Liber Amicorum in Memoriam of Judge Jose Maria Ruda [1 ed.] 9041113673, 9789041113672

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LIBER AMICORUM 'IN MEMORIAM' OF JUDGE JOSE MARIA RUDA

Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam' of Judge Jose Maria Ruda

Board of Editors

Calixto A. Armas Barea Julio A. Barberis Julio Barboza Hugo Caminos Enrique Candioti Emesto de La Guardia Hortensia D.T. Gutierrez Posse Guillermo Moncayo Emesto J. Rey Caro Raul E. Vinuesa Secretary: Frida M. Armas Pfirter

Kluwer Law International The Hague I London I Boston

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 90-411-1367-3

Published by Kluwer Law International, P.O. Box 85889, 2508 CN The Hague, The Netherlands. Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by Kluwer Law International, 675 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Law International, Distribution Centre, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

The hook has been coordinated hy the International Law and International Relations Department of the Austral University.

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2000 Kluwer Law International Kluwer Law International incorporates the publishing programmes of Graham & Trotman Ltd, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, and Martin us Nijhoff Publishers. No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner. Printed in the Netherlands.

Table of Contents

Board of Editors

lX

Board of Honour

Xl

Acknowledgements

Xlll

National Tribute Committee

XV

Contributors

XlX

Judge Jose Maria Ruda: Biography

XXV

Hugo Caminos- Jose Maria Ruda (1924 -1994)

XXXlll

Sources and General Principles of Public International Law Julio Barboza -The Customary Rule: from Chrysalis to Butterfly Pierre-Marie Dupuy- Dialogue onirique avec Wolfgang Friedmann - Sur les evolutions du droit international entre la fin des annees soixante et la veille du XXIeme siecle

15

M. C. W Pinto - Reflections on the Role of Religion in International Law

25

Antonio Remiro Brot6ns -Justice Among States

43

Ernesto J Rey Caro - Reflexiones sobre las relaciones convencionales del Mercosur. Su proyecci6n en el regimen legal argentino

57

v

VI

Territorial

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

Sovereignty and the Law of the Sea

Julio A. Barberis- En torno a la noci6n de "territorio del Estado"

69

Edith Brown Weiss- International Waters Conflicts: Managing Competing Uses

89

Hortensia D. T. Gutierrez Posse- The Significance and Reasoning behind Dr. Jose Maria Ruda's Arguments at the United Nations in Relation to the Question of Sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland), South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands

99

Rafael Nieto Navia - Jurisprudencia en materia de delimitaci6n maritima

109

Luis Ignacio Sanchez Rodriguez - Jurisdicciones rampantes y libertad de pesca en alta mar

139

Prosper wei!- Le principe de la juridiction consensuelle a l'epreuve du feu: a propos de !'arret de la Cour internationale de Justice dans !'affaire de la competence en matiere de pecheries (Espagne c. Canada)

157

Settlement of Disputes George H Aldrich - Judge Ruda's Contributions to the Work of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal

179

Daniel Bardonnet- De 1'equivoque des categories juridiques: la revision des sentences arbitrales pour "erreur de fait" ou "fait nouveau" dans la pratique latino-americaine

189

Santiago Benadava- La 'competencia de la competencia' y el exceso de poder en la justicia arbitral

221

Sir William Douglas- Jose Maria Ruda- His Contribution to the ILO as Expert and Judge

231

Francisco Orrego Vicuna -A New System of International Dispute Settlement for the Twenty-First Century

235

Felipe H Paolillo - El Consejo de Seguridad en los procedimientos de la Corte Penal Internacional

24 7

KrzysztofSkubiszewski- The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal

265

vu

Table ofContents Hubert Thierry- Au sujet du juge ad hoc

285

Eduardo Valencia Ospina -The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Pact of Bogota

291

Raul Emilio Vinuesa - Las medidas provisionales en la soluci6n de controversias entre Estados e inversores extranjeros en el sistema del CIADI

331

International Court of Justice Prince Bola A. Ajibola -Africa and the International Court of Justice Mohammed Bedjaoui - Presences latino-americaines nale de Justice

a la Cour internatio-

353

367

Francisco Cuevas Cancino- Foundation: The Theory of Counterbalance

393

Juan Manuel de Faramifi(m Gilbert - Las reformas pendientes del estatuto del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia a la luz de las transformaciones de la comunidad internacional

405

Gilbert Guillaume - Les declarations jointes aux decisions de la Cour internationale de Justice

421

Keith Highet - The Emperor's New Clothes- Death Row Appeals to the World Court? The Breard Case as a Miscarriage of (International) Justice

435

Shabtai Rosenne - Counter-Claims in the International Court of Justice Revisited

457

Stephen M Schwebel - The Inter-active Influence of the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission

479

Santiago Torres Bernardez- Are Prior Negotiations a General Condition for · Judicial Settlement by the International Court of Justice?

507

International Humanitarian

Law and Human Rights

Antonio Augusto Canfado Trindade - Judicial Protection and Guarantees in the Recent Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rigths

527

viii

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

Hector Gras Espiell- Universalite des droits de l'homme et diversite culturelle

537

Keba Mbaye - Les droits de 1'homme (definition, fondements, finalites et caracteres)

553

Mohamed Shahabuddeen - Duress in International Humanitarian Law

563

Nicolas Valticos - Protection internationale des droits de l'homme et ambigiiites etatiques: vers un role plus actif des Etats?

575

Law of Economic Integration Araceli Mangas Martin - European Union Law: a Special Subsystem of International Law

585

Guillermo R. Moncayo - Mercosur. Orden normativo y realidad

595

Manuel Diez de Velasco Vallejo - Le droit de L' Union europeenne et la condition de 1' etranger

615

Tabula

627

Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam' of Judge Jose Maria Ruda

Board of Editors

Calixto A. Armas Barea Julio A. Barberis Julio Barboza Hugo Caminos Enrique Candioti Emesto de la Guardia Hortensia D. T. Gutierrez Posse Guillermo R. Moncayo Emesto J. Rey Caro Secretary: Frida M. Armas Pfirter

The book has been coordinated by the International Law and International Relations Department ofthe Austral University.

ix

Board of Honour

Professor G. Arangio Ruiz Professor Daniel Bardonnet Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui Professor Santiago Benadava Professor Manuel Diez de Velasco Vallejo Sir William R. Douglas KCMG Judge Gilbert Guillaume Sir Robert Jennings Judge Peter Kooijmans Judge Keba Mbaye Professor Hermann Mosler Judge Shigeru Oda President Judge Stephen Schwebel Judge Jose Sette Camara President K. Skubiszewski Professor Santiago Torres Bemardez

xi

Acknowledgements

The Board of Editors wishes to present its highest respect and credit to the members of the Board of Honour and of the National Tribute Committee for their distinguished and generous support as well as to the internationally renowed authors whose invaluable contributions have made this homage possible. We also wish to sincerely thank the authorities of the Law Faculty ofUniversidad Austral (Buenos Aires, Argentina) for their generosity in granting us the use of its premises and competent and unfailing assistance of its staff. Mention must be made most particularly of the help received from the members of its Department of Public International Law and their friendly and efficient collaboration, namely Beatriz Freytes Taboada, Silvia de los Santos, Luisa Lemos, Maria Fernanda Perez Solla, Romina Pitondo, Maria Querol, Ramon Villagra Delgado and Paula Vernet. And finally we wish to bring up and remark most specially the meticulous attention paid by Kluwer Law International and its staff member Mrs. Annebeth Rosenboom, to the preparation and production of this volume. We are appreciative of their help.

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Liber Amicorum Jose Marfa Ruda

Agradecimientos

La Comision Organizadora desea expresar su mayor respeto a los miembros del Comite de Honor y de la Comision Nacional de Homenaje por su distinguido patrocinio y generosa disposicion asi como a los prestigiosos autores de la obra sin cuya valiosa colaboracion y adhesion no hubiera sido posible el presente homenaje. Asimismo, desea agradecer a las autoridades de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Austral (Buenos Aires, Argentina) por su generosidad en el uso de sus instalaciones y la asistencia de su personal, especialmente del Departamento de Derecho Internacional Publico. Cabe destacar la cooperacion de Beatriz Freytes Taboada, Silvia de los Santos, Luisa Lemos, Maria Fernanda Perez Solla, Romina Pitondo, Maria Querol, Ramon Villagra Delgado y Paula Vernet. Finalmente quiere hacer especial mencion ala dedicacion y atencion prestada por Kluwer Law International y su colaboradora Sra. Annebeth Rosenboom en la preparacion y edicion de este volumen. Apreciamos enormemente su ayuda.

National Tribute Committee

JUAN R. AGUIRRE LANARI

Ex Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y Senador Nacional JORGE A. AJA ESPIL Miembro de Ia Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos Aires ROBERTO TEODORO ALEMANN

Ex Ministro de Economia JOSE MARIA ALVAREZ DE TOLEDO

Ex Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores HORACIO A. BASABE

Ex profesor de Derecho Internacional Publico GLADYS SABIA DE BARBERIS

Directora del Instituto de Derecho Internacional (CARl) JUAN CARLOS BELTRAMINO

Profesor de Negociaci6n Internacional en el Instituto del Servicio Exterior de Ia Naci6n GERMAN JOSE BIDART CAMPOS

Profesor Emerita de Ia Universidad de Buenos Aires CARLOS HORACIO CERDA

Profesor de Derecho Internacional Humanitario ALBERTO LUIS DAVEREDE

Embajador argentino ante el Reina de los Paises Bajos ALFREDO DE LAS CARRERAS

Profesor Titular de Derecho Internacional Publico XV

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

LILIAN DEL CASTILLO

Profesora de Derecho Internacional Publico MARCELO DELPECH

Ex Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores LUIS MARIA DE PABLO PARDO

Ex Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto MIGUEL ANGEL ESPECHE GIL

Ex Miembro del Comite Juridico Interamericano GUSTAVO FIGUEROA

Presidente del Consejo Superior de Embajadores JUDITH CANCLINI DE FIGUEROA

Ex Profesora de Derecho Internacional Publico PEDRO JOSE FRIAS

Presidente Honoraria de Ia Academia Nacional de Derecho de Cordoba RAFAEL M. GOWLAND

Ex Embajador en Australia ROBERTO GUYER

Ex Secretario General Adjunto de las Naciones Unidas para Asuntos Politicos Especiales ELSA KELLY

Directora General de Asuntos Ambienta/es del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Co mercia Internacional y Culto MARCELO KOHEN

Docente del Instituto Universitario de Altos Estudios Internacionales (Ginebra) BARTOLOME MITRE

Ex Director del Diario La Naci6n CARLOS MANUEL MUNIZ

Ex Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto CARLOS ORTIZ DE ROZAS

Ex Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas

National Tribute Committee

xvn

FERNANDO PETRELLA

Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas ANA I. PIAGGI Juez de Ia Excma. Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial JOSE DOMINGO RAY

Profesor Emerito de Ia Universidad de Buenos Aires ORLANDO R. REBAGLIATI

Director General de Ia Consejeria Legal del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto. EDUARDO RoCA

Ex Embajador ante Ia Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos (O.E.A.) ALBERTo RoDRIGUEZ GALAN

Ex Ministro de Educaci6n y Justicia SUSANA RUIZ CERUTTI

Embajador JoRGE REINALDO VANOSS!

Miembro de numero de Ia Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales

Contributors

A. AJIBOLA Judge Ad-Hoc of the International Court of Justice, member of that Court until February 1994; Judge of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as a judge of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Peace in The Hague; Member of the ICC Court of Arbitration in Paris.

JULIO BARBOZA

BOLA

Ambassador, Judge of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ex Chairman of the International Law Commission, Professor of International Law at the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Belgrano, Ex Legal Adviser of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DANIEL BARDONNET

Profesor Emerito de la Universidad de Paris II; miembro del Curatorium de la Academia de Derecho internacional de La Haya; miembro del Institut de droit international.

GEORGE H. ALDRICH

Judge Iran-United States Claims Tribunal; Professor Emeritus of International Humanitarian Law, Leiden University, and formerly Ambassador of the United States for the Laws ofWar and the Law of the Sea.

SANTIAGO BENADAVA

Profesor de Derecho internacional publico de la Universidad de Chile; Embajador en Misi6n Especial ante la Santa Sede para el diferendo sobre la zona austral; Miembro del Tribunal Arbitral Internacional que dirimi6 la cuesti6n sobre Laguna del Desierto.

A. BARBERIS Profesor de Derecho internacional publico de la Universidad Austral, miembro del Institut de droit international, miembro del Curatorium de la Academia de Derecho internacional de La Haya, Juez del Tribunal Administrativo de la O.I.T.

JULIO

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

XX MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI

Ambassadeur, Representant permanent de 1'Algerie aupres des Nations Unies a New York (19791982); Juge a la Cour internationale de Justice de La Haye depuis 17 ans (1982- ); President de Chambre (1984-1986); President de la Cour (1994-1997); reelu pour un nouveau mandat de neuf ans en novembre 1996 par le Conseil de securite et 1'Assemblee generale des Nations Unies Gusqu'en 2006). Docteur honoris causa de plusieurs universites. Distinctions et decorations diverses, dont Commandeur de la Legion d'honneur (Paris, 1979). EDITH BROWN WEISS

Francis Cabell Brown Professor of International Law at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D. C.; from 1994-1996 she served as President of the American Society of International Law; from 1990-1992, she was Associate General Counsel at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, where she established the international law division. HUGO CAMINOS

Juez del Tribunal Internacional de Derecho del Mar; Miembro de la Academia Nacional de Derecho de Buenos Aires; Miembro del Institut de droit international.

ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANI:;ADO TRINDADE

Ph.D. (Cambridge); Judge VicePresident of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Professor of International Law at the University of Brasilia and at Brazil's Rio- Branco Diplomatic Academy; Former Legal Adviser to Brazil's Ministry of External Relations (1985-1990); Associate of the Institut de droit international. FRANCISCO CUEVAS CANCINO

Diplomatico de carrera, Embajador de Mexico (1965-1990); jubilado como Embajador Emerita. Actualmente profesor de Derecho internacional privado en las Universidades Veracruzana y Anahuac. MANUEL DIEZ DE VELASCO VALLEJO

Consejero Electivo del Consejo de Estado. Catednitico de Derecho internacional publico de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (1974-1991). Juez del Tribunal de Justicia de las comunidades europeas desde octubre de 1988 a octubre de 1994. SIR WILLIAM DOUGLAS

Former Chief Justice of Barbados, former Chairman of Inter-American Juridical Committee, Member of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, former Member of the ILO Administrative Tribunal.

Contributors PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY

Profesor en la Universidad de Paris II; Director del lnstituto de Altos Estudios Internacionales de Paris; Profesor invitado en las Universidades de Michigan y de Munich; Director de Ia Revue Generale de Droit International Public. JUAN MAUEL DE FARAMINAN GILBERT

Catednitico de Derecho internacional publico y Relaciones internacionales, titular de la Catedra Jean Monnet en Derecho comunitario europeo y antiguo Decano de Ia Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Juridicas de Ia Universidad de Jaen (Espaiia). HECTOR GROS ESPIEL

Profesor de Derecho internacional; Ex Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Uruguay; Ex Presidente de Ia Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; Ex Embajador de Uruguay en Francia. GILBERT GUILLAUME

Juge a la Cour internationale de Justice depuis 1987. Membre du Conseil d'Etat et ancien directeur des affaires juridiques au Ministere des affaires etrangeres.

XXI

KEITH HIGHET

Since 1963 he has served as counsel and advocate in numerous cases before the International Court of Justice and as a legal adviser to governments in territorial and maritime matters. President of the American Society of International Law and he is currently the President of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States. Member of the Board of Editors of The American Journal of International Law. KEBA MBAYE

Premier president de la Cour supreme du Senegal (1964-1982); Premier president honoraire de la Cour supreme du Senegal (depuis 1982); Ancien president et membre de la Commission des droits de 1' homme de 1' Organisation des Nations Unies; Juge a la Cour internationale de Justice ( depuis 1982) et vicepresident de la Cour (depuis 1987). ARACELI MANGAS MARTIN

Catedratica de Derecho internacional publico y Re1aciones Internacionales de la Universidad de Salamanca, Codirectora y Directora Ejecutiva de la Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo y Catedratica "Jean Monnet" de Derecho Comunitario.

HORTENSIA GUTIERREZ POSSE

Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Buenos Aires - Federal Judge, Civil Law.

R. MONCAYO Vicedecano y Profesor titular consulto de Derecho internacional publico de la Universidad de Buenos Aires; Doctor en Derecho de la Universidad de Paris; Jefe de Ia Misi6n Especial de la Argentina ante la Santa Sede en el conflicto del Beagle (1978-1981 ).

GUILLERMO

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

RAFAEL NIETO NAVIA

Juez del Tribunal Penal Internacional para la antigua Yugoslavia. Antiguo Profesor de Derecho internacional publico. Antiguo Presidente del Tribunal Arbitral Internacional argentino-chileno para la determinacion del limite entre el Hito 62 y el Monte Fitz Roy. Antiguo Presidente de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. FRANCISCO 0RREGO VICuNA

Professor of International Law at the Law School and the Institute of International Studies ofthe University of Chile; Judge and Vice President of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal; Membre de 1' Institut de droit international. M.C.W PINTO

Attorney of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, and of the Inner Temple, barrister. Member of the Institut de droit international. Secretary-General of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.

ERNESTO REY CARO

Profesor de Derecho internacional publico en la Universidad Nacional de Cordoba; Miembro de la Lista de Arbitros para la solucion de controversias en el Mercosur; Director del Anuario Argentino de Derecho Internacional. SHABTAI ROSENNE

Ambassador of Israel (retired). Member of the International Law Commission ( 1962-1971 ). Member of the Institute of International Law. Honorary President of the Israel Branch of the International Law Association. LUIS IGNACIO SANCHEZ RODRIGUEZ

Catedratico de Derecho internacional publico y Director del Departamento de Derecho internacional publico y de Derecho internacional privado de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Ha sido profesor invitado en varias Universidades europeas y americanas, asi como abogado ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia.

FELIPE H. PAOLILLO

Embajador actualmente acreditado ante la F.A.O. y la Santa Sede. De 1987 a 1991, Embajador ante las Naciones Unidas. Profesor de Derecho internacional publico. Secretario Ejecutivo Adjunto de la Comision de Indernnizacion del Consejo de Seguridad (Guerra del Golfo) (1991-1994). Miembro del Institut de droit international. ANTONIO REMIRO BROT6NS

Professor of Public International Law and International Relations at the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid.

STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL

Wno was a colleague of Judge Ruda in The Hague, has been a judge of the International Court of Justice since 1981. He served as Vice President 1994-97, and has been President since 1997. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN

Vice President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Former Judge of the International Court of Justice.

Contributors KRzYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI

Professor, Institute of Legal Sciences, Warsaw, 1973-1996. Minister for Foreign Affairs, 19891993. President, United States Claims Tribunal, 1994. Judge ad-hoc, International Court of Justice, 1994. Member, Institute of International Law (Vice President, 1995-1997). HUBERT THIERRY

Vicepresident de l'Universite de Paris X-Nanterre (1972-1976). Directeur adjoint de 1'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le desarmement (1981-1986). Professeur invite a l'Institut de hautes etudes internationales de l'Universite de Geneve (1986-1987). Judge ad hoc a la Cour internationale de Justice dans I' affaire de Ia Sentence arbitrale du 31 julliet 1989 (GuineeBissau c. Senegal) (depuis 1990). SANTIAGO TORRES BERNARDEZ

Member of the Institute of International Law; Judge ad-hoc at the International Court of Justice and former Registrar of the Court. EDUARDO VALENCIA-OSPINA

Doctor of Judicial and Economic Sciences, Javeriana University, Bogota, 1961. Master of Laws, Harvard University, 1963. Special Graduate Student, Harvard Law School1963-1964. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, New York ( 1964-1984 ), Senior Legal Officer. International Court of Justice, The Hague, Deputy-Registrar (19841987); Registrar (1987-present). United Nations Assistant-SecretaryGeneral.

xxiii

NICOLAS VALTICOS

Sous-directeur general au Bureau international du Travail (19491981), Juge ala Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme (1986-1998), President du Curatorium de 1'Academie de Droit international de La Haye (1996- ). RAUL E. VINUESA

Profesor titular de Derecho internacional publico de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y del Servicio exterior de la Naci6n. Miembro del Tribunal Arbitral de la Comisi6n Administrativa del Rio Uruguay. Miembro de la lista de arbitros del MER CO SUR. PROSPER WElL

Professeur emerite a 1'Universite de Paris. Membre de 1'Institut de France (Academie des sciences morales et politiques ). Membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Membre de l'Institut de droit international.

Biography Jose Maria Ruda 1924-1994

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS Lawyer, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences University of Buenos Aires 1949 Doctor of Law and Social Sciences University of Buenos Aires Master of Law (in International Law), New York University, 1955 Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa), Punjab University, India Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa), Peking University, Peking, China Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa), Universidad Aut6noma de Madrid, Spain

OTHER SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED Course in Sociology and International Relations at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, New York University, 1953. Course in Comparative and International Law at the Inter-American Academy of Havana, Cuba, 1955.

MEMBERSHIP IN JURIDICAL INSTITUTIONS Member of the Academy of Law and Social Sciences, Buenos Aires Member of the Institute of International Law Member of the International Law Association Member of the Inter-American Institute of International Juridical Studies Member of the Hispano-Luso-American Institute oflnternational Law Member of the International Institute of Space Law Honorary Member of the Argentine Law Association Member of the Curatorium ofThe Hague Academy of International Law

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

ACADEMIC POSTS Professor of Public International Law at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires Former Professor of Public International Law at the National Military School Visiting Professor at the Colegio de Mexico: Course on Argentine Foreign Policy in the twentieth century, August 1963 Course at the Academy of International Law on "Reservation to Treaties" The Hague, 1976 Course on "The Relation Between International and National Law" Institute of International Public Law and International Relations ofThessaloniki, 18th Session: September 1990, Lecturer

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES International Organizations United Nations Secretariat: Officer, Division of Codification of International Law of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat Legal Committee ofthe United Nations General Assembly: Rapporteur of the Committee at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1962 Chairman of the Committee at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1963 International Law Commission: Member from 1964 to 1972 Chairman of the Commission 1968 Observer for the Commission at the meeting of the Interamerican Juridical Committee, Rio de Janeiro, 1968 International Court ofJustice: Member 1973-1991 Member of the Chamber (Burkina Faso/Mali) Frontier Dispute1983-1987 Member and President of the Chamber on the affair Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (United States of America vs. Italy) 1988-1989 President 1988-1991 Judge ad-hoc for Qatar on the maritime delimitation dispute (Qatar/Bahrein)

Biography Jose Maria Ruda 1924- 1994

xxvn

Security Council Member of the United Nations Compensation Commission International Conference on the Ex-Yugoslavia Member of the Arbitration Commission International Labour Organization President of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations President of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization Permanent Court ofArbitration Member International Tribunals Agent for the Argentine Republic before the Arbitration Tribunal London 1965-1968 Argentina-Chile Frontier Case Legal Advisor for the Argentine Republic before the Arbitration Tribunal on the Laguna del Desierto Frontier Dispute (Argentina/Chile) 1994 Member of the Centre's Panels of Conciliators and Arbitrators, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Iran- United States Claims Tribunal President, (1991-1994)

GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC OFFICES Counsellor at the Argentine Embassy in Bolivia (1957-1959) Chef de Cabinet, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina 19591961 Legal Counsel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina ( 1961-1965) Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (R) Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations (1965-1970) Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (1970-1973)

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES Representative at the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Representative at the fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Delegate to the VII Regional Conference of the International Labour Organization, Buenos Aires, 1961. Representative at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1961.

