Anti-Communist Solidarity: US-Brazilian Labor Relations During the Dictatorship in Cold-War Brazil (1964-1985) 9783110732917, 9783110737745

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Larissa Rosa Corrêa Anti-Communist Solidarity

Work in Global and Historical Perspective

Edited by Andreas Eckert, Sidney Chalhoub, Mahua Sarkar, Dmitri van den Bersselaar, Christian G. De Vito Work in Global and Historical Perspective is an interdisciplinary series that welcomes scholarship on work/labor that engages a historical perspective in and from any part of the world. The series advocates a definition of work/labor that is broad, and especially encourages contributions that explore interconnections across political and geographic frontiers, time frames, disciplinary boundaries, as well as conceptual divisions among various forms of commodified work, and between work and ‘non-work.’

Volume 12

Larissa Rosa Corrêa

Anti-Communist Solidarity US-Brazilian Labor Relations During the Dictatorship in Cold-War Brazil (1964-1985) Translated by H. Sabrina Gledhill

ISBN 978-3-11-073774-5 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-073291-7 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-073297-9 ISSN 2509-8861 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021945875 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston First published as Corrêa, Larissa Rosa. Disseram que voltei americanizado: relações sindicais Brasil-Estados Unidos na ditadura militar. Campinas: Editora Unicamp, 2017. Cover illustration: The National Archives of Brazil. Correio da Manhã. BR_RJANRIO_PH_O_FOT_05610_004 Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

For Paulo Fontes and our best joint production: the twins, Leon and Miguel.

Acknowledgments This book resulted from my PhD dissertation, produced at the Department of History of the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), in the field of Labor History, defended in July 2013 and later published in Portuguese in 2017 by the Unicamp University Press as “Disseram que voltei americanizado”: relações sindicais BrasilEstados Unidos na ditadura militar brasileira. The original title alludes to the song that was immortalized in the voice of Brazilian samba singer and Hollywood star Carmen Miranda – “They Said I Came Back Americanized.” In the 1940s, the “Brazilian bombshell,” with her colorful fruit hat, sought to refute criticism that she was becoming less Brazilian because she was too closely linked to the United States. Like Carmen Miranda, it can also be said that the Brazilian union leaders who traveled to the USA to take part in the exchange program financed by the AFL-CIO did not return home completely Americanized. Despite their admiration for and fascination with American culture, many of them seriously questioned whether the US labor model would be the suitable for Brazilian workers. This study would not have been possible without the support of some of my colleagues and professors. It took several steps before the book could come out in an English translation. First, I would like to thank Professor James N. Green, from Brown University, for being my advisor during my doctoral internship at Brown, and for taking me into his home for six months in Providence, Rhode Island. Professor Green gave me all the support I needed to do my research in the United States in 2009 and 2010, when I obtained a Capes PhD scholarship to study abroad. To my professors at the Unicamp Department of History, especially Professor Michael Hall and my advisor, Fernando Teixeira da Silva, many thanks for all your support throughout my postgraduate studies in Labor History. Fernando, who patiently guided me between 2005 and 2013, played a key role not only in the completion of the PhD thesis that gave rise to this book, but over the course of my academic career. There is not enough room here to list all the people who were instrumental in the writing of this book. However, I would like to extend my special thanks to the staff of the Edgar Leuenroth Archives (AEL) at Unicamp, the National Archives, the Unesp Documentation and Memory Center (CEDEM), the Union Memory Center, the George Meany Archives, National Archives II, and the Khell Center at Cornell University. I would also like to thank my colleagues from the History Department at PUC-Rio for their warm welcome and our pleasant coexistence since 2015. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-001

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They also helped me obtain financial aid for part of the translation of this book from Portuguese to English. In fact, the funding obtained through research projects financed by CNPq and Capes, two of the largest research funding agencies in Brazil, which are currently suffering from budget cuts during the administration of ultra-right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro, were essential to getting this book translated. I would also like to thank Re:Work/ IGK Work and the Human Life Cycle in Global History, particularly Felicitas Hentschke and Andreas Eckert, for their warm welcome in 2014, and for supporting many of our projects in the field of Labor History in Latin America. My personal appreciation goes out to Professors Sidney Chalhoub, Christian G. De Vito, and James N. Green, who were on the committee that evaluated this book for publication. I would also like to thank H. Sabrina Gledhill for translating this book so carefully. Finally, my special thanks to Paulo Fontes, my companion on this journey since the beginning of this study. We share the hardships and small pleasures of the historian’s craft, as well as the life of a family of five, which includes the twins Leon and Miguel and our little dog Lola.

Foreword There has long been a fruitful dialogue between historians in and of Brazil and their North American counterparts, especially around the issues of slavery, emancipation, and so-called “race relations.” Much of this work has been comparative, setting the two cases side by side in order to highlight similarities and differences, though what these have purportedly been has shifted over the years. More recently, however, historians have set aside the comparative model, derived from historical sociology, and embarked on a more transnational approach, examining how the histories of these two nations have been intertwined and how Brazilians and North Americans have influenced and engaged one another. Larissa Corrêa’s book, emphasizing as it does the importance of such reciprocity, falls firmly into the latter camp. Corrêa, as a historian of labor and the working class rather than slavery and race, comes at the reciprocal and transnational history of Brazil and the United States from a slightly different angle than many of her predecessors. To be sure, as she shows, there is a long tradition of labor studies scholarship concerned with how the powerful postwar national labor federations of the U.S. cast their power and influence abroad in the name of “free trade unionism,” especially in Latin America and the decolonizing world of Africa and Asia. At its best, this work—frequently quite critical of U.S. foreign policy and its supporters in the AFL-CIO leadership—came to see the U.S. labor movement not just as an arm of the foreign policy establishment, but as an independent actor with its own motives, agenda, alliances, and international commitments—albeit, ones deeply imprinted with the anticommunism that governed so much U.S. behavior in the international sphere during the Cold War. But Corrêa’s book, heretofore published only in Portuguese, eschews an analysis centered merely on what union leaders from the U.S. sought to share with—or impose upon—their Brazilian counterparts in the name of inter-American solidarity and training in putatively “democratic” unionism. Instead, by charting the experience of Brazilian unionists who experienced North American tutelage in Brazil or even traveled to the U.S., she reveals what lessons Brazilians took from their pedagogical encounters with the U.S. trade union movement during the 1960s and 1970s. They did not always draw the conclusions that their AFL-CIO sponsors sought to impart. Presumably, some Brazilian readers already familiar with this book did not find this especially surprising, even if Corrêa is one of the few Brazilian scholars to scour the North American archives in order to demonstrate the gap between imperial intention and domestic result. But it should be eye-opening for North American scholars, so accustomed to https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-002

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an analysis—even if a critical one—that regards the AFL-CIO’s international programs as effective and hegemonic. Moreover, much like the Brazilian labor leaders whose experience she chronicles, Corrêa draws different lessons from the northern archives than a U.S.-based researcher might. If the AFL-CIO (and the US State Department) sought to export a model of “voluntarist” labor-capital relations predicated on the basic harmony between workers and employers, Brazilians were not necessarily buying what they were selling. An older generation of trade union leaders, for example, although resolutely anticommunist, resented being displaced by novitiates benefitting from North American support. Some beneficiaries of U.S. largess merely reaped the personal awards of the cultural capital gained by their U.S. sojourn; others continued to doubt the benefits of “pure and simple unionism”, which seemed impossible in practice in Brazil in any case. Many greeted with bemused skepticism the alleged apolitical stance of the AFL-CIO; after all, the labor federation seemed rather deeply enmeshed with U.S. foreign policy! A highly federalized system, where labor laws differed across states, seemed baffling. And, notwithstanding U.S. preferences, both workers and the Brazilian state continued to rely on the Labor Courts to resolve disputes in lieu of collective bargaining. Moreover, nationalist sentiment in trade union ranks, regardless of political affiliation, proved resistant to meddling in Brazilian labor affairs by “the brother in the North.” Some Brazilian labor leaders, their anticommunism notwithstanding, still denounced “American imperialism”, whether out of conviction or the desire to curry favor with those to their left. Ultimately, corporatism and nationalism proved difficult nuts to crack. Thus, it is all the more significant that Corrêa’s analysis, emanating as it does from the global south, can now be shared with U.S. labor historians (like myself) unable to read the original Portuguese yet familiar with at least some of the rich North American archives and historiography Corrêa relies upon to make her case. As Corrêa shows, the tip of the spear for U.S. intervention in Brazilian trade union affairs was the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which sought to blunt radical unionism in the Americas and bolster the kind of non-confrontational contractualism embraced by the AFL-CIO. Working with their Brazilian comprador organization, the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (ICT), AIFLD sought to overcome a more corporatist tradition of Brazilian unionism, one that made the national state first among equals at the bargaining table. Above all, they aspired to train a union leadership cadre that would embrace a depoliticized unionism and refrain from using workers’ economic power outside the narrow constraints of collective bargaining. In doing so, AIFLD consistently guarded against the influence of Soviet-aligned militants or parties—like Brazil’s communist party, the PCB– “infiltrating” unions. Brazilian labor leaders were in-

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structed on how to identify potential communist militants in their ranks; a favorable remark about the Cuban Revolution was surely a tip-off, for instance. In practice, however, the Americans worked with an overly broad definition of the taint of communism. In Brazil, many non-communist labor activists saw the PCB as potential allies in a broad front, an ecumenicalism their North American allies refused to countenance. Whatever its intentions in promoting “free labor unions”, in Brazil AIFLD ultimately supported the dictatorship that came to power in the 1964 coup with the connivance, if not outright support, of the United States security establishment. At the same time, as Corrêa insists, it would be a mistake to imagine the AFL-CIO International Affairs division as nothing more than an extension of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. Like their Brazilian counterparts enmeshed in U.S.-Brazilian bilateral relations, North American labor leaders came to the international sphere with their own agenda. This was not always dictated by the State Department, let alone the national security state. Defending workers’ wage levels in a São Paulo Ford plant, for instance, also meant protecting UAW members in Detroit against foreign competition. Moreover, by accessing the “foreign gaze” in the archives of the State Department and the AFL-CIO International Affairs Department alike, Corrêa casts the history of the Brazilian labor movement’s experience under the dictatorship into a new light for scholars in both countries and linguistic traditions. This book appears in English at an exciting moment, as North American observers of labor affairs would do well to turn their attention to Brazil again. As this book goes to press, Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and the Workers’ Party (PT), ignominiously shoved aside by the rightwing leader Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters (the ideological descendants of the golpistas), may be catapulted back into power by a newly mobilized Brazilian working class and its leftist allies in civil society. This represents a golden opportunity for the waning labor movement in the U.S. to forge new international ties with what has the potential to be the world’s most populous democracy governed by an unabashed defender of working-class power and genuine trade union democracy. During the dark days of dictatorship in Brazil, U.S. labor leaders had the hubris to imagine they had something to teach Brazilian workers struggling to assert the rights, eroded if not entirely extinguished in fact by a coup supported by the U.S. government. Now, perhaps, it may be time for them to learn something from their Brazilian comrades. Alex Lichtenstein, Indiana University

Foreword to the Brazilian Edition This book tells the stories of diplomatic, political, and union encounters and disencounters between Brazil and the United States in the 1960s and 70s. These are stories that intertwine, come together, diverge, and make two different work cultures collide. However, the differences between them have been transformed into binary oppositions, arranged in a hierarchical fashion. Supporters of the contractualist model of labor relations, which characterizes American unionism, seemed confident of themselves, their past history, and the superiority of their watchwords of democracy, freedom and autonomy. They claimed to be reasonably free from the opaque and spurious games of politics, the sharp fangs of the State, and totalitarian temptations. Therefore, they believed they were in a position to pontificate on how other countries should build “pure and simple” unionism, rooted in private law and based on the principle of collective and direct negotiations between employees and employers. If their propagandists are to be believed, unions in the United States did not need to ask permission or be accountable to the government in order to exist. They owed nothing to parties and politicians, and were not suffocated by regulations. They relied solely and exclusively on their own strength. Proof of the model’s supremacy was attested by the “American way of life” of US workers. This idyllic and Herculean image supposedly stood in contrast with Brazil’s “skin and bone” corporatism, lacking the nerves and muscles of the supposed voluntarism of the labor movement in the United States. After the post-war period, the corporatist system of labor relations emerged in Brazil as a phenomenon reminiscent of the fascism, “totalitarianism,” “populist” governments and communist opportunism that were said to have characterized some Latin American countries since the 1930s, among which Brazil figured as the most important. The workers of those nations seemed to be protected by the vast shadow of the State, but they had to be taught to live according to their own lights. It seems ironic that the heralds of American contractualism ended up going against their much-vaunted voluntarism and resorting to the power of politics, governments, international diplomacy and massive financial resources, both public and private, in their attempt to sell and practice “free and democratic trade unionism.” As a result, a portentous apparatus of bilateral exchanges was established, mobilizing politicians, union leaders, intellectuals, workers, diplomats and even businessmen from both countries before and during the 1964 military coup. However, the readers of this provocative and original book may be disappointed if they expect this to be yet another story of “one-way imperialism” – https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-003

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of Yankees dominating a defenseless underdeveloped country. In her vibrant, well-documented narrative, Larissa Rosa Corrêa vigorously analyzes a complex plethora of international relations punctuated by reciprocal exchanges, partially convergent expectations and mutual support. However, if there was an identity of purpose between characters and institutions in Brazil and the United States regarding the future of Brazilian unionism, the author asks: why was the system of labor relations established in Brazil not a carbon copy of the system practiced by the brothers in the North? Certainly, thousands of workers and hundreds of union leaders who traveled to the United States were enchanted by what they saw there. By scouring travel reports, interviews, letters and numerous other sources so far little or never before studied in the two countries, Larissa Corrêa intelligently and sensitively explores a rich cultural and social universe of dreams, expectations and disenchantments that makes it impossible to come up with easy answers to the question of whether workers who went to “America” returned Americanized. The book that is now being presented to readers makes us think about the anchors of the past in the persistent “legal culture” of Brazilian workers. Whether they liked it or not, several actors, from Brazilian and American union leaders to presidents of the Republic, were forced to recognize that those workers had a history, and they clung to it when making choices that did not always coincide with the wishes of those who paid for their trips, built affordable housing, invested in unions, and opened up hitherto undreamed-of cultural horizons. Whether or not what Larissa tells us is a “story that didn’t work out,” it will be up to the readers to draw their own conclusions. However, it is worth noting that the social historian is less interested in narratives of successes, failures and overcoming than in recalling the excellent lesson taught by a British Marxist historian about understanding how flesh-and-blood characters constructed their experiences in unredeemed time; a time that extends from the contradictions of the democratic period prior to the 1964 coup, through the long and barbaric military dictatorship, to the somber times in which we are now writing. Therefore, reading this book is just as relevant as it is urgent. Fernando Teixeira da Silva, State University of Campinas (Unicamp)

Contents Acronyms

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1 Introduction American trade unionism 3 Unionism and the Alliance for Progress 5 The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development Brazilian Trade Unionism during the Military Dictatorship 17 19 Sources and Chapters

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil 23 The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Brazil 32 Formulating the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil The creation of the ICT 43 The first training classes for union leaders 47

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Chapter II “What is good for the United States is good for Brazil” 53 (1964 – 1967) “The United States Trust Brazil” 63 “A good union leader is not made overnight” 73 85 Difficulties implementing “democratic unionism” Chapter III “Americanos, Go Home!”: From a Policy of Alignment to Diplomatic Cooling (1967 – 1970) 91 Brazilian government ministers and US officials 100 “Colonel Passarinho’s sweet song”: Action and repression in the union 108 movement The impact of the investigations 128 137 Chapter IV Between Tourism and Union Education: Travelers’ Views Transnational experiences: The “Union to Union” program 143 Travelers’ Impressions: Snow, Airplanes, Coca-Cola® and the Union 148 Movement in the United States “I Am Writing to….”: Communications between Brazilian Workers and the AFL-CIO 165

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Chapter V Conflicts, Interests and Alliances between Brazilian and American Unionists: From the “Economic Miracle” to the “Years of Lead” 173 177 Questioning the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy 182 Reassessing AIFLD’s Effectiveness and Aims in Brazil Conflicts and Alliances in the São Paulo Union Movement 192 The Complex Game of Alliances between American and Brazilian Union 205 Leaders during the Geisel Administration Conclusion Bibliography Index

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Acronyms AFL-CIO: AIFLD: BGLA: CIA: CLA: COMAP: COPE: CWA: FOIA: GAO: GLOP: IAFWNO: ICFTU: IFCCTE: IFOCW: IFPCW: ILGWU: IMF: ITF: ITS: IUF: NLRA: NLRB: OSS: PTTI: USAID: WFTU:

American Federation of Labor – Congress Industrial Organizations American International Free Labor Development Business Group for Latin America Central Intelligence Agency Council for Latin America Committee on the Alliance for Progress Committee on Political Education Communications Workers of America Freedom of Information Act Government Accountability Office Global Outlook Program Inter-American Federation of Working Newspapermen’s Organizations International Confederation of Free Trade Unions International Federation of Commercial, Clerical and Technical Employees International Federation of Oil and Chemical Workers International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers International Ladies Garment Workers Union International Metalworkers Federation International Transport Worker’s Federation International Trade Secretariats International Union of Food and Allied Workers National Labor Relations Act National Labor Relations Board U.S. Office of Strategic Service Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International U.S. Agency for International Development World Federation of Trade Unions

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-004

Introduction During Brazilian President João Goulart’s visit to the United States in April 1962, he met with John F. Kennedy, who got straight to the point by recounting the dangers of communist infiltration in Latin America. He spoke of the importance of maintaining the US’s ties with the entire region to maintain democracy, going on to discuss the subject of labor relations in Brazil. The President of the United States expressed his concerns about links between Brazilian labor leaders and the Cuban revolutionary government, and wanted to know if there actually was a plan to create a new international union organization.¹ The aim was said to be to exclude the United States and Canada and include the communist island, which Goulart soon smoothed over by informing Kennedy that he himself was against the idea and the plan had not been carried out. He said more than once that he had strong support from Brazilian workers, but emphasized that the strength of leftist movements in Latin American unionism was due to the lack of solutions to social problems. Their conversation about union movements in Latin America continued. Goulart went on to say that he himself had already suggested measures to Lincoln Gordon, the American ambassador to Brazil (1961– 1966), that would encourage exchanges between union leaders from both countries, observing that the Brazilians needed to learn more about American labor relations. Strategically, Goulart made a point of emphasizing the growing momentum of the Soviet bloc, which was establishing ever-closer ties with Latin American unions. Kennedy was willing to encourage the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to strengthen ties with Latin American leaders. Then, Goulart reiterated the importance of the work of American union leaders in Brazil, but warned that their attitude towards Brazilians should be cooperative; otherwise, there could be conflict if they openly interfered in the country’s internal affairs.²

 President Kennedy may have been referring to the plan to found the Central Única dos Trabalhadores da América Latina (CUTAL). There were plans to hold the 1st CUTAL Congress in Belo Horizonte, the state capital of Minas Gerais. However, a movement of anti-communist militants backed by the Catholic Church and the mainstream press, which opposed Goulart, prevented the event from taking place.  Goulart was referring to the major interventions made during the Eisenhower administration, observing that he was not sure whether AFL-CIO representatives in Latin America were fully aware of how they should change their approach to workers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-005

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Finally, Goulart mentioned that labor attachés at the American Embassy frequently interfered directly in the affairs of Brazilian union entities and called for caution when implementing the Alliance for Progress program, to avoid wounding the people’s national pride. The Brazilian president also pointed out the importance of making a joint effort to overcome a number of disagreements and the bad public opinion about the role of the United States in “Third World” countries.³ As the diplomatic records show, during Goulart’s visit to the United States, the American government still believed it was possible to convince the Brazilian president to break with the communists, despite Goulart’s (nicknamed ‘Jango’ in Brazil) political past. After his meeting with Kennedy, those hopes diminished significantly, leading to further restrictions on loans to Brazil.⁴ The issues discussed during that encounter between the presidents of the United States and Brazil are highly significant, as they reveal a number of intentions and tensions between the two countries and place the union movement at the heart of the debate. Many of the issues addressed during that meeting would extend into the period before and after the 1964 civilian-military coup, when Goulart was removed from power through an intervention coordinated by the military and civilians, with the backing of the United States.⁵ In this book, we will take a look at a number of programs created by the United States to strengthen relations with Brazilian trade unionists with the aim of removing communism from Brazil and introducing the American model of labor relations. Thus, the US hoped to facilitate the relationship between foreign employees and employers, who wanted to benefit from the industrial boom largely caused by the presence of American multinationals in the region.⁶ We will also observe the reactions and

 “Memorandum of conversation.” Washington, April 3, 1962. “Foreign Relations of the United States (19611963).” American Republics, vol. XII, doc. 223. http://history.state.gov Accessed on May 16, 2021.  Loureiro, 2012, 194.  I use the expression “civilian-military coup” to emphasize the participation of sectors of civil society in the process of overthrowing the João Goulart administration. In this sense, I follow the reflections presented by René Armand Dreifuss’s classic study 1964: A conquista do Estado – Ação política, poder e golpe de classe (see bibliography). Regarding the US’s role in the civilian-military coup, see Morel, 1965; Parker, 1977; Black, 1987, pp. 95-113; Correa, 1977; Fico, 2008.  The 1950s and the first half of the 1960s were marked by “national developmentalism,” which involved a set of policies and ideas focused on the economic and social areas whose main premises were intended to stimulate Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Introduced during the so-called “1930 Revolution” led by Getúlio Vargas, the developmentalist policy based on industrialization, as well as on the urbanization process, predominated in Brazil until the 1964 coup. Rural areas were seen as backward regions as opposed to large cities, which were symbols of modernity. Under the Juscelino Kubistchek administration (1955 – 1960), the economy became

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the strategies developed by Brazilian leaders and the different military regimes until 1978, when the Brazilian dictatorship began relaxing its iron grip on the country, ushering in a fresh wave of mobilizations by the union movement in the industrial ABC region of São Paulo and other parts of the country. In the eyes of the United States government, the political situation in Brazil in the early 1960s was dangerous and worrying. According to American experts, describing the situation of workers in Latin America was to describe Latin American society as a whole: “weak, illiterate, malnourished, homeless, angry, full of reformist ideas in an underdeveloped world.”⁷ It was precisely this description of the general discontent that was believed to make the people of that region “easy prey” for the advance of communist ideology. The Americans warned that the working class should be viewed as a potential revolutionary force.

American trade unionism The result of an alliance among six large trade unions formed under the leadership of Samuel Gompers and Adolph Strasser, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886 with the mission of demanding exclusively economic benefits acquired through collective bargaining, with a nonpartisan and pro-capitalist stance. The AFL sought to combat unemployment among skilled American workers, discriminating against foreign and unskilled workers. Gompers and his successor, William Green, the president of AFL from 1924, believed that unions should be autonomous and independent. The AFL identified with the most conservative wing of the union movement and focused on so-called bread-and-butter issues, such as wages. ⁸ The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) emerged in 1935 after breaking away from the AFL with the aim of representing and mobilizing a more economically and culturally homogeneous working class, focusing on the organization of unskilled workers and demanding social benefits and laws. Through its

more open to the entry of foreign capital, allowing a larger number of multinational companies to establish a presence in Brazil.  Survey of the Alliance for Progress – Labor Policies and Programs, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs and Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, June 15, 1968. Conducted by Robert H. Dockery, this survey was based on interviews with American union leaders, staff at the United States Embassy in Brazil and the US government.  The literature on the activities of the AFL and CIO since these two organizations began operations is extensive. See, among others: Lichtenstein, 2002; Carew, 2003; F. Romero, 1992; Hughes, 2011.

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policy of regulating the laws, rights and benefits introduced by Franklin Delano Roosevelt through the New Deal, the CIO intended to break with the union movement’s long-standing traditions, such as “voluntarism,” libertarianism, and a non-partisan stance. Represented by John Lewis, the leader of the coal miners, the CIO maintained that the AFL’s jurisdictional battles had got in the way of organizing unskilled workers from mass-production industries. According to Lewis, after providing important services to American workers when craftsmanship predominated, the AFL had proved unable to provide adequate representation for industrial workers. However, the differences between the CIO and the AFL were not limited to their organizational profiles. The CIO had a different political proposal from the AFL, advocating active government participation in the regulation of the economy and public spending to encourage the resumption of economic growth. The CIO vigorously defended federal administrative agencies, supporting the existence of labor courts. However, as Nelson Lichtenstein observes, the CIO model was never dominant in American unionism.⁹ In 1955, the unification of the two leading labor organizations in the United States – the AFL and CIO – made it the largest federation of its kind in the country. Generally speaking, this merger was due to the process of bureaucratizing and “deradicalizing” the US labor movement that had had been underway since World War II.¹⁰ For decades, members who were considered “radicals” and communists had been removed from the two organizations. Following the merger, the AFL-CIO had to deal with a number of internal problems and longstanding issues, such as corruption and irregularities committed by union leaders, jurisdictional conflicts and accusations of racial discrimination. In addition, growing unemployment, particularly in mass-production industries, and the impact of the rapid development of technology on organized and unorganized sectors made it difficult to push forward the demands of union members, who gradually distanced themselves from union activities. The organizational problems also had to do with a change in the type of unionized workers (more white-collar than blue-collar).¹¹ There was still an ongoing rivalry between the organizers, although that was partly overcome by efforts to organize in specific areas through campaigns carried out at the 1963 AFL-CIO convention.

 Lichtenstein, 2002, 64.  A significant number of books on the history and workings of the American trade union movement were published in Brazil in the 1950s and more intensely in the early, among them: Florence, 1953; Herling, 1964; Taftp & Sessions, 1968; Beirne, 1964.  Joseph Beirne, president of the Communications Workers of America (CWA), recognized that the number of unionized workers had fallen since World War II. Beirne, 1964, 13.

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Towards the end of 1945, the CIO joined forces with labor organizations from 54 countries, including the Soviet Union, to form the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The AFL refused to participate, because Soviet labor unions were controlled by the state and, therefore, not free. In 1949, the CIO and the other non-communist unions withdrew from the WFTU. Shortly thereafter, the AFL and CIO agreed to join another organization, and on December 7, 1949, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was formed with delegates from 51 countries representing unions with a total of nearly 50 million members.¹² However, although one of AFL-CIO’s main watchwords was the rejection of union involvement in political and party issues, throughout the Cold War its top leadership maintained close ties with the US government during several administrations. The “free” unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO were the most receptive to the government’s economic policies, while also being sympathetic towards the concept of “business unionism.” According to Beth Sims, these ideas originated from the philosophy that guided the national and international policy of the largest union federation in the United States: the concept of capitalist relations based on a harmonious relationship between workers, bosses, and the government. Labor and capital should not necessarily be seen as adversaries, but as partners in socioeconomic development. This potential alliance reportedly inspired the conservative concept of “business unionism,” or what Samuel Gompers called “pure and simple” unionism, which did not recognize the exploitative character of labor relations as a driver of capitalist profits. This was the concept that the AFL-CIO wanted to export during the Cold War.¹³

Unionism and the Alliance for Progress Convinced that trade unions were an inevitable factor in modern society, shortly after the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba in April 1961, President Kennedy approved the creation of a union program for Latin America, to be run by the AFL-CIO. That same year, still feeling the impact of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and concerned about containing the advance of communism in the region, the Kennedy administration launched the Alliance for Progress.¹⁴ It was a program that offered technical and financial assistance to allied countries, seeking

 Pequena história do movimento trabalhista norte-americano. [s.l.], [s.n]. 1965, 51-54.  Sims, 4.  Dreier (ed.), 1987; V. G. da Silva, 2008.

6

Introduction

economic and industrial development through basic education, land reform, better housing and health conditions, the stabilization of inflation, and cooperation programs.¹⁵ Inspired by previous projects carried out after World War II, particularly the New Deal, Kennedy created a ten-year aid and co-operation plan with the aim of promoting economic, social and political development in Latin America and ensuring the well-being of the United States. It was no coincidence that one of the main organizers of the Alliance for Progress was Adolph Berle, who was regarded as a liberal, anti-communist politician and the friend of several progressive Latin American leaders. He was chosen to represent the executive image that the Kennedy administration wanted to project in Latin America.¹⁶ As a result of the alliance between the US government, its Embassy, the State Department, USAID, the AFL-CIO and other American entities, the Alliance for Progress aimed to steer neighboring nations onto the path of “prosperity, freedom and self-confidence,” as US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon used to say.¹⁷ Those words represented principles that were considered fundamental for the creation of a hemisphere with commonly held values such as “freedom” and “dignity,” while guaranteeing the development of capitalist nations. To achieve the expected economic and social development, it was believed that investments in “weak” unions were necessary, especially those said to be under the yoke of totalitarian or demagogic regimes.¹⁸ The spokesman for the Alliance for Progress, which was at the heart of the United States’ backing of the 1964 civilian-military coup,¹⁹ Lincoln Gordon did  Also in 1961, the US government founded the Peace Corps in Brazil (1961– 1981), an assistance program that aimed to enlist volunteers from all over the country. The objective was to promote progress in Brazil along the lines established by the Alliance for Progress. See: Hoffman, 1998.  Baptista Jr., 2005, 159.  In 1966 and 1967, after serving as United States Ambassador to Brazil (1961– 1966), Lincoln Gordon was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs and director of the Alliance for Progress.  Monge, 1963, 188-189.  Gordon was appointed ambassador in August 1961, after the political crisis caused by the resignation of President Jânio Quadros, who governed Brazil for just seven months. João Goulart was his vice president and was expected to replace him. However, he was in Chine when Quadros resigned, and his opponents joined forces to prevent him from taking office. The solution to this political crisis was the establishment of a parliamentary system with Goulart as president, but with limited constitutional powers. According to James Green, “Gordon’s involvement in the coup remained secret to the public until 1974, when Phyllis Parker uncovered and published recently declassified documents proving that the United States was prepared to provide military and economic support to General Castelo Branco and other coup planners.” See https://li

Unionism and the Alliance for Progress

7

not hide the economic benefits that could be achieved through cooperation between governments, because “we know that prosperous neighbors can become good business partners.” In his view, the Alliance for Progress was based on the principle that only democratic institutions could fulfill the aspirations of free individuals, including jobs, homes, health care and education. According to the formulators of the US policy, “freedom” could only be achieved in a “democratic” political regime.²⁰ However, as we will see in the following chapters, despite paying lip service to respecting each country’s domestic affairs and traditions, the boundary between co-operation and American intervention in Brazilian political and economic matters would come into question in various areas and historical circumstances throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Having turned its attention to Latin America, the Unites States government expected Brazil to play a central role in the development of the Alliance for Progress, not only because of that South American nation’s vast size and population density but because the US feared it might become a “new Cuba” or even a “new China.”²¹ The creation of the Alliance for Progress received a warm welcome in Latin America. Clamoring for investment, the region had been demanding a technicaleconomic aid program similar to the Marshall Plan for several years. Finally, the time seemed to have come for the US not only to invest in Brazil’s economy but to treat it as a priority political partner, in line with the expectations nurtured by Brazilian governments since the end of World War II. In the decade following the war, large American corporations had practically doubled their investments in the Brazilian economy, with the exception of the oil industry. After the end of the Getúlio Vargas dictatorship, during the administration of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (194 – 1951), Brazil was considered one of America’s chief allies, mainly in the military sphere. Dutra was eager to receive US aid as a reward for having joined the Allies and contributed to the war effort. However, American foreign policy had focused on the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan.²²

brary.brown.edu/create/wecannotremainsilent/biographies/lincoln-gordon/, Accessed on May 17, 2021. See also, Green & Jones, 2009, 67-89; Green, We Cannot Remain Silent, 2010; Pereira, Anthony W. “The US Role in the 1964 Coup in Brazil: A Reassessment,” 2018; Spektor, Matias. The United States and the 1964 Brazilian Military Coup. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History, 2018.  Gordon, 1963, 16.  The American literature produced in the 1960s and 70s on Latin America and its social, political, and economic issues is vast. See, among others: Gerassi, 1963; Theberge & Fontaine, 1977; Needler, 1977.  Weis, 1993, 18.

8

Introduction

Kennedy’s program could give the US government an opportunity to ease the diplomatic tension created by his predecessors, given that experiences with the Ponto IV program developed under Harry S. Truman (1945 – 1953), as well as with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration (1953 – 1961), had greatly contributed to the deterioration of the United States’ relations with Brazil and Latin America.²³ However, the objectives proposed by the Alliance for Progress program did not explain what its action strategies would be and the boundaries it set for interference in the specific problems of each nation.²⁴ Due to a number of clashes between the Goulart and Kennedy governments, US resources were allocated directly to the state governments that opposed the federal administration, and with whom the United States had good relations, viewing them as allies in the fight against communism – “islands of sanity,” as Lincoln Gordon called them.²⁵ The AFL also expressed concern about the possible radicalization of the Brazilian union movement. Together with the US government, the labor federation started developing programs aimed at changing Brazil’s labor relations. Until the early 1960s, the AFL’s efforts to establish union relations (with the support of the CIO) could be summed up as sporadic visits by American union leaders, authorities and experts to Brazil, exchange activities and support for the work of the ICFTU and the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) in Rio de Janeiro.²⁶ With the Alliance for Progress, the effort to disseminate the American labor regulation system and working conditions took on fresh impetus. The idea was to encourage union leaders who were considered anti-communist to control the labor entities.²⁷

 Loureiro, 2012, 152.  Cecília Azevedo underscores the importance of the group that became known as the Berle Task Force in the formulation of what would become the Alliance for Progress. They were Adolphe Berle, Lincoln Gordon, Richard Goodwin, Robert Alexander, Arthur Whitaker, Teodoro Moscoso and Arturo Morales Carrion. Azevedo, 2008, 139.  Loureiro, 2012, 184.  For an overview of the history of ORIT and initial contacts between US and Latin American union entities, see Alexander, 1961, 41-53.  Spalding Jr., 1976, 52.

The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development

9

The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development That same year, 1961, the AFL-CIO created the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), known in Brazil as the Instituto Americano para o Sindicalismo Livre (IADESIL), to carry out these projects for Latin American unions. Charged with the mission of sowing the seeds of “free and democratic” unionism, AIFLD was the first of the other three organizations that carried out the AFL-CIO’s international policy during the Cold War.²⁸ In addition to obstructing the activities of union leaders in Brazil who were considered communist or antiAmerican, AIFLD sought to introduce the contractualist model of collective bargaining through a national labor federation, along the lines of the AFL, with the backing and patronage of international organizations. Direct negotiations with employers were supposed gradually to replace the already established corporatist labor system.²⁹ According to the critics and formulators of the US government’s international union policy, the corporatist system of labor regulation – identified with the labor policy introduced by Getúlio Vargas during the Estado Novo (New State) dictatorship (1937– 1945) – posed a major obstacle to the implementation of “free and democratic” unionism in Brazil. In their view, union leaders should focus solely on workers’ specific problems, such as demands for wage increases and better working conditions, which should be achieved through direct collective bargaining with the employers.³⁰ Based on the American contractual model of labor, Brazilian unionism should grow outside of State control, without the intervention of the Labor Courts, free from the bonds imposed by corporatist legis-

 In 1964, the AFL-CIO created the African American Labor Center and, four years later, the Asian-American Free Labor Institute. In Europe, the American federation created the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), in 1977, replacing the Free Trade Union Committee founded by the AFL-CIO after World War II.  A corporatist system is the entire government structure that regulates labor relations, such as the Labor Courts, the body responsible for settling and judging collective and individual labor conflicts, and the union structure organized by individual unions divided into regions and branches of production, with their respective federations and confederations, inspected and controlled by the Ministry of Labor. Unlike the American labor relations system, the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) banned union federations that brought together workers from different sectors of the economy. See Silva, Fernando Teixeira da; Corrêa, Larissa Rosa, ‘The Politics of Justice: Rethinking Brazil’s Corporatist Labor Movement’. Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, vol. 13, n. 2, May 2016, 11– 31.  Sims, 1992, 31.

10

Introduction

lation. As Cliff Welch aptly observed, “for many American liberals, the corporatist system of labor was a nightmare”.³¹ To introduce free collective bargaining in Brazil, AIFLD launched an educational program in that country to train new leaders who could introduce and develop the American trade union model. The program focused on organizing courses, lectures, visits, and exchanges between Brazilian and American union leaders.³² In practice, they had the support of the most anti-communist and conservative sectors of the Brazilian union movement. Many of the so-called pelegos, ³³ who would come to play an important role during the military dictatorship established in 1964, took part in AIFLD programs and maintained close ties with American trade unionism. Most of these training programs were carried out in partnership with ORIT, which in the 1960s was led by Arturo Jáuregui, a union leader known as a collaborator of the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).³⁴ At the height of the Cold War, the organization carried out workers’ education programs in several Latin American countries, even sponsoring a leadership training school at the University of Puerto Rico. In the Dominican Republic, for example, it provided financial and personal assistance for the development of “free unionism” after the fall of the Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina dictatorship in 1961 (subsequently, it supported the overthrow of the democratically elected leader Juan Domingo Bosch). In Mexico, it created a residential school for union training to house workers in the southern hemisphere. Until the early 1970s, ORIT remained the leading union organization in the Americas, bringing together national unions from Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic and Brazil, as well as English- and Dutch-speaking countries in the Caribbean and smaller union federations in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina.³⁵ At the height of the Alliance for Progress’s operations, the AFL-

 Welch, 1995, 67.  Gacek, 1994, 24.  The term pelego is closely associated with the corporatist labor system established under Vargas. It refers to those conservative labor leaders who were central to the corporatist arrangement yet who did not buy too much into its ideological claims while acting compliantly under the direction of the federal Ministry of Labor, or who otherwise acted at the behest of politicians or business leaders.  Arturo Jáuregui was also a member of the AIFLD’s Board of Directors. According to Petter Gribbin, the CIA exercised strong control over ORIT’s activities. In the early 1960s, Morris Paladino held the positions of Director of Education, Director of Organization and Secretary General of ORIT, while also serving as the CIA’s chief agent at ORIT. See Gribbin, 1979, 423.  See Alexander, 1967, 283-87; García, 2010.

The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development

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CIO’s International Affairs Department had more than a hundred staff members active in over 40 countries. In addition to AIFLD, other union organizations linked to ORIT were sowing the seeds of “free and democratic unionism” throughout Latin America, such as the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) and the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), entities that established a permanent presence in Brazil during the administration of Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964 – 1967), the first dictator of the Brazilian military regime.³⁶

New Perspectives on Brazil-United States Trade Union Relations: Issues and Methods In the context of a complex transnational political game influenced by the Cold War and Brazil’s political and economic leaders, this book is guided by several questions. The first is understanding how an institution that espoused “free and democratic” trade unionism could simultaneously back a dictatorship. The AFL-CIO’s activities in Brazil are divided into three stages: the first, from 1945 to 1964, was a phase marked by the American labor federation’s first contacts with Brazilian unionism, aiming to remove labor leaders linked to left-wing parties and disseminate American trade unionism in that country. I do not analyze the greater part of that period, but it does come up several times, as the post-1964 period inevitably harks back to the previous phase. Secondly, from 1964 to 1967, there was a perceptible concentration of AIFLD’s investments and development of its activities, driven by the civilian-military coup of 1964. The subsequent period, from 1967 to 1978, is characterized by increasing diplomatic tensions between Brazil and the United States, especially in political and military affairs, due to the interest of American business leaders in Brazil’s “economic miracle,” between 1969 and 1973, and the decline in the activities of American trade unionism in Brazil. AIFLD’s operations in that country are divided into the periods before and after the military intervention that forced President João Goulart from office. However, this book will focus mainly on the years following the civilian-military coup, from the time when AIFLD’s activities and investments in the country increased until the crisis in relations between union leaders and the Brazilian and US governments, when there was a marked reduction of American union activities in Brazil in the late 1970s. To this end, I will analyze AIFLD’s activities in São

 Alexander, 1967, 288.

12

Introduction

Paulo City, the nation’s largest industrial hub, where the US entity maintained a presence through an organization called the Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (Labor Cultural Institute), run by Brazilian and American directors. Using a transnational approach, I seek to understand how Brazilian union leaders understood and responded to the AFL-CIO’s international policy. As Barbara Weinstein has observed, “much of the literature on relations between the United States and Latin America has been written from the top down, from the American perspective, with Latin Americans generally being portrayed as passive and unhappy victims of the policies of the United States.” Nor were Brazilians pliant recipients of anti-communist propaganda.³⁷ According to Marcel van der Linden, the history of global labor is a field of investigation that can encompass two types of approaches. The first seeks a “universal history of labor,” gathering research on labor relations in different parts of the world to understand the history of work and workers in their entirety, thus surpassing Eurocentric analyses. The second proposes a “history of globalized labor,” to be carried out by observing labor relations and workers’ movements from the perspective of the globalized economy. However, the author himself warns that these two approaches are not mutually exclusive.³⁸ Although van der Linden claims that there is no specific method for studying the global history of labor, including cross-national and transnational history, as it is a field of research that is more open to different theoretical experiments, he draws attention to the need to relativize the boundaries of nation states. Thus, according to that author, transnational history may not be the most suitable method, as it would only be based on the formation and development of nation states, which risks losing sight of entanglements between different parts of the world.³⁹ However, to develop this analysis on the performance of American unionism in Brazil, the perspective of transnational history seems essential, in as much as the American union program was built, transformed and reformulated on the basis of workers’ relations with the State and vice versa. Likewise, its performance depended directly on diplomatic relations between the two countries during the Cold War. Furthermore, based on its relationship and experience with the Brazilian union movement, I have tried to understand the objectives of the AFLCIO’s international policy, its mechanisms of action, and the strategies developed by the military administrations that made up the authoritarian regime

 Barbara Weinstein. “Prefácio.” In Rodeghero, 2007.  van der Linden, 2012, 63.  Ibid., 60.

The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development

13

over the course of 21 years.⁴⁰ It should be said that these relations were a “twoway street” and not a “monolithic anti-communist campaign, carefully orchestrated and imposed on Brazil by American hegemony,” as Barbara Weinstein asserts.⁴¹ Like Fred Hirsch, Kim Scipes stresses the role of AFL-CIO leaders in laying the political groundwork for overthrowing democratically elected Latin American governments, such as in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, and Argentina in 1966 and 1976. According to Scipes, these examples are just the “tip of the iceberg,” as there is still a great deal we do not know about the AFL-CIO’s operations around the globe. In fact, the US Government’s collaboration with and support for coups d’état in countries “threatened by communist doctrine,” including Brazil, are nothing new.⁴² Although United States’ “Operation Brother Sam”⁴³ was key to the success of the takeover that deposed Goulart, Brazil was not exclusively dependent on foreign support to carry out coups d’état. If we look back on previous periods in the Republic of Brazil and even before, the Armed Forces had a long history of coups and anti-democratic conspiracies.⁴⁴ Marshal Castello Branco’s inauguration as president in 1964 created the conditions for the development of the American trade union program in Brazil. “Operation Clean-Up,” which the military regime carried out shortly thereafter, at-

 The Brazilian military regime held power between 1964 and 1985. Unlike the other military dictatorships that were established in the Southern Cone in the 1960s and 1970s, the Brazilian regime maintained a “democratic” façade. During the 21-year dictatorship, five generals held the presidency. They were indirectly elected through an Electoral College, and the military imposed and controlled the rules governing politics.  Barbara Weinstein. “Prefácio.” In: Rodeghero, 2007.  Scipes, 2010; Hirsch, 1974.  “Operation Brother Sam” was a movement of the US Navy in support of the military who ousted João Goulart in 1964. Through Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, the United States provided arms and military support for the operation. The objective was to provide military support if the troops led by General Olímpio Mourão Filho who moved from Minas Gerais to Rio de Janeiro failed to remove Goulart or if there was an armed response against the coup by the Brazilian Armed Forces or the public.  The first decades of the twentieth century in Brazil were marked by a successive wave of military revolts that meddled in national politics. This movement was called Tenentismo, based on the word tenente (lieutenant). The lieutenants participated in the so-called “1930 Revolution,” a civilian-military coup led by Getúlio Vargas. In 1937, Vargas staged another coup by establishing the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937– 1945). His government was overthrown by a military conspiracy. Other military conspiracies failed, such as the Jacareacanga and Aragarças uprisings, respectively in 1956 and 1959, against the administration of President Juscelino Kubistchek (1955 – 1960).

14

Introduction

tempted to eradicate national-reformist and communist leaders from the unions and the entire country, paving the way for receiving foreign aid from the United States. During that period, the two countries established very close political ties. However, although the Castello Branco administration’s foreign policy was committed to American ideals, it also developed its own economic and social policy, which often conflicted with US interests. One of the questions raised in this study is whether, at some point, the American labor entities believed it was actually possible to change the structure of the Brazilian union movement. If not, was the AIFLD project just a means of observing and manipulating the activities of Brazilian workers to ward off the “communist threat”? No less intriguing is understanding AIFLD’s reasons for remaining in the Brazil until the end of the 1970s, by which time the military dictatorship had suppressed all the left-wing organizations in the country. Through reports written by US Embassy labor attachés, we find a high degree of arrogance and even an apparently naïve belief that Latin American institutions could be “Americanized” in a short period of time, either overlooking or ignoring each nation’s historical processes and specificities. The labor attaché program was officially created in the United States in 1943 during the Roosevelt administration, when the State Department began taking an interest in international labor issues and the formulation of a labor policy for the occupied areas in Europe and Asia during World War II.⁴⁵ In any case, the history of AIFLD/AFL-CIO in Brazil during the military dictatorship still needs to be explored. One of the possible explanations for the lack of analyses of this subject is the idea that left-wing groups viewed the AFL-CIO and the other international labor organizations as mere tools of American “imperialism.” Since the 1970s, researchers have revealed the close ties between the AFL-CIO and the CIA, including extensive evidence of the involvement of union leaders with members of the intelligence agency.⁴⁶ It is true that most of the literature, including studies like that by Kim Scipes, is more accusatory than analytical,⁴⁷ although it should be said that most of

 Labor attachés were stationed at US embassies and sent periodic reports to the State Department. They frequently met with politicians, businessmen and union leaders to engage in political networking. E. J. Afonso, 2011, 45.  One of the first works to criticize the performance of AIFLD was by Hobart Spalding. That author revealed the entity’s relations with the CIA and the State Department, as well as its support for right-wing military regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, among other countries. Among his articles, see “Sindicalismo libre: ¿De qué? El instituto americano para el desarrollo del sindicalismo libre” (Spalding Jr., 1984, 48-58).  Scipes, 2010.

The Creation of the American Institute for Free Labor Development

15

these publications date from the time when military dictatorships dominated Latin American countries and are, therefore, strongly marked by repressive and anti-democratic events.⁴⁸ According to Spalding, the impact of the US international union policy, which was based on close relations between the union movement and industrialists, should be analyzed in the context of imperialism, as well as considering the roles of several American institutions, such as universities, government agencies like USAID, and secret services like the CIA.⁴⁹ There are also indications that the CIA maintained two agents at the American consulate in the city of Recife, and had infiltrated others into the Cooperative League of the United States (CLUSA) and AIFLD itself.⁵⁰ In 1975, a former CIA agent, Philip Agee, published an exposé on his ten years of experience, reporting on the role of the CIA in Latin America on the basis of AIFLD’s activities. Agee alleged that the CIA had created a new anti-communist and anti-Castro program for the organized union movement. AIFLD training could make it possible to recruit new agents in Latin America. For example, Serafino Romualdi became one the most important CIA agents in the Latin American division in the 1960s.⁵¹ Whether or not there is evidence to support these claims, the fact is, many members of the left-wing and nationalist movements in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s viewed American unionism as nothing more than an extension of the interests of the US government and the CIA. A common jibe among leftist groups in Brazil was calling the AFL-CIO the “AFL-CIA” as a way of emphasizing the ties between the two institutions. American academics, members of the Peace Corps and clergy, among others, were suspected of acting as CIA agents. The main characters who have already been extensively analyzed include George Meany, Serafino Romualdi, William Doherty, Jr. (all of whom have been identified as agents of the CIA’s International Organizations Division),⁵² and Jay Lovestone, who was also linked to the US intelligence agency.⁵³ However, the most recent literature on the subject has questioned or at least problematized the idea that there was an automatic alliance between union leaders and the United States’ foreign policy, providing a “bottom-up” approach that can contribute to reflections on the meanings of US labor policy for the American

 Sussman, 1983a; Spalding Jr., 1976, pp. 45-69; Agee, 1975; Blum, 1986. For a more recent example of the relationship between American union leaders and the CIA, see Wilford, 2008.  Spalding Jr., 46.  Lamgguth, 1978, 92-93. See also Braga, 2002, 58.  Agee. “Brazil and the CIA.” In Agee, 1975.  Ibid.  See Morgan, 1999; Buhle, 1999; Kofas, 1992.

16

Introduction

working class, as Angela Vergara has observed.⁵⁴ In the early 1980s, Michael J. Sussman also questioned workers’ participation in and knowledge of the formulation of the international policy outlined by AFL-CIO leaders for Latin America, Asia and Africa.⁵⁵ In that regard, this book seeks not only to analyze the AFLCIO’s policy and interventions in Brazil but to focus on the responses of Brazilian union leaders to the expectations raised and programs carried out by American union entities in Brazil. It can be said that this approach is still little explored by researchers who are interested in understanding the international role of that major American union federation. Regarding the Cold War’s impact on developing countries, Weinstein points out that the manner in which the United States pursued its goals in Brazil cannot be viewed separately from pre-existing attitudes towards Brazilian and Latin American culture and the way those assumptions were reworked in a Cold-War context.⁵⁶ Similarly, in her article on the role of the AFL-CIO in the Chilean union movement from the 1950s to the ‘70s, Angela Vergara points out the need to understand the different ways in which the Cold War was interpreted and experienced by “peripheral” countries. Although Latin American union leaders criticized the activities of US labor entities, many local leaders were willing to negotiate and deal with the foreign presence in union circles in a more pragmatic fashion. That relationship could be forged in different ways. Going against the logic imposed by the Cold War, many union leaders who requested financial aid from the United States saw no problem with negotiating aid from the Soviet Union as well.⁵⁷ It was also not uncommon to exaggerate the communist influence on the Latin American working class to show the “gringos” that they needed to invest in labor organizations. For Vergara, these contradictions are emblematic for thinking about new approaches and questions about the characteristics and motivations of US labor policy during the Cold War – a policy that combined a strong anti-communist ideology with a commitment to the defense of workers and their rights, such as the right to strike and putting collective bargaining on a level playing field.⁵⁸ It is no less important to explore the contradictions inherent in the US government’s international trade union policy, which was supposedly based on the principles of democracy and freedom but helped dictatorial regimes around the     

Vergara, 2013. Sussman, 1983a. Barbara Weinstein. “Prefácio.” In Rodeghero, 2007. Vergara, 2012, 4. Ibid.

Brazilian Trade Unionism during the Military Dictatorship

17

world carry out their programs. Thus, Barbara Weinstein points to the need to contextualize the concept of “democracy,” as well as that of “communism,” and the different meanings they took on during the Cold War period. As that author asks, “With nationalism and social-democracy similarly demonized as equivalent to communism, could democracy come to mean anything other than ‘non-communism’?”⁵⁹ According to Belmonte, American propagandists and communications experts were responsible for promoting the values of democracy by disseminating information about the lifestyles and customs of an idealized American people. This effort to vaunt the American way of life was part of the US’s ideological offensive against communism. Ads filled with appeals about “freedom” and “equality” played the role of clearly exposing the differences between democratic and communist governments. During the Cold War, it was essential to communicate the advantages of the American democratic system in the US and around the world. For Belmonte, the creators of American propaganda considered freedom to be the most attractive element of democracy, as opposed to the “slavery” of communist countries.⁶⁰ However, democracy and freedom are not the only concepts that must be contextualized. Telling the story of labor relations between Brazil and the United States requires the constant use of quotation marks, as the terms communism, freedom, terrorism, and revolution were widely used and re-appropriated in very different ways by both conservative movements and left-wing organizations, both in Brazil and the United States.

Brazilian Trade Unionism during the Military Dictatorship Over the course of this study, my attention was drawn to the small number of publications on the union movement during the military dictatorship, especially on the situation between 1964 and 1976. I also noted the lack of studies aimed at understanding the role of union leaders beyond their relations with the State. This scarcity makes it difficult to analyze relations between the Brazilian and American trade union movements during that period. It can be explained, in part, by the fact that in the early 1980s many Brazilian researchers focused on the major mobilizations of the working class that emerged in the late 1970s, when the military regime was relaxing its iron grip on the country. Furthermore, the repressive and controlling character of the regime, which made Brazilian unions virtually extensions of the State, may have given the impression that there

 Barbara Weinstein. “Prefácio.” In Rodeghero, 2007.  Belmonte, 2008, 95.

18

Introduction

was nothing of interest to be studied at that time, aside from scattered expressions of resistance by the working class.⁶¹ Thus, the idea that Brazilian unionism was dormant after 1964, had a spasmodic awakening in 1968, and woke up in a fever ten years later – when the so-called “new unionism,” from which former president Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva emerged as one of the main leaders unions of that period – still persists. However, some works published in the last decade have started to deconstruct that notion. As Antonio Luigi Negro has shown, Institutional Act no. 5 (AI-5), enacted in December 1968, did not completely eliminate the workers’ ability to mobilize.⁶² During the years of the “economic miracle,” workers managed to circumvent the repression, limiting their resistance to the factory floor, on the margins of most unions.⁶³ It is also no less important to ask why we should study international relations in Brazilian trade unionism. Viewing a national labor movement as part of a broader history, which at the same time influences and is influenced by international ideological currents and external circumstances, can be essential to understanding certain choices that leaders made, as well as their discourse and actions. Regarding Brazilian studies on international trade union policy, it is interesting to note that most of them deal with a more recent period in Brazilian history, more precisely, since the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (United Workers’ Central; CUT) was founded in 1983.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the foreign perspective on the Brazilian trade union movement helps us to formulate new questions, and gain an understanding of aspects that were little noted or even unnoticed in the nation’s historiography and even interpreted as a unique aspect of Brazilian history. As Victor Silverman observes, the involvement of the working class in international political issues cannot be viewed as a simple action carried out by local union leaders or as a reaction by organized workers for or against a specific foreign policy. More than that, the role of the trade union movement in diplomatic issues and international policy resulted from a complex network of interactions that could spark different types of conflicts, but also led to closer relations between groups of organized workers from throughout the globe.⁶⁵

 See M. H. T. de Almeida, 1975; Abramo, 2000; Maroni, 1982; S. A. Costa, 1986; Weffort, 1972.  Enacted on December 13, 1968 by Marshal Costa e Silva, Institutional Act no. 5 (AI-5) was a decree that marked the authoritarian and repressive escalation of the dictatorial regime. Many academics claim that the AI-5 was a “coup within a coup,” as the measure marked a break with the supposedly moderate line of the Castelo Branco administration.  See Negro, 2004; Negro, 1999, 932; Santana, 2008, 279-309; Mattos, 1998.  See Giannotti & Neto, 1991, 67-69; H. A. Costa, 2005; Bargas, 1991, 932; Rombaldi, 2012.  Silverman, 2010, 641-731.

Sources and Chapters

19

Sources and Chapters The documentation on Brazil produced by the State Department and made available by the United States National Archives and Records Administration is organized into three basic periods: 1964 to 1966, 1967 to 1969, and 1970 to 1973. When studying this same collection of documents, Carlos Fico warned of the danger of treating the documentation unilaterally, as an approach based exclusively on these sources cannot provide a general analysis of the US government, as there were differences of opinion between the Department of Defense or the Treasury, for example, and in other instances, between the White House, the National Security Council, the CIA and the Senate.⁶⁶ Therefore, it is important to compare them with a varied range of sources from the AFL-CIO, which are housed in the George Meany Memorial Archives at the National Labor College in Silver Spring, Maryland,⁶⁷ as well as the sources produced in Brazil, such as the archives of the political police, union newspapers and the mainstream press. The variety of sources makes it possible to compare US officials’ varying points of view on the political, economic, and union issues in Brazil.⁶⁸ Most of the documents studied in the US National Archives II were reports that the American Embassy in Brazil periodically sent to the State Department. In these reports, which are available in the State Department Central Files (RG 59), we can find factual details about the Brazilian union movement, as well as observations and comments about the situations that arose. Telegrams and reports on AIFLD in Brazil are also included in this research, filed in the group of diplomatic documents in RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files series. Some reports on surveys conducted in Brazil in which the subject of unionism and the working class was also addressed are located in RG 306 – Records of the US Information Agency. Unfortunately, when I was conducting this study, the remainder of the State Department documentation produced from 1976 until 2010 had not yet been released for public consultation. However,

 The State Department closely monitored all the operations of AIFLD and United States embassies, which maintained a team of labor attachés and other officials to prepare these reports.  The George Meany Memorial Archives are currently housed in the University of Maryland’s University Libraries. They contain approximately 40 million textual documents, which together with other documentary sources, make up the records of the activities of America’s largest union federation. Some of the documentation is digitized and made available through the Opening the Archives project, in the Brown University digital repository. See repository.library.brown.edu/studio/collections/id_644/, accessed on May 18, 2021.  Fico, 2008, 12.

20

Introduction

it is now possible to access some of this documentation, which is gradually being declassified, through digital means. In the George Meany Archives, I studied all documents related to Brazil, mainly the International Affairs Department Country Files, where I was able to analyze correspondence, newspaper clippings, reports, letters from workers sent to AIFLD and telegrams about the organization’s activities in Brazil. At the Kheel Archives, housed in the ILR School at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, I was able to make copies of documents related to the collection of Serafino Romualdi (1946 – 1966), who headed the AFL-CIO’s Latin American affairs office for decades. At the beginning of the study that produced this book, I wondered how documents produced abroad could contribute not only to the analysis of AIFLD’s activities in Brazil but to an understanding of the Brazilian union movement as a whole. It turns out that these reports sent to the State Department were not just intended to record events that had occurred. They also contain extensive commentaries and interpretations of the situations described. In this sense, the foreign gaze helps us think about other issues that might not have come to light if this study had been restricted to an analysis of Brazilian sources alone. I have tried to cross-reference the information and names mentioned in the American reports with the reports of the São Paulo political police (DEOPS) to observe how the Brazilian authorities perceived and monitored the activities of American unionism in their country. Furthermore, I have used a number of sources produced by major newspapers as well as publications and documents produced by unions in São Paulo City. It is also important to mention the interviews conducted by Robert J. Alexander with leaders of the AFL-CIO, among them William Doherty, Jr., representing the Department of International Affairs, and Michael Boggs and Andrew McLellan, representatives of AIFLD in Brazil. These figures are important for analyzing union leaders’ ideas and impressions about that country, as well as their difficulties in implementing the “free collective bargaining” program and devising strategies to deal with the different political-economic circumstances that arose during the military regime. In addition to the interviews Alexander conducted with Brazilian and American union leaders and political authorities, the Latin American Twentieth-Century Pamphlets collection – IDC Publisher Pamphlets proved to be extremely valuable to this study. Acquired by Unicamp’s Edgard Leuenroth Archives (AEL), it houses documents produced and archived by Alexander, such as the publications of local entities. Chapter I, “The Development of the AFL-CIO’s International Policy in Brazil,” gives an overview of the union federation since the creation of AIFLD and its establishment in Brazil, as well as discussing its strategies, objectives,

Sources and Chapters

21

methods, and approaches. Although this chapter focuses on how AIFLD was formulated, the Brazilian experience can help draw comparisons and seek similarities with the AFL-CIO’s performance in other Latin American countries. To understand AIFLD’s aims and operations in Brazil, the first contacts with American unionism in that country are summarized from World War II until the civilian-military coup. These analyses of the entity’s origins and the formation of alliances with Brazilian union leaders are essential for understanding Brazil-United States union relations during the post-1964 period. Chapter II, “‘What is Good for the United States is Good for Brazil’ (1964– 1967),” deals with AIFLD’s activities during the policy of aligning the Castello Branco regime with the United States government. The objective is understanding the performance of the American union entity and its relations with Brazilian unionism, based on an analysis of Brazilian foreign policy formulated shortly after the coup that overthrew President João Goulart. Chapter III, “‘Americanos, Go Home!’: From a Policy of Alignment to Diplomatic Cooling (1967– 1970),” analyzes the development of the AIFLD project in Brazil during a second stage, when General Artur da Costa e Silva’s administration introduced an authoritarian nationalist military policy. Thenceforth, a new Brazilian foreign policy emerged that was less aligned with the interests of the United States and more willing to negotiate with European countries and the Eastern hemisphere. Chapter IV, “Between Tourism and Union Education: Travelers’ Views,” presents the reports of union leaders and officials who visited the United States, where they were invited to tour the AFL-CIO’s facilities and get a first-hand look at the American union movement. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first aims to analyze a number of travel diaries published in the 1960s and 1970s by the travelers themselves, in order to observe their impressions, experiences, ideas and comparisons between Brazilian and American unionism. In the second part, letters written by Brazilian workers and sent directly to the AFLCIO board are analyzed, including requests for assistance and opinions about the union movement in that country. Finally, in Chapter V, “Conflicts, Interests and Alliances between Brazilian and American Unionists: From the ‘Economic Miracle’ to the ‘Years of Lead,’” I seek to analyze how those countries’ relations were conducted between 1969 and 1977, a little-studied period in the history of the Brazilian labor movement. The objective is to understand the complex and intricate game of interests which the labor leaders played, as they were extremely susceptible to political changes and the repression of the dictatorial regime, as well as to investigate AIFLD’s activities during the “economic miracle”. No less important is investigating the strategies of American trade unionism for remaining in Brazil and observing

22

Introduction

how AIFLD dealt with the repression and international denunciations of human rights abuses committed by the military dictatorship.

Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil The official story about the origins of the AFL-CIO’s international policy on Latin America begins in 1958, when Joseph Beirne, president of the Communications Workers of America (CWA), first witnessed the poverty of the Andean peoples while he was taking part in an international trade convention in Peru. After seeing a six-year-old child devour a handful of roots pulled from a field, Beirne felt that he had to do something to help the over 14 million workers in Latin America. The American union leader then noticed that there was no collective bargaining in most industries, working conditions were established by lawmakers, and the unions sparked riots, spreading social chaos. There was just a small number of trained, full-time union leaders, and democratic means of presenting workers’ demands – considered the backbone of American trade unionism – were virtually unknown.¹ Thus, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) reportedly came into being as a compassionate effort on the part of the AFL-CIO to train labor leaders and foster democratic trade union methods, economic growth and political reform throughout Latin America. This story was told in the October 1966 issue of Reader’s Digest, one of the most widely read US magazines during the Cold War. That publication also invited its readers to follow the adventures of Justo Canaviri, a Bolivian union leader trained by AIFLD in La Paz who became the head of a group of leaders in a town in the Andean highlands. Every day, Justo’s mission was to meet with about 30 rural workers from different farms to teach them the principles of democratic unionism and “free” elections. When he returned to the US, Beirne reportedly invited 16 Latin American union leaders to take a three-month educational program in the United States at the training center in Front Royal, Virginia. That facility offered courses and seminars aimed at developing “democratic unionism.” Back in their home countries, those Latin American union leaders received financial aid from the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI) for a nine-month period. Many of those graduates apparently became union leaders and played an important role in the Latin American labor movement. Impressed by these results, AFL-CIO president George Meany in 1960 suggested that the labor federation’s Executive Committee help finance the program to conduct a study of union  Eugene H. Methvin, “Labor’s New Weapon for Democracy.” Reader’s Digest, Oct. 1966, 21-28. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-006

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

movements in Latin America, with the help of the University of Chicago. In 1962, President Kennedy showed interest in AIFLD when the Alliance for Progress’s Labor Advisory Committee was created. To direct the work being done in Latin America, the AFL-CIO’s Executive Committee appointed Serafino Romualdi as the executive director of AIFLD. This is the official story of how the formulation of US trade unions’ foreign policy for Latin America began.² Since it was founded in 1961 through USAID and funds raised by the Alliance for Progress, AIFLD became the US government’s main instrument for providing technical assistance, education and training to Latin American trade unions. The institute was created as a private, non-profit entity directed by Serafino Romualdi, a fervent anti-communist who had devoted himself to combating communism in the international trade union movement for nearly two decades. In 1961, Romualdi attended the Fifth Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) Convention in Rio de Janeiro, where he had the opportunity to witness first-hand the movements that led up to the renunciation of President Jânio Quadros, along with his friend Carlos Lacerda, a staunch opponent of Getúlio Vargas who later helped plan the 1964 coup. Then, Romualdi also witnessed the turbulent inauguration of Quadros’ former vice president, João Goulart. In his book, Romualdi recounts ORIT’s efforts to encourage Brazilian affiliations.³ Known as an agent of business and the US government, Romualdi described himself as a socialist from Perúgia who had fled from Fascist Italy. In the United States, he joined the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU). His work attracted the attention of the State Department in 1942, when he organized the conference of Free (anti-Fascist) Italians of North and South America, held in Montevideo, Uruguay. Romualdi wrote for union newspapers and was a member of the Free Italy Committee, which aimed to bring together the Italian communities in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay to side with the Allies during World War II. Italian fascism was seen as a threat to the political and economic interests of US citizens in Latin America. In 1945, Romualdi joined the AFL and was responsible for establishing contacts with Latin American countries, later becoming the AFL’s representative in that region. Romualdi played a key role in establishing AIFLD in Latin America in the first half of the 1960s. The AFL’s international activities were considered extremely important for bolstering the labor federation itself. Since World War II, it had become a strong ally of the US government and businesses, contributing to the expansion of busi-

 AIFLD, 1972, 21.  Romualdi, 1967.

Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

25

ness and the containment of communism around the world. Nelson Rockefeller, the director of the Office for Inter-American Affairs during the war, was said to have been one of the people chiefly responsible for officializing the alliance between the AFL, the government and business in the USA – a collaboration that would gain strength during the Cold War.⁴ During the post-war period, more than being interested in promoting the freedom and prosperity of foreign workers, the AFL was concerned with the struggle to combat totalitarianism, in which the Soviets were seen as a constant threat. The AFL feared the enslavement of European workers by Soviet expansionist totalitarianism, calling attention to the importance of the organization of the working class and its role as a key sector in determining Europe’s future. The AFL’s extremist policy of combating Soviet communism came from the time of its first leaders, Samuel Gompers⁵ and William Green. In the 1920s, they were more hostile to the Soviet Union than the US government itself.⁶ When Franklin D. Roosevelt established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1933, Gompers and Green refused to have anything to do with Soviet trade unions. As a result, American unions began providing assistance to their European counterparts, contributing to the restoration of economic power in countries devastated by the war, mainly France and Italy. Finding itself at the center of the struggle for the hearts and minds of the European working class, as Ronald Filippelli observes, Italy was then home to the largest communist party outside the socialist bloc. According to Filippelli, the anti-communist pragmatism of the US State Department and the AFL fit in perfectly with the interests of an Italian elite that felt threatened by the anti-fascist resistance movement during the post-war period. The aim was to make Italy a pro-American nation – a stable and attractive destination for foreign investment. In this sense, it can be said that the international policy for Latin America outlined by the AFL before and after its merger with the CIO was strongly marked by the experience that the union had built up in European countries, particularly Italy.⁷ In 1964, two years after AIFLD established a presence in Brazil, the institute set up headquarters in Uruguay and later in Argentina. Prior to this, it had offices in Venezuela and Guyana (formerly British Guyana), from where it marshalled

 Sims, 1992, 10.  Regarding Samuel Gompers’s activities in the US labor union movement, see his autobiography: Gompers, 1968.  Goethem, 2013.  Filippelli, 1989, 410.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

efforts to destabilize the government of Cheddi Jagan.⁸ In addition to these countries, the AFL-CIO’s international policy focused on Chile, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, among countries in South and Central America. In 1963, George Meany declared that 23 percent of the income from contributions paid to the AFL-CIO was spent on a range of international activities. One of the sources of funding came from the United Auto Workers (UAW), which allocated interest and income from its strike reserves to an international contribution fund dedicated to the defense and expansion of international programs.⁹ As Angela Vergara notes, the Cold War created unique, but no less controversial, opportunities for building an international trade union solidarity network. In Chile, in the early 1950s, the leaders of the Copper Workers’ Confederation (CTC) sought strategic support from the American labor movement, becoming a highly active member of ORIT and forming close ties with the leaders of the AFL, especially Serafino Romualdi. The CTC’s objective was to obtain international support and distance itself from the most radical sectors of the Chilean labor movement.¹⁰ However, American trade unionism played a more prominent role in Chile during the administration of Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973) when AIFLD, together with major US-owned companies interested in the denationalization of communication and copper mining companies collaborated with the CIA to overthrow the socialist president. In Argentina, over the course of the 1960s, AIFLD developed a complex and controversial relationship with anti-communist unions by offering a series of training courses aimed at producing “authentic” leaders and social programs designed to curb the union radicalization and politics influenced by Peronism and communism in the workers’ movement, particularly the one organized by the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), founded in 1938 by the Mexican union leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano.¹¹ Throughout the 1950s and 1970s, AIFLD joined forces and shared experiences with several Latin American countries, including Brazil.

 Regarding the role of AIFLD in Guyana’s union movement, see Waters, 2013.  Comissão de Estatística do Trabalho, Divisão de Relações Industriais e Trabalhistas, 1965, 73.  Vergara, 2008, 83.  Bozza, 2010. See also Bozza, 2009.

The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Brazil

27

The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Brazil Undertaking the mission of defending the United States’ political and economic interests as well as ideas about American labor relations in Brazil, AIFLD sought – through the not at all ambitious task of educating Brazilian union leaders – to steer the country onto the path of “freedom” and “democracy.”¹² In addition to training anti-communist union leaders, the institute took part in a number of activities linked to “impact” projects such as the construction of affordable housing projects, forming credit cooperatives, providing technical assistance for farming, supplying medicine, providing community services, financing periodic educational meetings on a national and international level, and publishing books and pamphlets widely distributed in union libraries.¹³ As Peter Gribbin observes, AIFLD worked as an example of the “harmonization” of the interests of capital and labor, bringing together the CIA, the US State Department, private corporations, and the top leadership of American unions. The institute was proud of its tripartite makeup, including representatives of labor and business on its board of directors. About 60 business groups contributed to AIFLD’s budget in its early years. Its members included AFL-CIO president George Meany; Serafino Romualdi; Berent Friele – known as an “old fox” on Brazilian affairs; an associate of Nelson Rockefeller and vice president of the American International Association for Economic and Social Development – Joseph Beirne, the CEO of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) as well as a CIA collaborator; and William Doherty, Jr., as executive director of AIFLD. Another prominent name in AIFLD’s leadership was J. Peter Grace, director of the W. R. Grace Company, one of the founders of the union, and a CIA agent in charge of union operations. Grace was an active member of the Committee for Economic Development and the head of the US Department of Commerce’s influential Committee on the Alliance for Progress (COMAP). It was no coincidence that Grace had a keen interest in expanding business in Latin America. Through COMAP, Grace sought to increase the flow of short-term private investments in Latin America.¹⁴ There were also other business leaders on AIFLD’s board, such as Charles Brinckerhoof, from the Anaconda Company; William M. Hickey, president of United Corporation; Robert C. Hill, Merck and Company; Juan T. Trippe, of Pan American World Airways and Henry S. Woodbridge, man Survey of the Alliance for Progress – Labor Policies and programs. Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs and Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, June 15, 1968, 9.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 317.  Ibid., 316.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

aging director of Tru-Temper Copper Corporation. For a short time, Nelson Rockefeller was also on the list of members of the AIFLD Executive Council. In addition to these companies, representatives from Gulf Oil International, Johnson & Johnson International, Owens Illinois, ITT, EBASCO and the International Education Institute and International Fund for Economic and Social Education (both with strong links to the CIA) supported American unionism’s overseas activities.¹⁵ Although we can identify the corporations that contributed to foreign unions in the 1960s and 70s, we lack more detailed information about the relationship between business leaders and AIFLD, and their interests in Latin America. According to Elizabeth Cobbs, the American industrialists who had had business interests in that region since the 1950s sought to maintain a certain neutrality in local politics, unlike their government’s more interventionist stance. For investment groups, there were only two pre-requisites for establishing a presence in foreign countries: a degree of stability that guaranteed the rule of law to ward off the threat of expropriation, and a focus on economic expansion with a market large enough to grow. These conditions could be found in democracies and countries ruled by conservative, right-wing dictatorships. Cobbs observes that American business leaders were not overly concerned with democracy per se. They were chiefly interested in maintaining good relations with foreign governments that gave them little trouble.¹⁶ During the Kennedy administration, major US companies turned their eyes to Latin America through the Alliance for Progress. American investors favored this development program for the region, as the Eisenhower administration (1953 – 1961) had neglected US-Latin American relations. According to Cobb, the aim of promoting economic development in the region coincided with business leaders’ concern with containing the Latin American nationalist movement that rejected the presence of private foreign companies. Programs aimed at social reform could counter these corporations’ negative image, as well as nationalist groups’ criticism of the exploitation of local labor (see, for example, the expropriations carried out by the Brizola administration prior to 1964).¹⁷ There was also an interest in forming joint ventures with businesses in the region. Accord-

 Information based on studies by Radosh, 1969, 420, and Spalding, 1976, 66.  Cobbs, 1991, 123-155.  The governor of the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, a left-wing nationalist, carried out two expropriations of foreign multinationals in the region. The first takeover took place in 1959, involving Companhia de Energia Eletrica Rio-Grandense, which was a subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company (AMFORP). The second company to be nationalized was Companhia Telefônica Rio-Grandense, a subsidiary of IT&T, in 1962.

The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in Brazil

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ing to the same author, the cases of Kaiser and Rockefeller were frequently mentioned. However, Cobbs observes that business leaders’ participation in the Alliance for Progress did not happen overnight. The US State Department only announced the establishment of the Committee on the Alliance for Progress in 1962. Before then, business leaders were not even invited to take part in the conference held in Punta del Este in August 1961. This could suggest that, given the US government’s initial lack of attention to the business leaders’ involvement in the Alliance, AIFLD could have been a way of ensuring that they participated in the project.¹⁸ Following the Cuban Revolution and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, investors’ neutral position regarding political and ideological issues underwent a major shift. During that period, many industrialists’ attitudes changed from skepticism about – and often opposition to – US trade union activities in Latin America to a more (albeit not fully) supportive stance towards the work of “educating” the Latin American working class. It was believed that teaching workers the “correct” union orientation would ensure the safety of their operations. Furthermore, investors were aware that the climate of political instability, economic crises and hostility toward the American presence in foreign countries directly affected their business – hence the importance of working with the US government to participate in and contribute to good relations between the United States and Latin America. Thus, the participation of business leaders in AIFLD aimed at strengthening the relationship with local workers to prevent revolts, resistance and labor demands, rid themselves of the “dangerous” communist ideology, and use the unions as a means for identifying new supply and investment opportunities, as they could have access to US embassies’ monthly reports on the political and economic circumstances in each country and take advantage of the wide network of contacts created by AIFLD. However, although business leaders had a powerful interest in AIFLD’s activities, the US government provided most of the institute’s financial resources. Through USAID, the government was responsible for providing 62 percent of that entity’s funding in 1962 alone. In 1966 and 1967, that figure rose to 92 percent, totaling $15.4 million or 89 percent of AIFLD’s total income throughout its entire operations. That amount represented 67 per cent of USAID’s total budget earmarked for the union program linked to the Alliance for Progress. According to a survey commissioned by the US Senate in 1968 to evaluate the AFL-CIO’s international activities, AIFLD’s industrial representatives came from US corpo-

 Cobbs, 136.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

rations that belonged to the Council for Latin America, an association made up of about 200 American entrepreneurs with businesses in that region.¹⁹ Based in Washington, DC, AIFLD had a reasonably large staff of 84 employees to handle its local and international activities, as well as offering educational programs at the Front Royal Institute in Virginia.²⁰ Latin American unionists were sent to Front Royal for three months of intensive training. The programs included tours of the United States to enable foreign union leaders to familiarize themselves with the country’s culture.²¹ All told, the US union entity had 18 offices spread throughout Latin America. Most of them were in Brazil, staffed by a total of 46 employees. During the time leading up to the 1964 coup, when national-reformist and leftist unions were engaged in major mobilizations, AIFLD sought to “divide the working classes in an attempt to create a privileged and unionized labor aristocracy that would defend their material gains against unemployed and nonunion workers.” Furthermore, AIFLD sought to prevent or, if necessary, neutralize communist infiltration by denying the existence of class struggle. In this sense, it was union leaders trained in American unionism who were to be responsible for establishing a “consensus” between business leaders and workers based on the principle of higher productivity. No less important, the institute facilitated the construction of a “subtle” information gathering network made possible by its position within the Latin American labor movements.²² Nevertheless, AIFLD’s educational programs were its main field of activity. In Brazil, its work was divided into urban and rural areas. It prioritized affordable worker housing in the cities, and in 1964, the target was to build 11,300 units in the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Porto Alegre and Salvador.²³ According to Beth Sims, these urban projects aimed to create a positive image of the organization in the eyes of the working class: AIFLD should be

 AIFLD’s directorate included George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, as president of the organization; Kenneth Holland, president of the Institute of International Education, as vice president; Berent Friele, vice president of the American International Association for Economic and Social Development; William C. Doherty, the PTTI’s regional representative, as executive director, and Joseph Beirne, president of the CWA, as treasurer.  Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 10.  Impressions of these visits can be seen in chapter IV, which contains reports from Brazilian union members about excursions financed by AIFLD.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 317.  The John F. Kennedy Memorial Housing Project is the largest in Brazil, involving 41 unions. Built on a 1,400,000-km area of land purchased from the Instituto de Previdência do Estado de São Paulo, it was located in the A.E. Carvalho district, and 4,800 houses were supposed to be built there. AIFLD, 1964, 17.

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seen as an ally of the local unions. Rural areas of “peripheral” countries were a highly important part of the AFL-CIO’s international policy. As they normally contain an unorganized working class established in places with potential for economic development or in places characterized by movements with specific demands, these areas were considered strategic for the establishment of “free” unions.²⁴ In the rural zones of different parts of Brazil alone, AIFLD invested $350,000 in social projects between 1965 and 1966. The objective, among others, was to build service centers for workers in the northeastern states of Pernambuco, Bahia and Ceará. However, AIFLD ran into problems with the construction of affordable housing, a project that eventually resulted in one of the US union agency’s most complicated and controversial programs. As of 1961, during the rise of the peasant movements in the Northeast, the newly created AIFLD and the Brazilian entities Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais (Institute for Research and Social Studies; IPES) and the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action; IBAD) joined forces and pooled resources to slow the advance of nationalist reforms and the leftist movement throughout Brazil. Their main target was the Northeast, especially Pernambuco, which the IPES/IBAD considered “a political and ideological powder keg” due to the growing strength of the Peasant Leagues.²⁵ The programs focused on that region included encouraging the formation of rural unions organized by conservative sectors of the Catholic Church, as the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB)²⁶ was attempting to unionize farm workers.²⁷ With the support of the American Embassy, USAID and other American agencies, AIFLD established alliances with Catholic priests in Recife and other areas, including Father José Belisário Velloso, from Rio de Janeiro, all with co-financing from the IPES. Serafino Romualdi expressed his gratitude to these men for having

 Sims, 1992, 79.  The Ligas Camponesas (Peasant Leagues), whose most outstanding leaders included the lawyer Francisco Julião, were rural workers’ organizations influenced by the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCB), which fought for land reform and labor rights between 1955 and 1964, a relatively democratic period in Brazil. These leagues were initially formed in the Northeast, in Pernambuco and Paraíba, and later spread to the southeastern and central-western regions of Brazil.  Founded in 1922, the party was originally called the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCB). Banned in 1947 by the administration of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946 – 1951), the party remained illegal until it was disbanded in the 1990s. In August 1961, it changed its name to the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro) to facilitate voter registration and become legalized.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 300.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

worked to promote “free unionism” in the countryside.²⁸ Similar projects were also carried out in El Salvador, Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Mauritania.²⁹ AIFLD’s activities in Brazil and the rest of Latin America were justified by American experts who built up a stereotypical image of the labor regulation system in that region. According to them, Brazil not only rejected collective bargaining but did not know how to employ it. American trade unionists considered the involvement of workers in politics and the combination of labor and social demands to be “political bargaining” practices. When comparing labor relations in Latin America and the United States, Dockery, the author of the report sent to the US Senate, explained that in Latin America, “The workers would have gone on strike, but not in the same sense that American workers strike. They would not walk off, they would walk into the streets and squares, into rallies and demonstrations, laying the groundwork for violence and executive imposition of a satisfactory solution.”³⁰ These ideas helped crystallize some views about the evils of the Brazilian labor regulation system, as compared with the benefits of the contractual system. According to the AFL-CIO’s philosophy, the trade union movement should be independent, free from political parties and dogma, so it did not run the risk of being absorbed or used for other ends. Wages and working conditions should not be determined by the will of employers but through collective bargaining conducted by free unions. This line of thinking was widely shared by the US government and adopted as a reference for the creation of the AFL-CIO’s international policy.³¹

Formulating the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil As a result of the ideological polarization caused by the Cold War, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was created in 1949. Based in Brussels, Belgium, that entity brought together the trade unions in the capitalist bloc of European and North American countries that had parted ways with

 Serafino Romualdi, in Dreyfuss, 1981, 300.  In rural areas of Brazil, AIFLD sought to concentrate its activities more specifically in the towns of Carpina, Ribeirão and Garanhuns, in the state of Pernambuco, in addition to two other “mini-hubs” built in 1970, in the states of Sergipe and Maceió, according to the plans of the Alliance for Progress program.  Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 3.  Gordon, 1963, 59.

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the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Headquartered in Prague, then the capital of Czechoslovakia, that federation was aligned with political parties influenced by the Soviet Union. A year before, the AFL had created a regional organization to oppose the Confederación de los Trabajadores de América Latina (Confederation of Latin American Workers; CTAL), the WFTU’s arm in the region. The AFL founded the Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores (Inter-American Workers’ Confederation, CIT), an entity subsequently replaced by the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (Inter-American Regional Workers’ Organization; ORIT) in 1951, which initially included the main confederations in the region, except for Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Uruguay. In Brazil, the AFL and other international trade unions from the anti-Soviet bloc encouraged their local allies – most of them union leaders who backed the government of President Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946 – 1951) – to oppose Getúlio Vargas’s bid for the Brazilian presidency in 1950. The Dutra administration was marked by strong anti-communist rhetoric and the repression of trade unions and workers. Nevertheless, Vargas was hugely popular among the workers, which went against the interests of US labor policy and caused a problem for anti-communist union leaders seeking their bases’ support. Nevertheless, when Vargas returned to power after being overthrown as dictator of the 15-year (1937– 1945) authoritarian regime called the “Estado Novo” (New State), the “father of the poor” did not break with representatives of US trade unionism or the ICFTU.³² On the contrary, he expressed interest in supporting the activities of international anti-communist trade federations to hold back the advance of left-wing trade unionism.³³ In August 1951, the year the Joint United States-Brazil Commission was established to outline plans for Brazil’s economic development, Vargas sent a message to the Brazilian congress authorizing the affiliation of union federations and confederations with the ICFTU, while banning Brazilian unions from joining the WFTU.³⁴  The “Estado Novo” dictatorship was marked by the expansion of social rights, especially workers’ rights, through the enactment of the labor code and the establishment of state corporatism in labor relations, combined with firm control of the unions and strongly repressive measures against communism and other ideologies rejected by the authoritarian regime.  Regarding the Vargas administration’s cooperation with the United States’ anti-communist measures, particularly the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, see Baptista Jr., 2005, chapter III.  The new regulation replaced Decree no. 1,402, enacted by Vargas himself during the Estado Novo in 1939, which, in addition to introducing new rules for unionization, barred official trade entities from joining any international labor organizations (art. 52). The Brazilian Congress passed law no. 1,646 on July 16, 1952.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

That same year, in 1951, during a conference held in Mexico City, ORIT was launched as an affiliate of the ICFTU. Two years later, amid intense labor mobilization in industry, the two organizations set up their own offices in Rio de Janeiro. A number of obstacles then arose in enlisting the support of Brazil’s trade unions. Shortly after the Brazilian Congress approved the affiliation of Brazilian unions with the ICFTU, ORIT opened its second office in Rio. In September 1952, Arturo Jáuregui, then the ICFTU’s representative in Latin America, met with the Minister of Labor, José de Segadas Viana, who was regarded as an admirer of the productivity programs carried out in Europe by the Marshall Plan and the backer of a similar initiative in Brazil. Viana pledged to provide financial support for a conference to be organized by ORIT. Deocleciano Cavalcanti, president of the National Confederation of Industry Workers (CNTI), which at that time already stood out as an important ally of American trade unionism, was said to have played a key role in the intermediation of this meeting. The Labor Minister also saw the training of Brazilian anti-communist union leaders as an alternative to left-wing unionism, even going so far as to include support for leadership training courses in his portfolio.³⁵ No 1954, another organization emerged in the Latin American trade union movement: the Confederation of Latin American Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC), with the support of the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ACV-CSC). According to Robert Alexander, an American scholar specialized in Latin American labor relations, the ACV-CSC, which was established in Belgium, had not shown much interest in the Latin American trade union movement until the late 1950s. In the following decade, the confederation sought to establish itself in other parts of the Western Hemisphere, in an effort to become more international. In the 1960s and 70s, the CLASC began strongly criticizing ORIT and the ICFTU, accusing those organizations of acting as a “tool of the State Department,” and spreading a considerable amount of anti-American propaganda.³⁶ During the administration of Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956 – 1961), the AFLCIO’s Department of International Affairs, along with the ICFTU and ORIT, sought to establish closer ties with the leaders of Brazilian trade union confederations and federations. Over the course of the 1950s, João Goulart – who had been Labor Minister during the Vargas administration – was criticized by representatives of the US government when he became Kubitschek’s vice president. Goulart was declared persona non grata by the unions

 Colistete, 2012, 10.  Alexander, 1967, 289-290.

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and political authorities of that country. They saw him as a “two-faced” politician, who was accused of dealing comfortably with democratic and communist leaders alike. ICFTU representatives feared that union members linked to the PCB would take over the leadership of official unions in Brazil.³⁷ In the 1950s, Deocleciano de Holanda Cavalcanti, president of the CNTI, was considered the most important link between US interests in Brazil at that time. Cavalcanti acted as a kind of AFL correspondent in that country, having distinguished himself in the field of union politics and the fight against communist leaders, identified as “coup plotters” by those who supported a “democratic” regime. According to Clodesmidt Riani, a union leader and Brazilian Labor Party state deputy for Minas Gerais, Cavalcanti “had a great deal of experience with the American Embassy. He was always in there. And with all the other embassies.”³⁸ For him, “peleguismo was a well-organized gang with international scope.”³⁹ Later on, in 1953, Ary Campista, who was originally associated with the Interstate Federation of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Workers of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, joined the allies of US trade unionism shortly after beginning his activities in the CNTI. Campista was born in Rio de Janeiro in 1912. In 1933, he began his union career as an employee of the Banco do Comércio e Indústria de Minas Gerais, initially joining the Bank Workers’ Union of Rio de Janeiro. After that, he began working in the chemical industry and became a director of the Union of Chemical Industry Workers of Rio de Janeiro. After the Estado Novo regime was established in November 1937, he joined the Integralist movement and the uprising against Getúlio Vargas in May 1938. Created during the Dutra administration after Vargas was overthrown in 1946, the CNTI was chaired by Deocleciano de Holanda Cavalcanti. Campista started working there in 1953, brought in by the organization’s chairman. Both men acted as local ICFTU allies in Brazil and as opponents of the PCB. However, throughout the 1950s, Cavalcanti and Campista formed alliances with the left, as in the case of the National Popular Labor Movement (MNPT), created in 1955 by the PCB, when Campista was

 Romualdi, 1967, 279.  Paula & Campos (eds.), 2005, 210.  “Peleguismo” was an expression used to describe union leaders who did not represent the workers’ interests. They were accused of forming alliances and tacit agreements with the bosses and the Ministry of Labor. These union leaders gave up defending workers’ rights for personal gain, such as promotions in the corporatist structure of the union movement.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

chosen to lead the movement.⁴⁰ José Sanches Duran, president of the Federation of Metalworkers of São Paulo, and Luiz Menossi, president of the National Confederation of Workers in the Construction Industries,⁴¹ also collaborated with American union programs in Brazil during the time when ORIT was still active. An expert on labor relations in Latin America, Robert Alexander was a professor at Rutgers University with links to the American Social Democratic Party who “supported American intervention with unionists worthy of their position and unhappy with alliances with the communists.” He observed, “they could even be ‘left-wing,’ but that position was reversible after ‘persistent preaching,’ or after a time in the United States.”⁴² Gaining the allegiance of leaders considered to be “center-left” became an important strategy for bringing together a fresh group of “democratic leaders.” Thus, it was hoped that these new leaders would legitimize the union movement that the Americans wanted to establish in Brazil. However, ICFTU and AFL members had different views on the policy of forming alliances with national leaders. For Renato Colistete, the programs of the ICFTU and ORIT had failed in Brazil due to the strictly anti-communist policy set by the AFL, which rejected non-communist union leaders and those who had only an occasional working relationship with the PCB.⁴³ By 1957, the year of the strike that mobilized around 400,000 workers in São Paulo, the number of ORIT members had declined. There were only three – but no less important – Brazilian organizations contributing to it: the National Confederation of Retail Workers, the National Confederation of Industrial Workers, and the National Confederation of Transport Workers. According to Colistete, the ICFTU was unable to present itself as a real alternative to the Brazilian union movement. Among other reasons, this was because most non-communist union leaders tended to see an alliance with the PCB as being more advantageous than close links to international union entities. Despite their different political views, Socialist, Christian Democrat and Labor leaders, as well as the socalled independents who engaged with the union movement’s base saw the communists as possible allies in the effort to organize workers. Even the leaders who were sympathetic towards American programs refused to exclude communist

 Dicionário HistóricoBiográfico Brasileiro. CPDOC, base de dados. ; Accessed on July 28, 2020.  Luiz Menossi was also a lay judge and workers’ representative on the TST from 1962 to 1971; he is the author of Conceito e extensão do direito de greve. cf. Bibliography.  Negro, 2004a, 29.  Colistete, 2012, 673.

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union leaders from the union movement. Even Ary Campista was accused of having strong ties with PCB members.⁴⁴ In the late 1950s and early 60s, when nationalist and communist leaders of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Workers’ Party; PTB)⁴⁵ and the PCB, such as Salvador Lossaco, Dante Pellacani, Clodesmidt Riani, Hércules Correia dos Reis, Raphael Martinelli and Luiz Tenório de Lima, among others, were rising in the union ranks, the ICFTU and ORIT’s activities in Brazil were considered defunct. For many Latin American unionists, ORIT was nothing more than a tool of the US government’s political interests.⁴⁶ In 1960, ORIT closed its office in Rio de Janeiro. By the end of that decade, there was no question that the ICFTU and ORIT had failed. However, although ORIT and the ICFTU did not manage to increase their membership in Brazil or form as many alliances with Brazilian union members as they had wished, we must question the idea that American unionism failed in that country. After all, their aims have not yet been sufficiently clarified. If we consider that the goal of these organizations was to introduce “free negotiation” in Brazil, following the American model of labor regulation, then we can reach that conclusion. However, if we consider that the mission of spreading democracy around the world justified the presence of these international entities in the country, enabling them to establish direct ties with union leaders, businessmen and political authorities, the idea of failure deserves to be questioned. As we will see in the following chapters, these contacts were considered essential for the development of on-site analyses of Brazil’s political and economic situation, allowing the United States to intervene in that country’s internal affairs when they deemed necessary. These analyses were useful for keeping a close eye on the advance of communism in Brazil and the rest of Latin America. Furthermore, contact between American and Brazilian union leaders made it possible to develop reliable reports on the situation of the union movement in Brazil. These reports were prepared by US Embassy officials and employees of American labor entities, many of whom discussed the desirability of possible American business dealings in that country.

 Ibid.  Created in 1945 with the support of Vargas, amid the political crisis that would lead to the end of the “Estado Novo,” the PTB had as its electoral base urban workers and their unions. Its chief opposing party was the National Democratic Union (UDN), which brought together the main anti-anti-labor and anti-labor forces. There was yet another Varguista movement that formed the Social Democratic Party, bringing together Vargas’s former allies.  Survey of the Alliance for Progress, 9.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

In 1960, the new General Secretary of the ICFTU, Omar Becu, called for the urgent implementation of a fresh organization policy for Brazil. That same year, leaders Cavalcanti, Syndulpho Pequeno, of the National Federation of Urban Transport Workers, Angelo Parmigiani, president of the National Confederation of Commerce Workers, and Ary Campista went to Washington, DC, to help draw up an emergency plan for the resumption of the ICFTU’s activities in Brazil. In that new program, Brazilian union leaders would hold the majority of seats on the organization’s executive committee. New sub-headquarters were to be set up in the states of São Paulo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul. After almost a year of planning and debate, AIFLD was created as a new alternative to the now-discredited ORIT. During that phase of relations between US and Brazilian union leaders, the American institute had the support of the Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático; MSD), founded in 1961, the same year that the new American union institute was created. The MSD was basically made up of Catholic activists, graduates of ORIT programs and leaders linked to US employers and interests, financed by the IPES. These alliances between foreign and local union entities supported by civilian-military organizations, and financed by the CIA and the American Embassy, were strategic efforts aimed at undermining the union leaders who favored João Goulart’s national-developmentalist, “laborist” and distributist policy. Founded with the motto “God, Private Property and Free Enterprise,” the MSD received aid and guidance from the US trade union movement to sponsor meetings and set up training courses.⁴⁷ Having established a strong presence among retail workers, the MSD also received the support of industrialists from the Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo; FIESP) and other business groups. Its contacts also included several conservative politicians, such as Adhemar de Barros, Herbert Levy and Carlos Lacerda. Antonio Pereira Magaldi, president of the Federation of Retail Workers of São Paulo and vice president of the Confederation of Retail Workers, was the main union leader in the organization.⁴⁸ In Rio de Janeiro, the AFL-CIO had the support of a similar entity called the Democratic Resistance of Free Workers (Resistência Democrática dos Trabalhadores Livres; REDETRAL), organized by Deocleciano Cavalcanti and Ary Campista. It was also financed by the IPES and directed by Floriano da Silveira Maciel.⁴⁹  Dreyfuss, 1981, 317.  Magaldi would play the role of the workers’ representative on the Regional Labor Court of São Paulo after the 1964 civilian-military coup.  Ribeiro, 2006, 89.

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The activities of the Alliance for Progress program The early years of AIFLD and the Alliance for Progress in Brazil were marked by lackluster, highly problematic programs, due to the turbulent relationship between the Brazilian and US governments. The strained relations between those two countries were mainly due to the foreign policy of economic independence introduced during the administration of Jânio Quadros (1961), who resigned as president of Brazil after seven months in office, and later developed by President João Goulart (1961– 1964).⁵⁰ Furthermore, that period was also marked by the growth of strong anti-American feeling in the social movements led by leftist, laborist and nationalist groups that were openly critical of the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance for Progress did not come close to fulfilling the political and economic aims of Latin American governments. In Brazil, the sense of optimism felt during the program’s early days was soon replaced by skepticism and mistrust. While Brazilian experts criticized the lack of American investment in effective Brazilian economic and social development, the US government was not convinced of Goulart’s ideological “integrity.” Since his inauguration as President of Brazil, Kennedy’s advisers had focused on the possibility of supporting groups and organizations that favored his downfall. In addition to the crisis between the Goulart and Kennedy administrations, a number of measures were taken that conflicted with American interests. This was the case with the Punta del Este Conference, held in January 1962, where the Brazilian delegation, together with those of Argentina and Mexico, refused to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS). Thus began a series of strong American investments in anti-communist propaganda in Brazil. The “wave of strikes” that preceded the civilian-military coup led the US government to intensify investments in the policy of exporting “free unionism” in Latin America. As Peter Gribbin observed in his article “Brazil and the CIA,” a multifaceted penetration into Brazilian society began, designed by the American intelligence agency and the US government to influence the country’s domestic policy.⁵¹ The creation of the Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais (IPES) in 1961, and the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IBAD), which brought together business leaders, economists and liberal intellectuals, with the support of the CIA, with a view to overthrow the Goulart administration, is an example of the American effort to contain communism in Latin American

 Loureiro, 2012, 157-172.  Gribbin, 1979, 423.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

countries. Felipe Loureiro notes that the creation of the IPES also helped unify business leaders with links with foreign capital. In addition to the IPES, foreign interests were also represented by international hubs of power, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and by foreign governments, mainly the US government, given the weight of American investments in the Brazilian economy, according to that author.⁵² In line with US foreign policy, as well as Brazil’s conservative sectors, the AFL-CIO considered it essential to depoliticize the union movement, which was experiencing increased organization and mobilization of the working class in the early 1960s. During that period, the union movement took on a central role in Brazilian politics.⁵³ Therefore, the civilian and military opposition made up of Catholic conservatives with strict moral agendas, anti-laborites, pro-US liberals and anti-communists, strongly criticized the workings of the Brazil’s domestic policy on unions. Those groups feared that the communists might infiltrate and possibly even influence political decisions.⁵⁴ Clifford Welch noted the ability of Brazilian leaders to contain US anti-communist policies, showing a certain independence from American actions that sought to influence Brazilian unionism. However, when it came to the government’s corporatist structure, the author suggests that Brazilian union leaders were still highly dependent on the Ministry of Labor during most of the pre1964 period, although they often elected leaders who did not have government backing.⁵⁵ While strategies were being developed to intervene in Brazil’s trade unions, opposition to the Goulart administration grew rapidly in the USA. In 1962, diplomatic tensions were heightened by the creation of the General Workers’ Command (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores; CGT), representing the national-reformist alliance in the trade union movement.⁵⁶ This helped foster an atmosphere of political instability and chaos. Between 1961 and 1963, trade union heads identified as “democratic leaders” from throughout the country were invited to take courses on union leader Loureiro, 2012, 73.  Pereira Neto addresses the participation of the unions, especially the São Paulo Metalworkers Union, in the anti-communist campaign that culminated in the coup. Pereira Neto, 2007, 33-42.  For an analysis of the PCB’s influence on the union movement and the workers’ struggle between 1945 and 1964 in São Paulo, see, among others, Fortes et al., 1999.  Welch, 1995, 86.  The CGT was a national trade union organization that was not recognized by the Ministry of Labor. It had the aim of guiding, co-ordinating and directing the Brazilian union movement, including legally representing all categories of workers. The organization was dismantled and hit hard by the repression that followed Goulart’s overthrow in 1964.

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ship organized by the AFL-CIO in the United States. One of the strategies of the American federation and the US government during that period was to provide aid and loans to conservative, pro-American state governments, such as those of Carlos Lacerda, the Governor of Guanabara,⁵⁷ and Adhemar de Barros, the Governor of São Paulo, with the aim of isolating Goulart and weakening his hold on power.⁵⁸ The “democrats” also had the financial backing of the industrial federations of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, private companies and large corporations, such as the União Oil Refinery, which would later support union leader João Wagner’s ticket in the CNTI elections, held on the eve of the coup.⁵⁹ In 1963, the performance of the Alliance for Progress was widely contested in Brazil, not only by leftist movements and nationalist groups but by government officials, such as Labor Minister Almino Afonso (1963-1964). In a speech on the participation of the Brazilian workers’ movement in the Alliance for Progress, given at a meeting of Labor Ministers in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1963, Afonso questioned the concept behind the American program and strongly criticized its operations. According to him, its objectives had not been fulfilled, as Brazilians were unaware of the existence of the Alliance for Progress, and had no reason to believe in its aims. According to the minister, the Alliance for Progress had “not only failed to gain the workers’ support but even became unpopular.” He stressed the need for US aid for providing the Brazilian people’s basic necessities: water, sewage services, housing, basic schooling, and so forth. However, the minister stressed: But it is important for everyone to know that, over the course of the social struggles they are waging, Brazilian workers are becoming so highly politicized that they could not applaud social benefit plans that were not accompanied by economic development plans that effectively provided the country with the multiplication of wealth and generated social wellbeing for all. Can the Alliance for Progress meet the housing deficit in Brazil?⁶⁰

After demonstrating that the Alliance for Progress had not allocated enough funds to the housing program, and that other attempts to obtain loans through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) had previously failed, Almino Afonso observed that he was convinced that the American program was useless. For him, the Alliance for Progress was reduced to nothing but social aid programs.

 The state of Guanabara was created in 1960, when the nation’s capital was transferred to the newly created city of Brasília, and later incorporated into Rio de Janeiro State in 1975. It was located in the area that currently corresponds to the city of Rio de Janeiro.  Gribbin, 1979.  Negro, 2004a, 234.  A. Afonso, 1963.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

He believed that workers did not just want to applaud the final results of projects, but to participate directly in the process of creating the economic and social development plan. The Labor Minister also questioned the Alliance for Progress’s interests. In his view, the American aid program was split between the peoples of Latin America and international business groups. He argued that the Alliance for Progress should invest in socioeconomic development that took workers into consideration through decision-making councils. It should also allow workers’ representatives to be freely nominated by their unions, thereby decentralizing the decision-making bodies, and that in each country projects were studied and approved at the technical and political level without requiring the blessing of the American Embassy.⁶¹ Business leaders linked to the IPES also criticized the Alliance, albeit indirectly. The problem for them was the behavior of foreign investors in Latin America and Brazilian business groups. According to Gilberto Huber, an IPES associate, one of the shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress was that not enough Latin American business leaders were qualified to develop the program. To make it a success, said Huber, a co-ordinated effort was required, carried out by men who were committed to collective national cultural values. It was not a matter of just obtaining loans, nor was it due to a lack of capital.⁶² However, despite the criticism about the performance of the American program, the newspaper A Noite published a positive assessment of the Alliance for Progress’s activities in Brazil in its January 3, 1964, issue. According to that newspaper, by the end of 1963, the Alliance had been “committed to undertaking renewed efforts on behalf of Latin American economic development.” The program’s plan for the following year was to prioritize education, private enterprise and labor matters, as well as measures focused on technical, vocational, and higher education. The article also observed that an agreement between the member nations of the Alliance, signed in 1963, was intended to accelerate “pre-investment studies for new industries and prioritize the activity of government entities charged with boosting private companies.” Regarding the involvement of labor issues in the American program, the assessment of its work in 1963 showed that there had been significant progress, as a specific commission for that area had been created within the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES).⁶³

 Ibid.  Boletim informativo do IPES, n. 13, August 1963, vol. II, 1314. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 35, package QI.  A Noite, January 3, 1964, 12.

The creation of the ICT

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The creation of the ICT The establishment of the Labor Cultural Institute (Instituto Cultural do Trabalho; ICT), based in São Paulo City and financed by USAID and the IPES, with technical and administrative guidance from the AFLCIO and AIFLD, may have contributed to the positive assessment of conservative newspapers that opposed the Goulart administration. The ICT was intended to dispel criticism of American interference in domestic affairs and avoid exacerbating the US’s negative image in Brazil.59 Charged with acting as AIFLD’s partner agency, the ICT’s mission was to provide financial and methodological support for the movement to “renew” Brazilian trade unionism by educating and training its new leaders, who would be responsible for the “democratic” practice of collective bargaining in Brazil.⁶⁴ During that period, the ICT acted cautiously, focusing on the organization of that entity, while the US Government and the CIA awaited the coup being planned by the military and right-wing civilians.⁶⁵ When it was being set up in 1963, the ICT made it clear that the organization would be maintained by “donations, subsidies, contributions and aid that may be granted to it by entities and individuals or even by any funds resulting from the achievement of its objectives,” in order to maintain the appearance of independence from AIFLD. According to the ICT’s official history, Serafino Romualdi discussed the creation of an AIFLD leadership training program in Brazil with representatives of international organizations including ORIT, the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI), the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) and US labor attaché Herbert Baker. Units were to be set up in São Paulo City, given the strong union movement organized by the Communist Party in that region. The statement by Freitas Marcondes (considered by US specialists to be an “exceptional sociologist and professor of labor law”) given to Silvia Manfredi in 1982, while the military regime was still in power, points out that the ICT allegedly arose from a combination of mutual interest involving São Paulo Gover-

 The ICT was recognized by Decree no. 42,099 of June 24, 1963, signed by the governor of São Paulo State, Adhemar de Barros. The institution’s bylaws, as well as its creation, were part of the set of measures aimed at preventing the Brazilian government from controlling AIFLD’s operations.  Several documents attest to this fact, including Plans for a Rightist Group, August 7,1963, CIA. AEL, CIA collection, roll 2.

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Chapter I The development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil

nor Adhemar de Barros and the American businessmen and union leaders from the AFL-CIO.⁶⁶ According to him: When Kennedy was elected, Serafino was already on good terms with Kennedy and Rockefeller. The man who controlled the employers’ sphere was Rockefeller, and Serafino got along very well with him. Rockefeller never made a move without consulting Serafino. Serafino learned that Lumumba University had been founded (in the USSR), that it was very interested in Latin America and intended to train union leaders…. It was Serafino who, talking to Rockefeller and Kennedy, proposed that the US government co-sponsor the organization of institutes in Latin America. Kennedy thought it would be good for the Alliance for Progress to contribute one-third of the funds, the American employers another third and the AFL-CIO the remainder.⁶⁷

Freitas Marcondes’s statements highlight the relationship between the business community and the US Government, both of which had an interest in establishing ties in Latin America. As Manfredi noted, institutes with a similar structure to the ICT’s were set up in Peru, Chile and later in Brazil. Far removed from the Goulart administration, the ICT claimed to have been well received by the São Paulo State government, obtaining the necessary support from Governor Adhemar de Barros.⁶⁸ Serafino Romualdi himself had personally informed Barros about the AIFLD program. State Secretary of Labor Roberto Gebara was also mentioned as being “particularly co-operative and sympathetic toward the program.” The US Consulate in São Paulo maintained a close relationship with the ICT, helping establish contacts with state authorities and providing political advice, administrative support, translations, and transportation. AIFLD representative Gilbert Richmond arrived in Brazil in April 1963 to organize the training program. His task was to act as interlocutor between AIFLD and the ICT.63 The ICT was officially opened in September 1963. Initially, it was decided that no Brazilian union leaders would sit on the entity’s board of directors, with the justification of avoiding “favoritism of various democratic orientations and the rivalry between the leaders.” This decision would soon arouse the

 José Vicente de Freitas Marcondes was a professor at the São Paulo School of Sociology and Political Science, one of the intellectuals at the Institute of Social Law who obtained his doctorate from the University of Florida. Romualdi had appointed him as academic director of the ICT.  Statement from Freitas Marcondes, given to Silvia Manfredi, November 1981. Manfredi, 1986, 76.  Born in 1901, Adhemar de Barros had enjoyed a long political career since joining the conservative Partido Republicano Paulista (PRP) four years after the so-called Revolution of 1930. During the Estado Novo dictatorship, he was an interventor (appointed governor) of the state of São Paulo and later elected governor in 1947. He was regarded as a populist politician and became known for carrying out major public works and allegations of corruption.

The creation of the ICT

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ire of many Brazilian leaders who supported the American union project. However, the ICT’s bylaws established an advisory council formed by American and Brazilian union members, professors of labor law and employers.⁶⁹ The members of the ICT’s executive and advisory councils included Antonio Ferreira Cesarino Junior, a professor specialized in Labor Law who taught at the University of São Paulo Law School, and José Barbosa de Almeida, from the São Paulo Bar Association, who became the first president of the ICT.⁷⁰ Most teachers were trained by the Institute of Social Law and the School of Sociology and Political Science, affiliated with the University of São Paulo.⁷¹ Also included in the ranks of the ICT’s teachers were several leaders linked to the MSD and the circulistas such as Olavo Previatti, president of the São Paulo Paper and Cardboard Union; Antonio Magaldi, president of the CNTC before 1964; José Rotta, leader of the Union of Tailors and Dressmakers; Leopoldo Brissac, president of the Gas Production Workers Union; Hélcio Maghenzani, vice president of CONTICOP; Mário Lopes de Oliveira, former president of the CNTT, and João Wagner, president of the CNTI, all members of the Executive and Deliberative Councils of the ICT throughout the 1960s and early 70s.⁷² Furthermore, the advisory board included PTTI representative John Francis Snyder, as well as business leaders Mário Toledo de Morais, from the pulp and paper mill Cia. Melhoramentos de São Paulo, and Ruy de Azevedo Sodré, from the Electric Power Company São Paulo Light S.A.⁷³

 The DEOPS had a file on Gilbert Richmond, but it did not contain anything significant – merely a few references to books published by the ICT. APESP, acervo DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-1521377, May 30, 1966.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, by Herbert W. Baker, August 28, 1964. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Created in 1947, the Social Law Institute was a private entity formed by a group of teachers and intellectuals who taught regular courses for union leaders.  The circulistas were members of the Catholic Workers’ Circles (Círculos Operários Católicos), civil associations of workers organized by the Catholic Church, beginning in the 1930s, and present in most of the country. See Souza, Jessie Jane Vieira de, 2002.  First elected board: chairman, José Barbosa de Almeida; first vice chairman, Ruy de Azevedo Sodré; second vice chairman, John Francis Snyder; first secretary, Joaquim F. Otero; second secretary, Augusta Barbosa Carvalho Ribeiro. Advisory board: Cesarino Junior, Ruy de Azevedo Sodré, José Barbosa de Almeida, Camilo Ashcar, Augusta Barbosa Carvalho Ribeiro, George Meany, Serafino Romualdi, Joseph A. Beirne, Padre Pedro Velloso S. J., Hélcio Maghenzani, José Rotta, Domingos Alvares, Antonio Pereira Magaldi, John Francis Snyder, Mario Lopes de Oliveira, Humberto Monteiro, Dr. Elcio Silva, Dr. Oswaldo Silva, Joaquim F. Otero. Administration: superintendent, Professor J. V. Freitas Marcondes; treasurer-secretary, Gilberto Richmond. “Estatuto do Instituto cultural do Trabalho e outros atos,” São Paulo, 1963.

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Inspired by the motto “Bread, Peace and Freedom,” the ICT – like the Catholic workers known as circulistas – relied on training managers to build “strong and authentic” unions that represented the “true” interests of all workers, “not just half a dozen” who formed “cliques, favored by some state agencies and by people unknown to the workers.”⁷⁴ Although it aimed at containing the activities of the national reformist and leftist union leaders linked to João Goulart, this investment in training new leaders may have troubled the allies of American unionism whom the left-wing movements were called pelegos – a term that originally referred to labor leaders who kept their unions closely aligned with the State during the Vargas era, but later came to mean “quisling.” Comfortably established for decades, they probably did not welcome the training up of new colleagues who could pose a threat to their positions in the official union structure. According to Manfredi, the ICT training courses were designed to “convey a specific concept of unionism and prepare cadres of politically and ideologically influencing leaders, enabling them to challenge the influence of the nationalist movement.”⁷⁵ The ICT’s guidelines stated that the new union movement should “negotiate with the government in the same way that it negotiates with the bosses and still be able to contribute to both in order to make economic and social progress possible.” Freitas emphasized that the idea was to establish a different relationship from that of the wolf (the boss) and the lamb (the worker), which already existed. The ideal image of the Brazilian union movement should be that of “a team of oxen, each equally strong, pulling the plow with the guidance of public opinion.” The logic of data and figures should replace rhetoric and eloquence, as it was estimated that was this would be the only way for union leaders successfully to engage in collective bargaining.⁷⁶ Represented by its director Gilbert Richmond, the ICT could set up work groups or assign qualified people to do research in Brazil and abroad regarding matters focused on social objectives; hold lectures, courses and seminars for the examination, study, dissemination and discussion of subjects covered by social objectives; award prizes for valuable works published in Brazil on subjects related to the Institute’s program; provide scholarships; sign agreements, contracts and accords with similar entities in Brazil or abroad to establish the interchange of studies, ideas and suggestions, and lay the foundations for technical and economic cooperation; and, finally, to engage in any other activities related to social objectives.⁷⁷    

APESP, acervo DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-02– 620. Manfredi, 1986, 80. Ibid., 190. Estatuto do Instituto cultural do Trabalho e outros atos, São Paulo, 1963, 5.

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Generally speaking, the ICT’s mission was to help train Brazilian labor leaders with a view to furthering industrial development.⁷⁸ According to data published by the US Embassy, the industrial workforce in Brazil totaled approximately 2.5 million in 1963, of whom 18,000 were engineers, 17,000 were technicians, 25,000 held supervisory positions, 480,000 were specialized workers, 360,000 were unskilled, and 300,000 were administrative employees. Furthermore, a nationwide campaign was planned to train 50,000 urban workers. The work was supposed to take 20 months and scheduled for April 1964 – coincidentally or not, the month when the military took power.⁷⁹

The first training classes for union leaders AIFLD and the ICT, together with the IPES/IBAD, were responsible for organizing a series of classes and training events that sought to bring together possible leaders capable of curbing nationalist and left-wing trade unionism. For example, in 1962 the IBAD organized “Interstate Meetings on Democratic Trade Unionism” held in Guanabara, attended by Governor Carlos Lacerda, union leader Antonio Magaldi, labor lawyer Luiz Augusto Rego Monteiro, and Father Velloso, chairman of Catholic Workers Circle of Rio de Janeiro, among others. The meetings were widely publicized in the major media outlets. In the September 10, 1962 issue of the A Noite newspaper, the author of the trade union column identified as “A. C.” interrupted the series of announcements of the resolutions of the Interstate Meeting on Democratic Trade Unionism to “alert” public opinion about the activities of the Communist leaders of the Fourth National Workers’ Union Meeting held in São Paulo City the previous month, when the creation of the General Workers’ Command (CGT) was approved. In addition to the participation of the main union leaders (among them, Floriano Dezen, Dante Pellacani and Raphael Martinelli), the columnist denounced the presence of the communist international union federations, including representatives of the WFTU, which was backed by the USSR, and members of the Chinese federation. According to the newspaper columnist, these international organizations were guiding and financing the leaders to achieve what they called “governist

 For an analysis of the methodology used in the ICT’s union training courses, as well as their structure and programs, see Manfredi, 1986, 203.  Semi-annual report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, from July to December 1963, written by labor attaché Herbert W. Baker, received in February 1964. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.

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legalist-nationalist pseudo-unionism.” A member of ORIT-ICFTU (probably Domingos Alvarez, a member of the MSD whom the journalist mentions) attended the event. His presence was noted, and he was said to have been “booed loudly.” The union leader’s colleagues were also unhappy with him, and he was criticized by members of the “democratic union circle.”⁸⁰ As Dreyfuss pointed out, regional and national congresses and conferences were considered important because they brought together not only union leaders but also politicians, representatives of business associations and the Armed Forces. According to that author, those events “served as points of unity for renewed organized action with the union movement and strengthened the disposition of the labor groups supported by the IPES/IBAD complex to fight for the political terrain with leftist organizations.”⁸¹ The Federation of Catholic Workers’ Circles (Federação dos Círculos Operários Católicos; FCO) founded by Father Leopoldo Beltrano were another important ally of the forces conspiring against Goulart. These “Circles” were present in 17 of the 22 Brazilian states, totalling 400 across the country in the early 1960s. In the case of the Federation of Catholic Workers’ Circles of São Paulo, which had about 250,000 members during that period, the role to be played by the union movement was clearly based on the AFL-CIO model. Financed by the IPES, the São Paulo FCO was headed by José Rotta, leader of the Tailors and Seamstresses Union and a member of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG), who would be an important ally of AIFLD during the military regime.⁸² In its monthly newsletter published in January 1964, the IPES highlighted the nationwide activities of Workers’ Circles, which were considered a movement “of a national character and of a Christian democratic nature.” The first Workers’ Circle was founded in the city of Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul, in 1932. By the beginning of 1964, there were 408 FOCs across the country, with 405,000 members. They were affiliated with the National Confederation of Workers’ Circles, which was based in Rio de Janeiro City. As they were not part of the state corporatist union structure, FOCs could not legally represent workers or propose collective bargaining. Therefore, most of their activities consisted of educational, health, legal and economic assistance programs. Within the sphere of the trade unions, the FOCs aimed at unifying union members identified as “democrats.”⁸³

 A Noite, September 10, 1962, 2.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 315.  Ibid., 310.  Boletim informativo do IPES, no. 18, vol. III, January 1964, 6. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.

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Father Velloso, then the rector of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (Pontifical Catholic University, PUC) of Rio de Janeiro, was also an important ally of the anti-Goulart groups and the American anti-communist policy. Through the National Confederation of Workers’ Circles directed by Father Velloso, the IPES and AIFLD financed the training of right-wing union leaders and activists with a view to implementing the ideas of Christian Social Doctrine and US trade unionism. Between 1972 and 1976, the cleric held the post of assistant in the Federation of Workers’ Circles, creating the Labor Leaders School at PUC, which aimed at training the leaders of the union movement in Rio de Janeiro.⁸⁴ According to Silvia Manfredi, the activities of the Catholic Church in Brazil from 1960 to 1978 were seen as the result of a complex set of forces that acted simultaneously in a reformist, conservative and revolutionary direction. The Catholic Church acted according to internal conflicts, between its progressive and conservative forces, as well as external factors, according to the political and economic circumstances. Until 1965, the Workers’ Circles were the entities that were most closely linked to the American trade union project. In the early 1960s, the activities of two types of movements stood out: those of the circulistas and the following groups: Catholic Youth Workers (JOC), Catholic Agrarian Youth (JAC), Catholic University Youth (JUC), and Catholic Student Youth (JEC), in addition to Rural Adults, which was linked to Brazilian Catholic Action. These were the main trends in the “Christian” union movement. In addition to these groups, the National Labor Front (FNT), founded in May 1960 by a group of workers, lawyers, priests, and students, had its base of operations in the Union of Workers in the Cement Industries, located in the district of Perus, in the northwestern zone of São Paulo City. The group that created and organized the FNT originated from the Catholic Action movement (JOC and JUC) and the Economy and Humanism Movement led by Father Lebret.⁸⁵ In February 1964, the ICT published an announcement in its newsletter that the second Basic Union Orientation course would be held for 30 union leaders representing 17 trades from six Brazilian states. The graduation ceremony was scheduled for March 21, at the headquarters of the São Paulo Telephone Workers Union. A visit to the Willys Overland do Brasil plant, located in the city of São Bernardo do Campo, an industrial complex in the capital of São Paulo, was also scheduled. According to the newspaper, it was an opportunity for “colleagues to assess the technical development of the important automobile indus Father Velloso was also an ecclesiastical advisor to the Brazilian confederation of Christian workers and a member of the ICT advisory board in 1965. Information obtained from the site ; accessed on July 28, 2020.  Manfredi, 1986, 60-65.

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try.”⁸⁶ The ICT/AIFLD’s February 1964 newsletter also contained a report aimed at defending its students from critics of American trade unionism. According to the article, some ICT students were being maligned by co-workers in their unions. The article cited the case of Cornélio de Macedo Moura, the leader of an unnamed union, who was accused of leaving his post as president of his organization to go to São Paulo with US funding. In response, the ICT stated that the former student had performed brilliantly in its classes, and as a result, had been invited to study in the United States. The regional course held in Campinas also sparked a reaction from leaders identified as communists by the ICT. They reportedly sought to “disparage our work, trying to convince course applicants not to attend the seminar because it was reactionary and therefore contrary to the workers’ interests.”⁸⁷ These episodes shed light on aspects of the conflicts between union members with different political and ideological views. Nevertheless, it would be premature to say that ICT courses did in fact influence the Brazilian union movement prior to 1964. We also know very little about the participation of pro-American trade unionists in the civilian-military coup. However, there are indications that some leaders may have contributed directly to Goulart’s downfall. Shortly prior to the coup, 33 union leaders received training in Washington, DC. When they returned to Brazil, some went out into the countryside to pass on the union knowledge they had acquired in the courses taken abroad and organize rural workers. Others, as Peter Gribbin has found, headed for large cities like Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Santos.⁸⁸ Months after the coup, in a radio program that aired on July 12, 1964, William Doherty, then the representative of the AFL-CIO’s office of international affairs, gave the following statement in an interview with H. Conn (editor of Press Associations Inc.):

 The participating unions in São Paulo, Manaus, Fortaleza, Salvador, Recife and Porto Alegre included those for accountants, bank, rural and urban rail workers, baggers, dock workers, metal workers, shop clerks, printers, and food, oil, hotel, telephone, and other workers. Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, February 1964, n. 1. AEL-Unicamp, collection: Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0307, microfilm APC3, roll 34.  They included [Nobor Bito], Edgar Pereira Gadelha, Aldo Bernal de Almeida, Donovan Eliote Teixeira and José Cândido Rodrigues, from unnamed unions. The union leader Gamaliel Próspero Gama had been invited to represent Brazil in Europe and the Middle East. Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, no. 1, February 1964, 5. AEL-Unicamp, collection: Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0307, microfilm APC3, roll 34.  The former CIA agent provides a list of Brazilian union members sent for training on union leadership in the United States. See appendix 1 in this book. Gribbin, 1979.

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As a matter of fact, some of them (Brazilian labor leaders) were so active they became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution before it took place on April 1st. What happened in Brazil did not just happen. It was planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders, some of whom were actually trained in our institute, were involved in the revolution and the overthrow of the Goulart regime.⁸⁹

Doherty may have overestimated the influence of those union leaders on the movement that the Americans readily recognized as a “Revolution.” The fact is that little is known about the part they played in removing João Goulart from power. Although the US Government’s role in the coup is well known, the backgrounds of these union leaders are still unclear, although their names have been revealed.⁹⁰ In any case, we know that many unions and their federations, as well as the police, military groups, political parties, students, and housewives, were major movements that contributed to Goulart’s overthrow. Doherty was not the only person to stress the role of trade union leaders in the coup d’état. After taking a course offered by AIFLD in the United States, Rômulo Marinho, the head of the Guanabara Union of Telegraph, Radio and Telephone Workers, returned to Brazil to organize anti-communist seminars with content aimed at telegraph operators.⁹¹ Marinho is said to have prepared a group of workers to handle a crisis. Following their training by the union leader, they reportedly blocked communications between the unions that backed Goulart when they tried to call a general strike.⁹² Eugene Methvin also reported this version of events in the October 1966 issue of Reader’s Digest to demonstrate the success of the AIFLD training offered to Latin American workers in the fight against communism.⁹³ According to Dreyfuss, it was the ipesianos (members of the IPES, Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais), together with other union members who had worked in the IPES’s Union Sector for Action, who were responsible for drafting a number of reforms aimed at containing the working-class movement, as well as breaking the long-standing relationship defined as “Populist” waged between communist union leaders and the Ministry of Labor in the run-up to the coup. Thus, members of the IPES are said to have made a major effort to establish the principles of new labor laws. Dreyfuss observes that the IPES took on the  Sussman, 1983b, 12.  It was not possible to find additional information about these union leaders from different parts of Brazil.  Rômulo Marinho later served as union advisor to Labor Minister Jarbas Passarinho between 1967 and 1968. From 1969 to 1971, he was general director of the National Labor Department, in addition to being secretary in other public positions during the military regime.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 318.  Methvin, 1966, 28.

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task of gathering information on the laws of the other Latin American nations with the help of the Brazilian ambassadors in those countries to give the government the basic information it needed to change the labor code. Business leaders linked to the IPES were responsible for listing labor issues, and workers’ demands were referred to committees that included ministers and directors of government agencies and independent bodies. They acted “as a hub for collecting and distributing information, transforming it into feasibility studies and operational recommendations that could be communicated to activists who made decisions within the administration of the State.”⁹⁴ In an organized fashion, coup supporters and Goulart’s enemies were planning the new guidelines for a new government.

 Dreyfuss, 1981, 439 and 449.

Chapter II “What is good for the United States is good for Brazil” (1964 – 1967) We are on the threshold of the new year. The city, Brazil and the whole world were thrilled by the festive arrival of 1964. Everywhere, in homes, clubs, fields, farms, hospitals, barracks, prisons, etc., fervent prayers rise to the creator, hoping for better days, happier years, more harmony and more understanding. May the statesmen of this planet, setting aside precautions and misunderstandings, understand each other without the usual “squeamishness,” holding hands friendly and sincerely for the benefit of justice, peace, freedom and human fraternity. Otherwise, we will have nothing to expect but annihilation, chaos, of which the war of nerves has been a constant and undesirable harbinger. 1963 is gone. 1964 is here.¹

On April 2, 1964, homemakers, business leaders, students, conservative members of the Catholic clergy, union leaders and others took to the streets to celebrate the fall of President João Goulart with the March of the Family with God for Liberty.² From the office of the Institute for Research and Social Studies (IPES), jubilant business leaders watched the commotion in the streets, pleased with this win in the fight against communism. For the ipesianos, as members of the IPES were called, their organization was a good forum for debate and making decisions regarding their interests; “they saw themselves as the ‘private-sector government’ that should support the ‘public government,’ which they themselves would inspire and equip with their own people.”³ Thus, the coup’s supporters hoped to take charge of setting the basic guidelines for the new government and influence the appointment of individuals who would occupy key posts in the new administration. Business leaders and directors of private banks would play a direct role in formulating policy on the financial system. At the American Embassy, analysts reported the workers’ supposed inability to back Goulart. According to the São Paulo consulate’s report, “The April Rev-

Note: “What is good for the United States is good for Brazil”: Statement by Juracy Magalhães made when he was Brazil’s ambassador to the United States during the Castello Branco administration (1964 – 1966). His words became known as a symbol of the period when the Brazilian government prioritized US economic interests. Dicionário Histórico Biográfico Brasileiro pós1930. 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. FGV, 2001.  A Noite, January 3, 1964, 2.  O Estado de S. Paulo, April 3, 1964, 7.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 420-421 and 433. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-007

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olution has had a gigantic impact on São Paulo labor, both eliminating the widespread corruption and communist infiltration, and in offering the first opportunity in many years to develop an informed and democratic set of trade union leaders.” Minister Consul General Niles W. Bond observed that the “Revolution” had shown “how superficial the communist labor apparatus was,” claiming that workers had “failed completely to answer the call for a general strike.” According to him, the strike had been planned by union leader Dante Pellacani.⁴ Now that the so-called “internal enemies” had been removed, pursued and arrested, the path was finally clear for American unions to launch series of educational and aid programs in urban and rural areas with a view to introducing “free unionism” in Brazil. The demobilization of the union movement caused by the rise of the military marked the beginning a new project to educate workers with an emphasis on training union leaders. From that point on, the country saw an explosion of courses and seminars organized by a group of foreign and national union entities.⁵ By analyzing the activities of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), I will try to demonstrate how three different projects planned to be carried out after the military coup were developed. The first, formulated by foreign unions with support from the governments of Brazil and the United States and “democratic” Brazilian union leaders, aimed at encouraging the entry of foreign capital, investments in the training of the Brazilian workforce and the implementation of new rules for the regulation of labor in that country. At the same time, Brazilian business leaders associated with the IPES wanted to develop a labor relations program based on the principles of “Christian neo-capitalism.” In exchange, they expected the government to encourage the development of Brazilian businesses. Allied with the conservative Catholic groups that were active in the unions, these Brazilian businessmen advocated a third way to harmonize relations between capital and labor, based on the practice of cooperativism, and sharing the company’s management and profits. However, the multinationals, more specifically, the American corporations, sought to establish a presence in the country and take advantage of the major incentives offered by

 Pellacani was president of the CGT, the workers’ union organized outside the state’s corporatist apparatus. His name was on the first list of abrogations issued by the dictatorial regime (AI1). After being granted political asylum by the Uruguayan embassy, Pellacani went into exile in Czechoslovakia, later returning to Brazil during the dictatorship in 1969. “Semi-Annual Political Review – January-June 1964” (1964). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library. brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:335295/, accessed on June 30, 2021.  Ibid.

