Gleichheit als kulturelles Phänomen: Ergebnisse der 37. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung vom 19. bis 21. September 2019 in Greifswald [1 ed.] 9783161595011, 9783161595028, 3161595017

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Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung herausgegeben von der

Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung e.V.

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Gleichheit als kulturelles Phänomen Ergebnisse der 37. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung vom 19. bis 21. September 2019 in Greifswald Herausgegeben von

Uwe Kischel

Mohr Siebeck

Prof. Dr. Uwe Kischel, LL.M. (Yale), attorney-at-law (New York) ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Öffentliches Recht, Europarecht und Rechtsvergleichung (Nordosteuropa) – Mercator-Stiftungslehrstuhl, Universität Greifswald.

ISBN 978-3-16-159501-1 / eISBN 978-3-16-159502-8 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-159502-8 ISSN 1861-5449 / eISSN 2569-426X (Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nati­ onalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind über http://dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2020 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany. www.mohrsiebeck.com Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung ­außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags ­unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für die Verbreitung, Vervielfältigung, Übersetzung und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Das Buch wurde von epline in Böblingen aus der Minion gesetzt, von Gulde-Druck in Tübingen auf alterungsbeständiges Werkdruckpapier gedruckt und gebunden. Printed in Germany.

Vorwort Mit dem Generalthema „Gleichheit“ hat sich die 37. Tagung der Gesellschaft für Rechtsvergleichung, die im September 2019 in Greifswald stattfand, einem in der rechtlichen Praxis besonders konfliktreichen und zugleich dogmatisch besonders anspruchsvollen Konzept gewidmet. Die klassische Behauptung der amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitserklärung „all men are created equal“ kann kaum wörtlich verstanden werden kann, steht sie doch im auffälligen Kontrast zu den vielfältigen Unterschieden der Menschen etwa im Hinblick auf Religion, soziale Herkunft, Vermögen, Familie, sexuelle Orientierung oder individuelle Fähigkeiten. Wann zwei Menschen aber hinreichend gleich für eine Gleichbehandlung oder hinreichend ungleich für eine Ungleichbehandlung sind, ist eine Wertungsfrage. Die Antwort darauf hängt nicht zuletzt von den jeweils vorherrschenden Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen ab und ist somit im Kern kulturell geprägt. Gleichheit ist daher immer auch ein kulturelles Phänomen. Gerade diese Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Gleichheit, Gerechtigkeit und kulturellem Selbstverständnis sind es, die das Thema einerseits so komplex, andererseits für eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung so reizvoll machen. Denn der Vergleich verschiedener Gleichheitsvorstellungen läßt die dahinter stehenden kulturellen Eigenarten der unterschiedlichen Rechtskontexte deutlich hervortreten. Hier setzte die Sitzung der Fachgruppe Öffentliches Recht an, die es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht hat, ein breites Spektrum von Verfassungskontexten zu betrachten und so prima facie eine besonders hohe Vielfalt kontextueller Besonderheiten in den Blick zu nehmen. Der vorliegende Band dokumentiert die einzelnen Beiträge der Sitzung und macht sie so einer breiten Öffentlichkeit zugänglich: Nahed Samour untersucht die Bedeutung formeller und materieller Gleichheitsaspekte im islamischen Recht. John Osogo Ambani befaßt sich mit Fragen der Ungleichbehandlung aufgrund der sexuellen Orientierung und traditionellem Recht in Afrika. Für die Darstellung der Gleichheitsvorstellungen in Russland und deren Verhältnis zu traditionellen Werten konnte Elena Gritsenko gewonnen werden. Kyung-Sin Park erörtert in seinem Beitrag Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der Gleichheitsdogmatik in Südkorea, den USA und Deutschland. Schließlich stellt Laura Carlson die Gleichheitskultur Schwedens sowie ihre Bezüge zum schwedischen Wohlfahrtsstaat vor.

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Mein besonderer Dank gilt wie immer den Autoren für ihre engagierten, ertragreichen Referate sowie für die rasche Erstellung der Manuskripte. Gleichermaßen danke ich dem Sekretär unserer Fachgruppe, Prof. Dr. Sebastian von Kielmansegg, ohne dessen ruhige und konstante Unterstützung Vieles nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Für die Hilfe im Ablauf der Fachgruppensitzung ebenso wie bei der Vorbereitung dieses Tagungsbandes danke ich meinen wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeitern Philipp Mende, Christian Pfengler und Max Weber sowie meinen studentischen Hilfskräften Christine Hecker, Anna Keßler, Linda Laabs, Anna Mitzlaff, Philipp Schwadtke und Markus Tenhagen, die die oft schwierigen Aufgaben mit Elan, Kreativität und Einsatz gelöst haben. Greifswald im März 2020

Uwe Kischel

Inhaltsverzeichnis Vorwort  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    V Nahed Samour Formal and Substantive Equality in Islamic law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �   1 John Osogo Ambani Between marriage and punishment: A triple heritage of regulating homosexuality in Africa  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �  25 Elena Gritsenko Gleichheit und traditionelle russische Werte am Beispiel der Rechtsprechung des russischen Verfassungsgerichts  . . . . . . �  63 Kyung-Sin Park Trans-Jurisdictional Understanding of Equality in the context of Affirmative Action – Korea, Germany and the United States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �  99 Laura Carlson The Intersections of Equality, Welfare and Democracy in Sweden  . . . . . . . . � 125 Autorenverzeichnis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . � 159

Formal and Substantive Equality in Islamic Law Nahed Samour Does Islamic law have a concept of equality? And if so, what kind of equality speaks to Islamic legal understandings? The aim of this study is to examine the usefulness of distinguishing between formal and substantive equality and to consider how Western liberal thought which shaped this distinction is productive or problematic for understanding Islamic law. Used in a productive mode, my argument is that while classical Islamic law might not have a consistent perception of formal equality, it does know substantive equality. In particular, there is an acute understanding of linking substantive equality to vulnerable groups. Substantive equality in Islamic law can be explored to mean recognition and redistribution, as financial means are considered a key way of accommodating unequal conditions. Used in a problematic mode, the liberal Western contingency of this distinction, which is unknown to the Islamic legal tradition, poses many questions for the field of equality jurisprudence. While one could well argue for an Islamic meaning of substantive equality, a more vexing question emerges: Can there be substantive equality without formal equality? The Islamic case instead allows us to re-think the relationship between the formal and substantive, and challenges the European chronological understanding from formal to substantive equality. We need to invest more in considering whether the distinction between substantive and formal equality is helpful in the first place and how this relationship is constituted. At the same time, (inter-)national calls for formal equality today, risk overlooking substantive equality matters. While Islamic law has been suffering from patriarchal understandings, formal equality might help little to overcome injustices, and substantive dimensions addressing disadvantage and accommodating differences might be more useful here. To complicate our understanding of equality is to understand the deeper dimensions of injustices. Formal equality as in consistently applying the same rule for all can entrench injustices. Formal equality then expands as hegemonic paradigm, in which a dominant discourse perpetuates the view that Islamic law per se is not capable on delivering on equality. The story about equality and Islamic law remains relevant not least because of Muslim demands for a richer understanding of equality. In its comparative framing today between “them” and “us”, the discourse on equality unfortunately

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still too often is abused as justification for military or economic violence, in an attempt to bring “equality” to unequal societies.

A. Introduction Inquiring about equality in Islamic law is to ask whether pre-modernity has a concept for equality. While Islamic law is much more than the result of Islamic legal hermeneutics anchored in canonical Islamic scriptural texts,1 this contribution starts by looking at the constitutive text of the Qurʾān.2 With a view on the Qurʾān, it tackles the challenges of exploring the meanings of a 7th century revelation for a 21st century audience. Legal historian Lena Salaymeh argues that “No legal text from any premodern tradition implements the modern ideal of gender equality”3 – or equality between any other status group for that matter. It would be wrong to demand that premodern texts conform to modern ideals. In fact, this would be to succumb to anachronism.4 No scholar wants to fall into the traps of anachronism, misplacing a concept in time and creating a chronological inconsistency, and referring to something that is not in its correct time. Neither would one want to fall into the trap of presentism, i. e. of justifying a present-day concern with referencing it back to the past. And yet, there is clearly something of a “past present” or a pending past over present concerns that necessitates a delicate reading of texts across time. Significantly, historical methods and their proponents who are concerned about what a text meant at the time it was revealed or written and what it meant to its contemporaries should lay this out, yet not shut down thinking about law when it addresses authoritarian, exploitative or unequal effects today.5 The complexities of studying religiously revealed texts over time present significant challenges. In dealing with religiously revealed texts, such as the Qurʾān, no exegesis can go against the text. But we can and must contextualize text to 1  See also Lena Salaymeh, Historical Research On Islamic Law, in: Markus D. Dubber/​ Christopher Tomlins (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legal History, 2008, pp. 757–776, p. 757. 2  Sherman Jackson is right to warn against a “protestant approach” by those who “ignore and supplement scripture with little to no regard of any tradition of how previous generations have understood the holy writ.” Sherman Jackson, Islam and Affirmative Action, Journal of Law & Religion XIV:2 (1999–2000), pp. 405–431, p. 407. 3  Lena Salaymeh, Imperialist Feminism and Islamic Law, Hawwa – Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 17 (2019), pp. 97–134, p. 125. 4  For a nuanced reading of the meaning of anachronism for the study of international legal history, see Anne Orford, On International Legal Method, London Review of International Law 1 (2013), pp. 170–177. 5  See also the debate on the methods of history in international law Anne Orford, International Law and the Limits of History, in: Wouter Werner/​Marieke de Hoon/​A lexis Galán (eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi, 2015, pp. 297–320.



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understand and develop its meaning. Here we are dealing with the old question of when text is prescriptive (generating normatively binding rules) and when it is descriptive (and thus is not normative). In dealing with Islamic law, a religiouslegal order that took its beginning over 1400 years ago, one risks essentializing the normative as much as essentializing the empirical, and additionally risks exoticizing religion.6 To essentialize the normative would be to reduce Islamic law to one national legal order today, or to one classical legal school, or one scholar, at one particular time or space. And to essentialize the lives of Muslims or non-Muslims living in Muslim societies or Muslims living in non-Muslim societies would mean to not consider other factors such as class, race, age, sexual orientation, and other personal factors. With the modern secular Zeitgeist, it seems particularly necessary to not exoticize religion and remember that both equality and inequality can be pursued with religious arguments as well as with secular ones.7 While equality in many national and international legal systems remains an “elusive and ever-changing concept”8, dealing with it in Islamic law as a religio-legal tradition makes it challenging in its own ways. Tackling questions of equality in Islamic law necessitates taking the wider normative, moral and ethical framework encompassing both (non-changeable) divinely revealed texts and (changing) human understandings and articulations. As a value-laden concept, equality is by definition also, or overwhelmingly, an ethical question.9 It asks whether there can be one overarching understanding of equality, and if so, what it would look like. This contribution attempts to show the intricacies of a non-Western legal tradition that existed prior to the European Enlightenment and that did not distinguish between formal and substantive equality as Western liberal discourse does today.

6  See also Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qurʾan, Hadith, and Jurisprudence, 2006, p. xiii. 7  For a secular exclusion of women’s rights see e. g. Leslie Francis/​Patricia Smith, Feminist Philosophy of Law, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2017 Edition, URL = . 8  See e. g. Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, ICON 14:3 (2016), pp. 712–738, p. 713. 9  For some scholars Islamic law is better characterized as an ethical system than a legal one, see e. g. Jonathan E. Brockopp (ed.), Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia, 2003.

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B.  Equality in Liberal European Thought: From Formal to Substantive While equality is one of liberalism’s key universal corner stones10 and central to contemporary constitutional democracies11, it remains an elusive concept. Pinning down equality remains a challenging and frail subject, which some refer to as an empty concept.12 With equality having such a prominent position in liberal thought, it merits inquiring how equality developed as a key idea of ordering modern-day society and how European and North-American scholarship has increasingly turned from a formal to a substantive understanding of equality. Legal scholar Sandra Fredman starts her writing on equality by stressing that “[e]quality as an ideal is a relatively modern construct”.13 Premodern societies were not founded on the principle of equality. Hierarchy and privilege were much more prevalent as ordering principles than equality, which defined broadly as “same rights for all”. Classical thinkers such as Aristotle and Aquinas can therefore be both credited for each having developed an approach to (formal) equality – “treat like cases alike” – as well as criticized for not having had difficulties in laying out that women and slaves, by birth and status, were subordinate. Their legal inferiority and need for (white) male supervision were justified by their physical or rational “weakness”. Nature (“the empirical”), as they saw it, was drawn upon to justify the normative. The European feudal society’s conception was that persons were inherently unequal, depending on their birth, status or vocation, and rested on a hierarchy in which members of the aristocracy and clergy were treated as superiors to commoners, and thus entitled to privileges and prerogatives denied to commoners.14 Only with the emergence of mercantile capitalism and the loosening bonds of feudalism, equality began to crystalize as an organizing social principle. Fredman highlights two types of freedom that laid the ground for European equality thought: Greater economic freedom of individuals to pursue trade within a free market and greater political freedom as English parliament gained power from the monarchy. While politically this meant to untie the authority of the monarch, economic liberation was expanded on the notion of the principle 10  Wendy Brown writes about how liberalism’s self-satisfaction sits on the universality of its basic principles: secularism, the rule of law, equal rights, moral autonomy and individual liberty. Wendy Brown, Civilizational Delusions: Secularism, Tolerance, Equality, Theory & Event 15:2 (2012), p. 21. 11  Norman Dorsen/​Michel Rosenfeld/​A ndrás Sajó/​Susanne Baer/​Susanna Mancini, Comparative Constitutionalism, 3rd edition 2016, p. 617. 12  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harvard Law Review (1982), p. 537. The complexities of equality for the international and interdisciplinary discourse should not divest from its high significance for the lives of the many demanding it. 13  Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd edition 2011, p. 4. 14  Dorsen et al. (n 11), p. 617.



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of the freedom of contract. These freedoms allowed for liberalism as an ideology to blossom.15 Equality in European legal thought started as formal equality. The concept of formal equality meant that when two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant aspect, they must be treated equally with regard to this aspect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle formulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like”.16 The crucial question is which aspects are normatively relevant and which are not. In fact, formal equality could both characterize women as equal to men (as human beings) and view women and men as unequal (as differences between the sexes exist). Those that are characterized as different could be legitimately treated as better or worse.17 Formal equality leaves little room to accommodate that men and women are equal as human beings, and yet to some extent have different needs and aspirations.18 Furthermore, formal equality is based on equality of treatment and this in turn is predicated on the principle that justice inheres in consistency. Hence the old Aristotelian formula sees equality as consistency and fairness as requiring consistent treatment.19 However, this view is based on a purely abstract view of justice, which does not take into account existing distributions of, for instance, wealth and power. Consistency in treatment of two individuals who appear alike but in fact differ in terms of access to power, opportunities or material benefits results in unequal results. So formal equality is consistent, but also consistently ignoring categories such as class, gender, religion, race, sexual orientation, age and other relevant factors. It is this attempt to include a fuller social context that helped to understand the limits of formal equality. The distinction between formal and substantive aims at understanding deeper structures of injustice, namely those that cannot be solved by applying formal equality.20 This is why even if equality before the law as a major historic achievement has been established, it emerged that it was far from sufficient to achieve genuine equality.21 Dismantling formal legal impediments such as slavery or the exclusion of married women from property rights, rights over their own children, and the suffrage proved not to be enough. Disadvantage persists and this disadvantage tends to be concentrated in groups with a particular status, such as women, 15  Fredman (n 13), pp. 4–5. 16  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V. 3. 1131a10–b15; Politics, III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23, as cited in Stefan Gosepath, Equality, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011 Edition, ch. 2.1 Formal equality, URL = . 17  Michel Rosenfeld, Towards a Reconstruction of Constitutional Equality, in: András Sajó (ed.), Western Rights? Post-Communist Application, 1996, pp. 165–166. 18 Ibid. 19  Fredman (n 13), p. 7. 20  Fredman (n 8), p. 713. 21  Fredman (n 13), p. 6.

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people with disabilities, religious and racialized minorities and others.22 Formal equality leaves out whether laws and policies enforce stereotypes, entrench prejudices or treat anyone effectively unfairly. Over time, scholarship on equality realized that one should move beyond a formal conception, yet it still was not clear what a substantive conception would mean. Sandra Fredman therefore states that substantive equality resists capture by a single principle until today.23 Instead, drawing on the strengths of a several principles in the substantive equality discourse, she tries to bring those principles together and proposes a four-dimensional principle: Substantive equality means “to redress disadvantage; to address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence; to enhance voice and participation; and to accommodate difference and achieve structural change”.24 The right to equality should be “responsive to those disadvantaged, demeaned, excluded, or ignored”.25 Equality thus needs to be put into a social context.26 In exploring the meanings of substantive equality, closer attention was paid to what came to be known as vulnerability. Vulnerability rethinks that the “autonomy or liberty to mean little more than a mandate for sameness of treatment.”27 Vulnerability is instead posited to underline the interdependency of humans because of their weaker position in society or historical injustices (e. g. minors, women, members of religious minorities, and “others”),28 similar to the call for substantive equality to be put into a social context.29 In particular, vulnerability seeks to ensure that the needs of vulnerable individuals and groups are seen and recognized, and receive adequate protection. The European Court of Human Rights has recently come forward recognizing that some groups are considered particularly vulnerable, in the sense that members of certain groups are more likely to suffer harm or experience it to a greater degree.30 These harms range from misrecognition, to physical injuries and material deprivation.31 22  Fredman (n 8), pp. 712–713. 23  Ibid, p. 713. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27  Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, in: Martha Albertson Fineman/​Anna Grear (eds.), Vulnerability. Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics, 2016, pp. 13–27, p. 13. 28 Ibid. 29  Fredman (n 8), p. 713. 30 See Lourdes Peroni/​A lexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2013), pp. 1056–1085, esp. pp. 1064–1065. 31  The first group that was recognized as vulnerable by the Strasbourg Court was the Roma minority who, “as a result of their history” – the Court held – “has become a specific type of disadvantaged and vulnerable minority” in need of special protection. ECtHR (GC), D. H. and Others v. the Czech Republic, 13 November 2007; ECtHR (GC), Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, 16 March 2010. The next group was comprised of persons with mental disabilities. They have



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European and North-American scholarship on equality thus mirrors historical experiences with political and societal powers and largely revolves around liberal ideas of the autonomous individual (while there is also a substantial European Marxist critique of “the individual”). In liberal scholarship of equality, the formal, at least initially, was seen as divided from its substantive dimension and until today the relationship between the formal and the substantive is not firmly established. Arguably, a holistic approach to equality developed only late in liberal scholarship.

C.  Equality in Islamic Law: Substantive Equality and Vulnerability, not Formal Equality Premodern Muslim jurists lived in and provided the laws for a society that was hierarchical, from the relationship between ruler and ruled to the relationship between spouses. For Islamic legal scholar Kecia Ali, hierarchy was an ordering principle of Muslim societies in which Muslims were to be dominant over nonMuslims, those that were free were to dictate the lives of slaves, and men were to “stand over” women.32 And yet, surveying the history of legal practice with a view on women, the equality question stubbornly refuses to give a smooth answer. Islamic legal scholar Wael Hallaq observes that “Muslim women were full participants in the life of the law.”33 However, Kecia Ali critically observes that “this participation does not mean that there was gender equality.”34 And yet, social historian Judith Tucker states that “[w]hile equality was not a key principle here, it would be hard to say that these differences meant to cause or entrench inequality.”35 In fact, despite hierarchies and inequalities, Kecia Ali concludes that “something perceived as substantive justice was consistently delivered by legal institutions.”36 This trio of quotes sets the scene for what is to be discussed: What is the relationship between a lack of formal equality and substantial justice, as Kecial Ali calls it? Differently put, can there be substantive equality without formal equality? been regarded by the Court as a “particularly vulnerable group in society, who has suffered considerable discrimination in the past”. ECtHR, Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, 20 May 2010. The Court has expanded the list of vulnerable groups to asylum seekers and people living with HIV. ECtHR (GC), M. S. S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011 (asylum seekers) and ECtHR, Kiyutin v. Russia, 10 March 2011 (HIV-status). 32  Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, 2010, p. 188. 33  Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 2009, p. 70; see also Mathieu Tillier, Women before the qāḍī under the Abbasids, Islamic Law and Society 16 (2009), pp. 280–301. Tillier finds that while women would come to early Islamic courts to request their rights, those who came and those who did not correlates with social hierarchy. 34  Ali (n 32), p. 188. 35  Judith Tucker, Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law, 2008, p. 27. 36  Ali (n 32), p. 188.

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Islamic law does not discern between formal and substantive equality, nor does recent scholarship on Islamic law use this distinction. Formal and substantive are thus not inherently Islamic terms, which makes it challenging to use them. In fact, the term equality in Arabic (e. g. kafāʾa) in premodern texts would not be generally applied but e. g. used to discuss “equality” as suitability of spouses as a question of social hierarchies.37 Applying non-inherent concepts to a legal system remains risky, especially when meaning can go lost. For heuristic purposes, these distinctions can make sense if they aid in observing and understanding the complexities of equality, such as to justify legal positions (or rights, in modern parlance) and the ordering of society. I first want to address how one can frame a study of “formal and substantive equality” in Islamic law without committing a historical and/or theoretical anachronism, given that this distinction was articulated as a European intellectual product. As stated in the introduction, premodern texts do not know equality as a right and ordering principle of society as many conceptualize it today. However, demanding justice, though a heavily charged term, would not per se be anachronistic for any religiolegal tradition. In fact, modern Muslim scholars of Islam seem more comfortable discussing questions that first appear as questions of equality as questions of justice.38 With the Qurʾān invoking justice in multiple verses, justice is a Godly pledge to humans, and the ways of thinking about equality have to align with this pledge. It is here that the “formal and substantive” distinction as well as the idea of vulnerability from equality jurisprudence can be helpful in unfolding concepts of equality as justice in Islamic law.

I. Pledge of Justice: Equal before God An Islamic law approach to equality needs to start with God’s promise to humans that God is just, and that justice prevails, if not in this world but on the day of Judgement and beyond. Several of the 99 names of God in Arabic revolve around the notion of justice (the Just/al-ʿadl, the giver of justice/al-ḥakam, the Rightful/ al-ḥaqq, and many others). It is the Godly pledge that no one will be subjected to any discrimination in regard to the merits of their deeds. The Qurʾān says: “Then shall anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good, see its reward, and anyone who has done an atom’s weight of evil, shall see its recompense” (Qurʾān al-Zilzāl 99:7–8). It is not birth or status but individual action that God promises to make his basis for reward and punishment. 37  For an overview of the kafāʾa principle in Ḥanafī legal thought (comprising e. g. religion, wealth, education) in premodern and modern marriage law, see Lama Abu Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 37 (2004), pp. 1043–1146, see e. g. p. 1103. 38  See e. g. “substantive justice”, Ali (n 32), p. 188; “concrete justice”, Jackson (n 2), p. 427.



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Equality before God, then, is a central theme in Islam. The Qurʾān is empathic on equality in regard to human conduct that transcends the requirements of the law. Qurʾān al-Aḥzāb 33:35 is crucial here, establishing equality that goes beyond gendered equality: “Indeed, the Muslim men and Muslim women, the believing men and believing women, the compliant men and compliant women, the truthful men and truthful women, the patient men and patient women, the humble men and humble women, the charitable men and charitable women, the fasting men and fasting women, the men who guard their private parts and the women who do so, and the men who remember God often and the women who do so – for them God has prepared forgiveness and a great reward.”

Beyond God’s promise to treat men and women equally as to their deeds, the verse covers aspects of the relation with fellow human beings as well,39 equality is not a question of autonomy and independence but one of social context. Equality in this sense does not centralize the abstract individual but the individual as part of a social setting. Further Qurʾānic verses stress that Godly justice consists of treating women and men equally based on their deeds: “And their God answered them, never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male or female” (Qurʾān Āl-ʿImrān 3:195). “If any do deeds of righteousness, be they male or female, and have faith, they will enter Heaven, and not the least injustice will be done to them” (Qurʾān al-Nisā 4:124). “The believers, men and women, are guardians, one of another” (Qurʾān al-Tawbah 9:71).

These and other Qurʾānic verses promising justice and equal treatment cannot be repeated often enough. They explain why many Muslims, including women from all over the world, hold on to Islam as religion40 and see in it the pledge of justice that goes beyond man-made promises. These verses are what has inspired Muslim women41 as well as others seeking social justice in this world. There is a 39  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam, 2nd edition 2002, p. 63. 40  Judith Tucker in her introduction in Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law (n 35), p. 1 provocatively asks how Muslim women can view the discriminatory sharīʿa as a source of justice, and (next to her nuanced historical analysis), it is God’s promise of equality in verses like these that can provide an answer. Kecia Ali sees the answer in a vagueness of religious law, in which Islamic law is a code for “just” and “fair”, see Ali (n 32) p. 189. 41  See e. g. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, 1992; Amina Wadud, Qurʾan and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective, 1999; Asma Barlas, “Believing Women” in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qurʾan, 2002; Riffat Hassan, Equal before Law? Woman-man equality in the Islamic Tradition, WLUML Dossier, 5–6 December 1988/May 1989, p. 4; Aysha Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qurʾan, 2014; Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam, 1991; Ziba Mir Hosseini, Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism, Critical Inquiry 32:1 (2006), pp. 629–646; Saʾdiyya Shaikh, Transforming Feminisms: Islam, Women and Gender Justice, in: Omid Safi (ed.), Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism, 2003, pp. 147–162; Ali (n 6).

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consistent sense that vulnerable people would get protection through sharīʿa as “guarantor of justice”.42 It is reasonable to say that the above quoted verses entail a Qurʾānically enshrined understanding of equality – an equality despite or in the face of lack of formal equality in other parts of life, to which I will turn soon. It is these verses that any reformer, modernist, progressive, conservative (or whatever label is in use) would turn to first. Crucially, it is justice and dignity,43 not equality that serves as their grand narrative, which corresponds to questions not of formal but substantive equality as discussed in this paper. It is fair to say that these and the list of similar Qurʾānic verses do not per se and not automatically translate into an understanding of equality in a legal sense, i. e. one of rights and obligations enforceable before courts, or even enshrined in today’s statutory laws. In fact, in many cases it seems difficult to discern the historic link between the Qurʾān, the writings of the jurists, and the verdicts of the judges. Clearly, there are some Qurʾānic verses that possess the same validity and legitimacy in the eyes of the believing that entail (formal) inequality, and the question is how to deal with these. When reading the Qurʾān, we do find verses that distinguish between men and women, Muslim and non-Muslim, free and slave.44 The distinction can turn into discrimination against women, non-Muslims and slaves, i. e. different treatment of people because of certain characteristics tied to a person which cannot simply be stripped of. Here, too, interpretations of the biological nature could turn into legal disadvantage and status could determine law. Formal equality is undermined by referring to verses and many jurisprudential rulings, such as those covering inheritance, testimony, marriage and divorce, which accord men more rights or recognition than women. It is in particular six verses (out of a total of 6.660) in the Qurʾān that position male authority over female authority, namely verses 2:221; 2:228; 4:3; 4:34 and 24:30. Generally speaking, jurists did not need to resort to scriptural text to “find” or “discover” rules. Rather, more often than not, they relied on implicit naturalistic presumptions about human nature and the social good to justify a particular right and its distribution.45 The distinction between the pledge of justice that all reward and punishment will be without discrimination and the unequal legal situation especially of women has not gone without theory by Muslim jurists.

42  See e. g. Ali (n 32), p. 189. 43  Ali (n 32), p. 189, with no further explanation on the link between justice and dignity; Kamali (n 39), p. 62, refers equality back to dignity, also with no further explanation. 44  For an overview see Kamali (n 39), pp. 47–102. 45  Anver Emon, A  Legal Heuristic for a Natural Rights Regime, Islamic Law and Society 13:3 (2006), pp. 325–391, p. 328; Ali (n 32), p. 189.



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II.  Equality as Mirrored in the Theory of “Rights of God” (public law) and “Rights of Humans” (private law)? This collision of absolute equality before God and restricted equality, or inequality in human interaction, is one that has been discussed as the heuristic distinction of “rights of God” (ḥuqūq Allāh) and the “rights of humans” (ḥuqūq al-ʿibād). Much of this has been rephrased by modern scholarship as a publicprivate divide in which a different set of rights reign.46 In what follows, I will first illustrate the understandings of equality as in equal treatment in the public and private spheres of Islamic law, and then further the debate by probing the formal and substantive dimensions of equality. The term ḥaqq (sing of ḥuqūq) signifies both an obligation on one person and a claim of right on another. Muslim jurists used “rights of God” to refer to the wellbeing of society, as something that the ruler must uphold in light of his sovereignty over society, hence “public law”. In light of this juristic usage, the phrase “rights of God” is used here as a term of art to represent the social good that must be effectuated by the authority.47 This social good involves formal equality in that all, or at least all Muslims, are treated equally according to Islamic law in the public sphere. This public sphere of rights involves the following: the establishment of worship (ʿibadāt), punishment for adultery (zinā) and false accusation of adultery (qadhf ), punishment for theft, highway robbery, and drinking intoxicating beverages, and they involve the duty of paying the alms-tax (zakāt) as well as the duty of paying land tax (kharāj). These duties and punishments are meant to protect social order by guarding organized religion, family, property, and the redistribution of wealth through a social welfare system. These rights of God show a pattern of equality in beliefs and rituals, in criminal responsibility, and all obligations concerning wealth.48 All Muslims of age were equal subjects of the law, they were equal before God, equally protected and obliged by these rights, 46  See e. g. Baber Johansen, Sacred and Religious Element in Hanafite Law. Function and Limits of the Absolute Character of Government Authority, in: Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh, 1999, pp. 189–218; idem, Zum Prozessrecht der ʿuqubāt, in: Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh, 1999, pp. 421–433; idem, Der ʿiṣma-Begriff im hanafitischen Recht, in: Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh, 1999, pp. 238–262; idem, Staat, Recht und Religion im sunnitischen Islam, 1986; Bernard G. Weiss, Spirit of Islamic Law, 1998, pp. 181–184; Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal before Allah, Unequal before Man, 2000; Emon (n 45); Nahed Samour, The Principle of Just Exchange in the Private and Public Spheres of Islamic Law: the consequences of the construction of property and proprietor for the Hanafi woman, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2002), pp. 85–114; Mohsen Kadivar, An Introduction to the Public and Private Debate in Islam, Social Research 70:3 (Fall 2003), pp. 659–680. 47  Emon (n 45), p. 329; Samour (n 46), p. 86; The translation of “ḥuqūq Allāh” as rights of God seems inappropriate. Theologically, God does not need to have rights and is free from any need. 48  Samour (n 46), p. 92.

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while non-Muslims did not fall under these rules in the first place and needed to follow the rules established by their own beliefs as long as they did not publically contradict Islamic rules (i. e. they could drink alcoholic beverages but not in public). So huqūq Allah were upheld for and against all Muslim individuals by the state, they were considered the interest of all Muslims (kaffāt al-muslimin)49 and in this sense represented “public law”.50 In this sphere, one could argue that formal equality was a recognized principle, though not explicitly discussed as such. On the other hand, with “private rights” (the ḥuqūq al-ʿibād), only the request of a private party with a legal claim could justify the political authorities or the judiciary to interfere. For these ḥuqūq al-ʿibād, justice is to be served through the initiative of private persons, and the key format is the contract.51 For those who argue that these are private rights, they do so because these rights are constituted through contracts, such as in the case of marriage, divorce, inheritance, but also financial compensation in case of bodily harm. In many juristic elaborations of classical Islamic law the mercantilistic language of jurists was applied to contracts that do not trade goods but put humans into a contractual relationship with each other, through the principle of just exchange (mumāthala).52 It is in the realm of “private law” that (in-)equality becomes particularly crucial. Women were granted the right to hold property in their own right and neither the father nor a male relative nor the husband had the right to consume her property. The Qurʾān states: “To men is allotted what they earn, and to woman what they earn” (Qurʾān 4:32). Jurists unanimously asserted that the woman’s right to property is absolute, regardless of whether she might have acquired it from her efforts, inherited it or whether it was given to her as a gift, or a dower (the bridal gift, Arabic mahr). In commercial operations involving men and women the principle of just exchange was perfectly equal. In other private legal relations exchange might have been considered just but not formally equal. Men’s and women’s legal capacities can be centrally distinguished between commercial and social exchange.53 In commercial exchange, men and women are equal, but in social exchange  – the area where scholar of Islamic law Baber Johansen places marriage – they are differentiated. Johansen points to the disjunction between the equality of (free) men and women in commercial transactions and their inequality in transactions associated with marriage. Men 49  Samour (n 46), p. 87. 50  Johansen, Sacred and Religious Element in Hanafite Law (n 46), pp. 200, 210–216, with reference to Sarākhsī and Kasānī. See also Samour (n 46), p. 87. 51  Samour (n 46), p. 93. 52  Samour (n 46), p. 93; Muslim jurists developed the idea of just exchange for these contracts (al-mithl, or mumāthala). 53  Baber Johansen, Commercial Exchange and Social Order in Hanafite Law, in: Christopher Toll/​Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Law and the Islamic World: Past and Present, 1995, p. 82.



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and women may be equally fit to be commercial property holders, but husbands and wives are not equal with regard to the “property of marriage.”54 It is in these private rights that matters of distinction or difference, particularly between men and women in contractual relations, come up, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, polygamy, guardianship, and witnessing. These distinctions have, in some parts of the world until today, served to “honor and protect” women (e. g. from harm or poverty), but there was no pretense that they serve the cause of equality.55 It is important to note that, unlike in Western jurisprudence where equality scholars have had to hunt down hidden forms of discrimination in a legal system that lays claim to all individuals equally, the Islamic legal system has recognized and justified this differential treatment of women and men or that of Muslims and non-Muslims.56 This differential, non-equal treatment needs to be contrasted with “public” matters in which Islamic law gives men and women full equality, including the right to life, ritual obligations, and religious rewards, and competence in economic transaction. Islamic legal scholars such as Shaheen Sardar Ali and Kecia Ali have shown how the unequal law is part of an expert scholarly discourse concerned with legal methodological consistency and with winning arguments with jurists of opposing doctrines.57 Kecial Ali has demonstrated how legal pronouncements about marriage and women emerged less from “unremitting chauvinism” than from a larger set of preceding methodological commitments that had little to do with gender.58 Some had to do with Muslim jurists’ directing private into contractual relationships59 and with Islamic juristic thought turning from formal to formalistic in establishing and maintaining a legal order.60 How to treat this discrepancy that equality is operationalized in the public sphere but not in the private sphere? Is equality considered a public and ethical, yet not a private and legal question? Kecia Ali is skeptical whether this is merely a conflict between ethical and legal elements of jurists’ writings, with a triumph of the latter over the former: “To read the texts as the victory of the doctrinal over the ethical, enforcement over exhortation, pragmatism over the ideal, is to impose an inappropriate categorization on them: 54  Ali (n 32), p. 173. 55  Tucker (n 35), p. 27. 56  Tucker (n 35), p. 27. Indeed many of the recent reform efforts focus on aspects of such legal discrimination, seeking adjustment and ameliorations that could soften or eliminate differential treatment. 57  Ali (n 46); Ali (n 32), p. 191. 58  Ali (n 32), p. 191. 59  Samour (n 46), pp. 85–114. 60  Nahed Samour, Al-Shāfiʿī und Kelsen: Bestimmtheit, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Fehler(bewusstsein) in der formalen Rechtsordnung, in: Annett Warner/​Guido Pfeifer/​Dalia Bawanypeck (eds.), Die Normativität formaler Ordnungen und Prozeduren in der Antike – Mathematische und rechtliche Regelsysteme im Vergleich, forthcoming 2020.

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these texts always present an ideal, even if it is one that notices and attempts to account for the human propensity to flout divine guidance and worldly authority. Jurisprudence is irreducible to law plus ethics; the two cannot be disentangled.”61

She insists that they present an ideal, or rather a series of interlinked ideals, sometimes in tension or outright conflict with one another, with consequences for the practice of law and adjudication as well as for the guidance of the believer.62 The discussion on equality in Islamic law seems entrapped between public and private, between legal and ethical. Summarized as “equal before God, unequal before man” (Shaheen Sardar Ali), dissonances in what became an Islamic legal system are apparent. Historical and jurisprudential explanations bring closer the debate among historical contemporaries, but tensions persist.

III.  (Formal) Equality not as an Absolute Principle Instead of evoking the law-or-ethics question, scholar of Islamic legal thought Sherman Jackson expresses doubt about invoking formal equality as an “absolute, first-order principle” in the first place.63 He argues that human beings want first and foremost to be treated not equally but justly “whereby the human self can be actualized without having to seek validation or permission from universalizing subjectivities that set themselves up as objective criteria.”64 Jackson sees a risk in universalizing or standardizing equality, namely the risk of potentially denying the requested benefit to all rather than extending the benefit to the excluded group, a mechanism also known as “levelling down”, a “race to the bottom” that “equally” denies rights to all. Instead of equality, he argues, the status of a key principle in Islam is classically reserved to the so-called “five compelling interests” (al-darūrāt al-khamsa), i. e. preservation of life (ḥifz al-nafs), preservation of religion (ḥifz al-dīn), preservation of property (ḥifz al-māl), preservation of sanity (ḥifz al-ʿaql) and, as some jurists would add, the preservation of dignity (ḥifz al-ʿird).65 Equality, so Sherman Jackson, needs to be seen as serving the promotion and preservation of these interests. Equality, he cautions, is not an end in and of itself. And in this capacity, it would become clear that Islam may occasionally require that people be treated formally unequally in order to keep up these “compelling five interests”.66 Prophet Mohammad serves as an example of not treating people formally 61  Ali (n 32), p. 190. 62 Ibid. 63  Jackson (n 2), p. 407, takes on (formal) equality in discussing affirmative action in the USA. 64  Jackson (n 2), p. 423, speaks of equality without distinguishing between formal and substantive. It becomes clear in his statements that his critique is geared towards formal equality. 65  More on the five compelling interests, see Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, 1996, pp. 59–62, esp. p. 60; idem (n 2), p. 424. 66  Jackson (n 2), p. 424.



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equal. Two prominent historic incidents are referred to. In the Battle of Hunayn, (8/629) following the surrender of Mecca, he rewards one party for a deed while another receives nothing for the same act. Non-Muslims and newly converted Muslims were generously treated to the spoils of the Battle, while the Helpers (ansār, earliest Muslims) who had sacrificed life, limb and property for the entire of the Prophet’s stay in Medina received nothing. The compelling interest for dividing the spoils differently was arguably the preservation of religion: By treating these new and non-Muslims (all of whom presented the old Meccan nobility) with favor, the Prophet was seeking to open up space so that they could embrace Islam as their own, as opposed to resenting Islam as a capitulation.67 Arguably, embracing people into their new community and levelling up their status to help allow them to be seen as equals by the rest of the religious community is one way of reading the action of the Prophet. For nineteenth century Muslim reformist and scholar Muhammad ʿAbduh this verse contained a strong denunciation of pre-Islamic tribalism (al-ʿasabiyya),68 i. e. divisiveness and sectarianism. By treating one (new) group different from the other (old) group, the aim was to not to put the old group at a disadvantage or demean them but to attain religious and social cohesion for the entire Meccan community. Another prominent historic incident demonstrates that one party is pardoned for a certain violation while another is instantly punished: In the notorious Affair of the Lie (Khabar al-ifk) enemies of the Prophet slandered the Prophet’s wife ʿAysha as having committed fornication. All of the culprits were later on punished except for Abdallah b.ʿUbayy. Given the subversive stance and personal opposition of Abdallah b. ʿUbayy to the Prophet, to punish him would have run the risk of being seen as carrying out an act of personal vengeance.69 As a prophet, avoiding this overlap outweighed any earthly punishment to be meted out to Abdallah b. ʿUbayy. Arguably, the preservation of religion, or life, would make it necessary to not allow for any conflation of criminal penalty and personal vengeance. While one could discuss if or how these Prophetic policies (that can turn into legal precedent) suit the five compelling interests, it becomes 67  Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1352), Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿazīm, (2002), 3:134. Ibn Kathir points to the dangers of potential fractiousness and seditious elements to stir up enmity; Jackson (n 2), p. 424. 68  Muhammad ʿAbduh, Tafsīr al-Manār, (1931) 4:21. Writing at the late 19th century, ʿAbduh compared pre-Islamic tribalism with European nationalism which Westernized Muslims wrongfully imitated and which risked the well-being and welfare of all people, regardless of their religion or ethnicity. 69  Jackson (n 2), p. 425. The khabar al ifk is one of a number of long and complex narratives on the life of Prophet Muḥammad going back to ʿUrwa b. al-Zubayr, Ibn Isḥāq’s work is only accessible though later recensions by, e. g., Ibn Hishām (d. 218/833). See Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra l-nabawiyya, 2001, pp. 674 ff; William Montgomery Watt, ʿAʾisha bint Abī Bakr, Encyclopedia of Islam 2, 2012 online; Denise A. Spellberg, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past. The Legacy of ʿAʾisha bint Abi Bakr, 1994, pp. 61 ff. For an English language version of the chains of narration and Ibn Isḥāq’s subsequently constructed report of the incident see Alfred Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, 1978, p. 494.

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evident that formal equality is not an end in and of itself but might well become secondary if central higher ends need to be met. Equality becomes one among a number of competing principles and interests, not an absolute principle in itself. This rationale can be found in contemporary Islamic law, albeit not discussed under the title of equality. In a renowned treatise on Islamic law by Nigerian Muslim scholar Al-Kishnāwī (d. 1397/ 1977), following the Mālikī school of thought (for whom the custom of Medina and Mecca play a prominent role), we can read the following example of why applying formal equality would be misleading: “If one who is needy and compelled by hunger happens upon the provisions of one who is well to do and the latter refuses to sell or donate some of these provisions to him, the needy one should simply take it. And for this he will not be held liable. Shayk al-Dardīrʾ[adds]:70 ‘The poor one should go even as far as to fight the owner for a share of these provisions, after serving the latter notice that he is poor and in need. And should this fighting result in the death of the owner, the poor one should not be held liable under the rules of intentional homicide. If, on the other hand, the owner ends up killing the poor one, he would be liable under the law of intentional homicide.’”71

The two individuals are not to be treated equally. The poor and the well-off do not share the same status, and to treat them equally would mean to treat them unjustly. Consistency in treatment of two individuals who appear alike but in fact differ in term of access to power, opportunities or material benefits results in unequal results, as the elaborations of jurist al-Kishnāwī indicate. For Sherman Jackson, the application of equality would be both “false and irrelevant”.72 While this quotation contains no elaboration on equality as such, it emerges that an uncritical application of formal equality would maintain the status quo among parties who already do not enjoy parity with each other. In fact, applying formal equality where statuses are unequal would only entrench the inequality vis-à-vis each other. Relying on formal equality would sustain the unequal status quo and is therefore counterproductive, as it does not transform the status quo towards a more equal, or rather just, situation. Formal equality proves inadequate to accommodate the circumstances of the poor or the otherwise disadvantaged. This is why formal equality is not suited to be regarded as an “absolute, first-order principle”.73 70  Abū al-Barakāt Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dardīr (d. 1204/1786), prominent jurist of Mālikī school, amongst his most renowned works is Sharh al-Kabir (“The Great Commentary”), itself a commmentary on Khalil’s Mukhtasar; Mukhtasar Khalil. Mukhtasar al-Allama Khalil fi Fiqh al-Imami Malik, a book of fiqh by Sheikh Khalil ibn Ishaq ibn Musa ibn Shuʾaib al-Maʾruf bi al-Jundiyyi (Khalil). 71  Abū Bakr al-Kishnāwī, Ashal al-madārik sharḥ irshād al-ṣālik fī fiqh imam al-aʾimmah mālik, 3 vols, 2:63 (Isā al-Ḥalabī, n. d.), as translated by Jackson (n 2), p. 425. 72  Jackson (n 2), p. 425. 73  Ibid, p. 426.



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Neither the early Islamic source material nor modern scholars of Islamic law have made use of the distinction between formal and substantive. As shown here, premodern sources do not use the term equality either. Yet, examples like the above make it clear that there was a certain understanding of both equality as fairness or justice, as well as the distinction between formal (by way of comparison) and substantive (towards a just end). Sherman Jackson, without using these terms, in substance discusses the differentiation, albeit as a question of justice, not of equality. This way, he links equality to justice: “The problem arises, however, upon the failure to distinguish between two types or levels of justice. The first type, formal justice, or what we might call abstract or decontextualized justice, is roughly synonymous with equality. The second type, concrete or contextualized justice, is best understood by comparison with its opposite, with its opposite, i. e. injustice or what the Qurʾān refers to as ‘zulm’. Though commonly translated as ‘injustice’, zulm is formally defined as ‘putting a thing out of its proper place’ (wad ʿ al-shay fī ghayr mawdiʿih), as renowned lexicographic dictionaries would have it.”74

For Jackson “the essential difference between formal and concrete (‘substantive’, I would say) justice is that the former assumes an abstract or ideal context, the latter assumes a context in which other factors and principles compete for consideration.”75 To invoke formal equality in circumstance in which not all relevant factors (such as status, gender, religion, race, and relevant others) are considered will actually result in the commission of injustice, or zulm, i. e. “putting a thing out of its proper place”. Concrete justice, as the opposite of injustice (zulm), can be defined as “putting a thing in its proper place”. In stressing context and requesting the concrete, not abstract setting, Jackson’s interpretation of Islamic law comes close to the social context necessitated for substantive equality as put forth by Martha Fineman76 and Sandra Fredman77. What emerges is that treating people in a formally equal way might not be the answer in light of social dependencies and social context.78 These scholars see the need to go beyond formal equality and develop a substantive equality that is located in the social context. This is why Fredman calls for a substantive quality concept that is responsive to those that are disadvantaged, demeaned, excluded or ignored, by addressing disadvantage and accommodating difference.79 74  See e. g. Abū Naṣr Ismā ʿīl ibn Ḥammād al-Fārābī al-Jawharī (d. 400/1009), Tāj al-lughah wa-ṣiḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyyah, (1983), 5:1977; Ibn Manzūr (d. 712/1312), Lisān al-ʿarab, (1955), 4:2756, cited by Jackson (n 2), p. 427. 75  Jackson (n 2), p. 427. 76  Fineman (n 27), p. 13. 77  Fredman (n 8), p. 713. 78  Martha Albertson Fineman/​A nna Grear, Introduction: Vulnerability as Heuristic – An Invitation to Future Exploration, 2016, p. 1. 79  Fredman (n 8), p. 713.

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IV.  Substantive Equality and Vulnerability in Islamic Law A comparison on equality between Islamic law and any other system that stops at formal equality, would at best have to conclude that there is equality in the public but not the private sphere of Islamic law and at worst that there is no equality at all. However, I suggest to explore the meaning of substantive equality in Islamic law by drawing on the concept of vulnerability for Islamic law. Vulnerability is located in members of society who need extra forms of protection,80 otherwise called “groups at risk”. It can underline inequality as embodied in the conditions of that individual pertaining to a group. Vulnerability can highlight social dependencies in a way in which formal equality will just not suffice to do justice.81 While Islamic law does not know the term vulnerability, Islamic legal texts have an astute understanding for vulnerable members of society who require extra forms of protection. There is a variety of forms of vulnerability recognized by the Qurʾānic text. The Qurʾān enumerates who enjoins special care, repeatedly confirming their rights and warning whoever forfeits those rights. Of these are the elderly (of the fathers, mothers and further kin), the poor, the needy, orphans, the traveler, slaves.82 The following is a conclusive verse in this respect: “Righteousness is not that you turn your faces towards East or West; but righteousness is to believe in God, and the Last Day, and the angels, and the Book, and the Messengers, to spend of your wealth, though loved. For your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the traveler, for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayer, and practice regular charity, to fulfil the contracts which you have made; and to be firm and patient, in pain [or suffering] and adversity, and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the people of truth, the God-fearing and pious” (Qurʾān al-Baqarah 2:177).

Muhammad Jabri, renowned Moroccan scholar of philosophy and Islamic thought discusses this verse as entailing the “rights of the oppressed”.83 He firstly points out that this verse is not addressed to Muslims only but is meant to be understood universally (among the monotheistic religions), as the verse addresses Jews who face Jerusalem (to the West relative of the Arabian peninsula, the Hijaz) and the Christians, who face the East. He stresses that righteousness is not limited to worship and prayer but that recognizing the “rights of the oppressed”, or vulnerable, also counts as duty. Second, the verse couples the belief in God with the giving of money – something I will later elaborate on as recognition and redistribution. For Jabri, this stresses the importance of the “rights of the oppressed” and puts them on a par with the rights of God, namely worship. Third, 80  Fineman/​Grear (n 78), pp. 1–13. 81  Fineman/​Grear (n 78), p. 1. 82  Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought, 2009, p. 241. Jabri adds to them also prisoners (of war), though without further elaboration. 83 Ibid.



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Jabri explains that the verse specifies that payment of money to the “oppressed” is not limited to the obligatory alms tax (al-zakāt). One could conclude, then, that this verse constitutes a “particular” right that goes beyond the “general” duty of taxation. Fourth, Jabri affirms that the verse makes obligatory the payment of money to the oppressed as a central principle of Islam, and thus “raises the observance of the rights of the oppressed to the level of a religious duty”.84 To address the “rights of the oppressed” thus becomes a central concern in the Islamic taxation system.85 After these principal remarks, he discusses the groups listed in the Qurʾān: The “oppressed”, or vulnerable, in the verse are first the needy of the kin. In following the principle of subsidiary, the Qurʾān requires the believer to first maintain financial needs of family members. Then come the orphans whose parents did not leave them enough to fulfil their needs, then the needy (who are not part of the family) who do not have enough to live on. These are timeless, possibly universal groups that need additional forms of protection and financial care. Muḥammad Jabri argues in favor of a modern understanding of the needy as in the ‘unemployed’ who cannot find work and stresses the necessity to help make a living for these persons and their families. The traveler is the person who lost her or his way and, to Jabri, may be compared with the “political refugee” in the modern sense. Those who beg are the needy who ask for alms, either because they are poor or due to an emergency. The ransomed are the slaves to be liberated through buying them from their masters.86 The listing of groups is open-ended, as indicated by the words “for those who ask”. Arguably, the Qurʾān mentions categories of vulnerability by recognizing the groups whose situations warrant special protection. In several other verses, it is being repeated that some groups are considered as in need of additional attention and that their needs are to be financially addressed by the “state treasury”. For example, according to Qurʾān al-Anfāl 8:41, onefifth of booty obtained during war is to be divided between God, His Messenger, (his) relatives (dhū al-qurbā), orphans, the poor, and travelers (ibn al-sabīl). 84  Jabri (n 82), p. 241. Jabri quotes also Qurʾān: “And in their wealth and possessions is the right of the [needy] who beg and for the deprived” (Qurʾān al-Thairiyāt 51:19). 85  Jabri (n 82), pp. 243–249. 86  Jabri (n 82), p. 242. The enslaved, their condition and their treatment by Muslims were of grave concern to Muslims, instigating chapters such as “On the Rights of Slaves”, Sunan Abi Dawud, Book of General Behavior (Kitāb al-Adab), chapter 134, Sunan Abi Dawud 5156. Narrated by Alī ibn Abī Tālib; in:-book reference, Book 43, Hadith 384, English trans. Book 42, Hadith 5137, URL = , accessed on 14 July 2017. Despite Prophetic warnings not to violate the rights of slaves and the Prophetic advice that freeing slaves is recommendable, Bernard K. Freamon, Possessed by the Right Hand: The Problem of Slavery in Islamic Law and Muslim Cultures, 2019, p. 1 rightly states that “Muslims have not lived up to this admonition, both in the law as they have understood it to be applicable to them and in practice.”