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

Delegate to the eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este) 1962. Delegate to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1962. Delegate to the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna, 1963. Member of the Drafting Committee of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations. Head of Delegation to the Mixed Argentine- Bolivian Commission. Delegate to the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Head of Delegation to the Commission on the River Traffic with Paraguay. Head of Delegation to the Mixed Argentine- Uruguayan Commission on the River Plate, 1964-1966. Delegate to the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 19641965. Delegate to the First Extraordinary Conference, Washington, 1964. Representative at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1965. Head of Delegation to the third session of the Trade and Development Board, New York, 1966. Official Representative in the Security Council, 1966-1967. Representative in the Special Committee on Principles oflntemational Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, New York, 1966 and 1968. Chairman of Delegation at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1966. Chairman of Delegation at the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly, 1967. Chairman of Delegation at the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Middle East, July 1967. Chairman of Delegation to the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1967. Representative at the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1968. Chairman of delegation at sessions of the Economic and Social Council, 1968, 1969 and 1970. Representative in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Sea-Bed, Rio de Janeiro, 1968. Chairman of delegation at the twenty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1968. Representative in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits ofNational Jurisdiction, 1969-1970. Chairman of delegation at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1969.

Biography Jose Maria Ruda 1924- 1994

XXIX

PUBLICATIONS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW "La Conferencia de Caracas". Demos, No. 28, pp 70-76. "Los poderes de Ia Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en materia de politica y seguridad". Revista de Ia Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, University of Buenos Aires, Nos. 45-46, pp. 994-1002. "Nuevo enfoque de Ia jurisdicci6n sobre el mar territorial". Revista de Ia Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, University of Buenos Aires, No. 47, January-March 1956, pp. 159-164. "Un estudio en politica y derecho; las Naciones Unidas". Cordillera, Revista boliviana de Cultura, April-May-June 1957, pp. 59-65. "Estudio de las posibles inmunidades de los barcos de propiedad de Gobiemos". Interamerican Bar Association, Tenth Conference, November 1957, vol. I, pp. 312332. "El Desarrollo del Derecho Intemacional Publico por Ia Corte Intemacional de Justicia". Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, October-December 1958, pp. 97-108. "Estudio de las posibles inmunidades de los barcos propiedad de los Gobiemos". JurisprudenciaArgentina, 1 April1958, No. 7073, pp. 1-3. "La Competencia de Ia Corte Intemacional de Justicia". JurisprudenciaArgentina, 2 February 1959, No. 33, pp. 1-3. "El desarrollo progresivo del derecho intemacional y su codificaci6n". Lecciones y Ensayos. Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, No. 7, 1958, pp. 35-45 "Relaciones de Ia O.E.A. y Ia U.N. en cuanto a! mantenimiento de Ia paz y Ia seguridad internacionales". Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, 1961, nos. 1-11, pp. 3-63. "El Consejo de Seguridad". Preparatory Course for Instruction on the United Nations, Instituto de Derecho Intenacional, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1961, pp. 109-128. "La evoluci6n del derecho internacional publico". Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, 1962, nos. 1-11, pp. 195-205. "La Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Organizaci6n y procedimiento" Lecciones y Ensayos, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, 1962-63, No. 25, pp. 31-40. "Las Reservas a las Convenciones Multilaterales". Revista de Derecho Internacional y Ciencias Diplomaticas, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, January-December 1963, Nos. 23-24, pp. 7~85. "Posicion argentina en las Naciones Unidas" Revista de Defensa Nacional, MayAugust 1962, no. 2, pp. 53-55. "Islas Malvinas y Las Naciones Unidas". Revista de Defensa Nacional, MayDecember 1964, Nos. 8-9, pp. 5-8. "Aspectos juridicos de Ia cuesti6n de las Islas Malvinas-Resumen". Sociedad Cientifica Argentina, Seminario Francisco F. Moreno, 1964, pp. 30-32.

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

"Labor de la Comision de Asuntos Juridicos de la Asamblea General-Proyeccion y alcance". UN Monthly Chronicle, August-September 1964, p. 89-105. "La politica internacional de Argentina ante las Naciones Unidas", Course on the United Nations, Instituto de Derecho Internacional, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1965, pp. 19-31. "El Consejo de Seguridad", Course on the United Nations, Instituto de Derecho Internacional, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1965. "Comision de Derecho Internacional- Veinte afios de labor". Jurisprudencia Argentina, No. 3330, 25 June 1969, pp. 2-7. "Necesidad de revitalizacion de los procesos de arreglo pacifico de controversias". Book dedicated to Antonio de Luna. Instituto Fancisco de Vitoria de Derecho Internacional, Madrid, 1969, pp. 2-12. "Principios del derecho internacional relativos a las relaciones de amistad y a la cooperacion entre los Estados", Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional, Seventh Congress, Buenos Aires, 1969, pp. 3-46. "The Method of encouraging the wider study and appreciation of International Law in Africa". African Conference on International Law and African Problems, Lagos (Nigeria), 1967, pp. 63-69. "Ellimite exterior de la plataforma continental", Book dedicated to Professor J. Sela Sampil, Estudios de Derecho Internacional Publico y Privado, 1970, pp. 633-655. "Latinoamerica en las Naciones Unidas". Foro Internacional vol. XI, No.2, Colegio de Mexico,1970. "El impacto de la nueva tecnologia sobre la definicion de la plataforma continental". Revista AUANA, Buenos Aires, October 1970. "La posicion argentina en cuanto al Tratado de no proliferacion de armas nucleares ". Estrategia, Buenos Aires, 1971, pp. 75-80. "Drafting History of Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter of the United Nations on the Functions and Powers of the General Assembly". Multitudo legum ius unum, Book dedicated to Professor Wilhem Wengler, Director of the Institute of International Law of the University of Berlin, 1972, pp. 375-450. "The role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of world order". Symposium on "The future of international legal order", Princeton University, 1972. "The final acceptance oflnternational Conventions". The Stanley Foundation, 1976 pp. 1-29. "El Derecho Internacional Contemponineo". Anales, Academy of Law and Social Sciences, Buenos Aires, 1974. "La participacion de los Estados en los tratados multilaterales". Anales, Academy of Law and Social Sciences, Buenos Aires, 1976. "Valores en un mundo interdependiente". Anales, Academy of Law and Social Sciences, Buenos Aires, 1978. "Los Estados y los funcionarios internacionales". Book dedicated to Professor Adolfo Miaja de la Muela, vol II, Tecnos Madrid, pp. 759-772. "The outer limit of the Continental Shelf in International law in the Western Hemisphere". International Law in the Western Hemisphere, edited by N.S. Rodley and C.Heale Ronning, 1974, pp. 38-69.

Biography Jose Maria Ruda 1924-1994

xxxi

"Bolivar y el derecho internacional". Bolivar, Homenaje en el sesquicentenario de sufallecimiento, Bogota, 1980, pp. 31-43. "Efectos Juridicos de las reservas a los tratados multilaterales". Anuario Juridico Interamericano, 1982 pp. 1-67. "Paz y Justicia, Bases de una Politica Exterior". Hacia una Argentina posible, Bolsa de comercio de Buenos Aires, 1982, pp. 195-255. "Concepcion latinoamericana del Derecho Humanitario". Revista Juridica de Ia Universidad de Puerto Rico, Vol. LI, No.2, 1982. "The Latin-American concept of Humanitarian Law". Henri Dunant Institute, Geneva and Unesco, Paris, 1988, pp. 41-58. "Carlos Saavedra Lamas. El apogeo de la politica exterior argentina", Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, 1988. "States, Fundamental Rights and Duties", Encyclopcedia of Public International Law, Vol. 10, North Holland, 1988, pp. 467-477. "Nulidad de los Tratados". International Law at the Time of Perplexity. Essays in honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989, pp. 661-678. "Frida M. Pfirter de Armas Barea, in memoriam." Temas de Derecho Internacional edited by Raul Vinuesa, Fundacion del Centro de Estudios Internacionales de Buenos Aires, 1989, pp. 13-23. "Presente y Futuro del Tribunal Internacional de Justicia". Seminario Permanente Estudios Juridicos Internacionales y Europeos, Universidad de Granada, 1990, no. 1, pp. 7-39. "Some of the Contributions of the International Court of Justice to the Development of International Law". N.Y. University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1991 Vol. 24, pp. 35-68 "Reconnaissance d'Etats et des Gouvernements". 1991 International Law, Achievements and Prospects Unesco, pp. 449-454. "Recognition of States and Governments". 1991 International Law, Achievements and Prospects Unesco, pp. 449-454. "Contribucion de la Comision de Derecho Internacional de las N. U. a la elaboracion del derecho internacional publico". Desarrollo progresivo del derecho internacional, Consej o de Estudios Internacionales Avanzados, 1991, pp. 31-45. "The Role of the Argentine Congress in the Treaty-Making Process". The Role ofthe Parliament and Legislature in the Treaty Process: A comparative Study, edited by S. Riesenfeld and F. M. Abbot, Kluwer 1992, pp. 485-494. "Terminacion y Suspension de los Tratados". Essays in honour of Judge Talim 0. Elias, Vol 1., M. Nijhoff, pp. 93-116 "The opinions of Judge Dionisio Anzilotti at the Permanent Court of International Justice", Institut Universitaire Europeen, 1992. "El principio del no uso de la fuerza en America". La Escuela de Salamanca y el Derecho Internacional en America del pas ado a! futuro, Salamanca 1993, pp. 169187. "La Aplicacion y la primacia del derecho que emana de las Organizaciones Internacionales en el fuero interno". Book in Honour of Professor Diez de Velasco, Tecnos, Madrid 1993, pp. 623-631.

XXXll

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

"Relaci6n Jerarquica entre los ordenamientos juridicos internacional e interno. Reexamen de los Problemas Te6ricos". El derecho internacional en un mundo en transformaci6n, Liber Amicorum en Homenaje a! Profesor Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, T. I, Montevideo 1994, pp. 115-126. "Intervention before the International Court of Justice". Fifty Years if the International Court of Justice. Essays in honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Grotious Publications, Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 487-502.

BOOKS Collaborated in the book by Francisco Cuevas Cancino, Del Congreso de Panama a Ia Conferencia de Caracas, by preparing for the author summaries of the Proceeding and Acts of the First to Eightth Inter-American Conferences, including the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitartion, the Bolivar Conference, the Conference on the maintenance of Peace and the first three meetings of Foreign Ministers, as recorded in the introduction to the book, Caracas, 1955. Instrumentos Internacionales, Tipognifica Editora Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1976. Derecho Internacional Publico, (Vols. I and II) updating of book by Luis Podesta Costa. Tipografica Editora Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1984. Los prop6sitos y Principios de Ia Carta de las Naciones Unidas, Editorial C. de E., I, Buenos Aires, 1983.

COURSES "Reservation to Treaties" Academy of International Law, The Hague, Recueil des Cours vol.III, 1976, pp. 100-218. "The relationship between international and national law", Thessaloniki, Institute of International Public Law and International Relations, September 1990.

AWARDS Premio Ateneo Rotario, Laurel de Plata, 1972 Premio Konex de Platina, 1987 Herald Wei! Medal, New York University, 1989

Jose Maria Ruda (1924 -1994)

Hugo Caminos

La inesperada muerte de Jose Maria Ruda, el 7 de Julio de 1994, caus6 justificada constemaci6n entre los intemacionalistas del mundo entero. Pocos dias antes, como Juez ad hoc de Qatar, Ruda participaba de la audiencia publica en la que la Corte Intemacional de Justicia anunci6 su decision sobre las cuestiones de competencia y admisibilidad en el asunto relativo a la delimitaci6n maritima y cuestiones territoriales entre Qatar y Bahrain. Nada hacia prever que esa seria la ultima actuaci6n en su intensa vida profesional. Ruda desempefi6 las funciones de mayor jerarquia y responsabilidad a que puede aspirar un diplomatico y jurista intemacional: Juez y Presidente de la Corte Intemacional de Justicia, Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, Presidente de la Comisi6n Juridica de la Asamblea General, Miembro y Presidente de la Comisi6n de Derecho Intemacional. En todos esos cargos evidenci6 sus excepcionales dotes profesionales, forjada a traves de su experiencia como alto funcionario de la Cancilleria Argentina, y sus extraordinarias calidades personales caracterizadas por su invariable modestia y su hombria de bien. Tuve el privilegio de mantener con Jose Maria una s6lida amistad durante cuarenta afios. Lo conoci en 1954, cuando trabajaba en la Oficina de Asuntos Legales de las Naciones Unidas y cursaba sus estudios de derecho comparado en la New York University. Al afio siguiente, despues de los acontecimientos politicos en la Argentina, regresa al pais y emprende una etapa de casi veinte afios de actividad al servicio de su patria: Ministro de Gobiemo en la Provincia de Salta, Consejero de la Embajada Argentina en Bolivia, Jefe de Gabinete del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Consejero Legal de la Cancilleria, Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas, Agente del Gobiemo Argentino ante el Tribunal Arbitral en el caso de Rio Encuentro y Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores. El6 de Febrero de 1973, Ruda inicia su primer periodo como Juez de la Corte de La Haya. En 1982, es reelecto por un segundo periodo hasta el 5 de Febrero de 1991. Durante los tres ultimos afios de su mandato, ocupa la Presidencia de la Corte. Pero su labor como magistrado intemacional no se detiene alli. Al dejar la Corte Intemacional, le aguardan dos importantes cargos judiciales: el de Presidente del Tribunal de Reclamaciones Estados Unidos/lran, que ocupa hasta su renuncia en 1993, y el de miembro y Presidente del Tribunal Administrativo de la Organizaci6n Intemacional del Trabajo, que desempefia hasta su muerte. En sus ultimos afios, xxxiii

XXXIV

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

actu6 como abogado de la Argentina ante el Tribunal Arbitral en el caso de la Laguna del Desierto. Alii trabaj6 arduamiente hasta algunos dias antes de su deceso, en que el Tribunal se retir6 a deliberar. Ruda no lleg6 conocer el resultado favorable a la Argentina en dicho arbitraje. En el plano academico, pese a las exigencias de sus funciones diplomaticas y de magistrado intemacional, Ruda siempre demostr6 su clara vocaci6n por la investigaci6n y la enseiianza del derecho intemacional publico. En la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, a la que consagr6 su labor docente en la Argentina, culmin6 su carrera con la titularidad de la catedra. Su vasta tarea en este campo, se extendi6 por otros paises donde particip6 en un sinntimero de conferencias y seminarios. En 1975, di6 un curso sobre reservas a los tratados en Ia Academia de Derecho Intemacional de La Haya. En 1995, debia dictar en la Academia el curso general de derecho intemacional publico, reservado a los mas destacados scholars en la materia. En 1965, Ruda fue elegido asociado del Institut de Droit International y, en 1981, miembro titular. Sus publicaciones, en distintos idiomas, muestran la originalidad del pensamiento juridico de Ruda, asentado en una experiencia poco comun en la practica del derecho intemacional. La contribuci6n de Ruda al derecho intemacional se proyecta desde los diversos pianos de su labor de intemacionalista. En gran parte, esa tarea estuvo al servicio de la justicia intemacional. El entoces Presidente de la Corte Intemacional de Justicia, Mohammed Bedjaoui, en su discurso en la sesi6n solernne de la Corte en homenaje ala memoria del doctor Ruda, celebrada el12 de Setiembre de 1994, al referirse al papel de Ruda como Juez de la Corte, expres6: "Le President Ruda s'est indeniablement acquitte de sa tache avec un grand talent. Avec sa belle modestie, il nous expliquait, au moment de partir a Ia retraite, que, de toutes les charges politiques, diplomatiques oujuridiques, celle qui l'avait le plus marque, tant du point de vue professionel que personnel, fut sa charge a Ia Cour ou, disait-il, il avait fait le passionnant apprentissage du metier de juge. Sa personnalite le predestinait indiscutablement a cette fonction; et si apprentissage il y eut, ce fut surtout le cas pour tous ceux qui, au gre des annees, ont eu le privilege de servir avec lui, sur ce siege, Ia communaute intemationale".

Sin duda, el aprendizaje di6 sus frutos. Ruda fue un granjuez intemacional y durante su periodo como Presidente de la Corte de La Haya, el Tribunal reflej6 una clara tendencia hacia la unanimidad en sus decisiones. El mismo Presidente Bedjaoui describe con singular precision las aptitudes que hicieron de Ruda un eminente magistrado: "C'est qu'il avait, parmi bien d'autres, une qualite d'autant plus precieuse qu'elle semble aujourd'hui devenue rare: le don de pouvoir poser- et resoudre - dans les termes les plus simples les questions apparemment les plus complexes, sans jamais les denaturer en quoi que ce soit. II etait, pourrait-on-dire, un "realiste eclaire". II avait cet immense et tranquille bon sens, cette clairvoyance prudente, cet astucieux pragmatisme, cette faculte de toujours prendre vis-a-vis des choses le recul necessaire et de ne jamais succomber aux charroes faciles de leur artificialite, ce gout et ce respet passionnes pour Ia verite que seuls pos-

Jose Maria Ruda (1924 -1994)

XXXV

sedent ceux qui, comme lui, sont des sages authentiques. Mariant ces qualites exceptionnelles a une grande rigueur morale, il personnifiait de fa. Elle apparait en partie comme une revanche de ceux qui etaient le plus directement mis en cause par la revendication d'un nouvel ordre economique international dans les annees soixante-dix. Elle realise en effet la propagation de la liberte reputee universelle de communiquer. Comme l'echange dans l'economie liberale, dont elle accompagne et favorise la generalisation, la communication risque fort d'y devenir une fin en soi. Quels sont, alors, ses rapports avec le droit, demanda WF. J'y venais, precisement. Les concepts de "communaute internationale" ou d"'humanite" avaient ete conr;us, on l'a dit, dans un but normatif. lis servaient de substrat a de nouvelles regles de droit. Certains de leurs inspirateurs declares pouvaient etre les "peuples" au sens du droit des Nations Unies. II demeure que leurs destinataires ultimes restaient les Etats souverains. lis trouvaient done un epanouissement nature! dans le cadre du droit international. Tout au contraire, la notion de mondialisation designe un defi lance au droit. Substituant partiellement le reseau a la norme, elle manifeste une nouvelle sorte de flux transnational qui semble a son tour demoder l'Etat. Pas davantage qu'il n'a pu jusqu'ici endiguer les sautes d'humeur des marches financiers ou les strategies des multinationales, l'Etat ne peut arreter les "autoroutes de !'information". Les reglementations nationales ou meme internationales sont largement impuissantes a enrayer la planetarisation de 1' information par Internet. 4. Pourtant, une ler;on de cette fin de siecle est que Ia communaute internationale a besoin de /'Etat, comme structure d'organisation et de normalisation des condui-

20

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda tes humaines. On aurait done tord de penser que, dans l'avenir, le droit international public cessera d'etre en premier lieu un droit des Etats. Ils demeurent d'autant plus assures d'y occuper une place centrale qu'ils restent les instruments privilegies de Ia cooperation. L'intervention des Nations Unies en Somalie, par exemple, en janvier 1991' etait ainsi justifiee par le vide cree sur place du fait de I' effondrement de I' appareil etatique. 11

5. Encourage par le silence demon interlocuteur, je me permis alors de faire !'observations suivante, qui touche a une question encore plus large. Fidele reflet de son epoque, «The Changing Structure .... » porte Ia marque d'un certain optimisme rationnaliste. Dans ce livre, l'institutionnalisation croissante de Ia societe internationale laisse esperer une amelioration des conditions d'application du droit. La fin de ce siecle, comme marquee par une fievre millenariste, est au contraire caracterisee par Ia sensation que I' expansion constante du champ materiel d'application des normes internationales menace !'unite intrinseque de I' ordre juridique international. Dans les annees soixante et suivantes, on assistait deja a !'emergence de problemes d'articulation entre le droit international general et celui propre a chaque organisation internationale. On debattait deja, notamment entre juristes latino-americains, de Ia question des relations entre les organisations regionales et les Nations Unies. Pourtant, le probleme du maintien de Ia cohesion de l'ordre juridique international n'etait pas vraiment encore pose comme tel. Les internationalistes remarquaient au contraire que l'ordre juridique international se dotait progressivement d'une nouvelle unite materielle, caracterisee par le phenomene deja signale de cohesion des principes fondamentaux auxquels tous les membres de Ia communaute internationale etaient senses adherer, jusqu'a proclamer I' existence de normes imperatives. Aujourd'hui, au contraire, beaucoup denoncent notamment les dangers inherents a Ia multiplication des juridictions internationales, non seulement au niveau regional mais aussi universe!. La question de I'harmonisation de leurs jurisprudences respectives pourrait bien se poser a plus ou moins long terme. On observe par ailleurs Ia multiplication des systemes specifiques de contr6le de !'application des obligations etablies dans certaines grandes conventions internationales, notamment dans les domaines des droits de l'homme et de Ia protection de l'environnement. Avec !'apparition de !'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et de son systeme specifique de reglement des differends, le droit du commerce international semble prendre a son tour une grande autonomie. On a presque !'impression que de nouveaux feodalismes juridiques pretendent eriger leurs propres «regles d'adjudication» (rules of adjudication) pourparler comme Hart, en rupture avec le droit international general.

11 II resulte aussi de Ia persistance du role central de I'Etat que le droit de Ia coexistence continue egalement a occuper une part determinante.

Dialogue onirique avec Wolfgang Friedmann

21

C'est toute Ia problematique des «self contained regimes» au demeurant introduite sur la foi d'une interpretation tres contestable de !'arret rendu par la Cour internationale de justice dans !'affaire du personnel diplomatique a Teheran.I2 WF. me repondit alors que chaque generation d'internationalistes a sans doute sa mission. II incombe a la doctrine actuelle d'analyser toutes ces institutions en voie d'autonomisation pour montrer qu'il ne s'agit pas de regimes parfaitement autonomes, contrairement a ce qu' ont semble croire un moment certains, mais de phenomenes essentiellement techniques s' inscrivant dans le cadre de 1'expansion du droit international a l'interieur d'un ordre conservant profondement son unite. 6. WF. voulut cependant eviter de reduire notre dialogue a un debat technique. II prit alors !'initiative de revenir ace qui avait fonde sa demarche lorsqu'il avait ecrit son maitre livre. II insista ainsi sur le fait qu' au debut des annees soixante, marquees precisement par la periode fertile de la "coexistence pacifique" dont nous avions deja parle, !'idee qui 1' avait inspire etait celle d'un certain "progrid' du droit international. Un progres a la fois ethique et technique. Parce que les Etats accroissaient la prise de conscience de leur interdependance, ils developpaient alors les principes contenus dans la Charte de l'ONU. Forts de cette solidarite, les Etats s'etaient aussi appuyes sur un reseau dense d'institutions internationales permanentes. Leurs regles respectives modifiaient profondement la problematique classique de 1'application du droit comme celle de la sanction juridique de ses violations. Plus que la marque d'un certain «idealisme rationaliste», comme je l'avais moi-meme qualifie plus tot presque avec dedain, il s'agissait, lui avait-il semble, d'une avancee technique. Cela reste vrai meme si la pratique des organisations internationales n'estjamais que celle de ses Etats membres. Je sentis alors qu'il etait temps pour moi de montrer a WF. mon adhesion profonde a son projet de base, meme si les evenements ulterieurs que je lui avais decrits pouvaient m'inspirer uncertain regard critique. Pour tenter de mieux definir !'idee de "progres du droit", particulierement equivoque en elle-meme, j'insistai alors a montour sur le fait que !'introduction de Ia Charte des Nations Unies dans 1' ordre juridique international de 1'apres-guerre avait en effet rattache d'une certaine fa9on le dessin de ses promoteurs a celui des penseurs du XVIIIeme siecle. Ceux qui, dans !'esprit des Lumieres et de l'Aufkliirung", tels Castel de Saint-Pierre et Emmanuel Kant, avaient prone l'instauration d'une constitution internationale pour la promotion rationnelle de la "paix perpetuelle".I3 Dans ce reve, WF. ete cependant reste aussi bon connaisseur de la philosophie allemande qu'ille fut dans Ia realite. II me fit ainsi remarquer que, chez Kant, Ia pro-

12 13

Recueil CIJ, 1980, paragraphc 80, p. 37. Pour un developpement des idees de !'auteur sur ce point, voir P.M. Dupuy, "L'enfer et le para-

digme, libres propos sur les relations du droit international avec Ia persistance des guerres et I' objectif ideal du maintien de Ia paix", in Melanges offerts a Hubert Thierry, L'evolution du droit inter-

national, Paris, Pedone, 1998, pp. 187-200.

