UNITA (União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola)

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UNITA

DT

611.8 B73 1984 COPY 2

] STANFOPUOVERRARIES INSTITUTION

UNITA (UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA )

TEXT BY : W. DÖHNING PHOTOGRAPHS BY : CLOETE BREYTENBACH

This publication, independently researched and compiled , was commissioned and published by KWACHA UNITA PRESS. 1984

STANFORD LIBRARIES

It is virtually impossible to talk even for

a few minutes about Angola without mention of UNITA — the Angolan re sistance movement that simply refuses to disappear, and which gains in stature by the day. But what really is UNITA ? How did it originate ? Who are its lead ers ? Who are its supporters? And more important, why is UNITA such an im portant factor in Angola today ? These are questions of vital importance to anyone interested or involved in

Angola's future. They are also ques tions which have wider implications for the Southern African region and indeed the entire continent. For as Angola

enters the most crucial period in its post-colonial history, it has become clearer than ever before that UNITA

will play a pivotal role in determining the course of developments in that country.

In a very real sense , Angola's destiny lies firmly in the hands of UNITA , and

it is UNITA that holds the key to the troubled country's future. It is precisely for this reason that it has become

imperative to know more about the formidable force that is UNITA today – an organization much in the news, but about which relatively little is known .

1

ANGOLA

OCATED on the west coast of southern Africa, Angola ranks 20th in the

L

world in land area and 71st in population . It is one of the richest countries on

the continent in mineral resources, notably diamonds , iron ore and copper. Nevertheless, its erratic economic progress since the departure of the Portuguese

has posed enormous barriers in achieving this potential . Although oil production has returned to near pre-war levels , other areas of the economy have experienced

varying degrees of stagnation . Many of the stores and shops owned by the Portu guese before independence have not been reopened . In an effort to offset the gap in skilled workers , Cuba has sent 5 000 technicians and helped to train Angolan workers in Cuba . Under President Neto , Angola moved toward complete state

control of the economy , including petroleum production and distribution. These policies have been continued by his successor, Jose Eduardo dos Santos .

CONTENTS

Page

UNITA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

5

PROFILE ON PRESIDENT JONAS SAVIMBI

7.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW OF UNITA

13

UNITA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY

25

THE UNITA LEADERSHIP

29

FOREIGN BACKING FOR UNITA

31

UNITA AND LEGITIMATE RULE IN ANGOLA

35

JAMBA : PROVISIONAL CAPITAL OF FREE ANGOLA

37

THE MILITARY STRUGGLE

45

GOVERNMENT BY UNITA : PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

61

ANGOLA UNDER THE MPLA : AN ECONOMY IN REVERSE

65

UNITA'S AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY

69

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN ANGOLA

73

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT SAVIMBI

83

SUPPLYING THE FRONT

87

CHRONOLOGY OF SOME IMPORTANT EVENTS IN RECENT ANGOLAN HISTORY

92

3

O

A tranquil scene in Luanda during the Portuguese era .

4

UNITA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

HE extensive publicity which UNITA has been receiving of late

T as the result of its spectacular mili-

tary advances against the incumbent

nineteen - sixties though of only spo- country that were capable of freeing themselves from foreign (Portuguese) radic effectiveness.

A year after the MPLA's foundation, a

domination. As a keen student of his

the

tory, Savimbi pointed out that George

second

resistance

movement ,

MPLA regimemaycreate the impres- Uniáo das Populacoes do Norte de Washington could not havefreedthe sion in some quarters that UNITA is a Angola (UPNA) was established in British colonies of America by fighting relative newcomer to the Angolan Leopoldville (Kinshasa) byHolden " from a base ofexile against an army Roberto

scene , a “ Johnny-come-lately ” chal lenger to the Dos Santos government.

.

superior in numbers and equipment”.

Revolutionary effectiveness was depen

The formation of the party in the dent upon transcending exile, In fact UNITA’s roots are buried deep Congo, and its original title referring returning home to fight. in the colonial past ofthe former Portu- specifically to northern Angola, were in

upon

guese territory, and its claims to belong fact indicative of the rolethe party with these considerations in mind to the mainstream ofAngolan national would playin thefuture of Angola. For Jonas Savimbi decided to establish a ist movements are every bit as histori the UPNA was to remain a party-in - third Angolan resistance movement cally authentic as that of the MPLA exile based in the Congo , drawing its one which would be self -reliant, based -

regime itself.

support exclusively from the Bakongo After several centuries’ involvement in people of northern Angola. The Angola, Portugal's hold on the largest "Norte” was dropped from the party's of its African colonies was challenged title in 1958, and in 1962 the Upa

inside Angola, and representative of all Angola's various ethno -linguistic groups. Accordingly, in March 1966 Savimbi hiked into the Moxico district

in the nineteen-sixties by armed oppo- changed its name to the Frente Nacio- of Angola, where he founded the sition from three main nationalist resis- nal de Libertacáo de Angola (FNLA), Uniáo Nacional de Independencia but Roberto's organization never suc

tance movements .

The

oldest

of

the

resistance

Total de Angola (UNITA ) at the village

ceeded in becoming anything more than of Muangai. Within months, UNITA a vehicle for the age-old aspirations of succeeded in organizing a campaign of

movements, the Movimento Popular de Congo Nationalism . Neither did the political and military resistance to Libertacáo de Angola (MPLA ) was FNLA prove at all effective in the mili- | Portuguese control in the eastern and

founded in Luanda in December 1956 tary struggle against the Portuguese. south -eastern areas of Angola. and Antonio Neto Agostinho Dr by several Marxist intellectual radicals of It was in fact disgust at the corruption, By the early nineteen -seventies, Portu

mestizo/mulatto (mixedblood)origin. inefficiency,inertia and “tribalism ”of gal’s position in Angola, asintheother Although the MPLA claimed to be a

the FNLA that drove its young Ovim-

the mestizo and “ assimilado ” com munity in Luanda, and to the Mbundu

self to the “ empty speeches” of the and manpower resources, and mount

Lusophone colonies, had become in

bundu foreign minister, Jonas Savimbi , creasingly untenable in the face of the genuine “ peoples party”, in reality its to resign from the organization in July growing effectiveness of the resistance support was limited from the start to 1964. Savimbi could not reconcile him- movements, the drain on her financial

people situated in the immediate exiled MPLA and FNLA leaders, while ing political opposition within Portugal hinterland of Luanda . After several

in the meantime the war against the itself. In July 1974, following the over

violent clashes with the Portuguese Portuguese inside Angola stagnated throw of the Caetano government by a military coup, Portugal announced that it was prepared to grant independence MPLA was forced to flee to the Congo | To Savimbi, it seemed axiomatic that a to Angola and an armistice was subse

authorities in Luanda in 1960/61, the completely.

(Zaire) and latertoCongo-Brazzaville, “ guerrilla army shouldlive and progress quently arranged with the three libera arranged with the three libera quently from wherethe party leadership orga- intotheinteriorwith thetotalsupport tion movements . nized a campaign of armed resistance of the population ”. In his view, it was against the Portuguese throughout the only the Angolan people within the On 15 January 1975 Portugal signed the 5

“ Angola is the key to the situation in Southern Africa, Angola will influence events not only in Southern Africa but in the continent as a whole .”

“ Some day the war will be over, and when it is over, we cannot remain a militarized people and be free at the same time.” 99

historic Alvor Agreement with the three liberation movements, in terms of which 11 November 1975 was set as the date for the proclamation of indepen-

up its already impressive political The course and eventual outcome of power base in the expectation of com- the civil war which ensued are well ing to power in Angola through inde- enough known backed by massive pendence elections, elections , the MPLA and Soviet Arms deliveries and the services

dence for Angola , until which time

FNLA , jealous of the universal support

enjoyed Angola was to be ruled by a Portuguese which UNITA enjoyed preponderant High Commissioner and a transitional numerically numerically preponderant

of Fidel Castro's Cuban expeditionary

from the the force, the MPLA succeeded in defeating from Ovimbundu Ovimbundu the UNITA /FNLA alliance which re

government representing all three people as well as other ethnic groups in ceived limited support from a few West

nationalist movements in equal propor: Angola began aa deliberate Angola,, began deliberate campaign campaignern countries including the Republic of tion . Independence was to be followed by the holding of national elections to

to build up their military strength with a South Africa. As the victors in the civil view to seizing power by force of arms. war, Neto and his coterie installed

determine which of the three parties In short, the MPLA and FNLA were

themselves in Luanda as the " represen

enjoyed the support of the majority of simply not interested in making the tative” government of the Angolan Angolans . transitional government work — they people , and UNITA and the FNLA

The Alvor Agreement accorded the preferred instead to settle their differ- were banished into the political wilder MPLA, FNLA and UNITA equal rights

ences by military means at the expense

ness .

and responsibilities during the build -up of the political option which had been to Angolan independence . In effect, all three nationalist movements enjoyed

offeredthem by the Alvor Agreement .

UNITA's defeat in the civil war was so

comprehensive that few people ex In February 1975 a rash of localized pected the organization to recover, equal legitimacy at this juncture, and conflicts broke out between MPLA and least of all the MPLA themselves. an equal opportunity to participate in FNLA supporters. In March and April Flushed with victory, the MPLA army the shaping of Angola's future.

The inauguration of the transitional government on 31 January 1975 was

Luanda itself was rocked by further violent clashes between MPLA and FNLA

commanders assured President Neto in March 1976 that the remaining

followers. In May all pretense at adher- “ pockets ” of “bandit” resistance would

greeted with unrestrained euphoria by ing to the Alvor Agreement was dis- be wiped out within a matter of days. the great majority of Angolans, who pensed with , and a series of bloody somewhat naïvely saw the way clear at battles erupted across the length and Displaying a resilienceand resourceful last to a smooth and peaceful transition breadth of Angola as both the MPLA ness perhaps unequalled in modern to independence after 14 years of con- and the FNLA scrambled to stockpile lived its military set-backnotduring the flict and chaos . massive supplies of armaments from the civil war, but (in contrast to the FNLA ) As it happened , the euphoria and opti- respective foreign backers . recovered to the extent where today it

mism proved

short-lived .

Literally In July 1975 Neto's MPLA forces sud- poses a serious threat to the MPLA,

within days of its inauguration, the denly turned on UNITA , which up to despite support for the latter from transitional government broke down in a climate of mistrust and violence .

The blame for this development must be laid squarely at the door of the MPLA and to a lesser extent FNLA .

this point had managed to maintain a approximately 25 000 Cuban troops. neutral stance between the two warring Nearly a decade after the end of the factions. By August the situation had civil war , the roles of the warring

deteriorated into a full-scale civil war,

parties in Angola have been neatly

with UNITA and the FNLA thrown to -

- UNITA is going from strength to strength , while the MPLA is fighting for its very existence .

While UNITA saw the transitional gether in an uneasy alliance against the government as an opportunity to build | MPLA . 6

reversed

PROFILE ON UNITA PRESIDENT JONAS SAVIMBI: GUERRILLA LEADER, POLITICIAN, STATESMAN AND POET

HE world has been witness to

T

some remarkable statesmen and

leaders in the twentieth century, men who have left their indelible stamp on the course of contemporary history that by virtue of their “ greatness” quality so notoriously difficult to define. -

In the Western World , leaders such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt,

Winston Churchill , John F. Kennedy and Charles De Gaulle , among others,

can be said to have possessed the stamp of true greatness . Africa itself has been rather less well

endowed in this century with leaders of international stature. Unfortunately it is a continent best remembered for

leaders of spectacular ineptitude such as Idi Amin and Emperor Bokassa , and maverick leaders like Col. Gaddafi. For

all this, there have been a number of

African leaders in the post-colonial era whose talents and charisma acquired them an international reputation in their lifetimes – men like

Kwame

Nkrumah, Abdul Nasser and Jomo

Kenyatta to mention but a few . Probably the most remarkable of all contemporary African leaders , how ever, is UNITA's founder and leader, Jonas Savimbi. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was born on 3

August 1934 at Munhango in the Moxico province of Angola . He was given a strict Protestant missionary upbringing by his father, Lot Savimbi. Jonas was educated at the Protestant primary school in his father's village , Chilesso , at the Dondi Mission School, and at

secondary schools in Silva Porto (Bie) and Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) . From an early age Jonas Savimbi displayed a keen intellect and a willingness to learn

Savimbi in uniform with the old UNITA rank insignia of a general.

