The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies 0803901534

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A SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPER

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Series Number: 01-015

Volume 2

SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPERS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS Edited by and

HARRY ECKSTEIN, Princeton University TED ROBERT GURR, Northwestern University

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD GABRIEL ALMOND, Stanford University DAVID E. APTER, Yale University and Oxford University SAMUEL H. BEER, Harvard University RALPH BRAIBANTI, Duke University ROBERT T. HOLT, University of Minnesota SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Harvard University ROBERT PRESTHUS, York University LUCIAN W. PYE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology FRED W. RIGGS, University of Hawaii BRUCE M. RUSSETT, Yale University DANKWART RUSTOW, Columbia University PETER SAVAGE, University of New Hampshire ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, University of California at Berkeley SIDNEY VERBA, University of Chicago ROBERT E. WARD, University of Michigan MYRON WEINER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, University of Chicago

SAGE Publications Publisher: Sara Miller McCune, President Assistant Publisher: Connie Greaser Production Editor: Rhoda Blecker

The Ideology of Developmentalism:

The

American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies

SUSANNE J. BODENHEIMER

Center for Latin American Studies UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (BERKELEY)

PUBLICATIONS / Beverly Hills, California

This Edition Copyright© 1971 by Sage Publications, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

For information address: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. 275 South Beverly Drive Beverly Hills, California 90212 International Standard Book Number 0-8039-0153-4

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 79-161-584

FIRST PRINTING

CONTENTS

THE CONSENSUAL BASIS OF THE PARADIGM-SURROGATE IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE.7

(1) The Cumulative Notion of Knowledge and Development.11 (2) Stability.16 (3) The “End of Ideology” and Pluralism.18 (4) Diffusion.22 TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEPENDENCY MODEL.34

The Dependency Model.36 NOTES.40 REFERENCES.46

236769

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/ideologyofdeveloOOOOjona

The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American Studies

SUSANNE J. BODENHEIMER University of California (Berkeley) The inadequacy of American political science research on Latin America is a fact so well recognized and so often rehashed in conferences and graduate seminars as to require no further elaboration. Much less generally understood are the reasons why this is the case. In attempting to organize vaguely felt dissatisfactions into a coherent analysis of the deficiencies in this field, I shall develop the following general argument: The poverty of Latin American studies is not peculiar to that field, but rather stems from certain very fundamental premises of contemporary American political science and, more generally, of American social science. Despite the absence of a truly scientific paradigm and the existence of various competing theories or “schools” of analysis within political science, research and graduate training in the discipline have been governed by consensus at a more fundamental level. This consensus, which I shall call the “paradigm-surrogate,” has been transferred to Latin American studies and has dominated most empirical research in that area. It is rooted in four interrelated theories which, on both empirical and conceptual grounds, have produced a systematically distorted interpretation of the situation in Latin America. \\

AUTHOR’S NOTE: This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the May 1969 conference of the Centro de Investigaciones Socio-Politicas para America Latina (CISAL) at Asilomar, California/sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies of the University of California, Berkeley. This paper, with slight revisions, previously appeared in the Berkeley Journal of Sociology, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright ©1969, Berkeley Journal of Sociology

[6]

Underlying these substantive theories about Latin America is a set of epistemological preconceptions which recur throughout contemporary political science. Like all intellectual constructs, the paradigm-surrogate may be more fully understood in its social context; from this perspective, and specifically in terms of its relation to American interests in and policies toward Latin America, the paradigm-surrogate represents an ideology. Definitive modifications of prevailing theories about Latin America seem unlikely in the absence of changes in the basic social, economic, and political conditions governing the concrete relations between the United States and Latin America, as well as in the assumptions of American social scientists about American society and their own position within it. In the meantime, however, those who reject the conventional paradigm-surrogate must explore possibilities for an alternative paradigm for Latin American studies (as I shall attempt to do in the last section of this monograph). My primary intention is not to belabor the particular logical, methodological, or empirical shortcomings of specific “schools” of analysis, but rather to discuss critically their shared bases. Obviously the model or paradigm-surrogate constructed for this purpose does not exist as such in the work of any one individual or group of political scientists; rather, it is a composite which extrapolates the most salient common elements of various apparently diverse approaches. I shall not attempt' to prove the existence of a paradigm-surrogate or consensus on fundamentals; rather, having postulated its existence, I shall describe its main tendencies and implications for research on Latin America, in the hope of exposing the roots of the weaknesses of such research. In this sense, the paradigm-surrogate is a heuristic construct to direct attention to the most basic and widespread problems. If at times I seem to be attacking a straw man or flogging dead horses, I can only refer the reader to the major textbooks and readers on Latin America for confirmation of my remarks; since space is lacking to prove my assertions through an exhaustive survey of the literature, I must rely upon typical examples, illustrative of general patterns. The fact that some Latin American social scientists and dissident Latin Americanists in the United States are beginning to explore new approaches does not weaken my case against conventional theories; it indicates, rather, the spread of discontent with the prevailing paradigmsurrogate and the urgent need for an alternative.[ 1 ] Finally, if this account seems at times to pass over certain real differences among the predominant theoretical “schools ’ or the work of certain individuals, such overgeneralizations must be the cost of gaining perspective: for my

[7] purposes it may be necessary to overlook some of the individual trees, the better to see the entire forest. In contrast with those who complain that research on Latin America is “underdeveloped” in comparison with the rest of political science (Kling, 1964: 168) or that it has not been sufficiently integrated into the discipline as a whole and specifically into the field of comparative politics,[2] I shall attempt to demonstrate that the basic weaknesses of research on Latin America reflect those of the broader discipline. Thus, my critique will attempt to relate the misconceptions in Latin American studies to more general presumptions of political science and its “sister” disciplines, sociology and economics. By discussing the literature on Latin America in relation to its intellectual foundations in contemporary social science, I hope also to avoid the countervailing temptation to reduce the analysis to a critique of U.S. government policy in Latin America. (Policy itself will be discussed here only insofar as it is influenced, or justified by, or shares the preconceptions of, social science research.) Finally, at many points, it will be necessary to cite theories and concepts outside the particular field of Latin American studies because the broader comparative and political science theories articulate more clearly the central but often unstated premises of empirical studies of Latin America. It is precisely because many of the basic presumptions of empirical research have not been stated as such that they have persisted for so long; in this sense, my aim is to make explicit the implicit. Indeed, as Mannheim (1968: 89-90) points out, the failure to perceive or to acknowledge such presuppositions is a major pitfall of empirical research: The danger in presuppositions does not lie merely in the fact that they exist or that they are prior to empirical knowledge. It lies rather in the fact that an ontology handed down through tradition obstructs new developments, especially in the basic modes of thinking, and as long as the particularity of the conventional theoretical framework remains unquestioned, we will remain in the toils of a static mode of thought. . . . What is needed, therefore, is a continual readiness to recognize that every point of view is particular to a certain definite situation and to find out through analysis of what this particularity consists.

THE CONSENSUAL BASIS OF THE PARADIGM-SURROGATE IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE

It has become a commonplace among its professional practitioners to acknowledge that as yet political science has not acquired a scientific

Vol. 2 (167)

[8] paradigm which would, as Thomas Kuhn (1962: 10) conceives it, define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners.” For most professionals in the discipline, the lack of a paradigm constitutes the problem for political science, as David Truman (1965: 873) expressed it, “Redefinition and redirection will depend upon the emergence of a new and broadly based consensus about the discipline. . . . Continued and growing dissensus can have unfortunate implications. ” It is generally agreed that one of the main characteristics of a paradigm is a consensus as to the basic assumptions, the main theoretical and empirical problems, and the procedures for investigating them. What is too easily assumed, however, is that because there is no paradigm in political science, there is no consensual basis at all. In fact, despite the great variety of competing techniques and theories, and the absence of a truly scientific paradigm, most research in the field is governed by a paradigm-surrogate, a strikingly pervasive consensus on fundamentals, whose core is liberal democratic theory, as modified by the particular conditions of twentiethcentury America—a consensus which is all the less frequently recognized or challenged precisely because it is generally taken for granted. [3] The very strength of this consensus is derived from the fact that it appears not to be imposed from above, but rather to represent a converging of the opinions of many individuals. [4] But in American political science, as in American political life, it is consensus rather than “continued and growing dissensus” which has had unfortunate consequences. On the most obvious level, the paradigm-surrogate is the expression of a consensus about the substance of political science research. But the manifest content of research is largely determined by a “tacit” or latent component (Polanyi, 1958)—the values and intentions which guide the researcher’s “appraisals” or decisions regarding definition of the problem, choice of a specific subject, selection of a method for investigating it, and conclusions (Polanyi, 1958: 17; Wolin, 1969: 1078). More important for our purposes than are their psychological foundations, these intentions and values are rooted in a shared experience and social order. It is this environment, more than the particulars of the situation being investigated, which largely shapes the content of research. What was initially perceived as an intellectual construct (the paradigmsurrogate) takes on an additional meaning when seen in the context of a given social order. The particular values and assumptions prevalent in American political life, and underlying American social science, have their origins in specific social relationships and in the interests arising from them. Far from being a disinterested or “neutral” observer of those

[9] relationships, the social scientist is involved in them, and hence acquires certain specific interests which condition his observations. In this sense (as spelled out by Marx, Mannheim, and others), the paradigm-surrogate may be seen as an ideology-a body of ideas whose substantive content reflects concrete interests of particular social classes, which seek to maintain or alter their position relative to other classes, both domestically and abroad. In a society, such as the American, where the dominant classes determine the structure of rewards in the social sciences as well as in political life, it is difficult for the researcher to “rise above” the interests of those classes. This becomes particularly important in the case of Latin American studies. Just as American social science in general (and thus the assumptions underlying research on Latin America) has its origins in the social relations of American society, so too Latin American studies must be understood as an outgrowth of the concrete realities of United States-Latin American relations. In this sense, any research on Latin America contains or presupposes a theory about Latin America vis-a-vis American society and dominant American interests. Such research implies in addition a theory of action—that is, some notion of how it could contribute to maintaining or altering the actual situation; the intentions and expectations regarding the uses of research render every social scientist a would-be, if not an actual, policy maker. In the case of Latin American studies, research has seldom posed a fundamental, deliberate challenge to policy. The conceptualization of the paradigm-surrogate as an ideology provides the basis for calling into question the professed universality of its claims as a body of knowledge. It enables us to pinpoint the particularity of the paradigm-surrogate and, given the marriage between the social science community and the American policy establishment, its functions for U.S. policy in Latin America. In addition, the recognition of the paradigm-surrogate as an interest-based ideology accounts for the coher¬ ence among diverse theories, even where these are not explicitly set forth as a comprehensive world view: their congruence is not accidental, but rather essential, to an understanding of them individually and as a whole. Specifically, the postulated “ideology of developmentalism,” in the form of a paradigm-surrogate for Latin American studies, consists of four analytically distinct but integrally interrelated themes, which are mani¬ fested both on the substantive level in development theories about Latin America, and on the epistemological level as general presuppositions of political science. It may be summarized in Table 1. These interrelated themes have been selected for analysis because they not only recur throughout the substantive literature on Latin American Vol. 2 (169)

[10] TABLE 1

LEVELS OF THEORY Substantive Theories about Development

Epistemological Premises of Political Science (and other social sciences)

continuum model of development

cumulative knowledge

Stability

stable and orderly change

concern for prediction and the search for "universal" laws as aims of social science

End of Ideology

projected end of ideology in development, pluralism

objectivity of social science (versus ideological "bias")

diffusion from "modern" to "traditional" sectors of society and from devel¬ oped to underdeveloped societies (diffusion of mat¬ erial and cultural factors)

transference of the conceptual framework for developed societies to underdeveloped societies (ethnocentrism)

Cumulation

V)

111 2 LU i

(_

Diffusion

development, but also illuminate certain epistemological foundations of substantive research. The predisposition toward easy and widespread acceptance of these substantive theories stems at least partially from the more comprehensive epistemological preconceptions which have become part and parcel of contemporary political science; an understanding of the latter may suggest why the former have come to dominate empirical research on Latin America. The point of departure for my critique of the paradigm-surrogate is both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical level, I shall argue that most of the so-called empirical studies of Latin America and the assumptions in which they are grounded cannot account for, or project misleading interpretations of, certain basic facts: the increasingly unfavor¬ able economic condition of Latin America; the increasing dependence upon foreign resources; the failure to implement far-reaching social reforms; the rise or persistence of right-wing military regimes in over half of the twenty nations. On the theoretical level, I shall argue that the dominant theories employed by American social scientists are by no means universally valid, as their proponents claim them to be; they are very specific to certain American interests in Latin America, and thus are more accurately characterized as expressions of an ideology than as solid foundations of scientific knowledge.