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Brazil’s pro-US foreign policy while benefiting from the repressive measures taken by the Castello Branco administration, which greatly facilitated the exploitation of the local workforce.

Explaining the coup to the Americans Soon after the coup d’état, a group of Brazilian business leaders including José Luís Bulhões Pedreira, Paulo Reis de Magalhães, Luiz Villares, João Reginaldo Cotrim, Paulo Ayres Filho and Israel Klabin, accompanied by the director of the IPES, Harold Cecil Poland, went to the United States to meet with US investors and authorities. Poland and the Brazilian delegation also gave several interviews to the American press to better explain the Brazilian “Revolution” and overcome what they interpreted as the false impression that the military had seized power imprudently. As a result, they intended to present the new government’s economic plans to the Americans and make it clear that “this [administration] did not rise to power as a military dictatorship avid for control but with the aim of revitalizing the life of the country as quickly as possible.” They also met with the Inter-American Council and the Under-Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann, Alliance for Progress Director W. W. Rostow, Ambassador Ellsworth and George Woods, president of the World Bank. The Brazilian businessmen tried to convince them that the “Revolution” was broader and deeper than previously thought, and that it had been carried out by a middle class that was indignant about the corruption and communist “infiltration” in their country.⁶ Paulo Ayres Filho gave a talk about the “Brazilian Revolution” at a symposium on the global importance of Latin America held at the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University in July 1964. In his view, it was impossible to explain the 1964 movement without addressing the events that culminated in Goulart’s departure. At the end of his presentation, the businessman criticized the negative approach to the civilian-military movement taken by most of the European and American press, which he attributed to complete ignorance of the facts. Ayres said that the communists no longer had any chance of controlling Brazil, although they could still stir up conflict. In his speech, the business lead-

 Boletim informativo do IPES, no. 25, vol. III, August 1964, 25. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.

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er defended the actions of the Armed Forces, alleging that Goulart’s overthrow was necessary to prevent Brazil from becoming a larger version of Cuba.⁷ The business leaders’ mission seems to have achieved good results. When he returned from the United States, Paulo Reis de Magalhães, director of the IPES and former president of the Bank of the State of São Paulo, declared that the Castello Branco government had unlimited credit and full support from the US for the “reconstruction” of Brazil. In addition to giving technical and fiscal explanations of the economic stability plan, the delegation of Brazilian businessmen stated that the new government was committed to fulfilling the public’s expectations and aimed to make improvements in the system of land use system, banking, and affordable housing. He also said that, when they were considered “genuine,” the people’s demands would be heard, and measures were being taken to put an end to political control over the unions.⁸ In addition to the business leaders, Carlos Lacerda went to Europe at Castello Branco’s request on the same mission: convincing public opinion of the democratic nature of the political movement that overthrew Goulart.⁹ Philip Siekman addressed the lack of understanding of the meanings of the so-called “Brazilian Revolution” in the United States in an article entitled “When Executives Turned Revolutionaries,” published in Fortune magazine. According to that author, it was “hitherto untold” story: “how São Paulo businessmen conspired to overthrow Brazil’s Communist-infected government.” Eager to increase their investments, some foreign companies were said to be so enthusiastic about by new political environment that they quickly grew their business in Brazil. However, other American investors were cautiously awaiting the repercussions of Goulart’s overthrow. According to Siekman, their skepticism was explained, in part, by the fact that the American press had not covered all aspects of the “Revolution.”¹⁰ To recount those events and give due credit to the people whose actions led to Goulart’s overthrow, Siekman sought to underscore the role in the military coup of São Paulo businessmen who, in his view, had played an essential part in the coup’s success. In the words of an unnamed Bra-

 Lecture by Paulo Ayres Filho, entitled “The Brazilian Revolution” given at the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University in July 1964. Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA, document no. 72035.  Notícias do IPES, n. 3, vol. I. São Paulo, Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2, July 1964.  Sending Carlos Lacerda abroad may have been a strategic move on the part of Castello Branco to get him out of the way while the new government was being installed. It was no secret that Lacerda had backed the coup with the ambition of becoming president of Brazil. Neto, 2004, 277.  “When Executives Turned Revolutionaries,” by Philip Siekman, published in Fortune magazine, September 1964. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 21, package 3.

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zilian quoted in Siekman’s article, “Now that it has turned out so beautiful, everybody wants to be father of the child.” After singing the praises of the São Paulo business community, the author stressed the role of Paulo Ayres Filho, regarded as a capable leader of the pharmaceutical industry. In 1961, the São Paulo executive reportedly received a phone call from a “stranger who shared his fears” about a possible leftist revolution in Brazil. He was a young businessman from Rio de Janeiro named Gilbert Huber Jr., who we met in the previous chapter. He owned business ventures that had prospered in Brazil after World War II, including the creation of Brazilian telephone directories. The two men began meeting on a regular basis. Soon, the head of Banco do Brasil, João Baptista Figueiredo, and other friends of Ayres Filho and Huber began discussing how to “counter the statist and leftist propaganda echoing through Brazil.” This reportedly led to the creation of the IPES. All told, the IPES brought together about 400 companies, most of them based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. While Ayres Filho was taking action, a group of Goulart’s opponents in São Paulo, linked to the IPES and initially made up of three lawyers (Luis Werneck, João Adelino Prado Neto and Flávio Galvão – the latter, editor of O Estado de S. Paulo , a traditional and conservative newspaper, in tune with the thinking of the elites), met with several São Paulo executives and professionals. Julio de Mesquita Filho, owner of O Estado de S. Paulo, and Adhemar de Barros, governor of São Paulo State, were prominent members of this movement. Barros is said to have opened lines of communication with other governors sympathized with the “revolutionary group,” such as Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara. They soon made the acquaintance of Rubens Resstel, a veteran of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Força Expedicionária Brasileira; FEB),¹¹ who formed the link between the IPES collaborators and the military, an alliance that would later result in Goulart’s downfall. Once the military men and civilians backing the coup were in power, the Castello Branco administration issued a number of emergency decrees during its first year to stabilize the currency and economy with a view to curbing inflation, attracting foreign investors and resuming economic growth. Roberto Campos was committed to the policy of encouraging the influx of foreign capital as a means of creating employment opportunities and obtaining technical and financial aid from international agencies, particularly the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, the Planning Minister relied on designing a wage policy that could

 The FEB was a division of the Brazilian Army sent to Europe to fight in World War II alongside the Allies.

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benefit workers with the fruits of economic development, as long as those measures went hand in hand with the fight against inflation. With regard to its housing policy, the government was expected to turn the “less favored classes” into homeowners while “encouraging the construction industry to absorb unskilled labor.”¹²

Executives must study too! A few months after the coup, the mood among the business leaders and other opponents of Goulart was optimistic and fully supportive of the civilian-military government. According to Paulo Ayres Filho, a major pharmaceutical executive, the “Revolution” was still under way. During this new phase, which the ipesianos saw as a time for “rebuilding the country,” the IPES’s mission was to bring about “business reform” through a program to educate Brazilian executives. In addition to training sessions and conferences, the program invested in the production of several “educational” films on labor relations.¹³ Classes and seminars were offered periodically in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The institute said it was striving to “put private enterprise at the forefront of national progress.” To this end, it was offering current affairs courses aimed at business executives, as well as organizing debates, study groups to understand specific problems, publications, and conferences, while holding meetings with “men from the government.” For Gilberto Huber, a young ipesiano and advertising executive, employers should not limit themselves to their own busineses. It was imperative that they acquire a general perspective the economy and be willing to work in the sectors where they were most needed. Employers should take charge of accelerating economic development.¹⁴ Leopold Geyer, the owner of Masson, a jewelry store based in Rio de Janeiro, became an exemplary case of a businessman who was committed to balancing social relations, as an article published in the IPES’s monthly newsletter emphasized. Geyer’s establishment was considered a “true example of the democratization of capital.” Any of his 263 employees who had been on the payroll for over three years could buy shares

 Boletim Informativo IPES, no. 29, vol. III, December 1964, 19. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.  The films produced include: Que é democracia?; Depende de mim; Criando homens livres; História de um maquinista; Nordeste, problema número 1; Asas da democracia; A boa empresa; Conceito de empresa; and Portos paralíticos. Ibid., 26.  Boletim informativo do IPES, no. 13, August 1963, vol. II, 11. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 35, package QI.

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in the company, based on criteria that considered their years with the company and wages. For the IPES, this was an exemplary case of integration between employees and businesses – of harmony between labor and capital.¹⁵ In an article published in the IPES’s monthly newsletter in 1964, Carrido Torres suggested bringing about “authentic” reform in the thinking and behavior of Brazilian businesses. In his view, private enterprise should give priority to contributing to economic development and acting as a tool for income distribution. Torres believed that the key to harmonizing capital-labor relations lay in productivity, followed by the fair distribution of income and, consequently, by purchasing power. Naturally, Torres gave the United States as an example to be followed by Brazilian executives and foreign investors in Brazil. In the US, he said, “employees discuss company policy with their employers and their opinions are heard and accepted.” What was at stake, he argued, was the democratization of property rather than socialization. To confirm the formula for success, Torres suggested that his readers learn about American workers’ standard of living.¹⁶ In his view, they did not have any working-class awareness because it was unnecessary. There, workers considered themselves to be members of the middle class, owning their own homes, refrigerators, and cars, “all thanks to the purchasing power of their wages.”¹⁷ In a joint article published in the newsletter, other IPES students and staff members, including Alberto Venâncio Filho, Fernando da Silva Sá, Aurélio Ribeiro Viegas and Sebastião Ribeiro da Luz, stressed the importance of the so-called “work community.” This was supposedly based on the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, set forth in the three papal encyclicals, Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno and Mater et Magistra, which were based on what they called “the new concept of the company.” To this end, the subjects of profit sharing, the right to a share in property and the model of business co-management should be discussed. Clearly, Catholic Social Doctrine had a powerful influence on the IPES, especially the thinking of “Christian Solidarity,” which was widely disseminated in Brazil by Father Fernando Bastos Ávila. The authors started from the premise that profit sharing, covered in article 157, item IV of the 1946 Constitution, gave workers the right to share in the common good created by all. Shared ownership, the authors argued, meant the de-

 Boletim informativo do IPES, n. 2627, vol. III, September-October 1964, 13. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.  Boletim informativo do IPES, n. 2627, ano III, setembro-outubro de 1964, pp. 1617. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.  An example of the stereotype of the successful American worker widely spread by propagandists in the United States is the cartoon series entitled Joe: King of the Workers of the World!, ; accessed on August 10, 2020.

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mocratization of capital. Generally speaking, it would give more people access to ownership of the securities that represented the companies’ social capital.¹⁸ The ipesianos did seem to be concerned about Brazilian executives’ lack of preparation. According to José Roberto Whitaker Penteado, since the early 1960s the United States had been setting up management training centers in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, with courses run by the American Management Association. However, Penteado pointed out a mistake – quite commonly made, according to him – on the Americans’ part. When they launched this type of initiative abroad, they believed that “what is good for the United States is good for the rest of the world.” Penteado argued that this attitude was totally inappropriate in the field of business management in Brazil. In part, this was because the American method, which was based on the exchange of experience and debate, was difficult to apply in his country due to the “well-known differences [in social and educational backgrounds] among Brazilian executives.” Nevertheless, Penteado believed that specialized Brazilian departments were striving to train executives. They included the IPES, the Brazilian Institute of Business Administration, the Association of Christian Business Leaders and the Productivity Center of Industrial Federations based in several parts of the country, especially in the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre. In addition to these initiatives, some universities were beginning to invest in educating their students in the field of business administration.¹⁹ In 1965, the Council for Latin America (CLA) decided to hire more professionals to staff its Public Relations Department in its Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo offices. The CLA’s objective was to boost executive training activities in Brazil. These programs were carried out in partnership with the Social Action Fund (FAS) with funding from private American businesses based in that country. In addition to training, the CLA invested in the production of films aimed at the workers and managers of foreign companies. The highlights of the CLA’s productions included O preço da vida (The Price of Life), a documentary about the international pharmaceutical industry’s contributions Brazilians’ public health and well-being; Terra proibida (Forbidden Territory), which showed how a private company had transformed a dry and inhospitable part of northeastern Brazil into a fertile garden; and Esta é a minha vida (This is My Life), the success story of a Brazilian worker who provided services to a private company.²⁰ The IPES also had an “integration group” made up of 20 members, including executives and  Boletim informativo do IPES, no. 1920, vol. III, February-March 1964, 22-23. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 2.  Notícias do IPES, no. 5, vol. I, September 1964, 2. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 35, package QI.  Council for Latin America Report, October 1965. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 39, package 2.

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professionals who helped organize those events.²¹ The subjects covered in the courses on topical subjects for executives addressed everything from Brazil’s demographics to the aspirations of its people. ²² In 1967 and 1968, the IPES offered a number of business training courses in partnership with the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro for business training.²³

The influence of Catholic Social Doctrine on Brazilian business leaders Father Ávila presented “Christian Solidarity” or “Community Solidarity” as an alternative means of development in Brazil. This was supposed to act as a “third way” between socialism and savage capitalism, a way out of the dilemma imposed by the Cold War, which he considered “absolute and irreducible.” However, “Christian Solidarity” should not be influenced by “totalitarian, anti-Christian and anti-democratic socialism.”²⁴ In his view, there was no reason for Brazil to fit into a bipolar scheme that was far-removed from reality.²⁵ Father Ávila’s book had an impact in union, student and political circles and was widely publicized by political figures such as Franco Montoro, Afonso Camargo, José Richa, all members and supporters of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), as well as by Labor Minister Jarbas Passarinho (1967– 1969). In an interview published in the O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper in 2005, the then-former minister declared himself an admirer of the Catholic Church’s Social Doctrine, especially of Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and Pope John XXIII’s In addition to these encyclicals, Passarinho was inspired by Father Fernando Bastos de Ávila’s book Neocapitalismo, socialismo, solidarismo (Neocapitalism, Socialism, Solidarity) published in 1963, which he considered highly instructive and convincing.²⁶ “Christian Solidarity” was said to have gained support because, at the time, it was an option for people who were actively involved in student and party politics but rejected the ideology of Socialism because they found it incompatible with Christianity.²⁷ This Catholic movement rejected the idea of the collectivization of private property by the State as a solution to capitalist ex-

 In 1965, 90 members joined the IPES, including 27 legal persons and 63 private individuals.  Boletim Informativo do IPES, no. 44, vol. V, May 1966, 50. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 4.  See IPES bulletins published in October 1968. Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 37, package 5.  Pe. Fernando Bastos de Ávila. Solidarismo. Rio de Janeiro: Agir, 1965, 14.  Ibid., 55.  “Nostalgia e revolta,” O Estado de S. Paulo, September 20, 2005, 2.  Borba, 2004.

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ploitation. However, Father Ávila stressed that the Church condemned the abuse of economic power by individuals and private groups and recognized that the State had the right to nationalize or expropriate property under specific conditions. Nevertheless, the Church also approved the right to impose effective limits on the exercise of property rights. When analyzing the socialist ideology, Ávila pointed out the conflict between the social character of production and the individual character of the appropriation of the means of production or its results.²⁸ In response to this conflict, Ávila cited alternative examples as a way for individuals to share ownership of private property, including the creation of corporations in which the workers themselves could be shareholders. He also gave the example of forming cooperative associations as an alternative model of management, as well as the existence of business councils.The São Paulo Christian Democrats, who had been associated with the party since the 1950s, were concerned about drafting bills for the regulation of profit sharing, which was provided for in the 1946 Constitution. That provision was considered a dead letter in labor relations. According to Áureo Busetto, the approval of a regulatory law was not only a constitutional requirement but the application of “one of the proposals of its ideological-doctrinal ideology aimed at raising the country’s economic and social order to the levels of social justice in regard to labor relations.” It was hoped that profit sharing would create a new mindset about capital-labor relations, increasing and improving workers’ participation in the life of the company. As a result, the unions would be able to fight for autonomy and oppose communist leaders. According to Busetto, the communists were critical of participationist ideas because “they believed that workers would be much more concerned with the companies’ interests than with those of their profession.”²⁹ Since the 1950s, the Christian Democrats had advocated the decentralization of government, in line with Catholic Social Doctrine. According to Pius XI’s encyclicals, it was not the State but society that had the role of engaging in socioeconomic activities. To reform the State, the Christian Democrats advocated an administrative planning with the active participation of “representatives of the intermediate communities,” such as professional organizations, unions, cooperatives and neighborhood associations. Franco Montoro, one of the most influential Christian Democratic politicians in São Paulo, also advocated the creation of other labor rights, such as family wages, which should be paid by the compa-

 Ávila, 1965, 80.  Busetto, 2001, 241.

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nies.³⁰ As we can see, the ideals of US trade unionism and Brazilian Catholic groups converged until the early years of the Castello Branco administration, mainly with regard to supporting the participation of workers in companies’ profits, cooperatives, co-ownership, co-management and the search for balance in capital and labor relations in general. The alliance and cooperation between these two movements would be essential for the development of a project to reform labor relations, identified with anti-communist and democratic values. As Silvia Manfredi observes, in the 1960s, the main focus was on building a social capitalist system whose objective was the gradual transformation of private companies into working communities or co-operatives.³¹

“The United States Trust Brazil”³² In terms of foreign policy, the Castello Branco administration broadly signaled its desire to cooperate with the United States’ interests and return to “the bosom of the Western community.” Vasco Leitão da Cunha, a graduate of the Escola Superior de Guerra (War College; ESG), who was also linked to the IPES, remained in the post of Foreign Affairs Minister. His wife had taken part in the IPES-led campaign to mobilize the middle class. Shortly thereafter, he left that post and was replaced by Juracy Magalhães, then the Brazilian ambassador to the United States. Both men would play an important role in relations between Brazilian and American trade unions. By 1965, changes in Brazil’s foreign policy guidelines had already been outlined. The idea was to provide “special guarantees for US investment in Brazil, while any restrictions imposed by previous governments on the remittance of capital and normal or extraordinary profits have been lifted.” To ensure the collective security of the Americas, Brazil and the United States began sharing roles in the fields of economics, politics, ideology and the military. Based on this new diplomatic agreement, Brazil supported the military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965.³³ Brazil’s policy of commitment to US interests in the defense of the “continent against external and internal subversion and oppression” was introduced under Vasco Leitão

 Ibid., 263.  FNT activists, however, also shared these ideas, but were influenced by other political and ideological currents. Manfredi, 1986, 150.  The title of an article published in Notícias do IPES, n. 3, ano I, julho de 1964. São Paulo, Arquivo Nacional, IPES, box 35, package QI.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 441-442.

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da Cunha.³⁴ Cunha believed that Brazil should recognize its financial debt to American creditors, reimburse losses (IMF) and regain a position of respect in the world. However, Cunha denied that the United States’ financial support for Brazil was conditional on its compliance with the anti-communist political doctrine of the Cold War, stressing that the new American loans granted after the “Revolution” had been spontaneous, and that the Castello Branco administration was free to use the foreign aid as it pleased.³⁵ Paradoxically, Cunha defended “a traditional policy [of] keeping pace with the United States, but not being in tow.” Juracy Magalhães believed it was time to overcome the past misunderstandings that had done so much harm to good relations between Brazil and the United States. To this end, he invited representatives of American private enterprise to learn about the new reality in his country and consider the possibility of increasing foreign participation in the Brazilian economy. In a lecture given to business directors at Johns Hopkins University in January 1965, Brazil’s ambassador to the United States clearly specified his country’s needs: What we need in Brazil today are the means to create more wealth and more jobs, more opportunities for work and progress for all Brazilians: what we can offer is a huge range of opportunities for good investments in a new land animated by enthusiasm at its own rediscovery and driven by the conviction of the greatness of its destiny.³⁶

In exchange for encouraging the presence of American capital on Brazilian soil and providing political, diplomatic, ideological, and military support, the Castello Branco administration wanted the United States to transfer resources to Brazil. The regime expected to receive a number of benefits, including financial and technological measures to boost economic development, long-term loans, technical cooperation, the replacement of transnational companies’ corporate headquarters with Brazilian subsidiaries and the opening of the US market to the primary and industrial products of the multinationals based in Brazil. According to Vizentini, “Brazilian diplomacy expected preferential treatment in the region, given the international status of each country, conferring a sub-leadership role on Brazil.”³⁷ One of the Castello Branco administration’s first measures was to

 Cunha, 2003, 270.  Ibid., 285-286.  Speech by Juracy Magalhães, given at a meeting of business directors held at the Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies on January 22, 1965, quoted in Magalhães, 1971.  As shown by the political, diplomatic, ideological, and military support it received, the Castello Branco government broke diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba and China, sup-

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repeal the law that controlled the remittance of profits.³⁸ The new regime entered into an agreement with American groups to indemnify the companies that had been nationalized by the Goulart administration. As Vizentini noted, the US government’s response was swift. USAID and other institutions, such as the IDB and later the IMF and the World Bank, made hundreds of millions of dollars available to the Castello Branco government – funds that had been blocked for President Goulart.³⁹

Castello Branco’s labor policy Although the path was finally clear for the AFL-CIO to carry out its “free unionism” project in Brazil, the American unionists had to deal with the divergent interests of the State and national and foreign business executives, but they also faced another obstacle – the workings of Brazil’s union structure. According to US observers, despite previous efforts, they were a long way from breaking union leaders’ ties of dependence on the State. The two union movements, Movimento Democratico Sindical (MSD) and União Sindical dos Trabalhadores (UST), both of which were conservative and opponents of the CGT, depended on funding hitherto provided by the IPES, the UDN and business executives. Now, it would be up to them to implement “free and democratic unionism.” ⁴⁰ But how? We cannot understand the Brazilian union movement during the initial stage of the military regime, or the union relations between Brazil and the United States and AIFLD project during that period, without analyzing the changes in labor policy initiated by Castello Branco. Soon after his inauguration, the new president delegated powers to the Ministry of Labor to repress and reorganize the union movement. Under the command of Labor Minister Arnaldo Sussekind, new union leaders were appointed to intervene in the main union entities, elections were annulled and, when they were reinstated, the candidacies of many leaders whom the regime considered suspect were vetoed. On the eve of the coup, there were seven confederations, 107 federations and 1,948 urban workers’ unions in Brazil. A year later, the government had inter-

ported the establishment of a Multinational Peace Force in the OAS and participated in the intervention in the Dominican Republic. See Vizentini, 1998, 35-39.  Known as the Profit Remittance Law, approved by President João Goulart, Law no. 4,131, of 1962 regulated the investment of foreign capital and the remittance of funds outside Brazil.  Ibid., 26.  Negro, 2004a, 235.

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vened in 452 unions, 43 federations and 3 confederations.⁴¹ The aim was to demobilize the organizations with the strongest bargaining power and political clout at the time. São Paulo State saw the greatest impact of these measures: 270 workers’ associations suffered interventions. Any organization that was not officially recognized by the State and legalized by the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) was shut down by decree. That included the CGT.⁴² However, the anti-communist conservative Catholic associations which had taken part in the coup continued their activities, albeit without being given the leading role they wanted to play in labor relations. While Castello Branco promised to expand “the workers’ achievements,” behind closed doors CNTI members discussed how the Governing Board should proceed in the next union elections. Ary Campista and Olavo Previatti, president of the São Paulo State Federation of the Paper and Cardboard Industry, were the favorite candidates for the presidency of CNTI.⁴³ Shortly beforehand, the new president had introduced his platform of “redemptive revolution” based on social order and peace (the elimination of the “communist threat”), the fight against corruption and the resumption of growth by stimulating the private sector, while guaranteeing a swift return to democratic normality. At the same time, AIFLD announced that it was offering four scholarships that would enable Brazilian union leaders to study in the United States for three months. The selected applicants included Laurindo Marchezan, identified as an industrialist from Rio Grande do Sul, and Ibrahim Antun Ruiz, from the Santos Port Workers’ Union, who both accepted the invitation.⁴⁴ The ICT‘s newsletter took great pleasure in announcing that several of its students had been appointed as interventors in Brazil’s top unions, including Geraldo Eufrásio de Moura and João Theophilo de Souza, who were respectively invited to head the São Paulo Drivers Trade Union and the Mogi das Cruzes Metalworkers Union. In Guanabara, Rômulo Marinho was appointed to head the Federation of Telegraph Company Workers, who also became an instructor for Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI), and Armando Simões de Carvalho, in the same profession.⁴⁵ Other opponents of Goulart allied with AIFLD

 For more information on the jurist Arnaldo Sussekind’s activities as Minister of Labor, see Gomes; Pessanha & Morel (eds.), 2004.  Alves, 1984, 71-110.  O Estado de S.Paulo, April 30, 1964, 8.  Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, n. 1, 2, April 1964. AEL-Unicamp, coleção Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0307, microfilm APC3, roll 34.  Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, April 1964, 4. AEL-Unicamp, coleção Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0308, microfilm APC3, roll 34.

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were appointed as interventors in unions formerly led by members of the PCB. Some of them had played this role before, and once again were given the opportunity to run the unions, such as the São Paulo Chemical Workers’ Union.⁴⁶ João Wagner, president of the Paraná Federation of Industrial Workers, and Ary Campista were appointed as directors of the CNTI. The news was reported in the major press. The May 30, 1964 issue of the A Noite newspaper reported that the CNTI election was an event “of the greatest importance in the union world.” João Wagner took over as president; Ary Campista, as general secretary, and Olavo Previatti, as treasurer. Campista, who was linked to AIFLD and ORIT, ended his career as a lay judge representing the workers on the Superior Labor Court (TST). In the Northeast, four union leaders who graduated from AIFLD were appointed as interventors, among them José Rotta, who became president of the National Confederation of Farm Workers (CONTAG).⁴⁷ To ensure their loyalty to the new civilian-military government, Castello Branco spoke to the workers in Praça da Sé, in the heart of São Paulo City, a traditional site for political demonstrations, on May 1, 1964. On that occasion, he assured them that his government’s labor policy would be entirely favorable to the workers’ social rights, “improving the standards of protection for workers, strengthening the unions as authentic outlets for the true expression of their members, banning pelegos whose leadership was always based on personal favors received from the government.”⁴⁸ In line with the ideals of US trade unionism, it was expected that May Day celebrations would be held without “the help of union funds or the influence of any governmental bodies”; everything would be done “within the bounds of law and order, with freedom.”⁴⁹ The O Estado de S. Paulo newspaper, run by an ipesiano, portrayed the president’s visit as receiving a warm welcome from workers.⁵⁰ However, the new labor policy quickly proved to be detrimental to workers. The new measures for the implementation of the wage squeeze, as well as direct interference in the judicial decisions on collective bargaining in the Labor Court and the repressive apparatus aimed at controlling the unions’ political activities had a direct impact on the workers’ quality of life and the organized union movement. The repressive apparatus in-

 After the coup, union leaders Luiz Gonzaga Braga and Reinaldo dos Santos, both of whom had been interventors in 1947, returned to the board of the Chemical Workers’ Union. Ata da assembleia geral realizada no dia 21 de junho de 1964. Arquivo do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Químicos, Farmacêuticos e Plásticos de São Paulo, box 41.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 310.  Wamberto, 1970, 28.  O Estado de S.Paulo, April 30, 1964, 8.  Ibid., May 3, 1964, cover.

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cluded a number of “revolutionary” public order control measures, such as the abrogation of political rights, the exile of opponents, the transfer of nationalist military personnel to the reserves, and the arrest of leftist militants and nationalist groups that identified with the Goulart government, such as union, political, intellectual and military leaders. The aim of increasing the working class’s purchasing power came to depend exclusively on the development of the Government Economic Action Program (PAEG), the brainchild of liberal, pro-US economists who had been appointed as ministers of Planning and Finance, respectively, Roberto Campos and Otávio Bulhões.⁵¹ The main goals of this new economic plan were to contain inflation and accelerate the pace of economic development through free-market initiative, as well as introducing further measures aimed at creating jobs.⁵² In the field of collective bargaining, the new strike law, no. 4330, dated June 1, 1964, attempted to make the process of legalizing stoppages as difficult as possible and further encouraged the Labor Courts to intervene in collective bargaining between bosses and employees. Solidarity strikes and those considered “political, social or religious in nature” were also deemed illegal. Downing tools to demand the payment of wage arrears and better work conditions was permitted, but the bureaucratic procedure to be followed by the unions made it difficult to recognize them in the labor courts.⁵³ These measures drastically reduced the number of movements based on workers’ demands. According to Alves, “from the 154 strikes in 1962 and 302 in 1963, the total dropped to 25 in 1965, 15 in 1966, 12 in 1970 and zero in 1971. Between 1973 and 1977, there were only 34 strikes and slowdowns.”⁵⁴ In addition to the new strike law, the wage squeeze, regulated by Law no. 4725 of July 13, 1965, restricted the normative powers of the Labor Courts, that is, the power of these special and autonomous courts to create rules and working conditions within the scope of collective bargaining. Unlike the period of relative democracy that marked the years between 1945 and 1964, the cost of living indices, considered key to calculating wage increases, began to be set by the federal government and applied to all professional categories, with no scope for negotiation in the Labor Courts. The Castello Branco administration’s

 For an account of Roberto Campos’s personal involvement in the development of the PAEG, see his autobiography: Campos, 1994, 607-611.  Resende, 1990, 213-231.  Costa, E. S., 1997, 136.  Called “operação tartaruga” (“operation turtle”), this was a form of strike in which workers did their jobs slowly, reducing production without engaging in a collective work stoppage. Alves, 1984, 70.

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labor policy believed that the wage squeeze was the best strategy to fight inflation. As a result, the bosses took wage increases off the table during the first collective bargaining sessions conducted in the second half of 1964.⁵⁵ At Labor Court hearings, businesses disingenuously claimed that they could not comply with the workers’ demands, as the law no longer permitted it.⁵⁶ As a result, setting wage increases was a “merely technical calculation, carried out not at the negotiating table but by impersonal and pressure-resistant state agencies.”⁵⁷ Wary of pro-American euphoria and the narratives propagated by the military regime, the workers gradually suffered the loss of important labor rights, subtracted in favor of economic development.⁵⁸ Two changes directly affected workers. The first was the repeal of the Stability Law, which guaranteed an employee’s job security after ten years with the same company. It was replaced by the newly created Guarantee Fund for Time of Service (FGTS).⁵⁹ Another endangered right was the thirteenth-month salary, which began to be paid in two installments based on the regulation of Law no. 4749, of August 12, 1965.⁶⁰ At the same time, anxious for recognition and promotion within the unions, the interventors strove to convince not only their union members but the people responsible for putting them on the boards (business executives and political authorities) that it was essential to obtain better agreements than those previously negotiated by the nationalist, communist and pro-Goulart leaders removed by the 1964 coup. Not even the “democrats” agreed with the new wage policy. During the May Day celebrations in 1965, Castello Branco gave a speech in Ipatinga, Minas Gerais, in which he based himself on Vargas’s CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws) to say that the “Revolution” was committed to seeing “unionism supported and developed, as understood in Brazilian law, which has never viewed it as a hub of political, party, philosophical or religious propaganda.” Fi-

 On the work of the Labor Courts and the reaction of the magistrates to the new measures adopted by the Castello Branco administration, see Corrêa, 2013.  “10 anos… Texto sobre a situação do povo brasileiro em 10 anos de regime militar no Brasil”, n.d. CEDEM/UNESP, fundo ASMOB, box 17.03.59.4/037.  Alves, 1984, 83.  Negro, 2004a, 258.  It is interesting to note that FGTS currently represents one of the most important labor rights for workers. The recognition of compulsory savings as a right was due to the intensified growth of informal labor relations process in recent years, since the labor reform approved in 2017.  The 13th salary, also known as the Christmas bonus, was a right achieved by workers during the João Goulart administration through law no. 4.090, of July 13, 1962. This law, which only covered formally employed workers, ensured that they would receive an additional month’s pay every year.

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nally, the president announced the end of the intervention process in the unions and the resumption of elections for union directors. However, once again, he had to seek inspiration in Vargas, and, like a father who takes with one hand and gives with the other, he warned the unions to stay “far-removed from those disturbing factors which had not put them at the service of the legitimate interests of their members, but made them tools of merely personal ambitions.” He then stressed the improvements made in the field of social security, extolling the increase in the number of hospitals and the expansion of the health service.⁶¹ It is interesting to note how the military was paradoxically obliged frequently to resort to the “Varguista legacy.” This took the form of workers’ rights legitimized by the CLT. Seeking to win over the working class, Castello Branco would not be the only military president to invoke Vargas’s consolidation of labor laws to convince workers of the sacrifices that should be made for national development. However, the labor measures introduced in the first months of the Castello Branco administration and perpetuated throughout the dictatorship caused most workers to reject the military regime. In the vacuum of the contradiction between Castello Branco’s narrative and the implementation of labor policy, repression played its part, as we will see. To compensate for wage-containment measures, the government announced a five-year plan to build 100,000 workers’ homes, with the assistance of USAID. Subsequently, the National Housing Bank (BNH) was created to fill the deficit in affordable housing. In addition to these measures, the government authorized a decree that allowed for the monetary correction of indemnities approved by the Labor Court. Subsequently, it passed the law on the Rural Workers’ Statute (law no. 4214/66) and, finally, it introduced the FGTS system. Presented as a protective measure for workers who were fired without just cause, the system put pressure on employees to opt for the fund, a kind of savings account paid into by employers, in exchange for the benefit of stability. The fact that employers were no longer required to provide stable employment caused an increase in turnover, accentuating the already widespread idea among workers that, in practice, the Labor Courts were the “courts of the unemployed.” During his first two years in office, Castello Branco carried out a number of political measures that created the conditions for consolidating the authoritarian regime. Institutional Act no. 2 of October 1965 eliminated the existing political parties and authorized just two new ones – the Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating Alliance – ARENA), and the Movimento Democrático Brasi-

 Castello Branco, 1965.

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leiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement – MDB).⁶² That measure also made the election of the president and vice-president of Brazil an indirect process and conferred broad powers on the Executive branch to strip citizens of their political rights. Although by the end of 1965, Castello Branco was clearly taking an anti-democratic course, US officials and union leaders were very enthusiastic about his administration. One reason for their enthusiasm was the Brazilian government’s commitment to the Alliance for Progress. Although they were suspicious about the postponement to October 1966 of the presidential election scheduled for October 1965, observers at the American Embassy believed that the military government would achieve its proposed goals.⁶³

The impacts of pro-US policies and the Brazilian business community’s response According to Dreyfuss, the PAEG “allowed multinational companies, using their subsidiaries in Brazil, to buy Brazilian companies strangled by credit restrictions at very low prices, causing the phenomenon known as denationalization.”⁶⁴ This process worsened the exploitation of the work force through a strategy that combined the reduction of wages with the centralization and concentration of capital. The focus on the production of durable goods strengthened foreign industries, hampering the production of materials used for mass consumption, a sector in which Brazilian companies predominated.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the successive administrations of the military regime strongly backed the centralization of capital in the hands of foreign investors, which was achieved through the intensification of mergers and acquisitions between 1964 and 1973. According to Moniz Bandeira, the measures Castello Branco took to curb inflation, such as “the containment of credit, combined with the compression of wages, and the elimination of subsidies (oil, wheat and paper) and official support for industry,” benefited foreign companies, particularly US businesses, which could fall back on foreign resources to weather the recession in Brazil.

 The institutional acts were decrees with constitutional effect issued during the military regime. Between 1964 and 1969, 17 acts were decreed, resulting in a high degree of centralization, and placing control of national policy in the hands of the Executive branch.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 26, 1965, written by labor attaché Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Dreyfuss, 1981, 425.  Bandeira, 1975, 17.

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Many small and medium-sized Brazilian companies went bankrupt due to a lack of working capital, benefiting American businesses and acquisitions. In the auto industry, Ford acquired Willys Overland, which was 53-percent Brazilian owned; Chrysler bought Simca, a company of French origin, and Volkswagen acquired Vemag, a Brazilian company, while Fábrica Nacional de Motores, a stateowned firm, was transferred to Alfa Romeo. Bandeira relied on a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) report to demonstrate the profound process of denationalization that Brazil had undergone since the beginning of the Castello Branco administration. According to a study conducted by the CPI, between 1964 and 1968 alone, international companies had acquired controlling interest in at least 74 Brazilian businesses.⁶⁶ It did not take long for Brazilian business leaders to express their dislike of competing with the transnational businesses favored by the government. Their criticisms soon won the support of the “hard-line” military, a group of soldiers identified by their strong nationalism and opposition to the “Castelistas” from the Escola Superior de Guerra (War College; ESG).⁶⁷ The “hard-liners” advocated more violent political methods and profound intervention in society through developmentalist nationalism. In a way, their strategies for achieving economic development were similar to those of their “communist” and “nationalist” enemies, who had been persecuted and ousted from the Armed Forces after the coup, as Vizentini observes. In this sense, Costa e Silva’s appointment to the presidency was a response from the “national bourgeoisie” and the nationalist “hard-liners.”⁶⁸ When assessing the positive and negative aspects of the Castello Branco administration, the businessman Paulo Ayres Filho expressed displeasure with the measures taken to stabilize the economy during Roberto Campos’s tenure. According to Ayres Filho, a number and variety of mistakes had compromised the “extraordinary effort to restore the economy.” One of the problems the busi-

 Ibid., 99 and 104.  The so-called “hard liners” were known to include military men with a more radical stance in regard to repressive actions and authoritarian measures. The “Castelistas” earned the label of “moderates” and were also called the “Sorbonne group.” In theory, they defended the transition from the military to the civilian regime through direct presidential elections in 1966. However, recently, the historiography about the Brazilian military dictatorship has been problematizing these labels, deconstructing the image of a moderate democrat to emphasize the fact that Castello Branco was the dictator responsible for laying the foundations for the 21-year authoritarian regime. See: Chirio, Maud. A política nos quartéis. Revoltas e protestos de oficiais na ditadura militar brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012; by the same author: “La politique des militaires, 1961– 1978. Mobilisations et révoltes d’officiers sous la dictature brésilienne”. Bulletin de l’Institut Pierre Renouvin, n° 33, 2011, 109 – 113.  Vizentini, 1998, 30.

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nessman pointed out was the large number of technocrats leading the economic plan: “All of them are civil servants and, therefore, have a tendency to rise up against the mechanism of a market economy” – a direct criticism of the professional and political backgrounds of Roberto Campos and Octávio Bulhões. Ayres Filho also stressed that, in his view, the new administration was ignoring the opinion of the private sector.⁶⁹ The businessman criticized the government’s imposition of short deadlines and rigid goals to boost the national economy, as well as the “hasty drafting of laws and regulations, many of which had to be repeatedly modified.” He also observed that the private sector did not understand the measures taken by the Castello Branco administration. He accused it of raising corporation taxes while restricting access to credit under the pretext of combating inflation. In his opinion, the government was transferring investment capacity from the private sector to the State. In short, in the view of Ayres Filho, the Castello Branco administration’s biggest mistake in the economic sector was lacking confidence in the market economy and discouraging the private sector. However, he hoped that the Costa e Silva administration would consider the private sector “its greatest ally in the campaign against inflation, having it as the main artificer of the development the nation requires.” Thus, the conflicts of interest between the Brazilian business community and foreign multinationals, as well as the expectations and frustrations of local groups regarding first civilianmilitary administration, clearly show that the plan put together by the national business community through the IPES had been discarded in favor of extensive government subsidies granted to attract foreign capital.

“A good union leader is not made overnight” The technical co-operation measures established by the Brazil-United States and AFL-CIO’s international policy included making AIFLD-ICT responsible for training union leaders and growing its activities.⁷⁰ It also established good relations with the Ministry of Labor through Minister Arnaldo Sussekind, who was considered an enthusiastic supporter of the collective bargaining bill. The minister also invested in training new union leaders. According to the embassy, he said, “I am trying to develop new union leaders, capable and honest, of democratic back Manuscript by Paulo Ayres Filho, “Contribuição para um estudo que pretende apontar o lado positivo e o negativo da atual administração e o que se pode esperar da nova”, de março de 1967. CPDOC, coleção Paulo Ayres Filho, PAF, 1966-1967.03.c.  Extract from an article by Adriano Campanhole, “Circulismo e imposto sindical,” published in the Solidarismo newspaper, no. 22, May 1965. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, sem número.

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ground, who are neither communists, nor company stooges, and who won’t even ask the Ministry how they should act.”⁷¹ According to the US Consulate General São Paulo, Sussekind’s support for the training of democratic union leaders was admirable. After a brief term in the ministry, in 1965 Sussekind was replaced by Walter Perachi Barcellos, a congressional deputy and member of the Ação Democrática Popular party (Popular Democratic Action; ADP) of Rio Grande do Sul. Barcellos’ term was also brief. He was replaced in mid-1966 by lawyer and businessman Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva, an IPES lecturer, later elected governor of Rio Grande do Sul. While the turnover of ministers in the Ministry of Labor was underway, the new union leadership came from the conservative and anti-communist MSD. However, Niles W. Bond, from the São Paulo Consulate, believed that communist activities could once again plague the federal government when the next elections were held in organizations that had undergone interventions.⁷² Indeed, supporters of “authentic and democratic” unionism had good reason to be concerned. In October 1965, in the twelve union elections held in São Paulo, six slates backed by leftist militants garnered the most votes. The American experts were also concerned about the situation in Rio de Janeiro. The unions that underwent interventions had lost a large part of their membership, particularly in entities with a stronger communist influence, such as the of metalworkers’ and port workers unions in Rio de Janeiro.⁷³ Another cause for concern was the lack of sufficient leadership training courses to fill all the positions on union boards. Furthermore, Bond observed that São Paulo workers were resentful of the austerity measures in the government’s new economic plan, a situation that was aggravated by the increased cost of living, coupled with the low wage adjustments. These and other factors improved the chances that union leaders with communist links would win the elections. According to Bond, “The São Paulo labor scene during the last half of 1964 was marked by progressive disillusionment with and growing resentment of the Federal Government by the working masses.”⁷⁴ In a private conversation with the minister (consul-general) in São Paulo, Minister Sussekind was pessimistic about the ability of “democratic” leaders

 “Labor Minister Sussekind Explains GOB Labor Policy” (1964). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:344290/, accessed on June 30, 2021.  Ibid.  Alexander, 2003, 146.  “Semi-Annual Political Review – July-December, 1964” (1965). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:345573/, accessed on June 30, 2021.

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to defeat opposing slates, especially in the unions where the CGT exerted a stronger influence, such as the metalworkers, bank workers, printers, and textile and transportation workers. However, some American union allies were working hard to prepare for union elections. As early as 1964, Argeu Egydio dos Santos, considered by the labor attaché to be a competent young leader of the São Paulo Metalworkers’ Federation, traveled throughout the interior of the state to aid and better prepare the leadership in that region. Olavo Previatti, the president of the Federation of Paper and Cardboard Industry Workers and treasurer of CNTI, met with stakeholders to “advise” them on the preparations for launching candidates. Others, like the metalworkers’ union leader Domingos Álvares and the interim delegate of the DRT, Guaracy Sousa Sampaio, proposed that the interventions should continue in the following months of 1965.⁷⁵ AIFLD’s first two years of operations after the military coup were strategic for the implementation of the American collective bargaining method in Brazil. It was a time for gathering information, identifying problems and assessing which projects should be carried out. In the entity’s work plan for Brazil, an under-qualified workforce loomed as one of the biggest problems. Other studies, such as surveying the characteristics of each workers’ confederation and federation, aimed to ensure that left-wing organizations, including imprisoned, exiled and escaped communists, would no longer pose a threat to the new government. Based on these analyses for 1964, AIFLD was developing justifications for its activities. The organization stated that, as of 1964, following the overthrow of the João Goulart administration in Brazil, the western world could breathe easy, because that South American country, especially the Northeast, a predominantly rural and undeveloped area, had rid itself of the communist threat. AIFLD argued that this was an opportunity for the West to take concrete steps to show Brazilian workers and peasants that the labor entity was committed to progress, economic development, and free and democratic unionism. ⁷⁶ Shortly after the coup, a number of other international union organizations also intensified their activities in Brazil, such as the International Trade Secretariats (ITS), the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees (IFCCTE), the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), and the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF). Others included the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF), the Inter-American Federation of Working Newspapermen’s Organizations (IAFWNO) and Post,  Ibid.  According to the National Economic Council, the total estimated workforce numbered 23.1 million in 1958. AIFLD. Country Plan for Brazil – Social Projects Department. Washington, DC, AIFLD, 1964.

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Telegraph and Telephone Workers’ International (PTTI). These entities sought to establish relations with Brazilian unions with a view to increasing their international membership. In the same year as the 1964 coup, the São Paulo State Federation of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Workers joined the IFPCW.⁷⁷ Affiliated with the ICFTU, the ITS had begun focusing on Latin America in the late 1950s. According to Robert Alexander, two organizations linked to the ITS had a special interest in establishing themselves in Latin America: the IFPCW and the ITF, mainly in Venezuela.⁷⁸ However, although it was well known that educating Brazilian union leaders was a long and ambitious project, it had to provide immediate results. Clearly expectant and excited, AIFLD representatives spared no efforts to publicize the “remarkable improvements” made in the unions. For example, first ICT activity report, published in 1964, underscores the desire to emphasize the democratic nature of the programs, as well as the investment in training union leaders. As it feared the return of groups considered to be communists, this was no time to hide the ICT’s ideological stance and close cooperation with the United States, which had been kept quiet in the run-up to the coup. As proposals for the reformulation of labor laws were being presented, American union organizations, including AIFLD-ICT and the IFPCW, held events to discuss independent collective bargaining methods. For example, a seminar held from September 8 to 12, 1964 focused on “union orientation,” including lectures on the history of the union movement, administration, finance, political and union guidance, social security, collective labor contracts, international unionism, communist strategies and tactics, cooperatives, and labor law, among other topics. According to reports from the political police, the event was attended by several students from the Union of Chemical Workers of Campinas, Cubatão and Osasco.⁷⁹ When studying collective hiring processes, participants simulated negotiations with business groups. The teachers included Gustavo Monzon Quintero, from Colombia; Armando Arevalo Silva, from Peru; Efraim Velasquez, from Puerto Rico; Arnaldo de Souza Dias, from the Santos Union of Urban Rail Workers; Hugo Miorin, president of the Campinas Hat Workers’ Union; and Diva Benevides Pinho, a lecturer at the São Paulo Law School.⁸⁰

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil, May 28, 1965, July to December 1964, by Harold Shapiro. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Alexander, 1961, 50.  Report on several subjects, dated September 17, 1964. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-01– 369.  Interview with Diva Benevides Pinho emailed to the author on May 1, 2010.

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In June 1964, the National Conference of Brazilian Union Leaders took place in Rio de Janeiro City, organized by the National Confederation of Industrial Commerce Workers (CNTC) and Mass Transport Workers, an event that was widely reported in the mass media.⁸¹ At the meeting, for which AIFLD conducted the debates, the subjects discussed included the practice of collective bargaining, the right to strike, the workings of the Labor Courts, profit sharing, housing, government interventions and the compulsory compensation fund. The leaders of several local unions were invited to discuss the new strike law and approved a motion that supported the government’s power to determine, at its convenience, whether a strike could be considered legal or not. The meeting also unanimously approved a resolution that demanded union autonomy and freedom, based on the ILO convention, an act that the American Embassy made a point of emphasizing to the State Department.⁸² Nevertheless, although the Brazilian press was generally sympathetic towards the actions of foreign union entities, the Correio da Manhã newspaper on June 11, 1964 emerged as a dissident voice in the media when criticizing the National Conference of Brazilian Union Leaders. It reported that the event had had “a terrible impact in the most respectable Brazilian union sectors,” as the resolutions were drafted by “foreign elements completely divorced from the realities of Brazilian unions, concerned exclusively with political issues.”⁸³ That same month, the director of AIFLD’s Social Projects Department, William Doherty, Jr., went to Brazil with the mission of agreeing the details of a $10-million loan from the AFL-CIO for the construction of 5,000 affordable homes to be delivered to union workers. Doherty met with Roberto Gebara, the São Paulo State Labor Secretary, to present the AFL-CIO’s plans for social projects. At the time, Gebara gave a talk at the ICT in which he “extolled the democratic thesis of aid for the needy,” going on to ask: “What would Cuba or the Soviet Union offer us?” To which he immediately replied, “firing squads to spread death and terror.”⁸⁴ A year later, the intensive effort to train union leaders

 Correio da Manhã, June 7, 1964; Diário de Notícias, June 7, 1964; Jornal do Comércio, June 7, 1964; O Globo, June 7, 1964. Newspaper clippings collected by Evaristo de Moraes Filho, attached to the final report of the CPI on foreign entities in Brazil. Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, BrasíliaDF, Diário do Congresso Nacional, seção I, August 28, 1970.  Report from the US Embassy to the US State Department, dated August 4, 1964, written by Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1283.  Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, no. 4, 2, July 1964. AEL-Unicamp, Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0310, microfilm APC3, roll 34.  Ibid.

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continued. On July 19, 1965, in a lecture on collective hiring given to an audience of about 30 people at the Federation of Workers’ Circles in São Paulo, Freitas Marcondes cited the laws of several countries that practiced free contractual negotiations. He observed that the CLT already had a legal instrument that allowed agreements between employers and employees to be reached without the intervention of the Labor Courts; however, that instrument needed to be put into practice. He underscored the advantages of employment contracts, including the partial elimination of labor courts and the natural reduction of collective and individual lawsuits. Albeit with reservations, he also defended the Labor Code bill drafted by Evaristo de Morares Filho, claiming that it devoted an entire topic to collective work contracts. The idea of drafting a bill for new Labor Code originated during Jânio Quadros’s 1960 election campaign, when Evaristo de Moraes Filho was invited to advise the presidential candidate on labor law-related matters. Among the changes introduced in the first draft of the bill, the author proposed a redefinition of the right to strike (then regulated by decree no. 9070), claiming that it was, in fact, the right to “a half-strike, since this decree did more to punish than benefit such movements.”⁸⁵ The preliminary draft also called for the establishment of four general confederations for employers, employees, the self-employed and professionals. Their leaders were to be chosen through free elections and could not be re-elected.⁸⁶ When debating the bill, union leaders wanted to know the industrialists’ opinions on free collective bargaining. Marcondes stated that “there was a somewhat negative reaction on the part of employers, but more out of ignorance than opposing interests.” Finally, the Federation of Workers’ Circles undertook to hold a campaign to shed light on the matter, with a view to introducing employment contracts in the near future.⁸⁷ The same subject had already been discussed at a previous meeting held in March 1965, which brought together Circle members from São Paulo, Paraná and Mato Grosso. At the time, the topics discussed included the limits and the practice of labor conventions and the elimination of the union tax. According to an article by Adriano Campanhole published in the Solidarismo newspaper, until the unions managed to eliminate the union tax, it should be

 Moraes Filho; Russomano & Catharino, 1965.  Ibid.  Report on “Palestra proferida por Freitas Marcondes, subordinada ao tema contrato coletivo de Trabalho,” July 19, 1965. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento número 50-J-152-1362.

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scrutinized by the Brazilian Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas da União).⁸⁸ For the author of that article, it was not a trivial recommendation. The elimination of the tax should be a process, and it should be replaced by collective labor agreements that would allow the levying of a fee from non-members for the benefits they obtained by signing those agreements. The success of the negotiations should rely on the strength of the union, as was theoretically believed to be the case in the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore, it was essential for workers to get involved in the life of the unions. That was the only way for their members reach leadership positions, Campanhole observed. However, […] a good leader is not just honest. Being honest is obligatory. A good leader knows the labor laws, knows the technique of collective bargaining. He understands public relations. Above all, he must know the problems of the professional category he represents. A good union leader is not made overnight. A leader is practically born. But he must be perfected.⁸⁹

This explains the drive to hold trade union leadership courses, which were then being offered throughout the country. The courses organized by the circulistas consisted of two cycles. The first was introductory, imparting basic knowledge. It was the second, which could only be taken by those who had passed the beginners’ cycle, which made it possible to evaluate the students’ leadership capacity. Those skills would later be tested in practice at the general union assemblies. The efforts of the circulistas to provide cadres of “politically uncommitted” leaders to fill the void left by interventions in the unions, as well as their support for the military regime, led the most progressive sectors of the union movement and the Catholic Church to identify them as supporters “of the current model of social-political domination.” Because of their political and ideological stance, Workers’ Circles were excluded from the Latin American Confederation of Christian Unionists (CLASC) and the International Confederation of Christian Unionists (CISS).⁹⁰ Between 1964 and 1972, the CLASC began backing Brazilian Social Cooperation (CSB), which brought together representatives from a wide range of progressive and nationalist union and political organizations, such as the National Labor Front (Frente Nacional do Trabalho, FNT) and People’s Action (Ação Popular, AP), among others. According to Manfredi, at the time the CSB was acting

 Introduced in the 1940s, the union tax or union contribution was a mandatory contribution paid by union workers and was equivalent to one day’s wages. The tax was abolished by the 2017 labor reform.  Solidarismo, no. 22, May 1965, 3. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, s.n.  Manfredi, 1986, 64.

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as a “front for connecting the various Catholic movements that had bases within the working classes, both in rural and urban areas.” The aim was to create a “political plan of action within the process of transforming Brazilian society.” One of its basic tactics was the creation of specific sectors of leadership training.⁹¹ In his speech at the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference in July 1964, Labor Minister Sussekind, stressed that the training of union leaders who were committed to “authentic unionism” was a key issue in the labor policy outlined by the Castello Branco administration. In addition to the lessons broadcast on the Ministry of Labor’s radio station, others were offered by universities, unions and private associations. Sussekind stressed the importance of the courses offered by Catholic Workers’ Circles. Openly encouraging direct collective bargaining, Sussekind observed that a bill had been sent to the Brazilian Congress to motivate and facilitate direct negotiations between workers and employers, a document that will be analyzed at the end of this chapter.⁹² US labor attaché Herbert Baker considered the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI) seminar on collective bargaining, held in Rio de Janeiro in early 1965, to be a success. However, the American analyst regretted the fact that the cooperative of the Rio de Janeiro Union of Telephone Industry Workers had been closed due to a lack of members. Alberto Schtirbu, a representative of the Inter-American Federation of Professional Journalists Organization (FIOPP) in Brazil, backed the winning slate that ran for the leadership of the São Paulo Journalists Union, headed by Adriano Campanhole. However, they won without obtaining an absolute majority of votes and did not meet the legal requirements for the union electoral process established by the Ministry of Labor. Nevertheless, as Baker observed, Sussekind apparently made an exception to the rules and appointed Campanhole as chief executive of the organization, which greatly pleased the American Embassy. ⁹³ Also in early 1965, the ITF held a seminar in São Paulo for members of the unions representing bus, truck, urban vehicle and aviation workers. Eight participants were nominated to participate in the USAID-financed “Union to Union” exchange program. Other conferences and union meetings were held between 1964 and 1966, with the support of the American organization in partnership with the Catholic Workers’ Circles, seeking to stimulate debate among Brazilian union leaders regarding possible changes in labor relations. In the process, the  Ibid., 71.  O Estado de S. Paulo, July 2, 1964, 9.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, dated April 26, 1965, by labor attaché Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1283.

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ICT established itself as a model organization on that subject. The lessons covered a range of subjects, including the history of union law and other topics related to labor law and unionism, even classes in public speaking. Among the activities, there were simulated roundtable sessions; classes on Labor Law and on topics such as capitalism, socialism and communism; cooperativism, credit cooperatives, individual employment contracts, collective contracts and the international trade union movement, among others. In addition to its direct activities for students, the ICT also conducted surveys on union leadership, sending out questionnaires to unions and federations in São Paulo City. These studies resulted in the publication of A rede sindical paulista (The São Paulo Union Network) by Ophelia Rabello, and Radiografia da liderança sindical de São Paulo (X-Ray of São Paulo’s Union Leadership), edited by Freitas Marcondes, which contained analyses of the problems facing the working class.⁹⁴ The surveys justified investment in training and education for union members. In the first six months after the civilian-military coup, the Institute offered one-week courses for unionized workers in 12 states and 18 cities across Brazil. It was what the Americans called the “ABC of unionism.” The best 35 participants were selected for three months of intensive training in São Paulo City. By mid-1964, more than 100 union leaders had participated in these training sessions. The projections were highly optimistic. Gilbert Richmond even observed that, within two years, the entity would have trained 80 percent of union leaders in Brazil.⁹⁵ Regarding collective labor contracts, the words “law and order” printed on the ICT handouts indicated how the commitment between employee and employer should be conducted. It was necessary to eliminate the bosses’ supposedly arbitrary procedures. Workers should exert pressure and have a say in the process of negotiating collective contracts, eliminating the industrialists’ “divine right” regarding the establishment, regulation and methods of doing work. The teaching materials set out the general points that should govern the collective bargaining process and the organized movement of workers according to the contractual model. They were: protection and recognition of the union; union agency and monthly fees deducted from wages; protection from “bad faith” negotiations and banning individual contracts; refusal to handle hazardous materials; exemption from liability for unauthorized activities and the right to enter the workplace. Regarding the protection of the employment contract, the guidelines were as follows: provisions on termination of the contract; provisions on reopening negotiations; retroactivity provisions; invalidation of the contract by

 Marcondes, 1964.  Rabello, 1965, 17.

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law or by court order; maintenance standards and guarantee of existing conditions. The union leaders were presented with three types of negotiations: “cooperation,” which, according to the ICT, might seem to be the best but could be abused by employers, making it almost impractical in Brazil; “harmony,” which could be practiced, but without direct or indirect interference from employers; and, finally, “armed truce,” which would strengthen the union by always putting it in the forefront, since its role as a negotiator and representative of the working class would win the respect of its base and the industrialists, as long as it did not disrespect the employers. The ICT recalled that the CLT already contained an article that provided for collective labor contracts (title VI, article 611), therefore recommending that the unions insist on obtaining agreements with employers aimed at improving wages and working conditions. However, the ICT and AIFLD seemed to overlook the practice of agreements entered into directly between bosses and employees, approved by the Labor Courts or the Ministry of Labor. They also seemed to overlook the judges’ own actions – as well as the role and representation of the Labor Courts for workers – in mediating labor conflicts by simply criticizing the employers’ “divine rights” and advocating the negotiation of collective contracts. Regarding the communist presence in the unions, the ICT produced a manual entitled “Communist Strategy and Tactics in Labor Unions” for courses aimed at combating communism in Brazil. It made the following observation: The greatest damage done by the communists is the fact that they infiltrate non-communist unions. In view of this, we will show the secret tactics and strategies employed by the communists against the labor unions. Workers, particularly those from less developed countries who experience hunger, barely managing to make a living, feel eternally dissatisfied, and for this reason it is possible to easily stir their emotions and influence them. Often, even when disputes can be resolved through collective bargaining, the communists instigate a strike to create instability.⁹⁶

On July 24, 1964, the ICT graduated the third class to take the course in union leadership. That same day, it also marked the first anniversary of its cooperation with the ORIT and ITS. In his speech at the graduation ceremony as class patron, Lincoln Gordon said he “did not want to give the false impression that labor relations were completely harmonious in the United States”; on the contrary, “the unions had to face tough battles.” However, he stressed that the weapons used in those struggles were “entirely legal and with economic arguments, instead of

 “Estratégia e táticas comunistas nos sindicatos de trabalhadores.” Apostila do ICT sobre contrato coletivo de trabalho. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-01– 198.

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strikes,” which should only be the last resort.⁹⁷ His audience included members of the MSD, UST, the National Confederation of Catholic Workers’ Circles and REDETRAL, partners of American trade unionism dating back to the pre-coup period. According to the manuals used for union leadership courses, workers were supposed learn to value the role of the union representatives and their significance for the profession. Therefore, the representatives should have detailed knowledge of employment contracts, called “the bible of industrial relations.” In addition to the role of the union representative, the manuals also covered the stages of labor demands, collective bargaining, and the significance of arbitration. In the latter case, when a union and a company failed to reach an agreement, the workers learned about the role of the arbitrator – an impartial figure who would not take sides with the workers or the company. Aribtrators should generally be chosen by mutual agreement between the company and the union or by third parties, in case of disagreement between the parties. During the review process, he could hear witnesses, but the depositions were not official and his decision was final and binding.⁹⁸ Another manual advised that workers should be made aware of the weekly or monthly newspaper or bulletin published by international unions. Those publications could be regularly distributed to the unions, as well as being used in local educational programs. Furthermore, AFL-CIO manuals and brochures also contained legal advice and covered other specific topics of interest to union leaders.⁹⁹ In the training provided by AIFLD, one of the key points of the manual was the lesson on how to discover whether communist students had infiltrated the course. To do so, attention should be paid to their words and gestures. For example, students should be wary of anyone who made positive comments about Cuba. This sort of observation meant that many of the union leaders who criticized AIFLD or labor relations in general were labeled as communists.¹⁰⁰

 Ibid.  Regarding union leadership manuals based on the American union model, see: IUE, AFL-CIO. Manual da liderança. Rio de Janeiro: Lidador, 1965 (copyright: Education and International Affairs Department, Washington, DC); CIOSL. Manual para dirigentes sindicales. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Marymar, 1968; AFL-CIO. Organización y dirección de sindicatos. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Marymar, 1968; AFL-CIO. A qualidade no trabalho. Rio de Janeiro, Lidador, 1965; United States Department of Labor. The American Worker’s Fact Book. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960; Mauro Barranechea. Formação sindical. Rio de Janeiro: Lidador, 1965.  IUE, AFL-CIO. Manual da liderança, 27-28.  Missão Norte-Americana de Cooperação Econômica e Técnica no Brasil – USAID. Treinamento de liderança sindical – Um manual de instrumentos e técnicas. N.p.: Centro de Publicações Técnicas Aliança, 1965.