7

and in September 1958 he was awarded Savimbi is not only an extremely honest “ Jaguar Negro Das Jagas” (meaning a scholarship to study medicine at the person, but also a strong believer in roughly the “Black Jaguar of the Hunt University of Lisbon . In 1960, under

honour. He abhors corruption and dis-

ers” ).

pressure from the Portuguese secret honesty and deals drastically with de Apart from his vast experience at a police, he transferred to Fribourg Uni- faulters in these respects. tactical level of guerrilla operations,

versity and finally to the University of Not surprisingly considering his misLausanne in Switzerland, where he

Savimbi is also well versed in the wider

warfare. During studied for a “ licencié”' in political sionary upbringing, Şavimbi is a deeply strategy of guerrilla before entering Angolan religious person, and actively promotes the nineteen -sixties he conferred with

science

nationalist politics full-time towards the religion among UNITA's ranks. He various experts on guerrilla warfare end of 1961. Savimbi initially aligned has, for example, been instrumental in such as Vo Nguyen Giap of North Viet the compilation of a UNITA hymnal .

nam and CheGuevara, and he has used

(later to become the FNLA), but in July He also often sponsors visits abroad by

this intimate knowledge of guerrilla

himself with Holden Roberto's UPA

1964, disillusioned by Roberto's ineffi- UNITA priests, and is very knowledg- warfare to good effect in turning the

ciency, corruption and tribal prejudices able on the Bible. It is his religious tables on the present-day Cubans in he resigned his position as foreign convictions, too, which have no doubt | Angola. Savimbi is also an avid reader minister of the resistance organization. contributed to the success of his family of military history, possessing an Two years later, in March 1966 , he life . founded UNITA.

A familiar observation made by people

incredible capacity for absorbing and remembering places, facts and statistics — andates, essential capability for

It is no exaggeration to say thatUNITA who have come into personal contact has owed its formation, growth , survi- with Savimbi is that he is a man of im any successful military leader. val and ultimate success chiefly to the talents and efforts of Savimbi. He has

mense charm , polish andcourtesy. He If Savimbi is well-versed in military is also extremely articulate and has a matters, he is also an equally adroit

been the elected President of UNITA very agile mind, qualities which imme- politician . It is largely his politicalskills

since its inception. Apart from his posi- diately come to the fore when he is and charisma which have enabled him tion as President , he is also the engaged in conversation or debate . Supreme Commander of UNITA's ar med forces (FALA)with the rankof ge- Impressive as Savimbi'spmay ersonal be , it quali is the. ties and characteristics neral , as well as being chairman of quite astonishing range of his other

to drum up the incredible support which UNITA now enjoys , not only from

Savimbi's own Ovimbundu people,but

also from all of Angola's major ethno UNITA's highest executive decision- attributes that really distinguishes him ling uistic communities . Prime among making body , the Central Committee.

from his more mundane run -of- the-mill

these political skills is Savimbi's extra

The UNITA leader is a member of contemporaries in Africa. For Savimbi ordinary powers of oratory– he is a capacity brilliant speechmaker with the

Angola's largest ethnolinguistic community, the Ovimbundu. Apart from a natural fluency in Umbundu, Savimbi is

is not only a guerrilla leader of renown ,

to sweep up the emotions of his audi

but he is also a statesman of interna

ence and hold their attention for liter

tional repute , a strategist , a skilled poli

ally hours phenomenal on end. Anotherreason for completely at home in several other tician, a supreme oratoranda poetand Savimbi's political popu languages,

including

Portuguese,

writer ofno little talent .

that he is a

larity in Angola is the fact English, French and German. Foreign Savimbi is unquestionably Africa's shrewd judge of the ordinaryman. J. A. journalists and media men who have interviewed Savimbi have invariably been impressed by his command of so many languages .

longest surviving and most experienced Marcum , the principal Western histo guerrilla leader. He has actively cam- rian on Angola , has rightly called

paigned in the field for over 20 years, Savimbi “ a crowd pleasing aggregator first against the Portuguese and since

.. with a capacity for telling people

Much of the respect which Savimbi 1975 against the Cuban -backed MPLA what they want to hear” . commands throughout Africa, and regime. During that time he estimates A facet of the mercurial UNITA leader much of his personal popularity among that he has walked at least 30 000 km . which is not well known is that he is a his devoted followers, stems from the Savimbi is a leader who likes to lead by and writer of considerable talent, rectitude of his personal habits and example . He insists on sharing the same poet having composed poems and written

characteristics. Savimbi has never been dangers, hardships and adversities as an exhibitionist guerrilla leader with a

several articles and books on UNITA's

his troops. As he stated during the early

penchant for outrageous uniform and yearsof the struggle against the Portu- struggle for freedom in Angola. other superficial personal paraphernalia. He is a man of sober habits (in fact he has an aversion to strong alcohol) , doesn't smoke and is always impeccably, but not flamboyantly attired . He is also extremely hardworking, rising

guese “ A guerrilla whotakes with him a camp-bed and tinned foods is incapable ofof winning the people's confidence and co-operation ”. It is this attitude, together with his refusal to become dispirited when things go wrong, which has

regularly at 4 a.m. and retiring near midnight .

won him such love and admiration from

his guerrillas, who refer to him as

In addition to all this, Savimbi is an

international statesman in the truest sense of the word. He has the capacity to think in global and strategic terms

and is extremely well informed and knowledgeable on international affairs – chiefly as a result of his travels, his avid reading habits , and the fact that he 9

President Savimbi is assured of an enthusiastic reception wherever he goes in Angola.

As a devoted family man, Jonas Savimbi's two youngest children are very important to him. 10

listens to news broadcasts in several

languages every day. So much so , that his opinion on various aspects of inter national affairs and politics is regularly sought after not only in Africa but further afield as well . Mention should

be made too , of the fact that Savimbi

personally knows and enjoys the re spect of the great majority of Black Africa's

leaders,

however

reluctant

they might be to admit this in public for political reasons . All things considered , there can be little doubt that Jonas Savimbi stands out

among the leaders of Africa today as a quite exceptional leader in every respect. He is a man of vision , great wisdom , and diversified talents

"truly a man for all seasons”. Not only Angola , but the entire Southern Afri can region, will derive immense benefit when the charismatic UNITA leader as

sumes his rightful place among the fore most leaders of Africa.

2

MUU

IN

I.

Savimbi in uniform with the new rank insignia of a general. 11

ETAPA DINÁRC

FALA troops at ease on the parade ground at Jamba .

12

AN ORGANIZATIONAL REVIEW OF THE UNIÁO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (UNITA)

HE commentaries and reports on UNITA which appear in the inter inter-

TE

lism ” with the cell — the basic unit of The most important legislative organ is the party

-

connected to an elected the national Congress, attended by

national media from time to time Polit Commitical Bure au and Cent Political Bureau Central ral Commitinvariably stress UNITA's military tee at national level by a series of vil-

elec elected ted representatives from all the kimbos under UNITA's control, during

achievements and activities, while little lage (Kimbo ), district and regional which the party policy and military mention is made of the movement's committees in between. The organiza- strategy is formulated . The President, extremely sophisticated political origins tion's political cycle revolves around Secretary-General, Permanent Secre structure and

.

annual conferences and national con-

tary, Chief of Staff etc are all elected at

gresses, held every four years, years, atat which the quadrennial Congress, as are the

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

In fact UNITA was founded in March

all the office bearers from the President downwards are elected.

1966 more as a broadly -based political movement than a purely military orga nization . Savimbi himself justified UNITA's foundation by referring to the

members of the 20-strong Political Bureau and 55-strong Central Commit

NATIONAL LEVEL

need for “ a new political formation " in

Angola , and UNITA's constitution , decided on at the founding conference, proclaimed that the movement would strive for a government proportionally representative of all ethnic groups, clans and classes. From the very outset , moreover, UNITA placed at least as much emphasis on “ politically educa ting " the peasant masses as on the mili tary struggle against the Portuguese,

and more latterly the MPLA. As far as UNITA is concerned, the objective of its struggle is not simply the military defeat of the incumbent regime, but also the winning of the sympathy of the population over to its side. For in UNITA's view, people are even more important than territory. Indeed , UNITA's philosophy is , and always has been, that military operations and political action are inseparable with increasing military success the organi

CONGRESS

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

POLITICAL BUREAU (20 members)

(Political bureau + 35 members)

REGIONAL LEVEL

REGIONAL COMMISSAR

DISTRICT COMMITTEE

-

LOCAL LEVEL

zation acquires increasing political and social responsibilities, and hence the need for a sophisticated political struc

VILLAGE ( Kimbo) COMMITTEES

ture .

UNITA's political structure is based on CELL

the principle of "democratic centra 13

under the direction of the President .

devoted their full attention the function mainly of intelligence towards the building of the Forcas gathering, transport and food produc

The post of President (held by Savimbi since UNITA's inception) is the highest

Armadas de Libertacáo de Angola (FALA ) into a truly formidable force

tee , which fulfil an executive function

have

tion.

“ compact guerrillas” are better authority in the party, and the Presi- with an increasing semi-conventional The armed and trained , and their function is

dent is also automatically commander- and even conventional capability. The to conduct unconventional (guerrilla ) in-chief of the armed forces (FALA) success of these efforts has been re and chairman of the Central Commit- flected, moreover, in the spectacular warfare (sabotage, ambush , mine-laying military progress which UNITA has etc) in fixed geographical areas (regions) . General administrative matters of been making of late . national importance are dealt with The FALA of 1984 is a far cry from the The " semi-regular forces” are trained during the annual conferences, at- disorganized rabble which constituted to operate as independent battalions

tee .

tended by the members of the Political

UNITA's forces at the conclusion of the which can be transferred from region to

Bureau and Central Committee .

civil war – it is a sophisticated force region as the need arises. The semi

At a regional level,the political inter- organized along conventional military regular battalions are geared to oper lines . It has a rank structure similar to

ests and affairs of UNITA's various that used in most armies (with militaryregions(of whichthere are 22 thatusedin most Western Westernarmies(with

ate as self -supporting formations, with

offensive and defensive companies, as

an officer corps ranging from lieutenant

well as artillery, logistic, medical and at present) are the responsibility of to general ) and a centralized staff struc- intelligence supporting elements. At political commissars appointed by the President (who often fulfil the role of

ture incorporating the usual functional

the beginning of 1984 there were 33

divisions of intelligence, logistics. FALA's High semi-regular battalions in FALA . regional military commander as well). personnel and operations, The political commissars in effect act as Command consists of the Supreme The ” are intensively trained“ regular troops, forces also designed to operate the link between the village and district committees on a regional level and the Political Bureau and Central Commit tee at national level .

On the whole the system works remark-

Commander (Savimbi) and a HQ staff battalioncapacity strength. The regular forces headed by the Chiefof Staff (Demos inhavethe to conductconventio thenos) and Chiefs of Intelligence , Per sonnel, Logistics and Operations . The central HQ is responsible for the over

ably well , and despite the long chain of all planning and co-ordination of the command the party leadership has been

war effort.

able to maintain close contact with the

a geographical level , isUNITA's interests and aspirations of its support On divided area into of operations in Angola

nal warfare in all but the most sophisti cated form , with special emphasis on anti-tank , anti- aircraft, and support

artillery capabilities . Finally , a number of “ special force ” units have been established recently.

ers at grass - root level . UNITA has been

These comprise highly specialized present troops a number which so the plagued otherof African which ofin military turn areregions grouped(attogether trained in the skills and artof elitism 22) avoid pitfalls able tohave sabotage/demolition , tracking,

political movements , and the party has undoubtedly remained true

to the

intelli into five military fronts ( southern , west gence and reconnaissance. The “special ern , eastern , central and northern ) each force” units are trained to operate in

democratic , populist principles upon

headed by a Front Commander with the

which it was founded.

rank of Colonel or Brigadier. The mili tary regions are headed by a regional Chief of Staff with the rank of Lt-

both a rural and an urban environment.

