The Nazi Holocaust: Volume 2 9783110970470, 9783598215544

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THE NAZI HOLOCAUST

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

Edited by Michael R. Marrus Series ISBN 0-88736-266-4 1. Perspectives on the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-252-4 2. The Origins of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-253-2 3. The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder ISBN 0-88736-255-9 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-256-7 vol. 2 4. The "Final Solution" Outside Germany ISBN 0-88736-257-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-258-3 vol. 2 5. Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe ISBN 0-88736-259-1 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-254-0 vol. 2 6. The Victims of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-260-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-261-3 vol. 2 7. Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-262-1 8. Bystanders to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-263-X vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-264-8 vol. 2 ISBN 0-88736-268-0 vol. 3 9. The End of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-265-6

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder Volume 2 Edited with an Introduction by

Michael R. Marrus University of Toronto

Meckler Westport · London

Publisher's Note The articles and chapters which comprise this collection originally appeared in a wide variety of publications and are reproduced here in facsimile from the highest quality offprints and photocopies available. The reader will notice some occasional marginal shading and text-curl common to photocopying from tightly bound volumes. Every anerrpt has been made to correct or minimize thir effect. The publisher wishes to acknowledge all the individuals and institutions that provided permission to repeint from their publications. Special thanks are due to the Yad Vashem Institute, Jerusalem, the YTVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, and the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, for their untiring assistance in providing materials from their publications and collections for use in this series.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The "Final solution" : the implementation of mass murder / edited by Michael R. M amis, p. cm. — (The Nazi Holocaust ; v. 3) Includes index. ISBN 0-88736-255-9 (v. 1 : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-88736-256-7 (v. 2 : alk. paper). — $ (set) 1. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) 2. Holocaust Jewish (1939-1945) — Causes. 3. Jews — Government policy — Germany — History — 20th century. 4. Germany — Ethnic relations. I. Marrus, Michael Robert. Π. Series. D804.3.N39 vol. 3 940.53Ί8 s—dc20 1940.53Ί8] 89-12249 CIP British Library Cataloging in Publication Data The 'Final Solution' : the implementation of mass murder. - (The Nazi Holocaust; v.3). 1. Jews, Genocide, 1939-1945 I. Marrus, Michael R. (Michael Robert) Π. Series 940.53Ί5Ό3924 ISBN 0-88736-255-9 v.l ISBN 0-88736-256-7 V.2 ISBN 0-88736-266^ set Copyright information for articles reproduced in this collection appears at the end of this volume. Introductions and selection copyright © 1989 Meckler Corporation. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written permission of the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in review. Meckler Corporation, 11 Ferry Lane West, Westport, CT 06880. Meckler Ltd-, Grosvenor Gardens House, Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0BS, U.K. Printed on acid free paper. Printed in the United States of America.

Contents Series Preface Introduction

ix xi

Part One: The Decision for the Final Solution Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism TIM MASON The Selling of Adolf Hitler: David Irving' s Hitler's War CHARLES W. SYDNOR JR Hitler Orders the Holocaust EBERHARD JÄCKEL Genocide: Was It the Nazis' Original Plan? YEHUDA BAUER War in the East and the Extermination of the Jews ANDREAS HILLGRUBER Hitler and the Genesis of the "Final Solution": An Assessment of David Irving's Theses MARTIN BROSZAT A Reply to Martin Broszat Regarding the Origins of the Final Solution CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING The Decision Concerning the Final Solution CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING The Realization of the Unthinkable: The "Final Solution of Jewish Question" in the Third Reich HANS MOMMSEN Planning for the Final Solution against the Background of Development in Holland in 1941 JOSEPH MICHMAN From Anti-Semitism to Extermination: A Historiographical Study of Nazi Policies toward the Jews and an Essay in Interpretation SAUL FRIEDLÄNDER

3 21 52 74 85

115 168 188

217

265

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VOLUME TWO

Part Two: Functionaries and Institutions of the Final Solution Implementation of the Holocaust: The Behavior of Nazi Officials FRED E. KATZ Persecution of the Jews, Bureaucracy and Authority in the Totalitarian State UWE DIETRICH ADAM The "Aristocracy of National Socialism": The Role of the SS in National Socialist Germany BERND WEGNER Alfred Rosenberg and the "Final Solution" in the Occupied Soviet Territories YITZHAK ARAD The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen ALFRED STREIM Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS: Himmler's Personal Murder Brigades in 1941 YEHOSHUA BÜCKLER Rollbahn Mord: The Early Activities of Einsatzgruppe C YAACOV LOZOWICK The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination against the Soviet Union JÜRGEN FÖRSTER German Railroads/Jewish Souls RAUL HELBERG The Government Experts CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING

353

373

387

412 436

456 471

492 520 557

Part Three: Aspects of Nazi Population and Jewish Policy Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory Sterilization, and the State GISELA BOCK Lebensborn and the Eugenics Policy of the Reichsführer-SS LARRY V. THOMPSON

575 601

Reflections On Genocide ROBERT JAY LIFTON Genetics after Auschwitz BENNO MÜLLER-HILL Madagascar—Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question L. YAHIL The Lublin Reservation and the Madagascar Plan: Two Aspects of Nazi Jewish Policy during the Second World War PHILIP FRIEDMAN Nisko: The First Experiment In Deportation JONNY MOSER Nazi Resettlement Policy and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish Question, 1939-1941 CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING Nazi Ghettoization Policy in Poland: 1939-41 CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING The Forgotten Part of the "Final Solution": The Liquidation of the Ghettos WOLFGANG SCHEFFLER

625 665 683

703 730

760 783

809

Copyright Information

831

Index

835

Series Preface The Holocaust, the murder of close to six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War, stands as a dreadful monument to mankind's inhumanity to man. As such, it will continue to be pondered for as long as people care about the past and seek to use it as a guide to the present. In the last two decades, historical investigation of this massacre has been unusually productive, both in the sense of extending our understanding of what happened and in integrating the Holocaust into the general stream of historical consciousness. This series, a collection of English-language historical articles on the Holocaust reproduced in facsimile form, is intended to sample the rich variety of this literature, with particular emphasis on the most recent currents of historical scholarship. However assessed, historians acknowledge a special aura about the Nazis' massacre of European Jewry, that has generally come to be recognized as one of the watershed events of recorded history. What was singular about this catastrophe was not only the gigantic scale of the killing, but also the systematic, machine-like effort to murder an entire people — including every available Jew — simply for the crime of being Jewish. In theory, no one was to escape — neither the old, nor the infirm, nor even tiny infants. Nothing quite like this had happened before, at least in modern times. By any standard, therefore, the Holocaust stands out While Jews had known periodic violence in their past, it seems in retrospect that the rise of radical anti-Jewish ideology, centered on race, set the stage for eventual mass murder. As well, Europeans became inured to death on a mass scale during the colossal bloodletting of the First World War. That conflict provided cover for the slaughter of many hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey, a massacre that Hitler himself seems to have thought a precursor of what he would do in the conquest of the German Lebensraum, or living space, in conquered Europe. Still, the extermination of every living person on the basis of who they were, was something new. For both perpetrators and victims, therefore, decisions taken for what the Nazis called the "Final Solution" began a voyage into the unknown. As the Israeli historian Jacob Katz puts it: "This was an absolute novum, unassimilable in any vocabulary at the disposal of the generation that experienced iL" For more than a decade after the war, writing on the Holocaust may be seen in general as part of the process of mourning for the victims — dominated by the urge to bear witness to what had occurred, to commemorate those who had been murdered, and to convey a warning to those who had escaped. Given the horror and the unprecedented character of these events, it is not surprising that it has taken writers some time to present a coherent, balanced assessment The early 1960s were a turning point. The appearance of Raul Hilberg's monumental work, The Destruction of the European Jews, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 stimulated debate and investigation. From Israel, the important periodical published by the Yad Vashem Institute [Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority], Yad Vashem Studies, made serious research

available to scholars in English. German and American scholars set to work Numerous academic conferences and publications in the following decade, sometimes utilizing evidence from trials of war criminals then underway, extended knowledge considerably. As a result, we now have an immense volume of historical writing, a significant sample of which is presented in this series. A glance at the topics covered underscores the vast scale of this history. Investigators have traced the Nazi persecution of the Jews before the implementation of the "Final Solution," showing links both to Nazi ideology and antisemi tic tradition. They have indicated how the Germans coordinated their anti-Jewish activities on a European-wide scale in the wake of their territorial conquests, drawing upon their own bureaucracy and those of their allies, enlisting collaborators and various helpers in defeated countries. They have also devoted attention to the victims — whether in East European ghettos or forests, in Central or Western Europe, or in the various concentration and death camps run by the SS. Finally, they have also written extensively on the bystanders — the countries arrayed against the Hitlerian Reich, neutrals, various Christian denominations, and the Jews outside Nazi-dominated Europe. The volumes in this series permit the reader to sample the rich array of scholarship on the history of the Holocaust, and to assess some of the conflicting interpretations. They also testify to a deeper, more sophisticated, and more balanced appreciation than was possible in the immediate wake of these horrifying events. The literature offered here can be studied as historiography — scholars addressing problems of historical interpretation — or, on the deepest level, as a grappling with the most familiar but intractable of questions: How was such a thing possible? *

*

*

I want to express my warm appreciation to all those who helped me in the preparation of these volumes. My principal debt, of course, is to the scholars whose work is represented in these pages. To them, and to the publications in which their essays first appeared, I am grateful not only for permission to reproduce their articles but also for their forbearance in dealing with a necessarily remote editor. I appreciate as well the assistance of the following, who commented on lists of articles that I assembled, helping to make this project an educational experience not only for my readers but also for myself: Yehuda Bauer, Rudolph Binion, Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, Henry Friedlander, Raul Hilberg, Jacques Komberg, Walter Laqueur, Franklin Littell, Huben Locke, Zeev Mankowitz, Sybil Milton, George Mosse, and David Wyman. To be sure, I have sometimes been an obstreperous student, and I have not always accepted the advice that has been kindly proffered. I am alone responsible for the choices here, and for the lacunae that undoubtedly exist. Special thanks go to Ralph Carlson, who persuaded me to undertake this project and who took charge of many technical aspects of iL Thanks also to Anthony Abbott of Meckler Corporation who saw the work through to completion. Finally, as so often in the past, I record my lasting debt to my wife, Carol Randi Mamis, without whom I would have been engulfed by this and other projects. Toronto, July 1989

Michael R. Marras

Introduction This section presents some of the important texts in the scholars' debate over the origins of the "Final Solution." Clearly, much less is known about the decision to begin mass killing on a European-wide scale than about its implementation. Given Hitler's secretiveness about the murder of Jews and his reluctance to commit his orders to paper, historians have had some difficulty tracing the precise course of decision making on the issue. But the range of difference among writers has narrowed as more evidence has come to light. All of the historians represented hoe see Hitler's personal role as extremely important; they differ, however, on whether they see European-wide mass murder as the result of a determined plan or of specific historical contingencies. They differ as well on the role of various agents in the Nazi hierarchy, and the extent to which the latter acted independently to initiate and to extend the process of mass murder. This section also offers the reader a glimpse of the murderous bureaucracy at work — what Raul Hilberg, dean of Holocaust historians, has called "the machinery of destruction." Various contributors have posed questions about the social and intellectual background of the perpetrators, and also the nature of administrative apparatus associated with the "Final Solution." These essays also illustrate the gigantic scale of the murderous enterprise, involving countless participants, from railwaymen to ordinary soldiers, from jurists to Foreign Office officials,fromthe civilian managers of ghettos to doctors carrying out the racial projects of the Third Reich. The Nazis mobilized an entire army of participants, and the study of what moved these people is one of the important challenges for historians of the Holocaust. Finally, several of these essays help set the Nazis' assault on European Jewry in the context of other population projects of the Third Reich. While not detracting from the singularity of anti-Jewish policies which has already been discussed, these contributions show how the 'Final Solution" fit within a wider framework of racist, mysoginist, and Social Darwinist enterprises, with often independent murderous results.

Part Two

Functionaries and Institutions of the Final Solution

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Implementation of the Holocaust: The Behavior of Nazi Officials FRED Ε. K A T Z The Johns Hopkins University Historical research has supplied extensive information about the stark facts of the Holocaust. It includes efforts both to document the full extent of the horror and to maintain a degree of objectivity and avoid undue sentimentality (Bauer 1978). The historical work includes, and goes beyond, chronicling the details of the murderous events. It points up unresolved—and possibly unresolvable—questions, such as the nature of the involvement and responsibility of European Christians. That issue involves, at one end, the accusation that Pope Pius ΧΠ was, at the very least, inactive in the face of a supreme moral challenge (Falconi 1970). At another end, it involves acknowledgement of extensive efforts by Christians to protect Jews, at considerable risk to themselves (Friedman 1980; Flender 1963). Above all, the historical research illuminates not only the extreme brutality but the immense scope of the killings and the highly complex administrative processes that were needed in order to accomplish so vast an enterprise as the effort to exterminate millions of people (Hilberg 1967; Dawidowicz 1975; Shirer 1960). Vast material and human resources had to be harnessed. To a great extent the existing administrative structure of the German nation was utilized to accomplish the genocide. Utilized, too, were ideological antecedents to Nazism, such as the Urvolk theme, and a highly systematized indoctrination of the young (Koch 1975). The administrative processes through which a nation enacts a program of genocide contain many sociological facets. Some of these are now beginning to be addressed. Horowitz (1976, 1980) has suggested that one needs to classify and analyze whole societies on the basis of whether they are acquiescent to genocidal practices—"whether and to what degree [a society] permits the official and arbitrary termination of lives of its citizenry" (1976:31). Fein (1979) has examined how the different German-occupied countries

0010-4175/82/3855-1596 S2.50 © 1982 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION

responded to Nazi pressure to enact extermination policies against their Jewish populations. The countries varied greatly in the extent of their collaboration and in the resultant execution of the Nazi policies of extermination. Fein's theory is that this is due to the fact that the countries themselves differed in the following ways: (1) The degree of German control. Where there was lack of resistence to the Germans, where there was much cooperation with the Germans, victimization of Jews was extensive. (2) The degree of social solidarity in the country before the war. If, before the German invasion, there was strong solidarity, with Jews being included, there was little victimization of Jews after the German occupation. (3) The extent to which Jews had been included in a common "universe of obligations" before the war. Where such inclusion of Jews was the general rule, there was little victimization during the German occupation. Fein, like Horowitz, is emphasizing the bearing of a nation's social structure upon genocidal actions. Wytwycky (1980) dwells on the fact that the Nazis conducted extensive extermination programs against a variety of peoples, not just against Jews. Gypsies, Poles, Belorussians, and Ukrainians suffered on the order of ten million killed through genocide, aside from those who died in military actions of the war. Wytwycky's work shows that the method of genocide—routine and efficient—was highly exportable. It was applied to different peoples, in different geographic regions. Sociologically, this fact demands that one seek explanations of genocide beyond that supplied by the unique circumstances of the Jews. Hence the present paper, although it concentrates on the genocidal persecution of Jews, attempts to raise sociological considerations that may be extended beyond the fate of the Jews. There exists even today a relatively small body of sociological research on the Holocaust. Indeed, it has been said that "there is in essence no American sociological literature on the Holocaust" (Dank 1979:129). The shortage may be due to the fact that when it comes to explaining extraordinary events social scientists operate under a severe handicap. As scientists we are inclined to look to the ordinary in order to explain the extraordinary. This means accepting the possibility that routine and mundane behavior can produce morally monstrous behavior, and that "extremist movements are not primarily the product of extremists" (Lipset and Raab 1978). Looking to the ordinary to explain the extraordinary is inherent in the paradigms of the scientist. But these paradigms can become highly suspect, even repugnant, to the public when addressed to events seen as morally outrageous and uniquely abhorrent. For many who suffered in the Holocaust or whose kinsfolk were victims, the Holocaust is an evil that is utterly unique. For them, focus on the "ordinary" cannot do justice to the Holocaust. Insights of the routine, the mundane, cannot compare with insights of the poet, such as Nellie Sachs, or the novelist, such as Elie Wiesel, or the numerous

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autobiographical reports that dwell on the uniqueness, the incomparability of the Holocaust to any other event.1 There obviously is need for a reconciliation between two realms, that of the social scientist sifting the ordinary for clues to the extraordinary, and that of the morally outraged human being. This essay tries to contribute to a reconciliation by a twofold approach. On the one hand, it attempts to develop scientific explanations; on the other, it attempts to link these explanations to the perceptions of laymen, where the monstrous nature of the Holocaust is only too real. Practically, this means taking "monster" perceptions seriously. Conceptually, it means Dying to understand how exceptionally violent behavior can be practiced routinely and can, in fact, be incorporated into the day-to-day workings of a bureaucratic apparatus. Processes that produce this result—the routinization and bureaucratization of extremely violent behavior—are the focus of this study. Stated differently, we seek to discover what patterns of social structure and what patterns of personal immersion in a social situation serve to implement the program of an extremist movement. Many analysts have recognized that bureaucracies have a potential for operating with moral blinders (Weber 1947, 1958; Merton 1968; Moore 1978; Kellman 1973; Silver and Geller 1978; Antonio 1979). The bureaucrat's focus on a particular task and particular work context can be accompanied by moral myopia. Considerations that go beyond the immediate task are apt to be ignored. Thus, in coping with problems of transporting Jews and Gypsies to extermination camps, or of the efficient use of wartime slave labor in munitions factories in the German Ruhr, the morality of killing people is obscured because it is beyond the particular bureaucrat's range of responsibility. In trying to comprehend this phenomenon, one needs to bear in mind that there was also a deliberate political campaign against the victims. They were portrayed as outcasts, as a species of lesser human, as vermin (Fein 1978). Doubtless this may have contributed to the bureaucrat's moral myopia as well as to the willingness to adopt extraordinarily cruel methods of killing. But one also needs to analyze the process of implementation, the process which carried out the political campaign, the process which acted upon the less-thanhuman presumption to annihilate people en masse. Research on social movements and on routinization offers leads. It also offers indications of where the gaps in knowledge lie, and where further conceptualization is needed. 1 Sociologists (and historians) are also aware of the strong disagreement aroused by Hannah Arendt (1968, 1976). She pointed to the ordinariness, the "banality" of evil in the life of Eichmann. Part of the disagreement with her work arose because of her theme that the victims contributed heavily to their own demise. That theme is certainly questionable, given both the actual Jewish resistance thai occurred (and not only in the Warsaw ghetto) and the overwhelming nature of the assault on the victims.

356 SOCIAL

THE "FINAL SOLUTION MOVEMENTS

The literature on social movements, particularly that on extremist movements, has moved from focus on a specific mind-set and other personal characteristics of a movement's adherents to focus on conditions in the social structure that have generated social movements. The social structure can produce conditions of considerable strain, which is fertile ground for extremist movements. This can happen when social conditions produce dislocated and dispossessed individuals who then become candidates for recruitment into extremist movements (Kornhauser 1959). Or, there may be relatively specific strains that are endemic to existing social structures and which also nourish the development of extremist movements (Lipset and Raab 1978). Both of these explanations are essentially "theories of mobilization" (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Zald 1979), that is, they elucidate how movements are generated and how they subsequently organize resources for achieving certain objectives. It has also been shown that existing conditions in the social structure influence the direction of social movements—whether, for example, such movements will be of the extreme right or extreme left—and the sorts of options that will be entertained within movements (Lipset and Raab 1978; Tilly 1964, 1978). Operating in the tradition of Durkheim, the sociological scholarship has emphasized the importance of 'social" factors. That is, much of what goes on in social movements is to be understood in terms of conditions outside of individual persons. There are social strains and dislocations, and social institutions can foster movements. These have input into the behavior of individuals who participate in social movements. Nonetheless there is a crucial insight in that earlier perspective which focussed on the person, one that must not be ignored. It is that individual persons carry out the programs of social movements. This is the case even in mass societies, where it is easy to lose track of the contributions of individuals. It is also the case in authoritarian societies, where leaders have overwhelming power. There, too, individual persons implement the programs. How, then, are individuals immersed in movements, especially in extremist movements that may demand violent behavior? How, in the course of mobilization, do individuals become linked to a movement? How do they participate after they are immersed in the movement? How do they manage to carry out violent programs, especially when these programs conflict with some aspects of their own upbringing? To these questions the present study addresses itself. ROUTINIZATION

OF

BEHAVIOR

Max Weber's work on bureaucracy remains the central bench mark for any study of routinization. He emphasized routinization of behavior in the

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bureaucratic context. He pointed out bureaucratic conditions that are conducive to harnessing human resources. Bureaucracies coordinate the skills of diverse specialists and functionaries in the pursuit of goals that are subdivided into limited discrete tasks. Weber left a legacy of looking at such routinization both microscopically, within the confines of specific organizational settings, and macroscopically, as a part of the values and institutional order of a society. Both are clearly recognized by sociologists studying social organization and social psychologists studying sanctioned massacres and other organized violence (Parsons 1949; Williams 1970; Smelser 1963; Lipset 1963; Kellman 1973). The miscroscopic legacy has led to the realization that individuals can be submerged in the context of organizations. The individual bureaucrat is apt to attach his morality to the discharge of assigned duties and not to the choice of ends (Milgram 1974). Means, rather than ends, dominate the bureaucrat's thinking and action (Merton 1968). An organization's objectives may be so fractionated into component parts that the end state is obscured, and that the question of performing good or evil deeds becomes irrelevant (Silver and Geller 1978). The individual working in a bureaucracy may simply not apply these kinds of judgments to his or her own activities. As Kellman (1973) noted, the capacity to be aware of evil in one's behavior is influenced by one's integration into a system of norms. And systems of norms are translated into concrete behavior arrangements—in one's work, in one's family, in one's community. In all of these one may, in Kellman's sense, become unaware of one's own evil behavior. Etzioni developed an important modification of Weber's formulation in regard to routinization. He worked out a scheme for clarifying compliance in bureaucratic and other settings. This augments Weber's rather exclusive emphasis on control and authority, and concentrates on those who are subject to control, on followers rather than leaders, on middle and lower echelons rather than top echelons (Etzioni 1961). Etzioni postulates three different sorts of compliance patterns—alienative, calculative, and normative—that are found in different sorts of social settings. Katz has suggested that each form of compliance also includes a characteristic form of autonomy, or discretionary activity (Katz 1968, 1976). The uses of autonomy are crucial to the functioning and survival of any social organization. This perspective will be applied to the behavior of Nazi functionaries. Blau (1955) demonstrated that routinization of bureaucratic activities does not preclude innovative activities. He showed that, on the contrary, bureaucratic functionaries (social workers, in this case) do innovate as a matter of course. The routine performance of their tasks includes, of necessity, a considerable amount of innovative activities. Yet these activities do not necessarily destroy the over-all orderly, bureaucratic setting in which they exist. Indeed, they can help sustain it. Routinization, one may conclude, includes not only

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definite controls, but definite sectors of autonomy. This theme is central to the following discussion. Before turning to some characteristics of Nazism that seem to promote routinization of violent behavior it is necessary to insert a note about antiSemitism. The focus here on the bureaucratization of extremely violent behavior does not mean to imply that the middle-level bureaucrats, the subjects of this study, were not anti-Semitic and filled with hatred for Jews. It is plausible to assume that many were indeed deeply anti-Semitic. But the theme of this study is that one can account for a great deal of extremely violent anti-Semitic behavior without a basis in personal hatred for the Jews. It is assumed that a particular form of behavior, such as the killing of Jews, may derive from a wide range of motives, not necessarily those of hatred. This does not absolve Nazi officials from culpability for their deeds. And it does not accept the view that the individuals were merely following orders, that they had no choice but to execute orders that came from above. Instead, it is postulated that in their roles as bureaucrats these officials had a significant amount of autonomy. They exercised considerable discretion in the course of their murderous activities. SOME C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S OF N A Z I S M : I N C R E M E N T A L

PROCESSES

There is every indication that the Nazis had no clearly worked out plans for the extermination of the Jews before the party came to power in 1933 (Bauer 1978). The extermination evolved in a step-by-step incremental manner. After the Nazi ascent in 1933, a progression of repressive laws against Jews was passed. These laws deprived Jews of an increasingly large number of rights, with each law more severe than its predecessor. Every new law was an increment in a cumulative process that culminated in Jews being deprived of virtually all rights of citizenship. For example, on 23 July 1938, a decree was issued that ordered all Jews to apply for identification cards, to be carried at all times (Dawidowicz 1975). A law passed on 17 August 1938 ordered Jews to adopt, as of 1 January 1939, particular Hebrew-sounding names (Sarah for women, Abraham for men). Such steps would serve to identify Jews readily when it came time to round them up for transport to the death camps. But since the steps were taken legally, they could serve to coopt, in an incremental manner, the legal machinery of the state. The gradual curtailment of rights eventually terminated virtually all Jewish rights of citizenship. This, in turn, was a crucial step toward the 1942 secret order directing the physical annihilation of all Jews in German-occupied territories (Schleunes 1970). The piecemeal nature of the legislative sequence deceived many, even many of the victims, into believing that the actual killing of Jews was unlikely to happen (Schleunes 1970). The series of ever more repressive laws generated a course of action so extreme that it might have

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proven unacceptable to the German people—and perhaps impossible to cany out—if it had been attempted in one single action, without the incremental build-up. In a well-known series of experimental situations, Milgram (1974) showed that people who are asked to follow instructions tend to do so, even if the instructions are to hurt cruelly an innocent person. They do this although the behavior may conflict with their own broader values. The participants in the Milgram experiments were asked to take pan in a scientific experiment. It may be argued that their compliance with the instructions was a way of expressing their respect for a countervalue, namely the value of scientific research. But why accept this value when it is believed to hurt innocent people in this situation? Why could the value of scientific research here supercede humane values prohibiting the injury of innocent people? Presumably these participants would not deliberately hurt innocent people in other situations. An explanation of the apparent paradox may be that people are able to separate behavior in a particular situation in which they may find themselves from behavior in other situations. It is a way of solving immediate problems— by accepting the regimen of the present situation—while giving little attention to broader issues (Silver and Geller 1978), or to long-term consequences. Here persons solve problems one at a time, dealing with what confronts them right now. Stated differently, immediate situations in which individuals find themselves can serve as catalysts for activating some values while deactivating others. The restriction of behavioral focus to the immediate situation can have very unexpected consequences. The behavior can become the increments in a cumulative process that has truly monstrous properties. Documented life histories of a number of the Nazi SS officials demonstrate this. Hannah Arendt's study of Adolf Eichman (1976), the study of SS officers by the British psychiatrist Henry Dicks (1972), and the analysis of 581 biographies of early Nazis by Peter Merkl (1975), bear out the gradual nature of their becoming immersed in the Nazi programs. For example, the young Eichmann, following failures in education and work, was about to join an organization of youths dedicated to pranks and totally unpolitical recreational activities, when a friend asked him to join the Nazi party instead (Arendt 1976). Eichmann did join, but he evidently did so without commitment to, or even real knowledge of, the movement's ideology (Arendt 1976). He advanced in the movement in a step-by-step sequence while retaining reservations about the murder of Jews. He had some Jewish relatives. He claimed, perhaps with sincerity, to retain loyalty to these persons. He even proposed different solutions to the "Jewish question"—notably, that European Jews resettle in Madagascar. But all this did not keep Eichmann from complete adherence to the Nazi program of destroying the Jews. That adherence meant his becoming a highly significant and even innovative functionary in the mass murders. Much of his

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activity was pursued with the view to furthering his personal career, rather than with an ideological commitment to hating Jews. His career was carried out in the context of the Nazi state machinery. To live effectively, for Eichmann, meant contributing to that machinery. Incremental processes are very common. On the American national scene, for example, we find a great deal of ad hoc action in national policy making, in steering the economy, in carrying out reforms of welfare systems, in reorganizing bureaucratic procedures, in adapting to international pressures. Ad hoc activity means, in each case, that one adapts to pressures by trying to find immediate, stopgap answers. One makes specific and direct responses to immediate issues, rather than developing long-term plans and carrying these out systematically. (I am not saying that ad hoc action is instrinsically bad or good. Ad hoc action can scarcely be avoided in a nation based on pluralistic politics at home, where pressure groups are easily mobilized, and on complex international alliances abroad, where coexistence with some strange bedfellows is a necessity.) It is not only the Eichmanns who develop their careers incrementally. In a study I did some years ago, it was evident that persons can enter into an occupational career by a series of localized, immediate decisions, and without any explicit commitment to that occupation at all (Katz and Martin 1962). For example, one may enter a nursing school because one's closest friend is attending that school, and for no other reason. One may continue in nursing school because it would be costly to drop out and start afresh in another occupation. One may then continue on and enter nursing as a profession. In this sequence there need be no special commitment to nursing. Yet a career in nursing is the result. And there is no evidence to suggest that such noncommitted nurses cannot carry out their profession fully, that they cannot be fullfledged, dedicated nurses. Nurses are not unique in this respect. In every occupation there are likely to be persons who enter the profession by this same unplanned route. They incrementally carry out activities that lead to that particular occupation. They make decisions on an ad hoc basis, without ever having committed themselves to be in that occupation. It is often assumed that a person who goes through lengthy occupational training is bound to pick up a commitment to that occupation during that course of training if a definite commitment to the occupation did not already exist beforehand. But this assumption should be regarded with skepticism. There are indications that persons can fully engage in an occupation without commitment to its core features. A particular teacher may not be committed to teaching, and yet be engaged in teaching. 2 Or a particular physician may not ; Sylvia Ashton Warner, a greatly honored teacher, reports in her autobiography that she had not real commitment to teaching and that she did not enjoy teaching (1979). However, one ι Ilustran ve example, such as this, tells us nothing about the prevalence of this circumstance.

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be committed to healing, and yet be engaged in healing.3 Each may have come to the occupation via an incremental process whereby the commitment to the core feature is minimal, at best. The real commitment may be, for instance, to careerism. And the career will, in tum, be embedded in a social context. Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS, represent extreme careerists. Both occasionally expressed misgivings about their murderous work. But this did not keep them from enthusiastically and inventively continuing in it. Himmler, while noting the horror involved in carrying out mass murders, proposed that SS members should not say, "What horrible things am I doing!" On the contrary, they should say, "What horrible things do I have to witness while carrying out my sacred duty! " (Dicks 1972; Crankshaw 1977). The emphasis is on the great contribution one is making to the sacred cause, to the immediate social context of which one is a part, especially by doing things that may be personally obnoxious. Incremental processes lend themselves well to the practice of deception. They were so used by the Nazis at every step to obscure the direction toward mass murder (Dawidowicz 1975:202). Deception even occurred at the decisive conference on 20 January 1942, where the mass killing of Jews was specifically decided upon and the methods chosen for carrying this out (Hilberg 1967:102ff.). Deception also occurred in the transportation of Jews to the extermination camps. For example, the victims had to pay a fare for the train trip to their "relocation" (Hilberg 1967:114). The individual increments—the acts of individuals inventing and executing ever more efficient forms of murder—are components of personal careers that are embedded in a social context. That context is, itself, a composite package that needs to be understood. SOME C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S OF N A Z I S M : P A C K A G E D

BEHAVIOR

Nazism was a package, a composite of very diverse programs.4 This package included extreme anti-Semitism, strong nationalism (including the hope to 3 A study of surgeons reports thai some surgeons have little commitment to surgery, but continue to perform it (P. Katz, n.d.). 4 The notion of a package, a composite of linked items that form one whole, bears similarity to Gestalt psychology. The Gestaltists, too, emphasized the "wholistic" unity of a setting, as against discrete and separate component parts of that setting. But the Gestaltists concentrated almost entirely on the psychology of perception, on how people perceive a situation. They did not dwell on the social organization of behavior that may accompany the Gestalt phenomena. In the present essay, by contrast, the social organization of behavior is the central concern. The idea of a package is also similar to the anthropologist's conceptions of culture configurations and culture complexes. By these constructs anthropologists emphasize the diversity of items manifested within cultures. But the manner and degree of amalgamation of the diverse items within a culture configuration or complex are usually taken as given, not subjects to be empirically investigated and conceptualized in a theory. The present study, however, seeks to examine the manner in which the diverse parts are amalgamated and, at the same time, the manner in which those parts retain a degree of separale ness

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recapture all the land that Germany had had to give up as the result of World War I), ethnicism (including the romantic master race theme), and economic development (including new career possibilities for many who had suffered in the crash of the 1920s). All these components tended to be extensions of older, existing German values that were then being sanctified and reformulated. The ideology of German nationalism, for example, was built upon Herder's (1744-1803) concept of Volk. In its early versions, Volk referred to an organic, natural family, in contrast to the artificiality of the nation state (Koch 1975:5ff.). It was subsequently reinterpreted by the philosopher Fichte, to point to unique German individuality. Nazi ideologists gave it added meanings, particularly those of the romanticism and superiority of the German master race. These were used extensively in the indoctrination of children in the Hitler youth groups (Koch 1975). Those persons who became leading figures among the Nazis were evidently attracted to different items in the Nazi package. It is likely that Julius Streicher, with his history of hatred for Jews, was heavily and primarily attracted by the movement's anti-Semitism (Crankshaw 1977). Eichmann was probably attracted by, and committed to, its bureaucratic career possibilities. Hermann Goering was apparently also attracted to its career possibilities, but on a higher level of seeking personal aggrandizement and power (Arendt 1968). All of them are likely to have seen at least one feature in the Nazi movement that offered links to something important in their own lives. Tilly (1964, 1978), Oberschall (1973), Zald and Ash (1966), and Zald (1979) have shown that social movements recruit not only drifters and the unattached; they also attract people with definite social interests and links, to which the movement caters. Fanatical anti-Semitism was part of the Nazi package. It was linked to a number of existing and past components of German national life. Dawidowicz (1975:220) writes: Layer upon layer of anti-Semitism of all kinds—Christian church teachings about Jesus, Volkist anti-Semitism, doctrines of racial superiority, economic theories about the role of Jews in capitalism and commerce, and a half century of political antiSemitism—were joined with the solder of German nationalism. . . Doubtless many a person was attracted to Nazism because of its antiSemitism, although the proportion of Nazis that fall into this category is not known. In addition, it is very likely that Nazism converted many members to anti-Semitism after they joined the Nazi party. A third category consists of those who joined the Nazi party and actively participated in anti-Semitism but who nonetheless may not have had a personal commitment to anti-Semitism. Indeed, anti-Semitic actions could be carried out, with great zeal and persistence, by persons who may not have had a personal commitment to antiSemitism. Their commitment was to some other components of the Nazi package and to the acceptance of the total Nazi package. It is conceivable that

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deeds of noncommitted anti-Semites—those who were committed to, say bureaucratic efficiency—may have been more pernicious than those of the committed anti-Semite. For example, there is some indication that Eichmann had no pronounced hatred for Jews when he joined the Nazi party (Arendt 1976). Eichmann claimed that he was not anti-Semitic. Toward the end of his life he stated: "An anti-Semite I never was—no!" (Hilberg 1967:106). It is by no means certain that his claim, as he understood it, was false. If one believes Eichmann 's denial of anti-Semitism, one is not thereby absolving him of responsibility for his behavior. This is discussed in the nract section. A belief that Eichmann's assertion may be true impels one to draw some powerful sociological conclusions about the nature of Nazism and, for that matter, about participation in other extremist movements. They include the possibility that people can be thoroughgoing participants in a program of action to which they do not wholly subscribe, and that people can be indifferent or opposed to some components of a movement's program, components in which they are actually engaged but for which their scruples are held in abeyance. Anyone who has served in an army knows that this is not a farfetched idea. Soldiers routinely disregard moral assessments of many aspects of their task of killing enemies. One should not be misled by the revulsion against killing that emerged among many soldiers in the Vietnam war. This was the exception rather than the rule. Usually military killings are carried out relatively unquestioningly. The soldier's moral commitment against killing ordinarily remains intact for nonmilitary contexts, that is, for the context of the civilian life package. While adhering to the total set of components of the package of military service, the soldier may retain scruples against killing, but they will be held in abeyance. In short, participation in killing does not necessarily mean a commitment to killing itself; people can be enthusiastic participants in programs to which they do not wholly subscribe. The unquestioning participation in mass killing was particularly likely when the killing was routinized, as it was in the gas chamber operations. When the method of killing was not routinized, the participants were very likely to express revulsion. 5 This took place when German soldiers, stationed behind the Russian front lines in 1941, were ordered to kill civilians and prisoners indiscriminately. In the course of his career as an SS officer, Eichmann evidently did not have great personal commitment to every item of behavior in the SS package of behavior. And this was true for other SS officers (Dicks 1972). Eichmann expressed fairly explicit reservations for some items (Arendt 1976). But nevertheless he, and the other SS officers, carried them all out. He expressed 5 Here, and in a number of other parts of this essay, I am greatly indebted to an anonymous reviewer of the previous draft.

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unhappiness about the decision to annihilate the Jews, but he displayed the greatest zeal in its implementation. He was accepting the entire Nazi package of programs. A variant of this pattern was exhibited by Rudolf Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, under whose command millions of Jews were murdered. In his diary, Hoess (1959) completely accepts the ' need ' ' to annihilate the Jews. He does so because he accepts the ideology that Jews were the ultimate enemies of Germany. Yet Hoess was able to maintain, to himself at least, that he did not hate Jews and that he was appalled by some of the cruelty exhibited by the guards under his command. In this situation, one component—namely, a particular ideology—so dominates that other components are largely ignored. Here, too, the entire package is accepted, even those components that are distasteful. The acceptance of an entire package while having reservations about some of its components is a paradox. Yet it is a common enough paradox. In the daily execution of their occupations, individuals may be highly committed to some aspect of the work and not at all committed to other aspects. Nonetheless, they carry on with their jobs, including enactment of those aspects to which they are not committed. The individual's real commitment is very likely to be one or another item among the total number of items that constitute the occupation's total package of behavior. And yet the total package of behavior is being carried out. Behavior packages can change. Individual items from one package can recombine with items from another package to form a new package. In a presently continuing study of social movements it is becoming evident that packages can indeed be changed (F. E. Katz, n.d.). Packages can be undone and the constituent behavior "repackaged." For example, in the 1930s followers of Father Charles E. Coughlin were involved in his package of populism and advocacy of fairly radical economic reforms, increasingly severe anti-Semitism, and political leaning toward the fascistic regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. But as the United States came to be drawn into ever firmer alliance with the enemies of Mussolini and Hitler, the Coughlin package became increasingly unacceptable to many of Coughlin's followers. That is, Coughlin's package contained one item—friendship toward Mussolini and Hitler—that came into ever sharper conflict with the official national policy of the United States. As war approached, a rival package emerged in full bloom. It was highlighted by loyalty to the country in time of emergency—as against supporting a potential enemy. The new package contained the components of military service, active economic and military help for America's European allies, considerable reorganization of the national economy, internment of persons of Japanese descent, and much more. This package was composed of some of the same items as Coughlin s package, such as nationalism, but they were assembled differently. That is, they were placed in conjunction with

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items which the Coughlin package did not include, and some Coughlin items were excluded altogether. For many of Coughlin s followers, the new package, with its highlight of nationalism in a state of emergency, was one they could not resist, and they abandoned Coughlin. To be sure, Coughlin's own package also included a large amount of nationalism. But that nationalism was contained within a package very different from that encouraged by the federal government. Nationalism was being repackaged. In a similar vein, some of the early appeal of Nazism was due to the fact that its program was a repackaged version of some existing themes of German national life, such as that of Volk, of German national exclusiveness. Highlevel army officers saw Nazism's fervent nationalism as something they could accept (Taylor 1953:59ff.). Nazism was not an utterly new series of programs. It did contain some new elements, but it was also a rearrangement of some existing ingredients of German culture, ingredients to which many were already committed. In short, individual items of culture may persist in the context of different packages. Similarly, too, when the Nazi youth movements were obviously winning a mass allegiance, some Catholic youth movements tried to repackage their own programs by including some of the Nazi items, such as paramilitary training and rifle practice. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAZISM:

AUTONOMY

How much and what sort of autonomy did Nazi officials have? Were they merely following orders, as many claimed when they faced trial for murderous deeds? Nazi officials were members of a state-organized bureaucracy. As bureaucrats, they were subject to administrative regulations and controls. During the trials of Nazi war criminals, accused officials frequently referred to these controls and to their own lack of discretionary power in carrying out orders. The focus on bureaucratic control leaves a crucial component out of consideration. Bureaucrats do have considerable autonomy. Sociologists have shown that bureaucrats can carve out autonomy for themselves even when administrative rules seem to allow little leeway for it (Blau 1955). They have also shown that many forms of autonomy are built into the structure of bureaucratic organizations (Katz 1968, 1976). Such autonomy is part of the very fabric of bureaucracies. It is just as basic to the continuing operation of bureaucracies as are the controls. When Nazi bureaucratic functionaries said they were merely following orders, they were hiding the fact that they had considerable amounts of autonomy. Their inventiveness in the course of their work, their flexibility when they wanted to be flexible, all demonstrated autonomy. To give an example: Eichmann displayed a great deal of ingenuity and adaptability in his work of devising ways of getting trainloads of victims to their final destinations. He

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was successful even during the latter part of the war when there was a severe strain on the German railroad system. At that point he made special trips to plead with this or that official who had insisted on using the trains to transport troops. His persistence even meant by-passing some of his own superiors. Indeed, at one point toward the end of the war, Himmler, who was Eichmann 's over-all superior official as head of the SS, ordered Eichmann to stop the transportation of Jews to the death camps. (Himmler had not suddenly become a humanitarian. He was concerned about the advancing Allied armies discovering the Nazi atrocities. He was also under pressure to yield facilities, such as trains and manpower, to the German army in the last ditch effort to stop the Allied armies.) Eichmann, however, sabotaged this order and continued to transport the Jews (Arendt 1976). Here Eichmann was clearly demonstrating autonomy in accomplishing what he regarded as the mission entrusted to him in his position. He was also demonstrating that the bureaucratic system allowed for considerable flexibility for devising means of reaching objectives. It had enough built-in autonomy for the individual functionary to be inventive. SS Major General Otto Ohlendorf similarly exhibited autonomy in implementing the mass murders (Crankshaw 1977). At the Nuremberg trials he admitted to killing over 90,000 men, women, and children on the Russian southern front. He prided himself, however, on the efficient and " h u m a n e " manner in which the killings under his command were carried out. He instigated methods whereby there was little delay once the victims knew what was in store for them. The killings were carried out with military precision and speed. Ohlendorf prided himself on thereby reducing mental strain, for both victims and executioners. Eichmann exhibited autonomy in his bureaucratic zeal even after his capture by Israeli agents. Using a bureaucrat's style, he collaborated to a degree that astonished the agents. For example, after his capture in Argentina, his captors asked him to sign a document acknowledging his willingness to be brought to Israel for trial. He insisted on composing a document himself, in which he expressed the intentions of the Israeli captors in far more formidable bureaucratic language than his captors had done (Harel 1975). Bureaucracies, Max Weber noted some sixty years ago, are effective instruments for getting complicated work done. They help coordinate the work of many different specialists. Priorities are arranged strictly so that objectives can be reached. Weber emphasized that bureaucracies were engines of social control, control geared to integrating and routinizing the work of many specialized functionaries. He was well aware that bureaucracies could be established for diverse purposes—for organizing military service, for organizing political administration of a region, for organizing a business concern. However, he probably did not imagine that his own country would establish a bureaucracy to routinize mass murder. He also did not imagine that the au-

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tonomy of bureaucratic functionaries could provide a crucial component for reaching murderous objectives. In granting functionaries a measure of autonomy in the interpretation of rules, bureaucracies provide a mechanism for rationalizing horrendous deeds.6 When functionaries need acknowledge only adherence to rules, they can disregard their own independent contributions to murderous behavior. They can, then, concentrate on "technical" problems (Hilberg 1967:57-59), on the means rather than the end (Merton 1968). In recognizing the bureaucrat's autonomy, where he or she makes an independent contribution, one is clarify, ing where personal culpability exists. When the Eichmanns invented ways of bringing victims to the death camps, they were operating within definite zones of autonomy. This autonomy was granted to them—and, to be sure, with ample encouragement to put it to use by the Nazi regime of which they were members. Within their zones of autonomy, Nazi officials enjoyed the exercise of much discretion. There they could, and did, innovate, elaborate, and amplify on the instructions they received. There, finally, lies their culpability. In the folklore about bureaucracy, the individual bureaucrat is merely part of the machinery. He bears no responsibility for his actions. He merely follows rules. He does not make them. This is, of course, a very inadequate view of what actually goes on inside a bureaucracy. But it served as a shield behind which many a Nazi official tried to hide. And it may have served not only for public consumption, as the bureaucrat faced other people and tried to justify his activities. It may have been even more important as a framework for self-deception. To themselves, bureaucrats could justify deeds, no matter how novel or resourceful, on the basis that these acts were merely the result of following orden. Those above oneself bear the responsibility. The bureaucrat could therefore continue to hold a conception of self that was completely at variance with actual behavior within the bureaucracy. Thus, Eichmann could say, with apparent sincerity, that he was not anti-Semitic (Hilberg 1967:106). During the Nuremberg trials, most of the Nazi officials, such as General Ohlendorf, exhibited an extreme version of the obedience-to-authority theme. They claimed that in carrying out the planning and execution of mass murders they were merely carrying out orders. Ohlendorf, for example, acknowledged during questioning by lawyers that he had had reservations about the morality of the killings. Why, then, did he carry them out? "Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out orders given by the leaders of the state." When asked about questioning the legality of the orders, "Ohlendorf replied, perplexed: Ί do not understand the question; since the order was issued by the superior authorities, the question of legality ' I am indebted to Carl Sheingold for this insight.

