice-chancellor of Kim Il-sung University in the 1950s, the very first man to recommend Kim Il-sung to the Central Committee was a Soviet Korean named Mun Il. Known also under Russified variants of this name, “Mun Eri” and “Erik Aleksandrovich Mun”, Mun Il later became Kim Il-sung’s personal secretary. In a meeting with a Central Committee representative, Mun Il said that a group of partisans had crossed the Soviet border and had settled near Khabarovsk. There was a man there called Kim, and Mun Il suggested perhaps he would be a fitting candidate for the Central Committee.1 Of course, that was Kim Il-sung, who was, at the time, a battalion commander in the 88th Separate Infantry Brigade. However, this talk did not result in any decision being made. When the USSR attacked Japan in August 1945, Moscow’s policy towards Korea was not set. After Tokyo’s surrender, Moscow instructed the intelligence department of the 25th Army – the one in charge of North Korea – to start looking for a suitable candidate. Potential supreme leaders were to receive training from the officers of DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-4

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their colleagues from the Army’s political department. The instruction mentioned a number of criteria regarding candidates’ social background, education, political views and personal habits.2 The intelligence department did its best to comply with the order. There was just one problem: After the Army’s political department checked their list, they figured that there was not a single candidate to fulfil all the criteria set up by the Kremlin. Not willing to pick a fight with the intelligence, they ignored it and started training the candidates. The list, meanwhile, went to Moscow: it was time for Stalin himself to make the choice.3 This list was divided into several categories: Comintern candidates, Chinese Koreans, Soviet Koreans and local Koreans. Most were men, but one woman – Pak Chong-ae, former Comintern member and the future chair of the DPRK’s Union of Democratic Women – was included as well.4 Apparently, the debates on which of these would be the most suitable person started immediately: Some officers proposed that the army’s interpreter, Mikhail Kan, should be appointed leader, but ultimately, he was not included in the list.5 This was a rather extensive list. However, Stalin did not choose anyone mentioned in it. As testified by the political officer of the 25th Army, Major-General Nikolay Lebedev, there is a good chance that the final decision was influenced by the rivalry between the Soviet police and military intelligence. Lavrentiy Beria, the head of the country’s police organ – the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs – took an opportunity to show Stalin that they did their job better than the Army’s Main Intelligence Directorate. Thus, he instructed his men to start looking for a better candidate.6 One cannot know for sure if Mun Il putting a word in for Kim Il-sung played a role, but the command took a special interest in the young officer. Immediately after Tokyo announced its surrender in August 1945, Lieutenant-Colonel Grigoriy Mekler was summoned by the commander of the First Far Eastern Front, Marshal Meretskov. Meretskov and the front’s political officer, Colonel-General Shtykov, ordered Mekler to visit the unit Kim Il-sung served in and write a report on local Koreans. The lieutenant-colonel did as he had been ordered: His impression of Kim was a very positive one, and it was duly reflected in the report. Kim Il-sung spoke fluent Chinese and Russian and looked like a popular commander. It seems that Mekler’s report played an important role in Kim Il-sung’s selection.7 Next, the commander summoned Kim Il-sung himself. The 88th Brigade where Kim served was a part of the Second Far Eastern Front, and, thus, Kim was assessed by the front’s commander, General Maksim Purkayev and the political officer of the entire Soviet command in the Far East, Colonel-General Iosif Shikin. The latter evidently did most of the talking. First, the general confirmed that Captain Kim indeed was Korean, a member of the Communist Party of China and married. Shikin then asked him: “What if we send you to Korea?” Kim replied: “I am always ready, if it would help the World Revolution”. Shikin was pleased with such a loyalist answer.8 Evidently, though, this was not an interview for the leader position yet. At the time, the Soviets wanted to appoint Kim in a much more modest position – deputy to Colonel Vasiliy Korolyov, Pyongyang’s commandant.9

Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power 27 On 19 September 1945, Kim Il-sung returned to Korea. The man who introduced him to local Soviet commanders was Mun Il. Once again, Mun played the role of North Korean kingmaker. Generals liked Kim. The future leader’s initial plan was to become a businessman, yet General Lebedev suggested that he could be more proactive.10 As Kim Il-sung was introduced to the command of the 25th Army, it occurred to them that Kim Il-sung could very well be the man they needed as a future leader. He served in the same Red Army, he spoke fluent Russian – he was, essentially, one of them, a Soviet officer. And at the same time, he, a native of South Pyongan province, was local enough that he would not be perceived by the North Koreans as a foreign viceroy. They had no decision from Stalin yet and, thus, decided to improvise. Stalin ordered the 25th Army to create a wide bloc of various political forces in North Korea, and the army thought that they would need to establish some proto-government organ for it. For the military, Kim Il-sung looked like the man to lead this organ.11 Since this organ was not to be perceived as a Communist one, Kim Il-sung was not supposed to lead the Communist Party in the North – yet. Thus, Kim Yong-bom, a Soviet Korean and a former Comintern agent, was appointed the first secretary of the Northern bureau of the Communist Party of Korea in October.12 Meanwhile, the army started training Kim Il-sung in hopes that he would be endorsed by Stalin. The problem was that the future leader was very inept in Marxism-Leninism and, thus, intensive training was necessary so that he would have at least basic skills in Communist theory.13 On 14 October 1945, Kim Il-sung made his first public appearance. He was dressed in a civilian suit and had the Soviet Order of the Red Banner pinned to it.14 Naturally, the modern North Korean version of the photo has this order scrubbed from it. Later, an urban legend claimed that the whole event was organised in honour of Kim Il-sung. However, it was not so: As indicated by the displayed banners, one can clearly see that it was, in fact, honouring the Red Army. Kim’s appearance was the central part of the event, but, at the time, Kim Il-sung was yet to be endorsed by Stalin as the future leader. Soon after the event, a formal recommendation to appoint Kim Il-sung as the leader was submitted to Moscow. The available copy from the archives has no signatures on it, but the writing style suggests that it may have been General Shtykov. The addressees were Party Secretary Malenkov, Assistant Commissar for Defence Bulganin and Chief of the Ground Forces’ Main Political Department Iosif Shikin. The report said that Kim Il-sung had fought in Manchuria “for ten years” and that he had served in the Red Army as a battalion commander “from 1941” to 1945. It further said that “Kim Il-sung’s name is widely known amongst the Korean people”, that he is “known as a hero, fighter against the Japanese imperialism” and that “the Korean people made many legends about him”.15 It seems that Beria learned about Kim Il-sung soon after it happened – and recommended him to Stalin. The secret police’s chief pointed out that none of the military’s candidates fulfilled the stated criteria, but the man his people found – Kim

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Figure 4.1 14 October 1945. Major Mikhail Kan, the interpreter, stands beside Kim in the front. Behind them are generals (right to left) Lebedev, Romanenko and Chistyakov. Source: The Central Preparatory Committee to Commemorate the Liberation of 15 August [8·15 해 방 일주년기렴 중앙준비위원회]. A Collection of Photographs Showing the Process of Democratic Construction in North Korea [북조선민주주의건설 사진첩], Pyongyang, 1946. The original is in possession of the National Institute of Korean History (Kwachon, South Korea); this is a high-resolution scan

Figure 4.2 The doctored photo of Kim Il-sung’s first public appearance (14 October 1945). This photo is often found in North Korean books. Source: One of many copies of the doctored photo is available here: www.korean-books.com.kp/ko/ memoirs/index.php?id=229

Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power 29

Figure 4.3 14 October 1945. Kim Il-sung’s first appearance. One can see a banner behind him, which reads: “Glory to Stalin! Welcome, the Workers’ and Farmers’ Red Army!” Source: Photo taken by an unknown author in 1945. The original is kept in the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States. A digital copy is available here: www.ohmynews.com/ NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002501183

Il-sung – actually did. Beria’s suggestion was approved. The 25th Army received a new order – stop training the others and focus on Kim Il-sung.16 According to General Lebedev, this order came through Secretary Zhdanov and General Shtykov; the two were actually good friends.17 All evidence points to Stalin making his decision in December 1945. At the beginning of the month, Kim Il-sung was still described by the local Soviet officers not as a Moscow-approved leader but as an “outstanding Party activist, who personally is widely popular amongst the people”. Thus, the decision evidently was still not made at the time.18 Yet, on 14 December, Chongno, the main newspaper of North Korea, started to flatter Kim Il-sung by calling him “commander”, “true patriot” and “great guide”.19 On 21 December, Kim Il-sung ascended to the position of chief party secretary for North Korea, undoubtedly becoming the top man in the nascent country.20 And once North Korea’s proto-government, the Provisional People’s Committee for North Korea, was established, Kim Il-sung became its chairman, solidifying his position at the top. Why Did Stalin Choose Kim? “Your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others”.21 These words of Joseph Conrad could have been the epigraph to this chapter, for the most

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important reason for Kim’s success was that, by August 1945, the Korean Communist movement had no clear leader. There were countries where Moscow had zero doubts about whom to appoint to the top. For example, in Bulgaria, no one could have competed with Georgy Dimitrov, the former chief of the Comintern. The same applied to Klement Gottwald, who had been the leader of Czechoslovakia’s communists for about as long as Stalin had led the USSR. Things were completely different in Korea. No Communist Party even existed there when Emperor Hirohito announced his surrender. More than a decade before, the Comintern – fed up with the endless bickering amongst the local activists, had the Communist Party of Korea dissolved. The Party was reborn in August 1945, but by the time its leader, Pak Hon-yong, managed to reach out to the Soviets, the list of potential candidates was evidently already in Moscow. The December appointment was evidently a provisional one. Documents show that in 1946, when the Soviets were about to engage in talks with the Americans about a potential future for Korea, their list of potential candidates for the unified government featured another man – Yo Ung-hyong, a South Korean leftist – as the prime minister. According to the draft’s first version, Kim Il-sung was to become minister of interior – the head of the police.22 The second one gave him the position of war minister instead.23 Thus, Moscow was prepared to dismiss him if necessary. The final decision was made much later, and there is testimony that states that it happened in 1947. The testimony appeared in 1993 in an article in the Russian magazine Novoye vremya, the author using the pen name “Tumanov”. Evidence points to this man most likely being Ivan Loboda, a Soviet journalist well connected to the country’s secret services, who knew Kim Il-sung.24 According to this piece, a delegation from Beria arrived in Pyongyang in 1947. They spent three days in the North Korean capital and summoned Kim Il-sung a few times. It was at this time that Kim Il-sung was confirmed as a future leader. Thus, in 1949, when the North and South’s Workers’ Parties were merged, it was Kim Il-sung who became the chairman of the Central Committee. Things change quickly in North Korea. In the half a decade after Stalin died, Kim Il-sung removed the nation from the Soviet sphere of influence. And in the modern DPRK, Stalin is presented not as Kim Il-sung’s patron but rather as his loyal admirer. There was, of course, no way for anyone to predict that in 1945. Notes 1 Andrei Smirnov. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. 2 Anatoliy Zhurin. “Made in the USSR”, in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268], https://web.archive.org/ web/20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. 3 Ibid. 4 Gavriil Korotkov. “Stalin and the Korean War” in War in Korea of 1950–53: Looking Back after 50 Years. Tula: Grif i Ko, pp. 67–89 [Гавриил Коротков. Сталин и

Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power 31

5 6

7

8

9

10 11

12 13 14 15

16 17 18

Корейская война // Война в Корее 1950–1953 гг.: взгляд через 50 лет. Тула: Grif i Ko, стр. 67–89]. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Ivan Loboda, November 1990. Anatoliy Zhurin. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268], https://web.archive.org/web/ 20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. This article is based on the interview which the author (Anatoliy Zhurin)’s friend Boris Krishtul had conducted with General Nikolay Lebedev in 1984. Andrei Pochtaryov. “A secret councillor of the ‘Sun of the Nation’” in Independent Military Review, 14 January 2005 [Андрей Почтарёв. Тайный советник “солнца нации” // Независимое военное обозрение, 14 января 2005 года], http://nvo.ng.ru/ history/2005-01-14/5_kim_ir_sen.html. Gavriil Korotkov. Stalin and Kim Il-sung, vol. 1. Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1992, p. 180 [ 가브릴 코로트코프. 스탈린과 김일성, 제1권, 어건주 역, 서울: 東亞日報社, 1992, 180쪽]. This book appeared only in Korean translation – the Russian draft had possibly been written specifically to be translated. While the translation quality is very low, the book contains some unique testimonies about Kim Il-sung’s ascension. A List of Personnel of the 88 Separate Infantry Brigade Which Is to Be Dispatched to Work in Korea. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 3, inventory 19121, folder 2, pp. 14–15 [Список личного состава 1-го батальона 88-й отд. стр. Бригады 2-го Дальневосточного фронта, предназначенного для работы в Корее. ЦАМО России, ф. 3, оп. 19121, д. 2, лл. 14–15]. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Nikolay Lebedev, 19 January 1990. Livshits. “Assessment reference on the current status of the Communist Party in the northern provinces of Korea” in Documents on Political Parties and Public Organisations of North Korea of 1945, 20 October 1945. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 172, inventory 614630, folder 5, pp. 45–51 [Лившиц. Информационная сводка о состоянии компартии в северных провинциях Кореи // Документы, характеризующие политические партии и общественные организации Северной Кореи за 1945 г. 20 октября 1945 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614630, д. 5, лл. 45–51]. Ibid. Anatoliy Zhurin. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268], https://web.archive.org/web/ 20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. Valeriy Yankovskiy. From the Lord’s Tomb to a Tomb in the Gulag: True Story. Kovrov: Mashteks, 2000, pp. 89–91 [Валерий Янковский. От Гроба Господня до гроба Гулага: быль. Ковров: Маштекс, 2000, стр. 89–91]. To Comrade Malenkov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Comrade Bulganin, Deputy People’s Commissar of Defence, General of the Army, Comrade Shikin – Head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army, Colonel-General. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 172, inventory 614631, folder 23, pp. 21–26 [Секретарю ЦК ВКП/б/ тов. Маленкову, заместителю народного комиссара обороны – генерал-армии – тов. Булганину, начальнику Главного политического управления Красной Армии генерал-полковнику тов. Шикину, ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614631, д. 23, лл. 21–26]. Anatoliy Zhurin. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268], https://web.archive.org/ web/20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Nikolay Lebedev, 19 January 1990. A Reference Report on the Political Situation in North Korea [Справка-доклад о политическом положении в Северной Корее]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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19 “A message for Commander Kim Il-sung” in Chongno, 14 December 1945, p. 2 [金日 成 將軍에게 보내는 멧세이지, 正路, 1945년 12월 14일, 2면]. 20 “Comrade Kim Il-sung appointed the chief secretary of the Branch Office” in Chongno, 21 December 1945, p. 1 [分局責任秘書에 金日成同志就任, 正路, 1945년 12월 21 일, 1면]. 21 Joseph Conrad. Heart of Darkness. Moscow: Planet, 2002, p. 9. 22 Shtykov’s Proposal. 7 March 1946, #2776. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 17, inventory 128, folder 998, pp. 3–4 [Предложение Штыкова от 7.3.46 г. № 2776, РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 998, лл. 3–4]. 23 Assessment of Candidates to the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, collection 17, inventory 128, folder 61, pp. 1–14 [Характеристика на кандидатов во Временное демократическое правительство Кореи, РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 61, лл. 1–14]. 24 Georgiy Tumanov. “How the Great Leader was manufactured” in Novoye Vremya, 1993, no. 16, pp. 32–34 [Георгий Туманов, “Как изготовляли великого вождя”, Новое время, № 16 (1993), стр. 32–34].

Bibliography Korean “Comrade Kim Il-sung appointed the chief secretary of the Branch Office”, in Chongno, 21 December 1945, p. 1 [分局責任秘書에 金日成同志就任, 正路, 1945년 12월 21 일, 1면]. Korotkov, Gavriil. Stalin and Kim Il-Sung, vol. 1. Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1992 [가브릴 코로 트코프. 스탈린과 김일성, 제1권, 어건주 역, 서울: 東亞日報社, 1992]. “A message for Commander Kim Il-sung”, in Chongno, 14 December 1945, p. 2 [金日成 將 軍에게 보내는 멧세이지, 正路, 1945년 12월 14일, 2면]. Russian Assessment of Candidates to the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 17, Inventory 128, Folder 61, pp. 1–14 [Характеристика на кандидатов во Временное демократическое правительство Кореи, РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 61, лл. 1–14]. Korotkov, Gavriil. “Stalin and the Korean War” in War in Korea of 1950–53: Looking Back after 50 Years. Tula: Grif i Ko, pp. 67–89 [Гавриил Коротков. Сталин и Корейская война // Война в Корее 1950–1953 гг.: взгляд через 50 лет. Тула: Grif i Ko, стр. 67–89]. A List of Personnel of the 88 Separate Infantry Brigade Which Is to Be Dispatched to Work in Korea, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 3, Inventory 19121, Folder 2, pp. 14–15 [Список личного состава 1-го батальона 88-й отд. стр. Бригады 2-го Дальневосточного фронта, предназначенного для работы в Корее. ЦАМО России, ф. 3, оп. 19121, д. 2, лл. 14–15]. Livshits. “Assessment reference on the current status of the Communist Party in the northern provinces of Korea” in Documents on Political Parties and Public Organisations of North Korea of 1945, 20 October 1945, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 172, Inventory 614630, Folder 5, pp. 45–51 [Лившиц. Информационная сводка о состоянии компартии в северных провинциях Кореи // Документы, характеризующие политические партии и общественные организации Северной Кореи за 1945 г. 20 октября 1945 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614630, д. 5, лл. 45–51].

Kim Il-sung’s Rise to Power 33 Pochtaryov, Andrei. “A secret councillor of the ‘Sun of the Nation’” in Independent Military Review, 14 January 2005 [Андрей Почтарёв. Тайный советник “солнца нации” // Независимое военное обозрение, 14 января 2005 года]. http://nvo.ng.ru/history/ 2005-01-14/5_kim_ir_sen.html. A Reference Report on the Political Situation in North Korea [Справка-доклад о политическом положении в Северной Корее] (A document from the author’s collection). Shtykov’s Proposal. 7 March 1946, #2776, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 17, Inventory 128, Folder 998, pp. 3–4 [Предложение Штыкова от 7.3.46 г. № 2776, РГАСПИ, ф. 17, оп. 128, д. 998, лл. 3–4]. Smirnov, Andrei. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. To Comrade Malenkov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Comrade Bulganin, Deputy People’s Commissar of Defence, General of the Army, Comrade Shikin – Head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army, Colonel-General, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 172, Inventory 614631, Folder 23, pp. 21–26 [Секретарю ЦК ВКП/б/ тов. Маленкову, заместителю народного комиссара обороны – генерал-армии – тов. Булганину, начальнику Главного политического управления Красной Армии генерал-полковнику тов. Шикину, ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614631, д. 23, лл. 21–26]. Tumanov, Georgiy. “How the Great Leader was manufactured” in Novoye Vremya, no.16, 1993, pp. 32–34 [Георгий Туманов, “Как изготовляли великого вождя”, Новое время, № 16 (1993), стр. 32–34]. Yankovskiy, Valeriy. From the Lord’s Tomb to a Tomb in the Gulag: True Story. Kovrov: Mashteks, 2000 [Валерий Янковский. От Гроба Господня до гроба Гулага: быль. Ковров: Маштекс, 2000]. Zhurin, Anatoliy. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no.9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268]. https://web.archive.org/ web/20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. Other Sources Andrei Lankov’s interview with Ivan Loboda, November 1990. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Nikolay Lebedev, 19 January 1990.

5

The North Korean Flag and Other Symbols Made in the USSR

The Flag The traditional flag of Korea, still used by the South, originated in 1883. Known as the Flag of Great Extremes for the yin-yang symbol in its centre, the flag was used by both the Kingdom of Choson and the Korean Empire before the peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910. In the colonial era, the official flag was simply the flag of Japan, so the old symbol naturally was used by the nation’s independence movement. As both Korean states were only proclaimed in 1948, the Flag of Great Extremes was used all across Korea – including the North – after 1945. Kim Ilsung himself called this flag “beautiful”.1

Figure 5.1 North Korean film shows South Korea being “imprisoned” by the American flag. Source: North Korean Central News Agency DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-5

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Figure 5.2 The first parade of the Korean People’s Army featured the Flag of Great Extremes. Source: North Korean Central News Agency

These pictures come from the News Agency of North Korea; the KCNA’s predecessor organisation. The picture to the left clearly portrays the Flag of Great Extremes as the symbol for national liberty – which was allegedly stolen from the South by the “American imperialists”. Such a message has been repeated time and again by the DPRK, but the symbolism here is truly unique. The North Korean army, established in February 1948, is actually older than the North Korean state itself. Thus, the Flag of Great Extremes was still used at the time: The first emblem of the KPA featured both the traditional yin-yang symbol and the Communist red star. As the flag at the time did not exactly have a set design, there were at least two variations of the emblem in actual use. The man who ultimately decided that North Korea would need a new flag was Soviet Major-General Nikolay Lebedev. Pak Il, at the time vice-chancellor of Kim Il-sung University, later described how it happened. Lebedev summoned his superior, Chancellor Kim Du-bong, and told him that soon the time would come for North Korea to become an independent country. Pak Il was the one interpreting the General’s words. Lebedev asked Kim to explain the symbolic meaning behind the traditional flag. The question truly fell on fertile ground, as Kim Du-bong had a great passion for traditional culture. He started his lengthy explanation. Soon, however, Kim

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Figure 5.3 Head emblem of the KPA (February–July 1948). Source: Created by the author

Figure 5.4 Head emblem of the KPA (February–July 1948). Source: Created by the author

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Figure 5.5 Soldier of the KPA at the Army’s first parade. One can see a yin-yang symbol on his headgear. Source: North Korean Central News Agency

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was interrupted by Lebedev. The general was irritated, as he felt that he was being fed some superstitious medieval nonsense – and they were talking about a future socialist nation. Colonel Gerasim Balasanov – another Soviet officer present at the event – felt the same way.2 It was this meeting which ultimately resulted in a death sentence for the old flag. In a few months, Moscow sent to Pyongyang a design for a new flag – the current flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The DPRK’s provisional constitution already included this design. The change of flag was formally decided upon in April 1948 at a Special Session of the People’s Assembly for North Korea – the nascent nation’s proto-legislature. Normally, like all debates in Communist parliaments, it was supposed to be a pro-forma meeting – a decision is announced, endorsed unanimously with applause and without any suggestions, and the meeting is over. Yet here, one North Korean MP, Chong Jae-yong, committed an unprecedented act. He gave a short speech opposing the change of the flag. This is what he said: I would like to submit an opinion on the question of the national flag. I propose the Flag of Great Extremes be retained. The Flag of Great Extremes is the manifestation of the hopes and dreams for our people. When our people were suffering under Japan’s rule, they preserved the Flag of Great Extremes as hope for a fair future. On 15 August 1945, our Korea was liberated by the great Soviet Army. All Korean people – be they young or old, men or women – were overwhelmed with the joy of liberation. They carried Flags of Great Extremes in their hands, waved them and shouted, “Hurrah!” People attached this flag to the walls of their houses as well. On every important occasion and on all major buildings the Flag of Great Extremes was always hoisted together with the great Red Banner of the Soviet Union. And a Great Extremes emblem is a part of the headgear of our People’s Army and security troops as well. All this is because the Flag of Great Extremes is dear to our people. They love this flag; they think about it with great care. And not only northerners, but South Koreans, too, love the Flag of Great Extremes. Hence, this flag may become a weapon by which we will achieve unification. Northerners and southerners – all Koreans – may stand united under this banner. Therefore, I submit the proposal to retain the Flag of Great Extremes.3 The man who responded to Chong Jae-yong’s demarche was Kim Du-bong, who chaired the meeting. He said that the traditional flag was used only since there were not any other symbols available and that, in fact, it was a feudal symbol of the Lee dynasty and of the old Kingdom of Choson. Such a flag did not befit a socialist nation. Chong Jae-yong backed down, and the motion was approved unanimously. In later years, some South Korean rightists portrayed Chong Jae-yong almost as a freedom fighter, yet this author is very sceptical of such a claim. This man had

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not opposed the one-party system, planned economy or cult of Kim Il-sung. In fact, he did not oppose any of the things which truly made the lives of North Koreans miserable. All he cared about was the flag. Early East Germany had a somewhat similar situation. Until 1959, the country used the black-red-gold flag of the Weimar Republic. The symbol of democracy flying over East Berlin did not, of course, prevent the nation from becoming a Stalinist tyranny. Although the April session did approve the Constitution – including the new flag – it did not come into force until July, after another decision by the Bolshevik Party. The moment it did, the Flag of Great Extremes was lowered and replaced by the new one. This was the birth of North Korea as a separate state. A Soviet document shows how it happened: At 12:00, Chairman Choe Yong-gon announced that a ceremony of the change of the national flag will take place. Choe Yong-gon stated: “Since we have enforced the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea I suggest we proceed with a solemn change of the old national flag of Korea to the new one.” The deputies responded to Choe Yong-gon’s suggestion standing with heavy applause. At the same time Han Byong-ok, the secretary of the People’s Committee for North Korea and the People’s Committee Department Chairmen O Gi-sop and Lee Kang-guk took down the national flag attached to the wall at the back and gave it to the chairman of the Presidium of the People’s Assembly Kim Du-bong. Followed by thunderous applause from the people present and outcries of “Manse!”, Kim

Figure 5.6 The flag used by both Germanies until 1 October 1959.

Source: Original design invented by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn in the 1810s.

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Figure 5.7 The flag used by East Germany from 1 October 1959. Source: Original design of the flag invented by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn in the 1810s. The state emblem is based on designs by Heinz Behling, Herbert Gute and Martin Hänisch. The law combining both was signed by Wilhelm Pieck.

Figure 5.8 The ceremony of replacing the traditional Korean flag with the flag of the DPRK. 10 July 1948, circa 12.00 (North Korean time). Source: North Korean Central News Agency; collage created by the author

Du-bong unfolded the silk canvas of the new national flag and attached it in the place of the old one, next to the national flag of the USSR. The orchestra played the national anthem of Korea. After this, Chairman Choe Yong-gon announced: “Long live the Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea!” The deputies of the People’s Assembly responded to this with strong, thrice-repeated “Manse!”4

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10 July 1948 was the day when the division of Korea passed the point of no return. The Korean peninsula was divided: The South had conducted a separate election in May, and a communist state was now proclaimed in the North. North Korea later dated the birth of the DPRK as 9 September 1948, but, in reality, nothing significant happened on that date. Since the late 1950s, the fact that North Korea had once had a different flag was censored from all North Korean publications, and historical photos were redacted to erase the old flag. One of the victims of these redactions was the Liberation Monument in Pyongyang – the monument to the Soviet Army was redesigned, and the picture featuring the old flag was scrubbed from it.5 The Coat of Arms A coat of arms was not a part of traditional East Asian culture. To a large extent, it was introduced to the region by the Communists. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam all had their emblems, but they were barely used compared to the PRC, DPRK or Communist Mongolia.

Figure 5.9 The coat of arms from the provisional constitution. Source: Created by the author

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Figure 5.10 The coat of arms used in July–September 1948. Source: Created by the author

The first North Korean coat of arms appeared in the country’s provisional constitution: The coat of arms of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea consists of the image of a smelting furnace in front of the mount Paektu, with a red star above it, a hammer with two sickles to the right and left of it inside the star, all surrounded by an ear of rice wrapped in a red ribbon which has the phrase “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” written on it.6 The unusual symbol inside the red star – a hammer and two sickles – also could have been seen at the KPA’s first parade.7 While it is not certain, it seems that it was the symbol of the Workers’ Party of North Korea at the time. In March 1948, however, the Party’s Second Congress featured a well-known emblem of a hammer, sickle and brush instead.8 In April, the newly approved Constitution removed it from the coat of arms as well.9

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Figure 5.11 The coat of arms used from September 1948 to 1992.

Source: Author unknown. The image is in a public domain and is widely available online

Like with the flag, April 1948 saw the authorities permitting some discussion on the coat of arms as well. On 15 April 1948, Rodong Shinmun published an alternative design for the emblem, created by Sonu Dam and several other North Korean artists.10 The design had a strong resemblance to emblems of the Armenian and Georgian SSRs, and the latter might have not been coincidental, since Georgia was Stalin’s homeland and thus of symbolic importance. Another curious aspect of the proposal was that it appeared in print on Kim Il-sung’s birthday and featured the inscription “People’s Republic of Korea” – the one favoured by Pak Hon-yong, Kim Il-sung’s chief political opponent. Thus, there is a chance that this image was published as a result of some power play between Kim and Pak. In any case, this design was discarded by Pyongyang. Finally, in September, the new coat of arms was adopted, and it had the furnace replaced by the Suphung power plant, the one located near the Yalu River.11 The Soviets took a great interest in the plant,12 so there is a chance they instructed it to be placed on the coat of arms.

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Figure 5.12 The coat of arms proposed on 15 April 1948. Source: Rodong Shinmun, 15 April 1948, p. 1

Figure 5.13 Changes to North Korean rank insignia and passport per the adoption of a different coat of arms in 1992. Source: Created by the author

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The new version of the emblem stayed for decades, until 1992, when it was changed again. North Korea later claimed that it was Kim Jong-il who did it.13 The coat of arms of September 1948 featured a generic mountain, and Kim Jong-il had it redefined as Mount Paektu. The change of the symbol necessitated a new design to be approved for all the things which incorporated it – from the country’s passports to rank insignia for North Korean marshals. *** Naturally, North Korea claims that it was Great Leader Kim Il-sung who designed the country’s symbols. The Complete Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works published in the 1990s included his alleged speech “On Making a Design for the Coat of Arms and the Flag”.14 According to the collection, the speech was given on 19 January 1948. However, documents show that this is yet another fabrication. In this speech, Kim Il-sung instructs the smelting furnace on the coat of arms to be changed into a power plant. As the readers remember, this change actually occurred not in January but in September, and in April, the People’s Assembly actually endorsed the furnace design for the furnace. Like so many episodes from the 1940s, these historical bits are forgotten in North Korea, replaced by a false narrative to glorify the country’s founder. Notes 1 “Students, join the Democratic Union! With the working youth – only unity. Lecture of Commander Kim Il-sung at the Democratic Union (published in Pyongyang Minbo on 30 December 1945)” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 12. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1991, p. 345 [學生은 民靑에로! 勤勞 靑年과의 結合이 있을 뿐金日成 將軍 民青講座에서 力說 (一九四五年十二月三十 日附 『平壤民報』 所載), 北韓關係史料集, 第12券, 果川: 國史編慕委員會, 1991, 345쪽]. 2 Chang Haeng-hun. “The North Korean flag was made in the USSR” in Tonga Ilbo, 26 September 1993, p. 16 [장행훈. 북한 人共旗 舊소련서 만들었다. 東亞日報, 1993 년 9월 26일, 16면]; Andrei Smirnov. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. 3 “Transcript of the Special Session of the People’s Assembly for North Korea” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 8. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, 1989, pp. 332–333 [北朝鮮人民會議特別會議會議錄, 北韓關係史料集, 第8 券, 서울: 國史編慕委員會, 1989, 332~333쪽]. 4 Transcript of the Results of the Work of the Sixth Session of the People’s Assembly for North Korea. Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence, collection 172, inventory 614632, file 43 [Стенограмма об итогах работы VI сессии народного собрания Северной Кореи. ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614632, д. 43]. 5 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov, 24 September 1959 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР А.М. Пузанова, 24 сентября 1959 года] (A document from the author’s collection) 6 Propaganda Department of the People’s Committee for North Korea. Draft of the Provisional Constitution of the DPRK. Pyongyang: Korean People’s Publishing House, 20 February 1948 [북조선인민위원회선전부, 조선민주주의인민공화국 임시헌법초

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7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14

The North Korean Flag and Other Symbols 안. 평양: 조선인민출판사, 1948년 2월 20일], National Archives, Record Group 242, Shipping Advice No 2006, box 15, item 76. North Korean State Filming Centre. The Korean People’s Army Is the Child of the People’s Partisan Unit of Commander Kim Il-sung [북조선국립영화촬영소. 조선인민군 은 김일성 장군 인민유격대의 산아이다. 1948.3] (North Korean film). Kim Guk-hu. The Soviet Military Administration in Pyongyang. Paju: Hanul, 2008, p. XV [김국후. 평양의 소련 군정. 파주: 한울, 2008. XV쪽]. National Institute of Korean History. “The draft of the constitution of the DPRK” in Historical Materials on North Korea, vol. 8. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1989, pp. 242–254 [國史編纂委員會. 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國憲法草案, 北韓關係史料集 第8卷. 과천: 국사편찬위원회 1989, 242~254쪽]. “A recommendation concerning the draft of the provisional constitution of the DPRK”, in Rodong Shinmun, 15 April 1948, p. 1 [조선민주주의인민공화국 림시헌법초안에 관한 건의서. 로동신문, 1948년 4월 15일, 1면]. “Constitution of the DPRK”, Rodong Shinmun, 10 September 1948, pp. 2–3 [조선민주 주의인민공화국 헌법. 로동신문 1948년 9월 10일, 2~3쪽]. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Nikolay Lebedev, 13 November 1989. The Fatherly Commander Is Always with Commanders and Soldiers of the People’s Army [어버이장군님 인민군장병들과 함께 계시여] (North Korean film). Kim Il-sung. “On making a proper design for the coat of arms and the national flag” in Complete Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works, vol. 7, pp. 91–95 [김일성. 국장과 국 기 도안을 잘 만들데 대하여, 김일성 전집, 제7권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1993, 91~95쪽].