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Similarly, the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, Juracy Magalhães, who was charged with strengthening “even further the bonds of friendship” between the two countries, also focused on to training union leaders. When welcoming a group of young student workers in October 1964, Magalhães expressed the following wish: “that they should return to Brazil with renewed enthusiasm to work on behalf of unionism and for greater freedom within the workers’ movement. They should take an active part in the elections.”¹⁰¹ During that same period, as part of his mission of promoting union cooperation between the two countries, the Brazilian ambassador held a dinner for George Meany, Serafino Romualdi and authorities representing the two governments, including Thomas Mann, Deputy Secretary of Labor, Lincoln Gordon, Robert Sayre, a White House official, and Roberto Campos, the Brazilian Minister of Planning. ¹⁰² In January 1965, AIFLD awarded a group of five ICT alumni with a threemonth course in Washington, DC. They were Francisco Campos Aires, from the São Paulo Metalworkers Union; Themistocles Alves dos Santos, from the Pará Telegraph Workers’ Union; Itaborahy Feitosa Martins, a journalist from São Paulo,¹⁰³ and Antonio Florêncio da Paz, from the Pernambuco Woodworkers’ Union.¹⁰⁴ The ICT’s intensive efforts continued in the second half of 1965. During that period, the entity offered 87 basic courses on union guidance, with around 2,500 participants throughout the country. The year before, it had held a special course for transportation workers. The ITF was responsible for providing technical and moral support to the unions that were under government intervention, offering theoretical and methodological knowledge as the basis for an “independent transition with maximum democratic measures in its leadership and structure.”¹⁰⁵ Representatives of the International Union of Food and Allied Workers (IUF), which had previously had no Brazilian affiliates, paid a visit to Brazil and received a warm welcome for the establishment of an educational program. The board of the International Federation of Oil and Chemical Workers (IFOCW) also met with São Paulo union leaders to discuss the expansion of  Discurso proferido por ocasião da inauguração do Instituto cultural BrasilEstados Unidos. CPDOC/FGV, fundo Juracy Magalhães, JM pi Magalhães, J. 1964.09.08.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, August 28, 1964, by Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1281.  The six-week course was held with the support of the CNI. Report from the Associated Press Washington, DC. CPDOC/FGV, fundo Juracy Magalhães, série correspondências.  Itaborahy Feitosa Martins was the brother of Itamaraty Feitosa Martins, who was in the same profession and a PCB sympathizer.  Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, no. 9, January-February 1965, p. 3. AEL Unicamp, collection Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0314, microfilme APC3, roll 34.

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union education programs in Brazil. Likewise, the International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees (IFCCTE) had embarked on a range of activities in 1964, which included broadcasting a weekly radio program focused on the organization’s philosophy of democratic unionism.¹⁰⁶ However, despite their efforts, these international union organizations failed to attract the grassroots of the union movement.

Difficulties implementing “democratic unionism” Despite generous financial support from USAID and the large number of activities carried out, AIFLD faced the problems of time and space. After all, how could the entire union movement be transformed overnight? It involved educating over 21,000 leaders from 4,000 local unions, 131 state and federal organizations and 6 confederations. It also required getting bills on the regulation of free collective contracts enacted into law, which required congressional approval. Since the beginning of its activities in Brazil, AIFLD had reported some operational difficulties to the State Department, although it noted that “it was managing to resolve them efficiently, especially after the ‘Revolution,’” according to labor attaché Herbert W. Baker. Part of this optimism arose from the expectation of an increase in financial aid after Castello Branco’s inauguration, and 1965 was seen as a critical time for strengthening “democratic” unionism. Baker feared that communist union leaders, who were still active in grassroots unions after the coup, would actively discourage workers from taking part in ICT programs. In some cases, he observed that the communist leaders’ tactics of intimidation and reprisals against workers were succeeding.¹⁰⁷ As far as financing was concerned, the ICT reportedly managed to prevent changes in the amount to be sent by USAID. The latter had expressed the intention to finance the Institute in Brazilian currency instead of dollars. According to the US Embassy, that would have been highly detrimental to the development of the entity, as it would require the approval of the Brazilian government, naturally opening up the possibility of meddling and increased influence on ICT activ-

 “Weekly Summary No. 12” (1964). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library. brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:329123/, accessed on 20 July 2020.  Report from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, August 28, 1964, by Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1281.

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ities by government officials and pelego leaders.¹⁰⁸ To ward off the “communist threat,” it was essential to invest heavily in training union leaders. During its first year of existence, the ICT trained 876 leaders in its regional seminars. Another 100 from more than 34 different industrial areas around the country completed a three-month intensive course held in São Paulo City, and 12 union members were sent to the AIFLD school in Washington, DC. Other training courses were also held in Santos, on the coast of São Paulo State, and two courses for 108 metalworkers were held in the state capital, in addition to seminars in rural areas. All courses were held in areas known to be “dominated by the communists.” The main concern was to ensure that the new leaders trained by the American organization would fill the vacuum left by the former leaders considered to be communists on the boards of the unions that had suffered government intervention. However, it was nearly impossible to get the “democratic” leaders elected in such a short space of time. No less worrisome was keeping this new generation of union leaders in power in an unstable economy run by a government that sought to curb inflation by sacrificing the interests of the working class. In a way, the American experts were forced to recognize the difficulty of filling the void left by the CGT. They had been informed that communists were circulating freely in the unions, as, for example, in the São Paulo Bankers Union, and were angry with Brazil’s Federal Government because they believed the authorities were doing nothing to stop it. They feared that if the government refused to yield to union pressure, the interventors would be discredited in the eyes of the workers, leading to a communist victory in the upcoming union elections.¹⁰⁹ The ICT also its own allies to deal with, such as CNTI secretary Ary Campista. Regarded as a dominant figure in the Guanabara Federation of Chemical Workers, after the coup Campista began levelling a barrage of criticism at the ORIT, the AFL-CIO and the ICT, which he described as “an espionage center for the United States.” According to the labor attaché Niles W. Bond, Campista was still embittered by his defeat in the last union elections, held in late 1964, because the opposing slate included leaders trained by AIFLD and the ICT. That episode supposedly set other union leaders against the ICT, except for Olavo Previatti, the CNTI’s first treasurer, as Bond observed. João Wagner, the president of the CNTI, was angry but did not openly express his criticism. Instead, he canceled some cooperation programs between the CNTI and ICT. According to the Embassy, the reason for the increased animosity between the main figures in  Report from the Consulate General of São Paulo to the US State Department, June 1965, by Niles W. Bond. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Negro, 2004a, 236.

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the union leadership and the ICT lay in the possible threat that the American entity could pose to those leaders’ position in the union structure. They were said to be concerned about the rise of young union leaders trained by the ICT, which made it difficult to maintain a friendly environment among the main groups in the union movement.¹¹⁰ Previatti occupied the post on the ICT board vacated by Joaquim F. Otero. According to the reports of the US Embassy, the first member to exit the ICT board was Domingos Álvares, director of the CNTI for Social Security and vice president of the São Paulo State Federation of Metalworkers, who resigned in February 1965. Presumably, he meant to show support for Ary Campista. At the time, a new policy of alliances between Brazilian and American union leaders was becoming more clearly outlined. Many of the “authentic” leaders of the past began to be identified as pelegos in comparison with the young leaders, who were called “second-generation democrats.”¹¹¹ One of the difficulties the American consul pointed out was the supposed lack of self-sacrifice on the part of the students during the training sessions. The explanation, according to him, had to do with the corruption that permeated the Brazilian union movement and also the understandable antipathy of many, if not the majority of Brazilian workers, towards their unions and, finally, the relative weakening of these workers’ cost of living. These factors were said to be responsible for the difficulties in “convincing the workers to invest a little time and energy and perhaps some money to build a better life for everyone.”¹¹² Many courses were held during the day, which either meant having to ask employers to give employees time off work while paying their wages, or to reduce the number of class hours. This could be seen as an opportunity for workers to “take the day off” from work and thus attract students who were not really interested in learning or in becoming a new union leader. The solution, therefore, was to offer night classes. However, being a diligent student after a hard day’s work was no easy task. Many of the workers who had been given time off to study at the ICT during the day were wary of the guidance, financial aid and even the intentions of the organization itself. In this respect, night classes had the advantage of not requiring permission from employers and still “helped over-

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, November 18, 1964, by Herbert W. Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Report from the São Paulo Consulate General to the State Department, June 1965, by Niles W. Bond. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Ibid.

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come the impression that the ICT represented an employer, which has been a constant criticism.” The varied backgrounds of the groups of students was another obstacle mentioned by the creators of the ICT. According to them, from a teaching standpoint, it was almost impossible to teach bank workers (who normally had at least a high school education) in the same classroom as semi-literate rural workers. According to a survey conducted by the ICT, more than half of union directors and federation presidents had not attended elementary school, and about 60 percent had never taken any classes on union leadership.¹¹³ Regarding the selection of participants, another challenge was to prevent the directors of union associations from choosing candidates based on personal considerations or for their own benefit. For courses held abroad, the problem arose when students returned to Brazil and gave up their union activities or did not yet play an active role in the movement. To solve this problem, the ICT decided that the students would have to work at least 6 to 12 months after the end of the course before the training was officially completed. In the classes held abroad, one of the biggest barriers was the language, although some were taught in Spanish and Portuguese. In the local seminars, the average cost of each event was around $2,000, which the American Embassy considered expensive. Brazilian ICT employees were also paid in dollars, which could make working there a very attractive proposition at the time. This factor may also have influenced the criticisms leveled against the ICT by some “democratic” union leaders. They complained that they were not being included in the institution’s board of directors. They also criticized the entity’s operations, claiming that they were becoming too academic, with no basis in the realities of the Brazilian union movement. As expected, the ICT was also the target of criticism from union leaders who took a dim view of the American influence on labor issues. For example, during the meeting of Brazilian Metalworkers’ Organizations in October 1965, Joaquim Gonçalves denounced the “imperialist penetration in our country’s economy” with the aim of drawing strategic conclusions about the struggle of the metalworkers, both at the national and international levels. Before presenting data on the performance of US companies in Brazil, Gonçalves recalled the arrests of union leaders Afonso Delellis and José de Araújo Plácido, which occurred shortly after the civilian-military coup, and reported on the metalworkers’ achievements after the 1953 “strike of the 300,000.” In his view, the violence perpe-

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, from July 1964 to June 1965. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.

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trated against the working class in Brazil was related to the “forces linked to imperialist interests.”¹¹⁴ Joaquim Gonçalves’s anti-Americanism was not uncommon among workers, students, and leftists. It was also present in right-wing organizations and even among the military. However, despite the obstacles mentioned, AIFLD was committed to contributing a minimum of $50,000 annually for a two-year period. The American organization also agreed to pay the salaries and expenses of ICT executives and provide them with technical and personal support through films, publications and lectures.¹¹⁵ A total of 72 seminars were held as of July 1963, with the participation of 2,031 leaders in 43 cities in 21 states.¹¹⁶ Changes were made in AIFLD’s management in 1966. Following the death of Serafino Romualdi, William Doherty, Jr. took over as its director. During that same period, Xavier Vela, appointed AIFLD regional director for the southern hemisphere, made contact with Brazilian union leaders in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. In a report to the State Department, labor attaché Jack Liebof noted, “Since its inception in mid-1963, the ICT has trained over 250 labor leaders in its intensive course. Many of these graduates now occupy key positions in the Brazilian labor movement.” The aim was to expand labor training activities in 1966.¹¹⁷ Throughout this chapter, it has been clear that, even when Brazil’s foreign policy was geared towards the interests of the United States, after working together to depose Goulart, Brazilian executives linked to the IPES, workers, the Brazilian government, union members and American investors had conflicting interests. The IPES believed that the success of the country’s socioeconomic development was due to the strength of its business community and foreign investments. However, the Brazilian government centralized decision-making in the Executive branch and relied on a strong repressive apparatus to control workers while its anti-inflation policy was being implemented, based on the wagesqueeze law and the intervention of the normative power of the Labor Courts in collective bargaining. As for American trade union leadership, they relied on educating a new generation of leaders capable of developing the contractu-

 Ibid.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, September 4, 1964, by Niles W. Bond. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1281.  Untitled document, October 15, 1965. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento n. 50-J152-1355.  “Weekly Summary No. 13” (1966). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library. brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:326948/, accessed on June 30, 2021.

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alist model as a way of removing communists from the Brazilian union movement. When elections were held at the unions that had suffered State intervention, many of the “authentic” candidates were voted into executive roles with the support and manipulation of the regional labor offices and the Ministry of Labor itself. However, the former leaders who had been allies of American trade unionism prior to 1964 – such as Ary Campista – viewed the new “authentic secondgeneration” leaders as a threat to their positions on union boards, and began criticizing AIFLD-ICT and distancing themselves from that entity. However, there was a constant fear that leaders linked to the left-wing groups could return at any time and hold seats on union boards. This concern, which was shared by American observers and pro-military government sectors, further increased the need for investments in “democratic” union leadership courses offered by entities such as the ICT. By the end of 1964, workers were rising up against the new labor policy. In December of that year alone, more than 30 short-term strikes that the Labor Courts deemed to be legal were held due to non-payment of the 13th salary, affecting about 10,000 workers.¹¹⁸ Large US corporations had no interest in collaborating with a project to train Brazilian business executives or helping reduce social inequalities in the country. Instead, they took advantage of the wage policy and the actions of law enforcement agencies further to exploit the Brazilian workforce. Following the implementation of the government’s Economic Action Plan (PAEG), wage readjustments were lower than in 1963. The employees of the São Paulo Regional Labor Court themselves recognized that employers were increasingly reluctant to concede raises in pay.¹¹⁹

 Boletim de Notícias ICT/AIFLD, n. 21, February 1966. AEL/Unicamp, collection Twentieth Century Latin American Pamphlets: part III, BRZ 0425, microfilme APC3, rolo 42.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, from July 1964 to June 1965. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.

Chapter III “Americanos, Go Home!”: From a Policy of Alignment to Diplomatic Cooling (1967 – 1970) After the period of optimism during the first two years of AIFLD’s activities in Brazil, labor policy began to take new directions under the command of General Costa e Silva when he took office in March 1967. Largely instrumentalized by the activities of the Alliance for Progress project, diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States became increasingly tense due the various policy changes made by both sides. The cooperation pact with the “brother in the North,” one of the hallmarks of the dictator Castello Branco’s administration (1964 – 1967), was characterized by the “hard-line” generals as a naive belief in American brotherhood and gradually replaced with a kind of “authoritarian nationalism.” As Vizentini observes, the Costa e Silva administration’s foreign relations policy marked a profound break from that of the previous regime. According to that author, the “national-authoritarian” group had its socioeconomic roots in the public sector. In terms of their conception for economic development, this group advocated securing benefits in exchange for allowing foreign capital to enter the country. The objective of the “authoritarian nationalist” group was to achieve industrial development through import substitution without considering the social costs. To do so, they had to rely on the agencies of repression to clamp down on complaints from those who felt the direct impact of that development.¹ Critics of the first post-1964 administration, the military “hard-liners” and Brazilian executives questioned the previous foreign policy, as well as its impact on curbing inflation. In 1966, the inflation rate was four times higher than the government’s forecasts. Gradually, workers began taking to the streets again to complain about the impact of the wage squeeze and the liberal economic policy, which was responsible for the recession and a number of bankruptcies and insolvencies. Moving away from Pan-Americanism, the new architects of Brazilian foreign policy believed in “horizontal” regional integration. The idea was to invest in multilateral relations with Latin American neighbors and other countries in Europe and Asia, using foreign policy as a prop for economic development, while following the recommendations of the IMF.² Among other measures that conflicted with US interests, Costa e Silva withdrew his country’s support from the Inter-American

 Vizentini, 1998, 80.  Ibid., 78-82. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-008

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Peace Force in the Dominican Republic, demanded trade concessions from the Americans and complained that Brazil received insufficient military aid.³ Seven years after the Alliance for Progress began its activities in that country and amid growing criticism, it was believed that instead of closing the gap with developed countries, it had widened it.⁴ Generally speaking, the Alliance for Progress’s funding was earmarked for social aid, mainly for the purchase of basic necessities, such as food and medicine, for low-income communities and the construction of affordable housing. However, this was not enough for Costa e Silva. His administration was more interested in granting loans that would permit economic growth, aiming at independence from the US government when Brazilian developmentalism was firmly established. Although they were not at all happy with this turn of events, in November 1967 the directors of the Alliance for Progress asked foreign loan agencies to provide $168 million to Brazil. Then, they reached the conclusion that more money was needed to finance the Brazilian economic development plan. The following month, Finance Minister Delfim Netto,⁵ who was in charge of the negotiations, obtained $611 million to be spent on credit for imports of equipment and raw materials, education programs, agriculture and other sectors.⁶ However, conflicts of interest led to a gradual political distancing between the two nations, although the US maintained its financial aid throughout that period. The Brazilian State began to exert more control over the regulation of foreign capital and became a direct economic agent (dealing with savings, investments, loans, production and even consumption). It also changed its stance on foreign relations. As Vizentini observes, the State went from “bargaining from a subordinate position with transnational companies to active negotiation.” Furthermore, it centralized decisions in the hands of technocrats. During the Costa e Silva administration, the military gained even more power and took on a broader role. The “hard-liners” took on the task of maintaining political stability.⁷ Through the Strategic Program for Development (PED), the Ministers of Planning and Finance, Hélio Beltrão and Delfim Netto, respectively, increased

 Fontaine, 1974, 28.  Vizentini, 1998, 77.  Delfim Netto is regarded as a mentor of the Brazilian military regime’s economic policy and was an influential economist in later governments. He was attributed with the saying that “we have to make the cake rise before sharing it,” a very representative idea of the deepening social inequality generated during the economic policy of the so-called “Brazilian economic miracle” between 1968 and 1973.  Vizentini, 83.  Ibid., 79.

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the amount of credit available for durable consumer goods and favored the heavy and energy industry sector, among other measures. As a result, GDP rose 4.8 percent in 1967, and 9.3 percent in 1968, while inflation fell 23 percent. The government also increased exports (from 2 percent in 1960 to 11 percent in 1970) and grew the domestic market, but the minimum wage remained stagnant.⁸ All of this benefited the middle class. The housing policy drafted during the previous administration began yielding results through the use of funding from the FGTS that was directed towards the Banco Nacional da Habitação (National Housing Bank; BNH). Since 1967, AFL-CIO leaders and US officials had been seeking new strategies to deal with the Costa e Silva administration’s foreign policy. When José de Magalhães Pinto became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brazil decided to prioritize domestic interests in its diplomatic relations with the major world powers, following the thinking of the Armed Forces and other sectors of the civilian-military government, and going against the work of his predecessor, Juracy Magalhães.⁹ The new foreign minister criticized Roberto Campos’s economic policy, mainly because it was too open to the entry of foreign capital. The new approach aimed at placing diplomacy at the service of economic development to achieve the goals of reformulating the country’s foreign trade and acquisition of technology and, finally, to allow an increase of financial flows. It was a reinterpretation of the developmentalist project of the 1950s. While Costa e Silva was in power, there was a growing sense that Brazil could profit much more from dealings with other developing nations, especially in the areas of trade and nuclear power. Therefore, it should aim to avoid closer relations with the United States. One criticism was that programs financed by USAID were increasingly linked to imports of goods made in the United States. This was not in the interests of Brazil, which was now inclined to grow its domestic industry, as Ribeiro observed. For the new Planning Minister, Hélio Beltrão, the time had come to accelerate

 The growth of the domestic market was due, in large part, to the increase in technicians’ wages and the introduction of consórcios (a type of credit in which people form a consortium to pay part of the price of a product, in contrast with normal financing where loans are paid with interest. In a consórcio, the prospective buyer basically pays the bank before purchasing the product and builds up enough money to buy it outright), especially for automobiles.  After serving as a Brazilian ambassador to the United States and holding the portfolios of Justice and Foreign Affairs minister during the Castelo Branco administration, Juracy Magalhães left politics and entered the private sector, where he chaired several Brazilian and foreign companies.

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development, an objective that would lay the foundations for Brazil’s domestic policy and relations with the outside world.¹⁰

Time to “review, evaluate and develop a new position on Brazil” Within the sphere of labor relations, the program to introduce “free and democratic unionism” ran into the boundaries set by the Cold War and the domestic barriers raised by Costa e Silva’s economic policy. It was the beginning of a series of criticisms, frictions, and veiled threats on the part of American agencies that were eager to regain their previous economic prerogatives. From 1967 onwards, the activities of the Alliance for Progress decreased. As we shall see, the creation in October 1967 of a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI) to investigate the activities of union associations financed by the United States became one of the centers of conflict between union leaders and the Brazilian and North American authorities. Even before the CPI on foreign entities was established, in September 1966 the relationship between ICT and AIFLD officials was marred by open conflict. According to Robert H. Dockery, the Brazilian entity had decided to cancel the three-month course offered to workers, as well as all the regional seminars scheduled for that year without notifying the labor attaché. The alleged reason was that AIFLD had not provided sufficient funding. According to Dockery’s report, a US official later described this measure as “a serious, perhaps irreparable, setback which at the very least would shake the confidence of the instructors, participants, and collaborators in the union movement, and might well have far-reaching repercussions. Another official said that the action caused a good deal of inconvenience and embarrassment.” On that occasion, the affordable housing project was also interrupted.¹¹ The disagreements between ICT and AIFLD representatives in Brazil continued in 1967. In an attempt to solve the problems between the two entities, the labor attaché regularly monitored the AIFLD program, also sparking conflicts between the American union entity and the US Embassy in Brazil. AIFLD complained about the labor attaché’s constant meddling in relations between American and Brazilian unionists, to the point where the inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO wrote the following to the labor attaché in July 1967, which Dockery included in his report:  Ribeiro, 2006, 324.  Dockery, Robert H. Survey of the Alliance for Progress – Labor Policies and Programs. Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs and Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. July 15, 1968, 54.

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We are becoming increasingly preoccupied with the situation existing between your office and the AIFLD operation in Brazil. Every report we receive indicates what appears to be your desire to run and manage the entire labor program in Brazil using AIFLD solely as a conduit for your office.… Apparently, however, the situation is beginning to deteriorate again to the point where we may be obliged in the near future to make a new assessment of the Brazilian labor program.… You must understand that this will be a difficult decision to reach, but … unless the AIFLD is given some degree of autonomy and flexibility, then some drastic changes will have to be made.¹²

In later years, AIFLD shifted its focus to developing educational programs aimed at introducing “free and democratic” unionism in Argentina and Chile, with the support of right-wing civilian and military groups, while in Brazil the ICT encountered a number of difficulties that hindered its operations, including financial and political issues. As it had done in Brazil, AIFLD invested in producing union educational materials in Argentina and Chile, especially during the period prior to the military dictatorships in Argentina (1966 – 1973/1976) and Chile (1973).¹³ Despite the conflicts it faced in Brazil, the union entity insisted on using the same strategic formula, investing in dialogue with conservative, anti-communist and liberal government officials and as well as alliances with “authentic” leaders, a synonym for anti-communist leaders. Freitas Marcondes described one of the first signs of crisis in AIFLD’s activities in Brazil to Romualdi during the transition period for the Castello Branco administration. In a letter, he observed that the ICT was still active, despite the problems it faced. However, there was hope for improvement, as Marcondes was expecting a visit from AIFLD Social Projects Director William Doherty, Jr. that year.¹⁴ The cooperation and exchange projects between union members from Brazil and the United States continued. In 1967, an AFL-CIO delegation visited Brazil to take part in an intensive three-week internship. Traveling in the opposite direction, 13 Brazilian delegations made up of 104 union members selected by national confederations visited unions in the United States for six weeks. On another front, the “Ministry to Ministry” program strove to contribute to studies on the revision of the cost of living assessment index, involving the National Salary Department (DNS) and the US Department of Labor (USDL), in cooperation with the Brazilian Ministry of Labor. That activity included five groups of Brazilians made up of 25 technicians who spent a month studying at the USDL’s facilities. The objective was to carry out studies that could help calculate an increase in the  Ibid., 54.  See, among others, Pozzi, 1999; J. B. Romero, 1972, 551594; Bozza, 2009.  Letter from Freitas Marcondes to Serafino Romualdi, July 10, 1967. Kheel Center Archives/Cornell University, Serafino Romualdi Papers – 5459, box 13, file 1.

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minimum wage and readjustments for employers of public and private companies.¹⁵ Another factor that reportedly strained relations between the Brazilian government and the US authorities interested in implementing the American union model in Brazil was the rejection of the collective bargaining bill that Sussekind sent to the Brazilian Congress in 1965. From then on, the American Embassy became suspicious of the Brazilian government’s willingness to change its labor laws. Dialogue between officials on both sides show signs of impatience, retaliation and a lack of mutual understanding.¹⁶ In a letter to labor attaché Herbert Baker written in 1966, AIFLD’s inter-American representative Andrew McLellan emphasized the need to reassess the situation of the unions in Brazil. McLellan was also starting to question the effectiveness of the Workers’ Housing Program in Rio de Janeiro, which was supported by the AFL-CIO, although he acknowledged that it was too early for a broader assessment. However, he was hopeful about the work of AIFLD, ORIT, ITS and the “Union to Union” program, all of which sought to join forces to carry on what he considered to be a “multifaceted program” for Brazil. Overlooking the military regime’s repressive measures, McLellan also took the opportunity to express his disappointment at the supposed lack of “combativeness” on the part of Brazilian union leaders. In the face of so much criticism, the AFL-CIO’s inter-American representative underscored the urgent need to “review, evaluate and develop a new position on Brazil.”¹⁷ Yielding to the pressure of Brazilian leaders to contain criticism of the United States’ interference in Brazil’s domestic affairs, the ICT made room for those leaders to sit on its board. This change made it all the more difficult to engage in dialogue with American leaders, as AIFLD’s directors feared losing control of the activities underway in that South American country. At the same time, the American Embassy sought support from Brazilian leaders. However, labor attachés and other US specialists began criticizing people who had been considered allies in the not too distant past, such as former Labor Minister Arnaldo Sussekind. Seen as a promoter of “free unionism” in Brazil during the Castello Branco ad-

 Annual report of the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1220.  Semi-annual report, from July to December 1965, from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department – part 1, by Herbert Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 3 – 3 – box 1282.  Letter from Andrew McLellan to Herbert Baker, June 15, 1966. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, International Affair Department – Country Files (1945-1971), box 16, correspondence series, folder 5.

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ministration, Sussekind’s role at the MTPS was not well regarded by Robert J. Alexander, the specialist in Latin American labor relations.¹⁸ Despite the Costa e Silva administration’s best efforts to give itself democratic airs, the succession of institutional acts that began with the enactment of AI-5 in 1968 had shaken foreign analysts’ confidence about the country’s return to democracy. As Anthony Pereira notes, “The Brazilian military regime used peacetime military courts to prosecute political dissidents and opponents without ever suspending the constitution.” Systematically applied by law enforcement agencies, torture became practically institutionalized, while trials were being held in military courts with civilian judges and lawyers, thus giving a democratic veneer to the state of exception. Pereira observes that cooperation between civilians and the military was always a striking feature of the dictatorial regime. He also notes that, unlike the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, “The repression initiated by the 1964 coup was highly judicialized and gradualist; the regime slowly modified some aspects of traditional legality but did not engage in widespread extrajudicial killing, even after the hardening of the regime in the late 1960s.”¹⁹ The closing of Brazil’s Congress, followed by the removal of more elected officials from office and changes to the 1967 Constitution, were cause for concern, as well as criticism and doubts in official American circles about the United States’ involvement in Brazil’s internal affairs. The rise of a “hard-line” general to power did more than thwart the US’s economic interests. It was embarrassing for a country that called itself the leader of the free world to be so closely linked to a military dictatorship. According to the US Ambassador to Brazil, John W. Tuthill, who succeeded Lincoln Gordon in that post, the United States was overly committed to Brazil thanks to the close relationship his predecessor had established with the first post-1964 president. In addition to being unfamiliar with Brazil, Tuthill was reluctant to offer unconditional support to the Brazilian government’s authoritarian measures and had to face growing anti-American sentiment that increased in direct correlation to the US’s growing presence in Brazil. According to the embassy, some of the antipathy towards Americans was due to the suspicion that they coveted the country’s natural resources.²⁰ The ambassador had very different views about Castello Branco and Costa e Silva. He expressed admiration for Castello Branco, although he thought the Brazilian president had a very limited outlook because he was skep Letter from Robert Alexander to Serafino Romualdi, January 11, 1966. Kheel Center Archives – Cornell University, Serafino Romualdi Papers – 5459, box 13, folder 1.  A. W. Pereira, 2005, 312.  Interview with John W. Tuthill, given to Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987 for the foreign affairs oral history project conducted by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 22.

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tical about the role of the universities and unions, but judged him to be honest, a man who was respected and dedicated to “democratic” values. However, Tuthill was unsparing in his criticism of Costa e Silva, describing him as completely unqualified and a loose cannon, with occasional outbursts of nationalism. In an interview given in 1987, Tuthill did not disguise the fact that he had had numerous problems with Costa e Silva. This was partly due to the ambassador’s relationship with Carlos Lacerda, whom he knew to be an adversary of the government, a member of the opposition – Tuthill did not consider Lacerda a terrorist, but “one of the real intellectuals.” After meeting with Lacerda twice, Tuthill was called in for a conservation with Costa e Silva, who was said to be furious with the US ambassador’s supposedly disloyal behavior. The meeting was highly representative of the diplomatic tensions between the two countries, as well as the manner in which the ambassador built the image of Costa e Silva. When the president asked Tuthill not to meet with Lacerda anymore, the ambassador reportedly replied: Well, Mr. President, I’m very sorry to disappoint you. Your ambassador in Washington is free to see the opposition party in the United States as much as he wants, not the terrorists. And I’m not going to see the terrorists in Brazil. I have to maintain my own freedom to see people in Brazil, whether or not they agree with the government.²¹

We do not know the dictator Costa e Silva’s side of this story. However, Tuthill’s version reflects the underlying tensions between the US Embassy and the military regime. This was a phase when Tuthill claimed that Brazilian newspapers had launched a negative campaign against him, and he came to be considered persona non grata by the Brazilian government. The American press also fought back, criticizing Costa e Silva’s performance in one of its leading newspapers, The New York Times. According to Tuthill, the growing anti-American sentiment in Brazilian government agencies was due, in part, to the US Embassy’s strong involvement in the country’s internal affairs. In his first meeting with Embassy officials, Tuthill said he heard from one of them: “You must be clear that the president of Brazil is the most important man in this country, but the American ambassador is the second most important.”²² To avoid further involvement from the embassy in the military’s repressive measures, Tuthill launched Operation Topsy, which drastically reduced the staff at the American Embassy, as well as slashing funding from the aid program. Tuthill’s role as ambassador was considered very discreet, partly because of the repercussions of the torture of political  Ibid., 23.  Ibid.

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prisoners, which would intensify in the late 1960s.²³ Aware that the military regime’s unpopularity was associated with the actions of the Americans and the fact that many people felt that the “natives” were not in a position to lead their own country, Tuthill tried to stop the US government from playing a major role in Brazilian development. He said he had done what he could for the nation’s universities, youth, and unions. Referring to meetings with Brazilian union leaders, the ambassador cited a conversation that took place in São Paulo, which made clear the hostile tone of the dialogue between Brazilian union leaders and US officials. Asked by the leaders if he would show Brazilian unionism the way forward, Tuthill reportedly argued that he could talk about the US experience, saying that he supported the work of “free” unions but that he could not make the Brazilian government make any changes in that regard.²⁴ In 1969, the Embassy monitored the union leaders’ response to AI-5. According to the report, their opinions differed. Some supported it, while others objected that the decree had removed the dictatorship’s mask, although the majority did not take a stand on the matter.²⁵ As of December 1968, the American press, which had not previously considered the military government to be a dictatorship, began expressing strong criticism of Costa de Silva’s authoritarianism, even calling on President Nixon to distance himself from the regime. The State Department suggested a review of USAID’s financial aid to Brazil. However, as James Green observed, although the State Department threatened to reassess financial aid to Brazil in reprisal for its authoritarian measures while seeking to distance itself from the regime, the economic relationship between the two countries has not been seriously affected. During that period, shortly after AI-5 was decreed, another diplomatic episode involving the United States occurred. Two American clergymen who were on a mission in northeastern Brazil were arrested in a parish in the city of Recife, accused of “subversive activities.”²⁶ In addition to the political and bureaucratic problems faced on the domestic front, the US government was forced to deal with the varying stances of countries that “benefited” by the Alliance for Progress. Bedevilled by its unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam, the US government was under pressure from Congress to cut costs

 Until 1968, there were few critics in the US Congress who questioned Washington’s policies in Latin America. See Green, 2009, 120.  In 1968, US military aid to Brazil was considerably reduced.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, January 17, 1969. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.  Green, 2009, 146-153.

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and diplomatic posts in all missions around the world, including those with more than one hundred official posts, Brazil among them.

Brazilian government ministers and US officials Even before Costa e Silva took office, an episode involving Brazilian and American authorities who met towards the end of 1966 to discuss union-related matters once again strained diplomatic relations between the two countries. The attendees included Ambassador John W. Tuthill, Brazilian government ministers Octávio Bulhões (Finance), Roberto Campos (Planning), and Nascimento e Silva (Labor), and US labor attaché Herbert Baker. At a previous meeting, Tuthill had mentioned his government’s growing concerns about the well-being of Brazilian workers and the role of free trade unionism in the country. On this occasion, he observed that he expected to receive information from the military government on institutional changes that would strengthen the democratic union movement. In response, Bulhões had said he did not understand why the direction of wage policy was an issue that should be discussed with the Americans. Campos said that the matter was highly sensitive. He took the opportunity to support the Minister of Finance’s statement by the observing that it was impossible to increase wages above the government formula without destroying the plan to stabilize the economy. Baker replied by explaining the difference between wage and labor policy, and expressed his concern about rising inflation rates. He also observed that the application of an adequate wage policy could stimulate the stabilization program, rather than endangering it, since the unions would have a clear sense of their role, especially with regard to collective bargaining. This, according to the labor attaché, would naturally be done in the context of guidelines developed by the stabilization program, making the working class feel that they had a stake in the economic plan.²⁷ The “Union to Union” program, created by AIFLD to organize an exchange of union members between the two countries, was also on the agenda. Choosing his words carefully, Baker said that he regretted the criticism of Brazilian trade unionism that had recently been published in the United States. The attaché referred to the “incident” that occurred in mid-1966, when The New York Times reported the impressions of two US unionists who had spent three weeks in Brazil

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, December 27, 1966. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.

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through the union exchange program. In a report addressed to George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, the visitors expressed their perplexity when experiencing the civilian-military government’s policy of union control first-hand. Claiming to be concerned about the political situation in Brazil, the foreign officials said that its labor policies “are a sensitive area in United States-Brazilian relations.” The visit gave rise to a number of criticisms from the AFL-CIO regarding the Castello Branco administration’s measures, including the wage squeeze, the condensation of collective bargaining and the police crackdown on the unions. One of the American leaders commented that Brazilian union leaders were extremely fearful of police repression. As for the employers, it was noted that they used the government’s restrictive wage policy as a strategy to avoid negotiations with their employees. In the view of the American union organizers, instead of side-lining the communists, these measures were swelling their ranks. However, they felt that the biggest problem was the absence of collective bargaining mechanisms in labor relations, as the Labor Court system had proved to be insufficient and slow. Thus, one union organizer concluded, “The best labor leader in the world can’t represent the workers and keep their confidence under this type of system.” ²⁸ The repercussions of the two American union leaders’ critical remarks enraged the Brazilian authorities, worsening tensions between Brazil and the US regarding labor relations. Brazil’s ambassador to the United States, Vasco Leitão da Cunha, gave an interview to The New York Times in which he mentioned the creation of the Labor Courts to explain the nature of collective bargaining in Brazil. He explained that the withdrawal of the bill that aimed at establishing new rules for collective bargaining needed to be better analyzed and should comply with the dictates of the wage policy. Cunha stressed that the government was not opposed to collective bargaining; on the contrary, he stated that it was “welcome, as long as it is a spontaneous process that obeys the rules of the market.” In Brazil, Labor Minister Nascimento e Silva also countered criticism through the press. Without going into the validity of foreign intervention in Brazilian problems, Silva stressed the difficulties involved when comparing the union systems of Brazil and the United States. Months later, Baker tried to convince the Brazilian authorities that the program was a success, arguing that it was impossible to veto freedom of expression on both sides. In his report on the meeting, Baker said Bulhões expressed tedium  Juan de Onis, “Two US Unionists, in Rio, Denounce Brazil on Her Labor Policies.” Clipping from The New York Times, November 23, 1966. George Meany Memorial Archives, International Affairs Department, Country Files, 1945 1971, folder 16/10. See: https://repository.library. brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:1145538/, accessed on June 30, 2021.

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when he heard his statements, an attitude that apparently perplexed the American. At the same time, the Ministers of Finance and Planning announced that labor issues were exclusively within the purview of the Ministry of Labor, and should be discussed with them as well. Then, Baker went on to ask the officials to discuss other matters, such as agriculture, housing, education. After shrugging his shoulders disdainfully, Bulhões reportedly replied in English, saying “All right.” Two days later, the tensions between Brazilian and US government officials continued. At another meeting, the foreigners handed ministers Campos and Nascimento e Silva the draft of a goal plan that quickly became the focus of discussion. The idea was to present Brazilians with a set of political and economic guidelines to be followed. Regarding the 1967 wage policy, the government should put the brakes on wage deterioration, ensure profit sharing, increase the incomes of the self-employed and improve public services. As for collective bargaining, the Americans expected it to be included in the economic stabilization program. Finally, the US Embassy asked for the Brazilian government’s commitment to ensuring the union movement’s autonomy.²⁹ According to Baker, Roberto Campos gave the American demands a hostile reception. The minister went back to explaining his “already well-known theory” that average real wages had not gone down and that labor laws had replaced the practice of collective bargaining, stating that it was impossible to use both systems at once. Nascimento e Silva called for caution about the wage policy to prevent it from interfering with the stabilization plan. He also argued that labor law and the Labor Courts were satisfactory in Brazil, declaring that he had close relations with union leaders, and that he was not “aware of widespread criticism about the union policy.” The head of the US mission in Brazil, Stuart H. Van Dyke, questioned the Labor Minister’s statements, saying he was aware that Brazilian union leaders had frequently complained to the US government about problems with their country’s labor policy. Baker resumed the discussion by claiming that labor relations could take various forms around the world, and that many unions in Europe, the United States and Latin America had opted for direct collective bargaining between the workers’ union and employers – a model that, according to him, had proved to be more efficient. Minister Campos then suggested drafting the first paragraph on the devaluation of wages. However, the foreign delegation said that it was not willing to make any changes to the wording that would

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, December 27, 1966. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.

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change the emphasis on the need to adjust wages to inflation and the union’s share in increased productivity. After a brief discussion about changing the wording of the goal plan, the meeting ended without a final decision. That episode made it clear to the Americans that it was key for the Brazilian government to relax its harsh measures towards workers, fearing their response and the return of communist leaders. However, Castello Branco’s ministers were upset with the negative international response to the civilian-military government and seemed determined not to give way, or at least to cede very little, on labor matters. They were relying on the strategy of stabilizing the economy, which was based on the wage squeeze, coupled with the repression of workers, to achieve the goals of economic development, and gave no signs that those principles could be changed. Soon, the tensions between the Brazilian government officials and the Americans were eased by a boat trip including ministers Roberto Campos and Nascimento e Silva, accompanied by labor attaché Herbert Baker. On that occasion, the Minister of Labor expressed his approval of the US union model and took the opportunity to confide his embarrassment about the previous meeting. In his report, Baker revealed that the American delegation was aware that the presentation of its goals for the unions would not be strong enough to change the existing situation. However, they believed it was important to insist on re-presenting these matters in order to mobilize and pressure the Brazilian authorities. Baker still hoped that Minister Nascimento e Silva would present to Congress the bill on free collective bargaining that Castello Branco had rejected in 1965. Indeed, in January 1967, Nascimento e Silva asked a commission from the Ministry of Labor to reevaluate that bill. Sussekind, who was then a TST (Superior Labor Court) judge, was also consulted.³⁰ However, the approval of the new version of the constitution reinforced the old model of labor regulations, and the chapters on the subject of collective bargaining were very similar to those in the constitution of 1946.

The American presence is nettling for nationalists and leftists In the second half of the 1960s, complaints and suspicions that the CIA had infiltrated secret agents into its foreign aid programs, such as the Alliance for Prog-

 Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, January 20, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.

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ress, further increased anti-Americanism in the countries receiving that aid. Many Brazilians believed that Brazilianists, that is, scholars specialized in matters related to Brazil, were in the country at the service of the CIA.³¹ In 1967, the US government’s methods of combating communism in Latin American countries sparked a great deal of criticism. The previous year, more precisely in April 1966, The New York Times had sparked a major controversy by publishing the results of an investigation into the finances of several organizations with foreign activities that served as covers for the CIA, including the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Founded in Berlin in 1950, it was created in response to the success of communist congresses held in the late 1940s, and its main objective was to support cultural and intellectual activities inside and outside the United States. With the backing of the American government, the Congress for Cultural Freedom brought together 118 anti-communist intellectuals from over 21 countries, including Brazil.³² Accusations of CIA involvement in civilian agencies soon extended to the American union movement. During the union leaders’ peace conference in Chicago, which brought together labor activists protesting the Vietnam War, Victor Reuther, the head of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and director of the UAW’s International Affairs Department, confirmed that union entities were collaborating with official espionage agencies, forming a vast global information network. Reuther criticized the AFL-CIO’s international policy for being too closely linked to the State Department and other US government agencies.³³ In mid-1967, Brazilians – both from the conservative civilian and military wing and leftist militants – heard reports of CIA involvement in labor and student organizations. It is likely that Brazilian union leaders read the report published in the Washington Daily News in February 1967, quoted in major Brazilian newspapers, about the developments of the investigation being conducted by a congressional committee in the United States. If not, at least they were aware of the Portuguese translation of George Morris’s book CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy, released as A CIA e o movimento operário americano by Civilização Brasileira, a publisher that was persecuted by the dictatorship for publishing books on communism. Based on the charges leveled by Victor Reuther, Morris sought to reveal the links between the AFL-CIO, the intelligence sector and the US government as part of an alliance in the international struggle against communist ideology. The author also drew on a series of ar-

 Green, 2009, 31.  Cancelli, 2012, 67.  Morris, 1967, 2.

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ticles published in American newspapers about the joint activities carried out overseas by the union federation and the CIA. Among the articles on that subject considered to be the most relevant, the author cited the series of reports published in the Washington Post between December 30, 1965 and January 2, 1966. In the Brazilian unions, television commentator and former director of the National Housing Bank (BNH) Sandra Cavalcanti, who was linked to Governor Carlos Lacerda’s administration in the state of Guanabara,³⁴ accused the AFLCIO of having ties with the CIA, a fact that she reportedly observed when she was running the $23 million project to build affordable housing financed by USAID. Her statements had a major impact in the Brazilian media. In an interview with Lacerda’s newspaper Tribuna da Imprensa, published on December 28, 1967, Sandra Cavalcanti recounted her “odyssey” to receive the loan from the AFL-CIO, denouncing the links between American trade unions and the CIA. Cavalcanti had rejected the American union federation’s requirements for issuing the loan.³⁵ When she was at university, Sandra Cavalcanti was influenced by the political thinking of the German statesman Konrad Adenauer, a theoretician of Christian Democracy. She was elected to the city council in October 1954 as a candidate of the UDN, a party that was conservative about social customs and liberal in its economics. She defended the interests of private schools. In 1960, she was elected as a UDN state deputy for Guanabara and formed close ties with Carlos Lacerda when he was governor of that state (1960 – 1965). After the coup, in October 1964, she was appointed president of the BNH. Shortly over a year later, in November 1965, Cavalcanti was replaced by Luís Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva.³⁶ In a statement given to members of the CPI established in October 1967 to investigate the activities of foreign entities in Brazil, proposed by MDB Deputy Jamil Amiden of Guanabara (a subject that will be addressed further on in

 One of the chief opponents of Getúlio Vargas and João Goulart and a mastermind of the 1964 coup, Carlos Lacerda yearned for an end to military intervention and for presidential elections to be held in 1965. However, once the military dictatorship had been firmly established, Lacerda turned against the regime, and was arrested shortly after AI-5 was decreed in 1968. His political rights were suspended for ten years, and he died in 1977, before he could once again enjoy political freedom.  Before making the statements published in A Tribuna da Imprensa in 1967, Sandra Cavalcanti had granted an interview to the magazines Manchete and O Cruzeiro in 1966 denouncing the “dubious” performance of AIFLD. Relatório final da CPI das entidades estrangeiras no Brasil. Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, Brasília-DF, Diário do Congresso Nacional, seção I, August 28, 1970, 72.  Dicionário Histórico Biográfico Brasileiro CPDOC, data-base: ; accessed on November 19, 2020.

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this chapter), Sandra Cavalcanti provided further details about her relations with the AFL-CIO and the US government. According to her, the practice of issuing AIFLD loans had begun in 1963, the year the institute was established in Brazil, when it offered $23 million to São Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros for the construction of affordable housing. However, as there was no legal way for a state entity to accept such a large sum without federal approval, the transaction had to be transferred from the state to the federal level. Thus, in 1964, understandings had begun with Planning Minister Roberto Campos with a view to making US loans feasible. The BNH did not yet exist. After lengthy negotiations with Roberto Campos in Washington, DC, in June 1964, the $23-million package was back on the table. When Cavalcanti took office as president of the BNH in November of that year, she reportedly received an express recommendation to meet with the AFL-CIO leaders, who were accompanied by the Brazilian union leader Rômulo Marinho. She had drafted plans for a worker housing project, which she said was done in keeping with Brazilian law. During a visit to Washington, DC, Cavalcanti said she had met with Thomas Mann, director of the Alliance for Progress, Jack Prebish, who was in charge of engaging with the Brazilians, William Doherty, representing the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs division – whom Cavalcanti described as a fat, red-faced Irishman who had been to Brazil several times and spoke Spanish fluently, knew several Brazilian union leaders by name, and proved to know many of them well. Cavalcanti said she was surprised to learn that her plans were to be changed. The Americans demanded that a committee of union leaders be formed to inspect the construction works, including a member of the AFL-CIO. Furthermore, they wanted the construction work to be done by US companies and for plans for the housing projects to be submitted to the Federal Housing Bureau in the United States. Unlike Brazilian ambassador Juracy Magalhães, Sandra Cavalcanti said she had rejected their list of demands. “So I sparked a crisis,” continued Sandra Cavalcanti in her testimony before the CPI. The Brazilian ambassador had tried to resolve the situation. Given the stalemate, the US organization reportedly conceded and dropped its demand that US contractors be hired exclusively to build the housing for this project. It also relinquished its requirement that plans be submitted for verification by an American urban planning firm. When the revised proposal was once again submitted to the American officials for their analysis, Cavalcanti said she paid a visit to the AFL-CIO’s headquarters in Washington, DC. On that occasion, she met with William Doherty, who showed her around the building and other facilities, but she said that she asked for some free time because she wanted to have a private talk with the directors. Unlike the good impression that it made on many Brazilian union leaders who visited the AFL-CIO at the time, Cav-

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alcanti’s contact with union members had apparently left her with a very bad opinion of American unionism. In her view, “It all seemed more like a group of American pelegos, just like ours, the only difference being that over there they were better dressed, better fed and spoke English.”³⁷ After AFL-CIO members had made a number of changes to the proposal, Sandra Cavalcanti was reportedly informed that the union federation did not have the $23 million promised to Brazil. She observed that American union leaders had gone to Brazil and stayed at the Copacabana Palace, then the most luxurious hotel in Rio de Janeiro, to discuss the housing project. At meetings with the BNH board of directors, they criticized a clause in the agreement, disappeared for a week and “then returned, tanned and cheerful” to see if the point they had critiqued had been rectified. Finally, Cavalcanti learned that the loan would not be granted to the BNH through an AFL-CIO announcement published in a US newspaper and sent to Brazilian unions, declaring that the Brazilian government was not treating its unionized workers well, and therefore would not receive aid from the AFL-CIO. By that time, the dictator Castello Branco had already broken ground for the project, which was to be built in the city of São Bernardo do Campo. The plans called for the construction of 462 apartments, and the estate was to be named “Vila Gompers” in honor of Samuel Gompers, the founder of the AFL. The US Embassy hoped that the ceremony for Vila Gompers would be an opportunity to revive the free collective bargaining bill that had been sent to Congress and rejected in 1965. To keep the Brazilian government’s word and fulfil its commitment to union workers, who had attended the ceremony and created a cooperative, Cavalcanti explained that construction of the project was begun with FGTS funding.³⁸ The former president of the BNH also noted that a businessman linked to the AFL-CIO, Roberto Gebara, who was a state deputy between 1963 and 1967 and former Labor Secretary for São Paulo State, was one of the interlocutors for the project. She took the opportunity to suggest to the members of the CPI that they change the name of the housing project, as there was no point in paying tribute to an American if the project was being carried out exclusively with Brazilian funds. After stepping down as president of the BNH, Cavalcanti began accusing the AFL-CIO of links with the CIA, using arguments based on newspapers and other foreign publications, mainly from the United States. She must have read the controversial article by Thomas Braden published in the May 20, 1967 issue of The

 Final report of the CPI, 73, column one.  O Estado de S. Paulo, April 1, 1966, 16.

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Saturday Evening Post. In it, although his intention was to defend the CIA’s performance, the former agent revealed that the American intelligence agency had contributed to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which published the magazine Cadernos Brasileiros in Brazil. Braden was a journalist and had worked with the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later with the CIA until 1954. He owned a newspaper in California and was linked to businessman Nelson Rockefeller. When Ramparts magazine in 1967 published an article about the CIA’s involvement with student and union leaders, Braden defended the espionage agency without denying those links in an article entitled “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” which apparently had even worse repercussions. In addition to a series of reports published in The New York Times in October 1967, further evidence was revealed by Ramparts in its April 1966 issue, which contained accusations that the CIA financed the leadership of the National Student Association (NSA) in the United States, in addition to other student, union, religious and political organizations worldwide.

“Colonel Passarinho’s sweet song”: Action and repression in the union movement Although in union and diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States went through a critical period at the beginning of the Costa e Silva administration (1967– 1969), the American Embassy was pleased with the work of the new Minister of Labor, Jarbas Passarinho, who had previously governed the northern state of Pará. Passarinho had gained a reputation as a “moderate” military officer compared with the “hard-liners.” The new Labor Minister had a friendlier image with regard to the unions without necessarily diverging from Castello Branco’s new labor policy. He believed that the new Brazilian Constitution had been liberal regarding labor rights, stating that the “government must not, cannot, play a repressive role with the unions,” nor should it continue to “practice the same type of paternalism that existed before the Revolution.” A typical follower of Christian social doctrine, Passarinho also criticized the uncompromising stance of businessmen who were strongly opposed to plans to nationalize industrial accident insurance and profit sharing, or any other measure that favored the working class.³⁹ In his annual report, the US labor attaché wrote that he con-

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, July 6, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1220.

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sidered the Labor Minister’s initial activities to be positive, and aimed at establishing closer ties between the AFL-CIO and the wide range of Brazilian unions. His actions were said to have helped improve the negative view of Americans in Brazil.⁴⁰ In 1967, workers gradually began to reorganize. An article in the April 30, 1967 issue of Amanhã, a weekly publication produced by the Society of the USP School of Philosophy, Science and Letters, warned workers about “Colonel Passarinho’s sweet song” [his surname means “little bird” in Portuguese – TN], questioning the new Labor Minister’s statements in the mainstream press that he was willing “to make unions completely free from the policialesque and fascist legislation” imposed on workers in the previous three years. The article ended with the following warning: “It is common for a new government to start out with promises. Besides, it’s Eastertime. However, Colonel Passarinho’s song will find workers who no longer believe in Santa Claus.”⁴¹ In a previous issue, the students had portrayed Passarinho as being somewhat “out of tune.” They wanted to know what “rabbit Jarbas Passarinho has hidden in his hat to offer to São Paulo workers on May Day” that year; “higher wages it is not, as Delfim Netto has already warned that the squeeze will continue.” For workers, this exposed “a raw, naked reality: wages frozen for a long time to come, while the cost of living keeps rising.” However, the weekly publication acknowledged that the Minister of Labor still had maneuvering room, as workers would be forced to accept the Costa e Silva government’s wage policy. Therefore, that May Day seems to have been a little better than the previous year, as the workers’ fighting spirit began to resurface.⁴² It did not take long for the regime to start cracking down on the student movement’s involvement in the life of the trade unions. On December 18, 1967, General Moacyr Gaya, an official from the Regional Labor Office (DRT), announced measures to prevent alleged “abuses” and “agitation” in the unions. One of the steps taken was banning any participation in meetings of workers’ organizations by individuals who were not members of those institutions. The trigger that reportedly led to this move was apparently a meeting held at the Osasco Metalworkers’ Union, chaired by José Ibrahim, with the participation of students from the Marxist Revolutionary Workers’ Organization (POLOP) and People’s Action (AP), where they discussed wage policy. On that occasion, some of those pre Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1220.  Amanhã, April 27 to May 4, 1967, no. 3, p. 4. CEDEM/UNESP, localização P6/086.  Amanhã, March 30 to April 6, 1967, no. 1, 4. CEDEM/UNESP, pasta P6/086.

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sent reportedly criticized the federal government and classified the administration as a military dictatorship, while also criticizing the United States and the Brazilian press. At the time, one union member even said, “it was necessary to put an end to American imperialism.”⁴³ It was the beginning of the resurgence of the union movement, which would culminate in the strikes in Osasco and Contagem, both industrial towns on the outskirts of São Paulo City and Minas Gerais respectively, as well as stoppages by auto workers in the industrial belt of the ABC region in São Paulo State.⁴⁴ It was no coincidence that this anti-Americanism was combined with the Costa e Silva administration’s nationalist measures. This also bothered the regime’s supporters, as we will see in the case of “union piracy.” The leftist groups that fought against the dictatorship were not the only ones who were unhappy with the massive presence of American institutions in the country. They also included the military and civilians, among them businessmen who were dissatisfied with the first civilian-military regime’s economic policy. On the labor front, the imposition of the wage squeeze met with resistance from workers inside and outside the workplace, as well as newly formed factory commissions.⁴⁵ During that period, the issues that mobilized the working class the most were wage arrears and the payment of the “thirteenth salary.” They also wanted to regain control of the union movement, and the workers gradually returned to their unions to take part in the elections, as in the case of the Osasco Metalworkers’ Union. Fearful of losing their posts, many pelego leaders from the metalworkers’ unions of São Bernardo do Campo and São Paulo were vocal opponents of the wage policy, forming the Inter-Union Anti-Wage Squeeze Movement (Movimento Intersindical Antiarrocho, MIA) in mid-1967. For conservative candidates, the MIA was a bargaining tool they could use in negotiations with the authorities. To the pelegos’ dismay, the opposition slates, made up of former leaders of the PCB and CGT, as well as new activists who would give rise to union opposition, also joined the MIA, and played an important role in the struggle against the dictatorship.⁴⁶ The alternative newspapers published by leftist organizations and members of the student movement contain numerous complaints about “Yankee imperial-

 O Estado de S.Paulo, December 19. 1967, 20. I would like to thank Antonio Luigi Negro for providing this source.  On the 1968 strikes, see: Negro, 2004a, chapter 8; Couto, 2003.  Factory commissions were workers’ organizations that were organized horizontally at the production site itself, without necessarily involving the unions.  F. L. Almeida, 1982, 22.

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ism” in Brazil.⁴⁷ In an article published in Amanhã, entitled “Esse mister Jack manda em Brasília” (“That Mister Jack is the Boss in Brasília”), USP students denounced the activities of labor attaché Jack Liebof from the American consulate in São Paulo: a “strange figure who has been lurking around Brazilian unionism for some years,” as the newspaper pointed out, Liebof was described as a man who was “tall and portly, very pleasant and always with a ‘friendly’ smile on his lips.” And the labor attaché openly participated in meetings, roundtables, and union assemblies in fluent but heavily accented Portuguese. His presence depended on how he was received by groups of union leaders. The article concluded by questioning the Americans’ acts of “solidarity.”⁴⁸ According to Embassy officials, the main issues that contributed to rising anti-Americanism in Brazil included the following points: the US’s swift recognition of the military regime, its abandonment of the Alliance for Progress’s principles of helping bolster “democratic institutions,” and the fact that the military regime’s economic plan did not present a durable solution to social problems, in addition to the “policy of sacrifice” imposed on workers. The working class’s discontent had a direct impact on union elections. As the labor attaché observed, “authentic and democratic” groups were losing their leadership positions in organizations that were considered essential. Seeing no improvement in the workers’ financial situation, those leaders were forced to increase the tone of criticism of the government, becoming more nationalist and less pro-American.⁴⁹

Nationalists and pro-Americanists: Two sides of the same coin In Brasília, on October 19, 1967, the first session of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPI), proposed by Jamil Amiden, the MDB Representative from Guanabara, was held in the Chamber of Deputies.⁵⁰ The aim was to investigate

 See examples of newspapers published in 1967 and 1968: A Classe Operária, from the PC do B; Aonde vamos, from São Paulo; Debate, from USP Polytechnic students; Frente Operária, from the Revolutionary Trotskyist Workers’ Party, among others. CEDEM/UNESP, various collections.  Amanhã, April 6 to 13, 1967, 13. CEDEM/UNESP, pasta P6/086.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, October 19, 1966, by Raine, January to July 1966. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Jamil Amiden was born in the state of Mato Grosso. A sergeant during World War II, he was part of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB). He was elected federal deputy for the state of Guanabara in 1962, as a member of the Socialist Labor Alliance, formed by the PSB and the PTB, to which he was affiliated. When political parties were banned and the two-party system was established, Amiden joined the MDB. After being impacted by AI-5, Amiden was amnestied

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the activities of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW) and other international organizations financed by the United States. There were suspicions that these entities were interfering in Brazilian union matters, with the endorsement of the AFL-CIO and CIA.⁵¹ Following complaints published in the mainstream media, particularly from the Oil Distillation and Refining Industry Workers’ Union in the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, the CPI assigned its investigations to nine deputies, who were supposed to complete their work within 120 days.⁵² The team based its inquiry on the report from an investigative commission formed by the Ministry of Labor, which, according to Jamil Amiden, had already proven 70 percent of the charges.⁵³ Months earlier, two other CPIs investigating foreigners in Brazil had gone through Congress. One analyzed the invasion of the veterinary pharmaceutical production market by foreign laboratories; the other investigated the sale of Brazilian land to foreign individuals or legal entities.⁵⁴ The investigation was launched after complaints from Lourival Coutinho, the president of the Guanabara Oil Workers’ Union, made to the Ministry of Labor, but his revelations had not had a resounding impact. Coutinho then reportedly sought out Jamil Amiden, who had deemed the matter to be extremely serious. Among other things, the deputies wanted to know what the IFPCW’s aims in Brazil might be.⁵⁵ Expressing concern about the impact of foreign union policy in his country, Amiden feared that the nation’s interests would be affected. Then, Amiden presented a list of 219 deputies’ signatures supporting the creation of the CPI. In his testimony, given on January 23, 1968, Lourival Coutinho – considered a respected nationalist – denied that the tone of his report was in any way accu-

in August 1979. Dicionário Histórico Biográfico Brasileiro CPDOC, data-base: ; accessed on April 3, 2015.  Telegram to the State Department from the Brasilia Consulate of the US Embassy in Brazil, March 11, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1938.  The deputies on the committee included Arlindo Kunzler, Humberto Bezerra, Adhemar Ghisi, Lopo Coelho, Josias Leite and Dayl de Almeida, all from the Arena party, as well as José Maria Ribeiro, Ney Ferreira and Jamil Amiden, from the MDB. Arlindo Kunzler was appointed rapporteur. Resolution of the Chamber of Deputies no. 48, 1967, published in Diário do Congresso Nacional, November 24, 1967. Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, Brasília-DF.  Jamil Amiden’s testimony to the CPI, given on January 23, 1968. Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, BrasíliaDF, Final report of the CPI on foreign entities in Brazil, published in the Diário do Congresso Nacional, section I, August 28, 1970, supplement no. 101, 10, column four.  Arquivo da Câmara dos Deputados, Brasília-DF, Diário do Congresso Nacional, Section 1 (now Diário da Câmara dos Deputados), November 1967, 7272.  Final report of the CPI, 6, column 1.

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satory. He said that the statements were merely informative, giving nothing but evidence indicating matters that required further investigation. According to him, Efraim Velasquez, the director of the IFPCW, was a “very polished and intelligent” Puerto Rican. Coutinho went on to say that during the two visits he made to the Guanabara Oil Workers’ Union, Velasquez had engaged in “a very interesting conversation on several subjects, including unionism, about which we expressed our opinion without reservations.” According to Coutinho, this may have been why Velasquez had ceased to contact him. The union leader questioned the motives and interests of a foreign union organization in Brazil and said he distrusted the “generosity” of foreign unionists when “giving lessons in democratic unionism.” He asserted that Brazilian unions did not need such lessons, as “the [kind of] unionism adopted in an overdeveloped country like the United States cannot be the same kind adopted in a country that is still in a phase of developmentalist transition, like Brazil.”⁵⁶ In his testimony before the CPI, Coutinho continued to compare Brazil and the United States in the oil industry. In his view, the difference began with the relationship between the “wage payer” and the wage earner. In the United States, he explained, those connections were made with private companies, trusts. In Brazil, he continued, they were made through a state-owned company, “whose personnel policy rules are imposed as a standard on the few private oil refineries that exist among us, which could never become trusts,” as was the case with Petrobras. As a result, American oil workers could obtain bigger advantages over wages, even forcing many Petrobras technicians to give in to the trusts due to their significantly higher earnings, argued the union leader. However, he warned, when those trusts began operating overseas, they offered foreign workers lower wages – a negligible amount compared to those paid to American oil workers. Furthermore, the director was unhappy with the fact that the IFPCW regularly sent detailed reports on union life in Brazil to the United States – “reports that are accompanied by comments and criticisms that are not always flattering to us Brazilians.” Another matter for the CPI to investigate was the IFPCW’s payment of daily allowances to union leaders when they attended its seminars, as a jeton de présence. Occasionally, Coutinho informed the committee, groups of union leaders would travel from Brazil to the United States to study “democratic unionism,” receiving daily expenses paid in dollars. According to Coutinho, he had read about the members of the AFL-CIO in printed publications. His testimony was particularly based on the aforementioned article, published in the April 1966 issue of Ramparts magazine. He also comment-

 Ibid.