[11]

(1) The Cumulative Notion of Knowledge and Development “A science of politics which deserves its name must build from the bottom up ... by the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of relevant theories and data” (Eulau, 1963: 9). The notion that knowledge is built up through the patient, piecemeal accumulation of new observations, which has reached its triumphant culmination in the modern data bank, is echoed in the form ot a plea to Latin Americanists. This concern is illustrated in Merle Kling’s article on the state of political science research on Latin America—an article which was written as the outgrowth of a seminar on the subject and therefore deliberately represents the views of a number of scholars in the field. After noting critically that “traditional” political science has been overly preoccupied with the “accumulation of data,” Kling(1964: 191) himself goes on to state, Measured by virtually any relevant standard, the quantity of serious research on Latin American politics is inadequate. Modernization, among other things, simply requires an increase in the volume of research. . . . The requirements for personnel capable of adding to our store of knowledge of Latin American politics along almost any dimension are so great that we cannot be overly fastidious in setting boundaries of methodology. ... We can only echo the alleged demand of Samuel Gompers for labor: “More!” . . . One symptom of development is the availability of abundant supplies of goods-in this case research goods—for consumption or possible reprocessing. Inherent within this rather indiscriminate plea for “More!” is the suggestion that more data to be consumed or reprocessed (presumably using new statistical and computer techniques) will in and of itself further scientific progress. There is no hint that certain aspects of the Latin American situation might be more essential than others. Nor, apparently, is there any recognition of the possible danger in the cumulative view: that its very ecclecticism and “openness” to new knowledge, its “democratic” acceptance of all knowledge as having equal status, might obscure rather than illuminate some of the most significant facts of Latin life. A further consequence of the indiscriminately cumulative view of knowledge is that it masks the tyranny of the governing theoretical framework or consensus behind a curtain of “democratic” ecclecticism: that is, it creates a false impression of genuinely open-ended research. In fact, current research operates within a clearly defined conceptual and institutional framework. While not having achieved paradigmatic status, political science has acquired many of its trappings, not the least of which is an apparatus for reinforcing existing research trends through funding agencies, textbooks, “professional” associations, and institutionalization in Vol. 2 (171)

[12]

the universities. The tenacity and “enforcing power” (Wolin, 1968: 134) of the paradigm-surrogate is all the more compelling because contempo¬ rary empirical research has come to depend so heavily upon extensive foundation and government financing. In principle, there is no reason to suppose that previously gathered knowledge will necessardy hinder new approaches, nor that it will prove totally useless for future research. Nevertheless, in practice, acquired data tend to take on the characteristics of received knowledge if there is too much reliance on building upon previous research. The very existence of a stock of knowledge often serves to discourage radically new departures, if for no other reason than that the research problems themselves continue to be defined in terms of existing knowledge. Like common law, received research can become an arbiter of future endeavors, putting the burden of proof upon those who would break precedent, and “suppress[ing] fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments” (Kuhn, 1962: 5). It is because science, no less than religion or other belief systems, is circumscribed by a highly stable framework of belief (Polanyi, 1958: 292 ff.) that conceptual breakthroughs are rare. Nevertheless, real scientific progress has occurred less through the incremental procedures of “normal science” than through radical con¬ ceptual breaks or discontinuities. To be sure, largely as a reaction against the cult of data gathering, comparative politics has recently rediscovered theory. But the kind of theorizing that is done and the premises upon which it is based are closely linked to, and easily integrated with, cumulative empirical research: theory itself has taken on the contours of the cumulative model. Thus at one conference on research on Latin America it was suggested and seriously discussed that, “just as we now have ‘data libraries,’ there might also be theory banks” (Vallier, 1965: 23). The implication is that existing theoretical concepts, as well as data, need only be fit together, supplemented, and reordered. Few comparative theorists or Latin Ameri¬ canists appear to have recognized the importance of theoretical cf/scontinuities in the history of scientific progress or to have considered the possibility that current research might be pressing toward an intellectual dead end. [5] The preceding remarks are by no means intended to suggest that data or concept-gathering is ipso facto a worthless activity; particularly within the framework of a valid scientific paradigm, it would be the crux of “normal science.” But, under present circumstances, it should not be blithely assumed that this activity in and of itself generates valid explanatory theories or even valid propositions for the social sciences.

[13]

Moreover, until the most basic premises guiding empirical research have been radically reformulated, the misconceptions can only be compounded by serving as the bases for further research. On the substantive level, the cumulative concept has appeared in the orm of the continuum theory, according to which development and ^modernization” proceed in a continuous, linear progression from traditionalism” to “modernity.” [6] As a theory of development in which existing institutions and social relations form the basis for and give direction to those of the future, it shares with the notion of cumulative knowledge the image of continuous, irreversible progress. In fact as one Latin American (Nun, 1967b: 68, 70) writes, “The famous ’idea of scientific progress . . . constitutes a basic assumption of the continuum ‘traditional-modern.’ ’’ The great “danger” of the pervasive modernization model, he continues, is that it implies “a unidirectional process, with a predetermined point of arrival.” [7] It takes the abstract processes of social and economic development as independent variables, whose occur¬ rence need not be proved since they often serve as assumptions of the whole model. It leaves room neither for alternative routes or objectives of development, nor for the possibility that the current route may lead to a dead end or economic stagnation (as has actually happened in several countries, including Chile and Argentina). It provides no basis for explaining or even recognizing the hard facts, documented by the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), that Latin America’s problems of urban poverty, unemployment (particularly in rural areas), slow industrialization, inequalities of income and living standards, depend¬ ence upon foreign capital, foreign indebtedness, and slow expansion of foreign markets have become more critical during the last ten years; and that the annual average growth rate during the 1960s was lower than that of the previous decade and fell far short of targets established in 1961 (UN, ECLA, 1969a: 7 ff.). Nor can the continuum theory deal with the hypothesis of some scholars that, in continuing along the present course, Latin America is condemned to further and further underdevelopment (in terms of increasing dependence upon foreign resources, further aggravation of social and economic problems, and so on), [8] and that in many regions of Latin America, “underdevelopment followed upon and did not precede development” [9] (e.g., destruction of regional economies and industries). Being unable to account for the discontinuities and retrograde phases of development, the continuum theory cannot conceptualize the need for radical departures from existing socioeconomic systems; for if develop¬ ment is a cumulative process, piecemeal reforms should be sufficient to achieve the desired objectives and thorough structural transformations, or revolutions, become unnecessary. Vol. 2 (173)

[14]

In some respects, the development continuum is more useful than the static “missing features” or “gap” approach (Frank, 1967b: 23). The “subtraction” model (Vallier, 1965: 14), which juxtaposes abstract polar ideal types (“traditional” versus “modern”), consists of subtracting “the ideal typical features or indices of underdevelopment from those of development and the remainder is your development program” (Frank, 1967b: 23). (Such an approach is inherent, for example, in the Parsonian “pattern variable” model, according to which Latin American societies exemplify the “particularistic-ascriptive” pattern, as opposed to the “universalistic-achievement” pattern of developed societies [Parsons, 1951: 198-200] ,)[10] But the continuum, starting from its definition of development in terms of an irreversible process toward some determinate end-point, retains the two abstract ideal types-“traditional” and “modern”—as the two ends of the development spectrum, while adding an in-between “transitional” stage, and continues to analyze underdevelop¬ ment in terms of the absence of certain “typical characteristics of the developed society. [11] Moreover, the continuum theory takes for granted certain ideas about the end-point of development which are both rigid (in being determined by the previous experience of the now developed nations) and abstract in the name of universality. But the price of attempted universality is ahistoricity: the fundamental differences are obscured between development in the nineteenth century and develop; ment today, the latter being conditioned by an international environment dominated by the developed nations. No account is taken of “the degree to which the development opportunities (colonies, export markets, etc.) which existed [in the nineteenth century] no longer exist” for today’s underdeveloped nations,[12] or of the degree to which underdevelopment is an outcome of history. Furthermore, the excessive concern for constructing precise definitions of the abstract features of the “developed society” in terms of which the Latin nations can be measured has diverted attention away from the concrete obstacles to development within the existing social, economic, and political structures of Latin America.[13] Where they do refer to obstacles, American social scientists tend to derive these (e.g., peasant “traditionalism,” lack of capital, and the like) from prior conceptions as to the “prerequisites” or “typical characteristics” of development. Finally, while purporting to be a dynamic theory, the continuum lacks any convincing explanation of the mechanisms of change. The missing dynamic element has been supplied by the diffusion theory—see section (4) below—or by the notion of “urbanization” and “industrialization” as motor forces of development. But the definition of the vague concept of

[15]

development in terms of industrialization and urbanization, which are no less vague, which share the conceptual linear irreversibility of “develop¬ ment, and which are almost always assumed to occur together with development, does not bring us any closer to a real explanation of development or underdevelopment. [14] To be sure, such trends as migration to the cities and increasing investment in industry can be statistically proven; but the nature of these phenomena and their consequences for development are by no means obvious. The very fact that Latin industry is increasingly controlled by foreign capital, for example, suggests that industrialization cannot have the same bearing upon national development objectives in contemporary Latin America as it did in nineteenth-century Europe. Unless concepts such as industrialization and urbanization are treated as true variables, whose specific instances are determined by other factors (e.g., the historical and social circumstances under which migration to the cities takes place, the specific industrial sectors being built up, and their relation to foreign corporations), the concepts themselves lose all concrete meaning. One variant of the continuum theory which has already received sufficient criticism to obviate the need for much discussion here is the “stages of development” approach, exemplified not only in the work of economists such as Rostow,[15] but also in the literature on political development. For example, one major American textbook on Latin America maintains, “It makes sense to think of the [Latin American] states as standing at different stages of a process of change through time from one situation of equilibrium to another—at different stages of political development” (Needier, 1964: 517). Germani and Silvert (1967: 300) postulate political development in Latin America as a movement through successive stages, from the early traditional stage toward the final goal, “representative democracy with total participation.” [16] In both its economic and its sociopolitical forms, the “stages” approach retains the main defects of the continuum: its ahistorical conceptualization of development in terms of “universal” ideal-typical features (of the various stages), its failure to explain the dynamics of change, and its assumption of linear progress forward. The very presumption that Latin America is at a “lower” stage of the development process already completed by the industrialized nations leaves little room for the possibility that Latin America is experiencing a qualitatively different type of development and that the future of Latin America will not be replica of the American present. From the preceding discussion, we may conclude that the cumulative hypothesis distorts our understanding both of the growth of scientific Vol. 2 (175)

[16] knowledge and substantively of development. The fact that it has gone almost unchallenged for so long results less from its validity than from its integral relation to certain other key theories, as will be seen below.

