Sino-American Relations: A New Cold War 9789048554775

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Sino-American Relations

Sino-American Relations A New Cold War

Edited by Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: US Department of Agriculture. US and China flags at the 23rd Session of the US China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) press conference, at the Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium in Washington, D.C. on Wednesday, Dec. 19, 2012. USDA photo by Lance Cheung. Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6372 636 8 e-isbn 978 90 4855 477 5 (pdf) doi 10.5117/9789463726368 nur 697 © All authors / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2022 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher.

In Memory of James Z. Gao



Table of Contents

Note on Transliteration

9

Abbreviations 11 Acknowledgments 13 Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

15

Part One  Background and Lost Voices 1 From Admirer to Critic

31

2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience

55

3 Disillusioned Diplomacy

81

Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States Patrick Fuliang Shan

Jingyi Song

US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945 Travis Chambers

Part Two  Did America Lose China? 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible

113

5 Negotiating from Strength

135

A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947 Zhiguo Yang

US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953 Pingchao Zhu

6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises Xiaojia Hou

185

Part Three  Rapprochement and Opportunities 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation

215

8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991

241

9 Jiang Zemin and the United States

261

Guolin Yi

Yafeng Xia

Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge Qiang Fang

Part Four  Did China Lose America? 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy

293

11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations

319

Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II?

345

Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America Xiaoxiao Li

Xiaobing Li

Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

Index 359



Note on Transliteration

The Hanyu pinyin romanization system is applied to Chinese names of persons, places, and terms. A person’s name is written in the Chinese way, surname first, such as Mao Zedong. Some popular names have traditional Wade-Giles spellings appearing in parentheses after the first use of the Hanyu pinyin in the entry, such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), as do popular names of places like the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, Huang (Yellow) River, and Guangzhou (Canton). Exceptions are made for a few figures whose names are widely known in reverse order, like Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan, or Sun Yixian), and a few places and institutional names, such as Tibet (Xizang) and Peking (Beijing) University.

Abbreviations ADIZ AEW ASEAN BRI CCBA CCP CASS CCYL CECC CMC CNOOC CPG CPPCC CPVA DIA DPRK ECRC EEZ GDP GMD GNP MFN MPS MSR NATO NGO NIRA NKPA NNSC NPC PAP PLA PLAAF PLAN POW PRC

Air Defense Identification Zone early warning Association of Southeast Asian Nations Belt-Road Initiative Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association Chinese Communist Party China Academy of Social Sciences Chinese Communist Youth League Congressional Executive Commission on China (US) Central Military Commission (CCP) China National Offshore Oil Corporation Central People’s Government Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Defense Intelligence Agency (US) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) East China Regional Command (PLA) Exclusive Economic Zone gross domestic production Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, KMT) gross national product most favourable nation Ministry of Public Security Maritime Silk Road North Atlantic Treaty Organization nongovernmental organization National Industrial Recovery Act (US) North Korean People’s Army Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission National People’s Congress People’s Armed Police People’s Liberation Army PLA Air Force PLA Navy prisoners of war People’s Republic of China

12 Abbreviations

RMB ROC ROK SEATO SEZ SLOCs TAR UN UNC UNCLOS UNGA UNHRC UNSC USIA USN USSR WASP WTO WWI WWII XPCC XUAR

Renminbi (Chinese currency) Republic of China Republic of Korea (South Korea) Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Special Economic Zone sea lines of communication Tibet Autonomous Region United Nations UN Command UN International Convention on the Law of the Sea UN General Assembly UN Human Rights Commission UN Security Council US Information Agency US Navy Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Women Air Force Service Pilots (US) World Trade Organization World War I World War II Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Acknowledgments The research in this book reflects almost five years of continuous collaborative endeavours made between the authors and civilian administrators, governmental officials, college professors, and institute researchers in China, Taiwan, and the United States. In the period from 2017 to 2021, the Association of Chinese Historians in the United States (CHUS) organized several academic conferences and on-the-spot social and legal surveys in China and Taiwan. Many contributors to this book joined those delegations and spent time, often during the summer, to compile data and sources. Some of the chapters in this volume are drawn from several CHUS conferences. In both scope and content, this book offers a wealth of splendid scholarly presentations. Ranging across questions of leadership, policy, crisis, negotiations, media, and the worrying flashpoints of Taiwan, Xinjiang, the East and South China Seas, these essays provide a fresh look at key sites of friction. For the above-mentioned organization, heartfelt thanks from the two editors go to each of the authors for their significant contributions to this book and their essential insights into the many dimensions of the world’s most important bilateral relationship in the twenty-first century. This project received funding from the James Gao Memorial Fund, which is administered through CHUS. Many people at the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO) have contributed to this volume and deserve recognition. First, Xiaobing Li would like to thank Assistant Dean of the College of Liberal Arts Theresa Vaughan and Chairperson of the Department of History and Geography Katrina Lacher. They have been very supportive of the project over the past five years. As the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies, Li received research funds from the UCO Foundation and student research assistants sponsored by the RCSA grants from the UCO Office of High-Impact Practices led by director Michael Springer. Travis Chambers edited some of the chapters. Qiang Fang wants to express his gratitude for the generous financial support from a number of grants provided by the University of Minnesota Twin Cities and the University of Minnesota Duluth. These grants include, but are not limited to, the university-wide Grant-in-Aid, Imagine Fund, and special support from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. In addition, Qiang Fang would like to thank Ms. Jing Duan for her crucial assistance throughout the editing of this book. Finally, the two editors offer thanks to editors Shannon Cunningham and Saskia Gieling at Amsterdam University Press for their excellent

14 Acknowledgments

professionalism and always-timely support during the editorial and production progress of this book. Of course, we are grateful to the three peerreviewers and copy-editors for their constructive suggestions and first-class editorial expertise, without which this book could not be presented to the readers on time. Xiaobing Li (University of Central Oklahoma) Qiang Fang (University of Minnesota Duluth)



Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

From Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 to Barack Obama’s presidency in 2008–2016, relations between China and the United States were largely cordial, despite a few aberrations, like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)’s bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the US-China Hainan plane collision incident in 2001. However, since 2018, US-China relations have deteriorated, and tensions have escalated due to trade, technology, and currency wars. In 2019, President Donald Trump signed bills supporting the Hong Kong protests and Taiwan, further exacerbating bilateral relations. As if tensions were not high enough, the sudden eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic in China and its spread to the US deepened the fissure between the two powers. In March 2019, China and the US fought tit-for-tat over journalists (Smith, 2020). In July, after China promulgated the Hong Kong Security Law, Trump ended Hong Kong’s special status. Diplomatic enmity reached a new high when both countries closed one of their consulates. On July 23, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, after repeated attacks and lambasting by Chinese state media as the ‘Common Human Enemy’ announced that the engagement policy started by Nixon had failed. In another speech, Pompeo called China the biggest threat to the US (Shesgreen 2020). Like Pompeo, Trump floated the idea of ‘decoupling’ the Chinese and American economies, a far cry from his stance just a few years earlier. In 2020, Beijing launched a new, aggressive diplomatic campaign against the US, described by Western media as ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. On March 21, 2021, top Chinese diplomats cited the US’s own human rights problems when they denounced the United States, at high-level China-US talks in Alaska, as ‘not qualified’ to lecture China on human rights. Washington also saw a sharp increase in 2021 of hostile responses to the Taiwan question from Beijing. The increased hostility in those statements included warnings that

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_intro

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‘China will “take all necessary measures” to safeguard its sovereignty and security’ (Dai and Luqiu 2021). This harsh language has been coupled with clear actions. Since 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, China’s armed forces) and Air Force (PLAAF) have launched ‘gray-zone’ warfare in the Taiwan Strait by sending its warplanes to fly over the strait median line. In early 2021, Beijing blamed President Joe Biden for making no effort to ease tensions between the two countries after he took over the White House. Biden warned Congress and the American public, that ‘China is eating our lunch’ at several meetings since the Chinese invested hundreds of billions of dollars in research and infrastructure (Restuccia 2021). If this round of military actions and diplomatic ‘free fall’ continues, some scholars have cautioned that the US would sever its diplomatic ties with China and recognize Taiwan (Wang, 2020). In that case, the prospect of a new cold war between the two powers looms, and, like the Cold War between the US and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1946–1991, might force many states to take sides, plunging the world once again into fear of nuclear extinction. How and why have US-China relations deteriorated so quickly? Why do both countries no longer want to compromise? Is a new cold war inevitable between the US and China? Is there any way to prevent it? In this book, the authors address the above questions in their essays. The authors focus on the ‘human factors’ which determined many major events in a century of US-China relations from the Chinese-American perspective through cooperative interdisciplinary research efforts. It should be noted that one of the major consequences of too much fetishism is the belief in fatalism, which assumes that all changes in US-China relations are determined by objective, economic, strategic, realistic, and/or institutional factors. As a result, there is little room and possibility for subjective human efforts, as if impersonal aspects determine success or failure for all historical events. In fact, in the course of changing US-China relations, Communist leaders, American diplomats, Chinese generals, Western journalists, ethnic minorities, immigrants, ordinary people, and public opinion often play important roles, just as significant as objective reality, economic development, geo-political strategy, and institutional culture. The scholarship in this volume presents new contributions to the subject through multi-faceted components. It explores the theory and practice of policymaking, national security, military strategy, diplomacy, society, and personality. According to the authors, the historical turning points of deterioration in US-China relations over the past century have been determined by human influences. Since 2012, human efforts have operated

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from the positive to the negative, constantly moving toward decoupling and the Cold War, creating a negative feedback effect and a trend of so-called accelerated confrontations. At present, the Chinese nationalist power and the American decoupling forces are ostensibly working in opposite directions and at odds with each other, but the actual effect is to move in the same direction, because the left in China and the right in the US are all pursuing a similar course of self-reliance, independence, internal circulation, and seclusion. The contributors’ unique insights provide a better understanding of the Sino-US relationship, pointing to apredictable outcome for the two countries’ current issues.

Who Lost China? The Cold War Revisited The primary objective of this book is to explore responsibility for the US-China confrontations and illuminate problems, while discussing possible solutions. Few areas of research in international relations pose more difficulties than the study of these individual roles, especially that of the Chinese leaders, in US-China relations because of the latter’s unique political position in relation to the legitimacy of the nation’s Communist authority. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the state’s dominant political party and controls the country and media. A New Cold War clarifies key CCP conceptual frameworks to expose roots that have been neglected or ignored, offering case studies and policy analyses complicated by potential misunderstanding, crisis, or even war between the two countries. Today, whether China and the United States will go to war is a perennial question in foreign policy circles in Washington. A recent issue of The Economist featured a cover story on Taiwan titled ‘The Most Dangerous Place on Earth’ (Metz2021). US armed forces prepared a possible military conflict against the PLA in the Taiwan Strait. In May 2021, the American Naval War College held a conference on ‘Large-scale Amphibious Warfare in Chinese Military Strategy’. About 20–30 presenters and hundreds of strategists, analysts, and military planners from the Defense Department, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, CIA, DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), and the State Department discussed a possible PLA invasion of Taiwan to protect Xi Jinping’s so called ‘core interests’, namely a Taiwan Strait amphibious campaign, and how the US should respond to such a landing. Moreover, American China specialists, historians, and researchers, including some formerly pro-Chinese experts, for the first time echoed the Biden administration’s accusations and criticism, blaming Xi Jinping

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for lost opportunities to work with the United States and improve the USChina relationship from 2012 through 2021. As such, current research in the West engages in the debate on ‘Who Lost America’, a new question for the twenty-first century. Dominating academic attention and dividing schools, it means Beijing’s loss of positive American assessment and perception of mainland China’s status, as well as the ‘loss’ of basic trust in China’s development that the US has held for more than four decades. Zhiguo Yang revisits the ‘Who Lost China’ question and argues in his chapter that the great aberration between the United States and China stemmed from the end of World War II, when the US made mediation of the GMD-CCP conflicts a major component of its China policy and a part of its grand plan for postwar Asia (Yang, Chapter 4). This policy led the US to fall into the ‘mud pit’ of the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), from which it could not extricate itself. After the CCP founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, some Republican senators and representatives blamed the Truman administration for ‘losing China’, since the president did not provide full support to the Guomindang (GMD, or Kuomintang, KMT; Chinese Nationalist) government in the Chinese Civil War. The State Department issued a 1,000-page China White Paper in 1950 and tried to ‘whitewash”’ the problems of US policy towards post-WWII China by explaining that the Chinese Civil War was out of America’s control (Li, Sun, Gadkar-Wilcox 2020: 134–35). Thereafter, the US government disconnected from the PRC, the first US ‘decoupling’ policy, as associated with anti-communism and the rise of McCarthyism at home. Both questions make similar points: Who should bear the responsibility for the ‘loss’ of a good relationship? What are some major reasons behind the strategic decoupling policy? Some American historians challenge the old-century question. They argue that American influence in China was limited before 1949, and that ’who lost China’ is a false question because in order to lose, one must first own. In fact, the US never owned or colonized China, so how can people talk about losing it? (Chomsky 2012). Who should be responsible for the ‘lost relationship’? Which country should be blamed more for the collision? Conventional approaches, epitomized by Warren I. Cohen, John K. Fairbank, and Maurice Meisner, view American policymakers as ignorant and unfamiliar with China’s tradition and situation. Their lack of knowledge led to misunderstanding, crisis, even war with China. In his book entitled America’s Response to China, Cohen argues that a series of American presidents in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries failed to help China during crises and mistreated Chinese immigrants in the US (Cohen 2019: 28–35). As a result, their China policy

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became one-sided, or American-centric, with an imperialistic and aggressive nature. To improve the relationship, the US should have learned more about China and changed its China policy accordingly. In Harry Harding’s words, ‘US leaders should recognize that they share both common and competitive interests with China’ and therefore need to seek a ‘more realistic and mature relationship with China than has existed in much of the recent past’(Harding 1992: 22). Gordon Chang, Oliver Schell, and Bruce Elleman represent a conservative approach whose works criticize China’s US policy as irresponsible and selfish. Gordon Chang’s book entitled The Coming Collapse of China points out that China is not as robust as it appears: ‘The Middle Kingdom’,Chang states, ‘as it once called itself, is a paper dragon’. The CCP has a ‘destiny’, which is to lead the Chinese people for eternity. While Chang does not render a specific time for China’s collapse, it cannot ‘defy the laws of gravity forever’. After China’s acceptance into the WTO in the early twenty-first century, it promised open markets, and Chang, like many politicians and scholars at the time, believed that China’s accession would shake the CCP to its foundations (Chang 2001: chapters 1–2). Moreover, recent conservative work by Michael Pillsbury and Richard McGregor sees some fundamental differences between the two countries in the past, long before 1949. These different values and interests lead to inevitable conflicts in US-China relations. To limit or delay a crisis or even a war, the US should take initiative and fight proactively against China in all areas all the time. Pillsbury, a former Department of Defense official and one of the leading China specialists, remarks that in the past thirty years, China has ‘not evolved in the ways’the West had hoped and predicted for its engagement;Chinese hawks, the source of Chinese geostrategic thought, have advised Chinese leaders to avenge a century of humiliation and aspired to replace the United States as the economic, military, and political leader of the world by the year 2049. This policy began in the Mao era, and, since Xi Jinping took power, he has demonstrated his own dream, which is to reclaim China’s rightful place atop the global hierarchy. It is perhaps more intimidating that China has long planned to use the Americans as they used the Soviet Union—as tools for their own advancement. Pillsbury warns that once China wins the ‘economic marathon’ and develops an economy twice as large as that of the United States, its new status may, as America itself did between 1860 and 1940, have to be protected through military force. The world’s largest economy will need a force more powerful than any other that would eventually render American military might obsolete (Pillsbury 2015).

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Who Lost America? Voices from Both Sides In 2018, David Shambaugh raised the ‘new century question’ by blaming China for losing America, the key reason for distorted US-China relations (Lu 2019). He and others, like Elizabeth Economy, belonged to the Revisionist school of the 1980s–2000s, which believed China would internally change through increased free-market exchanges followed by a gradual introduction of democracy and civil liberties to the Chinese people. They valued Chinese tradition, political culture, and West-East interaction. However, Shambaugh changed his pro-China view by the late 2010s. He argues in his recent book, China and the World, that Xi Jinping has deserted Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of ‘Bide time and hide brightness (taoguang yanghui)’ and replaced it with more activist dictums such as ‘striving for achievement’, ‘China’s great rejuvenation’, ‘the Chinese dream’, and a ‘community of a shared future for mankind’. Xi’s ‘new and more forthright stance’ has nonetheless made other countries nervous despite his reassurance that a stronger China ‘will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion’. Shambaugh correctly notes that a more assertive and powerful China will inevitably ‘encounter difficulties in its foreign relations going forward’that are ‘already occurring’ (Shambaugh2020: 17–20). In a previous book, Shambaugh sees China’s ‘Achilles heel’ in its bid to rule the world, as it ‘remains a lonely power’ (Shambaugh, 2013: 6). This statement is in line with the thinking of Miles M. Yu, a China expert and former advisor to Pompeo (Lianhe zaobao 2020). Shambaugh predicts two divergent pathways for China’s future: Neo-Totalitarianism or Hard Authoritarianism, and Soft Authoritarianism or Semi-Democracy. By selecting one of the latter two paths, Chinese leaders ‘will have a greater chance of a win-win outcome—improving [China’s] chance of successful reforms at home and more cooperative relations abroad’ (Shambaugh 2013: 377). Scholars from the aforementioned schools are all Americans: accordingly, almost all of them make their arguments from an American perspective in hopes of providing American policymakers with advice. However, some of them failed to perceive Sino-US relations from a less biased stance. In fact, the individual factor of the general American public cannot be ignored as the driving force behind every positive step of the US-China relationship over the past forty years. As always, public opinion has come first, followed by foreign policy in the US (Hong and Sun, 2010: 429–48). Although US history proves that American public opinion is fluid and unpredictable, scholars need to observe and analyze its direction and development, especially evaluating the data released by the Gallup and Pew

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polls. The strength of Gallup polls is to ask the same question continuously for decades, building a more reliable trend, while the Pew polls focus on the classification and refinement of issues with more depth. For example, the Pew poll conducted on March 29, 2020, has four major figures worth analyzing, which sheds light on the darkest days of US-China relations. Like their American counterparts, most Chinese scholars, if not all, also strive to advise Chinese leaders. Among the hawkish and overbearing views voiced by leading scholars are those from Hu Angang, Jin Canrong, and the editor-in-chief of the nationalist tabloid Global Times, Hu Xijin. In 2020, they became extremely aggressive and suggested that China needed more nuclear weapons to deter the United States (Hu, 2020). Although Wang Jisi and other scholars have taken a more moderate and sober stance toward the United States, they still stand on the side of China, and it is difficult for them to adopt a nonjudgmental stance. Wang makes a plea to both Chinese and American leaders to prevent Sino-US relations from spiraling downward by sticking to three basic pillars. But he intentionally avoids criticizing the Chinese government and attributes the fission to the American government. Likewise, Wu Xinbo, a professor and dean of the School of International Relations at Fudan University, believes that China and the US are intensely engaged in economic, political, and geopolitical competition. Wu clarifies that the competition between the two countries is for neither hegemony nor security, but for society and economy. In Wu’s view, leaders in both countries should seek ‘competitive coexistence ( jingzhengxing gongchu)’, as China and the US have common interests in the economy, security, and social humanity. Wu, like Wang Jisi, praises the Chinese government for building up a Sino-US big-nation relationship with new, progressive ideologies, and transitional relations and a “community of common destiny for all mankind (renlei mingyun gongtongti).” Yet, in the meantime, Wu blames American policymakers for their infatuation with hegemony. Wu does not or dares not mention any of China’s aggressive policies in the South China Sea and Hong Kong (Wu2020). Conversely, most Sino-US relations studies or diplomatic histories are either one-sided or tendentious, and few, if any, are neutral and balanced with a delicate consideration for the nuance of those relations. One of this book’s great advantages is that all authors have been teaching, living, and researching in both the US and China for decades and are familiar with both countries. Many of them frequently visit China to remain updated on the latest developments. Moreover, the co-editors organized a recent scholarly trip to Taiwan so the co-authors could broaden their views through intellectual exchange with Taiwanese researchers and leaders, including

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President Ma Ying-jeou (President of the Republic of China in 2008–2016). They are now better positioned academically to provide a balanced answer to the new century’s question: ‘Who Lost America?’

A ‘Lost History’and New Cold War This book has another advantage, as most chapters are based on primary sources and examine Sino-US relations through a wide range of historical perspectives. The authors provide factual evidence, archival findings, and progressive interpretations. The essay collection begins with the foundation of the CCP and spans the early arrival of Chinese immigrants in the US to the boycott of American goods in China. It then examines the shift of President Woodrow Wilson’s image in China from saviour to villain, alliance during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Nixon’s visit to China, Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the US, the combination of conflicts and collaborations during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s presidencies, and the recent clashes between Beijing and Washington. It does not intend to cover all major events in the US-China relationship, and instead aims to look into what historians might have overlooked or missed in their research. This multi-authored book focuses on the ‘lost history’ of US-China relations from the 1890s to the 2020s. In Part One, ‘Background and Lost Voices’, there are three chapters examining the lost history of the human factors in US-China relations prior to the Cold War. In the first chapter,titled ‘From Admirer to Critic: Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitude toward the United States’, Patrick Fuliang Shan investigates one of the CCP’s founders, Li Dazhao, and his views on the United States in the 1910s–1920s. Shan’s study shows the May Fourth Movement of 1919 as the demarcation line between Li’s strikingly incongruent early pro-American stance and his pro-Russian posture. In his nationalistic zeal for seeking an exemplar for China’s resurgence and modernization, Li intended to transform his country by pursuing the Western, particularly the American, way of life before 1919. The Paris Peace Conference, however, dashed his hopes, and thereafter he decried America as an imperialist power. When he relinquished his long-held positive view of the United States, he became a pro-Russian activist and championed the communist cause. The next chapter, ‘Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience’,analyzes the anti-Chinese laws which shadowed the lives of Chinese immigrants in the United States. Jingyi Song argues that, although the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1882 was eventually repealed in 1943, false

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accusations against Chinese Americans as ‘disease carriers’and ‘cheap labourers’ originating in nineteenth-century political rhetoric, still echoe in today’s pandemic situation: President Trump used the slur ‘China virus’ to attack China during a public health crisis. The ‘China virus’ runs in the same historical vein, stirring hatred, racial antagonism, and social conflicts. However, the reckless accusations and racially discriminatory legislation against Chinese Americans did not go without opposition and resistance. According to Song’s chapter, Chinese Americans pursued justice through the judiciary process, rallied, and petitioned to voice their demand for racial equality and, more importantly, continued their participation in social, political, and economic activities, claiming their status as Americans even as anti-Chinese legislation was imposed. The third chapter, ‘Disillusioned Diplomacy: US Policy toward Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945’, examines an overlooked, complicated US policy toward Japan’s ‘puppet’ government in China during World War II. Travis Chambers’ research indicates the United States, Great Britain, France, and other Allies viewed the Abe-Wang Treaty, signed November 30, 1940, as Wang’s def initive submission of Chinese sovereignty to the Axis powers and a threat to Allied interests in China. Thereafter, US policy towards Wang was one of non-recognition, categorizing his government as ‘traitorous’, and implementing policies similar to those adopted for other ‘puppet’ states, like Manchukuo. Chambers’ analysis and interpretation fill in missing history in US-China relations and provide a more nuanced historical narrative. Part Two revisits the old-century question: ‘Did America Lose China?’ Three chapters provide new literature and interpretations on US-China relations in the early Cold War from 1946 to 1958. Zhiguo Yang focuses on US China policy during the Chinese Civil War in ‘Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947’. His chapter outlines an evolution of the interpretation of the Marshall Mission and its impact on Sino-US relations during the Truman era and beyond. In discussing the most recent Chinese scholarship on the Marshall Mission, from both the PRC and Taiwan, it argues that, although Chinese historians are recently more open to an international historical approach, their theoretical framework and perspectives remain fundamentally China-centred or Taiwan-centred. The fifth chapter by Pingchao Zhu focuses on the Korean truce talks, ‘Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953’. She explains why peace negotiations were prolonged as fighting continued for two more years. More than

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forty-five percent of all US casualties occurred after truce talks began. Furthermore, Zhu details how the two sides compromised, and truce negotiation progressed, particularly as the UN (United Nations) Command realized that the Chinese-North Korean delegation was less interested in peace than it was in utilizing the truce for propaganda and portraying themselves as the victors. The next chapter, ‘Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises’,covers two offshore conflicts between China and Taiwan from 1954 to 1955 and in 1958. China and the United States once again verged on direct military confrontation over the Taiwan Strait. Xiaojia Hou indicates in the sixth chapter that the Taipei-Washington mutual defense treaty of 1954 transformed what had been the Chinese Civil War into part of the global Cold War. Moreover, Beijing learned from the Korean War and tried to avoid another total war outside China’s border. As a result, limited military attacks mixed with Cold War politics over the Taiwan Strait throughout the 1950s. Chinese leaders resolved to avoid direct conflict over the offshore islands of Jinmen (Kinmen) and Mazu (Matsu) if the Americans committed to their defense. Part Three, ‘Rapprochement and Opportunities’, explores how the United States and China, bitter enemies during the Vietnam War, opened up to diplomatic rapprochement in the late 1960s. In Chapter Seven, ‘Media and US-China Reconciliation’, Guolin Yi addresses these dramatic episodes, like Ping-Pong diplomacy and Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing, through the eyes of the mass media. He concludes that the US media made substantial contributions to the key events of Sino-American rapprochement from 1969 when Richard Nixon took office to his historic China trip in 1972. Besides transmitting signals between the two governments, the media proposed policies ahead of the American government, as well as public opinion, and functioned as a ‘cultural diplomat’ in the official and unofficial interactions between the two countries. In Chapter Eight, ‘Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991’, Yafeng Xia critically analyzes how Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader after Mao, handled US relations in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown. Deng grappled with balancing China’s leadership between Conservatives and Reformers. Although Deng wanted to ‘keep the US door open’, he did not want to show weakness in dealing with Washington. Deng’s foreign policy directive, ‘avoiding the limelight, and getting some things done’,saved Communist rule in China. Had the Bush administration responded strongly to the Tiananmen crackdown, it might have delayed China’s economic rise, but it would not have toppled the Chinese Communist regime.

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Qiang Fang examines post-Tiananmen US-China relations in Chapter Nine, ‘Jiang Zemin and the United States: Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge’. According to his research, Jiang employed several strategies including greater economic reform, concession on human rights, and reserving strength to deal with the US, whose market, technological, and financial resources were critical to China’s modernization. Despite the Taiwan Strait Crisis, embassy bombing, and plane collision, Sino-American relations remained mostly stable and cordial in the Jiang era. While Jiang repeatedly stressed the importance of Sino-American relations, he, like Deng Xiaoping, continued to privately view the US as China’s biggest enemy. Unlike Deng, who preferred to conceal strength and bide his time, Jiang, emboldened by China’s rising economic and military might, became more assertive and forceful with the United States. Part Four responds to the new-century question, ‘Did China Lose America?’ In Chapter Ten, ‘China’s Belt-Road Strategy: Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America’, Xiaoxiao Li explains Xi Jinping’s Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) as a vast and complex global development strategy, involving infrastructure development and investments in more than 165 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. He emphasizes that BRI is independent of any US involvement. To contain Xi’s new aggressive strategy, the Trump administration criticized China’s violations of human rights, especially the detention of more than one million people in Xinjiang. The chapter examines an important shift in Xinjiang’s geopolitical position from Mao’s strategic rear in the Cold War to Xi’s strategic centre within the BRI network. Xiaobing Li argues in Chapter Eleven, ‘The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations’, that in Xi Jinping’s BRI, the East and South China Seas have become the most concerning flash points in Asia, an important source of insecurity in the Western Pacific, and a possible place of engagement between American and Chinese armed forces. The chapter explains why Beijing continues its pro-active defense strategy of deterring perceived foreign invasion both offshore and outside China’s border. He concludes that the PLA will overcome its military technology gap with a superior military power like the United States, by avoiding disastrous engagement on the mainland. Therefore, active defense policies, like the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), became aggressive in nature and heightened tensions between China, Japan, Taiwan, and the US in the East and South China Seas. This essay collection concludes that China’s security system has faced increasingly unstable and uncertain factors as the US has transferred its strategic attention to the region, implemented its ‘“rebalancing” strategy,’

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brought historical change, and adjusted the region’s political, economic, and strategic structures. While factors of insecurity and instability remain, China is surrounded by an unfavourable security environment, something the PRC knew when it was founded. Due to all the above challenges, Xi Jinping faces an arduous task to safeguard China’s national unification, territorial integrity, and developmental interests. The period of 2022–2040 is the most important time for China’s rejuvenation, as well as a time when China will face serious, unprecedented challenges.

Bibliography 2020. ‘Pompeo Adviser Yu Maochun (Miles M. Yu) Says that China has no Real Friend,’ in Lianhe zaobao, September 23. Chomsky, Noam. February 14, 2012. ‘”Losing” the World: American Decline in Perspective, Part 1’, Guardian Comment Network in https://chomsky.info/20120214/, Accessed April 2021. Cohen, Warren I. 2019. America’s Response to China. Columbia: Columbia University Press. Chang, Gordon. 2001. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House. Dorman, Sam. September 2, 2020. ‘Pompeo Declares China to be Greatest Foreign Power Threat to US: It’s Not, Frankly, a Close Call’, in The Fox News: https://www. foxnews.com/politics/pompeo-china-not-russia-greatest-us-threat, Accessed April 4 2021. Editorial. April 27, 2020. “The CCTV News Fiercely Attacks Pompeo Who is Becoming the Common Human Enemy” in The Beijing Daily: https://ie.bjd. com.cn/5b165687a010550e5ddc0e6a/contentApp/5b16573ae4b02a9fe2d558f9/ AP5ea6c71fe4b0b1fafa1940c2.html?isshare=1&contentType=0&isBjh=0, Accessed April 5 2021. Feng, Lu. October 24, 2019. “Xi Jinping Loses both the U.S. and Hong Kong,” Apple Daily. Harding, Harry. 1992. A Fragile Relationship since 1972. Washington D.C.: Brookings Press. Hong, Zhaohui and Sun, Yi. 2010. ‘The Butterfly Effect and the Making of “Ping-Pong Diplomacy”’. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 9, No. 25: 429–48. Hu, Xijin. July 26, 2020. ‘China Needs more Nuclear Weapons to Calm down the United States’, The Global Times: Li, Xiaobing, Yi Sun, and Wynn Gadkar-Wilcox2020. East Asia and the West: An Entangled History. San Diego, CA: Cognella.

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Metz, Justin. May 1, 2021. ‘The Most Dangerous Place on Earth; America and China Must Work Harder to Avoid War over the Future of Taiwan’. The Economist: ??? Pillsbury, Michael. 2015. The Hundred Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Restuccia, Andrew. February 11, 2021. ‘Biden Says China Will “Eat Our Lunch” on Infrastructure’, The Wall Street Journal: www.wsj.com/articles/biden-sayschina-will-eat-our-lunch-on-infrastructure-11613063295, Accessed April 7 2021. Shambaugh, David. 2020. China and the World. New York: Oxford University Press. Shambaugh, David. 2013. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. New York: Oxford University Press. Shesgreen, Deirdre. 2020. ‘Mike Pompeo Likens China Threat to “Frankenstein”, Says Engagement Han’s Worked’, in USA Today, July 23. Smith, Ben. April 20, 2020. ‘The U.S. Tried to Teach China a Lesson about the Media, It Backfired’. The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/ business/media/coronavirus-us-china-journalists.html Accessed May 31, 2021. Wang, Weiwen. July 24, 2020. ‘Trump Threatens to Close More Chinese Consulates, the Severing of Diplomatic Relations between China and the US is Likely’. Lianhe zaobao:.??? Wu, Xinbo. July 11, 2020. “Sino-US Strategic Competition,” https://fddi.fudan.edu. cn/b2/dc/c18965a242396/page.htm. Accessed May 25 2021. Yang, Zhiguo. 2022. ‘Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947’, chapter 4, in Li & Fang, eds., Sino-American Relations: A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Yaoyao, Dai and Luwei Rose Luqiu. May 12, 2021. ‘China’s “Wolf Warrior” Diplomats Like to Talk Tough,’ The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/2021/05/12/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-like-talk-tough/. Accessed March 2, 2021.

About the Authors Dr. Xiaobing Li is professor of history and the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma. He is editor of the Journal of Chinese Historical Review. His recent books include The Dragon in the Jungle, Attack at Chosin, The Mountain Movers, China’s War in Korea, East Asia and the West, History of Taiwan, Corruption and Anti-corruption in Modern China, Power vs. Law, and The Cold War in East Asia.

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Dr. Qiang Fang is professor of East Asian History at the University of Minnesota-Duluth and also a visiting professor at China University of Geosciences in Wuhan. He has authored several books such as Communist Judicial System in China, 1927-1076: Building on Fear; Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party; Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance; Zhongguo shangfang zhidu shihua, 1100 BCE–1949 [A Short History of Chinese Petitions].

Part One Background and Lost Voices

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From Admirer to Critic Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States Patrick Fuliang Shan Abstract The May Fourth Movement was the demarcation line in Li’s strikingly incongruent early pro-American stance and his later pro-Russian posture. His altered attitude paralleled the nation-wide demonstrations. What remained unchanged in his mind was his underlying nationalistic zeal for seeking an exemplar for China’s modernization. Before 1919, he intended to transform his country by pursuing the American model. However, this hope was dashed by the decision of the Paris Peace Conference. It was this event that inspired his noticeable ideological change. As he leaned towards Soviet Russia, he embraced communism. When he relinquished his long-held positive view of the United States, he became a pro-Russian activist, championed for the communist cause, and urged his countrymen to emulate Soviet Russia. Keywords: Admirer, critic, America, nationalism, communism

Introduction To many, it sounds ridiculous to link China’s first communist, Li Dazhao (1889–1927), with the United States, the global capitalist stronghold. Li never studied in America and did not even set foot on American soil. Li and America seem to be two distant unrelated objects impossible to group together. Nonetheless, the two are connected, because Li studied America ardently, deliberated over America frequently, and published on America regularly. He often cited American precedents to address China’s issues and intended to follow the American model for his nation’s modernization. As a progressive intellectual, he pioneered the exploration of Western civilization

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch01

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and paid close attention to the ascending superpower in North America. Confronting the status quo of his nation, Li felt the urgency of studying and emulating America. Yet, he ultimately drifted away, got closer to Soviet Russia, and embraced communism. His change in stance impacted his contemporaries, swayed the youth, and redirected his nation’s historical path. Without a doubt, an understanding of Li’s attitudes towards the United States will assist our comprehension of the complex historical evolution of twentieth century China. A close examination of Li Dazhao’s writings demonstrates that his attitudes towards America changed during the May Fourth Movement in 1919. Before it, Li was an admirer of America who appreciated almost every aspect of American civilization. To be specific, Li became a vanguard of promoting and emulating American democracy. His admiration of American civilization tended to be all-inclusive, ranging from American history to US politics and from folklore to historical figures. More than thirty-five percent of all his early articles mention America-related issues and over a quarter of his writings during his lifetime touched upon America. After the May Fourth Movement, however, he started to criticize American leaders, condemned American imperialism, and derided American democracy. The sudden switch was partially caused by Woodrow Wilson’s actions at the Paris Peace Conference. In Li’s eyes, Wilson helped decide to transfer the former German colonial privileges in Shandong to the Japanese Empire, which left Li feeling betrayed, as his country had fought on the American side during the Great War. His departure from the American model was accompanied by his rapid march towards communism, by his approbation of the Russian Revolution, and by his selection of Soviet Russia as a new model for his nation. Unfortunately, not a single scholarly book or article has been published on the relationship between Li Dazhao and America. The nonexistence of any scholarly activity, either in China or abroad, leaves it a much-neglected topic. The reasons for the absence are multiple, as it might be regarded as irrelevant, viewed as marginal, or deemed as unimportant. Even further, Li’s prominent status as China’s first communist and a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party has eclipsed his early ties with the United States. Yet, the study of Li Dazhao is a booming field in China, as a thousand articles and a few dozen books were published in the past five decades, and Western scholars have also written about this important historical figure. Needless to say, almost all of the existing literature has been devoted to Li’s philosophical thought, his conversion to communism, and his leading role in the early communist movement. Fortunately, the publication of The Complete Works

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of Li Dazhao in 2013 offers a number of newfound articles written by Li. This set of five volumes allows us to probe Li’s changing attitudes towards America, his feelings for the American people, and his analysis of American civilization.

Learning America from Afar The fact that Li Dazhao never visited the United States despite frequently featuring it in his writings puzzles everyone. This naturally requires an investigation of the way he acquired relevant information about the distant trans-Pacific country. Interestingly enough, Li himself went through many life changes, each one a milestone allowing him to get closer to America. During his youth, China underwent upheavals leading to dramatic transformation. Imperial decay and national weakness had frustrated Chinese intellectuals, who searched for a new model of national salvation. It was popular to introduce foreign cultures and this impacted young Li. Before 1919, he paid close attention to America, reading widely and writing productively. Even after he embraced communism in 1919, he continued to retain his strong interest in America, although his political viewpoint differed. Throughout his life, he gleaned America-related information from afar through diverse channels, such as schools, media, and publications, with occasional contact with Americans from whom he acquired first-hand information. Li Dazhao’s early classical education influenced his concern for his nation’s weakness, which was a factor in his continuing passion for a new model. He was born in Zhili [Hebei] in 1889. As a youth, he was educated at three private schools for Confucian learning. It is impossible for him to have learned about America there, because the goal of traditional education was to excel in the Civil Service Examination System. However, the sudden abolition of the system in 1905 terminated his prospects of being a government official. No evidence could be found to connect Li with his initial knowledge of America during those years, but the recent finding of Li Dazhao’s 1898 hand-copied Chinese translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations reveals his passion for Western learning (Wu 1994, 49). Because Smith wrote extensively on the thirteen British colonies, young Li could have learned about colonial America from this monumental book. The crucial moment for Li Dazhao’s transition to modern education came when he enrolled as a student at Yongping Prefecture Middle School in 1905. This school was established three years before as a part of the late Qing reform. Because Western learning was offered, Li got his first

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chance to learn English, Western history, geography, and politics, besides other subjects (Wu 1994, 54–55). He exhibited his Western learning in his own “My Autobiography” written in English for his American teacher, Arthur Robinson, in Tokyo: “I went to Yung Ping Fu [Yongping Prefecture] to study the primary sciences in the middle school. It was the beginning of my English lesson[s] and I spent two years there” (Meisner 1967, 3). Not far away was an American mission school run by the Methodist Episcopal Church, where Li’s classmate, Liu Yunzhi, later became a teacher. This may indicate that students at Yongping and the mission might have maintained ties, although we do not have any evidence about Li’s personal contact with the American missionaries (Li 2013, 1:148). In any case, it is safe to argue that Li acquired rich knowledge about the West during his two-year study at Yongping, which helped shape his embryonic view of the United States. A new vista of learning about the West opened in 1907 when Li Dazhao was admitted to the North China College of Law and Politics in Tianjin, where he received his formal undergraduate education until his graduation in 1913. Western learning occupied a large part of his curriculum. Not only did he study Western history, geography, laws, Western constitutions, and other subjects, but he also became proficient in two foreign languages, Japanese and English (Liu 1989, 6). More importantly, he was tutored by Japanese professors, including Yoshino Sakuzo, whose expertise on the West had a long-term impact on Li. Without direct access to America, Li viewed the emerging superpower across the Pacific Ocean from a distance. Being well-versed in the two foreign languages, Li was able to browse books and journals from Japan and America, wade into a new landscape, and driftcloser towards American civilization. As the United States became the largest global economy, it inevitably drew Chinese attention for its role in the new world order. While almost all his Western learning courses devoted a certain amount of time to the United States, Li’s familiarity with America was unquestionably strengthened. Moreover, he became an editor of The Political Review [Yanzhi], in which he published thirty-five articles (Zhu 2009, 38). Some of these touched upon issues in the United States or used American cases to interpret China’s problems. For example, in his article on impeachment in 1913, he quoted the views of American politicians, including those of Michael C. Kerr, Thomas Cooper, and Joel Prentiss Bishop (Li 2013, 1:14). Li Dazhao’s study abroad in Japan (1913–1916) marked a major turning point in his contact with American culture. Not only did his major in politics and economy at Waseda University allow him to further explore the United States, but his encounters with American scholars opened his eyes and

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helped him retrieve first-hand information. He lived in a YMCA dormitory near the campus, which was run by the global network of America’s Christian community. It was in this dormitory where he studied the Bible, leaned English with American teachers such as Arthur Robinson, and gained substantial information about American culture (Zhu 2009, 230). From his Japanese professors, he acquired new knowledge about the American economy and politics. The availability of books at the university library granted him a chance to explore related issues. He did not miss the opportunity to listen to American scholars’ public lectures. For instance, he attended Shailer Mathews’ talk, from which he learned the importance of public opinion in the United States (Li 2013, 2:157). Although he was expelled from Waseda due to his political activities, his Tokyo years saw him profoundly impacted by American civilization. For more than two years after his return to China, Li Dazhao’s new job as an editor for three newspapers in Beijing continued to broaden his familiarity with America. He made full use of his profession to explore American culture, do further research on the United States, and develop his unique perspectives on the American way of life. During those two years, he published about 100 articles in newspapers and journals, of which many were on America-related issues and in which he urged his countrymen to emulate American democracy. He liked to read American journals; North American Review and Atlantic Monthly were his favorites. Through recurring opportunities to explore American culture, Li emerged as a pro-American democrat who expressed his admiration through his conscious self-awareness. At special times, he defended America-centred Western learning. The Chen Jintao case in early 1917 is an example: Chen earned his doctorate degree from Yale University. After returning to China, he became the financial minister of the Chinese government. Unfortunately, his acceptance of a large sum of bribes was exposed as a national scandal. The conservatives took advantage of this opportunity to smear Western learning and vented their deeply rooted prejudice against it, particularly American culture. Li Dazhao published an article to defend Western learning, arguing that “this current case is an occasion for us to deliver our verdict on good and evil, while it has nothing to do with the new learning or the traditional learning” (Li 2013, 2:140, 166). There are few gaps in the course of Li Dazhao’s personal life; nevertheless, a number of transitions occurred, as his multifaceted career led him down diverse tracks. In early 1918, Li was hired by Beijing University as the head librarian, a position he held until late 1922, during which he contributed significantly to China’s library enterprise. He purchased a large number of

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foreign language books for his library, including those from the United States. More importantly, he utilized its available sources to deepen his study of America. With those rich materials, Li was drawn to Western scholarship by fashioning a connection with the global community, as Leigh Jenco points out (Jenco 2016, 436–445). Within the new culture-dominated terrain, Li indulged himself in the America-focused materials and wrote more articles. He read American scholars’ monographs, such as those by John Burgess, Paul Reinsch, Arthur H. Noyes, and Jeremiah W. Jenkins. He even translated a chapter of Jenkins’ Principles of Politics, with the intention to familiarize the Chinese with America’s constitutional rule (Li 2013, 5:546–558). Li tried to build a working relationship with the Library of Congress and personally interacted with its librarian, Katherine H. Wead, in 1921 (Wang 2010, 235). Needless to say, he learned more about America from those episodic, yet direct, encounters. Another shift in Li Dazhao’s career was his appointment as a professor at Beijing University in 1920, which required him to read more on America for teaching his courses. Although he became a self-converted communist in 1919, his passion for America remained strong. In fact, the ongoing New Cultural Movement led to the upsurge of public attention on America as a new superpower, which required Chinese intellectuals to acquire more relevant information. Adding to this growing passion, Li conducted his own research. His interests widened as he explored American politics, the economy, education, ethnicities, labour, and other topics by his direct use of foreign language sources. His interaction with his colleagues shows their common interests. Once, Hu Shi, a professor at the same university, wrote an article entitled “American Women” and asked Li to offer a foreword. In it, Li speaks highly of Hu’s work, stressing the importance of knowing more about American women (Li 2013, 2:336). Hu Shi studied in the United States and his friendship with Li allowed the latter to obtain more information about America. It is interesting to note that during this time Li even familiarized himself with communist doctrine through American publications, because he often read the materials published by Rand School of Social Sciences in New York City, which deepened his understanding of the communistic ideology, Lenin’s theory, Trotsky’s ideas, and Soviet Russia (Li 2013, 3:412). After Li Dazhao co-founded the Chinese Communist Party, and especially after his forging of the United Front with Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party, Li devoted himself to the ongoing revolutionary movement. Yet, he continued to study America, albeit in a critical way. As he gradually became a professional revolutionary, his time for the study of America was reduced. Nevertheless, he still paid attention to the United States and even worked

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with radical American intellectuals. In 1925, he hired an American couple in Beijing, Bill and Rayna Prohme, to edit the English publications of the official documents of the United Front (Hirson 2007, 12). He called Rayna “Peng Taitai” and even mentioned her in his last testimony he wrote in the prison in 1927 (Li 2011, 408). His five-month visit to the Soviet Union in 1924 was his opportunity of interacting with the leaders of the Communist Party of the USA (Li 2013, 5:26). To cope with the warlord regime’s persecution, Li hid himself in mid-March 1926 inside the Russian Embassy, where he stayed for over a year. In such a situation, he might have been unable to continue his studies, although he kept utilizing his existing knowledge of America to analyze complicated international issues. His execution by Warlord Zhang Zuolin in 1927 abruptly ended his long odyssey of learning about America from afar.

America’s Admirer Before the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Li Dazhao presented extensive, and wide-ranging coverage of America-related issues through his writings. As a vanguard of the New Cultural Movement, he offered a rich repository of literature which revealed the mood of the Chinese intelligentsia in emulating America for China’s reconstruction. In his work, Li showcased his almost complete admiration, while his analysis and discourse shepherded public opinion to recognize the importance of the emerging superpower across the Pacific Ocean. Under his pen, America was a democratic lightning rod to fend off tyranny. With his passion, he inspired the Chinese to learn from America. His promotion of the American model, its democratic system, and its constitutional tradition triggered an aspirational pursuit of democracy. By presenting the American way of life, he criticized China’s traditional despotism and warned its leaders to restrain themselves from crossing the red line. With his endeavours, Li emerged as a pro-American democrat with a blueprint of transforming China by following the American model. First, Li Dazhao unfolded a grand picture of the extraordinary development of American democracy by tracing it back to the American Revolution. He acknowledged the difficulties of building such a system, saying, “American independence ultimately succeeded, because of bloody battles during the eight long years.” In contrast, he told the Chinese that China’s path to democracy might be one hundred times harder due to its long tyrannical tradition (Li 2013, 2:54, 255). He spoke highly of “The Declaration of Indepen­ dence,” ranking it as one of the most significant political documents because

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it contributed to global democratic progress (Li 2013, 1:285). By elevating “The Declaration of Independence” and its influence on world history, Li valued, endorsed, and publicized American democratic ideals. His discourse was not confined within American bounds; rather, he superimposed it onto a global worldview to caution the Chinese against any attempts of drifting away from the universally shared value. Li Dazhao praised the Constitution of the United States as a guarantor of liberty and freedom. He stated: “a group of talented elites who emerged during the American Revolution gathered together in Philadelphia. For the long-term security and well-being of their country, those men crafted a constitution with their own hands, and turned it into a legendary tale on everyone’s lips in the world of political commentators.” More significant is that the American Constitution could be amended so long as two-thirds of the members of Congress approved it, with a further ratification by the states. Li highlighted the importance of “The Bill of Rights,” the first amendment, in protecting freedom and justice. With all of these, Li maintained that the Americans set up a model for other countries to draft their own constitutions (Li 2013, 1:106, 363–367, 405). By virtue of this constitution, the United States had become “the purest democratic federal country” (Li 2013, 2:398). Such a tradition allowedAmerican legislators in Congress to peacefully and orderly deliberate over issues and pass laws. Li noticed the magnitude of impeachment under American constitutional rule, which could prevent transgression and violations. However, Li did not totally copy the American political system. In contrast to the two-house system in the US Congress, he proposed the one-house system for the Chinese congress due to China’s special national circumstances (Li 2013, 1:12, 95, 493). Li Dazhao applied his study of American democracy to his analysis of Chinese politics and utilized the American model to admonish Chinese politicians. Never did he confine his discourse to the purely scholarly limit; rather, he applied his thinking in practice to contemporary Chinese issues. He advocated for curbing the potential arbitrary power of Chinese politicians who were warned to restrain themselves from exercising prerogative authority. By citing John William Burgess’s notion of sovereignty, Li criticized Yuan Shikai’s move of creating a new constitution in 1913. Li remarked: “The power of a president was endowed by the constitution which he should defend. If the president promulgates a constitution, it seems to be an irony as if a son gives birth to his mother” (Li 2013, 1:107). After suppressing the Second Revolution in 1913, Yuan Shikai outlawed the Nationalist Party and planned to dissolve Congress. In contrast to Yuan’s moves, Li studied the salary issue of legislators in various countries, emphasizing American congressmen’s high

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salary, compensation, and reimbursement. Li told the Chinese confidently that “our congress is suspended for the time being, but it will be reopened so long as our republic exists. By then, the salary will be an issue” (Li 2013, 1:139). After citing Ralph Waldo Emerson’s view, Li argued that democracy could never be quashed, because it represented a universal value (Li 2013, 1:277). In 1914, Frank Johnson Goodnow, Yuan Shikai’s advisor, claimed that a change in China’s national political system might be necessary, because the Chinese were not ready for democracy and because the people lacked the ability to participate politically. Li condemned Goodnow’s views and defended China’s newly built republican system (Li 2013, 1:207). In contrast to his admonition of China’s politicians, Li Dazhao praised American leaders as inspirational exemplars. His lauding of American leaders is evidence of his admiration for American civilization. To Li, George Washington was a paragon who refused to hold power beyond his second term, on which Li commented “ever since such a figure set up this praiseworthy precedent, the American people even now especially cherish the righteous virtues he left behind” (Li 2013, 1:159). In Li’s eyes, Teddy Roosevelt was a hero: “Even after his retirement from the presidency, he hunted in the deep mountains and used his fists to fight wild animals” (Li 2013, 1:317). Woodrow Wilson was respected as an indispensable world leader. Li commented in 1917 that “Mr. Wilson has been revered as a lover of peace. I am confident that the dawn of peace will rise on the eastern side of the Pacific Ocean, while the burden for peace will rest rightly on Mr. Wilson’s shoulders” (Li 2013, 1:458). As soon as the Great War ended, Li endorsed Wilson’s idea of establishing an international organization to ensure peace (Li 2013, 2:377). Li envisioned that this organization could be an initial step towards a global federation (Li 2013, 2:399). Indeed, Li bumped into “the Wilsonian Moment,” as Erez Manela terms it, which shows Wilson’s wide-ranging impact upon the global community (Manela 2019, 409). Li Dazhao extolled American social fluidity, which allowed gifted and hard-working individuals to climb the social ladder. He remarked: “America’s rich, influential, and powerful individuals mostly were sons of mediocre businessmen. With their unyielding spirit and their integrity, they strove to tap the natural treasures of the New World. While they became wealthy, their country became rich and strong” (Li 2013, 2:129). To draw public attention, Li selected Horace Greeley as a special example, making him the subject of a long article. Li traced Greeley’s ordinary background, his family’s suffering after his father’s bankruptcy, and his difficult early years. Through persistence, however, Greeley became the owner of an influential newspaper in the United States. From a child labourer to a typist, and then

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to a manager of a magazine, Greeley relied on his ability and efforts to amass wealth. Ultimately, he established the New York Tribune in 1841 at the age of thirty and then turned it into a daily newspaper with a circulation of 100,000. Li praised Greeley’s diligence, talent, and contributions and advised young Chinese to follow in his footsteps to chase their own careers (Li 2013, 1:351–355). Li Dazhao lauded the noble spirit of the American people who dedicated themselves to the public good without caring for honours. He wrote that “under America’s constitutional rule, the president has no power to bestow noble titles; yet American citizens are eager to work for the righteous cause” (Li 2013, 2:18). Amazingly, even senior Americans were active for social service, as Li noted (Li 2013, 2:45). He appreciated American fraternal social relationships, because people held friendly attitudes towards others even if unrelated and unassociated. This cordial tie existed among those who never met, which was, as Li termed, “the genuine social relationship.” Thus, he persuaded his countrymen to imitate the American style of social conduct. Nevertheless, he was critical of romantic love in the United States, on which he wrote a short story. The protagonists were General William Sherman and a Latina girl in Monterey, California. During the Mexican-American War, Sherman was stationed there and met the local girl. Handing her a beautiful rose, he won the lady’s heart. She planted the rose and waited for his return for over half a century. Unfortunately, he never came back. Li did not prize this kind of romance; instead, he expressed pity for the loyal woman (Li 2013, 1:505–506). This is Li’s only criticism of America before 1919. Although American women did not get national suffrage until 1920, Li took note of the great achievements of the feminist movement. For Li, women should enjoy equal rights in politics, society, finances, and education, which were fundamental to democratic life. American women’s bravery, wisdom, and high spirit in smashing men’s “arbitrary monopoly” was praiseworthy. Li happily saw American women filling the positions left by men during the Great War, but he bemoaned the unfair salary they received. To his delight, women won voting rights in some states, and he extolled their political participation in Colorado, Utah, and other states. The old fear that female voting rights would erode family life proved to be unfounded, for which Li provided evidence from Colorado:. it was a story of a couple who voted for different political parties. Although the wife’s candidate did not win, post-election family life was not harmed at all. Li spoke highly of American women for “their independent judging capability.” He extolled Jeanette Rankin for breaking the glass ceiling by winning a seat in Congress to become the first congresswoman in American history. Mentioning Rankin’s refusal

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to cast her ballot to support America’s war against Germany, Li praised her stance against violence (Li 2013, 2:414–415). After analyzing the American demographical make-up, Li Dazhao proclaimed that a miracle had occurred in the United States. He remarked that “ever since the Anglo-Saxons immigrated into America, they gradually became the dominant native-born residents. However, their population did not multiply much, and subsequently, America has relied on European immigrants to reinforce its demographical vigor, which becomes a miraculous wonder.” Commenting on this phenomenon, he was at odds with Thomas Malthus, whom Li criticized for formulating an invalid theory. According to Li, the population of modern industrialized societies declined, differing from Malthus’ vision. He coined the term “the civilization illness” in his discussion of the population drop. He polled a group of female graduates from Bryn Mawr College in which only one among sixteen gave birth to one child born in a seventeen-year span. Having ridiculed Malthus, Li stressed the American miracle by which the land was not only populated by those who were born there, but also by a large number of immigrants, whoreinforced its social dynamism to such an extent that “half are native-born and half are immigrants” among the white residents (Li 2013, 2:67). Through his widely publicized writings, Li Dazhao drew Chinese attention to the increasing importance of the United States as a new superpower. Not only would the world face America as a defining force of world peace, but would also confront the reality of America’s dominant power in international affairs (Li 2013, 2:23). As Li observed, the United States had reaped profits during the Great War while other powers bled themselves. By early 1917, the global financial centre had shifted to the United States, which owned sixty percent of all existing ready-made commodities in the world (Li 2013, 1:451). In an article on copper, a crucial metal for industry and the military, Li itemized its global distribution, stressing that American ownership of this metal constituted about seventy percent of the total, allowing the United States to easily manipulate its production, sale, and price (Li 2013, 1:461). Nevertheless, as Li pointed out, the United States encountered a serious issue despite its rise as a superpower. After it declared war against Germany, the danger emerged, as “about twenty million among ninety million American residents are of German descent, which is the most burdensome worry” (Li 2013, 1:478). Li’s concern over this issue influenced his admiration of America, inspiring serious doubts. Not surprisingly, Li Dazhao tried to press China to join the alliance with America, soon after the United States severed its diplomatic ties with Germany in 1917. Li wrote an article urging the Chinese government to

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cut its ties and then declare war against Germany. He echoed American justifications for war while viewing the German Empire according to the American stance. To win public support, Li reasoned that it “is not to regard Germany as the enemy, but to show our honesty in order to be in rapport with the allied and neutral nations … This move is not only for the war but also for postwar diplomacy” (Li 2013, 1:457). Here, Li offered his countrymen a realistic imperative: Germany would be defeated regardless and the United States would still be a superpower. Nevertheless, he hoped that “the United States and other Western countries could immediately move out of their narrow-minded racial mentality, move in line with universal humanitarianism, and treat all colored people equally” (Li 2013, 2:156).

A Critic of the United States Li Dazhao’s attitude towards the United States abruptly shifted during the May Fourth Movement in 1919. The reasons might be multiple, but the major one was China’s “strident nationalism” (Weston 2004, 253), as Timothy B. Weston terms it, which motivated radical Chinese intellectuals to shift their former pro-Western—in particular, pro-American—viewto a pro-Russian outlook. The direct cause was the decision of the Paris Peace Conference to transfer former German colonial privileges to the Japanese Empire, which caused a political storm and outburst of popular rage. The ripple effect was dramatic as demonstrations swept across the country, for which Li was one of the leaders (Shan 2020, 3–22). While the great powers failed China’s expectation to reclaim national sovereignty in Shandong, Soviet Russia responded generously by declaring its intention to relinquish Russian privileges in China. It was in the wake of the protests that Li started to align with Soviet Russia. Consequently, Li’s attitude towards America changed. With his praise of America diminished, he instead raised his newly sarcastic voice to blast American leaders, slam American imperialism, and satirize American democracy. First, Li Dazhao wrote to condemn Woodrow Wilson, whom he had greatly admired just a few months earlier. Wilson was a steady voice for world peace at the Paris Peace Conference and was respected as a global leader. Yet, the decision on China enraged Li. Although the notion that Woodrow Wilson betrayed China might be a misconception, as Bruce Elleman’s study shows, the decision in Paris caused China’s disappointment and popular anger (Elleman 2002, 135). Li expressed his fury at Wilson for establishing “a world of bandits,” saying indignantly: “Mr. Wilson! I feel sorry for you! I

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feel sad for you!” (Li 2013, 2:457–459). Li was not an ersatz intellectual under the spell of others; his nationalistic zeal was a spontaneous response to what happened in Paris. Like other radical intellectuals, Li began to turn to Russia “as a model for its [China’s] twentieth century modernization and development” (Elleman 2002, 136). After Li Dazhao’s embrace of communism, he began to reevaluate American democracy. Without a doubt, he still had faith in democracy but he claimed that communism would lead to true democracy. With his new stance, he started to expose the hypocritical nature of American democracy and tried his best to uncover its flaws. American politicians did not conform to democratic standards, failed to follow the democratic spirit, and often led the American people into political quagmires. By citing the Marxist doctrine, Li argued that American capitalism had generated an utter fallacy, as “the personal relationship no longer exists and as it turns everything into the commercial tie as if among commodities” (Li 2013, 3:137). Thus, “no justice could be found under the selfish capitalist system and the egoist imperialist system” (Li 2013, 3:100). Because women were treated unfairly, Li raved that “democracy in America cannot be called true democracy” (Li 2013, 3:90). Further, “Under the current imperialist system, no room can be reserved for democracy” (Li 2013, 4:153). The false façade of American democracy contradicted democratic principles. According to Li, elections were always manipulated by rich men. He remarked that “a steel tycoon in America often has a million ballots under his control during an election. During the campaign for presidency, a candidate cannot be elected, if he is not endorsed by industrial tycoons. The people below the tycoons have lost their political prudence and simply become submissive puppets to accept orders” (Li 2013, 4:476). Li Dazhao remained attuned to events in America, but increasingly became a fault-finding observer. In July 1919, he wrote an article to relay the shocking news of terrorist attacks. He said:“I trembled at the recent bombing cases in America,” as parcels were mailed through the post office a few weeks previously to officials and entrepreneurs in many American cities (Li 2013, 2:493). One senator’s wife was even injured while opening a package. Delivering the horrible news, Li presented a chaotic saga of dread and unmasked perilous behaviour in capitalist society. Moreover, Li examined the issue of suicide in America and its ruinous effects. Under the capitalist system, dissolute evils and unbridled debauchery led to the startling increase of suicide cases, especially those in New York City and Philadelphia. As Li noticed, this phenomenon was connected to the unhealthy life in “the defective society” (Li 2013, 4:33–42).

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In the early 1920s, Li Dazhao spent much of his time heralding the ruinous influence of imperialist powers, including the United States, upon China. The imperialists resorted to the gunboat policy to invade China, forced the Chinese to accept unequal treaties, occupied concession areas, and enjoyed numerous privileges. China’s traditional agrarian economy was taken under their control, while its traditional manufacture entered bankruptcy, so that “the entire nation has become a proletarian class of the world” (Li 2013, 3:189). Further, “Being crushed by the invasion of imperialism equipped by the capitalist system in Europe and America, the Chinese people are lowered down to subjugated and anemic status (Li 2013, 4:124).” The eight-powers, including the United States, invaded China in 1900, purporting “to ensure that the Chinese people could never lift their heads again” (Li 2013, 5:68). Li’s unique perspective of the Chinese as a proletarian nation shed light on modern Chinese history. As a result, he tagged “international imperialism as the sole vicious enemy of the Chinese people” (Li 2013, 4:517). In 1924, Li published an article on child labour in Shanghai and highlighted American and other Western owners’ wrongdoing in exploiting children, damaging their health, and ruining young souls (Li 2013, 5:28–34). Under the brutal oppression, as Li saw it, Chinese children became a special appendage of the proletarian nation. With this new identity, Li heralded a new national goal of making revolution, overthrowing imperialism, and achieving national liberation. According to Li Dazhao’s analysis, “the United States had become the main one among all imperialist powers” by the early 1920s (Li 2013, 5:8). Witnessing China plunging into the Warlord Era, American imperialists supported military strongmen to seize benefits from China’s wounds. The United States backed Wu Peifu and Cao Kun in North China, and Lu Yongxiang in the Lower Yangzi River Valley, who in turn were fully complicit with America (Li 2013, 5:8–10). For Li, this was the way “the imperialist bandits have imposed their civilization upon China. They lured warlords as running dogs, supplied them with weapons, and assisted them to fight civil wars. How humane is it for the civilization of imperialism!” (Li 2013, 5:39). Even worse, “the imperialist powers employed the counterrevolutionaries to suppress the Chinese revolution” (Li 2013, 5:68). With American support, Wu Peifu once “crushed the revolutionary force led by Sun Yat-sen” and suppressed the workers’ strike along the Beijing-Hankou Railway Line in 1923 (Li 2013, 5:41). It is eye-opening to notice Li’s changing attitude to the Open Door Policy, a benchmark of America’s relationship with China. In 1916, Li claimed that this policy at least gave China a chance of dragging out a feeble existence during a terrible national crisis (Li 2013, 1:213). By 1923,

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however, Li condemned the same policy, because the United States intended to share the privileges already enjoyed by other powers. After this policy was reaffirmed at the Washington Conference, according to Li, America utilized it as a justification for sharing the spoils under superficially moral grounds. Its true objective was to create a new imperialist order in China, which Li saw as the “new international co-management” (Li 2013, 4:131). In Li Dazhao’s eyes, imperialist powers had accelerated the pace of aggression in China in the early 1920s, which quickly became unbearable. To vent his grievances, Li enumerated recent events to double down on his condemnation of American imperialism. By selecting the Coltman Case to demonstrate how the American government unreasonably bullied the Chinese government, Li offered an example of imperialist oppression. During a clash with Chinese soldiers, Charles Coltman was wounded and then died in Zhangjiakou (Anon 1922, 3). Not only did China have to pay compensation in the amount of $50,000 USD, it also had to penalize local officials. According to Li, Coltman had violated the Chinese law for smuggling contraband goods (Li 2013, 5:1). Economically, American tobacco companies were exemptfrom the consumer tax, causing much loss for China. Militarily, the United States pressed the Chinese government to permit organization of a Western fleet to navigate the Yangzi River, which was censured by Li as an impudent move (Li 2013, 5:5). In the realm of the media, the imperialist invasion was disturbing. Western news agencies, including those from the United States, spread rumors, which Li termed “the invasion of the media.” Li angrily requested the Chinese authorities expel foreign reporters due to the trouble they caused and the insults they inflicted (Li 2013, 4:581). Sixty-five years later, the Chinese government republished this article, purporting to step up its measures against the Western media, which drew international attention (Anon 1989, A12). Regardless of his hostility to American imperialism, Li Dazhao saw the American people as diverse entities while feeling a natural bond with disadvantaged groups. Although his prediction that the raging revolution movement in 1919 would arrive in the United States was inaccurate, he continued to pay attention to its class warfare (Li 2013, 2:403). To support the united front with Sun Yat-sen, Li cited the American precedent, for which the US Communist Party USA joined the Labour Party for mutual benefits (Li 2013, 4:507). He relished American radical intellectuals’ views and expressed his gratitude for their support of the Chinese revolution, offering his thanks to the Communist Party USA for its condemnation of imperialism (Li 2013, 5:26). Li enjoyed working with American leftist intellectuals. As mentioned above, William and Rayna Prohme went to Beijing in 1925 to edit

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the English publications under Li. William fell ill and the work was mostly done by his wife. Although Rayna was later confirmed not a member of the Communist Party USA, her diligent spirit deeply moved Li (Cott 2020, 362). Unfortunately, Rayna died in Moscow during her visit in 1927. At her funeral in the Russian capital, Chang Ke cited Li Dazhao’s accolades he had heard a couple of years before. Li stated: “Look at the good example of Rayna Prohme. See how devoted she is to our cause. She worked for us for a considerable time, but never once did she express one word of complaint, even under all sort of difficulties” (Hirson and Knodel 2007, 12–13). Similar tender feelings could be found in Li Dazhao’s discourse on American workers, as his articles were replete with stories about their selfless sacrifice in the struggle against the capitalist class. Li studied the workers’ strike in Chicago in 1886, during which labourers demanded the implementation of the eight-hour workday. Although Li termed what happened in Chicago on May 1, 1886, and the following days as “the Chicago tragedy,” he praised those who participated. He provided a detailed description of what occurred, including workers’ demands, street demonstrations, clashes with policemen, the fateful bombing, unfortunate casualties, and subsequent unfair sentences. To Li’s anguish, some of the leaders were executed and others prosecuted:he regarded these as wrongful cases. He collected biographical information on eight major leaders and extolled their sacrifice. To Li’s satisfaction, May 1 had been celebrated as the International Labour Day to honour the Chicago strike, which showcased American workers’ enduring influence upon the working class in the global community. At the same time, Li asserted that Labour Day in America had nothing to do with the Chicago strike, while May Day should be regarded as a more important holiday than any other traditional celebrations for labourers (Li 2013, 3: 237–240). Li Dazhao’s long-lasting endorsement of American women reveals his steadfast compassion for the oppressed gender. He was happy to see American women’s reputation reaching new heights as national suffrage was granted in 1920. To him, their struggle to achieve nation-wide voting rights was an extraordinary moment in world history, tantamount to “a revolution,” as Li defined it. He saw American women as pioneers of the feminist movement. He further explored the women’s liberation movement by emphasizing American women’s dedication during turbulent times. According to Li, the vicissitudes of the feminist movement and its triumph for suffrage could not be separated from American women’s conscious perseverance. Decades before, the International Council of Women was established in Washington DC to encourage women to participate in politics; Li highlighted

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Carrie Chapman Catt’s role in championing women’s equality in education, professional life, law, and society. Li commented that “a just and pleasant gender relationship should totally rely on both genders’ interdependence, equality, and mutual aids rather than on women’s subordination to men’s superiority” (Li 2013, 4:18–21). He was elated when suffrage was granted, declaring “American women now can bear the same social responsibility as men do” (Li 2013, 4:185). It is interesting to note that Li Dazhao meticulously studied the socialist movement in the United States while praising socialists’ fervour, dedication, efforts, bravery, and persistence (Li 2013, 4:279). By utilizing Arthur H. Noyes’ works along with other sources, Li explored the entire gamut of American socialist experiments by religious leaders, utopians, activists, and immigrants (Li 2013, 3:50). He acknowledged the origins of socialism in Europe, but underlined its progress in “America, which is a pure new land, which provides rich and cheap soil for experiment, and which lacks the reactionary force as it is in Europe. Henceforth, those visionaries can freely experiment with their ideals there” (Li 2013, 3:195). Li examined Robert Owen and his New Harmony, his model community, particularly the one established in Indiana. He adored Owen’s valour, fearlessness, and determination, and acclaimed him as a great reformer. Yet, Li lamented Owen’s failure and accused the political climate of ruining his plans (Li 2013, 3:316–323). Obviously, Li placed the blame on the existing capitalist system for Owen’s failed experiments. Being firm in his communist stance, he intended to find continuity versus disruption, as well as similarities versus differences between utopian socialism and scientific communism to affirm his faith in the latter.

Professional Liaison Li Dazhao’s professional liaison with America from January 1918 to December 1922 was an extraordinary period of his life. As the head librarian at Beijing University, Li admired the library enterprise in America, strove to learn from the American standard, and was involved in exchange activities with American colleagues. Li’s professional connection breaks the 1919 demarcation line, as it displays his continued positive attitude in this special field. Needless to say, his open mind fostered learning about America’s library system, making him able to apply his knowledge to his own management to facilitate higher learning. Interestingly, he did not voice any criticism towards the American library system, which differs from his condemnation

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of American imperialism. Indeed, the library at Beijing University provided Li a platform for a professional relationship with America, as well as an academic connection. Although he resigned from this position in late 1922, his contribution to China’s library enterprise was substantial, as he had influenced China’s modern libraries. He deserves credit for his accomplishment: Diane M. Nelson and Robert B. Nelson acclaim him as “the father of modern Chinese librarianship” (Nelson 1993, 521). Soon after Li Dazhao assumed responsibility as the head librarian, he organized his staff to visit the library of Qinghua University, which was managed according to the American system. This trip occurred on March 15, 1918. According to Li’s personal report, “the first goal was to visit its library where we spent most of our time.” Li interacted with American-trained scholar Zhao Guocai, who served as the acting president of Qinghua, and conversed with Yuan Tongli, who was the head librarian, but would later be librarian at the Library of Congress in America. Yuan accompanied Li for six hours on a tour of the facility. Li was amazed at Yuan’s use of American cataloguing cards. The modern facilities in the new library dazzled him:he was awed by the large number of English language booksand the strict loaning policy (Li 2013, 2:276). The visit was the first of this kind for Li to learn about America’s library management through an in-person investigation of a Chinese university library. In fact, the high point of the visit was his careful observation of the conspicuously transferred American library system. Li Dazhao was a firm supporter of the open-stack policy with its benefits forreaders, for which he used American statistics for support. According to Li, American data told him that the benef its of open-stack were far greater than possible losses. In America, as he noticed, the open-stack system saved the readers valuable time in handling delivery, loans, and formalities. Li endorsed this practice at his library, which was originally located at Mashenmiao, a few miles from the campus. In October 1918, it was relocated to the new campus at Shatan near the Forbidden City. The new building featured grandiose architecture paid for by a Belgiun loan to Beijing University (Zhu 2009, 190). Yet, because of their size, the rooms posed an inconvenience for open-stack. To solve the problem, Li allocated rooms near the book storage to be reading rooms, which functioned as nearly equivalent to the open–stack practice. The future leader of communist China, Mao Zedong, was hired by Li as an assistant librarian to supervise one of those rooms (Lidazhaozhuanbianxiezu 1979, 35). According to Li, the traditional Chinese library was merely a book-keeping place, rather than a public facility optimized for use. Unfamiliar with the system, some conservatives raised their eyebrows at the open-stack system because of

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their fear of vandalism and theft. However, Li’s citation of American data allowed him to defend it in order to allow more readers to make full use of the resources at his library (Li 2013, 3:173). With Li Dazhao’s efforts, his library established ties with the Library of Congress. In June 1921, Li warmly received Katherine H. Wead for a visit. He accompanied her on a tour of his library and familiarized her with traditional Chinese library management. On September 17, Wead wrote him a letter to express her gratitude for his hospitality and professional assistance, which was published in the daily bulletin of Beijing University. In it, she told Li that she had already contacted the head of her library, Dr. Herbert Putnam, to request the dispatch of American catalogue cards to Li. At the same time, she said that she sent a letter to the director of her Chinese department, Dr. Walter K. Swingl, to foster ties with Li. Wead promised to return Qi Chenghan’s classification handbook she borrowed from Li as soon as its translation into English was complete (Wang 2010, 235). The exchange yielded fruit, as the Library of Congress not only acknowledged Li’s achievements in China’s library enterprise, but also donated one million catalogue cards to Li’s library in 1922 (Liao 2008, 45). Li Dazhao paid attention to American classification methods and supported the Dewey Decimal Classification system. In fact, Li’s endorsement led to China’s nation-wide adoption of it. In his speech in late October 1921, Li lamented China’s shortage of professional librarians and deplored the Chinese lack of basic knowledge of modern library management. Classification was a serious issue, without which books were too scattered to be relocated. He introduced a number of American methods and pinpointed their strengths and weaknesses. He ranked Dewey’s method as the best (Li 2013, 3:438–444). After careful study of the available options, he finally decided to choose Dewey’s method for his library, building twenty-one storage areas and six reading rooms (Pei 2007, 159). By 1927, seventy-nine percent of China’s libraries were “managed by librarians with whom he [Li] had maintained close contact” (Liao 2008, 46). More importantly, by the late 1920s, libraries throughout China adopted the Dewey Decimal Classification, for which Li’s influence in the process should not be underestimated. It is worth noting that Li Dazhao spoke highly of American library training programs for securing qualified employees. He drew Chinese attention to the initial resistance to Dewey’s establishment of a library school at Columbia University in 1887; soon after, as Li emphasized, the American people praised Dewey’s far-sighted move after they saw its tangible benefits. Li offered detailed information about seventeen American library schools, including their administration, management, course offerings, and related issues. In

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addition, he mentioned summer schools, apprentice classes, roundtables, seminars, and other activities for training librarians and staff in the United States. Needless to say, those activities helped publicize the importance of the library. Li emphasized the importance of libraries in American social life. Its chief value, in all probability, lay in not only storing books, but also maximizing their use, for which librarians must be professionally trained and their knowledge frequently upgraded. As he noted, females constituted over eighty percent among all the graduates from the library schools in New York, with a similar situation in other states. Henceforth, he encouraged Chinese women to be librarians to commence a new epoch of China’s library enterprise (Li 2013, 3:439–453). Having examined the function of the library in America’s social life, Li Dazhao stressed its importance in promoting social progress in the United States. The library provided easy access to useful information, enriched citizens’ cultural lives, enhanced their literacy, and helped mold them into responsible individuals. It was impossible to f igure out a library’s measurable profits, but its vital value in improving civic life was evident. The library served as a cooperative enterprise for public good; an innovative partnership between library and citizens should be forged. Financially, wealthy citizens should do their duty and offer help, for which Li praised American entrepreneurs for their philanthropic contributions. For example, John Simmons’ family donated funds to establish a library school at Simmons University in Boston, Massachusetts, and Andrew Carnegie subsidized the library school at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, which for years relied on the Carnegie Foundation for its operations (Li 2013, 3:449). The support of citizens enabled the library to be the most recognized resource in American social life, as it served as a prominent vehicle for its ever-growing mutually beneficial partnership with citizens. To praise the American accomplishments and to criticize China’s old way, Li sarcastically remarked that in American society “there are three essential things: library, post office, and church. In China’s social life, there are also three indispensable things: Confucian private school, opium-smoking den, and superstitious shrine” (Li 2013, 3:94).

Conclusion Li Dazhao’s changing attitudes towards the United States mirrored the history of early Republican China and reflected Chinese intellectuals’ quest for a new paradigm to revitalize their old civilization. Naturally, the rising

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America was viewed as such a model. The central theme of this ongoing pursuit was to achieve national salvation and modernization, for which Chinese intellectuals championed toppling the Confucian establishment and replacing it with a newer culture. They tried myriad cures for their ill nation. Li’s initial pursuit of American democracy represented one endeavour, as he viewed it as a fit for China’s needs. Yet, the decision in Paris shattered his hopes because “the West had undermined its commitment to China” while “the pledge of national self-determination had not been honoured,” as Morris Rossabi commented (Rossabi 2014, 340). In deep disappointment, Li blamed Woodrow Wilson,which ironically marked a radical shift in his personal attitude towards the United States. To be straightforward, no anachronical sequence can be found; rather, a clear-cut bifurcation took shape. Before 1919, or, precisely, before the May Fourth Movement, Li was an admirer of America; after it, he strongly criticized the United States. Across the demarcation line, the underlying force in Li’s ideological realm, which remained unchanged, was his unquenchable pursuit of nationalism. His choice of communism, in a sense, was the result of his continued efforts for national salvation. In other words, what happened in 1919 transformed him from a pro-American intellectual to a pro-Russian activist. To date, few academics have devoted their scholarship to the relationship between intellectuals and foreign relations, or do not define the tie explicitly. During the early years of the Republic, Chinese intellectuals, like Li Dazhao, became extremely sensitive to China’s foreign relations, because they were well-trained in modern education, mastered foreign language skills, possessed access to imported publications, and developed analytical skills in international affairs. Yet, it should be noted that Li learned about America remotely, even if he interacted with Americans occasionally. Nevertheless, his pro-American writings were available to large numbers of readers before 1919, which helped China make the decision to join the alliance that included the United States during the Great War. Nevertheless, “the message from Paris was bleak” (Mitter 2010, 5) as Rana Mitter remarks, which so infuriated Li that he began criticizing America and drifted away from the American model. From Li’s case, it is obvious that a big power’s alienation of intellectuals in a country could lead to its loss of supporters in fosteringfriendly ties with that country. Even worse, those intellectuals could prove to be the big power’s ideological rivals as they redirected their country along a different path. It would be wrong to assume that Li Dazhao incubated a hatred for America after 1919. On the contrary, he still retained his passion for the American people, particularly the working class, as he extolled American

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labourers’ contributions to the international proletariat. He admired American women for their accomplishments and supported their ongoing feminist movement. He did not deny the values of American civilization, because he continued to appreciate American cultural progress. However, he started to employ the Marxist doctrine to interpret the United States and view it through the lens of class struggle. He utilized Lenin’s theory to condemn American imperialism and its aggression in China, with which he advanced his notion that the Chinese people became a proletarian nation, while the Chinese revolution was intended to oust imperialist invaders. Throughout his life, he never compromised anything for his nationalism, which he proclaimed at the top of his lungs. It was his obsession with national independence, liberation, and resurgence that prompted him to be both a pro-American intellectual and a pro-Russian activist across the 1919 line. A close examination of his changing attitude towards America proves that American involvement in Paris so changed Li’s outlook that he could no longer in good faith promote American solutions for Chinese concerns. Henceforth, his nation-building and state-building efforts shifted from an American- to Russian-influenced transformation. Thisattitude change serves for us to understand the transformation of modern China, as Li’s transformed thought ultimately led him to adopt a new ideology and urged him to switch to a new model for his nation. More vitally, it was his newly chosen ideology that would redirect the unfolding path of twentieth-century China.

Bibliography Anon. September 18, 1989. “China Uses 1924 Essay to Target Reporters” Toronto Star: A12. Anon. December 24, 1922. “Differ on Kalgan Killing: Chinese Story of Shooting of American Contradicted by Consul.” New York Times: 3. Cott, Nancy F. 2020. Fighting Words: The Bold American Journalists who Brought the World Home between the Wars. New York: Basic Books. Elleman, Bruce. 2002. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. London Routledge. Hirson, Baruch and Arthur J. Knodel. 2007. Reporting the Chinese Revolution: The Letters of Rayna Prohme. London: Pluto Press. Jenco, Leigh. 2016. “New Pasts for New Future: A Temporal Reading of Global Thought.” Constellations 23, no. 3: 436–447.

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Li, Dazhao. 2013. Li Dazhao quanji [The Complete Works of Li Dazhao], Vol. 1-5. Beijing: Renminchubanshe. Lidazhaozhuanbianxiezu. 1979. Li Dazhao zhuan [Biography of Li Dazhao]. Beijing: Renminchubanshe. Li, Jihua, Chang Jinjun, and Li Quanxing. 2011. Li Dazhao beipu xisheng anzang ziliaoxuanbian [Historical materials concerning Li Dazhao’s arrest, death, and burial]. Beijing: Xianzhuangshuju. Liao, Jing. March 2008. “The New Cultural Movement and the Breakthrough in Chinese Academic Library Reform.” Library History 24, no. 1:37–47. Liu, Minshan. 1989. Li Dazhao yu Tianjin [Li Dazhao and Tianjin]. Tianjin: Tianjinshekeyuan. Meisner, Maurice. 1967. Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Manela, Erez. May 2019. “Asia in the Global 1919: Reimagining Territory, Identity, and Solidarity.” The Journal of Asian Studies 78, no. 2:409–416. Mitter, Rana. 2010. A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nelson, Diane M. and Robert B. Nelson. 1993. “Li Ta-chao,” in World Encyclopedia of Library and Information Services, Robert Wedgeworth, ed. 3rd EditionChicago: American Library Association.: 521. Pei, Ernian. 2007. “Li Dazhao: zhongguo xiandaitushuguanshiye de dianjiren” [Li Dazhao: the founder of the modern Chinese library enterprise]. Cangsang [Vicissitude] no. 5:158–159. Rossabi, Morris. 2014. A History of China. Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell. Shan, Patrick Fuliang. 2020. “Assessing Li Dazhao’s Role in the New Cultural Movement,” in A Century of Student Movements in China: The Mountain Movers, 1919–2019, edited by Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 3–22. Wang, Jie. 2010. Li Dazhao Beijing shinian: jiaowangpian [Li Dazhao’s Ten Years in Beijing: Social Connections]. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press. Weston, Timothy B. 2004. The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898–1929. Berkeley:University of California Press. Wu, Huanfa, ed. 1994. Li Dazhao yu guxiang [Li Dazhao and his hometown], Beijing: Zhongyangwenxianchubanshe Zhu, Chengjia. 2009. Li Dazhao zhuan [Biography of Li Dazhao]. Beijing: Zhongguoshehuikexuechubanshe. Zhu, Zhimin. 2009. Li Dazhao zhuan [Biography of Li Dazhao]. Beijing: Hongqichubanshe

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About the Author Dr. Patrick Fuliang Shan is professor in the Department of History at Grand Valley State University. His monograph, Taming China’s Wilderness: Immigration, Settlement, and the Shaping of the Heilongjiang Frontier, 1900–1931, probes the history of China’s northeastern frontier during a historical transformation. His new book, Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal, was published by the University of British Columbia Press in 2018.

2

Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience Jingyi Song

Abstract The core of the new cold war is racism. The race issue cannot be isolated to US policies in relationship with other countries, nor to its domestic policies. The world was dragged into more than half a century of Cold War between the two major camps of the Soviet Union and the United States. Meanwhile, the rise of China in global affairs and its rapid economic and technological development alarmed the United States and its European allies. Taking the neo-Churchillian view of the post-war globe, and sticking to old playbooks, the old WWII reenactors envision China as an autocratic foil against which democracy wages a global struggle. Keywords: Racism, Exclusion Acts, Migration and immigration, Transnational identity, Constitutional rights, Racial discrimination and resistance

Introduction It has been one and a half centuries since Congress passed the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, signed into law by President Chester Alan Arthur and enforced vigorously. The Chinese Exclusion Law and other anti-Chinese laws shadowed the lives of the Chinese in the United States for more than sixty-one years until 1943, when they were eventually repealed. However, the fraudulent accusations against the Chinese as ‘disease carriers’ and ‘cheap laborers in the political rhetoric of the nineteenth century still echo in our current situation. The frequent usage of the scientifically baseless and racist slur ‘China virus’ still hits Chinese Americans hard. President Donald Trump used the slur to directly attack China in a time of public health crisis when the Covid-19 pandemic spread around the world. It hurts the

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch02

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lives of Chinese Americans, causing pain in their hearts. ‘Disease carriers’ and ‘China virus’ run in the same historical groove, stirring hatred, racial antagonism, and social conflict. However, the reckless accusations and racially discriminatory legislation against Chinese Americans did not go without opposition and resistance. The Chinese in the United States pursued justice through the judiciary process, rallied and petitioned to voice their demand for racial equality and, more importantly, continued their participation in social, political, and economic activities, claiming themselves to be Americans during a time when anti-Chinese legislation was imposed. Their fight for racial equality continues into the twenty-first century. Immediate protests against the racial slur ‘Chinese virus’ took place across the nation when President Trump used it in a news briefing in March 2020. Activists and residents in many big cities such as New York, Boston, and San Francisco stood together during protests on the steps of the State House, objecting to misinformation aimed at Asian communities about the coronavirus pandemic (Washington Post, September 16, 2020). In an interview, Grace Kao, Chair and IBM Professor of Sociology at Yale University, publicly condemned the usage of the term observing that Chinese Americans have become the physical embodiment of the lung disease. She felt that ‘Everyone is scared of catching it, and so we’re seen with great suspicion’ (Thehill.com, March 19, 2020).Chinese Americans have been singled out as a foreign presence ever since they migrated to the United States. Even when born and raised in America for generations, they are still constantly asked ‘Where did you learn to speak English so well?’ and ‘Where are you from?’ because they are never simply seen as Americans. As a Chinese American herself, Kao has personally felt the effects of racism and the ‘us versus them’ mentality of xenophobia described by Edward W. Said, alongside the many Chinese Americans who have increasingly been targeted since the coronavirus began to spread (Said 1979). The usage of the term ‘China virus’, Kao contends, accentuates the fact that the virus is thought of as foreign, and that ‘Chinese Americans and Asian Americans are also foreign because they’re a part of a population that has never quite been seen as actually American-American’ (Thehill.com, March 19, 2020).

