Volume 2, Tome II: Kierkegaard and the Greek World - Aristotle and Other Greek Authors (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9780754669821, 0754669823

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KierKegaard and the greeK World tome ii: aristotle and other greeK authors

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 2, Tome II

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the søren Kierkegaard research Centre

General Editor Jon steWart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Katalin nun peter ŠaJda Advisory Board istvÁn CzaKÓ Finn gredal Jensen david d. possen heiKo sChulz

This volume was published with the generous financial support of the danish agency for science, technology and innovation

Kierkegaard and the greek World tome ii: aristotle and other greek authors

Edited by Jon steWart and Katalin nun

First published 2010 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © Jon stewart, Katalin nun and the contributors 2010 Jon stewart has asserted his right under the Copyright, designs and patents act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corpora te na mes ma y be tra dema rks or registered tra dema rks, a nd are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kierkegaard and the greek world. tome 2, aristotle and other greek authors. – (Kierkegaard research : sources, reception and resources ; v. 2) 1. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813–1855 – Knowledge – greek philosophy. 2. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813–1855 – Knowledge – greek literature. i. series ii. stewart, Jon (Jon Bartley) iii. nun, Katalin 198.9–dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kierkegaard and the greek world / edited by Jon stewart and Katalin nun p. cm. — (Kierkegaard research : sources, reception and resources) includes bibliographical references and index. isBn 978-0-7546-6982-1 (v. 2, t. 2 : hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813–1855 — sources. 2. philosophy, ancient. 3. philosophers, ancient. i. stewart, Jon (Jon Bartley) ii. nun, Katalin B4377.K45526 2009 198’.9—dc22 Cover design by Katalin nun ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-6982-1 (hbk)

2009022905

Contents List of Contributors List of Abbreviations Part I

ix xi

arIstotLe

Organon and Metaphysics iv: the First principles of logic and the debate about mediation Håvard Løkke and Arild Waaler

3

Physics and Metaphysics: Change, modal Categories, and agency Håvard Løkke and Arild Waaler

25

Nicomachean Ethics: ignorance and relationships Håvard Løkke

47

Poetics: the rebirth of tragedy at the end of modernity Daniel Greenspan

59

Rhetoric: eloquence, Faith and probability Heiko Schulz

81

Cumulative aristotle Bibliography Katalin Nun

99

Part II

other Greek PhILosoPhers

diogenes laertius: Kierkegaard’s source and inspiration Nicolae Irina

111

vi

Kierkegaard and the Greek World

the eleatics: Kierkegaard’s metaphysical Considerations of Being and motion Jon Stewart

123

heraclitus: presocratic ideas of motion, Change and opposites in Kierkegaard’s thought Finn Gredal Jensen

147

the skeptics: Kierkegaard and Classical skepticism Anthony Rudd

165

the sophists: Kierkegaard’s interpretation of socrates and the sophists K. Brian Söderquist

183

the stoics: Kierkegaard on the passion for apathy Rick Anthony Furtak

195

Part III

Poets, DramatIsts, anD hIstorIans

aeschylus: Kierkegaard and early greek tragedy Finn Gredal Jensen

211

euripides: Kierkegaard and the ancient tragic heroes Nicolae Irina

235

herodotus: traces of The Histories in Kierkegaard’s Writings Finn Gredal Jensen

247

hesiod: Kierkegaard and the greek gods Nicolae Irina

263

homer: Kierkegaard’s use of the homeric poems Finn Gredal Jensen

271

Contents

vii

plutarch: a Constant Cultural reference Nicolae Irina

301

sophocles: the tragic of Kierkegaard’s modern Antigone Nicolae Irina

313

Index of Persons Index of Subjects

327 333

list of Contributors

rick anthony Furtak, department of philosophy, Colorado College, 14e. Cache la poudre, Colorado springs, Co 80903, usa. Daniel Greenspan, department of philosophy, loyola marymount university, 1 lmu drive, los angeles, California 90045–2659, usa. nicolae Irina, department of philosophy, York university, s428 ross Building, 4700 Keele st, toronto, on, Canada m3J 1p3. Finn Gredal Jensen, society for danish language and literature, Christians Brygge 1, 1219 Copenhagen K, denmark. håvard Løkke, department of philosophy, university of oslo, p.o. Box 1020, 0315 Blindern oslo, norway. katalin nun, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. anthony rudd, department of philosophy, st. olaf College, 1520 st. olaf avenue, Northfield, MN 55057, USA. k. Brian söderquist, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. Jon stewart, søren Kierkegaard research Centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 Copenhagen K, denmark. heiko schulz, department of protestant theology, Johann Wolfgang goethe university, grüneburgplatz 1, 60629 Frankfurt am main, germany. arild Waaler, department of Computer science, university of oslo, p.o. Box 1080, 0316 oslo, norway.

list of abbreviations

Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. 1-2, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art. S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by rasmus nielsen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1857. EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by h.p. Barfod and hermann gottsched, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag, 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. i to Xi–3, by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii to Xiii supplementary volumes, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xiv to Xvi index by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1-28, K1-K28, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, alastair mcKinnon, and Finn hauberg mortensen, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 1997ff.

SV1

Samlede Værker, ed. by a.B. drachmann, Johan ludvig heiberg and h.o. lange, vols. i–Xiv, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by Walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by h.p. rohde, Copenhagen: the royal library 1967.

xii

Kierkegaard and the Greek World

BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by reidar thomte in collaboration with albert B. anderson, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an introduction and notes by lee m. Capel, london: Collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1992.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1992.

EO1

Either/Or, part i, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, part ii, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, among others: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia Watkin, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xiii

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk (vol. 7, index and Composite Collation), Bloomington and london: indiana university press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by Walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, alastair hannay, david Kangas, Bruce h. Kirmmse, george pattison, vanessa rumble, and K. Brian söderquist, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by henrik rosenmeier, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

LR

A Literary Review, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 2001.

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

P

Prefaces, trans. by todd W. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1996.

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Kierkegaard and the Greek World

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by William mcdonald, tallahassee: Florida state university press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by david F. swenson and Walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by Walter lowrie, new York and london: oxford university press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

SUDP The Sickness unto Death, trans. by alastair hannay, london and new York: penguin Books 1989. TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

List of Abbreviations

xv

WL

Works of Love, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1995.

WS

Writing Sampler, trans. by todd W. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

part i aristotle

Organon and Metaphysics iv: the First principles of logic and the debate about mediation håvard løkke and arild Waaler

traditional logic is developed on the basis of the three postulates: the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. The principles were first formulated in Metaphysics IV, where they are given a prominent role as “first principles” of metaphysics. In this way Aristotle significantly impacted a whole tradition of logic, a tradition that had few rivals before it was challenged by hegel and his followers in the nineteenth century. Kierkegaard arguably refers to the aristotelian tradition when he writes about the “law of contradiction” and the “either/or,” and in most cases his appeals to logical principles come in tandem with polemics against a hegelian principle or spokesman. this is perhaps why it has become a sort of cliché in the secondary literature that Kierkegaard armed himself with aristotelian logic in his battle with hegelian dialectics. as we shall see, there are strong reasons to reject this all too common view, or at least to substantially modify it. Kierkegaard was familiar with Aristotle’s first principles from a debate between key intellectual figures in Copenhagen concerning mediation. The debate started in the late 1830s and lasted until 1842, the year before Either/Or was published. at the outset of the debate, aristotelian principles were presented and defended by Bishop Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854) and philosophy professor Frederik Christian sibbern (1785–1872). playwright and philosopher Johan ludvig heiberg (1791–1860) and theologian hans lassen martensen (1808–84) argued against this traditional position, advocating the principle of mediation from speculative philosophy. The debate influenced Kierkegaard quite significantly, and it is likely that he deliberately selected the title Either/Or in response to this debate. in the secondary literature that addresses this debate, it is almost univocally agreed that Kierkegaard took mynster’s side in his view of the debate. however, one needs only make a brief inspection of the sources and the way they are applied in Kierkegaard’s writings to see that his relation to aristotle’s logic in general, and mynster’s position in particular, is more complex than has been argued. For one thing, by following this debate, Kierkegaard had at his disposal well-articulated arguments against speculative philosophy which used aristotelian notions and perspectives. But a brief inspection of the sources reveals that rather than adopting an Aristotelian position, Kierkegaard was deeply influenced by those arguments in the debate that went against aristotle.

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the main lesson we can learn from this is that we must be careful when interpreting Kierkegaard’s use of logical terms, simply because he uses notions from logic—such as contradiction, negation, and identity—primarily as they are used by hegelian authors. as we shall see this practice is at some points quite different from the way the concepts are used in traditional logic, derived from aristotle. on the other hand, we are not entitled to draw the too radical conclusion that Kierkegaard was entirely on the hegelians’ side in the debate. it is true that the contemporary debate was focused more on terminology than on profound philosophical issues, and therefore one cannot read Kierkegaard’s attitude toward the debate as unconditional support for hegelian dialectics. We shall argue that Kierkegaard was especially influenced by Heiberg’s claim that the laws of logic are only valid in the finite empirical sphere. From this, Heiberg concluded that these laws have no scientific significance. Clearly, this perspective is quite remote from that of aristotle, and this was also forcefully pointed out by heiberg’s opponents in the debate. But in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, seems to agree with heiberg’s assertions about the limits of the laws of logic, although he does not agree with the consequences heiberg draws. Climacus locates human existence in the sphere where these laws hold, and therefore the laws are significant. And most significant is the law of excluded middle, rendered in the form of an either/or pertaining to choices, since this is a law of logic that Kierkegaard takes to apply to existence. One of the motivations for the invention of speculative logic was to find an appropriate method for the comprehension of history. Kierkegaard’s positive attitude towards the speculative method is in part due to this sort of application. But while speculative logic provides conceptual machinery for the analysis of history, Kierkegaard seems be concerned about the fate of the individual. the problem arises if the sole focus of the individual lies on the past and the present. Kierkegaard argues that for the existing individual there is a tension between comprehending the past and directing his or her attention towards the future; the latter task presents the individual with an either/or while the former task requires that the law of excluded middle be sublated. speculative philosophy is thus criticized, but not for its limitation of the laws of logic. a major problem with speculative logic resides in its inappropriate— or at least insufficient—treatment of existence. Kierkegaard had a critical attitude toward another aspect of speculative logic as well: the assumption that there is movement in logic. on this matter, he did go to Aristotle to find support for his views, but not his logic; it is Aristotle’s physics that impacted Kierkegaard’s development of a counterposition to the hegelian view. to put it simply, it seems that Kierkegaard accepted heiberg’s hegel-inspired critique of aristotelian logic; but at the same time, he used aristotelian physics in his critique of Hegel’s logic. This simplified description enables one to see an intrinsic problem in Kierkegaard’s struggles with speculative logic, namely, how concepts relate to reality. the concept/reality discussion comes up in the danish debate about mediation as well, more precisely in relation to the identity principle. also on this point Kierkegaard was exposed to arguments against Hegel’s identification of concept and being. These arguments were primarily put forth by mynster, but Kierkegaard seems to ignore

organon and metaphysics IV

5

mynster’s position while adopting patterns of thought that mynster argued against. it seems, however, that Kierkegaard became considerably more critical of this aspect of speculative philosophy after having read Friedrich adolf trendelenburg (1802– 72) in 1845, and thus he was also influenced by a new interpretation of Aristotelian logic. We refer the reader to the article in this publication series on trendelenburg for a follow-up discussion of this point.1 I. The First Principles of Logic in Aristotle’s Works originating from aristotle’s discussions in Metaphysics iv, traditional logic operates with three basic principles. according to aristotle, the law of contradiction is the firmest of these.2 in its best-known formulation, it reads: “the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.”3 the law of contradiction resists direct demonstration, aristotle claims; instead, he argues that any claim against its validity can be reduced ad absurdum. it is commonly agreed that in the phrase “cannot belong to the same subject,” there is a tacit reference to a version of the second basic principle of logic, namely, the principle of identity. indeed, according to leibniz, the law of contradiction is even identical to the principle of identity. another famous identity principle—leibniz’s own principle of the identity of indiscernibles—states that two objects are identical if and only if they share the same set of properties. this principle is commonly taken to presuppose the law of contradiction since it assumes a notion of distinction. a well-known formulation of the third basic law of logic, the law of excluded middle, states that “there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories.”4 Following Hegel, in Kierkegaard’s time the expression “either/or” was used as an abbreviated form of the law of excluded middle. For aristotle contradictory opposition is exclusively related to predications (that is, statements, which he takes as subject–predicate combinations), since only predications can have truth values.5 terms like good and bad or black and white can never be contradictory, even though they can be opposed in a contrary fashion.6 aristotle points out several times that unlike the law of contradiction, which applies both to contradictory and contrary opposition, the law of excluded middle applies See Darío González, “Trendelenburg: An Ally against Speculation” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6) pp. 309–34. 2 the principle is often called the law of non-contradiction. We shall follow the terminology in Kierkegaard’s sources and refer to it as the law of contradiction. 3 aristotle, Metaphysics, iv 3, 1005b 19–20. 4 aristotle, Metaphysics, iv, 7, 1011b 23–24. 5 see, for example, Categories, 13b 2–12. 6 in Categories, 12a17–25 aristotle elaborates on what medieval commentators called mediate vs. immediate contraries, see also Metaphysics, X, 4, 1055b 2: “nothing can exist between two contradictories, but something may exist between contraries.” In the Prior Analytics, I, 46, 51b 5–10 Aristotle points out that “to be this” is not the negation of “to be not-this,” but rather the negation of “not to be this.” 1

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only to contradictory opposition, and hence only to predications. A term like “just” is, for instance, not opposed in contradictory manner to the negative term “not-just,” since a subject can possess neither of these properties.7 it is important to note that this crucial distinction was not observed by many commentators in the nineteenth century and in particular not in the Copenhagen debate about the law of excluded middle that we address in the next section. an interesting question related to the fundamental laws of logic is whether they are principles of ontology or semantics. this is not clear in aristotle, and both the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle are treated semantically as well as ontologically in Metaphysics iv.8 it is interesting to note that these nuances were not observed by the commentators that Kierkegaard read, even though these same commentators were heavily involved in debates about this issue, as we will see. in general, the distinction between ontology and semantics was not then conceived in the way it is today, and this can explain why they did not address, or observe, these ambiguities in aristotle. the three principles have been disputed and criticized throughout the history of philosophy, starting with aristotle himself. in a famous passage in On Interpretation, he addresses future contingencies in relation to the proposition “there will be a sea-battle tomorrow.” The proposition is problematic, Aristotle notes, because an assumption to the effect that it has a truth value today seems to imply a form of determinism, that is, that there can be no unactualized possibilities. such a conclusion is, as aristotle is quick to note, a problem both for his own metaphysical views about possibilities and for the common-sense notion that some things are up to us. aristotle’s own position has been disputed since ancient times. What has not been disputed is that epicurus, in order to retain the doctrine of free will, suggested that statements about the future do not have any truth value at all. as we shall see this solution was addressed by Kierkegaard’s teacher and friend poul martin møller (1794–1838) and further commented on by Kierkegaard. II. The Danish Debate about Mediation in Brief Outline it is well known that the aristotelian principles were questioned by hegel and his followers. it is less well known that these questions were also subject to debate in denmark while Kierkegaard was still a student, and that the debate had a deep impact on him. it is fair to say that this debate is the key to understanding Kierkegaard’s use of logical terms. it was opened in 1838 by Frederik Christian sibbern, who had been professor of philosophy at Copenhagen university since 1813, in an article entitled “on the manner in Which the law of Contradiction is treated in the hegelian School.”9 With reference to hegel’s critique of logical principles, sibbern here gives an account of hegel’s dialectical method in Aristotelian terms: aristotle, On Interpretation, 19b 24–25. a semantical formulation of the law of contradiction is: “opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time” (Metaphysics, iv, 6, 1011b 13–20). 9 Frederik Christian sibbern, “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole, med mere, som henhører til de logiske Grundbetragtninger,” 7 8

organon and metaphysics IV

7

the universal validity of the law of contradiction for thought should be evident to anyone who sees what it actually aims at. the law of contradiction is simply the law of consistency, and therefore, here in denmark, treschow long ago referred to it as the law of harmony. all thinking must render full homage to the law of consistency in a way that this law is an all-encompassing, universally valid law for thought. hegel, however, suggests that there are opposites everywhere which emerge in the form of a kind of contradiction, from which the positing of opposite assumptions, that is, selfcontradictions, seems to result. according to hegel, there are always things of this kind which can be dissolved and which thought should work towards dissolving. But to assume that such contradictions can always be dissolved in consistent and sustained thinking and demand that they should be, is eo ipso to argue for the law of contradiction.10

on sibbern’s account, the law of contradiction plays a fundamental role for hegel since it underlies his dialectics. it is by virtue of the law of contradiction that one can discover and subsequently sublate opposite propositions; it is by virtue of the law of contradiction that the dialectical process maintains internal consistency. sibbern gives credit to what he calls Hegel’s “second kind of law of contradiction,” by which he has “recognized that there is a ground of unity to which they must be led back and in which the contradictions are dissolved.” But this, Sibbern argues, is in harmony with aristotle’s law of contradiction: “hereby the so-called law of contradiction is actually recognized according to its genuine meaning.”11 in 1839 the debate was extended to theological issues, triggered by a statement of Johan alfred Bornemann (1813–90), namely that “[i]n theology both rationalism and supernaturalism are antiquated standpoints which belong to a time which has disappeared.”12 the claim offended the highly respected Bishop of zealand, Jakob peter mynster. he responded with an article simply entitled “rationalism, Supernaturalism,” in which he proposes strict definitions of the two notions. It is characteristic of rationalism to reject “the necessity and the actuality of a revelation as communication from God to man carried out in a supernatural manner.”13 By

Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, no. 19, 1838, pp. 424–60. (english translation: “on the manner in Which the law of Contradiction is treated in the hegelian school, among other things Which Are Relevant for the Basic Considerations of Logic,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, ed. and trans. by Jon stewart, Copenhagen: museum tusculanum press 2009 (Texts from Golden Age Denmark, vol. 5), pp. 47–56.) 10 sibbern, “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole,” p. 425. 11 ibid., p. 430. 12 Johan alfred Bornemann, “af martensen: de autonomia conscientiae. Sui humanae,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, p. 3. (english translation: “review of De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae, in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, pp. 57–91.) 13 Jakob Peter Mynster, “Rationalisme, Supranaturalisme,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 266–7, see p. 266 (reprinted in Jakob peter mynster, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, ed. by J.h. paulli, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 95–115; Kierkegaard owned vols. 1–3, ASKB 358–363). (English translation: “Rationalism, Supernaturalism,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, pp. 93–110.)

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contrast, “supernaturalism grounds itself in precisely such a revelation.”14 Far from being antiquated, mynster argues, the two views are effective in distinguishing between contemporary positions in theology, a claim which he seeks to demonstrate by classifying prominent contemporary colleagues in germany according to the rationalist/supernaturalist distinction. But mynster was not content with this. he also argues that two contradictory positions cannot both be antiquated at the same time, concluding with a reference to the law of excluded middle: “Aut, aut; one can mediate between opposites but not between contradictions. Every basic scientific theory must decide for the one or the other of the mutually contradictory opposing views.”15 mynster’s argument can clearly be criticized on its own terms. For even though we assume that one, and only one, of two contradictory statements is true, it is easy to come up with statements from theology that only antiquated scientific theories address at all (the eternal fate of those who died while still infants was, for example, heavily disputed in the seventeenth century, but not today. Would it not be fair today to refer to theories that seriously address this question as antiquated?). mynster seems to be unaware of the fact that scientific theories are limited in scope, and that on most issues they do not take a stand. the criticisms that were promptly raised against mynster’s claims go along these lines, in effect arguing that the way mynster sets up the opposition between rationalism and supernaturalism is a result of an antiquated view. Critique of mynster appeared in the next issue of the journal, written by two spokesmen for hegel’s philosophy in Copenhagen, Johan ludvig heiberg and hans Lassen Martensen. Heiberg, one of the main intellectual figures at that time, was the one who introduced hegel to danish readers, and in this article he uses the occasion to respond to both sibbern and mynster.16 martensen, who was just about to become professor of theology at the time, was in a sense the main source of the theological part of the dispute because Bornemann’s statement occurred in a review of martensen’s dissertation. in his response,17 he takes a historical and immanent perspective on central concepts of theology, including the notions of rationalism and ibid. ibid. 16 Johan ludvig heiberg, “en logisk Bemærkning i anledning af h.h. hr. Biskop dr. mynsters afhandling om rationalisme og supranaturalisme i forrige hefte af dette Tidsskrift,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 441–56. (reprinted in Johan ludvig heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 2, pp. 167–90.) (english translation: “a remark on logic in reference to the right reverend Bishop dr. mynster’s treatise on rationalism and supernaturalism in the previous number of this Journal,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, pp. 111–25.) 17 hans lassen martensen, “rationalisme, supranaturalisme og principium exclusi medii i anledning af h.h. Biskop mynsters afhandling herom i dette tidsskrifts forrige Hefte,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 456–73. (english translation: “rationalism, supernaturalism and the principium exclusi medii. (in reference to his right Reverend Bishop Mynster’s Treatise on this Subject in the Previous Number of this Journal),” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, pp. 127–43.) 14 15

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supernaturalism, thereby effectively ignoring Mynster’s definitions. Martensen also pays considerable attention to the doctrine of the incarnation, thereby adding further theological content to the dispute. in 1842 mynster repeats his previous claims and defends them by exposing the aristotelian principles in minute detail and with scholarly skill.18 Heiberg’s article specifically addresses logical principles and is worth looking at in some detail. A reader trained in modern philosophical logic will most likely find it rather odd. rather than arguing that the law of contradiction and the law of excluded middle are fallacious, heiberg’s point is that they have limited scope and application. Following the triad from hegel’s logic, he argues that the aristotelian principles play no role at the level of immediacy or at the level of the Concept. it is, heiberg argues, particularly imperative to exclude the law of excluded middle from “the Idea,” for it is the ability to mediate oppositions that paves the way for philosophical insight and explanation. granting the law of excluded middle unrestricted validity would, in particular, undermine the doctrine of the incarnation. aristotelian principles have some application at the intermediate level of reflection, but the examples are trivial and are not of scientific interest. According to Heiberg, Mynster can apply the law of excluded middle in his argument because he “posits a limit” by means of his definitions, and does so precisely in order to block mediation. The definition of the two theological positions enables him to remain at the level of reflection, which Heiberg also calls the “empirical standpoint of finitude”: one can adopt this standpoint for everything; one can always posit a limit and find oneself inside or outside of it. When such a limit is posited between rationalism and supernaturalism, they could not be mediated, and the principium exclusi medii becomes valid. But this is no more than a tautology, specifically: if one has reduced an opposition to the standpoint at which it cannot be mediated, then it cannot be mediated. this standpoint is the empirical standpoint of finitude. Reduced to this standpoint, the laws of contradiction and exclusion are correct, but their validity is so clearly limited that it is no longer worth the trouble of keeping them as independent laws since their content can be expressed far better and more clearly with other words.19

it should be noted that when heiberg approves of the principle for the empirical sphere, he deviates from hegel. also note that on heiberg’s account, traditional logic— including Aristotelian principles—can only produce “tautologies.” Tautologies are not to be confused with inferences, and they have nothing to do with logic, that is, Hegelian logic. heiberg’s article is hard to read due to various uses of negation, as is evident in the following statements: all the subject’s predicates, with the sole exception of a, belong under not a, but included among them, along with countless other oppositions to a, is that upon which it here Jakob Peter Mynster, “Om de logiske Principer,” Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, vol. 7, 1842, pp. 325–52. (Reprinted as “Om de logiske Principer,” in Mynster’s Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–6, ed. by J.h. paulli, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–57, vol. 2, pp. 116–44.) (English translation, “On the Laws of Logic,” in Mynster’s “Rationalism, Supernaturalism” and the Debate about Mediation, pp. 155–80.) 19 Heiberg, “En logisk Bemærkning,” p. 448. 18

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depends, namely, the direct, negative a, which is not a κατ᾽ εξοχην [par excellence] and therefore is not unifiable with A. It is thus only this direct opposite which can be claimed a priori as unmediated by A, but it is itself the opposition of reflection of plus and minus.20

heiberg uses the image of a rose to illustrate his notions, observing that the rose is both red and fragrant. Since the two properties are distinct, “fragrance” is, according to Heiberg, “not “redness,” and “redness” is “not fragrance.” The direct opposite of being “red” is being “not red.” The “plus and minus” is Hegelian jargon, and refers to opposites of reflection. In his critique of the Aristotelian principles, Heiberg makes no effort to distinguish these notions of negation. a rose, for instance, is both red and not red (not red because it is fragrant), a point which heiberg even takes to undermine the law of contradiction. at other places he admits that the law of contradiction holds for “direct opposites.” the debate between heiberg and martensen, on the one hand, and mynster and sibbern, on the other, is more about words than content. it is about what words such as “logic,” “negation,” “contradiction,” and “mediation” mean. It is clear that when heiberg wants to limit the scope of the law of contradiction, his underlying notion of negation is different from aristotle’s, a point which mynster is quick to make in a passage from his 1842 article: [W]e must note that those who would rather confuse thought with alternate meanings than accept a term in the sense in which it is obviously used, might seize on an ambiguity in our expression “not A.” Not A can also mean everything which is not = A and is not one and the same with it, that is, every predicate which is either more general or more narrow than the concept A. Thus, the rose is not = the red color; if we then designate the rose with a, then the red color is not a. since the rose is indeed red, we could, to this extent, derive the confused proposition that a is not a....When we use the expression “not A” in the law of contradiction, it should be absolutely clear that we do not intend to designate what is different from a in one or another respect, but what strives against and cannot coexist with a.21

mynster concludes the debate by appealing yet again to the law of excluded middle: “We could not on both sides be right: aut/aut.”22 this, then, is an outline of the contemporary debate on mediation. that the debate had an influence on Kierkegaard has been known since at least 1915 when victor Kuhr pointed it out.23 Kuhr suggests that Kierkegaard’s “either/or” can be traced back to Mynster’s first article, and he is primarily focused on its application in Either/Or. it is implicit in Kuhr’s essay that heiberg is a target, and that Kierkegaard used the debate primarily to sharpen his critique of the hegelians. the assumption

20 21 22 23

1915.

ibid., pp. 446–7. Mynster, “Om de logiske Principer,” pp. 333–4. ibid., p. 343. victor Kuhr, Modsigelsens Grundsætning, Copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal

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that Kierkegaard took mynster’s side is also made by later commentators.24 this view has been modified by Jon Stewart, but even he argues that Kierkegaard’s use of the law of excluded middle squares with sibbern’s and mynster’s views.25 in what follows, we will argue for an interpretation that by and large follows stewart, but which in some respects is more opposed to the traditional view than stewart. III. Climacus’ Comments on the Debate in the postscript in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard lets his pseudonym Climacus review the debate we have just outlined.26 Borrowing expressions from heiberg, he summarizes the hegelian critique of “the kind of thinkers who remained in the sphere of understanding and reflection and who have therefore insisted that there is an either/or,”27 adding that “Bishop mynster has more than once become a defeated standpoint.” Climacus then offers a solution, which we quote at some length: hegel is perfectly and absolutely right in maintaining that, looked at eternally, sub specie aeterni, there is no aut/aut in the language of abstraction, in pure thought and in pure being. Where the devil would it be, since abstraction, after all, simply removes the contradiction; therefore hegel and the hegelians should instead take the trouble to explain what is meant by the masquerade of getting contradiction, movement, transition etc. into logic. the defenders of aut/aut are in the wrong if they push their way into the territory of pure thinking and want to defend their cause there....on the other hand, hegel is just as much in the wrong when he, forgetting the abstraction, plunges from it down into existence in order by hook and crook to cancel [hæve] the double aut. it is impossible to do this in existence, because then he sublates [hæver] existence also. if i take existence away (if i abstract), there is no aut/aut; if i take it away in existence, this means that i take existence away, but then i do not sublate [hæve] it in existence.28

We find two sorts of criticisms of Hegelian logic in this passage. The first is related to a notion like movement. Kierkegaard addressed this point in more detail in the “Interlude” of Philosophical Fragments. the second criticism is related to his claim to the effect that hegel cancels the law of excluded middle—also at the level of existence.29 this point is important for Kierkegaard, and we shall discuss it further below. see, for example, thulstrup’s commentary in the third edition (SV3) of Søren Kierkegaard Samlede Værker, ed. by peter p. rohde, vols. 1–20, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1962–64, vol. 10, p. 291–2. 25 see Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new York and Camrbridge: Cambridge university press 2003, p. 195. 26 Pap. vi B 54, 4. 27 SKS 7, 277 / CUP1, 304–5. 28 SKS 7, 278 / CUP1, 304–5. (Translation slightly modified.) 29 the paragraph just quoted makes this point explicit right from the beginning: “that the language of abstraction really does not allow the difficulty of existence and of the existing person to come up, i shall illustrate with regard to a crucial issue about which so much is spoken and written,” SKS 7, 277 / CUP1, 304. 24

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meanwhile, note that the passage also contains partial approval of speculative logic. it opens by expressing support for hegel’s claim to the effect that the law of excluded middle does not apply in “pure thought.” This should be read in conjunction with the critique of the “defenders of aut/aut,” that is, Sibbern and Mynster, who “push their way into the territory of pure thinking.” In light of the historical background of the debate, this criticism has far-reaching consequences. there is a striking similarity in form between Climacus’ argument and heiberg’s argument, quoted in the previous section. Both argue that the law of excluded middle has a limited scope, and that the law of excluded middle is sublated at the level of the Concept. We find the same structure also in the second part of Either/Or, where Judge William is clear on what properly belongs to the level of the Concept: “the spheres with which philosophy properly has to deal, the spheres proper to thought, are logic, nature, and history. here necessity rules, and therefore mediation has its validity.”30 If we neglect the details concerning what belongs in “the sphere of logic,” William’s position is in agreement with that of heiberg. one can certainly argue that Kierkegaard’s conception of the proper use of mediation is narrower than heiberg’s, but even if these differences can be quite substantial, they are not important from the point of view of aristotelian logic. Kierkegaard argued for a sphere which is not governed by Aristotle’s first principles, and in doing so he dismissed the aristotelian tradition of logic. obvious as it may seem, the lesson we can draw from the debate may cause surprise since it stands in radical contrast with statements and presuppositions sometimes found in the secondary literature. moreover, had Kierkegaard wanted to use aristotelian principles against hegel, as some commentators have it, we would expect to find traces of Mynster’s criticism in his texts. But the support for mynster’s position is only conditional, and what we find, rather, is Heiberg’s arguments modified to meet the objectives of the Postscript. in fact, Climacus deliberately uses heiberg’s line of argument against sibbern and Mynster when he claims that “they push their way into the territory of pure thinking.” so perhaps it is not the cliché that is true, but rather its direct opposite, namely, that Kierkegaard adopts hegel’s (or rather, heiberg’s) arguments against aristotle. one consequence of our interpretation is that one must be careful about associating “negation” in Kierkegaard’s writings with the classical Aristotelian use of “negation.” One ought to be careful simply because such usage is inconsistent with claims that can be found in Kierkegaard’s texts. an inspection of his use of the term “contradiction” confirms this suspicion. When, for instance, Climacus writes about “the contradiction of existence [Tilværelsens Modsigelse]” in Philosophical Fragments,31 he uses Hegelian language to refer to a kind of “meaningful opposition.” there are several examples of this usage in Kierkegaard’s texts; another well-known example is found in Practice in Christianity, where Christ is described as “the sign of contradiction.”32 let us now return to the passage from the Postscript and examine Climacus’ attempts to guard the “difficulty of existence” against solutions based on the 30 31 32

SKS 3, 170 / EO2, 174. SKS 4, 219 / PF, 10. SKS 12, 129–32 / PC, 124–7.

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dialectical method. this is a central point for Kierkegaard that relates to the way he made use of the term “either/or” at the beginning of his authorship. Already in the summer of 1839 we find this term used in a journal entry dealing with the debate. this entry is also interesting because it was recorded after sibbern’s and mynster’s first articles had been published, but before Heiberg and Martensen had replied. This is part of what he writes: all relative contrasts can be mediated; we do not really need hegel for this, inasmuch as the ancients point out that they can be distinguished. personality will for all eternity protest against the idea that absolute contrasts can be mediated (and this protest is incommensurable with the assertion of mediation); for all eternity it will repeat its immortal dilemma: to be or not to be—that is the question (hamlet).33

Note that it is “personality” that protests against violations of the logical principle. the protest is not based on the force of the arguments given by mynster and sibbern; as we have seen, their arguments—contrary to those of heiberg—are almost absent from Kierkegaard’s writings. that the protest is “incommensurable with the assertion of mediation” is consistent with the point he later makes in the Postscript: that the sphere of existence is different from the sphere of “pure thought.” The law of contradiction finds its proper application in relation to the dilemmas of life, to situations that confront us with irrevocable choices. this is a major theme of Either/ Or, which we shall address in the next section. There has been some focus in the secondary literature on the significance of the title Either/Or. any contemporary reader in Copenhagen with knowledge of the debate would obviously relate the title of Kierkegaard’s book to the debate. Both Kuhr and Stewart seem to agree that the title signifies support for Sibbern and Mynster.34 this conclusion seems at the outset reasonable, since both sibbern and mynster claimed universal validity for the law of excluded middle. But, as we just have seen, Kierkegaard understands something else by the law of excluded middle than sibbern and mynster, and on Kierkegaard’s heiberg-inspired account the point is that the law is not universally valid: the law holds in the realm of human existence, but not in the realm of pure thought. moreover, heiberg and martensen also used the phrase “either/or” during the debate, with an understanding of the expression which is much closer to that of Kierkegaard’s pseudonym: so the term “either/or” does not in itself signify support for the sibbern/mynster camp. it seems more likely that Kierkegaard did not select the title to signal support for sibbern and mynster, but to point to the sphere of reality where the law of excluded middle, according to Kierkegaard, indeed has absolute validity. this interpretation squares with Climacus’ review of Either/Or in the Postscript, where he says that the title of the book is indicative of its central message and that its content is an “indirect polemic against speculative thought, which is indifferent to existence.”35

33 34 35

SKS, 18, 34–5, ee:93 / KJN 2, 30. see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 194–5. SKS 7, 229 / CUP1, 252.

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IV. either/or and the Law of Excluded Middle The “either/or” is instrumental for distinguishing the position of the aesthete from that of Judge William. according to Judge William, the aesthete relates to the future in the same way that (speculative) philosophy relates to the past. in doing so the aesthete is indifferent to the grand choices in life. This argument fits perfectly within the conceptual pattern from the Postscript discussed in the previous section, that is, that the sphere of existence is distinguished from the sphere of “pure thought,” and that “the law of contradiction” applies only within the former sphere. Throughout Either/Or, the aesthete is criticized for attempting to apply speculative logic to his own existence. Consider this example: You are situated in the area of action, philosophy in the area of contemplation. as soon as it is to be moved into the area of practice, it must arrive at the same conclusion as you do, even though it does not express it in the same way. You mediate the contradictions in a higher lunacy, philosophy in a higher unity. You turn toward the future, for action is essentially future tense; you say: i can either do this or that, but whichever i do is equally absurd—ergo, i do nothing at all.36

The attitude to which the judge refers is explicitly formulated in the “Diapsalmata” (at the beginning of Either/Or) in an “ecstatic discourse” entitled “Either/Or.” Here the aesthete applies the law of excluded middle in precisely the way the judge describes: “marry, you will regret it. do not marry, and you will also regret it. Marry, or do not marry, you will regret it either way,” et cetera.37 the aesthete hereby recommends that one should refrain from making decisions, which is precisely what Judge William accuses him of. As he states, “the aesthetic is the indifferent” while “the ethical constitutes the choice.”38 in Either/Or, Kierkegaard’s puts the “law of contradiction” to use in the form of a set of choices that have an “either/or” character. Clearly, Kierkegaard thus takes the “either/or” entirely out of its context in the debate about mediation and uses it for his own purposes. in fact, Kierkegaard’s use of the term differs from its meaning in the debate in two respects. First, the “either/or” in the debate is always associated with the law of excluded middle. there are certainly a number of examples from Either/Or where the set of options span all logical possibilities, in which case one could say that a form of the law of excluded middle is applied. But there are also examples where all Kierkegaard needs to say is that the options of choice are mutually incompatible. second, while the debate targets the proper meaning and application of the logical laws for thought (or logic), Kierkegaard applies them in real life situations. For Kierkegaard, the either/or designates a life dilemma which can only be resolved through decision. Kierkegaard might have found inspiration for his use of the “either/or” by reading sibbern’s article in the debate. sibbern here suggests that the law of excluded middle should be called “the law of decision” or “determination”: 36 37 38

SKS 3, 166 / EO2, 170. SKS 2, 47 / EO1, 38. SKS 3, 165 / EO2, 169.

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thus, i call the proposition “the law of determination,” which states that every “question” must ultimately be reduced to a “yes” or a “no” or to something “decided,” which is thus established according to a decision between its being-established and its not-beingestablished.39

Following aristotle, sibbern argues for the law of excluded middle by means of the bivalence principle, that is, that every proposition is either true or false. But since sibbern phrases his point in discursive terms, and even psychological terms, his argument resembles the one Kierkegaard is now known for: by taking action, one of the disjuncts of the “either/or” becomes true.40 We have now come to a point where we can summarize two ways Kierkegaard uses the arguments from the danish debate about mediation. First, he seems to generally accept heiberg’s argument, which allows only limited applicability for logical principles. this shows that when Kierkegaard uses logical terms, they should be understood primarily in a hegelian context. second, he takes either/or, the abbreviated form of the law of excluded middle, out of context and applies it to situations of choice, to which one can respond by making a decision or refraining from doing so. V. The Law of Contradiction in the Fragments the context in which Kierkegaard appeals to the law of excluded middle is arguably different from the context in which it was introduced by aristotle. there is, however, a reference to the law of contradiction in Philosophical Fragments which ties the danish debate about the law of excluded middle to aristotle: Basically, an unshakable insistence upon the absolute and absolute distinctions is precisely what makes a good dialectician. this is something that we in our day have completely disregarded by canceling and in canceling [ophæve] the principle of contradiction, without perceiving what aristotle indeed emphasized, that the thesis that the principle of contradiction is canceled is based upon the principle of contradiction, since otherwise the opposite thesis, that it is not canceled, is equally true.41

the argument, taken from Metaphysics iv, is close to sibbern’s terminology. employed in this way, it does support the sibbern/mynster camp. Climacus makes his point in order to stress the value of clear-cut distinctions, a point also stressed by sibbern and mynster. this does not square well with what Kierkegaard writes, via Climacus’ pen, in the Postscript. aristotle’s arguments which Kierkegaard renders in the Fragments can be used against heiberg’s position, as mynster does, and since Kierkegaard elsewhere accepts the pattern of heiberg’s argument there seems to be a tension in sibbern, “om den maade, hvorpaa Contradictionsprincipet behandles i den hegelske Skole,” pp. 431–2. 40 For further discussion of the relationship between Either/Or and the debate about mediation, see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 184–209. 41 SKS 4, 304–5 / PF, 108–9. 39

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Kierkegaard’s writing. But observe that in the quotation above, Kierkegaard makes use of the law of contradiction in the way it is intended to be used, quite contrary to the way he applies the law of excluded middle in Either/Or and in the Postscript. it is perhaps unsurprising that Kierkegaard was not bothered by the fact that he uses the logical principles in entirely different ways; after all, he seems not to care much about the details of the mediation debate. his rather sloppy reference to the law of excluded middle as “the law of contradiction” points in the same direction, given that both sibbern and mynster were pedantically accurate in their references to the respective principles. however, Kierkegaard was by no means the only author lacking precision; poul martin møller also shared Kierkegaard’s terminology on this point.42 one could perhaps argue that Philosophical Fragments, both in form and structure, lends itself to aristotelian logic and mynster’s use of it. the book is composed as a dichotomy with respect to a human being’s possibilities for obtaining “eternal happiness.” Position A is linked to Socrates and assumes that “the moment is decisive.” Position B is defined by classically negating position A (“otherwise...”). the very structure of Philosophical Fragments is thus a classical dilemma, based on the basic principles of aristotelian logic which holds that one and only one of two complementary positions is true. the contemporary reader with knowledge of the aforementioned dispute would readily associate the a and B positions with the main positions in mynster’s article from 1839 (that is, rationalism and supernaturalism), and recall his appeal to the law of excluded middle. since there is a direct reference to the law of contradiction in Philosophical Fragments, it is tempting to read this as an argument which holds that the two positions are distinct and exhaustive.43 against this view one could argue that the above quotation makes a case for the significance of distinctions, which is a fairly general point. It is not linked directly to the specific distinction between the A and B positions. Moreover, the Fragments is discussed in the Postscript with no reference to logical principles. so it seems rather that Kierkegaard was aware of aristotle’s argument in favor of the law of contradiction and accepted the argument in its proper context, though he still felt free to refer to the law of excluded middle as “the law of contradiction” in an entirely different context (that is, in the presence of choices) and for a different purpose. Kierkegaard was not accurate in his use of logical terminology, but this squares quite well with the way he used his sources in general. VI. Truth and Modal Categories not only do the modal categories of necessity, possibility, and actuality, and the related notion of sentential or propositional truth, play a role in a number of Kierkegaard’s writings, they are also closely connected to the logical principles under discussion. We see, for an example, the quotation from møller’s “lectures on the history of ancient Philosophy” in Section VI below. 43 For a discussion of this idea, see arild Waaler and Christian Fink tolstrup, “Philosophical Fragments—in Response to the Debate between Mynster and Martensen,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2004, pp. 208–34. 42

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will take a condensed and illuminating passage from the “Interlude” of Philosophical Fragments as the point of departure for our discussion of Kierkegaard’s conception and use of these notions in the first part of his authorship.44 at the beginning of the “Interlude” Kierkegaard’s pseudonym defines change as a transition from possibility to actuality, and just as he is about to address freedom, his next key notion, he takes an aside with the following remark: possibility and actuality are not different in essence but in being. how could there be formed from this heterogeneity a unity that would be necessity, which is not a qualification of being but of essence, since the essence of the necessary is to be. in such a case, possibility and actuality...would become the one and only thing that precludes coming into existence, which is just as impossible as it is self-contradictory. (the aristotelian sentence: “It is possible,” “It is possible not,” “It is not possible.” —The doctrine of true and false sentences (Epicurus) confuses the issue here, since it reflects on essence, not on being, with the result that nothing is achieved along that path with regard to determination of the future [Bestemmelsen af det Tilkommende].)45

the passage starts with an argument against Kant, but in the subsequent parenthesis, aristotle seems to be the target. it raises several questions of interpretation. Why does he take up semantic questions in the midst of an argument that is clearly devoted to ontological concepts? an argument of epicurus, related to determinism, is said to be confusing here; why is this so, in this particular context, and why does he comment on epicurus at all? Kierkegaard’s reason for making this aside about aristotle is very likely that he followed the exposition of aristotle in poul martin møller’s “lectures on the history of Ancient Philosophy.”46 Commenting on the famous sea-battle paragraph, møller states that aristotle argues against determinism, “expressly ascribing reality to the contingent,” because otherwise “the forthcoming [det Tilkommende] would have had no possibility by which it could become actual.”47 møller then directly turns from “Book 9” to “Book 12” of On Interpretation, and comments on modal principles: Thus he [sc. Aristotle] says in his reflections on the relation between the possible, the actual and the necessary that the proposition “it is possible” is not the contradiction of “it is possible not” but rather to “it is not possible.” For everything that is possible is also possible not. he arrives at this view by inquiring into the right way to apply the principle of contradiction to the forthcoming. When i say about the forthcoming “that this or that is,” is the proposition I am expressing true or false? If it is true, it seems necessary that it will occur (Cajus will fall in the battle). such propositions are said to be true or not Come argues that Kierkegaard’s conception of modal categories changes after the Postscript; cf. arnold B. Come, Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, montreal: inter editions 1991. 45 SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74. 46 Poul Martin Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 275–527 (ASKB 1574– 1576). 47 ibid., p. 473. 44

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Håvard Løkke and Arild Waaler true: they are true when it [that is, what they express] occurs, and not true when it does not occur. Both options are possible, but the forthcoming is not altogether necessary. something can be true without being necessary and false without being impossible. the same also underlies a distinction that aristotle draws between two kinds of possibility [det Muelige]. he arrives at this by asking himself whether the following inference is valid: everything that is necessary is possible; the possible can be or not be; thus, the necessary can be or can not be. this unacceptable result forces him to distinguish between one kind of possibility that can turn out either way, and one kind that is co-extensive with necessity. one kind of possibility can thus be or not be. everything that is necessary is actual [virkeligt], but not everything that is possible, is actual.48

The passage is strikingly similar to the line of argument in the “Interlude.” Even though Climacus is occupied with change—and for this reason has no need to address the interplay of modality and negation—it is likely that Kierkegaard’s reliance on Møller leads him to question part of Aristotle’s theory. Climacus finds Aristotle guilty of a category mistake: “[h]is mistake is to begin with the thesis that everything necessary is possible...since the possible cannot be predicated of the necessary.” 49 here, instead of arguing against aristotle directly, Climacus is drawing the consequences of the two-layered metaphysic presented in the preceding paragraphs. according to Climacus, there is a dichotomy between two spheres of existence. in itself an essence possesses a particular kind of idealized being. since essences possess this being of necessity, they are referred to as “the necessary.” On the other hand, in reality an essence has one of two modes or ways of existence: either as possibility or as actuality. Climacus takes aristotle to confuse these two spheres when arguing from necessity to possibility.50 note that Kierkegaard makes no effort to interpret aristotle based on aristotle’s own assumptions; instead, he rather dogmatically states that necessity belongs to a sphere different from that of possibility and actuality, and that it is thus incommensurable to both of them. he could have attempted to relate essence to its definition in terms of necessary (that is, essential) properties. This would have made the link to aristotle’s discussion much tighter. the criticism of epicurus is rooted in the same idea, that is, that epicurus does not properly observe the distinction between essence and being. By referring to Epicurus, the discussion of determinism related to the sea-battle finds its way into the “Interlude.” By rejecting Epicurus’ theory of “true and false propositions,”51 Climacus in effect denies that determinism follows from “the law of contradiction,” that is, from the assumption that every statement about the future has a truth value.52 The argument is, Climacus claims, fallacious “since it reflects on essence, not on being.”53 ibid., pp. 472–3. SKS 4, 275 / PF, 75. 50 Cf. aristotle, On Interpretation, 13, 22b 11. 51 SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74. 52 SKS 19, 392, not13:23: “epicurus has already sublated [hævet] the law of contradiction.” This remark is made in relation to § 169 and § 170 of the Theodicy, where leibniz discusses future contingents. 53 SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74. 48 49

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this is a tricky passage to interpret. the sea-battle argument is about truth conditions for statements about the future. Does this not imply a reflection on being rather than essence? not according to Climacus. note, incidentally, that later in the “Interlude,” Climacus states that to believe “the truth of the past” is a matter of cognition “which involves essence, not being.” So the truth of the past is a matter of essence and not being. This clarifies what is stated in the quoted parenthesis from the “Interlude,” but it does not seem to bring us any closer to what is meant. to see what Kierkegaard had in mind, we must now recall that he operates entirely within a hegelian/heibergian perspective. according to this view, the law of contradiction is not a principle of semantics, but expresses a highly constrained “way of thinking.” Moreover, the language is different; there is of course no guarantee that Kierkegaard is using the terms in their original meaning, and if he does not, we can easily be misled. But another comment on the sea-battle argument by Kierkegaard seems to indicate that he is indeed adopting the conceptual pattern from heiberg. in this entry, Kierkegaard links the argument from bivalence to determinism to Chrysippus: “it is really extraordinary that Chrysippus uses the statement, ‘every statement is either true or false,’ to prove that everything happens according to fate. Here the idea of mediation seems to be necessary in order to find a providence.”54 the remark about mediation in this context seems to mean that Kierkegaard simply did not catch the point of the argument, and that the reason for this was his preoccupation with the hegelian tradition of logic. needless to say, Climacus’ criticism of the argument from bivalence completely misses møller’s point in his discussion of aristotle’s sea-battle passage. But it shows yet again that Kierkegaard adopts a hegelian approach to the language of traditional logic, and that he does not seem to notice that his use of the terms of logic is different from the use made by, say, aristotle. or maybe he did notice. the following journal entry suggests that he was not entirely content with the treatment that he had provided, and that a proper treatment must account for the relationship between logic and ontology: “very likely what our age needs most to illuminate the relationship between logic and ontology is an examination of the concepts: possibility, actuality, and necessity. it is hoped, meanwhile, that the person who would do something along this line would be influenced by the Greeks.”55 Kierkegaard’s remark that “the idea of mediation seems to be necessary in order to find a providence,” along with the remark that the truth of the past belongs to its essence, seems to indicate that in his view there is a close relation between mediation and essences, that is, between logic and ontology. We shall find further support for this observation in the next section. VII. The Principle of Identity and Kierkegaard’s Metaphysics the principle of identity is seldom directly addressed in Kierkegaard’s writing, but two journal entries illuminate his understanding of the principle. here we recognize SKS 19, 398, not13:30 / JP 2, 1242. the journal entry points to the source: “see Tennemann, IV, p. 272”: that is, Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: Johann ambrosius Barth 1798–1819 (ASKB 815–826). 55 Pap. vi B 54, 19, p. 150 / JP 1, 199. 54

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Kierkegaard’s general conception of logical principles. these passages not only stress that the “law of contradiction” pertains to existence, but they also show that the dichotomy between being and essence that is so fundamental to Kierkegaard’s metaphysics also shapes his conception of identity. it is especially interesting that Kierkegaard here offers an explanation of how he conceives the relationship between essence and mediation. here again, Kierkegaard is somewhat sloppy with terms: he does not distinguish between “the identity principle” and “the principle of unity.” The identity principle is, he claims, “in a sense higher than, is foundation for, the principle of contradiction.”56 the identity principle sublates the law of contradiction, precisely because, on Kierkegaard’s account, it applies to a higher level of abstraction: that the principle of unity has sublated [ophævet] the principle of contradiction can be said only in the same sense as pythagoras taught that one is not a number. One is prior to discrimination and counting begins first with discrimination. Unity is prior to contradiction, and existence [Tilværelsen] first begins with contradiction.57

He quotes Zeno here: “the one is not among those things that are.”58 this is yet another remark that links the identity principle to essences. again, this is reminiscent of the general hegelian pattern put forth by heiberg. this time it is not primarily heiberg’s article that is central, but his Speculative Logic. In the section on “Essence” Heiberg addresses quality and quantity. Here he states that “when these [that is, quality and quantity] are transferred into the sphere of reflection and regarded as absolute moments of essence, then quality becomes identity and quantity becomes difference.”59 note the similarity between heiberg’s duality of identity and difference, and Kierkegaard’s duality of unity and discrimination that we saw in the passage from JJ:68 quoted above. this observation seems to imply that, for Kierkegaard, the identity principle pertains to quality, that is, essence, while difference gives rise to “contradictions.” It seems that Kierkegaard is in a debate with heiberg about identity, as he is with so many other concepts, and that they agree on key distinctions. they do, however, disagree about epistemology, a point which we shall address below. in the other key journal entry about identity, Kierkegaard relates his conception of the identity principle to reasoning and dialectics: But the principle of identity is simply the limit of human thinking; it is like...the line the draftsman calls the base—the main thing is the drawing. so long as i live in time, the principle of identity is just an abstraction. therefore, in no way is it easier to delude SKS 18, 223, JJ:261 / KJN 2, 204. SKS 18, 161, JJ:68 / KJN 2, 149. 58 ibid. 59 Johan ludvig heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1832, p. 40. (english translation, Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic. Guide to Lectures at the Royal Military College, in Heiberg’s Speculative Logic and Other Texts, ed. and trans. by Jon stewart, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2006 (Texts from Golden Age Denmark, vol. 2), p. 95.) 56 57

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oneself and others into believing that one is thinking the identity of everything, than by ignoring the difference.60

note the image of the drawing: the base line is something that fundamentally shapes the drawing without itself being visible in the final result. This is an image of the essence. Then note that the principle is called “the limit of human thought,” an expression that should be carefully observed.61 how can a principle be a limit? this is probably just a case of notational sloppiness. it is likely that Kierkegaard wanted to say that the identity principle applies only in the limit and that he had leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles in mind. according to this principle, a thing is identified with its total set of properties, and Kierkegaard seems to claim that this identity principle only comes to application in the limit case where all properties have been determined. Then note that Kierkegaard writes “human thought” where he had written “unity” in JJ:68. This seems to suggest that concept and essence for Kierkegaard are very closely intertwined. at this point it is tempting to read this passage with an eye to sibbern, especially his Logic as a Doctrine of Thought from 1835, a work which exercised a profound influence in philosophical circles in Copenhagen. In his section on the identity principle, which he takes to be the “first and highest principle,” he emphasizes its double role as an objective principle (“a thing is what it is”) and a subjective principle: “a thing must be posited to be what it is known [or perceived, erkjendt] to be.”62 in the latter form, Sibbern refers to it as “the principle of certainty.”63 as a fundamental underlying assumption, sibbern also emphasizes that “everything is related to everything,” and hence that one must “exceed the thing in itself” and investigate the relationships in which it participates in the system as a whole.64 the underlying and ubiquitous assumption in sibbern’s work is concept realism; this is evident in the following expressions: “What thought seeks everywhere is unity, context and ground, and to penetrate to the essence of things.”65 likewise, “by a thing’s essence we mean the same as the thing’s concept in its objective sense. the concept reveals itself such that it can be followed and developed in its inner consistency.”66 in his polemic against hegel, sibbern claims that hegel in fact uses the principle when he develops the idea of movement in logic, but that he unfortunately fails to observe it. sibbern thinks highly of hegel, and despite strong differences in expression, sibbern is related to heiberg in his view of realism and knowledge. Kierkegaard’s SKS 18, 223, JJ:261 / KJN 2, 204. also note SKS 18, 223, JJ:261 / KJN 2, 204: “identity can never be terminus a quo but is terminus ad quem; one constantly arrives only at it, namely, by abstraction.” (Translation slightly modified.) 62 Frederik Christian sibbern, Logik som Tænkelære, Anden forøgede og forbedrede Udgave, Copenhagen: Forfatterens Forlag 1835, p. 300: “Enhver Ting maa sættes at være, hvad den erkjendes at være.” 63 ibid. 64 ibid., pp. 300–2. 65 ibid., p. 27. 66 ibid., p. 90. 60 61

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reflections on the identity principle convey a critique of these assumptions. By viewing the identity principle as a limit he criticizes an overly optimistic attitude towards obtaining knowledge by means of logic. “on the one side i have eternal truth, on the other side manifold existence, which human beings as such cannot penetrate, for then we would have to be consistent. the uniting link is therefore belief [Troen].”67 this criticism is related to Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the sorites paradox, which stresses the difficulty of inferring quality from quantity, and Kierkegaard’s solution to it in terms of “the leap.”68 expanding on points from Either/Or, Kierkegaard also formulates another criticism directed against contemporary hegelians, namely, that human existence disappears in the abstractions of thought. he concludes that the identity principle has no practical application for the existing individual: “in identity i am beyond time. suicide is therefore the only ethical consequence of the principle of the identity adhered to in time...as long as I live, I live in contradiction, for life is contradiction.”69 note the similarity to the pattern in the Postscript, addressed in section iii above. it is interesting to compare Kierkegaard’s statements about identity with mynster’s, not least because some have argued that Kierkegaard relies on mynster’s arguments in the debate about mediation. on comparison, one recognizes immediately that mynster’s line of thought about identity is sharply different from Kierkegaard’s. mynster explicitly warns against the treatment of identity that we find in Kierkegaard: if, for example, we consider the formula introduced by leibniz, reimarus, sibbern and many others, “Everything is what it is” or “A is what A is,” the proposition is certainly correct, but the law of identity has entered a restless stream of change and will soon be obliged to struggle against the waves...After an infinitely short time has elapsed, quicker than one can even say this proposition, A is no longer the same A, but is already modified and changed.70

in mynster’s view the identity principle is something that pertains primarily to language, and it should therefore not be confused with the flux of being. Educated in a Kantian tradition, he does not share sibbern’s realism. it is also striking that he uses the sorites to emphasize the point he is making: “if we gradually remove them [the grains of a pile] one by one, the thing can still be said to be there until finally so much has been removed that we are compelled to admit the thing has disappeared or that in actuality there is no longer anything which corresponds to the concept of the thing.”71 Mynster’s point is that the properties of things are in a continuous flux and are therefore difficult to fix. Note that Kierkegaard puts the sorites to a directly opposite use, that is, to argue that a new quality cannot be determined on the basis of quantity measures. SKS 18, 223, JJ:261 / KJN 2, 204. Cf. SKS 18, 225, JJ:266 / KJN 2, 206. Cf. also gonzález, “trendelenburg: an ally against Speculation.” 69 SKS 18, 223, JJ:261 / KJN 2, 204. 70 Mynster, “Om de logiske Principer,” p. 329. 71 ibid., p. 330. 67 68

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to summarize, Kierkegaard adopted the structure of heiberg’s exposition of logical principles, accepting their limited application. however, according to Kierkegaard, the existential dimension can only be accommodated at the level where the law of excluded middle applies, and it applies in the form of an either/or that sets forth possible courses of action. Kierkegaard is primarily interested in a practical use of the principles, stressing situations in which they apply to real life. The influence from Aristotle is arguably both indirect and complex since Heiberg argues against aristotle, and Kierkegaard applies the law of excluded middle in a way analogous to its aristotelian application. But even though Kierkegaard was familiar with a detailed exposition of the basic laws of aristotelian logic and a thorough exposition of hegel’s method, he still insisted on using heiberg’s hegelinspired language. By contrast, the law of contradiction is applied in Philosophical Fragments in a way that is congenial to its use in traditional logic, and Kierkegaard does not seem to notice the tension this creates. Kierkegaard’s reflections on the principle of identity fit neatly into the patterns he uses when commenting on the “law of contradiction.” For Kierkegaard, identity is related to essence, which cannot be fully comprehended unless one is omniscient. he responds to heiberg, stays within his general pattern of thought—which is strongly related to sibbern’s—and adopts heiberg’s hegelian-inspired language. and in doing so he seems to virtually ignore mynster.

Physics and Metaphysics: Change, modal Categories, and agency håvard løkke and arild Waaler

At first glance it may seem that Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy is of little significance for the interpretation of Kierkegaard’s texts. after all, the texts in which Kierkegaard refers or alludes to aristotelian doctrines are relatively few, and they belong to the first period of his authorship. Moreover, it may seem that these few references are easily accommodated, since Kierkegaard as a rule is careful to point out when he adopts aristotelian notions. these prima facie assessments are unfortunate, but still rather widespread. There is a general tendency among commentators to only briefly observe the Aristotelian influences, and if one delves into the matter further, one usually goes to Aristotle’s own texts for clarification. this, however, is naive. Kierkegaard’s knowledge of aristotle’s own texts was superficial, as he confirms in a note from 1844–45,1 and his understanding of aristotle seems to have been formed almost exclusively by secondary sources. these sources are now well documented in the commentaries in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. But often, it seems, Kierkegaard did not read these sources very carefully, either.2 Thus, in order to give a sound assessment of the Aristotelian influence, we must start with Kierkegaard’s own concerns and only from this starting point inquire into what reasons he had for taking an interest in a particular aristotelian view, as this was presented in the sources. this source-sensitive approach is especially important since the interpretations of Aristotle that influenced Kierkegaard differ at some points from the way aristotle is usually read today. in this article we shall focus on a set of Aristotelian metaphysical ideas that we believe influenced Kierkegaard in his writings up to and including the Postscript period.3 Kierkegaard’s struggle with hegelian logic constituted the background of his encounter with aristotle. By and large it also determined which of aristotle’s metaphysical ideas he took notice of and used. this is especially clear with respect SKS 18, 231, JJ:288 / KJN 2, 212. For a case in point, see arild Waaler, “aristotle, leibniz and the modal Categories in the interlude of the Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1998, pp. 278–9. 3 our approach to Kierkegaard’s use of aristotle during this period is strictly thematic. this means that we are not going to comment on Kierkegaard’s use of various greek expressions that may well have an origin in aristotelian logic and metaphysics, but which in his texts seem to be just figures of speech. Examples of such cases are κατὰ δύναμιν and μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. 1 2

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to Kierkegaard’s critique of the hegelians’ appeal to movement in logic. perhaps the clearest evidence in the pseudonymous writings that aristotle came to be seen as a welcome alternative to the current vogue, is vigilius haufniensis’ remark in The Concept of Anxiety that “when aristotle says that the transition from possibility to actuality is a κίνησις [movement], it is not to be understood logically but with reference to historical freedom.”4 so Kierkegaard seems to have found in aristotle a philosopher who discusses change, possibility, actuality, and freedom as real phenomena, the sort of phenomena that occur in life as we live it. this assessment was doubtless influenced by Kierkegaard’s admiration of the Greeks, since he found in them a “sobriety [that] is seldom found in the philosophers of our day.”5 But we shall see that he also found confirmation of this overall assessment in some of his sources. Kierkegaard’s main sources for aristotle’s metaphysics seem to have been two introductory expositions. one was by his teacher poul martin møller (1794–1838), who was professor of philosophy at the university of Copenhagen from 1830 until his premature death. in winter semester 1833–34 and 1834–35 he gave a series of lectures at the university that Kierkegaard presumably attended and which were published posthumously under the title “lectures on the history of ancient Philosophy.”6 It has been argued that Møller influenced Kierkegaard profoundly and in many respects.7 For our purpose it is important to bear in mind that in his dedication to møller in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard characterizes him as, among other things, “the interpreter of Aristotle.” Møller seems to have made use of aristotle in various ways in his own work. among other things, he began a translation of aristotle’s De Anima into danish. But it is likely that Kierkegaard regarded him as interpreter of Aristotle mainly in virtue of his “Lectures,” where the exposition of aristotle takes up 49 pages. Kierkegaard’s other main source for aristotle was Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann’s (1761–1819) influential History of Philosophy. Kierkegaard’s reliance on tennemann is well documented since he took notes while reading this work, and some of these shed light on his understanding of aristotelian doctrines. But while møller seems to have influenced Kierkegaard’s understanding of Aristotle in a general sense, giving him an overall impression of what sort of a thinker aristotle was, tennemann’s influence seems to have been more as a provider of reliable information on more specific points of doctrine. Kierkegaard could have done much worse than use tennemann as a source of information; most of the 313 pages he writes about aristotle contain level-headed expositions, although his section on metaphysics is vitiated by Kantian-inspired qualms about the very possibility of being the sort of SKS 4, 385, note / CA, 82, note. Pap. vi B 54 / JP 1, 199. 6 P.M. Møller in “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen and Christen thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 275–527 (ASKB 1574– 1576). 7 For a brief survey of and references to the literature, see Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new York and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 74–7. 4 5

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realist aristotle was.8 It seems to us that Kierkegaard was less influenced by the other expositions of aristotle’s theoretical philosophy that were in his library. We will thus turn to møller and tennemann in order to trace and assess the Aristotelian influence. But we will also spend much time discussing Kierkegaard’s own texts. This we do because the Aristotelian influence is not always easy to detect. often Kierkegaard makes clear that he is using aristotelian notions without specifying how he is using them. and sometimes he does not even make clear that he is using aristotelian ideas. so in order to be able to trace where Kierkegaard got his understanding of Aristotle from, we must first clarify what his understanding is, and this often requires a close reading of Kierkegaard’s own texts. the texts we will mainly focus on are the “Interlude” between Chapters 4 and 5 of the Philosophical Fragments, and parts of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, especially from Chapters 3 and 4. since the terrain ahead is rather compact, it is useful to start with a general assessment of Kierkegaard’s use of aristotelian metaphysical notions. We believe it is fair to say that his views are congenial to aristotle’s on a conceptual level, but different on the level at which the concepts get applied. To be a bit more specific, we see Kierkegaard as influenced by the Aristotle he knew from his sources in conceptualizing change in terms of possibility, actuality, essence, agent and aim. But it is no less true that Kierkegaard is moving away from anything recognizably aristotelian as soon as it suits his purpose to do so. We will detail this general assessment in four steps. First, we look at Kierkegaard’s conception of change in section i. here we argue that Kierkegaard in effect turns aristotle’s notion of change on its head by regarding essences as subjects of change, and we suggest that Møller may have influenced Kierkegaard to do this. Then, in Section II, we discuss the notions in terms of which change is defined, namely, possibility and actuality, which we discuss together with necessity. here we argue that Kierkegaard has an ontological understanding of the modal categories, and again we look to Møller for influence. Finally, we turn to Kierkegaard’s use of another aristotelian concept, namely, the unmoved mover. here we argue that Kierkegaard is like aristotle in regarding the unmoved mover as both the agent and the aim of Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–12, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 3, pp. 17–330 (ASKB 815–826). hegel severely criticized tennemann’s treatment of ancient philosophy in general and of aristotle in particular. he writes that “what is old is easily overthrown by something else more familiar to us, and where tennemann comes across such he is almost useless. in aristotle, for instance, the misinterpretation is so great, that tennemann foists upon him what is directly opposite to his beliefs, and thus from the adaptation of the opposite to what tennemann asserts to be aristotle’s opinion, a correct idea of aristotelian philosophy is arrived at. [all philosophers are presented as having] one defect, which is not to be Kantian philosophers and not yet to have sought the source of knowledge” (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, trans. by e.s. haldane, lincoln and london: university of nebraska press 1995, vol. 1, p. 113). it is true that tennemann’s treatment of aristotle’s metaphysics is muddled by Kantian presuppositions, but his interpretations of aristotle’s physics is more nuanced, and this is the part of tennemann’s work that Kierkegaard seems to mainly rely on for information about aristotle’s notion of change. 8

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all change, but, again, differs from aristotle in his application of this conceptual analysis, by understanding both the agent and the aim in his own way. to make the argument easier to follow, we discuss divine agency in section iii and human agency in section iv. I. Kierkegaard and Aristotle on Change Kierkegaard was much concerned with the phenomenon of change, and he associated it with aristotle.9 it is unclear whether Kierkegaard was aware of the fact that aristotle’s interest in change arises out of a situation that in many respects is similar to his own. For aristotle’s concern with the notion of change owes much to the fact that some of his predecessors, for example, parmenides and zeno, had argued against the common-sense view that change is what everybody assumes it is, that is, a real phenomenon.10 in any case, Kierkegaard is certainly entitled to see aristotle as a philosopher who regards change as something that occurs in reality. Kierkegaard begins Johannes Climacus’ discussion of change in the “Interlude” of the Philosophical Fragments by drawing a distinction between “the change of coming into existence”11 and “all other change,” which he calls “ἀλλοίωσις.”12 he next characterizes coming into existence by saying that “that which comes into existence...in itself remain[s] unchanged in the change of coming into existence.” to explain what he means by this paradoxical statement Climacus says that the change of coming into existence is not a change “in essence” (“i Væsen”), but a change “in being” (“i Væren”), that is, as he specifies, a change “from not existing to existing.”13 and to explain how that which does not exist can yet be said to be something, he characterizes the change of coming into existence in terms of the modal categories possibility and actuality: “such a being that nevertheless is a nonbeing is possibility, and a being that is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and see, for example, SKS 4, 385, note / CA, 82, note. SKS 7, 284 / CUP1, 312. SKS 19, 395, not13:27. SKS 19, 420, not13:55. 10 this is pointed out by tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 116. For evidence that Kierkegaard knew about the eleatic challenge, see, for example, SKS 19, 426–7, not14:1. SKS 4, 9 / R, 131. 11 SKS 4, 273 / PF, 73. “The change of coming into existence” is Tilblivelsens Forandring in Danish. “Change” (Forandring) is Kierkegaard’s translation of the Greek term κίνησις, a translation that he takes to be favored by tennemann (SKS 19, 395, not13:27). 12 this distinction is problematic. We suggest an interpretation towards the end of the section. here we may ask a terminological question, namely, why Kierkegaard uses the greek noun ἀλλοίωσις for “all other change.” He knew that for Aristotle, ἀλλοίωσις refers to change of quality only (SKS 19, 420, not13:55). perhaps we can understand Kierkegaard’s sloppiness on this point if we observe that he writes, in the very same journal entry: “aristotle says: that πάθος is the quality according to which it is possible to be changed (ἀλλοιοῦσθαι).” Kierkegaard thus associates ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (i.e., being changed in the sense of suffering ἀλλοίωσις) with passivity (i.e., being subject to an affection, a πάθος). this contrasts with “the change of coming into existence,” which, as we shall see, is associated with agency. 13 SKS 4, 273 / PF, 73. Note that the expressions translated into English as “being” and “existing” are very similar in Danish, namely Væren and at være til, respectively. 9

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the change of coming into existence is the transition from possibility to actuality.”14 this seems to be Kierkegaard’s most detailed philosophical exposition of what it is he understands by change. It leaves much to be explained. Let us first see how he may have been influenced by the sources he is likely to have used. The definition quoted above is not expressly attributed to Aristotle, but the learned readers that Kierkegaard addressed would probably have recognized it as aristotle’s definition of κίνησις in Physics 3.1. What aristotle here says is that “change is the actuality [ἡ ἐντελέχεια] of that which is potentially [τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος], in so far as it is potentially” (201a 10–11). But Kierkegaard’s main source seems to have been tennemann’s paraphrase of aristotle, which runs thus: since possibility and actuality can be distinguished in each thing, change in general is the actuality [die Wirklichkeit] of the possible, in so far as it is. that is, each thing can be thought of as possible and as actual, and it is actual when it has gone over [ist übergegangen] from possibility to actuality. the transition [der Übergang], then, from possibility to actuality is change (κίνησις). one would express this more accurately if one said: change, movement is the actualization [die Wirklichmachung] of the possible, in so far as it is possible. For he [sc. aristotle] uses the expressions ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, both of which mean actuality as well as activity through which something becomes actual...and in the end he decides in favor of the latter.15

tennemann is unclear on a key point, namely, whether change is an event or a process. on the one hand, he interprets the ἐντελέχεια in Aristotle’s definition as “actualization” and “activity,” both of which it seems natural to understand as a process. On the other hand, he introduces a term that is not in Aristotle’s definition, namely, “transition,” which it seems natural to understand as an event. Kierkegaard seems to take change to refer primarily to events. not only does he, like tennemann, define change as a transition, but also he will shortly speak of “the moment” at which the possible “becomes actual,” a moment that annihilates all the possibilities that had existed up until the transition, not only the ones that do not become actual, but also the one that does. so Kierkegaard seems to understand the change of coming into existence as a momentary transition, at least when the coming into existence represents a qualitative change.16 already this is a narrowing down of aristotle’s notion; for tennemann seems to be right in saying that aristotle takes change to

SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, pp. 126–7. (all translations from tennemann are by the authors.) 16 We say this because Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety says that “in the sphere of historical freedom, transition is a state. however, in order to understand this correctly, one must not forget that the new is brought about through the leap. if this is not maintained, the transition will have a quantitative preponderance over the elasticity of the leap” (SKS 4, 388 / CA, 85). it seems that quantitative changes and states are somehow associated with “the sphere of historical freedom,” while qualitative changes and leaps, that is, momentary changes, are associated with the introduction of “the new.” See Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, p. 410, for a brief discussion. 14 15

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refer mainly to processes in which something becomes actual.17 in any case, what happens at the moment of transition, according to Kierkegaard, is that something, for which it has so far been possible to be something, comes to actually be what it was possible for it to be. this leads to another point that is unclear in Kierkegaard, namely, what it is that turns from possible to actual being. on this point, tennemann is clear, and true to aristotle. as he says in the passage just quoted, all change involves a thing’s turning from possible to actual being; here by “thing” (“Ding”) he clearly means a physical object. this applies even to what aristotle calls substantial change, that is, the change of coming to be or passing away. to use one of aristotle’s examples, when unripe corn ripens it comes to be mature corn; the object that at first had the potential for becoming corn later turns into actual corn.18 thus, aristotle’s view is that the subject of change is always a physical object, and tennemann records this view correctly. however, this seems not to be Kierkegaard’s view. as we have seen, he characterizes the change of coming into existence by saying that that which changes, remains in itself unchanged. this cannot apply to physical objects. For instance, unripe corn that ripens does not remain unripe corn. so it seems clear that Kierkegaard cannot be referring to physical objects as the subjects of coming into existence. What then is he referring to? surprisingly, perhaps, his point seems to be that in a case of coming into existence, what happens is that an essence changes. so while aristotle held (as tennemann rightly saw) that it is physical objects that change, Kierkegaard holds that in coming into existence, it is essences that change from possible to actual being. this is such a drastic change of aristotle’s view that it is fair to say that Kierkegaard in effect turns aristotle’s notion of change on its head. this turning around of aristotle has two important consequences. First, we should bear in mind that, as Climacus says in the “Interlude,” an essence does not change “in itself,” and that the change of coming into existence is a change “in being,” that is, a change from “not existing to existing.” To make sense of these expressions it seems we must assume that essences change their way of being from possibility to actuality when they become instantiated in objects. thus, even if Climacus does not expressly say this, we shall attribute to Kierkegaard the view that coming into existence amounts to essences becoming instantiated in objects, thus changing their being from possibility to actuality. the second main consequence is that since essences do not cause themselves to become instantiated in objects, Kierkegaard must have had a different conception than aristotle had of what it is that causes the coming into existence. aristotle’s conception of change in general is based on the conviction that there are particular concrete substances, each of which is not only a subject of change, but also has in itself the source of change. this internal nature is the immediate cause of each natural object striving towards the actualization of its potential. Kierkegaard must have known this view, for example, from tennemann, who writes that “nature see now sarah Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, oxford: Clarendon press 1982, pp. 95–114. 18 see aristotle, Metaphysics, 5.7, 1017b 2–9. 17

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[according to aristotle] is the original, inherent principle in an object of all changes, or activities, coming from this object.”19 But, on the other hand, Kierkegaard cannot hold that the change of coming into existence is caused by essences: for they do not have a source of change in themselves. nor, it seems, can he hold that the coming into existence is caused by the object in which the essence gets instantiated. so what is it that causes the change of coming into existence? it seems that all coming into existence, according to Kierkegaard, requires an agent other than the subject of change, an agent that causes an essence to be instantiated in an object. this, we shall argue, is what Climacus refers to in the “Interlude” of the Philosophical Fragments as a “freely acting cause” (“en fritvirkende Aarsag”).20 We have so far argued that Kierkegaard’s turning of aristotle on his head, making essences the subjects of coming into existence, implies two other views to which it seems Kierkegaard must also be committed, namely (1) that the change from possibility to actuality occurs when essences are instantiated in objects, and (2) that this instantiation always requires an agent other than the subject of change. in general, we may sum up our results so far by saying that Kierkegaard’s upsidedown understanding of aristotle’s notion of change amounts to him downplaying the notion of substance and emphasizing the notion of agency. What could have influenced Kierkegaard to understand Aristotle in this way? We have seen that tennemann is true to aristotle, and Kierkegaard notes while reading him both that matter plays a significant role in Aristotle’s account, and that “four kinds of causes are given: matter, form and model, the effective cause, and purpose.”21 (For the fourth cause, Kierkegaard is using the german term, “Endzweck.”) But Kierkegaard’s understanding of aristotle also seems to owe much to poul martin Møller, where we do find an interpretation of Aristotle’s metaphysics that is similar to Kierkegaard’s in relevant respects. The first thing to observe in Møller’s treatment is that he has a restrictive use of “cause.” He says that “in regard to all physical, perceptible objects, Aristotle distinguishes 4 main concepts (‘grounds’), namely: (1) matter; (2) form; (3) the efficient cause (τὸ αἴτιον) that gives form to objects; (4) the purpose (τέλος) to which the cause strives.”22 møller is here talking about what aristotle himself calls the four causes, but he restricts the label “cause” to the so-called “efficient cause,” in fact, referring to it both in greek and danish as “the cause.” Møller then turns to discuss aristotle’s notions of matter and form before he returns to the notion of efficient cause, which he details thus: But how does the matter come to have form? all beings consist of matter and form, but how are these two elements combined; how does that which exists as ability become actual? this transition from possibility to actuality aristotle calls movement (κίνησις), and he believes that he has thereby removed the difficulties arising from determining this concept: movement is both actual and not actual, since it is transition from possibility to actuality. 19 20 21 22

tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 111. SKS 4, 275–6 / PF, 75–6. SKS 19, 395, not13:27. Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 478.

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Here Møller refers to Aristotle’s definition of change in connection with his own interpretation of how change must be brought about through an agent. møller’s argument seems to be that since matter as such has no characteristics at all, and since form must be assumed not to aim at being instantiated in matter on its own account, there would not have been any physical objects unless an agent brought these unrelated elements together. But there are physical objects. thus, the coming to be of physical objects must be caused by an agent combining matter and form. this argument is true to aristotle in one respect that Kierkegaard seems to discard, namely, in assigning a key role to matter. But the upshot of møller’s exposition is that there is no change without an external agent. he says this expressly a few pages after the passage just quoted: “the form is brought forth by an external cause.”24 this interpretation is at best a narrowed down version of aristotle’s view. to see what this narrowing down amounts to, we may look at Kierkegaard’s use of the term “plan” in the “Interlude.” It has been argued that Kierkegaard took the term “plan” from Møller, for whom it means “form.”25 this seems to be right, but is not entirely accurate. For Møller uses “plan” in order to distinguish between form as involved in natural causation and form as involved in artificial causation. The latter sort of case he paraphrases by talking about the form as an artist’s plan in creating something, for instance, the plan in a sculptor’s mind when he is making a hermes statue out of a block of stone, as aristotle would have said. We see this when møller says that “all existence has a rational aim; not only that which happens according to plan and deliberation, but also that which is brought forth by natural causes.”26 But then Møller also blurs the distinction between artificial and natural causation. For instance, at one point he says in so many words that “[n]ature is an artist.”27 so when he says that “the form is brought forth by an external cause,” he may be taken to speak not only about artificial causation (in which case Aristotle would agree), but also about natural causation (in which case he would not). For after all, møller has shortly before emphasized in general terms the role played by the efficient cause in aristotle’s theory of change.

ibid., p. 481. it is interesting to compare tennemann’s treatment of the same subject. He says that form and matter become unified because, “form and matter are one and the same, the latter that which can be designated ‘the possible object,’ the former designating ‘the actual object’ ” (Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 233). note that nothing is said here about the efficient cause. 24 Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 483. 25 arild Waaler, “aristotle, leibniz and the modal Categories in the interlude of the Fragments,” pp. 277–8. 26 Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 482. 27 ibid., p. 489. again, tennemann is more careful in his treatment of aristotle’s analogy between nature and art. he says that “there occurs in nature exactly the same relation as in the performing of an art...Nature is like a doctor who cures himself” (Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 124). the latter is aristotle’s own illustration in the Physics. 23

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this goes some way towards explaining how Kierkegaard can take himself to be following Aristotle when he places as strong an emphasis on the efficient cause as he does. As the very use of the term “plan” seems to testify, he was influenced by Møller and this, we argue, in such a way as to attribute to Aristotle the view that the efficient cause is the cause of coming to be. This fits with his understanding of Aristotle in that it allows him to downplay the importance of substance and emphasize the need for an agent in order for anything to come into existence. We believe it is fair to say that Kierkegaard found in møller an understanding of change, possibility, and agency that is more in line with aristotle’s notion of artificial causation than with his notion of natural causation. in fact, there is a sense in which Kierkegaard’s purpose seems best served by focusing on the sort of change that, according to aristotle, is brought about in the arts. For at least with respect to human agency, the changes that Kierkegaard seems to be mainly interested in are arguably the ones that shape one’s own life. We can illustrate the parallel with Aristotle’s notion of artificial cause as follows. Just as Aristotle conceives of a sculptor (or the sculptor’s plan) as the efficient cause of bringing out the potential in a block of stone by choosing to cut off some parts and keep others, so Kierkegaard seems to conceive of an existing person as the cause of turning possibilities into actuality by making decisions. But Kierkegaard’s focus on artificial causation and the efficient cause is more than just a biased rendition of aristotle. it also fails to square with tennemann’s exposition, which, as we have seen, underscores both the conception of κίνησις as a process and the significance of natural causation. And the discrepancy with tennemann’s text goes even deeper. For Kierkegaard’s whole focus on κίνησις as a coming into existence is directly opposed to what we find in Tennemann, who explicitly writes that “the arising [Entstehen] and passing away [Vergehen] of a thing is thus not a change.”28 in Kierkegaard’s words, this means that, according to tennemann, coming into existence is not a κίνησις while enduring existence is. so we should ask how Kierkegaard could possibly have taken tennemann as an inspiration for a theory of κίνησις that is directly incompatible with tennemann’s rendition of aristotle. the answer seems to be that Kierkegaard misread the above-cited passage from tennemann. For he read “Bestehen” rather than “Entstehen,” writing in his journal that “enduring existence [Bestaaen] and passing away are not κίνησις.”29 in other words, Kierkegaard seems to have learnt from tennemann that, according to aristotle, κίνησις is the change of coming into and going out of existence, while enduring existence is not a κίνησις! From this we can draw the obvious conclusion that Kierkegaard did not spend much time reading tennemann, since otherwise his misreading would have quickly been corrected by other statements in tennemann’s text. a plausible explanation for the misreading seems to be that Kierkegaard at the time of reading tennemann was already preoccupied with a conception of change as coming into existence, a conception he had probably formed by reading møller. But the misreading also sheds light on Kierkegaard’s neglect of aristotle’s notion of tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 129: “Daher ist das Entstehen und Vergehen eines Dinges keine Veränderung.” 29 SKS 19, 395, not13:27. 28

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natural causation. For it suggests that Kierkegaard did not see natural causation as falling under the concept of κίνησις that he develops in the “Interlude,” regarding “the coming into existence of nature” rather as something else.30 so it seems that Kierkegaard simply did not view the ripening of corn as a κίνησις at all, or rather that he viewed it as the sort of κίνησις called ἀλλοίωσις.31 to sum up, Kierkegaard’s notion of change differs from aristotle’s in three main respects: (1) he is concerned only with momentary change; (2) the subject of change is the essences that become actual by being instantiated in objects; (3) all instantiating of essences requires an external agent, which, according to Aristotle, applies only to artificial causation. These are, by any standard, significant differences. nevertheless, one would be entitled to call Kierkegaard’s notion of change “Aristotelian,” especially if one bears in mind the fact that contemporary hegelians applied the notion of change mainly to logic. We shall in what follows elaborate on each of the three points of difference, as just outlined. Let us first turn to the following subject. II. The Possible, the Actual, and the Necessary in the aristotelian tradition the use of the modal notions are stubbornly ambiguous between what we may call a semantic and an ontological sense; sometimes they refer to statements, and at other times they refer to what these statements represent. For example, by saying of something that it is possible, one can mean that a statement p is possibly true, or one can mean that a state of affairs is possibly real. aristotle himself can move easily between the semantic and the ontological sense. For instance, in the course of one and the same argument he can say both that the statement “he is standing” could be true and that a man who is sitting could be standing.32 in the latter sort of case, we may prefer to use “potential” or “capable” instead of “possible,” saying of a man who sits that he has the potential for standing, or that he is capable of standing. But far from drawing a clear-cut distinction between these senses, aristotle uses interchangeably such expressions as ἡ δύναμις (“potentiality/possibility”), τò δυνάμει ὄν (“that which is potentially/possibly”), and τὸ δυνατόν (“the potential/ possible”). aristotle also distinguishes between two kinds of properties: the essential ones that always and necessarily belong to a subject, and the accidental ones that from time to time and possibly belong to a subject. Here we may prefer to use “contingently” instead of “possibly.” Aristotle has a term, “τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον,” whose meaning is close to “the contingent”: literally it means “that which admits [of both being and not being].”33 But again he does not strictly observe this terminology. as Kierkegaard SKS 4, 276 / PF, 76: “the coming into existence that is here shared with the coming into existence of nature is a possibility, a possibility that for nature is its whole actuality.” Cf. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, pp. 126–7: “change...is the actuality of the possible.” (“Die Veränderung ist...die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen.”) 31 see note 13 above. 32 see aristotle, On the Heavens, i.12, passim. 33 see, for example, aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, ii.2, 731b 24–5. 30

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complains (see below), aristotle sometimes speaks as if the possible is included among the necessary, while he at other times distinguishes between the necessary and the non-necessary, that is, the contingent. thus, we may conclude that aristotle may be aware of the difference between what we call a semantic and an ontological use of the modal notions, but that he does not observe a clear-cut distinction between them. What then about Kierkegaard? assuming that he regards essences as having real being, we think it is fair to say that he uses the modal notions primarily in the ontological sense, that is, in order to characterize the sort of being essences have. In this section we first give a brief outline of Kierkegaard’s use of the modal notions, and then fill in the details on each point. First, Climacus gives a telling characterization of the necessary when he says that it is “always related to itself and is related to itself in the same way.”34 By this he seems to mean that essences belong to their own sphere of reality, a sphere in which there is no change and everything holds of necessity. Further, to the extent essences are instantiated in objects, Kierkegaard’s view is that an essence’s way of being can be either possible or actual. to understand what he means by this, we must bear in mind (1) that there is no instantiation of essences without an agent, or so Kierkegaard seems to think, and (2) that agents can relate to essences in different ways. as long as an agent is just entertaining an idea in a non-committed way, the essences they are thinking about remain possibilities; this, according to Kierkegaard is to relate to essences aesthetically or intellectually. But as soon as an agent decides to instantiate essences, they relate to them ethically or religiously. that, at least, is the overall picture we shall present. let us turn now to the details. First, the necessary. Climacus asks in the “Interlude”: “Can the necessary come into existence?” This question follows naturally from the fact that essences are the subjects of coming into existence. For essences are necessary beings, and it may seem to follow that the necessary, too, comes into existence. But it does not, for essences do not “in themselves” come into existence; they just change their way of being. underlying Kierkegaard’s line of thought is a general assumption to the effect that there are two spheres of reality; one in which there are essences that necessarily are, another in which things either are or are not. and since that which belongs to the former sphere is, only that which belongs to the latter sphere comes into existence and passes away. this assumption is expressed thus: “possibility and actuality are not different in essence but in being. how could there be formed from this heterogeneity a unity that would be necessity, which is not a qualification of being but of essence, since the essence of the necessary is to be...the actual is no more necessary than the possible, for the necessary is absolutely different from both.”35 this is an ontological view about how the world is, but it is a view that has implications for how modal terms are to be used. the distinction seems to be the same as the one Judge William draws in Either/Or between the sphere of thought and necessity, on the one hand, and the sphere of freedom and contingency, on the other, the “either/or” pertaining only to the latter.36 and earlier in the Fragments, Climacus 34 35 36

SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74. SKS 4, 274 / PF, 74–5. SKS 3, 166ff. / EO2, 170ff.

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draws what seems to be the same distinction when he says that “the hamlet dialectic, to be or not to be, applies to factual being...it is quite true that ideally speaking the situation is different. But as soon as I speak ideally about being, I am speaking no longer about being but about essence. the necessary has the highest ideality; therefore it is. But this being is its essence.”37 This distinction between “ideal” and “factual” being can be regarded as a distinction between two incommensurable spheres of reality, as long as one bears in mind that the two spheres are intertwined; not only do essences have being (albeit of an entirely different sort) just as much as any fly has; flies and other objects can also instantiate essences. But what is important for our purpose is that essences are instantiated in objects only in the sphere of freedom and contingency, with necessity having nothing to do with it. however, the isolation of necessity is a bit of a secondary issue for Kierkegaard and is important mainly for polemical reasons. his main interest is with possibility and actuality and the transition from one to the other. We have argued that Kierkegaard is talking about the possibility essences have of coming to have actual being by becoming instantiated in objects by an agent. We should now try to get clearer about how he applied this upside-down aristotelian conceptual scheme and what reasons he had for understanding these aristotelian notions in the way he does. For this purpose we may turn to a passage in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that picks up the more abstract discussion from the “Interlude” of the Philosophical Fragments. Just as in the “Interlude,” Climacus is here eager to assign necessity to its own sphere. But he is also much more specific than he was in the “Interlude” about what he means by actuality and possibility. In the first place, he characterizes actuality by saying that “[f]or the existing person, existing is for him his highest interest, and his interestedness in existing is his actuality...actuality is an inter-esse between thinking and being in the hypothetical unity of abstraction.”38 in contrast to actuality in existence, he maintains that the abstract conception of actuality is “a false rendition, since the medium is not actuality but possibility.”39 to understand what this means, we must bear in mind that, just like change, actuality was a category in hegelian systems of logic.40 This logical use of “actuality” is a misuse, according to Kierkegaard, because actuality essentially involves an element of contingency, while logic deals merely with the realm of necessity. By relating to actualities as objects of thought, philosophers get a “false rendition” of what actuality is, simply because “the medium” they use is “possibility,” that is, thought rather than existence. Kierkegaard seems to have had a settled understanding of actuality as an existential category, which made him disappointed with how the term was used in contemporary philosophy and which may well have been one of his reasons for becoming attracted to aristotle’s theory of change. For, as we have said, Kierkegaard seems to have found in Aristotle a conception of “real actuality,” an actuality in existence rather than in logic, just as he saw in his notion of change a conception of “real change.” 37 38 39 40

SKS 4, 247, note / PF, 41–2, note. SKS 7, 286 / CUP1, 314. ibid. see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 380–5.

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actuality, then, is said to be an “inter-esse between thinking and being in the hypothetical unity of abstraction.” This phrase is reminiscent of the way Møller and tennemann characterize not actuality, but change.41 here is what tennemann says: “the change, then, is an ability, but only an incomplete one; for it is the ability of that which can be active but is not yet active. thus, the change is something that is indefinite and hard to explain. For it cannot in the strict sense be attributed to either possibility or actuality, being more than the possible and less than the actual.”42 Climacus’ description of actuality first of all functions as a pun on the word “interest”: it works in danish, too. it seems not to function as a positive characterization of what actuality really is, nor does it seem to be meant as one. For Climacus seems to be saying only that, as long as thinking and being are abstractly conceived, actuality is a wedge in between them, the point apparently being that the very existence of such a wedge questions the unity of thinking and being. Climacus’ positive characterization of actuality is in terms of agency. We can see this when he argues in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that “if what is thought were actuality, then what is thought out as perfectly as possible, when i as yet have not acted, would be the action. in this way there would be no action whatever, but the intellectual swallows the ethical.” To this he immediately adds, “the actuality is not the external action, but an interiority in which the individual annuls [ophæver] possibility and identifies himself with that what is thought in order to exist in it. This is action.”43 What Climacus does in this passage is to apply possibility and actuality to a distinction that Judge William drew already in Either/Or, namely, between two ways in which one may relate to ideas. one may just aesthetically or intellectually entertain an idea without any commitment, with the result that the object of thought remains a mere possibility. But one may also relate to an idea in an ethical or religious way, in which case one “annuls possibility and identifies [oneself] with what is thought in order to exist in it.” As Climacus suggests in the first sentence of the quotation from the Postscript, the latter way of relating to ideas is characterized by involving an internal action, which is the point of transition at which the possible becomes actual. the sort of action that turns possible being into actual being is an act of choice, a decision, famously described by Kierkegaard as a leap. We have argued that Kierkegaard’s focus on momentary change represents at best a narrowed down interpretation of what aristotle means. But we should observe that Climacus links the notion of the leap with aristotle’s notion of change in the following passage from the same section of the Postscript: the transition from possibility to actuality is, as aristotle rightly teaches, κίνησις, a movement. this cannot be said in the language of abstraction at all or understood therein...there is a halt, a leap. When someone says that this is because i am thinking of something definite and not abstracting, since in that case I would discern that there is See Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 478 (quoted above). 42 tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 128. see also SKS 19, 395, not13:27. 43 SKS 7, 309–10 / CUP1, 338–9. 41

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We can now specify what Kierkegaard saw in aristotle’s theory of change: possibilities are made actual by agents who make momentary decisions, thus instantiating essences in their own lives. Climacus then gives two examples of leaps. First, there are ethical decisions, about which he asks rhetorically “to have thought something good that one wants to do, is that to have done it? not at all, but neither is it the external that determines the outcome, because someone who does not possess a penny can be just as compassionate as the person who gives away a kingdom.”45 and then there are decisions in the religious realm, about which Climacus asks equally rhetorically: “to have faith in god—does that mean to think about how glorious it must be to have faith, to think about what peace and security faith can give? not at all. even to wish, where the interest, the subject’s interest, is far more evident, is not to have faith, is not to act. the individual’s relation to the thought-action is still continually only a possibility that he can give up.”46 these are key themes in Kierkegaard’s works. We merely underline that they build on aristotelian metaphysical notions. to recycle the parallel we used above: Kierkegaard conceives of choices as that by means of which an existing person gives shape to their own life, just as aristotle conceives of decisions as crucial for an artist’s giving shape to a sculpture. We now have a rough picture of what Kierkegaard understands by necessity, possibility, and actuality with respect to human agency, and why he is so interested in these notions. each human being can make objects of thought actual by instantiating them in their own life, which they can do by making them count in existence, by letting them guide their decisions. But each of us can also abstain from this agent role, which we do as soon as we do not commit ourselves to an idea we are entertaining, thus letting the object of thought remain a mere possibility within the sphere of thinking. it is entirely up to us which of the two ways we choose; necessity has nothing to do with it. Again we should ask what may have influenced Kierkegaard to believe that he was operating within an aristotelian framework. the answer seems to us quite simple. We have already argued in section i above that Kierkegaard probably took the term “plan” from Møller. And we have argued elsewhere that Kierkegaard is probably following Møller when he blames Aristotle for allowing a sense of “possible” that implies “necessary,” in addition to a sense in which “possible” means “nonnecessary,” that is, “contingent.” This creates the impression that Kierkegaard had Møller’s “Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy” in front of him when he wrote the “Interlude” of the Fragments. in that case, it is worth pausing at what møller says as he begins his discussion of aristotle’s modal notions: “aristotle expressly ascribes reality to the contingent and holds that assuming the opposite would remove

44 45 46

SKS 7, 313 / CUP1, 342. SKS 7, 310 / CUP1, 339. SKS 7, 311 / CUP1, 340.

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from existence all freedom and change.”47 this is likely to have appealed greatly to Kierkegaard. in Kierkegaard’s own terms, then, aristotle’s view is that there is a sphere of contingent beings, differing from the realm of the necessary, a sphere in which free agents face real possibilities that can be made subject to change, that is, brought into existence. III. The Unmoved Mover as Agent and Aim We turn now to Kierkegaard’s use of another, but closely related, aristotelian notion, namely, the unmoved mover. Kierkegaard uses this notion in two ways. For one thing, it is one of his names for the divine agent, that is, god as the absolutely freely acting cause. We shall see that, in this sense, the notion of the unmoved mover is brought in by Kierkegaard to describe the incarnation, an issue that is of course entirely foreign to Aristotle. Secondly, Kierkegaard also uses “the unmoved mover” as a label for the ultimate goal of all change, that is, that which gives direction to all actions. We shall see that in this sense, too, Kierkegaard goes beyond aristotle’s notion of goal, making the greek term τέλος mean more than it means in aristotle. Yet Kierkegaard expressly associates both his usages of the unmoved mover with aristotle. In discussing the extent to which Kierkegaard was influenced by Aristotle’s views on god as agent and aim, we must not forget that he was of course much more influenced by the Christian tradition, according to which each human being comes from god and strives to return to him. a famous expression of this view is found in the opening lines of augustine’s Confessions: “man is one of your creatures, lord, and his instinct is to praise you...the thought of you stirs him so deeply that he cannot be content unless he praises you, because you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.”48 this double movement from god to man and back again is not necessarily in conflict with Aristotelian metaphysics, but still it is fair to say that Kierkegaard’s conception of god is very unlike aristotle’s. interestingly, this is not only due to the fact that aristotle lived before the incarnation. so did plato, but some of the features Kierkegaard associates with aristotle’s unmoved mover have more in common with Plato’s conception of god than with aristotle’s. this is perhaps not surprising. For after all, it was plato (and his follower plotinus) that augustine and the other early Christians found especially congenial to their own thinking, while it was mainly in medieval times that aristotelian metaphysics came to stamp its mark on Christian theology. these brief historical remarks open up big issues on the relation between pagan philosophy and Christian thinking and faith. We mention them here only to make explicit at the outset something that will shortly become evident, namely, that in his use of the aristotelian notion of the unmoved mover, Kierkegaard’s views are as a rule contrary to aristotle’s. it seems that Kierkegaard is sometimes aware of this contrariety between his own views and aristotle’s, but at other times not. Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 472. saint augustine, Confessions, trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin, Harmondsworth: Penguin 1961, p. 21 (Book i.1).

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Let us first look at Aristotle’s notion of God as agent and its influence on Kierkegaard. a telling passage in which Climacus refers to aristotle, is the following text from Philosophical Fragments, Chapter 2: What, then, moves [god] to make his appearance? he must move himself and continue to be what aristotle says of him, ἀκίνητος πάντα κινεῖ. But if he moves himself, then there of course is no need that moves him, as if he himself could not endure silence but was compelled to burst into speech. But if he moves himself and is not moved by need, what moves him then but love, for love does not have a satisfaction of need outside itself but within.49

the greek expression ἀκίνητος πάντα κινεῖ means “unmoved, he moves everything.” It is not found in Tennemann, who attributes to Aristotle the expression τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, which means “the first mover, unmoved.”50 it seems that Kierkegaard himself is the author of the expression ἀκίνητος πάντα κινεῖ. at least, he writes in a note that “the divine’s relation to man, as any philosophy is able to understand it, was excellently phrased already by aristotle, when he says: that god moves everything, himself ἀκίνητος. (as far as i recall schelling pointed this out in Berlin.).”51 this phrase, “god moves everything, himself ἀκίνητος,” translates into greek as ἀκίνητος πάντα κινεῖ, god being the implicit, masculine subject of the verb κινεῖ (“moves”). aristotle’s philosophical conception of god may be excellently phrased, but it certainly does not capture Kierkegaard’s own conception, in part because it cannot account for what it is that moves God to “make his appearance,” referring, it seems, to the incarnation. now one of Kierkegaard’s main concerns in the Philosophical Fragments was arguably to challenge the contemporary hegelian hans lassen martensen (1808–84) and his view that the incarnation happened out of historical necessity.52 this means that Climacus’ arguments must be interpreted in such a way that the incarnation comes out as a paradigm case of coming into existence. our interpretation fits the bill in that it takes Climacus to emphasize the role of agency: for it is seems to be only through god’s absolutely free agency that we can account for the fact that god entered history and became man. But we must not forget that Aristotle’s unmoved mover was never in the first place meant to account for the unique type of movement that occurred at the incarnation. no wonder, then, that Kierkegaard’s use of aristotelian metaphysics is congenial to aristotle only on a very abstract, conceptual level. But in the passage just quoted, Kierkegaard seems to be aware of this. For Climacus is arguing against aristotle’s notion of the unmoved mover. however, even if we regard this as a mere ad hominem argument, it fails. aristotle did not hold that god is moved by his need to move; on the contrary, the unmoved mover moves other things by being loved by them, that is, by each object striving towards SKS 4, 232 / PF, 24. see tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 159. 51 SKS 18, 192, JJ:160 / KJN 2, 178. 52 SKS 4, 285–6 / PF, 86–8. see also stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Chapter 8. 49 50

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its own best state. tennemann says correctly of the unmoved mover that “it has no needs; it need not act in order to attain a goal; for it has already attained all goals.”53 møller, too, gets aristotle’s view right: “as the most desirable, the best and the most beautiful being, [god] sets all desire and all reason in motion: whatever a finite being thinks and desires, it is a striving for the divine. This is how all finite beings are moved by God.”54 Kierkegaard therefore should have known better, and his argument fails because it attributes to aristotle a view he does not have, namely, that the unmoved mover moves itself out of some need. how then did Kierkegaard light on the idea that the unmoved mover is moved by his own needs? Perhaps he was influenced by his knowledge of Plato. There is a famous passage in the Timaeus in which plato asks why god created the world, to which his answer is that “being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to be as much like himself as possible,” that is, that “he wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow.”55 it seems to be this view that Kierkegaard has in mind when he notes in his journals that “it was a similar transition [i.e. a pathetic transition] when plato let god unite the idea with matter,” to which he adds in brackets a reference to Tennemann.56 so it is no accident that Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the unmoved mover has more in common with plato than with aristotle. let us now turn to the other aspect of the unmoved mover, that is, that god is the goal towards which all change is directed. again, Climacus associates this idea with aristotle’s notion of the unmoved mover. We can see this from the following passage in the Postscript: inasmuch as existence is motion, it holds true that there is indeed a continuity that holds the motion together, because otherwise there is no motion. Just as the statement that everything is true means that nothing is true, in the same way the statement that everything is in motion means that there is no motion. the motionless belongs to motion as motion’s goal [Maal], both in the sense of τέλος [goal, aim, purpose] and μέτρον [measure]; otherwise the statement that everything is in motion—if one also takes away time and says that everything is always in motion—is eo ipso stagnation. aristotle, who in so many ways emphasizes motion, therefore says that god, himself unmoved, moves everything.57

This passage bears on a question that many scholars today find problematic in aristotle, namely, how the unmoved mover can be both efficient and final cause. how can something that not yet is nevertheless be that which makes this something come to be? tennemann, too, seems to have found this problematic, observing that “whether [god] is the source or the goal of all movement, cannot be determined for certain, since [Aristotle] seems to waver between the two expressions.”58 53 54 55 56 57 58

tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 241. Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 486. see plato, Timaeus, 29d–30b. SKS 19, 386, not13:8.a. SKS 7, 284 / CUP1, 312. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 247.

