Volume 18, Tome V: Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, and Polish (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9781472477774, 1472477774

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KIERKEGAARD SECONDARY LITERATURE TOME V: GREEK, HEBREW, HUNGARIAN, ITALIAN, JAPANESE, NORWEGIAN, AND POLISH

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 18, Tome V

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre

General Editor JON STEWART Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board FINN GREDAL JENSEN KATALIN NUN PETER ŠAJDA Advisory Board LEE C. BARRETT MARÍA J. BINETTI ISTVÁN CZAKÓ HEIKO SCHULZ CURTIS L. THOMPSON

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature Tome V: Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, and Polish

Edited by JON STEWART

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 selection and editorial matter, Jon Stewart; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Jon Stewart to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 9781472477774 (hbk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC Cover design by Katalin Nun Copyright © Jon Stewart, 2017. All rights reserved.

Contents List of Contributors List of Abbreviations

xiii xv

I. Secondary Literature in Greek Δημήτρης Κ. Φαρμάκης, [Dimitris K. Farmakis], Ύπαρξη και Απελπισία στη Φιλοσοφία του S. Kierkegaard [Existence and Despair in S. Kierkegaard’s Philosophy] Georgios Patios Μιχάλης Κ. Μακράκης, [Michalis K. Makrakis], Εμμένεια και υπέρβαση στη φιλοσοφία του Kierkegaard [Immanence and Transcendence in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy] Vasiliki Tsakiri Νίκος Άγγ. Νησιώτης, [Nikos Agg. Nissiotis], Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις: Η υπαρκτική σκέψις εν τη φιλοσοφία και η χριστιανική πίστις ως το αναπόφευκτον και βασικόν πρόβλημα αυτής κατά τον Soren Kierkegaard και τους συγχρόνους υπαρξιστάς φιλοσόφους Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger και Jean-Paul Sartre [Existentialism and Christian Faith, or The Existential Thought in Philosophy and Christian Faith as the Inevitable and Basic Problem for Thought according to Søren Kierkegaard and the Modern Existential Philosophers Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre] Vasiliki Tsakiri

3

7

13

II. Secondary Literature in Hebrew Tamar Aylat-Yaguri, ‫ הסולם של קירקגור לפסגת הקיום הרוחני‬:‫דיאלוג אנושי עם המוחלט‬ ‫ האוניברסיטה העברית‬,‫ הוצאת ספרים ע"ש י"ל מאגנס‬:‫[ ירושלים‬Human Dialogue with the Absolute: Kierkegaard’s Ladder to the Climax of Spiritual Existence] Jacob Golomb

21

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III. Secondary Literature in Hungarian Judit Bartha, A szerző árnyképe. Romantikus költőmítosz Kierkegaard és E. T. A. Hoffmann alkotásesztétikájában [The Shadow of the Author: The Romantic Myth of the Poet in the Creation Aesthetics of Kierkegaard and E.T.A. Hoffmann] Zoltán Gyenge Béla Brandenstein, Kierkegaard. Tanulmány [Kierkegaard: A Study] András Nagy István Czakó, Hit és egzisztencia. Tanulmány Søren Kierkegaard hitfelfogásáról [Faith and Existence: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Conception of Faith] Zoltán Gyenge István Dévény, Sören Kierkegaard Anita Soós Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus [Kierkegaard and German Idealism] István Czakó Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard élete és filozófiája. A Kierkegaard-könyvtár teljes katalógusával [Kierkegaard’s Life and Philosophy: Along with a Complete Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library] István Czakó Sándor Koncz, Kierkegaard és a világháború utáni teológia [Kierkegaard and Post-War Theology] Sarolta Püsök András Nagy, Az árnyjátékos. Sören Kierkegaard irodalomtörténet, eszmetörténet és hatástörténet metszéspontjain [The Shadowplayer: Søren Kierkegaard at the Crossroads of Literary History, History of Ideas and Reception History] Anita Soós András Nagy (ed.), Kierkegaard Budapesten. A Kierkegaard-hét előadásai 1992. december 1–4 [Kierkegaard in Budapest: Proceedings of the Kierkegaard Week, December 1–4, 1992] Judit Bartha Sarolta Püsök, Søren Kierkegaard teológiájának súlypontjai [The Focal Points of Kierkegaard’s Theology] András Nagy

27 33

39 45

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Contents

Anita Soós, “Ha egy arcot sokáig és figyelmesen szemlélünk...” [“If We Watch a Face Long and Carefully Enough...”] Judit Bartha

vii

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Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, Kierkegaard élete és munkái [Kierkegaard’s Life and Works] András Nagy

93

László Széles, Kierkegaard gondolkozásának alapvonalai [The Basic Lines of Kierkegaard’s Thought] Sarolta Püsök

99

Sándor Tavaszy, Kierkegaard személyisége és gondolkozása [Kierkegaard’s Personality and Thought] Sarolta Püsök

103

IV. Secondary Literature in Italian Isabella Adinolfi, Poeta o testimone? Il problema della comunicazione del cristianesimo in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard [Poet or Witness? The Problem of the Communication of Christianity in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard] Laura Liva

109

Remo Cantoni, La coscienza inquieta. Sören Kierkegaard [The Restless Consciousness: Søren Kierkegaard] Ingrid Basso

115

Simonella Davini, Il circolo del salto. Kierkegaard e la ripetizione [The Circle of the Leap: Kierkegaard and Repetition] Alessio Santoro

119

Simonella Davini, Arte e critica nell’estetica di Kierkegaard [Art and Criticism in Kierkegaard’s Aesthetics] Laura Liva

123

Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx. per una definizione dell’esistenza [Between Kierkegaard and Marx: Towards a Definition of Existence] Cristian Benavides Roberto Garaventa, Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard [Anxiety and Sin in Søren Kierkegaard] Alessandra Granito

127

133

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Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio, L’estetico in Kierkegaard [Aesthetics in Kierkegaard] Laura Liva Massimo Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard. Una “lotta di confine” [Despair and Faith in Søren Kierkegaard: A Border Struggle] Alessandra Granito Alessandro Klein, Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Anti-Rationalism] Alessio Santoro Giuseppe Modica, Fede libertà peccato. Figure ed esiti della “prova” in Kierkegaard [Faith, Freedom, Sin: Figures and Outcomes of the “Trial” in Kierkegaard] Simonella Davini

137

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Giuseppe Modica, Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani [A Truth for Me: Kierkegaardian Itineraries] Silvia Vignati

155

Enzo Paci, Relazioni e significati. II. Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann [Relations and Meanings, vol. 2, Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann] Laura Liva

161

Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero [Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the First Phase of His Thought] Silvia Vignati

167

Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla” [Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the Postscript] Silvia Vignati

173

Giorgio Penzo, Kierkegaard. La verità eterna che nasce nel tempo [Kierkegaard: The Eternal Truth which is Born in Temporality] Alessandra Granito

179

Ettore Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia. Studi kierkegaardiani [Between Aesthetics and Theology: Kierkegaardian Studies] Silvia Vignati

183

Ettore Rocca, Kierkegaard Silvia Vignati

189

Contents

ix

V. Secondary Literature in Japanese Hiroshi Fujino, キルケゴール—美と倫理のはざまに立つ哲学 [Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical] Keisuke Yoshida Jun Hashimoto, キェルケゴールにおける「苦悩」の世界 [“Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard] Yusuke Suzuki Shosyu Kawakami, ドイツにおけるキルケゴール思想の受容—20 世紀初頭の批判哲学と実存哲学 [The Reception of Kierkegaard’s Thought in Germany: Critical Philosophy and Existential Philosophy in the Early Twentieth Century] Tomomichi Baba Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール青年時代の研究、正続 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth] Michio Ogino Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われた文学研究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1: The Realities of Young Kierkegaard’s Own Studies of Literature] Michio Ogino Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究　 後編—全著作構造の解明 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2: Investigation into the Structure of the Entirety of his Works] Michio Ogino Takaya Suto, キルケゴールと「キリスト教界」 [Kierkegaard and “Christendom”] Keisuke Yoshida

199

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225

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VI. Secondary Literature in Norwegian Trond Berg Eriksen, Søren Kierkegaard. Den fromme spotteren [Søren Kierkegaard: The Pious Mocker] Hans Herlof Grelland

237

Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard og Norge [Søren Kierkegaard and Norway] Morten Dahlback

243

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Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard Morten Dahlback Hans Herlof Grelland, Tausheten og øjeblikket. Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch [Silence and the Moment: Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch] Nathaniel Kramer Karstein Hopland, Virkelighet og bevissthet. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards antropologi [Actuality and Consciousness: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Anthropology] Morten Dahlback

247

251

257

Kjell Eyvind Johansen, Begrebet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard [The Concept of Repetition in Søren Kierkegaard] Morten Dahlback

261

Finn Jor, Kjærlighetens gjerninger. En roman om Søren og Regine [Works of Love: A Novel about Søren and Regine] Katalin Nun

267

Finn Jor (ed.), Filosofi & samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard [Philosophy and Society: Søren Kierkegaard] Narve Strand

271

Per Lønning, Samtidighedens situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards Kristendomsforståelse [The Situation of Contemporaneity: A Study in Søren Kierkegaard’s Understanding of Christianity] Morten Dahlback

277

VII. Secondary Literature in Polish Edward Kasperski, Kierkegaard. Antropologia i dyskurs o człowieku [Kierkegaard: Anthropology and the Discourse on Man] Wojciech Kaftański Stefania Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary [Pascal and Kierkegaard: The Philosophers of Despair and Faith] Andrzej Słowikowski Hubert Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna [Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology] Katarzyna Krawerenda-Wajda

283

289

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Contents

Hubert Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle Kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej [Kierkegaard’s Anthropology in the Perspective of Kantian Practical Philosophy] Katarzyna Krawerenda-Wajda Jacek Aleksander Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka paradoksu wiary [Søren Kierkegaard’s Dialectics of the Paradox of Faith] Andrzej Słowikowski Antoni Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji: studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda [Between Freedom and the Truth of Existence: A Study of S. Kierkegaard’s Thought] Wojciech Kaftański Karol Toeplitz, Kierkegaard Wojciech Kaftański

xi

301

307

313 319

List of Contributors Tomomichi Baba, The Open Air University of Japan, Tokyo Bunkyo Study Center, 3–29–1, Ootsuka, Bunkyo City, Tokyo, Japan. Judit Bartha, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Faculty of Humanities, Institute for Art Theory and Media Studies, 1088 Budapest, Múzeum krt 6–8, Hungary. Ingrid Basso, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli 1, 20123, Milan, Italy. Cristian Benavides, National University of Cuyo, Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, Department of Philosophy, General Saint Martin, University Center, Office 414, Postal Code 5500, Mendoza, Argentina. István Czakó, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy, 2087 Piliscsaba, Egyetem út 1. Hungary. Morten Dahlback, Institutt for filosofi og religionsvitenskap, Det humanistiske fakultet Dragvoll gaard, Dragvoll alle 40, 7491 Trondheim, Norway. Simonella Davini, c/o Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Farvergade 27 D, 1463 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Jacob Golomb, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Alessandra Granito, Università degli Studi “G. D’Annunzio” – School of Advanced Studies, via dei Vestini 31, 66013 Chieti Scalo, Italy. Hans Herlof Grelland, University of Agder, Jon Lilletuns vei 9, 4879 Grimstad, Norway. Zoltán Gyenge, University of Szeged, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, 6722 Szeged, Petőfi sgt. 30–34. Hungary. Wojciech Kaftański, Australian Catholic University, Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, Locked Bag 4115 DC, Fitzroy, Victoria, Melbourne, Australia. Nathaniel Kramer, Brigham Young University, Department of Comparative Arts and Letters, 3008 JFSB, Provo, UT 84602, USA.

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Katarzyna Krawerenda-Wajda, Institute for the Study of Religions, Department Philosophy of Religion, Jagiellonian University, 52, Grodzka Street, 31–044 Cracow, Poland. Laura Liva, Università G. D’Annunzio – School of Advanced Studies, via dei Vestini 31, 66013 Chieti Scalo, Italy. András Nagy, Theater Department, Pannon University, Egyetem utca 10, 8200 Veszprém, Hungary. Katalin Nun, c/o Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Farvergade 27 D, 1463 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Michio Ogino, Middlesex University, Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6HR UK, and Japan Central Bible College, 3–15–20 Komagome, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 170–0003, Japan. George Patios, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University Campus, Ano Ilisia, 15771, Athens, Greece. Sarolta Püsök, Babeş-Bolyai University, Reformed Theological Faculty, 400174 Cluj-Napoca, Str. Horea, nr. 7, Romania. Alessio Santoro, Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, 56126 Pisa, Italy. Andrzej Słowikowski, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Faculty of Humanities, ul. Fosa Staromiejska 1a, Torun, Poland. Anita Soós, Eötvös Loránd University, Institute of Germanic Studies, Department of Scandinavian Languages and Literatures, 1088 Budapest, Rákóczi út 5, Hungary. Narve Strand, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, The Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU Dragvoll, 7491 Trondheim, Norway. Vasiliki Tsakiri, Department of Humanities, Hellenic Open University, Parodos Aristotelous 18, 26335, Patras, Greece. Silvia Vignati, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich 6 – Ev. Theologie, Norbert-Wollheim-Platz 1, 60629 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Keisuke Yoshida, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Gakushuin University, 1–5–1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171–8588, Japan; and Institüt für Philosophie, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60629 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

List of Abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, ed. by Niels Thulstrup, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art.

S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by Rasmus Nielsen, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1857.

EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by H.P. Barfod and Hermann Gottsched, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. I to XI–3, ed. by Peter Andreas Heiberg, Victor Kuhr and Einer Torsting, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. I to XI–3, by Niels Thulstrup, vols. XII to XIII supplementary volumes, ed. by Niels Thulstrup, vols. XIV to XVI index by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1–28, vols. K1–K28, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, Alastair McKinnon and Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag 1997–2013.

SV1

Samlede Værker, vols. I–XIV, ed. by A.B. Drachmann, Johan Ludvig Heiberg and H.O. Lange, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by H.P. Rohde, Copenhagen: The Royal Library 1967.

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BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Lee M. Capel, London: Collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982.

CUPH Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2009. EO1

Either/Or, Part I, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, Part II, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, including From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia Watkin, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xvii

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk (vol. 7, Index and Composite Collation), Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by Henrik Rosenmeier, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978.

LR

A Literary Review, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 2001.

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

P

Prefaces / Writing Sampler, trans. by Todd W. Nichol, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.

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PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1996.

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by William McDonald, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by Walter Lowrie, New York and London: Oxford University Press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

SUDP

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Alastair Hannay, London and New York: Penguin Books 1989.

TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on

List of Abbreviations

xix

Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997. WL

Works of Love, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995.

WS

Writing Sampler, trans. by Todd W. Nichol, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

I. Secondary Literature in Greek

Dimitris K. Farmakis, Ύπαρξη και Απελπισία στη Φιλοσοφία του S. Kierkegaard [Existence and Despair in S. Kierkegaard’s Philosophy] Thessaloniki: Epikentro Editions 2008, 113 pp.

Farmakis’ synoptic but substantial approach to Kierkegaard’s overall existential philosophy focuses mainly on Kierkegaard’s views on the nature of existence and despair. Farmakis tries to both underline and explain the complex relation between existence and despair, while he unveils Kierkegaard’s general existential thought. If there is a blemish in Farmakis’ overall philosophical analysis, this is found in his effort to analyze these two major Kierkegaardian concepts without a further appeal to other important aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought. While the concept of anxiety, for example, is quite important for the complete understanding of the concept of despair, Farmakis hardly tries to examine in depth the relation of despair and anxiety.1 With that said, Farmakis is fully capable of presenting to his readers a complete picture of the close relation between Kierkegaard’s real life and his thoughts, while Farmakis makes the necessary conceptual bridges that explain and underline Kierkegaard’s different philosophical stages, from his early life as a follower of German idealism to his late days as an authentic philosopher of human existence. His analysis is divided into a short introduction, seven concise chapters, and an epilogue. The main argument of Farmakis is that despair is closely connected to the “Christ-centered character of Kierkegaard’s existentialism.”2 Farmakis’ specific advantage is that he is able to proceed smoothly and effortlessly with his analysis, starting from what Kierkegaard means with the word “existence” and ending with Kierkegaard’s philosophical view that human beings have the possibility to overcome despair. In the first chapter the author treats Kierkegaard’s change of philosophical orientation from German idealism to what Farmakis calls “Christ-centered existentialism.”3 There is a short depiction of Kierkegaard’s approach to the aesthetic,

He dedicates only few pages in their relation from p. 59 to p. 67 but even there Farmakis mostly describes instead of analyzes their relation. 2 Dimitris K. Farmakis, Ύπαρξη και Απελπισία στη Φιλοσοφία του S. Kierkegaard, Thessaloniki: Epikentro Editions 2008, p. 101. 3 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 1

4

Georgios Patios

ethical, and religious stage, and from there Farmakis goes on to analyze the peculiar relation between Kierkegaard’s thought and Hegel’s philosophy.4 The experience and the existence of faith are considered by Farmakis to be the cornerstone of Kierkegaard’s existentialism. Following this line of argumentation, Farmakis examines in his two next chapters the nature and the specific conceptual and existential horizon of despair. Farmakis considers God and the problem of how human beings can reach God as the main themes that underline every single thought Kierkegaard makes regarding despair. He makes some interesting remarks considering the relation of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas with the Kierkegaardian concept of despair.5 So far, Farmakis does not present us any new idea regarding existence and despair in Kierkegaard’s thought, although he is able to offer us a meaningful epitome of some of the best-known aspects of the secondary literature regarding Kierkegaard’s life and philosophy.6 The same thing happens when he analyzes specifically the concept and the nature of despair in his two next chapters. There is nothing new or innovative in his analysis, but his ability to sketch an overall picture of the Kierkegaardian despair is remarkable. Farmakis mainly argues that what is important in despair is the way every single human being chooses to actualize despair. In this way Farmakis underlines the existential authenticity of the experience of human despair, while he argues in favor of our personal responsibility regarding the way we “are in despair.”7 Farmakis examines three specific aspects of the existential experience of despair: (a) sin, (b) evil, and (c) freedom. He analyzes, in great detail, the complexity of the relation of these three dimensions of the phenomenon of human despair to the general problem of God’s existence. Farmakis is mostly interested here to point out the personal responsibility of every human being in despair, and he argues that our capacity to freely accept our despair is the key to the way out of the despair.8 The way Farmakis is able to handle these difficult and complex philosophical matters regarding personal responsibility, human freedom of will, sin, and despair and the way Farmakis can easily navigate his thought around them, renders his fourth and his fifth chapter the best chapters of this analysis. Farmakis points out the real agony which dominates the life of every human being that is in despair, and he is able to offer us a reliable picture of what actually happens in a man’s life while he is in despair. At this particular point Farmakis

Ibid., pp. 19–21. Farmakis seems to argue that Kierkegaard considers Hegel as his direct philosophical opponent, apparently unaware of the current discussion regarding the complex relations between Kierkegaard and Hegel. 5 Ibid., p. 30. 6 He makes many references to secondary literature in English, French, and Greek and exhibits a quite rich knowledge of the relevant secondary sources in these three languages. 7 Ibid., p. 43. 8 See, for example, his argumentation on p. 51. 4

Dimitris K. Farmakis

5

manages to present something that is more than a simple theoretical depiction of Kierkegaard’s thoughts; he is able instead to give a quite vivid and intense picture of what really happens in a man’s soul when he is in despair.9 Farmakis’ final chapter is about how Kierkegaard argues that men can overcome despair. This chapter consists of only four pages, and here Farmakis fails to make a full and clear analysis regarding the ways and the reasons Kierkegaard gives us about a possible overpowering of despair.10 All in all, Farmakis’ text is a very helpful introduction to Kierkegaard’s view regarding existence and despair. It is a clear, concise, and fair depiction of the main Kierkegaardian approach, and it is written in a manner that synoptically explains well these very difficult Kierkegaardian concepts. Georgios Patios

The pages that Farmakis devotes to Adam and innocence are very intense and fully capture the Kierkegaardian notion of despair as a real and existing agony. See ibid., pp. 63–7. 10 Ibid., pp. 69–72. There is no possible way to present the whole Kierkegaardian argumentation regarding the overcoming of despair in only four pages. Farmakis here does not do justice to Kierkegaard’s overall philosophical effort. 9

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Michalis K. Makrakis, Εμμένεια και υπέρβαση στη φιλοσοφία του Kierkegaard [Immanence and Transcendence in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy], Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation 1983, 377 pp.

Makrakis’ book was published in 1983 and is based on a series of lectures (five in total) that he gave in March of that year in the Goulandri-Horn Foundation. This is perhaps the reason why the book retains a somewhat freer approach to its subject matter, lacking in exact references and academic rigor, something that the author readily admits in his Preface. Furthermore, the author warns the reader that since it is based on the lectures, the book abounds in repetitions.1 However, in his view, these repetitions should not be considered as a disadvantage but as a device that aims at the clarification of the issues tackled by the book. At the same time the repetitions are supposed to arouse the reader’s awareness of the importance of fundamental Kierkegaardian themes. Makrakis’ book was written in a period in which only a few books and studies on Kierkegaard had appeared in Greek by scholars such as Nissiotis, Kostaras, Theodorakopoulos, and Theodoridis. The author is in dialogue with these studies and uses them in an edifying way, mainly by revealing their merits and incorporating them in his argumentation. It is also important to note in this context that Makrakis studied theology at the University of Athens, where he later taught courses on “Psychology and Religion” and “Philosophy and Literature.” He continued his postgraduate studies in St. Sergius Theological Institute and at the University of California (Berkeley), where he became interested in the thought of Tolstoy and Santayana. The influence of the latter is evident in the book under review, in which Makrakis attempts inter alia to bring to light the points of convergence between Santayana and Kierkegaard. Furthermore, Makrakis’ erudition in literature is apparent throughout the book, since there is literally no chapter lacking in references to this field. As the title of the book unequivocally indicates, Makrakis’ main aim is to explore the functions of the notions of “immanence” and “transcendence” in Kierkegaard’s

Michalis K. Makrakis, Εμμένεια και υπέρβαση στη φιλοσοφία του Kierkegaard, Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation 1983, p. 11.

1

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oeuvre. It is important to note that the author examines the aforementioned notions from the perspective of the distinction between existence and essence, and he treats the former as corresponding to immanence and the latter as corresponding to transcendence. Moreover, it is this divide between existence and essence that arguably dictates the division of the book in two major parts. The first part (pp. 29–228) considers the application of this division to beings in general, while the second (pp. 229–322) to the divine being.2 In the beginning of the first part, Makrakis offers us a short philosophical history of the notions of immanence and transcendence, existence and essence, and then he proceeds to a presentation of Kierkegaard’s account of the aforementioned notions, especially as depicted in Kierkegaard’s works Philosophical Fragments and Repetition. Makrakis shows how necessity is an exemplary feature of essence, and freedom a unique characteristic of existence, while he emphasizes the importance of repetition as transcendence and freedom. Using the same perspective as his point of departure,3 he examines the three stages of existence, as they emerge in Kierkegaard’s texts and in relation to Kierkegaard’s personal life, namely, his relation with his father, with Regine Olsen, and with others. Of particular interest is Makrakis’ analysis of the story of the Wandering Jew as an example of the highest form of the aesthetic stage, namely, despair.4 Of equal importance is Makrakis’ understanding of the ethical stage as the ground of praxis but also of the revealing of the “person,” who is for Makrakis a synthesis of “temporality and eternity.”5 Indeed, Makrakis uses in this context the Eastern Christian (Orthodox) notion of the “person” in order to refer to what Kierkegaard called the single individual, that is, the human being who reaches his highest form of being as he returns concurrently to himself and to God.6 This move is coupled by the claim that Kierkegaard’s view of being reborn, of the second coming refers to the entrance of the human being into the Kingdom of God. This state of affairs is likened to a spiritual birth through which the human being is transformed into a “person.”7 It is quite evident that the religious or the ethico-religious stage is the stage that interests Makrakis the most in this study. He elaborates on Kierkegaard’s distinction between Religiousness A (immanence) and Religiousness B (transcendence),8 and he argues that the absurd leap of faith ruptures immanence and is an exceptional feature of transcendence. Kierkegaard’s interest in the stories of Abraham and Job are seen as a preparation for the transition to Christ’s suffering and sacrifice, while Kierkegaard’s concept of contemporaneity is said to be indicative of this movement. The task of the person is to become contemporaneous with the Passion of Christ that is tantamount to the state of the necrosis of the human world through pain and

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Ibid., p. 230. Ibid., pp. 82–204. Ibid., pp. 133–6. Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., pp. 152–4. Ibid., p. 189. Ibid., pp. 169–79.

Michalis K. Makrakis

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suffering. The task is to transform passion and suffering into action and deed. Here Makrakis traces an agreement between Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and the teaching of the Eastern Church Fathers regarding suffering, the necrosis of the senses and the world, while he discerns a disagreement between Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard on the issue.9 According to Makrakis, the Church Fathers do not understand the necrosis of the senses and suffering as a state of death but, on the contrary, as a state of resurrection and rebirth. Here Makrakis disagrees with those Kierkegaard scholars (he mentions Kupt F. Reinhard,10 but I would also like to add Nissiotis11) who argue that Kierkegaard focuses primarily on Christ’s Passion and not on the event of his resurrection.12 He certainly accepts that Kierkegaard’s emphasis is put mainly on the Passion of Christ, but he nevertheless argues that for Kierkegaard the necrosis of the world is tantamount to “a spiritual resurrection” or to “an opening to eternity.”13 Yet it is not quite clear in this part of the text if by “resurrection” Makrakis refers only to the rebirth of the human individual during his or her historical life, or if he uses this notion in a wider sense that includes the belief in the continuation – or should we say radical transformation – of life after death. In any case, resurrection, rebirth, and repetition are seen as interconnected notions that rupture the immanence of time. Nevertheless, in his conclusion Makrakis refers explicitly to the event of Christ’s resurrection in Kierkegaard’s later oeuvre as an extremely joyful moment that also promises the resurrection of all the dead.14 As mentioned above, the second part of Makrakis’ book concerns the application of the division between immanence and transcendence, essence and existence to the divine being itself. Consequently, this part focuses on the two different ways of approaching the divine being, namely, through knowledge or through faith. Makrakis refers briefly to the different ways of approaching God in Western and Eastern Christianity, and he argues that in effect Kierkegaard unconsciously followed the Orthodox tradition on the issue. More specifically, Kierkegaard distinguishes sharply between the questions of “what” God is theoretically (a question that refers to the essence of the divine being) and “how” we relate to him (a question that refers

Kierkegaard’s antithesis with Schopenhauer’s teaching regarding suffering and necrosis of the joy of life is based on the fact that Schopenhauer was not an ascetic type and never applied these principles to his own life. Ibid., pp. 160–5. See also Kierkegaard’s “The Gospel of Sufferings” from Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. 10 He refers especially to Reinhard’s article “Cleavage of Minds: Kierkegaard and Hegel,” Commonweal, vol. 35, 1942, pp. 608–11. 11 Nikolaos Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις: Η υπαρκτική σκέψις εν τη φιλοσοφία και η χριστιανική πίστις ως το αναπόφευκτον και βασικόν πρόβλημα αυτής κατά τον Soren Kierkegaard και τους συγχρόνους υπαρξιστάς φιλοσόφους Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger και Jean-Paul Sartre [Existentialism and Christian Faith, or The Existential Thought in Philosophy and Christian Faith as the Inevitable and Basic Problem for Thought According to Søren Kierkegaard and the Modern Existential Philosophers Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre], Athens: Minima Editions 1986, p. 309. 12 Makrakis, Εμμένεια και υπέρβαση στη φιλοσοφία του Kierkegaard, p. 165. 13 Ibid., p. 166. 14 Ibid., pp. 333–8. 9

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to the existence of God), and he speaks in favor of the second way of approaching God. Indeed, faith is absurd and transcendent since it claims a personal relationship with the absolute unknown Being, thus transgressing the limits of theoretical knowledge.15 Makrakis further discusses the absurd character of knowledge through a comparison of Kierkegaard’s knight of faith with Vikentios Kornaros’ play The Sacrifice of Abraham,16 with Don Quixote de la Mancha, with the idiot of Dostoevsky17 and, finally, with the Platonic divine madness and Camus’ daimonic madness.18 In conclusion, Makrakis concludes his study by reaffirming the affinities of Kierkegaard’s thought with that of the Greek Orthodox tradition. Although Makrakis’ aim is to understand Kierkegaard through the premises of his own tradition (Lutheranism), he nevertheless claims that Kierkegaard’s attack on the Danish Church allows him to trace some features of Kierkegaard’s thought that are in agreement with the Orthodox tradition. Vasiliki Tsakiri

15 16 17 18

Ibid., pp. 231–40. Ibid., pp. 266–7. Ibid., pp. 268–76. Ibid., pp. 276–86.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Begzos, Marios, “Μιχαήλ Μακράκης (*1923): Βίος – Σκέψη – Έργο” [Michael Makrakis (1923): Life – Thought – Oeuvre], ΕΕΘΣΠΑ, vol. 35, 2000, pp. 33–59. Gaitanis, Vassilios, Η έννοια της απελπισίας στον Κίρκεγκωρ και στον Ντοστογιέφσκι. Μια εφαρμογή της Κιρκεγκωριανής απελπισίας ως ασθένειας προς θάνατο στις μεγάλες μορφές του Ντοστογιεφσκικού έργου [The Concept of Despair in Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky: An Application of Kierkegaardian Despair as Sickness unto Death on the great Personages of Dostoevsky’s Authorship], Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 1997, p. 85; p. 104; p. 149; pp. 164–5; p. 171; pp. 385–8; p. 401. Papalexandropoulos, Stylianos, “Θρησκεία και Χριστιανισμός στον Κίρκεγκωρ” [Religion and Christianity in Kierkegaard], Επιστημονική Επετηρίς Θεολογικής Σχολής Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών [Scientific Yearbook of the Theological School of Athens], vol. 43, 2008, pp. 374–85. Tzavaras, Yiannis, Η καθολική διάδοση της απελπισίας. (Σπουδή στον Κίρκεγκωρ) [The Universal Diffusion of Despair: A Study on Kierkegaard], Athens and Ioannina: Dodoni 1997, pp. 9–192. Zikas, Ioannis, review in Ελληνική Φιλοσοφική Επιθεώρηση τόμος [Hellenic Philosophical Review], vol. 2, no. 4, 1985, pp. 92–4.

Nikos Agg. Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις: Η υπαρκτική σκέψις εν τη φιλοσοφία και η χριστιανική πίστις ως το αναπόφευκτον και βασικόν πρόβλημα αυτής κατά τον Soren Kierkegaard και τους συγχρόνους υπαρξιστάς φιλοσόφους Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger και Jean-Paul Sartre [Existentialism and Christian Faith, or The Existential Thought in Philosophy and Christian Faith as the Inevitable and Basic Problem for Thought according to Søren Kierkegaard and the Modern Existential Philosophers Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre], Athens: Minima Editions 1985, 332 pp.

Nikolaos Nissiotis’ important work on the relationship of existential thought and Christian faith first appeared in 1956 in the form of a doctoral thesis submitted at the Theological School of the University of Athens; a second edition appeared in 1969.1 The published edition of this study by Minima Editions came out in 1985 and is an identical reproduction of the dissertation.2

Nikos Agg. Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις: Η υπαρκτική σκέψις εν τη φιλοσοφία και η χριστιανική πίστις ως το αναπόφευκτον και βασικόν πρόβλημα αυτής κατά τον Soren Kierkegaard και τους συγχρόνους υπαρξιστάς φιλοσόφους Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger και Jean-Paul Sartre, Athens: Published by the Author 1956; 2nd ed., Athens: Published by the Author 1969. 2 Nikolaos Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις: Η υπαρκτική σκέψις εν τη φιλοσοφία και η χριστιανική πίστις ως το αναπόφευκτον και βασικόν πρόβλημα αυτής κατά 1

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Nissiotis (1924–86) was a quite well-known Greek theologian and philosopher who also studied psychology and taught not only in Greece (where he held a Professorship in the field of Philosophy of Religion) but also in Geneva. His work is a fascinating example of interdisciplinary research, where philosophical and theological issues are interwoven and posited in an interesting way. As the title of his study indicates, this work focuses not only on Kierkegaard—although the major part of it is dedicated to him—but also on Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre. It is important to note in this respect that Nissiotis treats all of these philosophers as existentialists, a move that Heidegger would certainly not welcome.3 The innovative aspect of his work can be arguably traced in the simple fact that in 1956 the literature on Kierkegaard in Greece was almost non-existent (comprising only a handful of articles and a book), which is reflected in the very form and content of Nissiotis’ doctoral thesis. His main intention is to unveil the essential elements of the thought of the aforementioned thinkers (Kierkegaard, Sartre, Jaspers, and Heidegger) in relation to their attitudes towards Christian faith. His main argument is that every true philosophy of existence has ultimately a theological ground and every existentialist inevitably confronts, directly or indirectly, the sacrificial aspect of Christianity as it is especially exemplified in the Crucifixion.4 Thus, he argues that Jaspers’ thought is premised on an attempt to create a philosophy grounded on theistic principles, that a Christian world-view is hidden behind Heidegger’s philosophy, and, finally, that Sartre’s anti-Christian attitude originates from a psychological reaction against Christian faith.5 In Nissiotis’ interpretation a common aspect in the philosophies of these four thinkers is arguably their agreement that the existence of the human being uncovers an inevitable and strong opposition. This state of affairs signifies a struggle based on the split personality of the human being, which is simultaneously finite and temporal and open to infinity.6 He argues that the attitude towards this tragic and inconclusive dialectic of human existence determines the view of each of these existentialists towards Christian faith. In Kierkegaard’s case, this unsolvable struggle between the eternal and the finite leads to a radical split between God and human beings, Creator and creation, that grounds an extreme subjectivism.7 Nissiotis’ doctoral thesis focuses mainly on Kierkegaard’s reaction towards this inevitable split of human existence in order, first, to trace the relationship of existentialism to Christian faith and, second, to explore the possible affinities and discrepancies between Kierkegaard’s approach and Orthodox Christianity.

τον Soren Kierkegaard και τους συγχρόνους υπαρξιστάς φιλοσόφους Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger και Jean-Paul Sartre, Athens: Minima Editions 1985. (The pagination is identical to the previous editions.) 3 On another point, Nissiotis himself refers to Heidegger as a “semi-existentialist” (ibid., p. 260). 4 Ibid., p. 4. 5 Ibid., p. 5. 6 Ibid., pp. 259–61. 7 Ibid., p. 300.

Nikos Agg. Nissiotis

15

Kierkegaard is, for Nissiotis, an exemplary existentialist, quite consistent with what he calls “true” existentialism, since the leitmotifs of Christian faith, and especially crucifixion, play a pivotal role in his oeuvre. Nissiotis claims that Kierkegaard is the most radical of all existentialists not only because he influenced almost every aspect of Western European intellectual life,8 but also due to his “prophetic” gift. Thus, in his view, Kierkegaard foresaw most of the features that would challenge humanity in the twentieth century: such as nihilism, the inability of ethics to permeate the masses and endow social life with meaning, and the destructive aspects of technology. Nissiotis enjoins the orthodox researcher of Kierkegaard’s work always to bear in mind that Kierkegaard’s stance towards institutionalized Christianity springs from the excesses of his Protestant environment.9 He acknowledges that Kierkegaard’s thought could serve the Christian as an initiative to become more authentic, more active in his or her faith.10 He emphasizes some elements of Kierkegaard’s thought that could be useful and compatible with the Orthodox tradition: (a) The importance of self-knowledge in the understanding of oneself, (b) the repudiation of pantheism, transcendental idealism and materialism, (c) the importance of the singular existence and the realization that the human being struggles between infinity and finitude, (d) the realization that in his or her struggle towards infinity the human being is in need of an external source of redemption from the precarious state of his or her very own freedom, (e) the understanding that human existence is in a state of anxiety that could rekindle its longing for salvation, since anxiety gives rise to a destruction of self-sufficiency, which, according to Nissiotis, leads to atheism, (f) the understanding of human existence as a living event that evades thought, and, finally, (g) the importance Kierkegaard attributes to Christian faith, which Nissiotis considers the most important existential issue concerning human beings.11 Although Nissiotis acknowledges the authenticity and sincerity of Kierkegaard’s thought, he also detects in his philosophy some elements that, in his view, are incompatible with the Orthodox Christian tradition. First of all, in Nissiotis’ view, Kierkegaard holds a conception of temporality and history that links both temporality and history with sin and consequently results in the postulation of a radical split between Creation and Creator, temporality and eternity. This absolute and irresolvable antithesis leads to a devaluation and repudiation of historical life,12 which inevitably forces the human being to radically negate this world. Nevertheless, Nissiotis points out that Kierkegaard’s account of the fallen human being is not identical to the Lutheran one, where the human being is absolutely subject to God’s grace, being incapable of making a personal movement towards salvation. Indeed, Kierkegaard calls the human person to act and imitate Christ. Thus, on the one hand, Kierkegaard recognizes the tragic effects of the Fall, and,

8 9 10 11 12

Ibid., p. 5; p. 76. Ibid., p. 314. Ibid., p. 312. Ibid., pp. 312–13. Ibid., pp. 284–9; p. 310.

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on the other hand, he thinks of them as an initiative of waking up the authentic single individual.13 Although Nissiotis agrees with Kierkegaard’s critique of the masses and accepts the need for a radical act on the part of the human individual, he nevertheless traces in Kierkegaard’s thought the danger of absolute subjectivism and monism. By acknowledging the primary importance of the single individual, Kierkegaard devaluates the central role that the ecclesiastical community plays in Christianity and especially in the Orthodox tradition,14 where the human person is saved not solely through his union with God but through his mystical renewal that occurs within the society of the Ecclesia. Moreover, such a monistic conception leads to what Nissiotis calls “Christ-monism,”15 namely, the belief that salvation is only possible through passion, martyrdom, and crucifixion of the single individual imitating the Passion and the Crucifixion of Christ. For Nissiotis, behind such a conception where the emphasis is put on the person of the incarnated Christ lies a devaluation—bordering on latent negation—of the important role of the other two Persons of the Holy Trinity.16 Moreover, Nissiotis argues that due to Kierkegaard’s negative conception of temporality and historicity, one can even trace in his thought an overemphasis on the divine nature of Christ to the detriment to His human nature.17 This is, in my opinion, a forced argument especially if one takes into account Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and his late Christian works where the historical nature of Christ is discussed and given its proper place.18 Last but not least, Nissiotis argues that another effect of the absolute emphasis that Kierkegaard places on the Passion and Crucifixion of Christ is that he did not properly acknowledge the paradox of Christ’s resurrection that gives meaning to—and ultimately dissolves—the struggle of each individual.19 All in all, and despite some rather questionable interpretations, Nissiotis’ work retains even today its full value in providing the reader with a deep and insightful account of Kierkegaard’s thought and its relation to the Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition and to the whole of Western civilization. Vasiliki Tsakiri

Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., pp. 291–399. 15 Ibid., p. 304. 16 Ibid, pp. 304–7; p. 310. However, there are many references to the other two Persons of the Holy Trinity in Kierkegaard’s works. For a brief but convincing account see also Paul K. Moser and Mark L. McCreary, “Kierkegaard’s Conception of God,” Philosophy Compass, vol. 5, no. 2, 2010, pp. 128–9. 17 Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις, p. 289. 18 Interestingly, Kierkegaard has been accused of committing the opposite sin, namely, of overstressing Christ’s human nature. See David R. Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993, p. 173. 19 Nissiotis, Υπαρξισμός και χριστιανική πίστις, p. 309. 13 14

Reviews and Critical Discussions Begzos, Marios, “Ο Ν. Νησιώτης και η νεοελληνική φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας: η έκβαση μια προσωπικής παρέμβασης,” [“N. Nissiotis and the Neo-Hellenic Philosophy of Religion: The Outcome of a Personal Intervention”] in his Δοκίμια Φιλοσοφίας της Θρησκείας. Μεταμοντερνισμός και Εσχατολογία [Essays on Philosophy of Religion, Post-Modernism and Eschatology, Athens: Grigoris Editions 1988 (2nd ed. 1991)] pp. 27–47. Gaitanis, Vassilios, Η απουσία της παρουσίας: οι διαλεκτικές μορφές της απουσίας στον σύγχρονο κόσμο. Σκέψεις πάνω στην αγωνία, στον φόβο και στον χρόνο στον Kierkegaard [The Presence of Absence: The Dialectical Forms of Absence in Modern World. Thoughts on Anxiety, Fear and Time in Kierkegaard], Thessaloniki: University Studio Press 1994, pp. 236–7. Makrakis, Michalis, Εμμένεια και υπέρβαση στη φιλοσοφία του Kierkegaard [Immanence and Transcendence in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy], Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation 1983, p. 258; p. 264. Farmakis, Dimitris, Ύπαρξη και απελπισία στη φιλοσοφία του S. Kierkegaard [Existence and Despair in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy], Athens: Epikendro 2008, pp. 9–11; p. 18. The Listener [a pseudonym], review in To Vima, June 23, 1956, p. 2.

II. Secondary Literature in Hebrew

Tamar Aylat-Yaguri, ‫ הסולם של קירקגור‬:‫דיאלוג אנושי עם המוחלט‬ ‫ הוצאת ספרים‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫לפסגת הקיום הרוחני‬ ‫ האוניברסיטה העברית‬,‫ע"ש י"ל מאגנס‬ [Human Dialogue with the Absolute: Kierkegaard’s Ladder to the Climax of Spiritual Existence], Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press 2008, 216 pp.

Any serious academic work, written in Hebrew, which deals with the works of Kierkegaard, is a long awaited blessing for the readers of Continental philosophy in Israel. Indeed, any book that sheds further light on the enigmatic mazes and bewilderments of Kierkegaard’s religious belief in his central writings is of benefit to its readers. This book, in particular, is written with a clarity and eloquence that provides immeasurable insight into the works of this great philosopher. Aylat-Yaguri has undertaken the arduous task of providing an empathic and cogent analysis of Kierkegaard’s religious sphere, and has provided a sympathetic analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of the pathos of faith that surpasses the ethos of duty. The book clarifies and interprets the two paramount philosophical writings of Kierkegaard (some say the only philosophical essays in his vast corpus) that until now have yet to be translated to Hebrew: Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. This in itself is invaluable given the dearth of Hebrew literature on the works of Kierkegaard. Following Kierkegaard’s works, the author traces Johannes Climacus’ dialectical ladder, one that never fully reaches the climax of Christian faith and eternal happiness. The author’s dialectical treatise embodies three themes: dialogue, persons, and the absolute. The three become united in one structure, which is the source of the book’s title: Human Dialogue with the Absolute. The book is embellished with biblical proverbs, emphasizing that Kierkegaard’s Religiousness A, the experience of faith, is universally applied, contrary to Religiousness B, that culminates with the paradoxes of the Christian faith. Yet this book is not merely an explication but also a profound commentary. Aylat-Yaguri follows those two texts not in a chronological-diachronic way but rather in a thematic-synchronic way. The themes are dealt with from a multiplicity of perspectives; the discussion is erudite and comprehensive, sometimes turning to

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Jacob Golomb

fundamental terms in the Danish source text and sometimes analyzing them from the Hebrew point of view and Jewish tradition. Although, dedicated as it is to Kierkegaard research, this book is not confined to discussing the two mentioned philosophical writings but considers the aesthetic and the ethical spheres in addition to focusing on the religious one. Many of Kierkegaard’s writings are considered, including important passages from his journals (which are translated into Hebrew by the author). Hegel’s dialectic is discussed at length and is compared to and contrasted with Kierkegaard’s existential dialectic. In this insightful book there are fascinating discussions related to different philosophers, as well as thought-provoking analogies to Camus and Freud (on the origins of guilt and suffering). Positioning herself alongside other commentators (with copious references to current Kierkegaard research), Aylat-Yaguri concludes that Kierkegaard’s thought is committed to rational thinking, and declares that she belongs to those interpreters who read Kierkegaard as a rational philosopher. That is to say that Kierkegaard is not merely a religious or extremely gifted literary writer, but also that his writings carry a massive philosophical import and significance. Support of this view is exhibited by Kierkegaard’s impact on Western thought, which is not confined to religion alone. Wonderful parallels to Kierkegaard’s thought are the instructive discussions of Buber, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Sartre, and Wittgenstein. This is a brave approach since it requires that the author handle in rational way what Kierkegaard saw as transcending the rational in the religious experience. The assumption of rationality within the spiritual “sphere” is productive, and the upshot is a rational and fruitful discussion. Aylat-Yaguri’s book defends her assertion that Kierkegaard, like Climacus, does not seek the destruction of thinking. She claims that he does not deal with philosophy of religion, that is, theology, but with existential philosophy that deals with religion, and more accurately, existential philosophy of the absolute faith. In this rich book there is hardly a page that does not stimulate readers to question, inquire, or compare their own answers with those of the author. Indeed, the strength of the book is in the questions it raises. According to what criteria will the believer recognize that he has arrived at the climax of his spiritual development? How will he know that he is progressing in his belief? How can he tell that he is situated in an absolute relation to the absolute? How will he know that he has arrived at the end of his existential-personal dialectic? Does it make sense to talk about the end of the dialectic? Raising these and other questions, the author rightly concludes that Kierkegaard’s spiritual field directs one to adopt one’s test of subjectivity as regards to certain ideals. Hence there could be no objectively outward characteristics to define this development. Aylat-Yaguri’s answers are quite modest (which is in accord with the uncertain sphere of passions and commitment), and hence no decisive conclusion is provided. After all, the discussion at the heart of this book is essentially an unremitting and endless journey—a journey where it is impossible either to measure the passion of complete faith or bring it to an end. The strength of the book is its ability to bring those dilemmas into a new interpretive perspective and to instill them into the heart of life itself. Jacob Golomb

Review and Critical Discussion Golomb, Jacob, review in Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 58, 2009, pp. 373–84.

III. Secondary Literature in Hungarian

Judit Bartha, A szerző árnyképe. Romantikus költőmítosz Kierkegaard és E.T.A. Hoffmann alkotásesztétikájában, [The Shadow of the Author: The Romantic Myth of the Poet in the Creation Aesthetics of Kierkegaard and E.T.A. Hoffmann], Budapest: L’Harmattan 2008, 190 pp.

The Introduction of this work gives a most precise outline of the purpose of Judit Bartha’s book. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, the author endeavors to describe the parallel between the thought of Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann and that of Kierkegaard within the context of Romanticism.1 The book consists of several parts. Bartha dedicates a specific chapter to questions of irony, Romanticism as well as the alter ego respectively. The first chapter analyzes irony and humor, while the final chapter looks into states of anxiety and despair. The chapter about “incognito” is interesting. According to Bartha, a literary alias would not necessarily imply lying low, especially since it was apparent to all contemporary (literate) citizens of Copenhagen whom the alias referred to. What then is the essence of incognito? Bartha stands her ground in the face of some unusual arguments, such as Garff’s explanation, which is based on notions of helplessness and inertia,2 or the catchy proposal of “meta-communication of the inability to communicate.”3 Contrary to the above arguments, Bartha is right to argue that to describe Kierkegaard as helpless or to attribute notions of paralysis to his philosophy of existence would reveal the mere fact that the reader has not understood a single

1 Judit Bartha, A szerző árnyképe. Romantikus költőmítosz Kierkegaard és E.T.A. Hoffmann alkotásesztétikájában, Budapest: L’Harmattan 2008, p. 9. 2 Ibid. p. 30. See Joakim Garff, “Kierkegaard—egy bio-gráfia,” in Kierkegaard Budapesten, ed. by András Nagy, Budapest: Fekete Sas 1994, p. 134. 3 Bartha, A szerző árnyképe, p. 30. See Poul Erik Töjner, “Kierkegaard Hegel kritikájának és politikai bírálatának aspektusai,” in Kierkegaard Budapesten, ed. by András Nagy, p. 109.

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word of his work. She is right in saying that it is “in the interest of real action”4 that Kierkegaard’s name is absent. By becoming incognito, a certain distance is created between the inner sphere and the outer world—a space to build the foundations for existence. With the help of an incognito, one develops new insights into a unique problem. An incognito allows for various points of view regarding the same question. Applying an incognito as a mask gives one the means to observe different aspects of a given phenomenon at the same time; it also prepares the grounds for a diversity of meanings which may at times give rise to contradictions in turn. What is an incognito and what is the essence of the alter ego? An alter ego is a second self, a second personality within a person, one who sees things differently from the “I.” As Bartha testifies, the main question is whether or not one succeeds in creating a balance between reality and fantasy, body and soul, the outer and inner world. It is important to mention her thoughts on irony and humor in relation to the above. Naturally, Kierkegaard’s thesis, The Concept of Irony, which was based on meticulous studies conducted by the Danish thinker, offers a decisive direction with regards to questions of irony. At present, it is an undisputed fact that Kierkegaard’s reasoning is largely defined by Hegel’s thinking, although he keeps an apparent distance in his appropriation of Hegel. This fact is evident in The Concept of Irony where Kierkegaard reveals his indebtedness to Hegel, all the while adapting him for his own purpose. Bartha gives a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s concepts of irony and compares them to various approaches current in Romanticism and those captured in the works of Tieck, Solger, and the Schlegel brothers: “When it borders on religious existence, [irony] loses its own reason for existence because it fails to address the paradox of faith.”5 In sum, irony fails on the grounds of the paradox. Bartha’s interpretation of Hoffmann seems correct. The purpose of her analysis, that spans the chapter titled “The Rhetoric of Duplication,” reveals how the concept of irony is applicable in practical terms. Hoffmann’s works, such as Prinzessin Barmbilla and Meister Floh, illustrate the points of her analysis. Bartha provides an excellent and thorough treatment. The chapter, “Reflection of Suffering,” which discusses the reflexive nature of suffering, demands particular attention. The poet and suffering are organically linked. In Kierkegaard, when the poet exclaims in agony, the surrounding world takes his cry for a marvelous song. Every work of art is linked to agony. It suffices to recall Die Leiden des jungen Werthers by Goethe, a book that had a momentous effect on its time. The same is true of melancholy. Kierkegaard envisages existence itself as nothing but melancholy. Bartha is right to claim that melancholy is a side effect of being a genius. The same can be said about love and the desire to die that accompanies it. The era itself is defined by this approach as can be seen, for example, in the famous poem by Novalis, Sehnsucht nach dem Tode. This ambiguity (love-death) is present is Kierkegaard’s relationship with Regine Olsen as well; and it is symbolized by

4 5

Bartha, A szerző árnyképe, p. 31. Ibid., p. 105.

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the engagement ring that Kierkegaard sends back to his fiancée with no explanation offered, as well as by his constant hope for repeating the unrepeatable. Of course, this is not to be mistaken for eroticism like that of Don Juan who wanted to win over every woman even if that meant destroying the woman, and even if his actions were met by tolerance, and even desire, on the women’s part. The subversive powers of the great seducer overthrow the daily routine of marriage, an establishment where passion gradually disappears. Comparing Hoffmann’s reasoning on eroticism with Kierkegaard’s own thoughts on the issue provides an interesting picture. According to Bartha, the main difference between the two approaches is apparent in that Hoffman believes, unrepentantly, in the redeeming power of love, poetry, and music, while Kierkegaard favors resignation and melancholy.6 We should add that both music and poetry play a significant role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy nonetheless; and we must not forget that his works also belong in the realm of philosophy as well as literature. The concept of anxiety plays an essential role in Bartha’s book. Long before Freud, it was Kierkegaard who “invented” anxiety; and his work on this subject, The Concept of Anxiety, has had a profound effect on all areas of philosophy, the arts, theology, and, somewhat later, psychology, too. And although this work was published in 1844, it only became widely known once it was translated into German (it is worth noting that the first English version was only produced after the Second World War.) For instance, Martin Heidegger claims the book to be one of Kierkegaard’s most important achievements. Bartha’s book reveals that the problem of anxiety is not uncommon in the era, and it is especially pertinent to Romanticism. One is affected by anxiety caused by various natural and worldly phenomena; the question is how well one can cope with it. It is no coincidence that grim tales were increasingly popular during this period, including those written by E.T.A. Hoffmann. The literary ambience of the Romantic era is riddled with tensions between a magical past and a very prosaic present. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s book describes anxiety as a predicament that originates in the state of innocence. As the first human being in the Garden of Eden, Adam is not aware of the world. This ignorance constitutes being in Paradise. The Lord forbids him to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: “And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, ‘Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it. For in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.’ ”7 In Kierkegaard, Adam’s anxiety is evoked as a response to this command. He is unable to comprehend what “good and bad” means, and, further, he has no notion of death. The known world may evoke fear. But just as one feels anxiety in the encounter of the unknown, so it is with Adam: he does not understand the command and therefore feels anxious. His anxiety provokes an action: he makes a decision and consequently falls into sin. The aftermath: “So He drove out the man; and He placed at the east of the Garden of Eden the cherubim and a flaming sword which turned every way,

6 7

Ibid., p. 161. Genesis 2:16–17.

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to guard the way to the tree of life.”8 Bartha observes that in Kierkegaard, in contrast to fear, anxiety has no object. Kierkegaard’s work draws a parallel with Romanticism in that he contrasts childlike innocence with the torments of reason that eventually undo the equilibrium.9 However, the author also highlights what she considers to be a major source of difference: Kierkegaard perceives alternative consequences, where the road leads to the sphere of religion, and here the question of the original sin is explored. This is the actual topic that Kierkegaard intends to examine: hence the reason for his choice of psychological methods in examining the Bible story. We must add that anxiety is linked with yet another essential question, that is, the problem of freedom, the possibility and reality of freedom. Anxiety invokes action; action implies choice; and choice presupposes that one decides to choose free will from the array of possibilities. In Kierkegaard, life without freedom is not one intended for a human being. Thus, anxiety becomes one of the most important categories of existence; one which represents man as he battles with anxiety in his loneliness, on one hand; and, on the other hand, one which epitomizes man as he transgresses his anxiety only to stake out his claim to freedom and potential redemption. On a different note, we must mention the problem of despair, which he explores in one of his last works, The Sickness unto Death. Although in Kierkegaard’s case it is hard to single out one work for special praise, we must concede that this is one of his most significant books. In Kierkegaard, despair (Fortvivlelse) constitutes a mental illness, the disease of the self, and it may occur in three distinct forms: (1) We despair if we are not aware that we have a self. (2) We despair if we refuse to be who we really are. (3) We despair if we want to be exactly who we are. When one desperately seeks to be himself, this gives way to defiance, which in turn opens up the possibility for one to become demonic and renounce God. Bartha’s analysis is not concerned with the above work. Rather, she attempts to find closely related topics in two works by Hoffmann. These are Die Elixiere des Teufels and Meister Floh. Bartha’s analysis of the former is particularly interesting in that it provides the antithesis to the above process. According to her, man gradually loses his “self ” in the diabolic battle, and “he must reckon with his own demons in order to regain himself.”10 Therefore, in Hoffman, clinging to one’s ego is not seen as demonic; but the battle for one’s true self becomes frenzied. Nonetheless, Hoffman’s thinking approximates that of Kierkegaard in the second work (Meister Floh), since this text focuses on the third form of despair, that is, when the ego tries despondently to be himself. In sum, Bartha presents despair as the last stage the romantic poet will attain. The romantic self is of the utmost importance in Hoffman as well as in the era in which he lives. This is no coincidence, and future research will certainly reveal how we may bridge the gaps in understanding how Hoffmann relates to Kierkegaard. The present book establishes an important stage in this process. Zoltán Gyenge

8 9 10

Genesis 3:24. Bartha, A szerző árnyképe, p. 172. Ibid., p. 178.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Somhegyi, Zoltán, review in Élet és Irodalom, vol. 29, 2009, p. 25. Végh, Attila, review in Magyar Hírlap, vol. 11, 2009, p. 12.

Béla Brandenstein, Kierkegaard. Tanulmány [Kierkegaard: A Study], Budapest: Franklin Társulat 1934, 89 pp.

The publication in book form of this work by “baron” Béla Brandenstein (1901–89), the first complete study in Hungarian dedicated to Kierkegaard, originally appeared as a series of three installments in the prestigious and conservative periodical Budapesti Szemle.1 The publication was significant partly because of its author who, despite his youth, was one of the most influential Hungarian philosophers of the pre-World War II establishment.2 Respected as the head of the Philosophy Department at Péter Pázmány University of Humanities in Budapest, he was also president of the Philosophical Committee of the Academy of Sciences and director of the Hungarian Philosophical Association. The book is a nearly complete overview of the Danish thinker’s life and writings. Divided into 22 chapters, it provides a background—mainly personal, partly historical, and largely psychological—to assist in understanding Kierkegaard’s thought and life. It refers to some thirty works of the Danish thinker in a context which is both descriptive and polemical, and not a little judgmental. Based exclusively on German translations of Kierkegaard, the author’s understanding was restricted both by the German philosophical terminology and by a failure to appreciate the literary qualities of the original texts. Brandenstein relied on significant interpreters of Kierkegaard—Georg Brandes, Theodor Haecker, Erich Przywara, Christoph Schrempf, and several others—and had a certain familiarity with and maybe even drew inspiration from Heidegger’s works. The references to Kierkegaard’s works imply an in-depth familiarity with the oeuvre, and the references to the secondary literature are also impressive. However, in the book these are not arranged into an organic unity, and the text seems more like the diary of a reader taking notes on the disturbing thoughts of a controversial

1 The title of this prestigious and influential periodical can be translated as Budapest Observer, Brandenstein’s work was published in 1934 in vol. 62, no. 674, pp. 73–92, no. 675, pp. 180–209, no. 676, pp. 300–337. 2 Other Hungarian philosophers interpreting Kierkegaard were either indifferent to the establishment, such as Béla Hamvas, or antagonistic to it, such as the Marxist György Lukács, while many focused on Kierkegaard’s work from a Lutheran perspective (Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, Sándor Koncz, Sándor Tavaszy, and László Széles).

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personality rather than a thorough analysis of a great nineteenth-century thinker. It is hard to find the reason why Brandenstein wrote about Kierkegaard, since his thinking was dominated by the wish to create a universal philosophical system. For this reason he is considered the last philosopher to make the great attempt to present an overall structure for the description of our world, as did the Plato and Aristotle and a number of thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Brandenstein’s system also required a special language, which made his writings almost inaccessible to those not educated in his thought.3 He was bilingual in German and Hungarian, and extremely diligent in reading and writing, regardless of the focus of his interest. He kept an eye on current trends in European thinking, and a thinker opposing the creation of a system was a challenge for Brandenstein. He was further motivated to understand why Kierkegaard was so popular. Some have also added that he wanted to be the first to explore Kierkegaard for the Hungarian public. Brandenstein’s analysis starts with the introduction “Man as Paradox,” where anthropology is mainly substituted with psychology, including rather humorous presentations of the protagonist’s clownish, sometimes even morbid features. Brandenstein’s renewed attempts properly to understand Kierkegaard’s writings from a psychological angle resulted in several shortcuts in the interpretation. The love affair with Regine Olsen, the family’s social background, Kierkegaard’s relationship to his father and other biographical details are used to explain the complexity of the authorship. Emphasis on Kierkegaard’s eccentric habits also allowed the author to avoid the deeper analysis of the Dane’s controversies with contemporary philosophy and theology that became summarized simply as an anti-Hegelian attack. Kierkegaard is, in Brandenstein’s view, a “genius as a writer.”4 However, Kierkegaard’s works are not discussed as works of art of a writer nor are the pseudonyms properly understood and interpreted. While The Point of View for My Work as an Author is said to be the “key” to the entire body of writings,5 Either/Or and the upbuilding discourses had a special position for the analyst. In Brandenstein’s eyes Either/Or is the fruit “of the Romantic spirit of the age” and written by a “capricious and particularly original genius.”6 The work itself is “strangely attractive, sometimes disdainful, but in any case interesting,”7 as the author comments. He refers to the “heterogeneity of the texts”8 without understanding the importance of the changing point of view of the authors and personalities involved. While Brandenstein appreciates the Don Giovanni study, he refers to other pieces of writings as “overdone.”9 The “Seducer’s Diary” is to him

Ildikó Veres, “Brandenstein Béla ‘nyelvi játékai,’ ” in her Hiány – Filozófia – Kritika. Válogatott tanulmányok a magyar filozófia történetéből, Kolozsvár and Szeged: Pro Philosophia 2011, pp. 237–57. 4 Béla Brandenstein, Kierkegaard. Tanulmány, Budapest: Franklin 1934, p. 26. 5 Ibid., p. 76. 6 Ibid., p. 26. 7 Ibid., p. 28. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., p. 26. 3

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an exciting story with “a masterly psychological portrait,”10 but in spite of the spirit of Romanticism this “selfish and fruitless digging in love and sexuality is, in the end, disdainful.”11 He also mentions the “bottomless immorality” in the text, or “the expression of the writer’s less attractive side.”12 For him, Kierkegaard is identified even with the seducer Johannes himself. The “extremely luxurious imagination supports the ultimate emotional wish for lust,”13 he adds bitterly. The spiritual Don Juan is the “sexual-erotic hero of the imagination,” who then becomes the “demonic spiritual sadist”14 for the Hungarian philosopher. The Marquis de Sade often returns in connection with Johannes, paradoxically anticipating later Marxist analysts, but for Brandenstein’s summary the aesthetic-hedonist attitude is balanced by the “imaginary husband’s” ethical-religious convictions in the second part of Either/Or.15 This notion of the husband is the logical and somewhat consoling continuation of the book, since in this section “the romantic-individualist idea of marriage” unfolds. However, this idea is not enough to embrace the totality of life.16 The choices offered in Either/Or are not acceptable to the analyst until these are overcome by the wish to suffer and by the joy of suffering.17 The way out is the ascetic—or we may even add masochistic—approach to life, which, for Brandenstein, was probably a necessary feature of the devout believer. Kierkegaard’s polemics with the Danish State Church are mentioned somewhat controversially, and the author seemed to agree with Kierkegaard that “only the subjective person who is always searching and who rejects the creation of an overall system and who is always going further and who is always thinking, can arrive at the truth of Christianity.”18 Concerning Kierkegaard’s break with Christendom, the author even adds, “the speculation that privatized the terminology of Christianity brings society to a spiritual bankruptcy.”19 In spite of Brandenstein’s seemingly sympathetic remarks about Kierkegaard, the Danish thinker was defined as a “private-Christian” and blamed for “not being able properly to appreciate the role of the Church.”20 In the last chapter, entitled “How Kierkegaard’s Life and Personality can be Understood,” Brandenstein summarizes his views on Kierkegaard. Once again the psychological and biographical approaches are opposed to the philosophical, theological, or at least literary ones. Brandenstein’s conclusion was that Kierkegaard’s main controversy originated in the tension between his “strong spirit in a weak

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Ibid., p. 28. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 29. Ibid. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 89.