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The list is not fully congruent with the first Qurʾānic passage quoted, and yet what emerges is that orphans, the poor, travelers are vulnerable because their situation forces them to a particularly dire life experience, and yet lack power to make themselves heard so that their interests and rights could easily be overlooked. Their vulnerability lays in the concrete experiences of a particular group (even if temporarily, such as the traveler, re-conceptualized as refugee). Simultaneously, vulnerability places the needs of individual assistance in an interplay with community protection – and thus puts the burden of remedying the situation of the vulnerable on the community. Spread all over the Qurʾān are those verses that recognize another vulnerable group: mothers who through reproduction differ from the strictly male experience and norm. Islamic law is conscious about pregnancy, childbirth and nurturing, and recognizes the particular reproductive contributions of women by requiring fathers as husbands to financially compensate the mothers for their work in childcare and household by way of personal maintenance, wages for nursing and full child support.87 Here it is fair to argue that mothers’ experience is not denied by Islamic law and does not go unnoticed by Islamic financial redistribution.88 Social historian Judith Tucker also raises attention to the fate of divorcées and testifies that jurists were also “attuned to specifically female vulnerabilities”89, discoursing at length on the divorcée’s rights and holding the courts responsible for insuring that women and their children received their due. One could speak of female divorcées as a vulnerable group, at least one whose Qurʾānically prescribed share had to be vigilantly guarded by the community and its courts. In elaborating on the remedies sought for the vulnerable, recognition and redistribution as terms of substantive equality emerge.90 Recognition and redistribution are generally studied as the terms of a liberal-Western tradition in discussing the normative claims of (in)justice.91 Can these terms be made useful for understanding substantive equality in Islamic law? Islamic law shows an understanding of some members of society needing particular protection due to their position in society. Strikingly, in not denying 87  See for instance the legal discussion on nursing as legal requirement, reflecting also on questions of class, as well as the father’s legal obligation to financially remunerate the mother for nursing, Tucker (n 35), p. 55. More generally with a view to the Ottoman-Arab lived reality, see Tucker (n 35), p. 220. 88  Tucker (n 35), p. 220 points this out in contradistinction to the masculine bias of a legal system founded on the notion of an autonomous individual, see Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, Wisconsin Women’s Law Journal (1987), pp. 81–145. 89  Tucker (n 35), p. 220. 90  Fredman (n 8), p. 732. 91  See e. g. Nancy Fraser/​A lex Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, A  Political-philosophical Exchange, 2003.



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some people’s dire structural experiences, i. e. vulnerabilities, Islamic law recognizes these groups, such as orphans, the poor, travelers and mothers. The list of groups is open-ended. Qurʾānic verses that call for recognizing the mentioned groups and demand to ameliorate their situation literally call for financial or economic means. This recognition is connected to redistribution; both are elevated to a religious duty.92 Recognition is not separated from redistribution.93 While much in European liberal thought has posited recognition and redistribution as distinct, often even as antithesis, more recent scholarship has come to see that “[n]either redistribution alone nor recognition alone can suffice to overcome injustice today.”94 While their contours are and must be debatable, redistribution to groups and individuals in society is a concern of both social inclusion as well as equality.95 Western liberal thought and Islamic legal thought, as demonstrated in the examples above, seem to converge on the idea of social cohesion so that people are “less likely to become alienated from the community and will conform to its social rules and laws.”96

V.  Orphans: Recognizing vulnerability and substantive equality, while no formal equality Before concluding, I  need to complicate the equality question one more time by discussing a particularly venerated vulnerable group in Islam, orphans. This exemplary vulnerable group is interesting because it is here one can demonstrate how an Islamic legal approach recognizes vulnerability and substantive equality while granting no formal equality. Growing up without either or neither father or/and mother (as experienced by Prophet Muhammad, which explains why orphans play an elevated role in Islamic law and ethics) puts the young in a structural potential of injury. In that sense, the example of orphans is similar to that of minors97 as both are categorically in a situation that can be abused. Both are psychologically and physically prone to injury and their relatively low power to act is structurally conditioned. Recognizing these structural conditions necessitates additional 92 Similarly Jabri (n 82), p. 242. 93  Jabri refers to additional Qurʾānic verses such as “And those in whose wealth is a recognized right for the needy and the deprived” (Qurʾān al-Maʿārij 70:24–25) to stress redistribution as religious duty. Fraser/​Honneth (n 91), pp. 36–37. 94  Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation, in: Fraser/​Honneth (n 91), p. 9. Fraser goes on to explain the liberal provenance of redistribution and the Hegelian philosophy behind the term “recognition”, pp. 9–11. Her work elaborates why these are not “false antitheses”. 95  Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, 66 The Modern Law Review (2003), pp. 16–42, p. 24. 96 Ibid. 97  D. P. & J. C. vs United Kingdom, ECtHR 10 January 2003, 38719/97.

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protection beyond the individual help to reduce the risks of abuse. In light of these vulnerabilities the Qurʾān (al-Nisāʾ 4:2) warns: “To orphans restore their property; nor substitute [your] worthless things for [their] good ones; and do not devour their substance [by mixing it up] with your own, for this is indeed a great injustice.”

The Qurʾān orders the guardians of orphans to be fair and just in handling their property.98 Usurping the orphan’s property would be a great violation, and again financial and economic aspects are addressed here first. But the Qurʾān does not stop here: “But if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, then marry women of your choice, two or three or four, but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly [with them] then only one.” (Qurʾān al-Nisāʾ 4:3)

The Qurʾān connects the property of orphans with polygamy as one way of protecting the female orphan and her property.99 Considering orphans a vulnerable group, Muslim feminist scholars such as Amina Wadud and Amina Barlas argue that the aim of the Qurʾān was to ensure justice for female orphans.100 They read this verse as addressing a way to prevent the exploitation of female orphans who have come of age.101 In this verse, the status of orphans and gender is intersected and allows for a double sensitivity, making visible vulnerabilities through what we today would call intersectionality. Qurʾānic exegesis that engages the question on why the verse was revealed (asbāb al-nuzūl) highlights the historical context of the vulnerability of female orphans: The entire Qurʾānic section on Women (Surat al-Nisāʾ) was revealed right after the Muslim defeat of the Battle of Uhud (3/625) which resulted in a large number of orphans and widows.102 Recognizing their disadvantaged life experience and allowing for redistribution through polygamy was one answer given to alleviate their economic situation, include female orphans of age into society via marriage and allow for some sort of social cohesion. For feminist scholars such as Amina Wadud und Amina Barlas this verse is not a general authorization for polygamy103, but a direct response to military violence.

98  Jabri (n 82), p. 236. 99 Ibid. 100  Wadud (n 41), p. 83; Barlas (n 41), p. 191. 101  Wadud (n 41), p. 83. 102  See also Amira E. Sonbol, Rethinking Women and Islam, in: Yvonne E. Haddad/​John L. Esposito (eds.), Daughters of Abraham: Feminist Thought in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 2001. 103  Wadud (n 41), p. 83; Barlas (n 41), p. 191, strictly speaking polygyny in which only men can have multiple partners.



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D.  Conclusion: Why this matters – Comparative Law and Violence This contribution is one of the first attempts to probe the distinction of formal and substantive equality for Islamic law. The European liberal contingency of this distinction proved both problematic as well as productive in discussing Islamic law. From a comparative legal perspective, a comparison between Islamic law and any other system that would have stopped at formal equality would have had to concede that there is no equality in Islamic law. Without further exploring the potentials of substantive equality, or rather justice, in Islamic law, this distorted comparison has far-ranging consequences, far beyond the academic discourse. It is especially discourse on gender inequality, or more recently inequality regarding sexual orientation in Muslim societies, that has publically played a part in mobilizing for military invasions or repressive laws against Muslims.104 Islamic law is too easily seen as causing the wide-ranging and systematic inequalities we do indeed see in many Muslim societies, while too often pertinent economic questions on a global scale are left barely answered. Political theorist Wendy Brown therefore is skeptical of a discourse that evokes equality. If equality (and tolerance) today are “considered synonymous with the West, with liberal democracy, with Enlightenment, and with modernity, then tolerance [and equality] is what distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘them’.”105 With respect to intolerance and inequality she warns that they have become code words “not merely for bigotry or investments in whiteness but for a fundamentalism identified with the non-West, with barbarism, and with anti-Western violence”.106 “There is no innocence in comparison”107 is therefore a suitable reminder that in any legal order the potential for injustice is a given, with inequality always being a question of implicitly or explicitly negotiating power and societal rank.108

104  See e. g. Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?, 2013; Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, 2007; see also the French government in arguing for a burqa ban based on the argument of “gender inequality”, S. A.S v. France, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 1 July 2014. 105  Brown (n 10), p. 17, explicitly with respect to tolerance. 106 Similarly Brown (n 10), with respect to tolerance, p. 15. 107  Günter Frankenberg, Innocence in Context  – Comparative Law Revisited, in: Dieter Grimm/​​A lexandra Kemmerer/​Christoph Möllers (eds.), Rechtswege, Kontextsensible Rechtswissenschaft vor der transnationalen Herausforderung, 2015, pp. 143–166. 108  Uwe Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung, 2015, p. 722, sec. 85.

Between marriage and punishment A triple heritage of regulating homosexuality in Africa John Osogo Ambani* A.  Introduction and context The profile of sexual orientation in Africa has not been constant at all times. This fluctuation is a result of the convoluted journey most of Africa’s socio-political institutions have had to take. Prior to the coming of foreigners, Africans largely observed indigenous religious and cultural traditions. These nearly ‘pure’ societies were fundamentally altered by early visitors, imperialists and missionaries. The visitors interacted with indigenous institutions in multiple ways, thereby irrevocably distorting the continental socio-cultural landscape. At the East African coast, the Arabs and the Portuguese introduced unique civilizations which affected the local languages, cultures, political and social systems, agriculture, architecture, trade and religion.1 Writing in this context, Anthony Oliver and Anthony Atmore chronicled that the discovery of early mosques built of ancient architectural material at the East African coast signifies the presence of Arab traders in the region as early as the ninth century.2 The most lasting legacies of the Portuguese in East Africa are historical fortresses that are cultural and architectural monuments in themselves.3 Adewale Taiwo recounted similar experiences in West Africa. According to this narrative, Islam was firmly rooted in societies such as the Hausa by the fifteenth century. It is recorded that Islam walked to West Africa alongside 40 * This paper is an updated version of a paper initially published as John O Ambani, A triple heritage of sexuality? Regulation of sexual orientation in Africa in historical perspective, in: Sylvie Namwase & Adrian Jjuuko (eds.), Protecting the human rights of sexual minorities in contemporary Africa (2017). 1  See, for instance, BG Martin, Arab migrations to East Africa in medieval times (1974), 7 International Journal of African Historical Studies, p. 367. 2  Roland Oliver & Anthony Atmore, Africa since 1800 (5th ed 2005), pp. 30–31. It is also documented that “between around 700 and 1500 AD, a majority of Muslim visitors to East Africa probably concerned with some aspect of trade.” See, for instance, BG Martin (n 1), p. 375. 3  See, for instance, Stéphane Pradines, Portuguese fortresses in East Africa (2016), pp. 44 ff.

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Wangarawa traders, “and during the reign of Muhammad Rumfa between 1463 and 1499, Islam was firmly rooted in Kano.”4 On their part, the imperialists occasioned phenomenal transformation through the systematic imposition of foreign social, political and legal systems in which distinct Western values were embedded. According to Lord Fredrick Lugard, the architect of colonialism in east, west and parts of southern Africa,5 the advent of Europeans brought the mind and methods of Europe with it.6 And the revolution was a fusion of material development, education and progress.7 These outcomes were expected, given that part of the “dual mandate” pursued by British imperialism was the “civilization of natives”.8 The British imperialists were accompanied by Christian missionaries who perceived their religion and civilization as superior and thus bestowing a high responsibility upon them to “save” the native populations.9 These developments are relevant to the three countries under investigation (Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda), all of which were under British control during critical periods. The three civilizations – traditional African religion, the EuroChristian heritage and Islam – played an influential role on the continent later. Considering this background, Ali Mazrui rightly perceived contemporary Africa as the manifestation of this “trinity”. He recounted that “[t]he twentieth century witnessed the full flowering of Africa’s triple heritage (Africanity, Islam, and Westernization). This has developed into a major new paradigm for interpreting Africa – for viewing the continent as a convergence of three civilizations.”10

In the last five decades of independence, most African countries have undergone a process of internal reflection with the result that indigenous peoples have re-asserted, modified or annulled some of the values learned in the course of visitation and colonialism. With regard specifically to sexual orientation, countries like Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda appear to be reaffirming the colonial heritage and might have fared even better than their “mentors”. Others like South Africa have abandoned the colonial legacy by charting a new path. 4  Adewale Taiwo, Justifications, challenges and constitutionality of the penal aspects of Shariʾah law in Nigeria (2008), 17 Griffith Law Review, p. 185. 5  Regarding the conquest of the relevant regions of Africa, Lugard wrote: “During the first half of these thirty years, it was my privilege to assist in some degree in bringing under British control portions of Nyasaland, East Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria …” See Frederick Lugard, The dual mandate in British tropical Africa (5th ed. 1965), p. 7. 6  Frederick Lugard (n 5), p. 5. 7  Frederick Lugard (n 5), p. 5. 8  Frederick Lugard (n 5), p. 5. 9  Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Not yet Uhuru (1976), p. 42. 10  Ali Alamin Mazrui, The re-invention of Africa: Edward Said, VY Mudimbe, and beyond (2005), 36 Research in African Literatures, p. 76. See, also, Laurence Juma, Reconciling African customary law and human rights in Kenya: Making a case for institutional reformation and revitalization of customary adjudication processes (2002), 14 Saint Thomas Law Review, p. 475.



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This chapter investigates these developments. It enquires into how Africa has historically regulated homosexuality with a view to situate the “second wave of criminalizing homosexuality” into its proper context. The historical analysis also aims at discovering whether homosexual conduct is “un-African” or a western import as supporters of expanded criminalization claim. This important enquiry expends three distinct sections, each addressing a particular epoch – the pre-colonial period, the colonial era and the post-colonial phase.

B.  Regulation of homosexual conduct during the pre-colonial period As promised above, this part investigates how traditional African societies dealt with homosexuality before the advent of colonialism. A study of this kind has to reckon with a number of socio-cultural realities obtaining at the material epoch. It has, in the first place, to appreciate that regulation among Africans did not always show formal structures and procedures. Africans had their own authentic methods of operating governance and justice systems which may not always reconcile with the now dominant western approach. Although some traditional societies, such as the Wanga of Kenya, the Baganda of Uganda and the Zulu of South Africa, qualified to be called states, most others lacked a centralised political authority and functioned without codified law or regular systems of taxation.11 Instead, “[s]ocial cohesion was obtained through custom and consensus, not only within families but within clans and, as far as possible, between clans. Internally within the group there was minimal use of force and coercion, and greater reliance on traditional precedent.”12

Regulation in the traditional African sense, therefore, entailed more than just coercive laws or formal policies issuing from official governance structures. There was room for customs and related moral principles which were often exerted without police or tangible criminal sanctions. It is also important to mention that pre-colonial African systems were predominated by religion, which permeated nearly all aspects of life to the extent of making the separation of faith from action illusory. Practitioners of traditional African religion have been known to experience their faith long before birth, throughout life, and way after death. As John Mbiti ably demonstrated, “[w]here the African is, there is his religion: he carries it to the fields where he is sowing seeds or harvesting a new crop; he takes it with him to the beer party or to attend a funeral

11  Ali Alamin Mazrui, The Africans: A triple heritage (1986), p. 68. 12  Ali Alamin Mazrui (n 11), p. 69.

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ceremony; and if he is educated, he takes religion with him to the examination room at school or in the university; if he is a politician he takes it to the house of parliament.”13

Since traditional religion accompanied its subjects in virtually every undertaking, the regulation of homosexuality in pre-colonial societies requires to be examined against this backdrop, whereby “belief in the supernatural and law may be fused and mutually supportive”.14 The final rider has to do with the fact that there were close to 1000 different tribes and about 10 000 polities in Africa prior to imperialism and each had its own customs, religions and political systems.15 This rules out the possibility of a precise African conception of homosexuality. However, comparative experiences show general trends and patterns that make the enquiry amenable to a generic academic analysis. It is not controversial that heterosexual relationships leading to marriage and children were invariably cherished among African peoples.16 Marriage was understood to be a religious obligation and sacrosanct responsibility for everyone.17 Under appropriate circumstances, marriage was treated as the focal point where departed, present and future members of society met.18 In this sense, an African marriage was more than just a contract between a man and a woman; it was a social agreement between two large families,19 their ancestors and their descendants.20 Such an institution was “[t]he point of hope and expectation for the unmarried and their relatives”.21 A marriage peaked once reproduction had occurred22 and the resultant family was considered “the ‘fundamental element’ and the ‘basic sphere of action’ in African relationships.”23 Naturally, therefore, 13  John Samuel Mbiti, African religions and philosophy (1969), p. 142. 14  JW Van Doren, African tradition and western common law: A study in contradiction, in: Jackton Boma Ojwang & Jesse Ndwiga Kanyua Mugambi (eds.), The SM Otieno case: Death and burial in modern Kenya (1989), p. 128; Gunther Tessman, Homosexuality among the negroes of Cameroon and a Pangwe tale, trans B Rose, in: Stephen O Murray & Will Roscoe (eds.), Boy-wives and female-husbands: Studies in African homosexualities (1998), p. 149. 15  Martin Meredith, The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence (2006), p. 2. 16 See Marc Epprecht, “Bisexuality” and the politics of normal in African ethnography (2006), 48 Anthropologica, p. 188, where it is stated: “African societies traditionally placed an extremely high and prodigiously over-determined value on heterosexual marriage and reproduction”. See also Marc Epprecht, “Hidden” histories of African homosexualities (2005), 24(2) Canadian Woman Studies, pp. 138–139. 17  John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 148. See, also, Isaac D. Osabutey-Aguedze, The principles underlying the African religion and philosophy (1990), p. 156, where it is stated: “In Africa marriage has always been regarded as a sacred undertaking, and nowhere in the known world has the sacredness of womanhood been reversed and preserved as in that Continent.” 18  John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 148. 19  Isaac D. Osabutey-Aguedze (n 17), p. 157. According to this source, it is possible to count from at least 100 to 500 souls in an African family. 20  John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 148. 21  John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 148. 22  John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 148. 23  Laurenti Magesa, African religion: The moral traditions of abundant life (1998), p. 113.



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the family was an individual’s medium of integration into the clan and the wider society.24 Thus, a fecund marriage was an ideal aspired by virtually every right-thinking member of society. The importance placed on this aspiration was so high that “infertile women and impotent men tended to have very low, if not despised social status”.25 Invariably, impotence was considered a societal curse since, for Africans, “[i]nfertility and sterility block the channel through which the stream of life flows; they plunge the person concerned into misery, they sever him from personal immortality, and threaten the perpetuation of the lineage.”26

According to John Caldwell and Pat Caldwell, barren women would be subjected to dehumanizing treatment such as isolation so as not to contaminate others or cause the death of children, forced divorce and indecent burials.27 Low fertility was usually interpreted as evidence of sin and disapproval.28 In contrast, high fertility was not only cherished as a divine reward but also as evidence of the right behavior.29 African societies associated fertility in the marriage context with joy, the right life, divine approval, and approbation by both living and dead ancestors.30 Given the high premium placed on the fruitful marriage institution, most African societies worked towards presenting an appearance of universal conformity to a fecund heterosexual norm.31 In reality, however, this was sometimes a façade whose existence was socially protected by, what Marc Epprecht called, a “deeply embedded culture of silence” regarding the existence of alternative practices.32 For this reason, the possibility of impotence among men or homosexual preferences existing in traditional societies could hardly be admitted, except as cases of spirit possession, witchcraft or similar excuses.33 As part of this policy of silence, many African societies designed institutional mechanisms to cover up impotence and homosexuality. Among the Shona people of Zimbabwe, for instance, families would avoid the shame of a man’s inability to sire children through the customary device of kupindira.34 By op24  As above. 25  Marc Epprecht (n. 16), p. 139. 26  Benezeri Kisembo, African Christian marriage, pp. 105–106, as cited in: Laurenti Magesa (n 23), p. 134. 27  John Caldwell & Pat Caldwell, The cultural context of high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (1987), 13 Population and Development Review, p. 418. 28  John Caldwell & Pat Caldwell (n 27), p. 416. 29  John Caldwell & Pat Caldwell (n 27), p. 416. 30  John Caldwell & Pat Caldwell (n 27), p. 416. 31  Marc Epprecht, The “unsaying” of indigenous homosexualities in Zimbabwe: Mapping a blindspot in an African masculinity (1998), 24(4) Journal of Southern African Studies, p. 635. 32  As above. 33  As above. 34  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 139.

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eration of this custom, a male relative would secretly be invited to “stand in” for an impotent brother, sometimes without the knowledge of the “beneficiary”.35 By doing this, there was no need to name the husbands problematic sexuality and, therefore, the “honour” of the family could be preserved.36 In like manner, woman-to-woman marriages are renowned traditional panacea for barrenness among widows or married women.37 It is possible that such marriages acted to provide cover for lesbian sexual practices, including kissing, general touching, and even oral sex.38 The code of silence also found loud articulation in the abeyances of language.39 Most indigenous languages failed to assign specific terminology for homosexuality or related conduct arguably in the hope that the lacunae in vocabulary would remove “the problem” from sight.40 In fact, in most indigenous societies words referring to homosexuality are either non-existent or were only borrowed much later from other cultures and civilisations.41 There was also a tendency to explain the existence of same-sex conduct in Africa as a learnt habit. This method imagines a distant past of pre-colonial Africa devoid of homosexuality.42 The change being witnessed, goes this theory, was wrought by invaders, explorers and traders.43 A  most famous illustration of this method at work is the allegation that Kabaka Mwanga of the Baganda Kingdom might “have been corrupted toward bisexuality by his Muslim advisors at court”.44 Speaking of homosexuality, a proponent of this view, Apolo Kagwa, is quoted as having stated: “These Arabs introduced into our country along with numerous disorders, an abomination which we had never practised and which we had never heard spoken of.”45 Addressing his people during the commemoration of the Uganda Martyrs’ day, President Yoweri Museveni echoed the view that King Mwanga acquired homosexuality from the Arabs.46 This background of silence and escapism explains why the question whether pre-colonial African societies practiced or condoned homosexuality continues 35  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 139. 36  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 139; John Samuel Mbiti (n 13), p. 145. 37  Eugene Cotran, The law of marriage and divorce (1968), p. 117. 38  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 139. 39  Sylvia Tamale, Researching and theorising sexualities, in: Africa, in: Sylvia Tamale (ed.), African sexualities: A reader (2011), p. 13. 40  Marc Epprecht (n 31), p. 636. 41  Marc Epprecht (n 31), p. 637. 42  Stella Nyanzi, Dismantling reified African culture through localised homosexualities in Uganda (2013), Culture, health and sexuality, p. 954. 43  As above. 44  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 189. 45 See John Faupel, African holocaust: The story of the Uganda martyrs (1984), p. 18. 46 This speech is cited in Susan Dicklitch, Berwood Yost & Bryan Dougan, Building a barometer of gay rights (BGR)?: A case study of Uganda and the persecution of homosexuals (2012), 34 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 458.



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to elicit considerable debate. There are those who maintain that native traditions did not generally permit homosexual conduct. In a bid to show that African culture could not have condoned homosexuality, Laurenti Magesa wrote: “Active homosexuality is morally intolerable because it frustrates the whole purpose of sexual pleasure and that of a human person’s existence in the sight of the ancestors and God. Thus, homosexual or lesbian orientations cannot be allowed to surface, let alone be expressed actively. It is clear how such an expression would be directly antagonistic to what the ancestors and the preservation and transmission of life stand for.”47

Some proponents of this school view homosexual conduct as a “western invention” imposed upon native populations by remnants of colonizing powers.48 Being an imported concept, continental boundaries must shut it out.49 While advocating for an earlier version of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill,50 Dr James Butoro, at that time Uganda’s Minister for Ethics and Integrity, argued that homosexuality and its diagnosis are both products of the West.51 This view has, however, been contested by writers such as Scott Long who argued that “there is no reason to suppose that white colonists brought same-sex behaviour to Africa for the first time.”52 Long’s argument lends credence to the theory abundant in academic literature that homosexuality was generally tolerated, ignored, or incorporated into many societies in Africa before colonialism.53 Busangokwakhe Dlamini wrote that the existence of homosexuality in African societies is beyond doubt.54 James Sweet has written about the Kwayama, an ethnic group of planters and herders in Angola, in which male spiritual leaders cross-dressed, did women’s work, and became secondary spouses to men whose other wives were biologically female.55 An ethnographical study of the African tribes of Cameroon similarly confirmed that no tribe had punishment for homosexual conduct as no one felt harmed by it.56 Due to a combination of factors 47  Laurenti Magesa (n 23), p. 137. 48 See Adam Kretz, From “kill the gays” to “kill the gay rights movement”: The future of homosexuality legislation in Africa (2012–2013), 11 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, p. 216. 49  Courtney Finerty, Being gay in Kenya: The implications of Kenya’s new Constitution for its anti-sodomy laws (2012), 45 Cornell International Law Journal, p. 436. 50  Bill Supplement No 13, Uganda Gazette No 47, Volume CII dated 25 September 2009. 51  Dylan Harris, Death by injustice: Uganda’s anti-homosexuality laws, Christian fundamentalism, and the politics of global power (2013), 3 The Catalyst, p. 4. 52  Scott Long, Before the law: Criminalizing sexual conduct in colonial and post-colonial southern African societies. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/safrica/ (accessed 2 April 2020). 53  See, for instance, Judith Faucette, Human rights in context: The lessons of section 377 challenges for western gay rights legal reformers in the developing world (2010), 13 The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice, p. 417. 54  Busangokwakhe Dlamini, Homosexuality in the African context (2006), 67 Agenda, p. 135. 55  James Sweet, Male homosexuality and spiritism in the African Diaspora: The legacies of a link (1996), 7 Journal of the History of Sexuality, p. 191. 56  Gunther Tessman (n 15), p. 157.

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such as the scarcity of women, the early betrothal of young girls to rich and older men and high bride-prices, young and poor Azande men would seek sexual satisfaction among their age mates until they got wealthy enough to acquire a wife for themselves.57 John Faupel depicted some members of the Buganda royal family as having confessed that homosexuality was existent and tolerated before colonial rule.58 This confession is consistent with anthropological and historical literature which associate the reign of King Mwanga and Mutesa of the Baganda Kingdom with homosexuality. Faupel’s survey of the story of the Uganda martyrs concluded as follows: “Whether the Arabs were solely responsible for its introduction or not, homosexuality seems to have been rife at Mutesa’s Court … His son Mwanga was also an addict long before he succeeded to the throne.”59

To this day, there are allegations that many members of the Buganda royal family are gay.60 Ironically, Uganda’s long serving President and avid critic of homosexuality, Museveni, has on occasion acknowledged the presence of a few homosexuals in traditional societies observing that “there was no prosecution, no killings and no marginalisation of these people”.61 Sylvia Tamale corroborated this position when she wrote that “when we turn to the past, we find that, contrary to the popular belief, homosexuality in Uganda predates colonialism, and other forms of subjugation.”62 A recent survey by a human rights organization in Uganda added its voice to this debate by stating that male warriors in certain Horn of Africa communities had the moral latitude to cohabit with younger boys, usually under their mentorship.63 There are further explanations for same-sex conduct among indigenous Africans other than for sexual pleasure. Anal intercourse performed under the right conditions was used in some communities ritualistically to appease the gods to, say, increase crop harvests or protect the participants from evil spirits.64 Anal intercourse was also thought to bring greater virility in marriage. Among the Pangwe men of Cameroon, sexual conduct between men was considered “wealth medicine”.65 Same-sex relations existed in many other African societies 57  See generally, EE Evans-Pritchard, Sexual invasion among the Azande (1970). 58  Michael Hollander, Gay rights in Uganda: Seeking to overturn Uganda’s anti-sodomy laws (2009), 50(1) Virginia Journal of International Law, p. 226. 59  John Faupel (n 45), p. 18. 60  Michael Hollander (n 58), p. 226. 61 Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), Expanded criminalisation of homosexuality in Uganda: A flawed narrative (2014), p. 8. 62  Sylvia Tamale, Out of the closet: unveiling sexuality discourse in Uganda, in: Catherine Cole, Takyiwaa Manuh & Stephan Miescher (eds.) Africa after gender (2007), p. 18. 63  SMUG (n 61), pp. 7–8. 64  Marc Epprecht (n 16), p. 188. 65  Gunther Tessman (n 16), pp. 149–162. See also Laurenti Magesa (n 23), p. 137.



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including the Siwah, El Garah, Basotho, Venda, Meru, Phalaborwa, Nuer, Bantu, Lovendi,66 Langi and Teso.67 Given these contestations, a better compromise would be to make a distinction between homosexual behaviour, which is everywhere, and homosexual identity, which evolves under specific historic conditions.68 Therefore, what might have been introduced to Africa is homosexual identity which is a construct of western European culture in the late nineteenth century.69 Thus, when some Africans argue that homosexuality is un-African, they are correct in the strict sense that the idea of translating same-sex sexual acts into a sexual identity only arrived in Africa with the bourgeoisification of sexuality in Africa.70 As Thabo Msibi wrote: “African societies have never historically had a ‘gay’ identity or pathologized ‘homosexual’ category’, however, same-sex sexual attraction and expression were known to occur, but in usually hidden but sometimes even culturally accepted ways.”71

It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the high societal premium placed on fertile heterosexual marriages in most African cultures necessitated institutional support systems that sometimes went as far as concealing or suppressing the existence of barrenness or alternative sexual orientations. The presence of impotent or gay men in society was often overlooked through devices like kupindira, silences and abeyances in language. By most accounts, many African societies silently sanctioned gay conduct either for its own sake or for ritualistic purposes such as military prowess or to acquire and retain power or wealth. At the same time, there is very little evidence to support the claim that pre-colonial African societies prohibited homosexuality.72

C.  Regulation of homosexuality in the colonial era In this part, it will be demonstrated that the colonial experience shook the values and cultural institutions discussed above vigorously. The new epoch not only 66  James Wilets, From divergence to convergence? A  comparative and international law analysis of LGBTI rights in the context of race and post colonialism (2010–2011), 21 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, p. 635. 67  Sylvia Tamale (n 62), p. 18. 68  Pierre de Vos, Gay and lesbian legal theory, in: Christopher Roederer & Darrel Moellendorf (eds.), Jurisprudence (2004), p. 335. 69  Pierre De Vos (n 68), p. 334. 70  Pierre De Vos (n 68), p. 337. 71  Thabo Msibi, The lies we have been told: On (homo) sexuality in Africa (Fall 2011), 58 Africa Today, p. 55. 72  Solomon Ebobrah, Africanising human rights in the 21st century: Gay rights, African values and the dilemma of the African legislator (2012), 1 International Human Rights Law Review, p. 117.

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saw the transformation of the religious and moral traditions of native populations, it also altered the style of government and the methods of social control fundamentally. Africa would be a very different place, henceforth. British colonialism brought with it laws regulating homosexuality for the first time, as well as ways of evaluating existing African traditions on sexuality. Below, the received law in the context of regulation of homosexuality will be explained. British colonialism introduced new laws that altered the prevailing social, cultural, and political systems radically. With respect specifically to homosexuality, the colonists introduced criminal sanctions to discourage the practice. Juridical regulation of homosexuality in the Commonwealth has a history that stretches as far back as the English reformation.73 Prior to this period, in England, ecclesiastical courts determined cases related to amorous same-sex activities.74 Obviously, the basis for the crime of buggery under the ecclesiastical system was the Bible, whose dominant interpretations consider such acts both sinful and detestable.75 In the book of Genesis, God rained brimstone and fire upon the people of Sodom and Gomorrah arguably as punishment for engaging in homosexuality.76 In another context, the Bible directs men not to have sexual relations with other men as one does with a woman, warning that such conduct is detestable.77 Those who flout this command are to be put to death.78 Following the separation between the English church and Rome, ecclesiastic crimes were transferred to the jurisdiction of secular courts for the first time in 1533.79 The inaugural secular statute described the offence relating to homosexual conduct as the “detestable and abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast” and its punishment was death.80 In The King v Wiseman, the Court of Assize explained that the Italian word bugeriare, meaning unnatural sin, was adopted in the description of this offence “because of it being a vice so detestable and abominable, and against nature.”81 However, the offence was 73  The English reformation occurred during the reign of Henry VIII (1509–1547). It is important to note that “the English reformation was not a specific event which may be given a precise date: it was a long and complex process.”, see Christopher Haigh, The recent historiography of the English reformation, in: Christopher Haigh (ed.), The English reformation revised (1987), p. 1. For a fuller treatment of this subject see, also, David Newcombe, Henry VIII and the English reformation (1995). 74  For a fuller treatment of this aspect, see, section 3.2 of the Chapter 3 of this thesis. 75 As Sylvia Tamale aptly noted, ‘through religion and its proselytising activities, Africans were encouraged to reject their previous beliefs and values and to adopt the “civilised ways” of the whites. Sylvia Tamale (n 39), p. 16. 76  Genesis Chapter 19, Verse 24. 77  Leviticus Chapter 18, Verse 22. See also Romans 1: 26–28. 78  Leviticus Chapter 20, Verse 12. 79  Michael Kirby, The sodomy offence: England’s least lovely criminal law export?, in: Corinne Lennox & Matthew Waites (eds.), Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for decriminalization and change (2013), pp. 62–63. 80  Michael Kirby (n 79), pp. 62–63. 81  The King v Wiseman (16 March 4 Georgii I), paragraph 93–94.



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narrow in scope, only criminalizing male-male anal sex.82 During the reign of Mary I, the offence was yet again put under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts, a decision that was rescinded in 1563.83 About two centuries later, William Blackstone hailed the offence of buggery as one of the most precious legacies bequeathed by the common law to its people.84 The crime survived in this form in England until 1861. It is arguable that the dawn of the colonial epoch gave British authorities a chance to reevaluate the anti-buggery laws inherited from the ecclesiastical system. The strength of this argument lies in the fact that it took nearly three centuries before any meaningful changes were made to the 1533/1563 crime of buggery. Two major reasons appear to have necessitated penal reforms in the realm of sexuality at the beginning of colonialism. First, as is already apparent, morally-inspired penal laws were consistent with the colonial policy to “civilize” the conquered populations.85 Since reports which had reached Britain depicted most of its colonies including the ones in Africa as backward and prone to “barbaric” rituals like homosexuality, it was made part of the colonial scheme to change these “immoral” cultures using the tool of criminal law.86 The whole idea was to “inculcate European morality into resistant masses” since the British thought “native” cultures did not punish “perverse” sex enough.87 In their view, the “colonized needed compulsory re-education in sexual mores.”88 Second, the architects of colonialism feared that British officials deployed to execute the colonial policy in the identified territories could themselves be tempted into homosexual acts either due to loneliness or through the influence of their “backward” subjects.89 This background explains why there was renewed discussion of penal law in general and the law of buggery in particular at the commencement of the colonial epoch. Within no time more versions of anti-sodomy offences were proffered than had been attempted throughout the period since the English reformation. The first version of anti-sodomy offences was carried in the Elphinstone Code of 82  Brent Pickett, The A to Z of homosexuality (2009), p. 17. 83  Michael Kirby (n 79), pp. 62–63. 84  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England (1765–1769). http://lonang. com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-england (accessed 2 April 2020). 85  Joshua Hepple, Will sexual minorities ever be equal? The repercussions of British colonial “sodomy” laws (2012), 8 The Equal Rights Review, p. 54. 86  Joshua Hepple (n 85), p. 54. 87  Alok Gupta, The alien legacy: the origins of “sodomy” laws in British colonialism, in: Corinne Lennox & Matthew Waites (eds.), Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for decriminalization and change (2013), p. 86; Joshua Hepple (n 85), p. 54. 88  Alok Gupta (n 87), p. 86. 89  Alok Gupta (n 87), p. 94. Also, Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney, British colonialism and the criminalisation of homosexuality (2014), 27(2) Cambridge Review of International Affairs, p. 273.

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1827,90 introduced in India on 25 July 1828 by dint of the Act for Improving the Administration of Criminal Justice in the East Indies.91 This legislation stipulated: “And it be enacted, that every person convicted of the abominable crime of buggery committed with either mankind or with any animal, shall suffer death as a felon.”92

On 6 October 1860, the Governor General assented to a revised Indian Penal Code,93 the Macauley version,94 which carried the following proscription: “Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.95

The Macauley model described the homosexuality offence as “against the order of nature” signifying its heavy moral basis. However, penetration was made a critical ingredient of the crime meaning that non-penetrative sexual acts between men or between a man and an animal were not criminal. To cure this shortfall, the British subsequently96 amended the law in colonial India to accommodate the offence of “gross indecency”.97 By so doing, the scope of the Penal Code was expanded to cover sexual acts between men outside of intercourse, hence prohibiting erotic conduct between men in general.98 In the course of time, Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code “‘spread across immense tracts of the British Empire’ without debate or ‘cultural consultation’.”99 Michael Kirby has in fact rated the Indian Penal Code the most copied of all the templates.100 Like the Indian version, the Griffith Code (named after Sir Samuel Hawker Griffith, who had drafted a criminal code for Queensland in 1901) was 90  Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 65. 91  9 George IV. Cap LXXIV. 92 At LXIII. 93  The abominable crime of buggery was provided for in Section 61 of the Act. The Indian Penal Code was the first comprehensive codified criminal law in the British Empire. See, Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 273. 94  This Code was known as the Macauley Code after its author Thomas Babington Macauley. See Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 66. 95  Section 377. In 1861, Britain’s Offences against the Person Act (Act No 45 of 6 October 1860), consolidating and amending the statute law of England and Ireland relating to offences against the person, was enacted. By dint of Section 61 of this enactment, death penalty as a punishment for buggery was removed. 96  In 1885. 97  Judith Faucette (n 53), p. 416. 98  Judith Faucette (n 53), p. 416. 99  Shafiqa Ahmadi, Islam and homosexuality: Religious dogma, colonial rule, and the quest for belonging (2011–2013), 26 Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, p. 556. 100  Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 66.



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shipped to many jurisdictions101 including specifically Botswana,102 Gambia,103 Kenya,104 Malawi,105 Nigeria,106 Seychelles,107 Tanzania,108 Uganda,109 and Zambia.110 Kenya’s Penal Code,111 for example, still carries the following offence under the section “Offences against Morality”: “Any person who – (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or (b) has carnal knowledge of an animal; or (c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years: Provided that, in the case of an offence under paragraph (a), the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for twenty-one years if – (i) the offence was committed without the consent of the person who was carnally known; or (ii) the offence was committed with that person’s consent but the consent was obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of some kind, or by fear of bodily harm, or by means of false representations as to the nature of the act.”112

The other models of the offence were carried in the Fitzjames Stephen Code, based on Sir James Fitzjames’ main works, A general view of the criminal law113 and Digest of the criminal law;114 and the Wright Penal Code, drafted by British jurist RS Wright for Jamaica.115 It is, therefore, accurate to say that although laws criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of same sex in Commonwealth Africa have the United Kingdom as their cradle, their refinery and incubation occurred in India, Australia, the English-speaking Caribbean and other earlier colonies before eventual deployment to the newly acquired territories in Africa. Typical entities in these model legislations are ambiguously stated offences whose descriptions take different though kindred formations. A striking feature of these provisions remains their vagueness – “referring as they do to ‘unnatural offenses’, or ‘carnal knowledge against the order of nature’, or ‘gross indecency’.”116 Some models are 101  Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 67. 102  Section 164, Penal Code, Chapter 08:01, amended by the Penal Code Amendment Act 5, 1998. 103  Section 144, Criminal Code, 1965, as amended in 2005. 104  Section 162, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya. 105  Section 153, Penal Code, Chapter 7, Laws of Malawi. 106 Section 214–218, Criminal Code Act of 1916, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria; Cap C38 (rev ed 2004). 107 Section 151, Criminal Code of 1955, available at www.seylii.org/sc/legislation/ consolidated-act/158. 108  Section 154, Penal Code of 1945, as amended by the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, 1998. 109  Section 145, Uganda Penal Code, Chapter 120, Laws of Uganda. 110  Section 155, Penal Code Act, as amended by Act No 15 of 2005. See, Section 155 thereof. 111  Chapter 63. 112  Section 162. 113  James Stephen, A general view of the criminal law (1863). 114  James Stephen, Digest of the criminal law (1887). 115  For a general discussion on these models, see, Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 66. 116  Scott Long (n 52).

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still so vaguely drafted that questions have arisen regarding whether they apply to the female gender.117 This problem has sometimes been cured through the use of the neutral term ‘person’, rather than ‘man’, as in the case of the Kenya Penal Code.118 In most versions, for sexual intercourse to qualify as “against the order of nature”, it must be penetrative. Some versions also criminalize attempts to commit unnatural offences. For those colonies that interacted with RomanDutch imperialists, such as Namibia,119 South Africa,120 and Zimbabwe,121 the defining word “sodomy” was operative. The recently amended criminal code of Zimbabwe still reads: “Any male person who, with the consent of another male person, knowingly performs with that other person anal sexual intercourse, or any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act, shall be guilty of sodomy and liable to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both …”122

In all the models, the crimes elude a stable definition. Their content keeps shifting “according to alterable understandings of what ‘nature’, or social mores, would actually allow.”123 It is possible that the very stigma historically attached to these acts prevented an effective description. Besides their vagueness, the colonial laws do not cover marriage, civil unions or other associations of gays and lesbians. The original penal codes merely criminalize sexual conduct between persons or by persons with an animal or by persons against the order of nature. None of these statutes mention “homosexuality” perhaps because the term had not found its way into legal discourse at the material times of their formulation.124 This brand of penal regimes remains a glaring relic of the colonial era in most of Commonwealth Africa. As James Wilets argued, British colonialism accounts 117  Initially, in Britain, it was unclear whether the crime of unnatural offences applied to women. The judges at the Assizes at Rochester in Kent however clarified in The King v Wiseman (16 March 4 Georgii I) as follows: ‘Besides the unnatural abuse of a woman, seems worse than either that of a man or a beast for it seems a more direct affront to the Author of Nature, and a more insolvent expression of contempt of His wisdom, condemning the provision made by Him and defying both it and Him.’ Para 93. 118  Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 67. Also see the Kenya Penal Code. 119  In Namibia, sodomy is a crime according to Roman-Dutch common law. 120  Sodomy in South Africa was initially proscribed in certain schedules of the Criminal Procedure Act (No 51 of 1977), the Security Officers Act (No 92 of 1987), and Section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act (No 23 of 1957; Section 20A). 121  Section 73, Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Chapter 9:23, Act 23/2004. 122  Section 73, Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Chapter 9:23, Act 23/2004. Emphasis added. It is important to note that the crime of sodomy comes from Roman-Dutch law which punished the act with death. See, Ronald Louw, Sexual orientation, the right to equality and the common-law offence of sodomy: S v Kampher 1997 (2) SACR 418 (C) (1998), 11 South African Journal of Criminal Justice, p. 112. 123  Scott Long (n 52). 124  According to Scott Long (n 52), the term “homosexuality” was invented in Europe in 1869 by a medical doctor and took a long time to move from medical to legal discourse.



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for most of the contemporary hostility towards sexual minorities in Africa, and elsewhere.125 In fact, there is a “correlation between having a British legal origin and having a law criminalizing homosexual conduct.”126 This means that in comparison with other colonies, “British colonies are overwhelmingly more likely to have laws that criminalize homosexual conduct.”127 However, there is no evidence to support the claim that British colonial experience is unique in delaying decriminalization of homosexuality.128 Given the preceding discussion, a more accurate deduction is to say that British “colonialists did not introduce homosexuality to Africa, but rather intolerance of it and systems of surveillance and regulation for expressing it.”129 In sum, they introduced legal homophobia to their colonial African territories. A different scenario applied to French colonies in Africa because, “after the French Revolution, the French Penal Code of 1791 decriminalized sodomy between over-age consenting adults in private.”130 Hence, by the time of colonialism, France had no capacity to bequeath criminal sanctions against homosexuality. This accounts for why former French colonies in Africa generally do not criminalize homosexuality. The few that still criminalize it, including Algeria, Cameroon, Mauritania and Senegal, did so on their own after independence.131 However, there were instances of colonial activities unwittingly enhancing African homosexuality. A case in point is the labour hostels like the mining compounds introduced by the colonists. Mining industries such as those in South Africa brought together many male black migrant workers who were not usually allowed to bring their families or female friends.132 To mitigate these fairly harsh and solitary conditions, “miners would take new miners as wives, teach them ways of the mine and the nature of its work, and offer them protection in exchange for cooking and sexual favours.”133 However, this debate is convoluted as some studies indicate that even in these settings, colonial authorities and the dominant morality of the workers did not permit penetrative anal sex.134 The colonial regimes also introduced boarding schools,135 prisons and other detention centres where homosexual conduct thrives.136 125  James Wilets (n 66), p. 642. 126  Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 278. 127  Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 273; Joshua Hepple (n 85), p. 54. 128  Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 283. 129  Busangokwakhe Dlamini (n 54), p. 135. 130  Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 281. 131  Enze Han & Joseph O’Mahoney (n 89), p. 281. 132  Busangokwakhe Dlamini (n 54), p. 129. 133  Busangokwakhe Dlamini (n 54), p. 130. 134  Busangokwakhe Dlamini (n 54), p. 130. 135  An argument has in fact been made that “same-sex boarding schools breed homosexuals”. See Sylvia Tamale (n 62), p. 19. Also, Judith Gay, “Mummies and babies” and friends and lovers in Lesotho (1986), 2 Journal of Homosexuality, p. 97. 136  See, for instance, Sasha Gear, Sex, sexual violence and coercion in men’s prisons. Paper

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To conclude this part, it is crucial to highlight that British colonial authorities in Africa left behind new implements of regulating sexuality which survive almost in their original states in most countries in the region. In addition to imposing western legal implements, the British also sought to inculcate their mores in the legal systems under their domain.137 The British regarded their own standards as the ideal barometer with which to measure the appropriateness of competing indigenous laws, customs and institutions.

D.  The regulation of homosexuality in the independence phase As a rule, most common law countries in Africa retained the Penal Codes bequeathed by the British at independence together with their criminalization of homosexuality.138 To paraphrase Adrian Jjuuko, the new governments did not much more than simply renaming “ordinances” as “Acts”.139 The trend to retain colonial anti-homosexuality laws became so attractive that some civil law countries like Algeria, Burundi,140 Cameroon and Mauritania took cue.141 As if oblivious of developments in international human rights law and other parts of the world including South Africa’s unprecedented move to constitutionally protect the right to sexual orientation, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda not only retained the pre-independence laws discussed above, they have also made attempts at further fortifying the legal and penal regimes inherited from the British. It will help to discuss these developments in more detail beginning with South Africa’s exception.

I.  The South African exception In many ways, South Africa’s groundbreaking constitutional protection of sexual orientation was (and remains) a serendipitous development. For, when South Africa’s constitutional deliberations began in earnest in the late 1980s, the majorities were averse to sexual minority rights, all neighbouring countries were dismissive of them, and jurisprudence on the issue at the international level was presented at AIDS in Context International Conference, 4–7 April 2001, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/correctional/sexsexualviolence.pdf (accessed 2 April 2020). 137  Shafiqa Ahmadi (n 99), p. 556. See also, Solomon Ebobrah (n 72), p. 119. 138 See Michael Kirby (n 79), p. 69. 139  Adrian Jjuuko, The incremental approach: Uganda’s struggle for the decriminalisation of homosexuality, in: Corinne Lennox & Matthew Waites (eds.), Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for decriminalisation and change (2013), p. 386. 140  See Article 567, Law No 1/05, 22 April 2009, concerning the revision of the Penal Code. 141  See the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) State-sponsored homophobia dataset 2019.



