The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology (Religion in the Modern World) 1538148706, 9781538148709

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The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology

RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD Series Editors Kwok Pui-lan, Emory University Joerg Rieger, Vanderbilt University This series explores how various religious traditions wrestle with the dynamic and changing role of religion in the modern world and examines how past changes reflect on today’s critical issues. Accessibly and engagingly written, books in this series will look at secularization, global society, gender, race, class, sexuality and their relation to religious life and religious movements. Titles in Series: Not God’s People: Insiders and Outsiders in the Biblical World by Lawrence M. Wills The Food and Feasts of Jesus: The Original Mediterranean Diet, with Menus and Recipes by Douglas E. Neel and Joel A. Pugh Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude by Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan The Politics of Jesús: A Hispanic Political Theology by Miguel A. De La Torre Modern Muslim Theology: Engaging God and the World with Faith and Imagination by Martin Nguyen Race, Religion, and Politics: Toward Human Rights in the United States by Stephanie Y. Mitchem The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology edited by Kwok Pui-lan and Francis Ching-wah Yip

The Hong Kong Protests and Political Theology Edited by Kwok Pui-lan and Francis Ching-wah Yip

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Rowman & Littlefield An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom Copyright © 2021 by The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2020944622 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Is Available ISBN 978-1-5381-4870-9 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-5381-4871-6 (pbk: alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-5381-4872-3 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Acknowledgments vii Note on Chinese Names

ix

Introduction 1 Kwok Pui-lan PART I:  OVERVIEW OF THE HONG KONG PROTESTS

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1  A  Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 Ben Siu-pun Ho

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2  F  rom Crony to Authoritarian Capitalism: Structural Problems Underlying the Hong Kong Protests Alex Hon-ho Ip

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3  “ If Not Us, Who?”: Youth Participation and Salient Aspects of the Protests Hung Shin-fung

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4  U  nderstanding the Use of Violence in the Hong Kong Protests Lai Tsz-him PART II:  THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE HONG KONG PROTESTS 5  B  iblical Allusions on the Hong Kong Protests Philip P. Chia v

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91 93

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Contents

 6  “ For Our Struggle Is Not Against Flesh and Blood”: The Demonic in Hong Kong Francis Ching-wah Yip

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 7  H  ong Kong “Freedom Cunt”: Sexual Violence and Crucifixion Jessica Hiu-tung Tso

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 8  C  rucified People, Messianic Time, and Youth in Protest Kung Lap-yan

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 9  I s Dialogue in the Church Still Feasible after the Hong Kong Protests? Albert Sui-hung Lee

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PART III:  GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

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10  When the Minjung Events Erupt: Protests from Korea to Hong Kong Nami Kim

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11  W  hen the Stones Cry Out in Palestine: Protesting Empire Mitri Raheb

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12  A  rmenia, Hong Kong, and Political Change Tamar Wasoian

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13  H  ong Kong and Ireland: Protests and Post/colonies Stephen D. Moore

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14  T  he Power of Nonviolent Direct Action Sharon D. Welch

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Suggested Further Reading

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Index 243 About the Contributors

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Acknowledgments

We are deeply grateful to our contributors who saw the importance of this project and supported it with enthusiasm. They had to work under the pressure of time constraints, and without their cooperation in the different stages of the editing and production process, this book would have taken much longer to be published. We want to thank Natalie Mandziuk for her interest in this book project from the beginning and for her encouragement and assistance along the way. We want to offer our special thanks to Bruce Van Voorhis, who has devoted much time and meticulous care in editing the manuscript. We are indebted to the Candler School of Theology at Emory University for providing funds to support this book. We also thank the editorial and production teams at Rowman & Littlefield Publishers for bringing this volume out with professionalism and efficiency.

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Note on Chinese Names

For Chinese names without an English name, the family name comes before the given names. For Chinese people with English names, the English name appears before their Chinese names, for example, Francis Ching-wah Yip. Since English publications render Chinese names differently, we follow the way the authors’ names appear on their publications when citing their works. Otherwise, it may cause confusion to locate the sources. As people in Hong Kong are increasingly conscious of their Hong Kong identity, we follow the Hong Kong style of rendering Chinese names into English when citing Hong Kong authors if only their Chinese names are given. The names of Taiwanese and mainland Chinese people are rendered in the ways they are commonly known.

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Introduction Kwok Pui-lan

In November 2019, hundreds of black-clad protesters, many of them students, clashed with police on a bridge leading to the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The incident began when some protesters threw objects onto railway tracks near the university to stop traffic to support a general strike in Hong Kong. When the police wanted to stop the protest and enter the university to arrest people, protesters erected barricades to stop the police from doing so. The police fired rubber bullets and launched a heavy volley of tear gas. Protesters responded by hurling bricks and petrol bombs at the police and building massive bonfires.1 At one point during the intense standoff, university vice chancellor Rocky Tuan tried to mediate between the police and protesters, but to no avail. It was surreal to see the serene campus turned into a smoking battlefield with the police stomping inside to arrest students. The confrontation was part of the protests against an extradition law amendment bill, which would have allowed criminal suspects to be extradited to Communist China. Many Hong Kong people feared that the bill would erode civil liberties in Hong Kong because people might be extradited without due process. For two consecutive weekends in June 2019, millions took to the streets to demand the bill’s withdrawal. When the government refused to respond to the protesters’ demands and instead used excessive force to suppress the people, the protests escalated to become an anti-government struggle. Many felt that China would no longer honor the “one country, two systems” arrangement, stipulated when the British government returned Hong Kong, once a colonial outpost, to China in 1997. As a graduate of the Chinese University of Hong Kong in the 1970s, the clash at the university reminded me of an earlier era of student activism when student leaders confronted the police. In the late 1960s and 1970s, student activists protested against government corruption, social inequity, and colonial 1

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suppression. The slogan of the movement was “Know about the motherland and be concerned about society.” Radical and left-leaning students wore dark blue Mao jackets and organized study groups to discuss Maoist and Leninist thought. One of the demands of the protests was to have Chinese as one of the official languages of the city. For even though the majority of Hong Kong’s population were Chinese, English was the only official language until 1971. During the orientation week before the start of my first year in college, student leaders screened a documentary showing the president of the student union being arrested and shoveled into a police van. In those stormy days of student protests, there were rumors that the police would come to the dormitories to arrest students, but the colonial government hesitated to do so for fear of the backlash from the public. Much has changed in the span of fifty years. In the 1970s, students protested a colonial government that was corrupt and oppressive. In 2019, the target was the Hong Kong government, which protesters saw as following the marching orders of China’s leaders rather than listening to Hong Kong’s people. During the protests in the 1960s and 1970s, leftist students looked to China and studied Maoist thought for inspiration to fight the colonial government. Today more and more people assert their local identity as Hongkongers,2 as being separate and distinct from that of the Chinese. Around the time of the handover, there were a few people who wanted Hong Kong to remain a British colony, but there was no push for Hong Kong’s independence. In recent years, however, young activists have become so disillusioned by both the Hong Kong and Chinese governments that they have advocated for independence or self-determination for Hong Kong’s future. As the first chapter of this book will show, the protests in 2019 were the culmination of growing distrust and widespread discontent with Beijing’s intervention in local affairs. In the years after the 1997 handover, Hong Kong people had hoped that the guarantee of “one country, two systems” would allow a high degree of autonomy. But in 2003, the introduction of the National Security Bill shook the people’s confidence as they feared that their freedom of expression would be curtailed. The bill had to be withdrawn after half a million people took to the streets to protest it. Then in 2010 the government proposed to introduce moral and national education as a compulsory subject for the purpose of inculcating a strong sense of national identity. The proposal met with strong criticism from teachers, parents, and students alike. High school students, such as Joshua Wong, circulated leaflets and organized protests against the proposal. Under strong local opposition, the government withdrew it in 2012. Two years later the Umbrella Movement fought for true universal suffrage, which was stipulated in the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong. The movement was so named because protesters used



Introduction 3

umbrellas for defense against the police’s use of pepper spray and tear gas. Using some of the strategies of the Occupy Movement in other parts of the world, protesters occupied three busy commercial districts for seventy-nine days. Although the movement failed to bring about concrete political change, it succeeded in propagating the idea of civil disobedience and arousing the people’s political consciousness, especially among the young. The “one country, two systems” policy presented special problems for the development of postcolonial democracy and subjectivity; for unlike other postcolonial nations, Hong Kong did not become independent and autonomous after 1997. During the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong’s future, there was no representation from the Hong Kong people. Although about one-third of the committee members who drafted the Basic Law were from Hong Kong, they were handpicked by the Chinese government, and the majority of them were pro-Beijing loyalists. During the handover, both the British and Chinese government did not want to dwell on the colonial past. The British wanted to tout their accomplishments in turning Hong Kong from a fishing village to the Pearl of the Orient—a vibrant, prosperous city with a sound legal system. The Chinese used the reunification of Hong Kong with the motherland to promote a nationalist tale of pride and patriotism. China promised that, as a Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong’s political and economic system would be unchanged for fifty years. This pledge meant that the colonial political system and power structure would be operational after 1997. Because of this arrangement, some people wonder whether Hong Kong has truly become “postcolonial” as the city was passed from one colonial master to another master. Ironically, maintaining the colonial system became a way to resist the encroachment of Communist China, from which many people in Hong Kong had fled. There was little room for debates to overhaul the colonial system or to discuss its mechanism of control and oppression. For these reasons, Wing-sang Law, a professor of cultural studies in Hong Kong, said that the handover represented an “indefinite deferral of decolonization” and that the Hong Kong people were prevented from developing political subjectivity after colonialism.3 The situation has greatly changed as successive waves of public protests have conscientized the people, who are no longer willing to remain silent in the face of escalating pressure from Beijing. A new civic and political community has been formed gradually as more and more people realize that they have to stand up together to protect their Hong Kong identity and values. This stance is especially strong among the younger generation, who are anti-establishment and want to work outside the existing power structures and political parties. They have formed their own parties and have pursued more radical social activism. Young people served as the

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vanguards of the 2019 protests and made up a high percentage of the people arrested. Therefore, Law observes that “the local consciousness and localist movement that emerged in recent years in Hong Kong can be seen as a ‘return of the repressed,’ a revenge of the fate of ‘being returned to China’ unwillingly. What is coming back is the Hong Kong cultural and political subjectivity that had long been suppressed; it demands the overdue ‘recognition.’”4 A notable phenomenon of the protests has been the highly visible involvement of Christian leaders, pastors, and the Christian community. Clergy and leaders of religious organizations have spoken at public forums and church events, visited protest sites, and mediated conflicts between the protesters and the police. They enjoyed high-profile coverage in the mass media and social media. They also participated in the protests and provided guidance and pastoral support for parishioners, students, and others in need. Different Christian denominations also issued public statements urging the government to withdraw the extradition bill. Christians organized prayer meetings as well in churches, public spaces, and in front of government buildings. Unlike public protests, religious meetings enjoy more protection from interference from the police, and the organizers do not have to apply for a permit to gather in public. Christians sang hymns and offered prayers for the city and for government officials and elected representatives. The Christian hymn “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord” emerged as a unifying anthem during the early stage of the protests, sung by Christians and non-Christians alike. Some churches near the protest routes opened their doors and offered hospitality to protesters, but there were also Christians who believed in the separation between the church and state and that Christians should obey the authorities. The divergent opinions have split local churches and denominations. As protesters risked their lives and future careers to fight for Hong Kong’s future, Christian leaders and theologians discussed the nature of Christian witness and the roles of the churches in turbulent times and polarizing situations. Since the protests in the 1970s, some of the theological educators in Hong Kong have spoken of the need to develop a contextual theology that responds to the social upheaval of the time.5 To prepare for the 1997 handover, biblical scholars and theologians discussed the themes of diaspora and return in the Bible, Hong Kong identity and the church’s mission, and a theology of reconciliation that would bring people of diverse ideologies and backgrounds together. Some have studied the relation between the church and state in China, the changing Chinese religious policies, and the struggle for religious freedom.6 After the handover, a few have used insights from postcolonial theory to develop feminist theology and a theology of resistance.7 Scholars have also analyzed changing church and state relations in Hong Kong and politics and religions in post-1997 Hong Kong.8 Biblical



Introduction 5

scholars, theologians, and activists offered astute theological analyses of the Umbrella Movement in dialogue with liberation theology, feminist theology, and Catholic social teachings.9 The development of political theology in Hong Kong took place in the historical context of popular movements for democracy in Asia and the theological awakening and ferments among Asian theologians over the course of decades. South Korea was under the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee while the Philippines was under martial law declared by Ferdinand Marcos. Chiang Kai-shek ruled Taiwan with iron fists, and the Taiwanese people were deprived of their rights and suppressed under martial law for almost forty years. As people took to the streets, students occupied campuses, and political prisoners went to jail, Asian theologians became aware that they could not do theology as usual without addressing the political changes sweeping across Asia. They had to develop contextual theologies that were relevant and responsive to the social and political concerns of the time. It was Shoki Coe, a Taiwanese theological educator, who coined the term “contextualizing theology” in the early 1970s. For him, contextualization “responds to the Gospel itself as well as to the urgent issues in the historic realities, particularly those of the Third World.”10 Different theological movements began to emerge from people’s struggles for human rights and democracy. In South Korea, minjung theology emphasized people as subjects of history and the use of Korean cultural resources and their social biography in doing theology. Minjung means the masses or the people. Theologians emphasized the role of the masses who followed Jesus from place to place in the Jesus movement. They affirmed that Jesus was part of the minjung and was in solidarity with their plight and demands.11 In the Philippines, a theology of struggle challenged religious, social, and cultural domination and explored new ways of “being church.” Socially concerned Christians articulated new understandings of selfhood and humanity and considered Jesus as the suffering and struggling Filipinos.12 In Taiwan, theologians proposed a homeland theology and saw parallels between the histories of Taiwan and Israel. Just as the Hebrew people had left the land of bondage of Egypt, many Chinese have crossed the Taiwan Strait over the years to escape political oppression and seek better lives. Theologians insisted that Taiwan belongs to the people who love their homeland and not to the powerful and political parties.13 Leaders from these theological movements visited Hong Kong to share their insights and involvement in social movements. Scholars and theologians in Hong Kong also connected with other Asian theologians through the ecumenical movement and international Christian organizations. As a former British colony and situated in the interstices of several global powers, Hong Kong and its political theology have significant contributions to

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make to the church and wider society. The 2019 protests began as resistance to an extradition law. In the past, there were several incidences in which the Hong Kong government requested the National People’s Congress of China to interpret the laws in Hong Kong. These cases have challenged the judiciary’s independence and the political rights of Hong Kong’s citizens.14 In the absence of a democratically elected government, the judiciary plays a key role in protecting the people’s rights. The field of political theology has been concerned with the relationship among juridical rule, sovereignty, and the power to decide the exception since the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt published his book Political Theology in 1922.15 The situation in Hong Kong complicates the matter because of the “one country, two systems” arrangement. The assumptions behind the laws in China and those of the common law in Hong Kong introduced by the British are very different. China’s imposition of a national security law for Hong Kong in June 2020 and bypass of Hong Kong’s legislature has caused an uproar domestically and internationally because many fear that it will curtail the city’s civic liberties, including its tradition of free speech and an independent judiciary. Pro-democracy leaders, such as Martin Lee, argue that this would be a breach of the promise of “one country, two systems.”16 There are pro-Beijing politicians, business leaders, and other people, however, who want the return of law and order and support the national security law. Doing political theology in a fluid and changing context demands attention to competing claims, values, and worldviews. Postcolonial theorists have often discussed the “in-between” spaces,17 and Hong Kong political theology can draw out the legal, political, and religious tensions of living in between two vastly different political systems and cultures. Hong Kong political theology can also contribute to the comparative study of religion and democracy. The protests in 2019 took place on the centenary of China’s May Fourth Movement. In 1919, students in Beijing demonstrated in protest of the Treaty of Versailles, agreed upon at the Paris Peace Conference to end World War I. Instead of reverting the rights of Shandong Province to China after Germany’s defeat, the Allied powers gave the rights to Japan. The protests in Beijing soon spread to other cities and grew to become a large-scale political and cultural movement. Leaders of the May Fourth Movement believed that traditional Confucian culture was responsible for the political backwardness of China. The radical leaders argued for the rejection of Confucian values and advocated the adoption of the Western ideas of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. During the 2019 protests, some political leaders and commentators referred to the May Fourth Movement and recalled the tortuous history of democratic struggles in China. In the West, democracy came about because of many factors, such as the change of attitudes and values brought by the Enlightenment, the rise



Introduction 7

of the middle class, and the availability of popular education. Christianity played a certain role because of its emphasis on the sinfulness of human nature. Such an understanding contributed to the development of checks and balances in democratic structures and values. Reinhold Niebuhr’s realist assessment of sinful human nature led him to write, “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”18 In China’s long road to democracy, scholars have debated whether Confucianism’s optimism in human nature and its belief in moral education have hindered democratic development.19 Others have pointed to Confucian ideas, such as the emphases on people as the foundation of society and on human relationality, as building blocks of democratic thought. Sungmoon Kim has argued that Confucianism is not incompatible with democracy. There are different models of democracy, he said, and a particular mode of Confucian democracy based on Confucian values and mores has developed in East Asia, as in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan.20 Amid the debates on democracy in non-Western societies, Hong Kong political theology can utilize insights from comparative political theory to further the discussion on religion and democracy and contribute to the development of comparative political theology. Mass demonstration and assembly in public spaces have become dominant modes used by grassroots movements since the Great Recession to fight for economic justice, political change, racial equality, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people’s rights. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, people made connections with social movements in the past. For example, demonstrators formed human chains across the city, an action that recalled the large-scale anti-Soviet demonstration in the 1989 Baltic Way protest. Some commentators linked the protests with the struggle for democracy and student protests in South Korea in the 1980s and the decadeslong fight against occupation by Palestinians. They debated whether the strategies used during the worldwide Occupy Movement were still feasible in the face of police brutality. During the months that the protests persisted in Hong Kong, demonstrations also broke out in Chile, Colombia, Sudan, Lebanon, India, and other places.21 Social theorists and philosophers have commented on mass demonstration and the use of technology and media in the protests. For example, Judith Butler expands her gender performative theory to the assembly of bodies in public protests. She argues that these protests challenge the reigning notion of the political and demand the recognition of the “right to appear” in public. The embodied way of coming together enacts a form of radical solidarity in opposition to the political and economic forces that render the bodies precarious.22 Many of these movements were spearheaded by young

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people, who are adept at using the Internet and social media to organize and connect with one another. Social scientists have discussed the use of social media in protests and grassroots organizing and global networking in the digital age.23 Through the use of social media and digital platforms, the Hong Kong protests have been decentralized, fluid and spontaneous, and adaptable to the situation. Political theology from Hong Kong can contribute to the understanding of social protests by examining the involvement of religious actors, organizations, and media. The protests also present challenges to Christian social ethics, especially regarding the use of violent tactics in social movements. The Umbrella Movement emphasized nonviolence, and some of the leading figures were Christians. But as the movement failed to bring concrete political changes, some people, especially the youth, began to question the strategies used by the older generation. The protests in 2019 were peaceful in the beginning; but when the police used excessive force to quell the protests, some began to throw bricks and Molotov cocktails, vandalize subway stations and proBeijing businesses, set fires, and engage in acts of vigilantism. These actions have created controversy among the Christian community and in the wider society. Some Christians argue that violence is incompatible with Christian teaching and commend the use of nonviolence by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in the civil rights movement. Unlike in the former protests, however, many people in Hong Kong have shown a greater tolerance of the use of both nonviolent and violent resistance. In A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil, Candice Delmas argues that we have not only the duty to obey the law but also the duty to justice. She says that resisting injustice demands principled disobedience and such disobedience need not always be civil.24 Hong Kong political theology will need to develop an ethical framework to evaluate the complexity and multiple dimensions of social protests, the use of divergent means, and the theory and practice of civil disobedience when facing Communist China. The protests in Hong Kong have attracted worldwide attention because Hong Kong is a cosmopolitan city and one of the world’s major financial centers. The protests also occurred during the trade war and the competition for global dominance between China and the United States. In order to galvanize international support, protesters have run advertisements about the Hong Kong situation in major international newspapers and have lobbied in the United Nations and in the United States, Europe, and other countries. Some of the leaders saw that Hong Kong is playing a particular role in the frontline of the battle to protect universal democratic values against the threat from China.25 Yet globalization has linked the world together, and it is not easy to draw a clear demarcation between the free world and the Communist bloc as



Introduction 9

in the Cold War era anymore. China has increasingly been integrated into the neoliberal market since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001 and practices a form of state capitalism. The coronavirus outbreak has tested the world’s dependence on China for manufacturing, and many countries have decided to reconsider trade relations with China. Meanwhile, liberal democracy is under attack by nationalist and populist movements in the United States and Europe. The election of Donald Trump is an example of the rise of populist and conservative movements in the United States. In the summer of 2020, protests broke out across the United States against insidious racial injustice and police brutality. Protesters demanded systemic changes as they rallied to support the Black Lives Matter movement. The mass protests across the world show that the existing economic and political order is untenable because it has created a rich transnational capitalist class while the masses toil at the bottom for survival. As people are looking for alternatives, Hong Kong occupies a special and strategic position in between global powers, competing economic systems, and divergent value systems. Its geopolitical position challenges political theology to think about the relationship between local and global, grassroots globalization,26 and the search for the common good across differences. This book offers insights on the Hong Kong protests and theological reflections of the protests by Hong Kong contributors and international scholars from diverse vantage points. Part I provides the historical and social backgrounds and offers analyses of several salient aspects of the protests. It presents a detailed description of the different stages of the protest—from an anti–extradition bill movement to an anti-government struggle. It discusses the structural reasons that prompt so many people to take part in the protests; for beneath the surface of apparent prosperity, there are deep social tensions caused by economic disparity and social inequity. Young people, both women and men, have played critical roles in this decentralized movement. Their motivations and their “leaderless” style of organizing will be discussed. As the movement developed, protesters not only organized locally but also networked internationally to garner support from outside. A key issue that might hinder support is the use of violent tactics. The use of violence will be placed in a historical context, and different views about civil disobedience and the use of uncivil means will be explored. Part II presents biblical and theological reflections on the Hong Kong protests. It draws allusions from the Bible, especially from the succession narratives from the divided kingdom in ancient Israel, to illumine the Hong Kong situation. Since the Hong Kong protests point to prolonged systemic injustice, irrevocable political deadlock, and an escalating spiral of violence, this part will investigate the concept of the demonic as powerful forces that

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go beyond human freedom as a theological response to the tragic elements of the protests. An important development in the protests was the high participation of women and girls, many of whom fought on the frontline. To address the politically motivated sexual violence targeted at them, the concept of Jesus as a victim of sexual violence and the work of women in Galilee in the Jesus movement will be retold in the Hong Kong context. The young people paid a heavy price during the protests—many were injured or arrested and a few even sacrificed their lives—and thus, their experience of self-sacrifice will be interpreted through the metaphors of crucified people and suffering messiah in dialogue with Latin American liberation theology. The Christian communities in Hong Kong were divided over the extradition bill and the protests. Controversies broke out not only among mainline and evangelical Christians but also among Christians belonging to the same denomination or local church. The feasibility and ethics of the churches in future dialogues with the government and within the divided churches will be analyzed. Part III includes international perspectives from scholars and activists who have studied social movements, anti-occupation movements, anticolonial struggles, and political theology from diverse national and cultural backgrounds. They help us situate the Hong Kong protests in a longer historical frame and broader social and cultural contexts, including the minjung movement in South Korea, the struggle of Palestinians for justice, the anti-Soviet movement of Armenians, the Irish decolonization process, and the tradition of nonviolence in American social movements. The authors discuss commonalities and differences of these various movements and the Hong Kong protests and point to the importance of transnational solidarity in working for justice and peace. As we send the book manuscript to the press in July 2020, the protests in Hong Kong continue despite the ban on public gatherings put in place because of the coronavirus outbreak. On the anniversary of the protests on June 9, 2020, thousands of Hongkongers responded to an online call to gather in local malls and neighborhoods to chant pro-democracy slogans and sing “Glory to Hong Kong,” a protest anthem that has become very popular. They continue to push for democracy, an investigation into police brutality, and amnesty for the roughly nine thousand people arrested.27 As a tough national security law was imposed by the Chinese government at the end of June 2020, which stipulates that convicted offenders could face life imprisonment, the future of the protests remains to be seen. I hope that this book will provide important information of the history and significance of the Hong Kong protests and will stimulate conversations about transnational and comparative political theology relevant to our time.



Introduction 11

NOTES 1.  James Griffiths, “Chaos and Disruption across Hong Kong as Protesters Fortify University Campus,” CNN, November 13, 2019, www.cnn.com/2019/11/12/asia/ hong-kong-protests-chinese-university-intl-hnk/index.html. 2.  The term “Hongkonger” refers to a native or inhabitant of Hong Kong. People call themselves “Hongkongers” when they want to claim their local identity with values and customs that are different from those of the Chinese. 3.  Wing-sang Law, “Hong Kong Identity in Historical Perspective,” in Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong: Localism After the Umbrella Movement, ed. Wai-man Lam and Luke Cooper (New York: Routledge, 2018), 14. 4.  Law, “Hong Kong Identity in Historical Perspective,” 14. 5.  See Kwok Pui-lan, “Doing Contextual Theology: Feminist and Postcolonial Perspectives,” in Wrestling with God in Context: Revisiting the Theology and Social Vision of Shoki Coe, ed. M. P. Joseph, Po Ho Huang, and Victor Hsu (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2018), 66–70. 6. For example, 郭佩蘭编，《一九九七 與香港神學》(香港 : 崇基學院神 學組，1983)。[Kwok Pui-lan, ed., 1997 and Hong Kong Theology (Hong Kong: Chung Chi College Theology Division, 1983)]; Archie C. C. Lee, “Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong,” Biblical Interpretation 7, no. 2 (1999): 156–73 (the article was based on a presentation in 1997); and 葉 菁華 ，《 尋眞求全 : 中國神學與政敎處境初探 》(香港 : 基督教中國宗教文 化研究社，1997)。[Francis Ching-wah Yip, Chinese Theology in State-Church Context: A Preliminary Study (Hong Kong: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture, 1997)]. 7.  Wai-ching Angela Wong, The Poor Woman: A Critical Analysis of Asian Theology and Contemporary Chinese Fiction by Women (New York: Peter Lang, 2002); and Simon Shui-man Kwan, Postcolonial Resistance and Asian Theology (London: Routledge, 2014). 8.  Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003); and Kung Lap-yan “Politics and Religions in Hong Kong after 1997: Whether Tension or Equilibrium Is Needed,” Religion, State & Society 32, no. 1 (2004): 21–36. 9.  Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan, eds., Theological Reflections on the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 10. Shoki Coe, “In Search of Renewal in Theological Education,” Theological Education 9, no. 4 (1973): 243. 11.  Kim Yong Bock, ed., Minjung Theology: People as the Subjects of History (Singapore: The Commission of Theological Concerns, Christian Conference of Asia, 1981). 12.  Eleazar S. Fernandez, Toward a Theology of Struggle (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994). 13.  王憲治编，《台灣鄉土神學論文集》，第1卷 (台南 : 台南神學院，1988)。 [Wang Hsien-chih, ed., Collected Essays of Taiwanese Homeland Theology, vol. 1 (Tainan: Tainan Theological Seminary, 1988)].

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14.  Cliff Buddle, “Can Beijing’s Power to Interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law Ever Be Questioned?” South China Morning Post, October 11, 2017, www.scmp.com/ comment/insight-opinion/article/2114919/can-beijings-power-interpret-hong-kongs -basic-law-ever-be. 15.  Published in German in 1922, the book was translated as Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 16.  Lily Kuo, Verna Yu, and Helen Davidson, “‘This Is the End of Hong Kong’: China Pushes Controversial Security Laws,” The Guardian, May 21, 2020, www .theguardian.com/world/2020/may/21/china-proposes-controversial-national-secu rity-law-for-hong-kong. 17.  Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994). 18. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense (1944; Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011), xi. 19.  張灝，《幽暗意識與民主傳統》 (臺北 : 聯經出版事業公司，1990)。 [Chang Hao, Dark Consciousness and the Democratic Tradition (Taipei: Lien Ching Publisher, 1990)]. 20. Sungmoon Kim, Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 21.  Ciara Nugent, “From Chile to Hong Kong, the World Saw a Lot of Protests in 2019. Here’s Why That Trend Is Going to Continue,” Time, January 16, 2020, www .time.com/5766422/protests-unrest-2019-2020/. 22.  Judith Butler, Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 23.  For example, Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph M. Chan, Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Elizabeth Brunner, Environmental Activism, Social Media, and Protest in China: Becoming Activists over Wild Public Networks (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019). 24. Candice Delmas, A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 25.  Joshua Wong with Jason Y. Ng, Unfree Speech: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now (New York: Penguin Books, 2020), 240. 26. Grassroots globalization means networking from below against economic globalization; see Arjun Appadurai, “Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination,” Public Culture 12, no. 1 (2000): 1–19. 27. Agence France-Presse, “Hong Kong Protests: Arrests as Thousands Sing Protest Anthem on Anniversary of Clashes,” The Guardian, June 12, 2020, www .theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/13/hong-kong-protests-arrests-as-thousands-sing -protest-anthem-on-anniversary-of-clases.

