The Nazi Holocaust: Volume 2 [Reprint 2011 ed.] 9783110970432, 9783598215582

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THE NAZI HOLOCAUST

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

Edited by Michael R. Marnis Series ISBN 0-88736-266-4 1. Perspectives on the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-252-4 2. The Origins of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-253-2 3. The "Final Solution": The Implementation of Mass Murder ISBN 0-88736-255-9 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-256-7 vol. 2 4. The "Final Solution" Outside Germany ISBN 0-88736-257-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-258-3 vol. 2 5. Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe ISBN 0-88736-259-1 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-254-0 vol. 2 6. The Victims of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-260-5 vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-261-3 vol. 2 7. Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-262-1 8. Bystanders to the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-263-X vol. 1 ISBN 0-88736-264-8 vol. 2 ISBN 0-88736-268-0 vol. 3 9. The End of the Holocaust ISBN 0-88736-265-6

THE NAZI HOLOCAUST Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews

5

Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews Φ in Nazi Europe Volume 2 Edited with an Introduction by

Michael R. Marrus University of Toronto

Meckler Westport · London

Publisher's Note The articles and chapters which comprise this collection originally appeared in a wide variety of publications and are reproduced here in facsimile from the highest quality offprints and photocopies available. The reader will notice some occasional marginal shading and text-curl common to photocopying from tightly bound volumes. Every attempt has been made to correct or minimize this effect The publisher wishes to acknowledge all the individuals and institutions that provided permission to reprint from their publications. Special thanks are due to the Yad Vashem Institute, Jerusalem, the YTVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, and the Leo Baeck Institute, New York, for their untiring assistance in providing materials from their publications and collections for use in this series. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatlon Data Public opinion and relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe / edited by Michael R. Marrus. p. cm. — (The Nazi Holocaust; v. 5) Includes index. ISBN 0-88736-259-1 (v. 1 : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-88736-254-0 (v. 2 : alk. paper). — $ (set) 1. Holocaust, Jewish (1939-1945) — Public opinion. 2. Public opinion — Germany. 3. Germany — Ethnic relations. 4. Public opinion — Poland. 5. Poland — Ethnic relations. 6. Righteous Gentiles in the Holocaust 7. World War, 1939-1945 — Jews — Rescue. I. Marrus, Michael Robert Π. Series. D804.3.N39 vol. 5 940.53Ί8 s—dc20 [940.53Ί8] 89-12245 CIP British Library Cataloging in Publication Data Public opinion and relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe. - (The Nazi Holocaust; v.5). 1. Jews, Genocide, 1939-1945 I. Marrus, Michael R. (Michael Robert) Π. Series 940.53 Ί5Ό3924 ISBN 0-88736-259-1 v.l ISBN 0-88736-254-0 v.2 ISBN 0-88736-266-4 set Copyright information for articles reproduced in this collection appears at the end of this volume. Introductions and selection copyright © 1989 Meckler Corporation. All rights reserved. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form by any means without prior written permission of the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in review. Meckler Corporation, 11 Ferry Lane West, Westport, CT 06880. Mecklar Ltd., Grosvenor Gardens House, Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0BS, U.K. Printed on acid free paper. Printed in the United States of America.

Contents Series Preface Introduction

ix xi

Part One: Germans Was There an "Other Germany" during the Nazi Period? PHILIP FRIEDMAN 3 The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich: Recent Publications and Trends in Research on German Society and the "Jewish Question" OTTO DOV KULKA and ARON RODRIGUE 46 The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews LAWRENCE D. STOKES 61 The Persecution of the Jews and German Popular Opinion in the Third Reich IAN KERSHAW 86 "Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question" OTTO DOV KULKA 115 "Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany; The Final Solution OTTO DOV KULKA 139 Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases MICHAEL H. KATER 151 German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections IAN KERSHAW 182 The German Resistance and the Jews CHRISTOF DIPPER 204

Part Two: East Europeans Interwar Poland: Good for the Jews or Bad for the Jews? EZRA MENDELSOHN Relations between Polish and Jewish Left Wing Groups in Interwar Poland JERZYHOLZER Introduction to; Polish-Jewish Relations during the Second World War JOSEPH KERMISH

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259 266

An Early Account of Polish Jewry under Nazi and Soviet Occupation Presented to the Polish Govemment-in-Exile, February 1940 DAVID ENGEL Polish-Jewish Relations in Occupied Poland, 1939-1945 WLADYSLAW BARTOSZEWSKI Polish and Jewish Historiography on the Question of Polish-Jewish Relations during World War II YISRAEL GUTMAN Polish Responses to the Liquidation of Warsaw Jewry YISRAEL GUTMAN Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation PHILIP FRIEDMAN Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations TARAS HUNCZAK Czech Attitudes towards the Jews during the Nazi Regime LIVIA ROTHKIRCHEN

299 315

329 342 358 396 415

VOLUME TWO

Part Three: Support for Jews The "Righteous among the Nations" and Their Part in the Rescue of Jews MOSHE BEJSKI The Need to Recognize the Heroes of the Nazi Era SAMUEL P. OLINER The Activities of the Council for Aid to Jews ("Zegota") in Occupied Poland JOSEPH KERMISH The Relief Council for Jews in Poland, 1942-1945 TERESA PREKEROWA Rescue and Relief Activities in Behalf of Jewish Victims of Nazism in Scandinavia HUGO VALENTIN The Uniqueness of the Rescue of Danish Jewry LENIYAHIL The Historiographie Treatment of the Abortive Attempt to Deport the Danish Jews TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN The Dynamics of Decency: Dutch Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust DR. LAWRENCE BARON

451 477

485 517

533 561

570 608

Help to People in Hiding LOUIS DE JONG The Rescue of Jews in the Italian Zone of Occupied Croatia DANIEL CARPI Notes on the History of the Jews in Greece during the Holocaust Period. The Attitude of the Italians (1941-1943) DANIEL CARPI

627 670

731

Copyright Information

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Index

773

Series Preface The Holocaust, the murder of close to six million Jews by the Nazis during the Second World War, stands as a dreadful monument to mankind's inhumanity to man. As such, it will continue to be pondered for as long as people care about the past and seek to use it as a guide to the present. In the last two decades, historical investigation of this massacre has been unusually productive, both in the sense of extending our understanding of what happened and in integrating the Holocaust into the general stream of historical consciousness. This series, a collection of English-language historical articles on the Holocaustreproducedin facsimile form, is intended to sample the rich variety of this literature, with particular emphasis on the most recent currents of historical scholarship. However assessed, historians acknowledge a special aura about the Nazis' massacre of European Jewry, that has generally come to berecognizedas one of the watershed events of recorded history. What was singular about this catastrophe was not only the gigantic scale of the killing, but also the systematic, machine-like effort to murder an entire people — including every available Jew — simply for the crime of being Jewish. In theory, no one was to escape — neither the old, nor the infirm, nor even tiny infants. Nothing quite like this had happened before, at least in modem times. By any standard, therefore, the Holocaust stands out While Jews had known periodic violence in their past, it seems inretrospectthat the rise of radical anti-Jewish ideology, centered on race, set the stage for eventual mass murder. As well, Europeans became inured to death on a mass scale during the colossal bloodletting of the First World War. That conflict provided cover for the slaughter of many hundreds of thousands of Armenians in Turkey, a massacre that Hitler himself seems to have thought a precursor of what he would do in the conquest of the German Lebensraum, or living space, in conquered Europe. Still, the extermination of every living person on the basis of who they were, was something new. For both perpetrators and victims, therefore, decisions taken for what the Nazis called the "Final Solution" began a voyage into the unknown. As the Israeli historian Jacob Katz puts it: "This was an absolute novum, unassimilable in any vocabulary at the disposal of the generation that experienced iL" For more than a decade after the war, writing on the Holocaust may be seen in general as part of the process of mourning for the victims — dominated by the urge to bear witness to what had occurred, to commemorate those who had been murdered, and to convey a warning to those who had escaped. Given the honor and the unprecedented character of these events, it is not surprising that it has taken writers some time to present a coherent, balanced assessment. The early 1960s were a turning point. The appearance of Raul Hilberg's monumental work, The Destruction of the European Jews, and the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 stimulated debate and investigation. From Israel, the important periodical published by the Yad Vashem Institute [Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority], Yad Vashem Studies, made serious research

available to scholars in English. German and American scholars set to work. Numerous academic conferences and publications in the following decade, sometimes utilizing evidence from trials of war criminals then underway, extended knowledge considerably. As aresult,we now have an immense volume of historical writing, a significant sample of which is presented in this series. A glance at the topics covered underscores the vast scale of this history. Investigators have traced the Nazi persecution of the Jews before the implementation of the "Final Solution," showing links both to Nazi ideology and an ti semi tic tradition. They have indicated how the Germans coordinated their anti-Jewish activities (Mi a European-wide scale in the wake of their territorial conquests, drawing upon their own bureaucracy and those of their allies, enlisting collaborators and various helpers in defeated countries. They have also devoted attention to the victims — whether in East European ghettos or forests, in Central or Western Europe, or in the various concentration and death camps run by the SS. Finally, they have also written extensively on the bystanders — the countries arrayed against the Hitlerian Reich, neutrals, various Christian denominations, and the Jews outside Nazi-dominated Europe. The volumes in this series permit the reader to sample thericharray of scholarship on the history of the Holocaust, and to assess some of the conflicting interpretations. They also testify to a deeper, more sophisticated, and more balanced appreciation than was possible in the immediate wake of these horrifying events. The literature offered here can be studied as historiography — scholars addressing problems of historical interpretation — or, on the deepest level, as a grappling with the most familiar but intractable of questions: How was such a thing possible? *

*

*

I want to express my warm appreciation to all those who helped me in the preparation of these volumes. My principal debt, of course, is to the scholars whose work is represented in these pages. To them, and to the publications in which their essays first appeared, I am grateful not only for permission to reproduce their articles but also for their forbearance in dealing with a necessarily remote editor. I appreciate as well the assistance of the following, who commented on lists of articles that I assembled, helping to make this project an educational experience not only for my readers but also for myself: Yehuda Bauer, Rudolph Binion, Christopher Browning, Saul Friedländer, Henry Friedlander, Raul Hilberg, Jacques Kornberg, Walter Laqueur, Franklin Littell, Hubert Locke, Zeev Mankowitz, Sybil Milton, George Mosse, and David Wyman. To be sure, I have sometimes been an obstreperous student, and I have not always accepted the advice that has been kindly proffered. I am alone responsible for the choices here, and for the lacunae that undoubtedly exist Special thanks go to Ralph Carlson, who persuaded me to undertake this project and who took charge of many technical aspects of iL Thanks also to Anthony Abbott of Meckler Corporation who saw the work through to completion. Finally, as so often in the past, I record my lasting debt to my wife, Carol Randi Marrus, without whom I would have been engulfed by this and other projects. Toronto, July 1989

Michael R. Marrus

Introduction How did Europeans respond to the events that we are considering? Historians are able to advance some concrete, well-grounded judgments about popular attitudes toward Jews during the Nazi era, and can make important distinctions between various periods, groups, and regions. Christian churches will be examined subsequently, in Section Eight. Included in this section are important descriptions of German opinion, drawn extensivelyfromthe Nazi police apparatus and carefully evaluated by several historians. Not surprisingly, the latter present a range of interpretation of these necessarily problematic sources. Some contributors accentuate the failure of Nazi propagandists to inculcate an intense, violent hatred of Jews. While antisemitism undoubtedly was active, they say, there was also opposition to the persecution of Jews and, more commonly, massive indifference. Others scholars find much more evidence of anti-Jewish commitment in the sources, identifying a solid antisemitic consensus and pointing toward what one historian has termed the "passive complicity" of the German public. Both groups would recognize, however, that generalizations must be carefully qualified and that we must make the appropriate allowances for differences among various groups, regions, and changing circumstances of the Reich over its twelve-year history. Historians have differed even more sharply over the attitudes and behavior of East European populations, in a region of longstanding, intense antisemitism. Interestingly, Polish scholars have recently participated in these debates, and a sample of their assessments of Polish wartime attitudes is presented here. At the close of the section are articles dealing with support that was, in some remarkable circumstances, provided to Jews — the views and actions of those in East and West who, at great risk, harbored fugitivesfromthe Nazis' murder apparatus and saved the lives of significant numbers.

Part Three

Support for Jews

SUPPORT FOR J E W S

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THE "RIGHTEOUS AMONG THE NATIONS" AND THEIR PART IN THE RESCUE OF JEWS

by MOSHE BEJSKI

For more than thirty years we have been endeavoring to intensify our research while asking ourselves how it was possible for a nation professing to belong to the civilized world to decree the destruction and annihilation of another nation — a decree whose execution was planned with characteristic precision, and carried out with a barbarism that staggered belief. The perspective of thirty years does not provide an answer. The astronomical loss of lives certainly justifies extensive research, and indeed, in recent years, historians, sociologists, and psychologists have completed quite a few studies which have attempted to trace the developments that preceded the Holocaust and which, in their opinion, constituted direct motives for or influenced the course of events that led to the Holocaust. Without detracting in any way from these studies, I must state that it is nevertheless doubtful that they can provide an answer to the cardinal question of how it happened, for it is doubtful that there is any rational explanation for such irrational acts. While much research has been conducted on the vexing question mentioned above, I believe that we have not sufficiently examined another phenomenon, related to the first question, which is of utmost importance. Why was it that in the approximately twenty states under Nazi occupation or influence, which had a combined population of hundreds of millions, there were relatively only few persons who were

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prepared to help those who were in such urgent need of relief during that period? Moreover, it was not a matter of extending aid to foreigners: in each of the states in question citizens of more or less equal status had their civil liberties curtailed, were persecuted cruelly, and were finally deported, never to return — all in full public view. This question appears just as difficult to answer as does the first since at least from the point of view of one's attitude toward the occupying authorities, there was reason to believe that the population would not react indifferently to the inhuman acts perpetrated against citizens of its state, not to mention the humanitarian obligation an individual has toward one's fellow man. Thus it would appear that it is difficult to find a rational answer for this question as well, though in analyzing this phenomenon one can no doubt point to various factors, such as deeply rooted anti-Semitism, fear of danger, and so on. The term "Righteous Among the Nations" was mentioned several times in the lectures and discussions at this conference. I am not certain, however, that everyone who used the expression was referring precisely to those persons about whom I intend to speak. Much has been said about the population of many nations who looked on indifferently as Jews were led to deportation and extermination. Obviously they are not included in the category of the "Righteous." What about those, however, who were upset by actions against the Jews and perhaps shed a tear at the Jews' bitter fate — is this sufficient to warrant calling them "Righteous Gentiles"? As far as I am concerned, and from the point of view of the Yad Vashem Commission for the Designation of the Righteous, the answer is negative. The Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Law (Yad Vashem — 57131953) did not provide an exact definition of who was worthy of the title of "Righteous Among the Nations." It merely mentioned "the highminded Gentiles who risked their lives to save Jews," without defining who they were. During the eleven years of its existence, however, the Commission has established certain criteria which must be fulfilled

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before one can be considered worthy of the title. These criteria are: extending help in saving a life; endangering one's own life; absence of reward, monetary or otherwise; and similar considerations, by which the rescuer's deeds stand out above and beyond what can be termed as ordinary help, which is, of course, also praiseworthy. On more than one occasion the Commission has been forced to make difficult decisions regarding the granting of the title of "Righteous Among the Nations." If all those who were labelled "Righteous Gentiles" in this conference had actually deserved the title, surely the number of survivors would be large, as would the number of those designated by the Commission. The fact of the matter is, however, that to date only 900 people, who without any ulterior motives endangered their lives to save Jews, have been granted the title. In addition, there are a further 350 cases presently being reviewed, and undoubtedly there are quite a few others whose deeds are unknown to the Commission, whether because those who received their help were killed or have passed away, or because those who were rescued have not taken the trouble of thanking their benefactors by bringing their deeds to the attention of Yad Vashem. Moreover, there is a definite lack of knowledge among the survivors in the Diaspora about Yad Vashem's role in honoring those who rescued Jews. Yet even when one considers all the instances in which those of other nations helped save Jews during the Holocaust period, the number does not exceed several thousands. In order to undertake rescue in those circumstances, however, an enormous number of people was required, perhaps as many as the Jews of Europe who were exterminated. On no account can it be said that rescue was impossible, and in the course of my remarks I shall endeavor to demonstrate that aid and rescue were possible — if there was a willingness to act, under the most terrible conditions, and even within the extermination camps themselves. Only because such a relatively small number of people were prepared to oppose the persecu-

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tions and to provide aid and rescue, were the Nazis able to execute their plans on such a large scale. In the framework of this lecture I will not deal with the lack of action on the part of states, international, and national organizations throughout the entire period of the Nazi persecution. My predecessors have already lectured on the topic, and others have dealt with the subject. My own remarks refer only to the actions of individuals, undertaken on their own initiative, and in most cases without any assistance from external factors — actions such as hiding a Jewish family or child in their home, providing false documents, supplying food, helping smuggle persons out of the country, or any one of a wide range of deeds and activities undertaken as dictated by the circumstances in order to save a Jew from death or facilitate his concealment or escape. The sad truth is that when examining the rescue of individuals by individuals, one discovers that from a quantitative point of view Jews did not receive more help from individuals than they did from states, organizations, or groups, and the numbers I mentioned previously are instructive. On the other hand, one does find wonderful and heart-warming stories of families who over a lengthy period shared their meager fare with a Jewish family that found shelter in their home, and whom no risk could deter from aiding those in need of help. To account for the small number of individuals who helped Jews the justification is often offered that it was not easy to help Jews during that period because of the great risk entailed. Whoever concealed a Jew endangered both himself and his family, and there were indeed instances in which the rescuers were executed or imprisoned for many years in labor and detention camps. While this fact is undoubtedly true, it does not serve as a sufficient answer to our question, because precisely in those states where there was a more marked tendency on the part of the local population to help Jews, the reprisal measures taken by the Germans were fewer. Moreover, even if it were

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true that only fear of reprisals prevented many from undertaking rescue, the question of why the non-Jewish population extended so little help during an earlier period when no risk was as yet involved still remains unanswered; I am referring to the period before the outbreak of the war when tens of thousands of refugees from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia sought shelter in vain, and also to the initial period of the war itself, before stringent laws were promulgated against those assisting Jews. I shall only note one matter which for some reason has not yet been mentioned at this conference. When the conference of the representatives of 32 states was convened at Evian in 1938 — a conference whose main objective was to find a haven for the tens of thousands of refugees whose absorption in any state whatsoever would have meant their rescue — no one yet faced any danger. All that was required to solve the problem was to find countries willing to admit the refugees. The conference was opened with great pomp, and speeches were made about the need for relief and rescue. The replies received from various countries to justify their refusal to accept refugees are not even worth mentioning because they are an insult to human dignity. In fact, the conference achieved no concrete or practical results for the resettlement of several hundred Jews in the Dominican Republic. In my opinion, events which took place after World War II demonstrate that the claim that it was the danger alone which prevented people from helping Jews is not accurate. After the war ended helping a Jew did not entail any risks. Moreover, the relief in question was not the same kind as that needed during the deportations, but rather help in facilitating the absorption of the surviving remnant. Nevertheless, displaced persons' camps still existed in Germany in 1952 to absorb the refugees who had been streaming out of Eastern and Central Europe since the end of the war — refugees who were compelled to leave their birthplace because the hostile attitude of the local populace made it impossible for them to resettle in their former homes.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS THE "RIGHTEOUS AMONG THE NATIONS"

These wretched refugees, survivors of the camps, could not stake a claim — even for a transitional period — in those states where antiSemitism had always been deeply rooted in the blood of the people. In Poland, for example, quite a few pogroms were carried out by the local population, such as the one in the city of Kielce in 1946, which was staged in order to prevent the resettlement of a small number of Jewish survivors. On the 15,000 Jews who originally lived in the small town of Dzialoszyce, about 90 returned after the war. When the Poles murdered three of them one night, the remainder did not wait for dawn, and left under the cover of darkness, never to return. There were many such incidents, and they indicate the population's attitude toward its Jews. It would certainly be too much to expect antiSemitic Poles, Ukrainians, and Latvians, who for generations had sought to be rid of the Jews in their countries, to help Jews in times of trouble and to aid in their rescue. Theoretically it could be expected that the citizens of the occupied countries would resist every edict of the occupying authorities, including those decrees which forbade extending aid to Jews. In practice, however, the situation was quite different. Those within the population of the various countries who organized undergrounds were ready to fight against the Germans, but when it came to helping and rescuing Jews even the underground fighters (not all of them, it is true) identified more with the Nazi occupation authorities than with their Jewish neighbors who were born in the country and were fullfledged citizens. (Yesterday a few episodes were related which reflect the attitude of the non-Jewish partisans to Jewish fighters, and what the latter's fate was at the hands of the former.) As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, there was always a sizeable portion of the populace which sought to get rid of the Jews of its country. Then the Nazis appeared and perpetrated deeds which, although unpopular, included actions likely to bring about the disappearance of the Jews — and this was a policy which was in line with the

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_ MOSHE BEJSKI

hopes of at least part of the country's population. In this respect the response was not one of indifference, but rather one of a certain degree of satisfaction that the Jews will disappear forever. We do indeed receive a different picture from Dr. Yahil's remarks of yesterday, but no contradiction is involved. No uniform criteria exist as far as the rescue of individuals by individuals is concerned, nor can a comprehensive generalization be made which could include all ihe Nazi-occupied countries. The situation in Denmark was different from that in Poland, and the conditions in Holland were not the same as those in the Ukraine; the people were different, the backgrounds and circumstances varied, and, most important, there were differences in the attitude of the populations of the various countries toward their Jews, both in normal times and during the occupation. Dr. Yahil attributed the rescue of Danish Jewry to the attitude of the remnants of the Danish Government toward the Jews. The attitude of the Danish authorities toward the grave problem of their country's Jews is not in question. Ever since the end of the war we have extolled it and pointed to it as a model of exemplary behavior, but I think we may be permitted to doubt whether even the Danish authorities would have succeeded in saving the Jews had it not been for the citizens of Denmark and their willingness to mobilize themselves en masse for the great rescue operation. Without the many Danes who were prepared to endanger themselves, it is doubtful whether it would have been possible to organize and execute the transfer of 7,200 persons across the sea to Sweden on the three nights between September 29 and October 1, 1943. Indeed, there were only a few days between the warning and zero-hour. It is almost inconceivable that such an operation could have been effected in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, or the Ukraine. Although various types of rescue activities were carried out in these countries, there was a basic unwillingness to extend help, not to mention a lack of readiness to organize a large operation or undertake any risks.

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It seems to me that as far as individual rescue is concerned, it was not necessarily the government's attitude that was the determining factor, but the attitude of the individual toward his fellow citizens; an examination of the numbers of Jews rescued by individuals in each country lends support to this contention. For example let us take the case of Italy, where a fascist government was in power from the beginning of the 1930s. Under German pressure, racial laws were promulgated in Italy, and one might have assumed that Italy would follow Germany's lead in eliminating its Jewish problem. Yet of the 57,000 Jews living in Italy prior to the outbreak of the war, 42,000 survived. Moreover, it is particularly noteworthy that a large number of Italian Jews found shelter with individuals, and many were hidden in churches. The fact that their country was ruled by fascists did not prevent Italians from endangering themselves in order to help Jews — which they did to a far greater degree than did citizens of other countries that fought against the Nazis. In Holland, many Jewish families were hidden by people whom they did not even know. A referral by the underground, which kept a list of hiding places, was sufficient. In fact, the Commission came across the case of a village in Holland in which each of the inhabitants concealed a Jew or a Jewish family. The operation was organized by the residents of the village without any external assistance. The situation was utterly different>in Poland. Possibilities of rescue by individuals did not exist to a lesser degree in this country than they did elsewhere. The best proof of this is the actions of those "Righteous Gentiles" who hid Jews and extended help in various forms. The number of those who did so in Poland, however, is relatively small. It is unnecessary to expound upon the attitude of the Polish population toward the Jews during the occupation period. The facts are known and have been recorded. Mr. Arad added many details yesterday on the attitude of the Polish undergrounds toward the Jewish partisans, many of whom were killed in the forests by the Poles. These

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fighters who fled to the forests in order to fight the common enemy, were murdered solely because they were Jews. As to the relative number of those rescued, the situation is no different. While it is true that in terms of absolute numbers Poland had the most survivors, it would be a mistake to credit their rescue to the Poles. The truth is that only a handful of the three and a quarter million Polish Jews were saved thanks to the help of individual Poles. Most of those Jews who survived were in Russia during the war; 170,000 returned to Poland in the course of the first repatriation in 1946 and 19-20,000 others returned in the general repatriation from Russia in 1956. In addition, there were those who had survived the labor, concentration, and extermination camps — Jews whom the Germans had employed as a Labor force as long as they had the strength to work. Others survived years of fighting as partisans in the forests, and a small group managed to live through the hardships of the war with forged Aryan papers. The smallest category of survivors consists of those Jews who were saved because they had been hidden by Poles. The fact that they do not number in the thousands does not of course detract from the merit of the Polish "Righteous Among the Nations" who did not conform to the general behavior of the population. It is even possible that their activities were more dangerous than those of the "Righteous" in other countries because the risk of being denounced for hiding Jews was much greater in Poland where denouncements were very widespread. The case of Poland is not the only example. In the majority of the occupied countries one finds a direct relationship between the Germans' success in implementing the Final Solution and the attitude of the local population toward the Jews. Italy is a case in point, and the same applies to Denmark. In Bulgaria as well, the attitude of the population and the intervention of individuals and the authorities contributed to the survival of the 50,000 Jews of that country. In Latvia and Lithuania, on the other hand, the proportions were re-

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versed. Only about 10,000 of the 95,000 Jews in pre-war Latvia survived, and in Lithuania only about 15,000 of a community of 160,000 were saved. Individual rescue undoubtedly entailed a certain degree of danger. Before a person considered the extent of the danger, however, he or she had to have the desire and the readiness to help a Jew. Unfortunately, the majority of the populations of the occupied countries never even considered the nature of the risk involved because the willingness to help Jews was lacking. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the events proved that the more persons there were in a country who were prepared to take risks to help Jews, the less the danger actually became. The Nazi occupation authorities adopted a different attitude toward those who extended help to Jews in Poland and Lithuania and those who did so in Denmark and Holland. Moreover, the more hiding places there were, the less dangerous it was to hide Jews, as it was possible to transfer Jews from one hiding place to another as the need arose. In theory, the greatest danger lay in hiding a Jew in one's own home. Sometimes it was for a period of months or even years, with the risk renewing itself daily. There were modes of help which entailed far less danger, such as supplying false papers or ration cards, finding places of employment, enlisting in the underground, and other actions which could bring about rescue. However, there also were undertaken by few individuals. Unfortunately, no study has yet been carried out on the motives of those who despite the risk involved did not bow to the edicts of the occupying authorities or conform to the behavior of the general population and extended help to Jews. In each case the motives are different, but there is a common denominator among the "Righteous" — the humanitarian motivation which dictates a charitable attitude toward one's fellow man. Hostility toward the occupying authorities and opposition to the cruel acts they perpetrated against the Jewish

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population were certainly important, but even in these cases, the humanitarian motivation was dominant. Very often religious conviction motivated individuals to help Jews. This is paradoxical as it is known, and it has been confirmed at this conference, that the Church qua Church did almost nothing to get its adherents to extend help to the persecuted Jews. Nevertheless, quite a few cases have come to our attention in which it was the individual's profound religious feeling that motivated him to fulfill the command: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Of course, personal acquaintance and friendship between the rescuer and the rescued also constituted a motive for extending help in time of trouble. We have already mentioned those of the "Righteous Among the Nations" for whom acts of rescue constituted a part of their underground activities. We have not yet made a study of the social origins of the "Righteous" recognized by the Commission; they are to be found among all classes of the population. My distinct impression from years of work on the Commission has been that while the "Righteous" came from all sectors of the population the majority were from the lower classes — poverty-stricken common folk, poor people who had difficulty providing for their own families yet found it possible to share their meager fare with those they took under their protection. The limited time at my disposal does not permit me to relate the stories of those wonderful farmers and other persons who were so poor that they could not even buy bread and potatoes for their families, yet shared the little they had with those they were concealing. Moreover, when we add the fear of the authorities and the apprehension lest they be denounced by anti-Semitic neighbors, informers, and collaborators, then we shall be able to properly appreciate the nobility of spirit of the handful who did not blindly follow the general line and reached a high degree of humanity. There were also those who were true heroes, such as the farmer's wife whose husband was murdered by the Germans before her eyes because he refused to divulge the hiding place of seventeen

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Jews who were hiding in the forest and whom he had helped feed for a long time. This is a supreme level of sacrifice which is unsurpassed. Indeed the reward of the Commission members who hear of such cases from time to time is that these stories of rescue inspire the feeling that in a sea of malevolence and darkness there were wonderful human beings! They were, however, very few. I hope that Yad Vashem will publish the details of the deeds of each of the "Righteous Among the Nations" so that the episodes of individual rescue will not remain the exclusive preserve of the rescuer and rescued; not only because these episodes are the sole source of light in a world of atrocities and the loss of the image of God, but because we owe it to the rescuers. Moreover, the publication of these episodes will prove to the whole world what could have been done in terms of help and rescue if only many people had made the effort. I would like to devote a few words to a special class of "Righteous Gentiles." So far I have dwelt mainly upon those who extended the most common types of relief such as concealment in the rescuer's home, supplying papers and food, help in escape and smuggling persons out of the country, and the similar actions. I have already noted that there was, in fact, no place where help of this sort could not have been extended in order to save individuals or at least to ease their suffering. The cases that have come before the Commission indicate that, given the appropriate initiative and willingness to help, it was possible to bring relief into the ghettos during Akt ions, and even into the concentration and extermination camps. This help usually made it possible to ease the burden of the persecuted Jews and to rescue individuals. Not many people could be concealed in one apartment or in a particular hiding place, and an escape organization could only comprise individuals. There were, however, rescuers whose actions were above and beyond what was customary during the Holocaust — those who were not content with saving one life or the lives of a single family. They felt

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obligated to act within broad frameworks, so that they, the individuals, could become rescue institutions which would save many lives. I regret that within the time allotted to me I will not be able to mention each of them and their deeds, though each is especially worthy of such mention, if only to indicate that even under the most difficult circumstances it was possible to do something if there was initiative and a willingness to act. I will only mention a few of them to illustrate my point, and once again express the hope that the stories of all the "Righteous" will be collected and published so that they will be brought to the knowledge of the public. Raoul Wallenberg In July 1944, upon the initiative of Jewish organizations, this Swedish aristocrat was sent to Budapest as an attachö of the Swedish embassy in order to work for the rescue of Hungarian Jewry together with the War Refugee Board and Jewish institutions. By that time about 300,000 Hungarian Jews had already been deported to Auschwitz. Wallenberg's first step was to print Swedish protective cards, which he distributed to anyone connected in any way whatsoever with Sweden, and to extend the protection of the Swedish Government to all those who received the passports. When he found out that the local authorities were honoring these protective documents for the time being, he printed more and more of them, and expanded the operation by purchasing 32 houses and four apartments which he converted into an "internal ghetto" where he housed the new citizens of the neutral country. At one stage the number of those under Swedish protection exceeded 33,000. He employed nearly 400 workers, established soupkitchens and hospitals, and provided vital services. Particularly noteworthy is the large number of children in these houses. Wallenberg endangered his diplomatic status, but this did not perturb him. He worked without respite, devoting his inexhausible energy to rescue. During the street riots when Szalasi's "Arrow Cross" seized power,

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Wallenberg dashed from house to house to save Jews from death, no longer checking whether those he saved had any direct connection with the neutral state. When tens of thousands of Jews were expelled from Budapest in November 1944, and sent on the "death march" to the Austrian border, which meant having to walk 200 kilometers in snow and cold, Wallenberg followed the Jews with food trucks and distributed food, warm clothing, and shoes. Moreover, he took everyone he could possibly remove from the transport back to Budapest, and safety. At times a meaningless scrap of paper sufficed to pull someone out of the column. Wallenberg's deeds proved to be contagious. Thus the Swiss, Spanish, and Portuguese representatives extended protection to a number of Jews whose ancestors had been expelled from their countries. Many thousands of Jews were rescued thanks to Wallenberg's initiative and extraordinary action. Moreover, his deeds constitute proof of how much a courageous individual, with a profound feeling for his fellow man, could accomplish under difficult conditions. Unfortunately, Wallenberg's fate was not a happy one. He was last seen on January 17, 1945 (following the liberation of Hungary) en route to Marshal Malinovsky's headquarters to discuss plans for those under his protection. His last words were: "I don't know whether I'm going as a guest or as a prisoner." Wallenberg was never seen again, and only in 1957 did the Russians admit (after unceasing pressure from the Swedish Government) that he had died of a heartattack in 1947 in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow. It later turned out that this "admission" was also not true. Wallenberg's aged mother has so far refused to accept the medal granted by the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous because of the lack of certain knowledge about his fate. We have honored her wish. Nevertheless, Raoul Wallenberg stands in the front rank of the nobleminded individuals whose actions to rescue Jews exceeded any possible expectations.

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Dr. Adelaide

Hautval

This wonderful doctor was imprisoned in France in April 1942 because she travelled without a permit (to her mother's funeral) from Vichy to the occupied zone. She was originally confined in the Bourges Prison, which also had several Jewish prisoners. When she saw how badly the Jews were treated, she protested to the Gestapo, which forced her to wear the yellow badge with the words "friend of Jews" written on it, and threatened her that her fate would be the same as that of the Jews. After suffering hardships in various camps in France she was set to Auschwitz, and there she was put to work as a doctor in Block 10. Dr. Hautval realized that the Jewish women in her block were being treated worse than herself, and she began to lovingly take care of them. The female prisoners of the block called her the "saint," and only those who were there can relate to what an extent they were helped by Dr. Hautval. When a typhus epidemic broke out in the block, it was certain that all the women who contracted the disease would be sent to the gas chambers. Dr. Hautval, the only doctor in the block, decided not to inform anyone about the epidemic. She hid those who were ill on the upper level of the bunks, and treated them with motherly devotion. She used to say to those around her, "Here we are all condemned to death — let us behave like human beings as long as we are still alive." The chief doctors, S.S. Officers Dr. Agrad and Dr. Wirths, demanded that she assist them in gynecological medical work, explaining that they were conducting experiments regarding the detection of the initial manifestations of cancer of the uterus. Dr. Hautval, however, had doubts about the type of experiments being performed, and informed Dr. Wirths that she would not participate, saying that no one h .d any right to decide the life and fate of his fellow man. She also refused to assist in such duties as administering anaesthesia or performing sterilization. Moreover, when Dr. Wirths asked her whether she perceived the difference between these people and her own world, she retorted: "I have indeed perceived people

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different from myself and you are one of them." Dr. Hautval did her best to protect the Jewish women prisoners and in her capacity as a doctor she was truly "the angel in white." In the famous trial held in London in 1962 in which the Polish gynecologist Dr. Wladislaw-Dering sued Leon Uris, the author of Exodus, for libel, Dr. Hautval testified for the defense about the thousands of sterilization experiments performed on Jewish women in Auschwitz. She made an extraordinary impression at the trial, a fact which found expression in Judge Lawton's verdict: "Dr. Hautval, you may think perhaps one of the most impressive and courageous women who has ever given evidence in a Court in this country, a most outstanding and distinguished personage. We know what happened to her. She very early made a stand, and not once but I think it was a total of four times all together. She made it quite clear what she was prepared to do and what she was not prepared to d o . . . Summoned for this she gave a reply to Dr. Wirths which I expect will live in our memories for many, many years: a devastating reply." Judge Lawton was not exaggerating in the last, and whoever meets Dr. Hautval is indeed thus impressed. Her friendship for the Jewish people and the State of Israel is profound and sincere. It is only because I did not receive her permission, that I do not read you the moving letters she wrote on various occasions such as the outbreak of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. These missives are faithful testimony to an extraordinary concern for the world's attitude toward the Jewish people. Dr. Hautval's deeds are perhaps the most conclusive proof that even under the difficult conditions which existed in the inferno called Auschwitz it was possible to ease the suffering of others and to help; and people such as Dr. Hautval and Ludwig Werl did so.

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Elisabeth Abegg "Righteous Gentiles" found ways and means of helping Jews even in the nerve-center of the Nazi regime. Thus, for example, Mrs. Elisabeth Abegg helped a large number of Jews in the city of Berlin during the years 1942-1944. Her home was open to persecuted Jews and whoever received her address found help and succor. Allow me to quote from the testimony of Mr. Yitzhak Shverzantz of Haifa: "I found Mrs. Abegg to be a person whom we could turn to in any distress, and indeed we did so. Besides offering spiritual help and succor, which in itself was so important at that time, Mrs. Abegg also provided material help. Thus, for example, she kept the young girl Eva Fleishmann in her home and found hiding places for others including myself. When Eva Fleishmann was forced to leave Berlin she found a hiding place for her with a family of farmers in East Prussia. Besides finding lodging and hiding places she also saw to it that we received hot meals. I would come to her house to eat a hot meal about twice a week, and I was not the only one to do so, as she also invited children from our group to her house to eat a hot meal. Besides this she provided us with ration cards without which it was totally impossible to obtain food. In addition, she also gave us actual financial assistance. Mrs. Abegg was undoubtedly in contact with other people. This is clear to me from the number of food cards she collected and the sums of money she obtained for us. She also contributed her own funds — and thus for example she financed my escape to Switzerland by selling her own jewelry... Thanks to Mrs. Abegg's efforts the approximately 25 children under Mr. Shverzantz's care were successfully hidden during the most difficult period of the war. It is superfluous to point out to what extent she endangered herself. Suffice it to say that her activities were carried out in Berlin where not only the Gestapo was on the lookout, but even the concierge of her house constituted a threat because of the

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frequent visits of suspicious-looking individuals. Mrs. Abegg and other "Righteous," however, viewed helping the persecuted and the needy as their main obligation. Thus the danger they took upon themselves stemmed from an awareness that it was their duty to act as they did. Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz In her lecture on the rescue of Danish Jewry, Dr. Leni Yahil presented the details of the operation to transfer the 7,200 Jews to Sweden. For some reason, however, she failed to mention an individual who, in my opinion, deserves to be mentioned in this connection, a man who achieved recognition through a deed which was of great importance in the rescue operation. I am referring to Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, the attach6 for shipping affairs in the German legation in Copenhagen. Duckwitz assumed his post in Denmark in 1939, and he continued to serve in this capacity during the occupation. He had no connection with any of the political or military departments. Until he issued the famous warning, Duckwitz had had no direct contact with any Danish Jews, but he was in touch with non-Jewish Danes, and it was known that the items of information he provided on various occasions had proven completely reliable. On September 28, 1943, Duckwitz warned that deportations were due to be carried out within a few days. Although frightening information had previously been received on a number of occasions, this warning was believed and was treated with full gravity because it was received from Duckwitz. Thus it was obvious that a comprehensive rescue operation had to be undertaken at once. There is not the slightest doubt that it was Duckwitz's warning which galvanized all the factors into immediate action, a few days before the deportation was to be implemented. Concerning the significance of Duckwitz's warning, I should like to quote remarks from two sources: the first were made by Prof Aage

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Bertelsen at a reception held in his honor by the World Jewish Congress on March 24, 1971: "I now wish to explain something which also concerns you. You are grateful to the non-Jewish Danes. I wish to say, however, that if there is any justification for the use of the word 'heroism' in this context, it is only applicable to two people, one of whom is the German Dr. Duckwitz, who is entitled to it in everything concerning Danish Jewry. At the time, when I published my book on this subject, I spoke with Dr. Duckwitz, then an ambassador of his country, and what I heard from him was then considered confidential in view of the post he held. It has been ι known, however, since 1943 that it was Duckwitz who several days before the deportation conveyed the news of the danger through a friend of his so that the Jews would be informed ahead of time of what was about to occur. The information was indeed relayed and this time everyone was convinced of the extent of the danger because the information came from Duckwitz. "A few days previously Duckwitz had realized what was about to occur, and he went to Berlin for talks with the Foreign Office in order to prevent the deportation. When he found out that he was too late, he went to Stockholm to talk to the Swedes and ask their advice on what to do when the deportations were carried out. Afterwards he had to operate in the underground. Duckwitz was declared persona non grata and in fact might well have been executed by a firing squad. When I later pointed out the danger he had taken upon himself he replied: 'Everyone should see himself in the situation in which he, too, like his fellow man, might find himself. I do not think that my life is more important than the lives of 7,000 Jews.'" Dr. Leni Yahil, who is an authority on the history of Danish Jewry during the Holocaust, writes in her letter of February 24, 1971: "There is no doubt that Duckwitz played an important part in

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the rescue of the Jews by the Danes. His prior warning about the deportation which was to be implemented two days later enabled the Danish individuals and organizations to warn the Jews ahead of time. The flight and concealment of the great majority of the Jews prevented their seizure on the night of the roundup and opened the way for smuggling them across to Sweden. In the period while the deportation was still being prepared, Duckwitz also attempted to enlist the aid of the Swedish Government for the rescue operation, and this action was also of importance. Just as the entire episode in Denmark was unusual even within the framework of rescue operations (such as in Bulgaria), so Duckwitz's action is unique. We know of no other senior German official who fulfilled a rescue mission of this kind which certainly involved self-imperillment.. The case of Dr. Duckwitz is different from those in which the "Righteous Among the Nations" extended help directly to individuals, and it only proves that rescue was possible in all circumstances when there was initiative and willingness. Oskar Schindler Oskar Schindler arrived in Cracow, Poland in late 1939 and took charge of a factory for the manufacture of kitchen utensils. Until the end of 1942 he employed several dozen Jewish workers who came to the factory from the Cracow Ghetto. From the beginning he was sympathetic toward his Jewish employees, and protected them from the hardships of the ghetto. During Aktions, in fact, they would remain in the factory so as not to be exposed to the danger of deportation. The number of Jewish workers in the factory gradually increased, and by the time the ghetto was liquidated on March 13, 1944, Schindler was employing several hundred Jews. When the remaining Jews of Cracow were sent to the notorious Plaszow camp, Schindler saw to it that his Jewish employees were

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not deported, and he obtained a permit to accommodate them in cabins he built near the factory, which were considered a branch of the Plaszow camp. Those who worked in Schindlers factory were truly privileged. They enjoyed humane living and working conditions and were spared the atrocities of the Plaszow camp. Moreover, even in the few instances when S.S. men from the camp command sent several Jews to Plaszow, Schindler always found a way to rescue them, whether through his connections with the S.S. or by bribery. Indeed, in over four years not one of his employees was taken. The main part of his rescue work, however, began with the approach of the Russians in the summer of 1944, when as a result of the liquidation of the Plaszow camp and its various branches, transport were sent almost daily from Plaszow to Auschwitz, Mauthausen, Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, and other death camps. Schindler obtained a permit to convert his factory into a plant for the manufacture of armaments, move it near his birthplace (the town of Briinnlitz in the Sudetenland), and employ 1,100 Jews. In addition to the approximately 500 Jews who had worked for him in Cracow, Schindler added the names of as many as 700 men from among the Plaszow prisoners to the list of employees — among them the leaders of the Zionist movement — whom he requested on the basis of their professional training as engravers, locksmiths, technicians, and the like, even though in reality they had no connection whatsoever with these professions. Thus 700 men arrived in Briinnlitz via the Gross-Rosen camp. In the course of the liquidation of the Plaszow camp, most of the women were sent to Auschwitz. Schindler managed, through unusual and extraordinary efforts, to do what no one had ever done; he extricated 300 women from Auschwitz — the wives, daughters, and mothers of the men at Briinnlitz. No one can describe the joy and excitement at Briinnlitz when the 300 women arrived there from the place of no return to be united with their families. This appears to be

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the only case during the entire Holocaust period in which 300 women were released from the planet of Auschwitz. Schindlers concern for his 1,100 workers constitutes a separate episode, which I shall not describe here. Not only did he spend his own money to supply the workers with extra food, but he also took care of hundreds of everyday matters, and provided medicine, clothing, and eye-glasses. Schindler had letters forwarded to Poland to places where children were being hidden, and even provided arms in the event that in the course of liquidation of the camp the prisoners would be forced to undergo a "death march" which was tantamount to a death sentence. Schindler was willing to listen to everyone's problems and to try to solve them. The conditions in his factory were completely different from those in the other camps during the fifth year of the war. In fact Schindler did not allow the S.S. command or the camp guards to enter the factor, and he himself was certainly not strict about work productivity. In February 1945 Schindler learned that two railroad cars, with Jewish prisoners from the recently-liquidated camp at Goleshau who had been shunted from camp to camp in the European frost without food or clothing for about two weeks, were at the train station at Zwitau. Without receiving any authorization, he moved the cars to his factory. When the cars, which arrived covered with ice, were soldered open, a dreadful sight was revealed — sixteen frozen corpses and about 100 musselmen, not one of whom weighed more than 35 kilograms. A sort of hospital was established in a special wing of the factory, and a team of doctors began intensive treatment of the wretched survivors, while Schindler's wife Emilia prepared special food from the extra rations allotted by Schindler. The people of Goleshau were treated for weeks, and the majority recovered — despite the wrath of the camp commander who found it intolerable that people who were worthless as workers should obtain treatment. Schindler even paid their

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salaries to the S.S. authorities. The camp commander Leipold ordered the cremation of the frozen corpses. Schindler, however, granted the request of the prisoner Yitzhak Stern, who was one of his close friends, and arranged for a plot to be set aside in the local cemetery and obtained permission for a minyan of prisoners to accompany the dead, with one of the prisoners, Rabbi Levertov, reciting Zidduk ha-Din. Thus we see that Schindler was even anxious to care for the deceased. (The documents on these two railroad cars are in the Yad Vashem Museum. All the stations they passed through on their wanderings are crossed out. The final station, Schindlers factory in Erünnlitz, was written in Schindlers own handwriting.) Schindler promised the Jews that he would remain with t lem until the end of the war, and he kept his word. Only after the S S. guards had left the camp at midnight of May 8, 1945 did he depa t, accompanied by about a dozen Jews. After the war a special phrase was coined: "Schindler Juden" — in reference to the 1,200 Jews who were rescued only thanks to his special care, constant concern, and incessant intervention. Schindler remained in contact with those he rescued throughout the world, and for the past seventeen years he has visited Israel (where 250 of those he rescued live) on the day of liberation. (P.S. It was recently learned that Oskar Schindler passed away in Germany on October 28, 1974. Schindler was buried in Jerusalem at the Latin Cemetery on Mount Zion. Over 400 of those he rescued together with their families came to accompany their benefactor on his final journey.) Paul Grueninger Paul Grueninger served as Chief of Police of St. Gallen, Switzerland. After Austria was annexed to the Third Reich many Jews sought to flee from the violent disturbances and began to seek shelter elsewhere. Orderly emigration was difficult, and time was pressing. Thousands attempted to cross the border into Switzerland, but the Swiss authori-

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ties opposed their entry. As the number of those fleeing increased the Swiss closed the border more hermetically. Grueninger could not reconcile himself to the bureaucratic directives. He knowingly endangered himself by exceeding his jurisdiction as Chief of Police in order to enable many refugees to cross the border and find shelter in Switzerland. There are no exact figures on the number of refugees who crossed into Switzerland thanks to Grueninger's help, but they certainly number at least several hundreds. Grueninger's actions were discovered by the Swiss authorities, who considered him to be a criminal offender for having disobeyed orders by permitting the entry of the refugees into Switzerland. Following an investigation, he was tried for violating his official duties and falsifying official documents, and in accordance with the indictment was found guilty by the District Court in St. Gallen in December 1940. Grueninger was dismissed from his post, and lost his pension. Grueninger did not even seek recognition for his deeds. For many years he lived quietly in St. Gallen, barely supporting himself as an assistant instructor. In fact, most of those who entered Switzerland thanks to his efforts did not even know to whom they owed their rescue. It was only in 1969 that knowledge of his action reached Yad Vashem, and he was granted the title of "Righteous Among the Nations." Moreover, when the Swiss media began to publicize and praise his deeds, the state authorities could not remain indifferent, and thus in 1969 he was awarded official rehabilitation. Paul Grueninger died in 1973 at the age of 82. Aristedes de Sousa Mendes Aristedes de Sousa Mendes served as Portuguese consul in Bordeaux, France. Following the German occupation of northern France, masses of refugees, among many thousands of Jews, fled from the occupied zone to the south. Nearly 10,000 Jews were concentrated in Bordeaux alone, and they were shunted about in the markets, squares, and streets.

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All of them had one desire — to escape to Spain via the Pyrenees, and from there to Portugal. From May 10, 1940, however, the Portuguese Government refused to grant entry visas, and especially not to Jews. Replies to applications were not received in the consulate and there was a general order not to stamp visas. The consul, Aristedes de Sousa Mendes, a lawyer and a devout Catholic (he claimed he was of Marrano descent), was unable to remain indifferent to the refugees' suffering and torment. He admitted many of them — including Rabbi Chaim Kruger of Belgium and his family — to his house, and the entire floor and all the passageways were crowded with the children and women who slept there. Moreover, thousands waited on line in front of his house, in case the edict were rescinded. The consul went out to speak to them and told them that "My government has rejected the refugees' requests for visas, but I cannot let these people die. Many of them are Jews and our constitution states that the religion and political views of a foreign subject shall not constitute grounds for their being refused asylum in Portugal. I have decided to act in the spirit of this principle. I shall give anyone who so desires a visa... Even if I am dismissed from my post I cannot act but as a Christian, faithful to the dictate of my conscience." Thereupon, he sat down to stamp visas for those in front of his home, with his wife, his two children, and Rabbi Kruger helping him. For three full days they worked indefatigably, until he was physically unable to continue. When word of his action reached Lisbon, two officials were sent to bring the consul back to Portugal. De Sousa Mendes packed his belongings and set out in his car. While passing through Bayonne he saw that here, too, the refugees were milling about in front of the Portuguese Consulate. In reply to his question, the local consul told de Sousa Mendes that according to the directives received from Lisbon he was forbidden to grant visas, especially to Jews, and that he was carrying out the instructions of his superiors. Mendes turned to the

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consul and said: "I have not yet been dismissed from my post and I am still your superior." Thereupon he issued instructions to grant the visas, and began to stamp them himself, working at it for a full day. Continuing on his way to Lisbon, Mendes passed the Spanish border town of Hendaye, where he found that the border had been closed by agreement with Portugal. For a moment it appeared that all his efforts had been in vain. Mendes understood that the Spanish authorities expected the refugees to cross the border at this station, and therefore had issued orders to bar their entry, and stationed guards on alert. He therefore instructed the refugees to proceed to a near-by border station, and indeed no instructions forbidding the crossing had been received there. Mendes identified himself as the Portuguese consul, and the refugees were permitted to enter Spain. In Lisbon, Mendes was asked to account for his behavior and bear the consequences. A committee of inquiry investigated the case, and he was dismissed from the foreign service for disobeying orders. His struggle to regain his post did not prove successful, and he also lost his property. He did, however, preserve his human dignity, and the lives of several thousand Jews. Aristedes de Sousa Mendes died in Portugal in 1954. To his dying day he was convinced that the sacrifice he had made was insignificant in comparison to the rescue of the lives of those in distress. The time I was allotted does not permit me to even mention the names of other "Righteous Gentiles," whose deeds must become public knowledge. If I only mentioned a few, I did so merely to demonstrate that in every place and under any circumstances there were possibilities to extend help and rescue. Only the willingness and initiative were lacking. Unfortunately, the number of the "Righteous Among the Nations" was totally out of proportion to the needs of the times, and as a result the number of those rescued was also very small. To those few individuals we owe a moral debt, and the commemoration of their deeds is the least that we are obliged to do.

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THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THE HEROES OF THE NAZI ERA SAMUEL P. OLINER

Some twenty years have passed since Rabbi Harold Schul weis of Temple Beth Abraham of Oakland, California, originally pröposed that a memorial be established in Israel and elsewhere to the many thousands of gentiles who risked their lives during World War II to save Jews from the Nazi horrors. Initially there was an enthusiastic response from the famous and less famous, from all religious denominations, including clergy, laity, social scientists, philosophers and moral educators. All offered help and cooperation. T h e media were glad to spread the word about this worthy project. There was even a broadcast on a national television n e t w o r k by the late C h e t Huntley on Christmas Day, 1962. T o accomplish this task of building a memorial to the non-Jewish heroes, the Institute for the Righteous Acts was established at the Judah Magnes Memorial Museum in Berkeley, California. An advisory board was formed consisting of social scientists, religious leaders and laity. A formal organizational structure was estab-

lished and a research director appointed to supervise the collection of data. The Institute for the Righteous Acts adopted the following major aims: 1. T o study the rescue of Jews by nonJews. 2. T o search out and conduct interviews with the rescuers, probing the motivation for their acts. 3. T o apply the i n f o r m a t i o n thus gained to moral education and character training. By doing that it would enable society to balance the distorted image of man. After all, not all European gentiles or even all German people were SS men or Gestapo or acquiesced in the Holocaust.

Rabbi Schulweis expressed the urgency of the Institute's aim in these words: The Nazi era has taken the heart out of man. Upon the heels of its unspeakable atrocities, a wave of disillusionment and distrust in man has set in. The cynicism and suspicion which attend this moral breakdown threaten all efforts toward spiritual recovery. The Institute was established to h e l p rehabilitate man's traumatized conscience through the focusing of attention upon a significant area of human relations long ignored — the al-

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truistic behavior of the rescuers of Jews in the Nazi era.

Researchers Short of Funds

The Institute appointed a research staff u n d e r Dr. Perry L o n d o n ' s direction, who began developing archives on rescue activity based on a library of relevant literature and mat e r i a l s f r o m a r c h i v e s of t h e Holocaust in the United States, Europe, and Israel. As a result of widespread publicity, letters have been received by the Institute from survivors who were rescued, offering invaluable information on the persons involved in courageous and selfless acts of rescue. Over 200 names of rescuers were obtained. On the basis of the preliminary documentation and other materials. Dr. London prepared a research design for the study of rescue behavior. Interviews with survivors and rescuers in a number of countries were recorded. Though much information about the rescuers has been collected under the direction of Dr. London, including recorded interviews of 27 rescuers and 42 rescued, much more needs to be done to awaken this worthy project which has lain semidormant since 1965 when the researchers ran out of funds. Hence, one of my purposes in writing this article is to make a plea to the readers, especially those readers involved with doing research undertakings. My second purpose is to briefly summarize the tentative stages of information we have about the profile of the savers and what motivated

them to help Jews survive during those dark days of Nazi occupation. Below follows a summary of London's, Coopersmith's, and my own research which is currently in progress. What Motivated The Rescuer«?

Perry London and his associates interviewed 27 rescuers and 42 survivors and proposed three categories that have appeared among these heroes who acted in this pro-social manner: 1) the sense of adventurousness of the rescuers; 2) an intense identification with parental models of moral conduct; and 3) the sense of being socially marginal. About the rescuer who helped victims as an adventurous act, London says the following: Almost all the rescuers interviewed, regardless of w h e r e they came from and of what they did to fall into our sample, seemed to possess a fondness for adveoture. T h e y had not only a desire to help, but also a desire to participate in what were inherently exciting activities. 1

Describing the rescuer who has had a strong identification with a parental model of moral conduct, London says: We observed, first of all, that almost all the rescuers t e n d e d to have very strong identifications with parents, usually more with one p a r e n t than with the other, but net necessarily with the same-sex parent. Se&> o n d , the p a r e n t with whom they had the strong identification tended to be a vcrf strong moralist — not necessarily religious, but holding very firm opinions on moral issues and serving as a model o£ moral conduct. 1

Discussing the rescuers that felt marginal in their community, Lon-

SUPPORT FOR JEWS don says: "The final characteristic we noted often among our rescuers was social marginality. The German, for example, grew up in Prussia, but his mother was from Hesse and spoke a different German 1 dialect than that common in Prussia. He said that he always felt friendless." 3 Profile of a Rescuer

T h e late P r o f e s s o r Stanley Coopersmith, a psychologist who was also briefly associated with the Institute of the Righteous Acts, made a significant start in explaining the motivation of the rescuers and developing a descriptive profile. Below is a p r e s e n t a t i o n of P r o f e s s o r Coopersmith's findings.4 1. The saver was influenced by one parent or senior figure who was committed to and preached ethical, altruistic and moral values. The parent or senior figure may have been otHerwise ill-tempered, grouchy, cool, vigorous or unexpressive, but there was no question in the respondent's mind where the parent stood. They were committed to living by their beliefs. By and large, their parents appeared to be quiet and did not always physically or verbally express their warmth to their children Their offspring reported that they felt accepted and loved though simultaneously their parents were gruff, harsh, rigid and stern. Though religious observance was not necessarily present, the respondents felt that for them religion represented ethics, goodness, concern for others, and the fellowship of men rather than the allegiance to an organized church. Though church attendance was pre-

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sent in the early years, it didn't- appear to have made deep believers out of them. Active Rather T h a n Contemplative

2. Savers were brought up to believe in themselves quite early, were self-initiating and confident in their actions. Their parents believed in them, set up expectations of success and led them to conclude that they were capable of taking direction of their lives. There were frequent indications they persisted in their activities even when success was not rapid, and did not accept defeat. 3. O n e of t h e s t r i k i n g c h a r acteristics of the group was its emphasis on specific people — on the immediate situation rather than the past or the future. These people did not talk about man in the abstract, people, humanity, goodness, ideals, moralities, but rather of people in particular. They did not talk about what had previously happened that could explain the event or what they could do in the future to make a better situation, a happy world, rather they dealt with specific individuals involved, the thoughts and feelings they experienced and the options open to them. They were concerned with people rather than with abstractions about people. They considered the possibility of helping one person rather than saving humanity in the future. 4. T h e savers almost invariably were active doers whose style was to do things rather than talk about them. T h e y were h a r d working adults who had been working stu-

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dents; they had been active in their communities and felt a sense of pleasure and accomplishment. For as long as they could remember they had gained satisfaction in doing rather than from being studious or contemplative or long-suffering. They tended to affirm their principles by their conduct. Participation, involvement, building, working and improving were more in their pattern of conduct than was sustained, abstract contemplation. They were involved with people, rather than interested in humanity and ideas. Their activities as savers — as rescuers — were consistent with their own acdvities. When action was required, they acted rather than deliberated. In their own words, they felt they had to act when their friends were threatened. Given their personalities, they may well have had no choice.