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at its infancy.142 The success of the gay rights lobby in ensuring the inclusion of sexual orientation in the new constitutional order could, therefore, aptly be described as both revolutionary and anomalous. The feat that is the unique constitutional protection of sexual orientation was enabled by many timely factors, including the strategic alignment of the gay rights lobby within the broader liberation struggle, the African National Congress’ (ANC) radical anti-discrimination ideology and the changing landscape of international human rights law. From 1986, when the Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression (LAGO) was formed, the gay rights lobby in South Africa changed tact from being apolitical to getting directly involved in the liberation struggle alongside other revolutionaries.143 This vantage point proved to be strategic since the gay rights lobby began to earn legitimacy through the activities of its luminaries like Simon Nkoli144 and Ivan Toms,145 who actively participated in the broad anti-apartheid movement.146 The collaboration between the pro-gay lobby and the anti-apartheid activists (especially the ANC) opened avenues that made ideological cross-pollination possible. The pro-gay agenda particularly benefited from the ANC’s robust antidiscrimination ideology, which incrementally proved accommodative of sexual orientation.147 It helped matters that, as a victim of institutionalized discrimination, the ANC perfectly understood the need for an all-inclusive anti-apartheid approach. Eventually, the right to sexual orientation did not meet very strong opposition since equality and inclusion had been the uniting mantra of South Africa’s independence.148 Additionally, the ANC’s long association with pro-gay international partners created an environment whereby some form of pressure could be exerted successfully on its leadership, part of which operated from exile in western capitals.149 Another factor that made the constitutional protection of sexual orientation plausible were two communications, Madinos v Cyprus150 and Toonen v Aus142  For a fuller treatment of the subject, see Eric Christiansen, Ending the apartheid of the closet: Sexual orientation in the South African constitutional process (2000), 32 International Law and Politics, p. 997. 143  Eric Christiansen (n 142), p. 1023. 144  A founder member of the Gay and Lesbian Organization of the Witwatersrand (GLOW). For further details, see Mwanawina Ilyayambwa, Homosexual rights and the law: A  South African constitutional metamorphosis (2012), 2(4) International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, p. 51. 145  A founder member of Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression (LAGO). 146  Eric Christiansen (n 142), pp. 1023–1024. 147  Eric Christiansen (n 142), p. 1000. 148  Carl Stychin, Constituting sexuality: the struggle for sexual orientation in the South African Bill of Rights (1996), 23 Journal of Law and Society, p. 455. 149  See, for instance, Thomas Brown, South Africa’s gay revolution: The development of gay and lesbian rights in South Africa’s constitution and the lingering societal stigma towards the country’s homosexuals (2014), 6 Elon Law Review, p. 465. 150  Application No 15070/89, decided on 22 April 1993. The Applicants impugned sections

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tralia,151 decided by the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) and the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), respectively, at the peak of constitutional deliberations. In Madinos152 the European Court declared the continued criminalization of sex against the order of nature in Cyprus a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, even though the Attorney General’s office had a policy of not prosecuting homosexuals. In Toonen the UNHRC held it undisputable “that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy’”. On this basis, it proceeded to declare provisions of Tasmania Criminal Code, which outlawed homosexual conduct between adults in private,153 to be contrary to human rights principles.154 The UNHRC also flexibly conceptualized the protected ground of “sex” to encompass sexual orientation.155 These international developments provided a solid springboard for projecting the gay rights agenda. South Africa’s highly praised journey towards the protection of sexual orientation solidified by the enactment of an Interim Constitution, and later a transformative Constitution,156 which, at Article 9(3), expressly makes reference to sexual orientation as a ground protected from discrimination. Just as the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (the Coalition) had predicted, South Africa’s phenomenal success in judicial protection of sexual minorities would occur incrementally.157 The revolution commenced by challenging the criminalization of sodomy and proceeded to touch on the various aspects of same-sex relationships, before culminating into questioning the institution of the conventional family. The now vast and exemplary jurisprudence on sexual orientation was heralded by less sophisticated litigation which merely 171–173 of the Criminal Code which made it an offence to have sex “against the order of nature” and for two men to have sex. 151  Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 152  Application No 15070/89, decided on 22 April 1993. The Applicants impugned sections 171–173 of the Criminal Code which made it an offence to have sex “against the order of nature” and for two men to have sex. 153  Sections 122(a) and (c) of the 1924 Tasmanian Criminal Code read: “Any person who (a) has sexual intercourse with any person against the order of nature; (b) … (c) consents to a male person having sexual intercourse with him or her against the order of nature is guilty of a crime.” Section 123 provided for the following offence: “Any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any indecent assault upon, or other act of gross indecency with, another male person, or procures another male person to commit any act of gross indecency upon himself or any other male person, is guilty of a crime.” 154  Para 8.2. 155  Para 8.7. 156  South Africa’s 1996 Constitution has been described as transformative. See Karl Klare, Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism (1998), 14 South African Journal on Human Rights, p. 146. 157  This plan ran its full course despite the intervention of other actors not affiliated to the Coalition in the litigation process. See Beth Goldblatt, Same-sex marriage in South Africa – the Constitutional Court’s judgment (2006), 14 Feminist Legal Studies, p. 265.



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contested the constitutionality of consensual intercourse between persons of the same sex. In S v Kampher,158 Justice Farlam was invited to nullify the conviction of an applicant who had confessed to having consensual sex with another man.159 The judge affirmatively responded to the invitation in the process initiating the beginning of a new jurisprudential era. In one of the earliest cases involving the Coalition, a policewoman named Langemaat petitioned the High Court to invalidate certain rules of a medical scheme which prevented her same-sex partner from being registered as a dependant.160 The High Court agreed with the application, finding that same-sex partners also have a right to support each other. The Coalition returned to the judicial forum, this time to ask the Constitutional Court to confirm that the common law offences relating to sodomy161 were no longer constitutional.162 Concurring with the petitioners, the Constitutional Court found that these offences, all of which were aimed at prohibiting sexual intimacy between gay men, violated the right to equality since they unfairly discriminated against gay men on the basis of sexual orientation.163 The Constitutional Court found such discrimination to be unfair especially because South Africa’s Constitution expressly includes sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination.164 The judicial tribunal considered gay people a vulnerable minority group in society. On this basis, it declared attempts at criminalizing their most intimate relationships inappropriate for the reason that they devalue and degrade them.165 Exclusions of this kind, therefore, constitute a violation of their fundamental right to dignity.166 In addition, the Constitutional Court saw no logic in criminalizing private conduct between consenting adults which causes no harm to anyone else.167 This intrusion into the innermost sphere of human life, the Constitutional Court held, also violates the constitutional right to privacy.168 158 1997(2) SACR 418 (C). 159 1997(2) SACR 418 (C). 160  Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1998 (3) SA 312 (T). 161  Sodomy was proscribed in certain schedules of the Criminal Procedure Act (No 51 of 1977) and the Security Officers Act (No 92 of 1987). In addition, Section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act (No 23 of 1957), prohibited ‘acts committed between men at a party calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification.’ 162  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v Minister of Justice and others, CCT 11/98, decided on 9 October 1998. 163  Para 109, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 164  Para 109, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 165  Para 120, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 166  Para 36, as per Justice Laurie Ackermann, with President Arthur Chaskalson, Deputy President Pius Nkonzo Langa, Justice Richard Goldstone, Justice Johann Kriegler, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice Catherine O’Regan and Justice Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob concurring; Para 120, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 167  Para 108, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 168  Para 108, as per Justice Albert Louis Sachs.

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This judgement created a jurisprudential foundation upon which subsequent and more reformative decisions would be built. For example, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & others v Minister of Home Affairs & others,169 the Constitutional Court was asked to determine the question as to whether it was unconstitutional for immigration law to facilitate the entry of heterosexual foreign national spouses of permanent South African residents into South Africa but not to grant the same benefits to South African gays and lesbians in permanent same-sex life partnerships with foreign nationals. The Constitutional Court concluded that the rights of equality and dignity were closely related in this instance and that the impugned provisions reinforced harmful stereotypes of gays and lesbians.170 The judges took the view that the immigration law portrayed gays and lesbians as lacking the inherent humanity to found families, a sad attack on their dignity.171 In the end, the impugned provision was held to discriminate unfairly against gays and lesbians on the intersecting and overlapping grounds of sexual orientation and marital status and to be seriously limiting their equality and dignity rights.172 The Constitutional Court accordingly held the omission of partners in permanent same-sex life partnerships from immigration privileges to be unconstitutional.173 The same golden thread of equality, non-discrimination and human dignity prevailed in the granting of equal adoption rights to a same-sex couple in Du Toit & Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development & Others (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as amicus curiae).174 While confirming the decision of the High Court, the Constitutional Court found that the exclusion of either single persons or heterosexual couples from adoption by the Child Care Act and the Guardianship Act was discriminatory against the appellants on the grounds of sexual orientation and marital status.175 The Court also declared such dis169  CCT 10/99 [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 (2) SA 1; 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (2 December 1999). 170  Para 42, as per Justice Laurie Ackermann, with President Arthur Chaskalson, Deputy President Pius Nkonzo Langa, Justice Richard Goldstone, Justice Tholie Madala, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice Sandile Ngcobo, Justice Catherine O’Regan, Justice Albert Louis Sachs, Justice Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob and Justice Edwin Cameron concurring. 171  As above. 172  Para 40–42, as per Justice Laurie Ackermann, with President Arthur Chaskalson, Deputy President Pius Nkonzo Langa, Justice Richard Goldstone, Justice Tholie Madala, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice Sandile Ngcobo, Justice Catherine O’Regan, Justice Albert Louis Sachs, Justice Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob and Justice Edwin Cameron concurring. 173  Para 89, as per Justice Laurie Ackermann, with President Arthur Chaskalson, Deputy President Pius Nkonzo Langa, Justice Richard Goldstone, Justice Tholie Madala, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice Sandile Ngcobo, Justice Catherine O’Regan, Justice Albert Louis Sachs, Justice Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob and Justice Edwin Cameron concurring. 174  2003 (2) SA 198 (CC); 2002 (10) BCLR 1006 (CC). 175  Para 26, as per Assistant Justice Thembile Skweyiya, as then was, with Justice Laurie Ackermann, with President Arthur Chaskalson, Deputy President Pius Nkonzo Langa, Justice David Du Plessis, Justice Richard Goldstone, Justice Johann Kriegler, Justice Tholie Madala, Justice Sandile Ngcobo, Justice Catherine O’Regan and Justice Albert Louis Sachs concurring.



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criminatory adoption criteria to be an infringement upon the cardinal principle of best interests of the child.176 Ultimately, on 1 December 2005, a day described as a proud one for South Africa,177 the Constitutional Court decided the ground-breaking case of Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie178 – the first to legalize homosexual marriages in postindependence Africa. The judges179 unanimously decided that the common law definition of marriage, as “a union of one man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”,180 and Section 30(1) of the Marriage Act,181 which did not make provision for same-sex marriages, failed the constitutional threshold of equality,182 non-discrimination,183 privacy,184 and human dignity.185 Justice Albie Sachs observed on behalf of the majority that “[s]ections 9(1) and 9(3) cannot be read as merely protecting same-sex couples from punishment or stigmatization. They also go beyond simply preserving a private space in which gay and lesbian couples may live together without interference from the state. Indeed, what the applicants in this matter seek is not the right to be left alone, but the right to be acknowledged as equals and to be embraced with dignity by the law. Their love that was once forced to be clandestine, may now dare openly to speak its name. The world in which they live and in which the Constitution functions, has evolved from repudiating expressions of their desire to accepting the reality of their presence, and the integrity, in its own terms, of their intimate life.”186

In reaching this decision, the Constitutional Court counteracted the contention that international law recognizes and protects only heterosexual marriages by distinguishing South Africa’s unique circumstances. The Constitutional Court clarified that “[i]n contradistinction to the ICCPR, our Constitution explicitly proclaims the anti-discriminatory right which has held to lack support from the text of the ICCPR. Indeed, discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is expressly stated by our Constitution to be presumptively unfair.”187

176  As per Assistant Justice Thembile Skweyiya, at para 22. 177  Beth Goldblatt (n 157), p. 261. 178  The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on this case on 30 November 2004. 179 Chief Justice Pius Nkonzo Langa, Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice Sandile Ngcobo, Justice Thembile Skweyiya, Justice Johann Van der Westhuizen, and Justice Zakeria Mohammed Yacoob concurred with the judgment of Justice Albert Louis Sachs. 180  Mashia Ebrahim v Mahomed Essop, 1905, TS 59 at 61. 181  Act 25 of 1961. 182  Sections 9(1), Constitution of South Africa. 183  Section 9(3), Constitution of South Africa. 184  Section 14, Constitution of South Africa. 185  Section 10, Constitution of South Africa. 186  Para 78. 187  As per Justice Albert Louis Sachs, para 103.

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Eventually, the judgment concluded that while it is accurate that international law expressly protects heterosexual marriage, it does not necessarily preclude the equal recognition of same-sex couples.188 The majority opinion similarly overruled the widely held notion that the marriage institution must have “procreative capacity” or “potential”. Regarding the view that same-sex marriages ran contrary to the main religious teachings, the Constitutional Court retorted that “it would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide to the constitutional rights of others.”189 As a remedial measure, the Constitutional Court ordered Parliament to enact implementing legislation recognizing samesex marriages within a period of 12 months failure to which Section 30(1) of the Marriage Act would be read as including the words “or spouse” after the words “or husband” as they appeared in the marriage formula. It is in response to this judicial decree that the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 was passed to make provision for same-sex marriages in addition to the conventional form of marriage. Heterosexual and homosexual persons who meet the requisite criteria may by dint of the Civil Union Act conduct a “marriage” either in its conventional form or in the form of a civil union. Only traditional marriages may still be transacted under the Marriage Act, although both legal regimes have similar legal consequences. The above progressive legislative and judicial jurisprudence has elevated South Africa’s record to the extent of being an example in the protection of the right to sexual orientation. South Africa is now praised as the first country in the world to constitutionally ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and the fifth to legalize same-sex marriage.190 However, like other African countries, South Africa has high levels of homophobia explaining why its anomalous revolution has taken place through the Constitution and the courts rather than through the Legislature. Despite having one of the most progressive constitutions in terms of the protection of the right to sexual orientation, there is “a great disconnect between policy and reality” in South Africa.191 The reality is sometimes that of homophobia whereby irrational fear, hatred, and intolerance are visited upon people who are presumed to be homosexuals.192 For example, a past Mayor of Durban once dismissed Cape Town as a city that “can stay with its moffies (a pejorative term for gay men) and its gays.”193 South Africa’s former President, Jacob Zuma, also stated: “Samesex marriage is a disgrace to the nation and to God. When I  was growing up 188  Justice Albert Louis Sachs, para 105. 189  Justice Albert Louis Sachs, para 92. 190  Adam Kretz (n 48), p. 209. Also, Dennis Francis & Thabo Msibi, Teaching about heterosexism: challenging homophobia in South Africa (2011), 8(2) Journal of LGBT Youth, p. 160. 191  Thabo Msibi, “I’m used to it now”: experiences of homophobia among queer youth in South African township schools (2012), 24(5) Gender and Education, p. 518. 192  Dennis Francis & Thabo Msibi (n 190), pp. 159–160. 193  Cited from Dennis Francis & Thabo Msibi (n 190), p. 162.



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unqingili (homosexuals) could not stand in front of me. I  would knock them out.”194 In South African township schools, nearly all queer students have had a negative experience.195 These experiences take forms such as teachers and other students using violence or derogative language to refer to homosexual students. Derogatory words like “isitabane”, “moffie” and “ongqingili” are often used to refer to male homosexuals.196 Such discriminatory treatment is catalysed by a combination of factors including religion, culture, sexism and lack of understanding about what homosexuality really is.197 Discrimination of homosexuals in schools is also driven by the fear resulting from the threat caused by homosexuality to heteronormativity. In this regard, Msibi’s study found that many boys fear “that the lesbian girls will convert their girlfriends, which will result in them having no girls to date.”198 Notwithstanding the now rampant cases of homophobia, Pierre de Vos rightly equated the developments in South Africa to a revolution.199 Only such an explanation can account for the monumental changes that have occurred in a country that is less developed and has a majority population that cannot be described as “enlightened”.200

II.  Second wave of criminalizing homosexuality in Africa The fairly progressive jurisprudence by South Africa’s Constitutional Court on the issue of sexual orientation has remained an isolated development with minimal influence in the region.201 Far from being inspired by South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda have instead resorted to reinforcing the penal and even constitutional regimes bequeathed by colonial governments to further marginalize gay and lesbian individuals and advocates of their cause. The most retrogressive changes have mainly taken place through constitutional amendments and penal enactments. Meanwhile, as if to vindicate Solomon Ebobrah’s view that “judicial arms of African governments are better situated to protect and safeguard the rights of the most vulnerable minorities”,202 some progressive judicial decisions 194  Cited from Dennis Francis & Thabo Msibi (n 190), p. 162. 195  See, generally, Thabo Msibi (n 191), pp. 515–533. 196  Thabo Msibi (n 191), p. 523. 197  Thabo Msibi (n 191), pp. 515–533. 198  Thabo Msibi (n 191), p. 524. 199  Pierre de Vos, A judicial revolution? The court-led achievement of same-sex marriage in South Africa (2008), 4 Utrecht Law Review, p. 174. 200  As above. 201  However, not all African countries have insisted on criminalizing homosexuality. It is important to note that in July 2015, Mozambique amended the colonial statutes, which had criminalized homosexual acts. By the end of 2015, 36 African countries still criminalized sodomy. For a discussion, see Abadir Ibrahim, LGBT rights in Africa and the discursive role of international human rights law (2015), 15(2) African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 264. 202  Solomon Ebobrah (n 72), p. 113.

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with limited potential to mitigate these legislative damages are emerging. Despite scoring poorly in the protection of the right to sexual orientation, Kenya has had a better record than Nigeria and Uganda, which recently passed perhaps the most draconian anti-homosexuality laws in recent history.203 1.  Kenya: Between legislative exclusion and judicial wobbling Kenya’s contemporary legislative agenda is inclined towards the marginalization of those with minority sexual orientation. In addition to retaining the colonial crimes that outlaw unnatural sexual offences, the people of Kenya seized the moment of constitutional reform to emphasize a strain of conservative moral philosophy that is dismissive of the right to sexual orientation. Thus, although the Bill of Rights emulates South Africa’s204 by prohibiting discrimination on an elaborate list of grounds,205 it excludes the ground of “sexual orientation”. This omission leaves open the view that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation may be continued in the new constitutional order. The constitutional marginalization of this entitlement is further articulated by Article 45 of the Constitution, which perpetuates the idea that marriage is a preserve of adult persons of opposite sex.206 This threshold has since been consolidated by the Marriage Act,207 which defines marriage as “the voluntary union of a man and a woman whether in a monogamous or polygamous union and registered”.208 In practice, however, there is a sense in which woman-to-woman marriages practiced under certain customary regimes may be recognized, at least for purposes of succession. In Monica Jesang Katam v Jackson Chepkwony & Another,209 then High Court, now Supreme Court judge Justice Jackton Ojwang, did not hesitate to protect the inheritance rights of a woman married to another woman under Nandi customary law. The Judge agreed with the petitioner that she “[w]as a ‘wife’, and, by the operative customary law, she and her sons belonged to the household of the deceased, and were entitled to inheritance rights, prior to anyone else.” 203  On this aspect, Joe Oloka-Onyango has stated that “the direction in Kenya is decidedly more liberal than that taken in Uganda.” See, Joe Oloka-Onyango, Debating love, human rights and identity politics in East Africa: The case of Uganda and Kenya (2015), 15(1) African Human Rights Law Journal, p. 30. 204  See Section 9(3) of South Africa’s Constitution. 205  Article 27(4) of the Constitution states: “The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.” 206 Article 45(2). Emphasis added. As if taking cue from Kenya, Namibia’s 2010 Constitution at Article 14 (Act No 7, 2010) similarly preserves marriage for men and women of full age. Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution (Act No 20 of 2013) expressly provides that “persons of the same sex are prohibited from marrying each other” (Article 78). 207  Act No 2, 2014. 208  Section 3(1). 209  [2011] eKLR.



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Following from this logic, the same-sex marriage was read into the scheme of the Law of Succession Act,210 placing the petitioner and her children in the first line of inheritance: the petitioner herself for being wife of the deceased and her children for being the children of the deceased. The Katam precedent is significant in the ongoing discourse on sexual orientation since it highlights the tough and immediate reality “that among various ethnic groups in Africa a family system is in place which differs from the conventional one based on the male-female union”.211 It may be time these alterative family formations found overt legal articulation. The High Court has had another opportunity to adjudicate a matter on the general subject of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) under the new constitutional framework. In a judicial review case, Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council & another Ex parte Audrey Mbugua Ithibu,212 the superior court of record directed the statutory examinations’ body, the Kenya National Examination Council, to issue a new secondary education certificate to the applicant under a new name in spite of the fact that the change of name was occasioned by an impending sex change. According to the evidence adduced, the applicant, who was under treatment for gender identity disorder and was in the process of transitioning from male to female, had changed “his” name from Andrew Mbugua Ithibu to Audrey Mbugua Ithibu and required relevant documentation to bear the new identity. In a bid to solve the question of the “problematic” gender of the litigant, the presiding Judge213 declared, that it was not necessary for the examination certificate to indicate the gender of the bearer, a novel and major score for the SOGI movement. Eric Gitari v Non-Governmental Organisations Coordination Board & 4 others214 is yet another key milestone in the quest for equal treatment of sexual minorities in Kenya. In this case, Eric Gitari, the promoter of three nongovernmental organizations, sought to reserve certain names for purposes of registration with the Non-Governmental organizations Coordination Board (NGO Board)215: Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Council, Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Observancy and Lesbian Human Rights organization. The NGO Board advised against the proposed names mainly because homosexuality is both criminal and a taboo in Kenya’s religious, cultural and moral setting. This 210  Section 29, Chapter 160, Laws of Kenya. 211  Jackton Boma Ojwang, The common law, judges’ law: Land and environment before the Kenyan courts (2014), p. 122. 212  [2014] eKLR. 213  Judge Weldon Korir. 214  [2015] eKLR. The other respondent was the office of the Attorney General. Audrey Mbugua Ithibu, Daniel Kandie and the Kenya Christian Professionals Forum joined the case as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd interested parties. The Judges admitted Katiba Institute as amicus curiae. 215 The NGO Board is established under Section 3 of the Non-Governmental Organizations Co-ordination Act, Chapter 134, Laws of Kenya. Part of its key mandate is to register nongovernmental organizations.

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prompted the petitioner to bring an action against the NGO Board to vindicate his right to freedom of association guaranteed in Article 36 of the Constitution. Despite strong opposition by the NGO Board and other respondents, judges Isaac Lenaola, Mumbi Ngugi and George Odunga agreed with Gitari that “[t]he term ‘every person’ in Article 36 properly construed does not exclude homosexual persons, and the petitioner therefore falls within the ambit of Article 36 of the Constitution, which guarantees to all persons the right to freedom of association.”216

Addressing the respondents’ claim that homosexual acts are illegal in Kenya, the High Court ruled that “the Penal Code does not criminalize homosexuality, or the state of being homosexual, but only certain sexual acts ‘against the order of nature’.”217 In effect, the High Court made a distinction between the right to freedom of association, which applies to all persons including homosexuals, and certain specific homosexual acts that are criminal. Thus, the High Court considers the historical limitations apparent in the colonial offence inadequate to anticipate other issues incidental to homosexuality including free association of homosexuals. By way of remedy, the High Court issued an order of mandamus directing the NGO Board to comply with its constitutional duty to ensure that the petitioner realizes his right to equality and freedom of association.218 The above “progressive stance” has recently taken a negative turn. In COL & Another v Resident Magistrate, the High Court declined to declare compulsory anal tests on persons suspected to have committed unnatural sexual offences an affront to human dignity, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.219 In EG & 7 others v Attorney General; DKM & 9 others (Interested Parties); Katiba Institute & another (Amicus Curiae), the High Court certified sections 162 and 165 of the Penal Code, which criminalize, “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature” and certain “acts of gross indecency” between males, respectively, as consistent with the Constitution and the human rights to dignity, equality, equal protection of the law, fair trial and privacy. The High Court found the Penal Code provisions to be clear and unambiguous. The High Court further argued that legalizing same-sex conduct would offend Article 45 of the Constitution, which restricts marriage to persons of opposite sex only. In finding so, the High Court ignored the very progressive jurisprudence developed at the international level, such as Madinos v Cyprus and Toonen v Australia and at municipal level in African countries like Botswana220 and South Africa. Clearly, Kenya’s judicial jurisprudence on the question of sexual orientation has wobbled dangerously between progressive decisions that affirm human dig216  Para 76. 217  Para 114. 218  Para 148. 219  COL & Another v Resident Magistrate, Petition No 51 of 2015. 220 See, Letsweletse Motshidiemang v Attorney General, in: the High Court of Botswana (Gaborone).



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nity and retrogressive precedents that ruin any possibilities for entrenching a culture of sexual minority rights. On the other hand, the political class is both ambivalent and oblivious of the human rights situation. For instance, President Uhuru Kenyatta stated that Kenya faces many challenges on the social, cultural and political front which render sexual minority concerns less urgent.221 On a different note, a section of the political class called upon respective Government agencies to implement existing anti-homosexuality laws fully, saying that otherwise they will rally the public to action.222 A fringe political party, the Republican Liberty Party, even proposed the enactment of a law punitive enough to eliminate homosexuals from society through draconian sentences such as public stoning of suspected homosexuals.223 However, these efforts have remained mere suggestions as no concrete measures have been taken for their implementation. 2.  Nigeria as an exemplification of the second wave of criminalizing homosexuality Through expanded and punitive criminal sanctions, Africa has communicated its renewed resolve to eliminate amorous relations between persons of identical sexes completely. And it is Nigeria that typifies this post-colonial paradigm best. In January 2014, Nigeria enacted the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act.224 This legislative instrument describes itself as “an Act to prohibit a marriage contract or civil union entered into between persons of the same sex, solemnization of same, and for related matters”.225 True to this introduction, the Act prohibits all marriage contracts or civil unions between persons of the same sex.226 It denies these institutions the benefits usually synonymous with heterosexual marriages.227 The drafters were also careful to proscribe same-sex marriages solemnized in foreign countries hence stripping them of legitimacy once on Nigerian territory.228 The legislation meddles into the realm of religion by explicitly prohibiting the solemnization of gay marriages in places of worship229 as well as it renders any certification issued to this effect invalid.230 Perhaps for the avoid221  President Kenyatta says gay rights “of no importance”, in: Kenya Daily Nation 21 April 2018. 222  MPs to fight homosexuality, in: Daily Nation 19 February 2014. Also, After Uganda, Kenya gears up for gay rights debate, in: Voice of America 5 March 2014. 223  Kenya: An anti-gay bill of our very own? Really?, in: The Star 18 August 2014. 224  On 7 January 2014, the President of Nigeria signed into law the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act. 225  Preamble, Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act. 226  Section 1(1). It is an offence punishable by imprisonment for 14 years to enter into these now criminalized unions (Section 5[1]). 227  Section 1(1). 228  Section 1(2). 229  Section 2(1). 230  Section 2(2).

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ance of doubt, the Act emphasizes the recognition only of marriages contracted between persons of opposite sex.231 Unlike the initial regimes enacted by colonial authorities, this Act provides that it is illegal to register gay clubs, societies or organizations232 and the proscription extends to any activities meant for their sustenance, including processions and meetings.233 It is also illegal to register, operate or participate in gay clubs or organizations or to make public show of same-sex amorous relationships.234 Finally, it is criminal to aid or abet any of these acts or processes.235 All these objects are achieved in just eight articles.236 Through a single and brief legislation, Nigeria has expressed its contempt for homosexuality and the rights related to it in the strongest terms possible. And it has violated a wide range of international human rights provisions in the process.237 For Nigeria, colonial anti-homosexuality laws needed more sting in the form of draconian penal sanctions. 3.  Uganda and the winding walk toward popular anti-homosexuality legislation Uganda has grappled with the regulation of homosexuality the most. Like most other Commonwealth countries in Africa, the bulk of Uganda’s policy-makers have manifested a chronic allergy to the rights of sexual minorities. They have excelled in their anti-homosexuality endeavors to the extent that “if South Africa’s constitutional position on sexual orientation is seen as a benchmark on a particular spectrum, then Uganda’s position is at the extreme opposite end of such spectrum.”238 Aside from retaining the colonial anti-homosexuality laws on its statute books, post-independence Uganda has not only attempted concrete measures aimed at enhancing the scope of criminal sanctions against homosexuality, it has also enacted constitutional provisions aimed at entrenching heteronormativity. The first step in Uganda’s quest for stern measures against homosexuality involved increasing the punishment for “unnatural sexual offences” from a maximum sentence of fourteen years to life imprisonment.239 Save for this amendment, Section 145 of Uganda’s Penal Code, which outlaws intercourse against the order of nature, is identical to Section 164 of Kenya’s Penal Code, quoted 231  Section 3. 232  Section 4(1). 233  Section 4(1). 234  Section 5(2). The offence attracts 10 year prison terms. 235  Section 5(3). The offence attracts 10 years imprisonment. 236  See Nigerian President signs ban on same-sex relationships, in: The New York Times 13 January 2014. 237  For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 5 of this thesis. 238  John Mubangizi & Ben Twinomugisha, Protecting the right to freedom of sexual orientation: What can Uganda learn from South Africa? (2011), 22 Stellenbosch Law Review, p. 331. 239  Tiffany Lebrón, “Death to gays!” Uganda’s “one step forward, one step back” approach to human rights’ (2011), 17 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, p. 185.



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earlier in this chapter.240 An attempt to commit such crimes is also criminal and is punishable, upon conviction, by a seven-year prison term.241 Uganda’s Penal Code further prohibits “indecent practices” by any person.242 In September 2005, Uganda enhanced its anti-homosexuality measures by altering the Constitution243 to conceive marriage as an institution of only adult persons of opposite sex244 and to unequivocally declare a marriage between persons of the same sex illegal.245 Although these measures were meant to silence the increasing voices in favor of sexual minority rights, the amendment was superfluous as the 1995 Constitution already expressly provided that “men and women of the age of eighteen years and above have a right to marry and to found a family …”.246 Notwithstanding the fact that Uganda’s Constitution “[o]utlaws discrimination on several grounds and provides that all persons are ‘equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic and cultural life and in every other respect’, it does not include an express reference to sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination.”247

This exclusion was largely because delegates during Uganda’s Constituent Assembly made no argument for protection on the ground of sexual orientation. Like in the case of Kenya, this omission creates a presumption that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is permissible by law. It is less wonder that Uganda’s Constitution has “legitimized” human rights abuses against homosexuals in areas such as employment, assault and murder.248 In 2007 a last-minute amendment to the Equal Opportunities Commission Act meant that the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) has no jurisdiction over matters “involving behavior which is considered to be (i) socially harmful, or (ii) unacceptable by the majority of the cultural and social communities in Uganda.”249 The provision has been understood by human rights actors to curtail the equal protection of minorities, particularly homosexuals.250 240  As above. 241  Section 146, Uganda Penal Code. 242  Section 148, Uganda Penal Code. 243  See Section 10 of the Constitution Amendment Act, 2005, amending Article 31 of the Constitution. The amendment acquired the force of law on 30 September 2005. 244  Article 31(1), Uganda Constitution. 245  Article 31(2), Uganda Constitution. 246  See the initial Article 31(1). 247  John Mubangizi & Ben Twinomugisha (n 238), p. 339. 248  Sylvia Tamale, Laws and human rights, in: Sylvia Tamale (ed.) Homosexuality: Perspectives from Uganda (2007), pp. 55–70, cited in: John Mubangizi & Ben Twinomugisha (n 238), p. 340. 249  Section 15(6), Equal Opportunities Commission Act, 2007. 250  Adrian Jjuuko of the Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum challenged Section 15(6) of the Act in the case of Jjuuko Adrian v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition 1 of 2009. See, Joe Oloka-Onyango (n 203), p. 39. To date, the Constitutional Court has not yet concluded the case.

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Further sanctions were attempted in 2009, through the Anti-Homosexuality Bill (AHB).251 According to its own preamble provisions, AHB was designed to fill the gaps in the Penal Code such as the lack of comprehensive provisions catering for anti-homosexuality and inadequate provisions for penalizing the procuration, promotion and dissemination of literature and other pantographic materials concerning the offence of homosexuality.252 True to its intentions, the AHB provided an elaborate catalogue of offences including homosexuality, aggravated homosexuality, attempt to commit homosexuality and the protection, assistance and payment of compensation to victims of homosexuality.253 The Bill also sought to proscribe other related offences including aiding and abetting of homosexuality, conspiracy to engage in homosexuality, procuration of homosexuality by threats, detention with the intent to commit homosexuality, the running of brothels meant for homosexuality, celebration of same-sex marriages and the promotion of homosexuality.254 Perhaps the most controversial aspects of AHB were the imposition of death penalty for the offence of aggravated homosexuality255 and the proposal to criminalize failure to disclose information relating to the offence of homosexuality and to punish this omission by a sentence fine of up to three years imprisonment.256 Had it become law, the Bill would have rendered any international legal instrument, whose provision contradicted its spirit, null and void.257 Despite enjoying overwhelming public support and near-unanimous backing by parliamentarians the Bill, which was moved by David Bahati with the backing of conservative evangelical preachers in Africa and the United States, like Caleb Brundidge, Don Schmierer, Martin Ssempa, Scott Lively and Steven Langa,258 failed due to pressure from influential world leaders including Ban Ki-Moon, David Cameron, Barack Obama, Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela.259 Thus, while the AHB was designed and sponsored by prominent local and foreign religious personalities and organizations like the Family Life Network, it’s tabling “galvanised an unprecedented level of diplomatic intervention and global protest on behalf of LGBTI populations.”260 Uganda acted as an arena where conservative politics and religion and the liberal diplomatic community wrestled about the highly controversial issue of LGBTI rights with the latter emerging the tentative 251  Bill No 18 of 2009. 252  Preambular para 2.1. 253  Part II, AHB. 254  Part III, AHB. 255  Section 3(2), AHB. 256  Section 14, AHB. 257  Section 18, AHB. 258  Ryan Thoreson, Troubling the waters of a “wave of homophobia”: political economies of anti-queer animus in sub-Saharan Africa (2014), 17(1/2) Sexualities, pp. 28–29. 259  Adam Kretz (n 48), p. 219. 260  Ryan Thoreson (n 258), p. 23.



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victors. As a result of this, it is widely believed that President Museveni exerted pressure on the lawmakers to vacate the initiative for the sake of Uganda’s cordial international relations.261 This explains why Bahati’s Bill continued to stagnate despite subsequent popular efforts to resuscitate it in 2010 and 2011.262 Even without seeing the light of day, AHB succeeded in sowing the seeds for homophobia in Uganda and neighboring countries. Commenting on this Bill, John Mubangizi and Ben Twinomugisha concluded that there was no legal instrument (proposed or existing) in Uganda with the potential to promote homophobia like the AHB.263 Msibi similarly commented that the immediate results of the Bill were “a witch-hunt, approved publicly and supported by the State and the media”.264 Joe Oloka-Onyango validated these views by stating that “[t]he Bill led to a heightened situation of homophobia, not simply by attempting to translate the existing fear into legally-sanctioned forms of targeting the LGBTI community, but by increasing the penalties against same-sex behaviour, extending the sanctions for the alleged ‘promotion’ of such conduct to counsellors, lawyers and even academics, and providing for the Ugandan Government to opt out of any international treaties that went against the spirit of the Bill.”265

On the other hand, faced with the potential hazards of AHB, individuals and organizations working on sexual minority rights in Uganda like Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG), Freedom and Roam Uganda and the Support Initiative for People with Atypical Sex Development, found new impetus for intensifying their solidarity, visibility, voice and activities.266 In this sense, the AHB brought the largely invisible and voiceless homosexuals and organization supporting their cause to the limelight. The AHB also laid the foundation upon which homosexuality legislation in Africa would be erected. Walking in the immediate footsteps of Nigeria, Uganda in February 2014 captured world attention by finally enacting one of the most comprehensive and draconian pieces of legislation in the history of regulating sexual orientation. The AHA not only innovated by expanding the scope of anti-homosexuality offences, it also stipulated very harsh sentences for the crimes. Crafted along the same lines as the aborted Bill, the Act introduced crimes such as homosexuality,267 aggravated homosexuality,268 attempted homosexuality,269 attempted aggravated 261  Adam Kretz (n 48), p. 220. 262  Adam Kretz (n 48), p. 220. 263  John Mubangizi & Ben Twinomugisha (n 238), p. 342. 264  Thabo Msibi (n 71), p. 59. 265  Joe Oloka-Onyango, We are more than just our bodies: HIV/AIDS and the human rights complexities affecting young women who have sex with women in Uganda (2012), 36 (HURIPEC) Working Paper, p. 31. 266  Stella Nyanzi (n 42), p. 962. 267  Section 2. 268  Section 3. 269  Section 4(1).

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homosexuality,270 aiding or abetting homosexuality,271 conspiracy to engage in homosexuality,272 procuring of homosexuality by threats,273 detention with intent to commit homosexuality,274 use of premises (brothels) for homosexuality,275 contracting of same-sex marriage276 and promotion of homosexuality.277 The crimes of homosexuality, aggravated homosexuality, attempted aggravated homosexuality and contracting of same-sex marriage attracted the sentence of life imprisonment. The law made provision for the extradition of persons involved in acts amounting to the crimes and the cancellations of licenses for businesses found to contravene the draconian law.278 Despite intense international pressure against the legislative initiative, Uganda’s law-makers sold the Bill as a panacea to the “promiscuous and immoral culture of homosexuality” which human rights activists and other foreigners were imposing upon the people of Uganda to the detriment of the crucial family institution and innocent children and youth.279 The motion-movers were categorical that homosexuality and related practices are offensive to both Christian values and traditional African mores.280 Thus, Benson Obua-Ogwal understood the Bill as an important step in restoring marriage as a heterosexual union of man and woman,281 which is the ideal originally intended by the Creator.282 ObuaOgwal ’s view tallied with that carried in the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. This report explained the purposes of the Bill as strengthening not only the nation’s capacity to deal with emerging internal and external threats to the traditional heterosexual family but also the provision of comprehensive and enhanced legislation to protect the cherished culture of the people of Uganda and their legal, religious and traditional family values against the attempts of sexual rights activists seeking to impose their values of sexual promiscuity and the need to protect children and youth.283 These are the same arguments that some anti-homosexuality sects of Christianity have variously fronted. For example, Ssempa, a US-trained Pastor, warns 270  Section 4(2). 271  Section 7. 272  Section 8. 273  Section 9. 274  Section 10. 275  Section 11. 276  Section 12. 277  Section 13. 278  Annex 1, gives a summary of the Act. 279  See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Official Report, Third Session – Second Meeting – Friday, 20 November 2013. 280  See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (n 279). 281  See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (n 279). 282  See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (n 279). 283  Paul Muvini, Speaking for the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (n 279).



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in his preaching that the practice of homosexuality poses serious impacts to Uganda’s social and moral fabric, including its families, youth and children.284 There have equally been allegations linking Uganda’s President to “the Family”, a US Christian fundamentalist anti-homosexuality group allied to the Republican Party.285 Additionally, Lively, a prominent US evangelist and anti-homosexuality activist has faced criminal charges in the US for certain criminal acts allegedly committed during the pro-AHB campaigns.286 These examples show that one cannot ignore the influence of fundamentalist evangelical US churches with strong anti-homosexuality theological basis in Uganda during the second wave of criminalizing homosexuality.287 Although in clear minority, a report authored by parliamentarians Sam Otada and Fox Odoi-Oywelowo was resolute in its criticism of AHA. The report contended that the enactment of AHA would contravene many international conventions and treaties ratified by the State.288 The Act was also singular for its ban on pro-lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) activities hence eliminating the advocacy and political mechanisms by which such progress can be achieved.289 Within six months of its enactment, the Constitutional Court of Uganda declared the AHA unconstitutional on the ground that Parliament did not summon the requisite quorum at the time of its passage.290 Although the petitioners raised more substantive human rights questions in this litigation,291 the Constitutional Court chose to determine the case on the issue of technicality hence preserving the possibility that the legislation could be revived in the future. Already, influential political actors have made statements to the effect that the aborted law might be reintroduced in the near future.292 Informed by these factors, the Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum (HRAPF) decided to pursue the matter further at the East African Court of Justice, the idea being to draw a finding based on the merits of the case.293 HRAPF also intended to “transmit a 284  Ryan Thoreson (n 258), p. 29. Pastor Ssempa holds a Master of Arts degree from the Philadelphia Biblical University. 285  Ralph Stone & Judi Iranyi, The fellowship: A secret Christian fundamentalist organisation, Fog City Journal, 30 November 2009. 286  See, for instance, Meredith Bennet-Smith, Scott Lively, “Kill the gays” bill supporter and evangelist on trial for crimes against humanity, Queer Voices 2 February 2016. 287  James Wilets (n 66), p. 680. 288  See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) (n 279). 289  Adam Kretz (n 48), p. 230. 290 See, Oloka-Onyango & 9 Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No 8 of 2014. 291  The other human rights issues raised in this petition included: Discrimination, privacy, equality, and inhuman and degrading treatment. 292  New anti-gay bill drawn up in Uganda, Aljazeera 20 November 2014. 293  Human Rights Awareness and Promotion Forum v Attorney General of Uganda, Reference No 6 of 2014.

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message to other governments in the East African Community (EAC) that such legislative intervention violated the treaty of co-operation which established the body.”294 The East African Court of Justice declined to rule in favor of HRAPF arguing that the matter was moot. While Uganda’s legislative forums have fared badly in the protection of sexual minority rights, its judiciary has on several occasions exhibited the capacity to protect human rights related to sexual orientation and gender identity. In Victor Juliet Mukasa & Yvonne Oyo v Attorney General295 the High Court ruled for the leaders of an LGBT pressure-group who claimed to have had the privacy of their homes violated, correspondence interfered with, private property trespassed and bodies assaulted. This happened when local government officials entered their premises forcefully, searched it and detained them unlawfully. During the time they were in illegal detention, further violations were committed including torture and physical harassment. In awarding damages to the appellants, Justice Arach Amoko invoked the rights to life, privacy, equality, equality before the law, non-discrimination, security of person, property, and the right not to be subjected to torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment.296 Like in the Gitari case discussed above, Uganda’s High Court made a distinction between certain homosexual acts, which are criminal, and homosexual persons entitled to human rights.297 In Kasha Jacqueline, David Kato & Onziema Patience v Rolling Stone Ltd & Giles Muhame298 the High Court again ruled for sexual minorities. It issued both injunctive and compensatory orders against a newspaper that was serializing the names, pictures and private sexual lifestyles of homosexuals in Uganda (including the three applicants) under the caption, “Hang them: they are after our kids”. Despite sex against the order of nature being criminal in Uganda, the High Court found homosexual individuals to be entitled to rights such as dignity and privacy and protection from actual or future threats to life. Justice VF Musoke-Kibuuka reasoned that “Section 145 is narrower than gayism generally” and, thus, except for those specific elements criminalized under the Penal Code, homosexuals are entitled to the full dose of human rights. The call to violence against homosexuals is therefore unacceptable. The above fairly progressive jurisprudence from Uganda’s judiciary was, however, compromised in Nabagesera & 3 Others v Attorney General & Another299 where the High Court failed to protect the rights of participants who State authorities forcefully evicted from a workshop allegedly, because it “aimed 294  Joe Oloka-Onyango (n 203), p. 45. 295 (2008) AHRLR 248 (UgHC 2008). Civil Division, Miscellaneous Cause No 24/06. 296  See paras 41–44. 297  Para 41. 298  Miscellaneous Cause No 163 of 2010. Unreported. 299  Miscellaneous Cause No 33 of 2012. Unreported.



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at encouraging persons to engage in and or promote same-sex practices in the future”. Justice Steven Musota reasoned that since the applicants were members of the LGBTI community in Uganda that encourages same-sex practices among homosexuals, their free exercise of the rights of expression, association and assembly would be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, the High Court agreed with the State that “it was reasonable and justified for the Minister to conclude that this workshop was engaging in direct and indirect promotion of same-sex practices, which is prohibited by sections 145 and 21 of the Penal Code”. Notwithstanding the Nabagesera case, the Mukasa and Kasha precedents remain exhibits of the potential of the judicial forum in Uganda to serve as an effective bastion for the protection of sexual minority rights. For, in both cases, the courts identified homosexuals as human beings entitled to all categories of human rights. The High Court also made the useful observation that homosexuality is larger than the few acts criminalized under the Penal Code. It is a question of identity and not simply action or practice.

E. Conclusion In conclusion, it is important to highlight that the history of homosexuality in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda is one of escalating marginalization. Although traditional African societies showed preference for fecund heterosexual relations leading to marriage and children, they permitted homosexual conduct in certain instances such as during rituals meant to generate wealth or to maintain magical or political power. Available literature does not point to incidences of violence against or penal condemnation of practitioners of homosexuality in traditional African societies. To the contrary, same-sex relations existed in a variety of African societies including the Azande, Baganda, Basotho, El Garah, Kwayama, Langi, Lovendi, Meru, Nuer, Pangwe, Phalaborwa, Siwah, Teso and Venda. In line with the triple heritage theory, matters changed fundamentally with the coming of visitors, missionaries and imperialists. Through both their interactions and deliberate acts, the visitors (mostly Arabs and Europeans) caused significant changes in their hosts’ way of life. Be it in art, architecture, culture, language, music, politics or trade, the visitors left an indelible mark. By introducing new religions of Islam and Christianity, the missionaries availed new lenses through which to view life. These lenses began to influence how Africans understood phenomena including the family and sexuality. Informed by their Judaeo-Christian morality, British colonists introduced new laws which had the effect of altering the social, cultural, and political systems in a manner never before imagined. With respect specifically to homosexuality, for the first time, criminal sanctions were introduced to discourage the practice. The relevant colonial laws were vague and sketchy.

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On attaining independence, most common law jurisdictions in Africa retained the colonial criminal codes and their provisions on homosexuality. Recently, however, efforts have been made to fortify these regimes of law and it is Nigeria and Uganda that have triggered the second wave of criminalization. The key attributes of this wave appear to be the expansion of the scope of the anti-homosexuality offences introduced by the colonialists and the imposition of draconian penal sanctions. The new offences are unambiguous and “call a spade a spade”. Unlike the colonial penal regimes which contained euphemistic words like “carnal knowledge against the order of nature”, “unnatural sexual offences” or “sodomy”, the new codes are directly aimed against homosexuality. The new wave takes no chances as it is sufficiently methodical to proscribe not only homosexual acts but also homosexual identity in its entirety. Enabling entitlements such as the rights to association, assembly and privacy have equally been curtailed. The emerging codes also proscribe homosexual conduct prominently. Similarly, marriages or unions based on homosexual orientation have been denied legitimacy. Recent initiatives have also involved constitutional enactments that speak strongly for heterosexual families and clearly against homosexual marriages or unions. The stern laws, which have been enacted, have catalyzed both verbal and physical homophobic attacks against homosexuals. To support the legal frameworks discussed above, their architects, mostly politicians and conservative religious groups, have presented various arguments. They have argued, for instance, that homosexuality is un-African – that it is both immoral and non-existent in traditional African societies. Homosexuality is also presented as a threat to the traditional family and a danger to children and youth. Other proponents have warned that allowed to thrive, these practices will promote the spread of HIV, rape, defilement and other sexual offences. But it is religious arguments that have been most prominent. Most anti-homosexuality crusaders have cited the Bible and the Quran as the basis for criminalizing homosexual conduct and relations and for punishing those with this orientation harshly. The adage that “religion is a determining factor in defining societal attitudes towards homosexuality”300 has proven to be true in the African context. On a positive note, the analysis in this chapter shows that there is still hope for human rights in Africa. This is because judicial institutions in countries such as Kenya and Uganda have demonstrated both the capacity and the potential to protect the human rights of homosexuals. Even in countries where homophobia has manifested itself the most, such as in Uganda, courts of law have ruled in favor of LGBTI rights on certain occasions. There is also evidence of a vibrant civil society movement ardent at advocating for LGBTI rights in the countries under review.

300  James Wilets (n 66), p. 664.



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The final point is that just like in the beginning when British imperialists introduced criminal sanctions against homosexuality, the battle for and against LGBTI rights has remained a global affair. The battle has local and transnational fundamentalist politicians and religious groups on one side and the diplomatic community led by the United Nations and liberal democracies in the west, on the other. While colonialism introduced formal regulation of homosexuality in Africa, it is the activities of fundamentalist Christian organizations that have triggered the second wave of criminalizing homosexuality.

Gleichheit und traditionelle russische Werte am Beispiel der Rechtsprechung des russischen Verfassungsgerichts Elena Gritsenko Der Gleichheit kommt in Geschichte, Philosophie, Politik, Soziologie sowie in der Rechtswissenschaft und -praxis eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Die Gleichheit der freien griechischen und römischen Bürger war bereits in der Antike bekannt und von vielen Philosophen (etwa Platon, Aristoteles etc.) als ein spezifisches Merkmal menschlicher Natur und als Grundlage des menschlichen Zusammenlebens anerkannt. Der Gleichheit kommt damit eine ähnlich große Bedeutung zu wie der Freiheit und der Gerechtigkeit. Doch trotz dieser langen Historie haben die Diskussionen über die verschiedenen Gleichheitsfragen bis heute nicht zu einem Konsens geführt  – weder im Allgemeinen noch in einem bestimmten Kontext und auch nicht unter Berücksichtigung der Traditionen und Besonderheiten konkreter Gesellschafts- und Verfassungsordnungen. Das kann kaum verwundern, denn aufgrund ihrer Eigenart werden Gleichheitsbestrebungen immer unvollendet bleiben. Gleichheit ist relativ, sie entfaltet sich nur in bestimmter Hinsicht oder in einem bestimmten Verhältnis. Es kommt immer darauf an, was und mit wem verglichen wird, nach welchen Merkmalen und Maßstäben das Eine mit dem Anderen in Übereinstimmung gebracht werden soll und in welchen Fällen Ungleichheiten und ungleiche Behandlungen gerechtfertigt erscheinen. Die Gleichheit der Menschen hat sich in der demokratischen Verfassungsordnung inzwischen zu einem Grundsatz, zur Garantie, zum Grundrecht (subjektiven Recht) und schließlich zum wichtigen Wesenselement des Rechtsstaates entwickelt. Trotzdem lässt sich ein entscheidender Unterschied zwischen der formalen Gleichheit, also der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, und der Chancengleichheit sowie der sozialen Gleichheit herausstellen. Letztere umfasst den Anspruch für sozial Bedürftige und sozial schwache oder beeinträchtigte Gruppen auf Sondersozialhilfemaßnahmen und Vorteile, was eine Folge der sogenannten positiven Diskriminierung ist. Die Balance und den Ausgleich zwischen den verschiedenen Facetten der Gleichheitsaspekte zu finden, ist ein Rechtsproblem und eine Herausforderung für Gesetzgeber und Rechtsanwender in jeder Rechtsordnung.