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not anse in the mind of [us] for [we] had swom obedience to the people issued the orders' " (Crankshaw 1977:141). The interpretation of the court, and of many social analysts, was that such s t a t e m e n t s were a denial of personal responsibility for actions that (a) demand m u c h personal initiative and (b) were so extreme that the orders, even if legally promulgated and delivered, should have been disobeyed. But this point of view does not adequately capture the sense in which Ohlendorfs autonomy was important to himself. The general's statement demonstrates that by obeying orders, even difficult orders, the officer is making a contribution to his status' honor, to use Max Weber's term. After all, has he not sworn to carry out orders? When would he be making the greatest independent— autonomous—contribution to the honor of his status, when carrying out orders that are easy or when carrying out orders that are difficult, even repugnant? 7 The same theme was noted by Himmler. In the speech to SS leaders cited earlier, he recognized the moral and emotional difficulties involved in participating in mass killings. He emphasized that by participating in such abhorrent activities, they were actually contributing to a "grand historic mission.'' Instead of dwelling on the horrible things " I am d o i n g , " they should dwell on the horrible things " I have to witness while carrying out my sacred d u t y . " They should regard themselves as killers making a contribution to their honor, and should take pride in that contribution (Crankshaw 1977). The bureaucrat who says he was merely following orders ignores his own originality in the course of his contribution. We have seen that the Nazi functionaries had considerable autonomy. The people at the top of bureaucracies have autonomy to make the big decisions. They formulate policies. But their underlings also have considerable autonomy, even when they claim that they do not. This is only too well known to anyone who has to deal with a bureaucrat. It is true that bureaucrats base their work on law, on existing rules, and on orders received from persons above them in the hierarchy. But could w ho

7 Kingsley Davis (1949:93-94) set the s u g e for this insight by distinguishing between prestige, the rank accorded a social position, and esteem, the evaluation of a particular individual's performance of the responsibilities in that position. H o w e v e r , Davis and a subsequent generation of scholars have emphasized assessments of a position and of an individual made by other persons, not by the individual who occupies the position. What is thereby omitted is that the position's occupant cao personally have a sense of contributing to the position's honor. This can happen (a) whether or not the position is itself ranked highly in relation to other positions and (b) whether or not the occupant is rewarded by esteem f r o m others.

Even a person holding a low-ranked position may have a sense of status enhancement, of contributing to the honor of the position occupied and, thereby, derive a sense of dignity. (The traditional English butler, proud and urbane, is an example.) W h a t is crucial is that the individual derives satisfaction not only from the relation of his position to other positions and not only f r o m the esteem of others. The individual can also derive satisfaction f r o m believing that he is making a contribution to the honor of his position In making such a contribution the individual m a y exercise considerable autonomy.

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they can carry out orders with zeal or, figuratively, they can drag their feet They can destroy the spirit of the law by insisting on the letter of the law. Or they can bend the letter of the law to achieve the spirit of the law. They can interpret orders in many ways. This behavior is common and " n o r m a l " in any bureaucracy. It involves using the bureaucrat's existing autonomy, the sort of autonomy that Nazi functionaires had in ample supply. When bureaucrats deny their own contributions they are practicing selfdeception. One need not be a monster to engage in such self-deception. Indeed, it is possible that many a bureaucrat indulges in it to some extent as part of the "ordinary" day-to-day activity. Yet ordinary bureaucratic behavior, like ordinary incremental behavior and ordinary packaging of behavior, can become an ingredient contributing to monstrous deeds. CONCLUSION

Sociologically the Holocaust is one instance of a genre of social behavior. Massive social violence is not unique. The Holocaust is unique only in its extreme amount of concerted violence. Implementation of the Holocaust depended to a considerable extent on behavior that is ordinary and mundane. As sociologists we begin by dwelling on the ordinary. Therefrom we may eventually extract and contribute knowledge that can curb transformation of the ordinary into the monstrous and the malignant. Some of the "ordinary" behavior that existed in the Holocaust phenomenon can be conceptualized as follows: (1) Clarification of where autonomy lies also clarifies where inventiveness, for good or ill, can be practiced. Knowing where an individual's autonomy lies clarifies where his personal culpability lies. The Nazi programs gave Nazi functionaries considerable autonomy. They used it to tailor bureaucratic techniques to a task, the attempt to annihilate a particular population, the scale of which had not been attempted before. Autonomy often goes unrecognized, even one's own. This can serve as a mechanism for rationalizing horrendous deeds. (2) A person's involvement in a social movement or in a personal career may result from a series of incremental decisions. These can focus on solving immediate problems, one at a time, without regard for wider concerns. This limited outlook can result in a lack of response to the moral issues involved in the total course of action by the persons who are, in fact, canying out that course of action. It is not known how many Nazi officials acted in such incremental fashion. Nor, for that matter, is it known how common incremental decision making is generally or how culture specific it is. But it is clear that Eichmann was not alone among Nazi officials in the incremental way in which he became immersed in executing Nazi policies (Schleunes 1970).

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(3) Nazism included a variety of political, economic, and racial programs which were amalgamated to form a cohesive package. Because of this amalgamation, adherents to one of the component programs were likely to implement the entire package of programs, even those programs to which they had no strong personal commitment. This behavior dovetails with the incremental decision process—in both it is a question of evaluating only some components of a larger entity in which one is, in fact, participating. The Nazi package of programs contained some new items. But since it was also a repackaged version of some previously existing themes of German national life, it could appeal to people by relying on previous affiliations and commitments. (Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978; Zald and Ash 1966; Zald 1979) It was a matter of repackaging existing allegiances rather than depending on entirely new ones. In this process some new ingredients were added, notably extremes of anti-Semitism. The new items became acceptable because they were part of a larger package, a package that promised revitalization of the national honor and the economy. The extreme anti-Semitism of Nazism was, at the same time, an incremental increase of the longstanding Western antiSemitism (Dawidowicz 1975); it was a repackaged form of earlier antiSemitism. The combination of behavioral autonomy, incremental decision making, and packaging of behavior helps to explain how some of the officials were able to participate in an extremist movement. They help explain, also, how these officials could engage in routinized mass murder. In future work, the great variation in the degree to which the different German-occupied countries cooperated in the genocidal process can be examined in the light of the concepts of incrementalism, packaging, and autonomy. Provisionally, and building upon Fein's work (1979), one can say: (1) In countries where Jews were previously defined as being outside a "universe of obligations," the ideology underlying Jewish genocide was but an incremental addition to an already existing orientation. It was not drastically new. The new ideology and its application in practice were therefore readily acceptable. (2) Where German control over the occupied country was strong, the German government was in a position to repackage the country's social structure, incorporating much Nazi policy in doing so. (3) Those leaders in occupied countries who favored the Nazi programs were given considerable autonomy to enact Nazi policies. Leaders who opposed those programs were severely restricted in the capacity to act if, indeed, they were allowed even to live. REFERENCES

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1976. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New YorkPenguin Books. Bauer, Y. 1978. The Holocaust in Historical Perspective. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Blau, P. M. 1955. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Crankshaw, E. 1977. Gestapo. Moonachie, N.J.: Pyramid Publications. Dank, Β. M. 1979. Review of "On the Edge of Destruction," by Celia S. Heller, Contemporary Sociology, 8:1, 129-30. Davis, K. 1949. Human Society. New York: Macmillan. Dawidowicz, L. 1975. The War Against the Jews, 1939-1945. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Dicks, H. 1972. Licensed Murder: A Socio-Psychological Study of Some S.S. Killers. New York: Basic Books. Etzioni, A. 1961. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. New York: Free Press. Falconi, C. 1970. The Silence of Pius XII, B. Wall, trans. Boston: Little, Brown. Fein, H. 1978. "A Formula for Genocide: A Comparison of the Turkish Genocide (1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-1945)," in Studies in Sociology, I, in R. Tomasson, ed. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. 1979. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust. New York: Free Press. Flender, H. 1963. Rescue in Denmark. New York: Simon and Schuster. Friedman, P. 1980. Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust. New York: Jewish Publication Society of America. Harel, 1. 1975. The House on Garibaldi Street. New York: Viking Press. Hilberg, R. 1967. The Destruction of European Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Hoess, R. 1959. Commandant of Auschwitz, C. Fitzgibbon, trans. Cleveland: World Publishing Company. Horowitz, I. L. 1976. Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. 1980. Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. Katz, F. E. 1968. Autonomy and Organization: The Limits of Social Control. New York: Random House. 1976. Structuralism in Sociology: An Approach to Knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press. n.d. "Social Movements." Unpublished study. Katz, F. E., and Martin, H. W. 1962. "Career Choice Processes." Social Forces, 41:2, 149-53. Katz, P. n.d. "Surgeons." Unpublished study. Kellman, H. C. 1973. "Violence without Moral Restraint." Journal of Social Issues, 29:4, 25-61. Koch, H. W. 1975. The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development. 1922-1945. New York: Stein and Day. Komhauser, W. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Lipset, S. M. 1963. Political Man. New York: Doubleday Anchor. Lipset, S. M., and Raab, E. 1978. The Politics of Unreason, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merkl, P H. 1975. Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Merton, R. K. 1968. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press. Milgram, S. 1974. Obedience to Authority New York: Harper and Row. Moore, B., Jr. 1978. Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt White Plains, N . Y . : Sharpe Oberschall, A. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Parsons, T. 1949. The Structure of Social Action. Glencoe, 111.: Free Press. Schleunes, K. A. 1970. The Twisted Road to Auschwitz' Nazi Policy toward German Jews. 1933-1939. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Shirer, W . L. 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich New York: Simon and Schuster. Silver, M . , and Geller, D. 1978. " O n the Irrelevance of Evil: The Organization and Individual Action. " Journal of Social Issues. 34:4, 125-36. Smelser, N. 1963. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press. Taylor, T . 1953. Sword and Swastika. London: V. Gollancz. Tilly, C. 1964. The Vendee. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Warner, S. 1979. I Passed this Way. New York: Knopf. Weber, M . 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, T. Parsons, trans. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. trans. New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, R . , Jr. 1970. American Society·. New York: Knopf. Wytwycky, B. 1980. The Other Holocaust: Many Circles of Hell. Washington. D.C.: The Novack Report. Zald, M. 1979. " M a c r o Issues in the Theory of Social M o v e m e n t s . " Paper presented at American Sociological Association Meetings, August 1979, at Boston, Mass. Zald, M . and Ash, R. 1966. "Social Movement Organization: Growth, Decline and C h a n g e . " Social Forces. 44:3. 327-41.

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373

Persecution of the Jews, Bureaucracy and Authority in the Totalitarian

State

BY U W E D I E T R I C H ADAM

One of the last anti-Jewish measures of the Nazi régime, intended to complete the racial purge of the civil service, is examined in some detail in the present study and taken as a point of departure for a few tentative reflections on the modes of acting characteristic of a bureaucracy and its dominant figures. The result should throw light on the realities of governmental power in the Third Reich and provide the basis for a generalised theoretical interpretation - as distinct from the customary descriptive accounts - of some of the specific features of that régime. The psychological impact of the attempt that was made on his life on 20th July 1944 rekindled the Führer's obsessive concern with a "problem" that had virtually ceased to engage his attention since the "final solution" - so called by the institutions of the Reich bureaucracy entrusted with the execution of the relevant measures - had taken effect.1 In the preceding four years the extermination machinery of the SS - extermination camps and mobile Einsatzkommandos had worked with such efficiency that by the late autumn of 1944 the Jews of Germany and, indeed, of Europe had been largely wiped out. Yet, the racial doctrine of National Socialism called for the purification of the "organism of the German people" of all racially alien elements, and thus the status of persons of mixed descent - the Mischlinge - and of partners in mixed marriages was called into question. This problem had exercised the authorities since 1935. Hitler's own rulings on this question during the early years of the war were blatantly contradictory. 1 The "Wannsee Conference" of 20th January 1942 raised the fate of these groups in an acute form. Adolf Eichmann had endeavoured since the previous summer to commit the state to a new concept of "Jewishness" that was to do away with most of the existing legal distinctions between "Jews" and "half-Jews". Although the Reich Ministry of the Interior, officially the competent authority in this sphere, strenuously opposed the idea, a serious debate came to be conducted on plans under which "first-degree" Mischlinge (two Jewish grandparents) were to be treated like Jews or, if exempted from deportation, subjected to compulsory sterilisation, while "seconddegree" Mischlinge (one "non-Aryan" grandparent), with some exceptions, were to be considered as of "German stock". At an inter-ministerial conference on 6th March 1942 the Party Bureau argued that it would be undesirable to preserve the Mischlinge in the long run as a minor third race in addition to people of German stock and Jews, and handed down the opinion, attributed to l

Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Tübinger Schriften zur Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte 1), Düsseldorf 1972, pp. 316 f., 329 f. »Ibid., p. 317.

374

THE "FINAL SOLUTION 1

the "highest quarters", that there ought to be a drastic review of the group of Mischlinge, with permission to stay on in the Reich to be reserved for a carefully sifted minority on condition of their consenting to compulsory sterilisation. Here was a clear indication of the long-term measures Hitler had in mind for dealing with the "half-Jews". s It was due only to the stubborn rearguard action of several Reich Ministries, which advanced ever-new objections to these plans, that the bulk of the "half-Jews" was not included in the measures encompassing the "final solution". 4 After 20th July 1944, however, events soon showed that Hitler's hatred of Jewry was so overpowering that he was inaccessible to the consideration of any rational criteria. He himself justified the crazed fanaticism with which he began to extend persecution to everyone with a Jewish ancestor by referring to "prophecies" from the Old Testament.* But if it is asked just what were his motives in turning his attention to the "half-Jews", there can be no clear-cut answer. Hitler's actions in relation to the "Jewish question" were manifestly determined by dark psychological impulses and elude rational explanation. His reaction following the attempt of 20th July is a case in point: although no officer with a Jewish ancestor was even remotely involved in the plot, Hitler immediately ordered the dismissal from the Wehrmacht of all officers with two Jewish grandparents as well as of all those whose wives fell into that category.· This astonishing measure, taken at a time of acute crisis on all fronts, when the recruiting authorities were scraping the bottom of the barrel and the last reserves deemed fit for military service were drafted into the war, bears witness to the utterly irrational character of the racial policy that stuck to its ideological precepts even at the price of seriously weakening the Nazi war effort.' This state of affairs is confirmed and further elucidated by a subsequent measure, dictated by the same considerations, which is the subject of a detailed documentation in the files R 43 11/599 of the Reich Chancellery (1933-1945), now in the Bundesarchiv. In the beginning of November 1944 Martin Bormann, in his capacity as "Secretary to the Führer", informed the Reich Chancellery "on the Führer's instructions" that it was necessary "to remove from leading offices in the Reich all men whose origin is such as to give rise to doubts about their National Socialist bearing and ideological firmness when exposed to exceptional strain". Bormann added that this included notably those who had Jewish links through ancestry or marriage, who accordingly should no longer be employed by the top-level authorities of the Reich* The Reich Chancellery, as the Reich Chancellor's central guiding and coordinating authority, hastened to comply with Hitler's wish and wrote to all the Reich authorities concerned on 7th November 'Ibid., pp. 320 ff. 'Ibid., p. 330. Hbid., pp. 315 f. 'Ibid., pp. 331 f. ' I t needs to be pointed out, however, that the absolute punuit of the racial precepts of National Socialism, that is to say the outright rejection of a commonsense approach to ends and means, was a wartime phenomenon, and became increasingly acute as the war went on. In the years before the war, the anti-Jewish measures of the Third Reich were manifestly accompanied by a careful consideration of the overall effectiveness of means in relation to ends. •Letter, Bormann to Lammers, 2nd November 1944; Adam, op. cit., p. 332.

375

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1944, requesting lists of names of those persons who, according to Bormann's letter, were to be removed from the civil service. Before turning to the reaction of the Reich Chancellery and the top-level executive authorities, it will be appropriate to present a brief outline of the general war situation and the position of these bureaucratic institutions at that time. In November 1944 the Allied troops had advanced as far as the West Wall, the last major obstacle barring entry into the Reich. Aachen had already fallen. In the east and north-east the Red Army had reached the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries. In the south and south-east Romania and Bulgaria had collapsed, and the German troops withdrew from the Balkans. In Italy the Mussolini régime had ceased to exist as a power factor and the Anglo-American troops were pressing on towards the Alps. In the eyes of any observer who had followed the events of the war since 1942 the military situation must have appeared to be hopeless. And the condition of the central bureaucracies of the Reich, as regards staffing and location, was just as hopeless. By that time the vast majority of the Reich Ministries based in Berlin existed only on paper. The unceasing air raids on the Reich capital necessitated continual improvisations. Nearly every Ministry had been forced to move to alternative locations, some of them outside Berlin.* Matters were made worse by the fact that departments of the same authority, or even subsections of individual departments were dispersed to widely scattered locations, so that communication was restricted to personal contacts and the telephone. And under the conditions of total war, which naturally affected the communications network as a whole, such contacts were bound to be fitful at best. Thus it can be said, with good reason, that government offices which continued to function in an orderly manner were the exception rather than the rule. There is another circumstance that should be borne in mind. As the war dragged on, an ever-swelling spate of emergency regulations, orders, directives was unleashed, which placed the officials in a position that seemed to run counter to Parkinson's Law. However, before dealing in detail with this significant question, which has a direct bearing on the motivation of bureaucratic institutions, we propose to examine the reactions of a number of top-level executive authorities to the circular of the Reich Chancellery as typical examples of the behaviour of bureaucracies. The fact that all the responses considered here relate to an exceptional situation does not affect the argument. What concerns us here is a line of reasoning that was first put forward in precise terms by Max Weber, and which can be summed up in the proposition that rationality is one of the intrinsic attributes of any bureaucracy, provided only that it operates under certain conditions and is structured according to certain specified principles. 10 Let us elaborate this thesis, which is of immediate relevance to the question •No comprehensive documentary study has so far been published on the subject of this decentralisation. For the Reich Ministry of the Interior, see Jürgen Huck, Dienststellen des Reichsministeriums des Innern 1943 bis 1945 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ausweichstellen, Marburg 1954. » M a x Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Cologne 1964, 2. Halbband, pp. 735, 836.

380

THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

here investigated. T h e "rationality" characteristic of bureaucratic institutions can be defined as a meaningful relationship between ends and means that marks the actions and conduct of such institutions. 11 In other words, "goal-directed rationality" is the attribute of social action dedicated to the single-minded pursuit of a given end (goal), with the most effective means to that end selected after careful consideration of all possible incidental consequences. 12 According to this definition bureaucracies and bureaucratic actions are invariably founded on goal-directed rationality, since that is the only method by which irrational elements inhibiting the proper functioning of the administration can be excluded. 1 3 T h u s it becomes necessary to establish a clear distinction between " e n d s " and " m e a n s " within a bureaucratic institution. I n terms of a theoretical model, certain ends (goals) are presented to, or imposed upon, the bureaucracy, which duly strives to attain them by goal-directed rational action, subject however to certain clearly set out stipulations (laws) a n d prescribed procedures (administrative regulations). Applying these theoretical considerations to the question investigated in the present study, we arrive at the following proposition: the persecution of Jews and J e w r y as goal of a particular policy m a y elude any rational explanation ; yet, once formulated its a valid end, it was carried into effect by rational bureaucratic action. If this explanation is accepted - a n d there is hardly a historian or political scientist who disagrees 14 - the Nazi persecution of the Jews must also be acknowledged as a form of rational action in all its phases. Adopting the terminology of Talcott Parsons, National Socialist policy towards the Jews can be presented as a classical example of what he terms an "intrinsic relationship", in so far as a combination of empirically documented measures can be rigorously shown to relate to the attainment of a given end, the extirpation of Jewry. 1 8 T h e above interpretation, however, should undergo modification in the light of the detailed records of the aforementioned documentation on the files of the Reich Chancellery. Parsons himself supplies the most effective counter-argument by {jointing out that the overriding goal inherent in any social system must be to a d a p t in order to ensure survival. 18 Seen from this angle, a war, and especially a world war, clearly constitutes the most extreme form of an endeavour to a d a p t . If it is accepted that political decisions should be governed by a rational relationship between ends and means, it follows that, in face of the alternative of total victory or total defeat, the goal is absolute, and then it becomes imperative to make all actions subservient to the pursuit of that one goal that is the conditio sirte qua non for the attainment of any other goals. A rational political " R o b e r t Presthus, Individuum und Organisation. Typologie der Anpassung, H a m b u r g 1966, p. 62. »•Weber, op. cit., p. 18. "Ibid., p. 718. " A l l authors writing on the Third Reich emphasise the efficiency of the system in terms of its political and ideological goals, or at least the effectiveness of its actions modelled on its programmatic declarations. " C f . Talcott Parsons, ' T h e Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory', International Journal of Ethics, 45 (1934), pp. 282-316. " T a l c o t t Parsons, 'Evolutionary Universals in Society', American Sociological Review, 29 (1964), p. 340.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

381

strategy thus requires its agents not to pursue objectives, resort to methods or engage in avoidable actions that appear to be less than adequate to the prevailing situation in the light of a rational comparative assessment of alternative objectives and the appropriate measures for their achievement. But that is precisely the "charge" that can be brought against Bormann's instruction to the top-level executive authorities of the Reich. In the prevailing war situation his move was not only utterly superfluous but, in terms of returns for the effort invested, a wasteful blunder. In its circular of 7 th November 1944, the Reich Chancellery asked the toplevel authorities for the first time to state whether their staffs included officials who were either themselves of mixed descent or married to Jewish or partJewish spouses. Since not all the departments concerned responded to this request, the Reich Chancellery wrote again on 27th November. The reactions of the individual top-level authorities showed that the Reich was by then in a state of disintegration. The "Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia" had not received the circulars of the Reich Chancellery by the middle of December. 17 Reich Minister Seyß-Inquart, Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands had been compelled twice to move his headquarters, and the requisite personnel files had been destroyed in the war, so that in the final months of the war the Minister had to resort to the expedient of inviting the members of his staff to submit personal affidavits on their status. 18 Two of the top-level authorities the Governor General in Cracow (Dr. Hans Frank) and the German Minister of State for Bohemia and Moravia - were quite unable to communicate with the Reich Chancellery except by radio. Nevertheless, most of the Reich authorities concerned showed surprising speed in responding to the enquiry of the Reich Chancellery. No less than three Ministers - Meißner, Schwerin von Krosigk, Dorpmüller - hastened to send off their departments' replies over their own signatures, while the other replies were signed by the top civil servants concerned. Such priority treatment was rarely accorded in those months. The conspicuously positive and rapid response of the top-level authorities was largely due to the fact that the Reich Chancellery had made a point of linking the treatment of this utterly unimportant question with the names of Adolf Hitler and Martin Bormann. This example is a further corroboration of the fact - baffling to historians - that the "Führer and Reich Chancellor" was still able to claim supreme authority within the official hierarchy, even where, as in the present case, his will had to be asserted via the roundabout route of two intermediary institutions. This is undoubtedly a reflection and result of the propensity, inherent in any bureaucracy, to hang on to a given framework of authority and subordination irrespective of how sound or otherwise the directives of the superior authority may be. Our example similarly highlights another characteristic of bureaucratic organisations that was carried to extremes under the Nazi régime. It is the fact that in the highly developed industrial societies, no matter whether their governmental structure "Letter from Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia to Reich Chancellery of 13th December 1944, BA R 43 H/599. "Letters, Seyß-Inquart to Reich Chancellery of 11th and 23rd Dccembcr 1944, ibid.

382

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

is democratic or authoritarian, the so-called "cardinal decisions", decisions in matters of life or death, are made by a small number of individuals. 1 ' In the Third Reich the decision-making group was virtually narrowed down to one single individual. Indeed, it happened repeatedly that utterances by which Hitler had merely meant to express an opinion were interpreted by his entourage as definite instructions and acted upon accordingly.*0 As Hider's immediate entourage, certainly during the war years, was composed in the main of men to whom bureaucratic thinking in terms of command and obedience had become second nature; such instances of excessive zeal throw a significant light on the possible modes of reaction of bureaucratic institutions. The bureaucratic apparatus is not concerned with the sense, or nonsense, of an instruction; it will do as it is told, provided only the order to do so has come from a superior level in the official hierarchy and the command can be executed according to established procedures. Such was precisely the case when the order came for the extermination of the Jews. This order was certainly never given explicitly in writing, at least not in the form of a written instruction by Hitler. Nevertheless, there cannot be the slightest doubt that most executive authorities viewed the destruction of Jewry as a task laid upon them by a political order, to be interpreted as an administrative instruction. The fact that all the top-level authorities of the Reich consistently accorded top priority to the execution of any ordinances, directives or internal instructions on the Jewish question reveals the political and ideological importance attached to that issue even in a desperate situation. Let us now turn to the results of the operation. The Reich Chancellery had addressed its circulars to a total of fifty-two top-level authorities, of which forty replied. Those that failed to reply included significantly the Head of the Party Bureau (Martin Bormann) and the "Chief of the Führer's Bureau" (Philipp Bouhler). These two Party institutions were officially classified as top-level Reich authorities, although they belonged structurally, functionally and in terms of personnel to the Party leadership of the NSDAP. Their heads may have thought that the enquiry did not concern them or, more likely, considered it absurd for Party institutions to reply to such questions. Nor is it surprising that the central authorities of Hermann Göring's most important offices failed to react. The offices headed by Goring in his capacity as Plenipotentiary General for the Economy, Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan and Chairman of the Cabinet Council for the Defence of the Reich, once the most powerful institutions in the land, had long ceased to be operative owing to Göring's indolence. Bereft of leadership, without purpose or function, they had become mere names, leading a s h a d o w y paper existence. That they were approached at all only shows the tenacity with which the Reich Chancellery persisted in a game of make-believe with organisations that had become entirely fictitious. There were other authorities which existed only on paper among the addressees of the Reich Chancellery's circulars. The Prussian Ministry of Finance, for instance, " C f . C. P. Snow, Science and Government, Cambridge, Mass. 1960, p. 1. " S u c h cases are amply documented in Henry Picker, HilUrs Tischgespräche im Führerhauplquartier 1941-1942, Stuttgart 1963.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

383

had virtually ceased to function after the arrest of the Minister, Johannes Popitz. The same applied, for different reasons, to the Reich Labour Service, the Reich Youth Leader and the Chief of the Foreign Office Department for Germans Abroad. Though never dissolved officially, these institutions, too, had ccased to exist as a result of the recruitment measures launched to meet the needs of total war. But quite apart from the question of the real or unreal existence of the organisations concerned, the enquiry threw the power structure of the Third Reich into relief, for it was only Göring's offices and the leading Party bodies which blithely ignored the Reich Chancellery's circular even after the second reminder. Of the forty top-level authorities who responded, twenty submitted a nilreturn (vermeldeten Fehlanzeige), that is, to say that no person of mixed descent or with a spouse of that description was employed in their establishments.11 This result can be described as a triumph of the racial ideology of National Socialism, bearing in mind what the proportion of civil servants who were themselves, or had spouses who were, either Jewish or of mixed descent had been twelve years earlier.** By 1944 the German civil service could be said to have become judenrein, purified of Jewish elements. The twenty top-level authorities which returned positive reports to the Reich Chancellery still employed between them twenty-four Jewish Mischlinge of whom no less than ten had been accorded by Hider's dispensation the status of persons of German stock. Another fifty-two "Aryan" civil servants had spouses who were either Jewish or of mixed descent. Thus this operation, carried out at Hitler's behest regardless of the high cost in time and labour imposed on nearly all the top-level executive authorities of the Reich, netted all of seventy-six "cases", which in Hitler's mind were liable to jeopardise the National Socialist ideology. Considering the conditions prevailing at the time for the exercise of power and influence, it certainly needs an over-heated imagination to believe that this trifling number of subordinate officials who, moreover, had long ago lost all connection with the (by-now destroyed) Jewish religious community would have had either the capability or even the will to undermine the régime. It remains to place on record how the authorities that did have employees of the relevant categories on their staffs reacted to the order of the Reich Chancellery. Before pursuing this question, it should be pointed out that the civil servants affected by this operation were distributed among the various authorities according to a distinct ideological line of demarcation. It is scarcely surprising that the "new" Ministries and those of ideological import - Foreign Office, Ministry of Propaganda, as well as all Reich authorities established since 1940 tt

See the facsimile of the first and third pages of the Reich Chancellery compilation between pp.140-141. "By April 1934 hundreds of academic teachers and 2,000 civil servants had lost their jobs, according to Karl Dietrich Bracher et al., Die nationabozialistùcfu Machtergreifung (Schriften des Instituts für politische Wissenschaft, vol. 14), Cologne 1962, p. 284. The number of Mischlinge removed from their poets in consequence of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 is certain to have exceeded that figure of 2,000.

384

THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

should have replied in the negative. It is worth noting that even the complex empire of the Reichsfuhrer-SS, carrying the mentality of German officialdom to grotesque lengths, made a point of conforming strictly to the rules of the bureaucratic game: thus the central authority entrusted with the extermination of the Jews, the "Reichsfuhrer-SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior" - the superior authority of Reinhard Heydrich's Reick M a i n Office for Security - reported dutifully that its staff was free of Mischlinge as well as of officials with spouses of Jewish or mixed descent.* 3 This example deserves to be singled out as a rare specimen of the lunatic consistency with which the Nazi bureaucracy continued to function in the void as far as the treatment of ideological questions was concerned. O n the other hand, a quantitative comparison reveals that all the oldestablished Ministries still had officials of the relevant categories on their staffs, foremost among them - as was to be expected - the Reichsbank which, of course, was obliged to make high demands o n the professional standards of its staff and could hardly work according to ideological precepts. It named no less than forty-two persons belonging to the relevant categories, 44 substantially more than half the total numbers brought to light by the enquiry. This clearly confirms the supposition that an authority was the better able to resist ideological pressures in its personnel policy, the farther removed it was from the centres of political power and the greater its need to rely on the professional competence and formal qualifications of its staffs. T h e group of top-level executive authorities which returned positive answers can be subdivided into two sections : those which felt it incumbent upon them to attest the trustworthiness of the persons named in their reports, , s and those " L e t t e r , Reichsfihrer-SS to Reich Chancellery of 15th November 1944, loc. cit. See facsimile between pp. 140-141. " S e e facsimile of the first page of a four-page list between pp. 140-141. " T h u s the Foreign Office in its letter to the Reich Chancellery of 20th November 1944: it n a m e d five persons and went out of its way to stress the worthiness in particular of Legation Counsellors T h o r n e r and Herwarth von Bittenfeld who were credited with "services to the cause of National Socialism". As for the Head of the Law Department of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Friedrich Gaus, whose wife had one Jewish grandparent, the letter described him as exceedingly able and knowledgeable, an official whom the Ministry thought it could i)Ot spare. T o prevent his dismissal, the letter added that " i t is to be expected that after the war the Führer will definitely allow Ambassador Gaus to join the P a r t y " . T h e Reich Ministry of the Interior showed similar fervour in its letter of 17th November 1944, in which it reported two names to the Reich Chancellery. It pleaded in particular for Regienmgsrat Willy Bukow, whose wife also had " a n admixture of Jewish blood". Stuckart, the senior official who signed the letter, appended a "genetic expert opinion" which h a d investigated the racial status of Bukow's bride before his marriage. T h e expert consulted on that occasion had raised the question: " W o u l d Fräulein Milisch strike a layman in any way - on account of her psychological attitude, her environment or her appearance - ω n o n - A r y a n ? " T h e expert thought not, a n d on the strength of his findings Bukow was allowed to marry, and Hitler informed him on 19th J u n e 1936 in a personal letter that he had decided as an act of grace to allow Bukow to retain his Party membership in spite of his wife's racial impurity. Another interesting case is t h a t of Ministerial Counsellor K u r t G r ü n b a u m , for whom his employer, the Reich Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, interceded in a letter to the Reich Chancellery of 17th November 1944. Both he and his wife were of mixed descent. This had led well before the war to " f r i c t i o n " , a n d the Ministry, which wanted to prevent his dismissal, tried in 1939 to have him transferred to the

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which contented themselves with supplying a list of names without comment. 2 · This distinction is of some interest as it leads to what at a first glance seem to be paradoxical findings. T h e point is that it was precisely the so-called "ideologic a l " Reich authorities - e.g., the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office - which endeavoured to clear the officials named in their reports by appending explanatory statements and documentary evidence, whereas less ideologically committed authorities presented bare lists of names. T h e paradox, however, is only apparent. I t was not that the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office were more eager than others to keep the racially compromised officials. It may be noted that the authorities which made representations on behalf of the affected employees, happened to be those that were closest to the highest decision-making bodies in terms of channels of information. Accordingly they were well aware of the treatment in store for the affectcd persons, and the measures that had been visualised in earlier debates were grim indeed.* 7 In fact, the Reich Chancellery, anticipating the personal decision which Hitler was expected to take in the given circumstances, had already drafted a "Führer Decree", 2 8 which in contemptuous disregard of the Civil Service Act envisaged drastic consequences for the individuals concerned. T h e Decree was never promulgated, thanks to the chaotic conditions prevailing as the Reich collapsed. In the end the draft was not submitted to Hitler to be signed by him, and we may surmise that the reason was the very rapidity and finality of that collapse, which perhaps reawakened a vestige of administrative rationality in the Reich Chancellery. T h e result of our investigation leads back to the points made in the introduction : the anarchic structure of the Hiderite state must be considered a relapse into a pre-rational conduct on the part of its bureaucracy. As regards ends, the weight to be attached to various subsidiary objectives in relation to the main goal at any given time was determined in an utterly irrational fashion. As regards means, the methods imposed from above and duly applied similarly defy all canons of rational administrative action. A more detailed analysis of the Third Reich, carried out with these points in mind may suggest the conclusion that we are faced here with a basic structural Prussian Chamber o f Audits. T h e Ministry's representations were answered on 31st M a y 1939 by the Führer's Deputy who announced that Bormann, the official responsible for dealing with matters o f that nature, had rejected Griinbaum's transfer, since it had been noted " t h a t officials who on political grounds could not be employed elsewhere had been transferred to the Prussian Chamber of Audits or the Reich Court of Audits". Bormann declined to sanction such a transfer and suggested that, since all legal methods of removing Griinbaum from office had been exhausted, he ought to be advised to apply for premature retirement. None the less, Grünbaum was still at his post in 1944, which shows that even in the lawless Third Reich the rights of civil servants enshrined in the law proved stronger than ideological imperatives. " L e t t e r from the Reich Minister of Finance to the Reich Chancellery o f 16th November 1944; letters of the same date from the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs and the Reich Minister of Labour. " S e e p. 139 above. " A l l o w i n g for Hitler's acute longsightedness, this Decree was typed on the special "Führer typewriter", which featured exceptionally large type faces. See facsimile between pp. 140-141.

38b

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

problem of that system of government. There is ample evidence from other sources that the final acts of the dying régime as exemplified in this twilight anti-Jewish purge were founded on modes of thinking and conduct that in respect of both ends and means can only be described as irrational.** "Another instance is an order given during the last months of the war on instructions from Hitler by Himmler, Reich Minister of the Interior. It called for the termination of the employment of relatives working in the same department or branch. This order, clearly irrelevant to the situation during the final phase of the war, occupied the bureaucratic machinery for nearly three months. See Hans Mommsen, 'Ein ErlaB Himmlers zur Bekämpfung der Korruption in der Inneren Verwaltung vom Dezember 1944', VierUljahrsheßeßir Zeitgeschichte, 16 (1968), pp. 295 ff.

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The 'Aristocracy of National Socialism 5 : The Role of the SS in National Socialist Germany

BERND WEGNER In 1956 Gerald Reitlinger published a (now outdated) book on the history of the SS, The S S - Alibi of a Nation.1 The title suggests one of the main difficulties previously complicating the historian's analysis of the 55: the impact of the Black Order's monstrous amorality on the post-war generation, since, after 1945, the executors of the holocaust became, so to speak, the 'whipping boys' of German atonement. In coundess books, films and magazine articles the SS has been presented as the incarnation of all evil. For many people both inside and outside Germany the delicate moral question of their own involvement in the events of the NS period seemed expeditiously answered simply by reference to the terror apparatus of the SS and the universal threat it Original œntribution to this volume.

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represented. Confronted by an historical issue so entangled in emotional commitments, it is understandably difficult for the scholar to maintain the requisite 'intellectual distance'. There are two other considerations which complicate an analysis of the SS. One of them is that the SS - though it left deep traces on the map of Europe - was in historical terms very much an ephemeral phenomenon. Historians concerned with the evolution of political parties, armies, economic or religious institutions, may look back over decades, even centuries, and thereby get to the heart of the matter. But the SS lasted hardly 20 years: a ridiculously short time which becomes even shorter when one realises that in its first seven years the organisation led at best a shadow existence. But what a breathtaking development during those two decades: from the bodyguard of an initially rather unsuccessful völkisch politician named Hitler to the 'party police' of the NS movement; from the party police to the keystone of German domestic policy; from this domestic springboard to a controlling influence in the German war effort and to a mastery over large parts of German-occupied Europe. The climax of this unique expansion of power was the SS" s vain attempt to establish itself as a new elite, and as the chief organising force of a new 'Germanic Europe'. The development of the SS was like an historical brush fire: never in its short history was there a period of constancy or stability, or a moment of calm; every objective that was achieved was swallowed up by its ever-expanding appetite. A third problem for the historian of the SS is its enormously varied character. The SS was a conglomeration of loosely connected offices and branches, which often had little to do with one another, and which fulfilled radically different duties. The historian's judgement is therefore shaped by whichever aspect or branch of the 'SS State' he studies: the concentration camp system or the WaffenSS, the organisation's economic enterprises or the SD {Sicherfuitsdienst), the SS" s secret service, the so-called 'General SS" (Allgemeine SS) or the SS authorities in German-occupied countries. In addition, as each section of the SS had its own distinctive domain and flavour it is difficult to draw any general conclusions on the 'Black Order' as a whole.