From the beginning they responded to a threat of a specifically known person. Involvement appears to generalize to other persons in similar situations. In the words of one of the respondents, "If I cannot respond to the people near me, how can I hope to do something for those at a distance?" One Person Does Maks A Difference

6. The savers believe that they are persons who do indeed make a difference and part of this stems from their pattern of an active life and part from the appraisal of their own competencies and part from recognition that they have saved lives or have helped save lives. They tend to believe that people should do what they possibly can, that they really don't know what will make a difference and that one should proceed to do Concerns Specific the most and best of which one is Rather capable. T o quote one of them: Than General "How can you be sure that you don't a difference if you don't try?" 5. Interviews revealed that the make ? savers had been initially involved in : hey tend to conclude that "I must their acts by a threat to an individual do what I can and let others do what who was personally known and sig- they can. I cannot leave the situation nificant to them. It appears that as it is»" They do not evade the potenwhile· often people talk of doing tial dangers, or downgrade an activsomething for the "poor", the "op- ity of others but merely conclude that pressed", the rescuers actually have each person must do as much as he been doing things for specific indi- can. "I cannot let it happen; if I save viduals closely known to them. Ini- one life it will have made a difference tially the involvement begins with right there," said bne respondent. "my student," rather than with chil7» T h e savers are not heroes, dren in general; with "my' neigh- saints or spiritual people who are unbors," rather than with Jews in gen- feeling or unconcerned about life. eral; with the shooting of my best They definitely indicated they were friend, rather than with the occupa- frightened at the prospect of helping tion of a country and starvation. others being pursued by the enemy.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS They felt anxious, apprehensive.and fearful. T h e i r decision to assist Others came by way o f working through their anxiety, not by avoid' ing or denying it. They were, in other words, compelled to act according to their principles and felt that the situation of risking their lives for others was a moment of truth and selfconfrontation. Professor Coopersmith adds that the savers appear to be persons with hearty and very human appetites, they enjoy food, comfort, sex, humor and physical activity, They do not deny the flesh, but appear to enjoy the very experience of being alive. Specific Models Had An Influence

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an incident in which their, parents, family friend, public or religious figure performed heroically. T h e s e deeds aroused heroic, impulses in them — at least indicating that such actions are truly possible. In a certain sense, the interviews suggest savers felt inspired and saw themselves copartners with the prime models of heroism. In that sense they were not alone but associated with mother who fought the Nazis, with father who had gone beyond the call of duty to shelter animals, or with a sports hero who significantly carried the day to victory. The models were not vague figures, but trusted individuals who had the courage and capacity to do what had to be done. Specific Victims C h o s e n For Saving

8. T h e savers appear to be persons with deep, intense emotions though their emotions are not,gen10. Another characteristic associerally overt or casually expressed. ated with altruistic acts was the opThe character structure appears to portunity to assist others in rescuing be one of efficiency, work orientation victims. Few people seek danger, and concern for others. In general, particularly high-risk danger, and they are not overly emotional people the savers were not impulsive or but can be touched by the deeds and self-destructive in their actions. They sufferings of others, "I have seen in- responded to a specific request from tense feelings and even tears in the a known individual to hide and proeyes of the savers interviewed when tect the person in flight. they recounted suffering, death and Though not all of these, charterror," says Professor Coopersmith. acteristics were found in all altruistic These persons live close to their feel- individuals, Coopersmith concluded ings and are aware of them, but not that most of the characteristics were overwhelmed by them. They focused found among those who were apon the world of doing as well as the proached for help. The rescued saw world of feeling and thought. them as trustworthy and a potential 9, Savers had a real fantasy «model contributor to a humanitarian cause. of individuals performing heroic Being seen in this way, and holding a deeds. In one case a person referred self-image of a hero, imposed a to h i m s e l f as David c o m b a t i n g moral responsibility as well as anxiety Goliath. Some of the rescuers report about the risks involved to the res-

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cuers. Such opportunities are necessary conditions more likely to come to persons who have previously indicated their trustworthiness and responsiveness to h u m a n i t a r i a n appeals. Victims approached those they trusted or they risked their own lives. We d o not know how many more people would respond to such an opportunity to save others, but since we d a r e risk with only those we personally t r u s t , we're unlikely to f i n d wide-scale public efforts to answer the question about who is a potential contributor to a humanitarian cause. Three Characteristic· of The Rescuer In my interviews 5 with five rescuers and eighteen rescued, including reconstructing the profile of the rescuers who helped me survive the Nazi era in Poland, I found three clusters of characteristics of the rescuer: 1. T h e situational helper — the particular individual helper who has perceived the victim as being unfairly victimized and who at that particular p o i n t of t i m e was in a position/ situation to help the victim because he had the financial or the physical facilities in which to hide the victim. Furthermore, the rescuers knew the victim and came f r o m a similar or same social network. If he/she did not know the victim himself, some of his close relatives and trusted friends knew him/her or the family of the victim and had some pleasant, harm o n i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e m prior to helping. 2. T h e second characteristic, a "deviant personality-type" which is

not unlike that of Professor London's adventurous individual. I call this rescuer deviant because he/she appears to deviate f r o m the norms of his village, town o r community. He/she stands out as someone who violates or doesn't go along with the accepted norms or values. Often the priest who was "uppity" or considered arrogant, or some woman who was considered the "Jew lover" or the liberal or the educated individual could serve as examples. This deviant felt loved and secure in childhood and continued to live in an environment of loving and caring. 3. T h e third is what I call a cultural or moral o r d e r characteristic which is not like Professor London's intense identification with a parental model of moral conduct. I see the i n d i v i d u a l as r e a r e d in a socio· c u l t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t in which norms emphasized a universal sense of justice where people tended to be more humanistic, had high moral standards, and had been brought up in a secular culture which emphasized pro-social ethics. Also, some individuals in this g r o u p subscribed to the Christian tradition of saving "lost souls for Christianity," hence did the rescuing. Need For Further Research As a survivor myself, currently involved with the Institute for the Righteous Acts in Berkeley, and also involved for the last two years with interviewing non-concentration camp survivors who have survived as a result of righteous gentiles' help, I

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urge that we proceed with this im- sociologists and social psychologists, portant task and carry it a few steps feel rather comfortable in studying further towards its completion. I am such behaviors as violence, prejunot so naive as to imagine that this is dice, hatred, racism, but do shy away an easy task. I am also aware that this totally from the study of caring, love, is an ex post facto research. Many justice, altruism, etc. T h e famous informants could be glorifying their Authoritarian Personality study of involvement in the act of rescuing. I the '50s dealt with the prejudiced/ also know much has been d o n e fascist personality. Surely we social throughout the world by a number of scientists should be able to draw a different individuals and institutes in profile of an altruistic personality. gathering information. Books about We must draw profiles of the hero the heroism of some of the hundreds because we need models of heroism of European gentiles during those in this alienated, segmented, narcisdark years have been written. But I sistic, contemporary world. We need believe that much more needs to be to return to the original purpose of done now because many of the res- the study that was first suggested by cuers will be leaving us soon and Rabbi Schulweis and the Institute for those data will go with them. I think the Righteous Acts. what we need to do also is intensify our interviewing procedures in some Study L o v e — systematic way and also do someNot Only Hate thing with the existing data. Professor Douglas K. Hunkeke began along Sorokin, the eminent sociologist this path by working on a study, titled, who was tossed to oblivion by some "A Study of Nazi-Era Rescuers," at because he had become known in the the University of Oregon in 1980k I '50s as "the philosopher of love," has know there are data on the righteous strongly urged sociology to become gentiles in some institutes, including concerned with love because this is Israel, L o n d o n , New York, Los what truly will help us to survive. Angeles, Berkeley, and other places, And I would agree with Professor but I am unaware that these data Sorokin that we need to compile an have been analyzed for purposes of inventory of the heroes of love and constructing motivational explana- justice — an inventory of the rightetions. Specifically we need to probe ous, the altruists, the people that why people risked their lives in per- genuinely dared and cared. And by forming these heroic acts when they increasing the n u m b e r of these knew very Well that the risks were so heroes of truth, justice and love, we Immense —• which could result in could then also increase the "productheir own death along with the death tion of love and justice in the rank of the rescued. and file of the people. 7 In order to balance the image of Finally, in addition to teaching our man, I think this sort of human be- children in elementary and secondhavior needs desperately to be expli- ary schools about the brighter side of cated. Social Scientists, especially humanity, we could also balance the

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content of the Holocaust material currently being taught in some 600 universities and colleges and many elementary and secondary schools. Otherwise, all the current content of horrors in Holocaust courses will leave us with a sense of despair and a sense of a perverted image of man which may be destructive for our future generations. We must talk about and recognize "the saving remnant of heroes" who are still with us and we must use them as models. Those individuals must become as wellknown in the classroom as the Hitlers and other tyrants.

NOTES 1. J. Mecaulay and L. Bcrkowiu (eds.),sMrnoM and Helping Behavior. New York: Academic Prm, 1970, p. 245. 2. Ibid., p. 247. 3. Ibid., p. 274. 4. Alice Coopersmith, the widow of Dr. Stanley Coopersmith, was kind enough to give me his note· and tapes dialing with his research on altruism. 5. My current research in progress, consisting of 320 individual rescuers during the Nazi era, l e w me to believe that the more educated individual! are more likely to perform acts of saving victim from persecution and extermination. 6. Huneke, Douglas K., "A Study of Nazi-Era Rescuers,"'Unpublished, University of' Oregon, 1980. 7. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Explorations in Altrwlk Love and Behavior. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. Alio , see Samuel P. Oliner's discussion on Sorokin entitled, "Sorokin's Contribution to American Sodol· ogy," Nationalities Papers, Vol. IV, No. 2, Fall, 1976.

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THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR AID TO JEWS ("2EGOTA") IN OCCUPIED POLAND

JOSEPH KERMISH

its establishment in December 1942, the Council for Aid to Jews (known by its code-name "Zegota") became one of the most active and dedicated organizations operating in the underground in occupied Poland. In spite of the grave dangers which its workers faced daily, and the frequent crises as a result of the discovery of the Council's clandestine apartments, the arrest of its leaders and workers, and the constant fear of the Gestapo, the Council was able to extend aid to Jewish survivors, and the cooperation between the Polish and Jewish members of the Council was very close. Thousands of Jews were saved from death as a result of the systematic arid ramified work carried on by the Council until the liberation, and its cooperation with the Jewish National Committee and the Bund. The Poles in both camps — those in Poland as well as those in exile — are proud of the achievements of "Zegota," which constituted part of the underground in Poland, and Polish historiography has greatly overestimated its accomplishments. Prof. Madajczyk exaggerated the extent of the aid extended by Poles to Jews in order to prove that the rescue of Jews was a common phenomenon in occupied Poland. Thus he ignored the role played by certain elements of the Polish population in the deportation and liquidation of the Jews. He also exaggerated the amounts of money which "Zegota" allegedly received from the underground authorities thirty-seven million zlotys and an additional fifty thousand dollars. SHORTLY AFTER

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Another writer, Iranek-Osmecki, exaggerated to an even greater extent. "Underground Poland," he wrote, "in spite of its being engaged in a struggle with the conqueror, established a large-scale organization [the reference is to "Zegota"] with its own administration and executive apparatus, which provided the Jews with hiding places, communications by messengers and radio with the West, and also supplied them with arms and money." The same author also asserted that "hundreds of thousands of Poles proved their attitude to the Jews by sincere sacrifice," and concluded that "it would not be exaggerated to state that millions of Poles had to be involved in order to save several tens of thousands of Jews." Even eyewitnesses who were themselves members of "Zegota," such as Ferdynand Arczyriski and Tadeusz Rek, overestimated the number of Jews saved by the organization. Another eyewitness, Witold Bierikowski, a leader of the Catholic underground group, "Front for a Reborn Poland" (Front Odrodzenia Polski—F.O.P.), who was a member of the Provisional Committee of "Zegota" and the permanent representative of the Government's Delegate on the Council, also exaggerated the achievements of "Zlegota." He declared that in his capacity as the person responsible for the execution of extortionists, he personally signed 117 death sentences, of which 89 were carried out, and that a total of 220 people were executed for blackmailing offences according to the statistics in his possession. It is now possible to refute these tendentious claims on the basis not only of Jewish documentation (the reports and surveys of the Jewish National Committee and of the Bund which were sent abroad), but mainly using the records of "Zegota," and it is our duty to do so. The documents preserved in the "Zegota" archives (copies of which are available on microfilm in the Yad Vashem Archives) include the minutes of Council meetings; reports by its representatives in the provincial cities; weekly news bulletins issued by the Council, which include figures and data on the current activities of the Council; and very important documents relating to the pressure which "Zegota" applied in order to convince the Delegate of the Polish Governmentin-Exile to increase its subsidy for relief activities to help the Jews and of the need to launch a decisive struggle (including death sentences) against extortion and informing by Poles, which had become a common phenomenon. Incidentally, considerable significance was

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THE ACTIVITIES OF "ZEGOTA"

attached to the information concerning events in which Jewish underground fighters participated. A number of important documents related to our subject, which were found in the archives of the Jewish National Committee, established by Dr. Adolf (Abraham) and Batya Berman, were published by the former in his work "The Jews on the Aryan Side," (Enziklopedia shel Galuyot, Vol. I, "Warsaw," Jerusalem, 1953). On the other hand, the archives of the Jewish Fighting Organization on the Aryan side of Warsaw (in its bases on 5 Panska Street and 18 Leszno Street) have not been recovered. They included correspondence with official bodies, letters exchanged with prisoners in the concentration and work camps, about 2,000 testimonies by Jews in the Aryan sector, memoirs, etc. It is important to deal initially with the establishment of "Zegota" and the motivation for its creation. During the large-scale deportations, various sectors of the Polish public evinced a desire to help the Jews. The initiative came from Catholic circles and from one of the democratic groups in the underground. In August 1942, at the height of the large-scale deportations from Warsaw, the Catholic organization F.O.P. published a declaration of protest which in harsh terms condemned: "the murder of millions of defenseless human beings which was being conducted amidst hostile general silence. The hangmen are silent, they do not exult in their deeds; England and America do not raise their voices — even the highly influential international Jewry, which was always so sensitive to every evil act directed against it, keeps silent; and the Poles are also silent..."

Under these circumstances, the proclamation continued, Polish Catholics must raise their voice in protest, although their feelings toward the Jews have not changed nor have they ceased to regard the latter as the political, economic, and ideological enemies of Poland. On the other hand, they have also noticed that the Jews hate them more than they do the Germans. Nevertheless they asserted that: "this sensitive consciousness does not exempt us from denouncing the crime. We do not wish to be Pilates... we are unable to do anything against the murderous German action, we are unable to take action to save one person, but we protest from the depths of our hearts, full of compassion, anger and dread. This protest is demanded of us

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JOSEPH KERMISH by the Almighty God who forbade killing. It is demanded by Christian conscience."

One of the principal initiators of the activities to help the Jews was the well-known Catholic writer Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, authoress of historical novels, who was active in the Polish underground and was later interned in Auschwitz (1943-1944). Although she was known for her right-wing, conservative, and religious views, the bitter fate suffered by the Jews made such an impression on her that she deemed it her Christian duty to help them. She set to work with great fervor and to a large extent was responsible for the formation, on September 27, 1942, of the "Konrad Zegota Committee," a code name for the Provisional Committee for Aid to Jews. Two others who played a leading role on the Committee were Wanda Krahelska-Filipowicz ("Alinka"), a Democrat, wife of the former Polish Ambassador to Washington, and the lawyer Jozef Barski, a Catholic and conservative, who prior to the war had not been considered a friend of the Jews. He also underwent a crisis of conscience as a result of the annihilation of the Jews and personally endangered his life to save Jews. The Provisional Committee conducted its operations on a very limited scale, as it lacked broad public support. It received a very small subsidy — practically a token sum — of 50,000 zlotys per month from the Delegate of the Government-in-Exile. The Committee assumed responsibility for 180 Jews in hiding (mostly children), 90 of whom were in Warsaw. Aid was extended to a dozen people in Cracow, and three children were brought from there to Warsaw. The first meetings of the Committee for Aid to Jews were held in October 1942. One of the subjects discussed was the role of the Jewish representatives in the relief organization. The Committee did not agree that representatives of the Jewish National Committee and the Bund should have the same rights on the Provisional Committee as the representatives of the Polish organizations — F.O.P., Democratic Party (a progressive party of radical Polish intelligentsia and small groups of bourgeoisie), Peasants' Party and the right-wing Freedom Equality Independence (Wolnosc Rownosc Niepodleglosc — W.R.N.) faction of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.). The representatives of the Jewish Coordinating Committee (made up of members of the Jewish National Committee and the Bund), however, believed that the relief agency must represent the entire population, Poles and Jews

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THE ACTIVITIES OF "ZEGOTA"

alike. The firm stand taken on this issue by the representatives of the Jewish underground — "Berezowski" (Dr. Leon Feiner of the Bund) and "Borowski" (Dr. Adolf Berman of the Jewish National Committee) — as well as the lack of financial means to conduct rescue activities, led to the dissolution of the Provisional Committee. At the same time, a plan was drawn up for the creation of a Council which would have the broadest possible public support. On December 4, 1942, a clandestine Council for Aid to Jews — the "Zegota" Council — was established by representatives of the Polish parties operating in the underground — socialists, peasants, democrats, and Catholics, as well as delegates of the Jewish Coordinating Committee. Its composition was as follows: Chairman — Julian Grobelny ("Trojan"), a veteran worker of the P.P.S. in Lodz; Vice-Chairman — Tadeusz Rek ("Rozycki"), editor of the underground organ of the Struggle for Victory Party (Przez walke do zwy· ciestwa) from July 1942, and one of the outstanding leaders of the Peasants' Party; the lawyer Leon Feiner ("Mikolaj Berezowski"), who had won fame as a defence attorney at political trials, one of the leaders of the left wing of the Bund, a former prisoner in the BerezaKartuska camp, a brave and energetic person, who had a distinctly "Polish" appearance; Secretary-General — Dr. Adolf Berman ("Adam Borowski"), who since October 1942 had been a member of the Presidium of the Jewish National Committee and served as the Director of "Centos" (Orphans' Aid Union) in the ghetto until the dissolution of the organizations caring for Jewish children; Treasurer—Ferdynand Arcynski ("Marek Lukowski"), an active member of the Democratic Party who did a great deal to help rescue Jews; Members of the Council — the engineer Emilia Hizowa ("Barbara"), a Democratic Party activist, and Witold Biehkowski ("Jan Kalski"), a Catholic publicist and F.O.P. activist, who represented the Government Delegate. Another person who took part in the initial activities of the Council was Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a young Catholic, who had been imprisoned in Auschwitz from September 1940 to April 1941. Bartoszewski was a member of the Information and Propaganda Bureau of the armed combat organization Z.W.Z. which eventually became the

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Home Army {Armia Krajowa — A.K.) and was one of the organizers of the Jewish Section in the International Affairs Department of the Office of the Government Delegate. The Catholic movement, however, only participated in the work of the Council for a brief period. The doubts and reservations within the movement concerning relief activities for the Jews became evident later on, and in July 1943, the F.O.P. withdrew from the Council. On the other hand, Piotr Gajewski, a representative of the left wing of the Polish socialists, which at that time were already known as the R.P.P.S. — Polish Workers' Socialist Party, joined the Council toward the end of 1944. It should be noted that the Labor Party (Stronnictwo Pracy) and the Syndicalists were not represented on the Council. The two most active workers in "Zegota" were the General Secretary and the Treasurer. They employed two secretaries, the lawyer Dr. Paulina Hauzmann ("Alicja"), and Janina Wasowicz ("Ewa"), both of whom were members of the Democratic Party. In addition, tens of dedicated and loyal supporters of the Polish underground took part in the Council's various activities. Many Polish underground activists in the provincial towns cooperated with the Council in the operations to rescue Jews. The Council had at its disposal six secret apartments in which it conducted its office work and held meetings. From December 1942 to January 1945, the Council held 61 plenary sessions, over 100 meetings of the Presidium, more than 30 meetings of the Control Committee, and a large number of meetings of the Council's special departments and committees. To ensure secrecy, the Council changed its residence from time to time. It also had secret mailboxes, as well as hiding-places for the storage of documents. During the initial months of its existence, the Council extended aid only to Jews living in the Aryan quarter and the ghetto, but it later extended the scope of its activities. The Council had two basic goals in expanding its work — material aid to Jews living on the Aryan side, and aid in "legalization," i.e. obtaining Aryan documents for the Jews in hiding. The large majority of the Jews on the Aryan side were unable to earn a living because they had a distinctly Jewish appearance, did not know Polish well enough, were afraid of extortionists, etc. Only a small number of Jews had substantial material resources, but they

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were usually soon depleted due to the numerous expenses involved in living in hiding and the rising prices. The majority of the Jews who fled to the Aryan side during the days of the large-scale deportations were poor people, members of the working intelligentsia, laborers, etc. The many acts of blackmail economically ruined hundreds of people and were it not for the relief afforded by the Council they would have died of hunger. Indeed all those who approached the Council for aid were helped — either directly or through the organizations represented on "Zegota." The average subsidy was 500 zlotys per person per month. It was by no means a large sum, nor could it even assure a minimal existence, but in any event it did help those in need. In special cases, such as impoverishment due to extortion, or if public or cultural leaders were involved, larger grants were provided. There were also instances, however, in which the Council, plagued by financial difficulties due to the tremendous increase in the number of the needy, was compelled to reduce the average monthly grants to 300400 zlotys per person. During the initial stages of its work, the Council received funds for its relief activities only from the Delegation of the Polish Government in London. Due to the pressure and urgent demands of the Council, the Delegation raised its monthly remittance from 50,000 to 150,000 zlotys, and later to 300,000-400,000 zlotys and more. Yet even this amount was merely a drop in the bucket. The Council could not expand the scope of its activities until July 1943 when the Jewish organizations — the Jewish National Committee and the Bund — began to receive relief funds sent directly from abroad. (In spite of the many secret messages, warnings, and appeals to the Jewish organizations abroad, no aid was sent for many months and the first payments from abroad arrived only in June 1943). From that time on, the Coordinating Committee of the Jewish National Committee and the Bund gave the Council 100,000 zlotys per month for its relief activities, and eventually significantly increased this amount. (In its memorandum of September 5, 1943, the Council reported that the Coordinating Committee had increased its monthly grant from 100,000 to 150,000 zlotys.) Both the Jewish National Committee and the Bund conducted their own large-scale relief operations. It should be noted that during the period of the most intensive activities (in May 1944), the Jewish Na-

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tional Committee, the largest Jewish relief organization in Warsaw, had over 100 cells which cared for 5,000 Jews. Incidentally, it is estimated that the number of Jews living on the Aryan side of the capital city in 1944 was at least 15,000, and if we take into account the Jews living in the environs of the city, the total reached 20,000. The Committee also dealt with relief activity for the Jews in camps in the provincial areas and undertook to rescue the more important leaders who were interned in the camps. Until funds were received from abroad, the Jewish organizations received grants from the Council for their relief activities, but from June 1943, they allocated grants to the Council out of their own funds. After the liquidation of the ghetto, in the latter half of 1943 and in 1944, when the number of those requiring assistance increased, the Council's budget was again greatly augmented. In addition, the Council, like other Jewish bodies, extended aid to Jews in the rural areas (see below). The task of preparing "Aryan" documents for Jews was also very important. During the initial phase of its activities, the Council was aided by "legalization cells" of the underground organizations, which employed about ten people for this purpose. The method used, however, proved to be inefficient and consequently, upon the initiative of Arczynski and under his supervision, the Council organized a separate cell, which was headed by Leon Weiss ("Leon") and which employed six "professionals." They produced thousands of birth certificates, baptismal documents, marriage certificates, pre-war identity cards, identity cards (Kennkarten) issued by the occupation authorities, residence permits, a variety of work permits, etc. For certain very important cases, the Council used government documents issued by the German authorities and even S.S. and Gestapo certificates. The workmanship on these documents was on a very high level. The Secretariat of the Council collected thousands of orders from all the Polish and Jewish organizations and the relief cells connected with the Council. The staff of the Legalization Office were constantly in danger. They always worked with their weapons nearby ready for use, and more than one of them fell at his post. The head of the Council's documents "factory" was a former district governor (starosta) of one of the cities in Poland, who had professional experience in this field. He

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worked diligently and loyally until he fell into the hands of the Gestapo and was shot. The Council distributed thousands of Aryan documents free of charge to Jews in Warsaw and the vicinity; thousands were sent to the provincial towns and camps as well as to Jews in hiding in other cities. It should be noted that the Jewish National Committee, besides sending substantial sums of money to the secret committees active in the Poniatowa and Trawniki concentration camps, smuggled — together with "Zegota" — scores of sets of "Aryan" papers, stamps (to fill out the documents properly), cameras, crucifixes, Catholic medallions, prayer books, and New Testaments into these camps in order to help fleeing Jews conceal their identity. The Council was particularly concerned about the plight of Jewish children, toward whom the Germans were especially cruel. On January 30, 1943, the Council urged the Delegate to take the thousands of Jewish children who had survived the previous liquidation operations out of the ghetto, but the appeal remained unanswered. While the ghetto was still in existence, many Jewish parents tried to save their children by sending them over to the Aryan side. The number of youngsters involved reached sizeable proportions during the first Aktion and especially immediately afterwards — during the latter half of 1942 and the beginning of 1943. A number of parents were able to get their children to the Aryan sector by paying large sums of money to Polish smugglers, policemen, and the like. Others turned to the Polish underground, especially through its leaders, who were connected with the Social Aid Department of the Warsaw Municipality, the Child Care Section of the Central Council for Social Aid as well as to Catholic organizations which had access to the Child Care Councils of the Church, monasteries, etc. In this way, hundreds of Jewish children were smuggled out of the ghetto to the Aryan side. The function of "Zegota's" special department for children, established in the wake of a proposal made by Dr. Berman at a meeting held on July 10,1943, was first of all to care for orphaned and abandoned children and place them in institutions or with families. Irena Sandlerowa ("Jolanta"), an excellent underground leader and one of the members of the staff of the Social Aid Department of the Municipality, was in charge of this special department. Under her professional and vigorous direction, and with the assistance of a bevy of other female

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workers, the Council's projects for children developed successfully in spite of the many obstacles. Due to the bold and exemplary assistance rendered by the -'thor Jan Dobraczyriski, Director of the Child Care Section in the Social Aid Department of the Warsaw Municipality, the Jewish children were secretly placed in Polish orphanages and monasteries. According to information gathered by the department, there were about 600 Jewish children in various institutions in Warsaw and its environs by the end of 1943, among them 53 children in municipal establishments, 22 in institutions of the Polish relief organization — Central Council for Social Aid (Rada Glowna Opiekuncza — R.G.O.) — and over 500 in public and ecclesiastical institutions. In addition, there were many children scattered in other institutions throughout the country. The department's report stated, for example, that in September 1943 it had dealt with the placement of 58 children. On December 23, 1944, the Council applied to the Delegate with regard to granting aid to hostels in which there were 100 Jewish children. The Council set up a separate department headed by Stefan Sendlak, a P.P.S. leader, to handle the relief operation in the provinces. The department worked together with the Jewish National Committee, which was in close touch with the Jews in a number of camps. It also sent special couriers in order to maintain contact with Lodz, to which access was extremely difficult, and with other towns such as Radom, Kielce, Piotrkow, etc. from whence they were able to reach the work camps (in Czestochowa, Radom, Piotrkow, Skarzysko, Starachowice near Kielce, and Plaszow near Cracow) and bring a certain amount of aid to the Jewish inmates. One of the most active messengers in this area was the poet and journalist Tadeusz Sarnecki (his pen-name was Jan Wajdelota) who was connected with the Democratic Party. He and his wife Ewa served as contacts with the Jews of the ghettos and concentration camps in the vicinity of Radom and Lublin. The extension of activities throughout Poland, however, encountered serious difficulties. It was only in April 1943, that upon the initiative of the Central Council, a district council was established for the city and region of Cracow. The Council in Cracow gave aid to 91 Jews — including 79 wards of the W.R.N., three of the Popular Peasant Party, two of the Democratic Party and seven of the Delega-

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tion — and also kept in touch by messenger with a number of ghettos and camps in the area. The Council in that city received a monthly subsidy of tens of thousands of zlotys. The allocation for May 1943 was 30,000 zlotys (individual subsidies were 400 zlotys and in June they received 50,000 zlotys, at a time when 320,000 zlotys were required to cover relief needs and rescue the Jewish survivors in the city of Cracow. In September 1943, a district council was formed in Lwow and it was allotted 60,000 zlotys, but the grant did not reach its destination because the female courier was arrested. There was also a relief committee in Zamosc, which at first helped ten Jews in hiding, but later extended relief to 100 individuals. At the beginning of 1943, there were 193 children in hiding in the Zamosc-Lublin district but at the end of that year the number of those requiring assistance had risen to 220. The cooperation given in the Lublin area by the socialist combat organization Socjalistyczna Organizacja Bojowa (S.O.B.) in the Lublin area, within whose ranks quite a few Jews hid, is noteworthy. The Council established a special medical department in order to ensure that the hideouts of the Jews who fell ill would not be detected. Reliable doctors, who were fully acquainted with the nature of this clandestine operation, visited and treated the patients. Prior to entering the lodgings where the Jewish patients were hiding, the doctors used prearranged passwords to prove that they were not strangers, but members of the underground. The problem of housing was most difficult due to the German terror, and the fact that anyone caught concealing Jews was sentenced to death. Moreover, there were many cases of extortion and blackmail. The exorbitant rents also impeded a solution of the housing problem. Consequently, the Council had to devote much time and extensive means to alleviate the situation, and it even set up a special department for this purpose. Nevertheless, the aid in this respect was insignificant. The purchase of apartments was too expensive and did not always solve the problem, since if the dwelling were discovered by blackmailers it could no longer be used. Thus those who sought to hide themselves or others were compelled to operate on their own, with the help of personal acquaintances or friends, in order to overcome these difficulties.

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The Propaganda Department of the Council, which had been set up in order to influence the public to extend aid to Jews, issued four leaflets during 1943, three of which were addressed to the Polish population (25,000 copies). The fourth was published in German (8,000 copies), under the pretense that it was issued by a clandestine German organization. These leaflets were distributed among the houses, posted on walls in Warsaw and provincial towns, and sent to various offices. In addition, the Council published underground bulletins on what was happening to the Jews and about Jewish acts of resistance — information it reprinted from journals published by the Socialists and the Democrats. The Council, it should be noted, also did a great deal to distribute underground publications on Jewish subjects — for propaganda purposes and to help Jewish relief operations. According to the minutes of the Council meeting of November 27, 1943, all 4,000 copies of the now-renowned bulletin, "Before the Eyes of the World" (Na oczach swiata), which deals with the martyrology and armed struggle of Warsaw Jewry and was published by the Armia Krajowa, were distributed. As a precautionary measure, the place and date of publication were listed as "ZamoSc 1932." The Catholic authoress Maria Kann, wrote and assembled the material, which included a series of documents and reports by Polish and Jewish eyewitnesses and observers, and it had a great effect on Polish readers. Special mention should be made of the evaluation of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in the chapter "In the Steps of Bar Kochba." Nonetheless, Jewish underground leaders who were on the Aryan side—Dr. Emmanuel Ringelblum, Yitzhak Zukerman ("Antek"), and Dr. Adolf Berman — saw fit to convey their critical comments on a number of inaccuracies which appeared in the bulletin regarding the history of the Jewish people, as well as general tendencies which they considered fallacious, to the "Zegota" Council and the Government Delegation. In May 1944, the Coordinating Committee published a frightening booklet entitled "A Year in Treblinka," written by Yankel Wiernik, one of the participants in the Treblinka uprising. This publication (3,000 copies) was also circulated with the help of "Zegota" and was smuggled abroad. The Propaganda Department of "Zegota" also circulated a small book of poems (22 pages) by Polish and Jewish poets on the strug-

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gle and destruction of Polish Jewry, which was published by the Jewish National Committee in the early months of 1944. This small collection of poems, made up of ten poems and one elegy, "Lament After the Death of Martyrs," was sent to Batya and Dr. Berman through the channels of the Jewish and Polish resistance, with the help of the Polish author of Jewish origin Adolf Rudnicki. Five thousands copies were printed in the printing works of the Polish Democratic Party with the aid of "Marek" Arczynski, the Treasurer of "£egota." (According to the minutes of the meeting of November 27, 1942, all the copies were distributed.) The Council was powerless in the face of the plague of blackmailing, which became a serious menace for all the Jews in hiding on the Aryan side, due to the refusal of the underground leaders to help in the struggle. Following the liquidation operations in the ghetto, the scourge of blackmail and extortion became even more severe. Large gangs of blackmailers called Schmalzowniki, as well as informers, roamed through Warsaw and its environs and lay in wait for Jews concealed on the Aryan side, as well as for those who provided them with shelter. Polish policemen who were members of the extremist anti-Semitic organizations joined these gangs, as did Polish agents of the Gestapo and the Kripo, smugglers, speculators, and various criminal underworld types. The victims were ruthlessly stripped of their belongings and robbed of their cash, jewellery, and clothes. At best, the Jews would lose their dwellings and be compelled to flee for their lives; more than once the victims would return to the ghetto, as long as it existed, and die there. The most dangerous blackmailers and informers were the members of the Polish anti-Semitic fascist organizations such as Szaniec (The Wall) and Miecz i Plug (Sword and Plough), who did their despicable work for its own sake, without any remuneration. The Gestapo and Kripo offered cash rewards for any Jew caught hiding. Hardly a day passed without Jews being blackmailed and, in many cases, being forced to relinquish their last possessions. It often happened that individuals or families were victimized by extortionists time after time and very often these Jews either committed suicide or were killed by the Germans after being handed over by the blackmailers.

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The "£egota" Council repeatedly appealed to the government representatives to undertake a systematic and rapid campaign against the blackmailers (see, for example, the letters of the Council to the Government Delegate dated the end of March and April 6, 1943), and called upon them to publicly announce that anyone caught engaging in blackmail would be sentenced to death. Indeed, official announcements of this sort were published several times in the underground press. The Command in Charge of Civilian Struggle, (Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej — K.W.C.) which was under the control of the Government Delegate, published an announcement on March 18, 1943 condemning those who blackmailed Jews and/or Poles who aided Jews. A strongly-worded article also appeared in the March 1943 issue of Prawda, the journal of the Catholic Front, inveighing against blackmailing. Similar articles were published in the official underground organ Rzeczpospolita Polska (March 6, 1943); the journal of the W.R.N. (March 21, 1943); the publication of the Democrats, Glos Demokracji (September 4, 1943); and in Nowa Droga (February 7, 1944). In addition, the Council itself issued leaflets from time to time censuring acts of blackmail and robbery and calling upon the public to help the Jews against the extortionists. The pressure of the Council and Jewish organizations in regard to this issue was so strong that, in August and September of 1943, two proclamations appeared one after the other signed by the "Polish Independence Organizations," (which were actually bodies represented on "£egota,") concerning the blackmail operations and the need to aid the Jews. Both manifestos were circulated in large numbers among all sectors of the Polish population. Nonetheless, the warnings issued by official circles in March 1943 and on January 31, 1944, which stated that acts of extortion against Jews were punishable crimes in accordance with the laws of the Polish Republic and that the punishment for extortion would in certain cases be carried out on the spot, remained on paper alone. The execution of death sentences against the blackmailers responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Jews and notices posted on walls as well as in the underground press, would certainly have made an impression, but this was never done. On April 6, 1943, in view of the tremendous increase in the cases of blackmail, the Council appealed to the Delegate to least pub-

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licize — as widely as possible by street posters — a number of fictitious death sentences, but this request also went unanswered. On July 12, 1943, the Council asked the Government Delegation to provide a list of the cases of blackmail which were referred to the Special Tribunal (the number of verdicts handed down and how many had been executed). On August 9, 1943, the Council received a reply that only eight such cases had been submitted to the Tribunal. On September 4, 1943, Witold Bienkowski ("Wencki"), the representative of the Government Delegate on "£egota," informed the Council of the execution of Boris Pilnik, the leader of a blackmail gang who had previously been sentenced to death by the underground, and the confiscation of important material found in his possession. It should also be noted that the Polish underground also executed Jacek Gonczarek, a Kripo agent and blackmailer. Several death sentences passed against blackmailers and informers were announced in November 1943. Several other verdicts were handed down and executed in 1944 "for the crime of collaboration with the conqueror in the persecution of Polish citizens of Jewish origin." (The execution of a death sentence handed down by the Special Civilian Tribunal against a Pole convicted of killing two Jews was announced on March 9,1944.) It should be noted that there were very few blackmailers and informers who persecuted Jews among the thousands of collaborators executed by the Polish underground. The Council, as well as the representatives of the Jewish resistance movement, more than once expressed their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, and they were especially perturbed because these sentences were not announced on street posters, but only in the underground press. The failure to punish the extortionists led to more wild behavior on their part and an increase in the scope of their criminal activities. Following the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt and the bloody destruction of the ghetto, the situation on the Aryan side deteriorated noticeably. As more and more Jews made their way to the Aryan sector, the Gestapo and Kripo sent squads of plainclothesmen to the streets to hunt down the Jews and those who gave them refuge. A new wave of anti-Semitism swept the city and the plague of blackmail became much worse. This atmosphere was reinforced by the political changes which took place in the Polish underground. General Rowecki ("Grot"), commander of the underground Z.W.Z., the combat organ-

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ization that united military groups and organizations, was arrested by the Gestapo at the end of June 1943 and was replaced by General Bor-Komorowski. The Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, was killed in a plane crash over Gibraltar under mysterious circumstances on July 5, 1943. He was succeeded as Prime Minister by Stanislaw Mikotajczyk, the leader of the Peasant Party, and as Chief of Staff by General Sosnkowski. This development immediately had strong repercussions in the underground movement in Poland. The Z.W.Z., which had became the Home Army (A.K.), was under the influence of the Sanacja political bloc and anti-Soviet political elements. The ranks of the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne — N.S.Z.), which had been founded at the end of 1942, began to swell. It was the adherents of the National Radical Camp (Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny — O.N.R.), the "Falanga" group, and other organizations who sowed the seeds of blatant Nazism in Poland. There was little difficulty in disseminating propaganda against Jews and Communists in this poisoned atmosphere, under the patronage of the Nazi authorities. Under these conditions, the Catholic "Front for Polish Rebirth" withdrew from "Zegota." It should be noted that the attitude of the Government Delegate, Jankowski, a leader of the Labor Party, toward "Zegota" was, according to its chairman, generally restrained, and increasingly "cool" according to the minutes of the Council meeting of November 27, 1943. The Council, however, did not cease to demand redress from the Delegate. In its letter of September 9, 1943 to Jankowski, the Council praised the contributions of the Jewish organizations in "Zegota" — initially 100,000 zlotys a month and subsequently 150,000 zlotys a month. The Council therefore requested that the budget be increased to one million zlotys, the amount required to cover its most minimal needs. During interviews with the Delegate, Council representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the inadequate allocations, which made it impossible to distribute essential relief, even to those who were already under the Council's care. They also warned of the hostility vis-ä-vis the activities to aid Jews. Dr. Berman, declared during an interview on October 28, 1943 that:

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THE ACTIVITIES OF "ZEGOTA" "The Germans murdered three million Jews and the Council is giving its help to no more than 1,000-1,500 people. It is a drop in the ocean."

During the same interview, Tadeusz Rek, the Deputy Chairman of the Council, declared that the Council's budget made it impossible to meet the great and growing needs and that the aid given by the Council had shrunk to 300-350 zlotys per individual per month. In a letter written to the Delegate on the same day, the Council emphasized the fact that due to the devaluation of the currency and the increases in the prices of the essential food commodities, the relief grants given to the needy were in effect merely symbolic. "It should be objectively stated," Rek asserted bitingly at that interview, "that the overwhelming majority of Polish society are hostile toward those extending relief [to the Jews]." The Council representatives insisted that the Delegate should create a more favorable atmosphere, vis-ä-vis this operation through the underground press and by means of propaganda. No response was made to these demands. The Delegate exploited the occasions when the Council representatives came to see him to express his surprise at "the lack of response" by world Jewry to the Holocaust. The first time the Delegate made such a statement, was on April 28, 1943, in a conversation with "Zegota" representatives during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. He subsequently repeated this allegations at his meetings with them on October 28, 1943, and in April 1944. It must be pointed out that the Jewish survivors were preoccupied with the question of why the great democracies were not prepared to exert the slightest effort to save the remnants of the Jewish people. That was the reason that Szmul Zygielbojm, the Bund leader, committed suicide in London during the Warsaw Ghetto revolt. His intention was to protest against the indifference of the Allies toward the destruction of the Jewish people, and his act made a deep impression on the Jewish survivors in occupied Poland. The Je\vish National Committee gave appropriate expression to these sentiments in its message to Jewish organizations abroad toward the end of 1943: "Vengeance for the blood of three million Jews will be sought not only from the Hitlerite beasts of prey but also from those indifferent and reluctant circles who, apart from hollow words, did nothing to

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JOSEPH KERMISH save a people condemned to extermination by the Hitlerite assassins. No one among us will forgive or forget this."

Unfortunately, the repeated demands of the Council to the Government Delegate regarding the need to increase the monthly subsidy were to no avail. Under these circumstances, the Council turned directly to the Government-in-Exile in London in February 1943 and demanded that it raise its monthly allocation to six to eight million zlotys, "if the relief project is to be something concrete and not a fiction." The appeal did not elicit any response. On May 12, 1943, the Council appealed by cable to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government-in-Exile, emphasizing that they had not received a reply to their previous appeal to the government. This appeal, however, was also to no avail. The Polish Government-in-Exile played an important role in establishing the policy which determined and influenced the events in Poland, and therefore should be considered responsible for those actions of the underground which affected the fate of the Jews in occupied Poland. A Polish source (A. Wylezynska) declared: "The Polish Government in London failed to stand by its Jewish citizens here [in Poland], although it initiated relief for Jewish refugees who had fled from France to Switzerland."

We know that the Council received the following remittances from the Government Delegation in 1943: January—150,000 zlotys; February—300,000 zlotys; March—250,000 zlotys; April-October (at a rate of 400,000 zlotys per month) — 2,800,000 zlotys. Following the outbreak of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, the Council expanded the scope of its activities in order to aid additional Jewish survivors. After making urgent demands to the Government Delegation, the Council received an additional one-time allocation of 500,000 zlotys. This grant enabled the Jewish organizations to expand their activities. In its memorandum of September 9, 1943 to the Delegate, the Council demanded a minimum subsidy of one million zlotys a month, but it received only 1,500,000 zlotys for the months of November and December. Starting in June 1943, the Council also received 150,000 zlotys a month on behalf of the provincial towns and cities (Cracow, Lwow, Siedlce, Ostrowiec, etc.) The total sum received by the Council during 1943 was 6,550,000 zlotys. In addition, 600,000 zlotys were received from the representatives of the

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Jewish Coordinating Committee, and in November 1943 the Delegate gave the Council the one-time sum of $25,000 that had come from the International Organization of Polish Jews in the United States and was earmarked for Jews hiding in the Aryan sector. (The Council gave $2,000 out of this sum to Polish farmers who had been banished from the Lublin District.) With these allocations, the Council was able to spend the peak sum of two million zlotys during the month of November 1943 for relief and social welfare. During the period of January-July 1944, the Council was given one million zlotys per month by the Government Delegation. An additional million zlotys was received in April 1944 (500,000 from the Delegate and 500,000 from the Jewish Coordinating Committee). Prior to the outbreak of the Warsaw revolt on August 1, 1944 and at the end of 1944, the Council received two million zlotys a month. The Council deeply sympathized with the plight of the Jewish underground groups that lacked financial support. In its December 15, 1944 memorandum to the Delegate, the Council noted that it had received no assistance from the Jewish Coordinating Committee for the past six months, and therefore asked the Delegate to double the monthly budget (to four million zlotys), since the value of the zloty had dropped in comparison with the period prior to the outbreak of the revolt. It also requested a one-time grant that had been promised by the Delegate as early as July 1944. The Jewish underground organizations suffered a financial crisis at the beginning of 1944. The remittances sent from abroad did not reach their destination. Having no alternative, the Jewish National Committee was forced to reduce its grants and to limit the scope of its relief activities. People faced starvation, the loss of their dwellings, and even death. The massive Soviet offensive in the spring of 1944 and the entry of Soviet forces into areas which had formerly belonged to Poland brought about a change in the course of the war. The survivors of the Holocaust pinned their hopes on the victories of the Soviet armies. Yet during this period, the Gestapo persistently searched for Jews in hiding on the Aryan side. (Thus, in April 1944, it surrounded a large part of the Zoliborz quarter in which many Jews were concealed; 50 Jews were apprehended and shot.) A reliable Jewish source described the situation in those days:

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"In the Aryan quarters, the fear of death persisted day and night. People lived constantly under the shadow of the Gestapo beast of prey, the S.S. and the gendarmerie, the Blue Police, the blackmailers and informers... Not a single day passed without scores of people in Warsaw being killed due to these saboteurs."

The front-lines were getting closer. The decisive battles between the Soviet Union and Germany and the growing influence of the Polish Communists led to the increase of political tension in the Polish underground and considerable nervousness among Government Delegation circles and in the Home Army. The influence of the extreme nationalists mounted daily in these circles. A rapprochement took place between the Sanacja and Endecja parties and such openly antiSemitic factions as the National Radicals. The gangs of the National Armed Forces officially joined the Home Army in March 1944 and were received warmly by General Bor-Komorowski. This fact angered the Democratic underground movement and aroused the fears of the Jewish survivors. (Moderate democratic elements in the A.K., such as the "New Paths" group, also rebelled against his gesture.) In addition, the Jewish organizations had learned that in the spring of 1944, Roman Knoll, the Director of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Government Delegation (who had formerly served as Polish Minister in Berlin), had, in an official Delegation journal, advanced the assumption that after the war there would still be "too many Jews" left and that it would be necessary to set up a special "closed area" for them in the East. According to Knoll: "The prevailing mood throughout the country is one which leaves no openings for the return of the Jews, in however small numbers, to their previous businesses and workshops. The non-Jewish population has taken the place of the Jews in the cities and towns and their return would be regarded not as restitution but as an invasion to be resisted by physical force."

Moreover, the Delegation rejected the proposal submitted by Jewish organizations to the National Minorities Department of the Government Delegation regarding the exchange of civilians—mainly Jews—for German civilians living in the Allied occupied areas of Poland. According to their reply: "Polish citizens of Jewish nationality do not constitute a separate community with special prerogatives on whose behalf it will be pos-

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THE ACTIVITIES OF "ZEGOTA" sible to conduct talks in the international sector, other than those concerning Polish citizens of Polish nationality."

This was written at a time when the Germans were engaged in wiping out the remnants of Polish Jewry! Reports about Jewish soldiers "deserting" the Polish Army commanded by General Anders in the Middle East, Palestine, and Great Britain were used by official circles as a pretext for launching an overt anti-Semitic campaign. It was clear to the Jewish underground organizations that these "desertions" had been provoked by the antiSemitism rife in General Anders' army. The National Minorities Department of the Delegation endeavored to persuade the Jewish Coordinating Committee to publish a declaration condemning the deserters, but the Committee immediately rejected the proposal out of hand. A proposal by the Government Delegation that the Jewish organizations should join the Council of National Unity, which was to be a sort of substitute clandestine parliament alongside the Governmei t Delegation, was similarly turned down. This policy still further cooled the relations between the Delegate and the Jewish underground movement, as well as between the former and the "Zegota" Council. The strained relations reached a climax when a shocking report was received that a unit of the Jewish Fighting Organization in a village near Koniecpol in the Czestochowa district had been attacked by a band of the N.S.Z. or the A.K. under the command of "Eagle." Eleven of the 24-man unit were murdered. The Coordinating Committee and the Jewish Fighting Organization protested to all the organizations in the Polish underground movement. "Zegota" immediately sent a letter to the Government Delegate (May 1944) in which it expressed its anger at the murder of the Jewish fighters, as well as at the murder of 200 Jews who had been in hiding in the area of Czestochowa, Kadom, and Kielce. It should be noted that N.S.Z. bands also killed Polish Democratic activists linked with the A.K., particularly those of Jewish origin. Considerable resentment was aroused in "Zegota" circles and among the members of the Jewish organizations by the fact that anti-Semitic attacks were frequently featured prominently in official publications of the Government Delegation. This situation motivated the Council to request another meeting with the Government Delegate, which took

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place on July 17, 1944. The representatives of the Council for Aid to Jews emphasized that the atmosphere regarding the Jewish question had been poisoned and that the Jewish relief activities had of late encountered increasing difficulties. One of the reasons was the attitude displayed by a certain section of the Polish underground press which engaged in anti-Semitic propaganda. Several publications of the Government Delegation, such as the Nowy Wspolny Dom (The New Cooperative House), published by the Agricultural Division of the Delegation, contained anti-Semitic passages. Anti-Semitic tendencies were also evident in a booklet called "The Imperialist War" published by a group supported by the Delegation. The representatives of the Council stated that it was essential to act against the anti-Semitic campaign being waged in the underground press. Detailed factual reports regarding the acts of murder perpetrated by N.S.Z. gangs were presented at the meeting. However, the alarming protests sent by the Jewish Fighting Organization and the Coordinating Committee about the killngs near Koniecpol, the murder of a group of 18 Jews in the village of Wygoda, and other killings brought no results. The Jewish representatives also stated that members of the N.S.Z. had organized a special group at Josefow near Warsaw to search for Jews and kill them. The "Zegota" envoys demanded that an end be put to these abominable murders by the N.S.Z. and proposed that the Government Delegate publish an announcement condemning the murderous acts, and the A.K. issue an "Order of the Day" on the same subject to all units in Poland. (After the N.S.Z. formally joined the A.K. in March 1944, however, the actual responsibility for its acts rested with the Home Army.) The Jewish envoys added that the declaration must also denounce all anti-Semitic manifestations. The publication of such a statement would help to ease the hostility. Another matter dealt with at the meeting was the problem of the camps. At that time, there were 20 camps for Jews in occupied Poland, which had a total of approximately 20,000 Jewish inmates. There were also other concentration camps with both Polish and Jewish prisoners. The Council representatives stated that during the turnabout in the course of the war, it would be imperative to take extraordinary measures to protect the camps in order to save tens of thou-

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sands of people from certain extermination. They suggested that the Allies be approached to help in this matter. As far as increased aid for relief activities, the Jewish representatives stressed that the National Committee was caring for 5,600 people in Warsaw. Together with those being aided by "£egota" and the Bund (about 2,000 Jews), the number of those receiving relief was about 12,000, apart from those in the provinces. In response to the demands of the "Zegota" representatives, the Government Delegate rejected the contention that anti-Semitic tendencies were increasingly evident in official publications. As for the general atmosphere regarding the Jews, he asserted that this matter was dependent on both sides. The frequent instances of Jews disclosing the names of their Polish protectors to the Germans or their collaborators had aroused great resentment. The behavior of Jewish partisan units in the rural areas (where they were forced to steal food from the peasants in order to survive) had also evoked negative reactions among the population. Reports of Jewish soldiers "deserting" from the Polish Army, especially the "desertion" of 2,000 Jewish soldiers from the Second Corps in the Middle East, had added fuel to the fire, since these acts were considered anti-Polish demonstrations. The Government Delegate added: "The recollection of the behavior of the Jews in the areas occupied by the Soviets also influenced the hostile attitude toward them." Incidentally, the complaint about close collaboration between the Soviet authorities and the Jews, and the charges that the Jews had "taken an active part in the Communist governing bodies that had been set up by the conqueror [the Soviet Union]," was levelled every time the Jewish underground leaders met with their Polish counterparts. A trenchant reply to these charges was given by Mordechai Tennenbaum-Tamaroff in his letter of April 2, 1943 to the Bialystok Regional Command of the Civilian Struggle (in which the commander of the Jewish Fighting Organization asked for 200 handgrenades and a few dozen revolvers): "Had the time and conditions been different, I could prove to the Poles that all the organizations which make up the 'Jewish National Committee' were disbanded and [their members were] tortured in the Soviet Union, and their leaders were banished to Siberia."

As far as the camps are concerned, the Government Delegate de-

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clared that it would be extremely difficult to protect them. He would discuss the matter with the Commander of the A.K. and would refer appropriate suggestions to London. In addition, the Delegate promised to respond to the murders by the N.S.Z. and the cases of blackmail, but he did not promise to publish any declarations in this respect since, "He did not believe that the present time was right for such action." As far as financial problems, the Delegate promised at the meeting, "which was conducted throughout in an atmosphere of coolness mixed with tension and a mutual lack of confidence," to increase the allocation. In mid-1944, alarming reports from the international underground in Auschwitz of the murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews began reaching the organizations of the Polish underground and especially the Council for Aid to Jews. "Zegota" immediately sent a message to the Government Delegate urging him to arouse world opinion by radio and call for immediate intervention in order to halt the slaughter. However, no significant action was taken by the Government Delegation this time either; the Council's plea remained unanswered. At their next meeting with the Government Delegate, which took place in December 1944, the Council representatives categorically reiterated that the Jewish organizations had not received the amounts, which according to prior reports had been dispatched, and as a result had not received any financial support from "Zegota." (It should be noted that the funds sent by Jewish organizations abroad for the Jewish underground in Poland were transmitted via the channels of the underground of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.) It is clear from the letters sent by Feiner, the Bund representative, to the Government Delegate in May and June of 1943, as well as in February 1944, that part of the sums intended for the Bund were in effect frozen by the Government Delegation. On August 11, 1943, Feiner again sent a request to the Delegate to release the sums that were being held by the latter — $5,000 of a total remittance of $15,000 which had arrived in February 1943, and $25,000 out of $38,000 which had been received from London in April 1943. During the period from June through September, the Jewish National Committee received $40,000, which was converted into 3,030,550

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zlotys. The sum apparently included £15,000 which had been remitted by the Jewish Agency prior to July 1943. Larger amounts began arriving in November 1943. Thus S 100,000 was received from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in December 1943 as the first installment of the $500,000 which it had earmarked for the Jewish National Committee. The Jewish Agency was supposed to send an additional $200,000 and £10,000 on this account shortly thereafter, but these funds were "tied up" en route. The failure — from January 1944 onward — to deliver the funds to the Jewish organizations was denounced by Aleksander Kammski ("Juliusz Gorecki"), editor-in-chief of the official underground organ Biuletyn Informacyjny, in his sharp letter of May 18, 1944 to Jerzy Makowiecki, ("Malicki"), head of the Information and Propaganda Department of the Government Delegate. It seems that the funds from overseas were not delivered due to a controversy that broke out between the Jewish organizations, and the Government Delegation and the A.K. The Jewish organizations used the funds received from abroad not only for relief activities but also to purchase arms for the Jewish Fighting Organization and to prepare resistance activities in the concentration camps. Thus according to a brief financial report presented by Dr. Berman at the Council meeting held on July 10, 1943, most of the funds received from Poalei Zion and the General Zionists abroad were spent on the acquisition of arms, part of which were sent to Zaglebie and Czestochowa; 130,000 zlotys were sent to the Poniatowa camp, and 100,000 to the camp at Trawniki. It should also be noted that on September 27, 1943, the Council received a report that the situation in the Poniatowa camp had deteriorated and that the German guards had found arms in one of the huts. The Government Delegation and A.K. command vigorously and consistently opposed the acquisition of arms by the Jewish underground organizations. It should be noted that the underground military authorities refused to recognize the Jewish partisan movement, support its organization by the youth who were saved from the liquidated ghettos, or to maintain contact with the so-called "wild" groups in order to ensure that they would not be forced to resort to robbery. The Delegation insisted that the Jewish bodies observe this condition as a sine qua non for continued receipt of the financial grants which

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arrived from Jewish organizations abroad. The representatives of the Jewish Fighting Organization and the Coordinating Committee declared that they would not accept this condition under any circumstances. As a result of the firm and unequivocal position they adopted, the withholding of remittances from abroad was stopped shortly thereafter; the payments were resumed and they reached their intended destination. Unlike the Government Delegation and the A.K., "Zegota" supported the purchase of arms by Jewish organizations. As early as the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, the Council earmarked a special grant of 500,000 zlotys, received from the Government Delegate, for the purchase of weapons. This allocation was in line with the Council's policy vis-ä-vis "acts of resistance," which were initiated in the Warsaw Ghetto on April 19, 1943. The Council had immediately voiced its "full solidarity with the justice of the cause of those who fell for the dignity and freedom of man." In its letter of April 30, 1943 to the Government Delegate, the Council urged him to issue "a protest for the whole world which would shock the conscience and heart of the entire world," as well as a manifesto to the Polish public, "which will express not only the official attitude of the Polish Government in regard to that terrible murder, but primarily the emotional reaction of the Polish people to Jewish martyrdom." On May 6, the Government Delegation published a statement in its official organ, in which it "displayed a sense of honor and feelings of solidarity with the Jews who were defending themselves and feelings of contempt vis-ä-vis their German murderers." The Polish population was also called upon to extend aid to the persecuted Jews. An appeal signed by "The Organizations of Polish Independence" appeared at the beginning of May 1943. It contained the announcement made by General Sikorski (repeated by his Delegate in occupied Poland), and stated inter alia that: "Under the given conditions all help extended directly or indirectly to the Germans in their murderous activities is a most heinous crime against Poland. Any Pole who collaborates in their acts of murder, whether by extortion, informing on Jews, or by exploiting their terrible plight or participating in acts of robbery, is committing a most serious offence against the laws of the Polish Republic."

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Unfortunately, however, there statements did not command proper attention and, in effect, no concrete aid was given to the ghetto fighters. A special meeting of the Council dealt with practical steps to extend help to those Jews and Jewish fighters who would succeed in reaching the Aryan side, such as the preparation of sufficient documents, financial aid, etc. Council members tried to obtain a map of the Warsaw sewer system in order to carry out rescue activities. "2egota" widened the scope of its activities in order to care for the groups of Jews who reached the Aryan side. According to the information which the Council received, approximately 500 Jews remained underground in troglodytic conditions after the suppression of the revolt. After making insistent demands, the Council received an additional one-time grant of 500,000 zlotys from the Government Delegation in September 1943, and thus the clandestine Jewish organizations were able to extend their activities. In addition, it should be noted that the Council solemnly observed the first anniversary of the ghetto uprising at a special meeting, held in mid-April 1944, by passing the following resolution: "The most appropriate way to honor the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto battles and the memory of the fighters who fell holding their weapons and of the millions of murdered Polish Jews is by giving the greatest possible help in order to enable the remnants who survived to go on living and to continue the common struggle for liberation."

The resolution was sent to the Polish and Jewish underground organizations. A letter was also sent to the Government Delegate suggesting that he issue a proclamation to the Polish people on the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt. However, no official statement was made by the Delegate or by the Armed Forces Command — an omission that caused great resentment among the Jewish leaders on the Aryan side. The Council also wrote to the Jewish Coordinating Committee "expressing words of admiration and respect for the memory of the heroes of the Jewish Fighting Organization who fell in the unequal fight against the German wildmen," as well as its "admiration and respect for the memory of the millions of defenceless Jews in Poland who were savagely murdered by the German barbarians." Finally, the Council expressed its readiness and desire to present an official pro-

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posal, "even now during the period of occupation... to name the streets of Warsaw which witnessed the glorious battles of the Jewish Fighting Organization for the leaders of the armed struggle and the battle of valor." •

*

*

The motivations for the establishment of "Zegota" and its beneficent activities were defined by its leaders. According to a letter which the Council sent to the Coordinating Committee on the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt: "The cooperation between the Council for Aid to Jews and the Coordinating Committee [of the Jewish National Committee and the Bund] was based on the most noble, Christian and humanitarian motives, and it began during the most tragic hours for our two peoples. It is of lasting value and will serve as a cornerstone for mutual relations in liberated Poland."

The Chairman of the Council, Julian Grobelny, declared in a statement made in March 1943: "The rescue of people condemned to death by the brutal conqueror is a duty of conscience for the [Polish] nation and is required for the good name of the state."