Bibliography Korean “Constitution of the DPRK”, in Rodong Shinmun, 10 September 1948, pp. 2–3 [조선민주 주의인민공화국 헌법. 로동신문 1948년 9월 10일, 2~3쪽]. Kim Guk-hu. The Soviet Military Administration in Pyongyang. Paju: Hanul, 2008 [김국후. 평양의 소련 군정. 파주: 한울, 2008]. Chang Haeng-hun. “The North Korean flag was made in the USSR” in Tonga Ilbo, 26 September 1993, p. 16 [장행훈. 북한 人共旗 舊소련서 만들었다. 東亞日報, 1993년 9월 26일, 16면]. Kim Il-sung. “On making a proper design for the coat of arms and the national flag” in Complete Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works, vol. 7. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1993, pp. 91–95 [김일성. 국장과 국기 도안을 잘 만들데 대하여, 김일성 전집, 제7권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1993, 91~95쪽]. National Institute of Korean History. “The draft of the constitution of the DPRK” in Historical Materials on North Korea, vol. 8. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1989, pp. 242–254 [國史編纂委員會. 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國憲法草案, 北韓關係 史料集 第8卷. 과천: 국사편찬위원회 1989, 242~254쪽]. Propaganda Department of the People’s Committee for North Korea. Draft of the Provisional Constitution of the DPRK. Pyongyang: Korean People’s Publishing House, 20 February 1948 [북조선인민위원회선전부, 조선민주주의인민공화국 임시헌법초안. 평양: 조선인민출판사, 1948년 2월 20일], National Archives, Record Group 242, Shipping Advice No 2006, Box 15, Item 76. “A recommendation concerning the draft of the provisional constitution of the DPRK” in Rodong Shinmun, 15 April 1948, p. 1 [조선민주주의인민공화국 림시헌법초안에 관 한 건의서. 로동신문, 1948년 4월 15일, 1면].

The North Korean Flag and Other Symbols

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“Students, join the Democratic Union! With the working youth – only unity. Lecture of Commander Kim Il-sung at the Democratic Union (published in Pyongyang Minbo on 30 December 1945)” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 12. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1991, p. 345 [學生은 民靑에로! 勤勞靑 年과의 結合이 있을 뿐金日成 將軍 民青講座에서 力說 (一九四五年十二月三十日附 『平壤民報』 所載), 北韓關係史料集, 第12券, 果川: 國史編慕委員會, 1991, 345쪽]. “Transcript of the Special Session of the People’s Assembly for North Korea” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 8. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, 1989, pp. 332–333 [北朝鮮人民會議特別會議會議錄, 北韓關係史料集, 第8券, 서울: 國史編慕委員會, 1989, 332~333쪽]. Russian Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov, 24 September 1959 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР А.М. Пузанова, 24 сентября 1959 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Smirnov, Andrei. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. Transcript of the Results of the Work of the Sixth Session of the People’s Assembly for North Korea, Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Collection 172, Inventory 614632, File 43 [Стенограмма об итогах работы VI сессии народного собрания Северной Кореи. ЦАМО России, ф. 172, оп. 614632, д. 43]. Other Sources Andrei Lankov’s interview with Nikolay Lebedev, 13 November 1989. The Fatherly Commander Is Always with Commanders and Soldiers of the People’s Army [어버이장군님 인민군장병들과 함께 계시여] (North Korean film). North Korean State Filming Centre. The Korean People’s Army Is the Child of the People’s Partisan Unit of Commander Kim Il-sung [북조선국립영화촬영소. 조선인민군은 김 일성 장군 인민유격대의 산아이다. 1948.3] (North Korean film).

6

The Korean People’s Army Forged in the Soviet Image

The Origins of the North Korean Army It is a popular stereotype to see North Korea in general and the North Korean military in particular as a “middle road” between Stalinism and Maoism. Another stereotype is, following Pyongyang’s own narrative, to look for “guerrilla traditions” of the DPRK’s armed forces. Some South Koreans point out people like Lee Hwal – the founder of the North Korean Air Force and a former pilot in the Japanese Army – and argue that the KPA had partly carried on the Japanese legacy, too. Yet the origins of the North Korean military are much simpler. The Korean People’s Army was a creation of the Soviet Union. As ColonelGeneral Shtykov put it, “Our main task here is to impose the Soviet social system whilst considering the local peculiarities as well.”1 Thus, nearly the entirety of its structural characteristics was distinctly Soviet and not Chinese, Japanese, or “guerrilla”. In fact, the very creation of the KPA was directly authorised by Moscow: Permit the People’s Committee for North Korea to create the Department of National Defence and on the final day of the session of the People’s Assembly conduct a demonstration and a parade of Korean national armed forces in the city of Pyongyang with one division and officer academy participating. (Decision of the Politburo of the Bolshevik Party [3 February 1948])2 It was only natural for the Soviet officers to create the KPA in the image of the army they served in, as was it only natural for the North Korean leadership, handpicked by the Soviets, to endorse such a choice. Thus, the KPA ended up being almost a replicate of the Soviet Army, and early North Korean books even directly acknowledged it: We creatively apply the principles of the progressive Soviet military science and follow the plentiful experience of the great Soviet Army which serves as an example of a socialist country’s military development. (Lee Gwon-mu, “The Glorious Korean People’s Army”, 1958)3 DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-6

The Korean People’s Army 49 The North Korean Army’s hierarchy of units (Army → Corps → Division → Brigade → Regiment → Battalion → Company → Platoon → Squad) was identical to the Soviet one. China’s hierarchy was smaller, and Imperial Japan’s larger than the KPA’s, proving where the North Korean system originated. As in the USSR, North Korea has Party organisations in their military. KPA platoons have Party sub-cells, companies have Party cells, battalions have primary Party committees and regiments and larger formations have Party committees. These link the army and the Party together, provide political education to soldiers and oversee Party admissions. The admissions themselves are also conducted in a very Soviet manner: A potential new member must get two recommendations from a standing Party member, and, if their application is approved, becomes a candidate member for a year. From there, they may be upgraded to full membership. All this was true for the USSR and is true for the DPRK. Like in the Soviet Union, these Party organisations were chaired by political officers. The North Korean uniform originates from the Soviet Union as well and thus, indirectly, from Imperial Russia. At this time, the original designer of military clothing was Emperor Nicholas I. Whilst he was perceived by communists as the icon of reactionary thought, his legacy nevertheless survived in North Korea of all places. In the early KPA, the Soviet influence was even more obvious. The Internal Regulations of the North Korean military from 1955 contains this peculiar line: “When a general or any person of higher rank addresses his/her subordinates, he/ she addresses them with the words, ‘Are you healthy, comrades?’, while soldiers standing in line respond: ‘We wish you health’”. This is a consequence of bad translation – the Russian standard greeting zdravstvuyte literally means “I wish you health”.4 Borrowing Obsolete Soviet Traits Perhaps the most unusual thing about the KPA was that it adopted some traits of the Soviet army which, by 1948, were already considered obsolete. These were military positions – a substitute for actual ranks. When the KPA was established, it had no ranks – as had been the case in the Soviet army before 1935. A depiction of how the system worked is shown in the following. Note that almost all the insignia mirror the contemporary Soviet ones, but they reflect the soldiers’ positions, not ranks. North Korea introduced ranks for soldiers and NCOs sometime in 1949 and for officers on 31 December 1952.5 It indeed was an unusual era, but not unique: The Red Army before 1935, the People’s Liberation Army of China before 1955 and between 1965 and 1988 and the Albanian People’s Army after 1966 all did not have any ranks. The fact that the North Korean Army was rankless through most of the Korean War has been virtually ignored in all previous research on the subject. The unusual system of military positions may be explained by the fact that it was introduced in 1947 when the North Korean armed forces were still officially a large paramilitary. A paramilitary is not supposed to have ranks – and an obsolete Soviet system was implemented instead.

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Figure 6.1 Positions and position insignia in the early KPA. Source: Created by the author Note: * From February to September 1948, this position was called commander-in-chief before it became minister of national defence

When the rank system was fully implemented, it mirrored the contemporary Soviet one with one distinction – the rank of senior colonel (commodore in the Navy) was unique to North Korea. Evidently, the difference was immediately noticed by curious children of Soviet Koreans in Pyongyang; they gave these officers a nickname: “sub-generals”.6 The Chinese Model and the North Korean Armed Forces North Korean military history is quite different from Chinese. The Chinese army abolished ranks in 1965,7 while the KPA kept them. China moved away from

The Korean People’s Army 51 conscription; North Korea did not. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese military became more autonomous from the Party – something which had never happened in North Korea, despite all the talk about the “military primacy”. However, when it comes to the DPRK’s paramilitaries, the Chinese influence suddenly becomes much more obvious. For example, the Workers’ and Farmers’ Red Guard of North Korea is modelled after the People’s Militia of China. The paramilitaries were established when Soviet control over the country was waning or gone – which would explain the influence. Why did Kim Il-sung keep the Soviet model even after he broke from Moscow’s control? One should remember that Kim was not just a Manchurian partisan – he was also a Soviet officer. And the Red Army proved infinitely more effective when fighting the Japanese: Tokyo surrendered a mere week after the USSR declared war on it. Of course, one can correctly argue that the long campaign waged by the United States against Tokyo, especially the nuclear weapons being deployed against Japanese cities, played a more important rule in breaking the Empire’s will to resist. Yet, from Kim Il-sung’s view, the optics were extremely impressive: a week of war provided a bigger result than nearly a decade of his struggle. Thus, Kim Il-sung built the KPA using his own experience of service in the Soviet rear unit. To a large extent, the modern North Korean army still resembles one. Notes 1 Andrei Smirnov. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. 2 “Protocol no. 62” in Decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 27 January–17 March 1948 [Протокол № 62 // Решения Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) за 27 января – 17 марта 1948 г., 3 февраля 1948 г]. (A document from the author’s collection). 3 Lee Gwon-mu. The Glorious Korean People’s Army. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1958, p. 24 [리권무, 영광스러운 조선인민군, 평양: 조선로동당출판사, 1958, 24쪽]. 4 Internal Service Regulations of the People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defence, p. 23 [조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 인민군 내무규정, 평양: 민족보위성 군사출판부, 1955, 23쪽]. 5 “On the introduction of military ranks to the high-ranking commanders and officers of the Korean People’s Army” in Korean Central Yearbook 1954–55. Pyongyang: Korean Central Yearbook Publishing House, 1955, p. 48 [조선인민군 상급 지휘성 원 및 군 관들에게 군사칭호를 제정함에 관하여. 조선중앙년감 1954~55. 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1955, 48쪽]. 6 Author’s interview with Yuriy Kang, April 2021. 7 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Abolishing the Military Rank System in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 22 May 1965 [全国 人民代表大会常务委员会关于取消中国人民解放军军衔制度的决定. 1965年 5月 22日], www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/25/content_5004360.htm.

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Bibliography Korean Lee Gwon-mu. The Glorious Korean People’s Army. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1958 [리권무, 영광스러운 조선인민군, 평양: 조선로동당출판사, 1958]. Internal Service Regulations of the People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defence, 1955 [조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 인민군 내무규정, 평양: 민족보위성 군사출판부, 1955]. “On the introduction of military ranks to the high-ranking commanders and officers of the Korean People’s Army” in Korean Central Yearbook 1954–55. Pyongyang: Korean Central Yearbook Publishing House, 1955, p. 48 [조선인민군 상급 지휘성 원 및 군관 들에게 군사칭호를 제정함에 관하여. 조선중앙년감 1954~55. 평양: 조선로동당 출 판사, 1955, 48쪽]. Russian “Protocol no. 62” in Decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 27 January–17 March 1948 [Протокол № 62 // Решения Политбюро ЦК ВКП(б) за 27 января – 17 марта 1948 г., 3 февраля 1948 г]. (A document from the author’s collection) Smirnov, Andrei. “How the Soviet Army implanted President Kim Il-sung and his government to North Korea” in Top Secret, 1992, pp. 10–11 [Андрей Смирнов, “Как Советская Армия внедрила в Северную Корею президента Ким Ир Сена и его правительство”, Совершенно секретно, № 8(1992), стр. 10–11]. Chinese Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Abolishing the Military Rank System in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, 22 May 1965 [全国人民 代表大会常务委员会关于取消中国人民解放军军衔制度的决定. 1965年 5月 22日]. www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/25/content_5004360.htm. Other Sources Author’s interview with Yuriy Kang, April 2021.

7

The Korean War Through the Eyes of Pyongyang

The inception of the Korean War has been relatively well studied. After becoming the WPK’s chairman in 1949, Kim Il-sung and the leader of South Korean Communists, Pak Hon-yong, started approaching Soviet ambassador, Shtykov, on a possible “liberation of South Korea”. After the ambassador was finally convinced, he related the suggestion to Stalin. It took some time for Stalin to be swayed, but, ultimately, after witnessing Chinese Communists’ successes in the Civil War, he gave his blessing on 30 January 1950.1 From January until June, the North Korean army was armed with Soviet weaponry, while Pyongyang conscripted more men to its ranks. Kim Il-sung was the one who picked the date for the invasion – 25 June 1950. On this day, the bloodiest war in the history of Korea began. It is well known that, initially, this war went heavily in North Korea’s favour. By August 1950, 90% of the Korean Peninsula was under the DPRK’s control. It is reasonable to assume that this was a time of great joy for the DPRK’s leadership. But it was not. A vast collection of Soviet documents, compiled in the late 1990s by Russian scholar Valeriy Vartanov and his team, allows one to have a much clearer image of what was going on in Pyongyang during this time. For reasons unknown, this collection was never published as a book, but I have it in my possession – and would like to share my findings with the readers here. Reports of Victories, Fears of Defeat On 25 June 1950, North Korea launched its invasion. Seoul was caught completely off guard. At the time of the attack, the South Korean president could not be reached: He, as he usually did during the weekends, had gone to enjoy one of Seoul’s palace gardens, where he could fish in solitude while reflecting on state affairs. It took the military nearly four hours to reach him.2 On the third day of the war, 28 June, the South Korean capital fell to North Korea. Kim Il-sung issued a proclamation to all the people of Seoul, the “liberated capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.3 Taking the enemy’s capital in just three days was certainly a major achievement. However, the People’s Army Supreme Command did not feel like celebrating. Contrary to Pyongyang’s expectations, the United States chose not to stand aside. DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-7

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The American Air Force joined the war immediately and started bombing North Korean cities. Kim Du-bong, the head of North Korea’s parliament, reached out to Kim Il-sung, asking him why the Soviets were not helping them. Pak Hon-yong suggested that they needed to immediately request the assistance of the Soviet Air Force and direct intervention from China. Kim Il-sung, greatly stressed by the news, told them to stop pestering him and making him even more nervous.4 On 27 July, the North Korean army took Taejon. Yet the fall of another major South Korean city did not result in the collapse of the enemy lines. By that time, Kim Il-sung had started to understand that his blitzkrieg had failed. His underlings repeatedly said that the country needed Soviet and Chinese assistance to avoid a catastrophe.5 It felt like the lull before the storm. Enemy at the Gate In September, Kim Il-sung’s worst fears were proven right: On 15 September, the United States launched the Inchon landing operation. The North Korean defence was no match for the American armada. On 21 September, the Political Council of the WPK formally requested China’s assistance.6 The situation looked very grim for them. Pyongyang lost contact with Seoul’s garrison and its commander – Minister of National Defence Choe Yonggon. Kim Il-sung dismissed him from the position and appointed himself the minister, while, of course, keeping his position as the premier as well.7 It is unknown, though, if he ever wore the minister’s uniform, as it was mostly a symbolic and rather frantic gesture. Naturally, it had no effect on the frontline. On 28 September, Seoul was retaken by the South. Chairman Mao to the Rescue The southern coalition decided to take the war to North Korea. On 1 October, less than a month after the Inchon landing, Stalin already noted that Pyongyang’s situation had become dire. He told China to make a decision as soon as possible – would they intervene or not?8 The Chinese leadership was split on the issue: Premier Zhou Enlai led those who preferred to keep China away from the war. PRC Vice-Chairman Gao Gang was the leader of the interventionists.9 At first, Mao sided with Zhou. On 2 October, he informed Stalin that China wouldn’t be intervening in the conflict. The chairman argued that a few divisions could not change the course of the war and intervention could result in a full-scale Sino-American war or even World War III. China had just gone through a civil war, continued Mao Zedong, and, thus, intervention was unlikely to be supported by the people. Beijing should rather focus on rebuilding its own nation, while North Korea could suffer a temporary defeat and create guerrilla units to continue the fight.10 Kim Il-sung was broken upon learning about this decision. He felt that defeat was imminent.11 However, in a few days, Mao yielded to Stalin’s continuous pressure.12 The final decision to intervene was made on 13 October.13

The Korean War Through the Eyes of Pyongyang 55 The American army advanced on Pyongyang, and Kim Il-sung left the capital. He returned only in December, after the city was retaken by the Chinese army. For the time being, the KPA’s command was stationed in Kanggye, and it seems as if Kim Il-sung went there through China. The Chinese army’s famous commander, Peng Dehuai, felt no joy about his assignment and was greatly irritated with Kim Il-sung. He felt that China now had to pay in blood for the North Korean premier’s arrogance and miscalculations. He openly spoke about how negatively he assessed Kim Il-sung’s military skills.14 Reportedly, at some point, he even asked Kim: “Tell me, who started the Korean War? Was it American imperialism, or was it you?”15 The documents show that, at some point, Kim Il-sung was detained by the Chinese guard when he came to talk to Peng.16 It is unlikely to find another case of the head of an allied nation being treated this way by a supposedly friendly country. Kim Il-sung’s Petty Vengeance Twice, in 1945 and in 1950, Kim Il-sung was brought to power through the might of a foreign army. In 1945, the Soviets fought the Japanese in Korea and installed him as the leader. In 1950, the Chinese fought the United States and their allies and resurrected Kim Il-sung’s regime. The history of the Soviet-Japanese war is now completely rewritten in North Korea. Pyongyang falsely asserts that it was Kim Il-sung’s Korean People’s Revolutionary Army, and not the allies, who defeated Japan. The Soviets are recognised only as an auxiliary force to the mighty KPRA.17 In a similar way, the role of the Chinese army is massively downplayed in North Korea.18 They are portrayed as a mere assistance to the “ever-victorious Korean People’s Army”, who came to help it when it was “engaged in strategic retreat”. There still is a monument to the Chinese army in Pyongyang, kept mostly for diplomatic purposes. This author visited it in January 2014 with a Sino-Taiwanese tourist group. This tiny museum had no electricity supply at the time. Kim Il-sung never forgot how Commander Peng mistreated him. In 1956, when the Chinese marshal came to North Korea co-chairing a Soviet-Chinese delegation and forced Kim Il-sung to partially reverse a purge he had conducted earlier, Kim was given another reason to loathe Peng. The Great Leader’s vengeance was a petty one. Peng Dehuai was completely removed from the state history of North Korea. The DPRK’s encyclopaedias have entries about Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, He Long and other Chinese commanders – but not a single word about the man who led the army that saved North Korea. Notes 1 Stalin’s Telegram to Shtykov, 30 January 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 346, p. 70 [Телеграмма Сталина Штыкову. 30 января 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 346, л. 70]. 2 The Committee for Compilation of the War History of the Republic of Korea. Testimony Record 271, Hwang Gyu-myon. 30 April 1977 [대한민국 전사편찬위원회. 증언록. 면

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The Korean War Through the Eyes of Pyongyang 담번호 271(황규면, 1977년 4월 30일)]. Quoted from Pak Myong-nim. Korea, 1950: War and Peace. Seoul: Nanam, 2002, p. 144 [박명림. 한국 1950: 전쟁과 평화. 서울: 나남, 2002, 144쪽]. “On the liberation of Seoul – The capital of our motherland” in Korean Central Yearbook, 1951–1952. Pyongyang: Korean Central Yearbook Publishing House, 1953, p. 63 [우리 조국 수도 서울 해방에 제하여, 조선중앙년감 1951~1952, 평양: 조선중앙통 신사, 1953, 63쪽]. Telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Restructuring of the Governing Bodies of the Korean People’s Army and the First Report on Its Military Activities, 7 July 1950. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 5, folder 918795, item 122, pp. 168–171 [Телеграмма Председателю Совета Министров СССР о перестройке органов управления корейской Народной армии и первом отчёте её боевых действий. 7 июля 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 122, лл. 168–171]. Telegram from the Ambassador of the USSR to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with Information from the North Korean Government on the Situation on the Frontline and on Sino-Korean Talks about Possible Chinese Intervention to the War, no. 649, 20 July 1950. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 5, folder 918795, item 122, pp. 352–355 [Телеграмма посла СССР Председателю Совета Министров СССР с информацией северокорейского правительства об обстановке на фронте и состоявшихся китайско-корейских переговорах о возможном вступлении с войну Китая 649. 20 июля 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 122, лл. 352–355]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with Information about the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of North Korea. No. 1258, 22 September 1950. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 5, folder 918795, item 125, pp. 89–91 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР Первому заместителю министра иностранных дел СССР с информацией о заседании ЦК Трудовой партии Северной Кореи. 1258. 22 сентября 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 125, лл. 89–91]. Telegram from the Representative of the General Staff of the Soviet Army in North Korea to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Situation on the Korean Front from Pyongyang. No. 1298, 27 September 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 3, folder 65, item 827, pp. 103–106 [Телеграмма представителя Генерального штаба Советской Армии в Северной Корее Председателю Совета Министров СССР об обстановке на корейском фронте из Пхеньяна № 1298. 27 сентября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 3, оп. 65, д. 827, лл. 103–106]. Telegram from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Soviet Ambassador to the PRC with the Recommendations to the PRC Government to Assist the DPRK by Dispatching the Troops, 1 October 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 334, pp. 97–98 [Телеграмма Председателя Совета Министров СССР послу СССР в КНР с рекомендациями китайскому правительству оказать помощь КНДР войсками. 1 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 97–98]. Telegram of Roschin to Moscow, 25 October 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 335, pp. 80–81 [Телеграмма Рощина в Москву. 25 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 335, лл. 80–81]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Text of a Letter from the Chairman of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Position of the CPC Central Committee on the Dispatchment of Chinese Troops to Korea, no. 2270, 3 October 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 334, pp. 105–106 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР Председателю Совета Министров СССР с текстом письма Председателя Центрального Народного правительства

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КНР о позиции ЦК КПК по вопросу ввода китайских войск на территорию Кореи, 2270. 3 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 105–106]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about the Intentions of the DPRK Government to ask the Government of the Soviet Union to Prepare Flight Personnel and Officers of Other Specialties from among Soviet Koreans and Korean Students Studying in the USSR, No. 1426, 6 October 1950. Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 5, folder 918795, item 124, pp. 89–90 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР первому заместителю министра иностранных дел СССР о намерениях правительства КНДР просить правительство Советского Союза подготовить лётные кадры и офицеров других специальностей из числа советских корейцев и корейских студентов, обучающихся в СССР, № 1426. 6 октября 1950 года, ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 124, лл. 89–90]. Stalin’s Telegram to Shtykov, 8 October 1950. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 334, pp. 112–115 [Телеграмма Сталина Штыкову. 8 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 112–115]. Encrypted Telegram no. 25629, 13 October 1950. Second Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, collection 45, folder 1, item 334, pp. 111–112 [Шифртелеграмма № 25629. 13 октября 1950 года, 2 ГУ ГШ ВС СССР, АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 111–112]. Shen Zhihua. Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War. Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2004, pp. 245–246 [沈志华. 毛泽东, 斯大林与朝 鲜战争. 广州: 广东人民出版社, 2004, 第245–246页]. On the Korean War of 1950–1953 and the Peace Talks, 9 August 1966. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 58, item 266, pp. 122–131 [О Корейской войне 1950–1953 гг. и переговорах о перемирии. 9 августа 1966 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 58, д. 266, лл. 122–131]. Shen Zhihua. “Peng Dehuai asked Kim Il-sung: ‘Tell me, who started the Korean War?’”, Phoenix Weekly, 24 December 2011 [沈志华. 彭德怀质疑金日成: 朝鲜战 争究竟是谁发动的?, 凤凰周刊, 2011年 12月 24日], http://news.ifeng.com/history/ zhuanjialunshi/shenzhihua/detail_2011_12/24/11543343_0.shtml. On the Korean War of 1950–1953 and the Peace Talks, 9 August 1966. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 58, item 266, pp. 122–131 [О Корейской войне 1950–1953 гг. и переговорах о перемирии. 9 августа 1966 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 58, д. 266, лл. 122–131]. Fyodor Tertitskiy. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4, October/December 2021, pp. 164–183, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf; Fyodor Tertitskiy. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan”, Korea Observer, June 2018, pp. 219–238, www.researchgate.net/publication/325990388_A_Blatant_Lie_ The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_liberating_the_country_from_Japan. The entry on the Korean War in the DPRK’s largest encyclopaedia only mentions that the Chinese joined the war, without telling anything about the battles they participated in. “Fatherland Liberation War” in Grand Encyclopaedia of Korea, vol. 17. Pyongyang: Encyclopaedic Dictionaries Publishing House, 2000, pp. 501–505 [조국해방전쟁, 조 선대백과사전, 제17권, 평양: 백과사전출판사, 2000, 501~505쪽].

Bibliography English Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-Sung liberating the country from Japan”, Korea Observer (June 2018), pp. 219–238. www.researchgate.net/ publication/325990388_A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_ liberating_the_country_from_Japan.

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Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4 (October/December 2021), pp. 164–183. https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf. Korean The Committee for Compilation of the War History of the Republic of Korea. “Testimony record 271” in Hwang Gyu-Myon, 30 April 1977 [대한민국 전사편찬위원회. 증언록. 면담번호 271(황규면, 1977년 4월 30일)]. “Fatherland liberation war” in Grand Encyclopaedia of Korea, vol. 17. Pyongyang: Encyclopaedic Dictionaries Publishing House, 2000, pp. 501–505 [조국해방전쟁, 조선대백 과사전, 제17권, 평양: 백과사전출판사, 2000, 501~505쪽]. Pak Myong-nim. Korea, 1950: War and Peace. Seoul: Nanam, 2002 [박명림. 한국 1950: 전쟁과 평화. 서울: 나남, 2002]. “On the liberation of Seoul – The capital of our motherland” in Korean Central Yearbook, 1951–1952. Pyongyang: Korean Central Yearbook Publishing House, 1953, p. 63 [우리 조국 수도 서울 해방에 제하여, 조선중앙년감 1951~1952, 평양: 조선중앙통신사, 1953, 63쪽]. Russian Encrypted Telegram No. 25629, 13 October 1950, Second Main Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 334, pp. 111–112 [Шифртелеграмма № 25629. 13 октября 1950 года, 2 ГУ ГШ ВС СССР, АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 111–112]. On the Korean War of 1950–1953 and the Peace Talks, 9 August 1966, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 58, Item 266, pp. 122–131 [О Корейской войне 1950–1953 гг. и переговорах о перемирии. 9 августа 1966 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 58, д. 266, лл. 122–131]. Stalin’s Telegram to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 346, p. 70 [Телеграмма Сталина Штыкову. 30 января 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 346, л. 70]. Stalin’s Telegram to Shtykov, 8 October 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 334, pp. 112–115 [Телеграмма Сталина Штыкову. 8 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 112–115]. Telegram from the Ambassador of the USSR to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with Information from the North Korean Government on the Situation on the Frontline and on Sino-Korean Talks about Possible Chinese Intervention to the War, No. 649, 20 July 1950, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 5, Folder 918795, Item 122, pp. 352–355 [Телеграмма посла СССР Председателю Совета Министров СССР с информацией северокорейского правительства об обстановке на фронте и состоявшихся китайско-корейских переговорах о возможном вступлении с войну Китая 649. 20 июля 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 122, лл. 352–355]. Telegram from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Soviet Ambassador to the PRC with the Recommendations to the PRC Government to Assist the DPRK by Dispatching the Troops, 1 October 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian

The Korean War Through the Eyes of Pyongyang 59 Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 334, pp. 97–98 [Телеграмма Председателя Совета Министров СССР послу СССР в КНР с рекомендациями китайскому правительству оказать помощь КНДР войсками. 1 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 97–98]. Telegram from the Representative of the General Staff of the Soviet Army in North Korea to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Situation on the Korean Front from Pyongyang. No. 1298, 27 September 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 3, Folder 65, Item 827, pp. 103–106 [Телеграмма представителя Генерального штаба Советской Армии в Северной Корее Председателю Совета Министров СССР об обстановке на корейском фронте из Пхеньяна № 1298. 27 сентября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 3, оп. 65, д. 827, лл. 103–106]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Text of a Letter from the Chairman of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Position of the CPC Central Committee on the Dispatchment of Chinese Troops to Korea, no. 2270, 3 October 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 334, pp. 105–106 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР Председателю Совета Министров СССР с текстом письма Председателя Центрального Народного правительства КНР о позиции ЦК КПК по вопросу ввода китайских войск на территорию Кореи, 2270. 3 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 334, лл. 105–106]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with Information about the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of North Korea. No. 1258, 22 September 1950, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 5, Folder 918795, Item 125, pp. 89–91 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР Первому заместителю министра иностранных дел СССР с информацией о заседании ЦК Трудовой партии Северной Кореи. 1258. 22 сентября 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 125, лл. 89–91]. Telegram from the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about the Intentions of the DPRK Government to Ask the Government of the Soviet Union to Prepare Flight Personnel and Officers of Other Specialties from among Soviet Koreans and Korean Students Studying in the USSR, No. 1426, 6 October 1950, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, Collection 5, Folder 918795, Item 124, pp. 89–90 [Телеграмма посла СССР в КНДР первому заместителю министра иностранных дел СССР о намерениях правительства КНДР просить правительство Советского Союза подготовить лётные кадры и офицеров других специальностей из числа советских корейцев и корейских студентов, обучающихся в СССР, № 1426. 6 октября 1950 года, ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 124, лл. 89–90]. Telegram of Roschin to Moscow, 25 October 1950, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Collection 45, Folder 1, Item 335, pp. 80–81 [Телеграмма Рощина в Москву. 25 октября 1950 года. АП РФ, ф. 45, оп. 1, д. 335, лл. 80–81]. Telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the Restructuring of the Governing Bodies of the Korean People’s Army and the First Report on Its Military Activities, 7 July 1950, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence of Russia, collection 5, folder 918795, item 122, pp. 168–171 [Телеграмма Председателю Совета Министров СССР о перестройке органов управления корейской Народной армии и первом отчёте её боевых действий. 7 июля 1950 года. ЦАМО России, ф. 5, оп. 918795, д. 122, лл. 168–171].

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Chinese Shen Zhihua. Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War. Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2004, pp. 245–246 [沈志华. 毛泽东, 斯大林与朝鲜战争. 广州: 广东人民出版社, 2004, 第245–246页]. Shen Zhihua. “Peng Dehuai asked Kim Il-sung: ‘Tell me, who started the Korean War?’”. Phoenix Weekly, 24 December 2011 [沈志华. 彭德怀质疑金日成: 朝鲜战争究竟是谁 发动的?, 凤凰周刊, 2011年 12月 24日]. http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhuanjialunshi/ shenzhihua/detail_2011_12/24/11543343_0.shtml.

8

The Famine of 1954–55 A Forgotten Tragedy

The North Korean famine of the 1990s is a comparatively well-known tragedy. Yet it was not the only famine the country experienced. This chapter is dedicated to a relatively forgotten event: a famine which occurred in the North soon after the end of the Korean War. First Signs of the Famine Like other satellite states of the Soviet Union, North Korea was a “people’s democratic” country, which was even reflected in the nation’s official name: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Stalinist doctrine said that such nations are in the process of advancing from capitalism to socialism and, thus, can have some vestiges of the old orders such as a market economy or private property. However, the goal was to eventually get rid of these relics. North Korea started this process immediately after the Korean War ended. In the communist narrative, this was called “building” or “constructing” socialism. For the farmers, this meant they were compelled to join collective farms. Farmers on them were supposed to surrender all their harvest to the state in exchange for food and other benefits. What happened next was very predictable, as Stalin’s USSR saw the same scenario being played out in the 1930s. Yet some people never learn. As one Internet saying went, “How to do communism? 1) Establish a communist utopia. 2) Rob or kill the successful. 3) Run out of food. 4) Starve to death. 5) Say it was not ‘real’ communism”. Of course, this state of serfdom was massively inefficient. When people receive the same fee no matter how much they work, they will lose any motivation to work harder. Some farmers slaughtered their cattle and sold the meat – what is the reason to have an ox, a cow or a horse if they only work for the state and not for you? Meat would at least bring you some money, reasoned many. Thus, the crop yield under such a “progressive” system was much lower than under “exploitative” capitalism. In the Soviet Union, collectivisation resulted in a famine from 1932–33. The famine hit Kazakhstan and Ukraine especially hard, resulting in millions of people starving to death. North Korea went the same dark way. DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-8

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Collectivisation started in 1953 in the North.1 However, the speed of it was quite slow – until a plenum of the Central Committee in November 1954 decided to speed up the process.2 The first reports of food shortages started to appear in the autumn of 1953, but it wasn’t until after the plenum that the grim consequences of such a policy truly started manifesting themselves. The public distribution system, which had expanded during the war, could not cope with so many mouths to feed. At the time, Lazarev, a Soviet chargé d’affaires in the DPRK, estimated that Pyongyang lacked 200,000 tonnes of grain (~17.4% of the total amount) to feed the people.3 Pyongyang reacted to the crisis by exempting North Hamgyong, the province which suffered the most, from in-kind taxation of agriculture and by allocating 40,000 tonnes of grain to the most vulnerable farmer communities in the region.4 The Cabinet of Ministers assembled a task force, made Choe Chang-ik its chief and sent it to North Hamgyong. One cannot say that these measures had no effect, but the North Korean government did nothing to remove the actual cause of the crisis – collective farming. In fact, Pyongyang doubled down on the policy. On the November plenum of 1954, Kim Il-sung said that the harvest has been good so far, and, thus, they should push further with collectivisation. This intensified the crisis to a degree that even the government could not ignore it any longer.5 Pak Chang-ok (at the time a vice-premier and the chairman of the State Planning Committee) complained to the Soviets that they were forced to reduce distribution quotas and that the country wouldn’t have enough resources even in if China and the USSR helped them. The Soviets requested an explanation, and Pak said that the harvest had been worse than they expected, but the taxation remained on the previous level, resulting in 30–32% of grain being taken instead of 25–27% as prescribed by the law.6 Song Jin-pha, the editor of the state journal Sae Choson, revealed that the taxation essentially had become a form of a poll tax. As always happens with poll taxes, the poor suffered the most.7 Ho Bin, chief party secretary for the North Hamgyong province, confirmed it and said that the poor now had no wheat left for themselves.8 First Deaths Illarion Pak, chairman of the People’s Committee of the Chagang province, said that there were cases of over 50% of grain taken and that local authorities tended not to report to Pyongyang on the full extent of the crisis.9 Foreign minister Nam Il said there were cases when even the grain necessary for physical survival was taken away during taxation campaigns.10 Interestingly enough, no one in the leadership attempted to put the blame for the crisis on the recent war. The first reaction of the top leadership was to outlaw private purchases and sales of rice in the country. This order was passed on 5 December 1954.11 According to Soviet sources, this measure was highly unpopular amongst the farmers: They now could not buy rice to feed themselves. The crisis deepened. Song Jin-pha was one of the men at the top who understood that this order was one of the causes of the crisis. But he was not the one in charge of the country.

