History of the Cold War: From the Korean War to the Present [1] 0394706110, 9780394706115

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• FROM TO

THE THE

• KOREAN PRESENT

WAR

A LS O BY A N D 1 İ F O N T A 1 N B

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR F RO M THE O C T O B E R R E V O L U T I O N TO THB KOREAN WAR

A DIVISION

OF

RANDOM

HOUSE

NEW YORK

ANDRÉ FONTAINE

F R O M T H E K O R E A N WAR TO T H E P R E S E N T •

•

T R A N S L A T E D FR O M T H E F R E N C H BY

RENAUD

P A N T H E O N

BRUCE

B O O K S

PISST

AMERICAN

EDITION

Copyright © 1969 by Random House, Inc. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States by Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc., New York, and simultaneously in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto. Originally published in France as Histoire de la Guerre Froide. Copyright © 1965 by Librairie Arthème Fayard, Paris. Libraıy of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-19180 Manufactured in the United States of America by The Book Press, Brattleboro, Vermont Typography by Kenneth Miyamoto

C O N T E N T S LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS

xi INTRODUCTION

3

PA RT

ONE

L E A R N IN G T H E F A C T S O F C O E X IS T E N C E C h ap ter 1 • W AR IN TH E NAM E O F PEACE (1950-1951) Invasion of South Korea. Chinese intervention. Dismissal of MacArthur. Start of armistice talks. 9 C h a p te r 2 • TH E APPEA L TO TH E VANQUISHED (1950-1952) The H-bomb. Peace with Japan. German rearmament. 31 C h ap ter 3 • TH E CHANGE O F COMMAND (1951-1953) Churchill’s return to power. The election of Eisenhower. The death of Stalin. 50 C hapter 4 • TH E THAW (1953) The Korean armistice. The East Berlin uprising. The fall of Beria. Resumption of negotiations on Germany. The “Atoms for Peace” plan. 63 C hapter 5 • CUTTING TH EIR LOSSES (1953-1954) The Bermuda and Berlin conferences. Dien Bien Phu. Discussions on American intervention in Viet Nam. The conference and the accords of Geneva. 82 C hapter 6 • TH E SPIR IT O F GENEVA (1954-1955) The Manila Pact. The crisis in the Formosa Strait. Bandung. The failure of the European Army project. The Paris Accords. The Geneva “summit” and the “open skies” plan. Adenauer visits Moscow. 112

HISTORY

OF

THE

COLD WAR

C hapter 7 • A W ALL BU ILT ON TH E SAND (1947-1955) The creation of the state of Israel. The Iranian petroleum crisis. The Baghdad Pact. 136 C hapter 8 • TH E M IRAGE (1955-1956) Soviet arms shipments to Egypt. The Aswan Dam. Nation­ alization of the Suez Canal. Preparations for the FrancoBritish intervention. 161 C hapter 9 • SPRING IN OCTOBER (1954-1956) Khrushchev visits Peking. The fall of Malenkov. The Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. and destalinization. The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. Gomulka’s return to power. 185 C hapter 10 • TH E FIRST “W EEK O F TRU TH ” (1956) — BUDAPEST 210 C hapter 11 • TH E FIRST “W EEK O F TRU TH ” (1956) —SUEZ 233 C hapter 12 • NO SALVATION OUTSIDE TH E CHURCH (1956-1957) The end of the Suez crisis. The Eisenhower Doctrine. The crises in Jordan and Syria. The tightening of controls in the Soviet bloc. 252

P A R T TWO C H IN A T A K E S U P T H E T O R C H C hapter 13 • HIS M AJESTY SPUTNIK (1957-1958) Intercontinental weapons. Talks on disarmament. The 1957 Communist summit. Cessation of nuclear tests. Return of de Gaulle. Coup d'état in Iraq and the crisis in the Levant. Second crisis in the Formosa Strait. 283 C hapter 14 • TH E CANCEROUS TUM OR (1958-1960) Soviet ultimatum on Berlin. The Geneva Conference. Khrushchev visits the United States and China. The SinoIndian conflict. Khrushchev visits France. 311