The Deputy Chairman of the Council, Tadeusz Rek, on the other hand, made no effort to conceal his view that the major motivation for the creation of "Zegota" was the realization that "it was needed for the good of Poland." There are very significant differences between Polish and Jewish sources on the number of people helped by "Zegota." Rek declares that at least 40,000 Jews in Poland (including the camps) received aid from "Zegota." According to Arczynski, 50,000 Jews benefitted from the various forms of assistance—financial, legalization, medical, child care, and help against blackmailers. Jewish sources (Dr. Berman, Yitzhak Zuckerman, and Yaakov Zelemenski), on the other hand, assert that during the years 1943-1944, over 4,000, out of a total of 20,000 Jews in hiding in occupied Warsaw, received direct assistance from "Zegota." Emmanuel Ringelblum, who followed the work of the Council, was aware of the fact that it failed to fulfill the expectations of its founders. Nonetheless, it "had 300 Jewish families under

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its wing, who were on the Aryan side and whose existence was solely dependent on the aid of the Council." In summation, the Council was not given the opportunity to develop large-scale relief activities due to the lack of funds (a fact that was emphasized by Rek and Arczydski, who reiterated categorically that the Government Delegation consistently refused to make significant sums available to "Zegota") as well as the lack of assistance by government circles, which did nothing to save the surviving remnants of Polish Jewry. The government even allocated ridiculously small amounts to stimulate the cultural, intellectual, and communal activities of Warsaw Jewry, whereas nothing was done to find safe lodgings for various people. (Thus, for example, there was no money to arrange a hiding place on the Aryan side for the noted historian Dr. Yitzhak Schiper.) As a result, the small nucleus of scientists, authors, and political figures, who had survived the previous deportations, were eventually murdered. Despite the limited funds allocated to the Council by the Government Delegate, and the political and ideological differences among its various components, the Council vigorously undertook many activities attaining an unusual degree of harmony. Despite the fact that its members risked their lives daily, they continued to operate with great dedication, under all conditions, until the liberation. Great fear was aroused by the frequent official German announcements which threatened that anyone who hid or lodged Jews and all the tenants of houses in which Jews were found hiding would be executed. In many cases, the German butchers carried out their threats and shot the "offenders." Nonetheless, thousands of Poles, headed by the personnel of "Zegota" extended aid to Jews, many without any thought of recompense. Ringelblum praises the dedication of the Poles who risked their lives to save Jews. He wrote: "There are thousands [of idealists] like these in Warsaw and the whole country... The names of the people who do this, and whom the Poland which shall be established should decorate with the 'Order of Humanitarianism,' will remain in our memory as the names of heroes who saved thousands of human beings from certain death by fighting against the greatest enemy the human race has even known."

Dr. Berman also stressed "the noble stand of a significant part of

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the Polish intellectuals, party leaders, and other classes, and many ordinary and good people." The rescue of Jews by their removal from the ghetto to the Aryan side was done by individuals, and was not carried out in an organized manner. This conclusion by Ringelblum has found corroboration in Arczynski's assessment that "the aid given in saving Jews was based on humanitarian principles and was an individual effort which manifested itself in providing shelter, help in legalization, etc." Nonetheless the ramified activities of the Council for Aid to Jews — in addition it should be noted that, besides their public functions, each of the members of the Council personally cared for several Jews — constitute one of the most brilliant chapters in the efforts to extend relief to Jews.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bartoszewski, Wtadyslaw and Lewin, Zofia. The Samaritans; Heroes of the Holocaust. New York, 1970. Berman, Adolf. Mi'yemei ha-Machteret. Tel Aviv, 1971. . "Shira Min ha-Tehom," Dappim le-Cheker ha-Shoa ve-ha-Mered, Second Series, Volume 1 (1969), 289-298. . "Yehudim be-Tzad ha-Ari," Enziklopedia Shel Galuyot, "Warsaw," Vol. 1, Jerusalem, 1953, 685-732. Berman, Α., and B. "Zaglada Zydöw w Warszawie (Szkic kronikarski)," Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego (hereafter — Biuletyn Z.I.H.), No. 45-46 (1963), 138-158. Bernstein, T., Rutkowski, A. Pomoc Zydom w Polsce 1939-1945. Warsaw, 1963. Blumental, Nachman and Kermish, Joseph. Ha-Meri ve-ha-Mered be-Getto Varsha. Jerusalem, 5725 (1965). Borvitch, M. Arishe Papiren. Buenos Aires, 1955. Brener, Liber. "Ruch podziemny w cz?stochowskim getcie (Wspomnienia)," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 45-46 (1963), 159-179. Datner, Szymon. Las sprawiedliwych. Karta ζ dziejow ratownictwa Zydow w okupowanej Polsce. Warsaw, 1968. . "Materialy i Opracowania ζ Zakresu Ratownictwa Zydow w Okresie Okupacji, Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 74 (1970), 137-140. . "Materialy ζ dziedziny ratownictwa Zydow w Polsce w okresie okupacji hitlerowskiej," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 73 (1970), 133-138. Dunin-Wasowicz, J. "Wsponnienia ζ akeji pomocy iydom podczas okupacji hitlerowskiej w Polsce (1939-1945)," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 45-46 (1963), 248261. Fiszman-Kaminska, Karyna. "Zachod, emigracyjna rzad polski oraz Delegatura wobec sprawy zydowskiej podczas II wojny swiatowej," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 62 (1967), 43-58. Friedman, Ph. Their Brother's Keepers. New York, 1957. Iranek-Osmecki, K. Kto ratuje jedno iycie... Polacy i iydzi 1939-1945. London, 1968. Kermish, Joseph. "Al Yachasim Bein Yehudim ve-Polanim," Yalkut Moreshet, No. 11 (1969), 100-107. . "Yachasam Shel Polanim El Yehudim be-Yimei Shoa ve-Mered, beShulei Mahadura Shel Sefer Al Chassidei Umot ha-Olam," Dappim leCheker ha-Shoa ve-ha-Mered, Second Series, Volume 2 (1973), 248-258. Lawartowska, St. "Niektore formy dzialalnosci legalizacyjnej konspiracji warszawskiej," Studia Warszawskie, No. XVII.

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Madajczyk, Cz. Polityka 111 Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce. Warsaw, 1970. . "Rada Pomocy Zydom w Polsce ("Zegota"), wspomnienia centralnych i terenowych dzialaczy RPZ," Biuletyn Z.I.H. (1968), 173-205. Ringelblum, Ε. Polish-Jewish Relations during the Second World War. Edited by J. Kermish and S. Krakowski, Jerusalem, 1974. Sendlerowa, Irena ("Jolanta"). "Ci ktorzy pomagali Zydom," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 45-46 (1963), 234-247. Temkin-Berman, Batya. "Pan Rydzewski," Yalkut Moreshet, No. 2 (1964), 12-16.

. Yoman be-Machteret. Tel Aviv, 5716 (1956). Tenenbaum, Mordechai. Dappim Min ha-Dileika. Tel Aviv, 5708 (1948). Wroöski, S., Zwolikowa, M. Polacy-Zydzi 1939-1945. Warsaw, 1971. Wylezynska, Aurelia. "Ζ Notatek pami?tnikarskich 1942-1943," Biuletyn Z.I.H., No. 45-46 (1963), 212-233. Zelemenski, Y. "Mitn Farshnitnem Folk," Unzer Zayt. New York, 1963.

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The Relief Council for Jews in Poland, Teresa Prekerowa

The Relief Council for Jews (Rada Pomocy 2ydom, RP2) was neither the first nor the only Polish underground organization which extended its aid to Jews in hiding outside the ghetto, on the so-called 'Aryan side'. More elementary forms of aid, based on personal acquaintances came before. It has been the rule that in periods of historic cataclysms people's conduct, particularly that of whole groups resisting violence, frequently imitates traditional patterns, verified by the past experience. Some time has to pass before new organizational forms that take account of the current and specific circumstances start to emerge. This is true of Poland, where underground charity work in 1940 and even in 1941 was organized along the lines reminiscent of the first decades of the twentieth century. This meant that political, trade union and professional organizations took their members, both Jews and Poles, with their families, under care. The political parties maintaining links with the Polish Government-in-exile in London and its Delegatura for the homeland that ranked among the most active in the relief work were: the Polish Socialist Party 'Freedom-Equality-Independence' (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna 'Wolnosc-Rownosc-Niepodlegtosc', PPSWRN); the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD); the Union of Polish Syndicalists (Zwijtzek Syndykalistow Polskich) and the social Catholic organization, the 'Front for Polish Re-Birth' (Front Odrod zenia Polski, FOP). Various communist groups were also active in organizing help, and they combined efforts after their unification in January 1942 into the Polish Workers' Party, whose numerous members could be found both inside the ghettos and amongjews in hiding. Guidelines of the Department for Work and Social Security of the Delegatura issued in 1941 stipulated that help for Jews should be organized by the organs of the 'Underground State'. 1 But subsequently these rules had to be abandoned

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Teresa Prekerowa since the system of financial inspection adopted by the department was inconsistent with the situation of the people in hiding. It is obvious that no underground relief action, no matter how generous and substantial, could meet even the most essential needs of the people exposed to the extermination policy of the invader. For Jews in particular, the gap between their needs and the relief available opened wider from month to month, reaching truly dramatic dimensions in the summer of 1942. For that reason more and more people from underground circles came to the conclusion that the amount of aid had to be increased considerably and the forms it took expanded and differentiated. Growing pressure was exercised on the Delegatura to secure adequate organizational and financial means for that purpose; no other major source of finance was available for the relief action since all Polish public institutions were banned by the Nazis and the Polish population were becoming rapidly impoverished. The Delegatura responded to the public demand by setting up the Aid Committee for Jews on 27 September 1942. It was headed jointly by a famous Catholic novelist, the President of FOP, Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, and by Wanda Krahelska-Filipowiczowa, linked to the Democratic Party. Other leading personalities who had already been engaged in a relief action for the Jews were also recruited from those two circles. A certain expansion of their activities was possible when the Delegatura made some extra funds, although modest in the beginning, available to the Committee, and in Autumn 1942, help was extended to 180 persons. 2 Funding of the committee was only the first step. While its day-to-day activities were gathering momentum, endeavours were made to restructure the relief work in such a way as to gain a broader social backing. Two large, clandestine Polish parties, the WRN and the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe, SL), as well as the Jewish parties, the Bund and the Jewish National Committee (Zydowski Komitet Narodowy, ZKN) joined the relief action. The Aid Committee to Jews was eventually disbanded on 4 December 1942 and the Council for Aid to Jews (RP2, cryptonym 'Zegota') was founded on the same day. Its presidium consisted of the representatives of the co-operating parties, Julian Grobelny of the WRN (the president 1 ), Tadeusz Rek of the SL and Leon Feiner of the Bund (the two vicepresidents) Adolf Berman of the 2 K N (the Secretary) and 'Ferdinand' Marek Arczynski of the SD (the treasurer). Other members of the presidium were Emilia Hizowa of the SD and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski of the FOP. The secretary's office was run by Zofia Rudnicka of the SD, her support (and simultaneously the main liaison officer of the council on the lines Warsaw-Cracow and Warsaw-Lwow) being Janina Raabe-Wpsowiczowa of the SD. Witold Bierikowski of the FOP, President of the Jewish Affairs

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Division in the Delegatura, was delegated by the underground authorities to the council. This organizational pattern was to be followed by the local branches of the council in some bigger towns, where they were to be linked to the respective district offices of the Delegatura. Implementation of that project encountered enormous problems; for example, in Lodz the embryo local branch of the council was destroyed by arrests, incidentally for reasons other than the relief action for Jews. Eventually, local branches of the Council were set up only in Cracow in April 1943 and in Lwow, presumably in May 1943. In Cracow, Stanisfaw Wincenty Dobrowolski of the WRN became the President of the Council, Wf adystaw Wojcik of the WRN its secretary, Anna Dobrowolska of the SD its treasurer and Maria Hochberg-Marianska (after the war Miriam Peleg, resident in Israel) represented the Jewish community on the council. Other members of the presidium were Jerzy Matus of the SL and Janusz Strzalecki of the SD. The underground government authorities were represented by Tadeusz Seweryn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Civilian Struggle in the Cracow district. The Lwow Council was set up in particularly difficult circumstances. The course of the wartime events was that from September 1939 up till June 1941 Lwow was under Soviet rule, then subject to the rigours of the Nazi occupation. Consequently social stuctures in existence prior to 1939, both Polish and Jewish, disintegrated more completely than elsewhere and fewer members of the politically active intelligentsia remained. Moreover, any clandestine Polish action was rendered even more difficult and dangerous by the threat from the local Ukrainian nationalists. From the few documents preserved concerning the region in that period it is impossible to reconstruct the organization of the Lwow Council, its fate and activities. What is known is that the council's president was Laryssa Chomsowa of the SD and that the treasurer was Przemystaw Ogrodzmski of the WRN, both of them closely co-operating with the district Government Delegate Adam Ostrowski as far as the relief action for Jews was concerned. It is uncertain, however, if other co-workers of the Council, whose names appear in the documents, were also its members, or if they co-operated with it on an irregular basis. The RPZ's aim consisted in extending help to the Jews in hiding on the 'Aryan side', irrespective of their social status or political membership, and its action was guided only by the existing needs and possibilities of relief. A precondition of this activity was getting subsidies granted by the Delegatura. Initially the amounts granted were not large, ranging from 150,000 to 300,000 zlotys a month, so the council made determined and systematic

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efforts to raise funds. In its numerous memoranda and at the audiences with the Government Delegate the enormous needs of the fugitives from the ghetto were presented - they were homeless, stripped of even personal effects and without any means of survival. Their case was presented in letters sent to the Government-in-exile in London, on which the budget of the Delegatura depended. All these efforts proved to be fruitful: the amount of the subsidy was revised several times and amounted to 2,000,000 zlotys a month in the summer of 1944, and the amounts alotted to the Relief Council for Jews by the State Treasury eventually totalled 28,750,000 zlotys. A contribution of 5,300,000 zlotys to the sum at the council's disposal was made by the International Union ofJews in America, the Bund and the 2KN. All in all, the RP2 raised and distributed funds amounting to about 34,000,000 zlotys. Was that amount big or small as compared to the funds at the disposal of other relief organizations? Beside the council, the only organization subsidized regularly by the Delegatura was the Social Organization for Selfdefence (Spofeczna Organizacja Samoobrony, SOS). Zofia Kossak was responsible for its relief action for the persecuted. It should be remembered that among the people in SOS's charge there were many Jews, particularly children. If we compare grants to these two organizations we can see that a monthly subsidy to the RP2 was six times that granted to the SOS. However, each of the two underground Jewish organizations (the 2 K N and the Bund) raised and distributed funds comparable to those at the RP2's disposal, that is about 30,000,000 zlotys each. These sums were contributed by the international Jewish organizations through the intermediary of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. Given the Council's revenues, it could afford to pay individual monthly grants of the order of 500 zlotys, and yet, financial problems arose at times, either because of a sudden increase in the number of people under the Council's care, for example during the Ghetto Uprising, or when the Delegatura failed to receive the expected money. It reached the country by way of air drops, but it must be remembered that only 56 per cent of the air missions ended with a full success. If payments to the RP# happened to be smaller than usual, or, more often, delayed, the Council temporarily had to cut down its grants to 350-400 zlotys, or even as little as 250300 zlotys a month. Cases occurred of relief payments being stopped altogether to recipients in a better financial situation, while those in greater need received unchanged amounts. From time to time a person in need of winter clothes, of money for the increased rent or for some other extraordinary purpose was paid a considerably higher amount of 1,000 to 1,500, or even 2,000 zlotys. The most common rate of 500 zlotys a month, although not high, was in

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fact sufficient for a modest living. Industrial and communication workers, as well as those employed in the municipal service sector, received even smaller incomes. As a matter of fact, relief payments made by such a 'wellto-do' organization as the Home Army did not exceed the above-quoted figures. If a member happened to be killed or imprisoned as a direct result of his service to the underground organization, the Home Army only granted aid to his family if he had been the sole bread-winner and if, as a consequence, the family was left in an extremely difficult position, without any opportunity to earn its living. The maximum relief amount for an adult could not exceed 900 zlotys, and the amount paid for a child was 240 zlotys. For Warsaw those rates were subsequently revised to 1,100 and 300 zlotys respectively. And yet figures found in the preserved lists of payments of the Home Army never reach even half the amounts of the permissible maximum rate levels.4 Conversely, individual reliefs paid by the Bund and the 2 K N were higher than those of the RP2. Each of the organizations distributed a total amount of a size comparable to that which was at the council's disposal, but over a considerably shorter time. The RPZ did not have its own network to distribute money but resorted to the organizational links of the political parties represented on the Council. Nevertheless, it controlled the financial operations of each of its sections with precision. Control was particularly difficult since the rules of clandestine work had to be observed. Clearing of the accounts was based on the acknowledgments signed by the recipients with their original, but currently unused family names, or with their first names only, and it was the handwriting which was the main proof of authenticity of the 'receipts 1 which were used by persons distributing the money for settling their accounts with the local branch of the Council. Then, after periodical inspections by the Revisory Commission - in Warsaw it consisted of Rek and Feiner, in Cracow of Hochberg-Mariaiiska and Seweryn - the acknowledgments had to be destroyed for security reasons. But in both local branches of the council some workers preserved the receipts and hid them carefully in order to be able to give at any moment an account of their properly fulfilled duties. Those acknowledgments, brought to the light of day after the war, are valuable archival sources. To estimate exactly how many people received the financial relief from the council is not a simple task, due to the fragmented character of the records. In the middle of 1944 the number of persons who benefitted from the council's financial relief amounted to 3,000-4,000 (out of this number there were about 600 in Cracow, and at least 120 in Lwow). According to the estimates made by the 2 K N workers, financial aid of the three organizations, the RP2, the 2 K N and the Bund, reached about 12,000 people.

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Another line of the council's activity apart from the financial relief, was the procuring of forged personal documents for the people in its charge. A Jew or a Pole ofjewish origin while in hiding on the so-called 'Aryan side' had to be equipped with papers and certificates acceptable to the Germans who would control him, so that they remained convinced that he was fully authorized to live in the Polish quarter of the town. In all, he should possess an identity card (the so-called Kennkarte) issued by the German authorities and certifying his Polish nationality; a work certificate (the so-called Arbeitskarte); a residence certificate, a baptism certificate and, if applicable, a marriage certificate, the two latter issued by the Church. Only such a set of documents could transform a former fugitive from the ghetto into an 'Aryan'. Catholic priests rendered an enormous service to the Jews in hiding by supplying them with authentic baptismal and marriage certificates of the people who, by that time, were dead, or had vanished or were absent from the country (before and during World War II, church parishes in Poland performed functions of Registries). Officers of the municipal administration, for their part, helped to obtain the right certificate of residence. But soon all these possibilities were exhausted and when the number of people in hiding ran into tens of thousands, their needs could be met only by forged documents. Each local branch of the Relief Council for Jews from the start had to procure such documents for people under its care. The Warsaw Council initially collaborated with some clandestine presses turning out forged documents, which were run by the Home Army, and provided for the military underground. Later on, the council collaborated mainly with two privately owned presses, which after a period became so closely involved in the council's affairs that they could almost pass for its own. One of them operated until Autumn 1943, when its leader was arrested and perished at the hands of the Gestapo, the other was started soon afterwards. Each of them produced several sets of documents daily, and orders from the council were executed within a period of one to three days. The number of sets of documents supplied by both shops totalled about 50,000 according to the estimates made by Arczyriski, the council's officer responsible for that line of its activity. The Cracow branch of the council encountered fewer problems in that area. By coincidence, some of its workers (members of the PPS-WRN, the SD and the SL), were in close contact with the shops working for those organizations. Thanks to that close collaboration, the demands for forged documents of the people under care of the Cracow council could be entirely satisfied. The Lwow branch of the council depended, presumably totally, on the forged documents procured by the Home Army.

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The RPZ not only faced all the problems involved in procurement and delivery of the documents to people in its care, but did so free of charge while other organizations were normally charging their customers sums equal to their prime cost. At that time 'black marketeers' demanded from 2,000 to 5,000 zlotys for a forged 'Kennkarte' or a baptismal certificate. It should be remembered that some needs of the people in the ZKN's and the Bund's charge were served by the forged documents procured by the RPZ. 'Legalization' was a large-scale, systematic and uninterrupted procedure, in the absence of which, hiding Jews on the 'Aryan side' would be impossible, and for that reason it is one of the greatest achievements of the council. Another formidable task facing the council consisted in finding accommodation for people in its charge. All contacts with a Jew carried the death penalty, to say nothing of harbouring him under one's roof. Ά Jew living in the flat of an intellectual or a worker or in the hut of a peasant, is dynamite liable to explode at any moment and blow the whole place up', wrote Emanuel Ringelblum. 5 When the Germans discovered a person of Jewish origin hidden on the premises all its occupants were killed - including children and tlie aged. People were scared, they shrank from risk. 'Zegota's' workers did not ignore danger and they felt fear, but they were conscious of a moral obligation to hide people hounded and murdered by the invader. They persuaded people to act, endeavouring to lower their mental barriers and putting forward arguments helpful in combatting fear. Everyone on the council was in search of accommodation: members of the presidium, women active as liaison officers, representatives of the collaborating parties. None of the accounts given by the people linked in one way or the other to 'Zegota' fails to make a reference to a persistent hunt for a room, for a corner in a room, for some place to hide. The council made it a matter of principle that all dealings with owners of premises should be entirely honest, and that Jews must not be introduced as 'Aryans' since it would mean exposing people's lives to risk. If, in case of a give-away the owner of the premises attempted to explain to the Germans that he did not know about the Jewish origin of his lodger, they would certainly not accept it; perhaps under similar conditions all owners of premises would exploit that argument. However, several accounts given by the council's workers testify, that, under unusually stringent conditions, some of them came to break that rule in order to rescue people in their charge. Even more risk than letting rooms to persons ofjewish origin attended the organization of the so-called 'premises-to-pass-along' and 'hide-outs'. 'Premises-to-pass-along' served the people newly conducted out of the ghetto; some of them could not regain their equilibrium after painful

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Teresa Prekerowa experience of the 'closed quarter' ofthe town. Fugitives used to pass some days or even weeks in these places, before documents were procured for them, contacts established, permanent accommodation found and so on. Frequently they were offered instruction meant to facilitate their adaptation to life under changed conditions. Premises ofthat sort were the easiest to disclose; they had no excuse in case of a give-away. Only the very strong, and the very committed people working for the council had the wherewithal to run them. 'Hide-outs' were arranged either inside flats or on larger premises. Some were used in moments of danger only, others were permanently occupied by the illicit lodgers. The security offered by a 'hide-out' depended on the ingenuity of its construction: it had to remain unnoticed even during a search. The person on the Warsaw Council who excelled in designing such 'hide-outs' was the architectural engineer, Emilia Hizowa. One of the biggest structures of the kind was made by the two market-gardeners, Mieczystaw Wolski and Wfadystaw Marczak in 84 Grojecka Street, Warsaw. Thirty Jews lived there in hiding, Emanuel Ringelblum with his family among their number, and financial responsibility for their upkeep rested largely with the R P 2 and 2 K N . Unfortunately on 7 March 1944 the 'hideout' was disclosed: those in hiding and those hiding them were shot. Finding accommodation meant hiring premises and paying rents and there was a diversity of conditions pertaining in this respect. Some owners of premises put them at the council's disposal for no material reward, doing it for moral reasons, provided their financial situation was good enough. Other owners, irrespective of their lodgers being Jews or non-Jews, demanded rents of an equal amount. A third group demanded higher rents from Jews than from other lodgers. This extra amount was considered to be the cost of the complication in the lives of the owners of the premises arising from the presence of dangerous lodgers. The owners could no longer receive their customers at home or run some kind of semi-legal market production on which a part of the population relied for their living. The extra amount demanded by the owners of the 'hide-outs' was partly an equivalent of the extra attention required, but first and foremost was linked to the risk-bearing. Moderate rent increases did not incapacitate either fugitives or the council; problems notwithstanding, it was easier to get some extra money than to find other suitable accommodation. The R P 2 opposed the transformation of room-hiring into a lucrative trade in which some owners of premises speculated, demanding exorbitant rents and cashing them ruthlessly. The extent of this behaviour is hard to assess, but perhaps it was infrequent since the number of people able to afford such payments was limited. The council's accommodation needs were great, several times more than the number of people under its care. Blackmail, unfortunate coincidences

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by which the presence of illicit lodgers was disclosed, or, occasionally, their own imprudence, rendered the immediate change of place unavoidable. It is possible that any Jew who survived the occupation in hiding stayed in more than one place during that period; many had to move a few times, or even as often as a dozen or so. T h e council's workers played a considerable part in finding new accommodation, always in great demand. The brutality and ruthlessness of the Nazi occupation regime did not spare the weakest and most vulnerable - the children. In spring 1942, according to the data of the Municipal Administration passed to the underground, 4,000 children were begging for their bread in the streets of Warsaw, half of them Jews. So, 2,000 Jewish children were risking their lives by digging their way under the wall enclosing the ghetto, sneaking through holes to the 'Aryan side' to beg for money for bread, cereals or potatoes and coming back to the ghetto to feed their hungry families. Those who already had nobody to return to used to squat in great numbers in the debris of buildings until they met people who were willing and able to take care of them, or the Germans who raided and killed them systematically. Before the RPZ was funded, the relief for Jewish children had been organized in secrecy by a certain number of the workers of the social security departments of the Municipal Boards, by workers of the Central Council for Social Aid (Rada Glowna Opiekuiicza, RGO), orphanages and other charitable institutions. Since the lack of funds was the limiting factor of their charity, these people contacted the R P 2 immediately after its funding. Initially the council financially supported their work from its own coffers, but subsequently the council set up its Children's Division, headed from the autumn of 1943 by Irena Sendlerowa. Henceforth it was the main underground organization working for the protection of Jewish children; it also co-ordinated the work of the groups who had previously been active in providing relief and who had no direct or indirect contacts with the RPZ's members. In Cracow, where no Children's Division was set up, the lot of the Jewish children became of special concern to all members of the council's presidium, The group in the RPZ's charge consisted in part of the street children (it was they who should be given priority, insisted Julian Grobelny, the President of the RP2) and in part of children carried or led out of the ghetto, usually by members of the Bund and the 2 K N . There were two possible means of further action, one or the other of which was followed as circumstance permitted. About 50 per cent of the children were placed with Polish families, the so-called foster families, the other half was enrolled in orphanages or similar homes. Foster-families generally took those children whose features were not typically Semitic, as

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they were to pass for the members of the family. Younger children, with no memories of the ghetto, were taken more willingly than older ones, since they were less likely to speak out of turn, in the presence of undesirable listeners, of names and terms or events which only could have happened inside the ghetto, such as travelling by horse-driven tram. Since the children in foster-families were loved and cared for, they were able to become one of them very quickly. The council did not receive any reports on children being badly treated by their foster-families; quite the reverse, with many foster-parents declaring after a time their intention to make a legal adoption. But that tendency ran counter to the policies of the RPZ: it had forcefully stressed that its activity was not intended to denationalize Jewish children and to re-root them in the Polish environment, but merely to harbour them for the perilous period of the occupation, later returning them to their parents or to the Jewish organizations which might be ready to take care of them. The families of some fostered children benefited from relief payments, the amount for a child being equal to that for an adult. Others were helped by the council's collaborators who were employed in the legal institutions of social security and who secretly arranged for those children to become eligible for the relief payments of a similar amount. The remaining children benefited only from the money occasionally earmarked for specific purposes, to buy clothes for example; sometimes the aid was given to them in kind, in the form of milk coupons or clothes parcels, and so on. Concurrent with this was the council's regular aid to children which involved procuring suitable documents and moving a child immediately from one place to another in case of a give-away or blackmail. The children for whom foster-families could not be found were placed in orphanages or homes run by convents (the RGO) or those run under the management of the Warsaw or the Cracow Municipal Boards. The council's role ended when the institution concerned took the child in and when financial responsibility for his upkeep was accepted by a higher-rank institution. The children who had the most Semitic features tended to be taken in by the convent orphanages, since it was less probable that the presence of the Jewish, that is non-Catholic, children would be expected and spotted there by Germans conducting a search. Behind the convent walls, beyond the reach of blackmailers and informers Jewish children could at least play freely with other children of their age - a vital need to be satisfied. Jewish parents made the frequent objection that if their children were brought up by the Catholic families, and even more so in homes run by convents, they would not adhere to the faith of their forefathers and would finally become Catholics. But the identification of children with the Catholic community was a security precaution, for they merged with the

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environment they lived in. At the slightest cause for suspicion the Germans employed a test to check if a child had undergone a religious training - by ordering him to make a sign of the cross or say a prayer. Statistical data on children under the council's protection, as with other data of this kind, are only tentative. According to Irena Sendlerowa some 2,500 harboured children were registered by the Warsaw branch of the council and a considerable proportion of them were traced after the war. 6 They were returned to their parents or taken to Israel by the Central Committee o f j e w s in Poland. T h e lot of children rescued by the Cracow Council was similar. Since no special register was in existence, even most approximate figures are hard to quote. In the case of a Jew who had Semitic features and who consequently could not go out, happened to be ill and in need of medical aid, drastic action took place. People under whose care they remained could not approach an unknown, untested medical doctor, for the obvious reason that not all members of that profession were equally reliable; some of them were even Volksdeutschen. Conversely, a doctor guided by even the most genuine feelings of humanity could construe a request made by a stranger to help a Jew in hiding as in fact a provocation. The RPZ facilitated contacts between Jews in hiding and doctors. T h e grass-root level sections of that organization kept in touch with doctors and nurses who were acquaintances either of the R P ^ ' s members or of the people in hiding. In Cracow no organization other than this simple one was necessary, but in Warsaw, where the number of people in hiding was much greater, a special health service section was implemented. In autumn 1943 Dr Ludwik Rostkowski, the representative of the clandestine Conciliatory Committee of Medical Doctors (Democrats and Socialists) joined the section and promised his honorary services as well as those of his colleagues. T h e system was well organized. Secret post boxes were set up where addresses of the sick persons and the descriptions of their ailments were deposited by the heads of the sections. T h e RPZ's liaison worker made a round of these post boxes a few times a week to collect calls and to pass them on to Dr Rostkowski. H e then decided what specialized help was necessary in each case and which doctors should be asked to see particular patients. Notes with their addresses were passed to the respective doctors by Dr Rostowski's son, a medical student himself. T h e work of nurses was organized in a similar manner. Medical examinations and procedures were free of charge and medicines were purchased by the council. This section functioned until the beginning of the Warsaw Insurrection in August 1944. Many dozens of doctors contributed to its work and the number of home

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visits by a single doctor varied between a few to several dozen per month. It can be concluded from various accounts that the RPZ's effective health service was able to relieve people from the panic and fear of illness, for they knew that if in need they could count on a generous and competent medical aid. That the Warsaw Council establish contacts with the forced labour camps was demanded by the representatives of the Jewish political parties. Both the Bund and the 2 Κ Ν were intensely interested in getting news from the camps and in keeping in touch with their own members there. At the time railway journeys were particularly dangerous to Jews hiding their identity because of frequent inspections on the trains and in the stations. Initially the RP2's emissaries' journeyed to the provinces only from time to time, but later they travelled so frequently that in the summer of 1943 the council set up a section for organizing these missions and appointed Stefan Sendlak to be its head. He was the PPS activist in Zamosc, from where he had to escape. It was then, while hiding himself in Warsaw, that he set up the Zamosc-Lublin Relief Committee for Jews, its activities mainly financed by the RP2. The permanent staff of the council's section for organization of the couriers' missions consisted of the writer Tadeusz Sarnecki and his future wife, Ewa. Numerous couriers co-operated with the section (some of them known only by their pseudonyms) travelling to places in every district of the General Government except in its southern part which was encompassed by the Cracow Council activity. The Council's emissaries aided camp prisoners by bringing them money, drugs, and letters from the political parties and from their own families and friends. The couriers maintained contacts with the forced labour camps at Budzyh (a branch of Majdanek concentration camp), Trawniki, Zamosc, Cz?stochowa, Piotrkow, Radom, Pionki and Skarzysko-Kamienna as well as with the ghettos in Lodz, Biafystok and Vilna. One of the most outstanding achievements in the couriers' work was getting Emanuel Ringelblum out of the camp at Trawniki and organizing his flight to Warsaw, which was accomplished in autumn 1943, after a series of unsuccessful attempts, by a railwayman - the Home Army officer Teodor Pajewski. Other actions of that kind, both complicated and risky, were not always successful. Moreover, escapes undertaken by the prisoners themselves were substantially supported by the council, which supplied money and forged documents as well as facilitating their safe passage after leaving the camp. Equally, if not more significant in this respect were the achievements of the Cracow RP2. Regular help was extended to the prisoners, consisting mainly of the Cracow Jews, of the nearby Plaszow camp. The liaison was maintained through the employees of the German firms operating in the

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camp which used the slave work of the prisoners. For example, transport workers managed to smuggle in such products as flour, beans, cereals and other foodstuffs. Courageous men and women who were the liaison officers of the RPZ amongst their number were Jozefa Rysinska, Ada Prochnicka, Tadeusz Bilewicz, Mieczyslaw Kurz - reached labour camps at Putkow, Szebnie, Skarzysko-Kamienna and other localities. They also helped prisoners who had the courage to attempt an escape from Auschwitz. There were frequent contacts with Lwow, particularly with the labour camp in Janowska Street, from where several prisoners were extricated, Maksymilian Boruchewicz (after the war, Michal Borwicz) being among them. Those couriers' missions were heavily paid for: Ada Prochnicka lost her life, Josefa Rysmska was submitted to a very severe interrogation and then kept for a long period in the Plaszow camp, and there were other activists from the provinces who lost their lives.7 The RPZ people were aware that neither the council's activists alone, nor a much bigger group including its collaborators, would be able to achieve any meaningful results without broad social support. Therefore efforts were made to create a climate which was favourable to the actions of the relief groups. Members of the presidium in the first instance pressed the underground authorities and the Government-in-exile to appeal to Polish society to help the hounded Jews in every possible way. They also demanded from the underground press of the political parties to which they themselves belonged information to be published on the martyrdom ofjews and their acts of resistance, and to exhort the Polish community to stand by them even at the expense of its own security. These were attempts to offset the opinions of the clandestine nationalistic periodicals which persuaded their public that the lot of the Jewish minority 'is not our affair'. In order to supply editorial boards of the clandestine periodicals with edited materials in the autumn of 1943 the council published three issues of the Komunikaty Prasowe {The Press Service News) which reported the liquidation of the Jewish camps in the Lublin region and the uprising in the ghetto of Biatystok, along with other important events. T h e underground press failed to react in any significant way to the information published, which perhaps, contributed to the closing down of the title. Unaided, the council published and distributed three leaflets in May, August and September 1943, their total edition being 25,000. They quoted the pronouncements of the Polish Prime Minister, the Commander-inChief General Wfadysfaw Sikorski (of May 1943) and one of the Government Delegates for the Homeland, Stanislaw Jankowski (of 30 April 1943) calling on the Poles to give the Jews support and proclaimed punishment for

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extortionists and informers. Both leaflets were signed by the 'Polish Independence Organizations'. Moreover, in September 1943 the council edited 5,000 copies of a leaflet, written in German, which contained an alleged proclamation of the German resistance movement warning against crimes against Jews. It was circulated among German soldiers and administration officers. The council also participated in distribution of pamphlets concerning the tragic fate of the Jewish population, edited by the Information and Propaganda Office of the Home Army, as well as those edited by the 2 K N and the Bund, all of which deeply moved the readers both in Poland and abroad. From its inception the council demanded severe and immediate punishment for extortionists and denunciators whose criminal acts brought about the death of many people in hiding and, frequently, of their protectors as well. Criminals were generally organized in strong gangs and not only did they go unpunished but, on the contrary, they were backed by the police authorities of the invader. But to prove an informer's guilt was extremely difficult, since the underground administration of justice in Poland had very limited opportunities to conduct inquiries. The victims of blackmail could offer very little information; terrified at the time of the blackmailing, subsequently they were often unable to give any description of the blackmailer which would be useful in tracing him down. Since the only punishment at the disposal of underground organizations was a death penalty, its application was avoided in all dubious cases. Although the council made several independent efforts to collect adequate evidence material, for the most part they failed, and the Command in Charge of Underground Struggle refused to rely on them for its judgement since 'they were of an accusing and not of an evidential nature'. The council managed to collect the admissible materials only in a single case of the blackmailing of Adolf Berman. Thanks to the experience he got, he was able to act in such a way as to bring about liquidation of the gang, but this was as late as January 1944. Some time earlier, in 1943, on many occasions, the Council exhorted the Delegatura to combat blackmailers with more determination. On 6 April ofthat year, for lack of other measures, it even suggested some fictitious sentences to be passed against the schmalcownicy to intimidate others, but the proposal was rejected by the Delegatura, which did not want to expose the credibility of its statements to doubt, even if that fiction could have brought a temporary relief to the blackmailed. Notwithstanding the problems which faced the underground administration of justice, 150 Gestapo informers of Pc'ish nationality had been put to death by the end of April 1943. Blackmailing Jews was not explicitly mentioned in substantiation of the death sentences, but carrying them out

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resulted in a decline in the numbers of Jews blackmailed by the scum of society. The first death sentence was carried out in Cracow on 17 July 1943 and was announced in the Btuletyn Informacyjny (the Information Bulletin) on 2 September; Jan Grabiec, a tailor, was sentenced to death for blackmailing both Poles and Jews. Two weeks later the same source communicated that Borys vel BogustawJan Pilnik was shot for blackmailing and for denouncingjews to the Germans - only Jewish victims on this occasion. Then similar announcements concerning Warsaw, Cracow and other Polish towns started to appear in the press, although still more death sentences than reported were carried out. Although punishments for extortionists did not wipe out the plague of blackmailing, they reduced it so much that it ceased to be of primary importance to the council. The main lines of the council's activity already described, were accompanied by occasional relief actions intended to be an immediate and flexible response to changes in the position of the Jewish population, the council being ready to take every opportunity to come to its rescue. To give some examples, one may quote the council's financial support to the fighting in the Warsaw ghetto in April 1943, the rudiments of a military training as well as the purchase of the simple technical means of defence (the two latter actions organized individually by some RP2 members). Other actions involved the conduct of several people, by a secret passage, over the borders to Hungary by the workers of the Cracow Council, who took people from one town to another in search of a safer place to hide, as well as other similar actions. How big was the- group active in all the relief measures listed above? It is impossible to give an answer. The number of activists informed of the council's existence and fully aware of their membership of it was limited to but several dozen at the central branch and to even less at the two local branches combined. The relief money, forged documents and other relief they procured were distributed (as mentioned above) through channels of political and social organizations by their members, convinced that they were executing orders of their respective organizations. Very often, people who did not belong to any political party became engaged in the council's activity, but they neither knew nor wished to know what the sources of aid were. As a matter of fact, all those people were the associates of'2egota' who learned about the organization as late as post-1945. As the council's network merged with the networks of other underground organizations, it is impossible to assess, even crudely, the numbers of the council's taskforce. Similar difficulties occur with an assessment of the number of people in hiding who benefited from the council's protection. Statistics concerning

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the recipients of financial aid and the numbers of rescued children have already been examined. But it must be remembered that several times more people benefited from other forms of aid as vital as forged documents and accommodation. And yet, it is impossible to quote any definite figures, particularly since not all those people who were under the care of '2egota' managed to survive the war. Of those who did, not everyone - for the reasons mentioned above - realized that it was that organization which extended its help to him. Finally, I should mention that the Polish Government-in-exile in London set up there on 20 April 1944 the Council for Matters concerning the Rescue of the Jewish Population in Poland (Rada do Spraw Ratowania Ludnosci Zydowskiej w Polsce), which was an organizational counterpart of the home-based RP2, and which began to operate on 25 May that year. Adam Cioikosz of the PPS was its president, Emanuel Scherer of the Bund its secretary, and its members were Rabbi A. Babad, the representative of the Agudat Israel, Anzelm Reiss, a member of the presidium of the Representation of Polish Jewry with its seat in Palestine (Reprezentacja Zydostwa Polskiego ζ siedziba w Palestynie), Witold Kulerski and Stanislaw Sopicki. The Polish Government-in-exile set the budget of the council at £100,000 sterling annually. Out of that sum the council instantly earmarked £80,000 sterling to the RP2 in Poland, but the outbreak of the Warsaw uprising made the transfer impracticable. The help extended by the council in London reached Bergen-Belsen and attempts were made to establish contact with other camps as well as co-operation to that end with the Jewish organizations in the Allied Nations' countries; but soon afterwards the final events of the war put an end to that tardy initiative. Representatives of both Polish and Jewish organizations were members of all the Council for Aid to Jews branches, set up either by the Governmentin-exile or by the Delegatura. Each of the two national groupings was far from being ideologically and politically uniform, but that did not preclude harmonious co-operation and mutual trust within the council. The work of the Warsaw and Cracow councils was carried out in the course of two years both in great harmony and a sound moral climate, in spite of the permanently imminent danger. The courage, energy and ingenuity of the workers permitted them to make the most of the means they commanded for the benefit of people in their charge. In no other country of Europe under the Nazi occupation was a similar council created to attempt to rescue the Jewish population, within which such a wide spectrum of socio-political convictions would be represented, which would be attached to the central underground authorities, whose activities would be financed by the state budget and which would manage to continue for so long. Footnotes for this article appear after page 785.

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Before Hitler came to power, in 1933, the Jews in Scandinavian countries, on the rim of the Jewish world, lived in peace and tranquillity. Their number was not large: Sweden had about 7,000 Jews officially counted as members of the Jewish community and another 1,500 who were not citizens of Sweden, although some were natives of the country; Denmark had about 8,000 Jews; Norway about 1,500. The overwhelming majority of these Jews was concentrated in the capital cities. This was especially the case in Denmark, where the Jewish population outside of Copenhagen was exceedingly small. This fact proved to be of significance in 1943, when the Jews of Denmark had to be saved by flight to Sweden. In Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, the Jewish community numbered about 4,000 souls, while the two other large cities, Malmö and Göteborg, together had over 3,000 Jews. It was the leaders in these three Swedish communities who carried on the main burdens of the rescue work, collecting funds and dealing with the government authorities. The Jewish communities of Copenhagen, Stockholm and Göteborg were led by patrician Jewish families who had attained distinction in the national life of their respective countries. In Oslo and in Malmö the leaders were comparative newcomers from eastern Europe. Differences in social standing and Jewish traditions resulted in differences of approach and in difference of views regarding the handling of the rescue work. The members of the old families were accustomed to bureaucratic methods and were opposed to innovations. Their reputation for reliability and fairness and the good will they enjoyed with the authorities were their great assets. The leaders who came from the later immigrant groups, however, had morfe understanding of desperate situations and showed more readiness to take economic and financial risks and to attempt what to others seemed impossible. From their passionate will to rescue the Jewish victims came dynamic energy and bold imagination.

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RESCUE ACTIVITIES IN SCANDINAVIA

The position taken by the government and by public opinion in the Scandinavian countries on the question of Jewish refugees until November 1938 was influenced mainly by the economic depression of the 1930s and the often exaggerated fears that unemployment would be increased by the competition of the incoming refugees, or that they would become public charges if they were admitted to the country without permission of employment. None of the Scandinavian countries at that time were considered capable of absorbing new immigrants. Government agencies, therefore, demanded financial guarantees to make sure that the refugees admitted to the country did not become a burden on the public. This insistence on guarantees greatly obstructed and limited the activities in behalf of the Jewish refugees. There was, in addition, the constant fear on the part of the small northern countries lest they provoke Hitler and there was also considerably pro-Nazi sentiment. The upper social classes in Sweden, in particular, had traditional sympathy for the German people and for German culture. They had become accustomed to regard Germany as a Rechtsstaat and they refused for a long time to believe that the German Jews had actually been deprived of their rights in the Third Reich. It happened not infrequently, therefore, that Jewish refugees from Germany attempting to gain admission to one of the Scandinavian countries were turned away at the border. Those that gained admission were frequently deported on the basis of the antiquated laws of asylum. The fact that the refugees were subjected, because of birth, in their native country to restrictions on making a living or that they were made "uncomfortable" there did not make them "political" refugees with the right to asylum. There was constant altercation, with varying degrees of success, between the official authorities on the one hand and the Jewish and non-Jewish refugee committees of the various communities on the other hand. Professor Fredrik Paasche, a non-Jew who himself died in exile later in 1943 and one of the most devoted friends of the refugees in Norway, declared on one occasion: "It is much more dangerous to stifle in a people its natural feeling of pity than to admit into the country a few people with whom one shares employment and livelihood."1 But the government and the majority of the population took a different attitude. It was only after the pogroms in Germany in November 1938 that ι Valentin, H., "Tal vid Wergelands grav," in

Jtitiisk Tidskrift ( 1 9 4 5 )

p. 2 2 6 .

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people in the Scandinavian countries came to realize that emigration for the German Jews was a matter of life and death and that the old laws of asylum were outdated. Even then, however, there were important sections of the population which did not share this new approach. As late as February 1939 the students of the largest Swedish university adopted a resolution by a large majority opposing the admission into Sweden of ten Jewish physicians, including several of world renown. In the course of the vehement discussion opinions were voiced on the need to protcct Sweden against the "invasion" of foreigners and to keep the Swedish medical profession for Swedish students. W h e n a world-famous gynecologist requested permission to settle and practice in Sweden, about one thousand Swedish physicians raised protest against granting his request.2 Although occasional antisemitic views were heard now and then in the discussions these did not play a significant role. But it was not uncommon for the argument to be advanced that if a large number of Jews were admitted into the Scandinavian countries the result might be the creation of a "Jewish question," which thus far had been absent from these countries. N o doubt this fear was not altogether absent also from the minds of some Scandinavian Jews. But the leaders of the Jewish communities, without exception, made it their business to induce their governments to act more generously towards the refugees. Differences of opinion among the leaders concerned only the methods for attaining that goal, not the goal itself. There is no foundation for the statements made now and then, statements which reached beyond the borders of the Scandinavian countries, that the leadership of one of the largest Scandinavian Jewish communities had taken an unfriendly position with regard to the refugees. Misgivings do remain, however, as to whether the Scandinavian Jewish communities during the early years of the Hitler triumph displayed sufficient energy in their relief work. On the other hand, one may well argue that it took the German Jews themselves a considerable period until they realized all the implications of the Hitler policy toward them. W e r e it possible in those years to foresee the full development of the Nazi activities, no doubt, both the Jews of the Scandinavian countries and the governments would have acted differently. T o judge them harshly today is unfair. 3 2 Hellner, Kerstin, De Undsflyktiga och Sverige, Verdandis sm&skrifter, no. 254 (Stockholm 1 9 5 2 ) . 3 Josephson, Gunnar, "Mosaiska församlingen och flyktingspolitiken," in Församlingsblad for Mosaiska församlingen i Stockholm (February 1 9 4 5 ) .

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The number of Jewish refugees from Germany that entered Sweden up to October 1933 was only about 300-400. The number who entered Denmark and Norway was even smaller. The first arrivals were generally people of means who came provided with regular passports. Many had relatives in the country and their chief problem was to obtain permission to remain. Soon, however, refugees began to arrive who had little or no means and who needed help. Committees to help refugees were then founded, headed by rabbis and communal leaders, voluntary contributions were collected and communal taxes were increased. A number of non-Jewish refugee committees came into being for special groups of refugees, such as intellectuals, Communists, Socialists, converted Jews, etc. At the same time special governmental agencies were set up to deal with problems arising from the influx of refugees. Up to April 1940 the refugee question developed more or less evenly in all three countries of Scandinavia. The number of refugees who arrived during the whole period between 1933 and 1940 was very small. It was well known in the countries controlled by Hitler that the Scandinavian governments did not regard persons persecuted on account of race as political refugees deserving of asylum. Moreover, the immigration regulations were made more stringent in order to deter the thousands who were desperately looking for a place of refuge. Typical of such legislation was the Swedish law of September 9, 1938, according to which no foreigner could cross the Swedish border unless he had previously obtained a permit of sojourn, and he could be turned back at the border even with that permit if the officials believed that he had left his home for good. Since such permits were issued only in exceptional cases and under certain guarantees, very few were able to find refuge in Scandinavia. It should be noted that this law was severely criticized by some who considered it unduly harsh and by others who thought it was excessively liberal.4 Under these circumstances the Jewish and non-Jewish relief committees had to endeavor to induce the governmental agencies to adopt a more magnanimous attitude in interpreting the immigration laws. In addition, it was necessary to collect large sums of money and levy 4

Hellner, op. cit., p. 26.

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higher taxes on the members of the communities in order to provide the necessary financial guarantees. The main efforts were directed to influence the governments to grant transit visas to refugees who planned to settle in other countries, especially in Palestine, and who were in need of a temporary place of asylum. The refugee committee in Denmark succeeded in obtaining from the government permits for Jewish young boys and girls from Germany to stay in Denmark in order to receive agricultural training for life in Palestine. Benjamin Slor, prominent Danish Zionist, had long advocated that Zionists use Denmark as a model for agricultural development. Even before Hitler assumed power he was instrumental in establishing a number of halutzim from Germany and from eastern Europe on Danish farms. After Hitler's seizure of power th s activity was greatly extended since there were no difficulties in secu ing labor permits for agricultural workers. In this way, some 1,400 halutzim were trained in Denmark, out of which some 1,000 reachet Palestine before the German occupation of the country. Slor's brother-in-law, Emil Glück in Sweden, emulated h s example and organized a similar hakhsharak activity in his country. Later the halutzim who received their training in Sweden and those who escaped from Denmark merged into one organization during the Hitler occupation. There were thus in Sweden about 300 halutzim at that time. Besides, entry permits were obtained for some 500 children and 150 transit-emigrants. Before that took place, the Jews of Sweden, by taking over the care of Jewish children in Germany as trustees, sent 65 Jewish children to the schools of the Youth Aliyah in Palestine. Some 500 refugees from central Europe arrived in Norway and more than half of these managed to leave the country before the Hitler occupation. Jewish relief committees were organized in Oslo and in Trondheim. There were also some non-Jewish organizations of political coloration which helped certain Jewish refugees. The Nansen Committee led by Odd Nansen, son of the famous explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, headed the most important of those organizations. The Nansen Committee made it its special province to take care of the so-called "stateless" refugees, whose problem became acute with the Nazi occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and later Poland. The Nansen Committee managed to secure asylum in Scandinavia for a number of such refugees, among them many Jews. There were 1,000 Jewish refugees in Denmark and 300 in Norway

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when these countries were occupied by the Germans. About 100 of those in Norway succeeded in getting over to Sweden. About 3 , 0 0 0 Jewish transit-emigrants had passed through Denmark. About 3,000 refugees and a larger number of transit-emigrants were in Sweden at the time that the other two countries were occupied. SWEDISH RESCUE EFFORTS A F T E R THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY

After the outbreak of the war in 1939, and especially after the Germans occupied Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1941, Jewish immigration to Sweden practically stopped. In the fall of 1941 the authorities began to take a more liberal attitude towards the refugees. Entry permits were to be issued to individuals who had close relatives in Sweden who could guarantee that the migrants would not become public charges. But now it was too late. In April 1943 the Jewish community of Stockholm made a last attempt to rescue the Jews out of Germany and a large fund for guarantees was raised. But the German government refused to issue exit permits and only three persons were saved. In this situation the various refugee relief committees as well as individual leaders grappled desperately with the question how to come to the aid of the threatened Jews on the European continent. At the same time public opinion in Sweden turned more favorably toward the refugees and this in turn induced a more sympathetic attitude on the part of official government circles towards more active aid. The field of activity was thus enlarged and the burdens assumed by the Jewish relief committees in Sweden greatly expanded. At the head of all this activity stood the leader of the Stockholm Jewish community, Gunnar Josephson, who was rcspccted for his high moral qualities and practical sense and whose word carried great weight in government circles. W e shall deal later and at greater length with the more important projects, such as the bringing of Norwegian and Danish Jews to Sweden, the rescue action in behalf of the Hungarian Jews and the saving of Jewish inmates of the concentration camps in Germany at the end of the war. W e should mention here a few of the attempts of lesser proportion. The Swedish Zionist Organization vainly tried to obtain from the British, through their Stockholm embassy, Palestine certificates for halutzim in Denmark who were in grave danger. Two other projects

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had better luck and brought about satisfactory results. After an unsuccessful attempt to induce the British government, through the mediation of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, to use its influence with some South American countries that they grant protective passports to Jews in the Nazi-dominated countries, an appeal was made to the Stockholm consul of a small Latin American republic to the same end. He granted the request and made out passports for a number of persons as citizens enjoying the protection of the republic he represented. Some of those passports were intercepted by the German censorship and never reached their destination, but others, with the consul's signature, did arrive.5 Of greater significance were the steps taken by the Swedish section of the World Jewish Congress in 1944 under the direction of its energetic leader, Hillel Storch, to secure the consent of the Swedish government to allow food to be shipped to Jews in the concentration camps. The Allied powers agreed to lift their blockade in favor of such shipments and the Swedish section of the World Jewish Congress received economic aid from its parent body overseas. The food was sent via the Swedish Red Cross to Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and other concentration camps. Not all the parcels arrived at their destinations but many Jewish lives were undoubtedly saved by this action. In Bergen-Belsen, for example, the Nazis failed to deliver the packages to the inmates but the food stores thus accumulated in the warehouses were used later when the camp was liberated and before it was possible to bring in food from the outside.6 These shipments were continued in large proportions for a considerable time after the close of the war. A few words now about the Jtews in Finland. The entrance of Finland into the war as an ally of Germany against the Soviet Union posed a grave danger for the Jews of Finland. There was fear lest the Nazis exert pressure upon the Finnish government to bring about the liquidation of Finnish Jewry, not to speak of the stateless Jewish refugees found in that country. No one in Stockholm could have This was just what a consul of a Latin-American country in Switzerland did. The bearers of those passports, most of whom were Dutch Jews, were kept in Bergen-Belsen in a separate division and were treated better than other Jewish internees. Some of them were released in 1944 and sent to Switzerland, others were sent to a camp in Würtemberg, which was under the supervision of the International Red Cross and where they were well treated. β Rost, Nella, "Ur svenska sektionens Protokoll," in Var Rost (October 1949); also address by Josef Rosensaft reported in the issue of May 1 9 5 2 . 5

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known that the Finnish government made it plain to the Germans that they would not yield to Nazi antisemitic demands. Felix Kersten, in his recently published diaries, tells of his meeting with Foreign Minister Witting of Finland in August 1942, after Himmler had demanded that the Finnish Jews be turned over to him. "Finland is a decent nation," Witting said to Kersten. "We would rather perish with the Jews. We will never hand over Jews to them."7 In 1944 Finland began to waver and bccame increasingly more dependent on Germany. At that time the relief committee in Stockholm began making the necessary preparations to remove the Jews out of Finland in the same way that the Jews of Denmark and Norway had been evacuated. The Swedish authorities approved the plans. In the spring of 1944 a large number of Jewish children, pregnant women and about 160 stateless refugees were taken out of Finland. T H E RESCUE O F T H E J E W S O F NORWAY

On April 9, 1940 the Germans attacked Norway and after a struggle of two months all of Norway came under the heel of the Nazis. It may seem strange that the Jews did not endeavor during those two months to save themselves by crossing the border into Sweden. It must be remembered, however, that such flight entailed serious perils and besides, there was a general expectation that sooner or later Sweden, too, would be occupied by the Germans and the position of the refugees would be even worse than in their native land. Certain measures taken by Reichscommissar Terboven were interpreted as indirect evidence that there was no intention to molest the 1,700 Jews and part-Jews of Norway. The number also included 200 refugees from central Europe. A certain number of non-Jews who foresaw what was likely to take place offered their help to their Jewish neighbors to get them into Sweden. Unfortunately only a few Jews took advantage of this opportunity. Moreover, some Jews who had escaped into Sweden during the early days of panic returned to Norway in the summer. As a matter of fact, the situation of the J^ws during the early months after the occupation was not unbearable. Individuals here and there were subjected to oppressive treatment, but that happened to non-Jews as well. The sense of solidarity shown the Jews by their Christian fellow-citizens (the Quislings were an insignificant minority) 7 Kersten, Felix, Totenkopf (Hamburg 1952) p. 180.

und Treue: Heinrich

Himmler

ohne

Uniform

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contributed to their comparative sense of security. Little by little, however, the situation of the Jews grew worse. In June 1941, soon after the outbreak of the war with Soviet Russia, the Nazis rounded up all the Jews in Tromsö and several other towns in the northern part of Norway and deported them to Germany. In Trondheim only the stateless Jews were arrested, but they, too, were soon released. In Oslo about 6 0 Jews, all Russian citizens, were arrested and subjected to torture. Three weeks later, however, they were released. In the fall of 1941 the Jews in Trondheim and in cities in the north and west were again subjected to arrests, confiscation of property and even summary execution. Jews in Oslo remained unharmed. There was an evil omen in the decree of February 2, 1942 that documents of Jews must bear the stamp " J " ( J u d e ) . On October 22, 1942 a member of the Norwegian border police was shot and killed by a non-Jew on a train near the Swedish border. On that train were about ten Jews who probably were planning to escape to Sweden. They were immediately placed under arrest. The next day their families in Oslo and its environs were also arrested. The death blow to the Jews of Norway followed immediately. On the night between October 25th and 26th all male Jews over sixteen years of age all over Norway were arrested and their property confiscated. Only individuals who managed to hide out or who were overlooked were miraculously saved. There were some exceptions made for Jews who were married to "Aryans"—but not in the northern part of the country. These Jews, married to non-Jews, were interned and on March 1, 1945, were allowed to leave for Sweden. Some Jews who were foreign citizens were also spared. A number of Norwegian Jews who had relatives in Sweden were quickly made Swedish citizens and thus saved. But the Germans did not always respect Swedish citizenship. A month later, on the night between November 25 th and 26th, all the women and children were also arrested. Except for a few Jews whose transportation had been delayed, all were placed on a ship in Oslo that same day and taken to Stettin, from whence they were transported to Auschwitz. More than half of those thus seized, whose number came to 531, were burned in the crematoria upon their arrival in Auschwitz. Later a few more deportations took place. Altogether 7 7 0 Jews were deported from Norway, including 1 0 0 refugees from central Europe.

