UNITA: Daring to Challenge Soviet-Cuban Occupation in Angola

Citation preview

DT

611.8 U57 1984

IE AR BR

LI

WW

FO

RD

Lih

17 ;VIRIIUTION on War, Revolution , anu Peace FOUNDED BY HERBERT HOOVER , 1919

UNITA : DARING TO CHALLENGE SOVIET - CUBAN OCCUPATION IN ANGOLA

BY

or

ta

da

a

UNIAO NACIONAL PARA INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA )

U. N. I. T. A.

19

AT

Solusi NEGALIUDEI We .

C WALEMOCRACINTO

QUARTEL. GENERAL EM TERRA LIVRE DE ANGOLA

1

UNITA : DARING TO CHALLENGE SOVIET - CUBAN OCCUPATION IN ANGOLA

Introduction

Wars against foreign domination in Angola have been fought ever since Portuguese colonialism began in late xvth Century until 1926 when the African kingdoms

that made up what is today ANGOLA were

finally subdued by the colonialists . Kings Mandume , Ekuikui ,

Mutu - ya -Kevela , Muachiyava , Ngola Inene and Queen Ginga have all participated at the level of their own kingdoms in this resistance to the newcomer .

But 34 years later , resistance to Portuguese

colonialism resumed under a new banner of Angola .

the national liberation

Three national liberation movements fought against the

Portuguese colonial rule until 1975 when Lisbon's African empire came to an end . The three liberation movements were : The National

Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA ) , the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MP LA ) and the National Union for

the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA ) . These liberation movements fought separately ; there were sharp

ideological differences among them , with open hostilities flaring up intermittently against each other . But there were three strong common elements to them all : they were all for the liberation

and independence of Angola , they believed in Angola's territorial

integrity (borne of colonialism ) , and they all emplyed (albeit with varying degrees of efficacy ) guerrilla warfare as a method of struggle .

Portuguese colonialism ended without , however , Angola having

achieved true independence . The country fell under a new foreign domination

the Soviet - Cuban occupation

and the Angolan

people , under the leadership of UNITA , resumed their national

-

2

liberation struggle .

About U.N.I.T.A.

UNITA , THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA ,

was founded on March 13 , 1966 at Mwangai , in Angola's eastern

Province of Moxico , to give a new dimension and a new direction to Angolans ' anti-colonial struggle then in its 5th year and declining in effectiveness because of structural , tactical and

strategic mistakes of the then existing liberation movements (FNLA and MP LA ) .

From its inception , UNITA adopted as principles and priorities on its agenda :

a ) To integrate the leaders and the cadres in the guerrilla units , and to operate completely from inside the country rather than from havens in foreign countries .

b ) To unite the peasant

masses in the national cause against the

oppressor . And

c ) To count on our own efforts rather than to depend on uncertain outside help .

A Tradition of Dialogue and National Reconciliation Quest

A Permanent

for Peace

By operating strictly from within , by involving deeply the rural populations in the struggle and , most importantly , by practicing self- reliance , UNITA did not only contribute decisively to the ultimate success of the anti- colonial struggle but conquered

1

1

1

1

1

- 3 -

undisputed nationwide popular support in Angola . And when the Portuguese coup took place in April 1974 , UNITA , of the three

liberation movements , was the only one to be found inside Angola , entrentched in its combat positions against the colonial army . The MP LA , beset by serious internal divisions , had permanently retreated

to its sanctuaries in Zambia , Tanzania and Congo - Brazzaville ; and the FNLA , worn out by its protracted , directionless fight , had , too , resigned totally to its headquarters in Kinshasa (Zaire ) . Being alone on the battlefield and paying such a heavy price .

in

casualties had naturally placed UNITA in a uniquely privileged position to seize the first opportunity for cease- fire and negotiations with Portugal . Thus , when the new regime in Lisbon hinted at its willingness to de - colonize Angola , UNITA immediately

embarked on an intensive diplomatic process that led to the signing of a cease- fire aggreement with the Portuguese Armed Forces on June 14 , 1974. Next , UNITA worked assiduously to secure separately cooperation aggreements with the other two liberation

movements and , finally , the holding in Mombassa (Kenya ), under the auspices of the late President Jomo Kennyata , of a tripartite conference of the three nationalist groups , in January , 1975. The Mombassa Conference worked out a common strategy for independence

negotiations with the Portuguese government . The independence negotiations took place in mid January , 1975 , in the town of Alvor in southen Portugal at a conference named after the town

the Alvor Conference

at which ended with the signing,an

important document called the ALVOR AGGREEMENT , by Portugal, UNITA , MP LA and FNLA .

The Alvor Aggreement : A Reflection of the Inevitability of Pluralist Democracy in Angola

1

1

- 4 -

The Alvor Agreement established the framework , the mechanism and the steps

for the transfer of power from Portugal in a harmonious ,

orderly de - colonization process .

The Agreement stipulated , inter

alia , that :

a ) Angola should become independent on November 11 , 1975 ;

b ) prior to the proclamation of independence , free general elections

sould be held in October of the same year , to enable the Angolan people to elect a Constituent Assembly ;

c ) a Transitional Government would be established to govern Angola from January 1975 to the proclamation of independence (November 11 ,

1975 ) . The Transitional Government would be a coalition of equal

cabinet representation from Portugal , UNITA , MPLA and FNLA ; and d ) the Transitional Government was charged with the rsponsability to organize the elections .

The Transitional Government took office on January 28 , 1975. But

peace in the country was very brief : in February , exchange of gun shots began between MP LA and FNLA forces . Shooting intensified until August when the Transitional Government collapsed , UNITA

became involved in the fighting , and the full fledged civil war spread across the entire national territory .

The 1975 Civil War

The 1975 civil war in Angola resulted from several causes :

1

1 1

1

1 1

H

1 1

1

1

- 5 -

1. Although the Alvor Agreement had recognized pluralistic democracy for Angola as the only viable framework for the exercise with

of political power in a country , three legitimate political parties , the fact is that the long - time Soviet client organization ,

the

MP LA , has never accepted in earnest the principle of political power sharing . Similae ambition was manifest in the FNLA .