C hapter 15 • TH E SHOE ON TH E TABLE (1960) The abortive Paris summit. Beginnings of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev at the U.N. The December 1960 Communist summit. 337 C hapter 16 • TH E COLD W AR IN TH E TROPICS (1956-1961) Decolonization. The Congo crisis. Guatelama. Cuba. Laos. 358 C hapter 17 • TH E COUNTEROFFENSIVE (1961) The election of Kennedy. The strengthening of America’s strategic position. The Bay of Pigs. The death of Lumumba and Hammarskjöld. The neutralization of Laos. The Amer­ ican intervention in Viet Nam. 387 C hapter 18 • TH E W ALL (1961-1962) The meeting of the two K’s in Vienna. The Berlin Wall. The Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U. 412 C h ap ter 19 • TH E SECOND “W EEK O F TRU TH ” (1962) Soviet difficulties in the third world. The Cuban missile crisis. 432 C hapter 20 • TH E ARM ISTICE (1962-1963) The Berlin détente. The Sino-Indian conflict. The ideologi­ cal split between Moscow and Peking. The treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. The assassination of Kennedy. 461

EPILO G U E (1963-1968) 476 CHRONOLOGY

492 THE MAJOR FIGURES

503 INDEX

511

I * The principal battles of the Cold War II * The war and the armistice in Korea III * The Indochina War and the Geneva Accords IV • The Formosa Strait V

• The Cold War in the Middle East

12-13 16 85 115 142-43

VI

* The Himalayan conflict

331

V II

• The struggle for Africa

360

* The Caribbean region

443

V III

L IST OP A B B R E V IA T IO N S

A.l.O.C. —Anglo-Iranian Oil Company A N Z U S —Treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand Comecon —Organization of Mutual Cooperation of the European socialist countries Cominform —Information Bureau of the National Workers’ Parties C.P.S.U.—Communist Party of the Soviet Union Ex-Com — Executive Committee (of the National Security Council of the United States during the Cuban crisis) G .D .R . —East German Democratic Republic N A S A —National Aeronautics and Space Administration N.

E .P . — New Economic Policy

N J .O .C . —National Iranian Oil Company O. A .S .— Organization of the Secret Army (in Algeria) O .A S . — Organization of American States N A T O — North Atlantic Treaty Organization SE A TO — Southeast Asia Treaty Organization U .A .R . — United Arab Republic

• FROM TO

THE THE

• KOREAN PRESENT

WAR

I N T R O D U C T I O N

F I F T Y YEA RS A F T E R T H E B O LSH EV IK R E V O L U T IO N , HAS

the Cold War, its illegitimate offspring, finally come to an end? It would be premature to give a positive answer to that question while its most sinister symbol, the Berlin Wall, still stands in the heart of Europe, while Czechoslovakia is occupied by the troops of a bloc she is forbidden to leave, and while tens of thousands of Marxist guerrillas still clash with the superbly equipped gendarmes of the affluent society in Viet Nam. Moscow and Washington continue to invest a wealth of technological genius and fantastic amounts of money in the search for miracle weapons, for protective shields against those weapons and for the means of foiling those defenses. But every day, also, the two superpowers of the modem world are more clearly con­ vinced that, in the nuclear age, force is incapable of resolving the differences over which, several times, they have come within inches of annihilating humanity. This second volume of the History o f the Cold War, which opens with the Korean War—the climax of the confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the bourgeois world— is, like the first, an attempt to analyze those differences and to retrace the chain of numerous result­ ing tests of strength. The last one goes back to 1962. That year, Kennedy and Khrushchev found themselves engaged in a dramatic confrontation over Cuba, when the least false step could have brought about a catastrophe. But having faced each other “eyeball to eyeball” during a long October week, they resolved that they would do every­ thing possible to avoid the recurrence of such adventures, and less than a year later, in August 1963, their foreign ministers signed a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. It has been said repeatedly that the technological significance of that accord was minor, and no one denies it, but its political signif­ •