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Die geltende russische Verfassung von 1993 (im Folgenden Verf RF)1 orientiert sich an liberalen Werten, trägt jedoch auch einige Spuren der sozialistischen Vergangenheit. Sie kennt die Gleichheit als Grundsatz im Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Bürger, der das subjektive Recht auf Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und vor Gericht, das Recht auf Gleichbehandlung ohne Ansehen der Person und ein Diskriminierungsverbot umfasst (Art. 19 iVm Art. 6 Abs. 2 Verf RF). Die Gleichheitsgarantie gilt zudem nicht nur im rechtlichen, sondern auch im sozialen Sinne. Die rechtliche Gleichheit umfasst sowohl formale als auch materielle Aspekte. Die Gleichheitsrechte wirken allerdings nicht absolut, daher kann es durchaus zur Ungleichbehandlung objektiv ungleicher Sachverhalte kommen. Maßgeblich sind dann die in der rechtlichen Regelung angelegten objektiven Differenzierungen. Die Antwort auf die Frage, ob ein Umstand objektiv ist, ist aber selten eindeutig und bedarf regelmäßig der Auslegung. Erschwerend kommt hinzu, dass es sich hier oft um Wertungsfragen handelt. Die umfangreiche Judikatur des russischen Verfassungsgerichts (im Folgenden VfG RF) zu diesem Thema, in der das VfG RF die gleichheitsrechtliche Dogmatik weiterentwickelt hat, spielt hier eine außerordentliche Rolle. Um die Frage zu klären, inwieweit sich universelle Rechtsgrundsätze und europäische Standards der Menschenrechte entwickeln, und welche Rolle die kulturelle Identität sowie die traditionellen Werte dabei spielen, bietet sich eine Bewertung dieser Judikatur an. Die aktuellen Ansichten zur Lösung der verschiedenen Gleichheitsfragen in Russland sind historisch bedingt und haben sich vor dem Hintergrund der russischen Kultur und ihren Wandlungen entwickelt. Noch in der Sowjetunion und im Russland vor der Wende waren die im Recht und in der Gesellschaft herrschenden Vorstellungen von Gleichheit allein auf die soziale Gleichheit fokussiert, welche durch den Staat gewährleistet werden sollte; Gleichheitsgrundrechte waren nicht anerkannt. Die Hinwendung zu einem globalisierten Verständnis von Gleichheit begann erst Anfang der neunziger Jahre mit Einführung der Verfassung von 1993. Seit dem Jahr 2000 und insbesondere in letzter Zeit ist jedoch wieder eine Gegenbewegung hin zu russisch-traditionellen Werten zu bemerken, welche letztendlich im Konzept der Verfassungsidentität2 ihren 1  Hier und im Folgenden werden die Referenzen auf alle russische Rechtsquellen (Gesetze, Verordnungen und Gerichtsentscheidungen) nach der juristischen elektronischen Datenbank „ConsultantPlus“ gegeben. Stand: 15.11.2019. URL: http://www.consultant.ru. 2  Гаджиев Гадис А. Конституционная идентичность и права человека в России [Gadis A. Gadzhiev, Verfassungsidentität und Menschenrechte in Russland]: URL: http://www.ksrf.ru/ ru/​ News/​ Documents/report_Гаджиев_2016.pdf; Зорькин Валерий Д. Конституционная идентичность России: доктрина и практика // Журнал конституционного правосудия. 2017. N 4. С. 1–12 [Valerij D. Zor’kin, Verfassungsidentität Russlands: Doktrin und Praxis, in: Journal konstitutsionnogo pravosudija. 2017. N 4. S. 1–12]; Грачева Светлана А. Развитие концепта конституционной идентичности в связи с поиском подходов к разрешению конвенционно-конституционных коллизий и конфликтов // Журнал российского права.



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Ausdruck gefunden hat. Doch diese Bewegung ist recht kontrovers, denn die russische Kultur ist nicht einheitlich und war es auch nie. Die neuen Entwicklungen des Gleichheitskonzeptes sind insbesondere durch soziale Ungleichheit sowie durch die religiöse und ethnische Vielfalt der Bevölkerung geprägt. In der folgenden Darstellung soll untersucht werden, wie sich die Gleichheitsidee in der russischen und sowjetischen Philosophie, Politik und Verfassungsordnung entwickelt hat (A) und wie das Gleichheitskonzept in der geltenden Verfassung von 1993 aufgebaut ist (B). Behandelt werden soll außerdem, welche Rolle die traditionellen russischen Werte bei der Interpretation des Gleichheitssatzes und der Gleichheitsrechte in der Verfassungsgerichtsrechtsprechung spielen, welche Probleme aus dem Konflikt zwischen Tradition und Recht entstehen können und wie diese zu lösen sind (C).

A.  Gleichheit im Verhältnis zu Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Kontext der russischen Tradition Der Gleichheitsgedanke entwickelte sich in Russland historisch aus unterschiedlichen Richtungen, welche jedoch alle eng mit der Debatte zur Frage nach der „Gerechtigkeit“ verbunden waren. Gerechtigkeit wurde traditionell vor allem als soziale Gerechtigkeit verstanden, die in erster Linie die soziale Gleichheit umfasste, d. h. die Abschaffung sozialer Ungleichheiten, sich jedoch nicht aus dem „Rechtsgedanken“ oder aus Aspekten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit ergeben hat. Im Rahmen einer Umfrage des Lewada-Zentrums im Jahr 2015 gab jeder fünfte Einwohner Russlands (22 %) an, das russische Volk sei durch ein „starkes Gerechtigkeitsgefühl“ gekennzeichnet,3 und jeder dritte (30 %) gab zudem an, dass er Russland als ein gerechtes Land sehen möchte.4 Im Vergleich dazu gaben 2018. N 9. С. 52–64 [Svetlana A. Gracheva, Development of Concept of Constitutional Identity in Connection with the Search for Approaches to Resolving of Collisions of Constitutional Regulators and Law of the European Convention of Human Rights, in: Journal rossijskogo prava. 2018. N 9. S. 52–64]. 3 Wie Fjodor Dostoewskij in seinen „Aufzeichnungen aus einem toten Haus“ bemerkt hat, sind die typischsten Merkmale des russischen Nationalcharakters ein empfindliches Gerechtigkeitsgefühl und Durst nach Gerechtigkeit [„Высшая и самая резкая характеристическая черта нашего наро­да – это чувство справедливости и жажда её“]: Достоевский Фёдор М. Записки из мертвого дома. С. 142. URL: https://avidreaders.ru/download/zapiski-izmertvogo-doma.html?f=pdf. 4  Общественное мнение – 2015: ежегодник. М.: Левада–Цент р, 2016. C. 41 [Öffentliche Meinung  – 2015: Jahrbuch. Moskau: Lewada-Zentrum, 2016. S. 41] (im Folgenden: Öffentliche Meinung  – 2015). Cм. также: Дулина Надежда В., Засыпкин Владислав П., Икингрин Елена Н. Студенты о социальной справедливости и социальном равенстве в условиях современной России: региональные различия (по итогам прикладного социологического исследования) // Вестник Сургутского педагогического университета.

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nur 21 % der Befragten an, Russland als freies Land zu sehen; 57 % der Befragten wollten Russland als starkes Land sehen (ebenso viele – 57 % der Befragten – sehen Russland als wohlhabendes und ähnlich viele – 52 % der Befragten – als reiches Land). „Gerechtigkeit und Gleichberechtigung aller Gruppen der Bevölkerung“ wurden von 69 % der Befragten nicht als Merkmale des heutigen Russlands genannt, auf die man stolz sein könne.5 25 % der Befragten waren wegen der Probleme im sozialen Bereich besorgt, insbesondere wegen der ungerechten Verteilung des Einkommens und der drastischen Spaltung der Bevölkerung in arm und reich.6 36 % der Befragten vertraten die Meinung, dass der Wohlstand des Menschen davon abhänge, dass die Gesellschaft gerecht organisiert sei,7 wobei 46 % der Befragten meinten, ein normales Wohlstandsniveau solle vom Staat für alle geschaffen werden und nicht nur für die sozial schwachen Gruppen.8 Dass der Staat bei der Schaffung eines menschenwürdigen Lebens für seine Bürger eine aktive Rolle einnehmen solle, glaubten im Jahr 2018 sogar 62 % der Befragten.9 Die soziale Funktion des Staates wird damit für wichtiger gehalten als die rechtsstaatliche. Die Meinung, der Staat solle die gleichen Regeln für alle schaffen und auf deren Einhaltung achten, wurde nur von 30 % der Befragten vertreten.10 Und nur 14 % der Befragten empfanden Bürgerrechte und Freiheiten als prägende Merkmale einer Großmacht,11 während mehr als die Hälfte der Befragten 2017. № 5 (50). С. 176–185, 178 [Nadežda V. Dulina/​V ladislav P. Zasypkin/​Elena N. Ikingrin, Studien über die soziale Gerechtigkeit und soziale Gleichheit im heutigen Russland: regionale Besonderheiten (nach Ergebnissen einer soziologischen Forschung), in: Vestnik Surgutskogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. 2017. Nr. 5 (50). S. 176–185, 178]. 5  Öffentliche Meinung – 2015 (Fn. 4), S. 47. 6  Общественное мнение – 2017: ежегодник. – М.: Левада–Центр, 2018. C. 63 [Öffentliche Meinung – 2017: Jahrbuch. Moskau: Lewada-Zentrum, 2018. S. 63] (im Folgenden – Öffentliche Meinung – 2017). Im Jahr 2018 waren das bereits 30 % der Befragten (Общественное мнение – 2018: ежегодник. – М.: Левада–Центр, 2019. C. 56 [Öffentliche Meinung – 2018: Jahrbuch. Moskau: Lewada-Zentrum, 2019. S. 56] [im Folgenden  – Öffentliche Meinung  – 2018]). Dabei sehen 45 % (2017) und mehr als 50 % der Befragten (2018) die Armut der Bevölkerung als größtes Problem unter den sozial-wirtschaftlichen Problemen Russlands (Öffentliche Meinung – 2017, S. 62; Öffentliche Meinung – 2018, S. 55). 7  Öffentliche Meinung – 2015 (Fn. 4), S. 21. 8  Ibid., 22. 9  Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 (Fn. 6), S. 44. 10 Ibid. 11  Öffentliche Meinung – 2017 (Fn. 6), S. 35. Im Jahr 2018 ist diese Zahl um 10 % gestiegen (auf 24 %) (Öffentliche Meinung  – 2018 [Fn. 6], S. 33). Dabei sollte jedoch berücksichtigt werden, dass unter „Bürgerrechte und Freiheiten“ in der Regel auch die sozialen Rechte fallen. Nach der Ratingskala, die den Wert von verschiedenen Menschenrechten bestimmt, stehen die sozialen Rechte ganz oben (Recht auf Bildung, medizinische Versorgung und soziale Hilfe  – 65 %, Recht auf gut bezahlte Arbeit  – 40 %). Und selbst die Bürgerrechte und politischen Rechte stehen in dem mittleren oder unteren Teil der Ratingskala (Meinungsfreiheit – 32 %, Wahlrecht  – 17 %, Recht auf die Freizügigkeit  – 17 %) (Öffentliche Meinung  – 2015 [Fn. 4], S. 164).



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(47 % zu 40 %) nicht an faire Verfahren vor Gericht glaubte.12 Und genau so viele Befragte (47 % zu 39 %) fühlten sich nicht durch Gesetze geschützt.13 Im Jahr 2017 gaben 11 % an, sie hätten eine gute Vorstellung vom Inhalt der russischen Verfassung – 2018 waren es sogar nur noch 9 %.14 Die Mehrheit der Befragten glaubte auch nicht, dass die Bürger erfolgversprechend Einfluss auf die politischen Entscheidungen der öffentlichen Gewalt nehmen könnten (78 % bezüglich Entscheidungen auf föderaler Ebene und 65 % bezüglich Entscheidungen auf regionaler und kommunaler Ebene).15 Auch die Vorstellungen von der Demokratie sind verschieden: Etwa ein Drittel der Befragten verbindet die Demokratie mit der Sozialfunktion des Staates (34 %), etwas mehr (36 %) mit der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz (einschließlich der gleichen Pflichten) und ein etwas kleinerer Teil (31 %) mit der Meinungsfreiheit.16 Während 46 % der Befragten davon überzeugt sind, dass das Modell der westlichen Demokratie Russland fremd sei, glauben 36 %, dass dieses Modell in Russland unter Berücksichtigung der wesentlichen russischen Besonderheiten umgesetzt werden könne.17 61 % der Befragten schätzten Sicherheit und Ordnung mehr als Demokratie; letztere wurde lediglich von 21 % als wichtiger bewertet.18 Die Frage, ob Russland eine starke Hand braucht, wenn dabei gleichzeitig die Wahlen und andere demokratische Freiheiten eingeschränkt werden, polarisiert ebenfalls die Gesellschaft: Im Jahr 2017 gab es sogar mehr Stimmen (44 % zu 42 %) für einen starken Staat ohne demokratische Freiheiten.19 All dies geht mit der Einstellung einher, für welche sich Präsident Putin zu Beginn seiner Amtszeit 1999 ausdrücklich ausgesprochen hat: „Ein starker Staat ist für Russen keine Anomalie […], sondern im Gegenteil Quelle und Garant der Ordnung, Initiator und treibende Kraft hinter jeder Veränderung“.20 12  Öffentliche Meinung – 2017 (Fn. 6), S. 105. Der Vertrauensindex der Gerichte ist nach der Einschätzung der Befragten niedriger als der Vertrauensindex der Armee, des Sicherheitsdienstes, der Polizei und der Staatsanwaltschaft (Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 [Fn. 6], S. 89). 13  Öffentliche Meinung – 2017 (Fn. 6), S. 127. Im Jahr 2018 wurde die Zahl der Personen, die sich nicht geschützt fühlen noch größer (54 % zu 40 %), vgl. Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 (Fn. 6), S. 101. Zu soziologischen Angaben von vor 2011 siehe auch Marat Utjaschev, Das Rechtsbewusstsein der Bevölkerung aus soziologischer Sicht, in: Otto Luchterhandt (Hrsg.), Rechtskultur in Russland – Tradition und Wandel, 2011, S. 65–78, 69–70 (Zitiert nach: Uwe Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung, 2015, S. 588–589). 14  Öffentliche Meinung – 2017 (Fn. 6), S. 126; Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 (Fn. 6), S. 101. 15  Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 (Fn. 6), S. 45. 16  Öffentliche Meinung – 2015 (Fn. 4), S. 52. 17  Ibid., S. 51. 18  Ibid., S. 53. 19  Öffentliche Meinung  – 2017 (Fn. 6), S. 92. Zum Vergleich: 2011 betrug das Verhältnis 33 % zu 59 % und 2015 37 % zu 51 % (Öffentliche Meinung – 2015 [Fn. 4], S. 50). Im Jahr 2018 betrug dieses Verhältnis 42 % zu 49 % (Öffentliche Meinung – 2018 [Fn. 6], S. 75). 20  Путин Владимир, Россия на рубеже тысячелетий // Независимая газета. 1999. 30 дек. [Vladimir Putin, Russland an der Jahrtausendwende, in: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30. Dezember 1999]. Zitiert nach: Uwe Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung, 2015, S. 589.

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I.  Historische Entwicklung des Gleichheitsgedankens in der russischen Philosophie In der russischen Philosophie haben sich folgende Hauptrichtungen der Gerechtigkeits- und Gleichheitsinterpretation ausgebildet: 1.  Russisch-orthodoxische Philosophie und Slawophilie Es geht hier um die russische Religionsphilosophie, die auch und vor allem in der politisch-publizistischen Bewegung der Slawophilie ihren Ausdruck gefunden hat.21 Als bedeutende Vertreter dieser Richtung sind der Theologe Alexej Chomjakow (1804–1860), die Brüder Iwan (1823–1886) und Konstantin Aksakow (1817–1860) sowie die Brüder Petr (1808–1856) und Iwan Kirejewski (1806–1856) zu nennen. Die russisch-orthodoxe Philosophie, die „den russischen Sonderweg“ immer betonte, ist auch mit den Namen von Michail Tareew (1867–1934), Viktor Nesmelow (1863–1937), Pavel Swetlow (1961–1941), Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944), Pavel Florenski (1882–1937), Nikolai Berdjajew (1874–1948), Nikolai Losski (1870–1965), Fürst Sergej Trubetzkoi (1890–1949), Iwan Iljin (1883–1954) und Alexander Solschenizyn (1918–2008) verbunden. Die Slawophilie hat auch in den literarischen Werken von Nikolai Gogol (1809– 1852), Fjodor Dostojewski (1821–1881), Lev Tolstoj (1828–1910) und Fjodor Tjutčev (1803–1873)22 ihren Ausdruck gefunden. Die Religionsphilosophen sahen die christliche Orthodoxie als Grundlage der Gerechtigkeitstheorie, wobei die allheilige Person des Gottes Jesus Christus die Wahrheit verkörpere. Das Ideal der Wahrheit sei dabei die Gerechtigkeit in ihrer Ausprägung als allgemeine Gleichheit (vor Gott) und Wohlstand (Solidaritätsgemeinschaft, Brüderschaft). Im Vordergrund stehe das geistige Wohl und nicht die materiellen Güter. Außerdem wurde die Eigenständigkeit Russlands betont, welche ihre Stärke im Kollektivismus, in der Gemeinde und in der Gemeinschaft habe. Anders als beim Individualismus und Rationalismus wogen die Interessen der Gemeinschaft also schwerer als die des Individuums. 21  Das bedeutet nicht, dass alle religiösen Philosophen zu Slawophilen gehörten. So war Wladimir Solowjow als Westler bekannt. Seine Philosophie der All-Einheit, Staats- und Rechtslehre war den Westler-Ideen nahe. 22  Der russische Lyriker der Romantik Fjodor Tjutčev beschrieb die Besonderheit der russischen Mentalität mit dem berühmten Spruch: „Умом Россию не понять, аршином общим не измерить, у ней особенная стать, в Россию можно только верить“ [„Mit dem Verstand ist Russland nicht zu verstehen, nicht zu ermessen mit gemeinem Maß, ach, so ganz besonders ist sein Wesen, an Russland kann man nur glauben“] (Тютчев Фёдор И., Стихотворения 1860-ых годов, в: Тютчев Фёдор И. Полное собрание сочинений и писем в шести томах. М.: Изд.центр „Классика“, 2003. – Т. 2: Стихотворения, 1850–1873. С. 165 [Fjodor I. Tjutčev, Gedichte der 1860er Jahre, in: Fjodor I. Tjutčev, Sämtliche Werke in sechs Bänden, 2003, Bd. 2: Gedichte, 1850–1873, S. 165]).



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Alexej Chomjakow (1804–1860), der als Begründer der Slawophilie bekannt wurde, entwickelte das Sobornost’-Konzept. Für das Wort „Sobornost’“ findet sich keine passende Übersetzung. Es stammt etymologisch vom russischen Wort „sobor“ ab, das zweideutig ist: Es umschreibt zum Einen ein Kollegium aus Vertretern, die berufen sind, bestimmte Fragen gemeinsam zu lösen, zum anderen eine Kathedrale, in der die Geistlichen mehrerer Kirchen beim Gottesdienst zusammen sind. Die kirchliche Gemeinschaft spiegelt die Idee der „Einheit in Mehrheit“ (edinstvo vo mnozhestve) wider23 und unterscheidet sich von der katholischen und evangelischen Kirche dadurch, dass sie die im Widerspruch stehenden Grundsätze der Freiheit und der Einheit auf natürliche Weise zusammenbringt. Das Sobornost’-Konzept wurde von anderen russisch-orthodoxen Philosophen weiter ausgearbeitet. So hat es z. B. bei Wladimir Solowjow in der Philosophie der All-Einheit und in der Trubetzkoi-Philosophie als Sobornost’-Ideal, das sowohl dem Individualismus, als auch dem sozialistischen Kollektivismus entgegensteht, seinen Ausdruck gefunden.24 Im aktuellen philosophischen und soziologischen Schrifttum wird das Sobornost’-Konzept häufig als Grundlage sowohl späterer Solidaritätstheorien von Sergei Levitski, Nikolai Losskij und Semeon Frank, als auch des aktuellen Solidaritätsbegriffs betrachtet.25 Die Gleichheit wurde dabei vor allem als umfassende Gleichheit interpretiert – also als gleiche Verteilung der Güter und Ressourcen ohne Rücksicht auf Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Gruppen von Menschen. Dieses Verständnis von Gleichheit wurde später in der sowjetischen und postsowjetischen Zeit als uravnilovka bezeichnet. In diesem Zusammenhang trat die Gleichheit als Gegenteil der Gerechtigkeit und auch der Freiheit auf. Solange die Gerechtigkeit als eine moralische, nicht politische oder ökonomische Kategorie empfunden wird, darf sie hiernach nicht auf die gleiche Verteilung von materiellen Gütern reduziert werden. Nikolai Berdjajew kritisierte unter Berufung auf Alexis de Tocqueville und John Stuart Mill die liberale Einstellung zum harmonischen Verhältnis von Gleichheit und Freiheit: „Gleichheit richtet sich gegen jeden qualitativen Unterschied, gegen jeden Unterschied in der Lebensqualität, gegen das Recht auf die Erhebung über die anderen“. So steht die Gleichheit nach Berdjajew immer im unerbittlichen Antagonismus zur Freiheit.26 23  Хомяков А лексей С. Полное собрание сочинений: В 8 т. М., 1900. Т. 2. С. 312 [Alexej S. Khomyakov, Sämtliche Werke: in acht Bänden, Bd. 2, S. 312]. 24 Siehe dazu ausführlicher mit weiteren Hinweisen: Социальная справедливость в русской общественной мысли, Отв.ред. Юлия Б. Епихина. М.: Ин-т социологии РАН, 2016, С. 81 [Soziale Gerechtigkeit im russischen gesellschaftlichen Denken, Julija B. Epichina (Hrsg.), M.: Institut sociologii RAN, 2016, S. 81 (im Folgenden – Soziale Gerechtigkeit)]. Булгаков Сергей Н. Православие. М.: Лыбидь, 1991, С. 145–150. [Sergej N. Bulgakov, Orthodoxie. M.: Lybid’, S. 145–150. URL: https://royallib.com/book/bulgakov_sergiy/pravoslavie_ocherki_ ucheniya_pravoslavnoy_tserkvi.html]. 25  Soziale Gerechtigkeit (Fn. 24), S. 82. 26  „Равенство же направлено против всякого качественного различия и качественно-

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2.  Liberale Westler-Philosophen Unter dem Einfluss der europäischen Aufklärungsideen haben sich danach liberale Werte in Russland durchgesetzt und an die russischen Verhältnisse angepasst. Die Theorie der formellen Gleichheit von jedermann vor dem Gesetz, die in enger Verbindung mit dem Konzept der persönlichen Freiheit steht, wurde am stärksten vom liberalen Flügel der Westler-Philosophen27 beeinflusst und konkretisiert. Nach deren Auffassung kann Gleichheit nur dann zu Gerechtigkeit führen, wenn eine Rechtsordnung besteht, welche auch die Freiheit gewährleistet. Als Vertreter der liberalen Ideen im Russischen Reich sind Michail Speranskij (1772–1839), die Dekabristen28 und Pjotr Tschaadaew (1794–1856) zu erwähnen. Der Religionsphilosoph Tschaadaew ist auch als Ideologe und Gründer der Westler-Bewegung bekannt. In seinen Überlegungen zur Zukunft Russlands ging er von einem zivilisatorischen Ansatz aus. Er empfand die westeuropäische Zivilisation als Ideal und behauptete, dass Russland sich „zwischen den Zivilisationen des Ostens und des Westens“ befinde, wobei der für Russland richtige Weg in Richtung westeuropäischer Zivilisation gehe. Dabei blieben die Ursprünge der russischen und der westeuropäischen Zivilisation verschieden und es gehe nicht um den Zusammenschluss der russischen Zivilisation mit der westlichen, sondern um die eigene Zukunft Russlands, die sich auf westeuropäische Werte stützen solle. In seinem ersten philosophischen Brief schrieb Tschaadaew: „Wir haben keinerlei Tradition, keine Geschichte, die unser Volk erzogen hätte. Wir sind ohne Vergangenheit und ohne Zukunft. Isoliert von der übrigen Menschheit fehlt uns jede eigene Entwicklung, jeder wirkliche Fortschritt. Von den Ideen der Pflicht, der Gerechtigkeit und der Ordnung, welche die Atmosphäre des Westens ausmachen, sind wir ganz unberührt […]. Wir besitzen ein riesengroßes Land  – aber geistig sind wir vollständig unbedeutend, eine Lücke in der Weltordnung“.29 го содержания жизни, против всякого права на возвышение“: Бердяев Николай А. Философия неравенства. Письма к недругам по социальной философии. Берлин, [Nikolaj A. Berdjajew, Filosofija neraventstva. Pis’ma k nedrugam po socialnoj filosofii [Die Philosophie der Ungleichheit. Briefe an die Gegner in Fragen der Sozialphilosophie] 1923 (russ. Ausgabe)]. 27  Westler-Philosophie – eine politisch-philosophische Bewegung, die sich in Russland als Gegenströmung zu Slawophilie entwickelte. 28  In den Dekabristen-Verfassungsentwürfen haben sich liberale Prinzipien der Staats- und Gesellschaftsorganisation durchgesetzt. Im Verfassungsentwurf des Russischen Reiches von Nikita Murawjow (1795–1843) wurde die Gleichheit aller Russen vor dem Gesetz festgelegt (Art. 10), deren Voraussetzung die Abschaffung der Leibeigenschaft ist. Pavel Pestel (1793– 1826) hat in seiner Version der republikanischen Verfassung „Russkaja Prawda“ („Russische Wahrheit“) gegen Aristokratieprivilegien und Leibeigenschaft sowie für das Zusammenleben des einheitlichen Volkes in der demokratischen Republik plädiert, in welcher die Gleichheit der Bürgerrechte und der politischen Rechte (gleiches Wahlrecht) gewährleistet ist. 29  Чаадаев Пётр Я. Первое философское письмо // Телескоп. М. 1836. №15 / [Pjotr Ja. Tschaadaew, Pervoe philosophskoe pis’mo [Erster Philosophischer Brief ], in: Teleskop, 1836, Nr. 15].



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Die Politik der Europäisierung führe Russland vom engen Korsett seines Heimatlandes in die weite Welt der Menschheit, in der es einen anständigen Platz einnehmen könne.30 Der entscheidende Unterschied zwischen Westler-Ideologie und Slawophilie bestand also in der Vorstellung über die zukünftige Entwicklung Russlands: Die Westler meinten, Russland solle den Weg einer westeuropäischen Zivilisation beschreiten, während die Slawophilen die Idee des russischen Sonderwegs unterstützten. Die liberalen Westler-Ideen haben sowohl berühmte Schriftsteller und Dichter wie Ivan Turgenew (1818–1885), Nikolaj Nekrasov (1821–1878), Ivan Gontscharow (1812–1891) oder Michail Saltykow- Ščedrin (1826–1889) als auch bedeutende Staatsrechtler wie Pjotr Redkin (1808–1891), Konstantin Kavelin (1818–1885) und Boris Tschitscherin (1828–1904) vertreten. Liberale Werte haben sich in Russland jedoch nicht verfestigen können.31 Häufig wurden sie von Anfang an radikalisiert und als Versuche einer Rechtfertigung von Aufständen wahrgenommen. Eine solche Radikalisierung ist bereits bei Aleksandr Radiščev (1749–1802) zu sehen, dessen politische Einstellung von den Vertretern der französischen Aufklärung wie Rousseau, Mably und Montesquieu geprägt worden war. Er trat für die persönliche Freiheit, Menschenwürde, das Naturrecht und den Gesellschaftsvertrag als wichtigste Werte ein und sah diese durch die Selbstherrschaft und die Leibeigenschaft verletzt. Er verstand es als das natürliche Recht eines jeden, aufzubegehren, wenn das formale Gesetz dem Menschen keinen Schutz gewährleistet. In seinem bedeutendsten Werk „Reise von Petersburg nach Moskau“ schrieb Radiščev: „Der Mensch ist mit anderen gleich geboren. Wir alle haben den Körper, die Vernunft und den Willen. Der Mensch ist daher ein freies Wesen und unabhängig in seinem Handeln. Er wird zum Bürger, wenn er sich selbst einschränkt und zustimmt, dass er nicht nur seinem eigenen Willen, sondern auch dem Wille der anderen unterstellt wird“.

Der Mensch werde aus eigenem Nutzen zum Bürger. Und wenn das Gesetz ihn nicht verteidige, entspreche es nicht mehr seinem Willen, Bürger zu sein.32 Auch die Dekabristen bildeten eine revolutionäre Bewegung, die gegen die zaristische Selbstherrschaft gerichtet war.33 30  Siehe: Сараева Елена Л. Размышления П. Я. Чаадаева о судьбе России // Ярославский педагогический вестник. 2014. №4. С. 17–26, 21; Elena L. Saraeva, Razmyshlenija P. Ja. Chaadaeva o sud’be Rossii [Überlegungen von P. Ja. Tschaadaew zum Schicksal Russlands], in: Jaroslavskij pedagogicheskij vestnik, 2014, Nr. 4, S. 17–26, 21. 31  Siehe dazu: Uwe Kischel, Rechtsvergleichung, 2015, S. 589. 32  Радищев Александр Н., Путешествие из Петербурга в Москву. СПб.: Наука, 1992. С. 43; Aleksandr N. Radiščev, Puteschestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu [Reise von Petersburg nach Moskau], 1992, S. 43. 33  Siehe dazu: Adam B. Ulam, Russlands gescheiterte Revolution: Von den Dekabristen bis zu den Dissidenten, 1988; Dokumente der Dekabristenbewegung. Die Dekabristen des Jahres 1825: die Erinnerungen des Nikolaj I. Lorer/​Nikolaj Lorer/​Joachim Winsmann. 3. Aufl., 2017;

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3. Sozialisten Die revolutionäre Ausrichtung der Westler-Ideologie war in diesem Zusammenhang in Russland von besonderer Bedeutung. Sie beeinflusste zusammen mit der sozialistischen Idee die Entwicklung Russlands. Die Sozialisten unterschieden sich von den liberalen Vertretern der Westler-Ideologie jedoch in ihren Vorstellungen von Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit. Die Kernfrage war hier, wie eine soziale Gerechtigkeit erreicht werden kann, die nicht nur die formelle Rechtsgleichheit, sondern auch eine reale soziale Gleichheit umfasst. Im Vordergrund standen dabei Diskriminierungen aufgrund von Klassenunterschieden, die es auf dem Weg zu Gerechtigkeit zu überwinden galt. Diskriminierungen wegen anderer Kriterien, wie dem Geschlecht oder auch der Ethnie, waren im Vergleich hierzu zweitrangig und konnten durch entsprechende Maßnahmen im Rahmen der Chancengleichheit gelöst werden. Chancengleichheit wurde dabei häufig mit der Ergebnisgleichheit vermischt. In der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts kam im Russischen Kaiserreich die sozialrevolutionäre Narodniki-Bewegung (Volkstümler, Volksfreunde, Populisten) mit einer eigenen Interpretation der sozialistischen Idee auf. Alexander Herzen (1812–1870) betonte, die auf westlichem Boden gewachsene sozialistische Idee könne gerade in Russland auf der für sie günstigen Grundlage der Bauerngemeinde in Erfüllung gehen.34 Die Bauerngemeinde kenne kein Privateigentum und basiere auf gleichen Rechten jedes Mitglieds der Gemeinde auf Nutzung des Bodens. Sozialismus wurde dabei einerseits als Alternative zur bürgerlichen Entwicklung, welche sich im Westen vollzog, und anderseits als Alternative zur russischen Leibeigenschaft gesehen. Auch Nikolai Ogarjow (1813–1877) stellte sich Russland als föderale Republik mit selbstverwaltenden Gemeinden vor, die die Grundlage der sozialen Gerechtigkeit bilden sollten.35 Darin liegt indes ein Widerspruch begründet, denn Gemeinden stellten gleichzeitig eine Einschränkung für die freie Entwicklung des Individuums dar. Einen besonderen Platz in der Narodniki-Bewegung nahm Nikolai Tschernyschewski (1828–1889) ein, der für eine sozialistische Volksbauernrevolution Sam Bayat, Die Dekabristen  – Aufstand und Wirken: von den Geheimgesellschaften zum Dekabristenaufstand, 2. Aufl. Grin Verl., 2012. 34  Герцен Александр И. Порядок торжествует // Герцен Александр И. Собр. соч. в 30 т. М., 1960. Т. 19. С. 186, 193 [Alexander I. Herzen, Ordnung triumphiert, in: Alexander I. Herzen, Sämtliche Werke in 30 Bänden, 1960, Bd. 19, S. 186, 193]. Источник: http://gertsen. lit-info.ru/gertsen/public/kolokol-1866-1867/article-92.htm, siehe auch: Павлов Сергей И. Теория русского социализма А. И. Герцена // Вестник МГТУ. 2000. Т. 3. №3. С. 475–490 [Sergei I. Pavlov, Theorie des russischen Sozialismus von A. I. Herzen, in: Vestnik MGTU, 2000, Bd. 3 Nr. 3, S. 475–490]. 35  Огарёв Николай П. Русские вопросы. Крестьянская община // Колокол, прибавочные листы к Полярной Звезде. Лист 9. 15 Февраля. 1858. С. 68–73 [Nikolai P. Ogarjov, Russische Fragen. Bauerngemeinde, in: Kolokol, Beilageblätter zum Polarstern. Bl. 9. 15. Februar. 1858. S. 68–73].



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und die Idee des volkstümlichen Sozialismus (narodnicheskij sozialism) plädierte. Dabei trat er als Kritiker des Rechts auf, das seines Erachtens auf materieller Ungleichheit (Vermögensungleichheit) basiert und damit nur die Maske der Ungerechtigkeit darstelle, die aus der Herrschaft des Individualismus entstehe.36 Einer der prominentesten Vertreter des revolutionären Populismus im Russland der 1860er und 1870er Jahre war Michail Bakunin (1819–1878), der Begründer des russischen Anarchismus. Seine Einstellung entwickelte sich unter dem Einfluss von Lorenz von Stein („Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreich“), den Ideen französischer Frühsozialisten (François Marie Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc und Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) sowie Max Stirner. Nach Bakunin ist eine ideale und gerechte Gesellschaft eine atheistische, ohne Staat und auf Gleichheit beruhend. Gleichheit sei dabei der höchste Ausdruck der Gerechtigkeit. Die Umsetzung der Freiheit in der rechtlichen und tatsächlichen Gleichheit – das sei die Gerechtigkeit.37 Bakunin versteht unter Sozialismus die wirtschaftliche und soziale Gleichheit, aus der eine Gesellschaft ohne Klassen resultiert, in der jedermann gleichen Zugang zu Produktionsmitteln und Bildung genießt38 und in der Frauen emanzipiert und dem Mann gleichgestellt sind.39 Die Grundprinzipien einer egalitären Gesellschaft seien Freiheit (gleiche Freiheit für jeden durch die Freiheit aller)40, Sozialismus und Föderalismus (selbstorganisierter Aufbau der Gesellschaft von unten nach oben, basierend auf freier Assoziation der Individuen, Produktionsgemeinschaften und Kommunen ohne Konzentration der Macht auf eine zentrale Gewalt). Bei der Betrachtung der verschiedenen sozialistischen Theorien kann festgestellt werden, dass unter Sozialisten die Ergebnisgleichheitstheorien oder Verteilungsgleichheitstheorien deutlich verbreiteter sind, als die Theorien der formalen Gleichheit und der Chancengleichheit. Im Artikel „Philosophische 36 Чернышевский Николай Г. Полн.собр.соч. в 16-ти томах. Т. 4. С. 228 [Nikolai G. Tschernyschevski, Sämtliche Werke in 16 Bänden, Bd. 4, S. 228]. Zitiert nach: Козлов Михаил И. Социальная справедливость в контексте русской традиции. Архангельск, 2010. С. 94 [Michail I. Kozlov, Soziale Gerechtigkeit im Kontext der russischen Tradition. Archangel’sk, 2010. S. 94]. 37  [„Осуществление свободы в правовом и фактическом равенстве и есть справедливость“]: Бакунин Михаил А. Принципы и организация интернационального революционного общества // Бакунин М. А. Анархия и порядок: сборник трудов. М.: Эксмо-Пресс, 2000. С. 146 [Michail A. Bakunin, Prinzipien und Organisation der internationalen revolutionären Gesellschaft, in: Michail A. Bakunin, Anarchie und Ordnung: Sammlung von Werken, 2000, S. 146]. 38  Michail A. Bakunin, Die revolutionäre Frage: Föderalismus, Sozialismus, Antitheologismus, 2005, S. 60. 39  Ibid., S. 59. 40  Jürgen Mümken, Bakunin und die Autorität, in: Bernd Kramer/​Wolfgang Eckhardt (Hrsg.), Bakunin Almanach, 2007, S. 177.

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Wahrheit und intellektuelle Gewissheit“ kam Berdjajew zu folgender Schlussfolgerung: „Interessen der Verteilung und des Ausgleichs haben im Bewusstsein und in den Gefühlen der russischen Intellektuellen immer über die Interessen der Produktion und Kreativität dominiert“.41 Das führte zu folgendem Unglück: „Die Liebe zu egalitärer (Ausgleichs-)Gerechtigkeit, zum Gemeinwohl und zum öffentlichen Gut lähmte die Liebe zur Wahrheit und hat das Interesse an der Wahrheit, also das eigentliche Wesen der Philosophie, fast vernichtet“.42 4. Zwischenergebnis Ungeachtet größerer Unterschiede zwischen den historisch aufgebauten und in russischer Denkweise entwickelten Konzepten lässt sich feststellen, dass es bei der Lösung der Gleichheitsfrage im Kern schon immer um Gerechtigkeit ging. Die Gerechtigkeit wurde jedoch nicht mit dem Recht assoziiert,43 sondern mit sozialer Gleichheit. Dieser wurde höhere Bedeutung zugemessen, als den Ideen der Freiheit und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Die Gerechtigkeits- und Gleichheitstheorien entwickelten sich in Russland unter dem Einfluss der offiziellen Staatsdoktrin, welche auf drei ideologischen Säulen beruhte  – Selbstherrschaft, Orthodoxie und Volkstum.44 Diese ideo41  Бердяев Николай А.: „Интересы распределения и уравнения в сознании и чувствах русской интеллигенции всегда домини­ровали над интересами производства и творчества“ (Бердяев Николай А. Философская истина и интеллигентская правда // Манифесты русского идеализма. Сборник статей о русской интеллигенции/​Сост. Вадим В. Сапов. М.: Астрель, 2009. С. 455–471, 456. [Nikolai A. Berdjajev, Philosophische Wahrheit und intellektuelle Gewissheit, in: Manifeste des russischen Idealismus. Sammelband von Artikeln über die russische Intelligenz, Zusammenfassung von Vadim V. Sapov, 2009, S. 455–471, 456]. 42  [Бердяев Николай А.: „С русской интеллигенцией в силу исторического ее положения случилось вот какого рода несчастье: любовь к уравни­тельной справедливости, к общественному добру, к народному благу па­рализовала любовь к истине, почти что уничтожила интерес к истине. А философия есть школа любви к истине, прежде всего к истине] (Ibid.). 43 Wie der russische Philosoph Wladimir Solowjow (1853–1900) bemerkte, sind die Tugend der Gerechtigkeit und die Legalität oder die rechtliche Wahrheit nicht gleichzusetzen, vielmehr befinden sie sich manchmal in direktem Konflikt [„Справедливость, как добродетель, далеко не всегда совпадает с легальностью, или правдою юридическою, а иногда находится с нею в прямом противоречии“] Соловьев Владимир С., Оправдание добра. Нравственная философия. Глава пятая „О добродетелях“. Библиотека „Вехи“, 2004, URL: http://www.vehi.net/soloviev/oprav/index.html/ ​Wladimir S. Solowjow, Opravdanie dobra. Nravstvennaja philosophija [Die Rechtfertigung des Guten. Eine Moralphilosophie, Kap. 5, „Über die Tugenden“]. 44  Samoderzhavie, pravoslavie, narodnost’ [Самодержавие, православие, народность]. Siehe dazu: Вортман Ричард, „Официальная народность“и национальный миф российской монархии XIX века [Richard Wortman, „Offizieller Populismus“ und nationaler Mythos der Russischen Monarchie des 19. Jh.] // Россия/​Russia. Вып.3: Культурные практики в идеологической перспективе. Россия, XVIII – нач.XIX в. М.: ОГИ, 1999, С. 233–244 [URL: http://ec-dejavu.ru/o/​Official_Nation.html].



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logischen Säulen wurden wiederum durch die historische Entwicklung der Bauerngemeinden und das jeweilige Leibeigenschaftsrechts geprägt. Der prominente Rechtswissenschaftler Bogdan Kistjakowski beschrieb in seinem Aufsatz „Zum Schutz des Rechts“ die Besonderheiten der russischen Rechtskultur wie folgt: „Traten in der westeuropäischen Kultur Recht und Gerechtigkeit regelmäßig als Synonyme auf, so wurden diese von einem russischen Intellektuellen zumeist als Antonyme aufgefasst (zumindest zur Zeit des 19. Jh.). Das geringe Rechtsbewusstsein der russischen Intellektuellen und das mangelnde Interesse an Rechtsideen sind das Ergebnis eines langjährigen Übels: dem fehlenden Einfluss der Rechtsordnung auf das Alltagsleben der russischen Bevölkerung. Hieran wiederum tragen die Intellektuellen aber eine Teilschuld; sie haben nie das Ideal einer Rechtspersönlichkeit ausgebildet. Beide Facetten dieses Ideal einer Rechtspersönlichkeit, die einerseits durch das Recht und die nachhaltige Rechtsordnung diszipliniert ist und andererseits als Träger von Rechten und Freiheiten auftritt, sind ihnen fremd“.45

Die oben vorgestellten aktuellen soziologischen Aspekte bestätigen, dass auch im heutigen Russland ein hierarchisches und imperialistisches bzw. zentralistisches Denken, der Glaube an den Zaren-Vater, der weiß, was für seine Untertanen gut ist,46 eine tiefe Spaltung zwischen Macht und Volk sowie Rechtsnihilismus vorherrschen. So erlangten die Werte Privateigentum, Menschenwürde, Freiheit und Demokratie nur zweitrangige oder sogar kaum eine Bedeutung.

II.  Entwicklung des Gleichheitssatzes in Russland nach der Oktoberrevolution 1.  Ideologische Grundlage Unter den politischen, wirtschaftlichen und ideologischen Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts dominierte eine extreme Form der Westler-Philosophie, eine russifizierte Form des Marxismus, die von den Bol45  [Кистяковский Богдан А.: „Если в западноевропейской культуре право и справедливость чаще всего выступают как синонимы, то в сознании русского интеллигента (по крайней мере, того време­ни) они нередко выступали и как антонимы. […] Притупленность правосознания русской интеллигенции и отсутствие интереса к правовым идеям являются результатом застарелого зла  – отсутствия какого бы то ни было правового порядка в повседневной жизни русского народа. […] Но есть определенная вина и на интеллигенции: Наше общественное сознание никогда не выдвигало идеала правовой личности. Обе стороны этого идеала  – личности, дисциплини­ рованной правом и устойчивым правопорядком, и личности, на­деленной всеми правами и свободно пользующейся ими, чужды сознанию нашей интеллигенции.“] (Кистяковский Богдан А., В защиту права: Интеллигенция и правосознание // Манифесты русского идеализма: Сборник статей о русской интеллигенции/​Сост. Вадим В. Сапов. М.: Астрель, 2009, С. 552–576 [Bogdan A. Kistjakowski, Zum Schutz des Rechts: Intelligenz und Rechtsbewusstsein, in: Manifeste des russischen Idealismus, Sammelband von Artikeln über die russische Intelligenz, Zusammenfassung von Vadim V. Sapov, 2009]). 46  „Der Zar ist gut, die Adligen sind schlecht“, so ein russisches Sprichwort.

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schewiki unter der Führung von Wladimir Lenin vertreten wurde. Dies war die ideologische Grundlage der sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution in Russland im Jahr 1917. Motto der Oktoberrevolution war die Errichtung einer Gesellschaft auf Grundlage der sozialen Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit. Das implizierte vor allem die Abschaffung der Ausbeuterklassen, die Verstaatlichung des Eigentums an Produktionsmitteln und Ressourcen sowie eine gleiche Verteilung des Vermögens unter den werktätigen Klassen. Wie Lenin in seinem Aufsatz „Staat und Revolution“ bemerkte, kann Sozialismus als erste Phase des Kommunismus die soziale Ungleichheit zwar noch nicht vollkommen abschaffen und auch keine bedürfnisorientierte Verteilung der Güter gewährleisten (der Verteilungsgrundsatz „Jedem nach seiner Leistung“ bleibt also bestehen). Allerdings macht der Sozialismus den ersten Schritt in diese Richtung, indem er das Privateigentum als die Hauptquelle der sozialen Ungleichheit abschafft.47 Für den sozialistischen Staat – zunächst ein solcher der Arbeiter und Bauern, später aller Werktätigen – war die Gleichheit in sozialer, nicht jedoch in rechtlicher oder politischer, Hinsicht also von entscheidender Bedeutung. Die Ideen der Freiheit, der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der Grundrechte des Menschen in ihrer liberalen und naturrechtlichen Interpretation waren dem marxistisch-leninistischen Konzept der sozialistischen Persönlichkeit, die nur in sozialer Hinsicht als Rechtssubjekt existiert und sich entfalten kann, fremd. 2.  Verfassung von 1918 Die sozialistische Vorstellung von Gleichheit war in allen sowjetischen Verfassungen manifestiert. Bereits in der ersten Verfassung der RSFSR von 191848 wurde die Grundaufgabe und die Entwicklungsperspektive des neuen Staates festgehalten. Diese sollten die Beseitigung jeder Ausbeutung eines Menschen durch einen anderen, eine vollständige Abschaffung der Einteilung der Gesellschaft in unterschiedlichen sozialen Klassen, die schonungslose Unterdrückung der Ausbeuter, die Herstellung einer sozialistischen Organisation der Gesellschaft und den Sieg des Sozialismus in allen Ländern (Art. 3) umfassen. Zudem wurde eine allgemeine Arbeitspflicht für ausnahmslos alle Bürger der Republik eingeführt (Art. 18). Die Losung „Wer nicht arbeitet, soll auch nicht essen“ wurde verkündet und später in Art. 12 der Verfassung der UdSSR von 193649 neben dem leistungsabhängigen Verteilungsgrundsatz50 niedergeschrieben. 47  Ленин Владимир И., Полн.собр.соч. Т. 33, C. 93 [Wladimir I. Lenin, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 33, S. 93]. 48  Siehe den Text der Verfassung der RSFSR von 1918 auf Deutsch: URL: https://www.​ 1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_ru&dokument=0005_ver&ob​ject=​trans​la​tion&​ l=de. 49  Volltext der Verfassung der UdSSR von 1936 auf Deutsch siehe: URL: https://www.​1000​ dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_ru&dokument=0021_ver&object=translation&​l=de. 50  Jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seiner Leistung.



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Die Verfassung beschrieb die Finanzpolitik der RSFSR im Übergangsstadium der Diktatur der Werktätigen als ein Mittel zur „Expropriierung der Bourgeoisie und zur Vorbereitung der Bedingungen für die allgemeine Gleichheit der Bürger der Republik auf dem Gebiet der Produktion und der Güterverteilung“ (Art. 79). Der „Eingriff in das private Eigentumsrecht“ zur Erfüllung dieser Aufgabe wurde für zulässig und zweckmäßig gehalten. Zudem wurden gleiche Rechte aller Bürger anerkannt, und das ohne Rücksicht auf ihre nationale und Rassenzugehörigkeit. Die Gewährung von Vorteilen aus diesen Gründen sowie die Unterdrückung nationaler Minderheiten oder die Beschränkung ihrer Gleichberechtigung wurden für verfassungswidrig erklärt (Art. 22). Die besondere Aufmerksamkeit des Verfassungsgesetzgebers für das Rassenmerkmal kann damit begründet werden, dass die Rassengleichheit als ein internationales proletarisches Prinzip vom Sowjetstaat unterstützt worden war, obwohl die Rassendiskriminierung in Russland im Vergleich zu den USA nie ein bedeutsames Thema war. Die Abschaffung der Nationalitätenunterschiede war ein Teil der sozialistischen Nationalpolitik, die formell mit der freien Selbstbestimmung der Völker (Ethnien) in Russland verbunden war. Dieser Grundsatz wurde noch im ersten Programm der sozial-demokratischen Arbeitspartei Russlands festgelegt.51 Die Deklaration der Nationalitätengleichheit war grundlegend für die neue föderale Sowjetrepublik, die als national-territoriale Föderation aufgebaut wurde und die Vereinigung der werktätigen Klassen aller Nationen Russlands schaffen sollte. Die Gleichberechtigung nach anderen Merkmalen (wie z. B. soziale Herkunft, Vermögensstand, Religion, Weltanschauungen, Mitgliedschaft in einer Partei oder anderen gesellschaftlichen Vereinigungen) hat die Verfassung nicht erwähnt und somit auch nicht garantiert. Ein solcher Ansatz entsprach dem Klassenprinzip und den Grundaufgaben des Staates als Diktatur des Proletariats. Im Bereich der politischen Rechte war das Klassenprinzip besonders stark ausgeprägt. Das aktive und passive Wahlrecht wurde den Bürgern der RSFSR unabhängig von Geschlecht, Glaubensbekenntnis, Nationalität, Ansässigkeit und anderen Merkmalen verliehen, solange sie nur Werktätige waren und keine Lohnarbeiter zum Zwecke der Gewinnerzielung beschäftigten (Art. 64). Das Wahlrecht erhielten weiterhin auch die Soldaten der Sowjetarmee und der Marine, sowie die Ausländer, die im Gebiet der RSFSR wohnhaft waren, sofern sie der Arbeiterklasse oder der Bauernschaft angehörten und sich nicht fremder 51  Punkt 9 iVm Punkt 7 des Programms der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Russlands, angenommen auf dem 2. Parteitag im Jahr 1903 (siehe den Volltext auf Deutsch: URL: https://sites. google.com/site/sozialistischeklassiker2punkt0/lenin/1903/sdapr-das-programm-der-sdapr, siehe auch: Ленин Владимир И., О национальной программе РСДРП // Полн.собр.соч. в 30-ти томах. Т. 17. М.-Л., 1935, С. 139–146 [Wladimir I. Lenin, Über das nationale Programm der SDAPR, in: Wladimir I. Lenin, Sämtliche Werke in 30 Bänden, Bd. 17, 1935, S. 139–146] siehe den Volltext auf Deutsch: https://sites.google.com/site/sozialistischeklassiker2punkt0/ lenin/1913/wladimir-i-lenin-ueber-das-nationale-programm-der-sdapr.