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I As the above has made clear the 55 is far from being a well-defined, easily graspable and homogeneous object of historical research: rather it is an extremely dynamic, protean and heterogeneous phenomenon. What, then, besides the personal role of Heinrich Himmler as Reichsßhrer-SS, held it together? Perhaps the single most cohesive factor was a common mentality, more a nebulous attitude towards life than a coherent ideology. This attitude, best captured by the term politisches Soldatentum [the 55 as 'political soldiers' Ed.} was by no means shared by every member of the 55, but was sufficiently popular within all parts of the leadership for it to become the ideological underpinning for the 55* s boundless thirst for power. What exactly was this attitude, what does the term politisches Soldatentum mean? 2 In National Socialist ideology the notion of struggle {Kampf) focused centrally on both the individual and collective, völkisch life. It was not seen ω a limited contest according to a set of definite rules laid down in order to achieve an assigned objective - as, for example, in sports or in eighteenth-century warfare - but as a struggle for existence (Dasrinskampf). This concept of struggle, influenced by traditions of Social Darwinism, we find well expressed in Hider's own book3 according to which the National Socialist, if he took his ideology seriously, was a Kämpfer (fighter, warrior) by nature, and it was in this sense that he called himself a 'soldier' - or, more precisely, a 'political soldier' (politischer Soldat). It is quite obvious that soldiering of this kind had little to do with soldiering as a military profession. Himmler himself stressed this distinction, when he said in a speech in November 1938 with regard to the 55 Death's Head units: The Totenkopfierbànde were established from the guards in the concentration camps. Of course, they have - and I think that is our mission - become a troop; from jailers they developed into soldiers. I am convinced that in all things we do, we'll become soldiers sooner or later. This

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will be so in a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , it was the case with the guard troops [meaning here Hitler's personal bodyguard, ultimately the Leibstandarte—55 Adolf Hitler, c o m m a n d e d by Sepp Dietrich, an c o m m a n d e r who m a n a g e d to keep his distance from H i m m l e r . Ed.] and it is the same with the secret a n d criminal police. We always become soldiers, not military, but soldiers.4 (Author's italics) H i m m l e r ' s statement is typical of the National Socialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t a politischer Soldat was. Accordingly, every NS activist, regardless of his profession, was a 'soldier' and the military was one a m o n g others. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l difference between the military and the political types of soldier becomes still more obvious when we look at the object against which force is used. Concerning the professional military m a n , there was no doubt: he fought at a clearly defined time, that is in war, with military means against a clearly defined external enemy. T h e case of the politischer Soldat was quite different. His enemy was everywhere, inside G e r m a n y as well as outside the country. In his view M a r x i s m , 'plutocracy', freemasonry and Christianity were nothing other t h a n different faces of one universal threat, the focal point of which became the J e w . So 5 5 officer cadets had to learn, for example, that: ' T h e enemies of G e r m a n y are all led by J e w r y or are its children in spirit.' 5 From this and m a n y other documents it becomes quite clear that the J e w was simply the common denominator of all possible adversaries of National Socialism. Because of this view, the 55 m a n ' s perception of the world became extremely bi-polar a n d one-dimensional. As a high-ranking 55 officer said in 1939, m o n t h s before the outbreak of war: [The 55] is never tired, it is never satisfied, it never lays down its arms, it is always on duty, always ready to parry the enemy's blows and to fight back. For the 55, there is only one [!] enemy, the e n e m y of G e r m a n y , there is only one [!] friend, the G e r m a n people. 6 This totalitarian i n g r o u p - o u t g r o u p ideology of the 55 destroyed all differences between internal and external

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enemies and, as a consequence, those between war and peace, between military and civil life. As the enemy was ever present, it had to be fought at any time and in any place. Thus it is not surprising to find Himmler, for example, in his wartime speeches comparing the current war with the National Socialist struggle for power in the Weimar period. For him, as for many other 55 leaders, there was no difference in principle between the political and the military struggle. They were the same battle against the same enemy, fought only by different means and on different batdefields. As the SS saw itself as the power elite destined by history to fight that battle, it consequently demanded the right to incorporate all forces in state and society which seemed appropriate to its purpose. Thus the understood itself not so much as an organisation designed to fulfil a limited concrete social task (such as the army or the police did), but rather as an elite of the society as a whole. This is what Himmler meant when he called the SS a modern 'knighthood' or Germany's new aristocracy. 7 II The totalitarian and autocratic character of the 55 becomes evident in its development even during the early years of the Third Reich. Himmler tried to gain mastery over as many sectors of politics as possible. So even before the outbreak of the war, the 55 had succeeded in influencing no fewer than five large and significant areas. One sphere of influence, where the 55 began its calculated takeover as early as 1933, was ideology and propaganda. After the 5.4's loss of power in the summer of 1934, the 55 was well on its way to being the ideological arbiter and avant garde of National Socialism. They claimed to be not only the pioneers of the NS movement, but also a model for, and the educator of, the German nation. Himmler, convinced that Germany had been led astray for the last thousand years by Christianity, saw the restoration of the old pre-Christian, Germanic culture and lifestyle as the main task of the SS.6 To this end, the 55 sponsored many

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different cultural and scientific activities. For the sake of ideological education countless articles, books - mainly published by its own publishing house, Nordland-Verlag and films were produced. Himmler's organisation also controlled the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten, the elitist National Socialist grammar schools 9 [Himmler did not obtain control of these institutions until Hitler's order of 7 December 1944 when under the impact of war they were already in the process of dissolution. Ed.] and established a network of homes destined to look after 55 members studying at the university. The 55 encouraged research on early Germanic history and archaeology and founded a research society of its own, the Ahnenerbe, exclusively for this purpose. 10 The Lebensbom was another society formed by the 55 to further the production of racially pure children without regard to their legitimacy." [That the Lebensbom was an institution for the deliberate 'production' of racially 'pure stock' was established as a myth at the Nuremberg trials. It was the one institution of the 55 which received a 'clean bill of health'. The institution owned homes in which primarily, but not exclusively, unmarried women could bear their children with proper medical and post-natal care. Ed.} Secondly, more important than the ideological activities of the 55, from the perspective of power politics, was its role in the field of domestic security, where the 55 achieved a monopoly within a few years. T h e monopoly was principally based on three instruments of power at the disposal of the 55: the secret service (Sicherheitsdienst), the police and the concentration camps (including its armed guard units, the so-called Totkenkopfverbände). All of these subgroups expanded rapidly in size and competence. The Sicherheitsdienst, for example, founded by Heydrich in 1931, managed to monopolise all intelligence activities within the NS movement until 1934. Furthermore, in 1938, it began to penetrate the state administration. 12 Five and a half years later the SD had its finest hour: in February 1944, several months before the officers' putsch against Hitler, it took over the Wehrmacht's counter-intelligence agency, the Abwehr, which under the command of Admiral Canaris had been the only secret service organisation not controlled by the 55.13

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In the case of the concentration camps the development was even more remarkable. After the so-called 'Röhm Putsch' in the summer of 1934 all camps were put under the command of the and a special administration was established, the head of which became Theodor Eicke, a former commander of the Dachau concentration camp. Using this camp as a model, 14 Eicke within a few years developed a centralised and strictly regulated repressive machine. H e also organised special armed units, the 'Death's Head units' (SS-Totenkopfoerbände), for guarding the camps. By early 1939 its force was almost 9,000 strong. 15 The most important aspect of this development was that by establishing the concentration camp system the SS gave itself a freedom of action which was independent of the existing law and administration of justice. This meant in practice that anybody could be arrested at any time and sent to a concentration camp indefinitely without legal procedure or even after being discharged by a court. It was this lack of legal security which, more than the calculable, albeit rigid and unjust, laws of the Third Reich, helped to intimidate the German people and thus cripple the forces of opposition. T h e S-S" s most significant concentration of power was to be found in its domination, and eventual assimilation, of the police force. Himmler acquired authority over it by several steps: first, he gained control over the secret police (politische Polizei) in the German Länder (1933-4); then through his appointment as Reichsfohrn-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei (17 J u n e 1936) he integrated the police forces into the administrative structure of the SS.16 Himmler's aim was to form a complete amalgamation of both organisations, a gigantic 'state protection corps' (Staatsschutzkorps).v For at least two reasons this meant a complete change of constitutional principles. The police traditionally had formed part of the prerogative of the German Länder. Himmler's appointment to chief of the German police, however, constituted a centralisation of the police by the Reich's authorities. Thus here, as in many other fields, National Socialist rule led to an end of federalism. Furthermore, the fusion of police and SS meant the amalgamation of a state agency with an organisation of the

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NSDAP. Consequently the enjoyed many privileges usually reserved by the public administration, and the police force threatened to lose its character as an organisation of public service, changing instead to an instrument of the Führer's will. Thirdly, the advance of the 55 into the fields of the prerogative of the armed forces proved to be less spectacular, though none the less effective. Despite strong opposition, mainly from the army high command, Himmler managed within a few years to organise a 'second army' in the form of the Reserve Troops (SS-Verfiigungstruppe), the core of the later WaJfen-SS. Even if this amounted only to a few thousand soldiers, such a development was not warranted by any provisions in the constitution, and it challenged the already delicate balance of power between the political and military forces in Germany. After the National Socialists' accession to power Hitler had defined this balance by referring to the 'two pillars' that would support the new state: the Party and the Wehrmacht. The liquidation of the SA leaders, whom the Wehrmacht had feared as potential rivals, seemed to underline this policy of an 'equal partnership' between the political and military spheres. The dictator himself stressed at that time the principle that the Wehrmacht was to be the only 'Bearer of Arms' in the Nation. 18 The army generals were all the more astonished when a few months later the 55 leadership began to build up a small army of its own, namely the SS-Verfogungstruppe, which it then trained and equipped in a military fashion. The army leaders accepted this development in the following years only because the 55 units were too small to constitute a genuine threat to Wehrmacht supremacy, and because their training and equipping could be closely supervised and even controlled by the military. Moreover, both Himmler and Hitler stressed repeatedly that the SS-Verfügungstruppe was to have no military, but only domestic police-like functions. 19 By the end of 1938 at the very latest, however, it turned out that Himmler had deceived the Army generals both about the actual size of the 55 units and about their real purpose. They had by then expanded to well over 14,000 men, and

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

were on the threshold of an even more explosive expansion. Most alarmingly, their officer corps contained a disproportionally high percentage of 55 officers who had been educated in special 55 officer cadet academies (the 55Junkerschulen). The leadership was organised along the lines of a divisional staff. The recruiting of former army officers and NCOs as a training cadre ensured that service in the 55 would be solidly military in nature, and would therefore fulfil the obligatory standards of the Wehrmacht-20 As for the army high command, it had largely lost control of the SS-Verfiigungstnippe by 1938. Even more importantly, the crises concerning the commander-in-chief of the army, General von Fritsch, and his chief of staff, Col.-General Beck [there was no crisis about Beck, who resigned his post in protest at Hitler's policy in the Czech crisis of 1938, because he was sure that Britain and France would intervene, involving Germany in a war for which it was not armed. Ed.], cost the army its two most influential opponents of the 55 during these crucial years, and resulted in a general loss of political influence on the part of the army. The 55 managed to exploit this situation to its own advantage. A Führer-ordcr dated 17 August 1938, which had been drafted by Himmler, established that the 55Verfugungstruppe was to be used for its former, domestic purposes (which were not specified even now) as well as in a mobile role as part of the wartime army'. 21 [This provision was already contained in Blomberg's directive of 24 September 1934 - see note 19. Ed.] A few months later, with the prospect of war imminent, the SS-Verfiigungstruppe was allowed to develop into a full-scale division. Moreover, the Totenkopf units, which had hitherto served only to guard the concentration camps, were also expanded considerably and were now allowed to be used as a reserve for the frontline units.22 All these rulings had shifted the scales decisively in favour of the 55 in its quarrel with the army. It was no longer a question of whether the 55 units would be allowed to share in military conquests in the years to come; the disputes now concerned only their assignment, size and organisation.

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H i m m l e r had finally succeeded in what he had planned since 1934 - he had secured a foothold on army territory. Fourthly, a p a r t from cultural life and the spheres of internal and military security, foreign policy was another area in which the SS tried to gain an influence. Here, however, its success was less spectacular, and it was never able to help shape Hitler's f u n d a m e n t a l decision-making process. Still, it found a wide scope of action when it came to implementing the Fiihrer's general political guidelines. In this context, the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle [the SS agency responsible for racial G e r m a n s , or G e r m a n minorities living outside the frontiers of the Reich. Ed.] of the SS as well as the foreign d e p a r t m e n t of the SD both tried to gain influence on the often large G e r m a n communities in eastern, central and southern Europe, that is in those countries which were soon to become either the allies or the victims of G e r m a n expansionist policies. 23 H i m m l e r also tried to involve his SS in discussions regarding the policing of future G e r m a n colonies. 24 More importantly, he endeavoured to have the SS form the core of a future, supra-national racially hetrogenous 'police defence front against Bolshevism', which would comprise all the potential allies of Germany. 2 5 W e can assume that all these instances formed part of Himmler's policy to gain some share of influence on foreign policy. W h e n J o a c h i m von Ribbentrop was m a d e foreign secretary in February 1938, the SS seemed to have come very close to attaining its goal. Ribbentrop was thought to be closely intimate with Himmler, a n d he was an 'honorary leader' (.Ehrenfùhrer) of the SS. In his hope of influencing official G e r m a n foreign policy, H i m m l e r hastened to receive other high-ranking officials of the Foreign Office into the SS. However, his hopes in this area were soon dashed: during the two Czech crises in the a u t u m n of 1938 and the spring of 1939, a lively struggle over competence erupted between the Foreign Office and the SD. As it turned out, the Foreign Office was not prepared to follow the dictates of the SS, although it, too, was increasingly influenced by National Socialism. T h e conflict then escalated further as Himmler's and Ribbentrop's basic ideas in foreign policy - especially

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concerning German-Soviet relations - were diametrically opposed. 26 Finally, there was a fifth section in which the 55 contrived unobtrusively to gain some measure of power - namely the economy. The economic plans of the 55 sprang from its desire to use the concentration camps and their large manpower reservoirs more systematically and efficiently. In this endeavour the organisation founded a few of its own enterprises, 27 and after about 1938 it began systematic economic expansion in certain key fields of production. By the end of the war, the SS owned more than 40 different enterprises embracing about 150 plants and factories. It was involved in stone and earthworks, in the production of food and drinks, in agriculture and forestry, in timber and iron processing, in leathers and textiles as well as in publishing. 28 This official entrepreneurial engagement was supplemented by semi-official contacts with influencial circles in the German economy. These contacts were supported mainly by the Freundeskreis Reichsfiihrer-SS, a loose group of a few dozen industrialists, bankers and high-ranking civil servants who were interested in having some degree of connection with the SS without actually joining. For the 55, these contacts payed off in the literal sense: the members of the Freundeskreis supported the work of the 55 with substantial sums of money and were also prepared to help in other ways, for example in granting cheap loans.29 Ill The substantial early influence the 55 had achieved in internai, foreign, economic, police and military affairs shows that its ambition was aimed at the reformation of society as a whole. It is within this context that the different activities of the 55 - however varied they may seem at first sight take on their proper significance. In fact, this overall aim constituted the foundation of the 55's political influence. The ideological and propaganda apparatus of the 'General 55" (Allgemeine 55), for example, would probably not have been taken seriously, if it had not been supported by the

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ever-present threat of the Gestapo and the concentration camps. T h e establishment of an 55 military force would not have been possible without Hinimler's commanding position in domestic affairs. At the same time, it turned out that the military training increasingly received by 55 volunteers was very useful for domestic repression as well. [In this context however, it is important to note that the most serious threat to the NS regime, the plot of 20 July 1944, was suppressed by the Wehrmacht and not by the 55. Ed.] Himmler did all he could to impress the importance of these interlocking relationships upon his confidants. He realised very well that the 55's powerful position within the National Socialist system could be preserved only if it succeeded in maintaining its character as a cohesive community of 'political soldiers' without regard to different branches. Its members had to be more than just concentration c a m p guards, policemen, soldiers, security agents or propagandists. Himmler feared, above all, that the wide variety of functions within the 55 might result in a drifting apart of the individual parts. Particularly during the war, there was a real threat that one branch or other of his empire might succeed in gaining its independence. This, Himmler thought, would be 'the first step towards the end' of the 55: 'then all would . . . within a generation . . . revert to its former insignificance'. 30 Consequently, he endeavoured to link the individual activities of the 55 as closely as possible: his organised 'glue' induced a common ethic ideal, the creation of only one channel of education for a wide scope of activities, the constant transfer of young 55 leaders to new and different posts; the integration of 55 and police personnel, the standardisation of ranks, and many similar measures. T h u s at the end of the 1930s the influence of the 55 was extensive and varied, but it did have its limits. As we saw, the old elites had not been pushed aside everywhere as easily as they had been in the police force. In general, it can be said that the 55 reached the limits of its power when it had to compete with old or new leadership groups without having Hitler's backing. However, it was also the general consolidation and stabilisation of political structures which

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399

helped to retard the 55's evolution towards its goal of becoming the new aristocracy of a National Socialist society. For Himmler had* had his successes only as a result of the social and political convulsions which shook Germany following the National Socialist seizure of power. Once these convulsions receded, and once the new regime had firmly established its control, the 55 could no longer manoeuvre so freely. However, the further evolution of the NS system by no means completely shackled the SS. On the contrary, its power expanded even more rapidly than before. The reason was that the early period of domestic upheaval did not lead to stabilisation, but passed over to a new phase of external violence and war. The year 1938 marks this change.31 Hitler's self-appointment as military commander-in-chief indicated that the National Socialist 'seizure of power' had come to a temporary end. On the other hand, his annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland in the same year inaugurated a new policy of external expansion. In other words: all that the had accomplished so far had resulted from domestic infighting; all that it would henceforth achieve would come in the wake of Germany's foreign conquests. The outbreak of war and the ensuing revolution in European affairs gave the SS a unique opportunity to maintain its momentum and extend its successes beyond the German borders. Thus, the war became a conditio úru qua rum for the further evolution of the 55 as envisaged by Himmler. There are many indications that Himmler had anticipated this development even before the war began. As early as November 1938 he described in a speech to the higher 55 leaders his vision of Germany as 'the greatest empire ever created by man and ever seen on earth'.32 He left no doubt that the 55 would help to build this 'Great Germanic Empire', even if it required him 'to go out and rob and steal Germanic blood throughout the entire world'.33 Thus it is obvious that the 55 intended to use the war to become the dominant power in a new 'Germanic Europe'. In fact, the course of the war after 1942 prevented the 55 from achieving this aim. [However, it was after Stalingrad that the Waffen-SS experienced its most rapid phase of expansion, amounting by 1944 to over 900,000 men. fi/.]

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On the other hand, the various ways in which this organisation managed to expand were so extensive that they cannot be adequately described here. Therefore I shall iimit myself to illustrating the process by focusing upon two characteristic examples: the concentration camp system and the armed formations of the 55, the so-called Waffen-SS. IV As for the concentration camp organisation, the outbreak of war brought decisive changes both in scope and structure. When the war began, the total number of concentration camp inmates was about 25.000. Within the next four years, that is until the autumn of 1943, this number rose to 224,000, almost nine times the 1939 figure. From then on the expansion was even more dramatic: in August 1944 500,000 and in January 1945 more than 700,000 prisoners populated the SS concentration camps; an estimated third of them died within the last months of the war during the evacuation of the camps close to the front line.*4 But however shocking they may be, these figures represent only the 'tip of the iceberg' when seen within the total context of 55 extermination policy. They refer only to the prisoners actually living in the camps and do not include the hundreds of thousands who died there due to inhumane living and working conditions. 35 Nor do they include the around 5 million Jews who were murdered by the mobile '55 Action G r o u p s ' (SS-Einsatzgruppe)

of the SD a n d the Sicherheitspolizei

or were gassed in the specially designed extermination camps. 36 Therefore, the 55 as an instrument of repression served two very different, even conflicting purposes: on the one hand it became the executor of the 'final solution' ordered by Hitler - a policy which was not, as far as we know, proposed by Himmler, but which he loyally carried out as efficiently and as quietly as possible;37 on the other hand, it amassed large numbers of prisoners in the concentration camps, whose labour became invaluable to the German war effort. How significant - even crucial - this economic aspect

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

eventually became, is reflected in the takeover of the concentration camps in 1942 by the Economy and Administration Board {SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt). From then on, if not earlier, Himmler was working to create a vast 55 armaments industry exploiting the labour force in the concentration camps. This, in turn, was part and parcel of his plan to develop the 55 into an organisation which would ultimately be financially independent of the state budget. For years, however, Himmler's ambitions led to a confrontation with Albert Speer's ministry of armaments - which may in fact have been exacdy what Himmler wanted. But in the end it was Speer's continuous resistance as well as the incompetence of the respective 55 functionaries in economic affairs that foiled the Reichsfithrer's ambitions. 38 Nevertheless, the basic role of the concentration camps had changed drastically due to the aims of the higher 55 echelons. No longer did demands of 'state security' alone decide who would disappear into a concentration camp and how long they would stay; equally important was the increasing demand for cheap labour. To satisfy this demand, two things were necessary: on the one hand a steadily increasing 'supply' of prisoners, as well as longer stay in the camps; on the other, an increase of the inmate's productivity. As for the latter, the efforts of the 55 leadership met with little success. On the contrary, for several reasons mortality among the concentration camp inmates rose dramatically after the outbreak of war and achieved the tragic climax of nearly 60,000 in the second half of 1942. Due to increasingly hard working conditions, reduced food rations, deficient housing and hygiene, the 55 leadership was unable to preserve the prisoners' physical fitness. Nor could productivity be improved by threats of punishment or by offering minor advantages to prisoners. According to Speer's figures, the average work done by a concentration camp inmate amounted to only one-sixth of what a free civilian labourer could achieve.39 In short, it turned out that a system based on repression, dehumanisation and physical extermination could hardly be converted into a high-productivity economic enterprise.

401

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION" ROLE OF T H E SS IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY

For this reason every conceivable effort had to be m a d e to increase the n u m b e r of inmates. As early as the beginning of the war the 5 5 was empowered to detain ir. 'protective custody' (Schutzhaft) an ever widening circle of political, social or 'racial' offenders. Moreover, it was decided that for the duration of the war there would be no releases except for a few special cases. Since the new powers of the 5 5 were not limited to the Reich territory, the conquest of an increasing a m o u n t of foreign territory opened u p huge new possibilities to the Security Police. Thus, in the a u t u m n of 1941, the monthly Schutzhaft figure was about 15,000, about ten times that of 1935—36.40 Also, increasing n u m b e r s of mainly Polish and Russian 'foreign workers' (Fremdarbeiter) were sent to the camps during the last war years. T h i s changed the ethnic structure in the camps; only 5 to 10 per cent of the inmates were G e r m a n by the end of the war. 4 ' S u m m i n g up, it can be said that the concentration c a m p s were greatly expanded due to the war and that this brought a f u n d a m e n t a l change in their role. Before the war, their main purpose was to neutralise the regime's internal enemies. Later they retained this function, but after 1942 it was increasingly superseded by two other tasks: mass extermination and economic exploitation. These were mutually contradictory: economic exploitation required the preservation of the workforce; extermination meant its destruction. T h e 5 5 simply never succeeded in solving this problem.

V T h e development of the Waffen-SS was basically similar. Here, too, we see a massive increase in size due to the war combined with a fundamental change of structure a n d purpose. For the Waffen-SS this qualitative change could be characterised as the development from an elitist Pretorian G u a r d to a mass army. Again, a few figures can serve to illustrate this alteration: at the beginning of 1935 the overall strength of the armed 5 5 formations was about 7,000. By the beginning of 1939 this figure had about tripled to j u s t

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

under 23,000. By mid-1944 it had grown to nearly 600,000 men, or 85 times its 1935 size.42 [There is still some confusion on the numbers serving in the Waffen-SS. The author's figure is the lowest estimate. The highest figure cited and statistically verified is 910,000 by the end of 1944, though large numbers had been drafted or transferred from the navy and air force. Ed.] What made this explosive increase possible, after every peacetime effort to recruit more volunteers for the armed 55 had come to nothing through the veto of the Wehrmacht high command? There were three methods used by the 55: first, it asked to be granted a higher quota of recruits by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKVV) responsible for the assignment of conscripts. This proved more or less unsuccessful until 1941; the Wehrmacht needed every man for itself and was not prepared to set aside additional personnel for the 55.43 The second method was to enlist as many volunteers as possible without regard to the quota set by the OKW. 4 4 This required, however, that it should hide the additional enlistments from the Wehrmacht authorities responsible for recruitment. It is obvious that this could only be practised on a restricted scale and over a limited time. The third, and in the long run most successful, way for the 55 to meet the increasing demand for personnel was to resort to 'reservoirs' outside the Reich borders and therefore not accessible to the Wehrmacht. This meant mainly the millions of people of German origin living in south-east Europe or in the Baltic states, as well as the non-German, but 'Germanic' volunteers from west or north European countries either allied with, or occupied by, Germany. In the spring of 1940 the first two regiments with a few hundred 'Germanic' volunteers each were established. This was the first step in the direction of reorganising the WaffenSS into a multinational force; by the end of the war, only about 40 per cent of the Waffen-SS men had been born within the Reich borders. 45 The development of the Waffen-SS into a multinational army was a practical response to the problem of the scarcity of recruits, a problem which increased in urgency as the

403

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION" ROLE OF T H E SS IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY

war went on. But it was also consistent with the ideological and power-political aim of the 55, which was to become the elite of a 'Greater Germanic Empire' transcending the borders of the Reich. How outrageously ambitious this was is illustrated by Himmler's plans for a post-war 'panGermanic army' to be set up on the basis of conscription, and under the control of the in the 'Germanic' countries. 46 Even more absurd were the deliberations of the 55-leadership in the summer of 1940, when they wondered whether they should eventually recruit the millions of people of German descent living in Australia, Canada, the United States and South America for the resettling of the East. 47 While the development of the Waffen-SS into a multinational force was still an ideologically justifiable consequence of the demands of war, the same cannot be said of some other tendencies within it. One of these potentially suspect tendencies was the gradual subversion of the principle of voluntary service. It is not that the Waffen-SS was ever officially changed into a conscript army; the principle of voluntary enlistment of the 55 man was far too important a part of the 55 identity as an ideological order to allow that. However, in the totalitarian 'national community' ( Volksgemeinschaft) of the Third Reich, there were ample opportunities of coercing massive numbers of young people into 'voluntarily' joining the ranks of the 55. T h e 55 recruitment authorities were not slow to avail themselves of these opportunities, and by 1942 coerced 'volunteering' was more or less the norm. 48 Indeed, 55 recruitment policies were in a dilemma that could hardly be solved: it needed at one and the same time to satisfy Himmler's ambition of having at his disposal a maximum number of new 55 divisions and army corps, and to try and make good the extremely high losses sustained by the existing 55 formations. By the end of 1943, about 50,000 55 soldiers had fallen; more than twice the overall strength of armed 55 forces a year before the outbreak of war. These losses hit, above all, the divisions which had been developed from pre-war 55 formations (i.e. the Ldbstandarle-SS Adolf Hitler, Dos Reich, Totenkopf and Wiking divisions). With the best possible staff and equipment, they

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

were surely among the elite of the German armed forces.49 Almost exclusively employed as a 'fire-brigade' on critical spots of the eastern, western and southern fronts, they were responsible for the legendary military reputation of the Waffen-SS.

Their extremely high losses, especially among their officers, were the price they had to pay for this reputation. In the long run, however, these losses endangered the existence of the whole formation: the feverish creation of even more new divisions resulted in a Waffen-SS that bore hardly any resemblance to the pre-war contingency force. By mid-1944, out of all generals and colonels, less than 50 per cent had served in the armed SS forces before the war. Consequendy, the higher echelons were anything but unanimous in their ideology, and there were vast differences in their social and educational backgrounds. 50 The lack of a unified ideology was even more marked among the ranks, above all among those drafted into the SS. This also held true for foreigners who had usually joined for reasons which were anything but specifically National Socialist.51 In short, its military successes notwithstanding, the Waffen-SS was losing its political and ideological profile during this vast expansion. As the Waffen-SS now formed by far the largest part of the SS, we can make the generalisation that even as the 55 was increasing its power, its cohesiveness was being eroded. Due to the exigencies of war, the efforts of central SS authorities to remedy this through additional political instruction and other means remained without much success. Even from a military point of view, the efforts of the 55 leadership to develop the Waffen-SS into a mass army without sacrificing its claim as an elite had to lead to a dilemma. In the long run, it was not possible both to expand in size and to maintain very high standards at the same time. Therefore an increasingly varied range of quality developed within the Waffen-SS. The elite Panzer divisions which formed the backbone of the defence of the now hardpressed German front were only the smaller part of the Waffen-SS of the later years. More typical for the overall picture were by now divisions whose training and equipment were clearly deficient and whose fighting power was at best

405

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION" ROLE OF T H E SS IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMANY

limited. 52 In other words, with the wave of new formations created by 1943, the Waffen-SS had ceased to be a military elite per se. The leadership accepted this only because, once again, it hoped to use this change of structure towards a mass army for its own long-term political aims. Its military planning for the post-war period involved two aspects: the reorganisation of the Waffen-SS as the military spearhead of the 55 order with the wartime elite divisions as a core, and a Germanic-European army which would not be part of the 55 but would be controlled by it. This would consist of the other formations with their mainly foreign troops. 53 Its grip on such a European army would certainly have made the 55 the key power in a National Socialistdominated Europe. VI We were only able to follow the history of the 55 by drawing on two of its component parts, the concentration camps and the Waffen-SS. Our selectivity here should not obscure the fact that we are in reality dealing with a massive wartime augmentation of power - a process which threatened, even more than in pre-war years, to engulf the whole of society. It was particularly during the war that the interdependencies among the various components of the 55 became clear. We have seen how the development of the concentration camp system helped shape the role the 55 could play in the armaments sector; this in turn directly affected the Waffen-SS's materiel standards. The latter group proved to be not only a powerful military instrument, but also a suitable instrument for the realisation of the foreign and occupational aims of the Reicksführung-SS. The drafting of hundreds of thousands of Volksdeutsche, racial Germans, can only be understood within the context of the massive resettlement programme which Himmler planned in his capacity as 'Reich's Commissar for the strengthening of the German Race' (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums).* The negative side of this ambition was, however, the deportation, enslavement and partial extermination of the Slav population. Also in the establishment of 'Higher 55 and Police Leaders' (Höhere SS- und Polizeifuhrer) ,55 for

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

407

example, or in the foundation of a ' G e n e r a l - ^ (Allgemeine SS) on the German model in the occupied 'Germanic' countries, SS interests in the field of home affairs, occupational, military, police and ideological policies closely meshed. This network of interlocking interests tightened as Himmler took over more and more offices or functions within the regime. We should remind ourselves in this context that after October 1939 the Reichsfiihrer SS was also 'Reich's Commissar for the Strengthening of German Race' and that, in August 1943, he became minister of the interior as well. After the breakdown of the Army Group Centre [during the Russian summer offensive launched on 22 June 1944 Ed.], Himmler was given command of the newly drafted Volks grenadier-divisions, and eventually of the POW camps as well. [However, this did not change the administration and guarding of POW camps which remained in Wehrmacht hands. Ed.] Finally he became commander-inchief of the Reserve Army and head of army armaments (.Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres und Chef der Heeresrüstung) after the failure of the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt. 56 In retrospect, we can say that Heinrich Himmler's empire was the result of an exceptional historical situation. More precisely, it was a function of the unusual dynamism of the National Socialist system. The SS profited from this sociopolitical fluidity first during the internal restructuring of Germany after the NS seizure of power in 1933, and then during the military 'reorganisation' of Europe in the war. During the first phase, roughly until 1938, the succeeded in establishing its power only after strong competition both with older functional elites and with rival NS groups. From this position of strength it became, during the war, the catalytic element behind the radicalisation of the Führer regime. In other words, the SS helped continue the 'National Socialist Revolution' under the cover of wartime exigencies. It seems that this process accelerated as the regime's chances of survival diminished. It is certainly no coincidence that Himmler reached the zenith of his power at a time when the German defeat was no longer in doubt. By late summer 1944, the SS had become, in virtually every respect, the last hope for the 'Thousand Year Reich'.

408

THE "FINAL SOLUTION' T H E ' A R I S T O C R A C Y OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM', T H E R O L E OF T H E SS

IN N A T I O N A L SOCIALIST GERMANY

1. G. Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945 (London, 1956) The most authoritative analysis of the SS as a whole is now as before the collaborative work by H. Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols (Freiburg-Olten, 1965). (English abridged edition, Anatomy of the SS-state, New York, 1968). 2. For a broader analysis of the ideological impact of the idea of politisches Soldatentum see H. Buchheim, 'Befehl und Gehorsam', in Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 1; and B. Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: die Waffen-SS 1933-1945. Studien zu Leitbild, Struktur und Funktion einer nationalsozialistischen Elite (Paderborn, 1982), Part I. 3. A. Hider, Mein Kampf (Munich, 1933), p. 386. 4. Speech by Himmler on 8 November 1938, as quoted in Β. F. Smith and A. Petersen (eds), Heinrick Himmler - Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 (Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna, 1974), pp. 3If. 5. Reichssicherheitshauptamt/ Amt 1/ Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur SS-Führeranwärter: Grundriss Nr. 9, Judentum (Bundesarchiv Koblenz: R 58/844, Bl. 72). 6. SS-Gruppenführer Panclte as quoted in J. Ackermann, Henrich Himmler als Ideologe (Göttingen, 1970), p. 156. 7. As he did, for example, in a speech on 8 November 1937: 'we want to create an upper class for Germany, selected constantly over centuries, a new aristocracy, recruited always from the best sons and daughters of our nation, an aristocracy that never becomes old' (National Archives: microfilm Τ-175/ roll 90/ . . . 2447). 8. 'Erschliessung des germanischen Erbes', undated memorandum of the Reichsfûhrung-SS (1937), published in Ackermann, Heinrich Himmler, {>p. 253f. 9. For details see H. L'eberhorst, Elite für die Diktatur. Die Nationalpolitischen Erziehungsanstalten 1933 bis 1945. Ein Dokumentarbericht (Dusseldorf, 1969); H. Scholtz, NS-Ausleseschulen. Internatsschulen als Herrschaftsmittel des Führerstaates (Göttingen, 1973). H. W. Koch, The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development (London, 1975) 10. See M. Kater, Das 'Ahnenerbe' der SS 1935-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart, 1974). 11. See L. V. Thompson, Lebenskom and the Eugenics Policy of the ReichsjuhrerSS, Central European History, iv (1971), 54-77. 12. A decree of the Reichsminister des Innern of 11 November 1938 allowed the SD to work for the state administration as well; see also Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. ι, p. 74. 13. G. Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst. Geschichte der militärischen Abwehr (Munich, 1967), pp. 428fT. 14. For the 'Dachau model' see M. Broszat, 'Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933-1945', in Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. ri, pp. 46ff., and F. Pingel, Haßlinge unter SS-Herrschaß. Widerstand, Selbstbehauptung und Vernichtung im Konzentrationslager (Hamburg, 1978), pp. 35ff.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

409

15. Details of the numerical development are given in Hitlers Politische Soldaten Wegner, p. 104 (Table 2). 16. With the establishment of the Hauptamt OrmngspolUei and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt the top police administration became correspondingly organised to the central ££ administration. For details see H.-J. Neufeldt et al., Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei ¡936-1945 (Koblenz, 1957) and G. Browder, SIPO and SD, 19311940. Formation of an Instrument of Power, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1977). 17. The most lucid contemporary comment on the Staatsschutdtorps concept was given by W. Best, 'Die SchutzstafTel der NSDAP und die deutsche Polizei', Deutsches Recht, 9 (1939), edition A, 44ff. For further consideration see Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 1 lOff. 18. For the general background see K. J . Müller, Das Heer tad Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1533-19*0 (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 147. 19. This is well expressed, for example, in the regulations from the minister of defence on 24 September 1934, concerning the organisation of the SS-Verfiigungstruppt (published in P. Hausser, Soldaten wie ändert auch. Der Wog der Waffen-SS, Osnabrück, 1966, pp. 232ff., doc. no. 1). 20. This referred only to service in the SS-Verfigungstruppe, whereas service in the i S war academies or the £S Death's Head units was not accepted as military service in pre-war years. 21. Führer decree of 17 August 1938, published in Hausser, Soldaten wie andere auch, pp. 252fi°., doc. no. 6. 22. Führer decree of 18 May 1939 (Bundesarchiv Koblenz: R 2/ 12 172a); a detailed analysis may be found in Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, Chapter 8. 23. See R. M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem 1933-1938. Volkstunspolitik and the Formulation of Ναό Foreign Policy (Folkestone, 1975)/ pp. 166ff. and A. Ramme, Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS. Zu seiner Funktion im faschistischen Machtapparat und im Besatoaigsregime des sog. General-gouoemements Polen (Berlin, 1969), pp. 87ff. 24. O. Groehler, 'Kolonialforderungen als Teil der faschistischen Kriegszielplanung', Zeitschrift für Militär geschickte, 4 (1965), 552. 25. H. A. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialùtisdu Ausserlpolitik 1933-1938 (Frankfurt-Berlin, 1968), pp. 461ff. 26. Ribbentrop's relationship to the is sketched by R. M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, pp. 179f. 27. In pre-war years the two most important 5S enterprises were the 'Deutsche Erd- und Steinwerke GmbH, founded in 1938, and the 'deutsche Ausrüstungswerke GmbH', founded in 1939. An account of their development is given by E. Georg, Die wirtschaftlichen Unternehmungen der SS (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 42ff., 58ff. 28. Ibid., p. 10. 29. For further details see R. Vogelsang, Der Freundeskreis Himmler (Gôttingen, 1972). 30. Speech of 4 October 1943, as quoted in H. Buchheim, 'Die Höheren SSund Polizeiführer', VierteljahresheftefirZeitgeschichte 11 (Munich, 1963) 379f. In a speech on 8 November 1938 Himmler had already expressed himself in the same sense: 'We must . . . take care, that all the branches established always feel as part of the whole. . . . For every single one of these branches this should hold true: everybody is an man before everything else, then he belongs to the General 55, the Reserve Troops, the Death's Head units or the secret service.' (As quoted in Heinrich Himmler - Geheimreden op. cit., p. 29.) 31. The relevance of 1938 for the development of National Socialist Germany will be reflected in a forthcoming book, edited by F. Knipping and K. J . Müller.

