Rhetoric and Argumentation: Proceedings of the International Conference, Lugano, April 22–23, 1997 (USI, Facoltà di Scienze della comunicazione) [Reprint 2015 ed.] 9783110938814, 9783484750197

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Beiträge zur Dialogforschung

Band 19

Herausgegeben von Franz Hundsnurscher und Edda Weigand

Rhetoric and Argumentation Proceedings of the International Conference Lugano, April 22-23, 1997 USI, Facoltà di Scienze della comunicazione

Edited by Eddo Rigotti In collaboration with Sara Cigada

Max Niemeyer Verlag Tübingen 1999

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Rhetoric and argumentation : proceedings of the international conference, Lugano, April 22-23, 1997 / USI, Facoltà di Scienze della Comunicazione. Ed. by Eddo Rigotti. In collab. with Sara Cigada. - Tübingen : Niemeyer, 1999 (Beiträge zur Dialogforschung ; Bd. 19) ISBN 3-484-75019-7

ISSN 0940-5992

© Max Niemeyer Verlag GmbH, Tübingen 1999 Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier. Druck: Weihert-Druck GmbH, Darmstadt Buchbinder: Nadele Verlags- und Industriebuchbinderei, Nehren

Table of Contents

Preface

IX

Rhetoric in Argumentation

1

Frantisek Danes Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

3

Vincenzo Lo Cascio Narration in Argumentation: a Rhetorical Strategy

13

Eddo Rigotti The Enthymeme as a Rhetorical Device and as a Textual Process

39

Edda Weigand Rhetoric and Argumentation in a Dialogic Perspective

53

Rhetoric and Text Analysis

71

Kirsten Adamzik / Christa Pieth Rhetorik der wissenschaftlichen Kommunikation im Sprachvergleich (Deutsch — Französisch) Am Beispiel von Vorwörtern zu Literaturgeschichten

73

Marie-Hélène Boblet- Viart Questions de paroles: le roman dialogué en France depuis 1960

87

VI

Sara Cigada Uoratio grammatica et son "extension" rhétorique: Priscien et Roger Bacon

101

Svëtla Cmejrkovâ Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advertisement

113

Maria Cristina Gatti Negative Rhetorical Figures and Argumentation

125

Daniela Pirazzini Rhetorische Fragen in gegenargumentativen Kontexten

135

Galia Yanoshevsky An Anti-Cartesian Dream? A Critique of Rationalism in Surrealism's First Manifesto

143

Rhetoric, Argumentation and Reason

155

Massimo A. Bonfantini /Susan Petrilli /Augusto Ponzio The Dialogue of Lying and Truth: Rhetoric versus Argumentation

157

Marianne Doury Les procédés de crédibilisation des témoignages comme indices des normes argumentatives des locuteurs

167

Barbara A. Emmel The Enthymeme and Argument

181

Robert Maier Types of Debate

193

Christian Plantin La construction rhétorique des émotions

203

VII Rhetoric in Oral Interactions

221

Laurie Anderson The Co-construction of Competence in Oral Examinations

223

Carla Bazzanella Metaphor in Classroom Interaction

237

Liliana Ionescu-Ruxändoiu Argumentation as a Strategy in Face-to-face Interaction

247

Werner Kallmeyer Others' Inserts in an Ongoing Turn Some Sequential, Grammatical and Rhetoric Observations

255

List of Contributors,

.269

Preface

In April 1997, a team of selected linguists met in Lugano for the I.A.D.A. Conference Rhetoric and Argumentation. At that time the University of Lugano was a mere fledgling: it was about to celebrate the accomplishment of its first year of activity (19961997). In this preface to the Conference Proceedings, collected in the present volume of the series Beiträge zur Dialogforschung, it is for me a special pleasure to recall those days, when many notorious scholars and dear friends from all over Europe (the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Romania, Switzerland; even from Tel Aviv) shared an important step in this University's scientific growth, demonstrating their esteem for the young Faculty of Communication Sciences by taking part in the meeting. At this point it can be said that promises have been fulfilled and more have been made for the future. The works of the 1997 Lugano Conference took place over two days. As is usual in our Congresses, during both mornings we worked in plenary sessions, while the afternoons were devoted to 'section sessions'. Following this main division, the structure of the volume represents that of the Conference; moreover, contributions to section sessions have been subdivided according to content. In the first part of the Proceedings (Rhetoric in Argumentation) the reader will find the lectures delivered by Frantisek Dane!, Vincenzo Lo Cascio, Edda Weigand and myself. These texts address some central aspects of the role played by rhetoric in argumentation. From various perspectives and with different stresses, these all point to the fact that rhetoric does not represent a counterpart to argumentation, as if they were inconsistent dimensions: on the contrary, the powerful role of rhetoric in argumentative texts is repeatedly underlined. At the same time, these contributions focus on different aspects in which it can be seen that rhetoric itself is "full of reason", not a stranger to it. It should be said that the other 16 contributions also stress the same scientific attitude, albeit in different ways as is conceivable considering the variety of interests and research fields testified. Besides, as the section lectures focus on three main themes, we

X decided to group them in three different sections, namely: Rhetoric and Text Analysis', Rhetoric, Argumentation and Reason; Rhetoric in Oral Interactions. As the reader himself can easily note, two leit-motivs meaningfully emerge in many contributions: first of all, the relation between reason and emotions, and secondly, the fact that the methodological starting point is, naturally, almost always fixed in the analysis of texts, both oral and written ones. I wish to mention here Silvia Gilardoni, who helped Sara Cigada and me prepare the volume for publication. Special thanks should be given to two friends, Sorin Stati, who spared no pains in promoting this I.A.D.A. Meeting, and Edda Weigand, who negotiated the publication of these Proceedings with Max Niemeyer Verlag. I also wish to thank the University of Lugano, as well as the 'Ufficio Studi Universitari del Dipartimento Istruzione e Cultura del Canton Ticino', which gave the Conference friendly hospitality and financial support.

Lugano, Easter 1999

Eddo Rigotti

Rhetoric in Argumentation

Frantisek Danes

Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

1. Argumentation from the viewpoint of discourse studies 2. Pragmatic aspects of argumentation 3. Emotion in argumentative discourse 4. An analysis of two argumentative passages from dramatic texts References

1. Argumentation from the viewpoint of discourse studies

At the beginning let us consider the status of the term argumentation in discourse studies. I suggest differentiating three levels of its employment. On the first level, the general one, we find different stylistic modes of subject-matter presentation, that is, typical ways in which thematic material will be grasped and, in the construction and production of a text, processed and presented. At least the following modes can be distinguished: descriptive, narrative, expository, argumentative, reflective. On the second level, that of individual texts, we often find passages based on different modes, but mostly one of the modes appears as dominant or typical. Thirdly, when in a given text such predominance is highly conspicuous, then this text could be characterized as a description, a narration, an argumentation. This kind of characterization should not, however, be identified with the text types (sorts) or genres: these are specific formations (Ger. Gestaltungen) arranged or organized according to a text pattern (I mean formats such as the historical novel, a business letter, a lecture, etc.). Thus argumentative passages appear in various texts belonging to different genres. Argumentative passages are mainly of dialogical character, both in spoken and written communication (also in literary texts) and, in turn, argumentation is an essential part of dialogues. "Dialogues are argumentative texts par excellence", asserted Freddi (1998). Moreover, even without accepting the claim that any language use is dialogical, we clearly recognize evident dialogic features in monological texts (often written). A classical example of such an "inner dialogue" is the famous Hamlet's monologue "To be, or not to be ..." Its underlying dialogical structure corresponds to the particular steps in the process of argumentation.

4

Frantisek Danes

2. Pragmatic aspects of argumentation

If we consider "argumentation" as a piece of discourse, then we have to respect that it has its producer and receiver (interpreter), that it is going-on in a particular speech situation (context), and, consequently, to take all the pragmatic moments involved in these three factors into account, lock, stock and barrel. The partners enter argumentative discourse in their integrity, with their entire mental endowment, and all their human faculties (cognition, will, emotion) are operative in the process of argumentation. The classical rhetoric (in principle logical) approach to argumentation is of a formal character. It aims at a "rational reconstruction" of the assumed strict logical schema underlying any argumentation, consisting in the presentation of premises and presupposing proper rules of inference by means of which the given opinion can be justified or proved. It may be that this simplified and idealized picture could more or less fit some types of argumentative discourses in purely rational and intellectual domains, but it has a low validity in the bulk of the other argumentative discourses or passages in various domains and of different stylistic types. 1. First, any argumentation inseparably involves the above mentioned pragmatic moments of individual and social nature, which are operative both on the speaker's and the receiver's side, though in different ways. Thus argumentation reflects preferences, interests, value orientations, as well as the set (or system) of personal features and dispositions of individual partners, especially their actual manifestations prompted by the on-going discourse. Among others, it is omnipresent emotion (or affect) that plays an enormous role. No less consequential are the experience and competence of the partners, particularly differences between them, be it differences in the particular modules of knowledge, in various skills, intellectual abilities, inclinations, stereotypes, prejudices, and the like. - Last but not least, the important fact that argumentation is contextdependent or context-bound should be mentioned. 2. Second, it is dubious, to what a measure argumentation is, in fact, based on strict logical schemata and rules of inference (sometimes called "cognitive reasoning"). It is significant that Johnson-Laird (1983) arrived at the conclusion that "reasoning ordinarily proceeds without recourse to a mental logic with formal rules of inference ... The simplest inferences depend on the interrelations between propositions, not on their internal structure" (41). "People follow extra-logical heuristics when they make spontaneous inferences. They appear to be guided by the principle of maintaining the

Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

5

semantic content of the premises but expressing it with greater linguistic economy" (40). Other authors (e.g. von Wright) speak of "practical" or "instrumental" reasoning or inferring. L. Tondl (1997) goes further and maintains that this kind of reasoning does not have, in fact, a character of logical inference and that it is rather a form of association. It manifests a certain level of practical experience and knowledge of the partners and might be regarded as generalized experience or accepted rule. - Viewing this issue from another angle, Aldo di Luzio (1998) arrived at a concurrent and similarly significant claim, namely that "the force and power (vis et potentia) of the arguments are not a function of rational truth - as sheer rationalistic theory would imply - but a function of their socio-cultural relevance for the life-world of the disputants". 3. Third, from the logical point of view, argumentation aims at justification or proof of an opinion or standpoint. On the other hand, argumentation regarded as a piece of discourse is expected to have a certain communicative (illocutionary) function. This function will mostly be seen in the producer's endeavour to convince or persuade the partner. Of course, in ordinary argumentative discourses, this persuasive function mostly occurs in differently modified varieties (mainly weakened ones) or combinations. Thus the aim of the arguing person may be to gain support or assent to or acceptance of his/her opinion, of the proposed course of action, and the like, briefly, to win the partner over. Sometimes further (accessory) functions may be present, for instance to influence the partner's behaviour or mental state, to "show o f f ' , to put the partner down, to deceive him/her, or, in turn, to win his favour, etc. The persuasive

communicative

function, being the overall

function of

an

argumentative discourse as a whole, involves the various communicative sub-functions of particular component parts of the discourse, that is of paragraphs or individual utterances. I mean such functions as demand, order, prohibition, consent, and several others. 4. Let us add that an analogous analysis can be performed on the level of stylistic (rhetoric) composition

of discourse. Whereas the communicative

(illocutionary)

functions are directed outside the text, to the receiver, the said compositional functions derive from the relations between particular text components as they are set by the producer in the process of building-up the text according to a plan. I have in mind such functions as thesis, antithesis, substantiation, conclusion, exemplification, counterexample, illustration, documentation, enumeration, specification, evaluation, explanation, and many others.

6

Frantisek Danes

3. Emotion in argumentative discourse

In the subsequent part of my paper I will focus on the role of emotion in argumentative discourse. 1. My considerations start with the claim of the omnipresence (ubiquity) of emotion in discourse and with its consequence that any utterance and higher discourse unit has an emotional value (cf. Danes 1987/1990). As regards the relation of emotion to cognition, let us quote Piaget (1961): "The layman would speak about 'emotions' and 'intelligence' as about two opposing faculties, but, in fact, in either of these forms affective as well cognitive aspects of acting take place, so that they in no case represent two independent faculties." Another scholar, Mowrer (1960), went even further and claimed that "the emotions are of quite extraordinary importance ... and do not at all deserve to be put into opposition with 'intelligence', ... [rather they are] themselves a higher order of intelligence." From the side of linguists, let us remember, that as early as in 1927, E. Sapir claimed that "denotative functions of speech are always compounded with certain expressive factors", and a similar claim appeared in the "Theses" of the Prague Lingustic Circle in 1929. - Quite recently, Robert de Beaugrande (1996) explains the present "renaissance of the psychology of emotions" (Scherer's wording, 1986) by pointing to the fact that "the cognitive revolution cleared the way for more elaborated and integrated models of the 'whole man'". For a full understanding of dialogic discourse, the following formulation by Izard (1977) seems to be of primary importance: "The emotions in consciousness influence all perception, cognition, and behaviour. ... Some emotion is always present in ordinary states of consciousness, [although] it is not always cognized or symbolized." The "emotional value" of an utterance can tentatively be defined as the complex of emotions associated with it, in the given communication, both on the producer's and the receiver's side. I do not assume a state of "emotional neutrality", since in a certain situation, also tranquilization or a calm state can reckon as emotional. It is, of course, clear that only those components of the rich emotional complex are linguistically relevant which appear operative in the given discourse interaction. The fundamentally relevant fact is that cognition incites emotion (it is emotiogenic) and, in turn, emotions influence cognitive processes. Moreover, emotions themselves often evoke emotions in the other partner. The latter emotions may be either congruent or incongruent with the stimulus. (Thus anger showed or expressed by the producer can in the receiver elicit an angry emotional response, or ridicule, wonder, and the like). Certain

Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

1

types of emotions tend to be evoked more often cognitively (e.g. grief, by sad news), some others rather by manifestation of an emotion. As regards the extension of the field of emotion, it seems suitable to circumscribe it rather broadly, so that it would comprise not only short-time arousals and non-acute states (moods or feelings), but also more cognitive emotions, evaluative attitudes, emotions accompanying or even implied by opinions and various illocutionary acts. Briefly speaking, there is a whole gamut of related phenomena, whose functioning in discourse interaction justifies treating them as a unique category, though a rather complex one, with its centre and periphery. This decision is substantiated by certain facts from the domain of prosodic and other non-verbal devices of manifestation: By means of a rather complex phonic (vocal) signals, accompanied by some non-vocal features, complex functional wholes can be manifested, in which features of emotionality proper, attitudes, personality traits, together with social categories of the partners, their interpersonal relations and other pragmatic features (also illocutionary functions) are amalgamated. I will not discuss here the rather problematic issue of the classification of emotions. In linguistic description, it seems sufficient to work with a small number of polar dimensions, distinctive positions on the scale between two poles, and degrees of intensity. Sometimes one general "positive - negative" dimension is sufficient. This does not mean, however, that the different "content" classes of emotion are irrelevant to discourse processes. Thus, a positive excitement will influence the partner's discourse activity in a evidently different way than his/her state of anger or, again, of fear. We find interesting suggestions in Izard's (1977) classification. For instance, that interest and excitement "keenly motivate the agent to access knowledge, skills, or make creative innovations", that surprise or startle "deactivate a sector of current processing to clear a space for activating a quick response", or that anger "motivates the agent to defend the goal". The mentioned facts could be subsumed under the catalytic function of emotion: emotional states can promote (stimulate, facilitate), or, again, inhibit (make difficult, damp) discourse processes. Moreover, the impact of emotion concerns all linguistic as well as non-linguistic components of communication. In many languages we find locutions saying that fear or terror paralysed somebody's tongue or speech, or that a person couldn't speak for joy or because he/she was deeply moved. The manifestation of emotions is, in essence, spontaneous. Nevertheless, sometimes the speaker expresses them with a strategic intention, when he/she wants to influence the partner, to achieve a desired effect, to evoke a certain emotional state in the receiver (e.g. to soothe his/her grief by showing sympathy). The distinction "spontaneous vs. strategic"

8

Frantisek Danes

was in the Prague "Theses" labeled "emotional vs. emotive". The intentional manifestation of emotion may be either "sincere", ie. genuine, actually experienced by the speaker, or only performed (more or less pretended, simulated). Furthermore, the speaker can suppress (conceal, hide) his/her emotion, but, at the same time, unawares let it out, reveal it by various features of the utterance and by other communicative as well as non-communicative behaviour. 2. At this point I set forth a general reflection on the correlation between emotion and cognition in discourse. One of the important differences between the two is the fact that while the intensification of cognitive processes appears as a positive and desirable phenomenon, "the more cognition, the better", the intensification or increase of emotion has a threshold of acceptability or tolerability, the threshold being, of course, different with different types of emotion and partly conditioned by cultural norms. Some scholars look at emotion as at an unwanted irrational element, if not as at a regressive or immature behaviour (cf. de Beaugrande, 1996, 557). Emotion will strongly be opposed to cognition and so, in this view, emotion in discourse should be left hidden or, at least, controlled. Such a principle we find formulated, for instance, in the significant Prague paper by E. Weigand (1998). In my opinion, this radical stance is acceptable with several strong qualifications only. First, I think that at least emotions of positive kind, such as liking, inclination, delight, pleasure, joyfull mood, sympathy, and the like, should not be hidden, but, on the contrary, they ought to be manifested. E.g. not to show a friend my pleasure when hearing of his great success, or my sorrow and sympathy when learning about the death of his mother, such a bearing would go against the point. Second, it is true that in a civilized society, the ways of the manifestation of emotion need some control. Nevertheless, a control performed not only by cold reason, but motivated also by ethical emotions (attitudes) and by respecting the situation of the partners. Third, from the psychological and psycho-therapeutic point of view, to keep back or suppress emotions is regarded as unsound, if not dangerous. The so-called ideology of "anti-emotionalism" appears mistaken and undesirable. My counsel would read: Emotions should not be hidden, but cultivated. From my above considerations it follows that we need an integration of emotion with cognition, feeling with thinking. That is, a balanced interaction of the two, in which positive along with negative emotions operate productively and support appropriate actions. In fact, to quote de Beaugrande, "a balanced economy actually needs to accredit both ameliorative and pejorative emotions, and to dynamically weigh off pleasure with

Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

9

displeasure in ways that promote long-range progress" (1996, 557). To achieve such a balance is, of course, difficult. Nonetheless, the integrating potential of discourse offers a prime possibility.