I Hostility The United States of America is a country of immigrants. Attitudes and laws around US immigration have vacillated between welcoming and restrictive since the beginning of the country. During the centuries of

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immigration, immigrants to the United States remained largely unfettered by government regulation as it understood the necessity of filling up the country by foreigners for economic growth in the early days. However, that welcome was not unalloyed and anti-foreign campaigns often occurred. White supremacy and racist ideology and practice are deeply rooted in the American system, and they were firmly constructed in its foundation. The ‘Great Compromise’ or three-fifths compromise, an agreement between delegates from the Northern and the Southern states at the United States Constitutional Convention (1787) was set up to deny the basic human rights of Africans in the United States. The fear of new immigration and the fear of anything foreign has prevailed. Historical records demonstrate that as soon as the new nation was established, Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, the first law about who should be granted US citizenship. The Act only allowed any free white person of ‘good character’ who had been living in the United States for two years or longer to apply for citizenship. Without citizenship, nonwhite residents were denied basic constitutional protections, including the right to vote, own property, or testify in court. When the first US census took place in August 1790, the English were the largest ethnic group among the 3.9 million people counted, though nearly one in five Americans were of African heritage, American Indians and other ethnic groups who were living on the continent hundreds of years earlier than the English were shut out. Scientific research reveals that race has no basis in genetics regardless of its dubious roots in biology. Social scientists point out that race is traditionally social and cultural construction used as a means of control. Having discussed the creation and continuous usage of race and ethnicity to define immigration policies, Nancy Foner contends that the interpretation and reinterpretation of race through history is important as it demonstrates ‘how physical characteristics and/or putative ancestry are interpreted within particular social contexts and are used to define categories of people as inferior or superior’ (Foner 2005). History demonstrates that race has been largely coded as color. The black-white dichotomy dominated race relations in the United States, while Asians, and, later, Latin Americans were included as well. In the following centuries that saw a rapidly increasing influx of new immigrants from all over the world, the United States underwent several major discrete phases of anti-immigrant activities, namely, anti-Catholicism, anti-Asian, and anti-all immigrants. The anti-Catholic was aimed at Irish Catholics, and, to a lesser extent, at German Catholic immigration when a large migration occurred from Ireland and Germany into America in the

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late 1830s to the 1860s. As a consequence, America’s first anti-immigrant political party, the Know-Nothing Party formed as backlash. Nevertheless, the most anti-immigration legislation was the anti-Asian and the Chinese Exclusions, which became the first federal laws based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, and nation that passed Congress in 1875 and 1882. The United States of America witnessed a rapid growth of industrialization and urbanization with large job markets and opportunities, and with it an immigration boom. Between the late 1870s and 1920s, more than twenty million immigrants arrived. The majority were from Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe, including four million Italians and two million Jews. Many of them settled in major US cities and worked in factories. Among them emerged a steady flow of Chinese workers migrating to America beginning in the 1850s. They worked in the gold mines, timber industries, and cigarette factories, built transnational railroads, took agricultural jobs, and owned small businesses such as tool shops, laundries, restaurants, and grocery stores. Anti-Chinese sentiment grew as Chinese labourers became successful in America. Although Chinese immigrants made up only 0.002 percent of the United States population, white workers blamed them for low wages. Based on the conceptual interpretations of race and culture, the Chinese were perceived to be inferior. In the large wave of immigration from China in the mid-nineteenth century, a racial and ethnic hierarchy in the West involved an anti-Chinese movement. Chinese men were marked as ‘coolies’ presumably working for lower wages than the whites, thus seizing jobs from them, while Chinese women were perceived as prostitutes eroding social morality. Those women who came independently were particularly labeled as immoral, and they were accused of being guilty of sexual misdeeds. Chinese immigrant women were depicted as a social cancer as well as disease transmitters. The American Medical Association joined the anti-Chinese chorus in the late century, creating public panic with its attempt to convince the American public that Chinese immigrants ‘carried distinct germs to which they were immune, but from which whites would die if exposed’. The germs and diseases could most easily be transmitted to white men through the sex labor of Chinese prostitutes, it concluded (Luibheid 2002). This fear concentrated on Chinese women as major germ and disease carriers was an important factor in the public rejection of Chinese women immigrants. Following the accusation and having classified Chinese women immigrants as prostitutes based on created stereotyped images, Representative Horace F. Page proposed a ban on the entry of Chinese women in order to end the danger of cheap Chinese labour and immoral Chinese women. Congress passed the Page Law in 1875.

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The gender-based exclusion legislation of the Page Law in 1875 was an early attempt of the federal government to screen out Chinese immigrants from entry to the United States. The enactment of the Page Law legalized the fear, misconception, and racist bias against Asian women. The law was heavily enforced and proved effective to bar all Asian women trying to immigrate, especially the Chinese (Luibheid 2002). Historical records demonstrated a sharp decrease in the female population from 6.4 percent in 1870 to 4.6 percent in 1880 because of the law (US Census, 1870). On May 6, 1882, Congress passed a milestone anti-Chinese law, the Chinese Exclusion Act. It legally prohibited Chinese laborers from freely entering the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Act became the first national legislation that banned immigrants based on race, ethnicity, class, and nationality. The entrance of businessmen, students, and diplomats into the United States was also affected by the Act. The anti-Chinese rhetoric and action against the Chinese, especially women, became more furious after the passage of the federal Chinese Exclusion Laws in 1882. Lorenzo Sawyer, Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, openly agitated in 1886 for restricting the entry of Chinese women to the United States, commenting that ‘Chinamen were simply a machine’ laboring only for the advantage of white men. Therefore, Sawyer proposed, the Chinese should not be allowed to bring their wives to America (Peffer 1999). When they ‘die like a worn-out steam engine’, Sawyer continued, they would not ‘leave two or three or a half dozen children’ to fill their place. And that would be a ‘solution to the Chinese Question’, he concluded (Ibid). Restrictive state and local legislation across the country also excluded the Chinese from participating in social and economic activities. In Albany, the New York State Workingmen’s Convention voted to boycott all Chinese labor and all citizens who ‘may in any manner assist the Chinese’ (Pfaelzer 2007). Trade unions in New York City and Brooklyn declared a boycott of Chinese laundrymen. Ninety hotels discharged their Chinese employees in Los Angeles. In some areas, the Chinese were segregated in schools and theaters. Barber shops, hotels, restaurants, and other public facilities refused to provide services. Property owners signed restrictive covenants to keep the Chinese from buying homes or moving into certain neighborhoods. In a number of states, such as California, Arizona, and Washington, legislation forbade the Chinese from buying land. Local laws prohibiting the Chinese from marrying ‘whites’ were also enforced. Lon Thom, born in New York City’s Chinatown, was stripped of her citizenship when she married a Chinese student in 1922. Lon Thom remained in the country of her birth, the United States, as a non-citizen for eighteen years before she

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regained her American citizenship when Congress amended some of the provisions of the Cable Act in 1940 (Fong 1976). Roundups and purges took place in many states with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion laws. Violence against the Chinese in the United States occurred before the passage of the Chinese Exclusions. The most noticeable was the 1880 Denver Riot when one innocent Chinese was killed; many were injured. Many Denver Chinese lost their homes, businesses, and property during the riot. Defendants accused of killing and assaulting the Chinese were acquitted. Chinese residents were given twenty-four hours to leave their homes in Eureka, California. The Knights of Labor began to boycott Chinese labor throughout Kansas in 1884. In some places, innocent Chinese immigrants were killed in anti-Chinese riots. During an attack on the Chinatown area in Rock Springs, Wyoming, in 1885, twenty-eight Chinese were killed and another fifteen were wounded. Others suffered tremendous losses at the hands of rampaging mobs (Chen 1980). In 1886, rioters set fires in Tacoma, Washington, forcing the Chinese from their homes (Pfaelzer 2007). Immigration officials in New York City raided the Chinese community. At one time twenty-seven Chinese were arrested and deported without any legal process or proof of wrongdoing. For decades after the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Law passed, more laws and regulations were imposed to bar the Chinese from coming to the United States and to deny the right of naturalization to those already in the country. The 1888 Scott Act prohibited over 20,000 Chinese from re-entering the United States, because their certif icates of identity were declared null and void when they temporarily departed to visit their families in China. The Scott Act also prohibited new immigration or the return of Chinese labourers to the United States unless they had assets worth at least $1,000. The 1892 Geary Act extended the 1882 Act for another ten years, thereby continuing the legal prohibition of the Chinese from entering the country. Moreover, it requested the Chinese in the United States to register for certificates of residence that never applied to other ethnic groups. These laws of the last quarter of the nineteenth century effectively restricted the coming of Chinese men and women, thus decisively affecting the survival of Chinese American communities and families. The anti-Chinese legislation continuously expanded into the twentieth century. The Cable Act of 1922 requiring an American woman who married a foreigner to take the nationality of her husband made it impossible for a Chinese to get citizenship through marriage. The quota system of the 1924 immigration law declared ineligible for citizenship those Chinese already in the United States.

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For almost a century, historians and scholars have sought explanations for the causes and consequences of restrictive immigration legislation. Mary R. Coolidge suggested in 1909 that cultural ignorance and prejudice distorted the possibility of an American understanding of the Chinese, which eventually resulted in antagonism (Coolidge 1968). Later works of John Higham on nativism (Higham 1963), and Stuart C. Miller’s books about the stereotyped images of Chinese immigrants also present a cultural explanation of the causes of the exclusion laws (Miller 1969). Both Gunther Barth and Alexander Saxton seek economic explanations, suggesting that economic crisis and the panic that ensued contributed significantly to the rejection by American labor of the Chinese. The myth of coolies, they believe, also helped bring about restrictive legislation (Barth 1964). Historians such as Delber L. Mckee and Alexander Saxton argue that racial prejudice and racist views of ‘debased Mongolian’ and ‘heathen Chinese’ that were deeply rooted in the culture of white supremacy in the United States played an important role in Americans’ hostile reception of the Chinese (McKee 1977). Robert G. Lee and Krysten R. Moon demonstrate in their research that media and advertisements created images of heathenish Chinese that shaped their unequal treatment (Moon 2005). Political corruption in American government, scholars concur, contributed to the passage of Chinese exclusion legislation as well. Politicians who were scrambling for power used anti-Chinese sentiment to push for the passage of the Exclusion Act (Lee 2003). The racially-based restrictions quickly extended to other Asians such as the Japanese and Filipinos. They were also applied to other ethnic groups, including those who came from Southern and Eastern European nations, as well as those from Mexico, when the Immigration Act of 1924 triumphed; it went on to dominate American immigration policy for the next forty years. The Immigration Act of 1924 established the nationality quotas system. Under the new quota system, the United States issued immigration visas to two percent of the total number of people of each nationality in the United States at the 1890 census. The law favored immigration from Northern and Western European countries. Just three countries, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany accounted for seventy percent of all available visas. There were some modifications in the demographic preference in the Act with some favorable immigrants from certain geographic locations compared with that in the middle of the nineteenth century. Yet, immigration from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe was limited. Nevertheless, the Act completely excluded immigrants from Asia, aside from the Philippines, then an American colony.

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Anti-Asian discriminatory politics reached its highest point during World War II when the United States declared war against Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack. There was widespread despair and disillusionment with the Japanese in the United States. In the name of ‘internal security and military necessity’, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, to authorize the army to exclude ‘any or all persons’ from as yet unspecified ‘military areas’. As a result, Japanese Americans were relocated to internment camps throughout the west, especially in the states of California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. The mass incarceration of the Japanese in the United States was a continuation of racial injustice in immigration policies. The post-war era saw some improvement in restrictive immigration policies against Chinese and other minority ethnic groups, though only 105 Chinese were allowed admission based on the Chinese Repeal Act: the national origins request model was a stronghold in policies. There was a big change in the American immigration policies in the 1960s. The Immigration Act of 1924 with its national origins quota system was legally abolished after forty years of enforcement in 1965. The new 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act also instituted a family reunif ication program, placed immigrants from all countries on equal footing, and ushered in a surge in immigration from Asia and Latin America. However, as Erika Lee, a Chinese American historian, observed, the Act was designed to give preference to European immigrants and the new waves of immigrants from Asia and Latin America after 1965 were in fact its great ‘unintended consequences’. Moreover, it sustained racial profiling. Many of the barriers first established in the nineteenth century, such as the clauses regarding immigrants likely to become public charges, and the physical and mental health requirements, as Lee found, remained firmly in place (Lee 2003). The Chinese Exclusion Laws have transformed the United States into a gatekeeping nation. The controversial issues in the cases concerning who would be granted admission to the United States continue in late twentieth-century immigration policies to demonstrate the long route to justice. In 1982, a proposed abolishing of the preference given to adult brother and sisters of U S citizens to immigrate under the 1965 law would have severely curbed new Asian immigrants. In a 1993 case, Haitian refugees were denied rights in the process of entering the United States. The 1996 Illegal Immigration and Responsibility Act set up the border control policy that has been called the ‘Mexican Exclusion Act’. Activists for immigration justice criticize it as a violation of the civil and human rights of Mexican immigrants.

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The legacy of the Chinese Exclusion Laws was highlighted in the treatment of Muslims and Middle Easterners as well as Mexicans at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, racialized associations of Arabs and Muslims in America with ‘terrorists’ or ‘potential terrorists’ proliferated. Within days of the attack, more than 1,200 people were arrested by government enforcement officials. Government agents targeted 200 college campuses nationwide to collect information on Middle Eastern students (New York Times, November 12, 2001). Hate crimes directed against Middle Eastern Americans resulted in death: a South Asian Sikh gas station owner in Mesa, Arizona, was one of the victims. The usage of the new political climate to address the long-standing concern about immigrants escalated during the Trump administration. In the name of ‘national security’, the Trump administration pushed its immigration policy to the edge of corruption. In 2017, President Donald Trump issued two executive orders—both titled ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’—aimed at curtailing travel and immigration from six majority Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia), as well as North Korea and Venezuela. A travel ban policy has been included in transnational immigration control, echoing the legacy of racial, ethnic, demographic, and national preferences of certain groups of immigrants in American immigration policies established in the Chinese Exclusions. The demonization and criminalization of new immigrants reflects an increase in xenophobia and racism directed at Mexicans and South Americans and is obviously a twenty-first century continuation of earlier anti-immigration traditions and practices. President Trump publicly accused Mexican immigrants of being rapists, drug dealers, and gangsters. The government’s efforts to control the US-Mexican border have increased exponentially since the 1990s, turning it into a militarized zone designed to deter illegal immigrants at any cost. The Border Patrol became one of the government’s largest police agencies in the country with 9,400 agents. In the late 1990s, the United States spent $2 billion a year to build walls and manage a 24-hour-patrol over the border (New York Times, May 27, 2001).

II Resistance Where there is oppression, there will be resistance. The Chinese Exclusions generated opposition and resistance from the Chinese in the United States. Global migration across land and ocean are elements of the complexity of

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human experiences. The treatment of immigrants engages the conduct of international relations, impacting governments and individuals across the face of the globe. Moreover, immigration policies involve debates on human rights issues, addressing whether people have the right to live wherever they choose. Throughout American history, particularly since the Chinese Exclusion era, immigrants, including the Chinese, opposed and resisted the violation of basic and inherent human rights. They treasured these rights to obtain equal and just treatment as stemming from nature itself and thus inherited by all men, women, and children on earth as members of the same human family. A legacy of Chinese immigrants’ opposition and resistance against injustice was generated, developed, and fostered by the Chinese Exclusions. The Chinese Exclusion Act forced out Chinese immigrants from the United States soon after its passage. However, many left as part of the resistance movement against unequal treatment of the Chinese. The US Census Bureau reported that 10,366 Chinese left the United States in 1882 alone (Tsai 1986); there was no indication of arrivals that year. In the years following 1882, Chinese immigrants continuously departed in larger numbers: 12,157 left in 1883; 14,145 in 1884; 19,655 in 1885 (Ibid). Enforcement of the restrictive legislation sharply reduced the Chinese population in the United States from 104,455 in 1880 to 89,863 in 1900 (Song 1967). Nevertheless, most Chinese immigrants remained (Ibid). Although those who chose to stay suffered from tremendous hardship due to job exclusion and destructive riots, among other factors, they did not distance themselves from society. Instead, they denounced the discriminatory legislation and fought to regain their constitutional right to live and to work in their adopted land. Like other Americans, the Chinese in the United States pursued racial equality through the judiciary process, organized mass demonstrations to publicly voice their resistance, and sent petitions to the government demanding justice. Moreover, they participated in the mainstream political, social, and cultural activities identifying them as Americans. Over 9,200 Chinese immigrants f iled cases against the exclusion laws in the years between 1882 and 1905 (Tsai 1986). In Wing Hing vs. City of Eureka, Chinese in Eureka, California, were the f irst to petition the Supreme Court for compensation of lost property and forced eviction during mob violence. Judge Lorenzo B. Sawyer struck down all sections of the complaint that held Eureka responsible for the mob actions, the loss of Chinese business, and for driving out the Chinese. Only the claims for property losses due to the city’s negligence remained. Though legally unsuccessful, this case became a political triumph, as the filing of the lawsuit was a courageous

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and bold act of the Chinese taking a collective stand against enforced deportation. Chinese women participated in the legal fight against racial discrimination. They defied exclusion and proved to be resourceful in taking cases to the courts. In 1900, Mrs. Gue Lim sued the United States, arguing that the refusal of her entry into the United States as the wife of a Chinese merchant violated the American protection of Chinese merchants in the United States provided by the 1880 treaty. After years of persistent struggle, she won her case and was granted permission to join her husband (Tsai 1983). Court actions for justice clearly demonstrated Chinese immigrants’ determination in their pursuit of racial equality and freedom. In addition to court cases, Chinese immigrants also publicly expressed their opposition to restrictive legislation. Yung Hen, a San Francisco poultry dealer, denounced the discriminative law by questioning a newspaper reporter: ‘Why do they not legislate against Swedes, Germans, Italians, Turks, and others?’ A Chinese woman persisted that the Chinese had ‘as much right to land in America as the Irish’ (Lee 2003). Mass demonstrations and rallies were organized to voice opposition, demanding equal treatment for Chinese immigrants in the early years. The New York Tribune reported one such event on its front page: on June 15, 1901, 15,000 Chinese rallied in Chinatown to condemn the restrictive laws (New York Tribune, June 15, 1901). Prominent merchants and scholars of the elite class of the Chinese community provided both strong support and leadership in the opposition campaigns (McKee 1977). The elite class of gentry and merchants were exempt from restrictive laws, since the 1882 exclusion legislation allowed for ‘teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for pleasure or curiosity’ to come to the United States. However, these exempted classes, as named in the law, did not escape anti-Chinese harassment. In 1899, when Yee Ah Lum and thirty other merchants applied for permission to enter the United States, they were denied entrance on the grounds that their certificates in English lacked some of the information required. Efforts were also made to bar members of the exempted group from returning to the United States, unless they presented legal documents proving that they had a wife, child, or parents in the country. The constant and arbitrary disregard of the rights of members of elite classes spurred them to advocate racial equality, and they took on their traditional responsibility of leading the struggle. They frequently petitioned American authorities for equitable treatment on behalf of the Chinese in the United States. They sponsored court cases against restrictive laws towards Chinese in the United States; wrote letters to Congressmen, a

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quintessential American practice, denouncing the violence directed at Chinese; and demanded government compensation for Chinese victims who lost their property in riots and for the relatives of those killed by antiChinese mobs, arguing that their demands were not simply a matter of asking for payment for lost property and lives. Rather, they were to force the government to protect the civil rights of Chinese immigrants. As a result of the effort, the American government conveyed its regret over the consequences of the anti-Chinese riots, but refused to take responsibility for the compensation payment (Tsai 1983). Meanwhile, political organizations were formed to advocate opposition against the Chinese Exclusion laws. The Chinese Equal Rights League and the General Society of Chinese Residing in the United States for the Opposition of the Exclusion Treaty, for example, were some of the first such organizations established in New York City in the early 1890s. Outraged by the persecution of the Chinese, these organizations ‘claim[ed] a common manhood with all other nationalities’ that should be recognized according to the principle of American democracy and freedom. In addition, these organizations sought to dissolve images of differences in culture, religion, language, and race that ‘saturated American editorials, broadsheets, advertisements, and cartoons that shaped the unequal treatment of the Chinese under immigration laws’ through organized cultural and social activities (Pfaelzer 2007). Other political organizations such as the Baohuanghui and the Zhigong Party (Chee Kung Tong) were organized across the United States. Different from those organizations focusing on the constitutional rights of the Chinese in the United States, these groups were committed to the endorsement of a strong China. They supported the 1905 boycott movement in China, which was launched specifically to oppose the unequal treatment of Chinese immigrants in the United States. They organized activities and provided financial resources to endorse the 1911 Republic Revolution to throw out the last dynasty. The transnational identity of the Chinese in the United States has a unique character. Chinese immigrants differed from other immigrants in relating to their home country. Because of the Chinese Exclusion Law, they developed a dual allegiance often more complicated than that of other ethnic groups. Convinced that their unequal treatment in the United States reflected China’s ineptness and that a strong China could help them improve their status, they supported efforts to modernize China. Endorsement of their homeland’s Self-Strengthening Movements was an example of such support. The Self-Strengthening Movements were the

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responses to China’s defeat in the Opium Wars. Committed to military strength, China soon expanded reforms to include projects in transportation (shipping and railways), communication (telegraph), mining, and light industry. Chinese immigrants made important financial and technical contributions. Some of them went back to China in support of a strong home country. Among others, Huang Bingchang from San Francisco went back to China in 1890 and started the first electricity generating station in Guangzhou. In 1905, Chin Gee Hee from Seattle started a campaign to raise capital from Chinese immigrants in the United States and Canada to finance the construction of the Sunning Railroad, the first railroad entirely funded by Chinese Americans, that ran from Taishan District to Xinhui District in Guangdong province (Young and Lai 2006). In 1911, Fong Joe Guey went to China to start the Guangdong Aviation Company. A resident of Oakland, California, Fong was considered the first Chinese aviator in the world. Others included Tom Gunn, the first Chinese American licensed pilot, who also returned to his ancestral land in 1912. J. K. Choy left Honolulu for China and later became head of the Chinese Merchants Navigation Company (Lai 1980). Chen Heqin, among others who returned to their ancestral country to assist with modernization projects, went to ‘serve his Fatherland’ with his science degree from Columbia University in 1919 (The Chinese Reform News, June 4, 1919). The efforts of the Chinese in the United States to support a strong China were also demonstrated in their endorsement of Chinese territorial integrity. The establishment of concessions and extraterritoriality by foreign powers in China as consequences of the Opium Wars humiliated the Chinese in the United States. They strongly supported efforts to regain Chinese territories as a means of preserving national dignity and strengthening their demands for racial equality in the United States as a post-World War I solution. Their petition to President Woodrow Wilson for Chinese territorial integrity during the Paris Peace Conference once again demonstrated the dual sense of nationalism felt by the Chinese in America. Most Chinese in the United States, especially those who were born and raised in the United States, however, applied their sensibility of being ethnic Chinese Americans to the exercise of their political rights and engagement in American politics. The Chinese American Citizens Alliance exemplified the early Chinese American political consciousness in organizing themselves as American citizens. Earlier in 1895, the Chinese American Citizens Alliance in San Francisco was established to improve the sociopolitical status of American-born Chinese. The Chinese American Citizens Alliance in New York was formed in 1916 to engage young American-born Chinese to participate

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in main stream activities. As political organizations, both advocated for the rights of citizens of Chinese Americans. Its wartime efforts to support American military recruitment and to endorse the purchase of war bonds during the Great War, as well as its peacetime efforts to participate in local political campaigns in big cities such as San Francisco and New York right after the war, demonstrated the early emergence of the political consciousness of Chinese Americans for civil rights. World War I was a traumatic experience for people all over the globe. It led to the years of international instability that ultimately generated another world war. Yet, Chinese Americans’ support of the war should not be understood as justification of the war itself. Years of denial of their rights and their eagerness to exercise their obligations as citizens inspired their participation in war propaganda and on the front to claim their status as Americans. Motivated by American patriotism and ready to serve their country, they joined the American army and saw it as a family event. Recruits had their pictures taken and there were parties to honor them as well. According to the Chinese Reform News, approximately ten percent of soldiers who were recruited from New York were Chinese Americans (Chinese Reform News, September 26, 1917). Scholars try to understand the goal of Chinese Americans in their participation in the war. Commenting on the obligations and rights of Chinese Americans, some suggest that, because they were excluded by society, Chinese Americans focused more on rights rather than obligations in their struggle to be received as citizens. They claimed their political rights by participating in and supporting World War I. Moreover, Sucheng Chan, a Chinese American scholar, stressed that Chinese Americans not only exercised their rights to join the war, they also ‘fought for their rights—the right to be in the United States, the right to vote, and the right to own property’, rights given to all American citizens (Chan 1991). Voting is a right and a privilege protected by the US Constitution. Chinese Americans expressed their political desire to exercise their right to vote to claim their citizenship against the Chinese Exclusions. Realizing that not voting meant the self-denial of citizenship, Chinese Americans engaged in the first post-war local elections. New York’s Chinese Americans, for example, took the lead in the new political trend. The years 1917–1918 marked an election cycle for both the state and the city government of New York. Activists put up big posters along Chinatown streets, urging the Chinese community to give its support to either Republican or Democrat candidates (Ibid). Mass meetings were organized to publicize the importance of participating in elections. The message was that ‘Every Chinese who was born in the United

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States has the right to vote’, and the aim was to convince eligible voters that voting was constitutionally protected and part of citizenship. It was a ground-breaking effort of the Chinese Americans to encourage all those eligible to participate in the election. For more than three decades following the Exclusion Law of 1882, racism frustrated Chinese Americans’ efforts to become involved in American mainstream politics. Staying away from possible entanglement with the world outside the Chinese community became part of the protective measures of Chinese immigrants. Eligible voters were hesitant to use their votes, feeling that racism and their small numbers made it an empty privilege. However, for the first time in history, Chinese Americans took an action in the local elections and engaged in mainstream politics. Both the wartime and peacetime engagement efforts demonstrated the growing political energy of second-generation Chinese immigrants to identify themselves as American citizens and to pursue an important strategy against the Chinese Exclusions. Efforts of Chinese immigrants for justice and equality against the Chinese Exclusions continued when the Great Depression hit the United States in the 1930s. However, the fight took a different course when history witnessed the formation of the ethnic Chinese labor unions and small business associations and their integration into mainstream union activities. Engagement rather than disengagement in society redefined the Chinese immigrants and their relationship to American society. Second generation Chinese immigrants, in particular, firmly identified as Chinese Americans. Moreover, the formation of diverse interest groups’ organizations was not just an effort to survive the Depression; it shook the infrastructure of Chinatown, fundamentally challenging the governance of the Chinese communities in the United States. Their move to integrate themselves into society as Americans became a milestone in the history of Chinese American efforts to strengthen the legacy of their resistance against the Chinese Exclusions. The Great Depression plagued the United States in one form or another for more than a decade from 1929 onwards. It was a devastating experience for Americans, who faced unemployment, the loss of land and business, and, in some cases, homelessness and starvation. During the Depression, economic grievances and suffering extended into every area of society. During the first three years of the Depression, more than 5,000 banks failed and unemployment climbed to twelve million in 1932. In an industrial city like Cleveland, half of the working people found themselves without jobs that year. However, observers agree that the crisis was not remarkable in itself: periodic recessions are normal features of capitalist economies. The significance of the crisis lay in its severity and length.

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Traditional Chinese community organizations assumed their charitable responsibilities to deal with the economic crisis. The most important, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), quickly established relief agencies to distribute food and clothing to the needy and the desperate. The CCBA was originally formed in 1874 to settle disputes and conflicts over business and personal issues in the New York Chinese community. Membership in this association extended to different social stratifications, with prominent merchants and elite scholars constituting its leadership. Representatives of various organizations, such as business and district associations, comprised a large part of the CCBA. It had judicial power over most aspects of the lives of New York Chinese. Both Chinese and American society considered the CCBA the representative body for all Chinese in New York. It used its resources of collected revenues from business firms and membership fees to provide emergency aid to its people. Other Chinese community organizations, such as the Chinese Merchants Association, and various district associations also contributed to relief efforts, providing temporary room and board for those who could not afford to pay their rent. Mutual assistance among individual Chinese immigrants operated during the Depression too. Workers split full-time jobs with their fellows; landlords gave tenants a month’s concession on rent. Children brought friends home after school to share what food they had (Tenement Times, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring, 1990). Adults adopted orphans to save their lives (Chinese Nationalist Daily, July 7, 1933). However, traditional charitable organizations and mutual aid among individuals could not meet the needs of so many people who had lost their businesses and jobs during the Depression. As the Depression deepened, job shortages reinforced racial antagonism. African Americans suffered from greater unemployment than they had in the past. Whites in many southern cities demanded that all blacks be dismissed from their jobs. In 1930, the Black Shirts, a political organization in Atlanta, launched a campaign with the slogan ‘No Jobs for Niggers until Every White Man Has a Job!’ (Dollard 1957). Hispanic Americans were subject to similar harsh treatment during the Depression. Many Hispanics, particularly Mexicans, were forced to leave the country by officials who arbitrarily removed them from relief rolls or simply rounded them up and transported them across the border. Half a million Chicanos left the United States for Mexico in the first years of the Depression. The Depression worsened the situation for Chinese in the United States, reinforcing longstanding patterns of discrimination. The majority of Chinese Americans continued to work in Chinese-owned laundries and restaurants, as they could hope for no job opportunities outside the world of Chinatown.

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Although a few had odd jobs outside the Chinese community, they were threatened with the loss of them. In one case, a young man working as an ‘elevator boy’ in a Jewish hospital stated that all Chinese employees were being discharged to comply with the demands of other workers that their jobs be given to ‘white’ people (Lowe 2006). White-owned laundries and restaurants worked together to launch anti-Chinese campaigns to drive the Chinese out of their businesses. Local governments enforced discriminatory ordinances against the Chinese, requiring annual registration fees that small businesses could not afford. The intensified, institutionalized, racial discrimination against Chinese Americans during the Depression compelled them to turn to other alternatives for survival. The emergence of various labour organizations and small business trade associations such as the Chinese Unemployed Council, the Chinese Maritime Union, the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, and the Chinese American Restaurant Association, illustrated the transformations taking place within the Chinese communities in big cities in the 1930s. Instead of looking for assistance from traditional organizations, Chinese labourers and small businessmen moved towards self-reliance and organization to survive the economic crisis. In their struggle for survival during the Depression, Chinese American small businessmen also sought American governments’ assistance and legal protection. Their demand for municipal government relief, like their legal battles against the Laundry Ordinance and the license codes in New York City in the 1930s, significantly challenged the legitimacy of existing American discrimination against the Chinese. Driven by a legacy of racist exclusion, Chinese Americans developed a new set of attitudes reflecting their desire for change. The newly-formed, grass-roots, Chinese American labour organizations and small business trade associations also sought support from mainstream American labour unions to protect their interests. The 1930s saw the emergence of a powerful American labour union movement. Inspired by the collective bargaining provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), American workers became more radical and organized than before, challenging employers by demanding recognition of their rights to exist and to claim their benefits. Meanwhile, American labour organizations began to extend their interests to minority groups to support their movements. Motivated by the American labour movement, Chinese American workers and small businesses undertook new strategies to take part in organized American union activities. The participation of New York’s Chinese American workers in the 1933 city-wide pro-NIRA parades and in the 1937 National Maritime Union strike exemplified the Chinese American movement towards integrating

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themselves into society through active engagement in American political mainstream activities as a means for equal rights and legal protection as minority citizens. The reinforcement of racial discrimination during the Depression combined with years of racist prejudice and denial of rights, reshaped the political conscience of Chinese in the United States in the 1930s. In addition to the labour unions and small business trade associations, the growing political consciousness of Chinese Americans to participate in American mainstream activities was also demonstrated by the formation of political organizations such as the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, the Chinese American Voting League, and the Chinese American Committee of the National Democratic Party. Participating in both the 1932 and the 1936 presidential elections, these groups engaged eligible Chinese Americans to participate in national electoral politics to justify their citizenship and to impress on society that they were worthy of this voting privilege. The outcome of the 1936 presidential election was a landslide for President Roosevelt. He won almost 28 million popular votes to Landon’s 16 and a half million. About 1,000 Chinese Americans in New York in particular cast their votes for President Roosevelt (The Chinese Republic News, September 26 and November 4, 1936). It was the genuine effort of the Chinese American political organizations that brought in so many Chinese American votes for FDR. History demonstrated that Chinese Americans in the 1930s challenged the traditional ways in which Chinese immigrants dealt with a hostile society. They claimed the political rights of American citizenship denied by exclusion policies by actively participating in American politics. The active participation of Chinese Americans in American politics as a means of proclaiming themselves to be loyal citizens against the Chinese Exclusions extended further when the United States entered World War II after the Pearl Harbor attack by Japan. The wartime cooperation between the United States and China created momentum for Chinese in the United States to advance in society. John Dower maintains that the war changed the attitude of Americans towards Chinese Americans as they suddenly found themselves on the same line with China against Japan (Dower, 1993). Fred W. Riggs suggests that, to defeat Japan, the United States allied with China. This war strategy affected the longstanding anti-Chinese legislation and eventually brought an end to the Chinese Exclusion Laws (Riggs 1950). Yet, it needs to be stressed that the Chinese in the United States played a crucial role in changing American attitudes towards the Chinese. It was the involvement of Chinese Americans, both men and women, in the war effort to oppose Japan that changed American attitudes

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towards the Chinese. And that eventually ended the sixty-one years of Chinese Exclusion Laws. Like other American citizens, Chinese Americans joined the American military to defend the United States. Approximately 13,311 Chinese Americans, nearly twenty-two percent of adult Chinese males across the country, were drafted into the armed services. An unknown number, perhaps several thousands, volunteered for military service (Wong 2006). Joining with other American soldiers, they were deployed to war zones in all parts of the world, serving in the Third and Fourth Infantry Divisions on the European war front; and in the Sixth, Thirty-second, and Seventy-seventh in Asia and the Pacific. Twenty-five percent of Chinese American recruits served in the American Air Force (Chinn 1989). Many served in the navy. According to The Chinese Press, on March 20, 1942, the US. Navy wanted five hundred Chinese to be recruited. This newspaper applauded the change of the previous discriminatory policies dictating that Chinese Americans could only enlist as mess stewards or cabin boys on ships (Wong 2005). Chinese American women also participated in military services. They served both in the Army and in the Air Force. Hazel Toy, for example, was one of the first Chinese American women volunteers who enlisted in the air unit of the Women’s Army Corps in 1943 (Mark and Chin 1989). Maggie Gee became one of only two Chinese American women accepted by the Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASP). She flew a variety of aircraft during the war as part of her duty to transport airplanes from one base to another within the United States. Ah Ying, another Chinese American woman accepted by WASP, completed flight instruction and was assigned to China with her brother. While her brother flew combat missions, she taught in a village school in Southern China where her father originally came from. She eventually flew with WASP when she came back to the United States (Yung 1999). The highly-spirited and substantial support of Chinese Americans for America’s military defense also showed itself in various civilian activities and wartime industries. Organized fund-raising for the war front, war bond purchases, and blood donations for the wounded soldiers took place. Chinese Americans also joined the industrial labour force, which had excluded them for decades. Contemporary Chinese American publications indicated that the Chinese increasingly found jobs in shipyards, airplane factories, and defense plants (Lai 1980). In Los Angeles, some three hundred Chinese worked on the construction of the ship ‘China Victory’ (The Chinese Press, April 2, 1943). In Douglas, there were approximately one hundred Chinese working at the three defense plants of Santa Monica, Long Beach, and El

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Segundo (Ibid). Approximately 1,600 Chinese Americans out of a population of 18,000 in the San Francisco Bay Area worked in the defense industries, especially shipbuilding, in 1942 (Wong 2005). Chinese workers constituted fifteen percent of the shipyard work force in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1943 (The Chinese Press, April 2, 1943). Chinese workers also found jobs in the defense industries at the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation, and in the shipyards of Delaware and Mississippi. The increasing Chinese American work population, particularly in shipyards throughout the nation, was a result of the war time labour shortage, combined with federal regulations against discrimination, which made the shipyards quite willing to hire minorities (Wong 2005). Shipyards in the Bay Area in particular ran recruiting advertisements in Chinatown newspapers offering government-sponsored free classes in marine sheet metal, pipefitting, electricity, ship-fitting, and drafting to appeal to Chinese Americans. Shipyards in Richmond even announced that they were willing to hire the Chinese in the United States regardless of citizenship (Ibid). However, it was the war effort and sacrifice of Chinese Americans that changed American attitudes toward the Chinese in the United States. Their engagement in military services, wartime industrial production, and civilian activities such as fund-raising, war bond purchase, and blood donation were part of mainstream efforts to support America in the war. The contributions of Chinese Americans to the American war effort significantly amplified their demands for legal status in the United States. Repeal of the Exclusion legislation proved perhaps the most important consequence of the varied efforts of Chinese Americans to integrate themselves into society and to claim their rights as American citizens against the Chinese Exclusions. Chinese Americans, especially New York’s Chinese, saw American war strategy as a means of reaching their goals, intensifying their effort to bring an end to the Chinese Exclusion legislation. In early 1943, organizations as well as individuals of Chinese communities launched a petition campaign for repeal. The Chinese Women’s Association of New York took the lead in the petition-writing campaign. On February 16, 1943, Theodora Chan Wang, president of the Association, wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt, asking for a revision of the Chinese immigration laws. Denouncing racial discrimination, she firmly demanded equal treatment of the Chinese. What Chinese Americans wanted, wrote Wang, was merely an immigration quota, so that the Chinese would be accorded the privileges enjoyed by ‘our companions’ (Riggs 1950). This request received strong support from the leading organization, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. On May 4, the Benevolent Association sent a message to Congress demanding the

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repeal of the Exclusion legislation, calling it a most serious violation of the fundamental principles of equality (Takaki 1989). Meanwhile, individuals also wrote letters to petition for repeal. George Kin Leung, a New York Chinese resident, wrote to Marin Kennedy, a New York representative to Congress, demanding an immediate termination of the racially-based Chinese Exclusion Law (Riggs 1950). On November 11, 1943, Congress passed a repeal bill that terminated the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which had barred almost all Chinese immigration since 1882. Historians suggest that the American government’s repeal of Chinese Exclusion was an emergency war measure to combat Japanese war propaganda. Since China had already been at war against Japan, repeal to some seemed like a self-serving act to keep China as an ally (Dower 1993). However, the repeal was also a legal achievement of the Chinese in the United States, who regained their basic constitutional right to live and to work in the land they chose as home. Their demand for racial equality and their participation in the repeal movement eventually brought an end to the Chinese exclusion laws.

Conclusion The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws served as a milestone in the history of the Chinese in the United States. The persistent efforts of ethnic Chinese to win their constitutional right to live and work and be protected by law in the United States were finally realized. However, the repeal only marked an historical turning point; racial discrimination against the Chinese in the United States remains. The postwar experiences of Chinese Americans include many heart-breaking stories. When Chinese American soldiers returned from the war, they found they were not welcomed as American heroes and were, like black Americans, still subjected to racial discrimination. ‘I felt so frustrated that I was denied American citizenship when I came back home after fighting in Italy and France for the United States’, a World War II veteran from New York recalled (Author’s Interview 1997). Kain Chin, another war veteran, also expressed his resentment when he realized that his family was still suffering from racial antagonism after he came back home from the war front: ‘My family had been in this country for almost a century, and I served in the American army’, he said. But ‘we were still treated like aliens’ (Author’s Interview 1996). The repeal did not lead to a great increase in Chinese immigration either. In one respect, the repeal consolidated American’s restrictive immigration

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policy. The annual quota of 105 barred large numbers of Chinese immigrants from getting into the country. Thomas Kessner, professor of history at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, argues that, strictly speaking, the repeal was only a public relations gesture. It was a necessary step in undercutting Japanese propaganda accusing the United States of prejudice against Asians. The idea of dropping the bar to Chinese immigrants never represented a change of heart of the American immigration policy (Kessner and Caroli 1981). Chinese Americans have come full circle remembering and preserving the stories of Chinese Exclusions. Their experiences under the exclusion laws and after have become mainstream phenomena, shared by all immigrant groups and integrated into the very fabric of American life. Commenting on President Donald Trump’s use of the term ‘China virus’ and his apparent sympathy when he said ‘Asian Americans are working closely with us’ in his later speech to modify rhetoric under the pressure of criticism, Grace Kao contends that the president did not include Asian Americans as part of society, separating them from his collective ‘us (Thehill.com, March 19, 2020). Racial discrimination and rejection are problems with deep roots. The legacy of resistance against them continues.

Selected Bibliography Primary Sources ‘Ambivalence Prevails in Immigration Policy’, New York Times, May 27, 2001. Chinese Nationalist Daily, July 7, 1933. The Chinese Press, March 20, 1942 and April 2, 1943. Chinese Reform News, September 26, 1917. The Chinese Republic News, September 26 and November 4, 1936. ‘Democracy Dies in Darkness’, Washington Post, September 16, 2020. The New York Tribune, June 15, 1901, 1. US Census, 1870. US Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945, Washington DC., 1949. ‘US has covered 200 campuses to check up on Mideast Students’, New York Times, November 12, 2001. Thomas, Sharene, ‘Interview with Virginia M. Kee’, Tenement Times (Vol.1, No.2, Spring 1990).

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Author Interviews An interview with Kain Chin in the Symposium, ‘Allies and Enemies: The Dilemma of Asian-Americans during World War II’, New York, 1996. An interview with Kem Louei, daughter of a war veteran, in the Symposium, ‘Silent No More: Asian American Women Speak Out’, New York, 1997.

Secondary Sources Barth, Gunther. 1964. Bitter Strength: A History of Chinese in the United States 1850–1870 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chan, Sucheng. 1991. Asian Americans: An Interpretive History. Boston: Twayne. Chan, Sucheng. 1991. ‘Exclusion of Chinese Women, 1875–1943’, in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–1943 Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Chen, Jack. 1980 The Chinese of America San Francisco: Harper and RowChen, Shehong. 2002. Being Chinese: Becoming Chinese Americans. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Chinn, Thomas. 1989. Bridging the Pacific: San Francisco Chinatown and Its People. San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America. Coolidge, Mary. 1909. Chinese Immigration. New York: H. Holt and Company. Dollard, John. 1957.Caste and Class in a Southern Town. 3rd edition. Doubleday, Doran and Company Ltd. Dower, John.1993. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon Books. Foner, Nancy. 2005. In a New Land: A Comparative View of Immigration. New York: New York University Press. Fong, Kathryn M. December 19, 1976. ‘Asian Women Lost Citizenship’, San Francisco Journal:12. Greenberg, Cheryl Lynn. 1991. ‘Or Does It Explode’: Black Harlem in the Great Depression. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Higham, John. 1963. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925.New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Hoffman, Abraham. 1974.Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929–1939.Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Kessner, Thomas and Betty Caroli. 1981. Today’s Immigrants, Their Stories: A New Look at the Latest Immigrants. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kung, S.W.1962. Chinese in American Life. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Lai, Him Mark. 1980. The Chinese of America 1780-1980: An Illustrated History San Francisco: Chinese American Organization.

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Lee, Erika. 2003. At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1945.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Lee, Robert G. 1999. Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Luibheid, Eithne. 2002.Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. McKee, Delber L. 1977. Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open-Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes Over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Miller, Stuart C. 1969. The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785–1882. Los Angeles: University of California. Moon, Krysten R. 2005. Yellowface: Creating the Chinese in American Popular Music and Performances, 1850s–1920s.New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Peffer, George Anthony. Fall 1986. ‘Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women Under the Page Law, 1875–1882’, Journal of American Ethnic History 6.1: 28-46. Peffer, George Anthony. 1999. If They Don’t Bring Their Wives Here, Chinese Female Immigration Before Exclusion. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Pfaelzer, Jean. 2007. Driven Out: The Forgotten War against Chinese Americans. New York: Random House. Riggs, Fred W. 1950. Pressures on Congress: Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Said, Edward W. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Saxton, Alexander. 1977. The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Song, Betty Lee. 1967. Mountain of Gold: The Chinese in America. New York: The Macmillan Company. Takaki, Ronald. 1989. Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans. New York: Penguin. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. 1983. China and the Overseas Chinese in the US 1868–1911 Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry. 1986. The Chinese Experience in America. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Wong, K. Scott. 2005. Americans First: Chinese Americans and the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wong, Wayne Hung. 2006. American Paper Son: A Chinese Immigrant in the Midwest Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Yung, Judy. 1999. Unbound Voices: A Documentary History of Chinese Women in San Francisco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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Young, Judy, Gordon H. Chang, and Him Mark Lai, eds. 2006. Chinese American Voices: From the Gold Rush to the Present. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Zhu, Liping. 2013. The Road to Chinese Exclusion: The Denver Riot, 1880 Election, and Rise of the West. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Internet Sources ‘Changing America, Shared Destiny, Shared Responsibility: Trump’s use of the term “Chinese Virus” for Coronavirus hurts Asian Americans’, Thehill.com, March 19, 2020.

About the Author Dr. Jingyi Song is professor of History and former department chair in the Department of History and Philosophy at the State University of New York at Old Westbury. Her recent publications include, Shaping and Reshaping Chinese American Identity: New York’s Chinese in the Years of the Depression and World War II.

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Disillusioned Diplomacy US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945 Travis Chambers Abstract This chapter interprets and lays bare a new perspective on US-China relations by analyzing official American policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government from 1938–1945. It examines the intricate diplomatic network present in World War II China and narrates the evolution of US policy towards Wang Jingwei, from the initiation of his relations with Japan, to the establishment of the Reorganized Government, and to the official policy formulation of the US State Department. Analysis and interpretation of US policy towards Wang Jingwei completes a piece of missing history in US-China relations and provides a more nuanced historical narrative. Keywords: Wang Jingwei, US Policy, US-China Relations, World War II, China 1938–1945

Scholarship on US-China relations during World War II abound, and the overwhelming focus is on the relationship between the United States and Jiang Jieshi. Most historical narration emphasizes the importance of the Republic of China within the diplomatic dynamic held by the United States from 1938–1945. This is attributed to Jiang Jieshi’s role, although obligatory in the eyes of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, within the various Allied conferences during World War II. Unfortunately, the cliché ‘history is written by the victors’ applies to much of the early historical analysis of diplomatic relations between the US and China. Scholarship on American policy towards Wang Jingwei’s government was also affected by an outdated, binary lens of ‘good versus evil’, ‘friend or foe’, that existed before World War II and carried over into the Cold War.

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch03

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This research asks new twenty-first century questions of the diplomatic situation in World War II China to help understand current geo-politics and US-China relations. Just because Wang was pro-Japanese, did that make him anti-American? As discussed in a previous chapter, Li Dazhao was initially pro-American, yet became disillusioned by the United States; on that point, just because Mao Zedong was communist, did that make him anti-American during World War II? Eliminating the archaic ‘Cold War Lens’ of ‘good versus bad’ expands the study of this field. This chapter recognizes the complexities of American policy towards Wang, free from the formerly simplistic historical approach found in Cold War scholarship. Wang Jingwei faded into historical obscurity as the nationalist movements of Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi dominated scholarly narration. This is attributable to the continuation of the Chinese civil war after 1945 and the importance of Cold War geo-politics. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory in 1949 over the Guomindang (Nationalist Party or GMD) garnered more attention by historians than did Wang Jingwei’s failed government. In Chinese accounts, from both the CCP and GMD, the Reorganized National Government is labeled as treasonous collaborators (hanjian). This chapter initiates a new framework for the study of American policy towards Wang’s government, from a twenty-first century perspective and within the broader context of US-China relations. Previously, from 1938–1945, the United States 1) did not recognize Wang Jingwei’s government as legitimately representing China; 2) viewed that government as a ‘puppet’ of the Japanese empire; and 3) implemented policy based on Japanese posturing, not Wang’s rhetoric. As such, historians that experienced World War II or conducted research directly after, were influenced by the requisite, official narrative of the 1940s, one in which the only legitimate claimant for Chinese nationhood and diplomacy was the Republic of China. This is not to say that scholars were not aware of the Reorganized National Government or Wang Jingwei. Even though he is often labeled as ‘treacherous’ or a ‘puppet’, American academics knew of Wang and his Japanese-backed government. Nonetheless, Wang Jingwei’s obscurity in historiography is a by-product of American foreign policy decisions towards him, or completely ignoring him, during World War II. The Reorganized National Government was not only ignored by US diplomacy, it was also ignored by American scholars of US-China relations. Throughout the Warlord Period, 1916–1927, the United States economically supported the fledgling Republic of China with foreign direct investments while tacitly portraying to the rest of the international community Wilsonian ideals of self-determination for all nations. Simultaneously, the US sent philanthropic missions to aid the newly recognized ROC, with the

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establishment of banks, investment companies, missionaries, and colleges. Together with investments and infrastructural improvements, the United States refunded indemnity money paid by China for the Boxer Rebellion. However much economic backing the US sent to the ROC, it was not matched in diplomatic relations. At the 1922 Washington Conference, major powers like the US, France, Great Britain, and Japan did not necessarily assent to a non-aggression pact for the self-determination of China, but only to maintain the statusquo of their economic interests there (Chen 2004, 1–33). The Japanese were not deterred by American calls for equal trade, but when the issue of territorial sovereignty was addressed, the Japanese were dissatisfied, as they held further imperial ambitions in China. The US and other powers assured Japan that its current claims would not be threatened if the opportunity for equal trade was afforded the same courtesy. At the conference’s conclusion, the former ‘Open-Door’ policy expanded on an international scale, further ignoring China’s demands as it was relegated to a menial role in the diplomatic transaction (Cohen 2010, 96). After the Washington Conference in 1922, US-China relations remained static, as private American firms continued investment in Chinese business and infrastructure (Cohen 1978). By the 1920s, the United States entered a ‘return to normalcy’ following World War I. This policy approach projected a sort of isolationism in foreign affairs, avoiding direct military engagements, andinstead focused on supporting American enterprise abroad. Companies like Standard Oil entered into contracts on Chinese soil, often with the aid of the State Department in negotiating with Chinese state officials (FRUS 1940, 1:1093). Towards the end of the Warlord Era, Sun Yatsen died in early 1925. His military protégé, Jiang Jieshi, assumed control of the GMD and formally established the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou. Wang Jingwei, one of Sun’s intellectual and political acolytes, was elected chairman (Crossley 2010, 180–84). The Warlord Era concluded as the GMD and the CCP forces routed the various warlords throughout China. As Jiang reinstated the ROC under GMD control and ushered in the Republican Period (1927–1937), he also sought to eradicate Communists from the government. In reaction to these efforts, the CCP fled the cities and urban areas, often hiding in the rural countryside amongst the agrarian population, and another civil war commenced between the two sides. The Japanese Empire or Dai Nippon Teikoku, having previously colonized Taiwan in 1895, Korea in 1910, and former German holdings in Shandong, saw the rift between the CCP and GMD as a chance to expand its empire. The Japanese military invaded Manchuria in September 1931 and quickly seized control of the northeastern provinces. Just as they had practiced in their other colonies, the Japanese

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military leaders supported the establishment of a puppet government, Manchukuo, led by the former Qing emperor Pu Yi. In Manchuria, private Japanese business firms with government contracts established a foothold as well in seeking the empire’s economic advancement. Thus, the United States and Japan, two major powers from the Washington Conference, each vied for economic and diplomatic advancement in China as it was bogged down by internal conflict. While the GMD purged the CCP and Japan invaded China, US diplomats reported the situation to Washington, DC in detail. From the onset, ROC officials requested the intermediary aid of the United States to enforce the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929), as Japan was an original signatory. Secretary of State Henry Stimson reported back: The Department has received from the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires, and is now giving consideration to, a note in which it is charged that ‘in this case of unprovoked and unwarranted attack and subsequent occupation of Chinese cities by Japanese troops’, Japan has deliberately violated the Kellogg Pact. The Chinese Government urgently appeals to the American Government to take such steps as will insure the preservation of peace in the Far East and the upholding of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes (FRUS 1943, 1:8–9).

With Japan’s aggressive actions disrupting Chinese sovereignty and potentially disrupting American business interests, United States foreign policy shifted focus. From 1931 until 1945, the US dealt with Jiang Jieshi’s Republic of China as the sole representative of Chinese diplomatic interests. However, for much of the span from 1931 to1937, Japanese expansion halted as they consolidated their holding, both military and economic, in Manchukuo. Due in part to US-China relations, the Japanese were hesitant to seize too much, as American business interests were not only firmly established in China, but also interconnected with Japanese business, on the international market. Japanese expansion into China, whether intentional or not, initiated a trilateral diplomatic ‘chess-game’, leading up to and during the War Against Japanese Aggression (1937–1945). Later, the commencement of World War II found China, and its various fractured governments, as ‘pawns’ used by the United States and Japan. The War Against Japanese Aggression launched as the Japanese military marched south from Manchuria and engaged ROC troops at Marco Polo Bridge in July 1937. As the war progressed, a rift within Guomindang leadership developed between Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei. Jiang envisioned

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total retaliation against the Japanese, with the full support of the Chinese population. Wang desired a diplomatic path to halt Japanese advances and to negotiate. Despite being two key figures within the same Chinese nationalist circles, Jiang and Wang were opposed strategically on the Japanese problem. General Jiang headed the Whampoa Military Academy and Wang was Sun Yatsen’s, Japanese-educated, politically-minded, right-hand man. Both clashed on how to lead China out of immanent occupation. While Jiang Jieshi responded militarily, Japanese forces swiftly occupied Chinese cities and provinces. Beijing, Tianjin, and Nanjing all fell to Imperial forces by December 1937 (Li 2018, 29). Chinese forces were continuously defeated, and Wang Jingwei believed it imperative that Chinese nationalists cooperate with Japan. According to Wang, the only way Chinese sovereignty remained intact was to accept advisement and diplomatic engagement with their ‘neighbours’. By October 1938, Jiang’s capital at Nanjing fell to Japanese forces and compelled the Guomindang’s relocation to Chongqing. Wang Jingwei followed the GMD government to Chongqing, but after word reached Jiang that the former had conducted peace-talks with Japanese officials, several attempts were made on Wang’s life and others like him. Wang attempted to release official correspondence between Jiang and Japanese officials, from the outset of the war, that discussed an armistice. In response, Jiang Jieshi attempted to silence Wang Jingwei and did not accept his last pleas for peaceful negotiation with Japan. Before his temporary exodus to Hanoi, Wang Jingwei published an expository article titled ‘Yandian’, and argued for peaceful cooperation with the Japanese government. After Wang published his article, he was stripped of all governmental positions, dismissed from the GMD, and subsequently fled to Vietnam (Wang, China Weekly Review, 1939). On March 30, 1940, with assistance from Japanese advisors, Wang Jingwei established the Reorganized Nationalist Government of China in Nanjing. Kagesa Sadaaki, of the Japanese special services agency, Chen Bijun, Wang’s wife, and political partner, and General Yazaki aided Wang Jingwei in government operations (Yick, 2014, 221–23). The Reorganized Government enjoyed valuable political, economic, and military support from Japan. While governing over Guangdong Province, Madame Wang shared a belief with her husband that there could be no peace without anti-communism (Yick, 2014, 225). Certainly, anti-communism was not only a belief held by Japanese politicians, but also by the Reorganized Government’s nationalist rival, Jiang Jieshi. Japan viewed Wang’s government as the true embodiment of Chinese nationalism and fostered indigenous movements throughout the Greater East Asia Sphere (Shigemitsu, 1958, 330). Official Japanese policy under the Konoe Cabinet supported indigenous nationalist movements and

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allowed them self-governance, within the Greater East Asia Sphere. Just as Wang’s government received aid from Japan, so did they adopt modern Japanese methods in adherence to East Asian tradition. In support of Wang’s nationalist government, Japan sent military instructors and advisors in addition to weapons and ammunition. The Japanese clearly backed Wang’s nationalist movement and their desire to preserve Chinese nationalism against the resistance forces of the CCP and GMD. Wang wanted to create a truly politically motivated army that would fight side by side with the Japanese against the illegitimate movements of Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong (Jowett, 2004, 2314). As such, the Japanese agreed to equip and establish the Reorganized Government’s army and ‘promote Wang’s government as the true disciples of Sun Yatsen’ (Jowett, 2004, 2314). Wang Jingwei formed the new Reorganized National Army with Japanese tutelage and influence. Historically deemed as a ‘puppet’ state, the Reorganized National Government existed as an antithesis to prevalent Chinese governments of the period. While Mao and Jiang resisted, Wang laboured to preserve China through cooperation. Japanese policy, starting with the Konoe cabinet (1937–1939), called for self-governance or ‘Chinese governing Chinese’ (Yick, 2014, 221). Provisions for self-governance within occupied territories prevented logistical overload for Japanese officials as they expanded and engaged on numerous fronts in the Pacific. The Japanese aim was to assist the formation of a Chinese government in tandem with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: ‘With the help of a powerful Japan, the peoples of Asia will work together for independence. The aim of the present war [World War II] is the realization of His Majesty’s august will and ideal that the peoples of the world should each be granted possession of their rightful homelands’ (Tsuji, 1961, 197). Wang Jingwei thus established a Chinese government, one which the Japanese believed to be the true voice of Chinese nationalism and that of Sun Yatsen. Sun Yatsen never realized his ambitions for Chinese nationalism and sovereignty. However, his successor Wang Jingwei attempted to carry on his true legacy for the self-determination of China and the vestiges of securing for China a status of equality and unqualified independence in the family of nations (Wang, 1934, 107). Japanese influence on Wang Jingwei manifested in his time spent with Sun Yatsen in Japan: ‘These years of study in Japan had decisive influence on the young scholar … awakened in Wang a sense of patriotism’ (Wang, 1934, xiii). Wang Jingwei no doubt implemented the tenets of Pan-Asianism acquired in Japan in his own nationalist government in China. Unlike his contemporaries, Wang did not believe the issue facing China was resisting Japan, but rather preserving China as a nation. The

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so-called ‘collaborationist’ government strove to preserve China against Western aggression rather than against occupation by their fellow Asian neighbours. In an excerpt from his work, Wang summarizes his nationalist views in: Advocating the policy of ‘co-existence’ of China and Japan. In order that the voice of these liberals may gain ascendancy in Japan, it is necessary that not only Japanese, but Chinese also, should exert themselves towards this end. If this policy of coexistence of China and Japan be realized through combined efforts of two peoples, to reach the goal of national salvation we must therefore put up the most determined resistance against Communist banditry and foreign aggression (Wang, 1934, 61, 150).

Jiang Jieshi branded Wang and his ‘collaborationist’ government as traitors, banning them from the Guomindang. Claiming legitimacy over the Guomindang and representing the Chinese nation was a failed effort due to the United States’ well-established diplomatic ties with Jiang Jieshi. Because Jiang held the ear, and pocketbook, of the US State Department, US relations in China were conducted exclusively through the Guomindang and no other nationalist groups or governments. Early diplomatic scholars were familiar with Wang Jingwei and his role during the Republican Period. However, they often treated the Reorganized National Government as other Chinese ‘puppet’ governments, amalgamating it with Manchukuo, the Reformed Government of China, and the Federal Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia (Linebarger, 1941, 36–43). Although initial scholarship of US-China relations recognized a marked difference in Wang’s government, it was still considered ‘pro-Japanese’ or ‘collaborationist’. Linebarger reveals in his analysis of Wang’s Government that: This government differs from other Japanophile governments in two very important ways: it possesses the national capital, the flag, the laws, and the regalia of the legitimate government; and it is headed by men who have been of current political importance. Wang Jingwei is a brilliant man, charming, almost effeminate in feature. A romantic revolutionary, he began his career more than thirty years ago with an attempt to murder the Prince Regent of China … his charm, his daring, and his megalomaniac sense of mission give him a personal following, some of whom follow him even to the charnel houses of Nanjing. Wang’s affiliation with Japan did not represent an actual schism within the Kuomintang (Linebarger, 1941, 40).

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Seemingly, direct work with the Guomindang affected this treatment of Wang, as Linebarger’s stance on the Reorganized National Government was given with a condescending tone and almost amusement at its perceived futility. He continues ‘while Jiang profited by the delay of war to develop China’s technical defenses, Wang committed political suicide by explaining the policy of non-resistance … Japanese promised him eventual autonomy over all China. I found that the Reorganized Government was an amazing simulacrum of the National Government. Nanking was therefore a parallel of Vichy … Wang represents the very best that Japan can achieve in China’ (Linebarger, 1941, 42). Through equating the Reorganized National Government with that of Vichy, France, Linebarger suggests that Wang’s government is illegitimate, that he wholesale ‘bought’ Japan’s foreign policy initiatives, and that the Guomindang are the sole representatives of China. In another work, Linebarger, in reference to Wang Jingwei, states that ‘he reiterated his old point that the Chinese could not possibly whip the Japanese on the fields of battle, but that they might outmaneuver them over the tables of diplomacy’, and also explains a sort of Doppelganger effect in that ‘the Nanjing incumbents make every effort to confuse their regime with the National Government at Chungqing’ (Linebarger, 1942, 200–04). Comparatively and against State Department evaluations, scholars during the World War II period presented a partisan examination of Wang’s government in relation to US-China diplomacy: the first point being pity that Wang Jingwei was overly confident in his political and diplomatic acumen, ‘too smart for his own good’; the second that Wang’s government was not, through American eyes, China’s legitimate government, but simply an appendage to Japan’s overarching foreign policy goals for East Asia; and, finally, that the Guomindang was not only representative of Chinese diplomatic interests, but also that Jiang Jieshi’s Republic of China was the rightful government at the negotiating table and best served American economic and geo-political interests. During the Cold War, scholars of World War II China discovered new Chinese and Japanese language sources. This allowed authors like Gerald E. Bunker and John H. Boyle to reevaluate the diplomatic situation, and Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized government, from a perspective other than the Republic of China’s or the United States’. Both previously mentioned scholars published their comprehensive, yet highly detailed, works simultaneously and both remained as essential contributions to the field. But, in an effort to provide a fresh interpretation by focusing on regional diplomatic currents, Bunker and Boyle skimmed over the importance and influence of American diplomacy in East Asia, which later scholars, including this one, recognized

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as one of the major contestants in the diplomatic game during World War II. Bunker’s and Boyle’s historical interpretations, despite their efforts to illuminate new sources at the time, became entangled in the minutia between individual characters. No matter what diplomatic decisions or secret communiques Wang Jingwei or Jiang Jieshi made, the United States and Japan remained as the region’s diplomatic motivators (Bunker 1972; Boyle 1972). Later scholars, like Warren Cohen, analyzed US-China relations within the complicated diplomatic situation that was World War II East Asia. Cohen recognized the US State Department’s affinity for Jiang Jieshi as an alignment with anti-communism, before and after the war. But he also points out that many State Department diplomats, liaisons, and ambassadors that spent their entire careers entrenched in China, were more aware of the delicate political situation, more than the upper echelons of Washington, DC Even though many American attaches in China preferred working alongside the CCP, the Roosevelt administration maintained its relationship with the GMD (Davies Jr., 1944, 566–67). According to Cohen, relations with Jiang Jieshi deteriorated and it was thought that perhaps the US should work with and recognize Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (Cohen, 2010, 156–57). Additionally, this was an effort to ‘win over’ the CCP against Soviet influence as the United States began blue printing the post-war world. But United States foreign policy superseded popular sentiment on the ground and relations with the anti-communist GMD were maintained. American foreign policy hinged on anti-communism yet sought an alliance and conferenced with Stalin and the USSR. During World War II, it was strategically expedient to ally with the Soviets to defeat the Axis powers. By the same point, why did the US State Department ignore the anti-communist government of Wang Jingwei? Simply put, American foreign policy maneuvers were more easily directed towards Japanese actions, with China in the middle, than directly attending to the convoluted political environment that developed between the GMD, CCP, and Wang Jingwei. More contemporary scholars depict a highly nuanced narrative of USChina relations during World War II (Wang, 2013; Ma, 2015, 1:2:451–88; Chen, 2004, 1–33; So, 2002, 28:2:213–52). Wang Jingwei’s role within US-China relations has garnered increased attention and has been added to historical narratives. However, much like the Reorganized National Government’s role was ‘swallowed’ up by those of major diplomatic figures like the United States, Guomindang, and Japan, so too was its role within the diplomatic history of World War II. Xiaohua Ma briefly summarizes Wang’s position amongst the powers as a Japanese ‘puppet’ and as soon as the Reorganized

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Government gained Japanese recognition, the United States responded by aiding Jiang Jieshi with the Lend-Lease programs (Ma, 2015, 1:2:456). Ma indicates that US-China relations during World War II were less dependent on what Wang’s government did or what Japan did with Wang’s government, but instead focused on the overall Axis movements in the Pacific Theater. Additionally, World War II in China cannot be studied without consulting Rana Mitter’s research. Mitter’s truly comprehensive work from 2013 builds upon the broader perspectives of past scholarship as well as the focused ones. Mitter utilized Jiang Jieshi’s diaries, released in 2006, to gain more insight and contribute to the field a well-rounded and in-depth analysis of diplomatic workings during World War II. Not only does Mitter detail the relationships between the major figures, but also accounts for the broader importance of American relations with the Republic of China, Reorganized National Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and Japan (Mitter 2013). Japanese foreign policy reacted to American foreign policy, not China relations; all the while, both were diplomatically dueling each other in China. The Middle Kingdom essentially became the Kingdom in the Middle as foreign policy parries were exchanged between the US and Japan. The long-disputed topic of extra-territoriality treaties remained within US-GMD negotiations, but was not abolished until January 11, 1943, two days after Japanese foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu surrendered his nation’s extra-territorial rights in China to Wang Jingwei (Jiang 1943, 149–82; Wang 2013, 152; Ma 2015, 473). Both Chinese nationalist governments were effectively diplomatic ‘puppets’ of their subsequent allies: the US with Jiang Jieshi and Japan with Wang Jingwei. Circuitously, the Reorganized National Government’s agreement with Japan effectively expanded Chinese sovereignty, more so than the GMD, as it also forced the same terms between the United States and Jiang, out of American reactions to Japanese diplomatic advances. However, after the signature of extra-territorial rights over to Jiang, Washington, DC viewed the ‘puppet’ government in Nanjing as an increasing threat to their ally in Chongqing. This diplomatic quagmire made it easier for the US State Department to conceptualize foreign policy towards Japan than towards China, as the latter was previously torn by civil war and remained agrarian, while the former was ‘modern’ and industrialized, therefore predictable. In essence, US policy towards the Reorganized National Government was a function of factors beyond Wang Jingwei. American perspectives on the war in East Asia were initially passive and detached. Until the late 1930s, the United States held a more amiable relationship with the ‘Far East’ in comparison to their European counterparts.

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American interest in the region had not actively pursued territorial interests or exhibited colonial aspirations like Great Britain, France, and Germany (Dolin 2012, 262). Joseph C. Grew served as the American Ambassador to Japan from 1931-1941 and became diplomatically acquainted with Japanese counterparts, and, vicariously, Wang Jingwei, during his tenure there. Grew is but one representative of the American perspective leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. His accounts exemplified the ebb and flow of American-Japanese diplomacy, as Japan expanded its empire uncomfortably close to American economic and business interests in China. Ambassador Grew was stationed in Japan from 1932–1942 and his memoirs express an inevitable disintegration of US- Japanese relations, as well as disregard for Japanese ‘puppet’ states in China. In citing initial American concerns and misinterpretation of Japanese expansion into East Asia, Grew said, ‘The American Government and people understand what is meant by the “new order in East Asia” precisely as clearly as it is understood in Japan. The “new order in East Asia” has been officially defined in Japan as an order of security, stability, and progress’ (Grew 1944, 292). Before the gradual devolution of diplomacy between the United States and Japan, an air of understanding and sympathy was exhibited by Americans for Japan’s position, while simultaneously perceiving Japanese ambitions to overwhelm American economic interests in the region. Although it was a multi-faceted and complicated policy conceptualization by Japanese intellectuals, the State Department homed in on the diplomatic and militaristic implications of Pan-Asianism. In one diary entry Grew outlines American thoughts on Japanese Pan-Asianism: ‘the New Order in East Asia envisages permanent Japanese control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North China. Wang Jingwei’s subserviency to Japanese interests is being done to bring permanent peace to China … prevent the spread of communism into Japan proper (Grew 1944, 302–03). It was Prince Konoe and other Government members’ determination that Japan should not oppress, exploit, or interfere with other countries’ integrity’ (Grew 1944, 331). There existed between American and Japanese diplomats a healthy rapport on the topic of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, one side attempting to comprehend the other in a constant dialogue. Despite Japanese actions that suggested otherwise, the United States struggled to recompense the language of Japan’s foreign policy while simultaneously committing atrocities and supporting proxy, indigenous governments on the ground. As tensions boiled ever-closer to the brink of conflict, Grew recorded his exchange with Ambassador Matsuoka as the latter explained why Japan joined the Axis on October 5, 1940: ‘the construction of a new

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order in East Asia means the construction of a new order in which Japan establishes the relationship of common existence and mutual prosperity with the peoples of each and every land in East Asia … In a position of equality with every other country, Japan may freely carry on enterprises, trade, and emigration in and to each and every land in Greater East Asia’ (Grew 1944, 341). By joining Germany and Italy, Japan essentially lost all diplomatic credibility in the eyes of the State Department. Their alliance with the Axis also signaled a change in American policy as well, which shifted to maintaining relations with Jiang Jieshi to disrupt the order in China and exhaust Japan’s resources. Grew recognized Matsuoka and the Konoe Cabinets’ implementation of a sphere of mutual prosperity and endeavouring to abolish restrictions on the free activities of mankind (Grew, 1944, 341). Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (in office 1937–1939 and 1940–1941) was a Pan-Asianist from a young age and believed that the West had actively kept the East down in international politics. He was the main force behind the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, believing it was Japan’s duty to cooperate with and protect its neighbours (McClain 2002, 452). In relation to the Japanese occupation of China, this translated to severing the colonial grips of European powers and allowing the Chinese nation to enjoy all the rights of sovereignty as granted by the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Takekoshi 1915, vii; Togo 1906; Nitobe 1943, iv; Mochiji 1912; Kumamoto 1920; Yadao 1924; 1926; 1929; 1934; 1935; 1948; Iriye 1974, 425). Rhetorically, it aligned with Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ and President Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ (Stokesbury 1980, 119–21). In a private conversation concerning Roosevelt’s fears of Japanese dictatorship in China, Grew records a senior Japanese statesmen; in an attempt to understand what the President had in mind, the statesmen retorts, ‘Japan was at least not under a dictatorship; and then he had got it; why of course he was referring to Jiang Jieshi, the perfect dictator … he could not imagine any country less democratic than Jiang Jieshi’s China’. After working closely with Jiang’s ambassador, Soong Tzu-wen (T.V. Soong), and becoming enraptured by Soong Mei-ling’s (Madame Jiang) eight month speaking tour across the United States, neither the State Department nor Roosevelt believed that ‘their’ Jiang Jieshi should be bypassed for Japanese control of China or Wang’s government (Grew 1944, 375). As the United States developed a more complete diplomatic picture, Grew’s understanding of Wang Jingwei’s place within official China policy reflected such. On April 10, 1940, eleven days after the Reorganized National Government of China formed, Grew commented:

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Wang [Jing]wei opened shop and I wonder how long it will take for him to fade out too. The fundamental essentials for stability and permanency, apart from Japanese bayonets, appear to be lacking, and unless Japan is willing and able to keep a very considerable number of bayonets in that part of the world, it does not now appear that Mr. Wang will continue to feel quite sure of his footing. Predictions as to future developments are just as futile as they usually are in the Far East because of the many imponderable factors in the situation, but we can at least say that the futility of the China campaign, in its larger aspects, is steadily coming home to the great majority of thinking Japanese (Grew 1944, 314).

It appeared to the American embassy in Tokyo, by all actions and conversations with Japanese diplomats, that Wang was in fact subject to the Japanese and did not appear to hold any justification for recognition on behalf of the State Department. Since the US considered Wang the puppet representative of Japan in China, and that any policy decisions coming from Wang would be treated as coming from Japanese agents, Grew reported back to Secretary of State Cordell Hull the Japanese government’s publicly released position in China as: The rights and interests of third powers, including those of the United States, will be fully respected and maintained by Japan. These measures envisage no intention to drive American interests out of China. American cooperation in the reconstruction of China will be essential. The establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime is expected to solve these problems. It is fully expected that the Jiang Jieshi (aka. Chiang Kai-shek) Government will soon collapse and will throw in its lot with Wang Ching-wei (FRUS 1956, 4:310).

Ambassador Grew and the State Department were not oblivious to the contradictory actions of the Japanese government and their intentions in China or the contradictory opinions of Japanese officials in private. Some publicists and Japanese government officials who held a close rapport with Grew intimated their personal evaluations of the war in China and Wang’s government, which Grew relayed to the State Department (FRUS 1956, 4:311). By 1940, the United States not only supported Jiang Jieshi, but also endeavoured for 1) Japan to negotiate directly with the Guomindang; 2) East Asians to solve East Asian disputes especially as war commenced in Europe; and 3) to reinstate amiable economic and diplomatic relations in China. None of these foreign policy points included Wang Jingwei. Additionally, as reported by the French Ambassador to the American embassy, even some in

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Japanese diplomatic circles, including Foreign Minister Matsuoka, did not consider Wang Jingwei as representative of China at the negotiation table: ‘Matsuoka, it appears, considered himself largely instrumental in bringing about Wang [Jing]wei’s flight from Ch[o]ng[q]ing and he therefore felt obliged to support Wang in every possible way. However, in view of Wang’s attitude towards Japan, Matsuoka had no further claim on him for support and that in his opinion [J]iang [Jieshi] was the only person who could now carry out any settlement with Japan’ (Grew 1944, 387–88). Not only did United States foreign policy ignore Wang Jingwei, some in the Japanese militarist camp were dismissive of his diplomatic value as well. Japan outwardly portrayed the desire to settle the war in China by evading conflict with the United States. This was not sufficiently affirmed by Japanese actions in China, however. What was meant by avoiding conflict was subversive activities to undermine Jiang Jieshi and Western interests in China, via Wang Jingwei’s government. Japan forced itself into a position in which it was inseparably tied to its proxy in China. Through American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, Japan’s public intentions for China were made evident. His careful, first-hand documentation of his experience with Japanese foreign policy provides a perspective that comes from the ‘in-between’, a perspective that enforced official US policy demands and yet sought to understand those of Japan. Wang Jingwei’s nationalist China desired cooperation with Japan for the attainment of sovereignty, peace, and preservation of the nation. Japan stood stoic for all Pan-Asian nationalism and as a catalyst to realize not only nationhood, but freedom from oppression by the West. Through the ideological understanding of Pan-Asian nationalism, countries cooperated within the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and united against imperial forays from the Occident. Ambassador Grew makes this apparent when he recalls the words of Waseda University’s president on February 26, 1941, ‘as stressed in the Konoe statement made some time ago, Japan’s purpose in the present conflict is not a petty territorial acquisition … It is rather to safeguard China’s independence, and, respecting her sovereignty, to establish a New Order in East Asia’ (Grew 1944, 376). In tandem with the Konoe cabinet, the Japanese concept of hakko ichiu (universal peace) meant no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation of any peoples (Grew 1944, 390). Grew, like many others negotiating with Japan in the 1930s and up until 1941, made it clear that Japanese aspirations for China were overall peaceful in intent and cooperative in nature, including the desire for neighbourly friendship, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, cooperative defense between the two countries, and fusion of Chinese nationalists into

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one government. However, towards the end of Ambassador Grew’s tenure in Japan, the militarists within Japan wrested majority control within the Japanese government. Ultimately, as Japanese diplomacy said one thing, military actions expressed another, and Grew in Tokyo weeded through the rhetoric just as his associates at the State Department did in Washington, DC. As early as 1940, the US State Department acquired a clear understanding of the complicated diplomatic situation in China and viewed it as follows: 1) The United States supported Jiang Jieshi’s government in Chongqing; 2) Wang Jingwei’s government in Nanjing was a Japanese puppet; 3) There existed a rift between Japanese diplomatic policy and military implementation in China; and 4) Wang’s government was a Japanese tool to ‘save face’ in negotiating with the Guomindang. The American Ambassador to China, Nelson T. Johnson, explained in a communique to Secretary of State Cordell Hull: The ‘army’ faction feels that to negotiate directly with Chungking would be an admission of the failure of the Japanese military campaign in China and so they propose to set up a central government under Wang Ching Wei and let that government negotiate with Chungking; then even if severe terms are demanded by Chungking and conceded by Wang Ching Wei’s government, the army’s ‘face’ will be saved. The second faction, however, does not believe that Wang Ching Wei will be able to make peace with Chungking and wishes to deal directly with Chungking (FRUS 1955, 4:259).

The State Department knew that even though Wang’s government was representative of Chinese nationalism through Japanese projections, authentically or not, not even Japanese diplomats believed Nanjing would be able to carry out its mission effectively. Furthermore, neither American nor Japanese diplomats believed Wang could negotiate any sort of peace or recognition from Chongqing, let alone Washington, DC. Anti-communism presented another obstacle to the State Department’s position, in US-China relations, during World War II. The Reorganized National Government was vehemently anti-communist, despite Wang Jingwei’s previous relations with the Soviet Union during the fledgling days of the Guomindang and aligned with Japanese policy since its establishment in March 1940. Before the outbreak of World War II, the United States was also anti-communist, but after the Soviet Union joined the Allies, dismissed Jiang’s close relationship with Moscow as well as Wang’s anti-communism (FRUS 1955, 4:277). For the United States, ideological differences were set aside in favour of winning the war against the Axis powers, which included Wang’s Japanese-backed government. With initial support for Jiang Jieshi

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already established, Soong Mei Ling and T.V. Soong’s efforts in the US, and the Allies’ acceptance of the Soviet Union, any hopes of Wang Jingwei establishing meaningful diplomatic relations with either Jiang or the State Department were dashed from the outset. Even a few months before the Reorganized National Government’s inauguration, the State Department questioned the diplomatic efficacy of Wang Jingwei. US allies, France and Great Britain, were more concerned for their territorial and colonial holdings in East Asia; this fact was taken into consideration for official American policy towards Wang’s government. The other Allies’ concerns were relayed to Hull on January 29, 1940, when the Counselor of Embassy in China, in reference to Wang Jingwei’s government imminent forming, stated ‘I have received the impression from observations like that of the French Ambassador and from indications of British interpretation of Japanese pressure at Tientsin that while both nationalities are sympathetic with American policy as exemplif ied by the denunciation of the 1911 treaty, in regard to immediate pressure from Japan their Far Eastern possessions make their position far more vulnerable than is that of the United States’ (FRUS 1955, 4:280–81). Because Wang’s government was supported by Japan, other Allied powers, not just the United States, viewed the Reorganized Nationalist Government as disruptive of the status quo. France witnessed the threat of Japanese-sponsored puppet governments in their forced co-governance of Vietnam starting in 1940, eventually culminating in a full Japanese takeover and establishment of Bao Dai’s puppet government in March 1945 (Nitz, 1983, 14:2:2). Wang’s government was denied any chance of recognition by the United States due to its perceived threat against American allies. Nonetheless, Wang Jingwei endeavoured to establish the Reorganized National Government’s legitimacy in US-China relations. On March 21, 1940, nine days before officially initiating his government, Wang and supporters passed a series of regulations through the ‘Central Political Conference’ for the organization of the ‘North China Political Affairs Commission’. The first order of business was unanimously adopted as the ‘liquidation of the Chungking regime’ (FRUS 1955, 4:482). Accompanying the first resolution, others included: 1) ‘all laws, decrees, contracts, obligations, treaties, and agreements entered into by the National Government at Chungking shall be invalidated from the time of the return of the National Government to its capital at Nanking’; 2) ‘orders be issued to the men in the field to cease hostilities immediately’; and 3) ‘that all civil servants now in Chungking are to be ordered to return to Nanking and report for duty’ (FRUS 1955, 4:482). It was also agreed at the ‘Central Political Conference’ that Wang Jingwei

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would serve as President of the Chinese National Government with his supporters as cabinet members. Although it aligned with Japanese policy goals in China, to establish a Japanese-supported Chinese government, Wang Jingwei attempted to project a legitimately formed government in hopes of negotiating with the United States. However, despite those efforts, the US State Department ultimately perceived Wang’s government as a diplomatic ‘paper tiger’. While attempting to outwardly portray legitimacy as the sole Chinese government the Reorganized National Government’s actions suggested otherwise. To American diplomatic representatives entrenched in China, Wang’s actions, initiated by him or Japanese advisors, appeared aggressive, threatening, and only serving the interests of Tokyo. Just before establishing the Reorganized National Government, Japanese officials in China instituted a central bank in the Yangtze Valley that, according to Ambassador Nelson Johnson, ‘intended to destroy foreign interests through their inability to continue trade with China on a basis of equality by reason of planned exchange control in favour of Japanese trade’ (FRUS 1955, 4:508). Additionally, American Consul General C. J. Spiker intimated Wang Jingwei’s remarks at a foreign press conference, ‘he [Wang Jingwei] declared that the closing of American mission schools by officials of the new regime and attempts to tax mission incomes and donations from the United States were not in accord with the policy of his government. He stated that anti-American activities in Honan, about which he professed ignorance, were likewise contrary to the political program and manifesto issued on March 30’ (FRUS 1955, 4:868). Coupled with possible territorial threats, Wang’s government was perceived to be a financial threat to the Allies as well, and not necessarily by orders directly from Wang, but covertly by Japanese advisors utilizing his government as a shield against American retaliation. Conversely, the Yangtze Valley Central Bank was backed by Japanese interests, and it appeared to the State Department that the Reorganized Government was forgoing any previously purported aspirations to maintain amiable relations with the United States. As tensions grew and Wang Jingwei continually contradicted statements and actions, the United States framed its off icial foreign policy stance towards the Reorganized National Government. By the time Wang officially established his government, the US State Department considered him a puppet and perceived all his actions as manipulated by the Japanese government. In a March 30, 1940, dispatch to the US Secretary of State from Ambassador Johnson, US foreign policy relating to the Wang Jingwei regime was articulated to the French Ambassador after the former inquired

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about it. Johnson responded, ‘we would doubtless follow the same policy which we had pursued in respect to Manchukuo, that we would through Consulates look to local authorities in matters of purely local character and we would continue as in the past to look to and hold the Japanese Government ultimately responsible in all questions of protections of interests and injury to our interests” (FRUS 1955, 4:305). Wang Jingwei’s government was not only considered to be subservient to the Japanese and simply a militaristic-diplomatic tool, but was viewed as equal in status to the first puppet government set up in China, Manchukuo. By equating Wang Jingwei with Pu Yi, American foreign policy not only stated that both were puppets, but that both were traitors to the democratic and nationalistic principles of the Chinese people. Japan continued to subvert American and other foreign interests in China through their continued influence over Wang’s government. Additional restrictions on trade within areas under the Reorganized Government’s control had substantial consequences for American imports and exports, particularly in petroleum. The Japanese passed economic restrictions through the guise of Wang Jingwei’s government and intended to usurp full trade power over the region, establishing its own monopolies in place of American ones. As reported by Richard P. Butrick, ‘The activity and influence of the Japanese exerted through the Wang Ching-wei regime is increasing. The recent public utilities strikes in the International Settlement and those averted in the French Concession are politically inspired for the purpose of gaining control of labour through the General Labour Union, a Wang organ. The morale of the police of both the Settlement and French Concession is being undermined by Wang agents’ (FRUS 1955, 4:819). The Consul at Shanghai later notes that Wang’s government, through Japanese agents, attempted to wrest control from foreign entities of customs houses, property, and administration and resorted to assassination attempts, bribes, and intimidation tactics against foreign delegations and off icials (FRUS 1955, 4:819–20). Butrick ends his report with, ‘they are attempting to have Japanese police off icers assigned to the special branch of the municipal police which would result in giving the Japanese government confidential information which it would use for its own ends. The Wang press has already referred to this branch as an adjunct to the British secret service. A high ranking official of the Settlement recently informed me that “there will be no more elections”. Unless the Japanese are assured in the elections’ (FRUS 1955, 4:820). Clearly, the Japanese attempted a complete takeover for not only themselves, but Wang’s puppet government, to assume ‘legitimacy’. However, the US State Department

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saw right through Japan’s machinations through steady reports from the Far East diplomatic team. Coincidingly, American foreign policy recognized Jiang Jieshi as aligned with the Chinese people’s national sentiment: to resist Japan, not capitulate. Not only did Washington, DC support Chongqing, but it considered the puppet regime in Nanjing as an imposter government. The US State Department even diverged from its overwhelmingly neutral foreign policy stance, refusing to enter alliances to support Jiang Jieshi in his fight against Japan and Wang Jingwei. The US maintained previous policy stances, however, and initially only sent economic aid to Chongqing. This escalated after a series of dispatches from Jiang, relayed through Nelson Johnson, outlined the escalated situation in late 1940. Jiang warned the State Department of Japan’s impending, official recognition of Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, followed by that of Germany and Italy’s. Johnson transmitted as follows: If the Axis Powers should recognize Wang and Russia should adopt a cool attitude towards Chungking, he asserted, these actions would shake the confidence of the Chinese people. Therefore, he [Jiang] said, the United States and Great Britain should, before the recognition of Wang becomes a reality, ‘take steps to prevent this action from affecting China’s ability to continue resistance’.He went on to say that ‘if at that time America does not show a positive attitude and give positive assistance, our war of resistance will be gravely imperiled’ (FRUS 1955, 4:439–40).