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In January 1955, Pyongyang launched a campaign calling workers to donate one daily quota of goods per month to farmers.12 Yet the crisis continued. A famine broke out in North Korea that year. Rice started disappearing from farmers’ markets in January. By spring, it was gone completely. Quite a few officials, fearing retribution from Pyongyang, decided to conceal the situation from their superiors. A socialist utopia like the country was supposed to become could not have such a crisis. Thus, some people in the North Korean leadership started to assert that the shortages were, in fact, caused by the black market. In 1955, two people were executed for “market speculations”.13 Hence, the crisis continued and deepened. More and more people died from starvation. In August 1956, North Korean ambassador to the USSR Lee Sang-jo assessed that the famine took thousands of lives.14 Moreover, according to the ambassador, about 300 low-ranking officials killed themselves. One could suppose that some of these people were idealists and the thought of people dying from famine just after the DPRK “emerged triumphant in the Fatherland Liberation War” was too much for them to bear. The Soviet embassy hinted that something needed to be done, but, following the new, post-Stalin line, they did not explicitly command Kim on what needed to be done.15 The Government Starts to React Rodong Shinmun, despite being the country’s main newspaper, remained completely silent regarding the ongoing crisis. There was only one time when it attempted to break the silence – on 26 April 1956. However, this resulted in the entire issue being recalled and replaced with a new one where the crisis was not mentioned.16 Instead, the new issue praised the successes of collectivisation. The authorities started to act only in June of the same year. In the middle of that month, an extended plenum of the Political Council passed a number of decisions aimed at stopping the crisis.17 The Soviet embassy was informed about the decisions, and since their reports are now open, one can learn what decisions were passed: Upon considering the unusual conditions, the Political Council passed a decision to buy 200 thousand tonnes of wheat from abroad. These conditions are as follows. Due to the crop failure in several provinces last year, many North Koreans were starving. To ease the situation with the population and allow them to keep some stock, it has been decided to reduce the taxation in kind of agriculture from 27 to 25 per cent on irrigation crops and from 23 to 15 per cent on dry crops. There will be no forced buying of crops conducted this year. Some wheat would be bought through consumer cooperatives on a strictly voluntary basis. As there are more workers, state employees and military men, i.e. people who require the use of public distribution system, there will be needed for resources for this than in 1948. 700 000 tonnes of wheat will be necessary

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The Famine of 1954–55 to supply civilians and the military. The state could do it by taxing in-kind wheat purchases and providing 500–530 thousand tonnes of food and seed loans. The difference will be 170–200 thousand tonnes. Under the current conditions, it will be necessary to have at least a small state stock of wheat. Thus, the Political Council decided to buy 200 thousand tonnes of wheat from abroad this year.18

On 21 June 1955, the ban on private rice trade was quashed.19 Almost immediately after this, the situation began to improve. Evidently, the North Korean economy was quick to react to both negative and positive measures passed by the leadership. Sadly, this was a lesson Pyongyang never truly learned. The Second Famine of the 1990s One can see that North Korean government had two strategies to deal with the crisis. The first was making the grain market freer; the second was requesting foreign assistance. Kim Il-sung, as later years showed, was strongly in favour of the second solution. From the 1950s to the 1990s, Pyongyang was dependent on foreign aid, and when it stopped, a new famine broke out. In the 1990s, Pyongyang was much less quick to react to the crisis, and the number of deaths was different by two orders of magnitude. Why did this tragedy happen? While history shows some truly sadistic tyrants, who gleefully inflict pain on their people for the sake of it, such people are an exception. Normally a dictator wants their country to be prosperous. The famine of the 1990s also was not something conscientiously imposed from above. Yet Kim Jong-il’s and, especially, Kim Il-sung’s unshakeable faith in the supremacy of the command economy did play a huge role here. The line of Pyongyang since the 1980s has been “any reforms will doom our system”. Thus, one can clearly say that the famine was caused by Kim Il-sung, who created a catastrophically inefficient economy, and Kim Jong-il, who failed to reform it. Will Famine Ever Come Back to North Korea? A person should be paid for their work. This maxim was ultimately understood by Pyongyang as well – to some extent. In the 21st century, the DPRK leadership decided to follow the rest of the world and reform the economy to some extent. Marketplaces were legalised, and the agricultural system started to shift away from collective farming. The policy on decentralising the state’s control over farmers deepened under the first years of Kim Jong-un’s rule.20 It seems that the country developed some economic security after all. Thus, while Kim Jong-un’s North Korea never abandoned state planning completely, it seems that just a few steps away from Kim Il-sung’s way were enough to significantly reduce the chances of another famine.

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Notes 1 D. Markov (second secretary of the Embassy). Classes and Class Struggle in the DPRK (Reference Letter), July 1953 [Д. Марков (второй секретарь посольства). Классы и классовая борьба в КНДР /Справка/. Июль 1953 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 2 Kuznetsov, Stepanov, Fedorenko and Suzdalev. Reference Letter on the Situation in DPRK, 17 January 1953 [Кузнецов, Степанов, Федоренко, Суздалев. Справка о положении в КНДР. 17 января 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 3 Journal of S.P. Lazarev, chargé d’affaires of the USSR to the DPRK, 16 September 1953 [Дневник временного поверенного в делах СССР в КНДР Лазарева С. П. 16 сентября 1953 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 4 From the Journal of I.A. Nikonov, Councillor of the Soviet Embassy to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with the DPRK’s Deputy Premier Pak Chang-ok, 22 October 1954 [Из дневника советника посольства СССР в КНДР Никонова И.А. Запись беседы с заместителем премьер-министра КНДР Пак Чан Оком. 22 октября 1954 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 5 Kuznetsov, Stepanov, Fedorenko and Suzdalev. Reference Letter on the Situation in DPRK, 17 January 1953 [Кузнецов, Степанов, Федоренко, Суздалев. Справка о положении в КНДР. 17 января 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 6 From the Journal of S. P. Suzdalev. Record of 31 January 1955 Conversation with Pak Chang-ok, the DPRK’s Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, 1 February 1955 [Из дневника Суздалева С. П. Запись беседы с зам. председателя кабинета министров и председателем Госплана КНДР Пак Чан Оком 31 января 1955 года. 1 февраля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 7 From the Journal of I. S. Byakov, Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Song Jin-pha, the Editor of the Magazine “Sae Choson”, 29 March 1955 [Из дневника секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР Бякова И.С. Запись беседы с редактором журнала «Новая Корея» т. Сон Дин Фа. 29 марта 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 8 From the Journal of I. S. Byakov, Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Comrade Ho Bin, Chairman of the Committee of North Hwanghae Province, 18 March 1955. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 11, folder 60, item 8, pp. 135–139 [Из дневника секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР И.С. Бякова. Запись беседы с председателем провинциального комитета провинции Сев. Хванхе тов. Хе Бином. 18 марта 1955 года. АВП РФ, ф. 11, оп. 60, д. 8, лл. 135–139]. 9 From the Diaries of A.M. Petrov, the Embassy’s Councillor and I.S. Byakov, the Embassy’s First Secretary. Record of Conversation with Illarion Pak, the Chairman of the People’s Committee for Chagang Province, 31 March 1955 [Из дневника советника посольства А.М. Петрова и 1-го секретаря И.C. Бякова. Запись беседы с председателем народного комитета провинции Чаган Пак Илларионом Дмитриевичем. 31 марта 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 10 Journal of the Chargé d’affaires of the USSR to the DPRK, 25 January–16 February 1955 [Дневник временного поверенного в делах СССР в КНДР за период с 25 января по 16 февраля 1955 года. Запись за 2 февраля]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 11 Record of Conversation of First Secretary of the Far Eastern Department V. A. Vasyukevich with councillor A. K. Grishayev, 8 February 1955 [Запись беседы 1-го секретаря Дальневосточного отдела Васюкевича В. А. с советником Гришаевым А.К. 8. II. 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 12 From the Diaries of A.M. Petrov, the Embassy’s Councillor and I.S. Byakov, the Embassy’s First Secretary. Record of Conversation with Illarion Pak, the Chairman

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13 14

15 16 17

18 19 20

The Famine of 1954–55 of the People’s Committee for Chagang Province, 31 March 1955 [Из дневника советника посольства А.М. Петрова и 1-го секретаря И.C. Бякова. Запись беседы с председателем народного комитета провинции Чаган Пак Илларионом Дмитриевичем. 31 марта 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Balázs Szalontai. Kim Il sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 67. From the Journal of I. F. Kurdyukov. A Reception of the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Lee Sang-jo, 9 August 1956 [Из дневника И. Ф. Курдюкова. Приём посла КНДР в СССР Ли Сан Чо. 9 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR S. P. Suzdalev, 12 March–16 April 1955. Entry for 15 April 1955 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР Суздалева С.П. за время с 12 марта по 16 апреля 1955 г. 15 апреля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Balázs Szalontai. Kim Il sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 71. From the Journal of A.M. Petrov, the Embassy’s Councillor. Record of Conversation with Illarion Pak, the Chairman of the People’s Committee for Chagang Province. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 28, item 314 [Из дневника советника посольства А.М. Петрова. Запись беседы с председателем народного комитета провинции Чаган Пак Илларионом Дмитриевичем (Пак Чан Сик). РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 314]. Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 25 July 1955 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 25 июля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Balázs Szalontai. Kim Il sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 73. Lee Sok-ki and others. Economic Reforms in North Korea of Kim Jong-un’s Era: Focusing on the “Our Style Method of Administration”. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 2018, [이석기 등. 김정은 시대 북한 경제개혁 연구 – ‘우리식 경제관리방법’을 중심으로. 산업연구원, 2018년], www.kiet.re.kr/kiet_web/index. jsp?sub_num=8&state=view&tab=list&idx=54694&.

Bibliography English Szalontai, Balázs. Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005. Russian From the Diaries of A. M. Petrov, the Embassy’s Councillor and I.S. Byakov, the Embassy’s First Secretary. Record of Conversation with Illarion Pak, the Chairman of the People’s Committee for Chagang Province, 31 March 1955 [Из дневника советника посольства А.М. Петрова и 1-го секретаря И.C. Бякова. Запись беседы с председателем народного комитета провинции Чаган Пак Илларионом Дмитриевичем. 31 марта 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) From the Journal of A. M. Petrov, the Embassy’s Councillor. Record of Conversation with Illarion Pak, the Chairman of the People’s Committee for Chagang Province, Russian

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State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 28, Item 314 [Из дневника советника посольства А.М. Петрова. Запись беседы с председателем народного комитета провинции Чаган Пак Илларионом Дмитриевичем (Пак Чан Сик). РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 314]. From the Journal of I. A. Nikonov, Councillor of the Soviet Embassy to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with the DPRK’s Deputy Premier Pak Chang-ok, 22 October 1954 [Из дневника советника посольства СССР в КНДР Никонова И.А. Запись беседы с заместителем премьер-министра КНДР Пак Чан Оком. 22 октября 1954 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) From the Journal of I. F. Kurdyukov. A Reception of the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Lee Sang-jo, 9 August 1956 [Из дневника И. Ф. Курдюкова. Приём посла КНДР в СССР Ли Сан Чо. 9 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) From the Journal of I. S. Byakov, Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Song Jin-pha, the Editor of the Magazine “Sae Choson”, 29 March 1955 [Из дневника секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР Бякова И.С. Запись беседы с редактором журнала “Новая Корея” т. Сон Дин Фа. 29 марта 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) From the Journal of I. S. Byakov, Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Comrade Ho Bin, Chairman of the Committee of North Hwanghae Province, 18 March 1955, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 11, Folder 60, Item 8, pp. 135–139 [Из дневника секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР И.С. Бякова. Запись беседы с председателем провинциального комитета провинции Сев. Хванхе тов. Хе Бином. 18 марта 1955 года. АВП РФ, ф. 11, оп. 60, д. 8, лл. 135–139]. From the Journal of S. P. Suzdalev. Record of 31 January 1955 Conversation with Pak Chang-ok, the DPRK’s Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee, 1 February 1955 [Из дневника Суздалева С. П. Запись беседы с зам. председателя кабинета министров и председателем Госплана КНДР Пак Чан Оком 31 января 1955 года. 1 февраля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR S. P. Suzdalev, 12 March – 16 April 1955. Entry for 15 April 1955 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР Суздалева С.П. за время с 12 марта по 16 апреля 1955 г. 15 апреля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 25 July 1955 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 25 июля 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of S. P. Lazarev, Chargé d’affaires of the USSR to the DPRK, 16 September 1953 [Дневник временного поверенного в делах СССР в КНДР Лазарева С. П. 16 сентября 1953 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of the Chargé d’affaires of the USSR to the DPRK, 25 January–16 February 1955 [Дневник временного поверенного в делах СССР в КНДР за период с 25 января по 16 февраля 1955 года. Запись за 2 февраля]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Kuznetsov, Stepanov, Fedorenko and Suzdalev. Reference Letter on the Situation in DPRK, 17 January 1953 [Кузнецов, Степанов, Федоренко, Суздалев. Справка о положении в КНДР. 17 января 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Markov, D. (second secretary of the Embassy). Classes and Class Struggle in the DPRK (Reference Letter), July 1953 [Д. Марков (второй секретарь посольства). Классы и классовая борьба в КНДР /Справка/. Июль 1953 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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Record of Conversation of First Secretary of the Far Eastern Department V. A. Vasyukevich with Councillor A. K. Grishayev, 8 February 1955 [Запись беседы 1-го секретаря Дальневосточного отдела Васюкевича В. А. с советником Гришаевым А.К. 8. II. 1955 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Korean Lee Sok-ki et al. Economic Reforms in North Korea of Kim Jong-un’s Era: Focusing on the “Our Style Method of Administration”. Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 2018 [이석기 등. 김정은 시대 북한 경제개혁 연구 – ‘우리식 경제관리방법’을 중 심으로. 산업연구원, 2018년]. www.kiet.re.kr/kiet_web/index.jsp?sub_num=8&state= view&tab=list&idx=54694&.

9

The Last Days of Summer The Story of the August Plenum

Few days had such an impact on North Korean history as 30 August 1956. On that Thursday, during a WPK plenum, an opposition group tried launching a political assault on Kim Il-sung. They failed in their attempt, and this started a chain of events which ultimately resulted in Kim becoming the unchallenged ruler of the country. In 1967, when he proclaimed “the Singular Thought System” – a new totalitarian order – he said that this was a conclusion of the processes that had started back in 1956.1 Previous studies of the August Plenum mostly focused on the events before and after the plenum whilst nearly skipping the crucial events of 30 August.2 This study aims to be more balanced: The preparations and the aftermath of the plenum were, of course, important, but, arguably, the way the plenum itself unfurled had an even greater impact on North Korean history. Road to 30 August In early 1956, the North Korean elite was evidently divided into supporters and opponents of the country’s leader – Kim Il-sung, the chairman of the Party’s

Figure 9.1 The Third Congress of the WPK. Source: Rodong Shinmun, 24 April 1956, p. 1 DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-9

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Central Committee. To any independent observer, it was quite clear that Kim Ilsung was winning the fight. Pak Hon-yong, the Leader’s most important opponent, was arrested, tried and sentenced to death. Pak’s chief aide Lee Sung-yop had not only been given a death sentence but had already been executed. Most opponents of Kim Il-sung who weren’t yet purged hailed either from the Soviet Union or China. Both groups were already weakened. Vice-Premier Aleksei Hegai, the unofficial leader of the Soviet faction, died in 1953. Most likely, he committed suicide after being exposed to a barrage of unfair criticism by Kim and his loyalists. Pak Ir-u, a former minister of internal affairs from the Chinese faction, was put under arrest. All counterattacks on Kim Il-sung that the opposition had attempted had ended in failures. Yet, in February 1956, everything changed. In Moscow, during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev publicly condemned Joseph Stalin’s horrible legacy. The rejection of Stalinism signalled a new beginning for the Communist world and, thus, a new hope for the North Korean opposition. Khrushchev condemned the cult of Stalin. Thus, the idea of fanatically worshipping a leader suddenly became anathema in the Communist bloc. The first response of Kim Il-sung to this shift was to claim that the WPK indeed had a similar problem, but it was not his cult but rather a cult of Pak Hon-yong. And since Pak had been purged, this problem no longer existed.3 In the months to come, Kim Il-sung reiterated this claim several times. Naturally, no one in the opposition was willing to accept this trick. As of February, the whole country was preparing for a major political event. In December 1955, it had been announced that the Third Congress of the WPK was scheduled to be held from 23 to 29 April 1956. The Congress was to elect the Central Committee, which had the power to elect and dismiss the chairman. Thus, naturally, the event was of great importance to Kim Il-sung. As the opposition was completely unprepared at the time, the Congress proceeded according to the wishes of the chairman and, ultimately, even strengthened Kim Il-sung’s grip on power. The very first event of the Congress was a report of the Central Committee. Communist tradition said that this was to be given by the one considered the leader of the Party. Congress decided that the report would be done by Kim Il-sung, clearly sending a message that his power had not weakened. Kim Il-sung wasted no time: In the report, he attacked the former leaders of the opposition: Pak Hon-yong and Aleksei Hegai, who were, respectively, purged and dead.4 This intimidating atmosphere ensured another victory for Kim. The oppositionists did not speak openly against him, but they did manage to talk with the Soviet delegate Leonid Brezhnev and inform him what was going on.5 Brezhnev was a Party secretary at the time; it was long before he became the head of the Soviet Union. The British Foreign Office made the following observation by the end of the Third Congress: It can be said that so far Kim Il Sung has succeeded in the attack on the cult of the individual, for which he would seem to be an obvious target. His personal

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Figure 9.2 Kim Il-sung stands next to Leonid Brezhnev. Source: North Korean magazine People’s Korea [인민조선]. 1956, no. 5, p. 5

position appears unimpaired and the Congress re-elected him as the Chairman of the Party’s Central Committee.6 It is difficult to argue with such a conclusion. Kim Il-sung’s victory was evidently obvious to everyone – even to a such faraway nation as the United Kingdom. Ambassador Lee’s Failed Attack One of the important events of the Third Congress was North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union Lee Sang-jo’s failed attempt to attack Kim Il-sung. This was a spontaneous gesture. He made no preparations and had no plan. Lee attempted to pass a note twice to the Congress presidium, where he indicated that he wanted to talk about the cult. As the praesidium was firmly under the control of Kim Il-sung’s men,7 the note was simply ignored.8 After the Congress, Kim Il-sung’s supporters met Lee Sang-jo at the apartment of Kim Chang-man, a vice-chairman of the Central Committee, and started pressuring the ambassador. They said that he lacked a true understanding of the CPSU’s 20th

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Figure 9.3 Delegates at the Third Congress of the WPK. Source: North Korean magazine Korea [조선]. 1956, no. 2, p. 2

Congress and “mechanically applied” its decisions to the WPK. Lee replied that they were not even willing to understand what the Soviet Congress had been about.9 Kim Chang-man contacted other members of the North Korean elite: Minister of National Defence Choe Yong-gon, Central Committee Presidium member Pak Kum-chol and Party Organisation and Guidance Department Chief Han Sang-du. The consensus was that Ambassador Lee was to be dismissed from his position at once. Later, Lee Sang-jo expected that Choe Yong-gon, who had been the North Korean delegate for the 20th Congress, might support the opposition.10 Evidently, it was already not the case. After learning about an impending threat to his career, Lee Sang-jo approached Kim Du-bong, the head of North Korea’s parliament. On the same day, Kim Du-bong addressed Kim Il-sung, and the leader said that Lee Sang-jo should keep his job.11 The reason Kim Il-sung was so lenient was probably that the dismissal of an ambassador to the Soviet Union could not have gone unnoticed by Moscow. Thus, Kim Ilsung, as the great schemer he was, pretended to agree with Kim Du-bong. He said that Lee Sang-jo had done nothing wrong and merely voiced his opinion.12 Lee Sang-jo returned to the USSR. His attack ended up strengthening the leader’s position. The Formal Rules Unlike now, in 1956, the Party’s head in North Korea was elected by the Central Committee. Article 35 of the Party Bylaws adopted in the Third Congress stipulated: “Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Party’s Central Committee are elected on a Central Committee plenum”.13 Central Committee members were divided into two categories: full and alternate. Both could be present at a plenum, but only full members could actually

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Figure 9.4 The North Korean elite after the Third Congress. Source: North Korean magazine Korea [조선]. 1956, no. 2, p. 3

vote. After the Third Congress, the Committee had 71 full and 45 alternate members.14 In other words, 116 people could attend a plenum, and 71 of them could vote. The majority required to pass a resolution to dismiss the chairman was 36 votes. One could make some observations by looking at the list. The standard procedure in Communist countries was to put these people in order of their authority. Thus, Chairman Kim Il-sung was to be followed by full members of the Central Committee’s Presidium, alternate members of the Presidium and, finally, ordinary members of the Central Committee. However, the actual list was somewhat different. For example, a full member of the Presidium, Kim Kwang-hyop, was 37th, while Pak Chang-ok, an ordinary member of the Central Committee, was 7th. Kim Chang-man, the first on the list of alternate members of the Presidium, a vice-chairman and the head of the Organisational Commission of the Central Committee, was 27th on the list. Yet So Hwi, merely another member of the Central Committee, was 19th. Pak Chang-ok and So Hwi were members of the opposition, while Kim Kwanghyop and Kim Chang-man were Kim Il-sung’s supporters. Thus, one can conclude that after the Congress, Kim Il-sung implemented quick measures to give important positions to his followers. The oppositionists might have appeared high in the general list – but the leader did his best to limit their actual power. Final Countdown The leader of the opposition was Choe Chang-ik, a former Chinese Korean who, by 1956, was one of the DPRK’s vice-premiers. Kim Il-sung grew suspicious of

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him even before the Third Congress. He considered not including him in the Central Committee’s Presidium but ultimately decided against it.15 Official memoirs of Kim Il-sung claim that he was informed of the conspiracy by Nam Il, North Korea’s foreign minister.16 This claim does not seem to contradict the existing documents.17 Also, Kang Sang-ho, a vice-minister of internal affairs at the time, named Ho Hak-song, a department deputy chief in the Central Committee, as the one who served as the mole in the opposition.18 In the later years Ho was also purged. Kim got one of the first, maybe even the very first, report on the developing plot when he was travelling to the Soviet Union. People surrounding him noticed how his face suddenly darkened as the Leader understood how serious the situation was.19 Kim Il-sung was evidently unsure if Nam Il was truly on his side. In May, the leader spoke critically of both Nam and Choe Chang-ik.20 Kim was nervous, as he was afraid that he might lose his power. Indeed, he was right to worry. When Kim Il-sung was in the Soviet Union, the Soviets privately condemned him for his cult and disinterest in the plight of the common people. It seems that Moscow seriously considered him being replaced with another reformist figure, and, at the time, Kim had no power to directly oppose the Kremlin. Filatov, a high-ranking Soviet diplomat, met with the North Korean opposition and told them about this incident.21 The opposition decided to immediately capitalise on this development. They met Kim Il-sung and demanded reforms. This was yet another strategic mistake, as the leader was now alerted to their position. In order to placate the opposition, Kim promised change, while in secret, he was assembling his supporters for the final showdown.22

Figure 9.5 Kim Il-sung meets with Nikita Khrushchev. Source: North Korean magazine Korea [조선]. 1956, no. 3, p. 5

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Figure 9.6 Nikolai Bulganin, the Soviet premier, shakes Kim Il-sung’s hand. Leonid Brezhnev is standing behind Bulganin. Source: North Korean magazine Korea [조선]. 1956, no. 3, p. 5

Figure 9.7 Kim Il-sung returns to Pyongyang after his trip. Source: North Korean magazine Korea [조선]. 1956, no. 3, p. 2

Some oppositionists started probing the Soviet embassy, understanding that their support would be crucial. On 5 June, Choe Chang-ik scheduled a meeting with the Soviet ambassador, Ivanov.23 After three days, on 8 June, they met as agreed. The leader of the opposition made a lengthy speech. He mentioned factionalism and nepotism, smearing the

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name of the late Aleksei Hegai,24 assaults on Soviet Koreans, rampant poverty in the country, the incompetence of Kim Il-sung’s underlings, the lack of spirit of the 20th Congress in the Party, the cult of Kim Il-sung and other things.25 Choe did not suggest directly that Kim Il-sung was to be removed, but he did tell the ambassador that Kim needed to be given advice he could not refuse.26 By early August, the opposition was getting desperate. The Soviet embassy did not intervene directly in what was going on. And, more importantly, it did not seem like they would have a majority on their side at the plenum. The opposition adopted a new strategy: They started attacking Kim Il-sung’s loyalists, calling for them to be removed from the Central Committee. This could have weakened Kim Il-sung’s voting bloc.27 Of course, the leader did not sit idly by. He said that he, too, carried some responsibility for the alleged misdeeds of his underlings. By sharing accountability, Kim ensured that his supporters would stay on the Committee.28 The opposition had one more supporter – Lee Sang-jo, who, as readers remember, occupied the crucial position of North Korean ambassador to the Soviet Union. This enabled them to get in contact with the Kremlin. On 9 August, Ambassador Lee revealed the opposition’s plans to Moscow. The plan was to remove Kim Ilsung from the position of Central Committee chairman while allowing him to stay as premier. The position of the supreme commander was to be made separate and given to Choe Yong-gon.29 Choe was an ambitious man, and, notably, he was the one who represented the DPRK at the 20th Congress. The opposition hoped to receive his support.30 Yet things ultimately did not go according to their plan. Lee Sang-jo and his comrades were emboldened by what had recently happened in Bulgaria and Hungary.31 In Sofia, the position of the country’s autocrat, Valko Chervenkov, was already weakened before 1956: In 1954, the Bulgarian Communist Party nullified his position of general secretary, and, in 1956, he was demoted from premier to vice-premier. The new premier was Todor Zhivkov; a moderate reformist.32 Hungary’s way was somewhat similar. The country’s dictator, Mátyás Rákosi, was removed from the premier’s position in 1953. In July 1956, Rákosi, under pressure by the Soviet Union, wrote a letter asking to dismiss him as Party’s first secretary as well.33 Both countries removed their tyrants in two steps, so it seems that the North Korean opposition intended to do the same. The strategy looked reasonable, yet their tactics were awful. As the plenum approached, they continued to make openly critical remarks about Kim Il-sung. The leader, who, unlike them, was skilful in scheming and deception, made his preparation. His underlings attempted to pressure the opposition into silence.34 Meanwhile, by Kim Il-sung’s order, Pang Hak-se, his loyal minister of internal affairs, dispatched agents everywhere in Pyongyang to monitor the situation.35 The Most Fateful Morning The Plenum of the Central Committee opened on 30 August 1956. It was this plenum that decided the fate of the country.

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Officially, it was planned that Kim Il-sung, who had just come back from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, would make a report, “On Concluding the Work Done by Our Government’s Delegation during Their Visit to the Brotherly Nations and on Several Immediate Tasks for Our Party”, and the Committee’s members would discuss it. Things, however, did not unfurl according to this official plan: The central part of the plenum was the final clash between the opposition and Kim Il-sung. Kim Il-sung spoke about the socialist camp marching from victory to victory and about the DPRK’s economy and then mentioned the cult. He said that “Stalin’s cult” had been dealt with by the CPSU.36 As for North Korea, Kim did acknowledge that the WPK had experienced the problem “to a certain degree” without mentioning that this was, actually, his cult. While the main sources do not seem to confirm it,37 according to the testimony of an eyewitness, Central Committee member Pak Ui-wan,38 the next man to speak after Kim Il-sung was Lee Jong-ok, the head of the State Planning Commission. Lee said that the DPRK had achieved great success, thus indirectly supporting the current leader – Kim Il-sung. The next one to speak was Kim Thae-gun, chief of the Party Commission for North Hamgyong province. His speech mentioned that the Party’s policy had always been right, while the Association of Labour Unions and the Ministry of Trade’s work had been substandard. The Association’s chairman, So Hwi, and the trade minister, Yun Kong-hum, were both oppositionists. It was very clear not only that Kim Thae-gun was fully on the leader’s side but also that he knew whom to attack.39 After Kim Thae-gun concluded his speech, the main event of the plenum began. The next one to speak was Trade Minister Yun Kong-hum. In his speech, Minister Yun directly attacked Kim Il-sung. For decades, the exact content of this speech remained hidden from the scholarly community. However, recently a translated version of it was discovered in a Russian archive; due to its importance, the author chose to include the English translation of the speech as an appendix to this chapter.40 Before that, there was quite a bit of speculation on what Yun actually said. A false version of this speech appeared in a 1989 South Korean book under the name of Ko Pong-gi, Kim Il-sung’s former secretary.41 Yet the real Ko Pong-gi was, in fact, executed sometime near 1960,42 and the true author of the book was a Chinese-Korean man named Jin Xuetie.43 The speech he invented, naturally, bears no relation to the real one. If one looks at Yun’s actual speech, one can see that the trade minister was not going to say anything as radical as previously claimed. He did not call for the immediate dismissal of Kim Il-sung, for example. However, Yun was going to suggest that Kim’s cult be formally condemned by the Central Committee. Such a condemnation would have meant a suspended death sentence for Kim Il-sung’s reign: How can a man censured by the Central Committee lead it? Naturally, the leader could have never allowed this. Kim’s loyalists interrupted Yun’s speech,44 screaming “Why are you slandering?” and “Are you saying that the WPK is a fascist party or a bourgeois one?”45

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Yun pressed further. He said that the WPK’s Bylaws had been broken and named an example: Choe Yong-gon being appointed as the Central Committee’s vice-chairman. This was a callous remark, as no one could have expected Choe to support the opposition after this. Infuriated, he rose from his chair and screeched:

Figure 9.8 So Hwi.

Source: Rodong Shinmun, 25 May 1956, p. 4

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“You son of a bitch! What were you doing when I was fighting Japan? Shouting ‘hosanna’ to the Emperor, that’s what you did!”46 Kim Ju-bong, a Soviet diplomat who worked in the embassy to North Korea at the time, later remembered that Choe was so angry that he even tried to strike oppositionists with a chair. Of course, one cannot say if this detail was in fact true or not.47 The Plenum quickly escalated into a chaotic mess of screams, swears and mutual accusations. Two oppositionists – Pak Chang-ok and Pak Ui-wan – called for order. This is when Kim Il-sung made his strike. He said that there was no need to give anti-Party reactionaries such as Yun the right to speak and proposed a vote of closure. This vote effectively became the vote on North Korea’s future.48 Available records show that only seven members of the Central Committee voted against it but do not name them. Who were these seven? This author, based on known facts, strongly suspects that these were Trade Minister Yun Kong-hum; VicePremiers Choe Chang-ik, Pak Chang-ok and Pak Ui-wan; chairman of the SPA’s Standing Committee Kim Du-bong; Chief of the Association of Labour Unions So Hwi; and Construction Work Minister Kim Sung-hwa. Once North Korean archives become available, it would certainly be interesting to check if this were indeed so. As the vote concluded, it became obvious to everyone that the leader was winning. In an act of desperation, Choe Chang-ik and Pak Ui-wan called for the vote’s result to be quashed. Naturally, this did not pass. Foreign Minister Nam Il suggested that, though Yun had spoken against the Party, he was to be given chance to finish his speech. This suggestion was also rejected. Emboldened, the loyalists started chanting: “Crush and destroy!” This was, of course, a reference to the future fate of the opposition.49 Seeing that he was not getting support, Yun left the Plenum’s hall, after which Kim Il-sung announced a recess.50 The remaining part of the Plenum was dedicated to an endless condemnation of the defeated opposition. Choe Chang-ik attempted to speak but was silenced by Kim Il-sung’s loyalists.51 As for Yun Kong-hum, he did not return to the hall, and Kim Il-sung capitalised on this. “Yun Kong-hum is absent here”, said Kim Il-sung. “For a Party Committee member to be absent at a meeting without any reason is a violation of the Party Bylaws. This is an act against the Party. I thus propose to expel him from the Party as a punishment. Those in support – raise your hands”. The vote was nearly unanimous this time. Only So Hwi, the bravest member of the opposition, cast a “no” vote.52 It was over. Kim Il-sung won, and the opposition lost. The Leader Stands Triumphant The post-recess session of the Plenum was very different from the previous one. This was no longer a battlefield. This was the place where cadres proved their loyalty to Kim Il-sung by trampliing upon the opposition. In a few days, on 6 September, Pak Ui-wan, an oppositionist member of the Central Committee, met with Soviet Ambassador Ivanov and told him what had happened.53 Pak Ui-wan’s story allows one to reconstruct the events of the Plenum in greater detail.