At the conclusion of the civil war in March 1976, UNITA had at its disposal

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

In contrast to its political structure , Colonelor Colonel.The various rewhich was characterized by remarkable gions are in turn geographically divided

fewer than5 000 demoralized guerrillas or " bandits " as they were called by the MPLA. Today , FALA boasts 2000

sophistication from the outset , UNITA's military organization was for

into a number (usually three) of sectors

many years , after the formation of the

in turn comprised of three zones 20 000 compact guerrillas and as many

headed by a Major, and the sectors are regular troops, 18 000 semi-regulars,

headed by a each Lieutenantor Captain. as35000 dispersed guerrillas. All in all, movement rather rudimentary. In the Theoretically zone consists of 50 it is a highly motivated and professional period leading to and the guerrillas, each sector of 300 guerrillas force. Angolan civil upwar of including 1975-1976. and the HQ of the regional staff of 150 UNITA's guerrilla force was relatively guerrillas . poorly armed , poorly trained , ill-disci

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

In the areas of Angola under the total

plined and lacking in an organized staff UNITA has developed a unique system control of UNITA approximately a of the country) UNITA has estab system or command and control struc- of categorizing the forces at its disposal third ture .

into " special", " regular ", "semi-regu- lished a sophisticated socio - economic

UNITA's defeat in the civil war, how ever , caused the movement to reassess

gories .

its priorities, and from 1976 to date Savimbi and the other UNITA leaders

14

lar”, “ compact” and “ dispersed" cate The “ dispersed guerrillas” are the least well trained and armed category with

infrastructure

which

amounts

to

nothing less than a state-within-a-state. In fact from the outset UNITA's con

cern has not only been with liberating

territory per se , but also with the socio- ( there are only two in UNITA's service primary production centres , 53 second economic upliftment of the people at present) and an equally critical ary production centres (totalling 25 000

living in these areas. As far back as shortage of good quality medicines hectares of arable land) have sprung up 1972 a UNITA spokesman aptly (especially antibiotics, painkillers and in UNITA territory. These secondary summed up UNITA's philosophy re- malaria antidotes) and medical equip- production centres are in reality pro

garding its respective military and so-

ment ( surgical instruments, operating tected settlements where villagers dis

cio-economic responsibilities as fol- tables , oxygen , bandages etc ). just all not above an Apart from the health service, UNITA lows: “ Ourof Army instrument power. Itis must

protect our educational work and agri- places a high priority on its education programme – at present the responsicultural co-operatives. To liberate ter bility of Col. Dr Vakulakuta Kashaka . ritory is not our prime concern , we want to liberate consciousness ”. Consistent

with

this

philosophy,

placed by the war combine their efforts with members of the local population to grow various crops and vegetables such as maize, sorghum , soya-beans , pump

kin , cabbage and potatoes. After their own needs have been satisfied, the vil

There are a total of 22 secondary lagers hand over the surplus food to schools in UNITA controlled territory. members of UNITA's army, FALA. At UNITA's Jamba HQ itself, more

also etablished a systematic UUNITA N has programme, UNITA has built up andan agricultural impressive grammar than 500 school pupils, while attend the medical, educational aboutprimary 1000 veterinary in terms of which the movement's many thousand

infra- structure in the territory under its children attend the secondary grammar cattle are vaccinated for lung-sickness, school . In addition , UNITA sends control.

students overseas annually to acquire heartwater, anthrax and foot -and

A fully qualified Secretary of Health appropriate university educations, so Services, Maj . Paul Chindombe , is re-

that when the organization assumes

mouth diseases .

Overall, UNITA's agricultural pro

sponsible for UNITA's medical infra- power in Angola itit will have have a nucleus gramme has proved a big success, to the structure . There is a hospital at of highly trained professionals at its disUNITA's Headquarters at Jamba posal. (which can accommodate about 250

patients) as well as five other central Agriculture is another field which receives a great deal of attention from hospitals in UNITA's liberated terri the UNITA hierarchy. UNITA has tory. The hospital at Jamba has a well launched a comprehensive agricultural equipped theatreforathernias, which amputations and operations appendicitis programme in recent yearswith theaim

extent that the movement is now vir tually self-sufficient with regard to its food requirements. A feature of UNITA's administration in the liberated territory which rarely

receives publicity is the organization's

strict preservation approach to the question of wild

and operations for hernias,appendicitis of achieving completeself-sufficiency life

. In other areas of

etc are performed on a daily basis.

produce enough Africa afflicted by guerrilla warfare, Apart from the central hospitals, foodi.e.to the feed ability not onlyto the60 000 guerril- various species of game and bird-life

UNITA has 22 regional hospitals and 189 clinics/sanitary posts in the wider las in the field but the entire population operational zones of Angola , served by under UNITA's control as well . Primary production centres — large, cena total of 2 500 medical personnel . trally controlled agricultural projects

have been decimated and in some cases totally eradicated. In UNITA's terri tory, however, the hunting of game (elephant, lion , buffalo and various

Impressive as UNITA's health services have been successfully established with species of buck) is strictly controlled are, the organization suffers from a the object of growing maize under irricritical shortage of qualified doctors | gation on a large scale. Apart from the

with a view to preserving the wild -life resources of the country.

“ We believe in building up leadership — not of one man , but of several."

“ If there had been elections in 1975, UNITA would have won, and if there are 99 elections today, UNITA would still win .”

15

The medical facilities at Jamba, although in short supply, are geared for most operations and ailments.

UNITA places a great deal of em phasis on the education of young and old. 16

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19

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Tobacco , maize and vegetables are just a few of the numerous crops grown sufficient with regard to its food requirements.

20

NITA's primary and secondary agricultural centres. Today UNITA is virtually self

21

-

22

MOTUS

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION

LUANDA -

BENGUELA

.

HUAMBO

QUICONGO

GANGUELA

QUIMBUNDO

HERRERO

LUNDA -QUIOCO

AMBO

UMBUNDO

XINDONGA

NHANECA- HUMBE

24

UNITA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY

HERE has traditionally been a It is this concern for the wishes and economic infrastructure .

T

great deal of confusion regarding rights of the people which explains not only UNITA's democratic approach to economic ideology and orientation . politics, but also the organisation's atto the of omicTÀprinc iplesnot During the Portuguese colonial era, the tach classment ical socia does lismecon . UNI UNITA's precise political and

movement's literature was full of revo- perceive any contradiction or clash be

In

effect,

therefore, Angola will have a mixed economy under a UNITA government,

incorporating “ capitalist” enterprises and concerns in a predominantly social

ist-orientated

economic

super-struc

ture .

lutionary Maoist rhetoric, but this was

tween its basic commitment to free economic ideologygeneral UNITA's political and can be explained more with a view to cultivating material enterprise (the movement has repeat- While in assistance from Red China than a sin- edly stressed that it will respect the cere terms of its commitment to " democratic rights beliefs

- Savimbi himself would be the enterprise) and its desire to provide for

socialism ” , the real key to any under

firsttoadmitthatduringtheearly basic population needs ofAngola'sunderstanding ofUNITA'sapproachtopoli developed of its existence UNITA sometimesyears had the , likefood ,cloth; found ofis in“ negritude its concept tics andinpolitical action fact to be ”,

to be pragmatic in order to survive.

ing, housing, education and medical

which forms

a central and recurring In fact UNITA is quite definitely anti- services, by the implementation of a theme in the movement's political writ

communist(as its track record against comprehensive socialist economic pro- ings. Particularly in theRepublic of the MPLA proves) both on the grounds gramme. South Africa, “ negritude ” has been that it doesn't work and that it is a UNITA's brand of socialism , however, misinterpreted as meaning that UNITA foreign ideology which doesn't belong

is far removed from the unrealistic and

in Africa .

doctrinaire

UNITA's political and economic ideo

which have proved such a dismal failure ism. In fact the concept “ negritude”

socialistic

logy is perhapsbest described bythe elsewhere in Africa. For one thing the term " democratic socialism " - a term

often used by Savimbi himself.

is racist and anti-white , or that it

experiments espouses a form of exclusive national

UNITA leadership has been careful to

cannot be equated with black national ism as such . Rather , it is a generalized

avoid raising the materialistic expecta- concept embracing all the organiza tions of the peasant masses in the event

tion's most basic political beliefs as well

UNITA has always attached a great of a UNITA victory. Unlike other Afri- as its political modus operandi . Savimbi deal of importance to democratic values

can liberation movements, UNITA has

has explained negritude in the follow

and the associated concept of majority not promised its supporters a luxurious ing terms: rule. Indeed,one of the principle goals lifestyle ( complete with mansions, cars a. Consensus is the basis of government of UNITA's current strategy is to force and swimming pools)after the "final and all forms of political action . theMPLA to agree to the holding of free victory”. Savimbi is a shrewd and realis b . Leadership is characterized by com national elections in Angola as originally tic enough politician to realize that

envisaged by the Alvor Agreement of nothing is more politically dangerous 1975. ( There have never been national elections in Angola ). In UNITA's view ,

promise at all stages.

than false expectations and promises c. Black Africa has its own culture which do not materialize.

the Angolan people should be allowed to UNITA is also quite prepared to allow

which has been subverted by various colonial powers, resulting in “ root

decide their own destiny by exercise of foreign corporations and governments their democratic right to elect a govern- to operate large, privately -controlled

past. Yet Africans do have deep

ment of their choice free from foreign interference Savimbi himself has gone

industrial and mining concerns in a post-war Angola . The UNITA lead

less" African Societies without a roots in Africa which must form the

basis of their culture without being exclusive .

on record as saying “ The important point ership realizes that foreign ( particularly is that the people must have a say, i.e. Western) capital and technical exper- d. Inter-statal relations in Africa must the government must be accountable to

tise will be needed in large measures to

be based on practical co -operation

the people .”

help re -build Angola's war-ravaged

between free countries, and not on 25

the unrealistic ideals advocated in In fact, both from a historical point of and armed and dictated to by the Soviet the concept of "Pan-Africanism".

view as well as from the perspective of Union .

African Government is the recogni

the current situation in Southern Africa, UNITA's credentials as a true

tion of the existence and importance

nationalist far superior orthe question UNITA's credentials as a the MPLA, areSWAPO those of movement to

of ethnic (tribal) groupings and sys

genuine nationalist movement? By no stretch of the imagination can SWAPO be considered UNITA's equal in terms One of the accepted criteria of “natio of the criteria discussed above. It has

e . The basis of any successful form for

tems .

Negritude, therefore, espouses a form

What of the other Southern African

organizations which so glibly call into ANC .

of Afro -centric populism — it is not so nalist movements" or genuine much a political ideology per se as a “peoples' movements” is that they must absolutely no permanent bases or liber

particular way of approaching the com- by definition be based inside their ated territory inside SWA/Namibia respectare plex problems of governing multi- country of origin .And the fact is that of SWAPO's claims in this all the " national movements " which fiction. Its top leaders wage the “ strug ethnic ex-colonial African societies. have existed in Southern Africa in the gle ” from the plush comfort of West Eu

In the final analysis, UNITA's political post-colonial era – the MPLA,FNLA, ropean and Eastern bloc hotels. Sam UNITA, FRELIMO, SWAPO , ZAPU . Nujoma's idea of a visit to the “ battle

and economic views can be summarized

as moderate, democratic , an amalgam ZANU , the ANC , etc —

ZANU , the ANC , etc — only UNITA front” is a flight from Europe to of certain features of both capitalism can claim to have based itself inside its Luanda — he occasionally ventures so and socialism , Afro -centric, and based country of origin from start to finish . far south as Lubango ! Moreover, SWA on the complementary principles of Apart from a few excursions abroad , PO's support inside SWA is largely compromise and consensus. This ap- Savimbi has conducted his liberation restricted to the Owambo people. It is

proachis neatlyillustratedbyUNITA's struggle, firstagainst the Portuguese thereforedifficult to seehowitcan views". onAstheSavimbi questionof“ non-align- and since 1975 against the Cuban- movement regard itselfin asthe atruenationalist liberation ment told an American sense of the term . backed MPLA regime , exclusively from

visitor to Angola recently :

“ Angola needs to be independent

inside Angola itself. As a result, AAs for the ANC , they too have no per UNITA has managed to consolidate manent presence inside the Republic.

in various matters ... but non-

political and military support over the

no-one alignment is relative can be totally non-aligned therefore UNITA's sympathy is with the West , in economy and politics. In other areas, national

ideas must be followed ."

If anything, this last statement summarizes UNITA's political and economic ideology in a nutshell. PUPPETS OR TRUE NATIONALISTS?