Many in the State Department and military advisement in Chongqing agreed with Jiang Jieshi that only American economic and military might could maintain the Chinese people’s morale in resisting Wang Jingwei and that the former was not only hanjian, but also a potentially significant threat, should Jiang lose support. The Soviet Union also shared in the other Allies’ suspicions about Wang’s legitimacy and goals, specifically regarding anti-communism (FRUS 1955, 4:678). Informed assumptions from the US State Department were confirmed after the conclusion and release of a secret fact-finding mission that began in 1938, headed by US Marine Corps Major Evans F. Carlson. He submitted his study to the Political Relations Advisor of the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, by January 1941. Carlson’s report included observations from Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Szechuan provinces, all unoccupied by the Japanese at that time. In his report, Major Carlson found that China was tending towards fascism:

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rightist elements in the Kuomintang not only wanted to perpetuate their power, but also desired that Japan wrest control of China to stop the spread of ‘popular movements’, and that these fascist sects of Chinese nationalism had no faith in the American-backed ‘democratic groups’ (FRUS 1956, 4:477). Additionally, Major Carlson suggested that if the United States continued sending aid to Jiang Jieshi, it should secure assurances of no compromise with Japan and that the US should only lend support to Chinese groups that ‘labour to acquaint the people with the fundamental principles of democratic processes’ (FRUS 1956, 4:478). Wang Jingwei made the most significant compromise with the Japanese by establishing an alternate government with their support, thus eliminating any chances of recognition from the United States. It was quite apparent to Ambassador Johnson that Wang had sealed his fate by signing the Abe-Wang Treaty on November 30, 1940, which granted Japan’s official recognition of the Reorganized Government in Nanjing. With the conclusion of Major Carlson’s report and observations by Johnson, Wang Jingwei was too willing to sign away Chinese sovereignty to Japan for ends that, in the State Department’s eyes, were not in the best interest of the Chinese people, but for the advancement of his own power. Johnson iterates as much, ‘the antipathy and contempt of the average Chinese toward Wang and his regime is higher than ever. The few Chinese who apparently entertained the vestige of a hope that Wang Ching-wei was endeavouring in all sincerity to arrange an equitable and just peace seem finally to have been completely disillusioned’ (FRUS 1956, 4:479–81). By late 1940 into early 1941, Wang Jingwei’s hopes of moving forward with his plans—the legacy of Sun Yatsen, preserving Chinese nationalism, and achieving international recognition as the sole Chinese government—were dashed. The US State Department deciphered the Reorganized National Government’s rhetoric, exposing it as the words of a puppet of the Japanese empire. Cordell Hull was vastly aware of the complicated diplomatic situation in China, and that of Wang Jingwei’s aspirations, throughout the Sino-Japanese War of t 1937–1945. Conversely, the US Secretary of State was aware of the anti-American sentiment that permeated Japanese politics and policy implementation throughout that period (Hull 1948, 270–80). Anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric were part of the Konoye Cabinet’s plan for a ‘Greater East Asia’, in hopes that various indigenous, nationalist groups would consider Japanese ‘aid’, whether by choice or force, over that of the United States. With the Reorganized National Government’s investiture in March 1940, Hull and the US State Department realized immediately Japan’s intentions in backing Wang Jingwei. The Japanese embassy informed Hull on November 7, 1940, that a new Chinese National government as

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‘stable and independent [as] Manchukuo’, would be installed, as Wang fled Chongqing with Japanese support (Hull 1948, 724). Japanese diplomats did not initially think that the United States would legally recognize the new government, but insisted that they work with them from that point forward. The Secretary of State clarified the American diplomatic position, through Joseph C. Grew, on November 13, saying, ‘the proposed regime would be a purely artificial creation. Its existence would depend upon Japanese armed support. It would lack any spontaneous or genuine broad support by the Chinese public. It would be designed primarily to serve the special purpose of Japan. This, as in the case of the regimes established by Japan in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Peiping, and Nanking, would deprive Americans and others of long-established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment in China’ (Hull 1948, 724–25). Cordell Hull waded through Japanese attempts to project positive rhetoric, and from experience, reports on the ground, and observed actions formed an official US policy towards Wang Jingwei’s government—one of non-recognition. However, diplomatic talks did not cease between the US and Japan, especially concerning commerce and economic relations in China. Wang Jingwei’s position in American eyes and aid to Jiang Jieshi were affected by Japanese posturing over the Reorganized National Government. As the Treaty of Tianjin 1911 expired on January 25, 1940, Grew, Hull, and other US diplomats tried to negotiate a new treaty with Japan. With the expiration of the 1911 treaty, economic and diplomatic relations in China continued treaty-less, which strained multilateral US-China relations. Joseph C. Grew negotiated with Japanese Ambassador Arita to calm tensions and resume commerce in the region. Despite this, the Japanese contingency questioned several American foreign policy decisions: 1) Since the treaty’s expiration has caused uneasiness between the United States, China, and Japan, could a temporary measure be agreed to?; 2) Could the United States cease aid to Jiang Jieshi and cooperate with Wang Jingwei and Japan in ‘re-building China?’; and 3) Could the United States recognize the ‘new conditions in East Asia’? (Hull 1948, 894) Hull and others at the US State Department believed these to be untenable questions posed by the Japanese delegation: ‘Agreeing to them would have resulted in complete Japanese conquest of China, discouragement of the Western powers having possessions in the Orient, and Japanese overlordship of the Eastern half of the world. It would have meant initialing a blueprint under which Japan, in the course of a few years, could make herself the mistress of the Orient’ (Hull 1948, 894). Gendered language aside, Hull not only saw Japan jockeying to usurp American influence in East Asia, but also did

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not recognize those aims as belonging to Wang Jingwei’s government. US foreign policy did not recognize the Reorganized National Government’s seat at the diplomatic table, but it did recognize that Wang’s government was simply ‘window-dressing’ for the Japanese government’s proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As both the United States and Japan remained unbending in their diplomatic conversations, as Japan formally recognized Wang Jingwei’s government on November 30, 1940, and as Japanese military movements became more aggressive in Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, and in Burma, US foreign policy stiffened in response. As soon as the Abe-Wang Agreement was signed to formally recognize the Reorganized National Government, the US Export-Import Bank extended a new line of credit, $50,000,000, to Jiang Jieshi’s National Government in Chongqing (Hull 1948, 914–15). From that point on, US foreign policy was shaped by both reports from State Department ambassadors on the ground and Japanese actions in East Asia. Washington, DC increased aid to Chongqing as Tokyo followed suit with Nanjing. Amongst diplomatic relations in China, the two Chinese governments were used as ‘pawns’ within the larger diplomatic ‘chess game’ between the United States and Japan. Diplomatic conditions in China did not improve into 1941 as Japanese Admiral Nomura was sent to Washington, DC to negotiate with US Secretary of State Hull. The dismissal of Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the appointment of an admiral to American-Japanese talks signaled a steering towards militarism in China and of the Japanese government in general. In their initial discussions, Nomura posited that Japan would happily make peace in China by combining the puppet government at Nanjing with tthat at Chongqing. Upon questioning Nomura on the offer, Hull responded: The American people, who were long complacent with respect to dangerous international developments, have of late become very thoroughly aroused over movements by Japan … as long as Japanese forces are all over China, and Japanese troops, planes, and warships are as far south as Thailand and Indochina, accompanied by such threatening declarations as Japanese statesmen are making week after week, there can only be increasing concern by nations vitally interested in halting world conquest by force and barbaric methods of government (Hull 1948, 989).

After Hull’s response, Nomura went around him in favour of informal discussions with Bishop Walsh, Father Drought, and Postmaster General Walker on April 9, 1941. In that agreement, terms for US-China-Japan relations were

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formulated to the Secretary of State’s displeasure. The April 9 discussion included many concessions that the State Department had endeavoured to avoid, such as President Roosevelt’s requesting Jiang Jieshi to negotiate peace with Japan on the promise that China would remain independent, and Japan would withdraw troops from China upon said peace agreement; no annexation of Chinese territory; no indemnities; resumption of the ‘Open Door’ policy as amended in the future between the US and Japan; recognition of Japan’s domain over Manchukuo; and, finally, merging the governments of Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei (Hull 1948, 992). Hull countered with four principles with which any negotiations over China, between the US and Japan, must be agreed; 1) Respect for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of all nations involved; 2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; 3) Support of the principle of equality, including commercial opportunity; and 4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means (Hull 1948, 995). Nomura only agreed to one of the principles, equality of opportunity for commerce, without question. At that point, Hull reiterated that all four points must be unquestionably accepted before negotiations over China could continue. However, from April to late November 1941, the Japanese foreign diplomats ‘danced’ around any affirmative commitments as proposed by the United States. As negotiations stagnated, the US foreign policy stance in US-China-Japan relations stepped back from any semblance of recognizing Wang Jingwei’s government and instead increased support for Jiang Jieshi’s. In late November, Japanese diplomats echoed their previous position by saying ‘it would be difficult for Japan to renounce her support of Wang Ching-wei, the puppet “ruler” at Nanking’, to which US Secretary of State Hull summed up the American position: ‘Jiang Jieshi has made an outstanding contribution in bringing out the national spirit in China. The Nanking regime has not asserted itself in a way that would impress the world’ (Hull 1948, 1086). In the end, US foreign policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government was one of non-recognition. With that, Jiang Jieshi’s government in Chongqing enjoyed financial, diplomatic, and military support from the United States. From 1937 to 1940, the US State Department discerned, through expert diplomats and military advisors in China and Japan, that Wang’s government was in fact a Japanese puppet government in the vein of Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia. US-China relations throughout World War II were manifest in programs like Lend-Lease, which was approved for aid to China in April of 1941, and included assistance to the GMD, not Nanjing. Throughout this period of US-China relations, the United States did not

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directly engage the Reorganized National Government in negotiations. Nor did the Japanese substantially, directly, or consistently communicate with the government in Chongqing, preferring to ‘save face’ by goading negotiations with Wang Jingwei. Instead, both Jiang and Wang were caught between the two most powerful players in East Asia, the United States and Japan. Furthermore, the United States did not deviate with Wang Jingwei from its policy positions on earlier, Japanese puppet states. Especially after reports like Major Carlson’s were sent to the US State Department, the United States did not consider Wang to be what he professed, the arbiter of Chinese nationalism and representative of the Chinese people. In fact, because of the established relationship with Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei’s actions towards the international communities in Nanjing, American conceptualizations were that Wang was a traitor who surrendered Chinese sovereignty to the Japanese in return for power. As an American entrance into World War II became more inevitable in late 1940, the GMD aligned more with contemporary policy measures that were anti-Axis; because Jiang was vehemently anti-Japanese, and after Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, the United States had little other choice than to partner with Jiang Jieshi and throw more support behind his efforts in resisting Japan. To some extent, the US also supported the CCP, despite Wang Jingwei’s known anti-communist tendencies aligning with American fears of communism. The history of the United States and Wang Jingwei is a lost one indeed. Most historical scholarship focuses on the relationship between the US and Japan, the US and Jiang Jieshi, or the US and Mao Zedong. The geo-political climate in China was the most complicated of World War II and holds the greatest importance because of its implications for American Cold War policy towards East Asia. Even though the United States did not recognize Wang Jingwei’s government, it certainly recognized Japanese involvement in Nanjing’s governance and subversive actions against American and Allied interests in China. As such, US foreign policy only addressed the Reorganized National Government as far as it pertained to actions by the Japanese government. American foreign policy formulation was, in the minds of the State Department and Washington, DC, far easier to conceptualize towards Japan than it was to individually attend to the various local or puppet governments that vied for control of China. Despite Japan’s tendency to say one thing and implement another, leading up to World War II, US wartime policy found Japan more predictable and less problematic to negotiate with because it was industrialized and had one, centralized government; China, from 1937 to 1945, had neither attribute. After Japan’s defeat in August 1945, ending

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World War II, US foreign policy barely flinched to address the geo-political conditions that developed during the Chinese Civil War from 1946 to1949. During the War Against Japanese Aggression, the GMD suffered the brunt of casualties fighting the Japanese and suffered depleted resources. Capitalizing on his renowned ‘passive-defense’ strategy and unconventional warfare, Mao Zedong resorted to guerilla fighting, hiding in the mountains, and limiting casualties for his Eighth Route Army against the Japanese. Mao’s strategic acumen for preservation of the army, support from the rural Chinese population, and aid from the Soviet Union granted him and the CCP an advantage in the resumption of civil war against Jiang Jieshi and the GMD. Because American foreign policy handled geo-politics as a zero-sum game, eventually developing into the Cold War mentality of ‘good versus evil’, communism and Mao stood as the anti-thesis to democracy, despite the US working alongside him during the Second World War in China.

Bibliography Primary Sources Borton, Hugh. 1940. Japan Since 1931: Its Political and Social Developments. New York: International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations. Jiang Jieshi. 1943. China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory. Chongqing: Zhengzhong shuju. Consul General at Canton Jenkins to the Minister in China MacMurray. 1940. US State Department. Foreign Relations of the United States. [December 21, 1925]. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office Davies Jr., John Paton. 1949. The China White Paper. [November 7, 1944]. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Grew, Joseph C. 1944. Ten Years in Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan (1932–1942). New York: Simon & Schuster. Hull, Cordell. 1948. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The MacMillan Company. John Hay to Mr. Vignaud. 1901. US State Department. Foreign Relations of the United States. [September 6, 1899]. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Kumamoto, Shigekichi. January 1920. ‘Dai naru Nihon to doka mondai’ [The Great Problem of Assimilation]. Taiwan jiho:.55–63. Linebarger, Paul M. May 1941. ‘The Status of the China Incident’. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 215:36–43.

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Linebarger, Paul M. 1942.The China of Chiang Kai-Shek: A Political Study. Boston: World Peace Foundation. Mao, Zedong. 1967. ‘The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party’. [December 1939]. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 2: 305–334. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Mao, Zedong. 1989. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the State]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian [CCP Central Archival and Manuscript Press]. Mao, Zedong. 1991. Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong]. Beijing: Renmin [People’s Press]. Mochiji, Rokusaburo. 1912. Taiwan shokumin seisaku [Colonial Policy in Taiwan] Fuzambo. Nitobe, Inazo. January 1920. ‘Japanese Colonization’. Asian Review, Series 4, Vol. 16:113–121. Nitobe, Inazo. 1943. Zenshu [Collected Works]. IV Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Shigemitsu, Mamoru. 1958. Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. Sun, Yatsen. 1938. The Three Principles of the People. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd. Sun, Yatsen. 1981. ‘Zhina baoquan fenhai lun’ (Arguments for the Preservation or Dismemberment of China). Sun Zhongshan quanji (Collected Works of Sun Zhongshan [Yatsen or Yixian]), Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Sun, Yatsen. 2017. Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary: A Program for National Reconstruction for China. London: Forgotten Books. Tadao, Yanaihara. 1924. Shokumin seisaku kogian [Lectures on Colonial Policy, a Draft]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Tadao, Yanaihara. 1926. Shokumin oyobi shokumin seisaku [Colonization and Colonial Policy]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Tadao, Yanaihara. 1929. Teikokushugika no Taiwan [Taiwan under Imperialism]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Tadao Yanaihara. 1934. Manshu mondai [The Manchurian Problem]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Tadao, Yanaihara. 1935. Nan’yo gunto no kenkyu [Studies on the South Sea Islands]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Tadao, Yanaihara. 1948. Teikokushigi kenkyu [Studies in Imperialism]. In The Complete Works of Tadao Yanaihara. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963-1965. Takekoshi, Yosaburo. 1915. ‘Japan’s Colonial Policy’. Japan to America. Naoichi Masaoka, ed. Putnam.

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Tang, Leangli. 1934. ‘Wang Jingwei: A Biographical Sketch’, in Wang Jingwei, China’s Problem and Their Solution. Shanghai: China United Press. Togo, Minoru. 1906. Nihon shokuminron [On Japanese Colonialism]. Taipei: Taihoku Kozuka Togo, Minoru. 1925. Shokumin seisaku to minzuko shinri [Colonial Policy and Racial Consciousness]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. ‘Treaty with China’. 1846. The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from the Organization of the Government in 1789 to March 3, 1845, Vol. 8. Richard Peters, ed. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. Tsuji, Masanobu. 1961. Singapore: The Japanese Version. New York: St. Martin’s Press. ‘United States Legation, dispatch, Macao, April 24, 1844, Jules Davids’. 1973. American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China, Series I, Vol. 1. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. US Department of State. 1955. Foreign Relations of the United States 1940, (FRUS). Vol. IV, The Far East. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Wang, Jingwei. 1934. China’s Problems and Their Solutions. Shanghai: China United Press. Hoh, Chih-Hsiang. ‘Wang Pursues Peace Aim, Attacks Former Reds’. January 14, 1939. China Weekly Review 87, no. 7. 201. Wu, Tingfang to John Hay. 1901. US State Department. Foreign Relations of the United States. [September 12, 1899]. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Secondary Sources Allen, Louis. 2011. War, Conflict, and Security in Japan and Asia Pacific 1941–1952. Global Oriental. Boyle, John H. 1972. China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Brook, Timothy and Tadashi Wakabayashi. 2000. Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bunker, Gerald E. 1972. The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937–1941. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chen, Jian-Yue. Fall 2004. ‘American Studies of Wang Jingwei: Defining Nationalism’. -World History Review 1–33. Cohen, Warren. 1978. The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky, and American-East Asian Relations. New York: Columbia University Press. Cohen, Warren. 2010. America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press.

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‘Compilation of the ROC History’. 1981. A Pictorial History of the Republic of China. Taipei, Taiwan: Modern China Press. Crossley, Pamela K. 2010. The Wobbling Pivot; China since 1800: An Interpretive History. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Dolin, Eric J. 2012. When America First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail. New York: W.W. Norton. Fairbank, John King. 1969. Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842–1854. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gordon, David M. January 2006. ‘The China Japan War 1931–1945.” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 70, No. 1, 137–182. Iriye, Akira. 1974. ‘Japan’s Policies Towards the United States’. Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868–1941, A Research Guide, James Morley, ed. 407–459. New York: Columbia University Press. Iriye, Akira and Warren Cohen. 1990. American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia 1931–1949. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Jowett, Phillip S. 2004. Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan’s Asian Allies 1931–1945, Vol. 1, China and Manchukuo. Lancaster, UK: Helion. Kennedy, J. 1968. Asian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Kushner, Barak. 2006. The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Li, Xiaobing. 2018. The Cold War in East Asia. New York: Routledge. Li, Xiaobing. 2019. The History of Taiwan. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Ma, Xiahou. August 2015. ‘China, Japan, and the United States in World War II: The Relinquishment of Unequal Treaties in 1943’. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. I, No. 2:451–488. Martin, Brian G. 2003. ‘In My Heart I Opposed Opium: Opium and the Politics of the Wang Jingwei Government, 1940–1945’. European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2:365–410. McClain, James L. 2002. Japan: A Modern History. New York: W.W. Norton. Mitter, Rana. March 2011. ‘Classifying Citizens in Nationalist China during World War II, 1937–1941’. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2: 243–275.Mitter, Rana. 2013. China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival. London: Allen Lane. Mitter, Rana and Aaron W. Moore. March 2011. ‘China in World War II, 1937–1945: Experience, Memory, and Legacy’. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2:225–240. Myers, Ramon M. and Mark R. Peattie, eds. 1984. The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Nitz, Kiyoko K. September 1983. ‘Japanese Military Policy Towards French Indochina during the Second World War: The Road to the “Meigo Sakusen” (Mar. 9, 1945)’. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2:328–350.

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So, Wai Chor. January 2011. ‘Race, Culture, and the Anglo-American Powers: The Views of Chinese Collaborators’. Modern China, Vol. 37, No. 1:69–103. Spence, Jonathan D. 1982. The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution. New York: Penguin. Stokesbury, James L. 1980. A Short History of World War Two. New York: William Morrow and Co. Wang, Dong. 2013. The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Woo, X. L. 2014. Two Republics in China: How Imperial China Became the PRC. New York: Algora. Yick, Joseph K. October 2014. ‘Self-Serving Collaboration: The Political Legacy of Madame Wang in Guangdong Province, 1940–1945’. American Journal of Chinese Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2:217–234. Yongjing, Jiang. September 2008. ‘Hu Shi and Wang Jingwei: Discussions on SinoJapanese Issues Before and After the War of Resistance Against Japan’. Chinese Studies in History, Vol. 42, No.1:3–46.

About the Author Travis Chambers teaches at the University of Central Oklahoma. His research specializes in East Asian nationalism during the twentieth century and Japanese occupation of China in 1937–1945. He is an alum of the Asian Studies Development (ASDP) Program under the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii.

Part Two Did America Lose China?

4

Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947 Zhiguo Yang

Abstract As Truman’s representative, George Marshall mediated the CCP-GMD conflicts in China between 1945 and 1947. A cornerstone of Truman’s China policy, the Marshall Mission has been studied by American scholars in the context of the emerging Cold War. Investigating it from a different angle and perspective, however, Chinese historians in both mainland China and Taiwan are more focused on its impact on the CCP-GMD power balance and the outcome of the Chinese civil war. A historiographical overview of their interpretations and analysis, this chapter discusses the most recent Chinese scholarship on the Marshall Mission and argues that the theoretical framework and research agendas of the Chinese scholars remain fundamentally China-centred or Taiwan-centred even after the Cold War. Keywords: Patrick Hurley, Truman’s China Policy, the Marshall Mission, Jiang Jieshi, Mao Zedong, Manchuria

When Henry Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States on April 12, 1945, he inherited from the FDR administration a China policy the purpose of which his Secretary of State James Byrnes defined as to build ‘a strong, united, and democratic China’ (May 1974, 10). However, when Truman passed the presidency to Dwight Eisenhower on January 20, 1953, not only did China remain divided between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, but the United States had done its share in perpetuating such a division by fighting the

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch04

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Korean War with the PRC under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and by forging a political and military alliance with Taiwan under the rule of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD). Examining this episode of Sino-US relations in the context of the twentieth-century US China policy that began with John Hay’s Open Door Notes, Warren Cohen, a renowned historian of modern China and US foreign relations, calls the Truman administration’s China policy after 1950 the ‘great aberration’ caused by the fear of Communism that made the American people and their leaders forget ‘the sound geopolitical, economic, and ethical basis of their historic desire for China’s well-being’ (Cohen 2019, 198). As Cohen describes eloquently, as a result of the departure from the traditional American approach to China in the early Cold War, ‘[t]here was no longer any question of whether the United States would interpose itself between China and her enemies, for the United States had become China’s principle enemy’ (Cohen 2019, 199). The great aberration started around the end of World War II when the United States made its mediation of the CCP-GMD conflicts a major component of its China policy and a vital part of its grand plan for the postwar world. As one of his first steps to incorporate China into the postwar world order and contain the Soviet influence in Asia, President Truman sent General George Marshall to China in December 1945 to carry out the mission of preventing a civil war from dividing China. The Marshall Mission ended in failure in January 1947, and the only failure in the American general’s otherwise impeccable career led to an avalanche of watershed events in the history of Sino-US relations, including the publication of China White Paper in August 1949, the founding of the PRC in October 1949, the exodus of the Nationalists to Taiwan after their defeat on mainland China, and the participation of the PRC in the Korean War in October 1950. What role did the Marshall Mission play in this sequence of consequential events that reshaped the history of China, the United States, and the world in the mid-twentieth century? So far as the Chinese civil war is concerned, did the Marshall Mission create an opportunity for the Chinese Communists to gain the upper hand in their military struggle against the Nationalists, leading to the latter’s loss of mainland China and the division of China across the Taiwan Strait? Or, despite the confidence and reputation that Marshall as an American hero brought into his mission, did the Marshall Mission ever have a chance to succeed? Was it a mission impossible from the beginning? Crucial to understanding the impact of the Marshall Mission on the history of China and Sino-US relations between the end of World War II and the founding of the PRC, these questions underlie the study of the Marshall Mission by historians from the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan with

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different approaches and perspectives. While American scholars tend to examine the origin and impact of the Marshall Mission in the context of the emerging Soviet-US imperialistic competition leading to the Cold War after 1947 and the rise of American political, economic, and military power in the postwar world, Chinese scholars tend to analyze its impact on the power balance between the CCP and the GMD in postwar China (Leffler 1992). Separated by the Taiwan Strait, Chinese historians in the PRC and the ROC are still thinking and rethinking of the Marshall Mission and Truman’s China policy in terms of lost opportunities and untested alternatives. Their conclusions, however, are often drawn from two different versions of the history of postwar China. A historiographical overview, this chapter surveys the evolution of the study of the Marshall Mission and its impact on Sino-US relations by Chinese scholars. Focusing on the most recent Chinese scholarship, it argues that although Chinese historians are more willing than ever before to apply the international history approach to their study, their theoretical framework and perspectives with which they assess the historical significance of the Marshall Mission remain fundamentally China-centred and Taiwan-centred, or, ideologically, CCP-centred and GMD-centred, respectively. As much as the questions that American historians ask in their writings about the Marshall Mission are closely related to and determined by the fact that the United States was a preponderant global power during the Cold War, the research agendas of Chinese scholars are reflective of a historical bitterness that has divided Chinese historiography in the same way that it has divided China, its people, and its political system since 1949. Any historiographic discussion of the Marshall Mission must begin with Marshall’s own report on it in 1947. Both as a history in itself and as a primary source on which to base historical analysis, the report outlines the contours of the Marshall Mission and highlights its turning points, a feature that makes it indispensable for research on the topic from any angle or ideological underpinning. To Chinese scholars, however, the greatest value of the report is that it offers them an American perspective to critique with their own perspectives and sources.

Marshall’s Report: Background and American Perspective on the Mission Published in 1976, Marshall’s report on his mission completed the American record of the Marshall Mission to China, according to Lyman

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P. Van Slyke, who wrote its introduction (Marshall 1976, xiii). A first-hand account, the report guides its readers through the journey that Marshall took in China to deliver his mission, a journey reconstructed by Marshall himself. All stemmed from President Truman’s letter to Marshall on December 22, 1945, in which he spelled out the China policy that he wanted Marshall to implement as his representative: Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China (Marshall, 1976, 1).

Ambitious but difficult, Truman’s goals for China were nothing less than nation-building and political reconstruction through foreign intervention. To Marshall, the accomplishment of these goals revolved on his mediation of the CCP-GMD hostilities, and neutrality was the key to its effectiveness. However, as shown in his report, while the initial Chinese confidence in his impartiality brought a moment of success in early 1946, increasing doubts from both the CCP and the GMD filled the rest of the Marshall Mission with frustrations, setbacks, and lost opportunities. Marshall’s documentation begins with the record of his effort to build an infrastructure for peace-making from December 1945 to March 1946. First, Marshall created the Committee of Three on January 7, 1946, to work out measures with which to keep the CCP-GMD military conflict in check. Comprised of himself as the chair, Zhou Enlai as the Communist representative, and Zhang Qun as the Nationalist representative, the Committee reached an agreement to stop CCP-GMD fighting and issued a cessation of hostilities order on January 10, 1946. To enforce the ceasefire agreement, the Committee appointed an Executive Headquarters to oversee compliance by both the Communist and the Nationalist field commanders (Marshall 1976, 10–23). In the meantime, the Political Consultation Conference was convened in Chongqing and adopted resolutions for government reorganization, peaceful national reconstruction, the convening of the national assembly, and revision of the 1936 constitution. On top of that, the CCP and the GMD agreed on military reorganization and integration of the Communist forces into a national army (Marshall 1976, 23–32, 40–46). These promising accomplishments constituted the ‘honeymoon’ of the Marshall Mission.

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The key to Marshall’s initial but groundbreaking success was the cooperation that both the Nationalists and the Communists offered him. When Marshall mentioned to Jiang Jieshi his idea of the Committee of Three, for example, Jiang gave the American mediator a go-ahead right away (Marshall 1976, 10–11). In reflecting on his early interactions with the CCP, Marshall had nothing but positive comments to make: ‘During the first two or three months the Chinese Communist Party was cooperative and gave no indication of other than a friendly and sincere attitude toward the United States and American mediation’ (Marshall 1976, 440). Confident in his ability to retain Chinese trust and cooperation, Marshall would soon see how the changing international circumstances and domestic conditions in China put his abilities to the test. The peace Marshall helped make in the first three months of his mission in China fell apart in Manchuria first, due to the deeply-rooted CCP-GMD animosities and changes in international politics. Having liberated China’s Northeast from the Japanese Guandong Army and occupied it for more than half a year, the Soviet Red Army forces began to leave Manchuria in early 1946, prompting both the Communists and the Nationalists to race to the region. For the CCP, expanding and consolidating its ‘liberated areas’ in the wake of Soviet withdrawal would increase its leverage in its negotiation with the GMD about the power-sharing in this strategically and economically important region of China. For the GMD, the moment had finally arrived to establish its full sovereignty over Manchuria, something the Soviet Union had promised the Nationalist government in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. As for Marshall, when the Communist forces attacked and captured Changchun in April 1946 and then the Nationalists took it back in May, he felt that this seesaw fighting almost destroyed his ‘powers of negotiation’ (Marshall 1976, 129). Although he ultimately got Jiang Jieshi to issue a fifteen-day truce in Manchuria after Nationalist control of Changchun was reestablished, the CCP was no longer willing to extend the kind of trust to Marshall that he had enjoyed during the early days of his mission (Marshall 1976, 440–41). But Marshall did not want to call it quits. To keep the Communists in the negotiation and restore their confidence in his impartiality, he bypassed General Wedemeyer as a candidate for the American ambassador to China because the Communists did not like him and recommended Leighton Stuart to President Truman instead. To Marshall, Stuart’s ‘knowledge of China and the psychology of its people, his thorough command of the language, and the regard in which he was held by Kuomintang and Communists alike, admirably prepared him for participation in the mediation

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effort’ (Marshall 1976, 186). Truman accepted his recommendation, and with Ambassador Stuart joining the mediation team in July 1946, Marshall persevered in getting the CCP back to the negotiation table. However, when the Nationalists took Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) from the Communists in October and the CCP refused to send its delegates to the National Assembly convened on November 12, what Marshall had achieved in the promising first two months of his mission was completely shattered. Conceding to his failure in mediating for the peaceful reconstruction of a politically unif ied China, Marshall asked Truman to end his mission by recalling him from China. During a raging civil war, Truman approved his request. Before he left China on January 8, 1947, an embittered Marshall lashed out at both the Nationalists and the Communists for the failure of his mission. To him, while a ‘dominant group of reactionaries’ inside the GMD opposed his every effort at a coalition government, the ‘dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end … without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved’. Marshall wanted to hold both political parties accountable for the lost opportunity to peacefully reunite China (Marshall 1976, 432). There was another reason for the failure of his mission that Marshall did not spell out explicitly, even though he realized it as soon as he received his mediation instructions from Truman. It was a contradiction rooted in the fact that Marshall ‘was expected to mediate between the Nationalists and the Communists as a neutral, while at the same time the United States recognized one side, the Nationalist regime, as the sole legal government in China’ (Marshall 1976, xix). The report also remains quiet on the US concern over the Soviet influence in Manchuria, a concern that, according to American Cold War historians, motivated the Truman administration to strive for a CCP-GMD coalition government through US mediation in the first place (Tucker 1983; Gaddis 1997; Leffler 1992). Marshall’s report has been translated into Chinese in both Taiwan and mainland China. Among all the purposes the translation serves, making the report more accessible to Chinese scholars who may not get as much out of its English version as its Chinese translation is the most crucial one, because the evolution of Chinese historiography of the Marshall Mission is based on the rebuttal of the narrative and argument Marshall presented in his report. Let us first explore the field of Marshall Mission study in the PRC, which has been characterized by a consistent, or, in Marshall’s own words, ‘dyedin-the-wool’ theoretical framework and historical assessment.

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Marshall Mission in the Lens of Communist Revolution In the Communist vision of history, the American fear of a Communist challenge to Nationalist rule between 1945 and 1949 was the single most important factor affecting the making and implementation of Truman’s China policy. Since the GMD wanted to rule China with a one-party dictatorship, the CCP’s political and military struggle against it was nothing but a revolution to build democracy in China and to free the Chinese people from colonialism, imperialism, and economic exploitation by the landholding and bourgeoise classes. Therefore, when the United States declared its policy to help China become a unified, strong, peaceful, and democratic nation on one hand and aided the GMD regime in its reactionary war against the Communists on the other, such a policy gave rise to a ‘self-contradiction’ that was destined to fail (Niu Jun 1988, 256). No aspect of Truman’s China policy has been more consistently interpreted along this line of argument than the Marshall Mission, and the origin of such an interpretation can be traced to a small number of books about US history published in the PRC before the 1980s (Wang Chen-main 1992, 10). For example, Huang Shaoxiang, one of the founders of PRC’s American history study field, debuted her A Concise History of the United States in 1979. Applying Marxist historical materialism to the study of American history from its colonial period to the start of the Civil Rights movement, Huang includes a concise but nondescriptive analysis of Truman’s China policy in her book. To Huang, the victory in World War II provided the United States with an opportunity to resume its imperialistic expansion in the world. Since China had a big population and was the centre of the Asian continent, the US needed to secure its control over China before it could put its yoke on the rest of Asia. Waging a war in China to achieve that goal was impossible because, having just experienced the most destructive war in human history, neither the American people nor the peoples of the world wanted another. Moreover, the CCP and its armed forces deterred the United States from a military adventure in this massive Asian country. Thus, to gain control without a war the US government decided to aid Jiang Jieshi in fighting a civil war to eliminate the Communists on its behalf. To mislead world opinion and to cover up its imperialist ambition, Truman first declared a noble China policy and then sent Marshall to China as a smokescreen for boosting Jiang Jieshi’s regime that was ‘authoritarian, militaristic, and traitorous to the Chinese nation’. Huang’s narrative and analysis of the Marshall Mission is brief, but it is aligned with the theoretical framework that Mao Zedong spelled out in his rebuttal of Truman’s China policy in

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1946. In addition, she also regards the publication of China White Paper in August 1949 as the Truman administration’s acknowledgement of the failure of American aggression in China (Huang Shaoxiang 1979, 674, 678–82). Setting the tone for the study of the history of Sino-US relations, Huang’s scholarship remained influential—and official—in the PRC until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when a younger generation of Chinese historians began to bring in new perspectives, methodologies, and sources to this field of historical inquiry. Born after the founding of the PRC but trained in Chinese academia during Deng Xiaoping’s Era (1978–1997) and beyond, these Chinese scholars not only started their academic careers in a drastically different political, cultural, and intellectual environment than that of Huang Xiaoxiang’s, they also enjoyed far greater access to the declassified Chinese archives and the primary and secondary literature from the United States for their research, an advantage that was beyond the reach of the Communist historians of Huang Shaoxiang’s generation. These factors, especially the more relaxed and less dogmatic intellectual environment in post-Mao China, have moved the study of Truman’s China policy in general and the Marshall Mission in particular to a new stage (Wang Chen-main 1992, 10). Niu Jun is one of a number of Chinese historians who have proposed that the study of Sino-US relations during the Truman presidency be undertaken in the context of Cold War history (Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun 2002, 2). In 1988, he published his first monograph about the Marshall Mission and its impact on CCP foreign policy entitled Cong heerli dao maxieer: Meiguo tiaochu guogongmaodun shimo (From Hurley to Marshall: A History of the American Mediation of the GMD-CCP Conflict). As one of the earliest comprehensive history monographs about postwar US China policy in post-Mao China, Niu Jun’s book defines American mediation as an integral part of the US Open Door policy and examines it in that historical context as well. To Niu Jun, as World War II was winding down, the United States was poised to replace Japan as a new imperialist master over Asia. However, even with the military and economic power that the United States came to possess during the war, it still could not bridge the gap between what it wanted to do and what it was capable of doing. So far as the American attempt to control Asia was concerned, there was no realistic chance for it to succeed because of Soviet competition and the rising decolonization movement—it was a ‘contradiction’, or maodun (矛盾), that the United States could not overcome (Niu Jun 1988, 3–5). Mediating in China at this critical moment of ascending American power in the world, both Patrick Hurley and George Marshal—to a certain extent, Albert Wedemeyer and John Leighton Stuart

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as well—exemplified the contradiction that the Truman administration hopelessly trapped itself into with its own policy. Echoing the themes of Huang Shaoxiang’s scholarship, Niu Jun’s argument reflects the overarching influence of the CCP party line and ideological perimeter that Chinese historians continue to work under when the topic is the Marshall Mission (Bland 1998). Still, written almost a decade after Huang Shaoxiang’s A Concise History of the United States was published, his book is a well-researched account of Hurley and Marshall’s mission in China. More importantly, while recounting the Marshall Mission from the perspective of CCP strategy against GMD and CCP foreign policy as an emerging state, Niu Jun weaves postwar international politics—the dynamic and volatile Soviet-US relations at the end of World War II in particular—into his narrative, signifying a departure from earlier Chinese scholarship. By examining American mediation of the CCP-GMD conflicts from 1944 to 1947, Niu Jun also attempts to reveal the consistency of US China policy from the Hurley Mission to the Marshall Mission. Serving first as the personal envoy of President Roosevelt to Jiang Jieshi and then as US ambassador to China between August 1944 and November 1945, Hurley left behind a mixed bag of legacies for his successor to work with. For example, although during his visit to Yanan he secured Mao Zedong’s pledge to cooperate with the GMD for the creation of a unified national government and a unified national army, when Jiang Jieshi repudiated his interaction with Mao without his approval, Hurley took a 180-degree turn and embraced Jiang’s anti-Communist policies wholeheartedly. In response, Mao Zedong called him an enforcer of a US China policy that would get the United States entrapped in the ‘cesspit of the GMD reactionaries’ and make the United States the enemy of the Chinese people (Niu Jun 1988, 95). However, when the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on August 14, 1945, confirmed the Soviet-US agreement supporting the Nationalist government, Mao Zedong had to step back from his condemnation and flew from Yanan to Chongqing with Hurley to take part in the famous Chongqing Negotiations instead. Seeing this as his great accomplishment, Hurley pressed both parties to sign an agreement on October 10, 1945, announcing grand principles of peaceful nation-building without including ‘insignif icant details’ for the formation of a coalition government and the merging of CCP and Nationalist military forces. Ironically, while the talk of peace was going on, the Nationalist army attacked Communist ‘liberated areas’ in North China, leading to CCP-GMD military skirmishes. Frustrated with his setback in the mediation and criticism for his support of Jiang’s policies from the US news media, the Department of State, and

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US Congress, Hurley resigned his post in November 1945. To Mao Zedong, Hurley’s resignation put an end to his ‘logic of imperialism’ (Niu Jun 1988, 87; Tao Wenzhao 2004, 294–97). Given such a stance, it seemed unlikely that the CCP would cooperate with another American mediation attempt. More importantly, after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Communists moved a number of forces to Manchuria, and the military advantage that they had gained over the Nationalists there made the CCP even less motivated to participate in another round of American mediation that may end up benefitting its domestic enemy anyway. However, when both the Soviet Union and the United States confirmed their recognition of the Nationalist government’s right to restore its administrative power there, the CCP had to defer to the Soviet policy and halt its military advance. Only at that time did the CCP decide to join the GMD in accepting American mediation by General Marshall (Niu Jun 2005, 237). As decisive as it was to the CCP approach to the Marshall Mission, however, Stalin’s request that it suspend its military offensives in Manchuria and accept American mediation was far from forcing the CCP to stop all its foreign policy initiatives, as shown in Niu Jun’s more recent book entitled From Yan’an to the World: The Origin and Development of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. For example, probably partly because of the lack of confidence in American impartiality and partly because of their belief in the efficacy of ‘using barbarians to control barbarians’ tactic, CCP leaders suggested that the Soviet Union participate in the mediation of CCP-GMD conflicts with the United States. Only after Moscow reiterated its non-intervention policy did they settle on working with Marshall only (Niu Jun 2005, 248–50). It did not take long for Marshall to pass the impartiality test, though. On January 10, 1946, he succeeded in bringing the CCP and the GMD together in the Committee of Three to sign a temporary ceasefire agreement, and this encouraging development changed the attitude of the CCP toward the Marshall Mission. Before the ceasefire agreement, the CCP ‘Central Committee’s main purpose in deciding to resume negotiations with Guomindang was to launch a political offensive in conjunction with the military struggle’. Moreover, Marshall’s criticism of the right-wing GMD leaders who wanted to settle the CCP-GMD conflict with war won Mao’s praise of him as ‘objective, calm, and impartial’. It was truly the most promising moment in the Marshall Mission for both Marshall, who regarded the CCP and its representative Zhou Enlai as ‘reconcilable’ and for Mao Zedong, who declared that China had entered a new stage of peace and democracy thanks to Marshall’s impartial mediation (Niu Jun 2005, 252–53). Narrating this history, Niu Jun

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feels regret that the positive factors that made the CCP-GMD truce possible evaporated rather quickly. Otherwise, he argues counterfactually, China and Sino-US relations would have moved in a totally different direction from 1946 onward (Niu Jun 1988, 215). One such positive factor was the pre-Cold War Soviet-US relationship and Niu Jun attributes Marshall’s early success to the Soviet-US wartime collaboration. To retain such collaboration in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the US government had to make concessions to the Soviet Union; in turn, as an American ally, the GMD had to align its policy with that of the United States with its own concessions to the CCP as an ally of the Soviet Union. Partly for reciprocity and partly for avoidance of any complexity with the American government, after the January ceasefire was signed, the Soviet government warned the CCP leadership that ‘it must pay sufficient attention to the United States, should not envisage the sovietization of China, and should stop the civil war’. Such a warning left the CCP Central Committee no option but to ‘follow the graduate path of peaceful reform’ (Niu Jun 2005, 255). However, peaceful reform was quickly replaced by military offensives in the first half of 1946, as the simmering CCP-GMD conflict turned into a de facto civil war. First, as the focal point of the CCP-GMD power struggle, Manchuria witnessed large-scale military skirmishes in its major industrial and communication centres, such as Siping and Yingkou, both before and after the signing of the January ceasefire agreement. The Soviet withdrawal in March only increased the tension as both the CCP and the GMD rushed in to claim the areas the Soviets had just evacuated. After the US airlifted its best-equipped divisions there, the Nationalist government launched offensives against Communist-held Siping and Changchun, regaining control of both in May 1946. Afterward, as Marshall painstakingly documented in his report, the Nationalists moved on to attack the Communist bases south of Manchuria and captured Zhangjiakou, a CCP-controlled city in today’s Hebei Province, on October 11, 1946 (Niu Jun 1988, 233, 254). It was against this historical background that the CCP reversed its policy on the Marshall Mission. First, when the CCP requested in early March 1946 that negotiation with the GMD regarding Manchuria must include discussion of how the Communists and the Nationalists could share political administration in the region, Marshall rejected the proposal and reiterated that military issues and ‘diplomatic transfer’ of the Soviet-occupied areas to the Nationalists were the only talking points. As a result, the CCP concluded that his attitude and approach had departed from what it was in January 1946, because by conceding to Jiang’s vehement opposition to power-sharing

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with the CCP in Manchuria as a condition for peace negotiation, Marshall forfeited impartiality in his mediation. The CCP could have chosen to part ways with Marshall upon the drawing of such a conclusion, but it opted to continue its ‘fighting while negotiating strategy’ because it could slow down the Nationalist military attacks (Niu Jun 1988, 223, 236). However, when it became clear that Marshall was unable to convince Jiang to give up his conditions for a long-term ceasefire, such as the Communist withdrawal from their ‘liberated areas’ in Shandong, Jiangsu, and other regions south of Manchuria, the CCP began openly accusing the United States of encouraging the Nationalists to take ‘offensive actions’ against the Communists. On July 7, 1946, the accusation escalated to the level of hostility when the CCP condemned the United States as a ‘reactionary imperialist power’ aiming to turn China into an American colony (Niu Jun 1988, 249). To further propagate the CCP argument that the Marshall Mission and the American policy it represented could only be understood in the context of global ‘contradictions and conflicts’, Mao Zedong accepted an interview request from Anna Louise Strong, an American journalist, in August 1946. In that interview, Mao asserted that the key issue facing the postwar world was not Soviet-US conflicts, but American ‘aggression and expansion’ in the so-called ‘intermediate zone’ between the Soviet Union and the United States that included Europe, Asia, and Africa. As part of this zone, Mao continued, China should strive for the creation of a united front of all the countries and peoples to resist American aggression with Soviet assistance. Since the GMD was a tool of American imperialist policy in China, it was only logical and justified for the CCP to overthrow its regime through a military struggle. It was a revolution as much for the establishment of socialism in China as for national liberation and an independence movement in the world (Niu Jun 2005, 286–89). Mao’s public denouncement agonized Marshall, who took it personally, despite Zhou Enlai’s assurance that he was not the target of anti-American propaganda (Kurtz-Phelan 2018, 232). As for his mission in China itself, the chance for it to succeed slipped away rapidly after the Nationalist capture of Changchun in May 1946. When the Nationalists took Zhangjiakou in October, his mission was all but finished. To Niu Jun, without being ‘cautious, fair, and listening to CCP suggestions’, Marshall lost the opportunity to prevent the CCP-GMD civil war in Manchuria, a loss that made the failure of his mission inevitable. All in all, Niu argues, in mediating the CCP-GMD conflicts, Marshall acted like a ‘magician in the underworld’ (jianghu meshushi, 江 湖魔术师), who depended on nothing but deceiving and make-believe for carrying out his mission (Niu Jun 1988, 217).

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Niu Jun is not alone in applying this critical interpretive framework, whose genesis can be traced to Mao Zedong, to the study of the Marshall Mission. Tao Wenzhao, another prominent Chinese scholar specializing in the history of Sino-US relations, also wraps up a compelling narrative of the Marshall Mission and CCP participation with an emphasis on the destructive effect of the ‘contradiction’ in American policy on the mission itself: Throughout the Marshall Mission in China, the US government was never able to free itself from its contradiction …. On the one hand, it mediated the [CCP-GMD] conflicts; on the other hand, it assisted Jiang Jieshi in fighting a civil war. As a result, Marshall came to play a double role in China: He was a mediator in the CCP-GMD negotiations; in the meantime, he represented the US policy of supporting the Nationalist government [that wanted war] …. In the final analysis, the failure in his mediation was the failure of US policy and Marshall had no control over it (Tao Wenzhao 2004, 318).

For not comparing Marshall to ‘an underworld magician’ as Niu Jun does, however, Tao’s analysis of why his mission failed sounds less polemic and more historical. If there had been any hope to keep the engagement between Marshall and the CCP alive, it was completely gone in November 1946 when the Communists refused to join the National Assembly and Zhou Enlai flew back to Yanan for good (Niu Jun 1988, 254). Once ended, the official contact between the CCP, a state power in the making then, and the United States did not restart until February 1972, when President Richard Nixon visited the PRC. No matter who should shoulder the blame for it, if the Marshall Mission signified an opportunity for a more collaborative US-China relationship to deal with global issues and China’s own challenges, that opportunity was lost for a quarter century.

Taiwan: Loss of an Opportunity and Loss of China Marshall passed away on October 16, 1959. Still blaming Marshall for his loss of mainland China, Jiang Jieshi responded to his death by posing this question in his diary: ‘Is his death a good thing for the revival of the Chinese nation?’ He did not record his answer to it, but when his wife, Madam Jiang, asked him to sign the condolence note that she wanted to send to Marshall’s widow, Jiang refused. He changed his mind only after he found out that the

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note was just to console Mrs. Marshall and that it did not mention ‘the good or bad deeds of the deceased’ (Kurtz-Phelan 2018, 457). Such a response was not unexpected from the Nationalist leader who had already condemned Marshall’s ‘bad’ deeds in China in his book, Soviet Russia in China: Summing Up at Seventy (苏俄在中国 sue zai zhongguo), published in 1956, three years before Marshall’s passing. As a witness to and a main participant in it, Jiang Jieshi summed up the impact of the Marshall Mission this way: After World War II ended, the Nationalist government accepted the [American] request to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and started a one-year long negotiation with the Chinese Communists, for the purpose of pursuing peaceful coexistence between China and the Soviet Union and between the CCP and the GMD. However, in every peace negotiation, the more concession the government made, the more aggressive the Communist bandits’ demands would become. At the end, the CCP started the rebellion [against the government] under the direction of the Soviet Union and accomplished the Soviet goal of dominating mainland China as its fifth column.

What made this possible, according to Jiang Jieshi, was the Marshall Mission that gave the CCP time to prepare for a final showdown with the Nationalist government (Wang Zhizhen 1970, 84–85). He had never forgiven Marshall for his lost opportunity to defeat his Communist enemies and the loss of mainland China even after Marshall’s death in 1959. Forcefully and emotionally made, Jiang’s assertion set the perimeter for the study of the Marshall Mission by Chinese scholars in Taiwan in the same way that Mao Zedong’s anti-imperialist rhetoric underlay the Marshall Mission study by PRC scholars. For example, Wang Shizhen, a Nationalist official who wrote one of the earliest books about the Marshall Mission in Taiwan in 1970 based on Chinese archives, argues that the Marshall Mission continued the US Department of State’s pro-CCP policy that Hurley protested with his resignation. Descriptive, detailed, and occasionally bitter, Wang’s account of Marshall’s mediation ends with an analysis of why it failed. According to Wang, while American mediation in the CCP-GMD conflict before the end of World War II was motivated by the need to defeat Japan, that priority changed when Marshall came to China in December 1945. Now that the war was over, the Truman administration wanted to prevent the Chinese civil war from complicating Soviet-US relations, and the Marshall Mission was an integral part of that new policy and effort. However, not understanding

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that the Chinese civil war was instigated by the Soviet Union with the goal of turning China into a socialist country by its Chinese collaborators, Marshall weakened the Nationalist government and strengthened the CCP and its military forces, at least indirectly and inadvertently, by his mediation (Wang Zhizhen 1970, 80). To Wang, nothing can substantiate this argument more convincingly than the Truman administration’s decision to accept Marshall’s recommendation and suspend military aid to the GMD after the Nationalist victory over the Communists in Changchun in May 1946. Although aid was resumed in April 1948, it was too little, too late for the Nationalists to reverse their military defeat in the civil war battlefield. Wang acknowledges that as a career army general Marshall harboured no bad feelings toward the Nationalists, but his lack of insight on China’s political conditions and his underestimation of the danger of the Chinese Communist movement made him susceptible to CCP’s anti-GMD propaganda, leading to his refusal to recognize the soundness of the GMD strategies in dealing with the Communist threat. Critical of Marshall’s mediation, Wang nevertheless concedes that the GMD must be held accountable for the loss of mainland China as well, though its biggest mistake was to accept the Marshall Mission in the first place. Wang argues that in retrospect the key to solving the problems caused by the Chinese Communists was the Soviet attitude, so to find a solution to them the Nationalist government should have dealt with the Soviet Union without the intervention of the United States as a middleman. Since the GMD did accept Marshall’s mediation despite the opposition from Chen Lifu and other Nationalist leaders, whom Marshall labeled as a ‘dominant reactionary group in the Government’, the only explanation for abandoning direct and bilateral negotiation with the Soviets was the hope that the Marshall Mission might work, or, at the very least, that Marshall would become more realistic and objective about the danger of the Communists as his interactions with them increased. To turn their hope into reality, the Nationalists cooperated with Marshall as much as they could, but ultimately all their concessions to his requests failed to change Marshall’s mind, prompting Wang to lament: ‘Was this made inevitable by time, or was there something else that we could have done but did not do?’ (Wang Zhizhen 1970, 80–83) Other Taiwan scholars share Wang’s conviction that the Marshall Mission was a decisive factor in the Nationalist defeat in the Chinese civil war. Liang Ching-chun (1893–1984), a prominent Chinese historian whose study of the Stilwell Incident and translation of Marshall’s report laid down the groundwork for the study of Sino-US relations in the 1940s in the ROC, vehemently disputed the legality of the Marshall Mission. According to Liang, in all the

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US documents, the mission is referred to as a US mediation of the CCP-GMD conflicts. However, if such conflicts were China’s internal affairs, then it was not the business of the United States to mediate because international laws prohibited it. On the other hand, if such conflicts threatened world peace—both Wang and Liang believe they did—then the United Nations and its Security Council should step in. As if having anticipated criticism against his argument recognizing the legality of the Hurley Mission, but rejecting that of the Marshall Mission, Liang quickly points out a purported difference between these two American mediation efforts: While the former took place as a result of the invitation from both the CCP and the GMD, the latter was simply a US unilateral decision that could not be characterized in any other way but international intervention, infringement of another country’s sovereignty, and violation of the UN Charter that the United States itself helped draft (Liang Ching-chun 1994, 650–51). Critiquing the Marshall Mission at a time when the wound of the Nationalist defeat in the CCP-GMD civil war was far from healed and when Cold War tension remained high, both Wang and Liang approached their research and writing in ways not very different from how Huang Shaoxiang approached her study of Sino-US relations in the PRC: all of them allowed their works to bear the imprint of the political environment within which they were written, something that historians cannot always free their craft from. In addition, affiliation with the Nationalist government—Wang was a career diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC, and Liang served the Nationalist government in the 1930s in several roles, including coordinating American aids to China during World War II from Washington, DC, before becoming a fulltime scholar—may have shaped their view of the Marshall Mission, akin to the one that Jiang Jieshi had unequivocally held till the end of his life. From the 1980s onward, however, as younger scholars—especially those who were trained in the United States—began to bring new materials and perspective into the field, a sort of ‘paradigm change’ occurred, even though such a shift has yet to show its effect on the enduring unfavourable interpretation of the Marshall Mission in Taiwan. Shao Yuming is such a scholar. Holding a doctorate in history from the University of Chicago, Shao specializes in the history of Sino-US relations and pursues his academic inquiries from both Taiwan and the United States, adding a trans-Pacific dimension to his scholarship. Seeing the Marshall Mission as a watershed event with long-term impact on post-1949 PRC-ROC relations and Sino-US relations, Shao argues that it was the discrepancy in the US approach to the Communist threat in the early Cold War that weakened the mission’s ability to achieve its goals. Regarding Europe as

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historically and strategically more important to American national interests than anywhere else in the world, the Truman administration confronted the Soviet expansionist attempts more decisively there. In China, however, the United States merely wanted to put a stop to the CCP-GMD civil war and push the two political parties to create a coalition government, a policy geared toward preempting any possible Soviet-US entanglement over the CCP-GMD conflicts. Failing to see such a difference in US strategy for Europe and for Asia, the Nationalists believed that as long as they persevered in their fight against the Chinese Communists, the United States would ultimately come to their aid, an illusion that led Jiang Jieshi to decline Stalin’s invitation to visit the Soviet Union and improve Sino-Soviet relations. Ironically, while Jiang Jieshi took such a stance to align with America’s anti-Communist policy and thus lost the opportunity to get a negotiated settlement of the Manchuria issue from the Soviet Union, Marshall sent a telegram to Truman, telling the president that for the improvement of Sino-Soviet and CCP-GMD relations, Jiang Jieshi should go to Moscow. To Shao, this was not the only time that misunderstanding of US intentions resulted in a catastrophic outcome for the Nationalists. In 1978, history repeated itself when the United States severed its diplomatic tie with the ROC to normalize its relationship with the PRC. Until that point, many people in Taiwan believed that the United States would not go so far as to abandon a long-time ally for a partnership with a Communist nation. Besides focusing on the communication gap in analyzing the impact of the Marshall Mission, Shao also proposes a possibility for scholars to explore. Before Marshall traveled to China to start his mediation, he was instructed to be steadfast on the position that the United States would never provide aids to a politically divided and civil war-plagued China, and that position might have hardened the CCP resolve to not cooperate with the GMD on issues like the making of a democratic constitution, the distribution of governmental positions among the GMD, the CCP and third parties, and the integration of Communist forces into a national army, because resolution of these issues would have led to the arrival of American aids with no strings attached, the enhancement of Nationalist power in China, and the elimination of the chance for the Communists to win their war against the Nationalists. Put in another way, because of the loophole in Truman’s China policy, of which Chinese Communists took advantage, Marshall never had a chance to succeed in his mediation (Wang Chen-main 1992, 3). In appraising the Marshall Mission, Taiwan scholars also attempt to correlate Marshall’s personal experiences as a US army career officer in China before World War II with how he approached his mission after the

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war. Depending on their viewpoints and how far they are willing to go in blaming Marshall for the Nationalist loss, different scholars weave different aspects of his experiences into their narratives. To Liang Ching-chun, General Wedemeyer’s comment that Marshall ‘was primarily a military man who had little knowledge of the complexities of the world conflict and no conception of the skills with which the Communist pervert great and noble aspiration for social justice into support of their own diabolic purposes’ precisely explains his inaptitude in dealing with the Chinese Communists. Given that and his lack of ‘intelligence and skills for handling global affairs’, Marshall accepted Truman’s offer of a mediator’s job only because he wanted to stay out of the Congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack (Liang Ching-chun 1994, 612–13; Wedemeyer 1958, 370). On the other hand, appreciative of the fact that Marshall shuttled tirelessly between the CCP and the GMD, not only because his mission hinged on their cooperation with him, but also because he was genuinely concerned with China and its people, who would suffer enormously if his mediation failed, other scholars voice a more positive view of the effects of Marshall’s early China experiences on his approach to his mission. For example, relating the army officer’s career of Joseph Stilwell, Albert Wedemeyer, George Marshall, and Matthew Ridgeway in the American 15th Infantry Regiment stationed in Tianjin in 1912–1938 to their roles in the making of US China policy during and after World War II, Wang Chen-main describes how Marshall reacted to the poverty and suffering of the Chinese refugees—mainly women and children—who passed through Tianjin areas on their way to southern China to escape the plundering and looting by the warlords’ troops; he points out that these heart-breaking memories from the 1920s had much to do with his concerns over the Chinese people expressed in his writings and in his interactions with Chinese leaders during his mission, Communist and Nationalist alike. Also, after spending three years in Tianjin, Marshall had learned more than 2500 Chinese words, and he was proficient enough to converse with Chinese coolies such as rickshaw pullers, though he was not fluent enough to truly understand ‘traditional Chinese culture’ as an American mediator. There were also lessons learned in China that were wrongly applied; one such lesson was ‘intimidation and persuasion all at the same time’, which Marshall found effective in handling warlord incursions when he was stationed in Tianjin. However, when he tried it on the ‘new generation of Chinese leaders’, futility resulted: Devoting themselves to the restoration of China’s ‘national glory and sovereignty’, leaders like Jiang Jieshi, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai were less willing to make concessions to external pressure from foreign powers (Wang Chen-main 2012, 93–98). On the other

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hand, American scholars like Daniel Kurtz-Phelan and PRC historians like Zhang Baijia are more interested in unearthing how Marshall’s and Zhou Enlai’s mutual positive impressions affected their working relationship (Kurtz-Phelan 2018, 288; Bland 1998, 233). Believing that the Marshall Mission was responsible for the Nationalist defeat in the Chinese civil war that the Nationalists would have otherwise won, Taiwan scholars tend to concentrate on the adverse effects of Marshall’s mediation on the Nationalist ability to combat the Communists with or without sufficient American aids. To some, given the historical distrust that plagued the CCP-GMD relationship, which Marshall himself listed as a contributing factor to the failure of his mission, the Marshall Mission was a mission impossible from the very beginning (MacFarquhar 2018). However, if such an impossible mission made it possible for the Communists to strengthen themselves and kick the Nationalists out of mainland China, a causation that Jiang Jieshi never doubted, to Taiwan scholars, the loss of the opportunity to keep China free from Communism would forever remain an infamous legacy of the Marshall Mission. Neither Chinese historians in the PRC nor their counterparts in the ROC show any interest in investigating the significance of some mundane details of the Marshall Mission, especially those related to Marshall’s ‘people skills’ demonstrated in his mediation between two foes who just wanted to cut each other’s throats. In early September 1946, for example, Zhou Enlai left Nanjing, unannounced, for Shanghai, to protest Nationalist military offensives in Manchuria. To prevent the CCP-GMD engagement from total collapse, Marshall traveled to Shanghai and paid Zhou a surprise visit, startling him to ‘near death’, but also forcing him to return to Nanjing to continue his work in the Committee of Three (Kurtz-Phelan 2018, 271). Other examples of Marshall’s deep personal commitment to preventing a civil war from getting out of control were his seven trips to Kuling in the summer of 1946. Located on the summit of the legendary Lushan Mountain in southern China and reputed for its cool climate, Kuling was a renowned resort town where Jiang Jieshi stayed from July to October 1946 to escape the torturing heat in Nanjing, but also to distance himself from Marshall’s pressure for concessions to stop the raging civil war. To keep the hope of peace alive, Marshall shuttled between Nanjing, where the Committee of Three was, and Kuling, where Jiang Jieshi stayed cool, causing his wife, Katherine Marshall, to complain that her husband was treated like ‘a messenger boy between the Generalissimo and the Communists’ (Kurtz-Phelan 2018, 260). It may very well be an indication that Marshall’s self-esteem was

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a welcome sacrifice if his work could help stop the killing and bring relief to China and its suffering people. For all these practical reasons, a successful Marshall Mission was out of the question when the civil war broke out in Manchuria in May 1946, even though Marshall continued to try to reverse the unreversible until he left China in January 1947. Why did he do so? For American scholars, the exploration offered in the following passage may lead to a better understanding of his motives: Was it his sense of duty, his awareness, often expressed, that civil war would be a great disaster for the Chinese people? Was it his close acquain­ tance with Jiang Jieshi and Zhou Enlai that deluded him into thinking that he could again persuade them of the rightness of the proposals he had made? Did he simply share the Washington consensus that the Soviet Union had to be kept out of China, which meant supporting the Nationalists, though not to the extent of being involved in a civil war on their side? Or was his pride involved: How could he, who had masterminded a victory in a world war, be unable to prevent a civil war in a country heavily dependent on US largesse? As one of his more perceptive aides commented: ‘Never having failed before, he cannot yet bring himself to admit he has failed this time’ (MacFarquhar 2018).

If not all, are at least some of these questions implicated in the work of Chinese historians in both Taiwan and mainland China on the Marshall Mission and its impact on Sino-US relations during the Cold War? The Taiwan Strait remains a dividing line between two Chinese historiographies of the Marshall Mission, but common ground is by no means nonexistent: They both see the Marshall Mission as a lost opportunity. While PRC historians argue that the loss was the opportunity to peacefully transition China into a socialist country, ROC historians agree that the Marshall Mission contributed to the loss of China as a non-Communist nation. It is not totally unlikely that someday in the future historians across the Strait can focus on the lost opportunity in a different category: the Chinese people. We may never know for certain if Marshall’s concern for the Chinese people kept him in China longer than he would have otherwise, but we do know that when the Marshall Mission failed, the lost opportunity to mitigate the suffering of the Chinese people broke Marshall’s heart, a loss that for Chinese leaders like Mao Zedong and Jiang Jieshi was an acceptable and justifiable price to pay to realize their vision of how China and its people should be governed (Bland 1998, 547).

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Bibliography Bland, Larry I., ed. 1998. George C. Marshall’s Mediation Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947. Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation. Cohen, Warren. 2019. America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations. New York: Columbia University Press. Gaddis, John L. 1997. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford University Press. Grasso, June M. 1987. Truman’s Two-China Policy, 1948–1950. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Huang Shaoxiang 黄绍湘. 1979. Meiguotongshi jianbian 美国通史简编 (A Concise History of the United States). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Kurtz-Phelan, Daniel. 2018. The China Mission: George Marshall’s Unfinished War, 1945–1947. New York: W.W. Norton. Leffler, Melvyn P. 1992. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Liang Ching-chun 梁敬錞. 1994. 马歇尔使华报告书笺注 Maxieer shihu baogaoshu jianzhu (Marshall’s Mission to China: A Commentary on the Report). Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. Marshall, George C. 1976. Marshall’s Mission to China, December 1945 – January 1947: The Report and Appended Documents. Arlington, VA: University Publications of America. MacFarquhar, Roderick. September 27, 2018. ‘Mission Impossible’. ChinaFile. Last modified May 1, 2022. https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/ mission-impossible-George-Marshall. May, Ernest R. 1975. The Truman Administration and China, 1945–1949. New York: Lippincott. Niu Jun 牛军. 1988. 从赫尔利到马歇尔：美国调处国共矛盾始末 Cong heerli dao maxieer: Meiguo tiaochu guogongmaodun shimo (From Hurley to Marshall: A History of the American Mediation of the GMD-CCP Conflict). Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe. Niu Jun牛军. 2005. From Yanan to the World: The Origin and Development of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, Steven L. Levine, ed. and trans. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge. Tao Wenzhao 陶文钊. 2004. 中美关系史（1911–1949）上卷 Zhongmei guanxishi (1911–1949), (A History of Sino-US Relations, 1911–1949, Vol. 1). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe. Tucker, Nancy B. 1983. Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Wang Chen-main 王成勉, ed. 1992. Maxieer shihuatiaochu rizhi (马歇尔使华调处 日志 (The Chronicle of the Marshall Mediation in China, November 1945–January 1947). Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Historica. Wang Chen-main 王成勉. 2012. ‘Meiguo junfang duihuataidu suyuan: dishiwu bubingtuan zhi Yanjiu’ (美国军方对华态度溯源：第15步兵团之研究. Tracing the Origin of US Army Generals’ Attitudes toward China: Research on the United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China), Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu (中国近代 史研究Modern Chinese History Studies), no. 2:88–99. Wang Zhizhen 王之珍. 1970. 马歇尔调处国共始末Maxieer tiaochu guogong shimo (A History of Marshall’s Mediation of the GMD-CCP Conflict). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin – Madison. Wedemeyer, Albert C. 1958. Wedemeyer Reports! New York: Henry Holt & Company. Zhang Baijia and Niu Jun 张百家、牛军, eds. 2002. 冷战与中国 Lengzhan yu zhongguo (The Cold War and China). Beijing: shijiezhishi chubanshe.

About the Author Dr. Zhiguo Yang is professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-River Falls. He has published several articles on topics of Chinese nationalism, Chinese consumer culture in the twentieth century, and the history of post-WWII interactions between Chinese and American Marine troops in Qingdao.

5

Negotiating from Strength US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953 Pingchao Zhu Abstract This chapter is about the Korean War Armistice talks (July 1951-July 1953) between the United Nations Command and the Communist side (North Korea and the Chinese military forces in Korea) from the perspective of negotiating from strength. It explores how the interplay of military strength on the battlefields and diplomatic schemes at the truce tent shaped the negotiation strategies from Washington and Beijing. Keywords: The Korean War, The United Nations Command (UNC), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Chinese People’s Volunteer army (CPVA), POWs, demarcation line

George Marshall’s failed mission to mediate a coalition agreement between the ruling Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was followed by the Civil War that ended with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the Sino-Soviet alliance a few months later. In less than a year, the new Communist regime was faced with a graver challenge with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. This time, the responses of the United States and Communist China put the two already unfriendly countries on a collision course when the Chinese military and the American-led United Nations Command forces met face to face on the Korean battlefield. One year after fierce fighting, the Americans and the Chinese Communists agreed to meet at the negotiation table to talk about an armistice, however reluctantly, as the war stalled on the battlefields. With battle and negotiation, the Chinese Communists began to build a resume showing both persistence and bargaining capacity, while the Americans

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch05

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learned to consider cultural factors in future diplomatic and military operations in dealing with the Communists. In the long run, Sino-US relations were built mostly through negotiations and reconciliations. The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans attacked South Korean positions along the 38th Parallel, and ended with an armistice three years later. The United States’ instantaneous involvement in the war to lead the United Nations Command (UNC) on the side of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Communist China’s entry into the war four months later to aid the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) transformed the war from a civil war to an international conflict.1 The Chinese and the Americans found themselves faced with the most difficult battles since the end of World War II, as military contests on the battlefields changed hands several times before both sides agreed to sit down at the negotiation table to talk about a possible ceasefire. The armistice conferences lasted for two years, from July 1951 to July 1953, making it one of the most intricate events in modern military history. With the upsurge of Cold War tensions at both regional and international levels, the Korean War was bound to be a battleground for the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The central task of this study is to examine the diplomatic strategies of the chief delegates, the United Nations Command (UNC), headed by the United States. and the Communists, led chiefly by Communist China, during the Korean War cease-fire negotiations. Characteristically, both sides came to understand the importance of military force on the battlefields as the best bargaining power. Rivals with equally matched capacity might want to avoid their weaknesses and highlight their strengths during the bargaining process to improve the opportunity of winning. From the Korean War armistice talks, we begin to understand that it was more costly and difficult to achieve a truce than winning a war. Lessons learned through this bargaining process served as useful experiments, especially in negotiating from the position of strength for Washington and Beijing as Cold War tensions increased.

Prelude to the Negotiations, June 1950 – July 1951 The United States reacted swiftly to the outbreak of war in Korea as ‘a planned Soviet move to improve their cold war position’, and the Russians were ‘testing United States determination to oppose their expansion’ 1

Neither South Korea nor North Korea were members of the United Nations until 1991.

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(Schnabel 1972, 75). On the day the conflict erupted, President Harry Truman requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which issued three consecutive resolutions during the next two weeks calling for immediate cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of North Korean forces to north of the 38th parallel, and establishment of the United Nations Command (UNC) ‘in the course of operations against North Korean forces’ (UNSC Resolutions 82, 83, and 84, 1950). President Truman designated Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General of the UNC forces, joined by sixteen UN members. Consequently, these actions turned the United Nations into a warring party in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula to perform ‘police action’ in the name of resisting Communist expansion in Asia. Although the US quickly landed its first combat division of the Eighth Army in Taejon of central South Korea in July 1950, UNC forces were cornered by the forceful North Korean troops to the southeastern Pusan Perimeter by August (Hermes 1992, 9–10). General MacArthur’s counteroffensive, the daring amphibious Inchon landing in mid-September, miraculously turned the tables on the Korean battlefield in favour of the UNC forces. As the UNC ‘unhampered’ advance north of the 38th parallel continued to approach the Sino-North Korean border, the first wave of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA), four armies at 260,000 men strong, crossed the Yalu River into North Korea on Oct. 19, 1950.2 With Chinese military forces pouring continuously into the Korean war zone during the second half of 1950, the Chinese-North Korean Unified Command Headquarters was established in December, with General Peng Dehuai of the CPVA as both the Supreme Commander and Political Commissar, and the NKPA generals serving as deputies (Bajanov, 1995–1996, 55, 99). Thus, the Chinese took the lead role in both military strategies as well as combat operations in the Unified Command Headquarters during the entire Korean War, including the armistice talks. By the end of 1950, some 320,000 UNC troops were faced with a robust 550,000-strong CPVA force and 75,000 NKPA units in Korea. Between October 25, 1950, and June 10, 1951, the CPVA, flanked by NKPA (North Korean People’s Army) troops, and the UNC forces fought five major campaigns. Simultaneously, diplomatic initiatives by UN member states to bring about a ceasefire began almost as soon as the fighting broke out. The Chinese military forces were formidable in the first two campaigns (October 25 – December 24, 1950), driving the underprepared UNC troops 2 While the Chinese sources have always held October 19, the Chinese government did not officially publicize the CPV entry into Korea until November 8, 1950, out of concern for protecting its ‘confidential strategies’.

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fast southward: Seoul and Pyongyang, capital cities of both Korean states, changed hands a few times. On November 28, as the 1st Marine Division of the US X Corps was f ighting frantically to break through the CPVA encirclement near the Chosin Reservoir in ‘the most infamous retreat in American history’, the Chinese delegate, at UN invitation, delivered a lengthy statement at the UNSC session denouncing US ‘armed aggression against Chinese territory’ and intervention in Korean affairs (Pollack 1989, 224). Backed by the Soviet Union, the Chinese representatives emphasized their position on three conditions as a package deal for negotiations: withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and of the US 7th Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, and China’s UN membership (FRUS 1950, 7:1249). In fact, Beijing was sought worldwide publicity at the United Nations, not a UN solution to its proposal. On December 13, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, delivered a speech proposing ceasefire negotiations on the same conditions expressed by the Chinese delegate at the UNSC (FRUS 1950, 7:1536). More importantly, at the time when the CPV was making headway with high morale on the battlefield, the Chinese would not seriously consider negotiating a cease-fire. Toward the end of the second campaign, the CPVA/ NKPA forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea and General Matthew Ridgway took over a battered US Eighth Army on the battlefield after the accidental death of its commander, General Walton Walker. The third campaign commenced on New Year’s Eve of 1951 as six CPVA armies and three NKPA army corps thrust southward (December 31, 1950 – January 8, 1951) to push the UNC defensive line further back on the 37th parallel, also known as the Idaho Line, about seventy miles south of the 38th parallel. Realizing the implication of Chinese diplomatic moves at the UN session and CPVA’s tenacious offensives on the battlefield, Washington made efforts to bring its UN allies together to put pressure on the Chinese. The result was a series of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions to address issues at stake, including withdrawing all foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula, pausing Communist troops by the 38th parallel, condemning China as aggressors, and boycotting North Korea. A few committees were also formed calling for cease-fire. Three days following the conclusion of the third campaign, the UN Cease-fire Committee forwarded its cease-fire proposal to China (FRUS 1950, 7:1409; 7:1422; 7:1495, and 7:1245-46). Stalin’s instruction was for Beijing to reject the UN proposal by presenting terms acceptable to the Americans, thus guaranteeing the Communist side would be held accountable for disrupting the peaceful settlement in Korea (Foot 1990, 30; Weathersby 1995–1996, 34). For Mao, the CPVA’s successful military advances to force the UNC on the defense barely three months after China’s

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entry into the conflict demonstrated the intransigence of the Chinese military on the battlefield. This further boosted Beijing’s confidence that the CPVA was close to accomplishing their goal of ‘eliminating the enemy troops and forcing the Americans to leave the Korean peninsula’ (Chen 1992, 26) At this crucial juncture, negotiations for a cease-fire were out of the question for the Chinese. Throughout the first half of 1951, both the CPVA and the UNC mounted massive military operations, hoping to change the balance of power on the battlefield. During the early days of the fourth campaign (January 25 – April 21, 1951), Mao appeared to be convinced in his cable to Stalin that the CPVA would build momentum from the previous phases of combat to forcefully drive the UNC forces further south of the 38th parallel and force ‘the enemy … [to] conduct peace negotiations with us regarding a solution of the Korean question’ (Weathersby, Telegram 56, 1995–1996, 57). The fighting, however, did not develop as the Chinese expected. General Ridgway realigned combat strategies by launching the first UNC counteroffensive, Operation Thunderbolt, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemies, and established solid defensive lines north of the 38th parallel (the Kansas Line and later the Wyoming Line).3 In such a situation, President Truman’s primary intention was not an expanded war, but a consolidated military advantage on the battlefield so that the UNC would have the upper hand to call for an armistice. When General MacArthur publicly challenged Washington’s ‘limited war’ policy with his notion of ‘no substitute for victory’, his relief as UNC commander by President Truman on April 11 marked a turning point for US strategy in the Korean conflict. During the fifth campaign (April 22 – June 16, 1951), also known as the Spring Offensive, UNC forces changed from defensive to offensive operations, gaining tremendous advantage with modern technology and sufficient military equipment. General Ridgway, now the new UNC Commander, instructed the UNC troops to hold on to the Kansas Line, making it ‘as nearly impregnable as possible’ to ‘restore the peace and the border’ for the upcoming negotiations. Furthermore, the Eighth Army received orders not to conduct any operation beyond the Wyoming Line without instructions from the UNC Commander (Ridgway 1967, 122; Schnabel 1972, 384). At the same time, the CPVA suffered dismal 3 The Kansas Line was an uneven defensive line with its western point a few miles below the 38th parallel and the eastern end fifteen miles north of the 38th Parallel. The Wyoming Line was the UNC’s northmost defensive line, running roughly about three miles north of the Kansas Line. General Matthew B. Ridgway took over the US Eighth Army after the accidental death of General Walton Walker in late December 1950.

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setbacks, enduring another staggering 200,000 casualties, including more than one-third of its entire POWs. After the heavy loss in the fifth campaign, ‘the Communists never again came close to Seoul or mounted another major southward incursion of such magnitude’ (Li 2014, 212–13). Mao instructed the CPVA to adopt a strategy of ‘steady attack’ and restrict military maneuver only around the 38th parallel (Shen and Meng 1990, 119). The war reached a stalemate by June 1951. When military power alone failed to produce absolute political advantage for either side, both the UNC and the CPVA came to realize that their initial plans to ‘drive the enemy out of the Korean Peninsula’ were impractical. The UNC, having managed to consolidate its defensive positions on the battlefield, moved to modify its objective to fighting a ‘limited war’ with the defense of South Korea as priority, while the CPVA reset its combat strategy for ‘a prolonged war and active defense’ with a limited aim to ‘safeguard the security of both North Korea and China’ (Tan et al 1990, 88–89). The option now for the commanders of the opponents on the battlefields was to ‘strive for ending the war through peace negotiations’, a substitute for victory (Chen 1992, 39). The time for negotiations was ripe for both sides in mid-1951, when military strength failed to decisively overpower the enemy. On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative at the UNSC, broadcast a radio statement calling for an armistice. ‘For the sake of peace in Korea’, Malik underscored, ‘this should not be too costly’ (FRUS 1951, 7:547). This time, warring parties responded positively to Malik’s appeal for a ceasefire, despite their differences. Although US reactions were mixed among major policymakers, under increasing international and domestic pressure, Washington believed that the UNC had fortified its strategic defensive lines north of the 38th parallel and a cease-fire was in the best interest of the United States and its western allies. A week later, on June 30, General Ridgway sent out an initiative via UNC radio to the Chinese and North Koreans to ‘discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostility’ and proposed the meeting take place aboard a Danish hospital ship at Wonsan Harbor. The Chinese took Ridgway’s plea as a sign that the UNC was in a weak position to sue for peace. After consulting with Soviet leader Stalin through telegrams, Kim Il Sung, the Commander-in-Chief of the NKPA, and General Peng Dehuai of the CPVA agreed to meet with the UNC representatives for ‘conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace’ (FRUS 1951, 7:669,). The Communists, however, offered a different meeting site: Kaesong, an ancient town about three miles south of the 38th parallel and once a South Korean territory, but now under CPVA control. The Communist leaders considered it a psychological

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advantage and a winning signal to meet with the enemies south of the 38th parallel (Xu 1990, 270). After exchange of a few messages, both sides agreed upon Kaesong as the meeting site and on July 10 as the date of the opening session. Roughly one year after the first shots were fired over the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula, through military contests on the battlefields, numerous diplomatic attempts at both confidential and public levels, and modification of combat objectives, the warring parties came to an agreement to talk about a possible armistice.

From Kaesong to Panmunjom, July – December 1951 Strategically speaking, the Korean War armistice conference was the first major international encounter for both Communist China and the United States on the battlefield and at the negotiation table. The two-year long armistice conferences were also distinguished by negotiations that continued alongside the fighting. Since the United States had no diplomatic relations with either Communist China or North Korea, communication at governmental level was impossible. Washington directed General Ridgway to limit negotiations to military questions and not to initiate any discussion unrelated to the Korea problem, such as issues of Taiwan’s status and China’s UN membership, which should be dealt with at political level (Hermes 1992, 16–17). Furthermore, Ridgway was instructed to address Marshal Peng Dehuai in their communications only as the ‘Commanding General of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea’ despite Beijing’s designation of its military fighting in Korea as ‘volunteers’. Washington intended to hold the Chinese government accountable, in an official way, for its military action in Korea (FRUS 1951, 7:612,). For strategic consideration, the Joint Chief of Staff also advised Ridgway not to make ‘any reference’ to the 38th parallel in future discussions with the Communists. Should the 38th parallel be the cease-fire line, UN forces would have to retreat southward and surrender the position they had fought for since the January offensive. At the same time, both sides began organizing their respective delegations. The UNC negotiating team was made up of professional military men, four American commanders and one South Korean army general. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was to head the UNC delegation, assisted by Major General Henry I. Hodes of the Eighth Army, Major General Laurence C. Craigie of Far East Air Forces, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and Major General Paik Sun Yup of ROK (Hermes 1992, 17; Stueck 1995, 215). A group of liaison officers took care of conference details and facilitated communication between UNC

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negotiates and UNC headquarters. Ridgway categorically cautioned the UNC representatives to familiarize themselves with ‘oriental’ cultures to avoid misunderstandings caused by inaccuracies in translations. Anticipating that the CPVA would ‘intensify this offensive potential throughout the period of negotiations’, the general warned his troops to maintain vigilance and to be mindful of Chinese and Soviet dualism and deceit. General James Van Fleet, Commander of the US Eighth Army, was instructed to assume a similar strategy of ‘an active defense … [by] limiting offensive operations to the taking of outpost positions requiring commitment of no more than one division’ (FRUS 1951, 7:610). Admiral Joy was especially confident that the UNC/US started the negotiations from the position of military strength. Taking extra precautions, the Communist side organized their negotiating team at three levels, the front, the intermediate, and the rear lines. The front line consisted of two Chinese and three North Korean military commanders from the CPVA and the NKPA. Lieutenant General Nam Il of the NKPA, the Senior delegate leading the front line, was assisted by Lieutenant General Deng Hua and Major General Xie Fang of the CPVA, General Deng Hua of the CPVA, and Major Generals Lee Sang Cho and Chang Pyong San from the NKPA. General Nam Il received education in the Soviet Union and China, speaking fluent Chinese and Russian. Nam Il, however, remained as the head of the Communist delegation only in name and in performance. Li Kenong, a veteran revolutionary of the CCP, controlled the rear line and was the brain of the Communist negotiation headquarters, with Qiao Guanhua as his assistant. Under them were diplomats, interpreters, radio operators, and journalists, as well as a squad of staff officers from the CPVA to offer first-hand information on the battlefield. Hand-picked by Mao and Zhou, Li had been a capable politician and veteran revolutionary since 1928 and possessed ample experience in dealing with the Nationalists and the Americans in China’s Civil War period. After 1949, he took a position as China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Minister of the Military Intelligence Committee. Qiao, a gifted intellectual and experienced diplomat, assumed an important position in the Foreign Ministry and as director of the China International News Bureau (Chai and Zhao 1989, 119). Although talented diplomats neither had enough military experience to officially head the Communist delegation, according to the UN requirement of personnel composition. Consequently, Li and Qiao never appeared at the negotiation table. The intermediate level, with Qiao in charge and Lieutenant Colonel Chai Chengwen of the CPVA and two colonels from the NKPA, worked as liaison officers, shuttling information between the rear and the front lines. Although all three NKPA delegation members on the official list were

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categorized as senior negotiators, the North Koreans agreed that Mao and Zhou would control the armistice talks through telegram communications with Li. The day before the first session, Li Kenong emphasized to the Communist team the importance of ‘operating from a strategically advantageous position in order to outwit the opponents’. At the same time, Li reminded all delegates of paying close attention to the military developments on the battlefield, which might lead to a change in tactics at the negotiation table (Chai and Zhao 1989, 125–26). Following Mao’s new strategy of ‘fighting a prolonged war and assuming an active defensive’, Marshal Peng set the tone for the CPVA facing a different combat situation: ‘Those who fight on the battlefield strike heavily, and those at the negotiation table talk with patience’ (Chai and Zhao 1989, 118). With almost excessive precaution, the Communists hoped to minimize oversights caused by inexperience or imprudence of their own delegates. At the negotiation site, a routine meeting was held every evening at ten o’clock inside Li’s tent to review and analyze every detail of the talks. Li would summarize them, adding his comments, and then cable Beijing before dawn. It was estimated that Mao sent thousands of telegrams to Li during the entire negotiation period concerning policymaking, strategic formulation, and other important issues (Xu 1990, 270–77). Even the Americans sensed an ‘invisible man’ behind the curtain of the Communist delegates orchestrating the truce talks. The Chinese Communists appeared to be well-prepared and well-organized to face the Americans backed by undeniable military might. The Communist delegation resided in Kaesong as the UNC delegation set up its truce headquarters at Munsan-ni, a small village about ten miles southeast of the conference site. According to a mutual agreement, a fivemile diameter neutral zone was drawn around Kaesong, with the Chinese military providing security and logistics matters. With Chinese, Korean, and English set to be the off icial languages for the conference, Beijing at least felt content to be recognized as one of the major players at the negotiation table. As required, the UNC delegation would have to carry white flags on their vehicles for identification purposes when entering the CPVA controlled conference vicinity. The Communists printed these photos on their propaganda bulletins to show that the UNC practically approached Kaesong to surrender. The Communists would make extra efforts to elevate themselves as the winners in the spotlight of world attention. The first meeting of the Korean War Armistice Talks commenced at eleven o’clock (local time) on July 10, 1951, in an old teahouse in Kaesong. The UNC delegates happened to enter the room just a few minutes earlier

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and unknowingly took the seats on the northern side of the rectangular conference table. The Americans also brought a UN flag to place on their side. These details at the table disturbed the Chinese profoundly. According to oriental geomantic alignment theory, sitting north to face south provided one with a favourable position, and also meant sailing with a tail wind. The next day, the Communist delegates deliberately arrived at the meeting site much earlier to take over the seats on the northern side, along with a much taller North Korean flag. They also deliberately switched all the chairs on the UNC side to much lower positions (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 32, 34). Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, the UNC Senior delegate, later commented that the Communists were very sensitive to these traditions and tried hard to eliminate any possible sign of inferiority on their part. They carefully studied the performance from the UNC side in terms of equipment, transportation, and conference arrangements, and tried to capture any possible sign for propaganda purposes. When the UNC painted their sentry posts army olive drab, the Communists would outdo them by decorating their guard posts in bright tricolor of red, white, and green (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 75–76). General Nam Il, the Communist Senior Delegate, would extend his speech to 110 minutes because Admiral Joy had spoken for seventy minutes in the previous session. If Joy drove to the meeting site in a Chevrolet Army sedan, Nam would switch from a Russian army jeep to arrive in a captured Chrysler. Joy, however, challenged Nam Il’s attitude by saying that the Communists ‘could never match us with helicopters … and … that really bothered them’ (Goodman 1978, 6, 13). The stark contrast of the two different teams reflected not only the attitudes, but also the perspectives of the warring parties, who came to fight a different war with wit and courage. With little to no experience in international negotiation proceedings, the Communists appeared more audacious and cautious in conducting business. On the other hand, the passive environment at the negotiation site was ‘completely foreign’ to the UNC delegates, whose military training emphasized ‘action and concrete achievement’ (Foot 1990, 11).