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This massacre evoked bitter resentment throughout Norway. But the press was under strict censorship and naturally no public protest meetings could be held. Nevertheless the hierarchy of the Lutheran church sent a letter of protest to Quisling. The letter stressed that the persecution of the Jews was not only contrary to the Christian principle of brotherly love but was also a violation of the most elementary demands of human justice. According to the word of God, the letter said, all men have "the same dignity and the same human rights." On the Sundays of November 15 and 22 special services for the Jews were held in the churches. The number of Jewish victims would have been much greater had not some Jews fled betimes to Sweden, before the fatal night in October 1942. By some unknown way rumors of the Nazi plans had reached the Jews. Some Jews believed them, others did not. Those who took the rumors seriously tried to escape. The Norwegian state police whose duty it was to co-operate with the Nazis in arresting the Jews, often gave ample warning to those in danger. Escape to Sweden was fraught with grave danger. One had to trundle for days through thick forests and wilderness. Underground organizations to help Jews escape to Sweden had been formed before. Usually Norwegian families in the sparsely populated districts of eastern Norway would receive the refugees in strict secrecy and provide them with food and shelter until guides who were familiar with the country could lead them past the German border patrols to safety in Sweden. In November 1942, when the danger to the Jews became most acute, the sudden increase in the number of persons who needed help made tremendous demands upon the underground organizations for conccaling Jewish families and guiding them into Sweden. It was especially difficult to provide enough automobile drivers to bring the victims as close as possible to the frontier. Nevertheless the organization functioned pretty well on the whole. There were days in which they succeeded in bringing several hundred Jews from Norway to Sweden. But there were times when the refugees had to wait in hiding for months until they could be taken out. Those who had means paid for the help they received, others received it gratis. It was also a stroke of fortune that the Nazi persecution of Norwegian students and officers and other groups of the non-Jewish population did not coincide with the campaign against the Jews. As soon as the Jewish refugees arrived on Swedish territory they were received with cordiality and sympathy by the border population

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and government officials. They were then looked after by the office for refugees of the Norwegian embassy in Stockholm and by the Jewish refugee committees in Sweden. Altogether about 1,000 Jews from Norway (including the refugees from central Europe) arrived in Sweden. Of these 9 3 0 were smuggled across the border and about 6 0 were released from concentration camps in Norway in 1945. There were also about 100 halfJews or quarter-Jews. After the defeat of Hitler the Norwegian Jewish refugees returned to their homes and were warmly welcomed by their countrymen. Their property, of which the Nazis had despoiled them, was restored to them. (This was also true in the case of the Jews in Denmark.) But for the small Jewish community in Norway the loss of nearly half of its members, who had fallen victim to the Nazis and the Quislings, was a great tragedy. Only twelve Norwegian Jews came back from Germany. There was not a single Jewish family in the country but had lost at least one member. Some families were wiped out entirely. RESCUE W O R K IN DENMARK

When the Germans occupied Denmark on April 9, 1940, they promised to guarantee the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country and not to interfere in its internal administration. It was on that condition that Denmark did not offer military resistance to the invaders. At first it seemed that the Germans would keep their promise and would try to make Denmark into a sort of model protectorate. As long as the Germans honored their obligations the Jews of Denmark were in no danger since the Danish government had not the remotest intention of agreeing to any antisemitic concessions. W h e n the German ambassador in Copenhagen tried to explore the possibilities of introducing special anti-Jewish legislation in Denmark, two prominent members of the government, who were considered to be more or less pro-German, promptly let him know that such a policy "could not be carried out" in Denmark. The very rumor of such a step being considered at the behest of the Germans evoked widespread indignation in the country. King Christian, who throughout the trying years was a towering rock of support for Denmark's patriots and lovers of freedom, missed no occasion to indicate publicly that he shared these views of his people. Despite all this the Jews in Denmark did not feel secure, especially those Jews who were not Danish citizens. Their uneasiness became

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more pronounced in November 1941 when Denmark was compelled to join the anti-Comintern pact and when the Nazis declared that the Jewish problem would have to be solved sooner or later in their New Order in Europe. A small number of Jews managed to escape to Sweden. Thus in April 1943 a group of halutzim went from Bornholm to Sweden in a small fishing vessel and amidst a raging storm. The relations between the Danish government, and still more, the Danish people, and die occupying power became more and more strained until they led to the crisis of August 29, 1943. T h e Danish government resigned and von Hanneken, the German Supreme Commander, took over. The administrative departments, however, remained in the hands of Danish officials. There was now no obstacle in the way of the Germans to tackle the Jews in their own way. This they did. From the Nazi standpoint the results of the antiJewish action were disappointing. This was in part due to the fact that the Germans themselves had little stomach for this activity. First of all, it seems clear that Werner Best, who was the German representative in Denmark, was not enthusiastic about his task, although it was he who had proposed the project in Berlin, mainly to maintain his position against von Hanneken. Generally, the attitude of the Germans in leading positions in Denmark, was the same, including even the chief of the Gestapo, who argued that he had too few men at his disposal to carry out the arrest and deportation of the Jews. A crucial fact in the developments was that the attache of the German merchant navy, G . F. Duckwitz, was so shocked by the Nazi policy of violence towards the Jews that he revealed to the Danish leaders the Nazi plan to arrest all Jews in a raid which was to be made on the night between the 1st and 2nd of October. Hans Hedtoft, chairman of the Social-Democratic Party and prime minister of Denmark after liberation, reports that Duckwitz was white with shame and indignation when he reported this to him. Characteristic of the sense of security of the Jews in Denmark is the fact that when Hedtoft reported Duckwitz's warning to C. B. Henriques, head of the Jewish community in Copenhagen, Henriques refused to believe it.8 W h e n the planned action tober 1, 1943, of the German 8

Swedish government learned from Duckwitz of the against the Jews it decided on a bold step. On Octhe Swedish ambassador in Berlin drew the attention government to the grave effect such action would have

Bertelsen, Aage, Oktober

43

(Aarhus 1 9 4 7 ) p. 12.

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on public opinion in his country and offered in the name of his government to admit all the Jews of Denmark into Sweden. The Germans did not reply to this demarche but the Swedish government released the news of its step to the press and the general public response was one of approval. In Denmark the report made a tremendous impression. Jews in Denmark now knew that as soon as they would cross over to Sweden they would be received not as poor refugees but as welcome guests. When the Jews of Copenhagen gathered in the synagogue on the eve of Rosh Hashana, on September 29, 1943, they were told of the impending German action and were advised to hide out with their non-Jewish neighbors. Those who were not in the synagogue were also informed, so that very few Jews remained in the dark as to the German plan. When the Germans began their raids the great majority of the Jews were safely concealed in Christian homes in the towns and villages or, thanks to the swift action by Danish doctors, were admitted under assumed names as patients in various hospitals. Everywhere the Jews were received with open arms. On October 2 the Germans announced officially that the Jews had been eliminated from Danish public life and thus prevented from continuing "to poison the atmosphere." At the same time they made known the release of all interned Danish soldiers. This naive attempt to weaken the effect of the violent action against the Jews was a complete failure. The interned soldiers and sailors let it be known through their commanding officers that they would not accept any favors at the expense of their Jewish fellow-citizens. Denmark was swept by a wave of anger at the revolting deeds of the Germans. N o previous measure undertaken by the Nazis had evoked such resentment as this one. From now on reconciliation between the Danish people and the occupying power was out of the question. A deluge of protests came from the universities, students, officials, political parties and youth organizations. On the Sunday following the shameful act a pastoral letter was read from every pulpit in which the Christian congregants were reminded that Jesus too was a Jew. Almost the whole Danish people (the Nazis and their fellowtravelers constituted only about two percent) joined forces to save their Jewish countrymen and the Jewish immigrants. A few days after the German raid several organizations were founded to rescue the Jews. The organizations were the product of

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individual initiative and included men and women of various social strata. A central committee of ten members was formed to direct activities. The tasks of these committees consisted, first of all, in finding secure hiding places for the Jews and, in the next place, in transporting them by boat to Sweden. The costs of transportation came to about twelve million kroner. Part of this sum was covered by the Jews themselves, part by various illegal organizations, including the association of manufacturers and the Federation of Labor. This operation was referred to as a "little Dunkirk." Fishing boats and other vessels were hired for the purpose and within about a month's time 7,460 men, women and children, of which some were non-Jews, were brought to the shores of Sweden. They were very few losses. During the first few days the rescue work was of an improvised nature but in time it was well regulated and the boats operated to and fro during both day and night. One of these boats was manned by halutzim, who were in the fishery hakhshara in Denmark and in close contact with the Swedish "Hehalutz." The success of the operation was due in no small measure to the help of the Danish police and to the fact that in many places the Germans deliberately refrained from interfering. This was probably due to the antagonism which marked the relations between the Wehrmacht and the Gestapo. The rescue work in Denmark also received considerable aid from the Swedish officials, whose sympathetic attitude and active support proved to be invaluable, from Danes who had previously escaped to Sweden and from relief committees of the Swedish Jewish communities. On October 3, 1943 the Stockholm lawyer Ivar Philipson was requested by the leaders of the Jewish community in Stockholm to organize the transports of Danish refugees. Within a matter of hours Philipson and his friends raised the initial capital for the undertaking. He then got in touch with two Danish political refugees already in Sweden. They were Ebbe Münk, chief of the secret Danish Information Bureau in Stockholm, and Leif Hendil, an editor. The latter proved to be a most enterprising and brilliant organizer who refused to accept anything as impossible. Together with Philipson, and with the co-operation of the Swedish Foreign Ministry and other Swedish government offices, he organized the above-mentioned secret sea communication line between Denmark and Sweden under the Swedish flag with headquarters in Malmö. It is worth noting that the "service" continued operations even after all the Jews had been cleared from Denmark.

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It engaged in bringing non-Jewish refugees and in carrying to and from Denmark spies, British parachutists and saboteurs. Despite all these efforts, some Jews in Denmark did not manage to escape and about 4 6 0 fell into the hands of the Nazis. They were deported to Theresienstadt, where they were treated comparativly well. An order of the Nazi High Command to have them all liquidated before May 10, 1 9 4 4 was never carried out. W i t h the exception of about 45 who had died in the meantime, they were all brought back home in April 1945 in busses of the Swedish Red Cross. It is quite obvious that the Swedish authorities and the Jewish communities and individual Jews in Sweden were not ready for so sudden an influx of several thousand Jewish refugees who had to be supplied with food, clothing and shelter. Thus, Dr. Carl Mannheimer, head of the Jewish community in Göteborg, received in one day 1 3 0 relatives from Denmark. During the first half of the month of October 1943 the number of Jewish refugees who had come to Malmö exceeded the number of native Jews in the city. Practically every Jewish home in the city took part in the relief activity. There was not enough room in the community offices to register the refugees and the synagogue had to be opened for this purpose. Besides the material needs of the refugees, their religious and cultural requirements were taken care of. They were given a place to worship and their children were given schooling, including vocational training. Jewish relief committees were active not only in the large cities, but also in the smaller towns and hamlets. All along the coastline of the Skäne, relief committees were organized to co-operate with the government in rescue activities. Those committees enjoyed the support of the local population which displayed extraordinary devotion to the cause of saving refugees. People would receive the newcomers in the dark of the night and find asylum for them. The costs of this relief activity were very great. T h e money was provided by special campaigns and taxes imposed on the members of the communities. Jewish organizations abroad, especially the J D C , also helped. The refugees from Denmark, Jews and non-Jews, whose number reached 20,000, established a "central relief office" in Stockholm, with branches in other parts of the country. T h e office was under the supervision of the Danish embassy in Sweden, which, since August 29, 1943 functioned as an independent agency, without contact with the homeland. T h e expenses of the office were covered mainly by credit in the Swedish central bank. But the expenses were

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greatly reduced when the Swedish government showed generosity in issuing work permits for the refugees. The first director of the office was a Danish Jew, Professor Stephan Hurwitz, who was succeeded by another Jew. Jews and non-Jews were all treated equally. By the end of the war the number of Jews from Denmark in Sweden numbered 5,919 full Jews, 1,301 half-Jews and 686 non-Jews married to Jews. These figures do not include the 425 Jews who were brought to Sweden by Count Bcrnadotte from Theresienstadt. Thus, no less than 93 percent of the Jews of Denmark in the critical weeks of the fall of 1943, following the German raid, were rescued and brought to Sweden. This rescue action was unique in Jewish history. The unanimous resoluteness of the people of Denmark in protecting their Jewish fellow-citizens and Jewish refugees is not equalled anywhere except perhaps in Holland, where the population unfortunately did not have the same opportunities for helping the Jews. Moreover, the position taken by the Swedish government was unique, in its protesting to Berlin against the persecution of Danish Jews and in its decision to open the doors of its country to the Jews of Denmark. In this, the government of Sweden had the full support of the Swedish people. Although these steps were taken at the time when Hitler's star began to wane, it nevertheless entailed a certain amount of danger to that small country. Finally, it must be noted that nowhere were Jewish refugees given such a warm reception as the Jews of Denmark in Sweden. The attitude of reserve towards the Jews of Germany which had prevailed in Sweden before this time underwent a radical change when the Jews of Denmark had to be saved. The story of the rcscue of the Danish Jews reads like a legend. A Danish Jew, Julius Margolinsky, who had himself played an important role in the rescue work, rightly observed that if the Biblical canon had not been closed the saga of this rescue activity would have been accepted into the Sacred Scriptures in the same way that the book of Esther had been included in the canon." R A O U L W A L L E N B E R G AND T H E A T T E M P T S T O SAVE T H E J E W S O F H U N G A R Y

On March 19, 1944 the Magyar Nazis seized power in Hungary and immediately set out to exterminate the Jews, whose numbers, 9

Private report by Julius Margolinsky, Copenhagen (in manuscript).

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including the half-Jews, amounted to about one million. The first steps were taken in the provinces. Preparations were also made to confine the Jews of Budapest in a ghetto and later to deport them to death-camps. Admiral Horthy was now regent only in name. Plans began to mature in the minds of some people for a large project to rescue the Jews of Hungary through the mediation of neutral Sweden. The initiative originated with Norbert Masur, a prominent Jewish communal leader in Stockholm. In a letter to the Chief Rabbi of Sweden, Dr. Marcus Ehrenpreis, on April 16, 1944, Masur proposed that they secure the services of an eminent non-Jew who, with the help of the Swedish Foreign Ministry and with financial aid from the United States, would establish contacts with the Swedish embassies in Bucharest and in Budapest and would organize rescue activities to save the threatened Jews. The activity was .to be carried on simultaneously in Rumania and in Hungary and the rescued Jews would be brought to Turkey. Dr. Ehrenpreis endorsed the project. At the same time, the United States Department of State, following the representations made by American Jews, requested Sweden to utilize its position as a neutral state to intervene in behalf of the Jews of Hungary. The Chief Rabbi of Switzerland asked Dr. Ehrenpreis to ask the King of Sweden, who was known to be a staunch opponent of antisemitism, to intercede with Regent Horthy in order to prevent the extermination of the Jews of Hungary. Dr. Ehrenpreis waited on the aged sovereign and King Gustav, the oldest and perhaps the most respected monarch in the world, telegraphed to Horthy, appealing to him "in the name of humanity" and "in the name of the reputation of Hungary among the nations of the world," to try to save the Jews of Hungary from death. Regent Horthy replied that he would do everything possible under the circumstances to see that the principles of justice and humanity were respected. The Pope also addressed a similar request to Horthy. The intervention bore fruit and the deportations which had already begun were discontinued. But the danger was still ever-present. Even before the intervention of King Gustav of Sweden a suitable man was found in Stockholm to carry out the mission in Budapest. This was Raoul Wallenberg, a thirty-two year old businessman, a scion of a prominent Christian family in Sweden, which had played an important role for many generations in the country's finances.10 10

In certain circles in Sweden and in Germany it was thought that the family

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Wallenberg's name was suggested to Dr. Ehrenpreis on May 15 by the former's business associate in Hungary, Dr. Lauer. At the same time preparations were under way in Stockholm for another campaign to rescue the Hungarian Jews. The Executive Committee of the War Refugee Board set up by President Roosevelt, through the United States Ambassador in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry to designate a native Swedish citizen who would be prepared to carry on rescue work in Budapest. Later, when Dr. Lauer met with Ivar C. Olson, United States financial attache in Stockholm and representative of the War Refugee Board, the arrangements were concluded. Both agreed on Wallenberg. It is possible that Raoul Wallenberg first applied privately to Ivar C. Olson and thus brought about the American intervention at the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Wallenberg was named as secretary of the Swedish embassy in Budapest, which gave him diplomatic immunity. On June 6, 1944 Wallenberg set out with only a knapsack on his back which contained a list of Jews who were to be given priority in rescue and of Catholic and Protestant anti-Nazis whose assistance could be expected. The Nazis, fearing the effects of the open slaughter of Jews upon the native population and upon the neutral embassies in Budapest, tried to carry out the deportation of die Jews to what they called "labor camps" in the west, but what were really extermination camps. Wallenberg made it his business to keep delaying the deportations, hoping that in the meantime Allied bombers would put the railway communications out of commission or that die approaching Russian armies would enter the city. Horthy, under pressure by the Pope and by the neutral powers, wavered between dread of Hitler and fear of reprisals by the victorious Allies if Hitler should fall. Wallenberg skillfully exploited the situation. Upon his recommendation the Allies gave Horthy assurance that if the deportations would be discontinued his name would be stricken from the list of war criminals. As already mentioned, Horthy put a temporary stop to the deportations. Wallenberg used the time thus gained to add a new department under his charge in the Swedish Embassy for the sole purpose of rescuing Jews. In order to protect Jews from deportation Wallenberg made out several hundred Swedish passports for those Hungarian Jews who was Jewish. This is entirely untrue. As far as it is known, the family is descended from Protestant clergymen.

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had relatives or business contacts in Sweden. He devised a new kind of passport which he called "Protective Passport." It bore the Swedish colors and the stamp of the embassy with his own signature. Such a passport was to enable the bearer to return to his home in Sweden at the first opportunity and called for his protection as a Swedish citizen until he reached his goal. At first the protective passports were issued only to people who had some contacts with Sweden, even though the contacts for the most part were fictitious. But when the Nazi terror increased Wallenberg relaxed his requirements and within a short time placed more than 1,000 persons under his protection in this manner. The Swiss and other neutral embassies followed his example. The Gestapo, Nazis and Hungarists refrained from interference, feeling that if they cooperated they might obtain such protective passports for themselves if need be. Even the extreme Nazis were reluctant to get into a conflict with the more moderate Hungarian police and officials. The Budapest director of the Swedish Red Cross, Waldemar Langlet, also issued several thousand "protective passports" over his signature. But all this was not enough. Thousands of Jews besieged the Swedish embassy every day asking for protective passports. Soon there sprang up underground printing presses that produced counterfeit protective passports on a large scale. These operated independently of Wallenberg. But it was Wallenberg's influence that was responsible for saving numerous possessors of such passports from being deported even though these documents had no legal status. Apart from that, Wallenberg used his protective passports as a means of bargaining with officials of the Hungarian police and constabulary. By giving them such passports Wallenberg hoped he could induce them to release thousands of arrested Jews. The scope of these exchanges increased as Hitler's position became more shaky in Europe. Wallenberg worked indefatigably, sometimes twenty hours a day. Branches of the Swedish embassy were opened in various parts of Budapest with extra-territorial rights. His staff came to number 660 persons, including their families. The main thing was that these protective passports would have had no value at all if not for the fact that behind them stood an energetic, enterprising and fearless man who intervened personally in behalf of every possessor of such a passport who was molested or seized. When the Szalasi government took away from the Jews their food

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ration cards and issued an order to the police to check the ration cards of all persons on the streets and detain those who had no cards, Wallenberg again showed his resourcefulness. In one night he and his staff prepared thousands of documents bearing the stamp of the embassy and a facsimile of his signature and indicating that the bearers were entitled to the return of their ration cards. Thousands of persons were thus saved from arrest and deportation. When the Szalasi government later issued a decree that only the possessors of regular neutral passports were to be treated as privileged foreigners, Wallenberg again issued thousands of certificates indicating that the protective passports had the force of regular passports. The issuance of such certificates was tantamount to the annulment of a government decree and to intervention in the affairs of the Hungarian government. But they saved thousands of lives. Wallenberg's cool self-possession and his dauntless determination served as an inspiration to his subordinates who acted as his agents and negotiated in his name. He organized commandos, consisting almost exclusively of Hungarian Jews, to carry out the release of prisoners. The commandos often wore the uniforms of the Hungarian police and of the Hungarian military forces and at times even of the S.S. or of the Hungarists. The day arrived, October 15, 1944, when the German and Hungarian Nazis took over entire control of the government in Budapest. A reign of terror was inaugurated which lasted for three months. For Wallenberg this was a period of heroic struggle trying to keep the murderers from their victims, while two Russian armies tightening the noose around the city were raining explosives on the population. The neutral embassies were located in Buda while the largest part of the Jewish population lived in Pest, across the Danube. When the terror reached its peak Wallenberg transferred his offices to Pest in order to be closer to the persecuted. He did so against the advice of his superior, Ambassador Danielson. He rented 32 large houses which he placed under the protection of extra-territorial rights. Those houses were packed full with men, women and children who sought refuge from death; on October 16 the streets of Budapest were littered with the dead bodies of Jews and opponents of the new regime. The Swedish Red Cross and other embassies followed Wallenberg's example and set up extra-territorial centers. In this way the so-called International Ghetto was created in which 13,000 people lived under more

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humane conditions than the 80,000 in the real ghetto who were crowded like cattle. Jews were not permitted to leave their residences under any circumstances for ten days. Suddenly the Gestapo declared all protective passports as invalid (somewhat later they were again declared as valid). Only here and there individual members of the police could be induced to honor them. Now a real struggle ensued between the Gestapo and Wallenberg and his staff in which the lives of thousands of unfortunate Jews were at stake. The railway line to Auschwitz had been destroyed by bombing but Jews were herded together at large assembly centers and from there ordered to march on foot to Auschwitz. They were placed under the control of young Hungarists who exulted in their power by whipping the Jews and forcing them to keep on the march day and night. The Jews received neither bread nor water on the way and whoever failed to move his bleeding feet quickly enough through the deep snow and mire was mercilessly shot down by the young Hungarists. Thousands of Jews died on the way from cold, hunger, thirst and exahustion. These days and nights were a veritable inferno for Wallenberg. He was on the road almost all the time, accompanied by his Jewish chauffeur. Step by step he followed these marching columns of deportees. Jews recognized him, thousands of hands were stretched out toward him and mothers held forth their children to him. All called upon him to save them. Every morning Wallenberg would receive lists of the Jews arrested during the previous night. He would sign protective passports made out for them, place them in his file and secure permission to take out these charges from the marching lines of deportees. Then he would go to the assembly centers and when the lines began their march he would follow them. Each time he would force the commandant to release ten, or a hundred or even more of his victims. If he succeeded in winning the respect of the commandant he would first of all take out of the lines those whose names he had in his file, and then those who had protective passports of the Swedish Red Cross and finally all those under the protection of neutral embassies and of the Pope. Soon Wallenberg found it necessary to take along a truck on this death march. It would be loaded with bandages, warm clothes and shoes, which he would distribute among those he could not get released. He was, in this way, the messenger of humanity and civiliza-

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tion for thousands of persons in their lowest degradation. Here too his conduct became a pattern to be followed by others. Soon officials of the Swiss embassy and Catholic nuns likewise went out on the road and aided the Jewish victims with bread, water and clothes. Many deportees were able to escape thanks to this help and they found refuge in monasteries. Baroness Kemeny, nee Baroness von Fiichs, the wife of the Foreign Minister in the Szalasi cabinct, rendered Wallenberg immeasurable assistance in his work. It was of the utmost importance to gain time. Days and even hours could save thousands of lives. Thanks to the influence of the Baroness with her husband, many deportations were delayed. In the meantime Wallenberg had protective passports made out for the intended victims, thus saving them from death. It was in these days that Wallenberg developed from a successful amateur diplomat to a Samaritan. He became an indefatigable leader and fighter. In persons who had already given up all hope he set aflame once again the will and courage to go on living and to defend their lives. Wallenberg also succeeded in recruiting aid from among the Hungarian police and army. He took advantage of the fears that began to seize these helpers of the Nazis. He acquired stores of food for the hung/y and on several occasions prevented die Hungarists from blowing vp the ghetto. On December 23, 1944 the Russian army stormed Budapest. With bombs raining down upon the unfortunate city the Nazi mobs took over complete control. The embassy buildings were looted by Hungarist squads and the diplomatic representatives were forced to hide in the cellars in Buda. Wallenberg was the only neutral diplomat who remained in Pest, continuing tirelessly to work for the rescue of his charges. He succeeded in winning over to his side the representative of the Hungarists in police headquarters. Through this officer he secured the help of police officials who hoped to save themselves and their families by co-operating in this way with Wallenberg. Acting together with Wallenberg's commando squad they were able to frustrate the plan of the Nazis to kill all the Jews. On January 10, 1945 Wallenberg met with his staff for the last time. He reported briefly on the situation and stated that he intended to go to Debrecen, the seat of the provisional Hungarian government and the headquarters of the Russian Marshal Malinovsky. He had in

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mind to present plans for the maintenance of the Jews who had remained without means during the critical period following liberation. Wallenberg had asked for permission to set up in the premises of the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest a Swedish embassy for the liberated territory. On January 13 a Russian patrol led by a sergeant arrived in the new Swedish embassy. Wallenberg registered as the representative of Sweden, the state that had Russian war prisoners under its protection, and as special protector of the Jews. He asked that the embassy be placed under Russian protection and that he be put in contact with the Russian commander. From then on he was under Russian guard. On January 17, 1945 he was heard from for the last time. He announced that he was to travel under Russian guard to Debrecen and he added: "Whether as a guest or a prisoner, I do not know." It has been established that as late as 1951 he was still alive as a prisoner of the Russians. But all attempts to secure his release and repatriation to Sweden have thus far been to no avail. The Russians claim they know nothing of him. It would not be correct to characterize Wallenberg's activities as pro-Jewish. His prime concern was to save human beings in their hour of greatest need, without regard to their racial or ethnic affiliations. He was one of the few who entered the struggle without any external coercion at all. As a national of a neutral country he could well have enjoyed peace and comfort in Sweden. Instead of this, however, he joined the front lines of the battle and exposed himself daily to mortal danger. Raoul Wallenberg's view of life was not at all heroic. He lacked the hard qualities which were so characteristic of many of the leaders of the resistance movements. He came into the orgy of blood of the Nazi war directly from the peaceful world of western democracy. It was this precisely that impressed those desperate people to whom he brought aid. They saw in him a revelation of a world which they thought had utterly disappeared from the scene, a world dominated not by hate but by humanity. It is no wonder therefore that Raoul Wallenberg has become a lengendary figure and a symbol of love for all Jewish survivors and their families who owe their lives to him. Through him the Swedish embassy in Budapest became a rescue center for countless Hungarian Jews. He was a diplomat of a most unusual character. Wearing a wind-breaker jacket and steel helmet, he went about unarmed amidst bloody bandits for whom human life was of

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no consequence, a young man with no authority except that vested in him by Sweden and the name of King Gustav, or that which he was able to exercise by the assertion of his own personality. RESCUE W O R K IN GERMANY

As the end of the Nazi regime became increasingly apparent people in Sweden and in other neutral countries began to consider what could be done to save the surviving Jews still in the concentration camps. There was apprehension that the Nazis, in desperation, might kill them all off before final collapse. The activity which was started in Sweden for this purpose is connected with the names of Count Folke Bernadotte and Dr. Felix Kersten. Opinion is divided to this day as to which of the two deserves more credit for the work accomplished 11 and we cannot go into this problem here. Suffice it here to quote from the well-considered statement of Christian Günther, Swedish Foreign Minister during the war. And it should also be noted that the Swedish Red Cross expedition headed by Count Bernadotte was set up primarily for the liberation of Norwegian prisoners of war. This is what Günther writes: The Swedish Red Cross expedition for rescuing Norwegian and Danish war prisoners from German concentration camps certainly was not initiated by Felix Kersten or any other private individual. It was planned by the Swedish government. But Kersten's role was very great and perhaps decisive. It was through this mediation that contacts were established with Himmler and it was he who was responsible for winning Himmlers support of the project. As regards Jews and other prisoners Kersten accomplished very great things. 12 G ü n t h e r s conclusion is that without Kersten the Bernadotte rescue action would not have succeeded. Felix Kersten, a Finnish physician, had made himself almost indispensable to Heinrich Himmler through the massage methods he devised for H i m m l e r s nervous stomach. Kersten used his influence with his patient to save inmates of the concentration camps. In the fall of 1943 Kersten moved to Stockholm. On October 12, 1943 he visited Foreign Minister Günther, who was then engaged in making preparations for the rescue action mentioned above. Kersten promised 11

Trevor-Roper, H. R., "Ketsten, Himmler and Count Bernadotte," in Atlantic Monthly (February 1953) 43-45. See also Kersten, Felix, Totenkopf und Treue; The Memoirs of Dr. Felix Kersten (Garden City 1 9 4 7 ) ; interview with Dr. Hille! Storch in Dos Vort, Munich, November 17, 1947. 12 Dagens Nyheter, January 26, 1953.

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While these negotiations were in progress Count Bernadotte made attempts to establish informal contacts with the Swedish government. He knew of the plans to help the Norwegian and the Danish internees. He also established contact with the leaders of the Swedish Red Cross. On February 16,1945 he flew to Berlin to contact Himmler and he met with him on February 19. In the course of their talk Bernadotte touched on the fate of the Jews in the concentration camps and obtained a promise from Himmler that the camps in which the Jews were kept would not be evacuated and that the inmates would be handed over to the Allied military authorities. On February 21 Himmler informed Bernadotte that the Scandinavian prisoners would be assembled in one camp, at Neuengamme, near Hamburg, from which they could then be transported in the Red Cross busses which were at the disposal of Count Bernadotte. A long-drawn-out wrangle began between Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the Security Police, and Himmler's agent, Walter Schellenberg, which lasted for weeks. Kaltenbrunner made every effort to prevent Himmler from keeping his promise to Bernadotte. Schellenberg won. On March 1945 a large number of Danes and Norwegians were transported in the white busses of the Swedish Red Cross to Neuengamme. In April the order was issued for the Scandinavian prisoners to be taken to Denmark. But what was to become of the 20,000 non-Scandinavian internees? The armies of the Allies were approaching fast. On April 20 Bernadotte came to Berlin again and tried to contact Himmler that same day or night. Himmler had ordered the stopping of the transport of die Scandinavian Jews. As Kersten reports, Himmler had promised him to continue negotiations with Bernadotte regarding the release of the Jews, "mainly Norwegian and Danish Jews." A few hours before Bernadotte secured access to Himmler on the morning of April 21, Himmler received Norbert Masur, the representative of the World Jewish Congress, on Kersten's estate near Berlin. Kersten was also present at the meeting. Masur had accepted Himmler's invitation to visit him secretly.13 It lasted for two and one-half hours, until five in the morning, and was one of the most dramatic encounters of the war. On the one hand there was a free representative of the Jewish people and on the odier hand one of the greatest 13

Masur, Norbert, En jude talar med Himmler

(Stockholm 1 9 4 5 ) .

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to intervene with Himmler in favor of this plan the next time he visited him and this he did. Kersten managed to get Himmler's consent. At a later meeting with the Swedish foreign minister Kersten reported that he was also endeavoring to obtain the release of the Dutch internees in the camps. To this Günther replied: "Whomever you get released we shall gladly receive." Before the conclusion of these negotiations, which had nothing to do with the Jewish victims of Nazism, Kersten met with the leader of the Swedish division of the World Jewish Congress, Hillel Storch. Storch asked him to use his influence with Himmler in favor of the Jews in the concentration camps. It was decided that Kersten should request from Himmler first that he permit food parcels and medical supplies to be sent to the Jewish inmates and then that he effect the release of as many Jews as possible, of whom five to ten thousand would then be brought to Sweden. Himmler was inclined to favor both proposals but he stipulated that the whole thing be kept secret from Hitler, who would never forgive him any concessions made to the Jews. Himmler also demanded that the matter be kept out of the press, for the report of such a transaction would be interpreted as an indication of the weakening of Germany. On February I, 1945, 2,700 Jews were released from concentration camps at Himmler's order and brought to Switzerland. The news of this action elicited a wild outburst of rage from the Führer. On March 15, 1945 Kersten was promised by Himmler that he would consider the proposal to permit certain Jews to move from the camps to Sweden and to Switzerland and that he wished to discuss the matter personally with Bernadotte who was charged with providing transportation to Sweden. A few days later Kersten suggested that Himmler negotiate directly with a representative of the World Jewish Congress. To this Himmler replied: "I cannot receive a Jew. If the Führer should learn of it he would have me shot." Kersten replied that a secret meeting could be arranged on his estate near Berlin and Himmler agreed. Kersten informed the proper people in Stockholm. He added that the representative of the World Jewish Congress might be able to induce Himmler to increase the number of Jews permitted to leave the concentration camps for Sweden. It was quite apparent that Himmler sought to curry favor with the future victors and that he believed that Jews and the World Jewish Congress could wield powerful influence in that direction.

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mass-murderers in history, with the blood of six million Jews on his conscience, now in a desperate plight and looking for a way out. The most important result of these negotiations was Himmler's promise to release 1,000 Jewish women from the concentration camp at Ravensbriick. The 1,000 Jewish women were to pass as Polish women and their arrival in Sweden was to be kept secret. A few hours later Himmler again refused to withdraw his prohibition to stop the Scandinavian transports. But when Bernadotte appealed to him to allow him to take out the French women who were interned in the camp at Ravensbriick, he gave permission to take out all the inmates without regard to nationality. That concession was made, no doubt, on the basis of the commitment he had made to Masur. A few days later Himmler committed suicide and the Nazi Reich went up in smoke and ashes. There then began the rescue of the surviving victims. With the help of the Swedish Red Cross about 20,000 people were taken out of the concentration camps in April and May, 1945 and brought to Sweden. Of these, 3,500 were Jews. The women were mainly from the camp at Ravensbriick. In June and July, with the assistance of U.N.R.R.A., another 10,000 or 11,000 persons arrived in Sweden. About 80 percent of these were Jews, most of them from Bergen-Belsen. Almost all the 12,000 Jews who arrived in Sweden that year were from eastern Europe; 60 percent were from Poland. The overwhelming majority—80 to 90 percent—were women, of the ages between 17 and 30. Nearly all of them were fearfully exhausted by the ordeals they had gone through and many were so ill that they had to be carried from the ships. They were taken to hospitals, sanatoria and convalcscent homes. Most of them were quickly restored to health and later, with the assistance of the state, were given vocational training to enable them to lead a normal life. Those who had no occupational training were, for the most part, given positions in the textile factories in various parts of the country, including localities in which there were no large Jewish communities. In 1945 and in the course of the following years permission to settle in Sweden was given to some 300 relatives of the immigrants, to 1,500 skilled workers and their families and to 1,500 who had transit visas. Of the 14,000 to 15,000 Jews who had entered Sweden after Hitler's downfall, about 8,000, with the assistance of SwedishJewish relief organizations, emigrated to the United States, Israel and

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Canada. Many went without outside aid, including 1,000 who went to Israel. Of the Jews who entered Sweden during the Hitler period, about 2,500 or 3,000 remained in the country. A larger number remained of those who came in subsequently. Thus since 1933 the number of Jews in Sweden has doubled.14 14

Apart from the works mentioned in the notes, the author drew on the following sources: Private report by Oskar Mendelson, Oslo (manuscript); Private report by Ivar Philipson, Stockholm (ms.); Private report by Emil Glück and Norbert Masur, Stockholm (ms.); ΝÄgra ord och siffror ora Mosaiska försmalingens i Stockholm flyktingshjälp under &ren 1933-1950 (manuscript in the Bureau of the Stockholm Jewish Community); Steen Sverre, Norges krig, 1940-1945> V°1 '» (Oslo 1950) p. 62, 430, 450, 473-490; La Cour, Wilhelm, Denmark under besaettelsen, vol iii (Copenhagen 1946) p. 357-368; Frisch, Hartvig, Denmark besat og befriet, vol. iii (Copenhagen 1948) p. 48-59; Möller, Per and Knud Secher, De danske jlyktinge i Sverige (Copenhagen 1945) p. 17-31; Philipp, Rudolph, Raoul Wallenberg, Diplomat, Kämpe, Samarit (Stockholm 1946) and Raoul Wallenberg, Kämpe for humanitet (Stockholm 1947); Levai, Jenö, Raoul Wallenberg, hjälten i Budapest (Stockholm 1948); Bernadotte, Folke, Slutet. Aina humanitära förhandlingar i Tysldand vären 1945 och deras politiska följder (Stockholm 1945).

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LENI YAHIL

I MUST ADMIT that the invitation to lecture on the rescue of Danish Jewry somewhat baffled me. I have already dealt with the subject many times, and thought that I had totally exhausted it, that there was nothing more to add. After additional thought on the matter, however, I decided that it would be a good idea to briefly summarize the events and note the key aspects of the rescue of Danish Jewry in an attempt to compare the circumstances of their rescue with similar attempts elsewhere in Europe. When dealing with the period of the Holocaust, it is very difficult to establish the criteria by which to judge the events. Researchers have been struggling with this problem for years. It repeatedly becomes clear that there were particular conditions which determined the course of events in every country, and even in eveiy town and ghetto. I am referring not only to objective farts concerning the various locations, but also to such subjective factors as the individuals who influenced the course of events, whether they were Germans, local Gentiles, or Jews. We also realize that the results often contradict the predictions we thought we could make on the basis of past experience. Thus, for example, we heard in Sara Neshamit's lecture that given the relations between Jews and non-Jews in Lithuania, it was inconceivable that the local population could perpetrate such a slaughter. In view of the singular degree of freedom and deeplyrooted equality enjoyed by Dutch Jewry there was no reason to assume that the majority of the Jewish community would be destroyed. On the other hand, a large percentage of the Jews in Rumania, a country known for its deep-seated anti-Semitism and its cruel treatment of the Jews, were saved. All these facts make it difficult for us to categorize matters and arrive at a comprehensive evaluation of the activities of Jews and non-Jews during the Holocaust, and this is

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especially true as far as rescue is concerned. Indeed, one cannot be certain that clear-cut answers exist to all these questions, but I believe that we should at least make an attempt in this direction. First let us describe the situation in Denmark in general terms. On several occasions, Hitler declared that he planned to establish a "New Order" in Europe which would be based on racial principles. The Aryan race, represented by the German elite, would rule the rest of the peoples, whose racial inferiority was fixed according to a system of racial gradations. The Germans, and especially the elite represented by the S.S., were at the top of the scale, whereas the Jews and the Gypsies were at the bottom. The Slavs were considered the most inferior of the nations on the middle rungs, while the Scandinavians, for example, were at the top of that imaginary ladder. The Nazis presumed that the the establishment of the "New Order" meant the annihilation of most of the inferior races. The pre-condition for the incorporation of a country in this order was its "purification" — its being made Judenrein. It is obvious that Denmark was supposed to be an integral part of the new political body, since the Nazis considered the Danes to be Aryans. Yet in Denmark, of all places, the elimination of the Jews proved unsuccessful, and was postponed time and again with the full knowledge of the authorities of the Third Reich and their representatives in Denmark. Thus the agreement between Germany and Denmark, which was concluded on the day of the occupation and remained in effect until the end of August 1943, contradicted Hitler's plan as its explicit and implicit conditions included the assumption, which was shared by both Danes and Germans, that the latter would not harm the Jews of Denmark. The agreement was cancelled in late August 1943, upon the outbreak of the crisis. Then the kingdom's internal autonomy, which was based on its democratic constitution, was abolished, creating a new situation. The danger existed that the Germans would institute a totalitarian regime and begin to implement the "Final Solution." In reality, however, the situation proved quite different. The rescue operation carried out by the Danes in October 1943 is unique in two important respects: 1) more than 98% of the Jews were saved; 2) there was a basic consensus among the Danish people that the Jews must be saved.

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The high degree of success and the spontaneous unanimity of the rescuers' actions, make this episode an important event in the annals of the Holocaust. This unanimity was the result of a basic democratichumanitarian approach, and of the policy of the Danish Government during the early stages of the occupation. Given the significance of this basic approach and its political ramifications before the crisis, we still must outline the special circumstances that set the stage for the rescue of Danish Jewry: A. In the beginning of the occupation, Denmark was not accorded a central place in the strategic considerations of the Germans, since in April 1940 there was no threat from the direction of the Baltic Sea. As far as the Germans were concerned, the main front was in the West, and therefore Norway became their strategic focal point. They did not consider Denmark a front, and its main importance was as a transit country for German troops. Following the German attack on the Soviet Union, the situation was somewhat altered but the German victories at the beginning of the war minimized the danger from that direction, and as a result, Denmark enjoyed a few years of relative quiet. Only in the summer of 1942 did the tension mount, and a year later when the tide of the war was about to turn the crisis broke out. B. There were very few Jews in Denmark, and this fact facilitated the Germans' decision to postpone the execution of the "Final Solution" to a more opportune moment. This argument was also advanced at the Wannsee Conference, where Luther, upon instructions from Ribbentrop, noted that 'the operation against the Jews should be delayed in the northern countries because of the difficulties which had arisen. C. One of the decisive factors in the fate of the Jews of Denmark was the policy of the Danish Government during the period of the agreement. Labelled the "policy of negotiation," it was actually twofaced. On the one hand, the Danes appeased the German occupiers in practical matters, which were of particular significance to the latter, such as free passage for Nazi troops on their way to Norway and the supply of agricultural and, to some extent, industrial products to Germany. On the other hand, they retained a degree of freedom of action in internal affairs in order to maintain their democratic regime and their national character. This was no simple matter, and at times the Danish Government was forced to deviate from its principles.

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Thus, for example, in the summer of 1941 it was forced to take steps against the Communist Party, and in November of the same year it was coerced into joining the Anti-Comintern Pact. These were, in fact, basic concessions since they meant an encroachment on the rights of the political parties, and the end of Denmark's hopes of remaining neutral. Yet these tactics helped convince the local German representatives, as well as the central authorities in Berlin, that better results would be attained by allowing the Danes to fulfill the Germans' requests voluntarily. Denmark's status as a "model protectorate" was based on this assumption. D. It is no wonder that the German representatives in Denmark simultaneously conducted a two-sided policy and tried to serve as intermediaries between the authorities in Germany and the Danes. Nonetheless, some of the German officials, especially members of the Nazi Party and the R.S.H.A., sought to impose a more strict regime in Denmark, but the intermediaries employed various tactics, quite a few of which were highly sophisticated, in order to mitigate the extreme demands on the one hand, and to convince the Danes to accept some of these demands on the other. These complex relations continued until the summer of 1943, when a dramatic change came about as a result of the increasing strength of the Danish underground. With the outbreak of the crisis, the internal struggle among the different German factions competing for control of Denmark also intensified, and the plan for the deportation of the Jews became a tactic as well as a goal. The goal was to expel the Jews from Denmark in preparation for its inclusion in the "European Order." The tactic was to bring in German police forces to carry out the deportation, but even more important to strengthen the position of Plenipotentiary Werner Best in his struggle with the army. The Danes indeed feared that the failure of the "policy of negotiation" was liable to bring about the persecution of the Jews, yet the Aktion of the night following Rosh ha-Shanah nevertheless came as a shock. The shock, however, did not paralyze the Danish public, but rather aroused the forces opposed to the Germans into action. For two or three weeks, the Danes, identifying the Jews' fate with their own, became totally involved in the rescue operations. They viewed the rescue of the Jews as a manifestation of their national revolt against the Germans, and thus the rare situation

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was created in which it was not the Jews who were asked or sought to prove their identification with the host country, but rather it was the Danes who proved by their response and actions how great the identification was between their national interests and the fate of the Jews. Their exisence as an independent nation and the rescue of the Jews became a single goal. This fact explains both the spontaneity and the unanimity of the action. The underground was able to channel this revolt into new organizational frameworks which continued to function later on as well. The rescue operation was an important lever in the development of the resistance in Denmark. Among its members were Danish Jews who had been rescued and were living in Sweden, as well as Swedish Jews who provided financial assistance and organizational help. Unlike the situation in other countries, however, Jews did not particularly distinguish themselves in the ranks of the resistance. The Jews were accustomed to identifying with the traditional democratic regime, and were only able to act within this framework. During their exile in Sweden they were active in the Danish Refugee Administration, but with the exception of individuals, did not participate in resistance activities. Even before the Aktion, the leadership of the Jewish community had opposed all underground activities on principle, and had even taken steps against a group of halutzim who had planned to escape. The Jewish leaders were trapped between the hammer and the anvil — between German policy and Danish policy. After the escape of a group of Jewish fishermen to Sweden in the spring of 1943, the Germans threatened the Danish authorities, and the latter in turn warned the Jewish community against a repetition of such acts. Yet at a later date, it was the ambivalent nature of the relations between the Germans and the Danes which made the existence of the rescue organization possible. The Germans did not make a serious attempt to suppress it. Moreover, at this very time the Germans signed a new and better contract with the Danes for the supply of agricultural products. The contract was signed by the Danish Secretary of State of the Foreign Ministry, who served as the de facto chairman of the Council of Secretaries of State following the resignation of the Danish Government. This council headed the internal Danish administration which was left intact by the Germans even afterwards. When comparing the rescue operation in Denmark to similar at-

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tempts made in other countries, it is possible, I believe, to distinguish between three types of basic situations which determined the activities of the Jews, the local population, the local regime, and the German authorities. This classification does not include the question of external aid, or the lack of it. A. The first category consists of those countries in which extensive, organized Jewish activity developed — whether it was conducted publicly, in the underground, or in both forms — despite the fact that the local regime and the majority of the population were anti-Semitic and adopted a hostile attitude toward the Jews. The countries in this category are first and foremost Germany, and her satellites Slovakia and Rumania. To a certain extent, Hungary also belongs in this group. It is obvious that the center of organized Jewish activity, whether it was official, clandestine, or partisan activity, was in Eastern Europe, i.e. in Poland and Lithuania. It is important to note, however, that the conditions in these countries were so different that it is difficult to include them in the comparison we are making. The unique aspect of the situation in the three satellite countries mentioned above was that the Jewish leaders got various factions to support their rescue efforts. The reasons for this support varied — bribery, the desire to realize internal or external political aims, religious convictions, and sometimes a combination of all three. In all these cases, the initiative came from the Jews. B. The second category consists of the countries in which organized local elements, at times with the cooperation of the local authorities, initiated activities to rescue Jews. Besides Denmark, the countries in this category are Norway, Finland, Bulgaria, Italy, and the southern part of Greece. The efforts made in these countries were relatively successful. Unlike Bulgaria, which abandoned the Jews in the territories it annexed (Macedonia, Thrace, and Dobrudja), Italy protected the Jews in all the territories it acquired (in France, Greece, and Yugoslavia). In these countries, the Jews had to adapt quickly to the rescue initiatives. The major motivations for the rescue activities were rooted in the social, political, or religious structure of these countries. C. The third category is comprised of those countries in which there was Jewish activity with the support of local elements, but in most cases without the knowledge of the local authorities. The countries in this category are France, especially Vichy, Belgium, Yugoslavia,

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and to a certain extent Holland. The administration in Holland was somewhat similar to the one in Denmark at the time of the crisis and afterwards. It seems that countries without political leadership, in which all the power was in the hands of the administration, were much more likely to forgo their independent stance and give in to pressure. It is obvious that in making such a classification, as in all schematic evaluations, one cannot avoid a certain artificiality, and thus certain countries may be included in two of the above categories. Slovakia is a good example. Part of the Slovak Jews were temporarily saved due to the two-year postponement of the deportations obtained by the "Working Group." The deportations, however, were resumed when the Jews took part in the Slovak Revolt in the summer of 1944. This categorization, it should be noted, does not take into account the success or failure of the operation. Our aim was solely to delineate the general factors which motivated Jews and non-Jews. It seems that we do not yet have the data which would enable us to clearly delineate the unique aspects of the behavior of Jews and nonJews. If we consider the forms of government in the various countries, there are satellites with different degrees of internal independence in the first (anti-Semitic countries) and second (initiated activities) categories, such as "independent" Slovakia, which was Hitler's creation on the one hand, and Rumania or Hungary on the other. A country like Norway, however, which was ruled by the Security Police, excelled in its efforts to save Jews. (Although the Quisling government became known as the archetype of a collaborationist regime, Quisling did not have a decisive influence on the course of events in Norway.) The matter becomes even more complex when we examine the relations between Jews and non-Jews in the various countries. In those countries with a tradition of tolerance and equal rights, such as Holland, there were no organized rescue efforts and whatever was done was the result of spontaneous action. Yet in a blatantly anti-Semitic country such as Rumania, the situation was different. It seems that the key question is the internal image of the Jewish community during the period preceding the Holocaust — to what extent were the Jews prepared for self-help? There is indeed a relationship between the anti-Semitism in a country and the attitude of the local population to the Jews during the Nazi occupation. Hungary was occupied only in

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March 1944, and until then there were no large-scale deportations although the Jews did suffer restrictions, persecution, forced labor, and even expulsions. Yet Southern France was also occupied by the Germans well after the war began — in fall 1942. While the Hungarian population collaborated with the Germans, the French provided the Jews with considerable help even during the occupation. At the beginning of the occupation, the Danes did not exhibit a great deal of resistance to the Germans. The opposition of the people and the authorities to anti-Semitism, however, was very pronounced. It determined the policy from the outset and prepared the stage for rescue when the crisis broke out. The Jewish community in Denmark, on the other hand, was from what we know among the most passive, and its leadership rejected in principle any organized activity for self-rescue. Judged by the success of the rescue operation, Denmark takes first place, but from the point of view of Jewish self-help it is in last place. The explanation for this phenomenon does not only lie in the conditions which existed in Denmark prior to the occupation, since from the point of view of equal rights there was no difference between France and Denmark, nor was there a difference between the two countries in the degree of assimilation of the Jewish community. The situation in Denmark was better than that which existed in Vichy even before the German occupation in 1942. Yet whereas Danish Jewry refrained from engaging in underground work, French Jewry conducted extensive activity, especially in Southern France. In both countries the Christian churches — the Protestant Church in Denmark and the Catholic Church in Southern France — helped in the rescue of the Jews. The uniqueness of the rescue of the Danish Jews is rooted, therefore, in contradictory phenomena. Unlike the developments in other countries, the outbreak of the crisis brought about the almost total disappearance of anti-Semitism, which as became clear later on was a factor to be reckoned with even in Danish society. The identification with the Jews was political, and led to planned political activities. On the other hand, the persecutions and dangers paralyzed all organized Jewish activity, and thus the Jews did not undertake any independent political initiatives. It seems that various questions regarding the survival of Jews in the Diaspora, for which we have not yet found any answers, are involved in this episode.

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BOOKS AND ARTICLES BY THE AUTHOR PERTAINING TO THE LECTURE "Denmark Under the Occupation — A Survey of Danish Literature," Weiner Library Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1962), p. 73. Encyclopedia Judaica, Jerusalem, 1972, entries on: Denmark — Holocaust; Norway — Holocaust; Folke Bernadotte. "Esrim Shana le-Mif'al Hatzalat Yehudei Denya," Gesher, Vol. 4, No. 2, 5723 (1963), pp. 92-97. "Hatzalat Yehudei Denya u-Mikoma be-Toldot ha-Shoa," Am Yisrael beDorainu, Jerusalem, 5721 (1961), pp. 329-341. "Methods of Persecution, A Comparison of the 'Final Solution' in Holland and Denmark," Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. XXIII, pp. 279-300 The Rescue of Danish Jewry, Test of a Democracy, Philadelphia, 1969. "Scandinavian Countries to the Rescue of Concentration Camp Pris jners," Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. VI, 1967, pp. 155-189. "Yehudei Denya be-Terezienstat," Yalkut Moreshet, Vol. 2, No. 4, 5725 (1965), pp. 65-87.

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The Historiographie Treatment of the Abortive Attempt to Deport the Danish Jews Tatiana Brustin-Berenstein

Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz and His Portrayal of the Rescue of the Danish Jews THE DEPORTATION OF THE JEWS of Denmark was discussed in several historical studies during the years 1948 to 1967. It should be recalled that the historians had at their disposal a sixteenpage unpublished representation of Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz entitled Die geplante Aktion gegen die dänischen Juden und ihre Verhinderung (The Planned Action Against the Danish Jews and Its Prevention).1 Duckwitz has been regarded as the rescuer of Danish Jewry since he had disclosed the date of the intended action three days in advance. Thanks to his warning, the Jews were able to leave their homes in time, and only a very small number were arrested and subsequently sent to Theresienstadt. Dr. Werner Best, who was the plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark, and who was arrested after the war, claimed in his evidence in the Danish court and his work Die deustsche Politik in Dänemark während der letzten 2Vi Kriegsjahre (The German Policy in Denmark during the Last 2xh Years of the War) 2 that the credit for the failure of the action was

State Archives, Copenhagen, Private Archive 5344 (hereafter — Duckwitz). State Archives Copenhagen, Private Archive 5135 (of Werner Best).

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TATIANA BRUST1N-BERENSTEIN due to him, because he had informed Duckwitz of the date. For an exact picture of the events preceding the action against the Danish Jews, it is necessary to review Duckwitz's activities and career. His portrayal of this action must be critically analyzed, while the attitude of the available historiographic discussions toward this representation and the degree to which they were influenced by it, also merit contemplation. George Ferdinand Duckwitz (born 1904) was employed from the end of 1929 until 1933 in the Copenhagen branch of a Bremen coffee export firm during which period he learned Danish. In November 1932, he joined — in Copenhagen — the National-Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) and became an active Party functionary in Denmark. In 1933, shortly after Hitler's seizure of power, he was appointed to a post in the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP (Aussenpolitisches Amt — APA) 3 which was founded on April 1, 1933, and headed by Alfred Rosenberg, the Party ideologist. Rosenberg employed people with knowledge of foreign languages and had them excerpt articles from 300 foreign newspapers. He founded a training center with special departments whose task it was to closely observe political developments in individual countries, first in England, the Scandinavian countries, the Balkans and the Middle East, and subsequently in the rest of the world as well. This Office had its own intelligence service which was eventually incorporated in the Security Services of the SSReichsführer, in accordance with Hitler's decree of July 1934.4 Duckwitz probably obtained this job in the APA because he knew Danish; it seems that he worked in the Scandinavian department until mid-1935. According to a contemporary certificate, he was "an expert on Scandinavia and the Baltic Coast." 5 No data are available about his activities between 1935 and 1939.

H. Kirchoff, "Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz" (hereafter — Kirchoff), in Lyngby Bog, Copenhagen, 1978, pp. 136-140. Louis de Jong, Die deutsche fünfte Kolonne im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart, 1959, pp. 263, 265. Kirchhoff, p. 140, He claims that Duckwitz was in charge of the Balkans department in APA (p. 141).

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A few months after the German invasion of Poland, DuckwiU contacted friends who served in the Military Intelligence (Amt Ausland Abwehr) of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht — OKW) and was sent to Denmark as a secret agent. As such he came under the direction of Department II of Amt Ausland Abwehr: "Sabotage and Subversion" (Abteilung II: "Sabotage und Zersetzung") from which he received his orders to organize acts of sabotage and to investigate the plans of the Danish sailors to commit acts of sabotage and to provoke riots. 6 During the first months of 1940 the Military Intelligence kept a close watch on the situation in Denmark, in particular the deployment of its armed forces, the security measures at its border crossings, and its harbor installations. When German troops invaded Denmark on April 9, 1940, it was the task of the Intelligence outpost to disrupt Danish communications and to carry out preventive arrests (Schutzhaftmassnahmen) at the German-Danish border. 7 The OKW Intelligence — Amt Ausland Abwehr— had reached an agreement with the German Foreign Office to the effect that the latter was prepared to assign undercover agents of the Intelligence to certain missions of the Foreign Office. Such agents, as members of the assignment team, were to be subjected to the authority of the head of the mission or his deputy. This was, however, not to affect their military subordination to the Intelligence — their strictly military assignments would be given to them directly by the Amt, but they were obliged to inform the chief of their mission of these assignments and comply with the latter's wishes insofar as they came under his competence. The Foreign Office had also stipulated that it was not the task of an Intelligence member to engage in political activities. 8 6

7

8

Kirchhoff. Interesting is his remark that Duckwitz was suspected of espionage by Danish shipping circles. P. Leverkuehn, Der geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehrmacht, Frankfurt, 1964, pp. 59-60. J. Mader, Hitlers Spionagegenerale, Berlin, 1970, pp. 128, 325, 327. G. Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst: Geschichte der militärischen Abwehr, Munich, 1966 (hereafter — Buchheit), p. 225. State Archives, Copenhagen, AA (Auswärtiges Amt), 251/264227-229, draft of the agreement.

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In the framework of this agreement, Intelligence member G.F. Duckwitz was appointed as shipping expert9 (Schiffahrtssachverständige) in the office of the German ambassador in Copenhagen, without being subjected to the authority of the Foreign Office.10 Among the staff of the embassy he found a friend in Kanstein, who was responsible for Questions of Internal Administration (Beauftragte des Auswärtigen Amts für Fragen der inneren Verwaltung). Kanstein cooperated with the Military Intelligence in the fight against sabotage. He introduced Duckwitz to Best, the plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Copenhagen, on the very day that Best arrived in Copenhagen to take up his office (November 5, 1942)." Best realized that Duckwitz was particularly qualified to help him carry out his plans on account of his knowledge of Danish and his contacts with non-German circles who believed that he opposed the Nazi regime. From Best's diary we learn that he had frequent meetings and talks with Duckwitz, inviting him to dinner together with other guests. On other occasions, Duckwitz used to invite him with certain non-Germans whom Best was interested in meeting. It is noteworthy that in his diary Best always refers to Duckwitz without mentioning his title or rank, contrary to his usual practice. On November 24, 1942, he marked Duckwitz's rank — SS-Hauptsturmführer — next to his name.12 According to Kirchoffs article in Lyngby Bog, Duckwitz claims that after a short period of service in the APA he tried to join the SS, but new members were not accepted by then. Afterwards, he relinqmished this step.13

Buchheit, p. 222, mentions that a member of the Military Intelligence Post in Oslo was appointed "attache for shipping affairs." Kirchhoff, p. 143. Kirchhoff, pp. 144-146. Parliamentary Commission (PK), vol. XIII, no. 281, Copenhagen, 1954. Here Kanstein's report about the acts of sabotage in Denmark mentions that his department was involved in the investigation of these acts, with the agreement of "the local Military Intelligence Post." In Best's diary (Private Archive 5135), the entry of November 24, 1942 (afternoon) is missing, but a copy of this entry is to be found in the State Archives under K. 10.76. Kirchhoff, p. 138.