(2) Stability Closely linked to the cumulative view of development, as a thread running throughout the American literature on Latin America, is an underlying preoccupation with stable and orderly change and a cor¬ responding fixation upon instability as the main hindrance to develop¬ ment. [17] Despite the lip service paid almost universally to the “need for change,” the prevailing model takes as both desirable and necessary change that is nondisruptive of the existing order and permits continuity with the past and the present. Only occasionally are the implications for political participation faced as squarely as in this bald statement of one political scientist: What is the testimony of the developing world [regarding expanded political participation and order]? In the Congo, in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic it is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilized strata to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism from which they have recently been aroused by the process of modernization. At least temporarily the main¬ tenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired aspirations and levels of political activity [Pool, 1967: 26].

While few social scientists have gone so far in openly acknowledging the possible incompatibility between stability and increasing development or participation,

the

norm

of

stability appears in more

subtle

forms

throughout the literature. Seldom is it suggested that the main problem in Latin

America

is not

instability, but

stability—i.e., the paucity of

substantial social or economic change. Perhaps the extreme

example of this tendency is the structural-

functional school.[18] Aside from the obvious problems of structuralfunctional analysis (its teleological bent, its tendency toward tautology, its “closure” (Dahrendorf, 1958), the difficulties of operationalization, and so on), of special concern here are its conservative implications. Given the assertion that “all political systems have political structure,” the definition of political system as “that system of interactions to be found in all independent societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation [through] more or less legitimate physical compulsion,” and the definition of political structure as “legitimate patterns of interaction

[17] by means of which order is maintained,” [19] functionality is concep¬ tualized in terms of systems maintenance and adaptation. But adaptation is understood only in terms of readjustments made within the system, the transition from one state of equilibrium to another, or “compensation.” Real

change (e.g., from a capitalist to a socialist economy) can be

explained only in terms of events extraneous to the model; as one critic puts it, “Whenever an implicit ‘equilibrium’ model (such as structuralfunctionalism) is used, changes in patterns of action and their relationships tend to be viewed as deriving from ‘external’ sources and thus in some sense accidental.” [20] The premium is on development which maintains the system in equilibrium and promotes social integration. [21 ] Where real change occurs in Latin America, structural-functionalsim is hard put to account for it. Functions such as political socialization and recruitment

{into the existing system), interest articulation and aggregation, and the like are assumed to be “universal” (Almond, 1960: 12).[22] Thus the literature is replete with typologies of interest groups, parties, and so on, all seeking to discover how the universal functions are being performed; that they are perhaps not being performed, or that they might have little meaning in the Latin context, is seldom considered. While overexplaining the

often

meaningless formal

institutions and

structures, structural-

functionalism cannot conceptualize noninstitutionalized modes of action (e.g., peasant invasions of unoccupied land, guerrilla struggles). Given these deficiencies, why has structural-functionalism persisted? For one thing, it is peculiarly appropriate as a rationalization of the status quo.

By

translating

functions

into values,[23]

it

implies that

the

destruction of existing institutions is “dysfunctional” or “pathological”; the

theory

has, as one

Latin American points out, “triumphantly

rediscovered Hegel; . . . society has finally coincided with reason” (Nun, 1967b: 84-85). What exists is functional, hence rational. The only problem is:

functional according to whose definition and for whose purposes?

Structural-functionalism lends itself in a subtle way to the needs of a government which is very much an interested party in Latin America. It provides a framework for identifying those organizations and groups which,

because

of the

functions they perform, are

crucial

in the

development process: once the critical “functional elites” or “strategic subsystems” [24] have been identified, it becomes possible to locate the critical points of intervention and leverage-or, put bluntly, of manipu¬ lation. These

tendencies are

not

only

specific to

substantive

structural-

functionalism and systems theory, but are also echoed at a more general epistemological level in the preoccupation with prediction. This is woven Vol. 2 (177)

[18] into the fabric of the “behavioral” approach,[25] whose main elements include:

regularities

or

uniformities

leading

to generalizations with

explanatory and predictive value; empirical verification; rigorous tech¬ niques; and quantification through statistical techniques (Easton, 1962: 7-8). It is largely because the ultimate utility of research is seen as prediction that the quest for regularity and order has pervaded explana¬ tory theories and studies of Latin America and has been projected even onto substantive

notions of development.

For if stable patterns or

regularities in the development process can be identified, policy makers can be provided, as it were, with a map for guiding Latin American development toward their desired objectives. This is not to deny all legitimacy to the concern for prediction, but rather to note the tendency of a social science seeking predictable regularities alone to force the data into abstract, preconceived, “universal” theories, and the ease with which such a social science, placed at the service of policy, lends itself to the manipulation of human behavior. Perhaps it would be less frightening to hear American social scientists suggest the need for “a theory of social control” (Vallier, 1965: 18, 27) if the lines were more clearly drawn between American research on Latin America and U.S. policy in that area—if, for example, so many American social scientists had not become, whether or not intentionally, advisers or apologists for Washington’s actions in Latin America. Detached from its commitment to policy, social science might be more cognizant of Weber’s warning about “nomological knowledge,

i.e. the knowledge

of recurrent causal se¬

quences”: “The establishment of such regularities is not the end but rather the means of knowledge. ... In the cultural sciences the knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in itself’ (Weber, 1949: 80; see also Wolin, 1969: 1064).

(3) The “End of Ideology” and Pluralism A further concomitant of the continuum and stability themes is that of nonideological politics. The

same tendencies within American social

science which led Daniel Bell and others to announce the “end of ideology” in America and Western Europe [26] have been reflected in the prevailing

theories

about

Latin

American

politics.

Faced

with the

unpleasant facts of continuing ideological conflict in Latin America, American social science has postulated the end of ideology there not as description of present conditions, but as prescription and projection into the future. According to the basic assumption, political consensus or “agreement on fundamentals” is a function of increasing equalization of

[19] material

living

standards (which

ideological conflicts). [27]

presumably obviates the need

Thus, once the

for

fundamental problems of

industrialization have been solved—as the continuum theory assumes they will be-the ideological politics which have made instability chronic in Latin America can be replaced by a “rational,” consensus-directed politics in

which

technical

solutions may be

devised

for hitherto political

problems, and in which the nature of politics itself will be transformed. In place of the currently prevailing politics of conflict and often of violence, Latin America will

evolve toward

the

familiar pluralistic model of

competing pressure groups whose respective interests can be accom¬ modated by bargaining and compromise. In the words of one well-known expert on Latin America (Silvert, 1965: 19): Groups-in-interest are another crucial index of impersonalism and maturity in the political process. To the extent to which they exist, a policy of countervailing powers becomes possible, assuring the operation of lateral controls in the political system and making possible government by decisions as the result of a compromise through bargaining instead of by fiat through uncontrolled selfinterest. This ideal is implicit in the preoccupation of many American scholars to catalogue Latin American parties and interest groups[28] —as though their behavior, importance, and effectiveness in Latin America were analogous to that of their counterparts in the United States. In addition, the pluralistic vision implies the fluidity and flexibility of class structure and the possibility of “transcending” class divisions by pragmatic, interestoriented

coalitions.

As

one

Latin

Americanist

projects

the vision.

“[Interest groups] are a point of access for the articulated demands of the ‘lower’-level groups in the linkage chain. The class structure is neither

polarized nor rigid, which further facilitates access ... all major groups have, reasonable access to political decisions” (Packenham, 1964: 117). According to this model, labor unions, for example, should have as much “access” to, and carry as much weight in the political system as, industrialists’ associations, and the industrious worker should be able to rise individually to the ranks of the capitalists. If, indeed, the class structure is flexible, if individual mobility is resolving socioeconomic inequalities, and if all conflicts are over negotiable interests, why the increasing polarization in Latin America (and why the need to send Green Berets for “pacification”)? What this type of analysis does accomplish-by no coincidence, since the “end of ideology” thesis is at least partially inspired by an anti-Marxist Vol. 2 (179)

[20] philosophy [29]—is the elimination of Marxian class analysis and the transformation of the very concept of “class” from a powerful analytical tool into a contentless categorization of social groupings in terms of income, occupation, or “status.” It removes the very heart of the concept of class and class conflict, i.e., stratified power relationships. Deprived of the notion of power, and specifically of domination or exploitation of one class by another, pluralist analysis leaves little room for a conflict model. For

if all

conflicts of interest are

reconcilable

by bargaining and

compromise, notions of “class struggle” or conflict based in power relations will become irrelevant. But this analysis does not describe, much less explain, the situation in Latin America; rather, it seems to project a pious hope that development can be achieved without paying the high cost of removing the social and economic obstacles, that

the

impoverished

masses can somehow be

upgraded without infringing on the interests of the established elites. This myth has found its ultimate expression in the Alliance for Progress, which projected the vision of powerful established interest groups (e.g., the landed, commercial, and industrial elites) becoming the agents of change in the name of enlightened self-interest. Attractive as this may seem to Americans motivated by a certain brand of reformism as well as by the concern for stability, it overlooks certain glaring conditions in Latin America: the fact that the established interest groups in the middle and upper classes have not voluntarily enlisted in the battle for thoroughgoing structural change (large landowners continue to hold the line against land reform,

for

example); the fact that

industrialization has not

been

accompanied by equalization of income or living standards and has actually increased the relative poverty of the lower classes (according to ECLA, while average per capita income in Latin America is $410.00, half the population receives an average of $120.00 and the top five percent of the population receives $2600.00; UN, ECLA, 1969a: 12); the fact that in most countries the lowest sectors of the population (e.g., Indians, landless peasants,

and

marginal

urban slum dwellers) are not

organized

or

represented by any interest group; the fact that even where labor unions exist, they represent a very small fraction of the workers (ten to fifteen percent at most for the whole region), they are often governmentcontrolled rather than autonomous, and they can by no stretch of the imagination be said to “weigh” as heavily as vested interest groups or to constitute “one of the most significant pressure groups” in Latin political life, as claimed by one American expert. [30] Beyond its empirical inaccuracies, this type of analysis is based upon a concept of politics and “politicization” which makes ideological conflict