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as so often, Kierkegaard has his own take on the problem. in the passage just quoted, he ascribes to the greek term τέλος an ambiguity that it does not have. Τέλος means purpose, aim or goal; μέτρον, which Kierkegaard here associates with τέλος, means “measure.” In Greek, the two terms have nothing in common. But in danish, they do. For Kierkegaard renders τέλος by “Maal,” which is ambiguous, meaning both goal and measure. Both tennemann and møller are true to aristotle: the former renders aristotle’s term τέλος by “Ziel” (“end”) and “Zweck” (“purpose”); the latter renders it by “Ende,” (“end,” that is, the Danish equivalent to “Ziel”), and “Øiemed” (“purpose,” that is, the Danish equivalent to “Zweck”), but also by “Endemaal,” a combination of “Ende” and “Maal,” a word for which there is no equivalent english term.59 thus, in distinguishing between goal and measure, as he does in the passage just quoted, Kierkegaard is not even following the aristotle that he knew from his sources, except perhaps that he latches on to møller’s translation “Endemaal.” Rather, he seems to speculate about the ambiguous Danish term “Maal” by which he renders Aristotle’s ambiguous term τέλος, forgetting that the two ambiguities have nothing to do with each other. Yet, by using the word “therefore” in the last sentence in the quotation above, he ascribes the distinction he has developed to aristotle. this illustrates how careless and sloppy Kierkegaard can be in his use of other philosophers and authors. But being a perceptive thinker, Kierkegaard is right in taking there to be a link between change having an aim and change being continuous, the latter of which seems to be his main concern in the passage quoted. this is an important subject in modern aristotle scholarship. We just want to point out that tennemann emphasizes the role that aristotle’s unmoved mover has for making all change continuous by representing the one and only goal that all change aims at. For instance, Kierkegaard may have looked twice at the following passage in tennemann’s exposition: “since the movement is eternal, that which originates movement must also be eternal, whether there is one or more beings of this kind...But it is enough if one eternal being is the cause of movement for the whole nature. this is evident also from the fact that since movement is steady, that is, something continuous, the final cause too must be unitary.”60 But except for the passage we have quoted, Kierkegaard never seems to refer expressly to aristotle in his discussions of continuity. IV. Transcendence and Freedom Let us, finally, turn to human agency. In his thinking about this issue, Kierkegaard seems to operate with a closer parallel between humans and god than he allows in other connections. For instance, in the “Interlude” of the Fragments, Climacus speaks of coming into existence “by way of a relatively freely acting cause, which in turn definitively points to an absolutely freely acting cause,”61 and although he does not expressly say this, it seems that the former refers to humans, the latter to god. this close parallel between divine and human agency is also a key feature of 59 60 61

Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” pp. 482–3. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 161. SKS 4, 276 / PF, 76.

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aristotle’s view, as Kierkegaard would have known. tennemann, for instance, says of aristotle that “[the soul] is a substance that has in itself the ultimate ground of its activity. in this respect, it is the closest thing to the archetypal being [Urwesen], or, rather, the two are completely identical with respect to the notion in question.”62 Møller is even more explicit, attributing to Aristotle the view that “the first moving principle [must be] a being [et Væsen]. this being, then, is in all those beings that move themselves, since it is the source of all movement. everything that moves, participates in it.”63 From his sources, then, Kierkegaard would have formed an impression of aristotle treating divine and human agency as parallel phenomena. But what is neither made clear in the sources nor observed by Kierkegaard is the fact that this parallel holds for aristotle in virtue of the fact that both god and human beings are rational creatures. As the expression “freely acting cause” shows, the issue of agency is bound up with the issue of freedom. this is a very complex issue in Kierkegaard, and we are not going to say anything specific about it here. However, we shall make two general points that we believe are relevant for understanding Kierkegaard’s notion of human freedom and which bear on the question of whether this can in any sense be said to be influenced by Aristotelian metaphysical ideas. In the first place, one should be aware of the fact that Aristotle did not think of human beings as having a free will, and this for two reasons. For one thing, aristotle did not think of acts of choice as originating in a will at all. rather, he held that acts of choice are functions of deliberations, that is, outcomes of what we have rationally found out is the best thing to do or believe. in other words, aristotle advocated a strict rationalistic view on motivation. secondly, aristotle did not think of our choices as free, or as not free, for that matter. What aristotle famously did was to distinguish voluntary actions from involuntary ones, but this is not a distinction between free and unfree actions. For an action can be voluntary without being free in the sense of having been intended, as Kierkegaard rightly observed.64 on the other hand, Kierkegaard does not seem to have been aware of the fact that aristotle also characterized certain actions as being up to us, that is, as in our power to do and not to do, and later commentators, such as alexander of aphrodisias, characterized these actions as free. there is much debate and little agreement about how the notion of the will developed and what part aristotle played in this development. But two things seem clear. First, as we have just argued, aristotle did have a notion of voluntary, responsible agency, without thinking of this in terms of free will. secondly, when pagan and Christian philosophers, some centuries after aristotle, began to think of human beings as having a free will, they used a concept that was well known to aristotle (that is, that some actions are up to us), but referred to it by using a new expression, that is, “free will.” We can safely assume that Kierkegaard was influenced by this long Christian tradition of conceiving of human beings as having a free will. 62 63 64

tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 3, p. 110. Møller, “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” p. 485. SKS 19, 387–8, not13:14.

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however, this assumption should not be allowed to prejudge the issue. Kierkegaard can say things about freedom that seem to sit uneasily with a straightforward conception of free will. in Either/Or, for example, Judge William says that “[h]istory...is more than a product of free actions of free individuals...But this higher order of things that digests, so to speak, the free actions and works them together in its eternal laws is necessity, and this necessity is the movement in world history; it is therefore quite proper for philosophy to use mediation.”65 the views expressed here are certainly not Aristotle’s, but they do not fit an unrestricted free will doctrine, either.66 the second general point we want to make is that Kierkegaard seems to use his aristotle-inspired conception of change in discussing transcendence, which he in turn seems to associate with human freedom. By “transcendence” in the context of human agency, he seems to mean a new beginning, a state of affairs that does not stand in a necessary causal relation to any previous one, and by “immanence,” he seems to mean the opposite.67 in other words, without transcendence there is no freedom, as Kierkegaard understood it. as we have said, Kierkegaard seems to use his notion of change to accommodate this transcendence and freedom. evidence for this is found, for instance, in the following statement by vigilius haufniensis: “the history of the individual life proceeds in a movement from state to state. every state is posited by a leap. as sin entered into the world, so it continues to enter into the world if it is not halted. nevertheless, every such repetition is not a simple consequence but a new leap.”68 Likewise, in the “Interlude” in the Philosophical Fragments, Climacus says that in any progress of a teleological sort, “there is in each moment a pause..., which is the pause of coming into existence and the pause of possibility precisely because the τέλος is outside. if only one way is possible, then the τέλος is not outside but in the progress itself.”69 these passages do not mention aristotle, but they build on notions that we have seen Kierkegaard associates with aristotle. so it seems that Kierkegaard might have wanted to regard aristotle as an ally also in his views on transcendence and human freedom. however, Kierkegaard would not be entitled to do this. For aristotle is no friend of the view that freedom depends on the ability to make unprecedented beginnings. Kierkegaard seems to think that a human being can be at best a “relatively freely acting cause,” as Climacus says in the “Interlude” of the Fragments, and that they are free in this sense only to the extent that their actions and beliefs are aimed at “the absolute goal.” This latter point Climacus seems to be making in the Postscript when he says that “existential pathos results from the transforming relation of the idea to the individual’s existence. if the absolute τέλος does not absolutely transform the individual’s existence by relating to it, then the individual does not relate himself SKS 3, 170 / EO2, 174. see george J. stack, who also considers the aristotelian background, in his “Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Choice: The Aristotelian Model,” The Personalist, vol. 52, 1971, pp. 643–61. 67 see stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 294–5. 68 SKS 4, 415 / CA, 113. 69 SKS 4, 280 / PF, 80–1. 65 66

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with existential pathos but with aesthetic pathos—for example, by having a correct idea.”70 As the contrast with “aesthetic pathos” suggests, Kierkegaard seems to think of the “existential pathos” as the absolute ethical goal of becoming oneself and the absolute religious goal of becoming a Christian. this line of thinking is foreign to aristotle. Being a rationalist with respect to motivation, as we have seen he is, aristotle would not have regarded “having a correct idea” as a sign of aesthetic deficiency. On the contrary, he would regard it as a way to become a free agent, in fact, the only way to do so. again, however, one should not on the basis of this difference between aristotle and Kierkegaard jump to conclusions. even if Kierkegaard is not a rationalist in aristotle’s sense, it does not follow that Kierkegaard can be correctly described as an irrationalist. We can now conclude our discussion of Kierkegaard’s use of the aristotelian notions of change, the modal categories, and agency. We should first remind ourselves that Kierkegaard is in part motivated by a polemical purpose, namely, to use aristotle as a comrade in arms in the battle against two ideas. First, he is using aristotle to object to the very idea, advocated by contemporary hegelians, that movement occurs in logic. that change belongs not to logic but to reality, is implied in the Fragments and expressly stated in The Concept of Anxiety. secondly, Kierkegaard draws on aristotelian notions to argue against the view that things can come into existence of necessity. all coming into existence occurs in freedom, which means that something’s coming into existence amounts to its having some of its latent possibilities turned into actual being. But we have tried to show that Kierkegaard’s use of aristotelian metaphysical ideas is also motivated by a constructive purpose, namely, the task of formulating his own ideas on important issues. indeed, we believe it is fair to say that Kierkegaard uses aristotle’s metaphysics to build the foundations for some of his most crucial ethical views, especially the notion of decision and choice. What aristotle had to say on this subject is beyond the scope of our article. What we have pointed out is that the aristotelian foundation on which Kierkegaard builds, is an upside-down version of aristotle, a version that Kierkegaard partly found evidence for in his sources, but partly was himself responsible for. all in all Kierkegaard seems to assume that his views on change, modality, and agency square with Aristotle’s. On most specific points, this confidence is misplaced, as we have seen. But yet it is fair to say that Kierkegaard is operating within an aristotelian conceptual scheme when he interprets his notions of change, modality, and agency in ways that fit his own purpose.

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SKS 7, 353 / CUP1, 387.

Nicomachean Ethics: ignorance and relationships håvard løkke

Kierkegaard knew aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. this we can safely infer from the following excerpt of a note on aristotle from 1842: his Ethics falls into the following parts: Books 1–3 on the good, on virtue, and a number of other inquiries; Books 4–5 the development of the moral virtues, i.e., the virtues bearing on the irrational part of the soul: courage, moderation, magnanimity ἐλευθεριότης, justice. the 6th Book on the intellectual virtues: τέχνη [skill, craft], ἐπιστήμη [knowledge, science], σωφροσύνη [moderation], νοῦς [intelligence, intuition], σοφία [wisdom]. here a.[ristotle] no longer uses his observation on the μεσότης [intermediacy] of virtue. the 7th Book on abstinence etc., pleasure. the 8th Book on friendship; the 9th Book on friendship. the 10th Book on pleasure.1

the impression created by this survey is of Kierkegaard sitting with a copy of aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in front of him and skimming quickly through it. What creates this impression is mainly the fact that Kierkegaard writes, “the 8th Book on friendship; the 9th Book on friendship.” If he had taken the survey quoted above from a secondary source, he would surely have written “the 8th and 9th Books on friendship,” or something of this sort. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Kierkegaard does not seem to have consulted the chapters on aristotle’s ethics and politics in Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann’s (1761–1819) Geschichte der Philosophie, which seems to have been his main secondary source for aristotle’s philosophy.2 so it seems Kierkegaard knew aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from reading the text itself rather than works about it. the next question is what text or edition Kierkegaard read.3 no complete danish translation of the Nicomachean Ethics was available at his time, the first appearing SKS 19, 388–9, not13:19 / JP 3, 3292. (my translation.) Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819 (ASKB 815–826). tennemann treats aristotle in volume 3, pp. 17–330. While reading this volume, Kierkegaard notes that “What is remarkable up to p. 120 i have underlined in my copy”; see SKS 19, 394, not13:27. this squares with the fact that none of Kierkegaard’s references to volume 3 of tennemann’s work seems to be to the pages later than p. 128. it is only on p. 257 of his work that tennemann starts discussing aristotle’s practical philosophy. 3 i am very grateful to Finn gredal Jensen for information on this issue. 1 2

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nearly a century later.4 the only part of the Nicomachean Ethics to appear in danish before then was Books 8–9, which was published in 1858, that is, after Kierkegaard’s death.5 one should note that the author of this translation was ernst Frederik Christian Bojesen (1803–64), who had previously been Kierkegaard’s teacher at the Borgerdyd school. this is noteworthy because, as we will see, Kierkegaard was interested in the Nicomachean Ethics, Books 8–9, and his interest may thus have been awakened already at school, even if there seems to be no evidence to confirm this. What we do know is that Kierkegaard owned a complete german translation of the Nicomachean Ethics by the prominent philosopher Christian garve (1742–98) called Die Ethik des Aristoteles in two volumes.6 We also know that he owned as many as three complete sets of aristotle in greek, including the groundbreaking two-volume Bekker edition from 1831, which he purchased in 1843.7 Kierkegaard refers to garve’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics only once: aristotle distinguishes three aspects of the soul: πάθη [emotions, passions], δυνάμεις [powers, abilities], ἕξεις [states, dispositions]. (Garve translates the last one as “skills”; see Ch. 5. in arist: Ch. 4 in the 2nd Book.)8

this short note is interesting because it shows that Kierkegaard was using both the german and the greek text. this is made especially clear by the rather mystifying reference, “see Ch. 5. in arist: Ch. 4 in the 2nd Book.”9 the only way to make sense of this, it seems to me, is to take “Ch. 5” to refer to Garve’s translation and “Ch. 4 in the 2nd Book” to Bekker’s edition. in general, one should be aware of the fact that Kierkegaard’s references to the Nicomachean Ethics often differ from modern references to the same work, because editions of aristotle can vary quite substantially with respect to how a book is divided aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. by niels møller, Copenhagen: levin & munksgaard 1936. 5 Om den 8de og 9de Bog af den Nicomacheiske Ethik tilligemed en Oversættelse af disse Bøger og oplysende Anmærkninger, trans. and ed. by e.F.C. Bojesen, Copenhagen: J.C. scharling 1858 (this work functioned as a kind of invitation from sorø academy, where Bojesen taught greek starting in 1840 and became headmaster in 1847). 6 Die Ethik des Aristoteles, trans. and ed. by Christian garve, vols. 1–2, Breslau: Korn 1798–1801 (ASKB 1082–1083). 7 see Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera...cum Averrois commentariis, vols. 1–11 in vols. 1–13, venetiis [venice]: apud. iunctas 1562 (ASKB 1056–1068); Aristotelis Opera omnia graece ad optimorum exemplarium fidem recensuit, annotationem criticam, librorum argumenta, vols. 1–5, trans. and ed. by Johann gottlieb Buhle, Biponti [zweibrücken]: ex typographia societatis 1791–97 (ASKB 1069–1073); and Aristoteles Graece, vols. 1–2, ed. by immanuel Bekker, Berlin: g. reimer 1831 (ASKB 1074–1075). Furthermore, Kierkegaard owned the latin edition of Bekker, see Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis, ed. by immaneuel Bekker, Berlin: g. reimer 1831 (ASKB 1076). 8 SKS 19, 387, not13:12 / JP 5, 5590. garve’s translation “Fertigkeiten” is simply wrong; a ἕξις is a state or a disposition, translated “habit” in Liddell-Scott’s lexicon; see Die Ethik des Aristoteles, vol. 2, p. 45. 9 the hong translation renders the last half of the bracket thus: “see Chapter 5 in Aristotle. Chapter 4 in Book II.” This seems to me to make no sense. 4

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into chapters. a good illustration of this is Book 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics: in the Bekker edition that Kierkegaard seems to have used, the Nicomachean Ethics Book 3 is made up of 15 chapters; but in the edition that is mainly used today, it is made up of 12 chapters.10 The reason for this is that the long chapter that is called “3.1” by Bywater was divided into three by Bekker. one illustration of the effects this may have is a journal entry that also confirms that Kierkegaard was using the Bekker edition.11 here Kierkegaard quotes in greek a sentence from aristotle’s discussion of courage, with the reference “Arist: 3.10.” In modern editions, the sentence Kierkegaard quotes is found in 3.7; but in the Bekker edition, it is in fact found in 3.10.12 it seems likely, then, that Kierkegaard was using both Bekker’s edition of the greek text and garve’s german translation. What is most important in any case is to note that unlike his knowledge of other aspects of aristotle’s thought, Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Aristotle’s ethics seems to be first hand in the sense that he read the Nicomachean Ethics itself. But it is also important to note that this first-hand knowledge was superficial. already the brief survey quoted above suggests that skimming through aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics did not make a great impression on Kierkegaard. What suggests this more than anything else is the fact that, in his list of the intellectual virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics Book 6 (see the quotation above), Kierkegaard writes σωφροσύνη (moderation) rather than φρόνησις (practical wisdom). now, practical wisdom is by any standard a key notion in aristotle’s ethics. indeed, it is fair to say that by omitting this notion Kierkegaard in effect misses the most characteristic tenet in aristotle’s ethics.13 moreover, practical wisdom is not the only key aristotelian notion missed by Kierkegaard. in no passage does he expressly show an interest in how aristotle conceived of such issues as weakness of will (ἀκρασία), and choice. (the latter omission is especially noteworthy.) all in all, then, i think it is fair to say that Kierkegaard read aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics very quickly and found relatively little of interest in it. and it is not difficult to understand this lack of interest on Kierkegaard’s part. For his views on ethical issues seem to be mainly influenced by a Christian tradition that is opposed to the characteristic tenets in aristotle’s ethics, such as the role of cognition aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, ed. by ingram Bywater, oxford: Clarendon press 1894 (Oxford Classical Texts). 11 see SKS 19, 388, not13:16. 12 even if the chapters in modern editions may differ in this way from the ones in Bekker’s edition, all modern editions also use a standard way of making reference to aristotle’s works that is based on Bakker’s edition. this is because modern references to aristotle’s texts are of the form “Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1, 1110b 18–24,” where “3.1” refers to the book and chapter in the most recent Oxford Classical Texts edition, which, in the case of Nicomachean Ethics is still the one by Bywater, and “1110b 18–24” refers to the page, column and lines in Bekker’s edition from 1831. 13 For an attempt to tie aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom to Kierkegaard, see Robert C. Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue: Classical Themes in Kierkegaard,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon d. marino, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1998, pp. 182–4. roberts’ attempt is to my mind unconvincing. 10

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in attaining virtue, and the role of this cognition-based virtue in attaining happiness. the relation between greek and Christian ethics is a big issue that i cannot discuss here. But, in general, it seems safe to say that Kierkegaard’s project leaves very little room for the characteristic tenets in aristotle’s ethics.14 this general assessment has been questioned, however, by scholars who have argued that there are profound links between Kierkegaard and so-called “virtue ethics,” an influential position in current moral philosophy that looks to Aristotle as its main inspiration.15 in pursuing the question of how Kierkegaard relates to virtue ethics, i think one should be careful to keep apart two very different kinds of questions. on the one hand, one may well ask whether there are profound similarities in Kierkegaard and aristotle’s thinking on important ethical issues, such as choice and virtue. on the other hand, one may ask—which is what i do in this article— whether Kierkegaard’s views on any of these ethical issues were influenced by his reading of aristotle’s ethics. it is tempting to compare aspects of aristotle’s ethics with Kierkegaard: one has only to think of aristotle’s notion of choice, which he describes in a way that Kierkegaard is familiar with and interested in, namely, as bringing potentiality into actuality. But it seems to me that this temptation should often be resisted, not least because aristotle’s ethics is many-faceted and complex in its own right: one can easily find passages in the Nicomachean Ethics that are reminiscent of Kierkegaard, but there are also passages that are not. hence, it would be misleading to pay attention to the similarities between the two thinkers without at the same time taking into account the great differences between them. and what is most important for our purposes in this article, it seems clear from our evidence that Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Aristotle’s ethics was superficial, and that his understanding of much of it was poor. one may regret this, thinking that Kierkegaard would have benefited from knowing Aristotle’s ethics better than he did. But that is another sort of discussion. To see how Kierkegaard may have been influenced by Aristotle’s ethics, we must look at the references to aristotle in his journals and published works. the main evidence is the notes Kierkegaard took while skimming through the Nicomachean Ethics.16 Besides these 13 texts, 17 of the journal entries listed under “Aristotle”

this is in agreement with C. stephen evans’ sharp distinction between “divine command theories” and “human nature theories,” represented by Kierkegaard and Aristotle (and aquinas), respectively. see his Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Love: Divine Commands & Moral Obligations, oxford: oxford university press 2007, especially pp. 8–18. see also the work of Robert Adams, that is, his “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligations,” in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 4, 1987, pp. 262–75; and the work of philip Quinn, see his “Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 349– 75. 15 For a recent collection of studies of Kierkegaard in relation to virtue ethics, see Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. by John J. davenport and anthony rudd, Chicago and la salle, illinois: open Court 2001; see also david m. gouwens, Kierkegaard as a Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996. 16 see SKS 19, 387–9, not13:10–22. 14

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in the index to hongs’ edition, seem to bear in some way on ethical issues.17 this gives us 30 journal entries bearing on some aspect or other of aristotle’s ethics. in addition, there are eight references to aristotle’s ethics in the published works: two in The Concept of Irony, one in Either/Or, two in Philosophical Fragments, one in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and two in Stages on Life’s Way.18 so we have a total of 38 snippets of text, most of which are unrelated to each other, and none of which is very substantial. on the basis of this evidence i will try to piece together a picture of what influence Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics may have had on Kierkegaard’s thinking. i approach this task by searching in our pool of texts for themes that Kierkegaard associated with aristotle’s ethics. two themes seem to have caught his attention, namely (1) a concern with how an agent’s ignorance bears on the agent’s act being voluntary or not, an issue that Kierkegaard associates with sin, and (2) a focus on man as a social creature, that is, on the nature of our relations to others and to ourselves. these themes are discussed by aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics Books 3.1–5 and 8–9, respectively. Kierkegaard refers to the Nicomachean Ethics Book 3 six times in his journals and once in the Philosophical Fragments; he refers to the Nicomachean Ethics Books 8–9 four times in his journal notes and once in Either/Or. so there are 12 pieces of evidence bearing on the two themes just outlined.19 I. Ignorance, the Voluntary, Choice Three journal entries bear directly on the first mentioned theme. The first reads as follows: as far as greek aesthetics is concerned, aristotle says a remarkable thing in the 3rd Book of the Ethics, Ch. 2: “an act done in ignorance cannot as such be regarded as voluntary; but as fully involuntary it can be counted only when it occurs with dissatisfaction and later causes regret.” When it causes regret, then it is after all taken to be voluntary; and yet it is only at that moment that aristotle believes it can be seen as involuntary.20 these are: JP 1, 702; JP 2, 1057, 1182; JP 3, 2353, 2365, 2441, 2617, 2624, 2783, 3219, 3300, 3652; JP 4, 4104, 4826, 4839; and JP 5, 5571, 5606. the entries in italics contain either express references to Nicomachean Ethics, or a view Kierkegaard must have found in the Nicomachean Ethics. 18 here i rely on a. ibsen’s index to the second edition of Kierkegaard’s complete works in danish, that is, vol. 15 of Samlede Værker, 2nd ed., vols. 1–15, ed. by a.B. drachmann, J.l. heiberg and h.o. lange, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1920–36. 19 this means that i will leave out as many as 26 pieces of evidence. none of these seem to me to tell us much of interest about how Aristotle’s ethics may have influenced Kierkegaard—with one possible exception. Kierkegaard refers three times in his journal notes to the Nicomachean Ethics, 10.8, where what seems to have caught his attention is aristotle’s notion of divine bliss. this theme is also associated with aristotle in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and possibly in the passage in Either/Or, part 1. this is certainly a key theme in both thinkers, but in spite of five references to Aristotle’s view on the issue, it is not clear that Kierkegaard’s view on it was in any way influenced by Aristotle. 20 SKS 19, 387–8, not13:13. 17

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Kierkegaard’s quotation (“An act done...causes regret”) is a paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics.21 What aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1 is the two ways in which actions according to him can be involuntary, namely, if they come about by force or if they are done in ignorance. in the passage Kierkegaard paraphrases aristotle analyzes ignorance as a source of involuntariness, and he does this by distinguishing between an action being involuntary (ἀκούσιον) and an action being not voluntary (οὐχ ἑκούσιον), the former presupposing regret by the agent, the latter not.22 Kierkegaard seems to be puzzled by aristotle’s view that it is only if the agent regrets what they have done that a misdeed done in ignorance counts as “fully involuntary,” that is, not only “not voluntary.” What Kierkegaard seems to find remarkable is that such an action, which “is after all taken to be voluntary,” is not taken to be voluntary by Aristotle. this is not a case of Kierkegaard being influenced by Aristotle. the second text is more interesting in that it contains a reference to aristotle’s notion of choice. here is what Kierkegaard writes: one would understand better the aristotelian view on the voluntary if one bears in mind that a main distinction is being drawn between τὸ ἑκούσιον [the voluntary] and προαίρεσις [choice, decision] [Forsættet], so that something can be voluntary without being intentional [med Forsæt]. (cf. 3rd B. Ch. 4.)23

the source is the Nicomachean Ethics 3.2 (which is 3.4 in Bekker’s edition), where aristotle tries to characterize the nature of choice (προαίρεσις) by comparing it first to the voluntary, then to other mental operations, namely, judging and desiring. here is aristotle’s brief comparison between the voluntary and choice: “Choice... is clearly something voluntary, but it is not the same thing as the voluntary, for the voluntary is a wider type: the voluntary is shared in by both children and the other animals, whereas choice is not, and things done on the spur of the moment we say are voluntary, but not done from choice.”24 Kierkegaard is right, then, to observe that aristotle regards the voluntary as a wider category than choice. But it is not clear why he finds this distinction illuminating. It is tempting to say that what caught his attention was aristotle’s claim, in the passage just quoted, that things done “on the spur of the moment” are not done from choice. If that were the case, one would have been able to say that Kierkegaard was aware of a crucial difference see Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1, 1110b 18–24. For reasons outlined above, this passage is in 3.2 in Bekker’s edition. 22 aristotle seems to make this distinction in order to accommodate the fact that we feel sympathy and sometimes even pity for involuntary wrongdoing (Nicomachean Ethics, 3.1, 1109b 32–3), responses that are appropriate only if the agent regrets what they have inadvertently done. 23 SKS 19, 387–8, not13:14. 24 aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.2. 1111b 6–10. throughout this article i use the translation from Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction and Commentary, trans. and ed. by sarah Broadie and Christopher rowe, oxford: oxford university press 2002 (note, however, that I use “choice” where the Broadie and Rowe’s translation has “decision”). 21

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between aristotle’s and his own notion of choice, namely, that aristotle maintains that all choices are outcomes of processes of deliberation, which Kierkegaard seems to disagree with. unfortunately, there is nothing in the journal entry to suggest that Kierkegaard was aware of this difference. on the contrary, what is striking about the entry is that it is simply wrong to translate προαίρεσις as “Forsæt” (“intention”); προαίρεσις means “choice” or “decision,” not “intention.”25 so rather than using the journal entry as evidence for Kierkegaard being aware of aristotle’s notion of choice, what it shows is arguably that Kierkegaard did not even discover that choice is a key notion in aristotle’s ethics. in other words, a bad translation may be part at least of the explanation why Kierkegaard did not appreciate aristotle’s notion of choice, as some scholars think he should have done. the third journal entry Kierkegaard made while reading the Nicomachean Ethics Book 3 is more substantial: “the idealistic view by socrates and plato, that all sin is ignorance, arist.[otle] dismisses in Book 3, Ch. 7, but [he] does not eliminate the difficulty, because he merely ends in a realistic opposition. This problem is of the greatest importance and well suited for a monograph.”26 the source of this is the Nicomachean Ethics.27 here aristotle discusses in what sense we are responsible for our own characters. one of the things Kierkegaard does in the passage just quoted is to side with aristotle against socrates and plato in rejecting the view that we are governed entirely by reason. in particular, given what is at stake in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5, he sides with aristotle’s rejection of the socratic view that we develop a bad character if and only if we suffer from a specific cognitive failure, namely, if and only if we are ignorant of what it is that is good and bad. now, as is well known, aristotle and his contemporaries use the term ἁμαρτία, which is often translated as “sin” when used by Christian authors, in the sense of “mistake.” So the view aristotle rejects in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5, is that it is only by having acquired knowledge of what is good and bad that we can come to be the sort of person who avoids making mistakes, especially the sort of mistakes that we today would call moral ones. throughout the Nicomachean Ethics aristotle emphasizes that habit and training plays a much larger role in our moral development than socrates acknowledged. What he tries to achieve in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5, is to show that this view is compatible with each of us being responsible for his own character and thus for all the voluntary actions flowing from it. Kierkegaard is right in taking aristotle to be an ally against socrates’ “intellectualist psychology.” But what are we to make of his claim that Aristotle only gets his critique of socrates half right because he is “merely ending up in a realistic opposition?” Perhaps we will understand Aristotle’s failure on this point, as Kierkegaard saw it, if we look at a long footnote in Philosophical Fragments, Chapter 1. in this work, Kierkegaard also rejects what he says aristotle rejected, namely, that sin is the same as ignorance: the source of sin is not lack of knowledge this is probably based on “Vorsatz” in Garve’s translation, see Die Ethik des Aristoteles, vol. 2, p. 18. 26 SKS 19, 387–8, not13:15. 27 see Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5 in modern editions; it is 3.7 in Kierkegaard’s edition via Bekker’s edition. 25

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but lack of good will. Yet there is only one significant reference to Aristotle’s ethics in Philosophical Fragments. this appears when Johannes Climacus argues, against socrates, that the moment is of decisive importance. at this point, Kierkegaard says he allows himself a moment of “Greek thinking” about cases in which a choice cannot be remade. after elaborating on such cases, he attributes the following view to aristotle: “ ‘the depraved person and the virtuous person presumably do not have power over their moral condition, but in the beginning they did have the power to become the one or the other, just as the person who throws a stone has power over it before he throws it but not when he has thrown it’ (Aristotle).”28 the origin of this seems to be the following passage in the Nicomachean Ethics: [i]f someone does, not in ignorance, the things that will result in his being unjust, he will be unjust voluntarily—and yet he will not stop being unjust, and be just, merely if he wishes it. For no more will the sick person be healthy merely for wishing it; and it may be that he is ill voluntarily, by living a life in weak-willed disobedience to his doctors. previously, then, he had the option not to be ill, but once he has let himself go, he no longer has it, any more than it is possible for him to retrieve a stone after it has left his hand; but all the same it depended on him that it was thrown, for the origin of it was in him.29

The “realistic opposition” that Aristotle ends up with, then, seems to be made up of concrete situations, such as a child choosing how to spend his money, or a soldier choosing whom to show his allegiance. aristotle’s failure thus seems to be that he is bound to “Greek thinking,” that is, that his reflection is limited to concrete cases. now, Kierkegaard is right in taking aristotle to emphasize the importance of instantaneous acts, the “throwing of the stone.” But he seems to fail to understand aristotle’s point. What depends on one’s choice, according to aristotle, is not whether a concrete event a or B happens. rather, what depends on one’s choice is whether or not one becomes a virtuous person, a person with a good character. We will see this if we consider the fact that aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that “what makes us people of a certain quality is deciding for...good things or bad ones.”30 so even if aristotle does not expressly say this, he seems to hold that our lives are formed by our choices, that is, that we come to think of certain things as good or bad because we have previously chosen certain options rather than others. there is arguably much common ground between this view and Kierkegaard’s own view, but if my arguments are sound, Kierkegaard failed to realize this. II. Relations to Others and to Oneself another issue from aristotle’s ethics that Kierkegaard was interested in is the ways in which one relates to others and oneself. this is discussed by aristotle in the so-called “friendship books.”31 i think we should distinguish between two 28 29 30 31

SKS 4, 225, note / PF, 17, note. aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5, 1114a 12–19. aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.2, 1112a 3–5. see aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8–9.

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aspects of Kierkegaard’s interest in this issue, namely (1) the nature of interpersonal relationships, that is, friendships in the everyday sense, and (2) the nature of self-love. First, as to friendship in the everyday sense of the term, it is not hard to understand Kierkegaard’s interest in aristotle’s discussion. after all, this is a crucial theme in Either/Or, written not long after Kierkegaard read aristotle’s ethics. however, just as in the case of the Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard makes very little overt use of aristotle’s ethics in Either/Or. the only explicit reference is found towards the end of Judge William’s long exposition: if friendship is looked at in this way, one is looking at it ethically and therefore according to its beauty. then it gains beauty and meaning simultaneously. must i cite an authority on my behalf and against you? so be it! how did aristotle conceive of friendship? did he not make it the point of departure for his entire ethical view of life, for with friendship, he says, the concepts of what is just are so expanded that they all amount to the same thing. so he bases the concept of justice on the idea of friendship. in a certain sense, then, his category is superior to the modern one, which bases justice upon duty, the abstract-categorical; he bases it upon the social. From this it is easy to see that for him the idea of the state becomes the highest, but this, in turn, is the imperfection of his category. i shall not, however, make so bold as to enter into such investigations as the relation between the aristotelian and the Kantian views of the ethical. i mentioned aristotle only to remind you that he, too, realized that friendship contributes to a person’s ethical achieving of actuality.32

according to Kierkegaard’s reading, aristotle “bases the concept of justice on the idea of friendship” and this by virtue of holding that “with friendship...the concepts of what is just are so expanded that they all amount to the same thing.” We may ask whether Kierkegaard had a particular passage from the Nicomachean Ethics, Books 8–9 in mind, and, if so, which one. in their notes, the hongs refer to two passages, namely (1) Nicomachean Ethics, 8.9. 1159b 25–7 (“Friendship and justice seem...to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the same persons”), and (2) Nicomachean Ethics, 8.11. 1161a 10–11 (“each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice”). The problem with both of these passages is that neither of them explains why justice is based on friendship, as Kierkegaard says in the passage quoted above. a more likely source of inspiration for Kierkegaard seems to be the following passage: Friendship also seems to keep cities together, and lawgivers seem to pay more attention to it than to justice. For like-mindedness seems to be similar, in a way, to friendship, and it is this that they aim most at achieving, while they aim most to eliminate faction, faction being enmity; and there is no need for rules of justice between people who are friends, whereas if they are just they still need friendship—and of what is just, the most just is thought to be what belongs to friendship.33

32 33

SKS, 3, 303–4 / EO2, 322. aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1, 1155a 22–8.

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this is also a much discussed passage today.34 if it is this passage that caught Kierkegaard’s attention, it would explain why he attributes to aristotle not only the view that justice is based on friendship, but also the view that “the state becomes the highest.” For in the passage just quoted, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of friendship for good political order. on the other hand, the themes Judge William attributes to aristotle in the passage quoted above, is so ubiquitous in the Nicomachean Ethics, Books 8–9 that Kierkegaard may be loosely paraphrasing his understanding of aristotle’s notion of friendship. in any case, what is more important is to note that Kierkegaard has a much better understanding of aristotle’s views on friendship than on the set of issues discussed in section i above. he even makes a very interesting observation about how aristotle’s ethics differs from Kant’s in terms of its foundation. and even if Judge William refers to aristotle’s ethics only once, this reference is arguably more significant than it first appears to be. After all, William seems in effect to be saying that his whole conception of the importance of interpersonal relations can be found in aristotle.35 the impression one gets is that Kierkegaard read the friendship books in the Nicomachean Ethics more carefully than most other parts of the work, and that he was in overall sympathy with aristotle’s views on the role of friendship in an ethical life. But lacking explicit evidence beyond the passage just quoted, it is difficult to determine to what extent Kierkegaard was inspired by the Nicomachean Ethics, Books 8–9 when writing Either/Or. Kierkegaard’s interest in the “friendship books” is also testified by the fact that he ascribes to aristotle a notion of self-love. Kierkegaard has two long notes on this. The first is a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, 9.7: the more one thinks about it, the more one will see that the examples of love usually mentioned are examples of self-love. aristotle has already shown this very well in his Nicomachean Ethics, Book 9, Chapter 7. To be specific, he who has produced something loves it more than the production loves him. Why is this? Because there is more “being,” more egotism, in the first relationship than in the second, because author-love is the highest egotism. therefore the father loves the child more than the child loves the father; therefore the mother loves the child even more than does the father, for she is more egoistically interested in its existence (moreover, as aristotle naively says, she also knows more surely that the child is really hers); therefore the benefactor loves the one benefited more than the latter loves him, because there is an egoistical satisfaction in having done a good turn.— this whole chapter by aristotle is valuable.36

See, for example, Gisela Striker, “Aristotle’s Ethics as Political Science,” in The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, ed. by Burkhard reis, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2006, pp. 127–40. 35 needless to say, this does not include aristotle’s views on marriage. see, for example, SKS 19, 390, not13:22. 36 SKS 25, 149, nB27:34 / JP 3, 2441. 34

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The last sentence (“This whole...is valuable”) shows that Kierkegaard read Aristotle’s text carefully and found it interesting. the second journal entry is a reading note on the Nicomachean Ethics, 9.8, which is today regarded as aristotle’s main discussion of self-love: aristotle also represents love of self as the highest, that is, in the good sense (see 9:8, 10:7): “every man’s true self resides in this part, namely, the thinking part.” Therefore he recommends the contemplative life as the highest happiness, but happiness, again, is the goal of everything, and he defines happiness as an intrinsically desirable activity (see 10:6). see 10:8 about the felicity of the gods. it is readily seen here that aristotle has not understood this self deeply enough, for only in the aesthetic sense does contemplative thought have an entelechy, and the felicity of the gods does not reside in contemplation but in eternal communication.—aristotle has not perceived the qualification of spirit. Therefore, he recommends even external gods, although only as an accompaniment, a drapery, but at this point he lacks the category for making a consummating movement.37

Kierkegaard was aware, then, of the fact that aristotle distinguishes between a bad and a good type of self-love and that he regards the former as a serious flaw of character. But, again, he regards aristotle’s treatment of the issue as lacking: as he says in the passage just quoted, aristotle “has not understood [every man’s true self] deeply enough” and this presumably because he has “not perceived the qualification of spirit.”38 We may perhaps understand what Kierkegaard means by this if we turn to Works of Love, part 2, Chapter 4. here self-love is discussed in a way that, not surprisingly, owes much to the Christian view, according to which it is the opposite of neighbor love and, as such, a sign of a sinful character. there are no explicit references to aristotle in Works of Love, but there is a reference in part 2, Chapter 4 to a group of people to which aristotle belongs: only the love of spirit has courage to want nothing whatsoever of mine, courage to reject entirely the distinction between yours and mine, thus it wins god by losing its soul. again we see here what the ancient meant by saying that the virtues of the heathens after all are excellent vices.39

Kierkegaard seems to be saying that even if aristotle recognizes that there may be a “transformation [Omvæltning] of self-love,” that is, a change from a bad to a good type of self-love, he fails to understand this transformation properly. For as Kierkegaard rightly observes, the transformation depends, according to aristotle, on whether the self one loves is one’s higher, rational nature (“the thinking part”) or one’s lower, animal nature. Kierkegaard seems to give two reasons for why he finds this view lacking. First, he engages critically with aristotle’s views on self-love and contemplation, arguing that even a person devoted to their rational self-will, according to aristotle, remains 37 38 39

SKS 19, 389, not13:20 / JP 4, 3892. (my translation.) ibid. SKS 9, 267 / WL, 268–9. (my translation.)

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attached to external gods, “although only as an accompaniment, a drapery.”40 here Kierkegaard raises a version of a problem that is much debated today, namely, the question of how aristotle conceived of the relation between a happy life as it is lived in society (a so-called “civic” or “political” sort of life), and an even happier life, the so-called “contemplative” sort of life.41 But Kierkegaard seems to blur a distinction that is crucial for aristotle. the love of one’s rational self is described by aristotle as the sort of love that can motivate one to make huge sacrifices, even give one’s life for the community. By contrast, the contemplative life is not concerned with practical choices at all. in other words, Kierkegaard seems to associate the Nicomachean Ethics 9.8 too closely with the Nicomachean Ethics 10.6–9: it may well be true that aristotle’s notion of a contemplative life is problematic for the reasons Kierkegaard suggests, but this has no direct bearing on his notion of self-love. Kierkegaard’s second reason for dismissing aristotle’s position is that aristotle does not have a notion of spirit and therefore lacks a notion of the sort of love made possible by this, namely “the love of spirit.” This is not a case of engaging critically with aristotle’s views and arguments. as far as i can see, aristotle’s only fault in this regard is that he was born too early.

SKS 19, 389, not13:20 / JP 4, 3892. (my translation.) aristotle discusses the former in Nicomachean Ethics, 9.8, the latter in Nicomachean Ethics, 10.6–9. 40 41

Poetics: the rebirth of tragedy at the end of modernity daniel greenspan

Kierkegaard’s use of aristotle’s Poetics places him within an interpretive tradition which, even now, remains very much alive. as a text, the Poetics is incomplete, likely missing the second of its three books. the two most essential terms of its aesthetics, ἁμαρτία and κάθαρσις, likewise, due to a lack of context, have been the occasion of much debate ever since the neo-classicists reclaimed aristotle in the sixteenth century as the aegis of an authoritative greek aesthetics. Was the ἁμαρτία to which the tragic figure succumbed a moral fault? Was his suffering “poetic justice,” a crime rightly punished, the english critic thomas rymer (1643–1713) famously adjudged, or rather something more ambiguous?1 related to the question of ἁμαρτία was that of κάθαρσις. Was the κάθαρσις which tragedy inspired in its audience a religious purification, or, similarly, a moral regeneration? Or was κάθαρσις merely a certain pleasure attached to the relief of tragic emotions, namely, pity and fear? Classical scholarship today regards gotthold ephraim lessing (1729–81) in the wake of neoclassicism, as the origin of responsibly modern scholarship on the Poetics. this scholarship has always disregarded Kierkegaard’s role as an interpreter of the Poetics, perhaps wisely, since Kierkegaard’s use of classical texts, or of any text, for that matter, tends towards the synthetic. nevertheless, as an enthusiastic student of Lessing, an exemplar of the “subjective existing thinker”2 philosophizing in the style of ancient greece, and particularly his Hamburgische Dramaturgie, where the modern story about aristotle’s Poetics begins, Kierkegaard plays an early and potentially significant part in its interpretation.3 he deploys the Poetics against g.W.F. see Jan maarten Bremer, Hamartia: Tragic Error in the “Poetics” of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy, amsterdam: hakkert 1969, see pp. 91–8. Bremer gives an exhaustive account of the rise of interpretations of the term in each of the major european schools. 2 SKS 7, 73 / CUP1, 72. 3 For Kierkegaard’s attention to lessing’s interpretation of κάθαρσις in aristotle, see SKS 19, 376, not12:9. michael Conrad Curtius’ (1724–1802) translation and commentary on the Aristoteles Dichtkunst, ins Deutsche übersetzet, Mit Anmerkungen, und besondern Abhandlungen, versehen, trans. and ed. by michael Conrad Curtius, hannover: Johann Christoph richter 1753 (ASKB 1094) was an essential source for Kierkegaard. see SKS 19, 373, not12:2. SKS 19, 375, not12:4–4.a / JP 1, 808. SKS 19, 376, not12:11 / JP 4, 4835. SKS 19, 376, not12:12 / JP 4, 4836. SKS 19, 377, not12:15–15.a / JP 5, 5606. But his attention to the original is clear, which he owned as part of the complete Bekker edition. see the entries from not12:2–not12:16 in SKS 19, 373–8 (Pap. iv C 103–25 generally). For example, in the 1

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hegel’s (1770–1831) dialectical reading of ancient tragedy—a development in the idealist reading original to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von schelling (1775–1854)—a loyal return to the tragic texts themselves and their properly greek understanding, while avoiding, simultaneously, the moralizing interpretation of the Poetics which continued to consume classical scholarship.4 By examining both the published works in which the Poetics figure—Either/ Or, Fear and Trembling, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Stages on Life’s Way—as well as his journals and notebooks, this article will focus on Kierkegaard’s inventive use of the Poetics in his own literary-philosophical production. But, in doing this, i will also pause, when necessary, to clarify Kierkegaard’s philological application to the texts themselves, and the extent to which, as a reader of the Poetics, he has been both ignored and misunderstood. I. either/or i: The Importance of Tragedy as Historical Idea Kierkegaard’s lengthiest treatment of the tragic art of the greeks belongs to the pseudonym “A,” author of the literary essay in Either/Or, “the tragic in ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama.” In a very Hegelian introduction to the concept of tragedy, insisting on the historical development of the content of the universal concept, and the dialectical nature of their relation, in which each is empty unless mediated by the other, “A” orients the modern concept of tragedy in relation to Aristotle’s originary definition: “Indeed, it must be as a warning against every such one-sided effort to separate that aestheticians always return to the definitions of and requirements for the tragic established by Aristotle as exhausting the concept”;5 margins of his journal entry on Curtius’ commentary, Kierkegaard corrects one of Curtius’ citations in aristotle’s greek, relating a passage from the Poetics to the Ethics. see SKS 19, 377, not12:15–15.a / JP 5, 5606. 4 For a comprehensive discussion of modern scholarship on ἁμαρτία, see Bremer, Hamartia, pp. 91–8. For a similar discussion of κάθαρσις, see the appendix to stephen halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, london: duckworth 1986, pp. 351–6. the moralizing interpretation of κάθαρσις was first challenged, somewhat ambiguously, by Johannes Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, vols. 1–4, vienna: gerold 1865–67). Following vahlen’s reading of the term as “ignorance,” Ingram Bywater’s commentary (Ἀριστοτέλους Περὶ ποιητικῆς. aristotle, On the Art of Poetry, oxford: Clarendon press 1909) develops and further establishes this view. But it was not until Hey’s study of 1927 (see his “Hamartia,” Philologus, no. 83, 1928, pp.1–18; pp. 137–64), writes R.D. Dawe in “Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia” (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, no. 72, 1967, p. 90), that the moral interpretation of ἁμαρτία was “killed stone dead.” regarding the companion term of κάθαρσις, it was Bernays’ famous article of 1857 which finally turned the tide against its moral-religious interpretation. Κάθαρσις was no longer seen as a means of establishing virtue in the soul, either didactically, or through more immediate, emotional impact. 5 SKS 2, 139 / EO1, 139. as in g.W.F. hegel, Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, vols. 1–2, trans. by T.M. Knox, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975, “A” reduces the ancient hero to objective, universal aims: “therefore what principally counts in greek drama whether tragedy or comedy, is the universal and essential element in the aim which the characters are realizing” (hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 1206). Hegel’s ideas on modernity also had a clear influence:

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but the aesthetician who clings too exclusively to the Poetics risks emptying the formal definition of its historical content, and therefore meaning.6 We do not want to separate the ancient from the modern absolutely. on the other hand, abandoning aristotle’s authoritative work on tragedy would deprive tragedy of its concept, sentencing it once again to abstraction. the goal of a is to mark the identity and difference between the two, in order to illuminate the newfound nature of tragedy in modern european culture. his goal appears to be a kind of mediation between them, or possibly a repetition, in the hermeneutical sense, in which greece becomes what it is in Christianity’s recovery of tragedy, after its lapse in modernity. in any case, a clearly orients the question of tragedy and its use in the diagnosis and treatment of the present age in a reading of the Poetics. Beyond aesthetics as philosophy of art, the historical developments within the tragic drama are an occasion for reflecting more generally on the “common consciousness of the age”7 and the beginning of an anthropology: human life is either “the sadness of the tragic or the profound sorrow and profound joy of religion.”8 like the greece of aristophanic comedy, the modern age, a says, is now one of disintegration.9 the invisible religious bonds securing the state are in decline. In the absence of any pre-reflective reality, a comic subjectivity presides over the age which “wants to assert itself as pure form.”10 this generic subject has no obligations or determinations of any kind, ethically, historically, biologically, and “modern tragedy adopts into its own sphere from the start the principle of subjectivity. therefore it takes for its proper subject matter and contents the subjective inner life of the character who is, as in classical tragedy, a purely individual embodiment of ethical powers” (hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2 p. 1223). Beyond this, like “A,” Hegel identifies the comic with an engorged subjectivity (hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, pp. 1199–1202). in his journals, Kierkegaard makes extended use of hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, which he quotes in the german (see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke, et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 1384–1386)) with page and line number. see SKS 19, 273, not8:39.1 / JP 2, 1591. Pap. iii B 28. SKS 19, 275, not12:7 / JP 2, 1738. Pap. v B 60, p. 137. SKS 19, 285–6, not.10:1 / JP 5, 5545. SKS 23, 185, nB17:32 / JP 6, 6602. For more on Kierkegaard’s use of hegel, solger, and tieck in his philosophy of tragedy, see niels thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, princeton: princeton university press 1980, pp. 224–9; pp. 276–7. in his Jena lectures on The Philosophy of Art, schelling introduced a new concept of “the tragic” which departed from the understanding of tragedy in terms of tragic effect. For a discussion relative to Kierkegaard, see Isak Winkel Holm’s “Reflection’s Correlative to Fate: Figures of dependence in søren Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1999, p. 151. hegel historicizes this same idea in both his Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 1209, and the Phenomenology of Spirit (trans. by arnold v. miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1977, p. 279), where prereflective social morality (Sittlichkeit) is said to divide against itself in the objective laws of state and religion. 6 SKS 2, 140 / EO1, 140. 7 SKS 2, 144 / EO1, 144. 8 SKS 2, 146 / EO1, 146. 9 SKS 2, 141 / EO1, 141. 10 SKS 2, 142 / EO1, 142.

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the like. it has no practices or beliefs which it cannot sceptically call into question. a’s diagnosis of the age is contingent on understanding tragedy, in so far as the reign of the comic is equivalent to the loss of tragic possibilities. the comic age loses the sadness of tragedy, and with this sadness, the possibility of κάθαρσις, tragedy’s “healing powers.”11 With the loss of the tragic and the reign of the comic the age gains despair.12 But because the modern subject is one that has become completely “reflected in itself,” a subject that, with Descartes and then Hegel as its expositors, has filtered all of reality through the guarantor of reflection, its comedies and therefore its tragedies are more acute than those by the ancients. as the ancient world is modernized, the sadness of tragedy turns on its hinge, revealing a deeper, all-encompassing sorrow and the hope of an absolute joy. a presents tragedy as primitive stuff, reflectively sharpened by the exaggerations of consciousness in Christian conscience and the modern age. his essay suggests that understanding tragedy properly in its modern form can deliver the age from the desperate abstractions of its ἦθος, whose starting point in reflection, be it the scientific-metaphysical reflections of a Cartesian subject, or a genius-poet of romanticism, has exaggerated freedom beyond all meaning, happiness, and force. The individual cannot be happy “until he has the tragic,”13 he writes clearly enough. What, then, will aristotle’s role be in this development of the concept? II. either/or on Tragic Action: ἦθος and διάνοια in the poetics A first introduces concepts from the Poetics specifically to parse the historical difference in the conception of tragic action. the thinking of the ancient world was not reflexive. It did not refer to itself as a source, but rather sought truth and reality outside it. the limits of human reason were clearly pronounced. the circumstances of action were not wholly available to the agent. and so action proceeded not just from individual thought and character (the Poetics’ διάνοια and ἦθος, which a quotes in aristotle’s greek),14 directed, as he observes in aristotle, toward a deliberate “τέλος”15 but also from a remainder exceeding them, beyond the τέλος fixed by human reason. This “more,” what A calls the “epic remainder,”16 was the true source of “suffering” in a play. The transcendence of “the more,” unmediated by the reflection of “lines,” unsettled their dramatic dialectic from within. In “the more” we have another central concept which we ought to trace back to the Poetics. the idea that tragedy is a variation on the epic goes back to aristotle. it was the Poetics which originally identified tragedy, along with comedy, as a variation

SKS 2, 144 / EO1, 145. ibid. 13 SKS 2, 145 / EO1, 145. 14 see SKS 19, 285–6, not10:1 / JP 5, 5545, where Kierkegaard inscribes the german of hegel’s Aesthetics concerning this passage in the Poetics, Chapter 6. 15 SKS 2, 142 / EO1, 143. 16 SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 144. 11

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on homer’s epic.17 the idea that tragic poetry is an epic remnant, something left behind, incomplete, in which the story begins within a textual gap is a riff on this idea, one that returns in the appropriation of the tragic by the religious subject, such as abraham, who tragically fails to include himself in the reasoned transparency of ethical narratives, whose story is always incomplete, and its origin unobtainable. This is specifically Aristotelian, as Kierkegaard himself recorded in his journals: “All poetry is imitation” (Aristotle)—“better or worse than we are.” Hence poetry points beyond itself to actuality and to the metaphysical ideality.—Where does the poetic center lie—as soon as it is directed toward sympathy—therefore we cannot say that we sympathize with Christ. scripture also says the opposite. see hebrews 4.18

This “more” is represented both in the chorus, which is “more” than the individuality, at times having a privileged perspective, that of the city, or even the gods, expressing a world-order or objectivity from which the individual has been estranged, and also the monologue, which is “more” than the “situation” in which the deed takes place, which exceeds both the immediate scope of the deed and the broader action in which the “epic element” resides, family history, politics, religion, the history of the race, and the like, all fodder for the πάθος of monologue lyricizing the hero’s exclusion.19 as in the Poetics, thought and character are elements of a tragedy, not its essence. Aristotle, and then Kierkegaard, subordinates them both to the “plot” (μίμησις of a πρᾶξις, or human action), whose logic always exceeds the bounds of human deliberation, and contains what Kierkegaard identifies as the epic remainder. Aristotle’s “character and thought” are a means for the tragic mystery of the δαίμων to reveal itself, the sinister numen of the gods destructively at work in family history and civic strife.20 When tragedy undergoes its reflection in modernity, the same dynamics return in a subjectivized version. Character and thought run up against the undisclosable secret of the crime, forced to recognize the truth of the epic remainder, that all human productions, including the production of truth, are fragments.

III. Ἁμαρτία The reflection of ancient tragedy in the modern, more than anything, is a matter of transforming the nature of tragic crime, which, before aristotle’s rationalist interpretation, was likewise the mysterious force of the gods.21 aristotle insists, a

aristotle, Poetics, 1448b 34–1449a 1. SKS 19, 376, not12:8 / JP 1, 144. 19 our ears may need some adjusting to this language, a remnant of Kierkegaard’s Copenhagen at the time, and Heiberg, the critic and dramatist, specifically. See Karsten Fris Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, p. 125, notes 81–2. 20 on aristotle’s secularization of tragedy, see halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 233. 21 See Dawe, “Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia,” pp. 89–123. 17 18

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observes, that the hero have religiousness Α.22 Ἁμαρτία focuses the collision in an agent like Oedipus of “deed” and “suffering,” deliberate action and the onset of epic event:23 in solving the riddle of the sphinx, and marrying Jocastae, oedipus fulfilled the oracle pronounced before his birth. The guilt of tragedy lies between the responsibility of freedom and the fate one innocently suffers by necessity. as Kierkegaard’s pseudonym says elsewhere, greek fate was “the unity of necessity and accident.”24 As a result, authentically tragic guilt is ambiguously “guiltless,” while modern tragedies turn on the hero’s unequivocal guilt. But this, again, is less a development of the dramatic category than it is an analysis of the historically mutated concept crystallized within the dramas themselves. this development, a believes, unwittingly undermines tragedy from within. in analyzing the art form of drama we are engaged essentially in a historical psychology, exploring the difference in which the modern age conceived the godlike, metaphysicalized freedom of the subject, a necessary condition of the hero’s unambiguous guilt and ethical responsibility. tragedy reformulated in modern terms demands a reassessment of the way in which tragic action unfolds, and, especially, the concept of its source in ἁμαρτία, tragic guilt. the introduction of unequivocal guilt in the modern age, the autonomy of individual reason to think and choose for itself, the freedom to be culpable, has an immediate effect on the structure of the drama.25 Along with the “more” of fate and the other epic remainders which SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 143. See Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” pp. 121–2. Curiously, Friis Johansen, in his influential article, lumps Kierkegaard in with post-Lessing scholarship, where he also sticks hegel, in which ἁμαρτία is interpreted in moral terms and κάθαρσις becomes moral reconstruction. this is right for hegel but wrong for Kierkegaard, who goes back to aristotle’s ἁμαρτία to criticize hegel’s objectivized reading. it is the ambiguous innocence of the individual tragic figure in which the tragedy is located. Still, Friis Johansen writes, “Kierkegaard in no way anticipates modern Aristotelian scholarship” (p. 122). But despite his general praise for lessing, it is clear enough that Kierkegaard’s reading of both ἁμαρτία and κάθαρσις depart significantly from the moralist tradition Lessing perpetuates. Ἁμαρτία expresses the hero’s ambiguous innocence and subjection to forces beyond his control, outside of a moral scope. it does not, as with lessing and his predecessors, as well as successors, concern individual virtue, and κάθαρσις has nothing to do with morally regenerating an audience, with character building. on lessing in Kierkegaard’s authorship, see SKS 4, 178 / FT, 88. SKS 7, 65 / CUP1, 63. Clyde holler, the other, more recent commentator on tragedy in Kierkegaard, emphasizes the return to aristotle as a critique of hegel, especially the leap in interpretation of ἁμαρτία. see holler, “tragedy in the Context of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or,” in Either/Or, Part I, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 3), p. 132. 23 SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 144. 24 SKS 4, 400 / CA, 97. 25 Kierkegaard’s notion that the liberation of the individual in modernity coincides with a heightened sense of moral indebtedness, that modernity’s theoretically democratic impulse expresses itself actually in an ethos of calculation and submission, certainly anticipates Friedrich nietzsche’s (1844–1900) analysis in the second essay (“ ‘guilt,’ ‘Bad Conscience,’ and the Like”) of On the Genealogy of Morals (On the Genealogy of Morals. Ecce Homo, trans. by Walter Kaufman and r.J. hollingdale, new York: vintage Books 1969, pp. 57– 96). For more recent developments along similar lines, see michel Foucault, Discipline 22

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converge in a tragic event, family history, divine nemesis, and the like, the monologue itself vanishes, writes a, and, he should have added, so does the chorus.26 thought becomes subjectivized transparently in dialogue, which is to say, the monologue and chorus are no longer distinct elements of dialogue. “Thought” and “character,” two of the six elements of a tragedy Aristotle defines in the Poetics, were originally far from subjectivist. thought was not the province exclusively of individual characters. a drama, too, could be said to express the thought which governed it: ὕβρις, for example, will not go unpunished. likewise, tragedies ought to have an ἦθος. Character, here, does not refer to the individual roles the playwright assigns, but rather the moral hue of the entire play.27 the modernizing of tragedy, however, reduces the aristotelian categories of thought and character to the chattering of individuals, who now, as agents of unambiguous will, absorb the “character” which in ancient tragedy belonged to the plot itself. in a sartrean cut, all deeds are instantly cut off from the past, and “can be explained in situation and lines.”28 every wound is cauterized instantly with the right theory. Action becomes transparent in situation, absorbing the excess and deficiency of the epic element (that more which is always missing) into the presence of the deed and its immediate circumstances. the transparent situation occasions a choice which the self-same tragic figure now bears painfully as his own, without remainder. With this comic hypertrophy by the ethical of individual power, the ambiguous innocence of the tragic is lost and the age gains despair.29 the ambiguity of aristotle’s innovative term, ἁμαρτία, is lost, becomes senseless, or rather, stripped of its original flexibility and reconstituted in the strictness of an ethics in which the subjects of reason, no matter what, are always themselves to blame. the Poetics’ early modern readers interpreted it as such, from the italians of the sixteenth century to lessing. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, represents an early break with this misrepresentation and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (new York: pantheon Books 1977), whose concept of disciplinary power owes considerable debt to Kierkegaard by way of martin heidegger’s notion of enframing (das Gestell). For a contemporary reading of enframing and its influence in critical theory, see Dana Belu, “Thinking Technology, Thinking Nature,” Inquiry, vol. 48, no. 6, 2005, pp. 572–91. 26 SKS 2, 146 / EO1, 147. the editors of SKS provide the alternate rendering of the passage, where Kierkegaard does include the chorus in the list of what’s vanished. this drops out of the hong translation. 27 and so aristotle writes that there might be a play without character (Poetics, 1450a 24). For an insightful discussion, see John Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, london: Chatto & Windus 1962. For a critique of Jones, see martha nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1986, pp. 379–81 and mary Whitlock Blundell, “Ethos and Dianoia Reconsidered,” in Essays on Aristotle’s poetics, princeton: princeton university press 1992, p. 167. this latter essay focuses on the connection between ἦθος and διάνοια, neither of which, she concludes, echoing Jones, can be understood along strictly psychologistic lines. halliwell’s Aristotle’s Poetics, likewise confirms this reading of ἦθος, “a specific moral factor in relation to action,” but not without details which individuate, acting as signs of a deeper, more general ἦθος (p. 166). 28 SKS 2, 143 / EO1, 143. 29 SKS 2, 144 / EO1, 145.

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of tragic ἁμαρτία in both aristotle and the poets. it would take modern scholarship decades to catch up with him. the modern retrieval of tragedy in the profound joy of religion requires a Christian ἁμαρτία which recognizes the original ambiguities of tragedy, and radicalizes them religiously. By continuing to read Either/Or’s essay on tragedy alongside other texts of Kierkegaard, we will find that his criticism of modern tragedy as untragic belongs to a retrieval of ancient tragedy in the light of modern concepts and problems. IV. Daimonic Silence: ἀναγνώρισις and περιπάτεια in Fear and trembling as a augured the religious return of the tragic, another author, Johannes de silentio, creates the figure of father Abraham, the “knight of faith” in which this renewed tragedy might take place. the repetition of the tragic hero in the knight also repeats the aesthetic immediacy in which greek thinking and art, especially tragedy, are allegedly stuck, returning us once again to the question of mediation in greek tragedy, or, in the aristotelian language to which silentio returns, discovery (ἀναγνώρισις). the mediating discovery relieves the religious mystery of fate and resolves the agonizing contradictions by which the tragic figure has been scandalized and made unintelligible, that is, oedipus’ status as both husband and son, father and brother, king and exile. Abraham’s faith is a “later immediacy,”30 not, as hegel claimed of faith, and Kierkegaard was well aware, a first immediacy to be reflected by reason.31 Faith is not a second, but a third immediacy, which has passed through the “later immediacy” of the demonic in which the tragic hero must act, with his back turned to the good, closed in upon himself. Kierkegaard returns to aristotle’s Poetics, specifying the chapter,32 and again quoting the greek: [two parts of the plot, then, peripety and discovery (recognition), are on matters of this sort]. Whenever and wherever it is possible to speak of recognition, there is eo ipso a prior hiddenness. Just as the recognition is the resolving, the relaxing element in dramatic life, so hiddenness is the tension-creating factor….in greek tragedy, the hiddenness (and as a result of it the recogntion) is an epic remnant based on a fate in which the dramatic action vanishes and in which it has its dark, mysterious source.33

through this theme of discovery lifted from the Poetics, silentio goes on to distinguish the features of the knight against those of the tragic hero. the point is to have “aesthetic hiddenness and the paradox appear in their absolute dissimilarity.”34 But SKS 4, 130 / FT, 82. see hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 321–8. see also Pap. i a 273 / JP 2, 1096. 32 he does the same in the Postscript (SKS 7, 466 / CUP1, 514) regarding Poetics, Chapter 5. these are the only two direct citations of entire passages from the Poetics, rather than just terms. It is exceptional for Kierkegaard to consistently cite a specific work by chapter. this suggests, as the Papirer indicate, a close reading of the text itself, rather than a filtering through a commentator, which with aristotle was often the case, given his fondness for Friedrich adolf trendelenburg (1802–72) and Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann (1761–1819). 33 SKS 4, 173–4 / FT, 83–4. 34 SKS 4, 175 / FT, 85. 30 31

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he makes this point using the essentially tragic feature of discovery. With aristotle’s language in the background, it is impossible not to see the religious hiddenness as a radicalized version of the aesthetic hiddenness of tragedies, the religious Or to greek tragedy’s Either.35 By modifying discovery in such a way that it cannot be made, such that the tension between the hidden and the disclosed can never be dramatically exhausted, silentio erects a religious stage in the reader’s interior which is more tragic than tragedy itself. Tragedy conceals a relation “to the idea,”36 a unifying element the age has lost. What silentio means by this is “heroic resolution,”37 ethical commitment. the same criterion holds for the knight of faith, though his idea is paradoxically hidden from view, even his own. aesthetic hiddenness can be disclosed, and its collisions relieved. The hero individually affirms the universal will, the idea of the state, and so on as oedipus voluntarily went into exile, and socrates drank the hemlock, instead of fleeing his sentence, as he could have. The gap between the individual and the universal, the immediacy of family and its gods and the category of the state, where the tragic figure emerges, can be closed. This is not the case with religious hiddenness and the paradox.38 the knight lives for a paradoxical idea which the reversals of plot can never reveal, a reversal which is always possible, infinitely and anxiously postponed. Yet, abrahamic resolution shares with the hero’s deliberation the feature of concealment and the temporary impenetrability of the hero’s choice. it imposes the tension of the choice, the collision between the individual and all moral categories, perhaps even categories of judgment per se, not just for the time being, but as long as the hero lives. the hero cannot judge by the result, silentio tells us.39 he must begin, despite the scandal and collisions which define his choice. Despite eventual greek applause for agamemnon, spurred on by the poets, “the result (insofar as it is finitude’s response to the infinite question) is incongrous with the hero’s existence.”40 silentio forces us here to identify abraham as the essential hero, a radicalized greek general. While, reprising a’s very aristotelian language, the higher τέλος of the state relieves the greek agamemnon’s paradox between the particular obligation as a father to iphigenia and the universal one to the gods of the state,41 abraham’s collision between family and religious obligation is unimpeachable. there is no result which could make sense of him.

see SKS 2, 146 / EO1, 146. For the idea that the “either/or” of Enten—Eller might also apply to this alternating between the tragic and the religious, i must thank Joakim garff. 36 SKS 4, 174 / FT, 84. 37 SKS 4, 175 / FT, 86. 38 SKS 4, 175 / FT, 85. 39 SKS 4, 156 / FT, 63. 40 ibid. 41 aristotle understands poetry in terms of its telos, the cathartic arousal of emotion. see aristotle, Poetics, 1460b 25, 1462a 11–13, 1462a 18–b3, 1462b 12–15. 35

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V. either/or I: Κάθαρσις in aristotle’s text, the κάθαρσις of pity and fear begins most specifically at the moment of discovery and reversal, which, ideally, as in the Tyrannus, he says, ought to coincide.42 a’s employment as historical psychologist compels him to focus on the emotion of pity, since it is precisely the fragmenting of the social body that defines the comic consciousness of the age and the revaluation of the legal-dramatic term ἁμαρτία in terms of unequivocal guilt. to help clarify this development, he introduces the opposition of sorrow and pain. the ancient suffering spread in tragedies through the epic web of events. it was drawn away from its center in any individual deed. all deeds were absorbed in a mythically vast and original network of violence (Oedipus conjectures: “perhaps our race had angered the gods long ago”).43 the effect on the individuals ensnared in this web was “sorrow.” The tragic figure was never the center of the web, only its brightest strand. Sorrow penetrated the entire “work” of tragedy,44 whose aesthetic ambiguity between individual, rational freedom, and religious necessity made it impossible for any individual deed to be blamed. the greater the innocence, then, the greater this sorrow.45 ancient tragedies turned on the minimal “element of guilt” which attached this vague sorrow to a certain individual, like oedipus. he did, after all, kill his father and share his mother’s bed. But the guilt remained “unreflected,” objective, rather than internalized in the stuff of conscience. pity, then, was the right response. Κάθαρσις turned on this. this, in fact, would be a’s objection to hegel, who views tragic guilt in the Antigone dialectically as an “isolated fact”—“a collision between sisterly love and piety and an arbitrary human injunction.”46 it is grounded importantly in aristotle’s aristotle, Poetics, 1452a 31–4. sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, 964–5. my translation of θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον, / τάχ᾽ ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι. 44 SKS 2, 147 / EO1, 148. 45 SKS 2, 149 / EO1, 150. 46 SKS 2, 154 / EO1, 156. Friis Johansen’s article, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” confirms that it is here that Kierkegaard parts ways with Hegel. The conflict of objective ideas is most important to hegel, as opposed to the sorrow and pain of the hero, since “whereas Hegel is in search of a reconciliation of ideas, to Kierkegaard it is essential that the conflict is not ideally resolved. The ambiguity in the hero’s suffering has to be retained” (p. 123). Clyde holler, in “Tragedy in the Context of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or,” p. 128, agrees. Aristotle is the tool Kierkegaard uses to beat hegel back: “after the opening paragraphs, the reader may safely anticipate that the aesthete will confront hegel’s theory of tragedy with a reading of aristotle’s hamartia that undermines the validity of Hegel’s conception” of tragic suffering as punishment well deserved. see hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 2, p. 1198: “a truly tragic suffering, on the contrary, is only inflicted on the individual agents as a consequence of their own deed which is both legitimate and, owing to the resulting collision, blameworthy, and for which their whole self is answerable.” Hegel focuses too closely on his own reading of Antigone, and neglects the epic nature of her suffering. also in his Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 284: “But the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more inexcusable, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them to be violence and wrong, to be ethical merely by accident, and, like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime.” “The critique of Hegel,” adds Holler, p. 140, “lies in the destruction of his concept of tragedy, which in 42 43

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insistence that the tragic effect of κάθαρσις depends essentially on how the poet devises the ἁμαρτία. Kierkegaard drew particular attention to this passage in his journals, relating it to relevant passages in the Ethics which could help illuminate it.47 interpreting the Antigone and tragedy more generally as the dialectical clash between human and divine law is too modern a conception, focused exclusively on the isolated fact of the deed. a, rather, situates antigone within her tragic family, as the daughter of oedipus, and this makes all the difference. tragedy is no longer a merely dialectical problem, as hegel believed, though it has a dialectical element which hegel discerned and Kierkegaard’s authors surely incorporate in their reading. authentic greek tragic interest is actually in the transmission of “oedipus’ sad fate.”48 it is a world that goes under with oedipus, not just an individual. tragedy unleashes an “objective grief” like “a force of nature.” Guilt broke upon Oedipus like a wave from behind and antigone’s grief is an echo of her father’s. But the more pronounced the idea of guilt, the more suffering is localized in a particular body, connected with the hero’s individual intelligence and vision. the elaboration of reflection and the ideal of rational responsibility transmute Greek sorrow into the “pain” fixed in individual conscience, which the individual himself produces. While “the Greeks fear the hands of living gods,” modern man “fears the total guilt of conscience.”49 enter raskolnikov, or, his danish cousin, Quidam, who we will meet in the next section. guilt is something the individual concocts himself in the late hours at his writing table, as will Quidam, or sick and isolated on his couch. The ethical guilt which defines the modern understanding of ἁμαρτία, eliminating tragedy from the horizon and reducing action to the instant of the deed, as a explains, marks a break with the innocence of the aesthetic, be it the total innocence of homeric man, whose actions are beyond him,50 or the relative innocence of the tragic hero’s ambiguous responsibility. regaining the tragic means generating the κάθαρσις of pity despite, or, rather, in virtue of the age’s exaggerations of subjectivity. Tragedy’s religious reflection in/after modernity requires that the age develop new categories to think old phenomena, and so grace and divine compassion become ethically-religiously what tragedy was to human life aesthetically, the “healing turn casts aspersions on both the method and results of the Phenomenology of Spirit.” For a beginning of a critique of hegel’s aesthetics, see SKS 19, 285–6, not10:1 / JP 5, 5545. For the positive Hegelian influence and more on the German idealist background generally, see note 5, above. 47 SKS 19, 378, not12:16 / JP 4, 4839. the reference is to Poetics, 1453b 38–1454a 9. Kierkegaard turns to the Nicomachean Ethics, “especially the third book.” From the numerous citations in the papers, it is clear that this is a connection Kierkegaard drew himself, rather than from commentators. see also SKS 19, 387–8, not13:13–16 / JP 3, 3784. SKS 19, 388, not13:18 / JP 1, 112. SKS 18, 147, JJ:12.a / KJN 2, 137. SKS 25, 147, nB27:31. entries dated 1852. 48 SKS 2, 155 / EO1, 156. 49 SKS 2, 148 / EO1, 148. aristotle had already done his best to secularize ἁμαρτία. rediscovering the gods, and the archaism of hereditary guilt, a religious pollution, in tragedy, Kierkegaard returns to a pre-aristotelian understanding of tragedy and ἁμαρτία. 50 For an extensive discussion of homer’s implicit theory of action, see Bruno snell, The Discovery of the Mind, new York: harper and Bros. 1960.

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powers” corresponding to tragic κάθαρσις.51 translating ἁμαρτία now in the new testament terms of hereditary sin, κάθαρσις returns from the enlightened sense in Aristotle of the recognition of error to its more archaic roots in the purifications of religious encounter.52 The “motherly” sympathies of tragedy and the aesthetic may disappear into the “rigorous” paternalism of ethical conscience, but συμπάθεια returns again in the turn back from ethics to religious subjectivity, and its renewed sense of tragedy.53 The terrible “discrepancy” of sin had yet to appear in tragedy, which absorbed the sufferer and his sorrow in its relative innocence and “gentle continuity.” But with the religious that discrepancy can now be recognized and graciously forgiven, not by the “motherly love that lulls the troubled one” which A discovers in tragedy, but by a reflected version of it.54 no longer a relative ambiguity, now the coincidence of total innocence and total guilt transforms forgiveness into a paradoxical matter of fatherly love, a father’s love for a son, as an individual, moral-intellectual being, who, however unfortunately, Kierkegaard tends to think of as male. Kierkegaard’s reading, like the modern, classical scholarship it precedes, liberates κάθαρσις from the moral therapeutics of lessing as well as the didacticism of the neo-classicists, without turning to the strictly secular-medical analogy of “purging” with which Bernays, decades later, will revolutionize the field.55 Kierkegaard uncovers a religious experience in tragic κάθαρσις concealed by aristotle’s psychologizing of religious ritual, a violent encounter which exceeds the bounds of both moral education and emotional purging.56 although returning creatively to aristotle’s concept, he never suggests, as he had with ἁμαρτία, that his explanation or use of κάθαρσις was explicitly aristotelian. VI. stages on life’s Way: Elaborations on κάθαρσις Not only is the category of tragedy (and comedy) an omnipresent filter through which the figures of Stages explain the idea’s post-modern religious education in paradox, and the possibility in Quidam of this catastrophic regeneration, but the central themes of aristotle’s reading of tragedy—the pity and fear of κάθαρσις—return SKS 2, 145 / EO1, 145. according to both the pseudonyms of haufniensis and Climacus, it is the limitation of greek thought in general that it thinks evil intellectually, in terms of ignorance, deprived as it was of the Christian concept of hereditary sin, the perversion of the will. presumably, this would have applied, for Kierkegaard, to aristotle as well. Whether this does justice to aristotle’s position is another question. 53 SKS 2, 145 / EO1, 145. 54 SKS 2, 145–6 / EO1, 146. 55 Jacob Bernays, “Aristotle on the Effect of Tragedy,” in Articles on Aristotle, vols. 1–4, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, London: Duckworth 1979, vol. 4, Psychology and Aesthetics, pp. 154–65. 56 halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 354. Halliwell confirms that Aristotelian κάθαρσις was primarily a psychologizing of religious ritual. the discussion in the Politics in particular appeals to Corybantic rite. 51 52

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explicitly in Frater taciturnus’ observations on Quidam’s diary.57 together with the diary itself, these meditations on ambiguously tragic guilt make up 60 per-cent of the book, though the first sections of Stages are also largely a story about the tragic emotion of fear and its religious repetition as terror. While the essay on tragedy in Either/Or privileged compassion, taciturnus and Stages on the whole privilege its companion emotion of fear. We can read Stages as a companion to the essay on the relation between tragedy in ancient and modern times, supplementing its work on pity with the development of tragic fear. While sympathy is necessary to draw the victim of tragedy and the observer together, though “de te narratur fabula [the tale is told of you],”58 the “religious healing,” counterpart to κάθαρσις and return to the pre-philosophical, religious sense of the term, “consists first and foremost in arousing...fear.”59 mundane fear, in typically greek-tragic fashion, is best expressed for aesthetics in the annihilation of a house: “our lord can certainly bring danger and misery to your house; indeed, he can take your property, your beloved, your children, and he will surely do it if it is beneficial for you—ergo, since he has not done it, then there is no danger.”60 taciturnus quotes aristotle’s greek directly on the relation of tragedy to the spectator: δι᾿ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν [by pity and fear accomplishing its catharsis of such emotions].61 he sees in the Poetics’ passage a potentially religious discovery:62 fear and compassion become something different when “in turn the religious person has another conception of what awakens fear, and his compassion is therefore in another quarter.”63 the religious point of view departs from an inversion of the tragic destruction of a house and the introduction of a new object by which fear is gripped, the objectless object which discovery can never reveal, the infinitely postponed reversal which the religious suffer, discussed previously in relation to Fear and Trembling: “…the greatest danger is that one does not discover that one is not always discovering, that one is in danger, even if one otherwise had money and the most lovable girl and adorable children and was king of the country or one of the quiet ones in the land, free from all cares.”64 The usual enemies and conflicts typical of tragedy by which the hero is divided and destroyed disappear. “the superiority of the enemy SKS 6, 420–9 / SLW, 454–65. SKS 6, 440 / SLW, 478. 59 SKS 6, 431 / SLW, 468. see Walter Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1987. this was typical of the ritual καθάρσεις of the greek mystery cults in the sixth century. greece, which, along with medicine, are the background for aristotle’s use of the term. aristotle scholarship on κάθαρσις, since lessing, has been a question of whether to emphasize the moral, religious or medical aspect of the term, or merely the pleasurable relief described in the Politics. For a defense of this last view, see g.e.r. lloyd, In the Grip of Disease, oxford: oxford university press 2004. 60 SKS 6, 432 / SLW, 468. 61 SKS 6, 425 / SLW, 460. 62 SKS 6, 426 / SLW, 461–2. 63 SKS 6, 425 / SLW, 461. 64 SKS 6, 432 / SLW, 468–9. 57 58

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before which the hero in the tragic drama falls,” the “hard-hearted fathers” of Romeo and Juliet and all “unhappy lovers in the tragedy,” or “betrayal by the person one trusted,” Othello’s iago for instance,65 yield to an ambivalence or guilt which is totally one’s own. The “fate” in which the hero suffers an aesthetically ambiguous ἁμαρτία, an initial innocence, through the discoveries of plot, yields to an ambiguously innocent guilt over some crime. The sanctified revision of Aristotle’s formula for κάθαρσις concerns a “guilt” which is “sin,” an absolutely innocent ἁμαρτία claiming everyone, deeds notwithstanding. the innocent absence of a crime doubles paradoxically as the “total guilt” foreshadowed in the Either/Or essay as a metaphysical category66 and reprised in the “Religiousness A” of Climacus’ Postscript.67 ambiguities such as oedipus’ can be cleared up. paradox cannot. it is already the job of tragedy to purify the spectator “of all low egotistical elements” and develop his “eye for the idea.”68 The religious tragedy “purifies”69 the passions of pity and fear further through a “turning inward” in relationship with god.70 paradox directs the spectator away from the incidents and accidents of the stage; it frustrates the ability of the playwright to resolve the tension of a play aesthetically, forcing tragedy more deeply and openly into the province of the idea. With the introduction of paradox, the religious author releases tragic drama’s ethical-religious potential from a formerly aesthetic confusion. taciturnus lays down the theory for a radicalizing of tragic κάθαρσις now within the (post)modern category of the religious, beyond the mediations of aesthetics and the stage. he uncovers this radicalizing of aristotle’s κάθαρσις, and this is crucial, as latency in aristotle himself, rather than impose it from the outside. pity and fear in the aristotelian sense are, he writes, above the aesthetics of the pulpit, and metaphysical systematizing.71 This is the “good paganism” Taciturnus enlists in the religious battle against the “bad paganism” of modernity.72 “The religious speaker,” like the tragedian, with the benefit of Aristotle’s aesthetic categories can purify “these passions through fear and compassion” “by letting heaven remain closed, in fear and trembling.”73 It “ennobles” them, protecting them against the swoon into “an aesthetic absorption into something universal,” the dissolution of “invisible religious bonds” in aesthetic or intellectual reflection, the sacrifice of existence to the idea. SKS 6, 434 / SLW, 471. SKS 2, 149 / EO1, 150. 67 SKS 7, 480 / CUP1, 529. 68 SKS 6, 426 / SLW, 461. 69 here Kierkegaard uses the word at rense, in the passive, which the hongs translate as purify. The sense of the word, even more specifically in relation to the κάθαρσις debate, is one of “purgation.” It is interesting to see Kierkegaard use both the words for purgation and a more literally religious purification (at luttre) in the κάθαρσις context. 70 SKS 6, 426 / SLW, 462. 71 SKS 6, 427 / SLW, 463. 72 See the entry on “paganism” in Julia Watkin’s Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy (lanham: scarecrow press 2001) for Kierkegaard’s distinction between between good and bad paganism. 73 SKS 6, 428 / SLW, 464. 65 66

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like abraham, Quidam was faced with the problem of choice. What he lacks and suffers is “resolution.” The Judge’s admonition that decision-making “is the resolution’s bath of purification,”74 invoking the lustral baths of archaic greece,75 if subjected to a rewriting in the “strange tongue” of Abraham or Quidam, a more private language, less friendly than the Judge to Kantian universals, prepares us for a’s idea that tragic κάθαρσις is the religious healing which the culture of modern europe and its empty subjects require, if only they would understand what it means to choose, and be able to do it—if only they knew where to begin. these empty subjects are stuck either in the aesthetic evasion of ethics, that is, a kind of romanticism, or in an idealizing ethics, absorbed in a scientific-metaphysical flight from the flux of existing. religious ideality or subjectivity remains the only path from these abstract possibilities engrossing the culture back to the passionate concreteness of actuality. Quidam returns κάθαρσις from its surrogate home on the stage, as well as aristotle’s philosophical abduction, to its birthright of religion. “do not dampen my fervor, do not put out its fire”; he writes in the diary, “it is still something good even if it must be purified.”76 Quidam embodies the tragic-religious collision between reason and experience passionately charged with the god, which, nevertheless, qua experience, must somehow be recorded, recalled. taciturnus exacerbates the collision in Quidam between reflection and its limits, where representation, conceptuality, fails. He brings him to the point of rapture by inflaming the tragic passion of fear through the same mechanism against which this fear plays, namely, imagination and understanding, obsessed with the idea of a fantastic murder, of which he can conclude neither his innocence nor his guilt. The theater of Quidam’s interior purifies this passion subjectively by inciting it to its highest pitch, these lonely midnights, as he writes in his diary. if he does choose religion, then his total guilt is forgiven. taciturnus admits this is a possibility but never writes of it. if Quidam could recognize his ethical guilt as sin (the new testament ἁμαρτία mirroring that of tragedy), if his grasp of ἁμαρτία could shift from the visibility of crime to the metaphysical crime of original sin, which, like tragic guilt, is only ambiguously one’s own, taciturnus explains in the commentary, his repentance would conclude in sin’s forgiveness and purification. Neither tragic ἁμαρτία nor its Christian counterpart are crimes for which ethics can hold one responsible, which one could redeem on one’s own through some form of penance. they both represent a taint which only a foreign power can remove, as in the motions of grace which a names in his essay. the forgiveness of sin is not over something particular. particularity thinks on a children’s scale, taciturnus writes, or, we might add, a greek poet’s. this is immediacy.77 Forgiveness, on the other hand, is a total reflection and rebirth, the new testament μετάνοια,78 in which everything particular is affected, all immediacy absorbed and transformed by the projection of a new ideality embracing 74 75

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SKS 6, 153 / SLW, 164. the hongs’ annotations direct the reader to Symposium 174a. SKS 6, 153 / SLW, SKS 6, 216 / SLW, 232. SKS 6, 443 / SLW, 481. Climacus pursues this concept at SKS 4, 227 / PF, 18–19.

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the individual’s existence as a whole. this foreign power is the δαίμων behind tragic ἁμαρτία in its full religious reality.79 Quidam describes this rebirth more in terms of ascetic practice, ultimately, than the spontaneity of the κάθαρσις model which dominates the religious healing as taciturnus describes it. But Quidam’s intellectual ascetics, while preparing him for the kathartic return to actuality, through choice, tend to shut him up tighter and tighter within himself. They cure the suffering “by making it worse,” as Taciturnus puts it, exaggerating the conflicts within his thinking to the point of collapse.80 Quidam likens himself to the “Pythagorean” who “could not step on the earth more anxiously than I in fear of, as they say, taking any step.”81 Quidam’s repentance has lapsed ascetically into self-torment, which is just a “sin like other sins.”82 the preparations may be ascetic, but the healing, if it comes, will be spontaneous, as in the ecstasies of dionysus’ mysteries, or those of eleusis, and the Corybantics’ Kybele, which aristotle elaborates in the Politics and which are clues to deciphering the passage in the Poetics.83 still, in order for κάθαρσις to take place, for the tragic emotions of pity and fear to arise, the audience members must identify with the tragic character. interiorizing the lead in a tragedy to the point of a hamlet or a Quidam, or, their more courageous analogue, father abraham, risks undermining this effect. aristotle warned the poet of disturbing the effect through a poor choice of protagonists, or, more specifically, miscasting their ἁμαρτία.84 perverting tragic guilt in such a way that suffering is inaccessible is just what Kierkegaard does. the sanctifying of tragedy converts a sympathy for the conquering hero, majestically framed for the theatergoers in athens by a robust nature, illuminated by the mediterranean sun, into one for the suffering hero, alone in his room, trembling beneath his desk lamp at the sight of his pen.85 “The aesthetic hero is great by conquering, the religious hero by suffering.”86 VII. postscript and Fear and trembling: Kathartic Emotion after Modernity While Kierkegaard no doubt does borrow creatively from aristotle’s hermeneutics of tragedy, the Poetics also provide the target at which his religious destruktion of aesthetics takes aim: “aristotle remarks in the Poetics,” writes Climacus in the Postscript, “that poetry is superior to history, because history presents only what has See Dawe, “Some Reflections on Ate and Hamartia,” for a general discussion. SKS 6, 441 / SLW, 479. 81 SKS 6, 280 / SLW, 301. 82 SKS 6, 431 / SLW, 468. 83 aristotle, Politics, 1432a 5–17. For the Corybantic background, see Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, p. 19, note 32. 84 aristotle, Poetics, 1452b 34–1453a 12. 85 see sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, trans. by J.t. sheppard, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1920, p. ix. in his famous commentary on oedipus, sheppard insists that the staging of the play should respect the robust nature by which the theater in athens was framed: the mediterranean sun which illuminated the plays. 86 SKS 6, 420 / SLW, 454. 79 80

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occurred, poetry what could and ought to have occurred, i.e., poetry has possibility at its disposal.”87 the same idea recurs with thinly veiled reference to aristotle in the section in Stages on Life’s Way entitled “the tragic needs history more than the Comic Does; the Disappearance of this Difference in the ‘Imaginary Construction.’”88 here, taciturnus retrieves the aesthetically absorbed ideality of aristotle’s theater which Climacus criticized, and uses it as an instrument of tragedy’s redemption in religious reflection. The philosophical nature of tragedy which Aristotle discerns merely needs to be critically reflected upon, making it a subjective rather than an objective issue, since for Quidam it became a matter of choice and the idea. But it is not until the Postscript that Kierkegaard explains this outright. Both philosophy traditionally conceived, and theater, confused as bedfellows by the greeks,89 are the “disinterested” expression of an “indifference to actuality.”90 the philosophical nature of theater, for aristotle, reminds Kierkegaard of the theatrical nature of greek philosophy, which all-too-easily adequated the act of thinking with actuality per se. possibility absorbed actuality rather than expressing a transcendence within it, a possibility to be actualized, rather than the possibilizing of actuality. In a note on the definition of the tragic and the comic in the Postscript, the published authorship’s only other direct citation of the Poetics’ greek criticizes the same theatrical-philosophical aestheticizing of the idea.91 Climacus adds a dose of reflection to Aristotle’s conception of comedy, magnifying the tension between the aesthetic and the ethical until the idea emerges explicitly. here lies the difference between both the tragic-aesthetic, its loss in the universal ideality of ethics, and its return in the concrete ideality of religion. But according to Climacus, what applies to the comic does just as well to the tragic, since “the tragic and the comic are the same inasmuch as both are contradiction, but the tragic is suffering contradiction, and the comic is painless contradiction.”92 The Aristotelian definition (Poetics, v): τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν [The ludicrous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others] is not of such a nature that it does not allow whole families of the comic to be secure in their ludicrousness, and it does indeed become doubtful to what extent the definition, even in relation to the comic it embraces, does not bring us into collision with the ethical. his example: that one laughs at an ugly and distorted face if, please note, this does not cause pain to the one who has the face, is neither entirely correct nor so aptly chosen that with one stroke, as it were, it explains the secret of the comic. The example lacks reflection, because, even if the distorted face

SKS 7, 290 / CUP1, 318. SKS 6, 404–12 / SLW, 437–46. 89 see The Concept of Anxiety, SKS 4, 328 / CA, 21, for a discussion of the “aestheticalmetaphysical” confusion of theater and philosophy. 90 SKS 7, 290 / CUP1, 318. 91 SKS 7, 466, note / CUP1, 514, note. 92 Haufniensis, the pseudonym to treat “religious ideality” most explicitly, explains that rather than the greek actualizing of the idea, it is the idealizing of actuality, a project which is always incomplete, and deliberately engaged with human life. SKS 4, 326 / CA, 19. 87 88

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This reflection from theater, through the philosopher’s “idea,”94 to the interior stage of religion, forces tragic κάθαρσις into a new register, which the figure of silentio explains in the knight of faith, who is the occasion for reflecting on tragic heros.95 the inwardizing of κάθαρσις which begins in Quidam concludes in abraham, who rightly demonstrates what happens to tragic mechanism when the philosophicaltheatrical elements are neutralized, that is, when aesthetic-reflective abstraction is overcome in a religious reduction. But when the heroic courage of sacrifice for the state becomes the absurd courage, like abraham’s, which appends “the little phrase: But it will not happen anyway—who then would understand them?”96 if we cannot understand agamemnon, we cannot pity him, or fear him, since both emotions depend upon identification with the hero.97 instead of jettisoning the tragic mechanism of κάθαρσις altogether, in view of this misunderstanding, silentio replaces the emotions of pity and fear with one already familiar from Stages: “one cannot weep over abraham. one approaches him with a horror religiosus, as israel approached Mount Sinai.”98 the ancient tragic stage was a vehicle for the pleasurable relief of difficult emotion, like the Globe of Shakespeare, where the poet’s secret turmoil, he imagines, brought him this power of the word to tell everybody else’s dark secrets, driving “out devils only by the power of the devil.”99 But abraham, an enigma to his poet, silentio, has only horrified observers. The poet himself cannot penetrate his secret, and so the higher pathos of abraham isolates both the reader and would-be poet and turns them back upon themselves. tragic κάθαρσις develops into a deeper suffering which the stage cannot address, intensified and focused in a private encounter with god, a religious horror (such as Quidam’s) to be inspired and katharted in the individual reader. In the final section of Fear and Trembling (problema iii), silentio returns once more to aristotle for a story from the Politics which sheds light on greek tragedy SKS 7, 466, note / CUP1, 514, note. taciturnus distils the tragic idea of ambiguously innocent suffering which the pagans relativized on the stage, through a comic-ironic reflection identified with Socrates, returning it potentially through the religious movement at the edge of which Quidam painfully hovers to the inner stage of religion, the sanctum sanctorum of individual conscience which abraham suffers on his lonely climb up moriah. 95 typically, they are seen in simple opposition. sophia scopetea, for instance, in Kierkegaard og græciteten (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1995, pp. 22–3), finds in Agamemnon only a contrast class for abraham, and writes that as far as the value of the tragic hero per se, apart from defining what Abraham is not, it was as if euripides’ tragedy had never been written. But it is the difference between the hero and the knight in which they are both distinguished. The relation between them, the parallels, where they overlap, is as essential to defining the knight as their discontinuity. 96 SKS 4, 152 / FT, 59. 97 SKS 4, 154 / FT, 61. 98 ibid. 99 SKS 4, 155 / FT, 61. 93 94

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and the knight’s paradox: a bridegroom, for whom the prophets foresee a calamity whose origin is his marriage, suddenly decides, at the last moment, not to come for his bride.100 the details of the story are enough to show that he courts disaster by trying to avoid it, the classic tragic equation, and that, as with aeschylus and Sophocles, this disaster stems from a “contact with the divine,” though “in a double manner—first by the augurs’ pronouncement and next by being condemned as a temple thief.”101 he pollutes the sacred. But the problem with oracles for silentio is that they are intelligible to all. they do not “eventuate in any private relation to the divine.”102 this would have been the problem with oedipus, also, whose private encounter with the god was mediated by the universal language of oracular politics, unintelligible initially, but transparent once the disclosure was made. though the story of the bridegroom illuminates the religious, the tragedy of a religious hero like abraham has to recollect the oracle/fate in a new form, cathartically expressing the suffering encounter with a god in a paradoxically private and indirect language, so that the individual reader might enter into the same private relation. VIII. either/or i: Aristotle and the Religious Rebirth of Tragedy The essay, in order to fulfill its promise, to reflect the ancient, Aristotelian categories of tragedy in the modern, requires the Christian concepts of ἁμαρτία and the private, religious horror of the augustinian-lutheran encounter with god which, as an exercise in aesthetics, it can never deliver.103 the religious concepts which SKS 4, 178 / FT, 89. the allusion is to aristotle, Politics 1303b-1304. in his journals, Kierkegaard confirms that this story follows the pattern of tragedy. See SKS 18, 149, JJ:20 / KJN 2, 139. 101 SKS 4, 179, note / FT, 89, note. 102 SKS 4, 182 / FT, 93. 103 Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” p. 117: “The true counterpart is the religious category where the individual takes upon himself not a specific guilt, but ‘universal sin’ in all its [inexplicable] frightfulness, and therewith the possibility of mercy...now, the religious is not an aesthetic category, and so the question of ‘the true tragic’ is still in suspense,” even within ancient tragedy itself. Friis Johansen continues, p. 118, “the realm of the tragic is the ambiguous. to seek a unity of absolute innocence and absolute guilt in abstract terms is to raise a metaphysical question. to refer to the absolute unity of suffering and action in Christ is to speak religiously. the tragic must always be kept isolated from other categories—in this case from the metaphysical and the religious.” Friis Johansen believes the tragic points towards a supercession in the religious, whereas in the religious i see its proper fulfillment. It is not that neither the Greeks nor Christianity satisfy the concept of tragedy, as he implies, but rather that both do, and the latter in a more radical, more ideal way. the difference turns on the interpretation of the following passage from Either/Or i, quoted on p. 118 of Friis Johansen’s article. greek tragedy, he infers, p. 149, was not truly tragic, because it remained unreflected: “The greater the guiltlessness, the greater the sorrow. If this is insisted upon, the tragic will be cancelled. an element of guilt always remains, but this element is not actually reflected subjectively; this is why the sorrow in Greek tragedy is so profound.” This passage provides Greek tragic sorrow as an example of unreflected guilt, where the tragic is not cancelled, but preserved ambiguously in a guilt which both is and is not one’s own. if it 100

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this reflection demands violate the limits of both the aesthetic, its immediacy, the undialectical nature of poetic thinking, and the unambiguous transparency of the ethical. in order for tragedy to realize its essence in the modern age, the category of sin is necessary, an inwardizing reflection which begins with the unequivocal guilt of ethics, but in a paradoxically ambiguous form. modern tragedy, a believes, though it reduces man and his misfortunes to the deed, makes the individual morally responsible and does not make his sin grand enough. ethical responsibility ought to be exaggerated absurdly to the point of totality. no longer a single murder, but the whole of existence becomes a tragic liability, a loss which the individual conscience suffers, a death for which he is responsible. there ought to be, he says, a metaphysical guilt,104 which, after all, was the conclusion towards which Quidam strained. Without it, the inner resolve which ethics contributes is lost in the “halfmeasures” of aesthetics and the turn inward is either aesthetically avoided or mediated philosophically-reflectively, along with the tragic saving power of “grace and divine compassion,” the inexplicable κάθαρσις which the modern subject requires. the correct understanding of tragedy in the modern age opens the door to the religious “more” of Christ within the tragic texts circulated by aesthetes, both ancient and modern; the tragic daimon haunting tragedy itself. Christianity offers the only true expression for tragedy, which, in one sense, is no longer tragic (that is, no longer naive Greek aesthetics), but nevertheless fulfills the originally Greek tragic vision;105 Christ’s παρουσία is “in a sense the most profound tragedy,” since Christ is an “accidental person,” a man like any other, but the only one “with universal significance.”106 And yet it is “infinitely more” than this tragedy of tragedies, since the contradiction embodied in Christ develops the aesthetic collision in Antigone between reflection and the world of forces (an epic world of irrational powers, decentering the rational individual and society from without, for example, tainted was not actually tragic, then there would be nothing for modernity to reflect, and no occasion for A’s essay. Why, then, would A use the word “tragedy” at all? A’s point is that the tragic problem has become a subjective one, rather than the objective collision it had been for the Greeks. It is not a matter of the “true tragic,” as Friis Johansen insists, but what constitutes the tragic at which point in time, in what way tragedy remains the essential category of human experience. 104 SKS 2, 149 / EO1, 150. 105 again, on this point, i differ from Friis Johansen, who thinks that Christianity leaves the tragic behind, rather than realizing its paradoxical essence. For Friis Johansen the true tragic points beyond both greece and modernity, but can never be realized, since it is an aesthetic concept. this makes it a paradoxical category, on my reading, which becomes possible as it exceeds its own categories. Friis Johansen would have to conclude, on the other hand, that it is merely hypothetical. it never existed and it never will. rather, here in Either/Or and beyond, Kierkegaard discovers religious latencies in greek tragedy that a passage through ethics and an ethical crisis which ethics cannot address translates into a more developed, religious expression. Friis Johansen does just what Kierkegaard warns against in the first pages of the essay, dividing modern and ancient tragedy, and inadvertently emptying them both. rather, a implies, we ought to think them together vis-à-vis their hermeneutical retrieval in a Christian, post-modern age. 106 SKS 2, 142 / EO1, 142.