4. An analysis of two argumentative passages from dramatic texts

Without doubt, the most emotionally loaded discourses are the oral ones, especially impromptu speech and dialogue. The ideas expounded in the preceding part of my paper I will illustrate by analysing and interpreting two literary fragments. 1. The first sample is a dramatic passage taken from J. D. Salinger's piece "Zooey": (1) TINA (morosely)-. Oh, darling, darling, darling. I'm not much good to you, am I? (2) RICK: Don't say that. Don't ever say that, you hear me? (3) TINA: It's true, though. I'm a jinx. I'm a horrible jinx. If it hadn't been for me, Scott Kincaid would have assigned you to the Buenos Aires office ages ago. I spoiled all that. (Goes over to window) I'm one of the little foxes that spoil the grapes. I feel like someone in a terribly sophisticated play. The funny part is, I'm not sophisticated. I'm not anything. I'm just me. (Turns) Oh, Rick, Rick, I'm scared. What's happened to us? I can't seem to find us anymore. I reach out and reach out and we're just not there. I'm frightened. I'm a frightened child. (Looks out window) I hate this rain. Sometimes I see me dead in it. (4) RICK (quietly): My darling, isn't that a line from "A Farewell to Arms"? (5) TINA (turns, furious): Get out of here. Get out! Get out of here before I jump out of this window. Do you hear me? (6) RICK (grabbing her): Now you listen to me. You beautiful little moron. You adorable, childish, selfdramatizing. (J. D. Salinger, Zooey, 1964, 71)

To be sure, the analyst of such a printed dialogue is severely handicapped by the absence of phonic suprasegmental as well as other non-verbal features, that are the main carriers of emotion. Thus he can infer emotions only tentatively, vaguely, and with a dose of subjectivity, from various cues and clues prompted by the written text (including the dramatist's scenic hints). The text fragment represents a dramatic text having the quality of an argument on the edge of a quarrel, the "emotional topic" of which could be summarized as "Rick's calm effort to soothe passionate and morosely disposed Tina". From the interactive point of view, we may state its rhetoric argumentative structure involving an "emotional course or profile": In (1) T's morose and passionate emotional bearing, associated with her selfaccusation leads R to respond in (2) by soothing her. He

10

Frantisek Danes

refutes her argument (though in an indirect wording in the form of an illocutionary act of urgent request/appeal not to say such things, so that the inference of his (sincere) intention does not seem to be quite firm). But his soothing attempt is futile, T in (3) persists in her morose temper, she repeats her argument, makes it more particular, simultaneously revealing her present mental state to him in detail. But R in (4) has apparently not been influenced by her gloomy account. His quiet factual comment on the final part of her turn, seemingly innocent, but in fact covertly (and maybe intentionally) pointing at her self-dramatizing inclinations (explicitly mentioned by him in (6)) and at the performance character of her emotional display, is perceived by T as a provocation, infuriating her (one may only guess that such a response might have been anticipated by R himself). Thus the peacefiilness of R's speech in (4) could have a strategic function and in any case it carries a very high context-dependent emotiogenic potential. T's fury in (5), accompanied with a menace, prompts R to choose other tactics to soothe her: In (6) he takes on a very active, energetic (if not invasive) role, using four kinds of devices: first, he uses an extralingual, manual means of a sudden, forcible and rough seizing, secondly, he shows that her performance in (5) has not moved him much, thirdly, he shows a high degree of tender liking for her (though revealed with a kind of superiority), and fourthly, he uses an intellectual device, trying to reveal to her that she should look for the real reasons of her pessimistic approach and gloominess in her personal dispositions. 2. Let us now turn to the second, more perspicuous text sample, to the well-known scene from Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. JULIET: Wilt thou be gone? it is not yet near day: It was the nightingale, and not the lark, That pierced the fearful hollow of thine ear; Nightly she sings on yon pomegranate-tree: Believe me, love, it was the nightingale. ROMEO: It was the lark, the herald of the morn, No nightingale: look, love, what envious streaks Do lace the severing clouds in yonder east: Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops. I must be gone and live, or stay and die. JULIET: Yon light is not day-light, I know it, I: It is some meteor that the sun exhales, To be to thee this night a torch-bearer, And light thee on thy way to Mantua: Therefore stay yet; thou need'st not to be gone.

Extra-logical Factors in Argumentation

11

ROMEO: Let me be ta'en, let me be put to death; I am content, so thou wilt have it so. I'll say yon grey is not the morning's eye, 'Tis but the pale reflex of Cynthia's brow; Nor that is not the lark, whose notes do beat The vaulty heaven so high above our heads: I have more care to stay than will to go: Come, death, and welcome! Juliet wills it so. How is't, my soul? let's talk; it is not day. JULIET: It is, it is: hie hence, be gone, away! It is the lark that sings so out of tune, Straining harsh discords and unpleasing sharps. Some say the lark makes sweet division; This doth not so, for she divideth us: Some say the lark and loathed toad change eyes; O, now I would they had changed voices too! Since arm from arm that voice doth us affray, Hunting thee hence with hunt's-up to the day. O, now be gone; more light and light it grows. ROMEO: More light and light; more dark and dark our woes! (W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, III/V)

The overall ambience of this argumentative dialogue involves affectionate love on the background of existential uncertainty and grave anxiety. In the dialogue itself, two pairs of conflicting mental states are operative: reason vs. affect, and male vs. female approaches. The complex of implied affections comprises the following kinds of emotions: positive ones of mutual love and of desire to stay together, and negative ones of grief over their inevitable parting and of the fear of Romeo's death. The argumentative course and corresponding emotional profile look as follows: 1) Juliet, being motivated by her strong affection, sets forth and specifies an argument against Romeo's reasons to leave. 2) Romeo's male rational attitude disproves her argument, realistically pointing to some evident facts and calling to mind the fatal dilemma. 3) Juliet, without noticing his rational warning, stubbornly holds her own (in a female manner), adducing further, though rather poetic, arguments and entreating him to stay. 4) Romeo is, in fact, not persuaded by her problematic argumentation, nevertheless, having been moved by the power of her deep affection, apparently gives her truth and, in a sophisticated way, manifests the depth of his love for her by willingness to stay at the price of the disastrous consequences.

12 5)

Frantisek Danes R o m e o ' s argumentative tactics produce now a dramatic effect and a decisive turning point in the process o f argumentation (and in the story as well): Juliet, seeing n o w the possible tragical consequences o f her entreaty, at once becomes rational and realistic, recognizes and fully accepts his previous arguments, and being overcome b y fear and panic-sticken, she turns her argument about and vehemently and passionately endeavours to make R o m e o to take flight.

Well, n o w I would pose a question to m y present readers: Did the arguments adduced b y the t w o heroes express their true opinion, or were they used as a strategic device? Maybe consciously, maybe only subconsciously. Who knows? D o you think that Shakespeare w o u l d k n o w the answer? Such are the vagaries o f interpretation - in literature as well as in life. In any case, our analysis and interpretation clearly reveals that in argumentation, cognition and emotion go hand in hand and that an argumentative dialogue may not be only an issue o f discourse, but also o f people's lives and fates.

References Beaugrande, R. de (1996), New Foundations for a Science of Text, Norwood, N.J. Dane!, F. (1987/1990), Cognition and Emotion in Discourse Interaction. A Preliminary Survey of the Field. In: Bahner, W./Schildt, J./Viehweger, D. (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Linguists, Berlin, Vol. I, 168-179. Freddi, M. (1998), Dialogic Usage of Some English Connectives. In: Cmejrkovä, S./Hoffmannovä, J./Müllerovä, O./Svötlä, J. (eds.), Dialogue Analysis VI: Proceedings of the 6th Conference, Prague 1996, Vol. I, Tübingen, 441-453. Izard, C. E. (1977), Human Emotions, New York. Izard, C. E./Zajonc, R. (eds.) (1984), Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior, Cambridge. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983), Mental Models, Cambridge. Luzio, A. di (1998), Observations on the Interactional Sociolinguistic Analysis of Disputes and Discussions. In: Cmejrkovä, S./Hoffmannovä, J./Müllerovä, O./SvStlä, J. (eds.), Dialogue Analysis VI: Proceedings of the 6th Conference, Prague 1996, Vol. I, Tübingen, 133-150. Mowrer, H. (1960), Learning Theory and Behavior, New York. Piaget, J. (1961), La Psychologie de ('intelligence, Paris. Scherer, K. R. (1986), Vocal Affect Expression. A Review and a Model for Future Research. In: Psychological Bulletin 99, 149-165. Tondl, L. (1997), Dialog, Praha. Weigand, E. (1998), Emotions in Dialogue. In: ¿mejrkovä, S./Hoffmannovä, J./Müllerovä, O./Svgtlä, J. (eds.), Dialogue Analysis VI: Proceedings of the 6th Conference, Prague 1996, Vol. I, Tübingen, 35-48.

Vincenzo Lo Cascio

Narration and Argumentation: a Rhetorical Strategy

1. Narration and Argumentation 1.1 Types of texts and participation 1.2 Narration and modality: a rhetorical strategy 1.3 The modal value 2. Narrative texts and argumentative texts: their nature 2.1 Differences between narration and argumentation 3. Argumentation 4. Narration 4.1 The temporal dimension 4.2 The theory 4.3 Events and Situations 4.4 Aspect 4.5 Moving the story forward: R (Reference time) 4.6 Localizers 5. Tense and modality 6. Aspectuality in argumentation 7. Events=statements and arguments=situations? 8. Conditionals 9. Trends in Argumentation Notes References

1. Narration and Argumentation

In the present paper I am not concerned with the pragmatic function of argumentative or narrative texts, but rather with their linguistic organization and with the formal characteristics which allow the two kinds of texts to interact. I will argue that there are many similarities between the two types of texts, which make it possible for both to have an argumentative and a narrative function at the same time. Narration and argumentation can interact in two ways: a) argumentation can be a part of a story (a novel or something else), as in a detective novel where reasoning is naturally required. For instance: (1) ... he snapped the case open, and the secretary drew in his breath sharply. Against the slightly dingy white of the interior, the stones glowed like blood. "My God! sir," said Knighton. "Are they - are they real?"

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14

"I don't wonder at your asking that. Amongst these rubies are the three largest of the world ... You see, they are my little present for Ruthie." The secretary smiled discreetly. "I can understand now Mrs. Kettering's anxiety over the telephone," he murmured. But van Aldin shook his head. The hard look returned to his face. "You are wrong there." he said. "She doesn't know about these; they are my little surprise for her." (A. Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train, New York 1971, 13-14)

b) narration can be used in a text which is primarily argumentative, either as a matter o f similitude or with the function o f delivering events presented and interpreted as arguments. For instance: (2) She stared at him. He nodded back at her. "I mean just what I say. Have you got the grit to admit to all the world that you've made a mistake? There's only one way out to this mess, Ruthie. Cut your losses and start afresh." "You mean-" "Divorce." "Divorce!" Van Aldin smiled drily. "You say the word, Ruth, as though you'd never heard it before. And yet your friends are doing it all round you every day." "Oh I know that. But-" She stopped, biting her lip. Her father nodded comprehensively. "I know. Ruth. You're like me, you can't bear to let go. But I've learnt, and you've got to learn, that there are times when it's the only way. I might find ways of whistling Derrek back to you, but it would all come to the same end. He is no good, Ruth: he's rotten through and through. And mind you, I blame myself for ever letting you marry him. But you were kind of set on having him, and he seemed in earnest about turning over a new l e a f - and well, I'd crossed you once honey ..." (A. Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train, New York 1971, 16) or (3) ROBERT. Now listen to me, Polly. I must talk to you like a father. It's about the girl you are interested in. Now, I have seen her. I have talked to her. First, she's mad. That doesn't matter. Second, she's not a farm wench. She's a bourgeoise. That matters a good deal. I know her class exactly. Her father came here last year to represent his village in a lawsuit: he is one of their notables. A farmer. Not a gentleman farmer: he makes money by it, and lives by it. Still, not a labourer. Not a mechanic. He might have a cousin lawyer, or in the Church. These sort of people may be of no account socially; but they can give a lot of bother to the authorities. That is to say, to me. Now no doubt it seems to you a very simple thing to take this girl away humbugging her into no end of a mess, as I am her father's lord, and responsible for her protection. So friends or no friends, Polly, hands off her. (B. Shaw, Saint Joan, London 1948, 86) It can be seen from the above that narration in argumentative texts can have the function o f providing data (arguments) and rules from an (apparently) real world, or examples taken from (invented or possible) reality, so as to support proposed statements or conclusions, or trigger suggestions supporting a possible argument, and therefore contributing to the persuasive process.