410

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

32. Speech by Himmler of 8 November 1938, as quoted in Heinrich Himmln Geheimreden, p. 49. 33. Ibid., p. 38. 34. rhis is estimated as the minimum by Broszat in Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. n, p. 132. 35. For details on the deathrate in concentration camps see Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrsckaft, pp. 80ff., 18Iff. 36. The classic work on the holocaust is still R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago, 1961 ). For the role of the Action Groups {Einsatzgruppen) see the exhaustive study by H. Krausnick and H. H. Wilhelm, Die Truppe des WeltanscJuaamgskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981). 37. The latest result of the newly revived debate on the genesis of the 'final solution' is a detailed analysis of Hitler's personal involvement: G. Fleming, Hitler und die Endßsung. 'Es ist des Führers Wunsch . . .' (Wiesbaden-Munich, 1982). 38. Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft, pp. 123ff., A. Speer, Der Sklaoenstaat. Meine Auseinandersetzungen mit der SS (Stuttgart, 1981), and, more recently, L. Herbst, Der totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda (Stuttgart, 1982). Herbst (pp. 253ff.) deals with a rather neglected aspect, which is the SS's interest in the ministry of economy. 39. Speer, Der Sklaoenstaat, p. 61. 40. M. Broszat, 'Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager', in Anatomie des SSStaates, vol. u, pp. 94f. 41. Pingel, Häftlinge unter SS-Herrschaft, p. 129. 42. Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, p. 210 (Table 8). 43. For the negotiations between the SS-Hauptamt and the armed forces' high command in the early years of the war see G. H. Stein, The Waffen-SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945 (Oxford and Ithaca, New York, 1966). 44. Ibid., pp. 3Iff., 87ff.; see also G. Rempel, 'Gottlob Berger and Waffen-SS Recruitment, 1939-1945', MilitärgeschuMiche Mitteilungen, 27 (1/1980), 107-122. 45. To date, we lack an authoritative analysis of the as a multinational army. First approaches are Ph. H. Buss and A. Mollo, Hitler's Germanic Legions. An illustrated history of the Western European Legions with the SS, 1941-1943 (London, 1978); H. W. Neulen, Eurofaschismus und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Europas verratene Söhne (Munich, 1980). 46. For supporting documents see Β. Wegner, 'Auf dem Wege zur pangermanischen Armee. Dokumente zur Entstehungsgeschichte des III. (germanischen) SSPanzerkorps', Militirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 28 (2 Freiburg 1980), 101-36, especially pp. 112f. 47. Ibid., p. 102. 48. Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 273ff. 49. There are critical accounts of the history of two of those divisions: J. J. Weingartner, Hitler's Guard. The story of the Leiòstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 1933-1945 (London-Amsterdam, 1974); Ch. W. Sydnor, Jr, Soldiers of Destruction. The SS Death's Head Division 1933-1945 (Princeton, 1977). For additional bibliographical information see B. Wegner, 'Die Garde des "Führers" und die "Feuerwehr" der Ostfront. Zur neueren Literatur über die Waffen-SS,' Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen. 23 (1/1978), 210-36. 50. For a detailed sociographic analysis of the higher echelons of the Waffen-SS officer corps see Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, Part iv (pp. 217ff.) and, by the same author, 'Das Führerkorps der Waffen-SS im Kriege,' in H. H. Hofmann (ed.), Das deutsche Offtzierkorps 1860-1960 (Boppard a.Rh., 1980), pp. 327-50.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

51. This holds particularly true for the period after the German attack on the Soviet Union. 52. See also Stein's critical judgement, The Waffrn-SS, pp. 172fT. 53. See note 46 above. 54. One of the most impressive documents of this policy is the so-called Generalplan Ost from summer 1941; see G. Eisenblätter, Grundlagen der Politik des Reichs gegenüber dem Generalgouvernement, 1939-1945, Diss. phil. (Frankfurt, 1969), pp. 205ff., for the general background see R. Koehl, RKFDV: German resettlement and population polity 1939-1945. A history of the Reith commission for the strengthening of Germandam (Cambridge, 1957). 55. For the role of the Höhere SS- und Polizeifihrer within the SS administrative structure see H. Buchheim, 'Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer', VierteljaJaeshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (Munich 1962), 362-91. 56. Himmler's self-assessment at the culminating point of his career is well reflected in his speech to the Gauleiter of 3 August 1944, in Vterteljahrtshefte fir Zeitgeschichte (Munich, 1953), 357-94.

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

Alfred

Rosenberg

and the "Final Solution " in the Occupied Soviet Territories Y I T Z H A K

A R A D

appointed "Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories" (Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete) in view of his Baltic origin, close acquaintance with the peoples of the region and expert knowledge of Bolshevism and the USSR. As a young man he had witnessed the Bolshevik revolution and the collapse of Czarist Russia. The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" had influenced him greatly and he attributed the revolution and civil war in Russia to a world-wide Jewish plot, identifying the Bolshevists with the Jews.

ALFRED ROSENBERG WAS

In November 1918, as the German army was withdrawing from his home town, Reval (Tallinn) in Estonia, Rosenberg gave a speech at the town hall about the connection between Judaism and Bolshevism and the threat this implied for Germany. He crossed into Germany together with the retreating German army, bearing with him his hatred of Bolshevism and the crude, virulent anti-Semitism which is characteristic of Eastern Europe. 1

1

Robert Cecil. The Myth of the Master Race\ Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology, B . T . Batsford, London. 1972. pp. 18-20.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D

The German concept of Drang nach Osten, in quest of Lebensraum (living space) for the German people in the lands of Russia and the hatred of Bolshevism as symbolizing the Jewish plot to gain control of the world—these concepts were adopted by Hitler and the Nazi party partly through Rosenberg's influence and became the central political tenet of the Third Reich. Rosenberg was one of the first to join Hitler in 1918 in Munich, but despite his contribution to Nazi ideology was not granted any important position in Germany once the Nazis had gained power. His first post was that of "Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs" of the Nazi Party; he was also charged with the ideological indoctrination of the political cadres. Joachim Fest wrote of him : . . . and so in the course of the years as the idea of power itself visibly outweighed its ideological drapings, he came to be 'the forgotten disciple,' scarcely taken seriously any longer, insolently overlooked and pushed around, a prop from the party's recruiting phase when ideology determined action. 2

Rosenberg fought for his position within the Nazi hierarchy. On 15th April 1939 he founded "The German National-Socialist Workers' Party Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question" (Institut der NSDAP zur Erforschung der Judenfrage), an extension of "The Nazi Party High School," which was intended to serve as a central ideological institution for research and study of the Third Reich. The institute was inaugurated in Frankfurt between March 26-28, 1941. At the Institute's first scientific conference Rosenberg made several speeches about the wider significance of the 'Jewish question', saying, amongst other things: " . . .The day will come when the struggle of the democracies against the racialist concept will be assessed and compared with the Inquisition's struggle against the awakening of national culture and 2

Joachim G. Fest, The Face of the Third 1970, p. 163.

Reich.

Pantheon Books,

413

414

THE "FINAL SOLUTION' A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D T H E FINAL SOLUTION self-awareness in the European peoples . . . accordingly, 1940, the year of the great völkisch revolution, will be considered a year of decision, when the armies of the Rothschild republic were defeated . . . in the course of which our own house was put in order, when Mr. Roosevelt, his barons and movie-Jews could no longer intervene .. . and the strongest military instrument in history. Adolf Hitler's Wehrmacht, will prove that this desperate last attempt to make the white race march against Europe on behalf of Jewish-plutocracy will be foiled for ever . . ."

In another speech at the same conference Rosenberg stressed that: " F o r Germany the Jewish question will be solved only when the last Jew leaves the soil of Greater Germany . . . I believe that we can say in the name of all Europeans: for E u r o p e the Jewish question will be resolved only when the last Jew leaves the European continent." 3 Preparations for the Attack on the USSR and the A nti-Jewish Policy When preparations for attacking the USSR (Operation "Barbarossa") had reached an advanced stage Hitler appointed Rosenberg, the Nazi party's expert on Soviet affairs, to a key position. On March 31, 1941 he was given the task of establishing " T h e Political Bureau for Eastern Affairs." and on April 21 of that year his authority was extended and he was appointed by Hitler as the Commissioner of " T h e Central Agency for the East European Territory" {Beauftragter für die zentrale Bearbeitung der Fragen des osteuropäischen Raums).* The general view of the Nazi leadership was that the USSR should be eliminated as a Communist State (its Jewish-Bolshevik regime) and certain areas of it should be annexed to Germany. Beyond this general concept, opinions differed. A. Dallin writes

3 Max Weinreich, Hitler's Professors, YIVO. New York, 1946. pp. 98-101. 10Ó. 4

Hitler's directive issued on April 20, 1941. Nuremberg I MT, XXVI. PS-864.

documents,

415

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D

of three concepts which were current among the Nazi leadership: one opinion proposed complete rule over the USSR territory, which would be exploited for German settlement while depriving the peoples living there of their national rights. This line was supported by Hitler, Goring, Bormann and other Nazi chieftains. Another view was crystallized during the course of the war; this proposed appealing to the Russian nation and the other peoples of the USSR to join the struggle against Jewish-Bolshevik rule, being granted in return a certain measure of national independence within the framework of the new order in Europe. This concept did not have any supporters among the principle leaders of the Nazi party, most of its advocates being drawn at a later stage of the war from officers and senior officials who feared that Germany would be defeated in the war. The third view constituted a compromise between the two preceding ones, proposing an anti-Soviet line and the division of the USSR into small protectorate states. According to this concept Germany would declare that it was bringing liberation from Bolshevism and independence to the national minorities of the USSR, crushing the historical-Russian threat which menaced them; thus, they were duty bound to help fight the communist regime. Rosenberg was the main proponent of this approach, for whose acceptance he fought throughout the war. 5 Rosenberg's first directive, dated April 2, 1941, dealt with the objectives and methods of the German rule to be introduced once the USSR was conquered. He cited the political future of the various peoples and nationalities within the Soviet Union on the basis of their racial origin and support of or opposition to Germany. In this document Rosenberg wrote that the JewishBolshevik state administration was to be totally destroyed ( völlige Vernichtung) β

:

· Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia. 1941-1945, London. 1957, pp. 56-57 (hereafter — Dallin). β IMT. X X V I , PS-1017.

Macmillan,

416

THE "FINAL SOLUTION ALFRED ROSENBERG A N D THE FINAL SOLUTION

In Rosenberg's memorandum dated April 29, 1941, in which he defined the tasks of the "Political Bureau for Eastern Affairs," he wrote, amongst other things: "A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for which a temporary solution will have to be determined (forced labor for the Jews, creation of Ghettos, etc.)." 7 The instructions Rosenberg prepared on May 7, 1941 for the man who was to be appointed "Reich Commissar in the Ukraine" (Reichskommissar) also contained a reference to the Jewish question. The instructions were written in draft form, with erasures and corrections. The full text is as follows : After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution, through the institution of Ghettos. Insofar as the Jews have not been driven out by the Ukrainians themselves, the small communities must be lodged in large camps, in order to be kept busy by means of forced labor, in the same way as it has already been the practice in Lodz. 8

In accordance with Hitler's orders of early April 1941, the High Command of the German armed forces (OKW) and army (OKH) prepared to issue the "Commissar Decree." The objective of this order was to execute "political officials and leaders (commissars)" in the occupied USSR territory immediately and without trial. In practical terms this order signified that all members of the Communist party machine, on the national and municipal levels, as well as the political commissars in the Red Army, were to be liquidated. Rosenberg was aware of the fact that the total elimination of the state administration and the implementation of the "Commissar Decree" would leave the German administration in occupied USSR bereft of any local potential for the lower levels of administration. He therefore thought it necessary to train local administrative personnel, " PS-1024. 8 PS-1028.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D

so that they would be able to man the autonomous institutions which would one day be established in the occupied territories. In this connection he asked the High Command to transfer to Hitler his memorandum proposing that the "Commissar Decree" be applied only to senior Communist officials and not to those of low rank, so that the latter could serve in the German administration which would be established in conquered USSR. 9 However, Rosenberg's intervention was of no avail and the final version of the "Commissar Decree," which was issued on June 6, 1941, took no account of his suggestions. On June 20, 1941, two days before the invasion of Russia, Rosenberg called a meeting of senior officials who were to take up key posts in the German civil administration of conquered Russia. He delivered a long and detailed speech about Germany's political aims in fighting the USSR and about German administration and policy in the occupied territories. He also suggested that German propaganda directed at the Soviet populations should focus on the "Jewish rule" (Judenherrschaft) of the USSR. 10 In documents compiled during the preparations for invading the Soviet Union Rosenberg expressed his general ideas on the Jewish question, as mentioned earlier. His policy was based primarily on the anti-Jewish steps in the General Government in Poland, where the Jews had been concentrated, segregated in ghettoes and exploited for forced labor. However, Rosenberg regarded all this as an "interim solution." Presumably he was still unaware of the nature and meaning of the "special tasks," assigned to Himmler and the SS by Hitler and published in the Wehrmacht order for Operation Barbarossa on March 13, 1941. which in actual fact meant the total liquida-

9

Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 19391945, Athenäum Verlag, IMT, XXVI, PS-884. Frankfurt, 1964, pp. 181-183. io PS-1058.

417

418

THE " F I N A L S O L U T I O N

ALFRED ROSENBERG A N D THE FINAL SOLUTION tion of Soviet Jewry by the Special Task Force (Einsatzgruppe) cf the Security Police, the SD and other SS units. Rosenberg's report of June 28, 1941 on his preparations for German administration in the Eastern Territories emphasized the cooperation of the Wehrmacht and other institutions of the Third Reich, excluding the SS which apparently withheld information from him.11 The Establishment On

June 22,

of the Civilian

1941 Nazi

four Einsatzgruppen

Administration

Germany

invaded

the USSR.

The

of the Security Police and the SD advanced

together with the vanguard units of the Wehrmacht and began the total annihilation of the Jews of the Soviet Union. A few days after the invasion, at the beginning of July 1941 the Chief

of Staff of

the Wehrmacht, General Keitel, asked

Rosenberg to undertake the administration of all Lithuania and most

of

Latvia,

which had already

been conquered

by the

German army. The military did not relish the German army's dealing with the political problems resulting from the establishment of Latvians.

national administrations by the Lithuanians and the Rosenberg

transferred Keitel's application

and on July 8. received the reply:

to Hitler

" T h e Führer does not at

present desire a civil administration in the conquered territories in the East, and reserves the right to select the appropriate time." Without

waiting

for

Hitler's

answer

Rosenberg

reached

an

agreement with the Wehrmacht and, on July 14, it was decided that the lower echelons of the civil administration would begin functioning in the conquered territories in the East.12 On July 16, Hitler called a meeting, in which Goring, Rosenberg. Keitel, Bormann and Lammers participated, to discuss the objectives of the war in the USSR. Rosenberg suggested that the attitude to the local population be determined by condi-

11 12

PS-1039. Dallin. op. cit. p. 189.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK

ARAD

lions in the various regions and that the national aspirations of the Ukrainians be encouraged; his proposals were not accepted however. At this meeting the Jewish question was mentioned indirectly, when Hitler said: "The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us." Indeed, many reports about the execution of Jews in various places in the Soviet Union mention the sabotage activities of the Jews, either as partisans or giving assistance to such.13 The day after this meeting, on July 17, Hitler issued the civil administration decree. Alfred Rosenberg was appointed "Minister for the Occupied Territories in the East," and head of the German civil government there, although he was not granted exclusive control. According to the decree, the areas to be governed by civil administration Reichskommissariate divided into, regional — Generalkommissariate and district — GebietskommissariaXe. In an additional order issued by the Führer on July 17, 1941, Himmler was made responsible for police security in the areas under the civil administration and was empowered to issue direct orders to the Reich Commissars, thus circumventing Rosenberg's office, except with regard to subjects of a general nature having political significance.14 "Higher SS and Police Officers" (HSSPF) were appointed at all levels of the civil administration, being officially subject to the authority of those in charge of it, but in effect acting on direct orders from Himmler. Hitler appointed military commanders (Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht) with broad authority for each "Reich Commissariat," subordinate to the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). In addition, other German authorities, such as post, transport, mobilization 13 L-221. 14

PS-1997; in May 1942 Rosenberg complained to Lammers that none of Himmler's directives intended for the Reich Commissar were transmitted through him; see Dallin, p. 168.

419

420

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" ALFRED ROSENBERG AND THE FINAL SOLUTION of manpower,

etc., operated

independently

of the civil

ad-

ministration in the occupied territories. On June 9, 1941, Goring had been vested by Hitler with supreme authority in economic affairs and responsibility

for

the four-year plan throughout the occupied Soviet Territories, be they under military or civil rule. On July 17, 1941 Hitler appointed Heinrich Lohse Commissar for the Ostland"

"Reich

(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and

part of White Russia) and Erich Koch " R e i c h Commissar for the Ukraine." Lohse was appointed upon Rosenberg's recommendation, Koch, however, was nominated against his wishes, at the suggestion of Goring and Bormann. T h e Reich Commissars were officially subordinate to Rosenberg, but since they had been appointed by Hitler himself and their broad authority made them in effect independent of the former, they often either ignored his directives or acted against them. T h e fact that several independent German authorities functioned in the East, that there was no precise definition of their sphere of activities and that personal rivalries existed alongside differences of opinion

about the war objectives,

caused

in-

cessant conflicts within the German administration there. Dallin writes: " I f the purpose behind the establishment of a central Territorial-ministerium for the East had been to streamline its work by setting up a simple chain of command, the result was precisely the contrary."

15

At the end of July and the beginning of August 1941, before Hitler had issued the appropriate order, the civil administration was given authority over parts of the Ostland. T h e officiai order for the transfer of part of the Ostland to the civil administration was issued only on August 20, and the order pertaining to part of the Ukraine was published on September 1, 1941, 16 while the areas near the front remained under Military Government. i s Ibid., p. 99. i s Ibid.. p. 85.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK ARAD

On August 1, 1941 Rosenberg called a meeting of department heads in his Ministry, in which Lohse, the Reich Commissar for the Ostland, also participated. Lohse reported on what was being done in Lithuania and, referring to the Jewish question, said: "The Jewish problem is the most important of all; to date ten thousand Jews have been eliminated by the Lithuanian population; executions continue every night, labor camps have been established and Jewish women will also be included in the labor force." 17 The minutes of the meeting make no mention of the executions of Jews by the Einsatzgruppen in Lithuania in July 1941. On August 13. 1941 Lohse issued the "Temporary Directives for Dealing with the Jewish Question," which included instructions for registering the Jews, confiscating their property, imposing forced labor and segregating them in ghettoes. 18 The instructions stated that all these activities were to be temporary measures until "the action taken by the Security Police against the Jews shall be completed." The Security Police opposed the publication of this order, claiming that the Jewish question was not within the jurisdiction of the civil administration and was their responsibility alone. In a letter sent on August 10, by the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, SS-Brigadeführer Jeckeln, to Heydrich, the Head of the Security Police and the SD, he wrote: " I beg to inform the Reich Commissar that I am obliged to oppose the publication of orders before clarification with the Security Police, as the treatment of the Jewish question is primarily the concern of the Security Police . . . in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of the Führer's order of July 17, 1941 . . . " 19 Rosenberg regarded himself and the civil administration as being responsible for the Jewish question in the territories under the rule of the 'Ministry for the Eastern Territories' and there17

Minutes of the meeting held on August 5, 1941, Vad Vashem Archives, 0-4/53/1 (hereafter — Y VA), is PS—1138. is Letter sent by Jeckeln to Heydrich. Y VA, 0-/53/1.

421

422

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" ALFRED ROSENBERG A N D THE F I N A L SOLUTION

fore did not interpret Hitler's order about police security issued on July 17, as supporting the view that the Jewish question was within the competence of the SS. This attitude led to difference., of opinion between the SS and the civil administration. On August 16, 1941 Rosenberg issued the "Decree concerning Forced Labor for Jews in the Occupied Territories in the East", the first document referring to the Jews signed by him as Minister for the Eastern Territories. T h e decree obliged all Jews between 14 and 60 years of age, both men and women, to report for forced labor, those who evaded doing so being punishable by execution. On August 23, Rosenberg issued a decree making the opposition to or violation of orders issued by the German administration in the East; terrorism and the dissemination of hostile rumours or anti-German propaganda punishable by death through special courts. T h e decree stated that if it should be impossible to convene a special court, the commander of a police battalion, SS battalion or Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and the SD would be empowered to order the execution. 20 This decree made no specific reference to Jews, but the policy of terror adopted with regard to the entire population and which imposed the death penalty for minor offences, sanctioned the execution of Jews, who had been defined a priori as enemies of the Reich even if they had not committed any specific offence. On September 3. 1941 Rosenberg published orders concerning the structure of the civil administration and its policy in the occupied territories. This was called " T h e Brown Portfolio" (Braune Mappe) and was issued separately for the Reich commissariats in the Ostland and the Ukraine. Directives for Anti-Jewish 1. General

Policy in the Brown

Portfolio

All measures regarding the Jewish question in the occupied Eastern territories must be based on the view that the Jewish question 20 Y V A , 0 4 / 4 3 / 1 .

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK

ARAD

will be comprehensively solved throughout Europe after the war. Consequently, at this stage they are to be instituted as p r e p a r a t o r y partial measures and must be in agreement with the other decisions m a d e in this sphere. T h e experience gained in dealing with the Jewish question in the occupied Eastern territories m a y serve as the basis f o r conclusions about resolving the entire problem, since the Jews in these territories, together with the Jews in the General G o v e r n m e n t constitute the majority of E u r o p e a n Jewry. At all events vindictive measures which are unworthy of a Germ a n should be avoided. N o act by the civilian population against the Jews need be prevented, provided this is compatible with the maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting troops. Strict measures are to be taken against street mobs and evil elements whose sole concern is to loot Jewish shops and steal Jewish property f o r their own personal gain. 2. The State of the Population In the individual Reich commissariats and within the General commissariats, Jewry represents a portion of the population which varies in strength. F o r example, in White Russia and the Ukraine millions of Jews have been living there for many generations while most of the Jews in the central areas of the USSR arrived there only during the Bolshevik period. T h e Soviet Jews who came in the wake of the Red Army to East Poland, Ukraine, White Russia, the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and Bukovina are one particular group. Treatment of these divergent groups must differ to a certain extent. First priority should be given to taking drastic measures against those Jews w h o arrived in the areas conquered in the last two years by the Soviets, if they have not already fled. This g r o u p of Jews has incurred the hatred of the local populations as a result of the terror it has spread; the greater part of this g r o u p was eliminated by the local inhabitants when the G e r m a n a r m y reached the area. Acts of retaliation of this nature should not be prevented. T h e next task should be to gain control of the rest of the local Jewish population, through making registration obligatory. All the Jews will be made to wear a distinguishing sign (yellow p a t c h ) . 3. Isolating ¡he Jews from the Rest of the Population The first main goal of the G e r m a n measures must be the strict segregation of Jewry· from the rest of the population. Since the Bolshevik revolution the Soviet Jews, particularly in the grain

423

424

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D T H E F I N A L S O L U T I O N regions of the USSR, have tried to disguise their identity with a view to reaching key positions. F o r this purpose many Jews have converted and adopted Russian n a m e s . . . Instructions must be issued making registration of every change of name obligatory, even if done several generations back . . . The Jews' freedom cf movement must be immediately curtailed. Efforts should be made to transfer them to ghettoes . . . which can be placed under the supervision of a Jewish self-government and Jewish police . . . 4. Economic Activities Because of the wartime priority of the economic activities in the East, care should be taken when adopting anti-Jewish measures to avoid damaging vital economic interests. It is necessary to institute a total regrouping of Jewish professions; civil servants, who constituted the strongest Jewish professional group during Soviet rule, should disappear completely . . . and the manpower thus made available should be diverted, under supervision, to productive, primarily physical, labor . . . Jewish laborers in factories and workshops will be allowed to continue their w o r k . . . The part of the Jewish population engaged in agriculture should be increased . .. All Jewish property must be registered. Transactions require approval. 5. Cultural Activities The Jews should be separated, by stages, from the cultural activity of the general population and should be restricted to Jewish institutions . . . Jewish schools must absorb Jewish children who had previously attended schools with a different language of instruction . . . Alongside of Yiddish they should be encouraged to speak Hebrew as a language that serves [the aim of] separating them from the rest of the population. T h e teaching staff and curriculum of the Jewish schools must be under constant supervision. Jewish theatres and cinemas, etc. may continue to be run, under control, provided they are financed solely by Jewish funds and that only Jews may attend them. F o r the moment Jewish newspapers (in Yiddish or Hebrew) are forbidden. The possibility that Jewish journals may be allowed, under particularly close scrutiny, will be left for decision at a later date. Jewish public religious practices will be permitted only in the ghettoes. Ritual slaughter is forbidden. 2 1 2i The Brown Portfolio. YVA. 0 - 4 ' 5 3 / 1

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK ARAD

The anti-Jewish directives in the Brown Portfolio constitute a detailed account of Rosenberg's intentions, as outlined in documents he had prepared earlier, when the attack on the USSR was being planned. In these instructions Rosenberg was making use of the anti-Jewish measures which had been enforced for the previous two years in the areas of the General Government in Poland. It is interesting to observe Rosenberg's distinction between Jews in countries annexed to the USSR in 1939 and 1940 and those who had lived in the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution. No distinction of this kind can be found in instructions issued by other G e r m a n administrative bodies in conquered areas of the USSR. This difference may derive from Rosenberg's overall approach, which advocated steps suiting the aims and policy to the specific people of the USSR. In the Brown Portfolio it is explicitly stated that anti-Jewish steps must be based on the view that "the Jewish question will be solved after the war. . . " The difference between Rosenberg's instructions, as reflected in the Brown Portfolio, and those actually implemented in the Eastern occupied territories by the Einsatzgruppen was due to the fact that Rosenberg was unaware of Hitler's decision to liquidate all the Jews of the USSR in the course of the war. This decision had been made while the "Operation Barbarossa" was in the planning stage, and had been given over to Himmler and the SS for implementation. Rosenberg had not been informed of this decision at that time. Rosenberg apparently knew about the murder of the Jews in the conquered Eastern territories from reports received from sections of the civil administration, but he regarded this as part of the destruction of " t h e Bolshevik-Jewish government" and not as a wholesale slaughter of the Jews. Bräutigam, one of the senior officials in the Ministry for the Eastern Territories, wrote in his memoirs, after the war, that in accordance with the proposal put forward by the Political Department of the Ministry, Rosenberg agreed to speak with Hitler on "the disgusting and stupid deeds perpetrated against

425

426

THE "FINAL SOLUTION' A L F R E D R O S E N B E R G A N D T H E F I N A L SOLUTION

the Jews in the occupied Eastern territories." Hitler replied: "My dear Rosenberg, on this score vou have nothing to fear, as it has nothing to do with you. Himmler has received certain directives from me regarding the Jewish question, and he alone is responsible to me for their appropriate implementation." 22 Bräutigam does not say when this conversation between Hitler and Rosenberg took place, but if it did it must have been at the end of September 1941. Support for the Policy of Total Liquidation On October 4, Lohse sent Rosenberg a report on " T h e Solution of the Jewish Problem." In the report he described the mass murders, apparently adding that death by firing squads had created problems and that it was neccssary to find an alternative method of extermination. On October 25, 1941 a reply was sent to Lohse in Rosenberg's name, signed by Dr. Ernst Werzel, one of the senior officials at the Ministry for the Eastern Territories. Amongst other things, the letter contained the following phrases : . . . I have n o w to inform you that Obcrdienstleiter Brack of the Führer's Chancelier)· has agreed to collaborate in the manufacture of the necessary buildings and gas apparatus . . . He considers that it would be most useful to send some of his people — in particular his analytical chemist. Dr. Kallmeyer — to Riga immediately to assume responsibility for all further developments . . . I would ask you to apply to Brack through your Höhere SS und Polizeiführer for the secondment of Dr. Kallmeyer and such other assistance as you may require. In this connection I have to inform you that Sturmbannführer Eichmann . . . is in agreement with this procedure. He tells me that camps for Jews are to be established in Riga and Minsk, to which Jews from the Altreich will eventually be sent. . . In our present position we cannot afford to have scruples about taking advantage of Brack's facilities for the elimination of Jews 22

Otto Bräutigam. So hat es sich zugetragen 1968, p. 412 (hereafter — Bräutigam).

. . . Holzner Verlag, Würzburg

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D who are not fit for work, as these will provide a way of avoiding any possible recurrence of the events which occurred, according to a report I have in front of me, at the shooting of the Jews in Vilna. Incidentally, I see from the report that the shootings took place in public, which can hardly have been a p p r o v e d . . . 2 3

Documents published by the Soviets and trials of war criminals conducted in the USSR and other countries have not proved that permanent gas installations, in which Jews and non-Jews were killed, were constructed and used in the Eastern territories. However, gasvans, in which Jews were killed, did operate in these areas. 24 Apparently, Lohse did not accept Dr. Wetzel's "advice" and there were differences of opinion between Lohse and the SS concerning the Jewish question. On October 14, 1941 Rosenberg sent Lammers the complaints submitted by Lohse and Kube, the General Commissar for White Russia, against the SS, which "had confiscated and taken away large amounts of gold and silver from the Jews." Rosenberg was angry that the SS was "issuing decrees on its own when he alone was to have legislative power in the East." 25 During the second half of October 1941 Rosenberg's Ministry received a complaint from the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), stating that Lohse had forbidden Einsatzkommando 2 to continue executing the Jews in Libau, Latvia. In a letter dated October 31, 1941. sent by Leibbrandt, head of the Political Department of the Ministry for the East. Lohse was required to explain his action.

23 Helmut Krausnick — Martin Broszat, Anatomy of the SS State, Paladin, 1970, pp. 114-115. 24 Gas-vans, in which thousands of Jews were killed, were sent f r o m Germany, Austria and the Protectorate and were used in White Russia after May-June 1942; Nuremberg documents, PS-501; The Holocaust in Documents, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, 1978, (Hebrew), p. 328. 2 5 Dallin, p. 206; Rosenberg's letter to Lammers, Nuremberg documents, NG-1683.

427

428

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D T H E FINAL SOLUTION

On November 15, 1941 Lohse replied as follows to Rosenberg: I have forbidden the wild executions of Jews in Liepaia . . . I should like to be informed whether your inquiry of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all Jews in the East? Shall this take place without regard to age and sex and economic interests? So far I have not been able to find such a directive either in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the Brown Portfolio or in other decrees. 26

From the letter it can be inferred that the instructions in the Brown Portfolio were understood by Reich Commissar Lohse to mean that restrictions should be imposed on the Jews under his control, but not as an order to liquidate them totally. In mid-November 1941, before Lohse's reply to Leibbrandt's letter had been received, another letter reached Rosenberg's Ministry. This was also from Lohse and contained complaints by Carl, the District commissar for Slutzk, and Kube, the General Commissar for White Russia, concerning acts of cruelty perpetrated by men of the 11 th police force during an action against the Jews of Slutzk. T h e action was undertaken without any coordination with the civil administration and. according to the complaint, did serious damage to Germany's good name. Meyer, Rosenberg's second-in-command, forwarded this complaint to Heydrich. 27 As a result of these complaints a meeting was held between Himmler and Rosenberg on November 15, 1941. to discuss the subordination and authority of the SS civil administration in the East. At this meeting Himmler apparently clarified the tasks imposed on him by Hitler concerning the annihilation of the Jews in the East, stating that the Jews came under his jurisdiction and that of his representatives in the civil administration: " T h e Higher SS and Police Leaders ( H S S P F ) " on the basis of the decree concerning "Police Security in the Eastern 26 PS-3663. 2 " PS-1104; Rosenberg's evidence, IMT, XI, p. 502.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D

territories" issued by Hitler on July 17, 1941.28 Rosenberg accepted Himmler's stand. A joint directive signed by both Himmler and Rosenberg (issued on November 19, 1941) and distributed to all levels in the civil administration of the East as well as to the HSSPF attached to the civil administration, contained the following points : A. Higher SS and Police Leaders are personally and directly subordinate to the Reich Commissar. In his absence they are personally responsible for the tasks which they have been given, and are not subordinate to any other authority of the civil administration. B. Within the institutions of the Reich Commissariat in the East, the Higher SS and Police Leaders are responsible for all matters which are under the jurisdiction of the ReichsführerSS and the Head of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior. 29 His authority, apparently, also encompassed the Jewish question. Three days after the meeting between Rosenberg and Himmler, on November 18, 1941, Rosenberg addressed the representatives of the German press. In his speech, which no one was allowed to record, he mentioned the total liquidation of the Jews of Europe for the first time : The East is designated to solve the Jewish question, which confronts all the peoples of Europe. . . . There are still approximately six million Jews living in the East. This question can be solved only by the complete biological annihilation of all Jews, from the entire area of Europe . . .3°

The question of whether the liquidation of the Jews should be mentioned arose in a meeting between Rosenberg and Hitler 28

Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1961, p. 239 (hereafter — Hilberg). Himmler's memorandum of November 15, 1941, NO-5329. 29 YVA, 0 - 4 / 5 3 Ί . 30 Robert Kempner, The Profession: Annihilation, Schocken, 1965 (Hebrew) , pp. 69-70.

429

430

THE "FINAL SOLUTION A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D THE FINAL SOLUTION

on December 14, when the two men discussed a speech Rosenberg was to give at the Sports Palace in Berlin. In a memorandum Rosenberg wrote in connection with this meeting he stated: . . . I took the position that the annihilation (Ausrottung) of the Jews should not be mentioned in the speech. The Führer endorsed this view, adding that they had brought the war and the destruction upon us and that consequently it was hardly surprising that they should be the first to bear the consequences.

Rosenberg's speech at the Sports Palace was cancelled and there is no copy of the text he had prepared. However, after this meeting with Himmler in mid-November 1941 he talked about the liquidation of the Jews. On December 18. 1941 Bräutigam. Leibbrandt's second-incommand at the Ministry for the Eastern Territories, sent Lohse a reply to his letter of November 15, 1941 : Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic considerations should fundamentally remain unconsidered in the settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested that questions arising be settled directly with the Higher SS and Police Leaders.

Despite this letter, Lohse did not cancel his order issued on December 3, 1941 stopping the annihilation of Jews who were essential for the wartime economy. 32 At the end of January 1942 Himmler sent Rosenberg an "Express letter" (Schnellbrief) containing a proposal to alter the wording of the section dealing with the Jews in the Brown Portfolio. The first sentence read: All measures taken regarding the Jewish question in the East must be based on the view that the problem of the Jews has to be solved for Europe as a whole, on an overall level. Consequently, in the East no steps whatsoever should be taken to prevent measures directed at the elimination of the Jews. Our aspiration

31 PS-3664. 32 PS-3666.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK A R A D must be to rcach a rapid and final solution oí the Jewish question. It is assumed that the necessary steps are being taken by the appropriate authorities. N o obstacles should be placed in the way of possible activities undertaken by the local civilian population against the Jews, provided ihat this is compatible with the maintenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting troops.

According to Himmler's emendation, the emphasis was now being placed on the fact that the final solution of the Jewish question in the conquered Eastern territories was being implemented in practice by the appropriate authorities during the war and not "after the war," as had been stated in the Brown Portfolio. The amended document also contained the phrase "the final solution" (endgültige Lösung), which had not appeared in the Brown Portfolio. In section no. 2, "The State of the Population," the sentences dividing the Jews into different groups, distinguishing between Soviet and local Jews, were omitted. Himmler's document referred alike to all the Jews. In the section dealing with the registration of the Jews it was noted that this applied to "the Jewish population still remaining;" in section no. 3, "Segregation from the rest of the population." it was noted that "the strict segregaion from the rest of the population is temporary and will continue until measures designed to liquidate the Jews completely are taken." Section no. 4, "Economic Activities," runs: "Measures designed to achieve the annihilation of the Jews should be adopted, regardless of economic considerations," in contradiction to the note in the Brown Portfolio. Section no. 5. "Cultural Activities," which is the shortest, states: "There can be absolutely no Jewish cultural activities within the wider population. No Jewish newspapers may be published, Jewish ritual slaughter is forbidden. 33

33 This letter was received by the Ministry for the Eastern Territories on February 3, 1942; Y V A , 0 - 4 / 5 3 / 1 .

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION' A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D T H E F I N A L S O L U T I O N

This amended version was sent to Rosenberg's Ministry on January 29, 1942. The document emphasised the fact that the overall liquidation of the Jews and Jewry was to be implemented without delay, encompassing all Europe, and was the responsibility of the SS. The contents of the document reflected the decisions of the Wannsee Conference, which had taken place nine days previously, and in which Dr. Alfred Meyer, Rosenberg's deputy, had also participated. The contents of Himmler's "express letter" were accepted without question by the Ministry for the East. Any doubts about it related only to the administrative aspect. A n internal memorandum of the Ministry, dated February 4, 1942, read as follows: Because of the formulation some doubts have been raised in my mind. At any rate, the institutions of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories are not mentioned at all. Even if the solution of the Jewish question is to be decided by the institutions of the Reichsführer SS, then at least some hint should be given, that the poiice should inform the relevant regional and district commissars about the activities planned concerning the Jews . . . S 4

An unsigned and undated document entitled "Directives for Treatment of the Jewish Question in the Eastern Territories" was discovered in the Rosenberg Files after the war. T h e content of this document is similar in form to the Brown Portfolio, but has some important additions from Himmler's express letter, which change its substance. The first part, not included in the Brown Portfolio, states : 1. General. The competency of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, who is charged with the mission of Final Solution, extends even to the occupied eastern provinces. Accordingly, the officers under the Security Police for the purpose of handling the Jewish question in the occupied eastern provinces are qualified for their present sphere of activity." 35 34

This document was intended for Dr. Bräutigam, Leibbrandt's secondin-command. Y V A , 0 - 4 53/1. a5 PS-212.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YITZHAK ARAD

This document prepared after the Wannsee Conference includes the term Final Solution (Endlösung) that was not used in the Brown Portfolio. It also contains the consent of Rosenberg's Ministry that the Security Police has the full authority for handling the Jewish question in the Eastern Territories which were under German civil administration. The other parts of this document include also substantial changes in the spirit of Himmler's express letter. There is no evidence as to whether these new directives of Rosenberg's Ministry were published and sent to the Reichcommissariats. Actually, there was no need to issue an amendment of this kind since the letter sent by the Ministry to the Reich Commissar of Ostland on December 18, 1941, determined that the principle of liquidation took precedence in anti-Jewish policy over economic considerations; and that the authority in this sphere was in the hands of the SS. During the discussions and exchange of correspondence the process of the liquidation of the Jews in the areas of the civil administration was being fully implemented. At the first stage, which continued until the end of 1941, most of the Jews of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were murdered. During the second stage, in the course of 1942, the vast majority of Jews in White Russia and the Ukraine were executed. Whereas during the first stage in some places there were certain differences of opinion between the SS and the civil administration and the Wehrmacht concerning the scope of the liquidation, by the second stage the SS operated without any interference and even with the full cooperation of the civil administration. At the end of these stages some 70,000 or 80,000 working Jews and their families were still left in a few ghettoes in the East. On June 21, 1943 Himmler issued a directive ordering the liquidation of these ghettoes, the despatch of people fit for work to the concentration camps and the murder of all the rest.

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION' A L F R E D ROSENBERG A N D THE F I N A L SOLUTION

Nothing was known of this in advance by the Ministry for the Eastern Territories. Rosenberg held a discussion about the significance of implementing this order on July 13, 1943. Meyer, his deputy, noted that this directive referred to 72,000 Jews, 22,000 of whom were to be "resettled" and 50,000 sent to concentration camps. At this meeting no reservations were expressed concerning Himmler's instructions, but the need to find other sources of manpower to replace the Jews was mentioned. When, during the elimination of the last Jews in the ghettoes, an argument broke out between Kube, the General Commissar of White Russia, who tried to protect a group of Jews who had worked for him, and the Commander of the Security Police and the SD in White Russia, Strauch, who executed them, Rosenberg sent his deputy, Meyer, to reprimand Kube. 36 Conclusion Rosenberg's anti-Jewish policy in the conquered areas of the USSR, which crystallised during April-May i94i and was reflected in the "Instructions for Dealing with the Jewish Question" in the Brown Portfolio, issued at the beginning of September 1941. was based primarily on the anti-Jewish policy adopted by the General Government, and included restrictions, segregation in ghettoes, forced labour, etc. At that time Rosenberg did not belong to the inner circle of Nazi leadership close to Hitler, and was not familiar with the Führer's directive to Himmler and the SS regarding the total physical annihilation of the Jews of the USSR issued at the planning stage of the invasion. His directives concerning the Jews stemmed from ignorance of the Führer's intentions. Once these intentions became clear to him. being already implemented by the SS, he also gave his unequivocal support to the policy of liquidating the Jews. In cases where differences of opinion arose between the civil administration and the SS regarding the pace and extent of the liquidation, the 36 Hilberg, p. 254.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS YTTZHAK ARAD objection was raised by the officials of the civil administration in Ostland, and not by Rosenberg or his men in the Ministry. When Rosenberg was asked by Commissar Lohse, to intervene in this regard at the highest level, he did not support his subordinate, the civil administration, but gave full backing to the stand adopted by the SS, giving preference to the liquidation of the Jews over economic or other considerations. Rosenberg, whose hatred of Jews accompanied him throughout his whole political career, was the Nazi expert on anti-Semitism and Bolshevism. He adhered to his hatred of Jews till the end and was instrumental in preparing the ideological ground for their liquidation. Even when the armies of Nazi Germany were retreating on all fronts. Rosenberg initiated an international antiJewish conference. Most of the areas of the Soviet Union that were ruled by Rosenberg and the German civil administration were liberated during the summer of 1944. O n the eve of the liberation the last Jews who were still in the concentration camps were liquidated.

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

The Tasks of the SS Einsatzgruppen Alfred Streim Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm. Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 22. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981. 687 pages, illustrations, maps.

The tactical employment during the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) of mobile units under the command of the Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service1—Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos or Sonderkommandos—was nothing new. One such unit had already been employed during the "incorporation" of Austria in March 1938, and units of this type continued to be used until the end of 1944 in almost all assaults on foreign nations by the Wehrmacht. To some extent they were also involved in separate military operations, such as the Ardennes offensive in December 1944. But while the units employed in the West were charged only with security tasks until their conversion into stationary offices (ortsfeste Dienststellen), the assignment of those units operating in the East included, in addition, the physical destruction of certain segments of the population, particularly the Jews. Since the end of the war a flood of publications about the Nazi era

Translated by Henry Friedlander and Martha Humphreys.