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T H E ATTEMPT TO DEPORT THE DANISH JEWS

Best used Duckwitz as his spokesman, who presented to Danish circles his policy as the best possible policy under the circumstances, and allayed the suspicions of the Danes in connection with it. Through the mediation of a friend, the Swedish embassy secretary (Legationsrat) N.E. Ekblad, Duckwitz met with Hans Hedtoft, the leader of the Danish Social Democrats, toward the end of May 1943. Their breakfast meeting in a restaurant lasted more than four hours. Hedtoft's initial reserve soon disappeared — Duckwitz's "frankness" surprised him. In the subsequent correspondence between them, Hedtoft wrote that their conversation had taken place in a spirit of tolerance, mutual honesty and understanding of each other's viewpoints. Duckwitz, for his part, wrote in one of his letters that the German-Danish policy, as promoted and represented by Dr. Best, was based on all the principles which both he and Hedtoft considered reasonable and right. This policy should therefore be supported by Danish circles.14 Duckwitz's ties with prominent Danish circles were very important to Best, and he expressed the wish to meet the people with whom Duckwitz could establish contact. A suitable opportunity to meet these persons was offered at the receptions Duckwitz was wont to hold at his home in the evenings. Thus, on July 30,1943, Best met Svennigsen, the director of the Danish Foreign Office, and also N.E. Ekblad, and on August 18 he met the Social-Democrat politicians Wilhelm Buhl, Hans Hedtoft, Aising Andersen and H.C. Hansen. SS-Brigadeführer Kanstein was also invited to the latter meeting.15 After the proclamation of the state of military emergency on August 29, 1943, the meetings between Best and Duckwitz became frequent, in particular during the week preceding the action against the Jews — that is, from September 25 to October 2,1943. During this week Best conferred no less than seven times with Duckwitz: on Saturday, September 25; on Monday, September 27; twice on Tuesday, September 28; on Thursday, September 30; on Friday, October 1; and on Saturday, October 2.16 14 15 16

Kirchhoff, pp. 149-150. Private Archive 5135, diary entry of Best. Ibid.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATJANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN The fact that Duckwitz called six times on Best in his office immediately prior to the action against the Jews is sufficient reason for the assumption that Best charged him with some assignment in connection with this action. Duckwitz himself writes about the planned measures in his earlier-mentioned presentation. A brief summary of this representation follows. Duckwitz reports that on September 11, 1943, Best told him that he had sent a cable to Berlin on the 8 th o f t h a t month, in which he suggested exploiting the state of emergency in order to carry out an action against the Danish Jews. Duckwitz claims that he was surprised and protested vehemently. His argument with Best culminated in his refusal to continue to be part of a body which planned such an operation. He had no intention whatsoever of sharing responsibility for such a "shameful act." Notwithstanding his request to be released from his duties, however, he subsequently declared his willingness to fly to Berlin to prevent Best's cable from being forwarded by the Foreign Office to Hitler. 17 On September 13, he flew to Berlin where he spoke to his friend, Unterstaatssekretär Andor Hencke. Hencke's immediate phone call to the office of the Foreign Minister, however, established that he had acted too late: Ribbentrop had already forwarded the cable to Hitler. On September 19, Berlin's answer arrived — Hitler agreed in principle to Best's proposal. Since there was no longer any hope of effective intervention by the Foreign Office, it was decided to send Dr. R. Mildner, the commander of the Security Police in Denmark, to Berlin to persuade Himmler of the grave consequences of the persecution of the Jews of Denmark. Mildner indeed succeeded, during his visit to Berlin, in obtaining Himmler's promise to present this question to Hitler for reconsideration. 18 Not expecting much from Mildner's efforts — Duckwitz continues — and not wishing to lose time, he went to Stockholm, under the pretext of a tour of duty, to ask embassy secretary Ekblad to urge the Swedish Government to intervene. Ekblad organized a

Duckwitz, pp. 6-7. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

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meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, which took place on September 22. Following Duckwitz's "very impressive presentation," Hansson decided to send Ekblad to Copenhagen with Duckwitz so that he would be able to report immediately to his government should Hitler decide to abide by his decision. 19 Back in Copenhagen — Duckwitz reports — he received on September 25 the announcement that the decision to act against the Jews was irreversible and that the Aktion would take place on the night of October 2.20 His last hope was that the Wehrmacht would refuse to cooperate with the police in the operation. On September 26, he suggested to Kanstein, the head of the Administration Division (Verwaltung), that he should persuade "Party General" H. von Hanneken to do so. Kanstein used this opportunity to give him, Duckwitz, the friendly advice "to refrain from all independent steps which might aim at thwarting the orders of the Führer." Kanstein warned him "very urgently" and pointed out that the German Security Police had secret suspicions about him. But Duckwitz answered that he had done everything in his power, and would continue to do so, to nullify the result of the Führer's order. He was fully aware of the price he might have to pay. "But the lives of about 5,000 people are at stake, and even if one is willing to evaluate one's own life very dearly, the calculation of one against 5,000 never holds water." 21 "All the available possibilities of preventing, at the last moment, the planned operation against the Jews had by now been exhausted," Duckwitz writes. "But if the action as such can no longer be stopped, it should at least be as unsuccessful as possible." He therefore turned first of all to the men with whom he had established sufficiently friendly relations to be assured of their confidence: Hans Hedtoft and H.C. Hansen. On September 28 he informed his friends of the planned steps against the Jews. He also

19 20 21

Ibid. p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 11-13.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN passed this information on to Ekblad and Ministerialdirektor Hvass of the Danish Foreign Ministry.22 Duckwitz's portrayal contains factual untruths and most of his dates — with the exception of the last one — seem to be wrong. On the basis of contemporary documents, it can be established that the solution of the Jewish question in Denmark that was proposed by Best in his cable of September 8, 1943, was sent on the 13th of that month by the Bureau RAM of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop (Reichsaussenminister — RAM) in the special train "Westfalen" to Eberhard von Thadden (Inland II) in Berlin for his consideration. 23 Duckwitz's claim that it had already been forwarded to Hitler is thus not true. On September 14, von Thadden informed the RAM Bureau of the opinion of Inland II, in agreement with the Main Office of Reich Security (RSHA), that the proposed date would be the only possible one, "if a solution of the Jewish question in Denmark should become pressing in the near future." 24 Best's proposal was then forwarded by the RAM Bureau to Hitler, and on September 17, Hitler issued the order to deport the Danish Jews. Best was informed immediately about this by the Foreign Office and was asked for suggestions as to the number of additional police forces that were needed and the way the transport of the Jews was to be carried out. 25 On September 18, Best reported that fifty additional members of the Security Police from the Reich were required; he also supplied information about the number of Jewish families in Denmark and the necessary means of transport. According to him, the preparations for the deportation of the Jews could be completed within 9-10 days.26 On September 23, Ribbentrop sent the Führer a note containing the substance of Best's report, and Hitler decided that the action against the Jews "must take place as ordered." 27 22 23 24 25

26 27

Ibid., p. 14. AA 226/D 524779, Loesch to von Thadden, September 13, 1943. AA 226/D 524778, von Thadden to the RAM Bureau, September 14, 1943. AA 226/D 524787, Sonnleithner to Grundherr and von Thadden, September 18, 1943. AA 226/D 524773-74, Best to Foreign Office, September 18, 1943. AA 226/D 524771-72, Ribbentrop's "Note to the Führer," September 23, 1943.

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It is noteworthy that Best, in his cable to Ribbentrop of September 1, 1943, expressed his opinion about "the hard-handed policy" and the recent overt display of German power in Denmark. He drew the Foreign Minister's attention to the necessity to set up a sufficiently large German police force and pointed out that until the rescission of the military state of emergency approximately 25 police stations manned by 300 members of the German Security Police and two battalions of the Ordnungspolizei (Orpo) were needed in Denmark. 28 Gestapo chief SS-Sturmbannführer Karl Heinz Hoffman, who arrived in Copenhagen on September 14, 1943, began to prepare lodgings and offices for about 200 members of the Security Police who were to come to Denmark within the next few days. 29 The following day, about 120 Security Police members and a battalion of the Ordnungspolizei arrived in Copenhagen. 30 Since Best had informed the Foreign Ministry on September 18, 1943, of the technical details of the deportation of the Jews, there was no reason to think that the RSHA would not send the number of Security Police he had demanded on September 1 and 18. On September 21, an additional company of the Ordnungspolizei arrived, 31 but no members of the Security Police. That same day, Best and Mildner probably learned that they could expect no further officers of Security Police in times like these. On September 23, two other companies of Orpo reached Copenhagen, 32 but until the lifting of the state of emergency (October 6, 1943), no additional forces of the Security Police were sent. On the evening of September 21, the Foreign Office learned by telephone from Ambassador Paul Barandon in Copenhagen that "the commander (Befehlshaber) of the Security Police and the SD, Standartenführer Dr. Mildner, opposed the deportation of the

Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik (ADAP), Ser. E. vol. VI (1979), no. 271. Best to Foreign Office, September 1, 1943. AA 223/E 002719, Best to Foreign Office, September 14, 1943. AA 203/37176, Best to Foreign Office, September 16, 1943. AA 203/37216, Best to Foreign Office, September 22, 1943. AA 203/37224, Best to Foreign Office, September 23, 1943.

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Danish Jews and, with Best's approval, had appealed to the SSReichsführerSince Mildner could not appeal directly to Himmler, it may be assumed that he had sent his letter to the RSHA. It seems probable that this step against the deportation of the Jews was taken because only one-third of the necessary police forces had been placed at the disposal of the German authorities in Denmark. This number was too small to suppress a revolt which was likely to break out if the action was to take place, considering the tense mood of the Danish population since the proclamation of the military state of emergency. It was probably not on September 11, as Duckwitz writes, but at least 10 days later, that Best told him about the planned anti-Jewish measures and about the cable — that of the 18th, not of the 8th of September — that he had sent to Berlin. Best knew that Duckwitz maintained friendly relations with Hencke, the head of the Foreign Office's political department, and he had good reasons for hoping that the latter would help him to prevent this cable from being sent to Hitler. Therefore Duckwitz flew to Berlin to meet Hencke, not on the 13th, but on the 23rd of September. As we have noted, Ribbentrop had on that same day already sent his note to Hitler, and Duckwitz was consequently forced to return to Copenhagen without having accomplished anything. It seems that SS-Brigadeführer Kanstein also flew to Berlin about the same time to warn the RSHA personally of the expected consequences of an action against the Jews of Denmark. It should also be pointed out that on September 21, Hitler had given his consent to Himmler's proposal to transfer 4,000 Danish soldiers, who had been held imprisoned since the beginning of the state of emergency, to Germany 34 in order to recruit them for the WaffenSS. The realization of this plan, too, would have grave repercussions, and in view of the lack of sufficient Security Police forces, it was deemed advisable to cancel it. For an explanation of why there was suddenly such a lack of 33 34

AA 226/D 524765, note of Grundherr, September 21, 1943. AA 203/37218, Sonnleitner to Best, September 22, 1943.

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police forces, we must turn to the developments in Italy. After Marshal Pietro Badoglio had surrendered to the Allies on September 8, von Keitel was ordered to disarm all Italian soldiers who refused to fight on the side of the Germans and to regard them as prisoners of war.35 On September 12, Mussolini was freed from his prison by a German commando, and three days later, on the 23rd, a puppet government, headed by him, was proclaimed. SSObergruppenführer Karl Wolff was appointed as Special Advisor for Police Affairs {Sonderberater für polizeiliche Angelegenheiten) to this government, 36 and he needed Security Police forces and functionaries to establish his apparatus. The available forces were therefore sent to Italy and not to Denmark. As a result, the hardhanded policy in Denmark was a failure. Himmler was absent from Hochwald, his field headquarters, for more than 24 hours on September 23 and 24, and the RSHA could not reach him to inform him about the complications regarding the action against the Jews of Denmark. He returned to Hochwald on the 24th at 3.00 p.m. SS-Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the chief of the RSHA, talked to him on the phone at 5.25 p.m. At 7.00 p.m., the Referent for Jewish Affairs in the RSHA, SSObersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, arrived at Hochwald for a conference with Himmler.37 Himmler's notes of his talk with Kaltenbrunner make no mention of Denmark. There is, however, evidence that on the same evening, Himmler instructed SSHauptamt chief SS-Gruppenführer Gottlob Berger to fly to Denmark in order to obtain reliable information on the situation there. Two of Berger's subordinates departed immediately for Copenhagen by special plane and met with Best and von Hanneken

ADAP, Ser. E, vol. VI, nos. 291 and 300. J. Schröder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943, Göttingen, 1969, p. 325. ADAP, Ser. Ε. vol. VI, no. 340, Rahn to Ribbentrop, September 22,1943. Microfilm 84/25, Himmler's diary notes of September 12 and 15, 1943. The originals of the microfilms are in the State Archives of the Federal Republic of Germany in Koblenz. The documents were copied on microfilm in Washington and Alexandria (USA) soon after the war. Microfilm 84/26, Himmler's telephone conversation of September 24, 1943, and microfilm 84/25, Himmler's diary entry of September 24, 1943.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN with whom they discussed the deportation of 4,000 Danish soldiers to Germany. Their report caused Berger to recommend to Himmler, on September 26, that he should cancel this plan. 38 This question was indeed never raised again, and in October these soldiers were released.39 But it was too late to cancel the deportation of the Jews of Denmark. Hitler had already informed the OKW and the Foreign Office of his decision. It had therefore become necessary to find a solution which would avert the danger of a revolt with all its consequences. It seems that it was Eichmann, experienced in organizing criminal actions against the Jews of many European countries, who provided the solution. The fact that Eichmann arrived on the decisive evening to discuss with Himmler some undoubtedly strictly secret matter, is an indication that this was the case. He probably made certain suggestions and Himmler had to decide immediately in view of the urgency of the matter. It is very unlikely that Himmler's decision was ever committed to writing; only a small circle of confidants was informed by word of mouth. There can be no doubt that Himmler approved of the assumed proposal of Eichmann. His decision was that the action against the Jews must be carried out in consideration of the given possibilites, in such a way "that excessive unrest among the Danish population is avoided." On September 21, this vague instruction was, at Ribbentrop's request, passed on by the RAM Bureau to Legationsrat Wagner of Inland II.40 It should be borne in mind that the technical details of anti-Jewish actions did not fall within Ribbentrop's sphere of authority. We must therefore infer that the instruction was passed on to him on behalf of Himmler, without revealing the real contents of the order to the Foreign Office. Mention should also be made of the fact that later on the same evening, after Himmler's conference with Eichmann, Mildner was

" " 40

Microfilm 175/17/521032-33, Berger to Himmler, September 26, 1943. The same document is also on microfilm 6/007070 in Alexandria. Private Archive (of Hermann von Hanneken), von Hanneken's letter to General von Stemann, October 4, 1943. AA 2 2 6 / D 524770, Steengracht to Wagner, September 25, 1943.

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summoned to Berlin. He was to fly there the next day, September 25, together with Berger's subordinate, Obersturmbannführer Dr. Riedweg, in their special plane. 41 Mildner stayed three days in Berlin and returned to Denmark on September 28 with new instructions which the head of the Sipo gave him regarding the action against the Jews and the exact time of its execution. 42 On the same day that Mildner flew to Berlin in the special plane — on September 25 — Kanstein returned from that city and immediately, in the morning, he reported to Best.43 He probably gave him the latest instructions which stressed that the action was to be carried out without causing unrest among the Danish population. The successive events demonstrate that these instructions actually implied that the action was intended to be abortive and that the escape of most of the Jews to Sweden was not to be prevented. Best had therefore first to ascertain that Sweden was willing to admit the Danish Jews. Next, he had to inform the Jews in advance of the date of the action to enable them to leave their homes in time and to escape arrest and deportation. After his meeting with Kanstein, in the morning of September 25, Best conferred with Duckwitz. 44 He probably commissioned Duckwitz to travel to Stockholm. Best attached great importance to Duckwitz's friendly relations with Ekblad, who was at the time in Stockholm. Ekblad believed that Duckwitz "was opposed to Hitler and the National-Socialist movement," 45 and would certainly help him to establish contacts with Swedish governmental circles. The most probable course of events is that Duckwitz went to Stockholm by train on the 26th and met with Prime Minister Albin Hansson on the same day, and returned to Copenhagen, together with Ekblad, on the 27th. Hansson commissioned Ekblad to contact the Swedish Ambassador in Copenhagen to inform him of the news from

41 42 43 44 45

AA 223/E 002711, note of Grundherr dated September 24, 1943. AA 226/D 524759, Best to Foreign Office, September 28, 1943. Best, diary entry of September 25, 1943. Ibid. Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem 027/14. Note of N.E. Ekblad, January 22, 1958, p. 1.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN Duckwitz about the action against the Jews. Ekblad had arranged with Duckwitz to contact him daily on the telephone and in case Duckwitz had any new information about the action, he would say the password and they would meet afterwards in a given place. Best also charged Duckwitz with the second assignment. On September 28, Mildner returned from Berlin and reported to Best that the date of the action against the Jews had been determined. Best informed Duckwitz of this on the same day. On the afternoon of September 28, Ekblad phoned Duckwitz from the Workers' Meeting House in Römer street where he met with Hans Hedtoft, H.C. Hansen and other Danish politicians. Duckwitz gave Ekblad the password and met with him without delay. He told him what he had just heard from Best and went with him to the Workers Meeting House. There Duckwitz told Hedtoft the date of the planned action 46 and immediately afterward, he also informed the Danish Foreign Office. The aim of all this was to spread the knowledge about the appointed date, and to enable the Jews to leave their homes in time. That same day, in the afternoon, Best again conferred with Duckwitz, apparently to hear his report. On September 30 and October i, he met again with Duckwitz and gave him further details.47 On October 1, at 6.00 p.m., Ekblad called on Duckwitz at his apartment and was told that at 9 o'clock that evening all telephone lines would be disconnected and the hunt for Jews in the shut-off city would begin.48 At the last moment, just before the beginning of the action, Duckwitz thus gave the details to Ekblad and he passed on the information to the Swedish embassy in Copenhagen. In his representation, Duckwitz relates that his conversation with Albin Hansson took place on September 22, thereby creating the impression that he informed him of the planned action even before Hitler had made his final decision. Moreover, he also says that he reached Stockholm by train immediately after Mildner's flight to Berlin, which means it could not have been on September 22, but at 46 47 41

Ibid., p. 2. Best, diary entry, September 30 and October 1, 1943. Ekblad's notes, pp. 3-4.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS THE ATTEMPT TO DEPORT THE DANISH JEWS the earliest on the 25th. However, the real purpose ofMildner'strip to Berlin was not — as Duckwitz claims — to persuade Himmler of the grave consequences of the persecution of the Jews, but to receive new instructions from the RSHA concerning the action. Duckwitz actually returned from Stockholm on the 27th, and not on the 25th of September, and he learned of the date of the action only on the 28th. Nor could he have asked Best to release him from his duties, since such a request should have been directed to his superiors in Military Intelligence. He probably also made up the story of his talk with Kanstein in order to place himself in a favorable light and create the impression that he had endangered his life on behalf of the Jews by an act that could be regarded as treason. His claim that Kanstein warned him that he was suspected by the Security Police is absurd. The German police in Denmark were under Best's authority, while the Main Division of Administration and Internal Policy (.Hauptabteilung Verwaltung und Innenpolitik), which was headed by Kanstein, dealt with current police affairs. By giving incorrect dates, Duckwitz tried to obfuscate the fact that the real turning point was September 21, when the preparations for the anti-Jewish measures began, since this was the date on which Mildner sent his letter to Himmler. The myth of Duckwitz's great merit and his personal initiative to save the Jews of Denmark is untenable. He acted on Best's orders when he passed on the date of the action. If Best had not been in need of Duckwitz's help, he would have had no reason whatsoever to involve him in such secret matters of state. Duckwitz was an SS-Hauptsturmführer, and SS-Gruppenführer Best knew that he could rely on him. In his article on Duckwitz, Hans Kirchhoff remarks that he had firmly established himself in the circle of Best's counsellors, and that he and Kanstein had been Best's most important advisors since the spring of 1943.49 But this claim is not very credible. Duckwitz had no theoretical or practical training which qualified him to serve as an advisor to such an intelligent jurist and sly politician as Best, who had gathered much experience in the course of a long career. 49

Kirchhoff, pp. 147-148.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUST1N-BERENSTEIN

Remarks on Published Historical Works The Planned deportation of the Danish Jews is the subject of the following three books: Hartwig Frisch, Danmark besät og befriet (The Occupation and Liberation of Denmark) 50 ; J o r g e n H a e s t r u p , TU landets bedste. Hovedtraek af Departementschefs styrets virke 1943-1945 (For the Benefit of the Country. An Outline of the Rule of Department Chiefs 1943-1945)51; Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry, Test of a Democracy Hartwig Frisch, in the third and last volume of his work, devotes some space to the action against the Jews, proceeding mainly from Duckwitz's treatise. He gives exactly the same details about Duckwitz's travels to Berlin and Stockholm, his meetings with Hencke and Hannson, and the purpose of Mildner's visit to Berlin, and thus repeats all his falsifications." Frisch maintains that Duckwitz was a true friend of Denmark who, from the very beginning of the German occupation, utilized his function to prevent the Germans from going too far, in the belief that in the last instance this was to the good of Germany itself. He writes that on many occasions, Duckwitz was prepared to endanger his own life for the sake of his anti-Nazi principles, but without betraying the true interests of his country. He points to Duckwitz's memorable merit in saving thousands of Jews.54 He also recalls that soon after the action against the Jews, Kanstein requested to be transferred from Denmark since he had opposed it.55 It is true that with the arrival of the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer, SS-Gruppenführer Günther Pancke, the position

50 51 52 53 54 55

Copenhagen, 1948 (hereafter — Frisch). Copenhagen, 1966 (hereafter — Haestrup). Philadelphia, 1969 (hereafter — Yahil). Frisch, pp. 50-51. Ibid., pp. 49-50, 52. Ibid., p. 50.

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Kanstein held in Denmark was discontinued.56 On November 7, 1943, Ribbentrop asked Best to make Kanstein wind up the affairs of his office as soon as possible, and to report to Rahn, the Reich plenipotentiary in Italy.57 In Italy Kanstein was given a function similar to the one he had performed in Denmark. And finally: Frisch relates that Hitler ranted and raved when he learned how few Danish Jews had been deported. 58 It is not possible to establish whether Himmler explained to Hitler the serious consequences to be expected from an action against the Danish Jews, nor do we know whether Hitler was informed of the results. Jorgen Haestrup also relies to a considerable degree on Duckwitz in his discussion of the deportation of the Jews. Since some of the details in Duckwitz's representation were not clear to him, he wrote to him and asked for a clarification. This appeal induced Duckwitz to revise his article. Toward the end of May 1964, he informed Haestrup that he would send the revised version to the State Archives in Copenhagen, and request them to substitute it for the previous one.59 The revised version concentrates mainly on the following questions: what was Best's motive in proposing to deport the Jews, and what did he hope to achieve with his cable to the Foreign Office of September 8, 1943? To the first question Duckwitz now gives the following answer: Hitler a n d Himmler decided in a conference o n September 5 or 6 t o deport the D a n i s h Jews. The decision w a s passed o n to the Foreign

56

57

58 59

Pancke arrived in Copenhagen on November 2,1943. AA 229/331321, Best to Foreign Office, November 3, 1943. AA 204/43136, Best to Foreign Office, November 7, 1943. Ribbentrop had already discussed Kanstein's new appointment in Italy in a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Wilhelm Stuckart on September 18,1943. Microfilm 84/26, Himmler's telephone conversations. Frisch, p. 59. The letter and the new version are in State Archives Copenhagen, Private Archive 5344.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN Office confidentially through the mediation of Ambassador Hewel, the Foreign Office's permanent representative at the Fiihrer's headquarters. A brave member of the Foreign Minister's staff, F. von Sonnleither, informed Best of this decision in the morning of September 8, adding the request that this should not be disclosed to anyone 60

This new answer is as far from the truth as Best's claims in his work on German (and his own) policy in Denmark. Duckwitz's answer to the second question is as follows: The plenipotentiary of the Reich [Best], who had become practically powerless in the wake of the proclamation of the state of emergency, could and would not resign himself to this state of affairs. Proceeding from the assumption that it was impossible to change a decision of the Fiihrer's, but that its implementation might be prevented by a clever plan, he suggested in his famous cable no. 1032 of September 8, that the action against the Jews should be carried out while the military state of emergency was still in force. This cable, in which he drew attention to the expected consequences of an action against the Jews of Denmark, was the typical product of Dr. Best's devious mind. His personal attitude toward such an action had not changed. Best became the victim of the mistaken idea that he might be able to postpone, or even to prevent, the action against the Jews of Denmark, if he suggested that it be carried out now or in the nearest possible future. This was in view of his knowledge that the Foreign Office concurred with him, and the assumption that the General Staff of the Wehrmacht would be unwilling to take the responsibility for such an abominable act as the deportation of the Jews, which under the circumstances [the military state of emergency] would be carried out under its aegis, as it were, and because the commander of the Gestapo, Mildner, who had just arrived in Copenhagen, had already declared that he could not be responsible for this action, as his office was still in the process of formation. 61

Duckwitz's remarks about Best's way of thinking are a product of cunning speculation and entirely unfounded. His reference to Mildner's attitude is ludicrous, for Mildner began his function in 60 61

Duckwitz, new version, p. 6. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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Copenhagen and reported to Best only on September 20, and it is impossible that he influenced BestV considerations as early as September 8. In his new version, Duckwitz also claims that Best told him on September 11 about the cable he had sent on the 8th, and adds that Best "regarded me as a politically unreliable person, but nevertheless considered it of importance that one of the few Germans who maintained good relations with Danish circles should cooperate with him." 62 Thus Duckwitz reveals casually that Best cooperated with him owing to the need to make use of his relations with the Danes. His remark that Best did not rely on him politically cannot be taken seriously, for if this were true, Best would never have cooperated with him and revealed to him the secret matter of the planned action against the Jews. Concerning his request to be released from his function, Duckwitz writes in his revised version: I declared that even though I held a relatively modest position, I could not remain a member of an authority which would one day be held partially responsible by the judgment of history for an abominable and inhuman act. I requested to be released immediately from my post. The following day, September 12, Dr. Best summoned me again. After a stormy discussion ... I said that 1 was prepared to remain in Copenhagen on condition that I would be given a free hand to do all a human being can do to prevent "the success" of the planned action against the Jews in case my fears were to come true. 63

And once again, he repeats his misleading assertion that he went to Berlin on September 13 to prevent Best's cable from being forwarded to Hitler. He relates that Best told him on September 19 about Hitler's decision, and that on the same day he wrote in his diary: "I know what I have to do." But this note is meaningless, because it does not say what his plans were. Duckwitz also adds something that was not included in the original version. He mentions the search of the offices of the Jewish 62 63

Ibid., p. 8. Ibid.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATJANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN

community on September 17, and claims that he regarded this search as a kind of "warning which was confirmed by the cable of that same day. I therefore considered it already proper, in private conversations with my Danish friends, to draw their attention to the threat of an action against the Jews of Denmark." It is evident that in his new version, Duckwitz tries to back up his original, false argument that the search of the Jewish offices was not carried out on the instruction of Best. Consequently, he could write that he noticed that Best felt "very uncomfortable" because of this act. It was his impression at the time that the search was made on the orders of "a junior, over-zealous police officer." 64 Duckwitz inserts a detail about Best which was not mentioned in the earlier version. He writes that Best told him on September 28, at noon, that the arrest and deportation of all the Jews living in Denmark was to take place on the night of October 1 -2, and that Mildner had already received the relevant orders. He, Best, had had no possibility to intervene. Duckwitz adds: "Mildner was directly responsible to SS-Reichsführer Himmler." 65 Duckwitz took this information from Best's work on German policy in Denmark. At the Nuremberg Trials of German war criminals, Mildner stated that he, as the commander of the Security Police and the SD in Denmark, was subordinate to Dr. Best.66 In his first version, Duckwitz wrote that Mildner opposed the action against the Jews because he did not want to impose such an operation on the Security Police, who had just arrived in Copenhagen. In the new version, he mentions Mildner's "atrocities in Cracow" and adds: This war criminal has thus far managed to hide his deeds. He was not guided by humanitarian considerations when he opposed the planned deportation of the Jews, but by entirely technical reasons. He did not yet have enough skilled helpers for his dirty work. 67

Nolens volens Duckwitz reveals here that the lack of sufficient police 64 65 66 67

Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 16. IMT. Doc. 2375-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. V, pp. 2-3. Duckwitz, new version, p. 10.

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forces was the real reason for the opposition to the deportation of the Jews. Duckwitz repeats the story of his fictitious conversation with Kanstein. He adds words of praise for SS-Brigadeführer Kanstein who, in spite of the fact that he was a high-ranking SS officer, which he had never requested or wanted to be, was a man without blemish. The fact that he submitted his resignation when he heard for the first time of the plan to deport the Jews of Denmark, speaks for itself.

He also mentions again Best's remark that he would like to build a bridge over the 0resund to enable the Jews to cross to Sweden, and adds that he entered this remark in his diary on September 28.68 The last part of the revised version relates that on the night of October 1-2, 477 Jews out of a total of more than 6,000 were caught and deported. 69 This number is incorrect: in fact, 284 Jews were deported during that night, and about 170 on the night of October 13. The new version bears the title, "The Action Against the Jews of Denmark in the Fall of 1943: the Plan and the Execution." In a letter to Haestrup dated May 30, 1964, Duckwitz writes that Haestrup's questions induced him to re-examine the material in his possession very thoroughly. The original version "was of a highly personal nature and contained things which do not belong in a purely historical article." He expressed the hope that the revised version would be better than the original one in the State Archives. Jorgen Haestrup discusses the subject of the deportation of the Jews in the first of his two volumes, Til landets bedste ("For the Benefit of the Country"). He begins his discussion by quoting Best's cable no. 1032 of September 8,1943, almost in its entirety. He writes that the contents of this cable do not reflect Best's political views, nor his political aspirations in September 1943. According to Haestrup, these aspirations were: alleviation of the tension in the country; the formation of a Danish Government; and the

68 69

Ibid., pp. 14, 16. Ibid., p. 18.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATIANA BRUST1N-BERENSTEIN cancellation of von Hanneken's special authorization. An action against the Jews would destroy every chance of restoring more favorable political conditions for Germany — Best was aware of this as well as all the public servants in Dagmarhus. 70 To prove this point, Haestrup quotes Best's cable of September 18, and von Hanneken's cable to the WFSt of the Wehrmacht High Command (Wehrmachtsführungsstab bei Ο KW) of September 20, in which the general expressed his opposition to an action against the Jews as long as the state of emergency was in force. (He erroneously attributes this cable to Ambassador Barandon.) 71 Haestrup infers from this that all were of the same opinion as to the grave political and economical consequences of such an action. He then poses the question why Best sent this fateful cable. In order to answer it, he deems it necessary to scrutinize this cable thoroughly, because it is a femarkable document. At first glance, its contents may be interpreted as a proposal to organize an action against the Jews, but a closer examination reveals that the text is more complex. It does not contain an explicit proposal, but is rather a request to discuss the matter, assuming that such a discussion might lead to an affirmative decision. Its main point is that a decision must be reached during the emergency period.

Haestrup also emphasizes that Best mentioned the factors which might prevent a solution of the Jewish question if this solution was postponed to a later date: the resignation of a legal government, a general strike, the cessation of the work of the trade unions, and other politically negative activities. Best also repeated his previous demands to reinforce the police forces, and stressed the need for cooperation on the part of the Wehrmacht. Haestrup concludes his analysis with the following remark:

70 71

Haestrup, pp. 134-136. PK XIII/378. This cable is signed "Barandon" instead of "Hanneken." See Nuremberg Doc. 547-D, in Der Prozess gegen die Kriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, vol. 35, p. 152.

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592

T H E ATTEMPT TO D E P O R T T H E D A N I S H JEWS The cable contains no direct argument in favor of an anti-Jewish action. In this strange and ambiguous document, all the premises contradict the apparent conclusions. It contains at the same time both the deed and the alibi. 72

Moreover, Haestrup maintains that in view of what we know of Best's political views in general, this cable furnishes proof that Best was right when he insisted after the war that he had sent it because he had received secret information about an imminent action against the Jews. The aim of his cable was to prevent it, or at least to advance its date, until a German police force was organized in Denmark, since an unorganized police force would reduce the results of the action. This secret information, relating to Hitler's and Himmler's decision to deport the Danish Jews, had supposedly reached him on September 8 through the Foreign Office channels.73 In a note, Haestrup supports his view with a reference to Duckwitz's statements. On the basis of this analysis, Haestrup concludes that an action against the Jews was very undesirable as far as Best was concerned. But his way of thinking appears erroneous because he did not take into consideration the primitive mentality of the supreme NationalSocialist leadership.74 In this context it should be noted that Duckwitz, in his first version, also referred to the German political leaders as "primitive minds." Haestrup allows Best and Duckwitz to lead him astray, and he really believes that cable no. 1032 was sent to prevent the action against the Jews or to minimize its results. He does not attach any importance to the fact that Best had stressed that for an action against the Jews during the state of emergency (whose duration had not been defined) he needed — as he had demanded previously — 300 members of the Security Police, two regular police battalions, and additional Wehrmacht troops. He had also demanded the timely provision of boats to transfer the 6,000 Jews. Haestrup

12 73 74

Haestrup, pp. 136-137. Ibid., p. 137. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATJANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN believes that an earlier date of the action, before the establishment of the German police in Denmark, could really have reduced its results. Haestrup's conviction that Best wanted to establish a legal Danish Government in September 1943 is unfounded. He ignores the fact that in his cable of September 1, Best called for a hardhanded policy and a display of force, and that such a policy could never be supported by Danish politicians. The abrogation of the Danish constitution rendered the formation of a legal Danish Government impossible. In the fateful days of the August revolt, Best wrote to Himmler that if the government of Erik Scavenius resigned, he would rule and supervise the country on his own, together with a nonpolitical Danish Civil Administration. In order to reinforce the German position, Best asked Himmler to instruct the SS and the police to send him all possible aid, at least during the first period after the change of policy. He also requested that Danish volunteers be put at his disposal.75 Haestrup believes that by 1943, Duckwitz was already a longstanding opponent of the policy of the National-Socialist Party in general, and of the acts of violence and terrorism in Germany and the occupied countries in particular. And more than anything else, he was disgusted with the inhuman measures of the Nazis against the Jews. In the first years of the occupation, he did much to restrain German demands on Denmark. 76 Haestrup describes in detail Duckwitz's efforts to prevent the action against the Jews. His description is based both on Duckwitz's original representation and on the revised version of 1964. He accepts these articles as irrefutable truth without comparing Duckwitz's statements to other contemporary documents. He reiterates Duckwitz's declarations, remarks and interpretations, insists that he did extraordinary things on his own initiative, and presents the course of events exactly as Duckwitz himself did.77

Microfilm Τ 175/59/575530-33. Best to Himmler, August 22, 1943. Haestrup, p. 138. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

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Haestrup describes the developments thus: on September 18, the order of the Führer was received, and at this stage Best sought Mildner's cooperation. He, too, was against an anti-Jewish action, and traveled to Germany to find out whether a direct appeal to Himmler might bring about nullification of the decision. However, he, too, failed to achieve anything.78 This is followed by a description of Duckwitz's activities, including his visit to Stockholm, entirely in agreement with the latter's portrayal. He maintains that Duckwitz's meeting with the Swedish Prime Minister helped to instigate the Swedish protest which was to be submitted to Berlin when it was certain that the action would take place. According to Haestrup, Duckwitz returned to Copenhagen on September 25, and submitted a report on his talks in Stockholm to Best insofar as he considered this useful. Best informed him on this occasion that the night of October 1-2 had been fixed as the date of the action. Best also told him that Terboven had been present at the decisive conference in the Führer's headquarters, and had requested that Denmark should not be given a more favorable deal than Norway, as this would create difficulties for Terboven's policy in the latter country. Best saw no possibility of preventing the action, but hinted that insufficient police forces were available for its efficient execution, let alone guarding the 0resund coast. It was clear to Duckwitz, Haestrup writes, that the Gestapo and the Security Police could not be expected to take the initiative to prevent the action, and therefore he asked Kanstein to intercede with von Hanneken, in order that the latter might refuse to permit the cooperation of the Wehrmacht. 79 And finally, Haestrup argues, only one man — Duckwitz — was willing to act, whatever the price he would have to pay.80 Most of the book's errors are the result of Haestrup's failure to compare Duckwitz's statements with the documents of the Foreign Office. It is therefore appropriate to list these documents: 1. Best's cable of September 8 was not sent to Hitler on the 13th, but 78 79 80

Ibid., p. 140. Ibid., p. 141. Ibid., p. 147.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATJANA BRUST1N-BERENSTEIN to von Thadden in Inland II for his consideration. 81 Nor is it true that Duckwitz spoke with Hencke on September 13 about the withdrawal of the cable. 2. On September 18, Best did not believe in the possibility that the decision to act against the Jews could be cancelled, for on that same day he sent a cable with suggestions for its execution.82 3. The first step toward the cancellation of the action was taken by Mildner in his letter to Himmler of September 21.83 4. Best's suggestions were presented to Hitler by Ribbentrop on September 23.84 Duckwitz's talk with Hencke apparently took place on the same day. They discussed the withdrawal of the cable of the 18th, but in the meantime the matter had already been referred to the Führer. 5. Mildner did not fly to Berlin in an attempt to cancel the decision regarding the action against the Jews, but to receive new instructions from the RSHA for its execution.85 6. Duckwitz's meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Hannson did not take place on September 22, for he went to Stockholm after Mildner had departed for Berlin, that is, after September 25. 7. Consequently, Duckwitz did not return to Copenhagen on the 25th. Nor did Best inform him of the appointed date of the action on that day, for he himself learned of it only on the 28th. Leni Yahil discusses the deportation of the Jews of Denmark in her book, The Rescue of Danish Jewry, Test of a Democracy. She describes the action against the Jews in chapters IV ("The Political Crisis and Jewish Persecution") and V ("Operation Failure"). Chapter IV opens with a characterization of Dr. Best. According to

See above, note 23. See above, note 26. See above, note 33. See above, note 27. AA 233/002711, Grundherr's note of September 24, 1943, on his telephone conversation with Ambassador Barandon on the same day. Barandon had reported that Mildner would fly to Berlin the next morning for a meeting with the Reichführer SS. Himmler did not reside then in Berlin, but in his field headquarters in East Prussia.

595

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her, his character was ambiguous and full of internal contradictions. This became manifest in his enigmatic attitude, as the plenipotentiary of the Reich, to the fate of the Jews. At the height of the crisis, during the state of emergency, he suddenly suggested that action be taken against the Jews and that they be deported from Denmark. At the same time, he took a personal risk by trying to prevent such an action and enable the Danes to rescue the life and property of the Jews of Denmark. 86 Yahil asks who initiated the action against the Jews, and she undertakes to prove that Best himself was responsible for their persecution. On the surface, it seems as if this action was purposeless, but in fact it served his political and personal interests, and had decisive impact on the balance of political power. She stresses that Best's own utterances and declarations have no substantial significance. Their only purpose was to put the blame on others. In her view, this must be attributed to Best's political position under the conditions of the state of emergency. His objectives are summed up as follows: a. To ensure reaffirmation from the central authorities of his position as the chief representative of the Reich. b. To prevent the return of democratic rule to Denmark and in the future to govern the country and cooperate with the Danes with the aid of a civil administration. c. To prevent the various National Socialists and quislings from taking advantage of the situation. d. To create an administrative and judicial system in Denmark which would be responsible to him alone. e. To set up a police force under his personal command to constitute a counterweight to the army, and with its help — and, if possible, with the cooperation of the Danish police — to wield control over the country. 87

Yahil contends that points (d) and (e) were the most important and that in these fields Best attained his objective. His powers were indeed reconfirmed, and henceforth German rule rested on the police. This police force was established in September 1943 on

•6 »7

Yahil, p. 113. Ibid., pp. 130-131; see also pp. 127-131.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUST1N-BERENSTEIN Best's demand, and there is a connection between this fact and the persecution of the Jews. She believes that Ribbentrop's cable, which reached Copenhagen on the night of September 1 and reconfirmed Best's position as plenipotentiary of the Reich, was sent at the initiative of Ribbentrop himself, who wanted to leave political power in Denmark in Best's hands. But Best did not rely on the decision of the Foreign Office, and before he received Ribbentrop's cable, he had sent one of his own — no. 1001 — with the request to establish a strong German police force in Denmark while the state of emergency was still in force. 88 As to the question of why Best sent his cable no. 1032 suggesting a solution to the Jewish question, Yahil rejects Best's own explanation that he had received a secret message from the RAM Bureau that Hitler had already made his decision on this matter. She presents the documents of Inland II which show that on September 13, the RAM Bureau had asked for the reaction of Inland II to Best's cable. According to her, the RAM Bureau would not have made such a request if it was known that Hitler had already reached a decision. She therefore concludes that "no other authority," aside from Best himself, initiated the persecution of the Jews.89 Yahil maintains: "What is clear is that Best used the situation as leverage in his struggle for power in Denmark." 90 His failure in that country would inevitably have led to the end of his political career and to his loss of face with the leaders of the SS, and in particular with Himmler. He undoubtedly recalled his "exile" in France and his desperate attempts to regain the favor of the SS leadership, and he was willing to employ every means to avert the recurrence of such a situation. The author does not accept Best's argument, but on the other hand, she has complete confidence in his declaration relating to the period after the rejection of the German demands by the Danish Government:

Ibid., pp. 133-135. Ibid., pp. 139-143. Ibid., p. 144.

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THE ATTEMPT TO DEPORT THE DANISH JEWS For the plenipotentiary, Dr. Best, this phase was one of hard and ceaseless war on two fronts. On the one hand, he endeavored to defend German interests, as he understood them, against the increasing assaults of the enemy — through partisan actions and unsettling political maneuvers. On the other hand, he strove to prevent, or at least to minimize, the growing intervention in Danish affairs of the Fiihrer's general staff and other German authorities ... insofar as this intervention clashed with true German interests. 91

Yahil sums up this thesis by stating: The main factor in this campaign on two fronts was Best's fierce determination to preserve his own position. This two-fronted and two-faced policy involved him in complicated tactics in all spheres, but its implementation became especially obvious when, on the one hand, he suggested that the Jews be persecuted and, on the other, worked toward the frustration of that very persecution. 92

Against these arguments of Yahil the following objections can be raised: 1. The assumption that in September 1943 Best's position was unstable is unfounded. It is true that three days after the state of emergency had been proclaimed (August 29-31), he was suspended from his function as plenipotentiary of the Reich, but on Hitler's order Ribbentrop informed him (in the night before September 1) that he, as the plenipotentiary of the Reich, continued to bear political responsibility even for the duration of the state of emergency. This was not Ribbentrop's decision, since Hitler alone had the competence to appoint Reich plenipotentiaries. Hitler thus strengthened Best's position in spite of the state of emergency, and at the same time restricted von Hanneken's operative powers. This decision was preceded by the following developments: On August 31, in the afternoon, Himmler went to the headquarters of the Führer (Wolfschanze) where he conferred with Lieutenant-General Warlimont, the representative of the General 91 92

Ibid., p. 146. Ibid.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

Tatiana brustin-berenstein Staff of the Wehrmacht (WFSt), and with Field-Marshal Keitel, the chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), and subsequently with Hitler himself.93 That same evening, Hitler instructed Ribbentrop to send Best the above-mentioned cable, informing him that he was charged with establishing a centralized authority subordinate to him, consolidating relations with the royal family, providing guidelines to the press and the radio, and organizing the economy. It would also be expected of him to submit suggestions regarding political developments in Denmark and possible changes in the emergency regulations.94 The aim of Himmler's talks with Warlimont and Keitel was apparently to obtain their agreement to restrict von Hanneken's powers for the duration of the state of emergency. Von Hanneken realized that his position was crumbling, and he was convinced that Hitler had given Best new powers at the suggestion of Ribbentrop. 95 2. Best sent his cable no. 1001 on September l,at 10.10 a.m., shortly after (not before!) his position as plenipotentiary of the Reich had been reconfirmed. 96 In order to pursue the change of political course, he had to establish a police force in Denmark. He considered that the following most urgent steps needed to be taken before the rescission of the state of emergency: the formation of a police force large enough to man 25 police stations; the establishment of a German special court (Sondergericht)·, the transfer of the secret fiele police from the authority of the Wehrmacht to the civil police which was subject to himself, and the organization of a comprehensive secret service. Yahil's allegation that the purpose of establishing a police force was to create a counterweight to the Wehrmacht is unfounded. Its real aim was to fight the Danish resistance.

Microfilm 84/25, diary note of August 31, 1943. At 4.00 p.m., Himmler spoke with Warlimont, at 4.45 p.m. with Keitel, and at 5.30 p.m. with Hitler. A D A P Ser. E, vol. VI, no. 268. Ribbentrop to Best, August 31, 1943. Private Archive 5533, Hanneken to Warlimont, September 7, 1943. A D A P , Ser. E, vol. VI, no. 271.

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3. Yahil's assertion that Best regarded the persecution of the Jews as a means of regaining his position of power is incorrect, for on September 1 his position had already been reaffirmed. Nor was there any danger that he might lose face with Himmler. His term of office in France had not been a period of "exile." He could have returned to the RSHA, for Heydrich had merely given him leave to serve in the Wehrmacht. 97 But Best preferred his job in France. In this function he performed important assignments for the SS, including persecution of the Jews. On May 13, 1942, while still serving in France, he wrote to SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff that he was doing all he could in occupied France "to serve the interests of the SS and the objectives of SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich." 98 In his function as plenipotentiary of the Reich in Denmark, Best also tried to implement the policy of the SS, but prior to the state of emergency he was unable to take radical measures against the Jews, for a Danish Government then still existed and it threatened to resign if the Jews were to be persecuted. However, when the Scavenius Government was dismissed and a state of emergency was declared — the emergency regulations were to remain in force until the arrival of German police forces — Best decided to exploit this interim period to organize an action against the Jews. 4. The assumption that Best's character was ambiguous, that he fought on two fronts, and that this character trait became manifest when he ordered the deportation of the Jews and at the same time tried to prevent it, is untenable. This assumption is based on the statements and evidences of both Best and Duckwitz, given at Best's trial in Denmark. But all these utterances are misleading. It was not "at the same time," but 13 days after the proposal to act against the Jews (September 8), that Mildner expressed his objection to such an action in his letter to Himmler of September 21. This letter was

97

98

Microfilm Τ 175/425/2 953806. Announcement of Department I of RSHA (Referat I of group B) of June 12,1940, that Best "was granted leave in order to be assigned to the Wehrmacht" as of June 12, 1940, "until further notice." AA 443a, copies from Documentation Center in Berlin. Best's private documents: letter to Wolff of May 13, 1942.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN actually sent to the RSHA in the wake of a consultation between Best, Mildner and Kanstein in Best's apartment on the same day. On that day, too, one company of German Ordnungspolizei (Οτρο)99 — but not of the Security Police (Sipo), i.e., Gestapo and Kripo — arrived in Copenhagen. Best apparently realized that he could not expect further Sipo forces. It is indeed a fact that only Orpo forces, but no further Sipo officers, arrived after that date (i.e., before the action against the Jews). The lack of sufficient Sipo forces was Best's main reason for abandoning this action. 5. Best's purported desire to prevent the Danish National Socialists from exploiting the situation to their advantage is not in agreement with the facts. At that time, they had already ceased to be a ι active political factor. Best's main task, in line with the policy ol the SS, was to recruit Danish volunteers for the Schalburg corps against the wish of Fritz Clausen, the leader of the Danish Na is, who threatened to evict from the Party every member who vol nteered for this corps.100 In Chapter V, the author describes Best's attempts to prevent the deportation of the Jews: In his relations with the Danes, Dr. Best's maneuvers in his "war on two fronts" forced him to conceal the origin of the Jewish persecutions but also to do all he could to hamper their performance. He was convinced that he could not maintain his position in Denmark or appear before the German authorities as a confidant of the Danes if the latter were to find out that he had been the instigator of the pogrom. Opponent of persecution in theory and in practice — this had to be his public image. Were the order to intern thousands of Jews to be ascribed to him, he would forfeit all chance of maintaining himself in power, for even with his three police battalions he could not rule Denmark by force. Cooperation and goodwill on the part of the Danish administration were essential to him.101 99 100

101

AA 203/37216, Best to Foreign Office, September 22, 1943. Berger, the head of the SS-Hauptamt, wrote to Himmler on February 1, 1943, about Clausen's reservations. Joining the Schalburg corps would cancel membership in the DNSAP. AA 442, Berger's letter to Himmler. Yahil, p. 147.

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THE ATTEMPT TO DEPORT T H E D A N I S H JEWS

Yahil seeks to show that Best tried to prevent the disaster, which he himself had instigated, in several ways: 1. He maneuvered others into protesting to the central German authorities against the persecutions. 2. He tried to implicate the army. Under the state of emergency, the army was responsible for the general situation. If the army were to avoid the population's hostility, it too had to oppose the persecutions. Best, however, was interested in precisely the reverse process: if the action could take place under the military aegis the army would be blamed, while Best could pose as the decent fellow to whom such operations were distasteful. 3. He had to create the general impression that the persecution of the Jews was by Hitler's personal order, while Best — though he had no choice but to obey — was in fact opposed to it. 4. Every opportunity had to be granted the Jews to escape and the Danes to help them do so. 102

Under the heading "Attempts at Prevention" in chapter V, Yahil discusses the efforts of Duckwitz, Mildner, Kanstein and von Hanneken to prevent the action. She maintains that Best himself gave the signal for the start of these measures when he told Duckwitz on September 11 that he had sent his cable no. 1032. According to her, Duckwitz was a former National Socialist who had changed his views. On the basis of what Duckwitz maintains, she relates that the Danes received from Duckwitz important information about the dealings of the German centers of power, and passed much of it directly on to the British Intelligence Service.103 For Duckwitz's intervention in the matter of the anti-Jewish action, Yahil relies entirely on his own representation without questioning its reliability. She reiterates his account of the talks with Best about the deportation of the Jews, and cites the incorrect dates of his travels to Berlin and Stockholm. She also maintains that in his meeting with Prime Minister Hansson on September 22, he suggested that Sweden, as a neutral country, should intervene to prevent the deportation of the Jews. She writes: "It is difficult to say

102 103

Ibid., pp. 147-148. Ibid., p. 149.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN whether Best was aware of the scope of Duckwitz's Danish connections, though he presumably knew they existed.'" 04 According to her, Mildner was the second person urged by Best to do something to prevent the action against the Jews.105 She quotes Mildner's evidence at the Nuremberg Trials, in which he recalled all the arguments against such an action which he had listed in his letter to Müller, the head of Department IV of the RSHA. According to his evidence, he had received an answer from Kaltenbrunner who ordered him, on behalf of Himmler, to go ahead with the action. He then flew to Berlin to explain his arguments in person to Kaltenbrunner. But he did not meet Kaltenbrunner, and instead he met with Müller who phoned Himmler in his presence, reiterating all Mildner's arguments. Mildner concluded his evidence with the — false — statement that shortly after his return to Copenhagen, Himmler's instruction arrived to launch the action as planned. 106 Mildner placed all emphasis on his efforts to prevent the deportation of the Jews, but did not mention the real reason for his objection, namely, the failure of the RSHA to send sufficient Security Police forces to Denmark. Such an admission would not have served his interests. He did mention his stay in Berlin from September 25 to 28, but not that he received new instructions there from the RSHA, as well as the date fixed for the action. Following her remarks on Mildner's activities, Yahil turns to the steps taken by Kanstein to prevent the action against the Jews. On the basis of Kanstein's evidence, she writes that he learned of the plan to deport the Jews on September 17 when Hitler's order had been received. He then consulted with Ambassador Barandon, Duckwitz, Engelmann (head of the Military Intelligence Post in Denmark), a™d others to determine what could be done to prevent the implementation of the plan. As all of them agreed that the action

104 105

10i

Ibid. The author writes here that Mildner was the commander of the police battalions that Best had asked for. But in fact, they were commanded by Chief of Ordnungspolizei Major-General von Heimburg, who arrived in Copenhagen on September 29, 1943. Mildner was the head of the Sipo and the SD. Yahil, pp. 151-152.

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would harm German interests, they supported Kanstein's proposal to present their opinion to four ministries in Berlin: the Foreign Office, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Trade, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Von Hanneken also agreed, and Best was evasive, but did not object to Kanstein's trip to Berlin. Kanstein maintained that all these ministries, as well as certain individuals, showed a willingness to listen to his assertion that persecution of the Jews of Denmark would be unwise. Everywhere he was promised that his words would be forwarded. He returned to Copenhagen on the same day that Mildner flew to Berlin. According to Yahil, Kanstein, as well as Duckwitz, mentioned a new order — from Hitler — to carry out the action on the night of October 1-2. This action was assigned by Hitler to Himmler, and to execute it, Himmler would use the police battalions that had been sent for this purpose to Denmark. 107 These are all striking examples of misleading evidence. Kanstein was lying when he said that he had consulted several people and discussed such a secret matter as the deportation of the Jews with staff members of four ministries. As a matter of fact, the RSHA, subject to Himmler, was the only authorized body to whom he could have presented any reservation, but Kanstein never mentioned that he had been there. It is important to note that Mildner flew to Berlin when Kanstein returned. This means that the latter was in Berlin on the evening of September 24, the same evening that Eichmann flew to Hochwald for a conference with Himmler and returned after a conversation which lasted half an hour.108 It may be assumed that Kanstein was informed of the outcome of this conversation and instructed to report to Best. But in his evidence he did not even mention this. His talk about an order by Hitler from which the date of the action could be inferred is inane. Hitler did not concern himself with small things like dates of actions. We recall our opinion that the date was given to Mildner in the RSHA together with the new instructions.109 107 10

·

109

Ibid.,p. 152. Microfilm 84/25, Himmler's diary note of September 24, 1943. See p. 193 in the text. Note 42.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN Yahil maintains that the Wehrmacht also joined the opponents of the anti-Jewish measures. Best informed von Hanneken of Hitler's order only on September 20, and on the same day, von Hanneken sent a cable to the OKW, which Yahil quotes in full. She writes that Best gave von Hanneken this information on that specific day because he had just learned from the OKW that Hitler was willing to rescind the state of emergency if von Hanneken, with Best's approval, considered that the situation was sufficiently satisfactory to justify this. The final decision was to be expected within a few days after receipt of the opinion of the Foreign Office.110 Best's diary entries do not mention a meeting with von Hanneken on September 20, 1943. Von Hanneken heard only on that day of the plan to deport the Jews, probably not from Best but from Mildner. As the commander of the Sipo and the SD, Mildner was responsible for organizing the action against the Jews. His first meeting, after having reported to Best in the morning, was apparently with von Hanneken. It seems that they discussed, among other things, this action and the need of Wehrmacht support. In his cable to the OKW of the same day, von Hanneken rejected any suggestion that the Wehrmacht carry out this action.111 Yahil writes that in his telegram of September 18, Best undertook to conclude the preparations for the deportation of the Jews within 9 to 10 days, at the same time reiterating the harmful political repercussions of this action. Since his request for police contingents had in the meantime been complied with, and the troops had already begun to arrive, Best did not need the action against the Jews and was no longer interested in its implementation. Most of his efforts to prevent it were made during the ten days of preparation. 112 This argument does not seem substantial. Yahil ignores the fact that the attempts to prevent the deportation began not when the first forces had arrived, but when it became clear that the RSHA would not send further Security Police forces. The author mentions Foreign Minister Ribbentrop as one of the 110 111 112

Yahil, pp. 153-157. Nuremberg Doc. 547-D, see note 71 above. Yahil, p. 156.

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opponents of the action against the Danish Jews. The abovementioned "note to the Führer" of September 23 was intended to raise the question of whether the deportation of the Jews was really advisable. She believes that Ribbentrop was truly worried and feared the political repercussions. According to her, his concern and apprehension are manifest in the instructions that were sent on his behalf to the Foreign Office on September 25, emphasizing that the action must be carried out without creating "excessive unrest among the Danish population.'" 13 It must be stressed, however, that the Foreign Minister was not authorized to issue instructions on how to carry out actions against the Jews and which measures to avoid. Only the "Judenreferat" of the RSHA was authorized to do so. This instruction was probably a result of Himmler's conference with Eichmann on September 24. Right after the meeting with Eichmann, Himmler went to Hitler's headquarters,114 and probably gave the instruction to Ribbentrop through his permanent representative at Hitler's headquarters — Ambassador Walter Hewel. Yahil furthermore maintains that the attempts to prevent the deportation of the Jews were rejected categorically by the central authorities, including Himmler. She draws attention to the fact that no measures were taken against Best, although he acted against the wishes of Himmler. She believes that the internal investigation after the action was the reason for this. Himmler's reaction to Best's opposition to the action against the Jews and the deportation of Danish soldiers was to appoint Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (HSSP) Pancke as Best's equal and not as his subordinate.115 This assertion of Yahil seems to be incorrect. According to the historian Hans Buchheim, Pancke served in Denmark as the "ambassador" of SSReichsführer Himmler, and it was his task to safeguard the political interests of Himmler and of the SS in general.116 Best was

1,3 114 1,5 116

Ibid., pp. 161-163. See note 108 above. Yahil, pp. 190-191. H. Buchheim, SS und Polizei im NS-Staat, Duisdorf bei Bonn, 1964, p. 122-123.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

TATIANA BRUSTIN-BERENSTEIN Ribbentrop's representative in Denmark, and Himmler preferred this new arrangement. In the beginning of October 1943, Himmler informed Best of Pancke's appointment as HSSP and of the planned reorganization. In his letter to Best Himmler urged him, in very cordial terms, not to resent that Pancke would not be subordinate to him. The letter contains words of appreciation for Best's work in Denmark. As to the action against the Jews, Himmler wrote that it had been "right" — a clear indication that he had agreed in advance with its failure.117 Only a draft of this letter exists, dated "October" without specifying the exact day. However, it may be assumed that it was written during the first days of that month, shortly after the action against the Jews, mainly because it was sent from Himmler's field headquarters and Himmler was in Berlin between September 30 and October 2.118 The copy of this letter, which Yahil had at her disposal, contains two errors. Twice the word wichtig (important) is written instead l richtig (right). Instead of "the action against the Jews was right," it says, "the action against the Jews was important." 119 Perhaps this is the reason why she did not notice Himmler's positive evaluation of the anti-Jewish action that had failed. The historiography of the deportation of the Jews of Denmark has hitherto been influenced mainly by the representation of Duckwitz and partly also by that of Best, and has consequently been led astray. For neither Duckwitz nor Best aimed at revealing the historical truth. Both sought to secure their personal interests. Best tried to avert a heavy sentence, while Duckwitz was indeed believed to have been an opponent of Nazism and the rescuer of Danish Jewry, and eventually reaped the fruits of this reputation.

117 118 1,9

Microfilm Τ 175/59/575521. Himmler to Best, October 1943. Microfilm 84/25, Himmler's diary notes of September 30-0ctober 2, 1943. Yahil, p. 462, note 85.