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ed on the situation of the American trade union movement, which, he said, was going through an unprecedented phase of corruption and “lack of authenticity.” He accused AIFLD of having close links with the US government, to the point of using the State Department’s diplomatic structure to advance its own interests.⁵⁷ As AIFLD had three union schools in the northeastern city of Recife, in a region identified with the organization of rural workers, the institute’s activities in that part of Brazil also worried the union leader. In his view, making no attempt to conceal his prejudice against the inhabitants of the Northeast, they were illiterate workers, who lived on “rustic ranches, living like real pariahs, enfeebled by malnutrition, if not famine.”⁵⁸ He believed that this made them an easy target for foreign manipulation, and that they could easily “lose their sense of national identity” in exchange for some inexpensive tools. The union leader also noted that, in the AIFLD courses offered in rural areas, the subject of land reform was not even discussed. In his view, the explanation for this was that Americans were among the largest landowners in the country. The role of rural workers in labor relations and Brazilian society throughout the twentieth century, especially those in the Northeast, has been the subject of debate and analysis in the social sciences since the 1950s. The so-called São Paulo school of sociology tended to view rural workers and northeastern migrants as passive and subjected to archaic political and economic relations based on paternalism.⁵⁹ However, Coutinho himself observed that not all Brazilian union leaders were easily “enticed” by foreign entities. There were examples of “conscientious workers.” This was the case with Ary da Costa Souza, who reported his experience with AIFLD in the 1967 insurance workers’ bulletin. Invited by the National Confederation of Credit Workers (CONTEC) to take part in an ICT program, Souza went to the town of Piracicaba, São Paulo, where a course was underway. There, the leader stated that he “had a first-hand look at the impressive and growing influence that international unionism has been having among us.” With their courses, those entities “impress the ‘natives’ with improvement courses given abroad,” and even “provide union members with plane tickets, accommodation

 The union leader also cited a number of articles published abroad that addressed that subject, among them, one by Sidney Lens, entitled “American Unionism and the CIA: the Fifth International,” published in the May 1967 issue of Le Temps Modernes. Final report of the CPI, 13, second column.  In this passage, Coutinho evokes an image that was widespread in Brazilian society, particularly after the massive northeastern migrations impelled by drought in the second half of the twentieth century. See Fontes, 2008; Negro, 2004b, pp. 403-435.  Regarding this literature, see J. B. Lopes, 1964; J. B. Lopes, 1967; L. M. Rodrigues, 1970.

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at universities, books and learning materials,” said Souza, who was sorry that his colleagues could surrender so easily to that kind of inducement. Although he was not opposed to exchanging ideas, Souza believed that foreign educational materials could only be useful when they were “adapted to our unique educational, social and economic characteristics.”⁶⁰ Ary Campista, CNTI general secretary and the minister representing workers on the Superior Labor Court (TST), considered one of the most longstanding and influential pelegos in the history of Brazilian trade unionism, questioned the legality of the representation of foreign union entities in Brazil.⁶¹ Campista had been known for making and breaking alliances with trade unionists and political authorities since the 1950s. He was one of the leading backers of the 1964 coup and had free access to the military regime’s ministers. Along with seventeen other union leaders appointed by the seven confederations, he was chosen by Castello Branco to occupy the post of “class judge” on the TST.⁶² He called himself a “controversial” union leader, and his name was always accompanied by an adjective. He especially liked being called “Machiavellian,” “recalcitrant” and an “éminence grise,” according an interview he gave to journalist Paulo Henrique Amorim. He claimed to have joined union life as a tourist: “I went there to see how it was, liked it and stayed.”⁶³ After representing Brazil at the Sixth ORIT Conference, held in Mexico in March 1965, Campista gave statements to the Rio press questioning the “consistency of international affiliation with Brazilian law, as well as the principles inherent to the union unity system currently in place in Brazil.” In his view, foreign union federations acted like political parties or organizations of a political-ideological nature, unlike Brazil, which organized workers into single unions, regardless of their creeds.⁶⁴ The Sixth Conference supposedly ushered in a period of denunciations in the international trade union world, as Campista and other members of CNTI were accused of being communists by his colleague Rômulo Marinho, secretary general of the National Confederation of Communication and Advertising Workers, and known for siding with the Americans. The conflict between the two labor leaders seems to have been due to the selection of union representatives at ORIT. Marinho backed Mário Lopes de Oliveira’s candidacy to represent ORIT, which went against Campista’s interests.

 Final report of the CPI, 15, first column.  Regarding Ary Campista, see Alexander, 2003, 156; P. H. Amorim, 1968, 152-160.  A “class judge” or juiz classista it is a lay judge, that is, not necessarily trained in law, who is chosen by the workers’ and employers’ unions for a temporary term in the Labor Court.  P. H. Amorim, 1968, 159.  Final report of the CPI, 15, column four.

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When he lost, Campista went to the press and began questioning the activities of American entities in Brazil. His barbs strengthened the nationalist tone of the Brazilian unions, in sync with the domestic policy being outlined by Costa e Silva.⁶⁵ During that period, Campista became the symbol of “homeland unionism,” breaking off relations with American union entities after the controversial ORIT Conference in 1965. In his testimony before the CPI, he exaggerated the situation, claiming that international union entities’ meddling in Brazilian affairs was one of the biggest problems he had experienced during his 33 years in the unions. He defended the break between Brazilian trade unionism and international union bodies. His sole justification was the argument that, in the context of the Cold War, the international union movement was ideologically divided. In his view, Brazil should not take sides, as that type of ideological dispute was senseless in his country. Speaking before the members of the CPI, Campista questioned the concept of “free unions.” In his view, it was not just ideological or political but also had to do with financial matters. Unions should be free to use their funds as they wished. Union freedom, he continued, came from money: “if it has money, it has strength: without money, it has no strength.” Following this line of reasoning, Campista concluded, “Brazilian unionism is not free because it is not financially free; it lives the expense of money that is conferred on it by our laws.” However, the labor leader asserted that American unionism was not free either, as it also depended on extraneous factors and received funding from the US government. Regarding the oil industry, Campista explained there was a conflict of interest in that sector which was incompatible with the acts of “solidarity” carried out by the international oil union entity because, “if Brazil achieved extractive and industrial self-sufficiency, American oil could not be exported.” Then, Campista raised the question of remittances from those international organizations sent directly to Brazilian unions, asking: “What would stop the IFPQW from financing a strike against Petrobras lasting I don’t know how many days?” He also criticized the lack of unity among the leaders of the AFLCIO itself. In his view, that organization juxtaposed the AFL and CIO without actually being a federation. He informed the deputies about the divisions between the group led by George Meany and another led by the Reuther brothers, disagreements that were also reflected in ORIT, he noted. According to Campista, Reuther advocated organizing unionism with a focus on professional interests, while Meany believed that unionism went beyond specific labor issues to the higher cause of defending capitalism. And, in defense of that ideology, knowing

 Ibid., 16, column one.

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that money was scarce in the Brazilian union movement – argued Ary Campista – the AFL-CIO presented itself as a “giant Santa Claus.” Campista was not the only union leader who thought that providing foreign funding to the local unions without any strings attached was “softening up” their counterparts, making them complacent and discouraging them from fighting for the workers’ interests in exchange for easy money. Furthermore, Campista also questioned the criteria for donating or lending foreign money (how it worked, who decided which entity would benefit, and which were given priority). As a result, Campista suggested to the members of the CPI that the sums of money handed to Brazilian unions by foreign entities were intended to divide or benefit any union group that “sang from the same hymn sheet” as American unionism, directly interfering in the internal affairs of the Brazilian union movement. Campista also accused the Labor Ministry of favoring the activities of foreign union leaders in the country, allowing them to enter factories while many Brazilian leaders had a hard time obtaining credentials at the ministry itself for workplace inspections. Campista advocated the urgent regulation of the operations of foreign union entities in Brazil and drew attention to the role of the American Embassy as a facilitator of union relations between Brazilians and Americans. Observing that he represented about four million workers, Ary Campista thanked the members of the CPI for their “humane and highly patriotic attention to the great and serious problem of true subversion of the mentality of Brazilian men.”⁶⁶ One of the statements that the CPI considered most important was given by jurist Evaristo de Moraes Filho, a specialist in the field of Labor Law and author of the bill for the new Labor Code, which aimed to replace the CLT introduced in 1943. On some occasions, Moraes Filho criticized the “surrender of Brazilian union entities to the American federations.” Presenting himself as nothing but an outside observer, Moraes Filho handed the deputies a collection of 33 newspaper clippings about the performance of international entities in Brazil.⁶⁷ In 1953, Moraes Filho, then a lecturer at the National Law School, said he had been contacted by the director of the Agir bookshop, who offered him copies of American books. Moraes Filho was then asked which publication gave the most accurate idea of the United States trade union movement. The lawyer recommended a book by Florence Peterson, director of the Statistics Division of the American Department of Labor. He soon agreed to translate it into Portuguese and write a foreword for that edition. Some time later, said the interviewee,

 The source of the previous paragraphs is also the Final Report of the CPI, 70-72.  Ibid., 16, column three.

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the bookstores were provided with copies of that publication, which were widely distributed by the American Embassy. Based on subsequent developments, the situation became clear to Moraes Filho: he had been “a useful innocent.” Regarding the ideological disputes between the international union federations, he claimed neutrality. Nevertheless, Moraes Filho said he was surprised that the CPI had been established, declaring that he did not understand why it had taken so long.⁶⁸ He observed that he had denounced the activities of US entities in a speech to Christian union leaders in Rio in August 1964, four months after the military regime took power. He then went on to quote to the deputies words written by Otávio Maia, better known as Manoel Bispo (a columnist for the newspaper Última Hora) which, in Moraes Filho’s view, aptly illustrated the situation: “No sooner do they leave one but they fall into another; those who are not from the other side are free. Everyone thinks the other is a slave.” In addition to quoting Maia, the jurist showed the CPI newspaper clippings with photos of foreign union leaders “ecstatically arriving in Brazil.” He also said that he had ignored several invitations from the ICT except one. According to the jurist, he met with a political attaché from the US Embassy for lunch to discuss the draft bill for the Labor Code that Moraes Filho was working on. However, there were no further such meetings. Although he claimed to be nothing but a neutral observer, after reading out a number of newspaper clippings on the activities of the ORIT, AIFLD and other international entities in Brazil in 1964, Moraes Filho emphatically asked, “Do we need an outsider to solve our union problems?” And more: “What about all our knowledge? We, who spend our lives studying the subject, publishing books, are we worthless?” Among the articles he read out to the CPI members, the witness quoted a report published in Jornal do Brasil about the arrival of ORIT representative Manuel Pavon. He was said to have visited Brazil to “study and try to make suggestions regarding the major problems facing Brazilian unionism.” He also read out the following quote by Nilo Tavares taken from an unidentified newspaper clipping: “Nowadays, one must speak English to know Brazil.” Further statements give an idea of how contact between Brazilian and American union leaders took place. According to Nelson Ferreira de Bastos, a member of the Fiscal Council of SINDIPETRO of Guanabara since 1966, the first time he saw Efraim Velasquez was at a meeting held at the union, when he had just joined the entity’s leadership. According to Bastos, the foreign union leader

 Ibid., 51, column three.

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had turned up uninvited with the excuse that he was preparing a list of leaders to take a union leadership course, which apparently bothered many of those present, who were uneasy at the foreign presence. Velasquez claimed to want to “get to know the board better,” explaining that, to do so, he would ask a number of questions about the entity, its directors and details of the profession the union represented, among other issues. After the meeting, they apparently spoke privately, at which point Bastos raised a number of questions about the IFPCW’s operations. He had gone home laden with books, pamphlets and prospectuses about the IFPCW, as well as an invitation, suggested between the lines, to take a union course overseas.⁶⁹ The union leader told the CPI that, at their next meeting, this time with Velasquez as an invited guest, the leadership of SINDIPETRO from Guanabara and other parts of Brazil debated who would go to the United States to take the course offered by the IFPCW. The meeting was chaotic, according to Bastos. The leaders had been hastily summoned and the meeting was said to have been held at around midnight. When everyone was seated, according to the union leader’s testimony, the presence of an uninvited guest who claimed to be a Cuban refugee named Samuel Palmer was noted.⁷⁰ Velasquez’s attitude, as described by the deponent, also angered Bastos and his companions. According to Bastos, the foreign leader was consistently evasive, while maintaining an air of serenity that the Brazilian leaders present interpreted with a number of negative adjectives, such as brazen, mocking, arrogant and even indifferent. They also thought that Velasquez showed disrespect in “someone else’s house,” as he “sat with his feet on our chairman’s desk,” which reportedly made the leaders indignant. The meeting was called to an end and there were no further encounters. Clearly, we do not know whether there is any truth in these reports. However, Bastos may have changed his stance on foreign trade unionists or even exaggerated his account of his reaction when he realized that their presence in Brazil was not welcomed by more influential leaders, such as Ary Campista, and the Ministry of Labor authorities. A similar interpretation can be made of other union leaders’ statements. Nevertheless, there were those who did not hide their cooperation with foreign interests, such as union leader José Benedito de Assis, president of the Rio de Janeiro Broadcasting Workers’ Union and a reporter for Voz da América (Voice of America), assigned to its Rio de Janeiro office. He had come out in defense of

 Ibid., 59.  According to the testimony of Efraim Velasquez, the Cuban worked at the National Federation of Commercial Mineworkers. Velasquez said he did not know if the man was a refugee.

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the actions of foreign union entities in the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, on January 19, 1968, claiming that the CPI was the result of a “leftist-inspired campaign.” However, his colleagues accused him of working for the American Embassy. In his statement given on February 6, 1968, Assis defended himself against those charges, claiming that, as in the rest of the world, there were reporters, copywriters, and photographers from news organizations in Brazil, such as those who worked for the Associated Press, the United Press and Reuters. Therefore, his job was not unusual. Assis said he had never denied receiving money from AIFLD to help buy his union headquarters. According to him, that transaction complied with the financing regulations of the Alliance for Progress. He claimed that it was not a donation but a loan: an official transaction, and therefore legal.⁷¹ Regarding trips to the United States and union education courses, Assis responded that many of his colleagues had visited the American union federation and come into contact with their leaders. In his view, the teachings of American unionism could be reappropriated. He ended his testimony by strongly defending the principles and actions of the Alliance for Progress, claiming to be a “son of the Northeast,” born in a “very poor area,” and that, for that very reason, he deeply felt the benefits of the American aid program’s funding.⁷² In an interview with Robert Alexander in 1965, Assis said he was unhappy with AI-2 and other measures the Castello Branco government adopted with regard to workers. However, he said he believed that the union should steer clear of political issues. Instead, it should focus solely on wage demands and problems related to the world of work. With these words, the unionist emulated the ideas repeated extensively in the courses offered by AIFLD. Assis considered himself a lucky man. He had worked for the US Embassy for eight years, a job he considered to be a very good one, as government officials had treated him with respect. Assis said he did not care about the criticism and harassment he suffered from his fellow union leaders.⁷³ Another Brazilian who worked for foreign entities interviewed by CPI was Olavo Previatti, secretary general of the CNTI since May 1966, as well as president of the São Paulo State Federation of Paper Manufacturing Workers. The union leader did not hide the fact that AIFLD loans were made directly to

 José de Assis also cited other union entities that had obtained American loans, among them the Santos Dock Workers’ Union, which had received 3.2 million new cruzeiros to finish building a hospital.  Final Report of the CPI, 32, column four.  Interview with José Benedito de Assis given to Robert J. Alexander on October 27, 1965. AELUnicamp, Robert Alexander collection, interviews series (1947– 1994), box 5, folder 60, microfilm roll 4.

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the union entities, and therefore without the Ministry of Labor’s knowledge. Regarding the amount of the loans, Previatti only mentioned the cases of the hospital built by the Santos Dock Workers’ Union and the loan granted to the Porto Alegre Metalworkers’ Union to set up a technical school. Previatti did not agree that loans or donations could facilitate corruption or bribery in the Brazilian unions. Then executive director of the ICT, Previatti stated that AIFLD’s sole objective was “to help Brazilian unionism free itself financially and economically, in the sense of better distributing aid to workers.” He went on to discuss the extremely low wages obtained by workers and criticize the wage policy, which forced the courts to submit to government-set wages. However, when questioned by one of the CPI members who had said he did not believe in the “kindness of foreign agencies that grant interest-free loans [with payments] not adjusted for inflation,” the witness guaranteed that AIFLD did not require anything in return. He also said he did not think the American entity was a “goody two-shoes”; in fact, he added, “I don’t think the government is a goody two-shoes either.” However, he supported the claim that the role of AIFLD was simply to improve the worker’s living conditions. Former Labor Minister Arnaldo Sussekind was also called before the CPI to share his knowledge on this matter. When asked about the rivalries and disagreements between the international federations, he explained the differences between the IFPCW and the International Chemical Federation (ICF). Based on comments and observations made at the ILO meetings he attended, Sussekind explained that, for decades, the ICFTU had been run by a European secretary-general who was responsible for managing the massive resources allocated to the International Solidarity Fund. At one point, George Meany took charge of this task, which reportedly caused concern among the European leaders. For this reason, a second International Federation of Chemical and Other Workers was created, based in Geneva, covering workers in the oil and atomic power industries. This came to rival the existing federation, located in the US city of Denver, Colorado, resulting in the duplication of specific federations at the international level, in the exclusive case of oil and chemical companies. Both reportedly were keenly interested in establishing a presence in Brazil. Sussekind, who was then a Superior Labor Court (TST) minister (judge) upheld the practice of independent collective bargaining as one of the most important tools for a union leader. He told the CPI that he himself advocated that method. He had authored the bill on collective bargaining, which the government rejected in mid-1965, much to the Americans’ dismay. He explained that Labor Minister Nascimento e Silva had gone back to the old plan but changed it by removing three articles that Sussekind deemed essential. As a result, the bill

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had become decree no. 229 of the Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT).⁷⁴ Regarding his support for the work done by foreign union entities during his tenure as Minister of Labor, Sussekind claimed that, at the time, he was concerned with union formation and felt that he should encourage the work of the ICT and the Brazilian Confederation of Christian Workers, among other national union entities. Furthermore, in view of the negative international repercussions of the “1964 Revolution,” Sussekind claimed to have found it important to offer the possibility for foreign union leaders “to have the opportunity to verify what was wrong in this regard.” Although he had not found any problems with union exchanges between foreign entities, the former minister agreed with the measure that controlled and restricted the activities of these organizations in Brazil. ⁷⁵ Union leaders also cited the International Federation of Metalworkers (FITIM) in their statements to the CPI as an example of meddling in local union matters. The complaint was that the international metalworkers’ organization allegedly tried to intervene on behalf of the workers in the TST’s decision to reduce the inflation-adjusted wage increase for their profession. The FITIM was based in Switzerland, with offices in Mexico, Japan and Brazil. Established in São Paulo City since 1962, the entity was represented in Brazil by Miguel Huertas. The CPI members found it strange that the organization had representation in the country despite the fact that it had no official Brazilian affiliates. Huertas explained that some affiliation applications were being processed, involving the metalworkers’ federations based in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, but that the entity’s focus was on offering courses on collective bargaining and exchange programs. The entity was not supported by AIFLD. Its expenses in Brazil were entirely covered by the entity’s Mexico office. Sandra Cavalcanti also demonstrated her nationalist spirit to the CPI members when discussing the courses offered by the ICT and AIFLD. Although she said she was fearful, and did not want to give a hasty, uncorroborated answer, the BNH director emphatically stated that she did not see “major advantages in leaving the union education of Brazilian workers in the hands of a different mindset from ours.” Likewise, she also saw no sense in putting American colonels in charge of Army civics classes. At meetings with Brazilian union leaders, she said she had noticed a difference in attitude between union members who had not gone to the United States and those who had taken classes in American unionism. The latter, she noted, were overly positive about the Americans.⁷⁶ The  Title VI of Decree no. 229 of February 28, 1967 regulated the collective Labor Convention, which was of a normative nature.  Final report of the CPI, 37, column three.  Ibid., 74.

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CPI also gathered data on the international union entities that had been present in the country up to that time. It found that, until 1965, the London-based International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) had been represented in Brazil by the Cuban-American railroad worker Jack (Joaquin Francisco) Otero. He was replaced by the Peruvian union leader Medralo Gomero, who stayed in Brazil for just a year without leaving a successor. Until that time, the ITF had had just one affiliate in the country, the National Confederation of Land Workers. Another entity mentioned was the Geneva-based International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees (FIET), which was represented in Brazil by the American William Medeiros. Established in São Paulo City since 1964, the entity also had just one affiliate, the National Confederation of Commercial Workers (CNTC). However, the FIET engaged in intense educational activity in Brazil, periodically organizing unionization campaigns, while getting involved in donations to the unions and intervening with AIFLD to grant loans, which were used to purchase union headquarters or set up consumer cooperatives. By 1968, the organization had held 29 educational seminars throughout the country. In May 1965, the São Paulo political police took an interest in the activities of the FIET and its representative William Medeiros. In addition to monitoring the routine operations of the ICT and AIFLD, the Department of Political and Social Order (DEOPS) occasionally sought to map out the American unionists’ contact networks and programs.⁷⁷ This was the case with Medeiros. One of his aims was to organize the Federation of Barbers, Hairdressers and Related Professions in the city of Santos. However, those professions were already represented by the Federation of Tourism and Hospitality Workers in São Paulo State. Brazilian leaders believed the creation of a new organization might split the union, a fact that was already causing a number of disagreements among local leaders. They then accused the FIET of wanting to pit Brazilian entities against the interests of the Ministry of Labor and encouraging them to “apply the American strike system in Brazil.” In an attempt to win the support of local unions, Medeiros had issued a loan valued at one thousand dollars to the Santos Tourism Workers’ consumption cooperative. However, that move does not seem to have achieved the desired outcome, as the FIET did not even obtain a license to broadcast its

 The Department of Political and Social Order of São Paulo was created in 1924. From 1938 onwards, the agency came under the supervision of the São Paul State Department for Public Security Affairs. The DEOPS was dissolved in 1983, during the period when democracy was being restored in Brazil.

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radio program.⁷⁸ This demonstrates that, even before the establishment of the CPI in 1967, some São Paulo unions were already reacting negatively to the American entities’ activities. The third international entity mentioned was the International Federation of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Workers, based in Brussels and present in Brazil since 1959. Represented in Brazil by Marvin Myrtue, its affiliates in that country were the Union of Telephone Company Workers in São Paulo State and the National Federation of Telephone Company Workers. Brazilian union leaders José Alceu Câmara Portocarrero, Hélcio Maguenzani and Rômulo Marinho, all linked to the ICT, were also members of that entity. ORIT, represented in Brazil by the retired merchant navy radio-telegraphist Joviano de Araújo, was based in Guanabara. In addition to Araújo, the president of the National Confederation of Land Transport Workers, Mário de Oliveira Lopes, was also linked to ORIT. Its funding came from the ICFTU itself, through a solidarity fund and contributions from its affiliates. ORIT claimed to have spent ten thousand dollars in Brazil in 1966 and 1967, in addition to the funds generated by Brazilian union contributions. However, the organization claimed that it had not carried out educational programs in the last two years due to a lack of financial resources. According to the organization’s representative, Joviano de Araújo, the amounts received were used to publish “informative works, translating and transmitting to its affiliates the bulletins it receives from its headquarters in Mexico and maintaining contacts with its affiliates as an intermediary.”The IFPCW also had just one affiliate in Brazil, the National Federation of Commercial Ore and Mineral Fuel Company Workers, headed by Alberto Bettamio. According to the CPI’s investigation, the number of unions that benefited from the funding, including loans and donations from the international entity, was not insignificant.⁷⁹ That entity was considered one of the most active international organizations in the country. Its rival, the ICF, established a presence in Brazil in August 1967 through Herbert Kemmsies, a Brazilian-born naturalized American citizen. The CPI found that Kemmsies had proved to be a “toxic presence among us” from the outset.⁸⁰ Finally, the CPI analyzed the activities of the ICT, represented by José V. Freitas Marcondes, one of the institute’s founders. According to the data presented in the November 1967 issue of Problemas Brasileiros (Brazilian Problems) magazine, around 10,000 union members had attended ICT courses. In addition to the educational activities carried out at the institute’s headquarters, Freitas Marcondes  Information from union sources, dated May 6, 1965. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-152-1218.  Final report of the CPI, 17, column three.  Ibid., 8, column four.

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stated that the entity was trying to extend its courses to higher education, having achieved good results through partnerships with universities in the states of São Paulo, Paraná and Amazonas. He claimed that it was a public benefit entity, serving the purposes of the Alliance for Progress program. The ICT was reportedly created by Serafino Romualdi to combat the activities of Soviet institutes dedicated to training communist union leaders. Regarding AIFLD, the CPI found it to be an organization that was also linked to the American socioeconomic development program. With funding from USAID and the AFL-CIO, by the first months of 1968, AIFLD had financed 40 Brazilian unions. Marcondes reported that the loans were largely issued in response to requests to set up dentists’ and doctors’ offices at the unions’ headquarters. These requests were assessed and never fully funded, receiving 50 percent of the amount solicited, on average. However, the deponent explained that many requests were rejected. The CPI’s proceedings were widely reported in the mainstream press, as the committee members and their deponents observed. In their statements, some of them referred to newspapers articles. For example, Ultima Hora revealed that the Ministry of Labor and the Chamber of Deputies were investigating the relationship between Efraim Velasquez and Alcir Nogueira, from the Santo André Chemical Workers’ Union. Without awaiting the outcome of the investigation, the report stated that the organization offered seminars and courses for workers solely as a means of influencing Brazilian union leaders and representing the interests of the big oil monopolies.⁸¹ Many of the accusations made in the newspapers were based on deputy Jamil Amiden’s inflammatory statements. In his testimony on January 23, 1968, Amiden complained about the delay in investigating the charges made by him and the union leader Lourival Coutinho, observing that the federal government had been negligent in that regard.⁸² The opposition deputy took the opportunity to criticize the current political situation, turning against his colleagues to say that “the Brazilian Parliament, with very few exceptions, is hogtied by a powerful machine that the Executive branch imposes on Brazilian lawmakers.” He went on to address the case of foreign union entities, and stated categorically that the roots of the alleged cases of union bribery lay in a single agency, the CIA.⁸³ Coutinho’s and Amiden’s charges gained wider impact when the newspapers began reporting on another investigation conducted in São Paulo. A group of São Paulo union leaders from the chemicals industry had denounced the cor-

 Última Hora, Rio de Janeiro edition, December 21, 1967, 1.  Final report of the CPI, 10, column two.  Ibid., 10, column three.

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ruption and bribery of local leaders by foreign entities. The accusers included union leader Egisto Domenicali, who was arrested shortly after the complaint, accused of forging signatures to compromise American leaders and the DRT delegate. Domenicali had listed the names of several people who allegedly received money directly from foreign union entities. The union leader’s arrest had major repercussions because it took place when he was protesting on the premises of the São Paulo Legislative Assembly, wearing the uniform of an Army major.⁸⁴ Domenicali had been a staffer in the office of the São Paulo State Secretary of Labor and an assistant to Vice Governor Porfirio da Paz. He claimed to have been in contact with the union movement since 1957 and identified himself as a critic of Goulart’s labor policy and a Christian nationalist. He denied being an informant for the DEOPS, but said he was in the habit of sending letters to the presidents of the Republic, and that those letters were forwarded to the media. The media, in turn, often called him to confirm that he had written the letter and shed light on its contents. However, wanting to know more about Domenicali’s relationship with the DEOPS, Deputy Reynaldo Santana addressed the fact that he was responsible for a number of accusations that had reportedly led to several union leaders being stripped of their political rights. Under police escort, Domenicali testified before the CPI on the afternoon of February 9, 1968. He identified himself as a “self-employed” worker who provided administrative services for the São Paulo Federation of Chemical Workers. During the session, he explained what he knew about the chemical and pharmaceutical industry in São Paulo State.⁸⁵ Following the coup that overthrew Goulart, the deponent said he had contacted the American Alberto J. Ramos, from the metalworking sector in the United States, who had been hired by IFPCW to represent that entity in Brazil. Ramos and Velasquez had begun working together and sharing the same office, with the ICT’s support. They gave 30-day union courses held in the state capital and other cities in São Paulo State. According to Domenicali, due to a falling out between Ramos and the São Paulo Federation of Chemical Workers, the courses were cancelled. Ramos then reportedly contacted the union leader Alcy Nogueira, who was sent to study in the United States. Back in Brazil, Nogueira is said to have clashed with his board, as he insisted that the Federation help organize union training courses. Domenicali also stated that, in São Paulo, William Medeiros, from the FIET, along with Alberto Ramos, frequented the office of General Moacyr

 Regarding Domenicali’s arrest, see reports in O Estado de S.Paulo published on December 24, 26 and 29, 1967.  Final report of the CPI, 79, column three.

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Gaya, the director of the Union Orientation Center (before becoming the head of the Regional Labor Office or DRT). They began holding union seminars on a rural estate called São Jorge, in the town of Jacareí, São Paulo, a hub of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries in the country. The witness said that the labor attaché at the American consulate of São Paulo, Jack Liebof, with the help of William Medeiros, identified as his collaborator, provided financial support and bribed union leaders and employees, often offering them gifts, such as whiskey, and donating libraries of books with American content. Speaking to the members of the CPI, Domenicali emphatically declared himself to be “against the intervention of any foreign country in our homeland.” One of the first people on the list of IFPCW beneficiaries was Paulo de Oliveira e Silva, an interventor at the Federation of Chemical Industry workers.⁸⁶ The former president of that federation, Trajano José das Neves, had also been arrested for involvement in a case of union corruption. In an article entitled “The Fall of a Pelego,” the student movement newspaper Amanhã announced the departure of José Trajano das Neves from the São Paulo Federation of Workers in the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries. According to the report, he was accused of squandering millions of cruzeiros from the entity’s coffers and turning its headquarters into a brothel, in addition to using federation money to rent a mansion in the tony Jardim Paulista district for one of his lovers.⁸⁷ Because his name had been mentioned, General Gaya was also called to testify before the CPI. He had taken the helm of the DRT in 1967, at the invitation of Minister Jarbas Passarinho.⁸⁸ In his statement, he criticized the way the ICT conducted union training courses. In his view, the entity brought workers in from the interior of São Paulo to the capital, put them up in excellent accommodations and paid them more than their usual wages. When they finished the course, the workers were naturally reluctant to return to their original jobs. However, Gaya considered the ICT’s work to be an important contribution to the training of union members. He said it was common knowledge that some leaders had held the same positions for more than 20 years. In this regard, the work of the ICT to train new leaders was considered important.⁸⁹

 The document containing the expense report with the list of beneficiaries was considered false; the note signed by Alberto Ramos was considered authentic, and the third was being verified. Final report of the CPI, 78.  Amanhã, March 30 to April 6, 1967, 14. CEDEM/UNESP, pasta P6/086.  He had previously worked at Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista (COSIPA) and later held the position of executive secretary of the IPES from 1963 to 1966.  Final report of the CPI, 113, column one.

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Although they were judged to be false, the accusations made in São Paulo resulted in an executive decree to regulate the activities of foreign union entities in Brazil. The news was given by Minister Jarbas Passarinho himself, during a press conference held at the São Paulo Union of Journalists in early January 1968. On that occasion, Passarinho declared that he was against the denationalization of Brazilian unions “wherever it may come from, no matter what ideological form it may take.” Speaking before the CPI, Passarinho said he “was against allowing foreign entities to establish themselves here, guide our people, choose the curriculum of the courses to be taught, and decide the nature of the aid to be offered and the natural and legal persons to be assisted.”⁹⁰

The impact of the investigations The subject of union corruption arose in the newspapers once again in January and February 1968, following the government declaration that it would expel all international union entities except AIFLD, because it was linked to the Alliance for Progress program. Justice Minister Luís Antônio da Gama e Silva gave ICF director Herbert Kemmsies two weeks to leave the country, on the grounds that his visa was not in order. Efraim Velasquez’s right to remain in Brazil was also being analyzed.⁹¹ The Folha da Tarde newspaper also covered the results of the investigation in an article with the English title “The United States, Why Not?” When the CPI questioned the reasons for union members’ trips to the United States, a union leader reportedly replied, because “everybody goes to the United States!” Another confirmed, “The military go there and take courses, students also go, funded by the Alliance for Progress, and employers are always there. So, why can’t workers go, too?”⁹² Distressed by these events, analysts at the American Embassy blamed leftist movements for the crisis in relations with international unionism. They also pointed to the newspaper Ultima Hora, historically linked to what they called pre-64 “populism,” as the outlet responsible for “attacks” in the press. According to them, one of the people responsible for the wave of slanderous accusations

 Ibid., 125.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 21, 1968. National Archives II, RG 059. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.  Transcription of an article published in Folha da Tarde on February 1, 1968. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, International Affair Department – Country Files (19451971), series 4, Brazil, folder 16/10.

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was Danton Jobim, the president and CEO and editor of the newspaper, whom the Americans considered a left-wing journalist. In an unsigned, undated letter addressed to Danton Jobim, an American director accused him of being the “intellectual author” of the anti-foreign unionism campaign. The letter, which contains furious arguments, linked the accusations to the articles written by the journalist in Ultima Hora, stating that his aim was to eliminate Alliance for Progress projects and clear the way for communist organizations. However, it is likely that Jobim received a different version signed by Efraim Velasquez, which was much more polite than the original, saying that he and his group “will never achieve the objectives of the campaign against the democratic working class in Brazil and Latin America.” He added, “Yes, Mr. Jobim, we will always fight hunger and poverty, because John F. Kennedy’s ideals of Social Justice are alive and always will be.”⁹³ In an editorial entitled “Corruption and Unions,” published in Última Hora on January 17, 1968, Jobim accused the US union leader course “professors” of teaching workers to become leaders without changing the status quo. The journalist stated that supporting the closure of international organizations accused of “financing” Brazilian unionism was not a matter of xenophobia. On the contrary, “the union movement, in our opinion, can cross national borders when it is inspired by the ideal of brotherhood among workers and aims at solving problems common to several countries.” What could not be allowed, Jobim asserted, “is that, under the pretext of this legitimate internationalization, veritable spearheads of foreign interests should establish themselves in Brazil.”⁹⁴ The Embassy also pointed the finger at Helder Câmara, archbishop of the cities of Olinda and Recife and a representative of the Catholic left in Brazil.⁹⁵ According to the Embassy, he and Danton Jobim systematically criticized aid from

 A copy of this letter, written on January 25, 1968, was sent to CNTI President João Wagner. However, in this version there was a final observation in which Efraim Velasquez wrote, “Based on the above, I have made my position clear. Now you can start slinging all the mud you want at me.” George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, International Affair Department – Country Files (1945 – 1971), series 4, Brazil, folder 16/10.  Última Hora, Rio de Janeiro edition, January 17, 1968, 27.  Known as the “bishop of the favelas,” Helder Câmara was one of the founders of the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB), which played an important role in confronting the Brazilian military dictatorship. In 1964, he became archbishop of Recife and Olinda. He was accused of being a demagogue and a communist by the repressive apparatus of the state, which systematically pursued him throughout the military regime. His activism in defense of human rights, in which he denounced the tortures, deaths and disappearances committed by the Brazilian dictatorship, was widely recognized in Europe and the United States.

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international organizations to Brazilian unions in their speeches.⁹⁶ Speaking to members of the Federation of Agricultural Workers in the Northeast region, Helder Câmara reportedly urged workers to oppose the Americans. The archbishop reportedly warned its members to “distrust the easy money” that those organizations offered, claiming that “these investments only help to weaken the union struggle.” He advised them not to accept aid from foreigners, as “They [the Americans] hinder our momentum, our desire to fight.”⁹⁷ In response to the accusations made in Jobim’s editorial, IFPCW representative Efraim Velasquez wrote a letter refuting them and claiming that the aim of the opposition was to eliminate the Alliance for Progress program. However, that document had no impact in the Brazilian press. On February 17, 1968, the Federal Police closed the offices of the IFPCW and ICF. Velasquez, a US citizen, was arrested and held incommunicado for 14 hours. He had spoken before the CPI a few days earlier, saying that it was an opportunity to refute a number of unfounded charges. He went on to say that Brazilian workers should have the right to exercise their freedom. Asked if he maintained links with labor attaché Herbert Baker, the deponent had denied it, saying there was no subordination whatsoever between the American Embassy and the IFPCW.⁹⁸ These events mobilized the Embassy, which carefully monitored all government and police actions. The American experts tried to understand the changing behavior of the Brazilian authorities, especially Minister Jarbas Passarinho.⁹⁹ After all, in the recent past, those organizations had backed the legitimacy of the civilian-military coup in Brazil and had been treated as partner entities of the union movement. For the AFL-CIO analysts, the conflict was the result of an alliance between the State and a group of Brazilian industrialists who were unhappy with the IFPCW’s activities, with a view to defending the interests of Petrobras.¹⁰⁰ In Washington, union officials discussed how they might continue their activities in Brazil, according to Andrew McLellan, inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO. To this end, they had the support of Brazilian union lead-

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 19, 1968, by Tuthill. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.  Ibid.  Final report of the CPI, 6163.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 29, 1968, NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.  Manuscript entitled “Fact Sheet on Brazil.” Author and date unknown. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, series 4, box 16, folder 16/07.

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ers, including Orlando Previatti, who had spoken out publicly against the decree that prevented international entities from entering the country. Previatti was viewed with distrust by his union colleagues because he was accused of whistleblowing and being closer to the bosses than the working class. In return for declaring his support, the union organizer wanted to travel to the United States with funding from AFL-CIO. McLellan readily agreed to his request, if Previatti won the union elections. Former Labor Minister Nascimento e Silva also expressed support for foreign union organizations.¹⁰¹ According to the American Embassy and, especially, IFPCW Secretary General Lloyd Haskins, internationally accused of being a CIA agent, Passarinho was largely responsible for supporting and driving the campaign against the presence of international union organizations. Passarinho had asked Haskins for clarifications about the conflict between George Meany, director of AFLCIO, and Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers (UAW), in addition to other explanations that were not related to the corruption charges. Haskins allegedly argued that the disagreements between Meany and the Reuther brothers were internal matters in the United States and had nothing to do with the IFPCW’s continued presence in Brazil. Jarbas Passarinho was probably referring to the charges levelled in 1966 by Victor Reuther, the director of the UAW’s international affairs department, regarding the AFL-CIO’s involvement with the CIA. According to Morris, the AFL-CIO Convention held in December 1965 had unanimously approved the international operations run by George Meany and Jay Lovestone, both of whom had proven ties with the CIA. During that meeting, the members also declared their “unconditional support” for the US government’s policy on the Vietnam War. However, Reuther questioned that support, based on the declarations of some major workers’ organizations that had not backed the government’s actions. The UAW itself had withdrawn its support for the AFL-CIO at that 1965 convention, because it felt that the US’s foreign policy should be less hawkish, calling for friendlier relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁰² Haskins refuted the other charges, including the accusation that there was a jurisdictional dispute between the IFPCW and the ICF in Latin America. He also accused Jarbas Passarinho of stirring up nationalist feelings in the working class, at the risk of paving the way for the return of communist union leaders driven out in 1964. According to Haskins, he had credible information from reliable sources that Passarinho had allocated funds for the unions to pub-

 Letter from Andrew Mclellan, inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO, to Tom Altofer, April 1, 1968. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, series 4, box 16, folder 16/07.  Morris, 1967, 213.

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lish a series of articles criticizing international American trade union organizations. The articles were reportedly published in the Tribuna da Imprensa newspaper,¹⁰³ which had amply publicized the accusations that American trade unionism was involved in joint programs with the State Department and the CIA, as revealed in George Morris’s book CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy (1967). During the period when international organizations’ activities were under investigation, enrollment in the ICT union leadership course held in April 1968 declined. It was only attended by 19 students. According to the American Embassy, there was no doubt that the rejected invitations were due to the wave of propaganda against foreign organizations. AIFLD-ICT had lost the support of leaders belonging to union confederations and federations.¹⁰⁴ A month later, the suppression of the union movement intensified after a strike broke out at the Willy’s Auto Factory in São Bernardo do Campo. Nearly 80 percent of the company’s workforce downed tools. At the same time, ICT superintendent Marcondes Freitas traveled to Europe on a fund-raising mission for the entity. There was a chance that the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) would finance some of the ICT’s activities.¹⁰⁵ While the Chamber of Deputies’ CPI was conducting its investigation, the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo, a traditional outlet for the São Paulo elites, and formerly allied with American interests, once again ceded column inches to American union leaders, this time represented by Edward Kramer. After visiting Brazil through the “Union to Union” program in June 1968, the American union organizer strongly criticized the corporatist system, denouncing the fascist heritage of labor laws in Brazil without sparing the Costa e Silva administration. In his view, the form of government control of the unions introduced by President Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and mid1940s had increased even further after the changes made to labor laws in later periods. Kramer criticized the union tax, the wage freeze, and the Ministry of Labor through its main body, the Labor Courts, which he considered to be a “defective structure.” The union leader said it was more “appropriate for that agency

 Due to financial difficulties, Carlos Lacerda had sold the Tribuna da Imprensa to Manuel Francisco do Nascimento Brito in October 1961.  Report from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 26, 1968. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.  Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 6, 1968. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.

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to be called the Ministry over Labor,” as it acted with “authoritarian and absolute control over Brazilian workers.”¹⁰⁶ One of the main interlocutors of American unionism in O Estado de S. Paulo was the journalist Itaborahy Feitosa Martins, the brother of Itamaraty Feitosa Martins, also a union journalist and PCB activist. The US Embassy viewed Itaborahy Martins as an ally of American unionism. Between 1964 and 1968, the journalist made two visits to the United States, paid for by the AFL-CIO exchange program. It is hard to believe that Kramer was unaware of the overwhelming criticism and backlash from Brazilian leaders against the role of foreign entities in their country. It is possible, however, that the statements he made to the AFLCIO periodical and the mainstream Brazilian press were intended to garner the sympathy of workers who opposed the government, aiming to win over the grassroots of the working class, which was showing extensive signs of revitalization. Jarbas Passarinho’s riposte, published in the same newspaper, came a few days before the enactment of AI-5. The minister described the article as “insulting and impudent” and insisted that “No one owns the Brazilian union movement.”¹⁰⁷ The American Embassy took a positive view of the episode, considering that Kramer’s statements had resonated among Brazilian leaders, as many had sent messages of support for his ideas. This supposedly positive response towards the United States, as attaché Corrigan observed, could serve to counterbalance the anti-American movement, which he considered to be limited to leftist organizations.¹⁰⁸ On March 8, 1968, a few weeks before the metalworkers’ strike in the industrial city of Contagem, Minas Gerais, Costa e Silva signed decree no. 62.347 of March 6, 1968, which regulated “the granting of permission for Brazilian union entities of any kind to join international organizations and the operations of branches, agencies or representations of union entities in the homeland.” The ILO did not comply with these regulations. Associations that wanted to remain in the country would have to undergo a government assessment to obtain legal permission to continue their activities.¹⁰⁹

 O Estado de S.Paulo, December 4,1968, 11.  Ibid., December 7, 1968, 12.  Report from the American Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, January 3, 1969, authored by Corrigan. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1781.  Report from the American Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, de 26 de abril de 1968. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1221.

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A year after Deputy Jamil Amiden gave his testimony before the CPI, his political career was interrupted by AI-5, enacted in December 1968. Given this new situation and the closing of Congress, the CPI’s final report was delivered on August 28, 1970, although the most of its results had already been published in the press.¹¹⁰ In all, 25 witness statements were recorded, under the direction of Ildélio Martins, the head of the National Labor Department, and 24 meetings were held. Among the witnesses, the following stand out: union leader Lourival Coutinho, Ari Campista, then minister of the TST; Sandra Cavalcanti, Evaristo de Moraes Filho, Egisto Domenicali, Efraim Velasquez, Herbert Baker, Arnaldo Sussekind and Jarbas Passarinho, in addition to the heads of unions representing insurance company workers, oil workers from several parts of the country and chemical workers; Domingos Alvarez, from the CNTI, and the leaders of the Abrasive Industries of Salto Union, the Federation of Bank Workers of Minas Gerais and Goiás, and the Belo Horizonte Metalworkers’ Union, among others. After gathering testimony, information and documents, the investigation revealed that international organizations had free access to local union entities. However, no evidence was found that the seminars were used as “an effective process of raising awareness among the masses as an underhand way of defrauding Brazilian interests.” Even so, given the issues raised, the government decided that it was essential to regulate the activities of foreign entities operating in Brazil. The CPI concluded that there was interference and enticement on the part of the directors to obtain new affiliates. In exchange for loans, some entities let themselves be influenced by foreign ideas, such as the National Confederation of Chemical Industry Workers, which received a substantial donation (without paying interest or adjusting payments for inflation); the SINDIQUÍMICA chemical workers’ union of Duque de Caxias; the Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry Workers’ Unions of the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, and the Interstate Federation of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Workers, among others. All told, 20 Brazilian unions were found to be directly involved with international entities. According to the CPI members, there was no doubt that Brazilian leaders had been used as the “manipulated mass” of so-called “union piracy,” directed by the ideological disputes of the Cold War, foreign economic interests and internal rivalries between union federations at the international level. The authoritarian nationalists believed that Brazil was oblivious to these political-ideological issues, partly because they thought that foreigners could not determine the coun-

 Última Hora, Rio de Janeiro, August 25, 1968, p. 7. See also: transcript of article published in O Estado de S.Paulo, February 4, 1968. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, series 4, folder 16/10.

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try’s political agenda. Furthermore, the nationalist discourse of the military regime sought to homogenize the working class, depoliticizing it and, consequently, voiding the political meanings of “left vs. right” bipolarization.¹¹¹ AIFLD and ICT were authorized to continue their activities, with the justification that they were financed by the Alliance for Progress. In fact, those organizations’ links with the United States’ technical and financial cooperation program came up several times in CPI testimony from representatives of foreign entities. The intention was to show that their financial transactions and activities were above board, having received the endorsement of the US aid program. However, it is quite possible that the American trade unionists used the Alliance for Progress more as a political argument to pressure the Brazilian government, reminding it of the loans and massive amounts of money at stake in this delicate diplomatic issue. In September 1970, during the Fourth National Congress of Industrial Workers, four million workers said, “gringos go home!” The newspaper O Trabalho Químico reported a break in relations between Brazilian and American union entities. That initiative reportedly originated from the CNTI itself. According to the report, the foreigners who attended the meeting as “observers” had stormed out, visibly angry. More than that, they were reportedly shocked by the Brazilians’ unruly and restive behavior. According to the newspaper, “Accustomed to giving us orders, the international agents thought that they were facing a congress that could be easily manipulated to suit the interests of the United States.”¹¹² Meanwhile, the chemical industry was facing serious difficulties due to high turnover and dire working conditions imposed by the multinationals. According to the author of the report, the “high price” to be paid for the numerous offers of travel and loans was the corruption of the union members’ conscience. After all, “Why leave the country to learn unionism abroad, when here, in the day-today struggle to improve the living conditions of workers, we have a real school of union education?” ¹¹³ The report made it clear that the union sided with the military regime. In this sense, the documentation that the CPI collected from foreign union entities revealed important aspects of the political game being played by post1964 union leaders. Some statements showed clear changes in the behavior of Brazilian leaders regarding contact with the Americans following the implementation of Costa e Silva’s nationalist policy. However, some seemed troubled by

 Final Report of the CPI, 9, column one.  O trabalhador químico, newspaper of the Chemical Workers’ Union, October 1970, no. 9, 8.  Ibid.

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foreign intervention in local affairs, as they felt that their positions were threatened by the so-called “authentic” leaders of the “second generation,” made up of ICT graduates and backed by international entities. However, we cannot overlook the presence of leaders who were critical of the leftist movements but felt uncomfortable with and even disrespected by the growing foreign presence in the trade unions. The CPI also revealed the involvement of officials linked to the Ministry of Labor with foreign entities and their relations with local unions. It showed that many pro-American union leaders overused the words “freedom” and “democracy,” showing themselves to be influenced by the Cold War, while others carried on with the nationalist narrative, either keeping their jobs or rising in the government’s union structure. One example of this is the episode in which the São Paulo leader Egisto Domenicali played a prominent role. Clearly, the available sources do tell us exactly how the CPI was created – if, in fact, it arose from a spontaneous complaint from the unions or from a plan devised by the government, more precisely by Minister Jarbas Passarinho, to rid itself of nettlesome American interference, as Meany had charged. However, regardless of the veracity of the testimony it gathered, the CPI revealed details of the relations and conflicts between Brazilian and American union leaders and government officials, as well as the practices of the Brazilian union movement in a still little-known period. One of the aims of this chapter was to show that the fulfillment of AIFLD’s objectives in Brazil did not depend solely on the situation and US interests. It was also reliant on its relationship with the Brazilian authorities, on national political and economic interests and, above all, on the position of a major part of the Brazilian unions regarding the practice of American trade unionism in Brazil. Even when Brazil’s foreign policy was in line with the interests of the United States, as it was during the Castello Branco administration, a two-way political game was clearly being played that sometimes promised to meet the demands of foreign union members but sometimes achieved the exact opposite of what they wanted. As of 1968, following the internal reformulation of the ICT’s board of directors, Brazilian union leaders began teaching union education courses at the local and regional levels without rejecting the American entity’s assistance. They also selected the candidates for training at Front Royal, consequently gaining greater influence on inter-union relations. This marked the beginning of a new phase of Brazil-US union relations.

Chapter IV Between Tourism and Union Education: Travelers’ Views In January 1967, when he was in the northern Brazilian city of Belém do Pará, waiting for the call to take his Senate seat, Jarbas Passarinho received a telegram sent on behalf of the new President of Brazil, General Costa e Silva. It contained a request for him to fly to Rio de Janeiro immediatelyl. On his way to the airport, he learned the reason for the meeting. He was being invited to head the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. While declaring that he was surprised by that appointment, Passarinho did not disguise his lack of familiarity with social security matters.¹ Reportedly, he initially declined. However, according to him, the president used a convincing argument: We need to consolidate the Revolution. The area of labor, which is very sensitive, is vital to our goal. I need someone who is willing to take on a thorny mission and make sacrifices, which is why I chose you. Furthermore, the workers have lost advantages, some unduly, and others that you can review with my support, when applicable.²

In fact, Passarinho was supposed to become the Minister of Mines and Energy, while the Labor portfolio had been destined for Deputy Costa Cavalcanti. However, it was said to be Senator Daniel Krieger³ who had advised the president to make the switch, fearing that Cavalcanti’s past as chief of police in the state of Pernambuco would make it impossible for him to engage in dialogue with the workers, who by then were gradually returning to the streets to protest Castello Branco’s labor policy.⁴ However, there was another reason for Jarbas Passarinho’s appointment to the Ministry of Labor: a booklet he wrote, published in 1966, which had come into the hands of General Costa e Silva. According to the author, it was an “unpretentious” publication that chronicled his experiences during a visit to the United States.⁵ That trip, which lasted 30 days, took place at

 Passarinho, 1997, 252-253. The next paragraph is based on the same source.  Ibid.  Daniel Krieger was a supporter of the civilian-military coalition that overthrew President João Goulart in 1964. During the Castello Branco administration, he was the leader of the government in the Senate. Following the establishment of a two-party system, Krieger joined the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA), the party that backed the military regime.  For more information about Jarbas Passarinho’s activities as Labor Minister, see chapter III.  Passarinho, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-009

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the invitation of the State Department, which took charge of organizing his entire itinerary, as well as resolving the bureaucratic issues surrounding his visit. This was the first time that Passarinho had truly ventured onto foreign soil; before that, he had only taken part in a few military expeditions on the northern borders of Brazil.⁶ Expressing a combination of delight and surprise at the American way of life, Passarinho began recording his impressions and sending them to a periodical in the state of Pará. Upon his return, he decided to publish a collection of those articles, stating that it was a “neutral report, not compromised by the clichés and hackneyed phrases with which the United States is usually described.”⁷ First, he called attention to “the deep civic faith of the American people” when he saw hordes of families in Washington, DC., that “respectfully walked through the White House and the buildings of Congress” among other symbolic monuments in that country. Regarding his contact with the AFL-CIO union leaders, Passarinho observed that labor as a political doctrine did not exist in the United States, at least not as he knew it in Brazil. Throughout his conversations with the leaders of the largest union federation in the USA, the idea that political issues and labor conflicts should not mix came up several times. At one point, during an interview with a union leader and former labor attaché from the American Embassy in Colombia, Passarinho said he had learned lessons on the importance of individual liberty and the efforts and sacrifices required to preserve it. Subsequently, the Brazilian visitor was given a publication containing the resolutions of the most recent AFL-CIO convention, held in San Francisco in December 1965. At that meeting, the AFL-CIO had publicly expressed its support for the US government’s actions in the Vietnam War.⁸ The document revealed that the Brazilian government had not been spared. The American trade unionists expressed their respect for the so-called “Revolution of 1964” because they considered it a “grassroots movement.” However, the AFL-CIO had criticized the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Brazil and disapproved of the abrogation of civil and political rights. They called for free and independent unions based on democratic principles and declared that even a coalition of honest technocrats with well-intentioned military leaders could never replace Democracy and its vital institutions, such as free trade unionism.⁹ According to Passarinho,

 Interview with Jarbas Passarinho given to the author on July 18, 2011.  Passarinho, 1966, 7.  Bloch, Joseph W. “The Sixth AFL-CIO Convention.” Monthly Labor Review, February 1966, vol. 89, n. 2, 146.  Passarinho, 1966, 15. The following paragraphs are based on the same source.

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this was a direct reference to Minister Roberto Campos and his alliance with the military. Nevertheless, the future Minister of Labor praised the American workers’ doctrinal stance, as well as their abhorrence of communists. However, he responded ironically and cordially to what he considered to be a provocation, saying he found it strange to be criticized by “workers identified with the radical right, the exploiters of all the workers in the world.” Then, Passarinho asked whether, at the end of a strike, the Americans were paid for days not worked, as in Brazil.¹⁰ The question was reportedly viewed with puzzlement and received a negative response. The American leader explained to Passarinho that, in such cases, the unions had a strike fund, and that demanding payment for days not worked would be considered immoral. To justify the military regime’s anti-democratic measures, Passarinho asked whether “the workers of any company, when they went on strike, had the right to occupy the factory facilities, requisition vehicles for the strike command, and prevent the entry of workers and managers,” which he claimed to have witnessed in Pará, more precisely at Petrobras, prior to 1964. The answer was again negative. He also inquired whether dock workers had the right to use private workers, called bagrinhos (literally “little catfish”) in Brazil, whom the stevedores in Santos paid to work in their stead. The American replied that yes, this had occurred in the port of San Francisco when certain workers’ organizations were controlled by “gangsters,” which he said was shameful and had already been resolved. According to Passarinho, these questions sufficed to establish a mutual understanding of the problems the two countries faced and marked the beginning of a friendlier conversation. During his visit, Passarinho said that he understood how American unionists made use of “freedom with responsibility.” For example, the AFL-CIO said it did not indiscriminately approve its affiliates’ demands or strikes. The future Brazilian Labor Minister was also amazed at how the largest union federation in the country kept pace with the growth of major industries and companies in the United States. He was shown a number of annual balance sheets showing the financial situation of each company. Based on those documents, the AFL-CIO believed it was well-positioned to determine whether demands were justified. Thus, the Brazilian visitor learned that, represented by their unions, American workers “act as permanent supervi-

 In the period prior to the civilian-military coup, this was negotiated with the employers or the Labor Court. Depending on the workers’ bargaining power, they could receive payment for the days not worked during the strike.

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sors of their employers, with whom they collaborate loyally, while demanding and getting fair pay for their work.” As for Brazil, Passarinho agreed that the workers there had suffered from the loss of legitimate rights but rejected the American leader’s observation that only the working class had been sacrificed in the Castello Branco administration’s plan to beat inflation.¹¹ Responding to a report on the political situation in Brazil prepared by an investigative committee sent to that country by ORIT, Passarinho also did not deny that interventions had been carried out in the unions, which were still going on at that time. However, he observed in his travel diary that ORIT had not protested against “the autocracy, if not de jure then de facto, that had dominated the labor movement in Brazil prior to March 1964.” It was not that Brazil was inexperienced in the practice of free unionism, Passarinho said. However, he felt that it was only starting out on that path. Provocatively, Passarinho then made a point of showing the American union leader a newspaper clipping on the re-election to the presidency of the teamsters’ union of J. R. Hoffa. Considered one of the most powerful union leaders in the United States, he allegedly had close ties to the Mafia.¹² Much to Passarinho’s indignation, despite two prosecutions on bribery charges, for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison, Hoffa still had the teamsters’ authorization to call strikes. This would not be the only time that Passarinho told this story to criticize American trade unionism. Seeking to deconstruct the idea so widely popularized by American leaders that the US labor regulation system was the ultimate example of good relations between capital and labor, Passarinho reminded his hosts that “union leaders doubling as agents of the underground world of organized crime” were still present in the trade union movement in their country. However, he changed his tone by recognizing that those figures were the exception in American unions. Even so, he said it was disappointing to learn that just over one-third of American workers were unionized. Despite these tense and provocative exchanges, Passarinho claimed to have found an excellent form of organization in the American unions, firmly backed by the economic power of their members, with a highly qualified technical staff and established in not only comfortable but even luxurious headquarters. The visitor was aware of the presence of union representatives in American diploma-

 Passarinho was referring to the wage squeeze policy that aimed to drastically reduce adjustments for inflation, in addition to the new law that introduced the Guarantee Fund for Time of Service (FGTS) in exchange for the right to job stability, and the division of the payment of the 13th salary into two parts, among other changes.  Better known as Jimmy Hoffa. The leader of one of the largest unions in the United States – the International Brotherhood of Teamsters – he disappeared in 1975. See Sloane, 1991.

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cy and government commissions, but it seems that this fact did not attract his attention at that time. However, he noted that even though it brought together tens of millions of members and had enormous political potential, American trade unionism had not founded its own party, unlike the Labour Party in the UK. In response to this observation, the American union leader reportedly quoted the phrase coined by AFL founder Samuel Gompers: “pure and simple unionism.” To Passarinho, these words sounded more like a mantra than an ideology, and he was unconvinced. He considered that immediatist three-word phrase and its philosophy somewhat shallow. For him, it “meant using the union as a plain and simple instrument for obtaining a better standard of living for workers.” The future Labor Minister disagreed with the idea that the success of collective bargaining depended on keeping workers out of partisan politics. In his autobiography, Passarinho once again recalled his meeting with the American trade union leader and his explanation of the AFL-CIO’s analysis of company balance sheets. In this version, the minister claimed that he thought he was being shown the documents in order to convince him that his ideas about the relationship between capital and labor were wrong. Sympathetic towards the Christian Democratic Party (PDC.), which was canceled after the civilian-military coup, Passarinho declared himself a follower of Christian Solidarity, saying he was won over by the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church. Like other politicians, businessmen and some groups of Catholic workers, he advocated giving workers a share in corporate profits and the co-management model, such as that which he had learned about in the management of West German coal mines.¹³ Not that he supported the parity system – he only advocated that workers have a minority of seats on companies’ advisory boards, so the employees could take part in the industrialists’ decisions.¹⁴ The American trade union leader reportedly responded to his ideas “without showing the slightest interest,” merely saying: “What we American workers are interested in is this: examining the balance sheets to get what is ours in the negotiations with the bosses.” But, Passarinho reportedly asked, “What if the balance sheet is negative?” The answer, according to him, was cold and swift, “That is capital risk.” The young Brazilian politician believed that that exchange was a “demonstration of insensitivity toward the construction of a solidarist society.” Right then, he realized that he was there “as a naive visitor, welcomed merely

 Regarding the ideas of Catholic Social Doctrine and Christian Solidarity, see Chapter II.  On the role of the Catholic Church in Brazilian labor relations, see Sousa, 1998; Aquino, 2001; Farias, 1998; Martins, 1994.

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as a courtesy.”¹⁵ However, according to Passarinho, although he identified himself as a harsh critic of communism, the “solidarist” theses he supported did not please many Brazilian conservative politicians and businessmen either. Suspicions about his political ideology and commitment to the so-called “revolutionary” military regime reached the point that, shortly before becoming Minister of Labor in 1967, Passarinho’s loyalty to the 1964 movement was called into question. The most radical sectors of the regime had called him a “watermelon” – military green on the outside and red on the inside.¹⁶ The negative reaction of the “uncompromising bosses” apparently led Passarinho to consider the doctrine of solidarity too advanced for his time (“and for today as well,” as he wrote in his autobiography published in 1996).¹⁷ Generally speaking, Passarinho gave a positive portrayal of the American trade union movement. However, Passarinho was not the only one to set down his travel impressions. A small number of publications produced between 1965 and 1968 allows us to analyze Brazilian union leaders’ experiences and ideas of about the American union movement. In addition to travel reports, letters written by workers from different parts of Brazil – most of them strategically addressed to AFL-CIO president George Meany – regardless of the unique inherent characteristics of each writer, also allow us to analyze the process of building images and representations of the American trade union movement from the perspective of Brazilian workers. Furthermore, these documents make it possible to observe the use of union language adapted to the conflicts of the Cold War and interwoven with personal intentions and interests.¹⁸ Unlike the reports produced in previous periods, starting with the twentieth century, the development of means of transport and communication, as well as the new possibilities for exchange, also transformed the travelers’ experiences, making the experience of travel take on new meanings and different types of records and memories. In this sense, the intense process of modernization presents challenges and characteristics unique to this type of source. Part of the challenge is that the so-called travel literature is considered a highly diverse genre, in which “factual” and “non-factual” accounts are combined. It also presents itself in different narrative forms, such as letters, reports, news stories, essays, and travel diaries, as well as autobiographical testimonies, the genre used in the publications analyzed in this chapter.¹⁹ Regarding the travel reports of Brazilian     

Passarinho, 1997, 253-254. Interview with Jarbas Passarinho. Passarinho, 1997, 254. Passarinho, 1966; Santos, 1967; Martins Filho, 1969; R. A. P. de Souza, 1998. Torres, 2013.

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leaders who visited the United States in the second half of the 1960s, I seek to view them as a set of representations in which we can analyze the different images that these travelers built up of the United States, based on their lived experiences in that country and the comparisons they made with Brazil. It is interesting to understand these travelers’ impressions and analyze the different ways in which the students assimilated the exchange program financed by American agencies.