[21] and violence a form of “antipolitics” or “pathology” [31] in societies which have not yet achieved consensus. On the individual level, the ideological dissenter is reduced to the status of a psychological “deviant,” taking refuge in ideology as an outlet for his own frustrations. On the social level, ideology becomes even more dangerous, as its distortions have culminated in totalitarian philosophies (Fascism and Communism). [32] Much as these notions reinforce commonly accepted American norms, they cannot possibly enhance an understanding of Latin American politics. Deprived of pluralism, the vision of nonideological development becomes untenable. For if industrialization has not contributed toward equalization of living standards, if the interests of all groups are not being represented through a societal process of bargaining and compromise, and if class lines remain rigid, then ideological conflict is likely to persist as a central feature of the Latin American political environment for a long time to come. Even more fundamentally, pluralism provides no basis for an understanding of the sources of conflict and instability inherent within the socioeconomic system of Latin America and within its relation to the United States. It is perhaps no accident that American social scientists have projected these notions about consensus and ideology; for here again the substantive thesis has its analogue in certain epistemological predilections. The clue is offered by one of the most prominent spokesmen for the “end of ideology” hypothesis, S. M. Lipset (1963: 453), who notes “the shift away from ideology towards sociology.” Not only Western democracy, as a political system, but also sociology and political science, as disciplines, have as part of their rationale the substitution of rational scientific criteria for ideological bias. “Democratic progress” is seen as stemming from “the application of science [including social science] to human affairs” (Apter, 1964: 17). Social science comes to provide not only an apparatus for social problem-solving, but also a safe haven from the contamination of ideology; its cult of objectivity, of value-free science, is a reassurance that some higher level of truth can be discovered if only the cloak of values can be thrown off. And what better environment for such a discovery of neutral scientific truth than that of liberal democracy? As one eminent pohtical scientist states flatly, “Only popular governments seem to be capable of maintaining the freedom of inquiry necessary to empirical theory” (Dahl, 1963: 106). Just as the liberal democratic consensus society permits the resolution of political problems by competing interest groups, so, too, it promotes the competition of ideas within a framework of underlying agreement. Mill’s marketplace for ideas has been perfected; why worry if the products are all pretty much the same? Vol. 2 (181)

[22] But there is great irony in the idea that, by programming the end of ideology, American social science becomes “immune,” as Parsons claims (1961: 315), to “the pressure to put problems in an ideological context.” The very cultivation of “methodism” or “scientism” in contemporary social science, the elevation of “neutral” technique to a principle, is no less “value-laden” and ideological than the ideologies it scorns (Wolin, 1969: 1064-1069). Moreover, without belaboring the point, it is significant that the “end of ideology” thesis is itself sociologically rooted in the Cold War era, and that many of the most vociferous advocates of pluralism in Latin America are vigorous anti-Communists. [33] Unless we are prepared to maintain that any set of ideas opposed to a powerful ideology (such as Communism) is ipso facto nonideological, or that the prevailing American norms transcend the sociology of knowledge, we must recognize the ideological nature of American pluralism and American social science.

(4) Diffusion The diffusion hypothesis contains two major assertions about develop¬ ment: (a) that development occurs largely through the spread of certain cultural patterns and material benefits from the developed to the underdeveloped areas; and (b) that within each underdeveloped nation a similar diffusion occurs from the modern to the traditional sectors. Although these two assertions are closely linked and generally appear together as elements of a more comprehensive world view, they may be treated separately for the purpose of analysis. Beginning with the second aspect, the diffusion of “modernity” from the modern to the traditional sectors becomes another way of expressing the ideas implicit in the continuum theory. As has been seen above, while going beyond the simple comparison of the features of traditionalism with those of modernity, and while taking more interest in the stages in-between, the continuum retains the two ends of the spectrum. Its emphasis is on the movement forward from traditional to modern. The diffusion theory examines the very same processes, and in terms of the same end-points of the spectrum, but analytically its emphasis is on the movement backward or penetration of certain influences from the modern to the traditional sectors. Both theories presuppose and are predicated upon the notion of a “dual society.” The dualistic premise, as accepted by most prominent Latin Americanists[34]—one expert (Adams, 1967: 18) claims it is recognized by “all writers”-has become an analytical construct in studying not only the economies but also the social structures, value systems, and regional

[23] differences in the Latin American nations. Almost inevitably, dualists explicitly posit or imply a basic dichotomy between the two sectors and a coexistence or interaction between them, as though there existed in reality two separate sectors, each having its own history, dynamics, and mode of production. Typically, the image is presented of a preindustrial, archaic, “feudal” sector which has remained traditional, in contrast with an industrial or capitalist sector in which real progress is being made. [35] The dualism hypothesis obscures the essential relation between the two sectors: that they “represent the functioning of a single unified society of which the two poles are integral parts and . . . [that] these two poles originate in the course of a single process.” [36] Insofar as we can even speak of two sectors, we are studying two sides of the same historical and social processes, both international and internal, which affect development of the entire nation. [37] Thus, what is required for development is not further integration of the traditional sectors, but rather a qualitative change in their existing relationship to the more developed socioeconomic groups. Even with the less naive dualists, who acknowledge that the postulated two sectors are really part of a larger whole, there remain serious misconceptions about the nature of the processes by which each affects the other. In particular, it is commonly assumed that progress in Latin America has occurred and will occur through the spread of the material and cultural advances of the modern sector to the traditional, that the former contributes directly to the eventual modernization of the latter. On the economic level, this is illustrated in the Hirschman thesis (1958: 62-63) of creating “linkages” between “leading” and “lagging” sectors: “development has proceeded . . . with growth being communicated from the leading sectors of the economy to the followers”; similarly, Rostow’s “take-off’ (1962: 52) is initiated by the transmission of “expansionary forces” from the “primary growth” sectors to other economic sectors. Culturally, the spread of “modern” entrepreneurial attitudes, for example, is generally thought to stimulate development in traditional sectors. In fact, as a number of studies indicate, the developed sectors have blocked progress in the traditional sectors and have advanced materially only at the expense of and through the exploitation of the latter. Human and material resources have been diffused from the backward to the modern areas, causing a constant decapitalization and impoverishment ot the less-developed areas (e.g., through the export of raw materials from “backward” areas to urban centers, [38] the exploitation of agricultural resources by urban import-export interests, and the migration of the best-trained sectors of the rural population to regional or national urban Vol. 2 (183)

[24] centers). A number of Latin American scholars suggest that the internal structure of Latin countries is not one of “dualism,” but, rather, should be characterized in terms of subordinate-superordinate relations of internal colonialism and economic exploitation by dominant classes. [39] Internal colonialism, as defined by one Latin sociologist (Gonzalez Casanova, 1969b: 130) “corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous groups”; intersecting this structure, which has been reinforced by economic exploitation, is a societal class structure based specifically on the economic exploitation (and the consequent political domination) of the lower classes by the Latin bourgeosie.[40] Unlike the dualistic premise, this body of theory establishes a substantive link (dependence-domination) between the various sectors, rather than a mere relation of coexistence; it implies a causal explanation for the underdevelopment of the exploited sectors, in terms of stratified power relations. Finally it enables us to challenge the widespread assumption that the real resistances or “handicaps” to development lie in the backward sector, the implication being that these resistances can be overcome by cultural and material influences from the modern sector. [41] This view is based on certain definite conceptions as to what are the major barriers to development (e.g., capital shortages, “traditional” attitudes, insufficient education, a small middle class); once it is shown that these are not the critical variables (see below), the dualistic premise is invalidated, and with it the diffusion thesis regarding the remedies. Diffusion from developed to underdeveloped nations: Closely related to the theory of diffusion from the modern to the traditional sectors of the Latin American nations is that of diffusion from the developed to the underdeveloped nations; as postulated by one major textbook on Latin America (Needier, 1964: 517), “the speed [of diffusion from modern to traditional sectors] varies in accordance with the accessibility of the society to influences from more developed states.” I shall deal with two aspects of international diffusion: first, with material foreign inputs of capital and technology, mainly from the United States, into the Latin American nations; secondly, cultural or sociopolitical diffusion of insti¬ tutions and values. On the simplest and most concrete level, the international diffusion thesis argues that development in Latin America requires the stimulus of certain material inputs, mainly capital and technology, from the advanced industrial nations, as transmitted through foreign investment and aid. [42] In the words of two of its main proponents (Rostow and Millikan, 1957: 56), External capital is required to prepare countries for the transition to

[25] self-sustained long-run economic growth. In the transition itself, external capital will often make the critical difference between an upward spiral of economic, social, and political development and a downward spiral of stagnation and decay.” Without entering into a prolonged discussion here, there are several reasons why this theory should not remain unchallenged. First, serious questions may be raised about its empirical validity. Contrary to the almost axiomatic assumption of many social scientists, the correlation between foreign capital imports and Latin American growth (in terms of output-capital ratio and domestic savings rates) tends to be inverse rather than positive (Griftin, 1969: 115-125). Moreover, it has been shown in a number of studies (mainly by non-Americans) that foreign investment by the United States and other industrial nations in underdeveloped areas has resulted in a net outflow of capital from the underdeveloped to the developed nations, a decapitalization of the former. [43] In a number of Latin American countries and for the region as a whole, the input from foreign private investment has been far exceeded by the outflow of profit remittances abroad. [44] (According to U.S. Department of Commerce figures, the outflow from Latin America was $7.5 billion greater than inflow from 1950 to 1965.)[45] And this is to say nothing of the loss of profits which would have remained in Latin America if national resources were in the hands of nationals. This drain through foreign investment is aggravated by the clear deterioration of the terms of trade for the Latin nations and of their position in world trade, as summarized in the ECLA thesis regarding relations between “peripheral” nations and economic “centers.” [46] (Between 1950 and 1968, Latin America’s share of world trade shrank from 11% to 5.1%.) [47] The decapitalization resulting from direct foreign investment and an increasingly unfavorable position in world trade has not been counteracted by foreign aid programs. Foreign aid has become continually more “tied” to conditions imposed by creditor nations to meet their own balance of payments difficulties or to accommodate private business interests. Service (interest and amortiza¬ tion) payments on the foreign debt, as well as the flow of profits abroad, continue to mount in Latin American nations and to consume an increasing share of export earnings (now more than 35% for the region as a whole; UN, ECLA, 1969a: 9). By the mid-1960s, the total paid by Latin countries in debt service payments exceeded the amount of new loans (Wionczek, 1968: 6), and, at the end of the decade, the external debt has doubled since 1960 (New York Times, 1969). In view of the crisis proportions of the foreign debt and of what ECLA (1969a: 18-21) calls the “strangulation” of the external sector of the Latin economies, we must challenge the very concept of foreign aid as an input Vol. 2 (185)