Part I

OVERVIEW OF THE HONG KONG PROTESTS

Chapter One

A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 Ben Siu-pun Ho

The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the national security law for Hong Kong on June 30, 2020. Signed the same day by President Xi Jinping, the details of the law were finally revealed to the people of Hong Kong and the world at 11:00 p.m. that night. The broadly defined offenses include “secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security” and the law carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.1 The law is the Chinese government’s reaction and suppression of the social unrest in Hong Kong since 2019. The law threatens the “one country, two systems” policy and judicial independence in Hong Kong. As the city has started a new chapter, it is a proper time to review its protests of 2019. Hong Kong has witnessed tension, division, and violence since the middle of 2019 as protests erupted in the community in reaction to a proposed extradition bill by the Hong Kong government. The bill would extend the extradition of local people and even visitors to mainland China and other jurisdictions with which Hong Kong does not have a formal and legally binding extradition agreement. The underlying concern of Hong Kong’s people over this bill was a lack of faith in the judicial system across the border in mainland China; people fear it is susceptible to manipulation by government officials and especially leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. It is within this context that this chapter seeks to serve three purposes: (1) compiling scattered news and information into a single and hopefully comprehensive explanation of events, although it is impossible to furnish every detail of the protests; (2) depicting crucial incidents during the protest movement and explaining remote and proximate causes of them; and (3) suggesting several characteristically distinguishable, though chronologically overlapping, phases of the confrontation. However, this essay is not 15

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merely a presentation of facts; it also offers evaluations of the protests from my perspective as a Hongkonger. Finally, this chapter projects a future trend of the protests and the movement they have engendered, based on the understanding of the current situation. PRESAGE: EROSION OF AUTONOMY AND THE FEAR AND STRUGGLES OF HONG KONG PEOPLE The causes of the protests can only be grasped by first considering Hong Kong people’s complicated feelings about China in the past twenty years. Hong Kong was a British colony for more than 150 years, and its sovereignty was passed to China in 1997. Under the principle of “one country, two systems” and a “high degree of autonomy,” the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, states that the socialist system in China shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and that HKSAR “shall safeguard the rights and freedoms of the residents” for fifty years. The confidence of Hong Kong people in the Chinese government was severely shaken in 2003, when the Hong Kong government proposed the national security bill to the Legislative Council (LegCo) in February that year. Many Hong Kong people were afraid that their freedom of expression would be undermined in the name of national security by the government. The bill, together with other dissatisfactions with the government, caused a demonstration of an estimated five hundred thousand people on July 1 that year, the sixth anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong. The bill was eventually withdrawn by the government, and about one-and-a-half years later, the chief executive of the HKSAR, Tung Chee-hwa, stepped down, citing a deterioration of his health. Studies find that the Chinese government adjusted its policies toward Hong Kong affairs after 2003.2 The first wave of the adjustment was the implementation of the Individual Visit Scheme in 2003, which allowed individual mainland Chinese to visit Hong Kong to boost Hong Kong’s economy that had been depressed by the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome). This scheme was a response to Hong Kong people’s political discontent in 2003,3 and since then, providing economic opportunities and benefits has become the Chinese government’s main strategy to manage Hong Kong’s unrest. Although Hong Kong’s political unrest temporarily calmed down in the next five years, the 2008 global financial crisis created unease and anxiety. The economic strategy was further challenged by the anti–Hong Kong Express Rail Link movement that took place between mid-2009 and early 2010, in which protesters asserted that certain nonmaterialistic values, for instance, the maintenance of neighborhoods and democratic citizenship



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 17

of a local community, should not be sacrificed by the economic development of the city.4 Many Hong Kong people began to identify the nondemocratic political system as the root cause of numerous unjust incidents, and five legislators seized the chance to initiate the Five Geographical Constituencies Referendum Campaign in early 2010 to electorally reflect to both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments the people’s desire for political reform.5 It seems that the more Hongkongers express their desire for autonomy, the more tightly the Chinese government grips Hong Kong. This tightened control is evident since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Hong Kong people were frightened again, and more than ten thousand of them rallied at the government headquarters, when the Education Bureau proposed a school curriculum of moral and national education in 2012. The government was eventually forced to postpone the commencement of this educational policy indefinitely. Civil society strengthened afterward, and its power exploded into the well-known Umbrella Movement in 2014 that aimed at exerting pressure on the Chinese government to initiate “true” universal suffrage in Hong Kong as stated in the Basic Law.6 Unlike the previous movements, the Umbrella Movement ended without substantial achievements, and since then, a series of direct and indirect political interventions in Hong Kong by the Chinese government have been observed. These include the abduction of five staff members of a bookstore, Causeway Bay Books, by Chinese “special forces”7 and pro-democracy legislators being disqualified.8 The Hong Kong government’s efforts to serve two masters (the Chinese government and the Hong Kong people)9 seemed to be impossible, and various forms of freedom, human rights, and individual safety were devastated during these incidents. In the meantime, Hong Kong people’s impression of China (not only the Chinese government) continuously fell and reached its lowest point since 1997 in 2019.10 Calls by some members of the community supporting localism began to take root, and a small number of people advocated for the independence of Hong Kong. One scholar noted the emergence of “one country, two nationalisms” as the “one country, two systems” is doomed to failure.11 The confrontation with the Chinese government and the desire for the autonomy promised in the Basic Law incandesced in Hong Kong to an unprecedented degree in 2019. THE FIRST PHASE: THE GOVERNMENT’S TURN OF A DEAF EAR AND THE PUBLIC’S CONNECTION Only when we grasp Hong Kong people’s mixed feelings of fear of the Chinese government, their determination to fight for the city’s autonomy, and

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their frustrations in the process in the above social context do we comprehend why the 2019 Hong Kong protests were triggered. What sparked the protests was the controversial handling of a murder case by the Hong Kong government in which a young woman, Poon Hiu-wing, was murdered on February 17, 2018, in Taiwan by the suspect, her boyfriend Chan Tong-kai; both Poon and Chan are from Hong Kong. In February 2019, the Hong Kong government proposed that, in order to handle the case, the “loopholes” of two ordinances regarding the fugitive needed to be plugged. These amendments would allow fugitives to be sent to China, Taiwan, and Macao and other legal jurisdictions with which Hong Kong does not have an extradition agreement. Nevertheless, as explained by the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA), there were no “loopholes,” but rather the ordinances had been deliberately drafted as such to provide a necessary firewall to ensure fair trials and protect human rights.12 The association reiterated that the government “ought to explain why it considers that circumstances have changed since 1997 in terms of both the human rights record and the criminal justice system in the Mainland to justify major changes now,” and it counterproposed that “amendments might be made to other legislation to ensure that the Taiwan case will be dealt with.”13 Several thousand members of the legal sector also marched silently from the Court of Final Appeal to the government headquarters on June 6. Meanwhile, the Taiwan government lucidly stated that it would not ask for Chan to be returned to Taiwan because otherwise it implied that it accepted the Hong Kong government’s bill and it put Taiwanese people at risk of being seized by China.14 In other words, the amendments being proposed by the Hong Kong government were in vain to handle the murder case. Nevertheless, Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor insisted on amending the ordinances and regarded all the above worries and suggestions in LegCo as “nonsense.”15 This reaction made people much more suspicious that the true intent of the bill was to serve political purposes, and this time the fear of losing not only Hong Kong’s autonomy and judicial independence but also personal safety shaded gloomily over Hong Kong’s people as well as foreign investors and businessmen who would be affected too. The fear caused a huge amount of formal and informal signed petitions and declarations against the bill, and this fear was so extensive and threatening that even some businessmen in the pro-Beijing camp openly expressed their worries as they feared they could be apprehended for political reasons or inadvertent business offenses. Both the United States and European Union expressed concerns about the bill,16 and the Hong Kong government did make several adjustments to it, but it failed to reduce the worries of the majority. With numerous doubts and questions, the bill was carried to the Bills Com-



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 19

mittee of LegCo to be scrutinized in April, yet the committee was eventually paralyzed by a fight (a bodily encounter as well as verbal debate) between the pro-establishment and pro-democracy camps. The government decided in May to bypass the committee and to force the bill to have its second reading in the full chamber of the legislature. This move fueled the anger of Hong Kong’s people. Several demonstrations against the bill had been organized previously, and one of them in April had drawn more than one hundred thousand participants. However, people’s boiling point had not yet been reached then—not until June. THE SECOND PHASE: THE FURIOUS BURST AND DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AT ANY COST Many Hong Kong people were pessimistic about the government’s change of mind by the end of May, but they simultaneously recalled what they had achieved in the 2003 demonstration. With an intricate feeling of fear, determination, and worry about the next generation, protesters marched on the streets on June 9 with the number of participants reaching more than one million, according to the organizer, the Civil Human Rights Front. The demonstration was the largest expression of people’s discontent in the history of Hong Kong at that time. Although the demonstration caught the attention of the international community, it was incapable of shaking the government’s stance. Carrie Lam responded in a press conference the next day that, out of “conscience” and “commitment to Hong Kong,” she had no intention of withdrawing the legislation.17 Her response incensed many Hongkongers. A number of shops and organizations went on strike on June 12—the day the bill was scheduled for its second reading in LegCo. People gathered around the LegCo building, and some protesters occupied nearby streets. Confrontation occurred between the protesters and the police, who fired pepper spray, tear gas, and rubber bullets indiscriminately and without warnings.18 Unarmed protesters and journalists were beaten and hurt, and the police’s improper use of tear gas trapped people in one commercial building, almost causing a stampede.19 The police’s abuse of force opened another battle line that would become a major point of contention in the later phases of the movement. At any rate, the government on the next day characterized the June 12 protest as a “blatant organized riot,”20 which further inflamed many others in the community. Carrie Lam dramatically conceded to suspend the bill on June 15. Critics said the large-scale protests and discontent in Hong Kong had, and would, highly embarrass President Xi Jinping during the ongoing trade war with the United

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States and at the G20 summit to be held at the end of June, so Lam needed to calm the community and minimize the unrest.21 Her decision nonetheless did not satisfy protesters’ demands because they wanted her to “withdraw” rather than “suspend” the bill so that their fear could be completely alleviated. One protester, Leung Ling-kit, fell from a mall and died while expressing his support for the protesters’ demands on the same day Carrie Lam suspended the bill. His death was the first fatality related to the protests, and grief and indignation quickly spread among the people. The Civil Human Rights Front organized another demonstration on June 16 and listed five demands: withdraw the bill, drop all charges against protesters, cancel the “riot” characterization of the June 12 protest, investigate police brutality, and for Carrie Lam to resign.22 A historic number of more than two million participants joined the demonstration according to the organizer, not including demonstrations in various parts of the world on the same day to show their solidarity.23 Other tactics besides demonstrations employed by the protesters included crowdfunding an open letter that appealed to the international community to stand with Hong Kong; it appeared in more than ten leading newspapers around the world.24 However, Hongkongers’ despair led to actions that shocked the world further on July 1. Militant protesters25 stormed the LegCo building, sprayed graffiti, vandalized paintings inside, and read aloud their manifesto to signify the dysfunction of LegCo and poured out their wrath on the government. The astonishing scenes greatly embarrassed Carrie Lam, who said on the same day that she would humbly listen to the people in the banquet “celebrating” the twenty-second anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR. Militant protesters’ fury on July 1 flooded LegCo and was out of the police’s control, who evaporated mysteriously after standing inside the LegCo building for hours as protesters tried to smash the glass façade of the building with a makeshift battering ram. There were rumors that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be sent out of their barracks to suppress the storm, but the Chinese government did not issue this order on this day nor throughout the entire movement. It can be plausibly deduced that the Chinese government preferred not to do so, for this move would be, in effect, an official announcement of the end of one country, two systems. China, moreover, would lose Hong Kong as an international financial center. (This consideration, however, seems to be offset later by China’s determination to stabilize Hong Kong amid its unrest as the protests proceeded.26) This restraint by the Chinese government, on one hand, allowed the protesters to assess the “hole card” in the Chinese government’s hand for bargaining; on the other hand, it implicitly endorsed the Hong Kong police to crack down on the protesters. As illustrated below, this endorsement has ruined the relationship between the public and the police irrecoverably, at least in the foreseeable future.



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 21

THE THIRD PHASE: THE LAUNCH OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE PROTESTERS AND THE POLICE Carrie Lam emphasized that the bill was “dead” on July 9, but her announcement was incapable of erasing people’s fear and anger because they demanded a legal term, “withdraw,” from her. Demonstrations appeared in various districts every weekend after the historically large June 16 protest, and some protesters blocked roads after nearly every demonstration. The frequency of the demonstrations, the guerrilla-like tactics, the nimbleness of the protesters, and their intelligent use of social media seemed to exhaust the police. The police began to act abnormally, however. For instance, they entered aggressively into New Town Plaza, a mall in Shatin, on July 14 to arrest protesters. While the move shocked the people shopping in the mall, the police were embarrassingly besieged by people who threw various objects at them, and one policeman’s finger was cut off during the confrontation. July 21 is one of the days of the movement that has most horrified Hong Kong’s people, not because of the abnormal violent actions that occurred, but because of the unusual inaction of the police. On July 20, information had been circulated saying that triad members in Yuen Long, a northern district of Hong Kong near the border with mainland China, would beat the protesters on the next day. By that time, black clothes had become the “uniform” of the protesters; and on the evening of July 21, several men in black were identified and beaten by a mob of men dressed in white. Later that night dozens of thugs holding bamboo sticks got into the Yuen Long subway train station and bloodily beat the passengers, passersby, and journalists indiscriminately, including one pro-democracy LegCo member, Lam Cheuk-ting. Videos offered by passersby show that two police constables walked away when they saw the beatings, and pro-establishment legislator, Junius Kwan-yiu Ho, shook hands with some of the thugs and praised them by giving them a thumbs-up. Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) investigated this attack that created so much terror through the footage of closed-circuit television (CCTV) given by several shops and restaurants in Yuen Long. The CCTV recordings show that the police did not stop and search the thugs even though hundreds of them, all dressed in white, gathered on streets, and some policemen even chatted with them.27 The police station in Yuen Long was closed, and the police explained that it was due to “safety” reasons.28 Residents in Yuen Long were helpless, and others watching this violence live were terrified. That night is still a nightmare for all Hongkongers. Mobs attacked protesters in other districts as well, for instance, in Tsuen Wan after the July 21 incident. History tells us that authoritarian governments have employed similar tactics in the past, using paramilitaries to do “dirty

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jobs.”29 Indeed, scholars have suggested that triad members may have been paid to attack protesters during the Umbrella Movement.30 In the aftermath of the Yuen Long incident, various conspiracy theories have maintained that the police intended not to take action in order to make the public “recognize” their significance. In any case, the public—rightly or wrongly—accused the police of colluding with triad members during the July 21 incident, and people’s animosity toward the police intensified. The police, nevertheless, have received open support from the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council in Beijing for suppressing what they call “riots” since July 29. This endorsement seems to have made the police more fearless in their misbehaviors as illustrated through numerous examples:31 superiors have blindly supported colleagues by telling lies and spinning stories to cover the wrongs of the frontline police;32 they have arbitrarily arrested people, including journalists and social workers, with the number of arrestees reaching more than eight thousand, a number that is expected to increase if the protests continue;33 they have fired more than twenty thousand rounds of tear gas and rubber bullets,34 reportedly causing an Indonesian journalist, a secondary school teacher, and a young girl to become blind in one eye; they refused to wear their identification numbers on their uniforms for a period of time, making it difficult for people to complain about the actions of individual policemen; and while protesters referred to the police as “popo,” the police called the protesters “cockroaches,” justifying this label by saying that this insect is “full of vitality”35 (we know how dangerous this dehumanization is if we reflect on the past in which the Jews were called “rats” by the Nazis). Not only does conflict exist between the protesters and the police, but it is also present within Hong Kong society as the community has become divided into the yellow camp, which stands with the protesters, and the blue camp, which supports the police and the government. The blue camp has organized various assemblies supporting the police, and the government constantly reminds the public that militant protesters have vandalized targeted shops (i.e., those considered as belonging to the blue camp and pro-Beijing section of society)36 and that it is the police’s obligation to restore social order. The government has also sought to divide the yellow camp and gain the support of the people, but this strategy seems to be futile, for various surveys indicate that the majority of the public is extremely dissatisfied with the government and the police.37 Meanwhile, the yellow camp has been highly solidified as many peaceful protesters sympathize with, or even appreciate, what militant protesters have been doing, for “the maximum impact could only be achieved when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together.”38 While militant protesters confronted the police by blocking roads, throwing petrol bombs to drive them off, and directly beating them, peaceful protesters



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 23

played their role by participating in various peaceful and creative protests, for instance, by posting Post-it notes with messages on the colorful Hong Kong Lennon Walls,39 taking part in lunchtime protests,40 joining the noncooperative movement disrupting train and flight services,41 forming human chains by holding hands in the “Hong Kong Way” campaign,42 and so on. THE FOURTH PHASE: IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF TRUST Both the government and the protesters were increasingly aware of the importance of propaganda in this phase. While the police held a press conference every day, protesters organized a “Citizen’s Press Conference” at times. The latter was first held on August 6, and it invited people to correct or confront what government officials had said. The Citizen’s Press Conferences signified the public’s dubious attitude toward the government as the trust between the two parties collapsed after several incidents. The first incident on August 31 occurred when the police entered a subway train in Prince Edward station to arrest protesters, but it turned out that the police beat people who were most probably passengers and not protesters.43 The police did not allow first aid personnel to enter the station right away, and the Mass Transit Railway Corporation did not release the CCTV footage until the High Court on March 18, 2020—nearly seven months later—ordered the corporation to give it to a student who pursued a civil case against the police.44 At any rate, there was enough time for rumors to spread in which it was believed that several people were killed by the police and that the police covered up their crimes in the incident on August 31. A reflection of this conviction was that many people put white flowers and memorials outside the Prince Edward subway station, and these “memorials” have been appearing outside the Prince Edward station on the 31st of almost every succeeding month. The second incident was the death of a fifteen-year-old girl, Chan Yin-lam, whose body was found naked in the sea by the police on September 22. The police claimed that Chan, who was allegedly a competitive swimmer and a regular participant in the protests, committed suicide. The public was not convinced by the police’s assertions, and some suspect that Chan was killed by the police while being arrested or detained and, in order to cover their crime, Chan was said to have committed suicide. The public has demanded a thorough investigation, but Chan’s body was cremated about two weeks after the discovery of her body. A public ceremony of remembrance for Chan was held, and such messages as “Strive for justice for you” and “Revenge for you” were found at the ceremony.45

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The third incident also involved the death of a youth when a university student, Chow Tsz-lok, was found unconscious in a car park during a protest on November 4. Chow suffered a severe brain injury and passed away after several days. Police said he fell from the third to the second floor, and various causes of Chow’s death were suggested by the public, including the obstruction of an ambulance from assisting him by the police, which the police denied. While the real cause of his death remains unclear, it is certain that it is the first death on a site near the protests. The public mourns and insists that the government and the police are responsible for Chow’s death. By this time, many people in the community no longer trusted the government, which was reflected in several expressions of discontent. For instance, thousands of civil servants gathered on August 2 to express their dissatisfaction with Carrie Lam. Moreover, some protesters did not trust the police to deal fairly with the conflicts, and it is tragic that these protesters carried out siliao (illegal punishment) to people in the blue camp and offduty police officers. In response, Carrie Lam attempted to gain back trust from the people by, for example, announcing officially at last the “withdrawal” of the extradition bill on September 4 and promising to hold a “community dialogue” to meet citizens. Nevertheless, these reactions were not only too little and too late but also exposed the government’s insincerity: the “community dialogue” only took place once on September 26, and Carrie Lam has refused to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the actions of the government, the police, and the protesters, which is largely a consensus demand of the public.46 On the contrary, Carrie Lam has sought to remain strong by invoking the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to prohibit people from covering up their faces in public gatherings.47 Meanwhile, the police tightened up the approval of demonstrations and further incensed the public by shooting two young protesters on October 1 and November 11. Fortunately, the two youths did not die in the shootings, but people’s trust in the government and the police had already ceased by then. THE FIFTH PHASE: THE SPREAD OF THE CONFRONTATION TO VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS AND SECTORS Schools were swirled into these turbulent times when the new semester started in September. About ten thousand students from two hundred secondary and tertiary institutions joined the class boycott on the first school day,48 and secondary school students in their uniforms formed human chains to express their solidarity.49



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 25

However, it was only when several university campuses became battlefields between protesters and the police that the protests caught the attention of the world again. At this time, the police claimed they had the right to enter universities to arrest illegal protesters who blocked roads nearby and then fled onto the campuses, and they stated that no campuses should be havens for criminals, which enraged students and professors in the universities as they believed the police presence on campuses would heavily disturb the academic environment of universities. The university community maintained that the police should be crystal clear about the details of the people they intended to arrest and should communicate extensively with the universities. Students and protesters blocked the entrances of campuses to prevent the police from entering, and the police escalated the tension by firing numerous rounds of tear gas and rubber bullets inside the campuses. The police even employed a water-cannon truck around the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU), though, is the most shocking confrontation among these battles. PolyU was sieged by the police for about two weeks in November with hundreds of people trapped inside and the logistics of food and daily necessities cut off. Many frightening scenes appeared during this battle, including protesters attempting to crawl through a narrow sewer tunnel to escape50 and climbing down long ropes from a bridge to be taken away by volunteers driving motorbikes.51 The police’s provocative behavior, however, was not confined only toward students but also toward religious groups. The police fired a blue-dyed liquid from a water cannon outside the Kowloon Mosque in Tsim Sha Tsui on October 20, hurting several non-protesting Muslims and staining the gate of the mosque. An Anglican church nearby was also fired at and stained. The police said it was an accident and embarrassingly cleaned the gate of the mosque that night. Carrie Lam also went to the mosque to apologize to the imam and the Muslim community the next day. The protests and the mood and sentiment in the community the police created influenced another arena in Hong Kong: people’s voting power. Locally, with the help of the protest milieu, the pro-democracy camp won about 85 percent of the seats in the district council election on November 24, taking control of 17 of the 18 district councils. The result also increased resistance to the Chinese government’s ability to manipulate the election results for the upcoming chief executive in 2022 as about 117 seats reserved for district councilors out of 1,200 seats on the Election Committee that selects the chief executive will most likely come from the pro-democracy camp.52 Moreover, the pro-democracy camp generally controls an additional 325 seats on the Election Committee, meaning they will potentially hold more than one-third of the votes that could sway the outcome.

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Internationally, after witnessing the aggravation of the situation in Hong Kong and the manifestation of Hongkongers’ voting power in the district council elections, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, and it was signed by President Donald Trump on November 27. The law requires an annual report by the U.S. State Department to Congress assessing the autonomy of Hong Kong that could affect Hong Kong’s trading status with the United States and imposes sanctions on those responsible for human rights violations by freezing their assets in the United States and denying them visas or revoking any visas they currently hold. In short, the law sends a warning to both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments with the intent to cause them to reconsider how they deal with the unrest in Hong Kong.53 While the power of the protesters spread to various social groups and sectors, so did the government’s power of suppression. As an example, the Education Bureau has been applying pressure on school principals and teachers to forsake support for the protests.54 In addition, the police froze the money in the bank account of a fundraiser for the protests, the Spark Alliance, saying it is suspected of engaging in “money laundering,”55 and the police complained about RTHK for mocking them in one of the public broadcaster’s programs, causing the program to be halted in the subsequent season.56 In any case, the government seems to be intervening in various arenas in order to produce a “chilling effect” on the public. The festive atmosphere of the holidays in December did not relieve the tension between the protesters and the police as physical confrontations and demonstrations continued to take place on Christmas and New Year’s Day. The protests faced an obstacle, though, at the end of January 2020 in the form of the outbreak and spread of the coronavirus, COVID-19, that originated in Wuhan, China. While the fear of infection largely has reduced the number and size of demonstrations, it seems that the protests have not ceased but have become more diverse, more invisible, and more fluid as they are assimilated more into the fabric of people’s daily lives—one reason why the protests are called a “Water Revolution.”57 AN EVALUATION OF THE LASTING MOVEMENT: FACTOR OF “FIRE TETRAHEDRON” It is quite unusual for a protest movement to continue for more than six months. Obviously, there were factors maintaining the momentum of the protests. Throughout the phases delineated above, we can observe that the government, led by Carrie Lam, continuously fueled the movement. Carrie Lam



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 27

had chances to calm the unrest or just let it die out, but she missed all these opportunities and even further combusted people’s anger. For instance, by the time she announced the withdrawal of the bill, people’s wrath had already extended to the police, and her introduction of the anti-mask ban and refusal to form an independent commission of inquiry prolonged people’s detestation toward her. In any case, Carrie Lam could not respond to the protests in this manner without support from others. Although the Chinese government received pressure from other countries, it did not want to compromise in order to maintain its authoritarian image, especially toward Hong Kong’s people. For example, it has not asked for the resignation of Carrie Lam nor even one relevant politically appointed official of the Hong Kong government since the crisis began in June 2019. President Xi Jinping even openly expressed support for Carrie Lam in December 2019. While the Chinese government knows very well that Carrie Lam’s government has no more ability to deal with the unrest and no more credibility with the public, it has not sent out the army to assist and suppress the protests because the Chinese government prefers not to contend with the devastating consequences of such a response, as I have mentioned previously. Instead, the Chinese government has left it to Carrie Lam to pick up the pieces of the political crisis by herself. The Chinese government’s reaction, however, indirectly endorses the Hong Kong police to take up the task. Carrie Lam at an unofficial occasion expressed that, apart from the thirty thousand police officers, she politically has nothing more to offer to resolve the crisis.58 The police, with support from the Chinese government and the perception that Carrie Lam needs to depend on them, thus gradually became fearless in regard to their misbehaviors, which continuously outrages the public. While Hong Kong has not yet been internationally recognized as a police state, it has been described as a “failed state” as one interpretation of the situation in Hong Kong, for the Hong Kong government has almost no governance efficiency or efficacy.59 The government led by Carrie Lam, the Chinese government, and the Hong Kong police thus constitute a “Fire Triangle,” a model which I analogically adopt from fire science.60 It is the subtle interactions between these three parties in this Fire Triangle that has fueled the protests to burn for an unusually long period of time. However, scientists later found that the exothermic chemical chain reaction in the material is another factor for combustion, and thus, a model of “Fire Tetrahedron” is suggested. Analogically, the protests were sustainably combusting also by the fourth factor: the unexpected and persistent “chaining” among protesters. Social movements in Hong Kong in the past few years were usually divided internally because of disputes on the various strategies employed; for instance, protesters argued whether peaceful demonstrations

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or militant vandalization should be used. Nevertheless, the strategy of “no splitting, no severing of ties, and no snitching” (不分化、不割席、不篤灰) is embraced by both peaceful and militant protesters in the anti–extradition bill movement. The solidarity is formed partly because, after striving for more than twenty years, protesters became desperate and perceived that it is “game over” for the fight for the autonomy of Hong Kong if the extradition bill is enacted. The fear and the power to overcome it are so enormous that they bind themselves together. In addition, protesters have experienced the effectiveness of a “division of labor”—a strategy of “brothers climb a mountain together, each has to make his own effort” (兄弟爬山，各自努力). Peaceful protesters have witnessed how the storm brought about by militant protesters caused the government to concede to a certain degree, and peaceful protesters have played their roles by participating in various campaigns to arouse international attention. The entire movement began at the right time as the G20 summit and the trade war between China and the United States were taking place, and peaceful protesters caught this timing, stepped out to demonstrate, and explained the situation of Hong Kong to various countries, for example, attending international meetings for lobbying61 and spreading the so-called anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” worldwide by translating the lyrics into various languages.62 The government has tried hard to steer public opinion by blaming the extremists, like the strategy of the colonial government during the 1967 riots, but it has not been successful because it cannot attain the support of the majority of the community.63 WHAT’S NEXT?: PROVOCATIVE GOVERNMENT AND TRANSFORMATIVE PROTESTS The government’s policies on preventing the spread of COVID-19 are perceived by the public as ineffective and even threatening people’s health. A survey published in February 2020 showed that the satisfaction and trust in the government had reached the lowest level since the HKSAR was established.64 Carrie Lam is deemed by the public to be merely a servant of the Chinese government and has betrayed Hong Kong’s own interests, which became even more salient after she announced Hong Kong would not close all border crossings with mainland China when cases of COVID-19 were exponentially increasing and mainland people were flooding into Hong Kong around the end of January 2020 and with her complete obedience to China regarding the implementation of the national security law for Hong Kong. Consequently, many Hongkongers believe that they must save their community by themselves. They have established and are maintaining liaison



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with governments and organizations in other countries and have used creative materials, combined with people’s dissatisfaction with the government’s policies on prevention of the disease, to remind people “never forget why you started” (毋忘初心). In addition, more people are aware of the importance of their votes, especially after the pro-democracy camp’s victory in the district council election. The number of trade unions is also rapidly proliferating as a result of the protest movement, resulting in a significant increase of the number of voters in various sectors of functional constituencies. Meanwhile, a record 401,900 citizens have registered to vote in the past year—a 7.8 percent increase of new registered voters from about 4.13 million voters in 2019 (or 18 percent more voters than in the previous LegCo election in 2016).65 It seemed that people were looking forward to voting out the pro-establishment candidates in the LegCo election, but the election was postponed.66 Furthermore, it seems that protesters have been assimilating the protest into their daily lives. Certain shops and restaurants have been classified as being affiliated with either the yellow or blue camp. While the blue establishments are boycotted by the protesters, patronage of the yellow businesses is encouraged. The so-called yellow economic circle is forming in which protesters are weaponizing their purchasing power.67 In sum, it can be foreseen that, while protesters’ direct confrontations with the police will continue but less frequently due to the government’s restriction on the size of groups to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and people’s concern about how the national security law will be enforced in Hong Kong, the form and scope of the protests are diversifying and multiplying. The protest movement is penetrating various social groups and sectors, as noted in the last phase of the protest movement explicated earlier. As a result, Hong Kong’s people are experiencing the transformative power of the protests in their daily lives. However, although the assimilation of the protests into the fabric of everyday life increases the width and depth of the movement, it is not without difficulties and risks, for the division in society may become sharpened, and associating many aspects of daily life with political stances may overlook the ambiguities of reality.68 In any case, people in the yellow camp will either choose to emigrate as they fear or cannot bear anymore both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments, or they will remain with a determination to fight and protect their rights. The latter will try to employ whatever means they can to create difficulties for the government and to seek their democratic goals. Moreover, like the civic power accumulated during the post–Umbrella Movement period that then exploded into the 2019 protests, the post-2019 protest period may be another preparation time for the next round of political eruptions in the community if both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments do not positively respond to people’s demands.

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Some critics compare Hong Kong in 2019 with West Berlin in the Cold War.69 China’s system and culture of authoritarian power have spread extensively in recent years, causing many Western countries to feel threatened. With the promises of “one country, two systems” and a “high degree of autonomy,” Hong Kong is at the frontline of the battle between totalitarian China and democratic Western society. Hong Kong people are witnessing not only political clashes but conflicts of value systems. The imposition of the national security law for Hong Kong by China’s legislature, regardless of international condemnations and warnings, nakedly exposes the Chinese government’s intolerance of others’ voices and people’s freedom. The future of the protests depends on the solidarity not merely of Hong Kong’s protesters but also of those who cherish the values of human rights, freedom, and the principle of democracy. NOTES 1.  SCMP Reporters, “National Security Law: Tough New Reality for Hong Kong as Offenders Face Maximum Sentence of Life in Jail,” South China Morning Post, June 30, 2020, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3091241/national -security-law-chinese-president-xi-jinping-signs?fbclid=IwAR3CwWJqzwHpQTr1P 5d4nVRMbG8R_s-A-TzPQrbo8B2mv0hNcvQz9X0C5Go. 2. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep, “Introduction: The Long Transition,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (New York: Routledge, 2019), 25. 3.  Ngok Ma, “The Rise of ‘Anti-China’ Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council Elections,” China Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 45. 4.  This is a protest against the proposed Hong Kong section of the GuangzhouShenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, a high-speed railway that would link Hong Kong with mainland China’s high-speed rail network. Post-materialistic ideologies and grievances toward upward mobility are observed in various phases of this social movement. 5.  Five legislators from the League of Social Democrats and Civic Party resigned to force the Legislative Council by-election to become a referendum on universal suffrage. See Michael F. Martin, Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2012 Election Reforms (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2011), fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40992.pdf. 6.  Article 45 of the Basic Law stipulates for “the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures”; see “Full Text of the Constitution and Basic Law,” www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/. However, the “8.31” decision by the Chinese government stated that voters can only choose from two to three candidates who will be selected by a 1,200-person nomination committee. The nomination committee is considered by many as not being “broadly representative”



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and the universal suffrage not “true”; see “Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate,” BBC News, June 18, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27921954. 7. Elizabeth Joseph and Katie Hunt, “Missing Hong Kong Bookseller: I Was Kidnapped by Chinese ‘Special Forces,’” CNN, June 16, 2016, edition.cnn. com/2016/06/16/asia/china-hong-kong-booksellers/index.html. 8.  Joshua Berlinger and James Griffiths, “4 Hong Kong Lawmakers Disqualified, Fueling Worries about Beijing’s Influence,” CNN, July 14, 2017, edition.cnn. com/2017/07/14/asia/hong-kong-lawmakers-disqualified/index.html. 9. Kit Poon, The Political Future of Hong Kong: Democracy within Communist China (New York: Routledge, 2008), 46–69. The chief executive, Carrie Lam, is aware clearly of this task; see “Exclusive: The Chief Executive ‘Has to Serve Two Masters’—HK Leader Carrie Lam—Full Transcript,” Reuters, September 12, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-lam-transcript-excl/exclusive -the-chief-executive-has-to-serve-two-masters-hk-leader-carrie-lam-full-transcript -idUSKCN1VX0P7. Nevertheless, various policies show that she fails to accomplish the task as I have illustrated in this chapter. 10.  This sentiment is reflected in a survey on how Hong Kong people perceived their ethnic identity and national pride. For the details of this survey, see Public Opinion Program, the University of Hong Kong, “HKU POP Final Farewell: Rift Widens Between Chinese and Hongkong Identities, National Pride Plunges to One in Four,” June 27, 2019, www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1594.html. 11.  Brian Fong argues that Hong Kong is “an emerging case of peripheral nationalism under a centralizing state. . . . Beijing’s incorporation strategies toward Hong Kong in recent years have resulted in waves of countermobilization, shaping the dynamics of mainland-Hong Kong relations into a clash of nationalisms—the clash of the state-building nationalism of mainland China and the peripheral nationalism of Hong Kong. It is crystal clear that the OCTS [One Country, Two Systems] model is nearing a make-or-break moment”; see Brian C. H. Fong, “One Country, Two Nationalisms: Center-Periphery Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 1997–2016,” Modern China 43, no. 5 (September 2017): 524. 12.  Hong Kong Bar Association, A Brief Guide to Issues Arising from the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (“the Bill”), June 6, 2019, 2–6. 13.  Hong Kong Bar Association, Additional Observations of the Hong Kong Bar Association (“HKBA”) on the HKSAR Government’s Proposed Further Changes to the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, June 6, 2019, 1. 14.  “Taiwan Won’t Ask for Murder Suspect if Hong Kong Passes ‘Politically Motivated’ Extradition Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 10, 2019, www.hongkongfp .com/2019/05/10/taiwan-wont-ask-murder-suspect-hong-kong-passes-politically -motivated-extradition-law/. 15. Holmes Chan, “In Pictures: Democrats Ejected From Legislative Chamber After Accusing Chief Exec. Carrie Lam of Lying Over Extradition Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 9, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/05/09/pictures-hong-kong -democrats-ejected-legislative-chamber-accusing-chief-exec-carrie-lam-lying/.

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16.  The U.S. Department of State said it was “closely monitoring proposed amendments to Hong Kong’s Fugitive Ordinance law”; see U.S. Department of State, “Hong Kong: 2014 Occupy Movement Cases and Fugitive Ordinance Law,” U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong & Macau, April 25, 2019, hk.usconsulate.gov/n-2019042501/. Eleven representatives of the European Union met Carrie Lam to express their concerns; see Tony Cheung, Gary Cheung, Sum Lok-kei, and Alvin Lum, “11 EU Representatives Meet Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam to Protest Against Controversial Extradition Bill as Government Gathers 100 Officials to Build United Front,” South China Morning Post, May 24, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3011627/hong-kong-government-gathers-100-officials-meeting-build. 17.  Austin Ramzy, “Hong Kong Leader, Carrie Lam, Says She Won’t Back Down on Extradition Bill,” New York Times, June 10, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/ world/asia/hong-kong-carrie-lam-extradition.html?_ga=2.85721945.174350453 .1581931691-810644880.1580280612. 18.  For how the police cracked down on the people on that day, see 羅健熙 ，〈香 港警察暴力鎮壓和平示威者(合集) 〉[Law Kin-hei, “Hong Kong Police crack down peaceful protesters (compilation)”], YouTube, June 14, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=34oZjD8c5z4. 19. The New York Times has done a good visual investigation on the police’s excessive force on that day; see New York Times, “Did Hong Kong Police Abuse Protesters? What the Videos Show: Visual Investigations,” YouTube, July 15, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=gHfWuUhrKQg. 20.  “Carrie Lam Condemns ‘Life-Threatening Rioting,’” RTHK, June 12, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1462449-20190612.htm. 21.  James Pomfret, Greg Torode, and Ben Blanchard, “Brusque to Bruised: Hong Kong’s Lam Caves to Pressure on Extradition Bill,” Reuters, June 16, 2019, www .reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-extradition-lam-analysis/brusque-to-bruised-hong -kongs-lam-caves-to-pressure-on-extradition-bill-idUSKCN1TG0HS. 22.  Some of the contents of these demands varied after June 16. While the withdrawal of the bill, not characterizing the protests as a “riot,” and amnesty for arrested protesters remained unchanged, the demand of investigating the police was refined as setting up an independent commission of inquiry into police brutality. The demand of the resignation of Carrie Lam was replaced by the implementation of genuine universal suffrage. A sixth demand, restructuring the police force, was raised, especially after Carrie Lam officially withdrew the bill and the public witnessed the July 21 incident and the performance of the police afterward. Protesters demanded all these concessions, “not one less.” 23.  Nectar Gan, Xinyan Yu, and Laura Ma, “Hong Kong Protests Go Global as Marchers Take to Streets in US, Europe and Australia in Show of Solidarity,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/ar ticle/3014771/hong-kong-protests-go-global-marchers-take-streets-us. 24. Jennifer Creery, “‘Stand With Hong Kong’: G20 Appeal Over Extradition Law Crisis Appears in Over 10 Int’l Newspapers,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 28, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/28/stand-hong-kong-g20-appeal-extradition -law-crisis-appears-10-intl-newspapers/.