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body.”21 Here he focuses on Kierkegaard as a disturbed mind and life that lost control in attacking the church. The author’s philosophical background and his attraction to systematic thinking may not have been compatible with the key characteristics of Kierkegaard’s thought, which seemed to doom this short book to be nothing more than a philological peculiarity. Surprisingly, in recent years, a changed attitude toward conservative traditions in philosophy and in politics has resulted in a “Brandenstein renaissance,” which has focused on his whole oeuvre. This has led, among other things, to the republication of his Kierkegaard book,22 which today looks a bit odd given the great achievements of contemporary international and Hungarian Kierkegaard scholarship that have taken place in the interim. András Nagy

21 22

Ibid., p. 83. Béla Brandenstein, Kierkegaard. Tanulmány, Budapest: Kairosz 2005.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Farkas, Szilárd, Søren Kierkegaard magyar recepciója az 1930-as évek végéig, Ph.D. thesis, University of Pécs, 2014, pp. 110–24. Gyenge, Zoltán, “Kierkegaard Forschung in Ungarn, Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, pp. 341–60; see p. 351. — “Az osztrák és a magyar századelő kapcsolata a Kierkegaard-recepció szempontjából,” Világosság, vol. 47, no. 5, 2006, pp. 95–102; see p. 98. Hanák, Tibor P., Geschichte der Philosophie in Ungarn, Munich: Trofenik 1990, see p. 168. Koncz, Sánor, Kierkegaard és a világháború utáni teológia, Miskolc: Fekete Pál és Társai 1938, see p. 38; p. 163; p. 192. Nagy, András, “Hungary: The Hungarian Patient,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, Tome II, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 155–88; see p. 162. — “Our Long Way From Enten-Eller to Vagy-vagy: The History of the Reception of Either/Or in Hungary,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2008, pp. 440–69; see pp. 446–7. Somogyi, József, review in Atheneum, vol. 20, nos. 1–3, 1934, pp. 84–5. Szeberényi Lajos Zsigmond, Kierkegaard élete és munkái, Békéscsaba: Evangélikus Egyházi Könyvkereskedés 1937, see p. 144. Varga, Sándor, review in Potestáns Szemle, vol. 43, 1934, pp. 454–5. Veres, Ildikó, “Kierkegaard, a ‘magánkeresztény,’” in Béla Brandenstein, Kierkegaard. Tanulmány, Budapest: Kairosz 2005, pp. 5–25.

István Czakó, Hit és egzisztencia. Tanulmány Søren Kierkegaard hitfelfogásáról, [Faith and Existence: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Conception of Faith], Budapest: L’Harmattan 2001, 196 pp.

Faith and Existence: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Conception of Faith, a book by István Czakó, was published by L’Harmattan in 2001.1 The book was originally based on the author’s Ph.D. thesis. As indicated by the subtitle, this work focuses on the problem of faith and explores questions of religious existence with regards to theology and philosophy. Rather than reconstructing Kierkegaard’s philosophy as a whole, it aims to explore philosophical questions from the point of view of a theologian. What distinguishes this approach is the methodology of examination using Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous books. The book consists of four chapters. The first and second chapters explore various challenging questions which emerge from Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and Repetition, respectively. The story of Abraham and Isaac, as analyzed in this work, forms the foundation of all conceptions of faith in Kierkegaard; therefore, Fear and Trembling merits special attention. Faith represents a “double movement”2 as well as a “creative leap.”3 The quality of this position is also different with regards to existence, since, in Kierkegaard, it is impossible to realize an authentic existence without faith, and, more specifically, without impassioned faith. Considering the relationship between faith and rationality, Czakó observes that “it is not necessary to understand faith”4 since faith begins where the realm of rationality ends, in a space where passion only elevates one to a higher level to realize an absolute relation with the absolute itself. Consequently, faith cannot be obtained via mediation (in direct opposition to Hegel’s philosophy), since it stands above the realm of rationality.

István Czakó, Hit és egzisztencia. Tanulmány Søren Kierkegaard hitfelfogásáról, Budapest: L’Harmattan 2001. 2 Ibid., p. 54. 3 Ibid., p. 57. 4 Ibid., p. 61. 1

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Czakó’s observations are correct in stating that this question can only be validated when applying a theological view of existence as described in the work Repetition. Abraham has direct contact with God, and thus this direct relation signifies a new basis for existence, too. “Thanks to his faith, Abraham, the hero of Fear and Trembling, establishes an absolute contact with the Absolute,” writes Czakó.5 Thus the unique individual climbs higher than the universal; he soars higher than ethics. Furthermore, the commands of ethics are no longer valid at this level. With the power of the absurd (God) everything is possible. It is also possible for Abraham to recover Isaac. Nevertheless, could this possibly mean that everything can be repeated in the world? It is with a view to re-examine his relationship with Regine Olsen that Kierkegaard begins writing his book Repetition during his trip to Berlin. The young woman, previously his fiancée, and Kierkegaard met again in 1843. He contemplates what at first might appear a banal question, that is, whether or not this relationship could be revived. He had no idea that the young woman had in the interim become engaged. With regards to faith, however, the only significance of this episode lies in that it propels Kierkegaard to realize that perfect repetition does not exist in everyday life as such. He analyzes the character of Job as much as he explores that of Abraham in Fear and Trembling. Having lost everything but his faith, Job constitutes an example regarding faith. In the face of all this adversity, Job still has faith, and he refuses to renounce God. Question: Is repetition viable? Answer: In our world, repetition is not viable. Although Job was given twice as much as he had lost, he could not get back his children. Kierkegaard’s approach to faith is exclusive by nature, and as such it is irreconcilable with the theological approach since it lacks communion or communitas; and according to theology, fides would be unimaginable without communitas, claims Czakó.6 It is a well-known fact that Kierkegaard denied this. The third chapter examines another pseudonymous work, namely, The Concept of Anxiety, published in 1844. Czakó believes it is necessary to devote more attention to this work. He feels it is important to clarify what the concept of anxiety means. According to Czakó, “Anxiety is linked to existence by nature, and just like faith it cannot be strictly defined.”7 This statement is absolutely correct. At the same time, it is also viable to say that there is a dialectical relation between faith and anxiety, and that their existence depends on one another; further, the meaning of existence is none other than a way to “stand before God,” much like in the case of anxious existence, which is an existence that has fallen into sin. The above includes the question of freedom, as well as the issue of one’s ability to be free. The same logic is apparent in the analysis of Philosophical Fragments. Here, the main question revolves around the concept of paradox. It highlights the fact that the paradox is not an abstract form of logic; rather, just like anxiety, it constitutes

5 6 7

Ibid. Ibid., p. 154. Ibid., p. 103.

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a “category of existence.”8 Faith is none other than the paradoxical movement of personal existence towards the absolute paradox. It is not possible to mediate a paradox (especially not in the sense of Vermittlung as defined by Hegel); it cannot be rationalized. It is only faith that offers an opportunity to comprehend the meaning of the paradox with the help of passion. According to Kierkegaard, the fact that God became man defies logic, outside of the question as to whether God even exists or not. For Kierkegaard, if God does not exist, it is impossible to prove this; whereas if he does exist, it is foolish to try to prove it. We could add that if God exists, then it is impossible for a finite being to prove this by means of reason. This is also due to the fact that logic stops where the paradox begins. Faith itself also stands above rationality. It cannot be proven, grasped, or comprehended in the absence of what could link faith and logic, and therein lies the paradox. Thus, the paradox does not imply continuity. One of the most important thoughts explored in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is the relationship between the subject and freedom. The essence of this thought is easily summarized; as Kierkegaard writes laconically, “Subjectivity is truth; subjectivity is actuality.”9 This opens a polemic with Hegel, whose famous thesis is stated in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational.”10 According to Hegel, actuality (Wirklichkeit) is linked to the mind (Vernunft). In Kierkegaard, we see a completely different emphasis emerge since he believes the subject to be actual. We may postulate that the most interesting part of the book compares the concepts of faith as they appear in the aesthetic and philosophical stages, as well as the analysis of religious existence. It is important to emphasize that in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, we cannot speak of a system as defined by German idealism. The method that invokes a system excludes the probability of existence, and vice versa; moreover, it is Kierkegaard’s conscious intention to deconstruct the Hegelian system in order to allow for existence to come into play. Czakó points out that Kierkegaard’s approach to faith during the two stages (aesthetic and philosophical) is imperatively coherent, and that there are no major differences. Faith and existence are also linked by the fact that neither is “conceptual,” that is, it is irrelevant to apply a rational method of cognition. Similarly to existence, faith cannot be “understood” since it is not a product of the realm of logic, but rather, it goes beyond it. According to Czakó, “Faith is not a logical concept, nor is it to be obtained through rational exertion, nor emotional indirectness.”11 Rather, it constitutes immeasurable subjective confidence” and is therefore “the fusion of passion and decision.”12 While faith gives a definite direction to Kierkegaard’s thinking from the beginning, decision comes to the foreground in his philosophical

Ibid., p. 107. SKS 7, 314 / CUP1, 343. 10 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. by H.B. Nisbet, ed. by Allen Wood, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1991, p. 20. 11 Czakó, Hit és egzisztencia, p. 139. 12 Ibid. 8 9

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stage. In addition, we should note that decision and its subjective basis play a fundamental role here in the Postscript as well as in other works, except for Kierkegaard’s dissertation (The Concept of Irony), where it is linked with the daimon. The critique of Kierkegaard’s conception of faith plays an important role in Czakó’s work, as do the theological reflections regarding it. Czakó stipulates that Kierkegaard objects to the definition of faith as a supernatural insight, since this would render it nothing but mere superstition; rather, he gives faith an ethical-anthropological basis, which, we should note, is fundamental in Kant as well, and which makes the sense of faith imperceptible to both objective comprehension and logical analysis. This stands true even in the face of some doubt with regards to the possibility of differentiating faith from rationality and the understanding of faith (intellectus fidei). Czakó also offers an overview of the history of reception and describes how these thoughts survived in Karl Barth as well as in twentieth-century Catholic theology. The undeniable value of Kierkegaard’s conception of faith lies in its perception of faith that is fulfilled via a paradoxical relationship with God, beyond the constraints of a logical world. He links faith with passion, as well as with questions of reality and existence. Czakó concludes his analysis in four points. First, in Kierkegaard, the meaning of the paradox does not imply denying logic; rather, it means reaching beyond it. Second, for Kierkegaard, faith is not an objective certainty but a subjective one. Third, Kierkegaard does not deny cognition. Insofar as he does not disclaim cognition that is separate from faith, he is not agnostic. Rather, he subordinates it to the latter. Fourth, Kierkegaard is not an individualist. Rather, he conceptualizes that “existence equals standing alone before God.”13 As an excellent expert on Kierkegaard, István Czakó gives a convincing account of his point of view regarding the Danish thinker’s conception of faith. Furthermore, not only does his accurate work give insight into the thoughts of the philosopher, but it also offers a genuine context for contemporary thought and certain theological questions. Zoltán Gyenge

13

Ibid., p. 173.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

István Dévény, Sören Kierkegaard, Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő: Attraktor 2003, 264 pp.

Sören Kierkegaard became present in Hungarian thinking by means of presentations of his life and work in the 1930s. The next wave in the Kierkegaard reception came in the 1960s, when the first translations (mostly from German) appeared. István Dévény’s book is one of the attempts after 2000 that tried to fill the need generated by the shortage of biographies and presentations of the thought of Kierkegaard in Hungarian after the end of the 1960s. Dévény tries to draw—as he says—a fragmentary picture of the life and work of Kierkegaard and the inspirations by his spirit in literature, philosophy, theology, and psychology. The author emphasizes that an explanation of the work of Kierkegaard and his spiritual heirs, from one perspective, is not possible because of their complexity and apologizes for the subjectivity of his statements and conclusions, which he—referring to Kierkegaard’s sentence “subjectivity is truth”—sees as legitimate. The book consists of two main parts. Part One gives a biographical reading of Kierkegaard’s work. Dévény begins with a presentation of Copenhagen and Denmark in the Golden Age; he draws a portrait of Kierkegaard as a person and then continues by characterizing him as an author. Dévény focuses on three determining experiences in Kierkegaard’s life: the role of his father, the engagement with Regine Olsen, and the Corsair affair in 1846. Rejecting a deterministic way of interpretation, he looks to the parallelism between Kierkegaard’s personal fate and fiction, and pays extraordinary attention to melancholy as the main characteristic of Kierkegaard’s personality. With constant reference to Kierkegaard’s journals, Dévény reckons anxiety and despair in Kierkegaard’s life as life-converting powers and as some of the most important themes and constructive elements in his writings.1 In the next chapter Dévény deals with important questions related to Kierkegaard’s authorship; he circles around the problem of labeling him a philosopher, theologian, or something else, discussing Martin Heidegger’s proposal of characterizing him as “a religious writer” and referring to the French philosophical tradition in which philosophy and poetry often intertwine (in figures such as Rousseau, Bergson, Sartre, and Camus). Since faith, the most personal thing in life, became the focus of attention in Kierkegaard’s writings, Dévény argues for a poetic-aesthetic approach to the theme and explains the connection between content and form, emphasizing

1

István Dévény, Sören Kierkegaard, Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő: Attraktor 2003, p. 25.

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that an analysis of existence and human experience has much in common with the psychological approach. He gives Fear and Trembling as an example of the use of the psychological approach to experience the world and human consciousness. Dévény addresses the problem of authority and the right to influence the decisions of another individual, and raises the question of indirect communication and the use of pseudonyms, as well. His reflections and considerations on the above-mentioned themes are rather simplistic and reveal that the author is not familiar with Hungarian Kierkegaard terminology and has some problems with the translation (from German) of the title of some works. After these introductory reflections Dévény focuses on the analysis of Kierkegaard’s texts. He devotes a chapter to Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity. In the exposition of the next chapter focusing on Either/Or, Dévény provides some background information about the editor, Victor Eremita, and presents the structure and the genesis of the book in a historical frame. He briefly treats the issue of the two stages (the aesthetic and the ethical) of existence and (mistakenly) gives priority to the first one, but notes that—judging by the personal style of writing—Kierkegaard must have known the other one, too. He interprets Kierkegaard’s profession as writer from a romantic point of view, and underscores that he is an author chosen by God. Referring to Karl Löwith’s book, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche,2 he puts Kierkegaard in the context of the history of ideas, emphasizing his critical approach to his own epoch and the opposition of the individual and crowd. In the next chapter Dévény discusses the relationship between Kierkegaard and Romanticism, emphasizing that Romanticism and idealism were two movements by which Kierkegaard was strongly influenced; however, he tried to turn away from both of them. Dévény gives a simplified picture of Romanticism, idealism, and their most important representatives (focusing on August Wilhelm Schlegel and Immanuel Kant). He describes the rise of the literary movement and seeks passages that bear witness to Kierkegaard’s romanticism in his writings (Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, and Stages on Life’s Way). Dévény considers Kierkegaard’s conception of the individual and becoming a self as romantic. Here he refers to the personality redoubling and multiplying, and the anxiety generated by this. He briefly reflects on Kierkegaard’s criticism of Romanticism and the relationship between the romantic Kierkegaard and God. In the chapters about Fear and Trembling, Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety, and Philosophical Fragments, Dévény deals with questions of the three stages (he repeats the priority of the ethical compared to the aesthetic, and introduces the “stage of faith”), the possibility of repetition, Kierkegaard’s relationship to philosophers and theologians, and compared to the other themes he treats the problem of anxiety and sin in detail. He gives a review of the most essential terms in Kierkegaard’s

Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts: Marx und Kierkegaard, 5th ed., Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag 1964 [1941].

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writings and devotes a longer section to the paradox, based mostly on quotations from Philosophical Fragments. Before proceeding to the analysis of the next pseudonymous work, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Dévény dwells on comparing Kierkegaard and Hegel. He first rehearses and interprets the most relevant themes in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—what does truth and coming to truth mean—and then he explains the main points in Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel’s statements. He emphasizes that the most significant difference between the two thinkers is that Hegel’s approach to the questions of existence and knowledge is objective-speculative, while Kierkegaard’s is subjective-existential.3 Dévény’s method in comparing the two thinkers’ theory of history is the same: he focuses on Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History and Kierkegaard’s The Book on Adler. He points out the differences in their concept of history and finishes the chapter with a criticism of the criticism of Hegel, based on Theodor W. Adorno’s Konstruktion des Ästhetischen.4 He outlines the main questions from Adorno’s book without making an attempt to answer them. He concludes with a question: what can Kierkegaard give to us today given that he was only really interested in fighting against Hegel and his followers?5 After the comparison of Kierkegaard and Hegel, Dévény presents Kierkegaard’s “systematic antisystematic”6 fight, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, for the acceptance of the Christian existence as the only authentic one and the recognition that there are no systems or logical approaches that can lead to it. The next step in the presentation of Kierkegaard’s thoughts is a concise survey of The Sickness unto Death. Due to the complexity of Kierkegaard’s theory of despair, Dévény feels it necessary to approach it from an ontological, phenomenological, theological, and existential point of view. He declares that Kierkegaard can only be understood properly with an appreciation of his complexity and his standpoint towards Christianity. Part One ends, accordingly, with a review of Kierkegaard’s intentions in Practice in Christianity. Part Two is devoted to the presentation of Kierkegaard’s influence on different areas of academic thinking. Dévény examines the productive reception of Kierkegaard’s thoughts in literature, philosophy, theology, and psychology, providing numerous examples along the way. Part Two, accordingly, is divided into four main chapters. Dévény justifies his choice concerning literature with parallels with regard to the subjects. He treats Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegies and Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge. In Franz Kafka’s works he points out the thematic similarities with Kierkegaard in the relationship to women, the problem of marriage, the father–son conflict and being religious. In Max Frisch’s work he explores the problem of

Dévény, Sören Kierkegaard, p. 99. Theodor W. Adorno, Konstruktion des Ästhetischen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1997 [1966]. 5 Dévény, Sören Kierkegaard, p. 113. 6 Ibid., p. 120. 3 4

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becoming a self and the acceptance of self-identity, referring to I’m not Stiller, Homo Faber, and Gantenbein, and analyzing Stiller in detail. In the next chapter Dévény dwells on existential philosophers as inheritors of Kierkegaard’s thinking, emphasizing that he does not consider Kierkegaard an existentialist but a man who “wants to think while existing.”7 He devotes a chapter to Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the chapter about the theological inheritance of Kierkegaard, the author makes it explicit that a new way of theological thinking was developing in the German-speaking countries after World War I, due to the spreading of the thought of the Danish philosopher. He describes Kierkegaard’s influence on Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, and Emil Brunner. He finishes the book with a summary of Kierkegaard’s role in psychology. To conclude, István Dévény’s book about Kierkegaard is a compilation that bears witness to a wide knowledge of the secondary literature about Kierkegaard published in Germany from 1940 to 1980. Although the author has read several studies appearing later, he mostly draws on the earlier ones, which in several cases results in him giving an explanation of Kierkegaard’s thoughts that contain a certain degree of anachronism. The otherwise detailed work seems in a sense to lack completeness, too, because the use of Hungarian terminology is not always very precise, and the list of references for the quotations also seems a bit short, although it is diligently used by the author. Anita Soós

7

Ibid., p. 185.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus [Kierkegaard and German Idealism], Szeged: Ictus 1996, 229 pp.

The 1990s were characterized by a renewed and strong interest in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought in Hungary. Although many of his works were translated into Hungarian during this period, absolutely no monographs had been published on him in the country since the late 1930s. Therefore, it was a real breakthrough when Zoltán Gyenge published his first work entitled Kierkegaard and German Idealism in 1996, which marked the beginning of a new epoch in the Hungarian research. The book is based on the author’s doctoral (Ph.D.) dissertation submitted to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1993. The merit of this monograph is not only its comprehensive use of the recent English and German secondary literature but also its completely new approach to the problems of Kierkegaard’s relation to German idealism. Whereas the standard interpretations in this field were reduced to Kierkegaard’s biting criticism of and strong opposition to Hegel, Gyenge tried to find a different approach and discover the “missing link”1—if not between Hegel and Kierkegaard then between German idealism and Kierkegaard, and this “link” is for him the ontology of the late Schelling.2 According to Gyenge, it seems to be “philologically demonstrable” that “Kierkegaard’s concept of existence results directly from Schelling’s late philosophy.”3 This fundamental thesis of the work is, of course, highly exciting, and the problems of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Schelling are particularly relevant for contemporary international research as well.4

Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus, Szeged: Ictus [1996], p. 8. See also p. 14. 2 It is worth mentioning that the author has also recently published a monograph on Schelling entitled Schelling élete és filozófiája. A német idealizmus legrégibb rendszerprogramjának fordításával (Schelling’s Life and Philosophy. Along with a Translation of The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism), Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő: Attraktor 2005. 3 Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus, p. 144. 4 See, for example, Kierkegaard und Schelling. Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit, ed. by Jochem Henningfeld and Jon Stewart, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 8). 1

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As regards the Hungarian discourse, it is to be emphasized that Gyenge also published the first, exhaustively annotated Hungarian edition of Kierkegaard’s notes on Schelling’s Berlin lectures in 1841–42, which was another important contribution to the interpretation of this issue.5 Considering that Gyenge’s monograph focuses exclusively on Kierkegaard’s relation to Schelling, the title of the work seems to be overly broad since the book only deals with this specific segment of the issue of “Kierkegaard and German idealism” and does not treat the larger issue as such. Kierkegaard’s reception of the ontology of the late Schelling can of course be treated as a “missing link” between idealism and existential philosophy, but this “link” is, of course, not identical with the rather complicated set of problems indicated by the title. In any case, the Hungarian reader can undoubtedly gain many important insights into this relationship as well as a quite new perspective from the book since Gyenge’s approach to these problems had previously been almost totally been neglected. The book consists of two main parts, namely, one about “Schelling” (pp. 15–142) and one about “Kierkegaard” (pp. 143–225).6 (It is in all probability a sign of a too hurried editorial work—which was in no way unusual in the editorial practice of the late 1990s in Hungary—that the published book has—regrettably enough—neither a table of contents nor a bibliography.) Although the two parts of the book are thematically separated, the individual chapters are full of significant statements and analyses about the relationship between the two thinkers. The first part of the book consists of four chapters and presents a detailed overview of the historical development of Schelling’s ontology. Chapter 1 bears the title “Antecedents of the Problems of Being: The Search for ‘Unity.’” The starting point of Gyenge’s train of thought is a brief outline of Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s biography in which the main differences and the unique historical meeting point of the two paths of life are highlighted. Thereafter Schelling’s early conception of the relationship between reason (Vernunft) and the I (Ich) is dealt with; moreover, his concept of nature (Natur) is also treated. Gyenge rightly emphasizes that the old principle of Ἑν καί Πάν (One and All) was dominant for the young Schelling, whose central problems during this period were the possibility of unity (Einheit) in this world and identity (Identität). The title of Chapter 2 is “Preparation of the Late Philosophy: Foundations of Ontology.” In this part, two pieces of Schelling’s corpus are dealt with, namely, his Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom and his Stuttgart Private Lectures. Gyenge first presents Schelling’s relationship to Jacobi, and he

Søren Kierkegaard, Berlini töredék. Jegyzetek Schelling 1841/42-es előadásairól, trans. and ed. by Zoltán Gyenge, Budapest: Osiris-Gond-Cura 2001. 6 Gyenge makes use of the following editions: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, Part I, vols. 1–10, Part II, vols. 1–4, ed. by K.F.A. Schelling, Stuttgart: Cotta 1856–61; Søren Kierkegaard, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–26, ed. by Emmanuel Hirsch et al., Düsseldorf and Cologne: Diederichs 1950–69; Søren Kierkegaard, Samlede Værker, vols. 1–14, ed. by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg, and H.O. Lange, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1901–1906; Søren Kierkegaard, Die Tagebücher, vols. 1–5, ed. by Hayo Gerdes, Düsseldorf and Cologne: Diederichs 1962–74. 5

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briefly treats Jacobi’s well-known teaching about Spinozism, which had a significant influence upon German thought at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thereafter the topics of “faith” (Glaube) and “freedom” (Freiheit) are dealt with. Gyenge stresses that the way of knowing supersensual (übersinnliche) reality is, for both Jacobi and Schelling (and later also for Kierkegaard), faith and by no means reason alone (blosser Verstand ).7 After having emphasized the main differences between Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s concept of God, Gyenge delivers a detailed presentation of Schelling’s concept of the three potentials of human spirit (Gemüt, Geist, Seele). Finally Gyenge analyzes the concept of existence, which is consequently used by Kierkegaard as a synonym for “subject” and “individual.”8 Chapter 3 bears the title “The Exposition of Ontology: The Period of the Weltalter.” According to the author, the possibility of Kierkegaard ever having read the published part of this work of Schelling cannot entirely be excluded, although one cannot demonstrate it either.9 In any case, the Weltalter is a milestone in European philosophy since Schelling finds a new ontological basis for “time” (Zeit) in it, which also has an indirect effect on Kierkegaard’s thought. Gyenge, however, also stresses the main differences between the two conceptions: Kierkegaard deals with the problems of time in a different aspect from that of Schelling, and he explores the temporality of human existence with the categories of “moment” (Øieblik) and “repetition” (Gjentagelse).10 The last chapter of the first part is entitled “The Poesis of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation.” In this part the reader finds profound analyses of Schelling’s and Kierkegaard’s central positions on a priori, conceptually inconceivable, being (which is called unvordenkliches Sein by Schelling). Gyenge quotes Climacus’ well-known thesis from the Postscript: “(a) a logical system can be given; (b) but a system of existence cannot be given.”11 According to Gyenge this conception as well as Climacus’ sharp distinction between the “what” (hvad ) and the “how” (hvorledes) are conceptually based on Schelling’s late Berlin lectures on revelation especially on his famous distinction between Was-sein and Daß-sein.12 Whereas the negative philosophy as an a priori science of reason (Vernunftwissenschaft) can only grasp the abstract essence (Wesen) of a real being and is closed in the immanence of thinking (Denken), which is pure possibility (Möglichkeit), the positive philosophy aims at the actuality (Wirklichkeit) of being (Sein). Gyenge rightly points out that this distinction constitutes one of the most important conceptual bases of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel and of contemporary Danish Hegelians (primarily Hans Lassen Martensen).13

Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus, p. 40. Ibid., p. 70. See also p. 124. 9 Ibid., p. 94. 10 Ibid., p. 106. 11 SKS 7, 105 / CUP1, 109. Quoted on p. 115. 12 Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus, p. 126. See also p. 145. 13 Gyenge—in agreement with Hayo Gerdes—claims that the main target of Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegelian polemics were certain contemporary Danish Hegelian philosophers and theologians and not Hegel himself. See p. 128. 7 8

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The second part of the book consists of two chapters: the first one bears the title “Schelling’s Concept of Being and the Genesis of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence.” This chapter begins with a detailed presentation of Kierkegaard’s notes on Schelling’s Berlin lectures. Gyenge casts doubt on the standpoint of A.M. Koktanek, the publisher of Kierkegaard’s notes, according to whom Kierkegaard did not become acquainted with Schelling’s decisive position.14 Gyenge explains that Kierkegaard attended Schelling’s lectures—41 in all—for more than two months. After having profoundly reviewed the most important parts of Kierkegaard’s notes, Gyenge draws the conclusion that Kierkegaard’s concept of existence is—as far as its content is concerned—cognate with Schelling’s concept of das wahrhaft Seiende.15 This statement is certainly one of the most significant theses of the book. In the second part of the chapter the analysis of Kierkegaard’s Berlin notes is followed by a concise overview of the decisive turns of Kierkegaard’s life and of his intellectual milieu in the Danish Golden Age. Finally Kierkegaard’s central existential categories are explained (such as choice, inwardness, subjectivity, irony, passion, and faith) as they are reflected in some of his most important pseudonymous works. The very last chapter of the book is entitled “Time and Existence.” In this chapter one can read analyses of Kierkegaard’s concept of the Fall and repetition. To begin with, Gyenge reconstructs Kant’s concept of time and draws a parallel between Kant’s transcendental and Kierkegaard’s existential concept of it. According to Gyenge, Kierkegaard’s fundamental question here is how the individual being gets into the sphere of temporality. As Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Haufniensis shows, this transition is brought about by the Fall. Time and sin are therefore closely connected. The way of being of the existing individual is essentially temporal and sinful. Gyenge rightly highlights the difference between the positions of Hegel and Kierkegaard in this context.16 The main target of Kierkegaard’s criticism is the Hegelian interpretation of innocence as immediacy (Unmittelbarkeit). As Kierkegaard emphasizes, it is impossible to grasp the reality of sin by means of the a priori categories of Hegelian logic since they are closed in the immediacy of thinking. One can only conceive innocence as a real state of the dreaming spirit if one grasps it as ignorance. Finally Climacus’ well-known criticism of the Hegelian application of the logical category of necessity to history is dealt with. The second part of the last chapter treats Kierkegaard’s concepts of the “moment” (Øieblik) and “repetition” (Gjentagelse). In order to show the originality of Kierkegaard’s position, Gyenge compares it with the classical conceptions of Plato and Hegel. The main difference is that Kierkegaard does not conceive of the moment as an atom of time but rather as an atom of eternity in time. His existential conception of repetition is based on this original concept of time. The book closes with a short summary repeatedly highlighting the main links between Schelling and Kierkegaard. The most important of them is certainly

Ibid., p. 144. See Anton Mirko Koktanek, Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard, Munich: Oldenburg 1962, p. 68. 15 Gyenge, Kierkegaard és a német idealizmus, pp. 148–9. 16 Ibid., p. 191. 14

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Schelling’s concept of “real being” (das wahrhaft Seinde), which can be seen as a basis for Kierkegaard’s concept of existence.17 And if this really is the case, then German idealism and the philosophy of existence no longer stand diametrically opposed, as they were often described earlier, but they have also important points of contact. The merit of Zoltán Gyenge’s work is undoubtedly that it reveals one of these points for the Hungarian reader in the historical context of a new Kierkegaard renaissance in the 1990s—which is probably the most decisive one. István Czakó

17

Ibid., p. 226.

Review and Critical Discussion Gulyás, Gábor, “A filozófia ritka pillanatai,” Vulgo, vol. 3, no. 1, 2002, pp. 245–52.

Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard élete és filozófiája. A Kierkegaard-könyvtár teljes katalógusával [Kierkegaard’s Life and Philosophy: Along with a Complete Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library], Máriabesnyő, Gödöllő: Attraktor 2007 (Ad hominem, vol. 3), 370 pp.

Since the second half of the 1990s Zoltán Gyenge has undoubtedly been the most prolific writer in the field of Hungarian Kierkegaard research. He has published not only numerous articles and books about the Danish thinker but also translated some important pieces of the œuvre.1 His monograph Kierkegaard’s Life and Philosophy is his most comprehensive work on Kierkegaard and is based on his dissertation submitted to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the degree of doctor scientiarum (D.Sc.) in 2005. According to Ágnes Heller, one of the opponents of the dissertation, this work is “the first and so far the only comprehensive examination and interpretation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in Hungarian.”2 The book certainly reveals an impressive expertise with regard to the primary and secondary sources. Gyenge makes use of the first edition of Kierkegaard’s collected works3 as well as many important pieces of English, German, and Danish secondary literature. In accordance with its title, the work consists of two major parts, namely, that of “Biographia” (pp. 11–115) and “Philosophia” (pp. 119–265). In addition, the book has an appendix (pp. 309–69), which contains a corrected version of the auctioneer’s

Søren Kierkegaard, Berlini töredék. Jegyzetek Schelling 1841/42-es előadásairól, trans. and ed. by Zoltán Gyenge, Budapest: Osiris-Gond-Cura 2001. Søren Kierkegaard, Az ismétlés, trans. by Zoltán Gyenge, Szeged: Ictus 1993. (2nd ed. Budapest: L’Harmattan 2008.) 2 Ágnes Heller, “Opponensi vélemény Gyenge Zoltán Kierkegaard élete és filozófiája című akadémiai doktori értekezéséről,” Pro Philosophia Füzetek, no. 41, 2005, p. 111: “Ez a doktori disszertáció egy fontos mű: az első s eddig egyetlen magyar nyelvű átfogó elemzése és értelmezése a kierkegaard-i filozófiának.” 3 Kierkegaard, Samlede Værker, vols. 1–14, ed. by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg, and H.O. Lange, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel 1901–1906. 1

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sales record of Søren Kierkegaard’s library. Even though this catalogue (first edited by Hermann Peter Rohde) is well known to international readers, Gyenge’s version is a very useful tool for Hungarian scholars and readers, who thus can have direct access to this important source in Gyenge’s book.4 As regards the style of the work, it is characteristic that Gyenge consistently combines his scholarly research with a personal, passionate, “subjective reliving”5 of Kierkegaard in an original manner. The author rightly emphasizes that Kierkegaard’s thinking is closely connected to his personal life: his philosophy is really lived and deeply permeated by the problems of life. Writing (γραφή) and actual life (βίος) form an organic unity in Kierkegaard’s works, in consequence of which his œuvre has a constant biographical character. Gyenge makes it clear that his own interpretation of Kierkegaard also has explicit biographical traces corresponding to this fundamental feature of Kierkegaard’s thinking.6 The first part of the book consists of three chapters. The first chapter contains a detailed biography, which is divided into six stages. Gyenge’s presentation of Kierkegaard’s life story is not merely a historical account of the dramatic turns of an exceptional life but rather is based on a comprehensive and thorough survey of the cultural background of Danish Golden Age. The author consistently avoids the frequent tendency towards the one-sided “biographical reductionism,” that is, explaining a thinker’s creative writings exclusively through his life story. However, he makes it clear that Kierkegaard’s thinking still cannot be entirely interpreted without a systematic reflection on the twists and turns of his personal life. Gyenge also presents a detailed description of Kierkegaard’s relationship to the leading figures of contemporary intellectual life: he deals particularly with Mynster, Martensen, Grundtvig, Møller, Sibbern, Nielsen, and Heiberg. Thereafter, in the third stage, Kierkegaard’s well-known love story with Regine Olsen is discussed. Gyenge rightly points out that Regine “means the potentiality of a citizen’s life and at the same time the unique possibility of a passionate love for Kierkegaard.”7 The enigmatic breaking off of the engagement did not mean the end of Kierkegaard’s love for his fiancée, but rather this relationship was indeed a major motivation for his whole authorship: one can clearly see this fact especially in the genesis of Repetition. Stage four is dedicated to the exciting issue of the incognito, which certainly forms one of the central problems of the interpretation of the œuvre. Gyenge emphasizes that for Kierkegaard the use of pseudonymity was not about the mere possibility of speaking in another name, but rather it meant existence itself and a poetic alternative. Basically, the whole problem of pseudonymity was for Kierkegaard closely connected to that of personal identity

Dezső Csejtei calls this appendix in his review a “real philological delicacy” (valódi filológiai csemege). See Dezső Csejtei, “Habemus Kierkegaard,” Élet és irodalom, vol. 51, no. 43, 2007, p. 26. 5 Zoltán Gyenge, Kierkegaard élete és filozófiája. A Kierkegaard-könyvtár teljes katalógusával, Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő: Attraktor 2007, p. 7. 6 Ibid., p. 6. 7 Ibid., p. 30. 4

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and existential freedom.8 The topic of the next stage is Kierkegaard’s late criticism of Christendom (Christenhed) and of the established Church. Before the open polemic broke out, Kierkegaard also had a vehement conflict with the satirical journal the Corsair, in consequence of which he became absolutely alienated from the masses. It is certainly not without reason that one of the crucial points of his later criticism of the established church was precisely the quantitative expansion of Christianity, which was for Kierkegaard equivalent to its abolishment. Instead of being a member of a religious community, Kierkegaard’s ideal was rather a kind of private religion. The very last station of the first chapter bears the title “end game.” Here the narration of Kierkegaard’s last days is productively connected with the interpretation of his very impressive existential conception of death. The second chapter is dedicated to the issue of Romanticism. As Gyenge points out, many German Romantic thinkers were present in Kierkegaard’s library: Friedrich Schlegel, Jean-Paul, Armin, Eichendorf, Kleist, Novalis, Solger, and Tieck. Despite the strong impact of this school, however, Kierkegaard should certainly not be simply interpreted as a Romantic writer: Romanticism was rather an important inspiration and intellectual motivation for him.9 The third chapter, entitled “Kierkegaard and the End of German Idealism,” deals with Kierkegaard’s relationship to Hegel and Schelling. This issue was undoubtedly central for research up to this point. Gyenge rightly claims that it is impossible to understand Kierkegaard’s philosophy without taking into consideration the context of German idealism. First he outlines Hegel’s system, and then he deals with the questions of Kierkegaard’s criticism of it. Gyenge is fully aware of the complexity of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Hegel and Hegelianism. He makes it clear that Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel was in many aspects actually an implicit criticism of contemporary Danish Hegelians rather than that of Hegel himself.10 As regards the sources of Kierkegaard’s direct criticism of Hegel’s system, Gyenge emphasizes the important impacts of Trendelenburg and of the late Schelling. This latter figure is treated by him in detail. Gyenge presents a very thorough survey of Schelling’s lectures in Berlin as well as Kierkegaard’s notes and comments on them. Although Kierkegaard heard only some of these lectures, he certainly got acquainted with the basic thoughts of the late Schelling, which later influenced the genesis of his concept of existence. As already indicated, the second part of the book bears the title “Philosophia.” This part consists of four long chapters explaining some of the essential aspects of Kierkegaard’s thinking. The first chapter, entitled “The Genesis of Existence” treats the existential categories of irony and humor. It is well known that both of them are characterized in the Postscript as a confinium between the three stages of existence. Gyenge’s analysis of the concept of irony is closely connected to his interpretation of Kierkegaard’s dissertation on the same topic (The Concept of Irony). Gyenge makes a distinction between two aspects of this concept, namely, the methodological and the existential one. As regards the methodological side, he treats Kierkegaard’s

8 9 10

Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., pp. 85–6. Ibid., p. 92.

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well-known distinction between direct and indirect communication, and he emphasizes that “we can hardly find any examples of direct communication”11 in Kierkegaard’s writings. Thereafter he deals with Socratic and Romantic irony as well as Hegel’s interpretation of it. According to him, Kierkegaard’s concept of irony is substantially a Romantic one. For the Danish thinker, irony is not a mere literary tool but an essential expression of freedom, inwardness and existence of the individual. The following chapter is the longest one in the book and bears the title “Existence on Life’s Way.” This chapter is substantially based on analyses of Either/Or, Stages on Life’s Way, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling, and it outlines Kierkegaard’s concept of stages of existence. Gyenge convincingly argues that Kierkegaard’s conception of the stages cannot be considered to be a system,12 and subsequently he extensively outlines the aesthetic, ethical and religious forms of existence. The third chapter is entitled “Existence and the Mode of Being.” In this part of the text some of the central topics of Kierkegaard’s thinking are dealt with, such as freedom and historicity, anxiety and sin, time and repetition as they are reflected in Philosophical Fragments and The Concept of Anxiety. The topic of the final chapter is the existential category of despair. This analysis is based on the interpretation of The Sickness unto Death. The book ends with a “last conclusion,” in which some traces of Kierkegaard’s personality are stressed, and some interesting parallels between Socrates and his nineteenth-century follower are elucidated. This work is certainly a major contribution to the contemporary Hungarian reception of Kierkegaard, and it is a useful source for both scholars and general readers of the Danish thinker. István Czakó

11 12

Ibid., p. 123. Ibid., 145.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Csejtei, Dezső, “Habemus Kierkegaard,” Élet és irodalom, vol. 51, no. 43, 2007, p. 26. Izsó, Tímea, “Életbe zárt filozófia,” Különbség, vol. 10, no. 1, 2010, pp. 157–9.

Sándor Koncz, Kierkegaard és a világháború utáni teológia [Kierkegaard and Post-War Theology], Miskolc: Fekete Pál és társa 1938 (Tanulmányok a rendszeres theologia és segédtudományok köréből, vol. 3), 213 pp.

Kierkegaard and Post-War Theology, a book by Sándor Koncz, was published in 1938 by the University of Debrecen as the third volume of the series Studies of Systematic Theology and its Auxiliary Sciences. The book was based on the author’s Ph.D. thesis.1 In the Preface the author explains that he made his first careful study of Kierkegaard during his initial year at the university in Basel (1933–34), encouraged by Eduard Thurneysen.2 During his university years in Switzerland, Germany, and Scotland, the author had the opportunity to study intensively both Kierkegaard’s writings and the theology of the first half of the twentieth century. The final 29 pages of the book provide a detailed bibliography of Kierkegaard as well as a long list of secondary literature in reference to the relevant theological authors. Although the book’s title suggests a study in the history of reception, it is much more than that. The author examines the impact of Kierkegaard’s thoughts by thoroughly explaining the various Kierkegaardian impulses in later thinking. In the Preface the author states his intention to provide “a synopsis of post-war theology” in such a way that “it would not be a mere work of recording, but rather a systematization and evaluation.”3 This book is significant both for Kierkegaard research and the history of theology. However, the specific combination of the two makes the reading somewhat laborious. A description of Kierkegaard’s work and a separate presentation of other

He later became Professor of Systematic Theology at the Reformed Theological Academy in Sárospatak, Hungary. 2 Eduard Thurneysen was one of the important personalities of the so-called dialectical theology or new reformatory trend, which urged a change of paradigm in Protestant theology at the beginning of the twentieth century. Instead of the liberal, anthropocentric theology at the turn of the century, he focused on the Word of God again. 3 Sándor Koncz, Kierkegaard és a világháború utáni teológia, Miskolc: Fekte Pál és társa 1938 (Tanulmányok a rendszeres theologia és segédtudományok köréből, vol. 3), p. V. 1

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theologians would undoubtedly have been easier to follow, but this combination of the two requires serious concentration on the reader’s part and presupposes some prior knowledge of both Kierkegaard and the history of theology. Koncz underlines the important aspects in the writings of the Danish author that are most relevant for post-war theology, and presents the way in which these aspects are related to the works of several theologians. The book is divided into five chapters and several subchapters. The title of Chapter 1 is “Introduction the Problem.” In this chapter we learn that the author considers the basic problem of his age to be one of a theological crisis, and this leads us to Kierkegaard, who, according to Koncz, “is one who had previously experienced and explained the present crisis.”4 The first part of the long introductory chapter is an excursus, in which the author tries to outline the issues of Platonic subjectivism and Aristotelian objectivism, followed by Kierkegaard’s epistemology. According to his definition, “Kierkegaard creates the sameness of existence and thought,” and the author labels this form of subjectivism “existential realism.”5 The spiritual-historical journey continues with the author presenting the circumstances of the development of the Kierkegaardian renaissance. He makes a brief presentation of trends in post-war theology, enumerates the significant works of Kierkegaard research, and states that henceforth he will set himself apart from these trends as well as the works of Kierkegaard researchers. He does not consider these researchers to be important because they are not independent thinkers constructing their own philosophical or theological vision. Moreover, he considers post-war theological trends to be methodologically incorrect because “the impact of Kierkegaard lies in the universality of his thoughts, which may bring to a kind of synthesis the representatives of very different confessions and trends—the unification of which is not possible in any other way.”6 In the Introduction of his book, Koncz names the theologians whom he analyzes in detail: (1) in Protestant Theology: Paul Althaus, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann, Martin Dibelius, Friedrich Gogarten, Karl Heim, Otto Piper, Eduard Thurneysen, and Hans E. Weber; (2) in Roman Catholic Theology: Karl Adam, Romano Guardini, Erich Przywara, and Miguel Unamuno; and (3) in Eastern Orthodox Theology: Nicolas Berdyaev, Sergej Bulgakov, and Leo Sestov. Finally, he names the three kinds of impact, according to which the further analyses will be carried out; the titles of the next three chapters coincide with this division. First, Kierkegaard influenced others through his personality. Further, he made an impact through his critical attitude towards the recognition of the universal spiritual, philosophical, and cultural crisis. Finally, the positive relations between Kierkegaard’s thoughts and post-war theology are worthy of discussion. In Chapter 2, “Kierkegaard’s Personality,” the author analyzes the various aspects of Kierkegaard’s personality, without directly pointing towards any individual theologian. The presentation is not a biographical one, although he briefly refers to the

4 5 6

Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 35.

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biographical events. He rather brings to the forefront those features of Kierkegaard’s personality that had an impact on others. The author summarizes these features in ten points: (1) Kierkegaard had an edifying effect through his developing personality; (2) despite significant setbacks, he managed to live a full life; (3) his whole life is a story of suffering; (4) he tried to find his own existence in the single “One” (individual); (5) for him the principle of being was the “whirlpool” of contemporaneous existence; (6) his personality is built on hope and faith in the future; (7) he tried to realize a full religious, Christian existence; (8) a faithful existence is created by suffering and witness; (9) Kierkegaard was a cultural critic and a prophet; and (10) the greatness of Kierkegaard lies in the fact that he placed God and the simple believer as pivotal points in the universe. In Chapter 3 “Kierkegaard and the Critical Attitude of Post-War Theology,” the author lines up thoughts and ideas that had been formulated by Kierkegaard as criticism and which were adopted by several theologians unambiguously as critical arguments. To the presented topics of criticism he assigns the theologians, who expressed their views in reference to these. In further subsections the author presents four major themes: (1) German idealism and the Kierkegaardian stages of life; (2) the basic elements of Kierkegaard’s thoughts and philosophical thinking. Here he distinguishes these as follows: (a) categories and paradox, (b) abstraction and reality, and (c) the metaphysical “I” and personal existence. Clearly, the third subsection is the most extensive one: (3) theology as a crisis of the human spirit; this part explains three contradictory pairs: (a) illusion and revelation, (b) moralism and Christian ethics, and (c) humanistic monism and discontinuity. Koncz specifically outlines how the ideas named by the contradictory pairs enter into conflict with the failed theologies of previous ages. In the last subsection, he criticizes the theology of the nineteenth century. This involves (4) a criticism of the theology dependent upon the so-called human sciences (Geisteswissenschaft). He quotes theologians belonging to different confessions and trends who reject speculative theology based both on human reason and human emotions—theologians, like Kierkegaard, who recognize God as being “wholly other,” or “infinitely qualitatively different,” from humanity. The title of Chapter 4 is “Positive Correlations between Kierkegaard’s Thoughts and Post-War Theology.” Kierkegaard’s “existence dialectics” had a great and fruitful influence upon later theologians. In the first part of the chapter the author shows how the following topics and concepts develop in Kierkegaard’s work: “existence” and “subsistence,” the “dialectics of paradox,” and facts of existence, such as “the sinful, faithful and eschatological existence and the point of view of contemporaneity (i.e., simultaneousness).”7 In the second part of the chapter, he then explains how these ideas emerged in post-war theology. Chapter 5 is a brief presentation of Kierkegaard’s reception in “Hungarian Reformed Post-War Theology.” In the first footnote of the chapter, Koncz enumerates the books published on Kierkegaard in Hungarian up to 1938. One should note,

7

Ibid., p. 116.

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however, that a book written on Kierkegaard does not necessarily entail a reception of his thought. Although Koncz managed to find six books on Kierkegaard, showing that indeed the Dane was a known figure, nonetheless these works did not quote directly from Kierkegaard’s texts. The author is thus right in stating that until 1938 we cannot really speak of a real reception of Kierkegaard. Instead, one can speak of an indirect reception, whereby Kierkegaard is seen as a representative of German dialectical theology. The explanation is well argued: the Reformed theologians were those who discovered Kierkegaard first through the mediation of dialectical theologians, and immediately adopted his most relevant ideas, building them into their own thinking. Koncz says, “Our theologians follow him first and then begin to know him..., in foreign theologies Kierkegaard is a primary source of reference, in our theology his place is taken by those foreign theologians, who started out from him. In most cases Barth, Brunner, Bultmann, Gogarten and the philosophers of existentialism are the speakers through which we hear Kierkegaard here in our country.”8 Nonetheless, the mediation was effective, and it had a stimulating effect; later Kierkegaard’s original works appeared on the bookshelves of Hungarian theologians (at the time mostly in German translation). Koncz names Sándor Tavaszy, Béla Vasady, Ernő Mátyás, and László Ravasz among those theologians, who transmitted valuable Kierkegaardian ideas to the students of all four Hungarian Reformed Theological Faculties.9 The students, in their turn, willy-nilly took these ideas to their congregations and spread them among the believers. Sarolta Püsök

Ibid., p. 164. The Reformed Theological Faculties in Debrecen, Sárospatak, and Budapest (in Hungary), and Cluj-Kolozsvár (in Romania).

8 9

Review and Critical Discussion Püsök, Sarolta, “Kierkegaard-hatások a 20. századi teológiában,” Református Szemle, no. 5, 2003, pp. 494–507.

András Nagy, Az árnyjátékos. Sören Kierkegaard irodalomtörténet, eszmetörténet és hatástörténet metszéspontjain [The Shadowplayer: Søren Kierkegaard at the Crossroads of Literary History, History of Ideas and Reception History], Budapest: L’Harmattan 2011, 206 pp.

András Nagy’s study, The Shadowplayer, was published by L’Harmattan Publisher House in 2011. Preliminary studies had appeared earlier, and, as the author himself makes explicit, the tome also serves to document his decades-long research on Kierkegaard. This work can be read as a whole, or each chapter can be read individually. The author approaches Kierkegaard’s work from three points of view: first, he follows the genesis of Kierkegaard’s writing, emphasizing the influence of theatrical thinking on the philosopher. Next, he is interested in outlining the most important influences (both books and personal experiences) on Kierkegaard, again with a focus on the theater that, according Nagy, is an integrated part in Kierkegaard’s life. Finally, he describes the Hungarian reception of the Danish writer and presents a case-study: the reception of Either/Or. In line with these three approaches, the book can be divided into three main parts. Part One begins with an essay that explains the book’s main objective: it places Kierkegaard in a theatrical context and thus shows how his contact with the theater influenced his writings. Nagy interprets Kierkegaard’s work as a “textual theater”1 populated by a crowd of authors representing different attitudes and thoughts; he emphasizes that the permanent dialogue between them mutually exploits the dramatic elements of thinking. In addition, he explains the role of the pseudonyms in the context of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, and, according to Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, this allows Kierkegaard to treat the texture of several independent voices as polyphony. By means of the pseudonymous authorship,

András Nagy, Az árnyjátékos. Sören Kierkegaard irodalomtörténet, eszmetörténet és hatástörténet metszéspontjain, Budapest: L’Harmattan 2011, p. 18.

1

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Kierkegaard creates a connection between his views and puts them in the context of history of ideas, church, and religion. Quoting Peter Christian Kierkegaard, Nagy thinks of the name Søren Kierkegaard as a pseudonym used in the polemic against the Lutheran Church.2 Nagy suggests that Kierkegaard himself played the part of an actor, and his visits to the theater serve as an example of this. As his life, role and work intertwine inseparably, Kierkegaard composed his life to express his overall intention. Nagy correctly states that by playing a role he did not want to hide the truth, but rather explain it or embody it. Kierkegaard tends to use various kinds of references to different texts, which gives an extra dramatic effect to his writing. Based on the works in the auction catalogue, Nagy gives an illustrative reconstruction of the textual corpus (Shakespeare, Schiller, Goethe, Heiberg, etc.) that Kierkegaard worked with, and describes Shakespeare as the greatest psychologist. He devotes a chapter to Kierkegaard’s Repetition, which according to Nagy, is of great significance from the point of view of theater theory. The focus is on the connection between audience, performance, and the piece, and Nagy draws attention to Constantin Constantius’ statements regarding the methods of the performers, the artistic effects, and the interaction between the audience and the actor. Finally, Nagy shows the aesthetic dimension of the religious experience, which—being a terrible deception in Kierkegaard’s eyes—led to his public break with the Lutheran Church and its representatives. Kierkegaard’s writings reveal a variety of different influences from books, personal relationships and numerous thinkers. Part Two of The Shadowplayer is devoted to the explanation of these. The first essay (“Paradox Schiller”) in this part gives an overview of the connections between Kierkegaard and the great German poet and his works. Nagy points out, that Friedrich Schiller was present in Kierkegaard’s field of view from his youth in so far as the Dane constantly dealt with the same questions, problems, and conflicts that Schiller expressed in his poems. According to the author, Kierkegaard was attracted to Schiller because of the German poet’s lack of reflection, logic, and speculation, and appreciates the artistic composition and the aesthetic effect, reflected through his poetic mind.3 He mentions Schiller’s The Robbers and locates there a theme which he often returns to in his own works, namely, that of the incognito as a dramaturgical motif. Furthermore, Nagy’s reference to the father–son conflict in Don Carlos also suggests connections to Mary Stuart, Intrigue and Love, The Bride of Messina, William Tell, the Wallenstein trilogy, and Demetrius. Nagy believes that there are parallels between the train of thought in Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters and Kierkegaard’s own conclusions concerning the role and—indeed—superiority of the aesthetic, compared to the ethical.4 Although Kierkegaard again and again returned to Schiller and was conversant with his writings, the connection to the German poet remained mostly

2 3 4

Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., pp. 43–8.

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hidden, formed through different roles, and was never a relation of absolute acceptance or identification.5 Looking to Hegel and Danish Hegelianism, Nagy’s next essay is devoted to Johan Ludvig Heiberg, who, despite his role in the Danish Golden Age, is almost unknown in Hungary. Again, Nagy’s starting point is the theater (primarily the role of the vaudeville), and he explains Hegel’s philosophy via Heiberg’s intentions on the stage. He points out that Heiberg’s periodicals, articles, academic discourses, and not to mention his literary salon, played an important role in Kierkegaard’s life, but also emphasizes the ambiguous relation and the polemic between Heiberg and Kierkegaard. In another essay, Nagy offers a literary reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling as the only possible approach to the Christian paradox, faith. In this context, the understanding is unable to penetrate the paradox, and thus the only means of approaching the text is not one of interpretation but rather one of inspiration and imitation.6 Nagy suggests that Kierkegaard’s way of writing bears witness to the influence of German Romanticism on his thought. However, Nagy does not find it surprising that in the state of literary excitement Kierkegaard often oversteps the literature defined by traditional genres and methods of writing. The author of the text, Johannes de silentio, accentuates himself as the one, who turned his life into poesy, which excludes reflection and philosophy, but not dialectics. He is a person who cannot believe yet reveals a story about faith, and in this vein—as Nagy argues—the narrative contradicts the narration. Kierkegaard’s creation of Johannes de silentio allowed him to experiment with the secularization of the problem of faith and the understanding which, in turn, paved the way for the literary reception of Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, The Demons, The Idiot, and The Brothers Karamazov, where this problem is a recurring theme. Nagy sets the theme in a further context and gives a detailed and precise account of its use by referring to texts by Thomas Mann, Franz Kafka, and Rainer Maria Rilke as the inheritors of Kierkegaardian thinking. The secularization of faith leads up to György Lukács’ early philosophical writings, the Bolshevistic usage (Secular Messianism), and Lukács’ The Destruction of Reason, which Nagy fully analyzes in the next chapter devoted to Lukács and his reading and rereading of Kierkegaard. As Nagy makes explicit, the young Lukács tried to get an answer to aesthetic, philosophical, and literary questions in Kierkegaard’s work but finally found them where he did not expect, namely, in history.7 In this chapter, Nagy offers a historical overview of Lukács’ interpretation of Kierkegaard’s thought and its effect, and thus views The Destruction of Reason as a significant work from the point of view of both the history of philosophy and the history of ideas. The essay on Lukács sets Kierkegaard in the context of the Hungarian reception, which constitutes the third part of the volume.

5 6 7

Ibid., p. 53. Ibid., p. 92. Ibid., p. 10.

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Although Kierkegaard’s presence was felt in the Hungarian intellectual and poetic sphere in the 1930s, his indirect influence was perceivable much earlier. Given the character of the Hungarian intellectual milieu, it does not come as a surprise that this influence came to expression in the philosophical and theological literature, and this made it possible to reflect and play with the new thoughts and impressions. Nagy mentions several Hungarian poets (Mihály Vörösmarty, Imre Madách, and Béla Hamvas), whose writings bear witness to a certain parallelism to the Danish thinker, but the direct influence is so far not proven. The most important recipient in the Hungarian Kierkegaard reception is still György Lukács, who not only was affected by Kierkegaard’s writings, but whose own life, to a certain extent, mirrored Kierkegaard’s love story. Nagy then gives a detailed overview of the Hungarian thinkers and translators (László Ravasz, Sándor Koncz, László Széles, Sándor Tavaszy, and Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi) who dealt with Kierkegaard. The case-study about the Hungarian translations and publications of Either/Or gives an excellent overview of the Hungarian Kierkegaard reception. To conclude, the primary interest and the originality of the book lies in the fact that it treats a quite unknown, however, exciting field in Hungarian (as well international) Kierkegaard research: Kierkegaard and the theater. András Nagy’s theatrical approach can provide new ways of approaching current Kierkegaard scholarship. Anita Soós

Review and Critical Discussion Gyenge Zoltán, “Amikor az árnyjátékos a fénybe lép (Nagy András: Az árnyjátékos. Søren Kierkegaard irodalomtörténet, eszmetörténet és hatástörténet metszéspontjain),” Holmi, January 2013, pp. 125–8.

András Nagy (ed.), Kierkegaard Budapesten. A Kierkegaard-hét előadásai 1992. december 1–4 [Kierkegaard in Budapest: Proceedings of the Kierkegaard Week, December 1–4, 1992], Budapest: Fekete Sas 1994, 442 pp.

The volume, published in 1994, contains the proceedings of a grand-scale conference held in Budapest in December 1992. It was organized by the Hungarian writer and essayist András Nagy and accompanied by an exposition, a concert, a cabaret, and a theatre performance. Nagy, who is also the editor of the book, writes in his Preface that the conference was not an academic event but the philosophical overture of democratic Hungary after the change of 1989.1 Indeed, the undertaking had its revolutionary character partly because the conference held out the prospect of a more open discourse instead of the Marxist thinking that had been dominant since 1945. It is a sad fact, however, that the choice of Søren Kierkegaard as its subject matter was almost accidental. Yet the conference was a milestone in the philosophical life of Hungary, largely because it was linked to international research projects and thereby significantly broadened the horizon of Kierkegaard research there. Since then it has no longer been necessary to read his writings in accordance with the academic analyses which followed the German philosophical tradition or within the context of Protestant theology; and it has been possible to liberate Kierkegaard from the Marxist-Lukacsist interpretations which frequently accused him of subjectivism, irrationalism, mysticism, aestheticism, and the like. There emerged the demand for a new critical edition translated from the Danish original and for more critical textual analyses, although the fulfillment of these goals would take a long time. As the list of the contributors suggests, the conference was the fusion of ideas by prominent scholars from Western Europe and the United States, who represented the main lines of international Kierkegaard research as well as Hungarian literary

1 András Nagy (ed.), Kierkegaard Budapesten. A Kierkegaard-hét előadásai 1992. december 1–4, Budapest: Fekete Sas 1994, p. 9.

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scholars, aesthetic writers, philosophers, psychologists, and theologians, most of whom were not Kierkegaard researchers. The simple grouping of the papers closely follows the thematic blocks of the conference presentations. The Hungarian participants in the section “Psychology”2 (György Vikár: “The Don Juan Study as an Attempt to Solve a Life Crisis”; Antal Bókay: “Repetition: The Secret Law of the Soul [Kierkegaard and Psychoanalysis]”; Ildikó Erdélyi: “The Psychology of Seduction”) interpret Kierkegaard’s works in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis. Their method of literary studies also connects the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis established by Sándor Ferenczi to the later generations of psychoanalysis. A weaker link in this thematic chain is the paper by Niels Thomassen, “Kierkegaard on Happiness,” which questions Kierkegaard’s conception of freedom and happiness as being attained only within the context of Christianity. The section “Philosophy”3 covers quite a wide range of topics and approaches: the aesthetic-philosophical relationship between Kierkegaard and early German Romanticism (Sándor Radnóti: “Kierkegaard and Schlegel”; András Kardos: “The Tragedy of Metaphysics, Or Why Søren Kierkegaard Never Wrote a Drama”), the aesthetic and hermeneutical reinterpretation of concepts used in modernism (Konrad Liessmann: “Kierkegaard and Don Juan”; Béla Bacsó: “Can Repetition Be Repeated?”), as well as the postmodernist-deconstructive investigation of Kierkegaard’s œuvre (Poul Erik Töjner: “Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Hegel and Politics”; Joakim Garff: “Kierkegaard: A Bio-graphy”; Gábor Kardos Daróczy: “The Self-Interpreting Work as the Kierkegaardian Alternative to Interpretation”). In this latter category, even the computer-based analysis of texts appears as a most novel method (Alastair McKinnon: “Kierkegaard’s Work: The First Eight Dimensions”). For most of the authors of the section “Philosophy of Religion,”4 Lutheran Protestant theology is foundational for understanding Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Two of the authors regard his criticism of Protestantism as an opposition to a systematic theology that is not conducive to personal religiosity (Gusztáv Bölcskey: “Kierkegaard’s Criticism of Church and Christianity”; Kálmán Micskey: “On Kierkegaard’s Theology”). Others discuss the Christian character of Kierkegaard’s philosophy partly by comparing his aesthetic and religious writings that were published simultaneously (Helmut Vetter: “The Amen of the Finite Spirit: On Søren Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses”), partly by presenting the personal self that was formed in the crossfire of Christian religion and science (Julia Watkin: “The Relevance of Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Self Today”). The possibility of the personal decision of faith and the impossibility of mediating the paradox of faith appear as the most essential elements of Kierkegaard’s theology, both from a Catholic and a Methodist point of view (Henri-Bernard Vergote: “The Thorough Examination of Faith”; Gábor Iványi: “Go Away!”). There are also important external links to Kierkegaard’s concept of faith: to the dialectical theology of Karl Barth which helped to introduce Kierkegaard’s ideas to Hungarian Protestant theology (Ferenc Szűcs: “The

2 3 4

Ibid., pp. 21–84. Ibid., pp. 87–223. Ibid., pp. 227–327.

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Beginnings of 20th Century Theology and Kierkegaard”), and to the testimony of the Hungarian Evangelical bishop Lajos Ordass who translated Kierkegaard’s For Self-Examination during his imprisonment after the suppression of the revolution of 1956 (László Donáth: “By Faith He Being Dead Yet Speaketh”). The section “History of Influence” highlights some important moments of the immense reception of Kierkegaard.5 The literary interpretations focus mainly on parallels in thinking and subject-matter, without mapping the philological background of the direct or indirect impact (András Masát: “Kierkegaard—In Ibsen’s Dramas”; Endre Török: “Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard”; Péter Balassa: “Kierkegaard— Bergman—Pilinszky”). The historical investigations explore the ideal and cultural influence of Kierkegaard’s philosophy on following generations, for example, on the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan George, and Gottfried Benn (Béla G. Németh: “Kierkegaard’s After-Effect—A Religious Rebirth?”), and on Denmark’s contemporary literary life (Svend Aage Madsen: “How We Can [Not] Avoid the Effect of Kierkegaard?”). There is only one close textual analysis in the section, the paper by Mihály Vajda, who compares Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s concept of being (Mihály Vajda: “Despair and Care: Late Early Heideggerian notes on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death”). But the most exciting questions concern Kierkegaard’s theoretical influence: how his authorial praxis, his rejection of system, and rhetoric contributed to deconstruction (Jörgen Dehs: “Remarks on Søren Kierkegaard’s Theory of Literature”), and whether it is justified to talk about a postmodern Kierkegaard (George Pattison: “Kierkegaard And/Or Postmodernism?”)? The novelty of this conference, for both the Hungarian scholars and the other attendees lay in the strategies of interpretation: (1) the psychoanalytic method of literary studies overwrote the biography-based, psychologizing analysis that had previously characterized the study of Kierkegaard’s work; (2) the philosophical investigations made room for hermeneutics, deconstruction, and postmodernism; (3) the theological approaches rehabilitated, albeit with restrictions, the Protestant theological interpretations published in Hungary between the two World Wars; and (4) the reception took seriously Kierkegaard’s influence in literature, philosophy, and arts, without trying to force him into the usual cliché of existentialism. Of course, this novelty has some inherent dangers: the improvised, uncontrolled presentation of the freedom of thinking. For several reasons, the way in which Kierkegaard’s œuvre appears in this volume is not devoid of contradictions with respect to its language and content: the speakers had different professional backgrounds; the Hungarian philosophical language was still in the making, and especially the Hungarian idiom for Kierkegaard’s texts was far from consistent, the otherwise excellent translators could not cope with all the uncertainties (for which they cannot be blamed since they had no consistent language to rely on), and the volume did not have the benefit of professional proof-reading. But these deficiencies do not significantly diminish the value of the grand event. The conference brought to consciousness the enduring interest in the Danish philosopher and the ignorance surrounding him, indicating what an inexhaustible source

5

Ibid., pp. 331–442.