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In other words, stories, sequences of events going backwards or forwards in time in an argumentative text are rhetorical forms and strategies which can create specific worlds where it becomes possible for a proposed argumentation to hold. In example (1), when the Butler says "I can understand now Mrs Kettering's anxiety", he refers to an event which took place or could have taken place earlier in time, namely that Mrs Kettering knew about the jewels. That event apparently allows him to guess the reason and the cause of Mrs Kettering's anxiety. This is apparently a logical inference, but it will be frustrated by Mr Kettering's reaction which claims that the real state of affairs is different: Mrs Kettering does not in fact yet know about her father's present. (2) is an example where the narration (a set of events and facts which happened around Mr and Mrs Kettering) is in support of a reasoning, which suggests that Mrs Kettering should divorce. In (3) an argument given as support for the statement that Saint Joan is a "bourgeoise" is provided by the fact that in the previous year, Sir Robert met her father when he came to represent his village in a lawsuit.

1.1 Types of texts and participation Every language has a number of forms which can create different types of texts at surface level: narrative texts (NARR); argumentative texts (ARG); descriptive texts (DES). Two structures are particularly important for the way communication takes place: monological and dialogical structure. This differentiation is important both for the way the text is constructed and for the way the protagonists participate in the communicative process. Every text is characterized by different propositions connected to each other and organized according to different basic principles and hierarchical relations. I distinguish two basic types of organization: horizontal organization and vertical organization. Both have a semantic and a syntactic part. A text is also made up of a tense dimension, an inferential activity, a schema of a story or of an argumentation.1

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1.2 Narration and modality: a rhetorical strategy Argumentation in general is a form of defining the truth value of a statement. As a matter of fact, by adding an argument to a statement, a modal force is assigned to the former. Counterargumentation, in particular, always seems to impose a modal interpretation upon the argumentation to which it refers or to which it is a reaction. Counterargumentative categories are ways of questioning the validity of the truth of an argumentation. Narration is a form of giving more information about the reality of worlds. If an argumentation is placed in a "tensed" world, it means that it is placed in a world which is presented as existing but instantiated (i.e. bound to a specific time) and, therefore, does not always hold true. That world (like every world) can be characterized or described as containing aspects and characteristics which create the conditions in which events or states take place or are present. This happens if the conditions that those events are respectful of - in coherence with the semantic and encyclopaedic congruency principles - are met. A congruency principle requires that events meet the rules of the scenario in which they take place, i.e. in coherence with the world in which they are considered to take place. This then enables one to accept all the facts and events that can be inferred or can take place in that world as plausible. So, in a world where it is raining, an event such as "somebody closes his umbrella" is improbable. It follows that other characteristics must be assigned to that world in order to make an event like "somebody closes their umbrella" plausible when it is raining. Narration therefore seems to be a form of modality which gives the frame and the truth value to argumentation. Argumentation can be tensed and presented as narration, but it can also contain a narration which has the function of proposing an example in support of the argument chosen to support a statement. Indeed any story has an argumentative function (see Schiffrin 1990, 133). Narration is a good and successful tool with which to convince or persuade addressees. It generally provides examples from the real (or invented, semi-real) world. An instance of this is Scripture, in which all argumentation and propositions about religion are sustained by parables (cf. the parables of the prodigal son or of the sower). Narrative examples in argumentation are forms in vertical direction appended to data and arguments which must sustain/support a statement or chain. As Geargakopoulou & Goutsos (1997, 160) also sustain, "narratives are powerful forms of asserting views, shielded from proof, justification, testing and debate." A story in a non-narrative text owes its effect to the sense of immediacy, involvement and personal perspective it creates. The participation framework invoked

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also plays a crucial function: scientific information is nicely couched. "Narratives in conversation can be thought of as long turns that provide tellers with strong floor-holding rights" (Geargakopoulou & Goutsos 1997, 161). Geargakopoulou & Goutsos (1997, 162) also sustain that "through dramatization and vividness, narratives are capable of compelling belief in various views with minimal risk of argumentation challenges and truth-claims based on testing and debate." Geargakopoulou & Goutsos also sustain that one of the main uses of conversational narratives is in supporting an argument. I would nevertheless add that this is very often the case in all argumentative texts. Narratives can also have the task of making an argumentation more expressive and therefore more persuasive, since they present in concrete form that which reasoning normally presents in an abstract way. The introduction of a joke or of an anecdote in a lecture, with the intention of making it more pleasant for the audience is a "culturally bound" phenomenon. Italian speakers would not introduce such an element into their lecture because they would consider it offensive for the audience. In the Anglo-Saxon world, on the contrary, a speech would not be considered carefully prepared unless an anecdote or a joke as an example were introduced to make the audience relax and have some fun. In many cases, the story functions as backing, to speak in Toulmins terms, or as a source for the arguments, or so as to establish the general rule or warrant in favour of a statement. Bringing out an evidence in narrative form can always be a strategy. Speakers are always fascinated by stories, particularly if they refer to the past. The past guarantees the truth of things to the human mind. This is in fact the task of memory. Since human knowledge is the result of experience, and since stories are symbols of experience, it can then be argued that stories are good scenarios to propose warrants and general rules.

1.3 The modal value As mentioned above, the rhetorical value of using narratives in argumentative texts is both a modal (definition of the truth value) and an emotional (involvement in situation and experience) one. From the modal point of view, when used in argumentation narration has the function of creating possible worlds which are considered or could be considered as true, presenting characteristics and conditions which allow a proposed statement or an entire argumentation to hold.

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Abstract reasoning is very often left to the inferential work of the addressee who has to develop and formulate explicitly or implicitly the lacking abstract rules and relations which are made or can be made by applying a logical system. But such a task is arduous, while narration, as an exemplification of argumentation, is much easier to interpret and to follow. On the other hand, most of the addressees of a specific novel or argumentation (speakers) generally prefer to work out the inferences since this task can be developed in a way which fits their world, knowledge and capacity to reason. This kind of freedom, which the addressee wants and which is allowed thanks to the possibility of different interpretations and evaluations of linguistic messages, increases and enlarges the encoder's chance of succeeding in persuading the addressee. Non-narrative reasoning is typical of scientific texts in general and of math or chemistry texts, in particular. On the contrary, politicians, advertising people or speakers in ordinary life and conversation or communication lean considerably on narration, even when the communication they are involved in has a primarily argumentative character. A good example of a narration employed as a support for a claim could be the following: (4) "You say that this vase is not in harmony with the appointments of the room - whatever that means, if anything. I deny this. Jewes, in toto. I like this vase. I call it decorative, striking, and, in all, an exceedingly good fifteen bobs worth." "Very good sir." On the previous afternoon, while sauntering along the strand, I had found myself wedged into one of those sort of alcove places where fellows with voices like fog-horns stand all day selling things by auction. And, though I was still vague as to how exactly it had happened. I had somehow become the possessor of a large china vase with crimson dragons on it ... I liked the thing. It was bright and cheerful. It caught the eye. And that was why, when Jeeves, wincing a bit, had weighed in with some perfectly gratuitous art-criticism, I ticked him off with no little vim. Ne sutor ultra whatever-it-is, I would have said to him, if I'd thought of it. I mean to say, where does a valet get off, censoring vases? Does it fall within his province to knock the young master's chinaware? Absolutely not, and so I told him. (P. G. Wodehouse, Life with Jeeves, London 1981, 195)

The speaker in building his argumentation can sometimes use possible counterarguments presented as weak or unacceptable. In some cases he reports somebody else's argumentation, with a possible counterargumentation, or he reacts to this person's argumentation (protagonist or writer) by adding a counterargumentation.2 By making his statements explicit and by expressing possible counterarguments, the speaker makes his reasoning stronger, since he argues that it is possible to reject or evaluate them in advance.

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2. Narrative texts and argumentative texts: their nature

2.1 Differences between narration and argumentation Argumentation consists of the interaction between statement and argument, while narration is characterized by the interaction between events and situations (i.e. the description presented as stative information or as substories). Approximately speaking, NARR texts are dominated by a temporal and spatial dimension, while ARG texts are primarily dominated by the presentation of work of explicit inference, articulated in deduction or induction. NARR does not generally take place as a debate. In oral communication or in simulated oral communication, as often happens in novels, the narration can be shaped in the form of a dialogue. NARR generally takes place in monologue form and is, as such, monodirectional. The writer does not expect to enter into a discussion with the reader and does not explicitly want to know the reaction of the reader or his contribution to a story. The reader can contribute to the possible interpretation of the message received, thanks to his inferential competence, his activity of filling in the missing information and the invention of possible plots after every event. Nevertheless, the reader is generally conditioned by the encoder and must accept the interpretation and the plots the encoder is proposing or has chosen. In a monological text it is the encoder who decides which direction the text and the message will take. In that case the addressee is allowed to work out his inferential task but is always obliged to accept the paths and to follow the direction which the encoder chooses or proposes. In dialogical argumentative and narrative texts, on the contrary, the addressee can help to construct the texts through his inference and active participation; he can decide and negotiate which way and which direction the text should take, starting from a given event, a claim or specific data. Of course, the inferential activity the addressee must or can carry out can, in turn, be foreseen by the encoder of the message. ARG much more than NARR text takes the addressee into account because the aim of the encoder is to convince him/her. But, as already said, while in a conversation the development of the argumentation must be negotiated, in a monodirectional text the argumentation is built up in such a way that the possible reaction and amount of objections coming from the target addressee are foreseen. From the point of view of organization, ARG has a hypotactic, i.e. a vertical character. Verticality and subordination are primarily dominating characteristics of an argumentative text.