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25.  In this essay, I employ “militant protesters” rather than “radical protesters” as many people do to designate protesters who aggressively combat the government and to differentiate them from “peaceful protesters” because, from my point of view, peaceful protesters are also radical in terms of their thoughts and determination. 26.  It seems that the Chinese government’s limit of tolerance was reached as the social movement continued; and in 2020, it wagered the status of Hong Kong as an international financial center, not through the dispatch of the PLA, but through the introduction of the national security law. The Chinese parliament approved the national security law for Hong Kong at the end of May that year in a hasty manner when other countries were busy handling the COVID-19 pandemic. 27. RTHK, “Hong Kong Connection: 721 Yuen Long Nightmare,” YouTube, October 4, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpkFRsSo30o. In addition to RTHK, the New York Times and British Broadcasting Company News (BBC News) have also made investigations of this incident; see New York Times, “When a Mob Attacked Protesters in Hong Kong, the Police Walked Away: Visual Investigations,” YouTube, July 30, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDtM3dEJdHo; and Helier Cheung and Christopher Giles, “Hong Kong Protests: Were Triads Involved in the Attacks?” BBC News, July 22, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49071502. 28. Hong Kong Free Press, “Hong Kong Police Chief: Station Gates Closed ‘for Safety’ in Yuen Long,” YouTube, July 22, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v= mtxqDq6sE24. 29. Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017), 42–46. 30.  Varese Federico and Rebecca W. Y. Wong, “Resurgent Triads? Democratic Mobilization and Organized Crime in Hong Kong,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 51, no. 1 (March 2018): 23–39. 31.  The following are only a few examples of the Hong Kong police’s misbehaviors. For more illustrations, see “Police Misconduct,” Hong Kong Democratic Movement 2019, tl.hkrev.info/en/police-timeline/. 32.  One notorious example is of one pastor kneeling and begging a policeman in Tsuen Wan not to shoot the people, but the policeman kicked away the pastor; and in a subsequent press conference, a chief superintendent said the policeman was not “kicking away” the pastor but was “using a leg to push away” the pastor and that it was a “natural reaction”; see Holmes Chan, “‘Natural Reaction’ for Gun-Wielding Officer to Kick Kneeling Man, Hong Kong Police Say,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 26, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/08/26/natural-reaction-gun-wielding -officer-kick-kneeling-man-hong-kong-police-say/. Another example involves the police stating that one volunteer helper was an “object”; see Daniel Victor and Elaine Yu, “A Man or a ‘Yellow Object’? Hong Kong Police Dispute Assault Allegations,” New York Times, September 24, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/world/asia/ hong-kong-yellow-object.html. These types of dehumanizing behaviors, the moderation of grave events, and beautifying the unprofessional actions of the police shocked many journalists and the public. 33. “Hong Kong Protests: Police Watchdog Clears Officers over Crackdown,” BBC News, May 15, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52680094.

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34.  “Anti-government Protests Enter Their Seventh Month,” RTHK, December 9, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1496806-20191209.htm. 35.  “Cockroach Tag a Term of Endearment: Police,” RTHK, December 23, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1499200-20191223.htm. 36.  Various tactics of vandalization are employed by protesters in which looting and stealing are discouraged. For more details about militant protesters’ tactics, see Kris Cheng, “Explainer: ‘Renovation,’ ‘Decoration’ and ‘Fire Magic’—The Businesses Targeted by Hong Kong’s Hit-and-Run Protesters,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 9, 2019. www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/09/explainer-renovation-decora tion-fire-magic-businesses-targeted-hong-kongs-hit-run-protesters/. 37.  Refer to two reports about these surveys: Francis L. F. Lee, “Our Research in Hong Kong Reveals What People Really Think of the Protesters—and the Police,” Independent, October 16, 2019, www.independent.co.uk/voices/hong-kong-protests -police-violence-public-opinion-polling-support-a9158061.html; and Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong Police Receive Lowest Public Satisfaction Rating Among All Disciplinary Forces—Survey,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 7, 2019, www.hongkongfp .com/2019/12/07/hong-kong-police-receive-lowest-public-satisfaction-rating-among -disciplinary-forces-survey/. 38.  Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang, Samson Yuen, and Edmund W. Cheng, Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests (Hong Kong: Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 2019), 3, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/pdf/ENG_antielab%20sur vey%20public%20report%20vf.pdf. 39.  Inspired by the Lennon Wall in Prague, the Hong Kong Lennon Wall located at the Central Government Complex during the Umbrella Movement first caught the public’s attention. Lennon Walls appeared in various districts during the 2019 Hong Kong protests with the one in Tai Po considered the most magnificent. For a glimpse of the Hong Kong Lennon Wall, see South China Morning Post, “‘Lennon Walls’ Spring Up Across Hong Kong,” YouTube, July 10, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=PAQ220gWVR4. Most Lennon Walls are, nevertheless, being cleared by the government. 40.  Sarah Wu, “Hong Kong Office Workers Begin Week of Lunchtime Protests,” Reuters, December 2, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/hong -kong-office-workers-begin-week-of-lunchtime-protests-idUSKBN1Y60C8. 41.  Lily Kuo, Christy Choi, and Kate Lyons, “Hong Kong Brought to a Standstill as City-wide Strikes and Protests Hit,” The Guardian, August 5, 2019, www .theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/05/hong-kong-brought-to-a-standstill-as-city-wide -strikes-and-protests-hit. 42.  Andrius Sytas, “Lithuanian Human Chain Links Anti-soviet and Hong Kong Protesters,” Reuters, August 24, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-ww2-anniversary -baltics/lithuanian-human-chain-links-anti-soviet-and-hong-kong-protesters-idUSKC N1VD2C7. 43.  The scene was recorded by a passerby; see BBC News, “Hong Kong Police Storm Metro System After Protests—BBC News,” YouTube, September 1, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=iejjwdxQDYw. RTHK did an investigation on this inci-



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dent; see RTHK, “Hong Kong Connection: Minimal Force?” YouTube, November 1, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUAQ3XhTtpM. 44.  “MTR Ordered to Give Student CCTV from August 31,” RTHK, March 18, 2020, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1515266-20200318.htm. 45. Eyepress TV, 〈數百名市民悼念疑「被自殺」示威學生陳彥霖〉[Hundreds of people mourned suspected ‘suicided’ protester, Chan Yin-lam], YouTube, October 11, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=iougPnstUu0. 46.  The existing Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) is considered as having less investigative power; see Hong Kong Bar Association, “On the events at Legislative Council on 1 July 2019,” July 5, 2019; also Holmes Chan, “Explainer: Hong Kong’s Five Demands—An Independent Investigation into Police Behavior,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 24, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/12/24/ex plainer-hong-kongs-five-demands-independent-investigation-police-behaviour/. This is a reason why the public demands the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into the police’s performance during the protests. Indeed, the report released by the IPCC in mid-May 2020 is considered by many observers as impotent and ineffective in correcting the police’s misbehavior; see Tom Grundy, Jennifer Creery, Kelly Ho, and Rachel Wong, “Hong Kong Police Watchdog Clears Force of Misconduct Citing Online ‘Propaganda,’ But Says ‘Room for Improvement,’” Hong Kong Free Press, May 15, 2020, hongkongfp.com/2020/05/15/in-full-hong-kong -police-watchdog-releases-report-on-protest-conduct-but-no-evidence-of-yuen-long -mob-attack-collusion/. 47.  Alan Leong Kah-kit, “Hong Kong’s Mask Ban Reveals Carrie Lam’s True Face,” New York Times, October 7, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/opinion/ hong-kong-mask-protest.html. The government insists on appealing the ruling over the ban even though the court has considered it unconstitutional and the outbreak of COVID-19 occurred; see “Gov’t Appeal Starts Over Court Mask Ban Blow,” RTHK, January 9, 2020, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1501808-20200109.htm. 48.  “Students Boycott Classes on the First Day of the School Year in Hong Kong’s Latest Democracy Protest,” Time, September 1, 2019, time.com/5666731/hong-kong -student-strike-class-boycott-protest/. 49. Jessie Pang, “Hong Kong Children Form Chains of Protest as Economic Worries Grow,” Reuters, September 9, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong -protests/hong-kong-children-form-chains-of-protest-as-economic-worries-grow -idUSKCN1VU03P. 50. “Hong Kong Polytechnic University: Protesters Attempt Sewer Escapes,” BBC News, November 20, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50486757. 51. The scene was recorded by several media companies, for example, South China Morning Post, “Ropes and Motorbikes Used to Escape Hong Kong Polytechnic University Campus Siege,” YouTube, November 18, 2019, www.youtube.com/ watch?v=oYS0pzUt24I. 52.  Benny Tai Yiu-ting, “This Was Hong Kong’s Most Important Election Ever,” New York Times, November 25, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/opinion/hong -kong-election-results.html.

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53.  Paul LeBlanc and Steven Jiang, “Trump Signs Hong Kong Human Rights Act as China Blasts ‘Plainly Bullying Behavior,’” CNN, November 28, 2019, edition. cnn.com/2019/11/27/politics/trump-hong-kong-human-right-democracy/index.html. 54.  “Principals Who Back Problem Teachers Can Be Sacked,” RTHK, December 29, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1500053-20191229.htm. 55.  Joshua Berlinger, “Hong Kong Police Say They Froze $9 Million Meant for Protesters,” CNN, December 20, 2019, edition.cnn.com/2019/12/20/asia/hong-kong -protests-money-frozen-intl-hnk/index.html. 56.  “RTHK Apologises, Will Halt Production of ‘Headliner,’” RTHK, May 19, 2020, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1527100-20200519.htm. 57. “Water” implies flexibility and resilience, an idea that derives from Bruce Lee, the kung-fu movie star. In a TV interview in 1971, he said: “Be formless, shapeless—like water. Now you put water in a cup, it becomes the cup. You put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle. You put it in a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow, or it can crash. Be water, my friend.” The interview can be found on YouTube: Calpeper Minutemen, “Bruce Lee Interview (Pierre Berton Show, 1971),” YouTube, August 26, 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk1lzkH-e4U. 58.  “Apart from the Police, I Have Nothing: CE,” RTHK, September 13, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1480349-20190913.htm. 59.  Clara Ferreira Marques, “Hong Kong Is Showing Symptoms of a Failed State,” Bloomberg, February 9, 2020, www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-02-09/ coronavirus-hong-kong-shows-symptoms-of-a-failed-state. 60.  The Fire Triangle maintains that three elements—heat, fuel, and oxygen—are all needed for a fire to ignite. If any one of the three is removed, the fire will not burn. 61.  Examples are lobbying in a meeting of the United Nations and at the United States’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China; see Joshua Berlinger, “China Interrupts Hong Kong Pop Star During UN Speech,” CNN, July 9, 2019, edition.cnn .com/2019/07/08/asia/denise-ho-un-intl-hnk/index.html; and “Hong Kong Activists Denise Ho and Joshua Wong Testify at US Congressional Hearing on Protests,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 17, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/09/17/live-hong -kong-activists-denise-ho-joshua-wong-testify-us-congressional-hearing-protests/. 62.  A stirring orchestral version with English subtitles can be found on YouTube: Wiring HK, “Glory to Hong Kong, Orchestra chorus version,” YouTube, September 11, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulera9c18F0. 63.  Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (October 2019): 478. 64.  Hong Kong Public Opinion Program (HKPOP), “POP Releases Popularity of CE and SAR Government, Trust and Confidence Indicators and Public Sentiment Index,” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, February 25, 2020, www.pori .hk/press-release/2020/20200225-eng. 65.  Ng Kang-chung and Lilian Cheng, “Record 401,900 Hongkongers Sign Up to Vote Following Opposition Campaign to Win Seats in September’s Legislative Council Election,” South China Morning Post, June 1, 2020, www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/politics/article/3087061/record-401900-Hongkongers-sign-vote-follow ing-opposition.



A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 37

66.  Sarah Wu, “Hong Kong Workers Flock to Labor Unions as New Protest Tactic,” Reuters, January 10, 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-unions/ hong-kong-workers-flock-to-labor-unions-as-new-protest-tactic-idUSKBN1Z9007. 67.  Verna Yu, “From Loo Roll to Dumplings: Hong Kong Protesters Weaponize Purchasing Power,” The Guardian, January 23, 2020, www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/jan/23/from-loo-roll-to-dumplings-hong-kong-protesters-weaponise-pur chasing-power. 68.  For examples of difficulties faced by shops and restaurants, see RTHK, “Hong Kong Connection: Yellow Blue Consumers Battle,” YouTube, January 24, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=rlUJ_fFh-3U. 69.  Laignee Barron, “Hong Kong Is a Rebel Enclave in a Sea of Totalitarianism. Welcome to the New West Berlin,” Time, June 28, 2019, time.com/5616804/hong -kong-cold-war-battleground-us-china/.

Chapter Two

From Crony to Authoritarian Capitalism Structural Problems Underlying the Hong Kong Protests Alex Hon-ho Ip Hong Kong is a very rich and economically prosperous city with a per capita real GDP of US$64,928 in 2019, giving it the twelfth ranking among all developed countries,1 and with the world’s fourth-largest foreign exchange reserve of US$471 billion.2 Given these facts, why have Hong Kong people, especially its youngest citizens, come out on the streets to demonstrate for their political rights? What are they fighting for? What makes them desperate enough to insist on their rights even though they know they may have to pay a very high cost? Is it true, as some government officials claim, that they merely want a better economic standard of living? Or are they fighting for a fairer social and economic system rather than merely for selfish economic benefit? If one looks deeply into the social and political situation in Hong Kong, it becomes clear that economic prosperity is just one distorted side of a seriously ill city. The disparity between rich and poor, shown by a Gini coefficient of 0.539, which in 2019 was the highest among developed economies, confirms that the apparent prosperity gives just a partial view of the structural problems of Hong Kong.3 This chapter suggests the core reasons driving the social movement of recent years consist of these structural problems and makes use of the concept and analytical framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to investigate structural problems underlying the social and political problems of Hong Kong. I will first give an overview of how the structural problems can be viewed from the NIE perspective. Then, based on the NIE framework, I will look deeper into the nature and outcome of the issues that have been identified, using the conditions of poverty as one example of a structural problem. This analysis will enable us to better understand what triggered Hong Kong people to fight for their rights on the street. The final section will examine the major changes in recent years to identify how Hong Kong has transformed 39

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from a form of crony capitalism to one of authoritarian capitalism. This section argues that not much has changed in Hong Kong’s formal institutions to demonstrate a favoritism toward business, but the city’s informal institutions have changed significantly from using the free-market myth to a policy that is more suppressive and manipulative in nature. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS How can NIE help us understand the structural problems of Hong Kong? First, we need to define the meaning of “structural” in this chapter in light of NIE. By a structural problem, this chapter refers specifically to the problems created by formal institutions, including legal and political systems, and informal institutions, including the norms, social values, and beliefs of society. Although this chapter cannot fully explain the methodology and essence of NIE, it will give a summary of the key concerns and framework of NIE so readers can appreciate how such a new perspective can illuminate the problems confronting Hong Kong. NIE is not a single economic theory but comprises many theories sharing similar assumptions and concerns. What is unique among different NIE theories is that they start with the imperfectness of the world and study how different forms of institutions, both formal and informal, are able to help smooth the friction of the world. Institutions are defined according to formal and informal “rules of the game.”4 The imperfection of this world includes imperfect information and opportunistic human behavior. In other words, without social institutions that create mechanisms for trust, people are unable to interact smoothly or make transactions. By operating according to formal and informal rules, institutions emerge capable of reducing the frictions caused by this imperfectness. The reason to focus on both formal and informal institutions is that they work in a complementary way to help sustain the economy. Formal institutions are those that operate according to externally enforced rules, usually in the form of legal rules and a defined political system. Informal institutions, in contrast, rely on internalized rules, usually in the form of the beliefs and values that society accepts in general.5 Therefore, NIE focuses on looking into how these institutions emerge and function in order to help keep the economy running smoothly. From an NIE perspective, we will focus on both the formal and informal institutions of the Hong Kong economy. By looking into these formal and informal institutions, we can understand how the government is manipulating the formal rules of the game for both economic and political systems as well as the informal institutions, including major social values. Given this idea of



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the structural problems of Hong Kong, it will be easier to understand what the people of Hong Kong are fighting for. Formal Institutions of Hong Kong: The Ground for a Free-Market Economy Looking into every legal rule of Hong Kong would be a huge project. Therefore, the following section will focus on the key rules forming Hong Kong’s capitalist economy that have been the basis of the city’s success for the past several decades and that were written into the Sino-British Joint Declaration to be protected. Point 3 (5) of the Joint Declaration states clearly: The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.6

The protection of private property is the key to maintaining the free market and capitalist society. In the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, Article 5 guarantees that the market economy will be maintained in Hong Kong while Article 6 provides that “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) shall protect the right of private ownership of property in accordance with law.”7 Together, these statutes underpin the fundamentals of Hong Kong as a capitalist society. Therefore, either a market or capitalist economy is the key value to be maintained by law before and after the return of Hong Kong to China. To date, Hong Kong has been maintained as a market economy very successfully with the city being elected as the world’s freest economy for twentyfive consecutive years by the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.8 The index rates an economy based on twelve quantitative and qualitative features grouped into four main categories: rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets,9 thereby confirming the success of Hong Kong’s formal institutions in maintaining the free-market economy. The main methods of allocating resources have been determined by formal institutions. The right of private property has been well protected, and resources are mainly allocated by the market through price and non-price competition. The concept of positive nonintervention, or large market, small government, has been held as one of the key values of managing the economy by the government, although this has changed slightly in recent

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years.10 The government’s budget has been maintained under 20 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP, and Basic Law Article 107 states clearly that the government should maintain a balanced budget, avoid deficits, and maintain the GDP in a growth trajectory.11 The outcome is that, on the one hand, Hong Kong is a very good place for doing business as the tax rate is low and the tax system is simple; on the other hand, social welfare expenditure has also been kept to a minimum to protect private property rights and maintain the momentum of competition in the economy. This capitalistic society is further protected by the political structure of the HKSAR. On the one hand, the chief executive of the HKSAR is selected by an election committee, which is composed of 1,200 members, and is appointed by the Chinese government, which carefully chooses them to be under the government’s control. In 2017, three out of four of the Election Committee’s subsectors were dominated by pro-China members.12 On the other hand, the Legislative Council, or LegCo, is composed of seventy members and is divided into two constituencies: thirty-five members are elected directly from geographical constituencies and the other thirty-five seats from functional constituencies that are primarily composed of representatives from the pro-China business sector.13 Any motion proposed by legislative councilors has to be put to a vote and passed in both constituencies.14 As a result, the directly elected members can only exercise what is a form of veto power by casting their vote to refute any motion proposed by other members of the council. However, if the government proposes a motion, it does not need to be voted upon separately in the two constituencies but only once in the seventymember LegCo. Since pro-China members from the functional constituencies and the geographical constituencies are certain to be more than thirty-five seats, more than half of the total number of LegCo, all motions proposed by the government can, in principle, be passed by these pro-China members. The result is that the government can maintain the existing political stability and the free-market economy through this political structure. Informal Institutions: The Myth of a Market Economy According to NIE, formal institutions cannot function without the support of informal institutions in the form of norms and values that prevail in society. These values and norms help to justify and sustain formal institutions. For many years, three key core beliefs have constituted the myth of a free-market economy in Hong Kong: (1) competition will lead to prosperity, (2) a free market is the most efficient way to allocate resources, and (3) social welfare will make people lazy. Since these are informal institutions, they are formed in an informal manner.



From Crony to Authoritarian Capitalism 43

The concept of “competition is good for development” penetrates every corner of Hong Kong. This concept is indoctrinated through the education system per se and is manifested in the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s education system. With its dependence on highly competitive public examinations, competition is a hallmark of Hong Kong’s education system.15 The concept that competition is good has penetrated Hong Kong through examinations for choosing a good primary school, secondary school, and even kindergarten. This system combines with one of the key ideas of Chinese society that success can be achieved through hard work with the result that working hard to win in competition becomes a justified way to allocate resources.16 The implied core value of competition is that those who lose deserve it since they are merely not sufficiently competitive. Through participating in competition from kindergarten to the end of formal education in Hong Kong, people take competition for granted and accept it as a just way to allocate resources.17 The notion that competition is justified is accomplished by using it as a motivator. Because good results in school and examinations determine whether one can enter into a good university or not, schools and teachers encourage students to participate in education competitively. In a survey conducted in Hong Kong secondary schools with 257 Hong Kong Chinese students from Form 4 to Form 5, 81.3 percent reported that schools encouraged them to compete with each other.18 With a long duration and intense participation in competition, it is not difficult to understand why the concept of “competition will lead to development” has been implanted in most people in Hong Kong. Even when confronted with the great disparity between rich and poor, they will use the concept of competition to explain away the problem. The second and third core beliefs are more closely related. Their purpose is to help the government get rid of the heavy burden of welfare expenditure to respond to poverty. Upholding the free market as the most efficient way to allocate resources always runs parallel with the notion that government intervention is not necessary since poverty is a natural consequence of fair competition.19 The implicit message of upholding the free market is that it is not necessary to intervene in the market even though we can see that great disparities exist between poor and rich in society. This free-market myth, as some have called it, absolves the free market of any responsibility. It also further helps the government to sustain its formal institutions. The third core belief is that social welfare will negatively motivate the members of society. Not only did the director of the Social Welfare Department state directly in 1998 that the “‘comprehensive social security assistance (CSSA)’ scheme will make people lazy,” but the government even made a video implying that there are people pretending to be poor to get CSSA.20 Not only will government officials make use of this negative image for people

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who receive CSSA, but representatives from the business sector will make use of this message to oppose government social welfare policies. The outcome of these three highlighted informal institutions is that it helps sustain the formal institutions in maintaining Hong Kong as a free-market economy. SUFFERING OF PEOPLE: THE NATURE AND OUTCOME OF HONG KONG’S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE The above section outlined the institutional nature of Hong Kong, which does not necessarily constitute a structural problem. This section, though, will highlight three major problems originating from this institutional structure to clarify how we can understand Hong Kong’s structural problems and what Hong Kong people are fighting for in a concrete sense. This section will focus on three major problems: poverty, which is the most concrete and observable problem associated with Hong Kong’s institutions; politics; and spirituality. The Long and Deep Problem of Poverty in Hong Kong Poverty is not merely a state of being poor or having an inadequate living environment or means of financially supporting oneself. It reflects the problem of the formal institution that constitutes the major resource allocation mechanism—the free market. With the highest Gini coefficient among developed economies in the world, poverty in Hong Kong is a good indicator of the problems of the structure. I will first elaborate on the nature of poverty in Hong Kong. Then I will explain in what sense it is related to both formal and informal institutions. Unlike other countries with a high poverty rate, Hong Kong is a very rich and prosperous city. Our poverty problem is caused, not by inadequate resources, but by policies of the government and the structure of the economy. The Gini coefficient already makes plain that poverty in Hong Kong is only one end of the extremes. The other end is that extremely rich people hold a substantial percentage of wealth and income. This reality raises the question: how bad are the living conditions for poor people in Hong Kong? According to the poverty line set up by the Hong Kong government, there are 1.4 million people living under the poverty line. This means that 20.4 percent of the total population lives in absolute poverty according to the government’s own standard.21 These 1.4 million people are living in absolute poverty, which implies their household income is not sufficient to fulfill their basic needs, including housing, food supply, and other necessities. Out of these 1.4 million people, 0.45 million are working poor, which means they are absolutely poor even though they have a job.



From Crony to Authoritarian Capitalism 45

What causes this extreme situation? This situation actually reflects the typical exploitative nature of a capitalist society. On the one hand, workers only share a very tiny portion of the economic return of the whole economy. The capitalist owner, on the other hand, takes and enjoys a substantial amount of the whole economy. The exploitative nature of Hong Kong’s economy can be illuminated by looking deeper into one of the core root problems in Hong Kong, the housing market, as an example in which we can see how formal and informal institutions work together to sustain such a suppressive system. Inadequate housing has long been the core problem of Hong Kong. Many people live in conditions that should be shameful for the government of a city as rich as Hong Kong. In 2019, 200,000 residents of the city lived in “subdivided flats” with only 5.7 square meters of living area on average.22 In some extreme cases, people call home a “coffin house” that has room for only a bed. In 2019, the housing price in Hong Kong was the highest among the most expensive cites in the world with an average property price of US$1.2 million.23 Concerning rent for housing, Hong Kong is also ranked as the most expensive city in the world, according to Deutsche Bank’s 2019 edition of its annual Mapping the World’s Prices report.24 The extremely expensive property prices and rents absorb the greater part of Hong Kong residents’ disposable income, accounting on average for 36 percent of household income.25 This percentage is even higher than the housing share of people in Finland, the country with the world’s highest housing-cost burden, whose housing-cost share is only 32 percent.26 This unhealthily high percentage of housing expenditure to income is one of the root causes of poverty, especially for the working poor. Many university graduates even cannot afford to buy a house or live a decent life after paying such a high rent. The reason is that the median for the real income increase in Hong Kong is far lower than the property price increase. A survey in 2018 found that the median real income of workers with university qualifications has decreased 7 percent over the past ten years.27 However, from 2008 to 2018, the average property price increased 2.3 times.28 This result proves that fewer and fewer workers can afford to buy or rent a decent residence. Additionally, disposable income after one’s expenditure for housing has been decreasing over the years. Formal Institution Constituting the Housing Market Although the problem of land in Hong Kong is too large an issue to be discussed in this chapter, I would like to highlight some policy characteristics concerning the land market in Hong Kong so that we can see how favoritism toward the business sector is one of the factors to blame. First, the most

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important key is that the Hong Kong government is the main supplier of land in Hong Kong through tenders. Therefore, it can actually control the land supply and distribution to a very great extent. Given that the government sells land through tenders, developers can offer a low price to reduce the supply during economic downturns to sustain a high land price. Secondly, as regards taxation, there is only a stamp duty, an ad valorem tax paid by the buyer of the property, and a property tax, an ad valorem tax paid when an owner rents out the property. However, there is no tax charge on the profit from selling the property.29 This tax system means that those who gain a lot from the property, including large property developers, do not need to pay any tax on their profit from an increase in the property price. On the demand side, the government implements limited measures to reduce the flow of money into Hong Kong’s property market for investment. In short, government policy in the formal legal aspect is in favor of land developers and sustaining high land prices. There are, of course, other factors, such as demand side factors, including low interest rates for a very long time and high demand from mainland Chinese buyers, that also contribute to the high land price in Hong Kong. However, formal institutions certainly play an essential role in creating such a “free” but exploitative market. Informal Institutions If the exploitative nature of this system is so obvious, how can it be sustained? This tenacious system depends on the informal institutions. As stated earlier, the Hong Kong government uses the idea of protecting the free-market economy as the key reason to justify its policy of “nonintervention” in such a highly exploitative market. For example, in 2001, Financial Secretary Donald Tsang announced the cancellation of a publicly funded home ownership scheme that provided lower-priced property for members of a lower income group to buy. The reason he used to rationalize his decision was to stop such an “intervention” and to protect the freedom of the housing market.30 Another belief the Hong Kong government and Hong Kong property developers try to create is that the problem of high property prices is caused by a shortage of land. The preamble of the document explaining insufficient land supply issued by the Task Force on Land Supply, which was set up by the government in 2017, stated, Land shortage has been plaguing Hong Kong in recent years. The society at large is suffering from multi-faceted problems with “pricy,” “tiny,” and “cramped” living conditions, characterised by soaring property prices and rents; the difficulties in purchasing the first home; and all sorts of problems associated



From Crony to Authoritarian Capitalism 47

with overcrowded living space, inadequate community facilities, and high business operating costs. Insufficient land for housing, economic and other purposes has become one of the major issues of great concern to the public.31

It is clear that the government wishes to attribute every problem associated with housing to a land shortage. On the one hand, for many modern cities, a limited supply of land is certainly a problem. On the other hand, placing all of the responsibility for extremely high prices on the limited supply of land is suspicious. Together with the norms associated with competition and the idea that a free market is a just market, the Hong Kong government has tried very hard to inculcate the idea that such an exploitative housing market should be left alone without government intervention. FROM CRONY TO AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM The concept of crony capitalism is a model that can articulate the nature of Hong Kong’s structural problems. The above sections demonstrate that formal and informal institutions work together in favor of the business community across different markets, especially in the housing market, resulting in a severe disparity between the rich and the poor, which is a key characteristic of crony capitalism. Crony capitalism refers to a type of economy in which the friends of government or business-sector leaders are given unfair advantages in the competition process. According to the crony capitalism index created by The Economist, Hong Kong was ranked number one several years ago.32 This index confirms what I have tried to depict: the deep structural problem of Hong Kong’s poverty is rooted in the fact that formal and informal institutions give favor to business leaders. Although the key structure has not changed, the domination of Chinese capital in nearly all sectors of the economy has been a rising trend in recent years. The percentage of Chinese-listed companies on the Hang Seng Price Index in Hong Kong rose from 5 percent in 1997 to 56 percent in 2017.33 Chinese companies have also penetrated different sectors, including banking, telecommunications, the mass media, and building and construction, in which the number of listed companies rose from 71 to 1,013 from 1997 to 2017.34 This development surely reflects the domination of Chinese enterprises, including both state-owned and state-controlled, in Hong Kong’s economy. This implies that Hong Kong’s economy has shifted from crony capitalism to authoritarian crony capitalism; that is to say, the Chinese government can control Hong Kong through its domination of the business market.

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The Broken Promise and the Broken Myth: Keeping the Formal Institution There is a consensus that this type of crony capitalism could be brought to an end or at least eased through the ultimate direct election of the chief executive and legislature. For a long time, there has been a consensus that the interpretation of Article 68 of the Basic Law (“The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage”) and the interpretation of Article 45 (“The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures”) mean that the chief executive and all members of LegCo should be chosen by universal suffrage.35 The ultimate hope is that universal suffrage would bring structural reform to Hong Kong’s extreme crony capitalism. This dream was broken, though, by the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on August 31, 2014, which set an additional criterion for selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage, that is, two to three candidates would be chosen by a nominating committee that would be similar in composition to the Election Committee with a pro-China majority. This so-called 831 decision resulted in the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong amid calls for genuine democracy and was rejected by LegCo on June 18 the following year. This decision broke not only the dream but also the myth. The broken promise of ultimate universal suffrage awoke many people to the likelihood that the capitalist myth and the poverty brought about by it would last. More importantly, the increasing influence of the Chinese government directly in the political field and indirectly in the business sector or financial market has made the distribution of wealth even more controversial and unfair. This influence is shown, for example, in white elephant projects, including the mega bridge to Macau and Zhuhai costing HK$120 billion (US$15.38 billion) with exceptionally low usage.36 Moreover, the government proposed another controversial project called the Lantau Tomorrow Vision, which may cost at least HK$624 billion (US$80 billion).37 The priority of the government in managing its income and reserves provides another concrete example for Hong Kong people to demonstrate that the government places higher priority on the Chinese government and mainland companies than on its own citizens. Changing Informal Institutions: From Capitalist Myth to Authoritarian Suppression Given the broken myth and dream after the 831 decision and the Umbrella Movement, the credibility of the Hong Kong government has reached its



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lowest point, for the net value of people’s satisfaction with the Hong Kong government has reached a historical low of 3.3 percent.38 With such low credibility, the Hong Kong government can no longer use the original informal institutions to help sustain its formal institutions. Sadly, it did not choose to rebuild its credibility but shifted to using another strategy to replace the original function performed by these informal institutions to sustain its formal institutions. According to NIE, this is not a good method as the reduction in trust will surely increase the transaction cost and tension as well as dissipate the rent of all kinds of economic activities in Hong Kong.39 However, it seems that the government is not really concerned about long-term economic development but cares more about short-term political and social stability. Even worse, the new replacement policy is more suppressive and manipulative in nature, which has generated more resistance and the recent social movement triggered by the extradition bill. Although we cannot prove the intentions of such a government policy as the government is not as transparent as before and it is not a just policy, no government officials are willing to make a statement about the new replacement policy. However, we can show some side evidence to justify the existence and impact of such a suppressive replacement policy. First, the manipulative nature of the policy is reflected in the high “stability maintenance fee” spent by the Chinese government. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2019, China spent HK$135.6 billion (US$17.38 billion) in Guangdong Province, which includes Hong Kong. This amount was the highest among thirty-four provinces in China.40 No one knows though exactly how and where this money was spent. However, we can observe that more and more pro-China political and social organizations have been set up in Hong Kong. These organizations usually appear in the form of associations based on the same ethnic origin, business interest, or profession.41 One of the indications of their participation in pro-China social mobilization is that they have actively participated in all kinds of pro-government gatherings in the past few years. They also gather in opposition to the democratic movement, creating some tension and conflict for the participants of demonstrations. The suppressive nature of the policy can be seen by the increasing use of the police force in suppressing public activities. Since the government refuses to set up an independent commission to investigate whether the Hong Kong police have done anything inappropriate, we can only use supporting data to justify this point. First, the expenditure of the police has increased 66 percent from HK$15.5 billion (US$1.99 billion) in 2014–2015 to HK$25.8 billion (US$3.31 billion) in 2020–2021.42 Second, there has been the increasing use of military-level weapons in suppressing peaceful demonstrations in Hong Kong. Although there are cases of demonstrators

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also using different levels of violence in response to the police’s suppression, the police in many cases started using these weapons before violence was observed. Over the last six months of 2019, the Hong Kong police used sixteen thousand rounds of tear gas on a number of occasions.43 The Hong Kong police also arrested more than six thousand people in the movement over the same period.44 This reaction is a very significant indication of a policy change in dealing with the public protest movement. CONCLUSION This chapter has sought to paint a portrait of the structural problems underlying the coexistence of prosperity and political tension in Hong Kong in the light of an NIE framework. I first demonstrated how Hong Kong established a free-market economy through both formal and informal institutions. I then looked into one of the representative problems created by this structure, which is that of poverty. Using the same NIE framework, I explained the formal and informal institutions constituting the housing market, one of the core causes of poverty, showing how this exploitative market is supported by a similar institutional structure. In the final section, I discussed the recent disappointing change after the 831 decision in which there was not much change in the formal institutions but the shift to using a more suppressive and manipulative policy for the purpose of sustaining the formal institutions. As I completed this chapter at the end of May 2020, China’s National People’s Congress has approved a proposal to impose a national security law in Hong Kong without going through the local legislative procedure. This attempt has triggered US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to declare that Hong Kong no longer maintains a high degree of autonomy from China.45 This further confirms my views suggested in this chapter. NOTES 1.  Statistics Times. “Projected GDP Per Capita Ranking,” Statisticstimes, February 20, 2020, statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-capita-ranking.php. 2.  “Official International Reserves by Country 2019,” Statista, www.statista.com/ statistics/247231/currency-reserves-of-selected-countries. 3. The Gini coefficient is an internationally recognized indicator to measure income inequality of an economy in which zero represents maximum equality and one represents maximum inequality. Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng, “Hong Kong’s Real Problem is Inequality.” Ejinsight on the Pulse, August 28, 2019, www.ejinsight .com/20190828-hong-kongs-real-problem-is-inequality.