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THE DYNAMICS OF DECENCY: DUTCH RESCUERS OF JEWS DURING THE HOLOCAUST

By Dr. Lawrence Baron Associate Professor of History St. Lawrence University

FRANK P. PISKOR FACULTY LECTURE May 2, 1 9 8 5

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The deliberate mass m u r d e r of six million Jews by the Nazis during World War Two represents the most heinous historical example of t h e h u m a n capacity for cruelty and indifference. Standing in the dark shadows cast by t h e memory of the concentration camps, we have come to expect the w o r s t f r o m humankind. Holocaust scholarship has demonstrated how otherwise decent people suspended all moral considerations to commit atrocities in obedience to superior orders or f o r the sake of national security and racial purity. It also has shown how the vast majority of Europeans living under G e r m a n domination remained passive t o w a r d s the plight of their Jewish neighbors to protect themselves and their families f r o m the severe reprisals meted out to those w h o befriended Jews. As George Kren and Leon Rappoport have observed, a consciousness of the real meaning of the Holocaust engenders "a central, deadening sense of despair over the human species. Where can one find an affirmative meaning in life if h u m a n beings can do such things?" 1 Such pessimism, however, either neglects or minimizes the significance of that courageous minority of Gentiles w h o shielded Jews f r o m Hitler's genocidal policies. Despite the high risks this entailed, these m o d e r n good Samaritans managed to save approximately 200,000 Jews f r o m perishing in the Final Solution. Since 1953, Yad Vashem, Israel's major Holocaust documentation center and memorial, has identified and honored 5,000people w h o endangered themselves to rescue Jews without expecting any compensation in r e t u r n . The current director of this program estimates that there may have been as many as 50,000 of these "Righteous Gentiles." 2 Although this figure constitutes only a tiny fraction of the 300,000,000 Europeans ruled by Nazi Germany, it still reveals that there was a viable ethical alternative to the prevailing compliance and inaction exacted by German military coercion. "It is not the number that m a t t e r s , " Philip Friedman has argued; "What matters is that a small army of valorous men and women opened their hearts and their homes to a people marked to extinction, defying the invader and death itself." 3 Most research about this bleak period understandably has focused on the horrors inflicted on European Jewry and has avoided the atypical instances where compassion triumphed over barbarism. 4 To be sure, there are m a n y autobiographical and biographical accounts of the perilous e f f o r t s to shelter and aid Jews, like The Hiding Place and Schindlers List, but these popular narratives rarely examine in any depth the backgrounds, motivations, and personalities of their protagonists. Even Yad Vashem has limited its task to recording the deeds of the "Righteous Gentiles" and has done no follow-up studies on them. Thus, we know much about what decent people did to alleviate Jewish suffering under the Nazis, but little about why they did so. The few systematic explorations of this topic have employed t w o distinctive approaches. T h e first and most common has dealt with the historical conditions that fostered collective rescue operations at the national and local levels. 5 The second has analyzed the psychological traits and sociological profiles of relatively small numbers of individuals w h o had helped Jews. 6 What has been lacking is any attempt to explain the interaction between broader historical and situational factors on the one hand and personal characteristics, experiences, and motivations on the other. T o do this it would be necessary to adopt a comparative approach based on m o r e extensive samples of rescuers f r o m different countries. The Altruistic Personality Project headed by Professor Samuel P. Oliner

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of Humboldt State University already has begun this kind of study. The Project currently is conducting intensive interviews of five hundred rescuers who have been either recognized by Yad Vashem or identified by rescued Holocaust survivors. Based on the hypotheses and findings of existing research on altruistic behavior in general, and on the saving of Jews during the Holocaust in particular, the structured section of the interview is designed to collect data on factors which may have contributed to the decision to help Jews. These variables include the emotional and intellectual influence of parents and other significant role models during childhood, relevant socialization experiences outside of the family, previous perceptions and beliefs, situational circumstances conducive to involvement in rescue activities, and the nature of the relationship between the rescuer and the rescued person or persons. The open-ended part of the interview gives the rescuer the opportunity to tell his or her story without interruption. Though there is always the possibility that retrospective insights and memory loss have distorted the rescuer's account of what actually happened, the validity of the testimony can be checked by evaluating its internal consistency, comparing it to the version of the rescued person when available, and judging its probability in light of established historical knowledge about the conditions when the rescue occurred. The Project also plans to administer the interview to a control group of five hundred demographically similar people who lived under the Nazi occupation, but did not help Jews then. To provide a comparative dimension, the interview pool consists primarily of rescuers and non-rescuers from France, Germany, Holland, Italy, and Poland, and the results will be analyzed on both a national and composite basis. 7 As a research associate of the Altruistic Personality Project, I have interviewed seventeen rescuers and four rescued Jews in the past year and a half. Since by coincidence most of the people initially interviewed were Dutch, I decided to conduct a pilot study on what characteristics and motivations Dutch rescuers had in common and on whether these differed from those of rescuers from other countries. In pursuit of this goal, I went to Holland last October to interview more Dutch rescuers and to assist Professor Oliner in setting up a local research team there. Tonight's lecture is based on sixteen of my interviews and on three additional ones administered by another member of the Project. Given the limited size of my sample, along with the absence of interviews of a control group, it would be misleading for me to present a statistical analysis of my data and claim that it was representative of all Dutch rescuers. Instead, I will relate the stories of six rescuers and analyze the major reasons why they helped Jews during the Nazi occupation. I have chosen these cases because they best typify discernible recurring patterns in the backgrounds, motivations, and personalities of the Dutch rescuers in my sample as a whole. The categories I have placed them in constitute my synthesis of theories developed by other researchers in this field. Where it sems pertinent and significant, I will compare and contrast my findings to corresponding data about rescue operations and rescuers in other countries.

For those of you who are unfamiliar with the Holocaust, I will present a brief overview of its history and more specifically,the history of the Jewish community in Holland prior to and during the German occupation. Hitler's pathological hatred of the Jews was a matter of public record long before he came to power. Nevertheless, it was not originally self-evident that he planned to exterminate them." From 1933 until 1938, the Third Reich enacted legislation and issued propaganda that incrementally led to the complete disenfranchisement, expropriation, identification, segregation, and vilification of German Jewry. These policies ostensibly aimed at making the

611 SUPPORT FOR JEWS status of German Jews so unbearable that they would be forced to emigrate. Up until the Crystal Night pogrom in November of 1938, the use of statesanctioned violence against Jews had been the exception rather than the rule. The measures taken against Jews became increasingly brutal following the invasion of Poland in 1939 and culminated with the 1941 decision to kill the millions of them who now resided in areas under German domination. The preceding eight years enabled 60 percent of the German Jews to flee to safer places; the Jews in the newly conquered territories had neither the time nor the chance to choose this option. 9 Yet the extent of Jewish victimization varied greatly from country to country depending on several factors. First and foremost, how direct and thorough was SS control over each nation? After all, it was the SS which Hitler had entrusted with the mission of eradicating the Jews. Regular civilian and military German authorities usually had more practical priorities. Second, how much discretionary power remained in the hands of indigenous national leaders, and did they use it to restrain or resist Nazi demands for the persecution and eventual deportation of native Jews to the death camps in Poland? This was important because the SS relied on local governmental agencies and personnel to register Jews, strip them of their rights and property, and arrest and deliver them to transit camps supposedly for their impending "resettlement" in Eastern European labor camps. For example, both Bulgaria and Slovakia were autonomous German allies. The Slovakian regime agreed to most German requests for the deportation of its Jews; the Bulgarian regime did not. By the end of the war, 80 percent of Slovakian Jewry had perished, whereas 80 percent of Bulgarian Jewry survived. Third, the level of pre-war anti-Semitism and the degree of Jewish integration into each respective society affected the amount of sympathy and support Jews received during the occupation. In Poland, where anti-Semitism was widespread and Jews formed an ostracized subculture, little aid was extended to Jews even by many Poles who joined anti-German resistance movements. This contrasted sharply with events in Denmark where a broadly based and daring rescue operation saved almost the entire Jewish community which was regarded as an integral part of Danish society. Finally, there were miscellaneous factors that influenced the outcomt of the Holocaust in each country, such as whether the topography of the region facilitated or inhibited the hiding of Jews and whether its location favored smuggling them into contiguous neutral nations. 10 The Dutch Jewish community, which constituted 1.6 percent of the population of pre-war Holland, benefited from a long national tradition of religious tolerance and civic equality. As early as the seventeenth century, Jews were permitted to settle and worship in many cities in Holland without being required to wear identification badges, live in ghettos, and pay special taxes as was the practice in much of Europe. Although they could not hold public office and join certain guilds, they never became the target of the sort of anti-Jewish riots that erupted sporadically in other European countries. In 1796 the French revolutionary army invaded Holland and installed a republic which granted equal rights to all Dutch citizens regardless of their religious affiliation. After the defeat of Napoleon, the Netherlands retained this principle in its constitution. Over the course of the next century, Dutch Jews gained entry and acceptance in most sectors of the economic and political life of Holland. Aside from a few pockets of de facto discrimination, anti-Semitism exerted little popular appeal among the Dutch. 11 Even the small fascistic National Socialist Movement of the Netherlands, which I will subsequently refer to as the NSB for brevity's sake, originally stood for freedom of religion and admitted Jewish members. 12 Since Holland suffered from a high

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unemployment rate in the 1930s, the influx of Jewish refugees from Germany during that decade generated some anti-Semitic resentment. Nonetheless, the Dutch generally distinguished between native Jews and the alien newcomers. 13 The rapid German victory over the Netherlands in May of 1940 transformed what had been a secure haven for Jews into a perilous hell. Bordering either on open seas or on parts of the Nazi empire, the location of Holland made escape difficult and dangerous. The flat terrain, lack of heavy forestation, and high population density afforded little opportunity for those trying to hide in wild and remote areas. As one historian has put it, the Dutch Jews were caught in a "natural trap."" They were doubly doomed by the appointment of an SS High Commissioner to run the country. Despite initial assurances that Nazi ideology would not be imposed on the Dutch, the High Commissioner and his SS staff soon ordered discriminatory measures which dispossessed the Jews of all their rights in the next two years. By 1942 Jews were being sent to the transit camps at Westerbork and Vught. From there, 107,000 of Holland's 140,000 Jews were deported to the death camps between July of 1942 and September of 1944. Only 5,500 of them remained alive at the end of the war. Another 8,000 Jews who were discovered hiding in Holland were executed there. All told 80 percent of Dutch Jewry perished. This was the highest fatality rate for any Jewish community in Western Europe! 15 Although the primary blame for the decimation of Dutch Jewry rests with Germany, some responsibility for it lies with the Dutch too. After the defeat of Holland, the NSB endorsed and disseminated Nazi anti-Semitism. Its 80,000 members served the Germans by filling political positions, intimidating Jews and informing on them, and assisting in raids to round up Jews for deportation. The NSB's blatant collaboration with the enemy discredited it in the eyes of most Dutch citizens. 16 The Secretaries-General, the senior Dutch officials who were left behind to deal with the Germans when the Queen and cabinet of Holland went into exile, engaged in a more ambiguous form of cooperation. They had been instructed to stay at their posts and obey German orders if they believed that doing so would be better for the country's welfare than refusing to comply. When confronted with demands to disenfranchise and isolate the Jews, the Secretaries-General lodged formal protests, but then implemented whatever was asked of them to avoid giving Germany an excuse to punish or tighten its control over Holland. The council of local Jewish leaders appointed by the Germans to administer the Jewish community pursued a similar strategy of acquiescence. Though clearly performed under duress, this Dutch participation in carrying out antiSemitic decrees allowed the Germans to liquidate Dutch Jewry with a minimal SS staff. Furthermore, it lent the campaign against the Jews a semblance of legitimacy and lulled many into believing that such an orderly process hardly could have fatal consequences. 17 The Dutch record of defending its Jewish community was a mixed one. In February of 1941, communist-led workers in Amsterdam mounted a two-day general strike to protest brutal German raids in which 425 Jews were arrested in retaliation for the killing of an NSB thug. This impressive demonstration of Dutch solidarity with the Jews unfortunately ended with a declaration of a state of siege, the murder of seven strikers, and the incarceration of one hundred leaders of the strike. The ruthless suppression of the strike dealt the resistance a severe setback from which it did not recover until 1943. In that year local religious and political clandestine groups coalesced into the LO, a national organization dedicated to hiding fugitives from German authority and to obtaining food ration stamps and false identity papers for them. The main impetus for the consolidation of the LO was the German announcement

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in May of 1943 that young Dutch men would be conscripted to work in Germany. By the time the LO was functioning smoothly, the majority of Dutch Jews had been deported. Of the 300,000 people hidden by the LO, only 24,000 were Jews. The official history of the resistance estimates that the chances of a Dutch Jew finding a family willing to conceal him or her were five and a half times worse than those of a Dutch Gentile seeking sanctuary. Passive sympathy usually prevailed over active support, as the following quotation from a Dutch account of the occupation reveals: "One felt sorry for the Jews and congratulated oneself on not being one of them. People gradually got used to the Jews having the worst of it." 18 This then was the unfavorable context in which the rescuers I will describe operated. To maintain confidentiality, I have changed the names of the rescuers except for one person who has already received much publicity. The van Lenneps were a cosmopolitan Dutch family. Mr. van Lennep was in the import-export business and had resided with his wife and children in several foreign countries before resettling in Holland. The van Lenneps resented the German occupation from the beginning, but did not actively resist it until early 1943. In that year, their son, like 85 percent of the male students at Dutch universities, refused to sign an oath of obedience to German law and an accompanying pledge to work six months in Germany after graduation. Since the punishment for not signing this document was immediate impressment into the same labor service, young van Lennep joined the underground where he acted as a courier of information for the Allies.and distributed food ration stamps and identity papers to fugitives in hiding. Several months later, he returned home to visit his parents and discovered that they had built a concealed cubbyhole for him underneath the floor of the front closet. Soon thereafter, Mrs. van Lennep was approached by a friend of hers who had married a Jewish man. She asked Mrs. van Lennep to save her husband from the Germans. Without hesitating, Mrs. van Lennep offered to help. For the remainder of the war, the Jewish man lived with the van Lenneps and spent most of his waking hours in the crawl space that had been created for their son. On one occasion, both the son and the Jew crowded into that small space to evade raiding police who ransacked the rest of the house. 19 The van Lenneps are what Professor Oliner has termed "situational helpers." Such people never volunteered to rescue Jews, but, when asked directly to do so, they responded affirmatively because they possessed both the reasons and resources to help. 20 In the van Lenneps'case, anger over the increasing harshness of German rule climaxed when their son was put in jeopardy. By aiding his evasion of the Germans, these normally law abiding citizens crossed the mental threshold separating restrained discontent from active opposition. This first venture into clandestine activity made the second one possible. According to their son, sheltering the Jewish man was "another way to get at the Germans." Moreover, it now appeared "fo be a feasible way because the van Lenneps already had a hiding place and could procure additional food, as well as«dvance warnings about possible police searches of their home, through their son's connections with the underground. This situational explanation also clarifies how the timing of German actions against the Jews affected the amount of help Jews received in different countries. When the disenfranchisement and deportation of Jews occurred while the German occupation was still comparatively mild for non-Jews, it was easier for the native population to disassociate itself from the maltreatment of the Jews. This is what happened in France, as well as in Holland. When German exploitation of the local populace became more onerous, as exemplified by the introduction of the labor conscription in 1943 in both of these countries, the willingness to defy the Germans and assist the

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Jews correspondingly increased. 2 1 In Denmark the Nazi attempt to arrest and deport the Jewish community in 1943 coincided with the imposition of martial law and the loss of national autonomy. T h u s , the Danes perceived their fate and that of the Jews as inextricably linked. 2 2 This pattern was not duplicated in Poland. Although G e r m a n oppression there was severe for Jews and Gentiles alike, indigenous anti-Semitism inhibited most Poles from participating in Jewish relief work. T o counteract this antipathy and persuade Poles to help Jews, rescue g r o u p s often warned that Germany planned to start murdering the Poles en masse once it had destroyed the Jews. 2 3 Yet my analysis of the van Lenneps' behavior does not entirely explain it. S o m e Dutch Gentiles, who hated the G e r m a n occupation and hid m e m b e r s of the underground and other fugitives, refused to do the same thing for Jews. 2 4 What apparently distinguished these people from the van Lenneps is that the latter previously had good relationships with Jews and were positively disposed towards them. Mr. van Lennep had many Jewish business acquaintances and friends. His son remembers growing up in a neighborhood where there were many Jews with whom he felt comfortable. When he attended the University of Amsterdam, he lodged at the home of Jewish friends of his family. One day he came back from clases to learn that the S S had seaied off that house and had arrested its owners. This gave the van Lenneps a keener and earlier awareness of the precariousness of Jewish existence under the Nazis than most of their peers probably had. When the van Lenneps finally rescued a Jew, they rescued someone they already knew. T h o u g h being in a position to help at that m o m e n t undoubtedly contributed to their decision, it seems just as evident that M r s . van Lenneps's sense of obligation to her friend influenced it too. This anticipates the next category of rescuer to be discussed — namely, the individual w h o was motivated primarily by bonds of affection, friendship, or loyalty to the person who was rescued. Louisa Schölten w a s a housewife in the city of Groningen. Although her husband served in the underground and specialized in finding hiding places for Jews, he had always told his wife, " T h e less you know, the better it is." But Louisa was drawn into similar covert activities by her concern for the safety of Manny Stein, a Jewish man who had rented a room from the Scholtens before he was ordered to report to a G e r m a n labor camp in 1941. Even then, Louisa had tried in vain to convince Manny not to comply and to remain at her house. A year later Manny's brother and sister-in-law were taken to Westerbork. Louisa was so worried about their welfare that she requested and was granted permission to visit the camp to bring them clothes they had been forced to leave behind. Her memories of the despair she saw on the faces of those interned at Westerbork haunted her. Meanwhile, Manny had been transferred there too, but managed to escape and now accepted Louisa's earlier offer of sanctuary. He then invited another one of his brothers to live with the Scholtens w h o had built a secure room for their g u e s t s by installing a false wall in a large upstairs bedroom. In the course of the war, the concealed room became a haven for two more Jewish men, as well as for a Dutch teenager from Putten, the Dutch village where the Nazis had attempted to execute all the male inhabitants in retribution for a resistance bombing of a Wehrmacht truck. T h e price the Scholtens paid for their acts of compassion was high. Three months before the end of the war, the S S raided their home. A police dog located Manny, who w a s immediately shot to death by the S S commander. A f t e r the dog viciously bit off Scholten's hand, the commander fired several bullets into the screaming man to finish him off. In the tumult .Louisa had fled on foot with her young daughter. S h e left the child with her mother-in-law and went into hiding for the duration of the war. Louisa's story illustrates how positive interpersonal relationships with

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Jews could act as a powerful incentive for deciding to help Jewish acquaintances. Her case is remarkable because her adult experiences with Jews enabled her to overcome a childhood aversion to them. Her father had been aggravated by what he perceived as unscrupulous business transactions on the part of Jews and taught his daughter that Jews were greedy materialists. During the Depression, Louisa had trouble finding a job in her chosen field of teaching. In desperation she applied for a secretarial position and was on the verge of being turned down because she did not know shorthand when the Jewish owner of the company hired her with the provision that she learn it within three months. She worked there for eleven years and felt that she always was well treated. After the German invasion, she left her job to protest the takeover of the company by the Germans. Her former employer generously granted her three months' severance pay. Louisa's wartime hospitality to Manny and the other Jews she hid represented a form of belated gratitude towards people who had been kind to her and whose persecution appeared wholly unwarranted. Throughout her interview, she made comments that reveal this sort of reasoning: "All my life has been crossed with Jewish people. I don't know why. That's the way it is sometimes. I couldn't say no when they asked me to help. I hated the Germans for what they did. Why do they hate the Jews so much? I never know. Nobody can ever give me an answer on this. When I think about myself, I feel sorry for them." 2 5 It should come as no surprise that feelings of mutual appreciation, friendship, love, and responsibility sometimes withstood the Nazi campaign to place Jews outside the pale of humanity. Oliner has asserted that people are more likely to help others whom they already know or who are culturally similar to themselves than total strangers. He adds that perhaps as many as 75 percent of the rescues of Jews during the Holocaust started with this impetus. 2 6 About 40 percent of the rescues in my sample fall into this category. As Louisa's case demonstrates, the decision to save Jews often became a cumulative process, beginning with aiding an acquaintance and subsequently extending protection to his or her relatives and friends and even to strangers. As one might expect, the most intimate ties between Jews and Gentiles proved to be the most durable. The fate of mixed marriages under Nazi rule dramatizes this phenomenon. German propagandists vehemently denounced "interracial" marriages and tried to compel the Aryan spouses in such marriages to divorce their Jewish partners by imposing severe discriminatory measures against these couples, including voluntary sterilization of the Jewish spouse. Yet few of the Dutch Gentiles married to Jews severed their relationships with them because this would have doomed their Jewish partners to deportation. Recognizing that the disappearance of these Jews would have provoked an outcry that was out of proportion to the relatively low number of Jews involved, the Nazi regime stopped short of sending them to their deaths in Eastern Europe. 2 7 Even in Germany itself, matrimonial loyalty was an insurmountable obstacle to Hitler's goal of ridding the country of all of its Jews. On February 27, 1943, the Gestapo in Berlin arrested hundreds of Jewish men who until then had been exempted from deportation due to their marriages to German women. In the days following this action, the wives of those men assembled in front of the detention center where their husbands were being held and shouted, "We want our men! We want our men!" Unable to make them desist, the Gestapo guards finally yielded and released their captives. 2 8 It is tempting to wonder how many more Jewish lives could have been saved if every attempt to deport Jews had been met with such resolute public opposition!

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It is reasonable to assume that the incidence of such "friendship" rescues was directly correlated to the degree of acceptance and integration Jews had achieved in each locality and country. Where the civic equality of Jews was a long-standing and undisputed principle, as in Denmark, the rescue of Jews evolved as a logical defense of respected fellow citizens. 29 Even the collaborationist government of Vichy France resisted the deportation of French Jews in contrast to its cooperation in the expulsion of foreign Jews from France. 30 Nevertheless, the rescuers I have interviewed rarely explained their actions in terms of the protection of the constitutional rights of Dutch nationals. Instead, abstract principles of justice usually appear to have mattered less to them than the personal relationships with Jews that had been fostered by democracy in Holland. Similarly, Harold Flender has maintained that the high rate of intermarriage and assimilation among Danish Jews provided them with a widespread network of Danish relatives and friends on whom they could depend for help. 31 This interpretation also accounts for why Jews found more people willing to hide them in cities like Berlin, where Jews had constituted a sizable and well-established group in municipal life 32 , than in rural areas where their numbers were negligible and significant religious and social boundaries still remained between Gentiles and Jews. 33 Conversely, the Jewish community in pre-war Poland formed a distinctive and despised subculture. The limited extent and negative nature of most Jewish contacts with native Poles reduced their chances of having close Polish friends to turn to when the Nazi government unleashed its reign of terror against them. 34 Previous personal attachments were not the only reason why people sympathized and rescued Jews. Others empathized with the plight of the Jews because they saw parallels between it and their own experiences of persecution or sense of social marginality. This is a salient theme in the testimony of Harry van Maanen. Harry was a 20-year-old who still lived with his parents in Maastricht at the beginning of the war. Before the German invasion, he had met several German Jewish refugees who had been helped by his church. By 1942 his church youth group had transformed itself into a clandestine placement agency for Jews seeking sanctuary. As a travelling salesman, Harry had a credible alibi for traversing the countryside to identify trustworthy local families and then persuade them to hide Jewish fugitives. On one occasion he attempted to find a safe house for a Jewish widow and her baby son. A Dutch couple agreed to take the mother in, but balked at taking her boy too, fearing that his presence would be discovered by their neighbors. Harry brought the infant to his home that night, and the next day he and his mother decided to keep the boy there for the duration of the war. The same scenario was repeated with another Jewish child several months later. In the course of locating hiding places and distributing stolen ration stamps, Harry was apprehended by the Germans. They imprisoned him for the last eighteen months of the war, six of which he spent in solitary confinement. Aside from the obvious religious and situational aspects of Harry's behavior, he attributed his sensitivity to the suffering of the Jews to his own painful encounters with discrimination and exclusion as a devout Calvinist growing up in a predominantly Catholic city. He remembered how Catholic youths had taunted him and had thrown stones at his house. He confessed that this harassment gave him insight into what it felt like to be a Jew. Furthermore, Harry came from an impoverished family and had developed an acute consciousness of class differences. Hence he complained that the wealthier people in Maastricht did little to help the Jews even though they were in a far better position to do so than the less affluent families who opened their homes to Jews. 33 From his interviews of rescuers of Jews, psychologist Perry London

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concluded that socially marginal individuals formed one group who tended to identify with and respond sympathetically to the ordeal of the Jews. 36 Nechama Tec, a sociologist who has just completed a book on Polish rescuers of Jews, has elaborated on the reasons for this phenomenon. She argues that it is more than a matter of outsiders perceiving the predicament of the Jews as analogous to their own experiences of unfair treatment and ostracism. Those experiences, she contends, also enhance a person's capacity for independent judgment and action. In her opinion, "Being on the periphery of a community means being freed from some of its social controls. With a high level of marginality, then, come fewer social constraints and more freedom. The greater freedom is in turn closely connected to a person's level of independence." Tec reports that most of the rescuers in her sample exhibited a high level of social marginality. She hypothesizes that the nonconformist mentality of these outsiders emboldened them to intervene on behalf of hapless Jews in spite of strong popular and personal anti-Semitic prejudices mitigating against such acts of compassion.37 It is telling that very few of the rescuers in my interview pool can be classified as socially marginal. What this may indicate is that since positive attitudes towards Jews represented a prewar consensus in Dutch public opinion, the rescuers of Jews stemmed more from the mainstream of Dutch society than from its margins. In sharp contrast to Harry's humble origins, Marion van Binsbergen hailed from an upper class family. Her father was a high-ranking Dutch judge who had married an English woman. Marion had attended a fine British boarding school, but, finding it too snobby, had transferred to a Dutch gymnasium. By 1940 she had begun to study social work at the University of Amsterdam and became concerned in the next two years over the dismissal of Jewish students and faculty from her program. She joined a group of her classmates in organizing a network to place Jews in Gentile homes. At first she functioned primarily as an intermediary between fugitives and potential rescuers. This change in 1943 when she witnessed a Nazi raid on a Jewish orphanage during which the SS guards brutally tossed unsuspecting children and several protesting bystanders into an awaiting police van. Outraged by this incident, Marion vowed to do more for the Jews and soon thereafter invited a Jewish professor and his three children to live in her parents' summer cottage. She obtained forged birth certificates to document that these children were her own illegitimate offspring (even though two of them were listed as being miraculously born only five months apart). The toughest test of Marion's commitment to her adopted family arose when a local Dutch collaborator decided to investigate rumors that she was hiding Jews. Knowing his nefarious reputation, she killed him and disposed of his body by having the underground arrange for it to be buried along with the corpse of another man. At the end of the war, Marion continued to care for Jewish refugees in her capacity as a social worker in the Displaced Persons Camps in Germany. Reflecting upon her motivations, Marion cited several obvious reasons why she helped Jews: she knew many Jews affected by the anti-Semitic laws; her father had inculcated her with a strong sense of justice; and she was haunted by her memories of the scene at the orphanage. Having become a psychotherapist later in her life, Marion also probed for subconscious factors that could have influenced her behavior. She surmised that her parents' communicative and trusting relationship with her might have been the critical determinant in making her responsive to the needs of others even when this entailed great personal risk. She remembered that she never was* physically punished or verbally abused by her parents. Instead, when she was old enough, they discussed discipline problems with her to arrive at reasonable

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solutions for each situation. Marion believed that her self-confidence and independence were derived f r o m her parents' respect for h e r judgment and maturity as she was growing up. For example, they let her join the Girl Scouts and undergo psychoanalysis even though these activities were not deemed proper for youngsters from her social class. When she was puzzled about the ways of the adult world, her parents confronted her questions candidly without any hint of condescension. In particular she recalled asking her f a t h e r about the homosexuals she met at her ballet lessons and receiving a reply from him about differences in sexual orientation and the importance of tolerating them. With this type of psychological background, she could not passively accept the wrongs done to the Jews and felt certain that her decision to protect them was the right one. 38 Marion's analysis of herself confirms the findings of Frances Grossman, a psychotherapist w h o has counseled a number of people w h o rescued Jews during the Holocaust. Dr. Grossman reports that most of her clients had affectionate mothers and understanding and communicative fathers w h o raised them with openness and compassion. She draws attention to the fact that a post-war study of anti-Nazi Germans revealed that the majority of them had received the same type of supportive parenting. Grossman concludes that "those who had experienced security, acceptance and love, could readily empathize with another human being in trouble" and "that it is not so much w h a t a child is taught, but how it is treated which determines the kind of h u m a n being he or she will be, and the way in which he or she will relate to others." 3 9 From a comparative perspective, Grossman's approach suggests that national differences in child-rearing could partly account for why citizens of one country were more willing to aid Jews than those of another country. The history of childhood is, so to speak, in its infancy, 4 0 but as it develops, we may be able to comprehend the complex relationship between the parenting methods of diverse cultures and the extent of Jewish rescue among the populations of these cultures. Grossman and other psychologists engaged in Holocaust research, like Alice Miller and Israel Charny, have argued that such knowledge can teach us h o w to raise a generation that will be better equipped psychologically to resist f u t u r e attempts to commit genocide. 41 Delving deeper into the text of Marion's interview, I detected another personality trait acquired from her mother which apparently animated her involvement in rescue work. Marion depicts her m o t h e r as being "all feeling and all action." By this she means that her mother was someone w h o easily became aroused emotionally and spontaneously reacted to such emotional states. This caused her to be fearlessly impulsive when something angered her. For example, once Marion's mother could no longer endure the Nazi occupation, she hung a Union Jack outside her house to let the G e r m a n s know that she sided with the British. Marion's decision to hide Jews at the cottage arose in the same precipitate manner. Her visceral distress over seeing the children rounded up at the orphanage elicited an immediate resolve to make a greater personal sacrifice on behalf of the Jews. For Marion, this was not just an option — it was imperative. As she puts it, "I couldn't have done anything else!" In a recently published article, Eva Fogelman and Valerie Lewis Weiner divide the Holocaust rescuers they interviewed into two separate categories: "those motivated chiefly by moral consider •ions and those whose motivation was mainly emotional." People in the second group were very upset emotionally when they personally witnessed or heard about the persecution of the Jews. Their feelings of indignation and pity compelled them to care for and protect the Jews they encountered. To Fogelman and Wiener, it

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is not a coincidence that this g r o u p consisted predominantly of women. Citing Carol Gilligan's theory of female moral development, they note that w o m e n traditionally have been socialized to be empathic towards the needs of others and to respond to them in nurturing ways. 4 2 Similarly, in hispioneering e s s a y on rescuers of Jews, historian Philip Friedman postulated that w o m e n m a y have been more sensitive than men to the ordeal of the Jews, and especially of Jewish children, and may have been more prone to help because they w e r e " m o r e easily moved by their emotions and thought less of the consequences." 4 3 Although Friedman's remarks have a sexist ring today, the notion that women's reactions to Jewish suffering probably differed effectively f r o m those of men and often prompted more customary feminine f o r m s of relief activities s e e m s valid. For example, Marion brought Jews into her own home only a f t e r being shocked by a graphic instance of violence against youngsters. From then on, she assumed a strong maternal role in the upbringing of the children she sheltered despite the presence of their father. My fifth case epitomizes those rescuers who were guided by ideological or religious convictions. Martin and Theresa VanderBurg were devout Christians. In early 1942, a friend knocked at Theresa's door and beseeched her to hide an abandoned four-year-old Jewish girl whose mother had fled in the wake of her husband's murder by the Nazis. Learning that the departing mother had assured her d a u g h t e r that Christians would help her, T h e r e s a felt that she had been divinely destined to fulfill this mission of mercy. At first Martin opposed the idea of keeping the girl because he feared this would endanger his own family, but then his wife persuaded him by reminding him of the parable of the G o o d Samaritan. Once word got out to the underground that the V a n d e r B u r g s would hide Jews, their home became a temporary haven for anyone hunted by the Germans. On almost every night, there usually were twelve s t r a n g e r s in addition to the V a n d e r B u r g s ' own six children sleeping in their modest six-room house. Martin and T h e r e s a insisted that only people w h o would be difficult to place with other families, like pregnant women and persons with physical handicaps, could stay with them for prolonged periods. O v e r the course of the war, the V a n d e r B u r g s harbored approximately 450 persons, the majority of whom were Jews. T h e others were downed Allied pilots, Dutch dissidents, striking railroad workers, and evaders of the labor conscription. Although none of their wards ever fell into G e r m a n hands, Martin w a s arrested by the S S towards the end of the war, but the officer who subsequently interrogated him was so impressed by Martin's earnest piety that he released him. Theresa readily confided that her father had inspired her own Christian faith and charity. She fondly reminisced how he had taught her to live a righteous life in both word and deed. Emulating his conscientious and compassionate example, she had chosen nursing as her career and had cared for mental patients b e f o r e she got married. Whenever she was confronted with a moral dilemma, she would ask herself what would Jesus do in this situation. O n one occasion during the war, she knew she could turn to her elderly father to hide two Jews when her own home was under surveillance. All of this indicates that helping others in need was a virtue that had always been cultivated by Theresa's father and thereby had been transmitted to her. 4 4 Almost all of the existing studies of Holocaust rescuers report that m a n y of these people identified strongly with a "parental model of moral conduct." 4 5 Such parents consistently practiced what they preached. T h e children of this type of parent internalized that characteristic and the ideals behind it by witnessing how their father or mother regularly engaged in philanthropic activities which manifested the ethical precepts he or she espoused. Unlike the

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parents described by Grossman, the parents who served as moral role models for their children appear to have been less emotive and more strict towards them. Nevertheless, according to the psychologist Stanley Coopersmith, these parents still gave their children a sense of being accepted and loved. 46 This may corroborate Ervin Staub's clinical finding that the most effective method of instilling children with altruistic attitudes is combining nurturant parental relationships and moral role-modeling with reasonable disciplinary firmness. 4 7 Theresa's religious motivations for helping Jews bear the distinct imprint of orthodox Dutch Calvinism. The Dutch Reformed Church had been forged in the struggle against Spanish and Catholic domination in the sixteenth century. As a result of this conflict, it had developed a theological justification for revolt against sacrilegious tyranny. Another rationale for civil disobedience could be extracted from the Calvinist stress on ethical responsibility for monitoring and intervening in the temporal affairs of one's society. Moreover, Calvin's reverence for the Old Testament and its doctrine of divine election endowed his followers with an idealized image of the Jews and of their importance for fulfilling God's purpose in history. The Dutch Reformed Church altered and diluted many of these principles as it modernized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In rejection of this liberalization, fervent Calvinist traditionalists seceded from their parent church and formed more conservative sects. 4 8 Theresa belonged to one of these dissenting groups, the Christian Reformed Church. In her interview and in those of other orthodox Dutch Calvinists, there is a pronounced philo-Semitism. Theresa repeatedly said that she protected Jews because they were God's chosen people and had to be saved as a contribution to the rebirth of Israel after the war. She considered it her Christian duty to minister to the needs of the weak and dispossessed. Finally, her belief in divine providence imbued her with calmness and courage in the face of the most harrowing predicaments. Theresa's response to the persecution of the Jews was common among her co-religionists. It is estimated that the members of the schismatic Reformed Churches, who constituted only 8 percent of the Dutch population, accounted for 25 percent of the rescues of Jews in Holland. 4 ' As the experience of this sect shows, the historical heritage and theology of Christian denominations in particular areas or countries could play a significant role in motivating their congregants to participate in Jewish rescue operations. In the Netherlands, the minority Catholic Church openly protested the deportation of the Jews, whereas the majority Dutch Reformed Church struck a bargain with the Germans by squelching its plans for a similar protest as long as its Jewish converts were not deported. 50 Although the major German Lutheran Church also defended its Jewish converts, its clergy generally refrained from doing more on behalf of Jews because the church's traditional deference to state authority, identification with German nationalism, and vilification of Jewry and Judaism inhibited further sympathy and support. 51 The Danish Lutheran Church, on the other hand, had condemned Nazi anti-Semitism in the 1930s and exhorted its members to oppose the anti-Jewish measures which the Germans decreed in 1943. 5 2 The small Huguenot village of LeChambon in Southern France mobilized its inhabitants to save 5,000 Jews. These people equated the persecution of the Jews with their own past oppression by French Catholics. By helping Jews, they actualized the teachings of their pastor who had dedicated his ministry to aiding the downtrodden and fighting injustice with non-violent forms of resistance. 53 The religiously motivated rescuers often had the advantage of working in

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groups that had access to church resources and facilities. We already have seen h o w H a r r y van Maanen's Christian youth association coordinated Jewish rescue efforts. The same kind of support network enabled the VanderBurgs to clothe,, feed, and transfer the hundreds of fugitives w h o passed t h r o u g h their home during the war years. Douglas Huneke has analyzed ,these communal rescues and credits their relative success to their ability to enlist people living in close proximity to one another and w h o possessed a common set of values and institutional affiliations even before the G e r m a n occupation. Their beliefs fueled their opposition to Nazism, which t h e n was channeled through the organizations to which they already belonged. Such intellectual, organizational, and personal ties enhanced the effectiveness and security of these rescue networks and allowed t h e m to continue their activities a f t e r the arrest, death, or exile of their original leaders. 54 The maintenance of this kind of institutional framework facilitated resistance against the Germans, w h o had tried to abolish or infiltrate o t h e r political, professional, and social organizations to prevent potential centers of underground activities from developing." Secular ideologies also motivated people to rescue Jews. Marion, you may recall, cited the liberal commitment to justice which she had learned f r o m her f a t h e r as a primary reason for helping Jews, Ironically, the one rescuer I interviewed whose psychological and sociological profile most closely resembles that of pious Christians like Theresa was a communist w o m a n named Gretje. Her socialist father had filled his daughter's head with egalitarian and internationalist doctrines. As a child, she had attended several protest demonstrations with him. Following the German invasion, she let h e r communist friends print an underground newspaper in her apartment. When the SS arrested this group, Gretje managed to convince her captors that she had been unaware of what had been going on at her home. After her release, she began hiding Jewish relatives of an imprisoned comrade and sheltered several more Jewish fugitives in the years to come. 5 6 Despite the gulf between communism and conservative Calvinism, both of their adherents f r e q u e n t l y had activist parental role models w h o inculcated them with ideals that w e r e antithetical to Nazi racism and were not to be compromised. F u r t h e r m o r e , both groups utilized their pre-war organizational networks to conduct clandestine operations. T o avoid fostering an erroneous impression, I must mention that t h e r e were rescuers of Jews w h o were motivated by less honorable reasons t h a n the ones I have described. O n e Dutch Jew told me how his mother had to pay an exorbitant monthly fee to be hidden. 57 Another Dutch Jew recollected h o w as a thirteen-year-old she initially had been placed with a childless Dutch couple w h o kicked her out within a week because they wanted an infant to raise as their own child. 58 Some Christian zealots aided Jews to proslytize and convert them. 5 9 Nechama Tec reports that 16 percent of her Polish rescuers assisted Jews for baser ulterior motives. She adds that as a group these people differed greatly f r o m the legitimate rescuers in her sample. 60 Considering the s h a r p contrast between Dutch and Polish attitudes towards the Jews, I suspect that the final results of o u r study will show that a lower percentage of the D u t c h falls into this category of rescuer. On the scales of justice, the decency of the rescuers hardly can outweigh the indecency of the perpetrators of the Holocaust and the indifference of the bystanders whose silence provided the Nazis with the tacit consent to m u r d e r millions. Yet the lesson we can learn from the rescuers of the Jews is just as important as understanding the political pathology that afflicted Europe between 1939 and 1945. To use a medical metaphor borrowed f r o m Frances Grossman, the key to curing and preventing a disease often lies in

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investigating t h o s e organisms which are naturally i m m u n e to it. 6 1 I have no simple diagnosis of w h y some people exhibited moral fortitude in the face of adversity and coercion. T h e categories I have discussed tonight obviously are not mutually exclusive and do not e x h a u s t the myriad factors that influence h u m a n b e h a v i o r . Despite this, my study does point towards s o m e basic and c o m m o n - s e n s e w a y s that we as individuals, families, and citizens can employ to cultivate t h e conditions, traits, and values w h i c h promote an altruistic c o n c e r n f o r t h e welfare of o t h e r s . T h e s e range f r o m striving f o r a m o r e pluralistic and equitable society, w h e r e different ethnic, racial, and religious g r o u p s can live t o g e t h e r amicably and learn to understand each o t h e r ' s cultures and needs, to adopting more enlightened methods of raising and educating children to be caring, ethical, and independent adults. Living on an increasingly interdependent and nuclear-endangered planet, w e c a n n o t afford the m a s s moral passivity that occurred during the Holocaust. As the Jewish sage Hillel said over 2 , 0 0 0 years ago, "If I am not for myself, w h o will be for m e ? B u t if I am only for myself, what a m I? And if not n o w , w h e n ? "

FOOTNOTES 1. G e o r g e M . Kren and Leon Rappoport, The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior (New York, 1980), p. 126. 2. S a m u e l P. Oliner, " T h e Unsung H e r o e s in Nazi Occupied Europe: T h e Antidote f o r Evil," Nationalities Papers, XII:1 (Spring 1984), p. 1 3 0 ; Charles P a t t e r s o n , " Y a d V a s h e m C o n f e r e n c e : 3 5 Educators Learn H o w to T e a c h the H o l o c a u s t , " Jewish World (October 1 4 - 2 0 , 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 8. 3.

Philip Friedman, Their Brothers' Keepers (New York, 1978), p. 131.

4. For a discussion on the probable reasons w h y there has b e e n so little r e s e a r c h a b o u t the rescuers, see L a w r e n c e B a r o n , " R e s t o r i n g Faith in H u m a n k i n d , " Sh'ma: A journal of Jewish Responsibility, X I V : 2 7 6 ( S e p t e m b e r 7, 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 1 2 4 - 1 2 8 . 5. T h e following represent the best examples of this sort of approach: Frederick B a r r y C h a r y , The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944 (Pittsburgh, 1 9 7 2 ) ; Leonard G r o s s , The Last Jews in Berlin (New Y o r k , 1 9 8 2 ) ; Philip Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 9 ) ; Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry: Test of a Democracy (Philadelphia, 1 9 6 9 ) ; Eds. Efraim Z u r o f f and Yisrael G u t m a n , Rescue Attempts During the Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference (Jerusalem, 1 9 7 7 ) . 6. For overviews of this research, see Samuel P. Oliner, " T h e Need to R e c o g n i z e the H e r o e s of the Nazi E r a , " The Reconstructionist, XLVIII: 4 (June 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 7 - 1 4 : Lawrence B a r o n , "Psychohistorical O v e r v i e w of rescuing J e w s D u r i n g t h e Nazi Era, (Paper presented to International Political Psychology C o n f e r e n c e , Washington, D . C . , J u n e 19, 1 9 8 5 ) . 7. Daniel Coleman, " G r e a t Altruists: Science Ponders G o o d n e s s , " New York Times (March 5, 1 9 8 5 ) , pp. C 1 - C 2 .

Soul

of

8. Yehuda B a u e r , " G e n o c i d e : Was It the Nazis' Original P l a n ? " The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, C D L (July 1 9 8 0 ) , pp. 3 5 45.

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9. Raul H i l b e r g , The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago, 1 9 6 1 ) ; G e r a l d R e i t l i n g e r , The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe ( S o u t h B r u n s w i c k , 1 9 6 1 ) ; Karl A. S c h l e u n e s , The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews. 1933-1939 ( U r b a n a , 1 9 7 0 ) ; G e r a l d Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution ( B e r k e l e y , 1 9 8 4 ) . 10. H e l e n Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 9 ) ; Michael R. M a r r u s and R o b e r t O . P a x t o n , " T h e Nazis and the J e w s in Occupied W e s t e r n E u r o p e , " Journal of Modern History, L I V ( D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 2 ) , pp. 6 8 7 - 7 1 4 ; W e r n e r R i n g s , Life With the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945 (New York, 1 9 8 2 ) ; T h e o d o r e S. H a m e r o w , " T h e Hidden H o l o c a u s t , " Commentary, L X X I I I : 3 (March 1 9 8 5 ) , pp. 3 2 - 4 2 . 11. 62-83.

Judith C . C . B e l i n f a n t e , Joods Historisch Museum (Haarlem, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp.

12. W e r n e r W a r m b r u n n , The Dutch Under German Occupation ( S t a n f o r d , 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 8 5 - 8 7 .

1940-1945

13. B o b M o o r e , " J e w i s h R e f u g e e s in the N e t h e r l a n d s 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 4 0 : T h e S t r u c t u r e and P a t t e r n of I m m i g r a t i o n f r o m Nazi G e r m a n y , " Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, X X I X ( 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 7 3 - 1 0 1 ; B . A . Sijes, " S e v e r a l O b s e r v a t i o n s C o n c e r n i n g t h e Position of the J e w s in Occupied Holland D u r i n g W o r l d W a r II," in Z u r o f f and G u t m a n , pp. 5 2 8 - 5 3 2 . 14.

H i l b e r g , p. 3 6 5 .

15. Fein, pp. 2 6 2 - 2 8 9 ; Hilberg, pp. 3 6 5 - 3 8 1 ; H e n r y L. M a s o n , " T e s t i n g H u m a n B o n d s W i t h i n N a t i o n s : J e w s in t h e O c c u p i e d N e t h e r l a n d s , " Political Science Quarterly, I C : 2 ( S u m m e r , 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 3 1 5 - 3 4 5 ; Jacob P r e s s e r , The Destruction of the Dutch Jews (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) . 16. W a r n b r u n n , pp. 8 3 - 9 6 ; G e r h a r d Hirschfeld, " C o l l a b o r a t i o n and A t t e n t i s m in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s 1 9 4 0 - 4 1 , " Journal of Contemporary History, X V I : 3 Ouly 1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 4 6 7 - 4 8 6 . 17.

W a r n b r u n n , pp. 1 2 1 - 1 3 6 ; M a s o n , pp. 3 1 5 - 3 4 5 ; Presser, pp. 2 3 8 - 2 7 7 .

18. P r e s s e r , pp. 3 2 4 - 4 0 5 ; Louis D e J o n g , " H e l p to People in H i d i n g , " Delta: A Review of Arts, Life, and Thought in the Netherlands, V I I I : 1 9 ( S p r i n g 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 3 7 - 7 9 ; Louis D e J o n g , " J e w s and N o n - J e w s in Nazi-Occupied H o l l a n d , " in On the Track of Tyranny, Ed. M a x B e l o f f (London, 1 9 6 0 ) , pp. 1 3 9 - 1 5 5 ; S i j e s , pp. 532-553. 19. I n t e r v i e w of Nicholas van L. by T h e o d o r Linn and L a w r e n c e B a r o n , January 13, 1984. 20.

O l i n e r , " T h e Need to R e c o g n i z e t h e H e r o e s of t h e Nazi E r a , " p. 1 2 .

2 1 . M i c h a e l R . M a r r u s and R o b e r t O . P a x t o n , Vichy France and the Jews (New Y o r k , 1 9 8 3 ) , pp. 3 2 1 - 3 2 9 . 2 2 . Leni Y a h i l , " M e t h o d s o f P e r s e c u t i o n : A C o m p a r i s o n o f t h e 'Final S o l u t i o n ' in Holland and D e n m a r k / ' S r n p f a Hierosolymitana, XXIII ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 2 9 9 ;

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Marrus and Paxton, "The Nazis and the Jews in Occupied Western Europe," p. 711. 23. Yisrael Gutman, The Jews of Warsaw 1939-1943: Revolt (Bloomington, 1982), pp. 250-267.

Ghetto, Underground,

24. Dejong, "Jews and Non-Jews in Nazi Occupied Holland," pp. 139141; Presser, pp. 324-329.

135.

380.

25.

Interview of Louisa S. by Ellen Land Weber, July 2, 1984.

26.

Oliner, " T h e Unsung Heroes in Nazi Occupied Europe," pp. 134-

27.

Mason, pp. 317-318; Presser, pp. 115-116, 187-191, 313-316, 377-

28. H. D. Leuner, When Compassion Was A Crime: Germany's Silent Heroes 1933-45 (London, 1966), pp. 57-58, 69-70, 77-79, 97-98. 29.

Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry, pp. 33-44.

30.

Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 250-265, 321-329.

31.

Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark (New York, 1964), p. 207.

32.

Gross, pp. 11-18.

33. Frances Henry, Victims and Neighbors: A Small Town in Nazi Germany Remembered (South Hadley, 1984), pp. 147-178. 34. Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland Between the Two World Wars (New York, 1980), pp. 48-139. 35. Interview of Harry van M. by Theodore Linn and Lawrence Baron, October 22, 1983. 36. Perry London, ' T h e Rescuers: Motivational Hypotheses About Christians Who Saved Jews From the Nazis," in Altruism and Helping Behavior: Social Psychological Studies of Some Antecedents and Consequences, Eds. L. Berkowitz and J. Macaulay (New York, 1970), pp. 241-250. 37. Nechama Tec, "Righteous Christians in Poland," International Social Science Review, LVIII: 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 15-17. 38. Interview of Marion Pritchard (nee van Binsbergen) by Lawrence Baron, October 1 0 , 1 9 8 3 . For published accounts of Marion's rescue activities see " A Moment Interview with Marion Pritchard," Moment, IX: 1 (December 1983), pp. 26-33 and Marion Pritchard, "It Came T o Pass In Those Days," Sh'ma, XIV:273 (April 27, 1984), pp. 97-102. 39. Frances G. Grossman, "A Psychological Study of Gentiles Who Saved the Lives of Jews During the Holocaust," in Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, ed. Israel W. Charney (Boulder, 1984), pp. 202-216.

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40. For example, Grossman suggests that authoritarian child-rearing patterns in G e r m a n y may have contributed to the character type which violently oppressed others or at least tolerated such oppression and cites Aurel Ende's "Battered and Neglected Children in G e r m a n y , 1 8 6 0 - 1 8 7 8 , " Journal of Pscyhohistory, VII:3 (Winter 1 9 7 9 / 1 9 8 0 ) as a study which may substantiate this theory. For other works on the history of childhood, see Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York, 1962); Ed. Lyoyd de Mause, The History of Childhood (New York, 1975); T h e o d o r e K . Rabb and Robert I. Rotberg, The Family in History: Interdisciplinary Essays (New York, 1973). 41. Israel W. Charny, Genocide: The Human Cancer (New York, 1982); Alice Miller, For Your Own Good! Hidden Cruelty in Child Rearing and the Roots of Violence (New York, 1983.) 42. Eva Fogelman and Valerie Lewis Wiener, " F r o m Bystander to Rescuer: Altruism Under the Nazis," Psychology Today (August, 1985); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Ma., 1982). 43. Philip Friedman, "Righteous Gentiles in the Nazi e r a , " in Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust, Ed. Ada June Friedman (Philadelphia, 1980), pp. 411-414.

12.

44.

Interview of Theresa W. by Ellen Land Weber, June 23, 1984.

45.

London, pp. 2 4 5 - 2 4 8 .

46.

Oliner, " T h e Need to Recognize the Heroes of the Nazi Era," pp. 9 -

47. Ervin Staub, (Morristown, 1975).

The

Development

of

Prosocial

Behavior

in

Children

48. Walter Lagerweg, " T h e History of Calvinism in the Netherlands," in The Rise and Development of Calvinism, Ed. John H., Bratt (Grand Rapids, 1968), pp. 6 3 - 1 0 2 . 49.

Mason, p. 331.

50.

Warnbrunn, pp. 1 5 6 - 1 6 4 .

51. Richard Gutteridge, Open They Mouth for the Dumb: The German Evangelical Church and the jews 1879-1950 (New York, 1976); Eds. Franklin H. Littell and Hubert G. Locke, The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust (Detroit, 1974). 52.

Fein, pp. 114-115.

53.

Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed.

54. Douglas Huneke, "A Study of Christians Who Rescued Jews During the Nazi Era," Humboldt Journal of Sociat Relations, IX:1 (Fall/Winter 1 9 8 1 / 1 9 8 2 ) , ρ 145.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO J E W S

55. William Sheridan Allen The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930-1935 (New York, 1973), pp. 209-226. 56.

Interview of Gretje D. by Lawrence Baron, October 30, 1984.

57.

Interview of Karel P. by Lawrence Baron, October 29, 1984.

58.

Interview with Ilse L. by Lawrence Baron, January 25, 1984.

59.

Saul Friedlander, When Memory Comes (New York, 1979).

60.

Tec, p. 14.

61.

Grossman, p. 203.

Associate Professor of History Lawrence Baron joined the St. Lawrence University faculty in 1 9 7 5 . A 1 9 6 9 g r a d u a t e of the University of Illinois/Urbana, he earned his master of arts degree and doctorate f r o m the University of Wisconsin/Madison in 1 9 7 1 and 1 9 7 4 respectively. He is the author of The Eclectic Anarchism of Erich Mühsam (New York, 1976), as well as numerous articles on modern G e r m a n and European Jewish history. In 19S4 he received the J. Calvin Keene Faculty Award "for high standards of personal scholarship, effective teaching, and moral c o n c e r n s . "

The Frank P. Piskor Faculty Lectureship at St. Lawrence was initially established as the St. Lawrence University Faculty Lectureship in 1979. In 1980 the faculty and staff of the University established a fund to endow the lectureship in honor of Dr. Frank P. Piskor, who retired in 1981 after twelve years as president of St. Lawrence. The lectureship'9 purpose is to encourage and recognize original and continuing research and scholarship among the faculty, and to afford the faculty the opportunity to share their learning with the academic community. The recipient, chosen from a field of nominees, receives financial ? distance from the President, the Dean, and the Involvement Committee, to support research on which the lecture is based.

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627

Help to People in Hiding

LOUIS DE J O N G

In M a y i960 the Netherlands Television Foundation launched a fiveyear project: a series of twenty-one documentary television programs devoted to the history of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Second World War. In each year running from May to M a y , four programs have been broadcast. The writing and presentation were entrusted to D r Louis de J o n g - one of Deltas editors - w h o has been director of the State Institute for W a r Documentation at Amsterdam since 1945, and who has had experience in television since 1957. O f the twenty-one programs, the first treated the rise of Nazi Germany and the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940. Three reviewed the war in the Netherlands East Indies and the Japanese occupation there. One dealt with the Dutch government-in-exile in London and the activities of the 'free' Dutch military forces and merchant marine. One examined the general strategy of the Second World W a r with the purpose of answering the question, w h y did the liberation take five long years? The remaining fifteen programs together offered a history of the Netherlands proper during the years of German occupation. O f these fifteen, two dealt with the persecution of the J e w s ; six others gave systematic attention to the most important aspects of the resistance movement, including the suffering in Nazi prisons and concentration camps. For the last programs of the series, which depicted Allied military

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PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

operations from the Battle of Arnhem, in September 1944, to the liberation eight months later, Dr de Jong had access to valuable historical films primarily f r o m British and Canadian archives. A serious problem in most of the programs arose from the fact that very little authentic photographic material was available, and practically no films. The resistance groups had no time to make pictures, which would have meant serious extra risks; and during the occupation years far fewer amateurs took photographs than has become customary since the war. In many instances, therefore, Dr de Jong illustrated events by calling on people involved in certain actions to tell about their experiences. The written texts of the broadcasts, with a large amount of illustrative material, began to be published in 1961. Five paperback volumes carrying the title of the series - De bezetting (The Occupation) - have since been issued by Em. Querido's Publishing Company of Amsterdam. During the month of publication, they have always topped the bestseller list, and they continue to sell exceptionally well. In general, it may be said that the programs, which were very long for documentaries - ranging from seventy to a hundred minutes - were followed with rapt attention by a steadily growing audience. The Leiden historian Johan Huizinga once defined history as 'the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past.' For millions of Dutch citizens, the series De bezetting has proved to be the intellectual form in which they have taken account of the most stirring chapter of their recent past. The fourteenth program of the series, 'De hulp aan onderduikers' (Help to People in Hiding), broadcast on I October 1963, is here published in full (with slight adaptations in the translation for non-Dutch readers), with a selection of the pictures used in the broadcast. O f the long series of twenty-one programs, the editors oi Delta deemed this one most worthy of reproduction. Most of the people persecuted had to hide for months or even years, and they succeeded in escaping the enemy only with the help of their fellow-countrymen. The assistance given these people in hiding was a typically Dutch form of resistance. At the same time it is the most humanly touching chapter o f t h a t resistance.

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Television Broadcast, I October 1963 A 35, number 600930. This is page 2 of the identity card, compulsory during the occupation, of Presser, Jacob, born 24 February 1899, at Amsterdam, nationality Dutch, married to Appel, D. S., profession history teacher, issued 29 August 1941, at Amsterdam.

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PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

13267

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O n page 5 o f m y identity card was m y photograph, and the official picked up a stamp and set the fatal letter J beside the photograph. It was 1942, the deportations had begun - an appalling situation - and it occurred to me that I would have to g o into hiding. But to g o into hiding I o f course needed a n e w identity card. First I got in touch w i t h a man w h o sold me an identity card for three hundred and fifty guilders, but I scarcely had the card in the house before he got cold feet and demanded that I return it. Naturally, I had to give it back - I was just out the three hundred and fifty guilders. In m y need I turned to m y friend Jan R o m e i n , w h o was in touch with Sandberg o f the Municipal Museum, and Sandberg let me k n o w that some fine day I could expect a caller w i t h a new identity card. Sure enough, one day the doorbell rang, and there stood a man, rather tall and gaunt, a lean fellow. He looked at me and said, 'Smit.' ' C o m e in, please, M r Smit.' W e sat d o w n at a table, he cleared everything away, got out some inkbottles and other paraphernalia, and in no time at all had fixed up an identity card on w h i c h I became Klasen, Jacob Frans W i l l e m , profession teacher. Smit stood up, glanced at m y books, strolled along m y b o o k case, and said, ' W e ' r e more or less colleagues, eh?' I couldn't contain myself then, and I replied, 'Yes, but w h o are you?' He said, 'Smit.' He turned round and w e n t away, and, well, he was a real friend in need! PROFESSOR

JACOB

PRESSER:

631

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In a war, production is first and foremost for the military front. War means scarcity - scarcity of consumer goods, scarcity of food. The Dutch government considered it of primary importance to distribute equitably all that was available. Therefore, during the autumn of 1939, some eight months before the occupation began, the entire population of the Netherlands was issued individual distribution cards. These cards were simple, one-fold identity cards, without photograph. Numbered and lettered squares were ruled on the inside and back, for crossing off or stamping. Each time the distribution card was so marked, the holder received a loose sheet with detachable numbered coupons. This insert sheet, which was renewed when all the coupons had been used up, belonged with the distribution card. For one of the coupons from it a person would receive at the distribution centre, for instance, a ration card for foodstuffs, always limited to four weeks, with separate ration coupons for meat, potatoes, butter, skim milk, bread. N o food without ration coupons, no coupons without ration card, no ration card without insert sheet, no insert sheet without distribution card. In the late 1920s, quite removed from considerations of a possible war, some official circles in the Netherlands - primarily the judiciary and the police - advocated the introduction of a thoroughgoing system of identity cards, but their plans had little appeal to the pre-war Cabinets.

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

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T h e champion o f the system was J. L. Lentz, inspector o f population records. In August 1940, three months after the occupation began, Lenta went to Berlin with the sanction o f his superior, K . J . Frederiks, secretarygeneral o f internal affairs. His mission was to show the Gestapo the model o f an identity card he had designed. He had even conceived a name for it: pcrsoonsbewijs. He returned home proudly: the Gestapo had pronounced his identity card even more difficult to reproduce than its German counterpart. O n ι N o v e m b e r 1940, Secretary-General Frederiks' decree instituting a general identity card was published. Counterfeiting and falsification of the card were o f course punishable offences. A n d throughout 1941 all Dutch citizens were invited to appear at their local population registries, bringing with them their 'invitation' card and t w o duplicate photographs. A t the population registry the pertinent biographical data were filled in on the back o f this card. Each municipality had its o w n number, from Α ι for Aagtekerke to Ζ 43 for Zijpe. Amsterdam was A 35. T h e second number (Presser's 600930, for example) was the serial number in the local distribution. B e l o w these numbers appeared the personal data. O n e o f the t w o photographs was pasted on, a print o f the right index finger taken in the lower left corner, and the signature inscribed at the lower right.

633

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The card was then sent to the Central Population Registry, in the Kleykamp building at The Hague. There the master identity cards of all Dutch citizens over fifteen years of age were assembled. After this card had been processed, a personal identity card, with all the data typed in, was issued to each individual, to be carried at all times and produced on demand. The personal card was a strip of strong but light-weight cardboard, folded into thirds, and measuring a compact three by four inches when folded. The second photograph was inserted into a window in its fourth and fifth pages and made fast with a distinctive glued seal of which Lentz was extremely proud. It was then stamped front and back with a stamp almost impossible to imitate. One fingerprint was placed on the back of the photograph, another beside it. And above the photograph, the bearer had to sign his name. The cardboard from which these identity cards were made was dyed in three colours and printed with special, non-eradicable inks. One of these inks, of exceptionally subtle composition, became invisible under the light of a quartz lamp. The whole identity card, front and back, was covered with a diagonal, criss-cross design, lightly printed. When set straight and examined under magnification, this pattern proved to be composed of the same microscopic words repeated again and again: B E V O L K I N G S R E G I S T E R S V A N N E D E R L A N D (Population Registries of

634

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the Netherlands). If you held the identity card to the light - a very simple method of checking - you could see the watermark: three Dutch lions, one in each third of the card. Lentz wrote, 'This kind [of watermark] is exceedingly difficult to counterfeit in cardboard of this quality.' In April 1941 he published a book on the subject of the Dutch identity card, ending his introduction with the words, 'May this institution become familiar and everywhere find the appreciation it deserves.' The Gestapo displayed a lively appreciation indeed. In the summer of 1943 Dr J . H. A. J . S. Bruins Slot, editor of the clandestine newspaper Trouw, wrote in an editorial, ' W e are being flogged with the whips we ourselves plaited.' From 1940 to 1945 there was no scourge from which the Dutch received bloodier wounds than this execrable identity card - the invention of an over-zealous civil servant, himself not a Nazi. (After the war Lentz was sentenced to three years in prison.) This man was able to go his own way because all democratic checks and balances were missing, because at the beginning of the occupation his superiors, the secretaries-general in charge of administration in The Hague, agreed with him that the task of the Dutch government in situ was to maintain the social structure as intact as possible. To do so, popular resistance must be opposed. But the resistance went on, left with no choice but to depend more and more on false papers.