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has appeared. Comprehensive histories have only treated the Einsatzgruppen as part of the larger picture, and even then only those operating in the Soviet Union.2 However, comprehensive studies about the Einsatzgruppen and monographs about specific units did not appear. 3 Admittedly, for a long time there was little or no information available about most of these mobile units operating under the direction of the RSHA. In contrast, an abundance of material about the units that operated in the Soviet Union had been collected for the International Military Tribunal and the subsequent American proceedings at Nuremberg—specifically the trial of Otto Ohlendorf, former head of Einsatzgruppe D, and accomplices (Case No. 9), and former Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb (Case No. 12). But these sources had not been utilized for a comprehensive scholarly investigation. It is thus most welcome that the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich has now issued a study that was previously lacking. The authors are two specialists who have worked with the subject for many years: Helmut Krausnick, former director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte and an expert consultant in numerous proceedings against Nazi criminals, and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, also affiliated with the Munich institute. The work consists of two parts. In the first part, 4 Krausnick describes the origins of the Einsatzgruppen (the beginnings: Austria, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia), then provides a detailed depiction of the violent measures applied by them for the first time against ethnic and "racial" groups during the Polish campaign and subsequently during Operation Barbarossa. In each instance he investigates their relationship to the Wehrmacht command. In the second part, 5 Wilhelm provides an historical analysis of Einsatzgruppe A, which operated in the Baltic and White Russia, and uses it as an example to analyze the structure, activity, and reporting of such units as well as the participation in killing operations against Jews and other "potential opponents" by other German organizations and indigenous forces. Krausnick has evidently asked himself the one recurring question about Nazism: how was it possible? In trying to find the answer, he has accordingly not only described the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, but has also shown how the unparalleled extermination measures implemented against entire populations was made possible by the collaboration between the Wehrmacht command and the criminal regime, represented on the spot by the units of the Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service.

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In the process Krausnick also deals with the behavior of the troops and, citing examples, concludes that they did not always comply when the military command attempted to impose a standard of uniform collaboration. In this matter he will be faced with a great deal of opposition, especially since several publications that arrived at opposite conclusions have appeared in recent years. 6 We must, however, agree with Krausnick. Most of these publications are based on one-dimensional sources, specifically on the evidence presented at Nuremberg by the prosecution. The fact that these studies are one-sided and lack the objectivity history requires probably needs no further elaboration. For example, it has been repeatedly asserted that the Sixth Army in the East willingly collaborated with the Einsatzkommandos operating in their area. 7 After a thorough examination of all available sources—particularly the extensive documentation found at the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg—we must conclude that, on the contrary, it was not the entire army that collaborated but only the commander-in-chief and his general staff officer responsible for enemy information and counterintelligence (the Ic), as well as a few local station commanders (Ortskommandanturen). The preponderance of the command staff and of the units assigned to the Sixth Army opposed the activities of the Einsatzkommandos. They did so, for example, by circumventing official channels while informing their superiors about the killing operations against the Jews or, alternatively, disregarding their commander-in-chief's pro-collaboration posture to complain to him directly. A document is after all only a document. To base conclusions on it without further data is simply speculation and thus has no place in scholarly studies. The investigations of the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppen is necessarily extensive because the diverse interpretations of historians require such coverage. In addition, Krausnick deals intensively with the "mission of the Einsatzgruppen," particularly the question of when, where, and from whom they received the order to shoot all Jews. As expert witness in postwar trials Krausnick always concluded on the basis of the Nuremberg testimony of Ohlendorf and his colleagues that the order for the destruction of the Jews (Judenvernichtungsbefehl) was issued at their assembly points to the Einsatzgruppen by Bruno Streckenbach, the chief of Office I in the RSHA, prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union. Krausnick has in the main retained this thesis in this study. But this thesis may not correspond to the facts. Working through

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hundreds of interrogations produced in the proceedings against former members of the Einsatzgruppen, I have concluded that they have mainly asserted the following: 1. At the beginning there was no order to kill all Jews. 2. At that time always only male Jews of draft age were executed for reasons permissible under martial law; anyhow, that is what they were told. 3. Only several weeks after the invasion of the Soviet Union was the order issued to shoot all Jews, even Jewish women and children, "so that no avengers can grow up"; this was the justification sometimes offered for this order. After a subsequent first reexamination of the evidence I concluded the following: 1. Specific investigations concerning the exact time and place the order to kill the Jews was issued were as a rule not undertaken by the state attorneys. 2. The answer to the question "order or no order," essential for the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices, was frequently resolved by the same expert consultant—Helmut Krausnick—who believed that the Nuremberg testimonies of Ohlendorf and associates had proven that the order had been issued at the very beginning. Some historians hold the opinion that it is basically irrelevant when and by whom the order was issued to the Einsatzgruppen, since it is known that it was issued and also implemented. This opinion may suffice for history, but not for the law: all pertinent court decisions that found members of the Einsatzgruppen guilty as accomplices to murder for killing Jews immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union would have imposed a penalty that would be a legal error. Because the defendants acted without a specific order, which at that time had not yet been issued, the courts would have had to convict them as perpetrators and not as accomplices, and this would have influenced the penalty significantly; they would have been sentenced to life in prison instead of to frequently very light prison terms. 8 After a further examination of this proposition, which I continue to investigate actively and which can now be considered established fact, I have developed the following thesis: the general order for the destruction of the Jews was not issued to the Einsatzgruppen prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union; rather, it was issued weeks later, approximately between the beginning of August 1941 at the earliest and September 1941 at the latest. 9

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

The insights gained so far can be briefly summarized and delineated as follows: 1. Ohlendorf s testimony as witness before the International Military Tribunal and his defense in the Einsatzgruppen trial that the order for the destruction of the Jews was transmitted by Streckenbach at the assembly point prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union is false. 2. The farewell letter 10 of one of those condemned to death in the Einsatzgruppen trial shows that Ohlendorf posited this assertion as part of his defense argument, contending that if the defendants had not been under such orders from the beginning, they would be sentenced to death as perpetrators. The letter also shows that Ohlendorf, using threats and promises, persuaded his codefendants to adopt this line of defense. All but two complied with Ohlendorfs demand. Streckenbach was designated as the person who transmitted the "Führer Order" because it was assumed that he was dead; actually he was a prisoner in the Soviet Union and returned to Germany in 1955. 3. The information supplied by the farewell letter was confirmed by interrogations of Ohlendorfs codefendants conducted later by German prosecutors. 11 Further confirmation was obtained through the statements of attorneys who had defended the SS leaders in the Einsatzgruppen trial.12 4. After returning from Soviet captivity, Streckenbach denied that he had delivered the order for destruction. But he did not announce this publicly, because colleagues convicted in the Einsatzgruppen trial and released early on parole begged him not to do so, since they 'feared that public disclosure of their lies would return them to prison. 13 5. Testimonies by other Einsatzkommando chiefs, who went underground after the war but were later found by German prosecutors, also confirm that Streckenbach did not transmit the order for destruction. 14 This fact should now be considered indisputable. 6. Moreover, the order was also not delivered by Reinhard Heydrich, the former Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service, or by Heinrich Müller, the former head of the Gestapo, as has been asserted elsewhere. 15 Although Heydrich had visited the assembly point, he had only reviewed a farewell parade and had been forced by a rainstorm to return immediately to Berlin. 16 Almost no one in the end has been able to recall Müller.

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7. Unambiguous testimonies by several Einsatzkommando chiefs (lb, 4b, 5, 6, 8, and 12) asserted that the order was issued several weeks after the start of the Russian campaign. 17 8. The value of these depositions is of particular significance, since with them these former SS leaders incriminated themselves in ongoing proceedings against them. They could not have anticipated that the verdicts rendered against them would reach a different, for them more favorable, conclusion concerning the transmission of the order. 18 9. These statements were indirectly confirmed by Operational Orders No. 1 and 2, issued by the Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service on 29 June and 1 July 1941, instructing the Einsatzgruppen "silently" to instigate pogroms by the indigenous population.19 Further confirmation can be found in Heydrich's letter of 2 July 1941 advising the persons designated as Higher SS and Police Leaders [HSSPF] for the Soviet areas that only Jews in party and state positions and similar "elements" were to be executed. 20 If Hitler's destruction order had already existed at that time, it would not have been necessary to instigate pogroms, and Heydrich would not have had to restrict execution to only those Jews occupying party and state offices. 10. Moreover, the Einsatzgruppen situation reports, 21 the so-called Jäger Report, 22 and the evidence of the majority of former members of the Einsatzgruppen show that for the most part Heydrich's directives were carried out during the first weeks of the Russian campaign. 11. The conclusion that the order for destruction was issued between early August and September 1941 is thus based on the following: a. Testimonies bv various Einsatzkommando chiefs (5, 8, and 12). 23

b. Testimonies by SS leaders assigned to the Einsatzkommandos. 24 c. Documents listing time and place of executions as, for example, the Jäger Report. 25 d. Compilations of executions based on the results of judicial investigations (for example, Sonderkommando 4a). 26 e. Hitler's interest in the execution of Jews at that time (cable to the Einsatzgruppen of 1 August 1941).27 f. Various documents: for example, the report of Einsatzgruppe D of the end of August 1941, "The solution of the Jewish Question has . . . been initiated." 28

442

THE "FINAL SOLUTION g. Reports by the Einsatzgruppen about the establishment on higher orders of ghettos to contain the Jews. 2 9 h. Finally, the well-known order by Goring to Hevdrich of 31 July 1941 "to make all necessary preparations . . . for the final solution of the Jewish question." 30

The objections raised against this thesis are based on isolated interrogations,31 the 1958 Einsatzgruppen trial in Ulm, 32 and the so-called Stahlecker Report (progress report up to 15 October 1941 by the chief of Einsatzgruppe A, SS Brigadeführer Dr. Walther Stahlecker),33 and attempt to show that a general order for destruction—the shooting of men, women, and children—existed from the beginning. These objections are not valid and must be refuted. But if, for example, it is shown that a certain Einsatzkommando chief had already testified in 1960 that the order existed prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, this only proves that these explanations base themselves on what was known in 1960 and that subsequent interrogations—especially focused interrogations in other proceedings— were not taken into consideration. The use of the Ulm trial also fails as evidence. To be sure, several— but not all—of the defendants maintained that they had received the order to kill all Jews at the start of "Operation Barbarossa." This assertion, however, was simply a defense argument designed to obtain a conviction as an accomplice and not as a perpetrator. The Ulm court proceedings and court decision demonstrate that up to the beginning of August only able-bodied men were shot and, of course, here and there a woman who was described as a communist or as some other "element hostile to the Reich." Women and children, and also men not of draft age, were incarcerated in camps. The general liquidations started in August 1941 with 100 Jews; they were mostly women, children, and the elderly chosen from those who had previously been placed in camps. Finally, the Stahlecker Report also cannot be used to undermine the thesis that the general order for the destruction of the Jews was issued between early August and September 1941. Legal arguments have been advanced to refute my thesis. It has been argued that my basic contention that Ohlendorfs testimony in the Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen trial was a defense argument to escape the death sentence is not convincing; that Control Council Law No. 10, used by the Allies in the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, did not exempt anyone from responsibility because he followed orders. 34 Basically that is correct, but it is necessary to read further. Thus the entire Article II, Section 4(b) reads as follows: "The

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fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation"

(my emphasis).35

We still do not know who delivered the order to the Einsatzgruppen. Only the (original) chiefs of the various Einsatzgruppen could have provided an answer. But after the war had ended only Ohlendorf and Dr. Dr. Otto Rasch, former chief of Einsatzgruppe C, were still alive. Ohlendorfs answer is known. Rasch, who due to illness was isolated from his codefendants at Nuremberg and thus knew nothing of Ohlendorfs line of defense, did not testify on this point as many of his companions feared: "If Rasch testifies, we will have a catastrophe." 36 He was too ill to stand trial and died soon thereafter. The opening statement of his defense attorney, however, clearly showed that the order was issued in August 1941.37 The commanders serving under Rasch did know more: in August 1941 they had been called to Shitomir; there the Higher SS and Police Leader South, Friedrich Jeckeln (executed in Riga 1946), arranged that the order to exterminate be issued to them. 38 In other words, this happened precisely at the time in which the universal execution of Jews commenced within the area of Einsatzgruppe C. Evidence for this transmission route of the order to exterminate also exists for other regions. A former SS Oberführer who served on the staff of the Higher SS and Police Leader North, Hans Adolf Priitzmann (suicide in 1945), testified that Himmler ordered the destruction of all criminal elements, a category that included the Jews. 39 The following supports the contention that the order to exterminate was transmitted by the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen: 1. In the East many operations to kill the Jews were directed by the Higher SS and Police Leaders. 40 2. In August and September 1941, Himmler made inspection trips to the regions of the Higher SS and Police Leaders North, Middle, and South. 41 3. While in Soviet captivity, Streckenbach was briefly able to ask Jeckeln whether the order had been transmitted via the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and Jeckeln replied: "Yes, that's just about how it was." 42 Finally, it must still be pointed out that in the Third Reich not only the operations to exterminate the Jews in the Soviet Union and the Baltic states were initiated in this way; for example, certain euthanasia

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operations in Poland and the destruction of the Polish intelligentsia were initiated in a similar way. 43 All in all, however, Krausnick's contribution offers a revealing overview about the origin and mission of the Einsatzgruppen and provides unexpected insights about the cooperation they received from the leadership of the Wehrmacht. Much of this is certainly still obscure, but Krausnick has provided the groundwork that will ultimately determine the direction of future research about this sad chapter in the history of Germany. It would have been desirable, however, if Krausnick had not merely mentioned the activities of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos during the western campaigns in passing (pp. 107-15), but had instead treated them in a separate chapter as he did with their predecessors. After all, one could expect this from a work that promised to describe the Einsatzgruppen "from the beginnings up to the Russian campaign." Undoubtedly, these units were not as significant as those operating during the Polish and Russian campaigns; in part they were transformed into stationary offices after a brief period or were even disbanded. But the interested reader would be most interested to know how the Einsatzkommando for special purposes in Brussels—or the Einsatzgruppe "Norway" with its five Einsatzkommandos in Oslo, Kristiansund, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim—applied its "security police tasks." 44 Finally, it would have been welcome if Krausnick had completed his contribution by providing at the end an overview about the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos created after 1942. This is especially true because little or no information about these units has so far become known. For example, who knows anything about the following units: Einsatzgruppe E (formerly Einsatzgruppe Croatia) with its five Einsatzkommandos in Vin Kovci, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Knin, and Zagreb; Einsatzgruppe F (with Army Group South); Einsatzgruppe G (Romania, later Hungary) with its Einsatzkommandos number 11 and 12; Einsatzgruppe H (Slovakia); Einsatzgruppe Κ (with 5th Panzer Army in the Ardennes offensive); Einsatzgruppe L (with 6th Panzer Army in the Ardennes offensive); and Einsatzkommando "Luxemburg." 45 Who of those not familiar with this subject knows the notorious Sonderkommando 1005, and its numerous subsidiary units, charged with the task of excavating and burning the corpses so that all traces that could point to massive criminality should be obliterated?46 All these units also belonged to the Truppe des Weltanschaungskrieges that sought, as a rule with technical perfection, to realize the insane goals of the Nazi rulers.

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The section by Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm is based on his dissertation of more than 1,000 pages, 47 which has been cut and revised to avoid duplications with Krausnick's contribution. Of course duplications cannot be avoided in till instances, since repetition was occasionally needed to clarify relationships of various events. But these duplications in no way detract from the total picture. Wilhelm first describes the political, social, and ethnographic situation within the operational area assigned to Einsatzgruppe A. Next he covers the policies of the German occupation in the Reichskommissariat Ostland: German rule and indigenous administration; economic policies; mobilization of labor for the German war economy; racial policies (Volkstumspolitik) as well as the problems of Germanization (Eindeutschung); policies vis-à-vis religion, culture, education, and the media. He then deals with the fight against enemies: intelligence, police, and military activities. Thereafter he treats in detail the measures implemented for the destruction of the Jews, providing additional information about the killing operations (Vernichtungsaktionen) in various places (Riga, Liepája, Borissov, and Slutsk), the deportation of Jews from the Reich to the Ostland, and the participation of other German agencies as well as of indigenous forces in these operations. In dosing, Wilhelm provides a numerical accounting of the destruction of the Jews in the Soviet Union, and the role the Einsatzgruppen played in the origins of the Final Solution. Wilhelm's contribution is supplemented with a chart showing the organizational structure of SS and police in the northern area, brief biographies of SS functionaries who occupied leading positions within the operational area of Einsatzgruppe A, and a chart listing the chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in the Soviet Union. Basing his work on the best available sources for the history of the German occupation in the East, especially the extensive Einsatzgruppen reports that survived the war, 48 Wilhelm has produced an exemplary study on the activities of the Einsatzgruppen during Operation Barbarossa. Of course some readers will ask whether the study lacks objectivity due to its reliance on these reports; after all, amy specialist knows that even a superficial comparison with other sources shows instances where data in these reports was manipulated to support the arguments and praise the work of the security police and SS security service and especially that of the Einsatzgruppen. For example, the reports imply that in its area only Einsatzgruppe A undertook the fight against partisans; in reality the Wehrmacht was also involved and their reports showed a greater rate of success. 49

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Another example of how these reports manipulated information is the reasons at first advanced for the execution of Jews; they were designed to justify this killing operation as reprisals permissible under international law. This argument was, for example, applied to justify the notorious execution by Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C of 33,771 Kiev Jews on 29 and 30 September 1941 in Babi Yar. 5 0 In this instance the argument was advanced that the execution of civilians was a legal act of reprisal because the Kiev Jews had carried out acts of sabotage in the city. In reality, however, witness testimonies have provided absolute proof that the Jews were not involved in acts of sabotage in Kiev. Even General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations in the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, accepted the true facts—which were later confirmed by the testimony of other witness—in his Nuremberg testimony: At first the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this demolition chart in my hands. 51

Wilhelm has not failed to recognize these dangers as his discussion of the reports's credibility shows. Using sources from different provenances, he attempted verification and has informed the reader whenever he had doubts about the objectivity of the reports. 52 Wilhelm's careful investigation did convince him that these reports were not always complete, at least for certain events. Thus he has used a variety of sources to produce for us an accurate general picture. These sources included extensive files from involved civilian and military offices; reports from eyewitnesses; original minutes of important meetings; reports of inspection tours by emissaries from various central offices in Berlin; comprehensive reports about their experiences by district administrators (Gebietskommissare) and other functionaries; and, from the postwar period, memoirs and apologetic accounts of several leading participants; sworn testimonies from German and Soviet eyewitnesses; official reports by state commissions for the investigation of Nazi crimes in various Soviet republics; published and unpublished court records and court decisions in pertinent West German proceedings. Considering the abundance of sources and the multiplicity of their origin, it is understandable that

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Wilhelm had to overcome considerable difficulties, especially as the various sources do not supplement each other. He correctly points out, for example, that one must sometimes choose one of several sources without the ability to use the other sources as a reference point; official German reports and eyewitness testimony are an example of such incompatibility. My evaluation of Wilhelm's objectivity is based on the information I obtained at the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen, where I conducted numerous proceedings against former members of the Einsatzgruppen. And I can thus testify that Wilhelm has been able to produce, in spite of all difficulties, an account of the varied activities of Einsatzgruppe A that is as objective as possible, and that is also typical for the other Einsatzgruppen operating in the Soviet Union. His notably graphic descriptions show in impressive ways the extent of the atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen in fulfillment of their orders, particularly the destruction of the Jews. In this context, Wilhelm consistently and convincingly demonstrates that they could not have completed these criminal tasks if they had not been embedded within the German occupation and if numerous other German offices had not cooperated. The work by Krausnick and Wilhelm is a first step toward a comprehensive history of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. We must hope that additional monographs will treat the other units that also participated. It would be important as a service to truth and as a sign of respect for the victims to deal one by one with the killing operations, because many are not mentioned in the RSHA reports. For example, most operations by sub-units (Vorkommandos, Außenkommandos, and Teilkommandos) are frequently not recorded in detail; operations carried out by them figure only in the total count of the victims killed by the entire unit. But the sources for such work exist. The German judicial authorities have conducted hundreds of proceedings against former members of the Einsatzgruppen, from which individual killing operations can be extracted. For example, interrogations and other court records show that members of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C carried out approximately 115 mass executions, but only a fraction of these appear in the RSHA reports. 53 Ultimately, a full history of the Einsatzgruppen should include a work that deals with the postwar judicial proceedings against the former members of the units under the command of the Chief of the Security Police and the SS Security Service. It should not only describe the "reconstruction" of the crimes by the judicial authorities, but also the pitiful way the perpetrators tried to justify and excuse

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their crimes. Alongside the excuse that the perpetrators only followed orders—or the so-called duress under orders (Befehlsnotstand) that existed only in the imagination of the defendants—there were inappropriate justifications supposedly based on international law: the concept of lawful reprisals and the principles of tabula rasa and tu quoque. The defendants' wretched behavior is best illustrated by the arguments they advanced to prove duress. For example, some claimed duress by contending that they would have been transferred to the front if they had refused to carry out executions. This type of defense argument could also help in the construction of psychological profiles of the perpetrators, something we do not yet possess. Of course, any treatment of "duress under orders" should also include those cases where members of the SS and police successfully refused to carry out executions and did not suffer severe disadvantages. Finally, a comprehensive and detailed history of the Einsatzgruppen would effectively support the thesis that the mass crimes of the Nazis were unique. Such support is necessary, because recently there has again been an attempt to dispute this truth; 54 the historian Ernst Nolte has thus argued that, except for the technical innovation of the gas chambers, nothing the Nazis did had not already been done by others before them. 55 This type of argumentation posits that genocide represents historical normality and every nation shares the guilt. Certainly examples of genocide and murder for political, racial, and other ideological reasons can be found in every history text; but can this be compared with the crimes of the Nazi regime? Some hold the opinion that we should not ask the question whether the crimes of the Nazis were unique. Although this position is understandable, it does : not help us to clarify an important historical (and also anthropological) phenomenon. Attempts to declare this topic taboo will only serve reactionary interests and foster Nazi apologetics. Thus let us admit the question. The answer will by no means offend the victims. After a scholarly comparison of the arguments pro and con the thesis about the uniqueness of the Nazi crimes, even skeptics will conclude "that the barbaric, programmed, and planned outrage of extermination, implemented by administrative and industrial means, in a highly civilized and culturally prominent nation is, however, unique." 5 6

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NOTES 1. The Chief of the Security Police and SS Security Service (Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes) in this capacity also headed the Central Office of Reich Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA); Reinhard Heydrich occupied this position until his assassination in 1942; his successor was Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who was convicted and executed at Nuremberg. The RSHA combined the security police—Gestapo (political police) and Kripo (detective forces)—as a government agency on the state budget and the security service (foreign and domestic intelligence) as an SS formation on the Nazi party budget in one office. But for official purposes the office and its agencies, including the Einsatzgruppen, used the designation "Chief of the Security Police and the SD." The Einsatzgruppen thus received their directives largely from the RSHA, and RSHA personnel, both from the central office and from the local Gestapo and Kripo offices, formed the core of its personnel. For a brief history and explanation, see Henry Friedlander, "The SS and Police," in Genocide: Critical Issues of the Holocaust, ed. Alex Grobman, Daniel Landes, and Sybil Milton (New York, 1983), pp. 150ff. 2. See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (New York, 1957); Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945 (New York, 1953); Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago, 1961); Reinhard Henkys, Die nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen: Geschichte und Gericht (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1964). But see also Alfred Streim, "Zum Beispiel: Die Verbrechen der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion," in NS-Prozesse. Nach 25 Jahren Strafverfolgung: Möglichkeiten—Grenzen— Ergebnisse, ed. Adalbert Rückerl (Karlsruhe, 1971), pp. 65-106. 3. For official use by the prosecution and courts of the Federal Republic, however, extensive analyses of the Einsatzgruppen had been completed in the early 1960s by the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg; the results were accessible in mimeographed form to historians and were used by them (often cited in Krausnick and Wilhelm): Adalbert Rückerl, "Einsatzgruppen in Polen," 2 vols. (1963); Alfred Streim, "Das Sonderkommando 4a der Einsatzgruppe C und die mit diesem Kommando eingesetzt gewesenen Einheiten während des Rußlandfeldzuges in der Zeit vom 22.6.1941 bis Sommer 1943" (1964, 350 PP·)· 4. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Part 1, pp. 13-278: Krausnick, "Die Einsatzgruppen vom Anschluß Österreichs bis zum Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion: Entwicklung und Verhältnis zur Wehrmacht." 5. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Part 2, pp. 281-636: Wilhelm, "Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1941—42: Eine exemplarische Studie."

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6. See, for example, Jürgen Förster, "Zur Rolle der Wehrmacht im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion," in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung das Parlament 45/80 (8 Nov. 1980); Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1978). 7. See, for example, Gideon Hausner, Die Vernichtung der Juden (Munich, 1979), p. 86; Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built cm Sand (German ed., Hamburg, 1962), p. 129; Streit, Keine Kameraden, pp. 114f. 8. For a discussion of how German law has been applied to Nazi crimes, see Henry Friedlander, "The Judiciary and Nazi Crimes in Postwar Germany," SWC Annual 1 (1984): 27-44. See also Adalbert Rückerl, The Investigation of Nazi Crimes 1945-1978 (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe, 1979). 9. See Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa" (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe, 1981); idem, "Zur Eröffnung des allgemeinen Judenvernichtungsbefehls gegenüber den Einsatzgruppen," in Der Mord an den Juden im zweiten Weltkrieg: Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung, ed. Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer (Stuttgart, 1985), pp. 107-19. 10. Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung von NSVerbrechen, Ludwigsburg [hereafter cited as ZStL], 415 AR 1310/63 - E 32, Vol. XLV, pp. 8128ff. 11. See for example ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 2, pp. 330ff. (Gustav Nosske, Einsatzkommando 12); Vol. 6, pp. 65f. (Erwin Schulz, Einsatzkommando 5); Vol. 8, pp. 9ff. (Dr. Walter Blume, Sonderkommando 7a); Vol. 13, pp. 8058ff. (Emst Biberstein, Einsatzkommando 6); Vol. 18, pp. 8667ff. (Dr. Martin Sandberger, Sonderkommando la); Vol. XLIU, p. 7763 (Dr. Franz Six, Vorkommando Moscow). 12. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 9, pp. 136ff. (defense attorney for Erwin Schulz); Vol. 16, pp. 8394ff. (defense attorney for Otto Ohlendorf); Vol. 16, pp. 8390ff. (defense attorney for Gustav Nosske); Vol. 16, pp. 8387ff. (defense attorney for Ernst Biberstein). 13. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 5, pp. 53f.; see also pp. 56ff.; Vol. 13, p. 8058. 14. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 9, pp. lOOff (Erich Ehrlinger, Sonderkommando lb); 202 AR-Z 7/59, Vol. 5, pp. 1008f. (Rudolf Batz, Einsatzkommando 2); 202 AR-Z 52/59, p. 509; 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 11, pp. 7605ff. (Dr. Otto Bradfisch, Einsatzkommando 8); 202 AR-Z 73/61, Vol. 6, pp. 1580ff. (Dr. Alfred Filbert, Einsatzkommando 9); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 2, pp. 246ff.; Vol. 7, pp. 20ff. (Günther Herrmann, Sonderkommando 4b); 201 AR-Z 75/59, Vol. 9, pp. 14ff., I l l (Dr. Erhard Kroeger, Einsatzkommando 6); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 12, pp. 7766ff. (Paul Zapp, Sonderkommando Ila). 15. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Sonderband I, p. 172, Vol. 8, pp. 9ff. (Dr. Blume,

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Sonderkommando 7a); Sonderband I, pp. 174Í., 415 AR-Z 1310/63—E32, Vol. XLH, pp. 7563ff. (Dr. Filbert, Einsatzkommando 9); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Sonderband I, pp. 171f., 207 AR-Z 14/58, p. 1887 (Karl Jäger, Sonderkommando 3). 16. See for example ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 6, pp. 6944ff.; Vol. 7, pp. 17ff.; Vol. 11, pp. 76ff.; Vol. 14, pp. 8162ff.; Vol. 14, pp. 8173ff. 17. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 9, pp. lOOff. (Ehrlinger, Sonderkommando lb); Vol. 2, pp. 246ff. (Herrmann, Sonderkommando 4b); Vol. 6, pp. 58ff. (Schulz, Einsatzkommando 5); Vol. 9, pp. 109ff. (Dr. Kroeger, Einsatzkommando 6); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 11, pp. 7605ff. (Dr. Bradfisch, Einsatzkommando 8); Vol. 7, pp. 27ff. (Nosske, Sonderkommando 12). 18. See for example Landgericht (LG) Darmstadt, Urteil gg. Callsen u.A., Ks 1/67, 29 Nov. 1968 [former members of Einsatzkommando 4a); LG Munich I, Urteil gg. Dr. Bradfisch u.A., 22 Ks 1/61, 21 July 1961 [former members of Einsatzkommando 8]. 19. ZStL, Doc. Collection UdSSR, Vol. 401, pp. 270-71 (see "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," No. 10, 2 July 1941, Nuremberg Doc. NO-4534). 20. ZStL, Doc. Collection UdSSR, Vol. 401, pp. 263-69. 21. See below, n. 48. 22. Kommandeur Einsatzkommando 3, SS Standartenführer Karl Jäger, to Befehlshaber Einsatzgruppe A, SS Brigadeführer Dr. Walther Stahlecker, Kovno 10 Dec. 1941, facsimile reproduction in Rückerl, NS-Prozesse, appendix without pagination. 23. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 6, pp. 58ff. (Einsatzkommando 5); Vol. 11, pp. 7605ff. (Einsatzkommando 8); Vol. 7, pp. 27ff. (Einsatzkommando 12). 24. See for example ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 9, p. 117 (officer with Sonderkommando 4a); 415 AR-Z 1310/63—E 32, Vol. XUV, p. 7998 (Einsatzkommando 8); 202 AR 72/60, Vol. 1, p. 63m (Einsatzkommando 9); 202 AR-Z 96/60, Vol. 10, p. 3579 (Einsatzkommando 9); 415 AR-Z 1310/63—E 32, Vol. XLHI, p. 7830 (Sonderkommando 10a); Vol. XLIÏÏ, p. 7775 (Sonderkommando Ila). 25. See above, n. 22. 26. See for example ZStL, 204 AR-Z 269/60 (Sonderkommando 4a). 27. ZStL, Doc. Collection UdSSR, Vol. 401/11, p. 295. 28. "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," No. 63, 25 Aug. 1941, p. 6 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-4538). 29. See for example "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," No. 43, 5 Aug. 1941, p. 5 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-2949); No. 45, 7 Aug. 1941, p. 11 (Nuremberg Doc.

452

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" NO-2948); No. 54, 16 Aug. 1941, p. 17 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-2849); No. 63, 25 Aug. 1941, pp. 6f (Nuremberg Doc. NO-^538); No. 89, 20 Sept. 1941, p. 15 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-3148); No. 92, 23 Sept. 1941, pp. 33, 42 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-3143); No. 106, 7 Oct. 1941, pp. 16f. (Nuremberg Doc. NO-3140); No. 107, 8 Oct. 1941, p. 18 (Nuremberg Doc. NO-3139).

30. Nuremberg Doc. PS-710. 31. See Krausnick and Wilhelm, Part 1, pp. 150-72 (Der Auftrag der Einsatzgruppen). Concerning the transmission of the order of destruction, it is noteworthy that Krausnick bases his argument primarily on testimony by former Einsatzkommando officers found in the application filed by the Staatsanwaltschaft in Hamburg to open preliminary proceedings (Antrag auf Voruntersuchung) against Bruno Streckenbach (147 Js 31/63 f, 29 Dec. 1969, pp. 158-200). But there only those portions of the testimonies needed to substantiate the application are cited. If Krausnick had studied these testimonies in their entirety, as well as those by other Einsatzkommando officers, he would undoubtedly have reached different conclusions. For example, Krausnick uses Dr. Sandberger's testimony that the "Führer order" was announced before the departure for the Soviet Union to bolster his thesis (Krausnick and Wilhelm, p. 161). But if one considers all of Sandberger's testimonies in proceedings involving Nazi crimes, one must reach different conclusions about his statements (see Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener, p. 89). And in addition, Schulz of Einsatzkommando 5 reported the following concerning Sandberger. I met Dr. Sandberger frequently in the Zuffenhausen [internment] camp. There we were able to listen to reports about the Nuremberg trials on the radio. One day Sandberger came to me and declared with great excitement that he had just heard on the radio that Ohlendorf testified at the Nuremberg trial of the major war criminals that Streckenbach had passed on the Führer order. But that cannot be true (Das stimme doch nicht). I also commented that I could not understand how Ohlendorf could make such a statement. I can no longer remember whether I also inquired at the time where and by whom he had been notified about the Führer order. Later, in Nuremberg, Sandberger asked to speak to me: he had meanwhile been enlightened (he did not say by whom) that Streckenbach had after all passed on the Führer order. Lapses of memory are certainly possible; perhaps even I could now remember that Streckenbach had passed on the Führer order. To assure that all members would march in step at Nuremberg, Sandberger obviously wanted to persuade me to give false evidence (ZStL, 201 AR-Z 74/59, Vol. 6, pp. 8f.). In addition, Krausnick has cited the testimonies of former SS Sturmbannführer Ernst Ehlers to substantiate Dr. Sandberger's evidence. Ehlers was originally designated to be chief of Einsatzkommando 8; disturbed by the

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453

disclosure of the order of destruction, he asked to be relieved of his command and this request was accepted (Krausnick and Wilhelm, η. 289 on p. 161). However, Ehlers testimony was a defense maneuver (Schutzbehauptung); he was accused, as chief of the police section at the headquarters of Einsatzgruppe Β, of having issued orders to the Einsatzkommandos to execute Jews (ZStL, 202 AR-Z 73/61): Ehlers had first been designated chief of Einsatzkommando 8, but prior to the departure for the Soviet Union Dr. Bradfisch took his place and Ehlers was appointed to headquarters. Ehlers believed that he had been "booted out" by Bradfisch. (Thus Dr. Filbert: 202 AR-Z 73/61, Vol. 6, p. 1583). The event that aroused his indignation at that time could later serve as a defense maneuver. 32. Staatsanwaltschaft Ulm, Ks 2/57, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen 15: llff. See also Adalbert Rückerl, NS-Verbrechen vor Gericht: Versuch einer Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Heidelberg, 1982), pp. 140ff. 33. Nuremberg Doc. H 8 0 . 34. Thus Krausnick presented this argument in his presentation on the Einsatzgruppen at an intematioual conference (Stuttgart, 3 May 1984) on the murder of the European Jews. The conference papers and discussions were published in abbreviated form (Der Mord an den Juden im zweiten Weltkrieg [see above, η. 9]), but these remarks by Krausnick were not included. See instead Krausnick and Wilhelm, Part 1, p. 160. 35. Control Council Law No. 10 (20 Dec. 1945), in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, 14 vols. (Washington, 1950-52) 1: xvi-xix. 36. ZStL, 415 AR 1310/63—E 32, Vol. XLV, p. 8134. 37. U.S. Military Tribunal Π, Case 9, United States v. Otto Ohlendorf and others, Official Transcript, German ed. pp. 316f. 38. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 6, pp. 64f. (Schulz, Einsatzkommando 5); Sonderband I, p. 166 (Blobel, Sonderkommando 4a); Vol. 9, p. 34 (Dr. Kroeger, Einsatzkommando 6); LG Düsseldorf, Urteil gg. Herrmann U.A., 8 Ks 3/70, 12 Jan. 1973, p. 115 (Sonderkommando 4b) [Hermann testified, however, that this meeting had taken place in Winniza]. See also LG Düsseldorf, Urteil gg. Karl Jung U.A., 8 I Ks 1/66, 5 Aug. 1966, pp. 75-79 (former members of Einsatzkommando 5). 39. Nuremberg Doc. PS-3839. 40. The SS and Police Leaders thus directed the killing operations in the extermination camps. Auschwitz, where Himmler himself commissioned the camp commander Rudolf Höss to undertake the mass killings of the Jews, was an exception; however, Höss testified that originally Himmler had wanted to commission a HSSPF, but had then changed his mind to avoid jurisdictional disputes (Hans Buchheim, SS and Polizei im NS-Staat

454

THE "FINAL SOLUTION' [Düsseldorf, 1964], pp. 127f.) Further, in November 1941 Himmler ordered the HSSPF Rußland-Ncrrd (formerly Rußland-Süd) "to liquidate" the remaining Jews in the Reichskommissariat Ostland (ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Sonderband I, pp. 157f.).

41. See, for example, ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 16, p. 8384 (HSSPF North); 202 AR-Z 1319/62, Vol. 2, p. 526 (HSSPF Middle); 202 AR-Z 52/59, Vol. 4; p. 502ff. (HSSPF Middle); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 7, pp. 39ff. (HSSPF Middle); 213 AR 1897/66, Vol. 9, pp. 1932ff. (HSSPF South); 201 AR-Z 76/59, Vol. 7, pp. 6ff. (HSSPF South). 42. ZStL, 201 AR-Z 76/59, Sonderband I, pp. 157f. 43. See, for example, Staatsanwaltschaft Bonn, Anklageschrift gg. Wilhelm Koppe [HSSPF Reichsgau Wartheland], 8 Js 52/60, pp. 177ff. (Polish intellectuals) and pp. 246ff. (euthanasia). 44. See, for example, ZStL, 110 AR 238/71 (Einsatzkommando Brussels); Staatsanwaltschaft beim Kammergericht Berlin, Anklageschrift gg. Dr. Werner Best, 1 Js 12/65 (RSHA), 10 Feb. 1972, pp. 831ff; Hans Buchheim, SS und Polizei, p. 76; ZStL, 107 A R - Z 640/63 (operations of the Security Police and the SS Security Service in Norway). 45. ZStL, 503 AR 702/67; Doc. Collection Verschiedenes, Vol. 133, pp. 4 3 3 - 3 4 (Einsatzgruppe E); 415 AR 1310/63 (Einsatzgruppe F); 502 AR 3818/65 (Einsatzgruppe G): 505 AR-Z 293/60 (Einsatzgruppe H); 124 AR 1553/64 (Einsatzgruppen Κ and L); 124 AR-Z 2/67 (Einsatzkommando Luxemburg). 46. ZStL, 202 AR-Z 22/66; 202 AR-Z 294/59. See also Streun, "Verbrechen der Einsatzgruppen," pp. 65-106. 47. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, "Die Einsatzgruppe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des S D , " Ph.D. diss., University of Munich, 1980. 48. On pp. 6 4 9 - 5 4 Wilhelm provides us with charts listing the numbers, dates, and current location of these reports: 1) the "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," issued from 23 June 1941 until 24 Apr. 1942 by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, now located in Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) Record Group R58; 2) the "Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten," issued from 1 May 1942 until 21 May 1943 by the Kommandostab of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, also located in Bundesarchiv R58; and 3) the summaries issued simultaneously (22 June 1941—21 May 1943) as 'Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR," now located in Politisches Archiv des Aus-wärtigen Amtes (Bonn), Inland Ilg, 431 Russland: SD-Einsatzgruppen, Berichte 1941-42. Wilhelm also provides for each report the Nuremberg document number (available in the National Archives in Washington) and the library number assigned by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich).

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49. See, for example, ZStL, 213 AR 1901/66, Dokumenten-Band Π: Erfolgsmeldungen des Stabes für Partisanenbekämpfung/Abwehr-Offizier undder Einheiten und Dienststellen des Armeeoberkommandos 11. 50. "Ereignismeldungen UdSSR," No. 106, 7 Oct. 1941, pp. 14f. (Nuremberg Doc. NO-3140). 51. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-1949) 15: 329. 52. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Part 2, pp. 333-47. 53. ZStL, 204 AR-Z 269/60: Abschlussbericht der Zentralen Stelle in dem Verfahren gegen Kuno Callsen und andere, 31 Dec. 1964. 54. Quite soon after the war special interests in Germany pointed to the crimes supposedly committed by others, especially the Soviet Union, and used—without legal or factual justification—the slogan "balancing the accounts" (Aufrechnung). See, for example, Friedwald Kumpf, Die Verbrechen an Deutschen (Neustadt a.d. Weinstraße, 1950); works by Erich Kern, including Verbrechen am deutschen Volk (Göttingen, 1960). See also the relevant contributions constantly published in Deutsche SoldatenZeitung (Munich), National-Zeitung (Munich), and Deutscher Anzeiger— Freiheitliche Wochenzeitung (Munich). 55. Emst Nolte, "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will: Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (6 June 1986). For similar arguments or arguments supporting Nolte, see Andreas Hillgruber, Ziviler Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums (Berlin, 1986); Klaus Hildebrand in Historische Zeitschrift 242 (1986): 465-66; Joachim Fest, "Die geschuldete Erinnerung: Zur Kontroverse über die Unvergleichbarkeit der NS-Massenverbrechen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (29 Aug. 1986). For views in opposition, see Wolfgang Malanowski, "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will," Der Spiegel, No. 36 (1986): 66-70; Jürgen Habermas, "Eine Art Schadenabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung," Die Zeit (18 July 1986); Eberhard Jäckel, "Die elende Praxis der Untersteller: Das einmalige der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen läßt sich nicht leugnen," Die Zeit (19 Sept. 1986); Martin Broszat, "Wo sich die Geister scheiden: Die Beschwörung der Geschichte taugt nicht als nationaler Religionsersatz," Die Zeit (3 Oct. 1986). 56. Malanowski, "Vergangenheit," p. 66.

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KOMMANDOSTAB REICHSFÜHRER-SS: HIMMLER'S PERSONAL MURDER BRIGADES IN 1941* YEHOSHUA BÜCHLER Graduate Student, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Abstract — Although the basic outline of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in Soviet territory beginning in late June 1941 is well known, little research has yet been undertaken on the identity of the murder units and how they were organized and directed. The article focuses on the activities of one such group in the latter part of 1941. the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, which included three SS brigades numbering 25,000 men, and which murdered very large numbers of Jews in this period.