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4.  Wolfgang Kasper, Manfred E. Streit, and Peter J. Boettke, Institutional Economics: Property, Competition and Policies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2018), 32–33. 5.  Kasper, Streit, and Boettke, Institutional Economics, 111–14. 6.  “The Joint Declaration,” Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, www .cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm. 7.  “The Joint Declaration,” Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, www .cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm. 8.  “2019 Index of Economic Freedom,” Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/ index/ranking. 9.  “About the Index,” Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/index/about. 10.  Donald Tsang, “Big Market, Small Government,” Chief Executive, last modified September 18, 2006, www.ceo.gov.hk/archive/2012/eng/press/oped.htm. 11. Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Article 107, www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf. 12.  Jennifer Lo, “Hong Kong Elections Feature Many Candidates, Little Choice,” Nikkei Asian Review, February 16, 2017, asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Hong-Kong-elec tions-feature-many-candidates-little-choice. 13.  “Composition of the Legislative Council,” Legislative Council, www.LegCo .gov.hk/education/files/english/Exhibition_Panels_Supplementary_Notes/Composi tion-of-the-LegCo.pdf. 14.〈功能界別及立法會分組點票之不公義〉 [The injustice of legislative council’s mechanism of voting in groups], Inmediahk, www.inmediahk.net/node/1038769. 15.  David A. Watkins, “Motivation and Competition in Hong Kong Secondary Schools: The Students’ Perspective,” in Revisiting the Chinese Learner: Changing Contexts, Changing Education, ed. Carol K. K. Chan and Mirmala Rao (Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Center, University of Hong Kong, 2009), 71–72. 16.  Watkins, “Motivation,” 72. 17.  Watkins points out that most of the students in a capitalist society tend to take competition for granted and have relatively neutral views about its presence. Watkins, “Motivation,” 79. 18.  Watkins, “Motivation,” 80–81. 19.  “Free Market and Government Intervention,” Hong Kong Monetary Authority, February 17, 2005, www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/news-and-media/insight/2005/02/ 20050217. 20.  “Welfare Cheats Are Liable to Prosecution,” Social Welfare Department Hong Kong SAR Government, June 4, 2007, www.isd.gov.hk/chi/tvapi/07_sw70.html. 21.〈貧窮人口140萬創新高〉 [The number of people living under poverty reaches historical high 1.4 million], HK01, www.hk01.com/社會新聞/409860/貧窮 人口140萬創新高-七區貧窮率高於平均水平-4區每四人一個窮. 22.〈調查: 劏房戶人均居住面積58.2呎, 租金佔入息逾四成達新高〉 [Research shows that the average living area for a subdivided flat is 58.2 square feet and the rent share is 40 percent of their income], Mingpao, June 23, 2019, news.mingpao

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.com/ins/港聞/article/20190623/s00001/1561261429757/調查-劏房戶人均居住面 積58-2呎-租金佔入息逾四成達新高. 23.  “Singapore Remains the 2nd Most Expensive Housing Market in the World after Hong Kong,” CBRE, April 11, 2019, www.cbre.com/singapore/about/media -centre/singapore-remains-the-2nd-most-expensive-housing-market-in-the-world -after-hong-kong. 24.  Hillary Hoffower, “The 25 Most Expensive Cities around the World to Rent a 2-Bedroom Apartment,” Business Insider, January 14, 2020, www.businessinsider .com/most-expensive-cities-worldwide-to-rent-an-apartment-2019-5. 25.  “Expenditure on Housing as Share of Total Household Expenditure,” Social Indicators of Hong Kong, November 15, 2019, www.socialindicators.org.hk/en/indi cators/housing/8.13. 26.  “Housing Costs over Income,” OECD, December 16, 2019, www.oecd.org/ els/family/HC1-2-Housing-costs-over-income.pdf. 27.  張美華，〈大學生收入中位數近10年不升反跌〉[Cheung Mei-wah, “The median income of university graduate has not risen but dropped”], HK01, January 10, 2020, www.hk01.com/社會新聞/419782/大學生收入中位數10年跌7-至2-93 萬元-僅較高中學歷多1–86倍. 28.〈港樓10 年大升2.4倍十大屋苑「升幅王」揭盅〉[Property price has increased 2.4 times over the past 10 years], etnet, January 2, 2019, www.etnet.com.hk/ www/tc/news/topic_news_detail.php?category=special&newsid=10341. 29.〈公私營房屋供應比例改為7:3〉[Proportion of public to private housing would be changed to 7:3], HKSAR, October 21, 2018, www.news.gov.hk/chi/2018/ 12/20181221/20181221_164108_983.html. 30.  Leo. F Goodstadt, Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: How Hong Kong Mismanaged Its Prosperity (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 94. 31. “Insufficient Land Supply Leading to Imbalance in Supply-Demand,” Task Force on Land Supply, last modified December 5, 2018, www.landforhongkong.hk/ en/demand_supply/index.php. 32.  “Our Crony-Capitalism Index: Planet Plutocrat,” The Economist, March 15, 2014, www.economist.com/international/2014/03/15/planet-plutocrat. 33.〈中資股勢力擴張 恒指比重5%增至56%〉 [Expansion of Chinese capital, its proportion in the Hang Seng Index increases from 5% to 56%], hket, June 23, 2017, invest.hket.com/article/1842470. 34.〈港資退中資進：誰做未來10年領航者？〉[Who is the future leader? In times of increasing Chinese capital and reducing Hong Kong capital], Mingpao, June 9, 2017, news.mingpao.com/ins/文摘/article/20170609/s00022/1496969568052/【回歸 20年】港資退中資進-誰做未來10年領航者-（文-劉瀾昌）. 35. Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Article 45, www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basic law_full_text_en.pdf. 36.  “Hong Kong’s Mega Bridge to Macau or the Biggest White Elephant Known to Man?” South China Morning Post, January 4, 2019, www.scmp.com/comment/ letters/article/2180487/hong-kongs-mega-bridge-macau-or-biggest-white-elephant -known-man.



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37.  Shirley Zhao, “Lantau Tomorrow Vision Is Arguably Hong Kong’s Most Important and Controversial Project. Here’s What You Need to Know about HK$624 Billion Plan,” South China Morning Post, March 21, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3002583/lantau-tomorrow-vision-arguably -hong-kongs-most. 38. “People’s Satisfaction with the HKSAR Government (Per Poll) 7/1997– 9/2019,” HKUPOP, www.hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/sargperf/sarg/poll/ sarg_poll_chart.html. 39.  Transaction cost here refers to that part of cost involved in searching for true information and policy consistency due to the decrease in the creditability of the government. Dissipation of rent refers to the resources wasted in competition that does not involve any direct production of goods and services but the hidden competition due to unclear rules of the game in the economy. 40.  呂秉權, 〈中國地方維穩費再曝光〉[Bruce Lui Ping-kuen, “China’s stability maintenance fee revealed”), Mingpao, March 11, 2020, news.mingpao.com/pns/ 觀點/article/20200311/s00012/1583865919113/呂秉權-中國地方維穩費再曝光. 41.  李曉惠，〈香港愛國愛港社團的重要功能與未來發展〉， 收李曉惠编 ， 《香港社團 : 理論與實務 》(香港 : 商務印書館，2019) ，頁3。[Li Xiaohui, “The function and future development of pro-China associations,” in Associations in Hong Kong: Theory and Practice, ed. Li Xiaohui (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 2019), 3]. 42.  黃詠榆 、鄭秋玲，〈警隊預算258億創新高〉 [Wong Wing-yu and Cheng Chau-ling, “The record high police budget reaches 25.8 billion”], HK01, February 26, 2020, www.hk01.com/社會新聞/439902/財政預算案2020-警隊預算258億創 新高-增聘2543人換6裝甲車. 43.〈半年射16,000催淚彈 日均逾90枚〉 [Fired 16,000 tear gas bombs in half a year], Mingpao, December 19, 2019, news.mingpao.com/pns/要聞/article/20191209/ s00001/1575828738628/半年射16-000催淚彈-日均逾90枚-人權組織-數量如軍事 行動-監警成員-用量驚人但體諒. 44. “Tally of Arrests in Hong Kong Protests Surges past 6,000,” ABC News, December 9, 2019, abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/tally-arrests-hong-kong -protests-surges-past-6000-67591452. 45.  “Hong Kong ‘No Longer Autonomous from China’– Pompeo,” BBC News, May 28, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52824839?intlink_from_url= https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg56gy51g56t/mike-pompeo&link_location= live-reporting-story.

Chapter Three

“If Not Us, Who?” Youth Participation and Salient Aspects of the Protests Hung Shin-fung

It was 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday June 12, 2019. The second reading of the Extradition Law Amendment Bill was to be resumed that day. Thousands of protesters had surrounded the Legislative Council building since early morning, hoping to block council members from entering the meeting venue. Most of the protesters were university students on their summer holiday. Around 3:00 p.m., secondary school students left their schools and rushed to the protest scene. At 4:02 p.m., a message popped up in a WhatsApp group chat of my church’s youth: “Where are the adults?” Indeed, the city’s youth were highly visible throughout the protests.1 They were on the protest frontlines, they mobilized at schools, they organized in cyberspaces; some of them were arrested and charged. According to a public opinion poll conducted between July 24 and 26, 2019, 91 percent of the interviewees between the age of fourteen and twenty-nine were against the extradition bill while the figure for all age groups was 69 percent.2 A series of on-site surveys conducted during the protests from June to August revealed that the majority of the protesters were under thirty, and most of them were between twenty and thirty.3 As of May 31, 2020, 40 percent of the arrested protesters were students, around 40 percent of the arrested were twenty or below, and around 80 percent were thirty or below.4 The youth were the face and the backbone of the protests. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part paints the general picture of youth participation in the protests. Who are they? What did they do? What are they facing? Why do they participate in the protests? While some stress the underlying socio-economic problems youth faced, I contend that protesters are more concerned about the autonomy and the political future of the city. I discuss political factors particular to the current situation in Hong Kong, namely, growing youth activism in recent years, the 55

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rise of localism among youths, and their political frustration. I also analyze the leadership of this youth-led movement. The second part examines two salient aspects that were substantially developed during the anti-extradition bill protests: the “yellow economy” on the economic frontline and the increasingly important international frontline. FACES OF YOUTH PROTESTERS Youth protesters can be divided into three groups according to their life stages: secondary school students, tertiary students, and young adults. They developed different forms of participation according to their life circumstances, strengths, and constraints. The scale of participation of secondary school students in the protests was unprecedented. Schools were important spaces for mobilization. By June 6, 2019, petitions were initiated in more than 350 secondary schools in Hong Kong. These initial activities connected like-minded students and alumni and formed a strong basis and momentum for actions in the summer. When schools reopened in September, students put up posters, distributed pamphlets, and set up Lennon Walls in schools. They also sang protest songs and chanted slogans during recess and assemblies. Pictures and videos of these actions went viral on social media and sparked similar actions in other schools within days. Concern groups also organized class boycotts to show solidarity with general strikes and to put pressure on the government. Facing such politicization of campuses, some schools took a more liberal approach and turned the situation into learning opportunities through special lectures. Some teachers and social workers continued to care for students after school; some took students injured in protests to private clinics and hospitals for treatment and surgery. However, in schools operated by proestablishment institutions, student activists faced more constraints and even repercussions from school authorities. As secondary school students’ timetables at school are fixed and many could not stay out late, cyberspace became an important space for these cyber natives to get involved. Being financially dependent, secondary school students have limited resources to buy protest equipment. Some restaurants and organizations thus provided free meals for youth in financial difficulties. Some secondary school students thought they should take more risks than older protesters as they believed older people have more burdens and responsibilities and would face graver legal consequences if convicted.5 The protesters are generally highly educated and often engage in the movement with professional skills.6 A large number of them are tertiary students.



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Wing-sang Law called these protesters “mainstream rebels”—as opposed to protesters from marginalized groups.7 Tertiary students in general have the most flexible schedule among the youth. Many of them stayed for more militant protests at night. With part-time jobs, they often enjoy higher financial independence, which allows them to buy better equipment than secondary school students. Being better equipped and generally with a stronger physical build, some think they should bear more responsibilities in protecting others and thus tend to stay longer on the frontline. Most young adults are at work and do not have flexible schedules. With limited protection of their labor rights, many needed to take leaves to join protests and strikes during working hours. Many remained anonymous when participating in the protests as some protesters were fired for their movement participation, including for posting comments on one’s own Facebook page. Under these constraints, they developed creative ways to resist. Bankers and lawyers, for instance, repeatedly joined lunchtime flash mob protests in the central business district and went back to work when dispersed by the police with tear gas. Among youth protesters, young adults have been the biggest contributors of financial resources. They bought equipment and food and shared them with fellow protesters. They supported crowd-funding campaigns as well. Many also contributed their professional skills and utilized their local and overseas networks. Those, for example, from the advertising and design industries made professional-level promotional materials for the movement and launched international campaigns to arouse global support for the movement in Hong Kong. Apart from job security, some are also constrained by family obligations. Although some young parents joined the movement to fight for a better future for their children, concerned about their family responsibilities, they usually choose to engage in nonviolent forms of resistance. When the protests gradually developed into an anti-authoritarian movement, youths also fought on other frontlines, including running as candidates in the district council election on November 24, 2019. Many of these young candidates, including twenty-one-year-old Jordan Pang and twenty-threeyear-old Karrine Fu, were new to politics and did not have previous experience in community work.8 A surge in voting, especially by youth voters, secured a landslide victory for the pro-democracy camp.9 The youth have paid a high price for their participation in the movement though. They have given their time, money, energy, and effort for the movement. Their studies and work have been affected, and some have sacrificed their futures and even their lives.10 Some suffered physical injuries during the protests. From June 9 to December 9, 2019, 2,633 patients injured during the protests were treated at public hospitals.11 Many others who were too scared

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to be arrested in public hospitals sought treatment in volunteer-manned popup clinics. There were also alleged cases of sexual violence and deaths caused by the police. Noticing increasing reports of the discovery of dead bodies that police considered non-suspicious, some youth posted “non-suicide declarations” on social media.12 Clinical psychologist Ka-fai Mann states that many youth were experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).13 A survey on the psychological health of secondary school students indicated that more than 50 percent of respondents displayed signs of depression.14 Meanwhile, relationships among friends and families who held different political stances were broken. Some youth were financially blocked by their parents while some working youth stopped providing for their parents. There were even cases of youths being expelled from their homes. “Die outside; don’t die at my place,” a mother scolded her daughter, a wounded protester.15 Stronger tensions were built in police families. “I will beat you to death if you join the protests,” a protester from a police family was warned.16 Many youth protesters have been facing legal consequences as well for their participation in the movement. As of May 31, 2020, 8,986 people had been arrested for their involvement in the protests. A total of 1,808 have been charged with 612 charged with rioting.17 Among the arrested protesters, approximately 40 percent (3,666) were students.18 Eighteen percent were secondary school students, and 25 percent were tertiary school students.19 Going through the legal process can be torturing. Some youth have lost their jobs just for being charged.20 To avoid possible political persecution and legal consequences, some protesters fled Hong Kong. By April 2020, the number of exiled activists in Taiwan may have exceeded three hundred people.21 On June 18, 2020, the Taiwanese government announced the establishment of the Taiwan-Hong Kong Service and Exchange Office to provide humanitarian support for asylum-seekers from Hong Kong.22 WHY DO THE YOUTH PARTICIPATE IN THE PROTESTS? Amid the growing trend of youth activism around the world, what are the historical contexts and social conditions that have led the youth in Hong Kong to participate in the current movement? The Hong Kong government, some local elites, and even foreign China experts have seen socio-economic problems as the driving force behind youth participation in the protests.23 Hong Kong youth indeed felt frustrated when facing the least affordable housing in the world.24 It is also true that the labor market for Hong Kong’s youth has been adversely affected by the changing opportunity structure in



“If Not Us, Who?” 59

recent years.25 However, research by S. W. K. Chiu and C. Y. Ip has shown that Hong Kong youths’ perception about their future opportunities or their chances of upward mobility are not the causes of their political participation. Rather, their recognition of post-materialistic and universal values and their distrust of the Hong Kong and Chinese governments are more influential to their political stances and participation.26 A survey conducted in fall 2019 showed that 72.8 percent of the youth interviewees agreed that the problem with the extradition bill was that it threatens democracy, human rights, and the freedom of Hongkongers.27 Youth were more motivated to protest for these values than for their own self-interests. The protests must also be seen in the context of the rising youth activism in the past two decades in Hong Kong. This youth activism has accumulated momentum and resources for resistance, which has led to the overwhelming youth participation in the current protests. These movements have served as a space for political enlightenment for youth ideologically and experientially. Antony Dapiran argues, for example, that a generation of youth were politicized by the Umbrella Movement and many youths continued to participate in political actions that followed.28 Furthermore, the self-sacrificial spirit of youth leaders inspired and encouraged other youth to devote their lives for the betterment of the city. Unlike the more pragmatic and less confrontational politicians of previous generations, youth activists embodied both activism and idealism.29 Many of them have been arrested and charged, and some, including Joshua Wong of Scholarism, Alex Chow of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, and Edward Leung of Hong Kong Indigenous, were imprisoned. Leung, who coined the frequently chanted slogan of the current protests—“Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”—has been considered an icon for the youth and the guiding light for protesters.30 While protesters were only discussing whether they were ready to be arrested before the Umbrella Movement, youth in the current protests have been prepared to fight and die for the city. The commitment to fight and sacrifice for Hong Kong is also the result of the rise of localism among the youth. Public opinion polls on the ethnic identity of Hong Kong’s people showed that for youth between eighteen and twenty-nine, the proportion of respondents recognizing themselves as Hongkongers in a broad sense grew from 58.3 percent in June 2008 to the historical high of 94.4 percent in December 2019 while the overall rating was 77.7 percent.31 Conversely, during the same period, youth respondents recognizing themselves as Chinese in a broad sense dropped from 37.7 percent to 4.7 percent, which was much lower than the overall rating of 20.9 percent.32 Localists are a major force among the protesters. In on-site surveys conducted during protests on June 26 and August 4, 2019, localists accounted

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for around 40 percent of the respondents.33 A large portion of localists are youths, and many youths between fifteen and thirty-nine consider themselves localists. In earlier research conducted in 2016–2017 with tertiary students, 49.3 percent of the respondents identified themselves as mild localists while 10.9 percent recognized themselves as radical localists.34 Localism in Hong Kong puts Hong Kong citizens’ interests first, stresses a high level of autonomy in Hong Kong’s governance against Beijing’s intervention, and strives to maintain Hong Kong’s unique culture and identity in the face of Beijing’s efforts to mainlandize Hong Kong. Some have advocated for the right to self-determination of Hongkongers, some have promoted Hong Kong nationalism, and some have called for the independence of Hong Kong. They see the extradition bill not only as a legal arrangement, but as a political tool for Beijing to expand its control over Hong Kong and to further integrate Hong Kong into China. Political frustration among the youth also contributed to their participation in the movement. With a strong Hongkonger identity and weak Chinese identity, the youth perceived the extradition bill as a serious threat to Hong Kong’s autonomy and, in turn, their core identity. The future of Hong Kong intertwined with their own fate, and the fight to “save Hong Kong” became part of the struggle for their own existence. One seventeen-year-old student states that “the extradition law is a danger to our lives. . . . Once this passes, our rule of law would be damaged beyond repair.”35 This fear has made them more willing to participate in the movement, take higher risks, and even sacrifice: “I really want to give all I have to Hong Kong. . . . When you pursue freedom, sacrifices are unavoidable. . . . We are halfway into the gate of hell. We’ve put our future and career on a line, but it is worth it.”36 Police brutality and the government’s continual reliance on police force to crack down on protests further confirmed protesters’ fear of increasing authoritarian rule in Hong Kong. The feeling that there is “no future” radicalized young protesters. More and more accepted violent resistance and the strategy of “if we burn, you burn with us” (攬炒) that threatens to bring down China’s economy if it ruins Hong Kong’s autonomy. If young protesters were fighting for a democracy that they did not have during the Umbrella Movement, the young protesters against the extradition bill were fighting a war of defense, a war of life and death.37 YOUTH-LED OR LEADERLESS? Hong Kong youth have been empowered by the generational shift of political leadership in social movements in recent years, especially after the Umbrella



“If Not Us, Who?” 61

Movement; they are now in the “real seat of new impulses” in social movements.38 With the fifteen-year-old Joshua Wong starting Scholarism, which contributed to forcing the government to withdraw the moral and national education curriculum in 2012, and with the election of twenty-three-yearold Nathan Law as a legislative councilor in 2016, no Hongkonger would underestimate the political will and power of the youth. The youth are now considered to be legitimate stakeholders—political actors and leaders that one should take seriously. The slogan and narrative that “we are the chosen generation,” used by youth protest leader Lester Shum during a television debate during the Umbrella Movement, has been readily owned by many youth.39 A netizen states: “The selfishness of the previous generation made us suffer, now we are the previous generation of the next generation, we have a choice, don’t be selfish. Hong Kongers, resist.”40 With such a generational shift in the movement’s participants and its leadership, some commentators have described the movement as a youth movement or a youth-led movement. Focusing on the form of leadership, others have called the movement “leaderless.” Since the traditional democrats lost the leadership of the anti-government forces during the Umbrella Movement, oppositional forces in Hong Kong have become increasingly fragmentized while the movement has become increasingly decentralized. The radical localists, who have challenged the leadership of the traditional democrats, also lost their leaders as they were disqualified from elections, imprisoned, or fled Hong Kong in the past few years. Thus, when the anti– extradition bill movement began, none of these groups had the political power and capital to take the lead. They also chose not to claim leadership of the movement as this would attract unnecessary attention from the authorities, which might lead to charges of inciting or inducing unlawful assemblies or riots. This environment left a space for different actors to take their own initiatives. The power of young activists was thus released from the traditional movement power hierarchy. How then were the individual protesters organized? First of all, in the absence of a centralized leadership, protesters organized themselves into grassroots groups and initiated bottom-up group-based actions. Groups that were built during past years of social action were quickly reactivated. New groups were also formed according to one’s expertise, skills, or position on protest sites. On the protest frontlines, there were valiant groups, tear-gas-extinguishing groups, first-aider groups, logistic groups, and scouts. Outside the protest sites, propaganda groups formed by smaller designer groups, translator groups, and community organizers worked together, both online and in local communities, to inform and mobilize local audiences and the international community. Hong Kong human rights activist Johnson

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Yeung called this movement “leader-full” as protesters felt ownership of the movement and led it in their own small ways.41 These autonomous clusters of protesters connected with each other and shared leadership of this “leaderless” movement through a distributed network. The decision-making process involved elements of both direct and deliberative democracy. When mass collective actions were needed, individuals or grassroots groups would share their action plans online and invite comments from other protesters. When plans gained hundreds or thousands of likes, comments, or shares, a general yet nonbinding consensus would be considered formed. Actions organized in this way were generally more fluid and left space for protesters to actively and creatively improvise. Commenting on such distributed leadership, Brian Leung, the protester who unmasked himself during the storming of the Legislative Council on July 1, 2019, states that “social forces are intricately interconnected as networks. Each node of social force brings about new possibilities of further mobilization and new challenges to the regime.”42 Digital media played an important role in facilitating these organization and communication processes. Many protesters used Telegram, an encrypted messenger application, to share sensitive information and discuss action strategies while avoiding police surveillance. LIHKG, a popular online forum, became the public “war room” where protesters discussed movement direction, strategies, and actions. Facebook and WhatsApp groups were used to share protest news and less sensitive information. Facebook Live connected off-site protesters to protest sites and enabled the immediate spreading of more reliable protest information in this post-truth era. The use of digital media in protests allowed protesters to “be water”: protesters can swiftly change action plans according to on-site situations, and relevant promotional materials can reach thousands of other protesters with just one push of a button on a cell phone. Without central leadership and formal structure, how is the movement sustained? Similar to the Umbrella Movement, the current movement is sustained by determined and self-selected participants.43 Police brutality continuously filled protesters with anger, which, in turn, fueled further protests. The wide acceptance of a few guiding principles by protesters played a crucial role in keeping the fluid movement as one.44 First, learning from the fragmentation among protesters that contributed to the failure of the Umbrella Movement, protesters generally agreed that “brothers climb a mountain together; each has to make his own effort” (兄弟爬山，各自努力). Protesters also concurred that they would not distance themselves from those adopting different protest tactics and they would not snitch (不割蓆，不篤灰).45 Second, the slogan



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of “five demands, not one less” (五大訴求，缺一不可) that accurately captured the major requests of most protesters was proposed in a timely manner in an early stage of the movement, which eliminated potential internal conflicts among protesters in framing the movement. A strong sense of collective identity as Hongkongers also helped to hold protesters together.46 Facing such a decentralized movement, it is almost impossible for the government to bring protesters to the negotiation table or to decapitate the movement by arresting its leaders.47 It might seem that protesters lost the chance to convert political power on the street to bargaining power at the negotiation table. However, this ostensibly missed opportunity did not seem to bother protesters. A probable explanation is that, with the fruitless negotiation between student leaders and the government during the Umbrella Movement as a precedent, protesters no longer trusted the government and did not believe that negotiations would lead to any favorable results. In short, the generational shift of political leadership in Hong Kong in recent years and the subsequent persecution of young political leaders by the authorities left a leadership vacuum at the beginning of the protests. Numerous grassroots groups emerged, felt ownership of the movement, and through a distributed network provided leadership at different times and spaces. Youth, who made up the majority of these groups, to a large extent led this “leaderless” movement. SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE PROTESTS As the conflict intensified, protesters brought the resistance into all areas of life and opened new frontlines. The economic frontline and the international frontline are two that have been substantially developed and are worth our attention. The Economic Frontline—The Yellow Economy Since the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong society has used “yellow” and “blue” to identify the pro-democracy camp and the pro-establishment camp respectively. The creation of the “yellow economy,” or the “yellow economic circle,” denotes an unprecedented extension of resistance into protesters’ economic lives as protesters tried to do whatever they could to support the movement.48 Protesters started with boycotting anti-protest, police-supporting, or Chinarelated businesses. Lists of “blue” restaurants to be boycotted were compiled and shared among protesters. Companies that made anti-protest statements

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were included in the list. For instance, the Maxim group, a major catering company in Hong Kong with hundreds of restaurants and bakeries across the city, was boycotted after its founder’s daughter, Annie Wu, spoke out against the protests at the United Nations.49 The Mass Transit Railway, or MTR, was boycotted after it shut down stations on protest days and refused to release surveillance camera footage of the protests. Localist values also influenced the list-compiling process: corporations and chain stores that were pro-establishment or related with “red capital” were put on the list even when they made no explicit political statement. Consumers started to look for alternatives. Lists of restaurants and shops supporting the protests were shared online. Their support came in multiple forms: they provided space for posters and set up Lennon Walls in stores in support of the protests, gave free meals to protesters in need, participated in the general strike, made donations out of sales revenue to support the protests, or trained or hired fellow protesters.50 The “yellow job market” is also developed. Some protesters were fired by anti-protest employers. For protesters who were arrested and on bail, their bailing conditions and uncertain future made it hard for them to find a job. Out of concern for these fellow protesters, networks were developed to match jobseekers with employers who sympathized with their situations. For instance, a social worker started a Telegram channel for this purpose. Within months, 1,500 to 2,000 jobseekers and 1,700 jobs were registered.51 Why did the “yellow economy” develop during the protests? Local scholars, like Chiu Chi-yue and Simon Shen, believe that an identity economy, as suggested by the Nobel-Prize-winning economist George A. Akerlof, provides the explanation.52 As the Hongkonger and pro-democrat “yellow” identities strengthened during the movement and became core to protesters, these ethnic and political identities began to influence their economic decisions. Protesters hoped to exercise their consumer power to sustain the protests and undercut the economic dominance of China.53 This form of resistance became widely adopted as it is nonviolent and legal and has a low threshold for participation. As consuming at “yellow shops” became a habit for many protesters, the “yellow economy” gained momentum over several months, even amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Mobile applications were developed to help protesters identify “yellow shops” and avoid “blue shops.” While long lines appeared outside “yellow restaurants,” some “blue restaurants” recorded millions of dollars in losses and had to close their stores.54 Simon Shen estimated that the “yellow economy” has a potential market of more than HK$100 billion (US$12.83 billion).55



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The development of the “yellow economy” still faces many difficulties, however. First, amid strong government opposition against the development of the “yellow economy,” a case of political censorship emerged as the Hong Kong Companies Registry challenged the registration of “The Coming Dawn Limited,” a “yellow business.”56 Second, as of May 2020, almost all “yellow businesses” are small and medium-sized restaurants and retail stores that do not rely heavily on, or care about, the China market.57 To grow from a community of businesses to a full economy, upstream businesses need to be developed in the future. The International Frontline Hong Kong’s autonomy, as comparative political scientist Brian Fong explains, “is not only a local issue, but also an internationalized one.”58 Having substantial geopolitical and economic interests within Hong Kong, the international community was alerted to the threats to their interests that the extradition bill would bring even before many Hongkongers. The international business sector, which usually refrains from involving itself in local politics, was among the first to oppose the bill. Important business chambers, including the International Chamber of Commerce–Hong Kong and the American Chamber of Commerce, voiced concerns over Hong Kong’s autonomy and business environment publicly, asking the Hong Kong government to drop or amend the bill.59 International press and publishing organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists, also urged the government to scrap or modify the bill.60 Protesters, desperate to draw support from any and all fronts, followed up this international concern and put unprecedented effort into rallying global sympathy and support for the protests. In a survey, 79.6 percent of protesters at the June 9 protest considered the raising of international attention a “very important” motivating factor for their participation.61 Protesters translated protest information into foreign languages and spread it through the Internet. Large-scale collective efforts combining on-street, in-print, and online actions were made. For instance, targeting leaders of the June 2019 G20 Summit, protesters delivered petitions to consulates of the G20 countries, while waving the national flags of different countries. Meanwhile, a group of netizens launched a crowd-funding campaign to advertise in major international newspapers, urging the G20 representatives to “Stand with Hong Kong at G20.”62 The campaign received overwhelming support from protesters as HK$6.7 million (US$0.86 million) was raised within nine hours and twentyone advertisements were published in three days.63

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Protesters urged the international community to put pressure on the Hong Kong and Chinese governments and to impose Magnitsky sanctions against officials who violate human rights. Despite Beijing’s warning against “foreign interventions” in Hong Kong’s affairs, foreign officials, including those from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the European Parliament, voiced concerns over Hong Kong’s protests and the police’s violation of human rights.64 U.S. president Donald Trump called the protests a “complicating factor” in the U.S.-China trade negotiations.65 Backed by nationwide sympathy toward Hong Kong’s protesters, on November 27, 2019, the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019.66 The United States also enacted laws banning the export of some equipment and munitions to the Hong Kong police as well as prescribing sanctions on Hong Kong and mainland Chinese officials found guilty of human rights abuses.67 Some protesters urged the United Kingdom to bear legal and moral responsibility to Hongkongers, for it had guaranteed its former colony the continuation of a high degree of autonomy and basic rights and freedoms after 1997 during the Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong’s future.68 British prime minister Theresa May asked China to respect its commitments in the SinoBritish Joint Declaration of 1984 while her foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, urged China to open a dialogue with the protesters.69 In January 2020, an AllParty Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong launched an inquiry into violations of human rights and humanitarian principles by the Hong Kong police force.70 With more established international connections and as recognizable faces of the Hong Kong democratic movement, activists of the democratic camp, like Martin Lee and Joshua Wong, frequently traveled overseas for international lobbying. Hongkongers abroad played an important role in arousing international attention to the protests in Hong Kong.71 As the Hongkonger identity grew, “long-distance nationalism” also strengthened among overseas Hongkongers. They held solidarity protests in support of the anti–extradition bill movement.72 The more experienced and professional lobbyists among them who had a deeper understanding of the local political scene and rules of political participation served as hosts and contacts for Hong Kong activists visiting to lobby their governments, media, academics, and so on. They also helped to organize overseas Hongkongers to take collective political actions. To further strengthen and formalize these lobbying efforts, new organizations, including the Hong Kong Democracy Council U.S. and the Hong Kong Democratic Alliance of Overseas Postgraduate Students, were founded in 2019.73 Hong Kong does have a strategic role to play in geopolitics. The “Hong Kong factor” influenced the January 2020 Taiwan presidential election.74