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

22

motion de Ia paix par le renoncement a Ia force n'est pas a prendre exactement comme dans I'article 2 paragraphe 4 de Ia Charte. C' est I' imperatif categorique propre au droit des relations internationales. C'est un principe "a priori" pose comme ideal. Ce n'est pas une regie de droit positif. J'en conviens, repondis-je. Pourtant, c'est precisement par Ia que le vieux projet de Kant nous aide aujourd'hui a comprendre le dessin des Nations Unies. Chacun d'entre nous sait bien que les violation de la regie posee a !'article 2 paragraphe 4 sont quotidiennes sinon universelles. Elles sont meme si frequentes que, dans !'affaire des activites militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, en 1986, la Cour internationale de justice fut obligee a un rappel; celui d'apres lequel, malgre ses constantes violations, le principe du non-recours a la force n'est pas tombe en desuetude. En effet, observe la Cour, "pour qu'une regie soit coutumierement etablie ( ... ) il parait suffisant, pour deduire !'existence de regles coutumieres que les Etats y conferment leur conduite d'une maniere generale et ( ... ) traitent eux-memes les comportements non conformes a la regie en question comme des violations de celle-ci et non comme des manifestations de la reconnaissance d'une regie nouvelle" .14 Ils persistent ainsi a reconnaitre la validite de la regie qu' ils meconnaissent pourtant. En realite, dis-je, en etablissant dans la Charte le ''foedus pacificum" ou alliance pour la paix pronee par Kant quelques cent cinquante ans avant, la communaute internationale a produit deux resultats a la fois. Elle a fait courir un risque au droit international et, en meme temps, elle lui a donne un atout radicalement nouveau, deja perceptible dans les annees soixantes et confirme aujourd'hui. Ah, oui? Lesquels? m'interrompit WF., comme amuse par l'audace demon propos. Enhardi comme on peut l'etre dans un reve,je poursuivis: le risque, pour le droit international contemporain, c 'est desormais d' etre perpetuellement pris en flagrant delit de contradiction avec la nouvelle regie fondamentale qu'il a assigne aux Etats, a la suite des droits internes. Celle d'apres laquelle le droit et la force sont incompatibles, le premier devant se substituer ala seconde. Auparavant, du moinsjusqu'au Pacte Briand-Kellog, les Etats jouissaient de Ia competence de guerre pour regler leurs differends. C'etait peut-etre une incoherence logique, mais c'etait egalement bien pratique. Le recours a la force pouvait passer pour une application du droit. Desormais, les Etats n'ont plus cette possibilite legale. Lorsqu'ils violent le droit, ils n'ont plus que deux possibilites: soit se reconnaitre responsables, soit s'abriter derriere une excuse qu'ils esperent absolutoire. Cependant, avec le risque, il y a aussi l'atout. Lequel?

14

Recueil CIJ, 1986, paragraphe 186, p. 98.

Dialogue onirique avec Wolfgang Friedmann

23

Celui, pour le droit, d'avoir desormais un sens, c'est-a-dire une direction et une orientation qui lui est desormais historiquement assignee. La renonciation a Ia force, elle-meme reliee au respect des autres principes cardinaux poses par Ia Charte, on vient dele dire, n'est pas seulement une regie de droit positif; c'est aussi un projet, une finalite ultime, un but en comparaison duquel peuvent se mesurer les echecs, les regressions, mais aussi le progres vers Ia paix. On peut parler de «progres» ( ou de regression) du droit, parce que 1' on dispose depuis 1945, sur Ia base de Ia Charte des Nations Unies, d'un etalon, d'unjeu de criteres normatifs en regard desquels apprecier les developpements du droit et prendre Ia mesure de leur application. Mutatis mutandis, on peut dire Ia meme chose des droits de l'homme qui apparaissent comme !'autre grande innovation du tournant d'apres-guerre. Ils constituent aussi a Ia fois un droit positif et un ideal normatif, un «sein» et un «sollen» assigne a tous, ainsi juridiquement subordonnes a Ia realisation d'un but commun. Me tournant vers WF.,je l'interrogeais alors: ne s'agit-il pas Ia, finalement, d'une autre fa~on de designer ce phenomene que vous avez vous-meme analyse parmi les premiers, lorsque vous insistiez sur Ia concurrence desormais exercee par le droit de Ia cooperation a 1'egard du droit de Ia coexistence ? Dans ce sens, le droit est ainsi desormais anime d'un mouvement historique. C'est precisement ce mouvement que les positivistes formalistes classiques ne veulent pas voir. Comme s'ils avaient peur qu'on leur ait change leur droit, ils entendent le figer dans Ia position du Lotus, c'esta-dire dans Ia description qu'en avait fait Ia Cour permanente de justice internationale, en 1927, dans !'affaire du meme nom, en le ramenant a Ia seule dimension de Ia coexistence entre souverainetes egalement rivales. A son silence, je compris que WF. partageait sans doute mon propos. Cependant, quand je me retournais vers lui pour queter son approbation, je constatais qu'il avait disparu. C'est alors que mon reve s'interrompit. J'y pensais encore en me reveillant, bien decide a affronter l'avenir du droit international comme je le fais generalement du mien. Avec un optimisme desabuse ... 000

Reflections on the Role of Religion in International Law

M.C.W. Pinto

The temerity, if not the folly, of attempting to treat so vast a subject in a brief essay warrants explanation. First, it is hoped that these thoughts may serve to remind those more qualified that the potential of religion to facilitate and strengthen the working of international law, is a subject that could repay greater attention than it has received from practitioners in either field; second, Jose Maria Ruda, in whose memory this modest effort was undertaken was, among his many attributes, both an outstanding international lawyer, and an intensely religious man; and third, the country he loved so much is perhaps the only one today which combines in a single governmental Ministry, responsibility for both Foreign Affairs and Worship. As law without religion loses its sanctity and its inspiration, so religion without law loses its social and historical character and becomes a purely personal mystique. Law (the process of resolving conflicts and creating channels of co-operation by allocation of rights and duties) and religion (a collective concern with and commitment to the ultimate meaning and purpose of life) are two different dimensions of human experience; but each is also a dimension of the other. They stand or fall together. Harold J. Berman, The Interaction ofLaw and Religion (1974).

1.

International law in the twentieth century

The twentieth century has seen far-reaching developments in the field of international law, matching in quality the brilliant achievements of science in the same period. Indeed, advances in the field of international law and of law in general, have been to a substantial extent, consequent upon advances in science and their economic and physical implications. Some 27 Powers in 1899, and some 45 in 1907- nearly all of the mutually recognized Powers of the time, met in conference at The Hague, and were able to deliberate and reduce to writing rules of law- later characterised as

25 C.A. Armas Barea eta/. (ed.) Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam' ofJudge Jose Maria Ruda, 25-42 © 2000 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

"primary" rules! - to govern their actions in the conduct of that most law-less of activities: war. There were formulated for the first time on so ambitious and comprehensive a scale, rules to govern broad areas of action by belligerent as well as neutral powers. War being considered inevitable and legal, these were the first concerted efforts to make it more humane, to moderate the destructive capability with which technological advances had endowed modern weaponry; and to reduce its incidence through disarmament. Of crucial importance, too, were the conferences' formulations of "secondary" rules: rules to specify the ways in which the primary rules might be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined. Thus, the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Conferences, themselves became the foundation of the rules that would govern the deliberations of the great international institutions of the future, typified by the League ofNations and the United Nations, as well as of the great "codification" conferences that would meet under their auspices. Perhaps the most ambitious of these sets of "secondary" rules were those designed to govern the settlement of disputes among the Powers. In adopting Conventions on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes ( 1899/1907) which brought into being the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and another for the creation of an international prize court; and by annexing to their Final Acts a draft convention on a "judicial arbitration court", the Conferences declared their belief that all of the Powers, great and small, should be governed by a universally applicable body of law, to be interpreted and administered by one or more judicial institutions of universal -albeit consensual -jurisdiction. In the course of the century that followed, international conferences brought together a rapidly expanding universe of States, securing their broad agreement not only on sets of rules to regulate a comprehensive range of human activity in mutually beneficial ways, but also, in many instances, the establishment of institutions to implement and administer them. A century of what has been called "international legislation", has codified rules that would prohibit war or make the conduct of it more humane; bring about the reduction, elimination and prohibition of important categories of weaponry; set up collective measures for the maintenance of peace and security; secure the universal and effective recognition and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; promote the avoidance, or orderly settlement of

l The reference here is to H.L.A. Hart's analysis of law as the union of 'primary' and 'secondary' rules. Hart, H.L.A., The Concept ofLaw (1961), Second Edn. 1994, ChapterV. The International Law Commission, in dealing with the topic of State Responsibility, adopted a parallel use of terms: ' .... the purpose of the present draft articles is not to define the rules imposing on States .... obligations whose breach can be a source of responsibility and which, in a certain sense, may be described as "primary". In preparing the present draft the Commission is undertaking solely to define those rules which, in contradistinction to the primary rules, may be described as "secondary", inasmuch as they are aimed at determining the legal consequences of failure to fulfil obligations established by the "primary" rules.' Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-second Session, para. 23, Yearbook ofthe ILC (1980), Vol. II, Part Two, p. 27.

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international disputes; establish and punish international criminal responsibility; maintain and improve conditions of labour; enhance standards of health; regulate the exploration and use of marine and terrestrial natural resources, and of the air, outer space and the "celestial bodies"; maintain monetary stability, and provide sources of finance for economic development; facilitate and promote trade and commerce, travel, transport and communication; promote the exchange of meteorological information; improve the production and distribution of food, and the spread of education and scientific knowledge; protect intellectual property, and protect and preserve the environment. Meanwhile, through the work of the International Law Commission, the Commission on International Trade Law and the Conference on Private International Law, as well as non-governmental expert bodies such as the Institut de Droit International and the International Law Association, the rules themselves are kept under review and recommendations made from time to time for their clarification, amendment or suppression.

2.

Augmenting the effectiveness of "primary"

rules

Despite the existence of a substantial body of "primary" and "secondary" rules of international law, the effectiveness of the international legal system as a whole is frequently the object of criticism. Indeed, writers on the philosophy of law since Pufendorf, through Hobbes and Austin to the present day, have entered the debate on whether the phenomena of regulated inter-State behaviour may properly be characterized as "law"; and making inevitable comparisons with domestic law, addressed the question of international law's effectiveness.2 States often behave as though the doctrine of sovereign equality entitles each of them to interpret the rules subjectively. Few formulations of a rule are beyond being turned to advantage through selfserving argument, or claimed to be inapplicable in light of the alleged facts of the case. In the absence of an acknowledged authority superior to the States, the interpretations held by the powerful are likely to prevail, either because they are just, or because of the holder's ability to implement or reject other interpretations at will, with impunity. Polarized resentment and discord, fuelled by the politics of nationalism or ideology are likely to frustrate institutional machinery designed to trigger a co-operative response to the breach of a primary rule by the threat or use of official collective force, leaving to the reigning hegemon/s the ultimate power to dispose of any controversy. Although a hegemon is likely to act within the perceived limits of

2 For a brief survey, see Nardin, T., Law, Morality and the Relations between States (1983), pages

149 et seq. Amerasinghe, C.F., "International Law and the Concept of Law: Why International Law is Law", in Makarczyk, J., (ed.) The Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st

Century: Essays in Honour ofKrzysztofSkubiszewski (1 996), pages 79-88. Of particular relevance is the work of recent "deconstructionist" writers: Carty, A., The Decay ofInternational Law? ( 1986); Kennedy, D., International Legal Structures (1987); Koskenniemi, M., From Apology to Utopia: the Structure ofInternational Legal Argument ( 1989).

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tolerance of public opinion (within its borders, and now through the media, also beyond them), and the exercise of its authority may conduce to a temporary stability, its actions nourish the roots of future controversy, and of frustration and violence. Thus, in many instances the primary and secondary rules of international law have failed to bring about that degree of predictability that we have come to expect from law in the domestic context, and that has had there the desired effect of reducing social tension to an acceptable extent. H.L.A. Hart, in analyzing law in terms of "primary" and "secondary" rules, conceives the latter as the means by which a mature legal system provides remedies for the intrinsic uncertainty, static nature and inefficiency of its primary rules. The remedy for the static quality of a regime of primary rules consists in the introduction of what he calls "rules of change", for example, the empowerment of an individual or body to introduce new primary rules and eliminate old ones. In international law, an equivalent of such means of change may be the diplomatic conference and the process of ratification of the intergovernmental agreement elaborated by it. The remedy for the inefficiency of a primary rule consists of secondary rules empowering independent individuals to make authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has been broken. Substantial progress has been made toward remedying the "inefficiency" of primary rules of international law through the establishment of international courts and tribunals empowered to determine through adversarial procedures, whether or not in particular instances, a primary rule has been broken, the party in breach, and the nature of the appropriate remedy. However, consensual as well as subject-matter limits to jurisdiction tend to narrow their scope of operation. The functions of these courts and tribunals are supplemented by a range of mechanisms applying "alternative", third-party-directed methods of dispute resolution e.g., good offices, mediation, fact-finding, conciliation. These methods avert or resolve conflict in cases of alleged breaches of primary rules, not by publicly declaring responsibility and ordering restitution or compensation, but by bringing parties to agree upon a course of action reflecting a balance of their interests, and restoring a regime of cooperation among them. Desirable as such an outcome might be, it may not always be of assistance in clarifying any underlying rules of law so as to dispel inherent uncertainty and enhance the rules' effectiveness. Among secondary rules, rules ofrecognition needed to dispel the uncertainty surrounding a primary rule, are of fundamental importance. In Hart's analysis, the remedy for uncertainty is the introduction of the method whereby the existence and validity of a primary rule may be generally recognized e.g. through application of a "rule of recognition", or a method of authoritatively demonstrating acknowledgment of a primary rule. The method will specify some feature or features of a suggested rule which would indicate conclusively that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts. A rule of recognition will, moreover, indicate criteria, in some hierarchic order if necessary, for determining an ultimate rule of recognition. In municipal law, rules of recognition may be identified by their incorporation in legislative enactments and ultimately by reference to some superior text like a constitution.3 But the 3

Hart, H.L.A., op.cit. pages 94-5.

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potential for the exercise of social pressure by the group could only derive from "a common consciousness of consent",4 a pre-legislative consensus concerning the rule, with its roots in a common system of values. International law on the other hand, is the product of nation-States that have their roots in different civilizations, 5 each with a value system perceived as unique. Each value system is sanctioned by long tradition and deeply embedded like a vital organ in the national consciousness. Even to expose it for examination could be a process of the greatest delicacy, and seem like an attack on the national identity. International law thus rests on an uneasy mix of these varied value systems and the challenge has been to derive from it the "common consciousness of consent" that would enable a given rule of international law to be recognized as binding. Although the results of some efforts at codifying international law approach the level of detail, precision and authority of legislative enactment (e.g. the "treaty on treaties", and the conventions on diplomatic and consular relations), in many controversies appeals are made to the rules of customary law, and it is often difficult to discover there a rule of recognition that will conclusively dispel the uncertainty inherent in many such rules. The lack of unequivocal statutory (universal treaty) guidance in the matter, and the often plastic nature of customary law, complicate, prolong and exacerbate international disputes. Over the millennia, civilizations have developed three important tools for relieving stress through reducing uncertainty and increasing their sense of what is predictable: technology, law and religion. 6 If the uncertainties inherent in international law result from its origins in different civilizations, a collaborative effort among the religions that have marked those civilizations would be needed- if not essential- to discover the ultimate rules of recognition in international law, and also to facilitate the operation of mechanisms for their interpretation and enforcement.

4 "Law, it has been wisely said, .... involves a settled state of affairs, a common consciousness of consent, an ordered unity." Robson, W.A., Civilization and the Growth ofLaw (1935), pp. 2978, quoting with approval, Jarrett, B., Social Theories in the Middle Ages (1926), p. 2. 5 This was surely implied by the Japanese member of the League of Nations' Advisory Committee of Jurists charged in 1920 with making recommendations on the structure and functions of the proposed Permanent Court of International Justice, when he insisted that, in the composition of the Court 'All different kinds of civilization must be taken into account...' Acceptance of that view led to the requirement in article 9 of the Statute of the Permanent Court, emphasized in article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, that 'in the [Court] as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.' The same requirement is made in relation to those charged with the progressive devel-

opment and codification of international law, by article 8 of the Statute of the International Law Commission. See also Tomuschat, C., 'Ethos, Ethics and Morality in International Relations', in Bernhardt, R. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, who observes 'In a multicultural world, international law must therefore reflect the diversity of civilizations'. (Page 122). 6 Elaborated in the path-making work of Hofstede, G., Cultures' Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values ( 1984 ), when dealing with his concept of "uncertainty avoidance" as an attribute prevailing on a national scale, pp. Ill et seq.

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3.

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The power of religion

Religion is a feature of civilizations that has demonstrated enormous- perhaps unrivalled- potential for influencing human behaviour in all epochs, 7 for better or, sometimes indeed, for worse. For, if religion's ameliorating and civilizing influence has graced the millennia, so has religion, when acting upon certain frailties of human nature, produced misery, corruption, destruction and death. There come to mind the horrors of the Inquisition and the Crusades, when cruelties of every description were visited upon the innocent in the name of a religion of faith, hope and above all, love. These we readily recall because Europe's colonial expansion created world languages which made its history widely accessible. Horrors perpetrated in the name of every religion, however gentle the teaching of its founder, are of course, to be found in every part of the globe and in all epochs, our own not excepted. But few would deny that even today, in an age of unparalleled scientific progress, and despite the strong intellectual appeal of materialistic world-views that have decried religion as mere superstition and an "opiate of the masses", religion remains the most powerful of influences - for good or for ill - on the lives of most human beings. The term "religion" is used here in a broad sense, as extending beyond spiritual doctrine to mean a social institution that comprehends related custom and moral precepts that direct the life of a community. The English term derives from the Latin "ligare", to bind, or in this context, to "bind again" or "bind firmly". This origin it shares with terms such as "obligation", "alliance" and "reliance", all implying the binding quality, variously interpreted, that reflects the source of its directive power, and its linkage with custom and morality, and ultimately with law. Accordingly, it refers primarily, but not exclusively, to the so-called world religions that have been the foundations of entire civilizations: Hinduism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity and Islam. Tolstoy, when asked what he understood by the word "religion", and whether he considered it possible for morality to exist independently of religion, concluded: " ... in reply to your two questions, I say: religion is a particular relationship that man establishes between his own separate personality and the infinite universe, or its origin. And morality is the permanent guide to life that follows from this relationship;"

7

Nowhere is the power of religion more eloquently described than in Philip Allott's Eunomia:

New Order for a New World:

'6.18 Among the processes of social reality-forming, it has been religion which, throughout all the recorded history of human socializing, has had the most powerful effects on individual and social consciousness and on the practical products of that consciousness. Religion seeks to integrate all value with all reality. Religion seeks to connect an order of the whole universe with the willing and acting of the individual human being ... 6.19 Religion is as natural to a human being as thinking ... .'

Reflections on the Role ofReligion in International Law

31

and observes, 'There can be no genuine, non-hypocritical morality that is without a religious basis, just as there can be no plant without roots'. 8 The essence of the socially binding nature of religion is nowhere better expressed than in the following passage from a work dealing inter alia with religion in Africa: "Religion appears ... as the projection and affirmation of certain norms which govern the evolution of society. It is the selective codification, for its impact on everyday life, of a 'two-way' network of moral pressure: of the workings of the principle of Good in its positive sense, on behalf of whatever supports or guards a specific social system; and of the workings of the same principle in a negative sense - the sense of Evil which promotes or provokes, chiefly as one form or other of punishment or deterrent, whatever may go against that system. "9

Religion and law, perhaps coeval tools of the human brain in its earliest search for certainty and predictability, were intimately linked in their origins and, in various ways, influenced each other's development. In Sir Henry Maine's famous words, "there is no system of recorded law, literally from China to Peru which, when it first emerges into notice, is not seen to be entangled with religious ritual and observance". This generalization, though the object of subsequent critical comment, remains substantially true. It is thus conceded that the earliest lawyers were first of all priests, the original identity of the two professions being demonstrable by reference to practices among a broad range of peoples including those influenced by the Indian, Chinese, Celtic, Greek and Roman civilizations. Even the Code of Hammurabi and the codes of the Hittites and the Assyrians discovered after Maine's influential study, although of a more secular character, contain appeals to religion as the foundation of their authority, and do not weaken the validity of his general proposition. The earliest texts that offer evidence of civilizing communities beginning to regulate relations among themselves are replete with appeals to the gods as the arbiters of their conductiO The gods offer the reward for observance of relevant rules and mete out punishment for their breach. An oath, a formal undertaking to act in a prescribed way, and often given reciprocally so as to support an agreement, was declared before the gods. Even today, the oath has been defined for English law as " ... a religious asseveration by which the party calls his god to witness that what he says is the truth, or that what he promises to do he will do. Evidence is given an oath 'for the law presumeth that no men will foreswear himself for any worldly thing' " (emphasis added)

8

Essay entitled "Religion and Morality" (1893) included in a recent collection of his work

under the title A Confession and Other Religious Writings, translated by Jane Kentish (1987). 9 Davidson, B., Black Mans Burden: Africa and the Curse ofthe Nation-State (1992), p. 82. 1O See Bederman, D.J. "Religion and the Sources of International Law in Antiquity" in Janis, M. W. (ed.) The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law (1991); and extensive treatment in Nussbaum, A., A Concise History of the Law ofNations (1954) and Alexandrowicz, C.H., An Introduction to the History ofthe Law ofNations in the East Indies (1967).

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A religion's promise that behaviour according to its precepts in a material world full of suffering would, at death, guarantee transmutation into some desired non-material condition, variously described, still exerts its power on the vast majority of human beings. As in the earliest times contracts were secured by oaths declared before supernatural powers, so also were treaties between communities, and later between cities or territorially bounded nations. It is likely that no human enterprise from the sowing of seed to the commencement of battle would be undertaken before performance of some form of propitiation of the gods, who were believed to determine the outcome, and to do so depending inter alia on the nature of such devotions. Religion is intimately associated with the moral values that are reflected in today's domestic and international law, and that will continue to inform the lawmaking processes of the future. The official titles of several States and political parties contain references to a dominant religion, representing that the core values which guide them, and which they promote, are derived from that source. Religious groups within communities form links between the people and their government, and are in a position to bring significant pressure to bear on the latter. Modern examples of the power of religion to rally the people may be drawn from every continent: from Iran to Poland, and from Nicaragua to South Africa, and to the Philippines, religion has wrought fundamental political change. 1 I The basic law or constitution of a State will often declare to be fundamental the duty to protect (even propagate) a particular religion, or all religions. Heads of State and Government are consecrated, or required to take oaths, often of a religious nature, when entering upon their responsibilities. Similar solemn affirmations would be made routinely even by officers of less exalted rank. Among the most aflluent and secular-tending of States we may find inscribed on the currency - that most worldly of tokens - such unworldly expressions as "In God we trust", and "God with us". It is as though even the State, a soul-less abstraction, finds comfort in this ultimate form of insuring an ordered future. Heads of State lead the people in prayer, and temples and churches overflow in times of national crisis. Few regular armed forces would not have available, organized recourse to spiritual guidance for those whose profession would require them to make the supreme sacrifice. Religion has been a prime ingredient in bringing communities together in the building of nations, and in maintaining their cohesiveness. On the other hand, religion - origin and sustainer of moral values - has tended to set civilizations apart, rather than bring them together. As one authority observes: "These basic values, these psychological structures, are assuredly the features that civilizations can least easily communicate one to another. They are what isolate and differentiate them most sharply. And such habits of mind survive the passage of time. They change little, and change slowly after a long incubation which itself is largely unconscious too.