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The first one to speak was Finance Minister Lee Ju-yon. He hailed the WPK and said that, under the Party’s leadership, the workers’ salaries had increased by 35%. He also called Yun a deviationist and a factionalist who had made a counterrevolutionary, anti-Party speech. Nam Il, the foreign minister, spoke in an ambiguous way. He mentioned the necessity for intra-Party democracy and even said that a cult of the individual must be fought. Yet he said nothing on the cult in the WPK and strongly condemned Yun Kong-hum. Pak Yong-guk, the chief of the Union of Korea’s Democratic Youth, made a lengthy speech. He said that the WPK’s Third Congress had fully followed the spirit of the CPSU’s 20th Congress and that North Korea had overcome the cult, which was the cult of Pak Hon-yong. Furthermore, continued Pak Yong-guk, cult or no cult, one should not diminish the role of an individual in history. The “bureaucratic perversions” in the Party were the legacy of Aleksei Hegai, said the chief. And, he concluded, Yun Kong-hum was a counterrevolutionary and, as such, Yun should be expelled from both the Central Committee and the Party and brought to a court to face trial. The next in line was Choe Chang-ik. Finally, the leader of the opposition was allowed to speak. Choe knew that his cause was a lost one. Fearing for his life, he attempted to say that the Party’s policy had mostly been correct, though some mistakes were also made and that the problem of the cult should be discussed in a fair way. Choe Chang-ik was then interrogated by the Central Committee in a highly hostile way. Chairman of the Party Committee for South Pyongan Province Kim Man-gum reported on his region’s economy and stated that he fully agreed with Pak Yong-guk. Kim Chang-man, the chairman of the Party Committee for South Hwanghae Province, said that everything the WPK leadership had done had been right. He said that Yun Kong-hum was not only an anti-Party activist but also a rotten individual. Kim claimed that Yun was a corrupt crook who “eats only veal”. Kim Il-sung was the next to take the podium. He spoke of how the opposition had been born and stated that the leaders of the bloc were Choe Chang-ik and Pak Chang-ok. He said that the WPK leadership had heard rumours that the opposition acted under instruction from the Soviet embassy, as there were some people who thought that Pyongyang’s policy had been wrong. Thus, continued Kim, they sent Pak Chong-ae and Nam Il to investigate. The result of the investigation, announced the leader, was that these were lies spread by anti-Party elements. Kim also mentioned a letter from the CPSU, where it was said that, in other countries, leaders were given a vote of no confidence by bringing up the issue of the cult. Naturally, Kim Il-sung mentioned no problems of the WPK whatsoever, focusing his speech on the “anti-Party group”. The next speaker, Chairman of the Party Committee for South Hamgyong Province Hyon Jong-min, also spoke against the opposition. Lee Il-gyong, the head of the Party Propaganda and Campaigning Department, said that the WPK had solved the cult issue and solved it well. He mentioned that some people were critical of the lack of Soviet broadcasts in the country. Meanwhile, continued Lee, “grown-up countries” have no need for such broadcasts.

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The next speaker was Minister of National Defence Vice-Marshal Choe Yonggon, and, befitting his fiery character, he ended up being the one who gave the longest speech at the Plenum. He called Yun’s speech “a concentrated programme” against the Party and the government. According to Choe, Yun Kong-hum distorted everything: The Party’s history, the country’s economic situation, the Party’s policy towards cadres and the cult. The vice-marshal used this opportunity to attack his bitter rival, Pak Ir-u, former minister of internal affairs. Pak had already been purged and imprisoned, but Choe desperately wanted him to be shot.54 He said that the factionalists were continuing Pak’s dirty policy. Choe Yong-gon then said that the attack on Soviet Koreans had also been orchestrated by factionalists: Choe Chang-ik and Yun Kong-hum. The minister claimed that, back in 1952, these two had colluded with Pak Ir-u and Pak Hun-il, head of the Party Agricultural Department. They, said Choe Yong-gon, met in a bunker and conspired against Kim Il-sung. They decided to unite with Pak Hon-yong, and they did form a bloc. This statement was probably a lie, as Choe Yong-gon had never previously mentioned this alleged conspiracy. However, the vice-marshal was not done. He said that So Hwi had told the Chinese Koreans that they could work for a decade in the DPRK but would not be promoted above major-general. Minister Choe then said that Lee Phil-gyu, chairman of the Cabinet’s Office for Construction and Industry, had confessed that Choe Chang-ik and Pak Chang-ok were leading the group. Allegedly, Lee said that if the people’s living standards didn’t improve, the WPK would have “a Poznań” to deal with. He was referring to workers’ anti-government protests which had occurred in this Polish city in June of the same year. According to Soviet documents, Choe Yong-gon then expressed his displeasure with the fact that Pak Ir-u was still in prison.55 Knowing Choe’s feelings, this was clearly a motion not to release but to kill the prisoner. Finally, Choe Yong-gon spoke about Communication Minister Kim Chang-hum and Vice-Premier Pak Chang-ok. The vice-marshal claimed that Kim Chang-hum criticised the leadership while trying to assert that he, Kim, was not a member of any faction. As for Pak Chang-ok, Choe Yong-gon said that the vice-premier was deeply linked to “this pack”, that he was a complete factionalist and that he put Yun to go the Soviet Embassy. After this long speech, Pak Chang-ok, another leader of the opposition, attempted to defend himself. He agreed that previously, in December 1955, he had been rightfully subjected to criticism but tried to assert that he was not a factionalist. He was interrupted by the crowd and was unable to finish his speech. Finally, Kim Il-sung spoke again. The leader suggested that Choe Chang-ik, Pak Chang-ok and other factionalists would be condemned by the Plenum. Such a decision was indeed passed – on the next and final day of the August Plenum. 31 August: The Plenum Ends On Friday, 31 August, the Central Committee assembled once again. The most prominent oppositionists – Yun Kong-hum and So Hwi – were absent. Kim Il-sung

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now felt safe: At least for the time being, it looked like his power was secured. The Plenum adopted a resolution condemning the oppositionists for their “factionalist conspiracy behaviour”.56 The resolution did call them “comrades”, but the tone of it was very clear: The North Korean opposition was to be totally destroyed. Other resolutions adopted by the plenum were: “On concluding the work done by our government’s delegation during their visit to the brotherly nations and on several immediate tasks for our Party” and “On improving and strengthening

Figure 9.9 The first page of the resolutions of the August plenum. Source: Original created by the WPK’s Central Committee in 1956. A copy is kept in the Russian State Archive for Contemporary History, collection 5 inventory 28, item 4, p. 281

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of people’s health service”. These two were reported in the press.57 The nature of these decisions was not revealed to the public yet; the Soviet embassy was later provided with their full texts.58 The resolution condemning the factionalists was not given to them. However, a few years later, a North Korean official defected to the USSR with a number of important documents, including this resolution. For a while, the North Korean media remained completely silent about the showdown on 30 August. The hint given by Rodong Shinmun was one sentence: “organisational issues were also handled on the Plenum”.59 “Organisational issues” is a standard Communist euphemism for the appointment and dismissal of officials. As for details, the government decided to conceal it from the public for the time being. The Fate of the Opposition On 30 August, after Yun Kong-hum realised his speech would not get the majority’s support, he left the Plenum’s hall – for the last time. Yun took his car, and while he was driving by Pyongyang, he saw two Soviet diplomats – Georgiy Samsonov (future Soviet ambassador to Somalia) and Kim Ju-bong, the embassy’s interpreter. Yun Kong-hum stopped the car, got out and attempted to talk to them, but Samsonov quickly grabbed Kim by his sleeve and evaded any attempts to talk.60 When Yun Kong-hum got home, he discovered that his phone was cut off – at about the same time, So Hwi also made a similar discovery.61 Yun’s flat was monitored by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but So Hwi and another oppositionist, the chairman of the Cabinet’s Office for Construction and Industry, Lee Phil-gyu, managed to come in. The three quickly moved to Lee’s flat, as he was the least notable person in the group and thus the least likely to be tracked. The oppositionists decided that it was time for them to start running – lest they be arrested and killed. They were originally from China, so the only chance for them was to get to the PRC and hope for Chairman Mao’s mercy. One more official decided to flee with them – Kim Kang, the vice-minister for culture and propaganda. As Yun and So’s car numbers were well known by the authorities, the four took Kim Kang’s car – and quickly drove northwest, towards the Chinese border.62 They arrived at the Yalu River on 31 August. On the opposite bank lay the People’s Republic of China. The four saw a man fishing and summoned him. They suggested buying his fish and named him a very good price. The man, who was very surprised to suddenly see such high-ranking officials in front of him, agreed. The four asked the man to lend them his boat: They pretended that they were going to have a picnic. They did indeed spend some time at an island in the middle of the river – and then crossed it to the Chinese side.63 North Korea dispatched Kang Sang-ho, vice-minister of internal affairs, to catch the group. Kang arrived in China and tried to invoke the Sino-North Korean treaty, which stipulated that those North Korean or Chinese citizens who cross the border illegally are to be returned to their own country. Ultimately Kang was informed that this incident had been brought to Mao’s personal attention and would be solved on a higher level. The vice-minister headed back to the DPRK.64

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Figure 9.10 31 August 1956. The four escapees in China. From left to right: Yun Kong-hum, Lee Phil-gyu, So Hwi, Kim Kang and CPC’s head of organisational department for Liaoning province. Source: Photo taken by an unknown author in 1956. Reproduced in Kim Jung-saeng. The Secret Coming of the Korean Righteous Army to the North and the Korean War. Seoul: Sagacity Publishing, 2000, p. 166. [김중생. 조선의용군의 밀입북과 6.25전쟁. 서울: 명지출판사, 2000, 166쪽]

The Chinese government decided to accept the escapees.65 Immediately after their arrival, they wrote a report on the August plenum. These were the first documents through which the world learned about a failed attempt to remove Kim Ilsung from power.66 Ultimately, they ended up not being the only high-ranking North Korean escapees in China. It seems that the total number is about 15–17 people.67 A South Korean magazine once composed a list of them.68 From a historian’s point of view, the most important other escapees would be Hong Sun-gwan, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang Party Committee, and Kang Subong, a former division political commissar, who arrived in China in 1969. Both Hong69 and Kang70 wrote memoirs, which are a great source for anyone who studies North Korean history. One can be curious about be the ultimate fate of Choe Yong-gon’s rival – Pak Ir-u. After all, he was North Korea’s first minister of internal affairs. As mentioned, Pak was purged in 1955 – but in 1956 Kim Il-sung started considering releasing him to China. This caused great ire to Choe Yong-gon, who wanted Pak dead. His ultimate fate is quite murky. Lee Sang-jo believed that Pak Ir-u was ultimately saved.71 Yet no Chinese researcher who studied the documents from the 1950s mentioned Pak Ir-u being in China.72 Thus, there is a good chance that Choe Yonggon got his wish after all.

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During the Cold War, available information on the August Plenum was quite scarce. Things did greatly improve with the opening of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, but the fates of those who fled to China were still largely not known. Fortunately, a recent study by two Chinese scholars – Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng – has cast some light on them.73 The four escapees arrived at Andong, a Chinese city near the North Korean border, on 31 August. After a check-up was done and their identity was confirmed, they were to go to Beijing. In the capital, they met Premier Zhou Enlai and General Luo Ruiqing, the minister of public security. The four told Zhou and Luo about what had happened in Pyongyang. Upon learning that the four had escaped, North Korea demanded their deportation, but Qiao Xiaoguang, the Chinese ambassador for North Korea, rejected the demand. Thus, the escapees settled in China. It would be wrong to say that So Hwi and Lee Phil-gyu were happy with their lives in China. They did escape Kim Il-sung, but Maoism was not for them either. In 1958, Zhou Enlai angrily complained that those two thought that China, the Soviet Union and North Korea were all authoritarian countries. The request for Chinese citizenship from the four escapees had constantly been postponed and was ultimately rejected. Thus, none of them could join the Communist Party of China. However, the authorities did not object to them getting married.

Figure 9.11 1957. The four escapees visit the Great Wall of China. From left to right: So Hwi, Kim Kang, Lee Phil-gyu, Yun Kong-hum. Source: Photo taken by an unknown author in 1957. Reproduced in Kim Jung-saeng. The Secret Coming of the Korean Righteous Army to the North and the Korean War. Seoul: Sagacity Publishing, 2000, p. 166. [김중생. 조선의용군의 밀입북과 6.25전쟁. 서울: 명지출판사, 2000, 166쪽]

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In July 1958, the four were settled in Chengdu. Thus, they were separated from the rest of the escapees, who lived in Taiyuan in Shanxi province. The Chinese authorities set three basic rules for the escapees: First, do not meet any North Koreans who come to China. Second, do not send any letters to North Korea. Third, do not talk to Chinese people about North Korea. Yun Kong-hum ended up working in a manufacturing plant, Kim Gang was given a place in a local theatre and Lee Phil-gyu was given a job at a steel mill. As for So Hwi, the Chinese authorities were so annoyed with him that he did not get a job. All four were entitled to a special pension of 200 yuan per month. Every time Kim Il-sung visited China, the escapees were put under increased surveillance and were told not to leave Chengdu. The early 1960s were the time when the Sino-Soviet split occurred – and North Korea largely sided with China at the time. So Hwi took this warming worse than others. He feared that their safety was threatened – and increased surveillance over them seemed to confirm his fears. So Hwi made a daring attempt to escape to the Soviet embassy but was caught. Ultimately, he got a five-year prison sentence. In North Korea, the first mentions of the factionalists’ “misdeeds” appeared in 1957. Kulloja, the official magazine of the Party, claimed that So Hwi had violated the principle of unconditional loyalty of the labour unions to the Party.74 Andrei Lankov, a scholar who analysed this piece, suggested that the claim was false, as no Communist in their right mind would have objected to this core principle of Leninism.75 Yet it seems this actually did happen, as the earlier Soviet records mention So Hwi seeing his place as the leader of the Union as that of representative of the workers’ “material interests” before the state. Normally, of course, such a person’s task would have been to “enlighten” the workers to obey the Party, but So Hwi chose to break every rule and act as a true leader of a real union.76 The former chairman was perhaps the bravest and the most unusual person in the entire political history of North Korea. A man who could have spoken against Mao’s authoritarianism when his very life depended on Mao’s protection was exactly the kind of person who could have committed a blasphemy by suggesting that some of Lenin’s teachings might indeed not have been appropriate. Kulloja’s article further accused So of “promoting radical liberal, individualist tendencies”.77 This was intended as an insult, but one can actually see it as a compliment. No one amongst the conspirators was as committed to personal freedom as So Hwi. If there was any man who represented a true alternative to Kim Il-sung at the time, it was him. Conclusion: The Unbroken Dawn Kim Il-sung did not manage to get his hands on the four escapees. Yet their families remained in North Korea – and soon faced Kim’s wrath. So Hwi’s wife and young daughter and Yun Kong-hum’s wife and two sons were all killed on the orders from the Great Leader.78 One can only imagine how deeply Yun and So were hurt by this terrible news.

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Figure 9.12 Photo of Kim Il-sung meeting Khrushchev, published by North Korea in September 1956. Source: North Korean magazine Korean Art [조선예술]. 1956, no. 9, p. III

What were the final moments of these four? Yun Kong-hum passed away in 1974, in Linfen (Shanxi) in a hospital of a textile factory.79 So Hwi died in 1993 in Xian.80 Lee Phil-gyu’s fate is unknown. Kim Kang lived a long life; as of 2010, he was still alive.81 Kim Ju-bong, the interpreter of the Soviet embassy, said that Moscow had not realised immediately how important the August Plenum was. At the time, Ambassador Ivanov was on vacation. Neither he nor the chargé d’affaires Petrov were skilled diplomats. Petrov ignored virtually all of So Hwi’s hints on the impending attack on Kim Il-sung and did not report them to the Kremlin. Kim Ju-bong said that Petrov had later been dismissed, which, of course, was a small consolation for anyone involved.82 The year 1956 saw Stalinism being nearly completely rooted out in Europe. But in North Korea, Kim Il-sung’s regime had only become stronger. If one would look for a country with a similar fate, it would be Albania: April 1956 saw a conference of the Albanian Labour Party at which the opposition tried to attack the nation’s Stalinist dictator, Enver Hoxha. Yet Hoxha prevailed, and the nation lived under

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Stalinism for decades longer – until in the early 1990s, when the system Hoxha had built came to a crushing collapse. Ana Lalaj, an Albanian historian, wrote a book about these events called The False Spring.83 One could say that the same thing occurred in North Korea – a failed attempt to change the country for the better. Kim Il-sung’s victory enabled his tyranny to endure for decades – and the dynastic succession he later established enabled it to persist even after his death. As usually happens, the victims of Kim were not only those who opposed him but also many of those who offered him support. More than thirty members of the Central Committee who voted for Kim Il-sung in August 1956 were later purged. Pak Yong-guk;84 Kim Chang-man;85 and Hyon Jong-min,86 who passionately spoke in Kim’s support, were purged within a decade or two.87 They paid the ultimate price for supporting the tyrant. Under Stalinism, there may only be one victor. Everyone else loses. This, perhaps, is the most important lesson of the August Plenum. Notes 1 Kim Il-sung. “On improvement of the Party work and on the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party Conference. 17–24 March 1967” in Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works, vol. 21. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1983, pp. 135–258 [김일성. 당사업을 개선 하며 당 대표자회 결정을 관철할데 대하여. 1967년 3월 17~24일, 김일성 저작집, 제21권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1983, 135~258쪽]. 2 Andrei Lankov. Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004; James F. Person. “North Korea in 1956: Reconsidering the August Plenum and the Sino-Soviet joint intervention” in Cold War History, vol. 19, no. 2, 2019, pp. 253–274. 3 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade V. I. Ivanov, 21 March 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 21 марта 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 4 “Conclusory report on work of the Central Committee to the Third Congress of the WPK. Kim Il-sung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK” in Rodong Shinmun, 24 April 1956, pp. 1–8 [조선로동당 제3차대회에서의 중앙위원회 사업 총결 보고. 조선 로동당 중앙위원회 위원장 김일성. 로동신문, 1956년 4월 24일, 1~8쪽]. 5 Record of Conversation of V. I. Ivanenko with Pak Kil-lyong, 17 May 1956 [Запись беседы В. И. Иваненко с Пак Киль Еном. 17 мая 1956 г]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 6 Kim Il Sung and His Personality Cult. May 1956, National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 1100/2287/2 (B342), pp. 1–2. 7 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 8 From the Journal of G. E. Samsonov. Record of Conversation with Ki Sok-pok, Analyst of the Ministry for State Inspections of the DPRK, 31 May 1956. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 102, inventory 12, folder 6, item 68 [Из дневника Самсонова Г. Е. Запись беседы с референтом министерства Госконтроля КНДР Ки Сек Поком. 31 мая 1956 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 12, д. 6, п. 68]. 9 Ibid.

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10 Hong Sun-gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Ilsung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고백, 新東亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. The author, Hong Sun-gwan, was once the Chief Party Secretary for Pyongyang. See V. Ivanov. On the Situation in the WPK and the DPRK, 28 December 1956. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 28, item 486, p. 13 [В. Иванов. К положению в ТПК и КНДР. 28 декабря 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 486, л. 13]. His testimony is further confirmed by other sources of the era. 11 From the Journal of G. E. Samsonov. Record of Conversation with Ki Sok-pok, Analyst of the Ministry for State Inspections of the DPRK, 31 May 1956. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 102, inventory 12, folder 6, item 68 [Из дневника Самсонова Г. Е. Запись беседы с референтом министерства Госконтроля КНДР Ки Сек Поком. 31 мая 1956 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 12, д. 6, п. 68]. 12 Ibid. 13 “WPK Bylaws” in Rodong Shinmun, 29 April 1956, p. 2 [조선로동당 규약, 로동신문, 1956년 4월 29일, 2면]. 14 “List of full and alternate members of the Central Committee, as elected by the WPK’s Third Congress” in Rodong Shinmun, 30 April 1956, p. 1 [조선로동당 제3대회에서 선거된 당 중앙 위원회 위원과 후보위원들, 로동신문, 1956년 4월 30일, 1면]. 15 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 18 April 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 апреля 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 16 Comrade Kim Il-sung’s Memoirs “With the Century” (Post-Mortem Publication), vol. 8. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1998, p. 315 [김일성 동지 회고록 세기와 더 불어 (계승본), 제8권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1998, 315쪽]. 17 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov. 6–7 August 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 6 и 7 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 18 Kang Sang-ho. Reminiscences: An Eyewitness’ Testimony [Кан Сан Хо. Воспоминание. Свидетельство очевидца]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 19 Danil Svechkov. “Why Kim Il-sung refused to go in a bathhouse with Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk?”, 6 February 2015, Komsomolskaya Pravda Yekaterinburg [Данил Свечков. Почему Ким Ир Сен в Свердловске отказался от бани с Ельциным? Комсомольская Правда. Екатеринбург, 6 февраля 2015 года], www.ural.kp. ru/ daily/26339.7/3221562/. 20 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 18 May 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 мая 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 21 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 22 Ibid. 23 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 5 June 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 5 июня 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 24 Aleksei Hegai, an unofficial leader of the Soviet faction, died in 1953. Post-mortem, he received a lot of criticism from Kim Il-sung and his supporters. 25 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 8 June 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 8 июня 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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26 Ibid. 27 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 August 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 28 Ibid. 29 From the Journal of I. F. Kurdyukov. A Reception of the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Lee Sang-jo, 9 August 1956 [Из дневника И. Ф. Курдюкова. Приём посла КНДР в СССР Ли Сан Чо. 9 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 30 Hong Sun-gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Ilsung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고 백, 新東亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. 31 Ibid. 32 “Changing the guard in the country, the similarities and differences . . . ” in RNews.bg, 2 April 2016 [За смяната на караула в държавата, за приликите и разликите . . . RNews.bg, 2 април 2016 г], https://rnews.bg/априлски-пленум-червенков-живков/. 33 For Rákosi’s resignation letter, see Vladimir Popin. 1956. p. 45 [Vladimir Popin. 1956. 45. o], http://mek.oszk.hu/05500/05525/05525.pdf. 34 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 29 August 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, pp. 317– 319 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 29 августа 1956 года, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, лл. 317–319]. 35 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 36 Report of the Governmental Delegation on Their Visit to the Brotherly Nations and Some Immediate Tasks for Our Party. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 58, item 411, pp. 224–258 [Отчёт о правительственной делегации, посетившей братские страны и некоторые очередные задачи нашей партии. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 224–258]. 37 Ibid. 38 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 September 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, p. 328 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 328]. 39 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 40 “A draft of the report to be read by Yun Kong-hum on the plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in August 1956” in Material Prepared for the Visit of Comrade Mikoyan to North Korea [Проект выступления Юн Кон Хыма на пленуме ЦК Трудовой Партии Кореи в августе 1956 года // Материалы к визиту тов. Микояна в Северную Корею]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 41 Ko Pong-Gi. Chief Secretary of Kim Il-sung: Ko Pong-gi Remembers. Seoul: Heavenly Horse Publishing, 1989 [고봉기. 김일성의 비서실장: 고봉기의 유서. 서울: 천마, 1989]. 42 V. Pelishenko. Record of Conversation with Pang Hak-se, the DPRK’s Minister of Internal Affairs. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 0541, inventory 15, folder 9, item 85 [В. Пелишенко. Запись беседы с министром внутренних дел КНДР тов. Пан Хак Се. 12 февраля 1960 года. АВП РФ, ф. 0541, оп. 15, д. 9, п. 85].

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43 “Ko Pong-gi” in Database on Important Figures of Korean History. Academy of Korean Studies [고봉기(高峰起). 한국 역대 인물 종합정보 시스템. 한국학 중앙 연구 원], http://people.aks.ac.kr/front/dirSer/ppl/pplView.aks?pplId=PPL_7HIL_A1916_1_ 0024217&curSetPos=0&curSPos=0&category=dirSer&isEQ=true&kristalSearchArea=P. 44 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 45 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 1 September 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, p. 320 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 1 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 320]. 46 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 September 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, p. 328 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 328]; Hong Sun-Gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Il-sung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고백, 新東亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 47 Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kim Ju-bong, 2 February 1990. 48 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 49 Ibid. 50 Hong Sun-gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Ilsung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고 백, 新東亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. 51 A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. 52 Ibid. 53 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 September 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, pp. 327–332 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, лл. 327–332]. 54 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK comrade V. I. Ivanov, 18 May 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 мая 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection) 55 Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 September 1956. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, collection 5, inventory 28, folder 410, p. 331 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 331]. 56 “On the factionalist conspiracy activities of comrades Choe Chang-ik, Yun Konghum, So Hwi, Lee Phil-gyu and Pak Chang-ok” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 30. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1998,

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The Last Days of Summer pp. 784–879 [최창익, 윤공흠, 서 휘, 리필규, 박창옥 등 동무들의 종파적음모행위 에 대하여, 北韓關係史料集, 第30券, 果川: 國史編慕委員會, 1998, 784~879쪽]. “From the WPK’s Central Committee” in Rodong Shinmun, 5 September 1956, p. 1 [조 선로동당 중앙위원회에서. 로동신문, 1956년 9월 5일, 1면]. Results of the Work of the Government Delegation, Which Visited the Brotherly Nations, and Some Immediate Tasks for Our Party. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 58, item 411, pp. 259–270 [Итоги работы правительственной делегации, посетившей братские страны, и некоторые насущные задачи нашей партии. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 259–270]; On improving and strengthening of people’s health service. Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 28, item 411, pp. 282–285 [인민 보건사업 을 개선 강화할 데 대하여, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 282–285]. “From the WPK’s Central Committee” in Rodong Shinmun, 5 September 1956, p. 1 [조 선로동당 중앙위원회에서. 로동신문, 1956년 9월 5일, 1면]. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kim Ju-bong, 2 February 1990. A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. Kang Sang-ho. The Thought Enquiry. December 1988 [Кан Сан Хо. Идеологическая проверка. Декабрь 1988 года] (unpublished manuscript from the author’s collection). Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kang Sang-ho, 31 October 1989. Kang Sang-ho. Reminiscences: An Eyewitness’ Testimony [Кан Сан Хо. Воспоминание. Свидетельство очевидца]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kang Sang-ho, 31 October 1989. A Letter of So Hwi, a Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, collection R-5546, inventory 98, folder 721, pp. 170–190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng. A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and the Myth of Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976. Unpublished manuscript. “North Korean reception team in China makes its move” in Wolgan Chungang, February 2005 [중국의 북한 접수팀이 움직인다, 월간중앙, 2005년 2월], https:// web.archive.org/web/20180430114642/http://jmagazine.joins.com/monthly/view/ 218792?aid=218792. Hong Sun-gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Ilsung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고 백, 新東亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. Ryo Jong. The Taedong River Runs Red. Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1991 [呂政. 붉게 물든 대동 강, 서울: 동아일보사, 1991]. On Kang Su-bong’s real name, see Ko Jae-hong. “Study of specifics of political organs in the North Korean military of 1945–1950” in Collection of Works of Young Scholars on North Korea and the Unification, 2002. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2002, p. 106 [고재홍. 북한 인민군 정치기관 특성연구 (1945~1950), 2002 신진연구자 북한 및 통일관련 논문집 (제1권). 서울: 통일부, 2002, 106쪽], http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/libeka/elec/WebBook_data4/00063225.pdf. Lee Sang-jo. “To Comrade Kim Il-sung, the chairman of the WPK’s Central Committee” in Story of Soviet Koreans Who Made the DPRK. Paju: Seoul and Inchon Culture Company, 2006 pp. 269–278 [리상조. 조선 노동당 중앙위원회 위원장 김일성 동지 앞, 북조선을 만든 고려인 이야기. 파주: 경인문화사, 2006, 269~278쪽]. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng. A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and the Myth of Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976. Unpublished manuscript.

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Bibliography English Kim Il Sung and His Personality Cult, May 1956, National Archives of the United Kingdom, FO 1100/2287/2 (B342), pp. 1–2. Lankov, Andrei. Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Person, James F. “North Korea in 1956: Reconsidering the August Plenum and the SinoSoviet joint intervention”, Cold War History, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2019), pp. 253–274.

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Lankov, Andrei. Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004. Person, James F. “North Korea in 1956: Reconsidering the August Plenum and the SinoSoviet joint intervention”, Cold War History, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2019), pp. 253–274. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng. A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and the Myth of Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976. Unpublished manuscript. Korean Comrade Kim Il-sung’s Memoirs “With the Century” (Post-Mortem Publication), vol. 8. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1998, p. 315 [김일성 동지 회고록 세기와 더불어 (계승본), 제8권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1998, 315쪽]. “Conclusory report on work of the Central Committee to the Third Congress of the WPK. Kim Il-sung, chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK” in Rodong Shinmun, 24 April 1956, pp. 1–8 [조선로동당 제3차대회에서의 중앙위원회 사업 총결 보고. 조선 로동당 중앙위원회 위원장 김일성. 로동신문, 1956년 4월 24일, 1~8쪽]. “Forces opposing to Kim Il-sung’s solidification of power are crushed, the unchallenged autocracy is being born” in NK Choson, 8 January 2002 [김일성중심 권력구조 반발세 력 철퇴, 수령체제 뿌리내려, NK조선, 2002년 1월 8일]. http://nk.chosun.com/bbs/list. html?table=bbs_19&idxno=2131&page=3&total=134&sc_area=&sc_word=. “Former WPK secretary who fled to the USSR, exposes the inner works of the North Korean puppet regime” in Chungang Ilbo, 1 April 1982 [소련망명 전 북괴 노동당 비서가 폭로한 그 생생한 내막. 중앙일보, 1982년 4월 1일]. www.joongang.co.kr/ article/1626235#home. “From the WPK’s Central Committee” in Rodong Shinmun, 5 September 1956, p. 1 [조선로 동당 중앙위원회에서. 로동신문, 1956년 9월 5일, 1면]. Kim Hak-Chun. Fifty Years of the North Korean History: A Half of Our History We Should Bear as Our Own. Seoul: Tonga Publishing House, 1995 [김학준. 북한 50년사: 우리가 떠안아야 할 반 쪽의 우리 역사. 서울: 동아출판사, 1995]. Kim Il-sung. “On improvement of the Party work and on the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party Conference. 17–24 March 1967” in Collection of Kim Il-sung’s Works, vol. 21. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1983, pp. 135–258 [김일성. 당사업을 개선하며 당 대표자회 결정을 관철할데 대하여. 1967년 3월 17~24일, 김일성 저작집, 제21권, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1983, 135~258쪽]. Han Jae-dok. “22 years of North Korea” in Chungang Ilbo, 15 August 1967 [한재덕. 북한 22년, 중앙일보, 1967년 8월 15일]. www.joongang.co.kr/article/1130612#home Ko Jae-hong. “Study of specifics of political organs in the North Korean military of 1945– 1950” in Collection of Works of Young Scholars on North Korea and the Unification, 2002. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2002, p. 106 [고재홍. 북한 인민군 정치기관 특성연 구 (1945~1950), 2002 신진연구자 북한 및 통일관련 논문집 (제1권). 서울: 통일부, 2002, 106쪽]. http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/libeka/elec/WebBook_data4/00063225.pdf Ryo Jong. The Taedong River Runs Red. Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1991 [呂政. 붉게 물든 대동 강, 서울: 동아일보사, 1991]. O Ju-han. “Many suicides of Kim Il-sung’s relatives“, 17 March 2014 [오주한. 김일성 친인척 대량 자살, 2014년 3월 17일]. https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.naver?isHttpsRedirect= true&blogId=jhisa82&logNo=130187607107.