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Hong Kong has been considered a showcase of “one country, two systems,” the desired unification model of the Chinese government for Taiwan. In the eyes of many Taiwanese, however, the anti–extradition bill protests marked the moral bankruptcy of the policy, which contributed to the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen, who was considered more anti-China than her opponent.75 Hong Kong is also a player and a battlefield in the “U.S.-China New Cold War.”76 When in May 2020 the Chinese government proposed to impose a national security law on Hong Kong instead of establishing it through local enactment, the international community was even more alarmed of its threat to the continuation of Hong Kong’s autonomy. President Donald Trump stated that the United States would react “very strongly” if the law was enacted while Britain, Canada, and Australia jointly issued a statement expressing their deep concern.77 The situation has become more complex as the confrontation is no longer only between Hong Kong’s protesters and the Hong Kong government but has escalated to an international contention of power between Western democracies and China. CONCLUSION It was 10:22 p.m. on Monday, June 15, 2020. Thousands of citizens in black, mostly under thirty, were still lining up to pay tribute to the first person who gave his life for the protests, Leung Ling-kit. Throughout the past year, protesters had shouted, “Hongkongers, add oil!” (香港人，加油!), “Hongkongers, resist!” (香港人，反抗!), and “Hongkongers, revenge!” (香港人，報仇!). But this night the slogan became “Hongkongers, build our nation!” (香港人，建國!). This new mantra was the response of desperate Hong Kong protesters and youth to Beijing’s proposed enactment of a national security law for the city. Protests may have subsided somewhat due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the fire for resistance is still burning strong in the hearts of many Hong Kong citizens.78 The youth have made up the majority of the anti–extradition bill protesters. Unlike many protests around the world that have been caused by social and economic frustrations, these protesting Hong Kong youth have participated in the movement in order to safeguard judicial independence, the rule of law, and the autonomy of Hong Kong against Chinese influence. The rise of activism and localism among the youth has also contributed to their large-scale participation. With the help of new communication technologies and digital media, empowered youth have led this decentralized movement through a distributed network. They have also opened new frontlines: domestically, they have developed the “yellow economy” to sustain the movement

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nonviolently in their everyday lives; understanding the strategic political and economic position of Hong Kong in the “New Cold War,” they have gathered international support to put pressure on China to maintain Hong Kong’s autonomy. With the passage of the national security law, the cost of resistance greatly increases, and the space for resistance is further compressed. In this new environment, the protesters’ creativity in living out the “be water” philosophy will again be put to the test. NOTES 1.  Scholars suggest that the focus of the protests gradually shifted from anti–extradition bill to anti-authoritarian, especially after the government withdrew the bill. See Francis L. F. Lee, Samson Yuen, Gary Tang, and Edmund W. Cheng, “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising: From Anti-Extradition to Anti-Authoritarian Protests,” China Review 19, no. 4 (2019): 1–32. 2. Robert Chung, “Opinion Survey on the ‘Extradition Bill’ Survey Results,” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, last modified August 2, 2019, static1.squarespace.com/static/5cfd1ba6a7117c000170d7aa/t/5d5a081034ee4800018 f491f/1566181400708/pcf_anti_extradition_ppt_english_v2_pori.pdf. 3.  Gary Tang, Samson Yuen, and Edmund W. Cheng, Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests (Hong Kong: Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 2019), 3, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/pdf/ENG_antielab%20survey%20public%20report%20vf.pdf. 4.〈拘近9,000人僅20%被控612人涉暴動罪〉[Almost 9,000 were arrested, only 20 percent were charged, 612 persons were charged with rioting], Apple Daily, updated June 12, 2020, hk.appledaily.com/local/20200612/NCOHXYYYZAL GX3I4LDBRMKXD3U/?utm_campaign=hkad_social_hk.nextmedia&utm_med ium=social&utm_source=facebook&utm_content=link_post&fbclid=IwAR0y-aS9If ONSmjaB8f9_McXDeqxsEmGTVWW2oAHm1Bp9KqCUanN-bYQTPw. 5. Verna Yu, “Children of the Revolution: The Hong Kong Youths Ready to ‘Sacrifice Everything,’” The Guardian, December 15, 2019, www.theguardian .com/world/2019/dec/15/children-of-the-revolution-the-hong-kong-youths-ready-to -sacrifice-everything. 6.  Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, Chinese University of Hong Kong, “Research Report on Public Opinion during the Anti-Extradition Bill (Fugitive Offenders Bill) Movement in Hong Kong,” CCPOS, May 2020, www.com. cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/research/202005PublicOpinionSurveyReport-ENG.pdf, 3. 7.  張潔平，〈攤牌：抗命時代〉，收張潔平、鍾耀華編，《香港三年》（香 港：牛津大學出版社，2016），頁38。[Cheung Kit-ping, “Show Hand: Age of Resistance,” in Three Years in Hong Kong, ed. Cheung Kit-ping and Eason Yiu-wah Chung (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2016), 38].



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8.  “Hong Kong Elections: The Young Winners Who Unseated Political Veterans,” BBC News, last modified November 25, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia -china-50541933. 9.  Keith Bradsher, Austin Ramzy, and Tiffany May, “Hong Kong Election Results Give Democracy Backers Big Win,” New York Times, last modified November 25, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/11/24/world/asia/hong-kong-election-results.html. 10.  Julia Hollingsworth, Jo Shelley, and Anna Coren, “How Four Deaths Turned Hong Kong’s Protest Movement Dark,” CNN, last modified July 22, 2019, www.cnn .com/2019/07/21/asia/hong-kong-deaths-suicide-dark-intl-hnk/index.html. 11.〈6月至今2633人因參與公眾活動受傷到急症室求診〉[Since June 2633 people injured during public assemblies were treated at emergency units], RTHK, December 9, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/k2/1496738-20191209.htm. 12.  Sebastian Skov Andersen, “Hong Kong Protesters are Declaring ‘I Won’t Kill Myself’ Just in Case They Disappear,” Vice Asia, December 20, 2019, www.vice .com/en_in/article/7kzpa4/hong-kong-protesters-declaring-not-suicide. 13.  彼，〈創傷下的情緒危機〉[Pei, “Post-traumatic emotional risks”], Breakazine 59 (October 2019): 63. 14. “Hong Kong Protests: More than 40 per cent of Secondary School Students Highly Stressed, with Nearly a Quarter Anxious about Tense Social Climate,” South China Morning Post, last modified November 8, 2019, yp.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ article/114674/hong-kong-protests-more-40-cent-secondary-school-students-highly. 15.  編輯部，〈目睹城市傾倒〉[Editorial board, “Eyewitness of the city’s fall”], Breakazine 59 (October 2019): 27. 16.  芷寧，〈原來我是警察家屬〉[Chi-ning, “I am from a police family”], Breakazine 59 (October 2019): 59. 17.  The highest sentencing for rioting in Hong Kong is ten years’ imprisonment. 18.  “Almost 9,000 were arrested, Only 20 percent were charged,” see note 4. 19.〈鄧炳強：6月反修例至今7019人被捕約4成為學生〉[Tang Ping-keung: “Since June 7019 were arrested due to the anti-extradition bill protests, around 40 percent were students”], RTHK, January 16, 2020, news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/ k2/1503124-20200116.htm. 20.〈有官非無法做全職歌手，莊正同唱片公司解約〉[Being charged, Lester Chuang terminated contract with company and could not become a full-time singer], Apple Daily, February 16, 2020, hk.appledaily.com/entertainment/20200216/XFBJ 5GBH2MHTPTREY6GJMHNFUQ/. 21.  李雪莉、陳星穎，〈卸下full gear後，香港運動者「旅行」來台的流亡 人生〉[Lee Hsüeh-li and Chen Hsing-ying, “The lives in exile of Hong Kong activists in Taiwan when full gears were put down”], The Reporter, April 9, 2020, www .twreporter.org/a/hong-kong-extradition-law-protests-escape-to-taiwan-2?fbclid=Iw AR1NvmG1hV1hISerWE4z18VVAhscDqfcxWUScdnYcjxqyhIPVrsYzIiv5hg. 22.  Lawrence Chung, Victor Ting, and Phila Siu, “Hong Kong Protests: Taiwan Announces Humanitarian Aid Plan for People Fleeing City,” South China Morning Post, June 18, 2020, www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3089612/taiwanannounces-humanitarian-aid-plan-people-fleeing-hong-kong.

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23.  See, for example, Shaun Rein, “Social Mobility the Key to Addressing Hong Kong Discontent,” Nikkei Asian Review, July 16, 2019, asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/ Social-mobility-the-key-to-addressing-Hong-Kong-discontent. 24.  Ray Forrest and Shi Xian, “Accommodating Discontent: Youth, Conflict and the Housing Question in Hong Kong,” Housing Studies 33, no. 1 (2018): 12. 25.  Chung Yan Ip, “Youth and the Changing Opportunity Structure,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (London: Routledge, 2018), 302. 26.  趙永佳、葉仲茵，〈香港青年「下流」問題：客觀狀況與主觀感受〉 [Chiu Wing-kai and Ip Chung-yan, “Downward social mobility of youth in Hong Kong: Objective experiences and subjective perceptions”], Hong Kong-Macao Journal 3 (2015): 65. 27.  突破，〈七成半青少年感難過，九成半感受他人絕望，經歷同行共感， 縱感失落仍能積極面對〉[Breakthrough, “75 percent of the youth felt sad, 95 percent felt the desperation of others, experiencing the empathy of others helped them face frustration positively”], Press Release, Breakthrough Youth Research Archives, June 14, 2020, upload.breakthrough.org.hk/ir/Research/70_P&R_2019/. 28.  Antony Dapiran, City of Protest: A Recent History of Dissent in Hong Kong (New York: Penguin eBooks, 2017), chapter 5. 29.  Agnes Shuk-mei Ku, “In Search of a New Political Subjectivity in Hong Kong: The Umbrella Movement as a Street Theater of Generational Change,” The China Journal, no. 82 (2019): 125. 30.  Andrew Higgins, “‘Retake Hong Kong’: A Movement, a Slogan and an Identity Crisis,” New York Times, August 14, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/world/ asia/hong-kong-protests-identity-china-edward-leung.html. 31.  Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, “Ethnic Identity—Broad Hong Konger (Per Poll) (8/1997–12/2019),” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, www.pori.hk/pop-poll/ethnic-identity/q001/Hong Konger. 32.  Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, “Ethnic Identity—Broad Chinese (Per Poll) (8/1997–12/2019),” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, www.pori.hk/pop-poll/ethnic-identity/q001/broad-chinese. 33.  Lee et al., “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising,” 15. 34.  突破，〈五成青年支持溫和本土，大專生除政見外有類同價值觀〉 [Breakthrough, “Fifty percent of the youths support mild localism, tertiary students hold similar values”], Press Release, Breakthrough Youth Research Archives, June 10, 2018, upload.breakthrough.org.hk/ir/Research/63_Poli_Value_2017/. 35.  Mike Ives and Katherine Li, “For Hong Kong’s Youth, Protests Are ‘a Matter of Life and Death,’” New York Times, June 17, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/ world/asia/hong-kong-protests-youth.html. 36.  Yu, “Children of the Revolution.” 37.  Yu, “Children of the Revolution.” 38.  Ku, “In Search of a New Political Subjectivity in Hong Kong,” 130. 39.  The line was borrowed from the cartoon Digimon, which has aired in Hong Kong since 2000 and in which the main characters are kids chosen to fight monsters and save the world.



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40. Hugfriedhk, Twitter Post, October 4, 2019, twitter.com/hugfriedhk/sta tus/1180108352971407360. 41.  Mary Hui, “What the Hong Kong Protests Can Teach the World about Enduring Social Movements,” Quartz, November 19, 2019, qz.com/1695788/the-hong -kong-protests-epitomize-a-resilient-social-movement/. 42.  Hui, “What the Hong Kong Protests Can Teach the World.” 43.  Yongshun Cai, The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong: Sustaining Decentralized Protest (New York: Routledge, 2017), 8. 44.  Ideas and common goals can serve as leaders in social movements; see Hande Eslen-Ziya and Itir Erhart, “Toward Postheroic Leadership: A Case Study of Gezi’s Collaborating Multiple Leaders,” Leadership 11, no. 4 (2015): 484. 45.  Austin Ramzy, “In Hong Kong, Unity between Peaceful and Radical Protesters. For Now,” New York Times, September 27, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/world/ asia/hong-kong-protests-violence.html?_ga=2.226591706.618500504.1589556454 -1913246662.1585247355. 46.  Hui, “What the Hong Kong Protests Can Teach the World.” 47.  For example, student leaders rejected the government’s offer to meet privately, stating that the government should engage the wider public and respond to the demands of the protesters; see Jeffie Lam, “Hong Kong Student Leaders Reject Government’s Offer of Private Meeting about Extradition Protests, Calling It ‘Too Little, Too Late,’” South China Morning Post, July 5, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ politics/article/3017325/hong-kong-student-leaders-reject-governments-offer-private. 48. AFP, “Hong Kong’s ‘Yellow Economy’ Rewards Protester-Friendly Businesses,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 15, 2020, hongkongfp.com/2020/01/15/ hong-kongs-yellow-economy-rewards-protester-friendly-businesses/. 49.  Erin Hale, “‘Selling out Hong Kong People’: Global Companies Vandalised by Protesters over Links to China,” Independent, November 3, 2019, www.inde pendent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-shopping-mall-economy-banks -graffiti-starbucks-a9180701.html. 50.  Debby Sze Wan Chan and Ngai Pun, “Economic Power of the Politically Powerless in the 2019 Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Movement,” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (2019): 38. 51.  桀，〈反光衣下〉[Kit, “Under the Safety Vest”], Breakazine 60 (January 2020): 62–63. 52.  Jeff Pao, “Hong Kong Official Knocks ‘Color’-Coded Shopping,” Asia Times, December 18, 2019, asiatimes.com/2019/12/hong-kong-official-knocks-color-coded -shopping/. 53. Verna Yu, “From Loo Roll to Dumplings: Hong Kong Protesters Weaponise Purchasing Power,” The Guardian, January 22, 2020, www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/jan/23/from-loo-roll-to-dumplings-hong-kong-protesters-weaponise-pur chasing-power. 54.  Cannix Yau, “What Happens to Hong Kong’s Economy When Businesses Are Split by Protests into ‘Blue’ vs ‘Yellow’?” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2020, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3045737/what -happens-hong-kongs-economy-when-businesses.

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55.  Pao, “Hong Kong Official.” 56. “Censorship Concerns as Hong Kong Companies Registry Grills Startup over Political Stance,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 1, 2020, hongkongfp .com/2020/06/01/censorship-concerns-as-hong-kong-companies-registry-grills -startup-over-political-stance/. 57.  Chan and Pun, “Economic Power of the Politically Powerless,” 38. 58.  Brian C. H. Fong, “The Future of Hong Kong’s Autonomy: How will China and the West Respond to the Water Revolution?” The Diplomat, October 29, 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/10/the-future-of-hong-kongs-autonomy/. 59.  Erin Hale, “World’s Top Business Group Joins Critics of Hong Kong Extradition Bill,” Voice of America, May 10, 2019, www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/ worlds-top-business-group-joins-critics-hong-kong-extradition-bill. 60.  Separate statements were issued by the International Federation for Journalists, Reporters Without Borders, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and the Society of Publishers in Asia. See Jennifer Creery, “Record Turnout Expected for Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Protest, as Int’l Journalism Organizations Raise Alarm,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 9, 2019, hongkongfp.com/2019/06/09/record-turnout-expected -hong-kongs-anti-extradition-protest-intl-journalism-organisations-raise-alarm/. 61. Of the respondents, 14.4 percent found it “important,” in Tang, Yuen, and Cheng, Onsite Survey Findings, 16. 62. Su Xinqi, Rachel Cheung, and Tony Cheung, “Extradition Bill Protesters Hold ‘Marathon Petition,’ Calling at Hong Kong Consulates of G20 Nations, ahead of Osaka Summit,” South China Morning Post, June 26, 2019, www.scmp .com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3016103/extradition-bill-protesters-carry-out -marathon-petition. 63.  See, for example, Clare Jim and Anne Marie Roantree, “Hong Kong Activists Crowdfund for Anti-Extradition Bill Voice at G20,” Reuters, June 25, 2019, www .reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-extradition-crowdfunding/hong-kong-activists -crowdfund-for-anti-extradition-bill-voice-at-g20-idUSKCN1TQ0OH. 64.  Beijing and pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong have alleged that protesters took foreign money to disrupt Hong Kong. However, no solid proof has been provided; see Jeffie Lam, Catherine Wong, and Victor Ting, “Discussion of Hong Kong Extradition Bill Will Not Be Allowed at G20 Summit in Osaka, Beijing Says,” South China Morning Post, June 24, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong -kong/politics/article/3015792/discussion-hong-kong-extradition-bill-will-not-be -allowed. For international concern, see, for example: Agencies, “Germany’s Angela Merkel Renews Call for Peaceful Resolution to Hong Kong Protests,” South China Morning Post, September 7, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/ article/3026175/germanys-angela-merkel-renews-call-peaceful-resolution-hong; Marine Pennetier, “France’s Macron Says He Raised the Hong Kong Situation with Xi Jinping,” Reuters, November 6, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong -protests-macron/frances-macron-says-he-raised-the-hong-kong-situation-with-xi -jinping-idUSKBN1XG1JO. 65. Michael C. Bender and Chao Deng, “Trump Calls Hong Kong Protests ‘Complicating Factor’ in Trade Talks,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2019,



“If Not Us, Who?” 73

www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-calls-for-u-s-china-cooperation-at-critical-junc ture-11574422912. 66.  Sympathy among Americans: 68 percent of Americans state that the United States should support the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong—“even if it angers China.” See Ronald Reagan President Foundation and Institute, “Annual Reagan National Defense Survey Shows Broad Support for Peace Through Strength, American Leadership in the World: Americans Now View China as Greatest Threat,” November 26, 2019, www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355273/reagan-institute -2019-defense-survey-release-final.pdf. 67.  Jasmine Leung, “Beijing Hits out after Trump Signs Law Backing Hong Kong Rights,” NBC News, November 28, 2019, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/beijing -hits-out-after-trump-signs-laws-backing-hong-kong-n1092991. 68.  Tania Branigan, “Hong Kong Protests: Calls Grow to Give Citizens Right to Live and Work in UK,” The Guardian, September 1, 2019, www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/sep/02/hong-kong-protests-calls-grow-to-give-citizens-right-to-live-and -work-in-uk. 69.  Stuart Lau, “Britain Urges China to Ensure Hong Kong’s Freedoms on Joint Declaration Anniversary amidst Protest Turmoil,” South China Morning Post, December 19, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3042713/britain -urges-china-ensure-hong-kongs-freedoms-joint. 70. All-Party Parliamentary Group on Hong Kong, “Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Principles by the Hong Kong Police Force,” APPG, www.hkinquiry.org/. 71.  “Hong Kong Activists Denise Ho and Joshua Wong Testify at US Congressional Hearing on Protests,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 17, 2019, hong kongfp.com/2019/09/17/live-hong-kong-activists-denise-ho-joshua-wong-testify-us -congressional-hearing-protests/. Other major international lobbyists representing protesters in Hong Kong include veteran politicians like Hong Kong’s “father of democracy” Martin Lee and younger activists like those of the Hong Kong Higher Institutions International Affairs Delegation. 72. In solidarity with the June 9 protest in Hong Kong, they organized antiextradition protests in twenty-nine cities. See眾新聞記者編，《六月危城》(香 港：眾新聞，2019)，頁149。 [Reporters of CitizenNews, eds., A City at Risk in June (Hong Kong: Civic Journalists Ltd., 2019), 149]. In late September and early October, thousands rallied in more than forty cities around the world; see Holmes Chan, “In Pictures: Over 40 Cities Hold Anti-Totalitarianism Rallies in Solidarity with Hong Kong Protest Movement,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 30, 2019, hongkongfp.com/2019/09/30/pictures-40-cities-hold-anti-totalitarianism-rallies -solidarity-hong-kong-protest-movement/. 73.  For an overview of pro-democratic overseas Hongkonger groups, see〈國際 戰線：海外撐港組織一年結〉[“International frontline: overseas Hongkonger groups in the past year”], Standnews, June 15, 2020, www.thestandnews.com/politi cs/%E5%9C%8B%E9%9A%9B%E6%88%B0%E7%B7%9A-%E6%B5%B7%E5% A4%96%E6%92%90%E6%B8%AF%E7%B5%84%E7%B9%94%E4%B8%80%E5 %B9%B4%E7%B5%90/.

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74.  Agnes S. Ku, “New Forms of Youth Activism—Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in the Local-National-Global Nexus,” Space and Polity 24, no. 1 (2020): 115. 75.  Kathrin Hille, “Hong Kong Protests Loom Large over Taiwan Election,” Financial Times, December 22, 2019, www.ft.com/content/d1044236-21f4-11ea-92da -f0c92e957a96. 76.  Brian C. H. Fong, “Internationalized Autonomy: Re-Discovering the West’s Stake in Hong Kong,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2020, thediplomat.com/2020/01/ internationalized-autonomy-re-discovering-the-wests-stake-in-hong-kong/. 77. United States: Owen Churchill and Stuart Lau, “US Says Beijing’s New Proposal Undermines Hong Kong’s Semi-Autonomy, with Donald Trump Vowing to Respond ‘Very Strongly’ If It’s Enacted,” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2020, www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3085537/trump-says-us-would-respond -very-strongly-if-china-enacts-national. United Kingdom, Canada, Australia: Estelle Shirbon and Stephen Addison, “UK, Canada, Australia Deeply Concerned at China’s Security Proposals for Hong Kong,” Reuters, May 23, 2020, www.reuters.com/arti cle/us-china-parliament-hongkong-statement/uk-canada-australia-deeply-concerned -at-chinas-security-proposals-for-hong-kong-idUSKBN22Y2CV. 78.  This shift in public opinion was confirmed in a survey conducted in March 2020. See Felix Tam and Clare Jim, “Exclusive: Support for Hong Kong Protesters’ Demands Rises Even as Coronavirus Halts Rallies: Poll,” Reuters, March 27, 2020, www.reuters .com/article/us-hongkong-protests-poll/exclusive-support-for-hong-kong-protesters -demands-rises-even-as-coronavirus-halts-rallies-poll-idUSKBN21E11L.

Chapter Four

Understanding the Use of Violence in the Hong Kong Protests Lai Tsz-him

In the second half of 2019, Hong Kong was shaken by never-ending protests. After peaceful marches in June of one million people followed a week later by two million people, the Hong Kong government refused to withdraw the proposed extradition bill, which would have allowed the extradition of persons in the territory of Hong Kong to mainland China—visitors as well as local people. Instead of offering to negotiate with the protesters, the Hong Kong government permitted the police to fire tear gas and rubber bullets toward them. Hong Kong citizens were outraged by their decision, and more citizens chose to join the protests. Violent clashes between protesters and the police spread throughout the city after the escalated use of force by the police. People from different backgrounds have participated in the protests in various ways. Stronger protesters may be in the frontline of clashes, facing the weapons of the police and throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails in resistance. Younger participants may serve as backup for the frontline, and even elders have found their own ways to support protesters, such as helping protesters hide and escape from the police. The spirit of resistance is, once again, reactivated in these protests. As noted above, millions of people came out in protest of the proposed changes, and the bill was eventually withdrawn in September 2019. However, the protests have morphed from a single issue of anti-extradition into a broader anti-authoritarian movement: a movement about protecting freedom, demands for universal suffrage, and police accountability.1 One of the unique facets of the 2019 Hong Kong protests is the coexistence of using both nonviolent and violent resistance. Instead of criticizing one another, protesters have mutual respect for different ways of resistance. Various slogans, such as “Brothers climb a mountain together; each has to make his own effort” (兄弟爬山，各自努力), “No severing of ties and no snitching” 75

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(不割蓆、不篤灰), and “Peaceful and valiant resistance are inseparable” (和勇不分), have emerged in order to promote solidarity among protesters.2 These slogans have generated a guideline for protesters to practice nonviolent and violent resistance simultaneously. When did protesters start to employ violent tactics? What was the rationale behind their commitment to violence and militancy? How do we understand the meaning of using violence in the local context of Hong Kong and a global history of freedom struggles? To answer these questions in this chapter, I will first trace the origin of using violent tactics back to the 1967 Hong Kong riots and the 2016 Mong Kok civil unrest, illustrating how different protests have set the scene for the current situation. Second, I will recapitulate what kinds of strategies and tactics the protesters utilized. Anonymity, vandalism, vigilantism, and self-defense will be discussed in chronological order. Finally, in light of political scientists’ analyses and scholarly works regarding the U.S. civil rights movement, I will give my understanding of why the protesters act violently and will lead then into a discussion of the nondichotomous thinking of both violent and nonviolent resistance in the process of making social change. THE ORIGIN OF USING VIOLENCE DURING PROTESTS IN HONG KONG The 1967 Hong Kong riots were the first time in the history of Hong Kong after World War II that bomb and arson attacks occurred in the city. Inspired by the Cultural Revolution in mainland China, a group of pro-Communists and their sympathizers organized a labor dispute that led to six months of violence. The local leftists rioted, planted bombs, and struggled with the colonial police. During those six months, more than fifty people were killed, and at least eight hundred were injured by bomb and arson attacks.3 Some of the victims were neither pro-Communist nor pro-colonial but were simply citizens who were located next to the planted bombs at the wrong time. The chaos and violence created by the extreme leftists pushed Hong Kong citizens to sympathize with the colonial police. Afterward, bomb and arson attacks became a symbol of pro-Communist dispositions and anti–social harmony. Hong Kong’s people did not use these violent tactics to protest until the 2019 protests in which bomb and arson attacks occurred in a very different sociopolitical context. The threat created by the 1967 riots imposed tremendous pressure on the colonial government. To suppress the leftists by the authority of the rule of



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law, the colonial government invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance that was first introduced in 1922. This ordinance allowed the colonial government to “make any regulations whatsoever which he [or she] may consider desirable in the public interest.”4 Throughout 1967, the colonial government implemented twelve different emergency regulations. These regulations allowed the police to aggressively arrest leftist leaders, search leftist-related organizations on a regular basis, and show less restraint over the use of force in handling the crowds, such as employing batons, tear gas, and wooden bullets. According to Ray Yep, the suppression was “merciless and even brutal at times,”5 but it was efficacious in cracking down on the leftists, and social order was gradually restored by the end of 1967. Following the 1967 riots, the British colonial government introduced social reforms in order to maintain their legitimacy to rule Hong Kong. These reform policies, with the support of local elites, helped the Hong Kong economy to grow rapidly. The newer generation, especially those who were born in Hong Kong, no longer considered Hong Kong as a refugee city and had a stronger sense of belonging to Hong Kong. They were more willing to have social reforms in place of political revolutions.6 By the end of British colonial rule, Hong Kong people no longer had spectacular violent clashes with the police. The firing of tear gas toward crowds of protesters did not happen again until the Umbrella Movement of 2014, and the use of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance for civil unrest was not employed until the 2019 protests. People maintained their belief in peaceful and nonviolent protests until the failure of the Umbrella Movement in 2014. After the sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, the frequency of massive protests calling for democracy increased. In the fall of 2014, the citizens of Hong Kong engaged in a large-scale, pro-democracy occupation movement. Protesters occupied the main streets of three different busy commercial districts of Hong Kong for seventy-nine days. The media labeled these protests the “Umbrella Movement” because protesters used their umbrellas as a shield to protect themselves from pepper spray and tear gas fired by the police. While the movement was successful in illustrating the determination of the people in their fight for democracy, the lack of progress in the democratization of Hong Kong’s political system led to frustration and rendered it a failure. Protesters’ hard work that ended in futility caused many of them to question their trust in the use of civil disobedience. Meanwhile, the occupation of the Umbrella Movement caused the Hong Kong government to gradually militarize the police force. The Special Tactical Squad (nicknamed “Raptors”) was formed amid the Umbrella Movement to handle protesters.7 Since then, the Special Tactical

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Squad and the Police Tactical Unit have both served as paramilitary task forces on the frontline. Each member is well equipped with a helmet, respirator, armor, and a variety of nonlethal and lethal weapons.8 In addition to expanded units of the police force, the Hong Kong government also purchased three specialized crowd management vehicles (commonly known as “water cannons”) in 2018. The normalization of paramilitary task forces and the first deployment of water cannons became the main physical force to suppress protesters in 2019. One-and-a-half years after the Umbrella Movement, a violent clash caused by the Hong Kong government’s strict regulation on unlicensed street hawkers occurred during Chinese New Year in 2016. Enforcement of the law triggered thousands of people to gather on the street. People threw bricks, bottles, and trash bins at police, and the police struck back with pepper spray and batons. One police officer fired two warning shots into the air. That night ninety police officers were injured, and at least fifty-four people were arrested. It was the first time Hong Kong people used violent tactics to protest after Hong Kong’s handover to China.9 It was also the first time the government defined public dissent as a riot since 1967. After that night, Edward Tin-kei Leung and his political party, Hong Kong Indigenous, encouraged their supporters to show up on the site of the clash. Leung’s political party was one of the earliest political parties that employed violent tactics and asked their followers to protest with a black bloc suit.10 His advocacy of “valiant and militant resistance” (勇武抗爭) and participation in the clash led to him being charged for rioting. He was sentenced to imprisonment of six years. In addition to Leung, some of his colleagues were also imprisoned or exiled outside of Hong Kong. Although Leung and his colleagues have not been bodily present in the 2019 protests, their political thoughts of “valiant and militant resistance” have been reactivated. One of the slogans coined by Leung, “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” (光復香港，時代革命), has developed into a significant slogan shouted by Hong Kong’s people throughout the protests. For almost fifty years, between the Hong Kong 1967 riots and February of 2016, Hong Kong people practiced peaceful and nonviolent resistance. During the occupation of the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the practice of nonviolent resistance reached its peak. The failure of the Umbrella Movement to achieve any meaningful political reform made Hong Kong people question the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance in the face of an authoritarian regime. Simultaneously, the Hong Kong government militarized the police for future demonstrations of dissent. As a result, the violent clash of 2016 in Mong Kok became the starting point for both sides to act violently, and new spirals of violence emerged in 2019.



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THE USE OF ANONYMITY AND VANDALISM IN THE PROTESTS After the first march of one million people on June 9, protesters gathered again outside the Central Government Complex (the headquarters of the Hong Kong government) on June 12 with a plan to surround the building as they did during the Umbrella Movement. However, this time the police fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and bean bag rounds intensively in order to disperse protesters and discourage them from gathering. During this confrontation and chaos, seventy-two people were injured and sent to hospitals. One injured person, a secondary school teacher, lost his right eye because of the direct attack with rubber bullets.11 The police also fired two canisters of tear gas toward the trapped and panicking crowd inside a business tower as the protesters found no other way to escape. After that day, Amnesty International published a report detailing fourteen instances of excessive use of force by the police and denounced “the use of force by police in the largely peaceful protest that took place on June 12 [that] violated international human rights law and standards.”12 Considering the government responded to the peaceful protest by firing rubber bullets and tear gas and declaring it a riot, the protesters were outraged and escalated their actions to a militant level. Frontline protesters adopted the black bloc tactic again by wearing black and concealing their faces and hair with yellow hard hats, goggles, and gas masks. Yellow hard hats were used to protect protesters against baton attacks, the goggles protected their eyes from rubber bullets, and gas masks were used to filter tear gas. Protesters who did not wear protective equipment were asked to refrain from participating at the frontline, and equipment was often shared among protesters. The uniformity of wearing protective equipment lowered a barrier for participation, making it more difficult for the police to identify protesters as they all were anonymous. The protest on July 1 marked a high point of black bloc protesting. Hundreds of black bloc protesters stormed the Central Government Complex and successfully entered the Legislative Council. They damaged portraits of proBeijing lawmakers, trashed office and computer equipment, and vandalized walls with graffiti saying, “Hong Kong is not China yet,” “China will pay for its crimes against Uighur Muslims,” and a stunning phrase in Chinese that describes their reason for militant protest: “It was you who told me peaceful marches did not work.”13 Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor condemned the vandalism immediately the next day at 4:00 a.m., a time in which Western journalists could forward her message through the evening news in the United States. Her words did not receive any echoes from local Hong Kong people though.