II

Several examples are examined in Johnston D., and Sampson, C., (eds.) Religion, the Missing

Dimension of Statecraft ( 1994 ), in exploring the potential of religions and spiritual influences in conflict resolution, where problems have been resistant to resolution by traditional diplomatic means.

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Here religion is the strongest feature of civilizations, at the heart of both their present and their past.. .. " 12

Religion, in its extreme "exclusionary" mode, has appeared to cause the division of states, resulting in untold destruction of life and property.

4.

Euro-Christian

and other civilizations

Religion became so inter-twined with law because it was so pervasive of national life. It has been shown that for the peoples of ancient Egypt, of Babylon, Assyria and Israel, of India and China, and more recently those of Rome, Carthage and Macedonia, law, including the law that would regulate conduct among nations, was of divine origin. Thus, the facts do not seem to bear out the earlier assertion by eminent authority, that international law in its origins is the product of Christian civilization.13 While it might be true that what is referred to today as international law owes much to the systematic presentation of its content by Christian theologians from the time ofVitoria and Suarez, the substance of the system - the principles and rules themselves - is of far greater antiquity. The Christian religion was carried round the world in the trading ships of Europe's imperial powers. Their languages followed their trade and colonial expansion, so that their legal treatises would be read in the farthest comers of empire, while imperial power ensured their acceptance as authentic. 14 But this systematic treatment is but a snapshot, taken at a particular moment in history, of an international law that had been developing literally for millennia. If the Sanskrit language had travelled westward 20 centuries before the writings of those Christian theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries, to make known such works as the Manu Smriti, the Yagnavalka, Apastamba and Arthasastra, we might have been inclined to conclude that international law (especially its rules governing the sanctity of treaties, the treatment of envoys and the humane conduct of war) was, in its origins, the product of Hindu, and possibly Buddhist, civilization.15 Snapshots of other times and other civilizations 16 would reveal that although 12

Braude!, F., A History ofCivilizations (1987), trans. Mayne, R., (1993) p. 22.

13 Oppenheim, L., International Law (Eighth Edn. 1955), Vol. I, p. 48. 14 Grotius' great work De Jure Belli ac Pacis ( 1625) was translated into almost all of the main languages ' ... and as many as seventy-six editions have seen the light of day. No Jaw book, it has been said, has achieved such international fame since the days of the great Roman jurists'. Robson, W.A., Civilization and the Growth ofLaw (1935), p. 228, citing a note by Professor Winfield.

15 On the origins of international law in India, see for example, Bandyopadhyay, P., International Law and Custom in Ancient India ( 1920), and Viswanatha, S.V., International Law in Ancient India (1925). 16 Thus, as one commentator has observed: 'The jurists of Baghdad composed works on the Law of War and Peace some five hundred years before the works of Grotius and the Christian humanists ... the Arab rules of humanity in war influenced the Christian jurists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in their attempts to introduce temperamenta into the warlike practices of the European States'. Bentwick, N., The Religious

Foundations ofInternationalism (1959), p. 169.

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the contribution of Christian theologians of the 16th and 17th centuries was great indeed, the fabric of international law at every stage in its development has plural origins to which many civilizations (each being often characterized today by reference to a dominant religion) have contributed over many millennia.17 Civilizations may diverge in their approaches to political organization, and ultimately to law, under the influence of different religious beliefs acted upon by different histories. One writer18 draws attention to such a divergence which he attributes to different ways in which populations have perceived their relationships to their environments. Thus, what he describes as "purely" Asian ways of thought introduced by Aryan settlers and transmitted through Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and, more recently, Gandhian philosophy, derived knowledge inductively, through direct observation. Thus, political organization found its moral basis in "an intuitively felt continuum of immediacy or in the patriarchal family relationship or ethnological species given inductively by natural history science." Rules were derived from "warm-hearted intuition or the family, caste and tribal relations observed inductively." The associated religious goal is thought of as the "non-dualistic" "immediate immersion of oneself in the all-embracing formlessness which is the non-Aryan Brahman, Nirvana or the Confucian vastness." By contrast, the Western approach to political organization was influenced by Greek science, through which nature ceased to be described merely in terms of the way we feel it "when, through naive observation, we become aware of ourselves as immersed in its continuum of impressionistic aesthetic immediacy". Instead, nature is conceived as something inferred from this naively felt and observed nature, but not immediately seen in it. The relationship of humans to nature is not known through being directly sensed: it is the "thesis of Greek science that any truly known thing or event is an instance ofa theoretically conceived determinate law." If good conduct is conduct which proceeds from true knowledge about man and his fellow men in nature, and if knowledge of man and nature reveals man and other entities in nature to be instances of determinate laws not derived inductively from family, village or tribal relations, then the moral basis of political organization becomes free from such limitations. According to the author, Greek science was responsible for the creation of the Roman "technically conceptualized science of law", which transformed Hebrew culture and religion into the form of Christianity that became the foundation of Western civilization. The contrast between the author's 'purely Asian' and Western (Christian) approaches is well expressed in the following passage:

17 On the need for international law to draw upon the world's diversity of cultures, see also Jennings, Sir R., "Universal International Law in a Multicultural World", in International Law and The Grotian Heritage ( 1985), p. 195; and the Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the GabCicovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary/Slovakia) before the International Court of Justice (pages 7-16 of the Opinion). 18 Northrop, F.S.C., The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy (1952), pages 186-204.

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"With the locus of the model of justice in theoretically conceived nature rather than in the intuitively felt continuum of immediacy or in the patriarchical family relationship and the ethnological species given inductively by natural history science, fathers were, as Jesus said, put against son, mother against daughter and daughter-in-law against mother-in-law. Forthwith belief in a determinately expressed doctrine rather than loyalty to one's parents, ancestors, caste or ethnological group determined the morally good and just men. And with respect to a particular determinate, theoretically expressed doctrine which is believed, father and son, daughter-in-law and mother-in-law, nation and nation, and even man-tomanness can differ without any moral sense offailure of loyalty to family or tribe or

God."19 (Emphasis added).

The implications of these differences for the settlement of disputes between nations, among which goals and ideologies may well differ, is also significant: " ... when the ideologies are incompatible, the goals are also. Being in its essence dialectical, justice with respect to such a dispute simply cannot consist in the mediational, pacifistic Gandhian purely Asian technique of softening down or covering up the determinately expressed doctrinal differences as if they were of secondary importance and merely verbai."20

He puts the perceived difference in the starkest terms when he asserts: "To ask a people or nation with a theoretically formulated morality to compromise the basic principles of that morality is, from the standpoint of the spiritual foundations of Western civilization here outlined, to ask them to stop being moral men. Clearly until Western peoples and nations give up their own science, philosophy, religion, ethics and law to become non-dualistic Vedanta Hindus, pacifistic, intuitive Buddhists or mediational followers of Confucius, such a way to peace when dealing with Western nations or with Asian nations introducing and pursuing a Western political ideology or economic program simply will not work. More than this it is to ask the Western believer, or the Asians to accept a Western constitutional form of government, to be false to their own beliefs, ideals and values."21

Whether or not one concurs in the writer's thesis, the existence of perceptions of differences potentially so fundamental, present a formidable challenge to those who would, as suggested below, attempt to formulate the common religious/ethical foundations of civilizations, so as to enable the power of religion to support their implementation through international law. In the 16th century the Christian beliefs of the European powers entered a new phase, changing in significant ways under pressure from the new spirit of enterprise, which released long-suppressed human energies and sanctioned their use in the pur-

19 ibid., pages 195-6. 20 ibid., page 197. 21 ibid., pages 197-8.

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suit of material gain. Greed and the desire for power were recognized as part of human nature, and were thus not to be thwarted, but rather tempered or moderated by the gentle teachings ofChrist.22 Correspondingly, primitive Christian beliefs were reinterpreted to accommodate the upward spiral of material progress based on buying cheap and selling dear, not to mention the gold, slaves, textiles and spices taken from 'the Indies'. This vision of the real world had far-reaching consequences for European law. Seventeenth century Europe saw the growth of a natural law based no longer solely in theology, not on the will of God, but on reason. Under the influence of Grotius and Leibniz it was thought to be good sense not to do injury to your neighbour, and that any such injury should give rise to a right of redress. Justice was seen as the charity of the wise. It was not bad morals to demand excessive interest for the use of money: it was merely bad business to do so.23 This world view would lead in Europe to the division between the realms of church and State, and between religion and law. Following the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace ofWestphalia, the new wave produced, through the work of Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel, an international law which saw nation-States as separate individuals, sovereign and independent of one another, with equal rights, but compelled by reason (the law of nature) to allow each other their equal exercise. A bias in the direction of the individual showed that, in case conflict between the duty of a nation to itself, and its distributive duties to other nations, the duty towards itself- the raison d'etat- would prevail. Most importantly, it placed the individual at the centre of social effort, and allowed the virtually unrestrained pursuit of profit.24 This liberty was circumscribed only by limits set by positive law, which would at the same time provide protection from the excessive demands or tyranny of the Prince. These notions regarding the individual were also consistent with a fundamental belief in each human being's

22 As one distinguished writer encapsulates the implications of Calvin's teachings: ' ... capital and credit are indispensable; the financier is not a pariah, but a useful member of society; and lending at interest, provided that the rate is reasonable and that loans are made freely to the poor, is not per se more extortionate than any other of the economic transactions without which human affairs cannot be carried on. That acceptance of the realities of commercial practice as a starting-point was of momentous importance. It meant that Calvinism and its offshoots took their stand on the side of the activities which were to be most characteristic of the future, and insisted that it was not by

renouncing them, but by untiring concentration on the task of using for the glory of God the opportunities they offered, that Christian life could and must be lived.' Tawney, R.H., Religion and the Rise ofCapitalism ( 1926), Peregrine Books reprint, 1987, pages 116-7. 2 3 See Murphy, C.F., The Search for World Order: a Study ofThought and Action (1985), pages 29 et seq. 24 "That creed was that the individual is absolute master of his own, and, within the limits set by positive law, may exploit it with a single eye to his pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his own profit to the well-being of his neighbours, or to give account of his actions to higher authority. It was in short, the theory ofproperty which was later to be accepted by all civilized communities." Tawney, R.H., op.cit. note 22, p. 151. (Emphasis added).

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possession of a unique soul which retained its special distinctive character even in the transition to an after-life, and would, still in that form, be redeemed or condemned for its conduct on earth. After the first wave of European adventures in search of souls to be won for Christ (not averse, however, to the acquisition of gold for an expectant patron), the imperial powers propagated among the colonies their world-view founded on the spirit of enterprise and individualism. That view was reflected not only in their religious beliefs, but also in their laws, languages and literature, all of which were transplanted to the lands under their control. The consequences of such efforts on communities in which an indigenous religion, government and law lay, as yet, inextricably mingled, and whose social history had not been affected by currents of thought such as those that had sparked Europe's economic progress, were complex in the extreme, and continue so to today, after more than three centuries. Where imperial conquest did not extinguish entire populations, Christianity and the spirit of enterprise and individualism that travelled with it, encountered societies in which the prevailing moral code and religion demanded subordination of the welfare of the individual to that of the community, or reinforced customs and an ethic with that goal. Moreover, the new religion and its ways were not introduced by the dominant power for acceptance or rejection by the colony at its option. They represented an imposed doctrine, one that was inconsistent with the mores that had prevailed in the country since time immemorial, and threatened to disrupt and overturn hallowed and familiar social concepts and structures. It was a doctrine imposed by a foreigner, who sought dominance through a strategy of trade; and imposition was often accomplished by force of arms. In contrast to an indigenous religion which might see the notion of "self" as an impediment to spiritual development, as perpetuating a cycle of death and re-birth that needed to be broken to enable the false notion of self to dissolve and merge finally with the infinite,25 European Christianity, did not merely

25 " ... the idea of an abiding, immortal substance in man or outside, whether it is called Atman, 'I', Soul, Self, or Ego, is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. This is the Buddhist doctrine of Anatta, No-Soul or No-Self." Rahula, the Revd. Walpola, What the Buddha Taught (Revd. edn. 1967, reprint 1982), p. 55; also: 'From passions liberate, quit of self, Of arrogance, impatience, anger, pride;

Such a one grows to oneness with the Brahm; Such a one, growing one with Brahm, serene, Sorrows no more, desires no more .. .' The Bhagavadgita, trans. Sir Edwin Arnold, Chapter 18.

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acknowledge the existence of "self", but gave it a permanent and central place.26 Its introduction through promise of material advancement, or by forms of compulsion, together with the deprivation of land that accompanied colonial penetration, left the wounds which today appear to some to portend a "clash of civilizations" in the future.

5.

From religious exclusivism toward universalism

Remarkably, it was in the heyday of colonial expansion, in the latter part of the 19th century, that an interest in the "other" great religions developed in the capitals of the western powers. Max Muller's lectures in London in 1870, urging an "impartial and truly scientific comparison of.... the most important religions of mankind" drew large audiences. The work of other scholars of the time including T. W. Rhys Davids in Britain, Paul Deussen and Rudolph Otto in Germany and A.J. Edmunds in America sparked an interest in the study of comparative religion and provided a foundation for a movement toward universalism, described as the search for a truly global outlook that might be formed through a synthesis between Eastern and Western intellectual traditions, and based on the belief that "at the deepest level of human wisdom there is a unity of vision embracing all mankind".27 In 1893, a Chicago lawyer, Charles Carroll Bonney, set up a committee of businessmen, pastors and teachers from the city to prepare what came to be known as the First Parliament of the World's Religions. His intention appears to have been to demonstrate that there existed, alongside the advances in science and industry presented at the World Columbian Exhibition held in Chicago that year, something "higher and nobler". To this Parliament of the Religions came the representatives of some 45 religious persuasions, including leading figures of Hinduism (Swami

26 One may speculate as to the extent to which the apparently fundamental differences in policies concerning the protection of human rights, as manifest during the Vienna Conference in 1993 (some countries tending to emphasize the well-being of the community, others the rights of the individual) had roots in different religious beliefs. Several developing countries, some where belief in an individual, immortal soul prevailed, and others where there was no such belief, insisted that the duty of States to promote and protect human rights should be interpreted bearing in mind 'the significance of national and regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious peculiarities' ( 1993 Declaration para. 5). Were such attitudes merely those of a leadership motivated by considerations of political expediency? Could such positions ever receive democratic endorsement? Could such attitudes change with advancement of the well-being of the community through economic development? Would such change occur without a means of reconciling it with pristine religious beliefs, such as was found possible in sixteenth century Europe? 27 Ward, B., The Interplay ofEast and West: Elements ofContrast and Co-operation (1957) p. 77, quoted in Clarke, J.J., Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought (1997) p. 134. In an overview of the on-going 'Religious Dialogue' (chapter 8), the author describes the work of several philosophers associated with the abandonment of Euro-Christian exclusivist attitudes, and the rise of universalism (as defined in the particular context) in the West.

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39

Vivekananda) and Buddhism (Anagarika Dharmapala), besides Catholic and Protestant Christianity, Judaism and Shintoism. Notably absent were representatives of Islam (apparently for political, rather than religious reasons), the Sikhs and Tibetan Buddhists.28 The 'Parliament' may be seen as marking the rise of the universalist movement, as the west, then undisputed centre of economic and political power, began to recognize and study the religions of the lands which they governed or controlled. With the failure of diplomacy and law to prevent the carnage and destruction of World War I, the movement gathered momentum in the inter-war period, which saw the foundation of groups such as the Inter-Religious League, the International Congress of the World Fellowship of Faiths and the World Congress of Faiths. It would be questioned, however, whether such efforts to interact with non-Christian faiths represented an open-minded search for spiritual truth, or was merely another manifestation ofWestern Christian exclusiveness, and in reality aimed at demonstrating the "superiority" of Christianity, and at the conversion of others. World War II produced a similar resurgence of interest and, in 1948, the establishment of the World Council of Churches. Although its purpose was the reunification of Christian churches, the scope of the Council's activity was soon broadened to include a dialogue with non-Christian religions. A parallel development was seen in the Roman Catholic church with the holding of the Second Vatican Council (1962-5). Whereas the Church had maintained since the Council of Florence (1438-45) that "outside the Church there is no salvation" , it was now declared that "God desires the salvation of all mankind", and that while the role of the Church was unique, God works for salvation in and through all religious traditions. It was in 1993, a century after the "First Parliament of the World's Religions", that Chicago again became the venue of a gathering of representatives of religions from around the world. This second Parliament again brought together, not officially appointed delegations, but some 6500 individuals distinguished for their activity in each of the world's religions, including the main branches of Buddhism, of Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism; and in Jainism, Shinto, Sikhism, Tao, and Zoroastrianism, besides other religious groups, theosophical and anthroposophical societies, as well as religious federative and academic bodies. The achievement of this Parliament was the elaboration of a "Declaration Toward a Global Ethic". While the Declaration had a religious base it had been possible in the discussions that led up to it, to avoid many of the philosophical pitfalls that had beset inter-religious dialogue in the past (e.g. questions concerning the existence and nature of 'God') and to secure consensus among them at the level of binding values, irrevocable criteria, and fundamental moral attitudes. The basis of discussion was a draft in English prepared by an editorial committee of the 'Council' of the 'Parliament', and the document, in its final form, was subscribed by participants from a wide spectrum of faiths.

28 For a description of the work of the first 'Parliament of the World's Religions', see Kiing, H., and Kuschel, K., A Global Ethic (1993), pages 77-86.

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Those who signed the Declaration affirm, most importantly, that a common set of core values is to be found in the teachings of the religions, and that these form the basis ofa global ethic. They declare, inter alia, that each individual must be ready to take responsibility for his/her actions, and that those actions will have consequences; that individuals must treat others as they wish others to treat them, and are required to respect life and dignity, individuality and diversity; that they must forgive and not be "enslaved by memories of hate"; that they must commit themselves to a culture of non-violence, and undertake not to oppress, injure, torture or kill; and that they will strive for a just social and economic order and, moving beyond the dominance of greed of power, prestige, money and consumption, to make a just and peaceful world.29

6.

Conclusion

It has been suggested here, applying Hart's analysis of law to international law, that the latter's failure to be effective in certain situations of acute conflict could, in part, be the result of uncertainty as to the applicable primary rule, itself the result of the absence of reliable secondary rules ofrecognition. The reason for this latter feature, it was suggested, was that the religions which provided the core values of the civilizations of which international law is the product, differing significantly from one another in their historical development, had produced, instead of a necessary prelegislative consensus, apparently different foundations for possible rules of recognition, related, in particular, to the apportioning of emphasis in the relationship between the individual and the collective.30 The results of the second Parliament of the World's Religions shows, however, both that religious leaders are willing to work together, eschewing historically influenced tendencies toward exclusiveness, and

See Kiing, H., and Kuschel, K., ibid pages 13-36. Many of the basic ideas of the 'Declaration' had been researched at the University of Tiibingen under the guidance of the eminent theologian Hans Kiing, and expounded in an earlier work by him, Global Responsibility: In Search ofa New World Ethic (1991) (Projekt Weltethos, 1990). 30 One distinguished author, writing in 1971, saw little prospect of consensus in this crucial area: 'Present efforts aiming at an extention of international law to the sphere ofindividual1ife by drafting, for example, universally valid covenants of human rights, appear in this perspective to be exercises in futility - all the more so as most non-Western governments are not constrained by locally dominant moral orders to assure respect for individual liberties within their respective local jurisdictions. In fact such an accentuation of law is likely to contribute to further discords and divisions in the society of nations since it is apt to induce a false sense of moral duty'. Bozeman, A.B., The Future ofLaw in a Multicultural World ( 1971 ), pages 183-4. 29

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possibly related wrangling over arcane philosophical questions; and that it is feasible to isolate significant commonalities among the beliefs of their constituencies.3I Thus, it would seem that, if the world religions were to meet at the highest level and, in that spirit of boundless concern for humanity which informed the life and teachings of each of the founders of those religions, formulate in unequivocal terms, the common elements of their moral teachings - in Hans Kung's term, a "global ethic" - they could offer the most useful guide yet for the determination of rules of recognition in international law. The declarations of such a "Council of Religions" would help to clarify the attitudes of decision-makers to the primary rules, or help to put beyond doubt the manner in which those rules are to be applied, besides directing initiatives for the formulation and application of new primary rules of international law. By making a direct appeal to individual believers everywhere, the Council would influence and motivate the mass of the people, and through them, politicians of every persuasion, from regularly elected representatives to monarchs and presidents - for - life. Perhaps most importantly it would make possible the design of a programme of moral instruction that would be consistent with every system of religion or belief, and so could be compulsorily taught to children of every faith throughout the world, helping to mould the minds of tomorrow's decision-makers well before they are called upon to grapple with the complexities of implementing 'primary' and 'secondary' rules of law. Religion could thus regain something like its pristine role in the formation of international law, but would do so in an eclectic manner, drawing not from one, but from all of the world's religions their moral and spiritual insights, to strengthen the foundations of international law and augment its effectiveness. Through dialogue and collaboration among religious leaders under the auspices of the Council, and the adoption of attitudes of openness and self-criticism, religious constituencies would gradually lose their historical propensity to foster 'exclusionary' biases along national lines, and for the first time in history, jointly move people everywhere toward that

31 Prescriptions for peace by one recent authority, having specified an abstention rule (States must abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations) and a joint mediation rule (core States must negotiate with one another to halt fault line wars among civilizations), lays down a 'third rule for peace' in the following terms: ' ... Western Christianity, Orthodoxy, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism ... share key values in common. If humans are

ever to develop a universal civilization, it will emerge gradually through the exploration and expansion of these commonalities. Thus, in addition to the abstention rule and the joint mediation rule, the third rule for peace in a multicivilizational world is the commonalities rule: peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations'. (Italics added) Huntington, S.P., The Clash of

Civilizations and the Remaking ofWorld Order (1996), p. 320.