[26] into those economies, [48] and repeat the question raised by one scholar (Frank, 1967b: 49): “Who, we may ask, is diffusing capital to whom?” Moreover, it would be useful to follow the lead taken by a number of Latin American economists in examining the negative consequences of foreign investment and aid for balance of payments, capital formation, stimulation of national industry, income redistribution, and development planning in the Latin economies[49]-in short, the further obstacles to development created by foreign capital. Such studies might well confirm the findings of some scholars[50] that the net effect of Latin America’s integration into the world market and economic relations with the advanced nations has been “structured underdevelopment” and increasing financial dependence, rather than the promotion of autonomous progres¬ sive development. To the extent that such development has occurred at all, it has occurred when Latin ties to the advanced nations (and thus the flow of capital) have been temporarily severed (e.g., in times of international war or depression). [51 ] Similarly, the diffusion of technology, far from enabling the Latin American nations to “catch up” with the developed world, as is generally assumed, [52] has been limited to sectors of the economy in which foreign enterprise has a direct interest. [53] And even in those sectors where it has been introduced, advanced, capital-intensive foreign technology has aggravated the already serious problems of Latin development, such as increasing unemployment. [54] Finally, industrialization has intensified dependence upon foreign technology (UN, ECLA, 1969b: 14 ff.) and (particularly where it is confined to import-substituting light and intermediate industry) upon foreign imports of heavy equipment and machinery.[55] Thus, diffusion of technology has not disrupted the cycle of dependent development, but has merely altered its specific manifesta¬ tions. Beyond the dubious empirical validity of the international diffusion thesis, its adequacy as a conceptualization of development must be questioned. At the core of the theory is the assumption that Latin American social and economic development is compatible and in harmony with the interests of the United States. [56] This assumption leads almost invariably to the conclusion that whatever tensions may exist can be resolved by “good will” and a mutual drive toward closer cooperation; that what must be changed are not the material foundations of United States-Latin American relations, but merely certain hostile attitudes, particularly on the part of extreme leftist Latins. Seen as a touchstone for American policy, the notion that foreign capital and technology are beneficial and necessary instruments for promoting Latin development,

[27] and more generally that there is no basic antagonism or contradiction between Latin and U.S. interests, provides the rationale for certain ideas about the torms and pace of development which are most desirable from the American perspective, namely orderly development, nondisruptive of American interests in hemispheric security. (Very few Americans have questioned the easy assumption that foreign investment promotes stability in Latin America.)[57] Once the “harmony of interests” premise is challenged, however-and there is good reason to challenge it, in view of the widening economic and technological gap between Latin America and the U.S. [58]-the very congruence of the diffusion thesis with American policy interests may be taken as a measure of its nonuniversality and its limited value as an explanation of development, particularly for the purposes of Latin Americans seeking autonomous national development. In fact, if development in the United and States and underdevelopment in Latin America are seen as integrally and causally linked through concrete power relations, it may be suggested that a model of imperialism is far more appropriate than one of the “harmony of interests.” Diffusion of ideas. While its most concrete version is economic, the diffusion thesis has also been invoked to explain the development of social and political attitudes and institutions: “the influence of ‘modern’ ideas and practices is steadily encroaching on traditional societies;. . . modern values and ideas have greater attractive power than traditional ones and, however gradually, eventually win out over them, forcing modification in institutions and informal patterns of behavior.” [59] Although few state the case so baldly, most of the current literature seems to take for granted that the values and institutions which made Amer¬ ica and Western Europe “great” will flourish equally well if implanted in the Latin soil. If the goal is to emulate and replicate in Latin America the “successful” development of the United States and Europe, the problems of social and political development can be reduced to that of discovering mechanisms to facilitate this transplantation of Western institutions and attitudes, and of overcoming “resistances” to it in the traditional Latin American soil. It is here that the prevailing conceptions (or myths) about the nature of American society, as well as about Latin America, have greatly influenced the choice of subject matter, as well as the conclusions of research. If the model for Latin American development is to be constructed on the basis of the American experience, its organizing principle must be the most salient feature of American sociopolitical life: liberal democracy. Since democracy is a rather elusive ideal, even in the United States, the Vol. 2 (187)

[28] concept has been operationalized for the study of Latin America through more tangible institutional and attitudinal indicators, regular and fair elections, competing political parties and interest groups, a strong and growing middle class to supplant the extremes of wealth and poverty, universal education, and the spread of democratic attitudes. In the spirit of one Latin Americanist’s recommendation (Fitzgibbon, 1965: 213) that “a whole generation” of graduate students analyze Latin American political parties, there has been a barrage of studies and typologies of political parties, party systems, political groups, and so on. [60] To be sure, these typologies may be useful as descriptive guides for comparative studies. But once the idea of “permanently and universally valid”[61] or “natural” [62] classifications is set aside, then any set of classification principles is rooted in one or another theory and set of assumptions, and can be no more valid than the latter. In this case we must focus upon the widely accepted assumption that such recogniz¬ able institutions of American democracy as parties, interest groups, and regular elections have a similar meaning in Latin societies, and therefore can and should be reproduced there. A case in point is the attempt of Lipset, Coleman, and others[63] to demonstrate a positive correlation between economic development and “political competitiveness.” [64] Other less ambitious studies have confined themselves to an analysis of the political systems; they too employ such indicators of democracy as free and competitive elections (Fitzgibbon and Johnson, 1966: 6-7), the degree of participation in elections (Germani and Silvert, 1967: 311-312), the emergence of “modern” parties as a sign of political “maturity,”[65] the existence of autonomous legislative, executive, and judicial institu¬ tions, [66] and so on. Beyond the weak explanatory power of these “analyses,” our main concern is with the assumption (Martz, 1966: 72-73) that political parties really “aggregate” or represent popular interests, that formal political institutions are meaningful indicators of democracy in Latin America. In fact, enough is known about the manipulation of elections and party mechanisms to make them inappropriate indices of anything other than the gratification of American hopes for Latin America. As one Latin American has pointed out, “The act of voting has no meaning in itself and can acquire a meaning only through effective control of the result which the voting has helped to produce.” [67] The search for competing interest groups, as discussed above, betrays a similar and equally misleading desire on the part of American social scientists to universalize the American experience as a model for Latin America. In short, given the nature of the Latin American political context as a whole, the forms of Western

[29] democracy are often perverted, and the degree of assimilation of these forms is a meaningless indicator of substantive democracy. In this sense, the never-ending series of behavioral studies of elections and parties is no less formalistic than the traditional formalism which behavioralism is supposed to have overcome. Given this preoccupation with forms, it is not surprising that the only possible example of substantive democracy and mass mobilization in Latin America—Cuba—is generally classified as a totalitarian dictatorship. [68] Furthermore, the very obsession with democracy as we know it, as “the great problem in Latin American politics (Alexander, 1964: 125), is highly dubious; it may well be less the great problem of Latin America than of the United States in its attempts to cope with the explosive potential of Latin America. Rise of the middle class: Another element of the Western model often prescribed as a panacea for Latin underdevelopment is the rise and consolidation of the middle class. Numerous writers have argued that economic development and political democracy are associated with the increase of the middle class. [69] As summarized by one leading social scientist, “The growing middle class [in Latin America] like its 19th century European counterpart supports a democratic society by attempt¬ ing to reduce the influence of the anticapitalist traditionalists and the arbitrary power of the military” (Lipset, 1963: 135; see also Alba, 1962). That this reliance on the middle class as the primary and most “responsible” agent of development is closely linked to American social science’s preoccupation with stable and nonideological development is illustrated in the following fairly typical statement: [The middle sectors] have learned the art of compromise while balancing a mass of political antagonisms. The middle groups have thus become stabilizers and harmonizers. They have learned the danger of dealing in absolute postulates and their political experi¬ ences have given them a positive psychology as opposed to the negative one so often exhibited by opposition groups [J. Johnson, 1965: 108]. In addition, the middle class is generally seen as being urban, better educated, nationalistic, and as supporting industrialization, some state economic intervention, and legislation favorable to the working class. [70] One author (Alba, 1962: 68) actually claims that in Latin America “it is the interests of the middle class that coincide with the interests of all Latin America (and in our context with the interests of all mankind).” Within the middle class, the “progressive,” “dynamic,” local industrialist bourVol. 2 (189)

[30] geoisie has become the special object of faith: “as contrasted with other groups within their societies, Latin American entrepreneurs, particularly those involved in large-scale enterprise, tend to be the carriers of modern values”(Lipset, 1967: 16). Aside from the fact that the very concept of the middle class in Latin America remains vague, there is considerable evidence (which can be mentioned only in passing here) to contradict the thesis that the middle class, and particularly the industrial bourgeoisie, have been the dynamic motor forces of development. To the extent that they have promoted development at all, it has been primarily for their own benefit, at the expense of the lower classes. [71] In countries such as Chile, which have a relatively large middle class, they have not made the contribution to internal savings and investment which might have been expected according to the nineteenth-century Western model, and the net effect of their economic rise has been the relative decline of the lower classes. [72] Nor have the middle classes or the industrial bourgeoisie promoted anything resembling autonomous national development. On the contrary, their interests have become identified with and dependent upon those of foreign capital, which has gained increasing control over the most modern and dynamic sectors of Latin industry. [73] Equally misleading is the image of the Latin American middle class as the champion of democracy. First, while improving their own socioeco¬ nomic status, the middle class and, particularly, the industrialists in many nations have not opposed but rather have adopted the values and interests of the traditional elites.[74] Secondly, rather than “reducing] ...the arbitrary power of the military,” as Lipset suggests, the middle class has supported and has often been the beneficiary of military intervention in politics. Certainly the phenomenon of the “middle-class military coup” postulated by Jose Nun (1967a) is borne out by such cases as the 1964 coup in Brazil and the numerous coups in Argentina. If the middle classes were agents of national development and democracy in Western Europe and the United States, they are becoming increasingly entrenched obstacles to those goals in Latin America; the problem is not the lack of a middle class but rather its active role in maintaining the status quo. The entire debate about the middle class would be greatly clarified if less attention were paid to the idealized characteristics of the middle class in itself and more to its historical and contemporary role in relation to other social sectors in Latin America. If one wonders just how the miraculous diffusion of Western democratic institutions is to be accomplished, American political science has adapted the notions of “political socialization” and “political culture”

[31] to do the job. Political socialization is “the process of induction into the political culture [whose] end product is a set of attitudes. . . toward a political system” (Almond, 1960: 27-28). Political culture, as summarized by one writer, is “the set of attitudinal and personality characteristics that enables the members of the political system both to accept the privileges and to bear the responsibilities of the democratic political process.” [75] As translated into the civic culture,” those attitudinal characteristics are defined primarily in terms of the American civics textbook model (Almond and Verba, 1963: 29). Or, as a variant on Weber’s “spirit of capitalism” and Schumpeter’s “entrepreneurship,”[76] McClelland (1961: 205) has invented a modern version of economic liberalism: achievement motivation: “In its most general terms the hypothesis states that a society with a generally high level of n-Achievement will produce more energetic entrepreneurs, who in turn produce more rapid economic development.” McClelland’s mode of analysis “works,” of course, only under the assumption of the validity of the nineteenth-century liberal economic model of free enterprise and the primacy of national capitalists as agents of development. A more serious defect of these and other variants of political culture analysis[77] is their faith that transformation of values or psychological dispositions constitutes or is a sufficient condition for development; the material and institutional factors which condition these attitudes and the larger development process receive scant attention. The Cult of Education. If “democratic” attitudes are not simply absorbed by Latin Americans through some mysterious process akin to osmosis, how can they be diffused? Aside from the mass media, the principal instrument is education. The whole cult of education in American social science literature is directly related to the diffusion thesis; certainly when they extol education as the means to democracy and social mobility,[78] American social scientists are not thinking merely of the three R’s.[79] As Lipset (1963: 39-40) postulates the contribution of education to democracy, “Education presumably broadens man’s outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices. . . . The higher one’s education the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and to support democratic practices.” The most obvious discrepancy within the thesis that “democratic” values are positively correlated with more education is that Latin (and U.S.) university students—presumably the best-educated sector of the population—have shown a remarkably consistent susceptibility to attitudes Vol. 2 (191)