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his work is for various non-ideological interpretations. Unfortunately, the English twin volume promised in the preface has never been published, and even the noisy press events related to the conference could not secure the critical echo it would have deserved. But its influence is undeniable, although more difficult to measure. The 1992 conference became the first of several Hungarian conferences on Kierkegaard, and some of the papers in the volume continue to inspire books, Ph.D. theses, and studies on him.6 Judit Bartha

The authors cited most frequently in Hungary are Jörgen Dehs, Joakim Garff, George Pattison, Poul Erik Töjner, Helmuth Vetter, as well as Béla Bacsó Béla, Gusztáv Bölcskey, and Gábor Kardos Daróczy. Their papers also signaled the trends of Hungarian Kierkegaard research that have come into fashion since. An example of the effective exchange of ideas is a study by George Pattison (“If Kierkegaard is Right about Reading, Why Read Kierkegaard?,” in Kierkegaard Revisited, ed. by Niels Cappelørn and Jon Stewart, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 1997 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 1), pp. 291–309) which, according to the author, was greatly inspired by Kardos Daróczy’s presentation. 6

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Sarolta Püsök, Søren Kierkegaard teológiájának súlypontjai [The Focal Points of Kierkegaard’s Theology], Kolozsvár (Cluj): Egyetemi Műhely Kiadó, Bolyai Társaság 2010, 168 pp.

The book at hand, which analyzes the focal points1 of Kierkegaard’s theology, is a very ambitious and significant undertaking by the young pastor and professor of the Kolozsvár (Cluj)2 College of Divinity, Sarolta Püsök. The promise given in the Preface is to create an authentic portrait of the Danish genius, who, as the author suggests, never considered himself a philosopher, much less a theologian, but a religious writer. The importance of this short monograph—originally submitted as a Ph.D. thesis—is, however, great: it applies a coherent method to the understanding and interpretation of the system behind Kierkegaard’s thinking as expressed in the different texts. Püsök first and foremost emphasizes the role and position of God in Kierkegaard’s process of the writing and ultimately in the evaluation of his thoughts and deeds; the Lord is the ultimate judge. The viewpoint of the devout believer is present throughout the book, which is, furthermore, an important contribution in the Transylvanian Lutheran theological tradition of Kierkegaard research.3 The structure of the book is explained in the Preface: seven chapters cover the background of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, followed by a description of the composition of the authorship, which is characterized as sophisticatedly thought through. The context of the literary corpus is given in the section following the Preface with a description of the Danish Golden Age defined by the influence of Hegel on the Copenhagen intellectuals of the time; it then reveals the panorama of Kierkegaard’s entire authorship in the chapter which follows, with a chronological account of all his works. This is the basis for the concluding three chapters, which are dedicated

1 The Hungarian súlypont literally means “center of gravity”; however, used rather like the German Schwerpunkt, it can be translated as “focal point.” 2 The modern Romanian city of Cluj (Hungarian Kolozsvár) was an important intellectual and artistic center of Greater Hungary. In 1918 Rumanian troops occupied it, and after the Paris peace treaties in 1920 it became a part of Rumania, with a significant Hungarian minority. 3 See Sándor Tavaszy, Kierkegaard személyisége és gondolkodása [Kierkegaard’s Personality and Thought], Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Múzeum 1930. Tavaszy was a professor at the same College where the author teaches.

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to the three following aspects: first, the most important Kierkegaardian subjects are listed and analyzed, then Kierkegaard’s criticism of the church of his time is described and interpreted, and finally the Kierkegaardian authorship is evaluated in terms of the inspiration it had for the most influential twentieth-century theologian of the Lutheran church, Karl Barth. It is hard to find a similarly coherent and complex analysis of the Kierkegaardian authorship from the point of view of systematic theology, based on contemporary research and a thorough familiarity with the entire authorship. Earlier attempts did not have Püsök’s in-depth knowledge of the different aspects of the Danish thinker and his world,4 while mainstream Kierkegaard research in Hungary focuses more on the philosophical and aesthetic aspects together with the history of Kierkegaard’s influence, and tends to neglect the theological significance of his work.5 Püsök’s particular situation is also of importance: she follows in the rich and historically established tradition of Transylvania, while also being in a minority as an ethnic Hungarian intellectual in Romania and as a female Lutheran pastor. Finally, cultural interactions with the inspiring and interesting Kierkegaard interpretations of her Romanian colleagues are blended with the tradition deeply rooted in centuries of Hungarian culture and history.6 While the author finds Kierkegaard’s authorship wonderful, she still refers to him as a graphomaniac, a sort of maniac who constantly puts his thoughts on paper. The congruence of life with thinking is basic for Püsök, yet she is critical of Kierkegaard’s references to his fate as a martyr. Kierkegaard’s criticism of the church is referred to by Ms. Püsök as his Achilles’ heel, since, in her interpretation, community and belief are not compatible for Kierkegaard. The background of the above contradictions may lie in the life of the Danish thinker, which is characterized as poor in events, yet marked by significant episodes. These are mainly described through the medium of Joakim Garff’s biographical novel;7 therefore, the author gives no original sources or references concerning Kierkegaard’s life, and for Kierkegaard’s works only some quotations are provided from the biographical novel. In Püsök’s understanding, Kierkegaard’s basic intention was to find the way and to lead his readers to God. His different methods and genres, whether sermon, aesthetic writing, pseudonymous works, or even journal serve exclusively towards this goal. Kierkegaard poses similar if not identical questions throughout the authorship. For

Tavaszy did not take this approach, nor did the other significant Kierkegaard interpreter, Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, in his book Kierkegaard élete és munkái [Kierkegaard’s Life and Work], Békéscsaba: Evangélikus Egyházi Könyvkereskedés 1937. 5 There are several important studies on the theological reception and interpretation of Kierkegaard. However, the only monograph on him from this point of view is that by István Czakó: Hit és egzisztencia. Tanulmány Søren Kierkegaard hitfelfogásáról [Faith and Existence: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Conception of Faith], Budapest: L’Harmattan 2001. 6 The Hungarian name of the area is Erdély, in English Transylvania. It has a long history of religious tolerance and high-quality theological and philosophical thinking. This was interrupted and destroyed by the hardline communist leadership of Nicolae Ceauşescu. 7 Joakim Garff, SAK, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard—Életrajz [SAK, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard: Biography], trans. by Ágnes Bogdán and Anita Soós, Pécs: Jelenkor 2004. 4

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the author, Gadamer and Heidegger are the authorities to refer to when understanding direct and indirect communication. Different incognitos serve communication in the same way as created identities enable Kierkegaard to distance himself from his writings. Role-playing, too, is needed in order to experiment with ideas, views, and deeds. This multiplication of identities is alien to Kierkegaard’s inner convictions, yet necessary for obtaining certain results, for experiments, for provocation.8 In many respects to understand Kierkegaard’s authorship, as the title of Chapter 3 suggests, is to understand Hegel’s role and influence and also properly to absorb the time when Kierkegaard lived, which is called the Danish Golden Age. The analysis of the social and cultural context is based on Bruce H. Kirmmse’s book,9 while, on the subject of Hegel, Jon Stewart is quoted extensively.10 The determining factors of Kierkegaard’s career, such as his father’s melancholic legacy, the Regine Olsen affair, and the eccentric features of his life, are demonstrated in this context to have resulted in his individualism, subjectivism, and anticlerical feelings. The first half of the book concludes with a commented chronology of Kierkegaard’s works, and thus an extensive overview is provided.11 The scope of the book, however, goes beyond the description of the corpus to focus on certain issues that are of great importance, like paradox, sin, offense, faith, and time. These are mainly interpreted on the basis of Practice in Christianity, but other works are also referred to. While Püsök is generally careful to distinguish between the pseudonymous and the signed works, when she discusses these issues the references to different “authors” often fade away. This chapter, however, is not only the longest but also the most original and most important; here she interprets Kierkegaard’s ideas and elaborations or contradictions in the context of church history, systematic theology, dogmatics, and religious philosophy. Sometimes she reaches even farther afield when she refers to the inspiration of Kierkegaard’s views and logic of argumentation (mainly that of paradox) in theoretical physics, for example, in the thought of another Dane, Niels Bohr.12 The analysis is followed in the next chapter by an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s view of the church in this context. This discussion focuses both on the origins of Kierkegaard’s view (recalling his nickname, the “fork”) and on the experiences he must have had. The author’s complex and sympathetic picture of the passionate

The term “scandalizing” (Hungarian, botránkozás) properly expresses this notion. Bruce H. Kirmmse Kierkegaard and Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990. 10 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, New York: Cambridge University Press 2003. Besides the books of Kirmmse and Stewart, there are also references to others. 11 This chapter is based mainly on the Hungarian translations of Kierkegaard, and in the bibliography the edition of the collected works referred to is the first edition, published from 1901 to 1906 and the German edition of 1979–85. Neither the Hong translations nor Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter is listed (with the strange exception of vol. 9 of the latter). 12 See the book by James E. Loder and Jim W. Neidhardt, The Knight’s Move: The Relational Logic of the Spirit in Theology and Science, Colorado Springs: Helmes and Howard 1992. 8 9

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thinker refusing to come to terms with the basic principles of the religious community is contrasted with her critical evaluation of Kierkegaard’s work as diabolic. The most influential Lutheran thinker Karl Barth is the focus of the last chapter of the book as a very significant interpreter of Kierkegaard in his youth and a no less significant critic of the Danish thinker in later life. Barth rejects Kierkegaard’s subjectivism and cult of individuality since neither Pietism nor despair expressed in religious terms is acceptable for him. The dual portrait is, however, a very interesting analysis in comparative theology. Püsök’s important and original undertaking is a great achievement. Transylvanian Lutheran theology has its roots in the works of several great spirits of past centuries, but if it is to have a future as well, such efforts and achievements are very much needed. Even if in some respects some of the promises of the book have not been wholly fulfilled, the thinking about and understanding of Kierkegaard inspired by this work may establish a new discourse of theological issues that not only the Hungarian Lutheran church but all intellectuals, thinkers, and believers badly require. András Nagy

Review and Critical Discussion Avram Laura, “Egy hiteles Kierkegaard-kép,” Erdélyi Múzeum Évkönyve, 2011, pp. 201–3.

Anita Soós, “Ha egy arcot sokáig és figyelmesen szemlélünk...” [“If We Watch a Face Long and Carefully Enough...”], Budapest: Hass 2002, 236 pp.

As the author herself explicitly states, the main objective of this book is to map Søren Kierkegaard’s ironic attitude and style by reading his pseudonymous works in order to reveal the existence of the personality hiding behind the authorial masks and the deeper meaning of his texts which remain elusive for the average reader. The method employed by Anita Soós deliberately evokes the worlds of poststructuralism, deconstruction, and the aesthetics of reception at the same time.1 This excitingly eclectic approach is based on dominant models of aesthetics and literary studies. If we want to reconstruct her method, we can say that Soós assumes an author who is passively present in, or even disappears from, Kierkegaard’s works (Michel Foucault), and whose original task is taken over by a constructive reader being actively involved in the process of creation (Hans Robert Jauss). In interpreting the texts she treats them as open works (Umberto Eco) in which the chronologically constructed biographical structure proves to be intertextually penetrable (Gérard Genett) and even generates mutually deconstructive readings (Jacques Derrida), creating the possibility of dialogicity by providing alternatives which presume and exclude each another (Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva). The book has three main pillars and consists of three parts, accordingly. Part One, “The Approximate Definition of the Concept of Irony,” explores the concept of irony in general and points out a close relation between the views of Socrates, the Romantic authors, Kierkegaard, and postmodern thinkers with regard to irony as a play with masks. Part Two, “Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony,” aims to elucidate the novelty of his ironic attitude by analyzing his papers and journals and his dissertation, The Concept of Irony. Part Three, “The Author of Authors,” shows how irony, as an effective principle of textual organization, works in Kierkegaard’s authorial activity

1 Anita Soós, “Ha egy arcot sokáig és figyelmesen szemlélünk,” Budapest: Hass 2002, pp. 9–11.

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and the narrative structure of his texts, especially Either/Or, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, Stages on Life’s Way, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.2 Part One begins with a short overview of the historical precursors of Kierkegaard’s concept of irony,3 tracing them back to the central figure of Socrates. Soós then gives a hint at how ancient irony, which beginning as a rhetorical figure that broadened into a behavior and a way of life, could become a mode of philosophizing in German Romanticism in the nineteenth century and a part of postmodern thought in the twentieth. She then gives a parallel analysis of Romantic and Kierkegaardian irony. Their common feature is the use of irony as a general principle and a means of construction. But they also differ in that whereas in Romantic irony the irreconcilability of content and form demonstrates the impossibility of perfect communication, Kierkegaard can control his irony and employ it as a means of indirect communication. Soós detects further parallels in their protest against the almighty power of reason, which manifests itself first and foremost in the literary/philosophical/ aesthetic work of art that creates a new type of relation between author and reader. But whereas, according to Soós, the Romantic ironic artist flees into the world of fantasy through the artistically formed text, Kierkegaard hides himself in a fictionalized version of everyday reality, in the linguistic field of the text, thereby anticipating postmodern authors.4 This illustrative reconstruction is lacking something, however, because the reinterpretation of Romanticism is based on the insights of the Yale School formed in the 1950s (Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, Paul de Man), without taking into account the results of the research established by Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank in the 1980s. Furthermore, Romantic irony is represented primarily by Friedrich Schlegel, whereas the sometimes radically different views of Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger, Ludwig Tieck, Jean Paul, or E.T.A. Hoffmann are neglected. But Part Two5 makes it evident that the concept of irony can only be understood if we keep the necessary distance from the relevant theories of Danish and German Romanticism. Soós makes her readers aware that the basic ideas of Romanticism—such as the problem of the universe broken into pieces, the duality of the philistine and the artistic way of life, as well as the self-reflection of the split subject—are of high importance for Kierkegaard from his youth on. Yet he is likewise not attracted by the impossibility of bridging the abyss (Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis) or by the idea of reconciliation (Adam Oehlenschläger, Johan Ludvig Heiberg). Instead, he attempts to evince the paradox of existence so that we are able to live a human life in the world given to us. Soós offers a nice reconstruction of the process during which irony “becomes mature” in Kierkegaard’s early works. It starts with the “irony of life” representing a Romantic attitude (irony is outside the subject), then it reaches its peak in “irony as a controlled moment” (the subject himself becomes ironic), and ends with an irony that has lost its actuality (irony oversteps itself, laughs at its

2 3 4 5

Ibid., pp. 12–15. Ibid., pp. 17–33. Ibid., pp. 28–33. Ibid., pp. 35–72.

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own inanity, and cedes to humor). With this reconstruction Soós also anticipates the changes the concept will undergo on the bumpy road of “becoming a self” from the early notes, through the dissertation to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.6 It is not by accident, however, that Soós later focuses on the concept of irony as presented in the dissertation. Kierkegaard had three main references in creating the ironic personality: Socrates, the Romantics, and Hegel. It was by their example and counterexample that he formed his conception, which was rather malleable at the beginning. This complex relation comes to expression in the dissertation of which Soós gives a detailed and precise account.7 One of her main theses is that Kierkegaard’s own theory of irony takes us to truth and that the authors of the pseudonymous works also walk this way as the representatives of irony, giving it a practical justification, as it were. Hence the function of the pseudonyms is not to hide the real author but to get him closer to truth in a hidden way.8 Soós analyzes the indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works in this vein, too. In contrast to the widely accepted view of Ernst Behler, she does not identify it with irony, but rather she takes it as a means by which irony is expressed. She does not forget that this form of communication which prompts the reader to active co-operation also becomes a means of artistic conveyance for Kierkegaard.9 Soós ties Kierkegaard’s severe (and let me add, sometimes very biased) criticism of Romanticism to Kierkegaard’s own creating of a concept of irony. According to this criticism, the Romantic author strives to break free from the boundaries of everyday reality and to create the possibility of a new reality, but he falls prey to the seduction of possibility, so much that he wants to put his phantasms in the place of historical reality; as a consequence, his work is nothing but arbitrariness and mirage, penetrated by melancholy and anxiety.10 There is only one aspect in which Soós relates Kierkegaard’s irony to that of Romanticism (especially of Friedrich Schlegel): the simultaneous representation of theory (themes) and practice (the writer’s method) in the complex interrelation of author, text, and reader. Yet she thinks that Kierkegaard’s ironic procedure is more postmodern than that of Schlegel,11 and not unrightly so, in view of the complexity of the whole oeuvre. But we can remark that the historical-existential reinterpretation of the concept of irony by Kierkegaard is not an anticipation of postmodern efforts. For an irony that—as opposed to the Schlegelian one—leads the personality back to historical reality and thereby turns the attention beyond aesthetics to the questions of ethics and religion is ultimately aimed at understanding and thus at neutralizing irony. In Part Three, the chapter devoted to authorship12 opens with a historical outline of the use of pseudonyms. With a view primarily to the German Romantic

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Ibid., pp. 35–43. Ibid., pp. 44–62. Ibid., pp. 53–6. Ibid., pp. 67–72. Ibid., pp. 56–66. Ibid., pp. 66–7. Ibid., pp. 73–158.

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and the Danish literary traditions, Soós comes to the conclusion that Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity is of a different type: it is “a philosophically founded literary technique which establishes a special relation between author, text, and reader and plays a significant role in the process of reading, the interpretation of the text and its ‘after-effects.’ The pseudonym is nothing but a fiction of the self.”13 She analyzes this self-fiction and its requisites (titles and genre names, as well as prefaces and epilogues to texts, in addition to the use of pseudonyms) by employing Genette’s concept of paratext in an inventive way. In this respect, her boldest idea, inspired by Foucault, is that the authorial role taken not in the real but only in the functional sense can apply, beyond Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, to the works published under his own name, especially the upbuilding discourses or even to his papers and journals.14 Finally, the chapters on narration and intertextuality subject the problem of the self-fiction of the ironic author—treated hitherto thematically—to the procedure of textual analysis.15 Soós focuses on irony as a means of thematic and textual seduction by combining poststructuralist and deconstructive narratological readings, in a self- and hetero-referential intertextual web. As a translator for the Hungarian critical edition of Kierkegaard’s works, Anita Soós explores the texts with philological precision. Her literary approach can serve as an excellent starting point for those who want to read and interpret Kierkegaard’s works in the light of postmodern literary theoretical discourses. Judit Bartha

13 14 15

Ibid., p. 88. Ibid., p. 94. Ibid., pp. 159–208.

Review and Critical Discussion Gyenge, Zoltán, “Még egyszer az irónia fogalmáról. Soós Anita, ‘Ha egy arcot sokáig és figyelmesen szemlélünk,’ ” Pro Philosophia Füzetek, no. 4, 2002, pp. 123–9.

Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, Kierkegaard élete és munkái [Kierkegaard’s Life and Works], Békéscsaba: Evangélikus Egyházi Könyvkereskedés 1937, 148 pp.

When dedicating a book to Kierkegaard, the influential and devout Lutheran pastor Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi (1859–1941), head of the local community in the southeastern corner of Hungary, emphasized immediately in the title that both the life and works of the Dane would be the focus. This notion is of major importance for the argumentation and the logic of the book, since the facts of Kierkegaard’s biography (some of which are even fabricated and misinterpreted) are intended to assist in the proper interpretation of Kierkegaard’s authorship, particularly of those texts that are not easy to come to terms with for a devout Lutheran pastor. This short book is composed of ten chapters followed by twenty pages of notes. It provides an overview of Kierkegaard’s works, covering many of the significant events of his life and the majority of his books. The author’s basic intention is to be able to integrate the Danish thinker and his work into the Lutheran church, including those texts that are extremely critical of that very institution. The difficult task is made somewhat easier by the author’s unique advantage over his fellow-countrymen: he has access to the original sources thanks to his knowledge of Danish. The book was preceded by a short volume of Kierkegaard’s works, translated several years before by the same author: he refers in this volume also to the difficulties of translation.1 Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi’s studies in Berlin and his familiarity with Denmark provided him with the opportunity to rely on very important Danish monographs and publications on Kierkegaard as well as German ones. Thus he carefully lists books by Peter Andreas Heiberg, Torsten Bohlin, George Brandes, Harald Høffding, Albert Bärthold, and several others. The set of impressive references and the use of primary and secondary literature, however, soon become problematic for the reader because of the author’s inconsistent treatment of quotations. Sometimes it is not even clear who is the real author of the quoted text. This remains true also for the translations provided by the author from different works by Kierkegaard.

Søren Kierkegaard, Önvizsgálat. Ajánlva a kortársaknak and Isten változatlansága [For Self-Examination. Recommended to the Present Age and The Changelessness of God], trans. by Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, Békéscsaba: Evangélikus Egyházi Könyvkereskedés 1929.

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For example, even an imaginary dialogue between Kierkegaard and the late bishop Mynster is reconstructed in the book. In Szeberényi’s opinion, the key to understanding the authorship is Kierkegaard’s personality. This requires reference to the ancestors of the family, together with the many biographical details that may serve to account for his later thinking and activity. Szeberényi carefully lists the different personal details offered by the different biographies of Kierkegaard, liberally selecting events from them, such as Kierkegaard’s father “cursing God” in his childhood, the atmosphere of the home dominated by aging parents, the solitude of the child, and the many episodes that Brandes described in his book. It is all the more interesting that, for example, the events concerning Regine Olsen are hardly mentioned, while the Corsair affair is used to explain Kierkegaard’s alienation from the mob. (It is completed with anti-Semitic remarks as well, due to the editor of the magazine. This was a particularly delicate point in Hungary some months before the introduction of the country’s first racial laws.) In the book it is hard to distinguish between illustration and argumentation. However, regarding Either/Or, for example, the three stages are presented to demonstrate how Kierkegaard “tries to convince”2 his readers of the vanity of the aesthetic Weltanschauung, while leading them through the ethical stage to the religious one.3 In Szeberényi’s interpretation, Kierkegaard argues that all joy, whether carnal or spiritual, ends in despair, while in the ethical, although it is on a higher level that sin appears. The solution comes at the end of the book in the consoling truth that “no one is right before God.”4 The continuation would need to present the significance of Fear and Trembling, but no analysis of this work is given in the book; only random quotations of it are provided to convince the reader of its beauty. In Repetition, which follows, not only are the reasons for writing the book somewhat confused, but even the sources of the quoted texts become unclear. Finally, Stages on Life’s Way receives better treatment by Szeberényi, as the summary of Kierkegaard’s works.5 “Stages,” however, is translated as “standpoints” or “points of view” (álláspont), which may be misleading for readers, particularly in the context of Kierkegaard’s other works which refer to the “point of view” as authentically conceived. The description and analysis of the pseudonymous works mainly serve the author’s goal of explaining Kierkegaard’s anger against the Danish State Church as the outcome of psychological dilemmas and personal hardships. For Szeberényi, the Danish thinker’s attack on Christendom was a “sad detour,”6 and even a “break with his whole past.”7 The author’s logic, however, is paradoxically expressed by his conclusion that Kierkegaard wanted “not to destroy Christianity, but to defend

Lajos Zsigmond Szeberényi, Kierkegaard élete és munkái, Békéscsaba: Evangélikus Egyházi Könyvkereskedés 1937, p. 25. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 28. 5 Ibid., p. 33. 6 Ibid., p. 113. 7 Ibid. 2

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real Christianity, which he praised.”8 In this explanation, Kierkegaard attacked the authorities only in order that he should be able properly to defend them,9 while the works published under Kierkegaard’s own name were the proofs of his “real religiosity.”10 The “converted”11 Kierkegaard, as Szeberényi argues, is documented in the upbuilding discourses, which, in his view, becomes the center of the authorship. According to the author, this is how Kierkegaard’s thoughts on “real faith”12 can make not only a “Christian thinker”13 of him but even the “greatest Christian thinker of the nineteenth century.”14 This is not only a revisionist reading of the authorship, but also an ambivalently creative one, based on the author’s distinction between what the “real Kierkegaard must have wanted”15 in contrast to the resonance his works created among the “enemies” of religion. Szeberényi’s method of dividing the works and deeds of the great Christian thinker as opposed to the destructive genius was, as his later reviewer put it,16 to separate the healthy mind from the disturbed or even sick one. Commenting at length on different “psychopathic symptoms”17 of Kierkegaard that originated from his “melancholy and spiritual suffering,”18 the author even draws a parallel with Nietzsche’s madness and explains how Kierkegaard’s personality changed when confronting the church of Denmark. In searching for the origins of Kierkegaard’s anticlerical feelings, Szeberényi refers to his animosity towards the masses and also provides psychological explanations for this radical turn. Besides referring to the “sickness of the soul and the psyche” that includes “depression” and even “madness,” there is mention of “homosexuality”19 as motivation for his attack on Christendom. These arguments have remained in the Hungarian tradition of Kierkegaard interpretation for quite a long time. Szeberényi’s final judgment was that Kierkegaard had a “well deserved death”20 since he also misunderstood the role and concept of martyrdom, for which he was not suitable. The book did not have the same influence as those of other writers closer to the mainstream of Hungarian intellectual life. The work targeted a captive audience, as Gábor Kemény, the first reviewer of the book, put it, himself also a great intellectual from nearby Transylvania and of similar religious conviction. He understood and

Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., p. 69. 10 Ibid., p. 126. 11 Ibid., p. 67. 12 Ibid., p. 12. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 114. 16 Gábor Kemény, “Szeberényi Lajos Zsigmond, Kierkegaard élete és munkái,” Korunk, vol. 1, 1938, pp. 80–3. 17 Szeberényi, Kierkegaard élete és munkái, p. 44. 18 Ibid., p. 69. 19 Ibid., p. 143. 20 Ibid., p. 126. 8 9

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interpreted Szeberényi’s protagonist as a “great deceiver”21 who belonged to the “most stubborn and most talented destroyers of the history of the world.”22 The reviewer emphasized even in today’s context that “the first translator of Kierkegaard came from Békéscsaba,”23 and not only the book on Kierkegaard but other publications, too, were important in creating a locally significant center of Lutheran consciousness. Besides translating and interpreting Kierkegaard, Szeberényi was also founder and director of the periodical Evangélikus Egyházi Szemle (Evangelical Church Observer) and a socially sensitive intellectual facing the major tensions of a rural society on the margin of pre-World War II Hungary. His curse and his blessing were probably the same, since he was an unconditional believer and representative of the Lutheran church even if these two qualities were mutually contradictory. András Nagy

Kemény, “Szeberényi Lajos Zsigmond, Kierkegaard élete és munkái,” p. 80. Ibid., p. 80. It is of interest that the later interpreter of Kierkegaard, Béla Hamvas, married Kemény’s daughter Katalin, herself also a great intellect and an original interpreter of Kierkegaard in her essays and novels. 23 András Szilágyi, “S.A. Kierkegaard a keresztény Szókratész—magamat az egzisztenciában megkeresni” [“S.A. Kierkegaard the Christian Socrates: Finding Myself in Existence”] in A Hónap (Special issue, studies) Békéscsaba, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, p. 2. 21 22

Reviews and Critical Discussions Farkas, Szilárd, Søren Kierkegaard magyar recepciója az 1930-as évek végéig, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pécs, 2014; pp. 125–33. Gyenge, Zoltán, “Kierkegaard Forschung in Ungarn, Vergangenheit und Gegenwart,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, pp. 341–60; see p. 347; p. 353. Kemény, Gábor, review in Korunk, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 80–3. Koncz, Sánor, Kierkegaard és a világháború utáni teológia, Miskolc: Fekete Pál és Társai 1938, see p. 38; p. 163; p. 191; p. 193. Nagy, András, “Hungary: The Hungarian Patient,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, Tome II, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 155–88; see p. 162. — “Our Long Way From Enten-Eller to Vagy-vagy: The History of the Reception of Either/Or in Hungary,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2008, pp. 440–69; see p. 447. Szilágyi, András, “S.A. Kierkegaard a keresztény Szókratész—magamat az egzisztenciában megkeresni,” in A Hónap (Special issue) (Békéscsaba), vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, pp. 2–10.

László Széles, Kierkegaard gondolkozásának alapvonalai [The Basic Lines of Kierkegaard’s Thought], Budapest: Sárkány 1933, 86 pp.

The Basic Lines of Kierkegaard’s Thought, a short book by László Széles, was published by Sárkány in Budapest in 1930. With regard to chronology this is the second independent book in Hungarian about Kierkegaard, and, with regard to length, it is the first larger one. The central question addressed by the author is the message of the Danish thinker concerning the realization of an existence in faith, of Christianity. The first page of the book contains a list of Kierkegaard’s writings in German, which are later quoted by Széles. The study is divided into 8 chapters. The first (introductory) chapter is entitled “The Current Relevance and Purpose of Kierkegaard Studies.” In this chapter the author quotes opinions of several writers about the relevance of Kierkegaard, one of them being Harold Høffding, who said “Kierkegaard remains our eternal contemporary,”1 and this remains true even today. Chapter 2 presents the life and personality of Kierkegaard, while emphasizing the two “symbols” of his life (his father and his fiancée), and his subjectivism. The title of Chapter 3 is “The Critical Attitude of Kierkegaard.” In accordance with the then contemporary Kierkegaard research (in the 1930s), Széles emphasizes somewhat unilaterally the significance of the polemic against Hegel, and these ideas can be noticed also in the subsequent chapters. He stresses that Kierkegaard considered the abstract Hegelian ethics inadequate, especially when contrasted with the personal ethical approach that we find in his writings. Chapter 4, “The Great Plan: The Works of Kierkegaard,” is a brief presentation of the methodology and aims of Kierkegaard’s writings, namely, the dialectics of statements of existence. He enumerates the writings of the Danish author dedicated to answer the question: How does one become a Christian? Chapter 5, “The Issue of Subjectivism,” deals with the question which no Kierkegaard researcher can avoid, one of the fundamental ideas of the Danish thinker, namely, what is reality, and how does the individual relate to it? With the

1

p. 5.

László Széles, Kierkegaard gondolkozásának alapvonalai, Budapest: Sárkány 1933,

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use of quotations from Kierkegaard, the author stresses that reality is not an abstract idea but is existence itself, thus a real action; that is, “subjectivism is reality.”2 One of the most complicated chapters in the book is Chapter 6, “Dialectical Existentialism and the Categories of Existence: Existential Thinking.” Here Széles tries to explain the following categories: the leap (decision, choice), repetition, and paradox. In his analysis of the category of existence, he attempts to explain Kierkegaard’s conception of existence. He writes, paraphrasing Kierkegaard, “The human being is the synthesis of time and eternity.”3 This synthesis arises through the moment, and thus the moment is the atom of eternity. He writes at length about the importance of the leap, which does not span moments in time but rather binds them. Chapter 7 further explains the previous categories related to the Kierkegaardian stages. The author is right in stating that the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages do not alternate with one another but can overlap in such a way that the qualitatively higher stage transforms the lower level. With regard to the stages of Christian existence, Széles makes reference to two of Kierkegaard’s books: Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity. The pseudonymous writer of the former book, Johannes Climacus, does not consider himself to be a Christian. He is a simple enquirer, and accordingly he does not use the terminology of religious literature; he does not even call Jesus Christ by name but only circumscribes him as an absolute paradox, which is not a poem, but a miracle, a master, a savior, etc. Széles says by way of conclusion of the chapter: “if the misery of the era is that the cardinal religious categories lost their meaning and strength, Kierkegaard’s aim was to restore the lost power to the words.”4 The author points out a feature of the Kierkegaardian texts that only a few people succeeded in grasping, although it would be a basic requirement even today. In the age of emptying churches the art of communication should be a basic pastoral competence or skill. Kierkegaard is held up as a good example of translating the conventional religious terminology in an understandable way for his contemporaries, converting religious terms into useful concepts. While explaining complicated religious and philosophical ideas, the author of the book also had some difficulty. Perhaps due to the fact that he had studied both Kierkegaard’s writings and the secondary literature in German, and was one of the pioneer Hungarian Kierkegaard researchers, he struggled to find an acceptable Hungarian equivalent for many concepts and categories. The final chapter, “A Critical Appreciation,” is in fact the summary of the previous chapters. The author stresses the beneficial influence of Kierkegaard’s writings on Christianity, but he also reflects on his criticism of the church, which was one of the paradoxical tragedies of his personal life.5 He quotes Geismar, who said that the writings of Kierkegaard are “as a whole, missionary sermons for the

2 3 4 5

Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. 81.

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educated.”6 Lastly, the author apologizes to the Danish genius that—as he once foretold—he became a subject of research; however, by this statement Széles only wished to honor Kierkegaard and recognize the benefits of his ideas in the Hungarian universities. Sarolta Püsök

6

Ibid., p. 78.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Sándor Tavaszy, Kierkegaard személyisége és gondolkozása [Kierkegaard’s Personality and Thought], Kolozsvár (Cluj): Erdélyi-Múzeum-Egyesület 1930, 15 pp.

Kierkegaard’s Personality and Thought, a small booklet by Sándor Tavaszy, was published by Erdélyi-Múzeum-Egyesület as the 25th volume of the series “Erdélyi Tudományos Füzetek” (Transylvanian Scientific Booklets) in 1930.1 Sándor Tavaszy (1888–1951) was a Reformed theologian, philosopher, and publicist, who lived and worked in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár,2 the cultural center of Transylvania in Romania. Until World War II, Kolozsvár was an integral part of the European scientific-cultural environment, and its Hungarian population had an active relationship with academic life in Hungary. In Tavaszy’s time, it was still possible for a significant Hungarian work to be published in Kolozsvár, since it was only later that the communist dictatorship was able to disconnect the Hungarian scholarly life of Transylvania from the Hungarian and European cultural network. Tavaszy and his contemporaries spoke many languages and peregrinated to several universities in Europe. Tavaszy’s familiarity with Kierkegaard was mediated through the German translations; in his booklet he refers to the German translations of Kierkegaard’s works as well as to the then recent German secondary literature.3 Tavaszy’s booklet is very short, but it has to be included among the monographs about Kierkegaard since it is the first independently published comprehensive study about him.4 It is noteworthy that this first work of the Hungarian history of reception of Kierkegaard is, despite its brevity, a masterpiece of summarized presentation.

The Erdélyi-Múzeum-Egyesület (Transylvanian Museum Society) was founded in Kolozsvár/Cluj-Napoca in 1859; it is the largest academic scientific society of the Hungarians in Transylvania in Romania. 2 See the biography: Márton Tonk, Idealizmus és egzisztenciálfilozófia Tavaszy Sándor gondolkodásában, Kolozsvár and Szeged: Pro Philosophia Kiadó 2002. 3 The most quoted authors are Harald Höffding, Sören Kierkegaard als Philosoph, 3rd Printing, Stuttgart: Fr. Fromanns Verlag 1922, and Hermann Diem, Philosophie und Christentum bei Sören Kierkegaard, Munich: Kaiser-Verlag 1929. 4 Previously only a few articles about Kierkegaard had been published in Hungarian. The first of these was published by László Ravasz, the later Reformed bishop, in the 1

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In a footnote the author states that this essay is part of a larger, more detailed Kierkegaard study, which, alas, was never realized. The essay indeed resembles a summary of a larger monograph, a profound sketch, which includes all the significant information, but is in need of expansion in a larger work. The author divides his text into six sections. In the first of these, “General Aspects for the Appreciation of Kierkegaard’s Significance,” Tavaszy tries to describe the peculiar Danish writer. But he cannot be defined in ordinary terms since Kierkegaard calls himself a poet, a thinker, not a nineteenth-century philosopher. Tavaszy finds it impossible to categorize Kierkegaard into one particular genre, but he believes that we see the real Kierkegaard behind all of the different genres of his writing. Thus, according to Tavaszy, Kierkegaard transcends all classification as “someone able to pierce the soul of his age.”5 In the second section, “Kierkegaard’s Life,” the author discusses the nature of the relationship between Kierkegaard and his father, from whom Kierkegaard inherited his gloomy Christianity, and his inclination to melancholy and despair, which deeply influenced his life. Tavaszy also discusses Kierkegaard’s trip to Berlin; he refers to the fruitful writing period between 1843 and 1846 and to the last part of his life, the criticism of the church between 1846 and 1855 and the tragic end. However, the Regine episode is omitted. At the end of this section some German translations of Kierkegaard are listed. In the third section, “Kierkegaard’s Personality,” we encounter another side of Tavaszy. In the previous sections we see Kierkegaard’s biography offered very objectively and prosaically, but now the artistic writer comes out and gives a very lyrical description of Kierkegaard’s personality. He describes Kierkegaard’s complicated personality through the use of several metaphors, similes, and images from nature: In the landscape of Kierkegaard’s soul the sun-drenched, serene hills are almost imperceptible; however, it is full of abysses above which lightning flashes and high-voltage storms rage. In this life the majestic but grim voice of the moral world’s categorical imperative echoes almost permanently, not from some calculable human altitude, but straight from Zion, and this voice comes from the revelation of the law-enacting God, and echoes in Kierkegaard’s heart.6

In the fourth section, “Kierkegaard’s Relations in the History of Philosophical Thought,” Tavaszy names four personalities, whom Kierkegaard met personally or in his readings. In the metaphysical sense Kierkegaard considered Socrates his nearest relative. Hegel was the most influential personality of his time, and thus

Protestáns Szemle [Protestant Review], vol. 26, 1914, pp. 133–4. The very first study of a Hungarian author, which had been inspired by the Regine affair, was available only for German-speaking readers, because the young György Lukács published it in German, See “S. Kierkegaard und Regine Olsen” in his Die Seele und die Formen, Berlin: Egon Fleischel & Co. 1911, pp. 61–90. 5 Sándor Tavaszy, Kierkegaard személyisége és gondolkozása, Cluj-Kolozsvár, Erdélyi-Múzeum-Egyesület 1930, p. 4. 6 Ibid., p. 7.

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Kierkegaard could not avoid his influence; this, however, was an ambivalent relation. In Berlin, after initial enthusiasm, Kierkegaard took pleasure in Schelling’s critical lectures regarding Hegelian speculation, but he lost interest after Schelling himself began a mystical speculation. After his Berlin journey, Kierkegaard discovered that Trendelenburg had many ideas that he considered to be right, among others the criticism of Hegelian speculative dialectics, instead of which he emphasizes the importance of real dialectics. In the fifth section, “The Issue of Truth in Kierkegaard’s Approach,” Tavaszy states that all genuine philosophies deal with the problem of truth, and Kierkegaard’s own philosophy is no exception. At the same time, however, the issue of truth may only be emphasized and systematized in Kierkegaard’s work for the clarity of explanation, because he never built a philosophical system around this issue. Nevertheless, the question of truth is present in the whole of Kierkegaard’s corpus. He consistently stresses that only the single individual (in Kierkegaard’s words, “the one”) has authentic existence, because only he is concrete; the idea, the thought is abstract and only exists in the imagination. We need to be inside reality to be able to imagine it; that is, reality is an unfinished, permanent process, which cannot be contained within a system. The core question of the last section, “The Issue of Epistemology in Kierkegaard’s Approach,” is related to the previous one. Tavaszy points out a very important aspect of Kierkegaardian epistemology, that is, that cognition is always self-cognition, and in this process the “self” is not only the object of cognition but also its task.7 Tavaszy agrees that when discussing the issue of epistemology Kierkegaard cannot discard Hegelian philosophy. Hegel’s principle of identity was a provocation for him, to which he felt inclined to emphasize the principle of contradiction. With regard to cognition, the key words either/or mean that real existence and spiritual-intellectual development do not create a continuity composed of gradual transitions, because in existential reality great qualitative differences predominate, and these come into being through leaps and abrupt turns. Tavaszy concludes his work at the dawn of Hungarian Kierkegaard reception with the prophetic statement that Kierkegaard’s writings still hold a lot of food for thought, the discovery of which shall be the task of the future. Sarolta Püsök

7

Ibid., p. 15.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

IV. Secondary Literature in Italian

Isabella Adinolfi, Poeta o testimone? Il problema della comunicazione del cristianesimo in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard [Poet or Witness? The Problem of the Communication of Christianity in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard], Genova: Marietti 1991, x + 77 pp.

Poet or Witness? The Problem of the Communication of Christianity in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard is Isabella Adinolfi’s first published work. This study is part of a broader dissertation dealing with the problem of the relationship between philosophy and Christianity in modernity. With this study Adinolfi tries to fill a gap in Italian Kierkegaard studies. Indeed, up until the time of the publication of this work the issue of Christian communication had never been treated thoroughly. Despite the centrality of this topic in Kierkegaardian authorship, it had been investigated only marginally by Italian scholars.1 For this reason, from a methodological standpoint,

The author takes up this same topic again twenty years later in an article entitled “Insegnare il cristianesimo nel Novecento. La ricezione di Kierkegaard in Italia” (Teaching Christianity in the Twentieth Century: The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard), NotaBene. Quaderni di studi Kierkegaardiani, vol. 8, 2011, pp. 143–64. In this article, Adinolfi outlines the history of the Italian reception of Kierkegaard’s thought, specifically with regard to his theories of communication and his polemic against established Christianity. In the past, these themes had been discussed only briefly in more comprehensive studies on Kierkegaard. For this reason, it is not clear whether it is possible to talk about precursors of this study. A significant exception is Cornelio Fabro’s work, in particular his introductions to his translations of Kierkegaard’s texts, most importantly that of Scritti sulla comunicazione (Writings on Communication), vols. 1–2, ed. and trans. by Cornelio Fabro, Rome: Logos 1979–82. This anthology includes Den ethiske og den ethisk-religieuse Meddelelses Dialektik, Pap. VIII–2 B 79–89; Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed; Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed. En ligefrem Meddelelse, Rapport til Historien; Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger; Den bevæbnede Neutralitet eller min Position som christelig Forfatter i Christenheden, Pap. X–5 B 107,16; Angaaende Landsbypraestens Bog “om Mag. Kierkegaards Forfatter-Virksomhed.”

1

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the book deals mainly with Kierkegaard’s texts and does not make extensive use of secondary literature. Within the broader theme of communication, the author narrows her field of investigation down to the figures of the “witness” and the “poet.” These figures summarize the theory and practice of Christian communication in Kierkegaard’s authorship. Indeed, as Adinolfi points out, Kierkegaard often calls himself a “poet,” the “unhappy lover” of Christianity, as opposed to the figure of the witness to the truth. In Kierkegaard’s eyes, the witness embodies the Christian ideal, because he relates himself to the model in the medium of reality, preaching the Gospel through his own actions. By contrast, since the poet is able to express the ideal only through his words, he relates to it only through his imagination, and therefore he cannot put into practice the Christian teaching. Kierkegaard was fully aware of the ambiguity of the role that he assigned to himself, namely, that of the “poet of Christianity.” In fact, Kierkegaard always defined himself as a “poet,” but never as the “witness to the truth.”2 In the “Introduction,” Adinolfi explains that in her study the Kierkegaardian authorship will be looked at in the light of works such as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and The Point of View for my Work as an Author. Indeed, the author reads Kierkegaard’s authorship as a whole using, as hermeneutical principle, the texts in which Kierkegaard explicitly makes clear that he is and has always been a religious author.3 The question that Adinolfi’s study tries to answer is: Why did Kierkegaard arrange such a complicated plan in order to indirectly communicate Christianity? To answer this question, first she analyzes the features of Christian truth and explains how, according to these features, the revealed truth can be communicated. The Christian truth is not a science, and as such it cannot be the object of direct communication: the teacher has to master it and put it into practice in his everyday life. Second, Adinolfi explains how Kierkegaard put this theory into practice in his works through words rather than actions, emphasizing the importance of pseudonymity as well as the biographical elements in his authorship. After having outlined Kierkegaard’s theory of communication, Adinolfi takes a closer look at Kierkegaard’s works and his way of communicating Christianity within his authorship. She takes Kierkegaard at his word when, by defining himself

See also Cornelio Fabro, “Sull’essenza della testimonianza cristiana” (The Essence of Christian Testimony), Informazione e testimonianza. Archivio di Filosofia, vol. 3, 1972, pp. 40–54. 2 See, for example, SKS 21, 51, NB6:68 / KJN 5, 49. 3 Here the author is following Cornelio Fabro’s interpretation: Fabro “interprets Kierkegaard’s authorship according to the interpretation (Kierkegaard) gives in The Point of View...and as a consequence he recognizes that his works have always been religious” (Isabella Adinolfi, Poeta o testimone? Il problema della comunicazione del cristianesimo in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, Genova: Marietti 1991, p. 58 footnote). Nevertheless, Adinolfi clarifies from the outset that she is suggesting only one possible interpretation of the Kierkegaardian authorship (see ibid., pp. 5–6).

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a religious author, he shows that his authorship “directly or indirectly, has only one goal: to communicate Christ’s authentic message.”4 Why, then, although recognizing that the Christian truth can only be communicated within actuality, that is, through one’s actions, did Kierkegaard communicate only through his words, in the medium of ideality? Adinolfi points out that at the origin of this problem of the communication of the Christian truth is Kierkegaard’s complicated personality. According to the author, the fact that Kierkegaard published the edifying discourses under his own name indicates clearly that he was a religious author from the very beginning. Kierkegaard knew that a poet, even a religious poet, is not a true Christian, and “the awareness of his inclination toward poetry was the most intimate and profound tragedy of his life.”5 The poet is an aesthete, and as such he relates himself to the religious only via his imagination, his reflection. By considering himself a poet—and therefore without authority—Kierkegaard also sees himself as “the corrective,” as the instrument of Governance to make people attentive to the Christian truth. Adinolfi writes: “From an existential standpoint, Christianity is neither aesthetic nor ethical, from a theoretical standpoint, it is neither science nor faith, and from a historical standpoint, it does not coincide with the idle faith of Christendom...to communicate indirectly means, then, to reveal one’s thought in a indirect way, at the end of a reflective process.”6 Even though Adinolfi distinguishes between the aesthetic and the religious works—with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript as a turning point—she clearly states that it is not so easy to separate the author from his pseudonyms: “Each pseudonymous work has different meanings: an immediate meaning which is given by the content; a mediate meaning given by its place in the whole literary production, seen as a ‘plan’ or a ‘program’; and a personal meaning for the author.”7 Besides taking into account Kierkegaard’s own interpretation of his works, Adinolfi also considers the personal and private reasons that brought him to publish his aesthetic writings. His melancholy lies at the bottom of his escape in imagination: “by projecting this imaginary world in his books, Kierkegaard neutralized it.”8 But the private purposes have public echo because ultimately it is Governance that leads Kierkegaard to write his books. Being a poet, Kierkegaard communicates Christianity via ideality, through his words, even though he himself recognizes that the best way to teach Christianity is testimony. It is the deed that gives truth to the word. Objective truths require proofs, evidence, and subjective truths require an existential testimony because they cannot be demonstrated. More specifically, the Christian truth, a revealed truth, demands also a teaching (docere) because the

Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 41. 6 Ibid., p. 45. 7 Ibid., p. 48. For example, the content of “The Seducer’s Diary” is the description of the aesthetic life; the mediate meaning is maieutic; the personal meaning is that it was written to push away Regine. 8 Ibid., p. 51. See, for example, SKS 20, 97, NB:141 / KJN 4, 96–7. 4 5

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Christian revelation is a paradox that cannot be grasped rationally. The teaching and the practice in Christianity lead ultimately to martyrdom, the sacrifice of oneself, one’s death to the world. Only faith can give the pathos that is needed in order to preach Christianity and only through faith can one teach the Christian truth. If Kierkegaard saw himself as only just a poet, his place is among those who “disclose what truth is and what it demands but admit that their lives do not express it.”9 Even in the church struggle, Kierkegaard fought his battle only with words without putting them in practice. “Therefore”—Adinolfi concludes—“his communication of Christianity, although it is a very effective maieutics, remains incomplete: it lacks the driving strength of the model.”10 Laura Liva

9 10

SKS 25, 150, NB27:35 / JP 4, 4315. Adinolfi, Poeta o testimone?, p. 72.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Remo Cantoni, La coscienza inquieta. Sören Kierkegaard [The Restless Consciousness: Søren Kierkegaard], Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore 1949 (Il Pensiero Critico), 431 pp.

Remo Cantoni’s book, La coscienza inquieta [The Restless Consciousness], was first published in Milan in 1949 in the series Il Pensiero Critico [Critical Thought] and later reissued in 1976 by Il Saggiatore in Milan. The series Il Pensiero Critico was a collection of studies published by the big publishing house Mondadori, with the aim of presenting the most meaningful critical perspectives of contemporary thought, characterized by intolerance of any kind of dogmatism. The same title Il Pensiero Critico was also the name of the Italian philosophical review started by Remo Cantoni in 1950 and published until 1962 by the Istituto Editoriale Italiano, in Milan. Former pupil of the Marxist philosopher Antonio Banfi (1886–1957) at the University of Milan—to whom we owe the first Italian translation of Kierkegaard’s The Moment1—Cantoni with his review intended to remain in the philosophical line of Banfi’s review Studi Filosofici, a review started in 1940 as the organ of “critical rationalism.” According to Cantoni’s perspective, critical philosophy is connected to historical materialism in a way that humanism and historicism became the points of reference of his thought. Another characteristic of Cantoni’s perspective is the constant comparison between Italian and European philosophy. In this way, the work La coscienza inquieta represents, in the period when it was issued, the highest example of the “humanistic” reading of Kierkegaard, a restless “two-faced Janus” anguished among the different possibilities of existence. This work is, moreover, a part of Cantoni’s survey of several writers, who faced existence in its many-faced aspects without trying to give a systematic account of it. According

Søren Kierkegaard, L’ora. Atti d’accusa al cristianesimo del Regno di Danimarca [The Moment: Bills of Indictments against the Kingdom of Denmark], trans. by Antonio Banfi, Milan and Rome: Doxa 1931. This work is translated from the German edition of Hermann Gottsched and Christoph Schrempf. For a brief account of the history of this work see Ingrid Basso, “Italy: From a Literary Curiosity to a Philosophical Comprehension,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, Tome II, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 81–151, in particular p. 85. 1

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to this reading, Cantoni wrote essays on Dostoevsky, Kafka, Sartre, and Camus,2 the last three in the Appendix of La coscienza inquieta. Cantoni’s reading of Kierkegaard has to be understood in the context of Cantoni’s “historical humanism,” according to which philosophy does not have to solve the contradictions or dispel the aporias of experience, but it has only to establish their influence in the factuality that we try to manage. According to his view, the author tries to discuss Kierkegaard’s perspective from the same “atmosphere,” with a “lively sense of participation.”3 Cantoni emphasizes that Kierkegaard does not present any theoretical doctrine, but in any situation he simply “shows” acting characters for every “stage of life”: the esthetic, ethical, and religious. Cantoni’s book examines in depth the characteristics of every stage, very often quoting the words of Kierkegaard himself. The “phenomenological moments” described by Kierkegaard are not abstract contents of thought, but concrete stages, lively experiences.4 Nevertheless, in his analysis of the stages, the author notices that the movement of Kierkegaard’s thought always seems to look for a “universal,” although we do not obtain this universal human being as result of an ideal removal of the personal concreteness, but by keeping it in focus. In the ethical stage (Chapter II, “La scelta della personalità” (The Choice of the Personality)), Cantoni insists on the theme of the choice, looking at the concept of “negative decision” in contrast to the real ethical choice, which is presented in Either/Or and in the Stages. The concept of “negative decision” also appears in the analysis of the demonic attitude, which is a sort of autarkic choice for oneself. This negative choice is a kind of exclusion of possibilities. Cantoni describes the religious stage as a kind of non-static equilibrium, and he refers in this sense to the intermediate stages of irony and humor. In this way, he states, it would be even possible to talk about “esthetic-ethical,” “ethical-religious,” and “esthetic-religious” stages.5 Other aspects that Cantoni emphasizes are Kierkegaard’s position in contemporary literature as initiator of the “existentialist” novel, theater, and poetry, especially thanks to his theory of indirect communication.6 He, moreover, gives to existentialist philosophy its most positive and original concepts. But the most important message of Kierkegaard, according to Cantoni, is the idea of the possibility, the unpredictability of existence, which is the real limit to the “humanistic pride” of the human being, not only from a religious point of view. In his survey, Cantoni also makes great use of some classical international interpreters of Kierkegaard prior to his time, for example, Walter Lowrie, Torsten Bohlin, and Pierre Mesnard.

2 Remo Cantoni, Crisi dell’uomo. Il pensiero di Dostoevskij, Milan: Mondadori 1948 (2nd ed. Milan: Il Saggiatore 1975); “L’universo ‘indecifrabile’ di Kafka” [Kafka’s “indecipherable” Universe], Appendix to La coscienza inquieta, pp. 361–84; “La nausea sartriana” [Sartre’s Nausea], ibid., pp. 385–400; “L’uomo assurdo di Albert Camus” [Camus’ Absurd Human Being], ibid., pp. 401–15. 3 Remo Cantoni, La coscienza inquieta. Sören Kierkegaard, Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore 1949 (Il Pensiero Critico), p. 17. 4 Ibid., p. 28. 5 Ibid., p. 92. 6 Ibid., p. 11.

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La coscienza inquieta was criticized by several reviewers of Cantoni’s time and in a special way by the most influential Italian translator and interpreter of the Danish philosopher in Italy, Cornelio Fabro,7 who in 1952 pointed out that Cantoni totally forgot a fundamental question in Kierkegaard, that is, the problem of “how to become Christian,” while he gave more space to the themes of the aesthetic stage. Cantoni, moreover, did not sufficiently consider Kierkegaard’s strategy of the pseudonyms since he treats the word of every pseudonymous author as if it were Kierkegaard’s own. Other criticism came from Armando Vedaldi in his survey of Italian existentialist literature up to 1950. He points out that Cantoni’s monograph, despite some literarily brilliant pages, from a strictly philosophical point of view is very weak, since it only seems to be a long description of Kierkegaard’s works. This is also the point of another reviewer of the volume: Emanuele Caruso. Still in 1950, he points out that Cantoni’s enthusiasm and sympathy for Kierkegaard’s spiritual “atmosphere” weakens the force and rigor of the philosophical argumentation. Ingrid Basso

See Basso, “Italy: From a Literary Curiosity to a Philosophical Comprehension,” p. 91 and bibliography.

7

Reviews and Critical Discussions Caruso, Emanuele, review in Giornale di Metafisica, vol. 5, no. 2, 1950, pp. 241–2. Castagnino, Franca, Gli studi italiani su Kierkegaard 1906–1966, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1972, pp. 190–7. Fabro, Cornelio, review in Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, vol. 3, no. 4, 1952, pp. 134–5. Frieiro, Eduardo, review in Kriterion (Minas Gerais), vol. 5, nos. 19–20, 1952, pp. 267–8. Leger, Guy, review in Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, vol. 35, no. 4, 1951, p. 714. Vedaldi, Armando, “Recenti studi sull’esistenzialismo,” Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, vol. 5, no. 1, 1950, p. 159.

Simonella Davini, Il circolo del salto. Kierkegaard e la ripetizione [The Circle of the Leap: Kierkegaard and Repetition], Pisa: Edizioni ETS 1996, 123 pp.

Simonella Davini’s study on Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition was published by Edizioni ETS in 1996. At the time the work was issued, the Danish philosopher was often regarded as an asystematic, or even fragmentary, thinker. Such a view hinged mainly on two observations, namely, Kierkegaard’s peculiar communicative strategy and his ceaseless criticism of philosophical systems. Against this interpretation, Davini claims that Kierkegaard’s thought, although conveyed in manifold forms, is characterized throughout by a deep underlying systematicity. Likewise, Davini argues, his criticisms of Hegel’s system, upon closer inspection, prove to be aimed at denouncing its inconsistency—that is, its asystematicity. Against this background, Davini thoroughly analyzes the idea of repetition, trying to highlight the philosophical value of this Kierkegaardian existential category. Her book is divided into ten chapters, which explore the origin and meaning of repetition in connection with other fundamental Kierkegaardian categories, such as movement, the moment, and faith. In fact, movement is shown to be a pivotal concept in Kierkegaard’s reflections on the relation between thought and being. Davini examines the philosopher’s interest in categories of thought beginning with his notebook labeled Philosophica. There, Kierkegaard argues that being does not pertain to logic, and hence that defining existence by means of logical determinations entails a simple fallacy. The point is explicitly raised against Hegel’s doctrine of the identity of being and thought but also draws on Kierkegaard’s study of the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. Within this tradition, a key role is played by Aristotle’s doctrine of change (κίνησις). While reading the third volume of Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, Kierkegaard observes: “The transition from possibility to actuality is a change—thus Tennemann translates κίνησις; if this is correct, this sentence is of utmost importance.”1 As

1

SKS 19, 395, Not13:27 / JP 1, 258.

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Davini convincingly shows, Kierkegaard’s reading of Aristotle’s tenets on κίνησις is foundational to his rejection of Hegel’s doctrines. Regarding Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel, Davini analyzes the three criticisms that Vigilius Haufniensis singles out in The Concept of Anxiety. First, Hegel violates a fundamental epistemological rule, namely, that every scientific problem must have “its definite place, its measure, and its limit.”2 Second, Hegel’s alleged absence of presuppositions is at odds with the fact that he makes use of principles—such as negation, transition, and mediation—which are taken for granted and never accounted for. Finally, Vigilius rejects Hegel’s reflections on philosophical jargon as a “play on words.”3 All three points seek to identify the essential inconsistency in Hegel’s philosophical system and to reinforce Kierkegaard’s belief that thought and real existence belong to two mutually irreducible domains. The difficulty of placing the passage from thought to being within the realm of metaphysics was already regarded as a problem by Plato, who devised the category of the moment, that is, “the category of transition (μεταβολή).”4 Vigilius argues that since the age of ancient Greek philosophy no substantial progress has been made concerning the speculation on not-being. Accordingly, it is necessary to go back to the Greek view on change and movement. More precisely, we should restart from Aristotle’s conception of movement as the actualization of what is in potency. This is the line adopted in the Philosophical Fragments, where we find Kierkegaard’s most detailed account of κίνησις. In its “Interlude,” Johannes Climacus analyzes the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity, outlining an analytic framework which will enable Kierkegaard’s philosophy to “go beyond” the Greeks. Crucially, the basis for the determination of all three concepts is “the distinction between factual being and ideal being,”5 on the one hand, and the categorial difference between quality and quantity, on the other. Davini explores the historical sources of these distinctions, thus furnishing us with a clearer understanding of them. She argues that, especially under the influence of Schelling, Kierkegaard conflates all categorial distinctions into the opposition between factual being and ideal being, which, in turn, can be reduced to the fundamental difference between essence and existence. This suggests that the only movement that can be defined as an actual change is the qualitative one (κίνησις), insofar as it amounts to a passage from potentiality to actuality—hence, from an essential to an existential determination. This point is crucial to understanding the relevance of Kierkegaard’s idea of κίνησις with reference to his conception of history and to his views on ethics. In fact, since it is in one’s actions that κίνησις takes place, this real movement is what creates history— existence is the foundation of ethics. However, the only events that are capable of transforming reality—as Davini observes—are the leaps between two existential stages. In particular, what grounds man’s history is the leap of faith, which represents the individual’s consciousness of his or her freedom. This turning point in human

2 3 4 5

SKS 4, 317 / CA, 9. SKS 4, 320 / CA, 12. SKS 4, 385 / CA, 83. SKS 4, 246 / PF, 41.

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existence takes place in the moment, which—Vigilius Haufniensis argues—ought to be considered in light of its Christian meaning: the “first reflection of eternity in time.”6 The Greeks conceived of eternity in terms of a past time to which man can relate through reminiscence, and the Jews see it constantly as a future time to which they postpone their κίνησις. Yet, in the Christian view, the moment is at once the future and the past—which entails a contradiction: claiming that something will come into being which already was. As Davini shows, this is exactly what repetition amounts to: a circular argument, that is, an offense for human understanding. In Christian terms, repetition is faith, that is, accepting the paradox that lies behind human existence. Human beings are sinners insofar as they are existent, but the awareness of their own condition is only revealed to them by God, who re-gives to them the freedom which, as sinners, they had lost. Therefore, Davini can conclude that repetition, sensu eminentiori, means reconciliation. What is more, by coming into existence, Eternal Truth becomes a paradox for human thought, so that faith is not the condition to understand the truth, but, as it were, to perform it. In other words, repetition reopens the possibility for an ethics, which is a “new” ethics, or—as Vigilius Haufniensis calls it—a “second” ethics. This “second” ethics—Davini argues—edifies us by repeatedly calling upon our actuality and by pointing to repetition, that is, the constant reassumption of one’s past under one’s responsibility, as that in which freedom consists. Actualizing repetition means living in the awareness of what it means to exist qua human being. As Constantin Constantius writes, “Repetition—that is actuality and the earnestness of existence.”7 In the 123 pages that make up her book, Simonella Davini significantly contributes to our understanding of a fundamental but enigmatic category of Kierkegaard’s thought. It might be observed that the study lacks an explicit discussion of why Johannes Climacus in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript claims that repetition is a category that fails to go beyond immanentism.8 However, Davini does not neglect the problem of the development of Kierkegaard’s thought: she holds that the conceptual framework adopted in his pseudonymous works remains substantially the same. Finally, it is worth noting that the relatively limited reception of Il circolo del salto does not do justice to its analytic value. Not only is the book based on sound philological analysis, but it also casts light on at least three fundamental exegetical topics in Kierkegaard studies: Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Hegel, his redeployment of ancient Greek philosophy, and the originality and relevance of his own philosophical thought. Alessio Santoro

6 7 8

SKS 4, 391 / CA, 88. SKS 4, 11 / R, 133. See, in particular, SKS 7, 238–41 / CUP1, 262–5.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Adinolfi, Isabella, Il cerchio spezzato. Linee di antropologia in Pascal e Kierkegaard, Rome: Città Nuova 2000, p. 216. Longo, Giulia, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche: eternità dell’istante, istantaneità dell’eterno, Milan: Mimesis 2006, p. 175. Regina, Umberto, Kierkegaard. L’arte dell’esistere, Brescia: Morcelliana 2005, p. 85. Scaramuccia, Andrea, L’ironista nella botte, Pisa: Edizioni ETS 2006, p. 91.

Simonella Davini, Arte e critica nell’estetica di Kierkegaard [Art and Criticism in Kierkegaard’s Aesthetics], Palermo: Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica 2003 (Aesthetica Preprint), 78 pp.