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Instead, a renowned Hong Kong author, Kai-cheung Dung, showed his sympathy to the protesters: True, they destroyed things, but they were not rioters. They destroyed things in an orderly way, in a controlled way. Their destruction was a symbolic act, a means of stating their position, a means of expressing their righteous indignation. In the course of doing so, they did not harm a single person. . . . On the contrary, they were prepared to sacrifice themselves. Should we not reflect upon our understanding of violence? . . . Damaging the inanimate objects inside LegCo [Legislative Council], is that violence? This is an expression of anger against a useless government, the shameless pro-establishment political parties and an undemocratic system.14

THE USE OF VIGILANTISM AND SELF-DEFENSE IN THE PROTESTS As mentioned earlier, bomb and arson attacks were formerly a taboo in Hong Kong’s social movements, often seen as a reflection of the pain and trauma of the 1967 riots. However, given the escalated force of police repression, bomb and arson attacks were destigmatized during the 2019 protests. After the 2016 violent clash in February in Mong Kok, protesters learned that fire can be used as a temporary barrier between the protesters and the police. As a result, when the police used water cannons and rubber bullets in the demonstrations, protesters threw Molotov cocktails toward the police, diminishing their advance. The first day Molotov cocktails were thrown was June 7, two days before the march of one million people. Mainstream society believed, though, that this attack was not the plan and tactic of protesters but rather of pro-Beijing gangs as a kind of inside job. The reason for using this deceptive ploy would be to discourage Hong Kong people from participating in the June 9 march. To their dismay, however, the results of this inside job were not what they expected.15 According to a local newspaper, Apple Daily, the protest on July 21 in Sai Wan was the first day when confirmed protesters began to throw Molotov cocktails.16 That night protesters vandalized the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government (Beijing’s headquarters in Hong Kong) and set fires to retreat safely. Meanwhile, in Yuen Long in the northern New Territories near the border with the mainland, one hundred men in white shirts physically attacked both protesters who were returning home as well as ordinary people not involved in any protests. They used sticks and metal bars to attack, at random, anyone in the Yuen Long train station. The police did not arrive in



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the train station until thirty-nine minutes later, after all of the attackers had left. The Yuen Long attack is believed to have been operated by gangs of triad members and led many to believe that the police were in collusion with them.17 The Yuen Long attack shocked Hong Kong, and it became a tipping point in the process of radicalization. After the Yuen Long attack, Hong Kong people began calling the police “rogue police” (黑警), describing them as the same as triad gangs, in other words, organized crime members. Protesters and citizens sensed that their criminal justice system had failed to stand for justice and fairness. One month after the Yuen Long attack, the police arrested about thirty of the original one hundred or so attackers, but only four faced criminal trials.18 This sense of mistrust in the police and justice system subsequently escalated the level of vandalism. Protesters became vigilantes and damaged specific shops and offices in pursuit of self-perceived justice. Protesters first targeted shops owned by the Fujian Gang, which people suspected was responsible for organizing the Yuen Long attack.19 Later Hong Kong’s subway system, the Mass Transit Railway, or MTR, halted services prior to scheduled protests, thus making it difficult to attend demonstrations and also negating the protesters’ guerilla tactic of quickly and easily moving their protest site from one district to another in the city. Furthermore, the MTR company did not release the August 31 CCTV footage of Prince Edward station when the Special Tactical Squad attacked passengers indiscriminately without any legal consequences.20 People perceived the August 31 incident like the Yuen Long attack—another escalation of violence against the protesters. All of these incidents were like adding fuel to the fire, provoking protesters to seek revenge. Protesters thus started to vandalize subway stations as well as other businesses that were seen as pro-Beijing, such as banks, restaurants, and bookshops.21 Protesters destroyed these properties by breaking windows, torching entrances, and throwing furniture and other items (albeit without looting). According to a report from the MTR company, thirty-nine subway stations—more than 40 percent of the transportation system’s total stations— were damaged to varying degrees. The subway suffered damages of HK$50 million (approximately US$6.4 million).22 Hong Kong financial secretary Paul Chan condemned these vigilante acts as being “close to terrorism,” adding that “the whole of society is being swallowed up by violence and hatred.”23 For protesters, the widespread vandalism of subway stations, banks, and shops aimed to cause economic loss to those business owners and to add pressure on the government. However, the common practice of vigilantism due to a few individual incidents led to questioning the legitimacy and necessity of the protests. After an attack on a mainland Chinese reporter in the Hong Kong International Airport, some media emphasized the acts of vigilantism rather

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than the purpose of the demonstrations. Consequently, protesters and activists advocated that the rule of vigilantism should be in line with the principles of the just war tradition and target property only rather than an individual person.24 However, attacks on people without following suggestions still occurred. The most controversial incident was that of a middle-aged man who was set on fire after a verbal fight with protesters.25 This incident received criticism widely from both sides. To “stop violence and curb disorder” (止暴制亂), the government first intensified their use of force to suppress the increasing vandalism by protesters. In addition to the regular use of pepper spray and tear gas, the police fired a wide variety of nonlethal projectiles and live bullets toward protesters in different parts of the city.26 They also sprayed protesters with blue-colored dye from water cannons (blue-colored dye, though, can cause “burning pain”).27 Second, the government utilized the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, a rarely used colonial law (as previously noted), to ban people from wearing face masks during public assemblies.28 With these new aggressive tactics, more protesters moved away from nonviolence and used violent tactics in every clash without hesitation. Protesters considered throwing Molotov cocktails as a method of self-defense to fight back in their asymmetrical power relationship with the police. In an interview, one protester described how fire was useful in buying time for protesters to retreat: On October 1, one magician (a nickname used to describe a person who throws a Molotov cocktail) in Tuen Mun used fire in a really beautiful way. When the riot police were charging forward to make arrests, someone threw a bomb from a distance, the fire spread very fast. The whole column of riot police and the tactical unit stopped, and all our fellows there could withdraw and escape. That’s the ideal thing we hope to achieve every time when we use fire.29

The most extensive use of Molotov cocktails was recorded during the siege of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU) in November. During these two extremely violent episodes of the protests, the police fired more than one thousand canisters of tear gas and rubber bullets on both campuses. Students used Molotov cocktails, bricks, and arrows to fight back. In the siege of CUHK, more than eighty people were injured, and more than 3,900 ready-for-use Molotov cocktails were found. In the siege of PolyU, more than 1,100 people were arrested in and around the university, and more than 4,000 Molotov cocktails were found.30 These two sieges have been the most bloody and violent clashes throughout the protests. Wilson Wai-ho Wong, a professor working and living on the CUHK campus, shared his witness about the siege and pointed out that attacks on university campuses served as a means to terrorize students, a trap



Understanding the Use of Violence in the Hong Kong Protests 83

to arrest militant protesters, and as a signal to society that the government is determined to restore social order even if it leads to police attacking a place of higher education.31 After the attacks, according to a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, 40 percent of the interviewees gave zero marks to show their disappointment with the police force, and the Hong Kong police received their lowest public satisfaction rating since 1997.32 AN EVALUATION OF USING VIOLENCE In their book Contentious Politics, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow predict that the struggle of autonomy between Hong Kong’s citizens and the Chinese government “will endure for years—perhaps generations.”33 Five years after the Umbrella Movement, their prophecy became true. Hong Kong’s citizens are demanding their political rights again. This time, though, the cycles of protests are even longer, and the scale of participation is even larger, from the past of peaceful and nonviolent means of participation upward to a violent and lethal level. Political scientists have argued that levels and sites of collective violence result from the interaction between protesters’ mobilization and state repression. Charles Brockett says, “Repression generally succeeds in smothering contention if the prior level of mobilization was low. However, if state violence is increased after a protest cycle . . . is well underway, this repression is more likely to provoke even higher levels of challenge, both nonviolent and violent, rather than deter contention.”34 In the case of the 2019 protests, similar to what Brockett suggests, the public has been mobilizing at a tremendous and historical level. The chief provocation for the public to participate in protests is police violence as state repression and government inaction toward the protesters’ demands. Erica Chenoweth suggests that no civil resistance campaign has failed when at least 3.5 percent of the population sustained the movement.35 Given the fact that approximately two million people marched on June 16 in a city with a population of 7.4 million people, more than 25 percent of Hong Kong’s people have thus demonstrated their support for the protests. Hence, political reforms and social change can eventually be expected to occur in the long term. The case of Hong Kong will prove that this 3.5 percent rule is correct, or Hong Kong will become the first case to disprove this rule, given the present state of China’s authoritarian regime with President Xi Jinping described as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Some observers may question the effectiveness of using violence during the protests in Hong Kong. The literature on civil resistance finds that non-

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violent campaigns are more likely to succeed than violent campaigns. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, in their cowritten book Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, suggest that nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts between 1900 and 2006.36 Moreover, another critique of the use of violence is that the dominant media is more likely to frame and reinterpret the images of using violence as random acts of senseless violence, demonizing protesters as rioters and troublemakers. To answer these two concerns, Victoria Tin-bor Hui reminds critics that perhaps protesters did not have many choices when they faced police repression. She tends to believe that the goal of the Chinese central government is to subvert, or to “mainlandize,” to use another term, the Hong Kong police force to act like the People’s Liberation Army.37 Because of constraints contained in the “one country, two systems” framework, the Chinese central government would be in violation of the framework if they sent the army to repress Hong Kong citizens. Moreover, as Hong Kong’s judiciary is relatively autonomous, it is usually a long procedure for arrested protesters to stand trial. When punishment in the form of imprisonment cannot make protesters immediately retreat, and negotiation is not an option, the police are ordered to employ an excessive use of force on protesters to suppress them in the quickest way. In this context, Hui gives us a clearer background of why protesters tend to act violently and throw Molotov cocktails toward the police, for the act of throwing Molotov cocktails has served as a last resort for protesters to adopt. In the just war tradition, force is permissible “if it is the least amount necessary and likely to rebut a greater injustice and is directed against those particularly responsible for the injustice.”38 The next choices for protesters, who are already determined to rebel on the streets, would either be to be placed under arrest by the police, possibly facing the chance of physical and sexual violence,39 or to protest militantly, throwing Molotov cocktails toward the police with the aim of keeping themselves from permanent physical harm. The standard assumption of civil resistance is often that nonviolent campaigns are superior and more effective than violent campaigns. However, in the case of the civil rights movement in the United States, this notion is only partially correct. One of the most frequent misuses of the civil rights movement is that people tend to overemphasize nonviolence, mentioning it as the only driving force behind the movement, as well as to downplay violence (as a form of self-defense), neglecting it as one of the other kinds of activism that coexisted in the movement. In light of local studies in the United States, civil rights scholars suggest that nonviolence and violence are not mutually exclusive but are comple-



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mentary to one another.40 The popular images of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and his normative argument of nonviolence were essential in giving the movement a certain higher moral stature at a national and international level. There were also people who were willing to defend themselves from the death threats of white supremacists in their local daily life. James Farmer, one of the founders of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), an African American civil rights organization that advocated the principles of nonviolence, argued in his autobiography that the violent/nonviolent dichotomy never existed among black people. He said, It is incomprehensible to most white Americans that deep in the heart of every black adult lives some of Malcolm and some of King, side by side. The black experience has not been monolithic, and the black response is seldom without ambivalence. The same audience that showered Martin with “amens” could punctuate Malcolm’s rhetoric with emphatic shouts of “right”!41

Throughout the civil rights movement, there were black people and organizations who advocated and organized armed resistance as a form of selfdefense, such as Malcolm X, Robert F. Williams, Stokely Carmichael, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, and so on. Their affirmation of self-defense did not equally mean that they denied the strategical tactics of nonviolence. Robert Williams, as an author of Negros with Guns, actively participated in sit-ins and other forms of nonviolent direct actions.42 The Deacons for Defense and Justice offered protection for people participating in peaceful marches in Mississippi.43 Malcolm X was famous for his quote demanding freedom, justice, and equality “by any means necessary,” but he never carried a firearm in public.44 The history of their practices challenges the prevalent stereotype of the civil rights movement as solely nonviolent protests and reminds people that armed self-defense is not the opposite of nonviolence. Armed self-defense is a response to racism as physical harm. Nonviolent and violent resistance both simultaneously serve in the broader context of the black freedom struggle. The emerging Black Lives Matter protests continue this nonlinear resistance tradition as protesters resist nonviolently/violently, civilly/uncivilly, and publicly/anonymously all at the same time.45 When the 2019 protests are situated in the global history of freedom struggles, one may say that Hong Kong protesters are similar to other resistance movements, defending their political rights “by any means necessary.” It is not my intention in this chapter to create a new top-down approach of advocating for militant resistance nor to glorify the use of Molotov cocktails. Although this chapter summarizes the use of violence chronologically and classifies violent tactics in four different categories, Hong Kong people have also

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resisted nonviolently and peacefully in many other ways, such as boycotting pro-government businesses and lobbying internationally. The coexistence of numerous means of resistance in Hong Kong underscores the limitations of the violent/nonviolent dichotomy, pointing out that achieving social change is not either peaceful or militant but can be both depending on the context. At this time amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests continue. There is no evidence that Hong Kong people will stop protesting until an independent inquiry into police brutality and political reforms occur. It may still be too early to conclude the (in)effectiveness of using violence in the protests; but as scholars suggest that public mobilization and state repression are in a dialectical relationship, more forceful state repression will most likely trigger a more massive public mobilization. As long as the Chinese-Hong Kong governments permit the police to suppress protesters through the excessive use of force, the protesters and civil society will not be silent. The question of “When will people stop resisting?” will not be answered by the protesters. Rather, the question will remain, “When will the government listen to the voices of their citizens?” NOTES 1. Francis L. F. Lee et al., “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising: From AntiExtradition to Anti-Authoritarian Protests,” The China Review 19, no. 4 (November 2019): 1–32. 2.  Francis Lee, “Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong,” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 18–32, doi.org/10.1080/1467271 5.2020.1700629. 3.  Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 123. 4.  Ray Yep, “Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong: Emergency Powers, Administration of Justice and the Turbulent Year of 1967,” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 4 (2012): 1012, doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000369. 5.  Ray Yep, “Confrontation, State Repression and the Autonomy of Metropolitan Hong Kong,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (New York: Routledge, 2018), 231. 6.  Ngok Ma, “From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience: Hong Kong’s Road to Occupation,” in The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, ed. Ngok Ma and Edmund W. Cheng (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), 29. 7.〈藍衣軍正名「特別戰術小隊」〉 [Blue Shirt Unit officially named the Special Tactical Squad], The Sun, December 1, 2014, the-sun.on.cc/cnt/news/20141201/ 00407_026.html.



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8. “Hong Kong Police Riot Squad’s Equipment in Detail,” South China Morning Post, February 17, 2016, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/ article/1913695/hong-kong-police-riot-squads-equipment-detail. 9.  Sonia Lam-Knott, “Understanding Protest ‘Violence’ in Hong Kong from the Youth Perspective,” Asian Anthropology 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 279–98, doi.or g/10.1080/1683478X.2017.1374622. 10.  Some might argue that Horace Wan-kan Chin (also known by Chin Wan 陳雲) and his followers are the earliest political party to advocate for violent resistance. See 鄭煒、袁瑋熙編，《社運年代 ：香港抗爭政治的軌跡》(香港 ： 香港中文大學 出版社，2018) ，第12章 。 [Edmund W. Cheng and Samson Wai-hei Yuen, eds., An Epoch of Social Movements: Trajectory of Contentious Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2018), chapter 12]. 11.  “Bricks, Bottles and Tear Gas: Protesters and Police Battle in Hong Kong,” New York Times, June 11, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/world/asia/hong -kong-protest-extradition.html. 12.  Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Arbitrary Arrests, Brutal Beatings and Torture in Police Detention Revealed,” Amnesty International Hong Kong, September 19, 2019, www.amnesty.org.hk/en/hong-kong-arbitrary-arrests-brutal-beatings -and-torture-in-police-detention-revealed/. 13. Antony Dapiran, City on Fire: The Fight for Hong Kong (London: Scribe Publications, 2020), 95. 14. Dapiran, City on Fire, 93. 15.  Christy Leung, Naomi Ng, and Lok-kei Sum, “Four Men with Triad Links Arrested over Petrol Bomb Attacks on Police,” South China Morning Post, June 7, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3013507/firebomb -hurled-patrol-van-early-morning-hong-kong. 16.  佘錦洪，〈火魔法師之煉成 只守不攻避免傷人〉 [She Kam-hung, “The refining process of fire wizard: only defend, not attack, and avoid hurting people”], Apple Daily, September 24, 2019, hk.appledaily.com/local/20190923/5B5QW4NGB P6ILO2D26ABSSFXLI/. 17.  Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (October 14, 2019): 9, doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672397. 18.  Chris Lau, “Two Men Charged with Rioting over Hong Kong Train Station Attack on Protesters and Passengers Denied Bail,” South China Morning Post, August 26, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3024404/two -men-charged-rioting-over-hong-kong-train-station. 19. “What Is the Point of Vandalizing the Shops? A Look at the ‘Renovation’ Movement,” Wallpaper, October 26, 2019, firsthand-news.web.app/article/20092. 20.  Vincent Wong, “The ‘831’ Prince Edward MTR Incident Proves Hong Kong Urgently Needs Access to Information Reform,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 22, 2019, hongkongfp.com/2019/09/22/831-prince-edward-mtr-incident-proves -hong-kong-urgently-needs-access-information-reform/. 21. Enoch Yiu, “Five Banks Keep 13 Branches Shut and Hundreds of ATMs Offline after Vandals Attacked China-Linked Companies in Hong Kong,” South

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China Morning Post, October 8, 2019, www.scmp.com/business/companies/ article/3032031/five-banks-keep-13-branches-shut-and-hundreds-atms-offline-after. 22.  Cannix Yau, “Hong Kong’s MTR Corporation Pays Heavy Price for Protesters’ Wrath with Damage Estimate at HK$50 Million,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/transport/article/3025576/ hong-kongs-mtr-corporation-pays-heavy-price-protesters. 23.  Kang-chung Ng, “Hong Kong Protests: Violence and Hatred ‘Swallowing Up’ City and Pushing It to Brink of Worst Recession since 1997 Handover, Finance Chief Paul Chan Warns,” South China Morning Post, November 17, 2019, www.scmp.com/ news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3038112/hong-kong-protests-violence -and-hatred-swallowing. 24.〈勇武和理非大和解，終極行動守則上線了〉[The unity of peaceful and valiant resistance: ultimate rules of action], Lihkg, August 15, 2019, lihkg.com/ thread/1474951/page/1; 郭志， 〈義戰、私了、裝修......「勇武」的可與不可〉 [Kwok Chi, “Just fight, vigilante, vandalism . . . the “should” and “shouldn’t” of valiant resistance”], Initium Media, October 11, 2019, theinitium.com/article/20191011 -opinion-hk-movement-reflection/. 25.  AFP, “Hong Kong Police Say Man Was Set Alight after Arguing with Protesters,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 11, 2019, hongkongfp.com/2019/11/11/ hong-kong-police-say-man-set-alight-arguing-protesters/. 26.  “Weapons of Mass Control, Tactics of Mass Resistance,” Reuters, October 31, 2019, www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hong-kong-protests-violence/. 27.  Emily Tsang, “Indelible Blue Dye Fired from Water Cannons by Hong Kong Police—Protesters Adjust with New Clothes and Removal Tips,” South China Morning Post, September 1, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/ 3025234/indelible-blue-dye-fired-water-cannons-hong-kong-police. 28.  Hong Kong’s Court of Appeal ruled on April 9, 2020, that the ban on wearing masks was partially unconstitutional. For the detail, see Jessie Pang, “Hong Kong Court Rules That Blanket Ban on Masks Is Unconstitutional,” Reuters, April 9, 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-masks-idUSKCN21R193. 29.  “Three Youngsters Who Start Fires: How Did Moderate Protesters Become ‘Fire Magicians’?” Standnews, October 22, 2019, thestandnews.com/politics/three -youngsters-who-start-fires-how-did-moderate-protesters-become-fire-magicians/. 30.  Channel News Asia, “Hong Kong Protests: 1,100 People Arrested in a Day, 3,900 Petrol Bombs Found at University,” CNA, November 29, 2019, www.chan nelnewsasia.com/news/asia/hong-kong-protests-people-arrested-petrol-bombs-cuhk -polyu-12107494. 31.〈黃偉豪教授訪問〉[Interview with Professor Wilson Wai-ho Wong], Epoch Times, November 22, 2019, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBt90HuxSjU. 32.  “POP Releases Popularity Figures of Hong Kong Disciplinary Forces and the PLA Hong Kong Garrison,” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, December 6, 2019, www.pori.hk/press-release/2019/20191206-eng. 33.  Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 93.



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34.  Charles D. Brockett, Political Movements and Violence in Central America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 327, cited in Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 175. 35.  “The 3.5% Rule” actually is not mentioned in her book Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, cowritten with Maria Stephan. She analyzed later and presented this argument in a TEDx Boulder talk in 2013. See Erica Chenoweth, “My Talk at TEDxBoulder: Civil Resistance and the ‘3.5% Rule,’” Rational Insurgent, November 4, 2013, rationalinsurgent.com/2013/11/04/my-talk-at -tedxboulder-civil-resistance-and-the-3-5-rule/. 36.  Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 69. 37.  Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Beijing’s Hard and Soft Repression in Hong Kong,” Orbis 64, no. 2 (January 1, 2020): 289–311, doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.010. 38.  Thaddeus Metz, “The South African Student/Worker Protests in the Light of Just War Theory,” in Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South Africa, ed. Susan Booysen (Johannesburg, South Africa: Wits University Press, 2016), 293. 39.  Chris Lau, “Student Protester Who Accused Police of Sexual Violence Seeks Legal Advice,” South China Morning Post, October 11, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3032610/hong-kong-student-who-accused-police -sexual-violence. 40. Emilye Crosby, “It Wasn’t the Wild West: Keeping Local Studies in SelfDefense Historiography,” in Civil Rights History from the Ground Up: Local Struggles, a National Movement, ed. Emilye Crosby (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 194–255; Christopher B. Strain, “The Ballot and the Bullet: Rethinking the Violent/Nonviolent Dichotomy,” in Understanding and Teaching the Civil Rights Movement, ed. Hasan Kwame Jeferies (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), 83–94. 41. James Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Plume, 1985), 224. 42.  Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 43.  Lance Hill, The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), chapter 11. 44.  Strain, “The Ballot and the Bullet,” 87. 45.  For the philosophical discussion on civil and uncivil disobedience, see Candice Delmas, A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Part II

THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE HONG KONG PROTESTS

Chapter Five

Biblical Allusions on the Hong Kong Protests Philip P. Chia

This day of torment, of craziness, of foolishness—only love can make it end in happiness and joy. —W. A. Mozart and Lorenzo Da Ponte, Le Nozze di Figaro (1786) Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment and the other by acts of love. Power based on love is a thousand times more effective and permanent than the one derived from fear of punishment. —Mahatma Gandhi

One of the heart-wrenching agonies from the current wave1 of the Hong Kong protests in which millions have taken to the street to protest a proposed extradition law is the ill effect resulting from unjust police brutality and intimidation. The police have used excessive force to coerce protesters into submission, cause severe physical harm, and deny citizens’ legal rights to protest and enjoy freedom of expression and assembly. This chapter explores the political theology of the Hong Kong protests, first by engaging with the political philosophy of Jason Brennan, who validates and defends the political philosophy of the moral parity thesis. His work is worth considering because of the possibility of increased confrontation between Hong Kong’s people and the government if the government persists in using force to rule with fear and terror while supported by the Chinese government, which wants to assert tighter control over Hong Kong. The chapter proceeds to relate theologically and biblically the condition of Hong Kong’s protests with the succession narratives from David and Solomon to Rehoboam and Jeroboam. The goal is to search for potential solutions or insights that could be considered as divinely sanctioned action from the 93

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ancient context while drawing allusions to the present Hong Kong situation.2 It is not the intention of this chapter though to instigate or promote any form of violence or revolution. As the socioeconomic conditions of the city continue to worsen and with low public confidence and low morality among senior government officials, increased confrontation is in sight. It is urgent to search for any potential biblical and theological directions or allusions that may illumine the present situation. THE HONG KONG PROTESTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY It was alarming to see the police’s use of excessive tear gas, firing more than 2,300 tear gas canisters into the campus of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and chasing and arresting students on the evenings of November 12 and 13, 2019. Earlier, on July 21, the police had allegedly colluded with the triads in Yuen Long, who struck civilians with weapons indiscriminately and chased them all the way into the train station and inside the train cabins where there was no escape from their ruthless attack. This incident caught many people by surprise because it was quite unimaginable to see such violence in Hong Kong under the watch of a supposedly highly acclaimed and creditable police force. Furthermore, the crushing and beating of civilians by the police in the Prince Edward subway station on August 31 cast serious doubts on the professionalism of the police force, whose reputation took half a century to establish.3 Videos of frequent beatings and clubbings by the police during the protests were livestreamed and broadcast through the mass media and social media worldwide, causing extremely strong criticism of the use of excessive force that harshly and unjustly clamped down on civilians. Most of these people were unarmed civilians—primary, secondary, and college students as well as housewives, street shoppers, commuters on public transport, and bystanders who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. The question raised about the right of the government and its agents to crush civilians unjustly is no small matter for this international financial center. Police brutality turned this relatively peaceful, commercialized, and densely populated cosmopolitan city into a battleground on its sidewalks and streets, which were filled with tear gas, smoke, and fires. Despite the many arrests and the denial of rightful legal protection for those arrested and despite unconfirmed rumors about police “torture,” “people made to disappear,” or even causing the “passive suicide” of some arrested protesters, resistance continued unabated. There was a continuous outflow of younger protesters with persistence and determination, greater courage and boldness, wisdom and skill to sustain the protests with



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stamina and stronger resistance that we have not witnessed before. A whole new breed of Hong Kong youngsters who love their city and are willing to sacrifice their lives for it has been born. Police brutality is a serious violation of the Hong Kong police’s code of conduct and discipline. The government’s rejection of setting up an independent inquiry into the conduct of the police has caused a strong public uproar. The police’s total disregard for the rule of law in carrying out their operations without any checks and balances whatsoever on their use of force when engaging unarmed civilians in protests has led to the unavoidable question: what can civilians do when they are exercising their rights as citizens but are met with unjust and uncalled-for police brutality? Is there any right for self-defense against any unjust government or government agents who brutalize common civilians? The unchecked police brutality that would transform Hong Kong into a “police state” cannot be ignored and unchallenged even if there might not be any immediate outcomes or practical solutions. This issue requires sustained theoretical, philosophical, theological, or biblical investigations. JASON BRENNAN’S MORAL PARITY THESIS Jason Brennan, an American analytic political philosopher and business professor at Georgetown University, proposes and defends the “moral parity thesis” in his radical and provocative book When All Else Fails: The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice.4 His work provides some insights for the grievous situation in the Hong Kong protests. Brennan begins by noting that there are those who “often assume or argue that in liberal democracies, only nonviolent resistance to state injustice is permissible. They assume that we must defer to democratic government agents, even when these agents act in deeply unjust, harmful, and destructive ways.”5 The traditional options are limited to three major ways of responding to government injustice. He writes, “Many philosophers and laypeople seem to believe that when we react to political oppression and injustice, our options are limited to exit, voice, or loyalty. Some think that we have obligations to participate in politics, protest, engage in political campaigns, and push for social change through political channels.”6 He refers to the earlier work of political economist Albert Hirschman, who has analyzed these three popular options of “exit, voice, and loyalty.”7 Brennan argues that many people believe that, “when government acts badly, we are morally obligated to protest, write letters to newspaper editors and senators, and vote for better candidates. But, they think, we’re not supposed to stop injustice ourselves.”8 Many people

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instead have chosen to keep quiet and emigrate to another country. The general responses in Hong Kong have followed the pattern that Brennan has observed: “When a government issues an unjust command, behaves unjustly, or passes an unjust law, we may only comply, complain, or quit.”9 Brennan, however, adds a fourth option—resistance, which covers a wide range of behaviors.10 He contends that it is a false claim that “there is a special burden to justify interfering with, trying to stop, or fighting back against government agents who, acting ex-officio, commit injustice.”11 He concludes that (1) the special immunity thesis is false and (2) the morality parity thesis is true. The special immunity thesis holds that government agents—or at least the agents of democratic governments—enjoy a special immunity against being deceived, lied to, sabotaged, attacked, or killed in self-defence or the defence of others. Government property enjoys a special immunity against being damaged, sabotaged, or destroyed. The set of conditions under which it is permissible, in self-defence or the defence of others, to deceive, lie to, sabotage, or use force against a government agent (acting ex officio), or destroy government property, is much more stringent as well as tightly constrained than the set of conditions under which it is permissible to deceive, lie to, sabotage, attack, or kill a private civilian, or destroy private property.12

Brennan disagrees with this view and instead argues that government officials are not immune from defensive actions when they commit injustice. When they do so, it is morally permissive to treat them the same way we would treat private individuals committing such injustices. Brennan argues in favor of the moral parity thesis and elaborates that the conditions under which a person may, in self-defence or the defence of others, deceive, lie to, sabotage, attack, or kill a fellow civilian, or destroy private property, are also conditions under which a civilian may do the same to a government agent (acting ex officio) or government property. . . . The moral parity thesis holds that democratic government agents, property, and agencies are as much legitimate targets of defensive deception, sabotage, or violence as civilians are. The principles explaining how we may use defensive violence and subterfuge against civilians, and the principles explaining how we may use defensive violence and subterfuge against government agents, are one and the same. Government agents (including citizens when they vote) who commit injustice are on par with civilians who commit the same injustices.13

But what about civilians living under different systems of government, say, nondemocratic systems of government? Will there be any difference in the defensive action argument?



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Brennan maintains that his moral parity thesis is not affected by the system of government based on the principle “that we may do to them whatever we may do to each other” and highlights the fact that democratic officials often do things that they have no right to do and that we have no duty to let them do. “When government becomes the enemy, we may protect ourselves. Our rights do not disappear because senators voted to ignore them or because a cop is having a bad day.”14 This fundamental basis of Brennan’s arguments can find its roots in the Judeo-Christian teaching in Exodus 21:23–25, Leviticus 24:19–21, and Deuteronomy 19:21.15 It also resonates with Jesus’s teaching of do not return evil with evil in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:38–42). Brennan’s thesis dwells more on the “defensive” motive rather than the “offensive” revenge motive as he clearly states that defensive action is not the same as vengeance and that he is not defending “revenge or inflicting private punishment.”16 The concept of “moral parity” argues for the right to a defensive action or defensive resistance, or even potentially defensive violence,17 and that “the government and its agents do not enjoy any kind of special immunity against defensive action. When government agents commit injustice, they are liable to be deceived, sabotaged, injured, or even attacked, in the same way civilians would be.”18 Brennan further adds that “one important question for political philosophers is when, if ever, an ordinary citizen may justifiably use defensive actions, including defensive violence, against a president, congressperson, bureaucrat, soldier, or police officer, or against government property.”19 Although Brennan does not totally and categorically rule out the possibility of engaging in violence in the course of action in a real situation, he is careful in distinguishing self-defense with revolution and violent social change and is extremely cautious in applying defensive violent actions: Violence is an awful tool. It’s not exactly a last resort, but it’s rarely a first one. I have not argued for anarchism, violent revolution, or even peaceful revolution. I have not defended a theory of social change, or articulated a platform for revising unjust laws or removing systematic patterns of oppressions. These are difficult problems, and it’s unclear whether social scientists have made much progress identifying what works and what does not. My goal here has been quite limited: I have merely argued that you may defend yourself and others from particular acts of government injustice in the same way that you may defend yourself and others from particular acts of civilian injustice.20

Brennan’s book pushes us to reflect on the relationship between the ethical and the political in the messy and complex situations of social change

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and resistance. Christians cannot stay in their comfort zone as if religion and politics are separated. Daniel Bell has reminded us that there is “no political sphere that is devoid of theological depth and so immune from theological direction. To the contrary, human nature, and so every dimension of human life, is always already imbued with transcendent depth. Consequently, it is not possible to cordon off social and political concerns from more conventionally theological concerns like salvation and eternal life.”21 Brennan is conservative, if not overly cautious, in his advocacy for defensive action instead of social revolution in the sense of overthrowing a government. The biblical account of succession narratives, however, may think otherwise, which will be discussed in the next section. The situation of Hong Kong requires us to think about if there are any divinely sanctioned actions or revolts that may be supported biblically and theologically. A more serious question—theoretically, theologically, biblically, and, of course, hypothetically—that may be put forth in view of the Hong Kong protests would be: is there any divinely sanctioned “rebellion” or “revolution” that is biblically inspired or supported? This issue is important in the wider political context in Asia with the persecution of religious and ethnic minorities in China and other Asian countries, the suppression of religious freedom, and the harassment of church leaders and Christian communities in different countries. I will explore the different options in ancient Israel in response to unjust governments and oppression with the hope to provide a biblical basis to justify the consideration of certain actions given the grievous situation of social upheaval in Hong Kong. Countless young people courageously have taken to the streets with the knowledge that law and order might not protect their rights as citizens, and they have tried to make the situation known to the world to solicit international support. SUCCESSION NARRATIVES: FROM DAVID AND SOLOMON TO REHOBOAM AND JEROBOAM This section focuses on the effects of the changes and transfers of monarchical power when ancient Israel transitioned from a united monarchy under David and Solomon to the era of the divided kingdom—the North being Israel/ Ephraim/Samaria and the South being Judah/Jacob/Jerusalem. The succession of monarchs from David and Solomon to Rehoboam and Jeroboam from the tenth to the eighth century BCE in the promised land of milk and honey was a highly politically charged situation with theological implications in the biblical account. King Solomon had centralized the government, and his successor, King Rehoboam, rejected the advice of the senior council members



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of his father and opted for his young friends’ advice, making him a “clown” ruler. The succession narratives provide biblical and theological insights on the recent development of the increased control of China over Hong Kong that has led to massive unrest and protest. Could rebellion against the seated monarch and ousting the king from the royal blood of the Davidic kingdom be a divinely sanctioned coup d’état? From David as the anointed king taking over from the first king Saul (1 Sam. 16:12–13; 2 Sam. 5:1–10; 1 Chron. 11:1–3) to Solomon as the successor of the Davidic dynasty, the monarchy had turned sour, and Solomon quickly became the king abandoned. The Davidic kingdom was divided into two parts right after King Solomon. What happened, according to the biblical account, was incredible and unbelievable with the role of Yahweh being involved in the process as the kingmaker and also the kingdom-divider. Because of the fear of a coup d’état after his death and before Solomon could firmly establish his grip and monarchical power over the nation, the aging King David instigated a series of defensive and offensive acts for Solomon to implement when he assumed the throne so that his kingship might be stable with all of his enemies removed one way or the other (1 Kings 2:1–9). From Solomon the (Un)Wise to Rehoboam the Clown Solomon was anointed to succeed and rule the kingdom (1 Kings 2:1–4, 10–12; 3:2–14; 1 Chron. 23:1; 29:22–28; 2 Chron. 1:1). Despite all the blessings received in the “dream” (1 Kings 3:5–15) and “wisdom” events (1 Kings 3:16–28; 4:29–34; 10:1–10; 2 Chron. 9:1–12), affirming Solomon as the divinely anointed king to rule over all Israel, Solomon was abandoned by the Lord not long after (1 Kings 11:9–13, 33–34, 39). The divine anointment of kingship did not guarantee a long-lasting kingship. The Lord said, “Since this has been your mind and you have not kept my covenant and my statutes that I have commanded you, I will surely tear the kingdom from you and give it to your servant. Yet for the sake of your father David I will not do it in your lifetime; I will tear it out of the hand of your son” (1 Kings 11:11–12). After the death of King Solomon, the throne was passed on to his son Rehoboam (1 Kings 11:42–43; 2 Chron. 9:29–31). It was the beginning of the end of the one great Davidic kingdom of Israel, which split into two kingdoms. The split of the kingdom of David and Solomon was largely due to the ignorance of a “clown” king, Rehoboam, who succeeded to the throne with a fraction of the wisdom of his predecessor. The split came when Rehoboam rejected the demands of the oppressed ten tribes of the North who came to demand a cut in their taxes and a lighter burden, for they toiled under the weight of Solomon’s harsh rule (1 Kings 12:1–20; 2 Chron. 10:1–19).