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Arbeitskraft bedienten (Art. 64 iVm Art. 20). Diese Erweiterung des Wählerkreises entsprach dem Grundsatz der Solidarität der Werktätigen aller Nationen und dem Kampfruf der internationalen Sozialdemokratie: „Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!“. In Art. 65 der Verfassung wurden die Bevölkerungskategorien aufgezählt, denen das Wahlrecht nach dem Klassengrundsatz entzogen worden war.52 Selbst die Wahlen der Deputierten zu den Sowjetkongressen waren für die Stadt- und Landwähler nicht gleich (Art. 53). Grundsätzlich wurden alle Rechte der Bürger sowie die Gleichberechtigung unter dem wichtigen Vorbehalt erklärt, dass einzelne Personen und sogar Gruppen der Bevölkerung die Bürgerrechte verlieren, wenn sie ihre Rechte „zum Schaden der Interessen der sozialistischen Revolution benützen“ (Art. 23). 3.  Stalin-Verfassung (1936) In der sogenannten Stalin-Verfassung der UdSSR von 1936, der Verfassung des „endgültig und vollständig siegreichen Sozialismus“ war der Gleichheitsgrundsatz noch umfassender festgelegt. Die Gleichberechtigung der Staatsbürger der UdSSR wurde – unabhängig von ihrer Nationalität und Rasse – auf sämtlichen Gebieten des wirtschaftlichen, staatlichen, kulturellen, gesellschaftlichen und politischen Lebens als unverbrüchliches Gesetz deklariert (Art. 123). Der Grundsatz der Gleichberechtigung der Unionsrepubliken wurde hinzugefügt (Art. 13), der zuvor de jure in der Deklaration und im Gründungsvertrag der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken vom 31.12.1922 und in der Verfassung der UdSSR von 1924 im Rahmen der Gleichheit der souveränen Nationalrepubliken in der Union der gleichberechtigter Völker53 festgelegt worden war. Die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau in allen Bereichen des wirtschaftlichen, staatlichen, kulturellen und gesellschaftlich-politischen Lebens, die von Anfang an zu den wichtigsten sozialistischen Grundlagen gehörte,54 wurde ausdrücklich55 in Art. 122 der Verfassung von 1936 normiert. Die hauptsächlich 52  Es ging um folgende klassenfremde Bevölkerungsgruppen: a) Personen, die Lohnarbeiter zum Zwecke der Gewinnerzielung beschäftigen; b) Personen, die nicht von den Einkünften ihrer Arbeit leben, sondern z. B. von Kapitalzinsen, Einkünften von Unternehmen, Vermögen, usw.; c) private Handelsleute, Handels- und kaufmännische Vermittler; d) Mönche und geistliche Diener der Kirchen und Religionskulturen; e) Angestellte und Agenten der früheren Polizei, des besonderen Gendarmeriekorps und den Geheimabteilungen sowie die Mitglieder des früher in Russland regierenden Hauses. 53 Deklaration über die Gründung der UdSSR v. 30.12.1922; Gründungsvertrag der UdSSR v. 30.12.1922; das Grundgesetz (Verfassung) der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken v. 31.01.1924 (URL: https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_ru&​ dokument=0019). 54  Siehe Punkt 7 des Programms der SDAPR von 1903. 55  Zusätzlich hat die Verfassung das gleiche Wahlrecht von Frauen und Männern (Art. 137) neben dem Grundsatz der Gleichheit der Wahlen (Jeder Staatsbürger hat eine Stimme und nimmt auf gleicher Grundlage an den Wahlen teil – Art. 136) unterstrichen.



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soziale Auswirkung des Gleichheitsrechts der Frauen und Männer ist in den Garantien zu erkennen, die in Art. 122 Abs. 2 festgelegt waren. Die Möglichkeit der Frauen, ihre Selbstentfaltung zu verwirklichen, wird hier durch gleiche Rechte auf Arbeit, Arbeitslohn, Erholung, Sozialversicherung und Ausbildung gewährleistet. Dies geschah darüber hinaus durch den Schutz von Mutter und Kind, die staatliche Unterstützung der Mutter- und Kindesinteressen, die staatliche Hilfe für Familien mit vielen Kindern und für alleinstehende Mütter, die Gewährung eines voll bezahlten Schwangerschaftsurlaubs, und außerdem die Bereitstellung eines dichten Netzes von Geburtskliniken, Kinderkrippen und -gärten. Neben der Garantie der Gleichheit von Männern und Frauen im Hinblick auf sozial-ökonomische Rechte wurden also zusätzliche Rechte und Garantien für Mütter vorgesehen, nämlich der staatliche Schutz der Interessen von Müttern und Kindern, die staatliche Unterstützung von Müttern mit vielen Kindern und alleinstehenden Müttern, Schwangerschaftsurlaube und der Entwicklung der dafür notwendigen Infrastruktur. Die Emanzipation der Frauen, die formelle Gleichberechtigung der Männer und der Frauen in allen Bereichen des öffentlichen Lebens und letztendlich auch in der Familie sowie das Bild der „werktätigen Mutter“ (materi-truzhenitsy) werden von den sowjetischen Forschern als wichtige Errungenschaft des Sozialismus betont. Wie Ljudmila N. Zavadskaja dazu feststellte, sollte die Illusion der erreichten Gleichheit [der Männer und Frauen] die Erfolge des Sozialismus beweisen und sie erfüllte diese Funktion gut.56 Obwohl die sowjetischen Verfassungen in vielen ihrer Bestimmungen fiktiv waren und nicht der Rechtswirklichkeit entsprachen, war die Geschlechtergleichheit doch weitgehend durchgesetzt und offene Diskriminierungen von Frauen wurden unterbunden. Wie Olga G. Podoplelova bemerkt, war die Frauenemanzipationsgeschichte in Russland in vielerlei Hinsicht einzigartig. Politische, soziale und ökonomische Rechte, welche die Frauenbewegungen in den westlichen Ländern erst nach langem Kampf Schritt für Schritt im Laufe des 19. und des 20. Jahrhunderts erkämpft hatten, wurden den sowjetischen Frauen vom Staat von selbst verliehen.57 Doch bei der Durchsetzung des Geschlechtergleichheitsprinzips in den sowjetischen Verfassungen sind einige Widersprüche im Hinblick auf die formale Gleichheit zu erkennen, welche noch in der patriarchalischen Rollenverteilung 56  Siehe Завадская Людмила Н., Глава 2. Развитие конституционной идеи равенства полов в Конституциях 1918, 1936, 1977 годов // Гендерная экспертиза российского законодательства/​Под ред. Людмилы Н. Завадской. М.: БЕК, 2001. URL: http://www.owl. ru/win/books/zavadskaya/2.htm; [Ljudmila N. Zavadskaja, Kap. 2: Entwicklung der Verfassungsidee der Geschlechtergleichheit in den Verfassungen von 1918, 1936, 1977, in: Ljudmila N. Zavadskaja (Hrsg.), Genderexpertise der russischen Gesetzgebung, 2001]. 57  Подоплелова Ольга Г. Гендерные стереотипы в конституционном праве России: ловушка „особого отношения“? // Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2018. №3. С. 73–91 [Olga Podoplelova, Gender stereotypes in Russian constitutional law: the „special treatment“ trap?, in: Comparative constitutional Review. 2018, Nr. 3, S. 73–91].

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zwischen Männern und Frauen wurzeln. Die Begünstigungen der Frauen waren mit den traditionell patriarchalischen Vorstellungen über die Rolle der Frau als Mutter in der Gesellschaft und in der Familie verbunden (Frau – Mutter; Mann – Vater, Arbeiter und Ernährer der Familie) und hatten mit der Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau nichts zu tun. Da in der UdSSR jedoch alle Frauen und Männer in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft gleichberechtigte Werktätige waren, konnte das traditionelle Rollenverständnis nicht mehr aufrechterhalten werden. Die Unterstützung der Väter, Rechte des alleinstehenden Vaters und des Vaters mit vielen Kinder waren in der Verfassung von 1936 nämlich überhaupt nicht vorgesehen, obwohl die Funktion der Erziehung der Kinder sowohl der Mutter, als auch dem Vater zusteht (anders als die natürliche Rolle der Frau – Geburt des Kindes). Das führte in der Realität ebenso zur Ungleichbehandlung von Frauen wie auch der Männer, welche nur durch bestehende Stereotypen gerechtfertigt wurde, sodass in der Tat aus formaler Sicht eine Diskriminierung bestand. In der historischen und rechtswissenschaftlichen Literatur wird die StalinVerfassung von 1936, welche formal die sozialistische Demokratie und außerdem umfassende Bürgerrechte einführte, als Beispiel einer in besonders hohem Maße realitätsfremden Verfassung betrachtet, einer Dekoration des totalitären Regimes, hinter der sich eine beispiellose Welle politischer und ethnischer Säuberungen und Repressionen verbarg, die als „Großer Terror“ bezeichnet wurde.58 Bemerkenswert ist es, dass de jure in der Verfassung die Gleichheitskriterien allein auf Rassen- und nationale Zugehörigkeit reduziert worden waren. Unterscheidungen nach anderen Kriterien, wie z. B. soziale Herkunft, Vermögensstand, Religion, Weltanschauungen, Mitgliedschaft in der Partei und in anderen gesellschaftlichen Vereinigungen, wurden überhaupt nicht erwähnt. Dabei war auch die formelle Deklaration der Nationalitätengleichheit, als ein Teil der sozialistischen Nationalpolitik, fiktiv. In der Realität waren einerseits zusätzliche Vorteile für die Nationalrepubliken im sozialistischen Verteilungssystem vorgesehen, andererseits gab es keinen Schutz anderer Volksgruppen vor Repressionen (Deportationen) und ebenso keinen Schutz gegen die alltäglich vorgekommenen ungeschriebenen Einschränkungen, welchen die Angehörigen bestimmter Nationalitäten oder Religionen (Juden, Russlanddeutsche) unterlagen. Auch die Gleichheit zwischen Männern und Frauen wies, wie oben bereits erwähnt, eine eigene Spezifik auf. Alle staatlichen positiven Maßnahmen, die darauf gerichtet waren, die inhaltliche Geschlechterungleichheit im sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Bereich zu bewältigen, waren vom Stereotypendenken geprägt und konnten deshalb weder formale noch inhaltliche Geschlechtergleichheit gewährleisten. 58 Sieg des Sozialismus. Die „Stalin-Verfassung“ und der „Große Terror“: Unterrichtsmaterial (URL: http://lernen-aus-der-geschichte.de/​International/​Empfehlung%20Unter​richts​ material/13530).



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4.  Verfassung von 1977 40 Jahre später hatte auch die letzte sowjetische Verfassung von 197759 die Situation nicht grundlegend geändert, obwohl in der Etappe des entwickelten (reifen) Sozialismus (rasvitoj sozialism) die Deklarationen der sozialistischen Gleichheit und Demokratie noch umfassender ausformuliert und so auf eine neue Stufe gehoben wurden. Das sozialistische Gleichheitskonzept der Verfassung wurde theoretisch noch weiter ausgearbeitet, vor allem in Richtung der formalen Gleichheit, obwohl bereits die Präambel der Verfassung nicht nur die „juristische“ (formale) Gleichheit erwähnt, sondern auch die „tatsächliche“ (inhaltliche) Gleichheit aller Nationen und Völkerschaften, die eine neue historische Gemeinschaft von Menschen – das Sowjetvolk – bildeten. Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz wurde allen Bürgern der UdSSR (doch nicht jedermann) auf allen Gebieten des wirtschaftlichen, politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Lebens zugesprochen. Als Kriterien, bei denen eine Verletzung der formalen Gleichheit nicht gerechtfertigt werden kann, wurden nun neben Rasse und Nationalität60 weitere Merkmale genannt, namentlich die soziale Stellung, die Vermögenslage, das Geschlecht, die Bildung, die Sprache, die Religion, der Beruf und der Wohnort. Die Aufzählung war nicht abschließend zu verstehen – auch von „anderen Umständen“ sollte die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz unabhängig sein (Art. 34). Eine spezielle Regelung zur formalen Gleichheit vor Gericht gab es auch in Art. 156: „Die Rechtsprechung in der UdSSR erfolgt auf der Grundlage der Gleichheit der Bürger vor dem Gesetz und dem Gericht“. Die formale Gleichheit schloss aber nicht die Existenz verschiedener Formen der Sozialfürsorge für bedürftige Bürger aus. Diese beinhalteten Maßnahmen, die bereits mit der materiellen Gleichheit verbunden waren, bspw. die Sicherung im Alter, in Krankheitsfällen, im Fall des Verlustes der Arbeitsfähigkeit oder beim Tode des Ernährers (Art. 43). Das Konzept der tatsächlichen oder inhaltlichen Gleichheit wurde verfassungsrechtlich am stärksten bei der Gewährleistung gleicher Möglichkeiten von Frauen und Männern im Ausbildungs- und Berufsbereich (Bildung, Berufsausbildung, Arbeit, Entlohnung und Berufsförderung) sowie in Bereichen der gesellschaftlich-politischen und kulturellen Tätigkeit umgesetzt (Art. 35). Dabei wurden die speziellen staatlichen Ausgleichsmaßnahmen zum Schutz der Arbeit und der Gesundheit der Frauen weiterentwickelt, die es den Frauen ermöglichen, Arbeit und Mutterschaft miteinander zu verbinden. Um die tatsächliche Gleichheit von Frauen und Männern zu garantieren, wurden Maßnahmen zur rechtlichen, materiellen und moralischen Unterstützung von Mutter und Kind ergriffen, einschließlich der Gewährung von bezahltem Urlaub 59 Siehe den Volltext der Verfassung der UdSSR von 1977 auf Deutsch: http://www. verfassungen.net/su/verf77-i.htm. 60  Die Gleichberechtigung war unabhängig von diesen Kriterien zusätzlich in Art. 36 der Verfassung von 1977 garantiert.

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und anderen Vergünstigungen für schwangere Frauen und Mütter sowie die allmähliche Verkürzung der Arbeitszeit für Frauen mit minderjährigen Kindern. Es ging also wieder nicht nur um die Unterstützung der Frau bei der Geburt der Kinder (natürliche Rolle der Frau), sondern auch bei der Erziehung (soziale Rolle nach der Tradition). Eine Unterstützung der Väter wurde weiterhin nicht geregelt. Als Kompensation existierte Art. 53 mit seinen Regelungen über den staatlichen Schutz und die Unterstützung der Familie,61 in der die Ehegatten als völlig gleichberechtigte Personen auftraten. Damit aber war das Verhältnis des sozialistischen Staates zur Geschlechtergleichheitsfrage unverändert: Neben der Emanzipation der Frau blieb die patriarchalische Idee über die Verteilung der sozialen Rollen zwischen Mann und Frau grundsätzlich bestehen.62 Auch in der letzten sowjetischen Verfassung lagen diese Grundsätze und die Realität weit auseinander. Der Deklaration der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz standen verschiedene Ungleichbehandlungen in der Realität gegenüber, etwa Ungleichheiten, die sich aus dem System der Aufenthaltsgenehmigung (propiska) als einer Voraussetzung für den Zugang zu Arbeitsplätzen und die Wahl des Wohnortes, dem sozialistischen Verteilungssystem der Konsumgüter zwischen den Regionen und verschiedenen Bürgerkategorien oder aus der Mitgliedschaft in der Kommunistischen Partei der UdSSR ergaben. So konnte die formale rechtliche Gleichheit im sowjetischen politischen System nicht umgesetzt werden. Trotz der Bestrebungen des Sowjetstaates, durch Ausgleichsmaßnahmen und die sozialistische Verteilungspolitik eine inhaltliche soziale Gleichheit im Sinne der Chancengleichheit zu gewährleisten und den gleichen Zugang der Bürger zu öffentlichen Dienstleistungen zu schaffen, war dieses Ziel angesichts der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlage am Ende aber doch unrealisierbar.63

B.  Der Gleichheitssatz in der russischen Verfassung von 1993 Mit der Verfassung der Russischen Föderation vom 12.12.199364 wurde eine Verfassungsordnung festgelegt, die vor allem auf liberalen Werten aufgebaut werden 61  Nach Art. 53 der Verfassung von 1977 sorgt der Staat durch die Schaffung und Entwicklung eines umfassenden Netzes von Kindereinrichtungen, die Organisation und Vervollkommnung der Dienstleistungen und der Gemeinschaftsverpflegung, durch Geburtenbeihilfen, die Gewährung von Beihilfen und Vergünstigungen für kinderreiche Familien sowie durch andere Arten der Beihilfe und Unterstützung für die Familie. 62  Ljudmila N. Zavadskaja (Fn. 56). 63  Siehe Романов Павел В., Социальные изменения и социальная политика // Журнал исследований социальной политики. 2003. Т. 1. С. 45–67 [Pavel V. Romanov, Soziale Änderungen und soziale Politik, in: The Journal of Social Policy Studies. 2003. I. pp. 45–67]. Für die Beschreibung der Situation mit der Gleichheit im totalitären sozialistischen Staat ist das geflügelte Resümee aus der Fabel vom Meister der politischen Satire Georg Orwell „Farm der Tiere“ besonders treffend: „Alle Tiere sind gleich, aber manche sind gleicher“. 64 Den Text der Verfassung der RF von 1993 auf Deutsch unter Berücksichtigung der



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sollte. Russland wird hier als ein Verfassungsstaat dargestellt, der auf den Grundsätzen der Demokratie und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit basiert (Art. 1).65 Mit der Anerkennung und Garantie der Grundrechte (Rechte und Freiheiten des Menschen und Bürgers) auf völkerrechtlicher Grundlage (Art. 17 Abs. 1) und der Betonung von deren naturrechtlichem und unveräußerlichem Charakter (Art. 17 Abs. 2), hat diese Verfassung ein neues Konzept der Menschenrechte und der Gleichheit etabliert, welches das sowjetische ersetzen sollte. Das Wesen der verfassungsrechtlichen Gleichheitsbestimmungen wird unterschiedlich interpretiert. Nach der herrschenden Meinung in der russischen verfassungsrechtlichen Literatur wird die Gleichheit als Grundsatz und Garantie des verfassungsmäßigen Status des Menschen und Bürgers, aber nicht als Grundrecht, bezeichnet und analysiert.66 Diese Sichtweise ist teilweise auch mit der sowjetischen Tradition verbunden: In den Verfassungen der UdSSR waren die Gleichheitsbestimmungen separat von den Grundrechten und ‑pflichten der Bürger in verschiedenen Kapiteln geregelt (vgl. Kap. 6 und 7 Verf UdSSR v. 1977). Im Kommentar zur Verfassung der RF, der vom Vorsitzenden des Verfassungsgerichts der RF Valerij D. Zor’kin herausgegeben wird, betrachtet etwa Nikolai S. Bondar’ die Gleichheitsbestimmung in Art. 19 als einen Grundsatz sowie als Garantie,67 aber nicht als Grundrecht. Eine andere in der deutschletzten Änderungen v. 21.07.2014 N11-FKZ, siehe: http://www.ksrf.ru/en/de/​Info/​LegalBases/​ Pages/default.aspx. 65  Nach Art. 1 Abs. 1Verf RF, „die Russländische Föderation – Russland ist ein demokratischer föderativer Rechtsstaat mit republikanischer Regierungsform“. 66  Siehe z. B. Wladimir A. Tschetvernin, der betont, das Prinzip der rechtlichen Gleichheit sei ein immanenter Teil des Grundsatzes der Hoheit der Rechte und Freiheiten des Menschen und Bürgers (Четвернин Владимир А., 2.1.2. Равноправие // Конституция Российской Федерации. Проблемный комментарий/​ Отв.ред. Владимир А. Четвернин. М., 1997. С. 104–110, 104 [Wladimir A. Tschetvernin, 2.1.2. Gleichberechtigung, in: Verfassung der RF. Problem-Kommentar. M. 1997, S. 104–110, 104]). Nach Suren A. Avak’jan ist die Gleichheitsberechtigung ein Prinzip des verfassungsrechtlichen Status des Menschen und Bürgers (Авакьян Сурен А., Конституционное право: Учебный курс. 4-е изд. Т. 1. М.: Норма, 2010. С. 591–592 [Suren A. Avak’jan, Verfassungsrecht, I, 591–592]). Auch in diesem Sinn bezeichnen Natalja E. Taeva und Viktor A. Tscherepanov die Gleichberechtigung als Prinzip des Rechtsstatus des Menschen und Bürgers (Taeva) / der Persönlichkeit (Tscherepanov) (Таева Наталья Е., Глава 5, § 2. Принципы правового статуса человека и гражданина в Российской Федерации // Нарутто Светлана В., Таева Наталья Е., Шугрина Екатерина С., Конституционное право России: Учебник. М.: РИОР: ИНФРА-М, 2013. С. 130–133, 131–132) [Natalja E. Taeva, Grundsätze des Rechtsstatus des Menschen und Bürgers in der RF, in: Swetlana V. Narutto/​Natalja E. Taeva/​Ekaterina S. Schugrina, Verfassungsrecht Russlands: Lehrbuch. Moskau: RIOR: INFRA‑M, 2013. S. 131–132]; Черепанов Виктор А. Конституционное право России: Учебник для бакалавров. М.: Норма, 2016. С. 90–91 [Viktor A. Tscherepanov, Verfassungsrecht. Moskau: Norma, 2016. S. 90–91]. 67  Als Grundsatz des Staat  – Mensch  – Verhältnisses, Grundlage und Element des Verfassungsstatus des Menschen und Bürgers, als Gebot, das in jedem Grundrecht vorhanden ist. Das Gleichberechtigungsgebot im Art. 19 Abs. 2 betrachtet Nikolai S. Bondar’ zweiseitig: als formales Rechtsgebot einerseits und als Chancengleichheitsgarantie andererseits. Diese doppelte Funktion der Gleichheitsgarantie bleibt auch bei der Interpretation des Prinzips der

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sprachigen Literatur vertretene Ansicht, welche auf einer systematischen Auslegung von Art. 19 Verf RF basiert, versteht die Gleichheitsbestimmungen dagegen vor allem als Gleichheitsrecht, d. h. als ein subjektives Grundrecht.68 Insgesamt gesehen sollen bei der umfassenden Analyse des Gleichheitssatzes beide Aspekte berücksichtigt werden – sowohl der objektiv-rechtliche als auch der subjektiv-rechtliche. Letzterer ist in Bezug auf die Bestimmung der Grenzen des Schutzbereiches des Gleichbehandlungsanspruchs besonders aktuell. Die Gleichheitsbestimmungen in der Verfassung der RF sind mehrdeutig; sie umfassen sowohl formale als auch materielle Gleichheitsvorstellungen. Die Gleichheit von jedermann (also aller Grundrechtsträger, natürliche wie juristische Personen) vor dem Gesetz und vor dem Gericht, d. h. die rechtliche Gleichheit, wird in Art. 19 des Kapitels 2 „Rechte und Freiheiten des Menschen und Bürgers“ der Verf RF in den Vordergrund gestellt.69 Es geht hier um den naturrechtlichen Anspruch eines jeden auf formale Gleichheit, also Gleichbehandlung durch den Gesetzgeber und den Rechtsanwender70 (Art. 19 Abs. 1). Eine spezifische Ausprägung der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz enthält die Verfassung mit Blick auf bestimmte Grundrechtsträger, nämlich gesellschaftliche und religiöse Vereinigungen (Art. 13 Abs. 4, Art. 14 Abs. 2).71 Aus einer systematischen Gleichberechtigung der Frauen und Männer bestehen (Art. 19 Abs. 3 Verf RF) (S.: Бондарь Николай С., Комментарий к статье 19 // Комментарий к Конституции Российской Федерации/​Под ред. Валерия Д. Зорькина. 3-е изд. М.: НОРМА ИНФРА-М, 2013. С. 184–200. [Nikolai S. Bondar’, Art. 19, in: Valerij D. Zor’kin (Hrsg.), Kommentar der Verfassung der RF, 3. Aufl. M.: Norma, 2013, S. 184–200 (im Folgenden – Zor’kin-Kommentar)]. 68  Carolina v. Gall, Art. 19, in: Bernd Wieser (Hrsg.), Handbuch der russischen Verfassung, 2014, Verlag Österreich, Wien. S. 181 (im Folgenden – Wieser-Kommentar). 69  Art. 19 Verf RF lautet: „Alle sind vor dem Gesetz und vor Gericht gleich (Abs. 1). Der Staat garantiert die Gleichheit der Rechte und Freiheiten des Menschen und Bürgers unabhängig von Geschlecht, Rasse, Nationalität, Sprache, Herkunft, Vermögensverhältnissen und Amtsstellung, Wohnort, religiöser Einstellung, Überzeugungen, Zugehörigkeit zu gesellschaftlichen Vereinigungen oder von anderen Umständen. Jede Form der Einschränkung der Bürgerrechte aus Gründen der sozialen, rassischen, nationalen, sprachlichen oder religiösen Zugehörigkeit ist verboten (Abs. 2). Mann und Frau haben gleiche Rechte und Freiheiten und gleiche Möglichkeiten, sie zu verwirklichen (Abs. 3)“. Die Verfassung von 1993 erwähnt den Gleichheitssatz auch in anderen Aspekten, so etwa in Bezug auf das allgemein anerkannte Prinzip der Gleichberechtigung der Völker (Präambel), auf die Staatsorganisationsgrundsätze – Gleichberechtigung der Völker in der RF (Art. 5 Abs. 3), Gleichberechtigung der Föderationssubjekte (Art. 5 Abs. 1 und 4, Art. 72 Abs. 2), Gleichheit der Staatsbürgerschaft der RF (Art. 6 Abs. 1) – und auf den Grundsatz der Wirtschaftsverfassung der RF  – Gleichheit bei Anerkennung und Schutz der privaten, staatlichen, kommunalen und anderen Eigentumsformen (Art. 8 Abs. 2). 70 Unter der Gleichheit vor Gericht ist die rechtliche Gleichheit aller Streitbeteiligten gemeint, also die gleiche Rechtsanwendung in einem nach unabhängigen und gleichen Regeln geführten Gerichtsverfahren. Z. B. war das Moratorium über die Ausführung der Todesstrafe vom VfG RF im Urteil v. 02.02.1999 Nr. 3-P mit der Verletzung der Gleichheit der Angeklagten vor dem Gericht begründet. Im weiten Sinn kann diese Garantie auch auf den gleichen Zugang zum Gericht, gleichen Anspruch auf den Gerichtsschutz und auf die Gleichberechtigung der Gerichtsparteien im Gerichtsverfahren (Art. 123 Abs. 3 Verf RF) ausgeweitet werden. 71  Auch in anderen Artikeln der Verf RF wird der Gleichheitssatz in Bezug auf bestimmte



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Auslegung der Verfassung folgt, dass Gleichbehandlung in Bezug auf alle Aspekte der Rechtsstellung des Einzelnen, also nicht nur in Bezug auf Rechte, Freiheiten und Pflichten gewährleistet wird72 und auch eine diesbezügliche Gewährleistungsgarantie umfasst, was vom VfG RF schon mehrfach betont wurde.73 Außerdem hat das VfG RF aus der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und vor Gericht in Verbindung mit dem Prinzip der Hoheit des Rechts den Grundsatz der Rechtsbestimmtheit (prinzip pravovoj opredelionnosti) abgeleitet. Das Gericht definiert diesen Grundsatz als ein Kriterium der Verfassungsmäßigkeit einer Rechtsnorm und als Garantie des Schutzes vor Willkür und vor ungleicher Behandlung, zu denen es bei Unklarheit und Nichteindeutigkeit einer Rechtsnorm kommen kann.74 Ein wichtiges Element des allgemeinen Gleichheitssatzes bildet außerdem die Gleichberechtigungsgarantie, die in Art. 19 Abs. 2 S. 1 Verf RF als allgemeiner Maßstab des staatlichen Handelns manifestiert ist. Diese Gleichberechtigungsgarantie ist umfassend ausgestaltet und lässt hinreichend Spielraum für Interpretationen. Aus einer systematischen Auslegung der Verfassung, insbesondere des Grundsatzes der Sozialstaatlichkeit (Art. 7), der sozialen Leistungsrechte (Art. 37–41, 43, 48 Abs. 1) und der Bestimmung „Der Staat garantiert die Gleichheit der Rechte und Freiheiten“ ergibt sich, dass die Gleichberechtigungsgarantie nicht nur formal zu verstehen ist, sondern auch Handlungen des Staates fordert, die darauf gerichtet sind, die Bedingungen für soziale Gleichheit und inhaltliche Grundrechte oder Subjekte verwendet, wie z. B. Recht auf gleichen Zugang zum öffentlichen Dienst (Art. 32 Abs. 4); gleiches Wahlrecht der Bürger der RF bei der Wahl des Präsidenten (Art. 81). Dies ändert nichts daran, dass der Gleichheitssatz jedes Grundrecht betrifft (Bondar’, Art. 19, S. 185). 72  Die verfassungsrechtlichen Pflichten des Menschen und Bürgers haben ihre Wurzeln im sozialistischen Konzept der Rechtsstellung der Persönlichkeit im Sowjetstaat und im Grundsatz der Untrennbarkeit der Grundrechte, Grundfreiheiten und Grundpflichten der sowjetischen Bürger (Art. 59 Verf UdSSR v. 1977). 73 VfG RF: Urteil v. 30.01.2001 Nr. 2-P (gleiche Verantwortung hinsichtlich der Steuerpflicht); Beschluss v. 4.12.2003 Nr. 444-O (Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Rahmen des staatlichen Schutzes der Rechte und Freiheiten des Menschen und Bürgers). Hier und im Folgenden wird die aktuelle russische Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung nach der Rechtsdatenbank ConsultantPlus zitiert: URL: http://www.consultant.ru, Stand: 15.10.2019. 74  VfG RF: Urteil v. 25.04.1995 Nr. 3-P – Sitalova – Fall, Punkt 3 Abs. 5 des Begründungsteils: willkürliche Auslegung und Anwendung der Rechtsnorm verstoßen gegen die Gleichheit aller vor Gesetz und vor Gericht [П. 3 абз.5 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 25.04.1995 г. N 3-П „По делу о проверке конституционности частей первой и второй статьи 54 Жилищного кодекса РСФСР в связи с жалобой гражданки Лидии Николаевны Ситаловой“]; Punkt 4 Abs. 3 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 15.07.1999 Nr. 11-P [П. 4 абз.3 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 15.07.1999 г. N 11-П „По делу о проверке конституционности отдельных положений Закона РСФСР ‚О Государственной налоговой службе РСФСР‘ и Законов Российской Федерации ‚Об основах налоговой системы в Российской Федерации‘ и ‚О федеральных органах налоговой полиции‘“] u. a. Siehe dazu ausführlicher: Nikolai S. Bondar’ (Fn. 67), S. 190–192.

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(tatsächliche) Gleichberechtigung unterschiedlicher Bevölkerungsgruppen zu schaffen. Eine solche Auslegung der Verfassungsbestimmungen sowie die verfassungsrechtliche Idee der sozialen Staatlichkeit selbst haben ihre Wurzeln in der sozialistischen Tradition des starken Leistungsstaates. Dass es Aufgabe des Gesetzgebers ist, die reale Gleichheit zu gewährleisten und dabei die tatsächlichen Unterschiede innerhalb bestimmter Gruppen oder Gemeinschaften zu berücksichtigen, wurde in mehreren Entscheidungen des VfG festgestellt.75 In der russischen Rechtsliteratur ist insgesamt anerkannt, dass der Staat auch zielorientiert tätig werden muss, um mit Hilfe von rechtlichen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen, ideologischen und organisatorischen Maßnahmen ein soziales Umfeld zu schaffen, in dem jedermann grundsätzlich reale und im Vergleich zu den anderen gleiche Chancen hat, die Verfassungsrechte und -freiheiten auszuüben, und um diese zu schützen.76 Fasst man die verschiedenen Aspekte des Gleichheitssatzes zusammen, entsteht ein mehrdimensionales Bild der Gleichheit: 1) Gleichheit als ein rechtliches und als ein soziales Phänomen; 2) rechtliche Gleichheit im formellem und materiellem (inhaltlichen) Sinn. Im Vordergrund steht aber die Garantie der formellen Gleichberechtigung der Subjekte, die zu einer Gruppe gehören. Wie schon in der letzten sowjetischen Verfassung ist die Liste von Kriterien, von denen die Gleichberechtigung 75 Z. B. in Punkt 3 Abs. 2 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 24.02.1998 Nr. 7-P  – Fall Rentenversicherungsbeiträge hat das VfG RF dem Gesetzgeber einen Hinweis gegeben: Die Gewährleistung der nicht formalen Gleichheit der Bürger auf Grundlage des Gleichheitssatzes und des Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips fordert die Berücksichtigung der tatsächlichen Fähigkeit des Bürgers, die Versicherungsbeiträge zu zahlen [Пункт 3 абз.2 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 24.02.1998 г. № 7-П „По делу о проверке конституционности отдельных положений статей 1 и 5 Федерального закона от 5 февраля 1997 года ‚О тарифах страховых взносов в Пенсионный фонд Российской Федерации, Фонд социального страхования Российской Федерации, Государственный фонд занятости населения Российской Федерации и в Фонды обязательного медицинского страхования на 1997 год‘ в связи с жалобами ряда граждан и запросами судов“ (Постановление по делу о страховых взносах): „обеспечение неформального равенства граждан требует учета фактической способности гражданина (в зависимости от его заработка, дохода) к уплате страхового взноса в соответствующем размере“]. Im Beschluss vom 18.07.2006 Nr. 342-O (Panarin-Fall) hat das VfG RF in Bezug auf die Sonderregelungen im Bundesgesetz über die nationalen Kulturautonomien zum Schutz von nationalen Minderheiten Folgendes bemerkt: „(…) Gleichheit der Rechte und Freiheiten unabhängig von der nationalen Zugehörigkeit steht nicht im Widerspruch zur Notwendigkeit, tatsächliche Unterschiede in der Lage bestimmter ethnischer Gemeinschaften in der Gesetzgebung zur Sicherung der tatsächlichen Gleichheit zu berücksichtigen“ [Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 18.07.2006 N 342-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданина Панарина Владимира Анатольевича на нарушение его конституционных прав частью первой статьи 1 Федерального закона ‚О национально-культурной автономии‘“: „(…) равенство прав и свобод граждан независимо от национальной принадлежности не исключает фактических различий в положении тех или иных этнических общностей и необходимости их учета законодателем в целях обеспечения действительного равенства“]. 76  Nikolai S. Bondar’ (Fn. 67), S. 193.



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unabhängig bleiben soll, nicht abschließend. Neben den bereits aus der Verf UdSSR von 1977 bekannten Umständen (Geschlecht, Rasse, Nationalität, Sprache, Vermögensverhältnisse, Wohnort, religiöse Einstellung) sind in der Verf RF noch die Folgenden genannt: Herkunft, Amtsstellung, Überzeugungen, Zugehörigkeit zu gesellschaftlichen Vereinigungen (Art. 19 Abs. 2 S. 1). Außerdem hat das Verbot jeglicher Einschränkung von Bürgerrechten aufgrund sozialer, rassischer, nationaler, sprachlicher oder religiöser Zugehörigkeit eine besondere Bedeutung in der Verfassung. Dieses Verbot ist nämlich ohne jeden Vorbehalt formuliert (Art. 19 Abs. 2 S. 2 Verf RF). Die besondere Bedeutung der genannten Diskriminierungsgründe für den Verfassungsgeber wurzelt in der historischen Entwicklung der Gleichheitsvorstellungen, angefangen bei der Sowjetverfassung bis hin zu den aktuellen Auseinandersetzungen in der Wendezeit (Ende der 1980er/​Anfang der 1990er Jahre). Die Gleichberechtigungsgarantie spiegelt sich in erster Linie im allgemeinen Diskriminierungsverbot wider. Eine genaue Bestimmung seines Inhalts gestaltet sich allerdings ebenso schwierig. Zunächst umfasst das Diskriminierungsverbot grundsätzlich jede Form von Einschränkungen der Gleichheitsrechte aus den in Art. 19 Abs. 2 Verf RF genannten Gründen (negative Diskriminierung). Eine solche Diskriminierung stellt als Verletzung der Gleichberechtigung und der Gleichheitsrechte eine Ordnungswidrigkeit im Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht (Art. 5.62 des Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetzbuches  – OwiGB RF) oder gar eine Straftat im Strafrecht (Art. 136 des Strafgesetzbuches der RF) dar. Doch das VfG RF legt den Begriff der Diskriminierung noch weiter aus: Erfasst werden auch Einschränkungen, Ungleichheiten, Vorzüge oder Ausnahmen, die ohne objektiven und vernünftigen Grund Rechte und Freiheiten von Personen beeinflussen, die der gleichen Kategorie zuzuordnen sind.77 Dies meint auch positive Diskriminierungen (Begünstigungen und Vorzüge), solange diese nicht gerechtfertigt sind. Die Liste möglicher Diskriminierungsgründe, die in der Verfassung der RF formuliert ist, wird durch den Gesetzgeber und die Rechtsprechung des VfG RF ständig erweitert. So wird z. B. in Art. 3 des Arbeitsgesetzbuches der RF das Diskriminierungsverbot in Bezug auf Arbeitsverhältnisse ergänzt: Neben den aus der Verfassung der RF bekannten Diskriminierungsgründen werden hier zusätzlich „Familienstand“ und „Alter“ genannt.78 Die Qualität der Arbeits77  VfG RF: Punkt. 2.2 Abs. 2 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 05.04.2007 Nr. 5-P – Fall Wohnzertifikate [П. 2.2 абз.2 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 05.04.2007 N 5-П „По делу о проверке конституционности положений пунктов 2 и 14 статьи 15 Федерального закона ‚О статусе военнослужащих‘ и пункта 8 Правил выпуска и погашения государственных жилищных сертификатов в рамках реализации подпрограммы ‚Государственные жилищные сертификаты‘ на 2004–2010 годы, входящей в состав федеральной целевой программы ‚Жилище‘ на 2002–2010 годы, в связи с жалобами ряда граждан“ (Постановление по делу о жилищных сертификатах)]. 78 Art.  3 „Diskriminierungsverbot im Arbeitsbereich“ des Arbeitsgesetzbuches vom

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leistung wird dagegen nicht als Diskriminierungsgrund, sondern als legitimes Differenzierungskriterium benannt, was dem Zweck der arbeitsrechtlichen Regelung entspricht. Das VfG RF hat durch Auslegung der Verfassung auch ein Verbot der Diskriminierung im Hinblick auf die Arbeit oder Beschäftigung formuliert.79 Auch die sexuelle Orientierung sieht das VfG RF als möglichen Diskriminierungsgrund an. Wie es im Urteil vom 23.09.2014 Nr. 24-P im Fall Aleksejev-EvtuschenkoIsakov betont, würde „die Einschränkung von Rechten und Freiheiten nur aufgrund der sexuellen Orientierung […] den verfassungsrechtlichen Grundsätzen der Gleichheit und der Unzulässigkeit von Diskriminierung widersprechen“.80 Adressat der Gleichberechtigungsgarantie ist vor allem der Staat: „Der Staat garantiert …“. Auch das Diskriminierungsverbot im weiteren Sinne ist nach Ansicht des VfG RF hauptsächlich an den Gesetzgeber und den Rechtsanwender gerichtet. Die Aufgabe aller Organe der staatlichen Gewalt und der örtlichen Selbstverwaltung, Maßnahmen zur Sicherung der staatlich garantierten Gleichberechtigung zu treffen, wird durch die russische Gesetzgebung konkretisiert.81 30.12.2001 Nr. 197-FZ. Dabei wird noch die in der Verfassung erwähnte „soziale Zugehörigkeit“ konkretisiert als „soziale Stellung“ und „Zugehörigkeit zu bestimmten sozialen Gruppen“. Die Aufzählung von Diskriminierungsgründen ist wie in der Verf RF nicht abschließend. 79  VfG RF: Punkt 3 Abs. 9 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 24.02.1998 Nr. 7-P  – Fall Rentenversicherungsbeiträge [Пункт 3 абз.9 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 24.02.1998 № 7-П „По делу о проверке конституционности отдельных положений статей 1 и 5 Федерального закона от 5 февраля 1997 года ‚О тарифах страховых взносов в Пенсионный фонд Российской Федерации, Фонд социального страхования Российской Федерации, Государственный фонд занятости населения Российской Федерации и в Фонды обязательного медицинского страхования на 1997 год‘ в связи с жалобами ряда граждан и запросами судов“: „(…) повышение в 1997 году тарифа страховых взносов в Пенсионный фонд Российской Федерации в отношении указанных категорий плательщиков (индивидуальных предпринимателей  – курсив мой, Е. Г.) носит чрезмерный характер и ставит их в худшее положение по сравнению с такими плательщиками страховых взносов, как лица наемного труда. Тем самым нарушается статья 19 (части 1 и 2) Конституции Российской Федерации, исключающая какую-либо дискриминацию в зависимости от рода труда и занятий.“]. 80  VfG RF: Punkt 3.3 Abs. 2 des Begründungsteils des Urteils vom 23.09.2014 Nr. 24-P – Fall Alekseev/​Evtuschenko/​Isakov [П. 3.3 абз.2 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 23.09.2014 г. № 24-П „По делу о проверке конституционности части 1 статьи 6.21 Кодекса Российской Федерации об административных правонарушениях в связи с жалобой граждан Николая А. Алексеева, Ярослава Н. Евтушенко и Дмитрия А. Исакова“ (Постановление по делу Алексеева, Евтушенко, Исакова): „(…) ограничение прав и свобод человека и гражданина исключительно по признаку сексуальной ориентации, противоречило бы конституционным принципам равенства и недопущения дискриминации“]. 81  Siehe z. B. die Zuständigkeiten des obersten Vollzugsorgans der Staatsgewalt des Subjekts der RF in Art. 21 Abs. 2 Punkt a. 1. des Bundesgesetzes vom 06.10.1999 Nr. 184-FZ „Über die allgemeinen Prinzipien der Organisation der Gesetzgebungs-, (Vertretungs-) und Vollzugsorgane der Staatsgewalt der Subjekte der Russischen Föderation“ – Organisation-der-SubjekteGesetz – OrgSubjG (i. d. F. des Bundesgesetzes v. 22.10.2013 Nr. 284-FZ) [Ст.21 П. 2 пдп.а. 1) Федерального закона от 6.10.1999 г. №184-ФЗ „Об общих принципах организации зако-



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Außerdem ergeben sich aus der systematischen Auslegung des Art. 15 Abs. 2 i. V. m. Art. 17 Abs. 3 Verf RF die unmittelbare und mittelbare Drittwirkung der Gleichheitsrechte sowie die direkte Verpflichtung Privater, die Verfassungs- und Gesetzesbestimmungen einzuhalten.82 Außerdem kann die Pflicht Privater, nicht gegen das das Diskriminierungsverbot zu verstoßen, aus der Verfassungsgarantie abgeleitet werden, dass Schutz vor allen Formen der Diskriminierung bei Ausübung von Rechten und Freiheiten besteht.83 „Diskriminierung“ als Verletzung der Gleichheitsrechte ist nach russischer Gesetzeslage eine Ordnungswidrigkeit, die von natürlichen oder juristischen Personen begangen werden kann.84 Täter des Straftatbestandes „Diskriminierung“ nach dem Strafgesetzbuch der RF können nur Amtspersonen sein – sowohl Beamte und Angestellte im öffentlichen Dienst als auch Amtspersonen im Unternehmen sowie in nichtkommerziellen und gesellschaftlichen Organisationen.85 Wie oben bereits erwähnt, schließen die Gleichheitsbestimmungen nicht gleichheitsinterne Differenzierungen oder Einschränkungen der Grundrechte nach den Grundsätzen und Kriterien der Art. 55, 56 Verf RF aus. Bei Differenzierungen in diesem Sinne kommt die inhaltliche (tatsächliche, materielle) Gleichheit zum Ausdruck. Eine rechtliche Differenzierung ist hier aufgrund tatsächlicher Unterschiede und objektiver Gründe notwendig. Ihre Ausgestaltung richtet sich nach den Zwecken der Rechtssetzung. Eine differenzierte Behandlung unterschiedlicher Kategorien von Rechtsträgern ist nämlich schon in der Verf RF selbst angelegt. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt z. B. das Differenzierungskriterium der „russischen Staatsangehörigkeit“: In Art. 6 Abs. 2 Verf RF wird etwa festgelegt, dass jeder Bürger der RF die gleichen Rechte, Freiheiten, aber нодательных (представительных) и исполнительных органов государственной власти субъектов Российской Федерации“ в ред. Федерального закона от 22.10.2013 г. №284-ФЗ]. 82  Nach der sozialistischen Tradition ist die Pflicht, die Verfassung einzuhalten, in Art. 15 Abs. 2 Verf RF nicht nur als Aufgabe der öffentlichen Gewalt, sondern auch als Pflicht der Bürger und Bürgervereinigungen festgelegt (siehe dazu ausführlicher: Гриценко Елена В., Формирование доктрины прямого действия конституции в российском конституционном праве // Государство и право. 2015. №6. С. 5–19 [Elena W. Gritsenko, Ausgestaltung der Doktrin direkter Wirkung der Verfassung im russischen Verfassungsrecht, in: Gosudarstvo i pravo [Staat und Recht] 6/2015, S. 5–19]). 83  VfG RF: Punkt 2.2 Abs. 2 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 05.04.2007 Nr. 5-P – Fall Wohnzertifikate [П. 2.2 абз.2 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 05.04.2007 N 5-П „По делу о проверке конституционности положений пунктов 2 и 14 статьи 15 Федерального закона ‚О статусе военнослужащих‘ и пункта 8 Правил выпуска и погашения государственных жилищных сертификатов в рамках реализации подпрограммы ‚Государственные жилищные сертификаты‘ на 2004–2010 годы, входящей в состав федеральной целевой программы ‚Жилище‘ на 2002–2010 годы, в связи с жалобами ряда граждан“ (Постановление по делу о жилищных сертификатах)]. 84  Art. 5.62 des Ordnungswidrigkeitsgesetzbuches der RF [ст.5.62 Кодекса об административных правонарушениях Российской Федерации]. 85  Art. 136 des Strafgesetzbuches der RF [Ст.136 Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации].

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auch Pflichten hat. Dabei steht die Gleichbehandlung von Ausländern und Staatenlosen mit Bürgern der RF hinsichtlich ihrer jeweiligen Rechte und Pflichten unter einem Vorbehalt: Eine solche habe „außer in den durch Bundesgesetz oder völkerrechtlichen Vertrag festgelegten Fällen“ zu erfolgen (Art. 62 Abs. 3 Verf RF). Tatsächlich gibt es hinsichtlich politischer Rechte keine Gleichberechtigung von Bürgern der RF mit Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehörigkeit der RF besitzen. Weitere Beispiele gleichheitsinterner Differenzierungen sind im Bereich der sozialen Rechte zu finden: Die Verfassung kennt neben allgemeinen sozialen Rechten ebenfalls soziale Sonderrechte bestimmter Bevölkerungsgruppen, beispielsweise der Alten, der Invaliden, der Bedürftigen usw. (Art. 39, Art. 40 ff. Verf RF). Dies entspricht der Idee inhaltlicher und sozialer Gleichheit und schafft zusätzliche Garantien für die Durchsetzung tatsächlicher Gleichheit.86 Spezielle Regelungen, in denen die Gleichberechtigungsgarantie ihren Ausdruck gefunden hat, bilden Art. 19 Abs. 3 Verf RF, der die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau festlegt und Art. 38 Abs. 2 Verf RF, der bestimmt, dass beide Elternteile die gleichen Rechte und Pflichten bei der Kindesfürsorge und der Kindererziehung haben. Der Tradition sowjetischer Verfassungen folgend betont der Verfassungsgeber in Art. 19 Abs. 3 Verf RF neben der formalen Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau auch die inhaltliche Gleichberechtigung als Chancengleichheit bei der Ausübung von Rechten und Freiheiten sowohl im rechtlichen als auch im sozialen Sinn. Dabei gewährt die Verfassung Müttern einen besonderen Schutz (Art. 38 Abs. 1), obwohl in Art. 7 Abs. 2 Verf RF sowohl der Mutterschaft, der Familie und Kindheit als auch der Vaterschaft staatliche Unterstützung zugesprochen wird. Die Sonderrechte der Mütter sind in der Verfassung allerdings nicht geregelt, was einen breiten Spielraum für die weitere Konkretisierung und Interpretation des Gleichheitsgebots hinsichtlich des Geschlechts lässt. Die Verfassungsmäßigkeit ungleicher Behandlung von bestimmten Gruppen oder Kategorien wird vom VfG RF dann bestätigt, wenn die Gruppen anhand objektiver Merkmale abgegrenzt werden können und vernünftige Gründe die Begünstigung einer Gruppe rechtfertigen.87 Das VfG RF hat in ständiger Recht86  So bezeichnet Veniamin E. Tschirkin die sozial-ökonomische Gleichberechtigung und den tatsächlichen Ausgleich in der Verfassung als Indikator des Sozialstaates (Чиркин Вениамин Е., Конституция и социальное государство // Журнал российского права. 2008. №12. С. 24–37, 31 [Veniamin E. Tschirkin, Verfassung und Sozialstaat: rechtliche und tatsächliche Indikatoren, in: Journal rossijskogo prava. 2008. Nr. 12. S. 24–37, 31]). Zur Frage der Rechtsnatur von sozialen Rechten und deren Besonderheiten siehe z. B.: Хабриева Талия Я., Российская конституционная модель социального государства // Конституция, закон и социальная сфера общества: Материалы научно-практической конференции. Москва, 1 декабря 2008 г. М.: Юриспруденция, 2009. С. 6–7 [Talija Ja. Khabrieva, Russisches Verfassungsmodell des Sozialstaates, in: Verfassung, Gesetz und sozialer Bereich der Gesellschaft: Materialien der wissenschaftlich-praktischen Konferenz, Moskau, 01.12.2008, Moskau 2009, S. 6–7]. 87  Wie z. B. für die Mitarbeiter der Staatsanwaltschaft (VfG RF: Beschluss v. 01.10.1997 Nr. 96-O – Fall Sokolova [Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 1.10.1997 г. № 96-О



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sprechung einen verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmen für solche Differenzierungen ausgearbeitet und außerdem den Grundsatz der Ausdifferenzierung oder Ungleichbehandlung aus objektiven Gründen formuliert: Gleichheit bedeutet die gleiche Behandlung formal gleicher Rechtssubjekte, jedoch nicht, dass gleiche Garantien für solche Rechtssubjekte gelten, die zu unterschiedlichen Gruppen gehören.88 Die Bildung solcher Gruppen darf aber nicht willkürlich erfolgen und soll sich nach objektiven Kriterien richten.89 Zur Bewertung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit von Bevorzugungen im Altersvorsorgesystem hat das VfG RF weitere Kriterien der rechtlichen Differenzierung aufgestellt: Unterschiede im Rentenrecht sind demnach zulässig, wenn sie auf objektiven Gründen beruhen und soweit sie verfassungsbedeutsame Ziele verfolgen und im Hinblick auf diese Ziele angemessen sind. Der Schutz vor allen Formen der Diskriminierung im Bereich der Rentenvorsorge umfasst außerdem das Verbot, Personen aus der gleichen Gruppe ohne objektive und vernünftige Gründe unterschiedlich zu behandeln (Verbot der unterschiedlichen Behandlung von den Personen in gleichen oder ähnlichen Situationen). Kriterien, die eine Grundlage für die spezifischen Regelungen im Rentenrecht bilden, sollen nach dem bei der Recht„Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданки Соколовой Тамары Константиновны как не соответствующей требованиям Федерального конституционного закона ‚О Конституционном Суде Российской Федерации‘“]. 88  VfG RF: Punkt 2 Abs. 7 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses v. 08.04.2004 Nr. 167-O: [(…)  из конституционного принципа равенства не вытекает требование предоставления одинаковых гарантий и компенсаций лицам, относящимся к разным категориям (…)]: п. 2 абз.7 мотивировочной части Определения Конституционного Суда РФ от 8.04.2004 г. № 167-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданина Ф. Ф. Чертовского на нарушение его конституционных прав положением части первой статьи 177 Трудового кодекса Российской Федерации“ Punkt 3.3 Abs. 2 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses v. 03.11.2006 Nr. 455-O: [Принцип равенства, предполагая равный подход к формально равным субъектам, не обусловливает необходимость предоставления одинаковых гарантий лицам, относящимся к разным категориям]: п. 3.3 абз.2 мотивировочной части Определения Конституционного Суда РФ от 03.11.2006 г. № 455-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению запроса Слободского районного суда Кировской области о проверке конституционности пункта 2 статьи 292 Гражданского кодекса Российской Федерации и части 4 статьи 31 Жилищного кодекса Российской Федерации, а также жалоб граждан В. А. Вахрамеевой и Е. В. Кожанова на нарушение их конституционных прав этими нормами“. 89  VfG RF: Punkt 1.2 Abs. 1 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 27.04.2001 Nr. 7-P [Такие различия, однако, не могут быть произвольными, они должны основываться на объективных характеристиках соответствующих категорий субъектов]: п. 1.2 абз.1 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 27.04.2001 г. № 7-П „По делу о проверке конституционности ряда положений Таможенного кодекса Российской Федерации в связи с запросом Арбитражного суда города Санкт – Петербурга и Ленинградской области, жалобами открытых акционерных обществ ‚АвтоВАЗ‘ и ‚Комбинат Североникель‘, обществ с ограниченной ответственностью ‚Верность‘, ‚Вита  – Плюс‘ и ‚Невско-Балтийская транспортная компания‘, товарищества с ограниченной ответственностью «Совместное российско-южноафриканское предприятие ‚Эконт‘ и гражданина А. Д. Чулкова“.