Arte e critica nell’estetica di Kierkegaard was published in 2003 by the International Center for the Study of Aesthetics as the 69th issue of its journal, entitled Aesthetica Preprint.1 This volume is divided into two sections: the first is Davini’s essay, the second is her Italian translation of Kierkegaard’s article, “A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in Don Giovanni,” from 1845. The aim of Davini’s study is to examine Kierkegaard’s aesthetic theories according to the first meaning of the term “aesthetic” that was singled out by Adorno in his work Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic,2 where it refers to art or art theory (whereas the second meaning is the aesthetic as an existential sphere, and the third as a form of subjective communication). Davini tries to reconstruct a unified and coherent theory of art, in terms of both the production of and the reception of the work of art. According to the author, such a theory is traceable primarily in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. The reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic theory (understood as a systematic theory of the work of art) helps us understand Kierkegaard’s activity as a critic (both in literature and drama), but also illuminates his own art of communication. Indeed, this study highlights the significant correlation between Kierkegaard’s aesthetics (in his writings on the theory of art, particularly the first part of Either/Or) and his own rhetoric as an author. On the one hand, his aesthetic theory is part of his rhetoric as a polemical target; on the other hand, “certain traits of artistic production, as Kierkegaard conceived it, penetrate, more or less consciously, in his communicative practice: there is, for instance...a remarkable affinity between the pseudonyms and the characters of a play.”3 This book presents an unprecedented discussion of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic theory by tracing its foundation to the criterion of the “idea.” The “idea” is an aspect of

Simonella Davini, Arte e critica nell’estetica di Kierkegaard, Palermo: Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica 2003 (Aesthetica Preprint). 2 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen, Tübingen: Mohr 1933. 3 Davini, Arte e critica nell’estetica di Kierkegaard, p. 14. 1

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reality, an occasion that inspires the artist to create the work of art, and it is precisely the viewer’s understanding of this idea that is the principle of aesthetic pleasure. The work of art is said to be successful when it succeeds in transfiguring reality to show the idea in its very essence, and when, at the same time, the proper medium is used. Equally important for the evaluation of the work of art is its reception, because the viewer must be able to grasp the idea expressed in it and thus ascribe every detail to the idea (which, in turn, explains and justifies these details). After having defined Kierkegaard’s understanding of the work of art and his criteria for defining it as “successful,” the author shows how Adorno’s first two meanings of the term “aesthetic” are closely intertwined, not in the sense that to live aesthetically is to live artistically, but “in the sense that art, understood aesthetically, i.e., fine art, has as its object…the aesthetic stage of existence, but not the ethical and the religious stages or anything that pertains to them.”4 The first and third meanings, however, are related only to the extent that aesthetic representation is also indirect communication, although only in a broader sense, as a form of non-mediated communication, which posits the form of communication as a problem (and in this sense Davini speaks of “art beyond aesthetics”).5 In the last section the author looks more closely at the theory of the reception of the work of art and the activity related to it, namely, art criticism. This analysis constitutes the introduction to the pseudonymous article “A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in Don Giovanni,” written by A, which is included in the appendix to this volume. According to Davini, this feuilleton is “extremely representative of Kierkegaard’s critical method.”6 This criticism is part of the theoretical framework presented in “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” from Either/Or, Part One, where A argues that Mozart’s Don Giovanni is an absolute masterpiece due to the fact that there is a perfect congruence between matter and form, the idea and the medium through which it is realized. In this case, “the aesthete’s fleeting comment...is not the externalization of unquestionable taste preferences, but it stems from a certain interpretation of Mozart’s masterpiece…which in turn presupposes a whole system of aesthetics.”7 In fact, “by treating a detail, it is actually possible to say something about the whole.”8 Even in drama, which is the object of focus in this text, “it is not the virtuosity and the technical perfection that determine the success/perfection of a work of art and therefore also of that work of art which is the interpretation of a role, but its appropriateness, its adequacy in relation to the idea.”9 This book represents an original contribution to Italian Kierkegaard scholarship because it investigates a topic that has never before been treated thoroughly. Indeed, while the second meaning of the aesthetic (an existential stage) has always received a great deal of attention from scholars and readers, and the third (Kierkegaard’s

4 5 6 7 8 9

Ibid., p. 35. Ibid. Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 53. Ibid. Ibid., p. 55.

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rhetoric) has in recent years acquired an important role in Kierkegaard research, the first has always been neglected. The primary reason for this is the widespread opinion that Kierkegaard has no systematic theory of art and beauty, but simply borrows from aesthetic theories developed by other authors (such as Aristotle, Lessing, Hegel, and Heiberg). According to this view, it would be impossible to unify Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the matter into a coherent system. In contrast with this interpretation, Davini shows how it is possible to identify a systematic approach to aesthetics in Kierkegaard’s texts—albeit always presented in a fragmentary form. Moreover, this study supplies the Italian reader with an unpublished translation of Kierkegaard’s text that fits well as a complement of Davini’s theoretical analysis. Laura Liva

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza [Between Kierkegaard and Marx: Towards a Definition of Existence], Florence: Vallecchi Editore 1952, 242 pp.

The study by the Catholic priest and Thomist philosopher Cornelio Fabro (1911–95), entitled Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza, was published first by Vallecchi Editions in 1952, in Florence.1 The second edition was issued by Logos in 1978, in Rome.2 Yet another edition was published by Edivi in 2010, in Segni; this printing appears as volume 9 in the Opere Complete edition of the Italian philosopher, which is being edited today in the original language.3 In general, Fabro’s thought is known by philosophers in the tradition of Thomism or Italian neo-Thomism. His work is basically a reflection and in certain respects a rediscovery of the actus essendi, a notion whose rigorous character gives the appearance of the doctrine of a medieval doctor in all its speculative originality and fertility. Based on these investigations, Fabro made a profound critical confrontation with some of the most representative authors of modern and contemporary thought. In addition to his extensive and numerous exegetical articles and books on the notions of being and participation in Aquinas’ work, Fabro dedicated himself—especially in his final years—to the study of the problem of freedom. Related to this issue is the decisive encounter between the Italian philosopher and the work of Kierkegaard, whose thought strongly influenced the course of Fabro’s writings, statements and subsequent speculative interests. Tra Kierkegaard e Marx is a collection of essays written immediately after World War II and aims to guide the reader through the two major trends that emerged in the mid-twentieth century, namely, Marxism and existentialism. The work treats

Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza, Florence: Vallecchi Editore 1952. (All references in the following will be to this first edition.) 2 Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza, Rome: Logos 1978. 3 Cornelio Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza, vol. 9 (2010) in Opere Complete, ed. by Marcelo Lattanzio, Segni: Edivi 2005ff. 1

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primarily the radical problem of man, that is, the dilemma of freedom. Fabro writes: “It concerns the freedom of the human being, [i.e.,] his decision, to determine his being and that of the world. It is only about seeing whether the human being’s decision can be founded in itself, in its becoming, or whether it requires a metaphysical, and therefore theological, dimension.”4 Fabro believes that both Marxism and existentialism have lost contact with the Absolute and therefore have become prisoners of the principle of immanence. For the author, Kierkegaard and Marx are two imposing figures who do not lose themselves in academic debates. The alternatives that they present are extreme and unambiguous. They postulate opposing positions in the context of the same problem. Fabro juxtaposes and analyzes the key points of their thoughts because he believes they share one and the same passion: “the salvation of man.”5 These two authors do not lose themselves in generic (or general) studies, indifferent to the context and personal circumstances of the particular man, but rather they have a revolutionary character because they focus on the real concerns of life. Contrary to Hegel and his assertion of universal abstraction, they assume as their supreme goal the individual, the singular person who experiences the unique dimensions of his being in space and time. For Kierkegaard and Marx, the conquest of the authentic self is produced by a leap (Sprung). For the former, this leap is made by the act of faith in Christ; for the latter, it is made by the violent rupture of class struggle. The antithesis is clear. The one represents Christian personalism, while the other represents historical materialism. Fabro points out that the originality of Marx’s work consists, first, in the development of the dialectic of the empirical reality of man, which was discovered by Feuerbach, and, second, in his special vision of human labor, which, along with scientific communism, called for the end of private property. However, Fabro makes severe criticisms of Marxism. He does not deny that there are Marxists who have a sincere aspiration for social justice. But he calls into question the absoluteness of the focus that they adopt and the deterministic nature of the dialectical process, which ends up reducing everything to an economic historicism.6 The Marxist political praxis does not act by serving as the basis of truth. Therefore, it avoids any metaphysical aspect and ends with a “non-philosophy” by imposing its own ideology. Hence Fabro reaches the conclusion: “Marxism is not inhumane because it is atheist, but it is atheist because it is inhumane; it is the biggest scam on mankind ever to be attempted.”7

Fabro, Tra Kierkegaard e Marx: per una definizione dell’esistenza, p. 7: “È alla libertà dell’uomo, alla sua decisione, che tocca decidere del suo essere e di quello del mondo. Si tratta soltanto di vedere se la decisione dell’uomo si consolida in se stessa, nel suo divenire, o se esige una dimensione metafisica e quindi teologica.” 5 Cf. ibid., p. 14. 6 Cf. ibid., p. 20. 7 Ibid., p. 77: “Il marxismo non è disumano perché ateo, ma è ateo perché disumano, è la più grande truffa che mai sia stata tentata all’essere dell’uomo.” 4

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Considering existentialism in general, Fabro believes it has a genuine metaphysical demand because it focuses on the situation of man’s concrete being. Existentialism has, as its fundamental orientation, the concrete subject in the exercise of his or her individual freedom. However, the various positions taken under the general heading “existentialism” are not without some ambiguity. All existentialists agree in their opposition to idealism, while maintaining the Kierkegaardian principle that argues for the essential unsystematic character of the existential categories. But their various formal analyses frustrate the well-meant intentions at their point of departure. The spiritual requirement and Kierkegaard’s existential dialectic of the common or essential man are replaced by a formal structure of existence itself, according to a particular theory of consciousness and a particular type of being (sum). Fabro writes: “The affirmation of sum is phenomenological-ontic in Heidegger, phenomenal in Abbagnano, ontological-phenomenal in Sartre, logical-ontological (with a Kantian background) in Jaspers, trans-ontological in Marcel and his partners of the spiritual dialectic of the I-Thou (M. Buber, Ferd. P. Ebner, Cullberg, etc.).”8 Consequently, contemporary existentialism ends up corrupting the genuine existential perspective. Fabro notes—with a certain perplexity—that existentialists return to the same idealistic system that they criticized at first.9 In fact, they also reject the metaphysical foundation of essence, and assume the same negativity that is the driving principle of the Hegelian dialectic. Despite this criticism, Fabro believes that existentialism has some positive elements. Based on these, he sees a possible initial outline of a spiritual existentialism, that is, an existentialism, the center of which is the positivity of freedom and man’s metaphysical journey towards the Absolute. In this sense, according to Fabro, if we speak of a strictly spiritual or theological existentialism, Kierkegaard is the only figure worth mentioning. In other existentialist authors, the theological moment of the relation to God is either openly absent or viewed from a purely phenomenological, descriptive, or intuitive angle that fails to define the relation regarding the dilemma of existence. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, man is only truly free when he is before God. There is no contradiction, therefore, between human freedom and divine omnipotence. Freedom is the choice to choose only what one must choose, to choose the Absolute. The problem of man, which neither Marxism nor existentialism (left or right) can solve, is the enigma of freedom in the passage from possibility to reality. Moreover, Fabro says that man must become the transcendental possibility of the choice itself—precisely by the choice of the Absolute.10 He must do this first in order to enter into reality. Kierkegaard’s speculative itinerary regards God himself as the foundation of freedom. Kierkegaard’s theological core is the supreme act of faith, an act that leads

Ibid., p. 123: “L’affermazione del sum resta per es. in Heidegger fenomenologico-ontica, in Abbagnano sembra fenomenologico-attualistica, onto-fenomenista in Sartre, logico-ontologica—a sfondo kantiano—in Jaspers, Buber, P. Ferd. Ebner, Cullberg, ecc.” 9 Cf. ibid., p. 130. 10 Cf. ibid., p. 179. 8

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to the Incarnation and Redemption, and reaches true fulfillment in the imitation of Christ. Only after one manages to imitate Christ, does one attain salvation. From this approach, Fabro ends his book with the following words: “Any decision a human being plans in his authentic being as spirit and concerning his ultimate destiny is intrinsically dialectical, and is dependent on the actualization of his personal freedom in the relationship which it [sc. his personal freedom] has to have towards the Absolute. And this is rigorously theological existentialism, that is, Christian existentialism.”11 Cornelio Fabro’s book, in short, develops the following issues: the differences between the dialectics of Kierkegaard and Marx; the paradoxes of communist ideology and the foundations of Marxist atheism; the meaning of existentialism in its metaphysical view and the ambiguity of its existential subject; the theological structure of Kierkegaard’s existentialism and its relationship with Christian thought. All these issues are addressed with particular sharpness in order to explain the very foundation of freedom of the human spirit. The polemical tone and the strong criticism raised by Fabro against Marx, in favor of Kierkegaard—who, at that time, was rarely studied in Italy—were not well received, as one can imagine, by the Marxists. However, beyond a few isolated responses, Marxist theorists preferred to avoid any confrontation with the principles set out by the Italian philosopher, and applied themselves directly to the social question and revolutionary activity, which led Fabro, in later writings, to new recriminations. Cristian Eduardo Benavides

Ibid., p. 238: “Ogni decisione che progetta l’uomo nel suo autentico essere di spirito e sul suo ultimo destino è intrinsecamente dialettica, sospesa all’attuarsi della sua libertà personale nel rapporto ch’essa deve avere all’Assoluto. E questo è Esistenzialismo rigorosamente teologico ovvero cristiano senz’altro.” 11

Reviews and Critical Discussions Acerbi, Ariberto, “Fabro e l’assimilazione metafisica dell’esistenzialismo,” in Crisi e destino della filosofia. Studi su Cornelio Fabro, ed. by Ariberto Acerbi, Rome: Edusc 2012, p. 431. Dalledonne, Andrea, “Cenni sul pensiero e sull’opera del padre Cornelio Fabro,” in Cornelio Fabro, pensatore universale, ed. by Andrea Dalledonne and Rosa Goglia, Frosinone: Bianchini 1996, p. 34. Davini, Simonella, “Cornelio Fabro and the Reception of Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2004, pp. 356–69. Fontana, Elvio, Fabro e l’esistenzialismo, Segni: Edivi 2010, p. 48. Grusovin, Marco, “Convergenze e divergenze nelle letture di Kierkegaard,” in Verità e libertà. Saggi sul pensiero di Cornelio Fabro, ed. by Gabriele De Anna, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2012, pp. 113–22. Sánchez Sorondo, Marcelo, “Circolarità fra libertà ed essere assoluto per partecipazione in Cornelio Fabro,” in Cornelio Fabro e il problema della libertà, ed. by Federico Costantini, Udine: Forum 2007, p. 44.

Roberto Garaventa, Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard [Anxiety and Sin in Søren Kierkegaard], Rome: Aracne 2007, 240 pp.

Roberto Garaventa’s study Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard was published by Aracne Press in 2007. Roberto Garaventa is an eminent Italian scholar of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. He is Professor at the University G. d’Annunzio of Chieti-Pescara and the President of the Italian Kierkegaard Society (S.I.S.K.). The importance and originality of Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard for the Italian Kierkegaard reception consists in the fact that it highlights Kierkegaard’s psychological (and not dogmatic) reflection on sin in its peculiar and crucial relationship with anxiety. The goal of Garaventa’s book is to analyze the main topics discussed by Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety and to place them in their historical and cultural context. These topics include the central reflection about anxiety in all its forms (anxiety about nothingness, anxiety about evil and good, anxiety about sexuality, anxiety about the finite) in an age where the scientific psychology was in fieri;1 the hermeneutical nexus between anxiety, freedom and sin at the moment of choice, when the single individual has to decide about his own existence; the necessity to rediscover the importance of sin in a culture (the age of Enlightenment first, then Romanticism), where it seems to have fallen into oblivion; the relationship between choice and daily concerns in a neo-pagan Christendom; the demonic character of many aspects of the modern “liquid” modern society,2 and the importance of faith—of Christianity tout court as “dialectical and existential appropriation”3—as “guidance” for the single individual for a deep understanding of himself and as the only alternative to despair. First of all, the author highlights that at the center of both Kierkegaard’s philosophy and anthropology there is no Hegelian concept of reconciliation (Versöhnung), but rather the concept of sin (Synd ), that is, “the collapse of

As Michael Theunissen remarks, Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety gave the most decisive contribution to the discussion about the concept of anxiety among philosophers (Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre), psychologists (Horney, May, Rogers, Sugarmann) and theologians (Tillich and Drewermann). See Michael Theunissen, Das Selbst auf den Grund der Verzweiflung. Kierkegaards negativistische Methode, Frankfurt am Main: Hain 1991, pp. 11–15. 2 See Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press 2000. 3 Roberto Garaventa, Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard, Rome: Aracne 2007, p. 46. 1

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the ethical-religious destination,” and this “is related to the question of the Kierkegaardian becoming oneself ”;4 this concept “denotes a modus vivendi.”5 The Kierkegaardian conscience of sin is strictly related to the human experience of the “dissociated” (Schelling), “despairing” (Anti-Climacus), and “alienated” (Tillich) character of his own existence, and it is just in this perspective that Garaventa distinguishes the Kierkegaardian point of view from Schleiermacher’s conception of sin as “inhibition” (Hemmung) of the “conscience of God,” as well as from the conceptions of Erweckungstheologie (August Gottlieb Tholuck and Julius Müller), where the concept of sin has a metaphysical-speculative (Schelling, Franz von Baader, Carl Daub) and moral meaning ( peccatum est iniquitas): sin is always the result of the single individual’s relationship with himself, and it requires a voluntary and responsible decision. Secondly, Garaventa remarks that The Concept of Anxiety presents a fundamental and unprecedented contribution to the topic of sin, because in his point of view sin is linked with freedom and anxiety: when the single individual—in the vertigo of freedom and anxiety—must choose either the finite or the infinite, he prefers to hold onto the finite, that is, sin aversio a deo et conversio ad creaturam. In his longer Chapter 4, Garaventa points out Eugen Drewermann’s interesting psychoanalytic and theological reception of Kierkegaard’s concepts of anxiety. For Drewerman, the anxiety of freedom produces evil and neurosis, and the psychoanalysis is unable to face ambiguity of the human nature. “In line with Kierkegaard,” writes Garaventa, “Drewermann conceives of sin in a religious-existential sense, namely, as a way of life based on a voluntary separation from God, caused by anxiety.”6 The human being himself is the cause of his despair, which is the wrong way to react to anxiety, “a distorted and unilateral form of existence, the consequence of a wrong relation between the self and its own self, of the escape from freedom and not an exterior necessity.”7 To put Garaventa’s book in its proper and characteristic perspective, which marked a positive turn away and refreshing break from the general paradigm of reception which had been dominant in Italy, one should compare his interest in exploring the issue of anxiety with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s and Emanuel Hirsch’s positions. For Pannenberg (as well as Gerhard Ebeling), sin cannot be explained by virtue of anxiety8 but rather as the consequence of sin (understood as selfishness and assigning blame to ourselves); according to Hirsch,9 Kierkegaard’s conception

Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 28. 6 Ibid., p. 196. 7 Ibid., p. 205. About this, see my recent work, Alessandra Granito, Eugen Drewermann interprete di Kierkegaard. Le quattro forme kierkegaardiane della disperazione rilette alla luce della psicoanalisi, Naples: Orthotes 2013. 8 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1983, pp. 93ff.; pp. 98ff.; pp. 127ff.; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vols. 1–3, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1983–93, vol. 2, pp. 386ff. 9 Emanuel Hirsch, Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie, vols. 1–5, 4th ed., Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn 1968, vol. 5, pp. 91ff. 4 5

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of sin and of anxiety as the predisposing factor to the sin denotes an innovative and positive perspective compared to the Augustinian tradition. Garaventa explains Kierkegaard’s reflection in a critical and ambivalent way: since anxiety marks human existence ontologically and structurally, can sin really be understood as free choice? Is it really possible to talk about guilt and sin in relation to mistaken human choices? Is anxiety the psychological root of sin, or it is the reflection of an ontological condition of finitude and limitation, a kind of malum metaphysicum or malum mundi that is the basis of the human propensio ad peccatum? Garaventa does not provide us with answers but with a fascinating and suggestive hermeneutical horizon, and he paves the way for further investigations into the complex relation between sin and anxiety in Kierkegaard’s work: “it seems that Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety is a kind of escamotage in exonerating God from the responsibility of having created a realty (the human condition) marked by a constitutive malum metaphysicum, namely, by a condition of ‘sinfulness’ (Schleiermacher, Troeltsch), ‘alienation’ (Tillich) and ‘misery’ (Pannenberg), which is the basis of the emergence of every physical and moral evil.”10 Alessandra Granito

10

Garaventa, Angoscia e peccato in Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 28–9.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Berardini, Sergio Fabio, “La malattia per la morte” di Kierkegaard. Introduzione e commento, Rome: Aracne 2010, p. 29. Granito, Alessandra, “La fenomenologia della disperazione come critica della società,” in Il discepolo di seconda mano, ed. by Diego Giordano and Roberto Garaventa, Naples: Orthotes 2011, pp. 29–71. — Eugen Drewermann interprete di Kierkegaard. Le quattro forme kierkegaardiane della disperazione rilette alla luce della psicoanalisi, Naples: Orthotes 2013, pp. 143–4; pp. 155–6.

Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio, L’estetico in Kierkegaard [Aesthetics in Kierkegaard], Naples: Liguori Editore 1992, 197 pp.

Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio’s study on Kierkegaard’s aesthetics was published in 1992 by Liguori press, in the book series “Teorie e oggetti della filosofia” (“Theories and Objects of Philosophy”).1 The book is divided into two parts: in the first, the author analyzes the aesthetic experience as existential, philosophical, and religious, while in the second part she deals with the three major “figures of the aesthete”: the poet, Don Giovanni, and the seducer. The overall aim of this study is to analyze and at the same time re-evaluate the aesthetic life-view. The author sees this as “one of the elements or, better yet, one of the dialectic cores of Kierkegaard’s vast authorship. Nevertheless, the aesthetic never denies the explicit religious goal of his work.”2 The book represents an attempt to explore one of the deepest and most painful conflicts in Kierkegaard’s authorship (and in his own life): the tension between, on the one hand, the aesthetic temptation of poetry and poetic imagination and, on the other hand, the desire to be consistent with the Christian faith. Indeed, Giannatiempo Quinzio’s book emphasizes that the true Kierkegaardian either/or is that between poetry and faith, that is, the conflict between, on the one hand, a poetic truth that exists only in imagination and ultimately leads to inauthenticity and despair, and, on the other hand, the religious way of life. The aesthetic is the human experience in its finitude and immediacy; it is one of two dialectical poles that constitute the “self” (which is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite). But the aesthetic is also a dialectical pole of the alternative that allows the choice of the absolute. In fact, neither the religious nor the aesthetic can be grasped by reason.

As the author explains in a closing note, a shorter version of the first chapter “L’infelicità del poeta” (The Unhappiness of the Poet) had previously been published in the journal Bailamme, vol. 3, 1988, pp. 239–52, with the title, “La poesia e la sua ambiguità. Una lettura dei ‘Diapsalmata’ di Kierkegaard” (Poetry and Its Ambiguity: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s “Diapsalmata”). A shorter version of the second chapter “Don Giovanni. La seduzione del desiderio e la fugacità dell’attimo” (Don Giovanni: The Seduction of Desire and the Fleeting Moment) had been published a year later in Bailamme, vol. 4, 1989, pp. 169–87, with the title “Don Giovanni e la seduzione del desiderio” (Don Giovanni and the Seduction of Desire). See Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio, L’estetico in Kierkegaard, Naples: Liguori Editore 1992, p. 191. 2 Giannatiempo Quinzio, L’estetico in Kierkegaard, pp. 130–1. 1

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The existential truth finds poetry as a limit and as a possibility for expressing this truth: the poet sees the ideal but cannot put it into practice. Because of this impossibility the poet is in despair. Giannatiempo Quinzio offers a thorough analysis of the poet’s despair, both as described in the aesthetic writings (particularly the “Diapsalmata”), and according to Kierkegaard’s own account in his journals and papers. In the first part of the book, entitled “The Aesthetic Experience,” the author analyzes the aesthetic experience in three different perspectives. First, the aesthetic is considered as one of the stages or existential “spheres.” While little attention is paid to the ethical, this chapter focuses on the figure of the poet. This figure is closely related to the religious stage—in order to emphasize that the fundamental “either/or” is the one between the aesthetic and the religious. There are many aesthetic figures who represent different “life views,” but they have one feature in common, that is, the contradiction “of not knowing whether their life was really lived or whether it was just their imagination or a particular mood.”3 In sharp contrast to academic philosophy and abstract thinking, the representation of different aesthetic figures also becomes a way of communicating the “existential” truth. The aesthetic is thus a way to the truth, but a way that is also “deceptive”: the religious poet is the one who “deceives” people into the truth. Secondly, the aesthetic is interpreted by means of a close reading of Kierkegaard’s private journals. In fact, Kierkegaard himself is the poet—and many examples that sustain this theory are found in the journals and papers. The suffering that comes from experiencing the duality between reality and dream characterizes not only the poet’s life, but also the life of Kierkegaard himself. In support of this argument, Giannatiempo Quinzio draws a number of examples from the journals, describing some of the features that characterize both Kierkegaard’s personal experience and that of the aesthete (the alternation between different moods, the interesting, boredom, the subjunctive mode of existence, etc.)4 The inability to relate to actuality, to make a choice for himself results in despair. Nonetheless the poet is tempted to “remain a prisoner of the dream world precisely because the dreamed existence replaces the reality with such an intensity that it eventually dissolves reality itself.”5 The reality of the self is also dissolved along with external reality. Kierkegaard’s authorship is the result of his tormented personality; indeed, he writes to save himself from his melancholy.6 However, “even melancholy is ‘dialectic,’ i.e., it has its own intrinsic ‘duplicity’: it is the melancholy that gives rise to the ‘poet,’ but at the same time being a poet saves him from his melancholy.”7 Third, the aesthetic is also linked to the problem of the “truth,” which for Kierkegaard was not only an abstract concept but also an existential one. The problem of the relationship between “poetry” and “truth” is complicated and

3 4 5 6

Ibid., p. 27. See ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 70. See, for example, SKS 18, 171, JJ:99 / KJN 2, 158–9; SKS 20, 83–4, NB:108 / KJN 4,

82–3. 7

Giannatiempo Quinzio, L’estetico in Kierkegaard, p. 71.

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underlies Giannatiempo Quinzio’s study, which is based on the assumption that the entire Kierkegaardian authorship is religious. This problem is in fact at the core not only of Kierkegaard’s thought but also of his experience as “single individual.” In order for the poet to be a witness to the truth, his existence must follow this very ideal: “The problem of the relationship between ‘poetry’ and ‘truth’ accompanied Kierkegaard throughout his entire life and was the dialectical knot that tore him apart until the end.”8 In front of the truth of faith (the paradox) Kierkegaard knows that he is not a witness, and therefore “he goes back to being ‘poet’: a poet, we might say, to the ‘second power’ or ‘second immediacy.’ ”9 Here lies the transition from the figure of the poet to the figure of the religious poet. In the second part of her book, Giannatiempo Quinzio analyzes in detail three figures of the aesthetic. The first one is the unhappy poet, and many themes from the first part of the book—in particular the dualism aesthetic/religious—are analyzed in this chapter. The figure of the poet is problematic because, although it belongs to the aesthetic, it does so only in an ideal form (abstractly): This is the reason why in Either/Or the poet comes first, before Don Giovanni, the “immediate seducer” and even before the “reflective seducer”: The poet has no concrete relationship with reality, his world is the “ideal,” the realm of possibility....All the other aesthetic “figures” have a certain relationship with reality. It is not reality that disappoints them, but rather it is the way they relate to it that is illusory and fantastic. Every one of them is in fact searching for “something”—Don Giovanni pleasure, Faust knowledge, and the Wandering Jew his land or an impossible salvation—and yet they cannot achieve it, precisely because, for Kierkegaard, he who relies entirely on the finite loses the finite.10

The last two chapters are devoted to two other aesthetic figures: Don Giovanni, the immediate seducer, and the reflective seducer. They are both seducers, but the difference is substantial, and it consists in language. While the former lives in immediate desire, and gesture, the latter seduces through words, through the mediation of language. By means of reflection seduction becomes strategy, calculation. In conclusion, after having described the aesthetic in all its scope, Giannatiempo Quinzio states that “Kierkegaard lived the aesthetic experience not only through the filter of his imagination but also through his life.”11 She quotes Judge William’s description of the aesthete in the second part of Either/Or. According to the judge, the only possible cure to the aesthete’s melancholy and despair lies in the absolute choice of himself. And yet, despite the radical otherness of the aesthetic condition as opposed to the ethical, the aesthetic and the religious have something in common: a “uniqueness,” or something that is found in a human being and cannot disappear.12

Ibid., pp. 82–3. Ibid., p. 83. See, for example, SKS 20, 119, NB:201 / KJN 4, 119. 10 Ibid., pp. 92–3. 11 Ibid., p. 186. 12 Ibid., p. 189: “it is true that in despair nothing perishes and that ‘the aesthetic in a human being will always remain,’ because aesthetics has a ‘uniqueness’ that cannot disappear. And it is exactly this ‘uniqueness’ that—unlike the ethical—the aesthetic has in common with 8 9

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The interest of this book lies mainly in the fact that it deals with a topic often overlooked. The secondary literature in fact tends to downplay the importance of the aesthetic production, judging it a mere “deception,” or merely analyzing it in comparison with a higher, ethical point of view. Giannatiempo Quinzio’s study sheds new light upon the figure of the aesthete in all its complexity and diversity. Laura Liva

the religious. But if for the religious the ‘Absolute’ has enormous importance, for the aesthete the ‘accidental’ is the most important...thus, according to the ethical, the aesthetic is not able to go further, but precisely for this reason the aesthete can ‘despair,’ and from a religious point of view despair is the first step toward faith.”

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Massimo Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard. Una “lotta di confine” [Despair and Faith in Søren Kierkegaard: A Border Struggle], Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino 1999, 186 pp.

At a first consideration, despair and faith seem to be antithetical conditions. But upon a closer view, they prove to be very close to each other. Nowadays, for instance, faith is lived in a negative, ambiguous way, since in the contemporary age the light of truth seems to be obscured by indifference and relativism, individualism and irrelevance, which obstruct the human being’s natural relationship to the ultimate concern. This is one of the central themes in Kierkegaard’s work. Even back in the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard was one of the first thinkers who realized (along with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky) that the West was moving toward an existential and religious crisis. But he also translates this intuition into a philosophical Weltanschauung, whose pars destruens is an opposition to the artificial and illusory idealistic systems, and whose pars construens is an aim to bring out the courage to be oneself and the existential truth of the single individual. Published by Rubbettino Press in 1999, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard. Una “lotta di confine,” analyzes these issues by, so to speak, “listening” to the voice of existence rather than approaching these issues speculatively. In the context of a personal approach, Iiritano suggests an existential Christianity that reduces the value of reason and human free will in relation to faith: faith implies a “humble and paradoxical courage” that comes not from reason or the will, but from the “overbearing truth” of despair.1 The subject of the book is one of the most distinctive themes of Kierkegaard’s philosophical-religious reflection: the conception of the self as found in Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. The self portrayed there represents the ambiguous and dramatic condition of human consciousness beyond any Hegelian Aufhebung. Iiritano has two main goals. On the one hand, he shows how faith is understood as something to be conquered at the end of a process of despair and in the light of the essential

1 Massimo Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard. Una “lotta di confine,” Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino 1999, p. 63.

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contradiction that grounds the self. On the other hand, as Hildegard Kraus writes,2 Iiritano shows that the essence of spirit consists in its ability to know itself duplicated and enmeshed in the contradiction.3 In a Kafkian sense, the dialectic between despair and faith is presented by Iiritano as a “border struggle,” where the single individual upbuilds himself in light of being tragically divided between reality and ideality, but free to accept (in faith) or reject (in despair) his relationship with God. “In Kierkegaard,” Iiritano writes, “the gradual process of self-awareness, does not reach the self by virtue of rational reflection, but it loses itself in a duality that preserves the character of truth.”4 In other words, the dialectic between despair and faith does not dissolve in any Aufhebung: it remains rooted in the drama of a “fundamental negativity,”5 an unresolved opposition between fi nite and infi nite. The existential reality of this incessant movement is “only pain,” despairing awareness of one’s own “nothingness” (Nichtigkeit).6 According to Iiritano, Kierkegaard’s paradox of faith is a possible answer to this painful awareness at the end of a dramatic and desperate path. Why? “Because,” writes Iiritano, “man can relate himself to the truth, but this relationship is possible, not necessary; it is a task, not an assurance and a definitive salvation from the ‘hypocrisy.’ ”7 The Kierkegaardian self that Iiritano presents is more than a simple synthesis: it is spirit, action, and possibility,8 not a separate entity with respect to existential anxiety and concerns, but freedom, because freedom means being able to despair, beyond the seductions which remove the self from “the power, that established it” (“unconscious despair” and “extreme poverty”).9 In Iiritano’s essay, despair and faith are placed in an existential-religious dimension, which no metaphysical-transcendental system can solve or ignore in their enigmatic and paradoxical nature: in the Kierkegaardian perspective of the

Hildegard Kraus, “Verzweiflung und Selbstsein,” in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 13, 1984, p. 46: “Kierkegaard vollzieht mit seiner Lehre von der reflektiertesten Verzweiflungsform eine paradoxe Umkehr von Hegels ‘Phänomenologie des Geistes’. Der Prozeß der Selbstreflexion führt auch nach Kierkegaard zu vollständiger Selbsterkenntnis, aber diese soll zugleich die höchste Selbstentfremdung und Verzweiflung sein, während sie bei Hegel gerade die Aufhebung jeder Entfremdung bedeutet.” 3 See Wilhelm Windelband, Das Heilige, in Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, Freiburg i. B and Tübingen, Mohr 1907, pp. 414–50. For Windelband the object of the philosophy of religion is the (unreconciled) antinomy of the awareness. 4 Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 32. 5 Ibid., p. 46. 6 See Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio, “La scoperta hegeliana della negatività fondante,” Annuario filosofico, no. 5, 1989, pp. 221–38. 7 Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 79. 8 Günter Figal, “Die Freiheit der Verzweiflung und die Freiheit im Glauben. Zu Kierkegaards Konzeption der Selbsteins und Selbstwerdens in Krankheit zum Tode,” in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 11–23; Gregory R. Beabout, Freedom and its Misuses: Kierkegaard in Anxiety and Despair, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1996, pp. 117–25. 9 Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 91. 2

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philosophy of crisis, faith implies a humble and paradoxical courage that comes not from reason or will, but from the “negative truth” of despair. Indeed, in the “Preface” to Iiritano’s essay, Anna Giannatiempo Quinzio writes: “What binds us today is no longer the relationship between reason and faith...but between despair and faith.”10 Again, in a deeper significance, Iiritano writes: “Despair can be the prelude of faith. He who despairs of the finite can turn toward the infinite, and he who despairs of himself can learn to trust in God....Therefore, the movement of faith can be made only after despair: it is the extreme and invincible hope that has not yet been totally defeated.”11 Alessandra Granito

10 Giannatiempo Quinzio, “Preface” to Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard, p. IX. 11 Iiritano, Disperazione e fede in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 151.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Adinolfi, Isabella, Il cerchio spezzato. Linee di antropologia in Pascal e Kierkegaard, Rome: Città Nuova 2000, p. 62; p. 171. — “Prefazione,” in Il religioso in Kierkegaard, ed. by Isabella Adinolfi, Brescia: Morcelliana 2002, pp. 21–3. — “La lacerazione dell’Io tra disperazione e fede,” in Il religioso in Kierkegaard, ed. by Isabella Adinolfi, Brescia: Morcelliana 2002, pp. 271–8. Granito, Alessandra, Eugen Drewermann interprete di Kierkegaard. Le quattro forme kierkegaardiane della disperazione rilette alla luce della psicoanalisi, Naples: Orthotes 2013, p. 64; p. 86.

Alessandro Klein, Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Anti-Rationalism], Milan: Mursia 1979, 187 pp.

Alessandro Klein’s monograph Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard was published by Mursia in 1979. In the 1960s, Kierkegaard studies in Italy had been dominated by an interpretation that, in accordance with Catholic tradition, stressed the pre-eminence of theological over philosophical claims in Kierkegaard’s thought. In reaction to this tendency, Klein argues that the core of Kierkegaard’s reflections is the philosophical problem of the incompatibility between thought and existence. Further, he highlights the deep relation between these reflections and the Protestant tradition. This line of analysis is traced through the eleven chapters of the book, which clarify the terms of the problem and gradually lead the reader to Kierkegaard’s solution: his definition of ethical-religious existence as the only form of authentic existence. The starting point of the analysis is that, insofar as we are human beings, we both think and exist. However—Klein maintains—in Kierkegaard’s view, thinking and existing are two opposite determinations: as long as I am thinking, I am not doing what I am thinking, hence I am not properly existing. Thought is an abstraction from existence and remains separated from it unless it leads one to action. But if every action presupposes that we have decided to perform it, then existence proves to be intrinsically linked to ethics, for it results from the free decision by which we actualize a contemplated possibility. In light of this, Kierkegaard draws a distinction between a weaker sense of existence, which is the one of thought, and a stronger sense, which is the one of factual reality. This provides Klein with the criterion to discriminate between forms of “wasted existence” and existence in the strict sense, which Kierkegaard calls “passionate existence.” Under the former category fall those who live aesthetically, that is, continuously working out new plans and possibilities without actualizing any of them. By leading a disinterested existence, they contravene what Klein refers to as the “fundamental anthropological fact”1 of Kierkegaard’s thought: man is by nature existent and therefore all attempts to neglect existence are bound to result in failure. In short, Klein argues that Kierkegaard’s main philosophical concern is to assert the priority of existence over thought. In line with this principle, Kierkegaard criticizes the form of thought that is only concerned with its object, insofar as it distracts the individual from actually existing.

1

Alessandro Klein, Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard, Milan: Mursia 1979, p. 24.

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Objective thought can only contemplate reality on condition that it becomes a mere ideal reality—that is, something existing in the weaker sense. This point, Klein argues, lies at the foundation of Kierkegaard’s twofold criticism of the identity of thought and being posited by G.W.F. Hegel. Not only is such identity an a priori contradiction in terms, but it also hinders speculation itself. In fact, for Kierkegaard, it amounts to an abstraction, which, if successful, would eliminate that from which it is an abstraction. In contrast to this approach to existence, Kierkegaard defines as subjective the thought of an individual who completely devotes himself or herself to existence. Far from trying to eliminate the contradiction between thought and existence, the subjective thinker endeavors to exist despite this contradiction. While objective thought is exclusively concerned with what it is thinking, subjective thought is rather interested in how its object can be actualized in reality. As a consequence, Klein defines the interest of subjective thought as an inter-esse, that is, the conciliation of thought and existence.2 In fact, only the subjective thinker sees action as the aim of his or her existence. Moreover, since only an absolute goal can guarantee the uninterrupted actualization of one’s thought, all authentic existence must have eternity as its goal. As Klein puts it, existence in the strict sense is the “absolute relation to the absolute telos, to eternal beatitude and hence to God.”3 As a consequence, authentic existence turns out to be not only ethical but also religious: it is an ethical existence insofar as it consists in a free choice, but it is also religious in that it relies upon the decision of devoting oneself to eternity. Accordingly, ethical-religious existence is the only existence that enables human beings to live in conformity with the true nature of existent beings. The complexity of human existence and its relation to thought were already known to Socrates. Klein reconstructs Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the Greek thinker, highlighting both the common traits and differences which characterize their perspectives. In particular, Socrates prompted man to discover his eternal nature, while nonetheless reminding him of his finitude. In so doing, he invited his pupils to undertake the subjective way of existence, but he also left the objective way as a legitimate possibility. In fact, Socratic ignorance was a deliberate rejection of pure speculation on truth but by no means stemmed from the experience of a paradoxical truth, as is the case with Christianity. Furthermore, what Christian revelation makes clear is that, before divine intervention, human beings were not able to understand truth. Thus, Socrates’ view that men have always had access to an eternal truth is unacceptable from a Christian perspective. For this reason, Klein argues that Kierkegaard does not consider Socrates as a forerunner of Christianity, but rather treats him as the wisest among philosophers in order to emphasize the radicalness of the Christian message. In Kierkegaard’s opinion, “Christianity is not a doctrine, but it expresses an existence-contradiction and is an existence-communication.”4 This is why, far from

2 3 4

Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 86. SKS 7, 345–6 / CUP1, 379–80.

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being a matter of knowledge, Christian existence must comply with the principle of imitatio Christi. As Klein underscores, such a position is fairly problematic from a Lutheran perspective, for it seems to clash with the principle of sola gratia. However, if God’s intervention in time enables man to have access to Eternal Truth, this truth is only understood by means of faith, which is absolutely not reducible to a form of knowledge. As a consequence, Kierkegaard maintains that grace in no way cancels the duty to imitate the model, but rather heightens it. Nevertheless, he also observes that, since the Reformation, Christianity has conceived of faith precisely as knowledge, thus depriving it of its existential meaning. As a result, Kierkegaard argues that authentic Christianity can only be found outside the established church, that is, among the sects and spiritual circles which live according to the Christian existential message. In the final chapter of his book, Klein claims that Kierkegaard’s critique of the established Christianity of his era is substantially the same as one raised by a long tradition of Protestant mystics. However, he also points out that, unlike the latter, Kierkegaard never transforms imitatio Christi into an anticipation of eternal life: to use Klein’s words, Kierkegaard’s theology is essentially a theologia viatorum and never a theologia gloriae. Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard constitutes an insightful analysis of Kierkegaard’s thought and its philosophical foundations. However, from a methodological point of view, it might be observed that the study is limited in scope since it mainly focuses on Climacus’ works and on passages from the Papirer. On the whole, Klein regards Kierkegaard’s thought as uniform, and no attention is given to his peculiar communicative techniques. As a result, the general theses of Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard can be at least partially qualified. As an example, we might consider Klein’s interpretation of the relation between Kierkegaard and Socrates in Chapters 8–10. His claim that “the true Christian has nothing to learn from Socrates”5 is at odds with the fact that Kierkegaard regarded the Greek philosopher as an ethical model until the very end of his life. However, Klein’s book has at least two great merits. First, it provides an accurate and consistent philosophical reading of Kierkegaard’s tenets on the pivotal relation between thought and existence. And secondly, it drew the attention of Italian scholars to the investigation into Kierkegaard’s Protestantism. Thus, this monograph was, and still is, a fundamental work in the tradition of Kierkegaard studies in Italy. Alessio Santoro

5

Klein, Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard, p. 140.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Adinolfi, Isabella, Poeta o testimone? Il problema della comunicazione del cristianesimo in Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, Genoa: Marietti 1991, p. 57. — Il cerchio spezzato. Linee di antropologia in Pascal e Kierkegaard, Rome: Città Nuova 2000, p. 213. Colette, Jacques, review in Les Études Philosophiques, no. 1, 1981, pp. 91–5. Davini, Simonella, Il circolo del salto. Kierkegaard e la ripetizione, Pisa: Edizioni ETS 1996, p. 87. Lacoste, Jean-Yves, review in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 78, no. 40, 1980, p. 600. Modica, Giuseppe, “Per un’ermeneutica dell’ironia. I presupposti socratici dell’edificazione kierkegaardiana,” in Kierkegaard contemporaneo. Ripresa, pentimento, perdono, ed. by Umberto Regina and Ettore Rocca, Brescia: Morcelliana 2007, p. 282. — Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani, Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2007, p. 5; p. 214. Pizzuti, Giuseppe Mario, “Convergenze tomistiche nell’opera di Soeren Kierkegaard nel centenario dell’enciclica ‘Aeterni Patris,’ ” in Atti dell’VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, vol. 8, ed. by the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1982, pp. 205–6. — “Postille di letteratura kierkegaardiana,” Nuovi Studi Kierkegaardiani, vol. 1, ed. by Giuseppe Mario Pizzuti, Potenza: Ars Grafica 1989, pp. 144–6.

Giuseppe Modica, Fede libertà peccato. Figure ed esiti della “prova” in Kierkegaard [Faith, Freedom, Sin: Figures and Outcomes of the “Trial” in Kierkegaard], Palermo: Palumbo 1992, 166 pp.

As the title suggests, this book deals with the complex issue of the relations among faith, freedom, and sin in Kierkegaard’s thought. These are paradoxical relations, as the author points out in the Introduction; intrinsically paradoxical also, according to Kierkegaard’s understanding, is each of the three categories involved. Moreover, according to Modica, the paradox, understood as an unmediated synthesis of contradictory terms, is the main trait in the Danish philosopher’s reflection, or, as he says, “the formal structure” of his thought.1 Persuaded that the “trial” is the place where the paradoxical relation between faith and freedom shows itself emblematically, the author analyzes, in the first two chapters, Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Job’s and Abraham’s respective trials. Whereas with Job’s trial, “the focus—even if it concerns faith—is on tested freedom,” with Abraham’s “the focus—even if it concerns freedom—is on tested faith.”2 Kierkegaard’s reading of Job’s trial is fruitfully compared to other interpretations, in particular to that of Kant, with which it seems to have some affinity. According to Modica, Kierkegaard finds in Job the incarnation of freedom; Job defends freedom before God (when he is called to trial) and before the world (in the episode with Job’s friends). The trial shows that human freedom at its climax “exerts itself as reason’s renunciation before faith and as humble submission to God’s will,”3 that is, freedom finds its fulfillment in faith. By contrast, faith finds in freedom its necessary condition, as Modica remarks, in order to stress the dialectical complexity of Kierkegaard’s interpretation. It is actually Job’s firm awareness of being righteous before God, which makes impossible every rational explanation of his sufferings.

Giuseppe Modica, Fede libertà peccato. Figure ed esiti della “prova” in Kierkegaard, Palermo: Palumbo 1992, p. 147. 2 Ibid., p. 41. 3 Ibid., p. 28. 1

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This leads him to the infinite and confident submission to God’s will. Where it is impossible to understand, one must believe. According to Modica, Kierkegaard’s reading of the trial of Abraham, the “father of faith,” emphasizes, among other things, that faith is a “risk” and a “wager” and therefore, in final analysis, an “act of freedom.” When the tragic hero sacrifices his paternal love for the sake of the moral law, “he gives up the certain for the even more certain.”4 On the contrary, those who, like Abraham, give up their paternal duty for the sake of God’s command, that is, “gives up the universal in order to grasp something even higher that is not the universal,”5 find themselves in a state of absolute uncertainty. “To suspend the ethical,” Modica writes, “means to suspend also the certainty deriving from moral law.”6 To relate oneself absolutely to the Absolute (God) means to rely upon a “norm beyond reason, over and above rules, and it is just on this account that it can justify every exception, including every suspension of the ethical.”7 Hence Abraham cannot know whether he was elected by God and, as such, justified in suspending the ethical; he is not certain that the command received is not a “temptation” but a “trial.” As Modica concludes, he “has to measure himself with a concealed God, who, being beyond good and evil, offers freedom the possibility to assimilate his semblance either to the diabolic tempter or to the divine Savior.”8 There is a third element that the trial hints at but cannot treat directly: evil. “In Job it hides itself in the vestiges of the unjust and unjustifiable suffering, and in Abraham under the vestiges of the possibility of the unjust and unjustifiable death.”9 The trial does not come to terms with the issue of evil because, as Modica puts it, “it is a temporarily completed event. It cannot be otherwise, since it is essentially embedded in Judaism, that is, in a religion where suffering is not yet related to eternity, its only possible horizon of thematization,”10 as is the case in Christianity. Consequently, whereas in Judaism sin is perceived only as a present guilt, so that Job can remain firmly convinced of being righteous before God, in Christianity sin is an ontological guilt, a guilt inscribed in the individual’s being. Carried out within the Christian perspective, Kierkegaard’s analysis of evil and its origin, which is taken into account in the third chapter of Modica’s book, points out the paradoxical character of this issue. If it is sin, which is identified by Kierkegaard with the act by which freedom determines itself (that is, spirit “posits the synthesis”), that constitutes the individual as such, that is to say, if before sin man is not a self, then he cannot be rationally responsible for this sin which makes him into a self. The advent of sin hints at an ontological guilt, which, however, only becomes concrete in the ontic state of sin. That is, it hints at that condition of sinfulness that Christianity calls

See SKS 4, 154 / FT, 60. See SKS 4, 154 / FT, 60, and Modica, Fede libertà peccato. Figure ed esiti della “prova” in Kierkegaard, p. 60. 6 Ibid., p. 61. 7 Ibid., pp. 62–3. 8 Ibid., p. 64. 9 Ibid., p. 94. 10 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 4 5

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“original sin” and that escapes every attempt at understanding, since the concept of an inherited guilt is a paradox. Yet, the more evil is considered germane to existence, the more urgent it becomes to justify it, “especially,” as Modica remarks, “in the case of a thinker like Kierkegaard, for whom man’s relation to transcendence, far from being the end of an intellectual itinerary, is an act of belief in a loving God.”11 In this respect, the author claims that Kierkegaard’s whole reflection upon the religious sphere can be read as a relentless reconsideration of the issue of theodicy. Kierkegaard’s theodicy is a paradoxical theodicy, as the Italian scholar shows in the fourth chapter. And it could not be otherwise, given its presuppositions: sin is inexplicable, and God’s omnipotence is incomprehensible, because omnipotence as such gives, while at the same time withdrawing itself from the one to whom it gives. This theodicy advocates both the thesis that God and evil are unrelated (owing to the ontological difference) and the thesis that sin, as “existence before God,” and hence positive and real negativity, needs God in order to exist. Kierkegaard’s theodicy is thereby beyond every reconciling theodicy, such as those of Kant and Schelling. A comprehensive comparison between Kierkegaard’s and Kant’s and Schelling’s theodicies is carried out in the final pages of this valuable book. Simonella Davini

11

Ibid., p. 14.

Review and Critical Discussion Davini, Simonella, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 197–9.

Giuseppe Modica, Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani [A Truth for Me: Kierkegaardian Itineraries], Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2007 (Filosofia/Ricerche), 259 pp.

Giuseppe Modica’s book, Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani, published by Vita e Pensiero in 2007, presents the outcome of a systematic reorganization of nine essays the author wrote between 1995 and 2007. The group of studies was restructured into four sections: (1) “A Philosophy as Subjective Mediation and a Philosophical Way to Edification,” (2) “Singularity between Aesthetics and Religion,” (3) “An Ethics by Difference,” (4) “Communication of the Incommunicable: The Problem of the Relationship between Singularity and Alterity.”1 As Modica maintains in his Introduction, “this work assumes the religious dimension of Kierkegaardian discourse on a level where its distinction from the existential dimension is not yet completed.”2 With this statement the author actually reveals that he belongs to the Italian Catholic reception of Kierkegaard’s thought, hinting implicitly at his elective affiliation to the existential-religious approach of the Italian Catholic philosopher Luigi Pareyson. A distinguishing feature of Modica’s interpretation is that “being ‘in front of God’ represents for Kierkegaard an out-andout principium individuationis owing to which subjectivity becomes singularity.”3 According to Modica, “religiousness [in Kierkegaard] founds existence as such, that is, it is what qualifies each human being even before one addresses the problem of ‘becoming a Christian.’ ”4 In the first section, “A Philosophy as Subjective Mediation and a Philosophical Way to Edification,” Modica juxtaposes “logocentric thought,” that is, “the originarian presumption” of philosophy,5 with “Socratic logos,” such as “dià-logos,” that is, “a logos no longer monadic...which allows the [logocentric] logos to come out of

1 Giuseppe Modica, Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani, Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2007 (Filosofia/Ricerche). See also the preliminary remarks, where the author gives references for the essays that, reshaped, compose the present text, ibid., pp. 11–12. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., pp. 23–8.

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its self-referential presumption.”6 Modica secures the foundation for this first thesis through Rosenzweig’s argument, according to which “to remain in the fear of death is...a moral task.”7 Against this background, Modica draws an analogy between the two notions of “dià-logos” and “inter-esse,” that is, between “Socratic exemplarity”8 and “the Socratic exemplarity of Kierkegaard.”9 Modica’s point is that Socrates begins his search for the truth by “mediat[ing] subjectively between his own reasons [ανθρωπίνη σοφία] and those of the god.”10 Consequently, as Modica infers, Socrates’ decision to adopt the dia-logical method is not contingent, but intrinsically related to “the admonishment of the god [γνῶθι σεαυτόν],” which “is an index of alterity.”11 On this basis, Modica emphasizes, “it is always owing to this theandricity that the originarian [logocentric] logos is immediately undermined and overturned in the negation of its self-referentiality, though safeguarding its rational structure.”12 Modica’s argument, following the Postscript, thus consists in pinpointing Socrates’ and Kierkegaard’s positions as two “subjective way[s] to the truth,” that is, as two forms of “subjective thought,” whose peculiarity is not to be “objective” or “ontic,” but “ontological,” in the sense that what is at play is primarily “the relationship [of the subjective thinker] with the being that [he or she] is.”13 Thereby, in this first section of the book, Modica accentuates the existential dimension of “religiousness A.” Within this frame, “irony” is understood as the way to one’s own “edification.”14 In the second section, “Singularity between Aesthetics and Religion,” the author offers a two-sided sketch of the category of “singularity,” concentrating first on four aesthetic figures: Don Giovanni, “the psychic seducer,” Faust and A. Don Giovanni (that is, “the sensual seducer” in its Mozartian interpretation, selected by Kierkegaard as a paradigm) has the exclusive trait, as Modica highlights, of an absence of any meditatio mortis and awareness of guilt.15 Referring to the religious side of this second section, the discourse is based on The Concept of Anxiety, and the emphasized aspect is “the ontological culpability” of this other “singularity.”16

Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 27. See Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. by Barbara E. Galli, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 2005, pp. 9–29. 8 Modica, Una verità per me, p. 32. 9 Ibid., pp. 43–5. Kierkegaard’s most famous definition of the category of “inter-esse” is contained in the Postscript. See SKS 7, 286 / CUP1, 314. 10 Modica, Una verità per me, p. 33. 11 Ibid., p. 34. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., p. 43; p. 28. 14 Ibid., pp. 68–71, where Modica focuses on the “existential” and not “purely parenetic-religious” meaning of Kierkegaard’s edification. On the different nature of the “up-building” (or, “edifying”) referring to “religiousness A” and “religiousness B” see SKS 7, 509–10, note / CUP1, 560–1, note. 15 Modica, Una verità per me, p. 84. On p. 86, it is also claimed that Don Giovanni has no “distressing sense of the sin.” 16 Ibid., pp. 101–4. 6 7

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The third section, “Ethics by Difference,” represents an important contribution to the Italian reception of Kierkegaard’s ethics, which hitherto had been considerably neglected. Kierkegaard’s ethical position emerges here precisely “by means of difference,” that is, through Modica’s query of the anti-logocentric positions of Luigi Pareyson, Max Stirner, and Emmanuel Levinas. Modica’s first thesis is that Pareyson, despite his crucial role in the reception of Kierkegaard’s ethical thought in Italy, finally “underestimates” Kierkegaard’s ethics by adopting a more radical “ontology of freedom,” that is, by moving from an ontological personalism to an ontological hermeneutics of the “religious experience.”17 Next, Modica concentrates on the “dialectics of freedom...in the forms of Kierkegaard’s ‘choice’ [Valg] and Stirner’s ‘self-determination’ [Selbstbestimmung].”18 Modica’s conclusion is that, despite some structural analogies, there is an “unbridgeable...distance” between the “ontological foundation” of Stirner’s “Unique One” (der Einzige) and Kierkegaard’s “Single individual” (den Enkelte).19 “The Unique One” is in fact the negation of any transcendence and heteronomy, leading Modica to conclude that Stirner “ignores” Kierkegaard’s ethics, whose foundational moment is in relation to “the absolute,” that is, to a form of theandricity.20 Finally, according to Modica, Levinas would “overestimate” Kierkegaard’s ethics, because by negating any representability of God and by assuming “the relationship with the infinite” through the face of the other, he reduces “God’s revelation” to “the ethical revelation.”21 In the fourth and final section of the book, “Communication of the Incommunicable: The Problem of the Relationship between Singularity and Alterity,” Modica attends to the notion of “alterity” (that is, “otherness”). He defines it as a “form of the paradox...as unmediated synthesis between relationship and relatedness.”22 He then locates two examples of “alterity,” between “the Single individual” and “the others” (that is, “the crowd”), and between “the Single individual” and “God.” In these pages, Modica attempts to open the category of “singularity,” that is, to downsize “the solipsistic...curvature, which critics have often noticed in Kierkegaard’s thought.”23 For this aim, Modica introduces the Christian category of “the neighbor,” trying to cast light on Kierkegaard’s “second ethics.” The limit of this attempt, which is also the limit of this unquestionably rich group of studies, consists in the fact that

17 Ibid., p. 18; p. 141. On these fundamental issues of Pareyson’s philosophy, see Gaetano Chiurazzi, “Pareyson and Vattimo: From Truth to Nihilism,” in The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics, ed. by Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander, New York: Routledge 2015, pp. 179–90; Gianni Vattimo, “Pareyson: From Aesthetics to Ontology,” in his Art’s Claim to Truth, trans. by Luca d’Isanto, New York: Columbia University Press 2008; Il pensiero di Luigi Pareyson nella filosofia contemporanea. Recenti interpretazioni, ed. by Riconda G. Ciancio, Turin: Trauben 2000. 18 Modica, Una verità per me, p. 18; p. 145. 19 Ibid., pp. 163–4. 20 Ibid., p. 18; pp. 163–74. 21 Ibid., p. 180; p. 184; p. 186. Detailed references to the primary literature used by Modica are traceable in the three rich chapters of this third section. 22 Ibid., p. 200. 23 Ibid., p. 19; p. 211.

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Modica does not focus on Christ (that is, the “Reconciler”), but rather on an ir-related God.24 According to Modica, the collision with the crowd is the condition for gaining a relationship with God. Then, owing to the “independence” given by God, the Single individual (that is, “the extraordinary”) would have only two possibilities: “to derive from the relationship with others either the crossroads of salvation or of perdition.”25 As a concluding word, I would like to stress the importance of Modica’s book in the Italian Kierkegaard reception for at least three reasons: (1) For the acknowledged relevance of Socrates in Kierkegaard’s authorship; (2) For an analysis that puts Kierkegaard’s ethical thought in conversation with contemporary thinkers, of which Modica’s effort is still the only example in Italy today; and (3) For signaling the need to engage more deeply in the crucial question of Kierkegaard’s “second ethics.”26 Silvia Vignati

Ibid., pp. 207–11. Ibid., p. 209; p. 223. See also pp. 190–96, where these theses come to the surface through Modica’s analysis of Vigilius Haufniensis’ distinction between “first” and “second ethics.” 26 On Socrates as a representative of “objective thought,” see, for example, Giorgio Penzo, “Il paradosso come verità esistenziale in Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard: Filosofia e teologia del paradosso, ed. by Michele Nicoletti and Giorgio Penzo, Brescia: Morcelliana 1999, pp. 13–29. On the practicability of both “the objective” and “the subjective way to the truth” for Socrates, see Alessandro Klein, Antirazionalismo di Kierkegaard, Milan: Mursia 1979, Chapters 8 and 10. On second ethics, see Umberto Regina, “La ‘scienza nuova’ di Søren Kierkegaard. Gli atti dell’amore,” in Il discepolo di seconda mano. Saggi su Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Roberto Garaventa and Diego Giordano, Napoli: Orthotes 2011, pp. 119–42; Ingolf U. Dalferth, “Selfless Passion: Kierkegaard’s on True Love,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2013, pp. 159–79. 24 25

Reviews and Critical Discussions Bonagiuso, Giacomo, review in Giornale di Metafisica, vol. 2, 2007, pp. 611–15. Sesta, Luciano, review in Bio-ethos, vol. 4, 2008, pp. 98–9.

Enzo Paci, Relazioni e significati. II. Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann [Relations and Meanings, vol. 2, Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann], Milan: Lampugnani Nigri 1965, 341 pp.