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'common consciousness of consent', the lack of which, has contributed substantially toward impairing the effectiveness of international law throughout its existence.32 This is not to say that there will be no difficulty in formulating the commonalities of these moral teachings so as to place their meanings beyond doubt. Nor can it be assumed that, when the attempt is made to implement such formulations, they will not encounter resistance from entrenched parochial-minded national hierarchies unwilling to forgo or modify their traditional roles and influence. But the goodwill that is already manifest, a sense of mission and of urgency, and modem communications technology, including the Internet and the World Wide Web offer, perhaps for the first time in history, the possibility that such an initiative could reach individual citizens everywhere, promote their understanding of and participation in international decision-making, facilitate the emergence of rules of recognition, augment the effectiveness of primary rules of international law, and thereby strengthen predictability and the rule of law among nations. Since no formulation of commonalities among religions and their moral precepts is ever likely to be beyond the reach of ingenious self-serving interpretation, the Council should be willing to speak out from time to time, its membership jointly stating in unequivocal terms, the relevance and implications of those commonalities for particular circumstances of conflict or tension; or declaring the meaning of their formulations, or ways of determining internal contradiction, inconsistency or incoherence. Their pronouncements must take no account of governmental positions (their own or others') on a given issue, but must be based solely on the spiritual values, criteria and attitudes which they have formulated, and subscribed. This could involve a degree of public exposure, and demand considerable personal courage, depending on the situation or conflict addressed. Mahatma Gandhi forfeited his life for the values he proclaimed, as did Martin Luther King, Yitzhak Rabin, and legions of others throughout the centuries. But this should not be beyond the capacities of leaders of religions in which integrity, altruism and sacrifice have always been emphasized. In any event, such pronouncements would be made collectively. By adding spiritual force to the interpretation of legal principle, they could have a salutory influence on faltering political will or judicial indecision, and so have a direct and positive impact on the lives of a suffering people.

32 It is noteworthy that one religious leader, upon assuming office as Head of State stressed the value of a 'dialogue among civilizations'. In his recent address to the 53rd Session of the UN General Assembly, President Khatami of the Islamic Republic of Iran, called for commencement, on the threshold of a new century, of efforts to institutionalize such a dialogue as a way to achieve 'replacing hostility and confrontation with discourse and understanding'. He proposed that the United Nations designate the year 200 I the 'Year of Dialogue among Civilizations'. (Address of 21 September 1998).

Justice Among States

Antonio Remiro Brotons

Ubi Societas, Ibi Ius Today it should once and for all be established that the existence of the International Law can only be denied by first denying the existence of an international society. In fact, those excluded from the advantages of the legal order in international relations have in the past been excluded from international society based on criteria such as Christianity or civilization. Only since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century can one, thanks to the historical process of decolonization, speak of an international society (and Law) which are finally universal. Now, when this century comes to an end and the Socialist block has been broken down, it would be perverse to propose substituting the sacred mission ofcivilization which permitted justifying colonialism and imperialism with a sacred mission ofglobalization to chastise the difference. The globalization of problems does not justify imposing the model of organization and conduct which the most powerful of the developed nations have interests in. The story of little pig Babe, who learned to bark because he preferred to live among sheep rather than to be made sausages is cute, but a vision of the world as such a farm is little comforting.

Sic Societas, Sicut Ius Naturally, if law is a social need, it should respond to the characteristics of a given society and time. Therein lies the error of those who examine International Law within the parameters of States' own legal orders. International Law tends to confuse rules and obligations (due to the absence of a legislator), searches for agreement to resolve disputes (due to the lack of a judge), accepts self help to satisfy legitimate rights and interests of its subjects (for lack of a gendarme): International Law, in short, has up to now been a very slightly institutionalized order, and the proposal of a dedoublement fonctionel of States, which do justice when they make justice, does not hide International Law's feebleness when one scrutinizes the very unequal distribution of power among States.

43 C.A. Armas Barea eta/. (ed.) Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam· ofJudge Jose Maria Ruda, 43-55 ~ 2000 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

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Ubi Ius, lbi Justitia? This last point, the inequality of power in a society as decentralized as international society is, makes us to look in awe at the relationship between Law and Justice. Naturally, I do not intend in the very least to play the role of legal philosopher, although at times it does please me to provoke my hearers (and readers) by warning that Law and Justice by chance do meet at some point. The warning, which is nothing original and is probably somewhat uncouth, tends to be linked to considering the creation, interpretation, and application of the Law a game which becomes more attractive as the player aspires to win without counting on a better hand of cards. On an international plane, this approximation strikes me as very interesting, but it really takes us further from Justice among States, unless, using the HumptyDumpty prerogative, - always so much sought after in forensic discussions on legal interpretation- we use the expression to be able to say whatever we want without previously identifying justice - and the probability of its being carried out- in international relations. The following pages are written with this qualification.

"Justice"

in the Creation of International

Rules and Obligations

The fundamental role of a sovereign State's consent in creating international rules and obligations is a good reason to maintain that these rules and obligations regulate their object with justice. The use of armed force and acts of intervention, that is, acts which aim to impose with forced authority decisions on issues concerning a State's reserved domain, are prohibited. A limited yet sufficient battery of causes for which treaties can be deemed null and void seeks to preserve a State's freedom to bind itself and to protect itself from cunning mandrils, including its representatives. In certain fields, such as in delimiting areas of sovereignty and jurisdiction among neighboring States, or the succession of goods, archives, and debts of a State which is in the process of division or dismemberment, international rules expressly oblige to interested parties to reach an equitable agreement. In these cases, the apparent inequity or injustice of a regulation would be a privileged indication of the causes which could make an agreement null and void or justify its termination. Naturally, justice cannot be a universal remedy to escape from the incompetence of stupid or dim witted representatives. Nor can it be a shield against the wise administration of power, so unequally distributed among subjects formally equal and which translates into diplomatic, political, economic, social, or cultural influence. Without need of putting the bull in the glass shop, genuine power should, when the case merits it, allow whoever has it to attain the objective by getting others freely to do what they otherwise would not do. At the same time, International Law's need to be provided with rules by generalizing obligations has exceedingly liberalized the appreciation of consent, squeezing out the effects of acquiescence. As one can suppose, many States lack the infrastructure and human resources to respond expressly, in time, and continuously to all the issues which claim a response, especially when the issues do not directly affect them in the short term. The condition of persistent objector,

Justice Among States

45

exempted from rules to which it does not consent, often requires a certain degree of diplomatic sophistication. These latter considerations could suggest that power can overcome Law independently ofjustice by creating obligations (treaties, acquiescence ... ) which subsequently become generalized. The pacific and universal acceptance, however, that the international legal order counts on fundamental principles forces us to consider whether perhaps justice has taken the principles under its service to protect Law from the pounding of power. Certainly, the assertion of an international ius cogens is promising. Identifying what it consists of according to what the international community as a whole accepts eliminates the Robinsonian persistent objector so long as it is not a big power, since one can assume that the community as a whole consists of the representative majorities of different regions and particular systems of the world, including, of course, the most powerful States. The consequences of affirming a ius cogens can be spectacular, not only with respect to treaties, which will be null and void or which should terminate, but also in other areas, in particular the requirements of an accentuated responsibility: whoever violates an imperative rule commits a crime, not just a tort, a wrong, a delict, and beyond the compensation which it owes for the damages caused, it should be sanctioned; any subject, and not just the one who suffers damages, should see a legitimate interest recognized to plead for sanctions. It remains to be seen, however, how far States are willing to go on these premises, nor is it certain what direction each one intends to take, as can be deduced from the proposals made by James Crawford in his first report as the new Relator of the International Law Commission on the responsibility of the States .I Unless the normative advances have the due institutional accompaniment, the danger exists that in practice concepts such as ius cogens and its manifestations serve as bait in the political arena and as simple faith without practice in the judicial arena; sometimes, judges pray the creed like priests of the establishment. Powerful governments seem more enthusiastic to invoke principles with a greater ethical content in order to act on their own rather than to give representative international organizations the powers and means of action required for them to be appropriately respected. Most countries' governments follow along and react, exultant and protesting, like spectators of a soccer game do, depending on how their team is performing, and then they forget.

"Justice" in the Application and Interpretation Rules and Obligations

of International

In the State order, the patient and wealthy citizen cherishes the hope to have his rights endorsed by the judge and the judgment duly enforced. By contrast, in the international order, a subject whose claim is unattended has to manouvre between searching

I A/CN.4/490, 2 aprill998, par. 19-26; A/CN.4/490,Add.l, I mai 1998, par. 43-60; A/CNA/490, Add.2/ Rev. I, 5 mai 1998, par. 61-75, A/CNA/490, Add.3, II mai 1998, par. 76-100.

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for a peaceful solution by reaching an agreement with the other party or parties and, in order to protect its interests, applying as a last resource countermeasures or reprisals (unarmed) proportional to the consequences of the illicit act denounced. States, bound to resolve their differences peacefully, are not obliged to reach a solution, such that differences can be made eternal as long as the Security Council of the United Nations does not consider them a threat to international peace and security. No means of resolution can be attempted unless the parties consent, even if the mean only consists of a third party's involvement as a mere go-between- now coarsely called a facilitator - or as a mediator. With regard to the coercive application of international Law as an expression of self-help, only the use and threat of armed force are prohibited, although the decentralized and unilateral appeal to unarmed force will make more complicated an already problematic situation, especially when the rules of ius cogens are at risk. Under these circumstances one can proceed in two ways: 1) by creating autonomous regimes for the administration of justice through international organizations which handle a certain normative area (European Union, World Trade Organization, ... ), and 2) by nourishing the ideal principle of mandatory jurisdiction around the International Court of Justice, principal judicial organ of the United Nations with potentially universal and general competence, and by making the ideal principle of sanction of criminal acts the crown of a justice administered by international judicial institutions. Leaving aside the first of these approaches, which would take us to an excessively technical and specific terrain for this work, we proceed now with the second.

The Utopia of a Compulsory Jurisdiction In a society such as international society, whose subjects are primarily sovereign States, introducing a compulsory jurisdiction would require the devising of mechanisms of anticipation of the national consent, so that it could be possible the unilateral submission of the disputes to judicial resolution, no ad hoc compromise being needed when differences do arise. With regard to the International Court of Justice, one can point out that currently there are, counting settlement treaties and compromisory clauses, approximately 250 instruments which serve as an independent basis for the Court's jurisdiction, all efforts of implementing the acceptance of its jurisdiction through a general universal treaty having failed. Even the United Nations Charter, despite its celebration of the Court as its principal judicial organ, limited itself to remind the Security Council that it could recommend the parties to use the Court as a means of legal disputes settlement (article 36-3), recommendation which -by the way- the Security Council has only done very exceptionally. The furthest point reached regarding prior consent to the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to an open variety of disputes and counterparts was already reached in the twenties with the first Statute of the, then, Permanent Court of International Justice, which included what was called the optional clause (article 36-2), by which a State could declare that it accepted the Court's jurisdiction over a legal dispute with another State which also made the same declaration.

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The optional clause, far from serving as a reference to new adventures, appears almost 80 years later as a defensive little fortress, even weakened by the discouragement of those who should be its most prominent servants. As of January 1, 1999 only 62 of the 185 members of the United Nations had answered the optional clause's invitation- Spain did so on October 29, 1990- and many of those who made the declaration seemed to be seeking a bella figura with it, given the profusion of reservations which accompany the declarations and the exponential effects of the reciprocity which allows each of them to take advantage of the reservations of the opposing party to preclude the Court's jurisdiction. Among the most scandalous reservations, mention has been made of the so called automatic reservations, which consist of the ability to exclude from the Court disputes which are the State's exclusive domain as defined by the interested party itself; but, without apparently going so far, one often gets the impression that some States, having accepted the Court's jurisdiction in the first sentence of its declaration, use the subsequent paragraphs to deactivate it, reserving all the cases in which they see themselves as possible defendants. In addition, there is no lack of States which accomodate their declaration- and reservations - in line with their more or less aggressive policies, trying to avoid judicial bothers without, however, abandoning a system which grants them a certain degree of respectability. Countries such as Canada and India are experts in this type of laundering. Despite the fact that only a third of the member States of the United Nations are affilliated to the optional clause, the declarations have been invoked (either exclusively or not) as a legal basis, in two out of three applications submitted to the Court. But since three fourths of the declarations have been made with reservations tolerated by a too permissive judicial interpretation of article 36-2 of the Court's Statute, more attentive to the sovereign State's cause than to the trust of compulsory jurisdiction system, it should come as no surprise that in two out of three cases defendants argued the Court's incompetence and the inadmissibility of the application, arguments that, when not accepted, have occasionally provoked hysterical and/or haughty reactions, above all in defendants which have the highest regard for themselves: not appearing, not renewing or withdrawing the declaration, accumulating new reservations. France and the United States have a formidable file in this respect. Very recently, Nigeria has replied to the judgment of the Court rejecting the numberless preliminary objections lodged against the application of Cameroon on disputes concerning the land an maritime boundary, 2 storing a new declaration tailored with the reservations-mix most varied ever seen.3 When a plaintiff bases the Court's jurisdiction on a treaty providing for judicial settlement, on a compromisory clause, and/or on the play of the optional clause, whoever objects to the jurisdiction tries to drag judges to the opinion that only the

2

ICJ, Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria

(Cameroon v.Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, II june 1998. 3 At the same time, the 28 october 1998 Nigeria has filed a request for the interpretation of the judgment of II juin 1998. This is the first time that the Court has been seised of a request for interpretation of a judgment on preliminary objections.

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respondent's current, real, and specific consent offers a solid foundation for the administration of justice, for which reason the most restrictive interpretation of the jurisdiction of the Court is advisable. If this criteria were accepted - and there is no lack of champions of this cause among the influential judges of the Court, as Spain had the opportunity to experience lately,4 the expedition in search of mandatory jurisdiction will have ended like all the expeditions which sought El Dorado. In the best, one would be back at starting point: only the compromise of the parties is a complete basis for the jurisdiction, even if this reality tries often to be disguised through procedural judicial abilities and subtleties.s States that believe they have a good basis for their application - and that before carrying that action out have thought about it twice - find themselves overwhelmed with the feeling that when they plead their cause, the defendant is granted all the favorable presumptions, as if stealing the apparently accepted jurisdiction and being innocent were the same thing. In interpreting declarations based on the optional clause, this feeling is even more acute. The defendant undescores its condition as author to impose, even subliminally, its own interpretation of the declaration, an interpretation perhaps arising a posteriori. Tampering with the natural order of things, the reservations become the rule, and the acceptance of the jurisdiction, which was the rule, is reduced to an exception. Thus, the requirement of good faith in interpreting restrictively exceptions to a jurisdiction which as principle was accepted, ends up barren, and the plaintiff feels that it almost has to ask forgiveness for taking up the Court's time with an application opposed by the defendant, who knew better than anyone else what the limits were to its submission to the Court's jurisdiction. The Court's finding in the judgment of 4 december 1998 of its lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute brought before it by the Application filed by Spain against Canada may be better understood on these premises.

Non Justiciable Disputes? In the jumbled field of preliminary objections to the admissibility of an application (which are often confused with the objections to the jurisdiction) it is now useful to point out, for purposes of this work, those objections associated with the non justiciability of a dispute. The notion of non justiciable disputes fits in with the abstract delineation of the proper area for the administration of international justice. A political dispute, based on a party's intention to modify the established rules, will advise the interested party to avoid a judicial decision. New general rules are often created as a result of the pro-

ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction ofthe Court, 4 december 1998. Not to speak of the peculiar revival of the suggestion of the prior exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations as prerequisite of the admissibility of an Application (see, for instance, ultimately, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction ofthe Court, 4 december 1998, separate opinion of judge Oda, par. 17-20). 4

5

Justice Among States

49

vocation of States, who try to change the rules by systematically infringing those which are in force, and these suits are not won in courts. On the other side, one should also emphasize the political approach to legal disputes consisting in considering that a State should not leave its interests (at least the so-called vital or more essential interests) at the mercy of the decision of a third party which is supposed to apply legal rules (if the third party is not authorized to decide ex aequo et bono). But these are considerations that a State's authorities should make before granting its prior consent to a given jurisdiction. To maintain that there are disputes which by their very nature are non justiciable and that, because of such a nature, the administration of justice should be waived in the face of them even though a specific basis for the jurisdiction exists, is an impudence understandable only as a last political resort of defendants. For instance, the United States tried to rid itself of the Court when it was sued by Nicaragua for its military and paramilitary activities in Nicaraguan territory by alleging, among other reasons, that judicial organs were unsuitable to hearing cases on the use of armed force. The Court at that time (1984) rejected the argument.6 There are no disputes, no matter how sensitive they may be for the parties, which do not permit a decision in accordance with the Law. Leaving aside the beneficent effect of the judicial interposition in these cases, judges should not be dissuaded from exercising their functions because a powerful defendant wields the threat (how else should we call it if not?) of faire fi of an order, summon, or judgment from an international tribunal otherwise competent. Certainly, the New Order announced at the end of the cold war has encouraged a group of scholars- and some judges- to corner away judgments such as Nicaragua v. United States?, reducing them to an outburst better to forget.8 Such an attitude would be manageable if it did not meet with the simultaneous movement of a political organ, as the Security Council is, ready to arrogate itself judicial functions thanks to its device of treating resolutions which are properly dispute decisions as measures of the Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council resolutions on the Lockerbie cases, which blocked the provisional measures requested to the Court by Libya against two permanent members of the Council,9 have acutely reflected the

6 ICJ, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, 26 november, 1984, par. 89-98. 7 ICJ, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (merits),

27 june 1986. 8 It is the case of judge Schwebel who, for instance, in his dissenting opinion to the judgment of the Court in the Case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States) (Preliminary Objection), 12 december 1996, states: "The reasoning belatedly expressed by the Court on the matter in 1986 was in my view, unpersuasive and remains so; and question has been rightly raised (by Rosenne, who is quoted) about the 'value as a precedent' of holdings of the Court in the case". 9 ICJ, Questions ofinterpretation and application ofthe 1971 Montreal Convention arising from

the aerial incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Request for the indication ofprovisional measures, Order of 14 april 1992, par. 42; Id., Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom.

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perverse consequences of the supremacy of the Charter's obligations over any other obligations (article 103) when the Charter's obligations have their origin in a political decision which is exempt from a judicial control (which guarantees fundamental rights of the States members eventually violated by the decision). In the case mentioned, one can question whether the Court, if finally it reaches the merits, will dare criticize the Council for having acted ultra vires10. Prejudging this question President Schwebel said: "It does not follow from the facts that the decisions of the S.C. must be in accordance with the Charter, and that the I.C.J. is the principal judicial organ of the U.N. that the Court is empowered to ensure that the Council's decisions do accord with the Charter. To hold that it does so follow in a monumental non sequitur, which overlooks the truth that, in many legal systems, national and international, the subjection of the acts of an organ to law by no means entails subjection of the legality to its action to judicial review. In many cases, the system relies not upon judicial review but on self-censorship, by the organ concerned or by its members or on review by another political organ .11 Opinion, dissenting, of a President, non acting as such in the case. In general terms one can harbor a certain concern before some of the first world attitudes in relation to the New Order. The emphatic defense of the most respectable normative principles is often accompanied by manoeuvres not only to stall the institutionalization process of international society pushed forward in the last fifty years, but also to revert the process for the benefit of more or less informal groups, basing the reversion on political agreements of the self-selected big. Only the acceptance by the majority of members of the Security Council of an abusive role which responds to policies encouraged by the United States and those who praise it, has permitted slowing this process at the cost of discrediting the organ primarily responsible for maintaining peace and international security, but not of administering justice, and less by applying a double standard. Thus, the most spectacular normative advances become dangerous instruments. There is nothing more advantageous for a great power or for a group of them than to invoke the interests of the international community as a whole to justify their unilateral actions. A judicial decision should be the premise for a sanction imposed by a representative political organ on those who infringe the ius cogens. But it hardly can be said that it is so in reality. Apparently, it is easier to put a robe on a gunman than to remove his gunbelt.

10 In its judgments of27 february 1998 (Preliminary Objections) the ICJ stated its jurisdiction and the admissibility of the libyan applications, but declared that the objection according to which the claims of Libya lacked of any object because of the resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) of the Security Council, had not, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminar character. 11 ICJ, Questions on interpretation ... (Preliminary Objections), op.diss. Schwebel, p. 10.

Justice Among States

51

The Indispensable Third Party In the recent East Timor case, filed by Portugal against Australia, who had entered into a treaty delimiting the marine spaces with Indonesia in the so called Timor Gap, the Court, after rhetorically reaffirming its love for the self determination of peoples (the Timor people included) fled from the case stating that in order to rule on the Portuguese application, the participation of Indonesia, who had not consented to the Court's jurisdiction, was indispensable since the decision could directly affect its interests.I2 Considering that the application was filed by the administrator of a non autonomous territory whose population has not been able to choose its destiny freely because of the armed occupation of which it has been a victim, and considering that the imperative principles of International Law were at issue, the judges' reverence for the consent of the alleged and sovereign criminal which, logically, is not going to facilitate the rope for its lynching, is surprising. But it is even more surprising that no less than 14 of the 16 judges who took part in the decision shared this attitude. On this road, the fate of international ius cogens is very compromised. If the doctrine of the indispensable third party13 in cases filed by application is compared to the doctrine of the intervening third party in differences submitted through compromise, one can see how seducing the parties' consent is for the judges, who are always willing in this situation to hear the case, putting their scruples over the eventual rights of third parties to rest with the official discourse of res inter alios acta, the relative effect of a decision under article 59 of the Court's Statute, and the possibility, if the third party so requests, of opening the door to intervention (or even better, half opening it, as can be deduced from the role granted to Nicaragua in the land, island, and maritime frontier dispute between El Salvador and Honduras in relation to the Gulf of Fonseca).l4

The Relativism of the Administration

of Justice

When one encounters the symbol of justice, one can focus one's attention on the blindfold which covers the eyes of the beautiful woman, on the opulent bosom veiled by a light clamide, on the balance, anyway, with the empty dishes ... The administration of justice is an activity which has a conventional value, that is, a very relative value. In the case of the International Court of Justice, we consider the collegiate decision supported by a majority of the judges, or even by only half of them, so long as one is the President of the Court, to be just, that is, in accordance with the Law.

12 13

ICJ, Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 30 june 1995, par. 23 ff. See TORRES BERNARDEZ, S., "The new theory of 'indispensable parties' under the statute

of the International Court of Justice", International Law: Theory and Practice (K. Wellens, ed.), Kluwer Law International, 1998, 737-750. 14 ICJ, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), 13 september 1990.

52

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

We have had to accept this convention to save ties, but there is no doubt that those who support the minority view or the view of the non presidential half will consider that those who have administered justice have not done justice in the particular case. The fact that a minority can become a majority because of a judge's illness or absence, or that a Vice President can become acting President for one reason or another, underscores how much justice is subject to accidents. The two Court cases on Ethiopia and Liberia's claims against South Africa in the sixties best illustrate this assertion.l5 Concerning the Court, the only thing remaining for us on this point is a certain transparency, be it in concurring opinions and declarations which provide details of the support of the Court's decision, be it in dissenting opinions. States which dare to go to the Court dream of a favorable decision by unanimity or by a great majority. But they surely prefer to win -or lose- by the skin of their teeth rather than to see themselves beaten by an (almost) unanimous decision. No government is seduced by the idea of being criticized for leaving the sacred national cause to third parties; but they like being criticized for their clumsiness in defending the cause even less (a fatal accusation, for public opinion will not accept that their own reasons were less solid than the adversary's). When one loses by a little, especially on a decision on jurisdiction and admissibility, one can always claim moral victory, and the media, adequately handled, can enjoy the picture of a respondent which tried by all means to escape from the Court because of its bad conscience. When these ideas churn in one's mind, one is ripe for sociology. Although no one will question the judges' independence and impartiality, many will gamble on their favoritisms. Particularly at the stage of determining the existence of jurisdiction and admissibility, a plaintiff will feel more restless with the list of the defendant's friends if he believes that its claim has a very solid foundation on the merits. Given that friends won't be able to protect the defendant if the case reaches this phase, won't they help in the most discrete, technical, and esoteric procedural stage, dismantling the cause of action or reducing its object drastically to exclude the spinier questions? In the Oil Platforms case, which pits the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States, some judges' opinions regarding the incursion made by Judgment of December 12, 1996 (preliminary objection) on merits of the case are, in their variety, very suggestive.l6 Certain rules of the Court's Statute and of its practice are, certainly, unsatisfactory, to the degree that they nourish tacit distrust and hinder a broader acceptance of its jursidiction. Thus, in the first place, even though it is not at all prescribed, there is a national of each one of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Court, despite the fact that only one of them (United Kingdom) maintains its declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction, which two members (United States and France) repealed and another two (China and Russia) have never made. In the second

l5 ICJ, South Wtest Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 21 december 1962, 18 july 1966. 16 See, on the one side, the separate opinions of Ranjeva, Rigaux Uudge ad hoc) and Shahabuddecn; and, on the other, the separate opinion of Higgins.