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Apparently, the rule of Solomon reflected rule by fear and terror.22 When his labor superintendent Jeroboam attempted to reflect the discontent of the people of the North who felt much oppressed by the policies of Solomon’s central government, instead of reviewing and changing his policies, Solomon confronted Jeroboam by ruthlessly issuing an “assassin order” with a price tag on Jeroboam’s head. As a result, Jeroboam had to flee to Egypt to seek protection (1 Kings 11:40). When representatives of the northern ten tribes requested a meeting with Rehoboam and demanded a change of the relationship between the central government and the local northern tribes, Rehoboam firmly rejected their demands after three days of consultations with both senior councils of his father’s court and those councils of his own peers (1 Kings 12:1–20; 2 Chron. 10:1–19). Although it is not clear as to the reasons for Rehoboam to go to Shechem, according to 1 Kings 12:1, “Rehoboam went to Shechem, for all Israel had come to Shechem to make him king.” The crowning of him as king over all Israel required the consensus of the northern ten tribes. There are debates,23 however, about the reasons for Rehoboam’s involvement in the gathering at Shechem. Despite the debates, it is clear that the voices of the local people had never been heard by Solomon’s central government as it was passed down to Rehoboam. The discontent among the people grew, and their grievances could be traced as far back as David’s reign and forty years of Solomon’s rule. Anger and discontent would eventually erupt if the situation was not handled with great sensitivity toward the people who labored under oppressive rule. As a result, a new kingdom was born, the northern kingdom of Israel, as the united kingdom split into the North and the South after King Solomon. The Rise of Jeroboam: The Anointed and Blessed The rise of Jeroboam was a dramatic process, though not uncommon even in the modern history of politics. He became a fugitive who sought protection in Egypt when Solomon sought his life when he rebelled against the king (1 Kings 11:26). Whether his courage to confront Solomon was seen as right or wrong can be deduced by the pronouncement of a prophet. The Shilonite prophet Ahijah came to bestow a divine blessing on Jeroboam and said that he should form a new nation out of the kingdom ruled by Solomon (1 Kings 11:29–40). The blessing bestowed upon Jeroboam was even comparable to that given to King David: I am about to tear the kingdom from the hand of Solomon, and will give you ten tribes. One tribe will remain his, for the sake of my servant David and for the



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sake of Jerusalem, the city that I have chosen out of all the tribes of Israel. . . . If you will listen to all that I command you, walk in my ways, and do what is right in my sight by keeping my statutes and my commandments, as David my servant did, I will be with you, and will build you an enduring house, as I built for David, and I will give Israel to you. (1 Kings 11:31–32, 38–39)

Thus, the Lord had given the rebel Jeroboam the mandate to rule over the ten tribes and had formed a new kingdom, Israel, while the remaining two tribes would form the kingdom of the South, Judah. Here the history of the divided kingdom exhibits a departure from Brennan’s book. Brennan has advocated defensive actions in the face of injustice but cautions against rebellion against the government. However, in the succession narratives of ancient history, a divine blessing was bestowed upon Jeroboam when he rose up against the king who showed disregard for his people’s suffering and their demands for change. The Fall of Jeroboam: The Abandoned and Judged But the Bible also issues a cautionary tale for when Jeroboam disobeyed Yahweh, he was rejected, and his blessing was taken away. Not only was he rejected, successive monarchs in the northern kingdom were also rejected by Yahweh with reference to the “sins of Jeroboam,” their forefather. The sins of Jeroboam as presented in these biblical accounts, though, were mostly related to idolatrous worship rather than political or military misdeeds. Scholars have said that “Jeroboam’s religious violations, however, which are used to serve personal and political ends (a universal way of using religion), subvert the positive political agenda. Political liberation cannot stand by itself if the worship of God is not in order.”24 It is clear from this biblical account that the primary concern of Yahweh in dealing with God’s people and nation was putting the people first and not politics. God had not failed Jeroboam, but Jeroboam had failed God by not realizing God’s will. God was concerned with the people in the South just as much as those in the North, and God’s chosen people extended across both kingdoms.25 THE ALLUSION: LESSONS FROM ANCIENT ISRAEL Allusion, as a literary device employed to enlighten, enrich, and illuminate the subject under investigation, is often used when direct signification may be too offensive, sensitive, or threatening due to its elucidation and projection. “Allusion is a figure of speech, in which an object or circumstance from unrelated context is referred to covertly or indirectly. It is left to the audience to

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make the direct connection.”26 A website on literary devices adds: “Allusion is a brief and indirect reference to a person, place, thing or idea of historical, cultural, literary or political significance. It does not describe in detail the person or thing to which it refers. It is just a passing comment and the writer expects the reader to possess enough knowledge to spot the allusion and grasp its importance in a text.”27 Connections can be made between ancient Israel and modern China and Hong Kong because both biblical and contemporary contexts deal with politics, a power struggle, the succession of power, the elimination of political or military opponents, a dream vision for national endeavors, the charisma of the leader, and a system of governance. There are identifiable similarities between the biblical world and the real world in which the Hong Kong protests have taken place with major global powers sparring behind the scenes and coming to the fore, especially after the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic. Allusions between the ancient and the present world are made below with a focus on the transition of power, national governance, responses to social upheaval, and the formation and use of social power. The Dream of Solomon When Solomon as a young man asked Yahweh humbly for advice to govern his people, Yahweh bestowed wisdom on him in the form of a “dream narrative” (1 Kings 3:3–15; 2 Chron. 1:3–12). The dream developed in the form of a question, “How to make his people great again after the greatness of king David’s rule?” (1 Kings 3:7–9; 2 Chron. 1:9–10) A parallel can be seen in contemporary Chinese politics. President Xi Jinping ascended to power as the leader of Communist China, following the practice of the selection of successors by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Soon after his confirmation as the CCP’s general secretary, he spoke about “the Chinese Dream,” which is about Chinese prosperity, collective effort, and national glory. In other words, Xi dreams to make China a great nation for the next one hundred years, supported by the “Made in China 2025” project, which intends to change China from the “world’s factory” of cheap goods to producing high-value products and services. Despite all the resources at his disposal and the divine blessing bestowed upon him, Solomon used the national resources of the kingdom for his own benefit while neglecting his duties and responsibilities. His actions went strongly against the expectations of a divinely installed monarch. Besides those “wisdom” tales of the queen of Sheba or his resolution of the dispute of two mothers over a baby, there are no solid administrative achievements that



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can be credited to Solomon in the biblical account. Despite reigning for forty years, the account on Solomon in the Bible is rather short. If we compare the dreams of Solomon and Xi with the “I Have a Dream” speech delivered by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. during the march in Washington in 1963, we will see tremendous differences. The greatness of King’s dream is for the multitude of races to live together harmoniously. Although President Donald Trump does not use the dream language, his campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” indicates his hope and vision for his country. “Make America Great Again” shows a strong nationalist sentiment to put America first and is not comparable to King’s vision for America, though. The lessons of the narrowness of visions and dreams of powerful leaders must be learned by succeeding national and international leaders and monarchies. The Special Arrangement of David for Solomon Before his death, David told Solomon to implement strategic political and military measures to help ensure stability for the Solomonic administration. Specifically, David instructed Solomon to deal with rivals and take precautions against those who might rise up against him and threaten his rule (1 Kings 2:1–9). Such measures have been taken by both ancient and modern regimes when they want to ensure stability during a succession of power. In China, President Xi initiated an “anti-corruption” campaign soon after he became president, and many top leaders—some considered his rivals— were arrested and put in jail. This campaign was hailed as a major “achievement” during the first term of his presidency and was meant to serve the same purposes as those of King David when he instructed Solomon on the measures to take to stabilize and consolidate his power to rule with absolute authority. Furthermore, China removed the term limits for the presidency in 2018, clearing the way for Xi to remain the top leader for many years to come and without clear rivals. The Clown King Rehoboam’s Grievous Ignorance of Reality Upon Rehoboam’s succession to the throne after his father, Solomon, who did not instigate a plan to help eliminate opposition and consolidate power, all hell broke loose immediately. Rehoboam, the clown, did not foresee troubles coming that would threaten national unity, and hence, he did not prepare or devise plans and solutions ahead of time before demands were made upon his administration. With only three days for consultation, Rehoboam first

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consulted the senior advisers of his father’s court and then his peer advisers. The “wise” advice, of course, did not come from the seniors, who knew very well Solomon’s reputation and the serious social discontent his administration had caused in the North. Instead, Rehoboam decided to take heed of the advice from his peers, who did not have much public administrative experience or wisdom to rule a nation. He and his peers had enjoyed a relatively peaceful and prosperous time, though with great undercurrents waiting to erupt like the sudden burst of a volcano. Rehoboam’s court did not have sufficient knowledge about the public responses needed to answer the demands of the people, and complacency since the days of Solomon had eroded the capacity to rule with justice and sensibility. The outcome of the events revealed his total ignorance of the opinions of the North regarding his administration, and his security advisers were either meddlesome or sluggish. When the people rebelled against him, he could only narrowly escape (1 Kings 12:18). Thus, he ran like a “clown” from his enemies while he thought that he would be “crowned” as the king of the territory left behind by Kings David and Solomon (1 Kings 12). Instead of consolidating the nation under one big tent, Rehoboam’s complacency and stupidity led to the opposite outcome of splitting the nation into two with only himself to blame. Recently, there was a lot of gossip in the world of social media about the “new gown” of the king in China. This chattering alluded to President Xi’s ambitions expressed in his Chinese Dream, the Belt and Road Initiative, the “Made in China 2025” campaign, and so forth. His administration was seen as churning out most of his domestic and international policies in the style of the “king’s new gown.” He was also referred to as “Xi Da Da” (da means big) and “Yi Zun” (one singular authority), terms that signify the concentration of power in one individual. But when leaders have too much power and are put on a pedestal, they may lose touch with reality and fail to see looming problems. The Anointing of Jeroboam: Revolt Was Inevitable After the persecution under Solomon and the narrow escape to Egypt as a fugitive, Jeroboam presented himself as a leader of the people of the oppressed northern tribes. Upon Solomon’s death, Jeroboam gave up his Egyptian protection and comfortable life and returned to his people, who later crowned him as their first king of the North. Revolt was expected, though, often when the iron grip from those at the top could not hold onto power any longer. In some modern cases, complacency and ignorance of the facts and reality would bring about political changes even faster than expected.



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The Abandoning of Jeroboam: Judged Jeroboam was anointed to split the kingdom of Solomon into two through the symbolic act of the prophet Ahijah who tore a new garment into twelve pieces and gave ten to Jeroboam, symbolizing the territory and the ten tribes of people that would come under his monarchy. Yet Jeroboam was rejected sooner than he would anticipate. Just like Solomon, who was clearly the anointed king yet abandoned, Jeroboam experienced a similar fate. The judgment on Solomon in the rejection speech by the prophet Ahijah was no comparison with that of Jeroboam, however. The rejection of Jeroboam as the king of the North had a longer consequence because successive rejections of northern kingships often were traced back to the verdict of “the sins of Jeroboam” (mentioned at least twenty-three times from 1 Kings 13 to 2 Kings 23). There are enduring and serious repercussions on the nation that cause the people to suffer for years to come if leaders of the nation implement ill-fated policies during their reigns and waste a large portion of national wealth on unrealistic dreams. In conclusion, this study has presented the political philosophy of Jason Brennan who has proposed and defended the morality parity thesis, with ideas traceable to the biblical text, as a political theology in response to police brutality in the Hong Kong protests. I discuss the sequence of biblical events: first, the succession of Rehoboam to the Solomonic monarchy that ended with the birth of a new nation, the Kingdom of Israel, with Jeroboam crowned the first king of the North; second, the “clown-like” behavior of the anointed “clown” king Rehoboam who did not listen to wise counsel and instead brought calamity to his people. I also allude to how the histories of ancient Israel might have bearings on recent events in China and Hong Kong. In view of the current development of the CCP exerting pressure on Hong Kong through the imposition of a national security law for the city, the fate of the more than seven million inhabitants of Hong Kong rests on the vicissitudes of Chinese politics and the struggles of the people in the former colony. NOTES This essay is dedicated to, and in memory of, those missing in action and killed in action since the beginning of the anti–extradition bill protests of June 9, 2019, in Hong Kong. 1. The earlier waves included the Occupy Central Movement. I have reflected on it in “Occupy Central: Scribal Resistance in Daniel, the Long Road to Universal Suffrage,” in Interested Readers: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David J.

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A. Cline, ed. James K. Aitken, Jeremy M. S. Clines, and Christl M. Maier (Atlanta: SBL, 2013), 247–63; and presented a paper on “The Rise of Localism within Empire: Second Temple Judea and Postcolonial Hong Kong” at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in 2014. 2.  I first engaged the socioeconomic political context of Hong Kong with biblical studies just before the transfer of sovereign power from the British to the Chinese government in 1997; see “On Naming the Subject: Postcolonial Reading of Daniel 1,” Jian Dao 7 (January 1997): 17–36, and reprinted in The Postcolonial Biblical Reader, ed. R. S. Sugirtharajah (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 171–85. As I continue to reflect on China’s relationship with Hong Kong, similar to that of the British colonizers and the colonized Hong Kong, I must confess at this point of time that it was a grievous mistake in my earlier understanding. China has not honored the promises it made in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. China’s recent proposal of a national security law for Hong Kong has its repercussions as shown by a series of political responses from Western countries and Commonwealth nations. The British government is considering the “right of abode” to British National Overseas (BNO) subjects. 3.  The outcry of a series of numbers “721-MIA, 831-KIA, 101-Gun . . .” as protesters shouted in memory of those events in their resistance to police brutality also resonated worldwide in the support for Hong Kong protesters. 4.  Jason Brennan, When All Else Fails: The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 3. 5. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 3. 6. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 2. 7. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 8. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 5. 9. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 3. 10. Brennan’s fourth option of “resistance” rightly characterized the change of attitudes among protesters since the Umbrella Movement in 2014, which were very different from the responses in previous situations, such as the signing of the SinoBritish Joint Declaration in 1984, the June Fourth massacre in Beijing in 1989, or the years leading to the handover of sovereignty in 1997. The previous cases all sparked off massive migration. 11. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 10. 12. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 10. 13. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 11–12. 14. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 237. 15.  These verses in the Pentateuch are believed to have their ancient roots in the Hammurabi’s Law Code of the Babylonian empire, 1792–1750 BCE. 16. Brennan, When All Else Fails, xii. 17. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 15. 18. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 235. 19. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 235. 20. Brennan, When All Else Fails, 236–37.



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21.  Daniel M. Bell Jr., “Postliberalism and Radical Orthodoxy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Political Theology, ed. Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 114. 22.  On the concept of “rule by fear and terror” as experienced by Judah/Yehud/ Judea throughout the history from Assyria, Babylon, and Persia to the Greco-Roman era, see Anathea E. Portier-Young, Apocalypse Against Empire: Theologies of Resistance in Early Judaism (Grand Rapid, MI: Eerdmans, 2011); and John Ma, Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 23.  Carl D. Evans has a succinct summery of the debate in The Anchor Yale Bible Dictionary (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 743–45: “The reasons for Rehoboam’s involvement in the proceedings at Shechem are not specifically stated. Some have speculated that the N Israelites had a charismatic conception of kingship which gave them a natural reluctance to accept the regular dynastic succession when Solomon died, so Rehoboam went to Shechem to attempt to renew a personal union between N and S which supposedly had existed under his predecessors; it has also been proposed that democratic tendencies existed in the N to which Rehoboam responded. The uncertainties of a charismatic ideal of kingship or supposed democratic tendencies in the N aside, Miller justifiably suggests that urgent political realities prompted Rehoboam to go to Shechem to negotiate the matter of his kingship.” 24. Bruce C. Birch, Walter Brueggemann, Terence E. Fretheim, and David L. Petersen, A Theological Introduction to the Old Testament, 2nd ed. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2005), 258. 25.  Birch et al., A Theological Introduction, 258. 26.  “Allusion,” Wikipedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allusion. 27.  “Allusion,” Literary Devices, literarydevices.net/allusion/.

Chapter Six

“For Our Struggle Is Not Against Flesh and Blood” The Demonic in Hong Kong Francis Ching-wah Yip

Events during the 2019 protests have aroused moral outcries. Numerous posts on Facebook were filled with moral condemnation of the abuse of power, prevalent brutality, and indiscriminate use of violence by police officers; of the hubris of governing authorities and the absurdity and immorality of their decisions; of widespread vandalism, disruption, and the inflicting of bodily harm by protesters. In the face of the prevalence of discrimination, violence, injustice, oppression, and dehumanization during the 2019 events, the obvious concept for a theological-moral critique of the situation is sin. Yet moral condemnation and the critique of sin cannot do justice to the complexity of the situation. It seems to presuppose a simplistic understanding of human beings as autonomous individuals who can exercise their free will without hindrance. Sin would then be a morally wrong decision of free individuals—individual politicians, individual police officers, individual protesters, and so on. Such a predominantly individualistic and moralistic concept of sin fails to offer an adequate theological understanding of political reality. A more promising way is Reinhold Niebuhr’s reinterpretation of Augustine’s doctrine of sin in his polemic against the Pelagians.1 Instead of viewing original sin as a hereditary corruption, Niebuhr interprets it as a bias toward sin. Because of this bias, human beings sin inevitably. Yet they are still responsible for their sin, as they sin out of free will, albeit a biased one.2 Paul Tillich, Niebuhr’s contemporary and colleague at Union Theological Seminary, offers another set of ideas to interpret the classical doctrine of original sin and actual sin: “sin as fact” and “sin as act” in dialectical relations. They are rooted in the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny. They are not opposed to each other but are interdependent. Destiny, in Tillich’s usage, does not mean fate. It is not a power that predetermines our future. While 109

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freedom involves decision, destiny is “that out of which our decisions arise,” that is, “the concrete totality of everything that constitutes [our] being,” including our former decisions, our embodied personality, the communities we belong to, the environments that shape us, and “the past unremembered and remembered.”3 He says, “Destiny is not a strange power which determines what shall happen to me. It is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny.”4 The interdependence of “sin as act” and “sin as fact” follows the interdependence of freedom and destiny; as Tillich writes, Sin is a universal fact before it becomes an individual act, or more precisely, sin as an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement. As an individual act, sin is a matter of freedom, responsibility, and personal guilt. But this freedom is imbedded in the universal destiny of estrangement in such a way that in every free act the destiny of estrangement is involved and, vice versa, that the destiny of estrangement is actualized by all free acts. Therefore, it is impossible to separate sin as fact from sin as act. They are interwoven, and their unity is an immediate experience of everyone who feels himself to be guilty.5

Seen in this way, a predominant concern with the (im)morality of individual decision and action runs the risk of overlooking the political structure, economic interest, social milieu, cultural background, and historical context that influence, motivate, and limit such decision and action. Take the action of police officers for example. The use of excessive violence by police officers on unarmed protesters, which causes serious and irreversible injuries, rightly warrants moral condemnation and public outcry. Yet it is inadequate and beside the point to focus predominantly on the “bad cops” or even to explain the recurrence of police brutality by believing that “all cops are bad.” A police culture of conformity and obedience to commands paired with the policy of allowing police officers to conceal their identity by not showing their identification numbers on their shoulder epaulettes and by covering their faces (before the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic) contributes to the problem. Officially designating protests (even a peaceful protest like the one on June 12, 2019) as “riots” and protesters as “rioters” and the government authorities’ avoidance of laying criminal charges against police officers who have violated the law when dealing with the protests are factors as well. Add to this the hatred, confrontation, and violence of some protesters against the police; all these factors—some of which are obviously evil and sinful (sin as fact) and some less so—have contributed to the violence and brutality of police officers (sin as act), which, in turn, has reinforced some of these contributing factors.



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We have been talking about sin. A theological concept broader than sin is evil. Sin is basically a moral evil, though its communal and tragic dimensions cannot be overlooked. But there are other forms of evil where the concept of sin is inadequate to express its nature. The point is not only that the evil is horrendous but also that it cannot be seen simply as evil acts done by human beings. Rather, evil is a powerful force that can compel human beings to act even against their reason, conscience, freedom, and agency. During the 2019 protests, we have seen the unreasonable stubbornness of the government in its repeated refusal to withdraw the controversial bill in spite of one—and even two—million people having marched in the streets. We have seen the systemic discrimination against and oppression of the young by police and by the establishment. We have seen the dehumanization of protesters by police officers when they repeatedly call protesters (and even journalists and first-responders) “cockroaches,” and we see it in their enjoyment of shooting protesters with pepper spray, tear gas, and other weapons in a way analogous to playing action video games. We have seen the unleashing of violence and the vicious circle of violence and hatred between police officers and protesters. We have seen the splitting of communities into “blue” (pro-establishment) and “yellow” (pro-democracy) camps and the bitter antagonism between them. And we have seen the idolatry of law and order, the nation, and the party, which are regarded as sacrosanct. How can these phenomena be theologically interpreted, diagnosed, and critiqued? Paul Tillich’s idea of “the demonic” will be very helpful. The concept is explicated in his seminal essay “Das Dämonische” and other writings.6 For Tillich, the demonic powers are symbols of “supra-individual structures of evil,” which “rule individual souls, nations, and even nature” and are conquered by Christ, the Messiah, who brings “a new reality from which the demonic powers or the structures of destruction are excluded.”7 The overcoming of the demonic powers by Christ lies at the heart of the Christian message and is expressed in New Testament writings. The synoptic gospels depict Jesus as the one who casts out the demons, thus healing the possessed (e.g., Matt. 4:23–24; 10:8; 12:28; Mark 1:34). In Pauline letters, Christ is the one who will overcome or has already overcome the “principalities and powers” (1 Cor. 15:24; Eph. 1:20–21; Rom. 8:38–39). In the Book of Revelation, we learn that all demonic powers will ultimately be defeated. Tillich’s idea of the demonic captures all this. More importantly, he employs the idea of the demonic to analyze psychological and social issues in the contemporary world. He thus undertakes what David Tracy sees as the task of systematic theology: “the reinterpretation of the tradition for the present situation.”8 But Tillich does not stop at analysis and interpretation. In the preface to his seminal essay on the demonic, Tillich passionately

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points out the reason for naming and exposing the demonic in spite of the danger of doing so: “to strengthen the prophetic spirit of our time.”9 In his view, prophetic spirit is a social-critical spirit in light of the divine in history. In the last section of the essay, he delineates intellectualism and aestheticism in culture and capitalism and nationalism in society as great “demons of the present.”10 For Tillich, an awareness and understanding of the demonic is vital for a proper approach to social critique and social praxis that goes beyond optimism and pessimism. He writes: Otherwise, we are left with either the will to improve the progressive or the will to preserve the conservative view. The first sees everywhere the matter which one day will be formed according to the ideal, the second sees everywhere the insurmountable sinfulness that makes a decisive change impossible. The knowledge of the dialectic of the demonic leads beyond these opposing views. It leads to the recognition of an anti-positive that is overcome not through progress, nor through mere revolution, but through creation and grace. At the same time, it leads one to take account of the particular demonic powers of every social situation so as to identify and fight against them. The struggle against the demonic powers of an era becomes an unavoidable religious-political duty. Politics gets the depth of a religious activity. Religion gets the concreteness of a struggle with the “principalities and powers.”11

Tillich’s idea of the demonic contributes to our approach to the 2019 Hong Kong protests in several ways. First, it leads us to recognize the structural nature of evil in the events. The discrimination and hatred against young people, for instance, is somewhat similar to racism as a structural or systemic evil that pervades the cultures and practices of a substantial segment of society—though the two are not comparable in scope and in history. Moral condemnation of the actions of individuals does not suffice. Tillich opines that the demonic, as the mythical expression of the “structural, and therefore inescapable, power of evil,” cannot be adequately understood in terms of “individual acts of evil, dependent on the free decision of conscious personality.” Rather, it is “a ‘structure of evil’ beyond the moral power of good will, which produces social and individual tragedy precisely through the inseparable mixture of good and evil in every human act.”12 As such, the demonic is ambiguous. “The demonic is a power in personal and social life that is creative and destructive at the same time.”13 Moreover, good and evil, angels and demons, constructive and destructive powers of being are “ambiguously interwoven” and “fight with each other in the same person, in the same social group, and in the same historical situation.”14 Thus, we cannot “simply label one thing as purely demonic and another as purely divine”; otherwise one “will degenerate into demonic pharisaism.”15 The implication is this: we need to recognize that the demonic powers, as structures of evil,



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were working behind individuals, groups, and organizations in Hong Kong in 2019 by producing discrimination, oppression, and dehumanization, as well as cycles of violence and hatred. Since the demonic powers worked behind them, we should not view particular individuals, groups, or organizations as unambiguously demonic. Second, the demonic, in Tillich’s view, is the self-elevation of something finite to infinity. This provokes the reaction of another finite entity, thus causing split and conflict. For example, “the demonic self-elevation of one nation over against all others in the name of her God or system of values produces the reaction from other nations in the name of their God.”16 He elaborates, The demonic is a negative absolute. It is the elevation of something relative and ambiguous (something in which the negative and the positive are united) to absoluteness. The ambiguous, in which positive and negative, creative and destructive elements are mingled, is considered sacred in itself, is deified.17

In the case of Hong Kong in 2019, the self-elevation to absoluteness can be seen in the hubris of the governing authorities in their insistence to push forward the extradition bill even after reportedly one million and two million people marched on the streets to protest on June 9 and 16, respectively. This self-elevation can also be seen in their repeated refusal to commission an independent investigation into alleged police brutality. This self-elevation has provoked widespread split, conflict, and antagonism in society along with cycles of violence and hatred. Lying behind this hubris is the selfelevation to absoluteness of other finite things, such as law and order, the nation, and the party. Third, Tillich’s idea of the demonic emphasizes that it has the character of possession. The demonic destroys the unity and freedom at the center of personality and takes away personal autonomy.18 As Tillich puts it: “The personality—the being that masters itself—is grasped by a master that divides it.”19 Possessed by demonic powers, individuals and groups lose their freedom and autonomy and can be driven to do what is against reason and conscience. This may explain the irrational decisions of the government, the violence of many police officers against the innocent (pedestrians, first-responders, reporters, and nonviolent protesters), and the violence of some protesters against others who disagree with their political view. It is important to note that moral effort and repentance are no remedies to the state of possession. “Demonic structures in the personal and communal life cannot be broken by acts of freedom and good will. They are strengthened by such acts—except when the changing power is a divine structure, that is, a structure of grace.”20 For Tillich, demonic possession and divine grace are structurally similar, corresponding states. Their difference is this: “Grace fills

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its subject with form and being, while possession destroys the spiritual personality by draining it of being and sensibility. Divine possession brings enhanced being, creation, and formation; demonic possession brings diminished being, decay, and ruin.”21 “If evil has demonic or structural character limiting individual freedom, its conquest can come only by the opposite, the divine structure, that is, by what we have called a structure or ‘Gestalt’ of grace,” which includes “the church in its spiritual quality, as object of faith.”22 We are “necessarily and unconditionally demanded” to “unmask the demonic, seeking and using every possible weapon of resistance, but the results are not certain.”23 Thus, Tillich points to the ministry and mission of the church in “exorcism,” in unmasking and resisting the demonic powers in society. He does not elaborate on this theme, except in a sermon with the title “Heal the Sick; Cast out the Demons.”24 Nevertheless, it coheres well with the gospels’ portrayal of the disciples being sent by Jesus to do what he did, including the casting out of demons (John 20:21; Matt. 10:7–8; Luke 9:1–2).25 It also coheres well with what is often called “spiritual warfare,” though we need to go beyond the unhelpful dichotomies between supernatural and natural, spiritual and secular.26 As a commentary on the Ephesians observes, the “principalities and powers” are at once spiritual and secular; they can refer to social structures and political powers.27 The “principalities and powers” were originally angelic powers but, because of sin, “have been transformed into demonic powers, and the political and economic and cultural structures that shape our social life have been transformed into demonic structures.”28 In the church’s ministry and mission of exorcism, in fighting against the demonic powers in society, it is important to note that the “enemies” are not human beings. It is true that human beings have perpetrated sins and evils. But as we have seen above, we can see theologically that these perpetrators are perhaps in a state of being possessed by the demonic powers. As the author of Ephesians points out: For our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places. Therefore take up the whole armor of God, so that you may be able to withstand on that evil day, and having done everything, to stand firm. (6:12–13)

To recognize that our “enemies” in “spiritual warfare” are the demonic powers, not human beings, would put things into a theologically proper perspective. Surely there are significant moral aspects in the 2019 events that warrant critique, if not condemnation. But we will have a biased analysis and diagnosis if we presuppose that perpetrators of discrimination, violence, oppression, and dehumanization are entirely free and autonomous individuals.



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We need at the same time to recognize and take seriously the tragic aspects of the events, in which the perpetrators of evil are themselves grasped, enslaved, or “possessed” by the structures of evil that the demonic symbolized. This recognition can help reduce the hatred that has gripped various parties in the conflict. We can be angry about the evil occurrences, but there is no need to hate the perpetrators who, to some extent and in some respects, are also victims of the demonic powers. I am not suggesting that their legal responsibilities should be lessened. In fact, what is badly needed in Hong Kong is to find out the truth of the occurrences, identify the victims and perpetrators, and bring the perpetrators to justice. Yet we need to address the root of the problems—the demonic powers as structures of evil—by unmasking, resisting, and attacking them, by the power of God, with the goal and in the hope that the systems will no longer generate evils and their perpetrators. As the Second Epistle to the Corinthians says, “For though we live as human beings, we do not wage war according to human standards, for the weapons of our warfare are not human weapons, but are made powerful by God for tearing down strongholds” (10:3–4, NET). And in engaging and fighting against the demonic, we also need to recognize our own vulnerability to the demonic. As Tillich says: “Unless you are aware of the demonic possibility in yourselves, you cannot recognize the demon in others, and cannot do battle against it by knowing its name and thus depriving it of its power.”29 NOTES 1.  Reinhold Niebuhr writes, “Sin is to be regarded as neither a necessity of man’s nature nor yet as a pure caprice of his will. It proceeds rather from a defect of the will [i.e., as a result of original sin], for which reason it is not completely deliberate; but since it is the will in which the defect is found and the will presupposes freedom the defect cannot be attributed to a taint in man’s nature.” See The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 1:242. 2.  See Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, 1:241–264. 3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951­–1963), 1:184–85. 4. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:185. 5. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2:56. 6.  Paul Tillich, “Das Dämonische: Ein Beitrag zur Sinndeutung der Geschichte” (1926), in Paul Tillich, Main Works/Hauptwerke, ed. Carl Heinz Ratchow (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988–1998), 5:99–123. There is an early English translation: “The Demonic: A Contribution to the Interpretation of History” (trans. Elsa L. Talmey), in Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), 77–122, which leaves out the preface. In this essay, I use a later English translation: “The Demonic: A Study in the Interpretation of History” (trans. Garrett E. Paul), in

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Paul Tillich on Creativity, ed. Jacquelyn Ann Kegley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 63–91. See also Paul Tillich, “Der Begriff des Dämonischen und seine Bedeutung für die systematische Theologie” (1926), in Gesammelte Werke (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959–1971), 8:285–291. 7. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2:27, 40. 8.  David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 64. 9.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 63. 10.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 86–89. 11. Tillich, Main Works/Hauptwekre, 5:120 (translation mine, emphasis original). 12.  Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), xx–xxi. 13.  Paul Tillich, On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch (New York: Scribners, 1966), 79. 14. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2:40. 15.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 87. 16. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:103 (emphasis original). 17.  Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 132–33. 18. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2:40; Tillich, “Begriff des Dämonischen,” 287. 19.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 69. 20. Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3:103. 21.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 70. 22. Tillich, The Protestant Era, xxi. 23.  Tillich, “Demonic,” 90. He also writes, “The only thing that is certain is that the demonic is overcome in eternity, that it is united with the clarity of the divine in the eternal depths of the divine. It is only with a view to the eternal that we may speak of overcoming the demonic, and not in reference to any specific time, whether in the past or the future.” Tillich, “Demonic,” 90. 24.  Paul Tillich, “Heal the Sick; Cast out the Demons,” in Paul Tillich, The Eternal Now (New York: Scribner, 1963), 58–65. 25.  The casting out of demons from the possessed is a sociopolitical act. Drawing from the thought of the anthropologist I. M. Lewis and echoing Paul Tillich, a scholar observes that “possession phenomena may be fundamentally linked to systemic evil.” See David Bradnick, “The Demonic from the Protestant Era to the Pentecostal Era: An Intersection of Tillichian and Pentecostal Demonologies and Its Implications,” in Paul Tillich and Pentecostal Theology: Spiritual Presence and Spiritual Power, ed. Nimi Wariboko and Amos Yong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 166–67. 26.  For a serious work of political theology in the Pentecostal tradition, see Amos Yong, In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010). 27.  Allen Verhey and Joseph S. Harvard, Ephesians (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 67. 28.  Verhey and Harvard, Ephesians, 68. 29.  Tillich, “Heal the Sick,” 64.