Like SWAPO , the ANC wages its “ libe

years among the various ethno-linguis

ration struggle” from the safe havens of

tic groupings throughout Angola to a

Lusaka and London . Like SWAPO too ,

degree unmatched by any of its rivals.

the ANC is dominated , controlled and

financed in remarkably puppet-like The facts, after all , speak for them- fashion by the Soviet Union and its selves. UNITA at the present moment Eastern bloc allies. At most the ANC undeniably enjoys the support of the has perhaps 1 500 trained terrorists scat majority of Angolans perhaps as tered worldwide ( compared to

much as 60 % of the total Angolan

teUNITA's r 60 000 guerillas, all of whom

population. It has liberated over a third of Angola and effectively controls

ments, moreover, have led to the ANC

are inside Angola) . Recent develop

another third of the country. It is per- being denied operational bases even

Among the more amazing ironies and ceived in Angola as the only genuine the frontline states – it is quite likelyin

contradictions of the Southern African

nationalist movement which has the

that most of the ANC's terrorists will

situation is the fact that the Angolan interests of Angola and Angolans as its never set foot in the RSA again.

nationalist movement UNITA enjoys first priority . The FNLA, on the one Given the above facts and statistics, it less esteem and recognition in interna paid the price ofthe “emigre” becomesapparentjust how hypocritical tional forums such as the OAU and the hand, has United Nations than do so-called " libe ration movements " like SWAPO and

the ANC, not to mention the MPLA re

gime itself. The MPLA regime, as well

or exile approach of its leader and is the approach to the whole UNITA now no longer considered a serious fac question in various international tor in the Angolan equation . The forums has become . Far from being a MPLA regime, on the other hand re “ puppet organisation ”, UNITA is the

as SWAPO and the ANC, are fond of mains a minority party – it has never only genuine nationalist movement in

referring to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA been able to expand its political power Angola, and an organization of infi movement as " bandits", " rebels " or

base beyond the “ assimilado's ” of nitely greater intrinsic merit than any of

“ South African puppets”. They present Luanda and the Mbundu people in the southern Africa's other “nationalist” or themselves

as

true

“peoples' immediate environs of the capital city. “ liberation” movements. Itis high time,

movements ", while at the same time

To the majority of Angolans , it is the

one would think , that the international

casting aspersions on UNITA's creden- MPLA who are the real “ puppets ” in community takes cognizance of this tials as a nationalist movement . Angola, kept in power by the Cubans / fact. 26

-

27

o

Secretary -General Puna and President Savimbi during the singing of UNITA's national anthem.

THE UNITA LEADERSHIP : NO LONGER A ONE-MAN BAND

T has often been said of UNITA that the UNITA presidency at short notice . it is merely a one-man band and that

the maintenance of good order and dis

Probably the most influential and cipline. Able to speak good English, Mulatto has

very strong personality

a in the event of the death or capture of its leader Jonas Savimbi the entire powerful figure in UNITA after Sa and commands a great deal of respect

the Secretary-General, Miguel within UNITA . vimbi isPuna, organization would folduplike a pack N’Zau who also holds the mili of cards.

tary rank of Brigadier. N’Zau Puna is a While this assertion might have been Cabindan , with Tunisian training in

Jeremiah (Jerry) Chitunda, presently

UNITA's chief foreign representative

trueofUNITA intheearlyyears ofits agronomy. As Secretary-General of based in NewYork,is another leading it is palpably nolonger appli- UNITA, N'Zau Puna is responsible for personalityand respected figurein existence, cable. For a number of very important the civil administration of the party, as UNITA . Educated in the USA , he is reasons, there is little doubt that the

well as for the overall co -ordination of extremely articulate and has built up an

UNITA of today would survive the sud UNITA's logistic and communications

impressive network of influential con

den loss of its leader .

tacts in the USA over the years. networks. Like Savimbi , Puna is a

In the first place there has emerged , superb orator, with the ability to sweep A good indication of just how effective over the long and arduous years of up the emotions of his audience. Puna the UNITA leadership as a whole has

has undoubted charisma, is very intelli- become is the fact that the organization

It is no exaggeration to say that UNITA has owed its formation , growth , survival and

gent and possesses a keen sense of humour. Apart from his native lang uage , Puna is able to communicate well in Portuguese and French, and passably in English .

claimed that he has the

Another important figure in the

genuine support of the

Savimbi has often

, Brigadier Demosthenos majority of Angolans f f Chie ofStaf ultimate success chiefly Chilingutila. As Chief of Staff, he is the at least he should be -

to the talents and efforts effective head of FALA, and specific ally responsible for training, account of Savimbi. ing, mobilization and recruitment. An

given the chance to

prove this at the polls.

Ovimbundu like Savimbi, Demosthenos

was formerly a corporal in the Portu

in Angola, and his spec- has continued to function efficiently guese artillery UNITA's struggle in Angola, a capable tacular rise in the UNITA military hier- and smoothly for several months at a

second echelon of leaders who , while

perhaps no match for the exceptional archy has been due in no small part to time during Savimbi's frequent visits his enthusiasm , dedication and will

UNITA President as individuals , never theless collectively represent an

abroad in recent years. In Savimbi's

ingness to learn.

extremely effective leadership in their The Permanent Secretary of the Politi own right. UNITA in fact takes the is sue ofcollective leadership seriously –

own words, " Even when I am away overseas ... I have no worries about

the campaign back home.” cal Bureau and Secretary of the Com

for Control, Ernesto Mulatto, is Apart from the individual qualities of the movement firmly believes in build mission an influential and efficient leader of the UNITA leaders, the fact that there ing up the leadership , not around one man , but around several .

long standing in UNITA . Mulatto hails has evolved a sophisticated leadership

There are in fact several top UNITA personalities fully qualified to assume

from Bembe in the north of Angola, structure with a number of specialized and his responsibilities include the arbi- political and military posts and func tration of disputes within the party and I tions is itself significant. The net effect 29

of this trend towards specialization is | election and appointment of UNITA's |omic organization, it has acquired its that the loss of any single member of leaders. The senior leaders are demo- own dynamic in the mould of modern the leadership (including the President) cratically elected purely on merit political movements the world over. In

would not be fatal to the organization inaccording to set procedures enshrined short, it is no longer simply a one-man the constitution - there is no likeli- band. as a whole — for every post there is an understudy quite capable of taking over hood whatsoever, therefore, of self the task in question .

destructive tribal conflict arising in

There are several other personalities in

UNITA's ranks when a new President

the UNITA leadership hierarchy who

The UNITA leadership, moreover, is has to be elected.

deserve mention for their above aver

extremely broad-based and representa tive of all Angola's main ethno-linguis tic groups (unlike the MPLA , which is almost exclusively comprised of assimi

age leadership qualities . They include:

lado's or members of the Mbundu

ethnic group ). While Savimbi himself is a member of Angola's largest ethnolinguistic group , the Ovimbundu, the Secretary -General is a Cabindan , the permanent Secretary a northerner, the Southern

Front

commander

is

Brigadier Renato Campo Mateus, a former officer in the Portuguese army

Savimbi is

unquestionably Africa's longest-surviving and most experienced guerilla leader.

a

Kuanyama, and another influential

figure, Smart Chata is a Chokwe from

Unquestionably, UNITA is no longer

and now Chief of Staff Operations;

Brigadier Samuel Epalanga,

com

mander of the HQ base at Jamba;

Brigadier Geraldo Nunda , commander of UNITA's forces in the north east of

Angola; Colonel Dr Vakulakuta Ka shaka, a Kuanyama who is UNITA's southern front commander; Brig. Al tino Sapalalo, Chief of Staff Logistics;

ColonelWambo Kassitu , Chief of Intel

eastern Angola . The overall result of dependent on the charisma and personligence; Jorge Sangumba, formerly this diversity in the ethnic origins of the ality of its President for its very exis- UNITA's chief foreign representative leadership is that “ tribalism ” has been

tence . As a sophisticated and highly

and now chief political administrator

completely eliminated as a factor in the developed political, military and econ- inside Angola .

Undeterred by the loss of an arm in combat, Brig. Sapalalo exhorts his troops to greater efforts .

SE

30

FOREIGN BACKING FOR UNITA — WHY THE HESITANCY ?

ERHAPS the most remarkable in the event , Savimbi succeeded in

P

a result of this discrepancy in the

feature of UNITA's long military securing financial and material backing amount and sophistication of war struggle in Angola is that theorga- from aavariety variety of countries ((chiefly chiefly the material received ), the flow of foreign

nization has never depended upon a USA , RSA , France and Morocco) to regular supply of foreign aid for its sur- sustain UNITA's war effort during the ensuing civil war. Even so, however, vival , successes and growth.

assistance to UNITA dried up com pletely , and the guerrilla movement was forced once again to rely entirely the amount of aid which UNITA re- on its own resources and ingenuity in its

In fact from the time of its formation in

ceived during the civil war period was struggle for survival against the MPLA. 1966 to the eve of the Angolan civil war insignificant compared to the enormous in 1975, UNITA received virtually no material foreign assistance whatsoever.

tonnages received by the MPLA and Beginning in 1978 UNITA did succeed , FNLA . The former is calculated to

thanks chiefly to the diplomatic and ne

This was due in large part to Savimbi's have have received as much as as 20 000 tons of gotiating skills of Savimbi, in acquiring philosophy of self-reliance. He be assorted weaponry by March 1976 from financial assistance and fairly substan lieved that UNITA should base itself the Soviet Union, Cuba and other tial amounts of arms and ammunition exclusively inside Angola (unlike the

from a consortium of African and Mid

Eastern bloc countries, while the FNLA

MPLA and FNLA ) and become self-

countries (countries which received by far the greater proportion dle haveEastern been mentioned in the interna

reliant in economic and military resources, quoting Mao to the effect

of the arms valued at $32 million do tional press from time to time in this nated by the CIA to the FNLA -UNITA

that“theenemyshouldbetheprincipal “ alliance”. In addition, the sophistica- regardinclude Egypt,Iranbefore the Shah's fall Saudi Arabia , Mo -

source of guerrilla arms” . Savimbi him tion of the weapons received by the

the Sudan). Senegal, Zaire Other, countries whichandarethought to self estimated that during the later MPLA in particular (including tanks, rocco

stages of the waragainst the Portu- art armoured

personnel carriers, 122 mm

have provided UNITA with a limited

guese , no less than 80% of whatever “Stalin Organ” rocket launchers, anti

amount of material assistance in recent

weapons UNITA did have were either

aircraft missiles , heavy artillery and

captured or stolen from the Portu- Cuban-piloted Mig 19 and 21 aircraft) years are France (through Service) the channels of the French Intelligence guese. Notsurprisingly, UNITA always wasfar superior theRepublicof South tothatreceivedby Africa. UNITA (chiefly personal weapons , ma had far more recruits than weapons. While this approach sufficed against the Portuguese, it was clearly insufficient

and

chine -guns, bazooka's and light mor- On the whole , however, the major tars) . Western countries have pointedly and

to ensure UNITA's survival in the In the immediate aftermath of Savim- consistently refused to provide UNITA chaotic civil war conditions which fol- bi's defeat in the civil war (itselflargely with any form of backing or assistance lowed the breakdown of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola early in 1975 . Somewhat belatedly, Savimbi realized that if UNITA was to hold its own

against the rival MPLA and FNLA fac tions, which at the time were busy accu

whatsoever. Savimbi's occasional visits to Great Britain and the USA have

It is clear that UNITA's been sponsored by private individuals

military successes in recent months have now

as opposted to the governments con cerned .

The reasons for this lack of Western

particularly American) support for of sophis- placed the movement in |(and mulating massive stock-piles UNITA are, to put it mildly, difficult to from their respective ticated weaponry

foreign backers , it too would have to

foreign assistance . Accordingly, in the latter half of 1975 , seek

material

à position to entirely | fathom. UNITAis a moderate, pro dictate the pace and nature of the war in

Western and democratic organization engaged in fighting an unconstitutional,

Savimbi embarked on a frantic last

autocratic, radical Marxist regime

minute search for foreign military aid :

propped up and sustained only by Cuban bayonets and Russian roubles —

for his forces.

Angola .

31

a regime which even the Carter admin- hesitancy with regard to UNITA's tive intervention in Lebanon. Unlike istration refused to recognise. In every respect Jonas Savimbi's cre-

cause in Angola? The lack of Western aid to UNITA is all

dentials for receiving American support the more difficult to understand when are more plausible and defensible than was ever the case with American sup-

one considers that UNITA is actually

the Lebanese intervention , moreover,

the advantages of a UNITA take-over in Angola (or even the gaining of a share in ,government) would be con tangible immediate and in siderable

port for Vietnam (or for that matter and againstdemonstrably the MPLA winning regime its and war its diplomatic, political, economic and

some of the regimes in central and Cuban prop. This should mean some southern America). Jonas Savimbi has often claimed that he has the genuine support of the majority of Angolans

thing , surely, to a nation like the Americans who have so often in recent

times shown an unfortunate propensity at least he should be given a chance to for backing “ losers ”. In Angola, a real prove this at the polls. Nor can it be chance exists of turning back, for the argued that the USA is still paralysed first time in the modern era , the hither-

by the “ Vietnam syndrome”

hence

the lack of support for UNITA . The Reagan administration has demonstrated that it is prepared to act decisively against Communist and Soviet interests in Grenada, Central America and the Middle East. Why then, the I

thanks to Savimbi's UNITA , presents

the West with a unique opportunity to turn the tables on the Soviet bloc, to

pay them out in their own kind. Inter vention in Angola, in the form of diplo

to inexorable world-wide advance of

matic and material aid for UNITA , rep

Soviet-sponsored Communism . The amount of material aid to UNITA required to finally and decisively tip the scales against the MPLA would, moreover, be negligible in comparison with, for instance, the expensive and abor-

resents a low risk policy alternative with potentially high rewards. As such , it is an opportunity which should be ex ploited immediately, if only because its equivalent is not likely to present itself | again in the foreseeable future.