Each of

these two groups wanted to govern alone . Having operated from arung the struggle

outside,. where they shared worldwide support , the MPLA and the FNLA had established powerful alliances in the international community . Whatever little they did in the course of their forays into Angola was magnified severalfold by means of propaganda in the international community . In contrast , UNITA had no outside

bases ; it operated from within , consolidating and expanding its

support among the populations , particularly the peasants who make up 85% of Angolans . The Portuguese colonial authorities had every interest to undermine UNITA's successes by attributing to the

others much of the military actions undertaken by UNITA

against

the colonial armed forces . But at the ALVOR CONFERENCE , when MP LA

and FNLA delegates tried to demand the lion's share in the distribution of the portfolios for the Transitional Government , the Portuguese authorities set the record straight by telling the

conferees that if the importance of each group were to be judged by the number of casualties inflicted on then UNITA should have the lion's share .

the Portuguese aemy , It was

obvious that this

therefore least known organization in the international community was actually the best known one inside Angola . UNITA , however ,

maintained that the portfolios for the Transitional Government should be divided evenly among the four participants (Portugal , FNLA , MP LA and UNITA ) , a position which prevailed .

When , however , public opinion polls in March , April and May showed consistently that UNITA's popular support , in percentage points ,

1 .

1

- 6 -

across the country , was more than FNLA and MP LA combined , it became

clear to all observers that UNITA , in the scheduled elections , would win by a landslide . MP LA and FNLA had therefore decided to compete by the bullet rather than face an unfavorable verdict at

the ballots . They could count on substantial outside military support to foil the electoral process . But UNITA had no comparable source of military backing . Nevertheless UNITA remained convinced .

that a fair settlement in Angola , via elections, would create no losers , but only winners : a UNITA electoral victory could have still in the formation of a ( coalition ) government of resulted natioaal unity where those who had not faired well at the ballots would still enjoy ample participation in the governing of the country . UNITA's President Jonas Savimbi had all too well understood

the political , ethnic and social complexiity of Angola : national unity , peace and stability in this fragile period required a greater

vision , far beyond statistics and election tallies .

Thus in June ,

1975 , President Savimbi still managed a last-ditch effort of bringing the three Angolan groups together to a cease- fire conference in Nakuru , Kenya . Two weeks later , cannon and mortar

fire was back in full play , and the civil war widened irreversibly . UNITA's direct involvement in the fighting , however , began only in

August when MP LA's provocations culminated in the shooting at President Savimbi's executive jet aircraft in the city of Bié .

2. Despite its stated willingness to decolonize , Portugal actually

betrayed Angola's independence . The young leftist officers ruling in Lisbon

were manifestly biased in favor of the MP LA with whose

leaders they held strong cultural ties and a long tradition of

association in underground activities of the Portuguese Communist Party . The Portuguese officers believed that the survival of their newly -won revolutionary victory in Portugal would depend largely on Portugal's ability to leave in its former colonies similarly

- 7 -

revolutionary

meaning pro- MOSCOW

regimes . The Portuguese bias

became obvious right from early in 1975 when the stocks of weapons in Angola which the departing Portuguese troops were supposed to transfer to the three groups actually ended up almost entirely to the MP LA .

Portuguese Communist Party boss Alvaro Cunhal was

playing an active role on behalf of the MP LA along the axis Moscow - Lisbon - Luanda , channeling funds and arms . And prior to the Alvor Conference , the last Portuguese High Commissioner to Angola Admiral Rosa Coutinho , a staunch member of the Portuguese Communist Party and a fervent backer of the MPLA , staffed with the latter's

sympathizers most key posts in Angola's economic , educational , banking and media infrastructures , so when the Transitional Government took office , the burocracy in the capital had already

been handed over almost entirely to the MP LA by the Portuguese leftists .

In addition to the Portuguese connivance with Soviet expansionist

designs , there was utter inexperience on the part of Portugal to deal with the situation . Experienced diplomats and negotiators were lacking at the scene of this decolonisation process . No interna

tional organization , such as the UN , rendered support to the .

process .

with

As result , at the Alvor Conference , the issues were dealt

superficially and expeditiously . Had the negotiators gone to

the bottom of the problems , the Alvor Conference could have lasted several weeks , if not months , and not five days !

3. The Cubans started arriving in Angola

as early as January 1975 ,

first as instructors at MP LA's Massangano base south of Luanda , and

later on , as combat troops . During UNITA's first combat engagements against MP LA forces in Benguela in August , Cubans were already seen fighting alongside MP LA . In September , in the course of another battle , UNITA captured three Cubans , one of them being a lieutenant .

- 8 -

By October , when the South Africans entered the scene , there were already 7500 Cubans on the battlefield .

The Cubans came to Angola at Moscow's service , to put in power a

long time Soviet protegee , the MP LA . It is totally false to say that the Cubans came at the invitation of the Angolan Government : the only government then in existence was the Transitional Government and not the MP LA's government which came into being only after

winning the civil war in the end of the year . It is equally false to say that the Cubans came to fight the South Africans : the Cubans

weren the battlefield fighting Angolans months before the South Africans came in ..

At any rate , the conflict having become so heavily internationalized , the outcome of the civil war depended entirely on the behaviour of

these foreign forces of intervention rather than on the Angolans themselves .

4. The attitude of the West , particularly the United States , in

the wake of the Vietnam conflict , was one of resignation

and

capitulation to the Soviet expansionism . By the time UNITA received a modest assistance from the United States , the Soviets had already disgorged hundreds of millions of dollars worth of war materiel in the country ; and by the time some 1500 South African Army reservists

entered the scene , some 7500 Cubans were already on the field . Three months later , the U.S.Congress enacted legislation to cut off the assistance . The world uproar to the South African intervention was numbing , and the South Africans had to pull out . Having turned the

military tide decisively in its favor , the MP LA proclaimed its government which soon gained diplomatic recognition from many countries .

.

- 9 -

By February 1976 , there was little else to do for UNITA but to withdraw from every town , and the civil war was lost . However , .

in retrospect , the civil war was just one big , spectacular battle in UNITA's continuing war of national liberation .