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NARR can have both horizontal and vertical character. But it is the horizontal relation that makes a story and its movement forward in time possible. Verticality implies subordination while horizontality implies coordination. Semantic and syntactic verticality and horizontality are two fundamental characteristics, two axes at the basis of the two types of text. Two arguments used as support for the same statement are in a horizontal relation. Consider (5a) and (5b): (5a)

Lugano is nice to live in since it is a big city and is near Italy or/and has a wonderful lake.

(5b)

John left Italy and went to Lugano.

In (5a) two or three independent arguments together support the statement "Lugano is a nice town to live in" but they don't need to be related to each other. They are coordinate clauses dependent (vertical relation) on the main clause Lugano is nice to live in. In (5b) two coordinate clauses create a horizontal relation and form a narrative chain. Consider now: (6) ROBERT. There is something about her. They are pretty foulmouthed and foulminded down there in the guardroom, some of them. But there hasn't been a word that has anything to do with her being a woman. They have stopped swearing before her. There is something. Something. It may be worth trying. Robert. Oh come, Polly, pull yourself together. Commonsense was never your strong point; but this is a little too much. POULENGEY. What is the good of commonsense? If we had any commonsense we should join the Duke of Burgundy and the English king, They hold half the country, right down to the Loire. They have Paris. They have this castle: you know very well that we had to surrender it to the Duke of Bedford, and that you are only holding it on parole. The Dauphin is in Chinnon, like a rat in a comer, except that he is the Dauphin: his mother says he isn't; and she ought to know. Think of that! The queen denying the legitimacy of her own son! (B. Shaw, Saint Joan, London 1948, 88)

In (6) we have a strategy of proposing an if-clause presenting an event which could be supported or justified by a set of arguments representing characteristics, situations of a world where it becomes plausible that "we join the duke of Bedford and the English king." A minimal narrative text NARR is formed by a set of states of affairs expressing events (E) or states (S) and bound into a horizontal relation (two coordinated sentences).

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3. Argumentation

An argumentative text ARG is formed at least by an opinion, or statement, or claim (O) and at least a justification (JS), or more simply by an argument (A), supporting the statement presented in a subordinate clause. Clauses, or chains of clauses which cover a specific function as part of a narrative or argumentative discourse, are linked together on the base of a syntactic set of rules, which are often language specific. Some of the binding rules are nevertheless proper to different languages. A message aiming to persuade someone about the truth of a claim can be shaped linguistically in different ways. In order to propose and support a thesis (or a claim) in a specific language, a speaker has different forms at his disposal to do it. I suggest (cf. Lo Cascio 1991a, 1991b and 1998) calling these ways of organizing a message linguistically, "textual profiles": specifically, "narrative profiles" and "argument profiles." Every speaker should learn how to form the set of profiles typical of the language he uses to communicate, and learn to use well-formed profiles in every communicative situation. Not all profiles can be used in every communicative situation; only a few are appropriate. Pragmatic rules have the function of regulating their uses. The type of profiles allowed in a language is also determined by the syntactic rules present in that language. The following example: (7)

He was breaking the law because he was on the wrong side of the road

can be interpreted as: (7a) ARG

I

0

'

1

JS

where ARG is the node indicating the minimal argumentative text, O stands for opinion and JS for a justification containing an argument A and an (implicit) warrant, which allows that in that specific world where the event/state expressed in A holds, it is plausible that the event or state expressed by the statement O takes place. An expression such as (8)

Lugano is a big city

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is not yet an argumentation, unless we think that the encoder requires that the addressee infers some conclusions from this data, for instance, that the city is worth living in. (9) or (9a) are, on the contrary, linguistic sequences which overtly present an argumentation: (9)

Lugano is nice to live in since it is a big city

(9a)

I think he is going to live in Lugano since it is a big city

In (9) and (9a) the information "Lugano is a big city" describes a characteristic of a special world which also allows and makes plausible that an event such as "he is going to live in Lugano" can take place. An argumentative text can be expanded by adding more arguments supporting the statement proposed: (10)

He was breaking the law (O), since (JS) he was on the wrong side of the road (Al) and he had no lights (A2)

(10) can be interpreted as: (10a) ARG he was breaking the law

Al he took the wrong side...

A2 he had no lights (state)

In (10) the sentences he was on the wrong side of the road and he had no lights indicate situations or states belonging to a world and making it plausible that in such a world the event or state he is breaking the law takes place or holds. The possibility that the event "breaking the law" takes place is further regulated by the necessary existence in that world of a specific law (or warrant) according to which people will be outside the law if they drive on the wrong side of the road and without lights on. The ARG in (10) can be made more complex by expanding every argument with a subargumentation (specification of subworlds). Consider: (10b)

This book has no literary qualities (O) because (JS) the style is defective (A). (ARG1) The dialogues sound artificial (A)

which can be interpreted as:

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(10c) ARG' '

01

JS Alj

no literary qualities

because the style is defective -ARG

02j style is defective

A2

dialogues sound artificial

As can be seen in (10) the justification (JS) governing A1 expands in an argumentative subtext ARG' where, in turn, the statement in A1 (the style is defective) covers the function of an opinion which is supported by the argument A2. This is the reason why A1 and 0 2 are coindexed. A2 (dialogues sound artificial) is not an argument for O l but a support for 0 2 (the style is defective). In all those texts we notice a vertical structure (or direction), an expansion in depth, and a cyclic character. We also notice that the category Justification, at every level, gives information about the world and the conditions where the supported statement O holds or can hold in a world where if the dialogues in a book are artificial, the style is defective. This brings to the conclusion that such a book has no literary qualities. JS then introduces a modal value for the statement for which it is a support. It is the truth value of the data presented in the justification that makes it possible that the event or the state connected with the opinion holds. The entire argumentation can be further modalized by adding a modal value to the statement. In that case the inferential relation between the justification and the opinion which is the result of inferential process is also modalized. In (11)

Probably he was breaking the law because he was on the wrong side of the road

there is doubt about the opportuneness of formulating, from the fact that in some world (w() in the past, it is true that "he was on the wrong side of the road", the conclusion that "he is breaking the law" can be true in Wf. In other words, in a world (w^) in the past, the situation "he was in the wrong side of the road" is true and creates the conditions for the event "to break the law" to take place. Both ARG and NARR have a cyclic character and as such can endlessly expand respectively in a substory and or a subargumentation. In NARR an event can function as the starting point for a substory (see for instance E3 or E5 in (13) below). In an ARG it is, on the contrary, argument A which can expand and be supported in turn by a

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subargumentation. For instance, the argument/statement in (9) "Lugano is a big city" can be supported by or can borrow from the fact (or characteristic) mentioned in (12): (12)

Lugano, as a matter of fact, has more than 50.000 inhabitants

Let us now see how similar this relation is with a narrative chain.

4. Narration

Horizontal direction means that a story is a concatenation of events (and as such a concatenation of sentences or set of sentences) presented at the same hierarchical level in order to form a narrative chain. The following text: (13) Sir Stafford Nye's flat was (SI) a very pleasant one. It looked out (S2) upon Green Park. He switched (El) on the coffee percolator which was on the table (S3) and went (E2) to see what the post had left (E3) him this morning. It did (E4) not appear to have left (E5) him anything very interesting. He sorted (E6) through the letters. He shuffled (E7) them together and placed (E8) them on the table... (Agatha Christie, Passenger to Frankfurt, New York, 13)

presents different narrative levels and stories. The main story is formed by the events El, E2, E4, E6, E7, E8 which could be considered as located on the same time axis. The main factors characterizing the main story are the states SI (Nye's was in the flat) and S2 (it looked out) and, in particular, the event El (switched). The same can be said for S3 (was on the table). Conversely E3 (had left this morning) belongs to a secondary story which is an expansion of E2 (went to the post) and is controlled by it. E2 thus functions as a temporal perspective viewpoint from which the narrator looks at E3. Conversely E5 (had left) belongs to a time axis controlled by E4 (did not appear) which functions in turn as a viewpoint. In example (1), E2 follows El on the time axis while E4 follows E2 and not E3. E6 in turn follows E4 and not E5. So in the linguistic profile characterizing text (13) there is apparently a temporal connection at a distance between sentences representing events belonging to the same time axis. We can represent the temporal interpretation of a story like (13) in this way:

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(13a) El ( S I , S2, S3)

E2 —E3

E4

E6—E7—E8

1 —E5

as we can see the El (switched the light) creates the beginning of a temporal interval, which identifies a world dominated by the event El and therefore containing the conditions which allow E2 (went to see the post) to take place. Thus we have:

(13b)

-El

E2 '|

R2

E4

E6—

E7—

E8

—E3 —E5

E4 (did not appear) can take place only after E2 (went to the post) takes place and must take place in a time interval or in a world controlled and characterized by E2; as such, E4 must be congruent with E2, i.e. it must fit into a world where E2 holds. In other words, E2 creates the conditions which allow a set of events which are congruent with E2 to be expected. It is worth noting that the worlds composing the story in (13) can be bound at a distance: the world marked by the event E6 originates, for instance, by modifying the world marked by the event E4. Why and how do we interpret the temporal information in the above-mentioned linguistic example in this way? Tenses, temporal adverbs and temporal connectors provide the linguistic tools for such an interpretation.