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setzung verfolgten Differenzierungsziel bestimmt werden, d. h. die Kriterien und Rechtsfolgen der Differenzierung sollen ihrem Wesen nach in direktem Zusammenhang stehen.90 Die vom VfG RF vorgeschlagenen Kriterien für die Rechtfertigung einer Ungleichbehandlung entsprechen in methodischer Hinsicht insgesamt denen, die vom Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte und Gerichten in anderen Rechtsstaaten angewendet werden: – Realität der Unterschiede (nach objektiven Kriterien ausdifferenzierte Gruppe und Situation) – legitimer Zweck – konkrete Grenzen der rechtlichen Differenzierung – erforderliche, geeignete und ausreichende Differenzierung – Angemessenheit der anzuwendenden Mittel mit Blick auf den zu erreichenden Zweck Diese universelle Methodik der Gleichheitsprüfung enthält jedoch eine Reihe von unbestimmten Rechtsbegriffen, die auslegungsbedürftig sind. So ist etwa die Antwort auf die Frage, welche Kriterien für die Ausdifferenzierung der Personenkategorien und Situationen objektiv sind, nicht eindeutig und liegt nicht allein im rechtlichen Bereich, sondern stellt auch eine Wertungsfrage dar. Diese Frage zu klären, ist Aufgabe und Herausforderung des Gesetzgebers und Rechtsanwenders.

C.  Der Gleichheitssatz und traditionelle Werte in der Rechtsprechung des VfG RF: Tradition gegen Norm Auf der Suche nach objektiven Kriterien für die rechtliche Differenzierung und bei der Auslegung des legitimen Zwecks befinden sich der Gesetzgeber und der Rechtsanwender im Spannungsfeld zwischen traditionellen Werten und universellen Grundsätzen. Solche Auseinandersetzungen kommen auch in der Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgerichts der RF zum Ausdruck. Daher ist die Verfassungsgerichtsrechtsprechung in einigen Bereichen bei der Rechtfertigung von Ungleichheiten uneinheitlich: Argumente, die auf allgemeinen Verfassungs90  VfG RF: Punkt 2 Abs. 2, Abs. 3 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 03.06.2004 Nr. 11-P [П. 2 абз.2 и 3 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 3.06.2004 г. № 11-П „По делу о проверке конституционности положений подпунктов 10, 11 и 12 пункта 1 статьи 28, пунктов 1 и 2 статьи 31 Федерального закона ‚О трудовых пенсиях в Российской Федерации’ в связи с запросами Государственной Думы Астраханской области, Верховного Суда Удмуртской Республики, Биробиджанского городского суда Еврейской автономной области, Елецкого городского суда Липецкой области, Левобережного, Октябрьского и Советского районных судов города Липецка, а также жалобами ряда граждан“].



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grundsätzen aufbauen, werden mitunter durch solche Argumente ersetzt, die sich auf traditionelle Werte stützen. Dadurch gelangt das VfG RF manchmal in ähnlichen Situationen zu unterschiedlichen Interpretationen. Welche Rolle dabei die traditionellen Werte spielen, lässt sich am Beispiel konkreter Fälle verdeutlichen.

I.  Rechtliche Differenzierungen aufgrund des Wohnortes Noch im Jahr 1998 hat sich das VfG RF bei der Interpretation der verfassungsrechtlichen Bedeutung des Anmeldesystems auf Verfassungsgrundsätze gestützt. Es war bei der Prüfung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit einer bundesgesetzlichen Regelung über die Ein- und Ausreise in und aus der RF, welche die Ausgabe eines Reisepasses nur am gemeldeten Wohnsitz ermöglichte, zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass die Meldung an bestimmten Wohnorten kein Grund für die Einschränkung der Grundrechte und keine Bedingung für den Zugang zu Grundrechten sei.91 Es hat die geprüfte Regelung daher für verfassungswidrig erklärt. Anders hat das VfG RF eine Regelung des Beschäftigungsgesetzes eingeschätzt, wonach die Registrierung eines Arbeitslosen nur an seinem ständigen gemeldeten Wohnsitz (und nicht dort, wo er tatsächlich wohnt oder befristet auf lange Zeit gemeldet ist) möglich ist. Dies wurde als verfassungsgemäß eingestuft.92 Das System der Anmeldung am ständigen Wohnort tendiert zum sowjetischen Propiska-System (Aufenthaltsgenehmigungssystem) und ist teilweise schwer zu verstehen. Die für verfassungsgemäß erklärte Regelung des Beschäftigungsgesetzes schließt aus dem Arbeitslosenkreis solche Personen aus, die nur eine befristete Anmeldung an ihrem Wohnort haben oder überhaupt nicht am tatsächlichen Wohnsitz gemeldet sind. Die Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Regelung wird vom VfG RF mit dem Ziel der Arbeitsvermittlungsbehörden gerechtfertigt, günstige Bedingungen für Arbeitssuchende an ihrem Wohnort zu schaffen (Punkt 2 Abs. 4 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses zum Fall Avanov 2). Als Wohnort gilt dabei jedoch nur der „Ort der ständigen Anmeldung“, obwohl dies in Widerspruch zum Recht auf freie Wahl des Aufenthalts- und 91  VfG RF: Punkt 5 Abs. 3 des Begründungsteils des Urteils v. 15.01.1998 Nr. 2-P  – Fall Avanov 1: [(…) регистрация или отсутствие таковой не могут служить основанием ограничения или условием реализации прав и свобод граждан]: п. 5 абз.3 мотивировочной части Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 15.01.1998 N 2-П „По делу о проверке конституционности положений частей первой и третьей статьи 8 Федерального закона от 15 августа 1996 года ‚О порядке выезда из Российской Федерации и въезда в Российскую Федерацию‘ в связи с жалобой гражданина Александра Яковлевича Аванова“]. 92  VfG RF: Beschluss v. 06.02.2003 Nr. 105-O – Fall Avanov 2 [Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 6.02.2003 г. № 105-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданина Аванова Александра Яковлевича на нарушение его конституционных прав положением пункта 2 статьи 3 Закона Российской Федерации ‚О занятости населения в Российской Федерации‘ – Определение по делу Аванова 2“].

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Wohnortes (Art. 27 Abs. 1 Verf RF) sowie dem verfassungsrechtlichen Sinn des Anmeldesystems steht, den das Gericht 1998 im Fall Avanov 1 formulierte. Für die Verfassungsmäßigkeit der gesetzlichen Einschränkung führt das VfG RF als zweites Argument den Zweck der umstrittenen Regelung des Beschäftigungsgesetzes an, der darin besteht, einen Missbrauch des Rechts auf Arbeitslosengeld auszuschließen (Punkt 2 Abs. 4 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses zum Fall Avanov 2). Dieser Begründungsansatz ist durch die lange Tradition des Rechtsnihilismus und des Misstrauens zwischen Bürger und Staat geprägt. Sie stützt sich nicht auf die Verfassungsgrundsätze der Gleichheit und Unzulässigkeit der Diskriminierung.

II.  Rechtliche Differenzierung aufgrund von Arbeit und Beschäftigung Das VfG RF hat eine Diskriminierung aufgrund von Arbeit und Beschäftigung im oben bereits erwähnten Fall Rentenversicherungsbeiträge festgestellt. Das Gericht fand keinen objektiven und vernünftigen Grund für eine gesetzliche Differenzierung der Pflichtbeitragstarife des Rentenversicherungsfonds für Unternehmer und Freiberufliche (Rechtsanwälte, Notare) einerseits und Arbeitnehmer andererseits. Nach Ansicht des VfG RF hat die Regelung den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit verletzt und wurde deshalb für unvereinbar mit der Verfassung erklärt.93 Anders hat das VfG RF im Fall Khorokhordina entschieden. Hier hat es gesetzliche Unterschiede bei der Höhe des Arbeitslosengeldes zwischen individuellen Unternehmern und Freiberuflern (Rechtsanwälte) einerseits und Arbeitnehmern andererseits für zulässig erachtet. Das VfG RF begründete den Anspruch von Arbeitnehmern auf höheren Schutz vor Arbeitslosigkeit (durch höheres Arbeitslosengeld) mit dem Argument, dass sie die „wirtschaftlich schwächere Partei im Arbeitsverhältnis“ darstellten und zur Kategorie der Sonderbedürftigen gehörten. Als Sozialstaat treffe die Russische Föderation die besondere Verpflichtung, Rechte und Interessen dieser Kategorie in größerem Umfang zu gewährleisten.94 Der Grund für diese Argumentation des VfG RF liegt weniger im rechtlichen Bereich sondern vor allem in der traditionellen Vorstellung aus der sozialistischen Vergangenheit, dass Lohnarbeiter im Vergleich zu anderen Beschäftigten mehr Unterstützung benötigen. 93  VfG RF: Punkt 3 des Begründungsteils iVm Punkt 1 der Entscheidungsformel des Urteils zum Fall Rentenversicherungsbeiträge v. 24.02.1998 Nr. 7-P. 94  VfG RF: Punkt 3.2,Punkt 3.3 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses v. 12.04.2011 Nr. 550O‑O  – Fall Khorokhordina [П. 3.2 и 3.3 мотивировочной части Определения Конституционного Суда РФ от 12.04.2011 г. № 550-О-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданки Хорхординой Людмилы Валентиновны на нарушение ее конституционных прав положениями пункта 1 статьи 30, пункта 1 статьи 33 и пункта 1 статьи 34 Закона Российской Федерации ‚О занятости населения в Российской Федерации‘“].



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III.  Rechtliche Differenzierungen nach dem Geschlecht Im Bereich der Gleichheit der Geschlechter ist die Rechtsprechung des VfG RF ebenfalls kontrovers. Neben den objektiv-rechtlichen Kriterien zur Zulässigkeit einer Differenzierung werden für die Rechtfertigung von Sonderschutzmaßnahmen und Begünstigungen von Frauen häufig auch Argumente genutzt, die sich auf die anerkannten traditionellen sozialen Geschlechterrollen stützen. Diese objektiv-rechtlichen Kriterien hat das VfG RF z. B. bei der Prüfung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit der angefochtenen Normen im Fall Ostaev verwendet.95 Das Gericht entschied hier, dass der Schutz in Form eines Verbots der Kündigung von Frauen mit einem Kind unter 3 Jahren auf Väter als Alleinverdiener einer solchen Familie ausgeweitet werden soll. Andererseits spielen häufig Genderstereotypen bei der Argumentation des Verfassungsgerichts eine entscheidende Rolle. Dies wird etwa im Fall Klevetz deutlich, in dem das VfG RF die Einschränkung der Beschäftigung von Frauen in Berufsfeldern, die der Erfüllung der allgemein anerkannten reproduktiven Funktion der Frau schaden können, für gerechtfertigt hielt.96 Ein anderes bekanntes Beispiel einer umstrittenen Differenzierung nach dem Merkmal „Geschlecht“ ist der Fall Markin.97 Hier wurde eine Regelung, die vorsieht, dass nur weibliche Angehörigen des Militärdienstes das Recht auf Erziehungsurlaub haben, vom VfG RF für zulässig erachtet. Als objektiven Grund für die in der Regelung angelegte Differenzierung hat das Gericht die besondere gesellschaftliche Rolle der Frau als Mutter betont, die eine besondere Beziehung zum Kind habe und bei seiner Erziehung prägend sei.98 Dieser Begründung liegt der Stereotyp zugrunde, dass traditionell die Mutter die soziale Rolle der 95  VfG RF: Urteil v. 15.12.2011 Nr. 28-P  – Fall Ostaev [Постановление Конституционного Суда РФ от 15.12.2011 г. № 28-П „По делу о проверке конституционности части четвертой статьи 261 Трудового кодекса Российской Федерации в связи с жалобой гражданина Остаева Алексея Евгеньевича“]. 96  VfG RF: Punkt 2.2 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses v. 22.03.2012 Nr. 617-O‑O  – Fall Klevetz [П. 2.2 мотивировочной части Определения Конституционного Суда РФ от 22.03.2012 N 617-О-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалобы гражданки Клевец Анны Юрьевны на нарушение ее конституционных прав частями первой и третьей статьи 253 Трудового кодекса Российской Федерации и пунктом 374 раздела XXX Перечня тяжелых работ и работ с вредными или опасными условиями труда, при выполнении которых запрещается применение труда женщин“]. 97  VfG RF: Punkt 2.2 des Begründungsteils des Beschlusses v. 15.01.2009 Nr. 187-O‑O – Fall Markin [П. 2.2 мотивировочной части Определения по делу Константина Маркина от 15.01.2009 №187-О „Об отказе в принятии к рассмотрению жалоб гражданина Маркина Константина Александровича на нарушение его конституционных прав положениями статей 13 и 15 Федерального закона ‚О государственных пособиях гражданам, имеющим детей‘, статей 10 и 11 Федерального закона ‚О статусе военнослужащих‘, статьи 32 Положения о порядке прохождения военной службы и пунктов 35 и 44 Положения о назначении и выплате государственных пособий гражданам, имеющим детей“]. 98  Gegenposition vom EGMR vertreten: EGMR, Urteil v. 22.03.2012, Nr. 300778/06 – Fall Konstantin Markin vs. Russia.

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Erzieherin der Kinder einnimmt. Eine solche Vorstellung von Sonderrechten der Frauen aufgrund ihrer traditionellen sozialen Rolle führt in der Tat zur Diskriminierung der Väter im Bereich der Kinderbetreuung und -erziehung.

IV.  Rechtliche Differenzierungen aufgrund der sexuellen Orientierung Im Fall Alekseev, Evtuschenko, Isakov99 hat das VerfG die Verfassungsmäßigkeit der im Art. 6.21 des OWiGB RF geregelten Ordnungswidrigkeit des „Propagierens von nicht-traditionellen sexuellen Verhältnissen unter Minderjährigen“ geprüft. Obwohl das Gericht die sexuelle Orientierung als einen möglichen Diskriminierungsgrund anerkannt hatte, hat es im konkreten Fall keine solche Diskriminierung in der Norm gefunden und das Propagieren von nicht-traditionellen sexuellen Verhältnissen als Ordnungswidrigkeit bestätigt. Im Gegensatz dazu stelle das Propagieren traditioneller sexueller Verhältnisse und der Ungleichheit der traditionellen Familienvorstellungen mit nicht-traditionellen keine Ordnungswidrigkeit dar. Seine Entscheidung hat das Gericht mit traditionellen Werten begründet. Für das Gericht besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass ein Kind durch Informationen über Homosexualität einen potenziellen Schaden erleiden und zu nicht-traditionellen sexuellen Verhältnissen gedrängt werden könne, was zu einer Entfremdung von den Vorstellungen über die Familie, wie sie traditionell in Russland verstanden wird, führt (Punkt 3.2 des Begründungsteils des Urteils zum Fall Alekseev, Evtuschenko, Isakov). Das Gericht fußt seine Entscheidung folglich auf traditionellen und religiösen Vorstellungen über die Familie, die in der russischen Gesellschaft existieren, und auf der Unterstellung einer Gefahr für die Interessen der Kinder bei Information über Homosexualität. Solche Argumente kann man kaum als Rechtsargumente bezeichnen.100

D. Fazit Das mehrdimensionale Verfassungsmodell der Gleichheit lässt dem Verfassungsgericht der RF genug Spielraum für die Interpretation und Fortentwicklung des Gleichheitskonzepts. Auch traditionelle russische Werte spielen bei der Suche 99  VfG RF: Urteil v. 23.09.2014 Nr. 14-P. 100  Zur Analyse und Kritik dieser Entscheidung siehe Кряжкова Ольга Н., Новый раунд борьбы за права сексуальных меньшинств: комментарий к Постановлению Конституционного Суда России от 23 сентября 2014 года № 24-П // Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2014. № 6. С. 123–131 [Olga N. Kryazhkova, Neue Runde im Kampf für die Rechte sexueller Minderheiten: Kommentar zum Urteil des Verfassungsgerichts der RF vom 23. September 2014 Nr. 24-P, in: Comparative Constitutional Review, Nr. 6. 2014, S. 123–131].



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nach objektiven und vernünftigen Gründen zur Rechtfertigung rechtlicher Differenzierungen sowie bei der Interpretation des legitimen Zwecks der Einschränkungen der Gleichheitsrechte, wie z. B. Moral, Gesundheit und Staatssicherheit, eine Rolle. Der in der Präambel erwähnte „Glauben an das Gute und an die Gerechtigkeit“, welcher der modernen Generation von den Vorfahren überliefert wurde, hilft dem VfG RF, eine Brücke von den traditionellen Werten hin zu verfassungsrechtlichen und allgemein anerkannten Grundsätzen zu bauen sowie traditionelle Werte und Verfassungsnormen in Einklang zu bringen. Dennoch schließt dies Konfliktsituationen nicht aus. Solche Konflikte zu lösen ist auch eine Aufgabe des Verfassungsgerichts, wobei mehrere Hürden überwunden werden müssen, namentlich die Uneinheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung, Unterschiede bei der Auslegung im sozial-politischen und sozial-ökonomischen Kontext sowie die Rechtfertigung einer Reduzierung des Schutzbereiches der Gleichheitsrechte mit Argumenten, welche sich nur auf traditionelle Werte stützen und die rechtlichen Argumente ersetzen. Dabei leidet das vom VfG RF selbst aufgestellte Prinzip der Rechtsbestimmtheit. Solange das Gericht nicht die rechtlichen Argumente zur Auslegung der Verfassung heranzieht, tritt es nicht als Hüter der Verfassung, sondern vielmehr als Hüter der traditionellen Werte auf – eine Rolle, welche dem Gericht nicht zusteht und mit seiner Rechtsnatur in Widerspruch steht.

Trans-Jurisdictional Understanding of Equality in the context of Affirmative Action Korea, Germany and the United States Kyung-Sin Park Equality needs a better understanding. In the United States, affirmative action is consistently subject to strict scrutiny before the courts. This is often criticized for making it exceedingly difficult for legislators to implement any kind of socially progressive disparate treatment, thus missing the equalizing point of affirmative action.1 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court uses strict scrutiny to strike down various regulations, for example in the areas of tax and welfare law,2 while it does not do the same when it comes to affirmative action.3 How does German constitutional jurisprudence achieve such feat? Lack of precise definition leaves constitutional practice in uncertainty. For example, in South Korea, the law prohibiting massages unless provided by the visually impaired persons is upheld as constitutional as a sort of affirmative action for the visually impaired despite its apparent irrationality,4 while the law compensating military veterans for their services has been struck down as unconstitutional for the reason that an overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries turned out to be men and such compensation constitutes de facto discrimination against women.5 What does the constitutional principle of equality mean? Trans-national comparison has been done on external performance before6 but it requires robust logical justification. Also, comparison has been usually done on the liberty side (as opposed to equality) of constitutional jurisprudence,7 and this article 1  City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989). 2  Niels Petersen, The German Constitutional Court and legislative capture, 12(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law (July 2014), pp. 650–669. 3  Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 85, 191 ff., 28 January 1992. 4  Korean Constitutional Court 2017. 12. 28. Judgment 2017 Hun-ga 15. 5  Korean Constitutional Court 1999. 12. 23. Judgment 98 Hun-ma 363. 6  Edward J. Eberle, Equality in Germany and the United States, 10  San Diego Int’l L. J. (2008), p. 63; Alec S. Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Doctrine and the Problem of Balancing, 2010, Faculty Scholarship Series. 7  Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States:

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attempts at a parallel and satisfying comparison on the equality side. We start with the meaning of inequality.

A. Arbitrariness I.  American concept of Equality – “Suspect classification” – What is to be suspected of ? Our search for the definition of equality may well begin with “suspect classification”. Any first-year class at a U. S. law school teaches you the following: If differential treatment of people by the state uses a suspect classification, it has to be reviewed under strict scrutiny, but if the classification is not suspect, it must be reviewed under rational basis review. The rational basis review simply checks whether there is a modicum of rationality between the state action and its objectives as long as the objectives are not constitutionally illegitimate. Under such review most state actions are found to be constitutional to the point of becoming tautological because the state can always shape their objectives around the action in hindsight. Therefore, if equality has any tooth, we will find it in heightened review cases where some state actions are found unconstitutional. The starting point of equal protection methodology is the suspectness of a classification. Terms such as “strict scrutiny” and “suspectness” imply that there is a substance that we are looking for, and that when there is a higher chance of finding that substance, we should look more closely. But what is it, exactly, that we should be suspicious of ? The first-year law school class teaches that the differential treatment of a person for reason of his or her immutable traits raises a higher suspicion of unlawful discrimination.8 Similarly, classifications regarding people who have been historically discriminated against, or who are politically ostracized are also suspect classifications.9 However, these rules have not added up to a reliable theory of equality that produces a satisfactory resolution of such intractable issues as affirmative action10 or the suspect status of homosexuality11. The dissatisfaction comes from the absence of a precise definition of what exactly is to be suspected. A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture, in: Georg Nolte (ed.), European and US Constitutionalism, p. 49 (68), 2005; Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in: Michael Ignatieff (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, p. 29 (32), 2005. 8  Michael Gentithes, The Equal Protection Clause and Immutability – The Characteristics of Suspect Classifications, 40(3) University of Memphis Law Review (2010), p. 507. 9  For a latest attempt to set up a non-immutability-based suspect classification, please see Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17–1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464 (W. D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018). 10  Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. (1996), p. 51. Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjrl/vol2/iss1/2. 11  Gilreath, Shannon, Of Fruit Flies and Men: Rethinking Immutability in Equal Protection



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What we mean by saying that classifications based on immutable traits are suspect is that an immutable trait indicates the existence of something else which constitutes a violation of the principle of equality, and therefore requires strict scrutiny. Right now, we are searching for that something else, i. e., the ultimate definition of unlawful discrimination, the ultimate fact to be suspicious of when the Supreme Court points the accusing finger to racial classifications as “suspect”. Before we delve into that query, let us take a short detour into what strict scrutiny means. It does not actually mean “looking more closely”. Strict scrutiny requires that the classification is necessary to accomplish the compelling governmental interest. The state must achieve a countervailing public interest overwhelming enough to justify the great damage to the private interest caused by the state action. Phrased in this quantitative way, discrimination is unconstitutional if some private interest is infringed to such a great extent that even accomplishing the compelling governmental interest cannot justify it. We will come back to this point later, but it suffices now to conjecture that equality or the lack thereof is characterized by a substance that we can be suspicious of and for which we should therefore require greater countervailing public interest. Back on the main search, again the problem is that we do so without defining what that substance is. If strict scrutiny is understood in this quantitative way, i. e., as a substantive requirement of accomplishing a greater public interest, which kicks in when a certain classification is more “suspect”, we also need to require the suspectness of a classification to relate somehow to a quantitative measure of the private injury arising from to the state’s action. Let’s see whether we can come up with the definition of equality that fits this requirement. 1.  Suspected of “intentional” discrimination? The term “suspect” originates from such frequently used phraseologies as “suspected of invidious discrimination”, “suspected of intentional discrimination”, “suspected of racial antagonism”, or “suspected of bias”. In other words, stating that a classification is suspect is another way of saying that it is likely that the classifying state actor is being invidious or intentional. The classification triggers various heightened levels of scrutiny depending on whether it is done along the lines of race or of gender. It seems that each classification is ascribed varying evidentiary importance or probative value for “intentness” or “invidiousness” in what seems to be the Court’s ultimate inquiry into the actual mental state of the state actor. We will examine both concepts in turn. Initially, it seems consistent with common sense that, when the state impairs a private person’s interest intentionally as opposed to unintentionally, justification of such impairment will require countervailing production of public interest Analysis – with a View Toward a Constitutional Moral Imperative, 9 Law and Social Change (2006), p. 1 (1).

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greater than when the state acts unintentionally. Premeditated murder may result in capital punishment while unintentional killings may go unpunished. There is the problem of incommensurability: the problem of comparing two different values (e. g., apples and oranges)12 but we will deal with that later in a full chapter. The bigger problem is that intentionality cannot be the target of our legal repulsion. After all, our society sets up a system of moral values whereby intentional discrimination is not only allowed but actively pursued and passionately sanctioned. For instance, we differentiate those who commit senseless killings of other human beings from the rest of us and deliberately abridge their liberties and sometimes their lives. One may argue that punishment of a murderer according to the operation of a criminal justice system is different from, for instance, a mob attack motivated by feelings of anger and hatred. The first does sound more deliberate while the second more emotional. However, the heart of the matter is that both scenarios involve the conscious decision of a group of people that others need to be treated differently from themselves, and therefore involve intentional, differential treatment of people. We should not measure the constitutionality of the state’s act by referring to how deliberately it condemns other things, or how resolutely it evaluates other things. One of the modes of the rule of law is to identify those things that are harmful to society so that we can intentionally condemn and ostracize them. Therefore, that this differential treatment is intentional cannot be the reason for heightened review, or in the balancing language, for demanding a greater amount of countervailing public interest. We apply differential punishment to private individuals who commit crimes with varying degrees of deliberateness because we are dictated by such policy reasons as deterrence and retribution. These policy reasons do not apply to constitutional law. We need to reserve for the state the power to act intentionally and decisively when it needs to. Differential treatment does not become constitutionally repulsive just because it is intentional. 2.  Suspected of invidious discrimination? Invidiousness is a little more complex than intentness in that it presupposes the act or mental state of condemnation or hostility against a group of people. The theory goes as follows: When we prescribe differential treatment of murderers as opposed to others, we do not hold any hostility against murderers themselves. We are not being hostile to their persons. We may hold anger against them but 12  Moshe Cohen-Eliya/​Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality: The Historical Origins (September 23, 2008), 8(2) I‑Con: International Journal of Constitutional Law (2010), p. 263. Available at SSRN:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=1272763orhttp://dx.doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.1272763.



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that is not the reason for their differential treatment, at least ostensibly. Invidious differential treatment is different from our differential treatment of murderers because it is an attack against a group of people themselves, as opposed to their actions, harboring certain antagonism against them. However, antagonism, ill will, hostility, and bias describe emotive states of conscious beings. Defining suspectness in emotive terms such as the likelihood of ill will, hostility, bias, or invidiousness creates serious problems for constitutional law. First of all, it is difficult to figure out the emotive state of everyone involved in the state action in question when the passage of any single piece of legislation will involve hundreds of legislators. Even if individuals were forthcoming about their motivation, gauging an overall emotive state of the state actor will be difficult. What is more important, it seems that sometimes seemingly cool, reasoned evaluation of a group of people is not any better ethically than emotionally charged discrimination against them. For example, many forms of obviously unconstitutional treatment of the mentally incompetent are not based on any ill will against them. Instead it is argued that, on the basis of a supposedly scientific observation, their handicap precludes them from being afforded the full range of liberties that mentally competent people are entitled to. That discrimination is carefully reasoned as opposed to emotionally motivated does not make the latter any more condemnable. Invidiousness or any other emotive quality of a state action fails the touchstone of inequality.

II.  Lack of good reason or arbitrary discrimination? We seem to use such epithets as ill will, hostility, bias, or intentional discrimination to describe a state where one’s action is based on no or on false beliefs. As a matter of fact, no matter how intentionally and sometimes viciously or invidiously we attack or condemn a group of fellow human beings, such discrimination can always be justified by pointing out relevant differences that justify the anger or the contempt, as in the case of serial killers. We say “hate the deeds, not the person”. We cannot condemn people for just being themselves or simply being alive, but we often single out and condemn a group of people for their conduct. This is a logical corollary from the principle that one cannot be responsible for something beyond his or her control. Likewise, if the state, by chance, omitted distribution of some things of value to a group of people and they happen to belong to a racial minority, we would not invalidate such state action for being invidious or intentional but for being arbitrary or unreasonable, i. e., lacking good reason. Now, the point of this example is that we would still invalidate such action even if the state or its agents committed such omission with absolutely no ill will towards the racial minority. What seems to ultimately justify differential treat-

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ment of murderers and yet condemns differential treatment of racial minorities as invidious is that the latter is not done for any empirically good reason. This is arbitrariness.

III.  Rationality and arbitrariness In the end, the ultimate dividing line seems to be whether these differences proposed by the state actor as pretexts for differential treatment are based on truths. The Court reacts when some of the pretexts are based on misperceptions and falsities. The ultimate test, then, seems to be whether these pretexts can be justified by reason – or simply speaking, are rational – or arbitrary (irrational). In civil law states such as Germany and Korea, the mandate of equality has been interpreted as the requirement of prohibition of arbitrariness.13 Defining inequality as arbitrariness is preferable to defining it as invidiousness because it explains the non-invidious fact patterns that still trigger heightened scrutiny. A state action is invidious because the pretext for state-sanctioned hostility against a group of people is arbitrary, irrational, or lacking good reason, not because it is triggered by ill will or associated with any emotive state of mind. We should then ask whether the definition of discrimination as arbitrariness or irrationality is consistent with the “immutable trait” rationale for suspect classification. That it is arbitrary to discriminate against someone for simply existing or for something beyond their control like inherent traits seems to be a statement that the Court can rely on most times in formulating decisions in equal protection cases. There are other reasons for raising the level of scrutiny, for instance, when the subject matter of discrimination concerns “fundamental interest” even when it does not involve immutable-trait-based classification. However, as we shall see, this raising of scrutiny can be justified under the prevailing, quantitative concept of strict scrutiny while the definition of equality itself can afford to remain as that of arbitrariness.

B.  Multi-tiered review I.  Do we need more than one standard? To remind you, we began with the concept of suspect classification, the gravamen of strict scrutiny, in a search for the definition of equality. Interestingly, what we found is arbitrariness, which is consistent with rational basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny. It requires merely that the state action is “rationally related to 13  Christian Bumke/​A ndreas Voßkuhle, German Constitutional Law: Introduction, Cases and Principles, paragraph 479, 2019; Korean Constitutional Court, The First Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court, 1999, Trans. Kyung-Sin Park, p. 126.



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a legitimate state interest” or equivalently “not arbitrary”. Since this is the weakest test of constitutionality, it means that whatever fails this test will fail on any higher level of scrutiny. In other words, the minimum requisite of equality is coextensive with the rationality review test. As said before, the concept of equality as arbitrariness is also consistent with the leading German and Korean theories. The principle of equality, as stated in the leading expressions, is paraphrased as a mandate that all persons situated similarly should be treated alike.14 Then, any departure from equal treatment is unconstitutional if it lacks a sufficient reason, i. e. if it is arbitrary.15 Then do we really need strict scrutiny? One theory goes as follows: If arbitrariness is inequality, it should mean that when the Court states that racial classification raises suspicion of “invidious discrimination” or that it is “suspect”, what it means is that the related state action is more likely to be arbitrary and therefore the Court should “look more closely” into the state action. However, the content of strict scrutiny is much more than that as said before and will be examined in further detail below, which explains why the American jurisprudence is not satisfied with one standard of review. 1.  American solution: What stands out? Individual rights adjudication in the United States has converged on multi-tiered review crowned by strict scrutiny while other parts of the world have adhered to the unitary principle of proportionality.16 However, the U. S. Supreme Court also engages in the proportionality test but through a pragmatic formula to facilitate and add consistency.17 It first surveys the entire field of factual elements presented by each case and identifies those facts that stand out as surrogates for or indicators of reasons for requiring greater public interest to be produced by the state action. Of course, the Court merely says that it is applying close scrutiny, but upon close scrutiny – no pun intended – the Court does not mean merely a higher evidential standard but a higher level or a larger amount of public good to be produced by the classifying state action. For instance, in the realm of equal protection, the line by which people are categorized and given differential treatment by the state action has been given priority. At the same time, the subject matter in which discrimination takes place has gained an equally important role. If either the line is that of e. g. race or the 14  Korean Constitutional Court, The First Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court, 1999, Trans. Kyung-Sin Park, pp. 88 f. 15  The principle of equality has a second mandate: All persons who are situated differently should be treated differently. This mandate is more difficult to understand. Does it include a mandate concerning how much differently the two different people should be treated? Does this mandate actually require affirmative action? 16  Sweet (n 6). 17  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. (2006), p. 1267 (1315).

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subject being unequally distributed is of great importance, the Court will require the state action to produce ‘compelling interest,’ as opposed to just ‘important’ or merely ‘legitimate’ interest. In the realm of freedom of expression and other areas of liberty where the state action limits a private citizen’s actions, the Court will focus on the importance of the actions being limited. If very important private actions are enjoined it will require heightened public interest. These outstanding facts that trigger heightened scrutiny have been given such names as ‘suspect classification’, ‘fundamental interest’, and ‘fundamental rights’. Selection of these ‘outstanding’ facts has been a curious art involving various heterogeneous considerations drawn from history, psychology, philosophy, politics, etc. For instance, the nation’s history of racial discrimination is an important factor in crowning race with the title of suspect classification. The Court decided that any outright classification of people by racial lines is so much suspected of ‘invidious discrimination’ that it has to be scrutinized closely. It is as if the Court thinks that in order to compensate for the high likelihood of the state action being ‘invidious,’ it requires the state to provide some sort of insurance by demonstrating an overwhelming amount of public good to be expected by its action. The relationship between the outstanding facts and the appreciation of the requisite public good is more straightforward on the liberty realm of basic rights. For instance, voting rights have been considered ‘fundamental interest’ or a ‘fundamental right’. It triggers strict scrutiny because as a representative democracy, this society’s constitution assigns great importance to the right to vote. As a side effect of the adoption of the multi-tiered review, the process of determining which facts ‘stand out’ as deserving to make demand upon the state has assumed supreme importance in constitutional inquiries. Particularly contentious has been which line of division will be considered “suspect classification.” For example, in regard to homosexuality, even though the ultimate question remains whether a particular homosexual is impermissibly discriminated against, the road to the answer involves an intermediary question – which is seen more important in the larger scheme of things – that asks whether homosexuals as a group are a ‘suspect class’ that triggers heightened scrutiny. 2.  Strict scrutiny strictly scrutinized In the end, American constitutional inquiry, both in the equality areas and the liberty areas, seems to invariably involve some sort of balancing between private interest abridged and public interest promoted by a state action.18 ‘Balancing’ is 18  This is also Richard Fallon’s position, supra. It is squarely criticized by Roy G. Spece/​ David V. Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion, Paper No. 15–12, for leaving out other components of strict scrutiny such as the requirement of “least



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used here to denote a broader operation than the one frequently identified with ‘balancing tests’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny’ in the Court’s diction. The technical definition of ‘balancing’ can be stated broadly as “comparing quantitatively two subjects for the purpose of deciding which one is greater than the other.” Framed as a balancing act, the constitutionality of a state action depends on whether it produces public interest great enough to justify the damage to private interest. In other words, the state is allowed to commit a private wrong when, and only when, it produces public good to a sufficient extent to justify the private wrong. Naturally, the severity of infringement on private rights varies depending on the facts of the case. When state action causes much damage to private interest, the Court must require the state to justify its action by demonstrating the accordingly greater amount of public good. The Court’s varying treatment of state actions according to the amount of private damage done seems to appear in the form of the multi-tiered standard of review. Once the rights infringed are identified as “fundamental,” it is logical to assume that the private injuries are much more severe than they would be if the rights were not “fundamental” (actually, this seems to be the only meaning of ‘fundamental rights’). For the state action abridging fundamental rights to be constitutional, it has to produce an amount of public good that overwhelms the private injury – hence “compelling governmental interest.” If the affected rights were less fundamental, e. g., commercial speech, the state must produce enough public good to at least match the extent of the injuries done – hence “important government objectives.” If no fundamental right is infringed, the state can do pretty much what it wants to as long as it shows a minimum of public good is achieved – hence mere “legitimate interest” in rational basis review. In other words, the differing levels of scrutiny represent the Court’s demand of the varying amount of public interest to be produced by the state actor, depending on the severity of the infringement on the private interest. The same logic applies to the ‘fundamental interest’ prong of equal protection analysis. Once it is established that discrimination is infringement on the disfavored person’s right to equal protection, the subject matter in which the discrimination took place is relevant to measuring the extent of discriminatory harm. If the state’s violation of equal protection takes place in the realm of “fundamental interest” as opposed to non-fundamental interest, common sense suggests viewing that as a graver violation of the principle of equality: One would restrictive means” and that of “substantial advancement of the legislative purpose”. Although I agree with all the criticisms, those components can be subsumed into Fallon’s and my position without sacrificing the primal importance given to the balancing aspect of the strict scrutiny. For a fuller examination of strict scrutiny, see Kyung Sin Park, Korean Principle of Proportionality, American Multileveled Scrutiny, and Empiricist Elements in U. S. – Korean Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1 Journal of Korean Law (2001), p. 105.

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normally feel more violated when discriminated against in essential matters such as the right to livelihood than in peripheral ones such as the right to go hunting. The state must then justify the infringement by proving that it can produce an accordingly greater public good: hence the “compelling governmental interest” test in the fundamental interest prong of equal protection jurisprudence. If the infringed interest is not as important, the Court merely requires from the state that the effect of its action is in the form of a public good as opposed to a public wrong – hence “the legitimate interest”-test in the rationality review. Now, the most difficult part: can the same logic be extended to the other portion of equal protection analysis which varies the level of scrutiny according to the types of classifications? A  suspect classification triggers strict scrutiny. A quasi-suspect classification triggers quasi-strict scrutiny. In other words, some classifications give rise to more suspectness than others. Assuming that whatever is suspected of is derogation of private interest, the suspectness can be equated to the concept of likelihood or probability and then to the more quantifiable concept of probability. The product of the quantifier of the suspected injury and the probability is then equivalent to the expectation value of the private injuries. Under the balancing model described above, the rising expectation value of private injury increases the requisite countervailing public interest for the legality of the state action. It does seem to make sense that, when arbitrariness is considered a constitutional harm and it is more highly suspected because of the operative classification (i. e., immutable trait), we require the state to produce greater public interest to outweigh the constitutional harm. Inequality as arbitrariness remains a viable definition after understanding fully the concept of strict scrutiny as we know it now. We understand that the American multi-level scrutiny does not militate against inequality as arbitrariness. In summary, strict scrutiny facilitates constitutional review by requiring greater public interest in the cases where arbitrariness is more likely in equality jurisprudence or great private injuries are involved in liberty jurisprudence.

II.  The German-Korean Principle of Proportionality The concept of strict scrutiny was adopted in German and Korean jurisprudence as well. The German constitutional court, pre-1980, adhered to an interpretation of Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law as a mandate to treat equals equally and “unequals” unequally, but qualified that mandate by positing that “the principle of equality is violated when we cannot find in the law a rational basis for discrimination, a basis based on the nature of things, a specially objectively clear basis”19. This interpretation is called the no-arbitrariness principle or that 19  BVerfGE 1, 14 (52).



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of prohibition of arbitrariness. Starting 1980, the German constitutional court began differentiating in personam discrimination and in rem discrimination20 whereby the former is subject to strict scrutiny based on the principle of proportionality while the latter is left to the traditional non-arbitrariness review. By proportionality, the Court will look at whether the differences in treatment are proportional to the factual differences between the two groups treated differently. Then, in 1993, the Court presented the newest formula: the more in personam discrimination takes place along the lines of “sex, family, origin, race, language, birth place, birth origin, faith, religious or political opinions” listed in Article 3 Paragraph 3 of Basic Law or the more in personam discrimination causes the risk of discriminating against the minorities defined by those lines, the higher the level of scrutiny becomes.21 Also, if in rem discrimination burdens exercise of basic rights, such discrimination shall be subject to heightened scrutiny as well. If neither the minority groups defined by the enumerated categories are discriminated nor the exercise of basic rights is burdened, the no-arbitrariness rule applies. The Korean constitutional court also subscribed to the passive, non-arbitrariness interpretation of its equality provision in the constitution until 1999 when the Court called for a strict relationship of proportionality between the purpose of disparate treatment and its means when the Korean constitution explicitly warns against discrimination against certain groups or basic rights are substantially burdened by the disparate treatment.22 The aforesaid German-Korean strict scrutiny consists of the principle of proportionality demanding that the state action (1) be aimed at a constitutionally legitimate purpose, (2) be an appropriate means to achieve that purpose, (3) achieve a balance (proportionality) between that purpose and restrictions on private interests, and (4) finally restricts the private person(s) to a minimum extent. Generally, the German-Korean jurisprudence on liberty recognizes only this single standard of constitutional review under the title of proportionality. There are no differing levels of scrutiny because, theoretically, all state actions must satisfy each of the four requirements simultaneously to be constitutional. Practically, the courts seem to base their decisions on the sum total of their impressions under all the four categories. 20  BVerfGE 52, 277 (280); 55, 72 (88); 60, 123 (133 f.); 74, 9, (24). 21  BVerfGE 88, 87 (87 ff.). 22  Korean Constitutional Court, 1999 12.23, 98 Hunba 363. Some commentators point out that the Korean constitutional court applied a new “relaxed strict scrutiny” when the Constitutional calls for such disparate treatment as in the case of “certified national martyrs” (헌법재판소 2001.2.22. 선고 2000헌마25 결정). However, as other commentators argue, this only elevates the quantum of public interest weighed against the private interest; as such, the 2001 decision should not be considered a new standard.

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However, on the equality side, this principle of proportionality is applied only when certain special conditions are met, e. g., a state action treats people disparately along the lines of classification that either the respective constitutions each list specifically or that infringe upon the exercise of basic rights.23 When these conditions are not met, the ordinary prohibition of arbitrariness becomes the standard for deciding whether the state action violates equality. To compare, the U. S. Supreme Court originally required strict scrutiny when people are disparately treated along the lines of “suspect classification” while otherwise they simply require that the state action is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Strict scrutiny means that the state action is necessary for or narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental purpose. Later, the U. S. Supreme Court concocted an intermediate scrutiny that requires the state action to be substantially related to an important governmental purpose. Both the American multi-leveled scrutiny and the European proportionality can be visualized in the following common paradigm: that of a vehicle through which the Court conducts the balancing between private injuries and public good. In short, the multi-leveled scrutiny seems to achieve one of the components of the principle of proportionality, namely a balance between private injuries and public good. The German-Korean principle of proportionality is triggered only for special types of discrimination but also the American heightened scrutiny is triggered only for certain types of discrimination or rights-infringement. U.S. Korea & Germany Means-Ends Nexus Test Ends Test (“to … (“State action shall be …) government purpose.”) Strict scrutiny Narrowly tailored

Compelling

Intermediate scrutiny

Important

Substantially

Rational basis Rationally related review

Legitimate

Balancing between legal interests (triggered for special types of discrimination)

Let’s pursue further on that as the relevant academia is full of literature focusing on the differences between the two, and we try to find a universal or at least transnational operationalization of equality.24 Now, the four components of the principle of proportionality can be compared or better yet equated to the American multi-tiered review as follows: 23  Korean Constitutional Court 1999. 12. 23. Judgment 98 Hun-ma 363. 24  Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Law Jurisprudence, 57 Univ. of Toronto L. J. (2007), p. 383; Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 Univ. of Toronto L. J. (2007), p. 369.



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Legitimacy of the end means that the end aimed for by the state in engaging in a particular state action must be legitimate. This is equivalent to the ends analysis of the American multi-tiered review where the end has to be “merely legitimate” in rational basis review, “important” in intermediate scrutiny, and “compelling” in strict scrutiny, while the required desirability of the government’s end needs to be progressively greater in that order. Appropriateness of the means is equivalent to the means-ends analysis applicable to all levels of review, expressed as “rationally related to” in rational basis review, “substantially related to” in intermediate scrutiny, and “necessary for” in strict scrutiny. In the American framework, the requisite degree of appropriateness of the reviewed state action as the means to the end needs to rise as the level of scrutiny increases. A greater end still results in an unconstitutional state action if the means to the end are not appropriate. It is natural to require a method to be more proper as its end becomes more ambitious. Balance between legal interests requires us to take a step back to grasp its relationship to the overall American framework. This principle means that there must be proportionally great public interest created by the subject state action for it to infringe on a person’s basic rights without violating the constitution. Now, the whole purpose of the American multi-tiered scrutiny is to demand proportionally greater public interest to be achieved by the state as the infringed private interest increases. If ‘fundamental rights’ are infringed upon, ‘compelling governmental interest’ must be achieved. If no ‘fundamental rights’ are infringed upon, mere ‘legitimate interest’ suffices. Finally, we must clarify what is meant by minimality of the infringement. The American counterpart are the requirements of the least restrictive means or the “narrowly tailored means” which apply mostly to strict scrutiny and sometimes to intermediate scrutiny. It is safe to assume that the more the private interest is infringed, the more important the minimality of the infringement becomes. In other words, the bigger the private interest, the more the infringement must be kept as small as possible. In summary, both the American multi-level scrutiny and the German-Korean principle of proportionality operationalize the quantitative balancing between private injuries and public accomplishment. A common feature of the two systems is that each allows the judicial reviewer to take into account the country’s culture and history in weighing the magnitude of governmental interest aimed at by the state and the value of a certain right infringed. In the Korean-German system, the four requirements are simultaneously imposed and at the same intensity for all subject state actions, and have all the ingredients of the American system. The American system, when deconstructed into the concepts of the German-Korean one, exhibits its potential clearly for the balancing paradigm.

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III.  Which one “slides” better? German-Korean vs. American There are strengths and weaknesses in adopting a variable or multi-tiered standard of review as in the United States as opposed to managing a single standard of review with multiple components as in Korea and Germany. Both the GermanKorean principle of proportionality and the American multi-tiered standard of review seem to be a nice tool to balance on one hand the total moral value of injuries to private interest and the total moral value of the public good that the state action produced. However, the U. S. Supreme Court’s refusal to adopt the “sliding scale” seems to militate against the ideal of the balancing.25 If what the US Supreme Court wants to do ultimately is to demand in return insurmountable amount of public interest whenever private injury (either on liberty or equality as defined arbitrariness) is great, they should recognize whenever the private injury is increased, not just when arbitrariness is highly suspected or when the subject right is highly fundamental but also when arbitrariness is moderately suspected and the subject right is moderately fundamental. With a single standard format, there is the problem of judicial paralysis: it can create precedential inconsistency because there are too many variables that are not organized into algorithm or hierarchy so that precedents do not provide enough guidance to the reviewing courts of the new cases. Any act of state is limited by available scientific knowledge in fashioning a policy and by available technology in implementing it. The multi-leveled review described above allows the court to accord varying weight on different categories of classification, thereby allowing the court to use the policy considerations deemed important by the contemporaries in equality analysis. However, as we shall see later, its rigidity may itself block evolution of the precedents in the future. One may say that the single standard format is dynamically superior while the multi-tiered format is algorithmically superior.

C.  Quantifying Jurisprudence of Liberty and Equality I.  Incommensurability and quantifiability We have ascertained the substance of inequality as an arbitrary state action and the role of strict scrutiny in facilitating detection of arbitrariness. However, inequality as arbitrariness does not seem to fit well with the actual practice of American strict scrutiny. A literal meaning of strict scrutiny should mean “looking more closely” on whether the state action is arbitrary, and the 25  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1973).