Enzo Paci’s Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann is the second of a three-volume series entitled Relazioni e significati (Relations and Meanings).1 This second volume was reprinted in 1991 for the Bompiani Press book series “Saggistica” (Works of Enzo Paci), with a foreword by the philosopher Stefano Zecchi. Of the two sections into which this volume is divided, the first and most significant one (“Fenomenologia dell’esperienza estetica e religiosa in Kierkegaard” (Phenomenology of the Aesthetic and Religious Experience in Kierkegaard) is devoted to Søren Kierkegaard, while the second is devoted to Thomas Mann. Indeed, both these authors deeply influenced Paci’s philosophical thought.2 The section about Kierkegaard consists of ten chapters: nine articles and essays published between 1953 and 1955 in various journals and anthologies,

Enzo Paci, Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann, vol. 2 of his Relazioni e significati, vols. 1–3, Milan: Lampugnani Nigri 1965–66. This publication series is a collection of essays, written by Paci starting in 1947. The other volumes are Filosofia e fenomenologia della cultura (Philosophy and Phenomenology of Culture) (vol. 1, 1965) and Critica e dialettica (Critique and Dialectics) (vol. 3, 1966). 2 Søren Kierkegaard and Thomas Mann are “essential theoretical landmarks for the development of Paci’s later philosophy” (Stefano Zecchi, “Introduzione,” in Enzo Paci, Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann, Milan: Bompiani 1991, p. v). In 1940, in Pensiero esistenza e valore (Thought, Existence, and Value), Milan-Messina: Principato l940, Paci had attempted a first definition of Kierkegaard’s philosophy using the secondary literature as his only source. Between 1953 and 1955 he published a series of articles in which he deepened his analysis, interpreting Kierkegaard’s thought according to a “phenomenological” and “relationistic” approach. A first short version of his reading of Kierkegaard appeared later in his “Introduzione al Concetto dell’angoscia” (Introduction to the “Concept of Anxiety”) (in Søren Kierkegaard, Il concetto dell’angoscia, Turin: Paravia 1953, pp. i–xxix). See Franca Castagnino, Gli studi italiani su Kierkegaard 1906–1966, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1972, p. 293. 1

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while the last is Paci’s contribution to “Kierkegaard vivant,” the conference held in Paris in 1964.3 The order in which the different essays are placed offers a general overview of Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to specific themes (such as irony, aesthetics, ethics, faith, and, above all, anxiety), according to Paci’s phenomenological and relationistic approach. The underlying assumption is that Kierkegaard represents a significant—if not the most significant—precursor of phenomenology and relational thought. Paci was the first Italian philosopher who recognized the importance of Kierkegaard in a strictly philosophical context. Indeed, in the final essay the author tries to demonstrate that a contemporary understanding and a critical evaluation of Kierkegaard’s thought are possible only from a phenomenological point of view. The arrangement of the essays follows the gradual development of Kierkegaard’s thought and his critical and concrete approach to philosophy. As a whole, these essays offer—as Franca Castagnino pointed out—“a critical reconstruction of [Kierkegaard’s philosophy] from the point of view of phenomenology.”4 Kierkegaard’s work is of decisive importance for phenomenology insofar as it is

Chapter 1: “Ironia demoniaco ed eros” (Irony, Demonic, and Eros), in Archivio di filosofia, vol. 21, no. 2 (Kierkegaard e Nietzsche) 1953, pp. 71–113. Chapter 2: “Estetica ed etica” (Aesthetics and Ethics), published with the title “Kierkegaard contro Kierkegaard” (Kierkegaard against Kierkegaard), Aut-Aut, vol. 22, 1954, pp. 269–301. Chapter 3: “La dialettica della fede” (The Dialectic of Faith), published with the title “Kierkegaard e la dialettica della fede” (Kierkegaard and the Dialectic of Faith), in Archivio di filosofia, vol. 21, no. 2 (Kierkegaard e Nietzsche) 1953, pp. 9–44. Chapter 4: “Ripetizione e ripresa: il teatro e la sua funzione catartica” (Repetition: The Theater and Its Cathartic Function), published with the title “Ripetizione ripresa e rinascita in Kierkegaard” (Repetition and Rebirth in Kierkegaard), Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, vol. 33, 1954, pp. 313–40. Chapter 5: “Storia e apocalisse” (History and Apocalypse), published with the title “Storia e apocalisse in Kierkegaard” (History and Apocalypse in Kierkegaard), in Archivio di filosofia, vol. 22, no. 2 (Apocalisse e insecuritas), 1954, pp. 141–62. Chapter 6: “La psicologia e il problema dell’angoscia” (Psychology and the Problem of Anxiety), published with the title “Il significato dell’Introduzione kierkegaardiana al Concetto dell’angoscia” (The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Introduction to The Concept of Anxiety”), Rivista di filosofia, vol. 45, 1954, pp. 392–8. Chapter 7: “Angoscia e relazione” (Anxiety and Relation), published with the title “Angoscia e relazione in Kierkegaard” (Anxiety and Relation in Kierkegaard), Aut-Aut, vol. 23, 1954, pp. 363–76. Chapter 8: “Angoscia e fenomenologia dell’eros” (Anxiety and the Phenomenology of Eros), Aut-Aut, vol. 24, 1954, pp. 468–85. Chapter 9: “L’intenzionalità e l’amore” (Intentionality and Love), published with the title “Su due significati dell’angoscia in Kierkegaard” (On the Two Meanings of Anxiety in Kierkegaard), Orbis litterarum, vol. 10, 1955, pp. 196–207. Chapter 10: “Kierkegaard vivente e il significato di verità nella storia” (The Living Kierkegaard and the Meaning of the Truth in History), published in French: “Kierkegaard vivant et la véritable signification de l’histoire,” in Kierkegaard vivant. Colloque organisé par l’Unesco à Paris du 21 au 23 avril 1964, Paris: Gallimard 1966, pp. 111–24. 4 Castagnino, Gli studi italiani su Kierkegaard 1906–1966, p. 293. 3

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the demonstration, conducted on the negative side, of intentionality. The loss of intentionality is...the sickness unto death. But Kierkegaard’s work shows that the negative is a proof by absurdity of the positive. The demonic is the belief that only the negative can lead to salvation...Kierkegaard’s phenomenology, like Sartre’s phenomenology of Being and Nothingness, is a phenomenology of the impure consciousness. By hiding within itself, anxiety gradually leads the person to intentionality. From this point of view Kierkegaard’s work is typical, and one can find in it the core of the characters that are most distinctive of our contemporary literature.5

In this sense, Kierkegaard’s works function as a link between German Romanticism with its Bildungsroman and our contemporary literature. Kierkegaard does not dismiss Romanticism simply with the rhetoric of Anti-Romanticism, but with irony, one of the themes that Paci will investigate most thoroughly. From irony, through anxiety, Kierkegaard’s texts ultimately lead the reader to the subject of love. Paci’s approach to Kierkegaard’s thought is primarily phenomenological. Existence is at the foundation of philosophy: concrete experiences are the starting point for the construction of philosophical categories. In Kierkegaard this life experience is ironic, ambiguous, that is, negative. He is trapped in a fundamental disharmony, and he describes his negative experiences in his pseudonymous works.6 Although Kierkegaard was never able to escape this ambiguity, nonetheless it was this ambiguity/negativity which proved to him the possibility of a positive repetition through faith. His hope in a possibility of achieving a positive harmony is expressed in the edifying discourses. On the one hand, Kierkegaard gives expression to the negative, the disharmony, and he closes himself off within the pseudonymous authorship; on the other hand, he expresses his hope for a positive, harmonic life in the edifying discourses. This harmony can be achieved by overcoming sin, and this is the reason why we need a second philosophy. The Aristotelian philosophy of being must be overcome through a second philosophy, that is, the philosophy of repetition (repetition of being, rebirth.)7 While the first chapters focus on works such as The Concept of Irony, Either/ Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, and Philosophical Fragments, the remaining chapters deal mainly with themes treated in The Concept of Anxiety. Paci’s assumption is the relationistic thesis that “sin can only be explained in human interaction, understood as the fundamental structure of existence.”8 The human being is in itself a relation, that is, a synthesis of body, soul, spirit, and at the same time a synthesis of the three existential stages, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Anxiety

Paci, Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann, pp. 7–8. As a link with the second part devoted to Thomas Mann, Paci writes: “We will follow Kierkegaard in the path that, through ambiguity and anxiety, leads to the theme of love. And we should keep in mind that with this very theme, both The Magic Mountain and Doktor Faustus end” (ibid., p. 8). 6 See ibid., Chapter 1, pp. 7–45. 7 See ibid., Chapter 6, pp. 176–83, and for the concept of repetition, see Chapter 4, pp. 120–50. 8 Ibid., p. 184. 5

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is the evidence that we know that the synthesis can always achieve a better balance or harmony. In the final chapter Paci presents an overview of his account in order to demonstrate that a modern understanding and a critical evaluation of Kierkegaard are possible only with a phenomenological approach. Paci’s interpretation is “a reading of Kierkegaard based on philosophical perspectives that are different from that of Kierkegaard, since they have been derived from Husserl. Philosophy is a dialogue with the philosophers of the past and an attempt on the part of every philosopher, to establish a new dialogue.”9 Even when in dialogue with other philosophers, “the foundation of a community of subjects is always in the process of being established, and this process is always present in the history of mankind.”10 Paci repeatedly emphasizes the concrete aspect and the concrete starting point of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.11 Even when it comes to single individuals, as it happens in the case of Kierkegaard with his emphasis on the single individual, for Paci, it is impossible not to find the relational dimension of intersubjectivity: It is precisely in one’s unique and subjective life that one discovers the other subjects, even when he wants to deny them. He realizes, starting from himself and reflecting on himself, that his life acquires meaning only if it relates to others, in agreement or disagreement. The solitary Kierkegaard becomes a witness of the possibility of communication, even if he does not want that communication to come as already realized.12

Paci then concludes: “Ultimately, by going back to the subject, Kierkegaard teaches us that the real return to the subject is a return to intersubjectivity. The true meaning of life and of the dialectic of history is revealed in the meaning of the truth, which concerns time and lives in time.”13 Certainly Paci’s contribution to Italian Kierkegaard scholarship has been of great importance but primarily on the level of his use of Kierkegaardian categories, read through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology. With this particular approach, Paci puts into practice his own theory, that is, that human beings are first and foremost relation, that subjects have an intersubjective nature. Laura Liva

Ibid., p. 235. Ibid., p. 236. 11 See, for example, ibid., p. 236: “Philosophy, for Kierkegaard, is an experience of concrete subjects who live in time and in history.” 12 Ibid., pp. 236–7. 13 Ibid., p. 237. 9

10

Reviews and Critical Discussions Castagnino, Franca, Gli studi italiani su Kierkegaard 1906–1966, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1972, pp. 293–5; see also, pp. 232–5; pp. 241–9; pp. 253–4. Semerari, Giuseppe, review in Filosofia, vol. 17, 1966, pp. 407–8. Semeraro, Licia, L’etica come radice: la filosofia di Enzo Paci, Cavallino di Lecce: Capone 1993, pp. 57–8. Zecchi, Stefano, “Introduzione,” in Enzo Paci, Relazioni e significati. II. Kierkegaard e Thomas Mann, Milan: Bompiani 1991, pp. v–xv.

Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero [Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the First Phase of His Thought], Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1965 (Corsi Universitari), 226 pp.

Luigi Pareyson’s L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, first published in 1965 by Giappichelli Editore, represents the manuscript of the first lecture series on Kierkegaard’s ethics given by Pareyson at the University of Turin during the academic year 1964–65, then repeated in 1972–73.1 In 1998, under the supervision of the Centro Studi Filosofico-Religiosi Luigi Pareyson, which is part of the University of Turin, the work was revised by Sergio Givone and republished under the title Kierkegaard e Pascal (Kierkegaard and Pascal) by the publishing house Mursia in volume 13 of Luigi Pareyson’s Complete Works.2 Besides the new edition of Pareyson’s text from 1965, this collected volume includes two other sections corresponding to the revised manuscripts of two other lecture series given by Pareyson during the academic years 1965–66 and 1970–71: L’etica di Pascal (Pascal’s Ethics) and L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla” (Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the Postscript).3 Pareyson, an extremely prolific thinker, began his study of Kierkegaard’s thought during his first research stay in Heidelberg in 1936, when, only eighteen years old, he met Karl Jaspers for the first time.4 Pareyson’s first lecture series on

1 Francesco Tomatis, Pareyson. Vita, filosofia, bibliografia, Brescia: Morcelliana 2003, Chapter 3: “Corsi” (Courses), pp. 69–71. 2 Luigi Pareyson, Opere Complete, vols. 1–20, ed. by Centro Studi Filosofico-Religiosi Luigi Pareyson, Milan: Mursia 1998–, vol. 13, Kierkegaard e Pascal, ed. by Sergio Givone (1998). 3 Luigi Pareyson (1918–91), one of the major Italian philosophers of the twentieth century, was Professor of History of Philosophy at the University of Pavia (1951–52), Professor of Aesthetics (1952–64) and Professor of Theoretical Philosophy and Moral Philosophy (1964–91) at the University of Turin. Recently an important anthology on his work was published in English: Existence, Interpretation, Freedom: Selected Writings, ed. by Paolo Diego Bubbio, Aurora: Davies Group 2009. 4 Francesco Tomatis, Pareyson. Vita, filosofia, bibliografia, p. 10. See also ibid., pp. 9–35 (Chapter 1, “Biography”), pp. 73–101 (Chapter 4, “Publications”), and pp. 113–23 (Chapter 5, “Unpublished Works”).

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Kierkegaard’s ethics, given almost thirty years after his first encounter with the Dane and after having published several books and essays on Existenzphilosophie and existentialism, marked a fundamental moment in the Italian reception of Kierkegaard. As Ingrid Basso has highlighted, the Italian reception had, at its real beginning, grasped somehow the ethical nature of Kierkegaard’s thought, but soon after and until the early 1930s, that is, for about three long decades, the prevailing tendency had been to interpret his works from a literary point of view.5 Moreover, the existentialist efforts to reread Kierkegaard, between the 1930s and the 1950s, did not lead to any decisive clarification concerning the complexity of Kierkegaard’s ethical thought. On the contrary, one of the most influential of these studies, that is, Remo Cantoni’s monograph, La coscienza inquieta. Sören Kierkegaard (The Anxious Consciousness: Søren Kierkegaard), established a significant—but not exclusively Italian—misunderstanding, precisely by sanctioning the loss of any ethical and historical relevance for Kierkegaard in the religious stage.6 Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the First Phase of His Thought by Pareyson, the first Italian monographic work on Kierkegaard’s ethical thought, is a sober, clear, rich, and highly accurate reading of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings from Either/Or (1843) to Stages on Life’s Way (1845), showing a much more complex ethical path. Pareyson starts from the general premise that “Kierkegaard’s ethical thought has as basis...the distinction of the ethical stage and the aesthetic stage on the one side and [that] of the ethical stage and the religious stage on the other.”7 He underlines that the first distinction represents the main subject of this first phase of Kierkegaard’s thought (1843–45). However, the distinctive aspect of Pareyson’s reading is that for the first time in Italy the rigidity of the scheme of the “stages” was called into question by a meticulous examination of the primary literature.8 The analysis of the distinction between the aesthetic stage and the ethical stage, which covers the first three chapters of the book, is performed by Pareyson starting

Ingrid Basso, “Italy: From a Literary Curiosity to a Philosophical Comprehension,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, Tome II, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 81–151, in particular pp. 81–4. 6 Ibid., pp. 85–9. See Remo Cantoni, La coscienza inquieta. Sören Kierkegaard, Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore 1949, in particular p. 66 and pp. 131–57. However, for intellectual honesty it is necessary to stress the fact that Cantoni’s monograph was written before Cornelio Fabro’s first translations of The Dialectic of the Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication (1957), Philosophical Fragments (1962), and the Postscript (1962). 7 Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1965 (Corsi Universitari ), p. 3; Luigi Pareyson, Kierkegaard e Pascal, vol. 13 from Opere Complete, p. 15. 8 The consolidation of Luigi Pareyson’s work in this sense has to be credited to Ettore Rocca. See, for example, Ettore Rocca, “Kierkegaard’s Second Aesthetics,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 1999, pp. 278–92. 5

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with a focus on the symbolic figures of “the seducer” and “the husband.” In Chapter 1, “The Seducer as the Symbol of the Aesthetic Life,” three “incarnations of Kierkegaard’s Don Giovanni” are outlined: (1) the Mozartian Don Giovanni, that is, “the esthete of fate,” a demonic cosmic force, the desire before and outside the word, a “metaphysical truth,” as in “The Immediate Erotic Stages” (1843); (2) Johannes the Seducer of “The Seducer’s Diary” (1843), that is, “the professional seducer,” believing in his function of the aesthetic liberation of the woman, in the end victim of an “aesthetic punishment” for his own unhappiness; and (3) Johannes the Seducer of “In vino veritas,” or “the happy lover” perfectly able to enjoy “the most beautiful creature of the gods.”9 “But”—as Pareyson points out—“the dialogue of ‘In vino veritas’ [closes] with the praise of marriage.”10 Thus, in Chapter 2, “Marriage as the Symbol of the Ethical Life,” Pareyson moves to the figure of “the husband.” The first text he refers to is “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage” (1843). Pareyson scrutinizes William’s thesis according to which “marriage is not only good, that is, ethically valid, but also esthetically valid, i.e., beautiful.”11 In these pages marriage is depicted by Pareyson as “the true fulfillment and the true transfiguration of romantic love,”12 that is, as the actualization of the abstract transcendence of the latter: “the great aesthetic advantage of marriage”—concludes Pareyson—“is that it expresses the infinite in the finite.”13 Secondly, the reader’s attention is guided to “Some Reflections on Marriage” (1845), where, according to Pareyson, the aesthetic element of the marriage is reduced, the humoristic takes the place of the poetic, and the ethical-religious elements are expanded. In Chapter 3, “Aesthetic Life and Ethical Life,” the figures of “the seducer” and “the husband” are abandoned, making room for a broader analysis of the conceptions of the aesthetic and the ethical life. In the beginning, Pareyson concentrates on “the art of recollection-oblivion” as a “new aesthetics,” compared to that of the seducer, at play in the “Rotation of Crops” (1843).14 Next he analyzes “The Balance between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the

9 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 3–29; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 15–26. 10 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 28; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 26. 11 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 31; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 27. 12 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 36–7; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 29. 13 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 47; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 34. On Pareyson’s distinction between “aesthetic” and “artistic,” see Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 67; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 42. On “immanent teleology” and “inner history” of marriage, see Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 48–75; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 34–45. 14 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 97–112; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 55–61.

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Development of the Personality” (1843). After distinguishing seven stages in the aesthetical life—from a more or less immediate and exterior pleasure to the reflected and interior pleasure of A—Pareyson locates the failure of this conception of life in its “impossibility of repetition.”15 Finally, Pareyson examines “the superiority of the ethical conception of life.”16 Here, also with reference to Repetition (1843) and The Concept of Anxiety (1844), the category of “repetition” is investigated as an ethical category, as “life’s ethical courage,” as a “return to the finite.”17 Pareyson’s reading of “The Balance” closes on the “urgency” of choosing oneself, stressing that the question is not to choose between aesthetic and ethical life since that “the choice” is an ethical category.18 It is in the final chapter, Chapter 4, “Ethical Life and Religious Life,” that the second distinction, that is, between the ethical stage and the religious stage, is approached. And it is precisely here that Pareyson’s fundamental contribution to the Italian reception of Kierkegaard’s ethical thought is made. In fact, after a thorough analysis of the ethical-religious and transcendent category of “proof” with reference to Job and Abraham, that is, to Repetition and Fear and Trembling, and of the issue of the “risk of faith,”19 Pareyson—instructed by The Concept of Anxiety and the Postscript—claims: As soon as the religious sphere has unveiled the sin in its intensive meaning, that is, the profound sinfulness of human being, the ethical demand presents itself again, but completely transformed by this new awareness....There is an ethics without religion, whose insufficiency becomes quickly apparent and which, due to its failure, requires itself religion; and there is a religious ethics, which is the ethical demand as it is born again in religious life. The religious stage cannot be separated from the ethical sphere, not in the sense that religious life continues to transport ethics as inferior to itself, but in the sense that once having gained the religious stage, ethics itself is transvalued: suspended in its sufficiency, but reaffirmed in its dependence on religious life. From this moment on all of Kierkegaard’s production will speak about ethical-religious life, where morality (Sittlichkeit) and religiosity are...indivisible.20

With these words and by means of a profound examination of Kierkegaard’s concept of “repentance,” Pareyson breaks the scheme of the “stages,” thus coming to disclose, for the first time in Kierkegaard’s Italian reception, the question of

Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 113–29; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 61–9. 16 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 130–49; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 69–77. 17 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 140; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 73–4. 18 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, p. 159; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 81. 19 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 190–209; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 94–102. 20 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, pp. 215–16; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 105. 15

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“second ethics.” But Pareyson’s lesson remained almost completely unheard, and up to now the prevailing tendency in Italy—as in most of the international secondary literature—remains to refer to Fear and Trembling in order to depict the religious in Kierkegaard’s authorship.21 Silvia Vignati

21 In this text on the first phase of Kierkegaard’s thought (1843–45), Pareyson cannot avoid quoting from a passage of the Postscript, where Climacus focuses on the definitive vanishing of “the teleological suspension of the ethical,” once “sin” is really posited. See SKS 7, 243–4 / CUP1, 267–8. On this crucial issue important contributions have been made by Ettore Rocca. See, for example, his “If Abraham is Not a Human Being,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2002, pp. 247–58.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Bernascone, Bianca, review in Filosofia, vol. 1, 1969, pp. 147–50. Castagnino, Franca, review in her Gli studi italiani su Kierkegaard: 1906–1966, Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1972, pp. 296–8. Modica, Giuseppe, “L’etica di Kierkegaard secondo Pareyson,” in his Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani, Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2007, pp. 111–41; see pp. 114–27.

Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla” [Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the Postscript], Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1971 (Corsi Universitari ), 129 pp.

L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla” (Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the Postscript ), published in 1971 by Giappichelli Editore, represents the manuscript of the second lecture series on Kierkegaard’s ethics given by Luigi Pareyson at the University of Turin during the academic year 1970–71, and again in 1973–74.1 Pareyson’s text from 1971 was revised in 1998 by Sergio Givone, and reissued by the Mursia publishing house in Volume 13 of Luigi Pareyson’s Complete Works, under the supervision of the Centro Studi Filosofico-Religiosi Luigi Pareyson.2 Already in his first study on Kierkegaard’s ethics, it is clear that Pareyson ascribes a crucial role to the Postscript, which, according to him, marks the beginning of the second phase of Kierkegaard’s authorship. In fact, in the last pages of Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the First Phase of his Thought (1965), Pareyson, referring specifically to the Postscript, states: “From this moment on, all Kierkegaard’s production will speak about the ethical-religious life, where morality ( Sittlichkeit ) and religiosity are...indivisible.”3 But it is in Pareyson’s preliminary remark to his text of 1971,

1 Francesco Tomatis, Pareyson. Vita, filosofia, bibliografia, Brescia: Morcelliana 2003, p. 71. From Tomatis’ accurate examination of Pareyson’s posthumous papers, it also becomes evident that at first Pareyson had planned to give these lectures during the academic year 1967–68 and that their title was meant to be: “Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the Second Phase of his Thought.” See ibid., p. 115 and p. 70. 2 Luigi Pareyson, Opere Complete, vols. 1–20, ed. by Centro Studi Filosofico-Religiosi Luigi Pareyson, Milan: Mursia 1998–, vol. 13, Kierkegaard e Pascal, ed. by Sergio Givone (1998). In Pareyson’s literary testament, published by Francesco Tomatis among the “Documents,” it can be read that Pareyson’s wish and instruction addressed to his close pupil Sergio Givone was actually to republish both manuscripts on Kierkegaard’s ethics in a single volume, under the title “Kierkegaard between Aesthetics and Ethics.” The first manuscript was to constitute the body of the book, whereas the second was to be an appendix on “The Ethical Problem in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.” See Tomatis, Pareyson. Vita, filosofia, bibliografia, p. 181. See also, in this volume, my review of Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero (Kierkegaard’s Ethics in the First Phase of his Thought), Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1965. 3 Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella prima fase del suo pensiero, Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1965 (Corsi Universitari), pp. 215–16; Pareyson, Kierkegaard e Pascal, vol. 13 from Opere Complete, p. 105.

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which was not republished in the new edition of 1998, that essential information on Pareyson’s reception of this Kierkegaardian work occurs. In this important document—just after having stressed that “it was in the Postscript that [Kierkegaard] carried out explicitly and overtly his anti-Hegelian polemic, and adjusted his chief and more truly philosophical concepts”—Pareyson claims: “More precisely, ethics is here [i.e., in the Postscript] defined not only towards aesthetics, but also towards religion, with a complete revision of the theory of the stages, and with the explicit revaluation of the single individual against the System and of actuality against possibility.”4 Pareyson’s second study on Kierkegaard’s ethics is divided into two chapters. The first chapter, “Subjective Thought and Christianity,” consists of four sections: (1) “Facility or Difficulty of Christianity,” (2) “Existential Introduction to Christianity,” (3) “Neither Historical Conquest, nor Philological Disquisition, nor Philosophical Proof,” and (4) “Subjective Thought.”5 Pareyson opens his discourse by stressing that the Postscript testifies to Kierkegaard’s “necessity of collecting the results of his thought,”6 since this is the work with which the second part of his authorship begins. But, representing the addendum to Philosophical Fragments, it still deals with the issues of the latter. Therefore, according to Pareyson, “the threefold goal of the Postscript consists in [1] giving a satisfying answer to who is seeking the truth in Christianity, [2] providing a definitive refutation of Hegelian philosophy, [3] offering a complete exposition, even if not a ‘systematic’ one...of Kierkegaard’s thought.”7 In this first chapter Pareyson discusses all the crucial and polemical questions treated by the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, hinting already at a key element, which then will lead to the core of this second study. In fact, after having identified Kierkegaard as one of the major renewal theologians in Protestant theology as well as Christian theology in general, and as the forerunner of existentialism, because of the double nature of the Postscript, that is, for its “exquisitely religious” character despite its “substantially philosophical procedure,”8 Pareyson hints at the reason why the Postscript should be considered to be the writing with which Kierkegaard lays down “a complete revision of the theory of the stages.”9 He focuses on the totally personal—not speculative, not historical, not philological—problem of “becoming a Christian,” and comments: “The Postscript, precisely by dealing with the actual recovery of Christianity, and for this aim by undertaking a polemic against

4 Luigi Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” Turin: G. Giappichelli Editore 1971, pp. 2–3. (my emphasis). On the history of the reception of the Postscript in Italy, see Ingrid Basso, “The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2005, pp. 400–417, in particular, pp. 412–14. 5 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 7–58; Pareyson, Kierkegaard e Pascal, vol. 13 from Opere Complete, pp. 111–32. 6 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” p. 7; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 111. 7 Ibid. 8 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 12–13; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 113. 9 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 2–3.

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Hegelian philosophy, which hinders this recovery, precisely by pursuing this twofold endeavor, enunciates and explains a complete moral theory.”10 The second chapter, entitled “The Categories of the Moral Life,” begins with the following sentence: “It is...time to see how the categories, with which Christianity can effectively defend itself against Hegelian speculation, are the very same which make ethics possible.”11 Pareyson draws attention to the opposition between “knowing” and “believing,” stressing that the only way to recover Christianity is to acknowledge it and keep it as “the paradox,” as “the absurd.”12 But doing this means to believe “not for the reason, but for the passion...for a personal choice, a single decision, an irreplaceable commitment...for subjective appropriation.”13 “These are”—as Pareyson highlights—“the characteristics of ‘subjective thought,’ which are all contained in what Kierkegaard means with the general term existence, and which, if, on the one hand, are the only [characteristics], which explain an adhesion to Christianity, on the other hand, are the fundamental categories of ethics.”14 Pareyson’s key point is herewith clarified. In order to recover Christianity as an existential problem, that is, a problem in actuality, one has to seriously direct attention to Climacus’ profundity of “subjective thought,” that is, to appropriate existentially Climacus’ ethical categories. In this chapter the relevance of “subjective thought” is proven by Pareyson through his analysis of Climacus’ opposition between “universal history” and the dimension of “moral life.”15 In this second study, Pareyson emphasizes Kierkegaard’s rigorous philosophy of freedom, in the sense of a philosophy based on “the choice.” But he also stresses the fact that “the ethical commitment” in the phase opened by the Postscript is always an “ethicalreligious commitment.”16 Therefore, Pareyson claims that Climacus restates and enriches “the entire problematic of the choice of oneself...with the categories of the religious stage.”17 But Pareyson’s survey of the Postscript does not deal specifically with the latter categories, that is, with the peculiar categories of Christianity. Actually, his interest was to direct the attention to “the existential character of ethics” within the

Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 30–1; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 121. Immediately after this, Pareyson announces his intention to “reconstruct Kierkegaard’s theory of ethics” by means of an analysis of “the problem of the recovery of Christianity.” 11 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” p. 61; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 133. This second chapter is divided into four sections: (1) “Subjectivity and Existence,” (2) “Existential Thought and Choice of Oneself,” (3) “Opposition between Universal History and Moral Life,” (4) “The Existential Character of Ethics.” 12 Ibid. 13 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 64–5; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 134–5. 14 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” p. 65; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 135. 15 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 89–107; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 144–52. 16 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” p. 87; Kierkegaard e Pascal, p. 143. 17 Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” p. 87; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 143–4. 10

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religious stage,18 with the specific aim—as he reveals in his preliminary remark—to reevaluate the “single individual” against “the System” and “actuality” against “possibility.”19 In this second study on Kierkegaard’s ethics, Pareyson therefore treats the issue of “second ethics” by means of Kierkegaard’s major philosophical writing, that is, the Postscript, without expanding his discourse either to Works of Love or to the subsequent Christian writings, which Pareyson probably did not read. In my opinion, this perceptive contribution by Pareyson to the Italian reception should be reconsidered in the light of the contemporary international research on this crucial topic of Kierkegaard’s thought. Silvia Vignati

Pareyson, L’etica di Kierkegaard nella “Postilla,” pp. 108–25; Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 152–9. 19 As Sergio Givone recalls in his foreword, between the 1950s and the 1970s, the Catholic sui generis Luigi Pareyson was intensely dealing with the philosophical and existential problem of Christianity—both in polemic with Hegelianism in general and with the Italian neo-Hegelianism—by focusing precisely on a radical alternative: either Feuerbach (i.e., atheism and Marxism) or Kierkegaard (i.e., Christian existentialism). See Kierkegaard e Pascal, pp. 9–11. 18

Reviews and Critical Discussions Basso, Ingrid, “The Italian Reception of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2005, pp. 400–417; see pp. 412–14. Modica, Giuseppe, “L’etica di Kierkegaard secondo Pareyson,” in his Una verità per me. Itinerari kierkegaardiani, Milan: Vita e Pensiero 2007, pp. 111–41; see pp. 127–36.

Giorgio Penzo, Kierkegaard. La verità eterna che nasce nel tempo [Kierkegaard: The Eternal Truth which is Born in Temporality], Padova: Edizioni Messaggero 2000, 144 pp.

Giorgio Penzo’s study, Kierkegaard. La verità eterna che nasce nel tempo was published by Edizioni Messaggero in 2000. Penzo places Kierkegaard’s philosophy in the context both of an indissoluble relationship between life and thought and of his willingness to follow the divine request that tormented him deep in his soul. The sense of tragedy is a kind of “positive nihilism,”1 on which an authentic philosophizing is based, and it is characterized not by the principles of a scientific process but by an existential anxiety. However, for the Danish philosopher, the finite world is neither lost nor negated but is achieved entirely (thanks to the concept of the absurd), by the leap of faith, which is a paradoxical leap from the finite to the non-finite, and this is something peculiar to Christian culture, where the finite is re-conquered by virtue of the eternal. This is the Leitmotiv of Penzo’s essay, which is well illustrated by the figure of Abraham who serves to summarize the key point of Penzo’s philosophical reflection: the eternal truth is born in temporality. Abraham does not resign because his act of faith has a basic contradiction; paradoxically, he feels the hope that Isaac will not die, but he will be given back to him.2 Through an original and detailed analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of paradox, Penzo not only explores Kierkegaard’s inner world, but he also puts the Danish thinker outside the scheme of traditional Western philosophy and theology, in light of a fundamental discrimen between the philosophy of existence and existentialism. Whereas in existentialism existence is resolved in the pure act of existing, which does not proceed beyond the confines of space and time, for the philosophy of existence we can speak of authentic existence only when it is placed before transcendence:

Giorgio Penzo, Kierkegaard. La verità eterna che nasce nel tempo, Padova: Edizioni Messaggero 2000, p. 48. 2 Ibid., p. 62. 1

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“In the reality of the moment,” Penzo writes, “the continuous interaction between time and eternity takes place.”3 From this perspective, Penzo focuses on the single individual’s act of decision as the main way for an authentic understanding of temporality that reveals itself in its full meaning only starting from the “moment.” However, Penzo also speaks about the individual as an “anxious consciousness,” namely, “as a finite and temporal being whose metaphysical peculiarity consists in his opening to infinity and to the eruption of eternity.”4 Therefore, Penzo does not put us in front of an abstract and conceptual problem, but rather brings us to an existential one: in the decision of the moment, the individual is open to the true dimension of freedom, that is, the truth, which can be brought to light outside of the principle of non-contradiction and outside of a logical-rational philosophy, because the truth’s foundation is the “paradox,” which, in Kierkegaard, is the “expression of an existential philosophy.”5 Penzo deepens this crucial aspect in a new and unexpected way: in its essence the paradox—as well as the existential and not objective truth—implies the negative moment,6 which must be understood in terms of existence, not in conceptual terms, because it involves the negative as the only foundation of the reality. “The experience of the negative,” Penzo writes, “opens to the supra-historical and to the horizon of eternity.”7 Moreover, Kierkegaard deals with the problem of Lessing,8 who perceives the limits of knowledge (historical knowledge) and, overcoming the schemes of Enlightenment thought, puts it in relation to the eternal (the revelation), because the truth can never be a purely human product. According to Penzo, in Kierkegaard’s view, we should speak of “opening to the truth,” because not only is it possible to follow—in the sense of Heidegger and Jaspers—the “traces of the truth,” but—in the sense of Lessing—the human being’s value consists in the sincere “effort” (negativum) that he makes to arrive at the truth.9 In Penzo’s hermeneutical perspective, the centrality of the philosophy of Kierkegaard is not only the attention to the existential limits of knowledge (in contrast to Hegel), but also the evidence of the horizon, where, at the moment of a decision which is based on nothing, the eternal is different from the temporal, and it comes as an exercise of the negativum, conditio sine qua non of existence itself.10 Alessandra Granito

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Ibid., p. 88. Ibid., pp. 22–3. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 19.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Berardini, Sergio Fabio, “La malattia per la morte” di Kierkegaard. Introduzione e commento, Rome: Aracne 2010, p. 43. Granito, Alessandra, Eugen Drewermann interprete di Kierkegaard. Le quattro forme kierkegaardiane della disperazione rilette alla luce della psicoanalisi, Naples: Orthotes 2013, pp. 110–11. Longo, Giulia, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche: eternità dell’istante, istantaneità dell’Eterno, Milan: Mimesis 2007, p. 8; p. 125; p. 146; p. 173. Saladini, Paolo, “Giorgio Penzo filosofo del nulla,” Giornale Critico di Storia delle Idee. Rivista internazionale di filosofia, Milan: IPOC 2012, p. 134. Spadaro, Antonio, review in La civiltà cattolica, vol. 1, no. 153, 2002, pp. 520–1.

Ettore Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia. Studi kierkegaardiani [Between Aesthetics and Theology: Kierkegaardian Studies], Pisa: Edizioni ETS 2004, 213 pp.

Ettore Rocca’s work, Tra estetica e teologia. Studi kierkegaardiani was published by Edizioni ETS in 2004. This book—as the author states in his preface—gathers “some of the results of a decade of Kierkegaardian inquiries.”1 The eleven essays, which Rocca offers first and foremost to Italian readers, were written between 1995 and 2004 for different occasions and in different languages, but each of them was revised for this particular publication, “some of them in light form, and others substantially.”2 Despite the fact that this is unquestionably a collection of essays rather than a monograph, what emerges from Rocca’s different surveys shows evidence of a continuous and progressively deeper analysis of some fundamental Kierkegaardian philosophical and theological issues, related in particular to three “conceptual pairs: silence-word, secret-revelation, sin-forgiveness.”3 Rocca makes use of these concepts to introduce himself and the reader to the “main opposition”4 that characterizes all Kierkegaardian thought, that is, the opposition between aesthetics, on the one hand, and theology, on the other. And what actually constitutes the core of Rocca’s interpretation is the fact that he inverts this opposition, thus opening a new perspective informed by theology, that is, from Kierkegaardian religious thought, through theology to aesthetics, that is, to the so-called “second aesthetics.” With this new category—introduced to the Kierkegaardian international debate by Rocca himself in 19985—the author inaugurates a new line of investigation which calls into question some aspects of the Kierkegaardian Protestant and Catholic

1

Ettore Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia. Studi kierkegaardiani, Pisa: Edizioni ETS 2004,

p. 13. 2 Ibid., p. 17. Detailed information about the sources and the modifications of the original texts appears in the section, “Le fonti dei saggi” (The Sources of the Essays), pp. 17–19. 3 Ibid., p. 13. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., p. 18.

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theological reception, and which is a fundamental contribution to Italian as well as international Kierkegaardian research. Rocca’s main purpose with this publication is therefore to offer a compact, multifaceted answer to the central query, which undoubtedly constitutes the pivotal theoretical knot of his reading up: “Associated with the criticism of the aesthetic life, which is actually also a criticism of modern concepts of art and aesthetics in general, is it possible to rediscover in Kierkegaard another aesthetics, an aesthetics of the religious, a theological aesthetics?”6 Starting with a focus on the first element of the three “conceptual pairs” mentioned above (that is, “silence”), it is possible to obtain an initial outline of Rocca’s theological overturning of that “main opposition.” The concept of “silence” is investigated both in its aesthetic representations such as “demonic silence” (that is, “secrecy,” “rejection of otherness,” “despair” and “obstinacy”)7 and in its Abrahamic religious characterization as “divine silence” (that is, “the divinity’s mutual understanding [Samviden] with the single individual”).8 But Rocca goes one step further, stating that “divine silence” itself is an aesthetic category within the religious. In this further step another crucial thesis by Rocca finds its final explanation, that is, that “in Fear and Trembling there is no space for...an aesthetics of faith.”9 It is indeed from the year 1848, as Rocca points out, that an out-and-out Christological aesthetics explodes in Kierkegaard’s writings.10 This fact, maintains Rocca, seems to be strictly related to a particular event in Kierkegaard’s life, that is, when he begins believing in time in the “remission of sins.”11 Trying to reconstruct the genealogy of Rocca’s path, one can observe that the germ of his reflection on “second aesthetics” was already clearly present in the essay from 1997, “Silence,”12 in spite of the fact that the particular expression did not yet appear. Examining Kierkegaard’s religious silence for the first time, Rocca refers to three different figures, that is, “the lily,” “the bird,” and “the woman who was a sinner,” and concentrates specifically on the last one. In his analysis of the third discourse in Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, “The Woman Who Was a Sinner,” in which the woman is de facto identified as “an eternal image,”13 Rocca looks at this image, recognizing it as “the mirror of the

Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., pp. 22–7. On “secrecy” as a form of “demonic silence” see also essay no. 2: “Secret,” pp. 33–45, and essay no. 9: “In Conversation with the Cinema: Lars von Trier,” pp. 151–64. On “despair” see essay no. 3: “The Sickness unto Death,” pp. 47–67. 8 Ibid., p. 22. Cf. SKS 4, 177–8 / FT, 88. 9 Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia, p. 97. Cf. Essay no. 5: “Faith’s Word,” pp. 87–98, where Rocca examines Abraham’s “superhuman” nature, precisely because of his “absolute relationship to the absolute.” According to Rocca, Abraham, as a prefiguration of Christ, is the only “single individual,” who is in a relationship of “identity with the divine,” that is, in a relationship of “mutual understanding” with God. 10 Ibid., p. 100. 11 Ibid., p. 30. Cf. Ibid., pp. 30–2, § 3: “Il silenzio della scrittura” (Writing’s Silence). 12 Ibid., p. 17. 13 Ibid., p. 29. Cf. SKS 11, 279 / WA, 143. 6 7

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mirror,” that is, the mirror of the otherness, of Christ, of “the sign of contradiction par excellence.”14 The woman “being silent,” that is, being “an eternal image,” states Rocca, is an “example of love and...of the abandonment to otherness..., of opening up to otherness and hence of the completed self.”15 In doing “nothing at all,” emphasizes Rocca, “she is her own silence, her own lack of words,”16 and in so acting she was and still is an “image” of the “possibility” of and the “acceptance of forgiveness,” that is, of the “abandonment to the Other in self-forgetfulness.”17 On the basis of his investigations on “silence” Rocca seems to conclude that if all forms of “demonic silence” are forms of opposition to the “word,” both in the ethical sense and in the Christian sense (that is, the Word), then all forms of “divine silence” are outside rather than against the “word” (both in the purely human sense and in the ethical sense), but of course receptive towards the Word. More precisely, from Rocca’s perspective, at the sublime moment of the acceptance of forgiveness the Word can only find its proper expression in that new aesthetic dimension, that is, in the silence of the opening of the “eyes of faith.”18 It is in the essay “The Second Aesthetics,” presented in 1998—only one year after “Silence”—that Rocca concentrates systematically on this unveiled second aesthetic dimension. His aim now is to verify the theological function of the “image,” that is, to demonstrate “the necessity of such an aesthetics” in Kierkegaard’s work.19 To achieve this goal Rocca avails himself of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, referring to § 59 (“Beauty as the Symbol of Morality”) where Kant distinguishes between “schematic” and “symbolic exhibitions.” On the basis of Kant’s firm belief in the “schematism of analogy,” referring both to the “concepts of pure reason” (God, the soul, and the world as a whole) and to “reflective faith,” Rocca proceeds to examine the Kierkegaardian “semiology” of the Christian paradox (that is, Christ) and the paradoxical character of Christian faith. In these complex and strictly interrelated analyses, the figure of the “woman in sin” comes back as evidence as a “symbolic exhibition of the forgiveness.”20 This “eternal image,” in its constitutive silence—like every image—allows one to see the “possibility of forgiveness” incarnate,21 but only in its constitutive paradoxality, which must be repeated if it is to be real. The “image,” that is, the “symbolic exhibition” of the “woman in sin” is not the only one located by Rocca in Kierkegaard’s writings from the period 1848–51. The distinguishing feature of Rocca’s work is in fact the irreplaceableness of the “image,” that is, the “necessity” of a “second aesthetics” in Kierkegaard: Christian

14 Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia, p. 29. For the metaphor of Christ as a “mirror” see 1 Corinthians 13:12; 2 Corinthians 3:18. 15 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 16 Ibid., p. 29. Cf. SKS 12, 270 / WA, 157. 17 Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia, p. 29. 18 Ibid., essay no. 1: “Silence,” pp. 21–32. On the absolute difference in being outside the word of Abraham and of a Christian see essay no. 5: “Faith’s Word,” pp. 87–98, and essay no. 4: “Direct and Indirect Communication,” pp. 69–85. 19 Ibid., p. 100. 20 Ibid., p. 108. 21 Ibid.

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paradoxical truths cannot receive a “direct schematic exhibition,” since that would mean to contradict their nature, that is, to nullify them—or to open to a fanatic discourse. Therefore, according to Rocca, it is exclusively through “symbolic exhibitions” of these truths that attention can be attracted and the possibility of faith can be opened.22 Six years later, in 2004, in the essay “Faith’s Perception,” Rocca returns to investigate this second aesthetic dimension with a historical-theological approach. His intent is to challenge a common thesis, defended first by the Protestant theologians Emil Brunner and Rudolf Bultmann and later by the Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, which claims that in Kierkegaard there is only evidence of a “theology of the offense” but not of a “theology of glory” (that is, of a “theological aesthetics”) since Kierkegaard “increased...the ‘deaesthetization of the theology’ operating in Luther.”23 Through a critical parallel reading of the two first Kierkegaardian writings on the “theology of the offense,” that is, the “Dimissory Sermon” and Philosophical Fragments, both from 1844, Rocca argues that exactly here it is possible to “track down a theology of glory,” the central concept of which is “the marvelous” (Vidunderet) and not the concept of “beauty,” as one sees in Barth.24 According to Rocca, it is precisely the notion of the “eye of faith,” presented in Kierkegaard’s “Dimissory Sermon”—the eye which perceives the glory of God, the eternity that comes into temporality, that is, “the marvelous despite its logical contradiction”25—that can clarify Philosophical Fragments’ central notion of “condition”: “to receive the condition means...to see the glory with the eyes of faith.”26 In this statement another aspect of Rocca’s theological overturning finds its foundation: through the opening of this “second aisthesis,” “the consciousness of sin [becomes] part of faith’s perception,”27 that is, “sin” can only be seen by one who is in the “second aesthetics,” that is, in the moment of “revelation” and “forgiveness.”28 In conclusion, this book by Rocca represents a fundamental chapter in the history of the Italian Kierkegaardian reception and, moreover, a key tool for contemporary research. In fact, as already noted by Ingrid Basso, Rocca’s enormous contribution is not only due to the high originality of his theses, but specifically to the reason that these very theses come to the surface thanks to an uncommon (both philological and hermeneutical) investigation of the Danish originals. Besides the Italian reception of the book, which has been mostly concentrated on the topic of “demonic silence” in its particular declination like “secrecy,” Rocca’s single essays

Ibid., see pp. 103–8. Ibid., p. 129. 24 Ibid., pp. 127–30. 25 Ibid., p. 136. 26 Ibid., p. 139. Cf. SKS 4, 270 / PF, 70. 27 Rocca, Tra estetica e teologia, p. 145. 28 Rocca’s thesis of a simultaneity of “revelation of forgiveness” and “revelation of sin” in Kierkegaard finds a visual, iconographic, and theological exemplification in his surprising analysis of Emil Nolde’s painting Abendmahl (1909) (see ibid., pp. 189–210). 22 23

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have also been strongly echoed by the international Kierkegaardian reception and research. In this broader panorama two theses have particularly attracted attention: on the one hand, that of the actual presence of a “theological aesthetics” within Kierkegaard’s work; on the other hand, that of the absolute difference and inimitableness of Abraham. Silvia Vignati

Review and Critical Discussion Basso, Ingrid, review in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, vol. 97, no. 3, 2005, pp. 537–42.

Ettore Rocca, Kierkegaard, Rome: Carocci editore 2012 (Pensatori, vol. 29), 304 pp.

Ettore Rocca’s monograph, Kierkegaard, was published by the Italian publishing house Carocci in November 2012 as volume number 29 in the recently launched and distinguished series Pensatori (Thinkers). The book will also appear in a Danish translation for the Danish publishing house Gyldendal. Due to its outstanding documentation based on the original Danish sources and to its solid structure, this work represents a crucial turning point in the Italian reception of Kierkegaard’s thought. As an outcome of Rocca’s long dedication at the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in Copenhagen, this monograph is also highly relevant to current international research, explicitly and implicitly recalling a wide range of contemporary debates. In Chapter 1, “Communicating the Truth,” the starting point is established quite surprisingly in the year 1851, that is, when the 38-year-old Søren Kierkegaard decides to put an end to his “astonishing literary parabola.”1 More precisely, Rocca’s reading moves from Kierkegaard’s famous self-critical booklet On My Work as an Author (August 6, 1851), where the Dane—taking stock of his entire authorship—maintains that “qua author [he] ‘has willed only one thing,’ ” that is, “the religious,” and that his oeuvre deals with only one problem: “becoming a Christian.”2 As Rocca recalls, in this concluding booklet Kierkegaard also underlines the maieutic character and the not-authoritativeness of his literary production,3 expressly asserting: “I regard myself rather as a reader of the books, not as the author.”4 Now, what constitutes Rocca’s insightful remark within this well-known frame is that, in spite of Kierkegaard’s explicit statement, “there is...a difference between Kierkegaard as reader of himself and the other readers, a difference in which the role and the authority of the author return.”5 This “difference,” according to Rocca, emerges in the following statement from the same text, where Kierkegaard guarantees to his reader: “I know what

I must thank Dr. Carson Seabourn Webb for all his advice and patience in revising the present text, and here I take the opportunity to refer to his dissertation: “Attunements to the Good Life: Religious Joy and the Critique of Eudaemonism in the Writings of Søren Kierkegaard,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University, 2014. 1 Ettore Rocca, Kierkegaard, Rome: Carocci editore 2012 (Pensatori, vol. 29), p. 15. 2 Ibid. Cf. SKS 13, 13–14 / PV, 6–8. 3 Rocca, Kierkegaard, p. 16. Cf. SKS 13, 13–27 / PV, 5–20. 4 Rocca, Kierkegaard, p. 17. Cf. SKS 13, 19 / PV, 12. 5 Rocca, Kierkegaard, p. 17.

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Christianity is.” In this assurance—Rocca points out—a “theoretical pretension” arises, which is incompatible with Kierkegaard’s firm belief that “Christianity is not a knowledge but a life practice.”7 And it is precisely this contradiction that generates what Rocca calls “the fundamental paradox that at the same time bears and calls into question Kierkegaard’s entire authorship.”8 This “paradox” is explicated by Rocca through two critical questions: (1) “Is it possible to know, first of all, and secondly, to teach, something that is not knowledge?” (2) “Is it possible to know and to teach something that one is not?”9 In this first chapter, Kierkegaard’s last words as a religious author are the occasion for Rocca to investigate in depth the “statute [that is, the fundamental law] of Kierkegaard’s entire oeuvre.”10 Emphasizing the complete awareness of the Dane concerning the profound paradoxicality of his writing on “becoming a Christian,” Rocca interprets Kierkegaard’s “strategy of communication” as “a way to avoid the aporias that the antinomy poses.”11 The antinomy and the problem at hand are formulated by Rocca with reference to Practice in Christianity and can be summarized as follows: either the truth is propositional knowledge, or it is one’s own life; but a life is true only if it redoubles Christ’s life; thus, each proposition expresses the latter, that is, any writing about this existential truth, is untrue, that is, not Christian.12 Based on these considerations, Rocca’s thesis is that the pseudonymous writings circumvent the antinomy, whereas the religious writings practice it.13 Rocca’s Overture then leads to the conclusion that Kierkegaard in the end believes and hopes that his “communicating the Truth” is a work of love, even if this is not sufficient for him to label himself a true Christian.14 In other words, according to Rocca, Kierkegaard’s “theoretical pretension” mentioned above is only apparent, being in fact “only an expression of faith,” but not an authoritative statement.15 6

Ibid. Cf. SKS 13, 23 / PV, 15. Rocca, Kierkegaard, p. 17. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. The second point refers specifically to the fact that Kierkegaard never declares himself to be a true Christian. 10 Ibid., p. 41. 11 Ibid., p. 20. 12 Ibid., see “Antinomy,” pp. 15–20, in particular, pp. 17–19. Cf. also SKS 12, 202–3 / PC, 205–6. 13 Ibid., p. 26. By arguing this thesis, Rocca offers fundamental elucidations on Kierkegaard’s “indirect” and “direct communication,” focusing on the “demonic character” of any radical “indirect communication” for human beings, when the object of communication is Christianity. See ibid., pp. 20–7: “Strategy of Communication,” and pp. 27–9: “Divine or Demonic.” 14 Ibid., p. 43, where Rocca explicitly refers to Works of Love, SKS 9, 367 / WL, 374. 15 Rocca, Kierkegaard, p. 43. In this chapter, Kierkegaard’s important discourse on non-authoritativeness is developed by Rocca through the analysis of Two Ethical-Religious Essays, that is, Kierkegaard’s “anonymous writing.” Rocca’s main argument is that the human lack of authority derives from the impossibility of establishing an absolute relationship to the Christian truth, that is, to Christ, because of sin, and from one’s own responsibility towards others. See ibid., pp. 29–34: “Nautical Signal.” 6 7

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After this preliminary inquiry on the antinomic nature of Kierkegaard’s authorship, Rocca shifts the focus to the man Søren Kierkegaard, offering a critical, accurate portrait of the Dane. Precisely, he concentrates on a deconstruction of those aspects regarding the person Kierkegaard, which all too often have been overestimated in both Italian and international reception.16 In Chapter 2, entitled “Myths of a Life,” Rocca’s point is that the interpreter has to carefully avoid falling into these traps that, in the best cases, contain more fiction than reality. Next, in Chapter 3, entitled “The Young Kierkegaard in the Golden Age of Danish Culture,” Rocca outlines the complex intellectual life of the student of theology between 1834 and 1841.17 In this highly informative chapter, Rocca’s perceptive survey of the sources aims to highlight particularly those elements that later become fundamental in Kierkegaard’s authorship.18 It is in Chapter 4 that Rocca begins his thorough examination of Kierkegaard’s literary parabola. The analysis of Either/Or covers Chapter 4 and part of Chapter 5, respectively entitled: “Philosophies of the Secret: The Aesthetic,”19 and “Philosophies of the Secret: The Ethical.”20 In Chapter 4, Rocca argues that Kierkegaard in Either/ Or engages in a critical discussion of Hegel’s philosophical thesis regarding the identity between the inner and the outer (for the Dane, an example of Hegel’s violation of the law of the excluded middle), calling it into question through “the issue of the secret.”21 According to Rocca, “the secret” is precisely what refutes in experience Hegel’s defended identity. Briefly stated, Rocca’s meticulous analysis of Kierkegaard’s first pseudonymous writing rests on the “idea” that what gives unity to the papers of A and of B is “the relationship between secret and revelation,”22 that is, between demonic silence and ethical revelation. But what constitutes the peculiar trait of Rocca’s reading of Either/Or is that Judge William—usually identified only as the representative of ethical revelation, that is, of the openness, of the transparency

16 Ibid., pp. 45–72. The chapter is divided into 5 sections: “The Secret Note,” “The Father,” “The Fiancée,” “The Slanderer,” and “The Bishop.” By examining journal entries, letters and passages from the pseudonymous writings, Rocca infers that in all cases we do not have “descriptions of events, but fictional tales, myths of a life, built or...re-built by Kierkegaard himself, where events or real persons vanish in...possibilities,” ibid., p. 47. 17 Ibid., pp. 73–92. The chapter contains 4 sections: “The Golden Age,” “Satirical and Polemical Debuts,” “A Truth for Me,” and “Irony and the Mythical.” 18 Ibid. See, for example, p. 80, where Rocca defines satire—Kierkegaard’s first chosen literary genre—as “a figure of the opposition between the inner and the outer.” Rocca forms this definition on the basis of a journal entry from 1837, where the Dane implicitly hints at Hegel’s evaluation of Roman satire in the Lectures on Aesthetics. See also p. 90, where Rocca, by analyzing Kierkegaard’s dissertation On the Concept of Irony, highlights a passage in which “the religious” is rapidly located as the dimension of the “true reconciliation,” in opposition to “poetry.” 19 Ibid., pp. 93–114. 20 Ibid., pp. 115–33. 21 Ibid., pp. 100–101. 22 Ibid., p. 101.

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of oneself to oneself and to the others—would in the end be a figure of the secret.23 More generally, in Chapter 5 Rocca acknowledges the ethical conception of life as a higher form of spirit, yet only indirectly (and not necessarily) visible in the traces of the historical, that is, lacking a real identity between the inner and the outer—and therefore ultimately secret.24 Finally, Chapter 5 contains at least three more essential aspects of Rocca’s reading: (1) the thesis according to which the “Ultimatum” as well as the first five edifying discourses show a “religion of immanence” based on a “voluntaristic faith,” where no transcendence and no paradoxical character of Christianity is to be found;25 (2) the absolute heterogeneity of Abraham from a Christian point of view, since Abraham is not heterogeneous with the ethical;26 and (3) the absence of a “religiousness A” in Stages on Life’s Way, and specifically the presence of a negative religiosity of the demonic in “Guilty?/Not Guilty?”27 These first two points rest on Rocca’s central thesis that in Fear and Trembling, as well as in all Kierkegaard’s writings of 1843, “the issue of sin is absent,” even if the terms “repentance,” “sin” and “God” already appear.28 Indeed, according to Rocca, “the absolute difference between real and ideal, finite and infinite, human imperfection and ethical perfection” is “posited” by Kierkegaard with the writings of 1844, where the issue of sin is introduced as a genuine Christian issue, and where “sin”—claims Rocca—“is the new interior secret.”29 Rocca’s critical remark is that Kierkegaard, by means of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus—first in Philosophical Fragments and then more radically in the Postscript—sanctions the impossibility of any “suspension of the ethical.” “From a Christian point of view”—states Rocca—“we cannot suspend the ethical in favor of a superior relationship with God; rather the ethical is all along suspended in an inferior state of exception, which is yet the normality for the human being: the state of sin.”30 Thus, Rocca’s conclusion is that

Ibid., pp. 115–16: “William: Revelation and New Secret.” According to Rocca, Judge William is a figure of ethical secret, because “the beauty of marriage” belongs to the “inner history” and cannot be artistically represented. 24 Ibid., pp. 117–24: “Choosing Oneself, or Despairing.” Rocca locates the fundamental support for this thesis in the Postscript: SKS 7, 235 / CUP1, 258–9. See also Rocca, Kierkegaard, pp. 186–7, concerning “the ethical sphere.” 25 Ibid., pp. 124–6: “The Religion of the Ethical.” 26 Ibid., pp. 126–30: “Abraham’s Secret,” where Rocca also emphasizes the absolute difference between Abraham’s “secret,” that is, Abraham’s “absolute relationship to the absolute,” and any aesthetic secrecy, that is, any form of unwillingness to reveal whatever communicable secret one hides. 27 Ibid., pp. 131–3: “Autolesionism,” where Rocca stresses the indeterminate nature of Quidam’s category of “guilt.” 28 Ibid., p. 130. See also ibid., pp. 124–6: “The Religion of the Ethical.” 29 Ibid., p. 130. On Rocca’s analysis of the two crucial Kierkegaard’s writings from 1844, see Chapter 6: “Freedom and Anxiety”—where The Concept of Anxiety is analyzed as “a post-Enlightenment book”—and Chapter 7: “Socrates and Christ”—where Rocca concentrates on Philosophical Fragments, drawing the attention to his crucial thesis regarding the simultaneity of “consciousness of forgiveness” and “consciousness of sin.” 30 Ibid., p. 129. 23

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“there is no analogy between Abraham and us.”31 The clarifying element of the third point mentioned above, that is, the lack of a “religiousness A” in the Stages, is to be found in Chapter 8, entitled “Existence and Its Spheres,” where Rocca uses the Postscript to distinguish seven “spheres of existence,” illuminating specifically Climacus’ division of the religious into two spheres: “religiousness A” and “religiousness B.”32 Differently from Quidam’s irresoluteness concerning his possible guilt, in the sphere of “religiousness A”—paraphrasing Rocca—the category of “total guilt” is a fundamental existential category, disclosing the relationship to God at an immanent human interior level. This category, which is related to the human “fundamental culpability,” claims Rocca, does not have to be understood as “transcendental in the strict sense.”33 In fact, if it comes into one’s interiority, it happens in the form of an “essential recollection,” but after the real experience of guilt.34 Following Climacus, Rocca maintains that this first form of religiosity is the expression of a first striving of the “eternal self” towards an obscurely sensed “eternal beatitude,” of a first “dying to finitude,” of a relationship with a god that can only be felt as an absolute truth, that is, as one’s own tragic negation, and therefore causing suffering. “Religiousness A” marks, for Rocca, the pinnacle of “Kierkegaard’s philosophy of the secret.”35 But within “religiousness A,” “the secret” is the paradoxical existential relationship in interiority to the uncertainty of “the eternal.” It is starting from “religiousness B,” claims Rocca, that “interiority no longer hides any secret.”36 This means that Christian faith is beyond “the consciousness of total guilt” of “religiousness A,” that is, beyond a negative relationship to God. “Religiousness B” in fact begins with “the consciousness of sin”—but this consciousness, as Rocca has been arguing, does not derive from interiority. If it is awakened, according to Rocca, it is not by reason but by Christ’s standing in his actuality in front of the one who can see with “the eyes of faith,” that is, in the moment of Christ’s simultaneous revelation of forgiveness and sin.37 The true revelation of oneself is therefore the reconciliation with Christ. But at this point Rocca draws attention once again to his main thesis, that “the secret” is precisely what makes impossible in existence the identity between the inner and the outer. Now, in the Christian religious sphere—as Rocca points out on the basis

Ibid. In his argumentation, Rocca quotes from several passages of the Postscript, recalling also the one, where “sin” is located as “the [decisive] point of departure for the religious existence.” Cf. SKS 7, 243 / CUP1, 268. 32 Rocca, Kierkegaard, pp. 179–206, in particular, pp. 187–92 and pp. 192–6. 33 Ibid., p. 189. 34 Ibid., pp. 188–90. Cf. SKS 7, 483, 485 / CUP1, 531, 533. In philosophical terms, the Postscript echoes Vigilius Haufniensis’ discourse on “guilt” and on “sinfulness” as a quantitative determination. 35 Ibid., p. 192. This philosophy, according to Rocca, goes from Either/Or to II.II.4.A. § 3 in the Postscript, including also the upbuilding discourses, where “sin”—when Christianly posited—is not related to the issue of “forgiveness,” and thus, as noted, represents for Rocca a “new secret.” 36 Ibid., p. 194. 37 See also Ettore Rocca, “The Threefold Revelation of Sin,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2005, pp. 384–94. 31

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of the Postscript—“the secret” is “the revelation sensu strictissimo,” that is, Christ, the absolute paradox.38 This “secret” is the essential element of the new dialectic of existence. To conclude, the reason why I have focused on Rocca’s analysis of Climacus’ division of the religious—among the several topics treated in this extraordinary book—is that, at the beginning of Chapter 9, entitled “Love, Longing, Joy,” Rocca uses Climacus’ distinction in order to outline a still overlooked portion of Kierkegaard’s authorship.39 Specifically, by asserting that “the third and last part of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, entitled ‘The Gospel of Sufferings: Christian Discourses’ inaugurates a new chapter in Kierkegaard’s authorship, indeed that of the ‘Christian discourses,’ ”40 Rocca points out that it is only starting from the latter writing that Kierkegaard begins fulfilling “the task...of giving content to religiousness B,” that is, to say “what it means to follow Christ.”41 Recalling the starting point of Rocca’s monograph, this means that it is specifically starting from “The Gospel of Sufferings” that Kierkegaard begins practicing the antinomy through a much more “direct communication,” lingering over several variations on the joy and suffering of following.42 And, Rocca concludes, it is in defense of following, that is, in defense of New Testament Christianity, that Kierkegaard returns to the stage for the final attack upon Christendom. Now Kierkegaard is outside his authorship and does not need any strategy of communication, but still his “final ambition...is not to be a Christian witness to the truth by appealing to divine authority, but—by challenging human authorities—to be a human witness to speaking what is true”43—that is, as Rocca highlights, by remaining in the antinomy of the Christian truth for faith and for ethical duty until the end of his days, asking—as a modern Socrates—only honesty (Redelighed) from his contemporaries. Silvia Vignati

Ibid., p. 201. Cf. SKS 7, 195 / CUP1, 213. Rocca, Kierkegaard, pp. 207–32. Important contributions in this regard have been given by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser, and George Pattison. 40 Ibid., p. 209. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., pp. 207–70, i.e., Chapters 9–11, where Rocca offers the most accurate contribution to Italian reception and research concerning the group of Kierkegaard’s veronymous and pseudonymous writings published between 1847 and 1851. 43 Ibid., p. 278. 38 39

Review and Critical Discussion Regina, Umberto, review in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, vol. 105, nos. 3–4, 2013, pp. 1015–19.

V. Secondary Literature in Japanese

Hiroshi Fujino, キルケゴール – 美と倫理 のはざまに立つ哲学 [Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical], Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 2014, xvi + 270 pp.

Hiroshi Fujino’s Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical is one of the most recent studies on Kierkegaard in Japan.1 The main aim of this book is to “describe Kierkegaard’s philosophical thinking as a whole” and thereby to “bring out his philosophical significance.”2 From this point of view, Fujino “reads Kierkegaard against his own self-interpretation.”3 Fujino shares neither Kierkegaard’s religious motivation nor does he accept Kierkegaard’s request to take his use of pseudonyms seriously; further he distances himself from the so-called “theory of stages.” However, this does not mean that Fujino’s argumentation is developed in an arbitrary manner. He concentrates on “the task to locate Kierkegaard in a broader philosophical context and to re-read him from there.”4 This book consists of nine chapters and addresses three systematic themes.5 First, Fujino explains Kierkegaard’s concept of “existence.” Second, he discusses the ambiguity of “the aesthetic” and “the ethical” while criticizing Kierkegaard’s “theory of stages.” Finally, he reinterprets the concept of “repetition” as a positive fundamental experience at the base of Kierkegaard’s thoughts. Throughout the argumentation, Fujino claims that the central aim of Kierkegaard’s philosophy is to suggest a negativistic existential ethic, which is in opposition to the standard views on aesthetics and metaphysics at the time. Fujino says that his understanding of 1 Hiroshi Fujino, キルケゴール—美と倫理のはざまに立つ哲学 [Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical], Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 2014. This book includes the rewite of Fujino’s dissertation, which was published in 1994: Hiroshi Fujino, Kierkegaards ‘Entweder/Oder’: Ein ‘Entweder ästhetisch/Oder existentiell’, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1994. 2 Fujino, キルケゴール—美と倫理のはざまに立つ哲学 [Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical], p. xi. 3 Ibid., p. 11. 4 Ibid., pp. 268–9. 5 Ibid., p. xv.