On 22 June 1941. German forces invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa'. Defined by Hitler as an ideological war, the invasion and the subsequent German operations brought with them the planned total annihilation of all Jews in the territories occupied by the Germans, and the actual murder of the vast majority of them. The exact figures will probably never be known; they were variously estimated at between 1.2 and 2.2 million people. Until recently, the Einsatzgruppen, four special squads set up by the RSHA (Reich Security Head Office), a main division of Heinrich Himmlers SS, under the command of Reingard Heydrich, were thought to have been responsible for most, or almost all, these murders. It was always a source of wonderment, how a small group of less than 3000 men could have committed such a devastatingly large-scale murder. Recent research has shown that apart from the Einsatzgruppen, some army units and others were also involved. However, despite the fact that they appeared time and time again in official documentation, the special and large units known as the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS have not been recognized as what they were: a centrally important part of the murder machine, whose existence alongside other units helps to explain how the murder was possible and who committed it. It is these units that are the subject of our investigation. On 17 August 1938, Hitler issued a top secret order which in essence transformed part of the SS into an effective armed force, completely independent of both the Wehrmacht and the police and available for Hitler's exclusive use. This 'Verfügungstruppe [Emergency Troops] is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a standing army unit exclusively at my disposal.' 1 In light of the integration of the SS and the police, this Hitler order sought to define the functions of the SS both alone and in conjunction with the Wehrmacht and the police. In case of a mobilization, the SS Emergency Troops were to be activated in two ways:

"This is an abridged translation from the Hebrew, which is to appear in Yalkut Moreshet (in Hebrew), April 1986.

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1. By the Supreme C o m m a n d e r of the Army within the wartime army. In that case, it comes completely under military laws and regulations, but remains a unit of N S D A P politically. 2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders, in that case it is under the Reicnsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police. In case of mobilization, I myself will make the decision about the time, strength and manner of the incorporation of the SS Verfügungstruppe into the wartime army. 2

In a related move, 25,000 men of the General SS were drafted and armed in early 1939 in the framework of the reinforcement of the Death's Head Units'.3 The tasks of these forces were the same as those outlined by Hitler in his August 1938 order: to serve as a private internal police force when necessary, and to serve as armed policing units in time of war.4 When World War II broke out, twelve to fourteen Death's Head regiments, among other units and organizations, were poised to carry out Himmler's special tasks'. As German conquests in Europe progressed, the Death's Head Units were used as the terror arm of the Nazi regime.5 In Operation Barbarossa, which began on 22 June 1941, two principles of Nazi ideology converged; the desire for Lebensraum (living space) and the destruction of the Jews. It was clear to Hitler that the Jews had no place in this Lebensraum, and in this way he in fact determined the fate not only of the local Jews, but also of all Jews who would later be sent to the occupied Soviet territories.6 At the end of January of that year, in a meeting with senior SS commanders, Himmler spoke of 30 million people who must 'disappear' in the East.7 It was apparently in this connection and during a discussion on the treatment of the local populations in those areas that Hitler first informed Himmler of his plans for the Jews in the territories to be conquered in the East early in 1941.8 At that meeting, about which we have no details, Hitler gave the task of murdering the Jews to the SS and asked Himmler to make all necessary preparations to begin the mass murder upon the invasion of the Soviet Union.9 During this preparatory stage, Heydrich conducted a series of discussions with army commanders, in order to coordinate activities relating to the murder of the Jews and to prevent possible friction between army officers and the security police.10 As a result of these discussions, the Army High Command issued a series of orders and directives defining the areas of operation of Himmler's forces in performing the 'special tasks'.11 The formation of the Einsatzgruppen, the special action commandos whose main assignment was murdering the Jews, was completed in late April 1941. Besides the command staff, most of whom were senior officers in the RSHA, the units consisted of members of the Security Police (Sipo) and professionals, both from the Waffen-SS and civilian draftees who had no previous connection with the SS or the police. The nucleus of the Einsatzgruppen included the Security Police and SD units which were previously intended for activities in the Balkans 12 and connected with the invasion of England. In early May, the Einsatzgruppen gathered at the school for the border police in the town of Pretzsch, where they were joined by Reserve Battalion Nine of the regular police (Orpo).13 The men were divided into companies and assigned to the four Einsatzgruppen forming at that time. The Einsatzgruppen left their bases on 23 June 1941, in order to begin their activities, the primary one being the murder of the Jews.14 When they reached the front, some of these units joined the advancing German army. In order to take advantage of the element

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

of surprise, special subdivisions of the Einsatzgruppen, called Sonderkommandos, tried to enter the operations area on the heels of the conquering forces. Their job. which Heydrich called the first part of the solution to the Jewish question', 1 5 included counting, listing and marking off the Jews, removing them from the economy, separating them from the population, and murdering certain groups among them, chiefly the men. Other subunits of the Einsatzgruppen, called Einsatzkommandos, represented what the Nazi authorities called the 'second security policing wave', which meant murdering the 'enemies' (mainly Jews) left behind by the Sonderkommandos.'"' The rapid advance of the German army and the commandos, together with the limited manpower left behind the lines, created a kind of security vacuum in many areas of dense Jewish population. This meant that the murder was not carried out in full, especially in the areas of operation of Einsatzgruppe Β (White Russia) and Einsatzgruppe C (Ukraine). The RSHA received a report from Einsatzgruppe Β on 19 July 1941, stating: 'There are not enough troops beyond the former Russian-Polish border to carry out the second security police wave, and this has created a security vacuum.' 1 7 This situation moved Himmler and Heydrich to take special measures. They slowed down the advance of the commandos into the Soviet Union, while at the same time transferring parts of the operational areas of Einsatzgruppen Β and C to forces which were less burdened. In addition, ghettos were established which, apparently, were not a part of the original planning. The decision to set up ghettos in these areas seems to have resulted from 'technical and organizational' problems in the field. 18 Early in June 1941, Heydrich approved the undertaking of 'purification' activities by the commander of the Security Police and SD in the Generai-Government, Eberhard Schöngarth, in order to ease the load on Einsatzgruppe Β in the territories bordering on Poland. 19 Schöngarth established six commando units which set out from Cracow, Warsaw and Lublin in early July 1941. On 9 July, these units began murder operations in Slutsk, Pinsk, Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok, Vilna and the Minsk area. These units can be considered a fifth Einsatzgruppe which, beginning 19 August, was referred to as 'Einsatzgruppe for special tasks'. 2 0 This was not the only support force' which was sent to help the Einsatzgruppen. Two additional support groups, outside the command of Heydrich's security office, came from the police (Orpo) and Waffen-SS. 2 1 In addition to the arrangements reached between Heydrich and the Armed Forces High Command, Himmler reached an agreement with the Army Command (OKH) to send additional forces of the Waffen-SS and the police to carry out special tasks behind the lines on behalf of the Reichsführer-SS. This was discussed in a 21 May 1941 memorandum by Himmler on 'the special tasks', in which he defined the roles of the higher SS and police commanders (HSSPPF) and of the units they would command in the occupied territories. 22 This memorandum indicates that large forces operated separately from, or alongside, the Einsatzgruppen against civilian populations, especially Jews. In the latter part of July 1941, the murder of the Jews took on much larger proportions. 23 This was a result, primarily, of the introduction of additional forces, especially from the Waffen-SS, into the murder operations. 2 4 This supplementary murder network operating parallel to the Einsatzgruppen was not, however, an ad hoc reaction, but had been established well in advance, with the intention of operating where the situation called for additional forces. Parallel to the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen. Himmler, on 7 April 1941, established the Einsatzstab (Task Force staff). 2S From 6 May, this group was known as

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

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Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS (KRFSS; Command Staff of the Reichsführer-SS). Initially, the Kommandostab was led by SS Genera! Kurth Knoblauch and was subordinate to the SS leadership headquarters (SS Führungshauptamt). Later, it came under Himmler s direct command and served as headquarters for all the SS units which Himmler would use for the 'special tasks'. 26 On 1 May 1941, two mechanized SS brigades were established by Himmler's order: the first in the area of Cracow, consisting of SS regiments Eight and Ten, and the second in Warsaw, consisting of regiments Four and Fourteen.27 At the same time, SS Cavalry regiments which had been dispersed in the General-Government were also concentrated in Cracow and Warsaw. 28 On 15 May, Himmler formed the Begleitungsbattaillon RFSS (Escort Battalion of the Reichsführer-SS), which was composed of Death's Head Units and provided security for his own command post.29 On 20 June, Himmler ordered these units, together with the First and Second SS-Brigades, the SS cavalry regiments, and the SS Volunteer Regiment Hamburg, to be brought under the command of the KRFSS as of 21 June.30 This meant that at the start of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June, Himmler had under his direct command a large SS force numbering some 25,000 men and equipped to army standards.31 At a meeting with Goering, Bormann, Lammers, Keitel and Rosenberg held on 16 July 1941, Hitler responded to Stalin's 3 July call to Red Army soldiers to begin partisan warfare behind German lines by declaring: This partisan warfare gives us an advantage by enabling us to destroy everything in our path... .In this vast area, peace must be imposed as quickly as possible, and to achieve this, it is necessary to execute even anyone who doesn't give us a straight look.' 32 The war against the partisans was utilized by Hitler not only as a mask for mass murder, but also as a way to build a broad consensus of all the Nazi forces operating in the occupied areas in regard to the murder of Jews. 33 The Jews were portrayed by the Nazis as partisans or potential partisans, both as a group and as individuals. This conceptual integration of Jews and partisans was quickly internalized by a receptive SS and by German army soldiers, and provided the mass murder of the Jews with the legitimization of a 'war against the partisans'. All branches of the German state took part in the anti-partisan warfare, including the SS, police, army, civilian administration, local collaborators and parts of the armed forces of Germany's allies.34 The extent of the integration of the murder of the Jews with the anti-partisan warfare is reflected in the briefings given to army commanders by Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, commander of SS and police, Russia-Center, and Arthur Nebe, commander of Einsatzgruppe Β. In relating their experience in anti-partisan warfare, the two men spoke on 'The Jewish Question, with Special Regard to the Partisan Movement'.35 The widespread murder action against the Jews, which began in the last third of July 1941 under the pretext of anti-partisan warfare, opened up a track of murder of the Jews which was parallel to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. These mass executions were no less significant in quantity or brutality than those by the Einsatzgruppen, and were committed on direct orders from Himmler, under the command of the local Higher SS and police commanders. Two forces were especially prominent in this parallel murder track, the police (Orpo) and the Waffen-SS units in the Kommandostab framework.36 At the start of Operation Barbarossa, the SS brigades of the Kommandostab were under the command of the army in the northern section of the front, to safeguard the rear. However, on 27 June 1941, Himmler ordered their release from these tasks, explaining:'! need these units for other tasks.' 37 It was at this time that Himmler took personal command

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

of the Kommandostab and its units. 3 8 In effect, these units thereby became Himmler s private army. Discussions between Himmler and the Higher SS and police commanders on the use of the special SS brigades began in early July 1941. Himmler's first directive on the 'pacification' ot the rear areas by the Kommandostab s troops is dated 6 July. 3 3 The first operative plan in wnich these units were to participate, the combing of the Pripjet marshes,' was discussed by Himmler and von dem Bach-Zelewski on 10 July. 4 0 Himmler's orders of 19 and 22 July transferred the SS brigades to the commands of von d e m Bach-Zelewski and Friedrich Jackeln (SS and police. Russia-South) to impose peace' in the occupied territories, that is. to engage in mass murder, especially of Jews. 4 "' The special SS brigades of the Kommandostab served both as an independent force and as an auxiliary force under the command of the other authorities which took part in the murder of the Jews. This varied according to circumstances. The numbers of men in the brigades also varied, but according to SS manpower reports, SS Brigades One and Two numbered 7 2 0 0 - 7 3 0 0 men each, while the SS Cavalry Brigade numbered some 4000 men. 4 2 W h e n these served as independent units, they were under direct orders from Himmler, or else under his indirect command, through the Higher SS and police commanders. In such instances, these units received assignments in areas not covered' by the Einsatzgruppen. In memoranda, these actions were referred to as 'pacification' ( B e f riedungsaktion) or purification' (Säuberungsaktion). The 'pacification' of the Pripjet marshes is an example of this. Here, the SS Cavalry Brigade formed the second police security wave', with the aim of filling the gap left by the Einsatzgruppen because of their lack of manpower. The Kommandostab received explicit orders to kill all the Jews in this area, and the result was the murder of nearly every Jewish man, woman and child they could find. 4 3 Himmler viewed this area, which had not been combed at all by the Einsatzgruppen, as an ideal breeding ground for those elements he called 'hostile to the German Reich in heart and soul'. 4 4 Himmler's personal involvement in every oetail of the operation in the Pripjet marshes testifies to the significance he saw both in activating his private forces and in the operation itself. Although Bach-Zelewski, as SS and police commander of the area, was formally in charge of the operation, he could activate the Cavalry Brigade only upon Himmler's approval. 4 5 A special order by Himmler on 28 July 1941, which included directives for the operation, formally gave Bach-Zelewski field command. Still, Himmler's involvement increased as the operation got underway. O n 30 July 1941, Himmler visited BachZelewski's headquarters in Baranowice to instruct the field commanders personally. In this capacity, Himmler translated the general directives of 28 July into a clear command: 'All Jewish men should be executed, and the w o m e n and children pushed into the s w a m p s . ' 4 6 The next day, this order was given to the units of the Brigade as an explicit c o m m a n d of the Reichsführer·SS', from which it was understood that all Jews should be murdered. 4 7 The regiment commanders ordered the unit commanders to write daily reports on the murdered Jews. They were to refer to the murdered Jews as looters' or partisans'. 4 8 Groups of mounted SS were formed in each of the two regiments of the Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Gunther Lombard and Bruno Magill. These groups actually carried out most of the murder in the Pripjet marshes area. 4 9 The operation began on 29 July and was completed on 12 August. In his summation report. Hermann Fegelein, commander of the SS Cavalry Brigade, wrote that the task of 'imposing final peace in the area w a s carried out in full'. He reported the following execution statistics: 14,178 looters,

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

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1001 partisans, 699 Red Army soldiers, or a total of 15.878 killed (and 830 taken prisoner).50 The special SS brigades were also used in coordination with other units, in larger frameworks or as auxiliary forces. Usually such activity went under the title of 'anti-bandit warfare', or 'purification' actions. Another type of auxiliary activity of the SS brigades can be seen in the murder of 7000 Jews at Bobruisk, where the special brigades provided the execution squads, while Einsatzgruppen units concentrated the Jews and brought them to the execution site, and the army provided the transportation.51 The SS Cavalry Brigade continued the following murder activities in occupied Soviet territory until mid-December 1941 (when it joined the difficult winter battle at Moscow);52 after the completion of the action in the Pripjet marshes, it continued eastward. In early September, it was ordered to 'impose peace' in the territories between the Pripjet and Dnieper rivers, moving to the area of Gomel at the end of that month. From here, it proceeded to Vitebsk and from there to Toropetz and Velikye Luki. From mid-October, it was under army command, with orders to 'impose peace' in the area between Velikye Luki and Rzhew, approximately 200 kilometres outside Moscow.53 Perhaps the 'best' example of the use of the Cavalry Brigade as an auxiliary force is the murder of the Jews of Pinsk, 5-8 August, within the context of the Pripjet operation. This was the first large city whose Jewish population was to be completely annihilated. When the German army conquered Pinsk on 4 July, the Jewish population exceeded 30,000.54 On 9 July, part of Einsatzgruppe ZbV (see note 20) arrived in Pinsk and immediately began persecuting the Jews, including the murder of several of them.55 On 2 August, when the order to murder the Jews of Pinsk was transferred from SS Cavalry Brigade headquarters to units in the field, Himmler began the psychological preparation of the soldiers who were to take part in the murder. He rebuked them for their 'soft behaviour' so to speak, regarding the Jews. He demanded that the SS Cavalry kill more Jews.56 The 2 August order went to Bruno Magill, commanding him to send his First and Fourth Companies to Pinsk, to begin the murder of the Jews there. The First Company was then only 15 kilometres from Pinsk, and its commander, Charwat, went to Pinsk to coordinate the action with the commander of the Pinsk commando, Werthof. Werthof demurred, saying it was not possible to carry out Himmler's order literally. Women and children could not be pushed into the marshes.57 Werthof was apparently raising a technical, rather than a moral objection. This is implicit in Charwat's 4 August message to Cavalry Brigade headquarters asking for delivery trucks to transport the Jews and their murderers to the murder site.58 In the meantime, Charwat and Werthof agreed to begin the murder of all Jewish males between the ages of 16 and 60 the next day, 5 August. On that day, 8000 Jewish males were killed by the First Cavalry Company of the SS.59 Bach-Zelewski observed the day 's activities and commended Charwat and his men for devotion to their work. 60 The murder continued on 6 August, though on a more limited scale; the Fourth Cavalry Company arrived in Pinsk later that day to help speed the action. On 7 August, the two companies, together with the local militia, drove Jews out of their homes to the gathering area. The murder of Jewish males continued, from age 6 upwards, and at least 3000 were killed that day.61 Apparently, differences of opinion developed between Werthof and the SS Cavalry over the murder of women and children. Charwat wired Magill to inform him that carrying out the Reichsführer's order literally would take more time and might upset the timetable for the Pripjet marshes operation. Magill's response was that the Pinsk action must be completed, even if it would require more time.62 The murder in Pinsk continued on 8 August, but that evening an order was received for the cavalry companies

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

to leave Pinsk the next day in order to continue combing the area, as per the original plan. 6 3 The reasons behind these contradictory orders are not clear, but the latter c o m m a n d enabled part of the community, nearly all of them w o m e n and children, to survive for more than a y e a r 6 4 During the Pinsk operation, at least 11,000 Jews were murdered and approximately 20.000 left behind after the departure of the cavalry units. 3 5 What is evident from the Pinsk operation is that where the SS Cavalry Brigade served as an auxiliary murder unit under Himmler's direct command rather than as a sole murder unit, the murder was not total. This stands in contrast to other areas of operation in the Pripjet marshes, where the murder was carried out solely by the Cavalry Brigade in the framework of the Kommandostab Himmler's orders to the units under his c o m m a n d were more explicit at this time than were Heydrich's to the Einsatzgruppen. In contrast to the units of the Kommandostab, the nature of the Einsatzgruppen was such that there was room for initiative and interpretation of general orders by the local commanders. The SS First Brigade was considered the best of those under the aegis of the Kommandostab. More than the other units, this brigade was the most persistent in carrying out the 'special tasks', from late July 1941 to the spring of 1943 6 6 This brigade s e e m s to have been the one most involved in the murder of the Jews. In early July 1941, the First Brigade gathered in the SS training c a m p at Debica to undergo training for its operations in the occupied territories. These tasks were referred to as 'encircling and annihilating the e n e m y ' and 'encircling and annihilating bands in the forests'. 6 7 On 22 July 1941, the First Brigade passed through Lwow and c a m e under the c o m m a n d of Friedrich Jeckeln, SS and police commander, Russia-South. Their first tasK w a s the 'purification' of the area between Nowgorod-Wolinski and Stara Konstantinow, in the western Ukraine, beginning 28 July. Jeckeln himself c o m m a n d e d the operation. 6 8 From the Kommandostab's reports on this action, the impression could be formed that the First Brigade was given the military task of clearing the rear of the remaining Red Army soldiers. 6 9 However, the Brigade's own activity reports present a different picture. The SS First Brigade was the largest force under Jeckeln's c o m m a n d at this time, when the murder of the Jews was his main task. During the month of August alone, primarily in the area of the Ukraine, Jeckeln's forces killed over 44,000 Jews, more than any other group that month. 7 0 In the Nowgorod-Wolinski and Hoszcza areas, the Brigade w a s to encircle and destroy' four groups: the remaining soldiers of Red Army Division 124, armed bands, saboteurs, and people who supported the Bolshevik regime. 7 1 What is evident from the summation report is that during the purification the Brigade 'faced no resistance . . . and the Brigade suffered no losses'. 7 2 Clearly, it was operating against unarmed Jews. Before the Brigade began its work, its officers organized a sample shooting of Jews, during which several hundred were killed. This 'course', as the officers called it, was meant as a general review before commencing action. 7 3 Jeckeln here told the men of the Brigade: 'It is necessary to annihilate the Jews: Because of the Jews, the world is at war. They, the Jews, are plotting to destroy our people.' 7 4 The Brigade's units which served as an auxiliary force to Einsatzgruppen units operated as c o m m a n d o units assisting in the murder of the J e w s in various places such as Zhitomir, Berdiczew, Biala-Cirkew, Nowgorod-Wolinski, Nikopol, Uman and D n e p r o p e t r o v s k . 7 5 According to some reports, the SS First Brigade took part in the murder of 23,000 Hungarian and other Jews at Kamenets-Podolsk. 7 6 Neither the reports of Jeckeln, who commanded the operation, nor the war diary of the Kommandostab, indicate

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this,77 though it is possible that several Waffen-SS units of the Kommadostab were part of the operation. For most of the latter part of 1941, the First Brigade was under Jeckeln's command. However, for one month, beginning 6 August, the Brigade was transferred to the command of Field Marshal von Reichenau and the Wehrmacht's Sixth Army. 78 Von Reichenau's well-known sympathies for the Nazis and the murder of the Jews may have contributed to Himmler s willingness to have his crack brigade transferred temporarily to von Reichenau. It seems that the Brigade's activities under von Reichenau's command continued to be primarily 'purification', with several occasional military functions. During this month, the Brigade killed thousands of Jews. In its operations reports, the sentence, 'The Jews who abetted the bands were executed', is often repeated. 79 These reports also noted that 'the territory is pacified; there are no Jews or Bolsheviks there'. 80 Like the orders of the Cavalry Brigade, those of the S S First Brigade referred to actions against armed bands, partisans, Red Army soldiers behind the front lines, etc.81 While this might seem to indicate the existence of organized partisan activity in these areas as early as the summer of 1941, there was, in fact, no substantial partisan activity there until much later.82 The operations report of early August 1941 notes, 'there was no contact with the enemy'. 83 Operations against imaginary enemies reported by local civilians reached such proportions that the Brigade's officers seem to have begun to doubt that there was any enemy at all in the area. 84 Whereas the First Brigade had only modest success in 'cleaning out' actual partisan bands, it killed thousands of Jews. In Ostrog (upper Volhynia), for example, in August the Brigade killed 1358 Jews and one (!) Soviet soldier. 85 North of the Rosten-Bialokorowice road in central Ukraine, they killed 1018 Jews and thirteen 'partisans'. 86 In the area of Owrucz, in September, 437 Jews and seven 'partisans' were killed.87 During the fall of 1941, when the Jews of the Ukraine were being murdered in an operation code-named 'Aktion nach Kriegsbrauch', the First Brigade killed 5397 Jews. 88 From these figures, it is clear what the true mission of the First Brigade was. After several months of such activity, Himmler transferred the First Brigade to army command, on 9 December, in order to participate in the battles at Oriol. 89 There is only limited documentary material available on the S S Second Brigade. It saw action later than the other brigades, as it engaged in preparatory manoeuvres through most of July and August 1941. The emphasis of the exercises was on 'combing the forests', 'encircling and annihilating bands', and attacking convoys. 90 On 30 August, the Brigade came under the command of the S S and police commander of Russia-North, Hans Adolf Prützmann. 91 The Second Brigade s e e m s to have been the least involved in the murder of Jews. Several factors may help explain this, among them its area of operations. Estonia and parts of northern Russia had only sparse Jewish populations. This factor, combined with the relatively slow advance of the German army in this area, gave Einsatzgruppe A more time to conduct its murder operations. A s a result, Einsatzgruppe A did not need the assistance of the Kommandostab's Second Brigade. By the time this brigade reached its planned area of operations, almost no Jews remained. Unlike the other two brigades under the command of the Kommandostab the S S Second Brigade did engage Red Army units in combat behind the front lines. A s the stalemated battle at Leningrad wore on, Red Army soldiers hiding in the lakes and swamps of northern Russia engaged in sabotage activity against the German army. Therefore, the

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Second Brigade was indeed occupied with securing the rear o f the German forces militarily. 92 It is also possible that the presence of the Niederlande Legion, SS volunteers from western Europe who were placed in the Second Brigade, influenced the nature of its activities. T h e s e volunteers joined the Second Brigade as it crossed Latvia toward Leningrad on 30 August. 9 3 Himmler may not have wanted these western European units to participate in the murder of Jews. Himmler himself was displeased with the Brigade's military activity. He wrote to Prützmann: 'It is not your job to conquer Leningrad, but to purify the territories in your domain with the SS Brigade.' 9 4 Still, the Second Brigade did also take part in murder operations under the rubric of anti-partisan activity. 9 5 On 4 July, before the S e c o n d Brigade was formally ready for action, Prützmann ordered the Brigade to send a batallion from the Fourth Regiment to Minsk, Baranowice and Vilna, to carry out a 'special t a s k ' . 9 6 It may be assumed that this task was to assist Einsatzgruppen units then murdering the J e w s of these areas. It is difficult to determine how many Jews were killed by the Second Brigade in its various activities. The word 'Jew' does not appear in its reports on anti-partisan warfare. However, the general equation of saboteurs' and partisans' with Jews leads to the conclusion that many Jews were killed by the Second Brigade too. Several factors become clear from the research on the special SS brigades which operated in the framework of the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS in 1941. Perhaps most significant is the clear evidence that not only the Einsatzgruppen were engaged in the murder of the J e w s at this time. Units of both the police (Orpo) and the Waffen-SS played a very active role in the mass murder of J e w s in Soviet territory. Very little research has been done on the role of the police in the mass shootings, but approximately ten police regiments, joined by local militias, participated in the murder actions. 9 7 Research on the role of the Waffen-SS is also sparse. In part, this is a result of the complex and confusing problem of defining 'Waffen-SS'. Himmler included a wide variety of units, offices and commands under this heading, in addition to the divisions which fought at the front under army c o m m a n d . 9 8 It is clear, however, that the special SS brigades of the Kommandostab were within the Waffen-SS and under H i m m l e r s direct c o m m a n d as long as they did not join front-line S S units. When they did, they were temporarily under Waffen-SS and, ultimately, army c o m m a n d , but they never served very long. They were then withdrawn to come again under Himmler's direct command. It is obvious that Himmler took a direct, personal interest in these brigades, serving as their commander during the murder operations. What is equally obvious is that this was a most unusual armed body. Excellently equipped, it w a s neither part of Heydrich's police empire of the RHSA, nor was it under direct c o m m a n d of any other SS authority. Barring technical help from different SS offices these men fell under the direct authority of Himmler himself. It w a s an outstanding example of the Nazi desire to act outside and in opposition to any and all state institutions, including the army and police. It was, in this sense, both unique and, at the same time, a portent of the kind of regime that would have b e c o m e permanent had the Nazis overcome the Soviet Union. By camouflaging the murder of the Jews as a war against partisans, Himmler lent to it a different dimension. Under the banner of fighting 'the enemy behind the front lines' 9 9 the SS brigades murdered Jewish children, w o m e n and men. Through this bizarre nomenclature, Himmler w a s able to give the men of the brigades the feeling that they were participating in real warfare. The Jews, as abettors of partisan activity,' were held

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responsible for arousing disturbances in the rear. Hermann Fegelein referred to this when he said: O n l y villages which are judenrein do not become partisan bases.' 1 0 0 It is difficult to ascertain how many Jews were actually killed by the SS brigades. The available documentary material is limited enough to raise the question whether much more information is not hidden compared to that which has been revealed. The operations reports are incomplete chronologically, and the evidence of repetition in reports of different groups only adds to the confusion. The murder of the Jews in Soviet territory was a coordinated operation, and the same group of Jews may have been reported killed by more than one of the forces involved, or may not have been reported at all. An example of this is the summation report of the SS Cavalry Brigade on the combing of the Pripjet marshes. Fegelein refers to 15,878 killed, 101 yet his units had taken an active role in the murder of 18,000 Jews in Pinsk and Bobruisk. Were these 18,000 partially included in the 15,878, or, perhaps, not included at all? It is known that the Einsatzgruppe for special tasks took credit for 4500 Jews killed in Pinsk in its report, 1 0 2 but this still does not clear up the question. Where the special SS brigades served as support troops for SS and police commanders, they were usually the largest and best-armed group in the area. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that many, if not most Jews killed by the SS and police units were actually killed by Himmler's brigades. It is known that, in addition to the 15,878 in Fegelein 's summation report, 31,403 more were reported by him as taken prisoner by 28 September 1941, 1 0 3 The fate and identity of these detainees is not known but, since the SS Cavalry Brigade was involved in 'imposing peace' in densely Jewish Byelorussia from the latter part of September, it would not be far-fetched to assume that many of the detainees were Jewish and were killed, then or later. Taking this into consideration, together with the activities of the Cavalry Brigade during the last months of 1941, an estimate of 50,000 Jews murdered by the SS Cavalry Brigade in 1941 would not be an exaggeration. The documentary information on the SS First Brigade is also not clear regarding numbers of Jews killed. However, since it was largely responsible for the 44,000 killed reported by Jeckeln for August, as well as helping the Einsatzgruppen murder many thousands more in the later months of 1941, it probably killed at least as many Jews as did the Cavalry Brigade. 1 0 4 When considering the above estimates, in addition to the unknown numbers of Jews killed by the Second Brigade, it seems that the units operating in the framework of the Kommandostab in 1941 killed at least 100,000 Jews. Further research into KSRFSS activities in 1942 and 1943, and into parallel Orpo actions, may clarify further the background and the system of the mass murder of Soviet Jews. The research appears to point, generally speaking, to the following conclusions. The Jews of the Soviet territories were murdered by, roughly speaking, four armed German forces: Heydrich's Einsatzgruppen, the Orpo, the Kommandostab under Himmler, and a number of army units. All these were helped by fairly considerable numbers of local police forces recruited by the Germans. Of these, the three Kommandostab SS Brigades, a very powerful military force of about 25,000 men, formed a private army of Heinrich Himmler, and were responsible for an as yet undetermined but very considerable number of murders in 1941-3. A picture both of chaos and of careful planning emerges, and the two are not contradictory but complementary. They both served a purely ideological motivation, the result of which was mass dying.

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THE "FINAL SOLUTION APPENDIX

Below is a comparison of the dates of activity of units of the Einsatzgruppen Kommandostab in a number of places. The list is not exhaustive.' 05 Place

Belaya Tserkev Berdichev, ghetto Berdichev, region Bobruisk Chernigov Chernyakhov Denpropetrovsk Gomel Korosten Krivoy Rog Kirovograd Lakhovicze Mogilev Nikopol Novograd-Volinskij Rzhev Shepetovka Toropetz Liman Velikye Luki Zaporozhye Zhitomir, ghetto Zhitomir, region

Beginning of Einsatzgruppen activities Beginning of August 15 September End of August Early August 23 September 10 August 13 October Mid-September Mid-August End of September 16 September 1 August Early October 5 October Late July 21 October End of July 6 October 22 September Mid-October 5 October 19 September 7-15 August

ana of the

Beginning of Kommandostab activities Beginning of August 14 September Mid-August 30 July 18 September 6 August 10 October 24 September 10 August 21 September 22 September 30 July Early October 12 September 28 July 18 October 28 July 10 October 16 September 18 October 1 October 17 September 8-20 August

NOTES 1. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshot (IMT-Blue Senes). 42 vols. (Nuremberg, 1947-9), Vol. 26, pp. 190-8, document 647 PS. English trans, from Nazi Conspiracy and Aggressionn (Red Series), Vol. 2, p. 181. 2. Ibid. For a thorough analysis of this order and its significance in the development of the armed branches of the SS, see Bernd Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, Die Waffen-SS, 1933-1945 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1982), pp. 113-23. 3. Wegner, Hitler politische, p. 122. Together with the older units, the Death's Head Units totalled approximately 36,000 men. 4. Hans Buchheim, 'Die SS—das Herrschaftsinstrument', in H. Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, 2 vols. (Munich, 1982), Vol. 1, p. 175. 5. 'Geheimes Verzeichnis über Standorte und Führerbesetzung der SS-Totenkopfverbände . Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg, Federal Republic of Germany, File CSSR II, Vol. 6, Bild 141-51. In the years 1939-41, Death's Head regiments were stationed in Brno Bromberg, Bergen, Breda, Copenhagen, Cracow, Danzig, Linz, Lodz, Oslo, Posen, Praha, Radom Vienna, Warsaw and other places. See George Stein, Geschichte der Waffen-SS (Königstein, 1978). p. 38.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

467

6. Wolfgang Schettler, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der "Endlösung", in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 43(1982), 6. 7. Testimony of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. IMT-Blue Series, Vol. 4, pp. 535ff. 8. Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust: Historical Perspectives (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv. 1982), p. 58: Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981), p. 115. 9. On the 24 February 1941, meeting of Hitler, Himmler, Goering and Rosenberg, see N. Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 1937-1945 (Mainz, 1980), p. 262; Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische Verbrechen, 22 vols. (Amsterdam: University Press, 1968-81), Vol. 20, p. 35; 'Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung No. 21', IMT-Blue Series, Vol. 26, p. 54, document 477-PS; 'Der Ostkrieg und die Judenvemichtung', in Gerd Überschäl and Wolfgang Wette, eds., Unternehmen Barbarossa': Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941 (Paderborn: 1984), p. 225. 10. Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden (Stuttgart: DVA, 1978), pp. 28-30; 'Der Ostkrieg', pp. 224-5; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 80-101. 11. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 116-41; 'Der Ostkrieg', pp. 224-5. 12. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 142. 13. There were four Einsatzgruppen, containing sixteen commando units, totalling 3000 men. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 141-50; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction ot the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967), pp. 188-90. 14. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 173-95. 15. '.. .die Lösung der Judenfrage in ihrem ersten Teil. . .', IMT, Nuremberg Document NO-2655. Quoted in Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 155. 16. Justiz und Nazionale socialistìsche, Vol. 20, p. 38. 17. 'Ereignismeldungen UdSSR (EM) No. 27', IMT, Nuremberg Document NO-2942. 18. There is no evidence or documents showing that the establishment of ghettos was discussed during the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa. All orders regarding the establishment of ghettos were given after the invasion of the Soviet Union was underway. See IMT, Nuremberg Document PS-212, IMT-Blue Series, Vol. 25, p. 302 ('Richtlinien für die Behandlung der Judenfrage'); and 'Vorläufige Richtlinien für die Behandlung der Juden im Reichskommissariat Ostland', in Klaus Hildebrand, 'Hitler, Rassen—contra Weltpolitik', Militârgeschichtiche Mitteilungen, Vol. 19 (1976), pp. 207-24. 19. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 180; Hilberg, The Destruction, p. 193. 20. 'Einsatzgruppe ZbV in the original. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, p. 38; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Tnjppe, pp. 180-1; Hilberg, The Destniction, pp. 193-216. 21 There is no thorough research on the role of Orpo in the murder of the Jews. On the structure of Orpo and its general functions in occupied areas of the Soviet Union, see Hans-Joachim Neufeldt et ai, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei, 1936-1945 (Koblenz: Schriften des Bundesarchivs, 3, 1957). 22 Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer in the original. Hans Adolf Jacobsen, 'Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangemen', in Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, Vol. 2, pp. 184-5, and document 9, '.. . Betr. Sonderauftrug des Führers'. 23. Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, Politik und Kriegsführung 1940-1941 (Frankfurt/M: Bernard und Graefe, 1965), p. 530. 24. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 146. 25. . . . Aufstellung eines Einsatzstabes . . . ' , 24-4-1941. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), NS-19/ 3508. 26. '. . . Betr: Umbenennung des Einsatzstabes Reichsführer-SS, 6-5-1941.' BA, NS-19/3508. 27. '. . . Aufstellung von 2 SS-Brigaden (mot.) vom 24-4-1941.' BA, NS-19/3508, pp. 1-3. In the Second Brigade's operations diary the two regiments are identified as Four and Five, but the earlier source seems more accurate. See Unsere Ehre heisst Treue, Kriegstagebuch des Kommandostabes Reichsführer-SS (Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich: Europa, 1965), p. 17. 28. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, pp. 13-14.

468

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

29. K. G. Klietmann, Die Watlen-SS. eme Doxumentation (Osnabrück 1965), pp. 160-1. 307. 313, 395. 30. Unsere Ehre, p. 17 31. On 17July 1941, there were 25,221 men in the KSRFSS framework. See ' . Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS . . . Kriegsstärkenachweisungen und Sollstärken . . .', Zentrale Stelle, CSSR II. No. 3 (326), Bild 68-79. 32. IMT-Blue Series, Vol. 38. pp. 68-94, document L-221 33. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 598-604. 34. Nazionalsozialistische Verbrechen und Partisanenkampf USSR 1941-1944 (Ludwigsburg: Zentrale Stelle, 1969), p. 15; Der Ostkrieg', pp. 229-30; IMT-Blue Series, Vo!. 4, p. 538, document PS-3713; Jürgen Fürster. 'Die Sicherung des Lebensraumes', in H. Boog et al., Das dritte Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1983), Vol. 4, pp. 1042, 1050-3; Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, p. 248. 35. Krausnick and Wilhelm. Die Truppe, p. 248. 36. Ibid. 37. Unsere Ehre, pp. 8-11, 23. 38. Ibid., pp. 15, 23. 'Bericht über die Tätigkeit des KSRFSS für die Zeit vom 14-7 bis 20-7-1941' (B.ü.T), photocopy at Dokumentationszentrum Wien (DW). 39. Unsere Ehre, p. 26. 40. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische. Vol. 20, pp. 24-105. The prosecution of Bruno Magill and others. 41. Unsere Ehre, p. 219. 42. 'Kriegsstärkenachweisungen und Sollstärken' (KSRFSS O.U. 19-7-41), Zentrale Stelle. CSSR II, Ord. No. 3. Bild 68-79. A number of additional units served under the Kommandostab but were not incorporated in the brigades. These additional units included, for example, the Escort Battalion Reichstührer-SS. the SS Hamburg Regiment, the SS anti-aircraft platoon, and a number of service units, the Kommandostab's 25,000 men consisted of the 18.500 in the special brigades, plus the additional units. 43. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, pp. 47-9. 44. Kommandosonderbefehl', 28-7-1941. Unsere Ehre, pp. 220-3. 45. 'B.ü.T. des KRSFSS vum 14-7 bis 20-7-1941 ', DW. 46. See the order; '. . .Ausdrücklicher Befehl des Reichsführer-SS'. 1-8-1941. Quote from Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, pp. 46-7; see also 'Bericht über dem Verlauf der Pripjet Aktion vom 27-7 bis 11-8-1941', in Unsere Ehre. pp. 227-30. 47. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, pp. 46-7, 90. 48. Ibid., Vol. 20. p. 59; see also LKPA Niedersachsen, Vernehmungsniederschrift, Sonderkommission Z, Yad Vashem (YV) TR-10/1163. 49. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, p. 40; Unsere Ehre, ρ 224. 50. 'Abschlussmeldung der SS-Kavalene Brigade über Befriedung der Prypec-Sümpfe', YV 0-53/86. 51. The murder of the Jews in Bobruisk oy the SS Cavalry Brigade is described in Karla Miller-Tupath, Reichslührers gehorsamter Becher (Fulda. 1982), p. 62. The description is baseo upon the testimonies of the men who took part in this massacre. 52. Unsere Ehre. pp. 97-100. 53. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 1-9 bis 7-9-1941', YV 0-53/86; 'SS-Kav. Brigade . . . Bri gadebefehl No. 6 . . .', Zentrale Stelle, Sonstige: Ord. No. 355. Bild 23-4; Unsere Ehre, pp. 37, 50-7 54. There are various estimates for the Jewish population of Pinsk. German sources estimated 20,000. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, p. 62. Other estimates are more accurate. See Nachum Buna, 'The Holocaust and Struggle', in Seter Pinsk (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1966), pp. 325, 330 and Shalom Cholawsky, On the Banks of the Nieman and Dnieper Rivers. The Jews of Western Byelorussia in the Second World War (Tel Aviv, 1982), p. 14. Cholawsky concludes that there were 30,937 Jews in Pinsk.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

469

55. Hilberg, The Destruction, p. 216. 56. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische. Vol. 20, p. 82. 57. Buna, T h e Holocaust', p. 330. 58. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische. Vol. 20, pp. 52, 62. 59. Buna, T h e Holocaust', p. 328; Cholawsky, p. 14. 60. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische. Vol. 20, p. 53; Buna. T h e Holocaust', p. 328. 61. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische. Vol. 20, pp. 51-3; Buna, 'The Holocaust', pp. 330-1. 62. Justiz und Nazionalsocialistische, Vol. 20, p. 54. 63. Ibid. 64. See Himmler's order for the liquidation of the Pinsk ghetto, 27 October 1942. IMT-Blue Series, document NO-2027. The order appears in Buna, T h e Holocaust', p. 350. 65. Buna, The Holocaust', pp. 330-1. 66. Verordnungsblatt der Waffen-SS, No. 14, 15 July 1942. and No. 6, 15 March 1943. SS General Hermann commanded the First Brigade from 25 July 1941 to 4 July 1942. Afterwards, SS General von Treuenfeld was the commander until 1943. See Unsere Ehre, pp. 97-100. 67. B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 14-7 bis 20-7-1941', DW (photocopy). 68. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 28-7 bis 3-8-1941', YV 0-53/86; Unsere Ehre. pp. 105-8. 69. B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 28-7 bis 3-8-1941 ', YV 0-53/86. 70. Hilberg. The Destruction, p. 196; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Tnjppe, p. 189. 71. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 28-7 bis 3-8-1941', YV 0-53/86. 72. Unsere Ehre. p. 105. 73. A testimony oí a participant, printed in Informations- und Pressedienst der österreichischen Widerstandsbewegung, No. 5 (1975), 10, 33. 74. Ibid. 75. Unsere Ehre, pp. 42-4, 130-3; 'Anklagschrift gegen R. Wüstholz', YV TR-10/752; 'Beschluss in die Strafsache gegen . . . M. Täubner', YV TR-10/791; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 192; Hilberg, The Destruction, p. 196. 76. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 189. 77. On the murder of the Jews in Kamenets-Podolsk, see 'F.S.' of 27-8-1941, Zentrale Stelle, CSSR I, Teil I, Bild 32. On the position of the Brigade at that time, see Unsere Ehre, pp. 38-9. 78. Unsere Ehre, p. 34. B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 25-8 bis 31-8-1941 ', DW. 79. Unsere Ehre, pp. 34, 110, 114,115,127,140, 150; Zentrale Stelle, CSSR III, Band 397, Bild 242-61. 80. Unsere Ehre, p. 114. 81. Ibid., p. 105. 82. J. Hoffmann, in Boog et al.. Das dritte Reich, Vol. 4, p. 755. 83. Reports of this kind were common in the operations reports. See Unsere Ehre, p. 105; 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 28-7 bis 3-8-1941', DW; 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 1-9 bis 7-9-1941', YV 0-53/128; 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 8-9 bis 14-9-1941', DW. 84. Unsere Ehre, ρ 123. 85. Ibid., p. 108 86. Zentrale Stelle, CSSR'l, Teil, Bild 52-4. 87. Unsere Ehre, p. 153. 88. Ibid.. p. 174. 89. Ibid.. 30-101, 105-82. 90. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 14 bis 20-7-1941'. DW (photocopy). 91. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 1-9 bis 7-9-1941', YV 0-53/128; B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 8-9 bis 14-9-1941'. DW (photocopy). 92. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 8-9 bis 14-9-1941', DW (photocopy); Unsere Ehre, pp. 40-4. 93. Unsere Ehre. p. 46. 'B.ü.T. des KSRFSS vom 1-9 bis 7-9-1941', YV 0-53/128. 94. Zentrale Stelle, CSSR II, Band 3. Bild 112. 95. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 219.