The National Liberation Struggle

OO

Against Soviet Imeprialism

And oppression

Angolans had fought

Portuguese oppressive colonial domination .

They wanted to exercise their inalienable right to vote , to choose their own form of government, to lead a life of dignity and progress . These goals have not been achieved ; socio - economic and

political misery that be fell upon Angola under Soviet - Cuban occupation

is far worse than under Portuguese colonial rule .

Under such circumstances , UNITA had no choice but to reorganize

its forces and the people and to resume the national liberation

struggle against the new foreign domination . UNITA's withdrawal from the cities in the end of the 1975 civil war was indeed a

strategic retreat

OO

and not capitulation

OO

in the face of the

colossal disparity of forces .

Resisting Soviet Imperialism

in Angola : Unprecedented Challenge

In announcing , on February 88 , 1976 , its decision to continue to resist by guerrilla methods , the leadership of UNITA had to overrule Party members of the Left who , overwhelmed by the successes UNITA had achieved earlier tended to refuse to analyze

soberly the new situation and our weaknesses so as to chart out a realistic course of action ; the leadership had equally to overrule Party members from the Right who thought the new Soviet - Cuban - MP LA coalition to be invincible and that therefore

- 10 -

the Party should simply capitulate .

UNITA's appeal to the national conscience to resist seemed , in

fact utopia to some people and a dangerous adventure to others . The decision represented an unprecedented , daring enterprise : to

challenge Soviet imperialism in Angola , against an all -powerful Cuban expeditionary corps

and a host of other unfavorable

circumstances in the international community :

1. Fighting against Russian imperialism and Cuban adventurism would find us very few friends

in the Third World , where

colonialism , neo - colonialism and imperialism are generally associated with the West rather than with the USSR and its satellites .

Fighting against Russia and Cuba was perceived to

" be reactionary "

at a time when being "proggressive" (meaning

" pro - Soviet " ) was fashionable .

2. The Soviet Union enjoys a sort of moral ascendancy among the influencial Western liberal intellectuals , especially in the news media . They have been led to believe that "moderate pro - Western "

being labelled

may bear no resemblance to implied

cooperation with or help from the West . The label may actually be a liability , for we know all too well how eager is the Western press to castigate those perceived to be friends or allies of the

West , particularly of the United States . 3. Many people ( outside of Angola ) simply don't realize that

Soviet - Cuban occupation is very oppressive and dehumanizing . They tend to think that oppression and repression should be denounced only if perpetrated by one racial group against another , such as

a White minority versus a Black majority that characterized Southern Africa . They think that the illegitimacy of a regime

1

11 -

headed by a Black man (Agostinho Neto or Eduardo dos Santos of the MP LA ) should be deemed irrelevant . As such , they fail to see UNITA as a national liberation movement but rather as a " rebel ,

opposition Party " .

The world is generally solicitous to anyone

engaged in a national liberation struggle , against a colonial .

rule ; a small action on the battlefield would produce spectacular

propaganda results in the international community . Otherwise the world would behave cynically , and a spectacular military action at home by the " rebels " would only produce a modest impact in the international community .

4. Soviet aggressiveness was on the rise . The United States , having just suffered a setback in Vietnam , was in no mood to get involved in another conflict , especially when the Soviet Union was already so far ahead in its committment to conquer Angola .

5. There were 12,000 highly well trained Cyban troops and abundant quantities of sophisticated weapons the frightening

122 mm multiple- rocket launchers ( Stalin organs ) , the MIGs , the T- 34 and T-- 54 tanks , the assault chars , the M - 18 helicopters , etc. And there was much more where they had come from . The Cubans and

Russians had ...till then , a history of backing successful güerrilla movements ; they knew the science of revolutionary guerrilla warfare ; they were therefore presumed to be capable of waging a successful counter - guerrilla campaign against UNITA .

6. There was an incomprehensible rush by Western countries to

extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet- installed MP LA government . Some did it for economic reasons : they were in a

hurry to invest in Angola or to protect their investment therein .

-

Others

the majority , especially in Africa

12 -

did it simply

out of lack of will to resist Soviet expansionism ; they feared they "couldn't lick it " , so they preferred to " join it " by rushing with an olive branch of capitulation . In so doing , they foreward wanted to deter Russia from unleashing the Cubans to topple their

owin regimes , especially in Africa where so many unpopular dictatorships still flourish . Whatever the motive , the bottom line is that the

diplomatic recognition to the MPLA regime was a recognition of

the Soviet victory rather than of the legitimacy of that unelected minority government . Such diplomatic ties might soon translate into hostility toward UNITA . In fact Nigeria , Congo , Mozambique , Lybia , Algeria , Guinea - Conackry and Idi Amin's Uganda did subsequently send token contingents of troops to join the Cubans to crush UNITA right in the early days of its resistance . Others , especially in the developed West , resented our resistance as obstruction to their business schemes in the country . Still others in the West viewed

it as an embarrassing phenomenon that could delay a

speedier accommodation of the new situation , i.e. the emerging

Soviet dominance in the region . They wished UNITA away . (But there were also many who wished UNITA "good luck " , sincerely .) .

7. The reaction to the South African intervention was unexpectedly high-pitched , emotional and outrageous . Implicit in it was the strange notion that " it's ok to be trampled on by ' proggressive ' Russians and Cubans" and that nothing should justify South Africa's action !

Regardless of the motives of South Africa's intervention-

strictly in its own national and regional security interests-- the world's furor was not directed to South Africa or other

Western powers that had given Pretoria the green light to enter the conflict , but rather against UNITA . The South African connection became the main issue for a sensational and ostensible propaganda exploitation by UNITA's adversaries who numbed the

- 13 -

public at large to the real issues at stake .