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blood, divine nemesis, overwhelming passions, religious custom) into a religious collision reflected in the subject’s interior.107 although a is apparently a creature of aesthetics, it is Christ, he writes, who exemplifies tragedy in the modern age, the reflection of aesthetically ambiguous guilt in the paradoxical unity of absolute innocence and absolute guilt, aesthetics and ethics, in a metaphysical category.108

the individuality of eros collides with the universality of φιλία, family, the broader family of the state, in oedipus’ incest. the individuality of φιλία collides with the universality of the state, when oedipus the Corinthian is king. individual human λόγος is a gap in the divine. 108 SKS 2, 149 / EO1, 150. 107

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Even the most inexperienced or superficial reader will invariably feel overwhelmed, if not humiliated at some point, while skimming through the pages of Kierkegaard’s works, and here, in particular, the pseudonymous writings: not only by the wealth of philosophical insights, authorial viewpoints and literary genres exposed in these writings, but also by Kierkegaard’s obvious erudition, the depth and scope of his knowledge about and his masterful use of the philosophical, theological and literary tradition of the Western world. any dedicated Kierkegaard scholar who sets out to dig a little deeper, though, in order, namely, to determine and evaluate the different forms and the actual extent, in which other authors and their ideas have made their way into the Kierkegaardian corpus, may end up with a somewhat different, in any case more sober and partly critical picture: quite often Kierkegaard seems to have known and quoted from other authors only second hand, while his firsthand expertise was either based on a very selective and/or sloppy reading of the pertinent texts or impaired by a tendency to what i would call “appropriation by productive misunderstanding.” This attitude towards and this way of dealing with other sources can neither be done away with as merely idiosyncratic nor simply be attributed to common nineteenth-century hermeneutical practices (for example, the almost exclusive reliance on secondary sources). rather, it appears to be a facet and integral expression of Kierkegaard’s genius as such. an early journal entry thus states: “great geniuses couldn’t really read a book. While they are reading, they will always develop themselves more than understand the author.”1 it does not seem all too far-fetched to suggest that here the master is also, if by implication, speaking about himself. the way, in which Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms tackle aristotle’s works and ideas is a case in point, as the authors of the present volume have pointed out in detail, in particular, with regard to the former’s Nicomachean Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics. Concerning the Rhetoric things are somewhat different, though. or to be more exact, they are not as complicated, historically and philologically speaking, compared to the other texts just mentioned. For one thing, it can hardly be denied—as will become evident shortly—that in the present case Kierkegaard’s aristotle expertise is unmediated; in other words it is (almost) exclusively based on first-hand acquaintance. For another thing his interest in and the (literary expression of his) reception of the text 1

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turns out to be highly eclectic; in fact, it is restricted to and focused upon (various aspects of) one singular topic that Kierkegaard returns to time and again. In what follows I will first provide some basic information of a more statistical, typological, and philological kind, thus trying to determine the nature and actual extent of the Rhetoric’s presence in the authorship. next i will sketch the focus of Kierkegaard’s interest in the book, in order, finally, to extend and contextualize the preceding analysis. I. (1) it has occasionally been said that Kierkegaard’s works and his journals, in particular, are “overflowing with references to meditations on [among others] aristotle’s Rhetoric.”2 this is surely exaggerated. in fact, the sum total of direct and explicit references adds up to no more than 17, 14 of which are found in the journals,3 three in the published—and here in the pseudonymous—works.4 in terms of their content most of these references can be placed under one heading (faith and probability in Christian rhetoric)—these will be dealt with later and in somewhat greater detail. the rest consists of six more or less isolated remarks with no apparent connection to each other. Let us briefly look at them in turn: in order to support his claim that irony, contrary to immediacy, has the comic “within itself”5—here, namely, by producing the comical effect for the enjoyment of the ironist—Climacus approvingly quotes aristotle who (in Book 3.18.7 of the Rhetoric) states that irony “is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the first is employed on one’s own account, the second on that of another.”6 two pages later Climacus invokes the same passage again, this time in the attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate comic statements: the former preserve and express an adequate “relation between the spheres”7—here presumably: the spheres of the serious and the comical—while in concreto making a funny contradiction apparent. By contrast, illegitimate comic statements are essentially sophistical, in that here the comic “has its basis in nothing, in pure abstraction, and is expressed by pia søltoft, “the power of eloquence: on the relation between ethics and rhetoric in Preaching,” Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, pp. 240–7, here p. 243. 3 Cf., in chronological order, Pap. iv a 205 / JP 4, 4252. Pap. iv a 207 / JP 4, 4254, p. 208. SKS 19, 374, not12:3 / JP 1, 143. SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2, 212f. SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 6217. SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN 2, 221. Pap. vi a 146 / JP 5, 5786. Pap. vi C 2–5 / JP 5, 5779–82. SKS 20, 187–8, nB2:115 / JP 5, 6037. SKS 23, 23–4, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7. SKS 25, 83, nB26:80 / JP 1, 824. Pap. X–6 C 6 / JP 6, 6829. SKS 25, 432-4, nB30:57 / JP 1, 180. 4 Cf. SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 207. SKS 7, 473 / CUP1, 521. SKS 7, 475 / CUP1, 523. 5 SKS 7, 473 / CUP1, 521. 6 aristotle, The ‘Art’ of Rhetoric, ed. by J.h. Freese, 5th ed., london: William heinemann 1967 (The Loeb Classical Library, vol. 193), p. 467 [3.18.7; 1419b]. subsequent references to Rhetoric are to this translation. 7 SKS 7, 475 / CUP1, 523. 2

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gorgias in the abstraction: to annihilate earnestness by means of the comic and the comic by means of earnestness.”8 two further references are mere annotations, written down (probably in 1843)9 in a copy of The Concept of Irony;10 they are hardly more significant than a late journal entry (from 1852) containing a long list of book titles, two of which are, according to Kierkegaard, referred to and quoted in a german translation of both the Rhetoric and the so-called Rhetoric to Alexander.11 A sixth and final remark (1842–43) is only indirectly concerned with aristotle’s book; i mention it only for the sake of completeness. Prefiguring similar, if more elaborated reflections in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety,12 Kierkegaard notes: Some of the most difficult disputes are all the boundary disputes in the sciences.... usually a single science is treated by itself; then one has much to say and gives no thought to the possibility of everything suddenly being dissolved if the presupposition must be altered.—this is especially true of aesthetics...aristotle is an exception. he easily perceives that it has a relation to rhetoric, ethics and politics.13

(2) the previous reference may serve as a transition to our next question already: are there any hints to be found in the authorship pointing to a (direct, but) implicit reception of the Rhetoric? and how about indirect forms—whether explicit or implicit?14 naturally enough, implicit or material repercussions of some author B in author A are much more difficult to locate in the latter’s work—often they can only be claimed speculatively. in the present case i will only mention four instances that appear to be relatively safe. In a journal entry titled “Logical problems”15 (containing ibid. as to the corresponding quotation in aristotle, see Rhetoric, p. 467 [3.18.7; 1419b]. See Cornelio Fabro, “Aristotle and Aristotelianism,” in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6), pp. 27–53. 10 see Pap. iv a 205 / JP 4, 4252 (the corresponding passage is: aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 275 [2.20.4; 1393b], where the author illustrates the rhetorical use of parables in socrates); Pap. iv a 207 / JP 4, 4254 (see Rhetoric, p. 305 [2.23.8; 1398a], where socrates’ refusal to accept the invitation of archelaus (king of macedonia) to visit him is reported). 11 see Pap. X–6 C 6, pp. 466f. / JP 6, 6829, p. 461. The first of these two references appears to be more important. partly in greek, Kierkegaard quotes aristotle as saying: “epimenides the Cretan...used to divine, not the future, but only things that were past but obscure” (Rhetoric, pp. 455 and 457 [3.17.10; 1418a]). as to the german translation referred to in this entry, cf. notes 35 and 36. 12 see SKS 4, 317–31 / CA, 9–24. 13 SKS 19, 374, not12:3 / JP 1, 143. I doubt that Kierkegaard had a specific passage from the Rhetoric in mind here; rather, he seems to allude to pertinent considerations in aristotle’s Poetics (1450 b), as the editors of SKS rightly surmise: cf. SKS K19, 514. 14 As to the distinction between explicit/implicit versus direct/indirect reception, cf. briefly: Heiko Schulz, “Marheineke: The Volatilization of Christian Doctrine,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 117–42, see pp. 124–5. 15 Pap. vi B 13 / JP 5, 5787. as to the aristotelian term enthymeme see Rhetoric, p. 9 [1.1.11; 1355a] and passim. I will return to the term and its significance for Kierkegaard in due course. 8 9

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a rough outline of what later became the Postscript), Kierkegaard notes in number 7: “Conclusion—enthymeme—resolution [Slutning—Enthymema—Beslutning].”16 although aristotle is not mentioned by name, it is clear from the context that he and his Rhetoric are actually alluded to. on the other hand, Kierkegaard explicitly refers to aristotle—and here, in particular, to the term πίστις (as used, among others, by the latter in a specific way)—in a journal entry from 1852, without mentioning the Rhetoric as the actual source of that usage and of his own reference to it.17 these are rather marginal points. on a larger scale at least two things deserve to be mentioned: on the one hand it is obvious that Kierkegaard’s continuous and systematically consistent juxtaposition of “rhetoric” and “dialectic”18 is, at least to some degree, indebted to aristotle who holds that the former is in fact “a counterpart of dialectic.”19 in a wider or looser sense (of actual and presumably conscious indebtedness) we may call this a direct, albeit purely material or implicit reflection of the Rhetoric in the authorship. on the other hand, it has not gone unnoticed among Kierkegaard scholars that the latter’s notes and lecture fragments on indirect communication from 1847 can be read,20 in large part, as a Christian answer to aristotle’s Rhetoric and have actually, if implicitly, been written with the great predecessor in mind.21 as a minor piece of evidence one may consider the fact that aristotle’s distinction between ἦθος (referring to the speaker’s character), λόγος (referring to the persuasiveness of the speech) and πάθος (referring to the addressee’s Pap. vi B 13 / JP 5, 5787. SKS 25, 84, nB26:82 / JP 2, 1148. Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 17 [1.2.3; 1356a] and passim. the same implicitness (name of the author without explicit reference to his book) is used in SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 207 (cf. Rhetoric, p. 3 [1.1.3; 1354a] and passim)—here obviously on purpose. 18 Cf., for instance, SKS 7, 52–3 / CUP1, 47–8 SKS 22, 154–5, nB12:18 / JP 1, 508. SKS 26, 384, nB35:20 / JP 4, 4729. Pap. X–6 B 68, p. 74 / JP 6, 6598, p. 301. of special interest are Kierkegaard’s brief remarks on the relation between the dialectical and the rhetorical in The Sickness unto Death, cf. SKS 20, 365–6, nB4:160–1 / JP 5, 6136–8. 19 Rhetoric, p. 3 [1.1.1; 1354a]; see also ibid., p. 19 [1.2.7; 1356a], plus Pap. vi C 2 / JP 5, 5779. It must be kept in mind, though, that in Aristotle “counterpart” (ἀντίστροφος) is used more or less loosely and in any case neutrally. although he does not ignore or deny certain important dissimilarities between rhetoric and dialectic, his intention throughout is to argue for the principal analogies between both—contrary to plato’s polemic against the former as essentially sophistic (cf., for instance, Gorgias 464 bff.). roughly speaking one could say that, according to aristotle, rhetoric is tantamount to the use of dialectic (not in the classroom, but) in and under the specific conditions and restraints of the (potentially uneducated) public. it seems to me that Kierkegaard is ultimately inclined to take sides with plato rather than aristotle at this point; see, for instance, SKS 24, 122, nB22:34 / JP 1, 681: “to a large degree eloquence [Veltalenhed] is essentially sophistic; sophistry consists in the displacement of appropriate action by eloquence.” 20 Cf. Pap. viii–2 B 79–89, pp. 143–90 / JP 1, 648–57, pp. 267–308. 21 Cf. the editors’ note in JP 3, p. 530 (no. 1205). For a more detailed account of the pertinent connections see robert m. goldstein, On Christian Rhetoric: The Significance of S. Kierkegaard’s ‘Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication’ for Philosophical and Theological Pedagogy, ph.d. thesis, princeton university, princeton 1982, see especially Chapter 3. 16 17

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emotional state) as key parameters of the rhetorical analysis22 obviously resurfaces in Kierkegaard’s insistence that the nature and success of any communicational act depends in part on adequately accounting for the parameter, which is in focus, respectively: the communicator, the receiver or the object of communication.23 (3) It is not exactly true that Kierkegaard “first became directly acquainted with aristotle’s works in 1844 in Friedrich adolf trendelenburg’s (1802–72) new, critical edition of On the Soul.”24 For prior to that, in January 1843, he had already acquired a german translation of the Rhetoric,25 and two annotations in a copy of The Concept of Irony from about the same time confirm that the terminus a quo must be located somewhat earlier.26 now, apart from the chronological issue, another question looms large at this point. is it possible that he learned about the Rhetoric from secondary sources or from (university) lectures also—perhaps even prior to 1843? are there, in other words, hints to be found in the authorship as to a genuinely indirect reception of the Rhetoric (be it explicit or implicit)? i do not think so. at least i myself have been unable to discover any evidence to corroborate this assumption. i have to admit, though, that my search was more or less restricted to the “usual suspects.” And here it turns out that not only is any treatment of the aristotelian Rhetoric missing in hegel’s History of Philosophy; furthermore, and more importantly, respected teachers (like poul martin møller, 1794–1838) and authors (like Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, 1761–1819), whom Kierkegaard turned to, whenever the history of philosophy in general, aristotle and/or greek philosophy in particular, were on the agenda, simply ignored the book.27 Cf. Rhetoric, p. 17 [1.2.3; 1356a]. Cf., for instance, Pap. viii–2 B 81, p. 146 / JP 1, 649, p. 270. the trichotomy is later split up into four essential elements (communicator, receiver, object, and communication): see Pap. viii-2 B 83, p. 158 / JP 1, 651, p. 281. 24 Fabro, “Aristotle and Aristotelianism,” p. 38 (cf. also p. 40). 25 Cf. the editors’ note to Pap. iv a 207, p. 81. the two (small) books that Kierkegaard had bought in 1843 are aristotle, Rhetorik, trans. by Karl ludwig roth, in Schriften zur Rhetorik und Poetik, vols. 1–3, stuttgart: metzler 1833–40 vol. 1 (ASKB 1092); Rhetorik an Alexander, trans. by leonhard spengel, in Schriften zur Rhetorik und Poetik, vols. 1–3, stuttgart: metzler 1833–40, vol. 2 (ASKB 1093). 26 Pap. IV A 205 and 207 confirm that Kierkegaard read at least (parts of) the first book mentioned in the previous note. this notwithstanding, i do not want to deny that a more intensive study of the Rhetoric (including the greek text also) did not come about until 1845 (see, for instance, SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN 2, 221)—occasioned perhaps by the idea to write something, under Johannes de silentio’s name, “about the Art of Religious Address” (Pap. vi a 146 / JP 5, 5786). 27 Cf. the respective paragraphs on aristotle in poul martin møller, Efterladte Skrifter, vols. 1–6 (in 3 volumes), Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1855–56, vol. 4, pp. 196–249 (Kierkegaard owned the first edition, vols. 1–3, 1839–43, ASKB 1574–1576); Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 3, 1801, pp. 17–330 (ASKB 815–826). note also that there is no treatment of the Rhetoric to be found in the comprehensive accounts and overviews of greek philosophy that Kierkegaard possessed and referred to occasionally: heinrich ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd ed., hamburg: perthes 1836–39 (ASKB 735–738); eduard zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, 22 23

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there is at least one exception to the rule, though. apart from his earlier acquaintance with Cicero, and apart also from his own natural talent for, inclination to28 and proficiency in rhetoric Kierkegaard had at least one great teacher and living example in the area: Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854).29 it is not my task here to describe and assess in full detail the rhetorical principles, rules and strategies that mynster applied in his own sermons; nor will i tackle the latter’s impact on (and, in fact, deviation from the principles of) Kierkegaard’s edifying literature.30 instead, i simply want to call attention to the fact that mynster published, among many other things, theoretical reflections on the “art of preaching,” and this as early as 1810—reflections, which touch not only upon (homiletical and) rhetorical principles in general, but also, if only in passing, upon aristotle’s Rhetoric.31 Kierkegaard probably knew the text; however, even if he did, mynster’s references to aristotle are actually much too few and far between to draw any substantial conclusions from them, with respect to Kierkegaard’s reception. (4) supported by the evidence presented so far we may now safely infer that Kierkegaard’s knowledge of the aristotelian Rhetoric, instead of being mediated by secondary sources and/or university lectures, was largely based on first-hand acquaintance, that is, upon reading the book itself. and yet, which book—the greek original and/or a latin, german or danish translation? my guess is that Kierkegaard used german translations initially, translations though, which were at times— obviously, whenever he considered it important—also checked against and quoted along with the greek text.32 as far as his own library is concerned, he had access vols. 1–3, tübingen: laupp 1844–52 (ASKB 913–914); g.o. marbach, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, leipzig: Wigand 1838 (ASKB 642). 28 in a journal entry Kierkegaard speaks of himself as a “dialectician with an unusual sense for rhetoric” (SKS 20, 98, nB:146 / JP 5, 5981, p. 369). 29 required reading for the assessment of both sources in their impact on Kierkegaard is Andrew J. Burgess, “Kierkegaard and the Classical Oratorical Tradition,” Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, pp. 228–39. Burgess suggests, among other things, that “Kierkegaard may well have been attracted to aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric just by the incompleteness of...[Cicero’s] exposition” (ibid., p. 230) in De Oratore. As to the nature and extent of Mynster’s influence on Kierkegaard (in matters rhetorical and homiletical) see ibid., pp. 231ff. 30 in addition to a. Burgess’ instructive essay (see the previous note) cf. also george pattison, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature and Theology, london: routledge 2002, pp. 147–8. 31 Cf. “Bemærkninger om den Konst at prædike,” in Jakob Peter Mynster, Blandede Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53, vol. 1, pp. 81–129 (as to the references to aristotle’s Rhetoric, cf. ibid., pp. 91–2) (ASKB 358–363). 32 Whereas in a couple of cases Kierkegaard merely quotes single key terms in greek (e.g. πίστις, ἐπιστήμη etc.); see, for instance, SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2, 212–13), he occasionally also cites various greek terms at once, at times even parts of or complete sentences in greek (cf. SKS 7, 473 / CUP1, 521. Pap. vi C 2–3 / JP 5, 5779–80. Pap. X–6 C 6, p. 466 / JP 6, 6829, p. 461). at least in the latter case it seems fair to assume that he was either working with both the greek text and a translation at hand or that he was relying on the original alone—perhaps by making use of a separate edition of the text like the one referred to in the following footnote.

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to two separate editions of the book: one in greek and latin, presumably,33 and one in german. in addition he owned greek and latin editions of aristotle’s complete works—and, of course, these also contain the Rhetoric.34 Finally, he possessed a german translation of the (pseudepigraphic) Rhetoric to Alexander—a book that was in all probability written, at least in large parts, by the greek historian and rhetorician anaximenes of lampsakos, a contemporary of aristotle.35 One final riddle remains: in a journal entry from 1852 (in fact barely more than a list of book titles) Kierkegaard refers to specific passages of the Rhetoric, but his references are not to the (here: german) edition that was part of his own library; instead, he cites another contemporary German translation, which has not been verified as having been in his possession.36 Why? the answer is simple: we do not know. (5) let me sum up and systematize the results of the preceding reception-historical analysis by drawing on a typological matrix based on the four key parameters that i take to be instrumental for any such analysis: explicit reception direct reception

indirect reception

implicit reception

1. Pseudonymous Works: 1. Pseudonymous Works: SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 207. SKS 7, 473 / CUP1, For example, SKS 7, 52–3 521. SKS 7, 475 / CUP1, 523. / CUP1, 47–8. SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 207. 2. Journals: 2. Journals: Pap. iv a 205 / JP 4, 4252. Pap. iv a 207 / For example, Pap. vi B 13 JP 4, 4254, p. 208. SKS 19, 374, not12:3 / JP / JP 5, 5787. Pap. viii–2 B 1, 143. SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2, 212–13. 81, p. 146 / JP 1, 649, p. 270. SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 627. SKS 18, 236, SKS 20, 365–6, nB4:160–1 JJ:305/ KJN 2, 217. SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN / JP 5, 6136–7. SKS 25, 84, 2, 221. Pap. vi a 146 / JP 5, 5786. Pap. vi C nB26:82 / JP 2, 1148. SKS 2–5 / JP 5, 5779–82. SKS 20, 187–8, nB2:115 22, 154–5, nB12:18 / JP 1, / JP 5, 6037. SKS 23, 23–4, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7. 508. Pap. X–6 B 68, p. 74 / SKS 25, 83, nB26:80 / JP 1, 824. Pap. X–6 C JP 6, 6598, p. 301. SKS 26, 6 / JP 6, 6829. SKS 25, 432-4, nB30:57 / JP 384, nB35:20 / JP 4, 4729. 1, 180. For example, Jakob peter mynster, Blandede Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53, vol. 1, pp. 91–2 (ASKB 358–363).

Cf. aristotle, De arte rhetorica, editio stereotypa, leipzig: teubner 1831 (ASKB 1080). unfortunately, i could not check a copy of the book itself, so i cannot tell for sure that it actually contained both the greek and the latin text (which is what i would guess). 34 For instance, Aristotelis Opera omnia graece ad optimorum exemplarium fidem recensuit, annotationem criticam, librorum argumenta, vols. 1–5, trans. and ed. by Johann gottlieb Buhle, Biponti [zweibrücken]: ex typographia societatis 1791–97, see vol. 4 (ASKB 1069–1073). 35 a fact that Kierkegaard was probably aware of—at least he could have been aware of it, provided he read the introduction of Knebel’s translation of the Rhetoric to Alexander (cf. the following note) who on p. 212, after weighing the arguments, votes against the authenticity of the book. 36 see Pap. X–6 C 6, pp. 466–7 / JP 6, 6829, p. 461. the book he refers to is aristotle, Rhetorik. Rhetorik an Alexandros. Poetik, trans. by heinrich Knebel, stuttgart: p. Balz 1840. 33

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II. (1) in 1845 Kierkegaard made plans for writing a treatise, under Johannes de silentio’s name, “about the Art of Religious Address.”37 perhaps the reading of aristotle’s Rhetoric inspired him to do so; but perhaps also he got his idea prior to picking up aristotle’s book, so that the former was in fact the motivation for the latter and not vice versa. We have to leave the issue undecided. Yet, we are also entitled to do so, for after all the undisputable fact remains that as soon as he actually started reading the book, both the focus of interest he would take in it and the function it should have for his own authorship became clear to him pretty quickly. In concreto, Kierkegaard developed a particularly keen eye for the relation between faith and probability, or more specifically, between faith and the role of arguments in rhetoric, as conceived by aristotle. thus, drawing (if admittedly in a rather eclectical way) on the rich resources provided by the latter, Kierkegaard arrived at (a) a conceptual account of the nature and presuppositions of faith in greek versus Christian thinking; (b) an ontological account of (the meaning and place of) being and non-being in greek versus Christian thinking; (c) a historical, in fact culture-historical, account of both the principal relation between greek antiquity and Christianity and the corresponding historical development from one to the other; and, finally, (d) a rhetorical account of how the implications of (a), (b) and (c) should be applied within homiletics or in the context of a genuinely Christian “art of address.” Before looking at these aspects in greater detail, let me briefly examine the Aristotelian background. here the key terms—also for Kierkegaard—are πίστις and ἐνθύμημα. their meaning, conceptual relation, and systematical function within the overarching framework of the Rhetoric are fairly easy to specify. For aristotle, rhetoric is defined as the (methodically practised) art of discovering and applying “the possible means of persuasion [πιτανόν] in reference to any subject whatever.”38 hence, persuasion in turn functions as the primary goal of rhetorical practice. now, the means a rhetorician has to apply in order to achieve this goal are called πίστεις by aristotle—so that, surprisingly enough, πίστις does not, or at least not primarily, stand for the desired result or effect of applying rhetorical means (namely, in the sense of faith or conviction, brought about by persuasion), but rather for these means themselves.39 Furthermore, since the rhetorical “setting,” as it were, comprises three fundamental parameters or dimensions (the speaker, the addressee, the object, as Pap. vi a 146 / JP 5, 5786; cf. also the fragmentary realization of the plan, Pap. vi B 133–7. Cf. also SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 217 and SKS 20, 187–8, nB2:115 / JP 5, 6037, p. 397, where the idea is pondered again. as to the content, function and purpose of these reflections, cf. Tim Hagemann, Reden und Existieren. Kierkegaards antipersuasive Rhetorik, Berlin and vienna: philo 2001, pp. 12–13. 38 aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 15 [1.2.1; 1355b]. 39 Cf. ibid., pp. 8 [1.1.10; 1355a] and 15 [1.1.2; 1355b]. The English rendition of πίστεις with “proofs” (see Rhetoric, p. 8 and p. 15) seems to me to be misleading, but i admit that an adequate translation is hard to find. In German “Überzeugungsmittel” seems to be a good way of expressing the aristotelian intention: cf. aristotle, Rhetorik, trans. by F.g. sieveke, 2nd ed., munich: Fink 1987, pp. 12–13. note also that in De anima aristotle occasionally uses pístis in the second, more familar sense of “conviction” or “belief”: cf. Aristotle, De anima libri tres, 37

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presented by the speech), the rhetorician always has to consider three such πίστεις or means of conviction: the character of the speaker (he must be or at least appear trustworthy in order to be able to persuade), the frame of mind of the addressee (he must be disposed or at least disposable for generating certain emotions in order to be or to be more easily persuaded) and, last but not least, the content of speech (it must be or at least seem to be based upon plausible arguments in order to be persuasively effective).40 now, aristotle does not only take the πίστεις to be the core of rhetorical theory (compared to which everything else is, in his opinion, “merely an accessory”41); he also contends that among those three πίστεις or means of generating conviction the third one is of primary importance, since “we are most strongly convinced [πιστεύομεν μάλιστα] when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated [ἀποδεδείχθαι]”42—demonstrated, namely, with regard to the content of speech. moreover, since a demonstration normally takes on syllogistic form and since the enthymeme (ἐνθύμημα, from ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, to consider) turns out not only to be “a kind of syllogism [συλλογισμός τις]” per se, but also as the strongest and in fact genuinely “rhetorical demonstration [ἀπόδειξις ῥητορική],”43 it is hardly surprising that, according to aristotle, the rhetorician, precisely by considering and selecting appropriate πίστεις of persuasion, simultaneously has to consider and select appropriate rhetorical syllogisms or enthymemes of course, it is hardly possible, within the scope of the present article, to provide a full-fledged account of the nature, the different types, the rhetorical function, and the epistemological status of the enthymeme in aristotle—much less in comparison to its dialectical or non-rhetorical “counterpart.”44 Suffice it to say, in terms of a brief appendix, that the term denotes (a) an either deductive or inductive syllogism, (b) normally in conditional (“if A, then B”) or causal (“B, since/because A”) form, (c) the premises of which are grounded in certain generally (if at times also fallibly) accepted assumptions, taken at least probably to be true;45 moreover, (d) enthymemes are frequently46 incomplete, in that one premise is (deliberately) omitted, whereby (e) in terms of their rhetorical effect they foster and stimulate the inclination, on the part of the addressee, to believe its conclusion at face value by taking the missing

ed. by F.a. trendelenburg, Jena: Walz 1833 (ASKB 1079), book 1.1.4 and 3.3.8. as to the different notions of πίστις in Aristotle, cf. Fabro, “Aristotle,” pp. 35ff. 40 Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 17 [1.2.3; 1356a]. 41 ibid., p. 5 [1.1.3; 1354a]. 42 ibid., p. 9 [1.1.11; 1355a]. note that aristotle is reintroducing the more familiar notion of πίστις (viz. πιστεύομεν) in the sense of “belief” or “conviction” here. 43 ibid. (my emphasis.) 44 Brief, yet concise and illuminating explanations of the term and its use in aristotle are provided by Christoph Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” § 6; Aristotle, Rhetorik, pp. 228–31 (editor’s notes 4, 5, and 6). 45 Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 11 [1.1.12; 1355a]: in rhetoric, “our proofs [πίστεις] and arguments [λόγους] must rest on generally accepted principles [διὰ τὸν κοινόν],” since here “we are speaking of converse with the multitude [τοὺς πολλούς].” 46 Though not necessarily: see Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” § 6.4.

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premise to signify its self-evidently being true.47 For example: “if not even the gods know everything, human beings can hardly do so” (conditional type).48 or: “she has given birth, for she has milk” (causal type).49 in general, we may say that, according to aristotle, an enthymeme is part of a “process of cognition through probabilities and signs”50 and thus belongs to the realm of faith as opposed to the sciences proper, which alone are capable of generating knowledge through necessary conclusions. (2) so much for the aristotelian background. how does it resurface in Kierkegaard’s authorship? Judging from the pertinent journal entries written down in 1845, it is striking, first of all, that Kierkegaard barely took the time—or so it seems, anyway—to put down more than just a handful of rudimentary paraphrasing notes as to the structure, content, and main headings of the Rhetoric,51 before quickly, maybe all too quickly, delving into and elaborating on his own ideas, which essentially circle around one and the same issue. these ideas make use of the aristotelian sources as a springboard or as a (mostly negative) foil, serving to elucidate core elements of a theory, in which the conceptual, ontological, and rhetorical differences “Im Sinne der publikumswirksamen Praxisbezogenheit der Rhetorik liegt gerade in der Unvollständigkeit ein Element der πίστις (Glaubwürdigkeit) erzeugenden Wirksamkeit [der Enthymeme].” (Aristotle, Rhetorik, p. 229; editor’s note 5). 48 Complete form: “(1) the gods do not know everything. (2) all non-divine beings know less than the gods. (3) humans are non-divine beings. (4) therefore humans know less than the Gods.” I owe this example to Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” § 6.2. 49 Complete form: “(1) this woman has milk. (2) all women having milk have given birth. (3) This woman has given birth.” Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 27 [1.2.18; 1357b]. aristotle calls this latter example an “argument from signs (σημεῖον),” in fact, from “necessary signs,” and thus as a τεκμήριον (proof; see ibid.), since whenever (1) and (2) actually obtain, the argument is infallible and as such irrefutable. By contrast, a contingent sign-argument admits of being refuted, even if the corresponding fact be actually (that is, contingently) true or, more precisely, if a in a given case indicates or is a sign for B, like (e concessis) in the following: “[T]his man has a fever, because he breathes hard” (ibid.). Here the missing premise of the argument (“all men breathing hard have a fever”) is obviously false and thus also the syllogism as a whole. nevertheless we may still speak of an informative and practically orienting guess or conjecture—for example, in the context of a medical diagnosis. the epistemological problem going along with this ambiguity (an argument may as such be invalid and nevertheless contingently be true), or, generally speaking, the problem, in which sense and to which extent non-necessary sign, enthymemes may yet be valid arguments, has been pointed out by Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” § 6.5; according to Rapp, the crucial problem appears to be that aristotle “is bound to the alternative of deduction and induction, and neither class seems appropriate for non-necessary sign-arguments” (ibid.). 50 Fabro, “Aristotle,” p. 36; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 24 [1.2.14; 1357a]. 51 Cf. Pap. vi C 2–5 / JP 5, 5779–82, pp. 270–1. his general exegetical hurry and sloppiness notwithstanding, Kierkegaard clearly realizes that in aristotle (a) rhetoric “becomes an offshoot [Sideskud] of dialectic” (ibid.); (b) the “enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism” (ibid., p. 270); and, in particular, (c) “πίστις, in the plural, [denotes] the means whereby conviction [Overbeviisning] is awakened” (ibid.; my emphasis; cf. also SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 217). Besides that he criticizes that in “his Rhetoric aristotle does not consider the ‘listener’ at all” (ibid., p. 271)—a shortcoming that Kierkegaard is particularly keen on correcting in his own theory of indirect communication: cf., for instance, Pap. viii–2 B 83, pp. 160–1 / JP 1, 651, pp. 282–3. Pap. viii–2 B 89, p. 189 / JP 1, 657, p. 307. 47

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or even antagonisms between greek and Christian thinking are highlighted. these various elements or key aspects are closely related, which makes it difficult to account for them separately. the most obvious, yet also most important, namely the conceptual one, focuses on the different notions of faith (its nature, object, and genesis) in greek and Christian thought. here the major point at issue is the one just mentioned: if πίστις—here qua conviction, belief, or faith—is normally brought about by persuasion; if, furthermore, this persuasion rests, at least in large parts, upon reasoning via enthymemes; and if, finally, the latter must be based upon shared assumptions taken to be probably true at least, then πίστις may itself be regarded as a form of cognition—nota bene, a cognition, which, due to its being restricted to the field of mere probabilities, must be and remain opposed and subordinate to genuinely dialectical knowledge and the sciences proper. Kierkegaard does not hesitate to take sides with aristotle’s view presented so far, and this at least in two respects. on the one hand, the latter correctly distinguishes between—or more exactly, he correctly separates—the spheres of faith and knowledge, of πίστις and ἐπιστήμη.52 there is neither need nor room for faith in any qualified sense (that is, in being confronted with the irreducible uncertainty, going along with mere probabilities), if and wherever knowledge is possible—and vice versa. On the other hand, Kierkegaard finds in Aristotle an ally and in his account a distinctive echo and most welcome corroboration of his own distinction between “a pathetic and a dialectical transition.”53 the latter apparently corresponds to what “Aristotle calls an enthymeme,”54 and the former to the realm of science and dialectic in a stricter sense. Yet, why does he think that the “pathetic leaps” instantiating transitions of pathos (acts of faith and decision, in particular) are actually—if perhaps inadvertently—implied and admitted by aristotle in his theory of enthymemes? three associations come to mind. First, the discovery and application of adequate πίστεις (namely, of actually persuasive enthymemes) rest upon the virtuosity and “divinative power” of the rhetorician—however, this virtuosity can and has to be methodically trained and practiced and is as such in fact connotated as active by Kierkegaard.55 secondly, by using an enthymeme a speaker at least implicitly appeals to a deliberate, voluntary act of appropriation via πίστις on the part of his addressee. in fact, enthymemes, generate and preserve the pretence that speaker and listener share certain assumptions (as at least probably being true)—assumptions that are supposed to be corroborated and “repeated” by the listener thanks to the receptive acts of faith and of practice, as a consequence or integral element of the former.56 Cf. SKS 18, 236, JJ:305.c / KJN 2, 217: “...but the difference from knowledge [Forskjellen fra Viden] is the same in both cases [i.e. in the Christian and the aristotelian concept of faith].” 53 SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN 2, 221. 54 ibid. 55 Cf. Pap. vi C 2 / JP 5, 5779 (my emphasis): “πίστις, in the plural, [according to aristotle] the means whereby conviction is awakened (consequently active).” 56 This might be one of the reasons, why Kierkegaard occasionally replaces the “trilogy” “Conclusion—Enthymeme—Resolution” (SKS 18, 241, JJ:318 / KJN 2, 221 by another one: “Movement; Repetition; Decision a Trilogy.” (SKS 18, 269, JJ:384 / KJN 2, 248) (emphasis in original). Following Klaus schäfer’s interpretation we may say that, according to Kierkegaard, 52

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Finally, according to aristotle, enthymemes and, in particular, contingent sign enthymemes tend to be deceptive, as explained above. Yet, according to Kierkegaard, this is precisely what faith requires in order to be possible: the ubiquitous danger of possibly being deceived. it is this possibility, which always looms large and which makes faith a paradigm of pathos-filled transitions57 (namely, from the possibility to the actuality of something taken to be the case). hence, faith must be communicated indirectly, as an option individually to be actualized, and as an option, which calls for being actualized by the respective individual in the face of possibly being or having been deceived. and yet, in order to be so actualized, faith (or more exactly, its content) must always already have imposed itself upon its addressee as a tempting option. the potential believer must rhetorically be seduced,58 as it were, into wishing and imagining59 accepting what is rhetorically offered to him, whereas the rhetorician in turn has to possess the capability of “deceiving into the truth.”60 thus conceived, it seems hardly accidental that Kierkegaard conceived of Christ as a sign (though, as a sign of contradiction).61 For here something analogous applies: As a sign—and/or as performing “significant” acts, miracles, for example— he simultaneously attracts and repels; he fascinates as much as he calls forth and challenges offense, namely, by claiming to be (or at least by being proclaimed as) the god-man.62 thus, among possible candidates for Kierkegaardian enthymemes one may consider the following: “The eternal has become, for Jesus of Nazareth is God.” Or “Jesus of Nazareth is the God-man, for he performed miracles.” Or vice versa and

the movement of becoming (here, of becoming oneself via faith and/or decision) takes place, “wenn jemand einen anderen Menschen davon überzeugt, dies oder jenes sei wirklich (oder wirklich gewesen)...[H]ier überträgt eine in Bewegung befindliche Ursache wirkend Bewegung auf ein bisher Ruhendes, setzt es in seine (des ruhenden) Bewegung. Der Anstoß, in dem dies geschieht, heißt Enthymema.” (Klaus Schäfer, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel 1968, p. 303, note 213). 57 Cf. Pap. viii–2 B 85, 5 / JP 1, 284: “Faith is...the pathos-filled transition [den pathetiske Overgang].” 58 Cf. SKS 20, 365, nB4:160 / JP 5, 6136, p. 447, where Kierkegaard juxtaposes the dialectical and the rhetorical, the latter being coextensive with “the soul-stirring, the gripping [det Gribende].” 59 in Pap. viii–2 B 85, 15 / JP 1, 286, the rhetorical is defined as “the ethical in the medium of imagination.” Cf. also SKS 24, 107, nB22:6 / JP 2, 1828 and SKS 26, 294-5, nB33:51 / JP 3, 2993. 60 Pap. iX B 63, 13, p. 374 / JP 3, 2649, p. 159. 61 Cf. SKS 12, 129-32 / PC, 124–7. 62 Cf. SKS 18, 268, JJ:381 / KJN 2, 247: “in the case of Christianity, the duplex relation— that it goads just as powerfully as it attracts—is indeed what indicates its absolute truth.” The offensive or “repulsory” character of (the content of) Christian faith is also the basis for attributing to Kierkegaard the counter-Aristotelian project of an “anti-persuasive rhetoric,” as has recently been done by hagemann, Reden und Existieren, especially pp. 75–80. as to a critique of this approach cf. ulrich lincoln, “rede und resonanz. zur Bedeutung einer lebensweltlichen Rhetorik des Christlichen bei Sören Kierkegaard,” unpublished manuscript, 2004, pp. 5ff.

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as a conditional: “If Jesus Christ is the God-man, he performed miracles.”63 or “if Jesus proclaimed to be the god-man, he is the God-man, indeed.” And so on. (3) thus far it seems that Kierkegaard could, at least to some extent, take sides with and find an ally in Aristotle. Upon closer inspection it turns out, however, that he also and in fact to a much greater extent finds himself compelled to disagree with the latter, not so much as a person or as an individual philosopher and his views, but rather as a representative of greek (or heathen) thinking and culture in general—as opposed to Christianity. still tackling the issue of faith, we may roughly outline his standpoint with constant reference to three major theses: faith is not a form of cognition, but of passion; as such, its proper object is not the probable, but the improbable (Christianly speaking, the absurd or the paradox); finally, faith is not subordinate to, but, on the contrary, “higher” than reason (qua knowledge or cognition). all three claims are well-known among Kierkegaard scholars, so it may suffice to just briefly dwell upon them by drawing on a couple of pertinent quotations. Whereas in “the greek view, faith is a concept which belongs in the sphere of the intellectual,” it is, Christianly speaking, “at home in the existential [det Existentielle].”64 thus conceived, it is intimately bound up with an essentially and universally human qualification, namely (the capability and disposition to inwardness qua inner action or) passion.65 to be sure, the passion of faith entails intellectual activity, since the former is intentional in nature (to believe or be convinced of something); however, it cannot be reduced to it—much less so, as cognition, in the sense of striving to know, is in itself an expression of passion.66 moreover, in the act of faith the “how” of passionately relating to something (as true or trustworthy or real) and this very “something” itself, that is, the content or intentional correlate of the believing mind, must exactly correspond to each other. hence, the passion of faith is possible only if what is passionately envisaged as true, real or trustworthy, is not (conceived of as) probable, but, on the contrary, (as) improbable or even absurd. the higher the improbability, the more possible passion, and vice versa. now, since, according to Kierkegaard, Christian notions like the god-man or the eternal in time carry the idea of the improbable to its metaphysically utmost extreme—to “the paradox sensu eminentiori”67—it does not come as a surprise that, in his opinion, a corresponding “faith sensu eminentiori”68 is possible (and adequately grasped) in

see the discussion in SKS 12, 131 / PC, 126. SKS 25, 432-3, nB30:57 / JP 1, 180, p. 71. 65 That faith has to be defined in terms of passion, is witnessed by many passages in the (pseudonymous) authorship: cf., for instance, SKS 4, 141, 159, 209 / FT, 46, 67, 122 and SKS 4, 261 / PF, 59. as to a more comprehensive account of Kierkegaard’s theory of faith, cf. Heiko Schulz, “Second Immediacy: A Kierkegaardian Account of Faith,” in Immediacy and Reflection in Kierkegaard’s Thought, ed. by paul Cruysberghs et al., leuven: leuven university press 2003, pp. 71–86. 66 Cf., for instance, SKS 4, 244 / PF, 38–9. 67 SKS 7, 190 / CUP1, 206. 68 ibid. 63 64

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Christianity alone.69 the following statement neatly sums up Kierkegaard’s view of the deep opposition, in fact the unbridgeable gap between greek and Christian thinking at this point: “πίστις in the classical greek means the conviction...which relates itself to probability. But Christianity, which always turns the concepts of the natural man upside down and gets the opposite meaning out of them, relates πίστις to the improbable.”70 A third and final aspect: Kierkegaard is far from maintaining that reason is completely to be done away with or that it does not have any proper task to fulfill in relation to matters of faith. on the contrary, the indispensable “activity of reason is to distinguish the paradox negatively,”71 to grasp the fact “that it cannot and must not be grasped.”72 in fact, Kierkegaard inculcates time and again that in case of ignoring or refusing this genuinely dialectical task—in order, namely, to replace it by purely speculative thinking—reason ends up turning “the expression ‘paradox’ into a rhetorical expression,”73 a likewise arbitrarily claimed and denied or suspended entity. this notwithstanding, he refuses to accept that faith is “something far lower”74 than knowledge, like in greek thinking (plato and aristotle, in particular). despite—or because—of its being passionately related to the improbable par excellence instead of something merely probable, it is in fact “signifying the highest certainty”75 and as such also amounts to the highest human possibility—“a class by itself,”76 way beyond and above the dualism of faith and knowledge, as conceived of by the greeks. III. it has been suggested that compared to other segments of the aristotelian authorship the latter’s doctrine of πίστις, as being spelled out in the Rhetoric, “exerted the most significant influence, in this case...by contrast, on SK’s existential method.”77 the suggestion seems to me to be correct, indeed; in fact, i believe that the present article has fulfilled its main purpose, if and inasmuch as it has succeeded in providing sufficient or at least additional evidence for its viability. This being said, let me in conclusion and as a kind of appendix hint at some, or more exactly three directions, in which Kierkegaard expanded on and further developed his argument, inasmuch as it is stimulated and challenged by aristotle’s Rhetoric. Thus, in Climacus’ terms, (Christian) faith can be defined as the absurdity that God has become man (or alternatively, that the eternal has become), assented to or “held fast in the passion of inwardness” (SKS 4, 192 / CUP1, 210). 70 SKS 23, 23–4, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7, p. 4. Cf. also SKS 25, 84, nB26:82 / JP 2, 1148. SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 217. 71 SKS 23, 23–4, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7, p. 4. 72 SKS 23, 23–4, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7, p. 5. 73 SKS 7, 201 / CUP1, 220. 74 SKS 25, 84, nB26:82 / JP 2, 1148. 75 ibid. 76 ibid. 77 Fabro, “Aristotle,” p. 49. 69

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First, the ontological aspect: Kierkegaard boldly claims that the “entire question of being and non-being [Væren og Ikke-Væren]...is not found at all in aristotle’s philosophy” instead it is transferred “to the Rhetoric, as that which is especially to evoke conviction.”78 this is certainly not only a bold, but also a rather enigmatic statement. i read it as follows: according to aristotle, we succeed in persuading by rhetorical arguments, whenever “we demonstrate or seem to demonstrate that something is the case.”79 in doing so we are, correctly understood, not so much aiming at a demonstration to the effect that some given X actually exists; rather, we try to prove that something, the existence of which we (and, as we pretend and suggest, also our addressees) already presuppose, is a case of or does in fact belong in the class of “X” (for example, “Napoleon was a great general”; “Jesus of Nazareth is the God-man”). In other words, we are dealing with “factual being,” to use Climacus’ term, as a synthesis of ideality and contingency.80 thus, when Kierkegaard diagnoses a complete absence of any theory of being and non-being in aristotle’s philosophy,81 he is obviously thinking of factual being—as opposed to “ideal being,”82 which aristotle has indeed accounted for in his doctrine of categories, as Kierkegaard rightly observes.83 and yet, why does he think that the question has emigrated, as it were, into the realm of rhetoric in aristotle? Because here, and in Kierkegaard’s opinion solely here, it is being put on the agenda by actually finding an (admittedly, implicit) answer: whether X obtains or not, that is, whether X “is” in the sense of factually being or not, must and can only be decided via πίστις or faith.84 thus, strictly speaking it cannot be demonstrated at all, but instead it must be believed “that something is the case”—e.g., that Napoleon was a great general, that Jesus of nazareth is the god-man, or in general: that X obtains.85 moreover, Kierkegaard’s discussion of the Rhetoric is frequently interspersed with historical observations as to the relation between and the development from SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2. (my emphasis.) Rapp, “Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” § 5. 80 Cf. SKS 4, 246/ PF, 41, note. as to the analysis of factual being as a synthesis of ideality and contingency, cf. heiko schulz, “philosophie als existenzwissenschaft: empirismuskritik und Wissenschaftsklassifikation bei Sören Kierkegaard,” Theologie und Philosophie, vol. 71, 1996, pp. 205–23, see pp. 210–11. 81 and i myself am far from trying to tackle the question, if he is in fact right or not! 82 SKS 4, 246, note / PF, 41, note. 83 Cf. SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2, 212–13. 84 and Climacus is quick to point out that this obtains for both faith “in the ordinary meaning” (historical faith) and “faith sensu eminentiori” (Christian faith, qualified by the paradox), since in both cases it is factual being which is at stake: cf. SKS 4, 285–6 / PF, 86ff. 85 i can only mention in passing one other, anthropologically crucial aspect of this ontology and epistemology of factual being: according to Kierkegaard, faith is in itself a form—in fact: the highest form and expression—of factual being. paraphrasing the corresponding argument Klaus schäfer notes: “Keine Überzeugung zu haben ist...soviel wie nicht sein, aber sein können; in der objektiven Ungewißheit leidenschaftlich mit der Wirklichkeit einer Sache zu rechnen heißt soviel wie ‘sein,’ Wirklichkeit” (Hermeneutische Ontologie, p. 303, note 213). in The Sickness unto Death this view is repeated by formulating the leading principle of a genuinely Christian ontology: “to believe is to be” (SKS 11, 221 / SUD, 93). 78 79

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Greek and/to Christian culture. This is the second aspect that I would like briefly to illuminate. Kierkegaard notes, for instance, that “the place which politics held in Greece has been taken in Xnty by religion”;86 he then goes on historically to expand on the analogy with regard to the role of rhetoric within greek and Christian culture and its impact on the history of both: in ancient times it was essential to be educated in rhetoric, oratory, and eloquence. this education was related to the whole enterprise of public life in the republic; later this eloquence was put to executive use in the sphere of actuality. then came the empire, and the sphere of actuality changed completely—the actions ceased, but the instruction and education of the youth remained the same. in the schools of rhetoric they practiced orating on the same themes of freedom—aber in life there was no use for it. in the same way Christianity has been abolished in Christendom; but the priests are rhetoricians and the sunday services are like exercises in schools of rhetoric. in appearance everything seems to be alright, but the sphere of actuality has been abandoned by Christianity.87

the latter—in Kierkegaard’s opinion, fatal—change in Christianity (or from Christianity to Christendom) goes hand in hand with and is in fact an immediate expression of the attempt to accommodate faith to reason by making it appear probable: “Christianity is now made probable—and so eo ipso the rhetoricians flourish. With reasons upon reasons, they are able to depict and depict and bellow and make all Christianity so probable, so probable—that it most likely is no longer Christianity.”88 thus conceived, the history of Christianity is a history of decline, brought about, among other things, by its being rhetorically distorted and betrayed in the deceptive guise of probability. and yet, Christianity is no exception here; on the contrary, it follows a general pattern: For eloquence always “increases in proportion [to decline]; all political analogies show that eloquence flourished in the time of the dissolution of states,”89 as the example of Greek culture clearly testifies to. Finally, it is augustine who, in Kierkegaard’s opinion, holds a special place within this fatal decline of Christianity; for none other than augustine has “reinstated the platonicAristotelian definition, the whole Greek philosophical pagan definition of faith” as a concept which, as in aristotle’s Rhetoric, “belongs in the sphere of the intellectual,” to the effect that it is essentially “related to probability, and we get the progression: faith—knowledge.”90 at roughly the same time Christianity “was degraded into becoming a state religion”91 and, as an integral expression of this far-reaching transition, “became a doctrine”92—a transition, to be sure, for which augustine’s SKS 18, 232, JJ:290 / KJN 2, 212–13. SKS 24, 510–11, nB25:96 / JP 3, 3715. 88 SKS 25, 83, nB26:80 / JP 1, 824. 89 SKS 24, 122, nB22:34 / JP 1, 681. 90 SKS 25, 432, nB30:57 / JP 1, 180. 91 SKS 25, 222, nB28:10 / JP 1, 178. 92 ibid. Cf. also SKS 18, 236, JJ:305 / KJN 2, 217: “a new science [Videnskab] must be introduced, Christian rhetoric [den christelige Talekunst]. it is to be constructed ad modum aristotle’s Rhetoric. the whole of dogmatics, especially what it has now developed into, is a misunderstanding.” The tendency to avoid the term “Christian rhetoric” is clearly visible here (cf. also SKS 20, 187, nB2:115 / JP 5, 6037, where he speaks of “the art of religious address 86 87

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theology may be considered equally paradigmatic. in Kierkegaard’s opinion both events proved to be fatal blows to the preservation of Christianity in its ideal form. this being said, it should hardly come as a surprise that Kierkegaard programmatically argues for (a) the necessity of an introduction of “a Christian art of speaking [en Christelig Talekunst]...in place of dogmatics,” 93 and (b) the concept of πίστις or faith, as it “relates...to the improbable”94 (specifically, to the paradox), at its center. Christian eloquence will thus be clearly “differ from greek rhetoric in that it only concerns itself [!] with improbability, with showing that something [sc. the content of the Christian gospel] is improbable in order that one can believe it.”95 Fragments of how Kierkegaard set out to realize his plan on a theoretical level are, as is well known, to be found in his lectures on indirect communication—in the preceding paragraphs i have occasionally pointed to the relevant details. Concerning the realization of the program we find in his journals a considerable number of (partly made up, partly reported) samples supposed at least to show in detail “how not to do it”—paradigmatic sermons or fragments of sermons, which in one respect or another run counter to his program by violating its standards.96 of course, Kierkegaard’s own attempts to come up with a better alternative, are accessible for the interested reader (or listener, since they were meant to be read aloud) in the extensive corpus of his edifying literature—plus the six sermons that he gave in public, when he was still alive.97 It goes without saying that a full-fledged account of the many different ways in which Kierkegaard carried out his own program in the course of these writings [den geistlige Talekunst]”). A few years later Kierkegaard even drops the idea of a “science” to be so introduced; instead he writes: “a new practical training course ought to be introduced for theologians...: practice in the Christian art of address [christelige Talekunst], specifically not in the art of preaching, rhetoric [det Rhetoriske], and everything belonging to it, but in the art of being able to preach—Christianity. For with respect to communication Christianity has a singularity which brings entirely unique categories into force.” (SKS 21, 326, nB10:135 / JP 1, 669. (my emphasis.) 93 SKS 23, 23, nB15:25 / JP 1, 7, p. 4. (my emphasis.) 94 ibid. (my emphasis.) 95 SKS 18, 236, JJ:305.c / KJN 2, 217. (original partly italicized.) 96 Cf., for instance, Pap. vi B 10–11 / JP 1, 625–6. SKS 24, 487ff., nB25:69 / JP 3, 3525. For instance, in Pap. vi B 10 / JP 1, 625 (and, as a parallel: SKS 7, 202 / CUP1, 221) Kierkegaard parodies what he calls “the speculative sermon,” in this case a sermon about the “unutterable joy of Christian faith” (cf. 1 Peter 1:8): The speculatively predisposed priest does not only end up in a performative inconsistency (“he calls the joy unutterable, and then... a truly surprising surprise—he utters it”: SKS 7, 202 / CUP1, 221); worse even, the predicate “unutterable,” by being used devoid of any dialectical control, “becomes just a rhetorical predicate, a strong expression” (ibid.). By contrast, that “which really should be accentuated in religious joy is suffering and the idea that is the hinge of the category, namely, that the joy of poetry, art and scholarship stands in an accidental relationship to suffering, because one person becomes a poet without suffering, another by suffering..., but religious joy is in the danger. From here on it is easy to show why it is unutterable.” (Pap. vi B 10, p. 85 / JP 1, 6235, pp. 255–6.) (my emphasis.) the latter is precisely what Kierkegaard himself sets out to do (in various ways and from different angles) in his edifying authorship; cf., for example, part three of the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses (SKS 8, 313–431 / UD, 213–340). 97 Cf. Søltoft, “The Power of Eloquence,” p. 247, note 3.

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would be a separate task that goes well beyond the scope of this article. and the same must be said as to the quest for an equally detailed account of possible or probable (but in any case, implicit) traces of aristotle within the very same corpus. in conclusion, i would like to emphasize that i have considered the purpose of the present article to be purely reconstructive and descriptive. in other words, i have tried, as consistently as possible, not only to avoid any systematically constructive thinking beyond the reception-historical task, but also to abstain from philosophically and/or hermeneutically evaluating, in particular criticizing Kierkegaard’s use of and drawing on the Aristotelian sources. My final judgment is of typological nature and in that sense also a vague reflection of my willingness to abandon for a moment the purely descriptive perspective. For, whatever else we may want to say about Kierkegaard’s writings, inasmuch as they explicitly or implicitly reflect his attempt to come to terms with the Rhetoric, at least one thing should have become evident in the preceding paragraphs—evident, namely, with all possible (and desirable) ambiguity: Kierkegaard’s way of dealing with his great predecessor deserves, by all means, to be called genuinely productive.98

my reception-historical typology (which includes, among others, a genuinely productive type) is introduced and explained in heiko schulz, “die theologische rezeption Kierkegaards in Deutschland und Dänemark. Notizen zu einer historischen Typologie,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1999, pp. 220–44. 98

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I. Aristotle’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera...cum Averrois commentariis, vols. 1–13 in vols. 1–11, venice: apud. iunctas 1562 (ASKB 1056–1068). Aristotelis Opera omnia graece ad optimorum exemplarium fidem recensuit, annotationem criticam, librorum argumenta, vols. 1–5, ed. by Johann gottlieb Buhle, Biponti [zweibrücken]: ex typographia societatis 1791–97 (ASKB 1069– 1073). Aristoteles Graece, vols. 1–2, ed. by immanuel Bekker, Berlin: g. reimer 1831 (ASKB 1074–1075). Aristoteles Latine interpretibus variis, ed. by immanuel Bekker, Berlin: g. reimer 1831 (ASKB 1076). Scholia in Aristotelem, ed. by Christian august Brandis, Berlin: g. reimer 1836 (ASKB 1077). Aristotelis de anima Libri tres, ed. by Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Jena: Walz 1833 (ASKB 1079). De arte rhetorica, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1831 (ASKB 1080). Aristoteles Werke. Organon oder Schriften zur Logik. Der Topica zweite Hälfte, trans. by Karl zell, stuttgart: J.B. metzler (ASKB 1081). Die Ethik des Aristoteles, vols. 1–2, trans. and ed. by Christian garve, Breslau: Korn 1798–1801 (ASKB 1082–1083). Aristoteles Metaphysik, trans. by dr. ernst Wilhelm hengstenberg, ed. by Christian august Brandis, Bonn: Weber 1824 (ASKB 1084). Aristoteles Physik, trans. and ed. by Christian hermann Weiße, leipzig: verlag von J.a. Barth 1829 (ASKB 1085). Aristoteles Analytica, trans. by Karl zell, stuttgart: J.B. metzler 1836 (ASKB 1086). Aristoteles von der Seele und von der Welt, trans. and ed. by Christian hermann Weiße, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1829 (ASKB 1087). Die Politik des Aristoteles, vols. 1–2, trans. by Christian garve, ed. by georg gustav Fülleborn, Breslau: Korn 1799 (ASKB 1088–1089). Die Kategorien des Aristoteles, trans. and ed. by albert heydemann, Berlin: veit & Comp. 1835 (ASKB 1091). Aristotelis Rhetorik, trans. by Karl ludwig roth, stuttgart: J.B. metzler 1833 (ASKB 1092).

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Aristoteles Rhetorik an Alexander, trans. by leonhard spengel; Poetik, trans. by Chr. Waltz, stuttgart: J.B. metzler 1840 (ASKB 1093). Aristoteles Dichtkunst, trans. and ed. by michael Conrad Curtius, hannover: richter 1753 (ASKB 1094). Elementa logices Aristotelicae. In usum scholarum, new revised ed., by Friedrich adolf trendelenburg, Berlin: g. Bethge 1842 (ASKB 1095). Politik und Fragment der Oeconomik, parts 1–3, [from greek] trans. by J.g. schlosser, lübeck and leipzig: Bohn 1798 (ASKB u 15). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Aristotle ast, Friedrich, Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, landshut: thomann 1807, pp. 124–34 (ASKB 385). Baader, Franz, Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung. Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–3, Würzburg: stahel 1837, vol. 2, p. 9, note (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409–410) (vol. 3, ASKB 413). Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche ReligionsPhilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835, p. 228; p. 437; p. 530 (ASKB 421). —— Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1838, p. 231; p. 246 (ASKB 423). [Becker, Karl Friedrich], Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29, vol. 2, p. 429 (ASKB 1972–1983). Bojesen, ernst Frederik, De Problematis Aristotelis, Copenhagen: Bianco luno & schneider 1836 (ASKB 1078). —— Aristoteles’s Statslære, parts 1–2, Copenhagen: J.C. scharling 1851–52 [part 1, Aristoteles’s Statslære. Indbydelsesskrift til den aarlige Hovedexamen i Sorø Akademis Skole i Juli 1851; part 2, Aristoteles’s Statslære. Indbydelsesskrift til den aarlige Hovedexamen i Sorø Akademis Skole i Juli 1852] (ASKB 1090). Buhle, Johann gottlieb, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–6 (in 10 tomes), vols. 1–2, göttingen: Johann georg rosenbusch’s Wittwe 1800; vols. 3–6, göttingen: Johann Friedrich röwer 1802–05 (abtheilung 6 in Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer ausgearbeitet, abtheilungen 1–11, göttingen: röwer and göttingen: rosenbusch 1796–1820), vol. 1, pp. 256ff. (ASKB 440–445). Cousin, victor, Über französische und deutsche Philosophie, trans. by hubert Beckers, preface by F.W.J. schelling, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1834, p. 32 (ASKB 471).

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erdmann, Johann eduard, Leib und Seele nach ihrem Begriff und ihrem Verhältniß zu einander. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der philosophischen Anthropologie, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1837, p. 78; pp. 82–3; pp. 91–2; p. 105; pp. 109–16; pp. 121–2 (ASKB 480). —— Grundriss der Psychologie. Für Vorlesungen, leipzig: vogel 1840, p. 64 (ASKB 481). —— Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik, halle: lippert 1841 (ASKB 483). Fichte, immanuel hermann, De principiorum contradictionis, identitatis, exclusi tertii in logicis dignitate et ordine commentatio, Bonn: georgi 1840, pp. 5–7; p. 10; p. 17, note (ASKB 507). —— Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, heidelberg: akademische Buchhandlung von J.C.B. mohr 1846 (vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie), pp. 161–2; p. 311 (ASKB 509; for vols. 1–2, see ASKB 502–503). Fischer, Friedrich, Die Metaphysik, von empirischem Standpunkte aus dargestellt. Zur Verwirklichung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik, Basel: schweighauser 1847 (ASKB 513). Flögel, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte der komischen Litteratur, vols. 1–4, liegnitz and leipzig: giegert 1784–87, vol. 1, p. 4; p. 42 (ASKB 1396–1399). Frauenstädt, Julius, Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, p. 168 (ASKB 516). Goethe, Johann Wolfgang, “Nachlese zu Aristoteles Poetik,” in Goethe’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand (in 55 volumes), vols. 1–40, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30; Goethe’s nachgelassene Werke, vols. 41–55, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1832–33, vol. 46 (Nachlaß, vol. 6) pp. 16–21 (ASKB 1641–1668). hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, pp. 90–1; p. 95; p. 98, note; pp. 118–22 (ASKB 534). hahn, august (ed.) Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, leipzig: vogel 1828, p. 39; p. 158; p. 266; p. 288 (ASKB 535). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 2, p. 11; p. 38; p. 61; p. 80; p. 90; p. 94; pp. 215–16; vol. 3, p. 51; p. 79; p. 88; p. 94; p. 252; vol. 4, pp. 39–40; p. 43; p. 88; p. 128; vol. 6, p. 8; p. 186; vol. 7, p. 98; vol. 8, p. 370 (ASKB 536–544). hase, Karl, Kirkehistorie. Lærebog nærmest for akademiske Forelæsninger, trans. by C. Winther and t. schorn, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837, p. 39; p. 160; p. 263; p. 362 (ASKB 160–166). hartung, Johann adam, Lehren der Alten über die Dichtkunst durch Zusammenstellung mit denen der besten neueren, hamburg and gotha: perthes 1845 (ASKB 548). [Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich], “Philosophie des Aristoteles,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by

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—— Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57], vol. 1, p. 216; pp. 270–1, vol. 2, p. 118; p. 123; p. 126; p. 363 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, Forelæsningsparagrapher til Kirkehistoriens Philosophie. Et Schema for Tilhørere, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1843, p. 20; p. 43; p. 56 (ASKB 698). —— Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, p. 32; p. 38; p. 89; pp. 187–8 (ASKB 699). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 31; p. 90; p. 108; p. 147; p. 211; p. 242; p. 262; p. 311; p. 323; p. 413; p. 422; p. 429; p. 438; p. 442; p. 445; pp. 458–9 (ASKB 1037). —— Om Epheterne og deres Dikasterier i Athen, Copenhagen: trykt i Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1847, p. 87 (ASKB 720). ritter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: perthes 1836–39, vol. 3, pp. 3–423 (ASKB 735–738). —— Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, ed. by l. preller, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 234–315 (ASKB 726). rötscher, heinrich theodor, Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung. In ihrem organischen Zusammenhange, vols. 1–3, Berlin: Wilhelm thome 1841–46, vol. 1, 1841, p. 4, note; p. 5, note; p. 6, note; p. 16, note; p. 184, note; p. 187, note; p. 188, note (ASKB 1391; for vols. 2–3, entitled Cyclus dramatischer Charaktere. Nebst einer einleitenden Abhandlung über das Wesen dramatischer Charaktergestaltung, see ASKB 1802–1803). schlegel, august Wilhelm, Ueber dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Vorlesungen, vols. 1–2 [vol. 2 in 2 parts], heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1809–11, vol. 1, p. 110; p. 207; p. 352; vol. 2.1, pp. 84ff. (ASKB 1392–1394). [schlegel, Friedrich], Friedrich Schlegel’s Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806. Nebst Fragmenten vorzüglich philosophisch-theologischen Inhalts. Aus dem Nachlaß des Verewigten, ed. by C.h.J. Windischmann, vols. 1–2, Bonn: Weber 1836–37, vol. 1, pp. 35–9; pp. 386–9 (ASKB 768–768a). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, pp. 54–5; p. 82; p. 123; p. 162; p. 166; p. 331; p. 390; p. 521, p. 529; p. 549; p. 557; pp. 561–2; p. 574; p. 576; p. 597; vol. 2, pp. 36–7; pp. 42–3; p. 48; p. 50; p. 70; p. 101; p. 105; p. 110; p. 116; pp. 130–1; p. 142; pp. 150–1; p. 159; p. 176; p. 243; p. 268; p. 296; p. 332; p. 335; pp. 341–2; p. 350; p. 360; p. 366; p. 382; pp. 438–9. (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, pp. 45–50; p. 143; p. 148; p. 163; p. 219; pp. 300–1; pp. 308–9; pp. 317–18; p. 324; p. 386; p. 400; vol. 2, p. 110; p. 120; p. 180; p. 257; p. 337; p. 452; p. 502 (ASKB 774–775). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Logik som Tænkelære fra en intelligent Iagttagelses Standpunct og i analytisk-genetisk Fremstilling, 2nd enlarged and revised ed., Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens Forlag trykt hos Fabritius de tengnagel 1835, p. 2; p. 267; p. 275; p. 303; p. 351 (ASKB 777).

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—— Bidrag til at oplyse nogle ontologiske Udtryk i Aristoteles’s Metaphysik. Indbydelsesskrift til Kjøbenhavns Universitets Fest i Anledning af Hans Majestæt Kongens Fødselsdag den 6te October 1848, Copenhagen: Jens hostrup schultz 1848 (ASKB 1097). —— Nogle Betragtninger over Stat og Kirke [Indbydelsesskrift til Kjøbenhavns Universitets Fest i Anledning af Hans Majestæt Kongens Fødselsdag den 6te October 1849. Heri: Nogle Betragtninger over Stat og Kirke], Copenhagen: Trykt i det Schultziske Officin 1849, pp. 12–14 (ASKB 782). —— Om Forholdet imellem Sjæl og Legeme, saavel i Almindelighed som i phrenologisk, pathognomonisk, physiognomisk og ethisk Henseende i Særdeleshed, Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens eget Forlag 1849, pp. 61–2; p. 241; p. 448; p. 456; p. 459; pp. 467–8; pp. 470–8 (ASKB 781). [solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand], Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel, vols. 1–2, ed. by ludwig tieck and Friedrich von raumer, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1826, pp. 493–628 (ASKB 1832–1833). —— K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, pp. 15–17; pp. 98–9; p. 165 (ASKB 1387). stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion, vols. 1–2, leipzig: siegfried lebrecht Crusius 1794, vol. 1, pp. 263–9 (ASKB 791). stilling, peter michael, Den moderne Atheisme eller den saakaldte Neohegelianismes Conseqvenser af den hegelske Philosophie, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1844, pp. 86–7 (ASKB 801). sulzer, Johann georg, Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 377 (ASKB 807–808). —— sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 27; p. 42; p. 47; p. 49; p. 139; p. 142; p. 147; p. 242; p. 263; p. 341; p. 370; p. 462; p. 465; p. 487; p. 500; pp. 505–6; p. 511; pp. 516–17; p. 621; p. 631; pp. 657–8; p. 665; vol. 2, p. 29; p. 121; p. 322; p. 496; p. 504; p. 635; vol. 3, p. 60; p. 107; p. 142; p 171; p. 308; p. 491; p. 535; p. 670; vol. 4, p. 30; p. 45; p. 416; p. 560; p. 570; p. 573; p. 796 (ASKB 1365–1369). Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Philosophie des Aristoteles,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: Johann ambrosius Barth 1798–1819, vol. 3, pp. 17–331 (ASKB 815–826). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, pp. 10–11; p. 66 (ASKB 1378). tiedemann, dietrich, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1- 6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 2, pp. 212–328 (ASKB 836–841). trendelenburg, adolf, Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, leipzig: vogel 1826 (ASKB 842). —— Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 12, note; pp. 18–21; p. 43, note; p. 56; pp. 72–3; p. 97; p. 106, note; p. 119, note;

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p. 121; pp. 123–4; p. 175; p. 184; p. 209; p. 224; p. 234; p. 278; pp. 293–4; p. 315; vol. 2, p. 8, note; p. 13; p. 23; p. 32; p. 36; p. 166; p. 196; p. 228, note; p. 232; p. 234; p. 237; pp. 262–3; p. 266, note; p. 280; p. 284; p. 324; p. 330 (ASKB 843). —— Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. —— Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik. Zunächst für den Unterricht in Gymnasien, Berlin: g. Bethge 1842 (ASKB 845). Waitz, theodor, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, Braunschweig: Friedrich vieweg und sohn 1849, p. 35; p. 211; p. 449 (ASKB 852). Weiße, Christian hermann, Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: grimmer 1833, p. 69; p. 73, note; p. 94, note; p. 105 (ASKB 866). Wirth, Johann Ulrich, “Lehre des Aristoteles,” in his Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritischdogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845, pp. 212– 27 (ASKB 876). Zeller, Eduard, “Aristoteles und die Peripatetiker,” in his Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, vols. 1–3, tübingen: Fues 1844–52, vol. 2, pp. 362–558 (ASKB 913–914). zeuthen, ludvig, Om den christelige Tro i dens Betydning for Verdenshistorien. Et Forsøg, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1838, p. 6 (ASKB 259). —— Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852, p. 68 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Aristotle Bøggild, Jacob, Ironiens tænker, tænkningens ironie. Kierkegaard læst retorisk, Copenhagen: museum tusculums Forlag 2002. Burgess, Andrew J., “Kierkegaard and the Classical Oratorical Tradition,” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: reitzel 2003, pp. 228–39, especially pp. 230–1, p. 237. Campbell-nelson, John s., Kierkegaard’s Christian Rhetoric, ph.d., Claremont school of theology, Claremont 1982. Durkan, John, “Kierkegaard and Aristotle: A Parallel,” Dublin Review, vol. 213, 1943, pp. 136–48. Faber, Bettina, La contraddizione sofferente. La teoria del tragico in Søren Kierkegaard, padova: il poligrafo 1998, p. 41; p. 72; pp. 74–6; p. 78; p. 82, note; p. 157, note; p. 188. Fabro, Cornelio, “la pistis aristotelica nell’opera di S. Kierkegaard,” Proteus. Rivista di Filosofia, vol. 5, no. 13, 1974, pp. 3–24.

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—— “Aristotle and Aristotelianism,” in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6), pp. 27–53, especially pp. 35–8 and pp. 48–52. Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46. —— “Kierkegaard und die griechische Dialektik,” in Kierkegaard and Dialectics, ed. by Jørgen K. Bukdahl, aarhus: university of aarhus, institute for ethics and the philosophy of religion 1979, pp. 51–124. —— “Kierkegaard og den græske dialektik,” Fønix, vol. 4, no. 4, 1980, pp. 281– 305. galati, michael, “a rhetoric of the subjectivist in a World of untruth: the tasks and Strategies of Søren Kierkegaard,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 55, 1969, pp. 372–80. Garside, Christine, “Can a Woman be Good in the Same Way as a Man?” Dialogue (montreal), vol. 10, 1971, pp. 534-44. goldstein, robert m., On Christian Rhetoric: The Significance of S. Kierkegaard’s ‘Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication’ for Philosophical and Theological Pedagogy, ph.d., princeton university, princeton 1982. greenspan, daniel, Kierkegaard and the Rebirth of Tragedy (with reference to Aristotle and Sophocles), ph.d. thesis, villanova university, villanova, pennsylvania 2006. hagemann, tim, Reden und Existieren. Kierkegaards antipersuasive Rhetorik, Berlin: philo 2001, see especially p. 132. holler, Clyde, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Tragedy in the Context of his Pseudonymous Works, ph.d. thesis, Boston university graduate school, Boston 1981. —— “tragedy in the Context of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or,” in Either/Or, Part I, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 3), pp. 125–42. Holm, Isak Winkel, “Reflection’s Correlative to Fate: Figures of Dependence in søren Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1999, pp. 149–63. holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 15; p. 104; p. 111; p. 126; p. 128. Jensen, Povl Johannes, “Antigone,” in Kierkegaard’s Classical Inspiration, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1985 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14), pp. 12–17. Johnson, Richard, “Neither Aristotle nor Nietzsche,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays of Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. by John J. davenport and anthony rudd, Chicago: open Court 2001, pp. 151–72. Jost, Walter, “on Concealment and deception in rhetoric. newmann and Kierkegaard,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 24, 1994, pp. 51–75, especially pp. 66–7; p. 73. lillegard, norman, “passion and reason. aristotelian strategies in Kierkegaard’s Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics, no. 30, 2002, pp. 251–73.

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lincoln, ulrich, “rede und resonanz. zur Bedeutung einer lebensweltlichen Rhetorik des Christlichen bei Sören Kierkegaard,” unpublished manuscript, 2004, see especially p. 9; pp. 16–17; p. 22. Lindhardt, Jan, “Kierkegaard og Retorikken,” in Ordet og ordene: Udvalgte artikler fra 1979–97, ed. by C. Bach-nielsen, Frederiksberg: anis 1998, pp. 99–108. martinez, roy, Kierkegaard and the Art of Irony, amherst: prometheus 2001. mcdonald, William, Aping Kierkegaard: A Mimetic-Demonic-Offensive Redoubling of Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Rhetoric, ph.d. thesis, sidney university, sidney 1989. pattison, george, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature and Theology, london: routledge 2002, see especially pp. 141ff. pizzuti, giuseppe mario, Invito al pensiero di Sören Kierkegaard, milan: grupp ugo mursia editore 1995, pp. 76–80. Rohatyn, Dennis Anthony, “A Note on Kierkegaard and Aristotle,” The Classical World, vol. 65, 1971–72, pp. 130–1. Roos, H., “Sören Kierkegaard und die Kenosis-Lehre,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2, 1957, pp. 54–60. schäfer, Klaus, Hermeneutische Ontologie in den Climcacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards, munich: Kösel-verlag 1968, see p. 126; pp. 145–9; pp. 303–4. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995. søltoft, pia, “the power of eloquence: on the relation between ethics and rhetoric in Preaching,” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s). Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, pp. 240–7, see especially pp. 245–6. Stack, George J., “Aristotle and Kierkegaard’s Concept of Choice,” Modern Schoolman, vol. 46, 1948, pp. 11–23. —— “Aristótles y las categorías existenciales de Kierkegaard,” Folia Humanística, vol. 9, 1971, pp. 1029–41. —— “Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Choice: The Aristotelian Model,” The Personalist, vol. 52, 1971, pp. 643–61. —— “On the Notion of Dialectics,” Philosophy Today, vol. 15, 1971, pp. 276–90. —— “Aristotles y Kierkegaard: Concepto de posibilidad humana, I-II,” Folia Humanistica, vol. 10, 1972, pp. 15–33; pp. 137–49. —— “Kierkegaard and Potentiality, Existence, and Possibility,” Agora, vol. 2, no. 1, 1972, pp. 50–64. —— “Aristotle and Kierkegaard’s Existential Ethics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 12, 1974, pp. 1–19. tajafuerce, Begonía saez, “rhetoric in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, or ‘no sooner Said than Done,’ ” in Works of Love, ed. by robert l. perkins, marcon, georgia: mercer university press 1999 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 16), pp. 305–38, see especially pp. 327ff. thulstrup, niels, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by george l. stengren, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1980, see p. 210; pp. 224–9; p. 234; p. 242; p. 252; pp. 276–7; pp. 281–4; p. 287; p. 291; pp. 318–19; p.

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375. (originally published as Kierkegaards Forhold til Hegel, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1967.) Torralba Roselló, Francesc, “La recepción de Aristóteles,” in his Poética de la libertad. Lectura de Kierkegaard, madrid: Caparrós editores 1998, pp. 55–8. Waaler, arild, “aristotle, leibniz and the modal Categories in the interlude of the Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1998, pp. 276–91. Widenman, Robert, “Some Aspects of Time in Aristotle and Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 7–22. —— “Aristotle’s Prime Mover,” in Kierkegaard’s Classical Inspiration, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1985 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14), pp. 182–6. Wild, John, “Kierkegaard and Classical Philosophy,” Philosophical Review, vol. 49, no. 5, 1940, pp. 536–51.

part ii other greek philosophers

diogenes laertius: Kierkegaard’s source and inspiration nicolae irina

I. lives of eminent philosophers diogenes laertius was born in laerte, a town in the former roman province of Cilicia, situated on the southeastern coast of modern turkey, north of Cyprus. the details of diogenes’ life are uncertain, but the fact that he mentions sextus empiricus (c. ad 200) in his writings can easily support the commonly accepted idea that he was born and lived around the beginning of the third century. diogenes laertius’ celebrated Lives of Eminent Philosophers, written in greek, consists of 10 books encompassing the biographies of 45 philosophers, from thales to epicurus. diogenes gives more importance to a philosopher’s character, fame, and remarkable sayings than to his doctrine or philosophical views. however, as Jørgen mejer notes, “since the modern scholar usually approaches diogenes with the expectation of finding a work similar to most modern histories of philosophy he is of course disappointed to such a degree that he loses interest in the book as such.”1 moreover, this is not a homogeneous work; most of the biographical fragments included in diogenes’ book were presumably written between the third and the first half of the fourth centuries bc by various scholars, like aristoxenus, antigonus, hermippus, neanthes, and satyrus.2 in fact, diogenes used more than two hundred sources: “first, biographies of the philosophers that began to be written in the third century B.C., frequently with unreliable or even fabricated information; second, philosophical ‘successions’ of a kind that began to appear in the second century B.C., which identify one philosopher as the student, associate, or follower of another; third, chronological writings, specially the Chronica of apollodorus (second century B.C.).”3 the main effort of modern scholarship on diogenes laertius, as mejer points out, has been indeed to establish his sources. according to him, “the results of more than 100 years of Quellenuntersuchungen cannot, however, be said to have yielded any unanimity, and even a superficial knowledge of Laertian scholarship Jørgen Mejer, “Diogenes Laertius and His Hellenistic Background,” Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, vol. 40, 1978, p. 1. 2 ibid., p. 91. 3 richard d. mcKirahan, Jr., Philosophy before Socrates, indianapolis and Cambridge: hackett 1994, p. 5.

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should be enough to discourage anybody from proposing yet another detailed theory about Diogenes’ direct and indirect sources.”4 in the light of the results of laertian scholarship, one could very well be inclined now to quote diogenes’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers with more precaution. unaware of these more recent results, Kierkegaard used Diogenes’ text as a significant and reliable source of information about ancient philosophers and their views. II. Kierkegaard’s References to Diogenes By the time he wrote Either/Or, Kierkegaard had already studied the greek philosophical tradition, looking for help in Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann’s (1761– 1819) Geschichte der Philosophie.5 Correspondingly, one can easily find numerous notes from that period in Kierkegaard’s journals.6 These notes confirm that he dedicated plenty of time to this endeavor. Both before and after this systematic reading phase in tennemann’s work, he also read and used with diligence Børge riisbrigh’s (1731–1809) translation of diogenes laertius’s Lives of Eminent Philosophers,7 as sophia scopetea points out.8 Kierkegaard was indeed very interested in greek philosophy. he even planned a series of lectures on the greek sophists, which remained just a short fragment.9 notwithstanding, eventually neither greek philosophy in its development, nor individual systems in particular succeeded to maintain Kierkegaard’s interest in any lasting manner, as scopetea remarks,10 although socrates’ importance in Kierkegaard’s works holds a unique place. But let us now briefly indicate the presence in Kierkegaard’s writings of some ancient greek philosophers and point out the use of the laertian source which often helped Kierkegaard in understanding their philosophical views. in one of Kierkegaard’s notes to schelling’s lectures in Berlin, dated January 3, 1842, he writes that “in negative philosophy, nothing is fixed, but everything is ibid., p. 8. see Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819 (ASKB 815-826). 6 SKS 19, 302, not10:10 / JP 5, 5572. 7 see [diogenes laertius], Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111; Cf. also ASKB a i 154–155). (english translation quoted here: diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vols. 1–2, trans. by r.d. hicks, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1925 (Loeb Classical Library, vols. 184–5.)) 8 Cf. sophia scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, pp. 19–20, note 63 and p. 104, note 24. For instance, in his preface victor eremita suspects that B quoted in his manuscript from diogenes laertius (SKS 2, 19 / EO1, 11). 9 see Pap. iv C 97 / JP 5, 5601 (the sources are indicated in Pap. iv C 98 / JP 5, 5602). 10 Cf. scopetea, Kierkegaard og Græciteten, p. 39. 4 5

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flowing until it comes to the principle.”11 The flaw of negative philosophy is thus that it reverses the order of possibility and actuality, prioritizing the former, when in fact the principle is “really only that which is assured against all consequent possibilities.”12 the idea is discussed in the context of the pythagorean distinction between “dyad” and “monad,” contrasted with the precedence of the latter, in positive science. in relation to this note, the editorial comment of the english edition gives a possible reference to the ancient distinction in diogenes laertius.13 Kierkegaard’s Repetition begins with a rebuttal of the eleatics’ denial of motion. In his “Report,” Constantin Constantius reminds us of the anecdote about Diogenes of sinope’s opposition to the eleatics’ position, who thought that quietly stepping back and forth would suffice to refute that idea.14 the source of this anecdote is again diogenes laertius,15 and Kierkegaard uses it in other contexts as well. For instance, he paraphrases it in a letter from 1847: “if anyone denies that motion exists, i do as Diogenes did, I walk.”16 epicurus’ presence in Kierkegaard’s writings is also documented in diogenes laertius. Kierkegaard’s remarkable account of suffering, included in one of his Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, tacitly quotes from diogenes, noting Epicurus’ opinion that “one can become accustomed to protracted sufferings.”17 epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus,18 with his view on the individual’s relation to death, is also quoted by Kierkegaard who mentions in a footnote that epicurus’ standpoint also “holds for the relation between probability and improbability: When i am, it (death) is not, and when it (death) is, I am not.”19 in his papers, he reiterates epicurus’ “sophistically maintained” idea about the fear of death.20 Kierkegaard valued particularly the importance of the philosophical implications of greek skepticism. it is well-known that, for Kierkegaard, belief is “not a knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of will.”21 in Philosophical Fragments, he claims that even when greek skeptics entertained doubt, they did so “not by virtue of knowledge, but by virtue of will,” by denying assent, which eventually implies that, likewise, “doubt can be terminated only in freedom, by an act of will,” with the important distinction that in fact the greek skeptic “would not terminate his skepticism precisely because he willed to doubt.” 22 it is diogenes laertius again who provides Kierkegaard with the key to expressing what is distinctive in greek skepticism, that SKS 19, 335, not11:22 / SBL, 372. ibid. 13 Cf. CI, notes, p. 576, note 71. see diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 341–3 (8, 24–5). 14 SKS 4, 9 / R, 131. 15 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, p. 41 (6, 39); see also R, supplement, p. 363, note 2. 16 see WL, supplement, p. 475. 17 SKS 8, 212 / UD, 108. 18 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 651–3 (10, 124–6). 19 SKS 4, 294, note / PF, 95, note. 20 Pap. iv B 1:129 / PF, supplement, p. 147. 21 SKS 4, 282 / PF, 83. 22 SKS 4, 281 / PF, 82. 11

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is, keeping one’s mind or judgment “continually in suspenso…which brings with it a tranquility like its shadow.”23 Kierkegaard’s comment explicitly acknowledges diogenes laertius as its source. Furthermore, in the case of other implicit references to the Greek skeptics and their views, in the lines of the “Interlude” and of some of Kierkegaard’s journal entries,24 the editors indicate again a possible source in diogenes laertius.25 But let us now examine in more detail Kierkegaard’s preeminent interest in socrates. in relation to this, Kierkegaard’s papers are abundant with references to diogenes laertius. the Lives of Eminent Philosophers is a valuable source for his numerous contentions, commentaries, or even simple allusions to socrates, like the one located by the editors in Works of Love: “insofar as he is a thinking person, he fears most to be in error.”26 the passage in diogenes states that, according to socrates, there is “only one good, that is, knowledge, and only one evil, that is ignorance.”27 inevitably, some of Kierkegaard’s references to diogenes’ socrates are slightly inaccurate, as the editors point out.28 Kierkegaard considers that some of the laertian references are remarkable eulogies on socrates. he thought that even “the simple statement of diogenes that Socrates philosophized in the workshops and the marketplace”29 is worthy of praise. accordingly, he also refers to “the beautiful golden rule of the departed socrates: to reason modestly from the little that one understands of something to the much that one does not understand.”30 similarly, in the A Literary Review of Two Ages, Kierkegaard writes about “the socratic practice of drawing modest conclusions from the little that one understands.”31 it is a commonplace to say that Kierkegaard was fascinated by socrates’ irony. indeed, he dedicated his dissertation to this topic. But one can easily see this topic in his journal notes as well: “Oh, I would like to have heard Socrates ironize!”32 We should also note here that Kierkegaard considers that “the ancients’ use of irony is completely different from that of the moderns.”33 on the one hand, there is a sharp contrast between the compact Greek and the “modern reflective prolixity” of the modern language. On the other hand, the “plastic” character of the ancient greek irony is equally distinctive. thus, he discovers such greek irony in diogenes SKS 4, 282 / PF, 83. Cf. diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 517–19 (9, 107). 24 Pap. iv B 13:10–13/ PF, supplement, pp. 262–3. 25 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, pp. 513–15 (9, 102–5). Cf. PF, notes, p. 312, note 48 and p. 346, note 51. 26 SKS 9, 128 / WL, 124. 27 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 161 (2, 31). 28 see for instance Pap. v B 96:14 / P, supplement, p. 119 and P, notes, p. 192, note 50. 29 SKS 7, 298 / CUP1, 327. see also Pap. iv B 116 / R, supplement, p. 300. a slightly modified version can be found in SKS 4, 220 / PF, 11. 30 SV1 Xiii, 447 / COR, 28. 31 SKS 8, 14 / TA, 10. 32 SKS 17, 235, dd:38 / KJN 1, 226. 33 Ibid. (Translation modified.) 23

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of sinope, too, “who not only makes the observation that when a poor marksman shoots the best thing is for him to stand close to the target, but he walks ahead and stands close to the target.”34 diogenes laertius’ book was indeed an excellent source for Kierkegaard for pursuing his interest in the historical figure of Socrates. For instance, he even notes that “[socrates] learned to dance when he was sixty years old because the motion was superb,” and then he explicitly refers to Diogenes Laertius as the source of this information.35 When in The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard makes a detailed investigation of the two accusations against socrates, he refers to the historical document of socrates’ condemnation. in a footnote, Kierkegaard mentions the source of this information, which is, again, diogenes laertius. Kierkegaard states there that Favorinus, a contemporary and friend of plutarch, read the actual indictment,36 which indicated that socrates, “the son of sophroniscus of alopece…is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities.”37 on many occasions Kierkegaard makes direct reference to socrates’ relation with his wife, Xanthippe. one of the main sources of information and inspiration for his account of Xanthippe, in particular, but also for many of his general contentions on women inspired by her is diogenes laertius’ description. Kierkegaard acknowledges that, concerning socrates’ relation to Xanthippe, he has “indicated the best of Diogenes Laertius in [his] copy of the Danish translation.”38 in one of his articles from his student days (1834–36), namely, “another defense of Women’s Great Abilities,”39 Kierkegaard mentions that Xanthippe is “still remembered as a pattern of feminine eloquence and as founder of a school that has lasted to this very day, whereas Socrates’ school has long since disappeared.”40 various other passing references to Xanthippe are direct quotations from diogenes laertius, the source being clearly acknowledged by Kierkegaard, as is the case with the reference to the sound of her “continual carping” in the Prefaces.41 But Kierkegaard was specifically concerned also with distinguishing the historical character of Socrates from his “poetic image” in Plato’s rendering. In that context, Kierkegaard recalls that even the ancient scholars were aware of this “question of the relation between the actual Socrates in Plato’s poetic version,” and then he inaccurately indicates diogenes laertius’ division of plato’s dialogues into

SKS 17, 235, dd:38 / KJN 1, 226. Cf. diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, p. 69 (6, 67). see the same journal entry from 1837. 35 Pap. iii B 30 / JP 4, 4246. 36 SKS 1, 217 / CI, 168. 37 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 171 (2, 40). 38 Pap. iv a 202 / JP 4, 4249. 39 Published as “Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens høje Anlæg,” Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, no. 34, december 17, 1834, columns 4–6. 40 SV1 Xiii, 6 / EPW, 3. 41 SKS 4, 505 / P, 45. Kierkegaard paraphrases socrates, as recorded in diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 167 (2, 36–7). 34

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two groups,42 narrative and dramatic as “a kind of answer” to this problem.43 in order to obtain a more valuable image of the historical socrates, Kierkegaard thus prefers the “narrative” dialogues like the Symposium and the Phaedo, which provide a more valuable source. diogenes laertius’ report is also the starting point for many of Kierkegaard’s analogies and parables. in Fear and Trembling, for instance, in order to express the difficulty of Abraham to utter his final words,44 Kierkegaard tries to draw an analogy with Pythagoras, who in his final moment said that “it is better to be killed than to speak.”45 Kierkegaard attempts this parallelism in a footnote and also provides the reference to diogenes laertius.46 other brief references to pythagoras who commanded silence of his followers appear in Philosophical Fragments.47 moreover, in “Armed Neutrality,” Kierkegaard uses yet another parable involving Pythagoras48 in order to illustrate what it means to undergo the change that “being a Christian” actually demands.49 Kierkegaard’s references to the seven sages are also taken from diogenes laertius. For instance, as the editors pointed out,50 in Kierkegaard’s Prefaces he implicitly recalls anacharsis’ contention that,51 in Kierkegaard’s rendering, “in war games it is the connoisseurs of the art who do battle, and those who do not understand the art who judge it.”52 as the commentators note, this is also the case with Kierkegaard’s parable of Bias, one of the seven wise men of greece, sailing on a ship in distress at sea.53 the reference appears in one of the upbuilding discourses from 1843, namely, “Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins,” where Kierkegaard writes about “an elderly pagan, named and acclaimed in paganism as a sage.”54 diogenes

diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 321 (3, 49–50). on diogenes’ actual divisions of plato’s dialogues and the controversial character of other classifications (like the one Kierkegaard refers to, that is, the division into dramatic and narrative dialogues, which diogenes actually considers to be “better suited to the stage than to philosophy”), see Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 321 (3, 50–1). 43 SKS 1, 92 / CI, 30. 44 this is a major theme in Fear and Trembling (see SKS 4, 172–208 / FT, 82–119), as indicated in the article on euripides in the present volume. Kierkegaard makes many marginal comments on his sketch and draft with regards to this topic. see Pap. iv B 91:17 and Pap. iv B 93:1–6. the latter contains a brief reference to pythagoras’ death. 45 SKS 4, 206 / FT, 118. 46 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, p. 355 (8, 39). 47 Pap. iv B 1:139–140 / PF, supplement, pp. 157–8. 48 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 13 (1, 12). 49 Pap. X–1 B 107:297 / PV, supplement, p. 137. 50 see P, notes, p. 175, note 43. 51 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 10 (1, 103, 7). 52 SKS 4, 482 / P, 17. 53 see EUD, notes, p. 509, note 114. the parable reappears in one of Kierkegaard’s “Discourses on Fridays” on Luke 24:51 (SKS 10, 327 / CD, 299). 54 SKS 5, 75 / EUD, 65. 42

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of sinope55 walking “with a lighted lantern looking for man” is another source of inspiration for Kierkegaard in “Think about Your Creator” from 1844.56 there is yet another famous saying that Kierkegaard selected from one of the passages in diogenes laertius, which he often quotes and applies. in this passage, Hermippus recalls that Thales was “grateful to Fortune” for the three blessings of his life: (1) being born a human being and not an animal, (2) a man and not a woman, and (3) a greek and not a barbarian.57 For instance, in “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” a writes: “i am content with my allotted share [and] thank the gods that i became a man and not a woman.”58 let us now point to another important passage that Kierkegaard looked at in Diogenes Laertius’ book. From it, Kierkegaard draws one of the most significant characteristics of the aesthetic stage. in Either/Or, part 1, the beginning of the celebrated “An Ecstatic Discourse”59 is entirely modeled after a phrase in diogenes laertius’ chapter dedicated to socrates: “someone asked [socrates] whether he should marry or not, and received the reply, ‘Whichever you do you will repent it.’ ”60 Kierkegaard gives the source on the margin of his own copy of Either/Or, part 1.61 Subsequently, Kierkegaard freely paraphrases this passage in his “ecstatic” lecture. moreover, in Stages on Life’s Way, Judge William uses the expression again as “yet another example of socratic irony, namely as an indirect way of saying that one should not look for advice regarding marriage from someone else,”62 as scopetea puts it. The “venerable wise man’s puzzling words,” as Kierkegaard writes, reappear in various other contexts such as “The Thorn in the Flesh,” one of the upbuilding discourses.63 additionally, an earlier note in his journals dating from 1841 reads: “the universalized interpretation of the particular thesis—marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way—is, so to speak, the epitome of all the wisdom of life.”64 in Kierkegaard’s view, the apothegm conforms perfectly to every single life see EUD, notes, p. 522, note 119; diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, p. 43 (6, 40–1). In “To need God” (SKS 5, 297 / EUD, 303), yet another reference to diogenes of sinope is unveiled in an editorial note (EUD, notes, p. 529, note 237). there are other direct references to diogenes of sinope in Kierkegaard’s writings, as well, all documented in diogenes laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers, like the one in Repetition (SKS 4, 9 / R, 131) and the one in Philosophical Fragments (Pap. iv B 1,140 / PF, supplement, p. 158). 56 SKS 5, 244 / EUD, 245. 57 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 35 (1, 33). 58 SKS 2, 130 / EO1, 128. 59 SKS 2, 47–8/ EO1, 38. 60 diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 163 (2, 33). 61 Pap. iv a 220 / EO1, supplement, p. 529. 62 scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten, p. 20. Kierkegaard considered socrates as “en Ironiker,” see SKS 6, 147 / SLW, 156. Kierkegaard quotes yet another passage from diogenes laertius’ account of thales, which he considers also to be quite relevant in relation to this decision. see also SKS 6, 148 / SLW, 157. Pap. iv a 237 / JP 3, 2592. Cf. also scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten, p. 84, note 30. 63 SKS 5, 325 / EUD, 336. 64 SKS 19, 213–14, not7:31 / JP 3, 2586. 55

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situation, and it can be thus adapted accordingly to various circumstances, even to versions like “hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either way,” as he points out in the same journal entry. Kierkegaard’s account of periander in Stages on Life’s Way was largely inspired by both herodotus and diogenes laertius.65 in periander’ story Kierkegaard recognized his own. in a footnote to his translation, Walter lowrie shows that “the entry of april 18, midnight, indicates that [Kierkegaard] detected some similarity between himself and Periander.”66 Kierkegaard actually admits that “[i]n everything that i have heard and read, nothing has so hit me and struck home as what is said of Periander.”67 Joakim garff claims that Kierkegaard even had “the strange realization that it was not he who was to interpret the text, but the reverse, it was the text that was to interpret him.”68 For the piece on periander, Kierkegaard read herodotus in Friedrich lange’s translation of Die Geschichten des Herodotos69 and Diogenes Laertius in Børge riisbrigh’s.70 Comparing Kierkegaard’s account with the two original versions of herodotus and diogenes laertius, one can easily notice that “the piece is primarily a compact paraphrase; it is as if Kierkegaard had composed his manuscript with his volume of Diogenes Laertius open on his left side and Herodotus on his right.”71 as we have seen, diogenes laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers represents a significant source of information for many of Kierkegaard’s concerns with ancient figures and philosophical views, but it is also a fruitful inspiration for his parables. Journal entries, marginal notes or full-fledged passages, long descriptions, famous sayings, parables, all with direct or implicit references to diogenes laertius’ text are impressively abundant in Kierkegaard’s writings. thus, the Lives of Eminent Philosophers proves itself to have been a very helpful appendix in Kierkegaard’s endeavors. Kierkegaard’s use of references to ancient sources is not merely circumstantial. the overarching critical stance that he takes is directed against the tendency of his contemporaries to ignore the importance of the ancient concern with wisdom. thus, the context in which Kierkegaard uses diogenes laertius’ Lives is characterized by a more profound reading than a mere anecdotal reference to dismembered bits and pieces of ancient philosophers’ portraits. Kierkegaard’s claim is that it is worthwhile exploring what has been recorded in diogenes laertius’s Lives from the See “The Reading Lesson” (SKS 6, 301–5/ SLW, 323–8); alternate title “a school Exercise,” in Walter Lowrie’s translation, Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, new York: schocken Books 1967, p. 298. 66 ibid., note 97. 67 SKS 6, 287 / SLW, 310. in diogenes, see Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, p. 101 (1, 98). 68 Joakim garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. by Bruce Kirmmse, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2005, p. 352. 69 Die Geschichten des Herodotos, vols. 1–2, trans. by Friedrich lange, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1811–12 (ASKB 1117). 70 [diogenes laertius], Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh. 71 garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, p. 352. 65

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ancient philosophical tradition, in order to grasp the significance of what philosophy fundamentally means, that is, an attempt to harmonize one’s doctrine with one’s life. as Jon stewart indicates, “the philosophers portrayed there, regardless of how strange or idiosyncratic, are for [Kierkegaard] a model for the philosophical life. they are praised as living and acting with passion, whereas the speculative philosopher of the nineteenth century is criticized for lacking it.”72 it is in fact a meaningful undertaking that Kierkegaard sees himself involved in throughout his entire authorship. his task is to question the understanding and defy the sufficiency of established authorities, both religious and philosophical, of the “present age,” that is, the nineteenth-century paradigm. In the final number of The Moment, he describes his attack on the Danish Church in terms of a “Socratic task”: “the only analogy i have before me is socrates; my task is a socratic task, to audit the definition of what it means to be a Christian—I do not call myself a Christian (keeping the ideal free), but i can make it manifest that the others are even less so.”73 Kierkegaard’s claim of socratic ignorance directed against a too loosely selfassumed Christian definition “gives him the ability to make his fellow citizens aware of a deeper sense in which they are not Christians, while also allowing him at the same time to pursue an authentic and religious life,”74 as paul muench points out. Kierkegaard also urges his contemporaries to rediscover the sense of the ancient philosophical inquiry and its emphasis on the lived life. as rick a. Furtak explains, Kierkegaard sees the greek philosophy “not merely as a historical mode of thought, but as a disposition that could be adopted in any era by a person with the right attitudes and beliefs.”75 modern philosophy, on the contrary, detached from life, alienated by its castle-building systematization, and isolated in its exclusive concern with abstract and speculative philosophical matters, has lost the ancient sense of the “quest for wisdom” that characterizes any “ardent existing person impassioned by his thinking.”76 For Kierkegaard, what profoundly permeated the philosophical milieu of the “present age” in the nineteenth-century Copenhagen overwhelmingly influenced by German idealism was a tendency to alter the spirit of genuine philosophical inquiry, transforming it into a professionalized institution reminiscent of the much criticized sophistic movement. Kierkegaard’s effort is to advance an unaltered model of philosophy that seems to have vanished from contemporary philosophical pursuits. thus, his major philosophical concerns bring him closer to ancient philosophy, to socrates in particular and to stoicism.77

Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and new York: Cambridge university press 2003, p. 644. 73 SKS 13, 405 / M, 341. 74 Paul Muench, “Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 24, 2007, pp. 132–63, see p. 149. 75 rick a. Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, notre dame, indiana: university of notre dame press 2005, p. 42. 76 SKS 7, 280 / CUP1, 308. 77 Cf. Furtak, Wisdom in Love, p. 44. 72

Bibliography I. Diogenes Laertius’ Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library De Vitis Philosophorum Libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109). Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111; for the same title see also ASKB a i 154–155). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Diogenes Laertius [møller, poul martin], Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, p. 294 (ASKB 1574–1576). moréri, louis, Le Grand Dictionnaire historique, vols. 1–6, Basel: Jean Brandmuller 1731–32, vol. 3, p. 572 (ASKB 1965–1969). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 198; p. 246; p. 352; p. 386; p. 569 (ASKB 1037). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 102; p. 132; p. 146; vol. 2, p. 129; p. 154; p. 468 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: druck und verlag von a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 2, p. 25 (ASKB 774–775). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 99; p. 204; pp. 368–9; p. 698; p. 726; vol. 2, p. 639; p. 306 (ASKB 1365–1369). tennemann, Wilhelm gottlieb, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 3, pp. 343–432 passim; vol. 4, pp. 3–148 passim; pp. 189–389 passim (ASKB 815–826). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Diogenes Laertius scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 19; p. 39; p. 45, note 35; p. 84, note 30; p. 228.

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stewart, Jon, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and new York: Cambridge university press 2003, see p. 518; p. 644.

the eleatics: Kierkegaard’s metaphysical Considerations of Being and motion Jon stewart

it is well known that Kierkegaard was a great enthusiast for ancient greek philosophy. For example, he seems to make socrates the model for his own attempts at the religious reform of the individual.1 moreover, he often contrasts ancient greek philosophy with then contemporary german philosophy.2 his clear conviction is that ancient greek philosophy is closer to the real problems and issues of life and existence than academic philosophy, which has completely lost sight of such things. one of the less explored connections in this context is Kierkegaard’s use of the eleatics. he refers to these thinkers several times in both his published works and his journals and notebooks; most Kierkegaard readers will recall the prominent reference to them in the opening lines of Repetition.3 the eleatics are known as a school of metaphysics, and Kierkegaard tends to appeal to them in this regard, specifically in reference to their theory of motion. moreover, Kierkegaard often places the eleatics in the context of Hegel’s speculative logic. His use of the Eleatics thus testifies to an engagement in both ancient and modern philosophy. I. The Eleatics In the history of Greek philosophy, the term “the Eleatics” refers to a school of presocratic thinkers from the city-state of elea, which was a greek colony on the western coast of southern Italy. The leading figures of the Eleatic school are parmenides and his followers, zeno, and melissus. in older histories of philosophy, Xenophanes is also added to this group, while today he is usually categorized among the ionian thinkers by virtue of the fact that he was from Colophon and not elea. Kierkegaard refers to both Parmenides and Zeno specifically; however, he seems i would like to express my thanks to Finn gredal Jensen for his extremely useful comments on and suggestions for this article. 1 See, for example, Paul Muench, “Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 24, 2007, pp. 132–62. 2 i explore this in more detail in my Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new York and Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 640–50. 3 SKS 4, 9 / R, 131.