4.1 The temporal dimension States of affairs in a narrative text (profile) can be presented in the same temporal order according to which they took place, or are supposed to have taken place in reality. But there are many ways of giving linguistic shape (profile) to a story. Textual profiles are often articulated in many levels, presenting states of affairs differentiated on the basis of their prominence or relevance for communication (see Reinhart 1984). States of affairs in these cases are grouped and placed on different axes forming different stories, with one

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connected to or embedded in the other. The existence of one of the states of affairs makes a chain of worlds characterized by new states of affairs possible. In a narrative text, the narrator can be the author or a character of the story, and can play either the role of an I-person or a neutral role. In the latter case, the narrator can always switch from being absent to addressing the reader, using the I-person form. A story is always narrated from a precise temporal perspective point which is given and which I call Given Primary Time (GPT). In general, GPT is the narrator's perspective point, or the moment of enunciation. The classification of textual profiles can be based on the types of "voice" of which the texts are vectors. Indeed, by telling or writing a story, a narrator (or a writer) has to make explicit the temporal viewpoint from which he decided to look at the events in that story.3

4.2 The theory In Lo Cascio 1982-1986a and 1995b a theory was proposed which can represent the function of the different temporal tools and the organization of discourse. In the theory the task done by tenses, temporal adverbs, the kind of temporal relation at stake in discourse and the role of aspectual information are established. Lo Cascio's temporal theory of sentence and discourse is syntax oriented and is a modification of Reichenbach's theory. The theory offers a framework for explaining aspectual information for every language. According to Lo Cascio's theory, tenses and aspectual information in sentences and texts can be considered as an expression of different combinations and of the relation between four basic units: TB time binder: the antecedent or controller of the tenses (GPT or TB) L localizer: the anchoring time-unit which indicates in which position and at which distance on the time axis event times are located; R reference time: the time interval delivered by the antecedent relevant for moving a story forward; E event time, or states. According to the theory a narrative text is formed by a set of states of affairs all controlled by the same time operator and bound to each other in a hierarchical form. The time operator controlling them could be the speech time, the time of the hearer, the time of narration, an invented time as in tales, etc. A narrative text could contain different

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texts and different sets of states of affairs, controlled by different time operators or time binders. The time operator controlling a narrative text at the highest level is always a Given Primary Time (GPT) which has an extra-linguistic character and which can be compared with the Reichenbachian speech point. The world introduced, implied, controlled and characterised by the GPT and to which a set of states of affairs belongs, constitutes the frame within which the story takes place. Sometimes there is a need to describe such a world. This is done by a Descriptional Set (DS) formed by stative or iterative states of affairs which have the task of defining the situations within which a story takes place. As such those states of affairs create the conditions which allow new events to take place. Lo Cascio's grammar distinguishes between Foreground and background information. Foreground information is presented as a set of states of affairs belonging to a main time line of the story and generally controlled by the GPT. Background information is a subset or a set of subsets of states of affairs considered as a digression from a time line. A means for distinguishing between background and foreground information is syntactic embedding. Subordinate clauses form sets of background stories (or appended worlds) with respect to the story to which their matrix belongs. Every story or substory or single event in Lo Cascio's analysis can optionally be placed in a contextual and situational frame which represents the relevant world for the states of affairs in question. The descriptional set which gives information about such a world when lexicalized can characterize (have in its scope) the entire story or a subset of it or a single state of affairs. Aspectual forms and morphological markers are linguistic tools for distinguishing between events and the description of the world to which events belong. The distinction is a very important one. Tenses, temporal adverbs, aspectual morphological markers, lexical aspect, and syntactic organization are tools belonging to the temporal system.

4.3 Events and Situations While argumentation is formed by at least two categories: opinion and argument, narration is formed by two kinds of state of affairs: "events" and "situations." Events are states of affairs which confer a dynamic character to a narration, and therefore change the world in which they take place. Events are states of affairs presented as perfective, i.e. as closed time intervals; they are therefore able to set a limit for a new time interval where a new congruent event can take place (see also Comrie 1976 and Binnick 1991). Situations, on the other hand, describe the world in which events take place and are presented as imperfective states of affairs, i.e. as open, rather than closed (i.e. perfective)

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time intervals. Imperfectivity is an aspectual tool for the description of the world in focus. Every perfective event which takes place in some world must be congruent with and be a possible consequence of the characteristics of that world created and changed by the immediately previous perfective event. The time interval within which a new event takes place characterizes a world which allows the new event to take place. If, at first sight, the congruency principle is not clearly met at the surface as, for instance, in: (14)

He went out (El) and took a shower (E2)

then, in order to meet the congruency principle, the addressee or decoder must infer the hidden characteristics and knowledge needed for the time interval (in the world) within which the strange new event takes place. For instance, for (34) to be acceptable, we must assume that there is a world where a shower is placed outside the door. This reconstruction occurs frequently when a reasoning is presented on the basis of a nonstandard relation or on the basis of a relation not yet known to the addressee. In a story, the GPT which controls and creates the main time axis on which the main events must be located must always be defined. The time axis can be controlled by secondary time intervals (time binders) given in the text. In this case a substory will be formed by the events and states which are anchored on the same secondary time axis. Every time axis creates a set of worlds. All the events anchored in the same time axis, and belonging to the same line, either controlled by the GPT or by other time intervals (events), enter a horizontal relation and make it possible for a story(or substory) to move forward. The events controlled by the same time binder create a narrative chain. All the possible worlds where the mentioned events can be true are then anchored on the time axis. In other words, tenses assign events to possible worlds. Tenses have the function of indicating the time interval (world) an event belongs to or is controlled by.

4.4 Aspect Tenses express a temporal relation only with respect to temporal entities, functioning as time binders and belonging to a higher position in the (syntactic and semantic) hierarchy. In (15)

John called Mary (El) and told her (E2) that he had bought a car in Rome (E3) and had paid two months later with his American Express card (E4). Afterwards he went to the airport (E5)

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the past tense of E2 (told) does not say that E2 happens after El (called), but it is after its TB which is the GPT. E2 and El are coordinate clauses. As a matter of fact E2 follows El on the time axis controlled by the enunciation time. On the contrary, the tense of E3 is bound by the time interval set by E2, which is its matrix clause. In many languages, such as Italian or English, when there is an anaphoric reading, the tense will also give information about the temporal relation between the (world of) TB and the (world of) GPT. In (16)

He announced that he would come to see us

the event "would come" finds its time binder in the time interval set by the event "he announced." 4 In (15) the tense in E3 (had bought) tells both that E3 is past in relation to the TB (told) and that the intern TB (told) is past in relation to the GPT.

4.5 Moving the story forward: R (Reference time) A narrative chain is composed by the relation between the states of affairs which share the same time binder and have the same syntactic position. The type of relation between events belonging to the same time axis is given by their position (i.e. when they follow another closed time interval in the text) and by temporal connectors. Each new event mentioned in a narrative text finds its world in the reference time (R, or a world wR) set by the immediately preceding perfective event (i.e. a closed time interval) and belonging to the same time axis (i.e. controlled by the same TB) and presented with the same syntactic status (see Kamp/Rohrer 1981). States of affairs always show an aspectual character, even if the aspectual information is not overt. They can either be open time intervals and have the function of describing the situation at a given time, in which case they are marked by imperfective aspectual markers; or they can be closed time intervals and therefore marked by perfective aspectual markers. Only states of affairs which are closed time intervals and belong to the same time axis enter a temporal relation so as to move the story forward. Open time intervals are not able to set a reference time for another state of affairs on the same time axis and, consequently, they do not create new worlds. So in: (17)

Paul said (El) that John didn't come (E2) to the meeting because he was ill (E3). Afterwards he went (E4) on reading again

E4 and El form a set, since E2 does not have the same time binder as El and E4. E2 does not set a reference time for E4, although it is a closed time interval since it is in a

Vincenzo Lo Coscio

30

subordinate clause and therefore belongs to a lower class. E4 does not deliver any reference time since it is an open time interval.5 R will be the time interval which starts immediately after the last closing point of a given perfective event anchored on a time axis within which the next event belonging to the same time axis falls.

4.6 Localizers Tenses do not assign a precise position on the time axis to states of affairs. For instance, we do not know at which moment in (17) El took place in the past. We only know that E4 took place after El. In other words, E4 changes the world to which El belongs, but it is not known when. Temporal adverbs and temporal clauses are linguistic tools which express time intervals which have the task of anchoring an event or state on the time axis. They are a kind of binder and are called localizers. They establish the world where the state of affairs they localize is true. In (18)

John arrived in Lugano in the morning (El); he went to a hotel (E2) and wrote a letter to Mary (E3). Two hours later he took a shower (E4).

the temporal adverb (in the morning) indicates the world to locate El in. An event is localized in the part of the time axis which is defined by the tense. But, in order to be anchored, the event needs a localizer. A localizer is a time interval, a piece of world which is relevant for the state of affairs in question. The anchoring time interval is defined in a relational way and as such it has also a time binder (TB). The localizer expresses two types of relations with respect to its TB: the temporal relation (before, after or coincident) and the (quantification of the) temporal distance (two hours, one day, a year from, etc.). The localizer is a time interval which must be a subpart of the R of the same state of affairs and as such must be governed by R. In (18) the localization of the state of affairs "taking the shower" is defined within the R (world wR) created by the state of affairs "write a letter." The localizing interval within which John takes a shower starts two hours after the activity of "writing a letter" has stopped.6 According to Lo Cascio's theory, aspect must be considered as the expression of the relation of partial or total inclusion between the localizer and the event. There must be at least one time point which both share. The localizer position must always be indicated, although not necessarily in an overt way. A non-overt localizer must be considered as a subtime interval (or world wL) anchoring an event or a situation at some place on the section of the time axis which has been defined by the tense.