Justice Among States

53

place, the judges' mandate not only is long (which is a virtue) but also is renewable (which leads to all sorts of speculations in times of change, that is, of elections; even more when (re )election is in fact impossible without the support of the (permanent) members of the Security Council). In the third place, there are the gabels of a subsequent judicial career in other instances: think of the criminal international courts (Yugoslavia, Rwanda), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, the very solicited Iran/United States Claims Tribunal, arbitration courts ... Lastly, countries with official languages which coincide with the Court's (French and English) enjoy a relative advantage in terms of communication and costs.

Non enforceable Judgments Judgments of the International Court of Justice - as is the case with decisions of other international judicial and arbitration bodies- are final and binding for the parties. Unless otherwise established, it is understood that the parties have the right to go before the same organ which issued the award or judgment requesting the interpretation of their meaning or scope. Any other remedies must be previously agreed to expressly or established in the tribunal's statute. Given that international courts do not tend to be organized heirarchically, there are no appeals, common in state systems of administration of justice; nevertheless, you may sometimes count on the extraordinary remedy of the revision.J7 It is so provided in Court's Statute- it has been used on a single occasion, unsuccessfully 18- and in other treaties which have articulated judicial and arbitration mechanisms. Recently, in the case known as Laguna del Desierto, decided by a Latin American arbitration tribunal betweeen Argentina and Chile, Chile filed both remedies of interpretation and revision which did not succeed. 19 The practice, as one can see, is very limited and offers few expectations to the recurrent, except that it causes delays and it is the proof in front of the citizens that all remedies have been exhausted; nevertheless this can be counter-productive, at least from a political point of view, because of the risks inherent to prolonging the agony in a case which has been lost. At any rate, the greatest weakness latent in an international judgment stems from the absence of a mechanism of enforcement in conjunction with a party's allegation that the judgment is null and void according to general rules of international law.

17

See TORRES BERNARDEZ, S., "A propos de !'interpretation et de Ia revision des arrets de

Ia C!J'', Le Droit International

a I 'heure de sa codification.

Etudes en I 'honneur de R. Ago, Milano,

1987, I, p. 183 ff. 18 ICJ, Application for revision and interpretation ofthe judgment of24 february 1982 in the case

concerning the continental shelf(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab jamahiriya), 10 december 1985. 19

Controversia sabre el trazado de Ia linea fronteriza entre el hi to 62 y el Monte Fitz Roy,

(Argentina-Chile), 21 october 1994 (Revue Gem!rale de Droit International Public, 1996, p. 520 ff.); interpretation ofthe arbitral award of21 october 1994 concerning ... 7 mars 1996.

54

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The first weakness, the lack of a mechanism of enforcement and the freedom which States have to choose the means of enforcing a decision, has been justified by the principle of sovereign equality of the States, so strong in this respect that it has even affected the judgments of tribunals of international organizations of regional integration, such as the Tribunal of Justice of the European Union, which only since 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty came into force, has been empowered to impose fines on States which it declares have not enforced its prior judgments. Article 94-2 of the United Nations Charter provides that a State may request the Security Council's assistance to enforce a judgment of the International Court of Justice, but 50 years have passed as if nothing had happened with this provision. One can probably set one's mind to rest by considering that international judgments enjoy a great deal of spontaneous compliance, although in some cases, the confirmation requires that another 50 years transpire,20 or, when that is not the case, that an agreement ultimately be reached, even though when the relationship between the parties is very unequal, the agreement requires that the winner abandon its right, succombing to the loser's ilifluence. Such was the case with Nicaragua, which withdrew its application demanding compensation from the United States, previously declared by the Court infractor of half dozen basic principles of internationallaw.2 1 A State, of course, can resort to countermeasures to have a judgment enforced, but, naturally, this right is tied to a power which many lack. With regard to the second weakness, alleging that a judgment is null and void, there has never been such a case involving the International Court of Justice which, by contrast, has suffered other expressions of dissatisfaction. With regard to arbitration bodies, claims of nullity have been presented on occasions. In some, such claims have served to save the face of the party reluctant to execute the arbitral award; in others, a new arbitration has tried to be imposed, creating a dispute over the validity of the judgment susceptible of being resolved before the International Court of Justice. In the couple of opportunities offered to the Court, the Court has considered that the arbitation decision at issue was valid, underscoring that in its judgment it in no way implied addressing to the merits of the case.22

Interiorization of the Principles of International Justice It is certain that justice among States- such justice meaning the observance of general rules and obligations of International Law - would considerably improve if States

zo See agreement between Albania and United Kingdom, of 8 may 1992, concerning the reparation for damages established by the Court in the Corfu Channel case (merits), 4 aprill949. 2! ICJ, Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua c. United States), order of 26 september 1991 placing on record the discontinuance by the Republic of Nicaragua of the proceeedings and removing the case from the list of the Court. 22 ICJ, Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on December 23, 1906, (Honduras c. Nicaragua), 18 november 1960; Arbitral Award of 31 july 1989 (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal), 12 november 1991.

Justice Among States

55

constitutionalized, that is, interiorized, that observance, ensuring it through adequate means of control. If an international violation is simultaneously a constitutional transgression susceptible of being appreciated and sanctioned by the political and judicial guardians of the internal Fundamental Law, the sociological validity of International Law would undoubtedly be greater. A State which defines itself as democratic and law abiding should not persist in the idea that foreign policy constitutes an area under the prerogative of the Executive Branch, nor should that State content itself by protecting International Law only to the extent that the acts and events concerned have occurred in their own territory. From monism one should derive all the consequences. It is not a matter of imposing parliamentary nor judicialized criteria to the discretionary of the Executive Power on the foreign policy, but rather of avoiding that governments consider themselves free from any impediments to their initiatives. In this respect, judgments like those of the United States Supreme Court in the cases regarding the kidnapping of foreign citizens in their country in order to submit them to the federal courts for crimes related to drug trafficking,23 or apprehending Haitians in the high seas and returning them to Haiti to prevent their seeking political asylum in the United States,24 are very criticizable. One should recall that the thesis of the Auj3engewalt was maintained enthusiastically in the thirties in the Third Reich in Germany and, later, in Spain under Franco. Currently, in the United States some conspicuous patrons of using judges to serve power can be found among those who, without such conceptual sophistication, defend attitudes which lead to the same results. It is, thus, unfortunate to see judges, in the antithesis of what their function should be, at the service of laws like the Helms-Burton Act, unanimously considered, except for its Manichean authors, an expression and/or premise of an international illicit act.

Conclusions The moral of the story to be deduced from the preceding considerations is twofold. On the one hand, it is advisable to be cautious of legal advances which do not have institutional support. Just as what happens with vanguards which progress rapidly without guaranteeing their supply lines, the most spectacular conquests may be slaughtered along with the many innocent individuals who enthusiastically supported them. On the other hand, internal legal instruments should be contrived so that States respect international rules. Globalization and interdependence require that States' democracy and law abidance (including abidance of International law) be taken to the extreme in relation to foreign affairs.

See United States v. Humberto Alvarez Macha in, 112 s. Ct. 2188 (1992) See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 113 s. Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993). 23

24

Reflexiones sobre las relaciones convencionales del Mercosur. Su proyeccion en el regimen legal argentino

Ernesto J. Rey Caro

Las organizaciones internacionales intergubernamentales, a! tiempo que se constituyeron en una de las vias mas apropiadas para asegurar Ia cooperaci6n internacional entre los Estados, contribuyeron a modificar muchas de las instituciones clasicas del Derecho Internacional. Aunque hoy ya no se discute su subjetividad internacional, en una primera epoca, Ia posibilidad de que estos entes pudieran ejercer algunos derechos que estaban reservados exclusivamente a los Estados, gener6 dudas y vacilaciones tanto en el seno de elias, como en Ia doctrina. No sorprende que fuera en Ia Organizaci6n de las Naciones Unidas - por Ia epoca de su gestaci6n y por Ia ausencia de precedentes donde Ia incertidumbre se instalara a Ia hora en que Ia organizaci6n se viera forzada a emprender algunas acciones. Correspondi6 a Ia Corte Internacional de Justicia en el ejercicio de su competencia consultiva, sentar principios que habrian de tener gran trascendencia en el esclarecimiento de Ia naturaleza juridica y caracteres de las organizaciones internacionales.l La constituci6n de las organizaciones internacionales, trajo aparejada Ia delegaci6n de competencias por parte de los Estados Miembros, generalmente forrnalizada de manera explicita, sin perjuicio de las que no estando previstas en forma expresa pero que debian inferirse de Ia necesidad de cumplir con sus objetivos fundacionales.2 Entre Ia amplia gama de atribuciones conferidas, que deben ser individualizadas recurriendo a Ia estructura de cada organizaci6n, se destaca Ia de celebrar tratados o acuerdos- e!jus ad tractatum -, intimamente vinculada con Ia subjetividad internacional de estos entes.3 Las particularidades que ofrecen estos actos juridicos, deterrnina que despues de cumplida Ia etapa de codificaci6n del Derecho de los Tratados entre Estados, en 1969, se avanzara en este proceso, adoptandose Ia Convenci6n de Vierra de 1986 sobre tra-

I

2

C.I.J., Recueil, 1949, pp. 178-180. Seyersted, Finn, Objetive International Personality of Intergovernmental Organisations,

Copenhagen, 1963,pp. 80-82. 3 Reuter, Paul, Introduction au droit des traites, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995, pp. 11,29,107. Barberis, Julio A., Los sujetos del derecho internacional actual, Madrid, Tecnos, 1984, pp. 87-88.

57 C.A. Armas Barea eta/. (ed.) Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam' ofJudge Jose Maria Ruda, 57-68 © 2000 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

58

Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

tados entre Estados y Organizaciones Internacionales o entre Organizaciones Internacionales, cuyo Art. 6 prescribe que Ia capacidad de estos entes en materia convencional debe regirse por las "reglas" de cada organizaci6n, entendiendose por tales - 2.l.j) - "los instrumentos constitutivos de Ia organizaci6n, sus decisiones y resoluciones adoptados de conformidad con estos y su pnictica establecida". Hoy este nuevo tipo de relaciones convencionales se han multiplicado como consecuencia del papel cada vez mas protag6nico que asumen las organizaciones internacionales, tanto las llamadas "clasicas" o de "cooperaci6n", como las de "integracion" -con sus diferentes grados de institucionalizaci6n y profundizaci6n- que con frecuencia concluyen tratados o acuerdos, bilaterales o multilaterales, que pueden reunir variadas formas, 4 y que se rigen por el derecho internacional, sin perjuicio de que tambien participen en Ia celebraci6n de acuerdos de diferente naturaleza con entes que no poseen personalidad juridica internacional, v.g., organizaciones no gubernamentales, instituciones cientificas, etc. Dentro de las organizaciones de integraci6n, porIa magnitude importancia de los vinculos desarrollados y por Ia amplitud de las atribuciones que le han conferido los Estados Miembros, se destacan las Comunidades Europeas, que en cuanto tales han asumido numerosos compromisos convencionales - sean mixtos (con participaci6n de las Comunidades y los Estados miembros a! mismo tiempo) o estrictamente comunitarios -, practica que ha abierto una buena cantidad de interrogantes sobre Ia capacidad de las mismas y sobre el alcance de sus competencias. No es ignorado el hecho de que las Comunidades Europeas ademas de haber hecho uso de estas competencias, su "treaty making power" ha sido regulado con cierta prolijidad en los tratados constitutivos. Los procedimientos que deben observarse difieren segun Ia materia sobre Ia que versa el compromiso convencional, y generalmente se requiere Ia participaci6n del Consejo y de Ia Comisi6n en el proceso de celebraci6n, sin perjuicio del papel que se Ia ha otorgado a Ia Asamblea por Ia via de una consulta previa en ciertos acuerdos y a! Tribunal, llamado a ejercer en forma previa una especie de "control de constitucionalidad", funci6n esta que ha cumplido con reconocida eficiencia.s

4 Karunatilleke, Kesera, Essai d 'une classification des accords conclus par les organisations internationales, entre elles ou avec des Etats, en Revue Gem?rale de Droit International Public, 1971, Tome 75, pp. 12-91. 5 Mangas Martin, Araceli y Liiian Nogueras, Diego, Instituciones y Derecho de Ia Union Europea, Madrid, McGrau Hill, 1996, pp. 653-655; Boulouis, J., "La jurisprudence de Ia Cour de Justice des CE relative aux relations exterieures des Comrnunautes", Recueil des Cours, 1978-11, Torno 160, pp. 335 y ss.; Kovar, R. "La competence de Ia Cour de Justice et Ia procedure de conclusion des accords internationaux par Ia CEE", en Melanges P. Reuter, Paris,1981, pp. 357 y ss. Moreiro Gonzalez, Carlos J. "El control judicial de los Acuerdos internacionales celebrados por las Comunidades Europeas a Ia luz de las Sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia, Parlamento Europeo c. Consejo de 7 de marzo de 1996, y Hoesch y RFA c. Bergrohr, de 19 de octubre de 1989" en Aceion Exterior de Ia Union Europea y Comunidad Internacional, Ed. a cargo de Fernando M. Marino Menendez, Universidad Carlos III, Boletin Oficia1 del Estado, Madrid, 1998, pp. 317-352

Rejlexiones sabre las relaciones convencionales del Mercosur

59

Puede sefialarse Ia peculiaridad de que generalmente se ha reservado Ia expresi6n "tratado" para los instrumentos constitutivos de las Comunidades, utilizandose preferentemente el termino "acuerdo" para los actos celebrados por las Comunidades o en el marco de estas. Esta misma practica tambien ha sido adoptada, como se vera en las organizaciones de integraci6n del continente americano. No es prop6sito de estas reflexiones examinar esta particular problematica de tales Comunidades, que ha concitado Ia atenci6n de una calificada doctrina, 6 sino considerar algunas situaciones originadas en el ambito del Mercosur y su proyecci6n en el regimen legal argentino, cuando Ia hubiere, desde Ia 6ptica de Ia personalidad juridica internacional y de los procedimientos observados en el proceso de celebraci6n de los acuerdos y de su entrada en vigor, cuestiones estas estrechamente vinculadas, no sin antes recurrir a algunos antecedentes que ofrecen procesos de integracion iniciados en el Continente, especialmente en los que ha sido o es parte Ia Republica Argentina, pese a que Ia practica no ha sido muy pr6diga. Mas alia de los necesarios acuerdos de sede, son pocos los tratados, "stricto sensu", celebrados por estas llamadas organizaciones internacionales de integraci6n. El Tratado de Montevideo de 1960, que cre6 Ia Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC), en el Art. 46 estableci6 que esta gozaba de "completa personalidad juridica" y especialmente de capacidad- inter alia -, para contratar, y el Art. 4 7 previ6 que Ia Asociaci6n celebraria un acuerdo con el Gobierno de Ia Republica Oriental del Uruguay a los efectos de precisar los privilegios e inmunidades de que gozaria Ia Asociaci6n, sus 6rganos y sus funcionarios y asesores internacionales. Pese a que Ia Conferencia fue el 6rgano maximo de Ia Asociaci6n, fue a! Comite, a! que se le reconoci6 entre otras atribuciones, Ia de representar a Ia Asociaci6n ante terceros paises y organismos y entidades internacionales con el objeto de tratar asuntos de interes comun y de representarla "en los contratos y demas actos de derecho publico y privado"(Art. 39), facultad esta que parcialmente recogi6 el Reglamento de dicho 6rgano. 7 El Acuerdo previsto en el Art. 4 7, se celebr6 el 1 de septiembre de 1961, entre el Gobierno de Ia Republica Oriental del Uruguay y Ia ALALC, s marcando el comienzo de una practica que se observaria en las organizaciones que sobrevinieron.

Remiro Brotons, Antonio Derecho Internacional Publico. 2. Derecho de los Tratados, Madrid, Tecnos, 1987, pp. 179-186 y Ia extensa bibliografia citada; GanshofVan Der Meersch, W.J. (sous Ia direction de) Droit des Communautes Europeennes, Bruxelles, Larcier editeurs, 1969, pp. 116119; Abelll{m Honrubia, Victoria y Villa Costa, Blanca Lecciones de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Barcelona, Ariel Derecho, 1993, pp. 252-257; Andres Saenz de Santa Maria y otros Introducci6n a/ Derecho de Ia Union Europea, Madrid, Eurolex, 1996, pp. 273-286; Marino, Fernando "El Tratado de Ia Union Europea. Analisis Juridico", en Documentaci6n Juridica, Madrid, 1995, N° 82-83, pp. 38-40, etc. 7 lnstrumentos Relativos a Ia Integraci6n Econ6mica en America Latina, Instituto Interamericano de Estudios Juridicos lnternacionales, Washington, 1964, p. 211. 8 Ibidem, pp. 223-228. 6

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El Tratado de Montevideo de 1980, que instituy6 Ia Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (ALADI), reconoci6- Art. 52 -Ia personalidad juridica de Ia Asociaci6n y Ia facultad de esta para "contratar". El siguiente dispositive previ6 tambien Ia firma de un acuerdo de sede con el Gobiemo de Ia Republica Oriental del Uruguay, regul{mdose la sucesi6n en materia de personalidad juridica. 9 A diferencia del Tratado de 1960, el Acuerdo de 1980 no ha previsto que 6rgano posee la facultad de celebrar tratados, aunque se le ha conferido al Comite, - Art. 35 -, Ia potestad de representar ala Asociaci6n ante terceros paises, sin perjuicio de haberse atribuido a la Secretaria - Art. 38 -, la funci6n de representaci6n de la Asociaci6n ante organismos y entidades intemacionales de canicter econ6mico con el objeto de tratar asuntos de interes comun. La Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n ha suscripto acuerdos de diferente naturaleza juridica con el Institute para la Integraci6n Latinoamericana,IO con la Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, II con la Organizaci6n de Estados Americanos, 12 con el Parlamento Latinoamericano,l3 con la Corporaci6nAndina de Fomento,l4 etc. Todos ellos se han regido por normas particulares de conformidad con las caracteristicas de los entes partes en tales acuerdos. El Tratado de Asuncion de 1991, que instituy6 el Mercosur, no incluy6 norma alguna sobre Ia personalidad juridica intemacional ni sobre el "treaty making power". Cabe destacar que si bien se cre6 la Secretaria, que tendria su sede en Montevideo -Art. 15 -, no se estableci6 nada en cuanto a un acuerdo de sede. Este se suscribi6 recien en 1996.15

9 Articulo 54: "La personalidad juridica de Ia Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, establecida por el Tratado de Montevideo suscrito el 18 de febrero de 1960 continuani con todos sus efectos, en Ia Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion. Por Io tanto, desde el momento en que entre en vigencia el presente Tratado, los derechos y obligaciones de Ia Asociacion Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio correspondenin a Ia Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion." 10 Integracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs. As., N° 68, mayo de 1982, pp. 124-125. II Integracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs.As., N° 140-141, noviembre- diciembre de 1988, pp. 69-70. Este Acuerdo fue firmado en julio de 1988 entre el Secretario General de ALADI y Ia Junta de Cartagena, entrando en vigor en Ia fecha de su celebracion (Art. I 0). 12 Integracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs.As., N° 140-141, noviembre-diciembre de 1988, pp. 70-71. Acuerdo de Cooperacion entre el Secretario General de ALADI y Ia Secretaria General de Ia Organizacion de Estados Americanos. Modifico otros acuerdos celebrados en 1982. Su entrada en vigor se produjo en Ia fecha de su firma por los representantes (Art. 9). 13 lntegracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs.As., No 184, noviembre de 1992, pp. 69-72. 14 Integracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, No 200, mayo de I 994, p. 43. Fue suscripto entre el Secretario General de ALADI y el Presidente Ejecutivo de Ia CAF, entrando en vigor en Ia fecha de su firma (Art. 7). 15 Aprobado en Ia XI Reunion del Consejo Mercado Comun, en Fortaleza, Brasil, el 16 de diciembre de 1996.

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Es en e1 Protoco1o de Ouro Preto de 17 de diciembre de 1994 donde se pergefio el nuevo marco organico del Mercosur. Se establecio expresamente que este tendria personalidad juridica de derecho internacional -Art. 34 -, y que el Mercosur- Art. 35 - dentro de sus competencias, podia practicar los actos necesarios para la realizacion de sus objetivos, en particular, contratar, adquirir o enajenar bienes muebles e inmuebles, comparecer en juicio, conservar fondos y efectuar transferencias. Se reconoce originariamente al Consejo Mercado Comun- Art. 8 - la atribucion de ejercer Ia titularidad juridica del Mercosur y Ia facultad de negociar y firmar acuerdos en nombre del Mercosur con terceros paises, grupos de paises y organismos internacionales, aunque dicha competencia puede ser delegada por mandato expreso al Grupo Mercado Comun, organo este que podria negociar, con Ia participacion de "todos" los Estados Partes, acuerdos en nombre del Mercosur, dentro de los limites del mandato especifico que le determina el Consejo.I6 A su vez, con autorizacion de este organo, el Grupo Mercado Comun puede delegar tales facultades en Ia Comision de Comercio del Mercosur. Aunque no se establezca expresamente, esta delegacion de facultades en la Comision de Comercio, se podria realizar en relacion a materias que sean de competencia de este ultimo organo, y el mandato debera igualmente establecer los limites de tal delegacion. Sin duda, las normas consagradas en el Protocolo de Ouro Preto, contribuyeron a llenar algunos vacios que presentaba el Tratado de Asuncion, y que a partir de Ia vigencia de dicho Protocolo, Ia practica cambio de rumbo. Sin pretender examinar exhaustivamente los acuerdos celebrados con posteriori dad a! Tratado de Asuncion, a Ia primera etapa corresponde el Acuerdo de Cooperacion ( 4 + 1), celebrado en junio de 1991 con los Estados Unidos de Norte America, que tuvo la caracteristica de un compromise muy limitado en su alcance, y entro en vigor antes de la vigencia del Tratado de Asuncion, hecho este producido el 29 de noviembre, razon por Ia cual no ofrece interes desde Ia perspectiva de estas reflexiones. En mayo de 1992, se firmo un Acuerdo de Cooperacion Interinstitucional entre el Consejo Mercado Comun y Ia Comision de las Comunidades Europeas. Entro en vigor el dia de su firma por los representantes de ambos organos (Art. 9). Es un instrumento interorganico, de naturaleza "sui generis", propio de una etapa de transicion. El 15 de diciembre de 1995, se suscribio el Acuerdo Marco Interregional de Cooperacion entre la Comunidad Europea y sus Estados Miembros y el Mercado Comun del Sur y sus Estados Partes. Este instrumento tuvo como antecedente inmediato el Acuerdo de 1992.

16 Articulo 14. VII.: "Negociar, con Ia participaci6n de representantes de todos los Estados Partes, por delegaci6n expresa del Consejo Mercado Comun y dentro de los limites establecidos en mandatos especificos concedidos con esa finalidad, acuerdos en nombre del Mercosur con terceros paises, grupos de paises y organismos internacionales. El Grupo Mercado Comun, cuando disponga de mandato para tal fin, procedeni a Ia firma de los mencionados acuerdos. El Grupo Mercado Comun, cuando sea autorizado por el Consejo Mercado Comun, podni delegar los referidos poderes a Ia Comisi6n de Comercio del Mercosur".