635

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

Keizersgracht

763

Eduard

Veterman

At Keizersgracht 763 in Amsterdam, towards the end of 1941, the writer Eduard Veterman, leader of an espionage group already helping British pilots to escape across the border, began forging identity cards. The whole criss-cross ground pattern was reset, reduced, and plated. One of the phrases on each identity card was, 'print right index finger.' Veterman had a large printing plant in Amsterdam run off an 'In Memoriam' card in the same typeface, at that time quite rare; on the back of the card were the words, 'To be obtained from the sexton of St Martin's Church for 5 cents per print.' He next devised and had printed a children's game containing the instruction, 'Turn the dial with the right index finger.' The crucial words from the two pieces of printing were then combined, and - without the knowledge of the printing firm - a small part of one of the plates needed for forging identity cards was ready. This falsification work required endless patience and was carried out, as Veterman wrote after the war, 'in day-long efforts at the utmost precision.' On the Ruysdaelkade in Amsterdam the firm J . C. van Velzen - one of the great resistance printers - printed nearly two thousand counterfeit identity cards. The watermark could not be duplicated (as Lentz had very well known), but it could be imitated. Veterman made each identity card from two thin sheets which, when glued together, were the same

636

Willem

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Arondeus

Gerrit-Jan

van der Veen

Frans Duwaer

thickness as a genuine card. The three lions were reproduced on the inner surface of one of the sheets. If the two halves were pasted precisely together, the effect created could not be told - in a hasty check - from the real thing. In a thorough check, of course, the jig was usually up. The whole problem of falsifying papers became desperately acute in the summer of 1942, when all the carefully registered people with a J on their identity cards were hauled from their homes. They were assembled in such places as the Hollandsche Schouwburg in Amsterdam, from there transported to the Dutch concentration camp Westerbork, in the province of Drente, and from Westerbork to Poland. Moreover, the Germans issued a proclamation: every J e w found in hiding was liable to immediate deportation to the Austrian extermination camp Mauthausen. Anyone helping them could expect the same fate. Among those who did help was one of the greatest leaders of the resistance, the artist Gerrit-Jan van der Veen. Before the war he had made a sculpture portrait of that champion of the oppressed, William the Silent; during the occupation he himself became a champion of the oppressed. He initially attempted to make paper with a real watermark. He did not succeed. His first hundred identity cards went lionless out the door. There was no time to lose. Then began the printing of the lion

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

637

Transport of Jews

paper and the agonizing trimming, alignment, and mounting of the reproductions. Once the two counterfeited halves had been properly imposed, they were pressed in a hand-press. Not until they were completely dry could the concocted dates and biographical information be filled in. Sometimes they were left blank, to be filled in at the homes of the persons receiving the forged identity cards. 'Smit.' He stood up, walked to my bookcase, nosed around in it, glanced at me, and said, 'We're colleagues of a sort, I see.' At this point I could no longer contain myself and asked, 'Yes, but who are you?' He said, 'Smit.' The book at which he was looking was a study of the nineteenth-century painter, Matthijs Maris, and the author was Willem Arondeus. PROFESSOR

JACOB

PRESSER:

In 1943 Willem Arondeus fell before a firing squad. w. B. V R E U G D E N H I L : In 1942 I came in contact with Gerrit van der Veen. It happened like this: he was looking for a place in which to do his clandestine work, and I was able to find one for him. Later Gerrit van der Veen and Frans Duwaer began working together, and since I was a friend of Duwaer's and understood printing, I was able to help them. W e

638

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Duwaer's printing firm, Amsterdam

printed on Sundays - no employees about then, of course - and we had to take care to put things back exactly as we had found them so that when the staff came to work on Monday morning they could not tell anyone had been working there. When we smoked, we put the ashes in the top pocket of our work-coats to keep the floor clean. Frans had serious stomach trouble, but he kept on in spite of it, working hour after hour at the press. Each identity card had to go through the press six times. He kept slaving away simply because identity cards had to be produced. T w o long years - every Sunday, and often evenings and nights, too. In M a y 1944 Gerrit tried to rescue his friends from the Amsterdam jail. During the shooting that followed, a bullet hit him in the back, and the Gestapo later found him, half-paralysed. The evening before his own arrest, Frans was still busy printing. Three days later he was shot, together with Gerrit van der Veen and three others, in the dunes near Overveen. T w o of them had to hold Gerrit up. Frans had printed sixty thousand identity cards. The great round-ups of the Jews occurred in the summer of 1943. Entire districts of Amsterdam were combed through. Mauthausen hung over the heads of all those trying to hide. And week after week the

639

SUPPORT FOR JEWS m »aMgwiBmq*·

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ALGEMEEN

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General

Police

Gazette

deportation train headed east from Westerbork. None of the people on it knew what was in store for them in Poland. They thought: let's face it and make the best of it. They thought: let us bear our own troubles and not permit others to risk their lives for us. They thought: going into hiding is a frightening leap into uncertainty. They thought - well, perhaps they thought none of this at all. Perhaps they knew from bitter experience what hiding meant. In most instances going into hiding meant the separation of parents and children. It nearly always meant money - often a great deal of money. Many Jews did not have a cent. It meant forged papers, which were virtually impossible to come by. It meant a safe address - other people, usually complete strangers, willing and able to take you into their homes, in utter secrecy, for an indefinite period, and to share an existence that was threatened every day, every hour, every minute. Each Jew was expected to report for deportation. Those who did not were assumed to have gone underground. Their names then appeared in the General Police Gazette and, a short time later, in the Missing Criminals Register, a handy little book, published by the Criminal Investigation Department, that every policeman had, or could have, in his pocket. Day and night select tracking parties of the Gestapo and Nazi elements among the Dutch police pursued Jews in hiding. A score of specially

640

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Jews leaving their

homes...

trained Dutch Nazis on the Hague policc force alone pulled in nearly two thousand Jews. During three months of 1943 a similar team in Amsterdam tracked down almost three thousand hidden Jews, and these agents all of them Dutch - received for each captive a premium ranging from two and a half to about forty guilders - money derived from confiscated Jewish property. Sometimes the people who took Jews into their homes became frightened and tipped off the Gestapo or the Dutch police. Captured Jews were tortured or otherwise put under duress to betray the names and addresses of all those who had helped them. Many could not withstand this pressure. The Gestapo often went further, proposing to their captives that, in return for not being deported, they turn agents of the Secret Police and help in the systematic tracing of other Jews. Thousands refused; a few dozens gave way and became collaborators. Among them was a woman (sentenced to death after the war) who betrayed six hundred Jews in hiding, including her own brother and his family. Of perhaps twenty thousand Jews who went underground, at least half were seized. Try to visualize this omnipresent, all-penetrating atmosphere of lurking, mortal danger. Try to comprehend the tremendous reserves of spiritual strength a person needed to be able to go into hiding. In the

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

641

and waiting for deportation

autumn of 1942 a cousin of mine and her husband took refuge with a trustworthy farmer's family in the Achterhoek, in east Gelderland. Hidden in an unheated nook under the tile roof, with north exposure and winter coming, she wrote in her diary in the middle of October, 'This is the thirty-eighth day of our hiding; I so hope there won't be thirty-eight more.' There were nine hundred and thirty-three more. Some people were able to stay those nearly three years in one hidingplace. Others were hunted from address to address, twenty, thirty times. Some landed in places where they felt at home. Others, with protectors just as honest and brave, were never able to adjust; life together became a torment, repeated daily. Some were able to preserve their humanity intact, swallowing their fears, their cares, their grief - bearing everything in silence and even with humour, adapting themselves. Others failed, sometimes at the very beginning. One Jewish lad insisted upon taking his piano to his hiding address, where music had never been played. For the thousand difficulties anticipated, there were ten thousand unforeseen. I know about a girl, a courier for the underground, who had four Jews hidden in her house - one an old woman. This woman became ill and died. And that night the girl placed the body in a cart and pushed it to a canal in Amsterdam. Later she wrote: 'If it had been peacetime, I

642

A hiding-place in the woods

would probably have been strolling down a lane with a boy-friend. As it was I saw, through a fdm of tears, a little old Jewish grandmother sink d o w n into the dark canal water.' This girl was eighteen years old. P H I L I P V A N R A A L T E : In October 1942 we went into hiding in the Achterhoek, in Varsseveld, at Johan and Grada's farm. Johan and Grada did not ask our name - they didn't ask until it was all over. According to the custom o f the region, they called us by our first names. W e were to keep to ourselves, and when 1 asked for h o w long - h o w long, in fact, w e could stay at the farm - Johan said, ' W e l l , that goes without saying. Till the end o f the war.' But w e weren't alone long. A few days later an elderly Jewish couple arrived, and after another few days their son with his wife and an older man, and after a few weeks an old lady from the neighbourhood, and a few days after that a mother with her daughter. So, at a certain point, there were ten o f us in that little room. And the worst thing about the whole situation was that w e became constant objects o f pity and concern. W e couldn't join in, couldn't contribute in any way. There was just one thing w e could do - stay alive. Beyond that, w e couldn't do anything at all.

THEO

643

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

Johannes Bogaard's

brothers

with Jewish childrqp

Mr Bogaard,

Sr

This went along all right for a year, and then the farm burnt down. It was an accident - a leak in the gas pipes. But we had to leave, had to go to an emergency address. W e were sent to a farm in the neighbourhood that was completely unprepared for long-term visitors. It was just a waystation for passersby. All those who gave succour to people in hiding experienced such moments of crisis for which rapid solutions had to be found. Thenjohan took us to the chicken-house on his farm, where he had gone to live with his family after the fire. It wasn't easy, for there was little room in the chicken-house, and it turned out that five people were there already - five who had been at the farmhouse earlier. Grada asked, 'Johan, will it work out?' And Johan said, 'It has to. If it is easy, it is not worth while. W e have to do it because it is difficult and is therefore more pleasing to God.' And that was that. W e felt very safe in that chicken-house. W h o would think of looking for people in a place like that? But one bad day things went wrong - in the spring of 1944. They were after Johan's brother, who had been doing illegal work. So we held a conference, and Johan took us temporarily to a neighbour. THEO PHILIP V A N

RAALTE :

644

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Johannes Bogaard

When you begin to think back, to remember how unbelievably good to us Johan and Grada were, and his brother and sister, and the children Grada never once said, 'You're in my way,' and we were so often in her way - when you think back and try to appreciate what these people did for us - I don't think it can be done. I should like to thank by name thousands of nameless helpers, but I must limit myself to one. On neighbouring farms near the village of Nieuw-Vennep, in the Haarlemmermeer Polder, lived old farmer Bogaard with his sons and their families. As soon as the deportation of the Jews began; one of the Bogaard sons, Hannes, went to Amsterdam. He knew only one Jewish family there, and he brought them to safety. They gave him the addresses of others. He collected scores of children and hid them on the farms, mainly in primitive dugouts in the fields. After the war Hannes Bogaard wrote: 'The most terrible thing was that every day so many people begged, Uncle Hannes, please help me, or save my children - and I couldn't. The country folk were so afraid they didn't dare take anyone in. If they had only seen it themselves, as I did, things would have gone better. And then the troubles when I came home in the evenings: this one had heard that it

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

645

In hiding at the Bogaard farm

was known he had people in hiding; that one, that there would be a raid; a third complained that people in hiding were so difficult; a fourth had no food. So every evening we had a house full of people and problems.' He went to a neighbour with a very large farm: 'Man and wife and one small child, and I asked if I might, just for a few days, place a Jewish child with them. And the man answered, "I wouldn't risk my family for it for a million guilders, Bogaard." And what he said held good for so many others. But because of this attitude we got many too many people ourselves. My father - with two of my brothers, one sister, and my daughter to help out - then had sixty-nine people on his farm; my other brother had thirteen; and I too had thirteen permanent ones, but there were always more.' Some of the children I took away from their parents were nine days old, sixteen days, three, six, and nine months, one, two, three, and four years old. Can you imagine what that meant to the parents - to give their children to someone they had never seen, whom they knew nothing about, not even his name? I had one family with seven children. Their grief was worse, much worse, than all the danger I ran. To give an example: I had to take a little girl about four years old, take this only child away from her mother. The same day I got another child

JOHANNES

BOGAARD:

646

Koen

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Limperg

about two years old, and she was deaf and dumb. In the bus, when we were on the way, you couldn't say one word to comfort this younger child. She sat sobbing softly, the tears streaming down her cheeks, and the other little girl came with a handkerchief - she was crying, too, because she understood very well that it wasn't as much fun to be going along as she had thought at first - and she dried the child's tears. By then nearly everybody on the bus was crying. Uncle Hannes alone took in more than three hundred Jews. Three times the Gestapo raided his farm and those of his father and brothers. As a result of resisting, he lost his father, who was seventy-nine years old when he died in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen; his brother Piet, who succumbed after imprisonment; and his son Teunis, who did not return from the camps. 'They were murdered,' Hannes wrote. 'This was a heavy blow to us, and we have had to learn to look, not at what we lost, but at what we saved. God called us to this work, and He also gave us the strength for it. As Netherlanders we could not do otherwise.' Everywhere, in the Netherlands as elsewhere, the resistance got off to a slow start. It was a tragedy that at the time when help was most needed

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

647

Theo Dobbe

to save the lives of more than a hundred thousand fellow-citizens - the Jews - the Dutch resistance was just beginning. Despite all the efforts of its pioneers, the resistance during the critical period from summer 1942 to spring 1943 had not reached proportions sufficient to the task, and, saddest of all, did not have the essential support of the rest of the population. In general, it was small groups who cared for the Jews in hiding. They lacked time, safe addresses, money. Lack of money brought one of the first resistance leaders, Theo Dobbe - in September 1944 shot down in a gun battle with the Gestapo - to raid three Frisian ration bureaus in October 1942. He got away with five thousand ration cards. Part of these went to people in hiding; the rest brought in more than a hundred thousand guilders on the black market. These raids made the first small breach in the perfectly operating administrative system maintained by the Dutch. The persecution of the Jews and the forced removal of workers to Germany gave Gerrit-Jan van der Veen's resistance group the resolve to force more breaches. They devised a plan to set fire to the Population Registry in Amsterdam, situated in one of the buildings of Artis, the municipal zoo. Koen Limperg, an architect, surveyed the building by stealth and made drawings of it. The poet Martinus Nijhoff, who had served with the engineering corps during World War One, determined

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

648

Johan

Brouwer

where explosives could be placed most effectively. The designer Elmar Berkovich delivered material for police uniforms and caps. After two abortive attempts, a third was launched on the dark evening of 27 March 1943. The raiders included Willem Arondeus as police captain, Gerrit-Jan van der Veen as lieutenant, and four 'policemen' and three 'detectives' - some of them students recruited by Dr Johan Brouwer. Setting off from the Prinsengracht at the Amstel, they succeeded in entering Artis. They overpowered the guards, anaesthetized them with an injection, laid them decently in the garden. The 'inspection' they then carried out set a large part of the lower floor ablaze. Unfortunately, the reinforced concrete building, equipped with fireproof partitions, did not burn out entirely. Of the identity records, fded in six hundred steel cabinets, only fifteen per cent were destroyed. Lentz rushed to Amsterdam from The Hague and did his best tc repair the damage as quickly as possible. The cases with lists of Jewish names and addresses withstood the flames. Not that it mattered: there was a duplicate in his own office in the Kleykamp building. The Gestapo offered a reward of ten thousand guilders for assistance in tracing the perpetrators. 'Nowhere was there so much prattle,' wrote Veterman after the war, 'as in a country founded by a Silent.' Even before the raid on Artis, one

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

649

Population registry,

Amsterdam

of Arondeus' helpers had bragged about what was going to happen. His brother-in-law took the story to the office where he worked - and where one of the managers was a Dutch Nazi. This Nazi forced the brother-inlaw to accompany him to the Gestapo. Arondeus' man was arrested and at once broke down. Of those who invaded Artis, only Van der Veen escaped the claws of the Secret Police. A bare three months later nearly all the others, and some of their supporters, faced a firing squad. Far more important than the direct effect of this heroic attack was the example it set. A month later the April-May strikes shot like a spark through the entire country. On 5 May 1943 Higher SS and Police Leader Hanns Rauter ordered all university students to report within twenty-four hours for work in Germany. He exempted 'those who have signed the pledge' - that is, the oath of loyalty to the occupying power, made mandatory a few weeks earlier. Parents and guardians were held jointly responsible for their children's compulsory appearance at the labour call-up. More than ten thousand students had refused to sign the pledge in the first place; of these, over three thousand reported for the labour draft and were transported to Germany via the Dutch concentration camp Ommen. For the remaining seven thousand students, and for others who later returned secretly from Germany, going into hiding became of utmost urgency.

650

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Airs Kuipers-Rietberg

The statue in

Winterswijk

O n the eighth of May came proclamation of a general labour draft Tor all men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.' It had already been announced - the announcement had in fact led to the April-May strikes - that all members of the Dutch military forces, who had been taken prisoner of war in 1940 and then released, must report for reinternment. In the summer of 1943, therefore, tens - nay, hundreds - of thousands of Dutchmen knew that sooner or later they would be faced with the question, what shall I do? Report? Disappear? Where and how could hiding-places be found for all these people? Ration cards, insert sheets, identity cards? Another whole draft had been called up for the labour service in autumn 1942. At that time a Reformed minister from Heemse, in Overijssel province, had been in hiding for some months, forced to leave his church because of his fiery sermons against the occupying power. One evening in Winterswijk, in Gelderland, where he had preached clandestinely, he met Mrs H. Th. Kuipers-Rietberg, a board member of the Women's Federation of the Reformed Churches. When I was sitting with her here, on eithei side of the hearth as we are sitting now, she said to me, 'Frits, I'm at a loss. Our boys have to go to Germany, and we simply can't permit it. PASTOR

FRITS

SLOMP:

651

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

Concentration

camp,

Amersfoort

I'm stuck with a group of Jews who have to go into hiding, and I don't know which way to turn or what I should do. And then yesterday evening, when I heard you speak, I thought to myself, I've found my man. We're stuck with it. I've already found places for boys here and there, and I've hidden some Jews, but I've reached the point where I just don't know how to go on. Frits, we have to found an organization so that we can give these people places to hide. Now, I thought that you should do it - that you should travel all over the country and stir up enthusiasm for this plan.' I said, 'But I don't dare to. Everywhere I go I meet people, but I get to wherever it is on my bicycle. I don't dare ride in a train.' And then she said - and I'll never forget her words - 'Oh, Frits, would it really be so bad to lose your life if thousands of boys could be saved?' I could say nothing more. If you had heard the way she said it, like a mother worried about her children, about the boys, about the hundreds ofJews for whom there was no way out, you too would have kept silent. A statue to her stands here in Winterswijk, and that statue portrays a woman with a lamb turning to her for protection. She was the symbol of all Dutch women in the resistance who were inspired by their motherhood to carry out this great work. Aunt Riek, driven by her motherhood and her faith, stimulated hundreds of others to make the greatest sacrifice

652

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Pastor Slomp's church, in Heemse

that can be made. She died in Ravensbriick in 1944 in the firm conviction that she had done what she had to do and what God had called her to dc for her country, and for the welfare of our Dutch youth in particular. In Winterswijk, Aalten, Driebergen, Zeist, Hoogeveen, Meppel, Kampen, Zwolle, Pastor Slomp - who called himself Frits the Vagabond - began to make his first contacts. Before the end of 1942 he also found support in Ruinerwold, Wageningen, and Zutphen - pillars of support that is to say, people who in March 1943 proceeded to meet once a week at Zwolle. They gathered in the consistory of the Reformed South Church there, ostensibly for the consideration of problems of dogma in the Reformed Churches. In reality, they met to determine how the people in hiding, for the most part city folk, could best be given refuge in primarily rural areas. This organization at first worked only to the north of the Waal and Maas rivers. In August 1943 it linked up with Catholic groups that were doing the same sort of work, partly in liaison with their own church, south of the rivers in Brabant and Limburg. The organizers of these Catholic groups were Jan Hendricx, a teacher from Venlo; Chaplain Jacobus Naus of the same town; and Father Lodewijk Bleys of the Redemptorist congregation, who was in close touch with Leo Moonen,

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Consistory of Reformed South Church,

653

Zwolle

secretary to the Bishop of Roermond. Of the four, only Bleys was spared death in the concentration camps. Out of this alliance grew the National Organization for Help to People in Hiding, the first truly country-wide resistance association. And by the summer and autumn of 1943 people seeking such help were streaming in by the tens of thousands. But, no food without ration coupons, no coupons without ration card, no ration card without insert sheet, no insert sheet without distribution card, and no safety without identity card whether it be a real one with false personal data or counterfeited from a to 2:. Thousands of Jews, thousands of students were desperate to obtain all these things, as were those who were giving themselves, day in and day out, to the organization of this and other illegal work; as were the military men who had been called up for reinternment; as were the workers who refused to go to Germany, or returned home secretly, or did not go back to work after leave in the Netherlands. W e estimate that before the April-May strikes the number of contract-breakers ran to nearly eighty thousand. After the strikes - which brought a decisive change of atmosphere in the whole country - the transport of workers to Germany became a complete fiasco. In 1940 approximately a hundred thousand labourers left for German factories. In 1941, another hundred

654

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

The Nazified Dutch Labour Service

thousand. In March 1942 the labour draft was made compulsory; one hundred and sixty thousand left in that year. In 1943, a hundred and fifty thousand. And Hitler kept demanding more. But in the first seven months of 1944, he got only twenty thousand workers. More than a hundred contract-breakers were sent to the Amersfoort concentration camp in 1941. T w o years later a thousand men per month were deported from there to other concentration camps or to German factories. Special corps of Dutch Nazis and other pro-German elements were formed in 1943, and especially in 1944, to track down contractbreakers and workers in hiding. T o give an example: in the summer of 1943, all young men born in 1922, 1923, and 1924 were called up for the labour draft. That meant more than a hundred eighty thousand workers. To counteract this, patriotic officials at the regional labour bureaus and a number of employers took measures assuring that more than half of the hundred and eighty thousand cases were postponed, exempted, or medically rejected. In addition, sixteen thousand did not report at all; fifteen thousand did report, but did not show up for inspection; ten thousand passed the inspection, but when the trains pulled out, they simply weren't on board. Thus, not counting those excused for one reason or another, there were forty-one thousand draft-dodgers in the pertinent age group - that is to

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655

say, forty-one thousand potential hiders. And where were the ration cards, coupons, insert sheets, distribution cards, identity cards? Pieter Gootjes, a student from Groningen deeply involved in the resistance movement, and his brother Jacob, a clerk in the distribution office there (both were killed some six months later in a gun fight with the Gestapo), raided the ration bureau at Langweer on 4 June 1943. The loot: five thousand ration cards, twenty-five thousand loose coupons, eight hundred insert sheets. This raid marked the first appearance of the resistance groups that came to be known as the knock-out squads, and led to uniquely fruitful cooperation between them and the National Organization. The task of the squads was primarily to see to it that the National Organization got the ration cards needed for the rapidly growing army of people in hiding. To fulfil this task, the squads had to have arms and ammunition. In the beginning they attacked police bureaus, using imitation guns, in more than one case made of wood. Eventually they accumulated over two hundred revolvers from this source. The second prerequisite was brave men - men willing to step out of their ordinary existence, carry out raids as masked members of a knock-out squad, and, as long as the Gestapo did not scent them, return home after each assault. One member of the Westland Knock-out Squad had eight children.

656

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Liepke Scheepstra

Leendert Valstar

Izaak van der Horst

Johannes Post

A third prerequisite was leaders - leaders who knew how to organize raids thoroughly but prudently, and who were willing to lead the way when their men risked their lives (for they never knew when they might walk into a trap). From these leaders a national top command was formed. At the beginning of 1944 this command was made up of seven members: one man, assisted by two others, who did nothing but organize the distribution of seized material by a thousand and one artful dodges; and six regular squad leaders. These latter included Leendert Valstar, a nurseryman from Westland who used the pseudonym Bertus; Johannes Post, a farmer from south Drente; Izaak van der Horst, a notarial clerk from Kampen; Hilbert van Dijk, a baker from the same town; Theo Dobbe (mentioned above), a salesman from Naarden - all five of whom perished before firing squads or in concentration camps. The sixth member of the top command, and the only one who survived, was a corporal of the police troops who had gone into hiding. Louis

DE J O N G :

What is your strongest memory of the top command

meetings? Well, Mr de Jong, I suppose I should say the very first moment of each meeting. It was like this: during the week, when we didn't see each other, we had to travel a great deal, visit many LIEPKE

SCHEEPSTRA:

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Fake pistol used by a knock-out

657

squad

addresses - a lot of them 'infected,' as we called it. And then every single time you asked yourself, which one of us won't make it this week? Will we all be there? Are all of us being followed? L O U I S D E J O N G : And when you had got together, what did you generally talk about? LIEPKE S C H E E P S T R A : Well, in the first place we told each other what had happened during the past week - arrests, rescues. In the second place, we were responsible for our own men, not only their fmances but also their safety. Thirdly, there was of course the care of the people in hiding. At the end, the National Organization needed a hundred and twenty thousand to a hundred and forty thousand ration cards per month. L O U I S D E J O N G : Have you any special memories of the last meeting attended by some member of the top command who lost his life after it? LIEPKE S C H E E P S T R A : Yes, I have. I remember the raid on the prison in Arnhem, when Frits the Vagabond was rescued. W e celebrated this rescue somewhere in Arnhem, on the top floor of a house. Johannes Post was there, and Hilbert, and Jacques, and Bertus Valstar. W e had some delicious yoghurt, and when we had finished Bertus said, 'Boys, I want to add to the joy of the party by telling you my news. After fourteen years, my wife is going to have a baby!' At the next meeting, Bertus was missing.

658

Civil

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

records

hidden

in a sCable

Knock-out squads freed more than five hundred political prisoners in the course of raids on police bureaus and prisons, such as the famous raid on the prison in Leeuwarden. In self-defence they had to liquidate (and this was the hardest thing of all) a few hundred Gestapo agents and Dutch traitors. They pillaged nearly two hundred ration offices and a hundred and sixty population registries. For safety's sake, they hid the civil records ofjisp, a village in North Holland, in a stable; those of Dinxperlo, in Gelderland, they buried - but after the war the files were dug up again. The Gestapo tracked the knock-out squads like bloodhounds, for the Germans knew that the squads had been responsible for the raids that made it possible to provide food for the people in hiding, and thus to keep them alive. In the autumn of 1943, therefore, the Nazis began preparing a mortal assault on the whole resistance movement. The Netherlands was divided into distribution districts, each of which had a number. At first these numbers were used solely for internal administration. It was now suddenly decided that henceforward the insert sheets of each district would bear that district's number and be valid only there. Insert sheets 'liberated' in one municipality would thus be unusable in another. Even more dangerous was the decision to reregister the entire population, requiring all citizens to report for a new distribution card, which would contain more space for notation when

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659

Food-ration coupons

insert sheets were issued. When reporting, each person had to present his identity card, upon which a new inspection stamp, bearing the number of the distribution district, was to be placed next to the bearer's photograph. From then on anyone whose identity card was checked and found not to bear the new stamp was assumed to have been unable to report, and ipso facto a criminal in hiding. This offensive was brilliantly repulsed by the resistance groups, aided by thousands of civil servants. In January 1944 two Tilburg officials helped the Soest Knock-out Squad, working under the orders of the national command, to break into the local population registry and make away with more than a hundred thousand of the lethal inspection stamps. Moreover, the stamps were blank: Tilburg's number, 249, had not yet been printed on them. Then in April, at the request of the resistance movement, light bombers of the Royal Air Force finally attacked the Kleykamp building in The Hague, headquarters of the Central Population Registry. On file there were millions of master identity cards. A quarter of a million were destroyed, and the entire organization was disrupted. Tragically, among the more than sixty people killed in the bombing were a number of civil servants who had worked valiantly for the resistance. Lentz was inconsolable. His whole life's work, he moaned, lay in ruin.

660

PUBLIC OPINION A N D RELATIONS TO J E W S

The Central

Population

Registry

B y the spring of 1944 there were perhaps more than three hundred thousand people in hiding all over the Netherlands. In the communities of Andijk, Zegveld, and Helden, ten per cent of the population consisted of people from other parts of the country who had come there to hide. The National Organization, the largest resistance group, had developed into a powerful apparatus with more than twelve thousand permanent members, of w h o m more than a thousand were needed for courier services alone. This sector of the resistance also suffered heavy losses. Five hundred members of the knock-out squads lost their lives, and eleven hundred of the National Organization. In some districts, five or six leaders were arrested, one after the other. But the work went on. The counterfeiting groups begun by Eduard Veterman and Gerrit-Jan van der Veen had grown into industries with hundreds of workers, most of them students. They published whole catalogues of forged seals and stamps. A customer needing the seal of the District Labour Bureau Leiden, for instance, simply ordered no 487, and it was delivered to his house by courier. Or suppose that someone needed a particular number stamp from the more than five hundred distribution districts. He had only to order Η 1 3 1 8 , for example, to receive the Harderwijk stamp. Yet each district number had had to be separately cut or plated; Amsterdam's number stamp looked very different from that of Weesp, and Weesp's

...

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661

bombed by the Royal Air Force

quite different from Dordrecht's. And each stamp in the catalogue had required a civil servant willing to smuggle it into the hands of the resistance. People could also order forged signatures by catalogue number. Rauter's signature was no 105. Stamps with the eagle of the Third Reich were available in a varied selection. The stamps of German labour bureaus were used to falsify declarations that worker so-and-so had been honourably discharged from his service to the Reich. The dangerous inspection stamp on the identity card, about half the size of a postage stamp, was magnified, redrawn, reduced for plating, and printed by the tens of thousands. To reproduce the first insert sheet for the second distribution card, it was necessary to make three separate plates and run the sheets through the press three times to achieve the three-colour background of the original. The resistance printers also provided a long list of other essential papers. For Jews and people living illegally in Belgium, they supplied Belgian identity cards, which were childishly simple compared with the Dutch. In the Netherlands, Jewish children were transferred from one place to another with official papers from the Rotterdam Evacuation Office falsified by ingenious printers. They ran off documents which Jews could use as evidence that they, or their parents or grandparents, had been

662

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Detail of background,

second distribution

card

baptized as Christians. They counterfeited baptismal affidavits, complete with forged seal and all, from German parishes. Since these could be checked by the Gestapo, they went one better and produced AustroHungarian baptismal certificates from before the First World War, and similar papers from Tsarist Russia. There could be little fear that the archives from which these papers purportedly came still existed. At the beginning of 1943 a deposition came in, via Switzerland, from the Paraguayan consul in Bern. It stated that Senora Rosa Kahn was a citizen of the South American republic. In no time at all, this pretty piece of paper was reproduced and made available to other needy persons in hiding. The falsification centres had a useful list of all the distribution districts, arranged alphabetically and with the appropriate numbers. From some population registries they had received lists containing names, the municipal issuance number of these persons' identity cards, and date of issue. When one now filled in a false identity card, one could choose serial numbers and dates that tallied with those of actual identity cards in legal use. In the end, the Free Groups of Amsterdam, one of the largest resistance organizations in the capital city, issued printed forms to be used in applying for counterfeit identity cards. One of the most important of its ten questions was no 3: Ts this information invented, or does someone with this name, birth-date, and birth-place exist? If such a person exists, in

663

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

77 •

181

«s-a *

.

367

j f / t f j

3

J f * f i

t/
* Gp '-J 1

9

1 3

#/J/ S

A ,

^

3 2 0

JJ Catalogue of distribution

districts

which municipality is he registered?' If such a person did exist, it was of course necessary that his master identity card disappear from the population register. Hundreds of members of various resistance groups, aided by loyal civil servants who fought the Gestapo apparatus from the inside, made full-time jobs of artfully bungling the civil records. It had to be done, yet each of them knew the risk he ran: the bullet or the concentration camp. At the largest falsification centres entire cabinets full of stamps and seals stood ready for use when needed. On certain critical occasions emergency stamping crews were organized to turn out thousands of neatly stamped, highly illegal papers. Where did the money come from? Money for all this work of falsification, for the resistance organizations, for the people in hiding? Ration coupons alone were not enough. Food also had to be paid for. From 1940 on a great deal of money was collected for the resistance movement. Almost at the beginning many political and religious leaders were forced to resign their functions and often to go into hiding. They needed financial support. This support came in by the penny, the quarter, the guilder. But generous as it was, much more was needed. And much more came, thanks to the brilliant organizing and coordinating work

664

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

Abraham Filippo

Iman van den Bosch

of one group: the National Assistance Fund. The Fund owed its existence and its success to no one more than to a young banker from Zaandam, Walraven van Hall, brother of the present burgomaster of Amsterdam, himself formerly a banker. The National Assistance Fund originated in the so-called Seamen's Fund set up at the end of 194.1 by the late Abraham Filippo of the Holland-America Line. He collected money for the families of Dutch seamen serving with Allied fleets when the Germans forbade the shipping companies to continue paying family allowances. My brother organized this work in Amsterdam, and he was immediately faced with the problem how to get hold of enough money. He conceived the idea of asking for it, not as gift contributions, but as loans backed by the oral guarantee of the government in London. The system was as follows: we borrowed rather important amounts of money; secondly, we requested the distributive network to give full accounting of all money spent. This second point was exceedingly difficult for the whole underground movement, because we had had it hammered into us not to put anything down in black and white - a point constantly stressed by Radio Orange in its broadcasts from England. Yet we found it absolutely necessary to keep books, because we knew that we should GIJSBERT

VAN

HALL:

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665

Walraven van Hall

have to borrow large sums for which we would have to account after the war. Our first disbursements, which seemed mountainous to us, came to twelve thousand guilders a month, and we simply didn't know how we would be able to get that much together month after month. But by using my brother's system it became possible to attract steadily larger amounts, although it was often very hard. Some months we were practically out of cash and yet knew that we had payments to make totalling several hundred thousand guilders. Still, the system kept on developing, and at the end of the war we even had one month in which we disbursed fourteen million guilders. Through his work for the seamen, my brother met Iman van den Bosch, a retired naval officer then employed at Philips in Eindhoven. They reached the conclusion that the work must not be limited to the seamen's families but extend to the entire resistance movement. All the resistance work must be financed. This was difficult to organize, because the people in hiding had to be traced - the Jews and people who refused to work in Germany and all the others with problems. Therefore, organizations to trace these people had to be established throughout the entire country. For this purpose, Van den Bosch and my brother travelled far and wide.

666

Jews in

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

hiding

Moreover, my brother had the incredible quality of being able to persuade the most obstreperous people to work nicely together. This ability was immensely valuable in the resistance movement, because very intractable people were involved in it. At the end of 1944, just after we had solved the problems of financing the railway strike, the National Assistance Fund was dealt a heavy blow. Van den Bosch, who had had to disappear from Eindhoven because of his espionage work, was arrested at a meeting in Groningen concerned with the railway strike. A few days later he was shot. His last words were, 'Long live the Queen!' And then, at the end of January 1945, my brother was arrested on the Leidsegracht in Amsterdam at a meeting that had been betrayed. The Germans, who had been searching for him for years, sentenced him to death, and a fortnight later, on 12 February 1945, two days after his thirty-ninth birthday, he was shot down at the corner of a street in Haarlem. The spot was very near the River Spaarne, where he had often sailed as a boy and learnt to love the water. The National Assistance Fund also gave major support, in the amount of nearly a half million guilders, to many of the illegal newspapers, the largest of which were published in editions of hundreds of thousands. The espionage organizations, which mapped all the German military

667

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

Our Lady of the Good

Hiding-Place

installations, received nearly a million. Approximately six million went to the armed resistance - the knock-out squads and the Council of Resistance, which later joined with the Order Service to form the Forces of the Interior. People in hiding got about thirty million guilders; on the books they were always accounted for as filers of damage claims on accident insurance. Of this thirty million, more than four and a half went to Jews in hiding. In September 1944 the Allied armies marched with great speed through France and Belgium, and on the seventeenth of that month British, American, and Polish paratroopers were dropped near Eindhoven, Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. On the same day, the Dutch railways went on strike. The National Assistance Fund was faced with its heaviest problem: money to support the strikers, thirty thousand strong. Nearly forty millions guilders were made available for this one purpose. This amount, plus the other sums the Fund had succeeded in raising - through gifts; through loans by industries, banks, and investment trusts; and with the assistance of tax collectors - brought the grand total to far above a hundred million guilders. In the main, the Nazis lost the battle against the people in hiding during 1943 and 1944, and had to give it up in the Hunger Winter of 1944-45.

668

Forest

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

hiding-place

The problem was, the Netherlands was too densely populated. People lived nearly everywhere: only seven per cent of the entire country was not inhabited or in cultivation. Here and there it was possible for a few individuals to hide temporarily in the forests, but in these years of barbarous pursuit and persecution this was no solution for a pressing national problem. Where were such people to get food? "Where fuel? Contacts with the outside world were always necessary. Thus one by one these forest hiding-places had to be abandoned. Our Lady of the Good Hiding-Place, with her simple altar somewhere in Brabant, found little to attract her in the Dutch woods. The means of communication in the Netherlands were much too good, the enemy occupier could move about far too easily. No Dutch Maquis was possible. Nowhere could one escape the thralls of a highly developed modern society. There was only one thing to do: try to secrete in the folds of this society all those whose lives the enemy demanded, and all those whose working strength he wished to exhaust. Of one hundred and forty thousand Jewish citizens of the Netherlands, attempts were made to save twenty thousand. Of this twenty thousand, half were saved, including four thousand children. More than a half million workers were sent to Germany; three hundred thousand others went into

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669

Helping people in hiding: this was the greatest achievement of the Dutch resistance movement. It was accomplished with little cooperation from the Dutch civil service in occupied territory during the first three years, with little practical support from the government-in-exile in London during the first four. It was accomplished under nerve-wracking tensions in the heat of a raging battle with the Gestapo. It was accomplished by simple men and women - by the nameless, by the unknown, by the mortally harried - whose gifts of mind and heart flourished almost incredibly under the pressures of the time, making them people possessed, lifting them almost above themselves: a refuge and strength to people in trouble.

670

PUBLIC OPINION A N D RELATIONS T O JEWS

THE RESCUE OF JEWS IN THE ITALIAN ZONE OF OCCUPIED CROATIA

DANIEL CARPI

I WOULD LIKE to begin with several general remarks which, although of a somewhat personal nature, can be useful in illuminating the substance of my lecture as well as the methods I used in my research. I began research on the fate of the Jews in the Italian zone of occupied Croatia several years ago. I also conducted a seminar on the topic in the Jewish History Department at Tel Aviv University. At that time, my students and I sought to use as wide a range of documents as possible — both from the standpoint of the type of documents as well as their origin — including those from German, Croatian, Italian, and Jewish sources. Our aim was to attempt to understand all the various aspects of the events of the period. For various reasons I did not complete my research as planned. Now, however, having been invited by Yad Vashem to participate in this conference, I will present one part of that research — the chapter dealing with the role played by the Italian civilian and military authorities in rescuing the Jews who had found refuge in the districts of Croatia under Italian control. This is obviously only one aspect of the total rescue effort in which many bodies participated — including Jewish bodies, such as the leadership of the Jewish communities in Croatia and Dalmatia, the Union of Jewish Communities of Italy, and DELASEM (Delegazione Assistenza Emigranti), the organization established by the latter to assist refugees. Moreover, the picture will not be complete without a description of the contribution made by each and

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DANIEL CARPI

every one of them. I believe, however, that the activities of the Italian civilian and military authorities should be dealt with independently of the others for several reasons: because of the significant direct role played by the Italian occupation authorities in the rescue effort; the fact that it was their attitude which created the favorable conditions which enabled the other bodies — whose activities were dependent on the Italian occupation authorities — to take such actions as providing travel documents and vehicles, transferring funds, etc.; and the uniqueness of the phenomenon when contrasted with the stark events of the Holocaust period. It should be noted that we are dealing with an operation carried out by a foreign element — an occupation army in enemy territory — which acted as it did not for the sake of any rewards, on behalf of Jews with whom it had no cultural or emotional ties, such as those which might exist between a local population and their Jewish neighbors (as was the case in countries such as Holland, Denmark, Italy, and Bulgaria). Moreover, these actions were undertaken despite the unsympathetic attitude of most of the native population, and the opposition of the authorities of the "Independent State of Croatia," and in spite of their German allies who spared no effort to sabotage their activities. For these reasons, and for others which cannot be outlined here, I believe that this subject should be dealt with despite the methodological limitations which I have noted above. I hope that this discussion will aid researchers who in the future will attempt to deal with the entire range of activities undertaken at that time by the various bodies in question. I would like to make one additional comment, regarding bibliography, before I begin the main part of the lecture. This topic was dealt with for the first time in a short article which appeared in 1944, a few months after the liberation of Rome by the Allied armies. 1 The author, who concealed his true identity behind the pen name Verax, 10 relied upon the documents of the Italian Foreign Ministry. H e appar1

Verax, "Italiani ed ebrei in Jugoslavia," Politico Estera, I, Rome, 1944, pp. 21-29 (hereafter — Verax). After this article was already in print, I learned that "Verax" is Roberto Ducci, at that time head of the "Croatian Office" in the Foreign Ministry and today the Italian ambassador to the United Kingdom.

672

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

ently was a member of the group of high-ranking officials who planned and initiated the major rescue operations. For this reason, his article should be regarded as eyewitness testimony, which reflects the atmosphere of that time. As is common with testimonies of this sort, however, his article suffers from a lack of historical perspective. Following the appearance of this brief essay, a few months after the end of the war, the Italian Foreign Ministry published a memorandum, which for some reason was classified as "restricted" (Riservato), on its activities "to protect the Jewish communities during the years 1938-1943."2 At the time, this memorandum aroused some interest — perhaps because of its Riservato classification — and it is possible that it contains some previously unknown information about rescue efforts in several countries, particularly in Southern France. The chapter on Croatia, 3 however, is basically a synopsis of the article by Verax, and does not contain any new information of significance. In 1951, a short article was published by Jacques Sabille on ' T h e Attitude of the Italians Toward the Persecuted Jews of Croatia." 4 The article was later translated into several languages, albeit with a fairly large number of changes.3 Appended to Sabille's article were eleven documents relating to the period from July 24, 1942—April 10, 1943. All of these documents were taken from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry, and are undoubtedly important. In fact, until now they were the only documents available for research on this topic. Yet they contain few details on the general diplomatic campaign launched to save Jews, and they certainly do not accurately describe the activities carried out in Croatia. I am now able, for the first time, to present a broad survey of the subject, based upon several hundred documents which while they are 2

\Relazione suWopera svolta dal Ministero degli Affari Esten per la tutela delle Comunitä Ebraiche (1938-1943), n.p., n.d. a Ibid., pp. 18-22. 4 Jacques Sabille, "L'attitude des Italians envers les Juifs persecut6s en Croatie," Le Monde Juif, August-September 1951, pp. 5-8; October 1951, pp. 6-10. 5 A slightly altered version was appended to L6on Poliakov's book on the Jews under Italian occupation in Southern France, La condition des Juifs en France sous 1'occupation italienne, Paris, 1946. The book was also published in Yiddish (Paris, 1952), English (Paris, 1955) and Italian (Milan/ 1956) (hereafter — Poliakov-Sabille).

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DANIEL CARPI

all from the archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry, include copies of correspondence with the General Headquarters in Rome and the military commands in Croatia and Dalmatia, as well as the correspondence between these two commands. These documents, which date from the period from 1941 until Italy's surrender in September 1943, shed new light on the subject under discussion, which constitutes a unique chapter in the annals of the rescue attempts undertaken during the Holocaust. Following its defeat in the Blitzkrieg of April 1941, Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis powers, and divided into various sectors. Several districts were annexed to the neighbouring countries — Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Axis states — while two separate states, which were supposed to eventually become independent — Serbia and Croatia — were created from the remaining parts of Yugoslavia. Serbia never gained independence, even ostensibly, and throughout the war was under German military rule. Croatia, on the other hand, was declared an "independent state" (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska). The Italians helped establish the Croatian state in the hope that it would be an Italian satellite and a base for expanding Italian political and cultural influence in the Balkans. Ante Pavelic, the leader of the UstaSa, the Croatian fascist party, was appointed head of state. He had spent many years in Italy as a political exile, and had established close ties with the Fascist Party and its leaders. Indeed, a few days after the establishment of the new Croatian state, Pavelic came to Rome, and on May 18, 1941, signed a series of agreements with Mussolini, which were designed to serve as a basis for the friendly relations between the two states. They agreed that a monarchy ruled by a descendant of the Italian royal family would be established in Croatia and the Duke of Spoleto was chosen for this post. They also agreed upon the boundaries between the two countries, and Croatia ceded part of the Dalmatian coast — between the cities of Zadar and Split — as well as most of the islands off the coast to the Italians. It soon became clear, however, that these initial successes of Italian diplomacy were meaningless. From the very beginning, the Italians were prevented from extending their influence over all the territory of the Croatian state because of the opposition of the Germans, who considered this state a vital base for maintaining their influence in the Danube Basin even after the end of the war. This conflict of in-

674

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

terests between the two Axis powers led to a compromise, a sort of "partition agreement," which was signed by Ciano and Ribbentrop in Vienna on April 21 and 22, 1941. According to the agreement, "independent" Croatia was to be divided into two — the northeastern section was to be controlled by the German Army and the southwestern section by the Italian Army. Moreover, the agreement was supposedly signed only due to the current security situation and merely for the duration of the war. Thus even prior to the summer of 1941, three distinct regions were created in the territory which was to be included in the "Independent State of Croatia" — a region which was annexed to Italy (commonly referred to as Sector A); a region occupied by the Italian Army (Sector B); and a third region which was controlled by the German Army. In the latter two areas, the civil administration was handed over to the Croatian authorities. As early as August 1941, however, the Italian Army was forced to take over administrative duties in parts of Seotor Β — in effect throughout a strip about 50 kilometers wide along the coast — in order to stop the atrocities committed by bands of the Ustasa against the Serbian minority. Thus sector Β was divided into two: an area in which all civilian and military authority was in the hands of the Italian Army, and an area in which the Italian Army controlled only the major strategic points. The former was usually referred to as Sector C. This complex breakdown into sectors, with borders which were never completely delineated, set the stage for the great tragedy which befell the Jews of Croatia. It was also the framework within which the conditions, which in several respects were exceptional, were created for the rescue of some of these Jews. The persecution of the Jews of Croatia began shortly after the establishment of the Croatian state, and information regarding their plight reached the Italian Foreign Ministry early in the summer of 1941. The reports included descriptions of the brutal behavior of the Ustasa and of Croatian government officials toward Jews and Serbs, and these documents also express deep revulsion at these inhuman acts. One gets the impression, however, that the reports were still fairly routine. Even the two long and detailed memoranda sent by Jews to the Italian Foreign Ministry — one by a group of refugees

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DANIEL CARPI

from Sarajevo0 and the other by the Chairman of the Union of Jewish Communities of Italy — did not make an impact. In any event, we have no evidence of any changes which took place as a result. According to the documents of the Foreign Ministry, a change took place in the spring of 1942, when the first reports on "masses" of Jewish refugees who were fleeing Croatia, and even Serbia and Bosnia, in order to seek refuge in the sectors under the control of the Italian Army, began reaching the Italian Foreign Ministry. The first report was sent on May 15 by Giuseppe Bastianini, the civilian governor of Dalmatia, who was particularly concerned over this development because, in his words, thousands of Jewish refugees had already settled in Dalmatia. He asked the Foreign Ministry and the Command of the Italian Army in Croatia to act quickly to find an immediate solution to this problem. Thus, within a short time, most of the elements destined to play a role in this episode and in the rescue activities were activated: the Foreign Ministry in Rome and its liaison office attached to Italian Army Headquarters in Croatia and Dalmatia; the Italian Legation in Zagreb; the Italian civilian governor of Dalmatia, and the headquarters of the Second Army in Croatia and Dalmatia. Bastianini initially believed that due to considerations of logistics, internal security, and politics, thousands of refugees should not be allowed to remain in Dalmatia. He therefore ordered the army to block the entry of additional refugees and to expel those who had already arrived. This step, which at first was apparently taken on his own initiative, was quickly confirmed by an "order by higher authorities," which he received from Rome (apparently from the Ministry of the Interior), and which directed him to carry out the expulsion immediately. Nevertheless, this directive was not implemented — with the exception of a few isolated cases — because all those involved in the matter quickly realized that under no circumstances could the refugees be given over to the Croatians, a step tantamount to condemning them to persecution, torture, and even death. 8

Daniel Carpi, "Le Toledot ha-Yehudim be-Split u-be-Sarayevo (Te'udot Hadashot min ha-Shanim 1941-1942)," Yalkut Moreshet, No. 10, 1969, pp. 109-121.

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While there was general agreement on this principle, there was, however, no unanimity as to what the best solution would be. Bastianini insisted that the refugees not remain in Dalmatia. He suggested concentrating them in an area in Croatia, which would be selected in consultation with the Croatian Government, on the condition that the Italian Foreign Ministry obtain "guarantees" from the Croatians in advance that these Jews would be treated humanely and given decent living conditions. If this condition were not guaranteed in advance, Bastianini wrote, that it would "be impossible for me to carry out the instructions I mentioned above" regarding the extradition of the refugees (see Appendix—document no. 1). The Foreign Ministry was not at all enthusiastic about Bastianini's suggestion and it in turn proposed — in a document signed by Ciano, even though the initiative came from the Italian Legation in Zagreb — that the refugees be concentrated in Sector B, i.e. in the area of Croatia occupied by the Italian Army. In this way, the problems of the Governor of Dalmatia would be solved, and no one would have to depend upon the good will — if indeed it could be thus labelled! — of the Croatian authorities. The Italian Army was in charge of Sector Β and it would guarantee the welfare and safety of the refugees. Even this solution, which at first glance seemed exceedingly simple and practical, was fraught, however, with serious and almost insurmountable difficulties. By the middle of 1942, the control exercised by the Italian Army over most of Sector Β had weakened— either because of the pressure of the Ustasa or because of the activities of the Communist partisans — to such an extent that it became highly doubtful whether the Italians would be able to take on the additional and unconventional task of guarding the Jewish refugees. For this reason, General Mario Roatta, the Commander of the Second Army, rejected the suggestion. He noted that in Sector Β (CrkvenicaCirquenizza) there was already a small concentration of approximately 300 Jews whom the Italian Army had undertaken to protect. Moreover, they were barely succeeding in this task due to the pressure of the Croatians who incessantly demanded that these Jews be turned over to them. Roatta added, however, that the refugees then in Dalmatia should not be abandoned, because if they were to fall into the hands of the Croatians, they would be transported to the Jasenovac

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concentration camp, and "the consequences are well-known to everyone." He suggested therefore that the refugees be interned on one of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia, i.e. in Sector A, since in his opinion they could easily be protected there without causing unnecessary difficulties for the Italian civil administration. This first round of correspondence had no practical consequences, for Bastianini rejected Roatta's suggestion out of hand, claiming that it could not be implemented. The fact that no decision was reached, however, had very positive consequences. All those involved in the issue understood that if their desire was to ensure the safety of the refugees, they should not reach a hasty decision. As a result, they continued to correspond with one another at a leisurely pace, raising various possible solutions. In the meantime, certain facts were created which no one questioned. The refugees who succeeded in reaching safety were not expelled, and here and there they even began to rebuild their lives, with the help of DELASEM or upon their own initiative. Hardly more than a month had elapsed since the beginning of this correspondence, when a dramatic turnabout occurred. Soon this peripheral matter concerning the fate of several thousand refugees, became an issue of principle, morality, and policy, which involved the political and military policymakers of the two Axis powers, and in several respects strained the friendly relations between Italy and Germany. The beginning of this turnabout was purely coincidental. One day in June 1942 — apparently around the 20th of the month — a group of German officers and engineers serving in a unit of the Todt Organization which was in charge of bauxite mining in Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina, passed through that city. They were accommodated at the staff headquarters of the Italian "Murge" division, which was stationed there, and one of the German engineers commented about some sort of "agreement between the governments of Germany and Croatia to deport all the Croatian Jews, including those of Herzegovina, to the Russian areas occupied by the Germans" (see document no. 2). These remarks — made in the course of a friendly conversation among comrades at arms — aroused the ire of the Italian hosts, either because they considered the agreement a blow to the status and authority of the Italian Army — the district of Herzego-

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vina was included in Sector Β — or due to humanitarian principles. As a result, they appealed to the headquarters of the Second Army, which in turn contacted the Foreign Ministry in Rome, and expressed the opinion that this agreement should not be carried out with regard to the Jews of Sector B, at least as long as the Italian Army was still stationed there. This time, the various levels of Italian officialdom did not delay. On June 23, 1942, the first cable concerning the issue was sent to Rome, four days later a memorandum was sent, and on June 28, Ciano's personal secretary, the Marquis Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta replied that, "Also for reasons of a general nature this Ministry agrees that the said agreement between the governments of Germany and Croatia should not be carried out in the areas under our occupation." The policy adopted by the Italians, and the various steps which led to it, are fully clarified and confirmed in one of the documents of the German Foreign Ministry published by Sabille.7 A memorandum submitted to Ribbentrop on July 24, 1942 stated that an agreement had been reached between the Germans and the Croatians on the deportation of all the Jews of Croatia; that the agreement had already been formulated in writing; and that the Croatians favored the deportation, but insisted that it encompass all the Jews, including those in Sector B, whose number they estimated at about 4,000-5,000 persons. The author of the memorandum added that in his opinion the Croatians would need forceful German support to carry out the plan, since stubborn opposition by the Italians was anticipated, and in fact there were already many indications of such opposition. Thus, for example, the Italian Chief of Staff in Mostar had only recently announced that he would not agree to the deportation of Jews from the city, since it was against the declared policy of the Italians, who granted full equality to all residents. Even more caustic comments were made in the presence of the German commander of the Todt unit which was supervising the bauxite mining in the area. The same memorandum also states that Siegfried Kasche, the German Ambassador in Zagreb, expressed his opinion that the deportation could begin immediately, but that he also believed that "for reasons of principle" it must be implemented throughout the country. The me7

Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., pp. 164-165 (English edition).

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morandum seems to indicate even though it does not say so explicitly, ihat the German Foreign Ministry was requested to assist in the operation by asking the top political officials in Rome to order the army commanders in Croatia to change their position. Even before this memorandum was written, the Germans had, in fact, turned on several occasions to the Italian Legation in Zagreb and pointed out the extreme security danger posed by the presence of numerous Jewish refugees in Sector B. They evaded the Croatian "racial laws," engaged in espionage, and cooperated with the enemy. As early as July 7, Casertano, the Italian envoy in Zagreb, had reported regarding these repeated protests, noting that "This German concern, which already smells of interference, could be a prelude to some official step" in the future. Apparently the Italian authorities were not particularly impressed by this warning. Thus throughout the month of July and the first half of August 1942, they continued to leisurely correspond and discuss the placement of the refugees, despite the fact that during this entire period more and more information was received from the Italian Legation in Zagreb about the intensification of the persecution of the Jews in Croatia, including the news of the concentration of thousands of Jews and their deportation to the "territories of the East." According to this same source, this news seemed to indicate that "the Jewish problem in this country, which had already been dealt with in a most drastic manner in the past, was now approaching the stage which would perhaps constitute its final solution."8 Finally, on August 17 (according to one of the sources, August 18), 1942, an official intervention was made. Early in the morning, as was the custom of German diplomats, Prince Otto von Bismarck, the counsellor in the German Embassy in Rome, brought a telegram from Von Ribbentrop requesting his Italian counterpart "to see that instructions be given to the Italian military authorities in Croatia so that the operation planned by the Germans and the Croatians for a massive transfer of the Jews of Croatia to the territories of the East will be able to be carried out in the Italian-occupied zone as well." Verax, who apparently was among those who received the German coun8

Report of the Italian Legation in Zagreb, August 6, 1942, Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry (hereafter — AIFM).

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sellor, knew Bismarck personally and he described him as an average man, obsessed by feeling of inferiority vis-ä-vis the Anglo-Saxon world, a man who at times allowed himself to whisper criticism of the Nazi policies in a confidant's ear, yet was always ready to carry out orders, even of the most humiliating nature.9 On that morning as well, after he had fulfilled his mission, Bismarck whispered in the ears of the Italian officials that "the matter concerned several thousand people" and that "the purpose of the planned operation was in fact their physical dispersal and elimination." In response, he was told that his request would be considered and that it would be brought to Ciano and Mussolini for a decision. Ciano's response is not known, and it appears that he refrained from taking an unequivocal position in this matter. This was not the case as far as Mussolini was concerned. The memorandum presented to him by officials of the Foreign Ministry contained three short paragraphs: the substance of Ribbentrop's appeal, the whispered warning of Bismarck, and a summary of the abovementioned report sent by the Italian Legation in Zagreb on August 6, 1942. On the basis of this information, Mussolini was asked to decide whether to accept or reject Ribbentrop's appeal. Mussolini's answer was anything but ambiguous. On the page which he was given (and which has been preserved), he wrote in the upper right hand corner "nulla osta" — ("there is no opposition"), and signed next to it with the famous " M " (see document no. 3). Thus, with one stroke of the pen, and on the basis of two words written by Mussolini on a piece of paper with a coarse pencil, the fate of 3,000 individuals had been sealed. "There is no opposition," he wrote, and the meaning of these words was that the Jewish refugees should be handed over to the Germans, even though it was clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that this meant their death. Several days later, on August 29, Ciano's office informed Army Headquarters of the contents of the German Embassy's appeal and of the decision of "the Royal Government" that there should be "no opposition" to handing over the Jewish refugees who had found shelter in Sector B. (Of course no mention was made of Sector A, which had been annexed to Italy.) This communication, which was 0

Vcrax, op.

cit.,

p. 23.

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transmitted in the name of "the Government" was tantamount to an explicit command to the General Staff to see to it that the decision be implemented. It should be noted, however, that no date was set for the beginning of the operation and no timetable of any sort was included in the communication — an omission which perhaps was not accidental. In theory, the die had been cast. In fact, at the very moment that this decision was made, the real rescue efforts, planned from above and coordinated with the various branches, began in earnest. Among those who took part in this activity were several commanders of the Italian Army stationed in Croatia, among them General Mario Roatta and Giuseppe Pieche, the general of the Carabinieri forces, (who after the war was awarded a special citation by the Union of Jewish Communities of Italy for his bold efforts on behalf of the Jews), and Vittorio Castellani, the head of the liaison bureau between the Foreign Ministry and Army Staff Headquarters in Yugoslavia (Ufficio collegamento con il Comando Superiore delle FF.AA. Slovenia Dalmazia — Supersloda). In Rome, several high-ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry initiated and participated in the plan, particularly Ambassador Luca Pietromarchi, who was the head of the department which dealt with the problems of territories occupied by the Italian Army (Gabinetto, Affari Politici, Ufficio Slovenia, Croazia, Dalmazia, Montenegro, Grecia e hole Ionie), Signor Roberto Ducci, head of the "Croatian Office" (Gabinetto, Affari Politici, Ufficio Croazia), and the Marquis d'Ajeta, head of the Minister's Secretariat. During the initial consultations which took place in the Foreign Ministry after Mussolini's response was received, these officials — and perhaps others as well about whom we have no information — decided that on principle they would not accede to the decisions of the Ministry regarding the extradition of the Jewish refugees from Croatia. They considered the issue to be one of humanitarian concern, a matter of principle in which they simply could not give in—on a practical level — under any circumstances. They decided to adopt delaying tactics, in the hope that the longer they could put off the implementation of the plan, the more likely it was that it would eventually be abandoned. This decision was further reinforced upon receipt of a new report from the Italian Legation in Zagreb on August 22, 1942. The report.