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to regard them more as a group of thinkers than as individuals. When taken as a school, the eleatics are best known for their claims that all reality or being is one and unchanging. Conversely, one can say that the eleatics are known for their refutation of all forms of pluralism, dualism, motion, and change. to give some general sense of their philosophical disposition, i will provide a brief account of the thought of the school’s two most prominent members: parmenides and zeno. parmenides of elea was born around 515 bc. in the dialogue the Parmenides, plato recounts the meeting of socrates, then a young man, with the eleatic thinker, who was visiting athens together with his pupil zeno on occasion of a festival.4 diogenes laertius reports that parmenides was a student of Xenophanes and that he was active in the political life of his home city.5 otherwise, very little is known with certainty about the circumstances of his life. parmenides is generally regarded as the most important Presocratic philosopher, and his influence extends far beyond that of the ancient world.6 His main importance lies in the fact that he was the first thinker to address in a consistent way the basic metaphysical question of the nature of being. one reason for his success is doubtless his ability to challenge our common-sense intuitions about any number of things. parmenides’ work consisted of a philosophical poem, written in hexameters, perhaps called On Nature. this text survives only in fragmentary form. after a prologue, it is divided into two parts: “The Way of Truth” and “The Way of Seeming.” In the first part, Parmenides puts forth his own view about the immutability of being, and in the second he refutes the views of his predecessors. in the prologue it is recounted how the poet goes to the goddess who teaches him about truth and falsity. it is through her speech that the philosophical arguments are expounded. although Parmenides makes use of the figure of the goddess, this does not imply that he is religious or superstitious. On the contrary, he is often credited with being the first thinker to establish the truth by means of pure reason or logic alone. the goddess explains that it is important for him to learn both the truth and the errors which human beings fall victim to. the use of the goddess can be understood as a device plato, Parmenides, 127a. diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book iX, 21–3. 6 the standard collection for presocratic philosophy, including the eleatics, is hermann diels and Walther Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vols. 1–2, 10th ed., Berlin: Weidmann 1961. (in english see patricia Curd and richard d. mcKirahan, A Presocratics Reader, indianapolis and Cambridge: hackett 1996; g.s. Kirk and J.e. raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1957.) For works specifically on parmenides, see david gallop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments: A Text and Translation with an Introduction, toronto: university of toronto press 1991; a.h. Coxen, The Fragments of Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, assen netherlands & dover, new hampshire: van gorcum 1986; alexander p.d. mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments, new haven: Yale university press 1970; hermann diels, Parmenides’ Lehrgedicht, Berlin: reimer 1897; K. reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, Bonn: Cohen 1916; Francis macdonald Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, london: routledge & Kegan paul 1939; W.J. verdenius, Parmenides: Some Comments, groningen: Wolters 1942; Jaap mansfeld, Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt, assen: van gorcum 1964. 4 5

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to give the views presented there a kind of objectivity that transcends the personal opinions of parmenides himself. In “The Way of Truth” two different kinds of belief are distinguished as follows in Fragment 2: “i will tell you of two roads of inquiry which offer themselves to the mind. the one, that it is and cannot not be, is the way of credibility based on truth. the other way, that it is not and that not-being must be, cannot be grasped by the mind; for you cannot know not-being and cannot express it.”7 In the first statement the way of truth is defined: what exists is and cannot not be. This is Parmenides’ famous statement about the unity and necessity of being. Being is what is. the idea here seems to be that it is impossible to think of any negative predicate in connection with pure being. one can think of empty space, but this is still something positive. it is impossible to think nonexistence or what does not exist. the key missing premise here is supplied by Fragment 3, which states, “Thought and being are the same.”8 in other words, if something cannot be conceived because it is contradictory, then it cannot exist. the second statement articulates the opposite view, the way of seeming, namely, that not-being also exists. Parmenides immediately identifies this as erroneous and offers a refutation of it. the argument seems to be that non-being is a selfcontradiction. it cannot be thought or coherently expressed. this view is further outlined in Fragment 6, where the goddess states: it is necessary both to say and to think that being is. For to be is possible and not to be is impossible. i bid you consider this, and i warn you against another path, along which mortals wander ignorantly, with divided minds and scattered thoughts, so befuddled and helpless as to resemble the deaf and blind. there are crowds of them, without discernment, maintaining that to be and not to be are the same and not the same, and that everything is in a state of movement and countermovement.9

the goddess implies that the way of seeming is the view of common sense, which has ensnared all human beings; however, in her articulation of the position it is also clear that this is the view of heraclitus, although he is not mentioned by name. thus the unstated goal is to refute the heraclitean view that everything is change and that there is no stable enduring being. although parmenides’ positive view about the unity and necessity of being appears at first glance fairly straightforward and even plausible, it leads to a number of consequences that run contrary to our common-sense intuitions. Being is ungenerated and indestructible, or put differently there is ultimately no growth or decay. Being cannot come into existence or perish since it always is. in Fragment 8 we read: “there are many signs that what is has no beginning and never will be destroyed: it is whole, still and without end. it neither was nor will be, it simply is— now, altogether, one, continuous.”10 The first argument here is that it is impossible english translation quoted from philip Wheelwright, The Presocratics, new York: the odyssey press 1966, p. 96. 8 ibid., p. 98. 9 ibid., p. 97. 10 ibid. 7

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to conceive of how pure being could have arisen from something else: “how could you go about investigating its birth? how and whence could it have grown? i shall not allow you to say or to think of it as coming from not-being, for it is impossible to say or think that not-being is. Besides, what could have stirred up activity so that it should arise from not-being later rather than earlier?”11 the point seems to be that it is impossible to conceive of how being could have arisen from another principle. moreover, what could the moving force have been to have stimulated this other principle to create being in the first place? Similarly, since being is immutable there is no change or motion: “remaining always the same and in the same place by itself, it stays fixed where it is.”12 ultimately, each of parmenides’ arguments attempts to show that concepts such as change, motion, coming into being, and destruction, all presuppose the concept of not-being, which is self-contradictory. For a thing to be conceived as divided implies that there is a something which is not a part of the original thing. For motion to be conceived, one must think of a thing that is no longer at a specific point that it once occupied. To conceive of change, one must imagine a thing is no longer what it was. in all of these cases one is obliged to posit something negative or not-being. Thus, according to the argument, we should stick firmly to parmenides’ conception of being despite its counterintuitive character. after the account of the truth, the second part of the poem is dedicated to “the Way of Seeming.” Here the goddess begins by explaining that human beings are caught in a mistaken belief in dualism. they regard reality as consisting of opposing principles from which an attempt is made to give a cosmogony. she states: learn next about the opinions of men, as you listen to the deceptive ordering of my words. For men have established the habit of naming two thought-forms; therein they have erred, because one of the forms ought not to be named. they have distinguished the thought-forms as opposed in character and as having properties which set them apart from each other. On the one hand there is the fire of the upper sky, gentle, rarefied, and everywhere identical with itself; on the other hand there lies opposed to it utter darkness, dense and heavy.13

According to Parmenides, this conception is mistaken since opposites such as fire and darkness are ultimately the same, that is, pure being. thus, the attempt to explain the universe by means of conflicting opposites, as Heraclitus does, is misleading since there is only a single principle. With this parmenides laid the groundwork for a profoundly counterintuitive position, which naturally evoked a number of objections that his followers were obliged to try to refute. Parmenides’ most influential student was Zeno of Elea, who lived in the fifth century bc.14 only fragments and second-hand reports of his works survive. zeno ibid. ibid., p. 98. 13 ibid., p. 99. 14 For Zeno’s life and works, see N.B. Booth, “Zeno’s Paradoxes,” Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 77, no. 2, 1957, pp. 187–201; V.C. Chappell, “Time and Zeno’s Arrow,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 59, 1962, pp. 197–213; hermann Fränkel, “zeno of elea’s attacks on Plurality,” American Journal of Philology, vol. 63, 1942, pp. 1–25; adolf grünbaum, Modern 11

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is best known for his defense of the doctrine of the unity of being by means of his refutations of pluralism and motion. he devised a series of arguments demonstrating that the common-sense views that the world consists of a plurality of things or that there is motion ultimately lead to paradoxes or absurdities. he is credited by some sources with inventing the argumentative strategy of the reductio ad absurdum, that is, the refutation of a given position by the demonstration that contradictory or “absurd” consequences result from it. These arguments have been preserved in aristotle’s Physics.15 The first argument claims that in order for there to be motion from one point to another, the object in motion must first traverse half of the distance between the two points. But in order to traverse this distance it must first traverse half of it, and so on to infinity. Therefore, there can be no motion. Since the distance can be infinitely divided into halves each time, it seems impossible for the object to make any progress since between any two points there are always an infinite number of intervening half-distances, which must first be traversed. The second refutation of motion, called the “Achilles argument,” concludes paradoxically that the quicker runner, that is, achilles, can never catch up with the slower. Some versions of this refer to it as “Achilles and the Tortoise,” with the latter playing the role of the slower runner. the argument goes as follows: for achilles to catch the slower runner, he must first reach the point where the slower runner was at, but in the time he takes him to do so, the slower runner has progressed past that point. thus achilles must now reach that new point, but in the time he takes to do so, the slower runner has progressed yet again, and so on to infinity. Therefore, Achilles will be eternally getting closer but will never manage to catch up with the slower runner. The third argument, often referred to as “the arrow argument,” argues for the thesis that a flying arrow is not in motion. The argument claims that a moving object such as an arrow either moves in the place where it is or where it is not. the latter case seems blatantly absurd since an object cannot move in a place where it is not. But can the arrow move in the place where it is? zeno claims that at any given point in time the arrow occupies a place that is precisely equal to its own length, but this means that at any given instant it is at rest since it does not occupy a space beyond its own length. The time that it takes an arrow to fly from one point to another consists of a number of finite instants like this where the arrow occupies its own place and is thus at each moment at rest. therefore, at no moment is the arrow in motion. in a footnote in Philosophical Fragments reference is made to the “arrow argument.” Here, however, instead of referring to the Eleatics or to Zeno specifically, Kierkegaard ascribes the argument to “the skeptics.” There he quotes Aristotle to the Science and Zeno’s Paradoxes, middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan university press 1967; h.d.p. lee, Zeno of Elea, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1936; h.n. lee, “are Zeno’s Arguments Based on a Mistake?” Mind, vol. 74, 1965, pp. 563–90; mario untersteiner, Zenone, Florence: La nuova Italia 1963; Gregory Vlastos, “A Note on Zeno’s Arrow,” Phronesis, vol. 11, 1966, pp. 3–18; Gregory Vlastos, “Zeno’s Race Course,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 4, 1966, pp. 95–108; Zeno’s Paradoxes, ed. by Wesley C. salmon, indianapolis: Bobbs-merrill 1970. 15 aristotle, Physics, 239b and following and 263a.

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effect that when throwing a stone, one has power over it, but once it has been thrown one ceases to have power over it. then one reads, “otherwise the throwing would become an illusion, and the person throwing, despite all his throwing, would keep the stone in his hand, since the stone, like the skeptics’ ‘flying arrow,’ did not fly.”16 this is a simple allusion to the argument, but it is not explored further. zeno also offers a series of arguments against plurality that are generally based on the impossibility of infinitely dividing a thing into an infinite number of parts. however, i will forgo an account of these arguments since what interested Kierkegaard was clearly the refutations or paradoxes of motion and not pluralism. i likewise forgo an account of melissus since he plays no independent role in Kierkegaard’s understanding and use of eleatic philosophy. the challenge that the eleatics left to later greek philosophy was to reconcile two seemingly incompatible things: on the one hand, the claim about the ultimate metaphysical unity of being that seemed to preclude change and motion, and, on the other hand, the obvious demands of common sense, which observes examples of change and motion every day. later greek thinkers such as empedocles, anaxagoras, and democritus were profoundly exercised by this dilemma and offered several different solutions to it. attempts to refute parmenides and the other eleatics can also be found in the works of plato (in, for example, the Sophist) and aristotle (in the Physics, Books i–iv). thus there can be no doubt that parmenides and the eleatics significantly shaped the course of Greek philosophy by problematizing the concepts of being and motion. these issues continued to be important in medieval and modern philosophy and are still the object of discussion right up to our own day. II. Kierkegaard’s Familiarity with the Eleatics Kierkegaard’s knowledge of parmenides and the other eleatic thinkers could have come from any number of ancient or modern sources. he was, of course, an avid reader of plato, and he even mentions the dialogue the Parmenides in The Concept of Irony17 and The Concept of Anxiety.18 likewise, he could also have read about the eleatics in aristotle, whose works he also owned and studied.19 We know that Kierkegaard read diogenes laertius, who also provides a brief account of each of the eleatic thinkers in Book iX of his Lives of Eminent Philosophers, which Kierkegaard SKS 4, 225, note / PF, 17, note. SKS 1, 174 / CI, 123. SKS 1, 177 / CI, 126. see plato, Parmenides, Theaetetus 180a, 183b, Sophist 217c, 242d 18 SKS 4, 387, note / CA, 83, note. 19 see, for example, Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera cum Averrois commentariis, vols. 1–13 in vols. 1–11, venice: apud. iunctas 1562 (ASKB 1056–1068); Aristotelis Opera omnia graece ad optimorum exemplarium fidem recensuit, annotationem criticam, librorum argumenta, vols. 1–5, ed. by Johann gottlieb Buhle, Biponti [zweibrücken]: ex typographia societatis 1791–97 (ASKB 1069–1073); Aristoteles Graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, vols. 1–2, Berlin: georg reimer 1831 (ASKB 1074–1075); see specifically Physics 184b 16; 188a 19; 207a 16; Metaphysics 984b 2; 986b 19; 986b 29; 1001a 32; On Generation and Corruption 318b 17; 325a 3. 16 17

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owned.20 as we shall see below, it is clear that Kierkegaard used this source since he frequently refers to an anecdote recounted by diogenes laertius. Finally, sextus empiricus, whose collected writings Kierkegaard also owned,21 quotes extensively from parmenides’ poem in Adversus Mathematicos (vii, 111ff.). With regard to modern sources, Kierkegaard had a number of works on the history of philosophy which contained chapters on the eleatics, either as a school or as individuals. From the eighteenth century, one can mention Christoph meiners’ (1747– 1810) chapter “Xenophanes, parmenides, leukipp und heraklit,“ in his Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom from 1781 to 1782.22 it is well known that Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann (1761–1819) was one of Kierkegaard’s key sources for the history of philosophy. in tennemann’s extensive work he has a detailed chapter dedicated to the eleatics, entitled “Darstellung der Eleatischen Philosophie.”23 Kierkegaard takes meticulous notes on this chapter in Notebook 14.24 the eleatics are also mentioned extensively in the first volume of Dietrich Tiedemann’s (1748–1803) Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, published between 1791 and 1797.25 Kierkegaard also owned the works of several important nineteenth-century sources. here one must mention g.W.F. hegel’s (1770–1831) chapter “die eleatische Schule,” in his well-known Lectures on the History of Philosophy, which were published between 1833 and 1836.26 Karl Friedrich hermann (1804–55) dedicates a chapter to the eleatics in his book on plato’s philosophy from 1839.27 likewise Diogenis Laertii de Vitis Philosophorum libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109); Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navnkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh and published by Børge thorlacius, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111). 21 Sexti Empirici Opera quæ extant, geneva: Chouët 1621 (ASKB 146). 22 Christoph Meiners, “Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leukipp und Heraklit,” in his Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom, vols. 1–2, lemgo: meyer 1781–82, vol. 1, pp. 603–30 (ASKB 1406–1406a). 23 Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, “Darstellung der Eleatischen Philosophie,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 1, pp. 150–209 (ASKB 815–826). 24 SKS 19, 426–7, not14:1. 25 dietrich tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97 (ASKB 836–841). 26 G.W.F. Hegel, “Die eleatische Schule,” in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, pp. 280–327 (ASKB 557–559); see also his references to the eleatics in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 95; vol. 2, p. 432; p. 510; p. 515 (ASKB 564–565). 27 Karl Friedrich Hermann, “Die Eleaten,” in his Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. Erster Theil, die historisch-kritische Grundlegung enthaltend, heidelberg: C.F. Winther 1839, pp. 168–79 (ASKB 576). 20

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gotthard oswald marbach (1810–90) and eduard zeller (1814–1908) explore the eleatics in individual chapters in their respective works on the history of ancient philosophy.28 the eleatic school is also discussed extensively by heinrich ritter (1791–1869) in his history of greek and roman philosophy from 1838.29 Apart from these writings dedicated specifically to the history of philosophy, there were of course also critical discussions of the eleatics in the works of other philosophers. Kierkegaard could read about parmenides and his followers in Friedrich schlegel’s (1772–1829) Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806.30 the eleatics are also mentioned by schopenhauer (1788–1860)31 and, more importantly, Friedrich adolf trendelenburg (1802–72), whose Logische Untersuchungen Kierkegaard admired.32 schelling (1775–1854) refers to the eleatics a couple of times in his lectures on the philosophy of revelation, which Kierkegaard attended from 1841 to 1842. these references are recorded in Kierkegaard’s notes.33 in the danish context there can be little doubt that poul martin møller (1794– 1838) is Kierkegaard’s key source. in his lectures on ancient philosophy, which appeared in his posthumous writings, there is a section dedicated to the eleatics.34 it is also quite possible that Kierkegaard attended these lectures in person. other

Gotthard Oswald Marbach, “Die Eleaten,” in his Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, leipzig: otto Wigand 1838 (1. abtheilung, in gotthard oswald marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, abtheilung 1–2, leipzig: Wigand 1838–41), pp. 125–47 (ASKB 642; for abtheilung 2 see ASKB 643); Eduard Zeller, “Die Eleaten,” in his Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung Über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, vols. 1–3, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1844–52, vol. 1, pp. 133–54 (ASKB 913–914). 29 heinrich ritter, Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, ed. by l. preller, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 83–127 (ASKB 726). 30 Friedrich schlegel, Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806, ed. by C.J.h. Windischmann, vols. 1–2, Bonn: Weber 1836, vol. 1, pp. 196ff. (ASKB 768–68a). 31 arthur schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 30; p. 53; pp. 80–1 (ASKB 773–773a); Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: druck und verlag von a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, pp. 32ff. (ASKB 774–775). 32 adolf trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, pp. 179ff. (ASKB 843). 33 SKS 19, 322, not11:15 / SBL, 356–7: “then [aristotle] refers to other philosophers, the eleatics, who, as he says, promote a fraud and in whom there is nothing helpful as soon as they try to explain actuality. they promote fraud, just as does every uninterrupted movement at one point. socrates’ dialectic was directed as much against the subjective untruths of the sophists as against that more objective turgidity, which was, as plutarch says, like smoke that Socrates blew back upon them.” SKS 19, 347–8, not11:29 / SBL, 389: “pure Seyn is spinoza’s substance, but in this way spinoza did indeed become a monotheist. hegel even regards the Eleatic position as monotheism and speaks of several monotheisms.” 34 Poul Martin Møller, “Den eleatiske Philosophie,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 325–45; see also vol. 3, p. 350 (ASKB 1574–1576). 28

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danish thinkers such as Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854)35 and rasmus nielsen (1809–84) mention the eleatics sporadically,36 but only møller gives a more detailed account of their thought. given this, it is clear that Kierkegaard could have received his information about the eleatics from numerous sources. moreover, it could also be fairly claimed that the philosophical issues treated by the eleatics were quite topical at this time. thus, Kierkegaard’s attention to these thinkers was by no means original or idiosyncratic. III. Kierkegaard’s Use of the Eleatics Kierkegaard’s references to the eleatics can be broken down into a couple of main groups. In the first of these I will explore a few passages from his Nachlass that fall into the category “reading notes.” I will then examine his references to the Eleatics in connection with heraclitus’ student, who constantly tries to outdo his master. in the third subsection i will then explore Kierkegaard’s frequent allusions to the refutation of zeno’s denial of motion. Finally, an attempt will be made to understand the connection that Kierkegaard sees between eleatic philosophy and hegelian logic. A. Reading Notes that Refer to the Eleatics the background for Kierkegaard’s understanding of the eleatic philosophers can be found in his reading primarily of tennemann’s section on them in his history of philosophy. But, as we have seen in the previous section, this was presumably not Kierkegaard’s only source of information on this topic. although Kierkegaard’s most extensive use of the eleatics comes in the years 1843–46, that is, from roughly the period from Repetition to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, he shows an interest in the eleatics at a very early period. on a loose paper presumably from 1837, he mentions parmenides by name. in what appears to be a note taken perhaps from his reading or from a lecture, he writes the following: τὸ ὄν the eleatics (parmenides), Pure being— 1. it is universally applicable. 2. most universal. single—immediate. 3. not a distinction as if it were something objective. 4. copula without predicate or subject. to that extent it is nothing (i.e., nothing is predicated of it). τὸ ἕτερον (ἕτερον).

Jakob peter mynster, Den hedenske Verden ved Christendommens Begyndelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1850, p. 29 (ASKB 693). 36 rasmus nielsen, De speculativa historiæ sacræ tractandæ methodo commentatio, Copenhagen: tengnagel 1840, p. 7 (ASKB 697); rasmus nielsen, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, pp. 12–13; p. 115 (ASKB 699). 35

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This note seems clearly to be connected with Kierkegaard’s studies. The first part gives a description of the key elements in the eleatic conception of pure being (τὸ ὄν). the second part seems to sketch the heraclitean view that everything has an other or difference (τὸ ἕτερον); in contrast to the eleatics, this view features the dialectical interplay of opposites that generate one another reciprocally. What is significant here is that these two views are juxtaposed; this juxtaposition will reappear later in his published authorship. it is not certain from what book or lecture this is a note, but we receive an important clue when Kierkegaard refers to “what Heiberg calls infinite judgments.” this is a reference to Johan ludvig heiberg’s (1791–1860) main work on speculative logic that appeared in 1832 under the title Outline of the Philosophy of Philosophy or Speculative Logic.38 In this work, Heiberg gives an account of “infinite judgments.”39 Kierkegaard’s note also mentions the “abstract beginning,” which is clearly a reference to the controversial beginning of philosophy with the concept of being that hegel proposes in the Science of Logic and that heiberg sketches in his Outline. like hegel, heiberg in his account refers to the eleatics and to zeno explicitly in this context.40 From this one might argue that this is the text that Kierkegaard was taking notes to. In any case, what is significant is that right away the key topics that Eleatic philosophy is known for are understood in the context of hegel’s philosophy. this is important since we know that Kierkegaard was generally exercised by any number of key issues in hegel’s speculative logic. this association of the eleatics with hegel’s philosophy will emerge again even more explicitly in the later published writings. Pap. ii C 37 / JP 1, 193. Johan ludvig heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik. Som Ledetraad ved Forelæsninger paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1832. (reprinted as Ledetraad ved Forlæsninger over Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik ved den kongelige militaire Høiskole in heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1861–62, vol. 1, pp. 111–380.) in english in Heiberg’s Speculative Logic and Other Texts, ed. and trans. by Jon stewart, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2006, pp. 39–213. 39 heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik, § 144, remark 3, α. Heiberg’s Speculative Logic and Other Texts, p. 165: “the negative judgments are therefore positive. This is the case with respect to so-called ‘infinite judgments,’ where subject and predicate belong to mutually exclusive spheres, and therefore no subsumption or judgment can take place but only a proposition, and a meaningless one at that (for example, the proposition mentioned in connection with the law of contradiction: ‘an elephant is not a cube root’).” 40 heiberg, Grundtræk til Philosophiens Philosophie eller den speculative Logik, § 29, remarks 1–2. Heiberg’s Speculative Logic and Other Texts, pp. 56–7. 37 38

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Kierkegaard’s Notebook 14, from 1843, contains his reading notes to tennemann’s aforementioned history of philosophy.41 Kierkegaard goes through “1. the ionic School” “2. The Pythagorean School” and then arrives at “3. The Eleatics.” Here he notes the members of the school, Xenophanes, parmenides, zeno of elea, and melissus, and gives the following characterization of their doctrine: “the older philosophers had assumed that from nothing comes nothing; the Eleatics discovered the difficulty of thinking becoming. ‘In the world there is only being not becoming.’ ”42 this is presumably a free rendering of parmenides—perhaps Fragment 8—that Kierkegaard found in tennemann. Kierkegaard then continues by noting tennemann’s description of parmenides as follows: “Parmenides. What is, is, what is not, is not. to think nothing is the same as not thinking at all. Being is identical; for if there were several things, they must be different either by them being or by their not being, which is an impossibility. his poem consists of two parts: περὶ νοητοῦ—τὰ πρὸς δόξαν.”43 here Kierkegaard simply notes the main theses of parmenides’ philosophy and the organization of his poem into “The Way of Truth” and “The Way of Seeming.” still following tennemann’s account, Kierkegaard notes the following about zeno. he begins with a general statement and then proceeds to sketch three of zeno’s famous arguments against motion: Zeno. Rejected movement. The infinity of the space, which is to be traversed conflicts with the finitude of time. the 4 proofs against movement. 1) When a body moves, it runs through a line; before it comes to the end, it must have traversed the half [of the distance of the line], but now every space is infinitely divisible. 2) A body that moves with the greatest speed can never catch up with another one that moves with the greatest slowness; for the former must always first come to the point where the latter has been. 3) When a body moves, it must at once be both unmoving and in movement, for every body must at every moment be in a space that is equal to the body, which is unmoving. 4) two bodies run through unequal space with the same speed, which is a contradiction.44

there is a footnote to the second proof, where one reads simply, “this proof is called Achilles.”45 this seems clearly to indicate a fairly close study of zeno’s paradoxes, at least as expounded by tennemann. in the Journal JJ, there are a series of entries also from the year 1843 concerning the history of philosophy. These are again reflections on and notes to Kierkegaard’s reading of tennemann, as is indicated by the frequent references that he gives to that work in these entries.46 there Kierkegaard writes the following: “one can only say SKS 19, 425–7, not14:1. according to the editors, Kierkegaard worked on this journal during the period between January and april of 1843. leon Jaurnow and steen tullberg, “Tekstredegørelse” in SKS K19, p. 604. 42 SKS 19, 426, not14:1. 43 ibid. 44 SKS 19, 426–7, not14:1. 45 SKS 19, 427.36, not14:1. 46 see SKS 18, 150, JJ:24 / KJN 2, 140. SKS 18, 157, JJ:53 / KJN 2, 145–6. SKS 18, 158, JJ:55 / KJN 2, 146. SKS 18, 160, JJ:66 / KJN 2, 149. SKS 18, 160, JJ:67 / KJN 2, 149. SKS 18, 41

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that the principle of unity has sublated the principle of contradiction in the same sense that pythagoras taught that one was not a number. one precedes differentiation, and numbers only begin with differentiation. unity precedes contradiction, and existence only begins with contradiction.”47 then in the margin to this he refers to zeno of elea as follows: “or in the same sense that zeno the eleatic said: μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἐστι τὸ ἔν cf. tennemann, 1st vol., p. 202 and note.”48 in his reading notes to tennemann in Notebook 14, Kierkegaard makes use of this same passage.49 here tennemann quotes simplicius, who attributes the following statement to zeno: “the one is not among the things that are.”50 From these entries is it clear that in 1843 Kierkegaard was keenly interested in eleatic philosophy and that he actively sought to inform himself about it from one of the main works on the history of philosophy at the time. From these entries alone, however, it is not clear what the motivation for this study is or how he envisions it to fit into his writing plans. B. References to the Eleatics and Heraclitus’ Disciple, Cratylus one recurring motif in Kierkegaard’s allusions to the eleatics is the story of Cratylus, a student of heraclitus, who attempts to surpass his master. although neither Cratylus nor heraclitus is an eleatic thinker, the latter are mentioned together with the former since they represent opposed doctrines. in his Journal JJ, Kierkegaard writes the following in a marginal note presumably at some point between 1842 and 1843: a similar foppish conceit comes from one of heraclitus’ disciples. heraclitus had said, You cannot cross the same river twice. a disciple wanted to better that and said, You cannot do it even once. the nerve is thereby removed; the principle, so far as anything became of it at all, turned into the opposite, an eleatic principle, and denies movement.51

as noted, this is a reference to heraclitus’ student Cratylus, known primarily from the platonic dialogue of the same name. this anecdote is preserved in aristotle’s Metaphysics, which reads as follows: and again, because they saw that all this world of nature is in movement, and that about that which changes no true statement can be made, they said that of course, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing, nothing could truly be affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying 160, JJ:68.a / KJN 2, 149. SKS 18, 162, JJ:72 / KJN 2, 150. SKS 18, 163, JJ:74 / KJN 2, 151. SKS 18, 166, JJ:86 / KJN 2, 154. 47 SKS 18, 161, JJ:68 / KJN 2, 149. 48 SKS 18, 161, JJ:68.a / KJN 2, 149. 49 SKS 19, 427.13–14, not14:1. 50 tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 202, note 75. 51 SKS 18, 152, JJ:31.b / KJN 2, 141.

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that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once.52

the point that Cratylus wants to make is, of course, that there is also change even in the minutest instant of time that it takes to step into the river. thus, he attempts to make even more extreme heraclitus’ claim that everything is constantly in a state of change. Kierkegaard then subsequently returns to this anecdote in his published writings. in a key passage in the epilogue to Fear and Trembling (1843), he has his pseudonym end the work with a reference to the purported refutation of heraclitus: “One must go further, one must go further.” This urge to go further is an old story in the world. heraclitus the obscure, who deposited his thoughts in his books and his books in diana’s temple (for his thoughts had been his armor in life, and therefore he hung it in the temple of the goddess), heraclitus the obscure said: one cannot walk through the same river twice. heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who did not remain standing there but went further—and added: one cannot do it even once. poor heraclitus, to have a disciple like that! By this improvement, the heraclitean thesis was amended into an eleatic thesis that denies motion, and yet that disciple wished only to be a disciple of heraclitus who went further, not back to what heraclitus had abandoned.53

in the footnote to this passage Kierkegaard refers directly to the locus in tennemann, where he found this anecdote. thus, it is not certain that Kierkegaard knew the original source of the story in aristotle. it should be noted that the story is also recounted by poul martin møller in his aforementioned lectures.54 the point that Kierkegaard seems to want to make with the use of this anecdote is that Cratylus’ modification in effect undermines Heraclitus’ thesis, and indeed turns it into the very opposite. in short, heraclitus’ main claim was that everything was in flux and thus changing. But by saying that one cannot even step into the same river a single time, Cratylus seems to be denying that any motion at all is possible, which is precisely the thesis of the eleatics, that is, the exact opposite view that was intended to refute the radical claims of heraclitus. this anecdote illustrates the absurdity of trying to “go further,” a motif that Kierkegaard frequently returns to. By trying to go beyond the position of heraclitus, Cratylus ultimately ends up reverting to a previous position, namely, that of the eleatics. C. References to Diogenes’ Refutation of Zeno’s Denial of Motion Another episode concerning the Eleatics that one finds as a recurring theme in Kierkegaard is the refutation of zeno’s denial of movement by the philosopher diogenes. in order to defend common sense, diogenes is said to have walked back

english translation quoted from The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by richard mcKeon, new York: random house 1941, pp. 745–6. Metaphysics, Book iv, Chapter 5, 1010a 10–15. 53 SKS 4, 210.7–18 / FT, 123. 54 Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vol. 2, p. 304. 52

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and forth to refute the claim that there is no motion. Kierkegaard is clearly intrigued by this story. Kierkegaard makes fairly extensive use of the eleatics in Repetition (1843). here he begins the book with a reference to this story: “When the eleatics denied motion, diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward as an opponent. he literally did come forward, because he did not say a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had sufficiently refuted them.”55 the source of this anecdote is diogenes laertius, who writes, “in like manner, when somebody declared that there is no such thing as motion, he got up and walked about.”56 Kierkegaard has his pseudonymous author use this anecdote to introduce the concept of repetition. this same anecdote is referred to again in a letter from 1847 that Kierkegaard writes to the wife of his elder brother peter Christian Kierkegaard (1805–88). since his sister-in-law was apparently having problems with her health, Kierkegaard advises her to take regular walks. in this context, he writes, “health and salvation can be found only in motion. if anyone denies that motion exists, i do as diogenes did, i walk. if anyone denies that health resides in motion, then i walk away from all morbid objections. Thus, if one just keeps on walking, everything will be all right.”57 the point of Kierkegaard’s use of this anecdote is not easy to discern. on the face of it, one might claim that the reference to it at the beginning of Repetition merely serves the purpose of motivating the action since it is the occasion for Constantin Constantius to hit upon the idea of making a return trip to Berlin in order to test if a repetition is possible: When i was occupied for some time, at least on occasion, with the question of repetition— whether or not it is possible, what importance it has, whether something gains or loses in being repeated—i suddenly had the thought: You can, after all, take a trip to Berlin; you have been there once before, and now you can prove to yourself whether a repetition is possible and what importance it has.58

thus just as diogenes purportedly refuted zeno’s claim, not by a syllogism or a new argument but, as it were, by a performative act, that is, by walking, so also Constantin thinks that he can confirm or disconfirm the possibility of repetition, not by constructing an original argument in favor of or against the concept, but rather again by an action, by going back to Berlin. From this, one might infer that Kierkegaard finds sympathetic this kind of refutation of an abstract philosophical view by means of concrete action in the realm of existence. Such “arguments” represent a kind of protest against academic philosophy.

SKS 4, 9 / R, 131. english translation quoted from diogenes laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. by r.d. hicks, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1979–80 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 2, p. 41. 57 B&A, vol. 1, p. 169 / LD, letter 150, p. 215. 58 SKS 4, 9 / R, 131. 55 56

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D. Hegel and the Eleatics as noted at the outset, in a number of passages Kierkegaard associates the eleatics with Hegel’s philosophy. At first glance this might strike one as rather strange since usually he appeals to ancient philosophy as a contrastive term to hegelian speculation. in these passages, however, he seems to regard the eleatic doctrines of being and the denial of movement as pure abstractions, like hegel’s speculative logic. this is an issue that exercises him in connection both with the danish debate about mediation59 and with the development of his own concepts such as repetition and reduplication. in a journal entry from the year 1843, Kierkegaard anticipates his later accounts of this issue in works such as Repetition and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript: What principally concerned ancient philosophy, the most ancient philosophy in greece, was the question of the movement by which the world came into being, the constitutive relationship of the elements to one another. —What especially concerns the most recent philosophy is movement, i.e., logical movement. It would not be without significance to draw a parallel between these two spheres. modern philosophy has never given an account of movement. thus in the table of categories—which is so detailed in other respects—there is no category called mediation, which for modern philosophy is nonetheless the most essential of all; indeed, it is truly the nerve of modern philosophy, that with which it wants to differentiate itself from every previous philosophy.60

the immediate parallel that Kierkegaard wants to point out here is that both the ancient greeks (including the eleatics) and modern philosophy, that is, hegel, are interested in explaining change and movement. hegel attempts to do so by means of the concept of speculative mediation. But, although he gives no arguments for his view, Kierkegaard clearly finds this inadequate: “Modern philosophy has never given an account of movement.” Thus although speculative philosophy makes a lot of noise about mediation and the speculative method, the key problem of how to explain movement remains unresolved. this entry anticipates Kierkegaard’s later view, where he repeats this claim and even elaborates on it, especially in the Postscript. in Repetition, the philosophy of the eleatics is referred to again in reference to Hegel’s concept of mediation. In this difficult passage Kierkegaard has his pseudonym write: repetition is the new category that will be discovered. if one knows anything of modern philosophy and is not entirely ignorant of greek philosophy, one will readily see that this category explains the relation between the eleatics and heraclitus, and that repetition proper is what has mistakenly been called mediation. It is incredible how much flurry

see Jon stewart, “Chapter 3. the debate about mediation and the law of excluded Middle: 1839,” in A History of Hegelianism in Golden Age Denmark, tome ii, The Martensen Period: 1837–1842, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2007 (Danish Golden Age Studies, vol. 3), pp. 289–342. 60 SKS 18, 160, JJ:65 / KJN 2, 148. 59

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the discussion continues with an account of the concepts of being and nothing and the moment. here Constantius seems to introduce the concept of repetition as a superior alternative to hegel’s concept of mediation. From the last sentence quoted, it is clear that he believes that hegel’s concept, although it has attracted much attention, has not explained anything. the key to understanding this passage is to interpret what is meant by the claim that repetition “explains the relation between the Eleatics and Heraclitus.” This is not a straightforward matter. the eleatics were known for their thesis that there is a single, unchanging, unmoving being. this is a thesis that appeals to abstract thinking but is counterintuitive to the realm of the senses. heraclitus, by contrast, is known for the claim that there is no enduing substance and everything is in movement and always changing. this view appeals to the intuitive experience provided by the senses but fails to do justice to abstract thought and ideas, such as justice, beauty, or mathematical truths. The “relation” between these two views can thus be said to be the contrast between abstract ideas and the perceptions of the senses, that is, between universals and particulars. Hegel’s concept of mediation claims specifically to reconcile the universal and the particular. this is also the work that repetition is supposed to perform: one repeats the universal in the particular action. as is well known, heiberg gave a critical treatment of Repetition in an article in his journal Urania.62 this triggered a series of drafts of a response that can be found in Kierkegaard’s Nachlass. From these it is again clear that Kierkegaard wishes to object to hegelian mediation (advocated by heiberg) and to replace it with his own concept of repetition. in one of these he explains his use of the eleatics at the outset of the work: movement is dialectical, not only with respect to space (in which sense it occupied heraclitus and the eleatics and later was so much used and misused by the skeptics), but also with respect to time. the dialectic in both respects is the same, for the point and the moment correspond to each other. since i could not name two schools in which the dialectic of motion with respect to time is expressed as explicitly as heraclitus and the eleatics express it with respect to space, i named them.63

here Kierkegaard or Constantin Constantius explains that the concept of repetition concerns a “dialectical” movement in time. Since this is a new concept, the best he could do is to refer to the debate between heraclitus and the eleatics, which was primarily concerned with movement in space. seen in this manner, the concept of repetition captures, by analogy, not one side of this dispute but both; in the temporal sphere it includes the unchanging universal of the eleatics and the mutable particular of heraclitus. SKS 4, 25 / R, 148. Johan Ludvig Heiberg “Det astronomiske Aar,” Urania, 1844, pp. 77–160 (ASKB u 57). (reprinted in heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 9, pp. 51–130.) 63 Pap. iv B 117, p. 289 / R, supplement, p. 309. 61 62

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the eleatics and the question of movement also appear in The Concept of Anxiety (1844). in the introduction, in a criticism of hegelian logic, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author explains as follows that there is no genuine movement in logic, despite the hegelians’ claims to the contrary: in logic, the negative is used as the impelling power to bring movement into all things. one must have movement in logic no matter how it is brought about, and no matter by what means. the negative lends a hand, and what the negative cannot accomplish, play on words and platitudes can, just as when the negative itself becomes a play on words. in logic, no movement can come about, for logic is, and whatever is logical only is.64

the criticism is clearly aimed at the hegelian dialectical movement that is driven by the concept of negativity as a determinate negation. then he compares this with the eleatics in a footnote: “the eternal expression for the logical is what the eleatics through a misunderstanding transferred to existence: nothing comes into being, everything is.”65 the key critical point here seems to be that the eleatics took a logical concept “being” and applied it to the realm of existence and actuality. This seems to be one of the things that Kierkegaard believes hegel to be guilty of as well. as a system of thought, hegel’s logic may well be interesting and thoughtprovoking, but it does not apply to the realm of actuality, and it certainly does not explain the phenomena (such as movement) found there. This seems to be confirmed by what Kierkegaard’s pseudonym goes on to say in the text: “this weakness of the logical consists in the transition of logic into becoming, where existence and actuality come forth.”66 at the beginning of Chapter three of this same work, Kierkegaard has his pseudonym return to this same issue. here he criticizes the different hegelian terms, “negation, transition, mediation” for purporting to represent movement.67 this is then the occasion for the introduction of Plato’s concept of “the moment.” This issue is treated in more detail in a long footnote on plato.68 here the eleatics are referred to as follows: plato conceives of the moment as purely abstract. in order to become acquainted with its dialectic, one should keep in mind that the moment is non-being under the category of time. non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν; the τὸ κενόν of the pythagoreans) occupied the interest of the ancient philosophers more than it does modern philosophers. among the eleatics, non-being was conceived ontologically in such a way that what was affirmed about it could be stated only in the contradictory proposition that only being is. if one pursues this further, he will see that it reappears in all the spheres. in metaphysical propaedeutics the proposition was expressed thus: he who expresses non-being says nothing at all (this misunderstanding is refuted in The Sophist, and in a more mimical way it was refuted in an earlier dialogue, Gorgias).69 64 65 66 67 68 69

SKS 4, 320 / CA, 12–13. SKS 4, 320, note 2 / CA, 13, note. SKS 4, 320 / CA, 13. SKS 4, 384 / CA, 82. SKS 4, 385–8, note 2 / CA, 82–4, note. SKS 4, 385, note 2 / CA, 82, note.

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This passage again testifies to Kierkegaard’s study of these issues in the ancient sources. moreover, the context of this passage gives us some insight into his interest in the concepts of negation and movement. in the immediate context of The Concept of Anxiety, he is interested in the notion of negation or non-being as an interpretation or explanation of the Christian concept of sin. in short, he appeals to the history of philosophy to find the conceptual apparatus that he needs to explore this concept from dogmatics. the eleatics emerge again in several passages in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). here the eleatics’ conception of being is understood as pure abstraction, in line with hegelian logic. in his discussion of the danish debate about mediation, Johannes Climacus argues that there can be mediation in the realm of thought but not in the realm of being. there is no mediation in the latter sphere, but rather the “either/or” of irreducible alternatives or contradictions. He writes, “On the other hand, do not go and say that there should be an aut/aut sub specie aeterni, ‘where everything is and nothing originates’ (the Eleatics’ doctrine).”70 this is elaborated upon in the corresponding footnote: “misled by repeated talk about a continual process in which opposites combine in a higher unity and then again in a higher unity etc., people have drawn a parallel between hegel’s doctrine and that of heraclitus: everything flows and nothing abides. This, however, is a misunderstanding, because everything that is said in Hegel about process and becoming is illusory.”71 From this passage it is clear that the eleatics and hegel, with their insistence on enduring truth and abstract thought, stand on the same side, opposite heraclitus. Johannes Climacus is intent on clearing up the misunderstanding that it is the other way around and that hegel, with his notion of dialectical movement and mediation, is allied with heraclitus. Climacus clearly does not believe that hegel’s conceptual movement is genuine movement, since the latter must take place in the sphere of actuality. In the chapter, “The Issue in Fragments,” Johannes Climacus refers to the contrast of the eleatics and heraclitus. in the passage in question he criticizes hegel’s mediation of opposites into a higher unity. the point of the discussion is to indicate that when hegel attempts to sublate Christianity, he in effect turns it into something that it is not, that is, a concept. But mediation can only take place between two like things, that is, opposites, and not between two things that are radically different. Christianity is radically different from objective thinking and cannot be sublated without losing its essential character. in this context, reference is made to the eleatics as follows: For example, when speculative thought mediates between the doctrine of the eleatics and that of heraclitus, this can be altogether proper, because the doctrine of the eleatics is not related as an opposite of speculation but is itself speculative, and likewise the doctrine of heraclitus. not so when the opposite is the opposite of speculation on the whole. if there is to be mediation here (and mediation is indeed speculation’s idea), this means that speculation judges between itself and the opposite of itself and consequently is itself party and judge.72 70 71 72

SKS 7, 279 / CUP1, 307. SKS 7, 279, note / CUP1, 307, note. SKS 7, 342 / CUP1, 376.

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the idea here seems to be that speculative philosophy can reduce the eleatic doctrine and the heraclitean doctrine to thoughts and then sublate them as opposite positions. this is an immanent sublation. however, when speculative philosophy is confronted with something that is genuinely other, like Christianity, it cannot sublate it by reducing it to a thought or a doctrine in the same way. When it appears to do so, it is engaging in a deception by pretending to treat Christianity in this way, but what is really being treated is not Christianity at all but an abstract doctrine. speculative philosophy thus begs the question with its attempt to incorporate everything into its system of thought since it fails to recognize that not everything is a thought. Johannes Climacus continues this discussion over several pages, and later in the same analysis he refers to the eleatics again. the context is again the distortion done to Christianity by speculative philosophy. here he writes: if Christianity were a doctrine, it would eo ipso not constitute the opposite of speculative thought but would be an element within it. Christianity pertains to existence, to existing, but existence and existing are the very opposite of speculation. the eleatic doctrine, for example, is not related to existing but to speculation; therefore it must be assigned its place within speculation. precisely because Christianity is not a doctrine, it holds true, as developed previously, that there is an enormous difference between knowing what Christianity is and being a Christian.73

this passage makes it clear that, in Climacus’ assessment, eleatic thinking is a form of speculative philosophy. By this he seems to mean that it is concerned with what is abstract, the concept of pure being, or the universal. however, it does not concern existence or actuality, which, by its very nature consists of particulars. Kierkegaard’s interest in the eleatics was fairly extensive. he clearly studied them and not least of all zeno’s paradoxes with keen interest. he eventually came to associate them with the much-criticized abstraction of hegel’s thought. the eleatics’ doctrine of unchanging being was, in Kierkegaard’s eyes, an abstraction from actuality and existence. seen in this context, the anecdote about diogenes’ refutation of zeno’s denial of motion can be interpreted as a blow for common sense against abstraction. one can see diogenes’ pacing back and forth as an indirect strategy of critique or refutation in line with those used by Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms in their criticism of all forms of abstraction. in comparison with the eleatics and their abstraction, heraclitus, with his emphasis on the flux of actuality, might be thought to be a more sympathetic figure for Kierkegaard. the emphasis on change and contingency captures well what has come to be known as the existential dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought. in any case the two ancient schools constitute the two sides of the concept of repetition: the eleatics the universal, and heraclitus the particular. From this analysis, it seems clear that Kierkegaard developed his own concept of repetition in conjunction with his study of eleatic thought. as has been seen, the concept of repetition is intended as a replacement for hegel’s mediation of the universal and the particular, and thus

73

SKS 7, 346 / CUP1, 380.

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the development of that notion has a critical edge that again connects the eleatics to hegel’s philosophy. Finally, one of Kierkegaard’s key objections to hegel’s thought is its abstract monism and claim to universality. Kierkegaard is ultimately interested in making sharp and firm distinctions between, for example, objective and subjective thinking, philosophy and religion, the external and the internal. this view puts him in opposition to many of his systematicizing contemporaries, who attempt to see the grand unity of things by establishing a continuous hierarchy of the academic fields or the forms of cognition. One means to connect these fields or forms is Hegelian mediation. Kierkegaard sees eleatic thought as a forerunner of this. the doctrine of unchanging being smoothes over key distinctions and reduces and eliminates the absolutely important dimension of the individual. one of Kierkegaard’s clear goals throughout his authorship is to work against abstraction and attempt to help to recover the absolute irreducibility of the single individual who is in danger of being lost.

Bibliography I. Works by the Eleatics in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library none. II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Eleatics adler, adolph peter, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, p. 67 (ASKB 383). Buhle, Johann gottlieb, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–6 (in 10 tomes), vols. 1–2, göttingen: Johann georg rosenbusch’s Wittwe 1800; vols. 3–6, göttingen: röwer 1802–05 [abtheilung 6 in Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer ausgearbeitet, abtheilungen 1–11, göttingen: röwer and göttingen: rosenbusch 1796–1820], vol. 1, pp. 44ff. (ASKB 440–445). Cousin, victor, Über französische und deutsche Philosophie. Aus dem Französischen von Dr. Hubert Beckers, Professor. Nebst einer beurtheilenden Vorrede des Herrn Geheimraths von Schelling, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1834, pp. 25–6; pp. 28–9 (ASKB 471). Fichte, immanuel hermann, Die speculative Theologie oder allgemeine Religionslehre, heidelberg: J.C.B. mohr 1846 (vol. 3, in Grundzüge zum Systeme der Philosophie), p. 142 (ASKB 509; for vols. 1–2 see ASKB 502–503). Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Die eleatische Schule,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, pp. 280–327 (ASKB 557–559). —— Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 95; vol. 2, p. 432; p. 510; p. 515 (ASKB 564–565). Hermann, Karl Friedrich, “Die Eleaten,” in his Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie. Erster Theil, die historisch-kritische Grundlegung enthaltend, heidelberg: C.F. Winther 1839, pp. 168–79 (ASKB 576).

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Marbach, Gotthard Oswald, “Die Eleaten,” in his Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, leipzig: otto Wigand 1838 (1. abtheilung, in marbach, gotthard oswald, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, abtheilung 1–2, leipzig: Wigand 1838–41), pp. 125–47 (ASKB 642; for abtheilung 2 see ASKB 643). Meiners, Christoph, “Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leukipp und Heraklit,” in his Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom, vols. 1–2, lemgo: meyer 1781–82, vol. 1, pp. 603–30 (ASKB 1406–1406a). [Møller, Poul Martin], “Den eleatiske Philosophie,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 325–45; see also vol. 3, p. 350 (ASKB 1574–1576). mynster, Jakob peter, Den hedenske Verden ved Christendommens Begyndelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1850, p. 29 (ASKB 693). nielsen, rasmus, De speculativa historiæ sacræ tractandæ methodo commentatio, Copenhagen: tengnagel 1840, p. 7 (ASKB 697). —— Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, pp. 12–13; p. 115 (ASKB 699). Richter, Heinrich, “Die Eleatische Philosophie,” in Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: perthes 1836, vol. 1, pp. 459–572 (ASKB 735–738). —— Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, ed. by l. preller, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 83–127 (ASKB 726). schlegel, Friedrich, Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806, ed. by C.J.h. Windischmann, vols. 1–2, Bonn: Weber 1836, vol. 1, pp. 196ff. (ASKB 768–768a). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 30; p. 53; pp. 80–1 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, pp. 32ff. (ASKB 774–775). Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Darstellung der Eleatischen Philosophie,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 1, pp. 150–209 (ASKB 815–826). tiedemann, dietrich, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 1, passim (ASKB 836–841). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, pp. 179ff. (ASKB 843). Weiße, Christian hermann, System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee der Schönheit. In drei Büchern, vols. 1–2, leipzig: bei C.h.F. hartmann 1830, vol. 1, p. 27 (ASKB 1379–1380).

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—— Die Idee der Gottheit. Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Als wissenschaftliche Grundlegung zur Philosophie der Religion, dresden: Ch.F. grimmer 1833, p. 106; p. 142, note (ASKB 866). Wirth, Johann ulrich, Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845, pp. 152–8 (ASKB 876). Zeller, Eduard, “Die Eleaten,” in his Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung Über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, vols. 1–3, tübingen: Fues 1844–52, vol. 1, pp. 133–54 (ASKB 913–914). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to the Eleatics Carlisle, Clare, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming, Movements and Positions, albany: state university of new York press 2005, pp. 10–11. Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard und die griechische Dialektik,” in Kierkegaard and Dialectics, ed. by Jørgen K. Bukdahl, aarhus: university of aarhus, institute for ethics and the philosophy of religion 1979, pp. 51–124. —— “Kierkegaard og den græske dialektik,” Fønix, vol. 4, no. 4, 1980, pp. 281– 305. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 24; p. 71; pp. 242–3; pp. 361–2; p. 403, note 9.

heraclitus: presocratic ideas of motion, Change and opposites in Kierkegaard’s thought Finn gredal Jensen

I. Heraclitus and the Presocratics heraclitus of ephesus was in his prime in the 69th olympiad, that is, 504–501 bc.1 of his life we know very little apart from the fact that his family was very influential in the political life of his home town ephesus. he is placed a generation later than pythagoras and Xenophanes, whom he opposes, and a generation earlier than parmenides, who in turn opposes his philosophical views. these views were stated in his lone book, which covered all knowledge, metaphysical, scientific and political, and were formulated in an almost oracular style, for which reason he obtained the epithet the obscure (ὁ Σκοτεινός).2 instead of a normal, straightforward philosophical argumentation, his text consists of enigmatic or aphoristic utterances, interwoven with poetical and rhetorical figures—for example, parallelisms, chiasms, plays on words—and one might say that the structure of the language itself unveils the meaning and system of his thought. apparently, he had no philosophical teacher, but learnt everything by independent study. his work survives only in fragments.3 diogenes laertius remarks about this: “the book said to be his is called ‘on nature’ diogenes laertius, 9.1 (cf., for example, strabo, 14.25). this acme of heraclitus, that is, the age of 40, was presumably taken from the chronographer appolodorus. the prime about 500 bc is generally agreed upon, as well as the supposition that his main philosophical activity had ended by 480, cf. G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1983 or later, p. 182. 2 The epithet is first found in Aristotle’s De mundo, 396b 20. Cf. Cicero, De finibus, 2.15. According to Diogenes Laertius, 9.6, Heraclitus was also called “riddler” by a thirdcentury satirist, timon of phlius. 3 Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und Deutsch, vols. 1–3, ed. by hermann diels and Walther Kranz, 6th ed., Berlin: Weidmann 1951 or later; vol. 1, pp. 150–82 (diels– Kranz is abbreviated DK; in the following the fragment numbers of heraclitus all refer to DK, section 22, B). english translations are found in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, oxford: Basil Blackwell 1948, pp. 24–34 (cf. Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, oxford: Basil Blackwell 1946, pp. 104–32); see also Kirk et al., The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 181–212. 1

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[Περὶ φύσεως], from its chief content, and is divided into three discourses: on the universe, politics, theology. he dedicated it and placed it in the temple of artemis, as some say, having purposely written it rather obscurely so that only those of rank and influence should have access to it and it should not be easily despised by the populace.”4 heraclitus was both an aristocrat and a misanthrope; not only was he contemptuous of his fellow citizens, he even refused with scorn an invitation from the Persian king Darius. His deep disdain for democracy is reflected clearly, for instance, in Fragment 49: “one man to me is [worth] ten thousand, if he is the best.”5 scholars are accustomed to calling the philosophical thinkers who preceded Socrates the “Presocratics,” and this term refers especially to Ionic and Italic-Eleatic natural philosophy.6 the task of the natural philosophers was φυσιολογία. they were not preoccupied with ethics, but with cosmology, the question of the cause and constitution of the physical world, to which many interesting responses were given. What is interesting in this context, however, is not so much what these figures thought as that they thought, that human beings seriously wondered how reality was rationally constituted. thales of miletus, the oldest of the presocratics, is regarded as the founder of the tradition of Western philosophy with his reflections on the ἀρχή (in his case water). among the presocratics, however, heraclitus occupies a special position: to him, the fundamental question is not the physical form of the universe, the archetypal form of matter, but how to comprehend the world, the underlying coherence of things, as reflected in his thoughts on the nature of knowledge or wisdom. the epistemological aspect is central to heraclitus. it is important to emphasize that in greek philosophical thinking the cosmos is always rational. this is the case with heraclitus, and such thoughts are not rare to other Presocratics as well. The best-suited candidate for the predicate “atheist,” anaxagoras—against whom the charge of impiety was raised—was rather a theist: he believed that god is νοῦς. When Thales says that “everything is full of gods,” he means, according to Aristotle, “that soul is intermingled with the whole universe.”7 this is no primitive animism, but an expression of the view that an ensouled world is felt to be thoroughly penetrated by something divine and that the human soul is related to it. When something feels great or inconceivable, it was for the greeks, and also for Socrates, “divine” or “daimonic.” It is therefore a misunderstanding to 4

p. 183.

diogenes laertius, 9.5; translation from Kirk et al., The Presocratic Philosophers,

the quotations of heraclitus follow the translations by Kathleen Freeman in her Ancilla (see note 3). some of the fragments are also translated into english in Kirk et al., The Presocratic Philosophers. 6 this is a somewhat unfortunate word since some scholars also use it to designate the philosophers of nature from the fifth century and the older Sophists, both contemporary with socrates; such a usage, of course, renders the designation meaningless. thus, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker also include fragments from thinkers, some of whom actually survived socrates. “ ‘pre-socratics’ should be understood not in the strictly chronological sense...but as meaning all those whose thought is pre- or non-Socratic,” says Freeman in her Companion to Diels, p. xiii. 7 thales, DK 11 a22, cf. aristotle, De anima, 405a and 411a. 5

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think that the presocratics’ search for rational explanations of the cosmos inevitably ends in irreligiosity; on the contrary, they themselves regarded their thinking as the true religion in opposition to the ignorant masses and their superstition; this is also reflected in their rejection of the old mythological explanations of the world. Heraclitus, too, ridicules conventional religion, which he finds foolish and illogical. the authority of the presocratics, or their own claim of it, is supported by the fact that they often obtained their knowledge by means of a religious experience, a revelation which lies at the foundation of their teaching, as, for example, in the case of parmenides’ proemium (DK 28 B1).8 however, when heraclitus speaks of logos (λόγος)—the recurring formula of his thought—it is not just the “word” with a close connection to a unique historical event as in the prologue to the gospel of John. it is reason which constitutes the cosmic order; it is a creative force of divine nature. and the human soul is, note well, related to this force (cf. Fragments 45 and 115). This Logos is often called “fire,” and it is the common constituent of all things; it is the balance of the world and the human soul. logos is heraclitus’ version of the ἀρχή of the natural philosophers, that is, a fundamental ontological principle which all single natural and human regulations must rely on, a principle that is not change or movement, but the causa prima from which all movement arises. the mutability of everything is illustrated with the river image: “Those who step into the same rivers have different waters flowing ever upon them” (Fragment 12). One of Heraclitus’ central thoughts is also that of pairs of opposites since their unity is logos itself; this concept is expressed, for example, in Fragment 8: “that which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony.” as far as politics is concerned, εὐνομία is the expression for a general sense of justice which appears as respect for the laws. in this connection one should not overlook as a source of justice the “unwritten laws” (νόμοι ἄγραφοι), by which is understood the practices of justice or common customs (νόμος in a broader sense), that is, fixed patterns of behavior, including religious injunctions which are so ancient that their validity cannot be doubted. The unwritten laws tend to be identified with divine laws and thus seem also to be universal principles of a nature which is more difficult to relate to.9 heraclitus is said to have made the following statement: “if 8 an extreme example is empedocles who was not only a prophetic preacher, healer and mystic but also regarded himself as a god. he was said to have thrown himself into mount aetna, but whereas a god would disappear without trace, a sandal ejected from the volcano revealed that he was all too human, cf. diogenes laertius, 8.69. the persistence of this anecdote is probably also due to horace, Ars Poetica, 464ff.: Deus inmortalis haberi / dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam / insiluit. empedocles is used here as a frightening image of a mad poet who commits suicide. 9 Compare sophocles’ Antigone. When asked about why she dared to transgress the νόμος proclaimed by Creon, antigone says (vv. 450ff.) about human laws that neither zeus nor the chthonic dike proclaimed them; but with the divine νόμοι, “the unwritten and unfailing ordinances of the gods” (ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα, vv. 454–5), things are different: “For these have life, not simply today and yesterday, but for ever, and no one knows how long ago they were revealed” (vv. 456–7, translation from Sophocles, vol. II: Antigone, The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus, trans. by hugh lloyd-

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we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as the city on the law (νόμος), and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough” (Fragment 114). According to Heraclitus, then, all human laws spring from the divine law, which, in this fragment, refers again to the all-pervading logos. as a consequence of his doctrine of change, heraclitus thought the following of justice: “to god, all things are beautiful, good and just; but men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just” (Fragment 102). Thus, mundane justice becomes something relative which must be adjusted according to what human beings determine to be right.10 in contrast to this stands god or logos. II. Kierkegaard’s Use of Heraclitus Which, then, were søren Kierkegaard’s sources relating to heraclitus? as we shall see in the following, it is clear from a footnote in Repetition that he found the well-known river image in plato’s Cratylus. But naturally there were also other possibilities, especially the histories of philosophy he had access to. in The Concept of Irony (1841) he quotes in german from g.W.F. hegel’s (1770–1831) Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: “Eben der Begriff ist dieß fließende Uebergehen Heraklits, dieß Bewegen, – diese Kausticität, der nichts widerstehen kann.”11 Kierkegaard also owned, for instance, heinrich ritter’s (1791–1869) Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit,12 gotthard oswald marbach’s (1810–90) Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, which treats the history of greek philosophy in volume 1,13 and Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann’s (1761–1819) Geschichte der Philosophie.14 in the Journal NB29 from 1854—the last time Kierkegaard mentions heraclitus—he Jones, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1994 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 21)). 10 Cf. at the time of socrates the sophists’ relativistic conception of justice and protagoras’ homo mensura. 11 SKS 1, 251.6–8 / CI, 206; cf. g.W.F. hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Karl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 557–559); heraclitus is treated in vol. 1 (Werke, vol. 13), pp. 327–53. the passage here quoted is found in vol. 2 (Werke, vol. 14), p. 5. 12 heinrich ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1829–34, which treats heraclitus in vol. 1, pp. 242–79. Kierkegaard owned the second edition of vol. 1, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1836 (ASKB 735) and the first edition of vols. 2–4, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1830–34 (ASKB 736–738). 13 g.o. marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–2, leipzig: otto Wigand 1838–41 (ASKB 642); vol. 1, Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie, treating heraclitus on pp. 63–70. 14 W.g. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798– 1819 (ASKB 815–826), which treats heraclitus in vol. 1, pp. 209–39 (erstes hauptstück, Fünfter abschnitt: philosophie des heraclits). Kierkegaard’s use of tennemann will be discussed further below.

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makes use of a somewhat different source, arthur schopenhauer’s (1788–1860) Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, but only when quoting the pun, τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος (Fragment 48, “the bow is called life, but its work is death”).15 Furthermore, apart from plato’s dialogues,16 he had ancient sources such as aristotle in many different editions,17 and diogenes laertius both in greek and in riisbrigh’s danish translation.18 another type of source is what Kierkegaard remembered from lectures. We cannot be absolutely certain if he heard any of poul martin møller’s (1794–1838) lectures on ancient philosophy at the university of Copenhagen in the 1830s, but presumably he did, although there is no secure written evidence concerning this.19 in any case, he could read about heraclitus in “draft of lectures on the history of ancient Philosophy” in Møller’s Posthumous Writings.20 in 1841–42, Kierkegaard heard Quoted by Kierkegaard in this form (without the use of diacritics): τω ουν βιω ονομα μεν βιος, εργον δε θανατος, SKS 25, 316, nB29:29 / JP 4, 3873; cf. arthur schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844, vol. 2, p. 584 (ASKB 773–773a). the interesting thing here, from Kierkegaard’s point of view, seems to be only the greek play on words: βίος meaning life, βιός meaning bow. 16 Cf. ASKB 1144–1170 and ASKB a i 174–181. 17 Cf. ASKB 1056ff. Bekker’s standard edition, Aristoteles Graece, vols. 1–2, Berlin: georg reimer 1831 (ASKB 1074–1075), was possibly bought by Kierkegaard in 1843, cf. h.p. rohde, “om søren Kierkegaard som bogsamler. studier i hans efterladte papirer og bøger paa Det kongelige Bibliotek,” Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger, vol. 8, 1961, pp. 79–127; p. 118. 18 Diogenis Laertii de Vitis Philosophorum libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: Karl tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109); Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navnkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh and ed. by Børge thorlacius, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111), treating heraclitus in vol. 1, pp. 401–8. 19 møller’s lectures on ancient philosophy took place in the winter semesters of 1833– 34 and 1834–35, and in the winter semester 1835–36 he lectured on aristotle’s De anima. according to Akademiske Tidender, vol. 3, ed. by h.p. selmer, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1835, p. 151, there were 21 auditors for the lectures on ancient philosophy in 1834–35 (and for De anima the following year only 10). From møller’s years as professor at the philosophical faculty, lists of participants exist only for the winter semester 1832–33, the summer semester 1833, the winter semester 1833–34, and then, some years later, for the winter semester 1836– 37 and the summer semester 1837; see peter tudvad, Kierkegaards København, Copenhagen: politikens Forlag 2004, pp. 177–81, with references to rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. on the extant list of participants in the lectures on ancient philosophy in the winter semester 1833–34 Kierkegaard’s name does not appear (cf. tudvad, p. 177), from which, however, we cannot necessarily deduce that he was not in attendance, since he could have been present without being officially enrolled. According to Kjøbenhavns Universitets Aarbog for 1838, ed. by h.p. selmer, Copenhagen: gyldendal [1839], p. 87, because of sickness møller was unable to give his announced lectures in the winter semester 1837–38, which included a planned privatissime course of the lectures on ancient philosophy; cf. the course catalogue, Forelæsninger ved Kjøbenhavns Universitet og den polytechniske Læreanstalt i Vintersemestret 1837/38, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1837, p. 16. 20 Kierkegaard bought the first edition of møller’s posthumous writings, Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen 15

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F.W.J. schelling’s (1775–1854) lectures in Berlin, which is evident from Notebook 11. in his 15th lecture on the Philosophie der Offenbarung, schelling, referring to aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book 3, Chapter 4, mentions two types of philosophers: on the one hand, the “theologians,” that is, those influenced by mythology (for example, hesiod), and, on the other hand, the eleatic and “especially the ionian physicists, [for example,] heraclitus (τὰ πάντα ἰέναι, καὶ μένει οὐδέν [everything moves, and nothing remains unchanged]). By this the science of reason is designated because what is subject at one moment becomes object the next, etc.”21 Kierkegaard’s first encounter with Heraclitus, however, was presumably the dogmatic lectures of henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877), dating from 1833–34 (cf. Notebook 1). in his account of Christian anthropology, professor Clausen mentions, regarding purgatory, that “similar notions can be found in the zend religion, in Pythagoras, Plato, Heraclitus, the Stoics....”22 this refers to the idea of the worldfire, found in Heraclitus and later taken over by the Stoics. The all-pervading cosmic fire is the same as Logos; it is present in the human soul, seen by Heraclitus as pure aether, and it is the controlling and directing form of all matter in the universe. “this ordered universe (cosmos), which is the same for all, was not created by any of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure,” says Heraclitus (Fragment 30). The Stoics interpreted this in terms of ἐκπύρωσις, the destruction of the world by fire, as part of a cosmic cycle.23 What one first comes to think of when speaking of Heraclitus, is of course the river image. Kierkegaard uses this several times, most prominently perhaps when closing the epilogue of Fear and Trembling (1843) in the following way: “One must go further, one must go further.” This urge to go further is an old story in the world. heraclitus the obscure, who deposited his thoughts in his books and his books in diana’s temple24 (for his thoughts had been his armor in life, and therefore he hung it in the temple of the goddess), heraclitus the obscure said: one cannot walk through the same river twice. heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who did not remain standing there but went further—and added: one cannot do it even once. poor heraclitus, to have a disciple like that! By this improvement, the heraclitean thesis was amended into an

thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43 (ASKB 1574–1576), which treat heraclitus in “Udkast til Forelæsninger over den ældre Philosophies Historie,” vol. 2, 1842, pp. 302–8. On Kierkegaard and møller see further Finn gredal Jensen, “poul martin møller: Kierkegaard and the Confidant of Socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, Politics and Social Theory, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 7), pp. 101-67. 21 SKS 19, 322.22–5, not11:15 / SBL, 356. 22 SKS 19, 31.1–4, not1:6 / JP 5, 5058 (only the heading). 23 Cf. Fragment 66: “Fire, having come upon them, will judge and seize upon (condemn) all things.” 24 Cf. an entry from 1843 in the Journal JJ, “heraclitus withdrew from daily concerns, wrote his famous work, deposited it in the temple of diana as a treasure that was only to be made available to the initiated.” SKS 18, 161, JJ:69 / KJN 2, 149.

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eleatic thesis that denies motion, and yet that disciple wished only to be a disciple of heraclitus who went further, not back to what heraclitus had abandoned.25

in a footnote, Kierkegaard refers here to plato as his source, quoting in greek a passage from Cratylus, 402a: “he [heraclitus] compares being to the stream of a river and says that you cannot go into the same river twice.”26 What comes closest to this in the surviving fragments from heraclitus (the source in this case being arius didymus), is Fragment 12: “those who step into the same rivers have different waters flowing ever upon them” (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ).27 it is plato who interpreted and reformulated this river image as illustrating the perpetual flux of everything, and Aristotle explains it as absolute continuity of change: “moreover, the view is actually held by some that not merely some things but all things in the world are in motion and always in motion, though we cannot apprehend the fact by sense-perception.”28 in Repetition (1843) we find an indirect reference, reducing Heraclitus to common sense: “do not all agree—both ecclesiastic and secular speakers, both poets and prose writers, both skippers and undertakers, both heroes and cowards— do they not all agree that life is a stream.”29 earlier that year, 1843, in Either/Or, the same thought was expressed humoristically as a diapsalma: “time passes, life is a stream, etc., so people say. That is not what I find: time stands still, and so do I. All the plans I project fly straight back at me; when I want to spit, I spit in my own face.”30 in Prefaces (1844), in the sixth preface designated for an edifying book, the commonplace that everything moves is expressed as follows: But just as the essentially Christian was not concluded in the past, so also it is not concluded in the present moment either but has the future open and can still become anything at all. Only in this view is the truth infinitized in the infinite, whereas otherwise SKS 4, 210 / FT, 123. an earlier version of this is found in a marginal entry in the Journal JJ, “a similar piece of foppish conceit comes from one of heraclitus’ disciples. heraclitus had said, You cannot cross the same river twice. a disciple wanted to better that and said, You cannot do it even once. the nerve is thereby removed; the principle, so far as anything became of it at all, turned into the opposite, an eleatic principle, and denies movement.” SKS 18, 152, JJ:31.b / KJN 2, 141. 26 Kierkegaard refers to Friedrich ast’s edition, Platonis quae exstant opera, vols. 1–11, leipzig: Weidmann 1819–32, vol. 3, pp. 158–9 (ASKB 1144–1154). the dialogue in question is named after heraclitus’ disciple, Cratylus; concerning the teachings of this disciple, Kierkegaard, in another footnote to the passage cited, refers to tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie (on his use of tennemann, see further below). 27 By most editors of Heraclitus, the words “Souls also are vaporised from what is wet” are also seen as part of Fragment 12. Compare also Fragment 49a: “in the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not.” 28 aristotle, Physics, 253b 9–11. translation from The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vols. 1–2, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, princeton: princeton university press 1984. on the interpretation of the river image, see further Kirk et al., The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 195ff. 29 SKS 4, 48.1–4 / R, 174. on Repetition, see further below. 30 SKS 2, 34.27–30 / EO1, 26. 25

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The question of motion is of course essential when it comes to the conflict with the eleatic philosophers who deny it. among other places, this preoccupies Kierkegaard at the very beginning of Repetition: “When the eleatics denied motion, diogenes, as everyone knows, came forward as an opponent. he literally did come forward, because he did not say a word but merely paced back and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had sufficiently refuted them.”32 When further developing the concept of repetition, combining it also with hegelian thought, Kierkegaard says “that this category precisely explains the relation between the eleatics and heraclitus, and that repetition proper is what has mistakenly been called mediation.”33 in Prefaces he indirectly criticizes Johan ludvig heiberg (1791–1860) for a mistaken interpretation of aristotle concerning repetition.34 heiberg, in his periodical Urania, wrote on Repetition, saying that Kierkegaard “has applied it [the concept of repetition] to a concept from natural philosophy, namely, movement, since he thinks that the concept of repetition would be able to bring about a reconciliation between the Eleatics and Heraclitus....”35 that Kierkegaard saw this as a mistaken assertion, appears from an unpublished polemic, “a little Contribution by Constantin Constantius, author of Repetition,” in which he writes that “when Aristotle long ago said that the transition from possibility to actuality is a κίνησις [motion], he was not speaking of logical possibility and actuality but of freedom’s, and therefore he properly posits movement.”36 in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), the conflict with the Eleatics is touched upon again; there the teachings of heraclitus are described as speculative: “For example, when speculative thought mediates between the doctrine of the eleatics and that of heraclitus, this can be altogether proper, because the doctrine of the eleatics is not related as an opposite of speculation but is itself speculative, and likewise the doctrine of Heraclitus.”37 Certainly, Kierkegaard has very good reason to interpret Heraclitus as “speculative” in Hegelian terms, since in his lectures on the history of philosophy hegel praises the efforts of heraclitus, who made the necessary step forward in that he grasped dialectics itself as a fundamental principle. “Bei ihm ist also zuerst die philosophische Idee in ihrer spekulativen Form anzutreffen,” Hegel says, and openly proclaims: “Hier sehen wir Land; es ist

SKS 4, 495.17–23 / P, 33. SKS 4, 9.1–4 / R, 131. 33 SKS 4, 25.10–12 / R, 148. 34 SKS 4, 526.3ff. / P, 66. 35 Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Det astronomiske Aar,” in his Urania. Aarbog for 1844, pp. 77–160; p. 98 (ASKB u 57); cf. SKS K4, p. 625. Cf. FT, notes, p. 381. 36 Pap. iv B 117, p. 290.10–13 / R, supplement, p. 310; heraclitus is referred to in R, supplement, p. 309. 37 SKS 7, 342.22–6 / CUP1, 376. 31 32

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kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht in meine Logik aufgenommen.”38 Kierkegaard, in the Postscript, has the following comment: “misled by repeated talk about a continual process in which opposites combine in a higher unity and then again in a higher unity, etc., people have drawn a parallel between hegel’s doctrine and that of Heraclitus: all flows and nothing abides. This, however, is a misunderstanding, because everything that is said by hegel about process and becoming is illusory. Therefore the system lacks an ethics...”39 It is not clear which “people” are referred to here;40 but more importantly, in the passage quoted above, hegel himself clearly draws the parallel with heraclitus. later in the Postscript, Kierkegaard (Johannes Climacus) reflects again on motion: “inasmuch as existence is motion, it holds true that there is indeed a continuity that holds motion together, because otherwise there is no motion. Just as the statement that everything is true means that nothing is true, in the same way the statement that everything is in motion means that there is no motion.”41 in a footnote to this, he refers to the river image and to Cratylus in the closing words of Fear and Trembling: “this was unquestionably what was meant by heraclitus’ pupil who said that one could not even go once through the same river. Johannes de silentio (in Fear and Trembling) made a reference to this pupil’s statement, but more with rhetorical flourish than with truth.”42 on this and the following pages of the Postscript, Kierkegaard makes indirect use of heraclitus in his criticism of Hegel’s concept of mediation. Compare to this also the reflections on logic in the introduction to The Concept of Anxiety (1844), which concludes that there is only movement in existence: “in logic, no movement must come about, for logic is, and hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 328. Cf. also Carl philipp Fischer, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: liesching 1839 (ASKB 512), p. 32. 39 SKS 7, 279.26–30 / CUP1, 307, note. 40 the explanatory note in SKS K7, p. 265, suggests as a possibility the discussion in rasmus nielsen, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845 (ASKB 699), pp. 115–17. however, the combination of hegel with heraclitus was used in general by many at the time. For instance, Johann ulrich Wirth (1810–79) called hegel “ein wahrer Heraclitus redivivus” in Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845 (ASKB 876), p. 337; cf. pp. 158–62. Kierkegaard had also bought Friedrich adolf trendelenburg’s (1802–72) Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843 (ASKB 846), in which, inter alia, he could read the following comparison on pp. 56–7: “Im Theätet des Plato heisst es, mit Anspielung auf jene Bewegung, die Hegel mit der Negativität verglich, von den Schülern des tiefsinnigen Heraklit: ‘Mit ihnen wissenschaftlich zu verhandeln, geht nicht besser an, als wollte man es mit Solchen versuchen, die von Bremsen gestochen, nicht einen Augenblick still stehen können, denn ganz nach der Lehre ihrer Schriften sind sie in Bewegung.’ ” Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 179e. Compare also below note 58, in fine. 41 SKS 7, 284.12–15 / CUP1, 312. on the aristotelian aspects of this passage, see Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions, albany: state university of new York press 2005, pp. 18–19. 42 SKS 7, 284.30–4 / CUP1, 312. on the epilogue of Fear and Trembling and on the journal entry JJ:31.b, see above. 38

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whatever is logical only is. this weakness of the logical consists in the transition of logic into becoming, where existence and actuality come forth.”43 the whole discussion was anticipated the year before, in 1843, when in the Journal JJ, entry JJ:65, Kierkegaard outlined the following: What principally concerned ancient philosophy, the most ancient in greece, was the question of the movement by which the world came into being, the constitutive relationship of the elements to one another.―What especially concerns the most recent philosophy is movement, i.e., logical movement. It would not be without significance to draw a parallel between these two spheres. modern philosophy has never given an account of movement. Thus in the table of categories―which is so detailed in other respects―there is no category called mediation, which for modern philosophy is nonetheless the most essential of all; indeed, it is truly the nerve of modern philosophy, that with which it wants to differentiate itself from every previous philosophy.44

one of Kierkegaard’s main sources was Tennemann. since in a footnote to the closing passage from Fear and Trembling, cited above, Kierkegaard refers to tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie (vol. 1, p. 220), it is obvious, of course, that he used this work while finishing Fear and Trembling. actually, we know that he bought volumes 1–9 of tennemann’s work already in may 1841.45 it is clear from entries in Notebook 13 (“Philosophica”) and the Journal JJ that he studied the work thoroughly.46 that Kierkegaard read the chapters on the presocratics in volume 1, is also evident from Notebook 14.47 in this notebook his excerpt of tennemann’s treatment of heraclitus reads as follows in extenso: 4. Heraclitus. Fire is the force by which all change in the world becomes real. The world’s original condition was fire. SKS 4, 320.9–12 / CA, 12–13. (Translation slightly modified.) SKS 18, 160, JJ:65 / KJN 2, 148. For further discussion of Kierkegaard’s view of movement in logic, see, for instance, Jens himmelstrup, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates, Copenhagen: arnold Busck 1924, pp. 218ff.; Kalle sorainen, “means of movement in Logic,” in Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard, ed. by marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 3), pp. 94–5; robert Widenmann, “Counterposition,” in Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard, ed. by marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 3), pp. 244–7; F.-E. Wilde, “Die Entwicklung des dialektischen Denkens bei Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 7–51. Cf. also Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and new York: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 396–405. 45 h.p. rohde, referring to the bookseller schubothe’s “Hoved-Journal,” in his aforementioned article, p. 124. 46 see not13:27–28 (SKS 19, 394–7) and JJ:24, 31.b, 49, 53, 55, 65–69, 74, and 86 (SKS 18, 150, 152, 156–8, 160–1, and 166 / KJN 2, 140–1, 145–6, 148–9, 151, 154). 47 the editors of SKS claim that Notebook 14 possibly dates from as late as spring 1843, cf. the critical account to Notebook 14 in SKS K19, p. 604, with references to contemporary entries in the Journal JJ and Notebook 13. 43 44

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everything is constantly shifting and changing. ἡ κατω ὁδος; ἡ ανω ὁδος. Everything is and everything is not. the law by which reason functions is an activity by which opposite determinations become actual (εναντιοτροπη; εναντιοτης; εναντιοδρομια.)48

it is clear from these short notes that what concerns Kierkegaard most—apart from the themes fire and change—is another major Heraclitean topic: that of opposites. “that which is in opposition is in concert, and from things that differ comes the most beautiful harmony,” says Heraclitus in Fragment 8. The harmony of unity is logos: “When you have listened, not to me but to the law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one” (Fragment 50). The condition for change is that a given thing enters into a relation of conflict, thus the designation “strife,” with its opposite, and from this conflict arises movement. To illustrate this tension in a complex, consisting of opposite properties, heraclitus uses a simile: “they do not understand how that which differs with itself is in agreement; harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow and the lyre” (Fragment 51). In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard reflects upon Plato’s Symposium, 187a, referring to heraclitus: “incidentally, there is something unclear in eryximachus’ speech; he disregards on the one hand the necessity of the immediate element of unity, the bond of unity that encircles the duplexity, despite his quoting of Heraclitus’ words that what is in conflict with itself is in unison with itself just as in the tuning of a lyre or the tensioning of a bow.”49 the coherence of heraclitus’ thought shows itself also in the fact that the question of opposites is easily extended to the sphere of ethics. in the Nicomachean Ethics when developing the nature of friendship, Aristotle says that some define it as a matter of similarity or likeness, whereas others who “try to find a more profound and scientific explanation of the nature of affection” think that it depends on unlikeness, and he quotes Heraclitus: “Opposition unites,” “The fairest harmony springs from difference,” and “ ’Tis strife that makes the world go on.”50 Kierkegaard uses this passage when, in the Journal JJ, he writes: “Which view contains the profoundest grasp of life: that opposition unites people or unity and likeness do? heraclitus taught that only things standing opposed to one another are mutually useful, empedocles that everything is attracted only by the like. / Cf. Arist. Ethics 8, 2.”51 the unity of opposites, of course, is logos. already in Notebook 11 on schelling’s Philosophie der Offenbarung, this is referred to with the remark that “god always SKS 19, 427.15–24, not14:1; cf. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1, pp. 209–39. 49 SKS 1, 104.23–26 / CI, 43, note. 50 Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a 32–1155b 6. translation from Aristotle, vol. XIX: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by h. rackham, 2nd ed., Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1934 or later (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 73). 51 SKS 18, 148–9, JJ:17 / KJN 2, 138. Kierkegaard’s reference to “Ethics 8, 2” instead of Book 8, Chapter 1, is due to the diverging division of the text in garve’s german translation, Die Ethik des Aristoteles übersetzt und erläutert, vols. 1–2, ed. by Christian garve, Breslau: Wilhelm gottlieb Korn 1798–1801 (ASKB 1082–1083). 48

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works through means or, as a greek has expressed it, always through τὸ ἐναντίον (the opposite).”52 in a number of fragments, heraclitus develops different kinds of instances of the essential unity of opposites. one example is the pair in the passage quoted above from Notebook 14, “the way up and down is one and the same” (Fragment 60).53 another example in this notebook is “Everything is and everything is not.” Tennemann explains this as follows, “Wegen der durchgängigen Veränderlichkeit aller Dinge, da keines einen Augenblick in demselben Zustande bleibt, kann man von jedem mit eben dem Recht sagen, es ist, als, es ist nicht,” and refers to aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book 4, Chapter 7 (1012a 24–26), where aristotle interprets heraclitus’ thesis to mean that everything is true.54 in Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est (1842–43), Kierkegaard also treats this problem, referring to the very same page in Tennemann. In the chapter “What Is It to Doubt?,” Johannes Climacus reflects that “in immediacy there is no relation, for as soon as there is a relation, immediacy is canceled. Immediately, therefore, everything is true, but this truth is untruth the very next moment, for in immediacy everything is untrue. If consciousness can remain in immediacy, then the question of truth is canceled.”55 in a footnote he refers to “heraclitus’ thesis that everything is and everything is not, which aristotle interprets to mean that everything is true. see tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie, I, p. 237, note.”56 heraclitus’ words that everything is and is not, which survive in aristotle, can be compared with Fragment 49a: “in the same river, we both step and do not step, we are and we are not.” In this fragment the same thought is immediately connected with the river image, the main heraclitean topic as seen from Kierkegaard’s view. actually, as we have noted, this pregnant image applies to all the most important SKS 19, 345.5–6, not11:28 / SBL, 385. Cf. tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 221, and diogenes laertius, 9.1. these words, generally interpreted as depicting a cosmic process, are explained by p.m. Møller in the following way: “The pure aether (fire) is changed to air, which in turn is changed to water and water to earth; this is called the way downward [ἡ κάτω ὁδός]; by contrast, the change from earth to water, water to air, air to aether is called the way upward [ἡ ἄνω ὁδός]. these two directions converge so that an apparent rest can arise; since, for example, the ocean and the earth can have increase and decrease in equal measure, this increase and decrease seem to remain constant units. But the change to fire ultimately wins out; and then one period of the world is over in order to begin anew.” Efterladte Skrifter, 1st edition, vol. 2, p. 305. Freeman, Companion to Diels, p. 125, explains the genesis of the soul, being an exhalation of Fire, as part of the road up or upward path, whereas “the body is produced on the downward path towards moisture, and the soul is ‘exhaled,’ reaching up again towards the Fire from which it has come. the genesis of the human creature therefore is a replica of that of the Cosmos, and the soul’s flow towards Fire is likened to the flowing river” (cf. the spurious part of Fragment 12, “Souls also are vaporised from what is wet”). 54 tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1, p. 237 with note 45. 55 Pap. iv B 1, pp. 145.21–146.3 / JC, 167. the italics represent Kierkegaard’s underlinings in the ms. 56 Pap. iv B 1, p. 145, note / JC, 167, note. Cf. also Concluding Unscientific Postscript, SKS 7, 272.24–6 / CUP1, 298–9: “this in its general sense is the essential aesthetic thesis, that the moment is all and to that extent, in turn, essentially nothing, just as the sophist thesis that everything is true is that nothing is true.” In this case it refers to Protagoras. 52 53

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philosophical problems that interested him about heraclitus: motion, change, and opposites. presumably, one should add, he was also attracted by heraclitus’ obscurity, his often odd manner of communication. In “Silhouettes” in Either/Or, Kierkegaard quotes in greek what heraclitus said about the oracle at delphi, and in a certain sense these words might suit heraclitus’ own statements as well: “the lord whose oracle is that at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but indicates” (Fragment 93).57 the points of resemblance with Kierkegaard’s own indirect method seem obvious. this theme he also combines with socrates: as regards heraclitus’ obscurity, Kierkegaard alludes in several places to the words he was familiar with primarily from Johann georg hamann (1730–88) concerning socrates that he distinguished between what he could understand in heraclitus and what he could not. “Sokrates war, meine Herren, kein gemeiner Kunstrichter. Er unterschied in den Schriften des Heraklitus, dasjenige, was er nicht verstand, von dem, was er darin verstand, und that eine sehr billige und bescheidene Vermuthung von dem Verständlichen auf das Unverständliche,” Hamann says in the second preface, “An die Zween,” to his Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten (1759).58 the focal point, though, is not the means but the substance of the thought. in works like the Postscript Kierkegaard, in general, tends to extol ancient greek philosophy with its engagement with the problems of life and existence, in contrast to the current philosophical trends of his own day.59 every reader of Kierkegaard is acquainted with his praise of socrates and his criticism of hegel, and Kierkegaard’s attraction to heraclitus is basically the same as to other greek philosophers. still, the case of heraclitus represents, at least from the starting point, a kind of dilemma due to hegel’s enthusiasm, the “Hier sehen wir Land.” For Kierkegaard, Heraclitus had a keen eye to the transitory nature of human existence, which is expressed in his doctrines of motion and change. this positive view of heraclitus is, however, complicated by the fact that hegel claims him to be a forerunner of modern speculative thought. For that reason Kierkegaard feels obliged to distinguish heraclitus from hegel’s account of dialectical movement. he argues that heraclitus is concerned with true movement SKS 2, 196.12–13 / EO1, 200. Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin and leipzig: g. reimer 1821–23, vol. 2, p. 12 (ASKB 536–544). this statement is referred to in the motto for The Concept of Anxiety, SKS 4, 310 / CA, 3. in this and other cases, however, socrates’ understanding of heraclitus is only referred to indirectly; cf. also, for instance, Philosophical Fragments, SKS 4, 289.1–2 / PF, 91; Prefaces, SKS 4, 516.35–6 / P, 56; Postscript, SKS 7, 507.14–15 / CUP1, 558; A Literary Review, SKS 8, 14.14–16 / TA, 10; Works of Love, SKS 9, 233.26–7 / WL, 232; Journal DD, SKS 17, 216.32ff., dd:6 / KJN 1, 208.33ff. hamann’s own source was undoubtedly the anecdote found in diogenes laertius, 2.22. this was also used by trendelenburg, applied to hegel, in Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System, p. 5, where one reads regarding the profundity, “man hörte auf Hegel’s Logik das Wort anwenden, das Sokrates von Heraklit’s dunkler, aber tiefsinniger Schrift soll ausgesprochen haben: ‘Was ich in dem Buche verstanden, ist vortrefflich; daher meine ich, ist es auch Das, was ich nicht verstanden; aber es bedarf eines delischen Schwimmers, um nicht darin unterzugehen’ ” (in diogenes laertius, 2.22, the greek word κολυμβητής is better translated “diver” than “swimmer”). 59 Cf. stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, pp. 641ff. 57 58

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in the sphere of existence, whereas hegel’s dialectical movement is merely an illusion since there is no genuine movement in thought. thus, Kierkegaard uses heraclitus as he uses socrates and other greek philosophers, namely, as a contrast to German speculative thinking. In Heraclitus he finds yet another hero of engaged existential living in contrast to the vapid abstract thought of his nineteenth-century contemporaries.

Bibliography I. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to Heraclitus Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche ReligionsPhilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835, p. 472 (ASKB 421). Becker, Karl Friedrich, Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29; vol. 2, p. 409 (ASKB 1972–1983). Buhle, Johann gottlieb, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–6 (in 10 tomes), vols. 1–2, göttingen: rosenbusch 1800; vols. 3–6, göttingen: Johann Friedrich röwer 1802–05 (abtheilung 6 in Geschichte der Künste und Wissenschaften seit der Wiederherstellung derselben bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts. Von einer Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer ausgearbeitet, abtheilungen 1–11, göttingen: röwer and göttingen: rosenbusch 1796–1820); vol. 1, pp. 18ff.; p. 72; p. 481 (ASKB 440–445). erdmann, Johann eduard, Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik. Für Vorlesungen, halle: lippert 1841, p. 19 (ASKB 483). Fischer, Carl philipp, Die Idee der Gottheit. Ein Versuch, den Theismus speculativ zu begründen und zu entwickeln, stuttgart: s.g. liesching 1839, p. 32 (ASKB 512). Fischer, Friedrich, Die Metaphysik, von empirischem Standpunkte aus dargestellt. Zur Verwirklichung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik, Basel: schweighauser 1847, p. 128 (ASKB 513). hamann, Johann georg, Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin and Leipzig: Georg Reimer 1821–23; vol. 2, p. 12 (second preface, “An die Zween,” to Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten, 1759) (ASKB 536–544). Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Philosophie des Heraklit,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, pp. 327–53 (ASKB 557–559). Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, “Det astronomiske Aar,” in his Urania. Aarbog for 1844, pp. 77–160; p. 98 (ASKB u 57). Marbach, Gotthard Oswald, “Herakleitos,” in his Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, leipzig: otto Wigand

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1838 (1. abtheilung, in gotthard oswald marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, abtheilung 1–2, leipzig: Wigand 1838–41), pp. 63–9 (ASKB 642; for abtheilung 2 see ASKB 643). Meiners, Christoph, “Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leukipp und Heraklit,” in his Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom, vols. 1–2, lemgo: meyer 1781–82; vol. 1, pp. 603–30 (ASKB 1406–1406a). Møller, Poul Martin, “Herakleitos,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, 1842, pp. 302–8 (ASKB 1574–1576). [montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99; vol. 1, p. 255; vol. 2, pp. 358–66; vol. 3, p. 372; p. 428; p. 517; vol. 4, p. 40; p. 74; p. 113; p. 223 (ASKB 681–687). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852– 53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57]; vol. 1, pp. 269–70 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, Den propædeutiske Logik, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1845, p. 117 (ASKB 699). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 170 (ASKB 1037). richter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1836–39; vol. 1, pp. 242–79 (ASKB 735–738). [schlegel, Friedrich], Friedrich Schlegel’s Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806. Nebst Fragmenten vorzüglich philosophisch-theologischen Inhalts. Aus dem Nachlaß des Verewigten, ed. by C.h.J. Windischmann, vols. 1–2, Bonn: Weber 1836–37, vol. 1, p. 339 (ASKB 768–768a). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844; vol. 1, p. 8; vol. 2, p. 80; p. 584 (ASKB 773–773a). stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Crusius 1794, vol. 1, pp. 187–92 (ASKB 791). [sulzer, Johann georg], Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 2, p. 76 (ASKB 807–808). Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Philosophie des Heraclits,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819; vol. 1, pp. 209–39 (ASKB 815–826). tiedemann, dietrich, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 1, pp. 194–223 (ASKB 836–841). trendelenburg, Friedrich adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 184 (ASKB 843). —— Die logische Frage in Hegel’s System. Zwei Streitschriften, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1843; p. 5; p. 55; pp. 56–7 (ASKB 846).