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Kierkegaard was deeply influenced by the work of Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Nigg, Mark C. Taylor, and Joakim Garff.6 It is characteristic for Fujino’s argumentation that he consistently locates Kierkegaard in the historical context of dialectical philosophy between the phenomenon and the idea. After the necessity of a dualistic contradiction had been demonstrated, especially by Kant, in the modern age the synthesis or the unity of such a contradiction became the central task for the post-Kantian thinkers, particularly Hegel. According to Fujino, “for Kierkegaard it makes no difference that the purpose is the synthesis of the dualistic split. No matter how he strongly emphasizes an ‘Either/Or,’ Kierkegaard aims just at ‘Both/And.’ At this point he is same as Hegel.”7 Thus, just like Hegel, Kierkegaard is oriented toward the dialectic. However, unlike Hegel, the synthesis for Kierkegaard is not inherent in the dialectic, but realizable only by a leap of faith. Therefore, he seeks to bring about “the extreme breakdown of reason”8 through the dialectic for this leap. From this, Fujino directs his attention to Kierkegaard’s argumentation in The Concept of Irony.9 In that work Kierkegaard claims that Socrates’ irony is a kind of “negative dialectic” and adopts it as his own philosophical method for the critique, while distancing himself from Plato’s system of ideas. Then, to show the target of this negative-dialectical critique clearly, Fujino takes into consideration the history of the discourses on “the aesthetic” in Germany.10 Referring to Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, and Novalis, he claims that the connotation of “the aesthetic” is to be understood neither as the mere immediate or hedonistic lifestyle nor as the lowest stage in the “theory of stages.” For at the time the aesthetic was rather a metaphysical and epistemological project, which provided a general meaning instead of a religion in order to synthesize the dualistic contradiction. According to Fujino, the most noticeable example of this can be found in Schopenhauer’s concept of “contemplation,” which enables the observer to reach the idea as the eternal form through self-forgetfulness. Fujino argues that what Kierkegaard attacks in his critique of Hegelian “speculation” is none other than this concept of “contemplation.” Thus, Kierkegaard regards the

Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Konstruktion des Ästhetischen [1933], in Gesammelte Schriften, vols. 1–20, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970–86, vol. 2; Walter Nigg, “Sören Kierkegaard,” in his Religiöse Denker: Kierkegaard, Dostojewskij, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, Zurich: Büchergilde Gutenberg 1948; Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1980; Joakim Garff, Sören Kierkegaard: Biographie, trans. by Herbert Zeichner and Hermann Schmid, Munich and Vienna: Hanser 2004 (Danish original: Joakim Garff, SAK Søren Aabye Kierkegaard: En biografi, Copenhagen: Gad 2000). 7 Fujino, キルケゴール—美と倫理のはざまに立つ哲学 [Kierkegaard: The Philosophy of Standing in between the Aesthetic and the Ethical], p. 83. 8 Ibid., p. 84. 9 Cf. ibid., pp. 64–75. 10 Cf. ibid., pp. 91ff. 6

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“contemplative, metaphysical, and aesthetic” tendency of his time as “the greatest threat to Christianity”11 and seeks to overthrow it. Against this “contemplative, metaphysical, and aesthetic” lifestyle, Kierkegaard poses the “existential and ethical” life. Fujino claims that what a Kierkegaardian ethic actually means is the concrete “self-selection” which contrasts with the “self-forgetfulness” in contemplation.12 However, he points out that the ethical, which is thematized in the theory of “the teleological suspension of the ethical” in Fear and Trembling, is not a concrete self-selection, but the universal ethic in the sense of “Sittlichkeit.” The ethical for Kierkegaard is then not merely a stage to be overcome by the religious. Rather, his existential “second ethic” calls for the individual “to be immersed deeply in his own negative reality.”13 “Existence” in the Kierkegaardian sense is nothing more than the expression of such a negative state of the human being, who has no choice but to live temporally. However, Fujino claims that this fact of human existence must be understood as standing dialectically in contrast to “the longing for the eternal.”14 In this way, Kierkegaard’s existential ethic is reinterpreted by Fujino as the “normative postulate,” that is, “to realize thoroughly the fact of negative existence”15 that the finite human being who longs for the eternal idea can never reach it. Moreover, Fujino also stresses that this negativistic ethic can function as a critique of the deceitful synthesis not only in the theoretical sense, but also in the practical form. Thus, he sees in Kierkegaard’s attack on the church in his later years “the non-socialist social thought,”16 which determines his critique of the established order in society. From this point of view, Fujino emphasizes that Kierkegaard saw a problem with, in particular, the tendency of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom to connect the “aesthetic, contemplative, and metaphysical” self-forgetfulness with religion. Against such an “aesthetic religiosity,” Kierkegaard seeks to highlight the existential position which faces the negative aspects of human reality. “Kierkegaard’s ultimate choice can be seen as an ‘Either/Or’ between the aesthetic and the existential.”17 Thus, his negativistic existential ethic “plays a role of the wedge which is driven into the amalgam of aesthetic religiosity to separate it out into the aesthetic and the religious.”18 Additionally, Fujino discusses Kierkegaard’s concept of “repetition” as “the fundamental experience of his thought.”19 Repetition, that is, “a paradoxical experience” in which a past occurrence is experienced as a new one, and is understood by Kierkegaard as a religious experience like Adam’s fall or the contemporaneity

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., pp. 170ff. Ibid., p. 194. Ibid., p. 213. Ibid., p. 226. Ibid., p. 254. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid., p. 240. Ibid., p. 119.

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with Jesus Christ, which supports his negativistic thought. Fujino tries to reinterpret the anxiety which occurs in front of the possibility of an individual’s transformation in such a repetition—beyond the specifically religious context—as a “human condition.”20 Moreover he sees the essence of “the relevance” (Aktualität) in general in Kierkegaardian concepts like “repetition” or “contemporaneity,” which enable us to find a new significance in the past occurrences beyond “the succession of time.” Thus, he also points out the resemblance between these concepts and Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History.21 Fujino’s project to discuss “Kierkegaard in context”22 offers relevant hints as to some points which have not yet been given enough consideration in previous Kierkegaard research in Japan. In my opinion the following two points are instructive and thought-provoking in particular: Fujino reinterprets Kierkegaard in the philosophical and historical context about dialectics and aesthetics, and he regards Kierkegaard’s first work The Concept of Irony as relevant in the development of his thought. However, it must be pointed out that there are few references to other studies on Kierkegaard except for the few interpretations mentioned above. Rather, the points indicated by Fujino can and should be developed by “the productive dialogues and confrontations”23 with other interpretations—as Fujino requires himself. Keisuke Yoshida

20 21 22 23

Ibid., pp. 143–4. Ibid., pp. 158–60. Ibid., pp. 268–9. Ibid., p. 162.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Jun Hashimoto, キェルケゴールにおけ る「苦悩」の世界 [“Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Miraisha Press 1976, LIII + 420 pp.

“Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard (キェルケゴールに おける「苦悩」の世界) was published by Tokyo’s Miraisha Press in 1976. It is a masterpiece by Jun Hashimoto, who is considered today the most important and influential figure in Japanese Kierkegaard studies. Hashimoto regards “suffering” (Lidelse) to be one of the most essential concepts in Kierkegaard and assumes that an elucidation of the concept will allow us a better grasp of Kierkegaard’s life and thought. This is why Hashimoto tries to examine the paradoxical and dialectical function of “suffering” throughout Kierkegaard’s life and authorship in this work.1 His examination covers the key materials from Kierkegaard’s published works and his Nachlass, following primarily the historical method of investigation developed by Niels Thulstrup.2 In Chapter 1 of the book, Hashimoto investigates the inside story of Kierkegaard’s own suffering, presenting the problem of Kierkegaard’s melancholy. This analysis is preparatory work for the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, Hashimoto considers the suffering in the aesthetic-ethical existence, referring primarily to “Guilty?/Not Guilty?” from Stages on Life’s Way. After this Hashimoto’s examination of “suffering” explores the religious existence, and in Chapter 3 he investigates the suffering in Religiousness A, making reference to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In Chapter 4, the author focuses on the suffering in the movement from Religiousness A to B, by analyzing Kierkegaard’s view of the sufferings of Christ. In Chapter 5, Hashimoto confronts the reader with the suffering in Religiousness B, that is to say, Christian suffering. It is in this Christian suffering that the positive aspect of suffering appears paradoxically and dialectically: suffering gains an eternal meaning here. Kierkegaard’s

Jun Hashimoto, キェルケゴールにおける「苦悩」の世界 [“Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Miraisha 1976, pp. 3–4. 2 Niels Thulstrup, “The Complex of Problems called ‘Kierkegaard,’ ” in A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. by Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, New York: Harper and Brothers 1962, pp. 286–97. 1

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concept of “suffering” finds its ultimate form in the suffering of a truth-witness (with Christ as a perfect example), which is the subject of Chapter 6.3 In addition to these analyses, “Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard contains, as a supplement, some biographical studies and a chronology of the life of Kierkegaard.4 The biographical studies deal with Kierkegaard’s later years and his death, and the chronology provides detailed information on Kierkegaard’s whole life in parallel with Danish history. One of Hashimoto’s views that deserves notice is that he recognizes the necessity of Kierkegaard’s attack on Christendom in connection with his examination of “suffering” in Chapter 6. As stated above, Kierkegaard’s concept of “suffering” finds its ideal form in the suffering of a truth-witness. This implies that those who are not truth-witnesses, that is, ordinary people, must honestly and fairly admit their impotence, for it is only after this admission that God’s grace of forgiveness of sins can be given to them. However, while Kierkegaard, who regarded himself as a religious poet, admitted his impotence, pastors in Danish Christendom failed to do so but, rather, misused the concept of a truth-witness. This motivated Kierkegaard’s attack on Christendom, which is nothing other than a demand that people admit their own impotence.5 It goes without saying that Hashimoto’s study has some defects. For example, as Hashimoto himself admits, he carries on his discussion based on an assumption for which more evidence needs to be given, namely, that Kierkegaard’s life and authorship ultimately aim at God’s grace of forgiveness of sins.6 However, it may fairly be presumed that Hashimoto’s study has had a great impact on Kierkegaard research in Japan. To put Hashimoto’s book in its proper perspective, one should recall the situation of Kierkegaard studies in Japan at the time the work was issued. Hashimoto points out in his book that although Kierkegaard has been widely studied in Japan, these studies tend to possess obvious defects: (1) they tend to disregard historical factors that contributed to Kierkegaard’s life and thought; (2) they often underestimate the importance of Danish in studying Kierkegaard; (3) they tend to lack an understanding of an overall picture of Kierkegaard including his journals and notebooks; and (4) they sometimes do not have an adequate comprehension of Christianity.7 Hashimoto’s “Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard should be considered an important pioneering attempt to remedy these shortcomings which had been found in Kierkegaard studies in Japan. Yusuke Suzuki

3 Hashimoto, キェルケゴールにおける「苦悩」の世界 [“Suffering” in the Life and Authorship of Søren Kierkegaard], pp. 6–7. 4 Ibid., pp. 335–417, and pp. I–LIII. 5 Ibid., p. 255 and pp. 304–5. 6 Ibid., p. 419. 7 Ibid., pp. 32–6.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Iwanami, Tetsuo, review in Jitsuzonshugi, vol. 80, 1977, pp. 96–8. Muto, Kazuo, キルケゴールへの問い [A Question to Kierkegaard], Riso, vol. 555, 1979, pp. 37–49. Ogawa, Keiji, review in Nihon no Shingaku, vol. 18, 1979, pp. 152–7. Suzuki, Yusuke, キェルケゴールの1848年の信仰的突破について [On Kierkegaard’s Religious Breakthrough in 1848], Shin Kierkegaard Kenkyu, vol. 5, 2007, pp. 40–52. — キェルケゴールの信仰観についての一考察 – 「反省のあとの直接性」 とは何か – [On Kierkegaard’s View of Faith: What is “Immediacy after Reflection”?], Shin Kierkegaard Kenkyu, vol. 7, 2009, pp. 20–36.

Shosyu Kawakami, ドイツにおけるキルケゴー ル思想の受容 – 20 世紀初 頭の批判哲学と実存哲学 [The Reception of Kierkegaard’s Thought in Germany: Critical Philosophy and Existential Philosophy in the Early Twentieth Century], Tokyo: Sobunsya 1999, 352 pp.

Originally, this work was the author’s dissertation, which was later revised to become the work now under discussion. While focusing on the history of Kierkegaard’s reception in Germany, France, and Japan, this book specifically examines the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought in critical philosophy (that is, Critical Theory) and existential philosophy in the early twentieth century and therefore assumes significance in relation to the author’s other works. According to Kawakami, when we study the area of “history of reception,” there is generally a methodological difficulty. The study of the reception of thought, which deals with history as well as thought, describes a process of reception in accordance with a certain concept that symbolizes the movement of history. However, if the interest in the coherent perspective of the history is too strong, the research may take on an ideological character. That is, a study of the historical reception of a philosopher’s thought may come to reflect the presuppositions of the researcher, which clouds the clarity of the reception itself. The suspicion that past studies contain such a dogmatic character serves as Kawakami’s leading motive for this work. Aiding Kawakami’s investigation of Kierkegaard’s reception are the works of Helmut Fahrenbach1 and Michael Theunissen,2 which assume significance among

1 Helmut Fahrenbach, Existenzphilosophie und Ethik, Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman 1970; “Kierkegaard und die gegenwärtige Philosophie,” in Kierkegaard und die deutsche Philosophie seiner Zeit, ed. by Heinrich Anz, Peter Kemp, and Friedrich Schmöe, Munich: Wilhelm Fink 1980, pp. 128–69; “Kierkegaards untergründige Wirkungsgeschichte. Zur Kierkegaardrezeption bei Wittgenstein, Bloch und Marcuse,” in Die Rezeption Søren Kierkegaards in der deutschen und dänischen Philosophie und Theologie. Vorträge des Kolloquiums am 22. und 23. März 1982, ed. by Anz, Heinrich, Poul Lübcke and Friedrich Schmöe, Copenhagen and Munich: Wilhelm Fink 1983 (Text & Kontext, Sonderreihe, vol. 15) pp. 30–69. 2 Materialien zur Philosophie Søren Kierkegaards, ed. by Michael Theunissen and Wilfried Greve, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1979.

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other such investigations of Kierkegaard’s thought in German philosophy in the early twentieth century. While Kawakami admits that both produced great results, he insists that both researchers have arbitrary characteristics in their methods. For example, Fahrenbach analyzed individual reception dynamically using the concept “existential dialectic,” which was his main interest. However, according to Kawakami, this approach led to the arbitrary choice of the research objects and failed to account for the complex reception of Kierkegaard. In the meantime, Theunissen comprehended Kierkegaard’s influence on German thought in the widest and most systematic way. However, Theunissen’s method also had a tendency to explain the movement of the reception in a preconceived way in order to clarify the whole picture of reception, and thus failed fully to comprehend the individual concerns of the recipients. In previous research, it has generally been considered that existential philosophy accepted Kierkegaard’s thought wholly and critical philosophy partially, and explained each philosopher’s reception also within this contradistinctive framework. Kawakami points out that this view came from the approaches taken by Fahrenbach and Theunissen and that the reality of reception had a complexity which went beyond such a framework. For this reason, Kawakami uses another method, which is focused on the acceptance of Kierkegaard’s thought itself. This approach, of carefully tracing the evidence of Kierkegaard’s thought in each philosopher, is the distinctive feature of Kawakami’s methodology. Part I of the book discusses the reception of Kierkegaard by philosophers who are categorized under the rubric of critical philosophy: Georg Lukács, Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Bloch, and Theodor W. Adorno. In its search for the dialectical structuring of the human being and society, critical philosophy focuses particularly on Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity and regards it as the driving force of its structure. Kawakami offers two patterns that explain the manner in which we accept subjectivity; one is the “direct” (receiving affirmatively) relations (Marcuse and Bloch), and the other is the “indirect” (admitting its limitations) relations (Lukács and Adorno). Marcuse and Bloch sympathize with the existential pathos of Kierkegaard and introduce the truth of subjectivity into their philosophy “directly.” Marcuse focuses on the subjectivity of Kierkegaard’s thought in order to overcome the abstractness of thought, such as is seen in Hegel’s philosophy, and thus gives practical character to the dialectic between subject and object. He understands the dialectic mainly from an anthropological (immanent) perspective. This allows him to accept the subjectivity of Kierkegaard’s thought while omitting its transcendent characteristics. In contrast, with his strong interest in Jewish mysticism, Bloch finds that the same subjectivity has the transcendent characteristics which enable the movement from subject to object, from particular to universal, that is, the reconciliation with nature. In this way, while they accept the same subjectivity of Kierkegaard’s thought “directly,” they understand the dialectic differently, one in the immanent way and the other in the transcendental way. For this reason, the meaning and application of subjectivity is different in each philosopher. Meanwhile, Lukács and Adorno also focus on Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity but not in an affirmative way. They accept it, all the while understanding that the concept of subjectivity has certain limitations.

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Lukács, who played the pioneering role in critical philosophy’s acceptance of Kierkegaard’s thought, takes an ambivalent attitude towards it. Lukács’ earlier interests involve the constructing of a universal theory, which overcomes the relativity of life. He approaches subjectivity from such an interest. In other words, he understands the subjectivity of Kierkegaard as the form of the individual, which inevitably collapses in real life, not as the ideal form of life. While Lukács’ concept of subject is inspired by Kierkegaard’s notion of the individual, he sees through the consequences of such a being and thus interprets the subjectivity of Kierkegaard as a dialectical moment. Thus he tries to achieve universal life by overcoming its limitations. Adorno, on the other hand, finds that the same subjectivity of Kierkegaard can become a driving force of philosophical critique. While he explores the way to reconcile the human being as a subject with nature, history, and society, he remains at the position that reconciliation should be regarded as a future hope or possibility. Thus he considers that the real relation of this reconciliation can only be understood in a non-identical way. Non-identical characteristics of the relation between God and human beings, which Kierkegaard called “paradoxical dialectic,” suggest to Adorno the dynamism of such a non-identical dialectic. However, he rejects the religious interpretation of Kierkegaard’s paradoxical dialectic because of its idealistic and mythical tendency, and instead accepts it as a “construction of the aesthetic.” Part II discusses Kierkegaard’s reception among existential philosophers in the early twentieth century (Jaspers and Heidegger) by examining their main works. In addition, this book takes up materials that have not been given much attention, such as the arguments between Jaspers and Heidegger regarding Kierkegaard’s thought3 as well as Heidegger’s early drafts.4 In the past, the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought has been interpreted within the same framework as existential philosophy. However, Kawakami’s analysis of the arguments between Jaspers and Heidegger reveals that they understood Kierkegaard’s thought differently, depending on their own interests in existence. Based on his psychological interest in the movement of self-becoming toward something revealed, Jaspers focuses on Kierkegaard’s existence as a model of releasing the self from self-enclosing. Jaspers thus accepts Kierkegaard’s existential subject “directly” from a psychological standpoint. In contrast, Heidegger does not clearly express his own interests in Kierkegaard’s thought in the arguments with Jaspers or in his early rough drafts (for example, as it is called, the “Natorp-Report”). Nonetheless, by carefully scrutinizing the relevant materials we can read his deep interest in the same sort of

Martin Heidegger, “Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen’ (1919–1921),” in Wegmarken, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1976, pp. 1–44; Karl Jaspers, Philosophische Autobiographie, 2nd ed., Munich: Serie Piper 1984; Notizen zu Martin Heidegger, ed. by Hans Saner, Munich and Zurich: Serie Piper 1989; Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel 1920–1963, ed. by Walter Biemel and Hans Saner, Munich: Serie Piper 1990. 4 Martin Heidegger, Frühe Schriften, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1978. 3

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existence shown by Kierkegaard, that is, the human being who lives in the Christian time structure of life–death–resurrection. This Kierkegaardian notion of the existential human being can be found more clearly in one of Heidegger’s main published works, Sein und Zeit. In particular, one finds therein concepts such as the “moment,” “repetition,” “authenticity,” “death,” and “anxiety,” which lie in close relation with Kierkegaard’s thought. These concepts are involved in the time structure of existence, where the present, as “Nothing,” is understood as the relation between the past and the future. Although Heidegger does not refer to Kierkegaard in his texts, it is clear that he is influenced considerably by Kierkegaard’s thought in his understanding of human existence as explained by such a time structure. However, Heidegger accepts Kierkegaard’s thought “indirectly” in that he embraces it in a philosophical (atheistic) way, which is motivated by his more dominant interest of criticizing theology. Still, the two philosophers’ attitudes toward Kierkegaard’s thought can be interpreted differently from another point of view. Although Jaspers accepts Kierkegaard’s form of existence faithfully, his understanding lacks the essence of Kierkegaard’s concept of existence due to his nonreligious, “psychological” method. In contrast, Heidegger shares the core of Kierkegaard’s concept of existence in the sense that he interprets in his own way the eschatological existence, which faces the decision to overcome nihilism, which results from despair, even though his acceptance is philosophical. As has been explained, Kawakami, departing from the understanding of Fahrenbach and Theunissen, shows that Kierkegaard’s thought exerted as much influence on critical philosophy as existential philosophy. In addition, Kawakami points out, by paying attention to their own philosophical issues, each philosopher accepted Kierkegaard’s thought through their internal confrontations with it. Kawakami cites two reasons why the reception by existential philosophy and critical philosophy cannot be comprehended within a single framework: one is that some of Kierkegaard’s works were written under pseudonyms, and this allows philosophers to read them subjectively; the other is the historical aspect from which the philosophers experienced Kierkegaard’s thought during the early period of their own philosophical development. In this way, Kawakami attempts to comprehend the whole picture of Kierkegaard reception that includes complex relations. Thus, this book succeeds in overcoming the problems concerning past understandings that were limited by the scarcity of relevant materials as well as by ideological views, and therefore provides a more realistic explanation of the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought. These accomplishments make this book indispensable for studies in Kierkegaard reception. Tomomichi Baba

Reviews and Critical Discussions Keiichi, Kashiwabara, キルケゴールに於ける可能性の問題−ハイデガーを手 掛かりにして [The Problem of Possibility in Kierkegaard: With the Clue of Heidegger], Tetsugaku zashi, vol. 753, 1966 (Society of Philosophy), pp. 178–97. — ハイデガーの〈転回〉について−キルケゴールを顧慮しつつ [About die “Kehre” in Heidegger’s Thought: Considering Kierkegaard], Shisaku, vol. 13, 1980 (Society of Philosophy, Tohoku University), pp. 1–20. Satoshi, Nakazato, 初期フランクフルト学派からの衝撃−河上正秀「ドイツ におけるキルケゴール思想の受容」を読んで [The Impact from the Early Frankfurt School: A Reading of “Reception of Kierkegaard’s Thought in Germany” by Syosyu Kawakami], Sobun, vol. 411, 1999 (Tokyo: Sobunsya), pp. 20–2. — キェルケゴール思想研究にともなうアポリアについて−実存的思索とキ リスト教の問題性− [Aporia in Kierkegaard’s Thoughts: The Problems of the Existential Thinking and the Christian Faith], Kierkegaard Studies, vol. 7, 2009 (Kierkegaard Society of Japan), pp. 78–97. Tomoimchi, Baba, キルケゴール思想における他者と時間 [The Relation between the Other and Time in Kierkegaard’s Thought], Ethics, vol. 22, 2006 (Society of Ethics, University of Tsukuba), pp. 53–66. — キルケゴール思想における逆説の問題 [The Problem of Paradox in Kierkegaard’s Thought], Ethics, vol. 23, 2007 (Society of Ethics, University of Tsukuba), pp. 121–34.

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール青年時代の研究、正続 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vols. 1–2, Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1966–68, x + 1640 pp.

Japanese readers may have an odd feeling when they read the novels of Haruki Murakami in an English translation, because the beauty of the subtle nuances in Murakami’s writings seems almost impossible to express in other languages. Likewise, Hidehito Otani, who studied at the University of Copenhagen from 1958–60 and attained a Ph.D. in Literature from Keio University in 1969 with his dissertation A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth, would say that Kierkegaard can never be understood except by reading him in the original Danish and being familiar with his Danish and Scandinavian milieu. Kierkegaard expert Keiji Ogawa admiringly says that Otani has “read a large number of books and other written material in Danish without fully getting through the translation.”1 Otani is self-proclaimed and widely recognized as “the most Denmark-oriented scholar”2 in Japanese Kierkegaard scholarship. Finn Hauberg Mortensen observes Japanese Kierkegaard scholarship in the early 1990s and says that “Young Japanese researchers seem to be more interested in the Danish context than their predecessors.”3 Along with other Denmark-oriented experts such as Masaru Otani and Jun Hashimoto, Hidehito Otani played a significant role in contributing to “a state of transition, moving from a view of Kierkegaard that was influenced by the German tradition to a more Danish view....”4 Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth consists of three parts. The first part attempts to describe “the spirit of the age” during Kierkegaard’s lifetime by studying general history, church history, and the history of thought in early nineteenth-century Denmark. The reader is required to be patient throughout the whole chapter because Kierkegaard seldom appears in the 380 pages. The second part carefully studies Kierkegaard’s boyhood from his family background to his graduation from Latin

Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, Odense: Odense University Press 1996, p. 198. 2 Takahiro Hirabayashi, quoted from “New Identity, Hirabayashi Takahiro,” in Mortensen, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, p. 214. 3 Hauberg Mortensen, quoted from “New Identity, Hirabayashi Takahiro,” in ibid., p. 211. 4 Takahiro Hirabayashi, quoted from “New Identity, Hirabayashi Takahiro,” in ibid., p. 211. 1

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school and makes excellent use of historical primary sources. The third part examines Kierkegaard’s youth from his study of theology to The Concept of Irony and his break-up with Regine Olsen. When the first volume of Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth was published in 1966 and the second in 1968, the situation of Japanese Kierkegaard studies was as follows. Until the 1950s general audiences read some famous Kierkegaard works that had been translated into Japanese, and Kierkegaard researchers read his works mainly in German editions translated by Christoph Schrempf, Emmanuel Hirsch, and others. From 1962 to 1968 the edition Kierkegaard’s Selected Works was published by Hakusui-sha in twenty-two volumes.5 However, more than half of these were retranslations of German translations and not translations based on the Danish original. In other words, Japanese readers were forced to see Kierkegaard through a German lens. It was under such circumstances that Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth, which allows the Japanese reader to see Kierkegaard in the original Danish context, was published. According to the final review of the doctoral thesis, the contributions of Kierkegaard’s Youth are that Kierkegaard’s journals and other primary sources are intensively studied. Both when the Great Earthquake happened and what happened are articulated, and the significance of Kierkegaard’s notes on June 1, 1835 in the journals and his first work From the Papers of One Still Living are taken up for serious discussion. Otani further ascertains that Møller’s Socratic irony and Hamann’s Christian humor were integrated into a perspective that a most serious irony turns into a most serious humor in Kierkegaard’s thought.6 However, the final review criticizes Kierkegaard’s Youth, claiming that it could be half the size, and its central theme could be clearer if several footnotes and quotations were not superfluous and did not overlap with one another. Further, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s own view of his youth could have been integrated into Kierkegaard’s Youth if Otani had referred to famous works such as The Point of View and Stages on Life’s Way and if he did not overly rely on historical documents.7 One may be tempted to reply to this criticism that Otani intended to provide vital historical documents to Japanese readers, and therefore he intentionally used a good deal of space to make various sources accessible. Certainly, some references are repeated in Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth, but these repetitions are probably necessary in terms of readability. Although the review critiques Otani’s use of external evidence rather than references to Kierkegaard’s own works, utilizing historical documents is not a weakness but a strength, especially since Kierkegaard scholars have

キルケゴール著作集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works], vols. 1–22, with a supplementary volume, trans. by Masao Asai et al., Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1962–68. 6 Takashi Hashimoto, Masao Matsumoto, and Risaku Mutai, “《博士学位論文審 査の結果の要旨》キルケゴール青年時代の研究 大谷愛人 [“A Summary of the Final Review of the Doctoral Thesis,” A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth, Otani Hidehito],” in 哲学 第55集 [Philosophy, vol. 55], March 1970, ed. by Mita Philosophical Society, Tokyo: Mita Philosophical Society 1970, p. 225. 7 Ibid., pp. 225–6. 5

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a tendency to admire him and to concentrate on interpreting his works on their own. It is, of course, essential that scholarly works pursue objective facts. It is remarkable that Otani establishes his original methodology, which he calls 基礎的研究法 [primary research methods] in Kierkegaard’s Youth.8 Drawing from Aage Kabell’s Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden9 and Aage Henriksen’s Method and Results of Kierkegaard-Studies in Scandinavia,10 Otani categorizes the Danish-Scandinavian methods into three groups: the study of (1) Kierkegaard’s inner psychological world, (2) his outer-social environment, and (3) his thought from the perspective of a specific academic discipline such as literature, philosophy, or theology. Otani’s primary research method relies primarily on (2) and (3), and less frequently uses (1) since this kind of study has a tendency to be arbitrary. Otani is quite strict about methodology among Japanese researchers. Whether one agrees or disagrees with him, Japanese Kierkegaard researcher cannot avoid dealing with Otani’s discussion of methodology. Further, Otani’s method does not allow him to step into arbitrary or stereotyped interpretations, but rather attempts to demonstrate Kierkegaard as a nineteenth-century Dane whose thought was not formed in a vacuum. For instance, Otani, fascinatingly enough, says that Danish “melancholy” is not necessarily negative.11 By referring to Harald Høffding, Otani says that Ludvig Holberg was the first person to come up with the concept of Den Enkelte, which is famous for being a very Kierkegaardian term.12 Furthermore, according to Otani, Adam Homo by Frederik Paludan-Müller was the first novel to manifest “existential thought” before Kierkegaard.13 Otani’s standpoint in Kierkegaard’s Youth is neutral and fair. In his next massive work A Study on Kierkegaard’s Authorship and thereafter, Otani often calls Kierkegaard a “genius,”14 but in Kierkegaard’s Youth he does not show his admiration so explicitly. Whether they are Kierkegaard’s fond teachers or his opponents, Otani historically and sympathetically approaches each person that he treats in the work. Therefore, various people such as Henrik Nicolai Clausen, Frederik Christian Sibbern, Poul Martin Møller, Orla Lehmann and Hans Lassen Martensen are attractive and vivid in Kierkegaard’s Youth. Although most of Otani’s discussions enter into his own interpretations after an exhaustive overview of the history of research concerning the subject at issue,

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール青年時代の研究 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vols. 1–2, Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1966–68, vol. 1, pp. 17–43. 9 Aage Kabell, Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden, Copenhagen: H. Hagerup 1948. 10 Aage Henriksen, Method and Results of Kierkegaard-Studies in Scandinavia: A Historical and Critical Survey, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1951. 11 Otani, キルケゴール青年時代の研究 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vol. 1, pp. 299–303. 12 Ibid., p. 60. 13 Ibid., p. 367. 14 For instance, see Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇 – 青年時 代を中心に行われた文学研究の実態 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1, The Realities of Young Kierkegaard’s Own Studies of Literature], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1989, p. 3; p. 41; p. 315. 8

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one may be dissatisfied with his overly cautious attitude about such issues as the break-up with Regine.15 One should be reminded that Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth aims to provide basic-historical resources rather than eccentric new interpretations. Lastly, Otani’s translations and arguments are smooth and readable. Although Kierkegaard’s Youth is a massive study, it is a page-turner because of the thrill of historical investigation in plain Japanese. The vital role which Kierkegaard’s Youth played in the reception of Kierkegaard in Japan can be seen by that fact that most of the Japanese Kierkegaard secondary literature after the 1970s includes this work in the bibliography. The final review of the doctoral thesis of Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth says: “Even in the West there is no literature comparable to Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth that researches the background of Kierkegaard’s thought, boyhood, and youth in depth.”16 Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Youth has been and will always be a must-have item for any Japanese reader who has a desire to seriously study Kierkegaard in his historical context. Michio Ogino

Hidehito Otani, 続 キルケゴール青年時代の研究 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vol. 2, pp. 1628–9. 16 Hashimoto, Matsumoto, and Mutai, “A Summary of the Final Review of the Doctoral Thesis,” p. 216. 15

Reviews and Critical Discussions Hashimoto, Takashi, Masao Matsumoto, and Risaku Mutai, “《博士学位論文審 査の結果の要旨》キルケゴール青年時代の研究 大谷愛人 [‘A Summary of the Final Review of the Doctoral Thesis’ A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth, Otani Hidehito],” in 哲学 第55集 [Philosophy, vol. 55], March 1970, ed. by Mita Philosophical Society, Tokyo: Mita Philosophical Society 1970, pp. 213–26. Mortensen, Finn Hauberg, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, Odense: Odense University Press 1996, pp. 213–14.

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研 究 前篇 – 青年時代を中心に 行われた文学研究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1: The Realities of Young Kierkegaard’s Own Studies of Literature], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1989, xxi + 1223 pp.

A number of painstaking Kierkegaard studies have been undertaken, but only a few of them can be quantitatively and qualitatively comparable to Hidehito Otani’s magnum opus, A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, which was published from 1989 to 1991 by Keisou-shobou. This work is more than 2,800 pages long and took the author over twenty years to write. Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Authorship consists of two volumes. Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1, which this review discusses, deals with Kierkegaard’s early studies on literature, especially with three legendary medieval figures: Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus. Part 2 deals with the dialectical structure of Kierkegaard’s works as a whole. Being skeptical about the methodology of Japanese, German, and English Kierkegaard studies, and mainly in dialogue with Danish and Scandinavian researchers such as Niels Thulstrup, Gregor Malantschuk, and Lars Bejerholm, Otani attempts to let Kierkegaard speak in his own voice. In Otani’s judgment Kierkegaard’s dialectic is certainly philosophical, yet also literary in its nature, since it utilizes irony and humor as its main principles and methods. Otani boastfully claims that his careful research on Kierkegaard’s own study of literature in his youth unveils the organic structure of Kierkegaard’s entire works for the first time in the history of Kierkegaard reception.1 After the “Introduction” the reader is informed about various versions of the Ahasverus story, the historical development and categorization of numerous Ahasverusian literatures in Europe. Otani chronologically explores Kierkegaard’s

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われ た文学研究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1, The Realities of Young Kierkegaard’s Own Studies of Literature], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1989, p. 9. 1

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own study of literature from September 1834 to the late April 1836 and the development of his concept of Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus. Further, Otani investigates Kierkegaard’s concept of the aesthetic, poetry, Consequents (consistency), irony, humor, and the dialectic as a principle of his authorship. Finally, Otani studies Kierkegaard’s experiments with his literary position or stance. According to Otani, Kierkegaard’s literary stance was born of Ahasverus. Further, in Kierkegaard’s authorship Ahasverus developed into the standpoint of armed neutrality, Socrates’ stance, the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, and the stance of the Apostle Paul. Otani argues that Ahasverusian curses initially tormented the young Kierkegaard, but later on those curses turned into Pælen i Kjødet (the thorn in the flesh) through the experience of God’s grace, which is described in 2 Corinthians 12:7–10.2 Otani adds that the stance of the Apostle Paul gave birth to that of Anti-Climacus.3 Otani’s conviction is that the stance of Ahasverus penetrates Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship. Otani states that, for Kierkegaard, Don Juan, Faust and Ahasverus are “the [expressions] for the demonic qualified” as the sensuous, spiritual, and despairing, “that the Christian spirit excludes,”4 and therefore those three figures have dialectical or paradoxical relations to Christianity. Their roles in Kierkegaard’s authorship are, first of all, to seduce the aesthetic reader, then to let him or her face a deadlock of their aesthetic lives, and finally to accompany him or her to the Christian truth described in the religious works.5 According to Otani, one of his references to these three legendary figures holds the key for Kierkegaard’s idea of stage theory.6 It is well known that Kierkegaard’s stage theory is divided into the three stages: the aesthetic, ethical, and religious. Fascinatingly enough, Otani says that the aesthetic stage was initially divided into the three stages: Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus. Furthermore, the stage of Don Juan was divided into the three stages: the Page in Figaro, Papageno in The Magic Flute, and Don Juan.7 Otani’s intensively Christian method may appear to be provocative to some Kierkegaard researchers. According to Otani, Kierkegaard researchers need to humble themselves, to have a “transparent” relation to the Idee, to have a life of prayer, and to interpret Kierkegaard’s works in the light of God’s grace.8 On the one hand, Otani’s brave statement here is valuable because widespread de-Christianized Kierkegaard studies make it very difficult to appreciate his thought as it is. On the other hand, it seems to be legitimate to say: “The problem is that [Otani] claims you cannot understand Kierkegaard if you are not a Christian.”9 Rather, it should probably

Ibid., p. 1213. Ibid., p. 1223. 4 SKS 2, 95 / EO1, 90. 5 Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われた文学研 究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1], p. 469. 6 Ibid., p. 653. The key text for Otani is SKS 27, 143, Papier 172 / JP 2, 1565. 7 Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われた文学研 究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1], p. 654. 8 Ibid., p. 77. 9 Satoshi Nakazawa, quoted from “Danish Romanticism and Pietism, Nakazato Satoshi,” in Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, Odense: Odense University Press 1996, p. 133. 2 3

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be said that the dialectical tension between non-Christian and Christian researchers will reveal Kierkegaard’s thought as it is, since both “the justification of the human position” and “Christianity’s claim upon the whole man” are characteristic in his thought, and both aspects need to be fairly treated.10 Although Ahasverus (despair personified) seems to be existentially most important for Kierkegaard, Otani’s discussion that Ahasverus is the most important figure for Kierkegaard’s stance as an author is not fully convincing. Otani believes that Kierkegaard’s two references in journals11 are the evidence that Ahasverus is the most central figure for Kierkegaard’s authorship.12 One cannot help ask if Ahasverus were truly the most prominent figure for the authorship, then why does Kierkegaard refer to Ahasverus infrequently in his published and unpublished works? In Kierkegaard’s Authorship Otani promises to answer this question,13 but one is at a loss to find convincing reasons or explanations. Did Kierkegaard’s Authorship set off a trend to study Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus in Kierkegaard scholarship in Japan? It does not seem so.14 One can find some studies on Kierkegaard’s relation to Don Juan, but these mainly study “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic” in Either/Or.15 There are no studies comparable to Otani’s exhaustive work on Kierkegaaard’s relation to Don Juan in Kierkegaard’s Authorship. Studies of Faust are even fewer, and of Ahasverus there are almost none. To conclude, Otani’s Kierkegaard studies of Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus are fascinating and valuable. Like Kierkegaard’s Youth, Kierkegaard’s Authorship makes numerous vital documents available to Japanese readers. One can see that Ahasverus is certainly a key figure to solve several mysteries about Kierkegaard, but there are still some unsolved issues before it can be claimed that Kierkegaard’s stance as an author sprang from Ahasverus. Michio Ogino

Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974, p. 19. 11 SKS 27, 109, Papier 80 / JP 2, 2210 and SKS 22, 335–7, NB13:92 / KJN 6, 339–41. 12 Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われた文学研 究の実態 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1], pp. 489–92. 13 Ibid., p. 528. 14 The name of Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus are mentioned, and Otani’s Kierkegaard’s Authorship is referred to in the footnote in Kiyoshi Ito, “キェルケゴールにおける絶望の 教育学的考察 [Pedagogical Study of Despair in the Thought of Kierkegaard],” in 新キェル ケゴール研究第3号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 3], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2004, p. 143. 15 Akira Matsumoto, “モーツァルトとキルケゴール──歌劇〈ドン・ジョヴァン ニ〉をめぐる考察― [Mozart and Kierkegaard: Discussion on the Opera ‘Don Giovanni’],” in 芸術 [Arts], no. 22, ed. by Osaka Geijutsu University, Osaka: Osaka Geijutsu University 1999, pp. 200–212. Kazutaka Yonezawa, “キェルケゴールにおける歌劇受容につい て [Kierkegaard’s Reception of Opera],” in 新キェルケゴール研究第4号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 4], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2006, pp. 42–59. 10

Review and Critical Discussion Kudo, Yoshinobu, review in 実存思想論集VII『実存と宗教』1992年6月 [Annals of Existential Thought no. VII, 1992], ed. by Japanese Society of Existential Thought, Tokyo: Ibunsha 1992, pp. 175–8.

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究　 後編 – 全著作構造の解明 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2: Investigation into the Structure of the Entirety of his Works], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1991, xxiii + 1617 pp.

Hidehito Otani’s A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2, Investigation into the Structure of the Entirety of his Works was published in 1991 by Keisou-shobou, as the second volume of his massive work. Drawing on his research on Kierkegaard’s study of literature in his youth in volume 1, Otani attempts to reveal the dialectical structure of Kierkegaard’s works mainly from Either/Or to Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. The first section of A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2 explores how Kierkegaard came up with the idea of his pseudonymous authorship. Otani initially investigates previous studies on the issue, mainly Scandinavian but also occasionally German ones. Otani successively studies Kierkegaard’s authorial method of indirect communication, his concepts of incognito, det Interessante (the interesting), and Characteer (character), and finally identifies Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasverus as the source of the pseudonymous authors. The second section attempts to establish the ideal perspectives of Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. Otani interprets Kierkegaard’s works according to his authorial intention described in his journals and notebooks, The Point of View and other such works; therefore, Otani regards each pseudonym not as Kierkegaard himself but as a certain character that has a specific given role to play in his entire authorship. Further, Otani emphasizes that Kierkegaard’s genius made it possible that the personality of each pseudonym be incarnated in the literary genre of each pseudonymous work. Otani asserts that the principle of humor is much more dominant than that of irony, and that Governance played a decisive role in the authorship. The third section deals with the structure of Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. After investigating previous studies on the issue, Otani attempts to elaborate the complexity of the dialectical structure of Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. Otani proposes four dialectical perspectives in order to discern their relations in Kierkegaard’s works. The first dialectical perspective is Kierkegaard’s dual authorship of pseudonymous and signed works. But this perspective is not fully

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emphasized in Kierkegaard’s Authorship. The second dialectical perspective is to categorize certain of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works according to the concept of the movement of ascent and descent sketched by Johannes Climacus, Hovedpseudonym (head pseudonym) and Dialektiker (dialectician), in Kierkegaard’s unpublished work Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est.1 According to this perspective, Either/Or, Part One, Repetition, and The Concept of Anxiety belong to a movement of ascent or the ladder to heaven, and Either/Or, Part Two, Fear and Trembling, and Philosophical Fragments belong to a movement of descent or the ladder from heaven. The third perspective is the dialectical self-stultification of the pseudonymous works from Either/Or to the Postscript, that is, the goal is to help the readers to make the choice to abandon their aesthetical and speculative lives by revealing the vanity of those lives. According to this perspective, Either/Or, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and Stages on Life’s Way formulate the aesthetic line that dialectically dissolves. The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript formulate the speculative line that likewise dialectically dissolves. The fourth dialectical perspective is not to categorize Kierkegaard’s works according to the theory of the three stages, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, but to categorize his works according to the theory of the three realms— Danish civil life, the Old Testament realm, and the New Testament realm—or four realms if we add the Apostolic realm. According to this perspective, Either/Or and Two Upbuilding Discourses (1843) belong to Danish civil life, Repetition, Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), Fear and Trembling, and Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843) belong to the Old Testament realm, and the rest of the pseudonymous and signed works belong to the New Testament realm, and the works from Two EthicalReligious Essays to The Changelessness of God: A Discourse are subcategorized as the Apostolic realm. In this context, Otani’s theory of the three or four realms is different from anything else in Japanese Kierkegaard scholarship, which generally assumes the theory of the three stages to be true. On the one hand, Otani’s dialectical perspectives are one of the most dependable guides to explore the deep forest of Kierkegaard’s enigmatic works. On the other hand, Masaru Otani’s comment on Malantschuk’s Kierkegaard’s Thought is applicable as a critique of Hidehito Otani’s dialectical perspectives as well, namely, a static view from the angle of Kierkegaard’s whole authorship may make one overlook the realities of a living Kierkegaard, undergoing personal struggles and contradictions.2

Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究　後編 – 全著作構造の解明 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2, Investigation into the Structure of the Entirety of his Works], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1991, p. 1020. 2 Masaru Otani, quoted from “Translator’s afterword” in Japanese translation of Gregor Malantschuk’s Dialektik of Eksistens hos Søren Kierkegaard, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzel 1968, under the title キェルケゴールの弁証法と実存, trans. by Masaru Otani, Tokyo: Touhou-shuppan 1984, pp. 400–401. 1

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The reader will easily find Otani’s criticism of Kierkegaard researchers but will not find his criticism of Kierkegaard anywhere in his huge books. One of the specific features of Kierkegaard’s Authorship is its sympathetic, even admiring reading of Kierkegaard. This approach results in the following features. Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms or an incognito is generally regarded to be caused by his enigmatic personality. Yet for Otani it was caused by Kierkegaard’s imitation of Christ, who was a God incognito. In his previous A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth, Otani refrained from an extended interpretation of the Kierkegaard–Regine story, but in Kierkegaard’s Authorship, he enters into it.3 According to Otani, Kierkegaard broke up with Regine not because of his melancholy but purely because of his relation to God. According to Mime Morita, this kind of interpretation is common in scholars such as Jun Hashimoto, Otani, and Tetsuyoshi Kunii, but she argues that Kierkegaard did not practice Christian love toward Regine but rather cruelly abandoned her.4 The views maintained in Kierkegaard’s Authorship partly belong to the mainstream of Japanese Kierkegaard scholarship. For instance, Jun Hashimoto, Otani, and Yusuke Suzuki basically agree on the view that Kierkegaard’s spiritual awakening occurred in 1848.5 However, it cannot be said that Otani’s efforts to reveal dialectical relations among Kierkegaard’s whole works have been seriously taken into account. It is the task of future Japanese studies fully to appreciate Otani’s scholarly achievements by evaluating and enhancing his study of the dialectical structure of Kierkegaard’s entire works. Michio Ogino

3 Otani, キルケゴール著作活動の研究　後編 – 全著作構造の解明 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2, Investigation into the Structure of the Entirety of his Works, pp. 92–126. 4 Mime Morita, “レギーネとキェルケゴール – その関係の再考察 [Regine and Kierkegaard: Their Relationship Reconsidered],” in 新キェルケゴール研究第4号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 4], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2006, pp. 23–41. 5 Yusuke Suzuki, “キェルケゴールの1848年の信仰的突破について [Regarding Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Breakthrough in 1848],” in 新キェルケゴール研究第5号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 5], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2007, pp. 40–52.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Kudo, Yoshinobu, review in 実存思想論集VII『実存と宗教』1992年6月 [Annals of Existential Thought no. VII, 1992], ed. by Japanese Society of Existential Thought, Tokyo: Ibunsha 1992, pp. 175–8. Morita, Mime, “レギーネとキェルケゴール – その関係の再考察 [Regine and Kierkegaard: Reconsiderations of Their Relationship],” in 新キェルケゴー ル研究第4号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 4], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2006, pp. 23–41. Suzuki, Yusuke, “キェルケゴールの1848年の信仰的突破について [Regarding Kierkegaard’s Spiritual Breakthrough in 1848],” in 新キェルケゴール研究 第5号 [Kierkegaard Studies, no. 5], ed. by Kierkegaard Association, Tokyo: Kierkegaard Association 2007, pp. 40–52.

Takaya Suto, キルケゴールと「キリスト教界」 [Kierkegaard and “Christendom”], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 2014, vi + 463 pp.

Takaya Suto’s Kierkegaard and “Christendom”1 deals with the reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s thought in the context of the nineteenth-century Danish Christian world. Mentioning some earlier literature, such as the work of John W. Elrod and Hidehito Otani,2 Suto points out that these studies have the tendency “to generalize carelessly from Kierkegaard’s own statements” and “to make themselves ‘contemporaneous’ with Kierkegaard.”3 Rejecting the temptation to suppose such a direct “contemporaneity” with Kierkegaard, Suto seeks to clarify Kierkegaard’s thought in the cultural and historical context to which he belongs, and thereby to suggest the limit and relevance of Kierkegaard in the present time. In this book, Suto tries to distance himself from “the philosophical approach” which “considers Kierkegaard just ‘a philosopher’ and mainly considers only his philosophical works.”4 For Kierkegaard, philosophy is no more than the immanent work of human thinking, whereas he presupposes a transcendent principle, that is, “Christian faith.”5 Thus tracing his context carefully, Suto seeks to depict the significance of Kierkegaard’s thought. In order to give his study of Kierkegaard as strong of a foundation as possible, Suto cites Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works and religious discourses, as well as his unpublished works and journal entries, and he makes his translation of Kierkegaard directly from the original Danish. The first two sections, which occupy more than three-quarters of the book, are devoted to the reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s thought in the context of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom. Following Kierkegaard’s own claim that the

1 Takaya Suto, キルケゴールと「キリスト教界」 [Kierkegaard and “Christendom”], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 2014. This book derives from Suto’s dissertation, which was approved at the Hitotsubashi University in 2010, and was rewritten before publication. 2 John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981; Hidehito Otani, キルケゴール教会闘争の研究 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Attack upon the Church], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 2007. 3 Takaya Suto, キルケゴールと「キリスト教界」 [Kierkegaard and “Christendom”], pp. 6–7. 4 Ibid., p. 3. 5 Cf. ibid., p. 118.

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Concluding Unscientific Postscript was the turning point in his authorship, Suto divides his authorship into the “early” and “late” period. After outlining the content of Kierkegaard’s “Christian anthropology” in the early period, Suto illustrates Kierkegaard’s polemical praxis against Christendom in the late period, referring to the history of Denmark and Christianity in that country. Furthermore, to make the feature of Kierkegaard’s Christological thought clearer, Suto also makes a comparison with the projection theory of Feuerbach’s anthropology. In the third section of his book, Suto discusses the significance and limit of Kierkegaard’s thought in the present time. Referring to thinkers after Kierkegaard, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Theodor W. Adorno, Emanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, and carefully clarifying the similarities and differences between their thought and Kierkegaard’s, Suto seeks to indicate the relevance of Kierkegaard. It is central to Suto’s argument that he reinterprets Kierkegaardian thought as a Christian social ethic which guarantees “the relationship to others” by “the neighbor love” on the basis of the relationship with God.6 This is in contrast to the conventional image of Kierkegaard, which is often accused of being too individualistic or too exclusive. According to Suto, in order to realize such a relationship to others, Kierkegaard appeals to the idea of “following the humble Christ” in the New Testament as “an ethical norm.”7 This Kierkegaardian concept of following Christ is often criticized for emphasizing only Christian duty and overlooking grace; however, Suto argues that this critique is not true. Kierkegaard’s strict Christian ethic is founded upon his deep insight into grace, which reconciles relationships with others through God. Suto says, “what Kierkegaard means with single individuality is to close the door and meet God face-to-face, but that door will re-open for the relationship with others.”8 Moreover, Suto places this Kierkegaardian Christian ethic in the concrete social and intellectual context of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom. What he accentuates from this viewpoint is that Kierkegaard concentrates on the task to remove “the illusion in Christianity” that all those living in Denmark are already Christians. In nineteenth-century Danish Christendom, which was largely Lutheran Protestant, grace in the world was preached, while the duty of “following the humble Christ” was disregarded, and this enabled people to maintain the illusion of being Christian. For Kierkegaard, who understood himself as a “corrective” to Christendom, it was necessary to emphasize the aspect of duty. In this sense, Suto argues, “Kierkegaard tries to correct Lutheran-Protestant Christendom.”9 From this point of view, Suto also explains Kierkegaard’s concept of “polemic.” Kierkegaard takes a polemical stance against the church in this world as a “phenomenon” precisely because he deeply loves this world on the basis of “the idea of Christianity.” Suto says that a kind of “Platonic dualism” can then be seen in

6 7 8 9

Cf. ibid., pp. 154ff. Ibid., p. 193. Ibid., p. 213. Ibid., p. 296.

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Kierkegaard’s thought.10 This is most noticeable in the case of Kierkegaard’s relationship with Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster. As Kierkegaard’s journal entries show, throughout his authorship Kierkegaard was trying to show Mynster the truth of Christianity. From this fact, it emerges that Kierkegaard never considered the church unnecessary, but “he just hoped that the church will revive on its own, and he was engaged in providing opportunities for this.”11 Kierkegaard’s main aim was a “practical reformation of the real world” by “the idea of Christendom.”12 Thus, Suto argues that in Kierkegaard’s thought there is a social theory that strives for a concrete and real reformation of the church on the basis of the single individual’s relationship with God; he says, “The single individual also works politically as the subject of the thoroughgoing critique who never conforms to the power relations and the social situation.”13 Finally, Suto addresses the question of the relevance of Kierkegaard’s thought. In particular, with respect to the value of “the naïveté” of faith and the critique of systematic metaphysics, Suto says that there is a certain resemblance between Kierkegaard and contemporary philosophies which are critical of the so-called principle of identity and regard “the difference” or “otherness” as relevant. However, he maintains that the contemporary philosophical interpretation of Kierkegaard has “a certain limit.”14 Against such an interpretation, Suto repeatedly insists that Kierkegaard presupposes just “Christianity as a positive religion” and that he hardly turns his attention to anything outside of Christianity. Thus, Suto sums up, “Kierkegaard, who was born and grew up in Danish Christendom in the first half of the nineteenth century, aimed at the reformation of Christendom following the idea of Christianity which he had learned there.”15 Therefore, “the other for Christendom never comes into the sphere of Kierkegaard’s thought.”16 Nevertheless, Suto states, “those who discuss Kierkegaard must not ignore the fact that he was a thinker who has faith in Christianity as a positive religion.”17 However, against such a statement perhaps it could be asked whether or not a productive interpretive dialogue with Kierkegaard is then possible. This is exactly the problem that exists between the precise understanding and the productive interpretation of a particular thought. However, Suto does not exclude the possibilities of further productive interpretation, which does not follow Kierkegaard’s own words; rather, he says that one needs to be aware of a “difference in context”18 between Kierkegaard and the interpreter and thereby to strive for the relevance of his thought with this in mind. He says, “Kierkegaard’s thought must be overcome in a proper way.”19

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Cf. ibid., p. 359; pp. 368–9. Ibid., p. 324. Ibid., p. 337. Ibid., p. 341. Ibid., p. 375. Ibid., p. 372. Ibid. Ibid., p. 367. Ibid., p. 387. Ibid., p. 427.

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So where does Suto find the relevance of Kierkegaard in the present time? He argues that the relevance of Kierkegaard’s ethic, which is founded on the concept of the single individual before God, can be found just in “the relationship—mediated by difference—to the other in love,” and there is an obligation “to live multiple kinds of consciousnesses.”20 Thus, Suto suggests that even a Kierkegaardian ethic, which has not been fully realized by Kierkegaard himself, is “a noteworthy vision” in our globalizing age. Despite its long tradition, the research on Kierkegaard in Japan has mostly remained in the realm of philosophy or theology with few exceptions. Suto’s Kierkegaard and “Christendom” locates Kierkegaard in the cultural and social context of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom and at the same time gives insight into the relation between Kierkegaard’s thought and twentieth-century thinking—even though this point needs to be further discussed. In this sense, this book not only “releases Kierkegaard’s world to the social scientific and sociological dimension,”21 but also opens “a new perspective on the research on Kierkegaard.”22 Keisuke Yoshida

Ibid., pp. 451–7. Kazuhiko Ozaki, review in 『創文』[Soubun: The Newsletter of Soubun-sha], vol. 15, 2014, p. 14. 22 Ibid., p. 10. 20 21

Review and Critical Discussion Ozaki, Kazuhiko, review in 『創文』[Soubun: The Newsletter of Soubun-sha], vol. 15, 2014, pp. 10–14.

VI. Secondary Literature in Norwegian

Trond Berg Eriksen, Søren Kierkegaard. Den fromme spotteren [Søren Kierkegaard: The Pious Mocker], Oslo: Forlaget Press 2013, 481 pp.

The title of the book means “The Pious Mocker,” but the title does not do justice to the scope of this monograph by Trond Berg Eriksen, which is a comprehensive treatment of almost every aspect of Kierkegaard’s writing. The fact that the book is written in Norwegian and consequently has a limited circle of readers is unfortunate, since the book must be regarded as a contribution to international Kierkegaard research. Trond Berg Eriksen has been Professor of the History of Ideas at the University of Oslo since 1975 and has previously written monographs on Augustine, Dante, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche, as well as a long series of books dealing with all periods of European history, starting with Greek antiquity in his Ph.D. thesis on Aristotle’s ethics. If we add the author’s intimate knowledge of Scandinavian intellectual culture in the last 200 years, we can safely conclude that he is in the best possible position for placing Kierkegaard in his historical context. Kierkegaard is a difficult, probably impossible, subject for such an all-embracing study, due to the size and the complexity of his work, and, one may add, the complexity of the person Søren Kierkegaard himself and his literary and personal strategies. However, one may argue that the character of his total output demands a kind of total reading, since all the parts depend on the whole, both conceptually and historically. This was the view of Kierkegaard himself, and it is obviously the view of Berg Eriksen. The book is not an introduction; a general knowledge of both Kierkegaard’s biography and his literary production is assumed. However, it is written in an informal style that is easy to read and to understand. The reader may rightly suspect that there must be some intellectual difficulties, some complexities, or nuances hidden and perhaps left undiscovered by this all-comprehensive treatment, which is presented in a style which often deviates from academic standards. Yet the book is stimulating and refreshing, expressing the viewpoints of a highly competent researcher with more than forty years of experience reading through the whole body of Kierkegaard’s output with a fresh look.

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Berg Eriksen’s main project appears to be that of understanding Kierkegaard in his own time and as a part of European intellectual culture. Here, a leading idea, illustrated in a variety of ways, is that Kierkegaard belongs to the Romantic tradition. However, in addition to this thoroughgoing thought, the book contains a variety of observations and reflections, both inspired by Kierkegaard’s individual works and by the lines of thought running through some or all of them, which Berg Eriksen expertly traces. Berg Eriksen’s aim is to understand Kierkegaard’s self-understanding and how it shows itself in his literary strategies. Kierkegaard is to an extreme degree conscious of his own literary role and the meaning of the totality of his works, and he tries, for example, though his The Point of View for My Work as an Author, to analyze or possibly to construct the unity of his own work to lead the readers into the point of view he wanted them to have. Although Berg Eriksen appreciates that Kierkegaard sometimes is ahead of his time, he offers less space to discussing real insights which Kierkegaard may have, for instance, psychological insights, expressed in works which have generally been appreciated as lasting contributions to psychology. The book is divided into four parts and an Epilogue. The first part of the book presents Kierkegaard as a Romantic, or a “romantic critic of Romanticism,” and his thinking on subjectivity. This part presents a foundation for what follows, both historically and as regards to content. A key to Berg Eriksen’s approach is given in this statement: “Personally I am convinced that Kierkegaard only becomes interesting when the picture of him includes those sides of his activities with which one does not immediately sympathize, or which appear to be old-fashioned.”1 Although Berg Eriksen may sometimes have an eye for what is valuable in Kierkegaard’s works, he is certainly not apologetic, and sometimes downright paternalistic in his judgments. For instance, Kierkegaard is said to “knead his little fragment (smule) of a life and his unhappy engagement [with Regine] like dough.”2 Or, near the end of the book: “To make oneself into a martyr in a more or less literal meaning because one is teased by a comic paper for the length of one’s trousers’ legs, can only happen as a fanciful confusion of proportions.”3 However, the observation, “he frequently magnifies small, personal experiences such that they become metaphors, analogies, and allegories for the greatest and most difficult questions”4 is presented as criticism, but it might just as well be considered as one of Kierkegaard’s unique abilities. The dominating thought in this part of the book is the romantic character of Kierkegaard’s thinking and attitudes to all aspects of life. Even his religious thinking is modeled on the Romantic idea of unhappy love, which, for the Romantic, is more about unhappiness than love.

Trond Berg Eriksen, Søren Kierkegaard. Den fromme spotteren, Oslo: Forlaget Press 2013, p. 19. 2 Ibid., p. 33. 3 Ibid., p. 371. 4 Ibid., p. 33. 1

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Berg Eriksen stresses repeatedly in his book the impossibility of Kierkegaard’s form of Christian faith, which becomes through his works an increasingly unattainable ideal. There is a strong aspect of Romantic unhappy love and unfulfilled longing in his view of Christianity, gradually turning Kierkegaard into a harsh critic of those who do not live up to his high ideals and who dominated the theological scene in his own time. Thus, Berg Eriksen sees a line going from Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel and the system to the attacks on “Christendom” and the official State Church at the end of his life. His criticism of Hegel is essentially a criticism of Hegelian theologians like Martensen, who have reduced Christianity to a system of thought. “One has taken away the sin of the sinner and invented the teaching of the sin in general.”5 One chapter deals with reason and the limits of reason. Here Berg Eriksen also sees Kierkegaard’s (distanced) view of science in its historical context, before Darwin, but after the earliest attempts at a physiological explanation of the soul. Here, as everywhere in the book, Berg Eriksen has an interesting, although brief, analysis of the historical situation to which Kierkegaard had to relate. The second part of the book is the most comprehensive, and treats most of the great themes in Kierkegaard’s authorship: irony, Don Juan, and Faust, the aesthetic and ethical stage (in the traditional three-stage model usually attributed to Kierkegaard), Abraham and Job, anxiety, and the paradox. The main insights from the first part, in particular Kierkegaard as a Romantic thinker, are a seen also throughout this part. In the chapter on anxiety, Berg Eriksen takes a detour into the Kierkegaard reception, surprisingly suggesting that in the nineteenth century there was almost no reception to be noted, apparently in this chapter overlooking the influence on Scandinavian authors such as Henrik Ibsen, which is treated later in the book. He also points out Kierkegaard’s importance for twentieth-century philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, and Jean-Paul Sartre, and the theologian Karl Barth, pointing out that Kierkegaard’s thoughts influenced psychiatry through the mediation of Jaspers and Ludwig Binswanger. The third part of the book treats the last part of Kierkegaard’s authorship, the Corsair affair, Kierkegaard’s views on politics, his own authorship, despair, and Christianity and the Danish State Church. Continuing the analysis of Kierkegaard as a Romantic, Berg Eriksen presents with deep insight the context in which Kierkegaard places himself, in opposition to the ideals of the Danish bourgeoisie, represented by, among many others, Heiberg, Martensen, and the pastors of the Danish State Church, and dominated by Hegelian intellectualism, reflection, theory, and polished behavior as opposed to spontaneity and sincerity and the individual, passionate faith associated with the common people. Kierkegaard’s suffering during the Corsair affair is shown by Berg Eriksen to strengthen his tendencies to complain and lament, combined with a mythologization of his own sufferings as a part of his higher calling. In his treatment of The Sickness unto Death, Berg Eriksen makes the significant observation that

5

Ibid., p. 65.

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Hans Herlof Grelland ...seen historically, Kierkegaard’s concepts of anxiety and despair are an attempt at profiting theologically from melancholy as a romantic motive....Later readers’ impression that his dialectical presentation of anxiety and despair only confirms that the black sadness of the Christian tradition is historically wrong. Kierkegaard is nowhere more modern and abreast of the literature of his own time than when he wants to reproduce the Christian dogmatism from the melancholic experiences of Romanticism.6

Berg Eriksen presents a detailed study of Kierkegaard’s so-called “Church Fight,” in The Moment, his last literary output. He points out to what degree Kierkegaard makes Christianity utopian, that in the late Kierkegaard, Christianity is a religion that really does not exist. This last part of Berg Eriksen’s book contains new insights, historically and also psychologically, although Kierkegaard’s weaknesses are exposed, and perhaps enlarged, without mercy. The author approaches his subject without affinities or preferences. He has presented a solid study on Kierkegaard without giving the impression of being a “Kierkegaardian.” The last part is the Epilogue, apparently a loose collection of subjects, including Kierkegaard’s influence on later authors. It contains three chapters, one on the Grundtvig–Kierkegaard relation, one on Kierkegaard’s influence on Henrik Ibsen, with a detailed analysis of Ibsen’s play Brand, and a critical discussion of the so-called “post-human” period, represented by, among others, Heidegger and Foucault. As a conclusion, Berg Eriksen’s book has the double aim of treating Kierkegaard’s life and production as a whole and seeing it in a historical perspective. Its weakness follows inevitably: sometimes its informal language and its readability, together with its grand scope and limited size, hide subtleties and depths in Kierkegaard’s texts and may give the reader the impression that Kierkegaard is easier reading than he is, and perhaps also that Kierkegaard has less to contribute than he has. However, this is an unavoidable side-effect and could perhaps not be remedied without sacrificing some of the book’s strength. With all its limitations, the book is a significant contribution to contemporary Kierkegaard research. Hans Herlof Grelland

6

Ibid., p. 302.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard og Norge [Søren Kierkegaard and Norway], Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co. 1924, 309 pp.