Item One: Fighting for Agenda In his opening remarks, Admiral Joy outlined two points from the UNC delegation. First, hostilities would ‘continue in all areas, except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice and until such time as an approved Armistice Commission is prepared to function’. Second, the UNC would

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limit its discussion solely to military matters regarding Korea. Any other political or economic matters, including military issues unrelated to Korea, should be excluded (Foot 1990, 6). Joy also raised other issues concerning authority for International Red Cross staff to visit POW (prisoner of war) camps, and the forming of a Military Armistice Committee to supervise a cease-fire. General Nam Il proposed three principles: simultaneous cessation of all military hostilities, establishment of the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within the shortest time. ‘Foreign troops’, as defined by the Communists, were those who were in Korea ‘under the permission of their governments’ (Chai and Zhao 1989, 129–30; Goodman 1978, 17). Accordingly, the CPVA, nominally a ‘volunteer’ army, as Beijing claimed, was not considered in this category. During the next two weeks, the combatants debated the negotiation agenda with disagreement over two points: withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and designation of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line (Chai and Zhao 1989, 140; Goodman 1978, 20–21). After the UNC proposed to consider the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea at a future conference, the Communists agreed to drop the wording of designating the 38th parallel as the demarcation line (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 39–40). Reluctantly, the UNC and the Communists made their respective first concessions to formally agree upon a five-point agenda in principle at the eleventh session on July 27: 1. Adoption of agenda. 2. Fixing of military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and function of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease-fire and armistice. 4. Arrangement relating to prisoners of war. 5. Recommendation to governments of countries concerned on both sides (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 39–40, 43).

Item Two: Military Demarcation Line Attention immediately shifted to the discussion of the demarcation line. Three concerns motivated the two sides to reach an agreement. The first was about territory loss and gain. At the following sessions, General Nam

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Il continued to insist on the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, hoping to recover a significant portion of land north of the 38th parallel and restore the prewar status quo for North Korea (Chai and Zhao 1989, 139–41,166–77; Xu 1990, 271–77). ‘Just because war started on the 38th [parallel] was no reason it should end there’, Admiral Joy reacted by firmly stating the UNC position: the military demarcation line should be based on ‘military realities’, namely the current line of contact. The UNC forces had been fortifying this position since late April (Goodman 1978, 35–40, 112–120; Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 69–86). Consenting to Communist demand would mean a withdrawal from the present Kansas line that stretched unevenly between ten and eighteen miles north of the 38th parallel; it would therefore be ‘totally unacceptable’ to the UN Command. ‘The 38th parallel’, Secretary of State Dean Acheson reminisced, ‘had been amply proved to be indefensible and to us [of] no political or historic significance. We had no intention of giving up the strong positions of the Kansas line, we hoped to improve them’ (Acheson 1971, 535). The second concern was over the possession of Kaesong. The ancient town lay south of the 38th parallel but was under Communist control. The South Korean government had since demanded its return, and for that reason the UNC insisted on including Kaesong in the demilitarized zone. The Kaesong area was not only strategically important, with the station of the CPVA posts, but also economically productive. The Communists, realizing that the UNC demand would mean giving up another 1,500 square kilometers in territory, thus refused to concede. The third concern pertained to the UNC opposition to Communist insistence on making the demarcation line permanent before an armistice became effective. While the JCS inclined to recognize Communist position in principle, its instruction to the UNC was that if no real armistice could be reached at the expiration of a limited time, ‘the demilitarized zone would be subject to revision’ (FRUS 1951, 7:1126; Hermes 1992, 117). General Ridgway wanted to stand inflexibly upon the principle that the demarcation line must be ‘based on the line of contact existing at the time of the signing of the armistice’ (FRUS 1951, 7:1128). The UNC might be truly regretful in July 1953 when the CPVA took advantage of this position to launch a massive Kumsong offensive by recovering nearly seventy square miles of territory right before the signing of the armistice agreement. For over three months, the Communist delegation held stubbornly on the 38th parallel as the demarcation line, but failed to get the UNC delegation to agree. The negotiation procedures were also interrupted by several incidents during the same period of the UNC summer offensives. In early August, a heavily armed CPVA company marched past within just a few hundred

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yards of the UNC staff residence, violating the conference neutrality code (Goodman 1978, 24; Chai and Zhao 1989, 143). On August 23, the Chinese delegate declared a temporary cessation of all plenary meetings in protest of the incident. Mao later informed Stalin that ‘the negotiations will not be resumed until we receive a satisfactory answer’ (Telegram 87, August 13, 1951, Weathersby 1995–1996, 68). In the following two weeks, a few more incidents involving alleged UNC air assaults at Communist supply vehicles and napalming the resident site of the Communist delegation caused a spate of complains from the Communist delegate. To make the situation worse, at mid-month an unidentif ied force ambushed a CPVA military police patrol team within the area of the neutral zone near Songgong-ni, killing the platoon leader and wounding another soldier (Chai and Zhao 1989, 143, 145). Tensions mounted as both sides accused each other of breaching ‘good faith’. Each held the other accountable for the incident and demanded apology. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and General Peng Dehuai of the CPVA dispatched a protest letter to the UNC, followed by radio Beijing’s announcement to suspend the conference until the matter was fully investigated and properly handled. Real or alleged, both Joy and Ridgway described the incident as ‘a complete and premeditated fabrication’. The Chinese, the UNC speculated, intended to create an ‘excuse’ to ‘bring an end to the negotiations, with the object of seeking to fix the blame for the cessation upon the United Nations’ (Chai and Zhao 1989, 167–49; FRUS 1951, 7:851–52). None of these incidents were fully investigated or resolved when another episode on September 10 of strafing at the Kaesong neutral zone by the Third Bomber Squad from the United States Air Force occurred. Having confirmed the shooting, the UNC immediately assumed full responsibility and apologized to the Communist side. While protesting, Peng and Kim soon asked for resumption of negotiations, but did not receive a positive response from the UNC. By now Ridgway wanted to press for a new location if talks were to reopen. The Communists opposed the change, arguing that it was another UNC attempt to evade accountability. Faced with the impasse, both teams considered applying military force on the battlefields to pressure their opponent into making concessions. Mao became increasingly suspicious of the UNC intentions in the negotiations when he warned both the CPVA field commanders and negotiators to be watchful of the enemy’s so-called ‘good faith’ (Mao 1981, 2:426). General Peng suggested launching a September offensive to yield diplomatic leverage at the negotiation table. The Chinese, who were less skilled in combat, preferred to postpone serious negotiations until they had corrected the military imbalance. Believing that it was in the best interest of the Chinese and

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Korean peoples, Li Kenong, however, preferred paying more attention to the ‘question of cessation of military operations at the present front line’ to carrying on ‘the struggle for the 38th parallel and bring[ing] the conference to a breakdown’. (Telegram 87, August 13, 1951, Weathersby 1995–1996, 68). More significantly, General Deng Hua seemed to have a viable plan: should the UNC give up its demand for Kaesong, the Communists might consider accepting the current line of contact as the demarcation line (Xu 1990, 273–74; Chai and Zhao 1989, 171). The UNC delegate adopted ‘a double-barreled approach’ using both diplomatic and military means to break up the deadlock over the issue of the demarcation line. While Admiral Joy was working on a UNC ultimatum by the end of August to impose pressure on the Communist delegate, General Ridgeway closely monitored armistice talks before deciding to take military action. Accordingly, General Van Fleet of the US Eighth Army was preparing to get the summer campaign on the way. Starting from August 18, the UNC summer offensives targeted reinforcing the UNC defensive capacity of the Eighth Army frontline and confining ‘offensive action at the front to limited advances’. At the same time, the UNC also intended to ‘probe the Communist defenses, determine the disposition of the enemy troops, and prevent them from employing their amounting offensive capabilities by keeping them off balance’ (Hermes 1992, 72, 81). On the eastern section of the frontline guarded by the US X Corps in the vicinity of the Punchbowl, the UNC launched fierce assaults at the CPVA/NKPA-held hilltops, especially over the Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge, overlooking the UNC Kansas Line from three directions within striking distance by artillery fire. Although the uphill battles were challengingly tough, the Eighth Army adjusted combat tactics to eventually take over the hilltops around the Punchbowl area, a bulge of some 73 square miles and strategically important to the UNC frontline defense. Operation Commando, the beginning of the UNC fall offensive, lasting from early October to three days before the armistice conference resumed on October 25, also achieved its objectives. On the western and central sectors of the UNC battle line, UNC actions successfully expanded the forward line 180 square miles to include the Kumsong bulge, the northern tip of the Iron Triangle. The Eighth Army and the ROK units defended that bulge until July 1953 when the CPVA launched the last offensive to finally recover it before the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The US frontline commanders acknowledged that ‘enemy capabilities and will to resist had been underestimated’ and undoubtedly ‘UNC success on the battlefield was a factor in the enemy’s decision to resume negotiations’ (Hermes 1992, 96–97; 507).

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The Chinese version of these battles, however, were quite different from their perspective. According to the CPVA account, the UNC summer and fall offensives were foiled by the gallant resistance of the CPVA and NKPA soldiers. Although the Chinese admitted that the UNC seized over 250 square miles of territories, their estimated UNC casualties were twelve times bigger than the actual number from the Eighth Army to show that UNC forces were badly beaten (Hermes 1992, 86, 96; Shen and Meng 1990, 128, 134). Beijing sincerely believed that the armistice talks were resumed largely because the Communist forces demonstrated military strength, leverage to force the UNC back to the negotiation table. One reality was clear: while the Communist troops had ‘shifted from the fluid defense system that formed part of their tactical doctrine and had dug in in depth’, relying on deep bunkers, a complex system of trenches, and well stored supplies to defend their positions at all costs, the UNC took advantage of its military superiority to implement naval blockades, air bombardment, and tank maneuvers to support the ground operations in combat to fight a ‘limited war’ (Hermes 1992, 102). Seizing battlefield initiatives and limited offensives to exert ‘military pressures upon the Communists to conclude an armistice’, the UNC summer and fall campaigns not only disrupted CPVA’s planned September operation, but also significantly reduced Communist offensive capacities (Shen and Meng 1990, 121–28; Hermes 1992, 80–111). The battlefield impact on the truce tent was obvious. After several exchanges, Panmunjom, a small village about five miles east of Kaesong, was the new site agreed upon. The change of negotiation site bore strategic significance for both sides. Panmunjom stood squarely on the demarcation line and was indeed a neutral area for the talks. Agreements were signed to secure a 1,000-yard radius around Panmunjom and the neutralized zone was extended to include a 200-meter area on each side of the road from Kaesong to Panmunjom and to the UNC camp base at Munsan-ni (Hermes 1992, 50; Goodman 1978, 56). To prevent future violation of air space, the UNC agreed to set up barrage balloons and a search light over the negotiation site. On October 25, 1951, two months after the negotiation sessions were suspended, both delegations gathered in the new location at Panmunjom. Two days prior, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the First Chinese People’s Political Consultant Conference (CPPCC), pledging to continue ‘the war to resist US aggression and aid [North] Korea … until the American government is willing to resolve [the Korean problem] … on an equal and reasonable basis’ (Gong et al. 1993, 156). This political move intended to buoy a modified position for the Communist delegates as they

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returned to the negotiation table, showing willingness to accept the battle line as the armistice line with a specific reservation, only if they could secure the Kaesong area. It all seemed that the UNC’s ‘double-barreled strategy’ of applying military power on the battlefield to force the Communists into compromise at the negotiation table might have resulted in a solution for the demarcation line. After thirty-seven subcommittee meetings and twenty-eight full sessions, the UNC and the Communist teams reached an agreement on November 23, 1951, on Item Two: that the actual line of contact be the demarcation line, which should not be altered ‘regardless of changes in the battle line during the thirty days’ after the Armistice was signed (Goodman 1978, 90–92; Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 85, 239). The demarcation line settled north of the proximate line of contact and most of it stretched north of the 38th parallel. Staff officers from both sides were soon fiercely engaged in mapping out the actual line of contact. By December 10, the UNC and the Communists finalized both the provisional line of contact and demilitarized zone and signed the map as well. The conclusion on Item Two was a clear sign of compromise from both sides. The UNC was able to make the line of contact the demarcation line and to consolidate the Kansas line in exchange for Kaesong remaining in Communist hands. Until the final signing of the cease-fire agreement in July of 1953, the Eighth Army held this position firmly and the line of contact withstood minimum change. The Communists also realized that while the UNC would not give up the Kansas Line, neither was it possible for them to drive the UNC forces south of the 38th parallel. The line of contact was probably their only choice if negotiations were to proceed. But the Communist side was able to hold Kaesong, which to them was of historical as well as strategic importance. This outcome taught the warring parties that while the fighting on the battlefield continued to remain deadlocked, talks at the negotiation table might offer some leverage if they could make reconciliation without giving up their respective principal interests. With the establishment of a provisional demarcation line, the Korean War was to change from mobile fighting to positional operations, simply because the war had stalled on the battlefields.

Item Three: Arrangement Details for Armistice As the negotiations moved on to Item Three for the arrangements for the realization of armistice, the Communist and UNC delegates reached another

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impasse. Major differences focused on two issues: the reduction of military strength on both sides after the armistice, and the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). On November 27, the Communist delegation put forward five principles, which included a request for cessation of hostilities within twenty-four hours of the signing of the armistice and the withdrawal of all military forces from the demilitarized zone within three days (Chai and Zhao 1989, 184–85; Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 91–92). Although the UNC did not reject the proposal, it recommended the inclusion of two additional points: a cap on the level of military forces—essential to prevent resumption of future hostilities, and the establishment of a supervisory mechanism—with joint observer teams, to provide ‘sufficient authority and freedom of movement to keep all Korea under surveillance’ (Goodman 1978, 93; Hermes 1992, 123). To enforce such inspections, both sides should consider their choice of ports of entry and agree upon each other’s recommendation. For the next two months, the combatants were entangled in bargaining for the establishment of ceilings on military troop rotation allowances. Eventually, with the UNC lowering its ceiling from 75,000 to 40,000 and the Communists raising theirs from 5,000 to 30,000, a compromised medium figure at 35,000 was agreed upon in late February of 1952 (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 108). A month later, both delegates also reached an agreement on specified ports of entry: Pusan, Inchon, Kangnung, Kunsan, and Taegu for the UNC, and Sinuiju, Chongjin, Manpojin, Hungnam, and Sinanju for the Communists (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 110; Goodman 1978, 245–46). The Communists asserted that their concession on this issue reflected their ‘good faith’ in reaching a substantial agreement. Admiral Joy, on the contrary, contended that the basic conditions sought by both delegates were those of armistice, not of peace. Accordingly, steps to sustain the military strength of the UNC were highly necessary. The Communist scheme, Joy observed somewhat unilaterally, exposed ‘their settled intent to circumvent any aspect of the armistice agreement that did not operate to their advantage’ (Goodman 1978, 283; Joy 1952, 66). The UNC and Communist delegations, however, did strike a bargain on Item Five. From the very beginning of the negotiations, the UNC had emphasized the military nature of the armistice talks. Matters such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, seen as non-military in nature, must therefore be dealt with in a political conference at a higher level. The point of disagreement between the two sides lay in the wording of two points. First, the UNC preferred the use of ‘non-Korean troops’ to ‘foreign troops’, because the Chinese leadership insisted that the CPVA forces were only volunteers, not government sponsored foreign troops. Second, the UNC

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changed the wording in the Communists’ proposal from ‘other questions related to peace’ to ‘other Korean questions related to peace’ (Joy 1952, 158). The change was intended to prevent Beijing from taking the opportunity at an international level to readdress issues such as China’s membership in the United Nations and withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan. After an eleven-day debate, on February 17, the UNC accepted the Communist proposal, which intended to balance and satisfy the rival claims, in toto on the following compromising principle: In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean questions, etc. (Hermes 1992, 159)

It was obvious that the Communist side added ‘et cetera’ to the end of the statement as a kind of hidden agenda, leaving them room for future maneuver over ‘other questions related to peace in Korea’. The UNC negotiators, however, construed the ‘etc.’ differently, as they believed it ‘did not pertain to matters outside of Korea’. In reality, rewording seemed to be unnecessary and the noncommittal statement in Item Five was basically of little significance since “in essence it settled nothing and promised little,” as scholar Walter Hermes later noted (Hermes 1992, 159; Chai and Zhao 1989, 195). For the Communists especially, this addition might be a ‘face-saving’ formula to get the negotiation going. When it came to the forming of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), the Communist delegate recommended the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as neutral nations on their side. 4 According to the mutually agreed principle, neutral nations must be ‘acceptable to both sides which have not participated in the Korean War’; UNC’s rejection of the Soviet Union’s rights on the NNSC instantly set off another debate (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 101). Despite China’s argument that ‘the Soviet Union is one of the 4 Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway were initially nominated as neutral nations for the UNC side. The composition of the NNSC was finally decided in July 1953 to consist of four neutral nations, two from each side: Poland and Czechoslovakia for the Communists and Sweden and Switzerland for the UNC. The names of the Soviet Union and Norway were dropped.

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United Nations which is not only most strictly opposed to intervention in the Korean War, but is also most strongly in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,” the UNC found itself caught in a double dilemma (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 109). On the one hand, a UNC recognition of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation would mean acknowledgement of Moscow’s guiltlessness in the Korean War, a notion unacceptable to the United States. On the other hand, proof of Soviet participation in the Korean conflict could be ‘difficult to substantiate’, according to a Joint Chief of Staff report (Goodman 1978, 256). At a special meeting of the National Security Council four months after the outbreak of the war, President Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson had already come to understand the difficulty of openly accusing the Soviet Union of aggression. While an allegation without retributive action ‘would serve no purpose’, a proposal of action against Moscow could mean a hot war in which the United States would have to fight the Soviet Union alone. Although it was beyond all doubt that Kremlin encouraged and supported the Chinese and North Korean military operations in Korea, the best Washington could do, through public statements, including those from President Truman, was to denounce the Soviet Union by employing phrases such as ‘Communist aggressor’, ‘Communist imperialism’, and ‘Russian colonial policy in Asia’ (Truman 1956, 358–59, 389). The UNC negotiating team received order to avoid direct and open condemnation of the Soviet Union as an aggressor. Washington was left with two alternatives. One was to reject the Soviet Union without giving a reason. The other was to recommend that NNSC members be chosen from ‘those nations not in close proximity to Korea’(Goodman 1978, 256–57). On February 17, 1952, the UNC delegation adopted option one. The fact that the Soviet Union was one of the major countries to initiate the armistice talks made the US rejection self-defeating. Consequently, the issue of Soviet membership at the NNSC remained dangling until the armistice agreement was signed in July 1953. Xu Yan, a Chinese military historian, admitted that the Chinese side deliberately used Soviet Union membership in the NNSC as a bargaining counter, knowing it was unacceptable to the Americans (Xu 1990, 279). Many years after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, Admiral Joy continued to wonder why Washington would not simply make a straightforward objection to Soviet membership in the NNSC on grounds of its ‘aggressor’ character in the war (Joy 1952, 93). Meanwhile, the Chinese carefully exploited this ambiguity in the UNC position, seeing it as a good bargaining opportunity for a package deal on another issue—airfield reconstruction. In accordance with the principle

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of forbidding military reinforcement on both sides during the armistice period, the UNC wanted to impose airf ield reconstruction restrictions on the grounds of equalizing such operations to the increase of military strength. General Xie Fang of the CPVA pointed out that such prohibition was a sign of interference in Communist ‘internal affairs’,5 because it was the UNC who attempted ‘to gain control of all of Korea thru [through] aerial observation during arm [armistice]’ (Xu 1990, 278–79; Chai and Zhao 1989, 188–89; Goodman 1978, 168). Refusing to give in, the UNC made no effort to settle the dispute. After lengthy and fruitless squabbling, by mid-April 1952, the Communists suggested, with an implication of a possible concession, that the sub-committee meetings be resumed so that the ‘question of airfield facilities could be settled together with the question of the nomination of neutral nations’ (Goodman 1978, 314–356). It appeared to the UNC that the Communists were racking their brain to strike a deal whereby nomination of the Soviet Union at the NNSC could be dropped in exchange for UNC’s agreement on lifting restrictions on airfield reconstruction. Characteristically, the Communist side appeared to have learned the skill of bargaining for more important issues by compromising on lesser matters. With another impasse looming large, the UNC began to search for alternatives, including concessions to avoid further delay. Admiral Joy then contacted Washington for solutions. On April 26, Joy’s ‘package proposal’ was approved by the JCS. The UNC delegates suggested that an Executive Session be held to resolve problems in Items Three and Four. Joy reiterated the UNC three-point position on restrictions on airfield rehabilitation, rejection of Soviet Union membership in the NNSC, and opposition to forcible repatriation of POWs. ‘I must make it absolutely clear, however’, the Admiral affirmed, ‘that our acceptance of your posit [position] regarding airfields is contingent upon your acceptance of our posits [positions] regarding POWs and the composition of the NNSC’ (Goodman 1978, 382). The UNC was only interested in a package deal, not a piecemeal offer, thus blocking the Communist attempt to use compromise on one issue as a bargaining chip for another. A week later, the Communists offered a counterproposal, a replicate of the UNC package deal, showing a concession to Soviet Union 5 The real reason for the Chinese objection to the restrictions was that most of the airports in North Korea had been disabled by severe US air raids. The Russian MIG-15 fighters, flown by both Russian and Chinese pilots, possessed a flying radius of only about 300 kilometres. If taking off from the airports in China’s Manchuria, those fighters could hardly make it to the 38th parallel and beyond. Restrictions on airfield reconstruction, therefore, would greatly restrict China’s already very limited air power in Korea.

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membership in the NNSC in exchange for the UNC’s acceptance of two issues: the lift of restrictions on airfield rehabilitation and the repatriation of all Communist POWs. Not seeing it as an ‘equitable compromise’, Joy ‘formally & finally’ rejected the Communist proposition (Goodman 1978, 395). Surprised and enraged, General Nam Il condemned the UNC ‘plot’ in all three issues with an intention to ‘wreck’ the armistice talks. In his rebuttal statement, Nam Il reminded the UNC that the Communist delegation had exhausted all efforts to bring about agreement on several issues. If the UNC did not intend to consider making any concession, they would have to bear the consequences of disrupting the armistice process. Directives from the JCS further suggested that the UNC delegation engage in no ‘substantive discussion’ of the April 26 proposal, the POW issue in particular. Washington believed that a firm stand on the present ‘fair & impartial proposal’ would keep the Communists ‘on [the] defensive propaganda-wise and … maintain widespread support for UNC position in negots [negotiations]’ (Goodman 1978, 382–83; 408). With the termination of the executive session on May 7, the ‘tedious repetition’ of flagrant Communist propaganda and the UNC’s ‘final & irrevocable’ position bogged down the plenary sessions for the next two weeks (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 250; Goodman 1978, 405–06; Chai and Zhao 1989, 183–91). The UNC ‘package plan’ did not achieve its anticipated outcome when the Communists countered it with the same trick. Unlike the deliberation on Item Two, debates on Item Three became increasingly overshadowed by disagreements and friction from Item Four regarding the POW issue. Neither side showed willingness to budge. As a result, both teams became fiercely engaged in the question regarding prisoners of war, reducing the solution to two issues, namely the airf ields’ reconstruction and Soviet Union membership in NNSC, to secondary importance, only to be settled in the summer of 1953. Soon, Major General William K. Harrison of the US Army was to succeed Vice Admiral Joy as the senior UN delegate on May 23, 1952.

Item Four: Issue of Prisoners of War Staff officers in the sub-committees from both sides began working on Item Four, regarding the exchange of prisoners of war, as early as midDecember 1951. On the surface, the POW issue appeared to be a rather simple case, unlikely to lead to another impasse. Initially, both Mao and Stalin were confident that ‘it would not be too difficult [for the two sides]

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to reach an agreement on this matter’ (Qing 1997, 55). Disputes over the disposition of POWs, however, soon turned the issue into one of fundamental principles. While the UNC adhered to the principle of voluntary, or non-forcible repatriation, the Communists demanded total return of their prisoners. Conflicts ‘broke out between … human rights and legal rights, and between humanitarianism and Communist Party pride’, according to the UNC (Lewis and Mewha 1995, 20). The clash began with the interpretation and execution of the clauses in the 1949 Geneva Conventions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war. In early modern history, Western nations, including the United States, frequently encountered questions about the disposition of the POWs. The 1783 Peace Treaty of Paris, which concluded the American Revolutionary War, declared: ‘All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty …’ (Lewis and Mewha 1995, 20). This vague principle led thousands of British and Prussian soldiers to choose to stay in America rather than returning to Europe after the war. It did not, however, evolve into common practice in future wars. Instead, warring states in later conflicts preferred a total POW exchange toward the end of conflict. Since 1864, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been the key sponsor of a series of Geneva Conventions, first for the protection of wounded military personnel, and then for the treatment of prisoners of war. In 1929, the third Geneva Convention included amendments to the earlier Conventions arising out of problems during the First World War, and it incorporated provisions from a Prisoners of War Convention of the same year. The amended clauses stipulated that warring states must circulate information on prisoners of war and safeguard their interests through a ‘neutral power’, whose representatives would be allowed to visit POW camps and to question prisoners (Treaties & Alliances 1968, 1). In 1949, the ‘Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War’ was held under the auspices of the Geneva Conventions. Sixty-three countries participated in the conference that lasted for four months and generated four major conventions. The United States was among the seventeen delegations to sign the four documents. One of these agreements was ‘The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ of August 12, 1949. The 1949 Geneva Convention highlighted the notion of repatriation of POWs. This emphasis was intended to prevent the recurrence of such unreasonable practices as the Soviet government’s retention of a great number of German and Japanese POWs at the end of World War II to work on the reconstruction of the country. In this convention, two articles were particularly notable in terms of treating POWs. Article Seven ruled that:

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Prisoners of war may in no circumstance renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be (The Geneva Conventions 1949, 81).

Article 118 detailed the principles of release and repatriation of prisoners of war: Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph (The Geneva Conventions 1949, 125–26).

Communist China did not officially acknowledge this convention until July 13, 1952. The recognition itself could be seen as an expediency to meet its tactical scheme in the negotiations regarding POW repatriation (Chai and Zhao 1989, 196). By following the principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Communist delegation had a legitimate claim to request total repatriation of their POWs. Humanitarian, self-interested, realpolitik, and psychological motives formulated the core of the UNC principles on POW repatriation. The UNC opposed the Communist demand for total return of their POWs on three points based on historical experiences and other practical aspects. The first consideration came from the tragic experience of returned POWs under the custody of the allied forces to the Soviet Union toward the end of World War II. In June 1941, when the Soviet Union was invaded, many Russians were captured by the German army, and forced to wear German uniforms and fight against their own country (Tolstoy 1977, 415). Between late 1944 and 1947, the Allied authorities, according to the Yalta Agreement of 1945, forcibly repatriated over two million prima facie Soviet ‘traitors’ in German uniform and their families back to the Soviet Union, ‘irrespective of their own wishes and by force if necessary’ (Bethell 1974, 33). A piqued Stalin decided to put his betrayers in Gulag labour camps, where many of them perished. The Soviet leader believed that POWs and traitors were synonymous, therefore, ‘draconian measures’ must be applied to them (Tolstoy, 1977, 396). Washington was worried that Communist POWs in UNC custody would face similar punishment should they be forcibly repatriated to their home countries.

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The second issue was the ratio of captives. The UNC held over ten times as many Communist POWs as the Communists did the UNC’s. Release of some 120,000 Communist prisoners ‘in good condition’ on all-for-all terms would have immediately rebuilt Communist strength on the front, ‘giving [the] enemy [the] advantage of 12 Divs [divisions]’ (Stueck 1995, 244; Goodman 1978, 148); the UNC would not allow that to happen. The third concern pertained to the fact that Chinese military forces in Korea had replenished about two dozen Nationalist troop quondam units that surrendered to the overwhelming Communist forces that besieged Beijing in early 1949 and were later recommissioned into the Communist military forces (Chassin 1965, 210). These troops, now under CPV command with inadequate equipment and supplies, were hastily dispatched to the Korean battlefront in the first wave, suffering galling casualties during early days of the war. Frequent desertion and surrender to UNC forces were common occurrences among this group of former Nationalist troops. Many even conspired to kill their commanding officers, who were from the Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA).6 As a result, former Nationalist soldiers made up seventy percent of the CPVA POWs. Once captured, they defied Communist loyalists inside the POW camps (Da Ying 1986, 53). Similar problems also occurred among ex-ROK soldiers, who were forced into the North Korean Army after captivity and later became UNC POWs. To reduce tension, the UNC POW camp commandants had to recategorize North Korean and Chinese POWs into separate anti-Communist and die-hard Communist compounds. If the CPVA POWs from the quondam Nationalist troop could be repatriated to Taiwan, argued Brigade General Robert A. McClure, US Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, the UNC could kill three birds with one stone: respect individual choice, strengthen Taiwan’s Nationalist military, and prevent these POWs from becoming victims of Communist suppression in mainland China. Moreover, from a psychological perspective, enemy soldiers would be more willing to surrender on the battlefield knowing that they would not be forcefully repatriated (McClure 1951, 6). In sum, the UNC delegates reasoned that the Korean War had created a situation in which the POW issue must be handled in a different fashion, although the principles of the Geneva Convention should also be observed as much as possible. 6 In my interview with Xu Yan, he argued that the CPV deliberately sent those recommissioned Nationalist soldiers to Korea to test the waters. Unprepared and low in morale, those former Nationalist troops surrendered in large numbers, often in company and in division, to the UNC forces. Consequently, the CPVA POW population was divided into PLA and ex-Nationalist soldiers. Eventually, over two-thirds of Chinese POWs, most of them ex-Nationalist soldiers, refused repatriation to Communist China and chose to go to Taiwan instead.

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From December 1951 through July 1953, the UNC and Communist delegates sparred with each other over various details regarding the POW issue. In mid-December 1951, both sides traded tallies of the POWs, yet neither side was satisfied with the figures and locations of permanent prison camps. Wide discrepancies existed between the officially released figures and actual numbers each side submitted. Of the 132,472 POW numbers provided by the UNC, the Communists identified a shortage of 44,205 in names when they compared them with the records the UNC previously submitted to Geneva.7 Rear Admiral Libby, head of the UNC Sub-delegation on Item Four, explained that the shortage consisted of civilians or South Korea citizens dropped from the POW list: the UNC had no intention to repatriate this group of internees.8 Similarly, the UNC also pointed out that the Communist list of 11,559 UNC POWs showed a gap of over 50,000 names from their early propaganda boasting of some 65,000 UNC captives (Goodman 1978, 152). Although the Communist side gave reasons such as ‘releasing the prisoners at the front’, desertion, and death related to air raids and illness to cover a small portion of the shortfall, the Americans believed the Communists were holding back many UNC personnel in POW camps in Manchuria. In addition, the UNC also indicated that US forces and the ROK army had an estimated 11,500 and 88,000 men respectively listed missing in action (MIA), as eighty percent of total UNC POWs were captured between October 1950 and June 1951 before the commencement of the armistice talks (Goodman 1978, 152). The Communist roster, which included names of only 3,198 US and 7,142 ROK POWs, was an incomplete file. To work out a feasible plan to deal with the UNC ‘deceit and lies’, Li Kenong cabled Beijing in late December 1951 suggesting that the Communist delegation use the shortage of 44,205 Communist POWs to defy UNC’s ‘so-called’ 50,000 name deficits. The CPVA must be prepared to drag the negotiations out indefinitely, Li further argued, if the UNC delegation could not submit a constructive proposal soon. Mao immediately endorsed Li’s idea and pointed out that only patience and procrastination ‘could drive the enemy to be at their wits’ end’ (Mao 1981, 2:642–43).

7 This shortfall f igure is taken from Chai and Zhao 1989, 201. Admiral Joy’s account, in Goodman 1978, 148, is 44,259, and slightly different from that of Chai’s. The total f igure the UNC submitted to Geneva was 176,733 in Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 28. 8 This group of captives, according to the UNC, were domiciled on June 25, 1950, south of the 38th parallel. They were apprehended by UNC forces under suspicious or hostile circumstances, and for security purposes. The UNC believed that this group of Koreans should be released within South Korea.

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In early January 1952, UNC delegates presented a new proposal to establish the principle of voluntary repatriation on one-for-one exchange (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 133–34). The JCS outlined two objectives: to achieve quick return of the UNC POWs, and to evade forcible repatriation. Seeing Communism as ‘a system that has no regard for human dignity or human freedom’, President Truman vowed, ‘we will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery’ (Truman 1956, 460). To legally justify the UNC position, State Department staff elaborated on the interpretation, so that ‘voluntary repatriation’ would be consistent with the spirit of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article Six of the Conventions stated that ‘other agreements for all matters’ might be worked out separately between parties to the conflict, if the POWs’ rights were not violated (The Geneva Conventions 1949, 80–81). The principle of voluntary repatriation, intended to protect and respect individual rights, was therefore agreeable to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Endorsed by the President, the UNC voluntary repatriation position stood on firm ground from the start with both legal and humanitarian reasons. The Communists were furious. Without being a signatory of the 1949 Geneva Convention (until July 13, 1952), they were at a disadvantage in demanding that the UNC observe certain international agreements (Chai and Zhao 1989, 196). Worse, lack of experience in POW management and ignorance of the history of Stalin’s purge of returned POWs prevented the Chinese from effectively exploring the real intentions behind the UNC proposal. Holding firmly the position of total repatriation, the Communist delegation declared the UNC proposal, inter alia, ‘a barbarous formula and a shameful design’ at the January 3 session (Goodman 1978, 181). For the Chinese (and the North Koreans), allowing a vast number of their captives not to return to the motherland would be a severe failure of the country’s foreign policy in general, and a humiliation at the armistice talks in particular. For over three months, the UNC and Communist teams threw around their own pitches over the repatriation issue without moving closer to an agreement. Several revisions were proposed, and more disagreements followed. The UNC delegation began to play word games, trying to keep the principle of voluntary repatriation intact. The term ‘one-for-one’ was rephrased to ‘equal numbers’ and finally dropped altogether. ‘Non-forced repatriation’ replaced ‘voluntary repatriation’ (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 138). By late February, both sides agreed with major details regarding the POW exchange process, including a joint committee to supervise the execution of POW repatriation, priority exchange of seriously ill and injured POWs, completion of POW repatriation within two months, Panmunjom as the

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exchange site, and visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross to POW camps on both sides, among other issues (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 138; Chai and Zhao 1989, 207–08). Still, the key problem lay in the notable difference between voluntary repatriation and total return (or forcible repatriation) of the POWs. Neither side was willing to give in on the wording to the advantage of the other. To protect a group of Communist non-repatriates, Admiral Joy later complained, the UNC had to suffer another 50,000 casualties on the battlefield during the period of standoff over the POW issue (Joy 1952, 152). Incidentally, back in mid-February, to avoid hitting another impasse over the issue of POW repatriation, Washington policymakers introduced an idea of fait accompli. The scheme was to release those Communist POWs who elected non-repatriation without informing the Communist side. The worst situation the UNC could expect was to face the enemy’s ‘storm of protest’. The JCS believed ‘this plan also had the advantage of allowing the enemy to save face’ (Hermes 1992, 150). Most of the UNC delegates, including Joy, strongly opposed this ‘conspiratorial’ design. This ‘unilateral reclassification of POWs’, the Admiral contended, was a sign of bad faith on the UNC side and would ‘inevitably result in reprisal against prisoners held by the Communists’ (FRUS1952–1954, 15:77). For the UNC, however, a firm stand on voluntary repatriation was probably the only alternative with a ‘50-50 chance of winning’. Since the suggestion was simply Washington’s attempt to explore possible solutions for the POW issue, the UNC negotiators decided to hold on the fait accompli plan for a while (FRUS, 1952–1954, 15:76,). As dialogues on the POW issue came to a near dead end, General Ridgway decided to execute Washington’s fait accompli scheme. President Truman sanctioned the general’s plan to carry out an overt screening of all POWs under UNC custody to determine those who would violently resist repatriation (FRUS Vol. VII, 1952–1954, 15:126,;15:138–39). The UNC and the Communist delegates were in their two week-conference recess between April 4 and 19. On April 6, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, commandant of the Koje-do POW camps, received orders to carry out Operation Scatter, namely to screen POWs to separate the repatriates from the non-repatriates, in his camp compounds (Goodman 1978, 354, 367). Under such a time schedule, the Communist team was not informed of the commencement of the screening process; the UNC did not intend to inform them until the matter became a done deal. In early 1951, the UNC began moving most of the captured Communist personnel (CPVA and NKPA) to POW camps in Koje-do, an island off the southern coast of Korea. About 150,000 POWs jammed into the thirty-two compounds in Koje-do, among them over 10,000 CPVA POWs (Hermes

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1992, 234; Chai and Zhao 1989, 221). The UNC staff were on site in the camp setting up tents to interview every detainee. It took a week to get the general screening result. To everyone’s surprise, the number of Communist repatriates came to the rather small, round figure of 70,000, despite Dodd’s estimation of being roughly ten percent off the mark (Goodman 1978, 367). Joy expressed concern over the ’impossible figure’, much less than half of the total 170,000 Communist POWs. In a meeting with Ridgway and his staff, Joy stated emphatically that ‘the POWs, particularly the Chinese, should be rescreened’. But he was ‘over-ruled just as emphatically’ by the JCS (Goodman 1978, 354). Screening went on for another week in most of the POW camps located in Pusan, Cheju Island, and Pongam, and the number of repatriates was only slightly higher. For political reasons, the JCS expressed satisfaction with the lower count of 70,000 Communist repatriates, wishing to keep it as a ‘firm figure’ and ‘reliable estimate’ to inform the Communist delegates on April 20.9 Of the 70,000 repatriates, there were only 5,100 CPVAs and 53,900 NKPAs. The Chinese were shocked to learn that the majority of their captives chose not to be repatriated. They saw this as a psychological offense launched against them by the UNC. The Communist delegate continued to cling to the total return of their 132,000 POWs with no condition. Seeing it as an opportunity, the UNC wasted no time to introduce a package deal: the UNC would lift restrictions on airfield rehabilitation, only if the Communists dropped Soviet membership from the NNSC and accepted the exchange of the 12,000 UNC POWs for approximately 70,000 Communist captives. The package, Joy declared, was UNC’s ‘final and irrevocable effort’ (Goodman 1978, 382–83, 387). The Communists, however, continued to stand firm without getting an inch closer to an agreement with the UNC. The screening process obviously accelerated violence in prison camps. The composition of the Communist POW population complicated camp management. Inside Koje-do prison camp, the CPVA POWs were split into anti-Communist (or ex-Nationalist personnel) and die-hard Communist groups, and the NKPA detainees into ex-ROK soldiers and NKPA loyalists; the UNC POWs’ authority had to separate these groups into different compounds to reduce tension. Strong resistance to UNC screening inside 9 The round figure for those Communist POWs who desired repatriation increased to 83,633. This figure included the screening result in the Hospital Compound and some 43,807 POWs in seven compounds who refused to be screened. The initial 70,000 was broken down into: 7,200 civilian internees; 3,800 qualified ROK residents; 53,900 NKPA POWs; and 5,100 CPVA POWs (Goodman 1978, 365).

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Communist-controlled compounds caused a series of riots and disturbances. Screening continued into early July to finalize the figure for repatriates and non-repatriates. Then all the CPVA POWs were transferred to Cheju Island, fifty miles south off the Korean mainland, where the repatriates were segregated from the non-repatriates (Hermes 1992, 257–62). Life for the captives inside the POW camps on both sides continued to be topics of dispute throughout the rest of the negotiations. Different plans were suggested, then discarded almost immediately. By mid-July, the UNC informed the Communist side of the final round figure, with a reinforced determination ‘never to concede the repatriation of prisoners issue’. A total of 83,000 Communist repatriates were broken down into 6,400 Chinese constituting one-third of the CPVA captives, and 76,600 North Koreans, making up eighty percent of the North Korean POWs (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 161–62; Hermes 1992, 270). Mao was extremely disturbed to see only 6,400 CPV repatriates, less than one-third of the total of CPVA captives, despite further explanation by Li Kenong that the updated number was closer to their previous estimate of a maximum of 90,000 repatriates. Seeing the UNC-updated number as an intent of concession and an opportunity to resolve the issue, Li Kenong further reasoned that ‘the 77,000 NKPA repatriates show that the elite soldiers would return. POWs who desired otherwise must be the new recruits after UNC’s Inchon landing’ (Xu 1990, 285). Still, neither team was ready to yield too quickly: they would have to reevaluate the battlefield situation before making the next move at the negotiation table. The United States Air Force dominated the Korean skies from the very beginning. The Chinese Air Force, established only in mid-November 1950, began to train pilots under Soviet instructors. By the spring of 1951, the Chinese pilots, together with their Soviet partners, were flying MIG-15 fighters and engaging in daring air war with the powerful American Sabre, the F-86 fighter. The courage and valour of the Communist pilots, however, did little to challenge US power in the air. During the one-year span from August 1951, Operation Strangle made thousands of daring bombardments in an attempt ‘to cut off Communist ground forces in the line from their supplies by the sustained exercise of air power’ and ‘suffered the most galling failure’ (Hastings 1987, 266–67). To counter the enemy threat from the air, the CPVA adopted two tactics: one was to improve its limited antiaircraft defense power and camouflaged ground transportation routes through organizing concerted efforts to counter the enemy’s threat from the air. Supported by limited antiaircraft defense power and by as many as 6,114 aerial sorties from its inexperienced Air Force, CPVA engineering troops

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worked around the clock to repair roads and bridges destroyed by UNC air raids (Hong 1990, 214–33). As Operation Strangle cost the UNC 343 aircraft and damaged 290, the Communists claimed to have kept the ‘unbreakable transportation line’ running through the enemy’s interdiction attack. Even the United States Air Force officially admitted that the UNC air blockade failed to dispirit the Communist delegation at the negotiation table (Hermes 1992, 194). CPVA’s second tactic was a well-developed network of tunnels and bunkers, which honeycombed the Communist front line from mid-1951 until the armistice became effective, to sustain the war for another two years. The system was an extension of the initial foxholes, which were later connected, and dug deeper into the heart of the hills occupied by CPVA troops. A Chinese army officer proudly praised this unique fortification as ‘a great Chinese institution’. Inside the tunnel establishment, there existed all sorts of facilities such as office, medical clinic, kitchen, ammunition storage, even recreation club. Within its confines, the tunnels exceeded ‘all that mechanical ingenuity achieved on the UN side’, according to a positive American evaluation of the Communist invention in positional warfare (Hastings 1987, 276). According to CPVA estimates, the tunnels stretched some 778 miles along the Communist frontline and over thirty metres deep from hilltops, capable of enduring weighty bomb shelling artillery barrages ranging between 500 and 2,000 pounds (Chai and Zhao 1989, 192; Li 1993). By May 1952, this tunnel structure became a major defensive system along the CPVA forward outposts. Often, CPVA soldiers would retreat to the tunnels halfway up the hill when the UNC units overtook control of the hilltops. In areas such as the east and west coasts, where underground construction was not feasible for mountainous terrain, reinforced concrete bulwarks were built. The CPVA headquarters outlined campaign strategy and plans for frontline consolidation in the next year or so to ‘transform [the current] forward fortifications from fieldwork to permanent structure’ (Shen and Meng 1990, 156, 158–59). Strong outposts along the front lines would be gradually connected to a complete, durable defensive system, regardless of the length of the war. When President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower inspected the Korean front line in December 1952, he was impressed by ‘the strength of the position the enemy had developed’ and realized ‘it was obvious that any frontal attack would present great difficulties’ (Eisenhower 1963, 95). By June 1952, the focus of UNC air attacks shifted to bombardment of selected targets such as power plants, dams, mining areas, and major cities in North Korea. Operation Pressure Pump, for example, was ‘designated to impress upon the Communist delegation at Panmunjom the urgency of

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signing an armistice’ (Hastings 1987, 267). North Korean capital Pyongyang was under systematic air raids, with the US Air Force executing some 1,254 aircraft sorties during the summer of 1952, ‘the biggest air attack so far in the Korean War’ (Futrell 1982, 517). On July 14, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung cabled Mao, begging the Chinese leader to accept the UNC proposal and end the war quickly. Two days later, Kim cabled Stalin to suggest the Communist forces switch ‘to a passive defense’, since the beginning of the negotiations led to a situation in which ‘the enemy[,] almost without suffering any kind of losses[,] constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values’ (Weathersby, Telegram 106, 1995–1996, 77). Over six thousand North Koreans died in the UNC’s one day of bombing Pyongyang in mid-July. If the bombardment continued, North Korea would soon be devastated. Kim was extremely upset over the worsening situation at home (Qing 1997, 55). In his reply to Kim the next day, Mao rejected the idea of accepting the UNC proposal, which was ‘as irreconcilable, provoking, and deceiving as before’. Insisting on total repatriation of the CPVA POWs, China affirmed to its North Korean partners, ‘we must try to force the enemy to compromise, or we will have to resort to military action to reverse the current situation’ (Qing 1997, 55). Mao would not back down, at least at this moment. China’s position on the negotiations was not always independently resolved, it was often impacted by Moscow’s assessment of the war situation and assumption of American strategies. Beijing found itself caught between Soviet pressure to fight a tougher war against the Americans on the battlefield and a sense of urgency to ‘achieve a cease-fire’ if acceptable terms could be secured. To maintain combat capacity and home front productivity, China aggressively sought Soviet assistance. Since the start of the armistice talks, the CCP leadership sponsored a series of mass movements and political propaganda on the home front to galvanize national support for the war effort. Mao expected a better year in 1952 with successful accomplishments in those political and economic crusades. He hoped that the CPVA would achieve more successes in the negotiations, but if the talks failed, ‘we also have confidence to continue the war until winning it’ (Shen and Meng 1990, 241–42; Mao 1981, 2:483). Stalin, however, did not want to see the Chinese reaching a quick settlement in the Korean conflict by making compromises to the Americans. In his telegram to Mao in February 1952, Stalin continued to advise Mao to keep a ‘firm position and … force the enemy to make further concessions’ in negotiations (Weathersby, Telegram 100, 1995–1996, 74–75). Mao subsequently instructed the Chinese negotiators at Panmunjom to hold their ‘unyielding attitude’, and be prepared to ‘filibuster’ the enemy’s negotiation strategy for another few months to create

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a more positive situation and force the UNC to give in (Mao 1981, 2:424). In the opinion of historian William Stueck, the Chinese Communists at these critical moments ‘remained willing and able to stand firm in Korea until the UNC accepted terms that accommodated both China’s security needs and its national pride’ (Stueck 1995, 248). In the fall of 1952 (August–September), Premier Zhou Enlai led a mission to Moscow to negotiate more Soviet military and economic support. Stalin informed the Chinese comrades-in-arms of his support for Mao’s position: ‘The Korean War has sapped American vitality. North Korea has not lost anything except lives … [We] must hold on firmly against the Americans’ (Qing 1997, 55). As for the POW exchange, the Soviet leader suggested a ratio exchange, considering the greater number of Communist POWs in UNC custody. Should the UNC reject this plan, the Communist team could propose an armistice before trying to settle the POWs issue. If all efforts failed, Stalin recommended the options of entrusting the non-repatriates to a neutral nation and having personnel from the countries of the nonrepatriates persuade them to return (Shi 1991, 510). In fact, the Communist final proposition in the spring of 1953 was largely based on the principles of Stalin’s design. In terms of military support, Stalin agreed to equip sixty CPVA divisions with ammunition, artillery equipment, and new fighter jets. He also emphasized that the CPVA and NKPA forces should make sure that they hurl twenty artillery firing rounds to match every one of the enemy’s, instead of the current figure of nine to one (‘Stalin’s Conversations’ 1995–1996, 11). With stamina and confidence, Mao instructed the Chinese negotiators at Panmunjom: ‘We should not only focus on numbers … [We] must strive for an armistice under conditions favourable to us on political as well as military terms. Accepting a proposal under the enemy’s pressure was as bad as the Chinese adage, “signing a truce with the enemy at the gates (Jie chengxia zhimeng)”. It would put us in a rather disadvantageous position’ (Xu 1990, 285). Soviet military support appeared to have rebooted the CPVA’s combat capacity on the battlefield. As meetings in Panmunjom became unproductive for months, especially over the POW issue, General Peng Dehuai’s strategy, sanctioned by Mao, was to carry out the fall offensives, which grew out of the CPVA misjudgment of a possible UNC regional offensive on the Yonan Peninsula, just across the Yellow Sea Strait from the UNC-held Kyedong and Kanghwa islands near the dividing line of contact on the West flank. To offset the enemy’s scheme, the CPVA decided to strike first. Regretfully, the UNC had neither intentions on the Yonan Peninsula nor plans to wage large-scale offensive campaigns, according to the Eighth Army records and

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recollections by General Mark Clark, who became the United Nations Commander in May 1952. When negotiations hit an impasse, military strength on the battlefields would be considered as leverage to break the ice. Across the frozen front, the two sides were evenly matched in terms of military strength. UNC troops discovered that the CPV had improved its artillery firepower significantly since the spring of 1952, and the combatants were prepared for defensive engagements. The Communist fall offensive between September 18 and the end of October, was, in fact, an all-out campaign, though small in scale, assembling seven CPVA armies and two NKPA army corps to engage with a total of fifteen UNC divisions along the line of contact. Their tactics were sporadic and flexible (Shen and Meng 1990, 166; Hermes 1992, 283). Fierce fighting occurred in bursts, causing heavy casualties on both sides. Hilltop sites of military encounters, such as Hill 395 (also known by the Americans as White Horse Hill) and Hill 391 (known as Jackson Heights), were frequently probed by both troops in the span of a few hours (Hermes 1992, 296–310). Although the Communist fall offensive did not alter much of its frontal line, the scale and intensity of the campaigns quickly influenced Washington policymakers, when in September the State and Defense Departments debated how to make a breakthrough in the POW problem. The Pentagon reminded the State Department that it was very unwise to accept the Communist proposal (total return or ratio exchange) at the time of their offensive. The move, if taken, would certainly be construed as a sign of weakness by the Communists. General Clark’s position was clear: an honourable armistice must include an ‘agreement to ultimate disposition of non-repatriates’ and they should not be left open to ‘subsequent negotiations’ (FRUS 1952–54, 15:467; 15:507). This stiffer UNC position was endorsed by the JCS, and President Truman sent a personal message to General Harrison encouraging him to spell out the UNC objective ‘with the utmost firmness and without subsequent debate’ at the next plenary session (FRUS 1952–1954, 15:554,; Hermes 1992, 280). The talks on the POW repatriation progressed at snail pace. The Communist delegation continued to hold to its intransigent position of total repatriation with routine protests and invectives. General Harrison, a quiet but resolute military man, gave his opponents no break on their ‘red herrings’ simply by requesting constant recess and cutting the meetings short, the shortest only five minutes (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 254–60). The UNC non-forcible repatriation principle was readdressed to the Communist delegates on September 28 amidst the CPVA fall offensive: Communist rejection on October 8 was probably counter-productive, only leading to General Harrison’s ‘ultimatum’ of indefinite recess until the Communists

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came up with a sound solution agreeable to the UNC (Hermes 1992, 313–14). This would be the longest intermission, lasting for more than six months until April 26, 1953, during which time liaison officers of both delegates continued to meet only to exchange information. With little hope of reaching consensus on the POW issue in the near future, the warring parties, again, resorted to another round of contest on the battlefields. In less than a week after the indefinite recess began in Panmunjom, the UNC inaugurated Operation Showdown (October 14–November 25), intending to improve the Eighth Army’s defensive position north of Kumhwa by targeting the Communist-held position on Hill 598, known by the Koreans as Sangayong and as Triangle Hill by the Americans.10 Counting on mighty US air support and maximum firepower, the Americans were optimistic about overpowering the enemy and pushing the UNC front line some 1,250 yards forward (Hermes 1992, 311). If successful, the assault would offset the passive trend the UNC forces experienced since September. Ferocious battles dragged into late November and Hill 598 remained in Communist hands. Although the CPVA invested over ten times the manpower than that of the UNC forces, suffering nearly one-third of the casualties, CPVA soldiers were indeed successful, relying on their legendary mid-hill bunkers and deep tunnel system. The Americans lamented that at Triangle Hill the Chinese ‘gained face as their tenacious defense reversed the offensive defeat at White Horse Hill and forced the UN Commander to break off the attack’ (Hermes 1992, 318). UNC commanders noticed that the number of Communist troops on the front lines was obviously reduced. Their next steps were unclear as winter approached.

Towards the Conclusion of the Armistice Significantly, the period of the six-month-long recess of the executive conference in Panmunjom witnessed dramatic changes in international politics, which, in turn, dramatically affected progress on the conclusion of the armistice talks in Korea. Back in the United States, Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower winning the presidential election proved to be a game changer for the standstill of the armistice talks. In early December 1952, the Presidentelect made a whirlwind visit to the Korean warfront to fulfill his campaign pledge. Knowing that the war must be terminated at some point and a full-scale war was unwise, Eisenhower concluded that the United States 10 The CPV’s name for Operation Showdown was Kumhwa Campaign.

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‘could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible result’; neither could the Americans hope to impress the enemy by words, ‘but only by deeds: executed under circumstances of our own choosing’ (Eisenhower 1963, 95, 97). To demonstrate those deeds, the new President stated that he would not hesitate to consider employing the most powerful weapon in the world to deal with the Communists. Eisenhower’s nuclear coercion alerted the Chinese. From December 1952 to February 1953, CPVA forces strengthened their positions by digging deeper tunnels and building stronger fortifications along the frontal line. They believed there might be another UNC amphibious assault sometime in the spring of 1953, this time behind the CPVA rear line along three possible positions south of the Yalu River (Shen and Meng 1990, 186; Mao 1981, 2:638). A large-scaled CPVA operational preparation was on the way including political mobilization, deployment rearrangement, fortification construction, supply lay-up, and training for combat readiness. Five armies of reinforcements, along with tank divisions, artillery regiments, air force divisions, and naval torpedo vehicles poured into North Korea from China. More experienced troops were dispositioned on both coasts and supporting troops and workers such as engineering divisions, road and railway construction teams, transportation and medical units, and logistical divisions were also dispatched to different coastal areas (Shen and Meng 1990, 190–91). A full-scale anti-landing preparation was in place by the end of April and the Chinese leaders believed that they were going to win the war if the enemy dared to gamble. To CPVA commanders’ great disappointment, however, the much-feared UNC amphibious landing did not occur. For the UNC, a replication of the Inchon landing would not necessarily lead to a strategic victory or affect the armistice talks. Mao, however, construed this non-occurrence differently. It was the CPVA’s preparedness and combat readiness that deterred the enemy’s attempt (Shen and Meng 1990, 192). Beijing anticipated that the UNC would soon try to resume negotiations at Panmunjom after failing to subdue the Communists by force. With talks still in recess, General Clark, on February 22, 1953, delivered a routine letter to Kim Il Sung of North Korea and Peng Dehuai of the CPVA, requesting an immediate exchange of sick and wounded POWs. This UNC move was made in accordance with a solution adopted in Geneva on December 13, 1952, by the Executive Committee of the League of the Red Cross Societies (ECLRCS). With little expectation of a Communist agreement, Clark wished that the UNC would have an ‘obvious wide psychological and publicity advantage’ (FRUS 1952–1954, 15:785-86). Indeed, it took the Communists more than a month to respond. This time, it was not because

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of their ‘unique insensitivity’ to the UNC proposition, but a significant event that greatly influenced the course of the Communist world. Stalin died on March 5, 1953. The new Soviet leadership proved to have a more flexible attitude toward the West, with a drastic change in Soviet foreign policy. Georgy Malenkov, the new leader in Moscow, expressed willingness to work through peaceful means with Western powers. Within two weeks, the Soviet Council of Ministers issued a resolution and advised Beijing to produce ‘an acceptable path toward the soonest possible conclusion of the war in Korea’ (Weathersby 1995–1996, 80). The new Soviet leadership considered the POW issue the most urgent and suggested that Kim and Peng immediately respond to the UNC with a positive message. As a result, Communist strategy at the negotiation table suddenly stepped back from several sensitive issues once in irreconcilable dispute. On March 28, a letter from Kim and Peng to General Clark agreed to the exchange of the sick and wounded POWs (Chai and Zhao 1989, 252). The Communist delegates also expressed eagerness to reopen talks at Panmunjom. The Chinese showed willingness to ‘take steps to eliminate differences on this question so as to bring about an armistice in Korea’ (The Department of State Bulletin 1953, 526). To this end, the Communists acceded to the principle of non-forcible repatriation and suggested that both parties ‘undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insisted upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state’ (The Department of State Bulletin 1953, 526). The Communist message, which ‘held out the promise of breaking the logjam on the non-repatriates, had made the impetus toward restarting the negotiations most difficult to resist’, commented one State Department official (Foot 1990, 168). Although suspicious, the UNC felt relieved. After a series of discussions on details and arrangements for the exchange procedure by liaison officers of both sides, Operation Little Switch was set for April 20 to take place at Panmunjom. During the following thirteen days until May 3, a total of 6,670 Communistqualified POWs and 684 UNC POWs traded places (Hermes 1992, 414–19). Shortly before the exchange was over, the Panmunjom plenary session recommenced on April 26, 1953. During the two weeks following the resumption of plenary sessions, the Communist team provided two sets of proposals and revisions showing a major position change, conceding several issues they previously held irreconcilable. After a few rounds of bargaining, the UNC and Communist delegates reached a consensus. First, both sides would repatriate all the POWs desiring to return home within two months after the armistice

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became effective. The non-repatriates would then be delivered to a neutral state, where they would meet personnel from their respective countries for a period of six months to eliminate their worries about going home (Hermes 1992, 423–24; Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 186–87). Second, the Soviet Union was quietly dropped from the Communist nomination list for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Instead, the NNSC would consist of the four mutually agreed neutral nations with Sweden and Switzerland for the UNC, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the Communists (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 266). Accordingly, the UNC modified the airfield reconstruction restrictions to the Communists’ expectations. Third, both sides accepted the five countries, the four states for the NNSC and adding India, to form the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee (NNRC). Fourth, both agreed not to physically transfer the non-repatriates out of Korea. Personnel from the NNRC would take over the non-repatriates in their original place of detention after the armistice became effective (Hermes 1992, 425). At this point, the two parties were getting close on most aspects, differing only on several details in handling the POWs. For the UNC, the dispute over the principle of non-forcible repatriation seemed to be out of the way, with the Communists having ‘yielded on the most objectionable features of their first proposal’ (Hermes 1992, 425). By mid-June 1953, talks at Panmunjom appeared to progress satisfactorily, if not all smoothly, toward a promising conclusion, with some loose ends to be tied up, including POW repatriation details, terms and reference for the NNSC and NNRC, and revision of the military demarcation line, as well as the final signing ceremony arrangement. US media and newspapers proclaimed in a banner headline: ‘Truce All Set—POW Pact Signed’. (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 194). The Communists, the CPVA, and the NKPA alike were elated too. They had been building roads and bridges to connect Kaesong and Panmunjom and named one ‘The Bridge to Peace’. On the nineteenth hour of June 15, the Chinese-North Korean Unified Command Headquarters issued an order to all Communist troops to stop offensive attacks, since it was agreed by combatants of both sides that outposts taken after the zero hour on June 16 were invalid (Chai and Zhao, 1989, 260–61). General Peng Dehuai, in Beijing for a meeting, was scheduled to leave for Korea on June 19, for the signing of the Armistice Agreement. Everything went smoothly until an incident broke the cheerful atmosphere at Panmunjom. At midnight of June 17, the UNC press released shocking news: ‘Approximately 25,000 militant anti-communist North Korean prisoners of war broke out of the United Nations Command prisoners of war camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan, and Sang Mu Dai, Korea’ (Hermes, 1992, 451). With only less

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than four percent of the escapees recovered, the UNC, feeling profoundly shocked, knew clearly it was by the unilateral authorization of Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korea. At the outset of the conflict, Rhee pushed vigorously for an all-out war to unify the Korean Peninsula. Ever since the beginning of the armistice talks, Syngman Rhee had been an uncooperative ally to the United States, despite US soldiers fighting for a democratic South Korea. Rhee was furious upon learning of the agreement on the POW issue and that the Korean non-repatriates were not to be released right away. Despite a letter of explanation from General Clark ‘with wholehearted sincerity’, Rhee remained unpersuaded. He even later threatened to take unilateral action against the Communists if the UNC did not consider some of his requests (FRUS 1950, 7:787; Hermes, 1992, 426–270). The June 18 incident was Rhee’s revenge. Washington’s indulgence of Rhee’s recalcitrance sowed bitter seeds for his subsequent misbehavior in mid-June, which prolonged the war for another month. Since the Eisenhower Administration was under ‘intensive pressure’ from US allies and UN members to end the war in Korea as soon as possible, the President instructed the UNC delegates to meet immediately to discuss the final arrangements for the signing of the armistice agreement (Clark 1954, 279). The Chinese and North Koreans were outraged at Rhee’s perfidy. The breakout threw the UNC on the defensive. Clark denied any collaboration on the UNC side with Rhee and announced that ‘the entire responsibility rests squarely upon President Syngman Rhee and the Government of Korea’ (The Department of State 1953, 908). Furious, the Communists directly questioned UNC’s ability to control the South Korean government and military. Although CPVA’s full scale anti-landing operation plan was not realized in April, the demise of Stalin and sudden changes at the negotiation table led the Chinese to revive this military preparation to make the last few strikes, especially at ROK frontline positions before the armistice became a reality. By mid-June, two small scale offensives were carried out to resolve major details for the armistice. The Rhee incident of June 17 gave the CPVA a perfect excuse for another big push. General Peng Dehuai proposed to delay signing the armistice to teach both Rhee and the UNC a hard lesson by striking a few more heavy blows and wiping out another 15,000 ROK forces. Mao immediately approved Peng’s plan with instruction that the signing ceremony be put off indefinitely, depending on the progress of the CPVA offensives on the battlefield (Shen and Meng 1990, 205). With the truce looming in sight, Beijing continued to cling to the hope that a better bargaining lever could be obtained by f ighting one more aggressive battle.

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This was the CPVA’s final offensive, also known as the Kumsong campaign, and a successful and rewarding one. On the night of July 13, the CPVA’s five armies (240,000 men, with firing power of over 1,630 cannons) blasted the fifteen-mile-long UNC frontline primarily manned by ROK units along the Kumsong bulge between Kumhwa and the Pukhan River (Hermes 1992, 474–76; Shen and Meng, 1990, 205–13, map 22). As over one thousand artilleries barraged the designated UNC front line, General Clark sarcastically commented, ‘There was a strong suspicion they [the Communists] were using all the shells they had stockpiled near the front during the two years of the talking war’. The Communists wanted to ‘give the ROKs a “bloody nose”, to show them and the world that “puk chin” “go north”—was easier said than done’ (Clark 1954, 257). The Communist last offensive officially came to a halt on the very day of the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The military exploits were satisfactory: the CPVA removed the Kumsong salient, straightening out its central front and recovering an area close to sixty–nine square miles (178 square kilometres) for North Korea when the military demarcation line was redrawn. More significantly, the CPVA wreaked vengeance on UNC forces for taking over the Kumsong area during Operation Commando in the fall offensive, right before the negotiation site moved from Kaesong to Panmunjom by the end of 1951. Heavy casualties were the real defeat for both sides during the last CPVA assault. The CPVA reported 78,000 casualties for ROK forces and 33,253 for CPVA troops. The UNC records, on the other hand, showed a much lower fatality number: 29,629 for the ROK and 10,542 for the CPVA. For both parties, getting the armistice to the finish line cost these substantial losses (Shen and Meng 1990, 212; Hermes 1992, 476). On the diplomatic front, the CPVA was also gaining. Rhee’s imprudence irritated Clark, who knew that the UNC lost more than face when more lives were sacrificed for unnecessary reasons. At the plenary session on July 19, the Communists informed the UNC delegation that they were willing to proceed as soon as possible with discussions on ‘the various preparations prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement’. Clark felt it ‘most encouraging’ to see the progress which ‘should lead to the early signing of an armistice’ (Clark 1954, 291). This time, the Communists were not necessarily satisfied with the terms for the truce, but they had the initiative in hand to call for an armistice. After two years and seventeen days, one hundred fifty-nine plenary sessions, numerous staff, sub-committee, and liaison officer meetings, and, most importantly, three years of fighting, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in Panmunjom at 1000 hours on July 27, 1953. The conclusion of the armistice, ‘a peace without victory’, embraced different meanings for

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the warring parties and those whose lives were affected by the conflict. Beijing openly hailed the truce agreement as its ‘glorious victory’ over US aggression (Chai and Zhao, 1989, 278). Two months later, General Pen Dehuai made an incisive statement: It was essentially an armistice reluctantly accepted by US imperialists in an attempt to dominate the world, after they were deterred by a newly born people’s democratic nation … Therefore, the Korean War ceasefire negotiations were a rather intensified, complicated, and protracted struggle interwoven at both the military as well as diplomatic fronts (Chai and Zhao, 1989, 278).

General Mark Clark, who signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of the UNC, later wrote ruefully: ‘I gained the unenviable distinction of being the first United States Army commander in history to sign an armistice without victory’ (Clark 1954, 296–97). The truce on the Korean Peninsula appeared to have lent no glory to the American commanding generals. With the cease-fire terms settled, repatriation of POWs was the most imminent task. During Operation Big Switch, administered by the Military Armistice Commission between August 5 and September 6, the UNC handed over 75,823 POWs to the Communist side, who returned 12,773 to the UNC. Among the repatriates, there were 70,183 North Koreans, 5,640 Chinese, and 3,597 Americans. On September 23, the UNC transferred some 22,604 non-repatriates, most of them the Chinese (14,704), to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the demilitarized zone. The Communist side turned over 359 non-repatriates to the NNRC the next day (Hermes 1992, 515). The Nationalist government made its first effort to appeal to the CPVA non-repatriates to go to Taiwan. As soon as the armistice took effect, Jiang Jieshi, the Nationalist leader in Taiwan, broadcast his message urging the Chinese captives to stand firmly on their choice of freedom and not to fall for the ‘Communist enticement or bow to any form of Communist coercion’ (Jiang, 1953, 1). Disposition of the POWs was a major issue that ‘delayed the conclusion of the Korean conflict for so many months’, as historian Rosemary Foot put it (Foot 1990, 190). After the NNRC took custody of all non-repatriates, representatives from both sides would ‘explain to … the prisoners of war … their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands’ (Vatcher, Jr. 1958, 307). For various reasons, including unprepared staff and insufficient facilities in POW camps to help implement the work, the CPVA did not begin their persuading process until

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October 15. The Communist team spent only ten days interviewing POWs, covering merely fifteen percent of all compounds. They later requested but were denied an extension to make up for the lost days. Consequently, the Chinese were able to extract only a small decimal number of 440 of their non-repatriates. Reportedly, Beijing furiously criticized the chief of the Chinese team, demanding that he take ‘full responsibility for [the] failure’ (White, 1957, 310). The UNC began to explain to their group of non-repatriates as late as early December 1953; this result was not impressive either. Out of the 359 non-repatriates, only ten eventually changed their mind and returned. To the great astonishment of the American public, twenty-one US soldiers (and one British Marine) elected to stay in Communist China (Pasley 1955; Bian 1994, 259). The Chinese were reassured by this fact: ‘We have recovered all the face we had lost to the United Nations side’, declared the leader of the Chinese team (White 1957, 317). Perhaps. To the Chinese, the case of the twenty-two UNC non-repatriates was a stunning demonstration of the successful Communist ‘reeducation’ program, which transformed the imperialist POWs into ‘new persons’ useful for world peace. The non-repatriates had significant impact on both China and the United States politically as well as psychologically. The United States Army gave all twenty-one non-repatriated soldiers dishonourable discharges. Soon, the Secretary of Defense appointed a ten-man Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War to investigate the misconduct of the US-returned POWs during their captivity. The findings of the investigation revealed, to great extent, that American POWs in the Korean War did collaborate with the enemy and demonstrated signs of moral and physical weakness (Text of Report 1955, L10–11). On August 17, 1955, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10631, creating a Code of Conduct to ensure that every member of the US armed forces ‘shall be provided with specified training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him … during combat and captivity’ (Executive Order 10631, 1961, 266). The Americans and their leaders believed that too many Korean War POWs failed the test while in enemy captivity. The country hoped that the experience of twenty-one non-returnees would never be repeated. Across the Pacific, the fate of some 7,110 Chinese repatriates was disheartening. The Chinese military forces required its members to shed their last drop of blood on the battlefield and never to be captured. The seventh article of the CPVA Combat Code stipulated: ‘[I] would rather die than become a POW’ (Xu 1990, 314). Becoming a POW (Fulu) under any circumstance

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engraved one with lifelong disgrace and humiliation. Upon crossing the border into Manchuria, the CPVA repatriates were immediately placed under the supervision of ‘The Returnees Administration’ (Guiguanchu) (Da Ying 1986, 275). They were told that the government had already learned about their ‘heroic deeds’ in Korea, and now they must confess their ‘disloyalty’ during captivity. Almost overnight, their identities changed from ‘people’s heroes’ to turncoats, traitors, spies, cowards, and ‘the most cursed’. In the years to come, these repatriates’ experiences were comparable with those of Soviet World War II repatriates. Many were deprived of Communist Party membership, expelled from the military (without the dishonourable discharge), stripped of opportunities for education and employment, deported to remote areas to do hard labour, put in jail for the unwarranted charge of ‘releasing military secrets to the enemy’, demoted, abandoned, divorced, and more (Zhu, 2015, 162–200; He 1998). Some committed suicide, a few tried and failed miserably to appeal their cases to the authorities. It was not until 1980 when the Chinese government began the process of rehabilitating the surviving CPVA repatriates.11 On the other side, the two-thirds of the CPVA non-repatriates who elected to go to Taiwan were praised by the Nationalist government on the island as ‘anti-Communist fighters’. January 23, 1954, the day they arrived in Taiwan’s Keelung harbour, was celebrated as ‘1–23 Freedom Day’ (Zhou, 2006, 3). Although these non-repatriates ran into various hurdles including being locked up during debriefing in ‘Psychological Warfare Headquarters’, taking anti-Communism training courses, and participating in the ‘Voluntary Recommissioning’ movement, their transitions to normal life were comparatively easy (Zhang and Gao 2012). For the Nationalist government, the two-thirds of the CPVA non-repatriates who chose to go to Taiwan was a clear indication of not merely a psychological victory for the free world, but also a clear sign of resentment of Communist rule on mainland China. Thirty years later, when China moved to implement economic reforms, some of the non-repatriates went from Taiwan to China for a visit and met their former CPVA ‘comrades-in-arms’, with nothing but speechless emotion to share for their different experiences and choices as POWs. 11 The Chief Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army drafted a document entitled ‘The Review of All Returned CPVA POWs’. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee approved the document to authorize the process. Rehabilitation work continues to this day, and many cases are still pending. The No. 74/1980 document was among the Review and Rehabilitation Recommendations from the PLA General Political Department by the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, and the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee.

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Conclusion In sum, the Korean War occupies a unique place in the history of Sino-US relations. UN Commander General Clark once characterized the rocky road to the armistice in Korea: ‘… winning a satisfactory peace, even a temporary one, is more difficult than winning a war’ (Clark 1954, 257). Upon entering the armistice talks, both the Chinese and the Americans continued to believe in the importance of negotiating from and with strength, and tried to turn their military power on the battlefield into bargaining leverage. The Armistice Agreement only temporarily settled the fighting, and the ceasefire has since maintained peace on the Korean Peninsula for nearly seventy years. Ironically, in a stalled war, military strength, as well as the will to hold onto it on the battlefield, seemed more important than diplomatic efforts to produce a solution for a quick end to the conflict. In this case, military strength dictated diplomacy. The warring parties unfortunately had to fight more battles to achieve a truce. During the two-year span of ceasefire negotiations, troop reinforcements and supplies continued to pour into Korea from both sides. By late 1952, UN forces totaled some 600,000, while Communist troops reached 1,200,000. Confined by the ‘actual’ line of contact on the front, the nature of the warfare became positional, and it left modern armies on both sides little room to maneuver with little territory to gain. Still, field commanders and diplomats of both sides continued to see military strength as an indispensable factor for advantage at the negotiation table. According to the Chinese perception, it was CPVA’s successful military operations on the battlefield that forced the enemy to sue for a ceasefire. Therefore, only continuous application of military power, not diplomatic compromises, would empower them to negotiate from and with strength. Moreover, the Chinese believed that a protracted war was unaffordable for the Americans. As for Washington, caught between a deep commitment in Korea and global Cold War engagement, the most it could count on was military superiority. Both the Chinese and the Americans learned valued lessons, not from winning peace, but from negotiating a truce. Lessons of the Korean War Armistice Talks reached far beyond the Korean Peninsula. Armistice negotiation itself characterized the nature of the conflict: in Admiral Joy’s observation, ‘military victory could not be achieved by the United Nations Command. Therefore, an armistice was the only practical course of action’ (Joy 1952, 176). First, indecisive fighting led both sides to realize that the war would not only stall, but also possibly be protracted. Although Acheson repeatedly urged the US military not to begin armistice talks until they had fought the Chinese to a

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standstill, efforts from Washington to search for a mediator or opportunity for a cease-fire were never spared (Acheson 1971, 476–77). The Chinese did not show willingness to talk until after the CPVA’s serious setbacks in early June 1951. The Soviet UN representative Jacob Malik’s statement on June 23, 1951, calling for a ceasefire was not a coincidence, but rather a message on behalf of the Chinese to seek a truce. So, time for the negotiations was ripe when military strength failed to decisively overpower the enemy. While the UNC accepted the reality of a stalemate, the Communist side, at a military disadvantage especially in the wake of losing the Spring offensive of 1951, took the initiative of calling for the negotiations. Second, the length of the truce talks was likely to determine the efficiency and quality of issues under debate. Admiral Joy bitterly complained about Communist tactics to ‘wear away the stone by constant drippings’ (Joy 1952, 144). The negotiation process was fraught with suspension, procrastination, and intentional delaying, making the talks unproductive at best. It might not be an overstatement that, while the negotiating parties barely gave diplomacy a fair chance for a peaceful settlement to the Korean problem, they seemed to be obsessed with the impact of military strength at the negotiation table. Third, often effective, but costly, negotiating from strength was the strategy the warring parties adopted, hoping for the upper hand at the armistice talks. Military power (hard power) on the battlefields and diplomacy (soft power) during negotiations were equally vital to determine if one side could win greater bargaining leverage. According to Michael Handle, ‘historical experience such as the British decision in 1940 and the Russian decision in 1941 not to surrender demonstrates that the decision to delay surrender can pay. But this is discovered only ex post facto and is not a totally rational decision at the time that it is made. The risk involved is enormous’ (Handle 1978, 66). Both the Americans and the Chinese took risks to delay the conclusion of a truce by placing high hopes on the impact of their respective military operations. The negotiating-while-fighting (July 1951–July 1953) phenomenon explained why neither China nor the United States were in a hurry to reach an agreement, and why both managed to manipulate the negotiations by becoming ‘more aggressive, demanding more, and conceding nothing’ (Xiao 1993, 173–77; Joy 1952, 119). Ironically, forty percent of UNC casualties (20,000 Americans out of the total 60,000) and over fifty percent of CPVA casualties occurred during this period when the warring parties tried to leverage military power to gain strength at the negotiation table. Negotiating from strength also required strong military performance on the battlefield to back up the ‘talking war’. Firing power on the front could translate to a louder voice at the truce tent. Most of the UNC military

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operations on the front line were organized in response to Communist offensives, while air strikes behind enemy lines remained active almost to the last minute before the signing of the armistice. Capacity to demonstrate military advantage allowed the party to achieve a stronger position during negotiations, able to dictate the terms of the armistice agreement. The best example might be the battles for the bulge of the Kumsong area.After the Communist team announced suspension of executive meetings, the UNC invested its superior airpower and firing power in the fall offensives of late 1951 to take over the Kumsong area, pushing the UNC frontline further north and forcing the Communists back to the ‘talking war’. By early summer of 1953, as the light of the armistice loomed and agitated by South Korean president Rhee’s reckless action, the CPVA launched its last offensives by focusing exclusively on the Kumsong area, reclaiming it despite great losses, before signing the armistice agreement. That vengeance on the UNC was not only the recovery of lost territories, but also the gaining of muscle for negotiations. The success of the CPVA’s last offensives seemed to give Beijing its strongest ever leverage to manipulate the timing of the conclusion of the armistice talks. A military historian reminds us that ‘it would indeed be unfortunate if the hard-won lessons learned in the Korean War, both on the battlefield and in the negotiations, should be ignored or forgotten because of the absence of victory’ (Hermes 1992, 512). The Korean War armistice proves that the price of peace is high. Finally, perhaps most importantly, the Korean War was a contest of the Cold War with two arch enemies, the United States and Communist China, facing irreconcilably on the battle front, but working their respective ways to reach agreement over heavily disputed issues. One of the major reasons for this ‘accomplishment’ was the fact that both combatants upheld their own self-interests and agendas while negotiating a truce. Against the rising tensions in early Cold War, the United States, on one hand, strove to maintain the strong position of the free world and would never allow the Communists to take advantage anywhere in the world. To that end, the UNC would insist on principles to promote US political and military strategies in the region. On the other, Communist China wasted no time in challenging American arrogance both on the battlefield and at the negotiation table. Self-confidence and a steadfast stance were essential to the Communists as they confronted the UNC in armistice talks. Through numerous contests, both parties learned to consider their primary goals and how to reach an agreement without compromising too much. Rivals with equally matched capacity might want to avoid their weaknesses and highlight their strengths during the bargaining process to improve chances of winning. As sworn

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enemies fighting desperately on the battlefields, the United States and Communist China did meet to negotiate a truce to settle the Korean problem. After all, the Communist side made a major concession to the UNC principle of non-forcible repatriation to resolve the POW issue, and the UNC did stumble on its own design of setting the line of contact, allowing the CPVA a golden opportunity to recover lost territory for North Korea prior to the conclusion of the armistice talks. Although many factors affected the result of negotiations, whether compromise or gain, the two sides were able to come together to achieve a truce. Undoubtedly, Sino-US relations coming out of the Korean War were antagonistic and confrontational. From there on, more negotiations and conversations were to take place between the United States and Communist China, followed by more reconciliations and understandings, as well as opportunities and solutions. Arguably, Sino-US relations were built through tough but skillful bargaining, likely starting with the Korean War Armistice Negotiations.

Selected Bibliography Government Documents The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, 1953. McClure, Robert (Brigadier General) to Army Chief of Staff, ‘Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners’, July 5, 1951, RG 319, G-3, decimal file 383.6. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) No. 82 (June 25), 83 (June 27), 84 (July 7), 1950, at https://undocs.org/S/RES/82(1950) and https://undocs.org/S/ RES/84(1950). US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (FRUS). Vol. VII, Korea. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Vol. VII, Korea. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Vol. XV, Korea. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

Books and Journal Articles Acheson, Dean. 1971. Present at the Creation. New York: Norton: 535. Bajanov, Evgueni. Winter 1995–1996. ‘Assisting the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–1951’.Woodrow Wilson International Center, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7 (CWIHP): 54, 87–91.

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Bethell, Nicholas. 1974.The Last Secret: The Delivery to Stalin of Over Two Million Russians by Britain and the United States. New York: Basic Books33. Bian Zhengxia. 1994. Hua gange wei yubo: Lianheguojun zhanfu shiyi 化干戈为 玉帛: 联合国军战俘事宜 [The UNC POWs in the Korean War]. Beijing: PLA Literature Press. Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian. 1989. Banmendian tanpan 板门店谈判 [Panmunjom Negotiations]. Beijing: PLA Press. Chassin, Lionel Max. 1965. The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the Civil War, 1945–1949. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. Chen Jian. Spring 1992. ‘China’s Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950–1951’. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 1:8–41. Jiang Jieshi. August 8, 1953. ‘Statement to Chinese Non-repatriates’. South China Morning Post: 1. Clark, Mark. 1954. From the Danube to the Yalu. New York: Harper. Da Ying. 1986. Zhiyuanjun zhanfu jishi 志愿军战俘记事 [Story about the CPV POWs]. Beijing: PLA Literature. Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1963. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956. New York: Doubleday. ‘Executive Order 10631’. 1961. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3—The President, 1954–1958. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Foot, Rosemary. 1990. A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Futrell, Robert F. 1982. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. 1949. Geneva: The International Committee of the Red Cross. Gong Li, Zhu Di and Chen Shu. 1993. Mao Zedong zai zhongda lishi guanto 毛泽 东在重大历史关头 [Mao Zedong at Important Historical Moments]. Beijing: CCP University Press. Goodman, Allan E. 1978. Negotiating while Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Conference. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press. Handle, Michael. 1978. ‘The Study of War Termination’. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, issue 1, 51--75. Hastings, Max. 1987. The Korean War. New York: Simon and Schuster. He Ming. 1998. Zhongcheng: zhiyuanjun zhanfu guilai de kanke jingli 忠诚: 志愿军 战俘归来的坎坷经历 [Loyalty: The Frustrating Experiences of the Returned CPV POWs]. Beijing: China Culture and History Press. Hermes, Walter G. 1992. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. Centre of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1992.