A ruthless campaign

was waged to isolate UNITA in the international community . (Curiously enough , when a few years later , in 1984 , there came a surge of reconciliation , cooperation and non - aggression treaties between

South Africa and the Marxist regimes of FRELIMO (Mozambique ) and MP LA (Angola ) , far from being denounced , the two new Pretoria's friends were congratulated as "pragmatic" by most leaders in

Africa and elsewhere .) 8. Internally , there were

several concrete problems that had to

be dealt with immediately : From 1974 to the end of the civil war ,

UNITA had become exceedingly popular throughout the country . As a result , there were millions of its adherents

that would require

organization , schools , hospitals , security , defence , etc. UNITA could no longer look to a small area in the Eastern Moxico Province and settle there for the resistance ; if left unattended over a

long period of time , the enemy might come along with a socio -economic program to win these populations to his side . At the same time , 90 % of UNITA's troops had no previous experience in guerrilla warfare

they had joined FALA ( UNITA's Armed Forces )

as regulars , during the civil war . The size of the territory and the Army entailed a need for rapid communications and transportation means , especially radios .

These and other factors characterized the resistance to the

Soviet -Cuban occupation as unique in contemporary Africa .

14 -

Assessing the conditions for the Armed Resistance

Having decided to resist the Soviet - Cuban occupation , a thorough analysis of the situation had to be made to determine the material as well as the spiritual means to carry out the struggle

in this particular phase . There had been a profound change about Angola both internally and externally , therefore , UNITA could not

dogmatically apply the lessons from the anti - colonial struggle . President Jonas Savimbi anticipated that the enemy would try by

all means to act swiftly on the populations from the Centre , East and South of the country

strongest in popular support

the areas in which UNITA was the

in an effort to seek their acceptance

and undermine the Resistance . It was therefore obvious , in his

view , that we should not confine ourselves to returning to UNITA'S old guerrilla playground in the East (Moxico Province ) but rather

to the new geopolitical national reality . President Savimbi also realized that , unlike the anti- colonial struggle , the new war

would require tens of thousands of troops to enable UNITA to confront the combined Soviet - Cuban - Czech - Bulgarian - East German

-Katanguese - MP LA onslaught . Such a relatively large armed force would also require a back - up support of hundreds of thousands or millions of civilians whence would come army recruits and volunteers ,

food , infrastructures , etc. Only by establishing ourselves

firmly

and immediately in the most densely populated central plateau

region could we launch successfully the armed resistance . This was the theory of big numbers postulated by President Savimbi ,

underscoring the crucial role of the dialectical relationship between

the vast popular support UNITA enjoyed and the war

requirements .

- 15 -

It was also understood that no matter how unpopular the enemy might be , he would always be a powerful adversary who would neither yield nor disintegrate that easily . Our forces should therefore not dream of seizing power by a coup d'etat type action . Our revolutionary forces would have to grow gradually . This requires time , hence the protracted nature of the struggle that UNITA was contemplating .

One main reason for the protracted nature of the struggle was the fact that our Armed Forces would have to be founded in the

peasantry

Despite their various good qualities, peasants have

certain characteristics that may hinder any efforts to rapid

organization and efficiency : peasants are traditionalist , conservative and difficult to change the habits , individualist ,

as a social class they are generally disorganized , mostly illiterate ; they are generally fatalist and reluctant to discover their own power to shape the future ; peasants would view the struggle

essentially as something that ought to yield immediate results ;

and peasants may yield all too quickly to the enemy's divisive manipulations . Only by hard and dilligent work of mobilization

and teaching could UNITA help the peasants overcome these

shortcomings and transform them into a solid , most reliable base of support to the national liberation cause . This would take time .

In its intrinsic nature , the struggle would therefore be protracted

because of our existing weaknesses which would require time to overcome ; in its form , however , the struggle would have to move

rapidly , acquiring higher levels of professionalism in military skill and politico - administrative organization . Several factors were identified , or soon emerged , as decisively favorable to the Resistance :

.

16 -

1. Popular bitterness against the presence of foreign armies of occupation and repression .

2.Police brutalities and repression by the MP LA regime , reminiscent

of the old colonial days of PIDE-DGS .

3.Political blunders and administrative incompetence of the MP LA regime which engendered untold economic misery upon the country , while producing a new social caste of privileged exploiters in Luanda

4. Chronic , irreconcilable internal crisis within the MPLA .

5. The perceptible , growing willingness of Angolans to join UNITA and resist .

6. The existance of a cohesive core of revolutionary guerrilla force , FALA .

7. The vastness of the territory , enabling

substantial portions

thereof - to elude the control of the MPLA regime .

8. Availability of substantial leftovers of weapons and ammo from the civil war enabling us a healthy start .

9. Existence of loyal friends in the international community who soon might come to our help .

10. The

realization , by neighbouring countries , that the Cuban

presence in Angola represented a threat to their own security , as attempts to destabilize Zaire from Angola in 1977 and 1978 proved .

11. The presence of Dr Jonas Savimbi's most competent and most farsighted leadership .

- 17 -

12. Availability of UNITA's political and military youthful cadres with long years of experience .

13. The existence of a situation generally viewed as one in which our adversary was tactically powerful because of his impressive arsenals , but strategically

weak because of his lack of support

from the majority of the people .

Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare methods have been employed by man

throughout

history . There are objective as well as subjective conditions that must be met in order to employ guerrilla warfare methods , conditons

that may be natural or created , internal or external , geographical

or sociological, political and economic . There are also rules , principles and theories to be followed if a guerrilla force is to succeed . We observe , in our particular case , the following : 1. A guerrilla force must be guided by a well defined political

philosophy ; it should be a means for political aims ; and military problems must be viewed from a political perspective .

2.The guerrilla force must be rooted among the people , enjoy popular support and become truly a popular army for a popular war .

3.Guerrilla warfare must relate theory to practice and vice-versa .

4. A guerrilla army must strive to gain strength , cohesion and

ultimately evolve into a regular or semi - regular army or combination

- 18

thereof , to enable it to take on larger enemy targets .

5. The guerrilla army must avoid direct confrontation with the

powerful enemy's regular force , sticking rather to surprise attacks by small , flexible , mobile guerrilla units , taking advantage of the terrain , weather and popular sentiments .

A guerrilla army must ,

in the beginning , strive for its physical survival , avoiding adventuresome acts against the powerful adversary .

6. The guerrillas must retain high mobility and avoid becoming a sitting duck to the enemy .

7. Despite all its inherent difficulties , a guerrilla organization must strive to help alleviate some of the local populations ' needs in medicine , salt , clothing , schools , defence , etc.