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Este tratado, de naturaleza mixta, por cuanto participan los Estados Miembros de la Comunidad Europea y los Estados Partes en el Mercosur como entes soberanos17 y la Comunidad Europea y el Mercosur en cuanto organizaciones internacionales de integracion, sin perjuicio de la peculiaridad de su contenido, materia esta no comprendida en el ambito de estas reflexiones, al definir "las Partes" - Art. 32 seiiala, por un lado, a la Comunidad y sus Estados Miembros "conforme a las competencias respectivas, tal como se derivan del Tratado Constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea, y por la otra, al Mercosur o sus Estados Partes, conforme al Tratado Constitutivo del Mercado Comun del Sur". Aunque parezca una sutileza, se advierte que en relacion a la CE y sus Miembros se efectua una remision a "las competencias" del Tratado Constitutivo, expresion esta que se omite en relacion al Mercosur o sus Estados Partes, reemplazandosela por el U:rmino "conforme". El Acuerdo fue suscripto por los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de los paises Partes en el Mercosur y por este firmo el Presidente en Ejercicio del Consejo del Mercado Comun, presidencia que correspondia en ese momento a Uruguay. Por otro lado, el Acuerdo Marco en consideracion preve, que el mismo entraria en vigor el primer dia siguiente a la fecha en que las Partes se notifiquen "la conclusion de los procedimientos necesarios a tal efecto"- Art. 34 -, y que dichas notificaciones serian dirigidas al Consejo de la Union Europea y al Grupo Mercado Comun del Sur, siendo depositarios del Acuerdo por la Comunidad el Secretario General del Consejo, y por el Mercosur, el Gobierno de la Republica del Paraguay. Como el acuerdo se firmo coincidentemente con la entrada en vigor del Protocolo de Ouro Preto, hecho este que se produjo el 15 de diciembre de 1995 en relacion a la Argentina, Paraguay y Uruguay,18 en el momento de la rubrica se efectuo una Declaracion en el sentido de que "El presente Acuerdo hoy rubricado podra ser firmado cuando entre en vigor el Protocolo de Ouro Preto por el que se dota a Mercosur de personalidad juridica internacional" y otra Declaracion del Mercosur por la que este "manifiesta que una vez definida la naturaleza juridica del Acuerdo Marco Interregional, que se rubrica en el dia de la fecha, propondra a la otra parte, si fuere necesario, los ajustes juridicos correspondientes". El Acuerdo dependia en relacion al Mercosur, de la ratificacion que efectuaran del instrumento los Estados Partes. En lo que respecta a la Republica Argentina, fue aprobado por el Congreso por la Ley 24.694 del4 de septiembre de 1996.19

17 Dromi, Roberto y Molina del Pozo, Carlos Acuerdo Mercosur Union Europea, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1996, pp. 31-34. Segun estos autores, Ia diferenciacion entre Estados Miembros y Estados Partes obedece a que "Ia Union Europea esta ya tipificada como una comunidad asociativa donde los Estados que Ia componen son miembros de esa Comunidad, Ia cual esta reconocida como una entidad supraestatal, supranacional que se encuentra por encima de las estructuras de los Estados que Ia componen y que tiene a su vez su propia organizacion supraestatal o supranacional con organismos de personalidad intemacional indiscutible. En Ia situacion del Mercosur Ia realidad es distinta, porque no todos los Estados miembros del Mercosur tienen el respaldo constitucional para conformar organos supranacionales con transferencia de competencias". 18 Brasil recien deposito el instrumento de ratificacion el 16 de febrero de 1996. 19 Boletin Oficial de Ia Republica Argentina, 4 de octubre de 1996.

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Ya vigente el Protocolo de Ouro Preto, se firmaron dos importantes instrumentos con Chile, de 25 de junio de 1996, y con Bolivia, de 26 de febrero de 1997. Estos Acuerdos de Complementaci6n Econ6mica, presentan caracteristicas muy similares en cuanto a! proceso de celebraci6n y se suscribieron en el marco del Tratado de Montevideo de 1980 - que previ6 varias categorias de acuerdos, entre ellos los de complementaci6n econ6mica20 -, y de Ia Resoluci6n W 2 del Consejo de Ministros de laALADI. En efecto, en ambos, los Gobiemos de los cuatro Estados Partes del Mercosur y los Gobiemos de las Republicas de Chile y de Bolivia, son "Partes Signatarias", y las "Partes Contratantes" son el Mercosur y Chile y Bolivia. No existe coincidencia plies entre las Partes Signatarias y las Partes Contratantes en el caso del Mercosur, modalidad esta que se aparta de Ia pnictica usual en materia de celebraci6n de los tratados. Por otra parte, de conformidad con las Convenciones de Viena de 1969 y 1986 sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, que definen en los respectivos articulos 2) los terminos usados en ambos instrumentos, tampoco resulta clara esta distinci6n entre las "Partes" mencionadas. Mas aun, ambos Acuerdos prescriben obligaciones independientes tanto a cargo de las Partes Signatarias como de las Partes Contratantes, por lo que surge el interrogante en cuanto a! alcance de las obligaciones asumidas por estos Estados que son solo "Partes Signatarias". Asimismo, estas son los "Gobiemos" de los cuatro paises del Mercosur, situaci6n que no hace facil encuadrar estrictamente estos actos convencionales entre los que podrian ser adoptados por el Consejo Mercado Comun, o el Grupo Mercado Comun por delegaci6n de aquel. En cuanto a Ia entrada en vigor de los Acuerdos, a diferencia del Acuerdo con Ia Comunidad Europea de 1995, que Ia supedita a Ia notificaci6n de las Partes de los procedimientos "necesarios a tal efecto", estos instrumentos celebrados con Chile y Bolivia entraron en vigor, por disposiciones de los respectivos convenios, el 1 de octubre de 1996 y el 28 de febrero de 1997. Los Acuerdos no se sometieron a Ia consideraci6n del Congreso Argentino, pese a que los Gobiemos Signatarios -entre ellos el de Ia Republica Argentina-, han asumido compromisos y obligaciones en cuanto Estados, independientemente, como ya se sefialara, de los asumidos por el Mercosur. Esta circunstancia plantea algunos interrogantes en relaci6n a Ia adecuaci6n de estos instrumentos a las normas constitucionales, entre ellos el verdadero "status" juridico de estos acuerdos que no han sido aprobados por el Congreso, amen del problema de su publicaci6n y eventualmente de su aplicaci6n. La Constituci6n Argentina- Art. 75, inc. 22 -, atribuye a! Congreso Ia potestad de aprobar o rechazar los tratados concluidos con otros Estados, con organizaciones intemacionales y concordatos con Ia Santa Sede, otorgandoles a estos instrumentos una jerarquia superior a las !eyes. Esta ultima parte del texto, puso fin a una controvertida cuesti6n que origin6 pronunciamientos disimiles de los tribunales del pais, en particular de Ia Corte Suprema de Justicia.

20

Articulo 11 del Tratado de Montevideo de 1980.

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Tambien le otorgo a! Congreso- Art. 75, inc. 24 -Ia facultad de aprobar tratados de integracion que delegaren competencias y jurisdiccion a organizaciones supraestatales, en ciertas condiciones, asignandole igualmente a las normas dictadas en virtud de tal delegacion, jerarquia superior a las !eyes. La Ley 24.080 de mayo de 1992,2 1 regulo Ia publicacion de los tratados y otros instrumentos internacionales. Este cuerpo legal (Art. 1), obliga - "inter alia" - a Ia publicacion en el Boletin Oficial del texto del instrumento de ratificacion de los tratados o convenciones con sus reservas y declaraciones interpretativas; el texto de los tratados o convenciones precedentemente mencionados, con Ia aprobacion legislativa en su caso, mas las reservas y declaraciones interpretativas formuladas por las otras partes contratantes; Ia fecha del deposito o canje de los instrumentos de ratificacion o de adhesion, y Ia fecha de Ia suspension en Ia aplicacion del tratado o convencion, o de su denuncia. La publicacion en el Boletin Oficial debe efectuarse dentro de los quince dias habiles siguientes a cada acto o hecho precedentemente indicados (Art. 2). La expresion "con Ia aprobacion legislativa en su caso", preve Ia situacion de los acuerdos en forma simplificada, o los que comprende el Decreto del Poder Ejecutivo que se examinara a continuacion. En Ia realidad, no se ha cumplido con Ia publicacion de todos los actos o hechos mencionados y en algunos casos tampoco se ha observado el plazo fijado, aunque no puede dejarse de reconocer Ia existencia de dificultades en Ia aplicacion de esta Ley, por Ia imprecision en el uso de algunos terminos, especialmente en lo que se refiere a las reservas y declaraciones interpretativas formuladas por las otras "partes signatarias". En marzo de 1991 -dias antes de que se suscribiera el Tratado de Asuncion-, se dicto el Decreto 415/9!22 que dispone que los acuerdos suscriptos porIa Republica Argentina en el marco juridico de Ia ALADI, entrarian en vigor "en las condiciones y a partir de las fechas que en cada uno se convenga, sin perjuicio de su publicacion en el Boletin Oficial", norma esta que se aplicaria a los acuerdos que se suscribieran a partir de Ia fecha del Decreto (Art. 3). Este acto legislativo del Poder Ejecutivo vino a introducir una modificacion en el procedimiento constitucional de celebracion de los tratados y a crear una categoria que podria calificarse de "tratados extraconstitucionales". Dio origen, en consecuencia, a un sistema "paralelo" a! de Ia Carta Magna. Pareceria que al amparo de este Decreto, se habria omitido en relacion a los acuerdos con Chile y Bolivia el procedimiento establecido por Ia Carta Magna, aunque cabe destacar que al margen de la dudosa constitucionalidad del Decreto en cuestion, no se ha cumplido hasta el momento con Ia publicacion en el Boletin Oficial.

21 22

Boletin Oficial de Ia Republica Argentina, 18 de junio de 1992. Boletin Oficial de Ia Republica Argentina, 20 de marzo de 1991.

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Asimismo en Chile, la naturaleza juridica del Acuerdo de 1996 y la obligaci6n de someterlo a la aprobaci6n del Poder Legislativo provoc6 una interesante controversia. Finalmente, el Gobierno opt6 por este ultimo procedimiento.23 Durante el afio 1998 se han suscripto acuerdos que guardan cierta semejanza en cuanto a los mecanismos observados para su celebraci6n. El 16 de abril se firm6 el Acuerdo Marco para la Creaci6n de la Zona de Libre Comercio entre el Mercosur y la Comunidad Andina, en el cual los Gobiernos de los cuatro paises del Mercosur y los Gobiernos de las Republicas de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru y Venezuela, paises Miembros del Acuerdo de Cartagena, se declaran "Partes Signatarias" del Acuerdo Marco, y el Mercosur y la Comunidad Andina como "Partes Contratantes". Por su naturaleza, "Crear un area de libre comercio ... { } mediante la expansion y diversificaci6n del intercambio comercial y la eliminaci6n de gravamenes y las restricciones que afecten el comercio reciproco", "Establecer el marco juridico e institucional de cooperaci6n e integraci6n econ6mica fisica, que contribuya a la creaci6n de un espacio econ6mico ampliado que tienda a facilitar la libre circulaci6n de bienes y servicios y la plena utilizaci6n de los factores productivos, en condiciones de competencia y de equidad ... ", "inter alia", las obligaciones recaen fundamentalmente en las Partes Contratantes. El Acuerdo entr6 en vigor el dia de su celebraci6n (Art. 6) y tampoco fue sometido a la aprobaci6n del Congreso Argentino. Todo hace suponer que se sigui6 el mismo criterio que prevaleci6 en relaci6n a los Acuerdos con Chile y Bolivia. Cabe destacar que despues de las reformas introducidas por el Protocolo de Trujillo, de 10 de marzo de 1966, que entre otros objetivos, modific6 la estructura institucional del Acuerdo de Integraci6n Subregional Andino (Acuerdo de Cartagena), se atribuy6 al Consejo Andino de Ministros de Relaciones ExterioresArt. 16, inc. d - la facultad de suscribir convenios y acuerdos con terceros paises o grupos de paises o con organismos internacionales sobre temas globales de politica exterior y de cooperaci6n. Asimismo, por el Art. 48, se reconoce la personeria juridica internacional de la Comunidad Andina.

23 Llanos Mansilla, Hugo "El Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica Chile-Mercosur y sus Anexos: Natliraleza juridica y su incorporaci6n al Derecho interno chileno", en Ius ex Praxis, Santiago, Chile, 1997, pp. 11-24. En Ia Constituci6n chilena de 1980 existe una norma incluida en el Articulo 50, que prescribe "Las medidas que el Presidente de Ia Republica adopte o los acuerdos que celebre para el cumplimiento de un tratado en vigor no requeriran de nueva aprobaci6n del Congreso, a menos que se trate de materias propias de ley".

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El Grupo Andino suscribio en su oportunidad diversos acuerdos, con la Republica Argentina,24 con Panama,25 con la Comunidad Economica Europea,26 con la Comunidad Economica del Carbon y del Acero27 - inter alia -, presentando cada uno de ellos sus peculiaridades en los mecanismos observados en la celebracion y entrada en vigor. El 18 de abril del mismo afio se suscribio un Acuerdo Marco de Comercio e Inversion entre los Gobiemos de los Estados Partes en el Mercosur y los Gobiemos de los paises miembros del Mercado Comt1n Centroamericano (MCCA), a los que se denomina "Partes Signatarias", atribuyendosele el caracter de "Parte Contratante" al Mercosur por un lado y a los "Paises Centroamericanos",28 por el otro. Se advierte que no se ha otorgado la calidad de "Contratante" al Mercado Comun Centroamericano, pese a que los Estados Centroamericanos son miembros de esta organizacion. Ello explica que, en cuanto a la entrada en vigor del Acuerdo -Art. 8 -, se haya establecido que se produciria en la fecha de su adopcion, con excepcion de los paises signatarios "que requieran completar los procedimientos intemos de aprobacion legislativa", para los cuales entraria en vigor cuando se hubieren completado dichos procedimientos. Todo indica que esta excepcion ha sido establecida en relacion a los paises centroamericanos que conforme al Tratado, son cada uno de ellos signatario y contratante. Tal situacion se deriva de la estructura del MCCA, que carece de una regulacion precisa en este aspecto.

24 Integraci6n Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs.As., No 82, agosto de 1983, pp. 94-95. Este Acuerdo suscripto en julio de 1983, que estableci6 una activa vinculacion entre el Grupo Andino y Ia Republica Argentina, entr6 en vigor a partir de Ia fecha de su celebraci6n (Art. 10). 2 5 Integracion Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs. As., W 90, mayo de 1984, pp. 79-80. El Acuerdo Marco de Cooperaci6n de diciembre de 1983, fue suscripto por Ia Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagena y los Gobiernos de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru y Venezuela por una parte, y por Ia otra por el Gobierno de Panama. Prescribi6 que entrada en vigor el primer dia del mes siguiente a Ia fecha en que las Partes se hubieran comunicado "el cumplimiento de los procedimientos necesarios para el efecto"(Art. 7). 26 Ibidem, pp. 80-83. En este Acuerdo de Cooperaci6n, de diciembre de 1983 entre el Acuerdo de Cartagena y sus paises miembros por una parte, y porIa otra Ia Comunidad Econ6mica Europea, fue suscripto por Ia Comisi6n del Acuerdo y los Gobiernos de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru y Venezuela y el Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas. Firm6 por el Consejo su Presidente en Ejercicio y ademas el Vicepresidente de Ia Comisi6n de las Comunidades Europeas. La clausula de entrada en vigor es similar a Ia pactada en el Acuerdo con Panama (Art. 10). 27 Ibidem, p. 83. 28

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua.

Rejlexiones sabre las relaciones convencionales del Mercosur

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Los Estados Centroamericanos han conservado su individualidad en los acuerdos celebrados con terceros, pese a que forman parte de organizaciones de integraci6n regional. Tal es el caso - v.g. - de los instrumentos suscriptos con Mexico, en 199129 y 1992,30 y con Colombia y Venezuela, en 1993.31 El Acuerdo Marco de 18 de abril de 1998 no puede encuadrarse en las hip6tesis previstas en el Decreto 415/91, raz6n por Ia cual no se lo puede asimilar a los celebrados con Chile y Bolivia, desde el punto de vista de las normas internas consagradas por Ia Republica Argentina para Ia celebraci6n y aprobaci6n de los tratados. El 16 de junio de 1998 se suscribi6 un "Entendimiento de Cooperaci6n en Materia de Comercio e Inversiones y Plan de Acci6n" entre el Mercosur y Canada, en el que ambos entes se denominan "Partes". Conforme a! punto 4 del instrumento, el mismo entr6 en vigor en Ia fecha de su firma. Es un acuerdo esencialmente declarativo y programatico. Este instrumento difiere en el proceso de celebraci6n con los anteriores ya que es parte directamente el Mercosur, aunque no se estableciera que 6rgano de este asume Ia representaci6n, ni en que caracter lo hacen los cuatro firmantes del Acuerdo "por" el Mercosur. Se han escogido estos instrumentos para poner de manifiesto las diferentes modalidades que se han adoptado para su celebraci6n, antes y despues de Ia entrada en vigor del Protocolo de Ouro Preto. Asimismo, se advierte que en algunos de ellos Ia forma seguida en Ia celebraci6n, ha permitido eludir el procedimiento constitucional consagrado por nuestro pais, provocando interrogantes en cuanto a! "status" de estos acuerdos y sobre Ia aplicaci6n de los mismos. Igualmente, Ia variedad de mecanismos y procedimientos seleccionados para Ia celebraci6n de los instrumentos - llameseles acuerdos, entendimientos u otra denominaci6n que pudiera adoptarse en el futuro-, pone de manifiesto Ia ausencia de una adecuada regulaci6n juridica en Ia materia "intra" Mercosur y una indefinici6n en el ambito de las competencias del Mercosur por un !ado, y de los Estados miembros por

29 lntegraci6n Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs. As., N" 169, julio de 1991, pp. 98-100. Este Acuerdo General de Cooperaci6n de enero de 1991, fue suscripto por los Gobiernos de Mexico y de los cinco Estados centroamericanos, previendose que entraria en vigor "una vez que cada uno de los paises se comuniquen a traves de Ia via diplomatica, el cumplimiento de los requisitos establecidos por su legislaci6n interna". 30 lntegraci6n Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs. As., N" 184, noviembre de 1992, pp. 72-74. Acuerdo Marco Multilateral para el Programa de Liberacion Comercial, de agosto de 1992. Fue suscripto entre las mismas Partes que el anterior, aunque los Estados centroamericanos aparezcan como Signatarios del Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana. Carece de disposicion alguna sobre entrada en vigor. 31 lntegraci6n Latinoamericana, INTAL, Bs. As., N" 19l,julio de 1993. Acuerdo sobre Comercio e Inversion, de febrero de 1993, entre Colombia y Venezuela y los Estados centroamericanos ya mencionados. Prescribe que entraria en vigor "cuando las partes contratantes se hayan notificado, a traves de canales oficiales que todos los requisitos legales internos hayan sido cumplidos".

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el otro. Cabe agregar Ia falta de un adecuado control institucional dentro del Mercosur, cuestion esta que ha merecido una particular reglamentacion en los Tratados de las Comunidades Europeas. Las falencias enunciadas no son exclusivas del Mercosur, sino que pueden descubrirse en casi todos los procesos de integracion continentales. Las normas sobre Ia materia, cuando existen, son elementales, ambiguas y difusas. Asimismo, las clausulas sobre entrada en vigencia de los acuerdos, a! margen de poner de manifiesto Ia ausencia de criterios uniformes, reflejan Ia diversidad de Ia naturaleza juridica de los actos convencionales y de los procedimientos seleccionados, at1n para casos semejantes. Es obvia Ia diversidad de Ia naturaleza juridica de los instrumentos convencionales y de los compromisos que pueden asumir las organizaciones internacionales de integracion- como se ha puesto de manifiesto en los acuerdos celebrados no solo en el marco del Mercosur, sino tambien en ALADI, el Acuerdo de Cartagena y las organizaciones de integracion centroamericanas, algunos de los cuales se han reseiiado -, y esta circunstancia no puede ser ignorada a! momento de establecerse las respectivas regulaciones. Estas reflexiones tienden, mas que a dar respuestas a algunos interrogantes que surgen en torno a Ia celebracion de estos actos juridicos, a llamar Ia atencion sobre aspectos que deberan necesariamente ser considerados en el momento en que, de conformidad con lo previsto en el Art. 4 7 del Protocolo de Ouro Preto, se dec ida Ia revision de Ia estructura institucional del Mercosur o aun antes, si es posible. Tambien aspiran a replantear algunas cuestiones vinculas con las normas pertinentes de Ia legislacion interna argentina.

En torno a Ia nocion de "territorio del Estado"

por Julio A. Barberis

1.

Introduccion

El "territorio del Estado" constituye un capitulo importante del derecho internacional publico y de Ia teoria general del Estado. Los paises otorgan particular relevancia a todo lo relativo a su territorio y una prueba elocuente de ello son los numerosos tratados internacionales que suscriben para delimitarlo con precision y detalle. Igualmente, hay un numero considerable de sentencias judiciales y arbitrales que determinan el recorrido del limite entre los territorios de Estados vecinos. Las Constituciones de varios Estados contienen tambien disposiciones que preven emil es el territorio de cada uno de ellos.l Una convencion interamericana de 1933 considera que un "territorio determinado" es un elemento constitutivo del Estado. 2 Para precisar en que consiste el "territorio del Estado" es necesario efectuar un analisis de Ia practica internacional y averiguar emil es el sentido que se da a esta expresion. El concepto de "territorio del Estado" esta vinculado con el de "soberania territorial" porque dar una definicion de "territorio del Estado" implica, en cierta medida, definir tambien esta ultima, independientemente de Ia tesis que se afirme. Cuando se examina Ia practica internacional para determinar el sentido que se atribuye a Ia expresion "territorio del Estado", se advierte primeramente que se presen tan situaciones muy variadas y que algunas de elias pueden ser objeto de interpretaciones diversas. Por ello, a fin de evitar divergencias, algunos tratados especifican que ha de entenderse por "territorio" como, por ejemplo, el articulo 1, inciso 1,

Abreviaturas utilizadas. A.o.R.: Archiv des iiffentlichen Rechts. C./.1: Cour Internationale de Justice. C.P.JI.: Cour permanente de Justice internationale. C.T.S.: Parry, The Consolidated Treaty Series. R.d.C.: Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de Droit international de LaHaye. R.G.D.I.P.: Revue Generale de Droit International Public. R.I.A.A.: Reports of International Arbitral Awards. 1 Pueden citarse, entre muchos otros ejemplos, los arts. 5 y 6 de Ia Constituci6n de Costa Rica ( 1949), el art. I de Ia Constituci6n del Ecuador ( 1979) y el art. 84 de Ia Constituci6n de El Salvador (1983). 2 Articulo I de Ia convenci6n sobre derechos y deberes de los Estados, aprobada por Ia VII Conferencia interamericana (Montevideo, 1933) ( Conferencias lnternacionales Americanas, 18891936, Washington, 1938, p. 668).