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Hong Xuezhi. 1990. Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi 抗美援朝战争回忆 [Recollections on the Korean War]. Beijing: PLA Press. Joy, C. Turner. 1955. How Communists Negotiate. New York: Macmillan. Lewis, George G. and John Mewha. 1955. History of Prisoners of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776–1945. Centre of Military History.Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Li Mingtian, et al. 1993. Shangganling zhanyi 上甘岭战役 [Sangayong Campaign]. Beijing: PLA Press. Li Xiaobing. 2014.China’s Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mao Zedong. 1981. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan 毛泽东军事文选 [Selected Military Manuscripts of Mao Zedong]. 2 vols. Beijing: PLA Press. Pasley, Virginia 1955. 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose Communist China—Who They Were and Why They Stayed. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy. Pollack, Johnathan. 1989. ‘The Korean War and Sino-American Relations’, in Harry Harding and Yuan Min, eds. Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Qing Shi. 1997. ‘Chaoxian tingzhan neimu 朝鲜停战内幕’ [Inside Story of the Korean War Armistice Talks]. Bainianchao 百年潮 [One Hundred Years’ Tide], No. 3: 44–56. Ridgway, Matthew B. 1967. The Korean War. New York: Popular Library. Schnabel, James F. 1972. United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army. Shen Zhonghong and Meng Zhaohui, eds. 1990. Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi 中国人民志愿军抗美援朝战史 [A Military History of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist America and Aid Korea]. 2nd edition. Beijing: Military Science Press. Shi Zhe. 1991. Zai lishi juren shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu 在历史巨人身边: 师哲回 忆录 [Alongside the Historical Giant: Shi Zhe’s Memoirs]. Beijing: Central Documents and Archives Press. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander I. 1976.The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation. Thomas P. Whuney and Harry Willetts, trans New York: Harper & Row. ‘Stalin’s Conversations with Chinese Leaders’. Winter 1995–1996. Woodrow Wilson International Centre, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7 (CWIHP):4–29. Stueck, William W. 1995. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Tan Jingqiao et al., eds. 1990. Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng 抗美援朝战争 [The War to Resist America and Aid (North) Korea]. Beijing: China Institute of Social Sciences. ‘Text of Report to Defense Secretary by Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War’. August 18, 1955. New York Times: L10–11. Tolstoy, Nikolai. 1977. The Secret Betrayal. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Treaties and Alliances of the World: A Survey of International Treaties in Force and Communities of States. 1968. Keyusham, UK: Keesing’s Publications Ltd. Truman, Harry S. 1956. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, vol.2. New York: Doubleday. Vatcher, Jr., William H. 1958. Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Weathersby, Kathryn. Winter 1995–1996. ‘New Russian Documents on the Korean War:Introduction and Translations’.Woodrow Wilson International Centre, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 6–7:30–84. White, William Lindsay. 1957. The Captives of Korea: An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of War Prisoners. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Xiao Yunbin. 1993. Dachubing 大出兵 [The Great Dispatch]. Beijing: Tuanjie Press. Xu Yan. 1990. Diyici jiaoliang: kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi 第一次较量: 抗美援朝战争的历史回顾与反思 [The First Encounter: Historical Retrospect of the War to Resist America and Aid Korea]. Beijing: China Radio and Television Press. Zhang Zeshi and Gao Yansai. 2012. Gudao: kangmei yuanchao zhiyuanjun zhanfu zai Taiwan 孤岛: 抗美援朝志愿军战俘在台湾 [Isolated Island: The CPV Repatriates in Taiwan]. Beijing: Jincheng Press. Zhou Xiuhuan. 2006.Hanzhan yu fangong yishi pian 韩战与反共义士篇 [The Korean War and Anti-Communist Fighters], vol. 2. Taipei: National Archives. Zhu, Pingchao. 2015. ‘”Disgraced Soldiers”: The Ordeal of the Repatriated POWs of the Chinese Volunteer Army from the Korean War’. Journal of Chinese Military History, 4:162–200.

About the Author Dr. Pingchao Zhu is professor and the Director of Graduate Studies in the History Department at the University of Idaho. She has published two books, The Americans and Chinese at the Korean War Cease-fire Negotiations, 1950–1953 and Wartime Culture in Guilin: A City at War.

6

Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises Xiaojia Hou1

Abstract During the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, the world media was flooded with fear of imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, in both cases, Mao Zedong never intended an actual invasion, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise. Paying special attention to the memoirs of Chinese military commanders and the newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi, this chapter examines Mao’s decision-making during the Taiwan Strait crises. It attempts to take Mao’s perspective, assess the limits of his calculations, and shed light on the rationales behind Mao’s appearance of aggressiveness. Regardless of militant propaganda, this chapter demonstrates that Mao was extremely cautious not to provoke the US, and never planned to wage large scale warfare against the US or Taiwan. Keywords: Taiwan Strait Crises, Sino-American Relations, Mao Zedong, Shelling of Jinmen, China-Taiwan Relations

Introduction In 2020, the world witnessed rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait as China launched ‘gray-zone’ warfare and sent warplanes across the median line (Murray 2020). The US followed suit by dispatching Navy warships to pass through the Taiwan Strait. The media was flooded with concerns of another Taiwan Strait crisis. People wondered if the Xi Jinping administration would 1 I am indebted to Qiang Fang and Xiao-bing Li for their encouragement and careful editing. I am grateful for the SJSU Faculty RSCA Assigned Time Program that supported my research. I thank Lexi Xu, my first reader, for her constructive criticism.

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch06

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invade Taiwan, as well as how the US would respond as events unfolded. Since his inauguration as President of the People’s Republic of China in 2013, Xi Jinping has incorporated a good deal of Mao Zedong’s strategies into his own, and often promoted himself as a great figure. For example, Xi created a ‘Little Red Book’, and made pilgrimages to Yan’an.2 The current circumstances have reminded us much of the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, in which Mao played a dominant role. However, looking back at both cases, Mao never intended to invade Taiwan (Formosa) nor fight against the US, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise instead of war. Mao certainly had learned lessons from the past. After the Korean War, Mao wanted to avoid further conflict against the US. But as Pingchao Zhu convincingly shows in Chapter Five, Mao believed that diplomacy alone cannot guarantee peace; only military strength could secure China’s spot at the negotiation table (Zhu 2022), thus China’s military strength must be preserved and demonstrated. Furthermore, in the 1950s, China had territorial conquests over the offshore islands between the mainland and Taiwan, and occasionally engaged battles against Taiwan. Therefore, Mao had to walk a thin line between limited regional warfare with Taiwan and avoiding war against the US. His solution was to keep the real military goals limited and flexible, ready to modify plans at any moment, but at the same time maintain an aggressive appearance to deter enemies. Extensive scholarly work has been published on the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s. Scholarship in the US, predominantly based on US archives, tend to centre on US responses and interpret the crises as examples of Mao’s aggressive temperament (Huei 2019; Tucker 2009; S. Zhang 2001; Accinelli 1996; Christensen 1996). Publications in China are constrained by official narratives and usually could not critically assess the role of Mao Zedong in the crises (Xu 2011; Dai 2003; W. Shen 1992; Wang 1992). Most scholars have overlooked Mao’s anxiety throughout the crises and dilemmas he faced. No doubt Mao Zedong was the most significant driving force of the two crises, but he was neither ‘always right’ as portrayed by the majority of Chinese sources, nor ‘continually miscalculating’, according to some scholars (Sheng 2008). In reality, Mao was extremely cautious in his decision-making, 2 Such topics are widely discussed and analyzed in the media, including top journals like Wall Street Journal andBBC News. For example, ‘Advice from Mao Recycled in the Era of Xi Jinping: “Play the Piano?”’https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-28785; ‘Xi Jinping: Digital “little red book” tops App Store in China’, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-47236902; ‘Ian Easton On Taiwan: Think China’s aggression is alarming now? Just wait’. https://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/editorials/archives/2020/11/02/2003746192. Accessed Feb 28, 2021.

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often uncertain about his choices and constantly modifying his plans. He often looked for advice from military commanders as well. For Chinese military commanders on the southeastern coast, from 1949 to 1955, there was never peace in or around the Taiwan Strait, but a series of battles (Chang and He 1993). They failed to anticipate vehement international reactions to their military activities, and because of this ended up appearing aggressive. On Mao’s end, although he meticulously watched US reactions, he had limited access to what was happening inside the US government. Rather, his main source of information was Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News) (Liao 1994). It did not supply authentic US responses, but Mao’s perceptions of those responses determined his next move. Paying special attention to the suggestions from military commanders and using Cankao Xiaoxi as the main source of Mao’s information, this chapter examines the decisions Mao Zedong made during the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s. It attempts to take the perspective of Mao Zedong, understand his motivations, assess the limits of his calculations, and thus capture the rationales behind Mao’s appearance of aggressiveness, hoping to shed light on our understanding of current Sino-US tension over Taiwan.

1950: The Taiwan Campaign Becomes the Taiwan Problem When the Chinese Nationalist Party retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and continued the Republic of China (ROC) there, it still controlled approximately thirty offshore islands off China’s southeastern coast, most of which were a mere few miles from Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, while hundreds of miles away from Taiwan (See Map 1). Because of the close distance to the mainland, these islands posed immediate threats to China’s coast. Seizing offshore islands, then Taiwan, to the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), was just a continuation of China’s Civil War (Chang and He 1993). In June 1949, Mao Zedong did not consider the liberation of Taiwan as a difficult task. He had hoped the 3rd Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would ‘complete all preparations during summer and autumn, and occupy Taiwan in the coming winter’ (Mao, ‘To Su Yu’, 1949). The island of Taiwan at average was more than 100 miles away from China’s coast, so it would take a day to cross the Taiwan Strait from the mainland, which would leave the PLA exposed to attacks from the Nationalist air force, navy, and artillery. Quickly, Mao was convinced that the CCP needed the air force and navy to seize Taiwan, both of which the PLA lacked. Swiftly, the CCP turned to the Soviet Union for aid. Mao told Stalin that the PLA

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Map 1  China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (X. Li 2015, 144)3

would complete its military campaign in Fujian province by October 1949 and likely start the military campaign against Taiwan in the second half of 1950. Mao requested Soviet aid in building and training navy and air forces. Stalin consented to substantial assistance. In fall 1949, hundreds of Soviet military advisers, and trainers in the air force and navy arrived in China, together with airplanes, artilleries, shells, and supplies to build airports (Z. Shen 2009).3 At the same time, the PLA marched on its way to take over offshore islands. The 7th Army Corps started an island-by-island campaign to occupy the Zhoushan islands off Zhejiang province, while the 10th Army Corps were charged with taking Xiamen Island off Fujian province. Xiamen Island was less than two miles away from the mainland. The battle over Xiamen was 3

Courtesy of Xiaobing Li.

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a dazzling victory. The next target, naturally, was the Jinmen (Quemoy) islands (Xu 2011). The narrowest strait between Jinmen and the mainland was approximately seven miles, which was open to winds and waves. The island was less than fifty square miles, mountainous in the east, hilly in the west, with only the northern coast open to landing. After the fall of Xiamen, the Nationalist soldiers in Jinmen amounted to more than 30,000, and more on the way to Jinmen from Taiwan. Tanks were set up, covered by air force, and aided by the Nationalist Navy. But the PLA had poor intelligence about the Jinmen islands, and was unaware of the newly arrived Nationalist troops. The PLA planned to ship three corps, approximately 8,000 soldiers, to the northern beach in Jinmen during the night, and then carry another round of 9,000 soldiers with returning junks. On October 24, seven corps prepared to board the junks, with only eighty artilleries to cover them. Three corps f irst departed for Jinmen at 21:30 hours, but before they landed on the Jinmen beach, they were detected by the Nationalists and heavily bombed; the casualties were high. The junks were either sunk or stranded along the beach, not a single one returning to the mainland. The second round of PLA soldiers never departed the mainland. Hence 8,000 PLA soldiers fought on Jinmen alone: half of them were captured, and the other half killed (Xu 2011; Yu 2016). Mao called the Jinmen defeat ‘the most serious loss in the War of Liberation’ (Mao, ‘About’, 1949). One week later, the 7th Army Corps was also defeated on Dengbu Island, a small one among the Zhoushan islands. In November 1949, Su Yu, acting commander of the 3rd Field Army, proposed to postpone the battles on the Zhoushan islands and Jinmen to 1950. Evidently it would be impossible to launch successful amphibious warfare without navy and air force. Mao Zedong, at the time in Moscow, brought up the Taiwan issue to Stalin again and secured more Soviet support. He instructed Su Yu to build parachute units for the forthcoming Taiwan campaign (Z. Shen 2009). Even though upset by the setback, the PLA did not give up. On January 17, 1950, Xiao Jingguang was appointed the commander of the Navy, his first assignment being to coordinate with the 3rd Field Army to invade Taiwan. With more caution, in the first half of 1950, the PLA continued to acquire offshore islands one after another. In April, the PLA occupied Hainan Island, the second largest island after Taiwan. In May, the PLA successfully invaded the Zhoushan islands, and the next target was the Jinmen islands once again. Much more experienced in riverine warfare now, the Jinmen islands were not a major concern for the PLA, which had already begun to strategize how to land in Taiwan (Xu 2011, 91).

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By May 1950, ‘liberating Taiwan’ was not mere rhetoric, but a real mission. Mao had secured Soviet aid, and calculated in the US factor, which he assessed favourably. Although the US had been an ally for Jiang Jieshi since World War II, it did not intervene militarily in China’s civil war. By January 1950 there was no consensus among the US president, the State Department, the Pentagon, and Congress on how to preserve Jiang’s administration. 4 The CCP leaders were little aware of American domestic politics. From what they could observe, they had reasons to be optimistic. For example, US naval forces withdrew from Qingdao in early 1949. The most significant message was President Truman’s ‘Statement on Formosa’ on January 5, 1950, in which Truman categorized Formosa as part of the civil conflict in China., The US government stated clearly that it ‘will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement’; thus, ‘the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa’ (Truman 1950). Su Yu, on January 5, 1950, stated that Americans dispatching the military to defend the Nationalists was unlikely. Further, its allies, such as Great Britain, would not support such action. Although it was possible for the US to provide aircraft and artillery to Taiwan, Su Yu assessed that the US needed five years to mobilize adequate troops to initiate a major conflict in the Far East. Truman’s statement confirmed this view. On January 27, Su Yu was even more certain the US could not start a third world war because of Taiwan, as its president had clearly announced (Su 1950). But the world changed fast. The tensions between the US and the USSR kept rising, the Cold War had begun. When China signed the ‘Sino-Soviet Friendly Alliance and Mutual Assistance Treaty’ in February 1950, it completely disillusioned the US State Department. Dean Acheson earlier argued 4 For example, on December 27, 1949, the joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the National Security Council that a modest, well-directed, and closely supervised program of military aid to Taiwan would be in the best security interest of the United States, and ‘should be integrated with a stepped-up political, economic, and psychological program pursued energetically in extension of present United States programs there’. Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson). Dec 23, 1949. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1949v09/d488. Accessed on January 23, 2021. Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met the secretary of State Dean Acheson and recommended increasing military aid to Taiwan and station military advisors there. Acheson strongly objected, though, considering that ‘it was better to let Formosa go for political reasons’, and he believed Mao was not a true satellite of the USSR, so it was crucial not to alienate Mao’s China. The NSC then decided not to send military aid to the Nationalists in defending Taiwan. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State. [Washington,] December 29, 1949. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/ d490. Accessed Feb 26, 2021.

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that the CCP might keep its distance from the Soviet Union, but this treaty simply disproved his argument. Increasingly, the US strengthened its commitment to contain the USSR and halt the spread of communism, East Asia included, as NSC 68 signaled (NSC 68, 1950). China now became a communist rival, not another potential Tito. Gradually, the Pentagon’s view of defending Taiwan prevailed over Acheson’s. Within the State Department, the newly appointed consultant to the Secretary of State John Dulles and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Rusk both openly supported the US’s protection of Taiwan against communist invasions. The CIA, Navy, and Army all drafted their strategic plans to defend Taiwan. In May, Rusk proposed to Acheson the UN trusteeship for Formosa, and the US would ready the fleet to prevent any armed attack on Formosa while the request for trusteeship was pending. Although Acheson did not immediately act on it, he confirmed that the US continued to acknowledge the Nationalist Government of China and maintained diplomatic relations (Memorandum by the Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence 1950). As a matter of fact, the US media already caught the shift in government opinions. For example, the June 25th issue of the New York Herald Tribune reported that if the US stood firm, there was a ninety percent chance of stopping the CCP’s invasion of Taiwan (Z. Shen 2009). Another shock was Kim Il-sung’s plan to invade South Korea. Stalin not only approved the plan, but provided loans and material support like gasoline, artillery, and ammunition, probably at China’s cost. In 1950, airplanes and navy shipments from the Soviet Union to China were delayed. In May 1950, Kim Il-sung visited China and informed Mao of his invasion plan, to which Mao reluctantly consented (Z. Shen 2009). Keenly aware of the potential impacts on the Taiwan issue, Mao ordered the PLA to expedite preparations to invade Taiwan. On June 23, 1950, Su Yu submitted his combat plan to Mao Zedong. By then, the army units involved in the Taiwan campaign had increased from twelve divisions to sixteen. The entire force of the 3rd Field Army, the PLA’s strategic reserve forces, approximately one third of the total CCP military force, was reserved for the Taiwan campaign (He 1992). However, two days later, the Korean War erupted. On June 27, 1950, Truman ordered US air and sea forces to support South Korea. He also announced that in such circumstances ‘the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area’, so he dispatched the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan. Truman added that the status of Taiwan would be determined in the future (Truman, ‘On Korea’, 1950). Truman’s statement did not explicitly mention any offshore islands. But it clearly signaled a reversal of the US policy, and the Jinmen issue became

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delicate. On August 8, Chen Yi, commander of the East China Bureau, proposed to the CCP Central Committee halting the Taiwan campaign. On August 26, 1950, Zhou Enlai announced that the liberation of Taiwan would be postponed. Clearly, Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong included, had no intention to fight the US in the Taiwan Strait. Su Yu was appointed the commander of the Northeast Border Defense Army, and many PLA units in East China were transferred to the North. From then on, ‘Liberation Taiwan’ became a slogan (He 1992). The Taiwan campaign became the Taiwan problem, a problem that was no longer a civil war, but an international affair. The third player, the mighty US, had joined the play.

1954–1955: Aiming at Offshore Islands After the US fleet started patrolling the Taiwan Strait, the ROC was in no immediate danger of failing. Jiang Jieshi proposed the slogan Fanggong dalu (Counteroffensive against the mainland) to mobilize Taiwan society and reinforce his control. Although Jiang never invaded the mainland on a large scale, he stationed more troops on the offshore islands. From there, the ROC launched a series of attacks and harassments on the mainland coast and seaboard trade. In 1951, Jiang sent small operations, usually numbered in the hundreds, to land on the mainland coast, arouse unrest, and engage in guerilla warfare. These operations were crushed swiftly by the CCP. In 1952, the ROC changed tactics: it dispatched troops of moderate size, usually in the thousands, to land on a few small offshore islands controlled by the CCP, eliminate the defense troops, and withdraw quickly. There were a number of successes. Meanwhile, the ROC constructed substantial defenses in Jinmen, strengthened artillery, and improved the cooperation of navy and air forces. The artillery and air force from Jinmen frequently shelled Xiamen and transportation infrastructure on the mainland coast (Xu 2011, 111). On February 2, 1953, Eisenhower announced to the US Congress that “the Seventh Fleet was no longer employed to shield Communist China” (Eisenhower 1953). This policy was interpreted as ‘unleashing Jiang’, signaling more ROC attacks. For instance, in July 1953, Jiang Jieshi launched ‘Operation Pulverize’, involving 7,000 soldiers, multiple battalions, and nine ships of varying sizes. The plan was to land on Dongshan Island, eliminate all PLA troops, then leave. The operation ended with heavy casualties for the ROC (Xu 2011, 111). The ROC also caused trouble for China’s sea trade. For example, between 1950 and 1953, more than 2000 fishing ships from the mainland were robbed

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or shelled along the Zhejiang and Fujian coast. Half a million Chinese fishermen could not practice their trade as normal. Strategically, the PLA needed to guard its coastline and stop the ROC from using the offshore islands as anti-PLA military bases. In February 1952, the Eastern China Military Area resumed preparations for liberating offshore islands. In October 1953, Chen Yi proposed to send five armies to land in Jinmen. The plan was first endorsed by Mao. But in November, Mao changed his mind, ordered postponement of the invasion of Jinmen, and suggested a first attack of islands off the Zhejiang coast (Xu 2011, 117). By then, along the lengthy Zhejiang coast, the Nationalists occupied ten islands within a few miles of the shore. Railways and airports were completed in Zhejiang province. In contrast, there was no railroad or airport for jet fighters in Fujian province, both of which were absolutely needed to wage successful amphibious warfare. The number of Nationalist troops stationed in Jinmen would require massive firepower to conquer, so Mao chose islands off the Zhejiang coast as the first target. Moreover, Mao did not intend to draw international attention when China sought to present itself as a peaceful country. By that time, the Korean War had ended, and China started its first fiveyear plan. The initial investment need was enormous. The government was trimming its expenses, particularly the military budget, to finance economic construction. Internationally, after Stalin’s death, Soviet leaders sought to reopen the diplomatic space. Their new thesis was to relieve international tensions and coexist with countries with different social systems. China followed a similar path. In negotiations with India, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.5 It indicated that the CCP acted with the status quo and prioritized domestic economic needs over ideological support of international communist revolutions. The new stance was embraced by China’s neighbors, and Mao affirmed that countries of different ideologies were able to peacefully co-exist (Yang 2003). The first international arena for the CCP was the Geneva Conference of 1954. Mao then faced a dilemma: the ROC was using offshore islands to harass China, so the islands needed to be reclaimed for the sake of coast safety, yet Mao did not want to discredit China’s new stance on peaceful co-existence. In December 1954, the Central Military Commission (CMC) cabled the East China Regional Command (ECRC) to keep offshore defense on a small scale; its particular request was tomake no direct engagement with 5 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as promoted by China are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.

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the US armed forces. Mao did not want another fight with the US (X. Li 2015, 144). Zhang Aiping, the chief of the Zhejiang Command of ECRC, oversaw the mission. In 1954, compulsory military service replaced the old universal military service. Within a year, the PLA would reduce its troops from 6.1 million to 3.5 million. The ECRC alone would lose 300,000 soldiers, most of which were veterans. Zhang Aiping wanted to complete the military missions before the departure of the veterans, scheduled for February 1955. Pressed by the timing, Zhang came up with the ‘active defense’ plan. Unwilling to wait for the Nationalists’ next ‘hit and run’, Zhang decided to invade Nationalist-occupied offshore islands through a piecemeal operation, one island at a time, starting from the smallest island placed furthest north. Zhang recommended beginning with the Dongji islands, composed of four small islands farthest in the northern direction, 100 miles away from the US Seventh Fleet (X. Li 2015, 146–153). From March to May 1954, the East Sea Fleet attacked Nationalist naval forces and engaged in sea battles. On May 18, covered by bombers and fighters, the PLA took over the Dongji islands. It was the PLA’s first significant amphibious operation. The next target was the Dachen islands (Dachens), a much larger island group to the south of the Dongji islands, off Zhejiang, where the ROC had stationed 20,000 troops. The CMC ordered to prepare for attacking Dachens in September1954. Meanwhile, PLA troops were instructed to operate with extreme caution. Su Yu, in June 1954, instructed:‘unless the enemies bombard us, we cannot open fire, this is to avoid an armed clash’. (Mao ‘To Su Yu’,1954). Right at this point, Mao Zedong started to question the merit of peaceful co-existence. The Geneva Accord was signed on July 21, 1954. Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel, war washalted, and Cambodia and Laos were neutralized. Foreseeing its declining military presence in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the US switched to regional security. It pushed to form a regional defense organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). As early as May 1954, the US began to actively consider the negotiation of a bilateral security pact with the ROC (Huei 2019, 87). In early July 1954, Zhou Enlai flew back to Beijing from Geneva to make a progress report. The participants were particularly concerned about the potential US-ROC Security Treaty (Liao 1994). Mao Zedong, on July 6, suggested in a politburo meetingto apply both diplomatic and propaganda methods to prevent the US signing a military treaty with Taiwan (Mao ‘tong yiqie’, 1954). Right after the close of the Geneva Accord, Mao Zedong cabled Zhou Enlai:

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In order to break up the collaboration between the United States and Jiang Jieshi and keep them from joining together militarily and politically, we must announce to our country and to the world the slogan of liberating Taiwan. It was improper of us not to raise this slogan in a timely manner after the cease-fire in Korea. If we were to continue dragging our heels now, we would be making a serious political mistake (B. Wang 1985, 41–42).

Scholars have debated why Mao Zedong suddenly resumed action in the Taiwan Straits. Nearly all agree the negotiations of the SEATO and the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty dismayed Mao. When China softened and offered peace, the US failed to respond. Mao came to believe that China must maintain a firm stance against the US, being ready for fighting. Some scholars attribute this to Mao’s ‘victim mentality’ (Yang and Sheng 2016). Certainly, maintaining a high military position was a lesson Mao had learned from the negotiations in the Korean War. Mao’s own explanation was to break the US-Taiwan collaboration, which is accepted by most scholars. But it seems unlikely that Mao was naïve enough to expect that CCP military action would deter the US or Taiwan. Xiaobing Li argues that Mao was worried the world would get used to the division across the Taiwan Strait as another 38th Parallel in Korea and accept it (X. Li 2015, 48). Niu Jun offers another plausible calculation, which best accounts for the timing. He points out, aware that the US-Taiwan Treaty was unavoidable, Mao was keenly eager to know the coverage of this treaty. Would the treaty cover the offshore islands along Zhejiang and Fujian provinces? Would it even reach the coast in Guangdong and Tokyo Bay (Niu 2004)? For Mao, a good option was to take over the offshore islands as soon as possible before the treaty was signed, thus the US would not have legitimate excuses to intervene. Therefore, Mao decided to wage both propaganda campaigns and real battles on offshore islands to prevent the inclusion of these islands in the coming US-ROC Treaty (Niu 2004). On July 23, 1954, People Daily published the editorial entitled ‘[We] Must Liberate Taiwan’, launching a nation-wide campaign against the ‘US-Jiang bandits’. Commander-in-chief of the PLA, Zhu De, reiterated ‘Chinese people must liberate Taiwan’ in his August 1 speech. Meanwhile, active war preparations were launched in both Fujian and Zhejiang provinces (Xu 2011). On August 25, 1954, Ye Fei, chief of the Fujian Commander of ECRC, received the order to shell the Jinmen islands. Fully aware that the army was not ready for an amphibious operation, Ye made no plan to land on Jinmen. He recalled ‘our shelling of Jinmen was to respond

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to the Joint Declaration of the Liberation of Taiwan’; it was a punishing bombardment (X. Li 2015). The real battle ground was Dachens along the Zhejiang coast. In August, Zhang Aiping and Nie Fengzhi, the Lieutenant General of the Zhejiang Air Force, worked out a plan to first land on Yijiangshan, an islet seven miles north of Dachens, then attack Dachens. The US became concerned. On August 17, 1954, Eisenhower told reporters ‘any invasion of Formosa would have to run over the 7th Fleet’ (Eisenhower, ‘News Conference’, 1954). On August 19, four US destroyers paid a visit to Dachens. Mao approved the landing on Yijiangshan, but cautioned, ‘Please take note, we must ensure that there are no US ships and planes before we attack Dachens. Otherwise, do not attack’ (Mao, ‘To Liu Shaoqi’, 1954). By September 2, Nie’s air force was ready to launch the attack. Suddenly, however, Mao halted the plan. The claimed reason was that India’s Prime Minister Nehru was visiting Shanghai. Xu Yan speculates that Mao wanted to wait and see the world’s reaction to the just-begunshelling of Jinmen(Xu 2011). Indeed, Mao did not want to fight the US in the Taiwan Strait and was very cautious on every military move. It seems that the CMC gave Ye Fei more leverage in managing the operation. Ye was instructed to decide the bombing date, which he chose as September 3, the day a supply shipment from Taiwan would arrive in Jinmen. Starting in early afternoon, Ye Fei ordered two bombardments and poured 7,000 rounds on the Jinmen, killing two American officers. Shelling continued sporadically for several days. On September 22, Ye Fei ordered another heavy bombardment. Then, sporadic bombardment continued until November 20, 1954 (X Li 2015, 150). The US quickly assessed that the PLA lacked logistic preparation for an amphibious assault, thus with no invasion of Jinmen in sight. It noticed that ‘they (the communists) have taken no action against US forces’ (Huei 2019, 97). Nevertheless, the US immediately reacted. On the morning of September 5, the 7th Fleet patrolled the Taiwan Strait several miles away from Jinmen. John Dulles flew to Taiwan to meet Jiang Jieshi, primarily to discuss the details of the mutual defense treaty. At the UN, the US, in collaboration with Britain and New Zealand, proposed the Operation Oracle plan, to introduce a UN resolution to the Security Council calling for ceasefire and hope for a neutralization of the offshore islands. In the following two months, Jiang Jieshi used offshore islands as bargaining chips to secure the US’s explicit promises to protect Taiwan, Penghu (the Pescadores), and surrounding areas, while using ambiguous terminologies for the offshore islands (Huei 2019).

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The CCP leaders worked assiduously to defend China’s actions to international friends. In September, Mao explained to the Communist Bloc how the ROC had created threats to China using those small islands. Particularly, Mao held several conversations with Nehru, trying to convince him that Taiwan posed a real threat to China, yet China had no plans to wage a war (Huei 2019, 108–111). But local PLA commanders were not so patient. When Ye Fei was bombing the Jinmen islands, commanders at Zhejiang Front requested to launch their landing plan. In late October, Mao reluctantly agreed. Starting on November 1, the PLA air force began to bomb Dachens and Yijiangshan heavily. But every participating pilot was instructed not to exchange fire with US airplanes without permission from the general. In late November, the PLA had completed the torpedo boat base and coastal artillery opposite Yijiangshan, ready for an immediate attack. At this point, however, Beijing called a halt once again (X. Li 2015, 152). Presumably not wanting a fight with the US, Mao waited for the outcome of the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty. On December 2, 1954, the ROC-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. Eisenhower did not want to commit US military forces to protecting the offshore islands, as he held the idea of ‘keeping the enemy guessing’. In the end, the treaty did not explicitly include offshore islands (Chang and He 1993, 1511). Likely interpreting the ambiguity as the US’s reluctance, on December 16, the commander at the Zhejiang Front requested to resume the military operation on Yijiangshan. Beijing weighed the decision, giving a green signal on December 21. Starting on December 21, the Zhejiang Air force bombed Dachens heavily. Zhang Aiping and Nie Fengzhi scheduled the landing on Yijiangshan for January 18, 1955, and asked the General Staff headquarters for the final approval. However, Mao hesitated once again (X Li 2015). On January 15, 1955, China’s London charge reported to Beijing that Britain would advocate evacuating Jiang’s troops from offshore islands as a solution to Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu). The report hinted that Britain might move to recognize the independence of Taiwan, and the US admit ‘two Chinas’ (Huei 2019, 118). Alarmed, on January 17, 1955, Beijing telegrammed the ECRC to withdraw the troops and stop the attack. This time, however, Zhang Aiping did not bend, probably because most of the veterans were to leave the army soon. He appealed through the ladder of command, finally reaching Mao Zedong. Mao deferred the decision to Peng Dehuai, the Defense Minister, who immediately approved Zhang’s request and ordered the launch of the scheduled landing campaign. On January 18, 1955, the PLA initiated the Yijiangshan landing campaign, involving 188 ships, 184 bombers and fighters,

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as well as landing troops of 3,000 soldiers, totaling 10,000, ten times the number of the Nationalist troops in Yijiangshan. By the next day, the PLA had annihilated all Nationalist troops. Zhang Aiping then began to bomb Dachens, preparing for the next landing (X. Li 2015, 153–155). On January 19, 1955, Ye Gongchao, the ROC foreign minister, visited John Dulles in Washington, DC, admitting that the ROC troops were unable to defend Dachens alone. The Eisenhower administration decided to press Jiang to withdraw his troops from Dachens, in exchange for the US assisting the withdrawal and helping Taiwan to defend Jinmen. Jiang eventually consented. The US, through the Soviet channel, convoyed the evacuation plan to Beijing. Mao ordered a cease fire during the evacuation (Xu 2011, 130). Between February 8 and 12, the ROC evacuated all its military and civilian personnel from Dachens, and other offshore islands nearby. By February 26, all the offshore islands along the Zhejiang coast were under PLA control (X. Li 2015, 156). But the report from London about ‘two Chinas’ scheme remained a concern. It was no wonder that when news of victory reached Mao, he commented, ‘This is undoubtedly a military victory, but from the political angle, we still need to further observe and consider’ (S. Zhang 2007, 188–94). Nevertheless, the PLA commanders were thrilled by the success. ECRC immediately worked on campaigns along the Fujian coast. Given that there were no airports in Fujian, and the air force departing from Zhejiang could only reach northern Fujian province, the next target was Mazu Island, where 20,000 ROC troops were stationed (Xu 2011, 131). Mao had not made up his mind yet concerning US responses. He hoped that if the PLA kept pressure high, the ROC troops might withdraw from Mazu, as they had done in Dachens. So Mao ordered Peng Dehuai, on March 14, 1955, not to attack the Nationalists if they chose to evacuate (Mao, ‘guanyu Mazu’, 1955). The Eisenhower administration was provoked by the PLA’s continuous military activities and began to suspect if Beijing truly intended to ‘liberate’ more ROC-occupied territories. In late January 1955, the main forces of the 7th Fleet, including f ive carriers, moved towards the Taiwan Strait (Xu 2011, 128). On January 29, 1955, the US Congress passed the ‘Formosa Resolution’ that gave the US President the authority ‘to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack [by the Communists]’ (‘Formosa Resolution’ 1955). On March 8, Dulles announced on a national television program, that the Eisenhower administration considered using atomic weapons. On March 16, Eisenhower reconfirmed, in a news conference, the possible use of nuclear weapons

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in the Taiwan Strait. The next day, Vice President Nixon echoed it (X. Li 2015, 156). The nuclear threat had multiple layers of impact for China. Never intending to start another war against the US, Mao ordered holding any attacks on Mazu. Meanwhile, he was determined to develop China’s own nuclear bombs, with or without Soviet aid. Mao threw his full support on related research (X. Li 2015). To ease international tension, China adopted a more conciliatory approach. In the upcoming Bandung Conference, on April 23, 1955, Zhou Enlai announced that the Chinese people did not want war with the United States (Huei 2019, 149). Through emissaries like Indian ambassadors and Pakistani diplomats, Zhou persuaded the US into direct negotiations. Eisenhower accepted China’s offer, paving the way for the Sino-US ambassadorial talks. The 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis came to an end.

1958: Shelling Jinmen—A Political Show In July 1955, Washington agreed to proceed with the Sino-US ambassadorial talks. The first issue was US prisoners in China. The next was about Taiwan. Both sides could not reach a joint statement, for the US insisted that the PRC renounce the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, while Beijing firmly refused and asserted that Taiwan was part of China’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, the talks opened the door for a direct communication channel between Beijing and Washington (Xia 2006). After the 1954–1955 Taiwan Strait crisis, the ROC substantially reduced its military harassment of the mainland. It rarely attacked PRC commercial and fishing ships, and mostly stopped bombing China’s southeast coast. But it continued to send spies to the mainland and flew airplanes over the Fujian coast, occasionally bombing the Xiamen areas (Xu 2011, 136). During this time, through Cao Juren, Beijing made secret connections with Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo), son and heir of Jiang Jieshi, and offered Taiwan peaceful reunification. Although no deals were made, both sides shared resentment of the ‘two Chinas’plot. In 1956, several airports were constructed in Fujian province, and the Yin-Xia railway was completed in July 1957. The infrastructure for the air force was ready, but unwilling to unsettle the ROC, the CMC did not order the PLA air force to move into Fujian (Xu 2011, 134). From mid-1955 to 1956, domestically, the CCP prioritized economic development; internationally it propagated peaceful co-existence. However,

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in 1957, things began to change. In January, Taiwan started to build B-52 nuclear bomber runways. In May, nuclear-tipped Matador missiles were placed in Taiwan. Jiang Jieshi raised the number of troops in Jinmen and Mazu to 100,000, nearly double the number in 1955. From those two islands, ROC planes spied on the Fujian coast, and the ROC zealously broadcastthat Jiang Jieshi would take back the mainland (Huei 2019, 196). The Sino-US ambassadorial talks had reached a standstill, each side simply repeating the same rhetoric in every meeting. Frustrated, at the end of 1957, Washington decided to downgrade the talks. To Mao, neither Jiang Jieshi nor the US reciprocated his goodwill. He was dismayed. Meanwhile, exciting news came from the Soviet Union. In summer 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched its satellite into space, while the US had failed. When Mao visited Moscow in November 1957, Khrushchev announced the Soviet goal of exceeding the US in industrial output within the next fifteen years. Mao was thrilled, declaring ‘the east wind [is] prevailing over the west wind’ (Mao 1957). Essentially a Stalinist, Mao was dismayed by Khrushchev’s open criticism of Stalin and his peaceful coexistence theory (Radchenko 2009). After returning to China, Mao criticized the theory of unconditional peaceful co-existence and emphasized the need to weaken Western countries (Mao, ‘Talks at the Nanning Conference’, 1958). Zhou Enlai was relieved from the post of Foreign Minister in February 1958, replaced by Marshal Chen Yi, who was generally considered more militant. Mao decided to stir up the situation. In December 1957, Mao asked, ‘please consider the issue of having our air forces move into Fujian in 1958’ (Y. Wang 1998, 667). The CMC proposed to have the air force moved during July and August. In March 1958, Peng Dehuai ordered to prepare for the bombing of Jinmen and Mazu in case the ROC attacked while the PLA air force moved into Fujian. In April, Fujian Commander Han Xianchu and political commissar Ye Fei submitted their plan of bombing Jinmen (Y. Wang 1998, 672–674). In May 1958, the Lebanese people overthrew the pro-American government in Lebanon. In July, a military coup in Iraq toppled the pro-American government. Then, the US Marines landed in Lebanon to intervene. The USSR and other socialist countries strongly condemned the US invasion, but refused to arm the Iraqis, instead choosing to work with the UN Security Council. Mao decided to take this chance to launch the planned bombing of Jinmen, claiming in order to aid the people in the Middle East and to teach the US a lesson (Dang dai Zhongguo cong shu bian ji bu 1989, 387). On July 14, Peng Dehuai and Su Yu convened a meeting to finalize the plan. Ye Fei was appointed the front commander, and the date was set for July 25 (Xu 2011, 145). But it was hurricane season, so military preparation

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was delayed. Peng suggested postponing the bombardment until July 27, which was approved by Mao. However, on the morning of July 27, Mao sent a letter to Peng Dehuai, stating that he ‘could not sleep’, and considered it ‘more appropriate to withhold the attack for several days’. Concerned about the US response, Mao hoped Jiang Jieshi might launch an attack against the mainland first, which would give the PLA a legitimate reason to fight. Mao asked Peng to consult with front commanders for their opinions (Mao, ‘guanyu bawo’, 1958). The bombardment was thus postponed upon Mao’s further orders. Regardless, on July 27, the PLA air force began to move into Fujian province, engaged with Nationalist airplanes flying over Fujian on July 29, and shot down two planes (Xu 2011). Having not received orders from Mao, on August 13, Peng Dehuai told the Fujian front that if there was no enemy attack within three days, the artilleries could go back to normal status. On August 19, the headquarters instructed the army at the Front to disarm (Yi and Chen 1997, 213). At that exact moment, Mao instructed Peng Dehuai to prepare for shelling, to ‘deal with Jiang directly and the Americans indirectly’ (Mao, ‘To Peng’, 1958). What had happened, between July 27 and August 19, that propelled Mao to make the decision? One likely factor was Khrushchev’s secret visit to China. On July 31, Khrushchev quietly arrived in Beijing. From July 31 to August 3, Mao held four meetings with Khrushchev. Shen Zhihua convincingly demonstrates that Mao did not inform Khrushchev about China’s plan to bomb Jinmen. More interestingly, originally Khrushchev had planned to leave China secretly, as he came secretly. Mao, however, insisted on holding a formal farewell ceremony and published a joint statement to praise SinoSoviet alliance (Z. Shen 2004). Did Mao intend to create the image of Soviet endorsement of the bombings and use Sino-Soviet alliance to deter the US and Taiwan? Mao provided no answer to this question. After Khrushchev’s departure, Mao started to zealously encourage Chinese people, male and female, to join militias. It seemed that Mao was accumulating strength to convince the world, or primarily to convince himself, of the wisdom in shelling Jinmen. On August 20 and 21, Mao held meetings with Peng Dehuai to discuss the shelling plan. He demanded intense strikes on the Nationalists in Jinmen to block supplies from reaching Jinmen. Mao’s rationale was that the ROC might withdraw the troops from Jinmen, as had happened in Dachens. If the ROC would hold on, then Mao would decide whether to launch the landing campaign. The bombing date was set on August 23 (Wang 1992, 100). Fearing initiating a fight with the US, Mao summoned Ye Fei from the front to Beidaihe. One focus of their discussion was how to avoid killing Americans on

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Jinmen (X. Li 2015). Ye Fei confessed that he could make no guarantees;Mao fell into silence, but ultimately consented. Extremely concerned with the operation, Mao ordered Ye Fei to stay in Beidaihe while in charge of the shelling. Ye Fei, although confused, obeyed the order (Xu 2011, 224–228). On the morning of August 23, 1958, Mao hesitated once again. He put forward three options to Peng Dehuai: to bomb only the Nationalist ships; wait a couple more days; or take no action against Jinmen for two years (Luo 1999, 268). Peng Dehuai assessed that the US would not interfere and proposed to bomb as scheduled. At 15:00 hours, Mao agreed with Peng and gave the final approval. At 17:30 hours, the bombardment of Jinmen began. The PLA fired more than 30,000 shells in 85 minutes, killing 600 Nationalist troops, including three vice-commanders. By August 25, the shelling had successfully stopped Taiwan’s supplies from arriving in Jinmen (Xu 2011). Once the bombardment began, Mao anxiously watched how the US responded. Each day, Mao went through two volumes of Reference News to gather world news (Liao 1994). From Reference News, he learned that although the US quickly dispatched air forces and Navy to Taiwan, the US government did not assess China’s activity as an imminent threat, but more of a war of nerves. John Dulles was on vacation at that point. But as the bombardment went on, on August 27, Eisenhower told the press that Jinmen and Mazu were important for protecting Taiwan, but he still refused to confirm that the US would fight against the CCP (Cankao Xiaoxi 1958). For the commanders at the front, it was a bizarre and difficult mission, because they did not even know the goal, or whether or not the army would land in Jinmen. The Fujian Front intended to maximize the victory and planned to send bombers and fighters over Jinmen for air raids. However, Mao forbade PLA airplanes from crossing the air space above Jinmen. On August 28, the Fujian front broadcastthe ‘Letter to Jiang’s soldiers’. The letter declared that the PLA had made detailed plans to liberate Jinmen and was determined to liberate Taiwan and all other offshore islands (Shen 1992). This broadcast instantly attracted international attention and was widely circulated by Western media. The next day, the State Department of the US issued an official comment on the ‘Letter to Jiang’s soldiers’, and began to regard China’s shelling as a possible prelude to taking over Jinmen. Western media reported that the US military was going to strike the CCP hard (Hou 2003). The ‘Letter to Jiang’s soldiers’ was actually drafted by the local broadcast team at the Fujian front, with no approval from above. Having learned about the letter from Reference News, Mao was furious. He ordered that any declaration to the ROC must be approved by Beijing. But now, he had to clarify the goals of the shelling to the PLA. On September 2, the CMC

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issued the directive on Jinmen, asserting that there would be no landing on Jinmen or Mazu, now or in the near future; there would be no plan to liberate Taiwan in the next twenty years, adding that the ‘Taiwan problem is not just about Taiwan’ (Yi and Chen 1997, 215–216). The next day, Mao ordered the shelling of Jinmen to halt for three days (Luo 1999). At this point, the bombardment of Jinmen as a military probe was virtually aborted. Mao began looking for an honourable exit. On September 4, China officially declared that the territorial sea of the PRC was twelve nautical miles, but the US refused to acknowledge such a claim. On the same day, Eisenhower and Dulles publicly reiterated their commitment to defending Taiwan, including related territories such as Jinmen and Mazu. On September 6, the US Defense Department announced that it would escort Taiwanese ships within three nautical miles of the Jinmen islands. If US ships were attacked, they would retaliate (Cankao Xiaoxi 1958). The next day, seven American warships escorted two ROC supply ships to Jinmen. Mao was irritated. He decided to test the US’s willingness to risk a war against China to defend Jinmen. On September 8, he gave the order to open fire only on the Taiwanese ships when the US-Taiwan joint fleet approached. The US ships did not fire back, instead immediately turning southward and staying five to twelve miles away from Jinmen (X. Li 2015, 163). On September 8 and 10, Zhou Enlai met Cao Juren in Beijing. Zhou asked to pass messages to Jiang Jingguo warning against the two Chinas plot. Zhou offered, if the ships from Taiwan were unescorted by US warships, the PLA would stop shelling Jinmen for seven days (Liu and Du 2000). But the US-Taiwan joint fleet continued, so the PLA’s shelling went on, but to a much lesser degree. The blockage of Jinmen was no longer effective (X. Li 2015, 164). The real battleground switched to the diplomatic arena. In early September, the CCP had received a great deal of inquiries from friendly countries, particularly the Soviet Union on the Taiwan Strait crisis. On September 6, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko hastily visited Beijing. Mao and Zhou assured Gromyko that China had no intention of invading Taiwan nor involving the Soviets. Nevertheless, Khrushchev gave his endorsement of the CCP’s actions in the Taiwan straits (Yan 2006). On September 6, Zhou Enlai issued a public statement suggesting reopening Sino-US ambassadorial talks. The US swiftly agreed. To make progress, Zhen instructed Chinese ambassador Wang Bingnan to present Beijing’s offer in the initial meeting, even though Mao preferred not to reveal China’s baseline. On September 15, the talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland. Wang Bingnan followed Zhou’s order and presented China’s offer (B. Wang 1985,

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41–42). While most of the language repeated old rhetoric, the crucial new clause was ‘[The] Government of People’s Republic of China declares that, after recovering Jinmen, Mazu, and the other coastal islands, it will strive to liberate Taiwan and Penghu Islands by peaceful means and will, in a certain period of time, avoid using force to realize liberation of Taiwan and Penghu Islands’ (Telegram from the Embassy 1958). The US ambassador was not prepared for such an offer, and made no response. Mao was infuriated by this defiance, demanding to fundamentally amend the strategy. Zhou Enlai decided not to discuss any substantial articles with the US. After that, Wang Bingnan returned to the old strategy of repeating rhetoric, never mentioning his earlier offer again (B. Wang 1985). By the end of September, Dulles softened his tone, saying in a news conference: ‘I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands’ if there was a cease-fire (Dulles 1958). This new suggestion seemed closer to Wang Bingnan’s initial offer. However, by this point, Mao had fully realized that the US’s two Chinas plot had become a serious threat. The US was scheming to give up Jinmen and Mazu in exchange for the complete independence of Taiwan and Penghu. Mao reasoned that it was better to keep Jiang’s troops in Jinmen and Mazu, like a ‘noose around their necks’, and he finalized his ‘Noose Strategy’ (Mao, ‘some viewpoints’,1958). On October 6, Mao drafted the ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’, announcing that the PLA would stop shelling for seven days. After the duration passed, another two weeks of cease-fire was offered. On October 25, Mao drafted the ‘Second Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’, which declared that Jinmen would only be shelled on odd-numbered days, with very limited intensity. Although such symbolic shelling would continue until 1979 when the US normalized its relationship with the PRC, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 had virtually ended.

Conclusion In the early 1950s, Mao and PLA commanders had no doubt that they could liberate offshore islands and Taiwan within a couple of years. The outbreak of the Korean War completely changed the situation in Northeast Asia. The US had stepped in. From that point on, liberating Taiwan became mere propaganda, not a military mission. Offshore islands were a different story. In 1953, the Zhejiang military front was ready to take over islands off the Zhejiang coast and sought Beijing’s approval. Mao hesitated multiple times due to his uncertainty of the US

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response. Finally, it was Peng Dehuai who endorsed the Zhejiang front’s plan, and by then Mao could hardly veto. In early 1955, the PLA successfully liberated all the islands off Zhejiang province, and pushed to invade Mazu on the Fujian coast. This time, however, the US threatened to retaliate, and Mao immediately halted the PLA’s plan, sending Zhou Enlai for diplomatic negotiations. Throughout the 1954–1955 crisis, Mao did not single-handedly dictate Beijing’s provocative policy, nor make ‘counterproductive and self-defeating’ choices (Sheng 2008). Quite the contrary, Mao carefully weighed his decisions, closely observed the international situation, and frequently consulted PLA commanders. It was local PLA commanders who made constant pushes for the attacks, and the defense minister who gave the final approval. After the crisis, China was able to establish direct communication with the US through ambassadorial talks, claimed peaceful co-existence as the guideline for foreign policy, and made substantial economic developments. From Mao’s angle, the military campaign of 1954–1955 was a huge success, particularly with the ROC’s withdrawal from Dachens: China ended up with substantial gains and little losses. The Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 was different. It began impulsively on Mao’s side, but the situation was addressed with caution and calculation throughout. Mao wanted to press Taiwan, for he probably hoped the ROC would withdraw from Jinmen after PLA’s artillery blockage, as had happened in Dachens in 1955. It did not happen; instead, the US provided aid right away. Quickly Mao aborted his plan. When he realized the US’s two Chinas plot, Mao ordered symbolicbombing, and named it the ‘Noose Strategy’. This event was an awkward episode in China’s military history. It was a good example of China’s chaotic atmosphere when the Great Leap Forward movement devoured the whole nation. When Mao came up with an idea, the whole country was mobilized to follow without much rationale. The Fujian front fought a battle without knowing the objective or having a definite plan, yet no one dared to question Mao. This episode may be understood as the army’s devotion to the Great Leap Forward movement. But even at the height of the Great Leap Forward, Mao firmly stood by his baseline: never starting another war against the US. Throughout, Mao meticulously monitored military activity at the front, and anxiously eyed any responses from the US. He modified his plans accordingly, knowing that in the end ‘militarily it sounded like a joke’ (Wu 1994, 11). In retrospect, Mao at no time launched an actual military campaign to liberate Taiwan, regardless of numerous Chinese propaganda campaigns on the issue. The key concern had always been how the US would respond. In both Taiwan Strait Crises,

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the PLA acted because Mao assessed that the US would not intervene. Each time when the US showed strong commitment to offshore islands, Mao halted the military campaigns and resorted to diplomatic negotiations. During the two crises, through alternations of showing off military muscle and diplomatic negotiations, both Beijing and Washington came to know the other’s baseline and tactics. Neither wanted a full-scale war over Taiwan, and both sides were now convinced of that, thus reaching a tacit understanding. From then on, there was no major military clash between the two countries. The Sino-US ambassadorial talks served as an effective channel of communication: for example, much of the early preparation of Sino-US rapprochement took place in Warsaw, which paved the way for Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, as detailed in the next two chapters. Today Xi Jinping is in a similar situation over Taiwan. He needs to keep military pressure strong enough to dissuade Taiwan from claiming independence, but he cannot cause casualties, which could trigger a war against the US. Beneath Xi’s appearance of military flaunting, despite bellicose propaganda, he had no plan to take on battles with Taiwan. Both China and the US still hold the same baseline. However, with the deteriorating US-China relationship and the rise of the New Cold War, US responses to the CCP’s activities appeared more belligerent. Judging from history of the two Taiwan Strait crises, the US military commitment successfully deterred Mao. Mao, with his political genius and paramount control of China, managed to end the crises without revealing the compromises he made. It would be quite an accomplishment if Xi could achieve the same. Again, both China and the US are walking a thin line.

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Sheng, Michael. 2008. ‘Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet Split’. Modern China, vol. 34, no. 4:477–507. Su, Yu. January 5, 1950. ‘Report on the Problem of Liberating Taiwan’. Quoted in He Di, ‘“The Last Campaign to Unify China”: The CCP’S Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949–1950’, Chinese Historians, 5.1, 1992: 8. ‘Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State’. September 15, 1958. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d91. Accessed February 27, 2021. Truman, Harry. January 5, 1950. ‘Statement On Formosa’. https://china.usc.edu/ harry-s-truman-%E2%80%9Cstatement-formosa%E2%80%9D-january-5-1950. Accessed February 26, 2021. Truman, Harry. June 27, 1950. ‘Statement by President Truman on Korea’. https:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116192. Accessed February 26, 2021. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2009. Strait Talk: Untied-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ‘United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’. (NSC 68), April 1950. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. Accessed April 17, 2021. Wang, Bingnan. 1985. Zhong Mei huitan jiu nian huibu (Nine years of Sino-US talks). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Wang, Yan. 1992. Paoji Jinmen (The bombardment of Jinmen). Chaoxing shuzi tushuguan dianzi tushu. Wang, Yan ed., 1998. Peng Dehuai nianpu (Chronology of Peng Dehuai). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Wu Lengxi. 1994. ‘Wu zhang yu wen zhang: Paohong Jinmen meimu’ (Fighting with weapons, fighting with words: the inside story of the shelling of Jinmen), Zhuanji wenxue, Beijing, no. 1, 5–11. Xia, Yafeng. 2006. Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Xu, Yan. 2011. Jinmen zhi zhan (The Battle of Jinmen). Liaoning: Liaoning renmen chubanshe. Yan, Mingfu. March 2006. ‘1958 nian paoji Jinmen yu geluomike mimi fanghua’ (1958 bombardment of Jinmen and Gromyko’s secret visit to China) Bannian Chao, 16–18. Yang, Kuisong. 2003. ‘Mao Zedong he liangci taihai weiji’ (Mao Zedong and the two Taiwan Strait Crises). Shixue Yuekan, no. 11: 52–59. Yang, Kuisong and Sheng Mao. Spring 2016. ‘Unafraid of the Ghost: The Victim Mentality of Mao Zedong and the Two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s’. China Review, vol. 16, no. 1, 1–34.

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Yi, Qiming and Chen Yaguang. 1997. Di yiren guofang buzhang (The first defense secretary). Guangzhou: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe. Yu, Maochun. Spring 2016. ‘The Battle of Jinmen: The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait’. Naval War College Review, vol. 69, no. 2: 91–107. Zhang, Sheng. 2007. Cong zhanzhen zhong zoulai: Liangdai junren de duihua (Walking through the warpath: Conversations between two generals). Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe. Zhang, Shuguang. 2001. Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontation, 1949–1958. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Zhu, Pingchao. 2022. ‘Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953’. In A New Cold War: The Lost History of Sino-US Relations, Qiang Fang and Xiaobing Li, eds., Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

About the Author Dr. Xiaojia Hou is associate professor in the Department of History, San Jose State University. Her book, Negotiating Socialism in Rural China: Mao, Peasants, and Local Cadres in Shanxi, 1949–1953, was published by Cornell University Press in 2016. She has also published multiple book chapters, articles, and book reviews.

Part Three Rapprochement and Opportunities

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Media and US-China Reconciliation1 Guolin Yi Abstract The elite US media made substantial contributions to the key events of Sino-American rapprochement from 1969, when Richard Nixon took off ice, to his historic China trip in 1972. Besides transmitting signals between the two governments, the media proposed policies ahead of the American government, as well as public opinion, and functioned as ‘cultural diplomats’ in the official and unofficial interactions between the two countries. Meanwhile, the US media knowingly and unknowingly helped China project a positive image to the world and cooperated with the US government by cultivating the American public for better relations between the two countries. During the ‘TV spectacle’ of Nixon’s trip in China, media also became part of the story they covered. Keywords: Media, Sino-American Rapprochement, Richard Nixon, Nixon’s China Trip in 1972, TV Spectacle

From 1958 to 1963, US-China tensions did not alleviate under the administrations of Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War with the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents in August 1964 and his deployment of ground combat troops in south Vietnam in March 1965 increased Mao’s concern about the American threat on China’s southern border. However, when Johnson sent the signal to Beijing that the United States had no intention to either invade north Vietnam or to destroy the Hanoi regime, China also showed restraint in dealing with the American threat. The two governments thus reached a tacit agreement 1 Some contents in this chapter have been adapted from materials previously published in my book The Media and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1963–1972: A Comparative Study (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2020). I would like to thank LSU Press for allowing me to use materials from the book.

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch07

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about non-confrontation in Vietnam. During the high point of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1968, Johnson’s ‘tentative bridge-building’ gestures, such as conciliatory public speeches and allowing the sale to China of a limited amount of goods such as pharmaceutical and medical supplies, were rebuffed by Beijing (Lumbers 2008, 177, 188). It was Richard Nixon that broke the ice between the two countries after he took office in 1969. When it comes to the Sino-American reconciliation under Nixon’s presidency, scholars have covered how leaders of the two countries took advantage of the opportunities created by the unique context and contingencies of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and how they maneuvered through public and private communications. However, most of them have overlooked an important player, the media, through which the American people learned about the progress of Sino-American thaws. Media are important due to their power to influence public opinion, a power best reflected in their ability to ‘spin’ what happened through a subjective process of selectivity, placement, images, and opinions (Yi 2020, 2). Bernard Cohen, one of the earliest scholars to study the relationship between the press and US foreign policy, claims that the press is not only a ‘purveyor of information and opinion’, but also has agenda-setting functions. He argues that the press may not be successful in telling people ‘what to think’, but it is generally successful in telling the audience ‘what to think about’ (Cohen 1963, 5, 13, 259). Cohen made the claim at a time when the print media was the dominant means through which people learned about current affairs. Since the 1960s, television has replaced newspapers as the dominant medium and consolidated the media’s power to set the agenda for political issues. By looking at both the print media and television, this chapter examines how the US media contributed to the key events of SinoAmerican rapprochement from 1969, when Richard Nixon took office, to his historic China trip in 1972. Specifically, it examines their coverage of Sino-Soviet clashes in 1969, the signals from China to the United States in 1970 and 1971, Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971, and Nixon’s China trip. It aims to shed light on the unique roles of the media in the historic rapprochement and their relationship with the government in this process. Sources of the US media in this chapter include the New York Times and the Washington Post, two of the most influential newspapers during the period under study because other major newspapers, magazines, and television networks often accepted their definition of ‘what was “news”,’ two news magazines, Time and Newsweek, and the evening newscasts of the three national networks, CBS, ABC, and NBC. Students of American journalism would agree with Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon

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that these seven media institutions were the most important in the United States (Small 1994, 3). Scholars on Sino-American relations generally agree that the eruption of Sino-Soviet border conflicts in March and August 1969 was an important factor that brought the United States and China together because it created an important opportunity for Nixon to send signals of friendliness to Beijing. They trace the origin of Nixon’s thinking on China to his much-quoted article in Foreign Affairs in 1967, where he elaborated on the potential of China and the necessity of bringing it back to the world community (Nixon 1967, 111–25). Nevertheless, Nixon was very cautious with his public gestures on China in the early days of his administration. When asked about China in his first press conference on January 27, 1969, Nixon said his administration would ‘continue to oppose Communist China’s admission to the United Nations’. He cited China’s lack of interest in joining the UN, its refusal to abide by the UN Charter, and its insistence on the expulsion of Taiwan, which he described as a ‘responsible member of the international community’, and concluded that he saw no immediate prospect of any change in US policy ‘until some changes occur on their side’ (Washington Post, hereafter as WP, January 28, 1969, A8). Nixon’s remarks about China received criticisms in the mainstream US media. The Times editorial called it ‘the most disappointing section’ of his press conference because he seemed to have ignored the fact that the Chinese initiative in calling for the Warsaw talks was itself a change of its earlier stance. Newsweek claimed that they could have been ‘eagerly cited as proof of America’s evil intentions’. While the Times and Newsweek were critical of Nixon, the Post gave a cool-headed analysis of Nixon’s approach when its editorial argued that his position might let down Americans who longed for Washington’s flexibility and might ‘sweeten’ the Russians, who were worried that he may immediately ‘play the China card’. Interestingly, it also pointed out that Nixon had left ‘plenty of room’ for himself by taking a ‘non-committal view’ (New York Times, hereafter as NYT, January 28, 42; Newsweek, February 10, 1969, 44; WP January 28, 1969, A14). These stories suggest, in a way, that the US media were ahead of Nixon in calling for a new attitude toward China when he came into office.

Brainstorming on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes When the Sino-Soviet border clashes erupted in March 1969, US elite media were surprised not by the fighting, but by how promptly it was announced by

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China and the Soviet Union. They knew that there had been skirmishes along the border for years, but Beijing and Moscow had either denied unofficial reports of border incidents or dismissed them with vague references. The Post stated that the conflict was ‘important for being announced as for being fought’. The Times claimed that the territorial issue was only a ‘sidelight’ that the two governments turned on or off as the overall climate changed (NYT, March 3, 1969, 1; WP, March 4, 1969, A18). The image of China was not very positive on American television because all the three networks used Soviet-provided film, which featured the memorial service for fallen Soviet soldiers and Chinese border guards violently waving Mao’s Little Red Books and shouting in the face of Soviet guards. To add to the sensation, they all quoted the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s statement that the Chinese had mutilated dead Soviet soldiers with bayonets (CBS Evening News, Record #: 202959; ABC Evening News, Record #: 4603; NBC Evening News, Record #: 444972). The impression they gave was that the Chinese were more provocative than the Soviets. Time magazine criticized China and claimed that it was trying to use the border clash as a ‘domestic propaganda campaign’ aiming to ‘rally fervor’ for a new Great Leap Forward-styled economic venture (Time, March 21, 1969, 23). In an article entitled ‘Communists: Even Money’, Newsweek gave equal coverage to both sides in terms of their own versions of what happened during the battle, their respective diplomatic notes, domestic reactions, and how each side interpreted the background of the incident and the motivation of the other (Newsweek, March 17, 1969, 16–17). It is probably the most balanced coverage of the incident. While an editorial in the Times agreed with Time magazine that the Chinese government was using the clashes as a domestic campaign, it showed more support for China by arguing that Moscow had ‘itself to blame’ if the Chinese propaganda won more sympathy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere than it might have a year earlier when it invaded Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, the Times even supported China’s territorial claim when it referred to the ‘fact that much of Soviet Siberia was stolen from Manchu Empire little more than a century ago’ (NYT, March 8, 1969, 28). Whereas the US media admitted that the Chinese were more provocative, they presented the Soviet Union as a threat of a different nature. For example, the Times reprinted on its editorial page a speech of former White House counsel Theodore Sorensen, who claimed that Beijing was more hostile in words, but Moscow was more threatening in deeds (NYT, March 30, 1969, E13). Similarly, Time magazine held that China had been ‘involved less dramatically outside its borders than the Soviet Union, which

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has Hungary and Czechoslovakia on its record, to say nothing of the Middle East arms race and the mounting of missiles in Cuba’ (Time, June 6, 1969, 48–49). These stories show that there was sympathy toward China in the US media, even though it was portrayed as more provocative in the Sino-Soviet conflicts. When the two Communist giants were engaged in fighting, people would wonder where the United States should stand. Overall, the US media proposed two options. The first was to stay neutral and try not to exploit the conflicts. The second was to take advantage of the opportunity and improve relations with China. The Post was a good example. Its editorial followed the line of Stephen Rosenfeld, former chief of the Post’s Moscow bureau, who argued that the United States should avoid exploiting the Sino-Soviet trouble and develop close relations with both. Stanley Karnow, the Post’s main China watcher in Hong Kong, on the other hand, advocated tilting toward Beijing, which can be seen in his article titles such as ‘Moscow is Strident: China Tones Down Trouble on Border’ for his front-page article and ‘Soviet Anti-Chinese Blasts Provide Openings for US’ for his column (WP, March 4, 1969, A18; March 30, 1969, 40; March 22, 1969, A1; March 24, 1969, A25). Interestingly, these two positions ran parallel with the internal discussions of the Nixon administration (FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 27, 29). What they had in common was that no serious thoughts were given to siding with the Soviet Union. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its Ninth Congress between April 1 and 24 in 1969, US media interpreted it as a sign of China’s return to stability and an opportunity for better relations with the United States. For example, the Times made this connection in an article entitled ‘Washington Hopes Peking Meeting Leads to Talks with U.S.’ by reporting an ongoing China policy review headed by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and the recent remarks of Secretary of State William Rogers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Ninth Congress ‘might result in the formulation of new policies setting the course for China’s future developments’. NBC went even further than the Times. After reporting Rogers’s statement that the United States would not exploit Sino-Soviet troubles and that it wanted better relations with both countries, the anchor said that the CCP’s Ninth Congress might result in a ‘softer’ China policy and that ‘diplomatic gossip’ in East Europe about US-China warming-up gave the Russians ‘sleepless nights’ (NYT, April 2, 1969, 16; NBC Evening News, Record #: 445420). Although Rogers’s statement gave the impression of American neutrality, the anchor’s comments pointed toward better relations with China.

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Another example is how the Times covered the speech of Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Baltimore on September 5, 1969. His most important line was, ‘We are not going to let Communist Chinese invective deter us from seeking agreements with the Soviet Union. Conversely, we are not going to let the Soviet apprehensions prevent us from attempting to bring China out of its angry, alienated shell’ (Richardson 260). Kis­ singer argues that Richardson’s statement was a ‘revolutionary step’ for the US government when it publicly warned against a threat to China, a country that had been hostile to the United States and with which it had no communication since Nixon took office. In his memo to Kissinger on October 8, NSC staffer John Holdridge suggested calling Chinese attention to Richardson’s statement as part of US overtures (Kissinger 1979, 184). The next day, the Times featured the headline ‘Nixon Aide Affirms U.S. Will Press for China Ties’, which only published his remarks about bringing China out of isolation, omitting the part about Washington seeking agreements with the Soviet Union (NYT, September 6, 1969, 1). Essentially it rendered what appeared to be a neutral statement of the government into an official bias toward China. In their news analyses, the magazines also elaborated on the possibility of closer ties with China. Time pointed out that “with the passing of monolithic Communism, interesting possibilities open up for US diplomacy and the case for change in US policy is powerful’. Newsweek argued that if the Russians won the war against China, it would dramatically change the ‘international balance of power’ to the disadvantage of the United States and would cause deeper suspicion and animosity in Soviet-American relations than those that prevailed during the worst of the Cold War (Time, June 6, 1969, 48–49; Newsweek, August 18, 1969, 38). These stories show that US media tended to interpret the government gesture of neutrality as a sign of tilting toward China. At the same time, they analyzed the downside of siding with the Soviet Union. As a result, the overwhelming voice in the mainstream media signaled moving closer to China. These stories created a favourable environment for the Nixon administration to move toward China. As seen earlier, the US media paid close attention to the Soviet fear of an improvement in Sino-American relations, which can be seen in how NBC covered the speech of Sorensen at the National Committee on United States-China Relations conference on March 20. The conference attracted prominent media attention due to the attendance of Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who in his keynote address called for a ‘sweeping change’

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of America’s China policy in the context of Sino-Soviet conflicts. In the telecast, the NBC anchor started with, ‘however improbable it may seem, the United States and China might have an understanding’. He then explained that when the New York liberals met to talk about China policy, Russia’s New Time condemned the meeting because it seemed to ‘coincide with’ the Chinese attack (NYT, March 21, 1969, 1; March 22, 1969, 7; WP, March 21, 1969, A1; March 22, 1969, A12; NBC Evening News, Record #: 445359). When he pointed out that the meeting had been planned a year earlier, it looked like a blow to the Soviet accusation, thus exposing its paranoia. Media’s focus on the Soviet fear of a Sino-American thaw in relations would also add weight to the argument. In covering the Sino-Soviet conflicts, US media, unlike the US government, did not have to worry about upsetting the Soviet Union when they openly talked about moving closer to China. Their open discussions of the Soviet fear also justified the possible benefits of such a move. In so doing, they helped the Nixon administration cultivate public opinion by elaborating on something it might be quietly doing but was unable to state explicitly.

Passing on Chinese Signals to the United States In July and August 1969, the Nixon administration sent clear signals to China of its intention to improve relations through public and private channels. Beijing’s attitude was ambivalent until an incident at a Yugoslavian fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace of Culture on December 3, when US Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel, Jr. went out of his way to chase a Chinese diplomat to deliver a message of Washington’s desire to reestablish connections (Yi 2020, 108–9). Stoessel’s unusual behavior convinced Chinese leaders of Washington’s sincere desire to improve relations. After learning of the incident, Zhou Enlai at once instructed the Chinese embassy in Warsaw to let the Americans know of Beijing’s interest in reopening communications (Xia 2006, 144–6). On January 8, 1970, when the United States and China announced simultaneously that the Warsaw talks would resume on January 20, the State Department used the term ‘People’s Republic of China’ (PRC) for the first time. In their front-page articles, both the Times and the Post called attention to the change (NYT, January 9, 1970,1; WP, January 9, 1970, 1). An editorial in the Times and a column by Harrison Salisbury used the term right away. Actually, that was not the first time for the newspaper: it had used that term several times a year earlier, though not in prominent places

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(NYT, January 10, 1970, 29; January 11, 1970, 167; January 4, 1969, 1; April 3, 1969, 3; October 2, 1969, 3). Starting in 1970, the Chinese government became much more proactive in reciprocating overtures from Washington. Early that year, representatives from both countries in Warsaw visited each other’s embassies. At the 135th meeting of the Warsaw Talks in January 1970, Chinese chargé d’affaires Lei Yang stated Beijing’s offer to talk through ‘higher-level discussions or any other channel that both sides might agree upon’. At the 136th meeting in February, he made an unusually conciliatory statement and accepted the US proposal to send an emissary to Beijing (FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 62). On April 28, the Chinese side informed the US embassy that it was ready to meet on May 20. Two days later, however, US forces moved into Cambodia to clear Viet Cong sanctuaries (Kissinger 1979, 692). To show its support for Cambodia, the Chinese government not only cancelled the Warsaw meeting, but also started a propaganda campaign against the United States. As communications between the two countries were again cut off, Beijing took the initiative to send signals of friendliness to Washington in 1970. Kissinger described the signaling between Beijing and Washington as ‘an intricate minuet’ that was ‘so delicately arranged that both sides could always maintain that they were not in contact, so stylized that neither side needed to bear the onus of an initiative, so elliptical that existing relationships on both sides were not jeopardized’ (Kissinger 1979, 187). Under these circumstances, the media of both countries played an important role in passing on the signals between their governments. On July 10, the Chinese government suddenly released James Walsh, a 79-year-old Roman Catholic bishop detained in China for twelve years on charges of espionage. The Chinese government did not give prior notice of his release to the US consulate in Hong Kong. Nor did the bishop himself understand why he was released at that particular time (NYT, July 11, 1970, 1). Instead, Beijing chose to announce his release in the official People’s Daily with detailed information about his name, age, and even hometown (People’s Daily, hereafter PD, December 8, 1969, 6; July 11, 1970, 2). Its prominent position in the Party organ and the detailed introduction to the bishop showed the importance Beijing attached to his release. The bishop’s release promptly made the headlines in US elite media. Both the Times and the Post related the timing of his release to the recent exit of US forces from Cambodia. The Post commented that by doing so Beijing sought to ‘take the edge off some of its recent sharp verbal attacks on the United States’. In an editorial titled ‘… and a Signal from China’, the

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Times argued that his release was not accidental and that Beijing might be sending a signal to Washington, ‘the most important signal since the Chinese People’s Republic agreed to resume the Warsaw talks’ (WP, July 11, 1970, 1; NYT, July 11, 1970, 1, 19). The three networks showed vivid images of the bishop crossing the border into Hong Kong and his press conference afterwards. ABC and CBS rushed to interview Walsh’s sister and brother, both of whom said his release was a ‘miracle’ (ABC Evening News, Record #: 11052; CBS Evening News, Record #: 210826). When the bishop showed up in a wheelchair at the press conference, he was described as ‘alert’. Even though he claimed that he had been forced to sign the confession and that he found it hard to justify the severity of the sentence ‘meted out’ to him, he said that overall he received ‘good treatment’ in prison and that he ‘could not feel angry toward any Chinese’ because he just ‘loved the Chinese people’ (ABC Evening News, Record #: 11139; CBS Evening News, Record #: 210944; NBC Evening News, Record #: 452085). Instead of a condemnation of the Chinese government, the message from the press conference was more about the gratitude people felt for Walsh’s release. Vivid images of the bishop on television screens would send a positive signal to the American audience. In the fall of 1970, Beijing sent more signals to Washington through Edgar Snow, an ‘old friend’ of the Chinese Communists since the mid-1930s, when he visited their headquarters in Yan’an and interviewed their leaders. Snow’s greatly acclaimed book, Red Star over China, published in 1938, provided a favourable description of the Chinese Communist revolution (Chen 2001, 254). On the October Day for national celebration, Zhou Enlai deliberately arranged for Snow and his wife to stand next to Mao on the Tiananmen rostrum in reviewing the parade and a picture of Mao with Snow was taken (Snow 1972, 3). Actually, Mao’s photo with Snow was not published in the Peoples’ Daily until Christmas 1970. Its caption stated, ‘The Chinese people’s great teacher Chairman Mao has recently met friendly American Edgar Snow and had a cordial and friendly talk with him’. Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, all Chinese newspapers carried a quotation of Mao’s in the small box at the upper right-hand corner of every front page; the Mao quotation for that day was, ‘People of the world, including the American people, are our friends’. When they met in January 1965, People’s Daily also published a photo, but it called Snow ‘an American writer, the author of Red Star over China’ (PD, December 25, 1970, 1; January 10, 1965, 1). The different treatments Snow received in the Party organ illustrated the change in Sino-American relations. When the two countries were locked in hostility, he was treated as a private citizen without hint of friendship. In

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1970, Snow became a representative of the American people whom Beijing wanted to befriend. Beijing’s signals through Snow did not produce timely effects, as they attracted little attention from the mainstream US media. Very few of them featured the picture or even mentioned it on their frontpages. C.L. Sulzberger of the Times was among the very few who mentioned it in an article entitled ‘The Tea Leaves Change’ in his ’Foreign Affair’ column. He saw the picture in the first issue of Beijing Review in 1971, the only China-published English magazine targeting the Western audience (NYT, January 22, 1971, 39). Even though Beijing tried to send the signal to the American audience, most of the US media were not impressed by Mao’s high-profile appearance with Snow, probably because of their natural suspicion of leftists, especially those with a pro-Communist record. Besides the photo-op at Tiananmen Square, Mao also took an interview with Snow in December 1970, when he ‘casually’ said that Nixon would be welcome to visit China ‘either as president or as a tourist’. This remark was later published and interpreted as Mao’s invitation to Nixon (Snow 1972, 9, 12). Mao probably hoped that Snow would pass on his message to Nixon. However, Snow’s interview with Mao was not published in Life until April 30, 1971 (Life, April 30, 1971, 4, 46–51). By then, its impact would be overshadowed by the more celebrated Ping-Pong Diplomacy. Seymour Topping, foreign editor of the Times, claimed that, after Snow left China in February 1971, he sent to the newspaper a lengthy article based on a series of interviews with Mao and Zhou. Unfortunately, executive editor Abe Rosenthal, who was strongly anti-Communist due to his experience as a reporter in Poland, felt uneasy about giving too much space to a piece written by a journalist known for his strong sympathy for the Chinese Communists. He insisted on drastic cuts, arguing that the article was too long and ‘propagandistic’. When Snow refused to make the cut, Rosenthal ‘summarily’ rejected his article, not knowing that it reflected Mao’s attitude conveyed to Snow in ‘off-the-record remarks’ (Topping 2010, 325–6). The Times thus missed a precious opportunity to pass on the important signal to the Nixon administration, as well as a scoop. Kissinger’s version was that the State Department probably could not have obtained a full text of Snow’s talk with Mao because a memo to him on April 1, 1971, did not mention the element of an invitation to Nixon. It instead reported that Snow had gained the impression from his meetings with Chinese leaders that ‘there was no immediate prospect of improving Sino-American relations because of the war in Indochina’ (Kissinger 1979, 709). Richard Nixon claimed in his memoir that he learned of Mao’s statement

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to Snow within a few days after their conversation (Nixon 1978, 547). Nixon was probably bragging or simply lying because nobody else could verify his claim; nor did he produce any evidence about how he obtained it (Tudda 2012, 62, 229, n 19). The suspicion of communists in US media, to some extent, prevented Mao’s signal through Snow from being delivered at an earlier date, particularly when the signals from China were too nuanced; neither could US officials pick them up.

Witnessing Ping-Pong Diplomacy During the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in 1971, the media were important witnesses of the friendly exchanges between Chinese and American players. At the thirty-first World Table Tennis Championships held in Nagoya between March 28 and April 7, 1971, when American ping-pong player Glenn Cowan accidently boarded a bus for the Chinese players, three-time world champion Zhuang Zedong approached him and offered an embroidered scarf as a gift. When Cowan and the Chinese players got off the bus, they ran into a crowd of waiting journalists. The next day, Cowen returned the favour by giving Zhuang a Beatles t-shirt. Their exchange was again caught by journalists and cameras (Yi 2020, 132–3). The world media’s positive coverage of the Zhuang-Cowan exchanges was probably one of the reasons that encouraged Mao to invite the American ping-pong team to visit China. According to Mao’s head nurse, Wu Xujun, Mao was intrigued and praised Zhuang for his ‘diplomatic adroitness’ and ‘political smartness’ upon learning of the story from cankao ziliao [Reference Materials], an internal publication that fed top CCP leaders with translated news stories from world news agencies. During the tournament, leaders of the American delegation inquired repeatedly whether they could visit China when they met their Chinese counterparts. They became especially eager when they learned that Beijing had invited teams from England and Canada. When the American request was reported to Beijing, Zhou Enlai was supportive, while Mao was undecided. On April 6, when the tournament was about to end, he suddenly made the decision to invite the American team (Wu 1995, 306–10). When the American ping-pong team travelled in China, Beijing allowed three American newsmen into the country to cover their activities: John Roderick from the Associated Press and John Rich, as well as Jack Reynolds from NBC. In addition, there were two Japanese technicians working for NBC and two non-US reporters working for Life magazine. On April 16,

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Tillman Durdin, head of the Times’ Hong Kong bureau and a prominent China watcher, was given a one-month visa, the first of this kind issued to an American journalist for regular news coverage since 1949. As mentioned earlier, Snow was not treated as a journalist but a private citizen during his visits to China in the 1960s, because China did not want to establish a precedent of receiving any ‘American journalist’ (Wu 1995, 134, 121). In 1971, when the Chinese government felt the need to promote China’s positive image to the world and better relations with the United States, American journalists became their useful friends. For two weeks, John Roderick’s dispatches from Beijing made several front pages of the Times and the Post, and Ping-Pong Diplomacy occupied the primetime of the three networks. Frequently using Zhou Enlai’s remark about a ‘new page’ in Sino-American relations during his meeting with the American ping-pong team, US media presented overwhelmingly positive stories about China. The Post reported: ‘the smile on the face of the dragon was dazzling’ as the American team received ‘first class treatment, warm welcomes, and speeches of friendship’. The Times particularly elaborated on the significance of the Chinese move. With the phrase ‘Major Policy Change’ in its headline, it interpreted Beijing’s granting of visas to American newsmen as ‘more significant’ than the invitation to the ping-pong team in showing its discarding of the policy of ‘self-isolation’. It called the two moves Beijing’s ‘first positive response’ to American overtures (WP, April 11, 1971, 1; NYT, April 11, 1971, E3, 1). Even though magazines were not as timely as newspapers in news reporting, they have unique strength in picture stories. The cover of Newsweek was a big cartoon depicting Mao and Nixon playing ping-pong with the caption ‘A New Game Begins’. It pointed out that Chinese ping-pong players appeared in Japan with ‘no small little red book, no chanting of quotations, no speech making, and no singing’ and were instead ‘profusely’ polite when socializing with their ping-pong rivals and the local people. Also, it put the ‘cleanness’ of Guangzhou (Canton) in sharp contrast to the ‘litterstrewn shanty towns of Hong Kong’ and claimed that everything, including the Chinese guards and officials, had been ‘freshly scrubbed’ (Newsweek, April 12, 1971, 57; May 17, 1971, 48). Time published several large pictures of the American team’s activities in China. In an article based on witness accounts of Life’s two reporters, it described China as ‘a nation that was unified and organized—with a level of poverty, but absolutely no misery’ and the people as ‘healthy and self-confident’. Moreover, it described Zhou Enlai as ‘smooth, very handsome, and quite witty’. In 1954, when Zhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation to the Geneva Convention, Life called him ‘a

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political thug’, ‘a ruthless intriguer, a conscienceless liar, and a saber-toothed political assassin’ (Time, April 26, 1971, 26–8; Life, June 28, 1954, 116, 125). By 1971, Henry Luce, the founder of Time and Life, and a prominent member of the China Lobby, which consisted mainly of conservative Republicans against any change in America’s China policy, had been dead for four years. The position of his magazines also became much more softened on China under the new circumstances. Television had obvious advantages in covering Ping-Pong Diplomacy. For the first time, the networks had the chance to show films provided by the Chinese official news agency. As the only network with reporters in China, NBC sent over 10,000 feet of color film and thirty-odd voice casts back to the United States through telephone relay without being censored by the Chinese (Time, April 26, 1971, 54). In the NBC video, there were smiling Chinese children holding Mao’s red books and a large crowd waving to the Americans when they toured the Summer Palace. During the exhibition matches between the Chinese and the American teams, an audience of 18,000 was shown clapping for the American team. The most impressive scene of the game came at the closing ceremony, when players of the two countries marched into the stadium in pairs holding hands. In the end, the reporter stated, ‘In sports at least, the Chinese and the Americans have found a common meeting ground’ (NBC Evening News, Record #: 457079; Record #: 457126). ABC had its own way of illustrating the new relationship. While the anchor was talking in the studio, the background changed from the Communist ‘hammer and sickle’ into two crossing ping-pong bats bearing the Chinese and American flags (ABC Evening News, Record #: 15040). Through the Canadian Broadcast Company, CBS ran a video of American players visiting the elite Tsinghua University, where Chinese students produced tractors. Under the influence of the Cultural Revolution, it claimed, students would not be trained as an ‘intellectual class’,” but workers using their own hands (CBS Evening News, Record #: 216151). Considering the number of TV sets in the United States at the time, these television images would have impressed a substantial number of the American people. Most observers knew that the venues visited by American players and journalists in China probably had been carefully screened and stage-managed. What matters, nonetheless, was that the overwhelmingly positive report on China by American journalists helped create an image of stability and rationality, which stood in sharp contrast to the chaos during the Cultural Revolution. They displayed to the world that the Chinese government was confident enough to receive journalists from the United States. The film of Chinese and American players holding hands must have had a strong

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impact on American audiences. The Chinese government was aware of the media’s role when it invited the American ping-pong team along with journalists. It is fair to say that the Chinese government successfully used American media to improve chances for rapprochement. One of the few to express dissent about Ping-Pong Diplomacy in the Nixon administration was Vice President Spiro Agnew. While attending the spring Republican governor’s conference on April 19, Agnew told journalists that he had misgivings about Nixon’s policy of easing relations with Beijing because it might undermine Taiwan’s position. He especially disliked the media’s overwhelming positive coverage of China; for example, their stories about the ‘contented and productive’ lives of workers who lived in tiny apartments in Beijing. He argued that it helped the Chinese government achieve a ‘propaganda triumph’ over the United States. Agnew’s remarks were so shocking that they made the headlines in newspapers and on the networks. To clear up a possible policy rift within the Nixon administration, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler summoned the media the next day and declared that there was ‘no disagreement’ between the President and the Vice President and that Mr. Agnew ‘fully’ supported Nixon’s initiatives to improve relations with China (NYT, April 20, 1971, 1; April 21, 1971, 1; WP, April 20, 1971, 1; April 21, 1971, 1). While most media accepted Zielgler’s assertion, CBS speculated that Nixon might have ‘orchestrated’ Agnew’s statement to appease conservatives (CBS Evening News, Record #: 216286). Agnew’s concern shows that people were not unconscious of the media’s role in setting the agenda with their overwhelmingly favourable coverage of China. The US media’s coverage of Ping-Pong Diplomacy most likely played a role in changing public opinion about China. In its wake, a Gallup Poll in May 1971 found that for the first time, people supporting the admission of China into the UN exceeded those who were against it by forty-five percent to thirty-seven percent. The poll also indicated that for the first time, the number of Republican respondents who favoured China’s UN membership exceeded that of their Democratic counterparts (Gallup 1972, 2308). This was great progress considering the Republicans’ traditional support for Taiwan. It should be noted that this change happened before the July announcement of Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing and Nixon’s coming visit to China. In May 1971, James Reston, vice president of the New York Times, became the third journalist of the newspaper after Durdin and Seymour Topping to receive a visa to enter China. When he arrived in Beijing, Reston developed acute appendicitis and underwent surgery in the Anti-Imperialist Hospital. As soon as he recovered, Reston published on the front page of the Times an article elaborating on how well he was treated, as Zhou Enlai had sent

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eleven leading medical experts to work on his case, which was not a major surgery. Reston also catered to the imagination of Americans by writing in length about how the Chinese doctor treated his pain with acupuncture, a traditional Chinese therapy that many Americans considered mysterious (NYT, July 26, 1971, 1; July 19, 1971, 2). During his three-week stay in China, Reston wrote several columns and commentaries that presented favourable impressions of China. In one of his ‘Letters from China’ series, Reston vividly wrote, ‘The routine of life for an American visitor in China these days is full of paradox. For example, you live in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda, but are treated with unfailing personal courtesy and are free to cable your impressions without censorship from the lobby of your hotel’ (NYT, August 4, 1971, 33). Reston’s stories of China were so positive that cankao xiaoxi [Reference News], another internal newspaper that carried stories translated from world news agencies and circulated among communist cadres above the county level, reprinted many of them (cankao xiaoxi, July 31, 1971, 4; August 4, 1971, 4; August 12, 1971, 1; August 15, 1971, 1; August 16, 1971, 1). Zhou Enlai’s effort in winning over prominent US opinion shapers like James Reston and his newspaper seemed to have paid off.