[32] which American scholars consider “extremist.” More important, numerous studies have cast doubt upon the effectiveness of education as an instrument of social mobility for the disadvantaged.[80] There is considerable evidence that formal education in Latin America has contributed more toward legitimating existing social patterns than toward promoting fundamental changes (Stepan, 1966: 232-233). Indeed, as Ivan Ulich (1969: 22) eloquently points out, by teaching the poor to accept their “inferiority” and limiting their sense of alternatives, “Schools rationalize the divine origin of social stratification with much more rigor than churches have ever done.” This is not to suggest that education must necessarily stunt human or social change. It is the content and context rather than the amount of education which affects development. Experiments with the Paulo Freire “conscientizacion” method [81] and in revolutionary Cuba reveal clearly the potential of education as a force for human growth-of education understood not as “socialization” (acceptance of and adaptation to a given social order), but as the awakening social consciousness of one’s position in society and of the means for transforming it. Perhaps the main distortion of all versions of the cultural diffusion thesis is their tendency to divorce attitudes and social institutions from their economic roots. Cultural diffusionists (e.g., Lerner, 1958) generally maintain or imply that ideas and institutions have spread from developed to underdeveloped areas by virtue of their own superior rationality or “modernity.” But, in point of historical fact, the vehicle of transmission has been much more concrete and tangible: it is largely through the importation of foreign capital and commodities that European and American ideas, attitudes, and social institutions have penetrated Latin America. Illich (1969: 22) has noted, for example, the extent to which, however subtly, Latin schools are “deeply enmeshed in the world market.” The influence upon Latin values of the mass media, many of which are international businesses, and of imported consumer goods, is obvious. Is it not possible that imported cultural institutions are more appropriate to the needs of foreign interests than to those of the Latin American people? From the preceding discussion, it may be seen that the diffusion thesis for the national unit (from modern to traditional sectors) is integrally related to its international analogue. What binds them together is, on the material level, the “trickle down” theory (according to which the benefits of foreign inputs into the modern sector will eventually trickle down to the masses) and, on the cultural level, the image of the “oil spot” (according to which spots of modern influence dropped from the developed world into the underdeveloped nations will spread, eventually

[33] penetrating the traditional social sectors). To the extent that these two stages of diffusion are analytically interdependent, the whole theory is highly vulnerable: the invalidation of any one of several key assumptions throws open to question its entire conceptual underpinning. The epistemological counterpart of the substantive diffusion theory is the ethnocentrism of American social science-i.e., the projection of a conceptual framework trom the American environment to that of Latin America. One basic tenet of American social science goes back to Durkheim’s principle (Durkheim, 1897) that “social life should be explained not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes.’ In short, objective social science requires a departure from the relativistic perspective of the subject under investigation. In modern social science, this ideal has been translated into the preoccupa¬ tion with universal “objective” categories and concepts. But philosophers of social science (including Weber) have acknowledged the futility of denying the particularistic cultural roots of problem-definition and classification,[82] taken from the social experience of the researcher. Thus the social scientist must give up his pretensions to omniscience; he has merely replaced the relativism of his subject of investigation with his own particularistic framework. Hence there exists a strong tendency toward ethnocentrism. These remarks have particular bearing upon American social scientists studying another culture such as Latin America. To the extent that social phenomena derive their significance from the context in which they occur (Winch, 1958: 87, 107-108), the conceptual framework imposed by the observer often distorts that significance.,The fact that political democracy has been studied only in terms of voting, political parties, and interest groups: the conceptualization of social mobility as, in our own experience, individual mobility; these and other aspects of the American perspective add up to an often unintentional but nonetheless systematic distortion of the Latin American situation. This consideration is particularly important at a time when many of the commonly accepted theories about democracy, pluralism, the end of ideology, and so on cannot account for events within the United States itself (e.g., ghetto and campus riots). Probing a little further into American history, in fact, it must be asked whether such concepts as stability, continuity, and the absence of violence or ideology are any more accurate as descriptions of the U.S. past than as prescriptions for the Latin American present and future. In a rather significant sense, then, the paradigm-surrogate seems less a projection of the American experience than of the predominant American myths, which present at best only part Vol. 2 (193)

[34] of that experience. This is not to deny the need for any conceptual framework; but it does imply a thorough reappraisal of those typically American preconceptions and myths which have in fact hampered empirical observation of conditions in Latin America.

TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEPENDENCY MODEL

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force [Marx and Engels, 194 7:39]. The concept “ideology ” reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely that ruling groups can . .. become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination ... [and that their collective unconscious] obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others, and thereby stabilizes it [Mannheim, 1968: 40]. The paradigm-surrogate which governs the bulk of American research on Latin America fits both Marxist and non-Marxist characterizations of ideology. It is deeply rooted in the political economy of mid-twentiethcentury America. It gives expression to dominant interests within the American social order—interests which also play a determinitive role in shaping U.S. policy toward Latin America. It serves on the one hand to justify and perpetuate the historical pattern of domination-dependency relationships between the United States and Latin America, as manifested primarily in U.S. policy, and on the other hand to idealize and thereby mask that reality, to project particular interests as universal. The specific content of this ideology is not, therefore, an accidental convergence of ideas; it performs essential functions in preserving a given international order. [83] If American social science is to break out of its ideological mold, what are the necessary conditions for such a break, and what catalyst will trigger it, or even demonstrate the need for it? Perhaps it will take, in the case at hand, a “shock” from Latin America (e.g., another Cuba). [84] Left in this form, however, the problem might be reduced to what Kuhn calls a mere “puzzle.” In order to acquire the status of a real crisis, which is a

[35] “necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories” (Kuhn, 1962: 77), it must have its roots closer to home, within American society. Given the correspondence of research to conditions in and preconceptions about the United States, it is unlikely that a thoroughgoing reorientation of research will be effected in the absence of a recognition of and response to the incipient crises in American society. In addition (and in response) to crises in their society, social scientists must reevaluate certain aspects of their own stance toward that society, specifically the link between research and policy which has become a central feature of the social science profession. Symbolic of the fusion between research and policy is the growth of graduate training schools for government service, in-house research divisions and auxiliaries of govern¬ ment agencies, and a network of formal consulting arrangements, to say nothing of government funding of many major research projects (Eckstein, 1967: 157). If this is the new utopia for social science, as is sometimes suggested, then Project Camelot marked a high point, a culmination of the science-policy fusion rather than a scandal-if only it had not been publicly exposed. Social science is no longer “irrelevant”; but its particularization of relevance in the service of policy has conveniently obscured the ideal of the intellectual as social critic, and has detached the researcher from responsibility for the political, social, and moral conse¬ quences of research upon the “subjects.” Insofar as much of the resistance to paradigm change stems from scientific “professionalization” (Kuhn, 1962: 64), and insofar as that profession has identified itself with the policy vocation, paradigm change will require a reconceptualization of the social scientist’s own task and vocation. If these are necessary conditions under which a new paradigm might eventually be seen as necessary by the community of the discipline, what is to be done in the meantime by those who can no longer work within the existing framework? Contrary to Truman’s call for a new “consensus” constructed upon existing foundations, the need for the time being is for increasing dissensus, leading to explorations on hitherto untrodden grounds. The importance of striking out in new directions even now, while the impending crisis has not yet been generally perceived, becomes clear from Kuhn’s analysis of scientific revolutions. Existing paradigms are remarkably tenacious and resistant to being discarded. Even when confronted with serious anomalies or crises, scientists “will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theories in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.[85] Crises are necessary but insuffi¬ cient preconditions for conceptual revolutions; in addition, there must be an alternative paradigm which is finally seen as superior to the old one. Vol. 2 (195)

[36] Thus, there is an interim task for those who sense the poverty of current “normal science” and wish to probe in new directions. It is in this spirit that I shall sketch very briefly the outlines of one possible alternative paradigm for research on Latin America: the dependency model. [86] The Dependency Model The dependency model, as elaborated by a number of Latin American social scientists,[87] differs sharply from the paradigm-surrogate, insofar as it is an “international system” analysis. Dependency is defined historically as: an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development posibilities of the [subordinate] economies;., a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own [economy] is subjected [Dos Santos, 1968c: 26,29]. More specifically, Latin America has fulfilled certain definite functions in the “world economy” or world market, and Latin American develop¬ ment has been limited or conditioned by the needs of the dominant economies within that world market. To be sure, no nation has ever developed entirely outside the context of the world market. The distinguishing feature of dependent (as contrasted with interdependent) development is that growth in the dependent nations occurs as a reflex of the expansion of the dominant nations (Dos Santos, 1968c: 26) and is geared toward the needs of the dominant economies—i.e., foreign, rather than national, needs. At this point we must clarify what is meant by the world market. By itself, the world market encompasses all capital transfers and flows of goods and services among nations outside the Communist trade bloc. But the world market is the core of a broader “international system”: this international system includes not only a network of economic (market) relationships, but also the entire complex of political, military, social, and cultural international relations organized by and around that market (e.g., the Monroe Doctrine, the OAS, “Free World” defense organizations, communications networks). The international system is the static ex¬ pression and outcome of a dynamic historical process: the global expansion of capitalism. By focusing on the international system, the dependency model takes as its point of departure a concrete datum which has conditioned Latin

[37] American history: that since the Spanish conquest, Latin America has played a certain role in the political economy of one or another dominant capitalist nation. The Latin economies have always been shaped by the global expansion of the capitalist system and by their own integration into that system, and thus have borne the mark of a general characteristic of such expansion: its unevenness. [88] “Unevenness” here refers to an international division of labor,” in which some areas have developed more rapidly than-and often at the expense of-others: while Western Europe and the United States industrialized, Latin America remained for centuries an exporter ot primary raw materials and agricultural products. And even the recent faltering steps toward industrialization have not altered the fundamentally complementary character of the Latin economies (e.g., dependence on imports of capital goods, foreign control over the industrial sectors), so that growth is still governed largely by the needs of foreign economies. Politically as well, Latin development has been limited by the fact that policy decisions affecting development are conditioned, and alternatives limited, by the interests of the developed societies. [89] Although the fact of dependency has been a constant of Latin history, its forms have varied. The concrete limits within which a particular country has developed in a particular historical period have changed, according to two basic sets of variables: (1) Characteristics of the international system: (a) the prevalent form of capitalism (mercantile or industrial, corporate or financial); (b) the principal needs of the dominant nation(s) in the international system (agricultural commodities, minerals, cheap labor, com¬ modity markets, capital markets, and so forth); (c) the degree of concentration of capital in the dominant nation(s) (competitive or monopolistic capitalism); (d) the degree of concentration internationally (one hegemonic power or rival powers and if one hegemonic power, which nation [Spain, England, or the United States]). (2) Degree and nature of the Latin American country's ties to and functions within the system: (a) integration into the international system under conditions of mercantilism, “free trade,” protectionism (tariffs, quotas, and the like imposed by dominant nations) or trade within the structure of multinational corporations; Vol. 2 (197)

[38] (b) nature of political tie to hegemonic power(s) (colonial or nominally independent); (c) function primarily as a supplier of raw materials or agricultural products, as a market for manufactured goods, as a supplier of certain manufactured commodities, as an arena for direct foreign investment, or any combination of the preceding, (d) degree of foreign control in the principal economic sectors and, more generally, degree of relative autonomy (c.g., periods of world war or depressions versus “normal” periods).