470

THE "FINAL SOLUTION'

96. Zentrale Stelle. CSSR II. Band 3, Bild 95. 97. See G. Tessin In Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei. 1936-1945. pp. 5 2 - 6 8 . In March 1942, 29,230 Orpo men were active in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, and 60,421 from local militias. In Fürster 'Die Sicherung', p. 1061. 98. Buchheim ef a/.. Anatomie des SS-Staates, pp. 179-82; Wegner, Hitlers politische, pp. 1 2 6 - 9 : Stein, Geschichte der Waffen-SS. pp. 9 0 - 1 1 6 99. Fürster. 'Die Sicherung , p. 1050. 100. Ibid.. p. 1043. 101. Stein. Geschichte der Waffen-SS, pp. 9 0 - 1 1 6 . Wegner, Hitlers politische, pp. 126-9. 102. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, p. 567. 103. Zentrale Stelle, Polen: Ord. No. 355. Bild 2 0 3 - 6 . 104. Ilya Ehrenburg and Vassily Grossman, eds.. The Black Book (New York: Holocaust Library, 1981), pp. 1 8 - 2 0 ; YV TR-10/616. TR-10/752, TR-10/711: Zentrale Stelle, CSSR III Band 397, Bild 2 4 2 - 6 1 ; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, p. 192 105. T h e data in the appendix are based upon Unsere Ehre; Hilberg, The Destruction. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe; Martin Gilbert. Atlas of the Holocaust (London, 1982).

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

471

ROLLBAHN MORD: THE EARLY ACTIVITIES OF EINSATZGRUPPE C* Y A A C O V LOZOWICK Graduate Student. Hebrew University,

Jerusalem

Abstract — Einsalzgruppe C was active in the Ukraine and became responsible for the murder of Jews, including the Babi-Yar massacre at Kiev. At first, men only were murdered, but after a number of weeks, women and children became victims, too. The Einsatzgruppe was assisted in its task by the Wehrmacht, the German police, other units of the SS and by both individuals and organized groups of local Ukrainians and Germans. Though no clear orders regarding the scope of the Final Solution seem to have been given, Einsatzgruppe C relentlessly continued pursuing its victims until the act of murder itself became routine.

Das Kommando (ΕΚ 4a) war auf der Rollbahn Mord' — auf dem Marsche.'

Operation Barbarossa', the German invasion of the Soviet Union launched on 22 June 1941, was a turning point in the Nazi war against the Jews. Special SS and police units, among them the four Einsatzgruppen, embarked on a campaign of murder, directed mainly against the Jewish population of the newly occupied territories. A detailed examination of the early activities of the third of these units, Einsatzgmppe C, can contribute to understanding the development and execution of the 'Final Solution'. A number of issues must be addressed. The Einsatzgruppe systematically murdered tens of thousands of people. Both the methods used and their evolution are therefore significant. The theatre of operations was occupied by many diverse German formations, military and other. The relations between the murderers and their colleagues in other units were generally good, although not always without friction, a subject which will be examined closely. Likewise, the reactions of the local population had an important effect on the fate of many victims. The ideology of the perpetrators also contributed to the outcome, of course, as it helped them to persevere in a task that generally would be regarded as extremely repugnant. One final issue, currently under debate, will need to be addressed: What were the orders given to the unit? Was their mission to murder all Jews, or only specific groups? If an order for total eradication existed, was it given before the operation, and therefore must have been part of a pre-conceived plan, or did it filter down piecemeal, its origin unclear? It would seem that the answers to these questions differed in the various Einsatzgruppen, necessitating a detailed examination of each one of them individually. I. GENERAL OVERVIEW Einsatzgruppe C numbered between 800 and 1000 men and was commanded by Dr. "This article is an extensively revised and translated version of the Hebrew article in Yalkut Moreshet, No. 40 (December 1985), 67-90

472

THE "FINAL SOLUTION'

Ushomir

V O L Η Υ Ν I A Luck (Lutsk)

GREATER GERMANY

Rovine (Rovno)

NovgorodVolynsk • .G*",

Zborow

Rudki

~ χ : 3 c •· Λ V» • — VI

larnopol

Boryslaw Dobromil—'ft^ Sambor

ι Zhitomir Ivankov

Sokal

Lwow '(Lvov),

fè^

©Mart.η G.Ib·. I 19Θ6

Belaya Tserkov Kovshevata

Khmelnik

U K R A I N E •

Vinnitsa

Kamenets Podolsk Uman

"*

?

Fastov

Berdichsv

'•-.'β ^

chortkow

Kiev

Radomysl

f

'

r

Β U Κ O V I

Kirovograd (Kirovo)

NA

'f.

kilometres 150

Fig. 1. Editor's Note. The Editor wishes to thank Martin Gilbert, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford for his generous assistance in preparing the maps accompanying this article.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

473

Otto Rasch. It was divided into tour subunits, known as Einsatzkommando (ΕΚ). Paul Blobel commanded EK 4a, Gunter Hermann commanded EK 4b, Erwin Schulz led ΕΚ 5 and Dr. Erhard Kroeger led EK 6 2 Each Einsatzkommando was mobile and included officers, staff, translators and drivers.3 Until approximately 10 July, this battalion was called Einsatzgruppe Β, only afterward being renamed Einsatzgruppe C.4 Einsatzkommando 4a were the first to set out, from Bad Schmiedeberg in Prussian Saxony, on 23 June 1941.5 In early July, the entire Einsatzgruppe converged on Lvov (Lemberg), the only time that all the subunits were together. Thousands of the local Jews were then murdered.6 Until mid-July, the units advanced swiftly eastwards and many Jewish communities were hit.7 The method changed in mid-month when the various subunits set up headquarters in towns and despatched search squads to comb the villages and countryside for victims.® There was no substantial advance for the next month, while the Einsatzgruppe waited for Kiev to fall. Since the Wehrmacht failed to capture the city, the plan was changed and Einsatzgruppe C moved southeast towards Kirovograd.9 Einsatzkommando 4a remained in Zhitomir, near Kiev, its squads systematically combing the region. 10 In mid-September, they murdered the 3145 Jews still alive in Zhitomir. 11 At the same time, the unit in Kirovograd was preparing to advance to Poltava,12 when Kiev fell. Einsatzkommando 4a went to Kiev immediately, and within a few days the headquarters of the Einsatzgruppe and part of EK 5 also arrived.13 After the city was captured, a series of detonations occurred and fires broke out, severely damaging the whole centre of town. 14 Only after several days did the Germans manage to bring the situation under control. In an operation that had been coordinated with other units, 33,771 Kiev Jews were shot at Babi-Yar on 28-29 September 1941,15 dates which mark the time-frame of the research. II. PREPARATIONS AND METHODS The men in the ranks were not aware of the nature of their task until the operation began. Only after EK 4a arrived in Sokal on 27 June and was about to begin its murder operations did its commander, Blobel, gather all of his men and explain that 'the Jews and potential enemies must be put to death'. 16 He described the method and added that everybody must participate. There was no need to repeat the order; Blobel's men understood that their victims were being shot 'because they were Jews'. 17 One of them once explained to some Wehrmacht soldiers observing an execution that this was a 'Fiihrer-order'. 18 The men of EK 5 were informed of their task only about half an hour before they joined the men of EK 6, who had been shooting thousands of Jews in Lvov since early the same morning. 19 It appears that there were some initial difficulties in EK 6. After they shot 90 Jews in Dobromil on 30 June, their commander, Kroeger, saw the need the next morning to assemble his men for a pep-talk'. He encouraged them and repeated the importance of their mission. 20 In order to boost their effectiveness, the units tried to advance with the first troops. An example of this is the three vehicles of EK 4a which reached Lvov even before the capture of the city had been completed and then became embroiled in the fighting.21 Einsatzkommando 6 reached the city a few hours later,22 while a squad of EK 4b arrived in Kremenchug before all other units' (except, presumably, the conquerors themselves). 23

474

THE "FINAL SOLUTION'

There w e r e various methods of capturing the victims. Einsatzkommando 4a arrived at Luck, shot several hundred J e w s , and then issued a proclamation ordering Jewish men to report for labour. The 1160 J e w s w h o o b e y e d dug their own graves and were shot. 2 4 Posters were also used in Belaya Tserkov and Kiev. 2 5 The c o m m a n d e r of EK 4b s u m m o n e d the rabbi of Vinnitsa and ordered him to bring forward the Jewish intellectuals. W h e n there were not enough J e w s the next day, the order was repeated again and again. Shortly thereafter, the J e w s were shot. 2 6 T h e Jews of Rovno ; .id outside the town and returned only by night. They were caught one evening in a joint Einsatzgruppe-Wehrmacht operation. 2 7 A s more and more J e w s fled from the advancing Germans, the units developed a new tactic. Upon entering a town whose J e w s had fled, they harmed no one. J e w s in hiding interpreted this to mean that the rumours of mass murders had been exaggerated, and they returned to their homes. There was then no problem in capturing them. 2 8 Individuals in hiding were occasionally turned in by local non-Jews. There were also c a s e s o? SS-men and locals together raiding Jewish areas and forcefully collecting the victims from their homes. 2 9 T h e efficiency achieved in these operations is evident in the case of Uman, where EK 5 arrived in the town shortly after the Wehrmacht and the local population had perpetrated a pogrom, resulting in the flight of many Jews. The SS then established order, searched h o m e s for loot, and collected Jews, 1412 of w h o m were murdered the next morning. 3 0 While rounding up the Jews, graves had to be prepared. At times, anti-tank trenches or large shell-holes were used. 3 1 In Luck, Jewish men dug the graves, whereas prisoners-of-war prepared the graves for the thousands of Jews of Zhitomir. 3 2 If the murder-site was distant, as in Lvov, the Jews were transported by truck. 3 3 On the other hand, the Jews of Ivankov and Kiev were marched to their deaths. 3 4 Before the mass murders at Zhitomir and Kiev, the J e w s were registered, then forced to disrobe. Until then, the victims had been shot and buried in their clothing. 3 5 T h e victims knew their fate just before the end. At the point of concentration they were still ignorant of what awaited them, but as they approached the murder site, they could no longer have harboured any illusions. 3 6 W h e r e a s small 'actions' lasted only a few minutes, the larger 'actions', where thousands were murdered, gave some victims a few more moments to consider their fate. 3 7 In most cases, the S S - m e n cordoned off the area, at times with the assistance of other units. 3 8 There were various methods of killing. In some cases, two S S - m e n shot each victim, but in other cases only one. The victims stood, facing their murderers. 3 9 Blobel testified that he disliked methods that were too personal'.' 1 0 In EK 4b, one m a n shot bursts of machine-gun fire at groups of victims. 4 ' If cruelty can be measured, it would seem that the most horrible murder method was that used at Babi-Yar, where the J e w s were ordered to lie face d o w n on the dead bodies while the SS-men walked on the mounds shooting them at close range with their pistols. 4 2 Not everyone died immediately. S o m e of the victims of Babi-Yar managed to escape at night and made their way to a nearby hospital. Those w h o were still alive but did not m a n a g e to crawl away were buried alive the next day, when the SS exploded the walls of the ravine. In doing so, they were aware that there were still living Jews among the dead 43 T h e r e are very few testimonies relating to the perpetrators themselves. Rasch ordered that all personnel participate in the executions, and apparently he was obeyed. 4 4 One report tells us that during the first shooting, one of the men of EK 4 a fainted. 4 5 There is no evidence of drunkenness. O n e of the killers at Babi-Yar recalled that the men received

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

475

rum, but he made no mention of being drunk. 46 A few days after the operation began, Blobel was hospitalized because of excessive drinking, but this was not the first such incident of his life.47 The SS-men aimed at efficiency, and only seldom were there reports of mistreatment beyond what was deemed necessary. When they sensed that the populace was not cooperating, out of 'fear of Jewish power', they marched the Jews through the streets, thereby demonstrating Jewish powerlessness. 48 At the public execution of the Soviet judge Kiper, in Zhitomir, 402 Jews were forced to sit on the ground, hands above their heads, and to proclaim: Our Father, return us our leader Moses, we want to enter the Promised Land.' 49 At the outset of the shootings in Lvov, many detainees were interrogated. Those who could prove they had no communist connections were set free, while all others were shot. 50 It is conceivable that before the murderers adapted to their task they sought justification in the Jews' alleged ties to the Bolshevik enemy. In this case, such justifications would diminish or disappear with time. There are no other known reports of setting Jews free. A search for traces of humaneness in the reports will be all but futile. At Babi-Yar, Blobel and one of his officers did allow a small blonde girl to escape, though her fate is unknown. 51 Even Himmler was reputed to have once been willing to save a victim whose appearance was 'Aryan', but the man was shot when he told Himmler that he was definitely Jewish. 52 Kroeger related that he informed the first victims (at Dobromil) that they were being shot in retaliation for Soviet atrocities. His announcement was met with curses. Thereafter, the victims died without explanations. 53 There are no records of victims pleading for their lives, although the absence of such reports is not conclusive proof. Another indication that the men adapted to their task is the issue of booty. Efficient collection of Jewish property began only towards the end of September, when trucks were needed to remove the 20 to 25 tons of booty taken from the Jews of Zhitomir. 54 The reports do not specify the weight of the loot collected at Babi-Yar, but they note with satisfaction that the disposal of almost 35,000 Jews would contribute to solving the lack of housing created by the destruction of central Kiev. 55 The Einsatzgruppe had other tasks in addition to killing. They also supervised the agricultural work of the Ukrainians. At times they joined the Wehrmacht in the campaign against the remnants of the Red Army, referred to euphemistically as 'partisans'. Occasionally, the units sustained casualties in these operations. 56 The writers of these reports.complained that more time was dedicated to the war against these 'bandits' than to the main mission. However, through these actions, good relations with the Wehrmacht were established, allowing Einsatzgruppe units to enter towns immediately upon their conquest and to move freely throughout the military zone. 57 It is possible that the Wehrmacht agreed that the Ukrainian militia be attached to the Einsatzgruppe to make up for time 'lost' assisting the Wehrmacht.58 Since these were units of the security police, they also collected intelligence material. However, they were not overly successful because the Soviets managed to destroy most of their official documents before their retreat. 59 At the time the units were organized, in the spring of 1941, a distinction was drawn between sonderkommandos, active near the front, and Einsatzkommandos, active in the rest of the conquered territories 60 The reality represented in the reports reflects no such distinction.

476

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" III. EINSATZGRUPPE

AND ARMY

In preparation for Operation Barbarossa, there were discussions at the highest echelons of the Wehrmacht and the regime regarding the upcoming tasks of the security police in occupied areas. In the context o f these discussions, the commander of the army, von Brauchitsch, issued a 28 April 1941 command giving the Einsatzgruppen the responsibility for carrying out the special tasks of the security police. They had the authority to take action against the local populations as well. 61 On 13 May 1941, Hitler issued a directive to Wehrmacht soldiers ordering that punishment of the local population should not be brought before military courts. The soldiers were permitted to shoot partisans, even when they surrendered, and to execute summarily anyone operating against the army. Furthermore, when those responsible for such acts could not be definitely identified, collective punishment could be imposed, and the soldiers performing any of the above acts would not be tried by military courts unless they had disrupted military discipline. 62 On 6 June, the army command issued the Kommissarbefehl (Commissar Order), at first only to the most senior officers. Others received the order verbally. The order asserted that the enemy would not abide by international law or humanitarian considerations, and especial cruelty was expected to be inflicted upon German POWs by Soviet political commissars. Therefore, political commissars in the Soviet army should be shot on capture. For other commissars and functionaries of the Soviet regime, a distinction was to be drawn between active opponents of Germany, who were to be executed immediately, and others who could be left alone. In the rear territories, all doubtful cases were to be transferred to the Einsatzgruppen,63 Although the nature of the actions authorized for the Einsatzgruppen was vague, the Wehrmacht commanders could have harboured no doubts that they would not be within the scope of accepted behaviour in warfare. The report writers of the Einsatzgruppen were pleasantly surprised to be able to relate that 'the attitude of the Wehrmacht to the Jews is downright heartening'. 64 A month and a half later, towards the end of August, we read that the relations are still excellent, the Wehrmacht personnel are showing interest and understanding· for the actions of the Einsatzgruppen, and specifically towards the executions'. 65 Following the murder of 537 Jews at the beginning of October, the report states that the action was received with satisfaction by the army'. 66 Walter Hänsch, who commanded EK 4b, testified at Nuremberg that the units of the Einsatzgruppen could not have acted without the acquiescence of the Wehrmacht. At any rate, the relations between his officers and those of the military were more than collégial, they were friendly. 67 These testimonies reflect the feeling of the Einsatzgruppe troops that the army was not disturbed by their activities. A number of facts lend credence to this. Einsatzgruppe C received requests from the Wehrmacht to dispose of the Jews and communists in Radomysl and Kremenchug. 68 One case stands out: when the Germans suspected the Red Army of using dum-dum bullets, contrary to international law, a military doctor was commissioned to investigate the subject. At Zhitomir, Blobel placed SS-men and POWs ai his disposal. To determine if the Soviet ammunition was indeed illegal, the SS-men used it on the prisoners Consequently, the doctor returned to Berlin and published a 'scientific' article condemning Soviet methods of warfare and expressing abhorrence at their violation of international law. 69 In many instances. Einsatzgruppe actions were planned, and at times carried out, in cooperation with Wehrmacht units. The headquarters of the Seventeenth Army offeree

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

477

assistance in inciting the populace against the Jews and communists. 70 The Wehrmacht and the Einsatzgruppe worked together to round up the Jews of Rovno, Novgorod-Volinski (Zwiahel), Zhitomir and other locations,71 while at Zhitomir and Babi-Yar, the massacres themselves were planned in conference with representatives of local army units.72 Members of EK 5 were present at the registration of ail the men of Kiev by the army, after Babi-Yar, and arrested anybody identified as Jewish. 73 Jews in Lvov and Zhitomir were brutally beaten by soldiers before they were handed over to the EG for shooting. 74 Personnel of the Todt Organization also participated in the murder of Jews at Luck and Zhitomir. 75 There were cases where soldiers murdered Jews even when no Einsatzgruppe units were in the vicinity, such as near Tarnopol, Novgorod-Volinski and by the roadside near Lvov. 76 The first signs of friction between Einsatzgruppe C and the Wehrmacht appeared only when the SS-men started collecting victims from POW camps controlled by the army, but even then there were favourable reports, as well. 77 It may be that the tension was caused more by differences of opinion over jurisdiction than disagreement over the fate of the victims. On 19 October 1941, Field Marshal von Reichenau, commander of the Sixth Army, issued an order warning his men against mistaken feelings of compassion for the civilian population. He also called for the extermination of the Bolshevist doctrine of the Red Army. Two days later, the commander of all the forces on the eastern front, von Rundstedt, had the communiqué distributed to all his men. 78 The contents of the communiqué testify to Wehrmacht approval of the actions of the Einsatzgruppen, while the need to circulate it shows there must have been some difficulties. One difficulty not mentioned in the reports occurred on 19 August 1941, in Belaya-Tserkov, where EK 4a murdered hundreds of Jews, including children. The younger children and infants were concentrated in a building near the edge of town in horrible conditions and without food. They remained there for a number of days, and their crying could be heard from the street. Nearby troops watched both the murder and the suffering of the children and described the events to two military chaplains of Field Hospital 607/4, Trewes and Wilczek. In an attempt to save the children, the chaplains turned to the local commander, who referred them to the chief chaplain of Infantry Division 295, stationed nearby. The issue was bandied from unit to unit, but in the meantime, the army prevented the murder of the infants, the protests of the EK commander notwithstanding. On 21 August, a meeting of representatives of the various units concerned authorized the shooting of the children. There was general agreement that the two chaplains had overstepped their authority and that the slovenliness of the operation had brought on the complication. It would have been far better, it was agreed, if the action had been completed immediately, efficiently and without publicity. The infants and children were murdered.79 A number of points are apparent from this incident. First, the Einsatzgruppe's report writers, who never mentioned the case, are not totally reliable when describing relations with the Wehrmacht. Second, junior Wehrmacht officers could halt the murder actions, at least temporarily, when they discerned a reason to do so. The potential power of senior officers in this regard can only be imagined. However, these officers saw no need to intervene in the murder operations, making themselves accomplices. It may be assumed that there were soldiers who witnessed the murders and disagreed with them, such as the two chaplains and the soldiers who alerted them. Letters or documents to this effect may yet be uncovered, but they cannot blur the essential fact: their writers took no action to interfere with the murders.

478

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

IV. C O M P O S I T I O N O F T H E U N I T S —

In a d d i t i o n to t h e Einsatzgruppe

OTHER UNITS

COOPERATING

EINSATZGRUPPEN

WITH THE

a n d t h e Wehrmacht,

there were also other g r o u p s

s t a t i o n e d in t h e a r e a , m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s of t h e s e b e i n g S S units i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e

Einsatzgruppe

80

At the e n d of J u n e , s u c h a unit w a s a t t a c h e d to Einsatzgruppe

p l a t o o n d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g t h e Einsatzkommandos,

a n d their s e p a r a t e identity

C, its lost. 8 1

Einsatzkcmmando 6 c o n s i s t e d of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 3 0 - 1 5 0 m e n , i n c l u d i n g a p l a t o o n of o n e of G e s t a p o , c r i m i n a l p o l i c e a n d S D , a n d a third of t h e o r d e r (regular) police. T h e r e s t of t h e unit w a s m a d e u p of d r i v e r s , t r a n s l a t o r s a n d s t a f f . 8 2 T h e c o m p o s i t i o n of E K 5 w a s similar, a l t h o u g h it w a s s o m e w h a t larger ( c a 2 0 0 m e n ) 8 3 t h e Wafien-SS,

In a d d i t i o n to the Einsatzgruppe,

t h e u n i t s u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d of t h e r e g i o n a l S S Führer), F r i e d r i c h J e c k e l n , a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d in t h e m u r d e r . A m o n g t h e s e g r o u p s w a s t h e First S S B r i g a d e , of t h e Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, w h i c h p r o b a b l y c o u l d t a k e credit for m o r e m u r d e r s t h a n e v e n Einsatzgruppe C . 8 4 T h e s e f o r c e s are m e n t i o n e d o c c a s i o n a l l y in t h e r e p o r t s : 6 0 0 J e w s s h o t in Z b o r o v in J u l y , all J e w s of U s h o m i r s h o t in e a r l y S e p t e m b e r a n d 1 3 0 0 J e w s shot in B e r d i c h e v . 8 5 A f e w d a y s earlier, 2 3 , 6 0 0 J e w s h a d b e e n m u r d e r e d in K a m e n e t s - P o d o l s k 8 6 A s u m m a r y r e p o r t of 2 5 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 1 s t a t e d that J e c k e l n ' s m e n h a d e x e c u t e d 4 4 , 1 2 5 p e o p l e , m o s t of t h e m J e w s , in A u g u s t a l o n e . 8 7 T h i s s u m is larger t h a n t h e total of all Einsatzgruppe C m u r d e r s b e f o r e B a b i - Y a r , w h e r e J e c k e l n ' s m e n a l s o took part. It is i m p o s s i b l e to t r a c e t h e s e u n i t s t h r o u g h t h e Einsatzgruppe's reports, since they are mentioned infrequently and unsystematically.

c o m m a n d e r ( H ö h e r e S S - und Polizei

A large d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n e x i s t e d a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s b e c a u s e the H i g h e r S S a n d P o l i c e C o m m a n d e r s ( H S S P F ) , w h o w e r e n o m i n a t e d by H i m m l e r to s e r v e a s r e g i o n a l o v e r a l l c o m m a n d e r s of all p o l i c e a n d s e c u r i t y o p e r a t i o n s , w e r e in c h a r g e of

Einsatzgruppen

s e c t i o n s in this a r e a . J e c k e l n , t h e H S S P F in t h e U k r a i n e ,

personally

s u p e r v i s e d t h e first m u r d e r a c t i o n of E K 6 (90 J e w s in D o b r o m i l . 3 0 J u n e 1 9 4 1 ) . 8 8 A n S S C ' s liaison officer in J e c k e l n s s t a f f . 8 9 A s part

officer n a m e d M a i e r w a s Einsatzkommando

of J e c k e l n ' s f o r c e s , a n u n i d e n t i f i e d unit of t h e o r d e r police a s s i s t e d E K 4 a in t h e m u r d e r of 1 1 6 0 J e w s in L u c k o n 2 J u l y . 9 0 At R o v n o . a n additional, fifth Einsatzgruppe

'for s p e c i a l

t a s k s ' t o o k o v e r for t h e Einsatzgruppe,9'

and police

participated

in the m a s s a c r e

At least t h r e e u n i t s of Waffen-SS

at B a b i - Y a r .

alongside

EK 4a.92 This support w a s

so

e x t e n s i v e that the report a u t h o r felt the n e e d to point out, in early N o v e m b e r , that E K 4 a had already shot 51,000 victims

w i t h o u t a n y o u t s i d e a s s i s t a n c e ' . 9 3 H e s e e m e d to b e

r e a s s u r i n g his r e a d e r s that his Einsatzgruppe

w a s c a p a b l e of d o i n g its j o b u n a s s i s t e d Einsatzgruppe C a l s o h a d g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h the A b w e h r a n d military p o l i c e . 9 4 In at least o n e c a s e , a p p a r e n t l y at F a s t o v . military p o l i c e m e n shot J e w s o n their o w n . 9 5 F o l l o w i n g t h e large m a s s m u r d e r s , t h e Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (National Socialist W e l f a r e O r g a n i z a t i o n ) w o u l d collect t h e b o o t y for d i s t r i b u t i o n to G e r m a n s . 9 6 T h r o u g h o u t t h e region, t h e r e w e r e t h o u s a n d s of Volksdeutsche (ethnic G e r m a n s ' , s o m e of w h o m a s s i s t e d t h e Einsatzgruppe a s i n f o r m e r s . 9 7 O t h e r s j o i n e d t h e local militia a n d c a r r i e d out their d u t i e s to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the S S . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e y w e r e net a r m e d , c o n t r a r y to their r e q u e s t s . T h e · c o m m a n d e r of E K 6 n o t e d : T h e i r b l o o d thirst h a d us d o w n r i g h t s c a r e d . ' 9 8 Still, not all t h e Volksdeutsche w e r e enthusiastic about t h e N a z i s . T h e r e w e r e at least four c a s e s of local G e r m a n s b e i n g e x e c u t e d for p r o - c o m m u n i s t a c t i v i t i e s . 9 9 T h e r e are n o r e p o r t s of Volksdeutsche a s s i s t a n c e to Einsatzgruppe victims.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

479

V. THE LOCAL POLICE The overall picture, then, is one of support for Einsatzgruppe C from all the German formations in the area. While the SS units competed with the Einsatzgruppe in murder actions, the responses of the bystanders ranged from indifference to active assistance. If there were attempts to help the victims, they left no visible traces. According to the Nuremberg testimony of the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, Dr. Walther Stahlecker, his men attempted to incite the populace to enact 'spontaneous' pogroms. 100 Such a preliminary stage of action also existed in the region of Einsatzgruppe C. Many hundreds of Jews were murdered in pogroms at Tarnopol, Chortkov, Sambor and Kremenets. 101 Synagogues in Rudki and Stryj were burned following the Soviet retreat. 102 Yet, by the beginning of August, the reports were forced to admit that the policy had failed because there had been no other similar cases. The report cited the local population's fear of Jewish revenge, should the Soviet regime return, as the explanation for this. 103 If not for the fear, the author implies, the locals would certainly have taken a more active part in the murders. Once the Einsatzgruppe understood that the populace was not going to rid itself of the Jews on its own, they organized their activity accordingly, so much so, that a pogrom perpetrated by the Ukrainians and the Wehrmacht in Uman in late September interfered with the plans of EK 5. The Jews fled from the town before they could be shot. 104 The population of Khmelnik held a special thanksgiving church service following the murder of hundreds of local Jews, 105 which was adduced by the report writer as proof that they approved of the executions. 106 A large crowd of civilians attended the hanging of the Soviet judge Kiper, in Zhitomir, and many joined in the beating of 402 Jews whose maltreatment and murder were part of the ceremony. 107 Many Ukrainians assisted the Einsatzgruppe by denouncing Jews. They turned in Jews allegedly responsible for murders perpetrated by the Soviet regime in Luck. 108 In rural areas, representatives of villages travelled miles in order to request the disposal of their Jews. 109 Villagers often reported to the SS on the movements of partisans in their locality.110 When EK 4a searched the POW camps for Jews, they were also assisted by Ukrainian informers. 111 This phenomenon was widespread, as reflected in the following November report: 'Until now the units have exterminated approximately 80,000 people, of whom roughly 8,000 were apprehended following denunciations.' 112 Even if many of the informers were ethnic Germans, Ukrainians must still have been responsible for thousands of those deaths. According to historian Raul Hilberg, a Ukrainian militia operated alongside Einsatzgruppen C and D from August 1941. 113 However, the operations reports show that this militia was already in the field by the third day of Einsatzgruppe C's activities. On 29 June, this militia contributed to the uncovering of more than 100 NKVD men who were subsequently shot. On the following day, an additional 200 men, including Jews, were shot. 114 The militia were organized as police units manned by trustworthy Ukrainians. They were armed only with truncheons, despite their request for arms. 115 They collected the Jews who were to be shot, sometimes even before an Einsatzkommando arrived on the scene. 116 For example, they sealed off the Jewish ghetto in Zhitomir the night before its destruction. 117 In Kiev, they posted proclamations on the walls calling on the Jews to present themselves. 118 In some cases they actively participated in the shooting, 119 but Hilberg's contention that the SS shot adults while the militia shot children cannot be substantiated. 120 The militia also took part in the anti-partisan operations,121 while in

480

THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

Rovno the militia continued the operations alongside other G e r m a n units after the departure of the Einsatzgruppe. 122 At the s a m e time, while J e w s w h o hid in caves north of Zhitomir received no assistance from the local non-Jewish population, they were also not m o l e s t e d . 1 2 3 S o m e of the village representatives w h o travelled long distances to request the disposal of their J e w s , c h a n g e d their minds a n d tried to retract this information w h e n they realized they were c o n d e m n i n g the J e w s to d e a t h . ' 2 4 Quite a few reports tell of communist Ukrainians or others apprehended during anti-German activities. 1 2 5 In one case, the G e r m a n s reported 'the necessity' to burn d o w n several villages from which shots had been fired at G e r m a n troops. 1 2 6 However, there is no evidence of popular attempts to save Jews. It s e e m s that the c a s e of the mayor of K r e m e n c h u g , shot in January 1942 for attempting to s a v e J e w s , w a s indeed unusual. 1 2 7 T h e Einsatzgruppe also had a secondary goal, that of supervising the agricultural labour of the Ukrainian population. Towards the e n d of July, the reports began to describe the agricultural conditions in the region. Preparations for the harvest began in early August, a n d S S men then went from village to village to ascertain that the labour f o r e m e n were reliable and that harvesting w o u l d proceed smoothly. 1 2 8 The s e c o n d half of the m o n t h brought reports on the success of the harvest, a b u m p e r crop by local s t a n d a r d s . 1 2 9 It is interesting to note that the reports also tell of the harvests further east, in territory still controlled by the Soviets. 1 3 0 T h e harvesting continued undisturbed, even in areas which c h a n g e d hands at the time. 1 3 1 During September, preparations for the next agricultural s e a s o n were b e g u n with an attempt to deal with the lack of fuel and equipment 1 3 2 Only then do we hear of the first rumblings of discontent a m o n g the Ukrainian peasants, w h o were not pleased, for example, with the continuation of the hated collective farming system. 1 3 3 Is it possible to learn anything from all this? It seems that the local population knew that the G e r m a n s with w h o m they were in contact were the s a m e people responsible for killing the Jews. Clearly, they were not troubled by this fact, or by the murders t h e m s e l v e s They also seem never to have considered the possibility that they might suffer the s a m e fate after the J e w s were gone. VI. M O T I V A T I O N A n important question to be raised regards the Weltanschauung (world-view) of the m e m b e r s of Einsatzgruppe C w h i c h may have helped them murder thousands of people. It may be a s s u m e d that as adult m e n they gave s o m e thought to their actions, a n d it may be asked how their world-view w a s affected by their activities, if at all. The S S - m e n attributed at least four typical characteristics to their Jewish victims T h e y were seen as communists, dangerous, spreaders of disease and insolent. It w a s believed that the Soviet regime and system were used by the Jews to control society. During the Soviet occupation of Poland, civil servants were removed from their posts and n e w people, mainly Jews, were brought in from Russia.' 1 3 4 O n l y the Jews benefited from the Soviet regime. Most of the J e w s were Bolsheviks, and they were promoted by the regime even if they were not party m e m b e r s . ' 1 3 5 The J e w s are the main bearers of Bolshevism, alongside a small minority of others. They controlled the governmental b u r e a u c r a c y . ' 1 3 6 'All key posts were in Jewish hands. In the middle and large-sized factories, the m a n a g e r s and foremen were always J e w s , while the workers were Ukrainians.' 1 3 7 In October, w h e n the report writers began to s u m up the first months of action, they

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

481

remained convinced that 'it may be stated with certainty that, without exception, the Jews worked for Bolshevism. Again and again, especially in the cities, the Jews were Soviet powerholders; they brutally exploited the population and turned people over to the N K V D . ' 1 3 8 'The rampaging was the result of a deliberate program to achieve total control over the lives of the non-Jews in all of the Soviet Union.' 1 3 9 There are a number of indications in the reports themselves that the decisiveness of these comments was a reflection of political outlook that had little to do with reality. Dozens of reports enumerate separately the numbers of Jewish victims and of functionaries', an unnecessary distinction if they are one and the same. One of the men of EK 4a testified in the 1960s that even at that time, there was no problem in differentiating: 'Generally, the Jews in Russia had a distinct appearance, including b e a r d s . " 4 0 A second characteristic attributed to the Jews was their dangerous nature. 'Jews participated in all the bestial murders perpetrated by the Russians in Sambor and Dobromil . . . . The locals reported that Jews actively took part in murders of Ukrainians in Luck.' 1 4 1 Later it was reported that 'not even one Jewish corpse was found in any of the mass graves left by the Russians'. 1 4 2 There is no evidence that such graves were ever opened or searched by the Einsatzgruppen. T h e region of Khmelnik suffered from Jewish terror until our clean-up operation', noted one report. 1 4 3 'The unrest in the streets and the communist propaganda abated only after the J e w s were concentrated in a ghetto. This proved to be no more than a partial solution, as the ghetto was not sealed and the militiamen managed to determine that the center of activity was there.' 1 4 4 As the centre of Kiev was engulfed in fire, the report writer recorded: 'In town enormous fires are raging. Explosions and arson are still continuing, and all the efforts of the fire fighters have failed so f a r . . . some of the detonations are set by remote control. Jewish participation in these actions is obviously great. ' 1 4 5 It is not clear what factual basis such a statement had or could have had. There are other cases of unsubstantiated accusations. 'The Jews were active in sabotage and terrorizing the local population in the region of Korosten', 1 4 6 but shortly thereafter unarmed militiamen concentrated 283 of the J e w s in a building and handed them over to the Einsatzgruppe'. 1 4 7 Similar groups of unarmed Ukrainians did the same rounding up countless times, and it seems that their fear of the Jews was considerably smaller than the report writers would have the readers believe. At times, the reality was so clear-cut that even the report writers acknowledged that not only were the Jews neither Bolsheviks nor terrifying, they were wretched. In such cases, a different danger was attributed to them, that of threatening public health. 'North of Zhitomir, Jews are hiding in caves and shacks. Their presence increases the danger of epidemics, and the area must be c l e a n e d . ' ' 4 8 'Many Jewish refugees concentrated at Radomysl. The overcrowding was so severe that an average of fifteen people shared a room. The sanitary conditions were appalling and people were dying daily. It was impossible to treat them, and they were quickly becoming a source of epidemics. In order to remove the danger, EK 4a and the militia shot more than 1,600 Jews.' 1 4 9 Finally, the Jews were charged with insolence. 'The Jews continue to be insolent. S o m e of them are equipped with false papers stating that they are Ukrainians or even ethnic Germans.' 1 5 0 Their impudence seemed so great to the Germans that 'it seems s o m e o n e has even been using military seals'. 1 5 1 'The Jews of Sibolov were exceptionally impertinent towards the local population, and therefore 78 of them were executed.' 1 5 2 These insolent' acts can probably also be described as attempts by Jews to save themselves or their dignity in the face of the tortures.

482

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

None of these attributes appeared in the reports coincidentally. In most cases they were cited as the reason for the executions. Some Jews were shot because of their Bolshevik or partisan activities, while others were killed for being insolent or spreading epidemics. As the report author stated in late October, after accusing the Jews of murdering Ukrainians, 'tnerefore the need arose for special anti-Jewish activities'. 153 Nazi thinking attributed the various characteristics to the Jews collectively and then condemned them to collective death in recompense. It may be asked why the report authors had to bother with justifications to their superiors at all. Perhaps there was a defence mechanism operating here. The same ideology which condemned the Jews to death demanded absolute obedience from the murderers. Once the murderers convinced themselves that the interpretation of reality inherent in the ideology was indeed accurate, it may have been easier to act accordingly, to murder. In other words, reality was reinterpreted to fit preconceived rationalizations to justify a mass murder that had been decided upon independently of any 'reasons' or causes'. 154 The ideology at work in these operations is also reflected in the language used to describe Germans, Soviets and Jews. The Soviet system represented bad government with horrendous results. 'Because of the Soviet regime, the Ukrainians are frightened and lazy. They live in sickening poverty and their only interest is to raise a minimum of crops which will not be confiscated by the government.' The Soviets were also accused of kidnapping people and exiling them to distant labour camps. 155 The Jewish-Bolshevik enemy was held responsible for countless inhuman crimes. They were accused of perpetrating bestial murders' in retreat, of being bloodthirsty murderers , and of committing atrocities' (an oft-recurring word). 156 The report authors were convinced that 'all the atrocities are part of a planned program, instigated by the Soviet leadership . 157 The revulsion felt for Bolshevism was so intense that mythical accusations were made. Ά mass murder of Ukrainian intelligentsia is attributed to the Russians, although no corpses have as yet been found.' 158 A Soviet judge was accused of condemning people to death solely because he had been appointed to do so. In the context of his post, he murdered 1,060 people.' 159 In describing the Germans, no attempt was made to camouflage their actions. The descriptions of mass murders are dry and factual. The caption in the reports was often Exekutionen, but in each case described a different verb was used for literary purposes ('exterminated', removed', shot', finished', terminated', made harmless', 'uprooted'). 160 The reader of the reports could become so accustomed to their murderous terminology that other uses of the same words broke the rhythm of reading, as when several soldiers who found explosives made them harmless . 161 All the terms had the same meaning and were completely interchangeable. Even when, after some deliberation, it was decided to execute a local ethnic German, the action was described as an extermination'. Once his guilt was determined, he deserved no better word. The language used reflected Nazi beliefs and prevented the perpetrators from comparing their actions with those of the enemy. Regarding the Jews, the reports' language differs from that of other types of Nazi literature. The abusive, humiliating language used by Julius Streicher in Der Stürmer was totally absent from the reports. The Jews' murder was described in the cold and efficient manner in which it was carried out, in the manner in which one exterminates pests. There were no emotions or foul language. Occasionally, the victims were referred to as 'people'. 162 It may be, in these instances, that the sight of hundreds of corpses daily

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

483

overcame the Weltanschauung to the extent that, in the language of the reports, the murderers acknowledged the humanity of the victims. As noted, the report writers tended to adjust reality in their writing in order to fit their beliefs. Events which strengthened their beliefs were emphasized, others were neglected. Accordingly, a letter of gratitude written by local Ukrainians on their liberation from Stalin was quoted at length, and Soviet leaders' mansions were described in detail. 163 The Jewishness of two factory foremen near Berdichev was emphasized as an illustration of Jewish control of Soviet industry, but the identity of all other foremen is not mentioned. Where recognition of unpleasant facts could not be avoided, explanations were concocted. Jews murdered by the Soviets died because they knew too much. 164 Soviet propaganda photos of German POWs were presented as fabrications; the Russians dressed their own men in German uniforms. 165 There were rare cases where the truth filtered through the language, even though it contradicted the ideology: 'The information we had concerning Ukrainian nationalism turns out to have been all wrong.' 166 Ukrainian sympathy for the Germans was also not uniform, according to the report. When a relative is discharged from a detention camp, they [Ukrainians] are pro-German. When a German unit tramples their fields, they are anti-German. 167 There is no way of knowing if the report writers recognized the import of such statements, but, in any case, they are the exceptions which prove the rule.