69 C.A. Armas Barea eta/. (ed.) Liber Amicorum 'In Memoriam' ofJudge Jose Maria Ruda, 69-87 © 2000 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

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f), del tratado de garantia de inversiones entre Ia Argentina y los Estados Unidos de America del 14 de noviembre de 1991.3 De todos modos, si se pretende hallar el sentido que Ia expresion "territorio del Estado" tiene en la pnictica, se deben analizar todos los casos que se presentan y deducir de ellos las caracteristicas que poseen en comun. A fin de dar una idea de la variedad de situaciones que se deben tener en cuenta, conviene mencionar algunos casos a titulo de ejemplo: la base militar de Guantanamo en Cuba, el establecimiento portugues de Macao en China, el regimen dellago Titicaca segun el tratado peruano-boliviano del 19 de febrero de 1957, el Rio de la Plata segun el tratado argentino-uruguayo del 19 de noviembre de 1973 y el caso de algunas minas de carbon de la region fronteriza entre Alemania y los Paises Bajos, en las que, de conformidad con los tratados del 18 de enero de 1952 y del 8 de noviembre de 1960, existe un limite en el subsuelo (Betriebsgrenze) que es distinto del limite en la superficie. Una concepcion juridica y algunas decisiones de la jurisprudencia incluyen dentro de la nocion de "territorio del Estado" los buques de la bandera de dicho Estado que se hallan en alta mary hablan entonces de territorio jlotante. En este orden de ideas, conviene citar un pasaje de la sentencia arbitral del celebre jurista Federico de Martens del 13 (25) de febrero de 1897 en el caso del ballenero "Costa Rica Packet", entre Gran Bretaiia y los Paises Bajos, donde se afirma: " ... en alta mar, aun los navios mercantes, constituyen partes separadas del territorio del Estado cuyo pabell6n enarbolan".4

Otra concepcionjuridica, por el contrario, excluye del territorio estatal el espacio que ocupan las Embajadas extranjeras y sostiene, en este sentido, que gozan de extraterri torialidad. 5 Esta variedad notable de situaciones ha llevado a algunos juristas a la conclusion de que resulta imposible dar una definicion de "territorio del Estado" en el plano internacional. Asi, Wengler afirma:

Boletin Oficial de Ia Republica Argentina, 25.IX.l992. " ... en haute mer, meme les navires marchands, constituent les parties detachees du territoire de I'Etat dont ils portent le pavilion" (LA FONTAINE, Pasicrisie internationale, Berne, 1902, p. 511 ). El Tribunal permanente de Justicia internacional efectu6 un razonamiento semejante en el caso Lotus (C.P.J.l., Serie A, No 10, p. 25). 3 4

5 Asi, escribe VATTEL: "On considere, au moins dans tousles cas ordinaires de Ia vie, !'Hotel d'un Ambassadeur comme etant hors du Territoire, aussi bien que sa personne" (Le droit des gens ou principes de Ia loi naturelle, Londres, 1758, Livre IV, chap. IX, par. 117). Entre los sostenedores de esta concepcion en el siglo actual, ver GENET, Traite de Diplomatie et de Droit Diplomatique, Paris, 1931, t. I, pp. 417-422.

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"Las multiples aplicaciones del territorio del Estado por parte del derecho internacional positivo hacen evidentemente imposible reproducir en Ia formula simple de una 'teoria del territorio' Ia 'esencia' internacional del territorio del Estado".6

En el mismo sentido, Suy expresa que le parece imposible elaborar una teoria del territorio que responda a todas las cuestiones que presenta Ia variedad de situaciones de Ia pnictica internacionaJ.7 Pese a estas opiniones, vale Ia pena hacer nuevamente un esfuerzo para tratar de ver que tienen en comun, desde el punto de vista juridico, todos aquellos casos en que se habla de "territorio del Estado" y de hallar asi una definicion de este concepto.

2.

El territorio como patrimonio del Senor feudal o del Principe

En el medioevo y en las monarquias absolutas, en general, el Sefior o el Principe disponian de sus dominios como de un objeto de su pertenencia. El territorio formaba parte de su patrimonio. Ello se advierte principalmente en los modos como se transmitia el territorio. 8 En este orden de ideas, se pueden mencionar primeramente los convenios matrimoniales, la sucesion, ya sea ab intestato o por voluntad del causante y el reparto de los dominios de un soberano entre sus herederos. Otros modos de transmision del territorio se hallaban vinculados al derecho feudal 0 a instituciones propias de la epoca como, por ejemplo, el enfeudamiento, el regimen de reversion la "expectativa" imperial, Ia adjudicacion papal o los pactos de familia. Algunas sentencias arbitrates decidian sobre matrimonios y sus consecuencias en el plano patrimonial, las que solian referirse a cesiones territoriales.9

6 "Die vielf:iltige Verwendung des Staatsgebiets durch das positive Volkerrecht macht es offenbar iiberhaupt unmoglich, das volkerrechtliche 'Wesen' des Staatsgebiets in der einfachen Forme! einer 'Gebietstheorie', wiederzugeben" (WENGLER, Volkerrecht, Berlin-Gottingen-Heidelberg, 1964, p. 971). 7 "II me parait des lors impossible de construire une theorie du territoire qui soit a meme de repondre a toutes les questions soulevees par Ia variete des phenomenes que !'on rencontre dans Ia pratique internationale" (SUY, "Reflexions sur Ia distinction entre Ia souverainete et Ia competence territoriale", Internationale Festschrift fiir Alfred Verdross zum 80. Geburtstag, MiinchenSalzburg, 1971, p. 508). 8 Para un amilisis detallado de este tema, ver VERZIJL, International Law in Historical Perspective, Leyde, 1970, t. III, p. 298 ss. 9 El art. 2 del tratado del15.XI.l715 entre S.M. Imperial y Cat6lica, Gran Bretaiia y los Paises Bajos contiene una enumeraci6n de los modos de adquisici6n del territorio en aquella epoca (C. T.S., vol. 29, p. 337).

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Los acuerdos de matrimonio comprendian, a veces, territorios en Ia dote de Ia futura esposa.1o Asi, los casamientos sucesivos de Ana de Bretaiia con los reyes de Francia Carlos VIII ( 6.XII.l491) y Luis XII (7 .I.1499) aportaron el territorio de Bretaiia al reino de Francia.11 El 22 de julio de 1515 se concerto un doble contrato de matrimonio entre Wladislavo, rey de Hungria, y Maximiliano I de Austria. El acuerdo se referia, por una parte, a! casamiento del hijo de Wladislavo con Maria, nieta de Maximiliano y, por Ia otra, a las nupcias del nieto de este ultimo con Ana, hija de Wladislavo.12 Estos acuerdos fueron una de las causas de Ia subordinacion de Hungria a Austria. Igualmente, segun el contrato del 23 de junio de 1661 Tanger y Bombay fueron entregados como dote de Catalina de Portugal al rey Carlos II de Inglaterra con motivo de su casamiento.l3 El territorio podia pasar de un principe a otro por razones hereditarias, ya se trate de una sucesion ab intestato o testamentaria. Las disputas por estas causas ocupan varios capitulos de Ia historia de otros siglos. Asi, por ejemplo, el origen de Ia Guerra de los Cien Aiios (1337-1453), entre Francia e Inglaterra, se halla en las rivalidades entre pretendientes que invocaban distintos regimenes sucesorios. Entre las disposiciones testamentarias que tuvieron consecuencias territoriales, se puede mencionar Ia declaracion de ultima voluntad hecha el 24 de abril de 1312 por Thibaut II, duque de Lorena.1 4 Algunos reyes han repartido sus dominios entre sus herederos por acto entre vivos. Un ejemplo de esta categoria lo constituye Ia decision del 23 de julio de 1844 de Seyid-Sai"d, soberano de Mascate y Zanzibar, de repartir entre dos de sus hijos sus posesiones en Asia yen Africa.15 Una vez muerto el padre, se suscito una controversia entre sus descendientes que fue resuelta por una sentencia arbitral del 2 de abril de 1861 del Gobernador general de Ia India, Lord Canning.16 Otra forma de adquisicion de territorios fueron los pactos dinasticos o de familia que preveian Ia sucesion reciproca entre diversas ramas dimisticas ante Ia eventual extincion futura de una de elias. Entre los numerosos convenios de este tipo, se puede mencionar Ia convencion de Naumburg del 30 de marzo de 1614 entre los electores de Sajonia y Brandeburgo y los landgraves de Hesse relativa a su sucesion recipro-

10

Para algunas consideraciones interesantes sobre esta cuesti6n, ver BARTHELEMY, "Du

caracti:re international des contrats de mariage des Princes de famille souveraine", R.G.D.I.P., 1904, p. 325 ss. 11 DU MONT,

Corps universe/ diplomatique du droit des gens, Amsterdam- La Haye, 1726, t.

III, partie II, pp. 271 ss., 405 y 406.

12 DUMONT, op. cit., t. IV, partie I, p. 211 ss. 13 FERREIRA BORGES DE CASTRO, Col/ec~ao dos tratados, conven~oes, contratos e aetas publicos celebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal e as mais Potencias desde 1640 ate ao presente,

Lisboa, 1856, t. I, p. 234 ss. 14

DU MONT, op. cit., t. I, partie I, pp. 427 y 428.

15 Ver los antecedentes de este caso en LA PRADELLE-POLITIS, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, 2a. ed., Paris, 1957, t. II, p. 55 ss. 16 LA PRADELLE-POLITIS, op. cit., t. II, pp. 70 y 71.

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ca 17 y el articulo 16 del Acta final del Congreso de Viena del 9 de junio de 1815 que confirma el antiguo derecho del rey de Sajonia a Ia sucesion eventual a las posesiones de Ia rama ernestina de Ia Casa reinante.l8 El titular del Sacro Imperio romano-germfmico podia atribuir a un principe el derecho de sucesion a otro principado en el caso de su eventual vacancia. Esta institucion Hamada "expectativa" (expectative, Antwartschaft) estuvo reservada a! Emperador hasta comienzos del siglo XVIII y despues de entonces requirio el consentimiento de los principes electores. Se puede mencionar como caso de expectativa con consecuencias territoriales Ia carta (Expectantz-Briejj) otorgada el 4 de noviembre de 1570 por el Emperador Maximiliano II a! rey de Dinamarca Federico II y a sus hermanos Adolfo y Juan, duques de Schleswig-Holstein, a Ia expectativa feudal de los condados de Oldenburgo y Delmenhorst. 19 Las clausulas de reversion fueron incorporadas frecuentemente en las convenciones hasta el siglo pasado. En virtud de elias, se disponia que en el caso de extincion de Ia linea de sucesion a! trono en un reino, su territorio revertiria a otro principe. Disposiciones de este tipo fueron aplicadas principalmente en Italia y, en general, tenian consecuencias territoriales. 20 Otra institucion medioeval que tenia consecuencias territoriales eran los pareatges. Se trataba, en general, de un acuerdo mediante el cual un senor infeudaba su territorio a favor de otro mas poderoso a cambio de su proteccion. Frecuentemente era un convenio entre un obispo u otro senor eclesiastico y un noble laico. Los pareatges no consistian siempre en un convenio, sino que algunas veces eran el resultado de una decision arbitral. El origen de Andorra se encuentra precisamente en pareatges de esta naturaleza. En 1133, el conde de Urgell Ermengol VI, confirmando actos de sus antecesores, hizo donacion a! obispo de todo lo que poseia en Andorra. Desde entonces y hasta Ia mitad del siglo XII Andorra fue un senorio eclesiastico bajo el dominio de Ia diocesis de Ia Seu. Estos obispos habian infeudado Andorra a favor de senores de Ia region, cuyos derechos pasaron por razon hereditaria a los condes de Foix. Estos mantuvieron reiteradas disputas con el obispo que finalmente fueron so1ucionadas mediante los pareatges del 8 de septiembre de 1278.21 Este acto fue confirmado por una hula del papa Martin IV del 7 de octubre de 1282. Los pareatges determinan los derechos de ambos senores sobre los Valles andorranos y, en su acapite IV, establecen como principio que el conde de Foix es vasallo del obispo.

17

DUMONT, op. cit., t. V, partie II, p. 242 ss.

18 C.T.S., vol. 64, p. 461. 19

DUMONT, op. cit., t. V, partie I, pp. 183 y 184.

20 Ver, p. ej., el art. 7 del tratado definitivo de paz de Aquisgnin del 18.X.l748 relativo al derecho de reversion respecto de los ducados de Parma, Piacenza y Guastalla (C. T.S., vol. 38, p. 309 ss. ). 21 Ver el texto en BELINGUIER, La conditionjuridique des Va/Iees d'Andorre, Paris, 1970, p. 269 ss. La actual Constituci6n del Principado de Andorra, promulgada el 28.IV.l993, expresa en su pre:imbulo que sus instituciones encuentran su origen en los pareatges. Ver tambien el art. 43, inc. 2.

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En 1288 nuevos pareatges complementaron los anteriores y confirmaron Ia calidad de vasallo del conde de Foix respecto del obispo de la Seu d'UrgelJ.2 2 El arbitraje tuvo gran aplicacion en Ia Edad media y numerosas decisiones arbitrales se ocupan de cuestiones territoriales. En virtud de algunas de estas sentencias, un territorio podia pasar de los dominios de un Principe a otro. 23 La concepcion del territorio como patrimonio del Principe refleja la realidad internacional de la epoca de las monarquias absolutas y desaparecio con ellas. Solo ha sido tenida en cuenta en este siglo en alguna controversia en que se discutieron titulos territoriales de Ia epoca mediaeval, como es el caso de las islas Minquiers y Ecrehous.2 4

3.

El territorio como objeto de un derecho del Estado

Con Ia aparicion de los regimenes constitucionales se hizo comun la distincion entre las figuras del Principe y del Estado y se comenzo a vincular al territorio con este ultimo. Los juristas empezaron a preguntarse a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo pasado acerca de emil era Ia relacion del Estado con su territorio. Los estudios se multiplicaron, principalmente en las tres primeras decadas de este siglo, y se elaboraron numerosas teorias sobre el tema. Resulta pnicticamente imposible hacer un resumen de todas elias pues cada autor presenta su propio punto de vista y, a veces, combina diversas teorias. Por ello, se expondnin aqui las concepciones generales, las lineas principales de pensamiento en este tema, prescindiendo de las particularidades ofrecidas por cada jurista. 25 Una teoria, llamada del objeto, recurre a una analogia con el derecho privado y sostiene que el Estado ejerce sobre el territorio un derecho real semejante al del propietario sobre una cosa. No se trataria de una proprietas, sino de un imperium analogo a ella, pero con caracteristicas de un derecho real.

22 Ver el texto en BELINGUIER, op. cit., p. 278 ss. 23 Ver una relaci6n de sentencias arbitrales del medioevo, en NOVACOVITCH, Les compromis et les arbitrages internationaux du Xlle au Xfe siecle, Paris, 1905, p. 99 ss. 24 C.I.J., Recueil, 1953, p. 47 ss.

25 Para una exposici6n detallada de las principales teorias sobre Ia concepcion del territorio, ver HENRICH, "Kritik der Gebietstheorien", Zeitschriftfiir Volkerrecht, t. XIII, 1926, pp. 28 ss., 194 ss. y 325 ss. Ver tambien SCHNITZER, Staat und Gebietshoheit, Ziirich-Leipzig, 1935, p. 34 ss. Puede verse una bibliografia sobre el tema en COSTANZA, G/i Stati contermini nel Diritto internazionale, Palermo, 1975, pp. 62-66.

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Entre quienes afirman esta tesis, cabe mencionar a Fauchille26 y a Donati, cuya obra titulada Stato e territorio constituye una de las mejores exposiciones de aquella.27 Este au tor niega que el territorio sea un elemento constitutivo del Estado28 y, despues de un analisis detallado, llega a Ia conclusion de que el derecho del Estado sobre su territorio es un derecho de dominio. Este seria un derecho internacional, perfectamente compatible con el derecho de propiedad de las personas privadas. 29 Esta concepcion ha tenido una influencia notable en Ia terminologia y en Ia sistematizacion de todo lo relativo a! territorio en el derecho de gentes. En efecto, se habla de "cesion", "abandono" o "adquisicion" del territorio de una manera semejante a lo que ocurre con Ia propiedad privada. La sistematizacion de los medios de adquirir Ia soberania territorial, que incluye, entre otros, Ia prescripcion adquisitiva, el aluvion y Ia ocupacion de un territorio res nullius, es una prueba clara de Ia influencia de esta concepcion en el derecho de gentes. La nocion de restriccion a Ia propiedad internacional del Estado y Ia teoria de las servidumbres son tambien otras pruebas elocuentes de ello.30 La critica principal que, desde su formulacion, se dirigio a esta concepcion radica en que hace aparecer a! territorio como algo ajeno a Ia personalidad del Estado. Asi como un individuo puede desprenderse de una cosa de su propiedad sin que su personalidad resulte afectada, el Estado podria, de manera analoga, ceder su territorio. La critica estima que Ia relacion entre el Estado y su territorio no podria ser considerada como un derecho real y, por lo tanto, que esta concepcion no constituiria una descripcion fie! de Ia realidad juridica

26 En este sentido, el autor citado expresa: 'Tautonomie de I'Etat implique necessairement au profit de celui-ci un droit exclusif sur une portion du globe terrestre. Cette portion forme son territoire ... Le droit de propriete sur une certaine partie du globe est done pour tous les Etats un droit primordial. Chaque Etat est, dans Jes relations avec Jes autres Etats, proprietaire d'un territoire. Ce droit de propriete est une sorte de domaine eminent, non au sens qu'attachaient a cette expression les feudistes, mais en ce sens que, vis-a-vis des Etats etrangers, l'Etat exerce sur tout le territoire des droits de legislation, de juridiction et de police dans le but de pourvoir a Ia prosperite de Ia nation" (FAUCHILLE, Traite de droit international public, 8a. ed., Paris, 1922, t. I, Jere partie, p. 450). 27 Ver principalmente DONATI, Stato e territorio, Roma, 1924, pp. 16-123. 28 DONATI, op. cit., p. 43. 29 "Un diritto di dominio dello Stato sui territorio, e cioe un diritto internazionale di dominio ( che di altro qui non puo trattarsi), e perfettamente conciliabile con Ia simultanea proprieta dei privati su parti del territorio ... "(DONATI, op. cit., p. 60). Ver tambien Ia conclusion en Ia p. 61. 30 A este respecto, afirma FAUCHILLE (op. cit., t. I, Jere partie, p. 668): "Le droit de propriete internationale qu'ont Jes Etats sur leur territoire et sur Jes choses sises au territoire peut etre restreint de diverses manieres: par Ia constitution de rentes et autres droits reels tels que droits de fief, de gages, d'antichreses, d'hypotheques, et par J'etablissement de servitudes".

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Liber Amicorum Jose Maria Ruda

El territorio como espacio dentro del cual el Estado ejerce su imperio

Paralelamente a Ia concepcion anterior, se desarrollo otra tesis que presenta a! Estado como una entidad fenomenica constituida por tres elementos fundamentales, a saber: Ia poblacion, el territorio y el gobierno. Segun esta teoria, el Estado ejerceria su imperio respecto de sus subditos dentro de un espacio, el cual seria precisamente su territorio. Uno de los principales representantes de esta concepcion es Carl Victor Fricker, cuyo primer estudio sobre el tema data de 1867 y cuyo principal trabajo fue publicado bajo el titulo de Gebiet und Gebietshoheit en 1901.31 Fricker ensefia que el territorio es el espacio en el que el Estado ejerce su imperio, que noes un objeto sino un elemento constitutive del Estado.32 Este autor expresa que no debe confundirse el territorio (Gebiet) con el suelo (Grund, Boden). La soberania territorial no se ejerce sobre el suelo, sino respecto de las personas que se hallan dentro de un espacio.33 Esta tesis se ocupa de precisar el rol desempefiado por el territorio en el Estado a fin de establecer Ia diferencia con otras concepciones. En este sentido, Fricker afirma que su funcion es distinta a Ia que cumple una cosa respecto de su propietario. En este caso, Ia cosa esta sometida a Ia voluntad del propietario, este dispone de Ia cosa. Pero, Ia persona del propietario no se modifica con motivo de esta relacion de propiedad, Ia personalidad de aquel permanece inmutable. En cambio, el territorio tiene otro sentido para el Estado. El territorio es el espacio en el que el Estado ejerce su poder. El Estado no puede existir sin un ordenamiento unico y, a su vez, este no puede darse sin un espacio en el que el poder del Estado se ejerza de manera excluyente. De esta afirmacion, el autor concluye que el territorio es un elemento esencial del Estado, un momento en el ser del Estado.34 Esta teoria fue adoptada por los creadores de Ia geopolitica. Estos conciben el Estado como un ser vivo, como un organismo de las ciencias biologicas, en el cual el territorio seria su cuerpo.35 La geopolitica considera el territorio como pertene-

31 FRICKER, Gebiet und Gebietshoheit, Tiibingen, 1901. En las pp. 100-112 de esta obra se reproduce el estudio de 1867 titulado Vom Staatsgebiet. 32 "Das Gebiet ist vielmehr der Raum der staatlichen Herrschaft" (op. cit., p. 10), " ... das Gebiet ist nicht Object, sondern Bestandtheil des Staates" (op. cit., p. II). 33 FRICKER, op. cit., p. II ss. En este mismo orden de ideas, JELLINEK afirma que sin Ia existencia de seres humanos, no se puede hablar de territorio, sino simplemente de partes de Ia superficie terrestre ("Von menschlichen Subjekten ganz losgelost gibt es kein Gebiet, sondern nur Teile der ErdoberfHiche"), Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3a. ed., Berlin, 1914, p. 176. 34 "Das Gebiet kommt also fiir den Staat als Raum in Betracht und ist als solcher ein wesentliches Element des Staates selbst aber, wie ich mich ausgedriickt habe, ein Moment im Wesen des Staates" (FRICKER, op. cit., p. 10). 35 Ver, p. ej., KJELLEN, Der Staat als Lebensform, Leipzig, 1917, pp. 63 y 80. RATZEL, Erdenmacht und Volkerschicksal- Eine Auswahl aus seinen Werken, Stuttgart, p. Ill ss. (Der Staat als Organismus).

En torno a Ia noci6n de "territorio del Estado "

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ciente a! ser estatal y estima que uno de los grandes hallazgos de Ia teoria del Estado consiste en ver Ia relacion de este con su territorio como una relacion de canicter personal y no real. En este sentido, un atentado o intromision en el territorio del Estado es tenido como un ataque a! Estado mismo y no a su propiedad.36 Se ha criticado esta tesis diciendo que, desde el punto de vista juridico, no describe fielmente lo que se da en Ia realidad. Asi, ocurre que un Estado, aun cuando su territorio sufra modificaciones de radical importancia, guarda su identidad como tal. Si el territorio fuera un elemento constitutive del Estado, una modificacion fundamental de el, implicaria tambien un cambia del Estado en cuanto tal. Se ha afirmado igualmente que esta tesis presenta a! Estado como una realidad sociologica, pero no lo analiza desde el punto de vista juridico.

5.

El territorio como el ambito de validez espacial del orden juridico estatal

Las teorias expuestas hasta aqui tratan de responder a Ia pregunta acerca de que es el territorio del Estado acudiendo a! mundo natural. En esta materia, se produjo un cambia de concepcion con motivo del articulo de Ernst Radnitzky que aparecio en 1906 bajo el titulo "Naturaleza juridica del territorio del Estado" y que constituye un aporte nuevo y fundamental a! tema que analizamos.37 Radnitzky hace una critica de las teorias anteriormente expuestas y afirma que el estado de las ideas del derecho publico intemo y del derecho de gentes sobre el territorio, en esa epoca, se asemeja a! de aquel ciego que cargaba con un paralitico para que le ensefiara el camino, pero que, en un momento dado, ambos se separan, pese a que uno es imprescindible para el otro.38 La concepcion de Radnitzky se desarrolla en el plano normativo y parte de Ia idea de "competencia". Expresa que el Estado tiene su propia competencia, que se puede dividir en material, personal y locaJ.39 La competencia material est