8. A guerrilla army must know how to deal with possible enemy infiltration in its ranks ; it must beware of the enemy's counter guerrilla methods .

9. A guerrilla army is strategically a defensive force

defending

the country against foreign intruders ; but it is tactically an offensive force

it must retain the ability to initiative most

military actions against the enemy .

10. A guerrilla force must establish , as soon as possible , a Rear Base of Support

a vast , liberated peace of the national territory

where the Party and the Armed Forces may move freely and lay out the infrastructures for continuous expansion .

19 -

11. Universally recognized elementary guerrilla tactical principles include : to retreat when the enemy advances , to harrass the enemy when he camps , to go after the enemy when he runs away , and to

entrap him when he gets tired .

12. The relationship of a guerrilla army to the people is of

paramount importance for the survival and success of the organization ;

as such , the guerrillas' behaviour to the local populations must be beyond reproach at all times : they must be polite , courteous , honest , fair and helpful .

13. The command structure of a guerrilla force and the relationship between soldiers and officers ahould involve a strong sense of UNITY , COMPASSION and AUTHORITY .

A guerrilla commander must stay in tune and in permanent contact with his men ; he must know how they feel and care about their worries . He must strive to build the esprit de corps among his troops ,

knowing that it is often the state of mind that makes good combattants out of his men . A good commander must tune - in on his transistor radio for the news , to keep abreast of the national and international events and to share the news with his subordinates .

Unity between commanders and soldiers is absolutely achievable in FALA , and we have been abundantly successful on this , because we

are few and united in our objectives . In contrast , unity is totally

unachievable for the unwieldy , heterogeneous mass of troops made up of Russians , Cubans , East Germans , Portuguese and others on the MPLE side .

Guerrilla units

must know how to share and utilize their generally

scarce arms and ammo . A guerrilla commander should always think in

1

- 20 -

terms not only of his unit but also of the whole FALA and the country .

Rear Support Bases

We define a REAR BASE OF SUPPORT as a vast territory within the national territory , a State within

the State , a country within

the country . It starts out small . The idea of Rear Base of Support

( RBS ) should therefore be associated with a process of expansion of

our freeland .

It is the territory within which our people

and our Armed Forces may move freely .

Guerrilla warfare does not imply to be permanently on the move , camping here tonight and there tomorrow . To be constantly on the march

would soon fatigue and wear down the guerrillas

just human beings

they are

who would then be unable to undertake serious

action . Guerrilla fighters are no roving bands moving constantly from area to area . A guerrilla army needs a place where the men can rest , recuperate , train , consolidate their structures , set-up their political power organs , schools , clinics , agricultural projects , etc. This is the RSB .

In selecting an area for RSB , a paramount consideration is its relative inaccessibility to enemy forces : without roads , with dense

forests or mountanous , with water and with a population . We are proud of UNITA's spectacular achievement in establishing and

consolidating RSB which now (May 1984 ) cover more than one - third of Angola . But we cannot forget the many bitter lessons from the past ,

when the enemy bombed our schools , burned our hospitals , destroyed our agricultural projects and stalled our advance . As we continue to expand our Rear Support Base , we must remain vigilant , for the

- 21 -

enemy retains his superiority in fire power , sophistication and abundance of weapons . The enemy will continue to attempt to disrupt our efforts .

Organization of the Armed Forces

To meet our varous tactical and strategic needs , we have four levels of forces :

1. We have established the PEOPLE'S DEFENCE COMMITTEES , made up of local elements of the population to ensure the latter's security at

the village level . The system involves training in handling rudimentary weapons for self-defence and , occasionally , some

dispensation of rifles . This must be preceded by adequate political mobilization , lest the rifles end up to the enemy side .

2. The second level is that of DISPERSED GUERRILLAS in small units

whose function is ' to engage in actions designed to prevent enemy

advance into our areas .

3. The third level comprises COMPACT GUERRILLAS whose units achieve

company size and which may lay ambushes leading to heavy enemy losses .

4. Lastly , we have the REGULAR or SEMI - REGULAR FORCES which are trained to engage in frontal , conventional combats . They operate in

up to battalion size units , thus enabling our forces to attack and

destroy relatively large enemy targets such as well - garrisoned towns and important economic installations .

It is constantly emphasized to the troops that none of the four

22 O

levels of forces cited above is superior to the others . They are

interdependent and they must function like the five fingers on a hand : each different and unique in size but also uniquely important to the hand's overall performance .

There is a strong interelationship between the creation of Regular

Units , the establishment of RSB and the protracted nature of the struggle :

by nature , protracted war requires RSB ; only in rear

bases of support , under peaceful conditions , can one prepare regular forces ; and only with regular forces can one consolidate and stabilize the Rear Bases .

Recruitment

and Training

Recruits for the Regular Forces are selected from among the

guerrilla

units on the basis of combat record , age and literacy

level criteria .

Political awareness is of paramount importance in the FALA . Troops are not only expected to master the fundamentals of their military skill , but they are required to know the political essence of UNITA's struggle . Accordingly , we have instituted POLITICAL 1

COMMISSARS at all command levels of the FALA . In principle , a

Political Commissar is hierarchically superior to his unit military commander . The political commissar must therefore not only show proficiency in military arts but also a deeper ability to deal with political problems .

This is predicated on UNITA's conviction that it is the political understanding of the national situation that must determine the strategy and lead the gun and not vice - versa .

We use the gun only

23 -

because

the adversary allows us no other way to pursue

our

political goals of national liberation .

Similarly , UNITA's preocupation with the welfare of MAN the soldier , the cadre , the peasant , the teacher , the nurse , the student , etc. is based on our firm conviction that THE FORCE OF FIRE ARMS WITHOUT THE FORCE OF SOULS IS NOTHING .

Deployment of Forces

Militarily, the country is divided into Fronts , regions , Sectors and Zones . Generally , there are three Zones per one Sector and

three Sectors per one Region . An average of 1500 men in guerrilla

or regular units are deployed in each Region . In addition , special detatchments are assigned to specific missions . Various Compact Guerrilla units may be assembled for a specific large combat

mission and , upon completion , they revert back to their original

units .Several important enemy posts have been seized in this O

fashion . Most daily guerrilla operations against the enemy , however , are ; undertaken at the level of the Zone whose effectives never exceed

100 men (per Zone ) .