3

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INTRODUCTION icance was immense, as it coincided with the first denunciation of Mao’s heresy by the Kremlin. For the first time in its history the country of the October Revolu­ tion placed the conclusion of an accord with “imperialism” before the maintenance of the unity in the socialistic bloc. Contrary to what the Communists had believed for years, it was clear that in their camp as well, competition between national interests could be stronger than ideological solidarity and the similarity of social sys­ tems. It is too early, of course, to speak of a reversal of alliances, but when one faces two enemies fighting each other, one cannot long refuse to choose between them. In any case the Chinese, for their part, have already decided that the Soviet “revisionists” have “effectively” become the allies of the Americans. The turning point in the summer of 1963, which neither Ken­ nedy’s subsequent assassination nor Khrushchev’s sudden fall really changed, marks the provisional termination of a “cold war” which historians will probably see more and more as the Third World War; a war in which it has been possible to localize the recourse to arms, but whose extreme severity was relative to its stakes— the triumph, on a world scale, of one or the other of two apparently irreconcilable social conceptions of life. In reality the Moscow treaty has confirmed the failure of the claims of each of them. The game that started immediately following the defeat of the Reich ended in a draw, in an armistice without victor or vanquished. One already wonders whether the Fourth World War, in which China will be one of the belligerents, will see it opposed either to the United States or to the U.S.S.R., or to both at the same time, and whether or not it will remain cold. Unless, of course, an unforeseen reversal brings back to power in Peking friends of the Moscow “revisionists”— which does not mean, however, that the Soviet bloc would thereby regain the conquering dynamism which earned it so many admirers and so many enemies twenty years ago. Such speculations remain beyond the scope of this book. The au­ thor has attempted to take his revenge on time-serving journalism in doing the work of a historian. Has he succeeded? Of all the readers who have been willing to share with him their feelings on the first volume of this work, only one— not, however, the least— thought it was pre­

• 4 *

INTRODUCTION mature to write the history of the Cold War. It is tempting to rebut him with Pascal, for whom “any history which is not contemporary is suspect.” As for me, I am rather tempted to believe that meeting the protagonists and knowing the places where events took place are no less necessary than a knowledge of the archives when trying to understand an epoch. Yet while the historian may not have at his disposal all the documents—who will ever have them, and who in our paper~consuming time could ever examine them?— at least he must not ignore whole segments of reality which, at the moment, are not perceptible. Alfred Fabre-Luce is correct in citing, in his brilliant Histoire démaquillée, the words of Jules Isaac, one of the most impartial historians in this century: “It is later, always later, that the disquieting visage of reality appears.” Reality: that is precisely what I have tried to find in this book; the reality that the revelations of destalinization and the publication of the principal elements in the Sino-Soviet dispute have greatly helped to discover, in retrospect. Unfortunately, one of the sources has dried up since Khrushchev's fall. And, also, for the history of American diplomacy since Kennedy's death, we do not have at our disposal the unrivaled documents such as those that three of his close advisers— Ted Sorensen, Arthur Schlesinger and Pierre Salinger — have devoted to his presidency. In particular everything concerning Viet Nam remains too controversial and insufficiently known to be talked about with the necessary serenity and objectivity. Those two reasons— the importance of the turning point of 1963 and the insufficiency of information on the subsequent period— made me end the story of the Cold War there. For what followed, I have limited myself to an epilogue whose conclusions will probably have to be revised. It remains for me to express my deep gratitude to the politicians and the diplomats who have been willing to search their memories for me or to discuss certain aspects of the events I am reporting; to my friends on Le M onde, without whose archives and advice the number of inevitable errors and omissions in such a book would certainly be much greater; to the readers— known and unknown— who have encouraged me to continue; and finally to the critics from all sides, who agreed in recognizing the honesty of my approach. Will •

5

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INTRODUCTION they say as much of the second volume? This one reports events which I have followed too closely not to have been passionately involved in. However, my readers can be sure that, as with the first volume, it has been written dispassionately and with the single aim of presenting, as jurists say, the facts of the case.