Captured, mostly Soviet, weapons form the basis of UNITA's growing arsenal.

C53 24:22

32

military terms. In short, the situation in Angola,,

LINITA

IS THE ONLY RESISTANCE

AGAINST THE RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM IN AFRICA

34

4. 2

UNITA AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMATE RULE IN ANGOLA

support ofsome 25 000 Cuban troops to with a conveniently short memory, that is the legal and constitu- maintain Dos Santos in power. In there is little likelihood of the Angolan tional right of a given party to gov- accordance with the pattern which has has people themselves forgetting the the pattern

HE concept of " legitimate rule” GE

ern a country

-

has not surprisingly become all too familiar in the rest of unconstitutional manner in which the

lost much of its meaning in Africa dur- Africa, the minority MPLA regime has MPLA ing the last two decades as a result of discovered that it can remain in power Angola

regime came to power in -

if national elections are ever

wishes of the majority only heldinAngola.It isthisfactor above all frequent and ongoing revolutions, against the coups and civil wars which have racked by the brutal and repressive use of which is most likely to prove of decisive Itis after all precisely for this importance in the outcome of the elec the continent. So much so,that today in force. reason that the US Government has Africa the concept has come to mean

tions.

little more than the government of the steadfastly refused to recognize the MPLA Government – the Americans

day, whose legitimacy stems solely from

an exclusive monopoly of force. Few believe rightly that the mere passage of

African governments can justifiably lay time cannot in itself confer respectabil claim to any inherent legal or constitu- ity or legality on what is essentially an

tional “ right” to govern their countries illegitimate, non -representative govern ment .

apart from the right conferred upon them by the barrel of a gun.

The harsh reality of the situation is that the MPLA's right to rule Angola has

Nowhere is this more true than in

never been tested through the national

Angola. The ruling MPLA regime claims to be the “legitimate representa-

elections envisaged by the Alvor Agreement, while conversely UNITA

tive of the Angolan people” — yet it is has been denied the opportunity to test as illegitimate a government now as it

its claim to enjoy the support of the

was a decade ago when it unilaterally majority of Angolans. seized power for itself with the aid of cynicism Cuban arms. It came to power not With a breath -taking degree of and hypocrisy that was once the exclu through the ballot box, but through the sive preserve of the Soviet Union , the

barrel of a gun. A good indication of Organization of African Unity and the just how legitimate or representative United Nations, and indeed the inter the MPLA really is can be deduced from the fact that it requires the active

national community at large, insist on democratic elections and “majority rule " in SWA /Namibia and in the

The Alvor Agreement accorded the MPLA ,

Republic of South Africa itself, while at the same time completely ignoring UNITA's pleas for the holding of demo cratic, national elections in Angola . It

FNLA and UNITA equal been is no driven wondertothat Jonas Savimbi has ask bitterly “ Is black rights and

responsibilities during

majority rule something that matters only when it is blacks against whites ? ”

the build -up to Angolan independence.

Nevertheless, even if the MPLA's claims to legitimacy are taken at face value by an international community 35

UNITA's workshops at Jamba are equipped with power -driven tools which facilitate the easy repair, servicing and manufacture of a variety of vehicles, engines weapons and other artefacts.

36

JAMBA: PROVISIONAL CAPITAL OF FREE ANGOLA

OMEWHERE deep inside the sophisticated underground operations ers, barbed wire entanglements, mine and intelligence centre, which serves as fields, artillery and anti -aircraft em of south -eastern Angola the workplace for the HQ staff. It is placements, Jamba's sheer size would

S.

vast nahexpanse of flat, bushy savan-

the territory the Portuguese used to

from

this operations centre that alone present almost insuperable diffi

despairingly refer to as “the end of the UNITA's entire war effort is directed culties to would -be-attackers of the world” – lies UNITA's operational

and controlled by means of direct radio/

base .

Headquarters. Appropriately called comms links with the various fronts and Despite the “ permanency ” and sophis Jamba (meaning elephant) the UNITA military regions. tication of the facilities at Jamba , it is

stronghold sprawls over approximately Jamba is not surprisingly a very heavily significant that UNITA refers to the 100 sa

km of Angolan countryside.

Although the buildings aremadeonly

defended complex and would certainly be for theeversucceededin MPLA and Cubansa tough to cracknutifthey

complex only as the “provisional capital of free no Angola”. To UNITA, Jamba stepping clearly morethana -stoneis

of permanency mud , poles and grass, there is anis air of about Jamba which it- pinpointing its exact location. Sur to the real capital of Angola-Luanda self symbolic of the progress which rounded by a maze of trenches , bunk- | itself. UNITA has made in recent years in its struggle against the MPLA. Until 1980 the fluctuating military situation did not permit UNITA to maintain a per manent HQ at a fixed location . Since

1981 , however , UNITA's HQ has been

permanently located at Jamba .

Jamba is an impressive complex by any standards. It houses some 10 000 souls

in several astonishingly neat camps linked by an intricate communications system , each camp served by hot water and electricity and boasting kitchens, conference rooms and entertainment halls .

There is a primary and secondary school in the complex , several sports fields, and a sophisticated hospital with 250

beds.

There

are

also

several

workshops, equipped with a variety of generator-run lathes and drills, in which

vehicles are repaired and assembled, furniture is made, and captured weap ons serviced, repaired and “modified". In terms of military facilities, Jamba boasts an enormous parade ground for training and ceremonial purposes, a communications centre , and an ultra

tres

38

39

The parade ground at Jamba is the focal point of many of the activi at UNITA's provisional headquarters.

4

40

43

44

THE MILITARY STRUGGLE: SUCCESSES AND STRATEGY

1

N the early stages of its military cam- nent operational and training bases, in paign against the MPLA addition to safe logistic routes to the | (1976–1981), UNITA's military tac- various military fronts — both essential

say the least. One key town after another has fallen under UNITA con trol: Lumbala (formerly Gago Cou

tics reflected the usual approach of a prerequisites to the successful conduct

tinho) in November 1982; Alto Catum

guerrilla force confronted by a superior

of a guerrilla campaign .

bela (where 66 Czech and 20 Portuguese

conventional army that is to say , UNITA was careful to avoid commit

The acquisition of the “ safe” base areas

nationals were captured) in March 1983 ; Tempue ( Alto Quito) in April

1983; Munhango ( Savimbi's birthplace) enabled UNITA to go over to a totally in May 1983; Cangamba, after a set

ting itself to set-piece conventional con (the third stage ofthe guerrilla strategy) frontations with the MPLA and Cuban

forces who enjoyed a clear advantage new strategic phase in its military cam- piece conventional battle lasting 11 in fire-power as well as air support.

paign against the MPLA regime. Begin- days , in August 1983 ; Alto Chicapa, ning in 1982, and with the aid of newly- | Andulo and Cazombo in November;

Instead, intrue guerrilla tradition , established semi-regular units and bet- Cafunfo (where the British citizens UNITA concentrated at a tactical level

ter (mostly captured) equipment , the were captured) in February 1984; and on ambushes, sabotage ( particularly of UNITA forces ( FALA ) began to as Sumbe (Novo Redondo) for a short the Benguela railway line) , mine-lay sume a far more offensive posture . In period in March 1984. ing, long mortar bombard effect, FALA now considered itself ments etc, distance with a view to dispersing

A first -hand account of the dramatic re

further the already thinly-stretched strong enough to attack the enemy's enemy forces, to cutting the enemies strong-points, heavily defended posi: tionspreviously large towns and even the which sought Andit line of communication , and to confin- had to avoid.

versal of the military situation in Angola was provided by theBritish journalist who after spending Fred severalBridgland weeks ,with the

ing the bulk of the enemy strength to whereas previously UNITA would inthe defence of major towns and strate captured villages or

UNITA forces towards the end of 1983 ,

abandon gic installations. In the meantime, in variably towns in the face accordance with the first and second

MPLA /Cuban counter attack , the strat

stages of the classical guerrilla strategy

now followed was one of “ capture (as expounded byMao Tse Tung egy and -hold ". among others), UNITA concentrated

on improving its military hold on the The results of UNITA's new offensive rural areas of southern , central and strategy, which continued throughout eastern Angola, and on winning over 1983 (and indeed is continuing at the the sympathy of the population under present time) , have been spectacular to its control .

These tactics proved eminently success ful, and by the end of 1981 UNITA had

succeeded in its broad strategic aim of

acquiring total control over vast swathes of territory in south -eastern and eastern Angola as well as the vitally

A guerilla who takes with him a camp bed and tinned foods is

important central highlands, withthe incapable of winning the MPLA and Cuban forces in these areas restricted to the major garrison towns and mainly dependent on re-supply by air. In the rural areas under its control ,

UNITA managed to establish perma

reported that:

of the inevitable

people's confidence and

" It is difficult to convey adequately how total and sophisticated is the degree of UNITA military con trol, now extending to more than

a third of the country. Military bases, logistics bases , State farms, schools, hospitals and civilian vil lages under UNITA control are scattered throughout the area . Hundreds of trucks ply up and down the Savimbi trail carrying supplies right into the centre of

7

Angola. Rebel trucks move freely for many hundreds of kilometres

through Angola without any fear

of running into enemy mines or ambushes."

According to UNITA sources , FALA initiated no less than 3 373 attacks

co -operation .

against the MPLA /Cubans between December 1983 and March 1984, as

45

attacks

upon

UNITA. During the same period, a

At present, UNITA's overall strategy is to expand the total area of Angola af

total of 446 enemy trucks, nine trains and five tanks were destroyed by

ing new fronts We arefast approaching fectedbythewarbyopen in the north - west ( an important di

against

103

enemy

Small wonder that

the phase where the

amond mining region ), the northern

Jonas Savimbi declared recently “ We

correlation of forces,

border area with Zaire, and the coastal

are fast approaching the phase where the correlation of forces, until now in

until now in favour of

favour of the MPLA, will change and

the MPLA, will change

UNITA forces.

become favourable to UNITA . "

and become favourable A significant new feature of UNITA's

to UNITA .

military offensive in recent months has

been the infiltration of major MPLA held cities like Huambo and Luanda by

FALA's specially trained urban sab otage units the most spectacular example being the bomb blast in

Huambo on 21 April 1984 in which a large number of Cuban and Soviet offi

cers were reported to have been killed . UNITA's special forces have also suc ceeded in destroying several key strate gic installations such as dams, railway

bridges and power stations during the latest phase of its offensive. Not surprisingly, the morale of the

The only transport possessed by the garrison were two trucks with One prisoner, a Sergeant Andre,

military pressure is maintained by

commander of a platoon of 50 men , said three of his soldiers and

120 from the garrison as a whole had deserted. “ They were leaving because of hunger. It is three

Cubans or East Germans with

its disposal) has been severely curtailed

UNITA . He points out that already the deteriorating military situation has con fined the Cubans to the static defence

of major cities and strategic installa tions they are no longer employed in

months since trucks last reached

certed UNITA offensive (a difficult the terrain which has to be defended and the limited manpower resources at

quested to leave. Savimbi for one firmly believes that the Cubans can be pressurized into leaving Angola if the

plummeted sharply in the face of the military situation . deteriorating FAPLA's ability to withstand the con

enough task considering the vastness of

The intention is to place increasing military pressure on the MPLA regime , and especially its Cuban supporters, in the hope that the latter will leave Angola of their own accord or be re

out wheels ...

us with supplies. In many cases we were having to survive by stealing We weren't supplied regu larly with food because we had no

MPLA's armed forces, FAPLA , has

area immediately south of Luanda. ( The front in north -western Angola has in fact already been activated, as the British government has recently learnt to its cost .)

an offensive role against UNITA at all . Eventually, he reasons, a combination of military reverses and mounting casual

ties, diplomatic pressure , the unpopu larity of the war at home , general war weariness (the Cubans have been in

us . '

Angola for nearly a decade) and the As the military situation has deterio- ever-escalating costs of the war will rated for the MPLA , moreover, there leave Castro with no option but to with

by continuing food shortages and logis- has been a significant increase in ten- draw his expeditionary force. tic difficulties. Bridgland vividly illus- sion between FAPLA and Cuban trated the collapsing morale of the gov- forces. The FAPLA forces bitterly re At this point , faced with almost certain ernment soldiers in his account of the

sent the preferential treatment , espe- military defeat, the MPLA regime will

battle for Alto Chicapa on 29 Novem- cially with regard to food, which the be forced to negotiate a settlement with ber 1983 .