VII. THE EINSATZGRUPPE AND THE FINAL SOLUTION The significance of the Einsatzgruppen in the evolution of the Final Solution, a controversial issue in contemporary historiography,168 remains to be determined. The source of the problem is the absence of any written order pertaining to the extent of the anti-Jewish actions. This order was apparently given verbally and never documented. Heydrich's only explicit written directive in this regard was 2 July 1941 and called, inter alia. for the shooting of 'party- and state-employed Jews'. 169 This could not have been the only order received by the Einsatzgruppen, as there is no evidence that any of them acted accordingly. Other orders must have been issued, but their content is a matter of speculation. Those Einsatzgruppe commanders tried after the war, Otto Ohlendorf of EG-D foremost among them, testified that an order to shoot all Jews was delivered by Streckenbach, chief of Amt 1 of the RSHA (Reich Main Security Office), prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union. In 1955, Streckenbach, who had been presumed dead, returned from Soviet captivity, denied this allegation and succeeded in casting doubt on the EG commanders' version of events.170 Contradictory testimonies claiming that such an order was received only in mid-August also cannot be accepted at face value. Defendants citing mid-June as the time they received the order may have hoped to benefit themselves by showing that they had only followed orders, while those ascribing a later date to the order may have done so to create the impression that when the order arrived they were already too deeply involved to be able to balk. The fact that the Einsatzgruppen encouraged the local non-Jewish populations to start pogroms in the early stages of the operation does not, of itself, solve the problem. The policy of encouraging pogroms may have been planned as an intermediate stage before all-encompassing murder, or, alternatively, it may be an indication that no order yet existed, and the goal was limited to terrorization and murder of some of the Jews.

484

THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

It would seem that only a study of the actions, their extent and the perpetrators' perception of these can help clarify the issue. Helmut Krausnick, a leading proponent of the mid-June thesis, bases his contention primarily on the actions of Einsatzgruppe A, and to a lesser extent on the other units.' 71 He shows that the units at first refrained from killing women and children, while they shot Jewish men indiscriminately. It was only a matter of time and adjustment before all Jews were being killed It is interesting to note that Krausnick cites no evidence from Einsatzgruppe C. Alfred Streim, taking issue with Krausnick, does cite Einsatzgruppe C in his argument. 172 Indeed, from tracing the operations reports, it becomes clear that the actions became more all-encompassing with time, and different stages are definable. Nevertheless, it seems that at least for the initial stages, there was no order to kill all Jews, and, in fact, not all were killed. In the first operations: EK 4a shot only men As many as 7000 Jews of Lvov (their gender was not specified) were shot, but 160,000 Jews were still there a month later.173 In Zhitomir, not only were not all Jews murdered, but it was EK 4a who initiated the establishment of a ghetto.174 In some places, the Einsatzkommando perpetrated many repeat actions, but always left behind living Jews. 175 In Kirovograd, when food was distributed to the population, non-Jews received 250 grams. Jews 150 grams. 176 This is overt discrimination, but hardly an obvious attempt to kill all the Jews at this stage. In a Nuremberg testimony which is open to question, Schulz, commander of EK 5, said that 'At the beginning of August, Rasch, commander of Einsatzgruppe C, convened his officers. He told them of an order from Himmler, transmitted by Jeckeln, whereby all Jews, including women and children but excluding indispensable craftsmen, must be shot.' 177 The reports indicate no change in policy in early August, hence the doubt. However, there are definitely signs that classified workers were not always shot, as in Lvov in early July. 178 Einsatzkommando 6 found several all-Jewish collective farms, and in order not to disrupt the harvest, they shot only the foremen. This was probably in September. 179 There is no evidence that this sparing of Jews resulted from Wehrmacht pressure, as was the case elsewhere. The documents take us one step further, pointing to the possibility that the men of the Einsatzgruppen were not aware they were enacting the Final Solution. The term first appeared in the reports in mid-August 1941, when the report author suggested employing the Jews of the Ukraine in draining the Pripet marshes until a future decision on a final solution for the Jews of Europe. 180 Towards the middle of September, the report writer proudly noted that as a result of the Einsatzgruppe actions, 7 0 % to 9 0 % of the Jews were fleeing deep into the Soviet interior. He commented that the effortless removal of hundreds of thousands of Jews was a significant contribution towards solving the Jewish problem in Europe. 181 A month later, Himmler forbade any Jewish emigration, and S S officers spoke differently. The first marks of change appear as late as the report of 11 September, when, it seems, all the Jews of Fastov were murdered.182 Before the end of the month there was a 'special meeting' where the participants decided to exterminate the Jews of Zhitonrr finally and radically',183 and so they did. The terminology — special meeting', 'decided 'radical solution' — indicates that this had not been standard procedure, and also that the ghetto was not set up, at the time, with the intention of liquidating it a month later. As the fourth month of action opened, both the extent of the murders and their interpretation by the men changed. It may be that the following remarkable passage was written when the report writer learned of the order to kill all Jews:

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

485

Even if the J e w i s h problem will find an immediate solution, the political one w o n t. B o l s h e v i s m is b a s e d o n the Jews, and also on Georgians, Armenians, Poles, Latvians, Ukrainians, etc. J u d a i s m and B o l s h e v i s m are not identical. W e would miss the goal of political security if w e r e p l a c e d the main task of destroying the communist machine with the relatively easier one of eliminating the Jews. M o r e o v e r , solving the c o m m u n i s t problem requires the best forces, making the solution of the J e w i s h problem all the more difficult. What s more, in the towns of western a n d central Ukraine. J e w r y a n d skilled w o r k e r s and traders are one and the same. If we completely forego using Jewish labor, it will be nigh-impossible to rebuild Ukrainian industry and urban administrative centers [italics in original]. There is only one way o u t . . . solving the J e w i s h p r o b l e m through J e w i s h forced labor. This will lead to a gradual liquidation of Jewry, which w o u l d suit the potential of the country. 1 8 4

Whoever wrote these lines had no compunction about murdering Jews. He simply felt no need and saw no technical possibility of exterminating them all immediately, nor did he think anything would be achieved thereby. Until this point, he had not identified his actions with the Final Solution, if only because they had not been final for the whole Jewish community. At the end of September 1941, there was an attempt to kill all the Jews of Kiev. 1 8 5 Only afterwards do the reports begin to tell of the total annihilation of whole communities, such as Koschewatoje. 1 8 6 The term Judenfrei appeared for the first time only in mid-October, regarding Borislav. 1 8 7 At the beginning of November, the report author seems to have known he w a s participating in the Final Solution, but he still disagreed with the plan. 'Even if about 75,000 Jews have been exterminated by such methods until now, still, it is clear that it will not be possible to solve the Jewish Problem this way. Granted, in the villages and towns they have been completely annihilated. However, in the larger towns, the J e w s disappear after every action only to reappear in even greater numbers afterwards. - 1 8 8 There is no way of knowing if this reflected the general opinion of the units, or w a s only the personal view of the writer. It seems likely that reports such as this were among the causes for the establishment of murder camps, where the inefficient method of killing by shooting was replaced by gassing, which was both more efficient and less difficult for the murderer's psyche. These findings do not concur with those of Krausnick regarding Einsatzgruppe A. Nevertheless, it seems quite unlikely that the two sister units received significantly different orders. The discrepancy may perhaps be explained by the thesis formulated by Christopher Browning: the order to kill Jews, although given early, was unclear and was interpreted differently in the various units. EG-C reached the radical interpretation only as late as the end of September 1941. 1 8 9 This might also explain the actions Schultz attributed to Jeckeln, the HSSPF: he seemed to have been pushing towards a more radical interpretation, but may not have been the bearer of the order. Did Hitler initiate the Final Solution, or did the idea develop within the Nazi bureaucracy? The sources cited here give no clear answer. On the one hand, there seems to be no evidence for a clear pre-meditated plan, whereby the total murder of the J e w s was to coincide with the invasion of the Soviet Union: during the first three months of action, not all of the Jews were killed, nor did the Einsatzgruppen seem to aspire to do so. If Hitler planned to kill all of the Jews, who was expected to complete the task? O n the other hand, there is just as little evidence that the murderers in the field were radicalizing their actions to such an extent that they would soon have been killing all J e w s on their o w n initiative alone. On the contrary, the two above-quoted citations s e e m to indicate that the unit would never have made such a decision if left to itself.

486

THE "FINAL SOLUTION"

Possibly, the truth lies between the two historiographical positions. The impetus indeed came from above, but not in the form of clear pre-planned orders. Rather there was a willingness on the part of the top Nazi echelon to exploit the potentials of the situation to their utmost. This might also explain the discrepancies between the various Einsatzgruppen: with no clear directives, the various commanders reached diverse conclusions as to the extent of their task. As time passed, and the men grew accustomed to their duties, the goals became broader. Early in the operation, Schulz and Jeckeln disagreed over the number of Jews to be killed, with Schulz, the actual perpetrator, seeking to reduce their number. Elsewhere, the victims were informed of their fate, and the killers needed encouragement. With the entire Einsatzgruppe C in Lvov, thousands of Jews were murdered, but tens of thousands were not. As the weeks passed, such inconsistencies disappeared. Doctors were no longer needed to determine the deaths of the victims, and the murder method itself became more gruesome (especially at Babi-Yar). Murder was so routinized that not only was there time to consider the victims' property and capital, but this became more important than the human lives. The climax of the period June to October 1941 was indeed at the end. It seems no accident that the orderly, well-planned murder of 33,000 Jews took place at Kiev at the end of this period, rather than at Lvov near the beginning. If any Jews remained in Kiev after Babi-Yar, they were few and in hiding. If the men of the Einsatzgruppe had any human feelings regarding their victims in June, these had disappeared by October. The fact is, one can grow accustomed to mass murder.

APPENDIX In general, the reports tended to be long-winded. Some of them spent dozens of pages on one EG. As opposed to this abundance of verbiage, the following report, with the first news of the largest action, at Babi-Yar, stands out in sharp contrast: Standort Kiew. Das Sonderkommando 4a hat in Zusammenarbeit mit Gruppenstab und zwei kommandos des Polizei-Regiments sud an 29. und 30 9.41 in Kiew 33,771 Juden executiert.' 90 (Special commando 4a, together with Einsatzgruppe C Headquarters and two commando groups of the South Police Regiments, executed 33,771 Jews in Kiev on 29 and 30 September 1941.)

This was the complete report NOTES 1. From the Nuremberg testimony ot Wilhelm Gustav Tempel, a member of Einsatzkommando 4a. Nuremberg Documents NO 5123. 2. Helmut Krausnick and Hans Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauugskrieges (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981), p. 646. 3. Nuremberg Documents NO 3841: Yad Vashem Archives (YV), TR-10/698, p. 21. TR-10/610. pp. 134-5. The two relevant types of historical sources on the Einsatzgruppen are contemporary reports and post-war legal material. The reports, or Ereignismeldungen (EM), were sent daily from the eastern front to high-ranking Nazis. Among the thousands of pages of reports, hundreds of pages dealt with the daily actions of the Einsatzgruppe.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

487

It is important to note Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm s observation that the extant reports are those edited in Berlin and not the originals written in the field. The editors regulated the daily inllow of material and sometimes added relevant information from other sources. As a result, the dates are not always accurate, and occasional insignificant contradictions can be found On the whole. Wilhelm finds the reports to be generally reliable, which means that any reported event almost certainly did take place. (See Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 332-47.) There is little relevant information in the Nuremberg trial documents. More can be found in the proceedings of trials during the 1960s. Vad Vashem's archives contain the indictment from the trial of 10 officers of EK 4a (TR-1Q/616). as well as the verdict in the 1969 trial of Dr. Kroeger (TR-10/698) and the 1961 verdict in the trial of a member of Kroeger s command. EK 6 (TR-10/17). The nature of the sources dictates an SS perspective on events in the research. 4. EM 19, 11 July 1941, p. 1. 5. EM 24, 16 July 1941, which refers to the chapter Einsatzgruppe C in 'Ereignismeldung UdSSR des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD', in YV. 051-DN/67, 68. 6. EM 10, 2 July 1941; EM 11. 3 July 1941; TR-10/17, pp. 3-6. 7. See the reports from this period. 8. See, for example, EM 38, 30 July 1941; EM 60, 22 August 1941. 9. EM 60. 10. TR-10/616, pp. 130, 182, 260; EM 58. 20 August 1941 11. EM 106, 7 October 1941. 12. EM 88, 19 September 1941. 13. EM 97, 28 September 1941; EM 106. 14. EM 97. 15. EM 101, 2 October 1941. 16. TR-10/616, p. 134. 17. Ibid..

pp. 137, 142.

18. Ibid., p. 262. On the significance of Fuhrer-orders. see Helmut Krausnick el al.. Anatomy of the SS-Stale (London: Collins. 1968). 19. TR-10/17. p. 4. 20. TR-10/698, p. 34. 21. EM 23, 15 July 1941, p. 11; EM 128, 13 November 1941, p. 6. 22. TR-10/698, p. 57. 23. EM 111. 12 October 1941. ρ 6 24. TR-10/616. p. 155. 25. EM 128, p. 5. 26. EM 47. 9 August 1941, p. 9. 27. EM 128, p. 5. 28. EM 47. p. 9; EM 127, p. 3 29. TR-10/616. pp. 224. 251. 30. EM 119, 20 October 1941. ρ 6. 31. TR-10/616. pp. 174. 204 3 2 . Ibid..

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42

pp. 155, 240.

Nuremberg Documents NO 3644. TR-10/616. pp. 302. 323. EM 106, pp. 3, 18; TR-10/616, pp. 235, 302 TR-10/616, p. 142. Ibid.. pp. 241-3, 324, 326. Ibid.. p. 176, TR-10/698. p. 28. TR-10/698. pp. 28-9; TR-10/616. pp. 227-8. Nuremberg Documents NO 3824. Raul Hilberg. The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago; Quadrangle. 1961). p. 209. TR-10/616. p. 324

488

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

43. Ibid 44. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 215 45. TR-10/616, p. 140. 46. Ibid.. p. 326. 47. Ibid., p. 154. 48. EM 81. 12 September 1941. ρ 14 49. TR-10/616. pp. 224-5. 50. TR-10/698, pp 60-1 51. TR-10/616, p. 237. 52. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 218. 53. TR-10/698. p. 20. 54. EM 106, p. 18; EM 132, 12 November 1941, p. 19. 55. EM 106. pp. 13, 15 56. EM 63, 25 August 1941, p. 2; EM 94, 25 September 1941, pp. 15-16; EM 111, p. 7. 57. EM 74, 5 September 1941, p. 3; EM 97, pp. 23-4; EM 128, pp. 6-7. 58. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 205. 59. EM 24. pp. 9-12; EM 47, p. 11. 60. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 129-30. 61. Helmut Krausnick, 'The Persecution of the Jews', in Krausnick et al.. Anatomy. 62. Hans Adolf Jacobson, The Kommissarbeheft and Mass Executions of Soviet Russian Prisoners of W a r , in Krausnick et al.. Anatomy, pp. 505-36. 63. Ibid., pp. 519-20. 64. EM 14, 6 July 1941, ρ 6. 65. EM 58, p. 12. 66 EM 119, pp. 7-8. 67. Nuremberg Documents NI 4567. 68. EM 8, 30 June 1941, p. 8; Hilberg. Destruction, p. 197 69. TR-10/616. pp. 183-96. 70. EM 10, p. 2. 71. EM 28, 20 July 1941, p. 5; EM 38. pp. 9-10; EM 58. ρ 12. 72. EM 106. p. 7; TR-10/616. p. 318. 73. EM 119, p. 110. 74. Nuremberg Documents NO 3644; TR-10/616. p. 228. 75. TR-10/616. pp. 155, 158, 227, 229; EM 24, pp. 12-14. 76. EM 28. p. 8; EM 119. p. 5; EM 38. pp. 9-10; EM 14, p. 6. 77. EM 128, pp. 7-8; EM 132, p. 16. 78. Nuremberg Documents NOKW 309 79. TR-10/616, pp. 275-88. 80. See, for example, Yehoshua Büchler, 'Kommandostab Reichslührer-SS Himmler s Personal Murder Brigades in 1941', Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1 (1986), 11-25 81. EM 8; TR-10/616. pp. 202, 215-229; TR-10/698. ρ 21. 82. EM 8; TR-10/698. 83. Nuremberg Documents NO 3841 84. See, for example. Bùchler. 'Kommandostab Reichslührer-SS', pp. 11-25. 85. EM 19, p. 5; EM 86, pp. 12-13, 19. 86. EM 80, 11 September 1941, p. 13. 87. EM 94, pp. 14-15. 88. TR-10/698, pp. 24-5 89. EM 12. 4 July 1941, ρ 5 90. EM 24, pp. 12-14. 91. EM 28, p. 7. See also Büchler. 'Kommandostab Reichslührer-SS', p. 13. 92. TR-10/616. pp. 319. 322.

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS

489

93. EM 111, p. 4. 94. EM 128, p. 8. 95. EM 80, p. 13. 96. EM 132, p. 19. 97. EM 28, pp. 5-7. 98. Hilberg. Destruction, p. 106. 99. EM 47, p. 30; EM 80, ρ 12; EM 86. 17 September 1941. d 12. 100. Nuremberg Documents L 180. 101. EM 47, p. 10; EM 24, pp. 7-12. 102. EM 20. 12 July 1941, p. 4; EM 24. pp. 10-11. 103. EM 47, p. 10. 104. EM 119, pp. 5-6. 105. EM 85. 16 September 1941, p. 18. 106. EM 81, p. 21. 107. EM 58, pp. 9-11; TR-10/616. pp. 224-5. 108. EM 24, pp. 13-14. 109. EM 8, p. 111. 110. EM 47, pp. 7-9; EM 74, p. 3. 111. EM 37. 29 July 1941, p. 7; EM 38, pp. 9-10. 112. EM 128, p. 3. 113. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 205. 114. EM 24. pp. 12-13. 115. EM 8. pp. 11-12. 116. TR-10/616. p. 251; EM 80. 117. EM 106, pp. 17-18. 118. Ibid. 119. EM 80. p. 13; EM 88, p. 8. For one of the more graphic descriptions of Ukrainian participation in murder actions, see the 1945 testimony of German army Lieutenant Erwin Bingel, 'The Extermination of Two Ukrainian Jewish Communities. Testimony of a German Army Officer', Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1959). pp. 303-20. Whereas Bingel testified regarding the murder ol Jews in Uman and Vinnitsa, his details do not match those of the Einsatzgruppe reports for these cities. Bingel may have described the actions of one of the other SS units engaged in murdering Jews, perhaps at Kamenets-Podolsk. 120. TR-10/616 (Entire file); Hilberg, Destruction, p. 205. 121. EM 47, p. 12; EM 86, p. 17; EM 94, p. 15. 122. EM 28, p. 7. The other Einsatzgruppen also received active assistance Irom the local non-Jewish populations. See, for example, Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe, pp. 596-8. 629. 123. EM 94, p. 16. 124. EM 86. pp. 11-12. 125. EM 20, p. 4; EM 37, p. 7; EM 42. 3 August 1941, pp 1-2; EM 47, p. 13; EM 58. p. 7; EM 59, 21 August 1941, p. 11; EM 119, pp 6-7. 126. EM 28, p. 5. 127. Hilberg, Destruction, p. 201. 128. EM 20, pp. 19-20; EM 47, p. 8. 129. EM 59, p. 3; EM 60, pp. 13-18; EM 74, p. 6. 130. EM 59, p. 3. 131. EM 60. pp. 13-18. 132. EM 85. pp. 8-14. 133. EM 107, 8 October 1941, p. 11 134. EM 20. pp. 5-6. 135. EM 40, 1 Augusl 1941, pp. 16-19. 136. EM 25, 17 July 1941, pp. 4-11.

490

THE "FINAL SOLUTION'

137. EM 80, Dp 13-15. 138 EM 127. pp. 4 - 5 139. EM 129. 5 November 1941, pp. 6 - 1 2 . 140. TR-10/616. p. 138 141. EM 24. pp. 9 - 1 4 . 142. EM 127. pp. 4 - 5 . 143. EM 86. p. 18 144. EM 106. p. 17 145 EM 97, pp 2 3 - 4 146. EM 60, pp 2 5 - 6 . 147. EM 80. ρ 13 148. EM 94. ρ 16 149. EM 88. p. 8. 150. EM 94. pp 16-17. 151 EM 86. p. 13 152. EM 119, p. 7 153. EM 127. pp. 4 - 5 . 154. Helmut Krausnick suggests an interesting theory regarding this point: he believes the report authors justified their actions because they were ordered to do so. Nebe, commander of EG-B, did so only at the end of July Krausnick does not clarify the reason for such an order. Helmut Krausnick, Hitler und die Befehle an die Einsatzgruppen im Sommer 1941', in Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer, Der Mord an den Juden im zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: DVA, 1985Ί, p. 98. 155. EM 45. 7 August 1941. pp. 4 - 7 ; EM 81. pp. 11-12; EM 119, p. 6; EM 127, pp. 3 - 4 . 156. EM 9. 1 July 1941. p. 2; EM 20. p. 4; EM 47, p. 13. 157 EM 24. pp 9 - 1 2 . 158. EM 28. ρ 7. 159. EM 47. ρ 30 160. EM 47, p. 12: EM 58. p. 9; EM 80. p. 13: EM 86. p. 17. 161. EM 119. ρ 10. 162 Ibid., p. 8. EM 128. ρ 3. 163. EM 23. pp. 16-17: EM 106. ρ 10. 164 EM 24. pp. 9 - 1 2 . 165. EM 94. p. 18 166. EM 52. 14 August 1941. pp 4 - 1 1 167. EM 86. pp 2 3 - 4 168. Helmut Krausnick, Hitler und die Befehle an die Einsatzgruppen im Sommer 1941', pp. 8 8 - 1 0 6 . and Alfred Streim, Zur Eröffnung des allgemeinen Judenvemichtungsbefehls gegenüber den Einsatzgruppen', pp 107-19, in Jäckel and Rohwer, Der Mord an den Juden 169. Krausnick, 'Hitler und die Befehle', ρ 90; Krausnick, The Persecution of the Jews', pp 6 2 - 3 . See also EM 10. p. 3. 170. Krausnick Hitler und die Belehle'. pp. 9 0 - 1 ; Streim, Zur Eröffnung', pp. 106-9. 171. Krausnick, 'Hitler und die Befehle', pp 94ff. 172. Streim. Zur Eröffnung', pp. 107-19. 173. EM 24. ρ 212; EM 50, 12 August 1941, p. 3. 174. EM 106. p. 13. 175. EM 59. p. 11: EM 60. p. 28. 176. EM 87. 18 September 1941. pp 8 - 9 . 177. Nuremberg Documents NO 3644. 178. EM 24. p. 12 179. EM 81. p. 14. 180. EM 52. pp. 12-13

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS 181. 182 183 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190

EM 81. ρ 14. EM 80, p. 13 EM 106, ρ 17. EM 86. pp. 21--2. EM 106. EM 119, p. 9. Ibid. EM 128, p. 4. Discussion' in Jäckel and Rohwer, Der Mord an den Juden, p. 121 EM 101, p. 2.

491

492

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination against the Soviet Union JÜRGEN

FÖRSTER

T H E WAR A G A I N S T the Soviet Union is rightly called the "most monstrous war of conquest, enslavement and extermination" in modern times. 1 Ernst Nolte's 1963 judgment has lost none of its validity even in view of the genocide in Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime. T h e totally different character of the German-Soviet war—in comparison to the "normal European w a r " waged against France—can only be explained by Hitler's attempt to realize his long-cherished aims in the East. These were to gain Lebensraum (living-space) for the German nation and at the same time to destroy the "Jewish-Bolshevik mortal enemy." Military action for the sake of conquest and political and police measures to safeguard the acquired living-space were two different aspects of one single great war of extermination, in which also the Wehrmacht was to play a specific role. It is certainly a travesty of the truth to maintain that only the four Einsatzgruppen (Action Groups) of the Security Police and the Security Service liquidated Jews and Communist functionaries. The Wehrmacht too participated in the extermination of the "Jewish Bolshevism." Nonetheless, the general public in

1

Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus

in seiner Epoche,

Munich, 1963, p. 463

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS JÜRGEN

FÖRSTER

the Bundesrepublik still tends to differentiate neatiy between the military campaign against the Red Army and the simultaneous mass murder of the Jews, communists and prisoners of war. There is just no other way to explain the extremely intense and generally negative viewers' reaction to Report, a political program on "Crimes of the German Wehrmacht in World War T w o , " screened on German television on December 11, 1979.2 Despite clearly drawn differentiations, the editor was accused of partiality and deliberate defamation of the German soldier. Painful as the confrontation with this part of the German past may be for the older generation, and even if the expression " t h e unconquered past" (unbewältigte Vergangenheit) has become a source of irritation for them, the historian must strive for clarification. "History breaches the walls of self-deception which we are constantly constructing by confronting us with the past, without constraints or distortions.'" 3 For many combatants and their contemporaries the memory of the summer of 1941 was distorted. This because National-Socialist propaganda emphasized outrages perpetrated by the Red Army (particularly during its advance into Germany) and the sufferings of German soldiers as Soviet prisoners of war thus over-shadowing the actual conduct of the " w a r f a r e " as practised by the Wehrmacht itself. Subsequently, the Cold War not only prevented any modification of this picture of the enemy, but also provided justification for the German attack on June 22, 1941.4 German contemporary history has for too long been preoccupied with the " G e r m a n Catastrophe" (F. Meinecke) and has

2 Cf. Badische Zeitung, Freiburg, N o . 40, February 16/17, 1980, p. 9. 3 T h o m a s Nipperdey, "Geschichte als Aufklärung," in Die Zeit, H a m 4

burg, N o . 9, 22, 2, 1980, p. 16. F o r an especially graphic e x a m p l e cf. Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Schicksalsjahre. Historische Bilder aus dem zweiten Weltkrieg, Wiesbaden, 1950, p. deutsch-sowjetische

227f. Cf. as well Erich Helmdach. Oberfall? Der Aufmarsch 1941. Neckargmünd, 1975, p. 81.

493

494

THE "FINAL SOLUTION' THE WEHRMACHT AGAINST T H E SOVIET

UNION

thus overlooked the Holocaust. 5 Not before the sixties was the racial-ideological base of Hitler's concept of the war in the East, and the close connection between the military campaign and the war against the Jews described. 6 This may be a reason too why the National-Socialist euphemistic terms for the extermination process are still being taken by some Germans at face value. So, for instance, around a table of regular patrons drinking in Bürgstadt, the role of the mayor, Ernst Heinrichsohn, in the deportation of French Jews to Auschwitz earned the following cynical comment: "He merely sent the Jews off to work which did them good." 7 Hitler's war against the Soviet Union stemmed from his Lebensraum concept, which combined expansion to the East with the extermination of Bolshevism and the annihilation of Judaism. 8 As considerations of social Darwinism, racism, food supply and power politics were inextricably intertwined, it would be pointless to try and reconstruct the order of precedence governing Hitler's decision. In 1940 41 the strategic necessity of safeguarding the sphere of influence acquired vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon naval powers and of limiting the existing dependence on the Soviet Union, were combined with the reali5

Cf. K o n r a d

Kwiet,

verfolgung

im

1 1980, pp. 6

Eberhard

Reich."

Behandlung

der

Militärgeschichtliche

Juden-

Mitteilungen

149-153.

Jäckel, Hitlers

Tübingen, deutsche

"Zur historiographischen

Dritten

1969;

Weltanschauung.

Andreas

Ostimperium

als

Entwurf

Hillgruber, Kernstück

des

Herrschaft, und

rassenideologischen

des

N o . 20, 1972, pp. 133-153; and Martin Broszat. "Hitler und der 'Endlösung',"

ibid,

Vierteljahrshefte

No.

25,

für

das Pro-

schichte.

Genesis

in

einer

'Endlösung'

gramms die

Nationalsozialismus."

"Die

Zeitge-

1977, p. 7 3 9 - 7 7 5 .

the E n g l i s h version see "Hitler and the Genesis of the 'Final tion'," in Y ad

Vashem

Studies,

7

Badische

8

Karl Dietrich E r d m a n n , Die

Zeitung.

Stuttgart, 4).

For

Krüger

1976, Hitler's

No. p.

337

1979, pp.

73-125.

274, 27.11.1979. p. 3. Zeit

der

(Handbuch

economic

in Geschichte

Vol. XIII,

For Solu-

und

Weltkriege. der

understanding Gesellschaft,

9th revised edition,

deutschen 6,

cf.

the

1980,

Geschichte, article pp.

of

263-280.

Vol. Peter

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS JÜRGEN FÖRSTER

zation of Hitler's actual objectives. The conquest of the European part of the Soviet Union, regarded as essential for attaining blockade-defensible world power status, simultaneously provided the opportunity to initiate the annihilation of Judaism. For Hitler, Jewish power and Bolshevism were identical. Hitler's specific hatred of Jews can be pinpointed to a precisely dated trauma. While differing radically from other forms of religious, social or competitive anti-Semitism, these forms could still be utilized for satisfying his obsession. Hitler's concept of the War in the East comprises four elements: 1. procuring colonial territory for German settlers; 2. annihilation of the "Jewish-Bolshevik" leadership stratum, including its so-called biological root—the millions of Jews in East Central Europe; 3. decimation of the Slav masses and their domination by four German "viceroys"—the Reich Commissars; 4. exploitation of the economic resources in the conquered countries to safeguard the planned Germanic Empire against any form of blockade. The conquest of Russia would restore world power status to the Reich and enable it to challenge even the United States, so Hitler thought. 9 In the middle of July 1941, when Hitler and the military command believed they had overcome the Red Army, Hitler announced his destructive plan for the East in the terse formula: "Control, administer, exploit." 10 The "giant cake" was to be conveniently cut up; however, apart from a few end-slices to be conceded to Finland and Rumania, Germany was to be the only beneficiary. This would at last provide the "healthy" ratio between the number of Germans and Ger9

10

Hillgruber. Die Endlösung und das deutsche Ostimperium, p. 140; and Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims. The Establishment of the N e w Order. Vol. 2, London, 1974. pp. 326-332. /MT XXXVIli, pp. 86-94.

496

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" T H E WEHRMACHT AGAINST T H E SOVIET UNION

man Lebensraum. In the East a "Garden of Eden" was to be created for the Germans. Even measures of "shooting, transfer of population, etc." ready for implementation, were to continue, although this concept of a "New Order" for the Soviet Union was to be carefully camouflaged. In addition to the extermination of "Jewish Bolshevism," the extensive exploitation of the occupied territories in favor of the Wehrmacht and the German population implied the death by starvation of millions of Soviet citizens, civilians and prisoners of war. From the end of February 1941 onwards, when military preparations for Operation Barbarossa were already far advanced, Hitler hinted—first within a small circle of his advisers and then before a wider public—at his decision to conduct the approaching campaign as a racial-ideological war of extermination. On March 3, 1941 Hitler rejected the OKW's (High Command of the Armed Forces) "Guidelines for Special Fields to Directive No. 21 (Barbarossa Case)," issuing concrete directives for a new draft. The approaching campaign was to be more than just an armed struggle, it would also lead to a struggle between two Weltanschauungen The Soviet L'nion must be demolished, and the "Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia" that had oppressed the nation must be "liquidated."" Jodl gave instructions as to how the guidelines were to be altered. Military administration was to be restricted to the area of operation—the combat zone and the rear areas of the armies and the army groups. "The necessity for immediate liquidation of all Bolshevik bosses and commissars" would entail use of the SS in the area of operations in addition to the army's Secret Field Police. Military courts should be excluded from these spheres. Two days later the new draft was already passed on to the High Command of the Army (OKH) for comment. The Army command accepted that Himmler was entrusted 11

Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed., Kriegslagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Vol. 1. Frankfurt-on-Main, 1961, p. 341.

497

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS JÜRGEN

FÖRSTER

with "special tasks" in the operation.« area, even though since Poland they had known what this signified. As in 1939 the OKH was happy to be permitted to concentrate on military matters and not to be held answerable for the National-Socialist program of extermination. 12 With "turning a blind eye" no opposition could possibly develop against the OKW's "Guidelines for Special Fields" of March 13, and thus the "agreement between the army and the SS" of March 26 could be drawn up. This thinking appears to have been characteristic of the majority of the conservative commanding officers. By way of illustration we cite a discussion between the commander of Army Group Center, Field-Marshall von Leeb, and the commander of the rear area, General von Roques on July 8, 1941: R o q u e s . . . complains about the wholesale shooting of Jews in K o v n o (thousands) by local Lithuanian Schutzverbände [auxiliary police] at the instigation of the German police. W e have n o control over these measures. All that remains is to keep one's distance. Roques aptly supposed that the Jewish Question c o u l d hardly be solved in this manner. It w o u l d m o s t reliably be solved by sterilizing all Jewish m a l e s . 1 3

In the agreement between the army and the SS, the military command might initially have believed that it would not be held responsible for this "cleaning-up" in the new Lebetìsraum.li Hitler was determined, however, to convert the Wehr12

Cf. Hans Umbreit, Deutsche Militärverwaltungen 1938139, D i e militärische Besetzung der Tschechoslowakei und Polens, Stuttgart, 1977, pp. 116-273Í. ( = B e i t r a g e zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, Vol. 13

14

18). George Meyer, ed., Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 288 ( = Beitrage zur Militär—und Kriegsgeschichte. Vol. 16). H e r e a f t e r — M e y e r , Leeb. This was the formulation of the objectives of the SS in Poland, directed against Jewry, the intelligentsia, the clergy and the aristocracy,

Hans-Adolf

Jacobsen.

ed..

Generaloberst

Haider,

Kriegstage-

498

THE "FINAL SOLUTION" THE WEHRMACHT

AGAINST T H E SOVIET

UNION

macht as well into an instrument in the racial-ideological

war

of extermination and thus erase the boundary between military and political-ideological warfare. This intention b e c a m e o n M a r c h 30, 1941, in a major address in the

known

Reichskanzlei

to over t w o hundred c o m m a n d i n g officers and chiefs of staff of the units taking part in Barbarossa.

Hitler

stated

openly

that he did not want to see the impending war against

the

Soviet U n i o n conducted according to customary military principles, but as a "war of extermination" against

an

ideology

and its adherents: Clash between two ideologies... Bolshevism equals a social criminality. Communism [is a] tremendous danger for the future. We must get away from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no comradc, either before or after. It is a war of extermination . . . We do not wage war in order to conserve the e n e m y . . . The extermination of the Bolshevik commissars and Communist intelligentsia. . The battle must be conducted against the poison of decay. It is not a question of military courts. The leaders must know what is involved. They must take the lead in this struggle! The troops must defend themselves with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and secret service personnel are criminals and must be treated as such. The troops should not get out of control of their leaders. The leader must give the orders in accordance with the feelings of the troops. The leaders must make sacrifices and overcome their scruples. 15 A s early as February

10, 1939, in an as yet relatively

un-

k n o w n speech to the army field commanders, Hitler had defined his projected war for Lebensraum

as "purely a war of ideolo-

gies, that is to say, absolutely a nation's (Volks) war."

16

and a racial

H e had further demanded that in addition to Supreme

buch, Vol. 1. Stuttgart, 1962. p. 79, entry of 19.9 1939 ( h e r e a f t e r Haider, KTB). 15 Haider, KTB II, Stuttgart 1963, p. 336f. ™ Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BA), NS 11/28, BL 86 ff. Jochen Thies first drew attention to this speech, though in a different context: Archi-

499

FUNCTIONARIES AND INSTITUTIONS JÜRGEN

FÖRSTER

Commander of the Wehrmacht, he be regarded as supreme ideological leader to whom, as officers, they owed allegiance for better or for worse. His clear-cut demand that the entire officer's corps form "his very last guard" towards achieving ideologically slanted objectives is significant for the relationship between Hitler and the army, especially when viewed against the background of his "prophecy" on January 30, 1939: If international Jewry inside and outside Europe should succeed o n c e more in plunging the nations into another war, the consequence will not be the bolshevization of the earth and thus the victory of Judaism, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe

Hitler's intentions as announced on March 30, 1941 evoked the usual routine reactions by the Wehrmacht and the army command with the participation of the relevant departments and sections. The guidelines of March 13 had, after all, already conveyed special orders governing the conduct of soldiers and the functions of military courts. Without any protest, officers and officials of the OKW and OKH drew up the orders, later to be termed "criminal," which were to prove decisive in determining the character of the war in the East: 1 8 "Decree concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction and Procedure in the Barbarossa Area and Special Measures of the Troops

17

18

tekt der Weltherrschaft. D i e "Endziele" Hitlers, D ü s s e l d o r f , 2nd. ed., 1976, p. 112ff. M a x Domarus, ed., Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, V o l . 2, N e u s t a d t / A i s c h , 1963, p. 1058. Cf. M a n f r e d Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS—Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination, Hamburg, 1969, pp. 3998. Activity reports tor Mar. and Apr. 1941. (Si. Y V A . J M 800/82-83 (Poznan conference of 7 j u n e 1941) and 94 (Aktennotiz. 1 1 J u n e

'941)·

62. Di.M. 243-45 (Biebow to Fuchs. 4 Mar. 1942) and 245-47 (Biebow to Ventzki, 19 Apr.

1943)

1S3. Di'M. 248 (Ventzki Aktenvermerk, no date).

800

THE "FINAL SOLUTION

Nazi Ghettoization Policy in Poland In Warsaw the departure of the notorious attntionists Schön and Palfinger came too late to stem a skyrocketing death rate produced by a half-year's deliberate starvation. This death rate had risen above 1,000 in the month of February, above 2,000 m Apnl, and then nearly doubled to 3,800 in May 1941. "A quantum leap in deaths for May of this year showed that the food shortage had already grown into a famine, " Auerswald concluded. "The provisioning of food thus constituted our most urgent task." Auerswald did provide some extra supplies to the Jewish Self-Aid (JSS) to increase the daily meals it provided from 30,000 in May to 120,000 in August. "Due to the general impoverishment of the J e w s prevailing since the outbreak of the war," however, these supplementary rations did not staunch the rising death rates until they peaked at 5,550 in July and 5,560 in August. Thereafter a modest decline and stabilization set in. 64 As in Lodz in the early summer of 1941, the Germans briefly held out the prospect of "Polish rations" to the Warsaw Jews. These hopes were dashed in late August, as Czemiakow noted in his diary. "Auerswald declares that Krakow is also inclined not to starve out the Jews. However, the rations cannot be increased at this point because the newly captured territories absorb a lot of food. " 6 3 In October 1941 Max Bischof complained that the "unconditionally necessary" provisions for workers in the economy were lacking. But Frank, like Greiser in the Warthegau, refused any increase on principle, noting that "even for the Polish population hardly anything more can be provided." 66 Bischof then attempted with some success to get private German employers with contracts for military production to provide supplementary rations to their workers, hoping that the increase in productivity that resulted would induce other employers to follow suit. 67 Knowing that "the amount of legally delivered food is utterly insufficient effectively to counter the famine situation existing in the Jewish district," Auerswald initially took a relatively lenient view toward smuggling, provided that it could be accomplished without the spread of the ghetto epidemics that starvation had induced. Czerniakow noted, "He [Auerswald] indicated that so far as smuggling is 64. YVA. JM 1112. Auerswald repon of 26 Sept. 1941 The Journal ol Emmanuel Ringelblum. 191-92. Gutman. The Jews of Wersau·, 63-65. 65. The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czemiakow. 264 and 269 (entries of ?July and ¡9Aug. 1941) 66. YVA:JM 1112, Transferstelle repon of 8 Oct. 1941 : JM ; 1