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The inclusion relation between the event or situation at stake and its anchoring time interval (L) will be lexicalized whenever morphological tools are available in that specific language. Otherwise the relation of inclusion must be detected from the context. The contextual interpretation is bound by the nature of the verbal aspect or Aktionsart (momentaneous or durative, static or dynamic state of affairs) and by the syntactic character of the predicate: transitive, unergative, unaccusative and so on. According to this theory, an argument for positing a possible non-overt localizer is given by the fact that in any language, besides a temporal localization, an aspectual interpretation is always required in order to decide how a story moves forward. Events need to be localized and anchored on the time axis controlled by their time binder. As already said, there is always a reference time, thus a world wR, which indicates the time interval which is relevant for the position of the next event. The localizer is then a part of the relevant time interval anchoring the "next event" ( and therefore a world) which is a part of the world created and instantiated by the R. So the reference time R delivered by an event Ex for an event Ey starts after the end of Ex. Ey then falls within that new time interval which has a starting point in Ex+1. Ey coincides with a subpart of it which we call its localizer.7 In order to originate a reference time we need bound events, i.e. perfective events which have a closing point. Aspectual information is often needed in order to understand the role of a specific state of affairs in a story. In conclusion, we could state that temporal relation is a matter of order, while aspect is a relation of inclusion, i.e. a measure of the length of time intervals. The imperfetto/imparfait will be interpreted in a way which is opposite to the interpretation of the simple past, consider: (19)

When I arrived in Rome it was raining

which can be interpreted as: (19a)

raining E L'

L' ' ' L arrive

TB

GPT = TB & L < TB & E < TB & L CE

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5. Tense and modality

Tenses and modality are tools needed to define the truth value of our statements and the commitment of speakers about their statements (sse Lo Cascio 1995c). Tense defines the possible world in which a statement is true. Traditional modal forms are modal verbs, or adverbs. Some syntactic constructions also contain a modal value. In (20)

John must have been killed; otherwise, he would be here

the structure must have been killed contains an epistemic value. Otherwise introduces the argument sustaining the statement which contains the modalized hypothesis. The construction could be rephrased in one of the following argumentative forms: (20a)

Since John is not here, he has been killed

(20b)

if John is not here, he has been killed

(20c)

if John is not here he has probably been killed

(20d)

John would have been here if he hadn't been killed

As can be seen, all those constructions hold truth indications and, as such, modal information. The argument that John is not yet here would be a support and as such an indication of the quantity of truth value that the statement John has been killed contains. For the argumentative relation in the above-mentioned examples (20a-20d) to be true and persuasive, a world must be recognized where, in the past, things happened which created the condition for John's coming, unless he had been killed or he was dead.

6. Aspectuality in argumentation

Imperfectivity, in other words, presents a world characterization preparing the scenario where some events are admitted or some statements can be assumed to be true. Perfectivity brings changes, modifications in the world, which allow new types of events to take place. Narration, which is made up of the interrelation between events and situations, provides the right framework allowing an argumentation to stand and be successful. Narration creates a chain in which a description, if it is required, gives information and conditions concerning the world where a specific event can/should happen. The

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temporal information provided through tenses or other temporal forms, like temporal adverbs, has the task of identifying on the time axis the possible worlds where the events in question can be true. As such, tense information is a modal marker, since it defines the truth value of the state of affairs in question. Conversely, aspectual information is a morphological or syntactic tool whose task is to distinguish events from the description of the world to which the events belong. So the imperfective marker or the imperfective interpretation identifies the event, i.e. the dynamic state of affairs which marks and changes a possible world. Imperfectivity is a marker of situations similar to arguments in argumentation. Perfectivity, on the contrary, characterizes statements. Argumentation is the creation of a chain where information is given about the truth of the data contained in a statement.

7. Events=statements and arguments=situations?

I assume, in other words, that statements in ARG are similar to (have the same function as) perfective events in narration since both change the world and are allowed to exist, or else it is plausible that they exist in some given world or in a world in focus, characterized respectively by the mentioned situations or arguments. The function of arguments or data supporting the statements which create the conditions for the statements to be plausible and inferrable, is, on the contrary, that of describing the characteristics of the world in which it is possible that the statement holds, meeting an encyclopedic and semantic congruency principle. That is why I am suggesting that arguments are similar to imperfective state of affairs, although I am aware that the hypothesis is perhaps too strong. Consider the following examples: (21)

Mario has certainly been killed [statement/event] otherwise he would have been here [argument/situation]

(22)

Mario is not here; he has probably been killed [situation] [event]

A world wp where Mario is absent means that in the same world Mario cannot be still alive. Mario was alive in a past world wpl. In a world wp2 where Mario should be here but isn't, it must be concluded that he is dead. This can be stated on the grounds of some situations created by a previous event which allow that absence can imply Mario's death.

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34

As can be seen in (22), the argumentative relation A - O (argument - opinion) is a relation similar to the relation S - E (situation - event). Perfectivity can also be a marker of data which triggers a situation presented as a conclusion or opinion. (23)

Mario didn't come, therefore I think he is dead/I think he has been killed, data/event statement/state

This is a chain of events where the previous event creates a world where the second event can take place. It seems to me that the alternation of perfectivity and imperfectivty fits very well into the idea that argumentation and narration are interrelated. A sentence such as (24)

I think that he has started to play chess, Mary broke her leg.

sounds odd, or at least very strange, from a semantic and encyclopedic point of view. But the argumentative relation becomes less strange if one adds a story of the type: (25)

As a matter of fact last year, when we were together in Cortina d'Ampezzo and I broke my leg, he suggested I play chess with him as a way to not feel the pain.

An argumentation of the type (26)

Mario certainly has a restaurant since he is Italian

is the combination of a supposition about the possibility that an event or a state (Mario has a restaurant) in our present world holds, implied by, and therefore inferred from data which certainly characterizes the same present world, i.e. that Mario is an Italian, and a generalization or rule, or a trend which says that nowadays many Italians have opened an Italian restaurant. The same realization placed in the past can be reformulated as the relation between an event and a situation: (27)

Arriving in Lugano, Mario certainly opened a restaurant since he is Italian

The same relation could be presented in this way: (28)

Mario arrived in Lugano and probably opened a restaurant. He was Italian.

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8. Conditionals

If it is certain that a story is true in our world then it can be imagined what would happen if such a story took place in a possible world. The if-clauses, or conditionals, are forms and profiles for presenting possible stories which, if they are or could have been true, would provide the right world for a possible specific statement/event to stand or become true. In other words, narrativity and argumentation are also present in if-clauses. For instance, see: (29) DUNOIS. No, no my girl: if you delivered me from fear I should be a good night for a story book but a very bad commander for the army. Come! let me begin to make a soldier of you. Do you see those two forts at this end of the bridges? The big ones? JOHAN. Yes. Are they ours or the goddams? DUNOIS. Be quiet, and listen to me. If I were in either of those forts with only ten men I could hold it against an army. The English have more than ten times ten goddams in those forts to hold them against us. (B. Shaw, Saint Joan, London 1948,120)

where a sequence such as If I were in either of those forts with only ten men I could hold it against an army is the assertion that a possible event, such as being in one of the forts, would create the premises for a world where the event I could hold it against an army could become true and take place. Consider also (30) where two possible events are in contrast: (30)

We would have had a great victory if Lipedens had not taken in Antonious

I assume that conditionals are argumentative constructions and that they are a sort of story; a chain of events happening in a possible world which can become true or could have been true. So both narration and hypothetical narrative forms are ways of helping formulate the modal value of a statement and as such take an important place in argumentation. There is indeed a parallel to be drawn between conditionals, argumentation and narration. Consider (31)

I think he would come if you invited him

(32)

I think he will not come unless you invite him

The apodosis in (31) introduces the opinion whereas the protasis delivers the argument. If p then q means that there is also a temporal sequence in conditionals where the event in the protasis delivers the reference time, i.e. the allowed world, for the event in the apodosis to become true. The relation between apodosis and protasis is the same as that between two events in a temporal chain, on the same time axis. The first event (the

36

Vincenzo Lo Coscio

protasis) creates a world and the conditions, and therefore sets the R in order to allow the second event (the apodosis) to take place. This may be why the apodosis cannot be marked by a tense which expresses the past with respect to the protasis. The fact that in spoken language both types of sentences are often marked as imperfective could indicate that the relation expressed by conditionals refers to the situation of a possible world where a kind of law reigns i.e. every time something happens (the protasis) something else (a state or event: the apodosis) then follows. (33)

I think he will help you if you ask him

(34)

I think he didn't help you because you didn't ask him

(35)

He would have helped you if you had asked him

9. Trends in Argumentation

Telling a story as support for a reasoning means applying inductive reasoning for rhetorical purpose. Ethos and pathos are not argumentative, according to Aristoteles, whereas logos is, since the speaker makes use of reasoning and arguments in order to persuade the addressee of the validity of a statement or claim. Syllogism is the way argumentative reasoning (logos) is built. Rhetorical deductive syllogisms are called enthymemes and rhetorical inductive syllogisms are called examples. Narration is a form of example and belongs to the inductive part of a syllogism, which in turn can be called an enthymeme, i.e. a deductive reasoning in its macrostructure. In that case the inductive part is a kind of backing or support of the deductive one. Argumentation nowadays is becoming narration. As I have already said elsewhere (Lo Cascio 1992), both in common and in scientific language, speakers or writers nowadays prefer to delete argumentative connectors so as to create a more pleasant text to read. The function of indicating argumentative relations is taken over by the lexicon and by semantic relations. In this way, an argumentative text takes on the appearance of a narrative one. This form allows the addressee to enjoy the text more, but at the same time, it makes a text less easy to interpret as far as structure is concerned.

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Notes *

I especially wish to thank Amanda Murphy for reading my text and Silvia Gilardoni for preparing it for publication.