Transnational experiences: The “Union to Union” program Since 1966, in addition to the training provided in the countries in which the AIFLD was active, the program periodically offered opportunities to take part in a more in-depth union education program held at the Front Royal Institute in Virginia. Up to forty people could be accommodated on site. As in a boarding school, students stayed onsite full time, with all expenses paid by the AIFLD. They were taught leadership techniques, union education, finance, the history of the international union movement, economics, and statistics, as well as English and, primarily, collective bargaining methods. These international courses were later taught at the Loyola universities in New Orleans and Georgetown, Washington, DC.²⁰ As we have seen in the previous chapters, since the 1950s, one of AIFLD’s most high-profile activities was the exchange program with the United States, aimed at union leaders, specialists, and influential people in the labor world. The idea was that they would be able to not only see but learn in practice the supposed benefits of American unionism. In 1963 alone, 36 leaders benefited from the internship, in addition to 15 federal deputies and 10 governors, including José Sarney, a future Brazilian President who was then a member of the UDN party, and Mário Covas, a Social Labor Party (PST) deputy and, later, governor of São Paulo State. Between 1967 and 1970, their numbers increased considerably: 1,131 Brazilians “endowed with influence” were awarded scholarships to get to know the country.²¹ In the case of union leaders, the program generally lasted 40 days, although the courses could last up to three months, with USAID funding. As part of their activities, exchange students were supposed to visit the most important cities in the country, in addition to going on guided tours conducted by the main American labor institutions.

 AIFLD, 1972.  Fico, 2008, 45-81.

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In 1965, the Brazilian Ministry of Labor introduced the exchange program, planning the visit of a Brazilian delegation to the United States Department of Labor. On that occasion, the Attorney General of the Superior Labor Court (TST), Rego Monteiro, expressed his eagerness to help further the democratization of Brazilian unions if the US government agreed to finance his participation in an international conference. In April of that year, a group of Brazilian chemical workers representing the states of São Paulo and Guanabara travelled to the United States to participate in the “Union to Union” program. Another delegation of four judges from the Guanabara Regional Labor Court was scheduled to visit the United States on July 15 of that same year.²² Also in 1965, in cities in the Brazilian Northeast and South, the ICT held eleven union education seminars in partnership with other international organizations, including ORIT and other Brazilian entities. A total of 289 union leaders took part. At these local events, workers were chosen to participate in the international program. As labor attaché Herbert W. Baker observed, these activities did not go unnoticed by leaders linked to leftist movements in Brazil. According to Baker, the program developed by the International Transport Federation (ITF) had numerous critics, including Avelino Gomes de Castro, president of the Interstate Federation of Motor Vehicle Operators. Baker downplayed the problem, saying that it might be a typical case of an established pelego opposing the training of new leaders, considering that Gomes de Castro had supported the CGT before the coup.²³ However, Gomes de Castro was not the only one to criticize the offer of international scholarships to workers. In the alternative newspaper Amanhã, published by University of São Paulo (USP) students, an article entitled “Win a Trip to the USA” showed how workers could visit that country without paying a penny. All they had to do was ask for “Mister” William Medeiros at the American Embassy and say “you’ll play his game: go on the trip, learn about collective labor contracts and American unions and come back saying ‘what is good for the United States is good for Brazil.’” The article observed that Medeiros, who represented the International Federation of Retail and Office Workers (IFCCTE) in Brazil, had appeared to be drunk when he attended the Bank Employees’ Convention in São Paulo. The aim of that “agent,” as the student newspaper referred to the American union leader, was to offer bank workers plane tickets to the United States in order to affiliate the National Confederation of Bank Workers with

 Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 26, 1965. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Ibid.

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the FIET. Nevertheless, he had failed. The conference participants virtually ignored him, as he had made a bad impression on Brazilian union members. The outcome could not have been worse, as the newspaper reported. When engaging in a debate, the foreign leader was said to have lost his temper, cursing those present in English. The reaction, according to the newspaper, was silence, as no one could understand the foreigner’s gabble.²⁴ In November 1965, the US Department of Labor appointed N. Thompson Powers to lead an international labor management project in Brazil. He stayed on in that country until February 1966, with the mission of continuing the exchange program between the Department of Labor and Brazilian union entities. Powers observed that federal control and clientelist relations were the main obstacles to the introduction of “free unionism” in Brazil. In his view, the elimination of the union tax, the adoption of collective bargaining, the reduction of government control, including wage restrictions, and, finally, social programs for workers, were key issues.²⁵ In 1967, the AFL-CIO financed trips to and courses in the United States for a group of union leaders and labor specialists, among them Mozart Vitor Russomano, a law professor at the Federal Law School and reviewer of the draft Labor Code bill²⁶; João Wagner, president of the CNTI, and João Fassbender Teixeira, professor of law at the Curitiba Law School. The purpose of their activities was to put Brazilians in touch with the most important members of American trade unionism and keep them abreast of studies on collective bargaining, in addition to holding debates on wage policy and union education, among other topics. The outcome of these activities was viewed as positive. For example, upon his return to Brazil, Russomano gave two interviews to the newspaper Jornal do Brasil in which he made important statements supporting independent collective bargaining and freedom of action of the unions. However, according to the

 Amanhã, n. 3, April 13 to 20, 1967, 1. CEDEM/UNESP, folder P6/086.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 14, 1966, by Herbert Baker. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1283.  The draft of the new Labor Code bill, authored by jurist Evaristo de Moraes Filho and submitted to the administration of João Goulart in 1963, was an attempt to renew the regulation of labor relations in Brazil without breaking with the corporatist structure of the 1930s. The bill did not arouse great enthusiasm in the sectors linked to the Goulart government. The revision of the New Code was delivered in a melancholy fashion to the Ministry of Justice under the military regime and consequently shelved.

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US Embassy, the long-term assessment was not so positive, as American analysts considered that the wage squeeze policy made their activities impossible. ²⁷

“Estados Unidos, Why Not?” By 1968, when the “Union to Union” marked its fourth anniversary, 39 delegations representing the most important Brazilian professions had visited factories and unions in the United States, whereas just 13 American leaders had gone to Brazil to get a first-hand look at the facilities and procedures of that country’s unions.²⁸ Among the hundreds of students who graduated from ICT courses, we find the name of Luís Carlos Vasco. His union career helps highlight what union leaders thought about the courses the Americans were offering. The son of a poor migrant family from rural Paraná, and a former employee of the Rio de Janeiro Retail Workers’ Union, Vasco had done “odd jobs” for the union since he was a boy. Over time, he had learned to work with the union structure and started to build a professional career within the organization. When the AIFLD courses were first offered, Vasco saw this training program as an opportunity to improve his résumé and meet foreigners. Viewed as a handyman at the trade union, as well as a good typist, the ICT graduate used to keep a close eye on the collective bargaining process for retail workers. Vasco said he had witnessed how the real negotiations were conducted during the profession’s “base-date” period.²⁹ The president of the Rio de Janeiro Retail Workers’ Union called the director of the Shopkeepers’ Association and invited him to lunch. He claimed to have heard the following dialogue between the representatives of the employer and the employees on several occasions: “Well, I will ask for 5 percent, you will only offer 3 percent percent and we will agree on 4 percent.” Then, an assembly would be scheduled, although everything had been prearranged. “We always asked for more to boost the president’s prestige and satisfy our members.” That way, wage agreements were reached without the intervention of the Labor Courts. For the union leader, during that period, the maxim of the pe-

 Annual report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department in 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1220.  Letter from John W. Tuthill to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, dated May 17, 1968. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18, International Affairs Department, Country Files (1945-¬1971), folder 16/09.  The base date is the time of year when wage adjustments and working conditions specified through an agreement, convention or collective bargaining for the trade are reviewed.

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legos held true: “A bad deal is always better than a good fight.”³⁰ In 1976, Vasco graduated from the union ICT leadership course held in Rio de Janeiro. When asked about his application process, he said, “Ah, they came up to me at the union and asked, ‘Do you want to take this course?’ So I took it! We thought it was modern to receive training that came from the United States.” His classmates included the elected directors of other unions. However, the response of the militant workers who tried to change the course of the leadership of the São Paulo Chemical Workers’ Union in the late 1970s was very different. According to Domingos Galante (one of the most important members of the Chemical Union Opposition),³¹ the union’s president, Waldomiro Macedo, insisted that Galante and other union members take the course offered by ICT at its headquarters. “We were suspicious,” he said. “After all, why was the president so insistent on taking the course? What’s more, we couldn’t stop working for that entire time,” he added.³² In the 1980s, it was said that the interventors appointed to run the Chemical Workers’ Union in 1964, including Waldomiro Macedo, Augusto Lopes, Antonio Domingues Nogueira and José Belarmindo da Silva, were part of a union network financed by the US government and the CIA. During the 19 years in which they held their posts, those directors reportedly encouraged members to take union training courses in the United States. One of those members was Alcides Domingues, known as one of the most high-profile pelegos in his profession, who traveled to the US in 1968.³³ As for Luís Carlos Vasco and his colleagues at the Rio de Janeiro Trade Workers’ Union, their relationship with the Americans “was a political current; whoever got in gained the full support of the American Embassy. I myself spent a lot of time there.”³⁴ Those short seminars could open the way to new contacts and opportunities abroad. In fact, that is what happened to Vasco. Shortly after finishing the ICT course, he had the opportunity to take a specialization in market-

 The information in this and the following paragraphs comes from an interview with Luís Carlos Vasco, granted to the author on August 11, 2010.  Union opposition emerged in Brazil as a movement to reject the corporatist union structure and the unions that supported the military regime. Union opposition from São Paulo chemical workers emerged in the early 1980s. Strategically using the union’s own facilities, union activists organized workers in their profession and won the union elections in 1982.  Interview with Domingos Galante, given to the author on July 22, 2012.  Manuscript by Aloizio Mercadante, written in 1985, entitled “Construindo um sindicato de luta. 50 anos de sindicato – parte de uma história maior.” Personal archives of Professor Heloísa de Souza Martins. The archives were later donated to the AEL, Unicamp.  Interview with Luís Carlos Vasco, granted to the author on August 11, 2010.

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ing, with a diploma from Cornell University in the US.³⁵ A similar one-year course was also held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). Directed by Father Velloso, the classes were strongly anti-communist.³⁶ After graduating from the course, the student was eligible to apply for existing positions on the boards of federations and union confederations. According to Luís Carlos Vasco, after the end of the military regime, those institutes began losing importance, because “there was nothing more to be done.” In his opinion, the American organizations wanted to create a stable situation in the world of work, led by leaders who were sympathetic to the military regime and could keep the communists out of the unions.

Travelers’ Impressions: Snow, Airplanes, Coca-Cola® and the Union Movement in the United States For journalist Reinaldo Santos, a trip to the United States was an impossible dream. He had cherished the idea of one day visiting the “land of Uncle Sam” for a long time. Therefore, he was thrilled to get an invitation from labor attaché Herbert Backer in 1965 to join the group of staff members from the MTPS press room who would take part in an exchange program in the United States.³⁷ The goal was to give journalists specialized in labor issues first-hand knowledge of the American trade union movement. The trip was financed by USAID, and included a program organized by the US Department of Labor with the assistance of the State Department. In his book, Reinaldo Santos does not hide his admiration for the United States, nor the comical and pleasurable aspects of his trip, such as the excitement he described when he heard a voice on the airport loudspeaker announcing: “Passengers to Miami and intermediate stops!” It convinced Reinaldo Santos that it was not a dream; he truly felt like a “passenger from overseas.” Although he claims to have made just simple observations, “quick glances,” his expression of deference to the American labor regulatory system is strong and forceful:

 It was a course offered by EMBRATUR, with the assistance of the Hotel Workers’ Union, which was responsible for enlisting the participants, who, in turn, also selected the workers who would take the AIFLD union leadership courses.  Luís Carlos Vasco is referring to Father Pedro Belisário Velloso Rebello. Regarding the role of the clergy, see Chapter I, part II.  In addition to Reinaldo Santos, the group included Ítalo de Saldanha da Gama, José Nunes Pires, João Mineiro, José Corte Real and Lélio Raphanelli.

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I decided to write about this wonderful trip…. There were many cities, many unions, many visits. I was left with the impression that unionism in the USA is truly free and powerful, apolitical and decisive. Its leaders know what they want and always achieve their goals. I came back convinced of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective bargaining contracts and the need to have a top body for our unions, as recently proposed by the secretary general of the National Confederation of Communications and Advertising Workers (CONTCOP).³⁸

Based on the lectures he attended at the AFL-CIO’s headquarters, Santos noted that American labor regulations were not as vast as Brazil’s. On the contrary, they were limited to a few laws, known by the names of the congressmen who had presented their respective bills in the Capitol, such as the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act. However, Santos was convinced that it was not the laws that ensured better living conditions for workers, and that collective labor contracts could bring excellent practical results, as he claimed to have had the opportunity to see for himself. In addition to visiting Juracy Magalhães, the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, the group of journalists from the Labor Ministry delegation was feted with a cocktail party held by the National Press Club; they also saw the main tourist attractions in Washington, DC. One of the most memorable parts of their trip was meeting President Lyndon B. Johnson at the White House, when the group took part in the ceremonies marking the fourth anniversary of the creation of the Alliance for the Progress. The fact that the Brazilians visited the White House gives us an idea of the importance of labor and its influence on the US Government’s program for Latin American socioeconomic development at the time. In later years, other groups of visitors did not have that opportunity. After seeing Washington, the Brazilian travelers set off for New York City, going on to Scranton, Pennsylvania, and Detroit, where they met Walter Reuther, vice president of AFL-CIO and head of the United Auto Workers’ Union (UAW). There, they learned about early retirement, collective contracts, automation, the work of union delegates, mandatory unionization, strike funds, and other matters. According to Reinaldo Santos, the union tax was considered an anomaly. In that regard, they were informed that the unions charged their members high monthly fees to enjoy surplus and sufficient funds to pay for the organization’s activities, taking pride in being financially independent and denying the charge that many unions received bribes from companies. The Brazilian delegation was also surprised by the alleged absence of pelegos. According to Reinaldo Santos, American union leaders worked for their entities on a full-time basis, “on behalf of the interests and backing the union

 Santos, 1967, 12.

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members’ demands.” Unlike Brazilian union leaders, Santos believed that American counterparts “did not engage in demagoguery, only showing up when a new wage agreement [is reached].” Furthermore: [the Americans] do their jobs with religious selflessness, visiting workplaces, listening to opinions and suggestions from their colleagues, traveling, reading and studying extensively, in short, keeping up to date. They do not profit illicitly or immorally. Subservience to companies or to Labor Department officials simply does not exist. In my view, Mr. Walter Reuther is the very model of a genuine, authentic union leader. His magnetic personality and the sincerity of purpose emblazoned on his smiling face should inspire our leaders of entities representing different professions.³⁹

The fact that Santos is not a union leader, but a journalist, may have contributed to his glorification of American leaders. His observations on the supposed efficiency and authenticity of the American trade union movement, which resulted from his admiration for the culture of the USA, are one example of how many foreign travelers helped reinforce the idea of the superiority of the American unionist model as well as the American worker, which was widespread inside and outside that country in the 1950s and 1960s. After a 42-day tour that included visits to Canada and Mexico and several cities in the states of Illinois, Minnesota and California (as well as stops in Hollywood and Disneyland), Reinaldo Santos commented on a range of subjects, such as Labor Law, racial prejudice, inflation, unemployment and even chewing gum and Coca-Cola®. Contrary to his expectations, he did not see many people chewing gum or drinking vast amounts of soft drinks. Based on what he could see in the places he visited and the people he spoke to, Santos said the majority of the latter were viscerally anti-communist Americans, starting with the AFL-CIO unionists for whom, “I suppose [communism] is not even a topic of study or debate; it is simply out of the question.” He thus concluded that “the problem of communism does not exist in the United States.”⁴⁰ In 1967, the AFL-CIO continued with the “Union to Union” program, organizing exchanges between union leaders and other Brazilian and American professionals linked to the field of labor. A delegation traveled from the United States to Brazil to engage in an intensive program with a three-week itinerary, while 13 delegations made up of 104 Brazilian union members flew in the oppo-

 Santos, 1967, 16.  Ibid. 78.

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site direction, spending six weeks in the USA.⁴¹ One of those groups, members of the National Confederation of Retail Workers, set off for the USA on March 27, 1967 on a visit financed by USAID. They included Arthur Martins Filho, from the National Federation of Retail Employees, Vendors and Traveling Salespersons in Rio de Janeiro. His participation in the tour also resulted in a book dedicated to labor attaché Herbert Baker, published by Martins Filho’s union. Through his impressions, we can follow their itinerary, the lectures they attended and even the contacts they made there. When the group arrived in New York, the Brazilian union leaders were welcomed by James I. McFarland, a State Department official who was responsible for helping the travelers get through the tangle of red tape facing foreign visitors and facilitate their arrival in the international airport in the United States. Martins Filho observed that this procedure was extremely efficient, with no delays, carried out almost automatically. Before heading to Washington, DC, to start training, a surprise awaited them in New York City: “There was snow, and members of the delegation saw that element of nature for the first time.”⁴² During the nearly 60-day tour, the Brazilian union leaders attended several lectures aimed at introducing the operations of trade unions, the structure of the union movement and the practice of collective bargaining in the United States. At AFLCIO headquarters, the Brazilians were welcomed by Andrew C. McLellan, who was charged with putting together their training program and representing the AFL-CIO’s Inter-American Department. At that point, the delegation expressed their wish to follow the previously established itinerary point by point. After learning about the structure and operations of America’s largest union federation, the Brazilians heard Ben Albert’s presentation about the organization of the AFL-CIO’s political activities, which were conducted through the Committee on Political Education (COPE). It was supposedly nonpartisan, but, as the group was told, “worked actively and firmly through all the regional entities, and exerted its influence mainly through the workers’ wives, so their husbands would be more inclined to vote for candidates for posts in governance, the Senate or the House of Representatives, who are pro-labor.” However, the speaker himself recognized that the organization was not strong and saw little involvement from the workers, as they had different interests at stake, such as the activities of the church to which they belonged.⁴³  Annual report of the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, 1967. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 33 – box 1282.  Martins Filho, 1969, 26. The following paragraphs are based on the same source.  Ibid., 27.

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Other lectures took place that same day, one of them about the unions’ activities regarding the issues of racism and civil liberties, given by AFL-CIO Department of Civil Rights representative William E. Pollard. His presentation addressed the issues of racial segregation in unions, especially in the US South. According to Martins Filho’s report, the Brazilians were told that the AFL-CIO was “fighting tenaciously to end this state of affairs, but sometimes the blacks themselves were the cause of discrimination.”⁴⁴ Then, the leaders met with a representative of the AFL-CIO Research Department, which was in charge of sending data to the unions, including statistics (provided by the US Government) on finance, politics and administration, among other matters. The Research Department had representatives on government commissions and took part in debates on bills. Held on March 28, 1967, the final lecture was given by Marvin Friedman. He covered the activities of the Department of International Affairs, which he represented. According to Martins Filho’s notes, the AFLCIO provided support for foreign unions, particularly with loans for housing construction, which was the case in Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. When comparing American and Soviet trade unions, Friedman explained to the Brazilians that “the Vietnam War is a political issue: the communists want to take the country by force.” At the time, the embattled AFL-CIO was dealing with a number of accusations about its relationship with the CIA, its controversial support for the Vietnam War, and racism within the American trade union movement. In this sense, the exchange program formed part of a strategy to try to improve the international image of American unionism.⁴⁵ The practice of collective bargaining was one of the most widely explored topics in the lectures. Regarding the origins of collective labor contracts in the United States, the Brazilian union leaders were informed that they were not the outcome of a specific law, as in Brazil, but a tradition that began in the nineteenth century and was legalized during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. During their visit to the Department of Labor, the Brazilians observed the work of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, which was responsible for mediating disputes between capital and labor. It was clear that, unlike the labor courts in Brazil, the role of that agency did not involve interfering in the

 On the issue of race in international non-communist trade unions, see Richards, Yevette. “African and African-American Labor Leaders in the Struggle over International Affiliation.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 31, 2 (1998): 301–334; and, by the same author, “Race, Gender, and Anticommunism in the International Labor Movement: The Pan-African Connections of Maida Springer,” Journal of Women’s History 11, 2 (Summer 1999): 35 – 59.  Among the books that leveled that charge against the AFL-CIO, see Morris, 1967.

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decisions set down in employment contracts between employees and employers.⁴⁶ Martins Filho’s notes allow us to observe some of the ways in which foreigners learned about the practice of collective bargaining in the United States. According to our traveler, the explanation of the functioning of the American labor regulation system concealed legal and interest conflicts, giving the idea that there was minimal State interference in labor issues. On average, collective contracts were valid for three years, and the procedures for drafting them were as follows: the union had to notify the company 60 days before the end of the previous agreement. If, within a period of 30 days, a new contract was not reached, by law, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would have to be brought in to call the parties to the negotiating table. Initially, workers and employers did not sit at the same table, and the terms of the negotiations were drafted separately. There was no limit to the number of workers’ representatives; generally, they included one member of the international union, three or four from the regional union and one from the company. But there were cases where more than 50 union members were present. Also underscored was that the decisions taken at the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service were definitive, and not subject to appeal, unlike the Brazilian arbitration system. In 1967, there were 260 mediators working in 77 cities. Arbitrators were private citizens, introduced by the parties, and their fees were paid by the interested parties. The process had to be concluded within 30 days. If the parties failed to reach an agreement, a strike would be the last resort. The American Arbitration Association administered and coordinated the entire arbitration process. When choosing an arbitrator, Martins Filho explained, that agency presented a list of nine members from which just one could be selected. Meetings between employers and employees could be held at the association’s headquarters or even at the companies. These meetings were informal, and there was no limit to the personal testimonies and evidence presented, but the witnesses had be vetted by the union. The arbitrator was supposed to submit their report thirty days later. During his visit to the association, their representative stressed that, to point out the differences with the Brazilian labor relations system, the agency was private, as were the arbitrators, and there was no government interference. The arbitrators were recruited, full-time professionals. Their role was considered well paid. However, to become an arbitrator, the candidate needed to have eight recommendations and pass the test of the unions and the Association. Being nominated by George Meany, president of the AFL-

 Martins Filho, 1969, 49.

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CIO, was considered a significant advantage, said the representative. By 1967, the American Arbitration Association had handled about 1,800 cases. It is possible that Martins Filho found the system of arbitrating American labor conflicts strange because it is very different from the Brazilian corporatist model.⁴⁷ On another occasion, the Brazilian union leaders learned how to organize and structure a union according to the American model. Employees interested in unionizing their workplace needed the signatures of 51 percent of the company’s workers, after which they informed the employer in writing that they would be representing the majority of their co-workers in collective bargaining from that point forward. If the company refused to recognize the workers’ organization, the case should be referred to the NLRB. Along the way, it was expected that companies opposed to the union movement would seek to cajole, bribe, or even threaten their employees to prevent them from forming a union.⁴⁸ Benefits for unionized American employees, many of which Brazilian workers viewed as rights, were negotiated separately through a contract reached by the representatives of employees and employers, covering matters like retirement, absenteeism, and personal life insurance. In all cases, voluntary resignations were conducted fairly smoothly. However, when it came to layoffs, the redundant workers had no guarantees. According to Martins Filho, the labor regulation system adopted in Brazil was better than the one in the United States, “because [in Brazil] the laws are federal and the states are prohibited from legislating on the matter, and this uniformity alone is a guarantee for the workers.” At the State Department, Harold Kaufman gave a presentation on projects carried out with USAID funds. He told the Brazilians about the Alliance for Progress program and the need to expand it in Brazil, mainly within the sphere of trade between the two countries and the replacement of favelas with decent housing. Regarding the relationship between unions and politics, Kaufman explained to the Brazilians that politics was part of life, but American unionism was nonpartisan. Instead, it backed pro-labor politicians. As we will see, such statements would be increasingly questioned. For observers and critics of unionism led by the AFL-CIO, it was at very least strange that the union federation insisted on keeping workers out of party politics while justifying their own involvement with the US government and their strong ties with the State Department and the CIA.

 In Brazil, Constitutional Amendment 24, of December 9, 1999, extinguished the position of lay judge or member of the Labor Court. Until that period, the tripartite system had prevailed in the labor courts, in which employees and employers were represented by lay judges representing the workers, alongside the professional judges.  Martins Filho, 1969, 46.

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Kaufman said he was keeping a close eye on the situation in Brazil that began with the inauguration of Marshal Costa e Silva as president, and revealed that USAID took a keen interest in the operations of AIFLD and the ICT in São Paulo. He explained to the Brazilians that, since 1964, exchanges between Brazilians and Americans had intensified, although the latter were disappointed to learn that many restrictions had not been lifted in Brazil (they were possibly referring to the obstacles to free collective bargaining and intervention in the unions’ boards), in addition to fresh impositions, such as the strict control of wage increases. The good relationship between the American program and the governors of the states of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda, and São Paulo, Adhemar de Barros, was also stressed. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this may have been a way the speaker found to criticize the Brazilian military regime’s aggressive stance towards the presence of foreign union entities in the country. However, the training program did not just include lectures, and there were more than a few opportunities for recreation. Stopping in several cities, the visitors had a chance to visit a range of tourist attractions. Many were accompanied by their wives. They enjoyed experiences they described as unforgettable, including trips to a stadium, dinners, horse races etc. ⁴⁹ There were also pleasant moments when traveling from one region to another. The union leaders spent their time singing and having fun, as reported by Martins Filho. On one of those occasions, “first the Americans sang songs from their homeland, then the people in our group sang Brazilian songs, thus setting an improvised and friendly challenge, all very cordial.” Their first subway ride was also reported. It was in New York City, on their way to the American Arbitration Association. According to Martins Filho, American unionism was profoundly different from the Brazilian union model. This was partly due to what he called “guardianship, surveillance and care by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.” The visitor criticized government intervention in union entities during in the period following the civilian-military coup, not coincidentally one of the strongest criticisms leveled against the Castello Branco regime by American unionism. As for the American unions, Martins Filho thought they maintained a “friendly but not submissive relationship with the government divisions,” and sought to “solve all their problems on their own steam.” Another difference the Brazilian journalist observed was the fact that, unlike Brazil, American trade unionism had grown from the bottom up, following a long-held conception of the USA. The Brazilian visitors got the impression that unionism was much more advanced in America than in Brazil. However, Martins Filho wrote, there was one area in which “we

 Ibid., 75.

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surpass it: our Labor Courts.” In the United States, he continued, when an individual labor conflict reached the judicial level, the case was referred to the civil courts. In his view, that aspect alone completely distorted the proceedings. Martins Filho believed in the special nature of labor disputes and advocated the existence of specific laws, such as the CLT. However, the Brazilian journalist also stressed another highly positive aspect of the American system: the professionalism of its union leaders. In addition to being well paid, they could hold office indefinitely, without anyone accusing them of being pelegos. ⁵⁰ At the end of their trip, the delegation of trade union leaders sent a report containing suggestions to the AFL-CIO, which included allowing more time for the recreational, cultural and social side, providing more contact with American families, and producing educational materials in the visitors’ language so they could “be more easily assimilated.” They concluded the report by thanking USAID for its contributions, stating, “loud and clear, that in addition to the wealth of lessons learned, they are taking back to Brazil indelible memories of this great, wonderful, organized and disciplined country!” Martins Filho made a brief reference to the anti-Americanism also present in Brazil, stating that there was a current of foreign opinion proclaiming that the United States practiced the materialist philosophy of the dollar, which enslaved people from a wide range of social classes in that country.⁵¹ Generally speaking, the leaders said they were quite happy with the USAIDsponsored tour, although they did not get their wish to meet the President of the United States. They had to content themselves with a letter to him from Brazilian Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha. Aside from our union leader and writer’s expressions of admiration and commitment to the causes of the American trade union movement, it is hard to find concrete evidence that these overseas training programs had a real impact on the implementation of the US union model and its practices in Brazilian unions. This is not to say that the desire to change the Brazilian labor regulation system to bring it closer to the US model was not a legitimate aspiration – that assessment is not within the scope of this study. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the alliance between American and Brazilian leaders was highly complex and unstable. It changed according to the political winds of the dictatorship, as the Brazilians were subject to the interests and plans of each administration of the military regime.

 Ibid., 164.  Ibid., 168.

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The positions of the Brazilian leaders, most of whom were characterized as “pelegos,” depended on the union structure, which was increasingly manipulated by the dictatorial regime. Likewise, they also had to show support for and represent the interests of the working class by making closer, albeit minimal, contact with their bases to get their votes in union elections. It was these same union leaders who were interested in supporting the AFL-CIO and the US government’s foreign policy. Furthermore, although many of them expressed admiration for the American labor regulation system, the comparison with the Brazilian model convinced them that US laws could not be applied in Brazil, as the two countries had very different systems and realities. In any event, invitations to travel abroad and a network of foreign contacts could be very attractive to union leaders. Many of them found it easy to shape their discourse according to the opportunities that arose from both left-wing regimes and anti-communist union organizations. This was the case with the union leader Rômulo Augustus Pereira de Souza. The president of the Rio de Janeiro Shipbuilders’ Union and vice president of the National Confederation of Maritime Transport Workers, he actually called himself a pelego. In 1968, Souza was invited to attend a conference in Quito, Ecuador, that would bring together union leaders from throughout the Americas, including Cuba. The aim of the event was to organize a debate on the political, social, and economic issues in the participating countries.⁵² Souza was supposed to give a presentation on the characteristics of the Brazilian union movement. When faced with an audience of left-wing union leaders, he did not think twice – “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” – and fired out phrases condemning “Yankee imperialism” and the “relentless American directive to control our destinies.” Souza received a standing ovation, and his speech was published in the local newspapers. The following day, he said he had been approached by a Cuban trade unionist, who, after expressing emotional praise for his presentation the night before, invited him to visit Cuba and meet Fidel Castro. According to his own version of events, it was at that moment that Souza apparently discovered his “ability to playact, to pass on to others the emotions that he had induced himself to feel, albeit momentarily.” Souza believed that the authenticity of a union leader was innate, although there was no denying that training had helped to improve his role as a representative of the working class’s interests. In his view, Brazil had, “with honorable exceptions, naive and unprepared union members, a few idealists, and the over-

 Souza does not make it clear, but the event was probably organized by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). R. A. P. de Souza, 1998, 182.

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whelming majority of bureaucrats masquerading as union leaders, focusing on personal interests.” The trip to Ecuador had reportedly made Souza aware of the disputes between the international union currents financed by the Soviet Union and the United States, which sought to co-opt unionists from the so-called Third World. It was through these international conferences and visits by AFLCIO representatives that he learned about AIFLD’s presence in Brazil.⁵³ Between 1967 and 1969, the cultural exchange program run by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) sent to the United States eight people who were considered influential and linked to labor policy issues in Brazil. Without naming names, the AIFLD report profiled these travelers. Three of them were presidents of union confederations, two were university professors in the field of Labor Law and advisers to union entities and the Ministry of Labor, two others were active members of the congress in the area of labor problems, and one was a priest, also considered an influential figure in rural unionism. Two of the union leaders were still presided over the confederations, and the third held an important position in a union entity in 1970.⁵⁴ In 1969, despite a serious crisis in relations between Brazil and the United States, and threatened with the cancellation of the union program, the ICT organized 139 union and basic education courses for 3,742 workers with AIFLD funding. Although the ICT had changed its original concept and undergone major reformulations in 1967 and 1968, as we saw in the previous chapter, we cannot overlook its role in the training of union leaders in the late 1960s. A more intensive nine-week training program brought together 90 union leaders in São Paulo City. Another 24 Brazilian leaders were sent to the United States to take a ten-week course in economics and communication studies. A group of three advisers from the Ministry of Labor also visited that country to observe the practice of arbitration and mediation of labor conflicts there, as well as the workings of the US Department of Labor. All told, the “Union to Union” exchange program sent 57 Brazilian union leaders to the United States and 10 Americans to Brazil in 1969 alone.⁵⁵ In any case, we must not forget that Brazilians’ experiences of USAID exchange programs were many and varied. Could the effectiveness of those programs be gauged according to the objectives of foreign union entities? In the view of Renato Colistete and Cliff Welch, prior to 1964 the training programs

 Ibid., 182.  Field Survey Report on AIFLD Program Brazil, 1970, part II pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ XDAAB044 A.pdf Accessed on December 21, 2020.  Annual report of the American Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 16, 1970. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), box 1781.

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were ineffectual in Brazil. One explanation for the low impact of the exchange program could be the fact that, after studying abroad, many graduates found it difficult to win elections to the local unions’ boards when running against left-wing leaders. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that those graduates would toe the American trade unionists’ line.⁵⁶ Perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of the pre-1964 period is the case of Clodesmidt Riani, a young electrician from Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais who was believed to have national leadership potential in the 1950s. In the early 1960s, Riani underwent union leadership training through the Point IV program during a three-month visit to the United States. For him, it was a “very serious commitment, because there was a hotel, a teacher, etc.” Anyone who was interested could apply, according to the rules published by the American Embassy. Regarding his experiences on the trip, Riani explained …everything was a huge responsibility, if you didn’t like it and wanted to go back, you couldn’t [sic]. If you lost a family member, you couldn’t come back. [There were] commitments to the hotel’s daily rates, commitment [sic] to teachers, classes, with visits all scheduled, because we visited all the administrative departments in the United States, starting with the State Department… The company itself agreed to be responsible for paying the family our wages. It was a sure thing.⁵⁷

According to the electrician from Minas Gerais, it was not a question of union training but of learning about the union movement in the United States. He was also able to make comparisons. He found, for example, that an electrician in that country earned three dollars per hour, while “our salary…,” adding: “we saw the difference because it was a more developed country.” In an unidentified newspaper clipping dated March and April 1960, Riani observed that the “American capitalist regime also benefits workers.” One thing that surprised him was seeing cordless phones, something hitherto unimaginable for a Brazilian electrician, to the point where he initially thought they were “fake.” In addition to cordless phones and color television, Riani was impressed by the large amount of housing for workers’ families financed by the US government, all of which were equipped with appliances. There was also social security. Despite his positive impression of the classes and the program in general, Riani never supported ICFTU, ORIT or AIFLD members’ activities in Brazil. Thwarting the American trade unionists’ expectations, and to the chagrin of US authorities, PTB member Clodesmidt Riani became president of the National Confederation

 Welch, 1995, 61-89; Colistete, 2012, 669-701.  Paula & Campos, 2005, 171-172.

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of Industrial Workers (CNTI) in 1962, having formed an alliance with the PCB and other groups. Speaking at the Seventh ICFTU Congress, held that same year, Riani observed he did not agree with the term “free unionism,” in as much as “we want free unions, but not in the sense given by the ICFTU. I respect the communists, I have an open mind.” ⁵⁸

Training or “Softening Up”? In contrast with the travel experiences reported above, some union leaders were strongly critical of the American presence in Brazil, as well as the training courses offered in the United States. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the presence of foreign leaders in Brazil sparked a strong nationalist response in that country’s union movement and led to an investigation by the Chamber of Deputies, launched in October 1967. Some statements made during the CPI on foreign entities by leaders, Labor Law specialists and Brazilian authorities questioned the aims of the exchange programs, as well as their impact on Brazilian unionism. For example, Silvio Nunes da Silva Rocha, a board member representative from the Guanabara SINDIPETRO, saw no point in learning the methods of American trade unionism. According to Rocha, who had joined the oil workers’ union after 1964, the objective of these foreign organizations was to “tame Brazilian union leaders” through a powerful strategy: bedazzlement.⁵⁹ Rocha said he regretted that only a small number of workers were unionized in Brazil – at that time, not even 25 percent of oil workers were union members. In his view, that situation was aggravated by the fact that many members were believed to be apathetic, not taking part in the life of the trade union. They were “at the mercy of a minority, just as they had been before 1964,” the witness noted. Rocha’s contact with foreign trade unionism reportedly began when he decided to translate IFPCW teaching materials into Portuguese. It is possible that Rocha had initially flirted with American trade unionism before joining its critics. After that experience, Rocha reached the conclusion that those lessons did not contribute anything to the résumés of Brazilian union members. Furthermore, “along with the classes, aside from the subliminal messages whispered in your ear, there was a very intense tourism program,” warned the leader. “Just look at the photos of union leaders on trips to the United States, Canada and  Ibid.  Testimony given on February 5, 1968, final report of the CPI. Archives of the Chamber of Deputies. Brasília, DF, Diário do Congresso Nacional, section I, August 28, 1970, supplement to no. 101, 26, column three.

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Mexico,” he added. Finally, Rocha was decisive when saying that USAID-funded exchange programs “looked more like groups of tourists than union leaders.” Speaking about the activities of American union leaders in Brazil, Rocha did not hide his opinion of the situation from the deputies. According to the board member, it had worsened since 1964. One of the alleged reasons for this was that the destination of the money the entities raised was not discussed at union assemblies – the agenda was limited to technical assistance, which he believed had nothing to do with the workers’ problems. Before 1964, the witness observed, that sort of assistance was provided by sociologists and lawyers. Following the “Revolution,” those positions had been held by generals, brigadiers and colonels, who were unable to help union workers. When asked by the CPI if he knew whether trips to the United States were being offered before 1964, Rocha responded by saying that it was a different time. Previously, leaders had often gone to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba; after 1964, he noted, travel started to shift to the other side of the Cold War. In response to another question, Rocha spoke about the utility of overseas courses, sounding an alert to future union leaders. According to him, all union members (in the oil industry) who had studied abroad had lost elections when they returned. Then, he spoke about the possible influence of foreign entities in the Ministry of Labor, taking the opportunity to bestow moderate praise on Minister Jarbas Passarinho. Claiming that he was telling the unvarnished truth, Rocha observed that “until now, all the ministers of Labor since the Revolution were the ones who opened the doors of Brazilian unionism to foreign organizations” – the first being Sussekind, he noted. He believed that Passarinho had only decided to take action due to press coverage of the problem. Rocha’s incisive statements are quite intriguing. As he began his activities at the time of the coup, we might initially think he was a pelego or an “authentic new generation [union leader]” backed by the Americans. However, his critique of the exchange program, labor ministers and the realities of the union movement cast doubt on this theory. It is also possible that, being anti-communist, he had supported the coup but was later disenchanted with the results of what he may have initially believed to be a “Revolution.” However, we know that one of the hallmarks of the pelego was publicly to criticize the factors responsible for the problems of the working class, such as wage policy, employer exploitation, working conditions, etc., while colluding with the political authorities and employers. In this sense, the alternative newspaper Amanhã went so far as to teach its readers how to identify a true pelego: In the assemblies, he always says they need to stay calm, that they shouldn’t go on strike, because the boss is understanding. That the situation may be bad, but it will get better, and

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he will contact the representatives of the bosses to reach an agreement that serves the interests of the profession; moreover, he tries to dress like a worker and claims that he spends long hours working for the union. The fact is, he says one thing to your face and does another behind your back. His money, in the end, comes from Washington.⁶⁰

According to the article, the training of these union members was carried out in the so-called “little schools for pelegos” either located in the United States or financed by that country. There, they were taught “everything that needs to be done to weaken the union.” It also provided more tips on how to identify a pelego: If the pelego is important, a union or confederation president, for example, he wears a suit and tie. But always the same suit so as not to attract unwanted attention. As for a pelego who is still on the rise, his favorite outfit is a white shirt and dark trousers. Pelegos always try to dress like the other union members. Pelegos always look tired, like someone who is very busy. [Because] union members only show up when there is a wage increase, no one helps him. This is how a pelego talks. But what he likes most is answering the phone. Usually, it is an industrialist inviting him to lunch.⁶¹

Another type of behavior observed in pelegos was their attitude in the assemblies, the article warned. They usually held the position of president or sat the union’s board of directors, but they never spoke first. Before expressing their opinions, their strategy was to assess the workers’ mood. If the atmosphere was favorable for a strike, the pelegos brought in their assistants to argue against the stoppage, “but very lightly.” They were supposed to emphasize the hardships involved in going on strike to make the plenary think twice. Then came the “top pelego’s” turn to speak. Predictably, the he would criticize the bosses and go on to say … that they should be more humane, that the minister is to blame and that, unfortunately, they cannot go on strike. However, he is going to take the case to the top Labor official. If the assembly goes along, case closed. But if the workers have gone without pay for four months, for example, then the pelego looks for a way to postpone the assembly. He calls the factory owner, giving him a quick report to show that, this time, he will have to pay out – at least half. The boss will see that the situation is bad, and order one-third [of their wages] to be paid, and as a result the workers will decide to hold off a bit longer.⁶²

 Amanhã, n. 3, April 27 to May 4, 1967, 4. CEDEM/UNESP, file P6/086.  Ibid.  Ibid.

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In another report that came out in the same publication, entitled “Americans Train Pelegos,” its readers were shown the easiest way for a union president to take a few days off. The procedure was simple: “Just go to the ICT and apply for one of the courses taught by that institute.” The overseas apprenticeship program gave union leaders 30 to 60 days’ unpaid leave. However, they would have all expenses paid by the ICT, in addition to per diems. According to the author of the article, many of the students at the US-backed union entity, like the pelegos informants in the factories, were “gullible” individuals who would never graduate from the union leadership course because “when quizzed, they give the answer they think is right, instead of the right answer.” Therefore, the newspaper gave this piece of humorous advice: If you intend to get a union education diploma and a trip to the United States, when the teacher asks you what you think of American collective bargaining agreements, your answer should be: “They’re fantastic, teacher. Brazil should adopt this [type of] contract!”⁶³

Critiques of the US-sponsored exchange programs were not limited to students or the so-called nationalist or leftist leaders. According to Rio de Janeiro MDB deputy José Maria Ribeiro, a member of the CPI who was subsequently removed from office by the AI-5 decree, those foreign trips merely awakened Brazilian union leaders’ desire “to consume goods that we are not yet in a position to offer, not even to union leaders.” He believed that contact with an overdeveloped country only resulted in “distortions in the leaders’ thinking.”⁶⁴ However, the Superior Labor Court (TST) judge and labor minister Arnaldo Sussekind thought differently. In his view, the exchange programs did not pose a threat and could even be advantageous, because they “gave union leaders a broader perspective on problems.”⁶⁵ According to Sussekind, the very fact that they made union leaders aware of the differences in labor regulation systems was enough to broaden their outlook on the union world. However, the former minister did not rule out the possibility that the exchange programs had influenced some leaders, as they were “susceptible to such influence.” Finally, Sussekind sounded a warning about the selection criteria, as some people might take advantage of those trips for personal reasons.⁶⁶ According to João Batista de Lira, vice president of the Guanabara Oil Workers’ Union (SINDIPETRO) and an employee of the Petrobras-owned Manguinhos

   

Ibid., 15. Final Report of the CPI, 43, column two. Ibid., column three. Ibid., 47, columns three and four.

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Refinery, union exchange programs were necessary, but without “the use of individual financial aid, as has been done in the past.” Lira believed that Brazilian unionism was very different from its American counterpart, mainly due to cultural, economic, and other differences. However, the leader argued that the exchange programs should not be eliminated, as union members needed to get to know other countries besides the United States, such as France, the UK and Italy. Lira said he had never visited any of those countries, although he knew leaders who had done so. Although he proved to be a supporter of union exchange, Lira agreed with his colleagues at the Guanabara SINDIPETRO who criticized the interference of foreign union entities in Brazil’s internal affairs.⁶⁷ Efraim Velasquez, the IFPCW representative in Brazil, was called in to testify before the CPI on foreign entities. When asked about the objectives of these trips, he defended the exchange program, claiming that the idea was to instill knowledge into Latin American union leaders. However, he recognized that the program’s success depended on each individual. After all, he concluded, “if someone went to the United States and was only interested in tourism, they wouldn’t learn a thing.” The criteria for selecting the Brazilian union leaders who studied in the United States was also addressed by the DRT delegate, General Moacyr Gaya. He was opposed to the AIFLD-ICT’s methods. Furthermore, he criticized the fact that, instead of “trying to study our legislation in depth and [being taught about] US labor relations,” “wanted to set up the US model as the ideal.” Saying that he was concerned about the impact these trips might have, the delegate feared that “large doses” of lessons about American unionism would be injected into Brazilian workers. As a result, he added, they would think that “the ideal thing would be to follow the model of labor relations adopted in the United States.” However, he himself emphasized that most or nearly all of the union members he knew who had gone to the USA had “barely changed their way of doing things at all,” and that none of them had proposed any changes in collective bargaining procedures in São Paulo. In the opinion of Rivaldo Gonçalves Otero, a head of the Cubatão Oil Workers’ Union, the courses taken abroad had contributed very little to the performance of Brazilian union leaders in their home country. Based on his contact with eight directors of his union who had taken the course in the United States, he had observed that its impact was virtually nil. In his view, this was partly because trade unionism in America was very different from its Brazilian counterpart. Otero noted that, in addition to the differences in employee-employer relations, US workers enjoyed freedoms that were “much greater than ours when it

 Ibid., 58, column four.

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comes to strikes.” As for collective work contracts, he believed that it would not be possible to adopt the same practice in Brazil, as Brazilian unions were not prepared for that, nor could they bring the same pressure to bear – in this case, calling a strike, which was considered a key strategy. However, the leader thought it over and, finding an opportunity to make a joke, observed: “Exchange programs can be advantageous, be they with Soviets, Americans or Martians.”⁶⁸

“I Am Writing to….”: Communications between Brazilian Workers and the AFL-CIO The AFL-CIO used a varied range of methods to showcase the American labor system as a model for other countries, such as photo exhibits about the world of work in the United States, documentaries, radio programs, newspapers and other publications aimed at presenting the “American way of life” to the working class. The events organized by the US Embassy in Brazil, with the support of the other American entities, included a major exhibition on American labor held in the state capitals of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Financed by USAID, it took place in 1966. According to its organizers, the event, which had a footfall of approximately 165,000 visitors in Rio and 80,000 in São Paulo, and featured the participation of union leaders, was viewed as a success. The public response was said to be highly positive, which underscored the importance of this type of event for the dissemination of American ideals, in the words of labor attaché Herbert Baker.⁶⁹ That same year, the US State Department, in partnership with USAID and the AFL-CIO, published a number of books and films that were shown in the main union entities in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Those entities also received donations of books – more than 170 different titles on unionism, economics, science, biographies of politicians and the latest news about the world scene. Another important outlet for spreading the word about American trade unionism was O Trabalhador (The Worker), a monthly magazine distributed to over 400 unions and 134 federations and confederations throughout Bra-

 CPI Report, 118, column one.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 14, 1966. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), box 1282.

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zil.⁷⁰ Many Brazilian workers may have learned or heard about American unionism through these methods, which were widely used to build up the image of American workers around the world. It is also possible that, influenced by these publications, films and exhibitions, many Brazilian workers were encouraged to write to the AFL-CIO to get in touch or request favors. This is clearly demonstrated in a collection of approximately 20 letters written by workers from different parts of the country. Curiously enough, these missives were mainly addressed to AFL-CIO President George Meany, and they are similar not only in structure but also in the fact that they contain a request. Some were made directly and some more subtly, usually as part of a narrative about commitment to the values of American unionism. The writers of these letters lavished praise on American unionism before asking for a favor, which could be for themselves or their union.⁷¹ Letters have been widely used as a source by historians interested in learning about “subaltern” experiences.⁷² However, fascination with this type of source can lead researchers to draw hasty conclusions from epistolary sources that are easily questioned. After all, we lack further information about their authors; we do not know the context in which the letters were written, let alone the whole they represent. In this study, I seek to avoid analyses that interpret letters as a legitimate and full expression of Brazilian workers’ thoughts and feelings about American unionism. However, not using them could mean missing an opportunity to get to know some aspects of the type of language and strategies used, as well as specific interests that led Brazilian workers to get in touch with American union leaders. Most of the Brazilian workers’ requests were easily met, such as acquiring periodicals or teaching materials; others, not so much. Some apparently unassuming writers simply wanted to praise the AFL-CIO, such as the letter from José B. Braga, sent in 1966 and written in English. He was writing to congratulate the union federation for mounting the above-mentioned photo exhibit about the world of work in the United States, held in Rio de Janeiro. Delighted by the efficiency of the event, the author stressed the warm welcome the visitors had received, and made a point of observing that,

 Report of the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, October 19, 1966. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), box 1282.  The collection of letters is housed in the George Meany Memorial Archives. Many are accompanied by a reply or a note indicating that they had been answered.  Regarding the use of letters as an important documentary source for analyzing the Republican era in Brazil, see Ferreira, 1997; Fischer, 2006.

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to help them cool down when inside the building, the organizers had kindly distributed ice-cold bottles of Pepsi, free of charge.⁷³ Some requests may have arisen after an exchange of letters, or may just have been a show of deference to American labor, but not even the intent was previously revealed. A letter from the Instituto de Educação Sindical de Santos (IES) written in 1966 and addressed to the president of the AFL-CIO, begins with a pithy explanation of the ideas of American trade unionism that reads more like a collage of fragments from ICT teaching materials. In many cases, the use of a common language and ideas, such as the practice of free collective bargaining and the belief in independent unionism, was a way of initiating contact, as we can see in the letter signed by Severino Moretti. After a lengthy opening paragraph on the contributions that “a free and democratic unionism, properly prepared and enlightened” could make to Brazil, the writer requests copies of teaching materials used by American unions. The goal, according to the letter, was to enable the Instituto de Educação Sindical (Institute of Union Education) in the city of Santos to train its leaders according to the ICT’s guidelines. Although they had trained about 100 union members, they could do more, he wrote. The problem was the lack of support from the unions in Baixada Santista, a port area in São Paulo State, and the fact that the same leaders were running them. They did not want workers to be trained and compete with them for management positions, the union leader explained.⁷⁴ However, if the reason for the letter was the need to acquire handouts for training purposes, one could ask why the writer did not send the request directly to the ICT’s headquarters near the port city of Santos. Therefore, there may have been an ulterior motive for that modest request – perhaps the desire to be invited to travel to the US or simply to make direct contact with foreigners. “With hearts radiant with joy, we saw your presence” – thus began another letter to George Meany, from the Federação Nacional dos Empregados e Viajantes do Comércio (National Federation of Retail Employees and Commercial Travelers) in Rio de Janeiro State, written in 1963. Their reason for writing was to thank Meany for the AFL-CIO’s assistance with paying for medical treatment for the association’s president, Angelo Parmigiani (already mentioned here as an important ally of the foreign union federation).⁷⁵ According to the writer,

 Letter to the AFL-CIO, dated February 15, 1966, from José B. Fraga. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18 – 001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.  Letter from the Instituto de Educação Sindical de Santos (IES), dated May 31, 1966, to the president of the AFL-CIO. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.  See chapter I.

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the “perfect integration” between the AFL-CIO, labor attaché John Fishburn and Retail Clerks International to raise money to cover his hospital expenses and transfer the patient from Brazil to the United States “touched our hearts, due to the high sense of humanity that it demonstrates, showing the entire world how much solidarity and fraternity are worth among workers who struggle to achieve the same ideals.” A clipping of the newspaper O Globo’s report on Angelo Parmigiani’s trip to the United States was enclosed.⁷⁶ As we have seen, it was no coincidence that the group of retail employees and commercial travelers from the Rio de Janeiro State was invited to take part in the “Union to Union” program in 1967. In another letter, from the president of the Federação dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias do Estado de Santa Catarina (State of Santa Catarina Federation of Industrial Workers), the writer introduces himself to George Meany as one of the best students in the training program offered by AIFLD in Washington, DC, from the class of 1963.⁷⁷ He recalls that he received the certificate of completion from the AFL-CIO president in person. He considered that course to be “the most perfect one I have ever taken, and the one that most closely raised the voice of the Brazilian worker and, why not say Latin American workers in pursuit of better days.” Then, the union leader said he would like to attend higher education courses on unionism, including the technical and economic aspects, and continue his studies on forming cooperatives so that, “with this knowledge, I could apply it here in Brazil within our means.” Further on, the writer reveals that he has another reason for contacting Meany: Right now I am in a difficult situation. I started building my house in September 1966, and have not finished it yet, as I ran out of money, and private and public agencies have never helped workers in this regard. To give you an idea of the housing deficit in Brazil, it is almost one million units, and will tend to increase in view of the annual population density. I would like to take out a long-term loan for $5,000 (that is, 13,500 new cruzeiros) through the American Institute, which you so wisely direct. And that way, I can finish [building] my house.⁷⁸

 Letter from the Federação Nacional dos Empregados e Viajantes do Comércio to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, dated March 8, 1963. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.  It is possible that the writer was part of the group of 33 union leaders who received training in Washington, DC., shortly before the coup in Brazil. See chapter I.  Letter to George Meany from the president of the Federação dos Trabalhadores nas Indústrias do Estado de Santa Catarina, Joinville, dated September 8, 1967. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.

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Indeed, Brazilian workers were well aware of AIFLD’s financial aid program for working-class housing, provided through the Alliance for Progress project. Apparently, the president of the branch of the federation based in the southern state of Santa Catarina intended to propose a tacit agreement, based on an exchange of favors: he would receive a loan to finish building his house; the AFL-CIO would get his personal commitment to ensure that the American organization’s ideals were widely disseminated in Brazil. Similarly, in 1967, the year when accusations of corruption in foreign unionism erupted, Walter Alves Lima wrote to George Meany to inform him that he wanted to become president of the State of Guanabara Union of Vehicle and Trailer Drivers. That way, Lima hoped finally to be able to apply what he had learned from his AIFLD courses. However, the aspiring union leader had run into some problems: I know that my battle will not be easy to win, as I have no financial power on my side, unlike my rivals, who are benefiting from having a large amount of independent capital at their disposal for publicity, because money always helps win elections, even when candidates are extremely unpopular with the union members. As for me, if I am elected, I just want to be able to implement a work program in my union that will be conducted along the same lines I learned [from the course] to give my colleagues better opportunities, as well as a decent standard of living. If, with the benefit of your experience, you can offer me real help to win this battle, I thank you with all my heart and once again confirm my friendship and thanks for everything you have given me the opportunity to learn.⁷⁹

In another letter, shoemaker Olívio Resende de Melo, who lived in Franca, São Paulo, wrote impatiently to William F. Schnitzler, a representative of the periodical Correio Operário Norte Americano. Saying that he had already written several times to the American consulate in Brazil without receiving a satisfactory reply, the writer requested a list of the names and addresses of shoe factories and employment agencies in the United States. He wanted them so he could to apply for a job in that country. Finally, he wrote: “I am 31 years old, this is the only profession I have and like, and I would like to increase my knowledge at the major manufacturers in the USA, I am married with a son. I hope you will recognize my spirit of struggle, courage and willingness to progress.”⁸⁰ There were numerous requests for financial, material and even professional opportunities in the United States. Other writers wanted financial aid from the AFL-CIO for their studies on

 Letter to George Meany from Walter Alves Lima, dated July 17, 1967. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18 – 001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.  Letter to William F. Schnitzler, of the Correio Operário Norte-Americano, from Olívio Resende de Melo, from Franca, SP, dated June 4, 1967. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.

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the doctrine of American trade unionism. The requests multiplied. Reminders were attached to some letters, containing an order for some sort of memo or bulletin to be produced regarding these demands. As we can see, combining personal interests with those of the organization was a common strategy for workers, as was the case with Paulo René de Assis Bueno when writing to George Meany. The Brazilian worker asked the American union leader for a job and accommodation in the United States. He had already asked the American consulate to pay for his travel expenses. Bueno said he wanted to apply the knowledge he acquired in the United States to Brazil, but, to do so, he needed George Meany to tell him if it would be possible to “find a Brazilian family that already lives in the United States, who can help me move and could write to me, because I will keep up the fight until I succeed.”⁸¹ Writing from the town of Caruaru, Pernambuco, in northeastern Brazil, an unidentified student and worker affiliated with the local handicrafts and leather goods union, wrote to the president of the AFL-CIO in 1971 to say that he had read the “magnificent” Correio Operário Norte Americano. He explained to George Meany that he needed to work to finish his studies, as he wanted to succeed in life with the help of books, lamenting the fact that most of his brother workers were illiterate. Because of that, “I always wanted to receive this newspaper since it is useful for me and for the others around me. I also want to learn English, if I can get basic books to study.” By reading the foreign newspaper, the worker and student from Caruaru claimed to have developed a positive view of American trade unionism, insofar as he had observed how strikes in the United States had been carried out in an civilized manner. He ended the letter with the following words: “If you grant my request, I will be grateful and promise to publicize the newspaper.”⁸² Similarly, the representative of the Union of Nurses and Hospital and Health Care Workers from São José dos Campos, São Paulo State, wrote to the editors of Correio Operário Norte Americano to express his stance on the ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union: Through that vibrant union entity…, we had the opportunity to read the article “Hypocrisy of Soviet ‘Aid’ for Underdeveloped Countries,” by David Brombart. First of all, we would like to observe that these two great sister countries [Brazil and the United States] have contributed to the United Nations development program, according to their respective financial situations. We ranked last among the 20, but, God willing, next year we will obtain a better position. The union’s opinion is this: The United States first, Brazil second. As for this So-

 Letter from worker Paulo René de Assis Bueno to President George Meany, dated February 1, 1967. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 1.  Letter from unidentified writer to George Meany, undated. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18¬001, series 4, box 16, folder 10.

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viet “aid,” it is just cheap demagoguery, or as the saying goes, it’s an old wives’ tale. Interweaving the bonds of friendship that unite these two great countries, we reiterate our expressions of high and great esteem.⁸³

Apparently, the writer simply wanted to get in touch and express the union’s position in the ideological dispute in the arena of the Cold War, without making any specific requests. The president of the Chavantes Rural Workers’ Union, Ivalino Alves da Cruz, was more explicit in his letter to George Meany dated January 1970, when the presence of American trade unionism in Brazil had diminished considerably. After writing that he had been receiving copies of the newspaper Correio Operário on a regular basis and was following the “development of unionism in that friendly nation,” the leader took the opportunity to ask how he could acquire powdered milk and medicine to distribute free of charge to rural workers in order to better strengthen the unions. A town in in a predominantly rural area of western São Paulo State, Chavantes was one of the localities benefited by the Alliance for Progress, which invested $22.5 million in the construction of a hydroelectric plant there. In addition to that project, President Kennedy’s program was also well known in the Northeast for its donations of powdered milk through the Food for Peace Program, which distributed around 40,000 tons of that product.⁸⁴ We do not know whether the request from the president of the Chavantes Rural Workers’ Union was granted. However, we do know that the AFL-CIO turned down some requests. This was the case with a letter to George Meany from the technical sales instructor Paulo Malty. Waxing nostalgic and expressing his gratitude for taking part, along with a delegation of Brazilian unionists, in the union training offered by the AFL-CIO in the United States in 1957, Malty seems to have found his experience in that country to be a basis for requesting a scholarship for a co-worker – AFL-CIO Inter-American representative Michael Boggs replied in the negative.⁸⁵ From the supposed efficiency of the American worker to the practice of “free and independent” collective bargaining, several impressions about the United States have come to be considered common sense in the imaginary of many Brazilian workers, despite the growing anti-American demonstrations by left-wing

 Letter from the Sindicato dos Enfermeiros e Empregados em Hospitais e Casas de Saúde de São José dos Campos, São Paulo, dated February 2, 1971, addressed to the editors of Correio Operário Norte-Americano. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18001, series 4, box 16, folder 10.  A $6-million food distribution program was also carried out at the same time. Ribeiro, 2006, 304.  Letter from Paulo Malty, technical sales instructor, to George Meany, dated October 29, 1970. George Meany Memorial Archives, RG 18 – 001, series 4, box 16, folder 10.

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organizations, nationalist groups and the student movement in the late 1960s and early 70s. However, some workers individually sought ways to make contact with American unionism. In this sense, the letters analyzed in this chapter reveal a strategy used by workers and union leaders to ask for personal benefits or favors. To this end, they sought to show their knowledge about the basics of American trade unionism by incorporating Cold War language – such as combating “subversives,” – combined with demonstrations of sympathy with and commitment to the US’s trade union cause. Based on a set of travel reports, this chapter has sought to present aspects of union leaders’ experiences, as well as their impressions and ideas about the United States and trade unionism in that country. The observations published in memoirs described a nation where, the writers believed, everything worked perfectly, from the “deep civic faith of the American people,” as Labor Minister Jarbas Passarinho put it, to the supposed “absence of pelegos,” as noted by the exchange student Reinaldo Santos. However, when faced with a reality different from that of their own country, instead of trying to introduce so-called “free” trade unionism, as the creators of the “Union to Union” program intended, many of those travelers came to the conclusion that the American model was not right for Brazil. After all, they observed, “They had two very different [labor regulation] systems.” Furthermore, those union members had their own opinions about the ideal model for labor regulation. In the case of Brazil, it seems, union members could hardly imagine a system in which there was no mediation by the Labor Courts. In fact, for one of the travelers, this gave Brazilian workers an advantage. Compared to their American counterparts, they benefited from a specialized tribunal that guaranteed workers’ individual rights. Others, at a time when the military regime was seeking to curb the interference of US trade unionism in Brazil’s affairs, denounced the Americans’ attempts to “soften up” Brazilian union leaders when testifying before the Chamber of Deputies. Regardless of the true intentions and possible sympathies of Brazilians towards the United States, the fact is that the impact of the exchange programs on the national union movement in the 1960s and 1970s were small or virtually non-existent. One possible exception is the period leading up to the civilian-military coup, but that remains to be proven. This observation leads us to think that, despite considerable investment in exchange programs and the dissemination of American trade unionism on foreign soil, Brazilian union leaders did not “returned Americanized,” at least not completely. Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the strict wage containment policy and tight control of the Labor Justice actions by Brazil’s Executive Branch undermined any individual attempts by union leaders or organized labor entities directly to influence “free” collective bargaining.