P A R T

O N E

God wanted to stop their continual quarreling, and when he found that it was impossible, he fastened their heads together . . . —Plato, Phaedo

•

CHAPTER

1

•

WAR IN THE

Being the strongest, he does not consider himself the aggressor, and he defines his intention to invade the lands of free peoples as self-defense. — Bossuet, Political Principles Drawn from Holy Scripture

A T DAW N ON SU N D A Y , J U N E 29, 1950, N O R T H K O REA N

troops crossed in force the narrow demarcation line which, at the 38th Parallel, divided the people’s democracy from the pro-Western regime of the aging Syngman Rhee. The Cold War was becoming a hot war. The news seemed so unbelievable, in spite of warnings which American intelligence had been sending out for weeks, that at first, people refused to take it seriously. A journalist passing through Tokyo asked MacArthur if it was advisable for him to delay his return to the United States. The hero of the Pacific war, now the American proconsul in Japan, advised him not to be concerned over such a trifle. Soon, however, the evidence had to be accepted. The North Koreans had committed almost the whole of their small, Rus­ sian-equipped army—four divisions and three brigades of militia. The attack was launched at four different points and was combined with amphibious operations. In order to justify itself, the govern­ ment of Pyongyang— the Communist capital— maintained, in an order of the day, that the South Korean Government, after having rejected all offers for the unification of the country, had invaded the .

9

.

H IS T O R Y OF

THE

COLD WAR

North. Under those circumstances their own action was no more than simple retaliation. This contention, which every Communist party the world over was to obstinately uphold for years, doesn’t really stand up. The evident disproportion of forces involved, the need for extensive preparation, the speed with which they achieved their gains, all prove that the North Koreans had long premeditated their attack. Who made the decision? Even today on this side of the Iron Curtain no one knows with certainty. Khrushchev’s secret report on the crimes of Stalin is silent on the subject. However, it is im­ probable that the dictator had not, at least, approved the attack. From the day the war began, the Moscow press upheld Pyongyang’s explanation without any reservations. If the Soviet leaders had not been informed of the plans of their Korean protégés, they would have needed time to formulate their position. On the other hand, the Chinese newspapers waited to learn the Russian attitude before fall­ ing into line. Whether it was Russia or North Korea who first conceived the attack is of only secondary importance. What is clear is that no one in the Communist bloc had foreseen its repercussions. Once before, when he hurled his troops against Finland in 1939, Stalin had be­ lieved that the affair would be settled in a few days and at little cost. He had been mistaken and was, consequently, more prudent from then on. But this time an unfortunate statement by the Ameri­ can Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had probably convinced him there was no risk. On January 12, 1950, speaking before the Na­ tional Press Club, Acheson had declared that the “defensive perim­ eter” of the United States extended from the Aleutians to Japan, and from there to the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines, which clearly excluded Korea. And he had added: “. . . so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military at­ tack. . . .” 1 MacArthur himself, in an interview given to a British journalist March 1, 1949, had expressed the same opinion. Obviously, this was almost an invitation to invasion. Besides, how could anyone believe that America, which had not intervened while io