Phases of our Resistance

four phases are identified in the Angolan Resistance to Soviet - Cuban occupation : the start, the survival , the equilibrium of forces

and

the generalized counter - offensive .

1. The start of the resistance was a traumatic experience both to

our populations and to our Armed Forces . We had just enjoyed a

1 I

1

. 1 .

1 .

24

period of hope during the 1974-1975 transition when UNITA had a

taste of exercise of political power in the country ( including in the cities ) , and the people were jubilant . It was a bitter experience to abandon the cities , overwhelmed by the enemy fire power and lose control of the situation .

The people responded to President Savimbi's appeal to resume the resistance , but four aspects had to be dealt with 2. Survival .

immediately in order for UNITA to survive the initial enemy

offensive : ( a ) launch a campaign of mobilization of the people to explain the reasons for our struggle ; (b ) locate , regroup and reorganize into guerrilla units our forces at the time dispersed throughout rural areas ; ( c ) reorganize the country into military

zones , sectors and regions ; mobility had to be the chief characteristic of the guerrilla units whose primary task was to

sabotage the communication networks ; and ( d ) selection and procurement of appropriate weapons , having preferred light artillery and infantry arms to enhance mobility . 3. Equilibrium of Forces . With a number of initial victories and

arduous work , the people's confidence in themselves and in UNITA rose

was soon re - established and our troop morale high . But "equilibrium " in the sense of parity with the enemy is the most difficult and

most elusive phase to achieve , mainly because of the tendency to escalate the conflict : each victory by our Forces is followed by a greater effort by the other side to win the next round , and

vice- versa . As a result , we have increased , over a five - year

period , four- fold our combat effectives and improved tremendously O

the quality of the FALA ; but there has also been a Cuban increase from 12,000 in 1976 to 30,000 in 1980 and to 40,000 by 1984 , while

introducing , at the same time , more sophisticated weapons such as

25 -

the MIG - 23 and the " flying tank " MI- 24 helicopter . Moreover , a

number of victories in one single military region is no sure thermometer of our capabilities nor of the enemy weakness , in a theater of operations of shifting targets .

4. Generalized Counter -offensive . The accummulation of victories , experience and favorable political and economic factors have

justified UNITA's transition

to a phase of a strategic counter

-offensive . It will continue to be a long process of gains and losses , losses and gains until we reach the summit .

1

- 26 -

O

A Political Perspective : The Price and the Opportunities for a Negotiated Settlement

Por nine years , the Soviets have been orchestrating terror and

death in Angola .

Sophisticated armament and Cuban troops continued

to disembark on our shores , even as efforts by the United States to seek

negotiated settlements intensified over the past few months .

Portunately , we are abundantly blessed with the leadership of

Dr. Jonas Savimbi which enables the Angolan people to resist the Soviet - Cube occupation . Today , the Angolan people , in their over

whelming majority , across all ethnic lines , in rural as well as in urban areas , support UNITA and Dr. Savimbi . Competent leadership and popular support have enabled UNITA to create a viable armed force which has been scoring impressive victories aga inst the Soviet - Cuban - APLA forces .

The Cubans know they have become very vulnerable in Angola . The IPLA is fully aware it can never survive in power against UNITA without this cumbersome Cuban expeditionary force . And those who are doing business with the MPLA regime low quite well this regime

is totally incapable of ensuring the safety of foreign personnel in the country .

)

- 27

And , as we combine with increasing success urban with rural guerrilla warfare methods , we believe scholars who watch closely the situation in Angola will soon change completely the here tofore held notion

that only Soviet-supported guerrillas can win .

However , the spotlight, for the past three months , has not been on Angolans ' armed resistance to Soviet expansionist aggression but rather on rapprochement between South Africa and the Black African states in the region , notably Mozambique and Angola ; the spotlight has been on heightened expectations about a breakthrough on a negotiated

Cuban withdrawal from Angola and on the prospects

Namibia

independence settlement . Of course these are aspects of three basic political issues confronting our region : ( 1 ) Soviet expansionism and

Cuban presence , ( 2 ) apartheid and ( 3 ) Namibian independence .

These

issues profoundly affect the entire region of Southern Africa which

includes the countries of Angola , Zambia , Zimbabwe , Malawi , wozambique Namibia , Botswana , Swaziland , Lesotho and South Africa . endowed

The region is

with immense economic wealth in mineral rsources , which makes

it strategically and economically very important to the west . Lack of peace and stability bere may therefore not only hamper regional progress but also undercut vital Westem and international interests .

Southern African problems are indeed complex and heavily internation alized . In fact the players include the United States , the Soviet Union , Cuba , the Contact Group and other West European powers , the

United Nations , the Organization of the African Unity , the front wine States , South Africa , SWAPO , IPLA , UNITA , Namibia , ANC and various other organizations within these countries . Naturally , with such a complex group of protagonists with varying and conflicting interests , it is virtually impossible to bave uninamitv on the kind of solutions

that must be achieved . At the present , however, the spotlight is essentially on efforts led by the United States to seek negotiated solutions .

1

1

- 28 -

CLL'z

here

the

Wg remarks today will therefore pertain to this central issue of

negotiated versus military solutions to Southern African problems . Implicit in this is the question of whether or not there exist today opportunities for a negotiated , peaceful settlement ; and whether or not there are other courses of action that may be pursued in the event diplomacy fails . In the final analysis , both military and diplomatic .. activities bere are important only if they can lead to attainment of specifin , clearly defined objectives . The Maputo - Pretoria rapprochement has culminated in the signing of a non - aggression pact in March this year . Along with it would be

cessation of support to ANC and MNR respectively by Nozambique and South Africa , reopening of trade and tourism , economic cooperation and joint-utilization of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project . FRELIMO officials in. Mozambique were quoted declaring that apartheid was an internal South African affair ; by implication , it was non of Mozambique's business . It is the closest & Front Lige state bas come.

to open recognition of the legitimacy of the Pretoria regime . On the Angolan side , following the US - sponsored Lusaka conference last February between South Africa and MPLA , the South Africans began and completed their disengagement from the Cunene Province in Angola ; a joint South African - MPLA military unit now patrole the Namibia

-Angola border. to prevent , among other things , aay SWAPO incursions from its guerrilla bases in Angola into Namibia . A few days ago , a Britisha television showed a film footage of these joint South African

-NPLA troops living together in the same quarters at the border ; food ‫ܪ‬is

supplied by South Africa , and wounded MPLA soldiers are fetched by South African helicopters and treated in South African bospitals ‫ܪ‬in Namibia .