Chapter V Conflicts, Interests and Alliances between Brazilian and American Unionists: From the “Economic Miracle” to the “Years of Lead” In the view of the US Embassy, the lull between 1964 and 1966, when the Brazilian government’s measures were aligned with American interests, had come to an end. During the Emilio Garrastazu Médici administration (1969 – 1974), the economic growth that occurred during the period known as the “miracle” imposed a new agenda on Brazilian international politics. It was a time of transition, although the process took place at a moderate pace. The former head of the National Information Service, Médici became President of Brazil after a junta of “hard-line” military men had held power for a two-month period. During that time, a number of authoritarian and repressive measures were decreed, including the abrogation of the vice president’s mandate, preventing him from taking office, and the enactment of a new National Security Law, which introduced the death penalty and effected a fresh purge of the Armed Forces. It marked the beginning of the “years of lead.” Four days after the junta took power, members of two underground organizations engaged in armed struggle against the regime – the October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR8) and the National Liberation Alliance (ALN) – kidnapped US ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick.¹ He was released in exchange for 15 left-wing political prisoners. Subsequently, the Swiss and West German ambassadors were kidnapped, in addition to the Japanese consul in São Paulo. As for relations between Brazil and the United States, the relationship between the Médici and Nixon administrations was viewed as promising. Formulators of American foreign policy believed that Brazil could take the lead in South America and project US influence in the region. However, the State Department did not share that opinion, claiming that authoritarian leaders tended not to be

 For more information about the kidnapping of the US ambassador to Brazil, see: Resende, Pamela de Almeida. “Ser um embaixador não é um mar de rosas: o sequestro de Charles Burke Elbrick no Brasil em 1969” (“Being an Ambassador is not a Bed of Roses: The Kidnapping of Charles Burke Elbrick in Brazil in 1969.”) PhD thesis. FFLCH – University of São Paulo, São Paulo, 2019; Da-Rin, Silvio. Hércules 56: o sequestro do embaixador americano em 1969. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-010

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good partners. Furthermore, their regimes were unstable and therefore the US government could not trust them.² On the Brazilian side, diplomats wanted to assure the United States of their joint commitment to combating communism. However, they emphasized that Brazil’s actions would be decided on a case-by-case basis and based on “national interests.” State-to-State relations were the primary issue on the agenda the Brazilian Foreign Ministry prepared for discussion with the American government. Diplomats called for intensified Brazil-United States cooperation in all sectors – political, economic, commercial, cultural, scientific, and technological. Clearly, the union movement seemed to have lost its clout.³ Under Delfim Netto, Médici’s Finance Minister, the economy grew around 10 percent per year between 1970 and 1973 – it was the apogee of the “miracle.” The “cake recipe” for the much-vaunted “miracle” was the economic tripod formed by stateowned companies, transnational companies and domestic private capital. As Vizentini observes, the first “leg” of the tripod was responsible for infrastructure, energy, and capital goods manufacturers (steel, machine tools); the second produced durable consumer goods (automobiles and household appliances); and the third focused on the production of inputs (auto parts) and consumer goods. The auto industry became the most dynamic sector in the economy, reaching annual production of one million units.⁴ It was no coincidence that auto workers had the most bargaining power when demanding rights and better working conditions during the gradual return to democracy. However, the wage squeeze continued, because, as Delfim Netto observed, the cake had to rise before it could be shared. Keeping wages down was viewed as a strategy to boost the country’s international competitiveness. A new middle class of technicians and professionals was formed. In addition to a strong concentration of income, the Médici administration’s economic policy also led to more economic centralization, especially in the financial sector, as Vizentini notes. Financing for fresh investments was growing, thanks to the compulsory savings fund for workers (FGTS) and the spontaneous savings of the middle class. Workers, however, saw their wages reduced, causing worsening social inequalities, one of the hallmarks of the dictatorship. This formula was not sufficient to being about the

 Spektor, 2009, 40 – 49.  Ibid., 49.  Vizentini, 1998, 133.

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country’s economic growth, and new foreign markets had to be found for industrial products.⁵ One of the keys to understanding the Médici administration’s socioeconomic policy, as well as its foreign relations plan, is the concept of national authoritarianism, which gained strength during that period. Unlike reformist national populism, which was rooted in the domestic segment of the business community, Brazil’s development was in the hands of a state bureaucracy that was in charge of managing the public sector of the economy. According to Vizentini, national authoritarianism had conservative characteristics and relied on state-owned companies and the Treasury. However, good financial, commercial, and diplomatic performance in foreign relations was key to ensuring political stability. These were the foundations of the Brasil potência (“Brazil as a Power”)⁶ project. When Henry Kissinger was Nixon’s National Security Advisor, from 1969 onwards, Brazil and the United States established a policy of official consultations and forged new initiatives and methods to avoid disagreements. A new partnership had emerged, but not without crises and friction, as Spektor observes. In his view, it would be a “mistake to interpret Kissinger’s plan for Brazil as an attempt to transform the country into a puppet subjected to the will of the United States.” Nevertheless, a policy of indifference towards Brazil was considered bad for the US government. Kissinger believed it would be possible to derive real benefits from greater Brazilian involvement during the Cold War.⁷ On the military regime’s part, there were no plans to resume Castello Branco’s policy of alignment. Their aim was to establish good relations with the “brother in the North” to accelerate their conservative modernization drive and win trade concessions. Kissinger, who was responsible for transforming US foreign policy, saw no problem with supporting dictatorships in the fight against communism. Bypassing the State Department, he took control of the planning and operationalization of US diplomacy, defense and intelligence. In 1973, Kissinger also took on the post of Secretary of State. Following Nixon’s resignation in 1974, he remained at the helm of the State Department until the end of Gerald Rudolph Ford’s administration in 1977. Allegations of torture and repression against Brazilian political prisoners did not interest Kissinger, who was accused of turning a blind eye to such matters.⁸

 As we know, the “economic miracle” was also due to the expansion of the public works policy, including construction of roadways, the Rio-Niterói bridge, hydroelectric plants, and the Trans-Amazonian Highway.  Vizentini, 1998, 135.  Spektor, 2009, 14.  Ibid., 9.

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Harmonizing the nationalist plan with American interests was possible, in part, due to Brazil’s domestic problems. The US government had helped fight guerrilla movements when left-wing parties came to power in neighboring Chile and Peru, and Argentina and Uruguay were experiencing strong internal political conflicts.⁹ Therefore, Brazil was a crucial ally for the stabilization of the region, and the military regime met the US government’s expectations by providing support for the right-wing coups in Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Furthermore, Nixon was focused on ending the Vietnam War.¹⁰ According to Spektor, one of the most common mistakes made by Brazilian foreign policy studies is the idea that the 1970s were “marked by a progressive and natural distancing between Brazil and the United States.” However, if that did not occur in the commercial and diplomatic fields, relations had clearly cooled at the union level, although USAID still provided financial aid.¹¹ During that period, the AFL-CIO’s activities in Brazil continued, but in a relatively modest fashion compared to period from 1964 to 1967. In the early 1970s, relations between Brazilian and American union leaders were sorely strained. In addition, the US government had cut off aid for many fields of cooperation, such as education, only continuing to finance projects in what were deemed to be the most sensitive areas for its foreign policy.¹² In the field of labor policy, following the AI-5 decree, the government established a harder line with the union movement. In 1969, few unions managed to organize any kind of demonstration against the regime. One was held during the wage campaign carried out by the metalworkers of São Paulo and 19 other unions. The workers tried to resist the regime’s repressive measures by carrying out all the rituals leading up to a legal strike. The Ministry of Labor, now headed by Julio Barata, regarded as one of the toughest ministers in terms of worker relations, responded with a threat of intervention in the union. He also forced an early judgment of the strike by the Regional Labor Court of São Paulo, which took the steam out of the movement. The intensification of the repression by the military regime imposed new limitations on workers’ resistance.¹³ Prevented by the crackdown from engaging in more confrontational union activities, they focused on internal demands in the workplace, often without the unions’ knowledge. The workers then began devising silent, underground strategies for struggle.  Dávila, Jerry, 2013.  Vizentini, 1998, 142.  In 1971, AIFLD was the 15th-largest recipient of USAID funding. Sims, 1992, 22.  Vizentini, 1998, 150.  F. L. Almeida, 1982, 26.

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Questioning the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy The US Senate’s investigation of the American union federation’s overseas activities marked the development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil and throughout Latin America in the 1970s. The investigative proceedings contributed to the deterioration of the AFL-CIO’s public image inside and outside the United States, damaging its reputation as an entity that promoted solidarity and fraternity among the workers of the world. While Brazilian union leaders were going before the Chamber of Deputies’ CPI to testify about their involvement with American leaders, George Meany was being held to account by the US Senate regarding the AFL-CIO’s overseas activities. On the morning of August 1, 1969, the committee chaired by Senator J. W. Fulbright, known for his opposition to President Johnson’s foreign policy, met to hear the testimony of the president of that country’s largest union federation. First, they wanted to know about AIFLD’s role in Latin America and how it had spent USAID funds, which, since 1962, totaled about $28 million. Meany had prepared a formal written statement.¹⁴ Fulbright based his questions on two newspaper articles, in addition to a letter from Elmer Staats, director of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a legislative body responsible for overseeing and managing the US federal government’s accounting. The senator concluded that AIFLD’s operations, which were considered a tool for achieving the aims of US foreign policy in the field of trade unions, had failed to achieve their objectives. He claimed to have “considerable doubts about the effectiveness of AIFLD’s work in Latin America.”¹⁵ The publications he cited discussed how AFL-CIO leaders had been persuaded to support the Vietnam War after receiving large sums of money for AIFLD. Based on these sources, the senator expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of the union program in Latin America. He wanted to know if it was true that AIFLD had closed its offices in some countries because it was accused of “meddling in internal politics.”¹⁶ Meany defended himself by claiming that the same letter from Staats recognized that AIFLD had helped boost socioeconomic development in Latin American countries and the inclusion of workers in the Alliance for Progress program. Saying he was proud of the “long-standing and fraternal” relationship between

 US Senate Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. “Hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. Ninety First Congress. First session with George Meany, President, AFLCIO, August 11, 1969”. Washington, DC., U.S Government Print Office, 1969.  U.S. Senate Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. “Hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. Ninety First Congress, 14.  Ibid.

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the AFL-CIO and Latin American unions, the deponent denied that AIFLD’s offices had been closed, saying that it was active in more than twenty countries, except Cuba, Haiti, and Paraguay. Afterwards, he said he was aware of the 1968 report “Survey of Alliance for Progress Labor Policies and Programs,” an investigation run by Robert H. Dockery. He thought the document’s conclusions were unfounded and asked for a chance to rebut it. He said he was proud that the union federation had supported World War II, the Korean War and now the Vietnam War. Regarding the AFL-CIO’s foreign aid policy, Meany insisted on the narrative of “fraternal solidarity” with Latin American workers and said the union federation, “as always, had an interest in workers in every part of the world.” Finally, he observed, “We have learned from experience that when workers in other countries lose their freedom, where they are forced to submit to the yoke of a dictatorship or tyrannical government of any kind, their repression and enslavement constitute a grave threat to our own freedom.” The AFL-CIO reserved 20 percent of its annual income for its Latin American neighbor for “humanitarian” reasons. Furthermore, the leader argued that, as American citizens, they also had a duty to guarantee freedom in the Western Hemisphere. However, he acknowledged that the AFL-CIO had made mistakes and failed to take effective action in the region. Those mistakes included too much investment in the military and too little spending on social welfare. When asked about the AFL-CIO’s relations with private corporations and its aid to union programs abroad, Meany argued that economic development could only be achieved with the help of private enterprise and a harmonious relationship with them. Therefore, the long list of private companies that provided financial backing for AIFLD was the result of this policy of cooperation between capital and labor.¹⁷ Regarding the AFL-CIO’s activities at that time, Meany stated that over 730 young people, including Latin American men and women, had taken courses at Front Royal, Virginia, in addition to more than 100,000 local training courses. The AFL-CIO was financing a two-semester course on trade union economics for young Latin American leaders at a US university. As for social projects, Meany explained the role of AIFLD in the creation of cooperatives and the technical development of urban and rural Latin American unions in more than 12 countries. The largest project, named after the creator of the Alliance for Progress, had been  The following were mentioned: Peter Grace, president of AIFLD and former president of W. R. Grace Co.; William Hickey, president of United Corp.; U. W. Balgooyen, director of EBASCO Industries; Berent Friele, senior vice president, American International Association for Economic and Social Development; Juan Trippe, founder and president of Pan American Airways; and Henry Woodbridge of True Temper Corp., among others.

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carried out in Mexico City, which reportedly removed more than 20,000 people from the slums at a cost of $10 million. Meany rejected the idea that Victor Reuther, the UAW leader, was less sectarian, denying that he refused to deal with unions with communist links. It was alleged that Meany rejected unions supposedly involved with communism, confusing “democracy” with “anti-communism,” dividing the international union movement into “good” and “bad” organizations.¹⁸ He also sought to minimize Reuther’s departure from AIFLD’s leadership, also denying the charge that AFL-CIO leaders took a “good guys versus bad guys” approach to foreign unions.¹⁹ According to Meany, 90 percent of the funds allocated to the three AFL-CIOcontrolled institutes (AIFLD, the African American Labor Center and the Asia Labor Center) came from USAID. AIFLD expected to receive $5.8 million in 1970. The other institutes would receive much less: $1.5 million for the African American Labor Center and $800,000 for the Asian Labor Center. Asked about the activities of unions considered to be AFL-CIO subcontractors, Meany explained that, since 1968, AIFLD had been able to subcontract unions affiliated with the American union federation. USAID transferred the funds directly to subcontractors that carried out a number of activities in the fields of union organization, worker education and research in the field of work. The Senate also wanted to know about the operations of a private-sector entity led by Meany called the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance. It was a department created in 1961, following agreements between President Kennedy, Meany, and Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg. The idea was to create a space for communication between the leaders of the AFL-CIO, USAID employees, the State Department and the Department of Labor. According to Meany, the committee discussed methods, proposals, and the scope of international union programs, as well as the paths of foreign policy. Senator Fulbright once again turned to the mainstream press to address the relationship between the American union federation and the CIA, demanding explanations from Meany about the accusations published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch on April 13 and 14, 1969. According to the senator, the newspaper report stated that the US government was still financing international union entities to further the education of oil workers in Japan, finance the textile union in Peru and unionize workers in Congo, charges that Meany absolutely denied. Fulbright replied by stating that the funding came from USAID, transferred by the CIA. Meany reiterated his state Reuther’s accusation put the AFL-CIO’s Department of International Affairs at the heart of a fraught issue for the United States. See Morris, 1967, 5.  U.S. Senate Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. “Hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. Ninety First Congress, 28.

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ments, but pondered in the end, saying, “As far as we are concerned that is not true.”²⁰ The Senate brought up further charges published in the newspapers, including that AIFLD had backed the invasion of the Dominican Republic and Goulart’s removal from the presidency of Brazil, paving the way for a military dictatorship there. The senators had also learned that AIFLD insisted on applying its own strict rules for a worker housing program in Colombia, rejecting any workers who could be considered communists. US ambassadors to those countries had also complained that the American government had failed to control the activities of the three institutes run by the AFL-CIO, showing that there was disagreement between the US embassies and the American labor federation. Jay Lovestone, the head of the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department, was said to be the key link between AIFLD and the US government. He was accused of having veto power over the selection of labor attachés. The Senate laid bare what the mainstream American press had been investigating systematically in recent years, asking for explanations from the AFL-CIO’s top leadership about relations between the unions, the CIA, American embassies, and the US government. Senator Fulbright’s interest in CIA operations dated back to 1966, when he had asked the agency’s director, Richard Helms, to give public clarifications about its relationship with the unions. During the Johnson administration, the practice of financing had changed, more precisely as of March 29, 1967, when undeclared funding for private charities was banned. Fulbright called attention to how unions could be convenient for the government. He said he knew of a case in which a strike against an American company in Vietnam was settled in a few days’ time because of the excellent relationship between the Vietnamese union leaders and the Saigon government.²¹ In return, the union confederation allegedly received financial aid from the United States through the Asian American Labor Center, a body similar to AIFLD in Latin America. Brazil once again came into the spotlight during this investigation. The Senate wanted to determine the veracity of William Doherty, Jr.’s statements on an American radio program. According to him, AIFLD-trained union leaders trained had played an active role in Goulart’s overthrow. Fulbright asked Meany if Doherty was in effect “taking partial credit for the revolution in Brazil which instituted one of these military dictatorships which [Meany] deplored in [his] statement.” Meany gave a carefully worded response. According to him, Doherty

 US Senate Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate. “Hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations United States Senate, 23 – 24.  Ibid., 24.

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did not want to take credit or receive recognition. However, he continued, “When we graduate these people and send them back to their own country we have no guarantee that they will not take part in some sort of a movement to change the form of government.” Therefore, he concluded that some Brazilian leaders, reacting to “very heavy restrictions under the Goulart administration,” might have taken part in the coup, but Meany sought to exempt himself from any responsibility for the behavior and actions of his alumni. Unconvinced, the senator replied that Meany might not be aware of it, but he was sure that Doherty wanted to take credit for AIFLD’s “achievement.” Given the recent experience of New York governor Nelson Rockfeller in Latin America, who had seen clear expressions of anti-Americanism in the region, the Senate questioned whether the participation of AIFLD graduates in the political issues of their home countries should be the AFL-CIO’s responsibility. According to Fulbright, the reception given to Rockfeller (whom the senator considered to be one of the most highly respected governors in the United States) in Latin American countries indicated that “what we have being doing in Latin America is not the right thing.” Would it then be right to use public funds to expand the activities of entities like AIFLD? asked the senator. Once again, Meany argued that the AFL-CIO should not be held responsible for the actions of its students in their home countries, nor could they control them. However, the senator kept hammering the point, saying, “Well, I do not know, I think what a student does after he graduates often reflects, if the educational institution is effective at all, what he has been taught, either that or your educational institution is a total failure.”²² In 1969, Nelson Rockfeller, then Governor of New York State, was appointed to head the mission to Latin America with the aim of proposing new guidelines to the governments in that region. Months before he visited Brazil, the United States government had granted a $75-million loan to that country through USAID for the Alliance for Progress. However, in most of the Latin American countries he visited, Rockfeller met with protests in an unfriendly atmosphere. Despite his poor reception, the Brazilian government had censored negative reports about the visit.²³ The anti-American protests led Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick to ask US business leaders in Rio de Janeiro to play a constructive role in the development of Brazilian industry.²⁴  Ibid., 33.  Spektor, 2009, 358.  The Brazilian government wanted President Nixon to formulate an effective policy for Brazil in order to improve relations between the two countries, as well as between the US and Latin America. See Vizentini, 1998, 96.

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Reassessing AIFLD’s Effectiveness and Aims in Brazil Since 1967, despite the efforts reported by the US Embassy, AIFLD had found it difficult to operate in Brazil. Although it maintained cordial relations with the Brazilian union confederations, ORIT could not increase its budget to intensify its activities in the region, probably due to the Johnson administration’s restrictions on the funding of private volunteer organizations. Financial difficulties led to the closure of AIFLD’s Recife office in December 1973.²⁵ In addition to facing internal dissent and questions about its close relationship with US government agencies, the AFL-CIO was having a hard time sustaining its union philosophy, especially after congressional investigations and revelations in the mainstream press of a number of inconsistent and contradictory statements regarding its international policies. The narrative of solidarity among workers, widely exploited by the AFL-CIO, as well as the recommendation for unions to stay out of politics, did not convince the more attentive American and foreign workers. Amid a hail of accusations, Meany and Lovestone, who directed the AFL-CIO’s foreign affairs, faced the difficult task of trying to explain their policy of political activism at any price to the American and foreign working classes. In Brazil, just over a year after the regime issued the AI-5 decree, the ICT was changing. The CPI on that entity’s performance had clearly had an impact. The 16th class of 24 students representing 13 organizations from 8 Brazilian states held its graduation ceremony at the ICT’s new headquarters in April 1969. The program had undergone administrative and educational changes. After serious disagreements among members of the advisory board and the board of directors, which resulted in the directors’ resignations, the Institute was represented by Brazilian union leaders. Its staff were completely reorganized. From then on, the ICT presented itself as an entity that served Brazilian trade unionism, conceived and led by Brazilian leaders who had taken over the political, administrative and educational reins of the organization.²⁶ Olavo Previatti, president of the Federation of Paper and Cardboard Workers, and Hélcio Maghenzani, from the Telegraph Workers’ Union, were appointed to oversee the changes made in the ICT. Previatti became its CEO; Maghenzani took charge of the educational department, as well as having an administrative role. According to Previatti, the aim

 IADESIL Informativo, no. 58-59, Nov. Dec. 1973, 2. AEL/Unicamp, coleção CPDS, periódicos R/ 1378.  “Instituto Cultural do Trabalho: Report from the Board of Directors” (1969). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Accessed on June 30, 2021.

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was “to establish the basic and rational principles of management, thereby giving a better orientation to the educational program, which had been theoretical and, in many ways, obsolete and irrelevant to present-day trade unionism.” The changes included the introduction of different teaching materials, and “the school curriculum was modified by making subjects more practical and understandable to the students.” The ICT also started organizing regional seminars, previously managed by AIFLD. According to an interview given to Manfredi by an unnamed ICT leader, Brazilian union leaders thought “the formula for teaching ICT courses was wrong.” They wanted less theory and more practice. According to Manfredi, the statements she gathered showed “the convergence of internal networking with a view to redefining the educational project that had guided the Institute’s activities until that date.”²⁷ According to Manfredi, the pace of the ICT’s activities did not slacken during the period after 1967, and the annual average number of courses and participants remained the same, even showing a slight increase. Between 1963 and 1978, the ICT apparently managed to maintain a steady rate of growth. The explanation for this was said to be that, now that it was run exclusively by Brazilian union leaders, the entity had become “an educational space of its own, functional for this group of leaders who were part of the union pyramid.” Furthermore, the ICT’s survival was mainly due to its directors’ stance toward the military dictatorship. Although it was critical of the government’s labor policy, the organization was not directly opposed to the regime.²⁸ The courses had also changed; the legal-administrative approach, which once focused heavily on free collective bargaining, was reduced. According to an unidentified ICT official, the curriculum was restructured, with an emphasis on subjects that the Brazilian leaders deemed more appropriate.²⁹ As part of the reformulation project, and with a smaller budget, the ICT changed the location of its headquarters. Previously, it had been housed in an old building in the center of São Paulo City that was considered very imposing, with an “aristocratic air.” The new directors argued that the institute’s former headquarters had a negative impact on students, especially those from the poorest parts of the country. Anxious to convince the Americans of the new management’s achievements, Previatti stressed the ICT’s excellent performance in the field of public relations. According to him, the institute was attracting the attention of the authorities in general, as well as some of the more “enlightened” em-

 Manfredi, 1986, 198.  Ibid., 215.  Statement from the CEO of the ICT, in an interview with Silvia Manfredi in 1982. Ibid., 209.

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ployers, who agreed to authorize their employees to take part in the courses with paid leave. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s, efforts to “Brazilianize” the ICT still led to disagreements between AIFLD members and the local directors. As the foreigners were still financing the institute, they demanded detailed information on administrative matters. For example, the Americans strongly questioned a failure to provide information about the background of a newly hired employee.³⁰ Despite the fact that the ICT was being run by Brazilians, it still had a strong relationship with the AFL-CIO and continued to receive funds from the union federation and USAID. Previatti also maintained good relations with American union leaders. In mid-1968, he traveled to the United States to meet with IFPCW members and AFL-CIO President George Meany. According to AIFLD director Andrew McLellan, his visit was “fruitful.” On that occasion, Meany showed “keen interest” in Brazilian trade unionism and its development. Therefore, he invited Previatti to take part in a meeting of the AFL-CIO Executive Council, which was to be held in New York City. The Brazilian union leader claimed to feel isolated from the other members of the CNTI board.³¹ In the late 1960s, the AFL-CIO’s foreign policy advisors had to determine the extent to which the union federation would be willing to continue investing in Brazilian unionism. After visiting Brazil, AIFLD Regional Director Jessy Friedman said he did not understand what had led the CNTI to break with ORIT and other foreign organizations, although he noted that the leaders’ personal interests had become very clear. However, Friedman pointed to a difference in the relationship between AIFLD and local and regional leaders, saying that it was possible to keep the work going with those leaders at the helm. Furthermore, in Friedman’s view, the military would not stay in power forever, nor would the union leaders who supported the regime. Therefore, he felt that the AFL-CIO should not be too hasty about withdrawing from the country while it was still able to operate in Brazil. Thus, he advised that the union federation maintain all possible channels of communication and keep going.³²  Letter from Andrew McLellan, AIFLD Inter-American Representative, to Hélcio Maguenzani, secretary general of the ICT, dated May 14, 1970. George Meany Memorial Archives, International Affairs Department, Country Files (1945 – 1971), folder 16/09.  Letter to Thomas M. Altaffer, manager of the Altaffer Planificação e Consultoria consulting firm, from Andrew C. McLellan, Inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO, July 16, 1968. George Meany Memorial Archives, International Affairs Department, country Files (1945 – 1971), pasta 16/09. Digital version available at: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:1150140/, accessed on June 30, 2021.  Letter from Jessy Friedman, AIFLD Regional Director, to Andrew c. McLellan, inter-American representative of the AFL-CIO, August 20, 1970. George Meany Memorial Archives, International Affairs Department, country Files (1945 – 1971), folder 16/09.

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As we can see, in the late 1960s the “democratic” and “authentic” members of the “first generation” responsible for introducing “free unionism” and helping overthrow Goulart, came to be seen as an obstacle to the development of AIFLD’s programs. The notes made by the US Embassy in Brazil provide a significant example of how these alliances between Brazilian and American trade unionists were mutable, generally tending to side with the government. During the AFLCIO convention held in New Jersey in October 1969, the labor attaché said he had held private conversations with Brazilian union leaders in which their main complaint was the regime’s labor policy. However, they continued to support and justify the coup, which was seen as the only means of stopping the advance of communism. In 1970s, the union movement faced a dire situation. There was no sign that the military regime would loosen its grip over workers in the near future. According to the US Embassy, the influence of international trade unionism in Brazil had waned to the point of nearly disappearing. Nevertheless, the American observers believed the AIFLD program could still be expanded, as that entity was one of the only ones of its kind operating in the country, and little was being done with regard to the workers’ interests.³³ It is likely that the acts against the dictatorship that were characterized as “terrorist,” in the language of the regime, helped bolster the leaders’ belief that the military needed to remain in power. The kidnapping of the American ambassador and the establishment of a military junta to replace Costa e Silva due to his poor health had contributed to the atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty. In a conversation with the leaders of entities representing workers in the chemical, glass, printing, bank, journalism, food and rubber sectors, the labor attaché wanted to know about their response to recent events. Without giving any names, the observations of four representatives of local unions and another four from federations were noted. Many of them argued that union members were disturbed by the country’s political situation and felt that the situation was getting worse. Others said that Costa e Silva’s departure had marked the beginning of a period of instability among the military, caused by internal disputes and a power struggle. One leader also opined that political events had a negligible impact on workers, as it made very little difference to them who Costa e

 Annual report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 16, 1970. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.

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Silva’s successor might be.³⁴ It was not by chance that the Embassy’s prognosis for the 1970s was uncertainty in the fields of politics and labor. However, despite the negative prospects for the union movement, the dictatorship’s firm stance on anti-labor economic measures was starting to get results. The unemployment rate in São Paulo had fallen slightly compared to the previous three years, the labor market had improved, and the metalworking, construction, paper and textile sectors were showing clear signs of recovery.³⁵ Although they were aware that the Brazilian labor regulation system would not change, at least while the military regime was in power, the AFL-CIO and other American entities were looking for ways to continue working in that country. In addition to activities in the field of union education, American labor leaders and experts continued to produce analyses of Brazil’s political and economic situation, documents that were useful to the interests of American businessmen. The 1967 report by Berent Friele, senior vice president of American International Association for Economic and Social Development and AIFLD vice chairman of the board, is highly representative in this regard: Costa e Silva is off to a good start. He has surrounded himself with men of talent, integrity and experience in the economic field…. It is therefore obvious that Costa e Silva is anxious to enlist the support and cooperation of private enterprise in carrying out his gigantic task of economic development. Foreign capital and know-how is welcome on terms which are more attractive than in most countries. However, it is important for foreign investors to realize that quick profits cannot be expected….³⁶

In addition to political and economic analyses, interrupting the union program in Brazil would prevent the AFL-CIO from closely monitoring the actions of union leaders, developing contacts and forming alliances. To keep working in that country, AIFLD directors in Brazil were asked four key questions. They were: (1) are there valid objectives for the development of the program?; (2) is reasonable progress being made towards those objectives?; (3) can the program  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, October 13, 1969. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.  The construction industry was one of the sectors that benefited most from the military dictatorship, as a result of strong investment in the urban industrial area. In 1968 alone, the supply of labor in that sector grew by 20 percent. Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 18, 1969. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 178.  Report “Brazil: Recent Past, Present and Future.” George Meany Archives, International Affairs Department, country Files, 1945 – 1971, folder 016/11. Digital version: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:1145567/, accessed on June 30, 2021.

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be significantly strengthened ?; and, finally, (4) is the coordination of the program efficient? First, they had to assess the possibility of continuing the union program in Brazil at a time when the authoritarian regime’s repressive measures were having international repercussions. Furthermore, the absence of legal democratic conditions prevented the program from moving forward. According to AIFLD, every step the entity took could be interpreted as a threat to the government’s political and economic objectives. Nevertheless, since 1965, the military regimes had rejected the implementation of collective bargaining along the lines of the American regulatory system, a key issue for justifying that entity’s presence in Brazil. In a time of “blatant dictatorship,”³⁷ it no longer made sense to talk about free and independent negotiations in the union movement. Nevertheless, it was believed that as long as the unions were unable to elect their own leaders and conduct their internal affairs without government supervision and approval, the implementation of “free unionism” would be hindered. According to the American analysis, the main problem lay in the barriers erected by Brazilian labor laws, more precisely in the State’s corporatist system, which allowed the government to set workers’ wages.³⁸ According to data gathered by the Americans, just one-third of the Brazil’s population of 90 million was in the workforce, and almost half of that number worked as farm laborers for extremely low wages. In 1969, the 15 political prisoners released in exchange for the American ambassador and sent abroad began accusing the military regime of torture. From then on, there were ever-stronger rumors that the Brazilian government had made torturing its opponents a frequent practice. While the Washington Post and The New York Times reported on the atrocities committed by the military, the government-controlled Brazilian press was silent.³⁹ As a strong ally of the Médici regime, the Richard Nixon administration sought to cover up allegations of human rights violations. However, the AFL-CIO found itself in an awkward position. It feared criticism of its apathetic stance towards allegations of torture of political prisoners in Brazil. At the time, the image of the US’s largest union federation had been tarnished by the scandal of involvement with the CIA, in addition to accusations of racism, ties with the State and support for the much-criti-

 Here I am referring to the term that inspired the title of Hélio Gaspari’s book, A ditadura escancarada. See Bibliography, Gaspari, 2002.  American Technical Assistance Corporation. “An Appraisal of Program Effectiveness and Management of AIFLD – Based on Information Obtained in Brazil, Guyana, Honduras and Washington DC.” Washington, DC., April 1970. The following paragraphs are also based on this source.  Green, 2009, 213.

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cized Vietnam War.⁴⁰ Regarding the allegations of human rights violations of political prisoners in Brazil, AFL-CIO officials said, “We have to maintain a balanced view on the situation, but we cannot ignore the factual reports which we have been privileged to read.”⁴¹ In light of this situation, and considering all the political and economic difficulties caused by the Brazilian and American governments and the AFL-CIO itself, AIFLD needed to propose new objectives to justify its continued presence in Brazil. It was time to assess the feasibility of keeping the entity in that country, as well as its costs. Thus, rather than closing its doors altogether, new goals were set for the entity. AIFLD would start preparing the Brazilian union movement for the future, when “democratic” and “free” activities would be permitted. Its objectives included supporting and bolstering the less-organized unions, mainly those in rural areas, through charitable activities, which the government considered legal. Its union leader training projects would continue. Once again, the program’s directors deemed that training to be key to containing the communist presence, fearing both a mass public upsiring against the military regime, and the “leftization” of union leaders. To embark on a new era and make “the needs of rural workers heard,” in 1970 AIFLD created the Camela project. Based in the northeastern state of Pernambuco, it was financed by the US government in cooperation with Brazilian government agencies, private groups, and individuals. The aim was to increase workers’ incomes, improve their living conditions and boost the community’s self-sufficiency. According to AIFLD data, the number of workers participating in its local and regional seminars was 6,349, with an emphasis on rural areas from 1962 to 1975, reaching 9,528 workers in 1971.⁴² In 1970, 46 percent of the Institute’s funds were spent on that region. In Spalding’s assessment, in the 1970s the organization was forced to reduce its presence and participation in the union movement due to growing nationalist opposition from the right and left, as in

 Regarding the AFLCIO’s role in the Vietnam War, see Wehrle, 2005. For an analysis of racism and civil rights in US unionism, see Lichtenstein, 2002.  Letter from Andrew McLellan, AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative, to Alan Silberman, an Embassy labor attaché, July 24, 1970. George Meany Archives, RG 18, series 4, box 16. Attached to the letter was a copy of the report “Hart Quiz to Bare Tortures in Brazil” in the Washington Post, September 28, 1970, by Jack Anderson. The article denounced the torture of military regime opponents and emphasized the US government’s financial support for Brazil, as well as military and police training received from the United States.  The annual cost of AIFLD in Brazil in 1970 was budgeted at $600,000, representing 5 percent of the total technical assistance provided by USAID to programs in that country, an amount that analysts considered a reasonable investment.

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most Latin American countries. Consequently, he turned his attention to the Caribbean and Central America, as well as to rural workers and working women.⁴³ Some AIFLD members criticized the increased focus on the Northeast and advocated redirecting funds to rural workers in southern Brazil. However, the analysts found that the Institute had a smaller impact on large urban centers where the union movement could be considered more important when the “time came” for the workers’ long-awaited and feared retaliation against the military regime. To prove that AIFLD had little influence on urban workers, US labor attachés were tasked with preparing a list of the strongest and most important unions in Brazil. Following these parameters, 23 entities were surveyed, and their names were checked against the attendance records for ICT courses held in São Paulo, in addition to the list of officers sent to Front Royal and the unions that took part in minor projects. The results showed that only 8 of the 23 entities had taken part in AIFLD programs. Most of those which were not on the list were located in the industrialized metropolitan areas of São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro. It was believed that the American entity had less influence on the large unions because they were capable of managing their own vast resources and activities in the field of union education, and did not require the American union entity’s support. Furthermore, it was believed that many of those large Brazilian unions included workers who were more closely linked to left-wing movements, consequently alienating or pushing out the non-communist leaders who worked in partnership with American unionism. For example, in the port city of Santos, São Paulo, which was marked by strikes and a powerful organized labor movement, local union leaders had refused to participate in ICT programs and had not helped set up courses in that area. According to the analysts, they rejected the Institute for two reasons: (1) fear that the courses, which were deemed to be right-leaning, could alienate their leftist members; (2) fear that the training of new leaders would challenge the union’s established leadership. Even so, the ICT courses received positive evaluations and their results were considered promising. In 1969 alone, the São Paulo-based entity trained 3,700 managers deemed to have leadership potential, on a budget of $134,000. When comparing the number of workers graduated with the total number of unions across the country – then estimated to be 2,053 entities – the analysts considered the ICT program to be a large-scale undertaking. That same year, 129 Brazilians were sent to the US to take the intensive union training program at Front Royal, in addition to nine labor economics courses offered by American univer-

 Spalding Jr., 1984, 57.

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sities affiliated with AIFLD. Of the 129 Brazilians who graduated in the United States, 104 were monitored to assess the program’s effectiveness. Of these, 94 were active in the union movement and 8 were either working in union offices or as ICT instructors and coordinators. Furthermore, the study pointed out evidence that students who graduated from the AFL-CIO’s international course were rising to positions considered to be “highly responsible” and many showed leadership potential, a factor considered to be of great importance.⁴⁴ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, AIFLD sent an average of 12 Brazilian union members to study at Front Royal each year.⁴⁵ The change in the selection of managers to take courses in the US was pointed out as a strategy to try to increase the ICT’s influence on the large unions. Instead of leaders from the weaker unions, the selection process should favor managers considered to be good students who belonged to the most influential entities in the urban union movement, mainly from the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo axis. To achieve this, investing in English-language courses was considered essential to strengthen communication between Brazilian and foreign leaders. In addition to offering courses, AIFLD ran other projects aimed at strengthening union organizations. By April 1970, 145 small projects were underway, costing a total of $312,000 in low-interest loans and $50,000 in grants. In practice, these funds were used to build headquarters and provide social services. An example of these investments was Vila Gompers, a low-income housing estate in the industrial town of São Bernardo do Campos. That project was the result of cooperation between Brazilian unions and the American federation. Originally planned in 1964, it officially opened in early 1970.⁴⁶ According to analysts in Washington, DC, this project was difficult to assess. It was small, but considered costly (approximately $7,000 per 52 square meters), with poor-quality facilities built with the aim of attracting urban workers involved in the union movement. Another negative factor was the amount of the loan to be repaid by workers, which was considered very large, and more than the average monthly minimum  As an example, the president of the Confederation of Agricultural Workers and a leader graduated by AIFLD abroad were mentioned, who held the third most important position in the Brazilian Ministry of Labor; neither was identified by name.  In the early 1970s, over 219 Brazilian union members graduated from the Front Royal Institute. AIFLD report, August 1977, 8. George Meany Archives, International Affairs Department, Country Files 1969 – 1971, folder 5/11.  Labor Attaché Allan Siberlman carefully recorded the event and shared his impressions and photos with AFL-CIO members. See: Allan D. Siberman, “Pictures and Clippings from the Recent Ceremonies at the Vila Gompers Housing Project” (1970). Opening the Archives: Documenting USBrazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. . Accessed on June 30, 2021.

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wage, so only highly paid workers could occupy the houses. Furthermore, the disagreements between USAID and the Brazilian authorities were public knowledge, as we have seen in Sandra Cavalcanti’s statements.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the project was considered a success. Other USAID programs directed towards the unions were also considered highly important. They included the “Ministry to Ministry” program, aimed at making improvements in the Labor Ministry through the production of statistics, and providing courses for the development of specialized labor, evaluations of wage levels and social security. The Brazilian government supported the program by donating office facilities and staff to work with American technicians. There were also the “Industrial Security” exchange program, which since 1966 had been sending staff members from the US Bureau of Labor Standards to work at the Ministry of Labor, and the “Union to Union” program, which was based on the exchange of leaders between Brazil and the United States. By 1970, it had financed trips for 400 workers.⁴⁸ Between 1970 and 1974, under the direction of Américo Ramos, AIFLD’s activities focused on union training courses and exchanges, carried out with less intensity, in partnership with the ICT. Few of its projects drew the attention of the US Embassy and the São Paulo DEOPS during that period. The infrequent observations from the political police included a change in the makeup of the ICT’s members.⁴⁹ On September 21, 1971, that entity introduced its board of directors.⁵⁰ In 1972, the ICT planned to hold 121 regional and four local courses.⁵¹ ORIT was also changing. In January 1974, the year George Meany celebrated his 80th birthday, ORIT held its Eighth Continental Congress in Cuernavaca, Mexico. The aim of that conference was to help the entity recover from a serious and prolonged crisis. The attendees elected new members who were committed to re-

 See statements by Sandra Cavalcanti regarding the process of granting the American loan. Chapter III.  For an analysis of the “Union to Union” program, see chapter IV.  The new board included Antonio Pereira Magaldi, chairman; Orlando Coutinho, first vice chairman; José Cabral, second vice chairman; Hélcio Maghenzani, secretary general; Leopoldo Brissac, secretary.  They included Afonso Teixeira Filho, Alceu Cabral Medeiros, Américo Ramos, Angelo Verdu, Antonio Alves de Almeida, Antonio Pereira Magaldi, camilo Ashcar, Diva Benevides Pinho, Francisco Nunes, George Meany, Hélcio Maghenzani, Jesse Friedman, João Wagner, José Alceu Portocarraro, José Cabral, José Francisco da Silva, Joseph Beirne, Joviano Araujo, Leopoldo Brissac, Luiz Menossi, Marigildo de Camargo Braga, Mario Lopes de Oliveira, Mario Toledo de Morais, Olavo Previatti, Paulo José da Silva, Rômulo Teixeira Marinho, Ruy Brito de Oliveira Pedroza, Waldino Pedro dos Santos and William C. Doherty Junior. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-02– 620.  IADESIL Informativo, n. 3839, Jan.Feb., 2. AEL, coleção CPDS, periódicos, R/1378.

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vitalizing the organization.⁵² However, some believed that the entity would have a hard time continuing its activities. According to Ben Martin, a member of the State Department’s intelligence team, the organization had been overshadowed by AIFLD, which received most of the USAID budget for union programs. That year alone, the Institute received $5 million, while ORIT got just $200,000. However, the reasons that led the international development agency to invest more in AIFLD have not been revealed.⁵³

Conflicts and Alliances in the São Paulo Union Movement When assessing the attitudes of leaders considered non-communist towards the American presence in the union environment, the embassy identified two groups. One group supported and recognized the United States’ contributions to the union movement, and the other criticized the presence of foreign organizations in Brazil. The latter view was more commonly found among workers and leaders in São Paulo City. Two milestones in 1969 were considered significant for assessing union members’ attitudes towards the United States. On August 29, the ICT graduated its nineteenth class, with support from USAID and AIFLD, through the Alliance for Progress. A small group of Brazilian unionists, particularly those from the Transport, Retail and Telegraph Workers’ federations who attended the graduation ceremony openly recognized and praised the American entities’ support.⁵⁴ However, as we have seen, since the second half of the 1960s, local leaders’ opinions were divided regarding the role of the United States in the Brazilian union movement. The speech given by Joaquim “Joaquinzão” dos Santos Andrade gives an idea the extent to which they rejected American unionism. During the inauguration of the re-elected president of the São Paulo Metalworkers’ Union, with several São Paulo leaders in attendance, anti-Americanism was the keynote of Joaquinzão’s speech. He denounced “American imperialism” and accused the US of interfering in Brazil’s economic development.⁵⁵

 Statements and Reports adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council. Bal Harbour, Florida, February 18 – 25, 1974. Hoover Institution, Jay Lovestone Papers, 1904– 1989, box 20, folder 8.  Interview with Ben Martin given to Robert Alexander on June 30, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander collection, interviews series, box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 4.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, October 20, 1969. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.  Amanhã, May 4– 10, 1967, n. 6, 16. CEDEM/UNESP, folder P6/086.

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Joaquinzão had close ties with employers and the Ministry of Labor, as well the chameleon-like ability to change his mind according to the country’s political course, characteristics that earned him the sobriquet of “the biggest pelego in Brazil” in the 1980s. However, it cannot be said that his anti-American sentiment was a ruse. Clearly, union leaders in post-1964 Brazil were not necessarily proAmerican, which may have been the case with Joaquinzão. However, it is also possible that he was just trying to win over his colleagues and that, as a true pelego, he never missed an opportunity to tell his supporters what they wanted to hear. In this sense, shortly before AI-5 was decreed, an alternative newspaper published by USP students had revealed the tactics of this famous pelego, considered one of the breakthrough figures in the coup, as he did not belong to the “old guard” of communists and nationalists from the pre-1964 period. Joaquinzão was well educated and known for his people skills and speaking ability. He frequently appeared in the newspapers, sometimes to criticize the government, at others to say that he was committed to forming a strong union movement. However, the fact is that, at no point during the military regime did Joaquinzão form closer ties with the American trade unionists, and he never held any post in the ICT or AIFLD.⁵⁶ Argeu Egídio dos Santos, then secretary general of CNTI, was a different matter.⁵⁷ In an interview with Robert Alexander in 1968, he revealed that he was very impressed with American unionism. He had come to that conclusion when he attended a meeting at Rutgers University and met that country’s union leaders. When comparing Brazilian and American trade unions, Santos noted that the latter did not have to deal with the difficulties that their Latin American counterparts faced, such as lack of development, inflation and problems with the government.⁵⁸ Soon, Santos was invited to join the ICT’s board and became a new ally of American trade unionism, although William Doherty Jr. suspected that he was acting under communist influence.⁵⁹ Due to the anti-American demonstrations in Brazil, the American Embassy feared that more and more workers would begin to identify the United States

 The São Paulo Metalworkers’ Union was affiliated with the FITIM, the only international entity with which Joaquim dos Santos Andrade claimed to have closer ties.  Argeu Egydio dos Santos was also an opponent of Olavo Previatti, president of that entity and vice president of the FITIM.  Interview with Argeu Egydio dos Santos conducted by Alexander, dated May 11, 1968. AEL, Robert J. Alexander collection, interviews series (1947– 1994), box 5, folder 60, microfilm roll 4.  Minutes of the meeting of AFL-CIO members, including Jay Lovestone, Andrew McLellan, Angel Vergu, Willian Doherty and Michael Boggs, on October 7, 1970. George Meany Memorial Archives, International Affairs Department, country files (1945 – 1971), folder 9/16.

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with the military regime and the repression to which they were subjected. Furthermore, the leaders of the labor confederations had become a direct target of their bases’ dissatisfaction. When Médici became president of Brazil, Embassy analysts had the impression that he would be less repressive regarding workers’ interests. However, at the very first meeting between Labor Minister Júlio Barata and union entities in São Paulo, hopes of better times quickly waned. The labor leaders had expected the new minister to signal the beginning of dialogue with them, but that was not the case. Barata used the meeting to present his views and make recommendations to the leaders. Many union members were said to be disappointed with the lack of dialogue. It was a sign that the government’s strict control over the wage policy would continue. For the foreign entities, Barata’s statements were also worrying. He warned the union leaders that “he would not tolerate the infiltration of foreign ideologies in the unions.” Although he was mainly referring to communist ideas, the Americans also got the message. In a meeting at the São Paulo Regional Labor Office (Delegacia Regional do Trabalho; DRT), union leaders delivered a memorandum to the new Minister of Labor with a list of demands. Barata observed that the government had no intention of reviewing its wage policy, but said that it did plan indirectly to increase workers’ purchasing power through scholarships, increased health care, and loan funds for the purchase of low-income housing.⁶⁰ The murder of São Paulo Bank Workers’ Union president Salvador Tolezano on January 28, 1970, increase the tensions in the union world. The unconvincing version of events reported by the police was that Tolezano had been killed in his car after being robbed in the town of Sorocaba, São Paulo. However, none of his belongings had been taken. His death was made even more suspicious by rumors that he was linked to the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). According to the US Embassy, this incident caused tremendous tension among union leaders.⁶¹ They declared in the mainstream media that Tolezano’s murder was due to political-union reasons, accusing left-wing “radicals” of bringing it about. Shortly before his death, Tolezano had met with other leaders, including those of the São Paulo printers and textile workers. The aim was to draft a statement of facts to be sent to the government. Tolezano’s peers did not consider him to be a radical. They said he “was not very political or did not really think about

 “Labor Minister Meets São Paulo Labor Leaders” (1970). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:376386/ Accessed on June 30, 2021.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, February 6, 1970. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.

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politics, just about the union’s interests.”⁶² Based on the leaders’ statements, it is impossible to tell whether they were blaming leftist militants because they were afraid of police repression, or if they really feared being attacked by the underground organizations that were combating the military regime. Producing a document like the one Tolezano had been drafting was not an unusual practice for union leaders. Since 1964, one of the ways they had found to seek dialogue with government labor officials was to send statements of facts as a way of publicly showcasing workers’ demands. On May 1, 1970, President Médici received a number of such documents from several parts of the country. According to an article published in O Estado de S. Paulo, the national confederations were out of touch with the workers’ movement and had not been officially consulted when drafting of statements of facts. This was particularly true with the CNTI, which declared that it was opposed to sending such documents.⁶³ During that period, local union leaders who were under pressure from workers’ protests criticized the Labor Ministry’s actions and the fact that the government had granted few social benefits, such as health care and the right to a pension and job stability. They also complained that the Labor Courts were overburdened. Between 1971 and 1973, the union movement sought to push back against the authoritarianism and lack of dialogue that characterized Minister Júlio Barata’s mandate. The workers’ key demands included increasing the minimum wage. In April 1972, bank workers in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo attempted to organize a nationwide campaign. They asked for 34-percent increase, but acknowledged that the government would probably grant 20 percent.⁶⁴ According to the US labor attaché, the president of the National Confederation of Credit Company Workers (CONTEC), Rui Brito, was one of the most important leaders upholding workers’ interests. Brito was a typical “democratic” unionist from the first generation of ICT students. He had worked in the student movement in the late 1950s. After the coup, he was appointed president of CONTEC, with the mission of removing the communist leaders from that entity. The Embassy feared that his activism would lead to his removal from the union movement. There were rumors that if he continued leading the campaign to raise the minimum wage, the government would bar him from completing his term in office.⁶⁵ Those ru-

 O Estado de S.Paulo, January 29, 1970, 23.  Ibid., February 24, 1970, 6.  Until the early 1970s, minimum wage increases were highly unfavorable for workers. F. L. Almeida, 1982, 27.  Telegram from the American Consulate in São Paulo to the State Department, April 18, 1972. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.

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mors proved to be true, and it was not long before the Ministry of Labor discreetly intervened in the Bank Workers’ Confederation in October 1972, removing Brito and preventing him from standing in the upcoming union elections. This strengthened the American Embassy’s impression that the government exerted complete control over the union movement. Indeed, the persecution of a leader who had been one of Castello Branco’s most trusted men was a clear sign that the repression of the union movement was increasing. All indications are that Barata easily justified Brito’s ouster. Although he acknowledged that the union leader was neither a communist nor corrupt, he felt that Brito’s ideas about wage and union policy did not coincide with the government’s aims. Brito was considered too aggressive and uncooperative. Brito was also accused of wanting to create a labor federation along the lines of the AFL-CIO. However, according to the US Embassy, the military regime associated that idea with the “communism of the chaotic Goulart era.” Sometimes called pro-American, and sometimes communist, Rui Brito – who had been previously derided as a pelego by the left – said it was an ironic experience. After he was deposed, leftist militants began praising him. According to Robert Alexander, the CNTC was one of the few (non-communist) labor organizations that opposed the Médici administration.⁶⁶ In this sense, we can see that alliances and opinions about the military regime changed according to how much control it exerted over the unions and the severity of the repression, putting many nationalists with Catholic roots on the side of the communists. The US Embassy also gave a critical account of Minister Júlio Barata’s participation in the Inter-American Labor Ministerial Conference, held in Buenos Aires in November 1972. Barata was said to have presented a “glowing report” on the supposed progress that Brazilian workers were making on his watch as a result of the “economic miracle.”⁶⁷ The minister also announced that the construction of the Trans-Amazonian highway would “be of great benefit to Brazilian workers.”⁶⁸ However, the workers themselves were showing signs that they could not bear the wait for

 Interview with Ruy Brito de Oliveira Pedrosa given to Robert Alexander on June 2, 1972. See Alexander, 2003, 159.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 9, 1973. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.  The Trans-Amazonian highway is considered one of the “pharaonic works” of the Médici administration, one of the symbols of modernization produced by the Brazilian “economic miracle” during the dictatorship. Four thousand kilometers long, the Trans-Amazonian highway runs across the country from east to west. As well as decimating indigenous communities, the impact of the project on the deforestation of the Amazon region was incalculable.

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the “cake to rise.” In the second half of 1972, a series of stoppages reportedly occurred in São Paulo. The strikes were declared legal by the Labor Court, which, in turn, understood that the employers had not fulfilled their labor obligations.⁶⁹ In fact, despite strict controls and all the difficulties imposed by the strike law after AI-5 was decreed, the Labor Court considered strikes due to failure to pay wage arrears and other complaints to be legal, as those rights were set forth in the CLT. In 1972, AIFLD and ICT carried on with their activities. Forty-three leaders were sent to Front Royal for further training on collective bargaining, and the ICT offered four courses in São Paulo, bringing together 101 union leaders from throughout the country. A total of 4,923 union leaders attended 168 local seminars. In the Northeast, 2,570 farmers took part in 82 courses for rural workers. In addition to the students sent to Front Royal, another 15 union leaders traveled to the United States with USAID funding, as part of the union exchange program. However, relations between the AFL-CIO and the Médici government remained cool. According to the Embassy, some Brazilian officials were uncomfortable with the American labor entity’s international policy, more specifically, with George Meany’s activities. Barata even declared that Meany did not understand the Brazilian union movement. Some of the criticism of the American labor central had to do with the statements that many American leaders were making at that time about the fear of losing jobs to products manufactured abroad. The Brazilian exports that most concerned the Americans were shoes, textiles and instant coffee. The leaders of the United Auto Workers union also feared that Ford’s Brazilian plant would export car engines to the United States.⁷⁰ In the view of the American observers, which the Embassy and AIFLD shared, union policy was not a priority for the military regime in the early 1970s. Furthermore, although the foreigners were aware of the repression the workers were suffering, they believed that the working class and its union leaders were generally docile, apolitical, and passively accepting of government decisions. In this regard, the American labor attaché’s comments are highly representative: Some labor leaders appear anxious to please the government, but the actions of these “pelegos” are eyed suspiciously by the rank and file. Government programs developed for the workers are long on promise, short on performance. Businessmen, both foreign and national, are content with the strong role which the government plays in worker affairs. (…) The labor force are generally docile, non-militant and allow the government to make all major decisions for them. Except a few leaders who balance on the thin line dividing such legit-

 Ibid.  Ibid.

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imate activity as is permitted in Brazil and a more militant labor role common to other Latin America countries, there are not many labor leaders with the desire or drive to change the current state of affairs.⁷¹

It was true that there were exceptions – as the labor attaché acknowledged – such as bank clerks and metalworkers, but the difficulty in acting within the laws governing the union structure while representing the workers’ interests was a factor that virtually paralyzed those leaders. As the attaché noted, most of them had no interest in changing the country’s political situation. Chief among them was Ary Campista, secretary-general of the CNTI and minister of the Superior Labor Court, known for manipulating the union structure and forging alliances with union leaders and political authorities to hold the most coveted positions.⁷² This “docility” was due to the hardening of the regime, which imposed new restrictions on workers’ resistance. The early 1970s were considered the harshest years.⁷³ This situation was marked by the persecution, arrest, torture, disappearance, and murder of opponents of the regime, including workers. One of them, as we know, was Olavo Hansen, a São Paulo metalworker and member of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (POR) who died of kidney failure caused by ingesting a highly toxic substance after being subjected to sessions of torture in May 1970. Hansen had taken part in the May Day protests at Maria Zélia Stadium in 1970, where he distributed manifestos from the Fourth International. He was among the 18 people arrested at that event, most of whom were linked to the POR, and taken to Operation Bandeirante, an intelligence and investigation center set up by the Army. São Paulo union leaders denounced the arrests to President Médici. Hansen’s death caused outrage among workers and sparked a number of protests organized by the bank workers’, metalworkers’ and chemical industry workers’ unions.⁷⁴ We can see that industrial growth, which increased employment in the most technologically advanced sectors and large factories, created the conditions for the new forms of resistance that arose in the 1970s. Grassroots movements

 According to the labor attaché John Ohmans, “pelegos” were labor leaders who were primarily responsive to the government’s wishes rather than prioritizing the desires of the labor membership itself. Report from labor attaché, John Ohmans, January 17, 1972. George Meany Archives, RG 18 – 010 International Affairs Department, Country Files 1969 – 1971, file 5/11, Brazil, 1972.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, January 17, 1972. NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB, box 1781.  F. L. Almeida, 1982, 25.  Pereira Neto, 2009.

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began emerging in 1973, especially in the auto industry in the Greater ABC region. Despite the harsh repression, some strikes were carried out without union involvement, such as those at the Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen and Chrysler factories in São Bernardo do Campo.⁷⁵ In the previous year, “spontaneous” strikes calling for wage increases higher than those determined by the regime’s wage policy were also reported. These forms of industrial action were relatively successful for shipbuilding workers, bank clerks, General Motors auto workers and bus drivers in São Paulo. In addition to better working conditions, the strikers demanded that a wage increase be granted outside the official period for collective bargaining. Law no. 6,147 of November 29, 1974 extended the practice of pay advances to all professions.⁷⁶ They also asked for paid overtime, pressuring the bosses by reducing the pace of work, the so-called “go-slow operation,” similar to what happened at Aço Villares, in São Caetano, Greater São Paulo. As a way of demanding a 10-percent wage increase, the workers would down tools for 20 or 30 minutes. Similar actions were taken at other auto factories in São Bernardo do Campo.⁷⁷ However, the number of strikes fell dramatically compared to the early years of the dictatorship during the Castello Branco administration. In 1965, 302 stoppages were tallied; in 1970, there were just 12. In the years that followed, there were none.⁷⁸ Regarding labor conflicts in the early 1970s, the US labor attaché noted in his report to the State Department: “Strikes are a rarity on the Brazilian industrial or rural landscape,” adding, “The state of São Paulo, the most highly developed complex in Latin America, experienced no strikes during 1971.”⁷⁹ According to Kenneth Erickson, in addition to the AIFLD courses, the Médici administration invested in training union leaders, as the preceding military governments had done. Between 1972 and 1974, about 2,600 union employees took part in the program offered by the State, forming a cadre of anti-radical organizers who took over several unions. The few radicals who escaped the police, the military and the Ministry of Labor, were left with virtually no peaceful means of expressing opposition to the dictatorship.⁸⁰

 Regarding the history of the São Paulo metalworkers’ union’s opposition to the regime, see Batistoni, 2010.  F. L. Almeida, 1982, 32.  O Estado de S.Paulo, November 15, 1973, 24.  Alexander, 2003, 157.  Report from the United States Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, January 16, 1973, entitled “São Paulo Metalworkers Open New Year with a Strike.” NARA II, General Records of the Department of State (GRDS), RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF), LAB 6 – 1 BRAZ, box 1781.  Erickson, 1979, 220.

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In addition to the repressive atmosphere affecting the workers, the constant threats of intervention and the unions’ bureaucratic requirements put the few leaders who were more sensitive to the workers’ problems and still managed to cling onto their posts in a situation that was not very different from that of the pelegos. This was the assessment of a study of unions in the Greater São Paulo industrial region that Erickson quoted without giving a reference. It is a well-known fact that periodic arrests and interrogations, as well as veiled threats of torture, intimidated many union leaders. The repression of workers, especially those who actively participated in strikes inside and outside the factories or in any type of labor action, took many forms. Simply being booked by the police could cost them their jobs and put their names on the famous “black lists” that circulated among companies and in the DEOPS, making any kind of opposition to the dictatorship and the exploitation of labor a meticulously calculated act.⁸¹ During the Medici era, relations between the government and the working class deteriorated sharply, exacerbating the unions’ discontent with labor policy. During that period, several leaders who had helped establish the regime in the 1960s were removed from the union movement. According to Robert J. Alexander, the only labor leader who expressed a favorable opinion of the Médici administration was Ary Campista, who by then had headed the CNTI for over a decade. Campista declared that, although the workers’ situation had not yet improved, they had reason for hope, as the Brazilian economy was growing rapidly, precisely due to the political stability provided by the regime.⁸² However, even the union leaders who were most sympathetic towards the military regime considered Labor Minister Júlio Barata to be extremely hostile to the unions, surrounded by technocrats and out of touch with the union movement. During his mandate, the department was very bad for workers.⁸³ Barata also looked unfavorably on all foreign entities in Brazil, including AIFLD, and repeatedly threatened to shut the Institute down. Despite this, Silvia Manfredi observes that the ICT had played an important role during the period when repression of the union movement intensified (1968 – 1974), providing a “space for the activities of teachers and students who did not always share the same perspective on unionism.” According to Manfredi, this was due to the lack of room for action within the unions, as well as the fact that the ICT had taken a critical stance on the military regime’s wage policy. In a statement from the pres-

 Ibid., 220.  Alexander, 2003, 157.  Interview with Hélcio Maguenzani, diretor of the ICT, given to Robert Alexander on July 30, 1975. Alexander, 2003, 156.

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ident and CEO of the ICT, whose name was not given, which Manfredi obtained in 1982, this observation is clear: When the times were hardest, the ICT was probably the only light in the darkness; while nobody dared to do anything and we were teaching our classes, talking about union freedom and democracy…, afterwards, we were always opposed to the FGTS and the Strike Law. So it was clear that the ICT was not in line with the government’s philosophy of administrative unionism. So much so that, when Minister Júlio Barata was in office, the government tried to torpedo the ICT by creating [its own] courses for union leaders, held in Brasília and Rio.⁸⁴

Although this statement came from an ICT director who might have been biased in favor of that institution, it is possible that that entity did in fact become one of the few spaces still available to discuss trade unionism. In fact, as of the late 1960s, it was less and less visible in the news and public discourse. In the first half of the 1970s, union leaders still turned turning to AIFLD for financial support, as was the case with the São Paulo Chemical Workers’ Union. In December 1974, seeking money to build the entity’s the new headquarters and having failed to obtain any from the Ministry of Labor, the president of that organization during an ordinary meeting suggested resorting to AIFLD. He explained to members about the operations of that foreign entity and the help it had been giving to other unions, not only in the construction of headquarters buildings “but also for the purchase of dental equipment, doctor’s offices, as well as for education, offering courses at all levels for unionized workers.”⁸⁵ In 1973 and 1974, the much-vaunted “economic miracle” began showing signs of crisis, marking the beginning of a new transitional phase in the regime’s economic policy. However, the Médici administration did not go so far as to adopt openly recessive measures at the time, as the GDP was varied and productivity was rising. As for wage policy, Fernando Lopes Almeida notes that in 1974 the regime changed the application of wage increases adjusted for inflation. From that year forward, following the introduction of the Geisel administration’s new labor policy, there was a small increase in the minimum wage. However, it was still not enough to restore the workers’ buying power.⁸⁶

 Statement from the president and CEO of the ICT given to Silvia Manfredi in September 1982. Manfredi, 1986, 196.  Minutes of the general meeting of December 6, 1974. Centro de Documentação do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Químicos e Farmacêuticos de São Paulo, livro de atas de assembleias gerais, de agosto de 1970 a setembro de 1980, caixa 35.  F. L. Almeida, 1982, 27.

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Conflicts of Interest and “Close Friends” In the 1970s, AIFLD’s union education activities continued throughout Brazil. In July 1972, DEOPS, the São Paulo political police, reported that the ICT had held the 30th edition of the course, which brought together 28 union members from 14 states representing 14 professions.⁸⁷ The ICT itself informed the DEOPS about the completion of most of these courses, as we can see in police reports dating from 1972 to 1977. However, that same year, the American entity attracted the attention of the political police because of its relations with foreign businessmen. According to the report on their investigation, the DEOPS suspected that the entity was “a kind of spearhead looking for good deals for investments from the AFL-CIO and close friends.” Their suspicions were based primarily on the number of foreigners on the entity’s board, a fact that in itself the police found strange.⁸⁸ The investigating officer only named one of the “close friends,” Louis Berger, an executive said to have very close links with George Meany, with a businesses based in Orange, New Jersey. According to the report, Berger was responsible for representing projects of interest to the American organization in several countries. His company had reportedly been expelled from Mexico, accused of involvement in corruption during the construction of 3,100 housing units in Mexico City.⁸⁹ In São Paulo, Berger had come into contact with the Arena party deputy (congressman) and businessman Roberto Gebara, who had been São Paulo governor Adhemar de Barros’s Secretary of Labor prior to the coup and was considered to have extremely close ties with American trade unionism after 1964.⁹⁰ Gebara often appeared in the newspapers in the 1970s. Coincidentally or not, he was featured in the press precisely in the year the DEOPS cited his name as one of the intermediaries for American businessman. However, he appeared in the newspapers to defend the interests of the national business community. Contrary to what was said about him, in an article published in O Estado de S. Paulo on February 2, 1972, Gebara was decidedly unsympathetic towards American in “Relação de participantes do XXX Curso Básico de Educação Sindical do ICT, 31 de julho de 1972.” APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-02– 700.  Report on the IADESIL, August 4, 1972. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 52-Z-05 – 861.  At the time, Berger was also a familiar figure in the union world, having been mentioned by Sandra Cavalcanti in the case of the housing project she directed at BNH in 1965. See chapter III. Today, the Louis Berger Group describes itself as a project consulting company in the areas of engineering, architecture, construction, among other services, with 60 years of activity. It has partnerships with federal, state and municipal agencies in the United States. ; accessed on February 23, 2021.  Untitled. APESP, DEOPS, série dossiês, documento 50-J-02– 009.