•

W A R I N T H E N A M E OF P E A C E the Communists took over the whole of China, would fight for a small piece of Korea which its troops had evacuated the year before? Dean Acheson’s declaration seemed to herald the adoption of a peripheral strategy, perfectly understandable on the part of a country possessing powerful atomic weapons but very poor in “conventional” means of waging war. Stalin could not have known that in April 1950 the National Security Council of the United States, in a session presided over by Truman, had completely abandoned that strategy and determined to rebuild its armed forces and put the country in a position to meet any challenge. Starting with the premise that there existed between the Communist and democratic ideologies a fundamental incompati­ bility which would keep them in conflict for a long time, the report adopted by the Security Council, known as N.S.C. 68, provided for the allocation of some 20 percent of the government’s income to military expenses, and for an increase in the defense budget from $13 to $50 billion. If the implementation of that report had not begun immediately, American forces would have been unable to offer serious opposition to the invasion of South Korea. Another factor may help to explain the attack. Three weeks earlier the elections in South Korea had given a clear majority to the opponents of Syngman Rhee, the unpredictable old man who after thirty-three years in exile had become the first President of the Republic in August 1948. This was despite the fact that he had vigorously repressed, by methods somewhat less than democratic, all reputed Communist activities, imprisoning 14,000 people, includ­ ing 14 Deputies. The increasing deterioration of the country’s eco­ nomic situation was followed by general unrest. The government was unable to manage its finances, and Washington obliged it to agree to general elections only by threatening to cut off all aid. None of this prevented Rhee from loudly proclaiming his intention to attack the North, which thus had more than one excuse to invoke selfdefense and to suppose its troops would be welcomed as liberators. It is obvious that on June 25, 1950, the day hostilities began, no one in the North or the South believed the division of the country, resurrected from its ashes after the capitulation of Japan, would be permanent.

I

T H E P R I N C I P A L B A T T LE S

o e

U.S.S.R. and its allies “Unfriendly” allies Large American base Large British base

OF T H E COLD WAR

HISTORY

OF

THE

COLD WAR

That division had been effected solely to permit the Russians and the Americans to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops, and as early as 1947, serious efforts had been made to end it. The Soviet-American Commission created the year before had agreed in principle to consult with all “democratic” political parties to learn their views on the kind of provisional government to be formed. But soon, with the rejection of the Marshall Plan by the Eastern countries, tensions developed, and the Commission, unable to agree on the list of the parties to be consulted, was obliged to disband. Washington had then advocated elections in the two zones to select a single parliament which would appoint the provisional gov­ ernment. On November 14, the United Nations General Assembly had unanimously adopted, minus the votes of the Soviet bloc, a resolution to that effect, instructing a commission to make an onthe-spot study of measures to be taken later. But that commission had not been able to enter North Korea and had refused to accept the results of the elections held in the South on May 10, 1948. In August, Soviet-style elections were held in the North. Each of the two Parliaments claimed to represent the whole of the country. One hundred seats had been reserved for the Deputies of the North in the Seoul Parliament. As for the Pyongyang Parliament, 360 of its S72 members had been chosen by a group of delegates who affirmed that they spoke for the South. On October 12, Moscow recognized Kim-il-Sung as head of the North Korean Government, after his appointment to that post by the northern Parliament. Earlier he had fought as a guerrilla against the Japanese and had served in the ranks of the Red Army at Stalin­ grad. On January 1, 1949, putting into effect a provisional agree­ ment, Washington did as much for Syngman Rhee. All the conditions for civil war had been met, and the only thing which prevented it— as in Germany—was the presence of troops of two powers determined to avoid an armed confrontation which could be as fatal to one as to the other. As a result, when the U.S.S.R. on that same January 1 announced the complete withdrawal of its forces, Truman, after hesitation and deliberation, could find no other alternative but to follow suit— six months later. The former President, in his Memoirs, gives no completely satis­ •

14

.

W A R I N T H E N A M E OF P E A C E factory explanation for that decision beyond the fact that MacArthur favored it and that the experts regarded the outlook as “favorable as long as it can continue to receive larger scale aid from the U.S.” 2 It is apparent that, above all, the decision must be credited to the setback suffered by the United States in China, and to the hostility of the Korean population to the occupying forces, whose chief, General Hodge, had committed blunder after blunder. This soldier’s skill and intelligence did not equal his courage, and no one had forgiven him the remark imputed to him on his arrival in Seoul that “Koreans are the same breed of cats as the Japanese,” 8 or his decision to retain Japanese functionaries in their posts. S

I