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which was the most detailed and accurate hereto received on the subject, stated that the deportation to Poland (it is noteworthy that until then the indefinite term "territories of the East" had been used) of the remnants of the Jews of Croatia had recently begun; that the deportations were being carried out in special railway cars provided by the Croatian authorities; and that the Croatians even obligated themselves to pay the Germans 30 marks for each Jew who was taken out of the country. The report further stated that the representative of the Vatican in Zagreb, Monsignor Ramiro Marcone, had intervened via diplomatic channels to stop the deportations but his intervention had been futile. It seemed, however, that "Aryans" married to Jews would not be deported. Besides describing the events, the author of the report also noted that the German Ambassador in Zagreb had once again approached him and demanded that the Jews of Croatia who had fled to Sector Β be included in the deportations, stating that the German Government would soon take formal steps in this matter. (The German Ambassador in Zagreb also reported on this step.)10 The picture was thus very clear to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry. They also had already made their own decision and had chosen the tactics which were to be used. Nothing remained to be done except to begin to implement the plan which, of course, required careful coordination between the diplomatic and military elements, and this type of coordination, by its nature, required oral communication, rather than the use of the regular channels. This is what occurred, although clear evidence was also left in writing, which enables us to trace several of the major steps which were taken. It seems that the participants did not insist upon preserving the "conspiratorial" nature of their activities — apparently they did not deem it necessary. This fact is indicative of the extent to which they depended on the widespread support of various military and government circles in this operation. The first stages of the delaying process are very clearly outlined in a confidential summary composed by the staff of "Supersloda," a copy of which was attached to a letter written by Castellani, the liaison officer between the Foreign Ministry and "Supersloda" staff 10

Poliakov-Sabille,

op.

cit.,

p.

166.

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headquarters, to his superiors in Rome. Written on September 11, 1942, Castellani's letter relates that immediately upon his return to Second Army headquarters following his visit to Rome, he met with General Roatta. They discussed the "well-known problem of the Jews," and Castellani learned that "he [Roatta] agrees completely with our point of view." "Supersloda" will therefore reply to General Staff Headquarters in the spirit of the points raised in the summary which was attached, and it would do so "without any undue haste" (see document no. 4). The summary stated that while "Supersloda" was, naturally, ready to carry out the orders of the General Staff regarding the extradition of the Jewish refugees, the staff nonetheless considered it its duty to point out the practical difficulties hindering the execution of this program as well as the political considerations which in their opinion made it necessary to refrain from actually carrying it out. The refugees were very few in number, since most of Croatian Jewry "had been slaughtered by the Ustasa during the previous summer, particularly in the Gospic and Pago camps." The refugees were scattered throughout both parts of Sector Β (areas Β and C), where the control of the Italian Army was limited to several places. Moreover, even in those locations, the refugees were mixed together with local Jews and Jews from Sector A (who, of course, were not candidates for expulsion). Thus in order to carry out the instructions, it would first be necessary to determine where the refugees were located, their exact number, and who should be handed over. In addition to the great effort involved, which would be totally out of proportion to the number of refugees involved, the extradition of the refugees would cause inestimable damage to the good name and prestige of the Italian Army in Croatia and throughout the Balkans. It would be interpreted as a disavowal of the express obligation assumed by the Italians to ensure that no one would be discriminated against because of their religion or race in the areas under their occupation. Moreover, such a move was also likely to arouse the suspicions of the Serbian population that once the Jews had been extradited they too would be handed over to the "wild men of the Ustasa," a suspicion which might undermine the peace in this area which in any event was far from stable. Finally, the report noted that even though the behavior of the refugees had not aroused any security worries until then, a plan to transfer them to special camps on one of the islands

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off the coast of Dalmatia had recently been discussed (see document no. 5). From the tone of the report, it is obvious that the writer considered this to be the most practical and desirable solution. This document sums up the major points which the Foreign Ministry officials and the officers of "Supersloda" agreed would serve as the basis of their attempts to prevent the extradition of the Jews. Indeed, "Supersloda's" response, sent on September 22, 1942 to the General Staff, repeated these same points, albeit more briefly and in a somewhat laconic style. Castellani, who two days later sent a copy of this response to the Foreign Ministry, bemoaned the style and the abbreviations, and found it necessary to explain that "the formulation of this response was also very difficult, and the final version was not arrived at until after a series of six drafts" because "General Roatta's position is extremely difficult, and he is constantly preoccupied (and perhaps not unjustly) that his friends in Rome might be given an excuse to depict him as rebelling against the instructions of his superiors." These clear-cut comments are evidence of their fear that there were officers in the General Staff whose opinions were contrary to those which had hereto been voiced. (It is possible that this comment also, or mainly, referred to Marshal Ugo Cavallero, the Chief of Staff, who was considered to be decidedly pro-German. In his diary, Ciano labelled him a "servant of the Germans." According to the documents of the Foreign Ministry, however, one gets the impression that as far as the Jews of Croatia were concerned, Cavallero's position was no different than that of Roatta or his other colleagues.) In late September 1942, the situation was therefore fairly clear. The Italian staff officers in Croatia continued, "without any undue haste," their discussions about plans to concentrate the Jewish refugees in special camps—at that time the inclination was to intern them on one of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia — and they also began taking a census of the refugees. At General Staff Headquarters in Rome, there was no response to "Supersloda's" remarks and suggestions, either because they too considered this the wisest way of dealing with the matter, or because they believed that at that time there were more crucial military problems that required their attention. The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, followed the development of the events with interest, tensely and fearfully awaiting the German response.

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They did not have to wait long. At the end of September, Pavelic met with Hitler at German Staff Headquarters and in the course of one of their discussions, the question of the Jews of Croatia was raised. Hitler emphasized that "the Jews are the underground communication channels and the junction points of all the resistance movements" and he demanded that their activities be stopped once and for all. Ribbentrop, who was also present at that discussion, recalled Mussolini's decision concerning the extradition of the Jews of Croatia, and added that, "evidently this decision has not yet been transmitted to the local Army headquarters." 11 They finally decided that the German Embassy in Rome should ask the Italian Foreign Ministry what had been done to transmit Mussolini's instructions to the army personnel involved.12 Thus, on October 3, Johann Von Plessen, a counsellor in the German Embassy in Rome, contacted the Italian Foreign Ministry, and reminded them of the previous decision to hand over the Croatian Jews living in the "area under the control" of the Italian Army. He also declared that according to the information which had reached the Germans, the competent military authorities had not yet received the proper instructions in the matter (see document no. 6). He added orally — according to the testimony of Verax13 — that "certain German elements had opined that the Italian Foreign Ministry was somehow involved in this delay." This diplomatic maneuver led to an Italian reaction on several fronts. On October 7, Ciano sent an urgent cable to the General Staff, in which he informed them of the Germans' complaint, reminded them of the prior agreement of "His Majesty's Government" and asked that he be informed immediately what instructions had been issued and what steps had been taken. Either intentionally, or merely due to a slip of the pen, Ciano wrote about the extradition of the Jews "to the German authorities," even though until then they had always spoken of handing the Jews over to the Croatians. Ciano also added that the Germans had complained that, according to the information which they had, the Italian officers in Croatia had stated 11

12 13

Part of the protocol of this meeting is quoted in a memorandum of the Italian Foreign Ministry, dated October 20, AIFM. Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., p. 167. Verax, op. cit., p. 25.

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that they had received no instructions whatsoever regarding this matter. This last item aroused a certain uneasiness among the officers of the Italian General Staff. In a cable sent on October 12, they informed "Supersloda" of the Foreign Minister's appeal, emphasized the seriousness of the German complaint, and demanded that the matter be clarified. They also asked that a report on the results of the census and the steps which had been taken to implement the orders concerning the extradition of the Jewish refugees to "the German authorities," be sent immediately. This time "Supersloda" did not delay. One day later, on October 13, it sent a strongly-worded response that no one had ever discussed the handing over of the Jews to "the German authorities," thus it was only natural that no Italian officer had issued any "statement" on this matter, neither to the Germans nor to anyone else. It was the Croatians — and not the Germans — who had time and again asked them to hand over the Jews; and it was to them that "Supersloda" had responded that it had to receive explicit instructions from Rome. The Germans' complaint was thus unfounded. As for the census, it had been ascertained that the total number of Jews in Sector Β was 2,025. (In his letter of October 15, 1942, to the Foreign Ministry, however, Castellani noted that this figure did not include 1,626 additional refugees who at the time were "in the midst of being transferred from Spalato to Ragusa" — i.e. from Split to Dubrovnik — and for this reason they were not included in the census in either place). What presently had to be determined was how to divide the Jews who had been counted in the census into the various groups — those who were to be handed over to the Croatians and those who were to continue to benefit from the protection of the Italians. In order to do so, "Supersloda" added, it required further instructions from the Foreign Ministry, which would list the exact criteria which were to be used to classify the Jews. At the end, the cable stated that "Supersloda" had not changed its position as outlined in the report of September 22 — that the interests of Italy demanded that the Jews not be handed over. It had also not received any new instructions, since according to the oral instructions given by the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Cavallero to General Roatta, "Supersloda" was to refrain from taking any additional action until further

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notice. In any event, the opinion of "Supersloda" was that the members of the Italian armed forces should not under any circumstances be given the task of extraditing the Jews. If this shameful act had to be carried out, the Croatians should come and collect the Jews themselves. In the course of the ensuing developments, it became clear that of all the arguments used by "Supersloda" — all of which were of great moral weight — the one which led to the most practical results was "Supersloda's" request that the Foreign Ministry establish the criteria which were to be used in deciding "who was a Croatian Jew." It soon became clear that this question, which at first glance had seemed so simple, was fairly complicated, since it had to be formulated as follows: "Who was a Jewish refugee residing in Sector B, who was originally from one of the Croatian districts which had not initially been included in the area of the Italian occupation?" This formulation enabled anyone interested to ask many other questions such as: What was the definition of "refugee"? What was the cutoff date, after which a Jew who had come to Sector Β was considered a refugee? What should be done with a Jew who was in fact a refugee, but whose family had originally lived in one of the cities of Sector B? What should be the fate of those Jews who had in fact fled from Croatia but who had originally lived elsewhere, for example Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or even Spain or Portugal (from whence their ancestors had emigrated at the end of the 15th century)? Questions of this sort could be asked ad infinitum. It soon became clear that this matter of "criteria" could serve as very useful ammunition. One could easily find exceptions in the family origins of most of the Jews, and thus it was easy to claim that every case had to be investigated carefully and that the matter could not therefore be completed within a short time, particularly under the difficult wartime conditions. The correspondence concerning these questions went on for a long time, and we need not review the details. It is sufficient to note that immediately after Von Plessen's visit to the Foreign Ministry, the legal advisor of the Ministry was asked to give his opinion as to who could be considered a "resident" — as opposed to a "refugee" — of the areas under the control of the Italian Army, and who could claim Italian citizenship. On the basis of this initial legal opinion,

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which was dated October 13, 1942. the officials of the Foreign Ministry established a number of guidelines, which were intentionally broad and vague, and which later, with minor revisions in their formulation, became the basis for all subsequent directives. According to these guidelines, a "resident" was generally an individual who had been officially registered in the local population register. As far as being granted Italian citizenship was concerned, however, the following people would also be taken into consideration: individuals born in the area, those who had resided there "for a fairly long time," a person whose relatives (until the third degree) lived there, those who had real estate in that area, as well as individuals who had rendered outstanding service to the Italian occupation authorities — even if they did not fulfill any of the above criteria (see document no. 7). These guidelines were sent to "Supersloda" on October 16, and the Foreign Ministry repeated them verbatim in a cable sent to the General Staff on November 3. Since they were so broad, it is not surprising that the Italian Army authorities in Croatia claimed from time to time that not only was the clarification of the family origin of the Jews a complicated matter that would take a very long time, but that the number of those who in the end would be extradited would, according to all estimates, be very small indeed. Why then all the unnecessary anxiety concerning the matter? The problem is known and is being dealt with, and in the meantime no security problems are envisaged as a result. Parallel to this approach, which combined both delaying and diversionary tactics, the officials of the Foreign Ministry also attempted other steps which were more suited to their talents as professional diplomats. They began to conduct discussions with the Croatian authorities in Rome and Zagreb, and attempted to convince them to forego their demand for the extradition of the Jews. Verax, who apparently was personally involved in this activity, mentions a conversation with Stj. Peric, the Croatian Ambassador in Rome, which took place on October 20, 1942. At this time, the ambassador said that his government would be willing to forego its extradition request if the Italian Government were to undertake to transfer these Jews to Italy (to the "old Italian districts," as he defined it, even excluding Sector A, which had been annexed to Italy) and hand over all their property to the Croatians. According to

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Verax's testimony, Peric added that he personally hoped that the Italian Government would accept this condition "because he is well aware of the fate awaiting those Jews who are deported by the Germans to the territories of the East." 14 Verax was encouraged by the ambassador's comments, by his formal suggestion, as well as his personal remarks. He did not know, however, that on the same day that Peric had presented his government's proposal to the officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Croatian Foreign Minister, Mladen Lorkovic, had contacted Siegfried Kasche, the German Ambassador in Zagreb, had informed him of the Italian proposals, and told him that his government did not intend to accept them unless the Germans gave their explicit approval and unless regardless of what happened all the Jews' property would be handed over to the Croatians. That very day, Kasche sent a report to the German Foreign Ministry protesting the Italian diplomatic maneuvers — in which he saw signs of 'the influence of the Vatican — and expressed his opinion that these proposals be rejected outright because "to hand over the Jews to Italy would be tantamount to reversing our entire European policy vis-ä-vis the Jews."15 As could be expected, the response of the German Foreign Minister was shortly forthcoming. The next day, October 21, (according to another document — on October 22), Prince Von Bismarck came to the Italian Foreign Ministry and demanded that the Croatian Jews be handed over immediately "not to the German armed forces, but to the Croatian authorities who were working in close cooperation with special units of the German police." This appeal, and similar appeals which were subsequently submitted to the Italians almost every day, confused the Italian officials. They sensed that they were about to be "caught in the act" and that their maneuvers had brought them to a dead-end from which they had to extricate themselves as quickly as possible lest all their efforts came to naught. They therefore set up a small committee which was to come up with a new plan of action that could be endorsed by both Ciano and Mussolini and which, at the same time, would enable those involved to resist pressure from the Germans. « Ibid. » Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

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The committee worked very diligently and in the course of a few days prepared five drafts (in effect five different formulations of two alternative proposals), at least two of which were seen by the Foreign Ministry. The fifth draft, which was accepted by all involved on October 23, was presented to Mussolini for his endorsement. This time, Mussolini's signature was not preserved on the paper, but there is no doubt that he personally endorsed the plan, since it is referred to on many occasions as the "instructions of the Duce." It appears that Mussolini saw no contradiction between this endorsement and his earlier decision of August 21, 1942. In fact, at first glance there appears to be no contradiction between the two. According to the plan, the General Staff would instruct "Supersloda" "to coordinate the handing over of the Croatian Jews found in the area of the Italian occupation with the Croatian authorities." However, since these Jews had become mixed up with the rest of the Jews, some of whom were eligible for Italian citizenship, the General Staff should direct "Supersloda" to first of all clarify the origin of every Jew, for it was inconceivable that Jews who were eligible for Italian citizenship and were residing in the area of the Italian occupation would be negatively discriminated against in comparison with Jews who possessed Italian citizenship and were residing in one of the countries occupied by the Germans. (In these countries the Italians ensured that the civil rights of their citizens, including the Jews, were protected.) In the meantime, in order to carry out this investigation properly, the General Staff should immediately issue instructions that all the Jews living in the area of the Italian occupation, regardless of their origin should be concentrated in special camps. The fact that the words "immediately" and "all" were emphasized in the original, is an indication of the importance which was attached to the directive to concentrate the Jews, which was the only important innovation in this plan. The purpose of this directive was clear. The Italians feared that under the political and military circumstances which had developed, they would find it difficult to continue protecting the Jews who were scattered throughout a very wide area over which they were increasingly losing control. Similarly, it would be difficult for them to continue putting off the Germans' request, without having some new and convincing excuse. The concentration of all the Jews in a few places

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would tend to facilitate the problem of protecting them and, at the same time, make things a little easier for the Italian diplomats, who could now point to the fact that "practical steps" had already been taken towards carrying out the plan to extradite the Jews. Moreover, thus the current claim of the Germans, that the refugee problem had to be solved immediately, because as long as they were free the refugees constituted a serious security risk, could be absolutely refuted. Now the Jews would be held as prisoners in camps, where they could certainly not engage in hostile activities. Once the plan had been accepted and endorsed by Mussolini, all the Italians had to do was to inform their German and Croatian allies and begin carrying it out. This time, the Croatians unwittingly helped in the matter. On October 26, 1942, the Poglavnik himself, Ante Pavelic, intervened in the matter, and instructed his ambassador in Rome to propose again to the Italian Foreign Ministry the suggestions previously put forth by the Croatian Government concerning the transfer of the Jews to one of the "old districts" of Italy. It is difficult to ascertain what Pavelic's rationale was in making this additional appeal after his foreign minister had brought these suggestions to the attention of the Germans and in so doing had brought about the failure of the whole matter. Perhaps he did not know about Lorkovic's initiative; perhaps he knew about it and opposed it. At any rate, it was now easy for Ciano's secretary, the Marquis d'Ajeta, to reply to Peric in a cold and somewhat discourteous fashion that the Italian Government rejected these proposals outright. It would adhere to the original plan concerning the handing over of the Jewish refugees to the Croatians, and the Duce had already given orders to concentrate all the Jews in camps as the first step in the process of identification and extradition. The Italians were not interested in discussing the issue any further at this time. Peric, who a week earlier had admitted that he hoped for a different solution to the problem, apparently did not understand the meaning of the change in the Italian position. He announced that he had taken note of the message and expressed the satisfaction of his government at the decision.16 16

A report on the conversation which had taken place on October 27 was included in the cable sent by the Foreign Ministry to "Supersloda" and to the Italian Legation in Zagreb on October 31, 1942, AIFM.

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The following day, October 28, d'Ajeta met with the German Ambassador, Von Mackensen. He informed him of the "Croatian initiative" and of Italy's outright refusal to accept it, because in d'Ajeta's words, as reported by Von Mackensen, "Italy is not Palestine." D'Ajeta also expressed his displeasure that the suggestion was raised at all, claiming that it was an attempt on the part of the Croatian Government to transfer the responsibility for a problem which belonged solely to them and which they alone had to solve, to the Italians. Finally, d'Ajeta informed him of the new steps which 11 Duce had ordered, whose clearcut aim was to begin the implementation of the extradition program Von Mackensen listened to these words with great satisfaction, and in this spirit he reported the conversation to Berlin.17 When the German Foreign Ministry relayed this report to its ambassador in Zagreb, however, Kasche responded in a completely different manner. He had discussed the matter with Lorkovic and had expressed his doubts as to the true intentions of the Italians. Lorkovic, in turn, became furious, and on the spot sent a long cable to Peric instructing him to once again clarify his government's position to the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry. 18 In the meantime, this move allowed the Italians to again raise the idea of a "trade agreement" with the Croatians, the major points of which were that the refugees would hand over their property to the Croatians if the latter would forego their demand for the refugees' extradition. (On this matter see below, regarding the discussion between Roatta and Mussolini in late November.) In essence, however, these contacts and discussions were merely a matter of tactics, and few people believed that they would actually lead to any practical developments. In the meantime, new facts were being created at a dizzying pace. On October 28, the day on which the conversation between d'Ajeta and Von Mackensen took place, Marshal Cavallero, the Italian Chief of Staff, personally instructed the army staff stationed in Croatia to immediately carry out the following three activities: 1) to intern all the Jews located in the area of the Italian occupation in special concentration camps; 2) to divide these Jews into two groups, one con17

Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

18

Ibid., pp. 176-177.

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sisting of Croatian Jews and the other of Jews eligible for Italian citizenship; 3) to send a list of all the Jews in each of the two groups to General Staff Headquarters. According to the cable, additional instructions would eventually be sent concerning the methods to be used in carrying out the extradition (see document no. 8). This time, the instructions of the General Staff could not be considered ambiguous, and they were carried out without delay. In the course of a few days, all the Jews — approximately 3,000 in number — were rounded up and concentrated in a number of buildings requisitioned for this purpose in the area of Dubrovnik and Split as well as on the island of Lopud and in the Porto Re (Kraljevica) camp, to which 1,161 Jews, most of whom had formerly been in Cirquenizza (Crkvenica), were transferred. These instructions, which were issued so suddenly, and were put into effect without prior warning and without any explanation as to their true purpose, aroused different responses among the Jews, Italian officers, and Croatian population — reactions which ranged from extreme anger and great fear, to mockery and visible pleasure. The terrible fear that their fate had been sealed and that they were about to be given over to their Croatian and German torturers, was aroused among the Jews. There were outbursts of despair and even a few cases of suicide.19 In fact, the situation became so bad that General Roatta himself deemed it necessary to visit the Porto Re camp to meet Jewish representatives and reassure them regarding the future. 20 During the first days after receipt of the order to round up the Jews, the officers of "Supersloda," 21 the commander of the Carabinieri unit of the Fifth Corps,22 and General Roatta himself23 responded furiously. Apparently, none perceived the true intentions of the new orders which they had received, and they all expressed their anxiety as to what would happen to the Jews after they had been rounded ie Report by Castellani, November 18, 1942, AIFM. The Jewish representatives sent a letter of thanks for the visit which took place on November 27, 1942. It was attached to Castellani's report of December 6, 1942 to the Foreign Office, AIFM. 21 Memorandum to Ciano, November 3, 1942, AIFM. 22 Report to "Supersloda," November 8, 1942, AIFM. 23 Letter to the Foreign Ministry, November 4, 1942, AIFM. 20

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up and all the investigations had been completed. They feared that the next step would be the extradition of the refugees — that was the most logical move and this was expressly stated in the instructions issued by the General Staff. They therefore unequivocally and energetically opposed these moves, both on political-practical grounds and owing to moral and humanitarian considerations. The commander of the Carabinieri of the Fifth Corps, LieutenantColonel Pietro Esposito Amodio, wrote at length about these reasons, such as the damage that would be done to the image and prestige of the Italian Army in the eyes of the other minorities in Croatia and the Balkans. He also presented a lengthy and exhaustive summary of the reactions of the local population — the vast majority of whom were Croatians — to the rounding up of the Jews and their deportation from the area. (The Carabinieri unit involved was also assigned to supervise Cirquenizza. Most of the Jews who had previously been there were transferred to the Porto Re camp.) From his description, it seems that the initial reaction of the local population was surprise mixed with satisfaction and joy at the calamity. This was followed by an element of scorn for the Italians, which was rooted in rumors circulated by the Croatian authorities that the Germans had forced the Italian Government to take these steps. According to these rumormongers, this episode revealed that "it is not true at all that Italy is a great power as her press and propaganda attempt to prove. In fact, she is a small country that has been reduced to the status of a vassal of greater Germany, and she will no longer be able to oppose any demand made by Germany, or perhaps even by the Croatian Government, if it receives appropriate German support." These and similar rumors, the report continued, have made a deep impression upon the native population and have caused inestimable damage to Italian interests. Many people now believe that the day is approaching when the Italian Army will be forced to evacuate so that the German Army can take over, and "many Croatians no longer fear to ask the Italian soldiers and sergeants, simply and openly, when the Italian troops will be leaving the area." According to the report, these charges were widespread among the general population and especially in circles unfriendly to the Italians, and that was probably true. At times, however, it is difficult to distinguish in the language of the report between the comments of the

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anti-Semitic and anti-Italian Croatians, which were presented to give an indication of the current atmosphere, and the musings of the author himself. While the Jews were already being rounded up — but it is unlikely as a direct reaction to this step — the Foreign Ministry in Rome received a brief message from General Giuseppe Pieche, the commander of the Carabinieri in Northern Croatia and Slovenia, who reported that according to the information at his disposal, "the Croatian Jews who had been deported from the area of the German occupation to the territories of the East had been 'liquidated' by poison gas which had been introduced into the train carriages into which they had been sealed." The message was dated November 4, 1942 (see document no. 9). Perhaps it is difficult today to accurately assess the impact which this news made at that time and to what extent it was astounding and shocking. Although certain circles in the Foreign Ministry were already aware of the fact that expulsion to the "territories of the East" meant physical destruction, this brief statement of General Pieche's nonetheless aroused deep astonishment. On the spot it was decided that the message had to be brought to Mussolini's attention, and it is conceivable that he was influenced by it, as we shall see later on. What is certain is that this news had a profound effect upon the officials of the Foreign Ministry and it reinforced their conviction to continue working to prevent the deportation of the Jews at all costs. Several days later, the Foreign Ministry received a letter sent on November 5 by Raffaele Guariglia, the Italian Ambassador to the Vatican, who reported that it had become known to the "Secretariat of State" that the Germans were demanding that "2,000-3,000 Jews, most of them elderly, women and children" who were presently in the Italian occupied zone of Croatia, be handed over to them. The "Secretariat of State" asked the ambassador to intervene in the matter with the Foreign Minister "in order to possibly prevent the extradition of these people" (see document no. 10). We do not know what provoked this step by the Vatican. We have already mentioned that in the documents of the Foreign Ministry there are indications that an appeal was made by Monsignor Marcone, the Vatican representative in Zagreb, to the Poglavnik, in the wake of which it seems that the situation of "Aryans" married

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to Jews was ameliorated.24 Similarly, we found that the Germans suspected that the Vatican was somehow connected with the position adopted by the Italian officials regarding the deportation of the Croatian Jews.25 This suspicion, however, was unfounded. Today it is clear that the "Secretariat of State" — through Ambassador Guariglia — formally intervened to save the refugees, although we still do not know the full background to this activity, its immediate cause, and who initiated it. The proximity of the dates of the roundup of the Jews of Croatia (the beginning of November) and Ambassador Guariglia's letter (November 5), seems to indicate that the two are somehow connected. The rounding up of the Jews and their internment in several localities was carried out in less than a week, and was completed during the first week of November. The Italians now hoped that they would be given a reasonable amount of time in order to make the necessary — and even unnecessary — investigations concerning the origin of these Jews. This time, however, the Germans were suspicious. They were not content to receive generalized explanations and requested that they be given complete copies of the instructions issued to "Supersloda" regarding this matter, and a copy was indeed given to Von Bismarck on November 11, 1942. The text which was delivered to Von Bismarck was not exactly identical with the one sent earlier to "Supersloda."2® Yet it is not the difference in the details, but rather the difference in tone which is noteworthy. The document given to the Germans stressed the fact that all the Jews, regardless of their origin, had been interned and therefore there was no reason to fear that they might engage in hostile activities in the future. In the letter that was sent to "Supersloda" on November 17, on the other hand, the Marquis d'Ajeta emphasized the fact that because all the Jews had been rounded up without any prior screening, the Italian authorities now had to undertake exhaustive investigations in order to ensure that the Jewish "residents" would not be denied their rights, while remaining fully conscious of "the consequences which these clarifications are likely to bring about." 24 29 20

Report of the Italian Consulate in Zagreb, August 22,. 1942, AIFM. Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., pp. 171-172. Letter of the Foreign Ministry to "Supersloda", November 3, 1942, AIFM.

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Indeed, the extensive correspondence on this issue indicates that the officers of "Supersloda" took this remark very seriously, and whenever they thought that there was any room for doubt, they contacted the Foreign Ministry and requested appropriate instructions.27 In late November or early December, General Roatta visited Rome and met with Mussolini. At that time, crucial events were occurring which were to affect the outcome of the war. In Russia, the Red Army celebrated its first great victories, and the defensive alignment of the Axis powers in North Africa began to crumble in the wake of the landing of the American Army in Algeria. Despite all this, the two leaders found time to discuss the fate of the Jewish refugees in Croatia. Roatta expounded at length on the political an 1 military reasons which, in his opinion, made it imperative for the J alians not to hand over the refugees to the Croatians under any cir< jmstances. He even mentioned the severe damage which had been ca sed to the prestige of the Italian Army because of the roundups whic ι had been carried out in early November. Roatta was of the opin m that all the refugees should be transferred to camps located in Italy proper, and that a compromise should be worked out with the Croatians on the basis of their "proposal" — as he called it — that the Croatians renounce their demand for the extradition of the Jews and the Jews relinquish their property and their Croatian citizenship. Apparently Mussolini tended now, more than in the past, to accept such a solution and he himself summarized the conversation with two clear and unambiguous directives: "1) all the Jews would continue to be kept in concentration camps; 2) in addition to the investigations which would continue to be conducted regarding the origin of each internee, the collection would commence of applications of Jews willing to relinquish — in accordance with the abovementioned proposal of the Croatian Government — their Croatian citizenship and the property they owned in Croatia."28 These two directives, besides confirming the earlier policies, also contained two important innovations — first and foremost, that at least in the forseeable future, none of those rounded up would be 27

28

Letters of "Supersloda" to the Italian Foreign Ministry, November 3, 5, and 20; December 13, 14, and 16, 1942, AIFM. Report of Castellani to the Foreign Ministry, December 3, 1942, AIFM.

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extradited, not even those who would be classified as "refugees"; the second was that for the first time the possibility was raised — to be more exact, the possibility was not ab initio denied — that some day in the future the problem of the refugees would be solved by transferring them to Italy. This possibility was, in fact, never realized, and fortunately so, for it is very doubtful whether most of the refugees would have eventually been saved (as they were in Yugoslavia) had they been sent to Italy. A few days later, on December 9, Von Bismarck once again visited the Foreign Ministry to ask his by-now standard question concerning the extradition of the Jewish refugees in Croatia. This time, however, he also offered a new suggestion. His government understood, he said, the severe difficulties involved in transferring thousands of Jewish refugees through territory in which "bands of rebels" were active. He therefore proposed that these Jews be transferred by sea to Trieste and from there straight to Germany. It was clear that in this manner the Germans intended to forcefully present their demand. The Italian officials were startled by this suggestion and were not able to offer any response on the spot, except to mutter that technical difficulties, such as the lack of boats, would prevent the implementation of this proposal. Apparently Von Bismarck accepted this response and did not react.23 Nevertheless, the officials of the Foreign Ministry were worried by the tone of the new German proposal and a few days later, upon their own initiative, they contacted the German Embassy in Rome and reported once again that the staff of the Italian Army in Croatia had been ordered some time ago to round up all the Jews "in a small number of concentration camps," and that they were presently under the strictest possible surveillance.30 For several weeks after this answer, there is little information on the diplomatic activity regarding the fate of the Jewish refugees from Croatia. Perhaps it is only coincidental that few documents from the months January-February 1943 have survived. Perhaps the decisive events which occurred at the time, both on the Eastern front and in Minutes of the meeting of November 9, 1942, AIFM. " Report of the Foreign Office to the General Staff, December 15, 1942, AIFM.

3

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North Africa, caused the leaders of the Axis to forget this "worry." In the January 22, 1943 entry in his diary, Ciano described the situation of the Axis powers on the two fronts in the bleakest possible terms. According to the Italian Foreign Minister, Mussolini himself considered the German bulletin of that day as the most grave report received since the beginning of the war. The following day, Tripoli fell to the British Army, and thus the last remnant of the "Italian Empire" in Africa, which had always been the great dream of the Fascist leadership, was lost. Several days later, on January 31, 1943, Stalingrad fell to the Red Army and a large German force surrendered. With astounding suddenness, the great turnabout in the balance of power between the two fighting blocs became apparent, and for the first time since the start of the war it became conceivable that the Axis powers might be defeated, and perhaps in the not too distant future. Public opinion in Italy was deeply affected by these events, and in their wake — for reasons which cannot be elaborated upon here — opposition to the regime began to gain ground among wide sections of the Italian population. Mussolini sensed this, although he apparently did not realize just how strong the opposition was. In order to undercut his opponents, he decided to make large-scale changes in the leadership of the party, government, and the high command of the army. Some of these changes were to have an influence — in certain cases which was positive — on the fate of the Jewish refugees in Croatia. On January 31, 1943, a week after the fall of Tripoli, Marshal Cavallero, the Chief of Staff, was replaced by General Vittorio Ambrosio. In 1941, Ambrosio had been the commander of the Italian forces in Croatia — he was General Roatta's predecessor — and thus the general background of the Jewish refugee problem was wellknown to him. Five days later, on February 5, the Foreign Minister was replaced. Ciano was appointed Ambassador to the Vatican in place of Guariglia, while Mussolini himself assumed the post of Foreign Minister. In addition, he appointed Bastianini, who until then had been Governor of Dalmatia and was one of the first people to deal with the question of the Jewish refugees in Croatia, as Deputy Minister, the man actually responsible for running the ministry. Finally, in mid-February, General Ambrosio recalled Roatta from Cro-

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atia and gave him a command in Italy proper. (Both Ambrosio and Roatta later played a crucial role in determining the army's policy after Mussolini had been deposed and arrested.) Ambrosio appointed General Mario Robotti the commander of the Italian Army in Yugoslavia in Roatta's place. Robotti had formerly been one of the leading officers of the Italian occupation forces in Croatia and was deeply involved in all the activities that had hereto been undertaken in order to save the Jewish refugees. In this atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the future, which pervaded the ranks of the Italian leadership in early 1943, the Germans renewed their pressure for the extradition of the Jewish refugees, and this time they did so at the highest diplomatic level. Toward the end of February, the German Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, visited Rome, and spent three days conferring with Mussolini. According to detailed testimony which has been preserved in the documents of the Italian Foreign Ministry, Von Ribbentrop raised the issue of the fate of the Jews living in Southern France in the course of these talks,31 but he undoubtedly also dealt extensively with the fate of the Jewish refugees from Croatia. Evidence to this effect exists in the testimony of Colonel Vincenzo Carla which was given on March 6, 1945, about two years after the event.132 Carla, who at that time was one of the leading officers of "Supersloda," relates that he accompanied General Robotti when the latter travelled to Rome "early in 1943." In fact, the General had an audience with Mussolini at the beginning of March. Carlä also accompanied his commander on this visit, although he was not present during the actual meeting. Together with other officers, he waited in a room next to Mussolini's office. Upon leaving, General Robbotti told him that Mussolini had said: "Minister Von Ribbentrop was in Rome for three days and employed all kinds of pressure to ensure that the Yugoslavian Jews will be extradited. I tried to put him off with excuses, but he persisted, so in order to rid myself of him I was forced to agree. The Jews should be transferred to Trieste and given over to the Germans." General Robotti expressed his adamant opposition to Mussolini, repeating the reasons that had been 81

32

Memorandum of March 14, 1943, to which a report of February 25, 1943, by the German Embassy in Rome and the reply by the Foreign Ministry dated March 9, 1943 are attached, AIFM. Poliakov-Sabille, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

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put forth previously — the extradition was inhuman and it went against the interests of the Italian Army in that area. Mussolini was not insistent and summarized the discussion by saying: "O.K., O.K., I was forced to give my consent to the extradition, but you can produce all the excuses that you want so that not even one Jew will be extradited. Say that we simply have no boats available to transport them by sea and that by land there is no possibility of doing so.33 Thus the conversation ended — according to the testimony of Colonel Carla, who heard the details from General Robotti. Even if we assume that here and there the two witnesses embellished the description, the basic content of the testimony is undoubtedly accurate. It is confirmed by Verax,34 and various details concerning General Robotti's trip to Rome, such as the date and its general purpose, are confirmed by a cable sent to him by General Ambrosio inviting him to the meeting.35 The German pressure, therefore, bore no fruit, even when applied at the highest level. As spring approached, however, a new danger, potentially more severe than all the others, became evident. Everyone realized that the Allies would resume their offensive in the Mediterranean area in full force in the spring, and many thought that following the surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia, Italy would be the Allies' next target. This opinion also gained currency among Italian statesmen and military men. They began to argue that in view of this bleak prospect, it was imperative to bring at least part of the armed forces still stationed in the occupied areas of France and Croatia back to Italy as soon as possible, and to hand over the responsibility for the areas which would be evacuated to the Germans or their allies. As is known, however, these proposals were not accepted because of the stubborn opposition of Mussolini and his inner circle, 33 Copy of the testimony of Col. Carlä, which was given in the Italian War Office on March 6, 1945, is preserved in the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine in Paris and I am indebted to that institute for making a copy of the document available to me. Verax, op. tit., p. 27. 85 A photostat of the document was published in the pamphlet, Driavna Komisija za Utvrdivanje Zlocina Okupatora i Njihovih Pomagaca, Saopcenje ο Talijanskim Zlocinima Protiv Jugoslavije i Njenih Naroda (The Atrocities Committed by the Italians Against Yugoslavia and her Peoples), Belgrade 1946, p. 165.

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who were captivated by their delusions of grandeur and thus neglected the defence of their own country. The proposals themselves, however, represented a severe threat to the safety of the Jews interned in Sector B, and officials of the Foreign Ministry, as well as the Italian Army officers in Croatia, were forced to consider how to deal with this danger. It should be noted that at that time, the Italian authorities already possessed full and detailed information on the refugees — their number, origin, and citizenship. After the Jews had been concentrated in the camps, and especially during the long winter months, the census had been completed, as were the relevant "investigations." It was determined that 2,661 Jews were interned in the various camps, 893 of whom claimed Italian citizenship in accordance with the guidelines of the Foreign Ministry listed above; 283 possessed foreign citizenship (German, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese, and Albanian — the Albanians were at that time considered to be subjects of the Italian crown!); and 1,485 were Croatian Jews who could not prove any "right" to any other citizenship. All these refugees lived in areas under the jurisdiction of three corps of the Second Army: 1,172 under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Corps, in the Cirquenizza (Crkvenica) camp; 615 under the jurisdiction of the Eighteenth Corps, on the islands of Lesina and Brazza (Hvar, Brae); and 874 under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Corps in Cupari, Mlini, Gravosa, Isola di Mezzo.38 These figures, which appear to be reliable and exact, do not match the number of Jews who were eventually liberated. Their number, according to a Jewish source which seems to be reliable, was approximately 3.500.37 Perhaps the officers of "Supersloda" purposely minimized the number of the internees, especially the number of Croatians among them, or perhaps during the months between March and September, additional Jews, who at first had not been rounded up and were therefore not included in the census, later entered the camps. In any event, the documents of the Foreign Ministry from then on deal with the fate of the 2,661 Jews counted in the census of the internees 30 37

Reports of February 27, March 9 and 20, 1943, AIFM. JaSa Romano, "Jevreji U Logoru Na Rabu I Njihovo Ukljuöivanje U Narodnooslobodilaeki Rat" (Jews in The Rab Camp and Their Participation in the Liberation War), Zbornik, No. 2, 1973, (hereafter — Romano), p. 70.

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and who, it was feared, would fall into the hands of the Croatians as a result of border changes which might be made in the future. By this time, there were few options left for solving the problem and, in effect, the choice was between two possible solutions: either to transfer the refugees to Italy itself, or to concentrate them all in one camp in the annexed area (Sector A), as close as possible to the old Italian border, in order to make it easier for the Italian Army to guard them and, in an emergency, to transport them across the border. As expected, the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry differed on this question. The former supported the first option, since it would have freed them from any further responsibility in the matter. Moreover, under the conditions which existed at that time, it really would have been difficult to set up a camp which could accommodate thousands of refugees. The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, pressed for the adoption of the second option since, among other reasons, it feared that the Ministry of the Interior — which from the very beginning had not been particularly well disposed toward the measures taken on behalf of the Jews of Croatia — would object to, or at the least hinder, the transfer of refugees to camps in Italy. Moreover, without the consent of the Ministry of the Interior, under whose jurisdiction these camps would be, no such solution could be effected. Throughout March and the beginning of April, the issue was debated at length in the correspondence between the various bodies until a compromise of sorts was finally reached, whereby the Jews would be concentrated on the island of Arbe (Rab) in Sector A, but their transfer to this site would be carried out in two stages. During the first stage, 1,489 Jews under the jurisdiction of the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps would be transferred. They were further away and were scattered in various places, so the fear that they might fall into the hands of the Croatians was more real. Meanwhile, the Jews under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Corps, who were already concentrated in the Porto Re camp located several tens of kilometers from the Italian border, would remain there a few months longer, until the necessary arrangements could be made on the island of Arbe for their absorption.38 38

Correspondence between "Supersloda" and the Foreign Ministry, March 20, 25, and 31; April 5 and 16, 1943, AIFM.

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In fact, however, almost no time at all passed between the transfer of the two groups. The transfer of the first group was delayed time and again and began close to the end of May — whereas the transfer of the Porto Re group began on July 5, 1943. By the latter half of July, all the Jews were already concentrated on the island of Arbe, several kilometers off the Italian mainland. The Arbe camp (officially entitled "Campo di concentramento per internati civili di guerra — Arbe") was a large camp, in which approximately 20,000 individuals were incarcerated (according to some sources — 15,000), mainly Croatian and Slovene citizens. A separate wing of the camp was set aside for the Jews in which the conditions were fairly satisfactory although not comfortable. They were housed by families or groups of individuals. Dr. Jasa Romano, who was a prisoner in the camp, wrote about the life of the Jewish inmates, the internal organization, welfare and cultural activities, as well as about the contacts between the Jews and leaders of the underground in the non-Jewish section of the camp, and I see no reason to repeat what he has written.39 There is room, however, to dwell upon the significant changes which occurred in the condition and the status of the Jewish refugees during the short period they were in Arbe, as a result of the political developments that occurred in Italy at the time. The transfer of the Jews to Arbe was completed around July 20, 1943. Several days later, on the night of July 24-25, Mussolini's regime was overthrown. Literally overnight, twenty years of government by the Italian Fascist Party were ended, and a government of "technocrats," headed by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, was established. It negotiated with the Allies regarding the conditions for a cease-fire for 45 days, and finally, on September 8, surrendered unconditionally. During these forty-five days, the general political framework in Italy was radically altered and simultaneously, the condition and status of the Jews in Italy and in the Italian-occupied areas, and especially that of the Croatian Jews interned in the Arbe camp, also changed. The question which now confronted the new Italian Foreign Minister Guariglia, the officials of the Foreign Ministry, and the officers of "Supersloda" was no longer how to evade the pressure of the Germans to hand over the refugees, but rather how to free these Jews 30

Romano, op. cit., p. 70.

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from the camp without endangering their lives, at a time when releasing them might very well constitute a death trap for them, especially if in the future the Italian Army would be forced to retreat from the areas it had hereto occupied in Croatia. The subject was discussed at length by the military and political authorities both in Rome and in Croatia. The officers of "Supersloda" again proposed that the refugees, or at least part of them, such as the women and children and men with professions that might benefit the Italian economy, be transferred to Italy40 (see document no. 11). The Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, thought that due to the political and logistical circumstances, there was no chance that this solution would be acceptable to the various responsible bodies, and it demanded that first and foremost the physical survival of the refugees be guaranteed. Finally, on August 19, the newly-appointed Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Augusto Rosso, sent a detailed cable to "Supersloda", which was undoubtedly composed in accordance with the wishes of the Foreign Minister, in which he summarized the basic position of the latter vis-ä-vis the Jewish problem in general and the question of the Jewish refugees from Croatia in particular (see document no. 12). The Foreign Ministry attributed particular importance to this document as is evident from the fact that on the very day it sent the cable to "Supersloda," it also sent a copy to the branch of the Ministry of the Interior which dealt with matters of demography and race (Direzione Generale Demografia e Razza), and which had been in charge of implementing the racial laws against the Jews since 1938. Needless to say, the Foreign Ministry had hereto not kept this branch informed of the steps taken in the matter of the Jewish refugees of Croatia, and one may assume that it often had to make special efforts to ensure that the information would not reach them. Now, however, times had changed. The project to save the Jews no longer had to be kept secret, and the officials of the Foreign Ministry found it useful to keep their "colleagues" in the Ministry of the Interior informed of this new situation, "no matter what happens" as they explicitly stated in the accompanying letter, and in order to warn 40

Letters of "Supersloda" to the Foreign Ministry, July 28 and August 29, 1943, AIFM.

706

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

them in clear and unambiguous terms that they should not intervene in the matter. The cable of the Foreign Ministry instructed the Italian General Staff in Croatia that "Croatian Jews should not be released [from the camps] and are not to be abandoned in the hands of strangers without some sort of protection [thus being] exposed to potential acts of retaliation, unless they themselves prefer to be released and to be sent out of our area of occupation." At the same time, the Italians should prevent these refugees from coming "en masse" to Italy, in the wake of the Italian Army, if it would be forced to retreat, and therefore they must see to it that even in such a situation the Jewish refugees should be able to stay on the island of Arbe, where they would have "adequate protection." In the meantime, the army authorities could begin dealing with each case individually, in a friendly manner, in order to find individual solutions — all, of course, in accordance with the limitations imposed by the difficult conditions of the time. As for the policy adopted by the Foreign Ministry in regard to the Jewish problem, the author of the cable asserts that "the racial policy which was adopted in Italy never prevented us from preserving those humanitarian principles which are an indelible part of our spiritual patrimony. Today more than ever we are commanded to preserve them. It is nonetheless desirable, from a political point of view as well, that this position be properly presented and made known." Two elements which complemented each another thus influenced the establishment of the Ministry's policy — the humanitarian principle which the author of the cable and his colleagues certainly believed in sincerely and wholeheartedly, and political interests, which they were aware of and were anxious to fulfill. How fortunate that an elevated moral principle and an important national interest should coincide in this case. In reality, however, it soon became clear that the matter was much more complex than it had originally been considered. The "Supersloda" officers did not contest the moral principles which were the basis of the Foreign Ministry's directives, and they certainly were willing to serve the interests of their country. As individuals who were in close proximity to the events, however, they fully realized that no guarantee or promise would be of value to the Jewish refugees if they were left alone in the midst of a hostile population, at the mercy of

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

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DANIEL CARPI

the Croatian authorities. They also did not take into account that Tito's partisans could play a central role in saving Jews, as they eventually did. For these reasons, they maintained their position that, no matter what had occurred during the previous months, the only solution to the problem of the Jewish refugees was their original proposal to transfer them to Italy. The officers of "Supersloda" emphasized this point in a detailed letter sent to Castellani on August 29, 1943, in which they suggested — in response to the directives of the Foreign Ministry — to immediately begin transferring the first groups of refugees to Italy—elderly and sick refugees as well as those whose families were situated on the other side of the border. This impassioned plea met with no response. In a desperate attempt to bring about action and prevent the tragedy which they believed was imminent, the officers of "Supersloda" decided on September 7, 1943, to send Major Prolo, one of their officers, to Rome in order to speed up the handling of their proposal and convince the Ministry of the Interior to agree to its implementation. This step was taken too late, however. On the evening of September 8, 1943, the Allied Command suddenly announced the surrender of the Badoglio government. The Italian Army laid down its arms and, in most places, the German Army immediately took over. Shortly thereafter, the island of Arbe also fell to the Germans and their Croatian allies. Thus, for the Jewish internees in the Arbe camp, the day of liberation was one of great danger. It was, however, the day on which, for the first time since the beginning of the war, they were given an opportunity to cease being powerless and persecuted refugees and to become the masters of their own fate. For the first time, they were free to organize, to make their way to the areas which had already been liberated by the partisans, and to participate in the struggle against the common enemy. Of the Jews who were in the Arbe camp at that time — 2,661 according to the Italian sources and approximately 3,500 according to Dr. Romano's testimony — only 204 individuals, mainly elderly and sick people, decided to remain where they were. They were captured by the Germans, transferred by sea to Trieste and from there were deported to Auschwitz.41 The rest set out to join the partisans. Some 41

Romano, op. cit., pp. 70-72; Zdenko Löwenthal (ed.), Zlocini

fasistickih

708

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

were organized in a special Jewish unit, the Fifth Batallion, which operated jointly with four battalions of Slovenes, in the framework of the partisan brigade formed in Arbe. Many doctors, engineers, and nurses joined the regular partisan units. The Jews who could not bear arms — in Arbe there were some 500 children under the age of 1642 — found refuge among the civilian population in the liberated area. From among the Jews who joined the partisans, 277 did not live to see the day of liberation — 136 fell in battle and 141 were killed in the course of the war. Two and one-half years passed from the invasion of Yugoslavia to the surrender of the Italian Army, and an additional year and a half elapsed before the end of the war. Throughout this entire period, the Jews of Croatia were mercilessly oppressed and the majority did not survive. Some were the victims of the terror unleashed by the "wild men of the Ustasa;" others were killed by German soldiers; some died as a result of the torture, hunger, and disease in the concentration camps of Croatia, while others were killed with their brethren in the German death camps. Only a few succeeded in joining the partisans and fighting in the struggle for their freedom and the liberation of the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Very few indeed lived to witness the final day of victory. The percentage of Jewish survivors among those who escaped to the Italian zone of occupation, however, was relatively high — about 2,200 out of a total of 2,661 according to the Italian figures and approximately 3,000 out of 3,500 according to the figures of Dr. Romano. In addition, thousands of Jewish refugees managed to reach Italy, whether with the consent of the Italian authorities and the aid

42

okupatora i njihovih pomagaca protiv Jevreja u Jugoslaviji (The Crimes of the Fascist Occupants and their Collaborators against Jews in Yugoslavia), Belgrade, 1957, p. 23. These children were the subject of lengthy negotiations between the leaders of the Jews interned in Arbe and the Italian authorities. The former sought to transfer the children to Turkey (and from there to Palestine). Permission was not granted, due to the opposition of the Mufti of Jerusalem. I plan to deal with this episode, which lies outside the purview of this lecture, in an article entitled "The Negotiations Regarding the Transfer of Jewish Children from Croatia to Turkey and Eretz Israel in the Year 1943," which will appear in the forthcoming volume (XII) of Yad Vashem Studies.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

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of DELASEM — such as the group of Jewish children who were housed in the village of Nonantola near Modena 43 — or by traversing circuitous routes and illicitly crossing the border, activities which the local army commanders were generally well aware of. These small-scale rescue activities were the product of the efforts of several groups, a few of which were composed of refugees or Italian Jews, while others consisted of officials of the Foreign Ministry and officers of the Italian Army. In this lecture I only dealt with the work of the non-Jewish groups, which indeed were not the only factor, but whose role was undoubtedly of great, and perhaps from a practical point of view of decisive, significance. Having reached the end of my lecture, I must pose the almost traditional question: What motivated these men to do what they did? I have been asked this question many times in relation to this episode, as well as to other events, and the query always pains me because in my opinion it is an indication of a profound distortion in our thinking regarding the period of the Holocaust. The logical and natural question is not, "Why did so and so refuse to participate in cold-blooded murder or even try somehow to stop it?" but rather "How was it that so many people, and even entire nations, directly or indirectly sanctioned such deeds?" It is true that one cannot understand the history of a period without comprehending its internal logic and specific nature, but the criteria by which one measures human behavior cannot be arbitrarily changed to suit the character of this or that period, and it certainly cannot be made to suit the value system which governed the actions of the Nazis. Basic and universal moral norms are always binding, even in times of crisis, even when the majority of mankind ignores them, and the devotion to these norms requires no explanation. Nevertheless, since I have answered questions of this sort in the past, I shall attempt to do so this time as well. First of all, it should be noted that the initial activities of the Italian Army officers to save the Jews of Croatia were not in any way exceptional or unusual in relation to their operations in the area. When the "Independent State of Croatia" was established, and partic44

Ilva Vaccari, Villa Emma, Modena, 1960.

710

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

ularly during the spring and summer months of 1941, the members of the Ustasa brutally slaughtered many of the Serbian minority left in their state, including those living in Sector B, which was occupied by the Italians. At the time, the Italian Army was ordered to end this slaughter, and several times the forceful actions of the Italians led to clashes with their allies the Ustasa. The Italians finally decided to take away the authority for the civilian administration in Sector Β from the Croatians, and from then on, order was maintained in that region. In the spring of 1942, when the Ustasa intensified the persecution of the Jews throughout the area of the Croatian state, the officers and soldiers of the Italian Army who were stationed there understood that it was their obligation to protect the residents, and first and foremost the persecuted minorities; quite naturally, the Jews — both the local ones and the refugees — were also included. Thus the initial steps taken to save the Jews were part of the general responsibility of the Italian Army in the region and a continuation of its activities to save the Serbian population. There is no doubt, however, that the Italians eventually devoted special attention to the rescue of the Jews, and for them it assumed political and moral significance far beyond their general interest in maintaining order in the region. The Italians realized the political aspects of the problem in the spring of 1942, when the Croatian-German agreement to deport all the Jews in Croatia became known. The fact that the agreement had been signed without their knowledge, by a state which, it had been previously agreed, would be under their exclusive sphere of influence, was a severe blow to the status and prestige of the Italian Army. Moreover, according to the terms of the agreement, it was to include the Jews living in the area of the Italian occupation as well. From that time on, the opinion became widespread among various Italian political and military officials that the extradition of the Jews to the Croatians would be tantamount to a surrender to German orders and, would for the peoples of the region, constitute a public admission of the weakness of the Italian Army. All the arguments which the officers of "Supersloda" used so frequently in their appeals to the General Staff to justify their opposition to the extradition of the Jews, were basically true. Perhaps they at times embellished them a bit, or even a lot, but they certainly

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

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DANIEL CARPI

believed that they were true. Beyond the subjective sensitivity of the Italians, who regarded themselves as the weak and deprived partner of the Axis who had been shunted aside due to the Nazis' tremendous power, there were legitimate political interests which dictated that the Italians not accede to the demands of the Germans and the Croatians to extradite the Jews, and the officers of "Supersloda" understood this very well. At the same time, whoever thinks that the episode of the rescue of the Jewish refugees of Croatia can be explained solely on the basis of diplomatic interests errs. Soldiers and civilians on all levels participated in the rescue work and almost everyone regarded the issue first and foremost as a humanitarian problem, which had to be solved for reasons of conscience, which were beyond political considerations. In view of the enormity of the tragedy which befell the Jews of Yugoslavia, this episode naturally seems quite insignificant. It was, however, a small episode in which a great deal of humanitarianism was revealed, and it is in this light that it should be evaluated, within the broader context of the rescue activities undertaken during the period of the Holocaust.

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

CARPI — BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carpi, Daniel. "Le-Toledot ha-Yehudim be-Split u-be-Sarayevo (Teudot Min ha-Shanim 1941-1942)," Yalkut Moreshet, No. 10 (1969), 109-121. Driavna Komisija za Utvrdivanje Zloöina Okupatora i Njihovih Pomagaöa, Saopcenje ο Talijanskim Zlocinima Protiv Jugoslavije i Njenih Naroda (The Atrocities Committed by the Italians Against Yugoslavia and her Peoples), Belgrade, 1946. Hory, Ladislaus — Broszat, Martin. Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat 19411945. Stuttgart, 1964. Löwenthal, Zdenko (ed.) Zlocini fasistickih okupatora i njihovih pomagaca protiv Jevreja u Jugoslavij (The Crimes of the Fascist Occupants and their Collaborators Against Jews in Yugoslavia). Belgrade, 1952. Poliakov, L6on, Jews Under Italian Occupation. Paris, 1955. The book was also published in French, Yiddish and Italian. Relazione sull'opera svolta dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri per la tutela delle Comunita Ebraiche (1938-1943), n.p., n.d. Romano, JaSa. "Jevreji U Loguru Na Rabu I Njihove UkljuCivanje u Narodnooslobodilacki Rat," (Jews In the Rab Camp and their Participation in the Liberation War), Zbornik, No. 2 (1973), pp. 1-68 (English summary, pp. 69-72). Les systems d'occupation en Yugoslavie. Belgrade, 1963. Vaccari, Ilva. Villa Emma. Modena, 1960. Verax [Roberto Ducci], "Italiani ed ebrei in Jugoslavia," Politico Estera, I (1944), 21-29. An article by the author entitled "The Negotiations Regarding the transfer of Jewish Children from Croatia to Turkey and Eretz Israel in the Year 1943," will be published in the forthcoming volume (XII) of Yad Vashem Studies.

713

SUPPORT FOR JEWS DANIEL CARPI

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DOCUMENT NO. 1 — JUNE 3, 1942. Cable by the Foreign Ministry to the Italian Legation in Zagreb. Word was received from Giuseppe Bastianini, the Governor of Dalmatia, about the flight of thousands of Jews from Croatia to the Italianoccupied zone. Although this movement of refugees is creating severe logistic difficulties, the Governor of Dalmatia is not ready to send these Jews back unless absolute "guarantees" were secured from the Croatian Government that it would treat them in a humane fashion and grant them dccent living conditions.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

715

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RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA 3foo. 39 TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

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CASTELLANI 2 — JUNE 23, 1942. Cable from the Liaison Bureau of the Foreign Ministry in Army Headquarters in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry in Rome. German soldiers told of a German-Croatian agreement for the deportation of all the Jews of Croatia to Russia. The Italian officers in the locality expressed the opinion that they must not allow the agreement to be implemented in the areas under the control of the Italian Army. DOCUMENT NO.

717

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

DANIEL CARPI

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APPUNTO PER' IL DUC

Sisr.arclc ha dsto comunicazioneA i l un telesrsmnla a firma Hib'cer.trop con i l quale questa Arhbasciata dl .Germania viene r i c h i s s t a di provocare i s t r u z l o n i a l l e competent! Autoritä M i l i t a r i i t a l i a n e in. Croazia affinch% anche n e l l e zone di .nostra occupazione possano essere a t t u a t i i provvedimenti d i v i s a t i da parte germanica e croata per un trasferimerito in massa desili ebrei di Croazia nsi t e r r i t o r i o r i e n t a l i . Bismarck ha affermato che si tratterebbe di varle mig l i a i a di persone ed ha l a s c i a t o comprer.dare che t a l i provvedimenti te'nderebbero, in p r a t i c a , a l i a loro di.aperaione ed eil.r.ir.azione, L ' U f f i c i o compe'tente fa presente che seenalazloni d e l l a .R.Legazione a Zagabrla inducono a ritenere che, per d e s l derio sermanlco, che trova consenziente i l Ooverno u s t a a c l a , l a qusstlone d e l l a llquldazione degli ebrei in Croazia s t a rebbe omai entrando in una fase r i s o l u t i v a . Si sottopone, Duce, quanto precede per l e Voatre d e c i aioni. Rofna, 21 agosto I942-XX DOCUMENT NO. 3 — AUGUST 21, 1942. Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry to Mussolini. Von Bismarck, the advisor of the German Embassy, submitted the request of the German Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, that instructions be issued to Army Headquarters to extradite the Croatian Jews so that they could be included in the deportation to "the territories of the East." Von Bismark also remarked that this operation meant the "liquidation" of these Jews. The Foreign Ministry asked that Mussolini decide the matter. Mussolini replied in his own handwriting on the document: " N o opposition."

718

PUBLIC OPINION AND RELATIONS TO JEWS

RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

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RESCUE OF JEWS IN ITALIAN-OCCUPIED CROATIA

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DOCUMENT NO.

11 —JULY 28, 1943.

SUPPORT FOR JEWS

729

DANIEL CARPI

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