The specific forms of dependency in contemporary Latin America follow from the specific characteristics of the international system and of Latin America’s function within it. [90] Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to maintain that the international system causes underdevelopment directly; rather, it does so indirectly, by generating and reinforcing within Latin America an infrastructure of dependency. The infrastructure of dependency may be conceptualized as follows. The international system shapes development in Latin America by means of certain institutions, social classes, and processes (e.g., industrialization, urbanization). These aspects of Latin society become part of the infrastructure of dependency when they function or occur in a manner that responds to the needs or interests of the dominant powers in the international system rather than to national needs or interests. It is through the infrastructure of dependency that the international system becomes operative within Latin America, and that the legacy of Latin America’s integration into that system is transmitted and perpetuated domestically, thereby limiting the possibilities for development. Thus, for example, industrialization is not by nature dependent; it becomes part of the infrastructure of dependency when the industrial structure is integrated into and complementary to the needs of foreign economies—when, for example, its main sectors are controlled by foreign capital. [91] Thus, as new opportunities for development are opened up by industrialization, Latin countries are increasingly unable to take advantage of these opportunities. Another fundamental dimension of dependency has been the creation or reinforcement of clientele social classes—i.e., classes which have a vested interest in and benefit from the existing structure of the international system. In return for carrying out certain functions on behalf of foreign interests, these classes enjoy a privileged and increasingly dominant and hegemonic position within their own societies, based largely on economic, political, or military support from abroad. [92] The alliances and conflicts of clientele classes with other domestic classes

V

[39] are shaped largely by their previous and present alliances with foreign interests. The existence of these elites within Latin America, whose interests correspond to those of the dominant classes in the dominant societies, is a sine qua non for the perpetuation of Latin dependency. [93] The preceding remarks about the infrastructure of dependency suggest that dependency should not be taken to mean simply external domination, unilaterally superimposed from abroad. No less important than foreign exploitation is the fact that all classes and structures in Latin society have to a greater or lesser degree internalized and institutionalized the legacy of dependency. Thus, even the sudden disappearance of the United States and every other dominant capitalist nation would not necessarily or immediately signify the end of Latin American dependency. And thus, by implication, in order to rupture the chains of dependency, Latin nations cannot merely sever their ties to the international system; they must simultaneously—as a precondition for lasting autonomy from that system—implement a profound, their own socioeconomic order.

anticapitalist-socialist-transformation

of

Even from this very brief sketch, the decisive differences between the theories of the paradigm-surrogate and the dependency model become clear. Unlike the continuum theory, which interprets underdevelopment as a transient “lower stage” of the process already completed by the advanced nations, the dependency model attributes underdevelopment to the specific functions which Latin America has fulfilled throughout its history in an international system dominated by the more advanced nations. European and U.S. development and Latin American underdevel¬ opment are not two isolated phenomena, but rather two outcomes of the same historical process, the global expansion of capitalism. Unlike the diffusion theory, which assumes the positive contribution to development made by foreign investment and aid, the dependency model takes account of the empirical evidence that one fundamental factor conditioning Latin development has been the extraction of capital. In light of this evidence, it seems more appropriate to view foreign investment and aid as mechanisms of the dominant powers or interests in the international system which generates dependency and hinders development. And, unlike the stability and end-of-ideology themes in the paradigm-surrogate, the dependency model is inherently a conflict model on both the international and the domestic levels: given its challenge of the “harmony of interests” between the United States and Latin America, and of the inevitable reconciliation of competing interests within Latin America, the dependency model proceeds from the deep-rooted existing conflicts and attempts to isolate the structural roots of those conflicts in the existing socioeconomic order. Vol. 2 (199)

[40] The resolution of those conflicts, by implication, will not necessarily be conducive to short-range stability in Latin America. [94] The foregoing sketch is not intended as a finished paradigm, but rather as an example of the alternatives that are opened up, once the basic assumptions of the paradigm-surrogate are discarded. It is likely that some elements of the existing paradigm-surrogate (and its techniques) will survive and be absorbed within a new framework, as is generally the case in scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 1962: 148). Nevertheless, the bulk will have to be put aside, at least for the time being, while new foundations are constructed. For it is only within the context of a redefined conceptual framework that we may be able to salvage those fragments of contempo¬ rary empirical research which are more than intellectual appendages of a particular paradigm-surrogate and a particular ideology.

NOTES

1. As one theorist observes, “By [Thomas] Kuhn’s canon, the mere existence of new theories, or even the fact that some theories have attracted a following, are not conclusive evidence of a [conceptual] revolution. What counts is the enforcement by the scientific community of one theory to the exclusion of its rivals” (Wolin, 1969: 1063). 2. See Kling (1964: 176-190); Martz (1966: 79-80); Snow (1966: 33); Stepan (1966: 223). 3. According to Wolin (1968: 151), “A society which is operating fairly normally has its theory in the form of the dominant paradigm, but that theory is taken for granted because it represents the consensus of the society.” See also Wolin (1969: 1064-1065). 4. The degree to which this consensus arises from a real convergence of views, rather than being imposed from above, is a question too complex for full discussion here. Suffice it to say that, as de Tocqueville (1960: 273 ff.) observed long ago, American politics is marked by a strong tendency toward conformity and a “despotism of the majority”; this same tendency also characterizes mainstream political science. But this in no way diminishes the power of the subtle mechanisms for enforcing and reinforcing that consensus (e.g., in political science, the funding agencies) and for establishing the limits of acceptable dissent (Wolin, 1968: 134). 5. The reluctance to acknowledge this possibility is illustrated by Almond’s expressed “uneasiness” about Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions because it “understates the element of continuity, of cumulativeness” and the extent to which political science “will be what it has been” (Almond, 1966: 875, 878). 6. Examples of the continuum model may be found in Almond (1960: 12); Apter (n.d.), (1965); Rustow (1957: 530-549); Deutsch (1961).

[41] 7. Regarding the classical liberal notion of linear progress (and its class basis) see Mannheim (1968: 220-226); Gonzalez Casanova (1969a- 20) 8. See Frank (1967a), (1967b); Stavenhagen (1968). 9. See Stavenhagen (1968: 17); also Gonzalez Casanova (1969a- 283) 10

I am not raising here the more general and complex question of the validity

i ea

types an an analytical tool. My concern is with the quality of these particular

ideal types m comparative theory, which all too often are left in the form of abstract analytical constructs and which cannot be applied to the study of specific, concrete historical and social events. 1L ™1S, emPhasis measure

has

been

manifested most blatantly

in

the

attempts to

development quantitatively along a continuum by such “characteristics of

a modern nation-state” as “a fully effective legislature,” “a modem bureaucracy ” “a stable party system,” and so on (Snow, 1966). As one critic has pointed out’ the growth of mdicators of development” does not necessarily contribute to develop¬ ment itself (Stepan, 1966: 226); in fact, one may question whether many of these mdicators

indicate anything at all about development (as opposed to mere change).

12. See Petras (1968: 158); ahistoricity is a feature of many social science theories today, as noted by Wolin (1969: 1077). 13. While American social scientists have been constructing models of develop¬ ment which all too often have no empirical referent other than their own society, policy-oriented

Latin Americans, for example in ECLA, have focused upon the

obstacles or bottlenecks” in development. See, for example, Prebisch (1963), and other ECLA literature; also Veliz (1965). 14. For examples of the industrialization hypothesis, see Apter (n.d.), (1965); Kahl (1962: 28-29); for the urbanization hypothesis, see Maier and Weatherhead (1964); for a critique of these concepts, see Huntington (1964) and Stepan (1966). 15. See Rostow (1962); for critiques see Meier (1964: 23-47); Frank (1967b: 37 ff); Veliz (1967: ll);Baranand Hobsbawm (1961); Griffm (1969: 32-37). 16. For other examples, see Blanksten (1965a: 152) and Needier (1964: 517ff.). 17. See, for example, Needier (1965); Huntington (1964); Stokes (1965); Bwy (1968: 17-66); K. Johnson (1964: 432-446); Kling (1965: 130ff.). 18. Given the diversity of specific theories within structural-functionalism, the following remarks are of particular relevance to the authors cited below. 19. Almond (1960: 7, 11); see also Blanksten (1960). 20. Moore (1960: 811); the same point is made by Bock (1963: 233). 21. See Almond (1963: 3-10); Blanksten (1960: 475 ff.); for a critique see Fals Borda (1966: 23); regarding the status quo bias, see Wolin (1969: 1065). 22. If we cannot discover in certain Latin countries any institutions which are articulating or aggregating the interests of a large sector of the population, we shall only be told by the structural-functionalists to look harder; for it is a general rule that “if the functions are there, then the structures must be, even though we may find them tucked away ... in nooks and crannies of other social systems” (Almond 1960: 12). 23. See the critique by Sorokin (1947: 338-339). 24. See Apter, commentary in Vallier (1965: 28). 25.

See Dahl (1961: 763-772); Easton (1962).

26. See Bell (1960); Parsons (1961); Lipset (1964a), (1963). 27. See Lipset (1964a: 295-296), (1963: 439 ff.).

Vol. 2 (201)

[42] 28. See Blanksten(l965a); (1960: 479), Silver! (1965); Fitzgibbon (1965); to mention only a few examples. . 29 For examples, see the works of Parsons and Lipset cited above; this point is made by La Palombara (1966: 8, 13). The Cold War inspiration of this thesis is further suggested by the fact that it was first proclaimed at a conference during the 1950s ot the anti-Communist (CIA-financed) Congress for Cultural Freedom, and has since been defended most vigorously by those in and around that Congress. 30. 31. 32. 33.

See See See To

Alexander (1965a: 108), (1962). Stokes (1965: 149); Fitzgibbon (1950). Shils (1958), as cited by Geertz (1964: 50). mention only a few: Berle (1962), Alexander (1965b), (1957); Popino

(1967); Draper (1965). 34. See, for example, Needier (1964: 513); Germani and Silvert (1967: 304, 308)- Lambert (1967: 8 ff.), (1959); Rostow (1962: 7); Silvert (1966); Meier (1964: 48 ff’.); Higgins (1968: 21, 69-70, 87); Almond (1960: 25); Hirschman (1958: 125-132); Adams (1967: 18). 35. See Silvert (1966: 24); Hirschman (1958: 125-126); for a critique, see Vitale 36. See Stavenhagen (1968: 16); see Frank (1967a), (1967b: 60); Vitale (1968); Cardoso and Faletto (1967: 11-12). A refutation of dualism on economic grounds may be found in Griffin (1969: 21-31). 37. To illustrate with two examples: the chief export sectors in most Latin nations are generally seen as “enclaves,” isolated from and having no structural origins in or effect upon the rest of the economy (Hirschman, 1958: 110 ff.,ECLA literature); the university is often pictured as an “island” of modernism in a sea of traditionalism (Lipset, 1964b: 29; Walker, 1967). In neither case is sufficient attention paid to the contribution of the traditional sector to the development of the modem sector, or conversely, to the contribution of the modern sector to the continued underdevelopment of the traditional sector. 38. See Stavenhagen (1968: 16); Griffin (1969: 265). 39. See Stavenhagen (1968: 18); see also Gonzalez Casanova (1969b); Cardoso and Faletto (1967: ll-13);Quijano (1967);D. Johnson (1969). 40. See Frank (1969: 328); D. Johnson (1969). 41. For example, see Alexander (1965a: 173); for a critique, see Stavenhagen (1968: 20). 42. See Rostow (1962); McMillan and Gonzalez (1964); selections from Meier (1964: 131 ff.). 43. See Frank (1967a), (1967b: 46-49); Griffin and French-Davis (1964: 16-22); Vitale (1968); Halperin (1968); Griffin (1969: 144-145). 44. U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) (annual); U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1955: 15); de Castro (1969: 239); Halperin (1968); Magdoff (1966). 45. U.S. Department of Commerce data (from Balance of Payments Statistical Supplements, and Surveys of Current Business [annual] cited in Magdoff (1966: 27). 46. See Prebisch (1963); ECLA (1951), (1950), and other ECLA studies. 47. See New York Times (1969). 48. See Griffin (1970); Morray (1968); Malpica (1967); for an American economist’s criticisms of aid policy (from a different point of view), see Hanson (1968), (1967).