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Kim Jung-saeng. The Secret Coming of the Korean Righteous Army to the North and the Korean War. Seoul: Sagacity Publishing, 2000 [김중생. 조선의용군의 밀입북과 6.25 전쟁. 서울: 명지출판사, 2000]. “Ko Pong-gi” in Database on Important Figures of Korean History. Academy of Korean Studies [고봉기(高峰起). 한국 역대 인물 종합정보 시스템. 한국학 중앙 연구원]. http:// people.aks.ac.kr/front/dirSer/ppl/pplView.aks?pplId=PPL_7HIL_A1916_1_0024217& curSetPos=0&curSPos=0&category=dirSer&isEQ=true&kristalSearchArea=P. A Letter of So Hwi, A Member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Three Other Comrades, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, State Archive of Russian Federation, Collection R-5546, Inventory 98, Folder 721, pp. 170– 190 [Письмо члена ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи Со Хуэя и трёх других товарищей в ЦК КПК, ГАРФ, ф. Р-5546, оп. 98, д. 721, лл. 170–190]. “List of full and alternate members of the Central Committee, as elected by the WPK’s Third Congress” in Rodong Shinmun, 30 April 1956, p. 1 [조선로동당 제3대회에서 선거된 당 중앙 위원회 위원과 후보위원들, 로동신문, 1956년 4월 30일, 1면]. “North Korean reception team in China makes its move” in Wolgan Chungang, February 2005 [중국의 북한 접수팀이 움직인다, 월간중앙, 2005년 2월]. https://web.archive.org/ web/20180430114642/http://jmagazine.joins.com/monthly/view/218792?aid=218792. On Improving and Strengthening of People’s Health Service, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 28, Item 411, pp. 282–285 [인민 보건사업 을 개선 강화할 데 대하여, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 282–285]. “On the factionalist conspiracy activities of comrades Choe Chang-ik, Yun Kong-hum, So Hwi, Lee Phil-gyu and Pak Chang-ok” in Collection of Historical Documents on North Korea, vol. 30. Kwachon: National Institute of Korean History, 1998, pp. 784–879 [최창 익, 윤공흠, 서 휘, 리필규, 박창옥 등 동무들의 종파적음모행위에 대하여, 北韓關係 史料集, 第30券, 果川: 國史編慕委員會, 1998, 784~879쪽]. Ko Pong-gi. Chief Secretary of Kim Il-sung: Ko Pong-Gi Remembers. Seoul: Heavenly Horse Publishing, 1989 [고봉기. 김일성의 비서실장: 고봉기의 유서. 서울: 천마, 1989]. Pak Sang-hong. “On certain questions that rose up in the work of labour unions” in Kulloja, no. 7, 1957, pp. 39–45 [박상홍. 직업 동맹 사업에서 제기되는 몇 가지 문제. 근로자, 1957년, 7호. 39~45쪽]. Lee Sang-jo. “To comrade Kim Il-sung, the chairman of the WPK’s Central Committee” in Story of Soviet Koreans Who Made the DPRK. Paju: Seoul and Inchon Culture Company, pp. 269–278 [리상조. 조선 노동당 중앙위원회 위원장 김일성 동지 앞, 북조선을 만 든 고려인 이야기. 파주: 경인문화사, 2006, 269~278쪽]. Hong Sun-gwan. “Shocking revelation of the former executive secretary of Kim Il-sung” in Shindonga, October 1994, pp. 188–207 [洪淳官. 前金日成 비서실장충격 고백, 新東 亞, 1994년 10월, 188~207쪽]. “WPK Bylaws” in Rodong Shinmun, 29 April 1956, p. 2 [조선로동당 규약, 로동신문, 1956년 4월 29일, 2면]. Russian “A draft of the report to be read by Yun Kong-hum on the plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in August 1956” in Material Prepared for the Visit of Comrade Mikoyan to North Korea [Проект выступления Юн Кон Хыма на пленуме ЦК Трудовой Партии Кореи в августе 1956 года // Материалы к визиту тов. Микояна в Северную Корею]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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From the Journal of A. M. Petrov, Councillor of the USSR’s Embassy to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Pak Yong-Bin, Member of the Political Council of the WPK’s Central Committee, 8 September 1954 [Из дневника советника Посольства СССР в КНДР Петрова А. М. Запись беседы с членом Политсовета ЦК ТПК Пак Ен Бином 8 сентября 1954 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) From the Journal of G. E. Samsonov. Record of Conversation with Ki Sok-pok, Analyst of the Ministry for State Inspections of the DPRK, 31 May 1956, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 102, Inventory 12, Folder 6, Item 68 [Из дневника Самсонова Г. Е. Запись беседы с референтом министерства Госконтроля КНДР Ки Сек Поком. 31 мая 1956 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 12, д. 6, п. 68]. From the Journal of I. F. Kurdyukov. A Reception of the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Lee Sang-jo, 9 August 1956 [Из дневника И. Ф. Курдюкова. Приём посла КНДР в СССР Ли Сан Чо. 9 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Ivanov, V. On the Situation in the WPK and the DPRK, 28 December 1956, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 28, Item 486, p. 13 [В. Иванов. К положению в ТПК и КНДР. 28 декабря 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 486, л. 13]. His testimony is further confirmed by other sources of the era. Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade V. I. Ivanov, 21 March 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 21 марта 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade V. I. Ivanov, 18 May 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 мая 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 1 September 1956, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Collection 5, Inventory 28, Folder 410, p. 320 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 1 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 320]. Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 18 April 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 апреля 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 18 May 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 18 мая 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 29 August 1956, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Collection 5, Inventory 28, Folder 410, pp. 317– 319 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 29 августа 1956 года, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 317–319]. Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 5 June 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 5 июня 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 August 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6 September 1956, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Collection 5, Inventory 28, Folder 410, pp. 327– 332 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР В. И. Иванова. 6 сентября 1956 года. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 410, л. 327–332]. Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 6–7 August 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 6 и 7 августа 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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Journal of Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov, 8 June 1956 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. Иванова В. И. 8 июня 1956 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Lankov, Andrei. August 1956: A Crisis in North Korea. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009 [Андрей Ланьков. Август, 1956 год: Кризис в Северной Корее. Москва: РОССПЭН, 2009]. Pelishenko, V. Record of Conversation with Pang Hak-se, the DPRK’s Minister of Internal Affairs, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 0541, Inventory 15, Folder 9, Item 85 [В. Пелишенко. Запись беседы с министром внутренних дел КНДР тов. Пан Хак Се. 12 февраля 1960 года. АВП РФ, ф. 0541, оп. 15, д. 9, п. 85]. Record of Conversation of V. I. Ivanenko with Pak Kil-Lyong, 17 May 1956 [Запись беседы В. И. Иваненко с Пак Киль Еном. 17 мая 1956 г]. (A document from the author’s collection) Report of the Governmental Delegation on Their Visit to the Brotherly Nations and Some Immediate Tasks for Our Party, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 58, Item 411, pp. 224–258 [Отчёт о правительственной делегации, посетившей братские страны и некоторые очередные задачи нашей партии. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 224–258]. Results of the Work of the Government Delegation, Which Visited the Brotherly Nations, and Some Immediate Tasks for Our Party, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 58, Item 411, pp. 259–270 [Итоги работы правительственной делегации, посетившей братские страны, и некоторые насущные задачи нашей партии. РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 28, д. 411, лл. 259–270]. Kang Sang-ho. Reminiscences: An Eyewitness’ Testimony [Кан Сан Хо. Воспоминание. Свидетельство очевидца]. (A document from the author’s collection) Kang Sang-ho. The Thought Enquiry, December 1988 [Кан Сан Хо. Идеологическая проверка. Декабрь 1988 года] (Unpublished manuscript from the author’s collection) Svechkov, Danil. Why Kim Il-sung Refused to Go in a Bathhouse with Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk?, 6 February 2015, Komsomolskaya Pravda Yekaterinburg [Данил Свечков. Почему Ким Ир Сен в Свердловске отказался от бани с Ельциным? Комсомольская Правда. Екатеринбург, 6 февраля 2015 года]. www.ural.kp. ru/daily/26339.7/3221562/. Other Languages Changing the Guard in the Country, the Similarities and Differences . . . RNews.bg, 2 April 2016 [За смяната на караула в държавата, за приликите и разликите . . . RNews.bg, 2 април 2016 г]. https://rnews.bg/априлски-пленум-червенков-живков/. Lalaj, Ana. The False Spring of 1956 [Pranvera e rrejshme e’56-s]. Tirana: Infbotues, 2016. Popin, Vladimir. 1956. http://mek.oszk.hu/05500/05525/05525.pdf. Other Sources Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kang Sang-ho, 31 October 1989. Andrei Lankov’s interview with Kim Ju-bong, 2 February 1990.

Appendix Draft of Yun Kong-hum’s Speech on the August Plenum (Korean->Chinese>Russian->English Translation)

After fleeing North Korea, Yun Kong-hum, So Hwi, Lee Phil-gyu and Kim Kang compiled a report on the August plenum to the CPC.1 The report included a Chinese translation of the draft of Yun Kong-hum’s speech on the plenum. While both the original and the Chinese translations are unavailable, the report was further translated to Russian by Soviet diplomats. The author further translated this text into English. Hopefully, the nuances of the original text are not too distorted by the three rounds of translation. Comrades! Now we are discussing a highly important issue and we do that in order to strengthen our Party. I think that an honest discussion and debate would help to fully uncover serious drawbacks and mistakes which our Party allowed in the past – both in activities inside the Party and in our interactions with people’s masses. They would also help to explain how these drawbacks and mistakes happened – so that our Party would become a militant party, loyal to proletarian internationalism, so that all the people would unite even further around our Party to achieve the victorious peaceful reunification of the Motherland, to build socialism in its northern part so that there would be a truly Leninist unity in our Party. Threats and surveillance are the methods employed against our comrades loyal to the Party and the revolution, who come out with constructive suggestions – not ordinary Party members, but full and alternate members of the Central Committee who have their own opinions and suggestions. He himself flagrantly tramples upon democracy inside the Party and stifles criticism; these actions completely contradict the party’s charter and the Leninist norms of Party life; it means undermining revolutionary MarxistLeninist principles.* Comrades! As you know, these unhealthy developments which exist in our Party are unusual and very serious. First of all, Leninist principles are not followed in our Party. The ideology of a cult of an individual has become widespread in our Party. This hurts the

The Last Days of Summer Party’s activities tremendously. The Party’s ranks lack true unity; bureaucratism, hero-worshipping and sectarianism have become widespread. InterParty democracy, criticism and self-criticism are being suppressed; flattery, sycophancy and blind submission are being tolerated. Despotic abuse by several comrades has become a real thing. Second, the Party’s power over the people is being abused. All this weakens the trust of the people in our Party and makes them more distant. It is only natural that our Party is loyal to internationalism and Marxism-Leninism. Hence, our Party must thoroughly study the experience of brotherly parties, especially that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As everyone knows, the 20th Congress of the CPSU has the greatest historical meaning to the international communist movement. The decisions of this Congress gave a deep Marxist analysis of the international revolutionary movement of our time; they must become the programme of action for Marxist parties, including our own and of labourers of the entire world. Despite this, some of those who compose the guiding core of our Party do not intend to introduce the spirit of the CPSU’s 20th Congress decisions in our Party activities using the so-called “national spirit” and so-called “national peculiarities” as a pretext. Moreover, they consider these decisions to be wrong. Hence mistakes in our Party continue to happen, mistakes which our faithfully Marxist-Leninist Party cannot tolerate. I think that the issues mentioned above are by no means some small, insignificant problems. On the contrary, these are the fundamental issues, extremely important to the current situation, they have decisive importance to strengthen our Party, to its guidance of the revolution. Now, I would like to touch on some more concrete issues here. On the decisions of the CPSU’s 20th Congress and on the Third Congress of our Party. The first paragraph of the Decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences” stipulates: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that the decisions of the historic 20th Congress of the CPSU have been welcomed entirely and supported wholeheartedly by our party as a whole, by the entire Soviet people, by the fraternal communist and workers’ parties, by working people of the great community of socialist nations and by millions of people in the capitalist and colonial countries. And this is quite understandable, for the 20th Party Congress, marking as it did a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, gave a thorough-going analysis of the present international situation both at home and in the world, equipped the Communist Party and the Soviet people as a whole with a magnificent plan for the continued effort for building communism and opened up new prospects for united action of all working-class parties in averting the danger of war and on behalf of the interests of labour.

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As comrades know, fraternal parties and progressive individuals across the whole world actively support and endorse the historic decisions of the CPSU’s 20th Congress: Fraternal parties combine the decisions of the 20th Congress with the actual situation in their countries and adopt them as a militant programme for their parties’ activities and policies. But how was the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea conducted, the Congress which happened after the 20th Congress of the CPSU? The WPK’s Third Congress was not guided by the spirit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Because of that, our country has no discussion, no criticism and no deep Marxist-Leninist understanding of the social reality. In propaganda campaigning, mechanical, blind cramming, dogmatism and formalism were dominant methods. In the Party’s guiding organisations these things were even more prominent. During all of the past 10 years, the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the Party ruthlessly suppressed all views relating to the analysis of the state of affairs existing in Korea, which do not coincide with the views given by comrade Kim Il-sung. The spread of the cult of individual thought was always accompanied by hypocrisy, vanity and praise. Regardless of what the actual life of the people is, successes were exaggerated and it was claimed that “the life of the people is rapidly stabilising and improving,” that there are “greatest successes,” etc. Phenomena that were extremely insignificant, limited and personal in nature were presented in propaganda as ubiquitous phenomena. In the post-war period, although a number of serious mistakes were made restabilising the life of the people, propaganda always focused on proving that the people live well. Therefore, it has become, in a way, hypocrisy and a lie. It cannot enjoy the confidence of the people and it turns out to be completely helpless in mobilising the people for the fight. Secondly, it is necessary to point out that the so-called “national spirit” and the so-called “national characteristics” weaken education in the spirit of internationalism. Internationalism is very insufficiently promoted in newspapers, magazines, novels and illustrated publications: The section introducing life in the Soviet Union has already been deleted from Rodong Shinmun; the internationalist assistance selflessly provided to us by the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and the rest of the people’s democratic countries is very poorly covered; and there are no Soviet songs and dances that are so much loved by our people. This cannot be considered a propaganda line for our Party, a line corresponding to the spirit of internationalism. As can be seen from the above, the serious mistakes that exist in the campaigning and propaganda work of our party are due to the connivance of idealism in it.

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We must resolutely destroy the cult of the individual thought, which contradicts the Marxism-Leninist theory, we must educate Party members and the people that our victories are the victories of the people won under the leadership of the Party; we must point to the great vital forces of the people’s democratic system; clearly, fairly and frankly point to successes and failures; we need to strengthen criticism and self-criticism in the organs of campaigning and propaganda, encourage all scholars to think creatively, to analyse our reality, to debate, it is necessary to decisively put an end to dogmatism and formalism. We must conduct a new check of all internal Party textbooks, school textbooks, newspapers, poems, stories, songs, plays, films, etc.; wash away the traces of everything that contributes to the development of the cult of an individual and in every way strengthen the international education of the proletariat. With regard to the campaigning and propaganda work of our party, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU is of the utmost importance, because the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU gave a detailed Marxist-Leninist analysis of our forces and the forces of the enemy at the present stage, clearly indicating the course of the leadership of the revolution by communist and workers’ parties around the world. As a result, the Twentieth Congress revived the Leninist principles of party building and also gave a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the relationship between parties, people and leaders in historical development. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU truly became the beacon of the worldwide revolutionary movement. Its programme further enriched Marxism-Leninism and clearly indicated the way forward to the working people of the whole world and to Marxist-Leninist parties. Propaganda and implementation of the spirit of the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in our Party mean the need for a Marxist-Leninist analysis of our work, a clear understanding of the current situation, a creative understanding of the ways to achieve unification and independence of our country, building socialism; means the need to further strengthen the Leninist cohesion in the Party. The fact that in our party the decisions of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU are considered incorrect is the most serious mistake of the campaigning and propaganda departments. I believe that such a mistake contradicts Marxism-Leninism and is therefore intolerable. And finally, I table several proposals to the Central Committee of the Party: Resolutely guarantee intra-party democracy in the Central Committee and in Party organisations of all levels; immediately stop labelling comrades mentioning the cult of individual “sectarianists” or “anti-Party elements,” and immediately stop surveilling, pressuring and using other similar methods against full and alternate members of the Central Committee. All this

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I propose to add to the resolution of this plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, In order to further strengthen and develop our glorious Party, the Central Committee should make a decision on the ideology of the cult of the individual, the centre of which is comrade Kim Il-sung, and its serious consequences. I also propose that this decision, together with the protocols of the plenum, be transferred to a discussion among the entire Party. Comrades! As I make the abovementioned suggestions, I firmly believe that our glorious Party, acting in the interests of revolution and self-strengthening will be able to quickly eradicate all the unsightly things caused by the ideology of the cult of the individual and will be able to further strengthen the Party discipline and enforce a truly Leninist unity inside the Party. * He probably means comrade Kim Il-sung here.

Note 1 “A draft of the report to be read by Yun Kong-hum on the plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in August 1956” in Material Prepared for the Visit of Comrade Mikoyan to North Korea [Проект выступления Юн Кон Хыма на пленуме ЦК Трудовой Партии Кореи в августе 1956 года // Материалы к визиту тов. Микояна в Северную Корею]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

10 Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy

There are things about North Korea which make it truly unique. This nation, established as the Soviet Union’s puppet state, managed to break free from Moscow’s control long before the age of Mikhail Gorbachev. There were Communist countries that were quite independent of the Kremlin from the very beginning: China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, Albania, Cuba, Ethiopia and South Yemen. Others, like East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, remained in the Soviet sphere through the entirety of their existence. In the earlier years, we could find examples of Soviet satellites being formally annexed by the Union – like Tuva or the Far Eastern Republic. The North Korean way – from a Soviet satellite to an independent Stalinist state – looks nearly unique. The only country whose history bears any similarity to this would be Romania, yet the changes in Pyongyang came earlier and were much more profound than in Bucharest. In the 1940s, North Korea was a sovereign state in name only. Decisions on land reform, the creation of armed forces and everything from the composition of the cabinet to flag design were made by the Soviets. Even North Korean laws were translated from Russian and sometimes translated so badly that it became obvious. A typical mistake would be the official greeting prescribed by military regulations of 1955: “Are you healthy, comrades?”1 – an obviously badly translated greeting of the Soviet Army “Zdravstvuyte, tovarischi!” Yet things changed soon and quickly. The Soviet Rule Many things caused North Korea’s fate to be this unusual. Chronologically, the first one was the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1948. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Army was there to prevent any attempt to cast off Moscow’s rule; it was not so in North Korea. The second factor was the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Beijing’s decision to save North Korea meant that the Kremlin received a powerful counterpart in the DPRK. From then on, Moscow could not pass major unilateral decisions toward the North without securing China’s agreement first. Chinese troops stayed in North Korea until 1958.2 The third factor was Moscow’s new policy line toward socialist countries. Established by Lavrentiy Beria, it allowed the countries greater freedom in DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-10

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Figure 10.1 Bulgarian poster hailing Chervenkov. Source: Author unknown. The original is kept in Bulgaria’s Museum of Socialist Art. A copy is available here: https://presscenters.com/News/58254/muzeyat-na-socialisticheskoto-izkustvo-pokazvaplakati-na-stalin-georgi-dimitrov-i-vulko-chervenkov

Figure 10.2 Hungarian poster hailing Rákosi. Source:Author unknown.Acopy is available here: www.nkp.hu/tankonyv/tortenelem_8/img/67_zomanc_ rakosi_IMG_0003.png

Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy 105 policy-making. The New Line survived Beria’s execution in 1953 and ended only in 1956, after Hungary openly rebelled against the Communist regime. The fourth factor was Nikita Khrushchev’s policy to end Stalin’s legacy. One could argue that this factor proved the most important one. Khrushchev’s speech denouncing Stalin affected the entire socialist bloc. In Bulgaria, it ended the rule of Valko Chervenkov,3 and in Hungary, it brought an end to Mátyás Rákosi.4 In North Korea, an attempt to remove Kim Il-sung failed. Soon after it did, the triumphant Leader began his final intrigue. Separation of Powers One of the ideological novelties in the post-Stalin USSR was a concept of “collective leadership”. Designed to prevent the rise of another dictator, it stipulated that the top positions in the government and in the Party are not to be placed in the hands of one man. However, this was exactly the case in North Korea. Kim Il-sung was both premier and the chairman of the Central Committee. Thus, in 1956–57, the Soviets were pushing him to relinquish one of these two positions to someone else. The persistence of the Soviet ambassador gave no joy to Kim Il-sung. He wanted to stay an absolute, unchallenged ruler. However, times were changing, and Kim started to think that, perhaps, he could now subvert the will of his supervisors. Once, back in April 1955, Pak Chang-ok had already suggested that Kim should resign from premiership5 – and Kim nullified that proposal by suggesting the extremely unpopular Choe Yong-gon as his successor.6 Now the Soviets implied the same thing. Kim Il-sung’s response strategy was a rather multifaceted one: Plan A, the ideal one, was to keep both positions. Plan B was to yield premiership to his loyal comrade Kim Il, in hopes of later taking it back. Plan C was to agree to the proposal and appoint Choe Yong-gon the new premier. Choe Yong-gon vs Kim Il From the age of the Korean War up to 1957, Choe Yong-gon was largely perceived as the second man in North Korea. He has been the minister of national defence since 1948, and since 1953, he was the only holder of the rank of vice-marshal of the DPRK. Kim Il-sung’s comrade-in-arms, Choe was loyal to the leader – but at the same time was quite incompetent and power hungry. Both Soviet and American reports on him agree that he was a rash but faithful enforcer to Kim Il-sung.7 One should remember that back in 1945–46, it was he who subjugated one of the nascent North Korean opposition forces – the Democratic Party. Choe Yong-gon quickly transformed it into a puppet for the Communists. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Choe Yong-gon actively supported Kim Il-sung during the August Plenum; reportedly, he was so furious with the opposition that he tried to strike them with a chair. At the time, such a passionate loyalist looked like a good candidate for Kim Il-sung: The leader could have hoped that, eventually, Choe would give the premiership back to him.

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Figure 10.3 Choe Yong-gon.

Source: Rodong Shinmun, 23 April 1956, p. 3

Yet things changed in 1957 when Kim Il-sung’s favour switched from Choe Yong-gon to Kim Il. What could have been his reasoning? Most likely the primary reason was Choe Yong-gon’s continuous ambition for power. There was a risk that should he be allowed to become Kim Il-sung’s equal, he could use this as an opportunity to seize power from the Great Leader. Choe had led

Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy 107

Figure 10.4 Kim Il.

Source: Choson Inmingun, 17 September 1961, p. 3

the North Korean army since it had been created in 1948 – as commander-in-chief and then as minister of national defence. As time went by, his ego grew. A careful look at the DPRK’s military regulations reveals that they gave nearly unlimited authority to “the Minister of National Defence” and “Vice-Marshal of the DPRK” but barely mentioned “the Premier” and “Marshal of the DPRK”. The former were the position and rank of Choe Yong-gon, and the latter were that of Kim Il-sung.8

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There was one more factor for Kim Il-sung to consider: Choe Yong-gon’s wife Wang Yuhuan was from China. During the time that this intrigue was unfurling, Kim Il-sung had no reason to trust the Chinese. The leader of the August conspiracy, Choe Chang-ik, hailed from the Chinese faction. The August plenum caused China and the USSR to send a joint delegation to North Korea with a task to pressure Kim Il-sung to halt his purges. Only in October 1957 did Mao apologise to Kim and gave him China’s assurances that it wouldn’t happen again.9 But as of the summer of 1957, Kim Il-sung was still distrustful of Beijing. Thus, Kim Il-sung needed a safer option than Choe. This option was Vice-Premier Kim Il. Kim Il, whose original name was Pak Tok-san, was another one of Kim Il-sung’s comrades-in-arms. Back in the 1940s, he served in the Soviet Army in Kim Ilsung’s battalion. In 1956, Kim Il, just like Choe Yong-gon, was a vice-premier and vice-chairman of the Central Committee. He simultaneously occupied the position of agriculture minister. The difference between the two was that Kim Il’s position gave him much less autonomy than Choe’s. He also looked less ambitious and, thus, was the man Kim Il-sung would want for this task. Ambassador Puzanov’s Criminal Negligence Aleksandr Puzanov was appointed Soviet ambassador to North Korea. A year before that, this man had been dismissed from the position of premier of Russia – the biggest republic in the Soviet Union. This was a way to send a oncepowerful man into political exile. Puzanov had neither skills nor motivation in his new job. He had never worked as a diplomat before and had no connection to Korea whatsoever. The new ambassador still likely entertained the hope that this new assignment will be a temporary one and he would be welcomed back to the elite soon. Scared by his dismissal, this man feared doing anything radical lest his superiors grow displeased. All these factors made him the one who lost North Korea. During the entire summer of 1957, the ambassador was probed by two agents of Kim Il-sung – Nam Il and Pak Chong-ae. Both were originally from the Soviet Union and spoke native Russian. They made numerous attempts to find out what Moscow’s reaction would be if Kim Il-sung went with his wishes – and the ambassador did not do anything to indicate that the Kremlin’s will had to be enforced. This emboldened Kim Il-sung to make his final move. The Sun of the Nation Rises From 11 to 28 September, Puzanov was in Moscow on a temporary assignment.10 It was during his absence that Kim Il-sung decided to proceed with plan A: to simply keep the premiership.11 On 20 September 1957, the second North Korean cabinet was formed, and Kim Il-sung was still the premier. Of course, he retained the top post in the Party as well.

Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy 109

Figure 10.5 Aleksandr Puzanov.

Source: Author unknown. Original kept in the Archive of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation

No reaction from Moscow followed. In fact, later, Puzanov received explicit instructions not to interfere. On 22 October, the Kremlin commanded the following: It is possible that Kim Il-sung would ask what is the position of the CPSU’s Central Committee on the fact that they kept Kim Il-sung as both premier and chairman of the WPK’s Central Committee. It seems appropriate to tell him that this is their internal affair. [Emphasis added.] However, in the future, it would be more useful for the cause for Kim Il-sung to focus on his work in the Cabinet and nominate a different comrade as Chairman of the WPK’s Central Committee. The head of the government’s position is especially of primary importance in the situation where the country is divided and where the task of its unification lies ahead. It is also highly important that future connections with non-Socialist countries would be primarily established through state channels.12

110 Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy

Figure 10.6 Kim Il-sung’s second cabinet. Source: Rodong Shinmun, 21 September 1957, p. 2

Kim Il-sung likely never learned about this letter, but all evidence points to this document ultimately ending Soviet control over North Korea. After October 1957, one cannot find any trace of Moscow directly interfering in Pyongyang’s policy. Another result of this intrigue was the effective end of Choe Yong-gon’s career. In September 1957, he was moved from minister of national defence to a symbolic position of the chairman of the SPA’s Presidium. Evidently, he was also stripped of rank – no later document, including his own obituary and encyclopaedias’ entries on him, calls Choe a vice-marshal.13 Since it is standard practice for other military men, the conclusion that his rank had been retracted by a secret decision seems very logical. The Soviet records say that “comrade Choe Yong-gon judged his assignment to be an important task given by the Party” and seemingly offered no resistance.14 After winning the struggle over the most important issue, Kim Il-sung stopped asking the Soviet embassy for instructions and opinions. Established as a de-facto colonial government, this organisation was reduced to what it was called – the embassy of the USSR in a foreign country. Already in 1958, Kim Il-sung conducted a large-scale purge at the First Party Conference, and he did not ask the Soviets for consent. This was now his country and his alone. From a Puppet King to an Unchallenged Ruler If one was to say in one sentence why and how Kim Il-sung became politically independent from the Kremlin, one could say that the Kremlin permitted him to.

Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy 111 Step by step, Kim Il-sung asserted himself and at no point did the Soviets force him to step down – as they did to, say, Imre Nagy in Hungary in 1956. From 1957 onwards, Kim Il-sung was an independent ruler. He cast away control over his nation by a foreign power. This was essentially political decolonisation, but as often happens with decolonisation, it brought little joy to the people. Many of the “native” rulers were crueller than the colonial viceroys – and North Korea was a good example of this. The age of independent Kimism saw the introduction of social stratification; the cult of Kim Il-sung brought to truly insane levels; unending poverty; the country’s essential transformation into a monarchy; and more purges, more control, more repression and killings. This was not independence for the North Koreans. The only one who became independent was Kim Il-sung. Notes 1 Internal Service Regulations of the People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defence, p. 23 [조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 인민군 내무규정, 평양: 민족보위성 군사출판부, 1955, 23쪽]. 2 Lee Jong-sok. Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945–2000. Seoul: The Centre, 2000, p. 202 [이종석. 북한-중국 관계 1945~2000. 서울: 중심, 2000, 202쪽]. 3 “Changing the guard in the country, the similarities and differences . . . ” in RNews.bg, 2 April 2016 [За смяната на караула в държавата, за приликите и разликите . . . RNews.bg, 2 април 2016 г], https://rnews.bg/априлски-пленум-червенков-живков/. 4 Vladimir Popin. 1956. p. 45 [Vladimir Popin. 1956. 45. o.], http://mek.oszk. hu/05500/05525/05525.pdf. 5 From the Journal of the Councillor of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK S. N. Filatov. Record of Conversation with Pak Yong-bin, 25 February 1956. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 102, folder 12, item 6, folder 68 [Из дневника советника Посольства СССР в КНДР тов. Филатова С. Н. Запись беседы с т. Пак Ен Бином 25 февраля 1956 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 12, д. 6, п. 68]. 6 Ibid. 7 Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence. Collections and Dissemination Division. Who’s Who Reports, 1954– 1955 [Entry NM3 85G], National Archives and Records Administration, p. 41; Choe Yong-gon. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 495, inventory 228, file 28, pp. 13–16 [Цой Ен Ген. РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 228, д. 28, л. 13–16]. 8 Internal Service Regulations of the People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defence, 1955 [조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 인민군 내무규정, 평양: 민족보위성 군사 출판 부, 1955]. 9 From the Journal of A. M. Puzanov. Record of Conversation with Comrade Kim Il-sung, 13 November 1957. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 102, folder 13, item 5 [Из дневника Пузанова А. М. Запись беседы с тов. Ким Ир Сеном. 13 ноября 1957 года, АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 13, д. 5]; From the Journal of B. K. Pimenov, First Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Pak Kil-lyong, Chief of the First Department of the MOFA of the DPRK. 8 December 1957. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 102, folder 13, item 6, folder 72 [Из дневника 1-го секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР Пименова Б.К. Запись беседы с заведующим 1-м отделом МИД КНДР Пак Киль Еном. 8 декабря 1957 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 13, д. 6, п. 72].

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10 Journal of A. M. Puzanov, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 31 August–30 September 1957 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. А. М. Пузанова за период с 31 августа по 30 сентября 1957 г]. (A document from the author’s collection.) 11 “At the First Session of the Second Supreme People’s Assembly. A new cabinet of Comrade Kim Il-sung is formed” in Rodong Shinmun, 21 September 1957, p. 1 [조선민주 주의 인민 공화국 최고 인민 회의 제2기 제1차 회의에서. 김일성 동지를 수반으로 하는 새 내각 조직. 로동신문, 1957년 9월 21일, 1면]. 12 Notes for Talks with the Party and Government Delegation of the DPRK. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 0102, folder 13, file 72, item 11 [К беседе с партийно-правительственной делегацией КНДР. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 13, п. 72, д. 11]. 13 “Obituary on Comrade Choe Yong-gon” in Rodong Shinmun, 20 September 1976, p. 1 [최용건동지의 서거에 대한 부고, 로동신문, 1976년 9월 20일, 1면]; “Concise biographical record of Comrade Choe Yong-gon”, Rodong Shinmun, 20 September 1976, p. 1 [최용건동지의 략력. 로동신문, 1976년 9월 20일, 1면]; “Choe Yong-gon” in Grand Encyclopaedia of Korea, vol. 21. Pyongyang: Encyclopaedic Dictionaries Publishing House, 2001, p. 465 [최용건, 조선대백과사전, 제21권, 평양: 백과사전출판 사, 2001, 465쪽]. 14 From the journal of V. I. Pelishenko. Record of Conversation with Nam Il. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 September 1957 [Из дневника Пелишенко В.И. Запись беседы с министром иностранных дел тов. Нам Иром. 16 сентября 1957 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

Bibliography English Department of Defense. Department of the Army. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence. Collections and Dissemination Division. Who’s Who Reports, 1954–1955 [Entry NM3 85G], National Archives and Records Administration, p. 41; Choe Yong-gon, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Collection 495, Inventory 228, File 28, pp. 13–16 [Цой Ен Ген. РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 228, д. 28, л. 13–16]. Korean “At the first session of the second Supreme People’s Assembly. A new cabinet of Comrade Kim Il-sung is formed” in Rodong Shinmun, 21 September 1957, p. 1 [조선민주주의 인 민 공화국 최고 인민 회의 제2기 제1차 회의에서. 김일성 동지를 수반으로 하는 새 내각 조직. 로동신문, 1957년 9월 21일, 1면]. “Concise biographical record of Comrade Choe Yong-gon” in Rodong Shinmun, 20 September 1976, p. 1 [최용건동지의 략력. 로동신문, 1976년 9월 20일, 1면]. “Choe Yong-Gon” in Grand Encyclopaedia of Korea, vol. 21. Pyongyang: Encyclopaedic Dictionaries Publishing House, 2001, p. 465 [최용건, 조선대백과사전, 제21권, 평양: 백과사전출판사, 2001, 465쪽]. Internal Service Regulations of the People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Pyongyang: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of National Defence, 1955 [ 조선 민주주의 인민 공화국 인민군 내무규정, 평양: 민족보위성 군사 출판부, 1955]. Lee Jong-sok. Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945–2000. Seoul: The Centre, 2000 [이종석. 북한-중국 관계 1945~2000. 서울: 중심, 2000]. “Obituary on Comrade Choe Yong-gon” in Rodong Shinmun, 20 September 1976, p. 1 [최 용건동지의 서거에 대한 부고, 로동신문, 1976년 9월 20일, 1면].

Kim Il-sung’s Road to an Independent Autocracy 113 Russian From the Journal of A. M. Puzanov. Record of Conversation with Comrade Kim Il-sung, 13 November 1957, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 102, Folder 13, Item 5 [Из дневника Пузанова А. М. Запись беседы с тов. Ким Ир Сеном. 13 ноября 1957 года, АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 13, д. 5]; From the Journal of B. K. Pimenov, First Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK. Record of Conversation with Pak Kil-Lyong, Chief of the First Department of the MOFA of the DPRK, 8 December 1957, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 102, Folder 13, Item 6, Folder 72 [Из дневника 1-го секретаря Посольства СССР в КНДР Пименова Б.К. Запись беседы с заведующим 1-м отделом МИД КНДР Пак Киль Еном. 8 декабря 1957 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 13, д. 6, п. 72]. From the Journal of the Councillor of the Embassy of the USSR to the DPRK S. N. Filatov. Record of Conversation with Pak Yong-Bin, 25 February 1956, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 102, Folder 12, Item 6, Folder 68 [Из дневника советника Посольства СССР в КНДР тов. Филатова С. Н. Запись беседы с т. Пак Ен Бином 25 февраля 1956 года. АВП РФ, ф. 102, оп. 12, д. 6, п. 68]. From the Journal of V. I. Pelishenko. Record of Conversation with Nam Il. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 September 1957 [Из дневника Пелишенко В.И. Запись беседы с министром иностранных дел тов. Нам Иром. 16 сентября 1957 года]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Journal of A. M. Puzanov, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 31 August–30 September 1957 [Дневник посла СССР в КНДР тов. А. М. Пузанова за период с 31 августа по 30 сентября 1957 г]. (A document from the author’s collection.) Notes for Talks with the Party and Government Delegation of the DPRK, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 0102, Folder 13, File 72, Item 11 [К беседе с партийно-правительственной делегацией КНДР. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 13, п. 72, д. 11]. Other Languages Changing the Guard in the Country, the Similarities and Differences . . . RNews.bg, 2 April 2016 [За смяната на караула в държавата, за приликите и разликите . . . RNews.bg, 2 април 2016 г]. https://rnews.bg/априлски-пленум-червенков-живков/. Popin, Vladimir. 1956. http://mek.oszk.hu/05500/05525/05525.pdf.