1)

Stein (1982) proposes the following constituents in a story: 1. setting: the internal or external states and habitual actions that introduce characters and their social and physical environment; 2. initiating event: some type of change in the protagonist's environment; 3. (the protagonist's) response or reaction to the event; 4. attempt: a set of overt actions in the service of the protagonist's goal initiated by events or motivating states; 5. consequence(s) of the attempt (e.g. success or failure to attain the goal); 6. (the protagonist's) reaction to the consequences. These categories can show up at different (higher and lower) levels of narrative discourse and they are recursive. At the lower level, every single sentence can be parsed into one or more statements corresponding to any of the categories. Counterargumentation always means a refutation of an argumentation or part of it but it does not necessarily require the enunciation of a counter-opinion or an opposite conclusion. As a matter of fact, one can criticize without proposing alternatives. The counter-argument can remain exclusively negative (see: Apotheloz, Brands, Quiroz 1989) without being constructive. Two more examples of the above mentioned profiles are respectively: - indirect speech:

2)

3)

He went into the house and questioned Hippolyte closely once more as to whether any stranger had been to the house. (A. Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train, New York 1971, 121) - combinations of indirect speech and embedded direct speech: "We have mutual friends in Paris," said Mirelle. "I have heard of you from them, but I come to see you today for another reason. I have heard of you since I came to Nice - in a different way, you understand." (A. Christie, The Mystery of the Blue Train, New York 1971,117). 4)

5)

6)

The tense morpheme used in the specific embedded complement clause tells us that the time binder (announce) in turn is in the past with respect to its own time binder: the GPT. In some languages, such as Japanese, this indication is absent. Unlike complement clauses, tenses in other kinds of subordinate clauses (relative, temporal, causal or adversative clauses) in English and in the Romance languages are not controlled by the time interval set by the event of the matrix but by a TB (or vertical referent) set by other time intervals belonging to a higher domain and already given, or set by the GPT. Lo Cascio formulates the following rule: Rule: Reference Time R: the Horizontal Relation Every state of affairs marked by a deictic or anaphoric tense, in order to define its place on the time axis in relation to the other states of affairs belonging to the same temporal domain (or subdomain) and to the same time axis, finds the event time which delivers its reference time in the preceding state of affairs which has the same time binder and is a closed time interval (perfective) to enter a textual relation and to indicate in which direction the story moves. The localizer is defined in Lo Cascio 1995b thus: Rule: the localizer L Every state of affairs must be bound by a localizer, i.e. by a time interval which locates or assigns the E to the relevant time interval. As such the localizer includes the event partially or totally, or is included partially or totally by the event. The localizing time is defined by the expression of a

38

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7)

temporal relation and indexing with a time binder TB (L) and by the quantification of the temporal distance from that time binder. As Partee (1984) showed, the reference time begins at a point after the concluded preceding event.

References Adelaar, M./Lo Cascio, V. (1986), Temporal relation, localization and direction in discourse. In: Lo Cascio, V./Vet, C. (eds), 251-297. Apotheloz, D./Brandt, P. Y./Quiroz, G. (1989), De la logique à la contre-argumentation. In: Travaux du Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques: La Negation contre-argumentation et contradiction, Neuchàtel, 1-43. Binnick, R. I. (1991), Time and the Verb: a Guide to Tense & Aspect, Oxford/New York. Comrie, B. (1976), Aspect, Cambridge. Georgakopoulou, A./Goutos, D. (1997), Discourse analysis, Edimburg. Kamp, H./Rohrer, C. (1981), Tense in texts. In: Bàuerle, R./Schwarz, C./Stechow, A. V. (eds), Meaning, use and interpretation of language, Berlin, 250-269. Lo Cascio, V. (1982), Temporal deixis and anaphor in sentence and discourse. In: Journal of Italian Linguistics, 31-70. Lo Cascio, V. (1991a), Proposals for an argumentative Grammar. In: van Eemeren, F./Grootendorst, R./ Blair, J. A./Willard, C. A. (eds.) (1991), Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Argumentation, Amsterdam/Dordrecht, 530-545. Lo Cascio, V. (1991b), Grammatica dell'argomentare: profili strutture strategie, Firenze. Lo Cascio, V. (1992), La Dimensione testuale: tendenze e profili argomentativi nell'italiano di oggi. In: Moretti, B./Petrini, D./Bianconi S. (a cura di), Linee di tendenza dell'italiano contemporaneo, Atti del XXV Congresso Internazionale SLI (Lugano, settembre 1991), Roma, 407-428. Lo Cascio, V. (1995a), Aspetti retorico-argomentativi nella narrativa contemporanea: dall'evento alla parola e dalla parola all'evento. In: Vanvolsem, S./Musarra, F./van den Bossche, B., Gli spazi della diversità, Roma, 211-242. Lo Cascio, V. (1995b), The relation between tense and aspect in Romance and other languages. In: Bertinetto, P. M./Bianchi, V./Higgbontham, J./Scartini, M. (eds.), Temporal reference, Aspect and Actionality, Torino /Rosemberg/Sellier, 273-293. Lo Cascio, V. (1995c), Categories and modal function in argumentation, In: van Eemeren, F./Grootendorst, R./ Blair, J. A./Willard, C. A. (eds.), Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Argumentation (1994), Amsterdam, 78-95. Lo Cascio, V. (1998), Gramática de 1'argumentación, Madrid. Lo Cascio, V./ Vet, C. (eds.) (1986a), Temporal structure in sentence and discourse, Dordrecht. Partee, B. (1984), Temporal and nominal anaphora. In: Linguistics and Philosophy 7, 243-289. Reichenbach, H. (1947), Symbolic Logic, New York. Reinhart, R. (1984), Principles of gestalt perception in the temporal organization of narrative texts. In: Linguistics 22, 6. Schiffrin, D. (1990), The menagement of a co-operative self during argument: the role of opinions and stories. In: Grimshaw, A. (ed.), Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations of arguments in Conversations, Cambridge, 241-259.

Eddo Rigotti

The Enthymeme as a Rhetorical Device and as a Textual Process

1. The enthymeme as a rhetorical syllogism 2. Inference and the implicit side of verbal communication 3. The enthymeme in the interpretation and structuring of texts 4. Implicitness and manipulation Notes References

1. The enthymeme as a rhetorical syllogism

Following an old custom, we will start our inquiry to this central concept of ancient rhetorical theory by considering the lexical structure of the word enthymeme. Its wordformation, although very clear, does not help much in accounting for the specific value it has acquired as a technical term. The value suggested by its Wortbildung is that of something that 'takes place' or 'is produced' in the mind. On the contrary this etymological value is close to the meaning taken by the word in ordinary speech, which corresponds to what we call an idea in expressions such as I have a good idea to solve our problem.

The value is that of thought, an act of reasoning, a product of intelligence. 1 Here are some examples of this kind of use of the word:

GUVVCOSEI;

to Ev9\)|i.Tpxd)v iyxxaoOav xoiixo 8' eaxiv a^iov eiuxinfiaeox;."

5)

Quintilian (5.14. 24 ff.) refers to "some" who consider the enthymeme as a rhetorical syllogism, while "others" call the enthymeme "a part of a syllogism" ("Enthymema ab aliis oratorius syllogismus, ab aliis pars dicitur syllogismi, propterea quod syllogismus utique conclusionem et propositionem habet et per omnes partes efficit quod proposuit, enthymema tantum intellegi contentum sit") and provides three examples of complete syllogisms together with their rhetorical counterparts: in all the examples the part of the syllogism that is missing in the enthymeme is the major premise. It is also interesting to see that in one of the examples the enthymeme takes the form of a rhetorical interrogation.

6)

"[...] To 8' ev8t>NR||ia avXXoyianov, Kai ei; okiywv xe Kai JIOXXalso daß ichmhmi< *3,5* ich mhm I

278 FL: würde das gern auch so ma belassen denn: ahm: daß ihr mann would like to leave it at this point because ähm that your husband

Other's Inserts in an Ongoing Turn. Some Sequential, Grammatical, and Rhetoric Observations

263

The first insert (verstehet ich bring dir deinen söhn) has a preface defining the intervention as an explicitation of understanding, and this function is marked too by FL's perspective change to a position within the story. He formulates CG's situational understanding of what her husband was communicating to her. The second intervention is extraordinaiy by its length, but it clearly displays rhetoric practices of subordination: FL starts with a syntactically integrated completion of CG's utterance construction; FL maintains the empathic perspective taking; and both interventions are prosodically marked by a lingering tone without strong accentuation. Producing long pauses, FL offers the floor to'CG and, in reaction to her unability or unwillingness to speak, takes the role of a substitute speaker, speaking for her. In this case too, the expansion of the insert is the result of a turn internal negotiation.

4. Insisting: Further interventions of the secondary speaker

Secondary speakers' further interventions often have the quality of insisting and display an orientation shift from secondary to competing contributions: -

The construction completion principle looses its force and the principle of immediacy dominates. The orientation towards shortness and subordination is given up in favor of gramatically selfcontained, expanded and prosodically expressive constructions.

The sequential dynamic of this orientational shift is to be seen in the following example, taken from a talk show about smoking, with two antagonistic participants, TR and KR. TR argues that to smoke or not is part of the individuals' more or less rational decisions. In line 647/9 KR places an insert (beso "nders von drei "zehnjährigen schii: "lern) which fulfills the requirements of the positioning principles as well as those of shortness and subordination. KR uses the rhetoric device of expressing an antagonistic position in form of a completion of the primary utterance. This practice is relatively strong insofar as the adressee has great difficulties to take the insert into account during his ongoing turn without giving up his own utterance plan. Like in most cases where this rhetorical practice is used, the speaker specially underlines the conditional relevance of his contribution for the ongoing utterance with prosodical means like strong accentuation (see the three strong accents in KR's insert), thus aggravating the primary speaker's dilemma. TR ignores KR's insert, and KR insists with two competing interventions:

Werner Kallmeyer

264 (5) "Thirteen years old pupils" 646 TR: s=ein ->i"ndividuellet des sind >zwdlft no they are twelve 653 TR: >eines erwachsenen me"nschent sofe:rn sie an das of an adult person ifyou think at the 654 KR: zehnt iä:hrige schii"Ier die rau"chent-»< ten years old pupils who smoke 655 TR: erwachsenen/ darf ichla"ssen sie mich vielleicht adult/ may I would you please let me 656 KR:

+ * «-nicht yeah that you don't simply tell here

657 TR: mal #ausre:den# #ftnish# 658 K #GEREIZT# ANGRY 659 KR: einfach sagen erwa"chsen- >-»fangen an zu that adults begin to 660 XM: TROCKENES HUSTEN 661 KR: rau"chenf