Nixon in China: The TV Spectacle At 7:30 on the evening of July 15, 1971, in the NBC studio in Burbank, California, President Nixon announced that his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had paid a secret visit to Beijing and met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his recent Asian tour, and that he had accepted Zhou’s invitation to visit China sometime before May 1972 (Nixon 1978, 544). Eager to be part of the historic moment, Nixon had requested airtime so that his statement would receive live broadcasting on national radio and television. As Nixon hoped, his photo as well as the ‘surprising’ news became the headlines of the media. The Times described his acceptance of the visit as ‘simply astounding’ and a ‘dizzying performance’. The Post compared the China trip to a ‘moon landing’ and called the news ‘mind-blowing’. It went as far as predicting a ‘possible end of the Cold War’. Time was amazed by the ‘extraordinary Nixon-Kissinger diplomatic adventure’. Calling Nixon’s move a ‘political masterstroke’, Newsweek argued that his ‘awesome power’ in conducting foreign affairs had ‘shattered two decades of hallowed American policy’ in just three and a half minutes (NYT, July 16, 1971, 1, 30; WP, July 17, 1971, A1, A14; Time, July 26, 1971; Newsweek, July 26, 1971, 16). In the case of

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Kissinger’s secret trip, the media seemed to support Nixon’s use of executive power in conducting secret diplomacy for the sake of good ends. To guarantee the success of his China trip, Nixon paid close attention to the preparatory work with the media. The Post’s White House correspon­ dent Carroll Kilpatrick said that Nixon ‘understood the press better than Johnson did and he knew how to make news’. (Broder 1987, 164–5) Early in his political career, Nixon had learned about the power of the media in the Alger Hiss case, which not only brought him national prominence, but also made him the enemy of eastern liberals and particularly the eastern media (Small 1999, 11). Though Nixon despised most journalists and believed that they hated him in return, as a shrewd politician, he was well-aware of the importance of their favourable coverage of his trip, which he knew would place him in a unique position in history and would help him in his re-election (MacMillan 2007, 150–2). Among different forms of the media, Nixon was particularly suspicious of the print press. Living in an era when television had become widely available to ordinary Americans, he knew well that television could help him reach a larger number of people with far less physical effort (Nixon 1990, 123). In his ‘farewell’ to the journalists in 1962, he declared, ‘Thank God for television and radio for keeping the newspapers a little more honest’ (Spear 1984, 85). After he became the president, Nixon chose to deliver his key messages through television speeches. As he told the press, ‘I think the American people are entitled to see the President and to hear his views directly and not to see him through the press’ (Broder 1987, 164–5). Kissinger said, ‘Television in front of the President is like alcohol in front of an alcoholic’ (MacMillan 2007, 150). Nixon had good reasons to like television due to its ability to deliver his messages with less filter, such as paraphrasing or reinterpretation. His preference for sending messages through television is like President Donald Trump’s use of Twitter. In terms of media opportunities, Nixon even found his wife useful. John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, described him as ‘usually capable of a passionless and penetrating analysis of his press opportunities’ and that he thought ‘like an editor’ (Ehrlichman 1982, 263–4). With his China trip, Nixon believed that ‘people’ contact was more important than meetings in terms of public relations. Before Kissinger’s interim trip to China in October, Nixon asked him to raise the question of Pat Nixon’s itinerary, since he wanted her to act as a ‘prop’ for ‘good people pictures’. He also thought it was a good opportunity to convey to the American audience the ‘human side of the Chinese’. He told his chief of staff Robert Haldeman, ‘On TV the American President received by a million Chinese is worth a hundred times the effect of a communiqué’ (Haldeman 1994, 364–6).

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As a successful advertising man in Los Angeles and a tireless worker, Haldeman was not only Nixon’s chief of staff, but also his chief ‘stage manager’. He shared Nixon’s suspicions of the media and his consciousness of their role in public relations. Knowing well how to sell an image, Haldeman wanted to make sure that Nixon ‘shone’ as a great leader and statesman in China (MacMillan 2007, 273–4). According to Kissinger, in the cabinet meeting upon his return from the secret trip to China, what concerned Haldeman most was the ‘size of the press contingent’. He was ‘disdainful’ upon learning that Kissinger had not settled the issue with Zhou Enlai, especially when Kissinger said that forty was enough, which was even less than the number of Secret Service people. As he said, ‘Haldeman saw no sense in making history if television was not there to broadcast’ (Kissinger 1979, 757). To guarantee the success of TV coverage, the White House worked, in the words of the Post columnist Don Oberdorfer, ‘hand-in-glove’ for several months to bring it about. According to him, four days after Nixon’s announcement of his China trip on TV, the Washington bureau chiefs of the three networks met with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler to talk about coverage. The networks put forward three plans: film cameras only with footage to be flown out of China and transmitted to the American audience via satellite from Tokyo, Seoul, or Hong Kong; film cameras only with footage transmitted directly from China via satellite through a ground station in China; and live coverage with electronic cameras transmitting images directly from a Chinese ground station. They pushed hard without hopes of success for the third choice—live coverage (WP, February 20, 1972, B7). During Kissinger’s trip to Beijing in October, he secured from Zhou Enlai the permission to build ground stations in China used for communication and live transmission through satellites. Zhou said he understood the equipment would be used to ‘manage the whole show’ (FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-13, Documents on China, 1969-1972, Document 40). In early January when General Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s deputy, and Ziegler led the advance team of eighteen into China to install the ground stations, seven network executives and engineers went along. During his talks with the Chinese, Haig emphasized the importance of making Nixon’s trip a ‘visible success’. Travelling to Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou, the advance group literally traced every place Nixon planned to visit, paced every step he might take, and worked on every camera angle (MacMillan 2007, 228, 273–4). The White House also gave extraordinary privileges to networks in allocating the seats of correspondents who would travel to China. In the list of eighty-seven newsmen Ziegler announced on February 7, 1972, only fifteen

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independent newspapers were invited; six went to the two wire services. Three went to columnists Richard Wilson, William Buckley, whom Ziegler described as a ‘conservative’, and Joseph Kraft, whom he depicted as a ‘nonconservative’ (NYT, February 8, 1972, 5; WP, February 8, 1972, A2). Six slots went to magazines, including Reader’s Digest, which did not normally cover the White House but was friendly to Nixon (Spear 1984, 98). Each of the three networks could send four correspondents. In addition to the eight seats for cameramen and seventeen for television technicians, they received thirty-seven in total. This did not include the sixty television technicians who had arrived in China earlier in the month. In the end, the networks each had twenty-one seats while newspapers, magazines, and non-network broadcast organizations had only one seat each—if they were lucky. In order to attend the festivities, many TV executives and producers disguised themselves as ‘television technicians’, bumping real engineers (NYT, February 8, 1972, 5; WP, February 8, 1972, A2; February 20, 1972, B7). The three networks also ‘scooped’ the print media when TV Guide reported a week in advance many details of Nixon’s plans, of which the newspapers were jealous, but had to employ in their own reports (WP, February 15, 1972, A1; February 20, 1972, B7). Max Frankel, the only Times correspondent lucky to be on the press plane, talked about the ‘massive competition’ he faced when he arrived in China. As he wrote, ‘From the moment we landed, I saw myself outgunned by cameras, so I labored to paint verbal pictures into interpretive commentaries in ways that television could not match’ (Frankel 1999, 348–9). Frankel won a Pulitzer Prize in 1973 for his reporting of Nixon’s epochal trip. Even though US media supported Nixon’s policy to reconcile with China, they did not always agree with his handling of the media, particularly his use of television. David Broder, a prominent columnist for the Post, wrote that television, with its strength in images, creates a ‘communication loop’ that makes the TV coverage ‘part of the story it is covering’ (Broder 1987, 144–5). In covering Nixon’s China trip, television, or the ‘TV spectacle’, did become a hot topic. Largely feeling at a disadvantage in the competition or due to their envy, the print media pointed out many problems with their electronic rivals to critique Nixon’s overdoing of the TV drama. In an editorial entitled ‘Spectacle and Substance’, the Times described Nixon’s departure ceremony as a ‘genuine drama’ with ‘elaborately staged fanfare’. It warned of the danger that the spectacle Nixon had “assiduously” created might obscure the differences between the two governments and foster “illusions” about Sino-American relations (NYT, February 19, 1972,

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30). The Post similarly maintained that the audience had to tell ‘show business’ from ‘diplomatic business’. Stanley Karnow, the Post’s correspon­ dent in Beijing, called Nixon’s visit an exercise of ‘TV Diplomacy’, arguing that TV not only helped him maximize public attention, but also helped the Chinese irritate Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Union. He also surmised that the Chinese leadership might use TV as a ‘lever’ to build up the American expectations that Nixon might return home with some kind of ‘arrangement’ by inflating his image (WP, February 20, 1971, B7; March 4, 1972, A19). The weekly magazines also pointed out the problems in Nixon’s handling of the media. Time described Nixon’s trip as an excellent opportunity for ‘a presidential candidate seeking re-election to make a television appearance’ (Spear 1984, 98). It maintained that all was ‘elaborate scrollwork, hiding content’. In its cartoon, Nixon and Mao stood in the middle of TV cameras and spotlights with a row of saluting guns firing in the background. The caption read, ‘Just think, all this will have gone to waste if you’re not reelected!’ (Time, March 6, 1972, 10–12). In an article called ‘TV: An Eyeful of China, A Thimbleful of Insight’, Newsweek showed CBS journalists ‘huddled together’ in the Beijing press room, ‘bemoaning’ their isolation and the lack of ‘hard’ news. As it indicated, CBS president Richard S. Salant decided to cancel live broadcasts on Thursday, saying ‘we’d had enough picture postcards’ from the Great Wall one day earlier. It also mocked the lack of in-depth reporting in television coverage because the networks all sent their most experienced anchors who ‘made up standard news teams to cover a spectacular in standard American terms’, while their sinologists, better equipped from digging information from sources in China, were sitting in New York studios ‘7000 miles from the scene (Newsweek, March 6, 1972, 27). As pointed out in a Post editorial, Nixon, in his ‘Man of the Year’ interview with Time, had confidently said, ‘Where you need a lot of rhetoric, a lot of jazz, a lot of flamboyance, is where you don’t have much to sell’. Using Nixon’s own words, it argued that his effort to ‘embellish’ his trip with ‘rhetoric and flamboyance and jazz’ was to encourage the suspicion that he did not have all that much to sell’ (WP, February 20, 1971, B7; March 4, 1972, A19; February 28, 1972, A20). When television coverage was used to this frothy extreme, the media themselves began to question what Nixon could bring back from Beijing. As such, Frankel’s Pulitzer Prize not only reflects the quality of news reporting by an experienced China watcher in contrast to the ‘post cards’ stories on television, but also looked like the print media’s jabbing at Nixon’s overplay of the TV spectacle.

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Conclusion Scholars of communications have developed several theories on the relationship between American media and the government in terms of foreign affairs. One school of thought portrays the media as participants in the foreign-policy process. For members of this school, the media play the role of the ‘fourth estate’ of the government with unique influence on policy. The contrary school, widely known as the ‘hegemony’ school, claims that government manipulates the media when off icials ‘stage events, leak selective information, cover up facts behind a wall of secrecy, overwhelm the media with barrages of press releases’, and of course, lie occasionally to the point that the media become ‘putty in the hands of the president and his legion of media managers’. A fundamental argument of the ‘hegemony’ theory is that the media have ‘no independent contribution’ to the foreign-policy debate. The ‘fourth estate’ school tends to exaggerate the role of the media in the policy-making of the government. The problem with the hegemony theory, on the other hand, is that it perceives the media as too ‘subservient’ to the government (Berry 1990, ix; Entman 2004, 4). This study of the US media’s coverage of Sino-American rapprochement has shown examples where both schools of thoughts could apply. I argue that these two schools represent the two sides of the US media and they are not mutually exclusive. On some occasions, the US media did make an ‘independent contribution’ to the reconciliation between the two countries. They played important roles as transmitters of signals between the two governments and active participants in the key events of rapprochement, such as Ping-Pong Diplomacy and Nixon’s China trip. They also publicized for the American people the progress and significance of Sino-American reconciliation. At the same time, they often had to rely on and worked with the governments of both China and the United States to deliver meaningful news stories. Moreover, the media played an important role in amplifying the impacts of these key events. As transmitters of political information, US media functioned as a ‘diplomatic signaling system’ between the two governments, especially when direct communication between the two governments did not exist (O’Heffernan 1991, 37). When Nixon and other US officials addressed China by its proper name, or emphasized its importance in world affairs, the media delivered these gestures of friendliness to the American public as well as the leadership in Beijing. On the other hand, when the Chinese government announced the release of Americans from custody, the American media

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readily passed on the overtures to the American audience. Meanwhile, there were times when the messages did not get across. For example, Mao’s signals through Edgar Snow were not delivered to Nixon earlier because of the media’s suspicion of communist sympathizers. In this case, the media’s overlooking of the signal caused the failure of communication. To some extent, it reflects the independence of the media in the transmitting process. By participants, Robert M. Batscha means that the media acted as an ‘advocate’ for policy and a ‘representative of the people’ in foreign relations (Batscha 1975, 36–46). On China, US media often ran ahead of public opinion and the government in pushing for a more f lexible China policy, such as their response to Nixon’s comments in his f irst press conference. Starting from the Ping-Pong Diplomacy in April 1971, moreover, the Chinese government admitted members of the US media into China and treated them with extraordinary privileges. These journalists not only wrote generally favourable stories about China, but also acted as ‘cultural diplomats’ between the two peoples when off icial contacts were scarce. Due to their independence from government control, US media do not have to worry about political restrictions and they have more freedom to elaborate on issues that the US government cannot openly talk about. On Sino-Soviet border clashes, while the Nixon administration assumed a posture of impartiality to avoid provoking the Soviet Union (even though in private it tilted toward China), US media were not worried about upsetting Moscow when they openly discussed the benefits of closer ties with Beijing, which helped sway the American people. If public opinion could be an important factor for Nixon to make bolder moves toward China, the media was a great partner in this effort. The participatory role of the media can also be shown when they become part of the stories they cover. The use of live television to cover Nixon’s visit to China was unprecedented in history. As a visual medium with a much larger audience, television had a larger impact because its images of China and the friendly exchanges between the two peoples were truly refreshing to the American audience after two decades of isolation between the two countries. While television helped Nixon achieve a public-relations success, American journalists criticized him for arousing unrealistic expectations because of his overuse of television. By pointing out the distinction between ‘content’ and ‘form’, they questioned how much the President could bring home. The ‘TV Spectacle’ highlights the importance of the media as key players in history.

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Despite their role as message transmitters and participants in the Sino-American rapprochement, US media were far from being completely ‘independent’ players. They relied heavily on the government as the main source for reporting foreign affairs. Kissinger’s secret trip to China is a good example of the government totally denying the media access to the political process. There were also ample instances where the US government turned a deaf ear to prominent news agencies’ calls for change in its China policy. Moreover, the special privilege Nixon gave television in assigning the media seats and the use of live broadcasting during his China trip show the strong position of the government in dealing with the media. At the same time, despite his uneasy relationship with the media, Nixon faced a much more cooperative or supportive media than Lyndon Johnson in their coverage of America’s China policy due to the different contexts faced by the two presidents. Very often, the American media justified and helped Nixon legitimize his China policies. US media might be not only ‘putty’ in the hands of the US government, but also the targets to be wooed by the Chinese government. Chinese premier Zhou Enlai made great efforts befriending American journalists when they visited China in 1971 and 1972. According to Seymour Topping, when he, along with William Attwood of Newsday and Robert Keatley of the Wall Street Journal, attended a dinner hosted by Zhou Enlai in June 1971, the Chinese Premier expressed his belief that American journalists could help to ‘mobilize their fellow countrymen to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan and Indochina’. Topping perceived Beijing’s effort to ‘court’ American public opinion to achieve its foreign-policy goals (Topping 2010, 1971, 52). American journalists might not be able to convince their own government to withdraw from Taiwan or Indochina, but they certainly helped China project a positive image to the world and promote better relations with the United States. One of the possible reasons that American media were willing to cover China positively was that China watchers working for them might have a ‘China complex’ due to their earlier experience with China. For example, during Ping-Pong Diplomacy, the chief of the Times’ Hong Kong Bureau Tillman Durbin’s honor as the f irst American newsman to receive a visa to report in China may have something to do with his report of the Nanjing massacre in the 1930s. It is also not surprising that Seymour Topping became the second American journalist to receive the journalist visa and was invited to have dinner with Zhou Enlai because he had married Audrey Ronning, whose father, Chester Ronning, had been the chargé d’affaires of the Canadian embassy in China between

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1949 and 1951 and an ‘old friend’ of Zhou Enlai (Frankel 1999, 348–9). Zhou probably had expected them to cover China favourably when he granted them the journalist visas. For these American journalists, even though they knew that the sites they visited in China might have been staged, they were still willing to present China in a positive light because they were probably eager to see the thaw in relations between the two countries. In this sense, they might have been voluntary collaborators with both the US and Chinese governments in achieving the goal of rapprochement. With the deterioration of current Sino-American relations since the Trump administration, more efforts are needed to get the two countries back to constructive communication and cooperation. As seen in the case of Sino-American rapprochement, the US media have played in the past and could play again an important role in bringing the two peoples together.

Bibliography Archival Sources ABC Evening News, Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Nashville, Tennessee. CBS Evening News, Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Nashville, Tennessee. NBC Evening News, Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, Nashville, Tennessee.

Newspapers and Magazines cankao xiaoxi (Reference News) Newsweek New York Times renmin ribao (People’s Daily) Time Washington Post

Published Documents Gallup, George H. 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971, vol. 3. New York: Random House.

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Government Documents Department of State Bulletin 61. 1969. Washington, DC: GPO. Accessible at http:// www.heinonline.org. US Department of State. 1972. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976 (FRUS), Vol. XVII, China. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO). Accessible at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

Books and Journal Articles Batscha, Robert M. 1975. Foreign Affairs News and the Broadcast Journalist. New York: Praeger. Berry, Nicholas O. 1990. Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of the New York Times’ Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Greenwood Press. Broder, David. 1987. Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News Is Made. New York: Simon & Schuster. Chen, Jian. 2001. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Cohen, Bernard C. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Durdin, Tillman, James Reston, and Seymour Topping. 1971. The New York Times Report from China. New York: Quadrangle Books. Ehrlichman, John. 1982. Witness to Power. New York: Simon & Schuster. Entman, Robert M. 2004. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Frankel, Max. 1999. The Times of My Life and My Life with the Times. New York: Random House. Garver, John W. 1982. China’s Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Goh, Evelyn. 2005. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gong, Li. 1992. Kuayue honggou: 1969–1979 nian zhongmei guanxi de yanbian [Bridging the Chasm: The Evolution of Sino-American Relations, 1969-1979] Zhengzhou, China: Henan renmin chubanshe. Haldeman, H.R. 1994. Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Kissinger, Henry. 1979. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown. Lumbers, Michael. 2008. Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative Bridge-Building to China During the Johnson Years. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

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MacMillan, Margaret. 2007. Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World. New York: Random House. Nixon, Richard. October 1967. ‘Asia after Viet Nam’. Foreign Affairs, vol. 46, no. 1:111–25. Nixon, Richard. 1978. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap. Nixon, Richard. 1990. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster. O’Heffernan, Patrick. 1991. Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Inside Perspectives on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Richardson, Elliot L. 1969. ‘The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration: Its Aims and Strategy’. Department of State Bulletin 61 (Washington, DC: GPO.). Accessible at http://www.heinonline.org. Ross, Robert and Jiang Changbin, eds. 2001. Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Small, Melvin. 1994. Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press Small, Melvin. 1999. The Presidency of Richard Nixon. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Snow, Edgar. 1972. The Long Revolution. New York: Random House. Spear, Joseph C. 1984. Presidents and the Press: The Nixon Legacy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Topping, Seymour. 2010. On the Front Lines of the Cold War: An American Correspondent’s Journal from the Chinese Civil War to the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Tudda, Chris. 2012. A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Vang, Pobzeb. 2008. Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. Xia, Yafeng. 2006. Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Xu, Tao, Lin Ke, and Wu Xujun. 1995. Lishi de zhenshi—Mao Zedong shenbian gongzuo renyuan de zhengyan [the True Life of Mao Zedong—Eyewitness Accounts by Mao’s Staff]. Hong Kong: Liwen chubanshe. Wu, Xujun. 1995. ‘Mao Zedong de wubu gaoqi: dakai zhongmei guanxi damen shimo [Mao Zedong’s Five Superior Moves in Opening Sino-American Relations]’, in Lishi de zhenshi--Mao Zedong shenbian gongzuo renyuan de zhengyan [the True Life of Mao Zedong--Eyewitness Accounts by Mao’s Staff], Tao Xu, Lin Ke, and Wu Xujun, eds.Hong Kong: Liwen chubanshe. Yi, Guolin. 2020. The Media and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1963–1972: A Comparative Study. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

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About the Author Dr. Guolin Yi is assistant professor of History at Arkansas Tech University and an associate in Research at the Fairbank Centre for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. He has published Media and Sino-American Rapprochement: 1963–1972 and articles in American-East Asian Relations and American Journalism, among others.

8

Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–19911 Yafeng Xia

Abstract On the basis of current scholarship and previously untapped Chinese sources, this chapter provides a deeper analysis of how Deng Xiaoping, then China’s paramount leader, handled relations with the US in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown. Deng had a tough job of balancing between Conservatives and Reformers in China’s leadership circle. Deng wanted to ‘keep the US door open’, without showing any softness in dealing with Washington. Deng’s foreign policy directive, ‘avoiding the limelight, and getting some things done’, saved Communist rule in China. Had the Bush Administration been tougher on China after the Tiananmen crackdown, it might have delayed China’s economic rise, but it wouldn’t have brought down the Chinese Communist regime. Keywords: China; United States; Deng Xiaoping; George H. W. Bush; Western sanctions; Reform and Opening up

Soon after Nixon’s China trip, there was a lull in Sino-American relations from 1972 to 1978. Richard Nixon’s initial opening to China was followed by a period in which the projected normalization of diplomatic ties between the two powers was allowed to languish. By the spring of 1978, the Jimmy Carter administration had become more enthusiastic about establishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing. At the time, Chinese leader 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Yafeng Xia, “Avoiding the Limelight: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Policy toward the United States, 1989–1991’, in Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War, Nuno P. Monteiro and Fritz Bartel, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 206–224. It has been substantially revised and adapted for inclusion in this volume with permission from the original publisher.

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch08

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Deng Xiaoping was eager to proceed with normalization in order to enlist Washington to oppose the Soviet Union. But more importantly, China would be able to get access to Western science and technology for his “Reform and Opening up” policy. On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China. This relationship was premised primarily on US-China shared opposition to the Soviet Union (Mann 1998, 78–95; Kissinger 2011, 348–76). During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan suggested on several occasions that if elected president, he would restore ‘official relations’ with Taiwan. When Reagan took office in January 1981, China became one of the principal battlegrounds for infighting within the new administration. After a year and a half of diplomatic maneuvering between the two sides, China and the United States signed the August 17, 1982, communique, restricting US arms sales to Taiwan. Although the Reagan administration did not promise to end all arms sales to Taiwan, it did agree to set strict limits on these sales. China also agreed that it would seek peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. After the signing of the August 17 communique, Washington and Beijing gradually forged a relatively smooth and stable working relationship. When President George H. W. Bush came to office in January 1989, he was committed to continuing and consolidating the existing US relations with China. But, during his four years in office, US-China relations entered a shocking period of trials and tribulations. (Mann 1998, 115–54; Kissinger 2011, 377–407). In English literature, there are numerous important studies covering USChina relations from 1989 to 1991. Several people who were involved in this historical process either as decision-makers or senior diplomats published their memoirs. Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft published a coauthored book in 1999. In the book, they narrated how they responded to the Tiananmen crackdown and why they made efforts to save the relationship (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 86–181). In 2003, Qian Qichen, recently retired Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, published a memoir of his over 40 years of diplomatic career. In 2005, a translated English edition of Qian’s memoir became available (Qian 2003; Qian 2005). As a senior diplomat, Qian defended China’s acts and policies, blaming Western powers for interfering in China’s internal affairs (Qian 2005, 127). James Lilly, who served as US ambassador to China from 1989 to 1991, published a memoir of his years as an intelligence officer and diplomat in China, including his time as ambassador during this crucial period (April 1989 to May 1991) (Lilly 2005). These are valuable sources for this study.

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In 1998, James Mann published an informative account of America’s relations with China from Nixon to Clinton, devoting four chapters to the discussion of US-China relations in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989 (Mann 1998, chapters 10 –13). In 1999, Patrick Tyler published an investigative account of US-China relations, covering the same period from Nixon to Clinton (Tyler 1999, 341–380). Both Mann and Tyler were critical of the Bush administration’s handling of China relations in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown. These two are journalistic accounts, which make for good, but sensational, reading. In 2003, Robert Suettinger published Beyond Tiananmen. Hailed as ‘a classic assessment of US-China relations in the decade after the Tiananmen massacre’, he spent over sixty pages in covering how Sino-American relations slowly recovered in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown from June 1989 to November 1991 (Suettinger 2003, 70–132). In On China, published in 2011, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger devoted a chapter on US-China relations from 1989 to 1991. As a former high-level US government official, who was heavily involved in America’s relations with China for four decades, Kissinger defended China. He was invited to visit Beijing in November 1989, only five months after the Tiananmen crackdown to meet and talk with Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. In the chapter, he offers a unique perspective on why the US reacted so strongly to the Chinese crackdown, and how the Chinese viewed the relationship in the aftermath (Kissinger 2011, chapter 15). In Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, which was also published in 2011, Ezra Vogel has a section covering US-China relations from June to December 1989; the title of the section is ‘Keeping the US Door Open’. He discusses how President Bush and China’s supreme leader Deng Xiaoping tried to patch up relations in the first six months after the Tiananmen crackdown (Vogel 2011, 648-54). More recently, Jeffrey Engel does a great job in analyzing why Bush tried so hard to ‘keep the door open’ to China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown (Engel 2017, 197). All these studies provide the contours of the Bush administration’s reactions and responses to the Tiananmen crackdown, but are not particularly revealing on the Chinese side of the story. On the basis of current scholarship and previously untapped Chinese sources, this chapter provides a deeper analysis of how Deng Xiaoping handled relations with the US in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown. Confronted with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and Western sanctions, Deng had a tough job of balancing between

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conservatives and reformers in China’s leadership circle. Unlike the conservatives, who were ascending and blaming the US for all of China’s troubles—and would not have hesitated to break up relations with Washington—Deng wanted to keep the US door open’.” At the same time, Deng did not want to show any softness in dealing with Washington. Deng’s foreign policy directive, ‘avoiding the limelight, and getting some things done’ saved Communist rule in China. After three years of difficult diplomacy, China gradually broke Western sanctions and regained international acceptance, including a White House welcome for the Chinese foreign minister. This chapter sheds new light on the Chinese side of the history of Sino-American relations in the turbulent years from 1989 to 1991.

Balancing between ‘anti-Peaceful Revolution’ and ‘Reform and Opening Up’ After the Tiananmen crackdown, Premier Li Peng, who announced the imposition of martial law, was the favourite of the Conservatives and Party elders. But Deng Xiaoping did not promote him to the position of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee General Secretary after Zhao Ziyang was sacked. Jiang Zemin, Secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, got the top job. Nonetheless, Li Peng, with the support of the Party elders, actually controlled the government, dominating in China’s foreign and domestic policymaking in the early 1990s. Li Peng blamed the US and Western European countries for rumor-mongering about the Tiananmen crackdown, and exerting political and economic pressures on China after the Tiananmen incident (Xia 2021, 207–208). Deng Xiaoping was reluctant to criticize Bush and valued the historical role Richard Nixon played in the development of US-China relations. But Li Peng openly criticized both Nixon and Bush. On September 6, Li Peng talked to reporters from Le Figaro, a French daily newspaper, claiming ‘President Bush seems to dream as Dulles did years ago. They believe that China’s younger generation will eventually rise up to overthrow their government’. Li’s remark connected the most hostile US Secretary of State with the US President who was most friendly to China, suggesting that US policy toward China from Eisenhower to Bush had never changed (Chen 2010, 328; Xia 2021, 208–10). Deng Xiaoping did not want to worsen and break relations with Washington. But he had a difficult job of balancing between ‘anti-peaceful evolution’ and ‘reform and opening up’. He wanted to restore US-China relations to

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normalcy, friendship, exchanges, and continuous cooperation, but doubted he could achieve this only through conciliation. Deng’s strategy in handling relations with the US was similar to the CCP’s policy toward the Guomindang (GMD) during the Second CCP-GMD United Front era from 1937 to 1945: to seek unity through struggle, to prepare for the worst, and to struggle for the best. First, it was necessary to withstand the pressure. Beijing would not be afraid of confrontation, but it would strive to avoid conflict. The purpose of the struggle was not to break up, but rather to unite. At a conference of Chinese ambassadors and envoys held in July, a month after the June 4th crackdown, Deng’s instruction on the United States was transmitted: ‘It is very important what policy we’ll adopt in dealing with the United States. Don’t be afraid! Take a firm stand! Be courteous! Adopting a soft attitude won’t stabilize the relationship. On the contrary, a firm stand would force a turn for the better’ (Chen 1991, 99). On June 9, 1989, Deng Xiaoping received the officers at the rank of general and above in command of troops enforcing martial law in Beijing. He then disappeared from public view for over three months until he reappeared to meet and talk with the Chinese American physicist and Nobel Prize winner Professor Tsung-Dao Lee of Columbia University on September 16 (ZGZYWY 1998, 436–37). Deng’s strategy in dealing with the crisis was to adopt an intransigent attitude, separating domestic affairs from diplomacy. Deng stressed that the Chinese government’s crackdown on June 4 was an internal matter, and thus no foreign country would be allowed to interfere. China would not submit to any pressure, and China’s main diplomatic opponent was the United States (Chen 1999, 93). In a talk with leading members of the CCP Central Committee on September 4, Deng offered an analysis of the international situation and China’s strategy in dealing with its complications, stating, ‘China should hold its ground, or others will plot against us … The more afraid you are and the more weakness you show, the more aggressive others will be. They will not be kind to you because you are weak. On the contrary, if you are weak, they will look down upon you’ (DXPWX 1998, 319–21; SWDXP 1994). Six months later, on March 3, 1990, Deng again stressed that China should stand firm and not succumb to Western pressure. Deng told his successors, ‘If China wants to withstand the pressure of hegemonism and power politics and to uphold the socialist system, it is crucial for us to achieve rapid economic growth and to carry out our development strategy’ (DXPWX 1995, 353–54, 356). While resisting pressure on China, Deng did not forget to remind his colleagues about the importance of economic growth.

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Conflict without a Complete Break—Managing Relations with the United States After Chinese troops stormed Tiananmen Square in Beijing, cracking down on thousands of demonstrators who had been occupying it for more than a month, the world was shocked. The American public was particularly outraged by the violence and brutality of the Chinese regime using force against its own people. President Bush, who was relaxing in Kennebunkport after a visit to Europe over the weekend, felt the need to respond publicly (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 89). As Henry Kissinger observes, ‘In this atmosphere, the entire Sino-US relationship, including the established practice of regular consultations between the two countries, came under attack from across a wide political spectrum … the critics converged on the need for sanctions to pressure Beijing to alter its domestic institutions and encourage human rights practices’ (Kissinger 2011, 411–12). George Bush, who had served in China as head of the American Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974–1975, believed that he had a much better understanding of China and US-China relations than most American officials. Over the years, he had formed cordial and friendly relations with Deng Xiaoping. At 8:00 am on June 5, 1989, former President Richard Nixon called Bush, advising, ‘don’t disrupt the relationship. What’s happened has been handled badly and is deplorable, but take a look at the long haul’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 98). Bush wrote in his diary, ‘I wanted a measured response, one aimed at those who had pushed for and implemented the use of force: the hard-liners and the Army … I wanted to avoid cutting off the entire commercial relationship. Instead, I decided to suspend military sales and contacts’(Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 89). At the press conference on June 5, Bush said, ‘This is not the time for an emotional response, but for reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China’. He was ‘mindful of these complexities, and yet of the necessity to strongly and clearly express our condemnation of the events of recent days’. He thus ordered suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons and visits between US and Chinese military leaders, and to review more sympathetically extended stay requests from Chinese students in the United States (GBPL1). After announcing sanctions against China, Bush hoped to get in touch with Deng Xiaoping directly to understand the real situation in China. Thus, at 11:50 am on June 7, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates phoned Han Xu, Chinese ambassador to the United States, informing him that Bush

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wanted to talk with Deng Xiaoping over the phone before 6:00 pm that day, asking him to make the arrangements. At the time, the situation in Beijing was tense and unclear, and leaders in Beijing were very much divided. It was very difficult for Deng to promise anything to the American president. The Chinese embassy in Washington did receive instructions from the Foreign Ministry’s Department of American and Oceanian Affairs at 3:00 pm on June 7, instructing Ambassador Han to transmit the following to the US side, ‘The Chinese leaders are not in the habit of talking to foreign leaders over the phone’. Thus, Beijing could not accommodate Bush’s request (Chen 1999, 120). Obviously, Bush was unhappy with this outcome. As he wrote in his diary, ‘I was frustrated when the Chinese rebuffed my attempt to talk things out directly’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 100). The Foreign Ministry advised Ambassador Han, ‘If the President thinks it is necessary, he may write a letter [to Deng]’ (Ruan 2004, 372). Bush valued his relationship with Deng Xiaoping. At his press conference on June 5, Bush had a few good words for Deng, stating, ‘In the Cultural Revolution days, Deng Xiaoping—at Mao Zedong’s right hand—was put out. He came back. In 1976, he was put out again in the last days of Mao Zedong and the days of the Gang of Four. Then he came back in and to his credit, he moved China towards openness, towards democracy, towards reform’ (GBPL1). At his press conference on June 8, he again defended Deng when a reporter said that Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng were responsible for the massacre. Bush responded, ‘And all I’m saying from that experience is let’s not jump at conclusions as to how individual leaders in China feel when we aren’t sure of that’ (GBPL2). But on June 9, Deng received the officers at the rank of general and above who were in command of the troops enforcing martial law in Beijing. This was publicly reported in the Chinese media. Deng said, ‘This disturbance would have occurred sooner or later. It was determined by both the international environment and the domestic environment. It was bound to occur, whether one wished it or not; the only question was the time and the scale’. Deng blamed external factors for China’s problems. He concluded his remarks: ‘We should unswervingly carry out the line, principles, and policies formulated since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee’ (DXPWX 1995, 302, 308). This clearly demonstrated that Deng was behind the decision to violently suppress the demonstrators at Tiananmen and that he rejected Bush’s request to speak over the phone. For Bush, it was a slap in the face (Chen 1999, 121). Confronted with US-led international sanctions against China, Deng insisted that China should maintain independence and not be swayed by

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Western provocations. On June 16, in a talk with leading members of the CCP Central Committee, Deng said, ‘At the moment, the media worldwide are putting pressure on us; we should take it calmly and not allow ourselves to be provoked. Nonetheless, we should manage our own affairs well; this incident has really revealed enough of our mistakes!’ (DXPWX 1995, 311–312). Although very frustrated with China, Bush decided to write directly to Deng in order to preserve and restore the much-damaged US-China relationship. Bush began the letter by showing his kindness toward China and Deng personally. He wrote, ‘I write as one who has great respect for what you personally have done for the people of China and to help your great country move forward’. Bush also apologetically explained, ‘I have tried very hard not to inject myself into China’s internal affairs. I have tried very hard not to appear to be dictating in any way to China about how it should manage its internal crisis’. At the end, Bush proposed that Deng receive a special presidential emissary who could speak on Bush’s behalf. Bush also requested that the emissary’s mission be ‘kept in total confidence’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 100–102). National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft delivered the letter to Chinese Ambassador Han Xu at the Chinese embassy, and on June 24, less than twenty-four hours later, Bush got a personal response from Deng, who accepted the idea of a personal emissary. Thus, the private channel between the US and Chinese top leaders was reestablished. Bush eventually selected Scowcroft and deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger for the secret mission (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 104). The Scowcroft mission arrived in Beijing on the afternoon of July 1. It stayed in Beijing only for twenty hours. Deng Xiaoping, Premier Li Peng, and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met and talked with the American emissaries. Deng personally set a tough tone for these meetings (Xia 2021, 213). When Deng met with Scowcroft, he blamed the US for worsening relations with China, saying that China had not offended the United States. It was the US that directly infringed on the interests of China on a large scale. As Henry Kissinger observes, the Chinese leaders ‘could not understand why the United States took umbrage at an event that had injured no American material interests and for which China claimed no validity outside its own territory’ (Kissinger 2011, 422). Deng then warned: ‘There is a Chinese saying, “It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie it”’. He hoped, ‘The Americans could do something concrete to win back the trust of the Chinese people and cease adding fuel to the fire’(Qian 2005, 135; Qian 2003, 175). In his response, Scowcroft told Deng, ‘The actions taken by the Chinese government to deal with the demonstrations have produced demands by the American people

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and the United States Congress to take steps of our own to demonstrate our disagreement with those actions’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 108). Scowcroft concluded by telling the Chinese that Bush was ‘very sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding the actions he must take to preserve control over the course of events in the United States’, but he was ‘not omnipotent in his ability to control such events’. He said that he ‘brought no prescriptions as to what ought to follow, only to explain’ the US point of view (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 109). Scowcroft also had a separate meeting with Li Peng and Qian Qichen. Li claimed that US policy makers, including Congress and government leaders, ‘did not have a clear picture of what had been happening, or accurate information’ of ‘what had recently happened in China. Their sentiments had been whipped up by inaccurate information and rumours’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 109–10; Qian 2005, 137). With such a deep gulf in viewing the Tiananmen crackdown between Chinese and American leaders, there was not much to negotiate yet. Although Scowcroft’s secret mission achieved little in improving US-China relations, it was, from his perspective, ‘a most useful trip’. Scowcroft wrote, ‘We conveyed the message on behalf of the President of the gravity, for the United States, of what the Chinese had done, but also underscored for them, beneath all the turmoil and torment, how important the President thought the relationship was to the national interests of the United States’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 110). Secretly, Bush was violating his own rule on banning high-level contacts with Beijing. From Bush’s perspective, pressuring China too hard wouldn’t work and he did not want to burn bridges. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were China’s go-to-people when there were severe difficulties in US-China relations. In particular, Nixon was then the only living former president who had some influence on Bush. But the Chinese overrated the importance of Nixon and Kissinger in American politics, and underestimated the outrage of the American public about the Tiananmen massacre. By inviting Nixon and Kissinger to Beijing, Deng intended to demonstrate to American officials China’s unbending stand, and force Bush to lessen pressure on China (Chen 1999, 97). For Nixon, it was an opportunity to explain to Deng why the Americans responded so strongly to the Tiananmen massacre. According to Patrick Tyler, ‘Privately, Nixon gave Deng a bleak assessment. Tiananmen had devastated the relationship, negating much of the progress that had been made. They were going to have to start over’ (Tyler 1999, 366). When meeting with Nixon in Beijing on October 31, Deng remained obstinate, ‘Don’t ever expect China to beg the United States to lift the sanctions. If they last a hundred years, the Chinese

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would not do that … I can assure you that no one can stop China’s reform and opening up to the outside world’ (DXPWX 1995, 331–33). After returning to the US, Nixon had dinner with Bush on November 5, briefing the President on his talk with Deng and advising him ‘to make some move towards the Chinese’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 157). Nixon ‘suggested lifting the ban on travel by US senior officials and seemed to attach importance to reestablishing the Fulbright Scholarships” (GBPL4). In a letter to Bush on November 9, Nixon argued, ‘With Deng retiring, I believe we are going to see a very dicey succession battle. That is why it is critically important for us to have contact at the highest level so that we can use what influence we have on behalf of reforms over the reactionaries’ (GBPL3). Based on what he learned from Nixon, Bush wrote another letter to Deng on November 6, proposing to send another emissary to Beijing to debrief Deng on his discussion with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta. On November 15, Deng replied that he welcomed another personal envoy to China from Bush. On December 1, Bush wrote back, stating, ‘I am trying to untie my part of the knot, but please help by having China do its part’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 158–59). At the time, China invited Henry Kissinger to visit Beijing. When meeting with Kissinger in Beijing on November 10, Deng made a similar point as that he made to Nixon. He urged Kissinger ‘to convey to Bush his desire to come to an agreement with the United States, which, as the stronger country, should make the first move’ (Kissinger 2011, 427). Deng also proposed his ‘package solution’ for resolving US-China entanglement and asked Kissinger to convey this to Bush. The proposal included the following: ‘1) China would permit Fang Lizhi and his wife to leave the US Embassy in Beijing to go to the United States or a third country; 2) The United States, in ways that suit itself, should make an explicit announcement that it would lift the sanctions on China; 3) Both sides should make efforts to conclude deals on one or two major economic cooperation projects; 4) The United States should extend an invitation to Jiang Zemin to pay an official visit the following year’ (Qian 2005, 140). When Scowcroft and Eagleburger arrived in Beijing on December 9 for the second time in less than six months, it was a public visit. During their two-days’ stay in Beijing, they met with Deng, the CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Deng did not see them until the second day. In addition to briefing Chinese leadership on the US-Soviet Malta talks, the mission aimed ‘to explore the possibility of developing a “road map” toward better relations’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 174). Compared with the secret mission six months previously, this trip

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involved more substantive negotiations. Qian Qichen held two working-level meetings with the Americans. On the day of Scowcroft’s arrival on December 9, Qian Qichen gave a welcome banquet in his honour. In his toast, Scowcroft was critical of the Chinese, stating, ‘Speaking as a friend, I would not be honest if I did not acknowledge that we have profound areas of disagreement—on the events at Tiananmen, on the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe. We see your complaints about us in the pages of People’s Daily’ (GBPL5). None of the press seemed to give attention to his highly critical comments; instead, they printed the photo of Scowcroft’s toast to the Chinese foreign minister. This embarrassed Scowcroft and the Bush administration, for the media portrayed it as toasting ‘the butchers of Tiananmen Square’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 174). Scowcroft’s public visit to Beijing violated the Bush administration’s ban on high-level visits between China and the United States. The Chinese intentionally engineered this plot, although the Americans had hoped ‘to keep it at a very low profile, since it was bound to be controversial’ (Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 174). But the Chinese wanted to make best use of the visit of the American emissary. Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) printed out three large photos of the visit with a news report, and Chinese TV broadcast the welcome banquet with the scene of Scowcroft’s toast without the critical comments. An internationally-isolated Chinese government hoped to show to the Chinese public and international society the stability of China’s situation after the Tiananmen crackdown. It also wanted to demonstrate that China was indispensable to the United States, and Washington had to reconcile with Beijing eventually (Chen 1999, 146). As Henry Kissinger notes, ‘The incident demonstrated the conflicting imperatives of the two sides. China wanted to demonstrate to its public that its isolation was ending; Washington sought to draw a minimum of attention, to avoid a domestic controversy until an agreement had been reached’ (Kissinger 2011, 435). Deng met with Scowcroft at 11:00 am on December 10, with several points to make. First, he stressed the importance of Sino-American relations. He said, ‘Your visit to China at this time is very important … It is our common wish to solve as quickly as possible the problems that have arisen between us since June, so that new progress can be made in our relations’. He then talked about the importance of China’s stability for the world, noting, ‘If there were disturbances in China, that would be a big problem that could have repercussions elsewhere. It would be a misfortune not only for China but also for the United States’(DXPWX 1995, 350–51). Deng also said that China couldn’t be a threat to the United States, and the United States should not

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consider China as a threatening rival. Deng hoped that Bush would pardon China’s predicament, and pull Beijing up (Chen 1999, 141–43). During two working-level meetings, which started at 12:15 pm and 2:13 pm respectively on December 10, the most important topic for the Chinese side, according to Qian Qichen’s memoir, was the ‘“package” solution’, which he put forward to the Americans. Qian argued that this solution would ‘serve the best interests of China and the United States’, and would help to ‘end the current dispute as soon as possible, and turn to the future’. China also hoped that the United States would invite Jiang Zemin for an off icial visit in 1990 (Qian 2005, 141). The American side took issue with linking the release of Fang Lizhi to the removal of American sanctions. At the private meeting between Scowcroft and Qian, Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, acting as ‘bad cop’, articulated US informal responses to the Chinese package. He stated that ‘the linkage between sanctions and the release of Fang Lizhi is so direct that at home we politically cannot manage it’. He tried to convince the Chinese that Fang’s ‘release will have the greatest impact of all the actions you might take and will make the rest of the package easier to do’. He also suggested that the Chinese side take some small steps, such as stopping jamming Voice of America (VOA) or permitting a VOA correspondent to come to China. This would help the Bush administration with the US Congress (GBPL6). However, at the time, the Bush administration was contemplating the consequences of the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe; therefore, China received much less attention for more than eight months. Henry Kissinger later points out, ‘Deng’s package deal could not receive the priority it would have elicited in less tumultuous times’ (Kissinger 2011, 434; DXPWX 1995, 331–33). Qian recalled in his memoir, ‘The political changes in eastern Europe brought about changes in the international situation. The United States began to assess the general situation of the world, and was no longer so eager to improve relations with China’ (Qian 2005, 143–44). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, it threatened the lifeline of the economies of the United States and other western countries. The US worked to have the UN Security Council pass a resolution to condemn Iraq and impose economic sanctions. But the resolution failed to force Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Washington wanted to establish an international coalition to deal with the Gulf crisis, and it needed China’s cooperation. Washington started to reassess its relations with China (Qian 2005, 145). On August 31, the US Embassy in Beijing delivered a letter from Bush to Deng. In the letter, Bush stated that the US would not shrink or

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reduce the strategic importance it placed on Sino-American relations. The US appreciated China’s principled stand on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Qian 2005, 145). Washington needed China’s support in passing a UN resolution authorizing the US to use force to drive Iraq from Kuwait. Bush wrote to Yang Shangkun, President of the People’s Republic of China, and Secretary of State James Baker attempted to cozy up to Qian Qichen and strike a deal. On November 19, more than three months after Iraq invaded Kuwait and a few days before the UN Security Council was scheduled to discuss using force to expel Iraq from Kuwait, Baker phoned Qian from Paris. He hoped that China would vote in favour of UN Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq. As ‘a deal sweetener’, Baker promised that the US would invite the Chinese foreign minister to visit Washington, including a possible meeting with President Bush on November 30. Qian told Baker that China had to study the issue and he could not tell him whether or not he would attend the UN Security Council meeting in late November or how he would vote. The Chinese Foreign Ministry recorded the conversation between Baker and Qian (Qian 2005, 74; Chen 1999, 204–205; Suettinger 2003, 113). On the same day, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also called Qian for a meeting to discuss the Gulf Crisis. In the evening, Li Peng presided over a meeting to discuss Baker’s request, the Soviet intention, and whether and how China should vote at the UN. Li passed along Deng’s three-point instruction: 1) abstaining; 2) making a short explanation; 3) reiterating China’s principled stand, but being very careful with the wording (Chen 1999, 285). On November 24, vice foreign minister Liu Huaqiu informed Lynn Pascoe, Charge d’Affaires ad interim at the US Embassy in Beijing, that Qian would attend the UN Security Council meeting and make a formal visit to the United States. But the US wanted to backtrack, informing the Chinese that if Qian abstained from the Resolution, the US would not invite Qian to visit Washington and he would not see President Bush. This stirred a debate in Beijing’s leadership circle on whether or not Qian should travel to the United States. Some party elders argued against Qian’s trip, believing it would be seen as kowtowing to Washington at a time when the US still imposed sanctions against China. In their view, not only should Qian not make the trip, he should also not attend the UN Security Council meeting to roll logs for the United States (Chen 1999, 205). As a shrewd diplomat, Qian would not let go of the prospect of an off icial visit to Washington. After June 1989, Qian was able to meet with Baker several times at international conferences, such as the Paris Conference on Cambodia in July 1989, the Forty-fourth and Forty-f ifth

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UN General Assembly meetings in September 1989 and September 1990, and at Cairo International Airport on November 6, 1990. Regarding how China would vote, Qian played the stratagem of uncertainty and unpredictability. Even before boarding the flight from Beijing to New York on November 28, he was still parrying with reporters on the issue (Qian 2005, 77–78; Chen 1999, 206). When Qian f inally arrived at New York’s Waldorf Hotel at midnight, Baker and US diplomats were waiting for him. They attempted to persuade Qian to vote for the Resolution; Qian was non-committal. Nevertheless, at the UN Security Council meeting to discuss and vote on Resolution 678 on November 29, Qian abstained from voting (Qian 2005, 78–79). Baker was obviously annoyed at China’s abstention on the Resolution. In the evening, he informed Qian through a staff member that ‘President Bush was busy handling the Gulf crisis and would not have time to see’ Qian when he travelled to Washington. At 7:00 pm that evening, Kent Wiedemann, director of the Off ice of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, off icially notif ied Minister Zhao Xixin at the Chinese Embassy in Washington of Baker’s decision (Qian 2005, 79; Chen 1999, 206). Chinese diplomats then ‘mounted a secret campaign’ to keep the meeting on the President’s schedule. Ambassador Zhu Qizhen took to the road, travelling from New York to Washington with his driver at night. At 3:00 am on November 29, he called Brent Scowcroft, telling him that ‘the foreign minister would cancel his trip if he couldn’t see the President’. At 6:00 am, Scowcroft informed Ambassador Zhu that ‘Qian would see the President’ (Qian 2005, 80; Bush and Scowcroft 1999, 414–15; Mann 1998, 249; Suettinger 2003, 114). Scowcroft had made two trips to Beijing in 1989, and had become more sympathetic to the Chinese. The Chinese diplomats considered him a laopengyou (old friend), and thus they could work on him. On November 30, 1990, Qian became the first senior Chinese official to meet with President Bush at the White House since June 1989, making him the winner of this diplomatic game. According to Chinese sources, Qian would have made the trip to Washington whether or not President Bush received him at the White House. In the wee hours of November 30, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing sent an urgent top-secret cable to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, instructing Qian to travel to Washington no matter how the US side altered the agenda. The cable said, ‘After asking for instruction, it has been decided that Foreign Minister Qian should make the official visit to the United States even if the bargaining with the US fails. (You should) travel there gracefully. Don’t feel wronged and act

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rashly’; this was from Deng Xiaoping (Chen 1999, 208–209). James Mann notes, ‘Qian’s visit was another step toward breaking down the American resistance: the regime was now being welcomed back to the White House’. (Mann 1998, 250). Secretary of State Baker had refused to travel to Beijing or to meet Foreign Minister Qian in Washington. But during Qian’s visit to Washington on November 30, Baker was Qian’s host. At their meeting, Qian complained ‘that in order to secure the adoption of the United States resolution at the UN Security Council, Baker had visited twelve countries and had held discussions with their foreign ministers. The United States stressed that China had played an important role as a permanent member of the Security Council’, but Baker had not made a trip to China. Qian again extended an invitation to Baker (Qian 2005, 80). By the fall of 1991, President Bush decided to take another crucial step to restore US-China relations to normalcy. On October 10, he told Ambassador Zhu Qizhen that he had made the decision to send Secretary of State Baker on an official visit to Beijing. On November 15, Baker arrived in Beijing for a three-day visit. It was the first official visit to China by the US Secretary of State since Washington imposed a ban on high-level contacts with Beijing in June 1989 (Qian 2005, 146–47). Baker had three days of tough negotiations with Qian, and the departure of the American delegation on November 17 was postponed seven times (Qian 2005, 148). While in Beijing, Baker hoped to deliver a letter from Bush to Deng Xiaoping in person, but Chinese officials turned him down (Mann 1998, 251; Yu 2018, 17; Suettinger 2003, 130). It is very likely that Baker, unlike Bush and Scowcroft, was not regarded as China’s laopengyou (old friend), and thus did not deserve an audience with Deng. According to Qian Qichen, the negotiations eventually achieved some progress. The Americans ‘promised to support China’s bid to join GATT … to cancel the three punitive measures, including banning the export of satellites to China … to nullify Special Article 301 imposed on China’. On the Chinese side, Beijing ‘promised to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime Guideline and Annex’, and ‘to protect intellectual property rights’. But Beijing refused to budge on the issue of human rights on the ground of non-interference in its internal affairs (Qian 2005, 148–49). In his memoir, Qian Qichen wrote, ‘The visit was generally considered a success for China’s diplomacy. It marked the beginning of the lifting of sanctions that had been imposed on China by the United States and other Western countries for two years and more’ (Qian 2005, 149). But it was disastrous for the Bush Administration and further eroded Bush’s domestic credibility.

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Expanding International Outreach With the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and sanctions against China after the Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, China faced unprecedented diplomatic pressure. In a talk with leading members of the CCP Central Committee on September 4, 1989, Deng Xiaoping offered an analysis of the international situation and China’s strategy in dealing with it. He pointed out, ‘In short, my views about the international situation can be summed up in three sentences. First, we should observe the situation coolly (lengjing guancha). Second, we should hold our ground (wenzhu zhenjiao). Third, we should act calmly (chenzhuo yingfu)’ (DXPWX 1995, 319–21). In the next few months, Deng also proposed more principles for China’s foreign policy, including to ‘hide our capacities (shanyu cangzhuo), never claim leadership ( juebu dangtou), avoid the limelight (taoguang yanghui), and get some things done (yousuo zuowei)’ (Xia 2018, 236). The core of Deng’s foreign policy instruction is ‘avoiding the limelight and getting some things done’, which required China to perform well on the domestic front, in particular in economic development. China should set high aims and have lofty aspirations, but also be able to hide its capacities and bide its time. In international affairs, China should avoid being overly assertive, thus becoming a target of Western attack. China would continue to uphold socialist principles, but would not attempt to be the standard-bearer of the socialist bloc after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Following Deng’s directives, the CCP rule in China survived the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, broke through Western sanctions, stabilized relations with neighbouring countries, and expanded its diplomatic horizon. Chinese leaders appropriately handled China’s relations with Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. By January 1992, China had established ‘diplomatic relations with all the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union’ (Qian 2005, 177). By December 1992, Washington formally announced the termination of its ban ‘on high-level contacts with China’ (Xia 2018, 245). China made use of the contradictions in US-Japan and US-European relations to break through Western sanctions. A little over three months after the Tiananmen crackdown, on September 17–19, 1989, Masayoshi Ito, Chairman of the Parliamentary Association for Friendship between Japan and China, led a delegation to visit China. This was the first delegation from an advanced capitalist country to visit China after the Tiananmen crackdown. By October 1990, the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic

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Community announced the abrogation of all restrictions on China except visits between government heads, military exchanges, and trading of military goods. In August 1991, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu became the first head of government from an advanced capitalist country to visit China after Tiananmen, and Japan formally renounced its economic sanctions against China. This was a crucial breakthrough in Beijing’s fight against Western sanctions (Xia 2018, 246, 249). On its own soil, China set up the policy of ‘keeping a firm foothold in the Asia-Pacific region, and stabilizing neighboring countries and regions’. China took the initiative in solving long-standing disputes with countries on its borders. In the three years after June 1989, China gradually improved and consolidated relations with its neighbours. In August 1990, China reestablished formal diplomatic relations with Indonesia, which had been severed since 1967. In October, China established formal diplomatic relations with Singapore. After the 1979 border war with Vietnam, Sino-Vietnamese relations were very hostile. But, in November 1991, Beijing achieved diplomatic normalization with Vietnam (Xia 2018, 250–253). In breaking down international sanctions against China, Beijing valued access to South Korean capital and technology. Thus, China gradually changed its policy toward the Korean Peninsula. In 1991, China reversed its long-standing policy and pressured North Korea to join the UN with South Korea as separate member states. The admission of both South and North Korea to the United Nations was important to China: once and for all it disentangled ‘the “two Koreas” issue from the “one China” principle’. It effectively enabled China to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea while maintaining its own ‘one China policy’. In early 1992, China initiated the process of normalizing relations with South Korea. In August 1992, China and South Korea established full diplomatic relations, ending nearly half a century of hostilities between the two countries (Qian 2005, 117–12).

Conclusion When Deng Xiaoping made statements such as the US ‘has impugned Chinese interests, and has hurt Chinese dignity’, ‘The United States should take the initiative in putting the past behind us’, and ‘It is up to the person who tied the knot to untie it’, he was working from his misperception that the US President had unrestricted and unlimited power, like an autocrat (Chen 2010, 326). From Beijing’s perspective, how they treated their own people was an internal matter. When the American people responded strongly

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to the Tiananmen crackdown, and President Bush publicly condemned it, Beijing considered it interference in China’s internal affairs (Chen 1999, 128–29). Deng demanded that President Bush respect the feelings of the Chinese people. What happened in Tiananmen, however, was a great shock and had hurt the American people. As the President of the United States, Bush had to consider the beliefs of the American people above all else. Had Bush remained silent after Tiananmen, it would have been detrimental to his political career. Many have argued that Bush’s effort to maintain relations with China after June 1989 became a political liability, which contributed to his loss in the 1992 presidential election. Beijing continued to value access to Western technology and markets for economic growth after Tiananmen, but China’s political liberalization and the openness of the 1980s were reversed. In retrospect, Deng came up with a strategy in the wake of Tiananmen that guaranteed the CCP’s continuous rule in China, and China’s unprecedented economic growth for the last thirty years. Had the Bush Administration been tougher on China, it might have delayed China’s economic rise. However, from a historical perspective, containing China would not have brought down the Chinese Communist regime: it could only have added to the suffering of the Chinese people.

Bibliography Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. 1999. A World Transformed. New York: Vintage Books. Chen, Youwei. 1999. Tiananmen shijian hou Zhonggong yu Meiguo waijiao neimu— yige Zhongguo dalu waijiaoguan de lishi jianzheng (The Inside Stories of the Diplomacy between Communist China and America—A Historical Account of a Chinese Mainland Diplomat). Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju. Chen, Youwei. 2010. Wuhui tandang renshen: Cong jizhe dao Zhongguo waijiaoguan de huiyi yu zibai (A Magnanimous Life without Regrets: From a Journalist to China’s Diplomat—Recollection and Confession). Xianggang: Tiandi tushu youxiang gongshi. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (DXPWX) 1995. (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, vol. 3. Engel, Jeffrey A. 2017. When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. George H.W. Bush Presidential Library (GBPL)1: ‘Press Conference by the President, The White House, June 5, 1989’, in ‘US-China Diplomacy After Tiananmen:

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Documents from the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library’, available on line at https://www.chinafile.com/library/reports/us-china-diplomacy-aftertiananmen-documents-george-hw-bush-presidential-library. GBPL2: ‘Press Conference by the President, The White House, June 8, 1989’. GBPL3: ‘Letter from former President Richard Nixon to President George H.W. Bush, November 9, 1989’. GBPL4: ‘Cable from Brent Scowcroft to Ambassador James Lilley, November 10, 1989’. GBPL5: ‘Toast by National Security Council Advisor Brent Scowcroft to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Beijing, December 9, 1989’. GBPL6: ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Private Meeting of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, Beijing, December 10, 1989’. Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China. New York: Penguin. Lilly, James, with Jeffrey Lilly. 2005. Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy. New York: PublicAffairs. Mann, James. 1998. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Qian, Qichen. 2003. Waijiao shiji (Ten Stories of a Diplomat). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Qian, Qichen. 2005. Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy. New York: HarperCollins. Ruan, Hong. 2004. Yige waijiaojia de jingli: Han Xu zhuan (The Experience of a Diplomat: A Biography of Han Xu). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Suettinger, Robert. 2003. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989–2000. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (SWDXP). 1994. vol. 3 (1982–1992). Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Tyler, Patrick. 1999. A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: An Investigative History. New York: Public Affairs. Vogel, Ezra F. 2011. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Xia, Liping, et al. 2018. Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao shiliu jiang (Sixteen Lectures on Diplomacy of Contemporary China), 2nd ed. Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. Xia, Yafeng. 2021. ‘Avoiding the Limelight: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Policy toward the United States, 1989–1991’, in. Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War, Nuno P. Monteiro and Fritz Bartel, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 206–224. Yu, Hongjun. Winter 2018. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Strategic Thinking and Diplomatic Tactics in Managing the Sino-US Relationship’, Lengzhan guojishi yanjiu (Cold War International History Studies), no. 26:1–18.

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Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed. 1998. Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu, 1975–1997 (ZGZYWY) (Chronology of Deng Xiaoping’s Thought). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe.

About the Author Dr. Yafeng Xia is senior professor of Social Sciences at Long Island University in New York. He is the author of Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, and coauthor of Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership: A New History; Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split: A New History; and A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations.

9

Jiang Zemin and the United States Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge Qiang Fang Abstract Shortly after the Chinese government clamped down on the Tiananmen democracy movement, Western nations led by the United States imposed a range of sanctions on China. Sino-American relations plunged to a nadir since Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972, making China the counterweight of the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping picked Jiang Zemin to be the core of the next generational leadership. Jiang employed successful strategies such as deepening economic reform, making concessions in human rights, and hiding strength to deal with the US. Sino-American relations were mostly stable and cordial in the Jiang era. However, Jiang continued to privately view the US as China’s biggest enemy and became more assertive and forceful than Deng during clashes with the US. Keywords: Jiang Zemin, Sino-American relations, Hiding hatred and biding time, WTO, Reform period

In Chapter 8 of this book, Yafeng Xia discussed in detail Deng Xiaoping’s efforts in maintaining a tie with the United States while not weakening the Party’s rule in China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. In this chapter, I focus more on Jiang Zemin’s handling of Sino-US relations during Deng Xiaoping’s last years and beyond when Jiang was the de jure ‘core’ of the CCP leadership. In fact, with the retaining of some of Jiang’s supporters in the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo, Jiang’s power penetrated deep into the first term of Hu Jintao (2002–2007). Just one year after the outbreak of the pandemic in 2019, Sino-US relations witnessed a freefall, plunging to a nadir not seen since the Tiananmen

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch09

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massacre in 1989 when the George Bush administration and its European allies swiftly imposed a wide range of penalties, from military and economic sanctions to the termination of high-level contacts. Major polls showed that most Americans had unfavourable opinions of China, which was a drastic change from prior polls (Gallup Poll, 2021). In China, while the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident sealed the political career of former general Party secretary Zhao Ziyang, it marked the beginning of the era of Jiang Zemin, then the Party secretary of Shanghai and a new protégé of Deng Xiaoping. Within ten years, however, Jiang successfully rebuilt Sino-American relations to be on par with the so-called Sino-American ‘honeymoon in the mid-1980s’ shortly after the Carter administration formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Harding 1992, 311). How did Jiang Zemin manage to recover China’s relationship with the United States in such a short period? What kind of tactics or strategies did he adopt? Was Jiang able to resolve the fundamental differences between the two countries? To what extent was Jiang influenced by and different from Deng Xiaoping? These questions are addressed in this chapter. In both China and the United States, very few serious and nonjudgmental studies have centred on Jiang Zemin’s policies toward the United States. China-based scholars undoubtedly tend to praise Jiang’s strategies in dealing with the United States. For example, Ni Shixiong, a political scientist at Fudan University, applauds Jiang’s calmness, composure, and confidence, as well as savvy strategies that helped promote Sino-American relations to a new high (Ni 2009, 56–65). In comparison with their Chinese colleagues, America-based scholars do not have the same political constraint, and therefore voice their views more freely. Their studies, however, either contain limited Chinese sources or focus only on a portion of Jiang’s foreign policies and domestic politics (Chen 2012). In his book, Harry Harding touches briefly on Jiang’s policy toward the United States during his f irst couple of years as the Party leader, and, due to the paucity of primary Chinese documents, rely mostly on American sources (Harding 1992). Avery Goldstein studies the policy transitions of 1997, a critical year for Jiang as he lost his protector Deng Xiaoping, won a key power struggle against his foe Qiao Shi, and improved relations with the United States, Russia, and Europe (Goldstein 1998). Instead of examining Jiang Zemin’s diplomacy, both Lowell Dittmer and David Shambaugh feature Jiang’s domestic politics. Dittmer analyzes the factional politics during Jiang’s presidency, and he argues that the factional alignments under Jiang Zemin are ‘becoming shallower, more

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short-term, and purpose-rational’. Shambaugh observes that policymaking and recruitment in the era of Jiang Zemin as elite power is now ‘more vested in institutions than in individuals’. Under Jiang Zemin, the bases of elite legitimacy shifted from power and patronage to economic development, nationalism, and meritocratic criteria (Dittmer 2003; Shambaugh 2001). None of the studies engage meaningfully with Jiang’s foreign policy toward the United States. In this chapter, I first briefly discuss the major transition of China’s image as the archenemy of the United States to a Cold War ally. The chapter then looks into the Sino-American relations inherited by Jiang Zemin in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre. The bulk of the chapter focuses on China’s strategies in the Jiang era to revive the bilateral relationship through a new strategic base, and to make tactical concessions on a bevy of hot issues ranging from Taiwan, Tibet, and trade, to human rights. I argue that Jiang Zemin, however successful his efforts in amending the relations between China and America in a relatively short time, fails to make visible political reform and bridge China’s relationship with the United States on the basis of universal value and deep trust. As a matter of fact, Jiang, like Chinese leaders before and after him, continues to view the United States as the enemy that is always plotting to subvert the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. More importantly, this chapter seeks to address questions and lessons that have not yet been asked. For example, in his speech at the Nixon Library in July 2020, former secretary of state Michael R. Pompeo cast serious doubt on the fifty-year US engagement with China since Nixon’s visit. He argued that the original presumption that a more prosperous China would become freer at home ‘simply won’t get it done’ because the Chinese government had ‘exploited our free and open society’ (Pompeo 2020). By the same token, former president Donald J. Trump in 2016 blamed the Clinton administration for granting a green light to China’s entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization), resulting in ‘the greatest job theft in the history of our country’ (Trump 2016). However, both Pompeo and Trump fail to see what benefits the US has obtained from China’s entry into the WTO. In addition, many scholars have not asked why Jiang Zemin, unlike Xi Jinping, invariably and patiently resorted to negotiation with the US to resolve crises instead of confronting it with vitriolic rhetoric or countermeasures. Jiang’s conciliatory tone and policies in dealing with the US have successfully maintained a cordial bilateral relationship and significantly expanded China’s economic and political interests.

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From Nemesis to Allies The CCP and the United States are not inherent enemies, let alone primary foes. While the CCP was f ighting the Japanese aggressor in northwest China in the early 1940s, both its leaders, such as Mao Zedong, and official newspapers displayed excessive admiration of the United States. To acquire advanced American arms, Mao expressed his strong desire to visit the US to meet President Roosevelt (Hao and Zhai 1990, 95). Xinhua (new China) Daily, one of the CCP’s mouthpieces, lauded the United States as an ideal society and an exemplar for China (Zhong 1943). In the upcoming civil war, the United States’ opting to align with the GMD (aka, KMT or Guomindang) further infuriated the CCP. After the CCP founded the PRC in 1949, the US government set almost insurmountable preconditions for its recognition of the PRC and continued to support the GMD in Taiwan (Tsou 1963, 516). The outbreak of the Korean War dashed the last hope of any rapprochement between the two countries. In September 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai accused the United States of ‘always standing on the side of the adversary of the Chinese people and employ all its resources to assist the reactionary GMD against the Chinese people’ (Zhou 1990, 22). In turn, American politicians, like CCP leaders, inclined to portray the PRC as an increasingly headstrong and dangerous foe to the United States. In 1954, although President Eisenhower deemed it meaningful to conduct trade with and recognize the PRC, he complained that many congressmen would ‘crucify anyone who argues in favor of permitting any kind of trade’ with Communist China (Turker 2005, 109–35). In the early 1960s, China became more belligerent and aggressive policies prompted Kennedy and Johnson to seriously consider using ‘preventive action against Chinese nuclear facilities’. Despite the mutual animosity and distrust, the PRC and United States could sometimes show good will and retain low-level communications with each other. In 1961, Kennedy floated the possibility of ‘a food for peace’ arrangement by shipping grains to China, then experiencing one of its worst famines in history (Xia, 2006: 109). On September 7, 1960, Zhou Enlai told Edgar Snow, a liberal journalist who had known Mao since the 1930s, that the PRC and the United States would eventually become friends, as they did not have any fundamental conflict of interest (Zhou 1990, 249–99). To the surprise of most people, China and the United States kept a two-decade long but secret ambassadorial conversation, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw during the Cold War (Xia 2006, 113–34; Zhou 1990, 295). Although the Sino-Soviet polemics and eventual split in the 1960s and the escalation of the Vietnam War intensified the CCP’s anti-American rhetoric,

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some American policymakers were poised to change their attitudes and policies toward the PRC. In 1967, Richard Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs that it was no longer feasible for the United States to ‘leave China [with a billion able people] forever outside the family of nations’ (Nixon 1967, 141). To Chinese leaders, no impetus was bigger than the Soviet threat for them to seek better relations with the United States after Chinese soldiers fought the Soviet army in two bloody conflicts in 1969 (Chang 1990, 277). Lin Biao, Mao’s hand-picked successor, warned of the possibility of a nuclear war with the USSR (Shen and Yang 2007, 505). The Sino-Soviet clash plus the costly and unpopular Vietnam War drove the United States to play the Soviet card in dealing with the Chinese (Goh 2005, 482). Reeling from the combined threats of a Soviet encirclement, the Soviet army on its border, and the prospect of a détente between the two superpowers, Mao was forced to compromise on the Taiwan issue, the single biggest barrier between China and the United States. Meanwhile, Nixon, compelled by the Soviet threat and the Vietnam War, was willing to abandon his longtime friend and ally Jiang Jieshi to entice China to join an anti-Soviet alliance (Turker 2005, 117, 135). In the words of Paul H. Kreisberg, Nixon’s visit to China was driven more by American national interest and strategies than ideology (Kreisberg, 1988, 56; Harding 2000, 24). When the Carter administration finally recognized the PRC in 1979, the foremost reason behind the diplomatic relationship, as Secretary of State Vance noted, was that it could ‘consolidate an essential element in the global balance of power’ and greatly ‘enhance America’s national security’ (Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, December 9, 1979). While President Carter made human rights a pillar of his diplomacy, ideology played a ‘noticeably minimal role’ in his policy toward the PRC because the Soviets refused to budge on limiting strategic arms and responded in an ‘aggressive, patronizing manner’ to Carter’s emphasis on human rights (Hilton 2009, 597–99). Accordingly, the dominant issue connecting China and the United States remained the common Soviet threat. From Nixon to Carter, China’s poor human rights record was not a ‘principal concern (Harding 2000, 199). China’s decision to reform and reopen to the West after 1978 further eased the criticism within the United States. China’s new leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, were aware of the importance of the American market and technology to the success of China’s ongoing market-oriented reform. However indignant they felt at the Taiwan Relations Act passed by US Congress, Chinese leaders generally stuck to a friendly policy toward the United States in the 1980s, as they understood China’s role as a counterweight

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to the Soviet Union was undercut after Soviet leader Gorbachev rolled out ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ in 1985 to improve relations with the West. Most of the 1980s witnessed a relatively stable and cordial relationship between China and the United States, as the two countries doubled down on cultural exchanges, trade, and official meetings (Harding 1992, 139, 208).

Sino-American Relations Inherited by Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin, a ‘colorless’ technocrat and the Party secretary of Shanghai, whose father was a CCP martyr, came to power as a result of the Tiananmen incident. Jiang demonstrated an adroit ability to handle the protests in Shanghai and his restraint in using force won public praise and the favour of Deng Xiaoping (Meisner 1996, 476; Gilley, 1998, 18–19). According to Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping picked Jiang because he wanted to make sure that ‘Jiang’s reputation would be unsullied by Tiananmen’. Deng also expected Jiang to continue China’s reform (Vogel 2011, 644). At the outset of Jiang Zemin’s helm of the PRC, the Sino-American honeymoon in the 1980s had abruptly ended in the wake of the CCP’s repression of the democracy movement. The incident could not happen at a worse time for Sino-American relations, when the common Soviet threat was diminishing, as most East European and Balkan socialist states were undergoing political transitions and embracing the West (Gallagher 2003; Crampton 2002, Part III). Many Western states immediately imposed economic and political sanctions against China. Even the Soviet Union tended to back the Chinese students (Harding 1992, 236). The Bush administration, along with Western allies, decided to suspend high-level talks and the sale of military technologies. In addition, the US Congress granted asylum to Chinese students and scholars in the United States and allowed them to stay and work (Vogel 2011, 648). Although no American presidents since Nixon’s China visit had given attention to China’s human rights, the Tiananmen massacre permanently changed that, as both US Congress and the American public favoured a more forceful reaction to the PRC. One day after the crackdown, both the House and the Senate unanimously adopted resolutions endorsing the sanctions proposed by President Bush. Some congressmen demanded that the annual renewal of China’s most-favoured-nation status be conditional on political liberalization (Harding 1992, 248). In the meantime, the number of Americans with a favourable view of China plummeted from seventy-two percent in February 1989 to thirty-four percent after June 4 (Moore 2001).

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The estrangement of China’s superpower ally in the Cold War was just one thorny challenge for Jiang Zemin. On June 4, the day the Chinese army marched on Tiananmen Square to crush the democracy movement, the Polish labour union Solidarity won a decisive electoral victory, the leader of which, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, became the first non-Communist leader in Eastern Europe. In October, Hungary adopted a new constitution that granted a green light to a multi-party system and competitive elections. A more devastating event forinternational Communism came on November 9, 1989, as the Berlin Wall, the most notable token of the Cold War, was destroyed and the two German nations reunified (Cohen 1992). The downfall of Eastern European and Balkan Communism rippled through the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev’s reforms sowed seeds of disintegration and anticommunism. In December 1991, the Soviet Union, the first socialist state and once the mecca of Communism collapsed (Dunlop 1993, 186–284). The sudden demise of the Soviet Union not only damaged the ideological legitimacy of the PRC, the only major Communist state that barely survived a recent political crisis, but also removed crucial strategic leverage which China could use to negotiate with the United States in the Cold War (Harding 1992, 291).

China’s Strategies Dealing with the US under Jiang Zemin Mending the Rift Right after his ascendency to leadership, Jiang Zemin was immediately aware that one of his primary diff icult tasks was to mend the rift with the United States over the Tiananmen incident. Fortunately, by 1989, the strategic, political, and economic ties between China and the United States were strong enough to ride out a major crisis. For example, bilateral trade between China and America was $13.5 billion in 1988. If the United States imposed economic sanctions against China, neither country would benefit. Furthermore, President Bush and his advisers worried that the Soviet Union in 1989 remained a tiger with teeth and excessive sanctions against China could ‘throw China back into the hands of the Soviet Union’ (Harding 1992, 227). Also, the US needed China’s cooperation to tackle issues such as China’s arms sale to the Middle East, Cambodia, and nuclear nonproliferation. Ironically, the initial proactive gesture to restore the Sino-American relationship came not from the CCP, the perpetrator of the Tiananmen

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incident, but from President Bush. Having ‘established a personal chemistry’ with Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s, Bush was eager to prevent previous ‘healthy’ bilateral relations from being derailed by the Tiananmen incident. Additionally, Bush was concerned that more sanctions might push China to the Soviet Union (Vogel 2011, 648; Harding 1992, 227). While Jiang’s patron, Deng Xiaoping, insisted retreating to the ‘second line’ in September because his reputation was tarnished by the Tiananmen massacre. Nevertheless, Deng retained clout and power in the Party (Deng 1993, 3,322; Meisner 1996, 476). Bush took a couple of bold, secret actions, trying to call Deng Xiaoping on June 8, four days after the massacre, and not Jiang Zemin, the new leader of the PRC. When Deng failed to pick up the call, Bush then sent him a personal message ‘in the spirit of genuine friendship’, asking him to help preserve the bilateral relationship (Vogel 2011, 649). In the following couple of years, Bush took steps to ease or eliminate most sanctions against China except military contacts with the Chinese army. Compared with its European allies, the United States was the ‘only nation that has maintained the sanction as a result of the Tiananmen tragedy’ (Mann 1991). Three years after the June 4th incident, Premier Li Peng, the hardliner against the democracy movement, visited the United States in 1992, which virtually restored Sino-American relations (Everington 2018). Deng Xiaoping did praise Bush for speedily sending envoys to China, but he bluntly criticized the American government and media for siding with the ‘rioters’ in Tiananmen and exaggerating the violence. In contrast to Bush’s kindness, Deng dismissed the United States as a foe that China could never trust. On September 16, 1989, Deng warned the third-generation leaders led by Jiang Zemin that China should stick to socialism and maintain political stability as its top priority (Deng 1993, 3:329). When he met Nixon again in late October, Deng did not believe he made a mistake in suppressing the protests. Rather, he complained that China was the ‘real victim [of American sanctions]’ because it ‘has done nothing wrong to the United States’, who had ‘deeply engaged in the incident and repeatedly condemned China’. Deng assured Nixon that China would continue to reform; otherwise, the Chinese economy would not develop, and the living standard of the people would slump (Deng 1993, 3: 331). Owing his rise to Deng, Jiang Zemin carefully echoed Deng’s tactics in his talks with Nixon in October. Jiang argued that the Tiananmen incident was purely China’s domestic affair and had nothing to do with America, and that China’s reforms would stick to socialism and not capitalism. Knowing that the common threat of the Soviet Union was no longer at play for the United States, Jiang endeavoured to entice the United States with China’s vast

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market and the prospect of economic cooperation. He welcomed American businesses to invest to China’ (Jiang 2006, 1: 70). While meeting Scowcroft, Jiang exhibited his realistic diplomacy, which was similar to that of Nixon (Kissinger 1994, 711). Jiang appreciated Bush’s recent relaxation of sanctions against China that would help improve Sino-American relations. Jiang emphasized that a good Sino-American relationship would be suitable not only for world peace and development, but also for Asia’s stability and prosperity. More importantly, China’s 1.1 billion people and a booming economy would be a potential huge market for American business. Unlike Deng, Jiang tried to shift the focus of the Sino-American rift to Taiwan, as he argued that the biggest issue between the two nations was Taiwan and not the Tiananmen incident. Once American leaders recalibrated their attention to Taiwan, Jiang hoped, Sino-American relations could return to the 1980s, when no American leaders cared about China’s human rights (Jiang 2006: 1: 84–88). Unlike Deng Xiaoping, who was a professional soldier and communist revolutionary, Jiang Zemin attended one of the best universities in the Republic of China, where he was a former student movement activist (Bruce Gilley 1998, 23). In May 1990, Jiang made an extraordinary appeal to the American public, in which he f irst accepted an interview with Barbara Walters, and then sent a long letter to American college students expressing his desire for a better relationship with the United States (Harding 1992, 265). Although the common Soviet menace was no longer formidable in 1989, the Sino-American alliance in the Cold War remained robust enough to transcend the rift caused by the June 4th suppression in a short time. Thanks to the longtime Bush-Deng friendship and mutual trust, as well as China’s potential market, the Bush administration acted first to mend the rift in an effort to keep China on the track of reform and cooperative on international issues. Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, who was still in charge, initially blamed the United States for involving itself in the protest and claimed that China was not afraid of being isolated by the West. But, as Yafeng Xia argues in the previous chapter, Deng was aware that the American market, technology, and capitalwere critical to China’s ongoing reform (Xia, ‘Sino-American Relations’; Harding 1992, 237). He soon softened his tone and expressed willingness to improve bilateral relations. Through mutual efforts, the rift between China and the United States was quickly mended. As demonstrated by the 1992 summit meeting between Bush and Li Peng in New York City, bilateral relations were largely back to normal (Faison 1992).

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Deepening Reform In my other studies, I have argued that the ongoing reform of the PRC is not limited to the realm of the economy. It is an overarching reform that spread out across many other fields, such as law, education, and state-local relations(Fang 2013, Ch. 6; Li and Fang 2013, Intro; Li and Fang 2013, Intro). After the Tiananmen massacre, the US government and Congress employed draconian sanctions against China, including linking China’s annual Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to its human rights and continued economic reform (Harding 1992, 230, 248–250). Deng Xiaoping was worried that Western sanctions could embolden the anti-reform conservatives. Even Jiang Zemin was under pressure to act ‘in accord with’ the conservative and cautious policy of Chen Yun, a primary advocate of Mao’s socialist economy and critic of reform (Vogel 2011, 660; Chen 1986:3.367). To navigate his fledgling reform through the crisis and maintain trade relations with the West, Deng felt compelled to prod Party leaders to carry on. He sternly warned that anyone in the Party attempting to reverse the open policy and reform would be ‘opposed by the people and fall’. Moreover, Deng urged the Party to be more audacious in reform and conducting experiments. The best yardstick for measuring socialism and capitalism should be ‘whether it was propitious for enhancing the production force, comprehensive national strength, and people’s living standard of a socialist country’. In comparison with the ‘right (pro-reformists)’, Deng was more concerned about the ‘left (anti-reformists)’. (Deng 1993, 3: 371–75). Deng was correct in fearing a rollback of reform by anti-reform conservatives. Western sanctions over the Tiananmen incident eroded Deng’s power and reputation in the Party and empowered the conservatives. After Deng decided to retire to the second line in 1990, the Party’s policymaking was transferred to a group of retired or semi-retired elders. In 1990, when Deng called for the establishment of the special zone of Shanghai Pudong, Chen Yun, who was alarmed by the evil of capitalism in Shenzhen, vehemently sparred with him (Vogel 2011, 667). The clash between Deng and Chen turned more intense after the abortive coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991. While Deng reminded the Party to learn from the fall of the Soviet Union for its alienation with the people, Chen attributed the Soviet collapse to its abandonment of class struggle (Zhao 1993, 742–43). The Eighth Plenum in late 1991 decided to launch a campaign of ‘learning socialism’ in rural areas, a conservative backlash reminiscent of Mao’s Four Cleanups in the early 1960s, which was the precursor of the Cultural Revolution. Like Mao, who went to the south at the beginning of the Cultural

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Revolution because Beijing was dominated by ‘capitalist roaders’, Deng chose to tour the south in early 1992 after being frustrated by the conservative atmosphere in Beijing (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 50, 78). On his trip to Shenzhen and Zhuhai, Deng praised special economic zones and admonished Jiang Zemin and other high-ranking officials that only those who advocated reform could remain leaders. According to Vogel, Jiang had since begun to tilt ‘more boldly toward reform’ (Vogel 2011, 699–77). Li Rui, Mao’s former secretary, also recalled that Deng nearly fired Jiang in 1992 for his opposition to reform and private ownership, which forced Jiang to change course and support reform (Li 2013, 370). Ever since Deng’s southern tour, Jiang Zemin had determined to side with him on further reform. On June 6, 1992, Jiang Zemin proposed to establish a ‘socialist market economy’ in China. Invoking Deng’s recent talks on the distinction between capitalism and socialism, Jiang argued that the market economy did not belong to capitalism and both capitalism and socialism had adopted the planned economy ( jihua jingji). In addition, Jiang drew on the classic remarks of Frederic Engels and Vladimir Lenin to strengthen his argument that capitalism also had planned economy. Nevertheless, Jiang asserted that a socialist market economy would differ from capitalism in the following characteristics: socialist elements would continue to dominate the economy; wealth distribution would still be based on labour and contribution but allow certain regions and people to be rich first. The Party would combine the advantages of both market economy and planned economy to better optimize resource allocation and properly adjust social distribution (Jiang 2006, 1: 198–204). In October, Jiang Zemin and the official report of the congress not only pledged to accelerate reform and construct a socialist market economy, but also made the ‘left’ or conservative views a more dangerous enemy of reform. Jiang began his report by acclaiming Deng’s ‘important talks’ during his southern tour, which ‘greatly inspired’ the Party and people to ‘liberate their thought’. Like Deng, Jiang endorsed the experiments and success of the special economic zones established by Deng in the early 1980s. As a rebuke to the conservatives, Jiang stated that those special economic zones actually practiced socialism, not capitalism, to significantly ‘reinforce national reform and economic construction’. ‘The nature of socialism is to liberate and develop the production force (shengchanli) …’, Jiang pointed out. He continued, ‘[the current reform] is also a revolution, which is to liberate the production force, an inevitable path to China’s modernity … The objective of economic reform … is to construct and perfect the socialist economic market system’. To deepen reform, Jiang stressed the importance of opening

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to the world (mainly the West) and promised to promote political and legal reforms that would be able to solidify the social-political environment and to protect economic reform. The planned legal reform foreshadowed the Party’s incorporation of the rule of law into its official report at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 and revised constitution in 1999 (Li and Fang 2013, 12). To appease the worries of conservatives such as Chen Yun, Jiang stated that the Party would uphold the Four Cardinals (i.e., CCP’s leadership, socialism, people’s dictatorship, and Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Zedong thought) inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and steadfastly root out anything that could cause turbulence in China (Deng 1993, 2: 164–65; Jiang 2006, 1: 198–204). For Jiang and the CCP, political power was the foremost issue behind the reform. But Jiang also understood that, without a prosperous and sustainable economy, it would be tough to maintain social and political stability. David Shamburg has correctly observed that one of the striking features of the Jiang Zemin era is its ‘pluralized institutional sphere of elite policymaking’. As a trained engineer himself, Jiang was aware of the significance of technology in economic reform and development. At the Fifteenth Party Congress convened in 1997, fifty-six percent of the 193 full Central Committee members were replaced by younger members. Many of the rising technocrats in the Jiang era were pragmatic specialists in developing the economy, expanding reform, and pushing forward China’s modernization (Shamburg 2001, 103). Since Deng’s southern tour and the Party’s pledge to further the reform and opening, China had been on the fast track of economic growth. According to Jiang Zemin in his report at the Fifteenth Party Congress, the average growth rate of China’s GDP in these five years was 12.1 percent, arguably the fastest in the contemporary world. The market had played a larger role in distributing resources, which was one of the key features of the socialist market economy. Jiang also claimed that people’s living standard ‘significantly’ increased, and the per capita income had grown 7.2 percent in the past five years. The economic progress confirmed Deng and Jiang’s policies as those most suited for reform (Jiang 2006, 1: 636–37). But one thing Jiang would not admit in his official reports was the pressure of the United States behind China’s reform. As I have mentioned, the Sino-American alliance was compromised after the Tiananmen massacre, and the United States government demanded annual appraisal of China’s MFN (most favoured nation) status. One of the conditions tied to MFN was a more open economy in China. Without MFN status, China’s exports to the United States would have to suffer higher tariffs, which would be a devastating blow to the export-driven economy. In the 1990s, as China’s

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relations with the United States were improving despite a few unpleasant clashes, Jiang was seeking to enter the World Trade Organization, founded in 1995. At the APEC meeting in Seattle in 1993, Jiang had the opportunity to meet Bill Clinton, America’s new president. Jiang assured Clinton that China would be committed to reform and to opening. Because China’s reform had accomplished dramatic success in the past fifteen years, it would last for 100 years and would be irreversible. The main purpose of Jiang’s vow to continue reform was only to ask Clinton to influence Congress in granting China MFN status next year (Jiang 2006, 1: 332–34). But it was hard to convince Congress to drop the condition for China’s MFN. To ensure that Congress would grant the MFN, China had to make several compromises in tariffs and human rights, among other things, to satisfy American conditions. In May 1999, after NATO bombers ‘mistakenly’ destroyed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia (Ponniah and Marinkovic 2019; Gertz 2002, 1), Jiang adroitly leveraged the crisis to pressure the US to compromise on issues like China’s entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization). In addition to whipping up student protests against the NATO bombing, Jiang threatened in a politburo meeting that China would not yield to any American demands in light of China’s entry to the WTO. The NATO ‘mistake’ undoubtedly represented an optimal chance for China to end its deadlock in entering the WTO. Jiang later recalled that the United States was forced to apologize to China for the bombing (Jiang 2006, 3: 447). For China, there is no denying that the advantages of WTO membership would outweigh its disadvantages. As Jiang noted, entering the WTO would be conducive to China’s reform and economic development. China should ‘fully take advantage’ of its WTO membership to not only expand ties to the outside world, but also to accelerate enterprise reform and upgrade enterprise competition capability (Jiang 2006, 2: 425). In the same month, China formally signed agreement with the United States on the WTO, ending its marathon negotiations. After gaining what they wanted, Jiang and the Chinese government no longer supported protests against the US. On America’s part, the ‘mistaken’ bombing of China’s embassy was not the sole reason for it to allow China to join the WTO. A second reason was that the acceptance of China into the WTO conformed to America’s national interest. As Clinton hoped in his speech on the China trade bill in the spring of 2000, China’s entry into the WTO would open its market, ‘potentially the largest in the world’, to American goods, services, and investments in ‘unprecedented new ways’. But more importantly, Clinton envisioned that a WTO agreement would ‘create positive change’ in China, a goal

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Clinton claimed to have held from Nixon’s first visit in 1972. Clinton naively believed that the United States could influence China’s choice by using the WTO agreement to ‘pull China in the right direction’. Clinton concurred with some congressmen who opposed the agreement because China was a one-party authoritarian state that did not tolerate contrarians at home and posed a growing threat to Taiwan and its neighbours. He thought, however, that the ‘smartest thing’ to do was to improve China’s practices. ‘I believe the choice between economic rights and human rights, between economic security and national security, is a false one’, Clinton noted. ‘[China’s entry into the WTO] will not create a free society in China overnight … but over time, I believe it will move China faster and further in the right direction’ (Clinton, March 9, 2000). In retrospect, however, many politicians have criticized US engagement policies with China since Nixon. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, both Pompeo and Trump have blamed US engagement policy since Nixon and China’s entry into the WTO for empowering China and the loss of American jobs. Echoing the politicians, some scholars are also critical of America’s thirty-year engagement with China, which, they argue, has failed to meet nearly all of America’s ‘rosy expectations’. In fact, the CCP’s ‘authoritarian capitalism’ has become more resilient and viable rather than transforming China into an American-style free market economy (Nathan 2003, 6–17; Pillsbury 2015, 8–9). Moreover, CCP leaders were not unaware of the American aim to push it in the ‘right direction’ through the WTO agreement. On February 25, 2002, Jiang told a group of high-ranking officials that the WTO agreement was not the result of American ‘kindness’. There were two factors behind the American decision: one was China’s own strength, the other was America’s strategic consideration, which was to hasten the demise of China’s state-owned enterprises, a backbone of China’s socialist state and CCP rule, that would eventually trigger its social and political reform. Jiang warned CCP officials to remain vigilant, see through the nature of the American scheme, strive to attain China’s strategic aim, and push forward economic development (Jiang 2006, 3: 450).