Harald Beyer’s Søren Kierkegaard og Norge is a comprehensive study of the influence of Kierkegaardian ideas, theories, and literary innovations on the Norwegian intellectual, theological, and cultural scenes in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. With the possible exception of Valborg Erichsen’s “Kierkegaards betydning for norsk åndsliv”1 (“Kierkegaard’s Significance for Norwegian Intellectual Life”), Beyer’s book is by far the most detailed study of the reception of Kierkegaard’s writings in Norwegian culture. While the largest part of Søren Kierkegaard og Norge is devoted to tracing the influence of Kierkegaardian themes through the works of the great figures of late-nineteenth-century Norwegian literature—Ibsen, Bjørnsson and Kielland, among others—by far the most interesting part of the book deals with the impact of Kierkegaard’s writings on the Norwegian clergy, in particular the impact that those writings published in the periodical Øieblikket had on the emerging Pietist and popular-religious movements. Among the most illuminating chapters of the book is the one concerned with the reception of Øieblikket among Norwegian theology students,2 and the conflict between the clerical authorities and the pietist splinter groups emerging in the northern parts of the country. Beyer details the short sectarian career of Henrik Lammers, who for a while led a pietist sect—known as the Lammersian movement—in Troms. Lammers was persuaded by Kierkegaard to reject both clerical authority, priesthood and, in the end, even baptism. Beyer makes a convincing case that many of Lammers’ views and teachings were derived from Kierkegaard. In two separate chapters, Beyer gives an account of the philosophical reception of Kierkegaard’s writings, moving from Marcus Jacob Monrad’s Hegelian criticism to J.F. Barth’s use of Kierkegaard’s demanding conception of Christianity to mount a naturalistic and pantheist (!) attack on the official State Church. In general, the main impact of Kierkegaard’s philosophical writings consisted, on the one hand, in

Valborg Erichsen, “Søren Kierkegaards betydning for norsk aandsliv,” Edda, vol. 19, no. 2, 1923, pp. 209–429. 2 Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard og Norge, Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co. 1924, pp. 31ff. 1

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deepening the perceived opposition between religious faith and scientific knowledge, and, on the other, in often enthusiastically acknowledging what was taken to be his defense of the individual. In the former camp, convinced Comtean positivists like Arne Løchen—who nurtured a lifelong fascination with Kierkegaard—enlisted the theory of the paradoxical nature of Christianity in the service of an attack on the role of religion in philosophy, in particular Hegelianism. In the latter, Hegelians like Monrad and Lyng admired Kierkegaard’s spirited writings on the leap of faith and his radically demanding Christianity, but raised doubts about his grasp of Hegel’s philosophy and criticized him and his followers for remaining one-sided and alienating themselves from human society. In addition, both Monrad and Lyng connected Kierkegaard explicitly with the popular-religious movements and attempted to defend the official State Church against the invectives against “Christendom” contained in Kierkegaard’s later writings. The second half of Beyer’s study explores the relationship between Norwegian literature and Kierkegaard. The emphasis lies on Ibsen, Bjørnson, and Kielland, but a fair amount of space is accorded to Garborg and Elster as well. Beyer moves from biographical accounts of Kierkegaard’s influence on the authors to tracing that influence through their literary productions, focusing on unearthing borrowings and inspirations. Beyer argues that Ibsen’s Kejser og Galilæer was originally intended as a far more polemical work that would allegorically depict the Norwegian refusal to participate in the Danish–German war, and that this version of the play showed clearer Kierkegaardian influences. In the case of Kielland, Beyer showcases several convincing parallels between the clerical characters populating the pages of Kielland’s major novels (Garman og Worse, Gift, and Sne) and Kierkegaard’s anticlerical polemics in Øieblikket. Beyer supports this claim by citing the correspondence between Kielland and Kielland’s sister. Beyer’s study ends by considering the presence of Kierkegaardian themes in the literature of the early twentieth century, but is forced to conclude that it is limited to the enthusiastic form of individualism found in Hamsun’s early novels and a few sparse connections between neo-Romantic poets like Sigmund Obstfelder and Vilhelm Krag and—once again—Kierkegaard’s polemics against Christendom. Beyer’s study is not without its weaknesses. Some of these are clearly attributable to the general state of the discipline of comparative literature at the time and ought to be forgiven, but others are less excusable. Beyer’s interpretation of Kierkegaard oscillates between a psycho-biographical and a purely philological approach. On the one hand, Beyer declares that Kierkegaard’s writings must be understood in terms of a conflict between what he calls the “brighter” and “poetic” aspect and a “darker” and “ascetic” aspect of Kierkegaard’s character. On Beyer’s view, Kierkegaard was what William James calls a “twice-born,” meaning quite simply that his developed views reflect the struggle between the poetic and ascetic aspects of his character.3 The religious and moral crisis leading up to the break with Regine is interpreted as emerging from this struggle as is, perhaps somewhat more surprisingly, Kierkegaard’s style of writing and thought. According to Beyer, the dual nature of

3

Ibid., p. 23.

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Kierkegaard’s psychology manifests itself in the peculiarities of his style, in particular in his constant variation between rigorous philosophical argument and jocular—and often popular—forms of expression. While many of Beyer’s observations may be accurate, he rarely argues for them, and it often seems as if he thinks that once the Jamesian framework is established (in the course of a single page!),4 he is free to phrase all his general observations about Kierkegaard in terms of it. A more serious fault is the method Beyer employs in his study of Kierkegaardian influences on Norwegian literature. Although many of his discoveries must have been illuminating at the time Søren Kierkegaard og Norge was published—in particular the case he presents for the existence of a Kierkegaardian palimpsest in Ibsen’s Kejser og Galilæer—his mode of argumentation is often less than informative, limiting itself to presenting passages from the work of a given author and noting stylistic similarities with Kierkegaard’s writings. The connections between the passages Beyer quotes and Kierkegaard’s own writings range from obvious borrowings to the extremely tenuous, and often fail to convince this reader (as when Elster’s use of a common turn of phrase is taken as evidence of Kierkegaardian inspiration). Though sometimes enlightening, the method is too unreliable to render Beyer’s arguments genuinely convincing. Søren Kierkegaard og Norge is both an interesting study in intellectual history in its own right—in particular as a source of information about the role Kierkegaardian thought played in shaping Norwegian Pietism—and should in that respect be of considerable interest to the historically oriented scholar. At the same time, however, it is hard to embrace its psychologistic interpretation of Kierkegaard, and its excessive reliance on stylistic parallels and the juxtaposition of quotations hardly sets an example worth following. Nevertheless, its value as a piece of intellectual history by far outweighs its shortcomings as a work of comparative literature. Morten Dahlback

4

Ibid., p. 21.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Pineau, Leon, review in Revue germanique vol. 18, no. 3, 1927, pp. 209–14. Winsnes, Andreas H., “Norsk litteraturforskning i 1924,” Edda, vol. 24, no. 3, 1925, pp. 147–56.

Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard, Oslo: Olaf Norlis Forlag 1925, 70 pp.

As the first popularized presentation of Kierkegaard’s life and thought to have been published in Norwegian, Harald Beyer’s Søren Kierkegaard has exerted a considerable influence on the common conception of Kierkegaard in Norway. Drawing in part on Beyer’s 1924 study of the reception of Kierkegaard’s writings in Norwegian literary circles, Søren Kierkegaard og Norge, the book weaves together psychological, philosophical, and literary considerations in order to establish a concise biography of Kierkegaard’s intellectual and personal development. Aligning himself with the psychologistic approach favored by literature scholars in Norway in the early twentieth century, Beyer purports to explain general features of Kierkegaard’s thought in light of his psychological development. In this respect, Beyer seems to be influenced by the Taine-inspired interpretation of Arne Løchen, one of the few major figures on the Norwegian intellectual scene to have taken Kierkegaard’s thought seriously in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This approach leads Beyer to focus his attention on the relations between Kierkegaard’s psychological make-up and his philosophical positions. In the bulk of the book, Beyer is concerned with establishing connections between Kierkegaard’s psychological, personal and intellectual development. In keeping with this line of interpretation, Beyer approaches Kierkegaard’s periods of intellectual productivity as largely reactive, that is, as responses to external pressures shaped by an innate or acquired set of psychological dispositions A substantial portion of the book is devoted to recounting Kierkegaard’s early years in Copenhagen and his growth from a young effete bohemian into the reclusive self-styled Socratic figure of the later years. In this part, Beyer follows tradition in focusing on Kierkegaard’s relationship with Regine, and argues that the turning point in Kierkegaard’s personal life arrives when Søren’s father confesses on his death-bed that as a child, he cursed God’s name. According to Beyer, this revelation haunts Kierkegaard throughout his philosophical career and motivates his first productive period. The connections between the present work and Beyer’s earlier Søren Kierkegaard og Norge are displayed in Beyer’s occasional use of passages from famous literary works that either bear an obvious affinity to Kierkegaard or are directly influenced by him. Mostly, these passages play an illustrative and pedagogical role. When Beyer quotes a passage where Alexander Kielland appropriates Kierkegaard’s

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notion of indirect communication for his own literary ends,1 the aim is to show that Kierkegaardian concepts are already part of the Norwegian intellectual and artistic heritage, and to render his thought more accessible to the educated reader. Beyer is sometimes successful in shedding light on Kierkegaard’s concepts in this way, but the explanations and comparison are often far too short to be truly illuminating and do not move beyond mere statements of similarity or influence. Søren Kierkegaard is a minor work both in the context of writing on Kierkegaard in general and in the context of Beyer’s own scholarly efforts. The book seems to have received little attention in scholarly circles and is not included in the bibliography found in Beyer’s entry in Norsk Biografisk Leksikon (Norwegian Biographical Encyclopedia)2 as it presumably would have been, had it elicited a significant response. Similarly it does not appear in the bibliography prefacing the Festschrift published after Beyer’s death in 1960.3 This seems to warrant the conclusion that Søren Kierkegaard was likely considered a minor work compared with Søren Kierkegaard og Norge at the time of its publication. By present scholarly standards, Beyer’s book is severely flawed. Although its historical significance and impact on the general Norwegian understanding of Kierkegaard should not be underestimated, its methodology and conclusions are clearly outdated and problematic, even when considered as an attempt at popularizing Kierkegaard’s thought. To the contemporary reader, Beyer’s attempt to derive Kierkegaard’s literary style and complex philosophical temperament from psychological dispositions linked to his paternal and maternal inheritance will seem excessively reductive and unsupported. Although this does not diminish the historical significance of the Beyer’s work, it is unlikely that it will offer fresh insights on Kierkegaard’s philosophy. All things considered, Søren Kierkegaard contrasts unfavorably with Beyer’s major work on Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard og Norge. Morten Dahlback

Harald Beyer, Søren Kierkegaard, Oslo: Olaf Norlis Forlag 1925, pp. 19–20. Beyer’s entry in Norsk Biografisk Leksikon is accessible at http://snl.no/.nbl_biografi/ Harald_Beyer/utdypning. 3 Harald Beyer, Norsk og fremmed. Artikler i utvalg. Minneskrift til syttiårsdagen for hans fødsel 15 november 1961, Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard) 1961. 1 2

Reviews and Critical Discussions Valdemar Hansen, review in Nordisk tidsskrift för Vetenskap, konst och industri, vol. 48, 1925, pp. 145–6. H. S. (presumably Harald Schelderup), review in Nordisk tidsskrift för Vetenskap, konst och industri, New series, vol. 1, 1925, p. 368.

Hans Herlof Grelland, Tausheten og øjeblikket. Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch [Silence and the Moment: Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch], Kristiansand: Højskole Forlaget 2007, 231 pp.

Hans Herloff Grelland’s Tausheten og øjeblikket. Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch appeared in 2007 from Høyskole Forlaget in Norway. As an introduction to the life and work of Søren Kierkegaard, one would expect a fairly straightforward and conventional view of Kierkegaard, yet Grelland’s book follows a very different line than most. There is, of course, the obligatory sketch of Kierkegaard’s life, but as the title itself suggests, Grelland sees the concepts of silence (tausheten) and the moment (øyeblikket) as central to an understanding of the philosophy of Kierkegaard. Along with these two fundamental ideas, Grelland weaves together the notions of despair and anxiety as central to Kierkegaard’s understanding of human selfhood and the basis for Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The subtitle to the book also promises much more than just a general introduction to Kierkegaard’s ideas. The second half of the book pursues Kierkegaard’s broader impact on Norwegian intellectual and cultural life and more particularly Kierkegaard’s influence on two of Norway’s notables: Henrik Ibsen, the great Norwegian dramatist, and Edvard Munch, the great modernist painter. Issued by Høyskole Forlaget, a publishing house specializing in textbooks for høyskole and university students, the main audience of the book is the Norwegian student, though there is a great deal here for anyone interested in Kierkegaard and who reads Norwegian. Before continuing on to a more extensive treatment of the book itself, it might be helpful to pause and give a quick sketch of Grelland himself and his unique background. Grelland teaches at the University of Agder, but is part of the engineering faculty and a professor in quantum physics. His research interests in this vein have included Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum mechanics as well as experimental mathematics. His more recent work has taken advantage of a recent Master’s degree in philosophy from the University of Oslo in 2003. The title of his Master’s thesis suggests the provocative interdisciplinarity that marks his work in general, Derridas filosofi som grunnlag for en ikke-intuisjionstik forståelse av fysikken, med anvendelse på kvantemekanikkens tolkningsproblem (The Philosophy of Derrida as a Foundation for a Non-Intuitional Understanding of Physics, with Reference to

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Quantum Mechanic’s Problem of Interpretation). That same year he also published Angstens filosofi (The Philosophy of Angst) and then a revision of his dissertation in 2005 titled Derridas filosofi og kvantefysikken (The Philosophy of Derrida and Quantum Physics).1 Among his most recent books is the co-authored volume titled Fordi vi er mennesker. En bok om samarbeidets etikk (Because we are Human: A Book on the Ethics of Collaboration).2 The interdisciplinarity that lies at the heart of Grelland’s work has certainly found a place here in his introduction to the work of Kierkegaard. As mentioned above, Grelland’s purpose here is twofold: to provide an introduction to the work of Søren Kierkegaard and to see how Kierkegaard’s work figures in the work of Ibsen and Munch. While these two purposes might compete with one another or at least move in very different directions, Grelland has focused his introduction to Kierkegaard’s work on a handful of key, interrelated concepts that also allow him to explore Kierkegaard’s influence on the two Norwegians. The first two chapters of the book contain a brief biographical sketch of Kierkegaard, but move quickly to the third chapter and to what Grelland sees as the entry point of the Kierkegaardian corpus, Kierkegaard’s “The Lilly of the Field, The Bird of the Air” from Three Devotional Discourses (1849) and The Sickness unto Death from the same year. Grelland finds in these two works the core question of the Kierkegaardian corpus: what is it to be a human being? If “The Lily of the Field” outlines a more devotional response in this question, The Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety present this question in its psychological complexity. All three of these texts engage the difficulty with becoming such a human being as captured in the concept of despair, and it is this concept that becomes the gateway for Grelland not only to the question of what is it to be a human being but also to the other concepts he is interested in: desire (ønsket), the poet (dikteren), angst, happiness (gleden), and the moment. While one may well take issue with Grelland’s focus on these texts as the core of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre as well as the emphasis on narrative consistency and philosophical coherence, Grelland produces a remarkably sophisticated and provocative introduction to Kierkegaard’s work through his closely reasoned analysis of these terms and how they function in the texts Grelland has selected from Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. The second half of the book takes up how these concepts of Kierkegaard influenced two of Norway’s most important cultural figures, Ibsen and Munch. Despite Ibsen’s famous statement that he had read little of Kierkegaard and understood even less notwithstanding,3 Ibsen was much more indebted to Kierkegaard than he was

Hans Herlof Grelland, Derridas filosofi og kvantefysikken: om Derridas filosofi som grunnlag for en lingvistisk-empiriristisk forståelse av fysikken, med anvendelse på kvantemekanikkens tolkningsproblem, Agder: Høgskolen i Agder 2005 (Skriftserien 114). 2 Solvang Botne Eide, Hans Herlof Grelland, Aslaug Kristiansen, Hans Inge Sævereid, Dag G. Aasland, Fordi vi er mennesker. En bok om samarbeidets etikk, Oslo: Fagbokforlaget 2011. 3 Letter to the Danish publisher Frederik Hegel, March 8, 1867. Quoted from Gunnhild Ramm Reistad and Ragnfrid Grevstad, “Ibsens private bibliotek og trekk ved hans lesning,” in Ibsenårbok 1985–86, ed. by Daniel Haakonsen, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1986, p. 138. 1

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willing to admit. Grelland devotes five chapters to a discussion of Ibsen’s interest in Kierkegaard and focuses on the plays Brand, Peer Gynt, An Enemy of the People, and the poem Terje Vigen. Much has been written on Ibsen’s interest or ambivalence about Kierkegaard and his ideas, and Grelland does manage to breathe new life into a number of these issues. Given, however, the brevity of each chapter, he can do so only in a limited and general way. The last four chapters explore Kierkegaard’s notion of the moment and anxiety in the context of Edvard Munch’s life and paintings. While Grelland puts forward a consideration of these Kierkegaardian concepts at work in Munch’s painting, Grelland also notes that Munch’s interest was primarily in Kierkegaard’s life rather than his philosophy. After a rather thorough investigation of Munch’s own copies of Kierkegaard’s work, Grelland suggests Munch’s reading of Kierkegaard was rather haphazard. Instead, Munch ostensibly saw himself and Kierkegaard as kindred spirits. Nevertheless, Grelland’s point in these last chapters is to delineate how Kierkegaard’s notions of the moment and anxiety function as elements in Munch’s paintings as a whole. While a detailed and focused analysis of how these elements work in one of Munch’s paintings in particular is unfortunately not undertaken (the last chapter devoted to Munch’s The Scream seems to have held out such a promise but does not quite get there), Grelland develops an intriguing discussion of how the moment might become a basis for understanding Munch’s choice of subject matter as well as both the aesthetic and philosophical reasons that lay behind it. Insofar as Tausheten og øjeblikket is an introduction to the work of Kierkegaard, Grelland’s work is a compact but remarkably substantive exploration of key concepts as well as a provocative introduction to Kierkegaard’s influence on Norway’s leading dramatist and painter. As an introduction it can perhaps be forgiven its rather abbreviated treatments that mark especially the application of Kierkegaard’s concepts to discussions of Ibsen and Munch. Still, one perhaps might wish for a more substantive treatment, and not just of the superficial relations between Ibsen and Munch but a closer analysis of the two using the terms that Grelland has already articulated as central to the Kierkegaardian corpus. To say that Brand is a character who despairs or that Munch’s The Scream is a depiction of Kierkegaardian anxiety goes without saying (if only because it has been said so many times before). Grelland’s interdisciplinary approach is valuable and important insofar as it can and does result in some new and surprising connections, and yet more substantive analysis of both Ibsen’s and Munch’s work would be expected. Such an approach also reveals the shortcomings of someone not steeped in one discipline. For example, though Grelland does show an awareness of the problem of authorship, he often analyzes these texts as if the author’s position on his or her work is the correct and definitive one. Grelland, for example, suggests a pre-eminent place for Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety in the pseudonymous authorship since “there is no doubt that the book expresses Kierkegaard’s own positions.”4 While acknowledging the role of

Hans Herlof Grelland, Tausheten og øjeblikket. Kierkegaard, Ibsen, Munch, Kristiansand: Højskoleforlaget AS 2007, p. 92.

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pseudonyms in Kierkegaard’s authorship, Grelland then uncritically dismisses the authorial and textual consequences of such an authorship. In sum, the book tries to do two different and in many ways irreconcilable things. On the one hand, it is a general introduction to Kierkegaard, but, on the other hand, it also wants to be a more specialized study of the relations between Kierkegaard and Ibsen and Munch. That it succeeds in organizing and remapping the conceptual landscape of Kierkegaard’s thought in an accessible way is certainly the primary contribution of the book, though it falls short in its exploration of Kierkegaard’s contributions to the two Norwegian artists. The question of the significance for Kierkegaard studies that this book has or might have devolves really upon a question of audience. Since it is geared more to a høyskole student level, its broader academic value for Kierkegaard studies will certainly be limited. Still, aside from these issues, the Norwegian høyskole and university student will gain important insight into both Kierkegaard’s ideas and his influence on Henrik Ibsen and Edvard Munch. Nathaniel Kramer

Reviews and Critical Discussions Eriksen, Terje Gitmark, “Knytter Munch og Ibsen til Kierkegaard,” Fædrelandsvennen, June 26, 2007, p. 10. Fidjestøl, Alfred, “Den fortvilte Brand,” Klassekampen, June 28, 2007. Rimehaug, Erling “Kierkegaard var Ibsens filosof,” Vårt land, April 6, 2007, p. 539; p. 551. Sørbø, Jan Inge, “Fortvilingas frukter,” Morgenbladet, June 13, 2008, p. 35.

Karstein Hopland, Virkelighet og bevissthet. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards antropologi [Actuality and Consciousness: A Study of Søren Kierkegaard’s Anthropology], Bergen: Religionsvitenskapelig institutt, Universitetet i Bergen 1981, viii + 334 pp.

Karstein Hopland’s 1981 doctoral dissertation is a bold and ambitious work, and the first study in Norwegian to engage seriously with Kierkegaard’s thought after the long hiatus imposed by the influence of Næssian positivism.1 Engaging critically with the reception of Kierkegaard’s thought associated with German existential theology, as well as with Løgstrup’s classical interpretation, Hopland primarily aims to unearth what he calls Kierkegaard’s philosophical anthropology. According to Hopland, this anthropology not only offers the key to understanding Kierkegaard’s moral and existential views, but is a comprehensive theoretical perspective on the human condition as such. Hopland’s main thesis is that Kierkegaard, throughout his works, develops a substantive and coherent philosophical anthropology and that this anthropology is of independent theoretical value. According to Hopland, Kierkegaard’s anthropology had been unduly neglected by the research community, and he argues that this has resulted in a failure to appreciate the scope and value of Kierkegaard’s thought. In his dissertation, he intends to remedy this situation by unearthing and reconstructing its main elements and theses. In spite of this constructive program, Hopland’s dissertation is first and foremost a critical work. The primary thrust of Hopland’s criticism is directed against the reception of Kierkegaard in German theological circles, which was deeply influenced by Heidegger. Against this current, Hopland argues—quite convincingly—that far from rejecting the philosophical framework adopted by the classical German idealists (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) in favor of an

An English translation of Hopland’s dissertation (entitled Corporeality, Consciousness and Religion: A Study in Søren Kierkegaard’s Anthropology) is accessible through the homepages of the University of Bergen: https://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/2738/ Dr.Avh._Karstein_Hopland.pdf 1

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existentialist style of thought focusing on the “being-in-the-world” of the singular individual, Kierkegaard relies extensively on the idealist framework in developing his anthropology, although several key concepts from the idealist tradition are substantially revised in Kierkegaard’s work. Hopland offers a nuanced treatment of Kierkegaard’s relation to the German idealists and argues forcefully in favor of the view that Kierkegaard in his own work appropriates and develops the idealist notions of autonomy, self-consciousness, and reflection. According to Hopland, Kierkegaard’s most immediate predecessor in this respect is Fichte’s theory of the self-positing ego. However, Kierkegaard is said to differ from the Fichtean approach by shifting the theoretical emphasis from the constitutive features of the transcendental ego and its practical and theoretical experience and activity to the constitutive features of the human self, including its social and historical situation, ethical commitments, and psychological make-up. The central notions in Hopland’s analysis are corporeality and reflection. In Hopland’s view, Kierkegaard develops a comprehensive theory of the emergence of self-conscious reflection—both theoretical and practical—from the biological substrate common to all human beings. Hopland argues that Kierkegaard develops this theory partly in the analysis of Mozart’s Don Juan in Part One of Either/Or, and partly in the interpretation of the figure of Adam contained in The Concept of Anxiety. Hopland argues that Kierkegaard’s theory of corporeality is primarily a theory of sexuality and desire. Though he at times seems to modify this thesis slightly, claiming that sensibility and receptivity plays an equally important role, these claims are never developed. At any rate, these claims are of little import to Hopland’s main argument, which states that human sexuality anticipates the self-transcendence inherent in moral and religious subjectivity, and that the latter, more developed forms are only attainable for beings equipped with both sexual desire and a capacity for reflective and moral thought. Hopland is not particularly interested in the specifically religious dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought. Since his main concern is to unearth the similarities and points of contact between Kierkegaard’s thought and German idealism, his focus is rather on the ethical and pre-reflective forms of selfhood found in Adam, Mozart’s Papageno, and Judge William. In general, Hopland downplays the role of religious faith in Kierkegaard while emphasizing ethical commitment and subjective freedom and the social and the historical. Hopland argues that Kierkegaard held that the possibility of forming individual ethical commitments is contingent upon having experienced anxiety in the face of one’s own sexuality. Moreover, Kierkegaard is said to have adapted Fichte’s concept of practical desire (or Trieb) to this anthropological framework and to have held that sexual desire is a necessary condition for the moral desire for the ethical improvement of the self and the world. In fact, at times Hopland seems to imply that Kierkegaard thought that moral desire should be seen as an alteration of sexual desire, or, more specifically, as what emerges when rational beings attempt to come to terms with their sexual nature. In the end, what emerges as the content of Kierkegaard’s anthropology is precisely this relationship between the erotic and the ethical, which Hopland refers to as a structurally necessary element of human subjectivity. Indeed, in Hopland’s view, Kierkegaard’s account of the four stages can be interpreted in light of the development of self-transcendence from its

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immediate form as sexual desire to its accomplished forms in ethical commitment and religious faith. Though this is prima facie a stimulating work, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Hopland fails to meet the high standards he sets for himself. Laying out a philosophical anthropology requires a great amount of philosophical work and theoretical clarity and rigor. Unfortunately, Hopland’s study is far more rigorous in the critical parts of his dissertation than in the constructive parts. Although the criticisms he levels against authors such as Anz, Litt, and Løgstrup are successful more often than not, Hopland consistently fails to establish an intelligible alternative. As was already noted by Poul Lübcke in his largely sympathetic review of Hopland’s dissertation,2 it is difficult to get a clear view of the scope and content of the anthropology Hopland ascribes to Kierkegaard. This is partly due to Hopland’s often willfully obscure mode of expression, and partly because the status and content of the anthropology in question is never clearly spelled out. More specifically, the role of the anthropology ascribed to Kierkegaard varies from that played by a Heideggerian fundamental ontology to that played by Hegel’s “philosophy of spirit” from the Encyclopedia, and at times even appears to be akin to Kantian transcendental argument. Although the latter version seems to be the most prominent, Hopland never explicitly argues in favor of the one or the other, leaving the issue undecided. This indecisiveness has the unfortunate effect of undermining the thematic and theoretical unity of the work. Due to Hopland’s vacillation between a transcendental, an ontological, and an anthropological understanding of the nature of Kierkegaard’s philosophical anthropology, the content and implications of Hopland’s conclusions remain unclear, and it thus becomes difficult to judge whether his master concepts shed light on Kierkegaard’s philosophy or not. His critical discussions of rival interpretations are, by contrast, fairly clear and often incisive. This holds especially for the criticisms of the readings favored by existential theology. Hopland’s critical discussions will inevitably seem dated to the contemporary scholar. The last decades have seen a vast proliferation of scholarly works by Jon Stewart and others investigating Kierkegaard’s debts to German idealism, and the grip of existential theology on the minds and hearts of Kierkegaard scholars has been significantly loosened in the years that have passed since the publication of Hopland’s dissertation. Although this by no means implies that Hopland’s criticisms are invalid, they will inevitably seem dated in light of the present status of Kierkegaard scholarship. More likely than not, the significance of Hopland’s work will remain largely historical, in particular due to its anticipation of a more serious engagement with the elements of German idealism central to Kierkegaard’s thought, and its status as a breakthrough work in Norwegian Kierkegaard studies. Morten Dahlback

2

Poul, Lübcke, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 158–60.

Review and Critical Discussion Lübcke, Poul, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 158–60.

Kjell Eyvind Johansen, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard [The Concept of Repetition in Søren Kierkegaard], Oslo: Solum Forlag 1998, 182 pp.

A rewritten version of Johansen’s 1986 doctoral dissertation, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard was published in book format by Solum Forlag in 1988. As Johansen writes in the Preface, the most substantial alterations in the published text compared with the dissertation are found in the Introduction, as well as in the addition of a concluding chapter on “Inwardness, Choice and Repetition.”1 Although the book has remained mostly unknown in the broader community of Kierkegaard scholars, it has exerted some influence on the Norwegian discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought.2 Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard is a thematic study of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition. Its main aim is to explicate the position and role of repetition throughout Kierkegaard’s works. Johansen draws chiefly on the pseudonymous writings but is also the first Norwegian scholar to give philosophical attention to the edifying discourses. Johansen offers an existentialist reading of the theory of repetition, and his account centers on unearthing a common structure in the different relationships obtaining between epistemic uncertainty and moral and personal risk in the ethical and religious stages. Although it in some respects shares concerns that the poststructuralist tradition would later develop further, Johansen’s study remains firmly connected to the philosophical currents prominent in Norway during the 1970s and 1980s. This is likely partly due to the influence of Arne Næss on the philosophical environment at the University of Oslo (where Johansen wrote and defended his dissertation), partly due to the fact that Johansen’s thesis was supervised by the Kierkegaard scholar and analytic philosopher Alastair Hannay, and partly due to the Norwegian analogue of the German Positivismusstreit. The

Kjell Eyvind Johansen, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard, Oslo: Solum Forlag 1998, pp. 166–78. 2 See, for instance, Roe Fremstedal, “Forfekter Kierkegaard fundamentalisme i Frygt og Bæven?” Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift, no. 2, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2006, pp. 84–108. 1

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influence of Næss is especially prominent in Johansen’s largely successful attempt to explain the problem of uncertainty in terms of the relationship between empirical evidence and scientific hypotheses, whereas the traces of the Positivismusstreit are discernible mainly in Johansen’s reliance on an understanding of self-consciousness derived from the works of the German philosopher of language Ernst Tugendhat, whose works had a considerable impact on the Norwegian philosophical scene in the final decades of the twentieth century. Johansen’s main thesis is that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition should be explained in terms of the relationship between the ideal and the real. This relation can be theoretical, practical, and religious, and Johansen argues that Kierkegaard presents a unified theory of these three dimensions of repetition. According to Johansen, the model on which Kierkegaard based his understanding of the relation between the ideal and the real was Plato’s theory of anamnesis, which, on Johansen’s view, was primarily concerned with the possibility of knowledge of empirical objects. In order to form judgments concerning some empirical item, some form of prior acquaintance with the ideal type that the item tokens must be presupposed. On Johansen’s view, the role of the ideal in knowledge becomes particularly salient in Kierkegaard’s rejection of theodicy, that is, the attempt to found faith on empirical evidence of divine influence. According to Johansen, this rejection is supported by the following argument: although we may consistently hold that some features of human history or of the world in general result from a divine act of creation, this knowledge necessarily remains problematic and uncertain, since discerning traces of divine creativity in the empirical world presupposes a prior belief that there are such traces to be discerned in the first place. Because of this, Johansen argues, Kierkegaard held that religious faith must be continuously reaffirmed in the face of uncertainty. In a later article, Johansen explains that on this view, the epistemic inaccessibility of evidence for or against faith implies that living in accordance with faith involves an existential and personal risk.3 Of course, Johansen does not hold that Kierkegaard’s doctrine of repetition is nothing but an epistemological account of empirical knowledge. Instead, he distinguishes between the epistemic form of repetition described above, and a practical form of repetition concerned with the realization of the ideal in the empirical world. Johansen argues that Kierkegaard maintains that this latter form of repetition takes two different but related forms, which he associates with the ethical and the religious stages respectively. According to Johansen, the aesthetic stage does not involve repetition in any significant sense, except as something that should be avoided and fended off through an open and romanticizing state of mind. With regard to the ethical stage, by contrast, repetition designates one of the most valuable features of the ethicist’s moral disposition, namely, the capacity to maintain and reaffirm ethical commitments and projects even in the face of significant obstacles, negative social sanctions, or personal risk. The key notion is that of obstacle or challenge. According to Johansen, Kierkegaard considers the ability to reaffirm—or

3 Kjell Eyvind Johansen, “Kierkegaard on Religious Belief and Risk,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 43–58.

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“repeat”—an ethical commitment even when faced with seemingly insurmountable obstacles as the primary subjective significance of repetition. This feature is repeated at the religious stage. According to Johansen, the religious form of repetition has three distinct features that separate it from ethical repetition: (1) it involves the reaffirmation of faith in the face of lack of compelling evidence, (2) it maintains the same faith even when doing so involves affirming the paradox that the deity himself has made himself finite in the figure of Christ, and (3) finally it keeps to the belief that God loves the individual unconditionally. The latter feature is, according to Johansen, an instance of the absurd or the paradoxical on a level with God’s historical existence as Christ. The challenge posed by this radical uncertainty finds no parallel at the ethical stage, making the religious version of repetition the exemplary form of repetition. By elaborating the concept of repetition in terms of the different guises in which it appears in the various existential stages—as something to be avoided on the aesthetic stage, as the affirmation of a moral ideal on the ethical stage, and as the faith in salvation against all odds on the religious stage—Johansen is able to develop a rich and nuanced understanding of the idea of repetition, successfully foregrounding its significance as an organizing principle both in the pseudonymous writings and in Kierkegaard’s thought in general. Although it has remained largely unknown in the scholarly community, Johansen’s book displays several striking similarities with more recent work on Kierkegaard’s notion of repetition, in particular Dorothea Glöckner’s Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung4 (perhaps the only work in German that cites Johansen’s study) and Niels Nyman Eriksen’s Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition.5 While Johansen undoubtedly anticipates Nyman Eriksen’s extensive reliance on the Edifying Discourses, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard is, thematically speaking, more closely related to Glöckner’s book, especially in light of the concern with the relationship between repetition and freedom common to Glöckner and Johansen. Indeed, the two authors both hold that one of Kierkegaard’s main aims in establishing his theory of repetition was to develop a novel understanding of the structure and content of authentic human freedom, whereas Nyman Eriksen situates his work within a Heideggerian tradition that is largely foreign to Johansen’s concerns. Despite its merits, however, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard does suffer from an incomplete account of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Hegel, and from the fact that several obvious parallels between the concept of repetition and key notions in Kant’s doctrine of virtue go virtually unnoticed, especially Kant’s conception of virtue as the capacity to maintain a moral disposition of the will in the face of a world hostile to the attainment of the ends posited by practical reason. The author’s failure to notice these similarities is all the more surprising

Dorothea Glöckner, Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung. Eine Studie zu seinem Freiheitsverständnis, Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter 1998 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 3). 5 Niels Nyman Eriksen, Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction, Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter 2000 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 5). 4

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considering that he himself states in the Preface that the reading of Kierkegaard he proposes emerged from a study of Kant’s ethical thought.6 These are, however, minor flaws in an otherwise interesting and well-argued scholarly work. It is unfortunate that Johansen’s book has received scant attention in the scholarly community, and although its relevance and novelty may by now be superseded by more recent scholarship, it may still reveal itself to be a source of inspiration to scholars interested in the notion of repetition. Morten Dahlback

6

Johansen, Begrepet Gjentagelse hos Søren Kierkegaard, p. 3.

Review and Critical Discussion Glöckner, Dorothea, Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung. Eine Studie zu seinem Freiheitsverständnis, Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter 1998 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 3), p. 10; p. 20; p. 42.

Finn Jor, Kjærlighetens gjerninger. En roman om Søren og Regine [Works of Love: A Novel about Søren and Regine], Oslo: Pantagruel Forlag 1997, 251 pp.

Finn Jor’s novel Kjærlighetens gjerninger. En roman om Søren og Regine was published by Pantagruel Forlag in Oslo in 1997.1 This book is Finn Jor’s first fictional work, but it is his third book on Kierkegaard. His first work on the Danish philosopher was entitled Søren Kierkegaard: den eksisterende tenker (Søren Kierkegaard: The Existing Thinker) and was his Master’s thesis.2 The second, “Til hiin Enkelte”. Søren Kierkegaards liv og verk (“To the Single Individual”: Søren Kierkegaard’s Life and Work), was, as its title suggests, intended as a general introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and works.3 A Norwegian journalist and writer (retired in 1992), Finn Jor is known in Norway as a cultural figure and editor. Kjærlighetens gjerninger is a fictional work about the love story of Søren Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen. As a fictional work, it thus does not, strictly speaking, belong to the category of secondary literature about Kierkegaard, but rather is more closely related to other fictional works on Kierkegaard, such as Peter Tudvad’s recently published novel Forbandelsen and Roger Poole’s play All Women and Quite a Few Men are Right.4 Jor’s novel can, nevertheless, be regarded as a useful and highly readable introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and works for a broad reading public. The scene is set in Copenhagen in the fall of 1896. On November 11, on the anniversary of Søren Kierkegaard’s death, the first-person narrator, the elderly Regine

Finn Jor, Kjærlighetens gjerninger. En roman om Søren og Regine, Oslo: Pantagruel 1997 (2nd edition in 1999). This work was translated into German: Sören und Regine: Kierkegaard und seine unerfüllte Liebe, trans. by Gabriele Haefs, Munich: Pieper 2000. 2 Finn Jor, Søren Kierkegaard: den eksisterende tenker, Oslo: Land og Kirke 1954. 3 Finn Jor, “Til hiin Enkelte”. Søren Kierkegaards liv og verk, Oslo: Oktober 1995. 4 Peter Tudvad, Forbandelsen, Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag 2013. Roger Poole, All Women and Quite a Few Men are Right, unpublished. The piece was performed at the Netherbow Arts Centre, Edinburgh Festival, 1986. 1

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Olsen (1822–1904), visits Kierkegaard’s grave in the cemetery, and her servant Susanne accompanies her. On this occasion Regine Olsen starts to tell her servant the old love story about Kierkegaard and continues doing so in the following few weeks, while she sits in her armchair in her apartment in Frederiksberg, then a suburb of Copenhagen. But the story of Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen is actually a story within a story because the reader is presented not only with the old story but also with the life of the elderly Regine Olsen and how she recounts the story. With this narrative structure the author has chosen a rather complicated way of telling the story: there is the first-person narrator, an elderly woman, who talks about her engagement, the break-up, and the publication of Kierkegaard’s books. At the same time we have the servant Susanne, whose questions to Regine Olsen in a sense can be seen to represent the voice of the modern reader and scholar, who would like to ask Regine Olsen to explain certain things in more detail. Thus, we read for example: “Similarly, I could not help of thinking about Susanne’s question: Were the writings a sign of a guilty consciousness? Or was there something fundamentally wrong with this highly intelligent man?”5 In this way, the novel can be regarded as a complicated interlacing of dialogues and monologues that gives the reader the opportunity to reflect on the story from different perspectives. The way in which the first-person narrator tells the story sounds for the most part authentic and creates a kind of familiarity with both the persons and the events, but occasionally one can see the author behind the scenes putting his own words in the mouth of Regine Olsen. Thus on the first page of the novel, we read Regine Olsen saying, “I reach out for Politiken, which I usually read every morning. This newspaper is actually too liberal for me, but I have to keep up to date about what the important authors are writing.”6 Here the voice is much more of the author, who wishes to portray the cultural background of Copenhagen and Denmark at the end of the nineteenth century, than that of an elderly lady ruminating about her life.7 Altogether the multi-layered temporal and narrative structure makes this novel highly interesting and multifaceted, but sometimes it is not quite clear who is speaking to whom and whose opinion exactly is being represented. For example, the continuation of the above quoted passage reads as follows: “He [Kierkegaard] could use his own experience to write strange works....But he could not master the simplest things of life. Was it that complicated to be human being? Was love that complicated?”8 Here it is not quite clear whether this is still part of Susanne’s questions or whether it is Regine Olsen who is speaking. The context would suggest that it is Regine Olsen’s voice, but the words she uses do not fit with the way in which she otherwise speaks about Kierkegaard. Although Jor’s book is a fictional work, the novel nevertheless follows the historical facts about the story of Kierkegaard and Regine Olsen. It gives an accurate

Jor, Kjærlighetens gjerninger, p. 180. Ibid., p. 8. 7 The progressive newspaper Politiken was the most important organ of the social-liberal (in Danish, radikal) intellectuals of the Danish capital. 8 Jor, Kjærlighetens gjerninger, p. 180. 5 6

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account of Kierkegaard’s life and works, and it is obvious that the author has an extensive knowledge about the Danish thinker and an insight into his published works and journals. Thus, the reader receives a detailed account of the circumstances about how the two met, how they got engaged, how Kierkegaard only a year later broke off the engagement, and what happened in all the years thereafter. The characters of the story appear vital and lively, and it is easy for the reader to see all the important persons in Regine Olsen’s life: her parents, her sister and confidant Cornelia, and her husband, Johan Frederik Schlegel (1817–96), whom she married in 1847. Likewise the descriptions of Copenhagen in the first half of the nineteenth century are correct, detailed, and lively. The combination of historical facts and fictive elements can be regarded as successful since the facts are introduced in a way that makes the characters and the events seem familiar. The main question that the novel tries to answer is why Kierkegaard broke off his engagement. This issue is neither new nor original; in fact, it appears in almost all biographies ever written about Søren Kierkegaard, but Jor presents the story in an interesting way. The reader does not receive any final answer to the question and only suggests that Kierkegaard wanted to be a writer, but then he realized that he could not become one if he married Regine Olsen. He loved her throughout all of his life but chose to fulfill a higher destiny and to write. The thesis that this book presents is that everything that Kierkegaard wrote was written to Regine Olsen (“to the single individual”) and about his relationship to her. All the monologues and dialogues of this book can be seen as psychological analyses about whether Kierkegaard’s love for Regine Olsen really was the foundation of his authorship. The novel is written in a rather simple but not superficial language that fits well with the language of a cultivated lady of the educated Danish upper middle class. It makes the people and time seem familiar and gives an authentic and historically correct introduction to both Kierkegaard’s life and works and to his relationship to Regine Olsen. However, if the reader already knows the basics about Kierkegaard, then the novel will not provide much that is new. Still, thanks to its personal style, the novel is an enjoyable read, even if the reader has spent some time with the study of Kierkegaard’s life and works. Some purist scholars might look at a novel of this kind with a degree of disdain, thinking that it has little value since it is a fiction. But, in fact, in many ways one is probably better served with this novel, which is thoroughly researched and authentically portrays the facts of Kierkegaard’s life, than with some of the many biographies of Kierkegaard that scholars have traditionally used. Katalin Nun

Reviews and Critical Discussions Lisi, Leonard F., “Modern European Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, John Lippitt and George Pattison, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, pp. 564–5. Rottem, Øystein, “Velskrevet—og livløst,” Dagbladet, December 19, 1997. Stubberud, Jørgen A., “Søren ta kjærligheten,” Universitas, September 23, 1997.

Finn Jor (ed.), Filosofi & samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard [Philosophy and Society: Søren Kierkegaard], Oslo: Norwegian Academic Press 1998, 203 pp.

This book aims high: it wants to gauge Kierkegaard’s philosophy and its meaning for our world today. That relation is not necessarily seen in a one-sided way either. What draws attention here is not only those times when Kierkegaard is thought to be right on the mark, but where he is said to have missed his target or gone wrong. Questioning, not ready-made answers, is a signal trait of this book.1 This, together with the widely different backgrounds of its contributors, sets it off against all other anthologies with the same theme, making it relevant far beyond the world of Kierkegaard studies. Joakim Garff’s essay is the opening piece.2 To place Kierkegaard in the tension-filled field between philosophy and society is risky, he says, because it forces us to think about the most basic things in life in a stripped-down, doubly dialectical way. Kierkegaard’s fixation on the “single individual” may well have blinded him to the weight of human society (his anti-political stance). But that same one-sidedness allows him to see its flipside in a clearer light too: the dehumanizing role of natural science in modern society, or the psychological costs of mass media and public opinion. This is a point well taken. Keeping an open mind is vital to any balanced, critical work on the relation between Kierkegaard’s existentialism and modern society. Heyerdahl then asks: What is modernity?3 Following German-style historiography, she extracts five traits which she claims are unique: belief (1) in progress; (2) in methodical reason and science as the key to truth about the world and securing mankind’s place within it; (3) in the instrumental control of reality (nature and society); (4) in individuality/freedom; and (5) in the value of exposure and critique. This list captures modernity’s basic traits nicely. One might want to quarrel with the scheme taken singly: Greek culture and philosophy from Socrates and the Sophist Enlightenment, via Plato’s utopias to Archimedes’ marriage

See Finn Jor, “Til Leseren,” Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Finn Jor, Oslo: Norwegian Academic Press 1998, p. 7. 2 Joakim Garff, “Bum! Jorden er rund,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 11–17. 3 Grete Børsand Heyerdahl, “Hva er modernitet?” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 21–30. 1

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of mathematical models and technology embrace (2–5) in one way or another. Christianity, too, is responsible for introducing (1) into European culture at the close of antiquity. This means modern society is really a combination of Greek and Christian culture rather than something radically new. But Heyerdahl is right that modernity is a unique phenomenon as a whole, that is, if (1–5) are taken together—degrees matter. Her stress on individuality and criticism (4–5) as being in inherent conflict with social progress through scientific and instrumental control (1–3) is well taken. It is here Kierkegaard as a theorist and critic of modernity comes into his own, exposing (5) how deep the conflict between the individual and her freedom (4) and the instrumentalization of the human life-world (1–3) runs in modern society and how thoroughly opposed they really are. The care for individuality and freedom is a leitmotif of the liberal tradition too, but it is only with Kierkegaard that rationalization of civil society and the public sphere is recognized as a standing, existential threat. This more pessimistic take on the relation between the individual and society is highly original, putting Kierkegaard on a par with more well-known critics of modernity like Marx, J.S. Mill, or Tocqueville.4 (Johansen’s excellent essay on self-deception and leveling in modern society is also relevant here.)5 Götke’s essay is in many ways a further fleshing out and summing up of this whole problematic.6 Going back to Garff’s double dialectics: How do we balance the “good stuff” in Kierkegaard, that Garff et al. draw attention to, with his blind-spots, errors? Modern society (1–5) has wholly transformed and moved beyond Christian, medieval modes of thought and living, and so why reintroduce them as ideals to aspire to as Kierkegaard does? If modernity is deeply torn in its dual commitment to individuality and rationalized society, why stress the former at the expense of the latter as Kierkegaard arguably does in his talk of religious existence? Would not this only make matters worse? Could we not go further? Would not making individual responsibility the basis of all social ties be the height of irresponsibility? How, we might say, can we look for balanced, workable solutions in Kierkegaard at all if there is no real place for active citizen participation (as with Aristotle, say) or the constructive use of public, normative reason (as with either Kant or Habermas) or even voting? Individuals have lost all effective means of countering the reign of instrumental reason or of reform from within. One might well agree with Götke therefore: reading Kierkegaard is not very edifying.7 Repstad gives us a keen sociological analysis of the chances for survival of Kierkegaardian individuality in the modern world.8 Pietism too started off by

4 See also “Voting” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts, Tome VI, Salvation to Writing, ed. by Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald and Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2015 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 15), pp. 229–33. 5 Kjell Eyvind Johansen, “Kierkegaard, samtidskritikk og menneskesyn,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 37–44. 6 Poul Götke, “Søren Kierkegaards opfattelse af modernitet,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 31–6. 7 Ibid., p. 35. 8 Pål Repstad, “De rutiniserte valg,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 135–40.

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stressing inwardness and individual commitment but ossified into a kind of strict counter-conventionalism. It did this because of modernity: a pluralistic (4), progressively oriented society (1–3) makes it all but impossible for individuals to make resolute, long-lasting religious commitments. Then there is the basic sociological fact of institutionalization as a double-edged sword. Institutionalizing radical movements increases their chances of survival and growth, but it also means throwing hierarchy and regulation (routinization) into the mix—equality ends in inequality; inwardness and individual resolve in externalization. This is a tragicomic spectacle. The radical is doomed the moment he is in a position to be influential, or to forever remain on the sidelines in order to stay true to the cause. In the final analysis, Kierkegaard’s “single individual” is not only an irresponsible posture but also a self-defeating one. Garff’s essay gives further biographical content to the ultimate futility of his project to live life wholly beyond modernity.9 Kierkegaard, it seems, was absolutely convinced he embodied a higher purpose to be shared with the world. Imagine being a god among insects who is defeated by low laughter—laughter!10 And all because of a slightly hunched back and uneven trouser-legs. It is a hard truth: a human being can be right about modern society a million times over; but if she is unwilling—or unable—to make a case for it in public in a convincing way, it will always remain a private fantasy. It might still be possible to try to reform modernity in a more roundabout way of course, by deceiving people into the truth so to speak. This would make indirection and the pseudonyms in Kierkegaard a kind of pious fraud. Sæterbakken takes up and develops this theme.11 Kierkegaard comes up with a kind of divine dramaturgic ploy, but does not this mean splitting off and setting up simulacra of his true self in public? Would not they now—like idols—take on a life of their own? Given that language is not wholly controllable by us humans, would not these mock-ups (pseudonyms) start producing new, unintended meanings? Would not they create a basic ambiguity at least, forever blocking the path to the kind of pure, univocal selfhood that Kierkegaard dreams about? By the very fact of relating to others and using a language, we are always already entangled in the world. So who is being deceived here exactly? This kind of double irony seems to have been overlooked entirely by Kierkegaard. The next group of essays deals with the relevance of Kierkegaard today for the wider academic community and for culture at large. Holt takes Kierkegaard’s thoughts on the aesthetic individual as a guide to contemporary media and internet reality.12 This may be useful as a partial description anyway. Gan’s essay is important because it tries to find room for the Kierkegaardian self in modern psychology

Joakim Garff, “ ‘Grinets Martyr’—Kierkegaards konfrontation med sin samtid,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 45–63. 10 See ibid., p. 53. 11 Stig Sæterbakken, “Goddag mann, Alter Ego,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 77–82. 12 Anders Holt, “Det moderne menneske som estetiker,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 67–76. 9

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(beyond the mechanistic, instinctual model).13 Kierkegaard can help us gain a more complete, anthropological view of us humans at least. Almås points out the right path, I believe, to reclaiming a coherent self from either childhood trauma or alienation from modern society (1–3): to balance the need for community with individual autonomy in the world (nurturing private relationships while cultivating autonomous individuality, allowing the individual to stand against (not above!) external authority and society).14 Jaminon’s and Sægrov’s essays search, partly with inspiration in Kierkegaard, for a business ethics that is able to gauge nature, individual, society and business from an integrated, unified view.15 We need, they think, to foster a more critical, conflict-accepting mentality not only in the workplace but in society at large. It is hard to argue with this. Finally, this reader was piqued by Dyrerud’s paper on Kierkegaard and modern drama (Ibsen).16 One might agree that Ibsen’s symbolic dramas (Wild Duck, etc.) show modern traits found in a stark, solipsistic form with Kierkegaard (see (4–5)); and that modern drama is more existential (individual vs. reality (“vertical”)), with ancient Greek drama being more political (individual vs. society (“horizontal”)). But Greek thought and drama could also be existential (Sophocles’ Oedipus trilogy, for example) and the former highly political again (An Enemy of the People, etc.). It is by combining both “axes,” or so one could argue, that makes Ibsen such a rich and rewarding playwright. It also makes it possible for us to read Ibsen’s plays as a critique of the Kierkegaardian self. Brand, for instance, is an indictment of the ego-idealism and uncompromising religion of its title character (Brand dies abandoned and alone too at the end of Act 5);17 and The Wild Duck shows self-deception as necessary and truth as socially self-defeating to the human being (Hjalmar is living his life based on a lie, and he is active in destroying his family when the truth is discovered in the last act). The remaining essays are mostly by theologians and philosophers, addressing the narrower circle of Kierkegaard scholars and followers. Foss argues for subjective choice as a necessary rebellion against the status quo.18 A wholesale political solipsism, it is true, makes perfect sense as a kind of last refuge (in a totalitarian state, say), but it might just as well lead to blind violence and even terrorism at other times

Guri Gan, “Moderne psykologi som argument for Kierkegaard,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 105–10. 14 Elsa Almås, “Karakteristiske trekk ved psykiske problemer i det moderne samfunn,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 111–14. 15 Jean Jaminon, “Eksistensialisme og nærlingslivsetikk,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 115–22. Roald Sægrov, “Er det rom for intellektuelle i arbeidslivet?” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 123–32. 16 Thor Arvid Dyrerud, “Den Kierkegaardske ‘Reflex’ i Ibsens dramatikk,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 83–92. 17 See also Eivind Tjønneland, “Henrik Ibsens Brand og Søren Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaard, Ibsen og det Moderne, ed. by Thor Arvid Dyrerud, et al., Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2010, pp. 207–21. 18 Øyvind Foss, “Eksistens og emansipasjon,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 161–4. 13

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or places.19 Placing the self above society, as Kierkegaard does, is problematic, and not just in a non-Christian way either. Valen-Sendstad’s essay is more reasonable.20 Kierkegaard’s lasting value, he thinks, lies in his focus on Christians and then on individuals, irreducible to either dogma or community. Cook’s essay deals with the impact of existentialism on theology in the twentieth century as a whole.21 It is a more straightforward exegesis and is indispensable to anyone working in the field. The same goes for the following: Schmid’s essay on Kierkegaard and the modern self’s existential forgetfulness of the craving for the absolute,22 Arnarsson’s treatment of Kierkegaard and modern philosophy as both a repetition and a radicalization of Plato,23 Harbsmeier’s take on the concept of inwardness as inherently related to the external for Kierkegaard (at all three stages),24 and Lübcke’s stress on love of neighbor as a positive duty for Kierkegaard.25 Kierkegaardian thought and selfhood does, it is true, purify human interest of its all-too-human, cognitivist connotations—he clearly foreshadows Nietzsche and Heidegger in this. But we must not forget the double dialectic here. Kierkegaardian thought and individuality always relate to society, but it always does so in a one-sided way (that is, negatively, as standing above it). There is no room, we saw, for reciprocal relations and two-way communication. His theory of self and society, as it stands, is at best a torso therefore. Finally, Søltoft’s phenomenological reconstruction of an ethics of vertigo in Kierkegaard is highly engaging.26 For the Dane, faith has two correlates: The subjective (belief or trust—the “how”) and the objective (Christ—the “what”). It is the proper way to deal with the groundlessness of being human, for him, for sure. Not that the vertigo of existence goes away: But at least it becomes livable. One does not have to be a Christian to sympathize with this wish to find a way to live with human meaninglessness. This anthology is the most balanced, critical, and engaging this reader has come across on the issue. It is a must-read for anyone who is seriously interested in exploring Kierkegaard’s relation to society. Narve Strand

Ibid., pp. 161ff. Fartein Valen-Sendstad, “Søren Kierkegaard—stadig en utfordring for kirka og teologien,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 141–50. 21 E. David Cook, “The Impact of Existentialism on Theology,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 151–60. 22 Hermann Schmid, “Glemslens problematic,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 167–74. 23 Kristian Arnarsson, “Erindring og gentagelse,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 197–203. 24 Eberhard Harbsmeier, “Begrebet inderlighed hos Kierkegaard,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 182–96. 25 Pia Lübcke, “Om kærlighedens forpligtelser,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 93–100. 26 Pia Søltoft, “Svimmelhedens etik,” in Filosofi og Samfunn: Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 175–82. 19 20

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Per Lønning, Samtidighedens situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards Kristendomsforståelse [The Situation of Contemporaneity: A Study in Søren Kierkegaard’s Understanding of Christianity], Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke 1954, 330 pp

Alongside Harald Beyer’s Søren Kierkegaard og Norge, Per Lønning’s doctoral dissertation, Samtidighedens Situation, is likely the most significant work in the history of Norwegian Kierkegaard research. When Lønning published this work, it was the first Norwegian book concerned exclusively with Kierkegaard’s thought and writings, but also the first major study to engage substantially with the available research literature. Where Beyer had focused his attention primarily on Kierkegaard’s significance for Norwegian literary authors like Henrik Ibsen and Alexander Kielland, Lønning considers Kierkegaard as a significant thinker in his own right and offers a reading that clearly surpasses Beyer’s in both scope and sophistication. The study itself is cast as a theological investigation of Kierkegaard’s concept of contemporaneity (Samtidighed) and its relation to Kierkegaard’s view of Christian doctrine and practice. Lønning develops and defends the view that Kierkegaard himself took the concept of contemporaneity to be central to his overarching theory of the Christian faith. Throughout the text, Lønning primarily considers the theological content and implications of Kierkegaard’s work. His focus is on the Christological, existential, and soteriological aspects of the Kierkegaardian doctrine of contemporaneity, and their development from Either/Or up until the Kirkestorm of Kierkegaard’s final years. Uncontroversially, Lønning links contemporaneity with the central concept of paradox and argues that the former only acquires its full meaning in relation to the latter. On Lønning’s view, contemporaneity has two distinct aspects. On the one hand, the individual believer ought to place himself or herself in a relationship with Christ that accepts his paradoxical status as both infinite and eternal and as finite and debased (fornedret). On the other hand, this faith has to be translated into religious-ethical practice. Here, Lønning argues in favor of a reading that takes the doctrine of contemporaneity to involve a general account of the relationship between the religious believer and his or her socio-historical context. Although Lønning does

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not flesh out the specifics of the relationship in question, he makes a convincing case that Kierkegaard held that authentic faith inevitably engenders conflicts (referred to as “collisions” in Lønning’s text) between the believer and his contemporaries in a way that parallels the necessary collision of the Christ figure with historical and social reality. Lønning develops his view by means of a critical overview of the scholarly reception of the concept of paradox. In the course of this overview, he considers and rejects the view—prominent in the early twentieth century—that Kierkegaardian contemporaneity entails acting as if one were a historical contemporary of Christ. Instead, he argues that Kierkegaard’s view of contemporaneity with Christ applies, regardless of one’s specific historical period or temporal distance from the earthly life of Christ. On Lønning’s view, contemporaneity is a far more general concept that prescribes a specific attitude towards Christ rather than indicating a historical situatedness with respect to him. The appropriate attitude toward Christ ought to be mediated by his status as the paradoxical unity of the eternal and the temporal, which entails rejecting the idea that it is possible for anyone to stand in a privileged relation to Christ simply by virtue of historical contiguity. Rather, the authentic believer ought to accept that his faith cannot help but alienate him from his contemporaries, including the earthly representatives of God, such as the clergy. This view is a clear descendant of the Norwegian theological establishment’s response to Kierkegaard’s anticlerical writings in the 1850s, which emphasized both the admirable defense of the individual in Kierkegaard, while warning students and young priests against the powerful sectarian tendencies inherent in his conception of Christianity. However, Lønning extends this criticism by arguing that Kierkegaard’s view of authentic faith leads him to emphasize the alienation of the authentic Christian believer from his or her community, ending, in Lønning’s view, with an unacceptable overemphasis on the abasement of Christ and an increasing identification with his fate on Kierkegaard’s part. In addition, the exaggerated focus on the debased Christ results in a lack of interest in common religious practice on Kierkegaard’s part, which Lønning considers an implausible and one-sided position. On Lønning’s view, Kierkegaard is correct in emphasizing that “the unconditionality of God’s demand” is the condition for man’s “experience of the unconditional love of God,”1 but errs in considering the entire history of the official Christian faith as a process of degeneration. Lønning argues that while Kierkegaard’s treatment of questions related to the existence of the church and its relation to the faith of the individual does offer some insights, he ends up in what is ultimately an extreme sectarianism, placing himself outside any possible community of believers. In addition, Lønning takes issue with both the late Kierkegaard’s rejection of Scripture as a reliable source of insight into religious matters and his sharp criticism of Luther (which Lønning claims to be based on a caricature). While retaining both historical and scholarly interest, Samtidighedens Situation undeniably has a faint sense of being incomplete. In the introductory chapter,

1 Per Lønning, Samtidighedens situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards Kristendomsforståelse, Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke 1954, p. 298.

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Lønning declares that his ambition is to read Kierkegaard in terms of something he calls “the formal dynamics of existence.”2 This concept is never properly fleshed out and resurfaces only in the concluding summary chapter, and even there it is not clear what its theoretical role is. Fortunately, virtually none of Lønning’s arguments or interpretations depends on this concept, and a charitable reading might attribute its retention in the text to simple editorial oversight. A more serious ground for criticism is constituted by Lønning’s curt dismissals of several works of secondary literature. Lønning often dismisses views as “undialectical,” without making clear what this entails, or states without further explanation that a given interpretation is “false,” or that it attributes meaningless theses to Kierkegaard. To be sure, it is more often than not possible to reconstruct the argument Lønning is likely to have had in mind from the details of his own interpretation, but in an ambitious work like this, such reconstruction ought to be unnecessary. That being said, many of his criticisms are pointed and effective, especially when he castigates the facile assimilation of Kierkegaardian concepts to Heideggerian ones prominent in existential theology. Overall, Samtidighedens Situation remains a valuable piece of scholarship, not least as a source of insight into the state of the scholarly debate about Kierkegaard in the first half of the twentieth century. Morten Dahlback

2

Ibid., p. 28.

Reviews and Critical Discussions Hygen, Johan B., review in Norsk teologisk tidsskrift, vol. 57, 1956, pp. 23–55. Lindstrøm, Valter, “Eros og agape i Kierkegaards åskådning. Reflexioner kring Per Lønning: ‘Samtidighedens Situation,’ ” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1, 1955, pp. 102–12. Nielsen, Frederik, review in Social-Demokraten, December 12, 1955. Norborg, Jos, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, July 26, 1954. Prahl, S., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, July 22, 1955. — review in Fyens Stiftstidning, November 16, 1955. Rohde, Peter P., review in Information, November 11, 1955. Rubow, Paul V., review in Berlingske Aftenblad, December 29, 1954. Søe, N.H., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, October 12, 1954. Svendsen, Paulus, review in Norsk teologisk tidsskrift, vol. 57, 1956, pp. 1–23.

VII. Secondary Literature in Polish

Edward Kasperski, Kierkegaard. Antropologia i dyskurs o człowieku [Kierkegaard: Anthropology and the Discourse on Man], Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora 2003, 555 pp.

Kasperski’s Kierkegaard. Antropologia i dyskurs o człowieku was the first systematic work dedicated to Kierkegaard’s philosophy of man that was widely available to the Polish reader. The work comprises nine chapters. In Chapter 1, “The Discourse on Man: Introduction to Kierkegaard’s Anthropology,” the author first consciously distinguishes some contemporary paradigms for reading Kierkegaard and subsequently skillfully situates his reading as another important vantage point for Kierkegaardian scholarship. Among these various paradigms, Kasperski distinguishes a historical perspective, by which he understands an attempt to discern and analyze Kierkegaard’s relation to the Golden Age of Denmark, and a biographical outlook that aims at reading the Danish thinker through the events of his life. Reading Kierkegaard as the precursor of existentialism, postmodernism, the new Christian thought, and even humanism constitutes hermeneutical perspectives important for analyzing the thought of the Danish thinker. Lastly, the key to the successful reading of Kierkegaard lies for some, as Kasperski indicates, in understanding the mechanics of the design of Kierkegaard’s authorship, which explains the relation between his pseudonymous and signed writings. These reading paradigms often fail to provide a comprehensive perspective on his oeuvre as a whole, since they all emphasize only specific aspects of his authorship. Contrary to these readings, Kasperski claims to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kierkegaard’s thought that is based on understanding Kierkegaard’s “discourse on man” as the underlying theme of his writings. But the “discourse on man” is not a mere term for what we consider anthropology. It is a specific understanding of a human being as an ethical-religious being, and the author interprets the phrase predominantly from perspectives of literary studies and art. Kierkegaard’s “discourse on man” is, among other things, a result of his reflection upon the legacy of the classics and the condition of modern man; although it takes stock of the philosophical deliberations of the ancients and the moderns, Kierkegaard’s “discourse on man” eventually offers an alternative that, in its essence, is radically different.