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level of requisite rationality should be heightened. Strict scrutiny in practice does not look more closely at the level of rationality but changes the substance of equality. Instead of asking (1) ‘how rational is it to exclude all methadone users from public transit jobs?’26, American strict scrutiny asks (2) ‘how important is the public interest reason for excluding all methadone users, compared to the interest of the methadone users who are as employable as non-methadone users?’ Instead of asking (1) ‘what is the probability of methadone users lapsing back into addition?’, or ‘what is the probability of finding unemployable applicants among methadone users?’, American strict scrutiny asks (2) ‘how important is the goal of public transit safety?’, or ‘how important is the interest of all the methadone users excluded from the application process for that goal gratuitously (i. e., when it is unnecessary to exclude them)?’. The first set of questions demands better reasoning on the relationship between the state’s goal and the state action. The second set of questions demands state action to be more important. It is partly for this reason that the U. S. Supreme Court in Korematsu27 will approve Japanese internment pointing to the “pressing necessity” of war efforts in the very case announcing strict scrutiny for the first time. It is true that, as discussed earlier, the suspectness of arbitrariness can be quantified as a measure of immutability of the traits by which people are treated differentially or the expectation value of arbitrariness can be quantified in relation to the ‘fundamental-ness’ of the interest differentially protected. However, the idea that extreme arbitrariness can be somehow washed away (i. e., justified) by the state accomplishing an important government interest is repulsive to the humanitarian ideas which often form the basis of equality claims. If one person is singled out for sacrifice in benefit of one million people, we will accept that the liberty analysis may check out, but what about the equality analysis? Shouldn’t the equality analysis be a little more sacred compared to the fully quantitative liberty analysis? Now, this issue of incommensurability does not seem to arise in the liberty jurisprudence because both sides of equation are both quantifiable. Indeed, we can obviate this issue of incommensurability if we can easily take comfort in the idea that strict scrutiny in equality, phrased that way, is no different from strict scrutiny for substantive individual rights such as freedom of speech and bodily autonomy (e. g., abortion). In this area of constitutional jurisprudence, which we may call “liberty” (as opposed to equality), the quantitative balancing rules. Equality strictly scrutinized becomes indistinguishable from liberty strictly scrutinized. For instance, the requirement that an abortion ban be necessary for the compelling interest of protecting the “potentiality of personhood” as in Roe v. Wade28 becomes indistinguishable from the requirement that differential treat26  New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 (1979). 27  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). 28  Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).

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ment of those who aborted the fetus be necessary for that compelling interest. If equality merges into liberty this way, what is lost in the process is the communitarian ideal of equality that has applied a moderating pressure on libertarianism. This point becomes clearer if you include the fundamental interest prong of equal protection jurisprudence. The two issues, firstly incommensurability and secondly unity of equality and liberty, are related to each other because the balancing in the liberty analysis is decidedly quantitative and therefore equality analysis, when merged into liberty analysis, is bound to become quantitative as well. In order to understand this relationship, we will describe strict scrutiny in more detail below.

II.  American strict scrutiny quantified 1. Equality The assumption we must respect while conceptualizing heightened review is that the suspectness of arbitrariness can be quantified and there are things or states of affairs that are more suspected of arbitrariness than others. Then, the more suspicious the state action looks to be arbitrary, the greater the public good that the state needs to justify its suspicious action to overwhelm or outweigh the suspected arbitrariness of its actions. Any private injury can be balanced out by a sufficient amount of countervailing public interest. It is a bold postulate but American strict scrutiny cannot be justified in any other way. Also, depending on what medium is used in the state’s arbitrary action, the extent of private injury can vary. For instance, whether the state is acting arbitrarily in the area of basic necessity or in the area of superfluous amenities affects how much private injury results from the state’s arbitrary action. This observation forms the basis of the fundamental interest prong of equal protection jurisprudence. Accordingly, the extent of private injury can be quantified first by defining S as the level of suspected arbitrariness and R as the importance of the medium of the arbitrary state action. Then, the extent of private injury is the product of both, namely: S * R We require the state to come up with ever more public good as captured in such phraseologies as “important government objectives” or “compelling interest” when the arbitrariness of state classification increases and triggers higher levels of scrutiny. Then, the mandate of constitutionality in such relationship cannot be subsumed under the following mathematical formula: S * R  p can be substituted by: 29  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1973). 30  Sweet (n 6). 31  Raffi S. Baroutjian, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. (1997), p. 1277.

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G > F * E where F is the importance of the right burdened; E the extent to which the right is burdened; G the governmental interest. If a fundamental right is infringed upon, F is high. For the equation to hold true, the Court must require G to be great, i. e., “compelling” or “important”. If a fundamental right is not infringed upon, the Court applies rational basis review because P does not have to be high for the reviewed state action to be constitutional. Also, even if the fundamental right is infringed upon, if the infringement is not serious, i. e., E is low, G does not have to be great and the Court does not apply strict scrutiny. For instance, even when a state action infringes upon freedom of speech, an unquestionably fundamental right, if it is infringed only to the extent that the means of expression are restricted, then the Court applies merely intermediate scrutiny. Or when a state action infringes upon right to abortion, again a fundamental right, if its exercise was only delayed for 24 hours, the Court applies rational basis review.32 Again, American strict scrutiny is unnecessarily rigid in that unless the right is fundamental (F), the Court does not apply strict scrutiny no matter how extensive the infringement (E) is. But again, let us be satisfied that the GermanKorean proportionality is more flexible and comprehensive, and assume the plausibility of the quantitative modeling in interest of the discussion.33

III.  Merger of equality and liberty The equations G > F * E and G > S * R are similar but are they identical statements? Indeed, there are two competing narratives on the relationship between equality and liberty. The first one is independence of equality.34 The second one is unity of equality and liberty.35 The competition does not arise out of mere academic debates. Egalitarian societies have viewed liberty as dangerous for equality, and free democracies have found equality as suffocating liberty. Philosophers have pondered whether the two are mutually discreet values or whether they are – if not the same – at least reconcilable. For instance, Dworkin formulated equality as supporting liberty, and vice versa, through the concept of equality of resources.36 However, such attempts were counterfactual just as Rawls’ original positions are, and therefore have not yet provided pragmatic guidance to jurists for future cases, e. g. on how to analyze the next constitutional challenge coming into the docket from societies not so ideally arranged from the beginning. Now, within constitutional law, we can re-create the dichotomy as follows: 32  Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 US 833 (1992). 33  Baroutjian (n 31). 34  Kenneth Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, Boston University Law Rev (1985). 35  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. (1982), p. 537. 36  Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 2011, p. 506.



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Independence of Equality: Historically, it is true that the call for equality came from an urgent need to prevent serious infringement on liberties and other substantive freedoms, as in slavery or as in the Holocaust. People are not equal. However, we need to push for treating people equally in order to prevent repetition of such history. The idea is that we should assume people to be worthy of equal treatment, and any departure from the assumption should be justified by some reasoning. State actions lacking such reasoning will be considered not satisfying the equality norm. The substance of equality is assumption of equality of all human beings, and constitutional evaluation consists of measuring the logical soundness or arbitrariness of the justification for departure from that assumption. In that sense, equality is different from liberty in that it requires reason (or rationality or non-arbitrariness) in any differential treatment of a person. The problem is that, in that sense, substantive equality becomes difficult to achieve because people are assumed to equal, and therefore state actions such as affirmative action attempting to address pre-intervention inequities face very harsh and sometimes insurmountable constitutional scrutiny.37 Unity of equality and liberty: Imagine that you need to purchase a $500 voucher each year to exercise your right to travel during that period of time. The requirement of this purchase constitutes an infringement on the right to travel. The higher the voucher price, the greater the infringement. However, such a voucher also constitutes discrimination between the people who can afford it and those who cannot. In that sense, equality can be formulated as a question of liberty. Similarly, making available public education only to a certain race sounds like a discrimination against other races at first but also it constitutes a grievous – and for some, insurmountable – hurdle for enjoying the liberty of public education. Set up that way, a question of liberty does not require for its resolution any presumption of equality of all people, which was part of the first narrative. It simply asks a quantitative question: whether public interest is great enough to justify private restriction. If you analyze the $500 travel voucher from a liberty angle, you will weigh how many people can travel against the public interest created by such taxation. A  questioner from an equality angle will ask a comparative question such as, given that people who can afford $500 travel voucher can travel, how terrible is it that people under $500 cannot? In the end, the point is balancing the private 37  A progressive wing of the U. S. Supreme Court justices has tried to concoct a win for affirmative action even under the strict scrutiny using the concept of “continuing effects of past discrimination”, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980). However, such reasoning suffers from a critique that past discrimination influences the present through the family environment and resources made available to the current generation and if so, affirmative action should be for the poor, not for the previously discriminated race, which may include the financially affluent.

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interest of people who cannot travel due to the voucher requirement and the public interest generated by it. One may argue that equality still does not disappear into liberty. Even if a quantitative justification is made, one can still argue the state action is unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality. In the case of the travel voucher, one may justify it as a legitimate and appropriate method for defraying the cost of transit infrastructure and yet fail to justify it as discrimination between people who can afford the $500 and those cannot. Or, in the case of racially selective public education, one may be able to justify it quantitatively if 99 % of the nation’s population will be receiving sufficient public education, but not on account of the 1 %. However, if you look closely at the substance of the balancing, they are the same. Non-arbitrariness means that there is at least a legitimate goal the government tries to reach with the state action, whatever that goal may be. Yet there is no question how efficient that state action is or how important that goal is. This means that many inequality arguments will fail this test. In order to make it more difficult to justify such state actions, strict scrutiny requires a high level of efficiency and the compelling importance of the goal. In the racially selective public education example, the public interest in the equality evaluation is the marginal interest created by not giving the small minority public education. The same holds true in the liberty example. What seems to vary is the following: In the liberty setting, public education may not be important enough to trigger strict scrutiny while under the equality setting racial classification is suspicious enough of arbitrariness to trigger strict scrutiny. However, if you conceptualize race as an insurmountable hurdle (E) to enjoyment of public education in the liberty analysis, it also calls for strict scrutiny for the same reason that such racial classification (S) calls for strict scrutiny. Also, in the case of the $500 travel voucher, classification between people who can afford $500 and those who cannot may not seem to be highly suspected of arbitrariness in an equality analysis if viewed superficially; but in a liberty analysis the right to travel may call for strict scrutiny. However, if you conceptualize $500 as a hurdle (E) to enjoyment of the right to travel, the right to travel still calls for strict scrutiny in the fundamental interest prong of equal protection for the same reason that it does in the liberty analysis. In summary, within the confines of constitutional jurisprudence, equality merges into liberty whereby a state action can be justified by the varying level of government accomplishment of public interest, depending on how fundamental the subject right is (F, R) and how insurmountable the hurdle to enjoyment of that right is (E, S).



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D.  Back to Arbitrariness I.  How do we know that certain actions are more suspected of being arbitrary? We mentioned two issues arising out of operationalizing inequality as arbitrariness in the context of heightened review: incommensurability and merger of equality and liberty. We explored the possibility of equality merging into liberty above. There remains the issue of incongruence of non-arbitrariness as equality to the quantitative scheme of proportionality. Just to remind, arbitrariness can continue to be functional in heightened review via the concepts of expectation value, immutability, etc. However, if inequality is really arbitrariness, why should compelling government interest justify arbitrary action? Yes, we provided a tentative answer to the question when we realized that equality merges into liberty and therefore is subject to the kind of quantitative modeling prevalent in liberty analysis. But such a conceptualization of equality did not answer that question but was made possible only by deferring it. Again, we should be reminded that the U. S. Supreme Court, in real cases, does not seem to use arbitrariness as one of the variable parameters and instead uses suspectedness-of-arbitrariness, which still leaves unanswered the question: what is equality? German and Korean courts do use arbitrariness directly but their strict scrutiny still requires quantitative balancing. This indirectness is different from how the elements of balancing as applied to the First Amendment setting, for instance, are identified. There, the two variables were the importance of the right infringed and the extent to which the right is infringed. There is no tentativeness in identifying exactly what is being quantified for the purpose of the balancing between private injury and public interest in the liberty balancing. That tentativeness in the equality balancing seems to come from the nature of rationality. Absence of rationality, or arbitrariness, is ubiquitous in the real world. Everything we believe to be coincidental is in a sense arbitrary. There is nothing in this world that has a reason down to its mere existence, which itself has been characterized as “absurd” by some philosophers.38 The number of branches that each tree develops is subject to chance. The shape of each snowflake is subject to chance. Human action suffers from arbitrariness to no less extent than a natural phenomenon does. It is arbitrary to smoke as it endangers one’s health, while it is also somewhat arbitrary not to smoke and sacrificing the resulting pleasure without accurately calculating the attendant risks and benefits in accordance with individual circumstances and preferences. This is the result of us humans still having an incomplete understanding of nature. No matter 38 The reference is obviously to Sartre. See T. Z. Lavine, Chapter 24 (My Existence is Absurd), From Socrates To Sartre: The Philosophic Quest, Bantam Books, 1984.

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how rational we try to be, there is always an aspect of human action that is not completely explained and left to chance. The world is full of arbitrary phenomena, natural or social, in a sense that our science has not achieved a perfect understanding of the workings of our natural world, not to mention, ourselves. As a result we engage in a wide range of conduct, the ultimate rationality of which we do not know. Smoking and drinking are only some obvious examples. So are the laws that restrict smoking and drinking, for that matter. There is hardly any conduct that would stand the muster of absolute rationality. For instance, we readily accept the different treatment between those who hurt others’ emotions by using obscenities and those who hurt others physically through violence. What is the reason for this differential treatment? Is physical pain categorically more severe than emotional distress to the victim? Why? The obvious conclusion that this author is hinting at is that this entire world is full of arbitrary conduct. The reason for the ubiquity of arbitrariness is related to the concept of conduct. The very concept of conduct presupposes a subject that motivates itself into action. That the conduct is rational means that it is somehow aligned with or consistent with the goal or intent of the subject. However, unless the subject is fully aware of the nature or its external environment through which its goal will be attained, it cannot accomplish a perfectly rational action.39

II.  Is rational action even possible? Let me emphasize the impossibility of perfect rationality. A subject can only perform a perfectly rational action under one of the following three conditions: a) the absence of a subject in full determinism, b) a subject who has attained the perfect knowledge of its environment or c) an internally rational subject. In the first possibility, the human is reduced to an organism whose brain is merely a collection of organic molecules that reacts to the environment. If one’s action is broken down into its mechanical elements, it would not be his or her action per se but merely causal extension of some other events. Of course, a human being’s action is different from a physical event in that the former consciously reacts to previous events whereas the latter are unconsciously caused 39  The problem disables the German and Korean statements of the principle of equality. We want to treat equals equally and unequals unequally. However, we do not know what the relevant differences are. The principle of equality, as stated in the leading expressions only creates a pressure for the government to treat people alike. That is only half of the story. The other half of the principle of equality is that different people should be treated differently. As long as the principle of equality is wrapped in the language focusing on the need for mechanistic, superficial equality, the government remains free to discriminate by treating different people equally. Even if the state would like to treat different people differently, the state does not know in what way they are different.



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by them. However, the content of his conscious reaction depends on his world views, which is very much a function of his upbringing, education, experience, and present socio-economic status. Man’s action then can be understood as rational in the same way animal behavior can be understood as rational from perspectives of evolution or self-preservation. The proponents of utilitarianism and Marxists attempt to achieve perfect rationality by exploring this possibility. Of course, their conception of man/woman is much more organic than the mechanistic view presented here but my description is only for the purpose of emphatic distinction from other possibilities. While the second possibility seems impossible at first, Hegel explored it with his brilliant conception of absolute reason. Absolute spirit is the subject that achieves perfect understanding of everything. Individual instances of rationality, though imperfect, are the vehicles through which the absolute mind manifests itself.40 This does not apply to rational action of an individual. The third possibility is internal rationality which Kant resorted to. However, this was only possible by giving up any substantive content of the goal that man’s action aims to achieve. Internal rationality could be achieved by aligning one’s action with nothing but the will of oneself – hence the Kantian concept of radical autonomy. However, Kant’s moral projection of radical autonomy, the categorical imperative, is actually either empty or utilitarian as others have shown.41 None of the three possibilities is applicable to the kind of rationality that we are trying to adapt in relation to the concept of an agent.

III.  Liberties and External arbitrariness We were about to establish that the content of the principle of equality is none other than repulsion against arbitrariness. However, as I opined above, perfectly rational action is impossible due to lack of perfect knowledge. Then, the question is, why do we want the state to be rational or non-arbitrary? What is wrong with the state being arbitrary? We set up the government to protect our own liberties, but is it not illogical to hold it to the impossible task of acting only in non-arbitrary ways? Otherwise, the state will not be able to do anything. We should allow some arbitrary actions. This question is intriguing when we apply the same question to our individual selves. We actually protect our rights to be arbitrary i. e. doing something without explanation. We call them liberties. We want complete liberties in, say, choosing the flavor of ice cream we will eat after our next meal. We want complete liberties in, say, choosing the color of socks we will wear tomorrow. 40  Charles Taylor, Chapter 12 (Ethical Substance), Hegel, Cambridge University Press, 1975. 41  Charles Taylor (n 40).

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One may say that such arbitrariness is really not the kind of arbitrariness contemplated above. Decisions about the flavors of ice cream or the color of socks are arational, not irrational. Despite the fine distinction, the point is that these decisions are equally valued and respected in regards to their integrity even if they do not persuade others of their rationality. Nobody questions one’s choice of the ice cream flavor. Here we are speaking about external arbitrariness as opposed to internal arbitrariness. One may be convinced internally of the moral rectitude of choosing a certain flavor of ice cream and therefore internally rational. Such actions will still be considered arbitrary by the people who do not agree with that claim to rectitude.

IV.  Legislature’s formative freedom and state’s “right” to be arbitrary The state, for the purposes of constitutional law, is not an entity diametrically opposed to us, but one that represents us. In addition to our private action, the state is another conduit through which our freedom of will is exercised, at least in theory. If private action was the only channel of our freedom, we would have anarchy on our hands. Therefore we decided that it is better to exercise a portion of our individual free will through a collective entity, the state. Then, why do we not respect the arbitrariness of the state itself ? The concept that we endeavor to exercise our rights to be arbitrary through the state machinery seems at first sight diametrically opposed to the idea of the rationality of the state that constitutional law requires. Why do we not respect the liberty of the state, the collective entity that represents us? The answer is: we do. That is the policy-making privilege of the legislature in American jurisprudence and the freedom of legislative formation in Korean and German jurisprudence. Moreover, it is the philosophical foundation of American rational basis review and German-Korean no-arbitrariness standard. The idea that state actions will be considered legitimate unless they are arbitrary protects the freedom of legislative formation and the policy-making privilege of the legislature. Here, rationality is a proposition of discretion, rather than of requirement, for the state. It means that the state does not have to be reasonable, just, righteous, humanitarian, correct, virtuous, good, ideal, perfect, or congruent to any other euphemism, but merely rational. Again, we would like to preserve some arbitrariness in us. The essence of one’s human nature is being arbitrary and unpredictable, indeterminable despite the wealth of data provided about oneself, going against the heavy weight of deterministic causation. Being predictable means being an animal. In fact, society is built to protect our rights to be arbitrary (at least externally no matter how self-convinced people are of their own reasons for their choices). We happen to call those rights liberty. Although we put various restrictions on our rights to



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be arbitrary, one’s right to be arbitrary remains at the core of the concept of liberty. Now, when we collectively exercise our freedom through the state, the state action is justified as freedom of formation and such state action is considered constitutional as long as it is non-arbitrary. If that is the reason for the low standard of scrutiny on state action, why not use arbitrary instead of rational? It is because the state affects a multitude of people both through its actions on the people but also through its actions on behalf of the people. We impose a state and a system of laws upon us in order to protect our liberties, i. e. our rights to be arbitrary. We might have preferred anarchy if it protected the liberties of all of us but, as we all agree, we need a set of rules and a mechanism to enforce them to maximize the extent of our freedom. Our collective project of building a state will become meaningless if the state we built oppresses our own liberties. It is important that what we as a collective (maybe mediated through elected representatives) have intended does accomplish what we have intended to accomplish. In order to do so, the state has to meet a minimum level of rationality. This does not mean that the state is externally rational but at least internally rational.

V.  Equality: empiricist project of keeping the state rational Note that this requirement of state action rationality does not rely on any political claim to equality of people. Arbitrariness is not unique content of equality but content of democracy whereby people collectively try to maximize their own liberties through a machinery called the state. Now, how does it relate to constitutional jurisprudence of equality and liberty? In the world where everything is arbitrary to some extent, all the courts can do is to combat as much arbitrariness as possible or to draw a line between permitted arbitrariness and non-permitted arbitrariness. Since both a perfectly rational and a perfectly justifiable line to be drawn between permitted arbitrariness and non-permitted arbitrariness are impossible to accomplish, all we can do is to focus on those outstanding facts that represent greater arbitrariness. Although arbitrariness is ubiquitous and there are no certainties, we have not given up on the idea of rationality. The Court, instead of trying to carry the burden of dividing permitted arbitrariness from non-permitted arbitrariness, has devised a way to carry out ‘rough justice’, so to speak, by attacking only those state actions that are more suspected to be arbitrary than others. Now, how does the Court decide what outstanding facts are to be focused on as evidence of greater suspicion of arbitrariness or suspicion of greater arbitrariness?: by tapping into the accumulated knowledge and experience commonly shared and accepted by the society. There are outstanding facts that are probative of or provisional surrogates for arbitrary discrimination. When there is no outstanding evidence of arbitrariness that could trigger strict scrutiny, we have

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a rational basis review on our hands. The suspect classification prong of equal protection is a manifestation of our desire to continue the adventure toward more rationality with our irrational existence despite the uncertainties. The fundamental interest prong of equal protection is also an attempt to minimize arbitrariness when the state action takes place in very important areas of our lives. The “fundamental right” jurisprudence (i. e. liberty analysis) is also there in the background, always trying to maximize our own liberties.

E. Conclusion Equality in constitutional adjudication is different from political equality which we have diametrically juxtaposed to liberty. Equality means equal treatment by the state. The ideological equality that we juxtapose to liberty is substantive equality, i. e. equality of results, which is very different from equality of state action. Within constitutional law, such demand for “equal action” can be reformulated into liberty both at a heightened level of review as was pointed out early in this article, and also at the lowest level of review as became apparent later. What is to be left for further research is the contribution which this new definition of equality as part of liberty can make to the conundrums of affirmative action, namely that government programs of great equalizing potential are being strictly scrutinized and therefore struck down as unconstitutional. Can affirmative action be more easily justified now that we have established that equality is not really an independent value but is part of liberty and therefore does not depend on a ‘presumption of equality of people’ which seems to treat benevolent differential treatments equally harshly as malevolent ones? Is there a way to restore a bridge between substantive equality and constitutional equality of state action when the former often requires unequal treatment by the state? Did Germany and Korea succeed in that effort in some cases of affirmative action? At least, we now know that the logical difficulty with affirmative action is not endogenous to constitutional law as we know it now.

The Intersections of Equality, Welfare and Democracy in Sweden Laura Carlson Picking apart the threads of any of these three concepts, equality, welfare or democracy, is in itself a daunting task, much more so when attempting to cover all three in a relatively short article. The approach chosen here is to place equality in its Swedish historical and legal contexts, against the background of welfare and democracy. Sweden is often perceived internationally as a sort of equality Mecca, particularly with respect to gender issues. The World Economic Forum placed Sweden third in 2018 for removing 82.5 % of its overall gender gap.1 Equality encompasses, however, more than simply gender. Only two years earlier, the number of car burnings in Sweden reached an all-time high with over 1 600 cases of arson, most attributed to ethnic social unrest.2 A third indicator that can be taken up in this context of equality is employment. Unemployment in Sweden generally was 6.9 % so far in 2019.3 When broken down by group, a different picture of equality emerges. Unemployment for those born in Sweden during this period was 3.8 %. For those not born in Sweden it was 15.4 %, for those between the ages of 15–24 years it was 16.8 %, with the highest unemployment among those born in Africa at 26.5 %. 87 % of the women born in Sweden are employed, the number is 67 % for those women not born in Sweden. For men, the comparable numbers are 89 % and 76 %.4 To further complicate this picture, despite Sweden having had a very strong tradition of local democracy as exercised within the group, it historically has had (and arguably still has) a very weak approach to individual rights, particularly when seen through the lens of access to justice. EU membership in 1995 has brought this tension between corporativist group and individual rights to the fore. 1  World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, p. 7 (WEF 2018). This statistic can also be debated with respect to certain issues, as the gender wage gap in Sweden is about 13.3 % (Eurostat), with 65 % of women working part-time, and women between the ages of 65–9 having 75 % of the pensions of men, and 62 % for those aged of 85–9, see Statistics Sweden, Gender inequality from school to retirement, in: SCB Women and men in Sweden. Facts and figures, p. 86 (SCB 2018) available at scb.se. 2  Göteborgs tidningen, Antalet anlagda bilbränder ökar kraftigt i landet (GT 15 aug 2018). 3  Statistics Sweden, Arbetslöshet (SCB 2019) available at scb.se. 4  See Statistics Sweden (n 1), p. 86.

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The difference in treatment of different groups, historically, socially and legally, also underscores the distinction between formal and substantive equality. The readily accepted and applied concept of equality in Sweden is that of formal equality; basically, everyone within the group is treated the same under the law, often termed equal treatment. This is in contrast to substantive equality, which crosses across groups in efforts to have equitable outcomes, or create equal opportunities. An example of formal equality taken from Swedish history can be seen with respect to those laws that regulated the education of the Sami in the early 20th century. Theories of eugenics had great influence in Sweden at that time, with the political discussions regarding the Sami first focusing on high (Swedish) and low (Sami) cultures, and later superior (Swedish) and inferior (Sami) races.5 Public primary education for the Sami was not to be as extensive as for ethnic-Swedes according to the legislative preparatory works to the 1913 act on a specific nomad school for the Sami. Only a few selected subjects were to be taught in the nomad school, as the “Sami were to remain Sami” (lapp ska vara lapp).6 Consequently, a Sami child attending a nomad school was not eligible to study at university. The example of formal equality here is that the same university entrance requirements were still applied to all candidates, despite the fact that all the candidates did not have access to the same public primary school education. Substantive equality would mandate that the difference in the public primary education, particularly as it was established by law and prima facie limited, would need to be accommodated by the university entrance requirements to compensate as between Sami and ethnic non-Sami Swedes. An equitable approach in such a situation would be needed to achieve substantive equality (an approach that never was taken with respect to this disparity in public schooling). This article examines the historical legal treatment of equality and its presentday protections against the backgrounds of welfare, democracy and access to justice. This first part begins with the historical development and legal treatment of equality, democracy and local government, moving over to the Swedish labor law model and the “folk home” that created the Swedish welfare state, and then to the current Swedish discrimination legislation. Access to justice is then addressed, seen here as the necessary mechanism for achieving both formal and substantive equality, followed by a discussion as to what type of equality is being protected and promoted by the law.

5  The State Institution for Racial Hygiene (Statens institut för rashygien) was established in Uppsala in 1922, becoming the first state-funded race research institution in the world. 6 See Legislative Inquiry SOU 1960:41, Samernas Skolgång, p. 38 (1957). For the discussion on eugenics and the Sami, see Erik-Oscar Oscarsson, Rastänkande och särskiljande av samer, p. 942 (Sweden 2016).



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A.  Equality in Sweden Historically Formal equality, that those within the group should be treated equally, has strong roots in Swedish culture and law, arguably a product of both history and geography. Geographically, Sweden is the fifth largest country in Europe covering great distances, over 1 500 km from top to bottom. Its population today is approximately 10 million persons, putting it at less than 2 % of the EU population. The combination of a large land mass and small population can be seen as contributing to the very strong Swedish tradition of local government, with decisions to be taken as closely as possible by those affected. This tradition of local government has been constitutionally protected since 1974 and also enjoys statutory protection. The historical and cultural roots of local government can be traced back to the ting, invoked in pre-Sweden before and during the Viking period covering approximately the 8th to 12th centuries. The ting were gatherings of the local powerful families to settle disputes and questions of law. Kings were elected and held their power at the discretion of these more powerful families. Torgny the Lawspeaker is reputed to have told the Swedish King Olof Skötkonung (app. 980–1022) that the people (bonde, farmers) held the power and not the king. The proclamation of freedom (frihetsbrevet) in 1319 bound the King to the rule of law and consultation with the more powerful families. The last elected king was Gustav Vasa in 1523, who then instituted a hereditary monarchy. Despite this, two of his sons were deposed as kings.7 The Christianization of Sweden started around the eleventh century, heralding many societal changes. Cities with their own laws and charters began to be founded in the 13th century, often under the influence of either the German Hansa or the Danes.8 Different local laws were in place for those who lived in the countryside (landtmännen) and those who lived in towns or cities (stadsmännen). The first national legislation was passed under the regency of Birger Jarl (1248–66). King Magnus Eriksson enacted the first national legislative code in 1350 encompassing separate laws for city and country dwellers, in effect until 1734 (naturally in a somewhat amended state).9 The 1734 code abandoned this distinction, with the code applicable to all regardless of place of residence. The Swedish parliament reflected the different layers of society, comprising 7  Even after the hereditary monarchy was established, the conduct of kings was assessed. King Gustav IV Adolf was deposed after he lost Finland in 1809 and Jean Bernadotte, French and a Marshall of France under Napoleon, was chosen by the Swedish Parliament in 1810 in the hopes of gaining Napoleon’s support. 8 See Jacob Lundell, Om Handtverksskrån, näringsfrihet och arbetsorganisation, p. 52 (Lund 1846). 9 See Michael Nordberg, I Kung Magnus tid, Norden under Magnus Eriksson 1317–1374, p. 119 (Norstedts 1995).

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four chambers (ståndsriksdag): the nobility, priests, merchants/burghers, and farmers up until 1866.10 This history, with elected kings, powerful families, local government, laws specific to groups as well as certain privileged groups, particularly the merchants/guilds and farmers as represented by parliament, and a rather thin concept of law, gave rise to a legal system that had a high degree of self-regulation by certain groups. An example of the pervasiveness of this self-regulation and equality within these different groups can be seen with respect to the universities’ response to the dismantling of the university legal jurisdiction in the 19th century. This legal academic jurisdiction was granted by the Pope already in 1477 for Uppsala University. Universities had the jurisdiction to judge, sentence and sanction students, teachers and employees. Most of the group privileges began to be questioned in the mid-19th century, including this university legal jurisdiction. One of the arguments made by the universities for retaining this privilege was “the fundamental principle in Swedish justice – the principle of judgment by like over like.”11 The 1864 Freedom of Trade Proclamation finalized the dismantling of the guild system, ushering in industrialization. It expressly gave Swedish men and unmarried women the right to freely participate in trade or factory operations. In the subsequent and rapid transformation, paralleling Sir Henry Maine’s theory of status to contract,12 employee organizations and friendly societies quickly filled the vacuum left by the guilds and journeymen associations. The Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party (Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet) was founded in 1889 with the support of the labor unions, the friendly societies and foundations that provided sick and funeral benefits, and various socialist groups, based on a platform of expanded voting rights and an eight-hour working day. The first national umbrella labor union organization was established less than a decade later in 1898, the still existing central blue-collar employee organization, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, Landorganisationen (“LO”). An additional significant historical factor at this time with respect to the balance of power between employers, employees and the state was emigration. Between 1851 and 1910, almost one million Swedes emigrated to the United States. Of those born in Sweden during the second half of the 19th century, 20 % of the 10  A 1319 meeting of nobility, farmers, and priests at the Mora stones near Uppsala (Mora ting) electing Magnus Eriksson King of Sweden is seen by some as the first Swedish parliament, see Nordberg (n 9), p. 27. Others argue that it was a 1346 meeting held in Uppsala that first comprised the four estates (stånd)  – nobility, priests, merchants/burghers, and farmers. Still others consider the Arboga meeting in 1435 to be the first Swedish parliament, even though the farmers were not represented there. 11  Ernst Kallenberg, Akademisk jurisdiktion. Studenternas rättsliga undantagsställning, 2 Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 97–121, p. 105 (1906). 12  Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law ix (London 1917, reprint 1936) available from the Project Gutenberg, gutenberg.org.



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men and 15 % of the women left the country, leaving Sweden struggling to retain workers. The early 1900’s was a period of excessive worker strife marked by a general economic recession, decreasing wages, and efforts to expand the voting franchise (at the time, including less than 20 % of the Swedish male population).13 The first two national central employer organizations were founded, the Swedish Metal Trades Employers’ Association and the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (“SAF”), both still in existence, as a response to the great strike of 1902 calling for expanded voting rights.14 By 1906, Sweden led Europe with respect to union density.15 The December Compromise of 1906, a collective agreement between the private sector social partners, SAF and LO, set out the mainframe for the Swedish labor law model.16 The employers’ prerogative was recognized in that under the agreement, employers had the right to lead and allocate work, freely hire workers regardless of union membership, and freely fire workers.17 In exchange for this prerogative, employers agreed to a clause stating that “the right of association was to be kept intact by both parties”18 – the first legal recognition of the right of association – but only the positive right. The right for both employers and employees to associate was to remain inviolate, and labor unions were now recognized by employers. The pattern of the social partners resolving labor conflicts without state involvement was laid by this agreement, with both sides of the 13  Birgitta Furuhagen (ed.), Äventyret Sverige  – En ekonomisk och social historia, p. 73 (Stockholm 1993). 14  Now known as Industrifacket Metall and Svenskt näringsliv, The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, respectively. See Anders Kjellberg, Facklig organisering och partsrelationer i Sverige och Danmark, in: Flemming Ibsen & Steen Scheuer (eds.), Septemberforliget og det 21.århundrede. Historiske perspektiver og fremtidens dilemmaer, p. 57 (Copenhagen 2000). 15 See Klas Åmark, Facklig makt och fackligt medlemskap: Den Svenska fackförbundens medlemsutveckling 1890–1940, p. 11 (Arkiv förlag Lund 1986). 16  The Swedish labor law model falls with the Nordic legal family. The “hybrid” legal systems of the Nordic countries are characterized by self-regulation by central organizations, courts not perceiving their role as making law, but rather interpreting legislative intent, combined however with a fairly significant reliance on case law, earning them their own designation as the “Nordic legal family.” For a discussion as to the Nordic legal family, see, e. g., Jaakko Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of Law in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Perspective, 48 Am.J. Comp.L., p. 345 (2000). With respect to the Nordic labor law model, see Niklas Bruun, The Nordic Model for Trade Union Activity, in: Niklas Bruun, Boel Flodgren, Marit Halvorsen, Hakan Hyden & Ruth Nielsen (eds.), The Nordic Labour Relations Model Labour Law and Trade Unions in the Nordic Countries – Today and Tomorrow, p. 1 (Dartmouth 1992). 17  The origins of the employer’s prerogative as adopted in the 1906 December Compromise are found in § 23 of the 1905 SAF Charter. As part of the December Compromise, the employers’ prerogative was interpreted into collective agreements unless explicitly derogated, and the Labour Court began to articulate the employer’s prerogative as a general rule of law, for example the 29/29 principle stating the employer’s right to direct work: see AD 1929 no. 29, 1932 no. 100 and 1934 no. 179. For the history and analysis of the employer’s prerogative, see generally Mia Rönnmar, Arbetsledningsrätt och arbetsskyldighet: En komparativ studie av kvalititav flexibilitet i svensk, engelsk och tysk context (Juristförlaget i Lund 2004). 18 See Catrin Andersson et al., Strejk!, p. 128 (Börås 1974).

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social partners extremely resistant to legislative control. The historical mantle of self-regulation was taken up very enthusiastically now by the social partners.

B.  The Swedish Folk Home and Labor Law Model Sweden had very strong systems of both guild and state church control still in the mid-19th century, as well as pervasive poverty and a lack of inward mobility. The turbulence of the relatively late and compact process of industrialization, as well as the struggle for voting rights, led Sweden to having one of the highest strike frequencies at the end of that century. Not industrialized until the late 19th century, by the end of World War II Sweden was one of the world’s strongest economies per capita as well as a model of social welfare and industrial peace. Within the short span of a century, the guild system was completely dismantled, and the Swedish labor law model based on self-regulation by social partners and the Swedish “folk home” with extensive social welfare benefits were both firmly in place. Cooperatives offering goods, credit, and housing almost at cost were another strong component of the Folk Home and labor movement during this period. The December Compromise set a framework for the self-regulation of the labor market by the social partners that exists to the present day.19 However, it did not resolve all the issues between the social partners. Forty-seven million working days were lost between 1908 and 1926 due to labor conflicts.20 This turbulence led Per Albin Hansson, later a Swedish Prime Minister, to begin to articulate a vision of the folkhem in 1928 – a home for the entire society (folk), characterized by mutual understanding and equality (jämlikhet): “The good home knows no privileged or denied, no favorites or outcasts.”21 The leader of the Swedish Social Democratic Party argued already in 1907 that the party was a “folk” party. The Swedish Lutheran State Church was reformed in the 1910s into a modern folk church, folkkyrka. Male workers were arguably finally emancipated with the extension of the voting franchise. The right to vote in municipal elections was expanded in 1918 for all men over the age of 21 who had performed their military service, and the next year, for both men and women who had reached the age of 23 (under 19  That same year a mediation law was passed, with mediation provided under the auspices of the Kommerskollegium, lag (1906:13) om medling i arbetstvister. For the history of the Swedish mediation institution, see generally Birgitta Nyström, Medling i arbetstvister (Norstedts 1990). 20  This can be compared to the 50 days lost due to industrial conflicts in 2018, see Swedish National Mediation Office, Medling & Konflikt, Konfliktstatistik available at mi.se. 21  “Det goda hemmet känner icke till några privilegierade eller tillbakasatta, inga kelgrisar och inga styvbarn”: Per Albin Hansson, Prime Minister, address to the Swedish Parliament in 1928.



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certain conditions), with the majority of the population now eligible to vote in both national and municipal elections. The emancipation of women generally, however, required several additional steps. Married women received almost complete legal capacity in 1921 with the enactment of the new Marriage Code, heralded by certain Swedish organizations as the best in the world for furthering women’s interests, with Sweden argued as a model country for family legislation and a leader in women’s issues.22 Married women could now freely accept employment, or enter into trade without their husband’s consent and suretyship as had still been the case under the 1864 Proclamation. Women were given the right of equal access to certain state employment in 1923, however, exempting significant positions such as the priesthood in the state church, certain military and diplomatic positions and positions responsible for public order or safety. Access to the right of public employment for women coincided with a period in which men were leaving the low paying public sector jobs in favor of higher paying private sector jobs.23 A system was also created in 1925 within state employment differentiating wages between men and women for the first time since women began to gain employment in public jobs,24 which would remain in place until 1948.25 There was however a backlash to these advances. A depression hit Sweden in the 1920’s with unemployment reaching over 27 %.26 Motions were made in 1923, 1925, 1926 and 1927 for state action to encourage women to voluntarily terminate state employment upon marriage for the purpose of providing better income possibilities for men and unmarried women in order to help fight the rampant unemployment existing at the time. More than 400 000 Swedish workers were covered by collective agreements by 1920. Though the first legislative proposals concerning the recognition of collective agreements were made as early as the 1890s, no legislation was adopted until 1928, and then simply an act addressing the recognition of collective agreements and not their content, the Collective Agreements Act.27 Self-regulation was the rule with respect to dispute resolution, with the first Labor Mediation Act passed in 1906 establishing a central labor mediation institution, which later in 1920 became an arbitration institute. The Labour Court came into existence in 1929 through the Labour Court Act,28 replacing the arbitration institution. Though 22  Per Nyström, Sveriges historia, 5 I ord och bild, pp. 332, 334 (Sweden 1970). 23 See Renée Frangeur, Yrkeskvinna eller maktens tjänarinna? Striden om yrkesrätten för gifta kvinnor I mellankrigstidens Sverige, p. 59 (Lund 1998). 24 See Kjell Östberg, Efter rösträtten – Kvinnors utrymme efter det demokratiska genombrottet, p. 107 (Stockholm 1997). 25 See Lotta Lerwall, Könsdiskriminering – En analys av nationell och internationell rätt, p. 64 (Iustus 2001). 26  Lars-Arne Norborg, Sveriges historia under 1800- och 1900- talen, p. 70 (Almqvist & Wiksell 1995). 27  Lag (1928:253) om kollektivavtal. 28  Lag (1928:254) om arbetsdomstol.

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this might appear a radical departure from the arbitration and mediation panels that had existed previously, the Labour Court’s panels under the act still consist of seven members – two judge-trained members, a labor market expert, and four members appointed by the employer and employee sides – in essence still very much an arbitration panel. The concept behind these two acts, referred to as the “industrial peace legislation”, was that by recognizing collective agreements, incentives for industrial peace obligations would be created, which then would be enforced by the newly established Labour Court.29 A similar system of selfregulation with respect to landlord-tenant law was also eventually developed. Work began in earnest in the late 1920’s and throughout the 1930’s as to building the folkhem, with an even greater focus placed on social protections. The unions historically had provided sick funds for members, basically continuing the systems set up by the guilds and friendly societies. A legislative reform of the sickness insurance was enacted in the 1930s, tidying the system to encompass only 28 central and more than 1 000 local funds, still to be administered and provided by the unions. The unions also administered and provided the unemployment insurance system created in 1935. A minimum state pension had already been legislated in 1913, the folkpension, often supplemented by union insurance. Social welfare at this time was predominately provided for by the labor unions. The first holiday legislation was enacted in 1938,30 with certain collective agreements providing additional benefits. A  part of this model that is still the case today is that when the state provides a benefit, unions often offer supplemental coverage to their members. Union control over these different funds and benefits is seen as one of the aspects contributing to the historically high union density in Sweden.31 Two statutes ensured union control of labor market issues, a 1935 Act on Illegal Employment Agencies,32 banning employment agencies for profit with the state employment agency ensuring that unions were to be the only supply of labor, and a 1936 act on freedom of association and negotiation protecting only the positive right of freedom of association as can be seen from the act’s title, the act on the right of association and negotiation.33 29 See Bo Stråth, The Organisation of Labour Markets – Modernity, Culture and Governance in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan, p. 10 (Routledge 1996). 30  Lag (1938:287) om semester. 31 See Stråth (n 29), p. 89. See also Anders Kjellberg, Kollektivavtalens täckningsgrad samt organisationsgraden hos arbetsgivarförbund och fackförbund, Department of Sociology, Lund University Studies in Social Policy, Industrial Relations, Working Life and Mobility Research Reports 2017:1, p. 7 (Lund University 2017), who argues that the high union density of 70 % in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark rests partially on union unemployment insurance. Most unions today offer this supplemental coverage with respect to parental leave benefits, sick benefits, unemployment benefits and vacation benefits. White collar unions tend to offer better coverage than the blue collar unions, but this gap is narrowing. 32  Lag (1935:113) med vissa bestämmelser om arbetsförmedling. 33  Lagen (1936:506) om förenings- och förhandlingsrätt.



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Under legislative threat by a Social Democratic government, LO and SAF entered into the Saltsjöbad’s Agreement in 1938 after two years of negotiations.34 This collective agreement, referred to as the Basic Agreement (Huvudavtalet), is the cornerstone of the Swedish labor model, based on self-regulation of the labor market by the social partners, with the state’s neutrality evidenced by the absence of legislative interference. Under the Basic Agreement, all collective agreements are to have either an express or an implicit industrial peace obligation unless explicitly stated otherwise. Unions are to have the monopoly on the supply of labor.35 The cartel-like organization of the social partners was now firmly affixed, with both employer and employee organizations acting concertedly and centrally.36 In essence, these two powerful constellations of actors still control the Swedish labor market. Organizational density today among employers is about 90 %, and among employees, about 70 %. Sweden had been one of the most strike-prone countries in the 1920s, and by 1938, it had become the symbol of industrial peace.37 Given impetus by Per Albin Hansson’s vision of the folkhem, the political focus in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s was on the modernization of Sweden and social welfare. The working class was to be the core of the folk home. The Social Democratic Labour Party was and still is the most influential political party in Sweden, with only three minor interruptions in power during the periods 1976–82, 1992–6, and 2006– 14. Industrial peace and general prosperity reigned in Sweden from the 1940s until the 1970s, assisted greatly by an infrastructure left intact after World War II due to Sweden’s neutrality. Central wage negotiations coordinated by the umbrella employer and employee organizations were the rule from the mid-1950s until the 1980s. The situation in the labor market during the period has been described as “a harmony of interests between the social partners and a successful division of roles between the social partners, legislature and courts.”38 Changes in technology and in the economic conditions for industry and workers led to a radicalization of the labor movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with

34 See Sten Edlund, Inga Hellberg, Tore Melin, & Birgitta Nyström, Konfliktbehandling på arbetsmarknaden, p. 13 (Arbetslivscentrum 1988) and Arnold Sölvén, Landorganisationens skriftserien, Huvudavtalet, p. 17 (Stockholm 1939). 35 See Ann Numhauser-Henning, Lagstiftning eller självreglering i arbetsrätten? Svaret är både ock, 2001 SvJT, p. 314. 36  On the employer side, much of Swedish industry at this time was concentrated in the hands of a few families/spheres. One illustrative example here is Swedish Match (Svenska Tändsticks AB), which controlled 60 % of the world market with respect to matches. Monopolies and significant ownership constellations – both private and state – were generally accepted in Sweden until its EU membership in 1995, with its incumbent requirements under Union law as to free trade. 37 See Stråth (n 29), p. 3. 38  Id. at p. 14.

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demands for better work environments, greater worker democracy, and more secure employment.39 A package of legislation favorable to employees was adopted in the 1970’s, based to a large degree on the solutions already achieved in the collective agreements and replacing much of the legislation enacted during the period from 1928 to 1949.40 A new Work Time Act was passed in 1970.41 The representation of employees by employee board directors was tested in 1973 and adopted in 1976.42 A new unemployment insurance act was passed in 1973, replacing the 1934 ordinance, but with the unions still administrating the insurance.43 The Employment Protection Act,44 the Trade Union Representative (Status at the Work Place) Act,45 the Employee’s Right to Educational Leave Act,46 and the Labour Disputes (Judicial Procedure) Act were all passed in 1974.47 In 1976 the Employment (Co-Determination in the Workplace) Act,48 and the Act on the Right to Parental Leave were adopted.49 In 1977 a new Vacation Act was passed,50 as was the Work Environment Act. The first Equal Treatment between Women and Men in Employment Act was passed in 1979.51 Each of these acts were quasimandatory, and were gap-filling to a great extent, in that the social partners were free to agree to derogate from them through central agreements. The main focus was on the rights of the collective of employees. A telling example of this is that under the Equal Treatment Acts up to 1995, any damages paid for an employer’s unlawful discrimination would be based on the harm to one person, and then divided by the group harmed if more than one person had been unlawfully discriminated against. A new Instrument of Government was adopted in 1974 replacing that of 1809, embodying the several constitutional changes that had successively occurred 39 See Edlund et al. (n 34), p. 15. 40 See Svante Nycander, Makten över arbetsmarknaden, p. 255 (3rd ed. Stockholm 2017). 41  Lag (1970:943) om arbetstid m. m. English translations of some of the acts can be found on the website of the Government Offices of Sweden at government.se under the heading “Government Policy,” then “Labour law and work environment.” 42  Lagen (1976:351) om styrelserepresentation för de anställda i aktiebolag och ekonomiska föreningar. 43  Lag (1973:370) om arbetslöshetsförsäkring replacing the Förordning (1934:264) om arbetslöshetskassor. 44 Lagen (1974:12) om anställningsskydd m. m., replaced by lag (1982:80) om anställningsskydd. 45  Lag (1974:358) om facklig förtroendemans ställning på arbetsplatsen. 46  Lag (1974:981) om arbetstagares rätt till ledighet för utbildning. 47  Lag (1974:371) om rättegången i arbetstvister. 48  Lag (1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet. 49  Lagen (1976:280) om rätt till föräldraledighet, replaced already in 1978 by Lag (1978:410) om rätt till ledighet för vård av barn, m. m. 50  Semesterlag (1977:480). 51  Lag (1979:503) om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet and then replaced that same year by Lag (1979:1118) om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet.



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during the interim.52 The failure of the 1809 Instrument of Government to reflect the political reality of the 1900’s, particularly the triumph of parliamentarism and the greatly reduced role of the king, is seen as having given rise to a sort of anti-constitutionalism. The constitution did not and should not reign in popular sovereignty. A  second departure consciously taken from the 1809 Instrument of Government was the decision to change the balance of political power from that of separation of power to a separation of function. Parliament is to be the sole lawmaker as derived from the opening paragraph of the 1974 Instrument of Government: “All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people.” As a result, a comparatively weak judicial system was created, with only limited powers. The third branch of political power, after the legislative and executive branches, is generally not perceived of as the judicial branch in Sweden; but rather the press. The courts were not given a power of judicial review, simply the possibility in the case at hand to declare a law in violation of the constitution if it so on its face.53 Given this focus on majoritarianism in the 1974 Instrument of government, only five of its articles initially concerned individual rights. The first article addressed freedom of speech, expression, assembly, demonstration, association, religion, and movement. The second concerned the right to information and access to public documents. The third addressed protection from forced disclosures as to associations or religion, and the fourth protection from unlawful searches of person, home, or correspondence. The fifth stated that a “trade union or an employer or employers’ association shall be entitled to take industrial action unless otherwise provided in an act of law or under an agreement.”54 That the fifth took up the right to industrial action demonstrates the strength of protection (arguably even constitutional protection horizontally) of the labor law model. These Chapter Two rights, so termed as they were included in the Instrument’s second chapter, were expanded already two years later to add protections against unlawful race and sex discrimination. The 1976 Article 15 stated that no law or other type of legal provision can entail that a citizen is treated less favorably on the basis of race, color or ethnic origin and Article 16 forbade the state from discriminating against any person by law or regulation due to sex.55 The role of these chapter two rights, however, was greatly debated for decades. Those legal scholars in favor of a weak judicial system argued that the chapter two 52  Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform. 53  The 1974 Instrument of Government was amended effective 2010, removing the former requirement that legislation be “manifestly” in conflict with the constitution, and many of the Chapter 2 rights were extended to non-Swedish citizens. 54  These are now Articles 12 (ethnic origin, color and sexual orientation) and 13 (gender) in the Second Chapter of the 1974 Instrument of Government. An English translation of the Instrument of Government can be found on the Parliament’s website, riksdagen.se. 55  Exceptions to this were included in the article in that the discrimination is to be deemed legal where it constitutes a step in the endeavor to achieve equality between men and women or unless it relates to compulsory military service or other similar official duties.