Cubans receive. They also resent the UNITA based on a transitional coali

fight UNITA in the countryside. The objectives which drove UNITA to arms

down to its last few tins of pork There was no luncheon meat

simmering tensions between the " al lies " has in fact exploded into open con

electricity. The power station generator was in working order,

flict on at least one occasion , such as

reluctance of the Cubans to leave the

national elections

relative safety of the major towns and

but there was no diesel fuel to

the three-hour gun battle between FA PLA and Cuban troops which occurred

drive it . There was no running

in the wake of the Huambo bomb blast

water because of the lack of elec

on 21 April 1984.

tricity to pump water from the

– ie precisely the

in the first place. “ If they (the MPLA) refuse to ne gotiate ”, says UNITA's Presi dent , " one more year will be suffi cient for us to bring dramatic changes to this country .” Given its past record, moreover, there is

river to the town reservoir. Toi-

All in all , it is clear that UNITA's mili-

no reason whatsoever to doubt

lets in the barracks and in the gra-

tary successes in recent months have

cious stucco colonial houses, OC-

now placed the movement in a position to entirely dictate the pace and nature of the war in Angola .

UNITA's ability to affect changes to Angola's status quo every bit as dramatic as those predicted by the

cupied by officers , were hideously blocked .

46

tion government and followed by

“ I suspect the battle for Alto Chicapa was over before it began . The garrison had no grain and was

UNITA leader.

A troops passing through a UNITA village on the way to the front.

47

Rivers like the mighty Cuando can often only be crossed with the aid of pontoons.

The flat savannah of south -eastern Angola is seemingly limitless in extent.

49

《 海

50

5

51

UNITA's dramatic military successes in recent years can be ascribed to a vastly improved level of training.

Joka . Ms.BA

(

auto Surinam

la

52

base

12

A

3000 FALA patrols are regularly encountered in the territory under UNITA control . 56

57

ANGOLA : SITUATION IN 1973 FNLA

3 CABINDA FNLA

AMBRIZ

LUANDA MALANGE

LUAU

LOBITO LUENA

BENGUELA

HUAMBO

MPLA

LUBANGO MOCAMEDES

MENONGUE MPLA

PORTO ALEXANDRE

MPLA

FNLA Area of operations MPLA Area of operations UNITA Area of operations

58

UNITA : OPERATIONS INFLUENCE AND CONTROL MAR 84

II

Political agitation

CABINDA

Operation Control

UIGE

LUANDA MALANGE

SAURIMO

MUSSENDA

LUCAOA

GABELA LUENA

GAZOMBA MUNHANO

LOBITO BENGUELA

CUBAL HUAMBO

MENONGUE NAMIBE CASSINGA

CALUNDO

RIVUNGO

XANGONGO ONGIVA

59

60

GOVERNMENT BY UNITA: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

T

HE prospect of a UNITA government in Angola is becoming less fanciful by the day . Before 1984 is

out , and certainly before the end of 1985 , there is every likelihood that UNITA will at least acquire a signifi cant say in the governing of Angola .

tem as the only handle of a government of national unity . UNITA firmly believes in demo cracy and wishes to establish a

The main objective of the judiciary system will be to defend human life as well as the physical and moral integrity of the people .

democratic society in Angola based

The administration of justice will be

imperative to know more about what a UNITA government would try to achieve in Angola. Upon what prin ciples would its approach to the com plex task of governing Angola be

the exclusive responsibility of the on the basic principles of modern constitutionalism adapted to the state . No one will be permitted to take the law into his own hands or to African reality . administer any form of private jus Angolans must be allowed to excer tice whatsoever. cize their inalienable right to vote to create legitimate permanent gov- ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS erning institutions in the country. AND MINORITIES

based ? How would UNITA approach

Only the people's support or sanc-

For this reason alone , it has become

the question of a national constitution , tion expressed by vote or consensus elections , democracy and politics in may establish the legitimacy of the general? What would be UNITA gov regime. ernment policy on education , the econ omy and international relations? And ON THE SUBJECT OF THE RULE OF what would be the UNITA position on LAW AND THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM issues such as religion, the judiciary, O UNITA advocates a state based and the rights of the individual? The upon the rule of law.

following

direct

quotations

from

O UNITA

undertakes

to

protect

minority rights, be they racial , reli

gious or ethnic. The peculiar social situation of Angola calls for har monious co -existence of all ethnic

groups and races that are the com ponents of the Angola nation . The state must protect the rights of all individuals without discrimina

UNITA sources, based on a selection of

O UNITA advocates a judiciary sys-

UNITA press releases and extracts from the recently published book The Angola Road to National Recovery, will hopefully go some way towards answering these crucial questions:

tem based on a constitutional and institutional framework of the fun

damental principles of the rights and responsibilities, privileges and duties, and equality of all citizens

tion based on class , political beliefs, sex , race, language or nationality . O UNITA considers the individual as the foundation of all judicial order,

committing the state and its institu tions to the pursuit of human dig

before the law .

nity, progress and well being.

REGARDING ANGOLA'S POLITICAL FUTURE AND UNITA'S POLITICAL BELIEFS IN GENERAL

UNITA struggles for a true national harmony through the formation of a government of national unity . While the government of national unity is

in power, which will be one of tran sition , and after the formation of a >

government elected by the people of Angola , UNITA will tolerate the

O UNITA adheres to the values of

liberty, equality and human dignity

Angola needs to be independent in various matters ... no one can

be totally non-aligned .. UNITA's sympathy is with the West, in

expressed in the Universal Declara tion of Human Rights. CONCERNING CIVIL LIBERTIES o Civil liberties must be the liberties

of all citizens and not just of some ; no citizen may be excluded from the national community against his own will .

existence of other political group ings, which is to say that UNITA is not a protagonist of a one-party sys

economy and politics.

To guarantee freedom and liberty is to ensure the protection and secu 61

schools insofar as the latter comply with the country's regulations .

The UNITA leadership has been careful to

avoid raising the materialistic

expectations of the peasant masses in the

event of a victory.

O All education must be free and

UNITA is the only

democratized.

THE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC

genuine nationalist movement in Angola. It

DEVELOPMENT

is high time that the O UNITA's basic objectives in the economic sphere include the attain ment of national self sufficiency in food products and other essentials, health care , clothing and decent housing

international

community takes cognizance of this fact.

rity of the citizens against the arbi O UNITA considers the agricultural sector to be the most important trary excercise of power . lever of the Angolan economy. In ON THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND

this sector UNITA guarantees pri-

THE PRESS

vate initiative with the minimum

Freedom to practise one's religion is a fundamental human liberty which the state must protect .

UNITA guarantees the freedom of creed and worship and shall protect

all religious institutions. O UNITA advocates the freedom of

necessary intervention of the state .

If agriculture constitutes the main base of Angola's economy, industry will be the catalyst, the main driving factor, for agricultural moderniza O UNITA advocates the private enter prise of Angolans and foreigners,

national, free and private press in

within the laws and policies of the

CONCERNING HEALTH

government.

O UNITA advocates the creation of a national issue and reserve bank side

Health care must be a right, not a privilege , of every Angolan citizen .

by side with the privately owned banks and insurance companies .

Health and medical care must there

fore be free to the people . EDUCATION

O UNITA advocates the participation of the State with private companies in the field of oil exploration in equal parts.

Education is the key to raising the level of production and the standard

national conciousness and increas

ing the national ability to cope with

modern day obligations in the inter national community .

62

political independence and protec tion against foreign aggression by all possible political and diplomatic means .

Socio -economic development will require interaction with the interna

tional community in a wide range of co-operation agreements, trade, diplomatic relations , friendship treaties and membership in interna tional organizations . O UNITA is for regional groupings , not only to deal with differences but also to devise common projects capable of boosting regional econ omic progress. O UNITA seeks adherence to the non

of livingof Angolans; in unifying the country and bridging social , cultural and class differences; in raising the

O UNITA's basic foreign policy goals will be the preservation of Angola's

tion .

the press and accepts the idea of a

Angola.

RELATIONS

Is black majority rule something that matters

aligned movement in its original spirit of true non-alignment in rela tion to the super-powers, to actively promote world peace and co -opera tion .

only when it is blacks O UNITA is for the establishment of

against whites ?

good relations with all neighbouring

UNITA shall guarantee the estab

countries regardless of their politi

lishment of official and private

cal systems .

NATIONAL ANTHEM

All children of Angola , From this Home of Heroes ,

The new Sun's rising Is calling us to gain Our freedom . The Africa of our ancestors

Is threatened by a new slavery We swear to defend it

With our bravery And let

The shout of negritude Prevail .

Angolans arise , Steadfast against the invaders. Hear the Voice of Africa

Coveting the land Of our forebears, our heritage. Attracted to these beautiful sands

Foreigners crave our riches Bringing us pain and misery . Great UNITA People Let's follow our ancestors And smite the enemy

Without mercy . CHORUS

ANGOLANS ,

We struggle for our Continent Build a nation

Great and happy , Guide and school The African Civilization

Under the symbol of our Flag , The Negro -African Socialist Republic of Angola .

63

Rive Kwongo r

PRINCIPAL CENTRES OF CASH CROPS AND MINING ACTIVITY CONGO re iver R

Ph

Zaï

Ka

Ri

sa

ve

r

i

Р

Mn

Р

ZAÏRE

Cu

Mn

Ft

「para

I Ph S

Rive Chicrapa

Cu

LUANDA

Dande River

er Riv go an Cu

**

S

*

UIGE

D

Mabubas: Dam

D

D

D

D

P.

MD Fe

Fe

D

Cu

Cambambe Dam MALANGE

Р

an

ATLANTIC OCEAN

i

sa

za

Fe

Mn

r

ve

s Ca

Ri

Fe

st' LOBITO

HUAMBO

Biópio Dam

田

BENGUELA

Fe

Lomaúm Dam

Catumbela River

ZAMBIA

Fe KASSINGO

er Riv o ng

ba

er Riv i bez

Cu

8

S

Zam

er Riv do an

Cu

MOCAMEDES

Fe

D

ner neve CuRi

Matala Dam

Calueque Dam Ruacana Falls INI

Okavango River

NAMIBIA (SWA)

Cu

copper

Р

petroleum

coffee

sisal

D

diamond

Ph phosphate

cotton

maize

Fe

iron

S

Mn manganese

salt

Jos oil palm

sugar tobacco

8

cattle dam

64

ANGOLA UNDER THE MPLA : AN ECONOMY IN REVERSE

decade ago Angola was one of Africa's brightest economic pro spects. Richly endowed with natural resources, it was the continent's

An equally important reason for Angola's dismal economic performance

second largest oil exporter after Nige ria, supplied one -ninth of the world's

of wholesale nationalization. In terms of the March 1976 Law on State Inter

diamonds, and was the world's fourth

vention , the MPLA nationalized vir

A.

in the post civil war period, however, has been the MPLA's economic policy

largest coffee exporter. It was also a substantial exporter of various crops such as sisal, palm -oil, sugar and to bacco to Europe and Latin America. Average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth between 1960 and 1974, at constant 1963 prices, was no less than

tually all the manufacturing and mining enterprises in Angola. At the same time the small-holdings of peasant farmers and the commercial farms and planta

tions of former Portuguese colonists were converted , in typical Marxists fashion, into centralized collective state

7,8 percent, one of the highest in the

farms. The disastrous consequences and folly of these policies has subse quently been recognised even by the MPLA's Minister of Planning, Lopo do

world .

Today Angola is an economic cripple. It imports 65 percent of its food re quirements. People with ration cards are forced to queue for hours each day to buy the few necessities available in

formerly produced by peasant farmers.

the government shops. Manufacturing

“Our mistake was not to have remem

output has fallen by an average of 12 percent per annum since independence, while overall GDP was actually 9,2 per

bered this well enough ... If we had

Nascimento . In a recent interview he

noted that most of Angola's food was

concentrated more resources on sup

porting the peasants we would have greatly improved the food situation . ”

cent lower in 1980 than it had been a decade earlier. The decline in GDP, ac

companied as it has been by a popula tion increase estimated at 2,4 percent

per annum, has naturally meant a sig nificant decline in the standard of living of the average Angolan . The major reason for the decline in Angola's economy since the MPLA take -over is no doubt the debililating

and protracted war with UNITA. (A war in fact of the MPLA's own making given its refusal to negotiate a just

The movement is

virtually self-sufficient with regard to its food requirements.