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terests. The deputy denounced the efforts of “First World” countries to “prevent the expansion of developing nations.” He was concerned about the fact Brazil’s balance of trade was increasingly negative, including the supply of primary goods. The businessman criticized the international trade barriers that he believed were preventing Brazilian products from reaching foreign markets. For example, he cited the statements of an AFL-CIO official who alerted American public opinion to the evils of “indiscriminate entry into the United States of products made in countries where wages are lower.” The AFL-CIO asserted that this would not only cause a reduction in wages, but, above all, a decrease in the hiring of American labor. Defending business interests, Gebara called for defensive measures and the Brazilian government’s repudiation of foreign initiatives that, according to him, restricted, hindered and threatened “the legitimate and indispensable commercial expansion of the nation.”⁹¹ During that period, calls for solidarity among workers around the world gained strength within the AFL-CIO. Acting in defense of the American labor market, the union federation began emphasizing the need to strengthen relations with Latin American unions to guarantee the same wage levels for all workers employed by multinationals. The aim was to prevent the transfer of factories from the United States to developing countries from increasing unemployment in the US. This was the case with Ford, which would begin manufacturing engines at its Taubaté unit in São Paulo State in 1974.⁹² According to Meyer Bernstein, the leader of the US Steelworkers’ Union, which was affiliated with the AFL-CIO, cooperation between labor entities had taken on a double meaning: “On the one hand, it will help maintain the high level of wages and jobs in the United States while, on the other, it will improve the situation of Latin American workers, who are paid significantly less to do the same work.”⁹³ Gebara’s criticism indicates a movement in the business world that would later gain strength under President Geisel (1974– 1979). During the early years of his administration, business leaders began showing signs that the pact between the dictatorship and the private sector was severely under threat. At first, their dissatisfaction was limited to localized conflicts. Then, a campaign against nationalization began to grow in the business world, leading to real op-

 O Estado de S.Paulo, February 2, 1972, 27.  On January 11, 2021, Ford announced that it was closing its factories in Brazil, laying off more than 5,000 employees, not including outsourced and indirect jobs. The company claimed to be undergoing a global restructuring process, but maintained its plants in Uruguay and Argentina. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ford-motor-brazil/ford-to-close-brazil-manu facturing-operations-take-41-billion-in-charges-idUSKBN29G2E9 Accessed on January 22, 2021.  O Estado de S.Paulo, October 5, 1972, 1.

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position. Many executives began criticizing the authoritarian regime and joined the opposition to demand the return of the rule of law.⁹⁴ It is likely that Brazilian businessmen went from being the allies or sympathizers of AIFLD’s activities in Brazil to take a critical stance towards the Institute when they saw their interests threatened by major American corporations while their own government did little or nothing to help them. In fact, by the early 1970s, the IPES – an organization made up primarily of Brazilian businessmen who made a major contribution to the coup and the consolidation of the civilian-military government and cooperated with foreign businesspeople (especially the Americans) – had virtually ceased to exist. This is a strong indication that the development project begun during the Castello Branco period, which was to have been carried out by Brazilian entrepreneurs, was a thing of the past.⁹⁵ As Moniz Bandeira noted, in the 1960s and early 1970s, small and medium-sized companies, mostly Brazilianowned, went bankrupt: “American corporations took advantage of this to expand their power, not only at the expense of Brazilian business, but also of ventures from other countries.” According to that author, between 1971 and 1973, international corporations acquired control of about 40 Brazilian companies. Some Brazilian business leaders began complaining that it was not a matter of mergers but of the acquisition of domestic businesses by foreign companies.⁹⁶ In this sense, although it is hard to find sources that shed light on the relations between AIFLD and Brazilian and American business leaders, over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, many researchers charged that the Institute’s interests went beyond the implementation of “free unionism” and the fight against communism in Latin America.⁹⁷ For example, according to Pablo Pozzi, its real purpose in Argentina was to eliminate workers’ hostility toward American corporations. As in Brazil, AIFLD virtually closed down its program in Argentina in 1974, returning two years later, after the military coup. However, its extensive network of contacts with influential people made its activities possible.⁹⁸ The participation of large companies in AIFLD and that entity’s support for authoritarian regimes contributed to the Institute’s negative and murky image throughout Latin America. The AFL-CIO’s open support for military coups in

    

Cruz, 1995. See chapter II. Bandeira, 1975, 109. See Spalding Jr., 1976, 45 – 69; Hirsch, 1974; Radosh, 1969. Pozzi, 1999.

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the region only served to make that image worse.⁹⁹ In Chile, for example, the labor federation backed the truck drivers’ opposition to Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1973, with support from the CIA and American companies like IT&T.¹⁰⁰

The Complex Game of Alliances between American and Brazilian Union Leaders during the Geisel Administration As Alexander observes, the government’s attitude towards workers’ demands only began to show significant change during the Geisel administration, when Arnaldo da Costa Prieto, a Christian Democrat, became Labor Minister. During his term in office, the government took steps to make the wage policy more flexible, reopening dialogue with union leaders. According to Vizentini, the intensification of internal contradictions linked to the very exercise of authoritarian rule – above all the question of military unity and the economic crisis resulting in large part from external factors caused by the global oil crisis – affected the government’s legitimacy. Marked by international accusations of disrespect for human rights and lack of support for the regime in civil society, this situation brought to power General Ernesto Geisel, who believed in the need to liberalize the regime.¹⁰¹ Between 1975 and 1977, the number of worker protests grew, especially during campaigns for wage increases, presenting a growing list of demands for each profession. AIFLD was still present in Brazil, however, with a much more modest discourse. During a visit to Brazil in May 1975, Mike Boggs, assistant director of the AFL-CIO’s Department of International Affairs, took part in a debate with Labor Minister Arnaldo Prieto. An AIFLD official described that event later on. According to him, Prieto declared his support for the Institute’s presence in Brazil, but made a point of saying what the Brazilian authorities had already concluded since the Costa e Silva administration: “What is good for the US is not necessarily good for Brazil and vice versa.”¹⁰² That same year, the game of alli-

 See Corrêa, Larissa Rosa. Looking at the Southern Cone: American Trade Unionism in the Cold War Military Dictatorships of Brazil and Argentina. International Review of Social History, 62, 245 – 269, 2017.  Sussman, 1983b, 4.  Vizentini, 1998, 147.  Angelo Verdu, “Brazil” (1975). Opening the Archives: Documenting US-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. https://repository.library. brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:1145729/, accessed on June 30, 2021.

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ances between American and Brazilian union leaders changed again. After breaking off with and waging a public campaign against American trade unionism, Campista changed his stance and renewed the alliance with the AFL-CIO, taking a seat on the ICT board. In 1974, he was once again elected president of the CNTI, probably with the support of General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who had been best man at his wedding 30 years earlier. Golbery was one of the most important figures in the policy of liberalizing the regime, having been Chief of Staff during the Geisel administration. During that period, Campista contacted AIFLD director Américo Ramos and the American Embassy.¹⁰³ Argeu Egydio dos Santos, president of the São Paulo Metalworkers’ Federation, increased his contacts with AIFLD during that same period. Américo Ramos visited local metalworkers’ unions in cities in São Paulo State. And it was Argey Egydio dos Santos himself who facilitated the metalworkers’ contacts with AIFLD. He received funding to take an intensive course on trade unionism in Washington, DC, and attended a meeting of the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) in Japan. AIFLD’s activities with metalworkers began when the Brazilian government began repressing “subversives” in the São Paulo area, many of whom were linked to the opposition party MDB, including Manoel Constantino, president of the São Caetano Metalworkers’ Union, and other members of that entity.¹⁰⁴ The Americans closely followed the measures orchestrated by state agencies of repression to wipe out the PCB, considered the last remnant of leftist resistance to the dictatorship. José Ferreira da Silva, better known as Frei (Friar) Chico, the brother of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was rising in the ranks in the metalworkers union in the industrial region of ABC Paulista, and joined the union’s board as vice president. However, Frei Chico was arrested a few days after he took office. Subsequently, Manoel Constantino and Pedro Daniel, former director of the São Caetano Civil Construction Union, were detained by the police. In São Paulo, the target was Vladimir Herzog, who was tortured and killed in prison. ¹⁰⁵ Although he was not connected to the PCB, Manoel Constantino spent 18 days as a prisoner of the DEOPS.¹⁰⁶

 Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, April 5, 1974. NARA II, document released for consultation on June 30, 2005, reference number 1974 RIODE01250, film number D7400780575.  Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, October 29, 1975. NARA II, document released for consultation on July 6, 2006, reference number 75 RIO DE JANEIRO A-18, film number D7503750361.  CEDI. História dos metalúrgicos de São Caetano. Contribuição ao debate 2, Programa “Memória e acompanhamento do movimento operário no ABC”. São Paulo, n.p., [1987], 44.

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In a conversation with US Embassy officials, Argeu Egydio dos Santos also stated that the president and vice president of the Santos Metalworkers’ Union, Arnaldo Gonçalves and Moacir de Oliveira, had been summoned to the DEOPS to “provide explanations.” Gonçalves was considered to be sympathetic towards the Americans and highly cooperative with the labor attaché. The arrests sparked a wave of tension among the leaders, leading many of them to cease their activities for a time.¹⁰⁷ This episode is highly representative of how relations between Brazilian and American trade union leaders were a two-way street, deconstructing the idea of the manipulator and the manipulated. It is clear that, during the “years of lead,” when torture, persecution and disappearances were an institutionalized practice, the turn to the American Embassy in confidence to report what was happening with the union movement could be a valuable strategy to evade the repression. Angela Vergara’s analysis helps reinforce this interpretation. Focusing on the relationship between the AFL-CIO and Chilean leaders in the second half of the 1950s, through the activities of ORIT and AIFLD, the author draws attention to the complexity of these alliances, conflicts and negotiations. Vergara seeks to understand what motivated Chilean union members to join ORIT and other foreign entities, moving away from the traditional readings of “imperialism” and co-optation by American unionists in Latin America.¹⁰⁸ Also in 1975, Angel Verdu and the other AIFLD officers in Brazil were informed that the Institute was closing its Rio de Janeiro office. Verdu said he was surprised at the news, as he felt that there was no reason for it to cease its activities. In his report, he argued that since Institute was established in 1963, more than 1,000 Brazilian union members had taken ICT courses in São Paulo and about 30,000 had participated in

 Founded in 1924 with the mission of keeping and disciplining order in Brazil, the São Paulo Political and Social Order Police (Delegacia de Ordem Política e Social de São Paulo) was created to keep the social movements of that period, such as strikes and anarchism, under strict control. Linked to state governments, social and political police departments were created in various parts of the country. DEOPS continued to operate during the authoritarian and democratic periods until it was dissolved in 1983. It based its operations on the logic of suspicion – that is, the political police had investigated and monitored “suspects” believed to have committed crimes against the political and social order. Thousands of political prisoners were held in their cells. Many were tortured and some disappeared. The DEOPS archives are one of the main documentary references for understanding social movements in Brazil in the twentieth century, as well as the repressive practices of the State.  Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the State Department, November 5, 1975. National Archives II, document released for consultation on July 6, 2006, reference number 75 SÃO PAULO 2275, film number D750384– 0933.  Vergara, 2012.

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regional seminars, in addition to the 279 union members who attended the Front Royal Institute between 1963 and 1974. Verdu also underscored the 225 projects financed by the Alliance for Progress with funding totaling $575,000. According to him, 75 percent of the students who graduated from AIFLD, aged between 20 and 35, were active in the union movement, which augured well for the implementation of “free unionism” by future leaders.¹⁰⁹ However, perhaps the answer to the crisis facing AIFLD lies in the data Verdu collected, as the military regime was clearly displeased with the American entity’s activities.

Solidarity vs. political independence: The AFL-CIO’s international policies come into check In the late 1960s, the AFL-CIO’s international policy showed signs of crisis, including numerous conflicts with the Nixon administration (1969 – 1974) and the labor federation’s own internal problems. Failing to find a Democratic candidate who could match President Lyndon B. Johnson – possibly the AFLCIO’s greatest partner – and continue his efforts to combat communism around the world, George Meany formed a somewhat fragile, but no less beneficial and tumultuous, alliance with Nixon’s Republican government. Historically, the AFL and the CIO had supported the Democratic Party since their merger in 1955. By the late 60s, however, it became clear that the foreign policy ideas and concepts developed by the American labor federation’s top leaders, George Meany and Jay Lovestone, were no longer sustainable. They and their followers were suffering the consequences of their anti-communist crusade and did not hide their displeasure with the Nixon administration’s foreign policy. They were openly opposed to seeking dialogue with the USSR and other communist countries, just as they were against the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.¹¹⁰ In this context, it became increasingly difficult to hide the inconsistencies of the AFL-CIO’s international policy regarding trade unions, which was strongly marked by aggressive anti-communism. In the 1970s, these contradictions became more and more explicit. After all, how could they make their discourse of solidarity among workers, free unionism and political independence consistent with the actions that had led the AFL-CIO to support the overthrow of democratically elected presidents and condone dictatorships around the world?  Angelo Verdu, “Brazil” (1975). Opening the Archives: Documenting U.S.-Brazil Relations, 1960s-80s. Brown Digital Repository. Brown University Library. Accessed on June 30, 2021.  Wehrle, 2005.

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The director of the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department, Lovestone did not hide the difficulties he faced in Latin America and Africa. Furthermore, the federation’s second-ranking leader after Meany said the death of Serafino Romualdi in 1967 was a “terrible loss,” as he was considered to be the greatest intermediary between Latin American and American unions.¹¹¹ Viewed as being responsible for AIFLD’s operations, Lovestone and Meany became the target of strong criticism that began to intensify in the second half of the 1970s due to a number of internal and external factors. This crisis led many AIFLD and USAID officials to reflect on their activities, as well as on the direction to be taken in that new era in domestic and foreign union movements. In an interview with Robert Alexander, AIFLD director William Doherty, Jr., complained that employers contributed very little money to the Institute.¹¹² State Department and USAID officials also recognized that AIFLD faced problems in Latin America. According to Herman Kleine, the head of AID’s Latin America Bureau, the situation in that region had changed, and it was time to assess the validity of continuing to invest in those programs.¹¹³ According to Dale Good, Labor Advisor to the Secretary of State and Director of AID, one of the factors that had caused the decline in AIFLD’s activities was the United States government’s own disregard for union-related issues in Latin America. Furthermore, there were other problems, such as the retirement and deaths of labor attachés who had not been replaced because the embassies were said to be over-staffed. Good also cited Kissinger’s Global Outlook Program (GLOP), which aimed at restructuring diplomatic missions to make better use of their staff. As a result, many labor attachés active in Latin America had been transferred to other parts of the world. Good recognized that some regional bureaus “tended to be fiefdoms.”¹¹⁴ Another factor was the elimination of the Labor Advisory Committee, created to strengthen relations between members of the AFL-CIO, USAID and the State Department, with whom Meany used to hold regular meetings. Following the amendments made to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1974 after the scandal that became known as Watergate, those

 Jay Lovestone, interview with Robert Alexander, October 29, 1971. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.  Robert Alexander and Henry Hammond were conducting a study of USAID-funded union programs. William Doherty, interview with Robert Alexander, June 25, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.  Herman Kleine, interview with Robert Alexander, June 30, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.  Dale Good, interview with Robert Alexander, June 25, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.

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meetings virtually ceased – which Good considered to be a very bad thing, as the AFL-CIO had used them to pressure the government agencies to include labor unions in the international political agenda. Furthermore, Philip Agee’s book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, had had a major impact, not only on American unionism but also on the US government, as well as having international repercussions. Many AIFLD and AFL-CIO officials avoided talking about the issue. In his book, Agee stressed the importance of employing agents in the different International Trade Secretariats (ITS), partner organizations of AIFLD. The author wrote that he had attended a lecture given by Lloyd Haskins, executive secretary of the IFPCW, a CIA agent and one of the main people involved in the accusations of union corruption in Brazil. In his presentation, Haskins had emphasized the importance of those organizations for the development of unions in “underdeveloped” countries. According to what he had been taught, the idea was that workers’ associations should focus exclusively on economic matters, setting aside the ideologies of class struggle.¹¹⁵ Along with the scandal caused by Agee’s accusations, the GAO, a legislative body responsible for overseeing and managing the US federal government’s accounts, was investigating AIFLD’s activities. According to Dale Good, that institution lacked the specific knowledge of the area that would enable it accurately to assess the impact and validity of USAID-funded union programs. Then there were the ambassadors. According to the interviewee, many of them did not support the Institute’s union programs and were causing a number of problems. Criticism about the fact that AIFLD was both financed and represented by employers, mainly large multinationals, also intensified in the 1970s. According to AIFLD official Sam Haddad, many of his colleagues at the Institute did not agree with this type of involvement because they felt it hurt the organization, giving rise to more criticism of the role of multinationals in those countries. He said it was like handing a weapon to the enemies of the trade union movement. Even William Doherty, regarded as one of the greatest defenders of the participation of business leaders in the organization, had become “more or less neutral” on that subject. Regarding US government funding for AIFLD, Haddad revealed that Doherty used to justify that relationship to Latin Americans by claiming that most of the taxes collected by the American government came from workers, and that “it is only right that a small amount of these taxes come back to the US labor movement, to help their working-class brothers in Latin America” by

 According to Philip Agee (1975, 114), Loyd Haskins was a CIA agent in charge of running the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW), which had also been created by the intelligence agency.

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investing in AIFLD.¹¹⁶ Doherty also claimed that the presence of employer representatives in the entity set a good example for Latin American employers and employees, thus showing the viability of cooperation between capital and labor.¹¹⁷ In addition to all the problems facing the AFL-CIO/AIFLD, there was also a generational clash between the new members of the union federation and the American embassies. That conflict is clearly reflected in an episode recounted by AFL-CIO Inter-American Representative Andrew McLellan. When two AFLCIO directors were on a visit to Central America, a Guatemalan labor attaché, whom they considered young and inexperienced, had planned a list of activities for the group. However, McLellan had disapproved of some items on the itinerary, saying that he wanted to spend most of his time consulting with union leaders. Shortly after they left the country, the attaché sent a telegram to the State Department reporting that McLellan had made some mistakes during his visit. However, the veteran AFL-CIO leader refused to accept that a young man could teach him lessons on international unionism.¹¹⁸ As well as these issues, the growing protests against the Vietnam War, the scandals involving the AFL-CIO and the CIA, and the widespread disclosure of human rights violations in Latin America also affected grassroots workers. As we have seen, until the 1970s, the formulation of the AFL-CIO’s international policy was restricted to the top leadership more than four decades. Throughout that period, workers had had to content themselves with reports in union newspapers, which contained amazing stories about the benefits their Latin American “brothers” had gained from AFL-CIO programs.¹¹⁹ However, declining purchasing power and the threat of job losses for their “brothers” in the Southern Hemisphere were making American workers question solidarity programs even more at a time when their own country was undergoing a major crisis. While American workers were critical of the AFL-CIO’s union policy, domestic economic issues were leading other unions to reflect on the need to create a new transnational union movement that was more sensitive to international issues. It was a matter of identifying specific issues for each profession and the multinationals that were present in the United States and abroad. As Spalding asserted, local unions that were closer to grassroots workers were beginning to seek alternatives to the

 Sam Haddad, interview with Robert Alexander, July 1, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.  Windmuller, 1967, 215.  Andrew McLellan, interview with Robert Alexander, July 1, 1975. AEL, Robert Alexander Papers Collection (interviews), box 10, folder 3839, microfilm roll 13.  Spalding, 1976, 62.

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AFL-CIO’s traditional international policy, with in order to be truly representative of the interests of all workers in North and South America.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the experience of the Vietnam War have made workers and their families more critical of the United States’ actions abroad. Nevertheless, the formulation of a new American trade union international policy would only gain strength in the 1980s.

 Ibid., 1992/1993, 427– 431.

Conclusion In May 2016, when the political crisis in Brazil reached its peak and the legal-parliamentary coup¹ had been launched through a request for the impeachment of President Dilma Roussef, the AFL-CIO avoided repeating a past mistake: backing coups d’état in Latin America. In a blog post, the union federation mentioned the Brazilian coup of 1964, interpreting it as a movement led by conservatives and elites composed of civilians and the army to overthrow President João Goulart. That military intervention, the federation acknowledged, resulted in hundreds of deaths, disappearances, torture, and numerous other human rights violations. Now, more than 50 years later, said the AFL-CIO, those same elites had created a movement capable of once again removing a President of the Republic, this time the first woman in the country’s history to be directly elected by popular vote.² However, although the American union federation vehemently rejected Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment, it failed to disclose the close relationship it had maintained with those same elites when it backed the 1964 coup d’état and the other military coups that took place in Latin America. That is the relationship that I have sought to investigate in this book. When the military regime installed in 1964 dismantled the Brazilian union movement, the path seemed to be clear for American union organizations to carry out a number of educational and aid programs in urban and rural areas to introduce “free unionism” in that country. Through AFL-CIO reports, union, Brazilian and international publications, analyses from the US Embassy, police sources and major newspapers, I have been able to gain an overview of Brazilian-United States union relations during the military dictatorship. To this end, I have analyzed the activities of AIFLD, which was founded in 1961 with US government funding, channeled through the Alliance for Progress by the AFL-CIO and large American corporations. Since its inception in Brazil, AIFLD invested in courses, lectures, exchange programs and seminars throughout the country with the objective of training new leaders who could implement and develop the American union model. These activities were carried out with the support

 The process that removed President Dilma Rousseff from office has not yet found a definition among those who consider the act a coup. Some have called it a legal-media coup, due to the support of the main media outlets in the country. For opponents of the president, her ouster was a legal and democratic act.  “AFL-CIO Stands with Brazilian Workers and Democracy,” May 24, 2016. http://www.aflcio. org/Blog/Global-Action/AFL-CIO-Stands-with-Brazilian-Workers-and-Democracy. Accessed on May 26, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-011

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of the most fervently anti-communist and conservative sectors of the Brazilian union movement. Many of the pelegos who emerged and established themselves in that movement with the support of the military took part in AIFLD activities and maintained close links with American unionism. However, when analyzing the different political-economic conditions of the 21-year Brazilian dictatorship, I noticed that these alliances were unstable and varied according to the Brazilian union leaders’ interests and the successive military administrations’ different stances on the American union program. Despite American officials’ overt declarations of respect for each country’s specific issues and customs, the boundary between cooperation and intervention in Brazilian political and economic matters came into question during the different political phases that followed the 1964 coup. When observing the development of the Alliance for Progress program within the sphere of Brazilian trade unions, I have drawn attention to the complexity of transnational relations during the Cold War, which transcend the analyses that tended to assess the AFLCIO’s international policy from a perspective limited to domestic issues in the USA. In this sense, I have tried to emphasize the reactions and strategies developed by Brazilian leaders and the different military governments with regard to AIFLD’s union programs. I have argued that these actions were fundamental to shaping the direction of the American union project implemented in Brazil. When attempting to “guide” Brazilian unionism, the AFL-CIO and US government officials had to study, analyze, consider and negotiate with the political aspirations of the generals and union leaders themselves, which not infrequently required them to change their plans and approaches. Thus, I have sought to understand the discontinuities and hesitations in the US government’s support for the Brazilian dictatorship in the context of labor relations. Furthermore, I have tried to deviate from the analyses that focus on the impact of American union policy in Brazil based on the concept of the “success” or “failure” of the union program. In part, I believe it is improbable that concrete evidence will be found that proves there was a certain “influence” or “adoption” of exclusively American union practices. Such evidence is not likely to reside in numbers or specific facts, especially if we view the history of the union movement in Brazil from a global perspective. Even the range of sources analyzed in this study, which contain reports of activities, and the number of courses held and union leaders involved, reveal little or nothing about the practical results of these programs. The Americans were not passive observers of the repression that dismantled the Brazilian trade union movement from 1964 onwards. They sought to interfere directly in matters of Brazilian labor policy. However, if we focus exclusively on the Brazilian labor regulation system during the period when US unionism was active in Brazil, we could hastily conclude that the effects of

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the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil had little or no impact in the sense of implementing “free unionism,” as there was no change in the Brazilian union structure, and the Labor Courts continued to mediate labor conflicts. Therefore, that question would make us lose sight of the different meanings and significance of the presence of those international union entities in Brazil. In her study of the AFL-CIO’s international policy, Beth Sims found that it was impossible to give a concrete analysis of AIFLD’s performance, much less to assess the immediate impact of its activities, although representatives of that institute were expected to produce periodic reports containing qualitative and quantitative data on the projects implemented. More than demonstrating its impact, AIFLD was an important means of acquiring information, establishing relations with influential people in politics and business, as well as learning about facts and events that could affect US interests or threaten the development of the “free and democratic unionism” project. In this sense, keeping unions free of the influence of communist leaders was fundamental.³ To this end, there are signs that AIFLD sought to interfere in workers’ organizations through loans, travel opportunities, and other measures that could influence union elections and the activities of these entities, as the analysis of the 1967 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (CPI) on foreign entities concluded. When observing the development of the AFL-CIO’s international policy in Brazil, it is clear that between 1964 and 1966 the US trade union federation made a real effort to implement “free” collective bargaining in that country. However, the new labor policy outlined by the dictator Castello Branco’s administration and maintained by the other military regimes slowed down the development of that project. As he was seeking public support for the “Revolution,” I believe that Castello Branco was unwilling to take risks in unknown territory, such as “free trade unionism.” This is largely due to the fact that, undeniably, Brazilian labor laws were highly significant for the working class. As I have emphasized in this study, union relations between Brazil and the United States were severely strained even before General Costa e Silva took office. From 1967 onwards, diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States cooled, in view of the numerous changes in policy effected on both sides. These changes, which also affected union relations, can be explained, in part, by the growth of the US presence in Brazil, which led to increasing antiAmericanism not only among leftist militants but also among the conservative and military sectors. Brazilian business leaders and the “hard-liners” – that is, the group of military men who wanted to see the regime introduce even more

 Sims, 1992, 31.

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harshly repressive measures – began to question the foreign policy pursued during the previous administration, rejecting the model of independent collective bargaining. When Institutional Act 5 (AI-5) was decreed in December 1968, it marked the beginning of a new phase in Brazilian-American union relations. Responding to the demands of Brazilian union leaders, the AFL-CIO-financed Cultural Institute of Labor (ICT) was reformulated, albeit without rejecting assistance from the US entity. Local and regional union education courses dispensed with the leadership of American union members. However, at a time when the union movement was strictly controlled and repressed, the ICT functioned as a meeting place for leaders interested in debating the labor situation, even though its organizers backed the military regime, as Silvia Manfredi observes.⁴ In addition to looking at educational courses and social projects in the world of work, this study focused on the AFL-CIO’s exchange programs with the United States, which began in the 1950s. After the civilian-military coup, the American union federation intensified its “Union to Union” exchange program. Analyzing the experiences of Brazilian union leaders in that exchange program proved to be essential to understanding certain ideas that many of those leaders shared about the United States and trade unionism in that country. In addition to lacking the “deep civic faith of the American people,” as Labor Minister Jarbas Passarinho described it, when faced with a different reality, instead of trying to implement “free” unionism, many of those Brazilian travelers concluded that the US model would not work in their country, as the two nations’ labor regulation systems were very different. During the exchange experience, although they were fascinated by what they had seen in the “States,” some union leaders concluded that labor relations in Brazil were fairer because workers in their country enjoyed collective and individual rights, such as the “13th salary,” and demands for compensation for dismissal could be taken to the Labor Courts. As in the well-known song eternally associated with the Brazilian samba singer and Hollywood star Carmen Miranda, Disseram que voltei americanizada (“They Say I Came Back Americanized”), which she sang in the 1940s to contradict critics who said she was becoming less Brazilian due to her close ties with the United States, it can be said that, when they returned home, the union leaders were not entirely convinced that the US labor model would be better for Brazilian workers. Furthermore, whether or not they were collaborating with the military regime, when faced with a congressional inquiry that was somewhat hostile to the strong American presence in Brazil, many union leaders questioned the aims and effectiveness of the foreign

 Manfredi, 1986, 196.

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union entities’ exchange programs. Many viewed these programs as a way of “softening up” Brazilian leaders, who were only interested in what they called “union tourism.” In the mid-1970s, rejection of union involvement in party political and government issues – viewed as one of the AFL-CIO’s main watchwords – became virtually impossible. The close ties between America’s largest union federation and several US administrations throughout the Cold War were harshly condemned, even by AIFLD members, American union leaders and government officials. Their critiques clearly set forth the contradictions inherent to the US’s own international union policy, which was based on the principles of democracy and freedom while helping dictatorships around the world carry out their projects through activities financed by the US government. In 1977, the AIFLD program claimed to have basically one vague objective: “to help the Brazilian union movement develop technical know-how so workers can use more union benefits as members.” ⁵ That same year, Finance Minister Delfim Netto, who was responsible for the vaunted “economic miracle,” admitted that official inflation rates had been manipulated in 1973 and 1974. Evidence of this lent impetus to the 1977 wage restoration campaigns, led by the Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema. This episode boosted the union movement, made the workers’ organization stronger and attracted public sympathy, calling into question the supposed docility and apathy of Brazilian workers, a theory widely held by AIFLD union leaders. The workers organized in large numbers inside and outside the unions through factory commissions, in the struggle for wage increases and better working conditions. Seeking autonomy from the State, the workers demanded direct negotiations with employers without government interference in an attempt to break with previously established practices. However, the old guard of AFL-CIO union leaders, many of whom had formulated the federation’s international union policy during the Cold War, looked on as mere spectators during the movement of Brazilian workers organized by the main unions in the ABC region and São Paulo City. Far removed from the workers’ struggle, which was on the rise, the AIFLD’s directors timidly advised the entity to invest in a union exchange program for metalworkers between 1977 and 1981.⁶ The development of a new union movement in Brazil became more evident during the 5th CNTI Congress, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1978. On that occasion, a group of leaders who had been fighting against the leadership of the old union

 American Institute for Free Labor Development. AIFLD Report. Washington, D.C., AIFLD, 1977.  American Institute for Free Labor Development. AIFLD. Country Plans for Brazil, 1977-1981. Washington, D.C., AIFLD, 1977, 2.

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directors came to the fore. Among the union members who gained prominence in that movement was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, president of the Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo do Campo. Twenty-four years later, he would become President of Brazil. João Paulo Pires de Vasconcelos, of the Metalworkers’ Union of João Monlevade, Minas Gerais, Arnaldo Gonçalves, of the Metalworkers’ Union of Santos, Jacó Bittar, of the Oil Workers’ Union of Campinas, among others, were also outstanding figures. They began to be identified as a new generation of “independent” and “authentic” trade unionists, as they called themselves. Backed by progressive sectors of the Catholic Church, this movement not only criticized the official union structure and the CLT but demanded the end of the dictatorship, as well as freedom of association, expansion of the right to strike and free negotiation, among other issues.⁷ However, the AFL-CIO and AIFLD were also changing. After all, the arrival of young new union leaders was inevitable. While the union movement was gaining strength in São Paulo and spreading throughout the country, America’s largest union federation was facing a generational shock. The new figures filling leadership positions at the AFL-CIO included Stanley Gacek. His interest in Brazil had begun in 1980, through his contact with Maria Helena Moreira Alves.⁸ Accompanied by other union members, he had gone to Brazil to verify first-hand the reports being spread abroad about the Brazilian union movement and, more specifically, to get to know a union leader who was gaining international renown and had founded the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). He met Lula and they soon became friends. At that time, Gacek saw an effervescent movement in Brazil with “trade union trends and aspirations aimed at real union freedom and authentic collective bargaining.”⁹ In 1983, Gacek went to Brazil to attend the founding event of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central, CUT), with the encouragement of Bruce Jay, then the AIFLD representative in Brazil.¹⁰ In that context of Brazil’s return to democracy, amid the severe polit-

 See Keck, Margaret, “The New Unionism in the Brazilian Transition,” in Democratizing Brazil, ed. Stepan, Alfred (Oxford, 1989):260.  Born in Rio de Janeiro, Maria Helena Moreira Alves went into exile in the United States during the military dictatorship. She held a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), specializing in human rights and foreign policy. A Professor of Political Science and Economics at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), she also taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of New Mexico, in the United States. She was the author of State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 1985.  Statement from Stanley Gacek given to the author and Paulo Fontes on October 25, 2012. The next paragraph uses the same source.  Bruce Jay had lived in Brazil in 1968 and 1969, when he followed the union movement in the Pernambuco forest area, more specifically in the region of Palmares. He became the director of

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ical and economic crisis caused by the military regime, the union movement fell into two camps. The first was “authentic unionism,” which was responsible for the creation of the CUT, and brought together union leaders linked to the newly created the PT, progressive sectors of the Catholic Church, and Trotskyists. The second was made up of union leaders who advocated maintaining the corporatist union structure that had been in place since the mid-1930s. The Cultural Institute of Labor (ICT) was interested in inviting Jair Meneguelli, known as a powerful leader in the PT and president of the CUT, to take part in the entity’s courses and exchange program. Gacek noted that he was the only representative of American trade unionism attending the event. He was eventually encouraged to make a speech and was surprised not to be booed. It is likely that his involvement in the Brazilian trade union movement and in Latin America in general led the older leader William Doherty, Jr., to see him as an uncomfortable presence in the AFL-CIO. However, in the late 1970s, when George Meany was stepping down from the presidency of the AFL-CIO after 25 years, its younger leaders were committed to building a new history of international union solidarity. However, the new generation of union leaders decided not to dwell on past accusations about the close relationship between the AFL-CIO and the CIA; nor did they criticize the fact that the American union federation had systematically supported authoritarian regimes throughout the globe. According to Gacek, when the Brazilian union movement was on the rise between 1978 and 1981, AIFLD had focused on Central America, South Africa and the Philippines, as Brazil was not a priority for the AFL-CIO’s international policy. During that period, the old guard at AIFLD insisted on “pure and simple unionism” and said that the “new unionism” that had emerged in Brazil was a partisan political movement. Therefore, they decided to support the General Confederation of Workers (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores, CGT), represented by Joaquim dos Santos Andrade, better known as “Joaquinzão.” Regarded as one of the most prominent pelegos of the dictatorship, he has been mentioned in this book. As Gacek noted, the CUT became an inconvenience for AIFLD, which decided to invest in a trade union federation with a narrative that was more closely linked to the State and the corporatist system, contradicting what they had been demanding for Brazil throughout the Cold War period.¹¹ However, Gacek believes that, although it rejected AIFLD, the CUT could tell the difference between the old guard of American unionists and the younger leaders,

AIFLD in 1981. See interview with Bruce Jay, conducted by the Centro de Memória Sindical, June 3, 1982. CMS, series interviews, location unspecified.  A. W. Pereira, 1991.

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such as Gacek and John Sweeney. Nearly a decade later, Sweeney would be voted in as president of the AFL-CIO, as a representative of the “New Voice” ticket.¹² Throughout the 1980s, Gacek maintained a close relationship with Lula, acting as the contact person between the CUT and US trade unionism while organizing a number of visits to the US for Brazilian union leaders, including Lula himself, causing speculation from both the right and the left. Although this study was not intended to be an in-depth analysis of the period of the “new unionism,” I believe that these observations are important for understanding AIFLD’s influence in the late 1970s. Thus, it is interesting to note the apathy of the “old guard” leaders of that entity in the face of a movement that demanded “free trade unionism,” which was so widely disseminated by the AFL-CIO during the Cold War. In any case, it is curious that the agenda of “new unionism” was very similar to that demanded by American unionism.

 In the 1990s, AIFLD became the Solidarity Center at a time when a new era of union relations between Brazil and the United States was beginning through closer relations with the CUT. See W. A. C. Amorim, 2007, 231.

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Costa, Sérgio Amad. Estado e controle sindical no Brasil. São Paulo, T.A. Queiroz, 1986. Cruz, Sebastião Velasco e. Empresariado e Estado na transição brasileira. Um estudo sobre a economia política do autoritarismo (19741977). Campinas, Editora da Unicamp/Fapesp, 1995. Cunha, Vasco Leitão. Diplomacia em altomar. Depoimento ao CPDOC. 2a ed. Rio de Janeiro, FGV/Funag, 2003. Dálio, Danilo J. & Myamoto, Shiguenoli. “O governo Vargas e a Comissão Mista BrasilEstados Unidos”. Ideias, n. 1, 2010. Dávila, Jerry. Dictatorship in South America. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Dreyer, John E. (ed.) The alliance for Progress: Problems and Perspectives. New York, Praeger, 1987. Dreyer, John E. (ed.) A Aliança para o Progresso. Comentários de Milton S. Eisenhower, Raul Prebisch, José Figueres, Teodoro Moscoso e Dean Rusk. Rio de Janeiro, Fundo de Cultura, 1962. Dreyfuss, René Armand. 1964: A conquista do Estado – Ação política, poder e golpe de classe. Petrópolis, Vozes, 1981. Erickson, Keneth. The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977. Erickson, Keneth. Sindicalismo no processo político no Brasil. São Paulo, Brasiliense, 1979. Farias, Damião Duque de Farias. Em defesa da ordem. Aspectos das práxis conservadoras católicas no meio operário em São Paulo (1930-1945). São Paulo, Hucitec, 1998. Ferreira, Jorge. Trabalhadores do Brasil, o imaginário popular. Rio de Janeiro, FGV, 1997. Fico, Carlos. Além do golpe: Versões e controvérsias sobre 1964 e a ditadura militar. Rio de Janeiro, Record, 2004. Fico, Carlos. O grande irmão: da operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo – O governo dos Estados Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 2008. Fico, Carlos. “Prefácio”. In: GREEN, James. Apesar de vocês. Oposição à ditadura brasileira nos Estados Unidos, 19641985. São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 2009. Filippelli, Ronald L. American Labor and Postwar Italy, 1943-1953. A Study of Cold War Politics. Stanford, C.A., Stanford University Press, 1989. Fischer, Brodwin. “Direitos por leis ou lei por direito? Pobreza e ambiguidade legal no Estado Novo”. In: Lara, Silvia Hunold & Mendonça, Joseli Maria Nunes de (orgs.). Direitos e justiça no Brasil: Ensaios de história social. Campinas, Editora da Unicamp, 2006. Fontes, Paulo. Trabalhadores e cidadãos: Nitro Química: A fábrica e as lutas operárias nos anos 50. São Paulo, Annablume, 1997. Fontes, Paulo. Migration & the Making of Industrial São Paulo. Durham, London, Duke University Press, 2016. Fontes, Paulo; Corrêa, Larissa Rosa. Labor and Dictatorship in Brazil: A Historiographical Review. International Labor and Working Class History, v. 93, 27-51, 2018. Fortes, Alexandre (et al.) Na luta por direitos – Estudos recentes em história social do trabalho. Campinas, Editora da Unicamp, 1999. French, John. Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture. Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

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Lamgguth, A. J. A face oculta do terror. São Paulo, Civilização Brasileira, 1978. Lessa, Antonio Carlos. “Há cinquenta anos a Operação PanAmericana”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 51 (2), jul.dez. 2008. Lichtenstein, Nelson. State of the Union. A Century of American Labor. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. Limoncic, Flávio. Os inventores do New Deal. Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 2009. Linden, Marcel van der. “The Promise and Challenges of Global Labor History”. International Labor and Working-Class History, 82, inverno, 2012. Lopes, Juarez Brandão. Sociedade de indústria no Brasil. São Paulo, Difel, 1964. Lopes, Juarez Brandão. Crise do Brasil arcaico. São Paulo, Difel, 1967. Lopes, José Sérgio Leite. A tecelagem dos conflitos de classe na cidade das chaminés. São Paulo, Marco Zero; Brasília, Universidade de Brasília, MTC/CNPq, 1988. Lothian, Tamara. “The Political Consequences of Labor Law Regimes: the Contractualist and Corporatist Models Compared”. Cardozo Law Review, 1001, 1986, pp. 1.001-1.073. Loureiro, Felipe. Empresários, trabalhadores e grupos de interesse: A política econômica nos governos Jânio Quadros e João Goulart (1961-1964). Tese de doutorado. São Paulo, Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. Lowenthal, Abraham F. (org.) Exporting Democracy. The United States and Latin America. Themes and Issues. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. Malloy, James M. (ed.). Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. Pittsburgh, P.A., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. Manfredi, Silvia M. Educação sindical entre o conformismo e a crítica. São Paulo, Loyola, 1986. Martins, Heloisa T. de Sousa. Igreja e movimento operário no ABC. São Paulo/São Caetano do Sul, Hucitec/Prefeitura de São Caetano do Sul, 1994. Mattos, Marcelo Badaró. Novos e velhos sindicalismos no Rio de Janeiro (19551988). Rio de Janeiro, Vício de Leitura, 1998. Menossi, Luiz. Conceito e extensão do direito de greve. Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Trabalhistas, 1966. Mericle, Kenneth S. “Corporatist Control of the Working- Class – Authoritarian Brazil since 1964”. In: Maloy, James. Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America. Pittsburg P.A., University of Pittsburg Press, 1977. Methvin, Eugene H. “Labor’s New Weapon for Democracy”. Reader’s Digest, out. 1966, pp. 2128. Monge, Luis Alberto. “O movimento trabalhista e o desenvolvimento econômico”. In: Adams, Mildred. América Latina: Evolução ou explosão?. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1963. Moraes Filho, Evaristo de. O problema do sindicato único no Brasil. São Paulo, Alfa-Omega, 1978. Moraes Filho, Evaristo de; Russomano, Mozart Vitor & Catharino, José Martins. Anteprojeto do Código de Trabalho. Brasília, Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores/Serviço de Reforma de Códigos, 1965 Morel, E. O golpe começou em Washington. Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 1965. Morgan, Ted. A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, AntiCommunist, and Spy Master. New York, Random House, 1999. Morris, George. A CIA e o movimento operário americano. Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 1967.

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Books and Articles

231

Romero, Federico. The United States and the European Trade Movement, 1944-1951. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Romero, Jorge Basurto. “El sindicalismo y la penetración ideológica de los Estados Unidos en América Latina”. Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 34 (34), jul. dez. 1972, pp. 551-594. Romualdi, Serafino. Presidents and Peons. New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1967. Sader, Eder. Quando novos personagens entraram em cena (19701980). Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1988. Santana, Marco Aurélio. “Ditadura militar e resistência operária: O movimento sindical brasileiro do golpe à transição democrática”. Política & Sociedade, n. 13, out. 2008, pp. 279-309. Santos, Reinaldo. Trabalho, salários e sindicatos nos Estados Unidos. Rio de Janeiro, Presença, 1967. Schmitter, Philippe. “Still the Century of Corporatism?”. In: Pike, F. & Stritch, T. (eds.). The New Corporatism. London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Scipes, Kim. AFLCIO’s Secret War against Developing Country Workers – Solidarity or Sabotage?. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2010. Skidmore, Thomas. Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Silva, Fernando Teixeira da. Workers Before the Court: Conflicts and Labor Justice in the Context of the 1964 Coup d’Etat in Brazil. Berlim, De Gruyter Oldenbour, 2019. Silva, Fernando Teixeira da; Corrêa, Larissa Rosa. The Politics of Justice: Rethinking Brazil’s Corporatist Labor Movement. Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, vol. 13, n. 2, May 2016, p. 11-31. Silva, Vicente Gil da. A Aliança para o Progresso no Brasil: de propaganda anticomunista a instrumento de intervenção política (19611964). Dissertação de mestrado. Porto Alegre, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. Silverman, Victor. “Workers, Labor, and War: New Directions in the History of American Foreign Relations”. Diplomatic History, 24 (4), set. 2010, pp. 641-731. Sims, Beth. Workers of the World Undermined – American Labor’s Role in U.S. Foreign Policy. Boston, M.A., South End Press, 1992. Sloane, Arthur A. Hoffa. Cambridge, M.A., MIT Press, 1991. Sousa, Jesse Jane Vieira. Círculos Operários, a Igreja Católica e o mundo do trabalho no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ/ Faperj, 2002. Souza, Amaury Guimarães. The Nature of Corporative Representation: Leaders and Membership of Organized Labor in Brazil. Ph.D. diss., Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979. Souza, Rômulo Augustus Pereira de. Memórias de um pelego. Rio de Janeiro, Gryphus, 1998. Spalding Jr., Hobart A. “U.S. and Latin American Labor: The Dynamics of Imperialist control”. Latin American Perspectives, 3 (1). Imperialism and the Working-Class in Latin America, 1976, 45-69. Spalding Jr., Hobart A. “Sindicalismo libre: ¿De qué? El instituto americano para el desarrollo del sindicalismo libre”. Nueva Sociedad, n. 70, jan.fev. 1984, 48-58. Spalding Jr., Hobart A. “The Two Latin American Foreign Policies of the U.S. Labor Movement: The AFL-CIO Top Brass vs. Rank-and-File”. Science & Society, 56 (4), Winter, 1992/1993, 427-431. Spektor, Matias. Kissinger e o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 2009.

232

Bibliography

Stepan, Alfred. The State and Society: Peru Comparative Perspective. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1978. Stepan, Alfred. (ed). Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973. Sussman, Michael J. AIFLD: U.S. Troyan Horse in Latin America and the Caribbean. A Special Report. S.l., s.ed., 1983a. Sussman, Michael. AIFLD, U.S. Trojan Horse in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Joint Venture of the AFL-CIO, Dept. of State, U.S. Corporations, and the CIA: History of the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Washington, D.C., Épica, 1983b. Torres, Raquel Mundim. O inferno e o paraíso se confundem: Viagens de brasileiros à URSS (1928-1933). Dissertação de mestrado. Campinas, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2013. Vergara, Angela. Copper Workers, International Business, and Domestic Politics in Cold War Chile. University Park, P.A., The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008. Vergara, Angela. “Alianzas y encuentros internacionales: Sindicalismo, internacionalismo e intervencionismo durante la Guerra Fría en Chile”. Paper apresentado no II Seminário Internacional Mundos do Trabalho, Rio de Janeiro, 2012. Vergara, Angela. “Chilean Workers and the U.S. Labor Movement: From Intervention to Solidarity, 1950s-1970s”. In: Goethem, Geert Van & Waters, Robert (eds.). American Labor’s Global Ambassadors. New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013. Vizentini, Paulo Fagundes. A política externa do regime militar brasileiro. Porto Alegre, Ed. da UFRGS, 1998. Zieger, Robert. American Workers, American Unions, 1920-1985. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Wamberto, José. Castello Branco, revolução e democracia. Rio de Janeiro, s.ed., 1970. Waters, Robert. “More Subtle than we Knew: The AFL in the British Caribbean”. In: Goethem, Geert Van and Waters, Robert (eds.) American Labor’s Global Ambassadors. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Weffort, Francisco. “Participação e conflito industrial: Osasco e Contagem, 1968”. Cadernos Cebrap, n. 5, 1972. Weis, W. Michael. Cold Warriors & Coups D’Etat. Brazilian-American Relations, 1945-1964. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico, 1993. Wehrle, Edmund F. Between a River and a Mountain: The AFL-CIO and the Vietnam War. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2005. Welch, Clifford Andrew. “Labor Internationalism: U.S. Involvement in Brazilian Unions, 1945-1965”. Latin American Research Review, 30 (2), 1995. Wiarda, Howard J. (ed.). Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974. Wilford, Hugh. The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America. Cambridge, M.A., Harvard University Press, 2008. Windmuller, John P. “The Foreign Policy Conflict in American Labor”. Political Science Quarterly, 82 (2), jun. 1967.

Index Adhemar de Barros 38, 41, 43 f., 57, 106, 155, 202 Adolph Berle 6 Adolph Strasser 3 Adriano Campanhole 73, 78, 80 Afonso Camargo 61 Afonso Delellis 88 Alberto Bettamio 124 Alberto Schtirbu 80 Alberto Venâncio Filho 59 Alcides Domingues 147 Alcir Nogueira 125 Aliança Renovadora Nacional (National Renovating Alliance – ARENA) 70 Alliance for Progress 2 Almino Afonso 41 American Social Democratic Party 36 Anaconda Company 27 Andrew McLellan 20, 96, 130, 184, 188, 193, 211 Angel Verdu 207 Angelo Parmigiani 38, 167 Antonio Domingues Nogueira 147 Antonio Ferreira Cesarino Junior 45 Antonio Florêncio da Paz 84 Antonio Pereira Magaldi 38, 45, 191 Argeu Egydio dos Santos 75, 193, 206 f. Armando Arevalo Silva 76 Armando Simões de Carvalho 66 Arnaldo da Costa Prieto 205 Arnaldo de Souza Dias 76 Arnaldo Gonçalves 207, 218 Arnaldo Sussekind 65 f., 73, 96, 121, 134, 163 Arthur Goldberg 179 Arthur Martins Filho 151 Artur da Costa e Silva 21 Arturo Jáuregui 10, 34 Ary Campista 35, 37 f., 66 f., 86 f., 90, 115, 117, 119, 198, 200 Ary da Costa Souza 114 Augusto Lopes 147

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110732917-013

Aurélio Ribeiro Viegas 59 Avelino Gomes de Castro 144 Banco Nacional da Habitação (National Housing Bank\; BNH) 93 Brazilian Catholic Action 49 Brazilian Communist Party 31, 194 Brazilian Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas da União) 79 Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Força Expedicionária Brasileira\; FEB), 57 Brazilian Labor Party 35 Bruce Jay 218 Campinas Hat Workers’ Union 76 Carlos Lacerda 24, 38, 41, 47, 56 f., 98, 105, 132, 155 Carrido Torres 59 Catholic Agrarian Youth (JAC) 49 Catholic Church’s Social Doctrine 61 Catholic Student Youth (JEC) 49 Catholic University Youth (JUC) 49 Catholic Youth Workers (JOC) 49 Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central, CUT) 218 Charles Brinckerhoof 27 Charles Burke Elbrick 173, 181 Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 61 Cia. Melhoramentos de São Paulo 45 Clodesmidt Riani 35, 37, 159 Committee on Political Education (COPE) 151 Committee on the Alliance for Progress (COMAP) 27 Communications Workers of America (CWA) 4, 23, 27 Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores (Inter-American Workers’ Confederation, CIT) 33 Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 5, 32 Confederation of Latin American Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC) 34

234

Index

Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL) 26 Congress for Cultural Freedom 104, 108 Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) 9, 66 Cooperative League of the United States (CLUSA) 15 Copper Workers’ Confederation (CTC) 26 Cornélio de Macedo Moura 50 Council for Latin America (CLA) 60 Dale Good 209 f. Daniel Krieger 137 Dante Pellacani 37, 47, 54 Danton Jobim 129 Delfim Netto 92, 109, 174, 217 Democratic Resistance of Free Workers (Resistência Democrática dos Trabalhadores Livres\; REDETRAL) 38 Democratic Union Movement (Movimento Sindical Democrático\; MSD) 38 Deocleciano de Holanda Cavalcanti 35 Dilma Roussef 213 Diva Benevides Pinho 76, 191 Domingos Alvarez 48, 134 Dwight D. Eisenhower 8 EBASCO 28, 178 Edward Kramer 132 Efraim Velasquez 76, 113, 118 f., 125, 128– 130, 134, 164 Egisto Domenicali 126, 134, 136 Electric Power Company São Paulo Light S.A 45 Elmer Staats 177 Emilio Garrastazu Médici 173 Escola Superior de Guerra (War College\; ESG) 63 Eurico Gaspar Dutra 7, 31, 33 Evaristo de Moraes Filho 77 f., 117, 134, 145 Federation of Catholic Workers’ Circles (Federação dos Círculos Operários Católicos\; FCO) 48 Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo (Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo\; FIESP 38 Federation of Metalworkers of São Paulo 36

Federation of Retail Workers of São Paulo 38 Fernando Bastos Ávila 59 Fernando da Silva Sá 59 Flávio Galvão 57 Floriano da Silveira Maciel 38 Floriano Dezen 47 Francisco Campos Aires 84 Franco Montoro 61 f. Franklin Delano Roosevelt 4 Free Italy Committee 24 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 209 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) 132 Front Royal 23, 30, 136, 143, 178, 189 f., 197, 208 Gas Production Workers Union 45 General Workers’ Command (Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores\; CGT) 40 George Meany 15, 19 f., 23, 26 f., 30, 45, 84, 96, 101, 116, 121, 128–131, 134, 142, 146, 153, 166–171, 177, 184, 186, 188, 190 f., 193, 197 f., 202, 208, 219, 222 George Woods 55 Georgetown University 55 f. Gerald Rudolph Ford 175 Geraldo Eufrásio de Moura 66 Getúlio Vargas 2, 7, 9, 13, 24, 33, 35, 105, 132 Gilbert Huber Jr 57 Gilbert Richmond 44–46, 81 Golbery do Couto e Silva 206 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 177 Government Economic Action Program (PAEG) 68 Guanabara Union of Telegraph, Radio and Telephone Workers 51 Guaracy Sousa Sampaio 75 Guarantee Fund for Time of Service (FGTS) 69, 140 Gulf Oil International 28 Gustavo Monzon Quintero 76 Harold Cecil Poland 55 Harold Kaufman 154 Harry S. Truman 8 Hélcio Maghenzani 45, 182, 191

Index

Helder Câmara 129 Hélio Beltrão 92 f. Henry Kissinger 175 Henry S. Woodbridge 27 Herbert Baker 43, 80, 96, 100, 103, 130, 134, 145, 151, 165 Herbert Kemmsies 124, 128 Herbert Levy 38 Hércules Correia dos Reis 37 Hugo Miorin 76 Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco 11 Ibrahim Antun Ruiz 66 Institutional Act no. 5 (AI-5) 18 Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action\; IBAD) 31 Instituto Cultural do Trabalho (Labor Cultural Institute) 12 Instituto de Pesquisa e Estudos Sociais (Institute for Research and Social Studies\; IPES) 31 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 41 Inter-American Economic and Social Council (CIES) 42 Inter-American Federation of Professional Journalists Organization (FIOPP) 80 Inter-American Federation of Working Newspapermen’s Organizations (IAFWNO) 75 Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) 8 Inter-Union Anti-Wage Squeeze Movement (Movimento Intersindical Antiarrocho, MIA) 110 International Chemical Federation (ICF) 121 International Education Institute 28 International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, and Technical Employees (IFCCTE) 75, 85 International Federation of Commercial, Clerical, Professional and Technical Employees (FIET) 123 International Federation of Metalworkers (FITIM) 122 International Federation of Oil and Chemical Workers (IFOCW) 84

235

International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW) 11, 75, 112, 210 International Fund for Economic and Social Education 28 International Labor Organization (ILO) 80 International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) 24 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 40 International Trade Secretariats (ITS) 11, 75, 210 International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) 43, 75 International Union of Food and Allied Workers (IUF) 84 Interstate Federation of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Workers of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro 35 Israel Klabin 55 Itaborahy Feitosa Martins 84, 133 ITT 28 Ivalino Alves da Cruz 171 J. Peter Grace 27 J. R. Hoffa 140 J. W. Fulbright 177 Jack (Joaquin Francisco) Otero 123 Jack Liebof 89, 111, 127 Jacó Bittar 218 Jair Meneguelli 219 James I. McFarland 151 Jamil Amiden 105 Jânio Quadros 6, 24, 39, 78 Jarbas Passarinho 51, 61, 108 f., 127 f., 130 f., 133 f., 136–138, 142, 161, 172, 216, 223 Jay Lovestone 15, 131, 180, 192 f., 208 f., 222 Jessy Friedman 184 João Adelino Prado Neto 57 João Batista de Lira 163 João Fassbender Teixeira 145 João Goulart 1, 2, 6, 11, 13, 21, 24, 34, 38 f., 46, 51, 53, 65, 69, 75, 105, 137, 145, 213 João Monlevade 218 João Reginaldo Cotrim 55 João Theophilo de Souza 66 João Wagner 41, 45, 67, 86, 129, 145, 191 Joaquim dos Santos Andrade 193, 219

236

Index

Joaquim Gonçalves 88 John F. Kennedy 1 John Fishburn 168 John Francis Snyder 45 John Lewis 4 John Sweeney 220 John Tuthill 97 John W. Tuthill 97, 100, 146, 223 Johns Hopkins University 64 Johnson & Johnson International 28 José Alceu Câmara Portocarrero 124 José B. Braga 166 José Barbosa de Almeida 45 José Belarmindo da Silva 147 José Belisário Velloso 31 José de Araújo Plácido 88 José de Magalhães Pinto 93 José de Segadas Viana 34 José Ferreira da Silva 206 José Ibrahim 109 José Luís Bulhões Pedreira 55 José Maria Ribeiro 112, 163 José Richa 61 José Roberto Whitaker Penteado 60 José Rotta 45, 48, 67 José Sanches Duran 36 José Sarney 143 José V. Freitas Marcondes 124 Joseph Beirne 4, 23, 27, 30, 191 Joviano de Araújo 124 Juan Domingo Bosch 10 Juan T. Trippe 27 Julio Barata 176 Julio de Mesquita Filho 57 Juracy Magalhães 53, 63 f., 84, 93, 106, 149 Juscelino Kubitschek 34 Justo Canaviri 23 Konrad Adenauer

105

Laurindo Marchezan 66 Leopold Geyer 58 Leopoldo Beltrano 48 Leopoldo Brissac 45, 191 Lincoln Gordon 1 Lloyd Haskins 131, 210 Louis Berger 202

Lourival Coutinho 112, 125, 134 Luís Carlos Vasco 146–148 Luis Werneck 57 Luiz Augusto Rego Monteiro 47 Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 206, 218 Luiz Menossi 36, 191 Luiz Tenório de Lima 37 Luiz Villares 55 Lyndon B. Johnson 149, 208

74

Manoel Constantino 206 Manuel Pavon 118 Maria Helena Moreira Alves 218 Maria Zélia Stadium 198 Mário Covas 143 Mário Lopes de Oliveira 45, 115 Mário Toledo de Morais 45 Marvin Myrtue 124 Marxist Revolutionary Workers’ Organization (POLOP) 109 Medralo Gomero 123 Merck and Company 27 Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo do Campo 217 f. Meyer Bernstein 203 Michael Boggs 20, 171, 193 Moacir de Oliveira 207 Moacyr Gaya 109, 127, 164 Movimento Democratico Sindical (MSD) 65 Mozart Vitor Russomano 145 N. Thompson Powers 145 National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) 48 National Confederation of Commercial Workers (CNTC) 123 National Confederation of Credit Workers (CONTEC) 114 National Confederation of Industrial Commerce Workers (CNTC) 77 National Confederation of Industry Workers (CNTI) 34 National Confederation of Workers in the Construction Industries 36 National Housing Bank (BNH) 70, 105 National Labor Front (FNT) 49

Index

National Liberation Alliance (ALN) 173 National Popular Labor Movement (MNPT) 35 National Salary Department (DNS) 95 National Student Association (NSA) 108 Nelson Ferreira de Bastos 118 Nelson Rockefeller 25, 27 f., 108 Niles W. Bond 54, 74, 86 f., 89 Nilo Tavares 118 O Estado de S. Paulo 53, 57, 61, 67, 80, 132 f., 195, 202 O Globo 77, 168 October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR8) 173 Oil Distillation and Refining Industry Workers’ Union in the states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro 112 Oil Workers’ Union of Campinas 218 Olavo Hansen 198 Olavo Previatti 45, 66 f., 75, 86, 120, 182, 191, 193 Olívio Resende de Melo 169 Omar Becu 38 Operation Brother Sam 13 Operation Topsy 98 Ophelia Rabello 81 Organization of American States (OAS) 39 Orlando Previatti 131 Otávio Bulhões 68 Otávio Maia 118 Owens Illinois 28 Pan American World Airways 27 Parliamentary Inquiry Committee (CPI) 215 Paulo Ayres Filho 55–58, 72 f., 222 Paulo de Oliveira e Silva 127 Paulo Henrique Amorim 115 Paulo Malty 171 Paulo Reis de Magalhães 55 f. Paulo René de Assis Bueno 170 Peace Corps 6, 15 Pedro Daniel 206 People’s Action (Ação Popular, AP) 79 Petrobras 113, 116, 130, 139, 163 Philip Agee 15 Philip Siekman 56

237

Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC) of Rio de Janeiro 49 Pope John XXIII 61 Pope Leo XIII 61 Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (PTTI) 43, 66, 80 Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers’ International (PTTI) 76 Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina 10 Raphael Martinelli 37, 47 Regional Labor Office (DRT) 109 Reinaldo Santos 148–150, 172 Rerum Novarum 59, 61 Retail Clerks International 168 Revolutionary Workers’ Party (POR) 198 Reynaldo Santana 126 Richard Helms 180 Richard Nixon 187 Rivaldo Gonçalves Otero 164 Robert C. Hill 27 Robert H. Dockery 3, 94, 178 Robert J. Alexander 20, 97, 120, 193, 200 Robert Sayre 84 Roberto Campos 57, 68, 72, 84, 93, 100, 102 f., 106, 139 Roberto Gebara 44, 77, 107, 202 Rômulo Augustus Pereira de Souza 157 Rômulo Marinho 51, 66, 106, 115, 124 Rubens Resstel 57 Rutgers University 36, 193 Ruy de Azevedo Sodré 45 Salvador Allende 26, 205 Salvador Lossaco 37 Salvador Tolezano 194 Sam Haddad 210 f. Samuel Gompers 3 Sandra Cavalcanti 105–107, 122, 134, 191, 202 Santos Union of Urban Rail Workers 76 São Paulo Drivers Trade Union 66 São Paulo Paper and Cardboard Union 45 São Paulo State Federation of the Paper and Cardboard Industry 66 Sebastião Ribeiro da Luz 59

238

Index

Serafino Romualdi 15, 20, 24, 26 f., 31 f., 43–45, 84, 89, 95, 97, 125, 209, 222 Severino Moretti 167 Silvio Nunes da Silva Rocha 160 Social Action Fund (FAS) 60 Social Labor Party (PST) 143 Stanley Gacek 218, 222 Stuart H. Van Dyke 102 Superior Labor Court (TST) 67, 115, 121, 144, 163 Syndulpho Pequeno 38 Themistocles Alves dos Santos Thomas Braden 107 Thomas Mann 55, 84, 106 Trajano José das Neves 127 Tru-Temper Copper Corporation

84

28

União Sindical dos Trabalhadores (UST) 65 Union of Chemical Industry Workers of Rio de Janeiro 35 Union of Tailors and Dressmakers 45 United Auto Workers (UAW) 26, 131 United Corporation 27 United States Department of Labor 83, 144 University of Chicago 24 University of Puerto Rico 10

University of São Paulo 45, 144, 173 US Department of Labor (USDL) 95 Vasco Leitão da Cunha 63 f., 101, 156 Vicente Lombardo Toledano 26 Victor Reuther 104, 131, 179 Vila Gompers 107, 190 Vladimir Herzog 206 W. R. Grace Company 27 W. W. Rostow 55 Waldomiro Macedo 147 Walter Alves Lima 169 Walter Perachi Barcellos 74 Walter Reuther 131, 149 f. William Doherty Jr. 193 William E. Pollard 152 William F. Schnitzler 169 William Green 3 William M. Hickey 27 William Medeiros 123, 126, 144 World Bank 55, 65 World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 5, 33 World War II 4, 6 f., 9, 14, 21, 24, 57, 111, 178 Xavier Vela

89