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Wirth, Johann ulrich, Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845, p. 152; pp. 158–62; p. 164 (ASKB 876). Zeller, Eduard, “Heraklit,” in his Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, vols. 1–3, tübingen: Fues 1844–52, vol. 1, pp. 154–66 (ASKB 913–914). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Heraclitus Carlisle, Clare, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions, albany: state university of new York press 2005, p. 10; p. 14; p. 18; p. 56; p. 75; p. 93; p. 142. Fondane, Benjamin, “Héraclite le Pauvre, ou nécessité de Kierkegaard,” Cahiers du Sud, vol. 22, 1935, pp. 757–70. himmelstrup, Jens, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates, Copenhagen: arnold Busck 1924, pp. 218ff. holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 23; p. 86; p. 91; pp. 109–10; p. 140. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 38, note 19; p. 59, note 11; p. 68; p. 71; p. 205, note 57; p. 333; p. 341; p. 345, note 34; p. 346; pp. 353–5; pp. 361–2; p. 403, note 90. tzavaras, Johann, Bewegung bei Kierkegaard, Frankfurt am main: peter lang verlag 1978.

the skeptics: Kierkegaard and Classical skepticism anthony rudd

Skepticism was a philosophical movement of considerable significance in the hellenistic and roman worlds.1 a major revival of interest in classical skepticism occurred in early modern Europe, and significantly influenced the development of modern philosophy by the standing challenge it posed to all of those who cherished substantive philosophical ambitions.2 Kierkegaard, as i shall try to show in this article, drew quite significantly on the strategies of ancient skepticism in his critique of what he saw as the metaphysical hubris of contemporary hegelianism. however, the ancient skeptics—and, arguably, such early modern disciples of theirs as Montaigne—used the destruction of claims to “objective” knowledge as the basis for an attitude of tranquil indifference to ultimate questions. For Kierkegaard, by contrast, skeptical epistemology has the effect of throwing the individual back, firstly on his or her own anxious subjectivity, but ultimately—ideally—on an attitude of trust grounded in love. I. Overview of Classical Skepticism Classical skepticism has a long history. skeptical theses were being advanced by the sophists before plato’s time, but pyrrho of elis (ca. 365–275 bc), a younger contemporary of aristotle, was generally regarded as the founder of classical skepticism as a self-conscious philosophical movement. however, the only substantial texts by a self-described pyrrhonist to have survived are those of a much later author, sextus empiricus (ca. ad 150–225). It is unclear to what extent “Pyrrhonism” maintained a continuous existence as a philosophical school between these times, though sextus certainly saw himself as looking back on an established tradition and providing a summary of its ideas. in the course of doing so, he discusses arguments which are ascribed to earlier pyrrhonists such as aenesidemus and agrippa; but we know virtually nothing more about them. meanwhile arcesilaus (315–240 bc) For detailed studies of classical skepticism, see leo groarke, Greek Scepticism: AntiRealist Trends in Ancient Thought, montreal: mcgill-Queens university press 1990, and robert James hankinson, The Sceptics, london: routledge 1995. 2 see richard h. popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley: university of California press 1979. 1

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had converted the academy (founded by plato) to skepticism. sextus distinguishes pyrrhonism from the academic version of skepticism, though the similarities seem to have been greater than the differences. Carneades (213–128 bc) maintained the skeptical tradition in the academy, but it seems to have been abandoned there under antiochus (d. 68 bc). much of our knowledge of academic skepticism comes from the philosophical writings of Cicero, who wrote De Academica, as well as philosophical dialogues such as De Natura Deorum, which feature debates between representatives of stoicism, epicureanism, and (academic) skepticism. since Sextus’ writings are the only substantive first-hand works of a classical skeptic to have survived, and since these seem to have been Kierkegaard’s main source for classical skepticism (see section ii below), i shall concentrate on describing sextus’ position in the remainder of this section. sextus emphasizes that skepticism is not a set of doctrines, but a technique: “skepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatsoever, appearances and judgments, and thus—because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments opposed—to come first of all to a suspension of judgment, and then to mental tranquility.”3 the point of this technique is to rid our minds of the mental unrest and disturbance that is caused by adopting the philosophical quest for an understanding of the true and ultimate nature of things. “Men of talent”4 undertake this quest in the hope that knowledge of such deep truths will bring them peace of mind and contentment. For instance, both stoics and epicureans claimed that coming to a knowledge of the ultimate truth about the nature of things will lead to ataraxia, peace of mind. But for sextus, to make ataraxia dependent on gaining a correct theoretical view of reality will make it impossible. For any theory is open to serious objections; plausible arguments can be found against all of them. (sextus’ writings are designed to serve as a storehouse of such arguments which can be brought out and applied as needed.) and even if dogmatists think they have refuted the arguments brought against them, can they ever be quite sure that their refutations really are valid? they should think of all the opinions that have been held by great philosophers before them, and even held as more or less self-evident, which they now consider to be wrong or even absurd—can they be sure that their confidence in their own arguments is really better placed than theirs was? and they cannot, after all, know what arguments might be brought up in the future to challenge beliefs that seem secure to them now.5 theoretical studies can never bring us to ataraxia, for they can never guarantee the correctness of the conclusions that they reach. hence the theorist’s equanimity is sextus empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. by r.g. Bury in Sextus Empiricus, vols. 1–4, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1933 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 1, see i, 4 (in the following referred to as Outlines of Pyrrhonism). i have also consulted the more recent translations of this work by Julia annas and Jonathan Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1994, and Benson mates, The Skeptic Way, new York and oxford: oxford university press 1996. i have occasionally quoted from the Outlines, trans. by sanford g. etheridge, in Sextus Empiricus: Selections From the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man & God, ed. by philip paul hallie, indianapolis: hackett 1985, pp. 31–130. 4 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 6. 5 ibid., i, 13. 3

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always held hostage to some possible objection that will threaten the theory on which it rests; and such a vulnerable tranquility is not tranquility at all. meanwhile, those who are not committed to a particular system, but who still believe that ataraxia depends on finding the true system, will suffer frustration; tortured and bewildered by unanswerable questions, they will be torn between the different systems advanced with such confidence by the various philosophical schools. Skepticism sets out to liberate them by providing a set of techniques for refuting any doctrine that claims to provide knowledge about the true nature of things. By undermining philosophical dogmas of all kinds, it frees their victims from the delusion that philosophical knowledge can lead to ataraxia. and—so sextus claims—once this delusion has been thoroughly overcome, the tranquility that was being sought all along will supervene; not through the gaining of knowledge, but through abandoning the quest for knowledge. “the skeptics were in hope of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and thought, and being unable to effect this, they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense even as a shadow follows its substance.”6 the rejection of philosophical theorizing about ultimate truths does not involve any denial of appearances. the skeptic simply refuses to infer from appearances to any allegedly underlying reality. “For example, honey appears to us to be sweet...but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt.”7 and, of course, appearances are relative. The “Ten Modes of Aenesidemus” which Sextus sets out are a series of skeptical arguments,8 designed to point to the relativity of senseperception. different animals, different people, even the same person at different times, perceive things quite differently. We are thus forced to admit that what we perceive is as much due to ourselves as it is to the putative object of our perception, and that therefore we cannot know how things are independently of our experience of them. it might seem from this stress on the appearances that the skeptic is committed to some kind of empiricism, and is not therefore a merely negative critic. Charlotte stough indeed argues that sextus does have a distinctive philosophical system of his own and that he “presents us with what is perhaps the most consistent statement of an empiricist theory of knowledge in Greek philosophy.”9 We should, however, consider carefully what Sextus means by “appearances.” he states that “we do not deny those things which, in accordance with the passivity of our sense-impressions, lead us involuntarily to give our assent to them, and these are the appearances.”10 i do not think the contrast here is between sense-data and unknowable physical objects, but rather between those judgments that force themselves on us in the course of our experience—that there is a tree over there, that it is cold, that the chariot is approaching too fast to allow me to cross the road ibid., i, 12. ibid., i, 10. 8 ibid., i, 14. 9 Charlotte stough, Greek Scepticism, Berkeley, California: university of California press 1969, p. 106. 10 see Sextus Empiricus: Selections From the Major Writings on Scepticism, p. 38 (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 10). 6 7

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in safety now—and theories about the deep nature of things, in forming which the mind plays an active role, consciously suggesting explanations of phenomena and weighing up their relative probabilities. this is what sextus rejects: “For it is, i think, sufficient to conduct one’s life empirically and undogmatically in accordance with the beliefs that are commonly accepted, suspending judgment regarding the statements derived from dogmatic subtlety, and furthest removed from the usage of life.”11 to content oneself with the appearances, then, is to abandon philosophical theorizing altogether, which is a very different matter from embracing a philosophical theory to the effect that reality consists of appearances (sense-data, ideas, and the like). accordingly, sextus criticizes not only speculative metaphysics, but also the doctrine of the Cyrenaics (who “claim that states of mind are the only things that can be apprehended”12), the relativism of protagoras,13 and even what he sees as the negative dogmatism of the academic skeptics, who (so he claims) attempted to demonstrate for certain that metaphysical knowledge was impossible.14 sextus was well aware of the objection that skepticism was self-refuting; that the skeptic must at least be committed to believing in the truth of skepticism, and that by propounding a philosophical thesis (that philosophical knowledge is impossible) he was contradicting his own supposedly anti-theoretical stance. But sextus insists that he has no theory, but only a practice, by which he opposes to any philosophical thesis that is proposed to him an equally plausible antithesis. the arguments for and against these rival theses will remain inconclusive; they will establish neither the truth nor the falsity of any position, but will have served their purpose if they persuade their hearers of the futility of attempting to find out the true nature of things by philosophical theorizing. once the job has been done, the arguments themselves can be discarded. Sextus uses various analogies to make this point: “Just as...fire after consuming the fuel destroys also itself, and like as purgatives after driving the fluids out of the bodies expel themselves as well, so too the argument against proof, after abolishing every proof, can cancel itself also.”15 he then goes on to use the analogy with which Wittgenstein would close the Tractatus two thousand years later—that of the ladder which we throw down after having climbed up it. the account given so far has presented pyrrhonism as an anti-philosophical movement, a defense of practical common sense against theory. this interpretation is maintained by, among others, hallie, groarke, Frede, and Fogelin,16 but other eminent scholars such as Jonathan Barnes and myles Burnyeat have taken a different Outlines of Pyrrhonism, ii, 22. see Sextus Empiricus: Selections From the Major Writings on Scepticism, p. 89 (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 31). 13 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 32. 14 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 33. 15 sextus empiricus, Against the Logicians, trans. by r.g. Bury, in Sextus Empiricus, vols. 1–4, vol. 2, see ii, 480. 16 See Philip P. Hallie, “A Polemical Introduction,” in Sextus Empiricus: Selections From the Major Writings on Scepticism, pp. 3–28; groarke, Greek Scepticism; michael Frede, “The Sceptic’s Beliefs,” in his Essays in Ancient Philosophy, oxford: Clarendon press 1987, pp. 179–200; robert John Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, new York and oxford: oxford university press 1995. 11

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view, arguing that the pyrrhonists really did recommend a life free from any beliefs, common-sense as well as theoretical, and that as a result, the proposed skeptical life is not a real possibility.17 the question is whether the beliefs that the skeptics reject are supposed to be merely theoretical beliefs, or whether they include all beliefs, even the most commonplace ones. Burnyeat believes the latter to be the case. he is, however, convincingly criticized on this point by leo groarke. groarke points out that Burnyeat himself stresses that greek philosophers always interpreted truth in realist terms—truth is correspondence to the way things really are. the skeptics argued that we could never be sure of possessing the truth in this sense, but they did not deny that we have plenty of justified beliefs about the way things seem in ordinary life. groarke suggests that we should see the greek skeptics as precursors of modern anti-realism, the difference being that modern anti-realists reject the realist definition of truth and redefine truth in terms of warranted assertability (or some such notion), whereas the Pyrrhonists retained the realist definition of truth, and then demonstrated that we could never be sure of attaining it. this means that we have to rely in practice on warranted assertability.18 if we interpret them in this way, we can see how “the pyrrhoneans can accept belief without interpreting it as true in the realist way, endorsing it in an anti-realist sense...thus we can make room for their claim that Pyrrhonism is not opposed to life, belief and practical affairs.”19 to be fair to Barnes and Burnyeat, i should say that i think there are hints in sextus of a type of skepticism that would challenge common sense as well as philosophical beliefs. Barnes thinks we can make a distinction between what he calls “rural” and “urbane” Pyrrhonism, the former being opposed to all belief, the latter only to philosophical beliefs. Barnes thinks that sextus is predominantly “rural,” but with elements of urbanity.20 i think this gets it the wrong way round. the Outlines seems to me to be “urbane” for the most part, but it does also contain hints of rurality. The “rural” skeptics would be those who abandon the attempt to live by rational calculation or planning, and allow themselves to be determined by whatever inclinations happen to affect them from time to time. they would opt out of the effort to determine their own lives and relax into a passive reliance on their See Jonathan Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1982, pp. 1–29 and myles Burnyeat, “Can the skeptic live his Skepticism?” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. by myles Burnyeat, Berkeley: university of California press 1983, pp. 117–48. hankinson, The Sceptics, seems to take an intermediate position, arguing that the skeptic does aim to live without beliefs, but that this must be understood in a sense that, contra Burnyeat, does not make it impossible for the skeptic to live a fairly coherent life. 18 groarke, Greek Scepticism, pp. 140–2. hankinson, who dismisses groarke’s claim in a remarkably casual and off-hand way (hankinson, The Sceptics, p. 278) has simply missed the point that groarke is making. groarke does not claim, as hankinson seems to suppose, that the classical skeptics developed an explicitly anti-realist account of truth; in fact he stresses that they did not. his argument is that, in saying that we can have beliefs without supposing them to be true (in the realist sense), the skeptics were making the same substantive point that modern philosophers have made by developing anti-realist accounts of truth. 19 groarke, Greek Scepticism, p. 141. 20 Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” p. 18. 17

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natural responses to the passing appearances. (as Christopher hookway puts it, this sort of skepticism “involves a disengagement of reason and the will...from the determination of conduct.”21) there are plenty of silly stories that grew up about pyrrho himself to the effect that since he did not believe in anything, he had to be followed around by friends, who would prevent him from walking over cliffs and so on. of course, skeptics need not be reduced to such an extreme position; they would act in accordance with their natural instincts to avoid what seemed threatening, but would not hold any definite beliefs that such and such a situation really was dangerous. this attitude might be thought to give them a certain serenity and calm of mind beyond that induced by the mere rejection of the disquiet caused by philosophical controversies. Being without definite beliefs, I am freed from fears and hopes; i act on what appears to be the case here and now, guided by my desires, the customs of my society and by whatever principles i may have absorbed in the course of my training or education. i do not speculate about what the future might bring or about whether what seems good to me really is so. “For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is forever being disquieted...on the other hand the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly: and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.”22 this seems to be a rather unattractive image of someone sunk in apathy, but perhaps a more appealing picture of the ideal skeptic could be painted; that of someone who lives in the present moment, untroubled by regrets, unperturbed by worries or expectations, taking life calmly, as it comes. this would seem to be a distinct ethical ideal, rather than simply a return from metaphysics to the practical concerns of daily life, and one that does seem to involve a distancing of oneself from common sense as well as from philosophy. it seems to me that these two strands of skeptical thought—the wholly negative, purely anti-philosophical one and the more radically revisionary one—do both exist in the greek skeptical tradition and stand in some tension with one another in sextus’ writings. II. Kierkegaard’s Knowledge of the Skeptics The only direct mentions of the Greek Skeptics, or of Sextus specifically, in Kierkegaard’s published writings are (with one exception)23 to be found in the Johannes Climacus texts, Philosophical Fragments24 and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.25 there is also a reference in the uncompleted and unpublished Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est.26 (there are various other references to

Christopher hookway, Scepticism, london: routledge 1990, p. 44. Outlines of Pyrrhonism, i, 12. 23 SKS 4, 102 / FT, 6. 24 SKS 4, 243–4/ PF, 38. SKS 4, 281–2/ PF, 82–3. 25 SKS 7, 39 / CUP1, 33. SKS 7, 44 / CUP1, 38. SKS 7, 81 / CUP1, 81. SKS 7, 288 / CUP1, 316. SKS 7, 306, note / CUP1, 335, note. SKS 7, 322–3 / CUP1, 352–3. 26 Pap. iv B 1, 148–9 / JC, 170–1. 21 22

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skepticism, where it is clear that modern forms of skepticism are being discussed27— i shall not be directly concerned with these here.) there are also various references in the journals and papers to sextus28 or to greek skepticism generally.29 of these entries, one is dated 1844;30 the others all date from 1842–43. one of these notes, which was inserted in Kierkegaard’s author’s copy of The Concept of Irony (published 1841), reads “it is a shame i did not know at that time the skepticism that sextus Empiricus maintains with respect to teaching. See Tennemann, V, p. 294.”31 this suggests that Kierkegaard was not, or not well acquainted with greek skepticism, or with sextus, before the winter of 1842–43, when he seems to have embarked on an effort to complete his philosophical education by intense reading and note-taking. the reference to tennemann’s standard multi-volume History of Philosophy (which Kierkegaard owned,32 and which is also referred to in connection with his studies of the greek skeptics at another point33) suggests that this was an important source for him. he does not mention any other modern secondary sources in his references to the greek skeptics, but he certainly could have read about them in a variety of other places. hegel, for one, has a quite substantial discussion of the greek skeptics in the second volume of his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, as well as a brief and abstract, but important, discussion of skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit; both works that Kierkegaard owned.34 he also owned an important (if often dubious) classical secondary source, diogenes laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers,35 which he twice refers to it in connection with skepticism.36 in addition to these

For example, SKS 4, 101–2 / FT, 5–6, on descartes; SKS 7, 39, note / CUP1, 33, note, on hegel; and SKS 7, 306 / CUP1, 335, on Kant. 28 SKS 19, 395–7, not13:28 / JP 1, 42 and JP 4, 4844–5. Pap. iv a 198 / JP 2, 2280. Pap. v C 6 / JP 3, 2348. Pap. iv C 98 / JP 5, 5602. 29 SKS 18, 165, JJ:82 / KJN 2, 153. pap. iv B 5.13 / JP 1, 776. Pap. iv B 13.21 / JP 1, 777. SKS 19, 398, not13:31 / JP 2, 1243. SKS 19, 395–7, not13:28 / JP 1, 42 and JP 4, 4844–45. 30 Pap. v C 6 / JP 3, 2348. 31 Pap. iv a 198 / JP 2, 2280; see also CI, supplement, p. 448. 32 see Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819 (ASKB, 815–826). 33 Pap. v C 6 / JP 3, 2348. 34 see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 557–559); Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Johann schulze, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 550). 35 see Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111; for the same title see also ASKB a i 154–155). 36 Pap. iv B, 13.21 / JP 1, 777 and SKS 4, 282 / PF, 83. 27

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secondary sources, he also owned the complete works of sextus empiricus,37 and there seems no reason to doubt that he had at least some direct knowledge of this primary source. (Kierkegaard also owned the complete works of Cicero,38 as well as separate editions of some individual works, including a german translation of the De Natura Deorum.39 But while it is possible that he gained some knowledge of classical (academic) skepticism from Cicero, he never mentions Cicero in connection with skepticism, or skepticism in connection with Cicero, so this does not seem to have been a significant source for him.) On the whole, Kierkegaard appears to have had a respectable scholarly grounding in greek skepticism, and—as i shall go on to argue—a generally good understanding of the aims and strategies of the skeptics. III. Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Use of the Skeptics Johannes Climacus, or De Omnibus dubitandum est represents Kierkegaard’s first sustained attempt to come to terms with philosophical skepticism. (although the socratic and romantic forms of irony discussed in The Concept of Irony could also be regarded as kinds of skepticism.) he does this in characteristically existential fashion, by giving the narrative of a naive young man who is driven to increasing desperation by trying to take seriously the advice that philosophizing must begin with universal doubt. But while there are passing references to thales, heraclitus, and the sophists,40 Kierkegaard’s central concern in this work is with modern skepticism, and there is no explicit mention of the pyrrhonists or academics. For whatever reason, Kierkegaard set the unfinished Johannes Climacus aside, but when he returned to epistemological (amongst other) issues in the Philosophical Fragments of 1844, he appropriated the name of his earlier protagonist when he decided (at the last minute) to publish the book under a pseudonym. the Fragments starts with plato’s paradox of learning from the Meno and proceeds to contrast the platonic solution to that problem—the theory of Recollection—with a “thought-experiment” which turns out to look suspiciously like the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. Within this context, Kierkegaard/Climacus41 first introduces themes from Greek skepticism in Chapter 3, “The Absolute Paradox.” There he presents skepticism 37

146).

see Sexti Empirici Opera quæ extant [greek and latin], geneva: Chouët 1621 (ASKB

see M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera omnia ex recensione Iacobi Gronovii, accedit varietas lectionis...cum singulorum librorum argumentis ..., vols. 1–6, 2nd ed., ed. by io. augusti ernesti, halle: impensis orphanotrophei 1757 (ASKB 1224–1229). 39 see Gespräche über das Wesen der Götter in drey Büchern. Aus dem Lateinischen des Marcus Tullis Cicero übersetzt, zürich: bey drell, geßner, Füßli und Comp. 1787 (ASKB 1238). 40 Pap. iv B 1, 146 / JC, 167 and note. 41 There is of course considerable controversy about the significance of the pseudonyms, and especially Climacus. i believe that, at least in epistemological matters, Climacus does speak for Kierkegaard, and is not being set up to present views that Kierkegaard is hoping to wean us away from. However in what follows I will refer to “Climacus” rather then Kierkegaard as the author of the Fragments and Postscript, so as to leave this issue open. (i will return briefly to it at the end of this article.) 38

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as the only strictly philosophical alternative to the theory of recollection (taken in a very broad sense, as the proposition that we have the truth within us, or are “in the truth”). Sextus is mentioned in this context, as is the Sophist Protagoras.42 Climacus’ main concern, of course, is to show that his “thought-experiment” also offers a genuine alternative to the theory of recollection, and one that does not leave us in skepticism; but it is an explicitly paradoxical alternative. We are—as the skeptics rightly supposed—unable to reach the truth; but the truth has reached out to us. But this must be taken on faith as having occurred historically; it is not a conclusion that could be arrived at by reason. in this context, Climacus uses the skeptics to undermine the notion that human reason is capable by itself of arriving at metaphysically significant truth.43 We can only reason effectively if we assume the existence of something to start with, and such an assumption cannot itself be grounded in reasoning.44 in the course of criticizing traditional attempts to prove god’s existence, Climacus drops in an anecdote about Carneades’ ironic retort to the stoic metaphysician Chrysippus in connection with the sorites paradox. this may not add much to Climacus’ central argument that conceptual clarification by itself cannot take us to any ontological conclusion, but it serves to indicate his aligning of himself with the skeptical against the metaphysical tradition in philosophy. This is made clearer in the “Interlude” placed between chapters 4 and 5 of the Fragments, where Climacus investigates our knowledge of the past. this section is where Kierkegaard’s engagement with and use of greek skepticism is most apparent. he distinguishes between greek and modern skepticism by noting, quite correctly, the essentially ethical orientation of the Greek Skeptics, their concern to find tranquility, which meant that they “used cognition only to preserve the cast of mind, which was the main consideration.”45 and he emphasizes that, for this reason, greek skepticism was a will to doubt: “they doubted, not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of will.”46 Hence we should not ascribe to them the “stupid” modern opinion “that one doubts by way of necessity,” still less the “even more stupid opinion that, if that were the case, doubt could be terminated.”47 as we saw, sextus had insisted that skeptics do not deny the appearances, but refuse to draw conclusions from the way things seem to how they really are. Climacus also stresses this: “the greek skeptic did not deny the correctness of sensation and of immediate cognition, but, said he, error has an utterly different basis—it comes from the conclusion i draw. If I can only avoid drawing conclusions, I shall never be deceived.”48 one could of SKS 4, 244 / PF, 38. Which means that Climacus’ claims that he is not trying to refute the theory of recollection, merely to see if there is conceptual space for a genuine alternative to it, should not be taken at face-value. on this, see marilyn g. piety, “a little light music: the subversion of objectivism in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 47–62. 44 SKS 4, 244–5 / PF, 40. 45 SKS 4, 282 / PF, 83. 46 SKS 4, 281 / PF, 82. 47 ibid. 48 ibid. 42 43

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course open a can of familiar philosophical worms by asking what the “correctness” of sensation might amount to, what “immediate cognition” is supposed to be, and what the relation between sensation and immediate cognition is. But Climacus’ real concern lies elsewhere. the substantive philosophical point that Climacus is concerned to make is that skepticism is a willed decision to not make inferences which could be mistaken. the skeptic, he insists, is right to say that certainty, at any rate, can only be found in “sensation and immediate cognition” on the one hand, and in the purely formal reasoning of logic and mathematics on the other.49 the question now is, what significance do we ascribe to this? The Skeptic wills to doubt whatever can be doubted, but this itself is a decision, not a necessary conclusion. however, this “implies that doubt can be terminated only in freedom, by an act of will, something that every greek skeptic would understand, but he would not terminate his skepticism, precisely because he willed to doubt.”50 this is why a properly adroit skeptic cannot be intellectually refuted by pointing to the indubitablity of self-knowledge or to the paradoxes of self-refutation. “the doubter does not deny his own existence, but he draws no conclusions...he has no results, not even negative ones (for this would mean the acknowledgement of knowledge) but by the power of the will he decides to restrain himself....”51 however, Climacus’ main concern is not with skepticism for itself, but with what it can tell us about its opposite state—belief. this is a state directed, not to the certainties of immediate experience, or of logic and mathematics, but to objects which it is possible to doubt. But this means that belief is not a purely intellectual state; it is a willingness to accept what it is possible to doubt, and is thus a dismissal of doubts despite their intellectual irrefutability. hence “belief is not a knowledge, but an act of freedom, an expression of will.”52 it might be supposed that to believe in the existence of something is simply to make an inference from some cause to an effect; but to do that already involves making a leap beyond what one can be sure of. hence belief is an attitude of trust in one’s cognitive faculties, and in their attunement to a world that exists beyond one’s momentary sensory states. “Belief and doubt are not two kinds of knowledge...for neither of them is a cognitive act, and they are opposite passions. Belief is a sense for coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against any conclusion that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and immediate knowledge.”53 the notion that belief is a sense for coming into existence is valuable, since Climacus’ stress elsewhere on the role of will in belief might seem to suggest the implausible notion that one has to consciously will to believe in the existence of anything beyond one’s immediate experience. But i think his point is that we are naturally inclined to take our immediate experiences as indicative of a wider order to which we belong. skepticism shows that this is not intellectually forced on us; but those who consciously and deliberately reject skepticism as an 49 50 51 52 53

see SKS 4, 244–5 / PF, 40 and SKS 7, 105–20 / CUP1, 109–25. SKS 4, 281 / PF, 82. SKS 4, 283 / PF, 84–5. SKS 4, 282 / PF, 83. SKS 4, 282 / PF, 84.

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existential stance, despite being unable to defeat skeptical argument on their own terms, are deliberately choosing to trust their natural inclinations to believe. and there is no further basis in rational argument to show that they are right to do so. (in all of this, Kierkegaard seems influenced not only by the classical Skeptics, but also by F.H. Jacobi’s very influential ruminations on skepticism and rationalism—and, via Jacobi—by hume.)54 Climacus’ epistemological investigations are ultimately intended to support the discussion of religious issues with which he is primarily concerned. at the end of the “Interlude” he distinguishes between belief or faith “taken in its direct and ordinary meaning” and “faith...taken in the wholly eminent sense,”55 that is, specifically Christian faith, faith that the eternal has entered time, therefore, faith in a “historical fact...[that] is not a direct historical fact, but a fact based upon a self-contradiction.”56 the point here is not, i think, to make it easier to believe in this self-contradictory “fact” by pointing out that any historical belief rests on faith anyway; but to clarify what is and is not involved in a historically based faith, in particular to stress that historical closeness to such a paradoxical event gives the “contemporary believer” no advantage over a later believer. in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus returns at much greater length to many of the themes of the Fragments. his critique of the hubris of metaphysical philosophy is much more detailed, and involves a direct and extensive confrontation with hegel—whose system is implicitly under attack throughout the Fragments, but who is only directly mentioned there twice.57 But the basic themes of the Postscript’s critique of metaphysics are those already set out in the Fragments— the sharp distinction between the logical and the existential/ontological; the rejection of the “God’s Eye View”—except for God—the insistence on the impossibility of a finite temporal being creating a complete system that is not merely formal. The argument is not developed via any very detailed discussion of the greek skeptics, but they are mentioned at a number of points, and in terms that make clear the high regard in which Climacus holds them, and the importance of the insights that he thinks can be gleaned from them. “a study of greek skepticism is much to be recommended. there one learns thoroughly what will always require time and practice and discipline to understand...that sensate certainty, to say nothing of historical certainty, is uncertainty, is only an approximation....”58 presumably the lesson to be learned from the skeptics is that any further conclusion that i draw from my “sensation and immediate cognition” is dubitable; all that I can really be sure of is that I am having these experiences now. The reference to “approximation” suggests that my experiences may make a conclusion increasingly likely (if i can repeat the see in particular Jacobi’s David Hume on Faith. Kierkegaard owned an edition of Jacobi’s complete works, see Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke, vols. 1–6, leipzig: Fleischer 1812–25 (ASKB 1722–1728) and alludes to him explicitly at SKS 4, 283 / PF, 84. 55 SKS 4, 285 / PF, 87. 56 ibid. 57 Both times in footnotes—SKS 4, 227–8, note / PF, 78, note and SKS 4, 285, note / PF, 86, note. 58 SKS 7, 27 / CUP1, 38. 54

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experiences, use more than one sense-modality, and so on)—but still never certain.59 But Climacus’ concern is not with developing a theory of probabilistic knowledge, but with understanding skepticism as an existential practice. the point is to learn, not a few neat knock-down arguments, but an arduous discipline by which one comes to distrust that which one naturally and naively trusts; to understand—and not just theoretically—that appearance is not necessarily reality, or even a reliable indicator of reality. elsewhere in the Postscript, Climacus ascribes to both greek skepticism and to “modern idealism”60—and indeed to “the entire presentation in modern philosophy”61—the thesis that sense experience cannot provide certainty. this might not by itself seem to play a very crucial part in Climacus’ case against hegel, who was not, after all, an empiricist relying naively on the senses; but the fundamental point again is to show that there is no knowledge that just comes to us—whether through the senses or through the unfolding of world-history or the dialectic— without an effort (conscious or otherwise) of existential appropriation on our part. moreover—and this is crucial to the case against hegel62—knowledge of reality cannot be developed through pure logical thought alone, but requires a sensory input that is not and cannot become a basis for certainty. the great virtue that Climacus ascribes to greek philosophers in general is that they tried to “existentially express...[their] life-view, [and] be existentially absorbed in it....”63 he illustrates this claim with an anecdote about “the skeptic Zeno” who “made a study of skepticism by trying, as existing, to remain unaffected by everything he encountered.” When he went out of his way to avoid a mad dog he had to admit “that even a skeptical philosopher is still at times a human being.”64 this is a version of a story told by diogenes laertius about pyrrho.65 it seems to show Climacus accepting the claim that the pyrrhonists were concerned to doubt, not only philosophical theories, but even practical, common-sense beliefs about their surroundings. as noted above, this is a questionable interpretation, but for Climacus’ purposes here (contrasting the existential seriousness of the greeks with the supposed comic shallowness of contemporary metaphysicians) it hardly matters much. That he mixes up Pyrrho and Zeno is perhaps significant, since the aim ascribed to this supposed Skeptic (“to remain unaffected”) sounds as much Stoical as skeptical. indeed, both stoics and skeptics aimed at ataraxia, tranquility (though neither sought it in a sense that would have required them to not avoid a mad dog). see also SKS 7, 173–4 / CUP1, 189–90. SKS 7, 288 / CUP1, 316. 61 SKS 7, 81 / CUP1, 81. 62 Whether or not it works, or is really fair to hegel, are of course other questions. 63 SKS 7, 322 / CUP1, 352. For a recent defense of the claim that ancient philosophy was essentially a way of life see pierre hadot, La Philosophie comme manière de Vivre, paris: le livre de poche 2003 (english translation: Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. by a. davidson, oxford: Blackwell 1995); and hadot, Qu est-ce que la Philosophie Antique? paris: gallimard 1995 (english translation: What is Ancient Philosophy? trans. by michael Chase, Cambridge, massachusetts: Belknap press 2004). 64 SKS 7, 322–3 / CUP1, 352–3. 65 see CUP2, notes, p. 253, note 593. 59 60

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and it is this existential orientation that enables Climacus to make the effective contrast that he wants with the purely academic, philosophizing of modern times: “the skeptical ataraxia was...an existence-attempt to abstract from existing. in our day, one abstracts in print, just as in print one doubts everything once and for all.”66 in a footnote to a discussion of hegel, Climacus returns to the question of whether skepticism can be shown to be self-refuting.67 he now agrees that “at the bottom of all skepticism there is an abstract certainty that is the foothold of doubt,” and so “it is quite certain that nothing is accomplished even by the most rigorous attempts of greek skepticism to round off the hovering of skepticism by emphasizing that the statement of doubt must not be understood as a position.”68 it might seem that Climacus has gone back on his claim in the Fragments that the skeptics were able to consistently avoid even making negative claims about the impossibility of knowledge.69 But he continues, “it still does not follow that doubt overcomes itself.” The argument seems to be that the process of skeptical reflection will only be halted when the particular existing individual who is doing the reflecting admits that there is something that they cannot doubt—such as, perhaps, the danger posed by a mad dog. But in this case, “it is not doubt that cancels itself; it is i who stop doubting.”70 Climacus is very insistent on this “decisive” point. “If it is the case that doubt overcomes itself, that by doubting everything one in this very doubt wins truth without a break and an absolutely new point of departure, then not one single Christian category can be maintained, then Christianity is abolished.”71 if this seems extravagant, we should remember the central argument of Fragments, namely, that Christianity differs from the metaphysical tradition, whether in the form of Platonism or Hegelianism, by its insistence that we are not “in the truth,” and are therefore in need of having the truth brought to us from outside. and Climacus is quite correct to see that hegel fundamentally rejects that view. if skepticism selfrefutes as a matter simply of logic (as distinct from skepticism proving intolerable as an existential stance) then the theory of recollection (in the very broad sense, so including hegelianism) is correct. We are in the truth; we can produce it for ourselves, through the very act of doubting. and—given the assumptions of the Fragments—this means that Christianity (defined, as it is, in opposition to the Theory of recollection) must be false.72 the stakes are indeed high for Climacus here; and the importance of skepticism for his argument is made strikingly clear. SKS 7, 289 / CUP1, 318. The context is Hegel’s claim that skeptical thinking will eventually “cancel itself” (SKS 7, 306 / CUP1, 335); see, for example, the “Introduction” to Hegel’s Phenomenology which describes how critical thinking, though it appears to offer us a “way of doubt” or even of “despair” can, through a process of “determinate negation” bring us to an ultimately positive result. see g.W.F. hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by a.v. miller, oxford: oxford university press 1977, p. 49; p. 51. 68 SKS 7, 306, note / CUP1, 335, note. 69 see SKS 4, 283 / PF, 84–5. 70 SKS 7, 306, note / CUP1, 335, note. 71 ibid. 72 this is not, of course, to say that those assumptions are unassailable. For some critical reflections on the presentation of Christianity in the Fragments, see anthony rudd, 66 67

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the Climacus works are the only ones where Kierkegaard directly discusses greek skepticism. But the influence of his study of skepticism can be found elsewhere in his writings, even in the “edifying” works, where one might not immediately expect to find it. One very significant instance can be found in Works of Love, in a line of thought that is central to the discourses, “love Believes all things—and Yet is Never Deceived” and “Love Hopes All Things—And Yet is Never Put to Shame.”73 in these discourses, Kierkegaard tries to show that love requires us to think the best of others and to hope that even the worst of people will repent and amend their lives. he faces the immediate objection that such belief and such trust are foolish or naive; that we can often see that someone’s behavior is just vile and that, even when people do seem virtuous, it is wise to assume that they may be putting on a front. the psychologically sophisticated do not simply take things at face value. that people’s behavior can be differently interpreted, Kierkegaard fully accepts. But from this premise one can move in different directions, and which one the individual chooses tells us about the chooser. the malicious person, aware that apparent virtue could be a sham, delights in assuming that it is; the mistrustful person, aware that things may not be what they seem, thinks it wisest to suspend judgment, to think neither badly nor well of others; but the loving person takes the possibility of different interpretations as the occasion for choosing to take the most generous one. Kierkegaard is here insisting that the skeptic is quite right to point out that nothing is certain; in particular, that there is no certainty to be had in the understanding of human motives. Knowledge is of possibilities; to assert that something is actually the case involves a movement beyond knowledge in the strict sense, a movement of belief. “Knowledge places everything in possibility...there is no decision in knowledge; the decision, the determination and the firmness of personality are first in the ‘ergo,’ in belief.”74 this is plainly the skeptical epistemology defended in the Climacus writings with explicit reference to the greek skeptics.75 But what is notable here is the ethical and indeed spiritual use Kierkegaard now makes of this epistemological claim. For he argues that it means that the attitude of mistrust—let alone malice—cannot claim to be justified by the objective facts. That everything is doubtful means that one can chose to believe—maliciously or lovingly; or chose to remain uncommitted. But each is an existential choice; none of them is simply forced on us by undeniable facts. one should not, however, suppose Kierkegaard to be saying that these are choices that one could decide to make with the snap of a finger; on the contrary, to acquire the habit of interpreting other’s actions lovingly requires a long and hard spiritual discipline. part of this discipline is to learn—again, in a deep, existential “the moment and the teacher: problems in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 92–115. 73 SKS 9, 227–62 / WL, 225–63. 74 SKS 9, 232 / WL, 230–1. 75 a fact that is hard to reconcile with interpretations of the Climacus writings which claim that they represent views Kierkegaard is trying to get us to see through. on this, see Anthony Rudd, “ ‘Believing All Things’: Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt and Love,” in Works of Love, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 16), pp. 121–36.

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sense, not just theoretically—that there is always room for different interpretations. so Kierkegaard commends those who have “taken the time and effort to develop the infinite, equal sense for possibilities...and bring them into equilibrium.”76 and these sound very much like the people whom Climacus in the Postscript praises for having, through their “study of Greek skepticism,” come to learn thoroughly “what will always require time and practice and discipline to understand...that sensate certainty, to say nothing of historical certainty, is uncertainty....”77 so even in explicitly Christian writings, Kierkegaard suggests that we need to learn from the Greek Skeptics; firstly, to recognize the uncertainty of all claims to substantive objective knowledge; and secondly, to place that epistemological understanding in an existential context—though, of course, for Kierkegaard, the context is that of Christian love, not the greek search for ataraxia.

76 77

SKS 9, 232–3 / WL, 231. SKS 7, 44 / CUP1, 38.

Bibliography I. Works by Ancient Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to the Skeptics [sextus empiricus], Sexti Empirici Opera quæ extant [greek and latin], geneva: Chouët 1621 (ASKB 146). diogenes laertius, De Vitis Philosophorum Libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109). Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110– 1111; for the same title see also ASKB a i 154–155). [Cicero, marcus tullius], M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera omnia ex recensione Iacobi Gronovii, accedit varietas lectionis...cum singulorum librorum argumentis..., vols. 1–6, 2nd ed., ed. by io. augusti ernesti, halle: impensis orphanotrophei 1757 (ASKB, 1224–1229). —— Gespräche über das Wesen der Götter in drey Büchern. Aus dem Lateinischen des Marcus Tullis Cicero übersetzt, zürich: bey drell, geßner, Füßli und Comp. 1787 (ASKB 1238). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Skeptics Ast, Friedrich, “Skepticismus,” in his Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, landshut: Joseph thomann 1807, pp. 111–15 (ASKB 385). hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Johann schulze, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), pp. 154–8 (ASKB 550). —— “Philosophie der Skeptiker,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, pp. 538–86 (ASKB 557–559). —— “verhältniß des skepticismus zur philosophie, darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modifikationen und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten,” in Vermischte Schriften, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich Förster and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1834–35 (vols. 16–17 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s

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Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, pp. 70–133 (ASKB 555–556). Marbach, Gotthard Oswald, “Pyrrhon und die Skeptiker,” in his Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, leipzig: otto Wigand 1838 (1. abtheilung, in g.o. marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, abtheilung 1–2, leipzig: Wigand 1838–41), pp. 316–20 (ASKB 642; for abtheilung 2 see ASKB 643). [Møller, Poul Martin], “Skeptikerne,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christien thaarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 506–9 (ASKB 1574–1576). [montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99, vol. 3, pp. 414–16; p. 421; p. 477; vol. 4, p. 11; p. 37; p. 54 (ASKB 681–687). ritter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1836–39, vol. 3, pp. 427–54; vol. 4, pp. 282–361 (ASKB 735–738). ritter, heinrich and l. preller, Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, ed. by l. preller, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 322–9; pp. 453–63 (ASKB 726). sibbern, Frederik Christian, Om Philosophiens Begreb, Natur og Væsen. En Fremstilling af Philosophiens Propædeutik, Copenhagen: paa Forfatterens eget Forlag 1843, pp. 31–2 (ASKB 779). stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Crusius 1794 (ASKB 791). Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Aenesidens Skepticismus” and “Sextus Empirikus” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: Johann ambrosius Barth 1798–1819, vol. 5, pp. 44–103 and pp. 267–396, respectively (ASKB 815–826). Wirth, Johann ulrich, Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845, pp. 237–8 (ASKB 876). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Skepticism evans, C. stephen, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical Fragments,” Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1992, pp. 131–8. Perkins, Robert L., “Kierkegaard’s Epistemological Preferences,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 4, no. 4, 1973, pp. 197–217. piety, marilyn g., Kierkegaard on Knowledge, ph.d. thesis, mcgill university, montreal 1994. —— “a little light music; the subversion of objectivism in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus,

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ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 47–62. Popkin, Richard H., “Hume and Kierkegaard,” Journal of Religion, vol. 31, no. 4, 1951, pp. 274–81. —— “Kierkegaard and Scepticism,” in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Josiah thompson, new York: anchor Books 1972, pp. 342–72. rudd, anthony, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, oxford: Clarendon press 1993, pp. 34–40; p. 53; pp. 69–70. —— “Kierkegaard and the Skeptics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 1, 1998, pp. 71–88. —— “ ‘Believing All Things’: Kierkegaard on Knowledge, Doubt and Love,” in Works of Love, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 16), pp. 121–36. —— “the moment and the teacher: problems in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 92–115.

the sophists: Kierkegaard’s interpretation of socrates and the sophists K. Brian söderquist

in plato’s early dialogues, socrates and the sophists are inseparable. Where one finds Socrates, one also finds the Sophists. The dialectical relationship between these parties is particularly important in Kierkegaard’s interpretation and portrayal of socrates, for not only do the sophists set socrates’ position in relief, but, as Kierkegaard sees it, socrates’ position negates that of the sophists: the sophists propose, socrates refutes; the sophists argue for something, socrates reduces the argument to nothing. in fact, to understand Kierkegaard’s famous assertion that Socrates’ position is “absolute, infinite negativity,” Socrates must be understood against that which he absolutely and infinitely negates: the positive claims of the sophists. this study will give an account of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the relationship between socrates and the sophists, based on the text that treats it in detail, The Concept of Irony. Kierkegaard’s treatment of the sophists is presented there in dialogue with hegel’s account of greek history. i will thus include an overview of hegel’s discussion, though i limit my focus to the features of hegel’s history that are important in this context. I. Kierkegaard’s Treatment of Socrates and the Sophists although in his journals and notebooks Kierkegaard sometimes uses the terms “sophist” and “sophistry,” to describe his contemporaries and their style of argumentation,1 his only in-depth discussion of the sophists and their relationship to socrates is found in his Magister dissertation. the discussion there is a part of an unusual project that aims to discover the philosophical position of the “historical Socrates,” the historical figure who inspired the creation of “Socrates,” the literary figure. He knows that “the form of the whole treatise...departs somewhat from the

see Pap. vii–1 a 235 / JP 4, 4308. SKS 20, 196, nB2:137 / JP 1, 938. SKS 24, 122, nB22:34 / JP 1, 681. SKS 24, 198–9, nB22:173 / JP 6, 6719. SKS 24, 474, nB25:55 / JP 2, 1830. SKS 25, 11, nB26:4 / JP 1, 999. SKS 25, 17-8, nB26:9 / JP 4, 4313. SKS 25, 61-2, nB26:56 / JP 4, 4314. SKS 25, 180-1, nB27:68 / JP 4, 4294. 1

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now widespread and in so many ways meritorious scholarly method.”2 he argues that the contradictory accounts of socrates found in texts by plato, aristophanes, and Xenophon, suggest that none of them has understood the historical man behind their character, but have all presented misunderstandings. his unique strategy for getting around the problem of only having distorted accounts to deal with is to first posit a thesis about who the historical Socrates was—namely, an “ironist” who negates every positive claim to know the truth about important existential questions, but is truly ignorant about the truth himself—and then test the thesis to see if it is at least possible given the historical sources we have. this means that Kierkegaard is not committed to a loyal interpretation of the texts of plato, aristophanes, or Xenophon. his reading of plato, for example, aims only to demonstrate that it is possible that the historical socrates was indeed ignorant of truth, even if Plato’s socrates is not. the results can seem forced, and indeed unpersuasive if they are taken to be straightforward interpretations of the texts on their own premises. he is merely testing the possibility that socrates is not who plato, aristophanes, or Xenophon think he is. indeed, his argument aims to show that his historical socrates is not the figure presented by, say, Plato. For the purposes of this study of the sophists and socrates, a critical analysis of all of Kierkegaard’s arguments is not necessary. my point of departure is Kierkegaard’s conclusion, the lyrical third section of “Part One,” entitled “The Interpretation Made Necessary.” When the reader arrives at this section, Kierkegaard has already examined works by aristophanes, Xenophon, and plato and has given most of his evidence for his unconventional interpretation of the texts that describe socrates. With this in hand, he turns away from the greek sources and toward the contemporary discussion of socrates and the sophists, focusing in particular on hegel’s interpretation. Kierkegaard sets into relief his interpretation of an absolutely negative socrates by comparing it with hegel’s less extreme view. II. From the Oracle to the Sophists: Hegel’s Account of the Fall of Athens We find Hegel’s most comprehensive discussion of Socrates and the Sophists in his account of greek history in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.3 according to hegel, socrates made his appearance on the world-historical stage in an athenian state that had already arrived at a spiritual transition point: the naïve mythical consciousness of homeric athens had broken down and the critical philosophical consciousness of plato’s athens was emerging. As Hegel tells the story, the unreflective cultural consciousness of Homer’s Athens unreflectively understood the laws, customs, and traditions of the state to be absolute and universal. the gods had dictated these principles to the citizens of athens via divinely inspired poets, and thus the principles which distinguished good from bad were available to everyone, objectively. For this immediate “ethical” SKS 1, 206 / CI, 156. i am indebted to Jon stewart’s analysis of hegel’s and Kierkegaard’s respective interpretations of socrates in Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and new York: Cambridge university press 2003, especially pp. 150–61.

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[sittlich] consciousness, the good was a given. as hegel puts it, quoting sophocles, the Good was available to all but “no one knew whence it came.”4 as hegel sees it, the individual citizen living in “ethical” Athens was not even in a position to question the absolute authority of athenian law because the categories of thought needed to critically question objective ethical authority had not yet become common intellectual property. But a critical consciousness was on its way. a new form of understanding the world, based on reason, began to awaken. individuals, says hegel, wanted to “guide themselves by thought, and no longer merely through oracles, through custom, passion, the feelings of the moment.”5 religious and civil authority began to be questioned as the individual subject wanted to reflectively understand his or her own activity in the world.6 the result was the dissolution of the harmonious ethical athenian state. the breakdown of the legal and moral authority of the state was irrevocably set in motion by reflection. as hegel sees it, the breakdown of the authority of the ethical consciousness of athens necessitated that another order or authority be discovered. a new consciousness was emerging where the individual citizen no longer consulted the gods and laws of the state in search of ethical truth, but looked rather within the subject, to the desires and thoughts of the individual. This reflective “moral” [moralisch] consciousness, as he calls it, was facilitated in part by a famous group of thinkers: the sophists. The Sophists, he says, correctly recognized that once reflection had broken the security of the generally accepted rule of law, a new order had to be accessed through a reasoning process. as hegel writes, the human person desires to satisfy himself, “to convince himself through his reflection of what is binding upon him, what is his end, and what he has to do for this end.”7 Because the sophists realized that the authority of religious tradition was no longer recognized as a guarantee of truth, they looked elsewhere: they made up for the absence of a universal and permanent standard of truth by consulting their own particular individual wills, and there they found principles upon which practice could be based.8 they rejected objective laws and replaced them with their own “contingent and lawless wills.”9 For Hegel, Sophistry represented a highly reflective and calculating consciousness: the sophists were aware of what they were doing as they tore down the establishment. They knew that “nothing was secure”10 because their own power of thought allowed them to argue from any given perspective: “their acquaintance with so many points of view shook what was morality in greece (the religion, duties, and laws, unconsciously exercised), since through its limited content, it came into collision 4 Jub. = Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe, vols. 1–20, ed. by hermann glockner, stuttgart: Friedrich Fromann verlag 1928–41, vol. 18, p. 45. (english translation: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vols. 1–3, trans. by e.s. haldane, lincoln: university of nebraska press 1995, vol. 1, p. 386.) see also verses 454–7 in sophocles’ Antigone. 5 Jub., vol. 18, p. 9 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 355–6.) 6 Jub., vol. 18, p. 9 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 356.) 7 Jub., vol. 18, p. 11 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 357.) 8 Jub., vol. 18, pp. 20–2 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, pp. 365–6.) 9 Jub., vol. 18, p. 43 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 385.) 10 Jub., vol. 18, p. 26 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 369.)

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with what is different. First, it was highest and ultimate, then it was deposed.”11 they “knew” that nothing was true except what they desired to be true. III. Hegel’s Hybrid Socrates: Both Ironist and Midwife it is here, according to hegel, that socrates stepped onto the world-historical scene. the position of socrates was similar to that of the sophists in so far as he too considered it impossible to submit to the authority of state law. But unlike the sophists, socrates was not content to allow mere argumentation based on subjective desire to stand in lieu of the loss of an objective ethical order. socrates’ strategy for reaching the good, according to hegel, had both destructive and constructive aspects. negatively, socrates’ method included a form of “ironic questioning” which dismantled or “dissolved” all firmly established claims to knowledge. on the positive side, socrates engaged in a maieutic dialectic which sought to derive the universal good from the particular good.12 For Hegel, Socratic “irony” was at work when Socrates feigned ignorance about a given issue and asked to be taught more fully about it. With this guise, he was able to refute any Sophistic claim to knowledge. “With a seeming [earnestness],” Hegel writes, socrates, puts questions to his audience as if they were to instruct him, while he really wished to draw them out. this is the celebrated socratic irony which...is a particular mode of carrying on discourse between one person and another....When other people brought forward their principles, [socrates] sought to deduce, as its consequence, the direct opposite of what the proposition stated, or else to allow the opposite to be deduced from their own inner consciousness.13

Socratic irony is defined by Hegel as a disingenuous mode of questioning which serves to show his interlocutor the error of his ways. Because socrates is said to have known what conclusions he was after, his so-called “ignorance” is a mask.14 socrates’ ignorance is merely feigned ignorance.15 For hegel, the dismantling effect of ironic questioning is only one side of socrates’ mission, however. Just as important is socrates’ aim to discover truth via Jub., vol. 18, p. 26 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 370; translation modified.) 12 Jub., vol. 18, p. 59 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 398.) 13 Jub., vol. 18, p. 60 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 398.) 14 Jub., vol. 18, p. 60 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 399.) 15 in the Encyclopaedia, hegel describes socratic irony in similar terms. socrates’ irony was “to pretend in his conversations that he wanted to be instructed more precisely about the matter under discussion; and in this connection, he raised all manner of questions so that the people with whom he conversed were led to say the opposite of what had appeared to them at the beginning to be correct”; see Jub., vol. 8, § 81, Addition 1, p. 191. (English translation: Encyclopaedia Logic. Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett 1991, § 81, addition 1, p. 129.) 11

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midwifery.16 For hegel, socrates destroyed historically inherited conceptions so that reflectively scrutinized universal conceptions could replace them.17 socrates “sought from within his own consciousness the universal spirit which had disappeared from actuality.”18 the socratic claim to universality is key. as noted above, the sophists were said to think subjectively in so far as they consulted their own wills as the ultimate ground for their arguments. and since their ultimate task was to win any particular given argument, they were not inclined to seek more. the sophistic position remained subjective and particular. socrates is likewise said to have searched for a rule of law by looking inward for the ground. But as hegel sees it, unlike the sophists, socrates claimed to find universal law. IV. A Summary of Hegel according to hegel, the sophists represent the endpoint of the breakdown of the athenian state inasmuch as their basis for ethical reasoning had moved completely from the laws of the state to the particular will of the individual. hegel’s conception of Socrates can be summed up by saying that Socrates is a hybrid figure who both destroyed the arguments of the sophists via ironic conversation and worked as a midwife to bring a previously unseen ground of truth into view. his twofold activity in athens brought about a consciousness of the subjective pathway to ethical knowledge. he is said to have shown that the pathway to truth goes through the subject, but that the truth which one discovers is nonetheless universal. Kierkegaard’s Socrates, by contrast, is not the hybrid figure one sees—and perhaps recognizes—in Hegel. For Kierkegaard, Socrates represents the final step in the dissolution of state authority, not sophistry. socrates is the necessary logical conclusion of the decline of athens—and is nothing more than that. Kierkegaard denies that socrates has any midwife-like interests; socrates is a one-sided, destructive figure and with him, subjectivity is introduced only in the most abstract way. One might say that Kierkegaard moves socrates further away from the metaphysical thinking of plato and closer to the relativistic and egoistic thought of sophistry. V. Kierkegaard’s Desperate Sophists like hegel, Kierkegaard sees sophistry—and socrates—as instantiations of the rational reactions to the cultural circumstances of the time. the religious tradition that had guaranteed the order of things had lost its authoritative place in athenian life as citizens began to question the absolute validity of the religiously-mediated

16

p. 403.)

Jub., vol. 18, p. 59; p. 66 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 398;

Jub., vol. 18, pp. 69–70 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 406.) Jub., vol. 18, p. 73 (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 409; translation modified.) 17 18

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laws, traditions, and customs of the state. like hegel, Kierkegaard suggests that both the sophists and socrates reacted to the same problem. Kierkegaard begins his account with a rather sympathetic interpretation of the sophists. he writes that the sophists inherited a strained culture and were thus already burdened with an insight they could not ignore: the ethical order they had inherited was no longer credible as absolute truth. unlike the earlier generations of happy Greeks, who lived in a “beautiful world,” where the gods had given all things their proper place, the sophists were burdened with the consequences of reflection. Reason had robbed the Sophists of their faith, so to speak. Speaking of the difficulties which follow as a result of the reflective consciousness that the Sophists had inherited, Kierkegaard writes: The immediate consciousness, secure and confident as it relies upon what it receives from the past, like a sacred treasure, scarcely ever notices that life is full of contradictions. Reflection, on the other hand, discovers this at once. It discovers that what is supposed to be absolutely certain, determinate for men (laws, customs, etc.), places the individual in conflict with himself.19

in at least one important sense, the sophists recognized what was happening: they knew that the established world order had crumbled. at the same time, they also rightly saw that it was impossible simply to go back to the given order: “in relation to the immediate consciousness, which in all innocence accepts with childlike simplicity whatever is offered,” the culture of the Sophists “is negative—and is too intelligent to be innocent,” he writes.20 like hegel, Kierkegaard suggests that the sophists were introspective enough to recognize that after the ground of practical activity had been destroyed through reflection, a new order would inevitably have to replace the old. And they did indeed find a way to meet this “need of the moment”: the Sophists learned that they could fill the vacuum just as quickly as it arose.21 they simply replaced their lost ethic by creating another. Kierkegaard explains their solution: “When the foundations of everything have been shaken, what can then become the firm ground that is to save the situation? Either it is the universal (the Good, etc.) or it is the finite subject, his propensities, desires, etc. The Sophists seized the latter expedient.”22 at this juncture, Kierkegaard once again agrees with hegel: the sophists became experts in giving reasons—based on their own particular interests—to justify whatever it is they were undertaking. the sophists opted to reestablish order by arguing for their subjective positions. Kierkegaard explains that there were two different movements domiciled in Sophistry: in its first form, this consciousness “shakes the foundations of everything; but in its second form, it enables every honorable pupil to make everything firm and secure again.”23

19 20 21 22 23

SKS 1, 249 / CI, 204. SKS 1, 250 / CI, 204–5. (Translation modified.) SKS 1, 250 / CI, 205. ibid. SKS 1, 250 / CI, 204–5. (Translation modified.)

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Kierkegaard’s take on the sophists differs from hegel’s in a few central ways, however. hegel, says Kierkegaard, “makes sophistic movement too grandiose.”24 Hegel identifies Sophistry with the total breakdown of the established ethical order, the ethical and moral nadir of greek culture. Kierkegaard takes the movement of the sophists to be less extreme. unlike hegel who argues that the sophists were completely destructive with regard to ethical truth, Kierkegaard suggests that sophistry still contained a sort of positive content. For they genuinely believed that they had secured the truth and had given at least momentary ethical content to the world—even if that content was ultimately relative to the situation in question. Kierkegaard’s claim that the sophists’ primary activity is constructive might strike some as counter-intuitive, and, on this point, his interpretation differs indeed from the more familiar hegelian assertion that the sophists had no ethical principles at all. But, for Kierkegaard, the Sophists’ ability to fill the void is evidence that they did not have a purely negative relationship to practical activity.25 at the same time, the constructive impulse of the sophists was their worldhistorical weakness. the sophists were not conscious of absolute freedom from all ethical obligations and guideposts but were merely aware of the freedom to shuffle values according to their own particular interests. they lacked the insight which would have allowed them to see the logical conclusion of their own consciousness and thus to call into question all ethical principles.26 Kierkegaard’s sophists were thus what we might call ethical relativists but not ethical nihilists. VI. Kierkegaard’s World-Historical Socrates: The Only Consistent Sophist Kierkegaard does not want to identify the first historical consciousness of ethical nihilism with the sophists, as does hegel. one might say that, in Kierkegaard’s view, he was the most radical of all the sophists. Kierkegaard writes that Socrates entered history as a “gift of the gods,” whose divine task was to eliminate the Sophists’ false “positivity.”27 only a thorough dismantling of sophistic argumentation itself could topple relativism, and only Socrates could accomplish it. A “cleansing of the temple”28 needed to take place before the sophists could understand that their hope to establish a momentary order was based on illusion. a nihilistic consciousness had to replace a consciousness of mere relativism. This is why socrates was “purely negative.”29 socrates’ method of ridding the athenian world of sophistry was, of course, to show his interlocutors that rhetoric alone is incapable of shoring up what is wavering. The dialectical conversations one finds recorded in the early Platonic dialogues, for example, inevitably ended in aporia—in “nothing.”

24 25 26 27 28 29

SKS 1, 251 / CI, 207. SKS 1, 252–3 / CI, 208. SKS 1, 252–4 / CI, 208–9. SKS 1, 254 / CI, 209. SKS 1, 254 / CI, 210. Ibid. (Translation modified.)

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as explained above, hegel claims that one of socrates’ argumentative tools is “irony”—Socrates “feigned ignorance” about the particular concept in question even though he had a good idea what it was. a mask of ignorance is said to have disguised his serious interest in discussing a metaphysical truth which he already possessed. as hegel sees it, socrates had already begun to discover the sphere of platonic ideas. Kierkegaard’s interpretation of socrates’ irony is different. his interpretation centers on the notion that the socratic claim of ignorance is truthful, that socrates does not merely pretend to lack knowledge. his ignorance, of course, is philosophical rather than empirical, for it certainly is not due to an inadequate education; he is by no means unfamiliar with poets, philosophers, and practical experience: “on the contrary, he was a very well-informed person....in the philosophical sense however, he was ignorant. he was ignorant of the ground of all being, the eternal, the divine— that is, he knew that it was, but not what it was.”30 against hegel’s interpretation which attributes to socrates the possession of higher moral principles—a positive, speculative content—Kierkegaard emphasizes the complete absence of knowledge in socrates’ character. more accurately stated, Kierkegaard’s interpretation limits socrates to strictly negative knowledge. socrates knows he lacks an understanding of the ground of being: “When socrates declared that he was ignorant, he nevertheless did know something, for he knew about his ignorance; on the other hand, however, this knowledge was not a knowledge of something, that is, did not have a positive content, and to that extent his knowledge is ironic.”31 of crucial importance for Kierkegaard is the sharp distinction between an ironic attitude, which dismantles the prevailing cultural understanding of truth and meaning, and the philosophical or speculative attitude which seeks to uncover a ground of truth. The ironist is satisfied with the nothingness that results from his or her engagement, and asks nothing more of the world. the speculative philosopher or metaphysician desires a content to replace that which has been disrupted through doubt.32 Contrasting the socratic method with the speculative or metaphysical method, Kierkegaard writes that whenever a person asks a question, at least two different intentions could underlie the question: one can ask with the intention of receiving an answer containing the desired fullness, and hence the more one asks, the deeper and more significant becomes the answer; or one can ask without any interest in the answer except to suck out the apparent content by means of the question, and thereby to leave an emptiness behind. The first method presupposes, of course, that there is a plentitude; the second that there is an emptiness. The first is the speculative method, the second the ironic. socrates in particular practiced the latter method.33

socratic irony is characterized by Kierkegaard here as a mode of questioning that presupposes that the other cannot provide information which was lacking beforehand, but instead that the questioning proceeds with the sole purpose of dismantling all apparent knowledge. the goal for an ironist is not to discover knowledge, but to lay 30 31 32 33

SKS 1, 217–18 / CI, 169. SKS 1, 306 / CI, 269. SKS 1, 175–6 / CI, 124. SKS 1, 97 / CI, 36.

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bare an absence of knowledge.34 “socrates does not peel off the husk in order to get to the kernel, but hollows out the kernel,” he writes.35 in an interpretation of socratic irony that is consistent with Kierkegaard’s claim, alexander nehamas explains that it is not necessary to attribute knowledge to socrates in order to explain his irony: often, irony consists in letting your audience know that something is taking place inside you that they simply are not allowed to see. But it also, more radically, leaves open the question whether you are seeing it yourself: speakers are not always in the privileged position in relation to themselves that Quintillian attributes to them. irony often communicates the fact that the audience is not getting the whole picture; but it does not necessarily imply that the speaker has the picture or that, indeed, there is a whole picture to be understood in the first place....Irony constructs a mask. It leaves open the question what, if anything, is masked.36

it is this more radical form of ironic comportment for which Kierkegaard argues. socrates’ ironic manner of speech did not conceal anything. it did not even conceal knowledge in the form of a riddle, but rather socrates was a riddle to himself. For Kierkegaard, socrates did not himself know what he intended with his conversations, but rather he simply enjoyed the process of dismantling claims to knowledge. there was no “lingering knowledge” beyond his ignorance.37 VII. Socrates’ Contribution: The Most Abstract Form of Subjectivity But what more specifically was the historical upshot of Socrates’ ignorance? Why does Kierkegaard think it is of interest for the historian? Kierkegaard’s answer is that Socrates introduced to Spirit a novel mode of reflection, namely abstract subjectivity. For the first time in human history, a full awareness of the possibility of becoming a “subject”—intellectually and morally distinct from the habits of custom—was made an actual part of human consciousness. unlike the sophists, who were certainly able to look critically at the Athenian customs that did not fit their purposes, Socrates saw that the entire world of custom was completely lacking ethical validity. he saw the absolute hollowness of the objective world. It is this “absoluteness” which is critical for Kierkegaard: Socrates had discovered an absolute principle—“absolute nothing”38—that could be held up against the finite relativity of Sophistic argumentation. For the Sophists, justifications for practical activity could be given even though the inherited order of things was unstable. For Socrates, no justification of any practical principle was possible because a consciousness of the absolute showed that the inherited order of things was unstable in its entirety. Finitude could now be compared with an infinite standard. David SKS 1, 98 / CI, 37. SKS 1, 106 / CI, 54. 36 From alexander nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates, princeton: princeton university press 1999, p. 103. 37 SKS 1, 101 / CI, 40. 38 SKS 1, 141 / CI, 84. 34 35

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Kangas nicely sums up the insight of the socratic consciousness. irony, he writes, makes subjectivity possible where “subjectivity regards itself in light of the absolute and where the absolute has the form of a negation....in this light, the entirety of the phenomenal world appears alien and acquires an ironic coloring.”39 it should be emphasized that socratic subjectivity was a subjectivity in its most abstract form only; it was merely the first condition of possibility for a more fullydeveloped subjectivity. i take this to mean that socrates had discovered a novel mode of asking practical questions: he had revealed to his contemporaries the pathway for accessing universal guidelines for activity—by looking inward. But he could give no guidelines himself. his own inward gaze found an absolute void in the space where later thinkers would discover principles of moral behavior. the task of arguing for a conception of the good fell to socrates’ spiritual descendents. let me now summarize what i take to be the core of Kierkegaard’s historical argument. socrates is said to have destroyed the relativity of sophistry by exposing it to itself. a spirit of total nihilism remained in its place. From the perspective of history, socrates did what had to be done by introducing to human culture a consciousness of the complete emptiness of customary ethics. along with this consciousness of emptiness, the framework of subjectivity came into focus. thus, even if Socrates was not a philosopher in search of metaphysically stable “ideas” and even if he cannot be said to be an object for ethical emulation for later generations, Socrates paved the way for the search for ethical truth via subjective reflection. The “established order” or the “finite” was abolished in order to allow the possibility of the “infinite” to come into view. Kierkegaard sums up Socrates’ place in history: What socrates did with the sophists was to give them the next moment, the moment in which the momentarily true dissolved into nothing—in other words, he let the infinite devour the finite. But Socrates’ irony was not turned against only the Sophists, it was turned against the whole established order. he demanded ideality from all of it, and this demand was the judgment that judged and condemned greek culture. But his irony was not the instrument he used in the service of the idea; irony was his position [Standpunkt]—more he did not have. if he had had the idea, his annihilating activity would not have been so radical.40

Kierkegaard’s socrates is thus the pure instantiation of the destruction of culturallyinherited truth which typified Athens at that time. He is the Sophist of all Sophists who revealed to his contemporaries that the destructive power of sophistic rhetoric also undercuts its supposed constructive power. the sophists attempted to reestablish order based on their momentary subjective interests. socrates goes further. he completed the skeptical work the sophists had begun. he represents total negativity, the total destruction of the established order, total nihilism. and while some of Kierkegaard’s later works modify aspects of this view, Socrates as absolute, infinite negativity always the presupposed point of departure. david Kangas, “Conception and Concept: the two logics in The Concept of Irony and the Place of Socrates” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, p. 181. 40 SKS 1, 258 / CI, 213–14. 39

Bibliography I. Works by the Sophists in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library none. II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Sophists Ast, Friedrich, “Sophistik,” in his Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, landshut: Joseph thomann 1807, pp. 96–9 (ASKB 385). Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, “Philosophie der Sophisten,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, pp. 3–42 (ASKB 557–559). Marbach, Gotthard Oswald, “Die Sophisten,” in his Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, leipzig: Wigand 1838 (1. abtheilung, in gotthard oswald marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mit Angabe der Literatur nach den Quellen, abtheilung 1–2, leipzig: Wigand 1838–41), pp. 147–169 (ASKB 642); for abtheilung 2 see ASKB 643). Meiners, Christoph, “Geschichte der Griechischen Sophisten,” in his Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Rom, vols. 1–2, lemgo: meyer 1781–82, vol. 2, pp. 1–227 (ASKB 1406–1406a). [Møller, Poul Martin], “Sophisterne,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christien taarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 345–55 (ASKB 1574–1576). mynster, Jakob peter, Den hedenske Verden ved Christendommens Begyndelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1850, p. 30 (ASKB 693). ritter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: perthes 1836–39, vol. 1, pp. 575–659 (ASKB 735–738). —— Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, ed. by l. preller, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 128–38 (ASKB 726). stäudlin, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral und Religion, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Crusius 1794, vol. 1, pp. 216–33 (ASKB 791).

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Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Geschichte der Sophisten,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 1, pp. 344–402 (ASKB 815–826). Zeller, Eduard, “Die Sophistik,” in his Die Philosophie der Griechen. Eine Untersuchung über Charakter, Gang und Hauptmomente ihrer Entwicklung, vols. 1–3, tübingen: Fues 1844–52, vol. 1, pp. 244–72 (ASKB 913–914). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to the Sophists himmelstrup, Jens, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates—en Studie i dansk Filosofis Historie, Copenhagen, arnold Busck 1924. muench, paul, “the socratic method of Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus: Indirect Communication and the Art of ‘Taking Away,’ ” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, pp. 139–50. Jensen, Povl Johannes, “Kierkegaards Sokrates” in Sokrates i historiens lys. En samling nordiske studier, oslo: solum Forlag 1985, pp. 101–11. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 39; p. 49; p. 119; p. 124; p. 128; p. 129, note 53; p. 130; p. 359, note 9; p. 416, note 46; p. 420, note 82; p. 424. stewart, Jon, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, new York: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 150–61. Walsh, Sylvia, “Ironic Love: An Amorist Interpretation of Socratic Eros,” in The Concept of Irony, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2001 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 2), pp. 123–40. ziolkowski, eric, “From Clouds to Corsair: Kierkegaard, aristophanes, and the Problem of Socrates,” in The Concept of Irony, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2001 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 2), pp. 193–234.

the stoics: Kierkegaard on the passion for apathy rick anthony Furtak

I. Introduction to Stoic Philosophy Stoicism, one of the major philosophical schools which flourished in the centuries following the death of aristotle, was established by zeno of Citium (not to be confused with the pre-socratic zeno of elea, known for his paradoxes) and named after the porch where its headquarters were located in athens. the third head of the school, Chrysippus, was a prolific author who appears to have been responsible for formulating most of its core doctrines during the 3rd century bc. his numerous works, like those of the other early stoics, survive mainly in fragments quoted or paraphrased by such figures as Plutarch, Galen, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes laertius.1 By contrast, the teachings of a later stoic such as epictetus (ad 55–135), a former slave who ended up living in the northwestern greek city of nicopolis, survive in complete and readable form thanks to the Discourses recorded by his student arrian, which provide a more vivid and thorough illustration of stoic philosophy in practice. ancient stoicism prided itself on offering a comprehensive philosophical system whose branches in logic, physics, and ethics—in modern terms, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics—were integrated into a coherent whole that could provide guidance for human beings in every walk of life. the ethical aspect of stoic philosophy, which was its main focus (especially in the later ancient period), is principally oriented toward the cultivation of ἀπάθεια— that is, freedom from emotion. as one scholar of hellenistic thought admits, the identification of apathy as the cardinal virtue of Stoic ethics “does at first sight seem extremely perverse.”2 For the ancient stoics, however, this is the logical result of bringing one’s mind into accordance with the principle of reason that governs the entire universe.3 Chrysippus argues that emotion, or passion—the greek word is 1 the standard edition of these fragments is Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vols. 1–4, ed. by hans von arnim, leipzig: B.g. teubner 1903–24. another useful collection of primary texts, with translation and commentary, is a.a. long and david sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1987. 2 Julia annas, The Morality of Happiness, new York: oxford university press 1993, pp. 61–3. 3 on the connection between ontology and ethics in stoic philosophy, see epictetus, Discourses, i, 1.4–7 and ii, 8.12–3 and diogenes laertius, 7.88 and 7.138–49. zeno’s cosmology is described by stobaeus in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 1, 120. see also

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πάθος—consists in a judgment of value, or perception of significance, in something that lies outside of one’s own control.4 In other words, he classifies the emotions as cognitive processes. according to this view, i could not be disappointed in someone unless i believe that he or she has let me down. Furthermore, i would not be liable to disappointment in the first place if I did not consider this person’s attitudes or behavior to be important in some way. in every instance of passion, a similar structure must exist: a dispositional belief about the significance of something beyond one’s own control, and a response to some contingent event involving whatever is thus viewed as significant.5 Believing in the value of these contingent “externals” disposes a person toward a wide variety of emotional responses. “To cherish something,” that is, “to ascribe to it a high value, is to give oneself a basis for the response of profound joy when it is present; of fear when it is threatened; of grief when it is lost; of anger when someone else damages it...[and] of pity when someone loses such a thing through no fault of his or her own.”6 or, as another commentator explains, “virtually any concern (passion, interest, enthusiasm, attachment, involvement) can give rise to any or all of the whole range of emotions.”7 this is precisely the vulnerability that a stoic seeks to avoid, eliminating the entire spectrum of emotional experience by rooting out concern for anything that lies beyond his or her own control. as Chrysippus says, passions arise from “beliefs about what is good and what is bad” in the realm of uncontrolled externals—this is why, for Epictetus, the “most important” distinction is between what is in our power, or “up to us,” and what is not.8 the stoics deny value to anything in the latter category, asserting that nothing is worse than giving assent to false impressions about what matters. they spend a lot of time criticizing the ways in which emotions are liable to be flawed (unstable, excessive, distorted, and so on) due to some specific kind of error,9 but this criticism is derived from their basic position that each and every passion arises from the mistaken idea that what lies beyond our control is of value—and this, they argue, is categorically false.10 as they see it, to accept the a.a. long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, oxford: Clarendon press 2002, pp. 118–19. 4 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 3, 171; 391; and 456–63. strictly speaking, this “judgment” involves giving one’s assent to the proposition implicit in the appearance of value: see richard sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, new York: oxford university press 2000, p. 41. 5 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4, 27. Cf. Brad inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, oxford: Clarendon press 1985, pp. 146–55. 6 martha nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, princeton: princeton university press 1994, p. 370. 7 Robert C. Roberts, “Existence, Emotion, and Virtue: Classical Themes in Kierkegaard,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon d. marino, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1998, pp. 177–206; pp. 185–6. 8 see, for example, epictetus, Discourses, i, 1.14–17 and i, 29.24. Cf. F.h. sandbach, The Stoics, 2nd ed., indianapolis: hackett 1989, p. 165. 9 see, for example, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 3, 462 and 475; seneca, De Ira, i, 7.4; epictetus, Discourses, ii, 1.1; and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3, 61. 10 see diogenes laertius, 7.88 and 7.110.

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notion that a contingent event could affect us for better or worse is to make an error about the nature of reality. one of the recurrent themes of stoic philosophy is that we must reject any appearance of value: for instance, epictetus states that a violent storm is “nothing other than” an impression—and hence it is nothing that ought to disturb us.11 although objects actively impress themselves upon us, they do not force us to give assent to them in one way or another.12 But once we have done so, the stoics argue, our emotions take on a momentum of their own.13 and part of the mental agitation of an emotion is its intrinsic claim to its own truth, as epictetus grants: we are not always able to resist value-impressions such as the thought that “this child is precious.”14 this is why it is necessary for the stoic to be vigilant in eradicating his or her dispositions toward emotion, as far as possible. epictetus argues that we should think of even our closest family members in such a way that we will not be troubled when they die.15 and Chrysippus says that the way to console a person in mourning is to convince him that his grief is based upon a false judgment.16 here we see the stoic tendency to express a normative principle in epistemological language: passions are false perceptions, and it is up to us to eradicate them in the name of preserving our rational integrity.17 as we have seen, earlier and later stoics agree that nothing matters except what is within our control.18 it follows that if we educate ourselves about what is truly of value, then we will no longer be susceptible to passions.19 to care about objects in the contingent world is “a certain recipe for disappointment, anxiety, and unhappiness”: unless we avoid forming this kind of attachment, we are bound to suffer emotions as a result.20 on the other hand, since passions are perceptions of significance, a person for whom nothing is significant will (as a logical consequence) rest in a condition of apathy. When asked “whether it is better to have moderate passions or none,” Seneca responds that the Stoic’s epictetus, Discourses, ii, 18.30. see, for example, epictetus, Handbook, 1 and 5. 13 see Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 2, 974 and vol. 3, 177; Cicero, De Fato, 43.1. see also the discussion by susanne Bobzien in Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, oxford: Clarendon press 1998, pp. 240–63. 14 see epictetus, Discourses, i, 23.5–6. 15 epictetus, Handbook, 3. 16 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 3, 486. Cf. Josiah B. gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, albany: state university of new York press 1970, pp. 132–3. 17 see diogenes laertius, 7.110 and epictetus, Discourses, iv, 1.65–9. Cf. nancy sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1997, p. 108: “[a] passion is a false belief; the cure is a discursive method that leads to true and reasoned belief about what is of value or worth in the world.” 18 see, for example, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 2, 977; see also epictetus, Discourses, i, 4.27. 19 epictetus, Discourses, i, 22.9–11; ii, 22.19–20; iii, 1.40. in the last of these passages, we are told that moral volition is what a person essentially is: “You are not flesh...but volition; therefore, if you make your will beautiful, then you will be beautiful.” Cf. Seneca, De Ira ii.2.1–2. 20 long, Epictetus, pp. 28–9. Cf. sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, pp. 45–6. 11

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goal is to “expel the passions entirely.”21 What is truly valuable in us, on this view, cannot be damaged under any circumstances, even if our limbs are torn apart by wild animals. as the stoics encourage us to believe, our true self is not affected by such incidents, and it is only by realizing this that we can attain tranquility. II. Stoicism in Kierkegaard’s Corpus Kierkegaard’s notes on stoicism begin inauspiciously, with an early fragment mentioning “the Stoic philosopher Empedocles”; this may be an unintended reproduction of an error made by poul martin møller (1794–1838).22 But once he begins to study hellenistic thought in earnest, as evidenced especially by Notebook 13 (which bears witness to his research from 1842 to 1843), Kierkegaard fills his unpublished papers with the fruits of a careful scholarly engagement with original and secondary sources. the same passages often show Kierkegaard actively responding to what he is studying. For instance, one notebook entry finds him making the observation that Zeno’s classification of the passions is a way of sorting out what in danish are called Lidenskaberne.23 in this entry, Kierkegaard lists several emotional categories from stoic philosophy, as reported by tennemann.24 We know that he also learned the phrase εὐκαταφορία εἰς πάθος or “tendency to passion,” from tennemann’s Geschichte der Philosophie—where it is rightly attributed to Chrysippus.25 the account of stoicism that Kierkegaard would have read in this source is for the most part quite reliable: tennemann states that, according to the stoics, an emotion is a kind of false perception, founded on a belief which needs to be eradicated. But Kierkegaard did not rely only upon tennemann’s history for his knowledge of stoic texts. his own library included more than one copy of diogenes laertius, the

seneca, Epistle, 116. see SKS 17, 276, dd:199 / KJN 1, 267. 23 SKS 19, 398, not13:32 / JP 3, 3126. 24 such as ἡδονή and λύπη (pleasure or distress with respect to whatever is present; see diogenes laertius 7.110–111) and βούλησις, χαρά, and εὐλάβεια (well-wishing, rational satisfaction, and precaution; see diogenes laertius 7.116) on these εὐπάθειαι, see nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, pp. 398–400; sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, p. 117; and inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, p. 173. the stoics “certainly appear to have assumed (as opposed to have argued) that the sage’s εὐπάθεια would be tranquil,” as Lawrence Becker acknowledges in A New Stoicism, princeton: princeton University Press 1998, p. 131. See also A.W. Price, “Plato, Zeno, and the Object of Love,” in The Sleep of Reason, ed. by martha nussbaum and Juha sihvola, Chicago: university of Chicago press 2002, pp. 170–99; p. 190. according to SKS K19, 579, Kierkegaard’s source is Wilhelm gottlieb tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 4, pp. 126–7 (ASKB 815–826). 25 unpublished fragment from 1844: Pap. v B 3, 4 / CUP2, notes, p. 187. the passage by Chrysippus is Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 3, 104; see tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 4, 1803, p. 129. This phrase is also used by “Johannes Climacus,” in Philosophical Fragments, see SKS 4, 221 / PF, 12. 21 22

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original source of most of tennemann’s own references to zeno and Chrysippus.26 he also had multiple editions of epictetus—the greek text, along with one german and two danish translations.27 in one journal entry, he describes the distinction made by Epictetus between what is and is not “up to us” as the Stoic philosopher’s “main thesis,” which it clearly is.28 in another reference to this distinction made by epictetus, Kierkegaard reproaches the stoics for their ideal of passionless detachment.29 he has no complaint with the distinction itself, but he disputes the thesis that everything in the latter category is nothing to us. in another notebook entry, Kierkegaard refers to the claim made by epictetus that, if one eliminates the idea, the pain vanishes, and there is no longer any cry of “Woe is me!” He immediately adds that, while this may be true, it is not advisable: “from a religious point of view, to eliminate the conception is actually to eliminate God.”30 A sketch meant for the “Diapsalmata” of Either/Or I has “A” stating: “The Stoics say that all pain resides in the idea,” adding that, as an epicurean, the aesthete agrees.31 a sign of Kierkegaard’s fascination with epictetus is that some of his references to the stoic philosopher take the form of an ad hominem attack. in one of the passages already mentioned, he observes in the very first words of Epictetus the “voice of the slave,” complaining that it is slavish to be so exclusively concerned about the difference between freedom and constraint.32 Although here he finds this emphasis objectionable, on another occasion he compares epictetus favorably to marcus aurelius due to the former’s acquaintance with slavery: “it takes a slave to write with the loftiness of Stoicism,” Kierkegaard says.33 even J.m. schultz, the modern editor of one of the epictetus texts on Kierkegaard’s bookshelf, is subject to personal criticism—from schultz’s preface, Kierkegaard gets the impression that the editor and translator exemplifies the way that “someone can be occupied in a see De Vitis Philosophorum Libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109); Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110-1111; for the same title see also ASKB a i 154–155). 27 see Epicteti manuale et Cebetis tabula graece et latine, ed. by Johannes schweighäuser, leipzig: Weidmann 1798 (ASKB 1113); Epiktets Haandbog, trans. and ed. by engelbert Boye, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1781 (ASKB 1114) and Epictets Haandbog. Forhen udgiven paa græsk nu efter den græske Udgave paa dansk oversat og oplyst med Anmærkninger og Forelæsninger over enkelte Steder, trans. by. l. sahl, Copenhagen: p.m. høpffner 1785 (ASKB a i 156). he also owned Arrians Unterredungen Epiktets mit seinen Schülern, trans. by J.m. schultz, vols. 1–2, altona: hammerich 1801 (ASKB 1045). 28 see SKS 24, 422, nB24:156 / JP 4, 3863; in this passage, Kierkegaard is alluding to epictetus, Handbook, 1. 29 SKS 24, 120, nB22:30 / JP 4, 4514. 30 SKS 21, nB8:5 / JP 4, 4625; here, Kierkegaard quotes epictetus, Discourses, i, 4.23. 31 see Pap. iii B 180, 13 / EO1, supplement, pp. 489–90. 32 SKS 24, 120, nB22:30 / JP 4, 4514. a contemporary scholar also remarks upon how prominent the contrast between liberty and constraint is for epictetus, the former slave: long, Epictetus, pp. 10–11. 33 SKS 25, 35, nB26:28 / JP 4, 4516. 26

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scholarly pursuit without its having the remotest influence on him.”34 Kierkegaard alludes to a story told about epictetus, “who as a slave said to his master, who was beating him on the leg: if you hit harder, you will break it. and [the master] struck and broke the leg, and Epictetus said: I told you so, didn’t I?”35 By comparison with this example (apocryphal or not) of stoic apathy in practice, Kierkegaard is surprised to find that the words of Epictetus do not appear to have had any deep influence on the contemporary scholar. although a number of journal entries record Kierkegaard’s admiration for the rhetorical beauty of seneca’s letters, one instance is particularly noteworthy, since it shows Kierkegaard praising De Ira, a polemical stoic work which represents anger as a key example of an irrational passion.36 his research notes on stoicism even mention such an obscure figure as Ariston of Chios, who (as Kierkegaard observes) argues that the true stoic will lack any motive for action.37 Moreover, he is sufficiently thorough to take note of a dry topic such as the categories of stoic logic, which are listed under the heading “Copenhagen” in a notebook from 1842.38 needless to say, all of this suggests a serious and abiding interest in stoicism on Kierkegaard’s part. the Nachlass helps us to understand Kierkegaard’s relation with stoicism, since it reveals that he was familiar with a broad and diverse group of stoic authors, many of whom are alluded to in his published works without receiving any explicit mention. in From the Papers of One Still Living, Kierkegaard writes that it might be possible for a view of life to open up deeper experiences of meaning than stoicism does.39 Such a “life-view” is avoided by the one acknowledged Stoic among his pseudonymous authors: “Constantin Contantius,” who admits to having “always strongly mistrusted all upheavals.”40 This is the attitude that “Frater Taciturnus” has in mind when, at the end of Stages on Life’s Way, he speaks of the instinct for selfpreservation as having been established as a “moral principle” by certain “Greek philosophers,” meaning Chrysippus and the other early Stoics.41 as Kierkegaard says in discussing a passage by marcus aurelius, the stoic’s self—with its fear of upheaval and its defensive autonomy—is “the most isolated self” of all.42 in his litany SKS 24, 422, nB24:156 / JP 4, 3863. Cf. origen, Contra Celsum, 1.7. 36 SKS 22, 114, nB11:191 / JP 4, 3905. 37 see Pap. iv a 252 / EO2, supplement, p. 383. on ariston of Chios, see diogenes laertius, 7.160–1. 38 SKS 19, 302, not10:10 / JP 5, 5572; Cf. alexander of aphrodisias, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 2, 124. the danish editors suggest that Kierkegaard’s source might be simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories, by way of poul martin møller, although Kierkegaard’s notebook actually mentions tennemann, see SKS K19, 412. 39 see SKS 1, 32 / EPW, 76. 40 SKS 4, 45 / R, 171. in a draft of a letter ascribed to the pseudonymous author of Repetition, “Constantin Constantius” says: “I actually am a Stoic.” See Pap. iv B 117 / R, supplement, p. 320. 41 see SKS 6, 400–1 / SLW, 432–3. Cf. diogenes laertius, 7.85–6. 42 SKS 21, 148, nB8:8 / JP 4, 3898. Kierkegaard cites marcus aurelius, Meditations, 11.3. On Kierkegaard’s view of the self as a “network of relationships,” see Edward Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, london: routledge 1996, p. 94. 34 35

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of the varieties of despair, located in The Sickness unto Death, “Anti-Climacus” says the following about defiance: “if a common name were to be applied to this form of despair, one might call it Stoicism”; however, he adds, this is to be “understood as not referring only to that sect.”43 in this mode of despair, “the self is its own master, absolutely (one says) its own master; and exactly this is the despair,”44 although it is in this very fact that the stoic takes pride. the notion that good and evil are alterable by free will is stigmatized as a lazy way of thinking in The Concept of Anxiety, where “Vigilius Haufniensis” refers to Chrysippus as the source of the idea of λόγος ἀργός, or lazy reason.45 in Philosophical Fragments, “Johannes Climacus” relates a tale about Chrysippus arguing with Carneades over the sorites problem;46 later on, he cites Chrysippus again, this time in assessing the metaphysical status of past events.47 the same pseudonymous author, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, mentions at one point that “the Stoics regarded suicide as a courageous act,”48 introducing a theme which Kierkegaard takes up in a number of late journal entries. one such entry includes a reference by Kierkegaard to § 16 of the first volume of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, a text which itself supplies a rich variety of quotations from ancient stoic sources.49 initially, Kierkegaard marvels at the stoic policy toward suicide, as is shown by an early notebook entry.50 upon further consideration, he denounces this view of suicide as “a curious self-contradiction in Stoicism.” Supposedly, “the Stoic takes earthly sufferings, adversities, [and so forth] so lightly that they simply do not exist for him—and then suicide is still recommended as the ultimate avenue of escape.”51 But either it is ridiculous to recommend suicide on such negligible grounds, or else the stoic’s attitude toward suicide proves that earthly sufferings do exist, and are not really “nothing” to him. The conclusion that it is within our power to earn tranquility and self-sufficient happiness stands in sharp contrast to much of Kierkegaard’s religious philosophy. Yet some of his very late writings actually conflate Stoicism and Christianity, arguing (for example) that not to commit suicide at the worst of times is actually a more noble gesture and would perhaps be a good way of reviving

SKS 11, 182 / SUDP, 99. see also Pap. v B 229, 6 / EUD, supplement, p. 466; in this draft of one of the four upbuilding discourses from 1844, “wanting to be something” is specifically associated with Stoicism. 44 SKS 11, 183 / SUDP, 100. 45 SKS 4, 415–16 / CA, 112–13. Cf. Cicero, De Fato, 12.28. 46 see SKS 4, 248–9 / PF, 43. see also tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 4, p. 344. Cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 2, 32. 47 SKS 4, 276–7 / PF, 76–7. see Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 2, 939; 952. 48 SKS 7, 153 / CUP1, 165. on the topic of suicide, see epictetus, Discourses, iii, 8.6 and diogenes laertius, 7.130. 49 SKS 25, 388, nB30:10 / JP 4, 3880. 50 SKS 19, 397–8, not13:29 / JP 4, 4511. Cf. epictetus, Discourses, i, 24.20; see also SKS 24, 462, nB25:40 / JP 4, 4515; in this case, Kierkegaard cites epictetus, Discourses iii, 13.14. 51 SKS 23, 231, nB17:83 / JP 4, 4513. 43

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the austere ascetic ideals that are lacking in modern Christendom.52 although, most of the time, Kierkegaard recognizes that stoical detachment is not compatible with the unconditional engagement of a loving person, he sometimes goes against the spirit of Works of Love, advising a contemptus mundi attitude similar to that which can also be found in augustine, and which hannah arendt condemns as “pseudoChristian” since its “denial of human existence” makes love of neighbor impossible.53 to pursue this point any further, however, would lead us into the next section. III. Kierkegaard’s Relation to Stoicism it may have been inevitable that Kierkegaard’s response to stoic philosophy would turn out to be an ambivalent one. When he declares that the one thing needful in the modern age is for people “to become a little more greek in the good sense of the term, that is, more human, and not fantastically inordinate with systematic galimatias, something that no human being cares about,” he is advocating a return to the classical notion of philosophy as a way of life.54 and it would be hard to argue that any other school of thought dwells more emphatically on the most urgent concerns of human existence than ancient Stoicism, in which theoretical reflection is always meant to inform concrete practice. Just as socrates is esteemed by Kierkegaard for representing philosophy not as a set of abstract arguments but as a lived discipline, epictetus has been praised above plato due to his concern for the issues of ordinary life; and the socratic spirit of his philosophy is widely recognized.55 When Kierkegaard says “go hang” to those who try to explain all of existence without understanding themselves, he is repeating what epictetus is reported to have said to a person wanting to learn philosophy only for the sake of becoming adept at logical games.56 When the stoics contend that “it is bad philosophy to slip into a self-satisfied professional jargon, SKS 23, 367, nB19:56 / JP 3, 2755. see also, for example, SKS 24, 212, nB23:14 / JP 2, 1266 and SKS 25, 176, nB27:62 / JP 4, 4518. 53 hannah arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, ed. by Joanna v. scott and Judith stark, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1996, pp. 27–30. John rist suggests that, in augustinian Christianity at its best, love takes the place of “right reason” in Stoicism, see Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1994, p. 168. For epictetus, on the other hand “what is best in us,” or the divine principle of the human mind, is “nothing other than reason itself.” adolf Bonhöffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, trans. by William o. stephens, new York: peter lang 1996, p. 14. 54 Pap. v B 53, 29 / CA, supplement, p. 191. on the stoic distinction between philosophical discourse and philosophy itself, see pierre hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. by michael Chase, oxford: Blackwell 1995, pp. 266ff; and, e.g., epictetus, Discourses, iii, 21.1–6. Cf. Jon stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 644–7. 55 see the summary by sophia scopetea, Kierkegaard og grœciteten, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 465. Cf. origen, Contra Celsum, 6.2. on the ways in which epictetus was inspired by the example of socrates, see long, Epictetus, p. 92 and Bonhöffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, p. 15. epictetus himself obviously regards socrates as an exemplar of stoic virtue: see, for example, Handbook, 53. 56 Pap. v B 150, 26 / SLW, supplement, p. 645. Cf. epictetus, Discourses, ii, 17.34. 52

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neglecting the world of human beings for whom philosophy exists,”57 they are anticipating one of Kierkegaard’s central themes: “earnestness does not waste much time in guessing riddles; it...does not discuss, but acts.”58 in a similar vein, antiClimacus claims that the doctor of the soul must think of himself as standing at the bedside of a sick person—using an image so dear to stoic authors that Cicero at one point remarks that he is “tired” of hearing it.59 this idea, which appears unorthodox in the context of modern philosophy, is entirely in line with the ancient view that arguments are not abstract entities which interact with one another in logical space, but precepts to orient human action.60 in Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard makes what looks like a stoic point about the triviality of the emotions: passion should be linked with significance, yet we sometimes get passionate about insignificant trivialities.61 But admitting the need for caution in the affective realm is different from being comprehensively distrustful of the emotions. Kierkegaard’s vision of human life at its highest is quite unlike the stoic paradigm. indeed, he ultimately defends the view that passion can be a valuable mode of perception. that Kierkegaard parts company with the stoics on this matter is unmistakable: when he condemns sentimentality, it is in order to contrast it with “true and genuine feeling”;62 and, although he admits that anger can be “a dark passion,” he adds that it may also take the form of a “righteous indignation” that is justified by circumstances.63 at one point, Kierkegaard even goes so far as to claim that “only great souls are susceptible to passions.”64 here, we are far from the stoic position that wisdom is consummated in apathy: Kierkegaard in fact explicitly sets himself against the stoics, saying that what he wishes to see in a person is exactly the εὐκαταφορία εἰς πάθος, that is, “tendency to passion” that a Stoic must oppose.65 he cautions his reader not to misunderstand all his talk about passion and pathos as an indication that he wants to endorse any and every emotion.66 Yet he turns away nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, p. 330. Cf. seneca, Epistle, 48. this is from Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, see SKS 5, 452–3 / TD, 82–3. 59 SKS 11, 117 / SUDP, 35. this medical image is used throughout stoic writings—for instance, in epictetus, Discourses, iii, 23.27–30. see Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.23. 60 As Stewart writes, “Modern philosophy is objective thought that offers a specific model of reality and does not regard the life of the individual as worthy of consideration. much of Kierkegaard’s own project can be regarded as an attempt to return to the greek concept of philosophy in which one’s life is the embodiment of one’s thought.” Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, p. 642. speaking on behalf of the ancient conception of philosophy, pierre hadot maintains that “philosophical discourses cannot be considered realities which exist in and for themselves, so that their structure could be studied independently of the philosopher who developed them. Can socrates’ discourse be separated from the life and death of Socrates?” What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. by michael Chase, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 2002, pp. 5–6. 61 SKS 10, 135 / CD, 124. 62 Pap. i a 117 / JP 3, 3125. 63 SKS 6, 127 / SLW, 135. 64 SKS 18, 104, FF:152 / KJN 2, 95. 65 SKS 18, 158, JJ:55 / KJN 2, 146. The same phrase is used by “Johannes Climacus,” in Philosophical Fragments, see SKS 4, 221 / PF, 12. 66 SKS 18, 217, JJ:237 / KJN 2, 199. 57 58

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from the stoic ideal of an invulnerable soul toward a very different paradigm, that of a loving person who is emotionally open to the world of others. as pia søltoft has written, Kierkegaaard seeks to “open the self in the direction of the world,” thus making “a passage through which things can enter.”67 For epictetus, the reverent person has to avoid being involved in relationships;68 for Kierkegaard, by contrast, this would not be possible. the stoic suggestion that we ought to remain spectators and not participants would be opposed by Kierkegaard, who argues in A Literary Review of Two Ages that it is lamentable when participants turn themselves “into a crowd of spectators.”69 if “accurate, clear, decisive, impassioned understanding” is a morally valuable capacity, then a lack of emotional receptivity is, on Kierkegaard’s terms, an indefensible kind of ignorance.70 like epictetus, Kierkegaard wishes to follow socrates in learning “the true nature of each reality.”71 Where they disagree is not in their commitment to truthfulness but in their conception of what rationality is. a stoic observer may view the contingent world as empty of value and unworthy of concern, but Kierkegaard advises us to consider that “what one sees depends upon how one sees,” and that it is possible to see things in a more charitable light.72 in Works of Love he defends a conception of radically passionate subjectivity, in which the self is rooted and grounded in love, the emotional force which “builds up,” forming the heart as it flows from the heart.73 and he moves away from classical thought altogether when he develops an ethic of unconditional love that asks for nothing in return. no matter how different his ends may be, when Kierkegaard outlines a program for cultivating the passions of the soul he is drawing upon a feature of stoic philosophy that, in the words of Bernard McGinn, “greatly influenced later Christian spirituality.”74 appropriating the existential spirit of stoicism, Kierkegaard eventually directs it toward the articulation of an antithetical ideal. the example of ancient stoicism thus becomes a source of inspiration for Kierkegaard’s writings, as well as an antagonist for him to define himself polemically against.75

Pia Søltoft, “Love and Continuity,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1997, pp. 222–3. epictetus, Discourses, iii, 22.69. 69 SKS 8, 71 / TA, 73. Cf. epictetus, Discourses, i, 6.19–20. 70 SKS 21, 132–3, nB7:104 / JP 3, 3705. 71 epictetus, Discourses, iv, 1.41. 72 SKS 5, 69–70 / EUD, 59–60. in Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard adds that it is only when “you believe that God is love” that “all things serve you for good.” SKS 10, 203 / CD, 193. see also SKS 23, 24–5, nB15:26 / JP 4, 4554. 73 SKS 9, 15–24 / WL, 3–12. SKS 9, 201–15 / WL, 209–24. 74 Bernard mcginn, The Foundations of Mysticism, new York: Crossroad 1994, p. 30. 75 For a more extensive account of Kierkegaard’s relation to stoic philosophy, see rick anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, notre dame: university of notre dame press 2005. in addition to everyone thanked therein, i owe a special debt of gratitude to Jon stewart and Brian söderquist, for their encouragement and editorial support of this particular article. 67 68

Bibliography I. Works by Ancient Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to the Stoics [antoninus, marcus aurelius], Marc. Aurel. Antonin’s Unterhaltungen mit sich selbst. Aus dem Griechischen übersetzt. Mit Anmerkungen und einem Versuche über Antonin’s philosophische Grundsätze begleitet, trans. and ed. by Johann matthias schultz, schleswig: röhß 1799 (ASKB 1219). Arrians Unterredungen Epiktets mit seinen Schülern, vols. 1–2, trans. by J.m. schultz, altona: hammerich 1801 (ASKB 1045). [Cicero, marcus tullius], M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera omnia ex recensione Iacobi Gronovii, accedit varietas lectionis...cum singulorum librorum argumentis., vols. 1–6, 2nd ed., ed. by io. augusti ernesti, halle: impensis orphanotrophei 1757 (ASKB 1224–1229). diogenes laertius, De Vitis Philosophorum Libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109). Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh, ed. by Børge riisbrigh and m. Børge thorlacius, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111; for the same title see also ASKB a i 154–155). [epictetus], Epicteti manuale et Cebetis tabula graece et latine, ed. by Johannes schweighæuser, leipzig: Weidmann 1798 (ASKB 1113). —— Epiktets Haandbog, trans. and ed. by engelbert Boye, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1781 (ASKB 1114). —— Epictets Haandbog. Forhen udgiven paa græsk nu efter den græske Udgave paa dansk oversat og oplyst med Anmærkninger og Forelæsninger over enkelte Steder, trans. by. l. sahl, Copenhagen: p.m. høpffner 1785 (ASKB a i 156). [theophrastus], Theophrasti Characteres Epicteti manuale et Cebetis Thebani Tabula, editio stereotypa nova, leipzig: tauchnitz 1829 (ASKB 1205). [seneca, lucius anneus], L. Annaei Senecae philosophi Opera omnia. Ad optimorum librorum fidem accurate edita, vols. 1–5, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1832 (ASKB 1275–1279). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Stoics adler, adolph peter, Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, p. 42 (ASKB 383).

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Ast, Friedrich, “Stoicismus,” in his Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie, landshut: Joseph thomann 1807, pp. 137–45 (ASKB 385). hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 110, note (ASKB 534). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, p. 147; vol. 2, p. 286; vol. 4, pp. 221–2; pp. 245–6; p. 250; p. 262; p. 323; p. 441; vol. 7, p. 47 (ASKB 536–544). [hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich], Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Johann schulze, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), pp. 152–4 (ASKB 550). —— “Philosophie der Stoiker,” in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, pp. 429–473 (ASKB 557–559). —— Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 187; pp. 274–75; p. 312 (ASKB 564–565). [herder, Johann gottfried von], Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Philosophie und Geschichte, vols. 1–22, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 16, p. 29 (asKB 1695–1705; see also ASKB a i 114–124). Jäger, Josef nikolaus, Moral-Philosophie, vienna: heubner 1839, pp. 51–3 (ASKB 582). [leibniz, gottfried Wilhelm], God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera philosophica, quæ exstant latina gallica germanica omnia, vols. 1–2, ed. by Johann eduard erdmann, Berlin: [eichler] 1839–40, p. 482; p. 571; p. 600 (ASKB 620). martensen, hans lassen, Den christelige Dogmatik, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849, p. 163 (ASKB 653). michelet, Carl ludwig, Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes, Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1841, p. 41 (ASKB 680). [Møller, Poul Martin], “Stoa,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen taarup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 2, pp. 515–22 (ASKB 1574–1576). [montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99, vol. 1, p. 4; p. 11; p. 87; vol. 3, p. 19; p. 25; p. 38; p. 46; p. 219; p. 236; p. 338; p. 372; p. 413; p. 419; p. 435; p. 480; pp. 518–19; p. 545; vol. 4, p. 113; p. 136; p. 287; vol. 5, p. 66; p. 485; vol. 6, p. 120; p. 241; p. 302; p. 360 (ASKB 681– 687). mynster, Jakob peter, Den hedenske Verden ved Christendommens Begyndelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1850, pp. 35–7; p. 43 (ASKB 693).

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ritter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: perthes 1836–39, vol. 3, pp. 511–735; vol. 4, pp. 188–202 (ASKB 735–738). ritter, heinrich and l. preller, Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 350–95; pp. 437–52 (ASKB 726). [schlegel, Friedrich], Friedrich Schlegel’s Philosophische Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1804 bis 1806. Nebst Fragmenten vorzüglich philosophisch-theologischen Inhalts. Aus dem Nachlaß des Verewigten, ed. by C.h.J. Windischmann, vols. 1–2, Bonn: Weber 1836–37, vol. 1, pp. 391–7 (ASKB 768–768a). schmidt, W. adolf, Geschichte der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit im ersten Jahrhundert der Kaiserherrschaft und des Christenthums, Berlin: veit 1847, pp. 214–32 (ASKB 771). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, pp. 98ff.; vol. 2, p. 151; pp. 154–5; p. 158 (ASKB 773–773a). ——Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, pp. 50–4 (ASKB 774–775). Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, “Stoiker,” in his Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–11, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1798–1819, vol. 5, 140–82 (ASKB 815–826). tiedemann, d.[ietrich], Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 2, pp. 429ff. (ASKB 836–841). trendelenburg, adolf, Logische Untersuchungen, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1840, vol. 1, p. 315 (ASKB 843). —— “Die Stoiker,” in his Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. Bethge 1846–55, vol. 1, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Zwei Abhandlungen, 1846, pp. 217–32 (ASKB 848) [vol. 2, 1855 not in ASKB]. Wirth, Johann Ulrich, “Lehre der Stoiker,” in his Die speculative Idee Gottes und die damit zusammenhängenden Probleme der Philosophie. Eine kritischdogmatische Untersuchung, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1845, pp. 183–7 (ASKB 876). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to the Stoics Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard on ‘The Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46. Furtak, Rick Anthony, “The Virtues of Authenticity,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 43, 2003, pp. 423–38; pp. 425–7. —— Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, notre dame: university of notre dame press 2005, pp. 41–51; pp. 103–5. hannay, alastair, Kierkegaard, london: routledge 1982, pp. 22–7; pp. 237–40. —— Kierkegaard: A Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2001, pp. 109–15; pp. 172–3. malantschuk, gregor, Kierkegaard’s Thought, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1971, pp. 184–6.

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mooney, edward, Knights of Faith and Resignation, albany: state university of new York press 1991, pp. 49–56. roberts, robert C., “existence, emotion, and virtue: Classical themes in Kierkegaard,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon marino, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1998, pp. 177–206; pp. 184–203. rudd, anthony, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, oxford: Clarendon press 1993, pp. 3–4; pp. 166–9. shestov, lev, Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy, trans. by elinor hewitt, athens, ohio: ohio university press 1969, pp. 66–74; pp. 219–233.

part iii poets, dramatists, and historians

aeschylus: Kierkegaard and early greek tragedy Finn gredal Jensen

I. An Introduction to Greek Tragedy greek tragedy springs from the dionysiac cult. aristotle in his Poetics writes that tragedy originated from the dithyrambic choruses, and comedy from the phallic.1 the main characteristics in the development from cultic drama to drama proper are as follows: first, the abandonment of the chorus’ exclusively satyric character: it is no longer only dithyrambs in praise of dionysus, but also a celebration of the lives and achievements of other gods and heroes; second, the transition of the protagonist from being epic laudator of the events of others to himself representing the celebrated hero and reproducing his sufferings; and third, the introduction of a regular plot or action (δρᾶμα). “The number of actors was first increased to two by Aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue take the leading part in the play,” says Aristotle; “a third actor and scenery were due to Sophocles.2... discarding short stories and ludicrous diction, through its passing out of its satyric stage, tragedy assumed, though only at a late point in its progress, a tone of dignity; and its meter changed then from trochaic to iambic.”3 With the sole exception of aeschylus’ Persians,4 the surviving greek tragedies take their material from mythology, and the technical conventions are generally strictly adhered to; but this does not prevent the myths from being a general exemplification Poetics, Chapter 4, 1449a. apart from the chorus, consisting of up to 15 members, never more than three actors appeared on stage; therefore, the actors, always men, had to play more roles, which was made possible also by the use of masks and costumes. 3 Poetics, 1449a. aristotle translations here and in the following are from The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vols. 1–2, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, princeton: princeton university press 1984. aristotle is probably not right in assuming that tragedy developed from the satyr play. etymologically, though, tragedy (τραγῳδία) means “goat-song,” and the Satyr play was performed by actors dressed as the goat-like followers of dionysus. no original, primitive satyr play survives, but from classical times, where it always formed the last part of the tragic tetralogy, euripides’ Cyclops is extant, and so are fragments of, for instance, sophocles’ Trackers. 4 The Persians is unique in that it treats a contemporary historical theme. however, there are also earlier examples of this; for instance, we know that one of aeschylus’ predecessors, phrynichus, wrote a tragedy on the Capture of Miletus, and his Phoenician 1 2

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of fundamental problems such as the relations of humans to the divine, to each other and to themselves, their delusion, guilt, and atonement. the paradigmatic function of the myths can be seen in the sense that they, by enlarging the problems, in a paradoxical manner make them more real for the audience; moreover, it was difficult for the audience not to take a position on them, since as citizens of athens they had a duty to be present during the great dionysia where the performances took place.5 the issues which were presented to the public were universal. only rarely do the tragedies draw into doubt or comment on contemporary morality and religion.6 Tragedy is a ritual almost like a divine service and is rather a confirmation of the moral and religious conceptions which were dominant in the polis; but nonetheless, at the same time it has an educative function and becomes a forum of ethical debate when the audience is confronted with ideas which are supposed to be the occasion for self-examination.7 According to Aristotle’s well-known definition in the Poetics, tragedy is a representation of an action that by arousing pity (ἔλεος) and fear (φόβος) accomplishes a purgation (κάθαρσις) of such emotions.8 gotthold ephraim lessing (1729–81) took this to mean that the passions are transformed into virtues: “Da nähmlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten....”9 in Notebook 12, when quoting Aristotle’s definition, Kierkegaard refers to Lessing and then writes:

Women is presumably the model for The Persians. Cf. albin lesky, Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen, 3rd ed., göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1972, pp. 59–60. 5 in the theater of dionysus on the southern slope of the acropolis there was room for around 14,000 spectators, and the citizens had, as noted, a duty to attend. prisoners could leave jail, and compensation was given for lost working hours for those attending. presumably, entry was also allowed for metics and foreign guests; by contrast, it is still a matter of dispute to what extent, if at all, women and slaves participated. For the more technical aspects of theater, see in general margarete Bieber, The History of the Greek and Roman Theater, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1961. 6 as when euripides makes use of ideas of the sophists or, for example, with The Trojan Women seems to protest against the harsh treatment of the island of melos, the ἀνδραποδισμός, shortly before; cf. thucydides, History of the Pelopponesian War, 5.84– 116. 7 in the ἀγών of The Frogs, aristophanes lets euripides respond that a poet ought to be admired “for cleverness and giving good advice (δεξιότητος καὶ νουθεσίας [ἕνεκα]), since we [the tragedians] make people better in the cities” (vv. 1009–10). In fact, the function of comedy is the same, only the angle of attack is different; it is a social satire and chastises the vices of the citizens by holding up a mirror for the spectators. 8 Poetics, 1449b 24–28: ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας, δι᾿ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. 9 g.e. lessing, Hamburgische Dramaturgie (1767–69), Chapter 78. i quote from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s sämmtliche Schriften, vols. 1–32, Berlin: in der vossischen Buchhandlung 1825–28, vol. 25, p. 188 (ASKB 1742–1762).