11 Stalinism and Kimilsungism A Comparison

It is quite common to perceive North Korea as a sort of miniature copy of the Stalin-era Soviet Union.1 The Kim regime is, thus, described as Stalinism which survived Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation. Naturally, both countries were not that dissimilar. But they were not identical, either – and in this piece, I would like to show the actual difference between the two regimes. The Economic System The central part of the economy of Kim Il-sung’s North Korea was the public distribution system (PDS) of consumer goods. People were not supposed to buy them but to receive them from the state. Stalin’s USSR and even some democracies occasionally implemented such a system as an emergency measure – and once the emergency was gone, the rationing was to stop.2 North Korea, however, made this arrangement a permanent one. From the 1950s, the DPRK stopped perceiving the PDS as an emergency measure but rather as the ideal way the economy should be run. Up to the 1990s, Pyongyang did its best to make this system sustainable.3 The way sustainability was achieved marks the second large difference between Stalin’s USSR and Kim’s North Korea. The Soviet Union was a donor country, supplying many other nations with resources, and the DPRK has always been infamous for constantly asking its neighbours for more free resources.4 The third unusual trait of the North Korean economic system is closely linked to the second. An important part of the DPRK’s foreign income was donations from Japanese Koreans – both ideological followers of Pyongyang and those who had relatives in the DPRK. As these donations were made in yen, North Korea started to treat foreign currency in a highly lenient way. For example, foreign nationals who visited the North were supposed to use foreign currency. This was inconceivable in the USSR, where only roubles were accepted at shops. The Organisations and the People’s Groups The innocent term “organisation” has rather notorious connotations in North Korea. Every teenager and adult, except for inmates of the worst concentration DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-11

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camps and elderly people, belongs to an “organisation” in the DPRK. This can be the Party, the Children’s Union, the youth league, the Women’s League, the labour union, or the Agricultural Labourers’ Union. Such an “organisation” is responsible for ideological drills. The drills are conducted two to three times per week and are dedicated either to the Great Leaders’ unsurpassed wisdom or to self and mutual criticism sessions.5 Neither mandatory membership in an organisation nor such sessions were a thing in the USSR. Another unique North Korean trait is “people’s groups”. The reason the Soviet Union never had them is a bit unusual – to begin with, they are not a Communist invention. The progenitors of “people’s groups” were patriotic groups, organised by, arguably, the vilest Japanese colonial governor of Korea – Minami Jiro.6 The purpose of “people’s groups” is to monitor people at their homes and to maintain logs of their visitors. An important task of people’s groups is surprise flat inspections. The group’s chairwoman,7 accompanied by a squad of police officers, inspects the flats and dwellings under her jurisdiction, looking for unreported guests. This never happened in the Soviet Union, where the privacy of one’s personal habitat was mostly respected. This event led to a joke: “The Soviets’ authority stops at the entrance to my flat”. A person’s origins were a much bigger deal in North Korea than in the Soviet Union. Discrimination against those who had ancestors in the aristocracy largely stopped under Stalin. The later era saw people who proudly wrote “Origins: nobility” in their questionnaire employed as humanities teachers with no questions asked. By contrast, North Korea developed a very complex system of social stratification, which had the most direct impact on one’s life and career.8 The USSR permitted exceptions to membership in state organisations. Normally, all children were to become Little Octobrists and then Young Pioneers and attend ideological sessions as such. However, if one was from, say, a family of a priest, exceptions were allowed. The next stage was the Komsomol – the youth league – but it did require some minimum qualifications. If one had convictions as a minor, their application for membership could be rejected. The Soviet Union’s elections were almost completely farcical – only one pre-approved candidate was allowed to run. Similarly, lower Party or government organisations had no autonomy and usually just approved “suggestions” given to them by their superiors. However, voting against the candidate or a suggestion was technically permissible, and, thus, in some cases, it was not completely impossible to actually defeat the superior’s will through this remnant of democracy on a lower level.9 North Korea, on the contrary, was the country of no exceptions. Membership in an organisation has been mandatory for decades. All elections since 1962 have returned a singular number: 100.0% votes in favour of the presented candidate. The very idea that things could be different in a socialist country feels very odd to some North Koreans. Back in 2014, I visited Pyongyang and mentioned in a talk to a North Korean woman that, in the USSR, one could have been denied membership in Komsomol. Of all my stories, she found this one the most flabbergasting.

116 Stalinism and Kimilsungism Is the DPRK a Communist Nation? While in English, the word “communist” is often used to describe Soviet-type regimes, these countries themselves used it with a different meaning. Their actual system was called “socialist”, while “communism” was the goal – a future stateless utopia. A communist party was a party striving to achieve that goal. A good example here would be the Soviet Union’s full name: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As you see, it’s “Socialist”, not “Communist”. And, actually, in some Soviet fiction, one can find predictions that someday, near the final victory of Leninism, the USSR would be renamed the USCR: The Union of Soviet Communist Republics.10 But, of course, fiction remained fiction. North Korea’s attitude towards communism was rather ambiguous. It seems that the leadership did not truly believe in this core concept of Marxism-Leninism. Instead, from the 1980s, the leadership came up with a formulation “socialism in our own way”, which might be a more accurate description of the system they built. In the 2000s–2010s, the word “communism” disappeared from the state discourse nearly completely: Now the goal was to defend socialism under the “brilliant leadership of the Great Marshal”. Thus, one could say that North Korea was not a communist country, in the sense that it did not proclaim communism as its future goal. However, sometime circa 2020, “communism” started to re-appear in the state publications of the DPRK.11 In 2021, the Eighth Congress voted on the new Party bylaws, which had the following sentence in them: The immediate goal of the Workers’ Party of Korea is the build a prosperous and civilised socialist society in the Northern part of the Republic, to enforce sovereign and democratic development of society on a nationwide level, and, as its final goal to build a Communist society where the people’s ideals are realised completely.12 This shows that North Korea once again appears to be interested in communism – decades after it effectively abandoned the concept. At the time this book is being written, it is too early to tell if this will be a meaningful change. Worshipping the Leader This is arguably one of the best-known parts of life in North Korea, and for a good reason. Ever since 1967, the North Korean cult has been omnipresent, dwarfing its predecessor, the Soviet cult of Stalin. All North Korean buildings must have a portrait of the Great Leader put on a special wall reserved solely for it. Nearly all texts are mandated to have a quote from one of the leaders. All students from kindergarten and up are to study official (and heavily edited) biographies of the leaders as separate subjects.13 People with

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names identical to the leaders are to change their names.14 None of this has ever happened in the USSR. Freedom of Movement Soviet people had significantly more travel freedom than North Koreans. If, say, a resident of Riga wanted to go to, say, Dnepropetrovsk or Leningrad, they could simply go there, as no additional permit was required. Restrictions applied only to border areas and “closed cities” – places where military bases and major research centres were located.15 In North Korea, internal travel permits became a standard practice circa 1967 and were necessary to visit a neighbouring county. Major cities like Pyongyang or Rason required a special permit. Pyongyanites and people from border areas were given greater freedoms, but even they were not allowed to visit the whole country as they pleased.16 Restrictions on international travel in North Korea were also harsher than in the USSR. A Soviet citizen, if they were a Party member, could entertain some hope of visiting another socialist country.17 In North Korea, any leisure travel is a luxury affordable to only a tiny minority of the ultra-rich and powerful.

Figure 11.1 Special travel permit. The red line indicates that it permits visiting the capital. The practice of putting coloured lines on various special permits also originates from the USSR. Source: An official document by the DPRK; photo taken by an unknown author. A copy is available here: https://namu.moe/w/%EB%A0%A4%ED%96%89%EC%A6%9D

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Censorship North Korea took censorship to a level unseen in the Soviet Union. Even a brief look at the nations’ main newspapers would confirm that Stalin-era Pravda was much more honest than post-1967 Rodong Shinmun. Pravda acknowledged that the USSR was imperfect and offered some criticism of the lower officials. In North Korea, criticism was mostly limited to closed channels, whilst Rodong Shinmun projected an image of a utopia-like society. The Soviet Union did not restrict the literature of other socialist nations, leading to a booming interest in works of Eastern European authors – especially those from Poland. Some people even mastered Polish solely for the pleasure of reading Polish books. The reason, of course, was that the Polish People’s Republic was a freer society. Newspapers of capitalist nations’ Communist parties, like the American The Daily World or British Morning Star – were sold in major cities’ kiosks. Later, under Brezhnev, Moscow signed agreements with major Western nations, allowing for magazines with non-political content to be sold in the Union. These were Angliya from the United Kingdom, Amerika from the United States and Guten Tag from West Germany.18 All these were unthinkable for the DPRK. Another source of uncensored information for the Soviet people was old books. The Communist Party never managed to truly control this market. But the Workers’ Party succeeded in North Korea. In the late 1960s–early 1970s, a massive purge of libraries known as “arrangement of books” was conducted, and all undesirable books – including those from other socialist countries – were removed to restricted-access archives.19 The resulting desolation was impressive in a dark way. Only some classics and books handpicked by the Great Leader survived the purge. Military Service The Soviet army was a conscription-based one. The standard term for military service was two years in the Ground Force and three years in the Navy. The longest term of mandatory service which ever existed in Soviet history was nine years – for those unlucky ones who were conscripted in 1945 to the Navy.20 This sounds awful to most modern people – but North Korea is even more extreme. The conscription service in the DPRK at some points lasted for more than a decade – longer than anywhere else in the world.21 Yet, in North Korea, conscription was not necessarily perceived as something bad. For people with substandard origins, military service was virtually the only career (and Party membership) opportunity left. For poor people, the army was also a place where some basic food and shelter were provided, so they could be certain that they would at least not starve. Prisons and Labour Camps It would be fitting to start covering this darkest aspect of any autocracy by mentioning one area in which North Korea was actually better than Stalin’s Soviet Union.

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Stalin was infamous for conducting his purges completely at random, throwing people in jails and camps without any reason at all.22 North Korea is different. Here, an offence is actually necessary to be arrested. The catch is that this offence can be something like accidentally pouring ink on the Great Leader’s portrait or speaking about him without proper respect. The very fact that one listened to foreign radio constituted the grounds to throw one in a “labour unit” for a year, and if they did it more than five times, the sentence could be as harsh as ten years of forced labour.23 The death penalty is widespread in the North and has always been in use. By contrast, for three years between 1947–50, the USSR did not have capital punishment.24 Unlike the USSR, Kim Il-sung’s North Korea had a very low level of nonpolitical crime. The totalitarian system of surveillance had it almost completely eradicated. North Korean crime became a thing only in the 1990s, when the widespread socioeconomic crisis caused by the famine eroded the system. Yet, even then, it remained low, as potential criminals still had the age of rampant terror in their recent memories. Religion and the State The Soviet Union was officially an atheist country. However, the Union’s confused identity meant that this policy was not always enforced with vigour. When the authorities felt more as if the USSR was the progenitor of some future World Socialist Republic, religion was decisively stamped out. When the Kremlin wanted to stress that the Soviet Union was, in fact, the successor to the Russian Empire, priests, mullahs and monks were left in peace. North Korea’s attitude towards religion was continuously negative. True, Pyongyang established some “religious organisations” like the Korean Christian Union to project an image of a tolerant nation and created some churches for foreign diplomats to attend. The DPRK put effort into creating its own translation of the Bible, and this author must say that it was extremely well done.25 The book reads naturally, being written in plain, easy-to-read Korean, in sharp contrast with the standard South Korean translation, which often uses lofty language and obsolete grammatical forms. But apart from a tiny space for legal religion, Pyongyang’s policy was very simple: Religion is a subversive thought and must be eradicated from our socialist society. They did not, however, succeed completely: The country has a Christian underground where believers talk about their faith – not that dissimilar from Ancient Rome.26 The Twisted Reflection For the Soviet people, North Korea often looked like a grotesque parody of their own country. Everything they knew and saw around them was taken to a ridiculous extreme there. This did look funny – right up to the moment people realised that the DPRK was not a product of satire but an actual state.

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For North Korea, the USSR was what Poland was to the USSR itself. It was a country like their own but also one that was more prosperous, more rational and freer. Thus, the Soviet Union has always been rather popular in the North. Notes 1 George W. Breslauer. The Rise and Demise of World Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, p. 166. 2 Yelena Osokina. “The dirge for the Soviet queue” in Reserve stock, 2005, no. 5 (43) [Елена Осокина. Прощальная ода советской очереди // Неприкосновенный запас, 2005, №5(43)], https://web.archive.org/web/20121119070219/http://magazines.russ.ru/ nz/2005/43/oso10.html. 3 Natalia Matveeva. “Effect of economic policies on everyday life: North Korea” in Building a New World: The Economic Development Strategies of the Two Koreas in the Cold War, 1957–1966. PhD thesis, SOAS, 2021, pp. 118–131; So Dong-ik. “Food, clothing and shelter” in People’s Way of Life, vol. 1. Seoul: Archive Publishing, 2005, pp. 203–263 [서동익. 의식주 생활, 인민이 사는 모습, 제1권. 서울: 자료원, 1995, 203~263쪽]. 4 Kim Gwang-hyon. “North Korean economy in the swamp of foreign loans” in United Korea, vol. 46, October 1987, pp. 12–13 [김광현. 외채의 늪에 빠진 북한 경제. 통일 한국 46호. 1987년 10월. 12~13쪽]. 5 Lee U-yong and Hwang Gyu-jin. “Formative process of life review sessions: A study” in Bulletin of the Association for North Korean Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 121–145 [이 우영, 황규진. 북한의 생활총화 형성과정 연구. 북한연구학회보 2008, 제12권, 제1 호, 121~145쪽]. 6 On patriotic groups see Lee Jong-min. “Establishment of patriotic groups during the wartime era and daily control in the cities: Focusing on the case of Keijo” in Eastern Academic Journal, no. 124 (2004), pp. 839–881 [이종민. 전시하 애국반 조직과 도시 의 일상 통제: 경성부를 중심으로. 동방학지, 2004, 제124권, 839~881쪽]. 7 People’s groups are always chaired by a woman nowadays, but back in the 1950s, men could have headed them, too. “Smash the enemy spy plots! A spy pretending to be a police officer is uncovered. People’s group chairman, comrade Kang Sok-u, speaks”, Rodong Shinmun, 27 December 1952, p. 3 [적들의 간첩 모략을 분쇄하라! 내무원으 로 가장한 간첩 적발. 인민반장 강석우 동무, 로동신문, 1952년 12월 27일, 3면]. 8 Kim Sang-son and Lee Song-hi. A Reference Book on the Registration of Citizens. Pyongyang: Ministry of Social Security Publishing, 1993 [김상선, 리성히. 주민등록 사업참고서, 평양: 사회안전부 출판사, 1993]. 9 Information Summary no.12 of the Joint State Political Directorate’s Department of Information on the Re-Election of Village Councils, as of 4 April 1927, 6 April 1927. Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service, folder 2, inventory 5, item 390, pp. 110–116 [Информационная сводка № 12 информотдела ОГПУ о кампании по перевыборам сельсоветов на 4 апреля 1927 г. 6 апреля 1927 г. ЦА ФСБ РФ, ф. 2, оп. 5, д. 390, лл. 110–116], https://istmat.org/node/53903. 10 Lev Kassil. On a Truly Good Life. Moscow: Children Literature Publishing House, 1961, p. 184 [Лев Кассиль. Про жизнь совсем хорошую. Москва: Детгиз, 1961, стр. 184]; Vladimir Barkov. “A mission to the stars” in Ogonyok, no. 24, June 1948, p. 4 [Владимир Барков. Экспедиция в звездное пространство. Огонек, 1948 год, № 24 (июнь), стр. 4]. 11 “With high faith, advance forward – to the October of victory” in Rodong Shinmun, 14 September 2020, p. 2 [승리의 10월을 향하여 신심드높이 앞으로!, 로동신문, 2020 년 9월 14일, 2면]. 12 Bylaws of the WPK, January 2021 [조선로동당 규약, 2021년 1월]. (A document from the author’s collection.)

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13 Han Man-gil. The North Korean Education: A Study for the Unification Era. Paju: Education & Science Publishing, 1997, p. 164 [한만길. 통일시대 북한교육론, 파주: 교육과학사, 1997, 164쪽]. 14 Kim Ju-won. “Dr Kim Jong-gi’s original name was “Kim Jong-il”, he changed it” in Radio Free Asia, 19 July 2016 [김주원. 본명 김정일인 김정기 박사의 개명, 2016 년 7월 19일, 자유아시아방송], www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/ae40c528c77cac00c758-c228aca8c9c4-c9c4c2e4/hiddentruth-07192016100504.html. 15 Marina Lisnichuk. “The USSR’s closed cities: What they used to hide there and how did their fate play out” in Obozrevatel.com, 23 October 2020 [Марина Лисничук. Закрытые города СССР: что прятали и как сложилась их судьба 23.10.2020], https:// news.obozrevatel.com/society/zakryityie-goroda-sssr-chto-pryatali-i-kak-slozhilasih-sudba.htm. 16 Han Dong-ho, Kim Su-gyong and Lee Gyong-hwa. “Freedom of internal movement in North Korea”, KINU [한동호, 김수경, 이경화. 북한 내 이동의 자유, 통일연구 원], www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/bbdbf7ee-6c60-48e7-b39c-668e18a01f3d; Author’s interview with a former North Korean police officer. 17 Mikhail Voslenskiy. The Nomenklaura: The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Soviet Russia Publishing House, 1991, pp. 418–438 [Михаил Восленский. Номенклатура: Господствующий класс Советского Союза. Москва: издательство «Советская Россия», 1991, стр. 418–434]. 18 Irina Podzolkova. “Guten Tag: A case study of a magazine becoming a source of information of foreign nations” in Issues of Students’ Research, no. 6 (34), June 2019, pp. 384–397 [Ирина Подзолкова. Феномен журнала “Гутен Таг” как источника международной информации // Вопросы студенческой науки, №6 (34), июнь 2019, стр. 384–397]. 19 Son Kwang-ju. Kim Jong-Il: A Report. Seoul: Sea Publishing, 1996, pp. 63–66 [손광주. 김정일 리포트. 서울: 바다출판사, 1996, 63~66쪽]. 20 F. Gukov. “The last wave of conscription” in Maritime Daily, 9 June 2007 [Ф. Гуков. Последний призыв // Морская газета, 9 июня 2007 г], https://web.archive.org/ web/20150623214658/http://gazetam.ru/9-iyunya-2007/posledniy-prizyiv.htm. 21 Fyodor Tertitskiy. “Approximate conscription terms in the KPA” in The North Korean Army: History, Structure, Daily Life. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2022, pp. 32–33. 22 Marc Jansen and Nikita Petrov. Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002. 23 “Article 185 (Listening to enemy broadcast, collecting, keeping and distributing enemy materials)” in Penal Code of the DPRK, 2015 [제185조 (적대방송청취, 적지물 수집, 보관, 류포죄). 조선민주주의인민공화국 형법, 2015년]. 24 Laws of Abolishing and Re-Introducing the Death Penalty, 1947–1950. Stolypin Museum of the History of Russian Reforms [Законы об отмене и восстановлении смертной казни. 1947–1950 г. // Музей истории российских реформ имени П. А. Столыпина], http://museumreforms.ru/node/13856. 25 The North Korean Bible. Seoul: Seoul-USA Publishing, no year (reprint) [조선어 성경. 서울: 서울유에스에이, 날짜 없음(복각)]. 26 “North Korea: Two letters from the underground church are revealed” in Korean Missionary Research Centre, 10 October 2022 [북한 – 지하교회 성도들의 편지 두 통 공개 돼. 한국선도연구원, 2022.10.31], https://krim.org/북한-지하교회-성도들의-편지두-통-공개돼/.

Bibliography English Breslauer, George W. The Rise and Demise of World Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

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Jansen, Marc and Petrov, Nikita. Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002. Matveeva, Natalia. “Effect of economic policies on everyday life: North Korea” in Building a New World: The Economic Development Strategies of the Two Koreas in the Cold War, 1957–1966. PhD thesis, SOAS, 2021, pp. 118–131. Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “Approximate conscription terms in the KPA” in The North Korean Army: History, Structure, Daily Life. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2022, pp. 32–33. Korean “Article 185 (Listening to enemy broadcast, collecting, keeping and distributing enemy materials)”. Penal Code of the DPRK, 2015 [제185조 (적대방송청취, 적지물 수집, 보관, 류포죄). 조선민주주의인민공화국 형법, 2015년]. Bylaws of the WPK, January 2021 [조선로동당 규약, 2021년 1월]. (A document from the author’s collection) Han Dong-ho, Kim Su-gyong and Lee Gyong-hwa. “Freedom of internal movement in North Korea”. KINU [한동호, 김수경, 이경화. 북한 내 이동의 자유, 통일연구원]. www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/bbdbf7ee-6c60-48e7-b39c-668e18a01f3d So Dong-ik. “Food, clothing and shelter” in People’s Way of Life, vol. 1. Seoul: Archive Publishing, 2005, pp. 203–263 [서동익. 의식주 생활, 인민이 사는 모습, 제1권. 서울: 자료원, 1995, 203~263쪽]. Kim Gwang-hyon. “North Korean economy in the swamp of foreign loans” in United Korea, vol. 46, October 1987, pp. 12–13 [김광현. 외채의 늪에 빠진 북한 경제. 통일한국 46호. 1987년 10월. 12~13쪽]. Lee Jong-min. “Establishment of patriotic groups during the wartime era and daily control in the cities: Focusing on the case of Keijo” in Eastern Academic Journal, no. 124, 2004, pp. 839–881 [이종민. 전시하 애국반 조직과 도시의 일상 통제: 경성부를 중심으로. 동방학지, 2004, 제124권, 839~881쪽]. Kim Ju-won. “Dr Kim Jong-gi’s original name was ‘Kim Jong-il,’ he changed it” in Radio Free Asia, 19 July 2016 [김주원. 본명 김정일인 김정기 박사의 개명, 2016 년 7월 19일, 자유아시아방송]. www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/ae40c528c77cac00c758-c228aca8c9c4-c9c4c2e4/hiddentruth-07192016100504.html. Son Kwang-ju. Kim Jong-il: A Report. Seoul: Sea Publishing, 1996 [손광주. 김정일 리포 트. 서울: 바다출판사, 1996]. Han Man-gil. The North Korean Education: A Study for the Unification Era. Paju: Education & Science Publishing, 1997 [한만길. 통일시대 북한교육론, 파주: 교육과학사, 1997]. “North Korea: Two letters from the underground church are revealed” in Korean Missionary Research Centre, 10 October 2022 [북한 – 지하교회 성도들의 편지 두 통 공개돼. 한국선도연구원, 2022.10.31]. https://krim.org/북한-지하교회-성도들의-편지-두-통공개돼/. The North Korean Bible. Seoul: Seoul-USA Publishing, no year (reprint) [조선어 성경. 서 울: 서울유에스에이, 날짜 없음(복각)]. Kim Sang-son and Lee Song-hi. A Reference Book on the Registration of Citizens. Pyongyang: Ministry of Social Security Publishing, 1993 [김상선, 리성히. 주민등록사업참 고서, 평양: 사회안전부 출판사, 1993]. “Smash the enemy spy plots! A spy pretending to be a police officer is uncovered. People’s group chairman, comrade Kang Sok-u, speaks” in Rodong Shinmun, 27 December 1952, p. 3 [적들의 간첩 모략을 분쇄하라! 내무원으로 가장한 간첩 적발. 인민반장 강석 우 동무, 로동신문, 1952년 12월 27일, 3면].

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Lee U-yong and Hwang Gyu-jin. “Formative process of life review sessions: A study” in Bulletin of the Association for North Korean Studies, vol. 12, no.1, 2008, pp. 121–145 [ 이우영, 황규진. 북한의 생활총화 형성과정 연구. 북한연구학회보 2008, 제12권, 제 1호, 121~145쪽]. “With high faith, advance forward – to the October of victory” in Rodong Shinmun, 14 September 2020, p. 2 [승리의 10월을 향하여 신심드높이 앞으로!, 로동신문, 2020년 9월 14일, 2면]. Russian Barkov, Vladimir. “A mission to the stars” in Ogonyok, no. 24, June 1948, p. 4 [Владимир Барков. Экспедиция в звездное пространство. Огонек, 1948 год, № 24 (июнь), стр. 4]. Gukov, F. “The last wave of conscription” in Maritime Daily, 9 June 2007 [Ф. Гуков. Последний призыв // Морская газета, 9 июня 2007 г]. https://web.archive.org/ web/20150623214658/http://gazetam.ru/9-iyunya-2007/posledniy-prizyiv.htm. Information Summary No.12 of the Joint State Political Directorate’s Department of Information on the Re-Election of Village Councils, as of 4 April 1927, 6 April 1927, Central Archive of the Russian Federal Security Service, Folder 2, Inventory 5, Item 390, pp. 110–116 [Информационная сводка № 12 информотдела ОГПУ о кампании по перевыборам сельсоветов на 4 апреля 1927 г. 6 апреля 1927 г. ЦА ФСБ РФ, ф. 2, оп. 5, д. 390, лл. 110–116]. https://istmat.org/node/53903. Kassil, Lev. On a Truly Good Life. Moscow: Children Literature Publishing House, 1961 [Лев Кассиль. Про жизнь совсем хорошую. Москва: Детгиз, 1961]. Laws of Abolishing and Re-Introducing the Death Penalty, 1947–1950. Stolypin Museum of the History of Russian Reforms [Законы об отмене и восстановлении смертной казни. 1947–1950 г. // Музей истории российских реформ имени П. А. Столыпина]. http://museumreforms.ru/node/13856. Lisnichuk, Marina. “The USSR’s closed cities: What they used to hide there and how did their fate play out” in Obozrevatel.com, 23 October 2020 [Марина Лисничук. Закрытые города СССР: что прятали и как сложилась их судьба 23.10.2020]. https://news.obozrevatel.com/society/zakryityie-goroda-sssr-chto-pryatali-i-kak-slozhilas-ih-sudba.htm. Osokina, Yelena. “The dirge for the Soviet queue” in Reserve Stock, no. 5 (43), 2005 [Елена Осокина. Прощальная ода советской очереди // Неприкосновенный запас, 2005, №5(43)]. https://web.archive.org/web/20121119070219/http://magazines.russ.ru/ nz/2005/43/oso10.html. Podzolkova, Irina. “Guten Tag: a case study of a magazine becoming a source of information of foreign nations” in Issues of Students’ Research, no. 6 (34), June 2019, pp. 384–397 [Ирина Подзолкова. Феномен журнала “Гутен Таг” как источника международной информации // Вопросы студенческой науки, №6 (34), июнь 2019, стр. 384–397]. Voslenskiy, Mikhail. The Nomenklaura: The Ruling Class of the Soviet Union. Moscow: Soviet Russia Publishing House, 1991 [Михаил Восленский. Номенклатура: Господствующий класс Советского Союза. Москва: издательство “Советская Россия”, 1991]. Other Sources Author’s interview with a former North Korean police officer.

12 Playing Scylla and Charybdis North Korea and the Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split is one of the better-known events of the Cold War. The “eternal friendship” between the USSR and the PRC proved very temporary when Mao Zedong refused to accept Khrushchev’s way of de-Stalinisation and détente. The confrontation was a heated one. China published books like Brezhnev’s Gang Walks the Same Way Hitler Once Did1 and the Soviet Union those like Maoism: A Threat to Humankind.2 The Warsaw Pact countries, naturally, supported the USSR, and so did Mongolia. Albania sided with China, and Yugoslavia decided to stay neutral. As for North Korea, its policy was, perhaps, the most unusual, as the country had a record of supporting both superpowers. With Chairman Mao We Stand Mao and Kim did not approve of Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin. After the Soviet leader’s historic speech, Pyongyang grudgingly and reluctantly condemned the idea of a cult of an individual, but once Kim Il-sung secured his political independence, all the criticism stopped. A good example would be the North Korean Dictionary of Political Terminology. Its 1957 edition stated that “the ideology of worshipping an individual has no relation to Marxism-Leninism and causes tremendous harm to the consolidation of Party ranks and performance of the tasks of the revolution”.3 The 1959 edition had the entire entry deleted instead.4 Thus, it would be no surprise that Kim Il-sung chose to side with China in its conflict with the Soviet Union. By 1962, it was quite obvious to any impartial observer. In late October of that year, a border war was sparked between China and India, and the Soviet Union sided with Delhi. Meanwhile, Pyongyang openly and unequivocally supported the Chinese line.5 In the same year, both sides signed a border treaty.6 The treaty implied China got almost half of the Heavenly Lake on top of Changbai Mountain as its sovereign territory. South Korea, which never recognised either the treaty or the very statehood of the DPRK, still claims the entire lake. There were many other signs which pointed at Kim Il-sung’s pro-Chinese line. Every 15 August – the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1945 – Rodong Shinmun featured a portrait of the current Soviet leader on the front page. In 1962, DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-12

Playing Scylla and Charybdis 125 Khrushchev’s portrait was gone; only a Soviet flag was shown. In 1963, the flag was gone, too. And within a few months, Pyongyang published an open proclamation of support for the PRC. On 28 October 1963, Rodong Shinmun went out with a huge editorial, “Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp”. North Korea announced that it stood with China – a true socialist state – and opposed “revisionists”, strongly hinting at Nikita Khrushchev.7 However, compared to another Chinese ally, Albania, and its leader, Enver Hoxha, which severed all ties to the USSR, Kim Il-sung was a more devious and less ideological man. He made sure that the rift between Pyongyang and Moscow would not become a permanent one, as severing relations with the USSR would have resulted in the end of Soviet economic assistance. North Korea did not recall their ambassador from Moscow, and it continued to ask the USSR for aid. And, for example, after the end of the Cuban missile crisis, Kim Il-sung immediately voiced his support for the Kremlin’s line of détente to the Soviet ambassador.8 Yet, the late 1950s–early 1960s saw the almost complete destruction of the Soviet diaspora in North Korea. Apart from the three most loyal individuals – Pang Hak-se, Nam Il and Kim Bong-nyul – all Soviet Koreans were removed from the elite. Pyongyang’s Sixth School – the one where Soviet Korean children studied – was closed. They say Kim Jong-il once wanted to attend this school and later go to study in the USSR, but his father said no. Now the school was gone. The diaspora shrunk to a few dozen members, and then, by the end of the Kim Il-sung era, to just one man. At the time of this book being written, this man, Vladimir Li (or Lee Tong-guk in Korean), still lives in Wonsan with his North Korean family.9 Standing Alone There was one more reason for Kim Il-sung to stand with China. The Great Leader had never abandoned his dream of unifying Korea under his rule. In 1965, he visited the Chinese embassy and, with no uncertainty in his words, told Ambassador Hao Deqing: “We ask your army to participate in the future conflict!”10 Yet Mao, who had only reluctantly supported Kim back in 1950, did not welcome another bloody adventure. This was the moment when Sino-North Korean relations started to deteriorate. When Mao Zedong proclaimed the Cultural Revolution, Kim Il-sung was not supportive in the slightest. This was not his way. A society forged by Kim was a society of perfect order, not of chaos directed from above. It was to be run like a military unit. Any unapproved loyalist initiatives were unwelcome. Thus, in the 1960s, the “great friendship” between North Korea and China dissipated. On 12 August 1966, Rodong Shinmun published a new, huge editorial, entitled “Let Us Protect Sovereignty”. The editorial attacked three evils: “modern revisionists”, “dogmatists”, and “factionalists”.11 These were obvious hints at respectively Moscow, Beijing and WPK’s cadres dissatisfied with Kim Il-sung. This editorial was essentially a proclamation of autarky. China was, naturally, extremely displeased with such a turncoat move. Romanian records mention the Chinese ambassador leaving Pyongyang in October 1966,12