UNITA , for its part, firmly believes that it can improve on the MPLA's dis astrous economic performance. Savimbi and the UNITĂ leadership maintain that UNITA can make a sig. nificant contribution towards rebuild

ing Angola's shattered economy. Of course , UNITA's economic policies dif fer fundamentally from those of the

MPLA . If the present economic situa tion in Angola is anything to go by,

settlement with UNITA based on a

however, there would seem to be little doubt as to the relative merits of the

national reconciliation and elections . )

two approaches.

PRODUCTION TRENDS IN ANGOLA (Based on statistics from the Quarterly Economic Review of The Economist Intelligence Digest) DIAMONDS

OIL

IRON-ORE

COFFEE

SUGAR

100 % 88%

90

80

70

58,3 %

60

51,35% 50

40

30

22,01 % 20 10

0%

0% 1974

1981

WHEAT

1974

1981

J1973

1981

TOBACCO

MAIZE

1974

1981

COTTON

1970/71

1981

SISAL

100%

51,6% 42,85%

41,66 %

28,57%

13,15 %

0% 1974

66

1981

1974

1981

1974

1981

1974

1981

1974 1981

67

RA

ND

O

68

UNITA'S AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY

NITA may not possess an air suspended all flights over UNITA -con- In addition, UNITA's newly established

U

force, but this does not mean that the MPLA has complete freedom ofthe skies in Angola. Far from it. Despite a shortage of Anti -Aircraft (AA) weapons and missiles , UNITA's Air

trolled territory. Specially trained UNITA AA units, equipped with a variety of (mostly captured) AA weapons such as the 12,7 and 14,5 HMG (ZPU-2 and 4), triple-barrelled 20 mm

regular units are now supported by fully-trained and equipped AA batter ies. The net result has been a drastic in crease in the number (at the last count

5-7 per month) of MPLA aircraft shot Defence capability has improved to cannon and 23,65 mm ZU-23 as well as down mainly M18 and MI24 heli such an extent during the last two or SAM - 7 missiles, now operate at will copters, Mig 19 and 21 jet fighters, and three years that the MPLA has virtually I across the length and breadth of Angola. | Antonov AN-26 transport aircraft.

69

70

71

The foreign technicians, advisers, nurses, doctors, missionaries and priests who have fallen into UNITA's hands, sometimes with their entire families, have been of various nationalities. On release, however, the foreign nationals have attested without exception to the good treatment they received while in UNITA's custody.

72

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN ANGOLA: NO PLACE LEFT TO HIDE

IRTUALLY no part of Angola chiefly Portuguese, Czech , British, and by definition they cannot be regarded

V fensive against theMPLA,and there is

has remained unaffected by Filipino citizens but including a number UNITA's general and ongoing of- of Spanish, Argentinian Brazilian ,

as hostages. All that UNITA has demanded on occa

Italian, Polish , Bulgarian, Yugosla - sion from the governments of the

no mine, strategic installation or indus- vian, Swiss, Japanese,Cuban, Colum- foreignnationals concerned, is an as bian and American nationals .

trial town which is now safe from

surance that no more workers will be

UNITA attack .

sent to Angola UNITA naturally has sometimes wildly inaccurate specu- no wish to be saddled with the responsi There has been much confused and

During the last two years UNITA forces

have captured a succession of mining lation in the international media about bility of protecting foreign nationals and industrial towns in central , north- UNITA's motives for “ capturing” or every time that FALA attacks a town.

eastern and northern Angola, the most “ abducting” foreigners. Contrary to a That UNITA does not regard " abduc widely-held belief UNITA does not

noteworthy and widely publicized inci-

ted ” foreigners as hostages or wish

dents being the capture of the hydro- capture foreigners deliberately for the them any harm is a fact easily verified al at Alto Catumbela in purposes of obtaining publicity

electric complex

-called hostages invariably se, havethemselves, who,theon sotheirrelea Benguela province in March 1983 and though of course from UNITA'spoint by the attack on the diamond mining town of view publicity in the international testified good oftreatment re UNITA. they Typical of Cafunfo in Lunda province in Febru- media is a usefulby-product ofthis type ceived attothethehands

of operation. As Savimbi stressed dur ing an interview after the release of the

of the comments in this regard was the

Inevitably , foreign nationals working in British nationals in May 1984, “ Our aim

statement made by the Briton Robert

ary 1984.

various mining andindustrial towns (in attacking Cafunfo) was not to take Jones on hisrelease: "We have been the have become caught up in the fighting the Britons. Our aim was to attack the treated very well. The UNITA people At Alto Catumbela 86 Czech and Portu

town and destroy its economic infra- have taken, I think, every care under

guese citizens were removed from the structure , which is part of our general the circumstances that was possible. We town by UNITA soldiers and marched

strategy against the MPLA .”

through safe UNITA-controlled terri tory to the movement's HQ at Jamba.

have been very well looked after ." To

date only two foreigners (one Czech In fact the only reason that UNITA

concerns itself with capturing foreigners and UNITA's citizen) whileonein Portuguese custody,have bothdied of

(43 Portuguese, 15 Filipinos and 16 Bri- during raids on major towns is that the tons) were captured by UNITA and sent south to Jamba prior to their

much -publicized release. All in all

MPLĂ has in thepastmurdered foreign whom weresuffering from graveail capture .

nationals in the wake of such attacks

ments even prior to their

and then blamed UNITA for the atroci-

For all this , UNITA is unable to

ties. It has therefore become UNITA guarantee the safety of foreigners dur

nearly 300 foreigners have been “captu- policy to remove foreigners from the ing future raids on towns and installa red ” and then subsequently released by scene of fighting, for their own safety, tions in Angola. The escalation of the UNITA since 1979 following raids on towns and villages throughout Angola .

in order to prevent the recurrence of war alone makes this impossible. such incidents . Nor does UNITA regard

UNITA has repeatedly warned foreign

Most of the foreigners who have fallen the foreigners who are abducted in this workers to stay away from Angola for into UNITA hands have been skilled way as hostages. As Savimbi has rather their own safety, atleast until the war is

technicians, advisers , nurses , doctors, pertinently pointed out , UNITA does over when there will be time and oppor missionaries or priests . The “ captives”

not want anything in return for the re- tunity enough for them to help re -build

have been of various nationalities

lease of the foreigners, and therefore | Angola's devastated economy .

73

S R U

RI OLA E E N TFA A ECS2D PTOU

ÃO

NAC

74

O

NAO HA ARMA NENHUMANOMUNDO CAPAZ DE CALAR PARA SEMPRE AVONTADEDE UMPOVOT.

75

+

น 76

77

1

ID

78

79

1

80

British government representative Sir John Leahy with President Savimbi on the occasion of the former's visit to UNITA's HQ at Jamba in May 1984.

o

International newsmen interviewing President Savimbi on the occasion of the release of British nationals in May 1984 . 8

81

DO DE COMA !

RNA NÃO PASSARÁ SAVIMBI UNITA

82

i

D HÁ ARMA NANH NE ZUMA NO MUNDI

CAPA DE FAZER RE CALAR PARA SEMP ELL R VONTAD

DE UM POVA

is

SER NEGROND E ASSIMILAR SEM SER ASS

INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT JONAS SAVIMBI

[In July 1983 a prominent American po- it is not a new thing, it is part of our

tion

and

the Congress which is the

litical analyst visited UNITA's Head- own thinking to have a coalition gov- extremely powerful ... It is extremely quarters at Jamba and was granted an

ernment. We think it has to follow two

complex. We think we would like to

extensive interview by President Jonas steps. The first one , when the MPLA have a government at two levels, the Savimbi. The following is an abridged will agree to talk to UNITA, is a dis- Executive which is the Government, version of the key interview , which not cussion between MPLA and UNITA which will execute plans discussed by an

only reflects the official UNITA view

because we are the main fighting forces Assembly which will be the voice of the

point on many crucial aspects of the ... The second step is to bring in other constitutional | patriotic forces like the FNLA so that military, political and constitutional situation in Angola , but which also re- we have a government which will be veals much about the essential charac- representative. Then with time we may ter of the UNITA organization itself.] find other solutions , but for the time being we think these are the steps that Question : Mr President, what are must be followed. UNITA's goals for Angola ?

Answer: The goals of UNITA in Angola Q: What type of government would you are to support the total withdrawal of envisage by way of example ? Would it foreign troops which have entered our follow the traditional line of a democountry since 1975 so that the Angolan cratic government or socialist govern-

people ... on those two levels the

Assembly will represent the wishes of the people and the Executive will implement them . Q: How would the government be established and perpetuated ? In other words, would there be free elections,

how long would it be between elec tions? What are your views in that regard ? A: We think that the first step, as I said

people can decide their own destiny for ment or multi-party government? What before, is to have a coalition govern themselves. We want the Angolan are your thoughts along these lines ?

ment so that the coalition government

people to have an opportunity of hav- | A: By sayingthat it is a coalition gov can establish peace without which noth ernment it will be a multi- party govern- ing can be done. It may take some time ing a say in their own affairs ... to

Q: I see , then is one of your goals a

also have their say

As to com

is only within coali coalition government with the MPLA, munist or socialist we think that it must tion government that the possibilities of or is it your desire to have UNITA head parties be democratic for the fact that other n will ns have a say and a Gover sed electio will be discus . We will see the government, or what essentially parties will have a say and a Govern would be the role, if any, of the MPLA ment has to take into consideration how the situation develops. It is impor their views — it has to be a democratic tant that at one stage or another elec in a UNITA -led government? A: I think the situation in Angola is a government ... The people have to tions must be held in the country so that complex one. It is not comparable to choose their representatives so that the the people will know which party has the situation in other African countries Government will be accountable to the the majority. That does not mean the one which will have the majority has to because of the long wars ... This is people for their actions. fight the conditionsOurareviews why we cannot rule out the possibility Q: You are of course familiar with the when the minority. rightarein that the >

to ti

of a coalition government with the government structure of the United

MPLA and with otherpatrioticforces States. How would thegovernmentof countrywe willhave elections but the , as you see it, be compared with majority has totake into account the as theonlybodywhich first step... Inwent 1975outUNITA was Angola the of its way the government of the United Statesin positions and views of the minorities. to contact the FNLA , contact the

MPLA , in order to work out a provi-

sional solution which allowed us to negotiate with the Portuguese and

Q: The majority would then be the group that would elect the President and States A: The government of the United is extremely complex . I don't think that also the representatives of the people in it will work in Africa because you have their respective provinces? its structure ?

achieve our independence . That is why I an executive which is the administra- | A: The majority has to elect the Presi 83

dent , that is a fact, but the minority will Q: How would the government be whole . We have a lot of friends in Af be associated with the effort of the government because I think for peace to be totally established in Angola will take a long, long time . That is why the govern-

aligned ? Would it be in your view a govorica ... and we have a facility of estab

ernment that would be favourable to the lishing a dialogue with them . We want East Bloc as the present MPLA govern- to influence the countries in our area ment is or would it be aligned towards first of all, and then in the whole conti

ment has to be very careful in dealing the West Bloc or would it be a non-

nent , to see the sense that it is in our

with all the issues and not to rush solu-

aligned government?

tions ...

A: I think the present government has South Africa instead of violence. I am

own interest to find a dialogue with

Q: At the beginning would you envisage proven to bea failure. Angola is in the confident, I am positive, that this desire influence of the West and our economy elections to determine who would be the

will have a positive response from the

is organized in the Western type . This is other countries and I think even the

first President of Angola, should peace why we don't think that the next gov- front-line states will talk peace and co be brought about?

A: The problem with the President is not what concerns us most , it is the par ties. When peace is re-established in

ernment will be aligned to the East Bloc

operation .

as it is now , it has to be a little differ

ent. Even when we speak about non Q: Would the government of Angola as aligned government we have to realize you envisage it, permit SWAPO or other

our country there will be parties cam that non-alignment is relative . I don't anti-South African organizations to paigning in the name of their parties , think there is any country today that establish or keep bases in Angola ? not in the name of their Presidents . So A: No , by no means. I think when we can be totally non-aligned then any party which will have the ma

. Our sympa thy is towards the West because we

talk about peace in our country we

jority will nominate their President.

don't accept the economic and political want to also talk about peace in the

Q: How would the overall leader be selected once the parties have selected

methods of the East. There will be other areas where national ideas and

sive to want peace for ourselves and not

their leaders ?

interests must be followed .

peace for the others.