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I believe this to mean that by means of pity and fear...tragedy effects the purification of these by ennobling the sympathies. as egoistical determinants ἔλεος and φόβος are the conditions for making an aesthetic impression....generally speaking, this is the calming effect produced by the aesthetic, not through the thought that others suffer more but through the loss of oneself in contemplation of the aesthetic itself, of the aesthetic suffering.10

Kierkegaard’s aristotelian studies in Notebook 12 are later developed particularly in Either/Or in his essay, “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama.”11 In the modern tradition—here I will confine myself to emphasizing two central german scholars, schadewaldt and pohlenz—Wolfgang schadewaldt (1900–74) opposed lessing’s moral philanthropic interpretation by describing ἔλεος and φόβος as Elementaraffekte, elementary passions.12 these natural human, violent affectations release a specific “desire” (ἡδονή) in the audience (art and poetry are “pleasurable,” since they are aesthetic in the sense that they are the object of sensual perception, αἴσθησις). in connection with tragedy there is unfolded, on the one hand, a desire to lament over an incomprehensible suffering caused by fate or the Nemesis of unpredictable gods, and, on the other, a “primal fear” or desire to shock by means of the divine or daimonic, or perhaps rather in a general sense a shuddering over the irrational—it would be fitting to add: exactly all “the terrible,” τὰ δεινά, that the chorus sings of in the first stasimon of Sophocles’ Antigone. man’s desire for fellowship and socializing in the polis aims collectively-eudaimonically at ensuring the survival of society against the forces which threaten human beings from within and without; χάος and φύσις must yield to κόσμος, εὐνομία, and civilization. the accomplishment or completion of the two mentioned fundamental experiences or primal drives must be precisely κάθαρσις. In response to Schadewaldt’s “Furcht und Mitleid?,” Max Pohlenz (1872–1962) presented more reasonable results with respect to the immediate, moral quality of ἔλεος.13 the most important observation in this context is that ἔλεος does not need to be merely a feeling but also contains the impulse to an action, with the suffering fellow human being as object. pohlenz explains: “Der ἔλεος ist nicht eine Gefühlsregung, die sich isoliert in der Seele des einen Menschen abspielt; er SKS 19, 376, not12:9 / JP 4, 4826. SKS 2, 137–62 / EO1, 137–64; see also § 5 of “Letter to the Reader,” in Stages on Life’s Way, SKS 6, 420–9 / SLW, 454–65, particularly SKS 6, 425ff. / SLW, 460ff. Below, i will shortly touch upon some points in Kierkegaard’s analysis of Antigone since these points are of general significance, but regarding the essay in Either/Or, i refer to the article on sophocles in the present volume. In general, see also Karsten Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46. 12 Wolfgang schadewaldt, “Furcht und mitleid? zur deutung des aristotelischen Tragödiensatzes,” Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, vol. 83, 1955, pp. 129–71 (reprinted in schadewaldt, Hellas und Hesperien. Gesammelte Schriften zur Antike und zur neueren Literatur, zürich and stuttgart: artemis verlag 1960, pp. 346–88). 13 Max Pohlenz, “Furcht und Mitleid? Ein Nachwort,” Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, vol. 84, 1956, pp. 49–74; on ἔλεος (pity), see especially pp. 51–60. 10 11

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stellt seinem Wesen nach einen Kontakt von Mensch zu Mensch her.”14 here he thus presupposes a συμπάθεια, a sympathetic relation to the suffering of another, and in this sense ἔλεος is moral and the translation “pity” is fully justified; an amoral, elementary passion or drive such as “wailing” or the like, by contrast, designates an isolated, irrational phenomenon in the individual soul.15 aristotle, in the Rhetoric, treats pity and fear in a psychagogical respect, seeing them as means by which the speaker influences the souls of his audience, and also here it is clear that pity has a moral quality.16 Here pity is defined in the following manner: “Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain [λύπη] at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls

ibid., p. 52. however, in the twentieth century the main tendency was a psychological, more or less “medical” interpretation. The medical parallel results in the genitive τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων being understood not as an objective genitive as, for example, by lessing, but as a separative: a purging of the soul of “such feelings,” including ἔλεος and φόβος, more or less like a separation of an illness from the body. the medical approach to the problem is treated thoroughly by hellmut Flashar in his “die medizinischen grundlagen der lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik,” Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, vol. 84, 1956, pp. 12–48; see, for example, also teddy Brunius, Inspiration and Katharsis: The Interpretation of Aristotle’s The Poetics VI, 1449b 26, uppsala: almqvist & Wiksell 1966, Chapter 11 on epidaurus and κάθαρσις. the two παθήματα are, in other words, evils which the soul must be freed from (or if nothing else, must be freed from the harmful excess), and against this background it is reasonable to assume that this liberation is accompanied by a special feeling of desire or pleasure, ἡδονή. most interpretations take for granted that the purging, whatever it is, takes place in the spectator; by contrast, one finds a different approach in, for example, Gerald F. Else, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1957, according to which κάθαρσις is a process in the very structure and plot of the drama. drama is not merely a text or mere “literature”; more or less like a musical score, the text only becomes reality when it is (re)produced and experienced. therefore one should perhaps rather express it thus that pity, fear and purging do not take place in the spectator alone, but first in the inspired poet and then in the context of the performance as a whole. this also seems to be Brunius’ conclusion, Inspiration and Katharsis, p. 59: “so katharsis is a characteristic in connection with pity and fear and it can be found in oedipus, in sophocles, in the actor, in the actions on the stage, in the spoken words, and in the public.” At the same time this conclusion is the logical consequence of the “magnetic” theory of communication: the poetic μανία or ἐνθουσιασμός, which in plato’s Ion is explained as a so-called magnetism, is propagated from the god to the poet, the “interpreter of the god,” and from the mediator, be it rhapsodist or actor, to the “outer ring,” the listener or spectator. on this, see, for instance, Brunius, Inspiration and Katharsis. the theory can be more thoroughly illuminated especially with plato’s Phaedrus, 265b (cf. generally 244a ff.), where four forms of μανία are distinguished: (1) prophetic or mantic, (2) telestic or cathartic (as expressed in the rites of the mysteries), (3) poetic, and (4) erotic madness. in general, see also e.r. dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley and los angeles: University of California Press 1951 or later, Chapter 3, “The Blessings of Madness.” 16 aristotle had adopted the idea that the speaker should effect the auditor’s soul in order to evoke a judgment or opinion (cf., especially, plato’s Phaedrus). in addition to the argumentation or λόγος, the persuasion depends on the speaker’s own character (ἦθος) and the auditor’s πάθη (including pity and fear), which aristotle describes in the Rhetoric, Book 2. 14 15

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one who does not deserve it [τοῦ ἀναξίου], and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon.”17 the question of guilt (ἁμαρτία) is of course essential, since guilt is the central object of pity.18 although to some extent misunderstanding the ancient concept of guilt, Kierkegaard, in his analysis in Either/Or, is right in seeing this as a universal human condition, also from the greek point of view.19 Naturally, it is not “sin” in a Christian sense—although later paul, in the new testament, actually uses the very same word, ἁμαρτία—and not even just a moral “sin” as assumed by Lessing.20 it is more than that. note well the passage quoted from the Rhetoric: “an apparent evil...which befalls one who does not deserve it.” First of all, it is decisive for the communication of a tragedy’s ethical message that the spectator identify with the tragic hero’s suffering,21 in order thereby to be able to experience the problems presented as something which refers to and enters into the spectator’s own existence. actually, the word πάθος merely designates that one is passively exposed to something; but in the nature of the case the suffering must be violent: it should be “an action of a destructive or painful nature” (πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά).22 that the suffering, the pain which overtakes the hero, should best be undeserved, is already evident from the element τοῦ ἀναξίου of the aforementioned ἔλεος definition;23 but in the Poetics, Chapter 13, aristotle makes the point of view and the exact context with the tragic ἁμαρτία more precise. First, he emphasizes that the tragic hero should not be morally perfect, or as he writes, ἐπιεικής, since this would not evoke pity and fear but would only be repulsive (μιαρόν).24 similarly, the hero should not be a bad person who passes from bad fortune to good, or the Rhetoric, 1385b 13–16. one could add that later the stoics, not surprisingly, in an aristotelian spirit categorize ἔλεος as a secondary passion (πάθος) to λύπη, one of the four main passions which zeno posited: ἐπιθυμία, φόβος, λύπη, and ἡδονή (see, for example, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vols. 1–4, ed. by hans von arnim, leipzig: B.g. teubner 1903–24 or later, vol. 3: Chrysippi fragmenta moralia. Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi, 1903, p. 92, no. 378; cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.110ff.); the two first mentioned passions concern the future, and the last two are directed to the present. more or less like aristotle, the stoics define ἔλεος as a λύπη “as for someone who has undeservedly suffered pain” (ὡς ἐπ᾿ ἀναξίως κακοπαθοῦντι, diogenes laertius, 7.111). 18 the concept of guilt (ἁμαρτία) is treated by aristotle in the Poetics, Chapter 13. see further, for example, Kurt von Fritz, “tragische schuld und poetische gerechtigkeit in der griechischen Tragödie,” Studium Generale. Zeitschrift für die Einheit der Wissenschaften im Zusammenhang ihrer Begriffsbildungen und Forschungsmethoden, vol. 8, heft 3 and 4, 1955, pp. 194–237; reprinted in K. von Fritz, Antike und moderne Tragödie. Neun Abhandlungen, Berlin: Walter de gruyter 1962, pp. 1–112. 19 Edith Hall, in her essay, “The Sociology of Athenian Tragedy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy, ed. by p.e. easterling, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1997, p. 94, briefly mentions Kierkegaard as the one giving the universal significance of tragedy its definitive expression. 20 Hamburgische Dramaturgie, Chapter 82. 21 Poetics, 1452b 9ff. 22 Poetics, 1452b 11–12. 23 Rhetoric, 1385b 14. 24 Poetics, 1452b 34–6. 17

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opposite.25 almost by analogy with his ethical μεσότης aristotle now gives the following answer: the hero should be a person “in the middle” (ὁ μεταξύ).26 the element ἀνάξιος from the Rhetoric is found again in the Poetics, where concerning ἔλεος he says that this feeling is valid for the undeservedly unhappy person (περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστι δυστυχοῦντα).27 therefore, it might be surprising that aristotle right after this introduces the apparently moral concept ἁμαρτία when he describes more precisely the hero “in the middle”: such a person should neither be different with respect to virtue and justice or be struck by a misfortune due to evil or badness, but due to a ἁμαρτία.28 as examples of intermediate heroes of this kind he mentions oedipus and thyestes. thus, the hero should not be an ideal but a fallible human being; what is decisive is namely that the audience can identify with the suffering hero, and therefore he must be a person just like the spectator himself. immediately after this follows the problematic statement that the best peripeteia should be from happiness to unhappiness and that this shift must not be due to badness, but to a great ἁμαρτία—either in a person like the one described (that is, someone like us) or in someone who is better rather than worse: ...δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην, ἢ οἵου εἴρηται [sc. ὁμοίου], ἢ βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος.29 how can this statement be made consistent with the desirable imperfection or socalled “tragic flaw” in the character of the hero? The whole thing must of course depend on what exactly one should understand by the concept ἁμαρτία and the qualitative determination ἀνάξιος. the basic meaning of ἁμαρτία is “error,” and the corresponding verb ἁμαρτάνειν means “to make a mistake,” “to commit an error.” There can hardly be any doubt that ἁμαρτία later developed into an unambiguously moral concept, which is the case especially in the new testament where it is identified with “sin.” But in a classical context it is more ambiguous. For instance, oedipus suffers not due to moral badness (either in the past or present), but only due to a great ἁμαρτία,30 and this ἁμαρτία he has brought on himself in the ignorance of the murder of his father and incest with his mother. the error sets off a causality whereby someone suffers injustice or injury, and he who suffers in tragedy should preferably be the hero himself who has committed an offence. This does not mean necessarily that the suffering is “self-inflicted”; on the contrary, guilt—in Kierkegaard’s words—can also be a “hereditary guilt,” as one finds it precisely in Sophocles’ treatment of the Theban cycle of legends.31 the tragic Poetics, 1452b 36–1453a 4. Poetics, 1453a 7. 27 Poetics, 1453a 4. 28 Poetics, 1453a 7–10. 29 Poetics, 1453a 15–17. 30 Poetics, 1453a 15–16. 31 SKS 2, 149.24–32 / EO1, 150: “in other words, tragic guilt is more than just subjective guilt—it is hereditary guilt; but hereditary guilt, like hereditary sin, is a substantial category, and it is precisely this substantiality that makes the sorrow more profound. the ever admired trilogy of sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus the King, and Antigone, hinges essentially on this genuine tragic interest. But hereditary guilt involves the contradiction of being guilt and yet not being guilt. The bond by which the individual becomes guilty is precisely filial piety, but the guilt that it thereby incurs has every possible aesthetic amphiboly.” 25 26

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guilt’s “aesthetic” ambiguity, according to Kierkegaard, concerns the fact that this guilt is “an intermediary thing between action and suffering” because it is unclear whether the hero (with his own “free” action) is to blame for his fate, or whether the fate is to blame for his suffering; this uncertainty is actually a condition for pity.32 Guilt expresses itself unreflectively as grief rather than ethically-individually as reflected pain. Especially in Antigone, Kierkegaard’s favorite example, this element of innocence is found because as an individual she enters into an “objective dialectic” with the family and participates in the guilt of the father.33 But which deterministic forces are at play here? Kierkegaard expresses it in this way: it is not an individual who goes under, but a little world; it is the objective grief, unloosed, that now strides ahead, like a force of nature, in its own terrible consistency, and Antigone’s sad fate is like the echo of her father’s, an intensified sorrow. Therefore, when Antigone, in defiance of the king’s injunction, decides to bury her brother, we see in this not so much a free act as a fateful necessity, which visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children. there is indeed enough freedom in it to enable us to love antigone for her sisterly love, but in the inevitability of fate there is also a higher refrain, as it were, that encompasses not only oedipus’ life but also his family.34

perhaps one should with Kierkegaard (vigilius haufniensis in The Concept of Anxiety) call the Greek fatalism an “anxiety for nothing,” since one relates merely to an unknown future, and the cult of the oracle is an institutionalization of this anxiety of fate.35 greek fate is, one should note, a “unity of necessity and the accidental. this is ingeniously expressed in the saying, fate is blind, for he who walks forward blindly walks as much by necessity as by accident.”36 But the tragic hero can also be ἀνάξιος, even if there is not any instance of ignorance. this is, for example, the case with orestes and antigone, who are both fully aware of their ἁμαρτία, respectively the matricide and the defiance of Creon’s prohibition. in aeschylus’ Oresteia, orestes is acquitted of guilt, and his suffering (the pursuit by the Furies) was undeserved because he was not subjectively responsible

SKS 2, 143.30ff. / EO1, 144. SKS 2, 158 / EO1, 159–60. Kierkegaard refers also to the organism idea of 1 Cor 12:26: “If one member suffers, all suffer together with it” (SKS 2, 158.21–2 / EO1, 160); cf. also rom 12:4–5 on the congregation, or in a stoic context, for example, seneca, Epist. mor. 95.52 (membra sumus corporis magni) and marcus aurelius, 7.13 (τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος). the further implications of this idea (among others, the idea of equality) are, however, not relevant here where sophocles speaks concretely, and not in a wider sense of “family.” On original sin and participation, compare also The Concept of Anxiety. 34 SKS 2, 155.5–15 / EO1, 156; cf. SKS 2, 154.20–155.4 / EO1, 155–6: “[the father’s unfortunate fate] rests like an impregnable sorrow on the whole family....What provides the tragic interest in the greek sense is that oedipus’ sad fate resonates in the brother’s unfortunate death, in the sister’s conflict with a specific human injunction; it is, as it were, the afterpains, Oedipus’ tragic fate, spreading out into each branch of his family.” 35 See the section “Anxiety Defined Dialectically as Fate,” in The Concept of Anxiety, SKS 4, 399–400 / CA, 96–7. 36 SKS 4, 400.8–11 / CA, 97. 32 33

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for his great ἁμαρτία, the matricide, which he was ordered to do by apollo.37 the theory of nemesis, the notion of divine envy and punishment, as we know it especially from herodotus, but also from aeschylus himself (for example, Xerxes’ hybris in The Persians), does not really come out here: why should athena acquit orestes if she was “jealous” that he got away happily from his venture? Human beings can be deceived by fate, but, according to aeschylus, not by the gods, who, on the contrary, are guarantors of justice, whose highest maintainer is zeus.38 only a subjective ἁμαρτία, a moral error as manifestation of injustice should thus be punished; but orestes is subjectively innocent, and therefore he is acquitted.39 according to aeschylus, suffering or punishment apparently presupposes a personal responsibility.40 in the case of sophocles’ Antigone, it is Creon’s hubristic prohibition which is the outer occasion for the hegelian Entzweiung: the sharp conflict between equally justified moral values in the relations of human law–divine law, state–family, man–woman.41 here orestes’ action can be defended by the claim that he personally (and on behalf of the god) had to avenge himself because a collective order of justice was not established. What is decisive in the trilogy is, moreover, aeschylus’ transgression of the traditional personal ius talionis to the advantage of the city-state’s εὐνομία, cf. below section ii. 38 on aeschylus’ view of religion and justice in general, see, for instance, hugh lloydJones, The Justice of Zeus, Berkeley: university of California press 1971, Chapter 4. 39 a.B. drachmann (1860–1935), also known as co-editor of Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker, says in his essay, “Skyld og Nemesis hos Æschylus,” in Udvalgte Afhandlinger, Copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal 1911, pp. 9–37; p. 29: “in the theory of nemesis the demand is an aesthetic one: that fortune and misfortune should be equally distributed, that the general harmony should not be broken by disturbing exceptions. in aeschylus the demand is ethical: that the just principle which demands punishment for blame should take place to the fullest.” In general, see also Drachmann’s “Hovedtræk af græsk Religiøsitet,” in his Udvalgte Afhandlinger, pp. 38–54, and “Æschylus’s Dramaturgie,” Nordisk Tidsskrift for Filologi, 3rd series, vol. 2, ed. by Karl hude et al., Copenhagen: gyldendal 1893–94, pp. 145–68. 40 this harmonizes well with a much earlier statement, namely, the Odyssey, 1.32–4, where zeus himself appears to be disposed to solve the theodicy problem: “look you now, how ready mortals are to blame the gods. it is from us, they say, that evils come, but they even of themselves, through their own blind folly, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained [σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον].” Translation from Homer, The Odyssey, vol. 1, trans. by a.t. murray, 2nd ed., revised by george e. dimock, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1995 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 104); μόρος in v. 34 means “fate,” and ἀτασθαλίαι refer to voluntary sins; cf. the analysis of these verses by a.W.h. adkins in Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, oxford: Clarendon press 1960, pp. 24–5, where one reads, inter alia: “...his [zeus’] denial entails that a man may not blame the gods for his moral error when he is likely to be punished for it. that is to say, if he pursues a desirable end, an agathon, qua agathon, and this in the long run proves to be a kakon...it is his fault and no one else’s.” 41 these oppositions are juxtaposed in Phänomenologie des Geistes; g.W.F. hegel, Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe in 20 Bänden, ed. by hermann glockner, stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann verlag 1928–41, vol. 2, pp. 340ff. g.W.F. hegel (1770–1831) believed that the morality of the family comes to expression most clearly in the relation between sister and brother, and especially in the case of death; he claimed, in the words of the danish philologist Carsten høeg, “that the action which to the highest degree realizes the moral law within the sphere of family life is valid for the dead, since only they are raised above individual 37

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the foundation is laid for the collision or ἀγών.42 For hegel one should note that the conflict is between equally justified moral values.43 in Antigone this opposition concerns not least the state (moral life in general) vis-à-vis the family (the natural Sittlichkeit), or more precisely, the familial φιλία.44 in what, then, does the tragic consist? it consists above all in the fact that antigone is ἀνάξια, because she has acquired her ἁμαρτία without moral badness. her suffering is due to her piety, εὐσέβεια (cf. vv. 942–3); but the suffering is above all moral, since antigone does not know whether she is right, and one can thus say that she in a sense acts in “ignorance” about her ἁμαρτία. Human beings ultimately have no influence on the causality or the objective course of the world of which suffering forms a part, and which is set into motion by higher powers, be that “the gods” or “fate”; what name one puts on it is not decisive, since the main thing is that this higher context is beyond human understanding. When a human being suffers, he should not ask (like Job in the old testament) whether his suffering is justified or why, but he should take the blame and the suffering upon himself. the tragic concerns something fundamentally existential: that human beings through suffering should relate to what it means to be human, or as the words of Delphi say, “Know thyself,” that is, know one’s natural place in the world order. But nevertheless a general picture of the basic purpose of tragedy is clear: that the spectator as human being should learn to fear fate, or more precisely, to control anxiety of the unknown and what is irrational from a human perspective, and that the spectator should learn to feel pity for the person who suffers from fate. the latter element, pity, is moral because the spectator relates to a foreign suffering. Both when it concerns fear and pity, appropriation is promoted by the tragedian constantly portraying the greatness in suffering. tragedy has an immediate mental existence, and that the action with which one unites one’s kinsman with the bowels of the earth realizes the highest divine law.” Carsten Høeg, Sofokles’ Antigone og eftertiden, Copenhagen: Branner og Korch 1949 (Studier fra Sprog- og Oldtidsforskning, vol. 211), p. 13. 42 “La tragédie d’Antigone touche à ce que...on peut appeler le fond agonistique de l’épreuve humaine,” says Paul Ricœur in Soi-même comme un autre, paris: seuil 1990, p. 283. see his analysis of Antigone, ibid., pp. 281–90 (“Le tragique de l’action”). 43 hegel says in general about the tragic: “the original essence of tragedy consists then in the fact that within such a conflict each of the opposed sides, if taken by itself, has justification; while each can establish the true and positive content of its own aim and character only by denying and infringing the equally justified power of the other. The consequence is that in its moral life, and because of it, each is nevertheless involved in guilt.” Hegel, Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, in Jubiläumsausgabe, vol. 14, p. 529; translation from Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, vols. 1–2, trans. by t.m. Knox, oxford: Clarendon press 1975, vol. 2, p. 1196. 44 Cf. Philosophie des Rechts, § 166, according to which the woman has her place in the family and the private, moral sphere, while the law of the state is the sphere of the man; cf. hegel, Jubiläumsausgabe, vol. 7, pp. 246–7; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. by allen W. Wood, trans. by h.B. nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1991, pp. 206–7. the most interesting thing in Antigone is maybe the two main characters’ different interpretations of φιλία; this general approach to sophocles has been taken by mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1989, Chapter 4 on Antigone. Of particular significance in this connection is the understanding of antigone’s statement in v. 523: οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν (“It is not my nature to join in hate, but in love”).

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or psychological effect in the context of the production, where the spectator, by means of identification, lives through the two “primal drives” which steer existence; but the ethical-religious function is a broader one that extends beyond the theater: a hopefully deeper understanding of what it means—from the perspective of that age—to be human. II. The Tragedies of Aeschylus: An Overview The three great tragedians of fifth-century Greece were Aeschylus, Sophocles, and euripides.45 aeschylus was the oldest of the three; he was born 525/524 bc in eleusis and died 456/455 in gela on a journey to sicily. after his death the prohibition against repeat performances was repealed in his case (otherwise, plays could be performed only once). he probably made his debut as early as 499 bc. His first victory in a dramatic contest was in 484 bc, and later he won twelve times. in antiquity, between 70 and 90 plays were ascribed to him. the seven extant tragedies of aeschylus are the following: The Persians, The Seven Against Thebes, The Suppliants, the Oresteia trilogy (Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides), and Prometheus Bound. in addition to this there are the surviving fragments.46 aeschylus is an exponent of traditional greek piety and morality, but new ideas are also unfolded. the epitaph on aeschylus’ grave states that he fought at marathon; one can thus say that he was not short of personal experience about the persian Wars when he wrote his drama The Persians (472 bc), which, as already mentioned, is the only extant greek tragedy with a contemporary historical theme, but also the oldest one preserved. the distance from everyday life is established by removing the action to a nebulous place, the persian capital susa, whose character aeschylus could hardly have had any knowledge about; the gaps he fills in with fantasy. The description of the enemy’s deep sorrow and humiliation, the greatness and triumph of hellas and especially athens is emphasized (see especially the messenger’s report). As in Herodotus, the defining theme is the Persians’ hybris, but in aeschylus one senses a greater respect for the barbarian enemies because the presentation creates sympathy with their total defeat and unhappiness. The Seven Against Thebes (467 bc) is the last tragedy in a trilogy about the Theban cycle of legends (the first two lost tragedies being Laius and Oedipus) and portrays the conflict between Oedipus’ two sons Eteocles and Polyneices. The Suppliants (c. 463 bc) was the first tragedy in a trilogy about the Danaids, the 50 daughters of Danaus, the conflict being their refusal to marry their 50 cousins, the sons of aigyptus. the theme of the tragedy is the treatment of people in distress, the friendly reception and protection of strangers. When danaus and his daughters seek asylum in argus, King pelasgus, after having consulted the assembly, chooses among the more recent monographs on aeschylus, i recommend thomas g. rosenmeyer, The Art of Aeschylus, Berkeley, los angeles, london: university of California press 1982. on sophocles and euripides, see the separate articles in the present volume. 46 Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, vols. 1–5, ed. by Bruno snell, richard Kannicht, and stefan radt, göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1971–2004; the fragments of aeschylus are found in vol. 3, 1985. 45

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to protect them against the pursuing egyptians, although he risks war by doing so. the continuation of the trilogy, The Egyptians and The Danaids, has unfortunately not survived, but, according to the myth, the egyptian husbands later receive a rough treatment. Prometheus Bound treats the punishment of the Titan who gave fire and brought culture to mankind. the year of the performance of this tragedy is unknown, and apart from this, its authenticity is disputed. the Oresteia (458 bc) is the only surviving tragic trilogy from antiquity (although its accompanying satyr play Proteus has been lost). in the Oresteia we meet the traditional conception of justice in the form of lex talionis, the principle of retaliation, but at the same time one sees a modification of it, a wish to put something else in the place of the endless chain of retribution and blood vengeance.47 in opposition to the ancient blood vengeance (symbolized by the avenging spirits, the chthonic elemental forces) stands the new conception of justice, an idea of the possibility of reconciliation: the thought that in human life there should be room for mercy and grace (χάρις) as a counterweight to the hard, often blindly punishing justice. The first part of the trilogy, Agamemnon, ends with Clytemnestra’s mocking and gloating over the murdered king; her sneaky misdeed was revenge for the sacrifice of Iphigenia, and also for her husband’s infidelity with Cassandra, whom she then also has murdered. For aegisthus, the lover and accomplice, it is primarily a matter of evening the score for a previously committed injustice in the family. in The LibationBearers (or Choephoroe), orestes, prompted by apollo, electra, and the chorus, takes revenge for his father by killing aegisthus and his mother. the murder of one’s own flesh and blood is a deed which compels the Erinyes (Furies) to come into action; like blood-thirsty hounds, the goddesses of vengeance pursue orestes at the beginning of the third part, The Eumenides, when he seeks refuge under the protection of apollo at delphi.48 apollo feels compassion for him and cleanses him of guilt with a magic ritual (after all, the murder took place at apollo’s prompting). the rest of the action is moved to the areopagus in athens where athena calls in judges in order to determine the question of guilt.49 apollo here pleads that the murder of a mother is actually not murder of a blood-relation—a highly dubious “genetic” argument from today’s perspective, but understandable with reference to athena’s example since she was, as is well known, born from her father’s forehead. thus, here the “patriarchal” view wins out. At the later counting of votes, Athena’s vote for in The Libation-Bearers, vv. 309–14, the chorus says: “ ‘For a word of hate let a word of hate be said,’ Justice cries out as she exacts the debt, ‘and for a murderous stroke let a murderous stroke be paid.’ ‘Let it be done to him as he does,’ says the age-old wisdom.” here and in the following i quote from the prose translations in Aeschylus, vols. 1–2, trans. by herbert Weir smyth, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1926 or later (Loeb Classical Library, vols. 145–6). the “age-old wisdom” (τριγέρων μῦθος) is synonymous with the principle of retaliation; cf. albrecht dihle, Die goldene Regel. Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1962, p. 14. 48 the theme of seeking asylum is the same as in The Suppliants. 49 it is worth noting that athena has called in citizens of athens as judges; in other words, it is the ordered society or the state which should administer justice and punishment, even though the divine, here athena, has the decisive vote. 47

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acquittal is decisive, and, cleansed of guilt, orestes can return to argus. the erinyes, of course, cannot be satisfied with a solution of this kind, and Athena must appease them by dedicating a sanctuary to them. they are now changed into the Eumenides, the benevolently disposed or merciful ones, who sing: χάρματα δ᾽ ἀντιδιδοῖεν / κοινοφιλεῖ διανοίᾳ, / καὶ στυγεῖν μιᾷ φρενί· / πολλῶν γὰρ τόδ᾽ ἐν βροτοῖς ἄκος (vv. 984ff.: “But may they return joy for joy in a spirit of common love, and may they hate with one mind; for this is the cure of many an evil in the world”). III. Kierkegaard’s Use of Aeschylus apparently, Kierkegaard was not familiar with greek tragedy from his time at the Borgerdyd school. according to headmaster michael nielsen’s (1776–1846) report to the university dated July 29, 1830, Kierkegaard listed 16 books of homer for his examination, and of Greek prose he listed “otherwise as no. 1” (that is, the same as edvard Julius anger (1813–95), the top student in the class): plato’s Crito and Euthyphro, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, herodotus’ Histories, Books 8 and 9, and the gospel of John.50 We cannot even be certain if at any time later he read aeschylus in greek. at the time of his death, Kierkegaard’s library contained only german and danish translations: in german, the second edition of Johann gustav droysen’s (1808–84) Des Aischylos Werke (Berlin 1842),51 and in danish two editions: peter oluf Brøndsted’s (1780–1842) translation of the Oresteia, published by niels vinding dorph (1783–1858) with the title Orestias, Trilogie af Æschylos (Copenhagen 1844),52 and n.v. dorph’s own translations, Æschylos’s Tragedier (Copenhagen 1854), which contain Prometheus Bound, The Persians, The Suppliants, and The Seven Against Thebes.53 nevertheless, it is possible that Kierkegaard borrowed aeschylus in greek from the university library or elsewhere, or, maybe less likely, Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, ed. by Bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 14–15 and 273. niels thulstrup’s version of this in B&A, vol. 1, pp. 4–5, is misleading since he has “reconstructed” a school testimony for Kierkegaard; without respect to the source, he makes a reference to the prose texts given for the examination by the top student of the class. on instruction in greek at the Borgerdyd school, see the general presentation in my article, “homer: Kierkegaard’s use of the Homeric Poems” (Section II, “Homer at the Borgerdyd School”) in the present volume. 51 Des Aischylos Werke, trans. by J.g. droysen, 2nd ed., Berlin: g. Bethge 1842 (ASKB 1046). 52 Orestias, Trilogie af Æschylos, trans. by p.o. Brøndsted, ed. by n.v. dorph, Copenhagen: samfundet til den danske literaturs Fremme 1844 (ASKB 1049). 53 Æschylos’s Tragedier. Prometheus, Perserne, De Bønfaldende, De Syv imod Thebe, 4 vols. in 2 installments, trans. by n.v. dorph, Copenhagen: samfundet til den danske literaturs Fremme 1854 (ASKB 1047–1048). the four tragedies in dorph’s translation have individual title pages (for instance, Den bundne Prometheus. Tragedie af Æschylos), but appeared in two installments, the first part containing Den bundne Prometheus and Perserne, and the second part containing De Bønfaldende and De Syv imod Thebe. each of the two installments has its own cover with the title, Æschylos’s Tragedier. Prometheus, Perserne, De Bønfaldende, De Syv imod Thebe, oversatte af N. V. Dorph, and with the subtitles “Første Hefte: Prometheus. Perserne” and “Andet Hefte: De Bønfaldende. De Syv imod Thebe,” respectively. 50

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that he got rid of a greek edition at some time before his death, or that such an edition was removed from his library before the book auction. as will appear in the following, we can be sure that he read aeschylus in at least the above-mentioned translations. First, i will treat the general references to aeschylus (section iii, a), afterwards the references to specific tragedies (Section III, B). It goes without saying that almost whenever Kierkegaard writes in general about greek tragedy, although he is mainly focused on sophocles, he might also have aeschylus in mind. in the following only the cases will be discussed where it is possible to determine with near certainty that he is thinking of aeschylus. A. General References to Aeschylus In general terms, Kierkegaard reflects upon Aeschylus in several places. The first occurrences date from the year 1842 and are found in the Journal JJ and Notebook 12, respectively. in the Journal JJ the main entry JJ:12, dated november 20, 1842, describes a collision: Plot. somebody publishes a novella. to divert attention from the historical features in it, he uses fictitious names. Fortune has it that he uses the name of an actual girl, whom many of the small traits fit. The girl in the story is portrayed in an unfavorable light. The actual girl is disgraced. the author can only save himself by admitting the truth. But he cannot. Collision.54

in the marginal addition that belongs to this entry, JJ:12.a, Kierkegaard mentions aeschylus in the following way: “aeschylus’s life could be the occasion for such a tragedy, since he unwittingly reveals the mysteries. / Cf. arist. Ethics 3, 2.”55 the reference is to a passage in Book 3 of aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics which discusses the circumstances relating to voluntary acts, and where aeschylus is held up as an example: “But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance people say ‘it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking,’ or ‘they did not know it was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said of the mysteries.”56 he was accused before the areopagus of having divulged the eleusian mysteries in certain of his tragedies, but was acquitted. on this occasion he may have said that it came to his mouth; in any case, the phrase became proverbial.57 From the same time dates Notebook 12, “Aesthetica,” begun on November 20, 1842, that is, the same day as the main entry JJ:12. in most of the entries of this small notebook, Kierkegaard is occupied with aristotle’s Poetics, which he studied both in SKS 18, 147–8, JJ:12 / KJN 2, 137. SKS 18, 147, JJ:12.a / KJN 2, 137. 56 Nicomachean Ethics, 1111a 8–10. 57 Cf. plato’s Republic, 563c. in his library, Kierkegaard had several editions of aristotle; possibly, he also read the explanatory note in Christian garve’s german translation, where the incident is explained, see Die Ethik des Aristoteles übersetzt und erläutert, vols. 1–2, Breslau: Wilhelm gottlieb Korn 1798–1801, vol. 2, p. 12 (ASKB 1082–1083); garve’s translation is quoted in SKS K18, p. 231. 54 55

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greek and in michael Conrad Curtius’ (1724–1802) annotated german translation.58 aeschylus is mentioned in the following context where Kierkegaard refers to Curtius, p. 101: “solon refused to let thespis perform tragedy in athens lest the athenians be seduced into untruth. thespis introduced one person. phrynichus brought feminine masks onto the stage; women never appeared. aeschylus, two persons. (dialogue?) Sophocles, three. (Situation?).”59 as far as aeschylus is concerned, aristotle says in his Poetics, Chapter 4, as mentioned before, that “the number of actors was first increased to two by aeschylus, who curtailed the business of the Chorus, and made the dialogue take the leading part in the play.”60 In Plutarch’s essay, “How a Man May Become Aware of His Progress in Virtue” (79e), we read that “aeschylus at the isthmian games was watching a boxing-match, and when one of the men was hit the crowd in the theater burst into a roar. aeschylus nudged ion of Chios, and said, ‘You see what a thing training is; the man who is hit says nothing; it is the spectators who shout.’ ”61 this anecdote Kierkegaard uses in Three Upbuilding Discourses (1844) in the following manner: “an ancient pagan poet, who was quite famous but now, advanced in years, harbored the thought that his time would soon be over, said to the blond youth who sat beside him watching the contest, ‘You see, my son, how it goes: the loser is silent, and the crowd jubilates.’ ”62 as already mentioned, the popularity of aeschylus’ plays resulted in the fact that it was allowed for them to be performed more than once; the general prohibition against repeat performances of tragedies is referred to in the journal entry nB8:72 from 1848, although Kierkegaard does not mention the elimination of the prohibition in the case of aeschylus.63 his fame also comes to expression in the way that he appears together with euripides in The Frogs by aristophanes (405 bc), which is the Aristoteles, Dichtkunst, ins Deutsche übersetzet, mit Anmerkungen, und besonderen Abhandlungen, versehen, ed. by m.C. Curtius, hannover: richter 1753 (ASKB 1094). 59 SKS 19, 376–7, not12:11 / JP 4, 4835. 60 Poetics, 1449a 15–18. 61 translation from Plutarch, vol. 12: Moralia, vol. 1, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1927 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 197). the anecdote is repeated in the essay, “how the Young Man Should Study Poetry,” where one reads, “Once when a boxer at the Isthmian games was struck in the face, and a clamour arose, aeschylus said, ‘What a thing is training. the onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says nothing.’ ” Plutarch then continues, “in like manner, when the poet says that when ajax appeared resplendent in his armour, the greeks rejoiced at seeing him, whereas ‘dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every trojan; / even hector himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,’ [Iliad, 7.214ff.] who could fail to admire the difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs, as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear for their king.” Moralia, 29f–30a (translation from the same Loeb volume). 62 SKS 5, 281.8–12 / EUD, 288; cf. Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen, trans. by J.F.s. Kaltwasser, vols. 1–5, Frankfurt am main: hermann 1783–1800, vol. 1, p. 258 (ASKB 1192– 1196). 63 “What a change! in the old days [antiquity] each drama was usually presented only once; now special performances are on a subscription basis. / now the presentation of a drama very frequently signifies (in contrast to the old days) that basically interest has passed from 58

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comedy thought of by Constantin Constantius in Repetition when talking of “a task for an apocalyptic author who has understood his Aristophanes...and his Lucian.”64 B. References to Specific Tragedies Now let us turn to Kierkegaard’s references, directly or indirectly, to specific tragedies of aeschylus. i will treat them chronologically and begin with The Persians, then The Seven Against Thebes, the Oresteia trilogy, and Prometheus Bound (whose date, however, is disputed). in conclusion, i will discuss the important Achilleis fragment. Kierkegaard does not seem to have occupied himself at all with The Suppliants. presumably, this is also the case with The Persians. When in Either/Or, in “the Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,” he lets the spectator shout, “Help yourself, and heaven will help you,” this is a well-known proverb, also in a danish context.65 however, since what is treated in his essay is greek tragedy, it is not impossible that he has in mind v. 742 of The Persians where the ghost of darius says: ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν σπεύδῃ τις αὐτὸς, χὠ θεὸς συνάπτεται, meaning “but when a man himself hastens, God too joins him.”66 this ambiguous line is rendered correctly by herbert Weir smyth, “nevertheless, when man hastens to his own undoing, the god too participates with him.” The eagerness in question here is of course negative: the hybris leading to destruction.67 in the Journal NB as well as in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, aeschylus’ The Seven Against Thebes is referred to, but only indirectly, when Kierkegaard mentions a passage in Book 2 of plato’s Republic where glaucon describes the perfectly just person as “a simple and noble man, who, in the phrase of Aeschylus, does not wish to seem but be good” (361b).68 this refers to the description of one of the seven, amphiaraus, in verses 592–4, which reads that “he does not wish to appear the bravest, but to be the bravest, as he harvests the fruit of his mind’s the poetry to other objects of attention: the staging, the actors, finally to the scene-painter, the scenery, the hairdresser, the seamstress.” SKS 21, 176, nB8:72 / JP 1, 165. 64 SKS 4, 53.12–15 / R, 182. The other “apocalyptic” work referred to here is Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead. 65 SKS 2, 148.32–3 / EO1, 149. see, for instance, Christian molbech, Danske Ordsprog, Tankesprog og Riimsprog, Copenhagen: thieles Bogtrykkeri 1850 (ASKB 1573), no. 1457: “Hielp dig selv, da hielper dig Gud.” 66 in droysen’s german translation, Des Aischylos Werke, this line of darius and the immediately preceding ones read: “Wehe! eilig kam Erfüllung aller Sprüche; meinem Sohn / Schleuderte Zeus der Gottverheißung Ende zu! Wohl glaubt, ich einst, / Fern in ferner Zeit vollenden würde sie der Götter Rath; / Aber wer sie selbst sich zeitigt, dem gesellt sich schnell der Gott.” (vv. 739–42; in Droysen vv. 725–8 on p. 256). 67 Compare to this the aeschylus Fragment 395: φιλεῖ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι συσπεύδειν θεός (“God likes to help the one who suffers”), Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, vol. 3, p. 437. This fragment is not found amongst Droysen’s “Verse aus unbekannten Tragödien,” Des Aischylos Werke, pp. 523–6. 68 trans. by paul shorey in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. by edith hamilton and huntington Cairns, princeton: princeton university press 1961.

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deep furrow, where his careful resolutions grow” (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναι θέλει, / βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος, / ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα). in the entry nB:13 from march 1846, Kierkegaard, at first, notes that his walking the streets will be regarded as eccentricity or vanity, and that according to the king’s advice to his son in shakespeare’s King Henry IV, Part I, public appearance ought to be avoided: By being seldom seen, i could not stir But like a comet i was wonder’d at; ... thus did i keep my person fresh and new; My presence, like a robe pontifical, ne’er seen but wonder’d at: and so my state, seldom but sumptuous, showed like a feast and won by rareness such solemnity.69

“Good Lord,” Kierkegaard says, “as if I were so stupid not to know that much selfexposure etc. simply reduces one’s importance, that men love the illusion involved in keeping concealed—for then one must be somebody.”70 he, on the contrary, decided to do the imprudent thing and disdain the appearance of being somebody, which socrates develops so beautifully in the Republic, saying that one ought to shun the appearance of being good. But that all this in the service of the idea, is my highest interest, my artistic exertion in order to sustain my productivity...ah, yes, who of those who think about it will not say that it is foolishness or a lie! never mind, all the greater my art.71

apart from the fact that he wrongly ascribes the speech to socrates, Kierkegaard then indirectly refers to aeschylus, and this is also the case when in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits the following year, 1847, he speaks of socrates in this manner: “But in ancient times there was also a simple wise man whose simplicity became a trap for the quibbling of the brazen; he taught that in order to be really sure that it was the good that one willed, one should avoid even appearing to be good—presumably lest the reward should become tempting.”72

69 King Henry IV, Part I, act 3, scene 2. Kierkegaard presumably read shakespeare in the german translation by august Wilhelm von schlegel and ludwig tieck (Dramatische Werke, vols. 1–12, Berlin: g. reimer 1839, ASKB 1883–1888), but he also had other translation editions both in german and danish. 70 SKS 20, 24.10–13, nB:13 / JP 5, 5892. Compare to this also, for instance, The Sickness unto Death, SKS 11, 227.26–7 / SUD, 115: “keeping himself hidden, as the upper class [Fornemhed] usually does.” 71 SKS 20, 24.18–22, nB:13 / JP 5, 5892. in the margin Kierkegaard added, “(the passage as marked in my copy of Schleiermacher’s translation, book II.),” SKS 20, 24, nB:13a / JP 5, 5892; cf. Platons Werke, vols. 1–6, trans. by Friedrich schleiermacher, 2nd ed., Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1817–28, vol. 6, p. 128 (ASKB 1158–1163). the whereabouts of his own copy of the work is not known today. 72 SKS 8, 150.1–4 / UD, 37.

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as regards the Oresteia, Kierkegaard is mainly concerned with the Furies (erinyes or eumenides).73 in Either/Or he describes “The Unhappiest One” as not yet found: “he, the unhappiest one, whom not even the Furies are pursuing until he finds the door of the temple and the humble petitioner’s bench, but whom sorrows keep alive and sorrows follow to the grave!”74 this alludes, of course, to the erinyes’ merciless pursuit of orestes, who seeks sanctuary in the temple of apollo at delphi. this is also the case when in the Journal JJ we find an entry from 1845 reading thus: “In paganism the Furies were seen pursuing the guilty, their frightful figures were seen—but remorse cannot be seen, remorse is hidden, a hidden pregnancy of which a bad conscience is the father.”75 In the margin one finds the following addition: “And because the Furies were actual figures, they had to remain outside the temple in which the unfortunate person found refuge—but remorse accompanied him inside.”76 these entries from the journal are later used and further developed in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) in a consideration of the concept of guilt and the visibility of guilt in ancient tragedy: the aesthetic-metaphysical concept of nemesis is a lower satisfaction. nemesis is externally dialectical, is the consistency of externality or natural justice. the aesthetic is unopened inwardness; therefore that which is or is to be inwardness must manifest itself externally. it is similar to a tragedy in which the hero from the past appears as a spirit to the sleeper—the spectator must see the spirit, although its appearing is the sleeper’s inwardness. so also with the consciousness of guilt: the inwardness becomes outwardness. therefore the Furies were visible, but their very visibility made the inwardness less terrible and because of their visibility a boundary was established for them: the Furies did not dare to enter the temple. if, however, one takes the consciousness of guilt simply as remorse over a specific guilt, this hiddenness is precisely what is terrible, because no one can see remorse, and remorse accompanies one across every threshold. But the visibility of the Furies symbolically expresses the commensurability between the outer and the inner, whereby the guilt-consciousness is finitized, and satisfaction consists in the suffering of punishment in time, and the reconciliation consists in death, and everything ends in the sad exaltation that is death’s mitigation, that it is all over now and there was no eternal guilt.77

apart from the Furies, another Oresteia motif which will not be discussed specifically here since Kierkegaard does not refer anywhere to aeschylus as far as this problem is concerned, is the fact that as already mentioned the god apollo orders orestes to do the murder; as pointed out by Kurt von Fritz in the abovementioned article (see note 18), pp. 207–8, one might see a parallel to this myth in Kierkegaard’s use of abraham and isaac in Fear and Trembling. however, the old testament theme is not tragic: “In der Geschichte von Abraham und der Opferung seines Sohnes Isaak ist das ganz anders...etwas moralisch Schreckliches kann es für ihn, sofern er nur sicher ist, daß er nach göttlichem Befehl handelt, nicht sein. Damit ist ein tragischer Konflikt wie derjenige der Orestie des aeschylus unmöglich geworden.” In the case of Orestes, on the contrary, the motivation is rational, and the justification also from the divine point of view is clear: vengeance and the reestablishment of order. 74 SKS 2, 213.25–8 / EO1, 219. 75 SKS 18, 248, JJ:334 / KJN 2, 228. 76 SKS 18, 248, JJ:334.a / KJN 2, 228. 77 SKS 7, 492.12–31 / CUP1, 541–2. 73

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in several places in his writings Kierkegaard refers in general to faith and nemesis in antiquity.78 in this present case with the Postscript, however, there can be no doubt that he was thinking of aeschylus. as mentioned above, he possessed both Brøndsted’s danish translation of the Oresteia (1844) and droysen’s german aeschylus (1842), and he must have read one or both of these. Prometheus Bound is referred to twice in Either/Or. The first case is in the “Diapsalmata”: how dreadful boredom is—how dreadfully boring; i know no stronger expression, no truer one, for like is recognized only by like. Would that there were a loftier, stronger expression, for then there would still be one movement. i lie prostrate, inert; the only thing i see is emptiness, the only thing i live on is emptiness, the only thing i move in is emptiness. i do not even suffer pain. the vulture pecked continually at prometheus’ liver; the poison dripped down continually on loki; it was at least an interruption, even though monotonous....79

of course, this reference to the suffering of prometheus does not necessarily have to imply a reading of Aeschylus since the myth is common knowledge. It first appears in hesiod’s Theogony: “and ready-witted prometheus he [zeus] bound with inextricable bonds, cruel chains, and drove a shaft through his middle, and set on him a long-winged eagle, which used to eat his immortal liver; but by night the liver grew as much again everyway as the long-winged bird devoured in the whole day.”80 in his tragedy aeschylus added new features to this: that prometheus’ crime was not only stealing fire and giving it to mankind, but that he actually saved the human race from destruction by Zeus, that he taught them to use fire and gave them hope and all kinds of arts, and that zeus let hephaestus chain him to a rock. however, in aeschylus’ version the element with the liver only occurs towards the end where hermes predicts the future sufferings of prometheus when he refuses to reveal a certain prophecy of great importance to zeus: First, the Father will shatter this jagged cliff with thunder and lightning-flame, and will entomb your frame, while the rock shall still hold you clasped in its embrace. But when you have completed a long stretch of time, you shall come back again to the light. then indeed the winged hound of zeus, the ravening eagle [αἰετός], coming an unbidden banqueter the whole day long, with savage appetite shall tear your body piecemeal into great rents and feast his fill upon your liver until it is black with gnawing.81

since the crime of giving hope to man is aeschylus’ invention, we can assume that Kierkegaard has this from Prometheus Bound (v. 250) when in Either/Or he refers to this in “The Rotation of Crops.” The aesthete A speaks of a shifting between remembering and forgetting: see, for instance, A Literary Review, SKS 8, 81.11 / TA, 108. SKS 2, 46.8–15 / EO1, 37. 80 Theogony, vv. 521–5. prose translation from Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, trans. by hugh g. evelyn-White, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1914 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 57). 81 Prometheus Bound, vv. 1016–25. 78 79

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it is in these two currents that all life moves, and therefore it is a matter of having them properly under one’s control. not until hope has been thrown overboard does one begin to live artistically; as long as a person hopes, he cannot limit himself. it is indeed beautiful to see a person put out to sea with the fair wind of hope; one may utilize the chance to let oneself be towed along, but one ought never have it on board one’s craft, least of all as pilot, for it is a untrustworthy shipmaster. For this reason, too, hope was one of prometheus’s dubious gifts; instead of giving human beings the foreknowledge of the immortals, he gave them hope.82

in the above-mentioned diapsalma regarding the sufferings of prometheus, Kierkegaard’s misunderstanding with the vulture instead of the eagle is not due to droysen’s german translation, which renders vv. 1001ff. in the following way: “...es wird dir dann / Zeus flügelwilder, mächt’ger Aar in heißer Gier / Zerfleischen deines Leibes großes Trümmerfeld.”83 Kierkegaard just remembered the myth wrong. in another diapsalma, however, it is obvious that he used droysen when quoting a fragment of aeschylus’ lost trilogy Achilleis: “my life is like an eternal night; when i die, i shall be able to say with achilles: Du bist vollbracht, Nachtwache meines Daseyns [You are fulfilled, nightwatch of my life].”84 droysen is right in observing that this line belongs to the tragedy The Phrygians (or The Ransom of Hector), the third part of the trilogy: “Es ist unmöglich, den Schluß dieser Tragödie wiederzuerkennen; jedenfalls gehört ihm der Vers des Achilles an: ‘du bist vollbracht, Nachtwache meines Daseins.’ ”85 Wolfgang schadewaldt—like most classical scholars ascribing the words not to achilles, but to priam—in an article on the Achilleis describes the fragment in this way: “Das schönste Phryger-Bruchstück ist das nur aus zwei Worten gebildete Fr. 265 διαπεφρούρηται βίος, ein Ausspruch des Priamos, wie kaum zu bezweifeln. Das Leben eine ‘Wacht’, ein ‘Auf Posten sein’, wo es viel zu schirmen, viel durchzuhalten gibt, und diese Wacht ist nun am Ziel.”86 SKS 2, 282.7–16 / EO1, 292–3. vv. 1023–5 in Des Aischylos Werke, p. 450. dorph, in his danish translation, also has the vulture: “...Da skal Zeus’ / bevingede Hund, blodgriske Grib, med graadig Lyst / udhakke af dit flængte Bryst en livsfrisk Deel.” Den bundne Prometheus, p. 44. however, since this translation is from as late as 1854, it is, of course, irrelevant in relation to Kierkegaard’s diapsalma in question. 84 SKS 2, 45.2–4 / EO1, 36; cf. Des Aischylos Werke, p. 498. this lost trilogy is also known due to a parody in aristophanes’ Frogs, vv. 911–3, the silence of achilles being a focal point (in The Myrmidons, first part of the trilogy). 85 Des Aischylos Werke, p. 498. this line referred to by droysen is known as Fragment 265, cf. Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, vol. 3, p. 367. it may seem surprising that the classical philologists among the editors of Samlede Værker, a.B. drachmann and J.l. heiberg, were apparently not able to identify the quotation (SV1, vol. 1, p. 20; SV2, vol. 1, p. 23 with Anhang, p. 10); cf. H.P. Rohde, “Attisk nattevagt,” in his Gaadefulde stadier paa Kierkegaards vej, Copenhagen: rosenkilde og Bagger 1974, pp. 81–8; p. 87. however, their explanatory notes are very sparse, and so Rohde’s criticism is not justified. An earlier, shorter version of rohde’s article is found in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 26–9. 86 Wolfgang Schadewaldt, “Aischylos’ Achilleis,” Hermes. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, vol. 71, 1936, pp. 25–69; pp. 67–8 (reprinted in Hellas und Hesperien, pp. 166– 211; pp. 208–9). 82 83

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it is very interesting to observe here that Kierkegaard read not only entire tragedies, but also droysen’s account of the fragments, of which, not surprisingly, he picked out a felicitous line.87 The “fragmentary” aspect as such appealed much to him, the nightwatch fragment being a fragment among fragments in Either/Or, which aptly carries the subtitle “A Fragment of a Life.” The personal importance of the nightly diapsalma is reflected in the very fact that 11 years later, in October 1854, he remembers and uses it in the following central passage in the Journal NB32: my life, like everything else in the sphere in which i belong, for which i work, is in the sphere of the paradox: the positive is recognizable by the negative. alas, it is true my life is utter sadness, like nighttime (so those words from the diapsalmata in Either/Or are entirely appropriate: When i die, i will be able to say: Du bist vollbracht, Nachtwache meines Daseins); it is true my life is pain and suffering, and god—lovingly and out of love—tortures me where it hurts the most: yet his negative is a mark of the positive, a primitivity that does not relate to the contemporary age but to coming generations, and a significance which is properly expressed by the fact that I am superfluous to my age.88

However significant this repetition is, the general observation must remain that Kierkegaard read and used aeschylus in several different contexts, but only scarcely—at least compared to his extensive use of sophocles primarily in his essay on the ancient and modern tragic in Either/Or. in the earliest of the great dramatists, though, he could find the germ or very essence of every central idea in Greek tragedy that occupied him, particularly the themes of human delusion, guilt, and atonement, unfolded so fundamentally both in regard to aesthetics and morality. especially, the nature of individual suffering interested Kierkegaard, be it the destinies of orestes, prometheus, or other tragic heroes. orestes, seeking refuge in the temple of apollo at delphi from the pursuit of the erinyes, could not escape his remorse, his consciousness of guilt, and this inwardness or invisibility was the interesting part for Kierkegaard. one of prometheus’ crimes, according to aeschylus, was to give hope to man, a most dubious gift according to the aesthete a: “instead of giving human beings the foreknowledge of the immortals, he gave them hope.”89 he sees prometheus’ terrible punishment as indeed monotonous—and so is human life, at least from the aesthetic viewpoint; it is an eternal night, a being on guard that comes to an end with the words, “You are fulfilled, nightwatch of my life.”

rohde, Gaadefulde stadier, p. 87 (cf. Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, p. 28), suggests that Kierkegaard was inspired to read the aeschylus fragments by some remarks by droysen in his aristophanes edition as to why he did not translate and include the fragments of aristophanes: “Leichter ist dergleichen [translation of fragments] bei der Tragödie; der ausgeprägte Styl, die ihrem Inhalte nach bekannten Stoffe, die regelmäßige Architektur der Tragödie können der nachdichtenden Phantasie Maaß und Richtung geben....Die Komödie dagegen hat in Inhalt und Form eine so launenhafte, so allen Einfällen, Zufälligkeiten und Beiläufigkeiten bequeme Schrankenlosigkeit, daß Versuche nachdichtender Ergänzung auf Gewißheit so gut wie gar keine Ansprüche machen können.” Des Aristophanes Werke, vols. 1–3, trans. by J.g. droysen, Berlin: Veit und Comp. 1835–38, vol. 3, “Vorrede,” pp. vi–vii (ASKB 1052–1054). 88 SKS 26, 191, nB32:104 / JP 6, 6918. 89 SKS 2, 282.16 / EO1, 293. 87

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With Kierkegaard’s repetition of this significant fragment of Aeschylus he makes this almost a personal motto, and as he says, “entirely appropriate.”90

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SKS 26, 191, nB32:104 / JP 6, 6918.

Bibliography I. Aeschylus’ Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Des Aischylos Werke, trans. by Johann gustav droysen, 2nd ed., Berlin: g. Bethge 1842 (ASKB 1046). Æschylos’s Tragedier. Prometheus, Perserne, De Bønfaldende, De Syv imod Thebe, 4 vols. in 2 installments (Første Hefte: Prometheus. Perserne, and Andet Hefte: De Bønfaldende. De Syv imod Thebe), trans. by n.v. dorph, Copenhagen: samfundet til den danske literaturs Fremme 1854 (ASKB 1047–1048). Orestias, Trilogie af Æschylos, trans. by peter oluf Brøndsted, published by n.v. dorph, Copenhagen: samfundet til den danske literaturs Fremme 1844 (ASKB 1049). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Aeschylus hebbel, Friedrich, Mein Wort über das Drama! Eine Erwiderung an Professor Heiberg in Copenhagen, hamburg: hoffmann und Campe 1843, p. 10; p. 19 (ASKB 454). hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 1 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), p. 387 (ASKB 549). —— Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 388; vol. 2, p. 85 (ASKB 557–559). —— Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 52; p. 58; p. 89; p. 169; p. 180; vol. 3, p. 93; p. 202; p. 488; p. 495; p. 517; pp. 550–1; p. 566 (ASKB 1384–1386). —— Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 109 (ASKB 564–565).

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mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57], vol. 3, p. 272 (ASKB 358–363). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 71; p. 80; p. 94; p. 99; p. 102; p. 107; p. 121 (ASKB 1037). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, p. 9; p. 184; p. 274; p. 476 (ASKB 1378). rötscher, heinrich theodor, Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung. In ihrem organischen Zusammenhange, vols. 1–3, Berlin: verlag von Wilhelm thome 1841–46, vol. 1, 1841, p. 144, note (ASKB 1391; for vols. 2–3, also entitled Cyclus dramatischer Charaktere. Nebst einer einleitenden Abhandlung über das Wesen dramatischer Charaktergestaltung, see ASKB 1802–1803). schlegel, august Wilhelm, Ueber dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Vorlesungen, vols. 1–2 [vol. 2 in 2 parts], heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1809–11, vol. 1, p. 133; pp. 135–75 (ASKB 1392–1394). [solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand], K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, p. 154; p. 197; p. 201; p. 235; p. 316 (ASKB 1387). [sulzer, Johann georg], Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 147 (ASKB 807–808). —— Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, pp. 37ff.; p. 80; p. 145; p. 463; p. 707; p. 741; vol. 2, p. 18; p. 100; p. 163; p. 282; vol. 3, p. 105; vol. 4, p. 344; p. 582; p. 764 (ASKB 1365–1369). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Aeschylus Drachmann, A.B., “Skyld og Nemesis hos Æschylus,” in his Udvalgte Afhandlinger, Copenhagen and Kristiania: gyldendal 1911, pp. 9–37; especially pp. 9–14. Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46. Fritz, Kurt von, “tragische schuld und poetische gerechtigkeit in der griechischen Tragödie,” Studium Generale. Zeitschrift für die Einheit der Wissenschaften im Zusammenhang ihrer Begriffsbildungen und Forschungsmethoden, vol. 8, heft 3 and 4, 1955, pp. 194–237; pp. 207–8 (reprinted in his Antike und moderne Tragödie. Neun Abhandlungen, Berlin: Walter de gruyter 1962, pp. 1–112). Hall, Edith, “The Sociology of Athenian Tragedy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy, ed. by p.e. easterling, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1997, pp. 93–126; p. 94. høeg, Carsten, Sofokles’ Antigone og eftertiden, Copenhagen: Branner og Korch 1949 (Studier fra Sprog- og Oldtidsforskning, vol. 211), p. 19; p. 38.

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holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 24; p. 31; pp. 48–9; p. 64; pp. 72–3; pp. 80–1; p. 86; pp. 88–9; p. 97; p. 99; p. 104; p. 112; p. 115; p. 120; p. 138. —— “Findes ‘den religiøse Undtagelse’ i Græciteten?,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 143–9. Rohde, H.P., “Attisk nattevagt,” in his Gaadefulde stadier paa Kierkegaards vej, Copenhagen: rosenkilde og Bagger 1974, pp. 81–8 (an earlier, shorter version of the article is found in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 26–9). scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 20; p. 22; p. 26, note 19; p. 337, note 64; p. 354, note 3; p. 360, note 15; p. 375, note 62; p. 443, note 99; p. 447; p. 469.

euripides: Kierkegaard and the ancient tragic heroes nicolae irina

I. Euripides’ Modern Style it is an irony that euripides (ca. 480–406 bc), a defender of peace born in a time of war, was named after the very location of a victorious battle against the persian invasion, off the coast of euboea.1 he studied with anaxagoras, who strongly influenced him, as well as with Protagoras and Prodicus. Apparently, the recurrent association of euripides with socrates is erroneous, although it is arguably certain that socrates never missed a play by euripides,2 and surely true that, in plato’s dialogues, socrates’ references to euripides are not very scarce. many of euripides’ plays survive, some of them award-winning tragedies at the athenian dramatic festival. among euripides’ greatest works are Alcestis, Medea, Hippolytus, The Suppliant Women, Electra, The Trojan Women, Iphigenia in Tauris, The Bacchae, and Iphigenia in Aulis. mythopoetically, homer and hesiod, the fathers of greek didactic poetry, placed a distinctive emphasis on discussing moral virtues and the characteristics of the relations between humans and gods, individuals and society. The “moral tradition” was continued and very much refined by Herodotus, Thucydides, and the three great tragic poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Their fifth-century Greece “modern” perspective and their “treatments of moral issues are among the most sensitive and profound of any conceived in ancient Greece.”3 But it was euripides, as hegel noticed, who of the three greek tragedians anticipated the modern style.4 John Ferguson also considers that euripides is by far the most contemporary of the ancient dramatists.5 euripides’ characters are portrayed with psychological subtlety, and his heroes have a remarkable human stature. this, according to Ferguson, “led sophocles to say that he himself portrayed men as they the name of the strait between euboea and the mainland is euripus. Cf. John Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, austin and london: university of texas press 1972, p. 235. 2 ibid., p. 237. 3 richard d. mcKirahan, Jr., Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentaries, indianapolis and Cambridge: hackett 1994, p. 354. 4 Cf. Leonard Moss, “The Unrecognized Influence in Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 28, no. 1, 1969, p. 92. 5 on euripides’ ars dramatica, see Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, especially pp. 240–5. 1

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ought to be, Euripides portrayed them as they are.”6 as we will see, Kierkegaard himself attributes the same characteristics to the modern tragic. moreover, and more specifically, the figure of Euripides’ Agamemnon in Iphigenia in Aulis is of central importance in Kierkegaard’s understanding of the “tragic hero,” yet his analysis is also intended to reveal a sharp contrast with abraham’s puzzling character. on the contrary, discussing Iphigenia in Aulis, staged posthumously a few months after euripides’ death and most likely completed by his son or his nephew, d.J. Conacher claims that the play is clearly not a tragedy: “there is no meaningful relation between the character of the heroine and the fate externally imposed upon her, and no real significance, beyond the ‘edification’ of martyrdom, in the sacrifice itself.”7 moreover, Conacher contends that “certainly the agamemnon of this play, on the grounds of stature alone, could never be confused with a tragic hero.”8 But, as Conacher admits, there is a tragic hero in euripides, namely, mankind. he supports this claim with a reference to euripides’ Medea, according to Conacher, “no gods determine, either in reality or by dramatic convention, medea’s passion...what happens in her case we feel to be more the result of her own nature than of anything else.”9 after all, what in the story of Iphigenia in Aulis is objectionable to the modern reader is the fact that—although the play is skillfully written in terms of the modernity of its dialogue and the subtly depicted inner struggles of its characters—its plot is “woven around an angry goddess who won’t let the winds blow the achaean ships to the sack of Troy unless a king’s daughter is slain in human sacrifice!”10 the ancient athenians certainly grasped the entire situation differently, yet a modern audience would probably indicate indeed the importance of such a shortcoming. nevertheless, what makes euripides’ plays modern is, again, the way he deals with this shortcoming by focusing on a careful portrayal of his characters, describing their individual stance in relation to their fate. II. Kierkegaard’s Use of Euripides Kierkegaard’s concern with Greek literature was significant, though it was primarily philosophy that captured his interest. as sophia scopetea points out, “Kierkegaard’s relationship to the Greek mentality...confines itself without difficulty to the boundaries of his relationship with Greek philosophy.”11 nevertheless, greek tragedy has a unique place in his writings. ibid., p. 239; see also, p. 129. d.J. Conacher, Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure, toronto: university of toronto press 1967, p. 250. 8 ibid., p. 253. 9 ibid., p. 183. 10 Charles r. Walker, “introduction to Iphigenia in Aulis,” in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vols. 1–4, ed. by david green and richard lattimore, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1958–60, vol. 4, p. 292. 11 sophia scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 39. (my translation.) 6 7

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in The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard enumerates euripides as one of “[aristophanes’] three great comic paradigms: Cleon, Euripides, and Socrates.”12 Kierkegaard claims indeed that, in aristophanes’ dramatic art, socrates is represented in his comic ideality, the counterpart of plato’s consideration of socrates’ tragic side. Only the twofold depiction with all its “various nuances of misunderstanding”13 can make socrates’ personality intelligible. Kierkegaard insists that the reason for aristophanes’ preference is totally irrelevant. regardless of whatever tedious motivation one could possibly identify behind it (like aristophanes’ unlikely contentment regarding “socrates’ friendly relations with Euripides,”14 for instance), according to Kierkegaard, “simply to apprehend the empirical actuality of socrates, to bring him on stage as he walked and stood in life, would have been beneath the dignity of aristophanes and would have changed his comedy into a satirical poem.”15 Kierkegaard mentions that aristophanes’ depiction of socrates in The Clouds could also have been thus traced in order to mark aristophanes’ opposition to anaxagoras’ speculations about nature. Furthermore, the fact that Euripides was strongly influenced by Anaxagoras16 could well explain why aristophanes consistently associates socrates with euripides throughout his comedies. Besides, as Kierkegaard suspects, socrates could have been easily identified by Aristophanes with the Sophists.17 The various “aspirations of the age,” as Kierkegaard puts it, are reflected in aristophanes’ comedy. But, to put things in a broader perspective, it would be worth noticing here that, although fifth-century Greece was clearly dominated by the socalled “sophistic movement,” the intellectual scene of the time distinctively included other well-known figures like Euripides, Thucydides, Socrates, and Plato, as well as aristophanes himself. in order to represent, comically, the “aspiration of the age in its three trends,”18 it became essential for aristophanes to bring socrates’ actuality, and likewise Cleon’s and euripides’ on stage in an ideal form. according to Kierkegaard, aristophanes’ ars dramatica interprets actuality ideally yet in a comic manner, and

SKS 1, 181 / CI, 129. (my emphasis.) here Kierkegaard refers to aristophanes’ depiction of “the three great comic paradigms”: Cleon in The Knights, euripides in The Frogs and Thesmophoriazusae, and socrates in The Clouds. 13 SKS 1, 180 / CI, 128. 14 Cf. ibid. as already mentioned, the actual association between socrates and euripides is uncertain. in the Republic (viii 568a–b), socrates holds that the tragic poets are wise and that “tragedy in general has the reputation of being wise and...euripides is thought to be outstandingly so.” The reference to Euripides’ “Wise company makes wise tyrants” reappears in Theages (125 b–d). see plato, Complete Works, ed. by John m. Cooper, indianapolis and Cambridge: hackett 1997. 15 SKS 1, 180 / CI, 129. 16 diogenes of apollonia (active, according to various sources, in the two decades after 440 bc) could be another source for Euripides. According to McKirahan, Diogenes’ influential doctrines are echoed in both aristophanes and euripides. Cf. mcKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates, p. 346. 17 SKS 1, 180 / CI, 128. 18 SKS 1, 181 / CI, 129. 12

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thus satisfies both the need to reduce the gap between the audience and the stage, on the one hand, and the need to separate them and to preserve it on the other. From euripides’ Medea, Kierkegaard quotes the famous line: “i would rather go into battle three times than give birth once.”19 addressing herself to the women of Corinth, Medea deplores the condition of women, “the most unfortunate creatures.”20 medea desperately weeps: What they say of us is that we have a peaceful time Living at home, while they [men] do the fighting in war. how wrong they are! i would very much rather stand three times in the front of battle than bear one child.21

The context in “The Seducer’s Diary” is related to Kierkegaard’s disbelief pertaining to diana’s partly undeserved eulogies. he suspects that the goddess remained a virgin merely out of fear of delivery pains and not “because she felt the superiority of the state [of virginity].”22 however, Kierkegaard misleadingly attributes medea’s protest, that is, a complaint against maintaining the household and being “wronged in the matter of love,”23 to euripides himself. Kierkegaard explicitly does so in one of his 1841 journal entries where he notes the celebrated phrase.24 in Either/Or, Kierkegaard discusses extensively the characteristics of modern drama against the background of ancient greek tragedy,25 with an emphasis on sophocles’ characters, but, additionally, Kierkegaard also comments on this topic in Fear and Trembling. here he is mainly concerned, as already indicated, with the distinction between the characteristics of the tragic hero and those of abraham, the “knight of faith.” Kierkegaard had either read or was going to read euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis. as scopetea argues, however, even if he did in fact read it, he did not consistently refer to it: “For a reader of Fear and Trembling, it [looks] as if the tragedy was never written.”26 thus, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard’s agamemnon is intended to serve only as a contrasting figure to Abraham.

SKS 2, 423 / EO1, 436. these are medea’s words in euripides’ homonymous play, and not his own utterance. see euripides, Medea, in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, p. 67. 20 Medea (231). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, p. 67.) 21 Medea (248–51). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, p. 67.) 22 SKS 19, 219, not7:56 / JP 3, 2587. 23 Medea (265). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, p. 67.) as pointed out in the introductory section, the context of euripides’ play would have been better known to the Athenian audience: Medea, “a barbarian princess and...a sorceress, related to the gods,” acting as an enraged, jealous murderer. see rex Warner’s note in “introduction to Medea,” in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 3, p. 56. 24 SKS 19, 219, not7:56 / JP 3, 2587. 25 See “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama” (SKS 2, 136–62 / EO1, 136–64). 26 Cf. scopetea, Kierkegaard og Græciteten, p. 22 (my translation). 19

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Kierkegaard is interested in what agamemnon does qua “tragic hero.”27 as Johannes sløk points out, he is not so much concerned with analyzing euripides’ Agamemnon, but with making him represent what he wants the ancient figure to represent. likewise, in Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard’s analysis confers upon Agamemnon’s figure a radically different character, thus modifying Euripides’ intentions.28 Kierkegaard’s examination, however, which aims at deciphering the cultural characteristics of an ancient figure, is not a hopeless endeavor. He alters the classical, euripidean understanding of agamemnon, but, as sløk suggests, he does so by taking into account the hypothesis that there are some universal human structures, situations, and tendencies characteristic of each cultural epoch. sløk writes: “[the ancient human being] is a possibility for me, an alternate possibility which i do not realize, for i realize another possibility, that of my culture; nevertheless, he represents a possibility which I can understand.”29 in Fear and Trembling, as John donnelly explains, Kierkegaard “poses the question whether there can be any ethical justification for Abraham’s conduct and, in particular, whether there can be any moral explanation for the intended action of killing his own son, Isaac, out of obedience to a divine command.”30 in this context, Kierkegaard claims that “abraham is at no time a tragic [ethical] hero but is something entirely different, either a murderer or a man of faith.”31 if, on the one hand, the ethical is to be understood as the universal, all deeds without exception should be pondered accordingly, and Abraham could definitely be convicted for attempted murder. on the other hand, as merold Westphal argues, “the kind of faith that abraham exhibits requires that the individual, in his god relation, be higher than the universal.”32 the main difference lies with the fact that the tragic hero acts within the confines of the ethical realm, whereas Abraham transgresses it. Thus, Kierkegaard clearly distinguishes the teleological suspension of the ethical—a deferment of moral principles altogether that characterizes abraham’s act—from the tragic hero’s downsizing—a suspension itself, that is, but only a suspension of the duty pertaining

as already indicated, not everyone agrees that euripides’ agamemnon is a tragic figure (see Conacher’s position quoted above). But it should also be noted here that some have even argued, like philip l. Quinn, that Kierkegaard’s agamemnon “does not confront a tragic dilemma; there is a guilt-free resolution of the ethical conflict in which he is involved.” See philip l. Quinn, “agamemnon and abraham. the tragic dilemma of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith,” Journal of Literature and Theology, vol. 4, no. 2, 1990, p. 185. 28 Cf. Johannes sløk, Kierkegaard, humanismens tænker, Copenhagen: hans reitzel 1978, p. 223. 29 ibid., p. 224. (my translation.) 30 John Donnelly, “Kierkegaard’s Problem I and Problem II: An Analytic Perspective,” Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, p. 117. 31 SKS 4, 150 / FT, 57. 32 Merold Westphal, “Abraham and Hegel,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, p. 73. 27

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to the parental-filial relationship—to “a feeling that has its dialectic in its relation to the idea of moral conduct.”33 it should be noticed that not all interpretations of abraham’s situation converge. For instance, the very paradoxical character of abraham’s exclusive either/or situation is rejected by donnelly. according to him, there is “no paradox in the conduct of abraham, for it is surely no logical contradiction for an individual to remain consistently self-reliant within his chosen set of moral religious ideals.”34 However, this tenet is somewhat troublesome. Contextually, the significance of self-imposed “moral religious ideals” could sometimes infringe upon the logic of commonly acceptable moral obligations with overriding power over individual logical coherence in matters of religious concern. Kierkegaard seems to have clearly noticed that tension in the biblical story. Faith involves an absolute paradox, indeed, yet nothing justifies Abraham’s criminal intent. After all, as Mark C. Taylor points out, “abraham’s conviction that he should kill isaac might be a horrible temptation rather than a trial of faith.”35 stephen evans suggests that, instead of trying to grasp abraham’s logically unintelligible message, it would rather be more beneficial to investigate his “inability to communicate his duty to anyone else.”36 evans’ contention opens the discussion of the incommunicability issue, that is, the most unlikely interference of the two parallel ethical discourses and their insuperable separation. Kierkegaard insists that “abraham cannot speak, because he cannot say that which would explain everything (that is, so it is understandable),”37 and he notes, in the margin of the draft version, that “there is also another reason why abraham cannot speak, for in silence he is continually making the movement of faith.”38 Agamemnon, on the other hand, had to sacrifice Iphigenia, his daughter, to the goddess artemis, for the well-being of his people. Clytemnestra, iphigenia’s mother is devastated: “Why? Why? What is the demon of vengeance / Which drives him to this horror?” Clytemnestra’s devoted old servant reveals: “The oracle is the demon, the oracle / Which Calchas spoke telling how the fleet may sail / ... / To the lords of troy and to their halls / so that menelaus may bring helen back. / ... / it is to artemis that her father / Will sacrifice the child.”39 agamemnon’s personal tragedy is, contextually, comprehensible, which is not the case of abraham. therefore, the tragic hero’s agony elicits tears, yet abraham’s endeavor can only be approached with horror religious, as Kierkegaard puts it.40 SKS 4, 152 / FT, 59. Donnelly, “Kierkegaard’s Problem I and Problem II,” p. 132. 35 Mark C. Taylor, “Sounds of Silence,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, p. 185. 36 C. stephen evans, “is the Concept of an absolute duty toward god morally Unintelligible?” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, p. 145. 37 SKS 4, 202 / FT, 115. 38 Pap. iv B, 91:17 / FT, supplement, p. 254. 39 euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis (878–83). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 4, p. 342.) 40 SKS 4, 154 / FT, 61. 33 34

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What unites them all is the infinite movement of resignation, but the story does not end there for abraham. on the one hand, agamemnon and iphigenia heroically reach a tragic mutual understanding and thus their story ends. iphigenia weeps: “Life is no longer mine,”41 for it is tied to the destiny of her people. on the other hand, Isaac is clueless, yet his sacrifice is only an indicator of Abraham’s allegiance. But abraham does not end in resignation, for he thus also makes the movement of faith, “by virtue of the absurd,”42 and that is his only consolation: despite the absurd demand, he trusts god’s initial promise. thus, abraham acts “outside of the ethical and is possessed by some telos that is nonethical.”43 again, abraham’s act is incomprehensible if the attempt to approximate his deed by taking universal and ethical justifications into consideration is not completely abandoned, which is not the case with the tragic heroes. agamemnon, for instance, is the unfortunate ethical hero that sacrifices his daughter on ethical grounds, yet only the category of faith, as robert perkins points out, can make an explanation of abraham’s act possible. perkins contrasts Kant’s view of faith, “heteronymous, unnatural, irrational, and ununiversalizable,”44 which is postulated by morality, with Kierkegaard’s. For Kierkegaard, perkins claims, “faith is very much like the ethical striving of the Kantian moral hero, [using] the expression ‘the hero of faith’ precisely because the hero of faith must continue endlessly and forever to attain his faith again and again by obedience.”45 the heroic character of Kant’s ethics of continual striving is thus reflected in Kierkegaard’s view of faith, understood as “a task for a lifetime.”46 For Kierkegaard, greek tragedy is blind and the tragic characters are subject to the coercive force of destiny, like sophocles’ oedipus and euripides’ iphigenia, oblivious with regard to the real significance of their deeds. Kierkegaard contends that in greek tragedy, “the hiddenness (and as a result of it the recognition) is an epic remnant based on a fate in which the dramatic action vanishes and in which it has its dark, mysterious source.”47 Conversely, modern drama abandoned destiny, according to Kierkegaard, assimilating self-reflection. Thus, “hiddenness and disclosure, then, are the hero’s free act, for which he is responsible.”48 An entire paragraph of “Problema III” in Fear and Trembling is dedicated to a discussion of the tragic hero with direct reference to euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis, a play “more modern than most Greek tragedies.”49 Kierkegaard addresses the interplay between hiddenness and disclosure, pointing out the interaction between agamemnon, iphigenia, and Clytemnestra. on the one hand, aesthetical considerations demand silence of agamemnon, yet the tragic hero has to prove his euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis (1281). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 4, p. 362.) SKS 4, 203 / FT, 115. 43 Robert L. Perkins, “For Sanity’s Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, and Father Abraham,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, p. 54. 44 ibid., p. 54. 45 ibid., p. 58. 46 ibid. 47 SKS 4, 174 / FT, 84. 48 ibid. 49 Walker, “introduction to Iphigenia in Aulis,” p. 291. 41 42

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ethical courage by unveiling iphigenia’s tragic fate to her. if he does this, Kierkegaard points out, “then the tragic hero is ethics’ beloved son in whom it is well pleased... because ethics loves him for the very reason that he always expresses the universal.”50 aesthetics, Kierkegaard indicates, provides the trembling old servant51 with the “readiness to disclose everything to Clytemnestra, [yet] ethics has no coincidence and no old servant at its disposal.”52 abraham cannot speak. as taylor puts it, “[w]rapped in silence, unable to communicate with others or to become intelligible to himself, the knight is gripped by fear and trembling.”53 unlike abraham’s case, whose “intended deed serves no ethical higher purpose,”54 for agamemnon, offering an explanation of what duty demands from him is itself an ethical obligation. it is the ideal universality of agamemnon’s ethical deed that makes it understandable, admired as heroically courageous and subject of deep compassion, although failure to disclose its ethical background can nevertheless make it abominable. taylor argues that, from an ethical perspective, agamemnon is “obliged to break the silence and...explain to his daughter, his wife, and the whole state the demand that duty is making upon him.”55 agamemnon has to speak. indeed, according to Kierkegaard, ethics necessitates that no other person but agamemnon, the tragic hero, divulge to his unfortunate daughter the dreadful truth about her destiny. thus, as david Wren puts it, “events conspired against agamemnon: his purposes were revealed and he was challenged with the role of the ethical hero.”56 With regard to the same scene in Iphigenia in Aulis, in a marginal note later deleted from the final draft, Kierkegaard writes that “in the play by Euripides, iphigenia is allowed to weep for a moment, and in place of other signs of interceding, is allowed to wind herself like an olive branch about [Agamemnon’s] knee.”57 a modified version of this passage was actually included in the final version whereby iphigenia’s tears are described as her argumentum ad hominem.58 As we have seen, Kierkegaard’s most significant use of Euripides is dedicated to the understanding of the “tragic hero.” The creative way in which Kierkegaard utilizes euripides’ Iphigenia in Aulis makes the comparison between the case of the mythical agamemnon and the biblical abraham very productive. indeed, the clearcut contrast between the two heroes helps the reader distinguish what separates the tragic “ethical hero” from the “knight of faith,” yet it only sheds some feeble light on the paradoxical nature of faith. SKS 4, 177 / FT, 87. The old man confesses “Her father plans / With his own hand to kill your child.” euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis (873). (The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 4, p. 341.) 52 SKS 4, 177 / FT, 87. 53 Taylor, “Sounds of Silence,” p. 185. 54 ibid., p. 182. 55 ibid., p. 181. 56 David J. Wren, “Abraham’s Silence and the Logic of Faith,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, p. 157. 57 Pap. iv B, 91:16 / FT, supplement, p 254. Cf. line 1224 in Euripides, p. 145. For other references, see FT, notes, p. 377, note 28. 58 SKS 4, 177 / FT, 87. 50 51

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on the one hand, agamemnon’s situation requires disclosure, so that the “higher order” ethical values triumph, despite the tragedy surrounding the implacable fate of iphigenia and her parents’ misfortune. on the other, as Kierkegaard shows, the incomprehensibility of abraham’s absurd act, the unintelligibility of his message reduces him to an impenetrable silence. about the paradox of faith abraham cannot speak, and therefore the ambiguous reaction of the witnessing reader is highly predictable. as taylor unequivocally puts it, one of the most perplexing paradoxes of Fear and Trembling is “the mere fact that the book was written.”59

59

Taylor, “Sounds of Silence,” p. 188.

Bibliography I. Euripides’ Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Anthologia graeca, ed. by paul hagerup tregder, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, pp. 41–2; pp. 85–98 (ASKB 1041). Alkestis, Medeia, Iphigenia i Aulis, Iphigenia i Tauroi, Hekabe, Andromache, Bachantinderne, Hippolytos, trans. by Christian Wilster, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1840 (ASKB 1115). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Euripides [Becker, Karl Friedrich], Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29, vol. 2, p. 332; p. 404; p. 406; p. 413 (ASKB 1972–1983). [goethe, Johann Wolfgang von], “Phaethon, tragödie des euripides. versuch einer Wiederherstellung aus Bruchstücken”; “Zu Phaethon des Euripides”; “Euripides’ Phaethon, noch einmal”; and “Die Bacchantinnen des Euripides,” in Goethe’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand [in 55 volumes], vols. 1–40, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30; Goethe’s nachgelassene Werke, vols. 41–55, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1832–33, vol. 46 (Nachlaß, vol. 6), pp. 30–48; pp. 49–53; pp. 54–7; and pp. 58–63 (ASKB 1641–1668). hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 109 (ASKB 534). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 2, p. 31; p. 213; p. 222; vol. 3, p. 16 (ASKB 536–544). [hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich], Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1– 10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 293; vol. 2, p. 180; p. 185; vol. 3, p. 5; p. 69; p. 551; p. 553; p. 570 (ASKB 1384–1386). petersen, Frederik Christian, Om Epheterne og deres Dikasterier i Athen, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1847, p. 43 (ASKB 720). —— Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 80; p. 95; p. 102; p. 107; pp. 121–2; p. 164 (ASKB 1037).

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[richter, Johann paul Friedrich], Jean paul, Vorschule der Aesthetik nebst einigen Vorlesungen in Leipzig über die Parteien der Zeit, vols. 1–3, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1813, vol. 2, p. 470 (ASKB 1381–1383). schlegel, august Wilhelm, Ueber dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Vorlesungen, vols. 1–2 [vol. 2 in 2 parts], heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1809–11, vol. 1, p. 133; pp. 210–26; pp. 231–2; p. 243 (ASKB 1392–1394). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819]; vol. 1, p. 288; p. 396; vol. 2, p. 584; p. 589 (ASKB 773–773a). [solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand], Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel, ed. by ludwig tieck und Friedrich von raumer, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1826, pp. 493–628 (ASKB 1832–1833). —— K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, p. 237 (ASKB 1387). [sulzer, Johann georg], Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 147; p. 151; vol. 2, p. 104 (in “Vorbericht”) (ASKB 807–808). —— Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 139; pp. 146–7; p. 179; p. 243; p. 253; p. 259; p. 275; p. 363; p. 368; p. 388; p. 408; p. 462; p. 498; p. 505; p. 600; vol. 2, p. 56; p. 219; vol. 3, p. 163; vol. 4, p. 582 (ASKB 1365–1369).

III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Euripides Donnelly, John, “Kierkegaard’s Problem I and Problem II: An Analytic Perspective,” Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 115–40. evans, C. stephen, “is the Concept of an absolute duty toward god morally Unintelligible?” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 141–50. Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46; on euripides, see especially pp. 138–40. holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 49; p. 57; p. 74; p. 88; p. 92; p. 133; p. 136. Perkins, Robert L., “For Sanity’s Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, and Father Abraham,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 43–61. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 8, note 20; p. 22; p. 23, note 11; p. 44, note 28.

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sløk, Johannes, Kierkegaard, humanismens tænker, Copenhagen: hans reitzel 1978; on euripides, see especially pp. 223–4. Taylor, Mark C., “Sounds of Silence,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 165–88. Westphal, Merold, “Abraham and Hegel,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 62–80. Wren, David J., “Abraham’s Silence and the Logic of Faith,” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, ed. by robert l. perkins, tuscaloosa, alabama: university of alabama press 1981, pp. 152–64.

herodotus: traces of The Histories in Kierkegaard’s Writings Finn gredal Jensen

I. The “Father of History” Herodotus of Halicarnassus is the first Greek historian of greater significance and therefore considered the “Father of History.”1 Actually, the word “history” is derived from the greek ἱστορία (ionian ἱστορίη, “inquiry”), which appears at the beginning of his work in this famous manner: What herodotus the halicarnassian has learnt by inquiry is here set forth: in order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by time, and that great and marvellous deeds done by greeks and foreigners [barbarians] and especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown.2

herodotus was born around 485 bc in halicarnassus (today, Bodrum), which was originally a dorian colony, but in classical times its culture was ionic. the later persian sovereignty led to a great deal of unrest. For a time herodotus was in exile on samos due to his part in a failed revolt against the tyrant lygdamis. in his later years, he left his home city and became a citizen of the athenian colony thurii in southern italy (magna graecia), where he died around 424 bc. it is known that he stayed in athens around 445–444, where he lectured on parts of his historical work and entered into a friendship with, among others, sophocles. he wrote in the ionian dialect, in which he portrays the wars between the greeks and the persians. at the beginning of the 5th century bc there arose a confrontation between the greeks and the powerful persian empire in the east after the suppression of the ionian revolt, which culminated in the fall of miletus in 494 bc. the ionians had previously destroyed sardis, the capital of the lydian satrapy, to which the ionians paid tributes. the great King, who according to the oriental ideology of rulers was the lord over the four corners of the world, undertook an expedition to punish the mainland greek Cf. Cicero, De legibus, 1.5 (quamquam et apud Herodotum patrem historiae et apud Theopompum sunt innumerabiles fabulae). 2 here and in the following, translations are quoted from Herodotus, The Persian Wars, vols. i–iv, trans. by a.d. godley, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1920–25 or later (Loeb Classical Library, vols. 117–120). 1

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sympathizers of the revolt, but this expedition was defeated at marathon in 490. after the death of King darius, his son Xerxes undertook a new campaign against greece, which saw the greek defeat at thermopylae, the greek victory at the battle of Salamis in 480, and the Persians’ final defeat the following year at the battles of plataea and mycale. herodotus gives a thorough introduction to the background of the war, including a treatment of the “barbarians” whom the Greeks came into contact with. In order to do the research for his inquiries—his large, entirely extant Histories, in later times divided into nine books and named after the nine muses—he took several journeys to places around the Black sea, to asia minor, to magna graecia and sicily, to egypt to the sources of the nile, and to the orient, all the way to Babylon. this principle of personal experience, αὐτοψία, where it was possible, along with a general curiosity and a questioning spirit, formed the basis for herodotus’ immense wealth of geographic, ethnographic, and historical material, which is presented in the form of longer or shorter excurses (λόγοι) in relation to the main narrative as stated in the prologue: the conflict between the Greeks and the “barbarians.” Thus, Herodotus’ work is much more than just a war monograph; not only did he have a wonderful flair for good stories, but—as C.W. Fornara puts it—his Histories “represent a fusion of prose and poetry, of the Homeric epic and a now utterly transformed Ionian historiography.”3 herodotus’ history is also very theological; this is to say that all historical events are seen as the workings of divine providence, a natural maintenance of balance and order. however, his religious pessimism is seen in the fact that the gods are very distant from men in comparison with homer’s portrayal. although at the same time he criticizes traditional religion from a rationalist perspective, herodotus believes in the gods but mostly sees their will in dreams, omens, and oracles, and not in their actual appearance. the doctrine of Nemesis is evident most clearly in individual cases such as Croesus and Xerxes who become victims of divine jealousy. as mentioned above, a principle for herodotus is αὐτοψία, but he also uses written sources and collects oral reports from witnesses to obtain information. in general, he follows this methodological principle: “as for myself, although it is my business to set down that which is told me, to believe it is none at all of my business. this i ask the reader to hold true for the whole of my history” (Histories, 7.152).4 Charles William Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome, Berkeley, los angeles, london: university of California press 1988, p. 32. herodotus was indebted to earlier historical writers, especially hecataeus of miletus (ca. 500 bc), who produced a narrative geography, Circuit of the Earth, with a “map of the world,” and a work called Genealogies on the history of greece, in which he insisted—as did later herodotus—on a separation of the age of myth from the age of history. his works survive only in minor fragments (cf. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, vol. 1, Genealogie und Mythographie, ed. by Felix Jacoby, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1923), for instance, the following programmatic statement: “What i write here, is the account which i considered to be true. For the stories of the Greeks are numerous, and in my opinion ridiculous” (translation from J.B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians, new York: dover 1958 [1908], p. 13). the decision, however, to write the history of a major war owes nothing to hecataeus. 4 Compared to the standards of Thucydides, however, the “historical method” of herodotus falls rather short, cf. especially History of the Pelopponesian War, 1.20–22. 3

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II. Herodotus at the Borgerdyd School and in Kierkegaard’s Library at søren Kierkegaard’s school, the Borgerdyd school, instruction in greek and latin was quite extensive.5 Kierkegaard also read some herodotus during his school years. he had to submit a list of readings that he could be tested on at his university entrance examination (“studentereksamen”). According to headmaster Michael Nielsen’s (1776–1846) report to the university dated July 29, 1830, Kierkegaard listed 16 books of homer for his examination, and of greek prose he listed “otherwise as no. 1” (that is, the same as Edvard Julius Anger (1813–95), the top student in the class): plato’s Crito and Euthyphro, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, two books of herodotus (Book 8, “Urania,” and Book 9, “Calliope”), and the Gospel of John.6 according to per Krarup’s calculation, the greek prose material covered in all around 330 pages.7 Of these, Books 8 and 9 of Herodotus constituted not an insignificant part; in Friedrich Wolfgang reiz’s (1733–90) edition these two books correspond to 141 printed pages. according to The Auction Catalogue, Kierkegaard owned reiz’s edition, which carried the latin title, Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX Musarum nominibus inscripti. This edition consisted of two volumes, the first of which contained the greek text in two parts or tomes. volume 1, part 1, with The Histories, Books 1–4, was first published by Reiz in Leipzig in 1778. After his death in 1790 the edition was completed by gottfried heinrich schäfer (1764–1840), who published volume 1, part 2, with Books 5–9, for the first time in Leipzig in the year 1800, and volume 2 in 1820 with a latin translation by lorenzo valla (ca. 1407–57) and indices. the individual parts of volume 1 appeared independently in several editions. in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library we find more copies of the reiz–schäfer edition. First, in the main collection there is a copy in two volumes, ASKB 1116, according to the editor h.p. rohde dating from “1825[26].” This information makes it possible, at least, to identify one of these volumes

i refer to my general presentation of instruction in greek at the Borgerdyd school in my article, “Homer: Kierkegaard’s Use of the Homeric Poems” (Section II, “Homer at the Borgerdyd School”) in the present volume. Regarding the instruction in Latin, see Niels W. Bruun and Finn Gredal Jensen, “Kierkegaard’s Latin Translations of the New Testament,” in Kierkegaard and the Bible, tome ii, The New Testament, ed. by lee C. Barrett, aldershot: ashgate, forthcoming (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 1), or the earlier version of that article in german, “die lateinischen Übersetzungen søren Kierkegaards aus dem Neuen Testament,” Neulateinisches Jahrbuch/Journal of Neo-Latin Language and Literature, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 17–30. see also SKS K17, 277ff. / KJN 1, 435ff. 6 Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, ed. by Bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 14–15 and 273. niels thulstrup’s version of this in B&A, vol. 1, pp. 4–5, is misleading since he has “reconstructed” a school testimony for Kierkegaard; without respect to the source he makes a reference to the prose texts given for the examination by the top student in the class. 7 per Krarup, Søren Kierkegaard og Borgerdydskolen, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1977, p. 27. 5

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as the 4th edition of volume 1, part 1, published by g.h. schäfer in 1825.8 however, no edition of the reiz–schäfer edition appeared in 1826, so rohde must be in error; actually, no 4th edition of volume 1, part 2, ever appeared, and it is most likely, then, that Kierkegaard’s copy of volume 1, part 2, was the 3rd edition of this specific tome from 1822, since this was the latest issue available.9 if we turn towards the appendices of The Auction Catalogue—and one should bear in mind that it is a matter of dispute whether these books were actually from Kierkegaard’s library—we find, in Appendix I, yet another copy of the Reiz–Schäfer edition, ASKB a i 158– 159, which is dated “1813–36” in the catalogue. 1813 was the year of publication of the 2nd edition of volume 1, part 2, with The Histories, Books 5–9,10 whereas the indication 1836 does not make sense; it could be a mistake for 1816, the year of publication of the 3rd edition of volume 1, part 1, with Books 1–4.11 Finally, in Appendix II there appears an unspecified stereotype edition of Herodotus, ASKB a ii 37–39, which is not possible to identify. moreover, Kierkegaard owned Friedrich lange’s (1779–1854) german translation, Die Geschichten des Herodotus, vols. 1–2, Berlin 1811–12.12 he must, of course, also have obtained knowledge about greek history—including the events portrayed by herodotus—from different secondary sources, of which one should pay special attention to volume 1 of Karl Friedrich Becker’s (1777–1806) History of the World in J. riise’s danish translation.13 most likely, Kierkegaard loved Becker’s colorful descriptions, which often unfold a detailed psychology, and for this reason it is often difficult to determine whether Kierkegaard’s source was Herodotus directly or indirectly. When it comes to The Histories, Books 8 and 9, which Kierkegaard read in school, we can be certain that Herodotus was his source, at least in the first instance; but surprisingly, as we shall see in the following, there do not seem to be any references at all to these two books in his writings.

Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσῆος ἱστοριῶν λόγοι θ´ ἐπιγραφόμενοι μοῦσαι. Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX Musarum nominibus inscripti, vol. 1, part 1, ed. by F.W. reiz and g.h. schäfer, 4th edition, leipzig: schwickert 1825. 9 Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX, vol. 1, part 2, 3rd edition, leipzig: schwickert 1822. 10 Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX, vol. 1, part 2, 2nd edition, leipzig: schwickert 1813. 11 Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX, vol. 1, part 1, 3rd edition, leipzig: schwickert 1816. 12 Die Geschichten des Herodotus, vols. 1–2, trans. by Friedrich lange, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1811–12 (ASKB 1117). Friedrich heinrich Wilhelm lange was a german philologist in Berlin, not to be confused with Kierkegaard’s greek teacher Frederik olaus lange at the Borgerdyd school. 13 Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29, vols. 1–12 (ASKB 1972–1983). the persian Wars are treated in vol. 1, often quoting herodotus. 8

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III. Herodotus in Kierkegaard’s Writings in Kierkegaard’s writings the name of herodotus is mentioned only twice. in the one case, in Notebook 13, it is not even the right herodotus but a pneumatist by the same name from the first century ad.14 in the other case, herodotus is found in the Journal JJ in an entry which reads as follows: “someone who has one thought, but an infinite one, can be borne along by it through his entire life, lighty and swiftly, just as the hyperborean abaris who, borne by an arrow, traversed the whole world. / Herodotus, IV, 36.”15 The simile is about the figure of Abaris, whose story Herodotus says he will not tell, only to do so shortly thereafter: “thus far have i spoken of the Hyperboreans, and let it suffice; for I do not tell the story of Abaris, alleged to be a hyperborean, who carried the arrow (τὸν ὀϊστὸν περιέφερε) over the whole world, fasting the while” (Histories, 4.36). in this case we can even prove that Kierkegaard could not have read the original greek text of herodotus, or at least, if he had, he thoroughly misunderstood it. however, later writers such as porphyry and iamblichus made the arrow of apollo serve abaris like a witch’s broomstick, on which he sailed through the air over rivers and seas.16 herodotus’ version that he carried the arrow is clearly a later rationalization of the fantastic tale. Kierkegaard does not have the story from Friedrich lange’s german translation, in which it says correctly “daß er mit dem Pfeil um die ganze Erde gegangen, ohne etwas zu essen.”17 Nor does he have it from the first volume of Becker’s History of the World, which does not mention the hyperboreans. this does not mean that the cause of Kierkegaard’s “misunderstanding” was his own imagination, but rather that he had the story from some other unknown source.18 the indirect references to herodotus are numerous, although, as mentioned before, we should be aware of indirectness in more than one sense, since Kierkegaard might have the stories or themes from elsewhere, especially from Becker’s History of the World. in the following i will treat the books of herodotus in order and note the relevant appearances in Kierkegaard’s writings.