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Figure 12.1 Number of mentions of Mao Zedong in Rodong Shinmun in 1951–1993. Source: Created by the author

and in November of the same month, Kim Il-sung told the Soviets that the DPRK was recalling its ambassador from China as well.13 Mao’s Red Guards started manufacturing posters slandering Kim Il-sung. Pyongyang’s state media mostly stayed silent on the issue, but there was one time when the DPRK decided to openly protest their behaviour.14 The same era saw a border crisis between China and North Korea. Documents of the Hungarian embassy in North Korea reveal that Beijing informed Pyongyang that China had “renewed the territorial claims set up in 1956” concerning the area near the Changbai mountain and that should the DPRK not comply, the People’s Liberation Army would seize it by force.15 While one cannot say with absolute certainty what these claims were, an old publication may give us a clue. A 1966 article says that on 20 July 1965, The Indian Express quoted an official of the North Korean embassy in Moscow, with the latter stating that after the end of the Korean War, China demanded about 100 square miles of territory as compensation for the PRC’s participation in the war.16 One could suppose that this was the claim the Hungarian document mentioned. Evidently, Pyongyang managed to calm Beijing, and it was never enforced. For North Korea itself, it was a time of a dark transformation to the truly totalitarian state this country has been ever since. In 1967, the DPRK proclaimed a Singular Thought System, stating that all political and social activity must be derived from Kim Il-sung and his wisdom. Surveillance and censorship intensified dramatically.17 History was rewritten, and the rebirth of Korean independence in 1945 was no longer attributed to the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces but to Kim Il-sung’s own Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (which actually had never existed).18 Mentions of the Chinese soldiers’ role in the Korean War were also greatly reduced in number. If there was one group in North Korea that suffered the most from this policy, it was the North Korean Chinese. The state gave them a de-facto ultimatum: leave for China, change their passport to a North Korean one or be cut from most of the Public Distribution System and face the prospect of starving to death. Soon, this diaspora was nearly completely destroyed.19

Playing Scylla and Charybdis 127 The Sino-North Korean Thaw One of the key events that contributed to the end of this confrontation was Zhou Enlai’s visit to North Korea. Done with the Cultural Revolution, China was becoming a more moderate state and sought improvement of relations with the DPRK. The visit took place in 1970 and was a success. A détente was agreed upon. Like before, the new age was heralded by a Rodong Shinmun editorial, this one called “Let Us Adhere to Proletarian Dictatorship and Proletarian Democracy”.20 Both sides unofficially agreed that the North Korean Chinese who had lost their PRC nationality would be permitted to restore it.21 The process was a long one – it required first petitioning the DPRK to forfeit their North Korean citizenship and then applying for a Chinese one. Yet the majority chose to go forward with it. An important symbol of Zhou’s diplomatic success was a monument to him erected at Hungnam Fertiliser Complex. Monuments to foreigners are extremely rare in North Korea, making this one a highly unusual exception.22

Figure 12.2 Zhou Enlai’s statue in Hamhung. Source: Rodong Shinmun, 1 June 1979, p. 1

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After Zhou’s visit, the North Korean media started to talk about Mao in a loftier way. When the Great Helmsman passed away in September 1976, he was called “the Great Leader of the Chinese people and the closest friend of the Korean people” by the DPRK’s media.23 Mao’s death eclipsed the passing of Choe Yong-gon, one of the North Korean vice-presidents, in the same month, reports on which were significantly more limited. Back to the USSR Mao Zedong’s eventual successor was Deng Xiaoping, the father of the policy of reforms and openness. Deng’s rule completely reshaped the PRC. It was becoming a country with a capitalist economy, presided over not by a ruthless tyrant but by a moderate oligarchy. China’s long history has seen few, if any, figures comparable to this great reformer.24 There were some in North Korea calling for the leadership to follow China’s way. One of the most notable ones was Pak Chol, chairman of the Geological Institute of the DPRK’s Science Academy.25 Yet Kim Il-sung wanted nothing of it. Thus, after a long, long time, the DPRK started to favour Moscow over Beijing. In 1984, Kim Il-sung visited the Soviet Union. One of the people he saw was the rising star of Soviet politics – Boris Yeltsin, the future first president of Russia.26 In Moscow, Kim met the Soviet general secretary – Konstantin Chernenko. Kim Il-sung received gifts from the Soviets27 and suggested that as a gesture of friendship both countries would produce a joint film. The topic was to be a failed assassination attempt on Kim Il-sung in 1946, from which Kim was saved by Soviet officer Yakov Novichenko. This was a very touchy topic. The Soviet and the North Korean official views about these events were not exactly compatible. Both sides could agree that the Japanese, the Americans and the South Koreans should be portrayed as villains, but that was about it. The Soviets viewed themselves as liberators of Korea, but North Korea said that the main credit had to go to Kim Il-sung’s fictitious KPRA. The resulting compromise was quite peculiar. The Korean dub had the Soviet generals saying that they were going to war “side by side with the KPRA”, whilst the Soviets changed this reference to “Korean People’s Army” in their dub. Naturally, the KPA did not exist back in 1945, but at least it was real at some point later in time. As a joint Soviet-North Korean creation, this film (One Second for a Feat in Russian and Comrades-in-Arms for All Ages in Korean) predictably became popular in North Korea and flopped in the Soviet Union.28 In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader. His policies brought the most radical changes, ending the rule of the Communist Party in just six years. After North Korea realised just how radical this man was, it recalled its students from the USSR and retreated to isolation. After his resignation, Gorbachev joined the ranks of “traitors to socialism” in the North Korean discourse.29 As Francis Parker Yockey, one of the most prominent American Nazis, put it, “alliance does not mean love”.30

Playing Scylla and Charybdis 129 Kim Il-sung, a Stalinist? Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. These four dictators represented vastly different visions of state socialism. Of them, Kim Ilsung’s vision was undoubtedly the closest to Stalin’s. While, as discussed in the previous chapter, they were not identical, as Kim was a more authoritarian and vicious man than even his Soviet teacher, this Stalinist line played a role in his foreign policy. It is quite easy to see that Kim Il-sung always preferred power which stayed closer to Stalin’s original vision of socialism. With China reforming and the Soviet Union collapsing, North Korea ended up being alone by the time Kim Il-sung died in 1994. Notes 1 Brezhnev’s Gang Walks the Same Way Hitler Once Did. Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1976 [勃列日涅夫集团正在走希特勒的老路. 沈阳: 辽宁人民出 版社, 1976]. 2 Maoism: A Threat to Humankind (Book Series). Moscow: Foreign Relations Publishing, 1981 [Маоизм – угроза человечеству (серия). Москва: Издательство «Международные отношения”, 1981]. 3 “The ideology of the worshipping an individual” in Dictionary of Political Terminology for a Mass Audience. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1957, p. 47 [개인숭배사상, 대중 정치 용어 사전, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1957, 47쪽]. 4 Dictionary of Political Terminology for a Mass Audience (Enlarged). Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1959 [대중 정치 용어 사전 (증보판), 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1959]. 5 “India’s invasion army once again attack the Chinese” in Rodong Shinmun, 23 October 1962, p. 6 [인도 침략군이 중국측을 또다시 공격. 로동신문, 1962년 10월 23 일, 6면]; “The Indian side must immediately respond to the proposal of the Chinese government”, in Rodong Shinmun, 26 October 1962, p. 2 [인도측은 중국 정부의 협상 제의에 즉시 호응해야 한다, 로동신문, 1962 년 10월 26일, 2면]; “India’s invasion army engages in further provocative behaviour on the Sino-Indian border”, in Rodong Shinmun, 11 November 1962, p. 3 [인도 침략군이 중인 국경에서 새로운 도발 행동 감행, 로동신문, 1962년 11월 11일, 3면]. 6 “PRC-DPRK Border Treaty” in A Compendium of Treaties, Agreements, and Protocols Related to Sino-North Korean, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian Relations. Jilin: Foreign Affairs Office of the Revolutionary Committee of China’s Jilin Province, 1974, pp. 5–10 [中华人民共和国和朝斛民主主义人民共和国边界条的. 中朝, 中苏, 中蒙 有关条 约, 协定, 议定书汇编. 吉林: 中国吉林省革命委员会外事办公室, 1974, 第5–10页]. 7 “Let us defend the Socialist camp” in Rodong Shinmun, 28 October 1963, pp. 1–3 [사회 주의 진영을 옹호하자, 로동신문, 1963년 10월 28일, 1~3면]. 8 Journal of V. P. Moskovskiy, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1962, vol. 2. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 0102, inventory 18, folder 93, item 5, p. 137 [Дневники посла СССР в КНДР В. П. Московского за 1962 г., том 2. 1 ноября 1962 г. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 18, п. 93, д. 5, л. 137]. 9 Embassy of Russia to the DPRK. Love knows no borders [Посольство России в КНДР. Любовь не знает границ], www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/posolstvo/novosti-posolstva/ 660-lyubov-ne-znaet-granits. 10 Foreign Ministry of the PRC. Hao Deqing, Ambassador to the DPRK, Paid a Farewell Visit on Premier Kim Il-sung and Discussed with Him the Current Events. Declassified document 06-01480-07 [中华人民共和国外交部, 驻朝鲜大使郝德青辞行拜会

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14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22

23

24 25

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金日成首相谈话情况, 解密档案 06-01480-07]. Quoted from Cheng Xiaohe. “The struggle between ‘ideological principles’ and ‘security’: The evolution of North Korea’s relations with China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s” in Diplomatic Review, February 2009, pp. 21–35 [成晓河, ‘主义’ 与’ 安全’ 之争: 六十年代朝鲜与中, 苏关系的 演变, 外交评论, 2009年 2月, 第21–35页]. “Let us protect sovereignty” in Rodong Shinmun, 12 August 1966, pp. 1–3 [“자주성을 옹호하자”, 로동신문, 1966년 8월 12일, 1~3면]. Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.171, TOP SECRET, May 20, 1967, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/telegram-pyongyang-bucharestno76171-top-secret-may-20-1967. Journal of A. I. Gorchakov, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1966, 27 November 1966. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, collection 0102, inventory 22, folder 107, item 6, p. 241 [Дневники посла СССР в КНДР А. И. Горчакова за 1966 г. 27 ноября 1966 г. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 22, п. 107, д. 6, л. 241]. “Statement of the KCNA of the DPRK” in Rodong Shinmun, 27 January 1967, p. 1 [“조 선민주주의인민공화국 중앙통신사의 성명”, 로동신문, 1967년 1월 27일, 1면]. Hungarian National Archives, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1969, box 59, 1, 002218/1/1969 [Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1969, 59. doboz, 1, 002218/1/1969]. The author thanks Balazs Szalontai for providing him with the document. Thomas An. “New winds in P’yŏngyang?” in Problems of Communism, vol. XV, no. 4, July–August 1966, p. 68. Song Hye-Rang. A Wisteria House. Seoul: Land of Intellectuals Publishing, 2000, pp. 312–317 [성혜랑. 등나무 집. 서울: 지식나라, 2000, 312~317쪽]. Fyodor Tertitskiy. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?” in Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4, October/December 2021, pp. 164–183, https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf; Fyodor Tertitskiy. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan” in Korea Observer, June 2018, pp. 219–238, www.researchgate.net/publication/325990388_ A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_liberating_the_country_ from_Japan. The author’s interviews with escapees from North Korea; Wang Yonggui. “Reminiscences on North Korea” in Expatriate Field, no. 160, October 2013, pp. 68–69 [王永贵. 朝鲜记忆, 桥园, 第160期, 2013年 10月, 第68–69页]. “Let us adhere to proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy” in Rodong Shinmun, 4 February 1971, p. 1 [“프로레타리아독재와 프로레타리아민주주의를 고수 하자”, 로동신문, 1971년 2월 4일, 1면]. Wang Yonggui. “Reminiscences on North Korea” in Expatriate Field, no. 160, October 2013, pp. 68–69 [王永贵. 朝鲜记忆, 桥园, 第160期, 2013年 10月, 第68–69页]. Gleb Kriulin. On the WPK’s Current Policy and Some Directions of Our DPRK-Targeting Propaganda, 18 June 1979, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, collection 5, folder 76, item 958, pp. 1–11 [Глеб Криулин. О политике ТПК на современном этапе и некоторых направлениях нашей пропаганды на КНДР. 18 июня 1979 года, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 76, д. 958, лл. 1–11]. “On the demise of comrade Mao Zedong, the Great Leader of the Chinese people and the closest friend of the Korean people” in Rodong Shinmun, 10 September 1976, p. 1 [ 중국인민의 위대한 수령이시며 조선인민의 가장 친근한 전우이신 모택동동지의 서거에 즈음하여, 로동신문, 1976년 9월 10일, 1면]. Ezra F. Vogel. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013. “Ten years ago, the breakdown of the farmland Personal Responsibility System caused the food shortage” in NK Choson, 7 March 2001 [10년전 ‘농지 개인책임제’ 좌절 이 식량난 불러. NK조선, 2001년 3월 7일], http://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView. html?idxno=4764.

Playing Scylla and Charybdis 131 26 Danil Svechkov. “Why Kim Il-sung refused to go in a bathhouse with Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk?”, 6 February 2015, Komsomolskaya Pravda Yekaterinburg [Данил Свечков. Почему Ким Ир Сен в Свердловске отказался от бани с Ельциным? Комсомольская Правда. Екатеринбург, 6 февраля 2015 года], www.ural.kp. ru/ daily/26339.7/3221562/. 27 Dmitriy Volkogonov. The Seven Leaders, vol. 2. Moscow: JSC “News” Publising, 1995, p. 229 [Дмитрий Волкогонов. Семь вождей, том 2. Москва: АО Издательство «Новости», 1995, стр. 229]. 28 Anatoliy Zhurin. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР // Совершенно секретно № 9/268], https://web.archive.org/ web/20150628072203/www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. 29 A. Panin and V. Altov. North Korea: The Sunset of the Kim Jong-il Era. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003, p. 88 [А. Панин, В. Альтов. Северная Корея: эпоха Ким Чен Ира на закате. Москва: ОЛМА-пресс, 2003, стр. 88]. 30 Francis Parker Yockey. Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics. London: Wermod and Wermod Publishing Group, p. 169.

Bibliography English An, Thomas. “New Winds in P’yŏngyang?”, Problems of Communism, Vol. XV, No. 4 (July–August 1966), pp. 68–71. Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.171, Top Secret, May 20, 1967. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/telegram-pyongyang-bucharestno76171-top-secret-may-20–1967. Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “A blatant lie: The North Korean myth of Kim Il-sung liberating the country from Japan”, Korea Observer (June 2018), pp. 219–238. www.researchgate.net/ publication/325990388_A_Blatant_Lie_The_North_Korean_myth_of_Kim_Il-sung_ liberating_the_country_from_Japan. Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “North Korean narrative on the Second World War: Why the change?”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4 (October/December 2021), pp. 164–183. https://eng. globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/164-183.pdf. Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2013. Yockey, Francis Parker. Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics. London: Wermod and Wermod Publishing Group. Korean Dictionary of Political Terminology for a Mass Audience (Enlarged). Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1959 [대중 정치 용어 사전 (증보판), 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1959]. Song Hye-Rang. A Wisteria House. Seoul: Land of Intellectuals Publishing, 2000 [성혜랑. 등나무 집. 서울: 지식나라, 2000]. “The ideology of the worshipping an individual” in Dictionary of Political Terminology for a Mass Audience. Pyongyang: WPK Publishing House, 1957, p. 47 [개인숭배사상, 대 중 정치 용어 사전, 평양: 조선로동당 출판사, 1957, 47쪽]. “India’s invasion army engages in further provocative behaviour on the Sino-Indian border” in Rodong Shinmun, 11 November 1962, p. 3 [인도 침략군이 중인 국경에서 새로운 도 발 행동 감행, 로동신문, 1962년 11월 11일, 3면].

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“India’s invasion army once again attack the Chinese” in Rodong Shinmun, 23 October 1962, p. 6 [인도 침략군이 중국측을 또다시 공격. 로동신문, 1962년 10월 23일, 6면]. “The Indian side must immediately respond to the proposal of the Chinese government” in Rodong Shinmun, 26 October 1962, p. 2 [인도측은 중국 정부의 협상 제의에 즉시 호 응해야 한다, 로동신문, 1962 년 10월 26일, 2면]. “Let us adhere to proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy” in Rodong Shinmun, 4 February 1971, p. 1 [“프로레타리아독재와 프로레타리아민주주의를 고수하자”, 로 동신문, 1971년 2월 4일, 1면]. “Let us defend the Socialist camp” in Rodong Shinmun, 28 October 1963, pp. 1–3 [사회주 의 진영을 옹호하자, 로동신문, 1963년 10월 28일, 1~3면]. “Let us protect sovereignty” in Rodong Shinmun, 12 August 1966, pp. 1–3 [“자주성을 옹 호하자”, 로동신문, 1966년 8월 12일, 1~3면]. “On the demise of comrade Mao Zedong, the Great Leader of the Chinese people and the closest friend of the Korean people” in Rodong Shinmun, 10 September 1976, p. 1 [중국 인민의 위대한 수령이시며 조선인민의 가장 친근한 전우이신 모택동동지의 서거 에 즈음하여, 로동신문, 1976년 9월 10일, 1면]. “Statement of the KCNA of the DPRK” in Rodong Shinmun, 27 January 1967, p. 1 [“조선민 주주의인민공화국 중앙통신사의 성명”, 로동신문, 1967년 1월 27일, 1면]. “Ten years ago, the breakdown of the farmland Personal Responsibility System caused the food shortage” in NK Choson, 7 March 2001 [10년전 ‘농지 개인책임제’ 좌절 이 식량난 불러. NK조선, 2001년 3월 7일]. http://nk.chosun.com/news/articleView. html?idxno=4764. Russian Embassy of Russia to the DPRK. Love Knows No Borders [Посольство России в КНДР. Любовь не знает границ]. www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/posolstvo/novosti-posolstva/660lyubov-ne-znaet-granits. Journal of A. I. Gorchakov, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1966, 27 November 1966, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 0102, Inventory 22, Folder 107, Item 6, p. 241 [Дневники посла СССР в КНДР А. И. Горчакова за 1966 г. 27 ноября 1966 г. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 22, п. 107, д. 6, л. 241]. Journal of V. P. Moskovskiy, Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, 1962, vol. 2, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Collection 0102, Inventory 18, Folder 93, Item 5, p. 137 [Дневники посла СССР в КНДР В. П. Московского за 1962 г., том 2. 1 ноября 1962 г. АВП РФ, ф. 0102, оп. 18, п. 93, д. 5, л. 137]. Kriulin, Gleb. On the WPK’s Current Policy and Some Directions of Our DPRK-Targeting Propaganda, 18 June 1979, Russian State Archive for the Contemporary History, Collection 5, Folder 76, Item 958, pp. 1–11 [Глеб Криулин. О политике ТПК на современном этапе и некоторых направлениях нашей пропаганды на КНДР. 18 июня 1979 года, РГАНИ, ф. 5, оп. 76, д. 958, лл. 1–11]. Maoism: A Threat to Humankind (Book Series). Moscow: Foreign Relations Publishing, 1981 [Маоизм – угроза человечеству (серия). Москва: Издательство “Международные отношения”, 1981]. Panin, A. and Altov, V. North Korea: The Sunset of the Kim Jong-Il Era. Moscow: OLMAPress, 2003 [А. Панин, В. Альтов. Северная Корея: эпоха Ким Чен Ира на закате. Москва: ОЛМА-пресс, 2003].

Playing Scylla and Charybdis 133 Svechkov, Danil. Why Kim Il-sung Refused to Go in a Bathhouse with Yeltsin in Sverdlovsk?, 6 February 2015, Komsomolskaya Pravda Yekaterinburg [Данил Свечков. Почему Ким Ир Сен в Свердловске отказался от бани с Ельциным? Комсомольская Правда. Екатеринбург, 6 февраля 2015 года]. www.ural.kp. ru/daily/26339.7/3221562/. Volkogonov, Dmitriy. The Seven Leaders, vol. 2. Moscow: JSC “News” Publishing, 1995 [Дмитрий Волкогонов. Семь вождей, том 2. Москва: АО Издательство “Новости”, 1995]. Zhurin, Anatoliy. “Made in the USSR” in Top Secret, no. 9 (268) [Анатолий Журин. Сделан в СССР //Совершенно секретно № 9/268]. https://web.archive.org/web/20150628072203/ www.sovsekretno.ru/articles/id/2889/. Chinese Brezhnev’s Gang Walks the Same Way Hitler Once Did. Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House, 1976 [勃列日涅夫集团正在走希特勒的老路. 沈阳: 辽宁人民出版社, 1976]. Cheng Xiaohe. “The struggle between ‘ideological principles’ and ‘security’: the evolution of North Korea’s relations with China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s”. in Diplomatic Review, February 2009, pp. 21–35 [成晓河, ‘主义’与’安全’之争: 六十年代朝鲜与中, 苏关系的演变, 外交评论, 2009年 2月, 第21–35页]. Foreign Ministry of the PRC. Hao Deqing, Ambassador to the DPRK, Paid a Farewell Visit on Premier Kim Il-sung and Discussed with Him the Current Events. Declassified document 06-01480-07 [中华人民共和国外交部, 驻朝鲜大使郝德青辞行拜会金日成首相 谈话情况, 解密档案 06-01480-07]. “PRC-DPRK Border Treaty” in A Compendium of Treaties, Agreements, and Protocols Related to Sino-North Korean, Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian Relations. Jilin: Foreign Affairs Office of the Revolutionary Committee of China’s Jilin Province, 1974, pp. 5–10 [中华人民共和国和朝斛民主主义人民共和国边界条的. 中朝, 中苏, 中蒙 有关条 约, 协定, 议定书汇编. 吉林: 中国吉林省革命委员会外事办公室, 1974, 第5–10页]. Wang Yonggui. “Reminiscences on North Korea” in Expatriate Field, no. 160 (October 2013), pp. 68–69 [成晓河, ‘主义’与’安全’之争: 六十年代朝鲜与中, 苏关系的演 变, 外交评论, 2009年 2月, 第21–35页]. Hungarian Hungarian National Archives. XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1969, Box 59, 1, 002218/1/1969 [Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1969, 59. doboz, 1, 002218/1/1969]. Other Sources The author’s interviews with escapees from North Korea.

13 Why North Korean Propaganda Was Immensely Popular in the USSR

Figure 13.1 Koreya, March 1981 issue. Source: North Korea’s Foreign Languages Publishing House DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-13

Why North Korean Propaganda Was Popular in the USSR 135 If North Korea is to open or collapse someday and the DPRK’s archives survive this development, there is one discovery researchers will nearly certainly make. Reports from the North Korean embassy in Moscow very likely will indicate that North Korean propaganda magazines were extremely popular in the Soviet Union. It is, however, not very likely these reports would include the true reason behind it. North Korean propaganda aimed strictly at a foreign audience is a phenomenon about as old as the DPRK itself. Usually, these magazines have the word “Korea” in their titles – Korea Today, People’s Korea or simply Korea. The latter magazine’s Russian version – Koreya – was one of the most famous and memetic publications known in Brezhnev’s USSR. It is quite possible that a majority of people who lived in the USSR had heard about it. The magazine’s sales were booming, and subscriptions were quite common, too. The true reason for the magazine’s enormous success is that its contents were so, so funny. It looked like a parody of Soviet propaganda made by taking it to a truly insane level. The Soviet press could have occasionally given the leader a lofty title like “outstanding revolutionary and a fighter for peace”,1 but in Koreya, it was not occasional. Kim Il-sung was called “Great Leader” or “Respected and Beloved Leader” in every sentence that mentioned him. This was totally normal for post1967 North Korea, where the Singular Thought System prescribed such adoration, but for the Soviet people, it looked like some kind of dark comedy. Those who remembered Stalin’s era recalled, of course, how the late dictator had been hailed as “the Leader of all Nations” and as “the Wise, Dear and Beloved” one. Yet, even then, honorary titles were not supposed to appear in every sentence. Thus, reading Koreya became a legal way to enjoy something which looked like a mockery of the Soviet system. Who could possibly take sentences like “Thanks to the loving care of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung, comrade Lee Gi-yong received Kim Il-sung Prize” seriously? How stupid did a magazine look saying that while in North Korea “fields bloom under the rays of the Great Leader’s theses on the question of agriculture”, South Korea “has not seen rain for three years due to imperialist policies of Park Chung-hee”? Where else in the Soviet Union could anyone find gems like “the place where the Respected and Beloved Leader comrade Kim Il-sung used to give a beating to a Japanese boy”? Or how about a trolleybus model called “Sea of Blood”? Or a musical called “My Country without Taxes Guided by the Respected and Beloved Leader?” “Mangyongdae is the village where the Leader was born while creating a plan for our revolution” was another great line. The magazine introduced Soviet readers to the Leader’s infinitely wise sayings like “We need many pencils, so children could study”. Such apexes of human philosophy ensured that the magazine never ran out of readers. Apart from ridiculous content, North Korean magazines had one more problem – mistranslations. In the spirit of self-reliance, the translations were not checked by native speakers, which, apart from grammatical errors, caused some rather funny

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misunderstandings. Here is an example: an advertisement in the North Korean journal Foreign Trade. The Korean society Pugang specialises in the trade of natural green food products. It exports fresh horseradish, seasoning with horseradish, horseradish kimchi and canned horseradish, which give youth and vigour to a person. . . . Horseradish enables teenagers to grow quickly, gives boys and girls healthy strength, vibrant youth to middle-aged people and allows the elderly to maintain good health. Listed as international natural food, this Korean horseradish was highly praised at the 1994 Tokyo Market Horseradish Expo for its original taste and aroma and won first place at the World Horseradish Expo. The weight of fresh horseradish is 10–20 g. . . . Horseradish kimchi is made from horseradish and leaves; its iconic aroma and spicy taste attract consumers. The product for eternal youth and long life is always here for you.2 This innocent text went absolutely viral in the Russian-speaking community for one simple reason: The word for horseradish that the DPRK chose to use was, unbeknownst to them, a slang word for penis. If one re-reads the previous paragraph with that knowledge in mind, one could easily see how the Korean society Pugang managed to produce perhaps the most memorable North Korean ad of all time. “We Are Not the Worst” There was one more reason for these magazines to be popular in the USSR. No one likes being a loser – and North Korean publications reminded the readers that Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, with its closed borders and censorship, was not the worst place on Earth. A simple glance at Koreya’s content proved that there were places far, far worse to live in. The Soviet people were, of course, not unique in such an attitude. A 13th-century Persian book has the author making a similar reflection: I never complained of the vicissitudes of Fortune nor murmured at the ordinances of Heaven, excepting once, when my feet, were bare and I had not the means of procuring myself shoes. I entered the great mosque at Cufah with a heavy heart, when I beheld a man who had no feet. I offered up praise and thanksgiving to God for his bounty, and bore with patience the want of shoes.3 This author also once had a similar experience while talking to a North Korean friend. I told her of Pol Pot’s Kampuchea, of how this uniquely sadistic regime, evil beyond all comparison, outlawed wearing glasses, using money and living in cities and slaughtered almost a quarter of its population. “Even Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il would be better than this monster!” she exclaimed.

Why North Korean Propaganda Was Popular in the USSR 137 I saw horror and compassion for Pol Pot’s victims in her eyes – but also some newly found dignity. She just understood that her homeland was not the worst country in the world after all. And this knowledge felt somewhat good – because no one would want their country to be the last one on the list. North Korean Magazines Enter Soviet Culture North Korean propaganda was not just exported to the Soviet Union. People in East Germany, China, Mongolia and other nations could also read it. But only in the USSR did it have such a lasting impact. A 1988 song by the Soviet rock band Civil Defence, “Everything Goes According to the Plan” actually mentioned Koreya. The song’s main character is an ordinary Soviet citizen who slowly goes insane from the rapid changes the country is going through. Here are its lines: Only grandfather Lenin was a good leader, they admit Every other to the last was complete shit, All the others were enemies and fools My native country is covered by snow smokescreen, I bought this “Koreya” magazine, Everything is good there They have comrade Kim Il-sung there, They have the same as we do. I am sure that there, also Everything is according to The plan. Propaganda as a Weapon Against the Regime South Korea, where this author lives, still has laws which restrict, or rather pretend to restrict, Communist materials. They are available in libraries, and anyone can read them – but the rules normally dictate one has to fill out a form before they can take a copy of the material. North Korean sites are blocked – although anyone interested can use anonymiser software solutions like TOR or VPN to circumvent the censorship. South Korea is yet to learn the lesson the Soviet citizens knew – North Korean propaganda does not help the regime: it harms it. Nothing shows its face better than the preposterous content produced by Pyongyang itself. The idea that a Communist Party could seize power in South Korea is equally absurd. Gus Hall, Harry Pollitt, William Kashtan, Lance Sharkey and other Cold War-era leaders of Western Communist parties championed the Soviet cause for decades, achieved nothing and are forgotten by history. Censorship is the weapon of those who know deep in their hearts that their position is weak and that they would fail to gain support in an honest debate. It is a weapon of Stalinists, fascists and other extremists. An open society should not have it.

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Notes 1 “Proclamation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers to the Communist Party, to the Soviet people” in Pravda, 12 November 1982, p. 1 [Обращение Центрального комитета КПСС, Президиума Верховного Совета СССР, Совета Министров СССР к Коммунистической партии, к советскому народу. Правда, 12 ноября 1982 года, стр. 1]. 2 “Korean horseradish, grown with Kumgang mountains spring water” in Foreign Trade, no. 1(398), Juche 95 (2006) [Корейский хрен, выращенный с помощью Кымгансанской родниковой воды. Внешняя торговля, №398 (1) 95 год чучхе (2006)], https://web.archive.org/web/20080915201447/www.kcckp.net/ru/periodic/f_trade/ index.php?contents+680 + 2006–01 + 24 + 15. 3 Sa’di. The Gulistan (Rose Garden). Lucknow: “Newul Kishore” Press, 1884, p. 113.

Bibliography English Sa’di. The Gulistan (Rose Garden). Lucknow: “Newul Kishore” Press, 1884. Russian “Korean horseradish, grown with Kumgang mountains spring water” in Foreign Trade, no. 1 (398), Juche 95 (2006) [Корейский хрен, выращенный с помощью Кымгансанской родниковой воды. Внешняя торговля, №398 (1) 95 год чучхе (2006)]. https:// web.archive.org/web/20080915201447/www.kcckp.net/ru/periodic/f_trade/index.php? contents+680 + 2006–01 + 24 + 15. “Proclamation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Ministers to the Communist Party, to the Soviet people”, Pravda, 12 November 1982, p. 1 [Обращение Центрального комитета КПСС, Президиума Верховного Совета СССР, Совета Министров СССР к Коммунистической партии, к советскому народу. Правда, 12 ноября 1982 года, стр. 1].

14 The Father State Dies North Korea and the End of the Soviet Union

Figure 14.1 Moscow, 1991. A crowd prepares to demolish the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police. The inscription of the poster reads “bollocks to the junta!” Source: Photo by Dmitry Borko. Released under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International licence DOI: 10.4324/9781003413332-14

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The Cold War ended in December 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For Pyongyang, the end of the main Communist superpower was a huge threat to its stability. The DPRK’s elite paid very close attention to the events unfurling in Moscow in the late Gorbachev era. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not something they could have hidden from their people. Thus, Rodong Shinmun duly reported on the final days of the USSR – and in a rather calm manner, which was a bit unusual for this normally screeching newspaper. Things were changing so rapidly. When Mikhail Gorbachev secured power in March 1985, no one could have foreseen that in six and a half years, the Warsaw Pact would be gone and the USSR will be more or less peacefully dissolved. He tried to reform the country, make it more open and allow a free discussion of the most horrible parts of the nation’s history. And the political tsunami he unleashed destroyed his rule and his country. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, Gorbachev focused his reforms not on the economy but on politics, and he went much further than his Chinese counterpart. His management of the economy was not exactly competent, and, as freedom beckoned in the Union, its economy was collapsing. March 1990 saw the end of the Soviet Union as a Communist state. The infamous Sixth Article, which stipulated that “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the guiding and directing force of the Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and social organisations” was repealed, and the Union started a full-scale transition to a multi-party democracy. Gorbachev’s reforms upset not just North Korea. The Communist Party’s conservative wing had a growing grudge against him for mishandling the economy and, more importantly, for losing control over Eastern Europe. The final nail in the coffin was Gorbachev’s attempt to reformat the USSR into a non-Communist confederation: The Union of Sovereign States. This USS was to be born on 20 August 1991. One day before the deadline, the conservatives made one last daring attempt to reverse the reforms. The August Coup On 19 August, the counter-reform faction of the Soviet leadership launched a coup. Gorbachev was placed under an effective house arrest, and the nation’s second-in-command, Vice-President Yanayev, issued an executive order announcing that he had ascended to the presidency. The true mastermind behind the coup was Vladimir Kryuchkov, the chairman of the Committee for State Security. The secret police were not going to go down without a fight. The putschists issued a proclamation to the Soviet people: They announced that a new organisation called the State of Emergency National Committee had been established and that all power in the Union now belonged to it. The Committee called for complete and total compliance.1 The aspiring ruling council did not look intimidating. Vice-President Yanayev was visibly drunk, and the rest of the Committee were taken aback by Soviet journalists bombarding them with sharp and inconvenient questions.2 The army and the police were yet to take a side. Everything was hanging in the balance, and the fate of the entire Communist project was to be decided in the next few days.