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rights should be seen more as policy declarations, as were certain of the rights in chapter one – in essence, soft law – and were not meant to serve as a legal basis for a claim. They were to serve as guidelines for the parliament in its legislative work, giving precedence to the principles of parliamentary rule and popular sovereignty.56 This view of weak individual rights was further buttressed by the legal philosophy of Scandinavian legal realism. Scandinavian Legal Realism grew parallel to the Social Democratic political party, and at times both were espoused by the same individuals. Scandinavian Legal Realism argues that legal concepts and terminology should be based on experience, observation and experimentation and thus, be “real”. Professor Axel Hägerström (1868–1939) of the Department of Philosophy at Uppsala University started the Uppsala School of Legal Theory and is seen as a forefather to Scandinavian Legal Realism. Hägerström, and later Danish Philosopher and Jurist Alf Ross (1899–1980), had the objectives of eradicating the distorting influences of metaphysics from legal thinking, building a stable philosophical foundation for a scientific knowledge of the law separate and distinct from morals. Hägerström and Ross rejected natural law tenets such as “rights” and “duties”, arguing that they basically are meaningless as they cannot be scientifically verified or proven.57 The object of legal scholarship is “legal science”. Ross expressed this sentiment in his book, On Law and Justice: “The legal rule is neither true nor false; it is a directive [for judges]”.58 The intent of the legislator (in the singular even) overrides everything. This view of rights, however, began to be challenged by the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the Europeanization of discrimination protections. The next milestone of legal change was Sweden’s EU membership in 1995. Many Swedish laws were enacted or amended to be in conformity with the requirements of Union law, particularly discrimination protections. The Swedish protections against unlawful discrimination were expanded as to grounds, areas as well as duty bearers. Though Sweden had ratified the ECHR in 1952, the Convention was not transformed into Swedish law until 1998, and then as a requirement of EU membership.59 However, it would not be until 2018 that there would be a statutory right to damages for violations of the ECHR. EU law as based on individual rights challenges the collective perspective upon which the Swedish labor law model is based, with several cases brought to the Court 56 See the legislative preparatory works, Legislative Bill Prop. 1973:90 med förslag till ny regeringsform och ny riksdagsordning and Legislative Bill Prop. 1975/76:209 om ändring i Regeringsformen. 57 See Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 Harvard Law Review, p. 812 (1957). 58  Alf Ross, On Law and Justice, p. 2 (University of California Press 1959). 59  The issue of whether damages could be awarded for violations of the ECHR was debated as the ECHR itself contains no remedies provisions. The Swedish Torts Act (skadeståndslag 1972:207) was amended in 2018 to allow damages for violations of the Convention by the State or a municipality.



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of Justice clearly demonstrating this clash.60 The current challenges facing the corporativist Swedish labor law model mostly come from the outside, in the form of international and EU requirements as to individual rights that in Sweden are met by a collective rights approach – a tension manifested most clearly in the discrimination jurisprudence.

C.  Swedish Discrimination Legislation The statistical contrasts between the different groups, women, those born in Sweden and those not, taken up above in the introduction to a great extent reflect the historical, political and legal endeavors made in equality efforts in Sweden. Jämställdhet, equality between the sexes, has had a premiere place in Swedish politics since the 1970’s. Equality protections based on grounds other than sex and union membership, came significantly later, stuffed into the category of jämlikhet, and originally with weaker legal measures, creating a hierarchy among the different equality protections. The self-regulation by the social partners is based on an aversion by both employer and employee organizations as to invoking legislation and litigation in general to address issues raised in the employment context. This resistance originally extended even to issues concerning employment discrimination, which the social partners argued should remain in their domain, in part the reason for the lateness of Swedish legislative employment discrimination protections. Outside of the employment context, Sweden was the first nation in 1972 to pass an act concerning both legal and medical gender reassignment, and requiring sterilization for gender reassignment.61

60  See, for example, the Laval dispute in 2004, AD 2004 no. 111, AD 2005 no. 49, C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd mot Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnads-arbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:809 and AD 2009 no. 89. 61  For the history of this legislation, see generally Jameson Garland, On Science, Law, and Medicine: The case of gender “normalizing” interventions on children diagnosed as different in sex development (Uppsala University 2016). The Administrative Court of Appeals held in 2012 that this requirement of involuntary sterilization was a violation and discrimination under both the Instrument of Government and the ECHR, see Case 1968–12, judgment issued 19 December 2012. The Swedish Federation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Rights had raised this question for years, and initiated a damage claim on behalf of 160 plaintiffs to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, which was denied. The legal requirement of sterilization was removed by law in 2013. It is estimated that approximately 800 individuals were forced to undergo sterilization for gender reassignment in the period from 1972–2013. Sweden has now recognized this requirement as a violation of human rights and in 2017 set up a compensation program for damages in the amount of SEK 225 000 per individual, which have to be claimed by 1 May 2020.

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I.  The Focus on Women and Jämställdhet The booming post-World War II Swedish economy led to a labor shortage in the 1970’s, with two possible solutions contemplated by lawmakers, one being immigrant labor, and the other greater workforce participation by women.62 Women in Sweden had not been brought into the workplace to any large extent during the world wars as Sweden maintained neutrality and retained its men. The labor market participation of adult married women in Sweden during the 1940’s and 1950’s was at 5–10 %, among the lowest in Western Europe at that time. Legislation mandating equal pay for equal work in the Swedish state public sector was passed in 1948 in line with the international instruments taking up the issues of equal remuneration for equal work.63 Both parents were given legal custody of children in 1950 changing the presumption of married fathers having sole legal custody existing before. Whether Sweden should ratify the 1951 ILO Convention No. 100 on equal remuneration, and the 1958 ILO Convention No. 111 on discrimination (employment and occupation) was raised in the 1950’s. Both the social partners and parliament opposed ratification as they did not wish to depart from the generally accepted principle that the social partners, through free contract negotiations, had the right to enter into agreements as to wage conditions without interference or influence of the state. Different wage tariffs for men and women had existed in the collective agreements since the beginning of the 1900’s. The central parties, SAF and LO, entered into an agreement that all such different wage tariffs would be phased out over a period of five years beginning in 1960 to prevent legislation in the area. Based on these efforts, the Government found that the conditions required to ratify the conventions existed in 1962, with parliamentary consent that same year despite continued opposition by LO and SAF. This voluntary phasing out of wage differences based on sex, however, did not effect a resolution of the wage differences between women and men. The designations of male and female employees in the collective agreements were often simply substituted with the new designations, such as “A” and “C”, or “skilled” and “unskilled” workers respectively: The category of A or skilled workers had more nuanced and numerous categories allowing for greater wage development, while C or unskilled had fewer categories in the collective agreements and less potential for wage development.64 This issue appears to have come full circle now, as the leg62 See Lynn Roseberry, Equal Rights and Discrimination Law in Scandinavia, in: Peter Wahlgren (ed.), Stability and change in Nordic labour law, 42 Scandinavian Studies in Law, p. 221 (Stockholm 2002). See also Bengt Nilsson, Kvinnor i statens tjänst, p. 290 (Uppsala 1996). 63  One of these international instruments was the UN Declaration of Human Rights 1946, which states in its article 21 that everyone (not just women) without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. Sweden has interpreted the right to equal pay to exclusively be between women and men. 64 See Roseberry (n 62), p. 223. These reclassifications have repercussions even today



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islation finally adopted with respect to equal pay, first in 1991 and most recently amended in 2017, has been assessed with respect to wage audits in 2019 by the Swedish National Audit Office. The Office found the wage audit legislation to be ineffectual, with one of the agency’s proposals being that this legislation be once again made quasi-gap filling, with the social partners able to bargain out of the legislation.65 The 1970’s was the decade of change for women with the political campaign of jämställdhet and the transition to the economically independent women. Employment during the decade had increased by 390 000 jobs, of which 380 000 were held by women.66 Half of all women working did so part-time, in contrast with 5 % of men, and many women were working in the rapidly expanding public sector. The level of occupational segregation was (and still is) high as were the wage differences between women and men, at least in part a relic of the different wage tariffs in the collective agreements. Women still had almost total responsibility in the private sphere for home and the care of children. Jämställdhet focused exclusively on equality between the sexes, marking a shift from women’s issues to societal issues between women and men. Theoretically this was to free both sexes from the roles that society historically had placed on them, giving women and men equal rights as well as equal responsibilities. To this end, one of the first acts with respect to jämställdhet was the transition from familybased to individual income taxation in 1972, a process completed by 1991.67 The second step in this movement to economically independent women were amendments to the Marriage Code and the virtual repeal of spousal maintenance after marital dissolution, reflecting in part an ideological shift from the single breadwinner provider to a two-income household. The objective set out in the Marriage Code is that spouses are to be economically self-sufficient. Each spouse has legal control of his or her property and is responsible for his or her own debts. Spouses have a legal duty to provide each other with the information necessary for assessment of the family’s financial condition. In the event a spouse is not with respect to achieving pay equity as jobs held by men are categorized to a greater degree and number than jobs held predominantly by women, resulting in very different wage developments, see Svenska Dagbladet, Självkritisk LO-bas lutar åt lagstiftad jämställdhet – För stark tro på reformer enligt Wanja Lundby-Wedin. SvD Näringsliv (10 April 2005). For this history, see generally Susanne Fransson, Lönediskriminering (Iustus 2000) and Lena Svenaeus, Konsten att upprätthålla löneskillnader mellan kvinnor och män (Lund 2017). 65  See Riksrevisionen, En granskningsrapport från Riksrevisionen, Diskrimineringslagens krav på lönekartläggning – ett trubbigt verktyg för att minska löneskillnader mellan könen (RIR 2019:16) available at the website of Riksrevisionen, riksrevisionen.se. 66 See Legislative Inquiry SOU 1978:38 39 and Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:175 med förslag till lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet, m. m., p. 13–15. 67  Wealth tax, however, is still assessed on a family basis. For a criticism of the theoretical neutrality of this taxation system and its contribution to jämställdhet, see Åsa Gunnarsson, Myten om vad den könsneutrala skatterätten kan göra för jämställdheten, 2000 Skattenytt, p. 487.

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able economically to support his or her own personal needs, the other spouse has a legal duty to provide that which is reasonably needed. Spousal property is marital property to be shared equally upon dissolution due to marital divorce or death, unless the property is designated as individual property.68 Individual property is defined either by law or declared as such by the spouse, employer or any donor of gifts and as a rule, incomes, insurances and pensions are individual property. The other spouse can make no claim on individual property, or on any future income. Individual property is not included in the marital estate, and the only deviation allowed from a 50/50 division of the marital property is one in favor of the wealthier spouse, as he or she should not be forced to contribute more than found just according to the Marriage Code. A right to spousal maintenance still technically exists,69 but the dividing line between awarding spousal maintenance or not is basically destitution, the driving force being that the state should not then have to support a former spouse. Spouses have no right to claims of maintaining the same standard of living in the marriage or upon dissolution.70 These limited rights as to the marital estate are only granted to married spouses or registered partners, while almost one-third of the couples in Sweden cohabit and consequently fall outside these rights.71 The last act of the 1970’s package of labor law legislation was the Act on Equal Treatment between Women and Men at Work (1979). Whether legislation should be used as a means to promote sex equality in employment was debated during the entirety of the 1970’s, much in response to international pressures, such as UN Declaration of Human Rights, the ECHR, ILO Conventions nos. 100 and 111, the 1975 UN World Conference of Women and the EU 1975 Equal Pay and 1976 Equal Treatment Directives. An Equality Delegation had been appointed at the end of 1972 to further investigate and develop an overarching perspective that was to guide the work towards achieving equality between women and men. 68 Swedish law does not recognize joint tenancy property ownership, only tenants in common. The latter is a fairly rare outside of real property ownership. 69  Id. citing Anders Agell, Underhåll till barn och make, p. 102 (4th ed. 1988) and Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:12 om underhåll till barn och frånskilda, m. m. The obligation as to spousal maintenance arguably never took root in the Swedish case law even when it did exist. Already at the beginning of the 1970’s when the wage gap between women and men was significant and many women did not yet work or only worked part-time, spousal maintenance was awarded on a national average in one out of ten cases, and half of these for a period of four years or less, see Anders Agell, Äktenskap Samboende Partnerskap, p. 54 (3rd ed. Iustus 2004). 70  It was noted at the time of the passage of these amendments that the economic situation of women after divorce was worse, see, e. g., Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:12 70. The economic repercussions of this system combined with employment decisions are most palpable with pensions. Many, if not most, Swedish women take most of the extended parental leave, working part-time usually after as seen from the statistics cited above. 71  As to property regimes based on marriage or cohabitation in Sweden and the United States, see generally Göran Lind, Common Law Marriage – A Legal Institute for Cohabitation (Oxford 2008).



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The delegation presented its report in 1975, concluding that legislation could easily freeze the current injustices in the system and impede more active equality measures.72 The delegation found overwhelming reasons against adopting legislation similar to the American federal 1964 Civil Rights Act and deviating from other employment issues as already regulated by the social partners through self-regulation and soft law.73 A second Equality Committee was appointed in 1976 and given the task of investigating and drafting legislation prohibiting unlawful sex discrimination in employment. The new mandate was based on the premise that a law prohibiting sex discrimination was significant as one of several societal mechanisms for bringing about change.74 In response, the social partners entered into equality agreements in 1977 covering large segments of the work population. In the private sector, all areas except transportation were covered in an effort to prevent later regulation by the proposed statute or Equal Opportunity Ombudsman, JämO.75 The social partners then argued that these agreements should be given time to assess their effectiveness prior to the adoption of legislation.76 In the alternative, the social partners argued that legislation would impede work with equality and increase bureaucracy.77 Discrimination did not and should not differ in any aspect from other employment issues as already falling within their self-regulation under the Swedish labor law model.78 After receiving the second Equality Committee’s favorable 1978 report, the Government presented a legislative bill prohibiting unlawful sex discrimination in employment. Only a “half-law” was initially passed by a vote of 155 to 150, simply those paragraphs containing the general prohibition against discrimination.79 The proposed Equal Opportunity Ombudsman, JämO, as well as active measures, were not adopted. Strong resistance by the social partners existed as to placing collective agreements within the jurisdiction of JämO. The second leg72  Ds Ju 1975:7 PM till frågan om lagstiftning mot könsdiskriminering. 73  Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:175 med förslag till lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet, m. m. at 25. All the social partners were negative to the proposal in the responses they submitted with the exception of SACO/SR, id. at p. 196. 74  Its first report was Legislative Inquiry SOU 1978:38 Jämställdhet i arbetslivet med förslag till lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet. The Committee issued a second report, Legislative Inquiry SOU 1979:56 Steg på väg concerning a national plan of action resulting from the 1975 United Nations Women’s Conference in Mexico. 75  As to the efficacy of the Equality Agreements reached by the social partners, see Ronnie Eklund, Är jämställdhetsavtal värda pappret?, 1990 JT, p. 105. See also Anita Dahlberg, Jämställdhetslagen som paradox och dekonstruktion, in: Gudrun Norborg (ed.), 13 Kvinnoperspektiv på rätten, p. 34 (Iustus 1995). 76  See Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:56 med förslag till lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet, m. m., p. 9. 77 Id. at p. 196. 78  Legislative Bill Prop. 1978/79:175 med förslag till lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet, m. m., p. 25. 79  Lag (1979:503) om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet.

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islative bill, largely identical to the first, passed a year later by one vote, and the Equal Treatment between Women and Men at Work Act (1979) became effective 1 July 1980.80 The 1979 Equal Treatment Act had three components: the discrimination prohibition, active employer measures, and enforcement mechanisms and procedures, including the establishment of JämO. The social partners could derogate from the statutory active measures through central collective agreements. As the act was gap-filling, the majority of the private sector entered into agreements stating simply that the act was not to be applicable to them. Damages could be granted for discrimination in violation of the Act with a “group rebate” awarded in the event an employer discriminated against more than the one person. Damages were then assessed as to one person and shared equally by the group, a very corporatist solution. That the 1979 Equal Treatment Act was not a happy compromise can be seen not only from the fact that it passed by only one vote, but also from its many amendments already beginning already the next year. The 1991 Act Concerning Equal Treatment Between Women and Men at Work,81 though replacing the 1979 Equal Treatment Act, kept many of its structures, particularly its layout and enforcement mechanisms, including that central collective agreements could replace the provisions regarding active equality measures. The burden of proof, that the plaintiff had to demonstrate that she was (much) better objectively qualified, was retained. A prohibition against harassment based on a refusal of sexual advances or a reporting of a sex discrimination claim was now explicitly included, as were equal pay provisions.

II.  Legislative Concerning Race Discrimination International pressures also significantly affected the development of legislative protections on the bases of race and ethnicity. Section 16:9 of the Criminal Code was adopted in 1971 in line with the UN Convention to Eliminate Race Discrimination taking effect in Sweden in 1972, making it unlawful to discriminate in the provision of commercial services on the basis of race or ethnicity. Its enforcement, however, has been negligible. Pressured again by international obligations and criticisms for implementation failures, the first civil act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ethnic origins was passed in 1986.82 Only seven paragraphs, the purpose of the law was stated as combating discrimination on the basis of race, color, nationality, ethnic origins or religion, however with no actual prohibition as to such discrimination.83 The office of an Ombudsman against Eth80  Lag (1979:1118) om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet. 81  Jämställdhetslag (1991:433). 82  Lag (1986:442) mot etnisk diskriminering. 83  Section 1 of Act against ethnic discrimination states that it has the objective of combatting ethnic discrimination.



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nic Discrimination was created to work towards preventing ethnic discrimination in employment and other societal areas. Although technically legislation, no sanctions were included in the act and consequently, since plaintiffs had no right to any remedies under the act no cases were brought. The late date of this act is also telling given the fact that several ethnic groups have historically been treated differently to their disadvantage under Swedish law, such as the Sami, Romani and Jews. In addition to the 1913 Nomad School Act discussed above, a 1928 act prescribed that those Sami not participating in traditional reindeer-herding could not claim any other Sami rights, such as rights to fishing or hunting.84 Discrimination against the Romani, anti-zyganism, can be traced back to the 16th century.85 In modern times, it was forbidden for the Romani to migrate to Sweden from 1914 until after World War II in 1954 when the ban was lifted. The period of this ban coincided with Hitler’s persecution of the Romani. After World War II, many of these explicitly discriminatory laws began to be discretely repealed. The 1951 Religious Freedom Act gave Swedish citizens the right finally to freely leave the state Lutheran Church, and Jews could then voluntarily belong to a synagogue. However, it would not be until 1999 that a claim of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity would be raised to a court as it was under that act sanctions could be awarded, and not until 2002 that the Labour Court would find unlawful ethnic discrimination and until 2006 with respect to religious discrimination.86

III.  The 2008 Discrimination Act Sweden became a EU member in 1995, entailing the obligation now of loyally implementing EU law. Sweden had been unofficially harmonizing its laws prior to its membership, such as with the 1991 Equal Treatment Act, but after 1995 harmonization no longer was optional. The ECHR was finally enacted as Swedish law in 1994, effective 1998, a requirement under dualism.87 It was not enacted as a Swedish constitutional act, but given protection by Article 23 of the second chapter of the Instrument of Government prescribing that “[n]o act of law or other provision may be adopted which contravenes Sweden’s under84  After the Instrument of Government was amended in 1976 to give greater discrimination protections and the Sami were recognized by Sweden as an indigenous people under international law in 1977, a group of Sami brought a lawsuit legal rights as to reindeer herding. The Swedish Supreme Court held that there may have been a different treatment by law of the Sami in the case, but as there was no other group that could be used as a comparator with respect to these questions, no unlawful discrimination could be found, see Skattefjäll case, NJA 1981, p. 1. The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue again in 2011 as to reindeer herding and Sami rights, but this time found for the Sami, Nordmaling case, NJA 2011, p. 109. 85  Ombudsmannen mot Etnisk Diskriminering, Diskriminering av Romer i Sverige, p. 7 (DO 2004). 86  See AD 2002 no. 128 and AD 2006 no. 104 respectively. 87  See lag (1994:1219) om den europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna.

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takings under the European Convention.” The flurry of EU directives addressing discrimination issues led to a corresponding flurry of legislative acts in Sweden. By 2006, Sweden had eleven legislative acts covering different grounds of discrimination in different settings: – The 1991 Equal Treatment Act,88 – The 1995 Parental Leave Act,89 – The 1999 Measures to Counteract Ethnic Discrimination in Working Life Act,90 – The 1999 Prohibition of Discrimination in Working Life of People with Disability Act,91 – The 1999 Act Prohibiting Discrimination in Working Life based on Sexual Orientation,92 – The 2001 Act on Equal Treatment of Students at Universities,93 – The 2002 Act Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis of Part-Time and Fixed-Time Work,94 88  Amended in 1994 by lag (1994:292) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (1991:433), in 1998 by lag (1998:208) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (1991:433), in 2000 by lag (2000:580) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (1991:433) and lag (2000:773) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (1991:433), as well as in 2005 by lag (2005:476) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (1991:433). 89  Föräldraledighetslag (1995:584) replaced the 1978 Parental Leave Act. The 1995 Parental Leave Act has been amended in 1996 by lag (1996:1545) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584), in 1997 by lag (1997:99) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584), in 2001 by lag (2001:143) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584) and lag (2001:144) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584), in 2003 by lag (2003:373) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584), in 2004 by lag (2004:1251) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584); and in 2006 by lag (2006:442) om ändring i föräldraledighetslagen (1995:584). 90  Lag (1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet. The act was amended in 2000 by lag (2000:762) om ändring i lagen (1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet, in 2003 by lag (2003:308) om ändring i lagen (1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet and finally in 2005 by lag (2005:477) om ändring i lagen (1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet. 91  Lag (1999:132) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder. This act was amended in 2003 by lag (2003:309) om ändring i lagen (1999:132) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder, in 2005 by lag (2005:478) om ändring i lagen (1999:132) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder, and in 2006 by lag (2006:1330) om ändring i lagen (1999:132) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet av personer med funktionshinder. 92  Lag (1999:133) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning. This act was amended in 2003 by lag (2003:310) om ändring i lagen (1999:133) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning and in 2005 by lag (2005:479) om ändring i lagen (1999:133) om förbud mot diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning. 93  Lag (2001:1286) om likabehandling av studenter i högskolan, as amended in 2003 by lag (2003:311) om ändring i lag (2001:1286) om likabehandling av studenter i högskolan and in 2006 by lag (2006:308) om ändring i lag (2001:1286) om likabehandling av studenter i högskolan. 94 Lag (2002:293) om förbud mot diskriminering av deltidsarbetande arbetstagare och arbetstagare med tidsbegränsad anställning.



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– The 2003 Act Prohibiting Discrimination with respect to Goods and Services,95 – The 2006 Act Prohibiting Discrimination with respect to primary school children,96 – A 2006 regulation as to anti-discriminatory terms in public procurement contracts97 and – The 2006 Act on Genetic Integrity (prohibiting the use of genetic information against and individual).98 A 2006 parliamentary committee was charged with overhauling the discrimination legislation, changing the focus of many of the protections as employment issues to concluding that discrimination constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights. Legislation was viewed as one of several means of combating discrimination and thereby supporting those rights as espoused by the many international and European instruments Sweden had ratified. Finding that the regulatory situation in Sweden could at best be described as piecemeal, the committee proposed the introduction of a universal discrimination act. This universal act was passed two years later, the 2008 Discrimination Act, which came into effect 1 January 2009.99 The Act forbids unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, transgender identity or expression, ethnicity,100 religion or other belief, disability, sexual orientation or age.101 Transgender identity or expression as well as age are new protected grounds under the Act. Three protections remain outside the act in separate acts: protections as to part-time and 95  Lag (2003:307) om förbud mot diskriminering. This act was amended in 2004 by lag (2004:1089) om ändring i lagen (2003:307) om förbud mot diskriminering and in 2005 by lag (2005:453) om ändring i lagen (2003:307) om förbud mot diskriminering. 96  Lag (2006:67) om förbud mot diskriminering och annan kränkande behandling av barn och elever. This act was amended in 2008 by lag (2008:224) om ändring i lagen (2006:67) om förbud mot diskriminering och annan kränkande behandling av barn och elever. 97  Förordning (2006:260) om antidiskrimineringsvillkor i upphandlingskontrakt. 98  Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m. m. 99  Diskrimineringslag 2008:567. An English translation of the 2008 Discrimination Act is available at the Equality Ombudsman of Sweden website, do.se. 100  The Swedish legislator deliberately removed “race” from the list of protected grounds in the 2008 Discrimination Act. According to its legislative preparatory works, this was to demonstrate that a biological concept of race is unacceptable: “[T]here is no scientific basis for dividing human beings into different races and from a biological perspective, consequently is there neither any reason to use the word race with respect to human beings,” see Legislative Bill Prop. 2007/08:95, Ett starkare skydd mot diskriminering 119 (2008). The Parliament also stated that the Swedish Government in the international arena is to act so that the word “race” is avoided to as great a degree as possible in official international texts. The Government also was to review the extent to which the term “race” is included in Swedish laws not based on international texts, and as far as possible, suggest a different term. No such alternative term has been suggested to date, either by the Government or the Parliament, see id. at p. 120. 101  Sweden received a three-year extension with respect to implementing Directive 2000/78, but failed to implement age protections by the extended deadline of 2006.

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fixed-term workers, parental leave and the use of genetic information. The Act explicitly states that it is mandatory, and that any agreements in contravention of the rights or obligations afforded under the act are void. Remedies under the act can be damages (compensatory, nominal or discrimination damages) and the voiding of certain employment decisions. Damages can be reduced to zero if such is deemed fair. The protections in the Act encompass employment (both private and public), education, labor market policy, starting a business and professional recognition, membership in organizations such as labor unions, housing, the provision of goods and services both as provider and as customer, social benefits, social insurance and military service. Unlawful discrimination is defined as direct and indirect discrimination, inadequate accessibility, harassment, sexual harassment and instructions to discriminate. Direct discrimination is where a person is treated less favorably than another is, has been or would have been treated in a comparable situation, provided that the difference in treatment is based on sex, sexual identity, ethnic background, religion or other religious belief, disability, sexual orientation or age. Indirect discrimination occurs with the application of a provision, criteria or procedure that appears neutral but is likely to disfavor someone of a particular sex, sexual identity, ethnic background, religion or other religious belief, disability, sexual orientation102 or age, unless the provision, criteria or procedure can objectively be supported by a lawful objective and the means to achieve it are appropriate and necessary. The prohibition concerning inadequate accessibility clarifies the need for reasonable accommodation measures in working life, education and other situations. The prohibition against harassment covers conduct related to sex, sexual identity, ethnic background, religion or other religious belief, disability, sexual orientation or age, and which violates the integrity of a person. Sexual harassment is behavior of a sexual nature that violates a person’s integrity. Unlawful instructions to discriminate are orders or instructions to discriminate against a person given to someone in a position subordinate or dependent to the person giving the order or instruction or who, in relation to such a person, has undertaken to perform a task. Prohibitions against retaliatory measures as well as an obligation to investigate and implement measures against harassment are also included. Active measures are the second prong of equality work in Sweden. The Act includes the obligation to conduct active measures, expanding them to cover not only issues relating to sex, ethnic background and religion or other religious beliefs, but also to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity or expression and age. Employers are to take active measures regarding recruitment, education and the development of skills, job seeking and applications. The employer is to 102  The Marriage Code was amended in 2009 from marriage only being between a man and a woman to being between two individuals regardless of sex.



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prepare an annual equal treatment documentation concerning the work with active measures to achieve equal rights and opportunities in working life, regardless of sex, transgender identity or expression, ethnic background, religion or other religious belief, disability, sexual orientation or age. This documentation is to contain an overview of the active measures undertaken at the workplace according to the Act together with documentation of certain measures the employer intends to commence or implement during the forthcoming year.

D.  Discrimination Claims The focus here is on employment discrimination claims as they are the discrimination claims raised most often and historically were often the only discrimination claims available. Such claims are brought directly to the Labour Court by the social partners or DO if the union or DO has decided to bring the claim and individual has consented to such representation. If an individual brings a claim of discrimination without the support of the union or DO, the claim must be decided first by a general trial court and then the judgment can be appealed to the Labour Court. Since 2010, DO has litigated twenty cases and the unions twelve cases raising claims of unlawful discrimination before the Labour Court.

I.  Labor Union Representation of Members Swedish labor unions have neither any specific statutory or contractual duty to represent their individual members. The union can decide to pursue an employee member grievance, first through negotiations with the employer and then, if unsuccessful, by bringing a case to the Labour Court. The decision to pursue a case is at the sole discretion of the labor union as there is no general duty of fair representation by labor unions as to their members. The failure to bring up a grievance on behalf of a member has no sanctions. The only available remedy for a union member is to leave the union.

II.  The Discrimination Ombudsman JämO was established in 1980 after the “whole” 1979 Equal Treatment Act became effective. Five different Ombudsmen eventually were established under the different discrimination acts, JämO (1980), the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination (1986), the Disability Ombudsman (1999), the Ombudsman against Discrimination because of Sexual Orientation (1999) and the Children’s Ombudsman (1993). These first four were merged in 2009 into one authority, the Office of the Ombudsman against Discrimination (“DO”) under the 2008

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Act on the Discrimination Ombudsman. DO is to work to eliminate discrimination in all areas of society, to promote equal rights and opportunities, equality between men and women and prevent and counteract racism, xenophobia and homophobia, provide advice and assist in ensuring that those exposed to discrimination can exercise their rights and information to the public and governmental authorities in general. DO has the legislative mandate to pursue individual claims of discrimination, but in recent years has decided instead to focus instead on education and public opinion formation. DO received almost 2 000 discrimination complaints in 2012; of these 379 were dismissed without any investigation, 21 were filed with the court and 27 were settled. After a missive from the Government addressing this poor performance, DO received 1 827 complaints and 887 were dismissed without any investigation in 2013. Of these complaints, 294 concerned ethnic discrimination, and not one was pursued, with DO stating that the employers had “provided objective explanations for their actions and that it was difficult to determine whether any discrimination had occurred.” This against the background that the Labour Court has only found two cases of unlawful discrimination on the basis of ethnicity since the passage of the 1986 Act.103 DO’s 2017 budget was SEK 114 million. In that year, DO litigated three cases before the Labour Court. This lack of engagement by DO as to the enforcement of nondiscrimination rights is reflected in recent concluding observations by the CERD committee, pointing out among other things that the present operation of the “Equality Ombudsman is limited, that cases successfully resolved are relatively low in number.”104

III.  The Discrimination Jurisprudence of the Labour Court The Labour Court is an independent, specialized court outside both the administrative and general court systems. A  judging panel of the Labour Court typically consists of seven members, three non-partisan members who are the chair and vice-chair trained in law and a third member who is an expert in the labor market, as well as four partisan members, two chosen by the employer side, two by the employee side. If the case concerns a claim of discrimination, as of 2009 the judging panel is to comprise five members, of which only two are to represent the social partners. The parties to the case can however request the typical seven-member panel. Employment discrimination claims are either brought directly to the Labour Court by either the social partners or DO with the consent of the individual, and then the Labour Court is the first and final 103  See AD 2002 nr. 128 and 2011 nr. 13. 104  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-second and twenty-third period reports of Sweden, Advance Unedited Edition (11 May 2018) CERD/C/SWE/CO/22–23.



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instance with no right to appeal.105 Individuals not represented by their union or DO must bring claims to the regular trial court, which judgment can then be appealed to the Labour Court, creating an even greater economic risk for individuals then for either labor unions or the DO, as seen from the case discussed below.106 The case law of the Labour Court demonstrates a consistency of result and approach as to issues of discrimination.107 The first successful case of indirect discrimination was in 2005, with two more judgments in 2018, bringing the total number of successful indirect discrimination cases to three.108 Two cases of unlawful ethnic discrimination have been found by the Court of the approximately thirty cases brought.109 No successful cases concerning pay equity (between men and women) have been brought, this despite the high occupational segregation in the Swedish labor market with over two-thirds of women working in the low paid public sector, and two-thirds of men in the higher paid public sector.110 Wage negotiations are based on the principle “Industry leads”, entailing that no other sector is to surpass the percentage wage increase that the male-dominated industry sector achieves in the wage negotiations. The most successful discrimination claims brought to the Labour Court tend to be those with respect to taking parental leave. As to remedies, equity is not an institution in Swedish law, consequently the courts in general have no equitable powers, and cannot order for example, the hiring of an individual. A decision made by an employer with respect to existing employment can be voided, but the employer ultimately cannot be forced to effect the decision, such as take back a former employee, and can simply instead pay damages. Punitive damages are not awarded, only economic, nominal or discrimination damages. Economic damages are only awarded where the plaintiff already is an employee and has proven the economic loss. Nominal damages are awarded by the Labour Court in modest amounts, typically somewhere between SEK 25 000 and 50 000. The third category of damages, discrimination damages, 105  The Labour Court as an independent court fall outside the jurisdiction of both the administrative and general courts. 106  The Swedish Supreme Court does not have final jurisdiction with respect to the decisions of the Labour Court. However, a right exists to petition the Swedish Supreme Court to vacate the Labour Court’s final judgment if it is found to manifestly contradict the law and enter a judgment de novo, an argument seldom raised, see Chapter 58 § 1(4) of the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure. 107  For an overview of the discrimination case law of the Swedish Labour Court, see Laura Carlson, Addressing Unlawful Discrimination: The Swedish Journey, in: Laura Carlson, Örjan Edström & Birgitta Nyström (eds.), Globalization, Fragmentation, Labour and Employment Law: A Swedish Perspective (Iustus 2016). 108  AD 2005 no. 87, AD 2018 nos. 42 and 51. 109  AD 2002 no. 128 and AD 2011 no. 13. 110  OECD Economic Surveys, Sweden February 2017 Overview (OECD 2017) available at the OECD website, oecd.org.

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were introduced by the 2008 Discrimination Act as enhanced damages so that employers would be deterred from discriminating. The Labour Court to date has awarded discrimination damages in sixteen cases, with an average award per case of SEK 63 437.111 To determine whether there truly is an enhanced award of damages in these cases, a comparison can be made to the nominal damages awarded in the discrimination cases since the first 1979 Act. The average of nominal damages awarded for discrimination in the 1980’s was SEK  19 000, the 1990’s SEK 37 000, the 2000’s SEK 54 600 and during the 2010’s, SEK 57 222 (including both nominal and discrimination damages).112 Adjusting for inflation, the average award of SEK 19 000 in 1980 today is worth SEK 62 426.113 Taking the maximum average of discrimination damages at SEK 63 437, this entails that the amount of damages since the 1979 Act has actually decreased by 0.013 %, and consequently cannot be seen as reaching the threshold of enhanced. This decrease in the amount of damages awarded for discrimination can be contrasted against the dramatic increase during the same period of trial costs and fees. In Sweden, trial costs and fees are generally awarded according to the English rule,114 which means that the non-prevailing party pays the trial costs and fees for both parties. The Labour Court can order that each party bear its own costs if the losing party has had reasonable cause to have the dispute tried, but this is seldom invoked by the Court and even more rarely in cases where the employee has lost.115 The amount of trial costs and fees as awarded by the Labour Court in discrimination cases demonstrates a trend that deviates radically from the relatively modest increases in the amount of damages, with trial costs and fees awarded having increased by 258 % since the 1980’s, from SEK 22 287/73 213 111  AD 2018 no. 51, AD 2018 no. 42, AD 2016 no. 56, AD 2016 no. 38, AD 2015 no. 72, AD 2015 no. 51, AD 2015 no. 44, AD 2015 no. 12, AD 2014 no. 19, AD 2013 no. 71, AD 2013 no. 29, AD 2013 no. 18, AD 2011 no. 37, AD 2011 no. 23, AD 2011 no. 02 and AD 2010 no. 91. 112  These statistics are based on the 155 cases raising claims of discrimination brought to the Labour Court beginning with AD 1981 no. 109 and ending with AD 2018 no. 74. 113  According to Statistics Sweden, SEK 1 000 in 1980 is worth SEK 3 285 in 2019 compensating for inflation, see scb.se. 114  The English rule is that the non-prevailing party pays the trial costs and fees for both parties. It can be noted that in human rights cases, the UK has adopted the American rule, with each party bearing its own cases. The US in civil rights/human rights cases has abandoned the American rule and instead, where the plaintiff loses, each party bears their own costs, but if the plaintiff prevails, defendant pays for both parties costs and fees. 115  See § 5(2) of the 1974 Labour Disputes (Judicial Procedure) Act. Even if a party prevails on the legal merits, the Labour Court can reallocate the costs and fees depending upon the amount of the claims made. For example, in AD 2015 no. 44 plaintiff initially pled damages in the amount of SEK 100 000 and was only awarded SEK 25 000. The Labour Court found that plaintiff actually did not prevail due to this disparity and ordered plaintiff to pay defendant’s litigation costs of SEK 42 300, resulting in a pyrrhic victory. In a similar case, AD 2013 no. 29, plaintiff pled damages of SEK 200 000 and was awarded discrimination damages of SEK 50 000, the same 25 % ratio as in AD 2015 no. 44, but there was not ordered by the Court to pay the trial costs and fees of the losing party.



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adjusted for inflation, to SEK 188 900 in the 2010’s. Consequently, during this 40-year time span in which the discrimination laws have been in place, the amount of damages per plaintiff has decreased (although marginally) even after the implementation of enhanced discrimination damages, while the trial costs and fees have risen 258 %. It should be kept in mind that the awarded trial costs and fees are only for the prevailing party, so that the total of costs and fees for the litigation is even higher when the losing party pays both parties trial costs and fees.

E.  Access to Justice in the Swedish Context An additional gauge as to any commitment with respect to actually enforcing legal rights is the facilitation of access to justice. Access to justice is necessary, as seen in many international and regional instruments. For example, Article 47 of the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, including legal aid to those who lack sufficient resources.

I.  The Right to an Effective Remedy The 2008 Discrimination Act’s discrimination damages are to be both deterring and remedial. As the statistics above clearly demonstrate, there has been no enhancement in the discrimination damages awarded by the Labour Court. At the same time the economic risks to plaintiffs have significantly increased due to higher trial costs and fees. This disparity renders the option of litigation even more expensive to already disadvantaged plaintiffs. To this can be added the success rates of the different claims, with the lowest success rate for claims of ethnic discrimination; only two of over thirty such cases having been brought successfully by plaintiffs, a less than 7 % chance of prevailing. Litigation is arguably not an economically affordable option for most discrimination plaintiffs. This is particularly true in light of the fact that most cases of discrimination are related to hiring or firing, consequently involving individuals who are unemployed. DO and the unions can bring discrimination cases on behalf of plaintiffs, and have greater resources than individuals so that the financial risks associated with litigating discrimination claims are not as decisive. However, DO’s policy has resulted in it pursuing very few cases. As to the labor unions, as stated above there is no duty of representation under Swedish labor law, so unions are basically free to decline to represent members in discrimination claims, and the only redress the union member/employee has is leaving the union. Contingent fees are not allowed to be charged by attorneys

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who are members of the Swedish Bar Association, and neither is there a strong tradition of pro bono work among lawyers. There is only a limited right to receive legal aid for those individuals having assets and yearly income under SEK 260 000 and even then, there is a limit of onehundred hours of legal advice. If the individual is a member of a labor union, the labor union is to be first contacted before requesting legal aid. If an individual has legal assistance coverage in their home insurance, the insurance coverage is to be used instead. A caveat here though is that most if not all insurance policies exempt employment disputes, relying instead on the labor unions to pursue such claims. Given the financial risks for plaintiffs, some claimants have opted to take discrimination claims to small claims court, which has a ceiling as to damages of approximately SEK 22 000, with a filing fee of SEK 900 with essentially no risk of liability as to paying the other party’s trial costs and fees. Given this ceiling in damages, it is questionable whether a judgment in that limited amount by a small claims court can be seen as an effective remedy from an access to justice perspective. A more physical access to the courts question can also be raised. There is only one labor court in Sweden, which has a population of 10 million and a geographic area of 447 000 km2. The distance from Kiruna, one of Sweden’s most northern cities, to Stockholm where the Labour Court sits, is about 1 000 km. Per capita and kilometer, Sweden consequently has one venue for 10 million inhabitants and 447 000 km2, thus arguably also constituting a physical impediment for many individuals with respect to access to the courts. The assumption is that as the central social partners and DO are located in Stockholm this is not an issue. However, in a case driven by an individual, this can make the appeal process even more costly.

II. Procedural Challenges to Judicial Access From a procedural perspective, Sweden is a very defendant-friendly litigating forum. Rules that give rise to this conclusion include that: – Pleadings are to be based on the facts (with a list of the evidence already at the time of the filing of the complaint) with limited rights as to amendments, – Short statutes of limitation in employment (the original statute of limitations under the 1979 Equal Treatment Act was four months, extended to six months in 2008, and is still four months under the 1995 Parental Leave Act), – Few employer record-keeping requirements outside wage audits, – The courts have restricted powers as to ordering the production of discovery with minimal sanctions for non-compliance,



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– The shifted burden of proof to be applied in discrimination cases is often seen instead as a shared burden of proof entailing that plaintiffs seldom meet this threshold and – Equitable remedies such as ordering a hiring or change in employer policies, particularly concerning job applicants, are generally not available. Few evidentiary rules exist with respect to the presentation of evidence at trial other than exclusions for privilege. Despite this main rule of free evidence, statistical evidence is rarely accepted by the Labour Court as proof of discrimination. Even the offering of the inexorable zero, the total lack of a protected group, has not led the Court to a finding of unlawful discrimination or even that the plaintiff has met the threshold burden of proof.116 This denial of the evidentiary value of statistical information has now found a confirmed purpose in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Sensitive data under the GDPR has to be treated in a certain manner to be lawful. Sensitive data includes racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, membership of a labor union, health, a person’s sex life or sexual orientation, genetic data and biometric data that uniquely identifies a person. Almost all of these categories are taken up in employment contexts, and at least four are protected grounds under the law. The Stockholm Administrative Trial Court found in a 2018 judgment that employers were not allowed to ask employees as to providing sensitive data voluntarily even for the purpose of monitoring whether the employer acted discriminatorily against a protected category. The employer in the case had asked employees if they voluntarily would disclose information as to protected grounds anonymously in order to see if the employer discriminated indirectly in connection with employment, promotions or employee turnover. The Swedish Data Protection Agency found the request for voluntary information to be in violation of the GDPR and the court upheld this finding. The court found that the employer had not succeeded in proving that the information was necessary to fulfill the objective of improving diversity at the work place. This raises the concern of how plaintiffs are to obtain information as to discrimination on grounds deemed sensitive information by the GDPR if the employer is not allowed to have such information. Another aspect of this is whether employers can be held accountable for indirect discrimination related to any of these sensitive data grounds if they are not allowed to collect the data.

III.  Two Examples from Discrimination Jurisprudence Two cases are examined here to illustrate some of the hurdles that plaintiffs face when bringing discrimination claims. The first case was brought through the general courts, ending in a judgment issued by the Supreme Court in NJA 2008 116  See for example AD 2004 no. 44.

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p. 915. The plaintiffs were law students, frustrated with the fact that the law prohibiting ethnic discrimination in pubs and restaurants was never successfully prosecuted due to the high burden of proof required by the courts. The students divided themselves up into four teams, two with persons having blonde hair and blue eyes, two with persons having black hair and brown eyes. All the team members dressed in the same style, same hair styles, etc., so that in essence, the differences were simply hair, skin and eye color. Armed with recorders to document the treatment, the first black/brown team was sent in and refused admittance to the restaurant. The next blonde/blue team was sent in and admitted. The third team, brown/black, was sent in to confirm the discrimination, and not admitted, with the fourth blonde/blue team being sent in and admitted. Based in part on the documentation collected by the teams, the trial court found unlawful discrimination and awarded the four plaintiffs SEK 20 000 (approximately € 2200) each. This judgment was affirmed by the appellate court. The restaurant owner appealed to the Supreme Court, which also found that the restaurant had committed unlawful discrimination. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that this unlawful discrimination: [M]ust be assessed against the risk that the public’s confidence in the legislation can be lowered if the legislation is perceived as a means for allowing individuals to in a planned and systematic manner enrich themselves, a risk which becomes specifically more tangible if the compensation is in an amount that exceeds what can be considered reasonable compensation for the degradation that the violation entailed.

As the team members knew that they would not be admitted to the restaurant and expected to be discriminated against, the Court found that the degradation could not be seen as being too great. The Court lowered the damages to the amount of SEK 5 000 (€ 565). In addition, despite the fact that the main rule in Swedish litigation is the English rule with respect to costs and fees, in other words that the losing party must pay the winning party’s legal costs and fees, the Court ordered the parties to bear their own legal costs and fees for the litigation, in essence negating any damages that the plaintiffs had received under the judgment. The second case concerns the balance of religious freedom and employer needs. A  midwife claimed that a public health provider failed to hire her on several occasions during 2013 and 2014 due to her refusal to perform abortions as part of her employment based on her religious convictions. She reported the situation to DO in 2014, and DO decided to not represent her as the circumstances in the case did not give rise to a claim of discrimination based on religion or belief in the opinion of the DO (be mindful here of the criticism of DO’s cursory treatment of complaints seen above). The midwife brought the case individually to the general courts and lost. The trial court found that the employer’s requirement of performing abortions was narrowly tailored for the purpose and that the requirement of all employees being able to participate in all



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aspects of the clinic’s operations was both appropriate and necessary to ensure that all women had true access to abortions. The trial court issued a judgment in November 2015 that the plaintiff was to pay the trial costs and fees of the public employer, Region Jönköpings län, in the amount of SEK 925 854. The court stated that the plaintiff had reasonable cause to have the matter proven, and the review by the DO was sufficient to fulfill this function. DO had submitted an opinion in the case stating that the requirements of the job were motivated, outweighing the freedom of religion in this question. The midwife appealed the case to the Labour Court, which upheld the trial court’s judgment and in addition, ordered the plaintiff to pay an addition SEK 606 000 in trial costs and fees. The Labour Court stated that according to its view, the legal and evidentiary questions that were the objects of the case did not give reason to depart from the main rule as to the allocation of costs and fees. Neither did the Labour Court find that the plaintiff as a resulting of applying this main rule regarding the allocation of trial costs and fees was denied her right under Article 13 ECHR to an effective remedy. The total of the awards against plaintiff compensating the public employer for legal costs and fees for the midwife was over SEK 1.5 million. It can be added here that this is equivalent to 46 months of average wages for a midwife before taxes at SEK 32 400. These two cases clearly demonstrate the negative effect that the general rule as to allocation of trial costs and fees can have. Despite the fact that both cases raised questions that were important in a societal context, the first group was penalized with reduced sanctions as they knew that they would be unlawfully discriminated against. In the second case, despite the fact that case law is unclear with regards to the balance of employer needs and employee religious freedom, the plaintiff was ordered to pay the trial costs and fees for a public employer at an unheard-of level. That both courts in the latter case thought the requirements of access to justice and effective remedies were fulfilled is also interesting. A sharp contrast can be drawn with UK 2017 Unison case,117 where the UK Supreme Court held that the right of access to justice is both an English constitutional common law right as well as a protected right under European law, and that litigation is essential not only to the individual, providing both justice and the right to be heard, but also to society at large.

F.  A Culture of Equality, but What Type? The general question can be raised, why is there such a complete lack of interest by lawmakers and courts, and debate within civil society, with respect to access to justice in Sweden. The answer is of course complicated. As seen with 117  R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.

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Scandinavian legal realism, the idea of law as being invoked by individuals with respect to rights has historically not been strong. In contrast, Scandinavian legal realism viewed rights as non-legal, reducing the role of judges to simply applying the law as determined by the legislator, with scholars engaged in systemizing, and not criticizing, such law. Litigation is seen more as an unwanted intrusion than being beneficial to both the individual and society as is seen from the UK Unison case. Sweden does not have a historically strong tradition of private enforcement of the law, nor of individual rights in general, instead opting for corporatist structures and collective solutions. The interplay between civil society, government agencies, courts and lawmakers in Sweden relies to a great degree on consensus. The strongest civil society actors, the social partners, have quasi-state status in that they have the right through self-regulation in the form of collective agreements to determine the terms and conditions of the labor market, allowed to derogate from the legislation in many respects. For decades, being a member of an LO labor union automatically meant being a member of the Social Democratic political party. Arguably very few discernible tensions exist between the goals of the labor unions, the decisions of the Labour Court and the aspirations of lawmakers. The Swedish labor law model is unabashedly concerned with the social partners and collective solutions to labor market issues. Elaborate procedures have been put in place concerning the negotiations between the social partners, with extensive rights as to industrial action and secondary or sympathetic actions lawful. Even those legislative discrimination protections finally adopted in the late 1970’s were fit into this collective labor law model with a group rebate as to damages. The first race discrimination act did not even contain a civil law prohibition against race discrimination, much less sanctions or remedies. To this can be added that the impetus for enacting legislative discrimination protections was often as a response to external international and EU obligations with little domestic anchoring, as seen in the early legislative history. Instead legislative solutions were viewed as a risk for freezing any progress made in such areas, at least by the social partners. Discrimination issues were treated as labor law issues for the social partners and not as human rights, with the first act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex gap-filling for the private sector. The Swedish discrimination legislation still today cedes first voice to the labor unions in that they first decide whether to pursue a claim. Union members have no statutory rights with respect to the unions, and no voice with regard to employers except through the unions or through pursuing litigation themselves. No viable agency alternative is available either as DO has chosen the policy of pursuing a handful of individual claims through the courts. The low damages awarded and the relatively higher attorneys’ costs and fees create a significant deterrent for individuals considering the pursuit of employment discrimination grievances. Individual plaintiffs take significant economic



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risks when bringing cases themselves, and with respect to certain protected grounds, such as ethnicity, the number of successful claims before the Labour Court (the ultimate authority for employment discrimination claims) has been negligible. When facing the odds against prevailing, the economic risks, and the minimal damages, many potential plaintiffs choose to not litigate. Equality in Sweden is placed within the corporativist structures of both welfare and democracy, which arguably has been the case since the Middle Ages. The overarching lawmaker under today’s constitution is the people as a group, with the role of the courts to apply the intent of this legislator (in the singular). Individual discrimination protections by their nature create dissonance within these corporate structures based on majoritarianism, as can be seen from the fact that the most successful discrimination claims brought to the Labour Court are those concerning parental leave, and the least successful those concerning ethnicity. The Europeanization of human rights, such as discrimination protections, and Sweden’s 1995 EU membership have brought this tension to the surface, and the question is whether and how Sweden will successfully reconcile this friction in the future.

Autorenverzeichnis John Osogo Ambani, Senior Lecturer, LL.B., LL.M., LL.D., Strathmore Law School, Kenya Laura Carlson, Professor, B. A., J. D. (US), LL.M., J. D. (Sweden), Stockholm University, Department of Law, Sweden Elena Wladimirovna Gritsenko, Professor Dr., Saint-Petersburg State University, Department of Constitutional Law, Russia Kyung-Sin Park, Professor, J. D., Korea University Law School, South Korea Nahed Samour, Dr., Post Doc Researcher, Humboldt University Berlin, Faculty of Law, Germany