SKS 19, 397, not13:28.a. SKS 18, 152, JJ:32 / KJN 2, 141. (Translation slightly modified.) 16 porphyry, Life of Pythagoras, 28; iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 90–93. the story of Abaris flying on the arrow originated from Heraclides Ponticus, who wrote a book on Abaris now lost. 17 Die Geschichten des Herodotus, vol. 1, p. 326. 18 in a contemporary source, o. Wolff’s Historisk Ordbog, vols. 1–11, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1807–19, vol. 1, p. 6 (which does not appear in The Auction Catalogue), it says that “according to Porphyry and Iamblichus, he [Abaris] received from Apollo a flying arrow, on which he rode through the air.” In Louis Moréri’s Le Grand Dictionnaire historique ou la Mélange curieux de l’histoire sacrée et profane, vols. 1–6, Basel: Jean Brandmuller 1731–32, which Kierkegaard owned (ASKB 1965–1969), he could also have read about abaris in vol. 1, pp. 7–8, that as priest of apollo, “il avoir reçu de ce Dieu une fléche volante, que Jamblichus dit avoir été d’or, sur laquelle il traversoit les airs, comme s’il eût été monté sur un Pégase: ce qui lui donnoit cette facilité merveilleuse avec laquelle il faisoit les longs voyages qu’on lui attribuë.” 14 15

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in Book 1, herodotus treats the history of lydia, and we learn of the terrible destiny of King Croesus. having subdued the greek cities on the west coast and almost all other nations in asia minor, sardis was at the height of its wealth. solon of athens, one of the famous seven sages, paid a visit to Croesus, who, as herodotus says, “bade his servants lead solon round among his treasures, and they showed him all that was there, the greatness and the prosperous state of it” (Histories, 1.30). actually, for chronological reasons, solon could not have visited lydia at this time, but as how and Wells write in their commentary on herodotus, “it is best to look upon the tale as a piece of popular philosophy, in which Croesus and solon are introduced as illustrations, on ethical and not on historial grounds.”19 herodotus wishes to exemplify one of his main motifs, hybris as being the cause of the changes of fortune. Croesus asks solon who is the happiest, and solon answers him that a very rich person “is not more blest than he who has but enough for the day, unless fortune so attend him that he ends his life well....We must look to the conclusion of every matter, and see how it shall end, for there are many to whom heaven has given a vision of blessedness, and yet afterwards brought them to utter ruin” (Histories, 1.32). after solon’s departure, nemesis, divine anger, falls heavily upon Croesus: his son is killed by accident, and later, sardis is captured by the persians, and Croesus overthrown. in the Journal JJ, Kierkegaard reflects on Solon’s answer in this way: “Solon’s proposition that no one, as long as he lives, dares count himself happy, contains a profound sorrow over life; for really it says no one is happy until the moment he has been so, and then in a way he is unhappy, because he knows his happiness as something bygone.”20 In the first of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1843, “love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins,” Kierkegaard compares Christian to “heathen love” and the divine hatred that it implies: the pagan, too, extolled love, its beauty and its power; but his love could turn into something else that he extolled almost more. love was beautiful, more beautiful than everything; but revenge was sweet, sweeter than everything....no wonder that no love was happy, just as no one in paganism was happy before the last hour had come, which in turn could only bitterly mock a person with the idea that he had been happy! no wonder that sorrow infiltrated all joy, that the next moment, even in the moment of joy, incessantly walked by as alarming as the figure of death!21

there are several other places where Kierkegaard might have in mind the saying of solon, but we cannot be certain in the cases where paganism or solon are not implied; this is because “all’s well that ends well” is also a common saying in a Danish context. Take for instance the speech “At a Graveside” in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions: “The end alone decides whether one has been happy,”22

W.W. how and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus: With Introduction and Appendixes, vols. 1–2, oxford: Clarendon press 1928 or later [1912]; vol. 1, p. 67. 20 SKS 18, 148, JJ:15 / KJN 2, 138. 21 SKS 5, 66.2–21 / EUD, 55–6. 22 SKS 5, 464.5–6 / TD, 96. 19

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Works of Love: “Count no man happy as long as he is living,”23 or Christian Discourses: “i will remind myself that never has anyone been so fortunate that he could not become unfortunate, and never anyone so unfortunate that he could not become more unfortunate.”24 this universal thought is found also, for example, in the Book of sirach, 1:34, and different variations of it are expressed in several danish proverbs, too.25 an amusing allegorical angle is found in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits in “An Occasional Discourse,” where one reads that “no horse may count itself happy before it is dead.”26 once captured and imprisoned, Croesus is set on a pyre by the persian king, Cyrus. he remembers the saying of solon, that no living man was blest, and three times shouts out his name (Histories, 1.86). Kierkegaard refers to this in “the Unhappiest One” in Either/Or: “the person who is sure that he is the unhappiest one does not need to fear fortune: he will not taste the humiliation of having to shout in his final hour: Solon, Solon, Solon!”27 the doctrine of nemesis found so strongly in herodotus, or generally in greek traditional religion, was of course common knowledge at Kierkegaard’s time. it is possible, however, that at some time he might also have read Johan ludvig heiberg’s (1791–1860) treatise or essay on this concept, “nemesis: a popular-philosophical Investigation,” originally published in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post in 1827.28 in the first section, Heiberg treats the ancient concept of Nemesis in different perspectives, and he concludes in this way: in the other place where homer uses the word νέμεσις, namely, Odyss. ii, 136,29 the transition of this concept to the concept of Dike is already discernable. so also in herodotus in his story about polycrates’ ring (Thalia [Histories, Book 3], 40 and ff.), where he does not mention nemesis by her name [considered as goddess], but expresses the concept with the words, τὸ θεῖον φθονερόν. here τὸ θεῖον (the divine) is justice, SKS 9, 39.2–3 / WL, 31. SKS 10, 269.19ff. / CD, 255. 25 see, for instance, SKS K9, explanatory note to 39.2, with reference to e. mau, Dansk Ordsprogs-Skat, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: g.e.C. gad 1879; vol. 1, p. 646. 26 SKS 8, 208.29–30 / UD, 105. in a number of cases, Kierkegaard speaks of deceptive happiness in paganism, where one only learns afterwards whether one has been happy; but it cannot be determined with absolute certainty if he is thinking of herodotus here. see, for example, Stages on Life’s Way, SKS 6, 103.25–6 / SLW, 108; Postscript, SKS 7, 40.7–8 / CUP1, 33, note. 27 SKS 2, 215.6–8 / EO1, 221. According to Herodotus, this was not the “last hour” of Croesus, who was spared. 28 Johan Ludvig Heiberg, “Nemesis. Et populair-philosophisk Forsøg,” published in four parts in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, nos. 41 and 43–5 on may 21 and 28 and on June 1 and 4, 1827. these early issues do not appear in The Auction Catalogue (cf. ASKB 1606–1607), but Kierkegaard probably read the essay in heiberg’s Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1841–43; vol. 3, pp. 199–238 (ASKB 1560). an english translation is found in Heiberg’s Contingency Regarded from the Point of View of Logic and Other Texts, ed. and trans. by Jon stewart, Copenhagen: museum tusculanum press 2008 (Texts from Golden Age Denmark, vol. 4), pp. 101–25. 29 The first place Heiberg mentions is the Iliad, 3.156. 23 24

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Finn Gredal Jensen but by calling it φθονερόν (jealous) he thereby prepares the transition from unconscious justice to the conscious justice, or from Nemesis to Dike. Among all the finely nuanced mythological figures, contingency is the one that with the slightest movement in the concept immediately switches over to the other. this view of Nemesis-Dike is the foundation for the entire history of herodotus, and in the tragedians, from aeschylus to euripides, it little by little passes over into a pure dike.30

Book 2 of herodotus, which is a large digression on egypt, does not seem to have interested Kierkegaard much. in Notebook 7 we find an entry that reads as follows: “there is a rambling raisonnement which in its interminability has the same relation to the result as the incalculable lists of Egyptian kings have to the historical outcome.” however, the source of this is probably not herodotus, but rather g.W.F. hegel’s (1770–1831) Lectures on the Philosophy of History.31 only in Notebook 11 does Kierkegaard indirectly mention a few phenomena that appear in Book 2, especially the idea of dionysus, but the only reason he does so is because F.W.J. schelling (1775–1854) discusses these matters in his Philosophie der Offenbarung, of which the notebook is an account.32 Another of the Seven Sages was Periander, the Corinthian tyrant. In the fifth episode in “ ‘Guilty?’ / ‘Not Guilty?’ ” in Stages on Life’s Way, Kierkegaard pays considerable attention to him.33 the piece bears the strange title, “the reading Lesson” with the subrubric “Periander.” Herodotus deals with Periander’s domestic feuds in Histories, 3.48–53. according to Kierkegaard, however, his primary source was Fénelon’s biographies, which he owned in a german translation;34 this is clear Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, no. 41, may 21, 1827, last page; cf. heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, pp. 210–11. translation from Heiberg’s Contingency Regarded from the Point of View of Logic and Other Texts, p. 109. in a footnote to this passage heiberg refers to poul martin møller’s (1794–1838) interesting latin treatise “de invidia diis ab herodoto et æqualibus attributa pauca commentatus est Paulus Möller, Scholæ Adjunctus” [“On the envy attributed to the gods by herodotus and his Contemporaries: some Considerations by Poul Møller, Adjunct at the School”], published in 1823 in the Metropolitan School’s Examen publicum anniversarium in Schola Metropolitana X Calendarum Octobris A. MDCCCXXIII habendum indicit Rector Scholæ Nicolaus Lang Nissen, doctor philosophiæ et magister artium atque professor, havniae mdCCCXXiii: typis schultzianis, pp. 1–32. since this treatise was not included in møller’s Posthumous Writings (ASKB 1574–1576), Kierkegaard probably never read it. 31 SKS 19, 213, not7:29 / JP 5, 5497; cf. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. by eduard gans, vol. 9 [1837], in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: verlag von duncker und humblot 1832–45, p. 244. 32 see, for example, lecture no. 41, not11:39, SKS 19, 366.19ff., and compare Histories, 2.49 and 2.146. schelling also refers to, among other places, Histories, 1.131, cf. SKS 19, 360.8–9 (on the persians’ worship of the heavenly bodies), and Histories, 1.199, cf. SKS 19, 360.11ff. (on the custom of public adultery in the temple of melita). 33 SKS 6, 301–5 / SLW, 323–8. the theme of periander is anticipated SKS 6, 288.7–8 / SLW, 310, saying that he “talked like a wise man and acted like a lunatic.” 34 part v in the german translation of François de salignac de la mothe-Fénelon: Herrn von Fenelon weiland Erzbischofs und Herzogs zu Cambray Kurze Lebens-Beschreibungen 30

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not only from the fact that he refers to Fénelon as a “moralist,” calling Periander a fool (French, “un fat”) among the sages,35 but also from an entry in the Journal JJ, where reference is made to “something i have not read before and which is extremely interesting and poetic” in Fénelon’s section on Periander.36 although this is evident, we cannot rule out completely the possibility that sooner or later he had also read about periander in the original source, herodotus. Besides, it is not clear what is meant by the words “something I have not read before,” which might only refer to Fénelon as something not read. in addition, Kierkegaard was presumably familiar with the relevant facts from diogenes laertius, 1.94–100.37 What fascinates him seems to be the contrast of wisdom and madness. periander is a good ruler in his home town Corinth but later turns mad and evil. it is not clear what makes his madness break out: the disgrace caused by the rumor of a punishable relation to his mother,38 a piece of advice of his friend thrasybulus to eliminate rivals, or the fact that in anger he killed his wife melissa. he banishes to Cercyra one of his sons, lycophron, who mourned for her. When the Cercyreans have lycophron killed, periander has three hundred of their boys abducted and castrated. in his own death, his cruelty is combined with his wisdom: he did not want his grave to be known and therefore asked two young men to go to a fixed place and kill the first person they happened to meet and bury him; then he had four and eight men do the same with two and four people, and then “periander himself came at the appointed hour and was murdered.”39 since this suicidal death of periander is not mentioned by Herodotus, it is clear that he could not be the (first) source.40

und Lehr-Sätze der alten Welt-Weise, trans. and annotated by J.m. von loen, Frankfurt and leipzig: Fleischer 1748 (ASKB 486; originally in French 1697), pp. 78–91. 35 SKS 6, 301.9–13 / SLW, 323. 36 SKS 18, 217, JJ:238 / KJN 2, 199. Kierkegaard refers to pp. 80–7. in the draft Pap. v B 124 (ms 20 in the description of the manuscripts in SKS K6, p. 27), he refers to his own copy of Fénelon (ASKB 486), pp. 79ff. 37 Kierkegaard had riisbrigh’s danish translation, Diogen Laërtses filosofiske Historie, eller: navnkundige Filosofers Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn, i ti Bøger, vols. 1–2, trans. by Børge riisbrigh and ed. by Børge thorlacius, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1812 (ASKB 1110–1111), in which periander is treated in vol. 1, pp. 42–5. he also had a greek edition, Diogenis Laertii de Vitis Philosophorum libri X, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1833 (ASKB 1109). 38 this element is not found in herodotus, but in diogenes laertius, 1.96. 39 SKS 6, 304.32–305.7 / SLW, 328. 40 Fénelon’s source in this case seems to be diogenes laertius, 1.96, but his main source was herodotus. For example, Kierkegaard also mentions that in old age periander sent his daughter to persuade lycophron to return from Cercyra, but this element is missing in diogenes laertius, 1.95; in herodotus’ Histories, 3.53, however, we hear the sister admonishing him, “Child, would you want the power to fall to others, and our father’s house destroyed, rather than to return and have it yourself? Come home and stop punishing yourself. pride is an unhappy possession. do not cure evil by evil. many place the more becoming thing before the just; and many pursuing their mother’s business have lost their father’s. power is a slippery thing; many want it, and our father is now old and past his prime; do not lose what is yours to others.”

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another episode in Book 3 is the story of the pseudo-smerdis, who pretended to be the brother of the persian King Cambyses (Histories, 3.61–79). Kierkegaard, whose direct source in this case seems to be Becker’s History of the World, refers briefly to the external mark of the deceiver in Philosophical Fragments at the end of Chapter 4 on “The Situation of the Contemporary Follower.” In the autopsy of faith, every noncontemporary (in the sense of immediacy) is in turn a contemporary. if someone coming later, someone who may even be carried away by his own infatuation, wishes to be a contemporary (in the sense of immediacy), he demonstrates that he is an imposter, recognizable, like the false smerdis, by his having no ears—namely, the ears of faith— even though he may have the long donkey ears with which one, although listening as a contemporary (in the sense of immediacy), does not become contemporary.41

In the first part of Book 4, Herodotus treats Scythia and the Scythian expedition of the persian King darius (Histories, 4.1–144). this has very little to do with his main subject, but to an inquisitive herodotus everything seems interesting, in this case a study of an uncivilized people. We cannot say whether Kierkegaard read Book 4, when in The Concept of Anxiety he uses the scythians in the following comparison: “in the old days, the road to perfection was narrow and solitary. the journey along it was always disturbed by abberations, exposed to predatory attacks by sin, and pursued by the arrow of the past, which is as dangerous as that of the scythian hordes. now one travels to perfection by railway in good company, and before he knows it, he has arrived.”42 Book 5 deals primarily with the events leading up the ionian revolt, beginning in miletus 499 b.c. With an athenian alliance, the ionians attack and burn sardis, the satrapal capital of the persians. King darius, when hearing of this, “called for his bow, which he took, and laid an arrow on it and shot it into the sky, praying as he sent it aloft, ‘o zeus, grant me vengeance on the athenians,’ and therewithal he charged one of his servants to say to him thrice whenever dinner was set before him, ‘Master, remember the Athenians’ ” (Histories, 5.105). In “ ‘Guilty?’ / ‘Not Guilty?’ ” in Stages on Life’s Way, Quidam refers to this memento in the following way: darius or Xerxes, no matter which one, had a slave who reminded him about waging war against the Greeks. Since I dare not confide in anyone, I must be satisfied with having my reminder within myself. in my whole existence, i produce a halfness that is a memento. everything i buy, i buy double. my table is set for two; coffee is served for two; when i take a drive i always ride as if i had a lady beside me.43

later on, in Works of Love, the memento becomes far more forceful: “let the thunder of a hundred cannons remind you three times a day to resist the force of habit. like that mighty Eastern emperor, keep a slave who reminds you daily, keep hundreds.”44 SKS 4, 271.1–7 / PF, 70; cf. Becker, Verdenshistorie, vol. 1, pp. 15–17. SKS 4, 419.5–10 / CA, 117. 43 SKS 6, 274.19–24 / SLW, 295. 44 SKS 9, 44.22–4 / WL, 37. Kierkegaard later uses the same story in For Self-Examination (1851), expanding it in the following reflections: “That mighty emperor in the East, whose wrath the renowned little nation had incurred, is said to have had a slave who every day said 41 42

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Kierkegaard also uses the formula “that mighty Eastern emperor,” referring to darius’ son, Xerxes, who, like Croesus, was one of the more prominent victims of nemesis. a draft of the preface to Works of Love which Kierkegaard did not use and which appears in the Journal NB2, begins in this way: that great eastern emperor intended to perform so many and so great exploits that he had to take along a large number of writers in order to make complete and accurate reports. This would all have been fine and would have worked if the emperor’s numerous and great exploits had amounted to something and if in any case he had to take along an adequate number of writers. But Christian love! it is so unlike the mighty eastern emperor....45

the use of scribes possibly refers to Histories, 7.100, where Xerxes inspects his army: “riding in a chariot past the men of each nation, he questioned them, and his scribes wrote all down.” after his father’s defeat at marathon, Xerxes prepares a new campaign against the greeks. When crossing the hellespont, he punishes the sea by means of whipping it: “no sooner had the strait been bridged than a great storm swept down and broke and scattered all that work. When Xerxes heard of that, he was very angry, and gave command that the hellespont be scourged with three hundred lashes, and a pair of fetters be thrown into the sea”; and Herodotus adds: “Nay, I have heard ere now that he sent branders with the rest to brand the Hellespont” (Histories, 7.34–5).46 in general, herodotus portrays Xerxes as wild and unpredictable, an arrogant despot, and already the incident with the punishment of the hellespont makes clear why nemesis is his inevitable reward.47 the greeks could understand neither the persian luxury,48 nor the

to him: remember to take revenge. that was indeed something to remember; it seems to me it would have been better to have a slave who reminded him every day to forget. Yet this is not such a good thing either, because if one is reminded every day to forget, one never does really forget. But in any case this sovereign understood very well—precisely because he was angry (and anger, though not commendable, is a quality of personality)—the conduct required when an impression is to be made personally to someone.” SKS 13, 63–4 / FSE, 37. see also the Journal NB24 from the same year, 1851: “the mighty emperor in the east had a slave to remind him to inflict vengeance on that little nation.” SKS 24, 340.3–4, nB24:39 / JP 4, 4562. 45 SKS 20, 167.16–22, nB2:65 / JP 3, 2409. Cf. the Critical account to Works of Love in SKS K9, pp. 84–5; see also p. 87, from which it is clear that, according to the draft ms 2.8.5, Kierkegaard later considered working the piece into Works of Love, part ii, at the end of Chapter X. 46 Kierkegaard could also have read Becker’s retelling, Verdenshistorie, p. 106, which runs: “Herodotus tells (vii B 35 Cap.), that Xerxes not only had the construction foreman [of the bridges] executed but also had the sea given three hundred lashes and had a pair of foot-irons thrown into it; an account or rumor, which certainly was believed and retold by the freedom-loving greeks because the despotism which they so despised thereby showed itself in all its vileness.” 47 on Xerxes as a victim of nemesis, compare also aeschylus’ Persians. 48 The word “Persian” was in later times always associated with splendor and luxuriousness, cf. Persicos odi, puer, adparatus, horace, Odes, 1.38.1.

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groveling subservience which the persians practiced; for free men this kind of behavior was deeply shameful.49 of course, one might say, the episode with the hellespont appealed to Kierkegaard, who uses it more than once, the first time in the preface to Either/Or, in which victor eremita in anger fetches an axe to open a desk: “the blood rushed to my head; i was furious. Just as Xerxes had the sea whipped, so i decided to take terrible revenge. a hatchet was fetched. I gave the desk a terrible blow with it.”50 In “In vino veritas” in Stages on Life’s Way, Constantin Constantius also lets Xerxes whip the sea, but calls it a “jest.”51 in one of the late journals, Journal NB28 from 1853, Kierkegaard returns for a last time to the persian king: the abundance of talk about how blessed it is to have a personal god is like all the other hypocrisy one hears. in one sense, yes, but in another it is really far easier to have a blind fate to deal with, for in blind “fate” there is nothing inciting; one has to be as insane as Xerxes to be incited by the sea and natural forces.52

apart from Xerxes, some other components of Book 7 caught Kierkegaard’s eye. in the second of the Three Upbuilding Discourses of 1844, he draws attention to a special phenomenon: “For a moment, let us speak metaphorically....an army sometimes has a select little troop called the immortal battalion, and a warrior esteems it a great honor to be accepted into it.”53 Kierkegaard imagines a person who is just as keen on eternal blessedness as such a warrior was on being taken up into the immortal troop. Although the troop is designated as “small,” Kierkegaard presumably has in mind Histories, 7.83, which says that a persian general, hydarnes, picked ten thousand men, “who were called immortals for this reason, that when any one of them fell out of the number by force of death or sickness, another was chosen, and so they were never more or fewer than ten thousand.”54 the climax of Book 7 is the battle at thermopylae, the pass between the mountains and the sea where the greeks, led by the spartan King leonidas, tried to hold the invading persians. they fought for three days, but in vain, and leonidas died heroically: “There in that travail fell Leonidas, fighting most gallantly, and with him other famous Spartans” (Histories, 7.224). in the Journal NB2 from 1847, Cf. Xenophon’s portrayal of the persian customs in the Anabasis; as example of submission, see 1.5.8, where Cyrus’ fine people of the court throw themselves into the mud in order to free the wagons. the greek mercenaries’ respect for their persian employers is limited to the financial motivation. The idealized picture of a “foreign” ruler, which one finds in the Cyropaedia, is rather Xenophon’s own invention; how this work’s idea and purpose should be interpreted has been much discussed; if nothing else it shows Xenophon’s openness for a culture other than that of the greeks. 50 SKS 2, 13.32–5 / EO1, 6. 51 SKS 6, 52.8 / SLW, 49. 52 SKS 25, 281.25–31, nB28:89 / JP 2, 1437. 53 SKS 5, 264.27–31 / EUD, 269. 54 “The Immortals” are also mentioned in Becker, Verdenshistorie, vol. 1, pp. 122–3 (“the picked persian Corps, the so-called immortals, which is mentioned by Hydarnes, marched forward in order to put right the defeat which the first part of the army had suffered”), but not—as in herodotus—in connection with Xerxes’ review of the army. 49

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Kierkegaard writes: “he who stood and fell at the pass of thermopylae did not have a sounder position than i have at the pass and the narrows of the category of the individual—through which the age must go—for precisely when it walks this path over my body I shall have been victorious, which he was not.”55 also in the next journal, in its last entry NB3:77, he reflects on the subject of “the single individual,” and develops the comparison with leonidas even further: “The single individual” is the category through which, in a religious sense, the age, history, the generation must go. and the one who stood and fell at thermopylae was not as secure as I who stand at this narrow pass, “the single individual.” His particular task was to keep the hordes from pressing through the narrow pass; if they pressed through, he had lost. My task is easier, at least at first sight, and exposes me far less to the danger of being trampled down, since it is as an insignificant servant to help, if possible, the hordes press through this narrow gate, “the single individual,” through which, please note, no one in all eternity gets through without becoming “the single individual.”56

as in many other cases, we cannot say whether Kierkegaard read the original source or Becker’s History of the World.57 presumably, he read both. otherwise, why would he possess three critical editions of herodotus in greek and a german translation without ever using them?58 in the case of homer, for instance, it is clear that what Kierkegaard read in school originally and remembered by heart, he used later on in his writings.59 surprisingly, this is not the case with herodotus; on the contrary, Kierkegaard in his writings pays no attention at all to the last two books of The Histories, Books 8 and 9 that he knew from school. This significant difference might be just a coincidence, and we need not search for other explanations, such as assuming that he might have considered these two books more “boring” or unsuited for his purposes. We can assume another thing, however, namely, that he often used especially Becker’s retelling of herodotus, which does not exclude, of course, that he consulted the greek original or Friedrich lange’s german translation in his library. the question of sources is not as important, though, as noting in general, as we have seen in many different cases, that the themes of Herodotus and in particular his flair for a good story had a great appeal to Kierkegaard, who was often inspired by the pregnant examples and rich anecdotes provided by the “Father of History.”

SKS 20, 208, nB2:169 / JP 2, 2002. SKS 20, 280.4–17, nB3:77 / JP 2, 2004. 57 Becker, Verdenshistorie, vol. 1, pp. 119–28. 58 one should add, as mentioned earlier, that it is disputed whether the books in the appendices were actually from Kierkegaard’s library; but the copies of the greek edition, ASKB 1116, and of lange’s translation, ASKB 1117, indisputably were. 59 See my article “Homer: Kierkegaard’s Use of the Homeric Poems” in the present volume. 55 56

Bibliography I. Herodotus’ histories in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσῆος ἱστοριῶν λόγοι θ´ ἐπιγραφόμενοι μοῦσαι. Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri IX Musarum nominibus inscripti, vol. 1, part 1, ed. by Friedrich Wolfgang reiz and gottfried heinrich schäfer, 4th ed., leipzig: schwickert 1825, and vol. 1, part 2, [probably] 3rd ed., leipzig: schwickert 1822 (ASKB 1116). the same, vol. 1, part 1, [probably] 3rd ed., leipzig: schwickert 1816, and vol. 1, part 2, 2nd ed., leipzig: schwickert 1813 (ASKB a i 158–159). Die Geschichten des Herodotus, vols. 1–2, trans. by Friedrich lange, Berlin: realschulbuchhandlung 1811–12 (ASKB 1117). An unspecified stereotype edition of Herodotus in three volumes (ASKB a ii 37– 39). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to Herodotus Becker, Karl Friedrich, Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29; vol. 2, p. 7; p. 402 (ASKB 1972–1983). Brøchner, hans, Om det jødiske Folks Tilstand i den persiske Periode, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1845; p. 38; p. 71, note (ASKB 2037). Flögel, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte der komischen Litteratur, vols. 1–4, liegnitz and leipzig: d. giegert 1784–87; vol. 1, p. 237 (ASKB 1396–1399). hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845; p. 52; p. 87, note; p. 90; p. 100, note (ASKB 534). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, p. 59; p. 444; vol. 3, p. 209 (ASKB 536– 544). hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 134; p. 180; p. 191; p. 197; p. 222; p. 225; pp. 270–1 (ASKB 557–559). —— Vermischte Schriften, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich Förster and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1834–35 (vols. 16–17 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

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Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 410 (ASKB 555–556). —— Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 546; vol. 2, p. 25; p. 36; p. 68; p. 278; pp. 280–1; pp. 285–7; pp. 291–4; pp. 406–7; pp. 451–2; vol. 3, p. 240; p. 257 (ASKB 1384–1386). —— Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised edition, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 217; p. 287; p. 413; p. 417; pp. 437–8; p. 444; p. 446; vol. 2, p. 119 (ASKB 564–565). —— Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von henning, Carl ludwig michelet, and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840–45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 6, p. 140, note; vol. 7.1, p. 676 (ASKB 561–563). Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, “Nemesis. Et populair-philosophisk Forsøg,” in his Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1841–43; vol. 3, pp. 199–238; pp. 210–11 (ASKB 1560). Kanne, Johann arnold, Die goldenen Aerse der Philister. Eine Antiquarische Untersuchung, nuremberg: riegel und Wießner 1820, p. 3; p. 9; p. 17; p. 54 (ASKB 588). [lessing, gotthold ephraim], Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s sämmtliche Schriften, vols. 1–32, vols. 1–28, Berlin: vossische Buchhandlung 1825–27; vols. 29–32 Berlin and stettin: nicolai 1828, vol. 25 (Hamburgische Dramaturgie, 89. stück), pp. 260–1 (ASKB 1747–1762). michelet, Karl ludwig, Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes, Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1841; p. 34 (ASKB 680). montaigne, michel de, Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99; vol. 3, p. 471 (ASKB 681–687). mothe-Fénelon, François de salignac de la, Herrn von Fenelon weiland Erzbischofs und Herzogs zu Cambray Kurze Lebens-Beschreibungen und Lehr-Sätze der alten Welt-Weisen, trans. and annotated by J.m. von loen, Frankfurt and leipzig: Fleischer 1748; pp. 78–91 (ASKB 486). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57]; vol. 3, p. 43 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, De speculativa historiæ sacræ tractandæ methodo commentatio, Copenhagen: tengnagel 1840, p. 11, note (ASKB 697). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummers Forlag 1830, p. 28; pp. 128–31; p. 143 (ASKB 1037).

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steffens, henrich, Anthropologie, vols.1–2, Breslau: Josef max 1822, vol. 2, p. 367; p. 419 (ASKB 795–796). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 216; p. 517; vol. 2, p. 400; p. 580; vol. 3, p. 259 (ASKB 1365–1369). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Herodotus holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 37; p. 41; pp. 49–50; pp. 53–5; p. 63; p. 69; pp. 74–5; pp. 80–3; pp. 85–6; p. 88; pp. 97–8; pp. 100–1; p. 104; pp. 110–11; pp. 113–15; p. 123; p. 125; p. 133.

hesiod: Kierkegaard and the greek gods nicolae irina

I. Hesiod, the First Didactic Poet the historical details concerning hesiod’s life are uncertain. the exact year of his birth cannot be determined with accuracy, but it is highly plausible that it was not earlier than 750 or later than 720 bc. it seems that he was born and brought up in ascra, at the foot of mount helicon in Boetia. But this too is controversial. another city, namely, orchomenus, claimed to be hesiod’s birthplace and to possess his relics. Hesiod is considered to be the first of the didactic poets and the systematizer of greek mythology. notwithstanding, he is rarely mentioned as one of the poets of the first rank in the history of European literature. Yet, as Robert Lamberton puts it, “he is our principal source for the earliest recorded phase of greek ideas about the gods and the relations of gods and men, [offering] what appears to be the first picture of the society and economy of rural greece as it emerged from the dark age that separates European prehistory from European history.”1 the myths of prometheus, pandora, and the golden age have their origins in Hesiod’s poetry. The Golden Age is the first in the succession of the “races of men,” ending with the iron age. as West points out, every allusion to a golden age in Western literature “derives directly or indirectly from this passage of Hesiod.”2 The two most celebrated works attributed to Hesiod with a degree of confidence are the Theogony and the Works and Days. it is through his theogonic poetry that Hesiod fulfills the commission from the Muses to be their prophet poet. The Theogony consists of a cosmogony, a theogony proper, and an unfinished heroogony. the content of the Works and Days is diverse. its seemingly irregular structure owes much to various starting points in the poem, which gradually developed and took on a life of its own.

1

p. xiii.

robert lamberton, Hesiod, new haven and london: Yale university press 1988,

hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, trans. by Martin Litchfield West, Oxford and new York: oxford university press 1999, p. xiv; see also hesiod, Works and Days (108ff.), in ibid., pp. 40–1.

2

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II. Kierkegaard’s References to Hesiod søren aabye’s greek teacher was peter Christian, Kierkegaard’s elder brother. among the weekly hours of instruction in the danish educational system, there were six hours devoted to greek and thirteen to latin. indeed, the school curriculum for the two ancient languages was considerable. according to Joakim garff, “when søren aabye went up for his matriculation examinations in latin he was responsible for more than 11,000 lines of poetry and 1,250 pages of prose….the required curriculum in greek was not as extensive, but still quite considerable: almost 10,000 lines of poetry and more than 300 pages of prose—plus the Gospel of John!”3 the demanding danish instructional system paid off, however. Kierkegaard was acquainted with ancient greek texts in general, and he was familiar with many of hesiod’s theogonic tenets in particular. nevertheless, direct references in Kierkegaard’s writings to hesiod and his works are scarce. an example of a direct reference can be found in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, part i. Kierkegaard’s discussion of the second of lessing’s “possible and actual theses” is mainly an attempt to clarify the nature of “the existing subjective thinker, [who] is continually in the process of becoming, that is, striving.”4 there, Johannes Climacus recalls plutarch’s words about hesiod: “[he] assumed Chaos, Earth, Tartarus, and Eros to be primordial entities.”5 For him, this claim is sufficient to justify a connection with plato’s Symposium and, subsequently, it allows him to consider plato’s view there that “erotic love manifestly means existence or that by which life is in everything, the life that is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite,”6 as Kierkegaard phrases it. thus, for Kierkegaard, hesiod’s primordial entity, love (Eros) means pathos-filled existence, “that child who is begotten by the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, and is therefore continually striving.”7 however, for the most part, the references to hesiod in Kierkegaard’s works are indirect indeed. For instance, in Either/Or, part i, a makes a toast in front of the “Fellowship of the Dead,” invoking the “silent night, the eternal mother of everything”: “From you comes everything; to you everything returns.”8 the implicit reference is certainly to hesiod’s Theogony where night is described as the daughter of Chaos and mother of the ether and day.9 in fact, there are some editorial notes that offer some direct references to hesiod, but only by way of quotations from plato’s dialogues. these notes illustrate how Kierkegaard, while reading plato, had the opportunity to consider hesiod’s thought. Joakim garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. by Bruce Kirmmse, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2005, p. 22. 4 SKS 7, 80 / CUP1, 80. 5 SKS 7, 91 / CUP1, 92. Cf. Plutarch, “Isis and Osiris,” 57, Moralia, 374. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vols. 1–15, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt et al., Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press, 1967–84 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 5, p. 137.) 6 SKS 7, 91 / CUP1, 92. 7 ibid. 8 SKS 2, 166 / EO1, 168. 9 hesiod, Theogony (123–5), p. 6. West actually chooses “Chasm” and “Bright Air” instead of “Chaos” and “Ether.” 3

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For example, in “On the Occasion of a Wedding,” from the Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, the editors suggest that when Kierkegaard quotes the “ancient saying [which] states that love is older than anything else,”10 he actually refers to a passage in plato’s Symposium, where socrates recalls phaedrus’ mention of hesiod and his view of the rise of the earth and the subsequent emergence of love from Chaos.11 Kierkegaard adds that “many a beautiful and many a profound thought is linked to this saying in order with its assistance to explain existence,”12 and thus he alludes to his examination of Lessing’s thesis on the “existing subjective thinker” mentioned above. occasional remarks alluding to hesiod can also be found here and there. in a journal entry dated July 10, 1840, Kierkegaard recalls Socrates’ ideas of “immortality” and the “association with Homer in the other life, etc.”13 the commentators refer to the whole passage from plato’s Apology (40e–41d) where socrates expresses his trust that leaving for the other world will be a rewarding journey since, on his arrival, he will meet hesiod and homer, among others.14 assuredly, an immediate connection could be made between hesiod’s myth of the first woman and Kierkegaard’s version in Stages on Life’s Way.15 In “The Banquet,” Johannes the seducer offers his own interpretation of the myth. gods envious of men created the first woman as a unique and marvelous power able to compel man. the woman brings mankind’s punishment in her own person, just as in hesiod’s Works and Days where the woman is identified by name as Pandora, the ancestress of all women, and “releases all ills into the world by opening a jar16 in which they had been confined.”17 in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, there is an allusion to the opening of the jar, too. here, Kierkegaard recalls that “when all misfortunes befell the human race, hope still remained.”18 the Theogony version of the myth of the gods’ creation of the first woman and her descendants (“a great affliction to mortals [and] conspirators in causing difficulty”) is slightly different,19 since it contains no mention of the jar or of pandora’s name. in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard makes an interesting analogy, noting that gods piled mountains upon the titans assaulting heaven “in order to constrain them, [and likewise] the pastor should also lay the hundredweight of the religious task upon every mutineer (by laying it, of course, upon himself).”20 niels thulstrup claims in his commentary that it was actually not the titans but the SKS 5, 423 / TD, 47. Cf. hesiod, Theogony, (116–19), p. 6. Cf. plato, Symposium (178 a–c). For the editorial reference, see TD, notes, p. 161, note 5. 12 SKS 5, 423 / TD, 47. 13 Pap. iii a 7 / PF, supplement, p. 232. 14 PF, notes, p. 342, note 2. 15 Cf. SLW, notes, p. 691, note 211. 16 hesiod talks about the typical greek storage jar, a clay vessel almost a meter high. 17 hesiod, Theogony and Works and Days, pp. xiii–xiv. For this version of pandora’s myth, see hesiod, Works and Days (60–104), pp. 38–40. 18 SKS 9, 259 / WL, 259. 19 hesiod, Theogony (572–600), pp. 20–1. 20 SKS 7, 437 / CUP1, 482. 10 11

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giants who stormed olympus.21 thulstrup refers to Wilhelm vollmer’s Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen that Kierkegaard owned.22 Yet, in fact, both titans and giants fought against the olympians, separately. in his reference to the giants, Kierkegaard notes on January 20, 1839, that “hegel is a Johannes Climacus, who does not storm the heavens like the giants by putting mountain upon mountain, but enters it by way of his syllogisms.”23 he refers here to the battle between the giants and the olympians helped by hercules. in order to elucidate this passage, the commentators refer to paul Friedrich a. nitsch’s Neues mythologiches Wörterbuch, also present in Kierkegaard’s library.24 Kierkegaard’s aforementioned reference in the Postscript to the mythological passage involving the titans buried in rocks (not mountains) is indeed accurate. hesiod indicates that the hecatonchires (Kottos, Briareos and gyges, each with 100 arms and 50 heads), the guardians of zeus, “engaged the titans in grim slaughter, with sheer cliffs in their stalwart hands.”25 according to hesiod, these gargantuan figures, brothers of Kronos (Zeus’ father), with “a hundred arms [that] sprang from the shoulders of each of them, and [the] fifty heads [that] grew from their shoulders above their stalwart limbs,”26 were in fact the ones who helped zeus, their rescuer,27 to defeat the titans: three hundred rocks from their stalwart hands they discharged in a volley, darkening the titans’ sky with missiles. and they dispatched them below the wide-pathed earth, and bound them in painful bondage, having defeated them by force for all their pride: as far below the earth as heaven is from the earth, for so far it is from earth to misty tartarus.28

as we noticed, hesiod is unmistakably a highly regarded ancient authority for Kierkegaard. Hesiod’s view on the gods’ relations and their actions justifies the logic of the connection with plato that Kierkegaard makes in the Postscript, and it even helps his mouthpieces shape their lectures on love, night, and women, as see søren Kierkegaard, Afsluttende uvidenskabelige Efterskrift, vols. 1–2, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1962, see vol. 1, p. 473, note 3 and vol. 2, p. 403. 22 Wilhelm vollmer, Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen. Eine gedrängte Zusammenstellung des Wissenswürdigen aus der Fabel- und Götter-Lehre aller Völker der alten und neuen Welt, stuttgart: hoffmann 1836, p. 774 (ASKB 1942–1943). 23 SKS 17, 277, dd:203 / KJN 1, 268. 24 see paul Friedrich a. nitsch, Neues mythologiches Wörterbuch, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., ed. by Friedrich gotthilf Klopfer, leipzig: sorau 1821, vol. 1, pp. 751–2 (ASKB 1944–1945). 25 hesiod, Theogony (673–4), p. 23. 26 hesiod, Theogony (670–2), p. 23. 27 zeus, son of Kronos, “set his father’s brothers free from their baneful bondage, the sons of heaven [uranus] whom their father in his folly had imprisoned; and they returned thanks for his goodness by giving him thunder and lightning and the smoking bolt, which mighty Earth had kept hidden up to then.” Hesiod, Theogony (500–5), p. 18. For a more detailed story of their birth from Earth and Heaven, their subsequent confinement in a cavern of Earth, and their eventual release by Zeus, “on Earth’s advice,” see Hesiod, Theogony (417ff. and 617ff.), pp. 7–8 and p. 21. 28 hesiod, Theogony (715–24), p. 24. 21

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in Either/Or, part i and Stages on Life’s Way. one could certainly agree in fact that Kierkegaard’s references and allusions to the generations and genealogies of the greek gods, their actions, and their systematically organized divine functions are for the most part direct or indirect references to hesiod.

Bibliography I. Hesiod’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library none. II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to Hesiod [Becker, Karl Friedrich], Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbeidet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann, vols. 1–12, trans. by J. riise, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1822–29, vol. 1, p. 453 (ASKB 1972–1983). Frauenstädt, Julius, Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, p. 32 (ASKB 516). hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 94 (ASKB 534). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 2, p. 124; vol. 3, pp. 2–4; vol. 4, p. 426 (ASKB 536–544). [hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich], Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised ed., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 217; vol. 2, p. 100; p. 119; p. 143 (ASKB 564–565). —— Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832– 45), vol. 1, p. 134; vol. 2, p. 2; p. 25; p. 52; pp. 69–72; vol. 3, p. 328; p. 330; p. 336; p. 410 (ASKB 1384–1386). heiberg, Johan ludvig, Prosaiske Skrifter, vol. 3, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1843 (vol. 3, in Johan ludvig heiberg, Prosaiske Skrifter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1841–43 which is part of Johan Ludvig Heibergs Samlede Skrifter consisting of Skuespil, vols. 1–7, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1833–41 and Digte og Fortællinger, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1834–35), p. 210 (ASKB 1560). michelet, Carl ludwig, Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes, Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1841, p. 34 (ASKB 680).

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[montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99, vol. 3, p. 83; p. 349; p. 515 (ASKB 681–687). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 28; p. 148; p. 157; p. 294; p. 318; p. 352; p. 370; p. 421; p. 437; p. 443; pp. 459–60 (ASKB 1037). schopenhauer, arthur, Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 2, pp. 337–40 (ASKB 774–775). [solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand], K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, p. 285 (ASKB 1387). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 33; vol. 2, p. 179; vol. 3, p. 177 (ASKB 1365–1369). tiedemann, dietrich, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 1, pp. 9ff. (ASKB 836–841). vollmer, Wilhelm, Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen. Eine gedrängte Zusammenstellung des Wissenswürdigen aus der Fabel- und GötterLehre aller Völker der alten und neuen Welt, stuttgart: hoffmann 1836 (ASKB 1942–1943). zeuthen, ludvig, Om Ydmyghed. En Afhandling, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852, p. 64 (ASKB 916). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hesiod holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), pp. 21–2; p. 24; p. 39; p. 46; p. 71; p. 73; pp. 89–92; p. 99; pp. 102–3; p. 127.

homer: Kierkegaard’s use of the homeric poems Finn gredal Jensen

I. The Homeric Poems: General Introduction Western literature begins with the homeric poems: the Iliad and the Odyssey. originally, they were not written literature, but orally transmitted poems, performed by the so-called rhapsodists. To “the Homeric question” many answers have been proposed, especially since the appearance of Friedrich august Wolf’s (1759–1824) landmark work, Prolegomena ad Homerum (1795).1 the continuing dominant conception is that the poems had received their definitive form orally in the 8th century bc.2 theoretically, it cannot be ruled out that the author of the poems is one and the same person, but this is not very probable, particularly because the Iliad must be considerably older; in any case, “Homer” serves as a collective designation for the Iliad and the Odyssey.3 one can only be sure of the fact that the poems appeared in a final written form, a vulgata or κοινή, during the age of the pisistratides at the end

F.a. Wolf, Prolegomena ad Homerum sive de operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi [Introduction to Homer, or, On the Original and Genuine Form of the Homeric Works and their Various Changes and the Correct Manner of Editing Them], first published in Halle, 1795; photographical reprint of the 1884 edition, hildesheim: georg olms 1963. (english translation, F.a. Wolf, Prolegomena to Homer, 1795, with introduction and notes by anthony grafton, glenn W. most, and James e.g. zetzel, princeton: princeton university press 1985.) Wolf argued that the Iliad and the Odyssey in their modern form are not the work of homer but the result of an oral transmission of various smaller units, passed down by the rhapsodists, who learned the pieces by heart and performed them; only later were they collected and written down under pisistratus in athens around 540 bc. 2 see, for instance, g.s. Kirk, The Songs of Homer, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1962; A Companion to Homer, ed. by alan J.B. Wace and Frank h. stubbings, london: macmillan 1962, Chapter 7 by J.a. davison. minna skafte Jensen, The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory, Copenhagen: museum tusculanum press 1980, argues for a final oral composition from as late as the sixth century bc. 3 some other poems, especially the Homeric Hymns and the Batrachomyomachia, have also been ascribed to homer. Kierkegaard seems to have been familiar with these texts to some extent; he mentions, among other things, the Batrachomyomachia in Either/Or. For more on this, see section iii, d below. 1

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of the 6th century bc, at which time recitations of the poems became a permanent part of the panathenaic Festival in athens. the Iliad and the Odyssey look backwards but at the same time point forwards. herodotus says that it was homer and hesiod (in his Theogony) who had “created” the gods and their respective spheres of activity.4 it is true that they are exponents of a break with the more “barbaric” religiosity of the past. What is new is the olympian hierarchy of the gods and the belief in fate (μοῖρα or αἶσα).5 the strict anthropomorphism is an expression of a more rational religiosity; never before had the gods been so similar to human beings, immortality is virtually the only difference. What is grotesque and irrational falls into the background, and the gods become ethical beings. This strictness is also reflected in the very form of the poems and their fixed composition. a characteristic feature of the homeric poems is the many formulaic repetitions, which, as milman parry (1902–35) has shown, are an important testimony to the reality of the oral tradition.6 however, there are formulas at more than one level: one thing is the repetitions of, for example, quarter or half hexameters, typically in the form of epithets, another is that the poet operates with a series of recurring themes with regard to the story itself. one such motif which is constantly varied is, for example, the one-on-one fight: two warriors stand opposite each other, they exchange words and then fight. One such duel, albeit only in words, is the magnificent conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the first book of the Iliad, where the combatants’ eloquence unfolds in a pointed manner. the homeric world is a feudal society, where every individual king, maintaining his own sphere of power and his own vassals, ruled with the help of a council of elders and occasionally with an assembly of free men, but according to unwritten laws. the king is on the way to being primus inter pares, since “the nobles” have at this time attained greater influence (for example, the suitors at Ithaca). The picture of the heroic past does not, however, wholly correspond to what archaeology tells us about the mycenaean Bronze age. homer has several anachronisms: new concepts and institutions are mentioned sporadically, for example, the hoplite phalanx,7 and the description of the city of the phaeacians in Book 6 of the Odyssey is a description of a polis which one could imagine belonging to the 8th century when the second herodotus, Histories, 2.53 (cf. plato’s Republic, 606e). the verb ποιεῖν in this context signifies that Homer and Hesiod communicated this knowledge and gave it expression in verse, with ποίησις thus understood as poetry. “he recognizes the importance of homer and Hesiod as fixing the canon of Greek mythology,” one reads in W.W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, vols. 1–2, oxford: Clarendon press 1912 or later, ad loc., vol. 2, p. 193. 5 Cf. a.W.h. adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values, oxford: Clarendon press 1960, pp. 17–23. 6 see, in general, milman parry, The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry, ed. by adam parry, oxford: Clarendon press 1971. Compare also albert B. lord, The Singer of Tales, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1960, and John miles Foley, Traditional Oral Epic: The Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return Song, Berkeley, los angeles, and oxford: university of California press 1990. 7 Iliad, 13.130ff.; 14.214ff. 4

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great period of colonization took place; the formation of the polis, however, does not belong to the heroic age that homer wishes to describe. moreover, one can demonstrate several irregularities in the poems which cannot be explained by the fact that the poet often “makes blunders.”8 attempts have been made to discern the different layers in order to find an Urtext or original. nevertheless, despite many episodic characteristics, both of these poems appear as a carefully composed unity and bear a stamp of homogeneity. The influence of these two heroic poems on later times in Greek culture cannot be emphasized enough. they constitute not merely a part of a popular narrative tradition and, as such, compile a large part of the existing mythical material, but they were also of fundamental significance for the average citizen’s παιδεία, his education and rearing, since homer was a constant source of wisdom, a universal “encyclopedia” about all sorts of themes, a kind of compendium of knowledge.9 in Homer one could always find moral guidance (as Horace observes: Troiani belli scriptorem... / qui, quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, / planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit).10 It is worth noting that the poems reflect or pretend to reflect values and social conditions prior to the actual time of the poet himself. homer laments his degenerate contemporary age and praises the great ideals of the past. the homeric poems and their ideals rest on the idea of a heroic age.11 martial virtues are prominent, especially in the Iliad, and what is central in the heroic view is the concept of honor, reputation won by individual and noble achievements. By contrast, in the Odyssey the martial and ceremonial elements yield or fade into the background to the advantage of natural humanity and desire for adventure; the adventurous side comes out in the portrayal of odysseus’ many experiences on his journey home to ithaca.12 however, this difference in no way makes the Iliad appear one-sided; on the contrary, when one looks more closely at the main figures of the Iliad, hector and Achilles, one finds some surprising elements in the description of their characters. hector, the trojan hero, is the ideal of a brave army leader, in addition a good citizen, a caring son, brother, husband, and father (see especially Book 6 of the Iliad); one surprising feature is his mildness: all trojans hate and ridicule helen as a foreigner in the city, but hector is always friendly and gentle towards her (see her lament at his Indignor, quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus (“i am grieved whenever honest homer grows drowsy”), Horace, Ars Poetica, v. 359. 9 see, for example, plato, Ion, 539d–e. Even if the figure of Ion appears as a caricature, the dialogue nonetheless gives a good sense of what the rhapsodists’ activity had descended to by plato’s time. 10 horace, Epistles, 1.2.1–4 (“the author of the trojan War, who says what is good, what is bad, what is useful, and what not, more simply and better than Chrysippus and Crantor”). here horace associates homer with the stoics, for whom the homeric allegories later came to have great importance; cf. the surviving Epidrome (Theologia Graeca) of Cornutus. 11 Cf. hesiod’s myth of the ages of the world in his Works and Days, where vv. 156–73 treat the age of the heroes. 12 one can compare the Odyssey to the so-called Epic Cycle, an artificially arranged collection of early greek epics, of which very little is extant; this cycle also included Nostoi, the returns of various greek heroes from the trojan War. 8

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burial, Il. 24.762ff.). hector’s antagonist and slayer, achilles, by contrast, is violent, headstrong, selfish, and after the death of Patroclus downright cruel; what is surprising here is, however, the mercy he shows to priam by giving him the body of hector for burial in Book 24. achilles treats the old man with sympathy since he comes to think of his own father, Peleus. It is Priam who brings about this identification of Peleus with himself: “But respect the gods, achilles, and take pity on me, remembering your own father. i am more piteous far than he, and have endured what no other mortal on the face of earth has yet endured, to reach out my hand to the face of the man who has slain my sons” (Il. 24.503–6).13 By drawing attention to peleus, who will also soon lose his son, priam paves the way for a concilatory mood, albeit with the help of numerous gifts. But nonetheless with his friendly appearance, achilles shows a reconciliatory spirit and sympathy beyond what one has reason to expect. his anger, which is the main theme of the Iliad, now finally subsides, and with this the circle closes: the rise of anger in Book 1, and in Book 24 its remission. II. Homer at the Borgerdyd School søren Kierkegaard went to school at the Borgerdyd school in Copenhagen during the years 1821–30. in the instruction in classical languages—and in general—the main emphasis was placed on latin.14 the older classes received six lessons per week in greek (in contrast to thirteen in latin). the required reading in latin was for Kierkegaard more than 11,000 verses of poetry and around 1,250 pages of prose; nevertheless, the required reading in greek was also quite extensive: 9,570 verses of homer and around 330 pages of prose.15 the examination system at the time dictated that prospective university students submit a list of readings that they would be responsible for at the university entrance examination (“studentereksamen”). according to headmaster michael nielsen’s (1776–1846) report to the university on July 29, 1830, Kierkegaard, on his list, gave the following 16 books of homer as possible examination material: the Odyssey, Books 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and here and in the following i quote from Homer, The Iliad, vols. 1–2, trans. by a.t. murray, 2nd ed., revised by William F. Wyatt, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1999 (Loeb Classical Library, vols. 170–1). all translations of the Odyssey are from Homer, The Odyssey, vols. 1–2, trans. by a.t. murray, 2nd ed., revised by george e. dimock, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1995 (Loeb Classical Library, vols. 104–5). 14 the young Kierkegaard’s interest for latin is well-known, and as a student at the university he even gave instruction in this language at his old school. For the latin instruction at the Borgerdyd school, see further niels W. Bruun and Finn gredal Jensen, “Kierkegaard’s Latin Translations of the New Testament,” in Kierkegaard and the Bible, tome ii, The New Testament, ed. by lee C. Barrett, aldershot: ashgate, forthcoming (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 1), or the earlier version of that article in german, “die lateinischen Übersetzungen Søren Kierkegaards aus dem Neuen Testament,” Neulateinisches Jahrbuch/Journal of Neo-Latin Language and Literature, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 17–30. see also SKS K17, 277ff. / KJN 1, 435ff. 15 per Krarup, Søren Kierkegaard og Borgerdydskolen, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1977, p. 27. 13

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22, and the Iliad, Books 1–7.16 his reading thus comprised 4,413 verses of the Iliad and 5,157 verses of the Odyssey, a total of 9,570 verses. of greek prose, he gave “otherwise as no. 1” (that is, the same as Edvard Julius Anger (1813–95), the top student in the class): plato’s Crito and Euthyphro, Xenophon’s Memorabilia, two books of Herodotus (Book 8, “Urania,” and Book 9, “Calliope”), and the Gospel of John.17 Kierkegaard’s schooling in homer was thus very substantial, and there can be no doubt that the extensiveness of his reading presupposed an especially thorough and solid knowledge of greek.18 in the draft, Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est from 1842– 43, one can read the following, doubtless autobiographical, statement about greek instruction: While life in his paternal home was contributing in this way to the development of his imagination, teaching him to relish ambrosia, the education he received in school was in harmony with this. the sublime authority of latin grammar and the divine dignity of rules developed a new enthusiasm. greek grammar in particular appealed to him. Because of it, he forgot to read homer aloud to himself as he usually did in order to enjoy the rhythms of the poem. the greek teacher presented grammar in a more philosophical way. When it was explained to Johannes that the accusative case, for example, is an extension in time and space, that the preposition does not govern the case but that the relation does, everything expanded before him. the preposition vanished; the extension in time and space became like an enormous empty picture for intuition. once again his imagination was engaged, but in a way different from before.19

The “philosophical” Greek teacher referred to here is doubtless Frederik Olaus Lange (1798–1862). not only was he Kierkegaard’s teacher at the Borgerdyd school, but his dissertation from 1836, De Casuum universis causis et rationibus (ASKB 610), treated cases in different languages, and in his greek grammar, Det græske Sprogs Grammatik til Skolernes Brug (1826 and later), which was in wide circulation at the time and also used at the Borgerdyd school, he underscores this very point that the accusative case is the extension in space and time, and that it is not the preposition which governs the case but the relation.20 apart from lange, Kierkegaard could Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, ed. by Bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1996, p. 15. 17 ibid., pp. 14–15 and p. 273. niels thulstrup’s version of this in B&A, vol. 1, pp. 4–5, is misleading since he has “reconstructed” a school testimony for Kierkegaard; without respect to the source, he makes a reference to the prose texts given for the examination by the top student in the class. 18 the amount of homeric material given by Kierkegaard for the examination is impressive but nonetheless limited in comparison to the top student in the class, anger, who signed up not just for 9 books but for all 24 books of the Odyssey, along with the first 10 books of the Iliad. 19 Pap. iv B 1, p. 107 / JC, 121. 20 see Krarup, Søren Kierkegaard og Borgerdydskolen, pp. 66–7. poul martin møller in his review of lange’s grammar noticed the same thing: “in the treatment of the concept of the preposition, Mr. Lange has with great clarity and firmness, attempted to undermine the erroneous view, which is so easily imparted to young people in grammar instruction, 16

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also have had e.F.C. Bojesen (1803–64) and C.F. ingerslev (1803–68) as teachers in greek.21 We know with certainty that he was taught by his elder brother p.C. Kierkegaard (1805–88)22 and by headmaster michael nielsen.23 poul martin møller (1794–1838) had also at times taught at the Borgerdyd school, but per Krarup states that Kierkegaard “certainly could not have had him as instructor at the school. their acquaintance dates from his time as a university student.”24 there can be no doubt about this, since in 1821–22 Møller was only teaching Greek in “the first form,” that is, to the oldest pupils. Kierkegaard must have known møller’s translations of homer, even if they do not appear in The Auction Catalogue in the original printings (Book 9 of the Odyssey that in the ancient languages the preposition determines the case, since, on the contrary the casus obliqui as such express a relation which is either modified or made clear by means of an added preposition. this is one of the chapters in particular which distinguishes itself for its clarity and precision.” Dansk Litteratur-Tidende, no. 5, 1827, pp. 65–74, see pp. 71–2 (the review was not reprinted in møller’s posthumous writings, Efterladte Skrifter). in The Auction Catalogue there appears the third edition of lange’s grammar from 1835 (ASKB 992). Kierkegaard’s schoolmate edvard J. anger mentions in a letter to h.p. Barfod (the Kierkegaard archive at the royal library, d, pk. 5): “i am unable to say whether Frederik Lange (the Greek teacher) had the same influence on Kierkegaard as he had on me. He taught me grammar and was the only one of our teachers who represents something special to me.” Encounters with Kierkegaard, p. 10. 21 the school’s records are now lost, but h.p. Barfod mentions the relevant teachers in his “Notiser” in EP 1, pp. Xlif.; cf. sejer Kühle, Søren Kierkegaards Barndom og Ungdom, Copenhagen: aschehoug 1950, p. 38. a later letter to Bojesen, presumably from september 1841 (since with it Kierkegaard sends a copy of The Concept of Irony), ends thus: “no reply is necessary. What you probably still say many times a day, as you used to at the Borgerdyd school, i will say here: ‘that will do,’ and my intention is not to make you ‘the next’ who ‘continues.’ ” B&A, vol. 1, pp. 70–1. / LD, letter 48, p. 89. it is not clear whether this is a reference to greek or latin instruction. 22 in a letter from Kierkegaard’s schoolmate Frederik Welding (1811–94) to h.p. Barfod one reads the following: “in the second form s.K.’s greek teacher was his brother, the bishop. It was clear and often striking to us that he [Søren] deliberately made things difficult by bringing his relationship to his brother into the classroom situation on various occasions, and it seemed to us that he was teasing him.” Encounters with Kierkegaard, p. 24. 23 Cf. the letter to p.C. Kierkegaard in Berlin from march 25, 1829: “i am studying greek with professor [nielsen], something i did not expect, inasmuch as he became quite fed up last year with teaching Greek to the A section of the first class.” B&A, vol. 1, p. 31 / LD, letter 2, p. 40. 24 Krarup, Søren Kierkegaard og Borgerdydskolen, pp. 61–2. We know that after his return home from his journey to China in 1821, møller taught greek at the Borgerdyd school in the year before he was appointed professor in greek at the metropolitan school on november 12, 1822. Formerly, between 1812 and 1816, he had been a teacher of religion at the Borgerdyd school (cf. holger lund, Borgerdydsskolen i Kjøbenhavn 1787–1887. Et Mindeskrift i Anledning af Skolens Hundredaarsfest, Copenhagen: otto B. Wroblewskys Forlag 1887, p. 238); moreover, he taught during some periods at the other Borgerdyd school in Christianshavn, where his friend, the philologist n.B. Krarup (1792–1842) was headmaster, and where, as an “indbydelsesskrift” or ceremonial work of invitation, he published his translation of Book 9 of the Odyssey in 1816.

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in 1816, the first version of Book 5 in 1822, and Books 1–6 in 1825); if nothing else, he came to know these translations later, which is evident from the fact that in the dedication to The Concept of Anxiety he refers to møller as “the happy lover of Greek culture, the admirer of Homer....”25 of course, he owned a copy of møller’s Posthumous Writings, in which the translations of Books 1–6 and 9 of the Odyssey are reprinted.26 At first glance it is surprising that no Greek edition of the Odyssey is found in The Auction Catalogue.27 By contrast, there is a greek edition of the Iliad, Christian gottlob heyne’s (1729–1812) Homeri Ilias cum brevi annotatione, vols. 1–2, published in leipzig in 1804, and a stereotype edition of this same work from 1828.28 however, these editions are found in the appendices, and one should bear in mind that it is disputed whether these books were actually from Kierkegaard’s library. individual entries in The Auction Catalogue also list unspecified “bundles” of books, for example, appendix ii, nos. 27–28, described as “various schoolbooks in 1 bundle,” and thus it cannot be excluded that a copy of the Odyssey was among these.29 SKS 4, 311 / CA, 5. on the dedication and generally on Kierkegaard and møller see further Finn Gredal Jensen, “Poul Martin Møller: Kierkegaard and the Confidant of Socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, Politics and Social Theory, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate, 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 7) pp. 101–67. 26 Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 1, pp. 225–358 (ASKB 1574–1576). By contrast, in The Auction Catalogue, Christian Wilster’s (1797–1840) translations, which appeared in 1836 (Iliad) and 1837 (Odyssey), are absent. the only homer by Wilster present in the catalogue is p.m. møller’s review of Wilster’s early translation of the Iliad, Book 9, which originally appeared in Dansk Litteratur-Tidende, no. 44, 1831, but was reprinted in Efterladte Skrifter, 1st ed., vol. 2, pp. 74–84. 27 one must, however, be attentive to the fact that The Auction Catalogue to a certain degree reflects a “pilfered” library; it is, for example, known that books in which Kierkegaard himself had written notes, were removed prior to the auction; some of these books are found today in the Kierkegaard archive (group e in p.a. heiberg’s register) at the royal library in Copenhagen, but among these books there is no copy of the Odyssey. in addition to this there is the fact that Kierkegaard in his lifetime could have got rid of books; this, however, would hardly have been the case with the Odyssey. 28 Homeri Ilias cum brevi annotatione, vols. 1–2, ed. by Christian gottlob heyne, leipzig: Weidmann 1804 (ASKB a i 160–161), and a stereotype edition of the same, leipzig: Weidmann 1828 (ASKB a ii 50). 29 as far as the Odyssey is concerned, Kierkegaard may perhaps have used one of F.a. Wolf’s homer editions; Wolf published the Odyssey for the first time in Halle in 1783, and in 1794 he published all of homer in a new reworked edition, thereafter in several editions, the last of which appeared in leipzig in 1817 (Wolf died in 1824). it should be emphasized, however, that this assumption is bound up with great uncertainty. apart from the aforementioned works, Kierkegaard later bought or received søren ludvig povelsen’s dissertation, Emendationes locorum aliquot Homericorum, Copenhagen: J.d. Quist 1846 (ASKB 1118; in The Auction Catalogue it is mistakenly written that C.C.v. silfverberg is the author, but he was the respondent at the oral defense of the work; cf. Aarbog for Kjøbenhavns Universitet og øvrige 25

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III. Homer in Kierkegaard’s Writings homer left many traces both directly and indirectly in søren Kierkegaard’s writings. this is true above all of Either/Or, but there are also clear references in many other places. In what follows the general remarks about Homer will first be treated (Section III, A), then references specifically to the Iliad (section iii, B) and the Odyssey (Section III, C), respectively, and finally the few places where some other “Homeric” poems, apocrypha so to speak, are mentioned: that is, Hymns, Margites, and Batrachomyomachia (section iii, d). the point of departure for this overview will be thematic (with regard to the specific references, their order in the poems will be followed), but it will only be partly chronological with respect to date of composition because Kierkegaard often returns to the same material, and therefore in some cases it is useful to treat the Homer passage the first time it appears. In connection with the presentation of the appearances of these passages, their use in Kierkegaard’s wider context will also be discussed. A. General References to Homer Kierkegaard’s earliest reference to homer is found in Notebook 2 from 1835 in an excerpt of a treatise by Christian ludwig stieglitz (1756–1836) entitled “die Sage vom Doctor Faust,” in Friedrich von Raumer’s Historisches Taschenbuch, published in leipzig in 1834 (not2:2). as far as homer is concerned, we only learn that according to stieglitz the historical Faust “read in erfurt Collegier about homer, and at the request of the students he conjured up the heroes,30 also the oneeyed Polyphemus.”31 naturally, the last part refers to the Cyclops in the Odyssey, Book 9, while the first part refers to Homeric heroes in general. A wholly accidental appearance like this one is not very interesting since Kierkegaard’s chief aim is to appropriate the Faust legend and the historical development of the Faust literature.32 However impersonal an excerpt like this might be, it exemplifies well that, in general, Kierkegaard’s use of homer serves other purposes than homer himself. as will be

højere Undervisningsanstalter for 1846, ed. by hannibal peter selmer, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel [1847], p. 115); further, Kierkegaard could have oriented himself generally in, for example, F.C. petersen’s (1786–1859) Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1830 (ASKB 1037), where homer is treated on pp. 24–43. 30 in this connection one thinks of Kierkegaard’s headmaster, michael nielsen, who insisted that the students visualize the historical figures; see Holger Lund, Borgerdydsskolen i Kjøbenhavn, pp. 145–6. 31 SKS 19, 90.16–19, not2:2 / JP 5, 5083; cf. Stieglitz, “Die Sage vom Doctor Faust,” p. 141. 32 the thoroughness of Kierkegaard’s studies of Faust at this time is clear also from his meticulous copying in 1836 of stieglitz’s Faust bibliography in the journal entry BB:12 (SKS 17, 92–104 / KJN 1, 85–96), anticipated in not2:2. apart from the Journal BB his interest in goethe has also left a clear stamp on several entries in Notebooks 2 and 3.

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seen in what follows, he often picks up on interesting details or sometimes recurring, “stereotype” figures, which are used in widely different contexts.33 at the end of a long excerpt from Berlin of F.W.J. schelling’s (1775–1854) lectures on the Philosophie der Offenbarung, in Notebook 11 from 1842, Kierkegaard, on February 3, wrote down lecture no. 41, in which schelling designates homer as a completion of the exoteric mythology: homer himself is the supreme consummation of exoteric mythology. homer’s power consists precisely in the power with which he excludes the past. in that always lies the power to suppress the past. homer is beautiful youth. homer belongs to the time in which the hellenic people isolate themselves from the universally human, so that they are really not even a people.34

in h.e.g. paulus’ (1761–1851) printed edition of the notes to schelling’s lecture, this passage is supplemented with a discussion of “the Homeric question.”35 however, this question apparently neither exercised nor interested Kierkegaard.36 While the excerpts mentioned here are impersonal, one meets in Either/Or a wholly different, constructive approach to homer. this is found in the treatise “the Immediate Erotic Stages or The Musical-Erotic,” where Kierkegaard (the aesthete a) holds up homer as a parallel to Wolfgang amadeus mozart’s (1756–91) immortal Don Giovanni (1787). the comparison concerns the choice of material, which in the case of the homeric poems is the trojan War and its results (seeing that the Iliad and the Odyssey avail themselves of common subject matter of legend). mozart’s genius is tied to the greek thought of cosmos: it manifests itself as a well-organized whole, as an elegant, transparent adornment for the spirit that acts upon and operates throughout it, the way that happy view lets itself be repeated in a higher order of things, in the world of ideals, the way there is here again a

as examples of such useful stereotypes one can mention two instances from the same year, 1835, in the Journal AA regarding respectively sisyphus and the sirens in aa:12 and 14 (SKS 17, 28.15 and 32.21 / KJN 1, 23.9 and 27.14). 34 SKS 19, 366.30–6, not11:39 / SBL, 412. in the same lecture schelling refers to Il. 6.130–40, which is about Lycurgus’ fight with Dionysus: “His first opponent was King lycurgus, who is mentioned in the Iliad, and it is curious, after all, that in homer dionysus is not the complete god but the growing god.” (SKS 19, 366.24–7 / SBL, 412). in the excerpt the Demeter Hymn is also touched upon; on this, see below section iii, d. 35 Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der Offenbarung oder Entstehungsgeschichte, wörtlicher Text, Beurtheilung und Berichtigung der v. Schellingschen Entdeckungen über Philosophie überhaupt, Mythologie und Offenbarung des dogmatischen Christenthums im Berliner Wintercursus von 1841–42. Der allgemeinen Prüfung vorgelegt von Dr. H.E.G. Paulus, darmstadt: leske 1843, pp. 584–5. 36 By way of comparison, one can mention that p.m. møller was familiar with Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum (cf. note 1 above); this is clear from an excerpt among his posthumous papers (the royal library, Copenhagen, nKs 2433, 4o). Kierkegaard could perhaps have informed himself about the transmission of the poems in F.C. petersen’s Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie; but no evidence of this is found in his writings. 33

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a paltry disbelief, however, regards such connections as accidental, arguing that “many a poet has lived who would have been just as immortal as homer if that glorious subject matter had not been taken over by him.”38 after this Kierkegaard lists the factors which, in the case of homer, designate the accidental and the fortunate observation of the divine interaction: the accidental has only one factor: it is accidental that homer, in the history of the trojan War, acquired the most remarkable epic subject matter imaginable. good fortune has two factors: it is fortunate that this most remarkable epic subject came into the hands of homer. here the emphasis is just as much on homer as on the subject matter. here is the deep harmony that pervades every production we call classic. so also with mozart....39

Mozart is given the first place, but Homer is placed at the same level with him as belonging to “that little immortal band of men whose names, whose works, time will not forget because eternity recollects them.”40 in the continued consideration of the classical, Kierkegaard emphasizes the significance of the poetic genius penetrating the subject matter and transforming it, so that it fills the form in the correct way: For example, if it is said that it was homer’s good fortune that he acquired that most exceptional epic subject matter, this can lead one to forget that we always have this epic subject matter through homer’s conception, and the fact that it appears to be the most perfect epic subject matter is clear to us only in and through the transubstantion due to homer. if, however, homer’s poetic work in permeating the subject matter is emphasized, then one runs the risk of forgetting that the poem would never have become what it is if the idea with which homer permeated it was not its own idea, if the form was not the subject matter’s own form.41

What is decisive is the balance between content and form. in this context the discussion is linked to g.W.F. hegel’s (1770–1831) aesthetics since a criticism is raised presumably against especially Johan ludvig heiberg’s (1791–1860) emphasis on form.42 When what is at issue is the relation between content and idea, the idea becomes concrete by being penetrated by the historical. “But what does it mean that the medium is concrete except that it either is, or is seen in its approximation to, language, for language is the most concrete of all media.”43 applied to a concrete SKS 2, 55.5–12 / EO1, 47. SKS 2, 55.19–21 / EO1, 47. 39 SKS 2, 56.5–14 / EO1, 48. 40 SKS 2, 56.15–17 / EO1, 48. 41 SKS 2, 57.23–31 / EO1, 49–50. 42 SKS 2, 58.5ff. / EO1, 50. on this, see also Notebook 13, SKS K19, explanatory note to 414.22 on heiberg and “den moderne Form-Theorie.” See also the analysis in Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and new York: Cambridge university press 2003, pp. 209–18. 43 SKS 2, 62.23–5 / EO1, 55. 37 38

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idea and a concrete mediation like homer, this means that he “certainly is a classic epic poet, but precisely because the idea that becomes manifest is a concrete idea and because the medium is language, it is conceivable that the section of classic works that includes the epic has many works, which are all equally classic because history continually provides new epic subject matter.”44 Further, one reads again that “homer found a perfect epic subject matter, but because history offers more epic subject matter, many more epic poems are conceivable. this is not the case with Don Giovanni.”45 as should be clear by now, Kierkegaard’s use of homer in Either/Or is well considered and serves in a refined manner to demonstrate the genius of Mozart. this demonstration also takes place at the cost of Johann Wolfgang von goethe’s (1749–1832) Faust, which is likewise brought into the analysis: an interpretation of Faust can merit being called perfect, and yet a later generation will give rise to a new Faust, whereas don giovanni, because of the abstract character of the idea, lives on forever, in every age, and to wish to produce a Don Giovanni after mozart will always be like wanting to write Ilias post Homerum in a sense even more profound than is the case with homer.46

With the expression Ilias post Homerum we already have the first reference to the Iliad, but before I go over to treat specific references to this work, two further cases will be merely mentioned where homer is referred to with more general formulations. The first of these appears in “ ‘Guilty?’/‘Not Guilty’ ” in Stages on Life’s Way, where Quidam, in a description of his conception of “her,” considers that her pride cannot be regarded as too great “to save her in an intensification of temporality....The religious eternity very likely does not become the eternal decision but a spacing out of the temporal. so eternity has paused at her side, consoled her, just as in homer the god or the goddess hurries to the aid of the hero.”47 the second reference appears in the Journal NB18 where it is mentioned that homer, who according to tradition was blind, is held up as an opposition to Bishop Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854) in connection with a criticism of the contemporary practice of the sermon-lecture: “one has examples of the blind having had an even clearer eye of the mind (for example, i can think of homer), the hard-of-hearing have been profound thinkers. see, that is preaching!”48 Finally, one should draw attention to the fact that in a number of cases it is impossible to demonstrate to what extent Kierkegaard is actually thinking of homer, namely, when what is at issue are general phenomena which also appear elsewhere. as an example one can mention the invocation of the muse, which appears in both the Iliad and the Odyssey, but is not a specific Homeric phenomenon.49 44 45 46 47 48 49

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B. References to the iliad With regard to the specific references to Homer, the Odyssey seems to have exercised a somewhat greater influence on Kierkegaard than the Iliad, perhaps due to the simple reason that his familiarity with the Odyssey was a touch greater.50 nevertheless, in the Iliad he was also able to find pregnant expressions or images, which he could work into his own writings in different contexts. i will go through the books of the Iliad in order and note which concrete passages Kierkegaard makes use of. in the Iliad, Book 1, one finds in v. 530 an expression, μέγαν δ᾽ ἐλέλιξεν Ὄλυμπον (“[Zeus] made great Olympus quake”),51 at the end of the passage which in translation reads as follows: “the son of Cronos spoke, and bowed his dark brow in assent, and the ambrosial locks shook on the king’s immortal head; and he made great Olympus quake” (Il. 1.528–30). this expression is used adroitly in Either/Or in “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage” where Judge William says: “I have seen girls whose proud glance made Olympus quake.”52 In “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by a Married Man” in Stages on Life’s Way the following is written about the beloved: “she, the beautiful one, in her lovely apparel was so lovely that the old men followed her sadly with their eyes as they followed Helen through the hall.”53 here reference is made to the episode from the Iliad 3.146–60, where King priam and the other elders of troy, in wonder, watch helen walking, albeit through the scaean gate, and not “through the hall,” which must be Kierkegaard’s misunderstanding.54 Later in Book 3 in the one-on-one fight between Paris and Menelaus there is an example of a god protecting one of the heroes by hiding him in a mist, namely at Il. 3.380–1, where aphrodite in this manner saves paris: τὸν δ᾽ ἐξήρπαξ᾽ Ἀφροδίτη / ῥεῖα μάλ᾽, ὥς τε θεός, ἐκάλυψε δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἠέρι πολλῇ (“But him aphrodite snatched up, very easily as a goddess can, and shrouded him in a thick mist”). It is not clear whether Kierkegaard had in mind precisely this passage; but he clearly had in mind this phenomenon in “Eulogy on Abraham” in Fear and Trembling: “therefore, no one who was great will be forgotten, and even though it takes time, even though a cloud of misunderstanding takes away the hero, his lover will nevertheless come, and the longer the passage of time, the more faithful he adheres to him.”55 The gods also participate in the fighting. With regard to their own protection, we hear, for example, in Book 5, verses 844–5, that athena used hades’ helmet when regarding the volume of Kierkegaard’s reading of greek, see the beginning of section ii above. 51 the formula is also found in the Homeric Hymn, no. 1, to dionysus, v. 15, and with a variant word order in Il. 8.198 (where it refers to hera). 52 SKS 3, 80.6–7 / EO2, 75. 53 SKS 6, 149.14–16 / SLW, 159. 54 Il. 3.154–9 in translation appears as follows: “When they saw helen coming on to the wall, softly they spoke winged words to one another: ‘small blame that trojans and wellgreaved achaeans should for such a woman long suffer woes; she is dreadfully like immortal goddesses to look on. But even so, though she is like them, let her go home on the ships, and not be left here to be a bane to us and to our children after us.’ ” 55 SKS 4, 113.6–9 / FT, 16. 50

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she drove away ares, who was partisan to the trojans. this helmet had the special power of making its user invisible: αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη / δῦν᾽ Ἄιδος κυνέην, μή μιν ἴδοι ὄβριμος Ἄρης (“But athene put on the cap of hades so that mighty ares should not see her”).56 When Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety in a footnote mentions the sophist in plato’s dialogue of the same name, whose sophistry “like the armor of Mars enables him to become invisible,”57 then it is rather Book 21 that he has in mind and the invisible fight between Athena and Ares there (Il. 21.383–434). the image is used more effectively in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, where it says, “to paint a picture of Mars in the armor that makes him invisible.”58 The immortals are also injured in the fighting, but they have another fluid in their veins. in Works of Love Kierkegaard compares the conscience, which penetrates everything, with the blood, where the change is not external but internal: “Just as if a person, instead of having blood in his veins, had that divine fluid that paganism dreamed of—just so does Christianity want to breathe the eternal life, the divine into the human race.”59 it is highly probable that he has in mind here the passage in Book 5 where Athena has been injured by Diomedes: “and out flowed the immortal blood of the goddess, the ichor, such as flows in the blessed gods; for they eat not bread nor do they drink ruddy wine, and so they are bloodless, and are called immortals” (verses 339–43).60 the opposite of the gods are the mortals, about whom Kierkegaard has found a beautiful simile in Book 6 of the Iliad: “Just as are the generations of leaves, such are those also of men (οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν). as for the leaves, the wind scatters some on the earth, but the luxuriant forest sprouts others when the season of spring has come; so of men one generation springs up and another passes away” (verses 146–9). In this context one should also see the “Eulogy on Abraham” in Fear and Trembling: everything was emptiness and despair, “if there were no sacred bond that knit humankind together, if one generation emerged after another like forest foliage, if one generation succeeded another like the singing

Ἄιδος κυνέη appears only in this one place in the Iliad. it is also mentioned, for example, in the pseudo-hesiodian epic The Shield of Heracles, v. 227. rather it is a poetic manner of expressing the idea that athena makes herself invisible, not necessarily that she dresses herself with the aforementioned accessory. hades’ etymology is actually “the invisible” (ἀ-Ϝίδης). 57 SKS 4 385.34–5 / CA, 82, note. mars is the roman counterpart to ares. 58 SKS 7, 79.32, note / CUP1, 79, note. here reference is presumably made to Chapter 12 in Laokoon where g.e. lessing (1729–81) considers the artistic treatment of invisibility; cf. SKS K7, explanatory note to 79.32. With regard to hades’ helmet, there is perhaps also an allusion in the introduction to The Concept of Irony (SKS 1, 74.22–7 / CI, 12) where Kierkegaard claims that the image of Socrates is just as difficult to hold on to “as to picture a nisse with the cap that makes him invisible.” 59 SKS 9, 137.19ff. / WL, 135. 60 the meaning of ἰχώρ is unclear. the word also appears in Il. 5.416: “she [dione] spoke, and with both her hands wiped the ichor from the arm [of athene]; the arm was restored, and the grievous pains assuaged” (vv. 416–17). It is generally agreed upon that Il. 5.340–2 is an interpolation due to the explanatory nature of the lines. 56

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of birds in the forest,” and Kierkegaard continues to develop further the simile from the homeric point of departure.61 As mentioned above in Section II, Kierkegaard only read the first seven books of the Iliad in school. From this one of course cannot conclude that he did not read the rest of the poem; on the contrary, he owned a copy of heyne’s critical edition; but the low frequency of passages from the rest of the Iliad does not in itself evidence any greater familiarity with the material. in a footnote to The Concept of Irony he is also helped out a bit by plato: there is a reference to a translated quotation from Gorgias, 485d, in which reference is made to the statement in Il. 9.442, where it says that men distinguish themselves in public assemblies.62 “the man should do the speaking and therefore ought to possess some of the powers in the girdle of Venus with which she beguiled: conversation and sweet flattery, that is, the power to ingratiate,” says Johannes the seducer in Either/Or.63 here he has in mind aphrodite’s beauty-girdle, which one hears about in Il. 14.214–17: “she spoke, and loosed from her bosom the embroidered strap, inlaid, in which are fashioned all manner of allurements; in it is love, in it desire, in it dalliance—persuasion that steals the senses even of the wise.” aphrodite’s girdle also appears in a quotation from Jens Baggesen’s (1764–1826) poem “The Ghost and Himself” in Notebook 3: “the goddess is always the same / But the belt she enthralls the heart with, / With which she alone can enkindle our whole soul, / Must bear the mark of the song’s time and place.”64 In “The Unhappiest One” in Either/Or, Kierkegaard uses the legend of niobe, which appears, among other places, in Il. 24.602–617.65 however, it is not certain that he took this story from the Iliad, since it also appears elsewhere, for example, in ovid’s Metamorphoses (6.146–312). in a similar manner it cannot be determined in other cases whether the Iliad is the source, for instance, when Judge William in “the Aesthetic Validity of Marriage” refers to Zeus’ many erotic escapades: “at times I seem to see in you traces of wanting to play a little Zeus.”66 Finally, there are a few passages which have an atypical contact with the Iliad as a whole. The general figure of speech, Ilias post Homerum, has already been mentioned.67 in the journal entry aa:12, the letter to p.W. lund (1801–80), reference SKS 4, 112 / FT, 15. SKS 1, 101.21–2. / CI, 39, note. achilles when he went to war is described as νήπιον οὔ πω εἰδόθ᾽ ὁμοιΐου πτολέμοιο / οὐδ᾽ ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι (“a mere child, knowing nothing as yet of evil war, nor of assemblies in which men become preeminent”), Il. 9.441–2. 63 SKS 2, 406.21–3 / EO1, 418–19. 64 “Gudinden er bestandigen den samme; / Men Bæltet, hun fortryller Hjertet med, / Hvormed hun ene kan vor hele Sjæl opflamme, / Maa bære Præg af Sangens Tid og Sted.” SKS 19, 110.11–14, not3:10 / KJN 3, 111. Cf. Jens Baggesens danske Værker, vols. 1–12, ed. by the author’s sons and C.J. Boye, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1827–32, vol. 5, p. 472 (ASKB 1509–1520). on the odyssean elements of this Baggesen poem see below in section iii, C. 65 SKS 2, 220.18–27 / EO1, 227. 66 SKS 3, 17.36 / EO2, 8. Cf., for example, Il. 14.312–28. 67 SKS 2, 108.23. see, moreover, Kierkegaard’s letter to his niece henriette lund, presumably from 1845 (B&A, vol. 1, p. 143 / LD, letter 120, p. 181), in which he uses this expression: “although it would be like writing an imitation of homer’s Iliad.” 61 62

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is made to the story about achilles’ mother, the goddess thetis trying to hide her son on the island of scyrus in order to prevent his participation in the campaign against troy; but this legend is not found in the Iliad.68 achilles is called “paganism’s strongest and bravest hero” in the journal entry EE:167.69 the burning of troy is mentioned in Either/Or in connection with nero’s alleged burning of rome; but, as is well known, the destruction of troy is not portrayed in the Iliad, which ends with the burial of hector.70 in the following remark in Repetition, “this is the sophistical inclination of imagination, to have the whole world in a nutshell this way, a nutshell larger than the whole world and yet not too large for the individual to fill,” Kierkegaard makes use of a fixed expression, in nuce, which presumably has its origin in pliny the elder’s tall tale in Historia naturalis, 7.85, that there was a hand-written manuscript of the entire Iliad which was so small that it could fit into a nutshell.71 C. References to the odyssey the Odyssey clearly appealed better to Kierkegaard’s fantasy; this is true in particular of the story of the Cyclops and the images of the underworld, as we shall see. Just as with the Iliad, i will take the books in order, starting at the opening of the poem. the Odyssey begins with an invocation of the muse (Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, etc.) and a survey of odysseus’ adventures in the previous 10 years of his wanderings from troy to his home, the island of ithaca.72 in individual passages Kierkegaard makes use of elements of this introduction, first in 1836 in Notebook 3 SKS 17, 23.11–12, aa:12 / KJN 1, 18.17–18. “it is quite remarkable that the tendon that god touched in wrestling with Jacob is generally called ‘tendo Achillis’ by the doctors and thus takes its name from paganism’s strongest and bravest hero, and paganism never came into such near contact with the divine that its physical strength suffered from it; and yet one must say that Jacob was much stronger.” SKS 18, 58, ee:167 / KJN 2, 53. another atypical reference to achilles is found in Notebook 14 (SKS 19, 427.4–7 and 36, not14:1) regarding zeno’s second argument against motion, in which he appeals to the story of achilles and the tortoise; but this has nothing to do with the Iliad, apart from Achilles’ fixed epithet, “swift of foot.” 70 SKS 2, 281.19–20 / EO1, 292 (“one burns down half of rome in order to visualize the Trojan conflagration”) and SKS 3, 179.30 / EO2, 184 (“With your usual rashness, you once said that nero could hardly be blamed for burning rome in order to get an idea of the conflagration of Troy.”) The explanatory notes in SKS K2–3 to the two aforementioned passages in Either/Or state erroneously that the burning of troy is portrayed in the Iliad. 71 SKS 4, 32.28–30 / R, 157. the image is used again in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, SKS 7, 125.17–19 / CUP1, 133–4. pliny’s reference to Cicero (in nuce inclusam Iliadem Homeri carmen in membrana scriptum tradit Cicero) must be to one of his lost works. 72 on the invocation of the muse, see the remarks above in section iii, a, in fine. it is possible that Kierkegaard had in mind the summing up of the beginning of the Odyssey, when in the preface to Prefaces (1844) he alludes to the greek naïveté of wanting to say everything in the preface (SKS 4, 468.4 / P, 3–4); in the margin of a draft he has noted, “the greeks actually used no prefaces at all but said immediately in the first sentence everything the book would be about.” Pap. v B 74.1 / P, supplement, p. 108, quoted in the explanatory note to 468.4 in SKS K4, p. 566. Cf. also Works of Love, SKS 9, 358.23ff. / WL, 364. 68 69

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where he wished to fix in his memory a passage from Jens Baggesen’s poem “The Ghost and Himself.” The quotation is introduced thus: “Did even Odysseus see more diverse peoples and places, / and rare scenes and strange customs, / playing about on his comrades’ grave, / than did Cook from pole to pole upon the world’s wide ocean? / Each age has its struggles, its victories, its heroes, / Its epos within itself....”73 here Baggesen loosely paraphrases the Odyssey, 1.3–4: πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, / πολλὰ δ᾽ ὅ γ᾽ ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν, / ἀρνύμενος ἥν τε ψυχὴν καὶ νόστον ἑταίρων. (“many were the men whose cities he saw and whose minds he learned, and many the woes he suffered in his heart upon the sea, seeking to win his own life and the return of his comrades”).74 Kierkegaard even translates the Od. 1.3 at the beginning of “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by a Married Man” in Stages on Life’s Way, “it is true, of course, that no poet will be able to say of you what the poet says of wily Odysseus—that he saw many cities of men and learned to know their mentality,” and in what he goes on to say it is clear that the treatise is written by a “married man”: “but the question is whether he would not have learned just as much and things just as gratifying if he stayed at home with Penelope.”75 odysseus’ usual epithet “wily” in Greek covers over several different meanings, for example, in the Od. 1.1 πολύτροπος, which is, however, ambiguous since it can mean “far-travelled” and “very cunning,” but in particular the word πολύμητις (“of many counsels or devices,” for example, Il. 1.311). in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Johannes Climacus uses the expression πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς to characterize lessing.76 apart from the beginning of Book 1, Kierkegaard otherwise has to a very limited degree been occupied with the first four books of the Odyssey, often called the “Telemachy” because their main theme is Telemachus’ voyage and search for his father.77 One cannot say that the use of a term such as “mentor,” which has been “Saae vel Odysseus flere Folk og Stæder, / Og flere sære Syn og underlige Sæder, / Omtumlende paa sine Fællers Grav, / End Cook fra Pol til Pol paa Jordens hele Hav? / Hver Alder har sin Kamp, sin Seier, sine Helte, / Sit Epos i sig selv...” SKS 19, 110, not3:10; cf. Jens Baggesens danske Værker, vol. 5, 1829, p. 472. “Omtumlende” refers to the verb πλάγχθη (“wandered”) in Od. 1.2. 74 in this connection Baggesen also mentions aphrodite’s beauty-girdle, see above in section ii, B. 75 SKS 6, 87.14–19 / SLW, 89. Kierkegaard of course knew Od. 1.3 by heart, but the words would have likewise been familiar to him from horace, who says of homer: Rursus, quid virtus et quid sapientia possit, / utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen, / qui domitor Troiae multorum providus urbes / et mores hominum inspexit, etc. (“again, of the power of worth and wisdom he has set before us an instructive pattern in ulysses, that tamer of Troy, who looked with discerning eyes upon the cities and manners of many men”), Epistles, 1.2.17ff. 76 SKS 7, 72.17 / CUP1, 71. 77 homer scholars have argued that these books were originally an independent epic— apart from the beginning of Book 1. the introduction to Book 1 together with the assembly of gods are not considered to be a part of the telemachy, which is thought to begin with the arrival of athena at ithaca; moreover, a part of Book 15, the return of telemachus, is thought to belong to the work. 73

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incorporated into modern languages as a general designation for an advisor, should refer to mentor as advisor for telemachus and companion on his journey.78 the formulaic verse Ὣς ἔφατ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἐγώ μιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπον, which appears in three places in Book 4 (verses 375, 394, and 464), Kierkegaard weaves into the preface to From the Papers of One Still Living.79 however, the verse is also used, either as given or in a slightly modified form, in other places in the Odyssey, including several times in Book 11. By contrast, a clear reference to a specific episode in the “Telemachy” can be found in “Silhouettes” in Either/Or, namely, menelaus’ retelling of his encounter with and taming of the sea god proteus in Book 4 of the Odyssey. the comparison is with the hidden grief: But sometimes the sorrow conceals itself even better, and the exterior allows us to suspect nothing, not the slightest....the unshakable dauntlessness is required, for the struggle is with a proteus, but he must give up if one only holds out. even if like that sea god he assumed every shape in order to escape, such as a snake twisting in our hands, a lion terrifying us with its roaring, changed into a tree that whispers with its leaves or into roaring water or a crackling fire—at last he must nevertheless prophesy, and sorrow must disclose itself at last.80

in the Odyssey proteus assumes more or less the same forms: “We rushed upon him with a shout, and threw our arms about him; nor did that old man forget his crafty wiles, but first he turned into a bearded lion, and then into a serpent, and a leopard, and a huge boar; then he turned into flowing water, and into a tree, high and leafy; but we held on unflinchingly with steadfast heart” (Od. 4.454–458). With the concluding remark “he must nevertheless prophesy” reference is made to the fact that proteus, who possesses the gift of prophecy, describes the homecomings of other greek heroes and tells that odysseus, who has still not reached home, has been forced to stay with Calypso. Kierkegaard uses proteus’ metamorphoses to an entirely different purpose in the Journal NB, namely, as a metaphor for the natural sciences and as a prediction of their dominance: as proteus changed shapes in order to prevent anyone from seizing him, so natural science captivates, interests, elevates, charms, teaches, enriches, seduces, persuades— at one time with knowledge of the stars, now of the rare little bird, now of a special aptitude, now of a mysterious profundity, etc. By all these charms it prevents man from dialectically thinking it through. But there are so few dialecticians in each generation, and there will be fewer—then natural science will harness all mankind.81

after this we move forward to Book 9 of the Odyssey and the story of odysseus in the cave of the Cyclops. Kierkegaard of course knew this charming story from his time at school. he also read it in poul martin møller’s translation, which was reprinted

78 79 80 81

the word is used, for example, in Either/Or, SKS 2, 364.30 / EO1, 376. SKS 1, 12.1–2 / EPW, 57. SKS 2, 173.3–20 / EO1, 175. SKS 20, 70.35–71.10, nB:83 / JP 4, 2816.

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in his Posthumous Writings.82 What exercises Kierkegaard and what he frequently returns to is Odysseus’ special cunning with his use of the name “Nobody,” which of course deprives polyphemus of the help of the other cyclopses: “my friends, it is Nobody that is slaying me by guile and not by force!” (Od. 9.408).83 in part two of Works of Love, in consideration of the work of love of remembering the dead, “no one” can be made use of in a particularly effective manner: and if, in conversation with someone, you understand the art of making yourself no one, you get to know best what resides in this person. But when a person relates himself to one who is dead, there is only one in this relationship, inasmuch as one who is dead is no actuality; no one can make himself no one as well as one who is dead, because he is no one.84

in the Journal NB4, in the entry NB4:71 from 1848, Kierkegaard reflects, as he does so often, on The Corsair’s repeated attack on him, and this time he ponders who bears the blame for the attacks of the press when everyone denies responsibility: “ ‘No one’ is guilty.”85 also in the Journal NB13 from the year after this there is a possible allusion to Od. 9, but this time “no one” is used as an illustration of the fact that the sermon-lecture in Kierkegaard’s time has become impersonal, a theme he discusses in Practice in Christianity.86 the analysis is the work of the pseudonym anti-Climacus, who therefore must be held responsible: “the more which is there is really this: that while it is true the speaker is a nobody, a pseudonym, the publisher is an actual person and recognizes that he is judged by what the pseudonym says.”87 Regarding “no one’s” responsibility there is another passage in the Journal NB16 from 1850 about the individual’s conversation with an assembly and in what state the individual must be: “in a state of confusion of sorts, somewhat like a school

Efterladte Skrifter, 1st ed., vol. 1, pp. 341–58; first published in a work of the Borgerdyd school in Christianshavn in september 1816 under the title, “Forsøg til en metrisk oversættelse af odysseus eventyr i Kyklopens hule, ved P. M. Møller, Candid. Theol.,” in Indbydelsesskrift til den offentlige Examen i Borgerdydskolen i September 1816, Copenhagen: J.F. schultz 1816, pp. 3–20. 83 One exception where the theme is not “no one” is the entry Not2:2 discussed in section iii, a, an entry excerpted from Historisches Taschenbuch, according to which Faust “in erfurt read...about homer, and at the request of the students, conjured up the heroes, also the one-eyed Polyphemus.” SKS 19, 90.17–19, not2:2. 84 SKS 9, 341.20–5 / WL, 347. in a passage in Christian Discourses about “no one” and “someone,” SKS 10, 243.16–31 / CD, 236, Kierkegaard may be alluding to Od. 9. 85 SKS 20, 321.23, nB4:71. 86 the sixth section of “From on high he Will draw all to himself: Christian Expositions,” SKS 12, 227–49 / PC, 233–57. With regard to the sermon-lecture, see the aforementioned comparison (treated in section iii, a) between homer and mynster in the Journal NB18: “one has examples of the blind having had a much clearer eye of the mind (for example, i can mention homer), that the hard-of-hearing have been profound thinkers. see, that is preaching!” SKS 23, 309.29–31, nB18:84. 87 SKS 22, 285.24–7, nB13:21.c / JP 6, 6506. 82

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when the teacher cannot properly look after things and see the individuals, and the boys take advantage of the fact to have a lark because it is no one....”88 in Book 10 of the Odyssey there is the story of the stay with the sorceress Circe, who changes odysseus’ men into pigs, a fate which he, however, avoids thanks to Hermes’ magic herb. In “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage” in Either/Or, Judge William compares his aesthetic friend’s interaction with his fellow human beings with the changing of men into pigs but in reverse: “presumably you will say that people are no concern of yours, that instead they ought to be grateful that you, by your touch, do not, as Circe did, change them into swine but rather from swine into heroes.”89 in a quite original manner the story of Circe is used in the travel diary from the trip to Jutland. in Notebook 6, Kierkegaard contrasts the stay at his aunt’s, Else Pedersdatter Kierkegaard in Sædding and the “piglike” conditions of life there with the noble company in the city them: “it seems as if i really must experience opposites. after staying for three days with my impoverished aunt, almost like Odysseus’ cronies with Circe, the very first place I visited after that was so overcrowded with counts and barons that it was terrible.”90 the homeric nekyia or katabasis, odysseus’ visit to the underworld in Book 11 of the Odyssey has always been a source of inspiration; this was also the case for Kierkegaard, who in many places refers to the sufferings of the underworld. one should be aware of the fact that these points of contact with Od. 11 must be taken with a degree of caution since in the cases where homer is not named explicitly, the source of inspiration could well have been Book 6 of virgil’s Aeneid or ovid’s Metamorphoses. It is known that as a schoolboy Kierkegaard had read the first six books of the Aeneid;91 in addition, he owned several editions of virgil, both in latin and in translation.92 likewise, he owned ovid’s works.93 moreover, the underworld is treated in numerous other poetic works, both ancient and modern, as well as in

SKS 23, 106.1–3, nB16:17 / JP 3, 2953. it is possible that Kierkegaard has in mind the worsening blindness of his teacher Frederik olaus lange; see Dansk Biografisk Leksikon, vols. 1–19, 1st ed., Copenhagen: gyldendal 1887–1905, vol. 10, pp. 20–2; 2nd ed., Copenhagen: schultz 1933–44, vol. 13, pp. 550–1. lange sought in vain to regain his health on a longer journey abroad in 1828–29; cf. Kierkegaard’s letter from march 25, 1829 to his elder brother in Berlin, where he asks him for the news on this matter: “If you could find out about Fritz lange, whether his eyes are better or worse, i would appreciate it. What i heard here is that where he was staying he started wearing thick glasses on doctor’s advice but that he fell in the street and got splinters in his eyes and because of that went completely blind, but this I neither credit nor hope.” B&A, vol. 1, pp. 31–2 / LD, letter 2, p. 40. Cf. also the entry on “ventriloquism” in the Journal NB33, SKS 26, 272–3, nB33:33 / JP 3, 3224: “Yes, school boys find great sport in being able to say something without the teacher’s being able to discover who said it.” 89 SKS 3, 21.13–15 / EO2, 11. 90 SKS 19, 202.1–4, not6:31 / JP 5, 5473. 91 Encounters with Kierkegaard, pp. 32–3 and 374. 92 ASKB 1298, a i 192–5, and a ii 29–30. 93 ASKB 1265 with the complete works and ASKB a i 171 with a special edition of Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto. 88

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reference works on mythology.94 But regardless of the possible effects of these, the main source of inspiration is homer and especially Book 11 of the Odyssey.95 it is not surprising that The Concept of Irony, which for the most part is concerned with antiquity, also contains some scattered references to the underworld, the first of which comes in the section on plato, where immortality is discussed according to the subjective standpoint: “homer’s heroes sigh for the very humblest station in actual life and wish to trade the underworld’s realm of shades for it.”96 here Kierkegaard apparently has in mind the soul of achilles, who in the underworld says the following to odysseus: βουλοίμην κ᾽ ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, / ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη, / ἢ πᾶσι νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν. (Od. 11.489–91: “i should choose, so i might live on earth, to serve as the hireling of another, some landless man with hardly enough to live on, rather than to be lord over all the dead that have perished”). Along these same lines, one reads the following: “in plato, immortality becomes even slighter, indeed, almost to the point of being blown away, and yet the philosopher wishes to forsake actuality, yes, as far as possible to be dead already while still alive.”97 in the continued analysis of plato, Kierkegaard quotes in a footnote a passage from stallbaum’s commentary on the Phaido,98 where the term nekyia is expanded to also cover the platonic myths about the underworld: “Narrat Olympiodorus tertiam hujus dialogi partem vocari νεκυίαν, quo nomine constat rhapsodiam Odysseæ Homericæ ab veteribus dictam esse. Platonis autem cum tres sint νεκυῖαι s. fabulæ de inferis, in Phædone, Gorgia, de republica, singulæque singulis invicem lucem affundant, omnes inter se diligenter comparandæ sunt.”99 in Either/Or Kierkegaard writes about Faust’s relation to margarete in “Silhouettes” that “Just as ghosts in the underworld, when a living being fell into their hands, sucked his blood and lived as long as this blood warmed and nourished in The Auction Catalogue there are two lexicons of mythology: paul Friedrich achatus nitsch, Neues mythologisches Wörterbuch für studirende Jünglinge, angehende Künstler und jeden Gebildeten überhaupt, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich gotthilf Klopfer, 2nd ed., leipzig and sorau: Fleischer 1821 [1793] (ASKB 1944–1945), and Wilhelm vollmer, Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen. Eine gedrängte Zusammenstellung des Wissenwürdigsten aus der Fabel- und Götter-Lehre aller Völker der alten und neuen Welt. In einem Bande mit einem englischen Stahlstich und 129 Tafeln, stuttgart: hoffmann 1836 (ASKB 1942–1943). 95 also in Od. 24.1–204 there is a shorter nekyia, in which hermes conducts the souls of the suitors to hades (for different reasons aristarchus condemned this passage as spurious). 96 SKS 1, 134.10–12 / CI, 75. 97 SKS 1, 134.12–15 / CI, 75. 98 Platonis dialogos selectos, vols. 1–10, ed. by g. stallbaum, gotha and erfurt: hennings 1827–60, vol. 1, part 2, p. 177. 99 SKS 1, 152.15–19 / CI, 98, note; the latin quotation in translation is as follows: “olympiodor tells that the third part of this dialogue is called nekyia, which as is well known, is the name the ancients used for a book in homer’s Odyssey. since in plato there are three nekyias, i.e., myths about the underworld, namely in the Phaido, Gorgias and the Republic, and they all shed light on each other, they must all then be carefully compared with one another.” 94

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them, so Faust seeks an immediate life whereby he will be rejuvenated and strengthened.”100 the image of the dead with vampire-like characteristics is thus not a modern phenomenon.101 Five years later, in the Journal NB4 in an entry from 1848, Kierkegaard returns to this image in a comparison with contemporary novelists.102 in the Journal EE from 1839, there is the following general observation in the entry ee:175: “there has been so much talk about the pitiableness implicit in the greek conception of the powerless and bloodless bodies of the dead in the underworld— but what more joyous prospects are there in our times, indeed it can scarcely even be compared with it, when one considers that a man’s whole spiritual movement is contracted in death, reduced to a single immortal §.”103 one also hears in many places about the sighs of the souls in the underworld, but now this is made concrete in the different fates which odysseus meets. in many of these cases it is not clear to what extent Kierkegaard had in mind Od. 11, or if, with these kinds of mythological references, he merely avails himself of common images or manners of speaking. In various places he writes, for example, about “Tantalian” pains (an allusion to the description of tantalus’ sufferings in Od. 11.582–92).104 another favored simile is that of sisyphus, who in vain rolls a stone up a mountain (a story recounted in Od. 11.593–600).105 in Judge for Yourselves!, which was SKS 2, 201.33–36 / EO1, 206. Kierkegaard must have misunderstood something here with the notion that the dead suck the blood of the living. once having arrived in hades, odysseus performs the prescribed ritual, sacrifices the sheep, and the ghosts come flocking to drink the blood. 102 SKS 20, 322.15–17, nB4:72. For the shades’ bloodsucking of the living in the underworld, see also nB32:2 from 1854 in SKS 26, 121. 103 SKS 18, 60, ee:175 / KJN 2, 55. 104 “Yes, and i saw tantalus in bitter torment, standing in a pool, and the water came close to his chin. he was wild with thirst, but had no way to drink; for as often as the old man stooped down, eager to drink, so often would the water be swallowed up and vanish away, and at his feet the black earth would appear, for some god would dry it all up. and trees, high and leafy, let hang their fruits from their tops, pears, and pomegranates, and apple trees with their bright fruit, and sweet figs, and luxuriant olives. But as often as the old man would reach out toward these, to clutch them with his hands, the wind would toss them to the shadowy clouds.” On this, see The Concept of Irony, SKS 1, 116.20 / CI, 56 (“tantalizing attempt”); Stages on Life’s Way, SKS 6, 73.26–7 / SLW, 74 (“enjoyment makes an appearance but shuns you as the fruit shunned Tantalus”); Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, SKS 8, 367.11–13 / UD, 270 (“lest we be tempted by the ungodly thirst to search out the secrets of God, which even paganism’s perception punished with an eternally burning thirst”); Christian Discourses, SKS 10, 56.30–57.1 / CD, 46 (“see, that king whom the gods punished suffered the dreadful punishment that every time he was hungry luscious fruits appeared, but when he reached for them they vanished.” “It is not the fruits that withdraw themselves from him; it is he himself who withdraws himself even from being what he is”). See also the Journal BB, SKS 17, 77.8, BB:7 / KJN 1, 70.32 (Faust’s “tantalus-like striving for knowledge”); the Journal NB, SKS 20, 73.23–4, NB:87 (“the terrible tantalism of the intellectual”); the article in Fædrelandet from January 31, 1851, “An Open Letter,” Bladartikler, p. 51 / COR, 54 (“this Tantalus-like busyness about external change”). 105 “Yes, and i saw sisyphus in bitter torment, seeking to raise a monstrous stone with his two hands. in fact he would get a purchase with hands and feet and keep pushing the stone 100 101

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first published in 1876 by P.C. Kierkegaard, mention is made of “that hundredheaded monster that guarded the entrance to the kingdom of the dead,” but this is a confusion of Cerberus and hydra.106 an atypical allusion to Od. 11 is the mention of the illusion’s “virginal girdle,” which “was not as yet undone” in Either/Or, where Kierkegaard possibly has in mind Od. 11.245, where the story of poseidon is told, who undid the girdle of tyros (λῦσε παρθενίην ζώνην) and cast sleep over her in order then to complete his divine mission.107 the sirens in Book 12 of the Odyssey are used by Kierkegaard in many places. in The Concept of Irony they are applied to alcibiades’ close association with socrates, from whom he cannot tear himself free, and the relation is compared with, among other things, the sirens’ seductive songs to odysseus: “he avoids him as if he were a siren, plugs his ears lest he remain sitting at his side and grow old—indeed, he often even wishes that socrates were dead, and yet he knows that it would be far more painful for him if that were to happen.”108 socrates is also associated with the sirens in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.109 in the Journal AA, in an entry from 1835, aa:14, the devil is the tempter, “so the whole trick is to adopt the method already recommended earlier by Ulysses with the Sirens: put wax in your ears.”110 in the Journal EE, in the entry ee:148 from July 28, 1839, Kierkegaard compares his “youthful excesses” with the Sirens’ song.111 With the sirens our present journey through the Odyssey suddenly comes to an end, since in his writings Kierkegaard apparently has not used any material at all from Books 13–24. the explanation might be that with the exception of Book 22 he had not read the second half of the Odyssey in school and presumably was less familiar with it. toward the crest of a hill, but as often as he was about to heave it over the top, the weight would turn it back, and then down again to the plain would come rolling the shameless stone. But he would strain again and thrust it back, and the sweat flowed down from his limbs, and dust rose up from his head.” On this, see the Journal AA, SKS 17, 28.11–15, aa:12 / KJN 1, 23 (“When he struggles along the right path, rejoicing in having overcome the power of temptation, there comes perhaps almost simultaneously, hard upon the most perfect victory, some seemingly insignificant outer circumstance which thrusts him down, like Sisyphus from the top of the hill”), and Either/Or, SKS 2, 174.24–5 / EO1, 177, where both tantalus and Sisyphus are mentioned (“that Tantalus thirsts and Sisyphus rolls a stone up the mountain”). 106 Dømmer selv!, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1876, p. 13; SV1, Xii, 384 / JFY, 101. 107 SKS 3, 126.33 / EO2, 127. in the underworld odysseus seeks the advice of the seer tiresias, but Kierkegaard’s references to this are only indirect when, in three places, he makes use of horace’s Satires, 2.5.59–60: “O Laërtiade, quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non: / Divinare etenim magnus mihi donat Apollo.” Kierkegaard uses this for his motto to preface no. 8 in Prefaces: “What i predict will either happen or it will not happen—apollo has granted me the gift of prophecy.” SKS 4, 508 / P, 47. he had previously written this in the Journal JJ in a reference to leibniz, SKS 18, 154.16–17, JJ:40 / KJN 2, 40.17–18, and later in A Literary Review it appears again referring to thales, SKS 8, 100.24–6 / TA, 106. 108 SKS 1, 109.5–8 / CI, 48. 109 SKS 7, 193.11–13 / CUP1, 210. 110 SKS 17, 32.20–2, aa:14 / KJN 1, 27. 111 SKS 18, 52.14–33, ee:148 / KJN 2, 47.