The Father State Dies 141 The leader of the resistance was Boris Yeltsin – president of Russia, the largest of the Soviet republics. He refused to bow to the Committee and assumed the position of supreme commander in Gorbachev’s absence. His famous words, “you can build a throne of bayonets, but you won’t be sitting on it for long”, gave hope to many.3 The people of Moscow flooded the streets in defiance of the coup. Kryuchkov’s last hope was to storm Yeltsin’s residence and have him arrested. And here, the fate of the entire coup was decided when Alpha, a special task force of the secret police, refused Kryuchkov’s orders. The only way to go now was to instigate a civil war, but this, thankfully, was a price no one on the Committee wanted to pay. They chose to stand down and surrender, and Kryuchkov took a plane to see Gorbachev and offer him his apologies. All these dramatic events were monitored in Pyongyang. The Soviet ambassador, Aleksandr Kapto, reportedly welcomed the coup, and so did the North Korean leadership. During those days, cars with loudspeakers announcing the fall of “traitor Gorbachev” could have been seen in North Korea.4 Rodong Shinmun was more cautious – and, as history showed, rightfully so. The Final Collapse The failed coup ended any hope for the survival of the Soviet Union. The central government was completely discredited, and the Soviet republics were quick to assert their sovereignty. Komsomol, the Communist Party’s young league, announced its dissolution on 27 September.5 On 6 November, Boris Yeltsin dissolved and outlawed the Party itself.6 On 8 December, the founding republics of the USSR – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – agreed to nullify the original 1922 Union Treaty.7 On 21 December, eight of the Soviet republics announced the end of the union and the birth of the new Commonwealth of Independent States as its replacement. On 25 December, Gorbachev resigned, and the red flag over the Kremlin was replaced by the Russian tricolour. The final event which formally ended the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was barely noted by anyone. On 26 December, the upper house of the Union’s Supreme Soviet passed Resolution 142-N. This anticlimactically named document was the one which formally dissolved the Soviet Union: The Soviet of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR . . . stipulates that with the creation of Commonwealth of the Independent States, the Union of SSR ceases to exist as a state and as a subject of international law.8 Rodong Shinmun reported on the end of the USSR on the same day, but it cited the declaration of 21 December instead: The declaration indicated that with the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics ends its existence.9 An era had ended. Pravda’s next-day report about the Union’s final moments had a large ad crowning the newspaper’s first page: “SHARES OF THE NATIONWIDE

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Figure 14.2 A photo showing the name plate being removed from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR following the Union’s dissolution on 26 December 1991. Source: Photo by Valentin Kuzmin, released into the public domain

RUSSIAN EXCHANGE BANK ARE THE GUARANTEE OF YOUR SUCCESS, THE SYMBOL OF YOUR PROSPERITY”.10 Back in the day, it was “Workers of the world, unite”. One could hardly find a more fitting sign for this final victory of capitalism. New Maps for the New Era Two days before the Soviet Union was dissolved, Kim Jong-il ascended to the position of the KPA’s supreme commander.11 He inherited the nation in times of deep trouble for the regime. North Korea had to adapt to a world without the Soviet Union. Kim Jong-il was scared the DPRK might collapse. When meeting officers of secret police in 1992, he said: “If we are lax now, there will be no tomorrow for us”.12 Even open access documents show how chaotic this transition was. The first post-Soviet map of the world issued in the North had the USSR simply called “Russian Federation”. It took Pyongyang some time to fully process that the former Soviet republics were now independent states. Another curious development with North Korean maps was the one concerning Russia’s exclave – the Kaliningrad region. Annexed from Germany after the Second World War, this region became a part of Russia in 1991. Yet, until 2007, North Korea wrongly marked this territory as a part of Lithuania. Since Vilnius has

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Figure 14.3 Map of Asia from the Korean Central Yearbook of 1992. The Soviet Union is called “Russian Federation”. Source: “Asia” in Korean Central Yearbook 1992. Pyongyang: KCNA Publishing House, 1992, p. 336. [아세아, 조선중앙년감 1992년. 평양: 조선중앙통신사, 1992, 336쪽]

no claims to this region, one could surmise that it was a mistake no one bothered to correct for more than a decade. The economic consequences of the end of the USSR were dire for North Korea. Available documents showed that around 1990, the Kremlin made its new position clear to Pyongyang: “We still want to have good relations with you, but the era of freebies is over. Expect no more economic assistance”.13 But the political consequences were arguably even worse. The Soviet Union was a socialist country, and socialism, as Pyongyang taught, was infinitely better than capitalism. How, then, could an inferior system have possibly won? The explanation the authorities came up with was that the USSR’s collapse was caused by its traitorous leadership and the fact that, to borrow Pyongyang’s expression, the Soviets did not “venerate a great man as their Leader”. From then on, Gorbachev joined Khrushchev on the North Korean list of villains responsible for the end of a Stalinist idyll in the USSR.14

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Figure 14.4 Map of Europe from the Korean Central Yearbook of 2006. Kaliningrad is marked as a part of Lithuania. Source: “Europe” in Korean Central Yearbook Juche 95 (2006). Pyongyang: KCNA Publishing House, 1992, p. 446. [유럽, 조선중앙년감 주체95(2006)년. 평양: 조선중앙통신사, 2006, 446쪽]

But the most important task for Pyongyang was to prevent a Soviet scenario from occurring in North Korea. Ideology-wise, they chose to focus on leader-worship, which eclipsed socialist and nationalist rhetoric in the DPRK’s propaganda. The North Koreans were called to always trust Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, since these two were geniuses. And when it came to the preservation of tyranny, they truly were. The Soviet Union, Russia and North Korea One could argue that the biggest diplomatic achievement of Russia on the North Korean front was becoming the image of a country that still holds a great degree of influence on Pyongyang. This is not true. Moscow de facto saw Pyongyang as a part of China’s sphere of influence and, especially since the rise of Vladimir Putin, had supported China’s line. However, it did its best to present itself as the PRC’s equal partner – and the Kremlin’s efforts to project this image have been very successful. Yet the reality is different: North Korea’s foreign trade is completely dominated by China. By 2021, the number was 95.6%.15 By contrast, Russia was 41st on the list, with the amount of Russo-North Korean trade being 0.006% of that the DPRK

The Father State Dies 145 conducted with China.16 Thus, if you think of how this data should be seen, imagine some kind of an immense symposium on the DPRK’s foreign trade with 16,626 Chinese specialists and only 1 Russian present. Only such a composition would properly reflect the balance of economic influence of Moscow and Beijing. The cultural and educational bonds between Russia and the DPRK are all but gone. Little to no attention is given to the North Korean variant of language in Russian universities, with the education system nearly exclusively focusing on the South. North Korean refugees to Russia are, as a rule, not deported back to the DPRK, in sharp contrast with China.17 The former Soviet-North Korean alliance was dissolved by Russia,18 with the alliance agreement replaced by a more or less standard treaty on foreign relations. Thus, the idea that Russia is still a major player in North Korea is not correct. It seems that all concerned parties have slowly come to this understanding. A 2018 joint inter-Korean declaration mentioned the future “Four Party talks” between China, the United States and both Koreas. Russia was not invited (and neither was Japan, another state incorrectly perceived as a major influencer). When Kim Jongun started meeting foreign leaders, he held several meetings with Xi Jinping and one with new Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel before finally meeting Putin in Vladivostok. The latter was a symbolic event with no consequences.19 Looking Into the Past, Not the Future Many things changed on 24 February 2022 when Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian army to invade Ukraine. Just at the time I am typing these words in early 2023, millions have been turned into refugees, tens of thousands of people have been killed, cities have been destroyed and multiple horrific atrocities have been committed by the invaders. All this will have a lasting impact for many years to come. Pyongyang tried to use the war for its own benefit. North Korea recognised the quasi-states created by Moscow in eastern Ukraine and then welcomed the Kremlin’s annexation of several regions of the country.20 Given the unprecedented isolation Putin’s policy left Moscow in, it might have seen like Pyongyang was becoming an important ally for Russia – but a careful analysis shows that the DPRK’s support remained almost completely rhetorical. As of early 2023, the only real consequence of this diplomatic game was that the North reportedly supplied the Wagner Group – an infamous Kremlin-controlled paramilitary – with some ammunition, and even this remained to be proven.21 Like before, no one even suggested that North Korea would join any of the Russialed blocs: the Collective Security Treaty Organisation or the Eurasian Economic Union. The Kremlin still did not provide the North with any meaningful economic assistance. The reasons for that, are, of course, that Moscow needs resources to wage the invasion, the North’s support does not really change anything and, most importantly, as mentioned, the Kremlin has no intention to meddle in China’s sphere of influence. Thus, even now, more than 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet legacy still has a far greater impact on North Korea than the Russian one.

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The Soviets divided Korea with the United States, brought Kim Il-sung to power, greenlit the Korean War and allowed North Korea to escape their control in the 1950s. The story of Soviet-North Korean relations is a grand and tragic one. The story of Russian-North Korean relations is still a boring account of inconsequential diplomatic events. Moscow’s time in Korea is gone. No one knows what the future of North Korea will be, but it does not lie with Russia. Notes 1 “Proclamation of the Soviet leadership” in Pravda, 20 August 1991, p. 1 [Заявление советского руководства // Правда, 20 августа 1991 года, стр. 1]. 2 SENC’s Press Conference, Moscow, 19 August 1991 [Пресс-конференция ГКЧП, Москва, 19 августа 1991 г], www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVxH4e3Rfes. 3 “Call of the Russian president to soldiers and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces, of the State Security Committee, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs” in Putsch. The Chronicle of the Restless Days [Обращение президента России к солдатам и офицерам вооруженных сил СССР, КГБ СССР, МВД СССР // Путч. Хроника тревожных дней], http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991/putch12.htm. 4 A. Panin and V. Altov. North Korea: The Sunset of the Kim Jong-il Era. Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003, p. 88 [А. Панин, В. Альтов. Северная Корея: эпоха Ким Чен Ира на закате. Москва: ОЛМА-пресс, 2003, стр. 88]. 5 “The band is disbanded: The end of the Youth League in the Soviet Union” in Daily Express [Совсем распустились: как в СССР закончился комсомол // Экспресс-газета], www. eg.ru/politics/630412-sovsem-raspustilis-kak-v-sssr-zakonchilsya-komsomol-075346/. 6 Executive Order 169 of the President of the RSFSR, 6 November 1991. On the Activities of the CPSU and of the CP RSFSR [Указ Президента РСФСР от 06.11.1991 г. № 169 «О деятельности КПСС и КП РСФСР»], http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/385. 7 “Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States” in Unified Register of Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States [Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств // Единый реестр правовых актов и других документов Содружества Независимых Государств], http://cis.minsk.by/reestrv2/doc/1. 8 “Declaration of the Soviet of the republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the occasion of the creation of the Commonwealth of the Independent States” in Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, no. 52 (1991), 26 December 1991 [Декларация Совета Республик Верховного Совета СССР в связи с созданием Содружества Независимых Государств // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР, 1991, № 52, 26 декабря 1991], http://vedomosti.sssr.su/1991/52/#1561. 9 “Gorbachev resigns from presidency. Eleven republics proclaim Commonwealth of the Independent States” in Rodong Shinmun, 27 December 1991, p. 6 [고르바쵸브 대통령 직에서 사임. 11개 공화국 수반들 독립국가 협동제 형성을 선포, 로동신문, 1991 년 12월 27일, 6면]. 10 “The final farewell of the Union’s Parliament” in Pravda, 27 December 1991, p. 1 [Последнее «прости» союзного парламента, Правда, 27 декабря 1991 года, стр. 1]. 11 “Appointment of Comrade Kim Jong-il, a member of the Politburo Presidium of the Central Committee of the WPK and a Secretary of the WPK’s Central Committee, to the position of the supreme commander of the KPA” in Choson Inmungun, 26 December 1991, p. 1 [조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 상무위원이시며 당 중앙위원회 비서이신 김 정일동지를 조선인민군 최고사령관으로 추대. 조선인민군, 1992년 12월 26일, 1면]. 12 Paek Myong-gyu. “Suspicious death of Kim Yong-nyong, a man who was outsmarted by the Security Command” in DailyNK, 25 October 2005 [백명규. 보위사에 밀리던

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13

14 15

16 17

18

19 20

21

김영룡, 의문의 죽음. 데일리NK, 2005년 10월 12일], www.dailynk.com/보위사에밀리던-김영룡-의문의-죽음/. From the Journal of Georgiy Kunadze. Record of Conversation with the DPRK’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Son Song-phil, 20 September 1991, State Archive of the Russian Federation, collection 10026, folder 4, item 2083, pp. 1–3 [Из дневника Георгия Кунадзе. Запись беседы с Чрезвычайным и полномочным послом КНДР в СССР Сон Сен Пхиром. 20 сентября 1991 года, ГАРФ, ф. 10026, оп. 4, д. 2083, лл. 1–3]. “Gorbachev is being ostracised in Latin American countries” in Rodong Shinmun, 16 December 1992, p. 6 [라틴아메리카나라들에서 배척받은 고르바쵸브, 로동신문, 1992년 12월 16일, 6면]. “Tendencies on North Korea foreign trade, 2021” in KOTRA [2021 북한 대외무 역 동향, 대한무역투자진흥공사], https://dream.kotra.or.kr/kotranews/cms/news/ actionKotraBoardDetail.do?pageNo=1&pagePerCnt=10&SITE_NO=3&MENU_ ID=530&CONTENTS_NO=1&bbsGbn=249&bbsSn=249&pNttSn=195519&recordC ountPerPage=10&viewType=&pStartDt=&pEndDt=&sSearchVal=&sSearchVal=#. Ibid. Pak Ki-Hyon. “Unlike China, Russia does not deport North Korean refuges back to the DPRK” in Current Affairs Focus, 21 November 2014 [박기현. 러시아, 中처럼 탈 북자 강제북송 안해. 시사 포코스, 2014년 11월 21일], www.sisafocus.co.kr/news/ articleView.html?idxno=111058. Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, [Договор о дружбе, добрососедстве и сотрудничестве между Российской Федерацией и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой], www.facebook.com/RusEmbDPRK/photos/ a.1250541055119681/1250541288452991/?type=3&theater. The North Korean report on the event does not contain the full text of the treaty, likely exactly because it no longer featured an alliance clause. “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation is signed” in Rodong Shinmun, 10 February 2000, p. 3 [조선민주주의인민공화국과 로씨야련방사 이의 친선, 선린 및 협조에 관한 조약 조인, 로동신문, 2000년 2월 10일, 3면]. Artyom Lukin. “The Putin and Kim rendezvous in Vladivostok: A drive-by summit” in 38 North, 2 May 2019, www.38north.org/2019/05/alukin050219/. “Cho Chol-Su, the chief of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organisations Bureau, supports Russia’s integration of Donetsk and Lugansk” in KCNA, 4 October 2022 [조 철수 외무성 국제기구국장 로씨야의 도네쯔크, 루간스크통합 지지, 조선중앙통 신, 2022년 10월 4일], http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/10/10-04/2022-1004-007.html. Notably, the message calls Luhansk by its Russian name. As of April 2023, the only known credible evidence of this is an entry in the Wagner Group-affiliated channel “Grey Zone”, which mentions North Korean supplies. See Grey Zone. Telegram Channel [Телеграм-канал Grey Zone], https://t.me/grey_zone/15736.

Bibliography English Lukin, Artyom. “The Putin and Kim rendezvous in Vladivostok: A drive-by summit”. 38 North (2 May 2019). www.38north.org/2019/05/alukin050219/. Korean “Appointment of Comrade Kim Jong-il, a member of the Politburo Presidium of the Central Committee of the WPK and a secretary of the WPK’s Central Committee, to the position of the supreme commander of the KPA” in Choson Inmungun, 26 December 1991, p. 1

148

The Father State Dies

[조선로동당 중앙위원회 정치국 상무위원이시며 당 중앙위원회 비서이신 김정일 동지를 조선인민군 최고사령관으로 추대. 조선인민군, 1992년 12월 26일, 1면]. “Cho Chol-su, the chief of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organisations Bureau, supports Russia’s integration of Donetsk and Lugansk” in KCNA, 4 October 2022 [조철수 외 무성 국제기구국장 로씨야의 도네쯔크, 루간스크통합 지지, 조선중앙통신, 2022년 10월 4일]. http://kcna.co.jp/calendar/2022/10/10-04/2022-1004-007.html. “Gorbachev is being ostracised in Latin American countries” in Rodong Shinmun, 16 December 1992, p. 6 [라틴아메리카나라들에서 배척받은 고르바쵸브, 로동신문, 1992 년 12월 16일, 6면]. “Gorbachev resigns from presidency. Eleven republics proclaim Commonwealth of the Independent States” in Rodong Shinmun, 27 December 1991, p. 6 [고르바쵸브 대통령직 에서 사임. 11개 공화국 수반들 독립국가 협동제 형성을 선포, 로동신문, 1991년 12 월 27일, 6면]. Pak Ki-Hyon. “Unlike China, Russia does not deport North Korean refuges back to the DPRK” in Current Affairs Focus, 21 November 2014 [박기현. 러시아, 中처럼 탈북자 강 제북송 안해. 시사 포코스, 2014년 11월 21일]. www.sisafocus.co.kr/news/articleView. html?idxno=111058. “Tendencies on North Korea foreign trade, 2021” in KOTRA [2021 북한 대외무역 동향, 대한 무역투자진흥공사]. https://dream.kotra.or.kr/kotranews/cms/news/actionKotraBoardDetail.do?pageNo=1&pagePerCnt=10&SITE_NO=3&MENU_ID=530&CONTENTS_ NO=1&bbsGbn=249&bbsSn=249&pNttSn=195519&recordCountPerPage=10&viewTy pe=&pStartDt=&pEndDt=&sSearchVal=&sSearchVal=#. “Treaty of friendship, good neighbourhood and cooperation between Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation is signed” in Rodong Shinmun, 10 February 2000, p. 3 [조선민주주의인민공화국과 로씨야련방사이의 친선, 선린 및 협조에 관한 조약 조인, 로동신문, 2000년 2월 10일, 3면]. Russian “Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States” in Unified Register of Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States [Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств // Единый реестр правовых актов и других документов Содружества Независимых Государств]. http:// cis.minsk.by/reestrv2/doc/1. “The band is disbanded: The end of the Youth League in the Soviet Union” in Daily Express [Совсем распустились: как в СССР закончился комсомол // Экспресс-газета]. www. eg.ru/politics/630412-sovsem-raspustilis-kak-v-sssr-zakonchilsya-komsomol-075346/. “Call of the Russian president to soldiers and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces, of the State Security Committee, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs” in Putsch. The Chronicle of the Restless Days [Обращение президента России к солдатам и офицерам вооруженных сил СССР, КГБ СССР, МВД СССР // Путч. Хроника тревожных дней]. http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991/putch12.htm. “Declaration of the Soviet of the republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the occasion of the creation of the Commonwealth of the Independent States” in Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, no. 52, 1991, 26 December 1991 [Декларация Совета Республик Верховного Совета СССР в связи с созданием Содружества Независимых Государств // Ведомости Верховного Совета СССР, 1991, № 52, 26 декабря 1991]. http://vedomosti.sssr.su/1991/52/#1561.

The Father State Dies 149 Executive Order 169 of the President of the RSFSR, 6 November 1991. On the Activities of the CPSU and of the CP RSFSR [Указ Президента РСФСР от 06.11.1991 г. № 169 “О деятельности КПСС и КП РСФСР”]. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/385. “The final farewell of the Union’s Parliament” in Pravda, 27 December 1991, p. 1 [Последнее “прости” союзного парламента, Правда, 27 декабря 1991 года, стр. 1]. From the Journal of Georgiy Kunadze. Record of Conversation with the DPRK’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Son Song-Phil, 20 September 1991, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Collection 10026, Folder 4, Item 2083, pp. 1–3 [Из дневника Георгия Кунадзе. Запись беседы с Чрезвычайным и полномочным послом КНДР в СССР Сон Сен Пхиром. 20 сентября 1991 года, ГАРФ, ф. 10026, оп. 4, д. 2083, лл. 1–3]. Grey Zone. Telegram Channel [Телеграм-канал Grey Zone]. https://t.me/grey_zone/15736. Panin, A. and Altov V. North Korea: The Sunset of the Kim Jong-il Era. Moscow: OLMAPress, 2003 [А. Панин, В. Альтов. Северная Корея: эпоха Ким Чен Ира на закате. Москва: ОЛМА-пресс, 2003]. “Proclamation of the Soviet leadership” in Pravda, 20 August 1991, p. 1 [Заявление советского руководства // Правда, 20 августа 1991 года, стр. 1]. SENC’s Press Conference, Moscow, 19 August 1991 [Пресс-конференция ГКЧП, Москва, 19 августа 1991 г]. www.youtube.com/watch?v=TVxH4e3Rfes. Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [Договор о дружбе, добрососедстве и сотрудничестве между Российской Федерацией и Корейской НародноДемократической Республикой]. www.facebook.com/RusEmbDPRK/photos/a.125054 1055119681/1250541288452991/?type=3&theater.

Index

17th Area Army 11

88 Brigade 5, 25–26

Agricultural Labourers’ Union 115

Albania 87–88, 103, 124–125; Albanian

Labour Party 87; Albanian People’s

Army 49

America see United States

American-Soviet Joint Commission for

Korea 17

Amerika 118

Ancient Rome 119

An Gil 2

Angliya 118

Apanasenko, Iosif 5

Armenia 43

August Plenum 69–88, 98–102, 105, 108

Belarus 19, 141

Beria, Lavrentiy 26–27, 29–30, 103, 105

Berlin 18–19, 39

Berzarin, Nikolay 18

Bible 119

Bolshevik Party see Communist Party of

the Soviet Union

Bonesteel, Charles Hartwell III 11

Brezhnev, Leonid 70–71, 75, 118,

135–136; Brezhnev’s Gang Walks the

Same Way Hitler Once Did 124

Britain see United Kingdom

Bulganin, Nikolai 27, 75

Bulgaria 30, 76, 103–105; Bulgarian

Communist Party 76

Byelorussia see Belarus

Cambodia 136

Chagang 62

Changbai see Paektu

Changchun 12

Chengdu 86

Chernenko, Konstantin 128

Chervenkov, Valko 74, 104–105

Children’s Union 115

Chinese Civil War 10, 53–54

Chistyakov, Ivan 12–13, 17–19, 21–22, 28

Choe Chang-ik 62, 73–75, 79–81, 108

Choe Yong-gon 5, 25, 39–40, 54, 72, 76,

78, 81, 84, 105–108, 110, 128

Chong Jae-yong 38

Chongjin 11

Chongno see Rodong Shinmun Choson, Kingdom of 34, 38

Collective Security Treaty Organisation 145

Comintern see Communist International

Commonwealth of Independent States 141

Communist International 2, 26–27, 30

Communist Party of China 1–2, 5, 26,

84–85, 98

Communist Party of Japan 11

Communist Party of Korea (pre-1928) 11, 30

Communist Party of Korea (1945–1946) 27

Communist Party of Taiwan 11

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 12,

17, 21, 39, 48, 99, 118, 128, 141; 20th

Congress 70–72, 76, 80, 99–101

Complete Collection of Kim Il-sung’s

Works 45

Comrades-in-Arms for All Ages 128

Conrad, Joseph 29

Cuba 103, 145; Cuban missile crisis 125

Cultural Revolution (China) 51, 125, 127

Czechoslovakia 30, 103

The Daily World 118

Deng Xiaoping 128–129, 140

Díaz-Canel, Miguel 145

Dictionary of Political Terminology 124

Dimitrov, Georgy 2, 30

Index

151

Dnepropetrovsk see Dnipro

Dnipro 117

Dzerzhinsky, Felix 139

25, 27, 34, 38, 51, 55, 79, 115, 124, 128;

Imperial Army of 2, 4, 12–13, 48–49

Jin Xuetie 77

East Germany 19, 39–40, 103, 137

Emperor Hirohito see Hirohito

Emperor Puyi see Puyi

Ethiopia 103

Eurasian Economic Union 145

Everything Goes According to

the Plan 137

Kádár, János 22

Kaliningrad 142, 144

Kampuchea see Cambodia Kan, Mikhail 26, 28

Kang Gon 5

Kanggye 55

Kang Sang-ho 74, 83

Kang Shin-thae see Kang Gon Kang Su-bong 84

Kashtan, William 137

Kazakhstan 61

KCNA see Korean Central News Agency Khabarovsk 2, 25

Khalkhin-Gol battle see Nomonhan battle Khrushchev, Nikita 70, 74, 87, 105, 114,

124–125, 129, 143

Kim Bong-nyul 125

Kim Chang-hum 81

Kim Chang-man 71–73, 80, 88

Kim Du-bong 35, 38–39, 54, 72, 79

Kim Il 107–108 Kim Il-sung 1–5, 13, 21, 25–30, 34,

39, 43, 45, 51, 53–55, 62, 64, 69–81,

84–88, 100, 102–111, 114, 119,

124–126, 128–129, 135–137, 144, 146;

Kimilsungism 114–120; Kim Il-sung

University 25, 35

Kim Jong-il 3–4, 25, 45, 64, 125, 136,

142, 144

Kim Jong-suk 1, 4

Kim Jong-un 25, 64, 145

Kim Ju-bong 79, 83, 87

Kim Kang 83–85, 87, 98

Kim Kwang-hyop 73

Kim Man-gum 80

Kim Sung-hwa 79

Kim Thae-gun 77

Kim Yong-bom 27

Kogan, Aleksandr 2

Komsomol 21, 115, 141

Ko Pong-gi 77

Korea (magazine) see Koreya (magazine) Korean Central News Agency 35

Korean Christian Union 119

Korean Empire 17, 34

Korean People’s Army 35–38, 42, 48–51,

53, 55, 128, 142; Internal Regulations

49, 103

“Korean People’s Revolutionary Army” 13,

55, 126, 128

The False Spring 88

Far Eastern Front 2

Far Eastern Republic 103

Fatherland Liberation War

see Korean War

Fengtian see Shenyang

First Far Eastern Front 21–22

Flag of Great Extremes 34–35, 38–39

Foreign Trade 136

Fyodorov, Georgiy 19

Gao Gang 54

Geological Institute 128

Georgia 43

Gorbachev, Mikhail 103, 128,

140–141, 143

Gottwald, Klement 30

Governor-General of Korea 17, 115

Guten Tag 118

Hall, Gus 137

Hamhung 12–13, 18, 127

Han Byong-ok 39

Han Sang-du 72

Hao Deqing 125

Heavenly Lake 124

Hegai, Aleksei 70, 76, 80

He Long 55

Hirohito 12, 30, 79

Hiroshima 10, 12

Ho Ga-i see Hegai, Aleksei

Hong Sun-gwan 84

Hoxha, Enver 87–88, 125

Hungary 22, 76, 104–105, 111, 126

Hungnam Fertiliser Complex 127

Hyon Jong-min 80, 88

Indian Express 126

Ivanov, Vasiliy 75, 79, 87

Japan 10, 34, 41, 114, 135, 145; civilians

in North Korea 19; Empire of 2, 10–13,

152

Index

Korean War 21, 49, 53–55, 61, 63, 103,

105, 126, 146; Inchon landing 54

Korea Today 135

Koreya (magazine) 134–137 Korolyov, Vasiliy 26

KPA see Korean People’s Army KPRA see “Korean People’s Revolutionary Army” Kryuchkov, Vladimir 140–141 Kulloja 86

Kwantung Army 11

Mekler, Grigoriy 26

Meretskov, Kirill 12–13, 19, 26

Minami Jiro 116

Ministry of Internal Affairs (North Korea) 83

Mongolia 10, 41, 103, 124, 137

Morning Star 118

Mun Il 1, 25–27

Nagy, Imre 111

NAJUA see Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army Nam Il 62, 74, 79–80, 108, 125

labour camps: in the DPRK 118–119; in the Navy (North Korea) 50

Navy (Soviet Union) 118

USSR 12

Neutrality Pact (Japan-Soviet) 10

Lalaj, Ana 88

New Line 105

Lanin, Vasiliy 13

News Agency of North Korea 35

Lankov, Andrei 86

Nicholas I 49

Lazarev, S. P. 62

Nomonhan battle 4

Lebedev, Nikolay 26–27, 29, 35, 38

Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army 1–2 Lee Gi-yong 135

North Vietnam 103

Lee Gwon-mu 48

Novichenko, Yakov 128

Lee Hwal 48

Novoye vremya 30

Lee Il-gyong 80

Lee Jong-ok 77

O Gi-sop 39

Lee Ju-yon 80

O Jin-u 25

Lee Kang-guk 39

Okeanskaya 2

Lee Phil-gyu 81, 83–87, 98

On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual

Lee Sang-jo 63, 71–72, 76, 84

and its Consequences 99

Lee Sung-yop 70

One Second for a Feat see Lenin, Vladimir 17, 86, 137

Comrades-in-Arms for All Ages Leningrad see Saint Petersburg Let Us Adhere to Proletarian Dictatorship

Paektu 3, 42, 45, 124, 126

and Proletarian Democracy 127

Pak, Illarion 62

Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp 125

Pak Chang-ok 62, 73, 79–81, 105

Let Us Protect Sovereignty 125

Pak Chol 128

Lewis, Clive Staples 22

Pak Chong-ae 26, 80, 108

Li, Vladimir 125

Pak Hon-yong 21, 30, 43, 53–54, 70,

Liberation Monument 13, 41

80–81

Linfen 87

Pak Hun-il 81

Lithuania 142, 144

Pak Il 25, 35

Little Octobrists 115

Pak Ir-u 70, 81, 84

Liu Bocheng 55

Pak Kum-chol 72

Livshits, Yuriy 19

Pak Tok-san see Kim Il Loboda, Ivan 30

Pak Ui-wan 77, 79

Luo Ruiqing 85

Pak Yong-guk 80

Pang Hak-se 76, 125

Malenkov, Georgiy 27

Manchukuo 2, 10–12, 25; Imperial Army 11 Peng Dehuai 55

People’s Assembly for North Korea 38–40,

Manchuria 1–5, 10, 12, 27, 51

45, 48

Mao Zedong 54, 83, 86, 108, 124–126,

People’s Committee for North Korea 39, 48

128–129; Maoism 48, 85 (Maoism:

People’s Groups 114–115 A Threat to Humankind 124)

People’s Korea 135

Maritime Military District 19, 21

People’s Liberation Army (China) 49, 126

Marxism-Leninism 27, 99–102, 116, 124

Index People’s Militia of China 51 Petrograd see Saint Petersburg Petrov, A. M. 87

Plyshevskiy, Ivan 2

Poland 81, 103, 118, 120

Pollitt, Harry 137

Pol Pot 136–137 Poznań 81

Pravda 118, 141

Prisons (North Korea) 93, 118–119 Provisional People’s Committee for North

Korea 29

Purkayev, Maksim 26

Pusan 12

Putin, Vladimir 144–145 Puyi 12

Puzanov, Aleksandr 108–109 Qiao Xiaoguang 85

Rajin 11

Rákosi, Mátyás 76, 104–105

Rashin see Rajin

Red Army see Soviet Army

Riga 117

Rodong Shinmun 29, 43, 63, 83, 100, 118,

124–127, 140–141

Romanenko, Andrei 28

Rusk, David Dean 11

Russia 2, 30, 53, 77, 108, 141–142,

144–146; invasion of Ukraine 145; as

part of the USSR 108; Russian Empire

19, 49, 119

Sae Choson 62

Saint Petersburg 19, 21, 117

Samsonov, Georgiy 83

Science Academy (North Korea) 25

Second Far Eastern Front 11, 26

Seishin see Chongjin

Seoul 11–12, 53–54

Shanxi 86–87

Sharkey, Lance 137

Shenyang 12

Shen Zhihua 85

Shikin, Iosif 26–27

Shinchon 19

Shtykov, Terentiy 17, 19–22, 26–27, 29,

48, 53

Singular Thought System 69, 126, 135

Sino-Soviet split 86, 124

Sixth School 125

Sofia 76

So Hwi 73, 77–79, 81, 83–87, 98

153

Song Jin-pha 62

South Vietnam 41

South Yemen 103

Soviet Army 4–5, 10, 12–13, 17, 25, 38,

41, 48–49, 103, 108, 114–116, 118–119,

124, 129, 135

Soviet-Japanese War 1–13, 55

Stalin, Joseph 5, 11–12, 17–19, 21–22,

25–27, 29–30, 43, 53–54, 61, 63, 70,

77, 87, 105, 114; Stalinism 39, 48, 61,

70, 87–88, 114–120, 137, 143

(de-Stalinisation 114, 124)

Stalingrad see Volgograd State Planning Committee (North Korea) 62

Suphung power plant 43

Supreme Soviet of the USSR 141–142 Taejon 54

Taiwan 10–11, 41, 55

Taiyuan 86

Takeshita Yoshiharu 13

Transbaikal Front 11

Tumanov (pseudonym) 30

Tuva 103

Ukraine 61, 141, 145

Unggi 11

Union of Sovereign States 140

Union of Soviet Communist Republics

(imaginary utopian state) 116

United Kingdom 11, 25, 118; British

Foreign Office 70

United States 11, 17, 19, 21, 25, 30,

34–35, 51–52, 54–55, 105, 118,

128, 145–146

Ussuriysk 2

Vartanov, Valeriy 53

Vasilevskiy, Aleksandr 11

Vilkov, Konstantin 2

Vladivostok 145

Volgograd 5

Voroshilov see Ussuriysk

Vyatskoye 2

Wagner Group 145

Warsaw Pact 124, 140

Weimar Republic 39

Wei Zhengmin 2

Women’s League (North Korea) 115

Workers’ and Farmers’ Red Guard (North

Korea) 51

Workers’ Party of Korea 53–54, 69–70,

72, 77–78, 80–82, 100, 116; Eighth

154

Index

Congress 116; First Party Conference 110; Organisation and Guidance Department 72; Party Bylaws 72, 78–79, 116; Third Congress 69–74, 80, 99–100 Workers’ Party of North Korea 30, 42;

Second Congress 42

Workers’ Party of South Korea 30

WPK see Workers’ Party of Korea WPNK see Workers’ Party of North Korea WPSK see Workers’ Party of South Korea

Yamada Otozo 11

Yanayev, Gennadiy 140

Yeltsin, Boris 128, 141

Yockey, Francis Parker 128

Yo Ung-hyong 30

Young Pioneers 115

Youth league (North Korea) 115

Yugoslavia 103, 124

Yuki see Unggi

Yun Kong-hum 77–81, 83–87, 98

Xian 87

Xia Yafeng 85

Xi Jinping 145

Xinjing see Changchun

Zhdanov, Andrei 21, 29

Zhivkov, Todor 76

Zhou Baozhong 5

Zhou Enlai 54, 85, 127–128

Zhu De 55

Zhukov, Georgiy 4

Zyuzin, Aleksei 2

Yalta Conference 11

Yalu River 43, 83