Concessions on Human Rights Before 1989, human rights was merely a wrinkle in Sino-American relations: not only because US policymakers in the Cold War often believed that the Soviet threat and economic interests outweighed human rights, but also due to the limited revelation of China’s human rights abuses. Until the massive

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human rights violations in the Mao era were disclosed in the late 1970s, both the United States government and the public had been so preoccupied by the fallout of the Vietnam War and domestic problems that they could not pillory the human rights record of other countries. In 1984, though the Reagan administration was aware of China’s human rights violations, its officials were instructed to handle that issue through ‘private diplomacy and private discussion and not through public talk’ (Harding 1992, 199–200). After the Tiananmen crackdown, the American media lashed out at Deng Xiaoping, who visited the US in 1979, as the ‘butcher of Beijing’. Human rights groups that had previously overlooked China’s human rights now pressured the American government to impose sanctions. Congressional democrats sparred with President Bush over the human rights issue in China. Bush wanted to maintain normal relations with Beijing and Congress demanded a commitment to promoting Chinese human rights. Democratic representative Nancy Pelosi proposed a bill to provide asylum to Chinese students and scholars in the United States, which Bush endorsed (Harding 1992, 228–48). The Tiananmen incident prompted the US Congress to back a bill to tie China’s annual MFN status to its human rights record, a more open economy, and more responsible behaviour abroad (Harding 1992, 248). In 1993, the Clinton administration asked the Chinese government to conform to international human right norms (DC Meeting on China, April 27, 1993). To persuade the American government to renew its MFN status, the Chinese government opted to make flexible concessions on human rights by occasionally releasing prominent dissidents. After Jiang Zemin sent a letter to American college students in May 1990, wanting a better relationship with the United States, China in June allowed Fang Lizhi, a leader of the 1986 democracy movement, to leave China in a quid pro quo for American renewal of China’s MFN status (Kristof, June 26, 1990). From 1990 to China’s entry into the WTO, China’s MFN status would become an annually debatable issue in Congress. Though the American government finally agreed to render the MFN status, it caused headaches for Chinese leaders because they felt compelled to make concessions every year to satisfy American requests. Chinese leaders invariably complained about the link between China’s human rights record and the MFN status. Like previous rulers in the dynasties and the Republic of China, Communist leaders do not believe in universal values like personal freedom or democracy. As shown in Hong Kong after China imposed a national security law in 2020, human rights were perceived by the Chinese government as a purely domestic issue under the jurisdiction of a sovereign nation. No country has the right to intervene no matter how cruel and arbitrary

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the suppressions (The People’s Daily, July 6, 2020). For Chinese leaders, the ‘dignity’ of a state was always more important than individual ‘dignity’ or rights (Deng 1993, 3: 331, 363). In November 1993, Jiang Zemin met President Clinton for the first time in Seattle. Aside from promising continued reform and open policy, Jiang specifically brought forth the issue of human rights. In China, Jiang argued that the biggest human rights issue was that people had adequate food to eat. He dismissed Chinese dissidents and protesters as ‘criminals’ who should be punished and had no right to ask for protection of their human rights (Jiang 2006, 3: 334). In other words, Jiang flatly denied Chinese people their human rights because all they needed, or all the CCP was willing to render them, was food to live. In that regard, Chinese people were treated as mere animals and not as human beings. This is a far cry from the late Qing, when the famed jurist Shen Jiaben championed for China such Western notions as ‘respecting human dignity’ and ‘protecting human rights’ (Shen 1985, 1: 20). Despite their denial of Western ‘capitalist human rights’, Chinese leaders understood the consequences of not improving their human rights record. The United States would very likely reject the renewal of China’s MFN status, which would greatly weigh on the country’s economic reform, modernization, and even the political legitimacy of the CCP. Moreover, the Chinese government might, according to Bill Gertz, have divined the importance of human rights to the Clinton administration because ‘the issue of human rights “polls well” in White House surveys of public opinion’ (Gertz 2002, 28). To have its annual MFN status successfully approved in Congress and also to garner support for its bid for hosting the 2000 summer Olympics, China had made a range of concessions on human rights by releasing leading political prisoners such as Wang Dan, Wang Xizhe, and Wei Jingsheng. Chinese authorities also promised the United States that anyone without a criminal record could leave China. Premier Li Peng confirmed China’s willingness to engage in talks on human rights with the United States but offered no practical steps (Clinton Digital Library, Declassified Documents Concerning China, 1993). Although China’s concessions on human rights were neither consistent nor significant, Clinton in 1994 decided to delink the issue from China’s MFN status. In Clinton’s words, a tough human rights policy was ‘hampering the ability of the United States to pursue other interests’ (Human Rights Watch 1998). One of the interests was no doubt China’s large market. During his talks in the United States in October 1997, while he for the first time acknowledged the universality of human rights, Jiang repeated

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his view in Seattle in 1993 that the most fundamental and important human right in China was to feed people (Jiang 2006, 2: 52–53). Clinton apparently did not share Jiang’s views: he told Jiang that China’s human rights policy was ‘on the wrong side of history’ (Frost, November 24, 1997; Parliament of Australia, February 2021). As Avery Goldstein observes, both Clinton and Jiang only spoke to their domestic political audiences: neither expected to convince the other (Goldstein 1998, 46). Facing criticism at home for his engagement with China, Clinton argued that his ‘pragmatic policy of engagement’ was the ‘best way to advance our fundamental interests and values’. This was because the United States could not afford to contain or isolate Beijing, an approach that would embolden the enemies of freedom in China and give European and Asian business competitors a jump on the world’s largest emerging market (Broder, October 25, 1997; Goldstein 1998, 49). Like many of his predecessors and successors as well, Clinton prioritized US national/economic interests over China’s human rights. He did not want European countries to seize Chinese business while the United States only enjoyed lofty but empty compliments for standing up for its principles (Goldstein 1998, 49). Jiang Zemin and other CCP leaders were quite familiar with American weaknesses. On the one hand, they used business as the leverage to seek American compromises on China’s human rights record; on the other, they freed a few notable dissidents to cater to the American public and congressmen. As a matter of fact, violations of human rights in this period were rampant, as tens of thousands of people became victims of the reform. For example, when Jiang claimed that people’s income had greatly increased, he did not mention the tragic fact that many farmers complained about their heavy burden. Coerced relocation in rural China was another defect of the reform. In 2003 alone, nearly 10,000 square miles of farmland was lost to development. In one of my recent studies, I recorded the case of the Wuhan Waitan Garden, in which hundreds of middle-class victims in Wuhan had their apartments forcibly taken by local officials (Fang 2013, ch. 6; Fang 2017, chs. 1–3). In 1999, the Chinese government outlawed and clamped down on the Falun Gong, a religious sect with a mixture of Buddhism, Daoism, and local shamanism, for its largely peaceful but massive demonstration in Beijing. According to the 2003 Amnesty International report, hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners were tortured or killed by the government in 2002 alone (Amnesty International Report 2003,China). These serious violations of human rights did not affect China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 or the friendly summit meeting between Jiang and Clinton in New York in September 2000.

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Hiding Strength and Biding Time Hiding strength and biding time is a well-known idiom in China, practiced by many political leaders in history. One of them is Goujian, king of state Yue (r. 496–464 BCE). After he was captured in a battle by State Wu in 494 BCE, he hid his strength and pretended to be beholden to the king of Wu. In 482 BCE, Goujian successfully destroyed State Wu and killed its king (Zuo 1991, ch. 1). Other leaders such as Liu Bei (161–223 BCE), founding emperor of the Shu Han, and Zhu Yuanzhang (r. 1368–1398) are both famous for their skills in hiding their strength when facing more powerful enemies (Sima 2010, 63; Wang and Xu 1991, 10). During the final years of Mao’s rule, the PRC was much weaker and poorer than the two superpowers, especially the United States. Mao had backed off from his more bellicose rhetoric and diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s (See Hou’s Chapter Six in this volume). In 1975, during his visit to Beijing, Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos told Premier Zhou Enlai that China was the leader of the Third World; Zhou immediately corrected him, saying Mao had already declared that China did not want to be the leader of the Third World (The Annals of Zhou Enlai 1989, 710). In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping and his followers dusted off Mao’s strategy of hiding strength and biding time in handling Sino-American relations. Both Deng and Jiang Zemin had made frequent compromises during clashes with the United States to avert escalations. In contrast to the United States, China was a very poor country. Deng had repeatedly acknowledged China’s poverty to foreign leaders in the 1980s (Deng 1993, 3: 94; 218, 311). He and Jiang knew that China’s ongoing economic reform and modernization would not be successful without America’s cutting age technologies and huge domestic market. In the wake of the Tiananmen incident, Sino-American relations were at their worst since the time of Nixon. Deng Xiaoping warned Jiang Zemin and other CCP leaders that, if China did not consolidate its base and internal stability, Western countries might attack. Deng argued that China would be more powerful if it could grip the reform and open policies. In addition, Deng urged younger leaders to be careful in tackling world affairs. ‘To summarize the world situation’, Deng noted, ‘there are three words: first, calmly observing; second, holding your base f irmly; third, responding unflappably. Be patient and not hasty. [You] must calm down, calm down, and again calm down …’ (Deng 1993, 3: 320–21). In other words, Deng hoped future CCP leaders would remain patient and sober and not challenge the more powerful United States.

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In December 1990, Deng once again reminded other leaders not to be leader of the Third World lest China would be forced to confront the superpowers. ‘Some nations (e.g. Libya) in the Third World want China to be their leader’, Deng remarked, ‘but we should never be the leader and that is our basic national policy’. Deng went on to explain that China was not yet ready to be the leader. If it became the leader, it would gain nothing but lose many advantages (Wang, Sun, Liang, 2017, ch. 2; Deng 1993, 3: 363). As Deng’s protégé, Jiang Zemin was supposed to follow Deng’s advice. Yet his approach to the strategy of hiding strength differed from that of Deng, who talked tough but acted softly. Michael Pillsbury argues that China ‘had always portrayed itself as a backward nation’ (Pillsbury 2015, 9); his view may not square with the era of Jiang Zemin. The rising economic and military power of China in the 1990s had emboldened Jiang’s rhetoric and assertiveness in foreign policies, though Jiang, unlike Xi Jinping in the 2010s, refrained from confronting the United States directly, knowing when and where to back down. In early 1993, Jiang told military leaders that the current international situation was favourable to China. China should follow Deng’s instructions: that China should focus on economic development and never become a leader in international affairs. Any violations of Chinese sovereignty and interest would be parried with reason and restraint. Once China could enjoy ten years or longer of peace in developing its economy, it could better protect its national security and enhance its stature in the world (Jiang 2006, 1: 281, 288). In the post-Cold War era, the United States was the sole superpower and the SinoAmerican relationship would undoubtedly be one of China’s most important bilateral relations. Jiang, like Deng, was well-aware of the lopsided relationship between the two countries and that China was not ready to challenge America’s tremendous power. In July 1993, while addressing a group of diplomats, Jiang remarked that the United States would for a long period of time be China’s principal opponent. Sino-American relations contained both cooperation and resistance. After the Cold War, the United States was still the most powerful country, whose ‘economic and military standards are the highest in the world’. It was vital to maintain a good relationship with the United States, as it was not only a major market for China, but also the source of technology, investment, and advanced managerial experience. However, the United States would continue to pressure China on issues such as human rights, trade, arms sale, Taiwan, and Tibet. Jiang especially complained about America’s bullies, hegemony, and power politics. To deal with the United States, Jiang said that China should combine both fighting

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spirit and concession. Because President Clinton offered a kind gesture, we should grasp the opportunity to improve bilateral relations and not yield to America’s unreasonable actions. ‘Otherwise, that would be treated [by the US] as a sign of weakness’, Jiang stated (Jiang 2006, 1: 312–13). In the midst of the Taiwan crisis in March 1996 that was sparked by Taiwan’s deviation from China and pursuit of independence, Jiang was so overwhelmed by his impatience to conquer Taiwan that he took the bold decision to deploy thousands of army and test missiles to intimidate Taiwan (Chen 2012, 955–72). William J. Perry, US Defense Secretary, delivered a stern warning to a visiting Chinese official that any Chinese attacks against Taiwan would have ‘grave consequences’. Shortly after Clinton ordered two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area, China abruptly ended the missile test as a concession to the United States (Goldstein and Schriver 2001, 159). According to Wu Xinbo, the 1996 Taiwan crisis has had adverse ramifications on Sino-American relations, including closer and stronger ties (e.g. arms sale and missile defense) between the United States and Taiwan (Wu 2004, 54–60). Furthermore, China’s assertive and bold response in the 1996 Taiwan crisis explicitly showcases the disparity between ‘rhetorical’ Deng and ‘partially assertive’ Jiang in exercising the strategy of ‘hiding strength and biding time’. Jiang skillfully and carefully tried to keep the Taiwan crisis under control and prevented it from damaging China’s relations with the US. During Clinton’s visit in Beijing in June 1998, Jiang accused the United States of creating the issue of Taiwan, the single biggest obstacle between the two countries. But he hoped that the United States would, for the sake of the strategic partnership with China, move to solve the Taiwan issue (Jiang 2006, 2: 151–55). Two months later, however, Jiang talked to some Chinese diplomats in a private meeting, saying the United States and its Western allies would always be the enemy of China and plot to overthrow the CCP. Accordingly, China’s struggle with the West would last for a long time. Invoking Deng’s advice of hiding strength, Jiang wanted officials to stay calm and unflappable and to avoid pursuing leadership in the world. ‘We must hide our strength, bide our time, practice restraint, protect ourselves, and slowly develop [our strength]’, Jiang remarked; ‘our national conditions compel us to take that strategy [of assuming world leadership] …’ (Jiang 2006, 2: 195). Before China grew to be a more powerful nation, Jiang thought that it would be unwise to challenge the United States. In 1999, Jiang and the Chinese government’s fury over the United States intensified after NATO ‘mistakenly’ bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade and killed three Chinese state reporters. The Chinese Foreign Ministry

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slammed US-led NATO for violating Chinese sovereignty and trampling on international law. While NATO suspected that the Chinese embassy sent signals to Milosevic’s forces, then engaging in genocide against Albanians in Kosovo (Sweeney, Holsoe, and Vulliamy, October 16, 1999; for Kosovo genocide, see Moj 2011, 133–235), Jiang claimed in a politburo meeting that NATO intentionally targeted the three state reporters because they exposed Western hegemonism and power politics, opposed Western interference in Yugoslav internal affairs, and reported a good deal of civilian casualties. ‘Some Americans are very dissatisfied [with the Chinese reports]’, Jiang stated, going on to say that some Americans loathed China in their bones (guzili), despite never showing anger on their face. Jiang thanked Mao for developing the nuclear weapons in the 1960s that helped protect China’s safety. Deng Xiaoping’s previous caveats of hiding strength continued to resonate as Jiang reminded top officials to remain composed and coolheaded: China still lagged behind the West in terms of economy, technology, and national defense. ‘What China needs to do for the moment’, Jiang said, ‘is to seize any chance to concentrate on developing ourselves. Once China has greatly bolstered its national power, our national security in the world will be fundamentally guaranteed’. In spite of the embassy bombing, Jiang told officials that China had to deal with the United States before it grew stronger (Jiang 2006, 2: 323–25). The plane collision in April 2001 was the last major incident in the Jiang era in which Jiang Zemin and the Chinese government further demonstrated toughness and def iance in their negotiations with the United States. The new Bush administration blamed the Chinese pilot for hitting and damaging the US reconnaissance plane that was flying in the international area off the Chinese coast when it made an emergency landing on an Hainan airfield. But the Chinese government insisted the American plane collided with the Chinese plane and killed the pilot. While neither side could persuade the other on the cause of the collision, China demanded an official apology and a sizable amount of compensation from the US government. The US government refused to give a formal apology, but did offer ‘sincere regret’ to the widow of the missing pilot. The Bush administration was willing to pay only $34,567, not the $1 million China demanded as compensation for the crew’s detention. Chinese scholar Ni Shixiong argues that the speedy resolution of the crisis is the result of an ‘increasingly mature’ Sino-American relationship (Ni 2009, 62). Yet, in October 2001, a congressional report on the collision criticized Chinese leadership for its ‘hardline and non-cooperative approach’ in the incident (Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2001; The Guardian, April 13,

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2001). Jiang’s tough stance and irreconcilability at the start of the plane collision incident mirrors China’s growing economic and military might, as well as the CCP’s fundamental distrust and hatred of the United States. But the relatively swift solution of this crisis and China’s subsequent compromise further prove Jiang’s skillful negotiation ability, his awareness of China’s weakness, and the importance of ‘biding time’ when confronting the US, a more powerful opponent. The relations between Jiang and Bush, whose father built a close connection with Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s, were generally cordial during the rest of Jiang’s presidency. Both Jiang and Bush quickly shrugged off the effects of the plane collision and met twice in 2002. In October 2002, Bush even hosted Jiang and his wife at his Texas ranch, a rare invitation reserved only for friendly and important state leaders. In the meeting, Jiang voiced his wish to work closely with the US to find a ‘fair and reasonable solution’ to problems such as, inter alia, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and peace on the Korean peninsula (BBC News, October 25, 2002). Jiang assured Bush that China’s primary mission was to develop its economy because the country was still far from modernization. China would not seek hegemony when it was stronger. Jiang also claimed that democracy, freedom, and human rights were the goals for both Chinese and American people. Although China had just clamped down on the Falun Gong, a semi-religious sect, Jiang claimed that China’s constitution protected citizens’ religious freedom. What Bush wanted most from Jiang was China’s backing for the ongoing US war against terrorism, not its human rights (Jiang 2006, 3: 525–27). Jiang Zemin’s assertiveness in foreign policy was also embodied in China’s publication of human rights violations in the United States. Outraged by the repeated criticism of Western countries against China’s human rights record since 1989, China in the late 1990s started counterattacks by publishing a white paper of the yearly human rights records in the United States. Drawing most of its sources from the American public media and other off icial documents, China charged the United States with ‘police abuse of power, gun violence, prison labour, racial discrimination, and having the largest number of prisoners in the world’. The Chinese white paper also pointed out that the United States had political prisoners (The News Office of the State Council, February 27, 2000). The white paper mostly aimed to show Chinese people that the United States, the self-proclaimed human rights defender, had no right to condemn China’s poor human rights record. In the best scenario, China’s white paper could humiliate the U.S. government and force it to stop criticizing China’s human rights record.

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Conclusion Sino-American relations, founded on the common threat of the Soviet Union, suffered one of its biggest setbacks after the Tiananmen incident. The lingering Soviet threat, his friendship with Deng Xiaoping, and the fear of an end to China’s reform prompted President George Bush to take unusual initiative to mend bilateral relations. To develop the Chinese economy, strengthen the CCP’s power and image, and cater to US conditions for MFN renewal, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the CCP, and his successor and protégé Jiang Zemin, adopted several strategies to improve China’s relations with the United States. With Deng’s support, Jiang was determined to deepen and expand reform of economy, law, and the nature of socialism. In 1992, Jiang called on the CCP to construct the socialist market economy in China. Five years later, Jiang pledged to establish the rule of law in China to accommodate the socialist market economy. China’s continuous reform efforts, and its large market, in particular, convinced President Clinton and Congress to endorse China’s entry into the WTO. In addition, China in the Jiang era made a number of concessions in human rights, such as freeing prominent dissidents in exchange for the annual MFN renewal by the United States and summit meetings with US presidents, although the Chinese government in the meantime employed repressive measures against other political activists, religious groups, and complainants who lost their lands and properties to local officials. Learning from history, Chinese leaders from Mao to Jiang tried to hide China’s strength and bide its time when facing more powerful adver­ saries. After Western nations imposed sanctions against China due to the Tiananmen crackdown, Deng instructed younger leaders to keep a low profile, remain calm, and to avoid leadership in the world. As evidenced in the 1996 Taiwan crisis and the 1999 embassy bombing, Jiang generally followed Deng’s advice and quickly made compromises to avert direct confrontation with the United States, the only superpower. But unlike Deng, who did not want to openly challenge the United States, Jiang took up bolder and more assertive acts whenever necessary to show China’s growing power and resolve. The successful economic reform, plus Jiang’s skillful use of a variety of strategies and negotiations in dealing with the United States, won the approval of the American public. In 2000, a Gallup poll showed f ifty-seven percent of Americans held favourable views of China, much higher than that right after the Tiananmen incident (thirteen percent) (Moore 2001). Unlike Xi Jinping, more aggressive and assertive in challenging the status quo, Jiang fully understood the limits of China’s

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economic and military power vis-à-vis that of the US. After maximizing China’s interests through the tactics of brinkmanship (e.g., nationalistic rhetoric and negotiation), he was willing to compromise with the US. The best example is China’s entry into the WTO. While both Deng and Jiang publicly stressed the importance of SinoAmerican relations, they often reminded top officials that the United States was always the biggest enemy of the PRC (Pillsbury 2015, 4). ‘Whether the United States and other Western nations take the strategy of “containment” or “contact” [in dealing with China]’, Jiang noted in August 1998, ‘their objective is the same, which is to change China’s socialist system and eventually to incorporate China into the Western capitalist system. Such a struggle will be long-term and complicated’ (Jiang 2006, 2: 197). In that regard, Jiang, like other CCP leaders before and after him, had no intention to conduct serious political reform that could threaten CCP’s one-party rule, much less to embrace Western values such as democracy, freedom and the rule of law (Buckley, March 4, 2021). What Jiang had in mind was to hide China’s hatred for the United States and bide its time for revenge until China was powerful enough to challenge the United States. China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, and his recent aggressive domestic and international policies have somewhat reinforced the CCP’s consistent hostilities toward the United States and Jiang’s promised revenge against the West once China becomes more powerful (Jakes, March 19, 2021). Xi’s chauvinistic and hawkish tone cannot be more clearly testified in China’s recent reactions to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Ultranationalists such as Hu Xijin, former editor of the Global Times, even called on Chinese army to shoot down Pelosi’s plane (Fang, August 20, 2022). For American presidents and most, if not all, congressmen, the CCP’s rebuke of Western values and refusal to make any meaningful efforts to reform its party-state system is an insurmountable barrier to a better, value-based relationship between the two countries (Goldstein 1998, 47). Secretary Pompeo floated the idea of a new cold war between Communist China and the US in 2020. In March 2021, nearly fifty percent of polled Americans named China as the biggest enemy of the US, and both parties in Congress backed tougher bills against China (Lieser, March 16, 2021). President Biden, enraged by China’s ban on exporting Shanghai-made American masks in the spring of 2021, said that the United States ‘shouldn’t rely on a foreign country—especially one that doesn’t share our interests and values—in order to protect and provide for our people during a national emergency’ (Stockman, March 19, 2021). After Biden signed into law a spending package to bolster domestic chip manufacturing, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer evidently noted that the act was meant to

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prevent authoritarian countries like China from taking the leadership in the world. (Jack S. Truitt, August 9, 2022).

Bibliography The Annals of Zhou Enlai. 1989. (Zhou Enlai nianpu). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe. 1993. Clinton Digital Library, Declassified Documents Concerning China. “May 3. China Status Report, Non-MFN Leverage; Report; DC Meeting on China, 1993. April 27.” https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101089. Accessed April 25 2021. 2000. The News Office of the State Council, 1999 America’s Human Rights Record, February 27. http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/2014/2013nmgdrqjl/2013nmgdrq jl1/Document/1365449/1365449.htm ‘China-US Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessment and Policy Implications’. October 10, 2001 Congressional Research Service; https://crsreports. congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30946 Accessed March 3 2021. ‘US: It was the Chinese Pilot’s Fault’. April 13, 2001. The Guardian, ‘Jiang and Bush Start Texas Summit. October 25, 2002. BBC News, Amnesty International Report, China, 2003. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3edb47d2c.html.Accessed March 12 2021. ‘Interfering in Domestic Affairs Can Never be Successful (ganshe neizhengjuebuneng decheng)’. July 6, 2020. The People’s Daily, ‘President Clinton’s Visit to China in Context.’ February 2021. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/china-98/visit.htm Accessed April 12 2021. Broder, John M. October 25, 1997. ‘Clinton Defends Engagement with China’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 10 2021. Burr, William, ed. 1998. The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow. New York: The New Press. Buckley, Chris. March 4, 2021. ‘“The East is Rising:” Xi Maps out China’s Post-Covid Ascent’.The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 15 2021. Chang, Gordon. 2001. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Randon House. Chang, Gordon H. 1990. Friends and Enemies: The United States,China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Chen, Chien-Kai. November 2012. ‘Comparing Jiang Zemin’s Impatience with Hu Jintao’s Patience Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989-2012’. Journal of Contemporary China, 21 (78)): 955–972. Chen, Yun. 1986. Selected Works of Chen Yun (Chen Yun wenxuan). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.

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Clinton, Bill. March 9, 2000. Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill. https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_ China_Trade_Bi.htm. Accessed March 15 2021. Cohen, Roger. September 27, 1992. ‘Paying for the Fall of Communism’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 2021. Crampton, R.J. 2002. The Balkans Since the Second World War. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education. Dunlop, John B. 1993. The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Deng, Xiaoping. 1993. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Dittmer, Lowell. January – April, 2003. ‘Factional Politics under Jiang Zemin’. Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No.1: 97–128. Everington, Keoni. December 3, 2018. ‘Greatest US-China Policy Failure was George Bush’s Muted Response to Tiananmen Massacre: Scholar’. Taiwan News. https:// www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3588537. Accessed May 20 2021. Faison, Seth. February 1, 1992. ‘Summit at the UN: Bush and Chinese Prime Minister Meet Briefly at UN Amid Protests’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 2021. Fang, Qiang. 2013. Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis. ____. ‘“Taiwan’s Path to Peace, Prosperity Depends on China” in Duluth News Tribune, August 20, 2022, Page. C12. Frost, Frank. November 24, 1997. Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Group, Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/ CIB9798/98CIB07. Accessed February 13 2021. Gallagher, Tom. 2003. The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy. London: Routledge. Gallup Poll. 2021. https://news.gallup.com/poll/1627/china.aspx. Accessed March 17 2021. Gertz, Bill. 2002. The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America. Washington, DC: Regnery. Gilley, Bruce. 1998. Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China’s New Elite. Berkeley: University of California Press. Goh, Evelyn. June 2005.‘Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the US Opening to China, 1971–1974’.Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, Issue 3:. 475–502. Goldstein, Avery. January 1998. ‘China in 1997: A Year of Transitions’. Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 1: 34–52. Goldstein, Steven M. and Randall Schriver. March 2001. ‘An Uncertain Relationship: The United States and the Taiwan Relations Act’. The China Quarterly, No. 165: 147–172.

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Hao, Yufan and Zhihai Zhai. March 1990. ‘China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited’. The China Quarterly, No. 121:94–115. Harding, Harry. 1992. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972. Washington, DC: Brookings Press. Hilton, Brian. September 2009. ‘“Maximum Flexibility for Peaceful Change”: Jimmy Carter, Taiwan, and the Recognition of the Peoples’ Republic of China’. Diplomatic History. Vol. 33, Issue 4:595–613. Jakes, Lara. March 19, 2021. ‘In First Talks, Dueling Accusation Set Testy Tone for US-China Diplomacy’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 27 2021. Jiang, Zemin. 2006. Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (Jiang Zemin wenxuan). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe. Kissinger, Henry. 1994. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kreisberg H, Paul. June 1988. ‘The United States and China in the 1990s’. Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 10, No. 1:55–69. Kristof, Nicholas D. June 26, 1990. ‘China Lets Dissident Leave Haven in US Embassy to Fly to England’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 2021. MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals. 2006. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Li, Rui. 2013. The Oral Memoir of Li Rui (Li Rui koushu wangshi). Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. Li, Xiaobing and Qiang Fang. 2013. Modern Chinese Legal Reform: New Perspectives Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Li, Xiaobing and Qiang Fang. 2017. Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Lieser, Ethen Kim. March 16, 2021. ‘Poll: Majority of Americans Believe China is Greatest Enemy of the US’. The National, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ poll-majority-americans-believe-china-greatest-enemy-us-180394, Accessed April 20 2021. Mann, Jim. June 30, 1991. ‘Many 1989 US Sanctions on China Eased or Ended’. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-06-30-mn-2555story.html. Accessed March 7 2021. Meisner, Maurice. 1996. The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978–1994. New York: Hill and Wang. Moj, Paul. 2011. Balkan Genocide: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Moore, David W. April 2001. ‘Americans Divided in Feelings about China’.” Gallup News, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1837/americans-divided-feelings-aboutchina.aspx?version=print. Accessed April 19 2021.

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Nathan, Andrew J. January 2003. ‘China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience’. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1:6–17. Ni, Shixiong. 2009. ‘Jiang Zemin and the Sino-American Relationship’. The Study of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, Vol. 6: 56–65. December. Nixon, Richard. 1967. ‘Asia after Vietnam’. Foreign Affairs, October. pp. 128–144. Princeton University Press. Pillsbury, Michael. 2015. The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. New York: St. Martin’s. Ponniah, Kevin and Lazara Marinkovic. May 6, 2019. ‘The Night the US Bombed a Chinese Embassy’. BBC News.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48134881. Accessed April 12 2021. Pompeo, Mike. 2020. “Mike Pompeo China Speech Transcript July 23 at Nixon Library” in https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/mike-pompeo-china-speechTranscript-july-23-at-nixon-library. Accessed March 18 2021. Shambaugh, David. 2001. ‘The Dynamics of Elite Politics during the Jiang Era’. The China Journal, No. 45: 101–111. January. Shen, Jiaben. 1985. Factual Study of Past Criminal Laws (lidai xingfa kao). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Shen, Zhihua and Kuisong Yang, eds. 2007. Declassified American Information on China, 1948–1976 (Meiguo duihua qingbao jiemi dangan, 1948–1976). Beijing: Dongfang chuban zhongxin. Sima, Guang. 2010. Comprehensive Mirror in Assisting Governance (zizhi tongjian). Beijing: zhonghua shuju. Stockman, Farah. March 19, 2021. ‘Rising to the Challenge of China’. The New York Times, www.nytimes.com, Accessed April 26 2021. Sweeney, John, Jens Holsoe, and Ed Vulliamy. October 16,1999. ‘NATO Bombed Chinese Deliberately’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/ oct/17/balkans, Accessed April 20 2021. Trump, Donald J. June 2016. Time Magazine, https://time.com/4386335/donaldtrump-trade-speech-transcript/. Accessed March 2021. Truitt, Jack Stone. 2022. “Biden Sins CHIPS Act into Law as Tech Arms Race with China Heats Up” in Nikkei Asia, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/ Semiconductors/Biden-signs-CHIPS-Act-into-law-as-tech-arms-race-withChina-heats-up. August 9. Accessed September 2022. Tsou, Tang. 1963. America’s Failure in China, 1941–1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Turker, Nancy B. June 2005. ‘Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China’. Journal of American History, Vol. 92. No. 1:109–135. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980 (FRUS). December 9, 1979. VOLUME XIII, CHINA; 282. Memorandum From Secretary of

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State Vance to President Carter, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1977-80v13/d282. Accessed April 20 2021. Vogel, Ezra F. 2011. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wang, Tianyou and Daling Xu, eds. 1991. Sixteen Emperors in the Ming Dynasty (mingchao shiliudi). Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe. Wang, Hongxu, Hao Sun, and Lin Liang.2017. Deng Xiaoping and Chinese Diplomacy (Deng Xiaoping yuzhongguo waijiao). Beijing: Zhongguo minzhu fazhi chubanshe. Wu, Xinbo. 2004. ‘Reaction and Adjustment: 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and US Policy toward Taiwan’ ( fanying yutiaozheng 1996 nian taihai weiji yumeiguo duitaizhengce). Fudan Journal (social science), Vol. 2, No. 2: 54–60. April. Xia, Yafeng. 2006. Negotiating with the Enemy: US-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. _____. 2022. Sino-American Relations: A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Zhao, Suisheng. August 1993. ‘Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China’. Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 8: 739–756. Zhong, Ying. September 12, 1943. ‘The Ideal and Democratic Spirit of the American People (meiguo renminde lixiang he minzhu jingshen)’. Xinhua Daily, http:// www.cdjp.org/academy/ref/books/china/lsdxs/lsxs48.htm, Accessed May 2021. Zhou, Enlai. 1990. Selected Works of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomacy (Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe. Zuo, Qiuming. 1991. Commentary of Zuo (zuozhuan). Hunan: Yuelu chubanshe.

About the Author Dr. Qiang Fang is professor of East Asian History at the University of Minnesota-Duluth and also a visiting professor at China University of Geosciences in Wuhan. He has authored several books such as Communist Judicial System in China, 1927-1076: Building on Fear; Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party; Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance; Zhongguo shangfang zhidu shihua, 1100 BCE–1949 [A Short History of Chinese Petitions].

Part Four Did China Lose America?

10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America Xiaoxiao Li Abstract Xi introduced China’s Silk Road Economic Belt concept and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to promote maritime cooperation on different occasions in 2013. The combination of the two forms of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a vast and complex global development strategy involving infrastructure development and investments in more than 165 countries. China’s BRI is independent of any US involvement or could be described as a China-led system without America. Between 2017 and 2020, tensions between the US and China increased quickly after Trump took office. In 2019, the entire world was shocked by the news that the Chinese government imprisoned more than one million people in Xinjiang. This chapter reviews the history of Chinese policies towards Xinjiang under different leaderships since 1949 and Xinjiang’s new role and position in BRI strategy and US-China relations. Keywords: Xinjiang, Belt and Road strategy, US-China Relationship, human rights, conflict, New Cold War

Since the US pivot to Asia strategy and its implementation in the Indo-Pacific in 2010, China has tried to look for ways to break through this containment circle over its head. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt concept was introduced by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. In a speech delivered at Nazarbayev University, the president suggested that China and Central Asia cooperate to build a Silk Road Economic Belt. It was the first time that the Chinese leadership mentioned the strategic vision. Then, President Xi proposed building a close-knit China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) community and offered guidance

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on constructing a Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road to promote maritime cooperation later in October 2013. In his speech at the Indonesian parliament, President Xi also proposed establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to f inance infrastructure construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration. China also unveiled the concept for the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) as a development strategy to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa. The MSR is the maritime complement to the Silk Road Economic Belt, which focuses on infrastructure development across Central Asia (Green, March 2018). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called for accelerating infrastructure links among neighbouring countries and for facilitating the Belt and Road initiative. Furthermore, Xi and Russian president Vladimir Putin also reached a consensus on construction of the Belt and Road, as well as its connection with Russia’s Euro-Asia Railway. One important reason for such joint efforts is the fact that the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ is a series of roads, railways, and pipelines running from central China through Central Asia, and all the way to many important trading ports in Europe, such as Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Milan, that connect with the Russian plan. Because of this, Xinjiang would become the major hub and transformation point along with BRI due to its central geographical and geopolitical position in the Eurasian continent. The ‘Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road’ is a network of coastal infrastructure projects that would convey Chinese merchants to Europe through state-of-the-art port calls in places like Indonesia, Sri Lanka, East Africa, and the Suez Canal, a trade circle that reinforces each member and allows people to bypass chaotic areas in the region. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a vast and complex global strategy involving infrastructure development and investments in well more than 165 countries; its projects expand throughout Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the island countries of the Pacific and the Caribbean, and Central and South American countries. Plans for massive infrastructure development include physical entities such as railways, bridges, and roads, as well as digital infrastructure primarily financed by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank, which are composed of members from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Clearly, this all demonstrates the fact that China’s BRI is independent of any US involvement: is, in fact, a China-led system without America. Due to the construction of BRI and the transformative role of Xinjiang, with its unique geographical and geopolitical position in China’s long-term strategy, this chapter provides a historical

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overview of Beijing’s policy toward Xinjiang. It examines the past seventyyear history of CCP policy toward Xinjiang from Mao’s regime of the 1950s to Xi’s government beginning in the 2010s. This research addresses major issues in the ongoing Chinese-minority conflicts, illuminating barriers to ethnic relations while discussing possible solutions. It offers an analytical approach to many unanswered questions through new geopolitical interpretations and a diverse perspective, using historical methodology. With an emphasis on Chinese perspectives, this chapter elucidates Xin­ jiang’s geopolitical transformation from the periphery of the CCP revolution to a central position in China’s globalization, or walk towards the world. It sheds new light on Western conceptualizations of China’s remote hinterland, or ‘new frontier’ (Chinese meaning of Xinjiang) for the first time by exploring an important change in Xinjiang’s role from Mao Zedong’s ‘strategic rear’ (zhanlue houfang) in the Cold War to Xi’s economic hub in China’s world order through his ‘One Belt and One Road’ (yidai yilu) strategy. It examines their policy designs, political institutions, and social changes by focusing on strategic issues and security concerns within the historical framework of international relations. The untold stories of Chinese leaders provide unique insights into those who have shaped policy and made unprecedented changes over the past five generations of leadership. The work puts Xinjiang in the context of China’s wars, revolutions, political movements, economic reforms, and international relations, especially relations between the US and China. Between 2017 and 2020, tensions increased between the US and China after President Donald Trump took office. The US initiated conflict with China, in the areas of trade, high technology, and manufacturing, as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Then, in 2019, the entire world was shocked by the news that the Chinese government imprisoned more than one million people in Xinjiang, China. US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo denounced China’s human rights violations in his remarks on March 13, 2019, and again on September 23, 2019, at the United Nations Events on Religious Freedom (Pompeo, September 23, 2019). On September 24, 2019, Deputy Secretary John J. Sullivan also made remarks on the Human Rights Crisis regarding the Xinjiang event (Sullivan, September 24, 2019). Having ignored the Chinese government and many of its agencies’ remarks, the 116th Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019, condemning gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Such condemnations continued well into the Joe Biden administration in 2021. Many Washington pundits continue to demand freedom of religion and of speech in China, believing that Beijing’s policy toward the people of Xinjiang

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is ‘designed to erase their religious and ethnic identities’. (Bloomberg, December 29, 2019) The American public has some critical questions to ask: Why did ethnic minorities such as Uyghurs (Uighurs), Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and others become a serious problem during China’s rise as a world power? What really happened in 2017–2019? What are the Chinese Communist Party’s intentions and new policy goals in Xinjiang? Unfortunately, the US government, media, and academia do not have convincing answers to these pivotal questions. Since official documents and government reports are not readily available for Western researchers, there are only a few monographs on Xinjiang. Major publications focus on four areas: policy and political history, human rights, Islam and other religions, and Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. No recent works provide sufficient interpretation on the ‘Re-education Training Camps’ in Xinjiang.

CCP Xinjiang Policies under Different Leadership Mao’s Cold War Strategy Xinjiang stands at the crossroads between China and Central Asia on the historic Silk Road. With its political independence and religious diversity, Xinjiang played a pivotal role in the economic, cultural, and social development of Asia and the world in the past thousand years (Millward 2009). During the Han dynasty, Arabic and Chinese merchants traveled through Xinjiang for trade and established the well-known Silk Road, connecting the Middle East and China. European merchants like Marco Polo followed the Silk Road to China during the Song and Yuan dynasties. James Millward employs a geopolitical approach, tracing the historical role of Xinjiang since the Bronze Age. Christian Tyler provides a general history of Xinjiang from the seventeenth century (Tyler 2004). Justin M. Jacobs examines the Han Chinese political influence in Xinjiang from the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the Republic of China (ROC 1912–1949), and to the People’s Republic (1949). As a political history, Jacobs’ works also covers the Russian revolution, the warlord years, and the Chinese civil war (Jacobs 2016). Nevertheless, these historians do not focus on CCP policymaking, or most importantly, recent strategic changes. Few research areas in China studies pose more difficulties than the study of Chinese minorities because of the latter’s unique political position in relation to the constitutional right of religious freedom, the legitimacy of the nation’s Communist authority, and the sovereignty of the People’s

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Republic of China (PRC). After Mao Zedong founded the PRC in 1949, he considered Xinjiang as China’s strategic rear region in the northwest when Beijing faced external threats from the northeast (Korea), southeast (Taiwan), and south (Vietnam). Xinjiang became marginalized as a frontier, ethnic minority province. The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established in 1955 as one of China’s f ive autonomous regions and was set aside for ethnic minorities. Its population is over twenty-two million, twelve million of which belong to forty-seven different minorities like the Uyghur, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Tajik, Uzbek, and Tartar peoples. The Uyghur total ten million, about forty-five percent of the Xinjiang population in 2010, and an increase from 7.19 million in 1990 and 8.35 million in 2000 (National Census Office 1993; 2002; 2012, 488; 379–80; 511–12). In addition, ninety-nine percent of the Chinese Uyghur live in Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2010, 3–4, 35–36). Most Uyghurs are primarily Muslim. Xinjiang is the only province where the ethnic population outnumbers the Han Chinese. Even though minorities are the regional ‘majority’, they do not have a dominant influence in government and policymaking. Any change or improvement of their social and political status depends on the support and concern of the Han Chinese-controlled government. Minorities are unable to exercise significant legislative or administrative power to carry out self-governance in their own communities. Inequitable development policies benefit China’s political and geographic centre, and have neglected minorities’ basic needs, as well as used their land and resources without consultation. Mao increased the Han Chinese population in Xinjiang from fifteen percent in 1950 to forty percent in the 1970s by sending large numbers of Chinese there, establishing military farms, or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and increasing the PLA’s presence. Chinese officials served in most of the XUAR government positions. Moreover, Chinese teachers worked at colleges, schools, and kindergartens and Chinese officers commanded PLA troops in the Sino-Indian War (1962) and Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts (1969–1972). When the XPCC was established in 1953, it was largely a civilian organization comprised of demobilized soldiers, totaling 175,000 men in 1954, and its purpose was to combine production work with militia duties. The XPCC’s military duties were, however, considered only marginally during the time of relative peace and absence of external threats to Xinjiang. But its value as a military organization came to the fore when the Sino-Soviet relationship broke down and the extended Xinjiang border became exposed to potential armed invasion by the Soviet Union. After the escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute following the Soviet 20th Party Congress in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s cult of

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personality, Chinese leaders were embarrassed because Mao Zedong had long praised Stalin. The situation worsened when Moscow withdrew all Soviet advisors and experts from China, followed by the massive exodus of Soviet-passport-holding Kazaks residing in the border region of Xinjiang. In April–May 1962, more than 61,000 Kazaks crossed the border and fled to the Soviet Union. To protect Xinjiang, the CCP began to mobilize large numbers of urban youths to serve in the XPCC. In 1964–1965, for example, more than 40,000 middle school and high school graduates in Shanghai signed up for the XPCC (Deng 2019, 186). By 1966, the XPCC had a population of 1.48 million. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union reached new heights when the Chinese and Soviet armies prepared for border conflict in the north in 1968. After armed clashes over Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in March 1969, on June 10, fifty Soviet soldiers attacked the Chinese in Taskti, Xinjiang. On July 8, the fighting in Heilongjiang extended to Bacha Island along the Amur River. On August 13, more than 300 Soviet troops supported by twenty tanks and two helicopters engaged in Tieliekti, Xinjiang, and annihilated all the Chinese troops in the battle. By 1971, the Soviet Union had deployed up to forty-eight divisions, constituting nearly one million troops along the Russian and Chinese border. Reportedly, Moscow’s leaders considered using a ‘preemptive nuclear strike’ against China (Yang 1997, 7–8; Robinson 2003, 198–216). The border conflicts did not escalate into total war between the two Communist countries. Deng’s Reform and Jiang’s Continuity After Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping (1978–1989 in office) took control and made tremendous changes, moving from a centrally-planned economy to a free-market system seeking global inclusion, meeting an increasingly popular demand for China’s modernization, and improving the standard of living. Deng was determined to lead China onto the road of economic prosperity by deprogramming Mao’s system and convincing people that reality is the only criterion for judging whether a theory represents the truth. Deng stressed that Marxism was a century-old theory imported from the West. To expect Marxism to reflect China’s reality in the twentieth century would simply be unrealistic. Deng defended the market economy, as having no contradiction with socialism, because the market system is simply an economic tool that may serve any ideological cause, including socialism (Luo 2005, 1: 119). In Deng’s system, Marxism and Mao’s thought

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became means to support the reform, rather than ends that the party must abide by. During Deng’s reforms, Beijing moderated its policy toward minorities. The government first implemented a number of reform efforts to modernize the ethnic regions, including the construction of railroads, heavy industrialization, and opening to tourist economy. Secondly, the government accelerated the social development of the ethnic minorities, such as raising their living standard, reducing the poverty rate, and providing more health care and medical services. Thirdly, the government intended to win the minorities’ approval by protecting their cultural heritage and traditions. The shifting nature of the ongoing reform movement had mixed characteristics of both modernization and tradition, because Beijing intended to industrialize the ethnic regions as well as to re-establish their heritage. As one of Deng’s lieutenants, CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang reversed Xinjiang’s course ‘correcting’ Mao’s policies. Hu allowed the Chinese carders, veterans, and workers to return to their hometowns like Shanghai, replaced Chinese with Uyghurs for government positions, and abolished military establishments like regional commands and military farms in the 1980s. Newly acquired economic freedom from Hu’s policy changes resulted in mixed feelings amongst Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, as they had to compete with other Chinese regions. When Jiang Zemin became the head of the third generation of the CCP leadership after Deng’s retirement in 1989, it seemed that he was bringing new hope to the Chinese minorities, and that they might have an opportunity to adjust or improve their relations with the Central Government. As China expert Mary Key Magistad puts it, because of the reform and opening-up movement, the ‘people increasingly expect a different kind of relationship with their government—one of citizens and not subjects. They want their rights respected and their preferences heard’. (Magistad, September 26, 2014) Unfortunately, Beijing was not ready for any major change in its policy toward Chinese minorities. In 1990, Jiang Zemin emphasized that all ethnic groups and their activities must follow state laws and regulations (Jiang 2003, 5). Accordingly, his administration (1990–2002) made it clear that any ethnic group in China should adapt to the reality that the Chinese people are building China into a modern socialist country with Chinese characteristics. The Central Government thus continues to issue orders to the ‘autonomous governments’ in the ethnic regions and requires all minorities in these regions to conduct their activities within the sphere prescribed by policy and by law.

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Hu’s Policy against Violence and Separatism Market economy and social transition in the 1990s challenged the CCP with unprecedented issues like social stratification, inequitable development between economic centres and Xinjiang, and an educational gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs. New hopes for autonomy and better relations with the central government diminished when Hu Jintao (2002–2012 in office) continued issuing orders to Xinjiang’s ‘autonomous government’. Major issues were caused by the recent ethnic and religious crisis in Xinjiang and emerged from limited political participation, inequitable regional development, unequal opportunity, and inadequate protection of ethnic minority cultures and religious identities over the past decade, while China experienced rapid economic growth to become the second largest economy in the world, second only to the United States. Therefore, more and more complaints came from minorities, who believed they did not have a voice in their local autonomous governments, since most of the officials were appointed by the Central Government and follow orders from Beijing. Xinjiang is the only province in the country where the ethnic population outnumbers the Han Chinese. Even though the minorities are the ‘majority’ in the XUAR, they do not have a dominant influence in XUAR government and policymaking. Any change or improvement of their social and political status depends on the support and concern of the Han Chinese-controlled government. Minorities are not allowed to exercise significant legislative or administrative power for self-governance in their own communities. Numerous conflicts arose from discontented Uyghurs and other minorities, resulting in blood and violence. On July 5–7, 2009, 197 people were killed, and 1,721 others injured when more than a thousand Uyghur demonstrators clashed with both armed police and Han Chinese. Nick Holdstock examines the rise of terrorism in Xinjiang and respective Chinese perceptions (Holdstock 2019). His interpretation indicates that the spiraling violence is a reaction to repressive government policies put in place to control the people of Xinjiang. He bases his analysis on his personal experience and individual observation during his years in Xinjiang. Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle address ethnic relations between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities like Uyghurs and Tibetans, and the limits of regional autonomy that caused unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang (Hillman and Tuttle 2016). From the 2000s to 2010s, China has seen a surge in the number of people turning to religions such as Buddhism, Islam, and Catholicism. As a result of rapid economic growth and sweeping social, ideological, and political

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change, more and more Chinese people, especially minorities, are searching for meaning and emotional stability in their lives. According to official statistics in 2008, there were more than 250 million followers of various religious faiths, a number that almost doubled from 130 million in 2000 (Sanja, Walker, and Dizard 2008, 176–77). According to the national census, the Muslim population in China increased from fourteen million in 1982, to twenty-one million in 2000, and to an estimated thirty-two million in 2014. Most are Sunni Muslim, worshiping in 30,000 mosques and served by 40,000 Imams and Akhunds, each mosque serving approximately 1,160 Muslims. Among the traditional religions, Islam is not only popular, but also represents the different ways of life of some major ethnic groups in China. Islam has ten minority groups among its adherents. The Hui and Uygur are the two major nationalities with populations of 7.2 million Hui and six million Uygur in 1982, ten million Hui and 8.5 million Uygur in 2000, and an estimated fourteen million Hui and twelve million Uygur in 2014. There are several, credible historical monographs on Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. David Brophy offers a perspective on nation building in the twentieth-century Soviet Union and China and explains the ongoing contest for the history and identity of Xinjiang. Tom Cliff examines the Han Chinese experience, using oral histories and more than fifty photographs to explore how ethnic relations developed and intermittently clashed. His social history concentrates on ordinary Han settlers, farmers, and workers. Gardner Bovingdon follows fifty years of Uyghur discontent, as well as the role of various, dissenting organizations in his book, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. This chapter finds political continuities at several levels by providing a top-down view. Crucial to our finding is the assessment of historical events and empirical data from central and local governments that place our major interpretations in the context of Chinese political culture, power struggles, economic transition, and rights movements. As a result, power capitalism and party-controlled governments have served the CCP agenda in promoting the ‘China Dream’ and propelling the country to become a world superpower. Simultaneously, power politics and legal deviation have delayed formation of a middle class and the realization of democracy in Xinjiang. Strategic Shift of Xi Xi Jinping became China’s supreme leader in 2012 and made important changes for Chinese nationalism, international political status, and economic

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growth. In 2013, Xi designed his new global plan, ‘New Silk Road and Economic Belt’, to establish China’s own international connection, cooperation, and collective security. Xi’s system connects China with Central Asia and Europe by exploring energy sources, constructing modern transportation, and building new channels for trade, finance, and communication. To create a new world order, Xi has tightened political control, homeland security, and social stability, when he faced growing social unrest and mass riots among Xinjiang’s minorities. The government categorized them as the so-called three enemy forces: ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism. After Xi Jinping was reelected in 2017, China’s supreme leader campaigned for a faster and broader scope of implementation of the ‘One-Belt and One-Road’ plan to connect East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe along the new ‘Silk Road’. Xinjiang is no longer peripheral, but instead economically central to Xi’s global project. However, due to lack of political support and social stability, Xinjiang was and still is not ready to play Xi’s expected central role. Instabilities, as explained in this book, include border security, community safety, individual protection, civil liberties, social disparity, religious unrest, and ethnic dissatisfaction. Many Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the northwest region were victims of China’s economic growth, losing their land, labour force, traditions, and natural resources to southeastern-centric reforms. When Xinjiang gained its new status, its people, traditional and pragmatic, perceived it as a favourable opportunity to improve their living standard and economic condition. Despite their perceptions, Xinjiang’s requests and demands were unacceptable, as they were seen as counter to Belt and Road policy or to defy CCP leadership. Soon, Xinjiang’s issues will not only threaten Xi’s globalization plans, but also the CCP leadership’s political legitimacy. The issue of Xinjiang threatens not only Xi’s dream and his globalization plan, but also the political legitimacy of the CCP leadership. Xi decided to take tougher positions to control the explosive situation. In March 2018, the XUAR Public Security Bureau and the PLA commands began to establish the ‘Centres for Re-education and Training’ in Urumqi, the XUAR capital, and other cities, to detain those who complained. Within that month, more than 30,000 people were brought in and detained in the centres at Urumqi. Soon more centres were open across Xinjiang; by late 2018, about 800,000 people occupied them. According to the agreement among the police, court, and government, there are ‘Three Nos’ for all the detainees: no legal case, no defense, and no time limit. That means detained people and their families had no knowledge of their charges, no legal rights, and no idea how long

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they’d be held in the camp. In mid-2019, more than one million Xinjiang people were detained in the centres. The new century may compel the state to encounter ethnic discord, religious clashes, political enmity, and violent terrorism. Some ethnic groups like the Uyghurs will continue to view their ethnicity as a banner for them to live by and to carry on. Therefore, the study of ethnic issues in China is crucially relevant and significantly imperative. The amalgamated ethnic theme, including ethnic relationships, interaction, assimilation, problems, and conflicts, will remain as an eternal issue for the Chinese state to handle, over which the whole world may preside.

Xinjiang’s Role in the US-China Relationship Having discussed the evolution of Xinjiang policy change through five generations of CCP leadership, the chapter now moves on to Xinjiang’s role in the US-China relationship and China’s strategic shift to position itself in the unprecedented world geopolitical environment. It identifies three historical debates between Washington and Beijing since 2012. The first debate is over the sovereignty of Xinjiang, or autonomy and democracy vs. separatism. The second is about Islam, or freedom of religion vs. religious extremism. The third is over ethnic minorities such as Uyghurs (Uighurs), Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other minorities, or human rights vs. terrorism. In the fall of 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping put forward the strategic framework in Kazakhstan to build the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and a counterpart ‘Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road’, referred to as ‘One Belt One Road Initiative’, which is comprehensive, focused, and as some said, personal to President Xi (Johnson, March 2016). This strategic shift is based on Eastern China’s economic achievements, the fact that China has become the second largest economic entity in the world, and that it’s made the largest contribution to world economic development. The success of this shift would make Xinjiang, traditionally a borderland, into the front line and centre of Xi Jinping’s new strategic development breakthrough. Xinjiang, in this regard, is one of China’s core interests. China has continuously and strongly pushed back against US remarks on Xinjiang human rights and religious freedom issues, defending its stand on all kinds of mechanisms and tactics currently deployed to maintain political stability in the region. From 1989 to the most recent records, US efforts to change China’s views on human rights and religious freedom are proven to have failed.

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Historically, Arabic and Chinese merchants traveled through Xinjiang for trade and established the well-known Silk Road connecting the Middle East and China during the Han dynasty. Marco Polo and European merchants followed the Silk Road and traveled to China during the Song and Yuan dynasties. In the twentieth century, the new railways crossed Xinjiang, establishing the second Eurasia Continental Land Bridge. The Uyghurs totaled twelve million, about forty-five percent of the Xinjiang population, in 2014. After Xi Jinping was reelected as China’s supreme leader in 2017, he launched the ‘One-Belt and One-Road’ plan to connect East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe by the new Silk Road through Xinjiang. Suddenly, Xinjiang was no longer peripheral, but economically central in Xi’s grand global project. Nevertheless, Xinjiang was not ready to play such an important central role due to lack of political support and social stability.

US Interests in Xinjiang According to Dr. Timothy A. Grose, assistant professor of China Studies at Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, Xinjiang Study is a new discipline in the US. Before the 1990s, Xinjiang Study in America was very rare. US scholars gradually began to pay attention to Xinjiang since the start of the formal diplomatic relationship between the US and China in 1979. From the 1980s, US scholars have focused on the cultural and political connections between Xinjiang and China’s inland. Some also tried to study the Ili Riots in 1940, while others focused on Sino-Soviet relations and Xinjiang with the backdrop of the Cold War. Popular research results are Warlords and Muslims in Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949 by Andrew Forbes and The Ili Rebellion: Muslim Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949 by Linda Benson. From the beginning of the 1990s, Dru Gladney has contributed significant research on the southeastern regions of China and on issues such as national identity and ethnic recognition in the northwestern regions; his focus, however, is on the cultural identity of the Hui ethnicity. In 1997, Jonathan Lippmann published Familiar Strangers, examining Muslim history in northwest China. Justin Rudelson’s Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road is the first anthropological study of Xinjiang. After 2000, study of Xinjiang in the US became popular for two major reasons. First, some violent incidents occurred in Xinjiang in 1997 that attracted attention from all over the world. Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks motivated US scholars to study and educate people about the Muslim world;

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they chose Xinjiang as a focus point. US scholars are very interested in those moderate Muslims, and they found many of such Muslims living in Xinjiang to whom need to pay close attention. One of the masterpieces of Xinjiang study is Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, edited by Fredrick Starr. Historically, however, the US found its political interest in Xinjiang in the 1940s and with the US political influence into the area they levied great impact in Xinjiang political society. In the years from 1941 to 1949, the US’s presence in Xinjiang is divided into three periods, i.e., the Anti-Japanese War period; after the victory of Anti-Japanese War until the splitting of the coalition government of Xinjiang province; and during the Xinjiang peaceful governance transition. US Xinjiang policy changed multiple times, from keeping a foothold in Xinjiang and coordinating between China and Soviet relations, to expanding US influence to contain the Soviets and preventing the peaceful governance transfer by planning and supporting the Xinjiang independence forces (Xu 2011, 25–35). In June 1942, China signed the ‘Sino-US Mutual Assistance Agreement Against Resistance to Aggression’. Xinjiang became a hub of international transportation, and its strategic position was prominent. This signaled the beginning of US operations (Song 1986) and increasing US interest in Xinjiang. The situation changes in Xinjiang at the same time, providing the opportunity for US interference in Xinjiang affairs. During the Anti-Japanese War stalemate stage in 1942, the US received permission to set up the Tihua (Urumqi) Consulate, US forces began to influence Xinjiang (Yuan 2002). On April 19, 1943, O. Edmond Clubb, the first secretary of the US Embassy, was appointed as the first US consul in Tihua. The Tihua Consulate was located at No. 5, Toudaoxiang, Yangmaohu, Nanliang, Tihua (today’s Eighth Route Army Memorial Museum, No.1, Hepingxiang, Shengli Road, Urumqi, Xinjiang, China). After World War II, and especially when the Cold War between the Soviets and the US began, containing the Soviet threat became America’s priority. US-China policy was to join as allies to contain the Soviets. On the other hand, Russia’s ambition to annex Xinjiang provided motivation for US interference into Xinjiang affairs. Xinjiang thus became the front line for the US to deal with the Soviets and to collect intelligence information. At this time, the Soviet Xinjiang policy was to inspire and support the Xinjiang separatist’s movement to split Xinjiang. The US paid special attention to this move and enhanced its intelligence activities. From the winter of 1946, the US sent several agents to carry out espionage activities in Xinjiang as missionaries, tourists, journalists, and investigators (Guo 1994–2010).

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In June 1947, the Soviets supported Mongolia, inspiring the Beitashan incident. The US Consulate in Tihua once again strengthened its intelligencegathering efforts. From June to September 1947, many journalists, such as Robertson of the US International Information Office, Masterson of CNN, and Peggy Parker of the New York Daily News, came to Tihua and Beitashan for interviews(Song 1979). In November 1947, Mackiernan, a CIA agent, began espionage operations in Xinjiang undercover as the vice consul of the US Tihua Consulate. As early as 1947, the US Tihua Consulate began planning for Xinjiang independence. They encouraged Xinjiang independence activists such as Mesvud, Aisha, and Mohammed Imin and their efforts for separation from China. From 1948, the US changed its China policy according to the Cold War need and escalated its efforts to split Xinjiang. On September 25, 1949, Mackiernan sent out his last telegram from the consulate, headed ‘Chinese Communist Party already took over the local government and their army will enter the city quickly’ (Gup 2001). On September 27, 1949, Mackiernan closed the US Tihua Consulate and left Xinjiang. On his way out, however, he continued his support of the fighting Xinjiang separatists. From 1943 to 1949, the US Consulate in Tihua carried out a series of espionage operations, including planning and organizing Xinjiang independence activities; these operations heralded the US policy of Xinjiang independence (Shi and Bai July 2012).

Conclusion and Prospects Since 1949, when the CCP began governance of China, Xinjiang has been one of China’s core interests. It now plays an even more important role with the success of Xi Jinping’s BRI strategy. Continued US claims about Xinjiang’s human rights and religious freedom represent challenges and bargaining leverage with which China must contend. Actually, the US has noted China’s increasing security threat in the activities of minority nationalities in the heavily Muslim Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region since 1996. Xinjiang has been the target of bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist attacks, primarily thought to be committed by small groups of extremists (largely Uyghurs) (CRS Report for Congress, September 28, 2001). In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, US policy makers have been faced with balancing human rights concerns with what appear to be common Sino-US interests in combating fundamentalist global terrorism. For this purpose, some noted

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as early as 2001 that US policy makers must juggle efforts to persuade China to improve its human rights records with attempts to uphold and enhance economic cooperation. Although some report that China continues to maintain restrictions on Muslim religious activity, especially among the Uyghur nationality, the potential for Sino-US cooperation against global terrorism may bring changes in the policy calculations of US officials, who may seek to downplay traditional US concerns in the interest of assuring China’s cooperation. Since President Donald Trump, US national strategy has changed dramatically: potential and primary targets have shifted from global terrorism to emerging market powers like China. Since Xi Jinping announced BRI in 2013, the US view on this strategy has experienced three major changes, i.e., from US officials’ ignorance and lack of media attention to systematic study of the BRI by officials and thinktanks; from pessimistic opinions to full-scale alarm at significant BRI development; and from short of tactic approach to putting forward and executing systemic Indian-Pacific strategy (Gong 2019). During the initial stage of BRI (2013–2014), there were few official US responses. Discussions and evaluations by mainstream thinktanks did not take shape. Some analysis by the mainstream media reflected the US understanding of BRI. Robert Kaplan stated that China is not only a land power, but also a sea power. China’s ever-increasing strength would expand at a pace that would eventually make it a global geopolitical pivot point covering the whole of Eurasia. According to The Diplomat web article, the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt offered China an opportunity to establish a closer economic and diplomatic tie with South Asia, Central Asia, and Gulf regions, including Saudi Arabia, that exceeded China’s traditional open-door policy and relationship directions in the East Asia and Pacific region, but expanded in far-reaching western directions. Brookings Institute reported that China’s western move forward is closely connected with its domestic regional development strategy, intended to speed up China’s Western Development pace and further strengthen security in its western border regions. At its most basic level, BRI is trumpeted as the solution to help overcome China’s struggle with developing its chronically underperforming regions by integrating them into a holistic, externally oriented development program (Johnson, March 2016). The Jamestown Foundation reported that China accelerating its diplomatic strategy and shifting its focus to the Asian inland would escalate China’s influence and attraction for those bordering Eurasian countries. All these reports have one thing in common: in eastern and Pacific regions, US and China relations gradually show the outcome of potential conflict and a zero-sum game result.

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According to the US assessment, terrorism and extremist forces threaten the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt. It also states that China’s BRI has more advantages than the US New Silk Road Initiative laid out in the Obama Administration’s first term. The Washington Post clearly pointed out that the New Silk Road Initiative from Obama’s first term did not achieve its three original targets: to strategically tie down China and Russia; to fight terrorism militarily; and to economically control the natural resources in Central Asia. US thinktanks concluded that China would weaken US influences alongside the countries on the Belt and Road Initiative. From 2015 to 2016, BRI harvested its first round of achievements, which alarmed the US strategic circle and gave them the incentive to pay closer attention. They reached consensus that China’s BRI and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank signaled China’s new economic diplomacy, challenging international economic rules and threatening US interests and its regional alliance system. At this period of time, they started to criticize BRI for challenging the international order and threatening US interests, so the US should work out a full scale Asian-Pacific Strategy and coordinate with its allies to reduce potential risks. From 2017 to 2019, BRI’s jointly discussing, sharing, and building aim achieved much, which aroused US anxiety and alarm. In May 2018, the United States changed the name of ‘Pacific Command’ to ‘Indo- Pacific Command’. Official US competition and pressure on BRI took shape and its Indo-Pacific Strategy was formally put into action (Gong 2019). By this time, US officials, politicians, and media criticized China for violation of human rights and religious freedom in Xinjiang on an unprecedented level. The US Congress urged the government to levy sanctions on officials and companies in Xinjiang. Some Xinjiang officials were sued in the US for human rights violation policies, operations, and actions. By the time of this chapter, however, we have not found any successful cases of sanctions connected with human rights and religious freedom issues in Xinjiang. Having discussed so far, we foresee the escalation of US claims for Xin­ jiang, involving either genocide or forced labour in the cotton industry. It is not surprising to also note that, as China stated, competition between China and the United States in the integration of interests is the key to fair and just competition in general. With such a statement, China publicly makes clear that it has objectively declared itself in ‘competition’ for the US’s global leadership position. This change of expression, from the author’s perspective, is the response to strategies by the most recent three US administrations: after twenty years of swinging, US strategic positioning towards China has gradually become clear. The United States is the largest external variable

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influencing China’s strategy of rejuvenation. After the end of the Cold War, China’s policy toward the United States persisted in expanding positive aspects and reducing the negative, seeking convergence of the countries’ common interests, that is, the 16-character policy of ‘increasing trust, reducing trouble, developing cooperation, and not engaging in confrontation’. The correct policy towards the US has won China a twenty-year period of external strategic opportunities. In 2012, based on the 16-character policy, China once again proposed a new type of major power relationship based on ‘mutual respect, win-win cooperation, non-conflict, and non-confrontation’. After that, it also proposed a well-intentioned strategic proposition, saying, ‘the Pacific Ocean is large enough to accommodate the two major powers of China and the United States’. So, such change of position also makes it obvious that, in the author’s opinion, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be an alternative to avoid direct conflict and confrontation with the US. Above all, the Cold War inspired the US to actively push for tough measures for China from the Obama administration to those of Trump and Biden. On the other hand, more and more voices in China are urging the government not to passively react to the US’s provocation, but to show muscle under certain circumstances. Some scholars in both the US and China hope that only by understanding the three fundamental differences between China and the United States can we really find a way to cooperate. First, the Chinese economy is a developing economy led by the government, while the United States has an open economy built on rules. In the early years of the Chinese economy, the United States took no interest in the government’s support and protection of domestic enterprises. When China grows into a global economic power, however, the United States can no longer tolerate its defiance of the rules and demand for equal competition. Second, the Sino-American difference pointed out by Ezra Feivel Vogel is that the United States believes in the value of individual freedom, while China advocates collectivism. According to Vogel, China experienced a great deal of national humiliation and turmoil after the Opium War in 1840; now it has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, and therefore longs for stability. Many Chinese believe that for the happiness of the majority, it is necessary to restrict the freedom of speech and movement of the minority. It is precisely because of this principle—that collective action is superior to individualism—that China has successfully controlled the new Coronavirus epidemic. The third difference between China and the United States, discussed by Ezra F. Vogel, is the electoral system. The Communist Party of China established in 1921, says Vogel, represented the interests of the workers

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and peasants and opposed the capitalists and the landlord class. Now, class struggle is no longer the central issue, but the interests of all strata of society. The system for selection of officials is fundamentally different from the public election system in the United States. The systems and policies bred by China’s special history and cultural traditions are fundamentally different from those of the West; if you don’t understand this, you will not be able to grasp relations with China. In recent years, the US government has regarded China as its biggest external challenge, competitor, and even security threat. China has resolutely counterattacked the sanctions and provocations imposed by the United States and strengthened the spirit of struggle. The most important common goal of the two countries now seems to be not to coordinate and cooperate for common interests, but to prevent serious losses or even mutual destruction. We have seen an increasing number of incidents from both sides, such as China shutting down the US Chengdu Consulate in response to the US closing the Chinese Houston Consulate, and more frequent US naval activities close to Chinese coastlines on the South China Sea. Even so, we cannot anticipate any direct confrontations in the foreseeable future. Growing voices from both sides now say that, although the US and China compete on many fronts, chances still exist for close coordination and cooperation. Tensions between the two countries will not lead to a new Cold War, as elites of both sides have suggested. There is a special note to add at the end of this chapter. The last US soldier withdrew from Kabul as this book’s publication was in planning stages. The Taliban quickly took over Afghanistan after twenty years of the US War on Terror, begun to overthrow Taliban authority, which provided safe harbour for terrorist groups in the region, such as Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda. Compared to twenty years ago, the current Afghan Taliban has more combat effectiveness and cohesion, more financial independence, clearer political goals, and better understanding of dialogue with the international community. From its past history, one would guess the Afghan Taliban will never confine its political ambitions to Afghanistan, but may well look to the periphery, and merge with the Islamic State in the long run. Their traditional relationships with terrorist groups or organizations determine Afghan Taliban’s own current attributes. The practical changes that they have shown, and we now see are formal and may not be in essence. Regardless of whether or not the international world recognizes its legitimacy, even if diplomatic relations are established with the Taliban regime in the future, will it be stable? The biggest issue for the international community is whether or not the nature of the Taliban itself has changed. Its taking

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over Afghanistan poses a huge security challenge to China, especially Xinjiang, and could impact China’s apparently advantageous position. In the future, China will always have to deal with this problem. So, the key for China is how to coordinate the positions of relevant countries on the Taliban issue. From the perspective of a major power, Afghanistan has little impact on China, and the relationship between the two is relatively good. The main issue for China is how to seize this opportunity to better mobilize the American factor and prevent the United States from withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, then applying more strategic pressure on China. Additionally, the Taliban’s intention to form an inclusive government is symbolic: the basic nature of the Taliban regime is to establish an Islamic state with unified politics and religion. In general, this type of state holds extremist positions and deals with many problems in accordance with the Islamic canon and Islamic ideology. Since Taliban’s ideology is there, its decision makers will inevitably take some measures into consideration and in practice. So, the stability of the Taliban regime depends on two major conditions: one is its internal conditions and the degree of domestic resistance. The ideological differences and contradictions might lead to a new round of civil war in Afghanistan. The second is acceptance by the international community. Afghanistan’s dependence on the assistance of the international community is very high, exceeding eighty percent. When and how the international community accepts the Taliban and its governance, and provides necessary assistance, remains to be seen. Afghanistan itself is not a country that poses a potential threat to China’s national security. Most of the sources of separatist forces, such as East Turkistan, are located in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Although the East Turkistan training camp is in Afghanistan, it is not supported by the Taliban. Moreover, the Taliban has repeatedly stated it will not allow any terrorist organization to use Afghanistan to engage in terrorist activities against other countries in the region. Although it is difficult to judge whether the Taliban will export revolutions or other threats to neighbouring countries, some see the need to be alert to political Islamism on a larger scale, especially the spillover influence on the political situation of Central Asian countries. The victory of the Taliban encouraged the confluence of domestic opposition in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose political stability faces both internal and external pressures. In fact, this will eventually have spillover effects on China’s autonomous Xinjiang region. The United States has withdrawn from Afghanistan, after which it may be difficult for the region to maintain stability. Historically, unless the land of Afghanistan expands externally, when India, Pakistan,

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and other neighbouring countries were looted, and the wealth distributed to the various Afghan tribes, Afghanistan could then maintain a relative internal stability. At other times, in-fighting might be continuous. Therefore, this region may still be an important source of instability in the Central Asian region, with significant repercussions for the future. Ideology is the major concern, and the most influential element. Thoughts may spread across borders. For example, the Taliban advocates the unity of politics and religion, its consistent position. This may have a demonstrative effect on some negative elements in Xinjiang, and separatist forces may copy and assimilate. For the entire western region of China, the infiltration of extremist ideologies and forces of Islam is a long-standing threat, difficult to resolve with little money and little economic aid from China.

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Hillman, Ben and Gray Tuttle eds. 2016. Ethnic Conflicts and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press. Holdstock, Nick. 2019. China’s Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror, and the Chinese State. London: I. B. Tauris. H.R. 649, US Congress. January 17, 2019. Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019. Jacobs, Justin M. 2016. Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Jia, Chunyang. November 2010. ‘The Establishment of the US Consulate in Dihua and Its Attempt to Split Xinjiang’. Journal of Jianghan University (Humanities Sciences), Vol. 29, No. 5. P 82-85 Jiang, Zemin. May 2003. ‘We must Establish the Marxist Perception of Nationality and Religion’’ Selected Documents on China’s Minority Policies. National Minority Affairs Commission and Central Archives and Manuscripts Division of the CCP. Jin, Yijiu. 2006. History of Islam. Nanjing, China: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House. Johnson, Christopher K. March 2016. President Xi Jinping’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, CSIS Report of the Freeman Chair China Studies: https://csis-website-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf Kellner, Thierry. 2002. China: The Uighur Situation from Independence for the Central Asian Republics to the Post 11 September Era. UNHCR, Emergency and Security Service, WRITENET Paper No.2. Lang, Sheng and Aili Wang, eds. 2016. Interpretation of the Anti-terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China. Law Press, Beijing. Lehr, Amy K. and Mariefaye Bechrakis. October 2019. Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang-Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains. Report of the CSIS Human Rights Initiative. Leibold, James. July 6, 2012. Toward a Second Generation of Ethnic Policies? Jamestown Global Research and Analysis, China Brief, Vol. 12. P 7-10. Li, Sheng. 2013. Xinjiang, China: History and Current Situation. Wuzhou: Communication Publishing House. Li, Xuan. 2017. The Role of Scholars: American Researchers on the Western Frontier of China and the Formulation of Policies towards China, Journal of Beijing University of Nationalities, No. 6, p 26-32 Lin, Meicun. 2006. Fifteen Lectures on Archaeology on the Silk Road. Beijing: Peking University Press. Lincot, Emmanuel. April 2019. The BRI, Stabilizing Factor in the Xinjiang Policy? IRIS Asia Program, Asia Focus #111. P 1-13. Lipman, Jonathan N. 1998. Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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Liu, Amy H. and Keven Peters 2017. The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 17, No. 2, P 265-280. Liu, Wenjun. October 2016. Around Taklimakan Desert. China Communications Press Co., Ltd., Beijing. Luo, Jing. 2005. ‘Reform of Deng Xiaoping’ in China Today (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 1: 119. Ma, Xingrong. 2014. Research on the Construction of the Long-term Mechanism of Ideological and Political Doctrines in Urban Communities in Xinjiang Multi-ethnic Areas. Beijing: Intellectual Property Publishing House. Macaes, Bruno. 2019. Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order. London: Hurst. Magistad, Mary Kay. April 30, 2013. ‘China Past Due: Facing the Consequences of Control’. PRI’s The World, http://www.theworld.org/2013/04/china-past-duehome/. Accessed on September 26, 2014. Mahmut, Dilmurat. 2019. Controlling Religious Knowledge and Education for Countering Religious Extremism: Case Study of the Uyghur Muslims in China. FIRE: Forum for International Research in Education, Vol.5, no. 1. P 22-43. Millward, James. 2009. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang New York: Columbia University Press. Moneyhon, Matthew. Winter 2002. Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s ‘New Frontier’, Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 3 Issue 1. P 120-152 National Census Office of the PRC State Council. 1993, 2002, 2012. Zhongguo Renko Pucha Ziliao [National Census Documents], 1990, 2000, and 2010. Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe. Policy Research Office of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. September 2013. Xinjiang Population Development and Family Planning Research. Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing. Pompeo, Michael R. Remarks at the United Nations Event on Religious Freedom, September 23, 2019. Rapoza, Kenneth. VP Pence Throws China a Bone, But Political Risk Elevated for Investors’.” https://forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/10/24. Accessed on December 29, 2019. Robinson, Thomas. 2003.‘The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969’, in Chinese Warfighting; the PLA Experience since 1949, Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, eds., New York: M.E. Sharpe. Rogers, Roy Anthony. July–August 2018. ‘The Radicalization of Xinjiang: Its Roots and Impact on Human Rights’. Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2. P 487-512. Sanja, Kelly, Christopher Walker, and Jake Dizard, eds. 2008. Countries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance, 2007. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield:176–177.

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Shi, Hongfei and Jiancai Bai. 2011. The Sino-US-USSR Competition in China’s Xinjiang Region during the 1940s. Shaanxi Normal University Graduate Student Training, Innovation Fund Project: Research on US Policy on Xinjiang, China in the 1940s. Song, Xilian. 1979. ‘Beitashan Incident: Facts and Process’. Selections of Xinjiang Cultural and Historical Records, Vol. 3, Urumqi, Xinjiang, Xinjiang People’s Publishing House. Song, Xilian, Hawk and Dog General-Song Xilian Self-Description, Beijing, China Publishing House of Cultural and Historical Data, 1986. Song, Tao, Weidong Liu, Zhigao Liu, and and Yeerken Wuzhati. 2019. Policy Mobilities and the China Model: Paring Aid Policy in Xinjiang, MDPI, Sustainability June 26, 2019: www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability. Starr, S. Frederick. 2004. Xinjiang-China’s Muslim Borderland. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Stroup, David R. November 19, 2019. Why Xi Jinping’s Xinjiang Policy is a Major Change in China’s Ethnic Policies. Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost. com/politics/2019/11/19/why-xi-jinpings-xinjiang-policy-is-major-change-chinasethnic-politics/ Sullivan, John J. September 24, 2019. Remarks at the Human Rights Crisis in Xinjiang Event, see at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/09/25/deputy-secretary-john-jsullivans-remarks-at-the-human-rights-crisis-in-xinjiang-event/. Swaine, Michael D. November 15, 2010: China’s Assertive Behavior Part One: On ‘Core Interests’, China Leadership Monitor, No. 34. P 1-25, https://carnegieendowment. org/files/CLM34MS_FINAL.pdf Tang, Shu. 2014. Collected Works of Tang Shu, Beijing: Writers Publishing House, The State Council Information Off ice of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. Historical Witness to Ethnic Equality, Unity and Development in Xinjiang. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Tyler, Christian. 2004. Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang. London: Routledge. Wang, Hui and Wenjuan Jia, eds. 2016. Foreign Media Views on the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. Wang, Se. 2018. The Historical Imprint of the Xinjiang Section of the Silk Road. Shanghai, Sanlian. Wu, Guang. 2015. My feelings in Xinjiang. Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House. Xia, Guanzhou. 2013. Love of Kunlun Mountains. Beijing: China Culture Publishing House. Xinan Nightly News. July 10, 2020. ‘Modern Western Countries Involved in the Inside Story of Xinjiang’; http://www.xjass.cn/1s/content/2015-11/24/content389397.htm. Xu, Jianying. 2011. ‘Research on the US’s Xinjiang Policy in China in the 1940s’. Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), Issue 4.

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About the Author Dr. Xiaoxiao Li has taught at the University of Central Oklahoma since 2009. Before his college teaching career, he worked as director of international marketing for China CEE and Power Cost Inc., USA, and served as general manager of Asian Projects for Smith Cogeneration Management in 2001–2008.

11

The East and South China Seas in SinoUS Relations Xiaobing Li

Abstract Since Xi launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the East and South China Seas have become the most contentious flash points in Asia, an important source of insecurity in the Western Pacific, and a possible region for engagement between American and Chinese armed forces. To avoid humiliation or disastrous outcomes due to technological gaps between the PLA and the US’s superior military capabilities, Beijing continues its pro-active defense strategy to defend against any foreign threat outside mainland China. One of Beijing’s strategies is weaponizing and controlling deep-water islands for military, commercial, and political purposes. China’s forward maritime policy of artificial island construction and the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) became aggressive and continues to challenge the various powers in the region. Keywords: ADIZ, Disputed islands, East China Sea, Maritime strategy, PLAN, South China Sea

After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, his government sought an enhanced role on the geo-political stage while assuring the international community that the PRC would not pursue conventional policies of military and political hegemony. However, while China repositioned itself by creating a new ‘center of gravity’ in the Asia-Pacific region, its new demands faced new challenges and implications for its national security, foreign threats, and strategic environment. The disputed islands in the East and South China Seas are possible sources of international discontent and present increasingly sensitive issues over sovereignty. In April 2013, China released its annual Defense White Paper, titled ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch11

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Forces’. It clearly states that a strong national defense and powerful armed forces are strategically commensurate with China’s modernization, peaceful development, international standing, and security concerns. In short, China’s armed forces must meet the new requirement for its national development and security strategy (Information Office 2013). In August 2013, Xi Jinping, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), visited the aircraft carrier Liaoning, commenting that China should build an even stronger naval force (Huang and Ng 2013, 1–3). The PLA Navy (PLAN) expanded from a ‘coastal fleet’ in the 1980s to a ‘twenty-first century maritime power’ (Cole 2010, x). In 2015, the PLAN conducted three largescale military exercises in the East China Sea. The third live-fire exercise from August 2428 involved more than one hundred naval vessels, dozens of aircraft, and information warfare units. Chinese warships fired nearly one hundred various missiles (Rajagopalan 2016). Today, the PLAN is the second largest navy in the world, exceeded only by the US Navy (USN). It represents Beijing’s perception of its sea power, current national interests, and maritime strategy in the East and South China Seas, where the Chinese government strategically assesses pressure, and even threats, from Japan and the United States (Li 2018, 200–201).