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D. References to Homeric Hymns and Apocrypha since antiquity various other epic poems besides the Iliad and the Odyssey have been attributed to homer, but today scholars believe that they cannot be from the same author. Here I will briefly treat the ones which Kierkegaard mentions and make some remarks about them.112 there is a surviving collection of 33 Homeric Hymns. they consist of a series of fixed elements: an invocation of the god, a description of its being and field of activity, the history of the birth of the god, sometimes an epic account, the poet’s taking leave of and prayer to the god. at a very early time the alexandrian philologists were in agreement that homer was not the author of these poems. Kierkegaard’s occupation with these has only been indirect, namely, in connection with schelling’s lectures, which he took notes to in Notebook 11.113 as a part of the development of greek polytheism, the homeric hymn no. 2 to demeter is touched upon in several lectures; its theme is the myth of hades’ kidnapping of persephone down into the underworld.114 With the following remark reference is made to the eleusian mysteries: “We learn of demeter’s reconciliation from homer’s hymns. demeter says: i shall establish the mysteries so that you will be able to reconcile my mind.”115 in Notebook 12, entitled “Aesthetica,” Kierkegaard cites a passage from Aristotle’s Poetics, in which it is written that “Homer is the first inventor of comedy.”116 the explanation of this surprising remark is that aristotle ascribed to homer a burlesque called Margites: of the ancients some wrote heroic verse and some iambic. and just as homer was a supreme poet in the serious style, since he alone made his representations not only good but also dramatic, so, too, he was the first to mark out the main lines of comedy, since he made his drama not out of personal satire but out of the laughable as such. his Margites indeed provides an analogy: as are the Iliad and Odyssey to our tragedies, so is the Margites to our comedies.117

in connection with the discussion in Either/Or (treated above in section iii, a), where a comparison is made between homer and mozart’s Don Giovanni, Kierkegaard writes that homer has also written a short epic called Batrachomyomachia (the Battle of Frogs and mice), for which he did not deserve immortality: all poems mentioned in this section, the Hymns, Margites, and Batrachomyomachia, are translated in Homeric Hymns, Homeric Apocrypha, Lives of Homer, trans. by martin l. West, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 2003 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 496). 113 see section iii, a above. 114 SKS 19, 358.35ff., not11:36 / SBL, 402; SKS 19, 364.28ff., not11:38 / SBL, 409. 115 SKS 19, 366.7–9, not11:39 / SBL, 411. schelling quotes vv. 274–5: “i myself will instruct you on how in future you can propitiate me with holy performance.” 116 SKS 19, 376.27–31, not12:10 / JP 4, 4834. 117 Poetics, 1448b 32–1449a 2. translation from Aristotle, vol. 23, Poetics, trans. by W.h. Fyfe, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press and london: William heinemann 1932 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 199). 112

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the balance he has in mind here is that between content and form, but the Batrachomyomachia, which humorously portrays the war of the frogs and the mice as a parody of the Iliad, lacks this balance. in 1816 or 1817, poul martin møller translated the main part of the poem; the fragment, completed by Christen thaarup (1795–1849), was, however, first published in the second edition of Møller’s Posthumous Writings, which does not appear in The Auction Catalogue.119 it is therefore unclear whether Kierkegaard knew “The Battle of Frogs and Mice” in møller’s translation.120 it was not unusual that the poem was printed together with the Odyssey, as was the case, for example, with Wolf’s editions (1783 or later), and Kierkegaard might have used one of these in school.121 it is also possible, however, that he knew the Batrachomyomachia only from having heard it mentioned, perhaps by møller.122 Naturally, the pseudo-Homeric poems were insignificant to Kierkegaard. By contrast, as we have seen, this was not the case with the Iliad and the Odyssey, from which he draws heavily, although we must recognize that remarkably he does not seem to have used any material at all from the Odyssey, Books 13–24, which is, however, no accident: as already noted, one cannot avoid noticing that, with the exception of Od. 22, he did not read the second half of the Odyssey in school, and therefore he was presumably less familiar with it. on the other hand, we can easily conclude, Kierkegaard continually returned to the first half of the Odyssey as a reservoir when he needed pregnant images and poetic comparisons. as was clear from section iii, B, the same practice was evident in relation to the Iliad. generally, his application of homer always serves other purposes than homer himself, and as was shown in section iii, a, this is also the case in the one place where he discusses homer more extensively, namely, in “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic” in Either/ Or, where homer is only held up as a contrast to mozart’s Don Giovanni, however also belonging to “that little immortal band of men whose names, whose works, time SKS 2, 58.13–20 / EO1, 50. Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–6, ed. by C. Winther, F.C. olsen, C. thaarup, and l.v. petersen, 2nd ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1848–50, vol. 1, 1848, pp. 254–64. 120 there were also contemporary danish translations of the Batrachomyomachia; in particular, one should mention Frederik schaldemose’s hexameter translation (Copenhagen 1821), and also a prose translation by h.a. Balle (ribe 1822); but it is unlikely that Kierkegaard knew these. 121 Cf. above section ii, in fine. 122 the poem is also treated, for instance, in F.C. petersen, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1830, p. 43 (ASKB 1037). 118 119

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will not forget because eternity recollects them.”123 it is nevertheless quite surprising to what a large extent and in which widely different contexts Kierkegaard makes use of the homeric poems throughout his authorship and journals. his fascination with the greatest works of greek poetry was permanent and never faded.

123

SKS 2, 56.15–17 / EO1, 48.

Bibliography I. Homer’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Anthologia graeca, ed. by paul hagerup tregder, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, pp. 1–5 (ASKB 1041). Møller, Poul Martin, “Homers Odyssees sex første Sange. (1825),” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 225–340 (ASKB 1574–1576). —— “Niende Sang. (Odysseus i Kyklopens Hule.) (1816),” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43, vol. 1, 1839, pp. 341–58 (ASKB 1574–1576). Homeri Ilias cum brevi annotatione, vols. 1–2, ed. by Christian gottlob heyne, leipzig: Weidmann 1804 (ASKB a i 160–161). stereotype edition of the same, leipzig: Weidmann 1828 (ASKB a ii 50). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Homer [Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von], “Homer noch einmal,” in Goethe’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand [in 55 volumes], vols. 1–40, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30; Goethe’s nachgelassene Werke, vols. 41–55, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1832–33, vol. 46 (Nachlaß, vol. 6), pp. 64–5; see also vol. 33, pp. 14–20 (ASKB 1641–1668). [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, p. 428; p. 514; p. 516; vol. 2, p. 17; p. 38; p. 47; p. 203; p. 215; p. 221; p. 223; p. 274; p. 293; pp. 304–6; p. 361; p. 386; p. 392; p. 408; p. 434; p. 440; vol. 3, p. 6; p. 23; p. 109; p. 155; p. 231; p. 431; vol. 4, p. 82; p. 87; p. 185; p. 261; p. 331; p. 459; vol. 6, p. 11; vol. 7, p. 15; p. 52; p. 113; vol. 8, p. 360; p. 370; pp. 380–1 (ASKB 536–544). [hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich], Philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 1 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), p. 172; p. 389 (ASKB 549). —— Wissenschaft der Logik, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von henning, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–34 (vols. 3–5 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s

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Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 2, p. 229 (ASKB 552–554). —— Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Carl ludwig michelet, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1833–36 (vols. 13–15 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 85; p. 139; p. 233; pp. 290–1; vol. 2, p. 14; p. 63; p. 151; p. 183; p. 287; p. 543; vol. 3, pp. 19–20 (ASKB 557–559). —— Vermischte Schriften, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich Förster and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1834–35 (vols. 16–17 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 22; p. 410; p. 417; p. 461; vol. 2, p. 137; p. 172; p. 220; p. 222; p. 227 (ASKB 555–556). —— Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 38; p. 204; pp. 213–14; p. 223; p. 281; p. 287; pp. 290–3; pp. 304–5; p. 326; p. 336; pp. 339–40; pp. 351– 3; p. 358; vol. 2, p. 25; pp. 27–8; p. 52; p. 56; p. 58; pp. 62–3; p. 68; pp. 71–3; p. 87; p. 89; p. 94; p. 128; p. 169; p. 172; pp. 179–80; p. 187; p. 235; p. 248; vol. 3, p. 93; p. 202; p. 247; p. 273; pp. 278–9; p. 286; p. 333; pp. 336–9; pp. 343–9; p. 351; p. 354; pp. 360–72 passim; pp. 378–9; pp. 381–4; pp. 386–7; p. 391; pp. 403–4; p. 406; p. 455; p. 488; pp. 550–1; p. 554; p. 566 (ASKB 1384–1386). —— Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, vols. 1–2, ed. by philipp marheineke, 2nd revised edition, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840 (vols. 11–12 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 217; pp. 306–7 (ASKB 564–565). —— Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, vols. 1–3, ed. by leopold von henning, Carl ludwig michelet, and ludwig Boumann, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1840–45 (vols. 6–7.1, 7.2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. XXi; p. 265 (ASKB 561–563). Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, “Det astronomiske Aar,” in his Urania. Aarbog for 1844, pp. 77–160; pp. 113–14 (ASKB u 57). Herder, Johann Gottfried von, “Ueber die Humanität Homers in der Iliade,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst, vols. 1–20, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 15, pp. 97– 105 (ASKB 1685–1694; see also ASKB a i 125–133). —— Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Philosophie und Geschichte, vols. 1–22, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 14, pp. 38–45 (ASKB 1695–1705; see also ASKB a i 114–124). Kanne, Johann arnold, Die goldenen Aerse der Philister. Eine Antiquarische Untersuchung, nuremberg: riegel und Wießner 1820, p. v; p. 13; p. 17 (ASKB 588).

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[lichtenberg, georg Christoph], Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s auserlesene Schriften, Baireuth: bei iohann andreas lübecks erben 1800, pp. 26–7 (ASKB 1775). møller, poul martin, “recension af: ‘Gesandtskabet til Achilles, eller Iliadens niende Sang’, oversat med indledende Bemærkninger om en dansk homerisk oversættelse og om det heroiske versemaal af Chr. Wilster; i Blandinger fra Sorø, første Hefte,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st ed., Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43; vol. 2, 1842, pp. 74–84 (ASKB 1574–1576). —— “Strøtanker,” in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st edition, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43; vol. 3, 1843, p. 176; p. 183; p. 185; p. 196; p. 204; p. 216; p. 269; p. 283 (ASKB 1574–1576). nitsch, paul Friedrich achatus, Neues mythologisches Wörterbuch für studirende Jünglinge, angehende Künstler und jeden Gebildeten überhaupt, vols. 1–2, ed. by Friedrich gotthilf Klopfer, 2nd edition, leipzig and sorau: Fleischer 1821 [1793] (ASKB 1944–1945). olsen, Frederik Christian, Poul Martin Møllers Levnet, med Breve fra hans Haand, in Efterladte Skrifter af Poul M. Møller, vols. 1–3, ed. by Christian Winther, F.C. olsen, and Christen thaarup, 1st edition, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1839–43; vol. 3, 1842, pp. 1–116 [separate pagination]; pp. 19–20; p. 22; pp. 71–4 (ASKB 1576). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1830, pp. 24–43 (ASKB 1037). povelsen, søren ludvig, Emendationes locorum aliquot Homericorum, Copenhagen: J.d. Quist 1846 (ASKB 1118). (in The Auction Catalogue mistakenly attributed to C.C.v. silfverberg.) [richter, Johann paul Friedrich], Jean paul, Vorschule der Aesthetik nebst einigen Vorlesungen in Leipzig über die Parteien der Zeit, vols. 1–3, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1813, vol. 1, p. 23; p. 140; p. 315; vol. 2, p. 469; p. 497; p. 502; p. 518; p. 585; p. 630; vol. 3, p. 792; p. 929 (ASKB 1381–1383). schlegel, august Wilhelm, Ueber dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Vorlesungen, vols. 1–2 [vol. 2 in 2 parts], heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1809–11, vol. 1, p. 126 (ASKB 1392–1394). schopenhauer, arthur, Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, p. 241; p. 272; p. 313; p. 329; p. 446; vol. 2, p. 221; p. 383; p. 391 (ASKB 774–775). [solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand], Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel, vols. 1–2, ed. by ludwig tieck und Friedrich von raumer, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1826, pp. 629–49 (ASKB 1832–1833). —— K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, p. 245; pp. 279–82 (ASKB 1387). [sulzer, Johann george], Johann George Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin

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gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 159; vol. 2, p. 100 (in “Vorbericht”); p. 124; p. 233 (ASKB 807–808). —— Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 27; pp. 29–30; p. 78; p. 139; p. 150; p. 179; p. 207; p. 254; pp. 259–60; p. 382; p. 457; p. 683; vol. 2, p. 305; pp. 636ff.; p. 661; vol. 4, p. 273 (ASKB 1365–1369). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, p. 43; p. 46; p. 75; p. 164; p. 173 (ASKB 1378). tiedemann, dietrich, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie von Thales bis Sokrates, vols. 1–6, marburg: in der neuen akademischen Buchhandlung 1791–97, vol. 1, pp. 2ff. (ASKB 836–841). vollmer, Wilhelm, Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen. Eine gedrängte Zusammenstellung des Wissenwürdigsten aus der Fabel- und GötterLehre aller Völker der alten und neuen Welt. In einem Bande mit einem englischen Stahlstich und 129 Tafeln, stuttgart: hoffmann 1836 (ASKB 1942–1943). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Homer holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 14; p. 22; p. 27; p. 31; p. 39; p. 42; p. 44; pp. 52–3; p. 55; pp. 63–6; p. 69; p. 72; p. 85; p. 88; 122; pp. 126–7; p. 137. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 15; p. 114; p. 282; pp. 327–8; p. 469.

plutarch: a Constant Cultural reference nicolae irina

I. Plutarch’s Writings l. mestrius plutarch1 (c. 50–c. 120) was born in Chaeronea, a small city in northern Boeotia. he authored the most celebrated Vitae parallelae and a collection of more than 70 miscellaneous works that was titled Moralia.2 in fact, the number of Moralia in the Catalogue of lamprias indicates that more than half of them were lost over the centuries.3 plutarch wrote the Parallel Lives over almost a quarter of a century, between the death of domitian and his own death, early in the reign of hadrian. Of these biographies, pairing a Greek military or political figure with a Roman, 22 survive. Nowadays, a revived scholarly interest confirms a strong tendency to re-evaluate plutarch’s Lives: “no longer seen as an annoyingly opaque but fundamentally simple screen hiding reliable bits of information, the Lives instead emerged as original works by a master of style, rhetoric, and biographical technique.”4 this later tendency reaffirms the earlier esteem Plutarch enjoyed. Kierkegaard, like montesquieu, voltaire, hume, rousseau, Bacon, lessing, herder, and goethe before him—to name but a few—is a good expression of this type of interest and fascination with Plutarch’s “ability to use historical figures to contemplate the play of human qualities in action, to reveal the specific cast vices and virtues assume in the contingent world of political leadership and strife.”5

plutarch took the name of a friend—the consular mestrius Florus—who helped him obtain roman citizenship. Cf. tim duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice, oxford: Clarendon press 1999, p. 1. 2 as robert lamberton explains, the label Moralia “accurately describes [only] a small but influential minority of the nearly eighty essays, dialogues, compilations, and philosophical polemics” included in what was preserved of the initial collection. Cf. Robert Lamberton, Plutarch, new haven and london: Yale university press 2001, p. 23. 3 Cf. duff, Plutarch’s Lives, pp. 1–2. 4 Philip A. Stadter, “Introduction,” in Plutarch and the Historical Tradition, ed. by philip a. stadter, london and new York: routledge 1992, p. 2. 5 stadter, Plutarch and the Historical Tradition, p. 1. 1

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II. Kierkegaard’s References to Plutarch Kierkegaard has many direct and indirect references to plutarch. they support or put more emphasis on Kierkegaard’s own views, adding the revered touch of history to his claims. most likely, Kierkegaard remembered many of the passages he refers to, as niels thulstrup indicated, “presumably from his school lessons [or] from his reading of plutarch, whose works he owned both in greek and in various german and Danish translations.”6 in what follows, i will try to offer a concise account of Kierkegaard’s use of plutarch’s works, in an attempt to grasp his manifold but constant reference to this most valuable source of inspiration. Kierkegaard often refers to the consistency and long-lasting nature of greek public values. indeed, despite the fact that the public life of ancient athens underwent frequent changes, the essential civic values remained unharmed, which indicates that the greek sense of public values and duties endured while adapting to change. Kierkegaard appoints Frater taciturnus, in Stages on Life’s Way, to tell the story of pericles issuing the law of athenian citizenship and then abolishing it after his legitimate children died.7 Thus, in “ ‘Guilty?’ / ‘Not Guilty?’ ” he comments: “It is shocking: pericles weeps—and pericles does one thing one day and the opposite the next. But it is moving to read plutarch—he says that the athenians yielded to him; they believed that the gods had taken revenge on him and that the people therefore had to deal gently with him.”8 however, any other political offense is severely punished by the greeks. in the “Preface” to Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus claims with the greeks that abstention from participation in public life is “a political offense in any age, but especially in a time of ferment, during which, in ancient times, it was punishable even by death.”9 The source of this stipulation is Plutarch’s “Solon,”10 to which Kierkegaard refers also when he recalls the harsh laws of punishment recorded by dracon and repealed by solon.11 Niels Thulstrup, “Commentary,” in Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. by david F. swenson, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1962, p. 155. 7 pericles’ law (451–450 bc) imposed the very restrictive minimum qualification for athenian citizenship: both parents must be born in athens. most likely, the law was not applied retrospectively. Prior to this law, “the conditions for citizenship may not have been codified, as athenian citizenship was based on enrollment in phratry and deme” (my italics). Philip A. stadter, A Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles, Chapel hill and london: the university of Carolina press 1989, p. 334. 8 SKS 6, 296 / SLW, 319. see also Pap. v B 97:45 / SLW, supplement, p. 598. Cf. Plutarch, “Pericles,” 36–7, in Plutarch’s Lives, vols. 1–11, trans. by Bernadotte perrin, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1914–26 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 3, pp. 103–9. 9 SKS 4, 215 / PF, 5. Kierkegaard uses the term απϱαγμοσύνη, which was also used by Xenophon with reference to socrates. see Memorabilia, iii, 11, 16, Xenophontis memorabilia, ed. F.a. Bornemann, leipzig: 1828 (ASKB 1211), p. 236. 10 Plutarch, “Solon,” 20. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 1, p. 457.) 11 SKS 4, 335 / CA, 27. solon repealed all draconic laws but the ones dealing with murder. Plutarch, “Solon,” 17 (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 1, pp. 449–51). see CA, notes, p. 231, note 11. another quotation from plutarch’s Lives is Kierkegaard’s reference to solon—who 6

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the balance between forgiveness and punishment is indeed of great importance for Kierkegaard. the victim, he claims, is very rich when the perpetrator of violence or wrong-doing needs forgiveness. in one of the Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, namely, “On the Occasion of a Confession,” he discusses in more detail the nature and the power of forgiveness. Kierkegaard contends: [s]urely no king who rules over kingdoms and countries, no Croesus who possesses everything, and no philanthropist who feeds the hungry possesses anything as great or has anything as great to give away or anything as needful to give away as the person whose forgiveness someone else needs. needs—indeed, needs it as the primary necessity.12

to give more emphasis to his view on forgiveness as a primary necessity, Kierkegaard quotes Julius Caesar, whom he describes as a “pagan whose name is inseparable from the idea of conquests and power.”13 using plutarch as his source, Kierkegaard recalls Caesar’s words “when his enemy showed the highest courage (so it seemed, alas, to the pagans) by committing suicide, ‘there he robbed me of my most glorious victory, because I would have forgiven him.’ ”14 When Caesar heard of Cato’s death, he was clearly annoyed, according to plutarch: “ ‘Cato, i begrudge thee thy death; for thou didst begrudge me the preservation of thy life.’ For, in reality, if Cato could have consented to have his life spared by Caesar, he would not be thought to have defiled his own fair fame, but rather to have adorned that of Caesar.”15 indeed, the merciful magnificence of the victor is valued more in the eyes of his subjects than the martyrdom of his defeated ones. in the third part of Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, in the second discourse included in “The Gospel of Sufferings,” he mentions the famous claim of archimedes that states that “with any given force, it [is] possible to move any given weight” and its corollary that indicates that if he were able to go to another world, if there were one, then it would be possible to move this world from there.16 In Kierkegaard’s rendering, the celebrated saying of the “ingenious pagan” becomes: “Give me a place to stand outside the world and I will move the world.”17 “forbade plays as deception”—was indicated by commentators in SLW (SKS 6, 409 / SLW, 442). see SLW, Notes, p. 736, note 511: Plutarch, “Solon,” 29. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 1, p. 489.) 12 SKS 5, 394 / TD, 13. 13 SKS 5, 395 / TD, 13. 14 ibid. this statement alone is enough to make Caesar worthy of admiration, according to Frater taciturnus. see SKS 6, 356 / SLW, 384. 15 Plutarch, “Caesar,” 54 (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 7, p. 569); “Cato the Younger,” 72 (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 8, p. 409); cf. also Plutarchi vitae parallelae, vols. 1–9, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1829 (ASKB 1181–1189), vol. 7, p. 64; p. 213. 16 See Plutarch, “Marcellus,” 14. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 5, p. 473.) 17 SKS 8, 337 / UD, 236. in The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard points out how Aristophanes clarifies how Socrates “very emphatically” uses the phrase, SKS 1, 202 / CI, 152. moreover, in Either/Or, part 1, a makes a quick reference to “the archimedean point with which one lifts the whole world,” SKS 2, 283 / EO1, 295. see also SKS 4, 57 / R, 186. SKS 6, 242 / SLW, 261. SKS 7, 67 / CUP1, 65. SKS 9, 138 / WL, 136. SKS 19, 200, not6:24 / JP 5, 5468. SKS 17, 13–16, aa:6 / KJN 1, 9–11.

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the larger context in which Kierkegaard uses archimedes’ conjecture here is an attempt to show how faith alleviates the burden of suffering. Suffering is beneficial, in Kierkegaard’s view, although this is something that one has to believe, despite seemingly contrary or utterly unavailable evidence: [T]hat the heavy suffering is beneficial—that must be believed; it cannot be seen. later it perhaps can be seen that it has been beneficial, but in the period of suffering it cannot be seen, and neither can it be heard, even though ever so many people ever so lovingly keep on repeating it: it must be believed. Faith’s thought must be there, and the inward, trusting, repeated utterance of this thought to oneself....18

related to the above theme of faith and suffering, in Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard assumes that “all things serve for good those who love God,”19 which he considers to be eternally assured, the most certain of all certainties. he contends that “it has been shown how experience has confirmed its truth, how everything actually has served for good those who loved God” and that “it has been made obvious that...however different everything appears at the time or times of suffering, ordeal, and spiritual trial, yet finally everything must serve for good those who love God, [and] that no doubt can stand up against this assurance but finally must give up and submit.”20 therefore, for him, instead of demonstrating the truth-value of the former, it becomes more significant to discuss another idea, that is, “all things must serve us for good—‘when’ we love God.”21 thus, the whole discourse, as Kierkegaard claims, revolves around the word “when.” in order to illustrate his point, he describes philip of macedonia addressing the spartans and the impact that the brevity of their utterances had: “You probably know about the nation that was famous for expressing itself briefly, and you presumably also know that short reply: When. the superior force had haughtily announced what its countless troops would do when they had conquered everything; the terse reply was ‘When.’ ”22 the passage quoted by Kierkegaard has its origin in plutarch’s “Concerning Talkativeness,” yet, in Plutarch’s version, it is the aspect of conditionality that is emphasized by the spartans: “when philip wrote to the spartans, ‘if i invade laconia, i shall turn you out,’ they wrote back, ‘If.’ ”23 the exact source of a passage cited in the draft version, which, according to Kierkegaard, is a quotation from plutarch’s Moralia, has not been located by the commentators. here Kierkegaard recalls that “King philip was insulted because someone addressed him in compound words, since he was of the opinion that only

SKS 8, 336 / UD, 235. Cf. rom 8:28. 20 SKS 10, 199 / CD, 189. 21 SKS 10, 200 / CD, 190. 22 ibid. 23 Plutarch, “Concerning Talkativeness,” 17, Moralia, 511, in Plutarch’s Moralia, vols. 1–15, trans. by Frank Cole Babbitt et al., Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press, 1967–84 (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 6, p. 445. (my emphasis.) 18 19

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the common herd is addressed in this way.”24 since philip chose aristotle, “the most famous and learned of philosophers,”25 to be alexander’s teacher, he may have been exposed himself to some of the stagirite’s ideas. in aristotle’s Rhetoric, the misuse of compound words is one of the four forms of bad taste in language.26 When, in The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard grants vigilius haufniensis the opportunity to define and discuss anxiety as the consequence of sin, he claims that even the existence (Tilværelse) of a genius, despite its splendor, glory, and significance, is sinful and that, precisely therefore, it ends in anxiety. He adds that no genius—unless he “disdained the temporal as immediate and turned toward himself and toward the divine,”27 that is, unless he was a “religious genius”—has ever had any relation to fate other than one of anxiety. anxiety appears in the trembling moment of the genius’ conversation with fate, which usually occurs immediately after the moment of danger, for “in the moment of danger, the genius is stronger than ever.”28 Plutarch’s “Caesar” is again the source of inspiration here, when Kierkegaard recalls the story of Caesar, dressed as a slave, on the river aoüs.29 during the turmoil, fate is genius’ secret ally: [t]he genius knows he is stronger than the whole world, provided that at this point there is found no doubtful commentary to the invisible writing by which he reads the will of fate. if he reads it according to his wish, he says with his omnipotent voice to the captain of the ship, “Sail on, you carry Caesar and his fortune.”30 Pap. vi B 29:106 / CUP2, supplement, p. 20 /. Cf. also CUP2, notes, p. 273, note 17. one reason for philip’s disdain may be the shift indicated by dorothea Clinton Woodworth: “[F]rom aristophanes on, the comic writers and epigrammatists felt at liberty to coin compounds in –δης for comic effect, most if not all of which retain the implication of contempt. this tendency reaches its extreme in the hybrid compounds of plautus, who was very probably reproducing a feature which he found prominently used in the New Comedy.” dorothea Clinton Woodworth, “studies in greek noun-Formation dental terminations vi. 2,” Classical Philology, vol. 27, no. 4, 1932, pp. 343–52, see p. 352. 25 Plutarch, “Alexander,” 7. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 7, p. 241.) 26 Cf. aristotle, Rhetoric, iii, 3, 1405b. 27 SKS 4, 404 / CA, 102. 28 SKS 4, 403 / CA, 101. 29 at one point during this expedition, it became “impossible for the master of the boat to force his way along. he therefore ordered the sailors to come about in order to retrace his course. But Caesar, perceiving this, disclosed himself, took the master of the boat by the hand, who was terrified at sight of him, and said: ‘Come, good man, be bold and fear naught; thou carryest Caesar and Caesar’s fortune in thy boat.’ ” The attempt was nevertheless unsuccessful. Plutarch, “Caesar,” 38 (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 7, pp. 535–7). it would also be noteworthy to mention here that the “Caesar” chapter is not included in the edition owned by Kierkegaard (Plutark’s Levnetsbeskrivelser, vols. 1–4, trans. and ed. by stephan tetens, Copenhagen: Brummers Forlag 1800–11 (ASKB 1197–1200). therefore, the commentators refer to Plutarchs Levnetsbeskrivelser af Themistocles og Camillus, Alexander og Cæsar. Til Brug for de lærde Skolers øverste Classe. Efter den Reiske-Huttenske Text med critiske og oplysende Anmærkninger udgivne, 2nd revised ed., ed. by n. lang nissen, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1826 (ASKB a ii 51). Cf. CI, notes, p. 518, note 378. 30 SKS 4, 403 / CA, 100. The same is used to describe “good fortune” in The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress: “...here good fortune means what Caesar told the ship captain 24

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plutarch plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s treatment of socrates. in his dissertation chapter dealing with the daimon of socrates, Kierkegaard contends that it is critical for our conception of socrates to understand that “this daimonian is represented only as warning, not as commanding—that is, as negative and not as positive.”31 he supports this claim with a footnote which refers to both plutarch and Cicero who “have preserved several stories about the activity of this daimonian, [in which] it manifests itself only as warning.”32 Furthermore, when he discusses socrates’ condemnation, Kierkegaard mentions in another footnote that, according to diogenes laertius, “Favorinus, plutarch’s contemporary and friend, had read the indictment in the Metroön.”33 in addition, one can find several later remarks regarding Socrates’ life that Kierkegaard wrote on the inside front cover and front end-sheet of The Concept of Irony. For instance, he notes, “in his De genio Socratis, plutarch tells that socrates’ father had received the oracle about his son stating that he must compel him in no way but allow him to follow his inclinations completely.”34 For Kierkegaard, plutarch is also a reliable interpreter of various philosophical matters, as well as a valuable resource of biographical details. in Kierkegaard’s notes from Schelling’s Berlin lectures from November 1841, one can find a reference to Plutarch’s clarification of Plato’s distinction between “is not” and “is-not-being”: “by the former is meant the denial of any kind of being, [whereas] by the latter

about when he said to him: You are carrying Caesar—and his good fortune,” SV1 X, 328 / C, 308, and is also recalled in the Concept of Irony with reference to his brief exposition of hegel’s view on the daimon of socrates. Cf. SKS 1, 214 / CI, 165. 31 SKS 1, 209 / CI, 159. 32 see Kierkegaard’s footnote, SKS 1, 209 / CI, 159. he refers to Plutarchi Chaeronensis quæ extant opera, cum Latina interpretatione, parts 1–4 in vols. 1–13, ed. by henri estienne, geneva: stephanus 1572, vol. 2, p. 241; p. 243. as the commentators point out, Kierkegaard did not own henri estienne’s complete edition of plutarch: cf. CI, notes, p. 517, note 363; Plutarch, “On the Sign of Socrates,” 10–12, Moralia, 580c–582c. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 7, pp. 405–17.) 33 see Kierkegaard’s footnote, SKS 1, 216 / CI, 168. With regards to the reasons of the people in the “sophisticated, inquisitive Athens” to put Socrates to death, Kierkegaard writes: “admittedly, the fact that socrates bored them would have been just as valid a reason to execute him as Aristide’s justice was a valid reason for the Athenians to exile him.” The allusion here is to Plutarch’s “Aristides,” 7. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 2, pp. 233–5.) 34 Pap. iv a 200 / CI, Supplement, p. 448. See Plutarch, “On the Sign of Socrates,” 20, Moralia, 589e–f (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 7, pp. 457–9). other notes refer to the story about Xanthippe’s getting angry; see Pap. iii B 30 / CI, supplement, p. 448. this reference can be also found in SKS 21, 130–1, nB7:102 / JP 4, 4545; cf. plutarch, “on the Control of Anger,” 13, Moralia, 461d–e. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 6, p. 143.) For plato’s Apology version of socrates’ discourse on death, which is also documented in plutarch’s “Consolations to Apollonius,” see Pap. iv a 206 / CI, supplement, p. 450; cf. plutarch, Moralia, 107d–108e. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 2, pp. 137–45.) see also socrates’ house ownership and accumulated funds (Pap. iv a 212 / CI, Supplement, p. 451); cf. Plutarch, “Aristides,” 1. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 2, p. 215.)

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the otherness of the participant and what it participates in.”35 in december, 1841, yet another reference to plutarch appears in the context of the discussion regarding the “two philosophies.” Kierkegaard’s note provides Schelling’s clarification of socrates’ dialectic, “directed as much against the subjective untruths of the sophists as against [the] more objective turgidity, which was, as plutarch says, like smoke that Socrates blew back upon them.”36 there is a great abundance of other references to plutarch in Kierkegaard’s writings. Let us now only briefly mention, in the end, yet another set of examples, in an attempt to encompass, without the claim of comprehensiveness, the various contexts of Kierkegaard’s most significant quotations from Plutarch. in Stages on Life’s Way, “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections” begins with a motto borrowed from plutarch’s rendering of gorgias’ remarks: “[h]e who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than one who is not deceived.”37 in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus recalls that “plutarch states that some have assumed one world because they feared that otherwise the result would be an unlimited and embarrassing infinity of worlds.”38 Kierkegaard also points to the remarks of Cato the elder regarding what Johannes Climacus calls “the dialectical reciprocity between jest and earnestness.”39 in addition, he mentions plutarch’s “little treatise on ‘how one may praise oneself in a permissible way,’ ”40 and themistocles’ unrest when he “became sleepless over the idea of Miltiades’ triumphs.”41 Kierkegaard recalls in a footnote plutarch’s anecdote about eudamidas and Xenocrates,42 but also plutarch’s record of Hesiod’s claim that Chaos, Earth, Tartarus, and Eros are “primordial entities,”43 Cf. CI, notes, p. 556, note 12: plutarch, “reply to Colotes in defense of the other Philosophers,” 15, Moralia, 1115d–f. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 14, pp. 239–41.) 36 SKS 19, 321, not11:15 / SBL, p. 357. For plutarch’s actual contentions on this topic, see Plutarch, “Platonic Questions,” Moralia, i, 1000. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 13, part. i, pp. 23–9.) 37 Plutarch, “On the Fame of the Athenians,” 5, Moralia, 348c. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 4, p. 509.) Kierkegaard uses an abridged version: “the deceived is wiser than one not deceived”; cf. SKS 6, 86 / SLW, 88. see also SKS 18, 168–9, JJ:90 / KJN 2, 156. 38 SKS 7, 110 / CUP1, 113. Cf. Plutarch, “The Obsolescence of Oracles,” 22, Moralia, 421–2. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 5, pp. 414–15.) 39 SKS 7, 72 / CUP1, 71. Cf. Plutarch, “Cato the Elder,” 18, Moralia, 199. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 3, pp. 180–1.) 40 SKS 7, 257 / CUP1, 283, mentioned again in Pap. iX a 78 / JP 2, 1369. Cf. plutarch, “On Praising Oneself Inoffensively,” 17, Moralia, 545. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 7, pp. 154– 7.) the sketch of the passage indicates that Climacus read plutarch’s piece “just now with much interest”; see Pap. vi B 41, 9 / CUP2, supplement, p. 66. 41 SKS 7, 329 / CUP1, 359. Cf. Plutarch, “Themistocles,” 3. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 2, pp. 10–11.) 42 SKS 7, 39 / CUP1, 33. Cf. Plutarch, “Eudamidas,” 1, Moralia, 192. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 3, pp. 136–7.) 43 SKS 7, 91 / CUP1, 92. Cf. Plutarch, “Isis and Osiris,” 57, Moralia, 374. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 5, p. 137.) Kierkegaard also refers to “a small section in plutarch’s work on Isis and Osiris” when he describes Trendelenburg’s views, see SKS 7, 107 / CUP1, 110; cf. Plutarch, “Isis and Osiris,” 60, Moralia, 375 (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 5, pp. 143–5). 35

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Empedocles’ statement that “one should fast with regard to evil,”44 and plutarch’s “splendid definition of virtue: ‘Ethical virtue has the passions for its material, reason for its form.’ ”45 Plutarch’s “The E at Delphi”46 and “the dinner of the seven Wise Men”47 are also mentioned by Kierkegaard. indeed, there are several other tacit cultural references originating in plutarch’s Lives, like the one referring to archimedes’ death,48 socrates’ relation to aspasia,49 the reference to “the barber who gave his life in order to be the first to bring the news of the victory at Marathon,”50 or the one where Kierkegaard alludes to the demagogue hyperbolos.51 as we have already seen, Kierkegaard uses famous ancient dictums quite frequently for more emphasis, with plutarch often being their source.52 this plethora of cultural references proves that, indeed, Kierkegaard seems to regard plutarch as a trustworthy and very fruitful source of inspiration. his constant reference to plutarch’s writings, implicit in most of the cases, adorns his comments in various contexts and is an open invitation to exploring the wisdom and the puzzling dilemmas of the ancient greco-roman world, as unveiled by a writer who lived at the beginning of the two millennia that separate us from it.

SKS 7, 134 / CUP1, 143. Cf. Plutarch, “On the Control of Anger,” 16, Moralia, 464. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 6, pp. 156–7.) A modified version that substitutes “evil” with “vices” appears in SKS 17, 276, dd:199 / KJN 1, 267. 45 SKS 7, 150 / CUP1, 161–2. Cf. Plutarch, “On Moral Virtue,” 1, Moralia, 440 (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 6, pp. 18–9.) 46 SKS 20, 403, nB5:73 / JP 1, 69, where heroes are regarded as a different race by the greeks and SKS 18, 256, JJ:350 / KJN 2, 235. Cf. Plutarch, “The E at Delphi,” 1–21, Moralia, 384–94. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 5, pp. 198–253.) 47 SKS 21, 69, nB6:94 / JP 3, 3342. Cf. Plutarch, “The Dinner of the Seven Wise Men,” 1–21, Moralia, 146–64. (Plutarch’s Moralia, vol. 2, pp. 348–449.) 48 SKS 6, 441 / SLW, 479. Cf. Plutarch, “Marcellus,” 19. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 5, pp. 486–7.) 49 Cf. CA, Notes, p. 239, note 36; Plutarch, “Pericles,” 24, 3. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 3, p. 69.) 50 SKS 4, 480 / P, 15. nicolaus notabene’s reference is inaccurate, as the commentators have indicated and explained as: “[a] conflation of the account in Plutarch of the barber who spread the word of the defeat of sicily (413 bc) and the legend of the runner who fell dead after bringing the news to athens of the victory at marathon (490 bc).” Cf. P, notes, p. 174, note 37; see Plutarch, “Nicias,” 30. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 3, pp. 309–11.) 51 SV1 Xiii, 485 / COR, 86. Cf. Plutarch, “Alcibiades,” 13. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 4, pp. 30–1.) 52 see, for instance, Kierkegaard’s quotation of pyrrhus, the unhappy conqueror. Kierkegaard’s version: “One more victory like this, and it is over—for this victory is enough”; see SKS 6, 331 / SLW, 356. see also SKS 9, 328 / WL, 332. after the bloodshed of pyrrhus’ victory against the romans at asculum, “he said to one who was congratulating him on his victory, ‘If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.” Cf. Plutarch, “Pyrrhus,” 21. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 9, pp. 414–17.) another example is the elder Cato’s famous: “In my opinion, Carthage must be destroyed.” see SKS 2, 71 / EO1, 65. SKS 6, 19 / SLW, 11; cf. Plutarch, “Marcus Cato,” 27, 1. (Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 2, p. 383.) 44

Bibliography I. Plutarch’s Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Plutarchi chaeronensis varia scripta, quæ moralia vulgo vocantur, vols. 1–6, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1829 (ASKB 1172–1177). Plutarchs Werke, Moralische Schriften, vols. 1–3, trans. by Johann Christian Felix Bähr, stuttgart: metzler 1828 (vols. 20–22, in Plutarchs Werke, vols. 20–32, stuttgart: metzler 1828–38 (Griechische Prosaiker in neuen Uebersetzungen, vol. 33, vol. 43, vol. 47)) (ASKB 1178–1180). Plutarchi vitae parallelae, vols. 1–9, editio stereotypa, leipzig: tauchnitz 1829 (ASKB 1181–1189). Plutarchs Werke, Vergleichende Lebensbeschreibungen, vols. 1–2, trans. by Johann gottfried Klaiber, 2nd ed., stuttgart: metzler 1828–30 (vols. 1–2, in Plutarchs Werke, Vergleichende Lebensbeschreibungen, vols. 1–17, 2nd ed., trans. by Johann gottfried Klaiber, C. Fuchs, and C. Campe, stuttgart: metzler 1827–53) (Griechische Prosaiker in neuen Uebersetzungen, vol. 2, vol. 14) (ASKB 1190– 1191). Sammlung der neuesten Uebersetzungen der griechischen prosaischen Schriftsteller unter der Aufsicht des Herrn Kirchenrath Stroth, part 3, Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen, vols. 1–5, trans. by Johann Friedrich Kaltwasser, Frankfurt am main: Johann Christian hermann 1783–93 [vols. 6–9, 1795–1800] (ASKB 1192– 1196). Plutark’s Levnetsbeskrivelser, vols. 1–4, trans. and ed. by stephan tetens, Copenhagen: Brummer 1800–11 (ASKB 1197–1200). Plutarchs Levnetsbeskrivelser af Themistocles og Camillus, Alexander og Cæsar. Til Brug for de lærde Skolers øverste Classe. Efter den Reiske-Huttenske Text med critiske og oplysende Anmærkninger udgivne, 2nd revised ed., ed. by n. lang nissen, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1826 (ASKB a ii 51). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Refer to Plutarch Flögel, Carl Friedrich, Geschichte der komischen Litteratur, vols. 1–4, liegnitz and leipzig: d. giegert 1784–87, vol. 1, p. 86 (ASKB 1396–1399). Frauenstädt, Julius, Die Naturwissenschaft in ihrem Einfluß auf Poesie, Religion, Moral und Philosophie, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1855, p. 111, note; p. 112, note (ASKB 516).

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hagen, Johan Frederik, Ægteskabet. Betragtet fra et ethisk-historiskt Standpunct, Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandels Forlag 1845, p. 96, note; p. 97, note; p. 99, note; p. 128, note; p. 146 (ASKB 534). [montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99, vol. 1, p. 35; p. 181; p. 308; p. 366; vol. 2, p. 203; vol. 3, p. 37; p. 76; p. 197; p. 250; p. 253; p. 42; pp. 549–50; vol. 4, p. 386; p. 393; pp. 405–22; vol. 5, p. 224; p. 228; p. 288; vol. 6, p. 51; p. 161 (ASKB 681–687). meierotto, Johann heinrich ludwig, Ueber Sitten und Lebensart der Römer in verschiedenen Zeiten der Republik, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Berlin: in der myliussischen Buchhandlung 1814 (ASKB 656). meiners, Christoph, Beytrag zur Geschichte der Denkart der ersten Jahrhunderte nach Christi Geburt, in einigen Betrachtungen über die Neuplatonische Philosopie, leipzig: Weidmann 1782 (ASKB 659). —— Geschichte des Luxus der Athenienser von den ältesten Zeiten an bis auf den Tod Philipps von Makedonien, lemgo: meyer 1782 (ASKB 661). —— Geschichte des Verfalls der Sitten und der Staatsverfassung der Römer, leipzig: Weidmann 1782 (ASKB 660). mynster, Jakob peter, Den hedenske Verden ved Christendommens Begyndelse, Copenhagen: schultz 1850, p. 38 (ASKB 693). —— Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852–53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57], vol. 3, p. 384 (ASKB 358–363). nielsen, rasmus, De speculativa historiæ sacræ tractandæ methodo commentatio, Copenhagen: tengnagel 1840, p. 34 (ASKB 697). petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 28; p. 148; p. 157; p. 294; p. 318; p. 352; p. 370; p. 421; p. 437; p. 443; pp. 459–60 (ASKB 1037). —— Om Epheterne og deres Dikasterier i Athen, Copenhagen: Bianco lunos Bogtrykkeri 1847, p. 26; p. 56 (ASKB 720). ritter, heinrich, Geschichte der Philosophie alter Zeit, vols. 1–4, 2nd revised ed., hamburg: perthes 1836–39, vol. 4, pp. 530–56 (ASKB 735–738). ritter, heinrich and l. preller, Historia philosophiae graeco-romanae ex fontium locis contexta, hamburg: perthes 1838, pp. 483–9 (ASKB 726). [sulzer, Johann georg], Johann Georg Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmann 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 74; p. 89; p. 302; vol. 2, p. 100 (in “Vorbericht”) (ASKB 807–808). sulzer, Johann georg, Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 24; p. 44; p. 152; p. 205; p. 215; p. 217; p. 367; p. 370; p. 459; p. 464; p. 514; p. 517; p. 612; p. 614; p. 629; p. 726; vol. 2, p. 67; p. 305; p. 638; p. 640; vol. 3, p. 85; p. 99; p. 318; p. 364; p. 440; p. 509; vol. 4, p. 71 (ASKB 1365–1369).

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III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Plutarch scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 17, note 50; p. 309, note 45.

sophocles: the tragic of Kierkegaard’s modern Antigone nicolae irina

I. Sophocles’ ars dramatica most likely, sophocles was born in 494 bc. he played a role in public affairs, being elected to office in 441, in the aftermath, so they say, of the political impact of his Antigone.1 he died when he was 90, witnessing the establishment of democracy by pericles and ephialtes. as John Ferguson puts it, “war, which is in the foreground for aeschylus, a generation older, and for euripides, half a generation younger, is for Sophocles only a background.”2 of sophocles’ works only some have survived; among them, Ajax, The Trachiniae, Electra, Philoctetes, and the most celebrated “Theban plays”: Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone. produced in 441 bc, Antigone is the first play in the series dedicated to the famous myth of oedipus. Oedipus the King followed almost fifteen years later, and Oedipus at Colonus, according to david grene, was produced only posthumously, the year after sophocles’ death.3 despite some inevitable discrepancies, the common human dilemma that sophocles tackles in his trilogy gradually evolves throughout the theban plays and culminates in Oedipus at Colonus.4 The matured theme finds its expression, as grene puts it, in “the dramatic statement of a principle, of the union of the blessed and the cursed, of the just and the unjust, and sometimes (not always) of the consciously innocent and the unconsciously guilty.”5 Cf. John Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, austin and london: university of texas press 1972, p. 128. see also, Cedric h. Whitman, Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism, Cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1951, p. 45. 2 Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 127. 3 Cf. David Grene, “Introduction: ‘The Theban Plays’ by Sophocles,” in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vols. 1–4, ed. by david grene and richmond lattimore, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1958–60, vol. 2, p. 1. 4 grene adds, thematically, sophocles’ Philoctetes to the series. indeed, the parallel that can be drawn between the two dramatic characters of Philoctetes and Oedipus at Colonus supports this view. Both plays were written in sophocles’ last years and, according to grene, the figure of Philoctetes is “a twin child with Oedipus in Sophocles’ dramatic imagination.” See Grene, “Introduction: ‘The Theban Plays’ by Sophocles,” in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 2, p. 4. 5 Grene, “Introduction: ‘The Theban Plays’ by Sophocles,” in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 2, p. 6. 1

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sophocles admits that his earlier style was “grandiloquent and derivative from Aeschylus,” but of these early dramatic attempts of such influence no examples have survived.6 The subsequent style, “pungent and contrived,” confirms the later appropriation of sophistic elements. this style is associated with gorgias, antiphon, and thucydides and is characterized by the “sharp antithetical mode of composition that prevailed throughout the second half of the fifth century.”7 half a century after sophocles’ death, as Cedric h. Whitman explains, “aristotle’s preference for [sophocles], and his derivation of the so-called rules of tragedy from [sophocles’] plays, were all that were needed to put the final touch on the picture of the perfect poet who taught piety and prudence to his fellow citizens through the medium of a supreme technique.”8 sophocles’ ars dramatica never ceased to be intriguing and subject to debate. of his plays, Antigone seems to have been the most frequently scrutinized. nevertheless, considering that literary tradition consistently treated sophocles’ Antigone as a tragic play with a clear and straightforward conflict unfolded in a rigorous plot, it is all the more surprising that, as Käte hamburger remarks, “ever since goethe, hölderlin, and hegel, almost no greek tragedy has been more frequently and contradictorily interpreted than this one.”9 Kierkegaard’s contribution to the debate was significant in many respects, as we will see, and therefore his name could be certainly added to this inventory immediately after hegel’s. II. Kierkegaard’s Modern antigone Kierkegaard’s concern with greek literature was remarkable, and, consequently, greek tragedy holds a unique place in his writings. Kierkegaard’s main interest in sophocles is related to his concern with identifying the characteristics of the tragic in ancient versus modern tragedy, on the one hand, and the main traits of the tragic hero, on the other. the ancient tragic provides Kierkegaard with both the premise and the necessary contrast for the determination of the modern tragic. in Either/Or, Part I, in A’s essay titled “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,”10 Kierkegaard thoroughly discusses the distinction between the characteristics of Greek and modern tragedy. Additionally, he briefly analyzes this topic in Fear and Trembling11 and also in a very concise reference to sophocles’ Oedipus and Philoctetes in Stages on Life’s Way.12 the fact that Kierkegaard chooses sophocles’ theban plays and especially Antigone as a basis for his arguments is certainly a clear indication of his admiration of hegel, as scopetea

Cf. Ferguson, A Companion to Greek Tragedy, p. 130. Whitman, Sophocles. A Study of Heroic Humanism, p. 42. 8 ibid., p. 5. 9 Käte Hamburger, “Antigone,” in Sophocles. The Classical Heritage, ed. by r.d. dawe, new York and london: garland 1996, p. 251. 10 SKS 2, 136–62 / EO1, 136–64. 11 SKS 4, 174–8 / FT, 84–7. 12 SKS 6, 422 / SLW, 457–8. 6 7

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remarks.13 But it should also be noted here that Kierkegaard had other reasons as well that determined him to examine this play in particular. It seems that the first to indicate the similarities between Kierkegaard himself and his version of antigone was georg Brandes (1842–1927). indeed, there is a striking resemblance between the modern antigone’s understanding of her relation to her father’s destiny, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard’s own relationship to his father, on the other. according to povl Johannes Jensen, it is quite obvious that, although there is no direct indication of this fact, Kierkegaard “has put his own personal relations into the tragedy: in his father’s life, too, there was a secret crime, and he, too, sacrificed his betrothed.”14 But, before focusing in more detail on Kierkegaard’s analysis, it would certainly be worth mentioning, briefly, the context in which his original perspective developed, by first considering the implications of Hegel’s understanding of the tragic in sophocles’ Antigone. Jon stewart supports the view that actually “much of Kierkegaard’s Antigone interpretation is derivative from Hegel’s,” to which he seems to add that Kierkegaard simply modified the story by Sophocles in order “to make it into a modern tragedy.” Thus, Stewart claims, Kierkegaard’s “entire analysis, although original in its development, is informed and motivated by hegel’s characterization of the nature of modern tragedy.”15 nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s originality cannot be underestimated. the outcome of Kierkegaard’s analysis of sophocles’ Antigone is certainly unique, yet many of the key elements, while of hegelian origin, were current among Kierkegaard’s contemporaries. on the one hand, Johan ludvig heiberg (1791–1860), Cf. sophia scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, p. 23. although it was indeed hegel who developed this distinction between classical and modern art, according to leonard moss, it did not originate with him. one would have to consider the earlier formulations proposed by schiller (1793), Friedrich Schlegel (1793–96), and Schelling (1800). Cf. Leonard Moss, “The Unrecognized Influence in Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 28, no. 1, 1969, p. 96, note 9. as povl Johannes Jensen points out, “there was no real literary and aesthetic interpretation of the tragedy [Antigone] until the period in neo-humanism and romanticism, and decisive for [Kierkegaard’s] interpretation is hegel’s treatment of dramatic poetry in Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik (see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1– 18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45) (ASKB 1384– 1386)). See Povl Johs. Jensen, “Antigone,” in Kierkegaard’s Classical Inspiration, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1985 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14), p. 14. 14 Jensen, “Antigone,” p. 16. Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, in his youth, cursed God for his hardships. a parallel can be drawn indeed between antigone’s renouncing haemon and Kierkegaard’s breaking up with regine, supposedly because of the melancholy that he inherited from his father. Cf. Darío González, “El ‘reflejo’ de lo trágico. Nota sobre la Antígona de Kierkegaard,” Persona y Derecho, no. 39, 1998, p. 110, note 5. 15 Jon Stewart, “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” Persona y Derecho, no. 39, 1998, p. 196. 13

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like Hegel, defined tragedy as a literary genre “essentially representing a conflict of ideas, where individuals take only second place.”16 on the other hand, Kierkegaard’s philosophy teachers, poul martin møller (1794–1838) and Frederik Christian sibbern (1785–1872) challenged the hegelian view, particularly criticizing hegel’s interpretation of Antigone. the former claims that hegel’s mistake is “to interpret sophocles’ Antigone as a necessary conflict between family and state, [paying] no attention to the fact that the subject is a dramatic poem,”17 whereas sibbern argues that the real conflict is Antigone’s piety versus fate. Thus, quite obviously, Kierkegaard was indeed confronted with a context in which much revolved around hegel’s position. however, Kierkegaard’s reading of Antigone, while relying heavily on hegel’s conceptual framework, radically departs from the hegelian perspective and offers a quite modern interpretation, comparable to some recently formulated points of view. it would therefore be fruitful to highlight, in a nutshell, some of the contemporary criticism of hegel’s standpoint on Antigone, which will certainly throw a different light on Kierkegaard’s earlier attempt. For hegel, sophocles’ Antigone exceptionally illustrates the conflict between two moral forces: the state, represented by Creon, the King of thebes, and the family, represented by antigone. on the one hand, the universal human law is grounded, as Stewart explains, “in the mundane power of specific states,” whereas the divine law, on the other, is “eternal and exists as a fact of nature which is ruled over by the forces of the nether world.”18 This conflict is what constitutes, according to Patricia Jagentowicz mills, “the tragic character of pagan life and creates a fundamental antinomy between family life, as the natural ground of ethical life, and ethical life in its social universality...in the polis.”19 But what mills sees in hegel’s interpretation of the conflict between Antigone and Creon is nothing but an oversimplification intended to make it correspond to “[hegel’s] view of the tragic character of pagan life as a conflict between equal and contrary values.”20 What hegel fails to notice, mills claims, is of paramount importance: antigone “must enter the political realm, the realm of second nature, in order to defy it on behalf of the realm of the family, the realm of first nature, [and, in doing so], Antigone transcends Hegel’s analysis of ‘the law of woman’ as ‘natural ethical life,’ and becomes this particular self.”21 Karsten Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, p. 124. 17 ibid., p. 125. 18 Stewart, “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” p. 199. 19 patricia Jagentowicz mills, “hegel’s Antigone” in The ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ Reader: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. by Jon stewart, albany: state university of new York press 1998, p. 245. 20 ibid., p. 250. 21 ibid., p. 251. in agreement with part of mills’ comments on hegel’s interpretation of Antigone, victoria i. Burke indicates that although antigone, “as a woman, does not act in the public sphere where the exchange of recognition takes place, [she] knows fully well the law that she violates, and is conscious of her act as a crime. it is, in fact, a deliberate and self-conscious intervention in the order of things, and is, thus, a political act....antigone’s action defies the laws of the state, and thereby thrusts her into the political arena.” See Victoria I. Burke, “Antigone’s Transgression: Hegel and Bataille on the Divine and the Human,” 16

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mills strongly disagrees with hegel’s claim that antigone’s intuition of ethical life, qua sister, is not open to the daylight of consciousness. in support to her claim, mills states that antigone “retains a steadfast devotion to what is noble and just that goes far beyond the mere intuition of natural ethical life and the consciousness that comes from burying and remembering the dead.” 22 antigone deliberately chooses a course of action that eventually condemns her to death. as we will see, Kierkegaard’s view of a modern antigone anticipates the above criticism, focusing on antigone’s subjective inwardness as responsive to inherited guilt. stewart in fact admits that Kierkegaard’s use of sophocles’ play is “in a sense quite different from Hegel’s,”23 and he claims that Kierkegaard, “following hegel’s definition, has devised a way to make the conflict an inward one within Antigone herself.”24 Thus, the tragic conflict in Kierkegaard’s modern version of the tragedy takes place within the individual, which, although a conflict according to Hegel’s point of view, has only a secondary role, yielding pre-eminence to the conflict of ideas. Both hegel and Kierkegaard considered sophocles’ theban plays as “the most eminent expression of the ancient tragic,”25 as Karsten Friis Johansen remarks. For hegel, as already indicated, antigone and Creon personify the two moral forces, in their irreconcilable immediacy and one-sidedness, entering into conflict: the family and the state. But, as already indicated, Kierkegaard moves away from the hegelian frame of reference. For him, of paramount importance is not the conflict of objective ideas represented by Creon and antigone, as in hegel’s interpretation, but sorrow and pain. in this sense, Kierkegaard is the father of a modern version of the ancient tragedy and of its heroine. the rebirth of a modern antigone is, as a admits in Either/ Or, Part One, his work: “She is my creation, her thoughts are my thoughts.”26 Kierkegaard states that, in contrast to ancient tragedy in which the individual appears in substantial categories such as family and state, modern tragedy describes the hero’s subjective inwardness. as such, the situation of the modern antigone is tragic not because of the conflict between her duty to bury her dishonored brother, polyneices, who rebelled against the state, on the one hand, and the law of the state, that is, Creon’s edict that only eteocles should be given an honorable funeral, which Antigone transgresses, on the other, but because of her self-reflected inherited guilt. in Kierkegaard’s interpretation, oedipus’ fate is re-echoed in the death of polyneices, and, even more so, oedipus’ guilt subtly pervades the destinies of all the Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, vol. 38, no. 3, 1999, p. 540. unlike mills, Burke holds that hegel does in fact acknowledge antigone’s political action. she quotes from the Phenomenology: “the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more inexcusable, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them to be violence and wrong, to be ethical merely by accident, and like Antigone, knowingly commits the crime.” Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by a.v. miller, oxford: oxford university press 1977, p. 284. 22 mills, “hegel’s Antigone,” p. 253. 23 Stewart, “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” p. 206. 24 ibid., p. 207. 25 Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” p. 122. 26 SKS 2, 152 / EO1, 153.

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individuals in the family tree. thus, the father’s guilt is inherited by his offspring. to be sure, it is clear that Kierkegaard never doubted the common view about the hidden burden of the relation between king oedipus and his daughter that provides the plot of the tragedy, for he actually recounts that “oedipus has murdered his father, married his mother, and Antigone is the fruit of this marriage.”27 But this common view could be and was in fact contested. Jensen quotes pausanias’ conclusion that oedipus had no children from the incestuous relation with his mother and that his four children (polyneices, eteocles, antigone, and ismene) were by euryganeia.28 Kierkegaard distinguishes “subjective guilt” from “tragic guilt.” The latter is, for him, hereditary guilt in which the sorrow is more profound, although hereditary guilt always involves the contradiction of an incessant “guilty?/not guilty?” uncertainty, a recurrent theme in Kierkegaard’s writings. according to Kierkegaard, “the ever admired trilogy of sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, Oedipus the King, and Antigone, hinges essentially on this genuine tragic interest.”29 The filial relation and its piety, for example, antigone’s to oedipus, has the equivocal character of “every possible amphiboly,” as Kierkegaard puts it. in Kierkegaard’s version, only the unfortunate daughter knows oedipus’ secret: “everyone knows that he has killed the sphinx and freed thebes, and oedipus is hailed and admired and is happy in his marriage with Jocasta. the rest is hidden from the people’s eyes, and no suspicion has ever brought this horrible dream into the world of actuality. only antigone knows it. how she found out is extraneous to the tragic interest.”30 What is even more disturbing is Kierkegaard’s emphasis on antigone’s uncertainty “as to whether [oedipus] was aware of his guilt, a guilt which she believes she shares as his loving daughter and as a member of the family,”31 as hamburger notes. Antigone helplessly struggles “into the arms of anxiety.”32 her sorrow, alone, cannot expiate her father’s guilt. Dreadfully reflecting on her sorrow over Oedipus’ guilt, she actually appropriates it, and, in her anxiety, she assimilates it into her own fate. Kierkegaard thus adds yet another modern element to the description of an antigone aware of the fact that her father’s guilt is an eternal fact, which her sorrow is not able to alter. the uncertainty of the modern tragic antigone consumes her. her twofold burden is given by the fact that, although she realizes that her father’s guilt is her own, she is yet hesitant to ascertain his own awareness of that guilt. Kevin newmark explains that “what is so peculiar about the secret antigone owes her father oedipus, which she keeps for him alone and which in turn also keeps her separate, secret, from everyone else, is that even the one who has given it to her does not seem to know

SKS 2, 153 / EO1, 154. euryganeia is yet another name for Jocasta though, which further encourages the confusion. Cf. Jensen, “Antigone,” p. 12. 29 SKS 2, 149 / EO1, 150. 30 SKS 2, 153 / EO1, 154. 31 Hamburger, “Antigone,” p. 264. 32 SKS 2, 153 / EO1, 154. 27 28

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exactly in what it consists.”33 Reflecting constantly on the secret of her father’s guilt leads her to a sort of a “reflective anxiety,” as Stephen N. Dunning very suggestively terms it. dunning holds that “such anxiety is more pain than sorrow, for it involves a more personal or subjective identification with the tragic situation.”34 the outcome is that Kierkegaard’s modern antigone voluntarily internalizes oedipus’ guilt: so it is with our antigone, the bride of sorrow. she dedicates her life to sorrowing over her father’s fate, over her own. a calamity such as the one that has befallen her father requires sorrow, and yet there is no one who can sorrow over it, since there is no one who knows it. and just as the greek antigone cannot bear to have her brother’s body thrown away without the last honors, so she feels how harsh it would have been if no one had come to know this; it troubles her that not a tear would have been shed, and she almost thanks the gods because she has been selected as this instrument.35

the constant that unites the two antigones, as dunning puts it, is that “both are victims of the contradiction between externality and inwardness, between the objective relations which constitute fate for the greek and the subjective uncertainty and guilt which are the modern’s prison.”36 Antigone is a reflective individual and therefore her reflection casts her into profound sorrow and pain. But in her reflection over her tragic guilt she actually vacillates between guilt and guiltlessness, enough to allow the presence of sorrow. Kierkegaard thus explains that “since the tragic guilt must have this indefiniteness in order for the sorrow to be experienced, reflection must not be present in its infinitude, for then it would reflect her out of her guilt, inasmuch as reflection in its infinite subjectivity cannot allow the factor of hereditary sin, which produces the sorrow, to remain.”37 the tragic hero has to take part consciously in the hereditary guilt. in his papers, Kierkegaard notes, on november 20, 1842, that he could have actually envisaged another possible end for his antigone, letting her be a man,38 which in itself supports Brandes’ analogy indicated above. And even more significantly, on the same project of a modern antigone, Kierkegaard also writes that, contrary to the ancient tragedy, in his version of the romantic tragic he would let antigone fall in love with all the energy of love, but she would not marry.39 on the hidden stage of her tragedy, antigone guards the treasured secret of her inherited guilt. Jacob Bøggild clarifies the inner conflict of Kierkegaard’s modern Antigone: “She falls Kevin Newmark, “Secret Agents: After Kierkegaard’s Subject,” Modern Language Notes, vol. 112, no. 5, 1997, p. 742. 34 stephen n. dunning, “the dialectic of Contradiction in Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Stage,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 49, no. 3, 1981, p. 391. on Kierkegaard’s Antigone, see the chapter “Inwardness as Grief,” especially pp. 390–2. The certainty of her father’s guilt, as Friis Johansen puts it, “casts her into the arms of dread, [which] is a new determination of the modern tragic, for dread comes from reflected sorrow.” See Friis Johansen, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” p. 129. 35 SKS 2, 157 / EO1, 158. 36 Dunning, “The Dialectic of Contradiction,” p. 392. 37 SKS 2, 153 / EO1, 154. 38 SKS 18, 147, JJ:11 / KJN 2, 137. 39 SKS 19, 287, not10:4. 33

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in love, however, and she will have to reveal her secret to her lover if they are to establish a truthful relationship. But this is the one thing that she cannot do. she is caught in a conflict that only her death can resolve.”40 it is precisely this tragic inner tension that consumes Antigone. On the one hand, as Stewart clarifies, “if she keeps her secret to herself, then she is being pious to her father, oedipus, but untrue to her lover Haemon,” but if, on the other hand, she unveils her secret to Haemon, then “she sullies the reputation of her father.”41 as already indicated, Kierkegaard distinguishes in the ancient greek tragedy a transition from sorrow to pain. In addition, he briefly cites Sophocles’ Philoctetes, “the tragedy of suffering,” as an admirable illustration of this tenet. Kierkegaard’s account of “tragic pain” has the tendency to describe pain in terms of profound, “reflective sorrow.” Therefore, the “masterly depicted self-contradiction” in philoctetes’ case is the element that strikes him most in sophocles’ play. Kierkegaard thus identifies its “high degree of reflection” as the main characteristic of Philoctetes that “essentially separates it from [the] immortal trilogy.”42 another element in sophocles’ Philoctetes that Kierkegaard tries to address is the theme of philoctetes’ lamentation over his cruel pain and imminent death in the absence of his only means of survival, heracles’ bow. an outcast with a terrible wound, sophocles’ philoctetes is a man “without friends or comrades or city, a dead man among the living.”43 this theme is also evoked by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, in a brief analogy with the situation of the biblical Job: “What are philoctetes and his laments, which remain continually earthbound and do not terrify the gods. What is philoctetes’ situation compared with Job’s, where the idea is constantly in motion.”44 Indeed, Kierkegaard finds in Philoctetes’ lamentation a clear indication of the ancient style. in Either/Or, part one, he holds that “it is genuinely greek for philoctetes to lament that no one knows what he is suffering; it is a deeply human need to want others to understand it.”45 But reflective pain does not desire this, as Kierkegaard claims. in antigone’s case, this wish does not occur to her, but “instead she feels the pain in relation to her father, feels the justice implicit in sorrowing.”46 Kierkegaard’s modern antigone is different from her ancient counterpart precisely in her reflected anxiety that she cannot communicate, and that is what elevates her to the rank of Kierkegaard’s tragic heroes. Kierkegaard’s antigone, “the daughter of sorrow” to whom he gives “a dowry of pain as her outfit,”47 cannot speak, just like Jacob Bøggild, “revocated trials: on the indirect Communication in two of Kierkegaard’s Early Religious Discourses,” in The New Kierkegaard, ed. by elsebet Jegstrup, Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2004, p. 122. 41 Stewart, “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” p. 212. 42 SKS 2, 150 / EO1, 151. 43 sophocles, Philoctetes (1018). in The Complete Greek Tragedies, vol. 2, p. 442. 44 SKS 4, 73 / R, 204. in addition, there are other short references to philoctetes that can be found in Kierkegaard’s papers. see SKS 19, 287–8, not10:5–7. 45 SKS 2, 157 / EO1, 158. 46 ibid. 47 SKS 2, 152 / EO1, 153. 40

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the biblical abraham.48 Her internalized, reflected sorrow is the most relevant aspect of her tragic inwardness. abraham’s case is certainly different in many respects, but indeed, as Kevin newmark explains, like abraham, “antigone will also be subject to a law of absolute silence; through a faithfulness that remains secret, both abraham and Antigone separate themselves definitively from all living beings.”49 As we have seen, for its most significant part, Kierkegaard’s interest in Sophocles is primarily focused on the figure of Antigone. Kierkegaard’s modern version of the ancient heroine consists of her tragic inner conflict, which is Kierkegaard’s creation. an incommunicable secret about her inherited guilt reduces her to silence, sorrow, and pain. her anxiety is thus what radically separates Kierkegaard’s modern antigone from her greek counterpart and also what clearly traces the divide between the two corresponding kinds of tragic. although Kierkegaard is indeed very much indebted to hegel’s analysis of the tragic and especially to hegelian terminology, the peculiarities of Kierkegaard’s own reading of sophocles’ plays offer an original interpretation, which brings antigone closer to the imposing stature of other Kierkegaardian tragic heroes. thus, Kierkegaard’s position on the modern tragic promotes the individual’s unutterable, reflective anxiety to center stage.

For a discussion of abraham’s case, see the article on euripides in the present volume. 49 Newmark, “Secret Agents: After Kierkegaard’s Subject,” p. 740. 48

Bibliography I. Sophocles’ Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Anthologia graeca, ed. by paul hagerup tregder, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1842, pp. 79–85 (ASKB 1041). Sophocolis Tragoediae. Ad optimorum librorum fidem accurate recensuit, vols. 1–2, ed. by Christian hermann Weiße, leipzig: tauchnitz 1841 (ASKB 1201). Sophokles, trans. and ed. by Johann Jacob Christian donner, heidelberg: Winther 1839 (ASKB 1202). Des Sophokles Tragödien in deutscher Prosa, von einem Vereine Gelehrter, new ed., leipzig: schmidt 1846 [1840] (ASKB 1203). II. Works by Modern Sources in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Sophocles [hamann, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 3, p. 16; p. 101; vol. 2, p. 31; p. 87; pp. 222–3; vol. 3, pp. 6–7 (ASKB 536–544). hebbel, Friedrich, Mein Wort über das Drama! Eine Erwiderung an Professor Heiberg in Copenhagen, hamburg: hoffmann und Campe 1843, p. 28; p. 31; p. 34 (ASKB 454). [hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich], Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. by Johann schulze, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832 (vol. 2, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), pp. 332–59 (ASKB 550). —— Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik, vols. 1–3, ed. by von heinrich gustav hotho, Berlin: duncker und humblot 1835–38 (vols. 10.1–10.3 in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1–18, ed. by philipp marheineke et al., Berlin: duncker und humblot 1832–45), vol. 1, p. 290; p. 292; vol. 2, pp. 51–2; p. 58; p. 60; p. 180; pp. 185–6; p. 377; vol. 3, p. 3; p. 93; p. 333; p. 488; p. 491; pp. 505–6; p. 513; pp. 517–18; p. 539; p. 551; p. 553; pp. 557–8; p. 566 (ASKB 1384–1386). [montaigne, michel de], Michael Montaigne’s Gedanken und Meinungen über allerley Gegenstände, ins Deutsche übersetzt, vols. 1–7, Berlin: F.t. lagarde 1793–99, vol. 1, p. 16; vol. 2, p. 88; vol. 3, p. 17 (ASKB 681–687). mynster, Jakob peter, Blandede Skrivter, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1852– 53 [vols. 4–6, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1855–57], vol. 3, p. 43; p. 273 (ASKB 358–363).

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petersen, Frederik Christian, Haandbog i den græske Litteraturhistorie, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1830, p. 80; p. 95; p. 98; p. 102; p. 107; p. 121 (ASKB 1037). [richter, Johann paul Friedrich], Jean paul, Vorschule der Aesthetik nebst einigen Vorlesungen in Leipzig über die Parteien der Zeit, vols. 1–3, 2nd revised ed., stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1813, vol. 1, p. 140; p. 170; p. 315; vol. 2, p. 451; p. 469; p. 483; vol. 4, p. 929 (ASKB 1381–1383). rötscher, heinrich theodor, “elektra in sophocles Elektra,” in his Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung. In ihrem organischen Zusammenhange, vols. 1–3, Berlin: Wilhelm thome 1841–46; vol. 3, Der Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung Dritter Theil, welcher eine neue Reihe dramatischer Charaktere entwickelt, 1846, pp. 262–94 (vols. 2–3, ASKB 1802–1803; for vol. 1 see ASKB 1391). schlegel, august Wilhelm, Ueber dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Vorlesungen, vols. 1–2 [vol. 2 in 2 parts], heidelberg: mohr und zimmer 1809–11, vol. 1, pp. 175–97; pp. 226–7; p. 241 (ASKB 1392–1394). schopenhauer, arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1844 [1819], vol. 1, p. 19; p. 288; vol. 2, p. 584 (ASKB 773–773a). —— Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften, vols. 1–2, Berlin: druck und verlag von a.W. hayn 1851, vol. 1, p. 325 (ASKB 774–775). Solger, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, “Über Sophokles und die alte Tragödie,” in Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel, ed. by ludwig tieck and Friedrich von raumer, vols. 1–2, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1826, vol. 2, pp. 445–92 (ASKB 1832–1833). —— K.W.F. Solger’s Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, ed. by K.W.l. heyse, leipzig: F.a. Brockhaus 1829, p. 96; p. 222; p. 226; p. 228; p. 230; p. 239; p. 243; p. 248; p. 316 (ASKB 1387). [sulzer, Johann georg], Johann George Sulzers vermischte philosophische Schriften. Aus den Jahrbüchern der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin gesammelt, vols. 1–2, leipzig: Weidmanns erben und reich 1773–81, vol. 1, p. 36; p. 147; vol. 2, p. 104 (in “Vorbericht”) (ASKB 807–808). —— Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, in einzeln, nach alphabetischer Ordnung der Kunstwörter auf einander folgenden, Artikeln abgehandelt, vols. 1–4 and a register volume, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Weidmann 1792–99, vol. 1, p. 115; p. 142; p. 146; p. 217; p. 259; p. 463; p. 602; vol. 2, p. 101; vol. 4, p. 435; p. 582 (ASKB 1365–1369). thiersch, Friedrich, Allgemeine Aesthetik in akademischen Lehrvorträgen, Berlin: g. reimer 1846, p. 10; p. 67; p. 279; pp. 281ff.; p. 476 (ASKB 1378). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Sophocles Agacinski, Sylviane, “Le savoir absolu d’Antigone,” Digraphe, vol. 29, 1983, pp. 53–70.

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amorós, Cèlia, Sören Kierkegaard o la subjectividad del caballero. Un estudio a la luz de las paradojas del patriarcado, Barcelona: editorial anthropos 1987, see pp. 164–75. Bøggild, Jacob, “revocated trials: on the indirect Communication in two of Kierkegaard’s Early Religious Discourses,” in The New Kierkegaard, ed. by elsebet Jegstrup, Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2004, pp. 112–27; see especially the section “the apostle in the guise of a modern Antigone,” pp. 118–27. dunning, stephen n., “the dialectic of Contradiction in Kierkegaard’s aesthetic Stage,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 49, no. 3, 1981, pp. 383–408; see the section “Inwardness as Grief,” especially pp. 390–2. Faber, Bettina, La contraddizione sofferente. La teoria del tragico in Søren Kierkegaard, padova: il poligrafo 1998, p. 85; p. 88; p. 104. Fabro, Cornelio, La donna in Kierkegaard, l’aquila: l.u. Japadre editore 1980, see pp. 89–93. Fauteck, Heinrich, “Kierkegaards Antigone,” Skandinivistik, vol. 4, 1974, pp. 81– 100. Friis Johansen, Karsten, “Kierkegaard on ‘the Tragic,’ ” Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, vol. 13, 1976, pp. 105–46; see especially p. 119; pp. 122–33. González, Darío, “El ‘reflejo’ de lo trágico. Nota sobre la Antígona de Kierkegaard,” Persona y Derecho, no. 39, 1998, pp. 107–37. Hamburger, Käte, “Antigone,” in Sophocles. The Classical Heritage, ed. by r.d. dawe, new York and london: garland 1996, pp. 251–68; see especially pp. 263–5. Hirsch, Emanuel, “Kierkegaard’s Antigone und Ibsens Frau Atving,” in Gestalt Gedanke Geheimnis: Festschrift für Johannes Pfeiffer zu seinem 65. Geburtstag, ed. by rolf Bohnsack, hellmut heeger, and Wolf hermann, Berlin: die spur 1967, pp. 167–81. Holler, Clyde, “Tragedy in the Context of Kierkegaard’s ‘Either/Or,’ ” in Either/Or, Part I, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 3), pp. 125–42. holm, søren, Græciteten, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1964 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 11), p. 37; p. 48; p. 53; p. 57; p. 59; p. 72; p. 74; p. 81; pp. 86–7; pp. 93–5; p. 112; p. 115; p. 132. —— “Findes ‘den religiøse Undtagelse’ i Græciteten?,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 143–9. Jensen, Povl Johs., “Antigone,” in Kierkegaard’s Classical Inspiration, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1985 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14), pp. 12–17. mesnard, pierre, “la catégorie du tragique est-elle absente de l’oeuvre de la pensée de Kierkegaard?” Orbis Litterarum, 10, 1955, pp. 178–90. Newmark, Kevin, “Secret Agents: After Kierkegaard’s Subject,” Modern Language Notes, vol. 112, no. 5, 1997, pp. 719–52, see especially pp. 739–47. Quinn, philip l., “agamemnon and abraham. the tragic dilemma of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith,” Journal of Literature and Theology, no. 4, 1990, pp. 181–93.

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regina, umberto, Kierkegaard, L’arte di esistere, Brescia: editrice morcelliana 2005 (Filosofia, nuova serie, vol. 26), see pp. 166–70. Rehm, Walther, “Kierkegaards Antigone,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, vol. 28, no. 1, 1954, pp. 1–39 (reprinted in his Begegnungen und Probleme. Studien zur Deutschen Literaturegschichte, Bern: Francke 1958, pp. 274–316). Rocca, Ettore, “L’Antigone di Kierkegaard o della morte del tragico,” in Antigone e la filosofia. Hegel, Kierkegaard, Hölderlin, Heidegger, Bultmann. Un seminario, ed. by pietro montani, rome: donzelli editore 2001, pp. 73–84. —— “Il Segreto di Antigone,” in his Tra estetica e teologia. Studi kierkegaardiani, pisa: edizioni ets 2004 (Philosophica, vol. 12), pp. 40–5. scopetea, sophia, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1995, see p. 19 note 59; pp. 22–3. Stewart, Jon, “Hegel’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of Antigone,” Persona y Derecho, no. 39, 1998, pp. 195–216. Winkel Holm, Isak, “Arvesynd: Antigone,” in Tanken i billedet. Søren Kierkegaards poetik, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1998, pp. 249–76.

index of persons

abraham, 63, 66, 73–7 passim, 116, 238–43 passim, 282–3, 321. achilles, 272–4, 285, 290. aenesidemus, 165, 167. aeschylus, 77, 211–34, 235, 254, 313–14. agamemnon, 67, 76, 236–43 passim, 272. agrippa, 165. alexander of aphrodisias, 43. alexander the great, 305. anacharsis, 116. anaxagoras, 128, 148, 235, 237. anaximenes of lampsakos, 87. anger, edvard Julius (1813–95), danish pastor, 222, 249, 275. antiochus, 166. antigone, 69, 217, 219. antigonus, 111. apollodorus, 111. arcesilaus, 165. archimedes, 303–4, 308. arendt, hannah (1906–75), germanamerican philosopher, 202. ariston of Chios, 200. aristophanes, 61, 184, 224–5, 237. aristotle, 127, 128, 135, 148, 151, 153–4, 165, 195, 314. Metaphysics, 3–23, 25–45, 81, 134, 152, 158. Nicomachean Ethics, 47–58, 81, 157, 223. On Interpretation, 6, 17. On the Soul, 85. Organon, 3–23. Poetics, 59–79, 74, 76, 211–16 passim, 223–4, 293. Physics, 25–45, 81, 127–8. Rhetoric, 81–98, 214–16, 305.

aristoxenus, 111. arrian, 195. augustine of hippo (354–430), church father, 39, 96, 202. Bacon, Francis (1561–1626), english philosopher, 301. Baggesen, Jens (1764–1826), danish poet, 284, 286. Becker, Karl Friedrich (1777–1806), german historian, 250–1, 256, 259. Bekker, august immanuel (1785–1871), german philologist, 48, 49, 52. Bernays, Jacob, 70. Bias, 116. Bojesen, ernst F.C. (1803–64), danish educationalist, 48, 276. Bornemann, Johan alfred (1813–90), danish theologian, 7, 8. Brandes, georg (1842–1927), danish author and literary critic, 315, 319. Brøndsted, peter oluf, (1780–1842), danish classical scholar, 222, 228. Caesar, gaius Julius (100 BC-44 BC), roman military and political leader, 303, 305. Cambyses, 256. Carneades, 166, 173, 201. Cato the elder, i.e., marcus porcius Cato (234 BC-149 BC), roman statesman, 303. Christ, 12, 63, 78, 79, 92–3, 95. Chrysippus, 19, 173, 195–201 passim. Cicero, marcus tullius (106 BC-43 BC), roman politician, philosopher and author, 86, 166, 172, 202, 306.

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Clausen, henrik nicolai (1793–1877), danish theologian, 152. Cleon, 237. Clytemnestra, 240–2. Cratylus, 134–5, 155. Creon, 217, 218, 316–17. Croesus, 248–53 passim, 257, 303. Curtius, michael Conrad (1724–1802), german historian, 224. Cyrus, 253. darius, 248, 256–7. democritus, 128. descartes, rené (1596–1650), French philosopher, 62. diogenes laertius, 111–21, 124, 128–9, 135–6, 141, 147, 151, 154, 171, 176, 195, 198–9, 255, 306. diogenes of sinope, 113–16 passim. dionysus, 211. donnelly, John, 239–40. dorph, niels vinding (1783–1858), danish translator, 222. droysen, Johann gustav (1808–84), german historian, 222, 228–30. dunning, stephen n., 319. empedocles, 128, 157, 198, 308. epictetus, 195–204 passim. epicurus, 6, 17, 18, 111, 113. euripides, 220, 224, 235–46, 254, 313. evans, C. stephen, 240. Faust, 278, 281, 290–1. Favorinus, 115. Fénelon, François de salignac de la mothe (1651–1715), French writer, 254–5. Friis Johansen, Karsten, 317. Furtak, rick anthony, 119. galen, 195. garve, Christian (1742–98), german philosopher, 48–9. gorgias, 83.

goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832), german poet, author, scientist and diplomat, 281, 301, 314. hamann, Johann georg (1730–88), german philosopher, 159. hamlet, 13, 36, 74. hegel, georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770– 1831), german philosopher, 3–13 passim, 21–3, 59, 62, 66, 68–9, 85, 123, 129, 132, 137–42, 150, 155, 159–60, 171, 175–7, 183–90 passim, 218–19, 235, 254, 266, 280, 314–17 passim, 321. heiberg, Johan ludvig (1791–1860), danish poet, playwright and philosopher, 3–15 passim, 19–23 passim, 132, 138, 154, 253, 280, 315. heraclitus, 125, 131–41 passim, 147–63, 172. herder, Johann gottfried (1744–1803), german philosopher, 301. hermann, Karl Friedrich (1805–55), german classical philologist, 129. hermippus, 111, 117. herodotus, 118, 218, 220, 222, 235, 247–62, 272. hesiod, 152, 228, 235, 263–9, 272, 307. heyne, Christian gottlob (1729–1812), german philologist, 277, 284. hölderlin, Friedrich (1770–1843), german poet, 314. homer, 63, 184, 222, 235, 248–9, 253, 259, 265, 271–99. horace, 273. hume, david (1711–76), scottish philosopher, 175, 301. iamblichus, 251. ingerslev, Christian Frederik (1803–68), danish philologist, 276. iphigenia, 67, 240–2. Jacobi, Friedrich heinrich (1743–1819), german philosopher, 175.

Index of Persons Jensen, povl Johannes (1911–85), danish classical philologist, 315. Jesus, see “Christ.” Job, 219, 320. Kangas, david, 191. Kant, immanuel (1724–1804), german philosopher, 17, 26, 55–6, 73, 241. Kierkegaard, peter Christian (1805–88), danish theologian, elder brother of søren Kierkegaard, 136, 264, 276, 292. Kierkegaard, søren aabye (1813–1855), “another defense of Woman’s great Abilities” (1834), 115. From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), 200, 287. The Concept of Irony (1841), 51, 83, 85, 115, 128, 150, 157, 171–2, 183, 188–91 passim, 237, 284, 290, 292, 306. Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est (ca. 1842–43), 158, 170, 172, 275. Either/Or (1843), 3, 10–15 passim, 22, 35, 37, 44, 51, 55–6, 60, 62–72 passim, 77–9, 112, 117, 153, 159, 199, 213, 215, 225–30 passim, 238, 253, 258, 264, 267, 278–95 passim, 314, 317–20 passim. Fear and Trembling (1843), 60, 66–7, 71, 76, 116, 135, 152, 155–6, 238–43 passim, 282–3, 314, 320. Repetition (1843), 113, 123, 131, 136–8, 150, 153–4, 200, 225, 285. Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 252. Philosophical Fragments (1844), 11, 12, 15–18 passim, 23, 27–8, 31, 35–45 passim, 51, 53, 54, 113, 116, 127, 170–7 passim, 201, 256, 302. The Concept of Anxiety (1844), 26, 44, 45, 83, 128, 139–40, 155, 201, 217, 256, 277, 283, 305. Prefaces (1844), 115–16, 153–4,

329

Three Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 224, 258. Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (1845), 252, 265, 303. Stages on Life’s Way (1845), 51, 60, 70–6 passim, 117–18, 200, 254, 256, 258, 265, 267, 281–2, 286, 302, 307, 314. Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), 4, 11–16 passim, 22, 25, 27, 36–7, 41, 51, 60, 72, 74–5, 84, 131, 137, 140, 154–5, 159, 170, 175–6, 179, 201, 227–8, 264, 265–6, 283, 286, 292, 307. A Literary Review of Two Ages (1846), 204. Works of Love (1847), 57, 114, 178, 202, 204, 252, 256–7, 265, 283, 288. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (1847), 113, 225–6, 253, 303. Christian Discourses (1848), 203, 252, 304. “Armed Neutrality” (1849, published posthumously in 1880), 116. The Sickness unto Death (1849), 201, 203. Practice in Christianity (1850), 12, 288. Judge for Yourself! (1851–52, published posthumously in 1876), 291. The Moment (1855), 119. Journals, notebooks, Nachlaß, 13, 19, 20, 41, 50–1, 53, 69, 82–4 passim, 87, 89, 97, 112, 114, 118, 133–4, 156–8, 171, 198, 200–1, 223, 225, 227, 230, 238, 251–5 passim, 258–9, 278, 281, 285–93 passim, 319. Krarup, per, 249, 276. Kuhr, victor (1882–1948), danish philosopher, 10, 13. lange, Frederik olaus (1798–1862), danish philologist, 275. lange, Friedrich (1779–1854), german philologist, 118, 250, 251, 259.

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leibniz, Baron gottfried Wilhelm von (1646–1716), german philosopher and mathematician, 5, 21–2. leonidas, 258–9. lessing, gotthold ephraim (1729–81), german writer and philosopher, 59, 65, 70, 212–13, 215, 264–5, 286, 301. lowrie, Walter (1868–1959), american translator, 118. lucian, 225. lund, peter Wilhelm (1801–80), danish paleontologist, 285.

nehamas, alexander, 191. nero, i.e., nero Claudius Caesar augustus germanicus, born lucius domitius ahenobarbus (37–68), roman emperor, 285. newmark, Kevin, 318, 321. nielsen, michael (1776–1846), headmaster of the Borgerdyd school in Copenhagen, 222, 249, 274, 276. nielsen, rasmus (1809–84), danish philosopher and theologian, 131. nitsch, paul Friedrich achat (1754–94), german protestant theologian, 266.

marbach, gotthard oswald (1810–90), german philosopher, 130, 150. marcus aurelius, i.e., marcus aurelius antoninus augustus (121–180), roman emperor and stoic philosopher, 199, 200. martensen, hans lassen (1808–84), danish theologian, 3, 8–10, 13. meiners, Christoph (1747–1810), german philosopher, 129. mejer, Jørgen, 111. melissus, 123, 128, 133. møller, poul martin (1794–1838), danish poet and philosopher, 6, 16–19 passim, 26–33 passim, 37–43 passim, 85, 130, 135, 151, 198, 276–7, 287, 294, 316. montaigne, michel de (1533–92), French essayist and philosopher, 165. montesquieu, Charles-louis de secondat baron de la Brède et de (1689– 1755), French political philosopher, 301. mozart, Wolfgang amadeus (1756–91), austrian composer, 279–81, 293–4. muench, paul, 119. mynster, Jakob peter (1775–1854), danish theologian and bishop, 3–16 passim, 22, 23, 86, 131, 281.

oedipus, 64–9 passim, 72, 77, 216, 217, 220, 241, 313, 318–20 passim. orestes, 217–18, 221–2, 227, 230. ovid, 284, 289–90.

neanthes, 111.

pandora, 263, 265. paul, 215. paulus, heinrich e.g. (1761–1851), german protestant theologian, 279. pausanius, 318. parmenides, 28, 123–33 passim, 147, 149. parry, milman (1902–35), american classified scholar, 272. periander, 118, 254, 255. pericles, 313. phaedrus, 265. philip of macedonia, 304–5. pisistratides, 271. plato, 39, 41, 53, 94, 115, 124, 128–9, 139, 151–2, 157, 165–6, 172, 183–4, 202, 235, 237, 290, 306. Apology, 265. Cratylus, 134, 150, 153. Crito, 222, 249, 275. Euthyphro, 222, 249, 275. Gorgias, 139, 284. Meno, 172. Parmenides, 124. Phaedo, 116, 290. Republic, 225–6. Sophist, 139, 283.

Index of Persons Symposium, 116, 157, 264–5. Timaeus, 41. pliny the elder, i.e., gaius or Caius plinius secundus (23–79), roman philosopher and author, 285. plotinus, 39. plutarch, 115, 195, 224, 264, 301–11. pohlenz, max (1872–1962), german philologist, 213. porphyry, 251. prodicus, 235. prometheus, 228–30, 263. protagoras, 168, 173, 235. pyrrho of elis, 165, 170, 176. pythagoras, 20, 113, 116, 134, 147, 152. Quintilian, 191. raumer, Friedrich von (1781–1873), german historian, 278. reimarus, hermann samuel (1694–1768), german philosopher, 22. reiz, Friedrich Wolfgang (1733–90), german philologist, 249. riisbrigh, Børge, 112, 118, 151. riise, Johan Christian (1794–1875), danish translator and editor, 250. ritter, heinrich (1791–1869), german philosopher, 130, 150. rohde, h.p. (1915–2005), danish art historian, 249–50. rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–78), French philosopher, 301. rymer, thomas (1643–1713), english critic, 59. sartre, Jean-paul (1905–80), French philosopher, 65. satyrus, 111. schadewaldt, Wolfgang (1900–74), german philologist, 213, 229. schäfer, gottfried heinrich (1764–1840), german philologist, 249–50. schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775–1854), german philosopher,

331

40, 60, 112, 130, 152, 254, 279, 293, 306–7. schlegel, Friedrich von (1772–1829), german romantic writer, 130. schopenhauer, arthur (1788–1860), german philosopher, 130, 151, 201. schultz, J.m., 199. scopetea, sophia, 112, 117, 236, 238. seneca the Younger, i.e., lucius annaeus seneca (4 bc-65 ad), roman philosopher and playwright, 197, 200. sextus empiricus, 111, 129, 165–73 passim, 195. shakespeare, William (1564–1616), english dramatist, 76, 226. sibbern, Frederik Christian (1785–1872), danish philosopher, 3–16 passim, 21–3, 316. simplicius, 134. sløk, Johannes (1916–2001), danish theologian, 239. socrates, 16, 53, 54, 67, 114–19 passim, 123–4, 159–60, 183–94, 202, 204, 226, 235, 237, 265, 292, 306–8. ignorance, 186, 190–1. irony, 114, 117, 172, 186, 191–2. method, 186, 190. solon, 224, 252–3, 302. sophocles, 77, 185, 211, 216, 220, 223–4, 230, 235, 238, 241, 247, 303–25. Antigone, 213, 217–19, 303–25. stallbaum, Johann gottfried (1793–1861), german classical scholar, 290. stewart, Jon, 11, 13, 119, 203, 315–17, 320. stieglitz, Christian ludwig (1756–1836), german art historian, 278. taylor, mark C., 240–3 passim. tennemann, Wilhelm gottlieb (1761–1819), german historian of philosophy, 26–33 passim, 37–43 passim, 47, 85, 112, 129–35 passim, 150, 156, 158, 171, 198–9.

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thaarup, Christen (1795–1849), danish literary scholar, 294. thales, 111, 117, 148, 172. thespis, 224. thucydides, 235, 237, 314. thulstrup, niels (1924–88), danish theologian, 265–6, 302. thyestes, 216. tiedemann, dietrich (1748–1803), german philosopher, 129. trendelenburg, Friedrich adolf (1802–72), german philosopher and philologist, 5, 85, 130. treschow, niels (1751–1833), norwegian philosopher, 7. valla, lorenzo (ca. 1407–57), italian scholar, 249. virgil, i.e., publius vergilius maro (70bc-19 bc), roman poet, 289. vollmer, Wilhelm (1828–87), german historian of literature, 266.

voltaire, i.e., François-marie arouet (1694–1778), French enlightenment writer, 301. Westphal, merold, 239. Wittgenstein, ludwig (1889–1951), austrian philosopher, 168. Wolf, Friedrich august (1759–1824), german classical philologist, 271, 294. Xanthippe, 115. Xenophanes, 123–4, 133, 147. Xenophon, 184, 222, 249, 275. Xerxes, 218, 247–8, 256–8. zeller, eduard (1814–1908), german polyhistor, 130. zeno of Citium, 195, 198–9. zeno of elea, 20, 28, 123–8 passim, 131–6 passim, 141, 176, 195.

index of subjects

abstraction, 37, 61, 82–3, 140–2. absurd, the, 93, 241. actuality, 18, 26, 30, 37–8, 50, 63, 73, 75, 96, 113, 139–41, 187. aesthetics, 51, 61, 71–2, 77–9, 83. anxiety, 305, 318–21 passim. apathy, 195, 197, 200, 203. aporia, 189. appropriation, 176. approximation, 175. ataraxia, 166–7, 177, 179. aut/aut (see also “either/or”), 8–12 passim. belief, see “faith.” Bible, Book of sirach, 253. hebrews, 63. Job, 219, 320. John, 149, 222, 249, 264, 275. Borgerdyd school, 48. change, 17, 27, 28–34. Christendom, 96, 202. Christianity, 61, 78, 88, 93–4, 96–7, 140–1, 177, 201, 283. comedy, 61–2, 75, 293. communication, indirect, 84–5, 92, 97. conscience, 69–70, 78, 283. content and form, 294. contradiction, 4, 10–12, 75, 78. the law of, 3–20 passim, 23, 134. Corsair, the, 288. daimon, 63, 78, 306. death, 113. delphi, oracle at, 159. despair, 62, 201.

determinism, 17, 18. dialectical method, 6, 7, 13, 84. doubt, 172–4, 190. drama, 313–25. earnestness, 83. either/or (see also “aut/aut”), 13–15, 23, 35, 140. eleatics, 113, 123–45, 152, 154. epicureanism, 166. ethics, 47–58, 73, 75, 78–9, 83, 155, 157, 195, 242. excluded middle, the law of, 3–16 passim, 23. existence, 30–3 passim, 36, 39, 41, 78, 95, 134, 139, 141, 155–6, 159, 307. faith, 22, 38, 66, 82, 88–97 passim, 113, 174–5, 178, 240–3 passim, 304. fate, 64, 66, 72, 217, 219, 258, 272, 305. free will, 6, 201. freedom, 17, 26, 35–6, 39, 42–5, 62, 64, 113, 174, 189, 199, 217. friendship, 55–6, 157. god-man, 92–5 passim. good, the, 185–6, 192. going further, 135, 152. grace, 69, 73, 78. guilt, 79, 215–17, 227, 230, 313, 319, 321. ἁμαρτία 59, 63–6, 215–19 passim. ἀπάθεια (see also “apathy”),195. happiness, 50, 57, 62. hegelianism, 4, 19, 20, 25, 36, 45, 131, 139, 165. higher lunacy, 14.

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higher unity, 140, 155. history, 4, 12, 44, 74, 247–8, 301–11. identity, 4. and difference, 20. the law of, 3, 5, 19–23 passim. identity of indiscernibles, 5, 21. immediacy, 9, 66, 73, 82, 158. immortality, 265, 290. incarnation, 9, 39, 40, 172. infinite and finite, 264. inner/outer, 227. inter-esse, 36–7. irony, 82, 190. romantic, 172. Socratic, see “Socrates, irony.” justice, 56. κάθαρσις, 59, 62, 68–78 passim, 212–13. κίνησις (see also “movement”), 26, 29–34 passim, 37, 154. knight of faith, 66, 67, 76, 238, 242. leap, 22, 37–8, 44. logic, 3–23, 25, 36, 174. hegelian, 139–40. love, 40, 56–8, 68, 178–9, 204, 230, 265, 319–20. maieutics, 186–7. marriage, 117. mediation, 3–23, 44, 66, 72, 137–41 passim, 154–6. metaphysics, 20. midwife, see “maieutics.” miracle, 92–3. moment, the, 16, 29, 139. movement in logic (see also “κίνησις”), 4, 11, 21, 26, 31, 41–5 passim, 113, 123–45, 153–60 passim. dialectical, 159–60. mythology, 211, 263–9, 279, 290.

necessity, 12, 16–19 passim, 27, 35–6, 38, 44–5, 64–5. negation, 4, 9, 10, 12, 18, 132, 139–40, 192. negativity, 139, 189, 192. absolute infinite, 183, 192. nemesis, 79, 213, 218, 227–8, 248, 252–3. nihilism, 189, 192. offense, 92. opposites, 7, 8, 10, 126, 132, 140, 147–60 passim, 289. unity of, 157–8.

paradox, 22, 66–7, 72, 93–4, 97, 172, 230, 240, 242. passion, 195–208. pathos, 44–5, 76, 91–2, 203, 264. philosophy, beginning of, 132. πίστις, 84, 88, 91, 94–7 passim. politics, 83, 96, 149. possibility, 18, 30, 33–4, 37–8, 75, 113. and actuality, 16, 17, 19, 27–31 passim, 35–6, 92, 154. rationalism, 7, 8, 16. recollection, 172–3, 177. reduplication, 137. relativism, 189. religiousness a and B, 64, 72. repetition, 44, 136, 138, 141, 154. revelation, 7, 8, romanticism, 62, 73. sign, 92. silence, 66. sin, 44, 51, 53, 70–4 passim, 78, 140, 215, 216, 319. single individual, the, 259. skepticism, 113–14, 138, 165–82. sophists, 112, 128, 165, 172, 183–94, 307, 314. sorites, 22–3, 173, 201.

Index of Subjects speculative, logic, 4, 12, 14, 123, 132, 137. method, 4, 137. philosophy, 3, 5, 13, 14, 141, 190. stoicism, 119, 152, 166, 195–208. subjectivity, 191, 192, 204. suffering, 62, 113, 211–19 passim, 229–30, 289, 304. suicide, 201, 303. supernaturalism, 7–9, 16.

τέλος, 39–44 passim, 62, 67. theological suspension, 239. tragedy, 59–79, 211–34, 303–25. transition, 11, 17, 29, 36, 92, 139. transcendence, 42–5, 75. university of Copenhagen, 6, 26, 151. unmoved mover, 27, 39–42. virtue, 47, 50, 308.

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