Rapprochement between neighboring countries is a normal, interstate affair . Deals to reciprocally curb hostile forces within neighboring countries are being made all the time in Africa and elsewhere . Further more , South African economic and financial assistance to Black

1

-24 -

African states in the region has already been going on for many

years , even though these countries preferred , till now , to transact at night to avoid embarrassment . What is new here is the fact that the Marxist FRELIMO and MFLA regimes of Mozambique and Angola were the most militantly anti -South Africa , the least expected to turn around so sharply and so suddenlv in their relations to

with Pretoria

Pretoria .

Huch of the momentum in current diplomatic efforts in Southern Africa with regard to Mozambique and Angola appears to be based on the assumption that the west can transform a pro - Moscow biarxist regime. into a moderate pro -western one . There is no example of a successful precedent on this . True, faced with internal crisis , a Marxist regime will not hesitate to accept a temporary , pragmatic accommodation of its ideological adversaries . And for those who believe in ideologyand all Marxists do pragmatism is valid onlv if it can , in the

end , promote the ideological cause . No true Marxist will forego

bis /ber ideological commitment for reasons of temporary economic gains Por example, the Marxist IiPLA regime in Angola receives 90 % of its revenue from economic dealings with American companies ; the MPLA also

receives US bumanitarian assistance totallino some $ 3 million annuall; and loans from the Export- Import Bank , while on the other hand the remains in force to prohibit US help to UNITA . Yet ,

Clark Amendment

the MPLA insists daily in its domestic propaganda that US imperialism and #estern capitalism are the Enemy Number One of Angolans . The PLA can never become a friend of the Western free enterprise ; it

cannot share your goals nor accept to play politically by western rules .

Western analysts would rather dismiss all MPLA'S anti - Western

assertiveness as empty rhetoric , arguing that no one can do without Western money . This may be true ; but in Angola Western resources are being used to subsidize anti -Western campaign , to transform Angola into a solid bastion of anti -US struggle , cost - free to Koscow .

1

1

1

-30

One fundamental difference between the Soviet and Western attitudes

toward Third world conflicts is the fact that you sincerely seek

negotiated settlements , while the Soviets seek victories . They want the world , you want peace-- negotiated peace . In negotiations there must be a give and take approach . And we should beware the price that eager negotiators may be willing to pay for a settlement . What kind of deals are being cut? What are the bargaining chips ? What diplomatic trade - offs ? Is the price fair and affordable to the parties concerned ?

For us , a peace effort that does not lead to attainment of our

people's genuine national independence and freedom would basically imply untainable peace . A settlement must achieve peace WITH JUS TICE . Above all , it should not be tray the ultimate cause for democracy in the region .

We would certainly prefer a negotiated to a military settlement in

Angola . But the choice is not ours . Reciprocity is key to success in

negotiations . Given the present circumstances of the other side's refusal to negotiate , we have no choice but to continue successfullv our armed resistance ; or else , surrender . There is no balf-way . We

chose to fight for our lives , our dignity , our future ; and the Angolan people are heroically paying the price for freedom and liberty It would be good if DEMOCRACY were an internationalist cause engaging all free nations . Otherwise , in the face of aggressive Soviet

expansionism , democracy may become a vanishing ideal . The holding of free elections and the establishment of a democratic regime in Angola ,

for example, would naturally be in your interest . But the attitude

and actions of the West in relation to these perceived common interest remain quite anachronistic . Today it is the west , through its diplomac; and economic resources , that is trying hard to save the Soviet

surrogate Luanda regime from inevitable collapse . Western diplomats indeed conceive of a negotiated settlement in Angola as one in which the Marxist MPLA would be persuaded to kindly allow in its government

1

31

e token participation of UNITA . But today the CLA is no longer in the position to dictate the terms of the future governing of Angola .

UNITA has become very strong , the dominant factor internally , both politically and militarily . Yet UNITA does not seek to destroy the WPLA but to achieve genuine national independence and freedom . MPLA'S participation in the future governing of Angola can be ensured by achieving a settlement that must include ( a ) dialogue and national

reconciliation , ( b ) Cuban departure , ( c ) formation of a government of national unity and ( a ) free elections . The Cuban withdrawal is fundamental, since the advent of Cuban troops

in Angola in 1975 has profoundly internationalized the conflict . Unless they leave , one cannot propose local solutions to local

problems .

Free , general elections in Angola cannot be put off

indefinitely , for we need to create legitimate govtning institutions to enable the people to have a say in their own national affairs ; it to exercise the basic right to vote , to self - determination , the reason we fought Portuguese colonialism , the reason we fight the present regime .

Many western experts argue that the conflicts in Southern Africa are local and that therefore the US should keep its bands off . They further argue that the Africans ' aversion to communism and Soviet inability to deliver on economic assistance will automatically compel

the Africans to repel any Soviet intrusion in their countries . They cite the examples of Egypt , the Sudan and Somalia where the Soviets were asked to leave . These arguments are fallacious for obvious

reasons : ( 1 ) the Soviet Union indeed foments and exploits local armed conflicts as a form of promoting East- west confrontation

without actually coming to

direct super - power confrontation ; ( 2 )

African aversion to Communism is not enough : one must have comparable

means to face up to a powerful adversary . Did the so - called " captive nations " come about because the people in those countries had no

aversion to Communism ? ( 3 ) The regimes in question ( in Egypt , the Sudan and Somalia ) were not Marxist . And ( 4 ) there were no Soviet or

-32

Soviet proxy armies of occupation in these countries . The advent of

Marxist pro -Moscow regimes in Angola , Ethiopia , Nozambique and others , and , most importantly , Cuban expeditionary corps bave changed the picture . Under such circumstances , hope for democracy must be based

on effort from within each country , by the people , in a continuing national liberation process against Soviet aggression . This process

requires the support of the free , democratic peoples of the world . True , many of the so - called anti - Communist countries have little or nothing to do with democracy , and the democratic countries are not united , so they have no way to make up their mind to support effectively the democratic processes . But we need , at least , strategic support from the democratic West to this national liberation process-

the internal challenge to repressive authoritarian and / or totalit arian regimes

as only hope for effective change for democracy .