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Addressing the famous question of Kant, “Was ist der Mensch?,” Kierkegaard offers a new one, that is, “How does one become a man?,”1 and indicates that the answer to such a question can be found in one’s existential engagement with the “discourse on man.” Here Kasperski puts forward the categories of the single individual and redoubling, and emphasizes the importance of freedom and faith and the formation of “the ironic man” for Kierkegaard’s project.2 In the last part of this chapter, “The Laws of the Discourse,” Kasperski offers thorough analyses of Kierkegaard’s “discourse on man” as representing various forms of communication, and eventually identifies its several fundamental layers (characteristics and dimensions). These are the imperative of maintaining the principle of correspondence between the medium and the content of communication, mixing and mingling of literary genres, the esthetic dimension of Kierkegaard’s writings as expression of the poeticized form of life, the emphasis upon the author, the role of pseudonymity within the authorship and the “how” (not the “what”) of the discourse.3 Chapter 2, “Man as Synthesis of Contradictions,” attempts to overcome the dominant fragmented reading of Kierkegaard’s anthropology, offering a systematic and holistic perspective that shows the uniqueness of his approach that cannot be reduced to its theological, psychological, or philosophical dimension. Here, especially, the polymorphic and polyphonic mode of Kierkegaard’s writings is taken into account, but also the full spectrum of his authorship is considered. Kasperski’s reading is set against the interpretations of, among others, Malantschuk, Sløk, Theunissen, Mackey, and Gouwens. Lastly, according to Kasperski, one can find in Kierkegaard’s writings an understanding of man as someone who is oneself shaped by anthropological discourse. Here the reader is seen as someone creating oneself in the process of “conversing” with oneself. Kasperski sketches Kierkegaard’s “forms of existence,” highlighting that their presentation in the oeuvre is stretched between the actual “types of existence” and points of view that present them. Chapter 3 discusses man’s susceptibility to reflection, formations of personality, and relationships with other individuals as the main factors that shaped Kierkegaard’s image of a human. It is the reflection—especially understood as opposed to speculation and abstract thinking—that is the foundation of human consciousness; however, as Kasperski emphasizes, reflection can also be disinterested and directed away from the thinking subject. Chapter 4, “Existence against the System,” skillfully situates Kierkegaard among the dominant intellectual torrents in Denmark. Kierkegaard is presented as a thorough reader of his contemporaries; among them Kasperski emphasizes Hegel as the important point of departure for Kierkegaard, but also the readers of Hegel in Denmark such as Poul Martin Møller, Frederik Chistian Sibbern, Hans Lassen Martensen, Jakob Peter Mynster, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Hans Christian Andersen, and N.F.S.

Edward Kasperski, Kierkegaard. Antropologia i dyskurs o człowieku, Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. A. Gieysztora 2003, p. 16. 2 Ibid., pp. 16–19. 3 Ibid., pp. 35–57. 1

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Grundtvig.4 Kasperski traces the evidence of Kierkegaard’s reaction to Hegel and the Danish Hegelians in the writings that start with The Concept of Irony and finish with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Apart from the apparent criticism of Hegel’s system, Kasperski shows the difference between Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s readings of Socrates, where the old man of antiquity is presented by Kierkegaard as the ultimate negative ironist.5 Kasperski also shows that Kierkegaard takes stock of Hegel’s criticism of romantic irony and the romantic subject, which is rooted in the teachings of the Sophists of antiquity.6 Chapter 5, “The Single Human Being,” Chapter 6, “The Discourse and the Dialectics of Redoubling,” Chapter 7, “The Anthropology of Freedom,” and Chapter 8, “The Anthropology of Faith,” contain Kasperski’s reading of the Kierkegaardian man. The exposition of this topic begins with the definition of man outlined in Chapter 2; there Kasperski, establishing some connections between, mainly, the famous introduction from The Sickness unto Death and the well-known corresponding section from The Concept of Anxiety presenting man as synthesis, offers a relational defi nition of man founded on the concept of sin, anthropologically understood. Chapter 5 focuses on “the single human being” (człowiek pojedynczy), which the author understands as a composition of opposing categories of the singular and the universal. The composition is, however, far from being a homogeneous entity; on the contrary, it is marked by perplexity, split and duplicity.7 The following chapter, Chapter 6, concentrates on the notion of redoubling that Kasperski relates to reduplication, but also, to a certain extent, to repetition. These categories are important for Kierkegaard’s anthropology since they describe the intricacies of the human self, but they also characterize the literary genre of the Danish thinker. To be oneself is, according to Anti-Climacus, to be redoubling. To be redoubling means to be able to make free choices and to be free, and thus freedom is the main subject of Chapter 7, “The Anthropology of Freedom.” Here freedom is understood as inhabiting the human self, and its foundations are to be found in consciousness and will.8 Freedom also marks the relationship between the author and the reader; analyzing Kierkegaard’s works, Kasperski asks about what it means to be free for the author in relation to the reader and vice versa?9 The subject of this chapter is illuminated by the author in the perspective of angst that posits limitations for freedom10 and the existential choice that is the ultimate expression of freedom.11 Lastly, the freedom of the individual is set against the necessity of the historical-logical development offered by Hegel.12

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Ibid., pp. 127–32. Ibid., pp. 136–48. Ibid., p. 161. Ibid., p. 190. Ibid., p. 243. Ibid., p. 244. Ibid., pp. 251–5. Ibid., pp. 255–64. Ibid., pp. 270–7.

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The penultimate chapter of the monograph, Chapter 8, “The Anthopology of Faith,” discusses faith as stretched between the two categories of paradox and madness. Kierkegaard’s faith aims not at reconciliation and consolation, but is militant, challenging and, while building the new man, “burns the old bridges,” thus offering no way back.13 Kasperski compares Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the evangelical kerygma with Luther’s reformatory views.14 In the final chapter, Chapter 9, “The Ironic Man,” Kasperski comes back to the previously discussed subject of Socratic irony. He points out that, ultimately, irony is the foundation for Kierkegaard’s anthropological discourse; his writings, but also his life, teem with irony to the point where the Dane becomes its inevitable victim in the 1848 publications of the Corsair.15 Kierkegaard’s irony, however, is not the nihilistic irony of the Romantics, but a negative “suggestion” of what eventually a human being may become, and therefore a distinctive characteristic of subjectivity in man.16 Kasperski’s monograph offers a broad introduction to Kierkegaard’s anthropology, but also to his works, thought, and life. The author both refers extensively to Kierkegaard’s oeuvre (paying relatively little attention to the journals and upbuilding discourses) and the secondary literature in Polish, English, German, French, and Russian; from that perspective, Kasperski’s book is a mammoth that has no peers in Poland and probably only a few in the world. Kasperski’s exposition of the Danish thinker and his legacy is solidly grounded in the intellectual (philosophical, theological, literary, and artistic) and historical contexts contemporaneous with Kierkegaard. The great advantage of the book is that it covers most every possible aspect of Kierkegaard’s discourse on man. However, it seems that the book becomes in a way the proverbial victim of its own success—since to cover such a large amount material, it can only give scarce attention to some aspects of Kierkegaard’s anthropology. The book focuses on presenting the subject rather than on arguing for a particular reading of it. Kasperski treats on the same level issues that scholars seem to agree upon with those that are debatable. The reader has the feeling that some subjects reappear throughout the monograph and, often, the same arguments are repeatedly considered; however, despite the “non-analytical” approach of Kasperski and rather “a loose design” of the whole book, hardly any inconsistency can be found in the presentations and arguments. Important for the Polish reader would be the noted parallels between Kierkegaard and the local literary figures like Mickiewicz, Norwid, and Gombrowicz. Wojciech Kaftański

13 14 15 16

Ibid., p. 284. Ibid., p. 255. Ibid., p. 321. Ibid., pp. 325–44.

Review and Critical Discussion Słowikowski, Andrzej, review in Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. 62, no. 2, 2005, pp. 357–64.

Stefania Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard— filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary [Pascal and Kierkegaard: The Philosophers of Despair and Faith], Cracow: Universitas 2001, 153 pp.

The book by Stefania Lubańska, Pascal and Kierkegaard: The Philosophers of Despair and Faith, is the only monograph available to the Polish reader comparing the views of Kierkegaard and Pascal. At the moment of its publication it was the third comparative monograph on Kierkegaard in Polish; the other two juxtaposed the thought of the Danish thinker to the views of Immanuel Kant.1 The book’s thesis is already visible in its very title, since the author believes that both Pascal and Kierkegaard are philosophers of “despair and faith.” Indeed, Lubańska considers these two categories to be the most representative for the philosophies of Pascal and Kierkegaard. For both thinkers the human being is a dialectical entity, which simultaneously falls into despair and can free himself from it only with faith. The book consists of three chapters where the author, in turn, presents Pascal’s point of view and then that of Kierkegaard with regards to the central problem. This leads to a comparison of their opinions, and the author outlines the similarities and differences in their perspectives. The initial two chapters, which separately analyze the works of the two philosophers, are in fact summaries of the most important themes from the philosophers’ respective oeuvres. The third chapter relies on the simplest version of the comparative method, which consists in juxtaposing Pascal’s and Kierkegaard’s approaches discussed in the first two chapters, and then it attempts to include them in the wider context of existential and Christian philosophies. Chapter 1, “Man in the Face of God in Pascal: Despair and Faith,” begins with a section concerning “Despair as an Expression of Man’s Nothingness.”2 The author

At the time of its publication there were already two books which juxtaposed the works of Kierkegaard and Kant: Hubert Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej, Słupsk: WSP 1995; Andrzej Niemczuk, Wolność egzystencjalna: Kant i Kierkegaarda, Lublin: UMCS 1995. 2 Stefania Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, Cracow: Universitas 2001, pp. 9–18. 1

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points to the three types of despair in the thought of the French philosopher. The first type of despair occurs when a person focuses exclusively on one part of the synthesis that constitutes him—the synthesis of the finite and the infinite—and, in consequence, experiences the nothingness of his being. The second type of despair is connected with one’s feeling of absolute doubt about the possibility of rational cognition of the transcendent truth. It is also connected with the discovery of the heart’s guiding role in that respect. The last form of despair, according to Lubańska, is characteristic of Pascal, who cannot understand people’s indifference when faced with the issues of ultimate importance, and who is forced to formulate his famous “wager,” in which he expresses his concern for the human soul. In the second part of her meditations on Pascal, the author focuses on “Faith and the Routes to Achieve It.”3 She commences with a presentation of the dialectical tension between despair and faith, and with the analysis of the notion of sin understood as everything that contradicts God’s will and that stems from the breakdown in communication with the transcendent. Subsequently, Lubańska discusses the problem of the dialectics between reason and the heart as that which allows faith to reveal itself in the human being. The author recalls the interpretation of Thomas Moore Harrington, which differentiated two types of faith in Pascal: human faith and divine faith.4 The first one is based on the intellect, and the second on humility and can be only attained through God’s grace, which transforms the human heart. In the final part Lubańska studies the problem of “Man Faced with a Hidden God in Blaise Pascal.”5 She sets off from a classical reading by Lucien Goldmann, who presented the most famous picture of the “hidden God” in relation to the works of Pascal.6 In his approach the position of man in relation to God is radically tragic, since the latter remains hidden, silent and unknowable. The author attempts to distance herself from such an understanding of things and points to the Christian dimension of Pascal’s thought. Jesus Christ is, on the one hand, a “doubly-hidden God”7 and, on the other hand, seen from the perspective of faith, he becomes the mediator on a man’s path to God. The hidden God always remains a mystery for human beings—one they cannot understand; however, they can penetrate his hiding place through uniting with him by grace. In Lubańska’s interpretation Pascal is both a skeptic in relation to the possibility of a rational understanding of God, and a philosopher, who calls upon every person to search for the Absolute in their life. Interestingly, she presents his thought in such a way that it seems to anticipate the main theses of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre.

Ibid., pp. 18–31. Thomas Moore Harrington, Pascal philosophe. Une étude unitaire de la pensée de Pascal, Paris: Société d’enseignement supérieur 1982. 5 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, pp. 31–50. 6 Lucien Goldman, Le Dieu caché. Étude sur la vision tragique dans les Pensées de Pascal et dans le théâtre de Racine, Paris: Gallimard 1955. 7 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, p. 44. 3 4

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For example, she speaks about despair as an “intensified sin,”8 a “qualitative leap” which exists between the realms of reason and the heart,9 and the paradox of the “embodied God.”10 Chapter 2, “Despair and Faith in Søren Kierkegaard,” opens with a part devoted to an attempt to define his understanding of despair.11 The author not only refers to The Sickness unto Death, where despair is described as “the misrelation in the relation of a synthesis that relates itself to itself,”12 but she also recalls Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, where the Danish philosopher defines it as “to have two wills.”13 What follows is an elaborate paragraph, in which Lubańska meticulously follows Kierkegaard in describing the types of despair identified in The Sickness unto Death.14 It is rendered as a common spiritual phenomenon which concerns every human being, but which most people are not aware of. In opposition to this kind of approach, the author, while at the same time remaining faithful to the Kierkegaardian considerations, singles out “the awareness of despair as the highest stage of despair.”15 As the result, she demonstrates how, in his deliberations, the notion of despair is linked to the notion of sin and to such significant categories as offence, paradox and the consciousness of sin. In Lubańska’s presentation, human existence in the perspective of the Danish philosopher relies on the dialectics of faith and despair, between which there has to be a transition.16 Since despair—just like sin—is the opposite of faith, every person in one’s life can, at a given point in time, be described by only one of these phenomena—one either believes or is in despair. The main sources supporting the author’s reasoning in these passages are the books by Thomas H. Croxall17 and Vincent A. McCarthy.18 In the last section of the analyses devoted to Kierkegaard, Lubańska attempts to point to the most important elements of his conception of faith.19 What is characteristic of her interpretation is a holistic reading of this theme, without any exploration of the relation between particular pseudonymous works. She consequently links the theses from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript with the theses of Fear and Trembling or Either/Or. In consequence, she demonstrates how the notion of faith is connected to such themes as truth, subjectivity, passion, love, and

Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., p. 25. 10 Ibid., pp. 43–4. 11 Ibid., pp. 51–5. 12 SKS 11, 131 / SUD, 15. 13 SKS 8, 144 / UD, 30. 14 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, pp. 55–71. 15 Ibid., pp. 71–9. 16 Ibid., pp. 79–86. 17 Thomas H. Croxall, Kierkegaard Studies with Special Reference to A) the Bible, B) Our Age, London: Lutterworth Press 1948. 18 Vincent A. McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1978. 19 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, pp. 87–100. 8 9

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paradox. Additionally, she discusses the problem of the leap of faith which, following R.Z. Friedman, she interprets as a specific movement from morality to religion.20 Finally, she presents what is fundamental for Kierkegaardian thinking—his understanding of Christianity as life and not a doctrine—as something that reveals itself only in existence and in the faith of particular people. Kierkegaard, in Lubańska’s approach, is a philosopher who constructs in his writings a concise picture of human existence, which should follow the line of development from despair to faith. It is only in faith, which is a gift from God and a miracle,21 that one can look for fulfillment in existence, which itself is not attainable during one’s life.22 In her deliberations, the author, in addition to her use of the pseudonymous works, also refers to passages from Kierkegaard’s upbuilding discourses, which is very rare in the Polish secondary literature on this subject.23 Chapter 3 compares Pascal’s and Kierkegaard’s meditations. The author first juxtaposes the two conceptions of despair and concludes that for both philosophers despair constitutes a starting point for an understanding of the Absolute.24 However, they combine despair with the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty, and they see the possibility of overcoming despair only in a relation with God. In such a situation the greatest human misery for them is when a person does not notice his or her despair. The differences in their understanding of this phenomenon, however, as Lubańska demonstrates, stem from different conceptions of the human personality. Kierkegaard’s perspective is much more complex. The source of despair for him is one’s relation to oneself, and not to the external world, as for Pascal. That is why the latter limits himself to the analysis of the phenomenon of unconscious despair, while the Danish philosopher is able to convincingly show the more advanced awareness of experiencing it. The author compares this awareness with the experiences of the “dark night of love”25 experienced by the mystics. Answering the question formulated in the title of the second part of the monograph—“Is Pascal’s Faith the same as Kierkegaard’s?”26—Lubańska acknowledges that the concepts of faith offered by the two philosophers are almost identical. In both cases faith is understood as grace granted by God and as God’s love. According to the author, both Pascal and Kierkegaard describe Christianity as a domain of existence and not of knowledge; Christianity is about being in truth and not about intellectual cognition. It is what one reaches through despair and suffering, and it is revealed in inwardness. It brings to the believer solitude and the requirement of being silent in the world. In Lubańska’s approach, Kierkegaard’s vision is, however,

R.Z. Friedman, “Kierkegaard: First Existentialist or Last Kantian?,” Religious Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 159–70. 21 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, p. 95. 22 Ibid., p. 100. 23 Especially two of them: “An Occasional Discourse” from Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits and “Against Cowardliness” from Four Upbuilding Discourses from 1844. 24 Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard—filozofowie rozpaczy i wiary, pp. 101–17. 25 Ibid., p. 110. 26 Ibid., pp. 117–33. 20

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much more radical because it rests on the notion of the consciousness of sin, which thoroughly distinguishes faith from despair. What is of foremost importance, however, is the fact that Pascal appears in this interpretation as a thinker akin to the mystics; while Kierkegaard’s conception, which is less intuitive and much more detailed from the theoretical side, is close to “absolute faith,” as understood by Paul Tillich.27 Lubańska’s book should be considered more as an introduction to Pascal’s and Kierkegaard’s thought rather than an advanced study of their philosophies. The author offers a thorough summary of the positions of the two thinkers rather than an analysis of their works. The very juxtaposition of Pascal’s and Kierkegaard’s oeuvre is nothing original in the world literature, but in Poland it still remains the sole attempt of this kind to date. Andrzej Słowikowski

Paul Tillich, Sein und Sinn, vol. 11 in Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–14, ed. by Renate Albrecht, Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk 1958–83.

27

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Hubert Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna [Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology], Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku 1990, 106 pp.

Hubert Mikołajczyk’s study, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna (Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology) was published only once by the Teacher Education School Press in Słupsk in 1990.1 It turned out to be a very significant work despite the small print run. It filled an important gap in the Polish literature concerning the relationship between the philosophy of Kant and Kierkegaard in the field of anthropology. The problem of the influence of Kant’s philosophy on Kierkegaard’s thought in the area of philosophical anthropology had not been previously addressed in the Polish literature. However, it should be highlighted that the method that the author used was not original. Stefan Sarnowski in the work Twilight of the Absolute, published in 1974, analyzed the meaning of concepts like transcendentalism, transcendentism, and immanentism.2 The result was a partial adaptation of the Kantian metaphysical categories to existential philosophy, as seen in the work of, among others, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard. Mikołajczyk’s work seems to build on Sarnowski’s intuition, but it should be emphasized that he significantly goes beyond it by attempting to present Kierkegaard’s philosophical anthropology through the prism of Kant’s revolution of transcendental idealism. A probable reason that the relationship of Kant and Kierkegaard’s work had not been previously addressed was the restricted access to the Dane’s works in Polish in 1990. The situation changed after 1996, when the translation of Kierkegaard’s works into Polish began to gather pace. Another probable reason was the thought that the author of Either/Or was merely a simple critical point of

1

Hubert Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna, Słupsk: WSP

1990. Stefan Sarnowski, Zmierzch Absolutu [Twilight of the Absolute], Warsaw: Wydawnictwo PWN 1974.

2

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reference to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German rationalism. This view closed off opportunities for a creative development of the relationship between the two thinkers. Mikołajczyk could not agree with this point of view of the Dane’s thought. The main argument of his work is that we can speak about Kierkegaard’s metaphysics only when we take into consideration its Kantian inspiration. This means that Kierkegaard’s thought is based on Kant’s solutions, which are mainly noticeable in matters of theodicy. Mikołajczyk also presents other sources of Kierkegaard’s thought. He believes that the existentially oriented Kierkegaardian metaphysics is based on the achievements of Aristotelian pluralism and the doctrine of act and potency, and therefore it is a positive continuation of this anthropological metaphysics, which originates from ancient times. Mikołajczyk points to the difficulties of the interpretation of Kierkegaard’s writing, but he says that his work can be subjected to philosophical analysis, despite the fact that it contains paradoxes and inconsistencies. It must be admitted that the Kantian lens used by Mikołajczyk shows a unique dimension of Kierkegaard’s writings, although this interpretation is not free of certain oversimplifications. Mikołajczyk’s work consists of a short Introduction and three chapters. At the beginning Mikołajczyk shows the historical and anthropological background of Kierkegaard’s anthropology. The aim of Mikołajczyk’s inquiry is not to make a historical analysis. He intends a critical analysis of philosophical problems, which is necessary for philosophical development. From this perspective, the arbitrariness of Hegel’s thought is the arbitrariness of essence, and the absoluteness of Kierkegaard’s thinking is the absoluteness of existence.3 When Mikołajczyk considers Kierkegaard’s reflection on human nature, he shows that this reflection is preceded, on the one hand, by the Greek pagan tradition, especially represented by Plato and Aristotle, and, on the other hand, by the Christian tradition as taken up by Augustine and Aquinas. The author makes a strong assumption, namely, that there is a close relationship between anthropology and metaphysics; even the smallest change from the perspective of ontology entails amendments to the philosophy of the human person. This is particularly evident in the case of Thomism. This theory of realism was the basis for a new theory of the human person. The real existence of the human person postulated by Thomism—which does not require justification—then becomes the foundation of Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s anthropology. The goal of Mikołajczyk’s reflection, however, is to show these moments in which Kant has impact on the thought of the Dane. The most important area in which Kierkegaard has a strong dependence on the author of the Critique of Pure Reason is the problem of freedom and the related question of God’s existence. According to Mikołajczyk, Kant and Kierkegaard, who followed him, consider the difference between the finite cognitive faculties and the infinitude of God, which precludes full knowledge of his nature. Both philosophers point out another important element in the cognition of the Absolute: only morality in conjunction with rational conviction,

3

Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna, p. 6.

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based on this morality, reflects the true way of looking at the sacred.4 God can be understood only from the inside, through actual participation in moral experience. Thus, Mikołajczyk stresses the return to ethics through the philosophy of God in both philosophers. The issue to which Mikołajczyk devoted a lot of attention in the second chapter of his book is a critique of causality and the fundamental question of the existence of God related to it. The author especially refers to the arguments contained in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. According to this work, necessity is something that exists in the mind and not in reality, because the category of causality is rather an act of faith, not knowledge.5 Mikołajczyk points to the fact that depriving causality of its objective nature leads to certain consequences in the philosophy of God. If causality is a figment of the imagination, we cannot conclude to the existence of God. Similarly, Kant in his critique of the ontological argument shows that God is no Prime Mover or Final Cause; God is the Absolute whose existence cannot be achieved by reasoning as claimed by Anselm. God’s existence can only be established by the authenticity of human life. Similarly, Kierkegaard thinks that God is unknowable and all attempts to prove his existence are destined to fail. Mikołajczyk emphasizes that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the ontological argument is that the existence of the human person is necessary and if the humans exist thus, then God is the condition for their existence. In the last chapter Mikołajczyk presents the problems faced by the new philosophical anthropology. The main feature is the lack of separation of questions posed by philosophy from the sources of anthropological questioning. So we deal with the postulate that no cognitive activity, especially concerning the theistic sphere, can exist without an inner axiological commitment. Therefore, philosophy, which in the period of Hegel was supposed to resolve everything eventually, becomes “thinking according to values.”6 Thus, the new anthropology needs to refer to the element of subjective involvement. Both Kant and Kierkegaard, who are seen as representatives of axiological theism by Mikołajczyk, would agree with this statement. According to Mikołajczyk, the second feature of the new anthropology is faith understood as a specific pre-philosophy; faith is conditioned by knowledge, seen as the force which stimulates the mind. It is inseparably linked with the difficult issue of the rationalization of faith, which both philosophers must face. Mikołajczyk also draws attention to the fact that in all theistic issues any exclusion of intellect is impossible and may even be harmful. He also stresses the momentous problem of the role of emotions and feelings in cognition, of which Kierkegaard was the precursor. Another famous Polish philosopher Józef Tischner draws attention to the subjective side of knowledge of the Absolute. He writes that an intimate argument leads us to know God. Such an argument originates from the existential experience of the human person.7

Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., p. 60. 6 Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna, p. 82. 7 Józef Tischner, Myślenie według wartości [Thinking According to Values], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak 1982, pp. 180–4. 4 5

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Mikołajczyk defines this new cognition present in both philosophers as humanistic and experimental or complementary. In his opinion, this cognition should be based on what is dictated, on the one side, by reason and, on the other side, by faith and its experience. The work constitutes a mature and coherent study. Its structure is explicit and cohesive. The author demonstrates the sources of thoughts presented by Kant and Kierkegaard. However, it is seems that there are no references to Lessing, who made a considerable impact on Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. Moreover, Mikołajczyk omits the dialectic of pseudonyms, which is so important for a full comprehension of the thought of the Danish philosopher. This omission is probably due to the fact that this work has a propaedeutic character and is a general introduction to the Dane’s anthropology. However, despite these shortcomings, the study constitutes a pioneering position, which creates a new interpretative field for Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology has been an inspiration for further analyses. Andrzej Niemczuk, among others, referred to it in his work Existential Freedom: Kant and Kierkegaard and in one of his articles.8 It should be added that Mikołajczyk’s next work was published seven years later. It turned out to be a positive continuation and development of the topics presented in the work from 1990. Both books constitute two parts of a whole.9 Katarzyna Krawerenda-Wajda

Andrzej Niemczuk, Wolność egzystencjalna. Kant i Kierkegaard [Existential Freedom: Kant and Kierkegaard], Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 1995, pp. 18–19. Andrzej Niemczuk, “Decyzja egzystencjalna jako realność wolności u Kanta i Kierkegaarda” [Existential Decision as the Reality of Freedom in Kant and Kierkegaard], in Studia nad ideą wolności [Studies on the Idea of Freedom], ed. by Zdzisław J. Czarnecki, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 1995, pp. 111–33. 9 Hubert Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej [Kierkegaard’s Anthropology in the Perspective of Kantian Practical Philosophy], Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku 1995, p. 107. 8

Reviews and Critical Discussions Niemczuk, Andrzej, Wolność egzystencjalna. Kant i Kierkegaard [Existential Freedom: Kant and Kierkegaard], Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 1995, pp. 18–19. — “Decyzja egzystencjalna jako realność wolności u Kanta i Kierkegaarda” [Existential Decision as the Reality of Freedom in Kant and Kierkegaard], in Studia nad ideą wolności [Studies on the Idea of Freedom], ed. by Zdzisław J. Czarnecki, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 1995, pp. 111–33.

Hubert Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej [Kierkegaard’s Anthropology in the Perspective of Kantian Practical Philosophy], Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku 1995, 107 pp.

Hubert Mikołajczyk published Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej (Kierkegaard’s Anthropology in the Perspective of Kantian Practical Philosophy) in 1995.1 This book is a continuation of the author’s research, which he began in the 1980s, on the issue of the impact of Kant’s thought on Søren Kierkegaard’s anthropology. Two books were the result of these studies. The first one was issued in 1990 with the title Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology, in which the author interprets the Dane’s thought in the perspective of the metaphysics of Kant.2 It was the first monograph in Polish that discussed the issue of the relation between these two philosophers. The second book by Mikolajczyk, Kierkegaard’s Anthropology in the Perspective of Kantian Practical Philosophy, is a continuation of the themes contained in the previous work. The reviewed book covers and expands on these topics, but also includes problems that were absent in the book from 1990. In order to understand the context of this work, it should be noted that Hubert Mikołajczyk defended his doctoral thesis in 1988. The book Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology was published two years later. It included conclusions that were the result of his previous research that was undertaken during the preparation of the thesis. The book from 1995 was a complete comparative study of two great philosophers, Kant and Kierkegaard, in the context of anthropology. This work was a part of the discussion on the nature of Kierkegaard’s philosophical anthropology that took place in the 1970s and 1980s in Poland and whose main representatives were Karol Toeplitz, Janina Jakubowska, Wiesław Gromczyński and Tadeusz Płużański.

Hubert Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej, Słupsk: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku 1995. 2 Hubert Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard, Kant a antropologia filozoficzna [Kierkegaard, Kant and Philosophical Anthropology], Słupsk: WSP 1990. 1

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Mikołajczyk, recognized as an authority on the subject neo-Kantianism and hermeneutics, aims, as he did in the first book, to present the historical and anthropological threads which contributed to the development of Kierkegaard’s theory of existence. As in the previous book, in this work when he presents the ideas of the Dane, Kant is also the reference point. It should be noted that Mikołajczyk rejects the way of thinking of Hans Küng, who in his work, Does God Exist?, argues that Kierkegaard’s views were formed under the influence of Kant, but these views do not satisfy scholarly criteria.3 In the Preface Mikołajczyk describes Kierkegaard’s philosophy and claims that the theistic doctrine of Kierkegaard is not irrational. It includes views related to rationalism but not in the Hegelian sense. Mikołajczyk describes the rationalism of the Dane as personalistic and ethical, and emphasizes the inseparability of these elements. New rationalism should be based on the rationalization of individual experience as Mikołajczyk says when referring to Kant’s thought. In the first chapter, Mikołajczyk presents the historical background of Kierkegaard’s anthropology. He claims that antiquity and the Middle Ages, along with a developed theory of realism, constitute the basis for directions in modern philosophy that focus on the category of existence, which is not combined with the Cartesian program of rational philosophy. Mikołajczyk pays much attention to the problem of necessity and freedom and criticizes the main claim of Hegel’s idealism, which states that reality can be known by thought alone. Similarly, Kierkegaard, whose thought was a critical response to Hegel’s assertion of the identity of thinking and being, concludes that thinking and being concern different areas that cannot be linked. According to Mikołajczyk, the reaction to Hegel’s essentialism was also an introduction of the concept of the monadic subject by Kierkegaard. In order to show the difference between these philosophers, Mikołajczyk focuses on the problem of being and becoming. For Kierkegaard, no becoming can be necessary, because otherwise it could not exist. It is existential but not logical. The author also points to the positive impact of Hegel for Kierkegaard’s thought. He notes that Kierkegaard adapts the concepts of dialectic and mediation to his own philosophy, giving them a slightly different meaning. Mikołajczyk rightly stresses that the theory of opposites that are overcome in a synthesis, is strengthened in the Dane’s philosophy. Mikołajczyk also focuses on the relationship between Kierkegaard and Socrates and their relation to the problem of knowledge and time. Time, for Kierkegaard, is not seen as something that determines the flow of phenomena. For each individual, time is concrete and vivid. It is the eternity of the moment. Mikołajczyk notes that for Socrates the moment is, as in the Dane’s philosophy, the opportunity to recall the truth, but this moment belongs to the past time, while, for Kierkegaard, it is the present time, in which the human person touches eternity. According to Mikołajczyk, Kierkegaard seems to be a follower of the principle of the Socratic thought: I know that I know nothing.

Hans Küng, Does God Exist?: An Answer For Today, trans. by Edward Quinn, New York: Doubleday & Co. 1980.

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The second chapter is devoted to the concept of freedom in Kant and Kierkegaard. This problem, which was only marginally treated in the first book, is elaborated in detail here. Mikołajczyk assumes that the basis of knowledge is the inner experience of the human being and believes that both Kierkegaard and Kant look for the subjective conditions of human cognition. Although Kant found them in the a priori conditions of human reason and Kierkegaard in religious life, they both mean the same thing, Mikołajczyk claims. As a result of his so-called theoretical philosophy, Kant arrived at the problem of freedom as a consequence of his previous assumptions. Kierkegaard was also in favor of the Kantian postulates of practical reason.4 It should be noted that in Kant’s conception, the notion of God belongs to ethics and freedom and is understood as its foundation, whereas it is understood as a relationship with God in Kierkegaard. Bearing this in mind, Mikołajczyk says that in the realm of the Absolute in both their philosophies, moral and cognitive acts interact with each other. Thus, we can talk about a unity of a cognitive element and moral obligation in Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s philosophy. However, Mikolajczyk proposes a strong thesis: Kantian transcendentalism is merely a theoretical game, whereas Kierkegaard’s transcendentalism is that which empowers man and provides the goal of his existence. Both thinkers postulate a return to ethics in the realm of cognition. Subsequently, Mikołajczyk goes on to the question of the possibility of knowing God, pointing to the epistemological agnosticism in both philosophers. However, he indicates a certain way of reaching the Absolute in Kant through cognition by analogy, whereas in Kierkegaard’s thought this is only possible through the experience of transcendence.5 The last chapter contains a critique of the theory of causality, and its purpose is to define the appropriate nature of theism represented by Kierkegaard. As in the first book, Mikołajczyk discusses the point of view of Kant and Hume, according to which both philosophers argue for the subjective nature of the category of causality, which contradicts all metaphysics. God cannot be the result of a series of assumptions, and his real existence cannot be the final point of reasoning. Kierkegaard agrees with this thesis because, according to him, God exists in human interiority. It is worth mentioning that Mikołajczyk sees Kantian epistemology as existential philosophy. The reason for this is the fact that Kant, while suspending knowledge for faith, considers that the purpose of metaphysics is to search for meaning. When raising the question about a new anthropology, the representatives of which are Kierkegaard and Kant, Mikołajczyk sees the difficulty in the form of an epistemological paradox, which consists in the fact that we have knowledge about what is particular (individual), but the question is how it relates to something which is universal. Mikołajczyk finds the solution in Kierkegaard, for whom the reflection about being human must be focused on what is transcendent. Mikołajczyk’s work is highly recommended for those whose are interested in philosophical anthropology but also those who are interested in the relation of

4

Mikołajczyk, Antropologia Kierkegaarda w świetle kantowskiej filozofii praktycznej,

p. 60. 5

Ibid., p. 71.

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reason and existence. The work is organized in a logical manner. Numerous threads that are contained in it interweave with one another. Undoubtedly, this is an asset while comparing it to the previous work, the structure of which was not so well organized. The progress made by Mikołajczyk on the relationship between Kant and Kierkegaard is noticeable when we compare it to the previous book. It is visible in the greater use of sources and secondary literature related to both philosophers. He starts a substantive discussion with researchers such as Toeplitz, Kołakowski, Gilson, and Collins. An obvious weakness of this work is the assumption that the philosophy of Kierkegaard is slightly inferior to the thought of Kant. Mikołajczyk considers that the two philosophers cannot be considered as equals. Kierkegaard cannot be compared with Kant as regards the development of ontological ideas; however, the ethical motif in Kierkegaard is actually a continuation of considerations which we can find in the Critique of Practical Reason. It seems that Mikołajczyk ignores other sources of ethical thought of Kierkegaard such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Christian ethics. However, the reviewed book is extremely valuable since the philosophies of Kant and Kierkegaard are, in Polish research, usually treated as completely different or even alternative ways of philosophizing and are seldom considered together. Katarzyna Krawerenda-Wajda

Review and Critical Discussion Kuźmicz, Karol, Immanuel Kant jako inspirator polskiej teorii i filozofii prawa w latach 1918–1950 [Immanuel Kant as the Promoter of Polish Theory and Philosophy of Law in the Years 1918–1950], Białystok: Wydawnictwo Stowarzyszenia Absolwentów Wydziału Prawa Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku 2009, p. 50.

Jacek Aleksander Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka parodoksu wiary [Søren Kierkegaard’s Dialectics of the Paradox of Faith], Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum 2002, 316 pp.

The book by Jacek Aleksander Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka parodoksu wiary was, at the moment of its publication, the third monograph dedicated to Kierkegaard in Poland; the other two were Karol Toeplitz’s Kierkegaard and Antoni Szwed’s Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji. Studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda (Between Freedom and the Truth of Existence: A Study of S. Kierkegaard’s Thought).1 It was, however, the first monograph to focus on the notion of faith, and which not only put forward a general picture of Kierkegaard’s thought, but also attempted to reveal the Christian dimension of his philosophy. The main thesis of the book is thus the claim that the notion of faith, founded on Kierkegaard’s dialectics of paradox, constitutes the central subject of his oeuvre with other themes revolving around it. Among the major themes Prokopski indicates the problem of communication, approximation, historicism, authority, and the antisystematic dimension of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.2 In particular in its broadest sense, the anti-systematic notion works as a focal point for Prokopski’s analyses that are elaborated in the four chapters of the book, which are entitled “Dialectics of Existential Communication,” “Dialectics of Existential Faith,” “Negative Dialectics of Historicism,” and “Dialectics of Christian Authority.” The order in which these analyses are offered, as the author informs us, stems mostly from the chronology of Kierkegaard’s treatment of a set of theoretical problems and his practical moves, consisting of the “removal of the masks” for the sake of Christian authenticity.3

Karol Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna 1975. Antoni Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji. Studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda, Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk 1999. 2 Jacek Aleksander Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka parodoksu wiary, Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza Arboretum 2002, p. 10. 3 Ibid., p. 19. 1

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The anti-systematic mode of Kierkegaard’s philosophy lies at the base of his thinking in as much as he sets for himself the task of bringing back the existential and subjective character of faith and Christianity, and simultaneously liberates them from the constraints of the Hegelian system of knowledge. Such a reading constitutes the background for the central thesis of the book, which Prokopski formulates thus: “Kierkegaard does not present an irrational standpoint in terms of faith, where faith is situated beyond reason rather than against it.”4 This idea, often in different forms, echoes throughout the key sections of the monograph.5 While working to accomplish the task he set for himself, Prokopski makes use of what he terms the “source-analytical-synthetic method.”6 In the book, referring mostly to the pseudonymous works and The Book on Adler, Prokopski attempts two things. On the one hand, he singles out the main themes of the thinker’s oeuvre and subsequently studies them in detail. On the other hand, Prokopski combines these into a coherent whole, thus demonstrating how they constructed the main goal of Kierkegaard’s writings, “to make people aware of the religious, the essentially Christian.”7 To a limited extent, the author engages with the psychoanalytical method in order to address some elements relevant for Kierkegaard’s biography; however, Prokopski does not seek conclusive arguments for his book in the events of the life of the Dane. In his deliberations, Prokopski to a large extent makes use of the secondary literature on Kierkegaard, mostly anglophone, but also francophone, German, and Danish. At times one cannot help but have the feeling that the book is a compendium of world literature devoted to Kierkegaard. This is an important feature of the book since, apart from the analyses of Kierkegaard’s own writings, it also introduces the Polish reader to the international scholarship covering Kierkegaard’s philosophy of faith. Among these are Henning Schröer’s Die Denkform der Paradoxalität als theologisches Problem,8 C. Stephan Evans’ Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript,”9 Louis Dupré’s Kierkegaard as Theologian,10 and Reidar Thomte’s Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion.11 Prokopski’s work is thoroughly structured. Each of the four chapters comprises five dialectical steps which the author uses to introduce the reader into the intricacies

Ibid., p. 74. Ibid., p. 56; p. 103; p. 116; pp. 138–9; pp. 142–3; pp. 183–4; p. 197; pp. 199–201; pp. 239–42; p. 265. 6 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 7 SKS 13, 19 / PV, 12. 8 Henning Schröer, Die Denkform der Paradoxalität als theologisches Problem. Eine Untersuchung zu Kierkegaard und der neueren Theologie als Beitrag zur theologischen Logik, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1960. 9 Stephan C. Evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, New York: Humanities Press 1989. 10 Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, New York: Sheed and Ward 1963. 11 Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, New York: Greenwood Press 1969. 4 5

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of Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith. Prokopski not only contends that the paradox of faith is the central theme of Kierkegaard’s thought, but also shows that the paradox is not irrational in its essence, but supra-rational (it is situated beyond reason and not against it). He also supports and justifies the viewpoint that Kierkegaard is the first thinker who successfully managed to merge the problem of faith with existence and in this way to oppose Hegel’s approach to Christianity. Prokopski’s book begins this attempt at reading Kierkegaard with the explication of the most fundamental aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought: communication. The author claims that Kierkegaard’s writing, from the very beginning, worked for the very idea of the purification of Christianity from the errors of scientificity and aestheticism. In this approach, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity and the differentiation between direct and indirect communication are not simply an aesthetic play with the reader; rather, on the one hand, they constitute an attempt to answer the question how to communicate faith (Christianity) so one can authentically exist in it, and, on the other, they open a possibility for philosophical thinking about faith and present it without enclosing it in lifeless scientificity. Rather, they make faith into a riddle for the receiver. As the author concludes, “By placing the philosophical deliberations at the core of the indirect communication, Kierkegaard achieves a religious aim which consists in pointing to the ideal of true Christianity.”12 After sketching this, Prokopski moves on to what is crucial for both the thought of the Danish philosopher and the work under review—the problem of the existential view of faith. The idea, carried out consistently here, is that of juxtaposing Kierkegaard’s thinking based on the existential paradox with Hegelian philosophy that is conceptually founded upon non-paradoxicality. Prokopski thus shows how Kierkegaard, in opposition to the scientific philosophy of Hegel, uncovers and restores the truth of an individual, which persists in one’s internal and subjective existence. Hence, this shows that the dialectics of the paradox of faith is the process of the “existentialization” contrary to the “irrationalization” of faith.13 The paradox of the Christian faith is in Prokopski’s view “supra-rational” (super rationem).14 Therefore, it does not consist in the immediate denial of reason, but in the crossing of its limitations, or, put differently, in its “transcendalization.”15 This consequently does not mean that faith is something nonsensical, but that it cannot be explained in the form of speculative inquiries within the framework of science. It can only be revived and persist in the existence of an individual person, because it requires existential approximation.16 The author further presents the problem of the relation between faith and cognition based on historical knowledge.17 On the one hand, Prokopski refers to the crucial difference between the ideas of Hegel and Kierkegaard, but on the other,

12 13 14 15 16 17

Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka parodoksu wiary, p. 71. Ibid., pp. 109–11. Ibid., pp. 111–27. Ibid., pp. 115–16. Ibid., pp. 128–39. Ibid., pp. 140–214.

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he searches for parallels between the thinking of the Danish philosopher and that of Pascal or Kant. This is the backdrop for Prokopski’s detailed study of the exceptionality of the Christian understanding of faith in Kierkegaard. Prokopski analyzes some the basic themes in Kierkegaard’s thinking: the discovery and acquisition of truth (the moment), the critique of the scientific proof for faith, the decision of faith, the internalization of the paradox of Christ, the existential necessity of reduplication of the Christian truth in relation to the attempt at its objective cognition and, finally, the postulate of a militant church and the critique of modern Christianity. Prokopski’s book concludes with a chapter that touches upon the problem of authority which is analyzed mostly on the basis of The Book on Adler. This is an issue that is largely overlooked in the Polish literature. Prokopski attempts to answer the question of what it means to be called on by God, but he also addresses the difference between a genius and an apostle, the difference between an intellectual knowledge of the Christian doctrine and the existential expression of the Christian truth in one’s life. The author shows that in Kierkegaard’s approach, “if it was even possible to acquire objective knowledge about the Christian truth, its outcome would be harmful for the spiritual development of an individual.”18 The undeniable value of Prokopski’s book is the fact that it discusses many aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought that had not been previously analyzed in the Polish secondary literature. The author reads Kierkegaard as a Christian writer, and consequently in this context he discusses the particular elements of his thought. His approach reads the Danish philosopher’s oeuvre as, on the one hand, a ceaseless polemics with the Hegelian system and, especially, its interpretation of Christianity and religion, and, on the other, an attempt to explore the existential dimension of Christianity, which involves acquiring the Christian truth and living it out. The dialectics of the paradox of faith is thus, in Prokopski’s view, a reading of the truth of Christianity in which truth calls for reduplication and realization in the life of every individual, which simultaneously does not allow for enclosing the truth of Christianity in any finite or objective system of knowledge. What is more, the author uses a clear and convincing argumentation to show that perceiving Kierkegaard as irrationalist and fideist stems from an insufficient familiarity with his thought, and not from the actual views that the Danish thinker presented in his writings. The book, aside from its scholarly value, also has a potential to popularize Kierkegaard’s thought. First, it offers a clear presentation of the intricacies of the “paradox of faith” in Kierkegaard’s approach and makes references to numerous critical studies of his thought from the international secondary literature. Moreover, it critically takes up the claims of various authors (for example, Henning Fenger19 and Gordon D. Kauffman20) and makes it clear that Kierkegaard’s thought is still relevant. Second, the work concludes with a lexical table defining key terms of Kierkegaard’s dialectics and with a chronological one, which briefly outlines important events in Kierkegaard’s life and lists the corresponding works of the Dane accompanying

18 19 20

Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., pp. 37–43. Ibid., pp. 244–5.

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them. This allows the readers less familiar with the Danish philosopher’s thought to learn more about the way his writings evolved and how his task of bringing back the proper understanding of Christianity to “the Christendom” was gradually revealed and realized. Prokopski’s book is therefore so organized that it ascends up the subsequent stages of Kierkegaard’s thought, step by step, revealing the exceptionality of his understanding of the Christian paradox of faith. Andrzej Słowikowski

Reviews and Critical Discussions Undetermined.

Antoni Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji: studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda [Between Freedom and the Truth of Existence: A Study of S. Kierkegaard’s Thought], Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk 1999, 236 pp.

Antoni Szwed defended his doctoral thesis, Between Freedom and the Truth of Existence: A Study of S. Kierkegaard’s Thought, at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin in 1988. It was first published by Universitas in Kraków in 1991 and reissued by Wydawnictwo Antyk in Kęty in 1999.1 There is no difference between these editions. To understand the context of Szwed’s research and the importance of his work, one has to take into account two major factors that situated Szwed’s work in the Polish reception of Kierkegaard. First, in 1991 there were few Polish translations of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works and not a single complete translation of any of Kierkegaard’s signed works. In the secondary literature, few topics in Kierkegaard were covered, and for the most part they were treated separately and in an introductory fashion. Second, at the time of the publication of Szwed’s research, the main work that related to Kierkegaard’s concept of truth was Karol Toeplitz’s monograph, which gave a preliminary overview.2 The general understanding of Kierkegaard’s concept of truth in the Polish academia of the day saw it as irrational and/or relativistic. Consequently, the inability to classify it among the other theories of truth often meant that Kierkegaard’s concept of truth was omitted from major works on epistemology. Szwed’s pioneering work appeared unexpectedly as a systematic and analytic study that delves extensively into Kierkegaard’s concept of truth; it is founded on a thorough explication of Kierkegaard’s main concepts. The aim of Szwed’s inquiry is to give a critical but coherent survey of the whole of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, emphasizing those aspects that ultimately serve to provide a holistic picture of Kierkegaard’s thought.

Antoni Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji: studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda, Kraków: Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych Universitas 1991 (2nd ed., Kęty: Wydawnictwo Antyk 1999). 2 Karol Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna 1975 (2nd ed. 1980). 1

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Szwed sees Kierkegaard as a philosopher who is more than a theologian, a novelist, a poet, or just a thinker. In spite of the fact that Kierkegaard was not as systematic in his production as Hegel, his work in its entirety is more discursive and rational than is generally realized. According to Szwed, the writing style of Kierkegaard, which comprises a multitude of threads, poetic language, and literacy, make Kierkegaard’s enterprise difficult to read. Nonetheless, he argues that these difficulties can be overcome with a comprehensible and synthetic methodology that aims to grasp Kierkegaard’s main philosophical ideas. In the preface to Szwed’s study one can identify three main presuppositions that frame his research. First, Szwed sees “the truth of existence” simply as Christian truth and subsequently equates the subjective truth with Christian truth.3 Second, Szwed subordinates the role and meaning of Kierkegaard’s entire authorship—including the role of the pseudonyms—to the question (which Szwed claims guided Kierkegaard’s whole life): what does it mean to become a Christian? The reason for introducing the pseudonyms is to create a “map of ideas” according to which an individual has the ability to identify his own life’s idea that he is currently living, and to determine the highest idea that an individual should seek.4 The highest idea is spiritual liberation and subsequently the existence in truth, which Szwed understands as Christian truth. Third, Szwed believes that Kierkegaard’s philosophy, although it cannot be reduced to anthropology, is in fact fundamentally based on his understanding of human nature. According to Szwed, Kierkegaard’s concept of human nature is predominantly threefold (body/soul/spirit) and is marked profoundly by freedom—a human is in essence a free being. Szwed’s overall investigation seems to be limited in its references to the pseudonymous works; except for journal entries, one can hardly see any references to Kierkegaard’s signed writings. Moreover, it seems that what constitutes some of the starting point of Szwed’s thorough deliberation is still debatable in international scholarship. After the first chapter of his research, in which he introduces existential categories that are fundamental to understanding Kierkegaard’s philosophy—spirit, consciousness, existence, inwardness, “re-subjectivity,”5 and repetition—Szwed’s second chapter presents Kierkegaard’s concept of subjective truth. Szwed establishes a remarkably systematic discourse for discussing Kierkegaard’s concept of truth. His starting point is the correspondence theory of truth that he identifies in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript,6 which he then juxtaposes to Kierkegaard’s concept of subjective truth, also discussed in that work. From Climacus’ deliberation, Szwed distinguishes two facets of the correspondence theory: empirical truth is the correspondence between thinking and being, and ideal truth is the correspondence between being and thinking.7 According to the

Ibid., pp. 10–12. (All page references refer to the more readily available second edition from 1999.) 4 Ibid., pp. 24–5. 5 Polish resubiektywizacja. 6 According to the Polish philosophical nomenclature: the classical concept of truth. 7 Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji: studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda, pp. 76–7; SKS 7, 173–7 / CUP1, 188–91. 3

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correspondence theory, the invariability of the knowing subject and the object of cognition guarantee the true act of cognition. In Johannes Climacus, however, both object and subject changes. The subject is the becoming individual, and the intended object of cognition is also another becoming subject. The subject, in consequence, as an object of cognition, cannot be presented to itself as the whole; the cognition of the real is in fact identified, for Climacus, with transforming it into the possible or ideal.8 The act of cognition keeps the knowing subject immanent to its own thought projects, and therefore cognition is illusory.9 Because of the fundamental movement within the subject and the object, what is left is an approximation of the actual in the very momentus of cognition (subject).10 Szwed sees Climacus arguing for both the logical incoherence of the correspondence theory of truth and the “objective” impossibility of cognition in Hegel’s theory.11 In the final chapters Szwed discusses the main subject of his research: the relation between freedom and the truth of existence. He aims to put together the logical aspect of the subjective truth and its narrative and religious aspects. He reconstructs all the models of existence (and their sub-models) that can, according to Szwed, be derived from Kierkegaard’s stages of existence and presents them as a system of inwardness. Engaging with categories such as anxiety, despair, irony, humor, sin, paradox, and contemporaneity, Szwed builds the structure in which he attempts to show the link between the intensity of inwardness and freedom within the individual in the different models of existence. The aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious stages represent gradually advancing spheres of existence. Eventually, through overcoming anxiety and despair, and believing in paradox and the reality of sin, the individual has the possibility to reach the deepest intensity of the spirit. The individual in his freedom has the ability to assess his life through experiencing himself. The individual has the freedom to decide whether what is already experienced by the individual is satisfactory for that individual in terms of its development. The act of faith is an act of inwardness; in each act of inwardness an individual understands himself; therefore, in faith we understand ourselves. Our ultimate understanding of ourselves is possible only when facing God; thus the individual must surpass the Socratic model of faith and recognize and accept Christ as the model of faith to be followed in the individual’s contemporaneity. Szwed’s work addresses the scholarly demand for a comprehensive and systematic study. Despite the complexity of Kierkegaard’s enterprise and limited access to it, Szwed is able to read Kierkegaard as a consistent and systematic thinker. By staying focused on the core of Kierkegaard’s thought—the relation between freedom and the truth of existence—Szwed finds Kierkegaard’s works coherent and complete. However, Szwed’s reading of Kierkegaard lacks historical context. He simply ignores the possible influence of Danish Christianity (the Danish State Church and

8 9 10 11

Szwed, Między wolnością a prawdą egzystencji: studium myśli S. Kierkegaarda, p. 39. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 80. Ibid., p. 81.

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the Moravian Community) on Kierkegaard’s work. His references are mostly to Hegel and Aristotle, and one can hardly see the influence of Heiberg, Martensen, and Mynster. Even so, Szwed does defend Kierkegaard from marginalization. Although it is hard to see Kierkegaard yearning for it, Szwed re-establishes Kierkegaard’s position as more than a merely local thinker, but instead as a philosopher and even a metaphysician. Szwed’s research gives credit to the importance of Kierkegaard’s thought, corresponds with international scholarship, and is unquestionably an essential point of departure for Polish scholars in a further investigation of Kierkegaard’s complex enterprise. Wojciech Kaftański

Review and Critical Discussion Świderski, Bronisław, “Żyć z Kierkegaardem po Polsku” [To Live With Kierkegaard in Polish], ResPublica Nowa (Warsaw), no. 5, 1997, pp. 51–6.

Karol Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna 1975, 323 pp.

Karol Toeplitz’s Kierkegaard is a unique publication that comprises the first monograph-length study dedicated to Kierkegaard in Poland and a collection of some of Kierkegaard’s primary texts translated into Polish. Its origins are to be traced to Toeplitz’s doctoral thesis defended in 1967 under the supervision of Leszek Kołakowski at Warsaw University, entitled Faith and the Moral Choice in S. Kierkegaard (Wiara i wybór moralny u S. Kierkegaarda). Kierkegaard was published for the first time in 1975 by the publishing house Wiedza Powszechna in Warsaw and reissued by the same publisher in 1980.1 The difference between these two editions is the fact that the second edition takes more of a philosophical approach to several aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought at the expense of their religious and theological dimensions. These changes are especially noticeable in the section entitled “Qualitative Dialectics,” which introduces the existential categories of the leap, the moment, and repetition, and elaborates extensively on the theme of “re-subjectivisation.”2 Moreover, the second part of Kierkegaard, a selection of translations from Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, includes excerpts from Either/Or (translated by Toeplitz and Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz). The first edition of the book was translated into Serbian and published in Belgrade in former Yugoslavia, under the title Kjerkegor.3 The Polish reader, who at that time had been limited to the single complete translation of Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death4 and a handful of other translations from across Kierkegaard’s authorship, suddenly received a comprehensive publication that offered a short biography of Kierkegaard, a thoroughly developed overview of his philosophy, and a selection of the key primary texts. Kierkegaard together with other “numerous articles” by Toeplitz “began a new epoch in Polish research.”5

Karol Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna 1975 (2nd ed. 1980); references for the quotations below refer to the second edition. 2 Polish resubjektywizacja. 3 Karol Teplic, Kjerkegor, trans. by Peter Vujicic, Belgrade: Grafos 1980. 4 Søren Kierkegaard, Bojaźń i drżenie. Choroba na śmierć [Fear and Trembling. The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, Warsaw: PWN 1966 (2nd ed., 1972; 3rd ed., 1982; 4th ed., Cracow: Wydawnictwo Homini 2008). 5 Antoni Szwed, “Poland: A Short Story of the Reception of Kierkegaard’s Thought,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, Tome II, Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, 1

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Toeplitz’s work comprises six chapters, of which the first two—Chapter 1, “The Premises of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy,” and Chapter 2, “Life and Work”—establish a multidimensional interpretation of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. First, it assumes the negative, dialectic, and non-systematic character of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Second, it situates Kierkegaard’s thought in the context of post-Kantian thought that challenges the God–human relationship and Hegel’s response to that thought as formulated in his all encompassing philosophical system, which Toeplitz often terms “the philosophy of everything.” Third, the Dane’s thought refers to both the philosophy of Schleiermacher and the Romantics, such as Novalis and Tieck, and to the criticism of the objectivity of Christianity offered by David Friedrich Strauss and Hegel. Fourth, Kierkegaard’s production is contextualized in a time of spiritual, theological, philosophical, scientific, and social crisis, but also in a time of the alienation of the individual. Fifth, Toeplitz situates Kierkegaard in his Danish context as a follower of Poul Martin Møller and Frederik Christian Sibbern in terms of his criticism of Hegelianism, but also in the context of the Danish State Church and the emergence of the bourgeoisie. The short biography of Kierkegaard minimizes the influence of his life on his work and emphasizes the influence of his pietistic upbringing and theological studies. Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms are part of his Socratic methodology; they do not express his views, but rather present various traits of his personality/personalities. According to Toeplitz, Kierkegaard had a clear vision of his philosophy at the age of 33. Interestingly, Toeplitz claims that Kierkegaard deliberately instigated the so-called “Corsair affair” and that he personally ordered caricatures to be printed upon his request in the Corsair.6 A thematic continuity can be traced from the ideal Christian, through the affair, to Kierkegaard’s all-out war against the institutionalized Lutheran Church and—ultimately—his death.7 Chapter 3 of Toeplitz’s work, “Stages on Life’s Way,” gives a systematic analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of the spheres of existence, and as such the analysis posits Toeplitz’s framework for discussing Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Toeplitz understands the concept dialectically. He claims that the spheres of existence (the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious) constantly permeate the life of an individual, but not simultaneously and at the same time, and they do not necessarily develop in a logical manner (from the lower to the higher). The dialectics of the spheres of existence must not culminate in the religious, because the ideal of the single individual requires all three of them to be rejected since they are insufficient for “grasping” the single individual “before God.” The first section of Chapter 4, “The Philosophy of Madness,” which marks the most substantial part of Toeplitz’s work, presents Kierkegaard as a negative ironist, who initially relates negatively to the external world and finally relates positively to his own inner being. Kierkegaard’s irony is absolute in character since it negates

ed. by Jon Stewart, Aldershot: Ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), p. 218. 6 Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, pp. 34–5. 7 Ibid., pp. 36–46.

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everything objective and has its foundations in Socratic ignorance; it casts the individual into uncertainty and ultimately leads one to God. The main point of reference in the following section, “Rejection of the System,” is the philosophy of Hegel. Kierkegaard’s critique of the German thinker pertains to the inability of the system to capture the individuality of a particular human being without conceptualizing and objectifying that individual. Toeplitz perceives Kierkegaard as both a critic and follower of Hegel, like Feuerbach, Stirner, and Marx who tried to “recapture” the individual from the logic of the system.8 Kierkegaard identifies theology, the institution of the church, and its tradition as reminiscences of the system—they along with Hegelianism represent Religiousness A.9 The subsequent section, “Qualitative Dialectics,” analyzes the existential categories of the leap, the moment, and repetition against Hegel’s category of mediation. The leap is a movement that breaks free from reason, requires resignation and risk-taking and is related to quality, not quantity. The leap is associated with the famous theme of the risk of absolutely choosing oneself from an either-or, which contradicts Hegel’s indifferent mediation of oppositions, and as such this category makes Kierkegaard’s dialectic existential.10 The moment marks the meeting of temporality and eternity, and thus constitutes the now. Toeplitz discerns two types of repetition. In the ordinary or objective sense, repetition gives only approximate effects, and its aim is to reconcile the antinomies of the great philosophical systems. The second type represents the human being’s endeavor “to attain again” the synthesis that one is by taking an existential leap in the moment.11 The next section, “ ‘The Disciples at First Hand’: Existential Re-Subjectivisation,” discusses contemporaneity with Christ and his historicity. The historical is only an incentive to faith—not its foundation—and while the intersubjectivity of faith is not possible, a believer must build his subjective relationship with Christ as God and (the) teacher.12 Toeplitz introduces concepts of reduplication and direct and indirect communication to explain the paradoxical nature of Christ, as both the subject and object, and faith, and subsequently he points to the failure that awaits any attempt to express the truths of Christianity in language. He contributes a hermeneutical method or tool that explains Kierkegaard’s existential re-subjectivisation: “the S-O-S″ triad.”13 First, an individual in her subjectivity (S) appropriates the other, and consequently objectivizes (O) him through conceptualization. Subsequently, the individual appropriates what has been objectified again in an act of subjectivisation (S″). What follows is that the individual, on the one hand, distances himself from the objectivized data (and the person that has been objectivized) and, on the other hand, internalizes the data again in “quasireduplication, quasi-renewal, quasi-repetition....”14

8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Ibid., p. 95. Ibid., pp. 96–7. Ibid., pp. 117–20. Ibid., pp. 126–7. Ibid., pp. 134–7. Ibid., pp. 141–2. The triad comprises S, O, and S″ (double prime). Ibid., p. 142.

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In the next section, “The Existential Thinker,” the author situates Kierkegaard among other thinkers and gives a short critique of his philosophy. Like Stirner and Feuerbach, Kierkegaard disdained abstraction and the masses, the human multitudes. His critique of Hegel is based on the reflections of Kant, Schelling, and Trendelenburg. A certain relationship can be drawn between the philosophies of the Dane and Rousseau, where one’s subjectivity is treated as the foundation of the thinkers’ thought. Subjectivity situates Kierkegaard’s existentialism close to Dostoevsky and Rilke. Toeplitz’s analysis of Kierkegaard vis-a-vis Marx shows that the latter perceived the problem of reification of an individual—the issue that brings Kierkegaard close to Sartre and De Beauvoir—as superfluous, because each individual is already reified by having one’s existence embedded in a body. According to Toeplitz, Kierkegaard’s Christian existential project lacks coherence because it ultimately separates the problem of existence and the essence of the Christian truths. Pure subjectivity cannot build an existential “philosophy”; religious dogmas and concepts are necessary for that. If the pure Christian existence is to be considered without any religious content, then such philosophy can be universally applied to any religion; this is what Kierkegaard cannot agree to. In Chapter 4 Toeplitz sets Kierkegaard’s concept of “the fear of God” against the philosophical pretensions to either possess knowledge of God or to be able to prove or disprove God’s existence. Contrary to Hegel’s various attempts to grasp the movement of the Absolute’s existence, Kierkegaard claims that God “does not exist,” but rather, God is eternally. Following Schelling’s negative philosophy, Kierkegaard concludes that when discussing a priori knowledge about the existing reality we only become embroiled in mere possibilities. Finding objective knowledge about God, by contrast, results in approximation. Kant proved that we could not obtain the knowledge of God’s existence by analyzing its essence, and Kierkegaard showed that God’s existence and essence could not be logically obtained from human existence.15 Drawing upon Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, the author suggests that communication between God and man could be a monologue of a despairing soul, which consequently leads to nihilism or atheism. The last two chapters of the monograph present the theological-religious and philosophical background for reading Kierkegaard. In Chapter 5, “Kierkegaard’s Relation to Catholicism and Protestantism” Toeplitz believes that the accent should be put on Kierkegaard’s opposition to Christendom rather than on the opposition or affirmation of either of the two confessions. Chapter 6 then offers three vantage points for reading Kierkegaard. First, it is important to notice that Kierkegaard’s philosophy identifies and contributes to the nineteenth-century crisis of Christianity and Christendom. Second, the chapter juxtaposes Kierkegaard to Marx, Engels, and Stirner. Toeplitz finds in Kierkegaard a particular critique of “capitalistic social relations”16 and the “heterogeneity of the world of objects and people...and dehumanization,”17 but concludes by emphasizing the affirmation of

15 16 17

Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., p. 200. Ibid., p. 201.

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the individual and contempt for the masses in Kierkegaard.18 This, however, does not lead to the ideology of Stirner’s “egoistic I,” isolated from human relations, but to the “individual I” before God.19 However, for Marx, the inner freedom of the individual is an illusion, because in the outer world a religious individual is still constrained, controlled and regulated.20 Third, Toeplitz gives credit to the influence of Kierkegaard on thinkers such as Lukacs, Jaspers, Heidegger, Unamuno, Shestov, Camus, Berdyaev, Sartre, Sur, Mounier, Barth, Hamilton, Van Burren, Altizer, and Bonhoeffer. Toeplitz’s monograph provides invaluable information about Kierkegaard and his works in a particular socio-historical context. The thinker and his works are given a coherent account, showing that his philosophy is, on the one hand, a conversation with Christianity, and that is why it is not necessarily Christian, and, on the other hand, a conversation with his contemporaries, which is why he should be read as a reactionary philosopher. Although Toeplitz situates Kierkegaard in the broader context of post-Kantian thought, his dominant point of departure is Hegel, and thus Kierkegaard is read as an anti-Hegelian. Toeplitz does not establish Kierkegaard as a father of existentialism, but points out that familiarity with Kierkegaard would greatly contribute to deeper understandings of various existentialisms. This groundbreaking work of Toeplitz is a must for the novice as well as the veteran in Kierkegaard studies. Wojciech Kaftański

18 19 20

Ibid., p. 205. Ibid., pp. 202–3. Ibid., p. 206.

Review and Critical Discussion Urbańska-Bożek, Maria, “Działalność Naukowa, Dydaktyczna, Literacka i Translatorska Prof. Karola Toeplitza” [The Scientific, Educational, Literary and Translation Scholarship of Professor Karol Toeplitz], in Polifoniczny świat Kierkegaarda. Księga Honorowa dedykowana Profesorowi Karolowi Toeplitzowi [The Polyphonic World of Kierkegaard: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor Karol Toeplitz], ed. by Edward Kasperski and Maria Urbańska-Bożek, Gdańsk: Pomorskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzno-Teologiczne 2014, pp. 22–6.