A: I think the parties will know exactly how they will appoint their President . The parties have their own structures ,

whole area . Then we cannot be exclu

Q: What would the Government's policy Q: Would the government allow Cubans or other non -African forces to keep

hbouring states such towardsZambia, its neigNamibia be Zaire, as and includ. military or military advisory forces in

their own statutes, it will be easy . I Angola ? think because of the animosity domi- ing countries a little more distant as A: No , that is the reason why we are

nating the Angolan political scene it is Botswana, South Africa, Mozambique fighting. I think it would be counter

dangerous to personify the struggle. and so fourth ? That is why we prefer that it will be on party level , not on a personal level .

productive to fight for those foreign

A: The policy of UNITA is to have very | troops to leave and then to maintain

good relations with all our neighbours them. We want to be really free from the Peoples Republic of Congo, those forces. Q: Let's take a hypothetical case. For Zaire , Zambia and Namibia , they are instance, if MPLA and UNITA were to all

agree to bring the war to a stop, so that we now have peace, and UNITA elected you as its President and MPLA elected Mr Dos Santos as its President,

want to have good relations whatever

ment envisage as its role in relationship apartheid policies of South

to the the the political system they may have ... to

We also want to have good relations Africa ?

with South Africa, so thatwecan make how would the person be selected that our views known to them and they will

A: It has been the position of UNITA ,,

and we state it very clearly, that it is a

would be the one President of the coun

make their views known to us. I don't controversial issue not only in Africa think that there is any gain in trying to but in the whole black community and votes that the MPLA on depend will : It A will avoid each other. Our aim is also to in the international community as a UNITA will have and the

try?

have .

***

have good relations with the rest of the continent and with the world .

Q: As compared to the total number of votes ?

A: Definitely

whole . But there are encouraging signs now that the present Prime Minister is making efforts to make serious reforms...

Q: I take it then you would try to en

courage trade and favourable relations Q: What is the UNITA position with

Q: So that if once having selected you

with South Africa if that were to be in

reference to the Soviet Union ?

as the candidate for UNITA and Mr

Dos Santos, hypothetically , is the can

the best interests of Angola even though the OAU by and large would oppose

We cannot ignore the Soviet Union .

didate for the MPLA there would be an

such a relationship ?

A : I think that Angola is the key to the overall election to determine which of A: these two people would be the Presi- situation in Southern Africa. Angola dent ?

A : This would be the idea ...

A: The Soviet Union is a super-power. We in UNITA don't ignore the Soviet Union . But we don't want the Soviet

Union to play the role it is playing in

will influence events not only in South- our country , because it is a dominating ern Africa but in the continent as a factor. It is a colonizing element that

84

we don't want. The day the Soviet | A: A third of the country falls totally Union is reduced to a diplomatic role , under our control and the zones which like any other country, it will be ac- are disputed make up two-thirds of the cepted as such . Your own country has country. diplomatic relations with them . All

when it was presented to the media it was as rebels and terrorists and it was

not really accurately presented. That is why the first thing that is needed is to try to open doors so that the case of

countries in the world except South | Q: Whatdo you envisage the progress of UNITA can be seen as a national resis the future future African may have relations with the the UNITA effort to be in the given the present conditions and aid Soviet Union ... UNITA is receiving and projecting those 0: Would that also be the UNITA posi- conditions and aid into the future at the tion

with

reference

to

Communist

same level ?

tance against foreign domination. Our war is part of the struggle for the survi of val of the West against the onslaught the Soviet Bloc and it is very important for us to have open doors to present

China?

A : We have a programme of trying to is important that people A: Yes, I don't think it is wise to ignore push north ... towards Luanda and our who case are ... in theIt position deci of taking such a huge country with such a huge towards the border with Zaire and in sions be presented with an accurate

population ... But I don't think all these questions of Soviet Union and China will be dealtwith overnight . Our first obligations will be to solve the

the area of Lunda which means the of UNITA, of Angola's situation Saurimo - Lunda diamond area . We view and of the Southern African conflict. have already reached the Zaire border Secondly , we need assistance in train but we need to push from Lunda to | ing more young people not onlyat uni

problems of Angola before entering | Uige into the coffee area up to the versity level but also at technical levels into discussions with Russia and Com- border Zaire with

munist China ...

. I don't think a

in agriculture , nursing, mechanics, be cause those are the people who can time enough aid , but I think with in- make the country run smoothly. resistance movement can have at any

Q: Would that be similar to the UNITA

UNITA will achieve better Another point is medicine .. many position with reference to the United creasing results ..aid . people are not getting any medical care

States ?

A: No. We want a good relationship

from the MPLA any more , and we have

with the United States immediately. ( Q: If additional aid, material and train They do notfallin the same category as ing were to be available, how would it

to care for them . We have to show them

Russia and China . The United States is affect the UNITA timetable ? our friend. With Russia we have to dis- | A: ... We have to work towards an end

that the next Government led by UNITA ... will be different from the

present one . We don't have enough

cuss, put conditions ... With the Chi- | to the war which has to come through medicine. Lastly, when wecome to the nese the same.But notwith the United direct discussions between MPLA and military situation, the MPLA still has States . The United States , with the UNITA . Increasing support to us can military superiority in the air because Western countries , will be the first friends we are going to let come with out any conditions.

hasten the willingness of the MPLA to talk to us .

in Angola in recent months?

you at this time or are they still main-

we don't have an air force . They use

MIGS and helicopters against civilians .

Q: Have you detected any willingness on They bomb areas with napalm. If we Q: What successes has UNITA achieved the part of MPLA to sit down and talk to could get anti-aircraft guns and missiles

A: I think they have been tremendous. taining an attitude of no contact? We consider 1982 and 1983 to have

to counter that superiority it would give more assurance to our forces. Another

A: Officially no . In official circles there point where we are still weak is in

been the best years in our effort at has even been a hardening of MPLA at- artillery. We need support weapons for liberating this country. We have achieved a lot of success not only mili

titudes towards the question of talking our forces and more anti-tank weapons. to UNITA .

Q: What is your overall view of

tary speaking, but we now control more

areas and get support from more Q: UNITA, I take it, is willing to sit UNITA's present status in Angola, and people in areas where UNITA had no down with the MPLA and discuss this what is your prognosis for the future, influence in the past ... There is a con the immediate and the long range? time? anyare. Yes, we are. stantdefection from MPLA to UNITA , matter A: Yes,atwe A: In the short term , we want to expand soldiers , cadres, leaders, people who guerrilla activity to the whole of

have accepted our view that foreign Q: What would be your shopping list if | Angola ... We want to reach this troops like the Cubans cannot be a sub

you were to be furnished with the equip- situation in a very short period of time.

stitute to national effort.

ment or the opportunity of obtaining

In the long term , we must work towards

Q: What approximately is the area equipment and /or training? direct negotiations between MPLA and under the control of UNITA without A: What UNITA needs now in additio- UNITA next year so that we can end any question, that is , where UNITA has

nal aid in order to find a solution to

the turmoil in this part of Africa and

complete domination and co -operation Angola is not only military equipment .

look forward to a stable Southern Af

rica where economic development will from the people and is accepted by the We also need diplomatic support people ? for a long time our war was isolated and I be our main concern . 85

34

3

86

SUPPLYING THE FRONT

Because of Savimbi's rapid advance on Luanda and increased gains to the north , UNITA drivers and mechanics have their stamina stretched to the limit

getting troops and supplies to the fight ing front. With around 700 trucks in service ,

around the clock trips over long dis tances on some of the most atrocious

tracks imaginable , present a logistical problem of considerable magnitude, according to Col. Bok, commanding officer Logistics at Likua, in the south . The

track

UNITA

from

head

quarters, Jamba, in the far south ,

through Likua , Mavinga, Cingamba and all the way to the Zaire province in the north , and towards Luanda in the

west, can be called Savimbi's own Ho Chi Minh trail .

Heavy loads, consisting mainly of provisions, war material and battalions of bushfighters, have to be transported over distances of up to 1 500 km along

bumpy, knee-deep sand tracks, through thick bush and across savannas .

Vehicles used are mainly Russian , of which the Star is most common . This in

itself presents a problem because no spares are available

-

some of the

vehicles have to be kept off the road to serve as stock . Breakdowns are fre

quent and usually in the most inacces sible spots. Drivers are lucky if they can snatch half an hour's sleep in 24 hours .

87

88

89

oo

90

1

3

HK

91

A CHRONOLOGY OF SOME IMPORTANT EVENTS IN RECENT ANGOLAN HISTORY 1956

December

MPLA founded in Luanda

1957

July

1958

UPNA founded in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) UPNA changes name to UPA

1961

Campaign of armed insurrection against Portuguese initiated by the MPLA and UPA

1962

March

Alliance of PDA and UPA in FNLA

1962

December

1964

July

Agostinho Neto appointed President of MPLA Jonas Savimbi resigns from FNLA /GRAE

1966

March

UNITA founded inside Angola by Savimbi Three-pronged resistance campaign against Portuguese rule in Angola by MPLA,

1966/1973

FNLA and UNITA

1974

1974

April 24 July

Military coup in Portugal leads to overthrow of Caetano Government

Portugal declares its intention to grant independence to its African colonies. An ar mistice is arranged with the three resistance movements

1975 1975

January 15 January 31

Alvor Agreement between Portugal and the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA

Transitional government consisting of MPLA , FNLA and UNITA representatives takes office

1975

March

Transitional government collapses as fighting between MPLA and FNLA breaks out in Luanda and northern Angola

1975

1975

July September/October

“ Battle for Luanda”. The MPLA oust FNLA and UNITA from the capital Full-scale civil war erupts in Angola with direct Cuban and South African interven tion

1975

November 11

1975

November 24

“ Independence ” Day . The MPLA unilaterally proclaims the People's Republic of Angola (RPA) Nigeria recognizes the RPA

1975

December 19

US Senate votes to prohibit further covert aid to FNLA and UNITA (Tunney Amendment )

1976

1976

January 26 February 21

US House of Representatives confirms Tunney Amendment RPA admitted as forty-seventh member of OAU

1976

March

Organized UNITA/FNLA resistance to MPLA collapses and the last South African troops withdraw from Agola

1976

April

Savimbi starts reorganizing UNITA's guerrilla forces in preparation struggle against the MPLA

1976

December 11

Angola admitted as the 146th member of the UN

1977

May 27

Attempted coup led by Nito Alves fails

1979

September 10 September 21

Death of Neto

1979

Eduardo do Santos succeeds Neto as President of MPLA

1982

UNITA intensifies its guerrilla canpaign against the MPLA UNITA adopts an offensive , semi-conventional military strategy against the MPLA

1983

The strategic towns of Alto Catumbela , Tempue , Cangamba , Alto Chicapa, Andula

1980/1981

and Cazombo fall to UNITA 1984

UNITA increases its military pressure on the MPLA regime as international pressure for the withdrawal of the Cubans and the holding of national elections mounts

92

DESCRIPTION OF THE FLAG

U

NITA's flag is a horizontal rect angle , divided in three equal bands , the first and the third

being red, and the middle , a green band . In the middle of the green band , from the right to the left, are engraved

the rising sun (red) with 16 rays and the singing rooster. INTERPRETATION

1. The upper red colour means the bloodshed of the Angolan People in the period of the Resistance Wars against the Portuguese Colonization ( 1482-1932) and in the following period up to 1961 . 2. The green colour means the hope and the unbreakable faith of the

Angolan People in the final victory of their fight against their enemies . 3. The lower red colour means the

bloodshed of the Angolan People , since 1961 up to now , the War of

National Liberation against the Por tuguese colonialism and now against the occupation by Russian imperial ism . 4. The black rooster means the awake

ning of the Peoples of Africa against foreign domination. 5. The rising sun (red) means :

a . The beginning of the Armed Struggle of the Angolan People , in general , in 1961 , and , in par ticular, the beginning of the Armed Struggle in the East (Moxico) by UNITA , in 1966. b . The unity of all Angolan People of the 16 provinces (symbolised by the sun) . c. The 16 Angolan Provinces rep resented by the 16 rays .

93

STANTORD SUBRARIES Tavoid 'fine, this book should be returned on

or before the date last stamped below

APR 26 1989

MAY 3 1990 WAR 2 4 2005

MAR 2 8 2005

!