Senkaku Islands Among Sino-Japanese sovereignty disputes, two major issues exist in the East China Sea: the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the median line between the two countries. The Senkaku dispute has historically vacillated within Sino-Japanese relations. Among the uninhabited, geological formations of the island group are eight main islets with Diaoyu/Senkaku as the largest island (China Oceanic Administration 2012, 29–32).1 After World War II, the United States and forty-seven other nations signed the peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, placing the Okinawa and Ryukyu Islands, including Senkaku, under US administration (Huffman 2011, 160–61). For various reasons, neither the PRC nor the ROC (Taiwan) signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan (China Daily, September 10, 2010). Nonetheless, both Chinese governments made no official statements disputing or claiming sovereignty of the East China Sea islands prior to the 1970s. In 1972, within the context of US President 1 The Chinese government published the names of seventy-one geological formations of the Diaoyu group in March 2010.

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Richard Nixon’s détente policy, the United States exited the Vietnam War and Southeast Asia, and thus returned administrative control of Okinawa, Ryukyus, and Senkaku Islands to Japan (Henshall 2004, 155). Japan insisted that with the off icial restoration of its administrative rights, the issue was linked to the United States (Granados 2016, 82). Despite protests from Taiwan through the early 1970s, the Senkaku Islands had not yet emerged as a major issue between Tokyo and Beijing, since both tried to improve their relationship. The ROC government eventually asserted sovereignty over Diaoyu/ Senkaku (or Diaoyutai in Taiwanese) as its Executive Yuan announced in December 1971 that the islands belonged to Yilan County, Taiwan. Beijing blamed Taipei and Jiang Jieshi’s reliance on America’s support, in their failure to protest America’s ‘return’ of the islands to Tokyo in 1972 (BBC, September 11, 2012). However, no major incidents over the islands arose between the three governments. Japan argued that China started claiming ownership of the islands when the United Nations reported that large oil and gas reserves may exist under the seabed near the islands after the 1970s (Ito 2012). In September 1972, only months after Nixon’s visit to Beijing, Japan and China established a formal diplomatic relationship (The diplomatic relationship between Beijing and Washington did not commence until January 1, 1979). Japan and China went further and signed the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978 (Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson 2005, 187, 255). Beijing seemed able to manage the historic, anti-Japanese sentiment and nationwide victim mentality that had developed during Mao Zedong’s era of 1949–1976. When Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor from 1978–1989, began ‘Reform and Opening’ in the early 1980s, Japan was the first among all major industrial/capitalist countries to provide China with substantial technological and financial support (Chen and Li 2006, 123). Japan soon became China’s largest import partner in the 1990s, during which there were no official protests or major incidents between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Robert Sutter notices that since Deng had ‘a freer hand to shift policy in foreign affairs than in the complicated mix of domestic politics of the time’, he was able ‘to decide to shelve the sensitive territorial dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands during negotiations with Japan’ over the treaty (Sutter 2013, 75). After Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin assumed leadership of the CCP from 1989 to 2002. To survive the bloody showdown at Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Jiang modified CCP policy by gradually shifting the party’s ideology and political goals from radical communism to moderate nationalism

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(Li 2016, 64). External factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 contributed to policy change. The new vigour of nationalism revealed a profound change taking place in China. Fresh national interests and policies reflected not only new self-perceptions of the state’s own identity, but also different perceptions of other nations around the East China Sea sub-region. They defined Jiang’s national interests and objectives in terms of strategy, economy, politics, diplomacy, and military. Jiang Zemin led the party, the government, and the military through a bureaucratic institution of collective leadership for the political groups (Hong 2014, 194–96). It is interesting to notice that when the Chinese government promised attention to the people’s living standard, social stratification, and urban development at home, it took harsher positions on Tibetan issues, Taiwanese independence, and disputed islands with neighbouring countries in both the East China Sea and South China Sea. Thereafter, the Diaoyu/Senkaku debate allowed the Chinese government to demonstrate its strong nationalistic stance against foreign threats that involve territorial integrity. Any compromise over the islands seemed very difficult, if not impossible. After the 1990s, public protests, political propaganda, and civilian conflict increased over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan. China claimed territorial sovereignty and associated maritime jurisdiction over disputed areas in the East China Sea. The Japanese government maintained that the Senkaku Islands were inherently Japanese and that ‘there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands’ (Reuters 2010). Korean scholar Lee agrees: ‘Accordingly, and having regard to the various factual and legal issues explored above, one is inclined to conclude that Japan has a stronger claim to the disputed islands’ (Lee 2002). After 2002, Hu Jintao continued Jiang’s nationalistic foreign policy and engaged Japan in disputes over the Senkaku Islands since the ‘domestic political considerations make it difficult’ for him to undertake ‘any new initiatives to deal with nationalistically sensitive issues’ like the disputed islands (Hyer, Zhang, and Hamzawi 2016, 47). The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands became a testing ground for the Chinese public’s perception of the new leadership’s military strength, political toughness, and diplomatic skills. In June 2008, Beijing and Tokyo reached an agreement for joint development of hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area. But in the same month, Chinese Coast Guard vessels accompanied Taiwanese activists who approached the Diaoyu Dao/Uotsurishima Islands (Shih and Wang 2008). Contradictory policies were profoundly entrenched in Chinese political institutions and policy-making processes. Both Japanese and Americans were confused by the

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discrepancy between Hu’s policy and the PLAN’s behaviour, an inconsistency quite common in the formation of strategic issues and implementation of the policy. Gaye Christoffersen argues that since Beijing was unable ‘to maintain command and control over the five civilian maritime agencies’, the Chinese maritime policies were ‘highly decentralized in 2010–2012’ (Christoffersen 2016, 62).2 The situation became confrontational beginning in 2008 as three governments, Beijing, Tokyo, and Taipei, deployed their coast guard and naval forces around the disputed islands. Later that year, a Taiwanese fishing boat collided with a Japanese patrol vessel, and the Taiwanese captain was detained for three days (Jennings 2008). In September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japanese Coast Guard patrols in disputed waters near the islands (Granados 2016, 83). The Japanese sailors arrested and detained Captain Zhan Qixiong for seventeen days in Japan (Buerk 2010). In 2011, Japanese coast guard vessels stopped a Taiwanese fishing boat about 2.3 miles from the islands. A standoff ensued after Taiwan sent five patrol vessels to the area, until the Taiwanese Coast Guard Agency at Keelung called back its fleet. By 2010, Japan asserted a politically, and militarily, tougher position against China in the East China Sea. That September, the Japanese Coast Guard changed its routine from chasing Chinese fishing boats away from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to arresting the Chinese captains. Different voices inside and outside the Japanese government opined about the disputed areas. While Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hesitated, Coast Guard Minister Seiji Maehara decided to take stronger action (Tiberghien 2010, 74). Some moderate Japanese politicians questioned the cabinet’s policy shift from the status quo to a hard line, fearing an international crisis. Others even sought possible US mediation in the dispute. It was Chinese premier Wen Jiabao who suggested a direct hotline between Beijing and Tokyo for managing the Chinese captain incident (Rowley 2010). In November 2011, Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba responded to Wen with a bilateral mechanism for maritime issues in the East China Sea between Tokyo and Beijing (Ukai 2014). In December, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visited Beijing and signed the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs and the Japan-China Maritime Search and Rescue Cooperation. By May, tension eased as further multilevel meetings convened in Tokyo. In 2012, Beijing 2 The f ive Chinese maritime agencies include the Chinese Coast Guard, Maritime Safety Administration, China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and China Customs.

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invited Taipei to help resolve the East China Sea territorial dispute with Japan. However, Lai Shin-yuan, minister of the ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), declined the invitation in April, stating that ‘The ROC and Mainland China will not deal with the disputes together’ (Radio Taiwan 2012). Later in 2014, Taipei and Tokyo signed an agreement on fishing in the disputed waters (Ukai 2014). In 2012, nationwide protests occurred in China, after the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from their private owners and officially claimed seven of the eight islands. Considering the purchase as Japan’s nationalizing seven out of the eight islands, Chinese citizens across the country took to the streets, holding large-scale protests. Tens of thousands of protesters gathered before the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. Not only had senior Chinese citizens, who had experienced and remembered Japanese atrocities during World War II, reinvigorated hostility towards Japan, but also youths who suspected that Japan reacted against China’s resumption as the leading economic power in Asia (Sutter 2013, 217). In 2013, The New York Times reported that the massive Chinese protests seemed ‘semi-official’ since ‘almost all the voices in China pressing the Okinawa issues are affiliated in some way with the government’ (Perlez 2013). With popular support, both governments sent more naval and coast guard vessels to the disputed areas in the East China Sea. The BBC reported in February 2013 that the situation had become ‘the most serious for SinoJapanese relations in the post-war period in terms of the risk of military conflict’ (BBC 2013). On April 9, 2016, Ma Ying-jeou, president of the ROC, visited Taiwanese coast guard personnel at Pengjia Island in the East China Sea. The ROC controls Pengjia, as it is disputed amongst China, Japan, and Taiwan (Li 2019, 204). President Ma Ying-jeou maintains ROC sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands. He has published three books on their legal status from an international maritime law perspective. Ma published his 1981 thesis, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Determination in the East China Sea, in the United States after he received his S.J.D. from Harvard University. When he autographed his book, Ma told the co-authors and co-editors of this book, ‘This is one of the most important publications I have ever written in my entire academic career as a scholar’.3

3 President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016 in office), meeting with the authors and editors of this book in his office, in Taipei, Taiwan, on June 8, 2017. His 1981 thesis was translated into Chinese and published in Taiwan in 1996.

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Exclusive Economic Zone The second Sino-Japanese dispute is over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the East China Sea. Sixty percent of the PRC’s 5,000 offshore islands are in the East China Sea. The country depends on its east coast waterways along the East China Sea, as half of all China’s shipping passes through its east sea lanes and uses its ports. Twelve out of China’s seventeen major shipping ports are located along the eastern coast, including cities like Shanghai. With a total population of twenty-three million, Shanghai is China’s centre of trade, transportation, and international exchange situated at the outlet of Asia’s longest river, the Yangzi (Yangtze), emptying into the East China Sea (Wilkinson 2007, 4–7). From its mouth, about 200 miles inland, the Yangzi is virtually at sea level. Ocean-going vessels can navigate the Yangzi up to 600 miles from the sea. In 2005, Shanghai Port became the largest cargo port in the world by handling 443 million tons of cargo, surpassing the Port of Singapore (Li 2016, 27). This sea lane’s security is important for energy sources and technological supply deliveries driving China’s economy. In 1982, China and Japan agreed on 200 nautical miles of EEZ by signing the UN International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). There were, and remain, at least two contentious maritime issues between Japan and China over EEZ: the borderline between two EEZs and foreign military activities in the zone. The disagreement arose from whether or not the terms of the UNCLOS granted coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities within their EEZ, in addition to the right to regulate foreign economic activities. Where UNCLOS explicitly allows coastal states to regulate foreign military activities within their territorial waters (twelve miles from shore), whether it also applies within a country’s EEZ (200 miles from shore) is debatable. That same issue is also a point of contention between China and the United States. As cogently described by Ronald O’Rourke of the US Congressional Research Service, while the UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give them the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their twelve-nautical-mile territorial waters (Finkelstein 2014, 114). Another ongoing issue concerns the question of overlapping median lines between the Japanese and Chinese EEZs. The East China Sea has an elliptical width of only 360 nautical miles, and there is a large area, where the two countries’ EEZ claims overlap. In the 1980s, China began its oil and gas exploration in the East China Sea. In 1995, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a state-owned oil and gas company, built Chunxiao,

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the country’s first and largest undersea natural gas field. Although the Chunxiao field is within Chinese EEZ waters, it is only three or four miles west of the median line. Japan objected to the Chunxiao field’s proximity to their boundary, as it was possibly taking gas reserves from deep within the Japanese EEZ. Tokyo opposed any further Chinese exploration of natural gas resources in the same area (Li 2018, 248). Nevertheless, CNOOC continued exploration and erected f ive more natural gas fields in the area. By 2006, all of them were operational (Li and Molina 2014, 1: 42–43). There is no doubt the result indicates an increase in China’s natural gas reserves, for which deep-water drilling and other technological development deserves most of the credit. Chinese reserves in these natural gas fields are estimated at more than 100 billion cubic meters (bcm). China has proven gas reserves of more than 300 bcm in total within its East China Sea EEZ. The country has the second-largest gas reserves amongst its Asia-Pacific neighbors. China’s 3.1 trillion cubic meters (tcm) took up 18.45 percent of the region, second only to Australia’s 22.16 percent (Li and Molina 2014, 2: 464, 467). Tokyo petitioned Beijing to halt drilling and building gas exploration platforms so close to disputed waters. Japan’s major concern was that Chinese exploration and production would tap reservoirs that extended into Japan’s underwater oil and gas reserves. In June 2008, China and Japan agreed to joint exploration of oil and gas resources in the disputed area. However, the agreement never materialized between the two governments. As China’s oil and gas industries shifted to deep water exploration, international tensions surfaced with Japan over sovereignty along the median line in ‘China’s East Sea’ (Zhongguo Donghai). China ranks first in the Asia-Pacific for natural gas production. According to British Petroleum’s statistics, China produced 102.5 bcm of natural gas in 2011, with a growth rate of 238 percent between 2001 and 2011 and came second in the world for natural gas production growth. China took up 21.4 percent of the total gas production in the Asia-Pacific (Li 2016, 129). The Asia-Pacific altogether accounted for 14.6 percent of the world’s total natural gas production. Cole points out that ‘Beijing’s inflexibilities’ over its territorial claims are determined by its ‘increasing dependence on offshore energy resources’ (Cole 2010, 42). In contrast, Japan has been the world’s largest importer of liquef ied natural gas (LNG), as well as the second-largest importer of crude oil next to the United States. In 2011, Japan consumed 4.42 million barrels per day (mb/d) of petroleum products (BP Statistics 2012). Compared with its daily consumption, Japan’s proven oil reserves are meaningless in a global context.

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In terms of natural gas, it is in the same situation as with oil. In 2011, Japan consumed 105.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas, up by 11.6 percent from the previous year. Japanese domestic oil and gas production is of little consequence (Li and Molina 2014, 2: 563, 565–66). Given that Japan is highly dependent on imports, with foreign suppliers responsible for some eighty percent of its energy requirement, the country has been desperately looking for oil and gas reserves in the near seas. China’s successful exploration and production of natural gas in the East China Sea provides Japan a compelling rationale to look closer for domestic solutions and additional sources of oil and gas. In 2010, China’s total energy consumption surpassed the United States for the first time ever, making it the world’s largest energy consumer. China’s economy faces more challenges and pressures than ever, and the exportoriented manufacturing, that relied especially on energy resources, is no longer sustainable. Therefore, the 12th Five-Year Plan became crucial, in that China entered a period of necessary reform for its energy industry. By 2011, China had become the second-largest economy in the world, following only the United States (Li, Sun, and Gadkar-Wilcox 2020, 249). Its energy production and consumption taken together can be regarded as the driver of the national economy. China ranked fifth in world oil production with more than four million barrels a day in 2011, about 51 percent of the Asia-Pacific’s total oil production. Starting in 2012, Beijing shifted its strategic priorities from land power to maritime power. China’s maritime economic interests are as a net energy importer, increasingly reliant on regional and global sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The East China Sea became even more important as China shifted to building its maritime power. In November 2013, Beijing began using ‘China’s East Sea’ (Zhongguo Donghai) as it announced the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which includes the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (You 2016, 10, 72, 77–78). ADIZ requires all international aircraft to file a flight plan and submit radio frequency or transponder information to Chinese authorities before entering the zone. Thereafter, the PLAAF commenced regular patrols over the zones, including jet fighters and airborne early warning (AEW) aircrafts, to strengthen its effective control over the ADIZ. Shen Jinke, spokesman of the PRC Defense Ministry, said that the PLAAF’s routine patrols set out to verify and identify foreign aircrafts and administer official warnings, and that it should not impact commercial air traffic. He stated that the PLAAF patrols ‘are purely defensive and consistent with international norms’, and that the PLAAF would also conduct routine air drills in the zone for dealing with any emergency situations (PLA Daily 2014). As a result, the twenty-first

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century has seen the East China Sea become a major source for international tension in the Asian-Pacific region. Tensions between China and Japan over the East China Sea continued. In 2017, the Japanese Air Force surpassed a previous, Cold War annual record of 944 sorties, and scrambled 1,168 fighter jets in response to PLAAF aircraft encroachment into Japanese airspace, provoking 851 incidents. China thus replaced Russia as the major threat to Japanese airspace since the Cold War.

Disputed Islands in the South China Sea During his second term (2017–2022), Xi Jinping has continued employing ideological nationalism to unite China and fight for its new power status, perhaps resulting in the CCP maintaining legitimacy as the country’s ruling party. Moreover, Xi promoted his global plan, the ‘New Silk Road and Economic Belt’, to establish China’s own global system of international connection, cooperation, and collective security. As his signature project, Xi’s ‘One-Belt and One-Road’ plan endeavours to connect China with Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America through energy source exploration, modern transportation construction, and building new channels for trade, finance, and communication. Among recent works, Bruno Macaes explains China’s foreign policy in a global context and its new ambitions as a superpower. Beijing remade itself as the new centre of globalization (Macaes 2019, 2–3). On October 24, 2017, the BRI was added to the CCP Constitution at the 19th Party Congress in Beijing. BRI brought massive trade, transportation, communication, and energy programs from the Chinese coast by South and East China Sea routes and by land along the ancient Silk Road to other continents. However, as Xi Jinping made his strategic shift, he faced new challenges on the South China Sea and western frontier of Xinjiang. He must reevaluate his strategy to deal with the new challenges. It can be argued that the conflict between foreign pressure and domestic control is central to China’s status in Asia, as it tries to strike a balance between hard power and soft power. The change may then be in the approach to crisis, and that change or evolution in thought is a recurrent theme throughout history. The change in border threats and security concerns also caused changes in Chinese strategic thought (Li 2019, 191). In the BRI system, the South China Sea has become one of the most worrisome flash points in Asia, an important source of insecurity in the Western Pacific, and a possible location that pits US armed forces against the

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PLA in East Asia. The South China Sea is strategically important because it is the second most used sea-lane in the world, with one-third of the world’s shipping transit passing through its waters. Beneath its seabed are crude oil reserves of 7.7 billion barrels, about twenty percent of the total in the Asia-Pacific region. It holds estimated natural gas reserves of 266 trillion cubic feet, about forty-five percent of the total in the Asia-Pacific region. In the 1980s, as oil and gas shifted to deep-water exploration, international tensions rose among some of the surrounding countries over sovereignty of the South China Sea islands (Li 2016, 20–22). China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia all claim the Spratly Islands (Nansha in Chinese, Quan Dao Truong Sa in Vietnamese, and Kalayaan in Filipinos) and Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese and Quan Dao Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) in the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands, the largest group in the South China Sea, covers a water area of 61,755 square miles, and includes approximately 100 small islands. Although most of these are rocky, small, and uninhabited, the competing claims reflect the interests in oil and gas reserves beneath these islands. Among the countries occupying some of the islands, the PRC controls seven islands, Vietnam twenty-nine, the Philippines nine, Malaysia nine, and the ROC one, Taiping Island (also known as Itu Aba Island) (Raine and Miere 2013, 17–19, 42–43). During World War II, the Allied Powers decided at Cairo and Potsdam that the ROC government would accept Japanese surrender in Taiwan and other Pacific islands, including both the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In November 1946, the ROC sent GMD (Guomindang, Chinese Nationalist) marines to occupy the islands. Afterwards, the ROC government published its post-war administrative atlas, which included all 102 islands of the Spratly Island group on the Republic of China’s 1948 map (Li 2019, 203–204). In 1956, the Taiwanese established a permanent presence on Taiping Island, the largest one (about 110 acres) in the Spratly Island group. In December 2007, they completed the Taiping Island Airport (Ministry of Defense 2006). On February 2, 2008, Chen Shui-bian, ROC President (2000–2008), visited Taiping Island accompanied by a large naval force. Thereafter, President Ma Ying-jeou continued to claim the ROC’s sovereignty over the Spratly Island group throughout his two terms in office. He visited Taiwan’s garrison at Taiping in January before the 2016 Chinese Lunar New Year. Ma also rejected the international court of arbitration’s July 2016 classification of Taiping Island as a rock, so it may not be entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. He believes that all the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea belong to the Republic of China. During a meeting

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with the co-authors and co-editors of this book in 2017, President Ma gave us one of his three books on the legal status of the disputed islands from an international maritime legal perspective (Ma 1986 and 1996). The Paracel Islands are the second largest group in the South China Sea, composed of Xuande, Yongle, and thirty other islands located 330 kilometres southeast of China’s Hainan Island. These islands occupy an ocean surface of 15,000 square kilometres in the South China Sea. Many of these islets are sandbanks and reefs. Yongxing Island is the major island of 1.6 square kilometres (Xiaoxiao Li 2012, 502–503). With the help of the USN, the RVN (Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam) government previously occupied some of the islands in the 1960s (Nguyen 2010, 32–38). 4 In September 1973, after American withdrawal from the Vietnam War, the RVN government claimed more islands in the South China Sea, including Nanwei, Taiping, and ten other islands to secure the area’s abundant oil resources. On January 11, 1974, the PRC Foreign Ministry officially announced China’s sovereign claim over Nansha (Spratly), Xisha (Paracel Islands), Zhongsha, and Dongsha Islands with all their natural resources (Guo 1992, 151–52). On January 15, the VNN (South Vietnamese Navy) sent destroyers to the waters surrounding Paracel’s Yongle Island. On January 17, two Chinese submarines landed four platoons of troops on Jinqin and Chenhang Islands. After their landing, VNN destroyers fired around the islands. The Chinese navy also sent two more submarines to Yongxing Island. On the nineteenth, VNN destroyers landed Vietnamese soldiers on Chenhang and Guangjin Islands, where more than one hundred 100 Chinese troops awaited them. After the landing, both sides engaged in a firefight. After an hour and a half, two Chinese subs sank one Vietnamese destroyer. Then, the PLA landed more troops on the Ganquan, Shanhu, and Jinyin Islands, occupying them. During the Paracel Island campaign, more than one hundred ARVN officers and soldiers were killed or wounded, including an American naval officer, and forty-nine captured, while sixtyseven Chinese soldiers were wounded and eighteen killed (Li 2020, 216–18). The PLAN operations on the disputed islands provided China with a powerful position to deploy its warships and submarines into the South China Sea’s deep waters. The naval operation transformed the Chinese navy from a coastal fleet to a sea power in Southeast Asia. In late January 1974, the RVN denounced the PRC’s invasion and occupation of the Vietnamese 4 Lieutenant Nguyen Nhieu (VNN, ret.), interviews by the author at Garland, Texas, in May 2003. Nhieu served as the chief of the electronic reconnaissance team at Giang Doan and Ham Doi naval bases, VNN, in 1970–1975.

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islands and organized anti-China protests in major cities like Saigon and Da Nang. Before its take-over of Saigon, the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) landed its troops on six of the disputed Spratly Islands on April 22–28, 1975. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, North Vietnam) then made a public announcement on June 3, stating ‘the sufficient evidence has proved that Vietnam also has the sovereign power over the Quan Dao Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands, or the Xisha in Chinese)’ (Guo 1992, 154). Thereafter, the disputed islands in the South China Sea became a ‘time-bomb’ within post-Vietnam War, Sino-Vietnamese relations. Since 1975, China has controlled the major islands in the centre of the archipelago, deploying military forces, building airstrips, and establishing communication facilities. In 2013, General Jiang Weilie, Commander of PLAN South Sea Fleet, gave an interview after his fleet’s sixteen-day exercise in the Western Pacific and through the f irst chain of islands. The PLAN general said that the purpose of the exercise was to test the target accuracy for long distance, anti-missile, and anti-submarine attacks, as well as smooth coordination among battleships and fighter jets. They treated the exercise as a real war and stated that exercise is war (PRC Defense Ministry website 2013, Jiang Weilie interview). The overall objective for Chinese armed forces is to win the war. Thereafter, it made regular patrols over that zone, utilized jet fighters and AEW aircrafts, and effectively strengthened control over airspace. In 2015, the PLAAF began patrolling the South China Sea, including the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. The recent confrontation between Chinese and American navies in the South China Sea has aroused serious concerns in the international community about security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The USAF continues to fly military aircrafts in the ADIZ without informing China, defying China’s declaration that the region falls into a Chinese airspace defense zone. Public debates and strategic research in America focus on what these events may mean to the United States, and how to best deal with the PLAN in case of crisis or even a war in the Pacific. You Ji concludes that the PLAN would not risk a naval war over the disputed islands in both the South China Sea and East China Sea, since its ‘carrier-centric transformation’ would not guarantee any victory in the conflict against the American, and even Japanese, navies in the areas (You 2016, 203–208). Currently, many American and Japanese naval strategists predict that there will be a naval clash, sooner or later, between their navies or air forces and the PLAN or PLAAF, both of which have become more and more aggressive after acquiring Russian military technology (Li 2021).

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Xi Jinping made his first visit to Russia with the purpose of strengthening strategic support to China. China and Russia established a military alliance in 2009, and by 2014, the two nations announced a new era of military collaboration as part of an enhanced strategic partnership. From a historical standpoint, the Chinese Navy’s investment in Soviet technology and advisory assistance in the 1950s–1960s contributed significantly to the PLAN’s modernization in the 1980s–2000s (Li 2017, 220–21). However, the PLAN had only limited indigenous technological capabilities in the 2010s. It remained as a learner rather than an innovator in many areas of naval technology, into the 2020s. The PRC and Russian Federation air force partnership continues to grow since its inauguration in the 2010s. This raises serious questions over the future of American security and whether the United States has anything to fear from a potential military superpower of Communist China. The latest Chinese purchase included Su-35 fighters, accounting for over $1 billion annually from 2014 to 2017 (Majumdar 2016).

China’s Maritime Strategy China’s position in the East and South China Seas is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. It has been at the root of various contentious physical encounters between American and Chinese vessels in the past. For example, in 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk. Again, in 2007, China denied safe harbour in the midst of dangerous weather to two small US Navy minesweepers, the USS Patriot and the USS Guardian. Actions such as this not only increase misunderstandings between both sides, but also the likelihood of an accidental conflict. Gaye Christoffersen exposes a crisis management system in China’s near seas among China, Japan, and the United States, and identifies ‘different configurations for a crisis management mechanism’, which could escalate tensions in the areas (Christoffersen 2016, 74). Among the influential factors in China’s maritime strategy are national security concerns, international relations, economic resources, and political and social conditions. Perhaps the most important factor, and the most influential in the new century, is China’s world view as primarily related to global and regional threats of conflict. Chinese strategic analysts and military experts have new security concerns that are different from the Western specialists’ argument that China feels safer than ever before. Recent interviews show that some PLA officers believe they live in a dangerous world

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with many uncertainties and potential challenges to China’s sovereignty and security.5 Their concerns are confirmed by Beijing’s high command in the White Paper: China’s National Defense, which made it clear that the country is facing ‘unprecedented’ challenges because ‘new security threats keep emerging’ (Information Office 2008). Their justification and calculation seem reasonable and logical in terms of on-going globalization. Researching Chinese strategic thought is diff icult since Beijing has not yet published an off icial maritime strategy. As Yin Zhuo stated in 2011, ‘China lacks a clear maritime strategy and its approach was overcompartmentalized’, fragmented among numerous bureaucratic agencies (Hsiao 2011). Moreover, Chinese coastal authorities were from both military and civilian agencies, including the CMC, the State Council, and State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense (Gao 2010). In November 2013, Xi formed the National Security Commission (NSC) at the CCP’s Third Plenary Session of the 18th Party Central Committee with himself as the chairman. To avoid or successfully cope with problems in the East China Sea, China needs to make considerable progress towards building and fielding a credible naval, air, and even a strategic force, and taking part in the responsibilities that accompany the accumulation of national power in the Western Pacific. From 2010–2020, the continuing transformation of the PLA certainly affects doctrine, operational concepts, and warfighting techniques. For example, an important on-going change in PLA doctrine moves away from the traditional defense principle of ‘never open fire first’ in war. It dismisses the timing issue and instead justifies war efforts as defensive in nature, even though Chinese troops may have to open fire first. New strategies and transformations require the PLA to speed up building a combat force structure suitable for winning local wars in conditions of informationization. It requires the PLA to prepare itself for defensive operations under the most difficult and complex circumstances. According to the US Department of Defense’s 2009 assessment, ‘the pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces’ (US Secretary of Defense 2009). 5 Among the author’s interviews with PLA officers are Major Sun Lizhou, Second Department of the PLA General Staff, Beijing; the deputy commander, Jilin Provincial Command, Changchun, Jilin; and Major General Xu Changyou, Deputy Political Commissar, East China Fleet Air Force, Shanghai.

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Among the services, the Navy has held the lion’s share of the annual defense budget in recent years. Since 2000, the PLAN has commissioned more than thirty new submarines and is also developing four indigenous classes of submarines. The Chinese Navy has anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) systems, including formidable Sizzler and Sunburn missiles. Some of these ballistic missiles are able to carry nuclear warheads and provide nuclear deterrence against any offshore threat or naval engagement. The PLAN is armed with wire-guided, wake-homing torpedoes and ship-borne air defense. The Chinese Navy has expanded from a ‘coastal fleet’ in the 1980s to a ‘twenty-first century maritime power’ (Cole 2010, x). By 2010, the PLAN had a total force of 300,000 personnel and more than 600 warships, including an aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines. The Chinese navy has an air arm of 430 warplanes and 35,000 personnel, and also commands China’s 12,000-strong Marine Corps. You Ji examines the PLAN’s transformation in the 2000s–2010s when it was ‘extending its operations from coastal defense to far-seas power projection’ (You 2016, 181). Cole believes that the Chinese have ‘the idea that a great country should have a great Navy’. He links Chinese naval efforts to ‘the nation’s economic development’ and to ‘dependence on overseas trade’, which have been principally overlooked by other works in the field. He concludes that Chinese maritime strategy attempts to ‘achieve near-term national security objectives and long-term regional maritime dominance’ (Cole 2010, xix, 187, 190). Coincidentally, the PLAN also develops and implements ‘non-combative’ uses of force, such as naval escorts along shipping routes to Africa. The PLAN’s main mission is to resist seaborne invasion, protect coastal lanes and sovereignty, and safeguard maritime rights. Currently, naval training focuses on maritime blockage, anti-sea lines of communication, amphibious attack, anti-ship operations, maritime transportation protection, and naval base defense. In the past two years, the Chinese Navy has held bilateral and joint maritime training exercises with fourteen countries, including Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Pakistan, India, and South Africa. Today, the PLAN is the second largest navy in the world, exceeded only by the US Navy. In March 2007, China held the ‘Peace 2007’ joint maritime training exercise with seven other countries, including Pakistan, in the Arabian Sea. Cole concludes, however, that the PLAN is not currently capable of ‘maintaining even a presence in these far-flung SLOCs, let alone controlling them’ (Cole 2010, 56). In May 2015, the Chinese and Russian navies began a joint naval exercise, code-named Joint Sea 2015, in the Mediterranean Sea. In August, a larger scale operation, Joint Sea II, was held in international waters about 250 miles from Japan,

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involving twenty-two warships and twenty aircraft. Vice Admiral Aleksandr Fedotenkov, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, was happy with the training result, which ‘showed that Russian and Chinese seamen can effectively fulfill tasks in such a difficult region’(Gady 2015). China’s Defense Ministry stated that the aim of the exercises was to deepen ‘friendly and practical cooperation’ and increase the two navies’ abilities to jointly deal with maritime security threats (Yu 2015, 153). The partnership between PRC and Russian Federation naval forces continuesgrowing through new engagements launched in the 2010s. As discussed earlier, China certainly feels increasing pressure and even threats from US military activities in Asia, especially in East Asia. Beijing believes that Washington ‘has increased its strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its military alliances, adjusting its military development, and enhancing its military capabilities’ (Information Office 2008, 8). As long as different views, suspicion, misunderstanding, or even hostility continue, the military relationship between the two countries will not significantly improve in the near future. Even though the PLAN has made some progress, and the United States has reduced its ‘nearly six hundred-ship Navy of 1990’ to ‘less than half that size in 2009’, the PLAN, according to Cole, will not pose an immediate threat to the United States in the near future (Cole 2010, xxii).

Tension between China and the US After returning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan, the United States has no legal standing to contest East China Sea territorial disputes. Nonetheless, the US government has recently made it clear that these islands are included within the US-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty. In other words, the United States can commit its armed forces to the defense of the disputed areas if Japan makes the request. In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the Japanese Foreign Minister that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan covers the disputed areas, meaning that the Obama administration could have committed US armed forces to Japanese defense of these islands (Clinton 2010). On March 8, 2009, the US Naval survey vessel, Impeccable, was confronted with five Chinese naval ships. The Chinese ships surrounded and harassed the USS Impeccable, which conducted surveillance in an area over which Beijing claimed jurisdiction, but other countries consider international waters, according to the American account. The Chinese ships

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tried to block the ship and snag its cables with hooks. The Americans used a fire hose to spray water at the Chinese. The chief American intelligence officer called it the ‘most serious’ military incident with China since 2001. On March 12, 2009, when President Barack Obama met China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, Obama told the Chinese foreign minister that the two countries need to raise ‘the level and frequency’ of military dialogue ‘in order to avoid future incidents’ like the high seas confrontation (Baker 2009). In November 2012, a congressional amendment to the National Defense Act included possible defense of the disputed islands in the East China Sea in the event of armed attacks (US Senate 2013). In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry further warned Beijing that although the United States does not take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands, the White House acknowledges they are under the administration of Japan, and the American government opposes any unilateral actions that would seek to undermine Japanese administration (Mori 2013). In a May report, the US Department of Defense pointed out, ‘China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law’ (US Secretary of Defense 2013). On July 30, the US Senate unanimously passed a resolution condemning China’s ‘use of coercion, threats, or force by naval, maritime security, or fishing vessels and military or civilian aircraft in … the East China Sea to assert disputed maritime or territorial claims or alter the status quo’ (US Senate 2013). After Beijing announced the establishment of the ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013, the US and Japan criticized the move, which would cause new tensions over the disputed areas in the East China Sea. China seems precautionary about any possible military conflict with the US armed forces in the East China Sea. On November 26, 2013, for example, three days after Beijing’s announcement, two US military warplanes flew into the zone without informing China. Although the PLA did not respond either militarily or politically, Colonel Steve Warren, spokesman for the US Department of Defense, said,‘We have conducted operations in the area of the Senkakus. We have continued to follow our normal procedures, which include not filing flight plans, not radioing ahead, and not registering our frequencies’ (Reuters 2013). In November 2014, a MOU was signed between the Chinese and American defense ministers on establishing the ‘mutual reporting and trust mechanism on major military operations’ and the ‘code of safe conduct on naval and air military encounters’ between the two militaries (PLA Daily, December 29, 2014).

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Despite this positive advancement, however, the overall picture of USChina military cooperation is considerably bleak. According to the US Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress, ‘Much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, in particular in the area of its expanding military power and how that power might be used’ (US Secretary of Defense 2008). The American high command is not sure of Chinese intentions and changing world views. The lack of transparency in the Chinese military and national security apparatus is a major hindrance to more productive US-China military/security relations. In addition to its lack of transparency, some of China’s behaviour toward the United States would give the impression that it is not interested in friendly relations. Some of the Chinese actions apparently support these concerns. Also, regarding military exchanges and site visits, China is generally anxious to visit US military sites and meet American personnel, but is extremely cautious when it comes to US requests for the same. On April 23–25, 2014, President Obama re-confirmed the US commitments to the safety and security of Japan and the Senkaku Islands through a joint press conference and joint statement with Prime Minister Abe. He is the first US president to mention these disputed islands under Article 5 of the US-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In 2014, Taipei and Tokyo signed a commercial fishing agreement for the disputed waters (Ukai 2014, 3–4). In October 2014, nonetheless, under international pressure, both defense ministries consulted a maritime liaison mechanism to avoid possible military conflict. Christoffersen exposes a crisis management system in China’s near seas among China, Japan, and the United States. He identifies ‘different configurations for crisis management mechanism’, which could escalate tensions in the areas (Christoffersen 2016, 74). With an emphasis on the US factor, Granados states, ‘Washington has the responsibility and the power to help de-securitize the Diaoyu/Senkaku issues and lower tensions’, which neither Japan nor China is willing or able to do (Granados 2016, 92). In 2014, PLA Command-in-Chief Xi Jinping visited PLAAF headquarters and instructed air force generals ‘to improve air force structure, build up new combat capacity, and make a rapid transition to a balanced air power for both defense and offense’ (Xi 2014). In November 2015, the PLAAF conducted another large-scale air exercise in the ADIZ, involving H-6K heavy bombers, Su-30 fighters, and air tankers. The drill included reconnaissance and early warning attacks on air and sea surface targets, and in-flight refueling to test the PLAAF f ighting capacity on the high seas. In August 2014, the PLA organized its first air confrontation drill between the PLAAF and aviation force of the East China Sea Fleet of the PLAN. The US and Japan

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criticized China’s establishing ADIZ, which would cause new tensions over the disputed areas in the East China Sea. In 2014–2016, the PLAAF sent multiple warplanes to monitor and identify several foreign military aircrafts entering ADIZ, tracking them for evidence and issuing voice warnings. Some differences from the previous annual report show the increasing appearance of Chinese military in international waters and the participation of Chinese military in all kinds of joint exercises in different regions and areas. This reflects public opinion that China has made significant progress in acquiring military equipment, fighter jets, defense missiles, aircraft carriers, and space technology. In 2016, the territorial conflict escalated to military confrontation involving naval vessels, coast guard gunboats, and fighters in the disputed areas. The recent confrontation between the Chinese and Japanese navies in the East China Sea has aroused serious concerns in the international community about security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, US Air Force continues to fly military aircraft in the ADIZ without informing China, defying China’s declaration that the region falls into Chinese airspace defense zone. Public debates and strategic research in America focus on what these events may mean to the United States, and how to best deal with the PLA in case of crisis or even a war in the Pacific. In any case, Donald Trump promised to commit US forces for the defense of Japan, South Korea, free trade sea routes, and international maritime rights in the East and South China Seas. The Chinese government realized that in the current global environment, it is facing challenges such as national security, and the combination of traditional threats and non-traditional threats, both of which require fast development of national defense and military modernization. This reflects the country’s new expectation for defense and military construction under the new world order, especially when the global economic focus is shifting from the West to the East, when Asia and the Pacific region have become the focal point among world powers. China’s security environment faces increasingly unstable and uncertain factors, with the US transferring its strategic attention to this region and carrying out its ‘rebalance’ strategy, which would bring a historical change and adjustment in the region’s political, economic, and strategic structures. While factors of insecurity and instability remain, China does not face a favourable surrounding security environment, something as usually seen since the founding of the PRC. Due to all the above challenges, the PLA has an arduous task to safeguard China’s national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests. Chinese armed forces will continue to fulfill its mission by carrying on its tradition and culture while evolving

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through adaptation and improvement for mechanization and digitalization. Through its foreign war experience, the PLA demonstrated four key skills: planning, learning, making changes, and political control. Military planning or war strategy has always been at the forefront of PLA operations. On October 23, 2020, Xi Jinping called to expedite the modernization of the PLA at the Korean War’s 70th anniversary in Beijing. He told the Chinese people, ‘Without a strong army, there can be no strong motherland’ (Reuters 2020). The time period of 2020 through 2040 is the most important for China’s rejuvenation, as well as the time China has to face some of its most serious, unprecedented challenges. The PLA’s planning receives the most attention in our chapters, and became an important part of PLA culture. Political doctrine garners more attention in all military papers from Mao to Xi than any other military-related topics.

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Huffman, James L. 2011. Modern Japan: A History in Documents. New York: Oxford University Press. Hyer, Eric, Qingmin Zhang, and Jordan Hamzawi. 2016. ‘Analyzing China’s Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics, Public Opinion, and Leaders’, in China’s Strategic Priorities, Jonathan H. Ping and Brett McCormick, eds. London: Routledge: 43–61. Information Off ice, PRC State Council. 2008. White Papers of China’s National Defense. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Information Office, PRC State Council. April 2013. The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (China’s Defense White Paper); http://www.chinadaily. com.cn/language_tips/news/2013-04/17/content_16414985.htm. Accessed on November 4, 2020. Information Off ice, PRC State Council. 2009. The Security Situation: White Papers of China’s National Defense in 2008; http://English.people.com. cn/90001/90776/90785/6578688.html. Accessed on February 6, 2016. Ito, Matsuyi. May 18, 2012. ‘Jurisdiction over Remote Senkakus Comes with Hotbutton Dangers’. Japan Times: 23-32. Jennings, Ruth. June 13, 2008. ‘Taiwan Protests as Japan Holds Fishing Boat Captain’. BBC Chinese (UK); http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_7450000/ newsid_7452300/7452336.stm. Accessed on July 21, 2016. Jiang, Weilie. April 9, 2013.Quoted interview with a reporter,PRC Defense Ministry’s website, www.mod.gov.cn. Accessed on December 10, 2019. Lee, Seokwoo. 2002. Territorial Disputes among Japan, Taiwan, and China Concerning the Senkaku Islands; http://books.google.com/books?id=MZGsilptLvoC&pg=PA11. Accessed on August 15, 2016. Li, Xiaobing. 2016. Modern China: Understanding Modern Nations. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Li, Xiaobing. 2016. ‘South China Sea’, in Modern China: Understanding Modern Nations, Xiaobing Li, ed. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Li, Xiaobing. 2017. ‘How to Train the Dragon: Soviet Advisors and Assistance to the Chinese Navy’, in Naval Advising and Assistance: History, Challenges, and Analysis, Donald Stoker and Michael T. McMaster, eds. West Midlands, UK: Helion: 220–42. Li, Xiaobing. 2018. The Cold War in East Asia. London: Routledge. Li, Xiaobing. 2018. ‘Sino-Japanese Maritime Conflicts and Security Concerns in the East China Sea’, in Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific: Heritage and Contemporary Challenges, Howard M. Hensel and Amit Gupta, eds. London: Routledge: 243–60. Li, Xiaobing. 2019. China’s War in Korea: Strategic Culture and Geopolitics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Li, Xiaobing. 2019. The History of Taiwan. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

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Li, Xiaobing. 2020. The Dragon in the Jungle: The Chinese Army in the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. Li, Xiaobing. 2021. “The PLA Landing Campaigns against Kinmen, Hainan, and Yijiangshan Islands.” Conference paper presented at the ‘Large-scale Amphibious Warfare in Chinese Military Strategy’ symposium, organized by the China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, May 4–6. Li, Xiaobing and Michael Molina, eds. 2014. Oil: A Cultural and Geographic Encyclopedia of Black Gold. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Li, Xiaobing, Yi Sun, and Wynn Gadkar-Wilcox. 2020. East Asia and the West: An Entangled History. San Diego, CA: Cognella. Li, Xiaoxiao. 2012. ‘Xisha Islands Defensive Campaign (1974)’, in China at War, Xiaoxiao Li, ed. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO: 502–504. Ma, Ying-jeou. 1986. Cong xin haiyangfa lun Diaoyutai lieyu yu Donghai huajie wenti [New Oceanic Regulations: Issues of the Diaoyu Islands and Border of the East China Sea]. Taipei: Zhengzhong Books. Ma, Ying-jeou. 1996. Diaoyutai lieyu zhuquan zhengyi: huigu yu zhanwang [Disputed Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands: The Past and Future]. Taipei: ROC Government Printing. Macaes, Bruno. 2019. Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order. London: Hurst. Majumdar, Dave. 2014 ‘China to Get Russia’s Lethal Su-35 Fighter This Year’. The National Interest; http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-get-russiaslethal-su-35-fighter-this-year-14968. Accessed on July 8, 2016. Ministry of National Defense, ROC. January 6, 2006. ‘MND Admits Strategic Value of Spratly Airstrip’. Taipei Times: 6-17. Mori, Kayatsu. April 15, 2013.‘Kerry Spells out Policy on Senkaku Islands’. UPI; www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/04/15. Accessed on April 20, 2016. Nguyen, Nhieu (VNN, ret.). 2010. ‘Electronic Reconnaissance vs. Guerrillas’, in Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans, Xiaobing Li, ed. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky: 32–38 Office of the US Secretary of Defense. Annual Reports to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2008 and 2009. http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf and http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_09.pdf. Accessed on May 8–-12, 2016. Office of the US Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013; http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/ China_Military Report 13.pdf. Accessed on May 12, 2016. Perlez, Juliet. June 13, 2013. ‘Sentiment Builds in China to Press Claim for Okinawa’. The New York Times; http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia.html. Accessed on March 11, 2015.

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PLA Daily. January 22, 2014. ‘China’s Establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea’;http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2014-01. Accessed on February 11, 2016. Radio Taiwan. April 26, 2012. ‘Taipei Declines Beijing’s Invitation to Solve Disputed Territory Issues Together’. Radio Taiwan International. Raine, Sarah, and Christian Miere. 2013. Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. London: Routledge. Rajagopalan, Muhayazika. ‘China Conducts Air, Sea Drills in East China Sea’. Reuters, August 27, 2016. http://www.retuers.com/articles/us-china-defenseidUSKCN0QW1EX20150827 Accessed on September 14, 2016. Reuters. September 25, 2010. ‘Japan Refuses China Demand for Apology in Boat Row’, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-defense-idUSKCN. Accessed on November 10, 2015. Reuters. November 26, 2013. ‘US Aircraft Fly over East China Sea without Informing China’; www.reuters.com/article/china-defense-usa-idUSL2N0JB15M20131126 Accessed on August 7, 2016. Reuters. December 29, 2014. ‘China and US Build Two Mutual Trust Mechanisms’; http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view-channels/china-military-news/2014-12/29/ content_6288449.htm Accessed on February 14, 2016. Reuters. October 23, 2020. ‘On War Anniversary, Xi Says China’s Interests Won’t Be Undermined’. South China Morning Post; www.news.yahoo.com/xi-says-chinanot-let-030107278.html. Accessed on October 27, 2020. Rowley, Allan. September 29, 2010. ‘Looking Beyond the Obvious: Few Reports Have Mentioned the Extraordinary Context in Which the Recent Sino-Japanese Spat Has Taken Place’. Business Times Singapore: 32-45. Shih, Hun-chang. and Foo-liang Wang. June 18, 2008. ‘Officials Drop Plan to Visit Diaoyutais’. Taipei Times: 2-5. Sutter, Robert G. 2013. Foreign Relations of the PRC: The Legacies and Constraints of China’s International Politics Since 1949. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlef ield. Tiberghien, Yazihkalyn. March–April 2010. ‘The Diaoyu Crisis of 2010: Domestic Games and Diplomatic Conflict’. Harvard Asian Quarterly 12: 60–74. Ukai, Sakamoto. January 25, 2014. ‘Japan, Taiwan Agree on Fishing Rules in Waters around Senkakus’. Asahi Shimbun: 1-4. US Senate. 2013. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, H.R. 4310: Sec. 1251. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Wilkinson, Philip. 2007. Yangtze. London: BBC Books. You, Ji. 2016. China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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Yu, Bin. September 2015. ‘Russia-China Relations: Tales of Two Parades, Two Drills, and Two Summits’. Comparative Connections 17, no. 2:147–63. Xi, Jinping. Speech at the PLAAF headquarters on April 14, 2014; www.chinanews. com/gn/2019/04-14/8808584.shtml. Accessed on May 23, 2019.

About the Author Dr. Xiaobing Li is professor of history and the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma. He is editor of the Journal of Chinese Historical Review. His recent books include The Dragon in the Jungle, Attack at Chosin, The Mountain Movers, China’s War in Korea, East Asia and the West, History of Taiwan, Corruption and Anti-corruption in Modern China, Power vs. Law, and The Cold War in East Asia.



Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II? Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

The chapters in this volume suggest characteristics of Chinese political culture and traditional diplomacy. With a new understanding of Chinese concepts of the world order, the authors have examined the emergence of CCP leaders like Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping. All were individuals who thought eclectically about domestic and international issues. Their political and security concerns, unprecedented for national leaders in previous periods of modern Chinese history, were inspired not only by a heightened awareness of ideas transmitted to China from the West, including America, but also by robust traditions harking back to many centuries ago. Moreover, their vision and insight also grew out of active participation in international events of the period, often as actors. However, each generation of CCP leaders faced disharmonious factors and unstable elements in China as well as in the world. Chinese leaders today face some similar international and domestic issues, which prompted early leaders to prioritize their security concerns, national defense, economic development, and domestic control in 1950. Although the international environment dramatically changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China apparently replaces Russia as the primary challenge to the US and the post-Cold War world order. Certainly, the PRC is nothing like it was in 1950, but the CCP’s dominant leadership, continuing fear of insecurity (Fang 2021), and Xi Jinping’s call for the ‘fighting spirit’ against the United States carry on the party’s doctrine and Mao Zedong’s legacy as one of few Communist survivors, as well as a ‘beneficial participant’ in the Cold War (Xinhuanet 2021). In the 2020s, Xi Jinping’s Cold War II may include a ‘strategic triangulation’ of China-US-Europe relations, in which Beijing can look for new bargaining room with Washington. In the coming new cold war, China will deter the US from waging a full-scale hot war with its ever-expanding nuclear arsenal, as well as newly developed cyber and space powers. Meanwhile, China has prepared a new battleground, in case of war with the US, in Africa, as

Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022 doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_conc

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America’s next quagmire, even though the Biden administration is being battered by the pandemic, climate catastrophes, and racial tension at home. The survival lessons learned by the CCP, which have helped re-define the party’s strategy, have changed its perceptions of the world in numerous ways. Its leaders will act according to their own consistent logic on its political agenda, with their diplomatic experience within the context of Chinese society and the new international environment.

National Security and Perception of the US In the 1950s–1960s, China engaged in the Cold War for national security reasons. According to Chapters Four to Six of this book, when the PRC was founded in 1949, Mao Zedong’s strategic priorities included establishing the legitimacy the CCP needed as the ruling party; national security through winning the last battle of the Chinese Civil War against the GMD in Taiwan; an economic recovery; and military modernization. His decision led the new People’s Republic to join the Communist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union and to engage China in the bi-polar Cold War against the United States. By signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in February 1950, Stalin committed his nuclear protection and military aid to the new People’s Republic. China became the frontrunner in the Cold War in East Asia after the PLA intervened in the Korean War in October. Mao seized the opportunity to continue the revolution at home while establishing New China’s power status in East Asia. After its intervention in the Korean War, China quickly adjusted its position in international affairs and willingly moved to the centre of the ideological and military confrontations between the two camps under the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the global Cold War (1946–1991) was characterized by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and the two contending camps headed by two superpowers, China’s role in the Cold War was not peripheral, but, in many key ways, central (Chen and Li 2006, 120). Our contributors emphasize the importance of China’s role in the Cold War in their chapters. Chinese documents available in the past twenty years have provided scholars with more opportunities and resources. We argue that China’s Cold War experience—as exemplified in its participation in the Korean War, First Indochina War, two Taiwan Straits crises, and the Vietnam War—not only contributed significantly to shaping the specific course of the Cold War in Asia, but, also, and more importantly, helped

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create conditions for the Cold War to remain ‘cold’ (Chen 2001, 3; Li 2020, 154–55). After the Chinese-American military confrontation in Korea, East Asia became a focal point of the global Cold War—the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the only two ‘hot wars’ that the United States fought during the Cold War, also happened in East Asia. Moreover, the active role that China played in East Asia also turned this main Cold War battlefield into a strange ‘buffer’ between Washington and Moscow. With China and East Asia standing in the middle, it was less likely that the United States and the Soviet Union would become involved in a direct military confrontation. Thus, a central condition was created for the Cold War to remain ‘cold’ in the 1950s and 1960s. China has survived the Cold War as a ‘beneficial participant’ and became a global economic and military power twenty years after its end.

National Interests and Triangle Structure In the 1970s–1980s, China fought the Cold War for its national interests and strategic reasons. Its important role in the Cold War is also clearly indicated in the historical process leading to the end of the Cold War from the late 1960s/early 1970s to the late 1980s/early 1990s. This process began firstwith the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American rapprochement as detailed in these chapters. In retrospect, few events during the Cold War played so important a role in shaping not only the orientation, but also the essence of the Cold War in the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American rapprochement. The alliance between Beijing and Moscow was the cornerstone of the Communist international alliance system in the 1950s (Westad, 1998: Introduction). Yet, beginning in the late 1950s, because of complicated domestic and international factors, the Sino-Soviet alliance began to fade. The great Beijing-Moscow polemic debate in the early and mid-1960s further undermined the ideological foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union reached a new height in early 1969, when two bloody clashes occurred on the Sino-Soviet border. Reportedly, Moscow’s leaders even considered using a ‘preemptive nuclear strike’ against China (Kissinger, 1978: 183). All of this paved the way for Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing in February 1972, as detailed in Chapters Seven and Eight. After Mao’s death in 1976, the CCP became engaged in a deadly political struggle between the Maoists and victims of the Cultural Revolution. The latter, who were in large numbers with popular support, soon overthrew the Maoists. Deng Xiaoping, the leading figure of the second-generation

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leadership, won out and launched a wave of tremendous changes, particularly in the evolution from a centrally-planned communist economy to a quasi-free market system seeking global inclusion and meeting increasingly popular demand for modernization of the country along with improvement in the standard of living. Consequently, in Chapter Nine, we see the emergence of, from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, a crucial feature in Cold War international politics: domination of a specific ‘triangular structure’. Since China and the US shared ‘common ground’ for strategic reasons, Washington began to play the ‘China card’ against the Soviet Union. Thereafter, both countries accepted a policy principle toward the other as ‘seeking common ground while reserving differences’, and hoping for a ‘win-win’ result in the Cold War. In terms of the impact of this new ‘common ground diplomacy’ in international politics, the Sino-American rapprochement dramatically shifted the balance of power between the two superpowers. While policymakers in Washington found it possible to concentrate more of America’s resources and strategic attention on the Soviet Union, Moscow’s leaders, having to confront the West and China simultaneously, found Soviet strength and power seriously over-extended. Relations between the United States and the PRC steadily improved throughout the 1980s, but they encountered a serious problem in 1989 with Deng Xiaoping’s heavy-handed response to the Tiananmen Square student protests. In 1991, the USSR collapsed, and a more cautious approach developed between Beijing and Washington. Nevertheless, Jiang Zemin expanded China’s foreign trade by adopting new policies to promote international economic relations. Hong Kong then became part of China, and Taiwan developed extensive trade relations with the mainland. China’s total foreign trade had risen from $80 billion in 1988 to $300 billion by 1997, an increase of more than three times in less than ten years. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 further promoted its international trade. By 2002, China’s exports to the US exceeded that of Japan. As a result, the two countries continued their ‘seeking common ground’ policy, since they shared a global economy. Thereafter, ‘trade diplomacy’ replaced ‘common ground diplomacy’, and the Clinton administration engaged China in international affairs as a new ‘strategic partner’. By 2011, China became the second-largest economy in the world, following only the United States, and for the first time in its modern history exceeded Japan. As a new member of the global community, however, the PRC has not always followed every international standard and fulfilled all its promises, but has instead adopted the regulations selectively. While Hu Jintao, the leader after Jiang, was cooperative on certain issues, his government did not

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always agree with the West, especially not with the United States. President George W. Bush, trying to include China in the war against terror, as well as coordinating responses to the crises with North Korea, asked China to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in multilateral national efforts. Beijing considers many issues, including human rights and civil liberties, to be China’s domestic problems, and believes that no foreign government or organization should interfere in its internal affairs. The West believes in natural rights that cannot be taken nor given away; the Chinese government looks at these same rights as privileges granted by the state. With no common enemy to unite against, and with the PRC emerging as a major economic and military power, the relationship between the US and China arrives at a historical crossroad. Miles M. Yu, China policy advisor to former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, emphasizes that President Trump made a fundamental change in US policy toward China by terminating the ‘common ground’ policy principle and ending use of the ‘China card’. As China becomes the primary threat to the United States, America should confront and contain China as its potential enemy whenever it could (Yu 2020). President Biden continues Trump’s hardline policy and describes China as the ‘strategic competitor’ of the US. Xi Jinping faces challenges similar to Mao’s in 1950, although he has to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP in the party-state, f ight against Taiwan’s independence movement, continue economic development, and improve the PLA’s capacity in modern warfare, including an effective nuclear deterrence like the former Soviet Union against superior US military power. Nevertheless, China may replay the game of ‘strategic triangulation’ by establishing a new China-US-Europe structure, bringing the US back to the table to replay the ‘China card’.

Nuclear Deterrence and New Cyber Power After Stalin, Soviet Cold War policy changed by calling for a relaxation of international tensions and peaceful co-existence between the ‘communist camp’ and the free world. Moscow complained about the aggressive Chinese actions in 1954 and expressed its unwillingness to use its atomic weapons in case of US retaliation against any PLA amphibious operations in the Taiwan Strait in 1955. Moreover, Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg recently leaked top-secret US information to The New York Times, which indicates that President Dwight Eisenhower prepared a nuclear war against China in the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Ellsberg ‘told the Times he

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decided to disclose the document now due to rising tensions between the United States and China over Taiwan’ (Savage 2021). Beijing felt nuclear pressures from both superpowers: an increasing nuclear threat from the United States and decreasing protection from the Soviet Union’s ‘nuclear umbrella’. It became apparent that China could neither ensure its own national defense nor avoid international humiliations without its own nuclear weapons (Nie 2001, 5). A great country like China needed its own nuclear weapons to demonstrate its abilities, achievements, and prosperity, and to enhance its rising power status on the world stage. In January 1955, China began its first nuclear weapons program known as ‘Project 02’. In 1960, the first Chinese-made missile was launched in the northwestern desert, leading China to its first nuclear bomb test on October 16, 1964, and the first hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. In less than fifteen years after the Korean War, China became a nuclear power (Li 2007, 147–75). Today, China’s strategic force, or the Second Artillery Corps, totaling 100,000 troops, controls 320 nuclear warheads. The PLA has the largest landbased missile arsenal in the world. It includes 75–100 active inter-continental ballistic missiles, mobile nuclear delivery systems with a range of more than 11,200 kilometres and can reach most locations within the continental United States (DIA 2019). SAC also has 200–300 medium-range ballistic missiles, 300–400 ground-launched cruise missiles, and 1,200 armed short-range ballistic missiles. David Finkelstein warns, ‘For these and many other reasons, we can never discount or ignore this situation. It is one that casts a large shadow over the entire region … It always possesses high potential for major destruction and disruption’ (Finkelstein 2014, 113). What has not been clear is China’s relatively benign nuclear doctrine. Unfortunately, no official Chinese documents confirm it; much about it was inferred from the very beginning. Mao pledged that China and its people were not afraid of nuclear weapons, nor was China afraid to fight a war to defend itself when nuclear weapons had become available. China’s nuclear weapons were for self-defense purposes. In 1964, China also adopted a no-first-use principle, namely, it would not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances (Information Bureau 2000, 2: 412). China also supported the ‘nuclear disarmament, the “Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty”, security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states, and prevention of an arms race in outer space’ (Information Bureau 2005, 4: 703). As David Shambaugh points out, however, ‘China has consistently taken the “high ground” on global nuclear disarmament, but has itself been unwilling to enter into negotiations to reduce its own stockpiles until the other declared nuclear powers reduce their inventories to China’s level first’ (Shambaugh 2002, 102). Alastair I. Johnston indicates some changes in

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China’s nuclear doctrine from minimum deterrence to limited deterrence (youxian weishe) (Johnston 1997). China is clearly in line with the concept of limited deterrence based on a second-strike force, to retaliate only if the nation suffered a nuclear attack by another country. Limited deterrence necessarily requires the survivability and flexibility of China’s nuclear forces. China’s nuclear modernization plan, which would eventually bring mobile missiles online, was consistent with that policy. Further, China was not attempting to reach nuclear parity with either Russia or the United States. To do so would mean spending itself into bankruptcy, plus its main goal was to avoid being subjected again to 1950s-style nuclear blackmail in the Taiwan Strait. The problem of Taiwan and frequent crises in the Taiwan Strait with the GMD and the United States have been used to justify China’s nuclear modernization. Since the 2000s, China has focused on the development of cyber warfare (or Informationization warfare) as a major military task. According to Hu Jintao, the PLA should make a ‘leap-over’ transition from a conventional army to an army equipped with digital facilities. General Zhang Zhen, vice chairman of the CMC, endorsed the ‘leap-over’ idea and believed that the next war will take place where China centres its technology (Zhang Zhen, 1998). The Xi’s high command gave priority to new technological development in the armed forces, ‘to strengthen the capabilities for … conducting strategic counter-strikes’ since cyberspace is offense-dominant (State Council 2005, 645). In 2015, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force as a cyber force to develop reconnaissance, cyberattacks, and cyber-defense capabilities. Chinese generals of cyber warfare believe the PLA can respond with a precise counterattack after the first round of a cyberattack. Thus, the PLA is building up both an effective cyber offense and a strong cyber defense. To reach its goal, General Xiong Guangkai argues that the PLA has to reform virtually all aspects of its gigantic institution in order to prepare for the ‘new era of information warfare’ (Xiong 2003). The PLA considers cyber warfare as strategic warfare in the twenty-first century, just like nuclear war in the twentieth century. According to the Chinese definition, cyber warfare has broader significance for national defense and international politics beyond the military.

New Political Base and Critical Vulnerabilities The CCP’s decision to participate in the global market in 1978 has had a demonstrably powerful effect on domestic administrative structures,

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economic institutions, and legal norms. For example, once the decision to open up was made, administrative decentralization, enterprise reform, and the creation of a legal framework to protect commercial transactions and property rights were needed to enhance China’s competitiveness in the world market. The realization that rapid economic development and technological modernization would require large infusions of foreign capital similarly meant that the new leadership in Beijing had to pay greater attention to foreign concerns: in particular, to ways of improving the local investment climate. Under such conditions, they had little choice but to undertake a liberalization of prevailing commercial norms and practices. By the end of the Cold War in 1991, the CCP had grown beyond the Leninist party system, which depended on secrecy and institutional control and had developed a self-improvement mechanism and functionality, which could adapt to a new environment and allow changes within the party. According to Patrick F. Shan, the party’s association with Chinese grass-roots society ‘in a total native social setting’ guaranteed its flexibility and adaptation to the ever-changing China during the ‘Opening and Reform’ movement (Shan 2014, ch. 1). David Shambaugh concludes, ‘The CCP has exhibited many classic symptoms of an atrophying and decaying Leninist party—but, at the same time, it is also showing itself capable of significant adaptation and reform in a number of key areas’ (Shambaugh 2008, 5). The party created its new political power bases in the cities during urbanization from the 1990s to the 2010s. The recently established urban power-interest groups consist of the second generation of revolutionary veterans, pro-CCP entrepreneurs, as well as returning intellectuals sent by the government for Western degrees and overseas training, and bureaucrats, who are mostly CCP members. With political support, special treatment, privileges, and protection, this group has controlled the city governments and taken advantage of urbanization to generate considerable capital. In return, the urban power-interest groups support the CCP and carry out its policy through the legal system by controlling the ‘knife hilt’ (daobazi), while ignoring the benefits and rights of professionals and private business owners. The court works for the party as well as the government. Therefore, most of the metropolitan governments are party-governments, and today’s China remains a party-state (Fang and Li 2017, Introduction). The political survival of the CCP government through its transformation or evolution during the urbanization of the 2000s reveals that China’s urbanization has unique characteristics, transforming not only the country, but also the CCP, from a rural-based totalitarian party to a city-centred authoritarian party, from a people’s party to a power interest group’s

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party. Clearly, the party did not want to lose control of the cities through urbanization, as occurred from 1966–1976 during the Cultural Revolution, and again in 1989 during the Tiananmen incident (Sun and Li 2014, 46–55). It intended to lead the urban movement by making new policies, empowering pro-party interest groups, controlling the legal system, and putting more pressure on the middle class, which was campaigning for civil liberties, freedom, and democracy. The unprecedented historical transition of the CCP after 1989 has also drawn attention from other political scientists and legal scholars. Bruce Dickson concludes that to share the economic benefits, private entrepreneurs support the party’s agenda rather than promoting democratization in China (Dickson 2008, Introduction). He then predicts that if the CCP succeeds, it may be able to ‘preempt or postpone’ political reforms (Dickson 2011, 39–58). To survive urbanization, the party leadership became more flexible and was able to adapt to economic and social changes. The CCP governments in the cities of our research responded to the rising demands and expectations of society. They were willing and able to cope with the middle class by making a few compromises and following certain legal procedures in exchange for continuing political support. The chapters in this volume, however, indicate that urban residents and new migrants not only struggle to survive, but also attempt to be heard through the legal process while attempting to avoid being victimized. Although China has made great progress in its urbanization, especially with many approaches announced in the first term of new leadership in the 2010s, many Western scholars raised various points of view for a possible path for new Chinese cities. Kellee S. Tsai explains ‘the most populous non-transition case in the world’ by contending that ‘under certain circumstances, the etiology of formal institutional change lies in the informal coping strategies devised by local actors to evade the restrictions of formal institutions’ (Tsai 2006, 118). Tsai questions the widely accepted modernization theory that capitalism can lead to democracy. She classifies the ‘coping strategies’ of business owners and urban residents into four categories: ‘avoidant, grudgingly acceptant, loyally acceptant, and assertive. Only those in the latter category hold the potential for making direct demands for democracy’ (Tsai 2007, 15).

Ethnic and Economic Problems We examine the CCP not only in terms of political institutions, but also of social institutions, which endorse many social values and popular ideas, such

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as nationalism. Chinese nationalism, deeply rooted in the heart of many generations, has risen significantly since the 1990s as a result of China’s explosive growth during the previous twenty years. In these years, this pragmatic nationalism has maintained the CCP’s national leadership and improved its status in society. This ideology is dictated by the government to pursue China’s unity, strength, prosperity, and dignity, rather than value the human rights and democracy at its core. This kind of nationalism emphasizes a common will and goal rather than holding human rights as its fundamental value and democracy as its desired result. Often the government has even called on individuals to sacrifice personal rights for national interest. During his second term in 2017–2022, Xi Jinping continues to employ nationalism as an ideology to unite China and to fight for its superpower status, perhaps resulting in one more source of legitimacy for the CCP as the country’s ruling party. In his Belt and Road system, China’s western frontier, Xinjiang, is no longer peripheral or in the strategic rear in the Cold War, but instead becomes economically central to Xi’s global project. When Xinjiang gained its new strategic status, its people, traditional and pragmatic, perceived it as a favourable opportunity to improve their living standard and solve economic and social problems. Many Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities believed they were the victims of China’s economic growth, losing their land, labour force, and natural resources to southeastern-centric reforms. Despite their perceptions, Xinjiang’s requests and demands continue to be denied, seen as counter to Belt and Road policy. Due to the lack of political support and social stability, Xinjiang was not ready to play Xi’s expected new central role. Ethnic problems in Xinjiang worsened, and religious tension continued in the early 2000s. Turmoil in Xinjiang threatened Xi’s dream and his globa­ lization plan, as well as the political legitimacy of the CCP leadership. Xi decided to take tougher positions to control the explosive situation. His administration announced a ‘people’s war on terror’ in 2015 to mobilize the country against increased protests and resistance. The government constrained traditional cultures and Islam and replaced the Uyghur language with Standard Mandarin in K–12 schools. Nationalistic and integrationist strategies threaten to erase religious preference, ethnic identity, and minority languages. These policies have caused growing social unrest and even mass riots among minorities living in autonomous regions. Since 2017, local governments have worked with the PLA, law enforcement, prosecutors, and the court to carry out a proactive domestic security policy to maintain social and political order by arrests, detentions, incarcerations, and assimilation in Xinjiang. In 2017, the XUAR Public Security Bureau and

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the PLA established the ‘Centres for Re-education and Training’ (officially Vocational Education and Training Centres) in Urumqi and other cities to detain those considered ‘distrusted’. The government, through various administrative levels, informally widened its range of security concerns, including political and religious dissidents, members of regressive sects, and those with relatives and connections overseas. By March 2018, more than 30,000 people were reportedly detained in the centres at Urumqi, capital city of Xinjiang. More centres soon opened across Xinjiang (Economist, May 31, 2018). By late 2018, about 800,000 people were held in these places, most of them Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. The US Department of Defense reported in May 2019 that a large number of Chinese citizens were imprisoned in internment camps in a strong condemnation of the ‘concentration camps’ (Ensor 2019). In 2021, many families and human rights groups worried about the COVID-19 pandemic being widespread in the camps since they are overpopulated and crowded. Any economic recession in these two decades will weigh on China’s military modernization. Chinese analysts worry about the country’s macroeconomy instability and problems such as unemployment, limited natural resources, energy cost and price hikes, a weak financial system, state-owned enterprises, and a decline of foreign investment and exports. Although these serious challenges did not occur simultaneously, their repercussions have seriously damaged the country’s economy. Some Western analysts worry that these problems may lead to a more aggressive foreign policy or even military expansionism. Due to all the above challenges, the PLA has an arduous task to safeguard China’s national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests. China must solve its own problems, consisting of, but not limited to, corruption, power abuse, law infringement, human rights violation, and urban mismanagement. These factors all delay China’s growth and impede improvement of the Sino-US relationship. If the American government works with China on developing shared political, social, and judicial objectives, it may succeed in drawing China further into the international system. Otherwise, its current fraught relations and a looming Cold War II with the United States and the West will not diminish any time soon.

Bibliography Chen, Jian. 2001. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

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Chen, Jian and Xiaobing Li. 2006. ‘China and the End of the Global Cold War’, in From Détente to the Soviet Collapse: The Cold War from 1975 to 1991, Malcolm Muir, Jr., ed. Lexington, VA: Virginia Military Institute: 120–131. Defense Intelligence Agency. 2019. US Department of Defense. ‘China’s Military Power: Modernizing A Force to Fight and Win’; www.dia.mil/Portals/27/ Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf. Accessed on June 3, 2021. Dickson, Bruce J. 2008. Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dickson, Bruce J. 2011. ‘Updating the China Model’. Washington Quarterly 34, no. 4 (Fall): 39–58. Economist Briefing. May 31, 2018. ‘China Has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State like No Other’.” Economist; www. economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-a-policestate-like-no-other. Accessed November 12 2020. Ensor, Josie. February 22, 2019. ‘Saudi Crown Prince Defends China’s Right to Put Uighur Muslims in Concentration Camps’. The Daily Telegraph; www.telegraph. co.uk/news/2019/02/22/saudi-crown-prince-defends-chinas-right-put-uighurmuslims-concentration. Accessed April 6 2022. Fang, Qiang. 2021. The Communist Judicial System in China, 1927–1976: Building on Fear. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Fang, Qiang, and Xiaobing Li. 2017. Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Finkelstein, David M. 2014. ‘Three Key Issues Affecting Security in the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Asia-Pacific Security: New Issues and New Ideas. International Military Committee, ed., China Association for Military Science. Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe. Information Bureau. 2005. PRC State Council. White Paper of China’s National Defense in 2004. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Johnston, Alastair I. 1997. ‘Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control’, in China’s Military in Transition, David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds. New York: Oxford University Press: 284–312. Kissinger, Henry. 1978. White House Years. New York: Little, Brown. Li, Xiaobing. 2007. A History of the Modern Chinese Army. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Li, Xiaobing. 2020. Attack at Chosin: The Chinese Second Offensive in Korea. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Nie Rongzhen. 2001. ‘A Rough Start to China’s Nuclear and Missile Programs’, in Liangdan yixing; zhongguo hewuqi daodan weixing yu feichuan quanjishi [The Bomb, Missile, and Satellite: A Detailed Record of China’s Nuclear, Missile,

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Satellite, and Space Programs], General Armaments Department (GAD) of the PLA, ed. Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe [Continental Publishing House]. PRC State Council. 2005. White Papers of China’s National Defense in 2004. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Savage, Charlie. May 22, 2021. ‘Risk of Nuclear War over Taiwan in 1958 Said to Be Greater Than Publicly Known’. The New York Times; www.nytimes. com/2021/05/22/us/politics/nuclear-war-risk-1958-us-china.html. Accessed in May 2021. Shambaugh, David. 2002. Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shambaugh, David. 2008. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Shan, Patrick Fuliang. 2014. ‘Local Revolution, Grassroots Mobilization, and Wartime Power Shift to the Rise of Communism’, in Evolution of Power: China’s Struggle, Survival, and Success. Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Sun, Yi and Xiaobing Li.2014. “Mao Zedong and the CCP: Adaptation, Centralization, and Succession” in Xiaobing Li and Xiansheng Tian, eds., Evolution of Power: China’s Struggle, Survival, and Success. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Tsai, Kellee S. October 2006. ‘Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China’. World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Oct., 2006), pp. 116-141. Tsai, Kellee S. 2007. Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. United Nation Human Rights Report, “China Responsible for ‘Serious Human Rights Violations’ in Xinjiang Province,” August 31, 2022. https://news.un.org/ en/story/2022/08/1125932. Accessed September 14 2022. Westad, Odd Arne. 1998. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ‘Xi Focus: CPC leadership stresses enhancing historical confidence, unity, fighting spirit’. December 29, 2021. Xinhuanet; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/20211229/cc788728a0f942f7afe5e7dd7d517e7c/c.html. Accessed January 11 2022. Xiong, Guangkai. 2003. ‘On Revolution in Military Affairs’, in Guangkai Xiong, ed. Guoji zhanlue yu xinjunshi biange [International Strategy and Revolution in Military Affairs], (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe [Tsinghua University Press]:182–83. Yu, Miles M. November 12, 2020. ‘Special Interview of China Policy Advisor to Secretary Pompeo Maochun Yu’.Radio Free Asia; www.rfa.org/mandarin/ yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/nt-11122020220695.html Accessed on June 2, 2021. Zhang Zhen. 1998. ‘Joint Warfare Seminar’, in Shusheng Yu, ed. Lun lianhe zhanyi [On Joint Warfare], Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe.

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About the Authors Dr. Xiaobing Li is professor of history and the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma. He is editor of the Journal of Chinese Historical Review. His recent books include The Dragon in the Jungle, Attack at Chosin, The Mountain Movers, China’s War in Korea, East Asia and the West, History of Taiwan, Corruption and Anti-corruption in Modern China, Power vs. Law, and The Cold War in East Asia. Dr. Qiang Fang is professor of East Asian History at the University of Minnesota-Duluth and also a visiting professor at China University of Geosciences in Wuhan. He has authored several books such as Communist Judicial System in China, 1927-1076: Building on Fear; Power Versus Law in Modern China: Cities, Courts, and the Communist Party; Chinese Complaint Systems: Natural Resistance; Zhongguo shangfang zhidu shihua, 1100 BCE–1949 [A Short History of Chinese Petitions].

Index Acheson, Dean 146, 153, 177-178, 190-191 Anti-Chinese 22-23, 55-56, 58-61, 65-66, 71-72, 78, 219 Anti-communism 18, 85, 89, 95, 99, 176 Belt-Road Strategy (China) 25, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311, 315, 317 Biden, Joe 16-17, 27, 284, 295, 309, 346, 349 Brinkmanship 284 Carter, Jimmy 241-242, 262, 265, 287, 289 Chinese Civil War 18, 24, 44, 118-119, 124, 126-129, 131-132, 135, 142, 181, 190, 192, 239, 264, 296, 311 Chinese Exclusion Act/Law 22, 55, 57, 64, 75 Chinese Immigrants 60-61, 76 Chinese Nationalist Party/government 38, 82, 90, 135, 187 Chinese Volunteer Army 73, 135, 137, 141, 145, 182-183 Confucian Establishment 51 Learning 33 Private School 50 Containment 284, 293 Cold War 81-82, 88, 120, 123, 132-137, 179-180, 182183, 185, 190, 210, 215, 220, 229, 258-261, 274, 263-264, 267, 289, 295-296, 305-306, 309, 328 American historian 118 American policy 104 early 114-115 emerging 113 end of 352 global 177 global 22-25 in East Asia 108 mentality 105 new 55, 206, 211, 284, 310, 345-349 post era 279 Sino-American alliance 269 strategic rear of 354 Cultural Revolution 216, 223, 247, 270, 313, 347, 353 Deng Xiaoping 20, 24-25, 120, 257, 265, 279, 281, 298, 321, 345, 347 and Bush 281-283 and the US after Tiananmen Incident 241248, 268, 270, 275 compared with Jiang 269 pick Jiang Zemin 261-262, 266 Trip to the US 22 view on the US 255-258

Edgar, Snow 223-226, 235, 239, 264 Goodnow, Frank J. 39 Gorbachev, Mikhail 250, 266-267 Great Leap Forward Movement 205, 218 Hong Kong 15, 21, 26, 207-209, 219, 222-223, 226, 231, 236, 239, 275, 287, 313 348 Hu Jintao 22, 35, 261, 285, 300, 322, 348, 351 Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) 81-90, 92-95, 99, 100-105, 190, 192, 196, 199-201, 265, 321 Jiang Zemin 22, 25, 250, 252, 261-262, 266-270 after Deng’s 1992 tour 271 and Bush 282-283 and the US 272-279 became leader 244, 321-322 plane collision 281 Jinmen Island 24, 185, 189, 191-192, 195-205, 207-211 Johnson, Lyndon B. 215-116, 230, 236, 238, 264 Johnson, Nelson 97, 99-100 Kennedy, John F. 108, 215, 264 Khrushchev, Nikita 200-201, 203, 297 Kim II-sung 140, 147, 165, 169, 191, 260 Kissinger, Henry 24, 206, 219-220, 222, 224, 228-231, 236, 238, 242-243, 246, 248-252, 259, 269, 285-288, 347, 356 Korean War 24, 114, 135-144, 146-153, 158, 163-166, 168, 171-175, 177-183, 186, 191, 183, 195, 204, 207, 211, 257, 264, 282, 287, 339, 346-347, 350 Lenin, Vladimir 36, 52, 271-272, 352 Li Dazhao 22, 31-51, 53, 82, 345 Li Peng 247-248, 253, 268, 276, Lin Biao 265 Mao Zedong 24, 82, 86, 89, 104-106, 125-126, 132, 149, 186-187, 225, 247, 272, 297, 321, 345, 346 admire the US in the 1940s 264 librarian in Beijing 48 met Anna Strong 124 praised Stalin 298 rebuttal of Truman’s China policy 119-122 strategic rear 295 Taiwan Strait Crisis 189-199 Marshall, George 23, 114-129, 131-135 Marshall Mission 23, 27, 113-129, 131-133, 135

360  New Cultural Movement 36-37, 53 Nixon, Richard 199, 220-221, 243-244, 261, 321, 347 after Tiananmen 249-250, 268-269, 278 called Bush in 1989 246 library 263 Nixon administration 219 took office 24 visit to China 15, 22, 125, 215, 216-217, 224-226, 228-236, 241, 265-266, 274, North Korea 24, 63, 141, 349 joined UN in 1991 257 Korean War 141-142, 144, 146-150, 153-154, 158, 160, 163-166, 169, 171-174, 180, 183 split of Korean peninsula 137 Peng Dehuai 137, 140-141, 147, 166, 169, 171-172, 174, 197-198, 200-202, 205, 208-210 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 18, 23, 203-204, 221, 266-267, 297, 320, 325, 338, 345-346, 348-349 Carter recognition 262 China divided 113 defense ministry 327 in Korean War 114 Marshall Mission 115, 118-120, 125-126, 128-129, 131-132 Partnership with Russia 335 reform of 278 relations with the US 264-268 Spratly Islands 329-332 Taiwan 199 under Mao 284 under Xi 319 with Bush 270 Ping-pong Diplomacy 24, 26, 216, 224-228, 234-236 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 158, 189, 204-207, 297, 319, 330, 333, 339, 346, 355 air force in Fujian 201-202 annihilated nationalist troops in 1958 198 Dongshan island 192 encounter the US 336 first air confrontation drill 337 grey zone 16 in Xinjiang 302 largest missile arsenal 350 navy 320 reduction 194 Pompeo, Mike 15, 20, 26-27, 263, 274, 284, 288, 295, 312, 315, 349, 357 POW (Prisoner of War) 140, 154-156, 158-183, Reagan, Ronald 242, 275 Republic of China 22, 108, 136, 297 Scowcroft, Brent 242, 248-252, 254-255, 258 Sino-Indian War 297

Xiaobing Li and Qiang Fang

Sino-Japanese War 100, 320, 325 Maritime Conflicts 341 Spat 343 Sino-US relations 17, 20-25, 27, 31, 55, 81, 107, 113-115, 120-121, 123, 132, 134, 136, 215-221, 223-224, 232, 241, 246, 261, 319, 345 Korean War 177, 180 Marshal Mission 125-129, South Korea 136, 140, 146, 159, 172, 179, 191, 257, 338 Stalin, Joseph 81, 89, 191, 349 and PRC 138-140 denunciation 297 died 170, 172, 193 Gulag 157 Jiang Jieshi 129 Mao 147, 155, 187-189 Mao praised 298 nuclear protection to China 346 Offensive in Manchuria 122 purge 160 support Mao 166 with Kim 165 Sun Yat-sen 36, 44-45 Taiwan 13, 15-17, 21, 23-25, 113-115, 126-129, 131-132, 141, 176, 263-265, 279-280, 297, 320-324, 329 1996 crisis 283 and Clinton 274 and Jiang’s China 269 colonized by Japan 83 Marshall’s plan 118 Pelosi’s visit 284 Reagan 242 repatriation of POWs 158, 174 Taiwan Strait Crisis 185-211, 217, 228 US Seventh fleet 138 US withdrawal of troops 152, 236 Taiwan Strait Crisis 25, 185, 199, 204-207, 210, 289, 349 Tiananmen Incident/Crackdown 244, 261, 266, 268, 270, 275, 278, 283, 253 Tibet 9, 12-13, 215, 239, 257, 263, 279, 300, 314, 322 Truman, Henry 18, 23, 127, 167 and Chinese civil war 126 and Taiwan 190-191 confront Soviet 129 Korean War 137, 139, 153, 160-161 Marshall 113-121 Trump, Donald J. 25, 56, 237, 293, 309 Attack China 55 Biden continues 349 blame Clinton 263 blame US policy on China 274 change national strategy 307 China virus 23, 76

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defend Japan 338 immigration policy 63 on China and Hong Kong 15 tensions between China and US 295 use of Twitter 230 United Nations 24, 137-138, 147, 153, 217 American-led 135 Korean War 167, 171, 175, 177, 180 admission of Koreas 257 oil reserves 321 US Defense Department 203, 333, 336-337 USSR (Soviet Union) 16, 19, 32, 36, 42, 55, 99, 120-124, 126, 129, 132, 178, 190-191, 201, 203, 218, 220, 233, 235, 243, 261, 265, 267-268, 269, 301, 347, 349 aid to China 105 aid to China 187-189 and Deng Xiaoping 242 China card 348 collapse of 256, 267, 322, 345 coup 270 hostility with China 298 instigated China’s civil war 127 Korean War 136, 138, 142, 152-155, 157, 171 Li Dazhao visit 37 nuclear umbrella 350 promise to GMD 117 satellite 200 Sino-Soviet clash 216-217, 219, 221, 264 talks with the US 250 threat to China and the US 283, 297 under Gorbachev 266 Wang Jingwei 95-96 Vietnam War 22, 215, 321, 342, 347 Wang Jingwei 23, 81-109 Warlord regime 37 era 44, 82, 83 Warsaw Talks 203, 217, 221-223 World War I 12, 67, 83, 156 World War II 18, 62, 72, 95, 103-104, 190, 324, 329 after 305, 320 aftermath of 123 aim of 86

alliance 22 Asian Americans 77, 82 before 128 China 104 commencement of 84 end of 114-115 end of 126, 157 scholars of 88-89 Soviet in 176 veteran 75 victory of 119-120 Xinjiang 13, 25, 293-306, 308, 311-317, 328, 354-355 Xi Jinping 19-20, 26, 283-284, 306-307, 319, 349 became leader 301, 302-304 belt-road initiative 25 call for fighting spirit 345 core interest 17 incorporate Mao’s strategy 186 invade Taiwan 185, 206 modernization of military 339 nationalism 328, 354 negotiation with the US 263 not confronting the US 279 Silk Road Economic Belt 293 visit aircraft-carrier 320 visit PLAAF headquarters 337 visit Russia 332 Yuan Shikai 38-39 Zhou Enlai 89, 124-125, 132, 192, 203-205, 221, 225, 228-229, 231, 237 accused the US of standing with China’s enemies 264 arrange with Snow’s visit 223 as reconcilable 122 back from Geneva 194 befriend America 236 Communist representative in 1946 116 five principles 193 mission to Moscow 166 new page with the US 226 no war with the US 199 relieved from foreign minister 200 with Marcos 278 with Marshall 131