In this case , normalization of relations between Pretoria and Maputo ,

for example , might not be cause for jubilation if the price is to

squeeze out of existence the internal Mozambicans ' challenge to Marxist PRELIMO . As a matter of fact , after rapprochement with Pretoria , PRELIMO is reinforced with South African economic , financial and military assistance but with no obligation whatsoever to democra

tize its institutions or change ideology , while on the other hand , regardless of the future of ANC in Kozambique, pressure on South lfrica , from without and from within , to change its apartheid laws will likely continue or eten increase . We understand the complexity of the issues and the conflicting interests involved in Southern Africa . But the search for solutions

must not entail schemes of elimination of genuine local political forces : the need for pluralist political systems becomes obvious . Co- existence is necessary , both at national and regional levels . This co - existence and tolerance , borne of necessity by bistory and geogra phy , must lead to forging fruitful and sincere cooperation and interde pendence among the peoples of the region .

-3B -

In fact , " linkage " in Southern Africa is a consequence of the

interrelationship of the problems we face . From the moment the Cubans

came to Angola , and SWAPO , expelled from Zambia , came to wage its war from Angola , the Namibia independence settlement became inevitably linked to the situation in our country . Furthermore , South Africa is .

concerened about its own security in the region . SWAPO has vowed to

support ANC's armed struggle until total takeover in South Africa . Once in power in Namibia , SWAPO's priorities may include establishment

of sanctuaries on Namibian soil for ANC guerrillas to operate from against South Africa who will then retaliate against independent Namibia . SWAPO's regime would then ask its internationalist Soviet , W cvcle of violence Amew Cuban and East German friends to intervene . Afnew ? is

certainlv ; and for South Africa, closer to home. This way. Pretoria links , in a way , Namibia independence settlement to Cuban withdrawal from Angola . It is not fair to put South Africa on the same footing with the Cubans regarding withdrawal from the area . South Africa is a neighbor , a

regional power and the de - colonizer in Namibia . The Cubans are totally outsiders . Some analysts argue that because of South Africa's economic might , which has compelled all other countries in the region to

normalize relations with Pretoria , a SWAPO government in Namibia will likewise be 80 beholden to South Africa that it will constitute no

security problem to Pretoria . Perhaps . But if the Cubans remain in the

area, the normalization of relations with Pretoria will be just a temporary ploy , never a permanent overture for sincere dialogue and co - existence .

What are the prospects for the Cuban withdrawal ? According to the IPLA , Cubans may leave only after , among other things , all threats to

the Marxist Luanda regime cease . This is the thrust of the March 20 PLA - Cuban joint declaration from Havana where Bduardo dos Santos and Pidel Castro cite cessation of outside aid to UNITA as one of the

conditions . If , with or without outside support , we continue to score important victories

as we will

PLA will continue to make

unreasonable demands to its negotiating partners

the Americans and

1

1

- 34

the South Africans

O0

to justify its refusal to let the Cubans go .

We were told of the stick and carrot approach by the US in its effort

to negotiate with the MPLA the Cuban withdrawal . The carrot are US loans , bumanitarian assistance , US private investment in Angola and maintenance of the Clark Amendment to reassure the MPLA there would !

nothing for UNITA in the United States . The MPLA savored and swallowe each and every one of the carrots , and is yet to make one single

concession in these negotiations .

We do not know what the " stick " was

to consist of , por bas there ever been any indication to use it in th

process . But we have learned , from experience , that PORCE is the only language

the Soviet - Cuban -lPuA side readily understands and respects . Agains such an almighty adversary , an outright military victory by UNITA could never be easy ; but it is no longer impossible . We are getting stronger day by day . The negotiators should take advantage of this rather than attempting to reassure the MPLA that the ongoing peace talks may lead to the weakening or crushing of UNITA . We do not disagree with the need to continue efforts toward a negotiated

settlement . But negotiations that are based on unilateral refusal to use force when the other side seeks victory rather than accommodatior

may never succeed . To negotiate from a position of strength means

to possess and to be wiiling to employ all available tools , not exclusive of diplomacy , to achieve desired goals . And not all our goals are negotiable .

Despite the current wave of optimism about prospects for negotiated settlements , the fact is tbat peace in our area is as far away as ever . A veritable cease- fire in Angola must begin with a rapprochemen of the two main contenders

UNITA and KPLA . To circumvent UNITA in

this process is to misdirect the efforts towards a negotiated peace in the region . We understand the basic difficulty facing the negotiators : KPLA's paranoia about UNITA . But failure to bring about

direct negotiations between UNITA and MPLA will transform any seeming ly breakthrough in negotiations into a mirage of peace .

)

- 35 .

possesses the means to effectively lead successfully a negotiated effort toward these basic goals . We must The US

and only the US --

count on this , particularly when such goals are in everybody's interests of peace , stability and co - existence . But in reiterating

our faith in negotiations , we must also underscore our hope to see the US reassess its negotiating strategy to take advantage of existing favorable conditions created by UNITA inside Angola and to view realistically MPLA's long - held intransigence on the Cuban withdrawal .

DT GI1.I

DATE DUE

15 1984

MA

MARR

P20

082008

GAYLORD 234

PRINTED IN U.S.A

JUN 23 1990

NOV 2 1990

Ji

DT 611.8 DT 611.8 U57 1984

UNITA, daring to challeAJU3679 Hoover Institution Library

3 6105 081 565 538

457

1984