[43] IJ N9rSCf FaCUltieS

Schools of Economics in Latin America (1965); see also

(1969 ch nnnCeH°ntn c 3nd Devdopment (1964>; Wionczek (1968); Griffin (1969. ch. Ill); and other references in note 48, above. 50. See Frank (1967a); Stavenhagen (1968); Griffm (1970), (1969- ch V1IV Halpenn (1968); Dos Santos (1968a). ’ 51. See Griffin (1969: 269-270); Frank (1967a: ch. I). 52. See, for example, Rostow (1962: 142-143), who states explicitly what others assume. 53. See Prebisch (1963: 53-55); Frank (1967b: 51). 54. See Griffin (1969: 101-102);Quijano (1967: 32).

55. See Vitale (1968); Halperin (1968). 56. For examples of this assumption, see Berle (1962); Gordon (1963V Tannenbaum (1966); Hanke (1959); for a critique, see Petras (1968). 57. See Kling (1965: 138); Midlarsky and Tanter (1967). 58. For a confirmation of this trend, see ECLA (1969a), (annual).

59. See Needier (1964: 517); perhaps the best example of the cultural diffusion thesis is found in the work of Lerner (1958: ch. II). 60. See note 28 above. 61. See Weber (1949: 84). 62. See Polanyi (1958: 47); Duhem (1962: 47). 63. See Lipset (1959: 69-105); Coleman (1960: 538-544); Hagen (1962- 1-8V Cutright (1963: 253-264). 64. Neither political competitiveness nor the indices used to measure it are clearly defined; however, since “authoritarian” is at the low end of the competitive¬ ness scale, it may be assumed that “competitive” refers to the existence of competing political parties. Elsewhere (1963: 30), Lipset’s criterion for democracy in Latin America is “whether a given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most ot the post-World War I period.’ Although the particular indicator varies slightly from one study to another, their cumulative import is to postulate that the degree of economic development in a Latin American nation to positively correlated with the extent to which its political system approximates that of the United States. 65. See Alexander (1964: 101); see also Gil (1965). 66. See Almond (1960); all articles in Needier (1964). 67. See Nun (1967b: 108-109); as is pointed out on a more philosophical level, any group of voters “cannot be said to be ‘voting’ unless they have some conception of the significance of what they are doing” (Winch, 1958: 51).

68. To cite only a few examples, Berle (1962: 97ff.); Draper (1965); Alexander (1965a). Interestingly, one of the rare critiques of the “competitiveness” model by a prominent American political scientist recommends the creation of strong one-party political systems (anti-Communist parties, yet based on the Bolshevik model) in modernizing nations (Huntington, 1964). 69. See e.g., J. Johnson (1965) (1958); Lipset (1963); Germani and Silvert (1967); Alba (1962); Stokes (1967). 70. See J. Johnson (1958: 5, 184); see also Alba (1962: 67). 71. See, for example, Cardoso (1967); Frank (1967b: 36); Pinto (1965); ECLA (1969c: 82 ff.). 72. For the Chilean case, see Sunkel (1965); Pike (1968); Zeitlin (1968). 73. See Dos Santos (1968b); Vitale (1968: 42).

Vol. 2 (203)

[44] 74

See Frank (1967b: 58); Petras (1965); for the Chilean case, see note 72

above’ One scholar has proposed to do away with the concept of the middle class because “the apparently new middle group is only an extension of the traditional upper class, both in terms of economic position and of basic values

16)75.

(Adams, 1967.

See Packenham (1964: 117); Almond and Verba (1963: 12-13).

76 See Weber (1958); Schumpeter (1934). 77. See also Pye and Verba (1965), and other works by Pye, Parsons, and Shils. 78 See Almond and Verba (1963: 370);Walker (1967: 408). 79 It is no accident that McClelland (1961: 103) operationalizes n-Ach by comparing stories in school readers, or that Almond and Verba claim, “Any set of modernizing priorities will place heavy stress on education; and rising levels of education will create some of the components of a civic culture” (Almond and Vcrb2 1963* 373) 8o’. See Stepan (1966); for the Chilean case, see Sunkel (1965: 136-137); Pike (1968: 215). 81. See Freire (1968); see also Sanders (1968). 82. See Weber (1949: 81-82); Winch (1958). 83. On this aspect of ideology, see Althusser (1967: 49). 84. In a sense, this sort of crisis has already occurred, insofar as the failure ot the Alliance for Progress, which is the policy expression of the paradigm-surrogate, is evident to all who care to recognize it. To mention only a few of the very many examples, see speeches by Senator Church and others on the Foreign Relations Committees of the House and the Senate; also Hanson (1967); ECLA (1969a). This is also implicit in speeches by President Nixon and in the Rockefeller Report of 1969. 85. See Kuhn (1962: 77-78); see also Polanyi (1958: 292). 86. It should be stressed that my intention here is not to present a full exposition of the dependency model-a project for which space is lacking here, and which has been undertaken elsewhere (Bodenheimer, 1970). Rather, I hope only to sketch its bare outlines, in order to suggest the vast field lying beyond the paradigm-surrogate. The purpose of a model such as this is to establish basic categories for analysis of concrete situations, to highlight certain significant phenomena and relationships which have received insufficient attention in the paradigm-surrogate, and to lay the basis for the formulation of empirically testable hypotheses about concrete research problems. The ultimate validity of the model cannot be proved a priori, but must be judged on the basis of its utility as a guide to empirical research. 87. The dependency model was by no means the tirst international system model-i.e., the first attempt to relate Latin underdevelopment to the region’s function in the world market. An earlier international system analysis, developed after World War II, was that of ECLA, which traced Latin America’s problems to its “peripheral” status vis-a-vis the advanced industrial centers, with particular emphasis on the former’s disadvantageous position in world trade (e.g., Prebisch, 1963, and others cited in note 46 above). The specific impetus for the dependency theorists was their increasing dissatisfaction with the ECLA model, and particularly with its failure to explain the economic stagnation and aggravation of social problems in Latin America during the 1960s. The other intellectual predecessor ot the dependency model was Andre Gunder Frank’s thesis of the relations between “metropolitan” and “satellite” nations and regions, which focused on the process by which each metropolis appropriates the economic surplus generated in its satellites (see works by Frank cited above and Frank, 1966).

[45] Although my account is taken largely from the writings of the Latin dependency theorists, they should not be held responsible for those elements (e.g the infrastructure of dependency) which I have added. 88. See Lenin (1965: 72-73); the various writings of Frank.

Horowitz (1969: 42);Griffin (1969:

62

265)-and

89. See Cardoso and Faletto (1967: 25); Sunkel (1967: 57). 90. While recognizing the importance of country-to-country variations for the sake ot simplicity I shall not dwell upon these, since my purpose here is merely to out me the general model. Generally, the international system today is characterized by: advanced industrial capitalism (corporate integrated with financial capital); the dominant nations’ need for raw materials and, more important, capital and commodity markets; monopolistic concentration of capital; American hegemony, and increasing international integration of capital. Latin America’s function within' the system is gradually shifting from a supplier of raw materials and agricultural commodities to an arena where certain phases of industrial production are carried out-but still under foreign control. Latin America’s ties are, economically, to protectionist dominant nations (which distort her position in world trade) and politically, ties of nominal independence; the overall degree of integration into the international system is intensifying. 91. To mention only a few specific characteristics of dependent industrialization; increasing foreign control over the most dynamic and modern industrial sectors (through direct ownership and control of production, of patents and licenses, of marketing and distribution, and so on); consequent outflow of profits abroad; increasing competitive advantages for foreign capital over local firms, especially in’ industries of scale; continuing orientation of the entire economic structure to the needs of foreign corporations (despite production partially for the internal market); introduction ot advanced and capital-intensive technology, generally aggravating the unemployment problem; lack of a domestic capital goods industry, and consequently an increased dependence on imports and rigidities in the composition of imports. 92. In this sense, the clientele classes come to play in Latin America today the role historically performed by the comprador bourgeoisie (export-import elites, whose strength, interests, and very existence were derived from their function in the world market). The clearest example of clientele classes today are those elements of the industrial bourgeoisie which are completely tied to foreign corporations. In different ways, the state bureaucracy professional and technical elites, and other sectors of the middle class become clientele when their interests, actions, and privileged positions are derived from their ties to foreign interests. 93. See Quijano (1967: 4); Dos Santos (1968c). 94. An appropriate and necessary complement to the dependency model as outlined above is the economic theory of imperialism. By itself, the dependency model provides a view “from below”: it traces Latin underdevelopment to the region’s function in the international system which is governed by the interests of the dominant nations. What is needed in addition is a theoretical explanation “from above”-a model of the specific nature of the international system and its roots in the political economy of the dominant nations, which will specify whose particular needs or interests are served by the international system and determine (in this case, United States) relations with Latin America. For a number of reasons which cannot be fully explained here, I would argue that the missing link in the dependency model is best supplied by the economic theory of imperialism (as opposed to commonly accepted international relations theories and strictly noneconomic theories of imperialism). Vol. 2 (205)

[46] (Although they seldom analyze it in detail, many of the dependency theorists have proceeded from a Marxist conception of the roots of the international system in the dominant nations.) The economic theory of imperialism lays the groundwork for the dependency model by challenging the assumption (common in many international relations theories) that all nations, as actors in the international arena, enjoy a certain measure of autonomy and freedom of action. Moreover, this theory focuses attention on the essence of Latin dependency, which consists not in occasional military interventions, gunboat diplomacy, or other forms of physical coercion, but rather in the chronic and for the most part peaceful political-economic hegemony of advanced capitalist nations over Latin America. In this sense, dependency is an indirect means of ensuring the maintenance of imperialistic relations without formal political-mili¬ tary control. (The specific relation of the dependency model to the theory of imperialism has been spelled out in more detail elsewhere [Bodenheimer, 1970].)

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[53]

S US ANNE J. BODENHEIMER is a Fellow at the Center for Latin Ameri¬ can Studies of the University of California (Berkeley), where she is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science. She is currently doing her dissertation on the subject of “The Impact of Foreign Aid Programs upon Development in Guatemala. ’’Her teaching fields include Comparative Politics, Latin America, Political Theory, and Political Economy. She has published numerous articles in scholarly and nonacademic journals in the general area of politics and development in Latin America, and has authored the book Political Union: A Microcosm of European Politics,

1960-1966.

Vol. 2 (213)

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