Chapter Seven

Hong Kong “Freedom Cunt” Sexual Violence and Crucifixion Jessica Hiu-tung Tso

On June 13, 2019, a Hong Kong policeman in riot gear was filmed taunting protesters by shouting: “Come on, let’s have you, freedom cunts (自由閪)!” This phrase first appeared to be aimed at insulting female protesters who participated in the anti–extradition bill movement. Shortly, local feminists found it to be a fantastic and empowering identity that well illustrated women fighting for democracy and embraced their gender. Protesters then fearlessly reclaimed the insult as a badge of honor. This chapter examines women’s participation in the anti–extradition bill movement in addition to local feminism advocacy since the 1980s, which is now facing difficult struggles. Furthermore, rape, sexual harassment, body shaming, and doctored photos have frequently occurred during the protests. The concept of “politically motivated sexual violence” by the police or authorities will thus be discussed in this chapter as well. Additionally, the recognition of Jesus as a victim of sexual abuse and women in Galilee in Jesus’s movement are retold in the current context of Hong Kong, which might serve as empathic and resistance figures for sexual violence victims in the protests. WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AT FRONT AND BACK The anti–extradition bill movement has taken place since June 2019. This massive movement had about two million people participate in just one march on June 16,1 and a survey suggests that between approximately 36 percent and 50 percent of the demonstrators have been female protesters during the course of the movement.2 For more than ten months until the present moment, Hong Kong’s people continue to use a variety of ways to express 117

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their demands, including large-scale rallies and processions, the extensive use of social media and petitions, human chains and mass choirs, Lennon Walls and the creation of various protest symbols, union organizing and strikes, and the launch of a number of concern groups as well as frontline battles with the authorities. The movement also has mobilized a large number of groups and individuals from the medical, financial, insurance, social welfare, education, legal, aviation, and civil service sectors to protest through various activities. Its proliferation into various districts and locations in Hong Kong without any clear leadership can be viewed as a self-initiating anti–extradition bill movement.3 This model promotes participation of a variety of people in society— different genders, classes, age groups, and with a range of family roles—as well as people with diverse levels of experience in social engagement. The leaderless characteristics of the anti–extradition bill movement also broke through patriarchal restrictions, thus welcoming fluid gender roles and possibilities.4 A group of housewives, for example, formed a concern group to initiate a petition (全港九新界離島師奶反送中聯署) and organize a rally that subverted the stereotypical image of housewives as being naive and indifferent to social issues.5 Moreover, Hong Kong’s mothers hosted two assemblies that expressed solidarity to young protesters through their slogans of “No Tiananmen Mothers” and “Don’t shoot our kids.”6 Through seniors from Hong Kong—the silver-haired protesters—and some members of the frontline team Protect Our Kids, female protesters have also shown their care and support for the demonstrators. As many protesters are youth and students, the need for caring for them as food providers and offering counselling and other resources was crucial with many women providing any gap in services. Most of the networking and strategic discussions of the movement were through online channels or forums that also favored anonymous participation for different genders. Furthermore, due to the escalating brutality by the police and authorities, frontline protesters have upgraded their forces in order to increase their capacities to defend themselves. Compared to the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 2014, when female protesters were always asked to stay in the back due to stereotyped gender roles and the traditional homosocial, masculine view that frontline protesters should be men, the anti–extradition bill movement has broken this gender dividing line as most of the protesters wear black to protect their identity and it is difficult to easily distinguish the gender identity of the protesters. Some of the female protesters have made use of this gender-blurred “uniform” to be part of the frontline team combating tears gas, rubber bullets, and water cannon trucks.7 Through the strong cooperative and accommodating atmosphere of “No division,” “Come as one, leave as one,” there is a space and tolerance in welcoming different kinds of protesters and strategies.



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THE STRUGGLES OF FEMINIST ACTIVISM AMID DETERIORATING POLITICAL FREEDOM AND LOCALISM Feminist activism in Hong Kong began actively in the 1980s and 1990s with the formation of pioneer groups that sought to transform gender inequality and women’s political participation and to respond to domestic violence. Later more feminist groups were created that were concerned with a boarder range of topics, including women’s sexualities and autonomy as well as the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. After the handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997, however, “the civic sphere independent of the institution [was] rapidly deteriorating especially in the aftermath of the recent political upheavals since 2000.”8 The Hong Kong Federation of Women (HKFW) marked the divide of two major camps of women’s groups in Hong Kong as HKFW is viewed as pro-government and pro-establishment while feminist groups outside the boundaries of this federation are regarded as pro-democracy and grassrootsoriented. Moreover, the dramatic increase of mainland migrants, many of whom are women, with their great demand for social welfare, as well as increased pressure from Chinese government authorities caused a backlash toward local feminist advocacy. Groups concerned for the lives of new immigrants have faced enormous criticism because of the public’s fear of an “invasion” from mainland China.9 Local feminist groups that uphold the motto of humanitarian care and women’s empowerment have encountered the most challenging struggle in the anti–extradition bill movement. As there is a strong positive appreciation of a leaderless movement with anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian characteristics, the visibility of established women’s groups is so low that protesters prefer to participate anonymously. Moreover, because of the strong sense of xenophobia toward mainland Chinese and a false impression that all women’s groups are pro-establishment, protesters tended to be hostile toward established feminist groups. Furthermore, regarding local “right-wing extremism” and its association with the increasingly gender-irrelevant atmosphere in Hong Kong, Susanne Choi, Ruby Lai, and Javier Pang from the Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted interviews and a survey between 2015 and 2017 with those from the most prominent nativist and anti-immigrant political groups in Hong Kong who were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.10 They found that “respondents had some understanding of current debates about gender equality but tended to associate gender solely with immediate, personal relationships rather than with a social structure of distributing resources and power.”11

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During the anti–extradition bill movement, there has been sexist mocking and jokes directed toward the police and government officials as well as pro-establishment supporters (the blue camp), such as calling policewomen whores and making threats of rape. The individualization, naturalization, and universalization of gender inequalities and biases helped dilute the criticism that nativist political groups were particularly sexist.12 Some feminists challenged this point of view while some suggested an intersectional analysis is needed as well to examine local sexism closely along with Hong Kong’s political unrest and police brutality. SEXUAL VIOLENCE CASES DURING THE PROTESTS Apprehension about the social stigma makes sexual violence still a taboo topic in society. As well as being an unspoken topic, it is difficult to gain an accurate picture of the prevalence of sexual violence in the anti–extradition bill movement due to fear, worries of being arrested for other offences, and a lack of information about the perpetrator(s) and confidence in the police’s ability to enforce the law. In October 2019, Hong Kong’s equal opportunities watchdog reported that it had received more than three hundred “inquiries” since mid-June regarding allegations of sexual harassment by the police.13 The Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women (關注婦女 性暴力協會, ACSVAW), which has provided medical and legal assistance as well as counseling since 1997 to women who have experienced sexual violence and which established the first sexual violence crisis center in Hong Kong, RainLily (風雨蘭), initiated an “Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Sexual Violence Experience Online Survey”14 during late August and September. From this self-administered online questionnaire, a total of sixtyseven respondents (fifty-eight female and nine male) indicated that they have experienced sexual violence during the anti–extradition bill movement. Their ages are mainly from twenty to twenty-nine. Eleven people reported they have experienced sexual violence in the protests more than five times. They indicated that the perpetrators are mainly police officers and members of proestablishment groups. The violence they suffered covers a wide spectrum, from verbal abuse to threats and intimidation, from sexual assault to unlawful intercourse. The most frequent sexual violence experienced was “insulting, intimidating, and provoking words with sexual intention” (fifty-four cases), “unwelcome bodily contact” (twenty-six cases), and a “lascivious or unpleasant gaze” (twenty-five cases). Apart from the survey, there are a few brave women speaking up about their experiences: Sonia Ng, a Chinese University of Hong Kong student



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and the only protester using her real name, accused the Hong Kong police of sexual assault during her detention.15 Ms. X, an eighteen-year-old woman, filed a criminal complaint alleging that she was raped by a number of police officers in the Tsuen Wan police station and had to undergo an abortion as a result.16 In addition, there have been reports of assault in police stations, footage of police exposing women’s underwear during their arrest,17and allegations of humiliating and unnecessary strip searches from protesters,18 a journalist,19 and a district council member.20 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE The core purpose of sexual violence is shaming, not only of individuals but the community at large.21 These forms of humiliation of a sexual nature have been used to intimidate opponents and to demonstrate to the public and protesters the consequences of being politically active and rebellious. Linda Wong, executive director of ACSVAW, cited a prominent idea of “politically motivated sexual violence” that often takes place at the same time with other forms of violence in order to impose or consolidate power and eliminate the opposition and silence them.22 Thus, victims become the “site for acting out superior masculinity.” Using a case study in Egypt, Mariz Tadros pointed out that sexual violence is intended to intimidate because “it demonstrates the strength of the attacker against the weakness of the opponent who was not able to defend the victim.”23 In many contexts, sexual violence is understood as a means of emasculating or disempowering local leaders and male community members who feel powerless to protect their families.24 In most people’s perceptions of sexual violence, it is an individual issue, for example, to violate the victim based on sexual desires. However, during the anti–extradition bill movement, protesters have experienced unnecessary strip searches by the police that engendered “systemic abuse” as an instrument of intimidation that violated women’s right to bodily autonomy as well as every person’s right to lawful assembly. Since “politically motivated sexual violence” is an emerging concept, there is still a lack of academic research and studies. Many victims may not realize this is a form of sexual violence as they do not have adequate words to describe it. It might be easier to explain being hit than it is to express what occurred if the act involves sensitive body parts and feels shameful. Furthermore, victims have minimized their trauma, considering their experiences as “minor” compared to other protesters who have received explicit physical injuries.

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The few women who have spoken out about the issue have faced a massive backlash. Some have had their personal details leaked online; others have been targeted with fake sex tapes or have received harassing phone calls.25 In the case of one of the victims, Ms. X, the police allegedly sought to systematically discredit her and to undermine her criminal complaint by deliberately leaking purported details of the case.26 #PROTESTTOO RALLY In response to suspected instances of sexual violence during the extradition bill protests, the Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities (香港平等機會婦女聯席)27 organized a Me Too rally in Chater Garden on August 28, 2019, to demand answers from the Hong Kong police.28 The organizers estimated that thirty thousand people participated, which is the largest anti–sexual violence rally in Hong Kong’s history. The anti–sexual harassment and assault protests were dubbed #ProtestToo in reference to #MeToo, a worldwide movement that has called attention to gender-based sexual violence. The organizer called for action to be taken against the police force that has sexually assaulted protesters as well as protection for the dignity of all of Hong Kong’s people. Rally participants carried purple ribbons and shone purple lights to show their support for the victims and also displayed messages on their arms in lipstick. At the rally, there were speeches by representatives of human rights organizations, artists, and professors, together with protesters who have experienced sexual violence. Victims bravely shared on the stage about their reasons for protesting and the psychological pressure they are bearing. One of the emotional speeches of the night came from a protester who accused the police of conducting a humiliating and unnecessary strip-search. “I will show to the government that we are not afraid. The more you suppress us, the stronger we stand,” she said. She broke into tears several times, receiving a huge ovation of encouragement as thousands chanted, “Support you!” “Not your fault!” In the past, it was common that the testimony of sexual violence victims would be questioned and criticized. However, with the revelation of many severe cases, more chances to listen to victims’ own voices, and the explicit imbalance in power relations between the police and protesters, people started to understand the needs of victims. “It’s not your fault! It’s not your fault! It’s not your fault!” thirty thousand people shouted, together forming a process of community healing. It was a stunning gender-awareness educational rally, and many participants were empowered by the energy it formed.



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CONSTRAINTS IN SEEKING JUSTICE The police have complaint mechanisms for sexual violence cases, but none are effective. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) in Hong Kong also accepts complaints of sexual harassment from the public. The police, however, are “exercising public authority,” and the commission cannot handle cases related to the protests. Other channels for victims are the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) and the “independent” committee monitoring the work of CAPO, the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), but both are managed by the police with members appointed by the government.29 Furthermore, to avail themselves of the complaint procedures, victims need to point out the identity of the perpetrator(s). However, during the protests, many police officers intentionally did not display their warrant card, which acts as their police identity card, and were frequently wearing full riot gear when they were on duty. Consequently, the victims could hardly identity the perpetrator(s). With concern about the lack of a mandated independent mechanism to receive and investigate complaints, the Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities (WCOEO) and the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor (HKHRM) are seeking the attention and support of the international community. They have kept the United Nations Human Rights Council constantly updated with cases of human rights violations during the movement, and further efforts will also be taken, such as reporting cases to various United Nations special rapporteurs, including those mandated to examine cases related to violence against women, human rights defenders, torture, and the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly.30 There will thus be international pressure on the Hong Kong government to perform a thorough investigation to bring officers who committed sexual offences to justice. Apart from the challenge of a failed legislative system that has not adequately enacted laws to protect victims of sexual violence, the situation of victims is worrying too. Since the perception of trust in the community is fragile, protesters no longer believe in the existing institutions. They prefer to seek help anonymously from online groups, yet this option could be risky. Victims moreover are fragile, defensive, and in a marginalized status in which they cannot be easily located. ACSVAW is trying to respond to the needs of victims by setting up a telegram channel (Telegram@protestoo) for people who have suffered sexual violence by the police so that they can directly communicate anonymously with a counselor and with a promise to respect the willingness of clients to take action. However, there is still a service gap for male sexual violence victims as there is no specific male center

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coping with this issue. Because of the stigma of male sexual violence, victims are still living in a closet and feel ashamed to seek help. FROM #METOO, #CHURCHTOO, #PROTESTTOO TO #CHRISTTOO In 2017, the Me Too movement (#MeToo) that began in Hollywood started the momentum for women and men around the world to come forward and share their own experiences of sexual abuse, assault, or harassment. Survivors of abuse in the church have found the courage and space to speak out too as offshoots of #MeToo have been born, such as the Church Too movement (#ChurchToo) that has become broadly used to describe any gender-based abuse within a church environment. In addition, the protesters in Hong Kong have launched the Protest Too (#ProtestToo) movement. All of these movements have exposed the common tendency to deny, dismiss, or minimize the significance and impact of these experiences. From the vantage point offered by these various movements around the world, the image of stripping Jesus comes to mind—a powerful display of humiliation and gender-based violence that should be acknowledged as an act of sexual violence and abuse. It is time to recognize Jesus Christ as a sexual violence victim also through a #ChristToo movement. The liberationist method encourages readers to take a starting point in contemporary events and lived experiences to provoke new thinking about ancient texts and about lived faith today31 and vice versa. Through this process, we can step forward into the current struggle with new discoveries. David Tombs, who has worked extensively on religion, violence, and peacebuilding and whose current research focuses on Christian responses to gender-based violence, sexual abuse, and torture, provides many valuable ideas for us. His journal articles “Lived Religion and the Intolerance of the Cross”32 and “Recognizing Jesus as a Victim of Sexual Abuse: Responses from Sodalicio Survivors in Peru”33 and several additional articles have noted that sexual abuses have sadly been common in the past as well as the present and have served, in fact, as different forms of torture for both individuals and communities. With reference to Matthew 27 and Mark 15, one can visualize the sexual violence Jesus Christ experienced, including acts of public humiliation, mocking, and physical beatings by the soldiers and guards when he was naked. Roman crucifixion was meant to do more than just kill the victim: it was also intended to dehumanize the person and reduce them and their influence



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in the eyes of society. This kind of public humiliation also served as a warning to the community that there would be terrible consequences for opposing the people in power. Why is this not just physical violence but is rather a specific category of violence with a sexual element? The enforced nakedness and humiliation is the key to differentiate the two forms of violence. “For both the Romans and the Jews, nakedness during execution was a sign of humiliation and absolute powerlessness in which shame and dishonour were integral factors in the punishment.”34 The Romans, as well as other despotic authorities who have used sexual violence as a weapon of war, solely aimed to shame the opponents. Tombs highlights that this kind of sexual abuse was not accidental or incidental to crucifixion as a form of torture and execution, but rather it was intentional and integral.35 Therefore, physical pain and suffering is not enough to explain the sense of abhorrence and obscenity associated with crucifixion in the Roman world. When reading the transformative crucifixion image, Tombs wonders how it could help sexual violence victims today. In his article “Crucifixion, State Terror, and Sexual Abuse,” Tombs discusses the theological and pastoral perspectives. He writes: At the pastoral level, confronting the possibility of sexual abuse in the passion of Christ could provide practical help to contemporary victims of torture and sexual abuse. Recognition of sexual abuse in the treatment of Jesus could bring a liberating and healing message to the women, children, and men of Latin America and elsewhere who have also been abused. The acceptance that even Jesus may have suffered evil in this way can give new dignity and self-respect to those who continue to struggle with the stigma and other consequences of sexual abuse. A God who through Christ is to be identified with the hungry, the thirsty, the stranger, the naked, the sick, and the imprisoned (Matt. 25:31–46) is also to be identified with those suffering abuse and torture in the modern world.36

Several scholars from University College London hosted a psychological study of five nuns in Spain who were sexually abused by priests. They introduced to them the idea of Jesus as a sexual violence victim. One of the nuns said, “I felt I was very much a victim and I felt Jesus very much a victim too. I felt great solidarity with the Lord: we were both undergoing this horrible moment.”37 She felt that Jesus can understand her suffering as they suffered the same. The connection between both experiencing suffering is prominent. Identifying Jesus as a victim can help sexual violence victims redeem their spiritual well-being. Simultaneously, remembering Jesus’s crucifixion as an act of sexual violence evokes in us empathy for the current lived victims.

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WOMEN OF GALILEE Survivors of sexual abuse and other victims of violent maltreatment may identify with the crucifixion of Jesus because of the beating and violation of their bodies and the involvement of unjust power relationships.38 However, if we solely focus on the crucified God, that is still a doctrine of redemptive suffering that serves to normalize violence, promotes passivity, and fails to call the perpetrators of violence to account or to promote resistance. Karyn Carlo suggests that “we can reframe our attention to the cross in a way that both accounts for these concerns and presents an alternative vision of the cross that disrupts the normalization of violence and serves to move us toward a more positive ethical response.” She believes that such a vision can be found in the story of the women of Galilee.39 With reference to Mark 15:40–41, “There were also women looking on from a distance; among them were Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James the younger and of Joses, and Salome. These used to follow him and provided for him when he was in Galilee; and there were many other women who had come up with him to Jerusalem.” These women had followed and served Jesus from the beginning of his ministry in Galilee to his crucifixion, burial, and resurrection into the beginning of the first-century church. They witnessed the crucifixion with weeping and lamenting publicly. Women in Galilee were so brave and caring and overcame community pressure and even the fear of execution. Mourning was prohibited at crucifixions as evidenced by the Gospel of Peter (12:1–5): “Although on the day the master was crucified, we could not mourn or beat our breasts, now let us perform these rites at his tomb.” Through their lament and resistance, these women challenged the Roman oppression of the Galilean community and the dehumanization of its people through crucifixion and other forms of violence. Whereas the oppressors did everything they could to prevent people from knowing the identity of the dead body, the women witnesses in Galilee did everything they could to spread the truth from their compassion. They refused to let the Roman Empire define the worth, value, and humanity of their people. By putting these women at the center of our own story about Jesus’s death and resurrection, we can come to see the cross, not only as a saving death or heroic sacrifice, but as the place where we also learn to more fully grieve the violence and oppression of this world and to find the strength to rise up against it.40 Mary Magdalene as described in the Gospel of Mark sounds historically plausible as one of the core disciples, a key witness, and in the end the first to bring the news of the resurrection of Jesus to others and thus an example to



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them to overcome their own fear, to break their silence, and to do the same.41 Mary, as a strong leader whose lamentation and protest gave way to a resurrecting vision, is also very much alive today, particularly in communities of oppressed women who, as Mary and the women in Galilee did in their era, are still determined to struggle against crucifying and dehumanizing violence against them and against their people.42 The suffering and grief of these Galilean women are also the stories of women as active agents in the transformation of the numerous injustices in their lives and communities, stories that also resonate with women resisting oppression today. CONCLUSION In the incident of university student protester Sonia Ng, she accused the Hong Kong police of hitting her breasts while she was in detention after being arrested at a protest on August 31, 2019. She first told a press conference and then a public forum in front of the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s vice-chancellor Rocky Tuan. She even removed her face mask to reveal her identity publicly, signifying that she would bear the responsibility of her accusation. Even though she has been blackmailed and received rape threats to frighten her to stop, she continues to participate in the advocacy of human rights and women’s groups that encourage and support sexual violence victims. She writes: Some people are suggesting that female protesters shouldn’t go to the front line because of the risk of being sexually assaulted by the police. This decision is up to individuals, but I wouldn’t advise women against going to the front. The protests need people. We all know that Hong Kong is our home, and we have to stand up bravely regardless of our gender. Women’s groups in Hong Kong are working very hard advocating for women’s rights. A group called RainLily [ACSVAW] is doing a great job getting the message out that women don’t need to feel timid about speaking out about sexual violence and should not pay attention [to] remarks that are shaming. They’re also showing people where they can go to get professional support. After this movement, you can see there is an enormous change that is taking place in our society. It’s really challenging the negative perceptions that people have about Hong Kong. When they say Hong Kongers only care about money—look at all the people who are donating. When they say Hong Kongers do not care about others—look how they shed tears for a stranger who has died. When they say Hong Kongers kowtow to whoever holds power—look how people are getting together to strike.43

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There is the rising emergence of a new breed of women protesters in Hong Kong—women who are fearless in the face of escalating brutality from the police and authorities. Future studies should explore the struggle of women activism in Hong Kong over nativism and anti-migration politics that may lead to gender irrelevance. In addition, more exploration on the crucifixion story can make a profound contribution to attitudes of the church and society toward victims of sexual violence today. #MeToo, #ChurchToo, #ProtestToo thereby offer a belated opportunity for transformative renewal within theology and within the church. NOTES 1.  SCMP Reporters, “‘Nearly 2 Million’ People Take to Streets, Forcing Public Apology from Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam as Suspension of Controversial Extradition Bill Fails to Appease Protesters,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014737/nearly-2-million-people -take-streets-forcing-public-apology. 2.  Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang, Samson Yuen, and Edmund W. Cheng, “Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests,” Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 2019, www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/pdf/ENG_antielab%20survey%20public%20 report%20vf.pdf. 3. Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute and Project Citizens Foundation, “Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute Project Citizens Foundation Anti-Extradition Bill Movement People’s Public Sentiment Report,” December 13, 2019, static1.squarespace.com/static/5cfd1ba6a7117c000170d7aa/t/5df3158f04b7db 043c7da1bd/1576211867361/PCF_Anti_Extradition_Bill_Stage+3_rpt_2019dec13_ first+edition.pdf. 4.  阿離，〈踰越與隔限：反修例運動中的女性力量及性別策略〉[Ah Li, “Transcend and limit: Women power and gender strategy in the anti-extradition bill movement”], Initium Media, November 26, 2019, theinitium.com/article/20191127 -hongkong-extradition-female-protester/. 5.  黃泳欣，〈師奶團結反送中的力量〉[Wong Wing-yan, “Wives gather as a force for the anti-extradition bill movement”], hket, June 19, 2019, https://topick .hket.com/article/2380298/ [反送中] 師奶團結反送中的力量%E3%80%80博士 師奶：守護良心守護香港. 6. Elson Tong and Tom Grundy, “Thousands of Hong Kong Mothers Rally to Support Extradition Law Protesters, as Gov’t HQ Hunger Strike Enters 85th Hour,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 15, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/15/thousands -hong-kong-mothers-rally-support-extradition-law-protesters-govt-hq-hunger-strike -enters-85th-hour/. 7. Isabella Steger, “How Hong Kong’s Female Protesters Are Reclaiming the ‘Basic Bitch’ Stereotype,” Quatz, October 7, 2019, qz.com/1716703/hong-kong -female-protesters-challenge-pampered-stereotype/.



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8.  Joseph M. K. Cho, Trevor Y. T. Ma, and Lucetta T. L. Kam, “Feminist Activism in Hong Kong,” in Routledge Handbook of East Asian Gender Studies, ed. Jieyu Liu and Junko Yamashita (New York: Routledge, 2020), chapter 5. 9.  Cho, Ma and Kam, “Feminist Activism in Hong Kong.” 10.  Susanne Y. P. Choi, Ruby Y. S. Lai, and Javier C. L. Pang, “Gender Irrelevance: How Women and Men Rationalize Their Support for the Right,” Signs 45, no. 2 (Winter 2020): 473–96, doi.org/10.1086/705006. 11.  Choi, Lai, and Pang, “Gender Irrelevance,” 492. 12.  Choi, Lai, and Pang, “Gender Irrelevance,” 493. 13.  Zoe Low, “Hong Kong Protests: Equal Opportunities Commission Gets 300 Inquiries during Unrest, Mostly Third-Party Allegations of Sexual Discrimination against Police,” South China Morning Post, October16, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/ hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3033188/hong-kongs-equal-opportunities-commis sion-gets-300. 14. Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women, “An Executive Summary of ‘Anti-ELAB’ Sexual Violence Experience Online Survey,” ACSVAW, November 6, 2019, rainlily.org.hk/eng/news/2019/11/release. 15.  Kris Cheng, “‘I Am Not the Only One’: Hong Kong Student Removes Mask and Accuses Police of Sexual Assault,” Hong Kong Free Press, October 11, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/10/11/i-not-one-hong-kong-student-removes-mask-ac cuses-police-sexual-assault/. 16.  Holmes Chan, “Woman Files Complaint against Hong Kong Police over Alleged Rape in Station,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 9, 2019, www.hongkongfp .com/2019/11/09/woman-files-complaint-hong-kong-police-alleged-rape-station/. 17. Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong Police Fire Tear Gas Following Protest against Treatment of Female Protester,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 5, 2019, www.hong kongfp.com/2019/08/05/hong-kong-police-fire-tear-gas-following-protest-treatment -female-protester/. 18.  盧珮瑤，〈法院「臭格」裸搜再迫做踎低起身 女事主：唔夠膽再望住 警察〉[Lo Pui-yiu, “Nude search at the court and forced to squat and stand up. The woman is afraid to look at the police”], Apple Daily, September 23, 2019, hk.news .appledaily.com/local/20190922/34Y3VXKMFAVRZHV2HZVQ6EGUFM/. 19.  The Editorial Board Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Students’ Union, 〈本報女記者無懼陰影 籲其他受害者挺身而出〉[The paper’s female journalist is not ashamed and calls on other victims to come forward], Facebook, December 2, 2019, www.facebook.com/hkusteb/photos/a.195769800540041/251241 5278875470/?type=3&theater. 20.〈周六將軍澳警民衝突 5 區議員被捕，女區議員指控警抓胸蓄意非禮〉 [Saturday’s confrontation with the police at Junk Bay leads to the arrest of 5 district council members. A female district council member accuses the police gropes her breast], Standnews, February 11, 2020, www.thestandnews.com/politics/周六將軍澳 警民衝突-5-區議員被捕-女區議員指控警抓胸蓄意非禮/. 21.  Mariz Tadros, “Understanding Politically Motivated Sexual Assault in Protest Spaces: Evidence from Egypt,” Social & Legal Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 104, doi. org/10.1177/0964663915578187.

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22.  蔣金，〈無所不在的性暴力, 香港 #Protest Too—社運中的侵害，不是 「妳」的錯！〉[Chiang Chin, “Sex violence everywhere, Hong Kong #Protest Too—Social movement’s attack is not your fault”], NPOst.tw, November 14, 2019, npost.tw/archives/53503?fbclid=IwAR3CACcBQA__0q4TdH7zPTdAHz65cMoo3 h84HXPvnZ5yRhjRM3KHtj_2eBM. 23.  Tadros, “Understanding Politically Motivated Sexual Assault,” 104. 24.  Lindsay Stark and Mike Wessells, “Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War,” JAMA 308, no. 7 (2012): 677–78, doi:10.1001/jama.2012.9733. 25. Rose Troup Buchanan, “Female Protesters in Hong Kong Say Online Attacks Being Carried Out by Suspected Pro-Beijing Trolls,” Japan Times, September 6, 2019, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/06/asia-pacific/female-hong-kong-pro testers-say-online-attacks-carried-suspected-pro-beijing-trolls/#.XloxcC2B2XQ. 26.  Jennifer Creery, “‘Grossly Unprofessional’: Lawyers Slam Hong Kong Police for ‘Privacy Breach’ after Woman Accuses Officers of Gang Rape,” Hong Kong Free Press, November 12, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/11/12/grossly-unpro fessional-lawyers-slam-hong-kong-police-privacy-breach-woman-accuses-officers -gang-rape/. 27.  Established in 1996, Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities (the Coalition, or WCOEO) is a joint task force that connects various women’s groups and monitors the government’s practice for gender equality in order to promote the development of the women’s movement and achieve gender justice. Member organizations include Action for Reach Out, Association of Women with Disabilities Hong Kong, Hong Kong Federation of Women’s Centres, Hong Kong Women Christian Council, Hong Kong Women Workers’ Association, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions–Women’s Commission, the Association for the Advancement of Feminism, and the Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women. 28. Raquel Carvalho, “Thousands Gather at #MeToo Rally to Demand Hong Kong Police Answer Accusations of Sexual Violence against Protesters,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/ article/3024789/thousands-gather-metoo-rally-demand-hong-kong-police-answer. 29.  麥倩怡，〈67人反送中期間遭受性暴力 受害人不敢求助 斥警同為施暴 者及執法者〉[Mak Sin-yee, “67 people experienced sexual violence during the anti-extradition bill movement. The victims are afraid to seek help. They condemned the police as both perpetrators and law enforcers”], Inmediahk, December 18, 2019, www.inmediahk.net/node/1069199. 30. Amnesty International, “Sexual Violence against Hong Kong Protesters— What’s Going On?” Amnesty International, January 15, 2020, www.amnesty.org.hk/ en/sexual-violence-against-hong-kong-protesters-whats-going-on/. 31.  David Tombs, “Lived Religion and the Intolerance of the Cross,” in Lived Religion and the Politics of (In)Tolerance, ed. R. Ruard Ganzevoort and Srdjan Sremac (New York: Palgrave, 2017), 77, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-43406-3_4. 32.  Tombs, “Lived Religion and the Intolerance of the Cross,” 63–83. 33.  Rocío Figueroa Alvear and David Tombs, “Recognising Jesus as a Victim of Sexual Abuse: Responses from Sodalicio Survivors in Peru,” Centre for Theology and Public Issues, University of Otago, 2019.



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34.  Alvear and Tombs, “Recognising Jesus as a Victim of Sexual Abuse,” 4. 35.  Tombs, “Lived Religion and the Intolerance of the Cross,” 69. 36.  David Tombs, “Crucifixion, State Terror, and Sexual Abuse,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 53 (Autumn 1999): 109. 37.  Gloria Durà-Vilà et al., “Integrating Sexual Trauma in a Religious Narrative: Transformation, Resolution and Growth among Contemplative Nuns,” Transcultural Psychiatry 50 (2013): 33. See also, Gloria Durà-Vilà et al., “The Dark Night of the Soul: Causes and Resolution of Emotional Distress among Contemplative Nuns,” Transcultural Psychiatry 47 (2010): 548–57. 38.  Debra A. Galilee Reagan, “Reclaiming the Body for Faith,” Interpretation 67, no. 1 (2013): 53. 39.  Karyn Carlo, “The Cross and the Women of Galilee: A Feminist Theology of Salvation” (PhD diss., Union Theological Seminary, 2009), in ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 134. 40.  Carlo, “The Cross and the Women of Galilee,” 134. 41.  Esther A. DeBoer, “On the Possibility of an Historical Reconstruction of Mary Magdalene,” Women Priests Internet Library, www.womenpriests.org/magdala/ deboer.asp. 42.  Carlo, “The Cross and the Women of Galilee,” 161. 43.  Sonia Ng, “‘Hong Kong Is My Home’: I Am Protesting on the Front Line and Refuse to Back Down,” TheLily, November 23, 2019, www.thelily.com/hong-kong -is-my-home-i-am-protesting-on-the-front-line-and-refuse-to-back-down/.

Chapter Eight

Crucified People, Messianic Time, and Youth in Protest Kung Lap-yan

Figures released by Hong Kong police on January 16, 2020, revealed that, to date, 7,019 people participating in protests against a controversial extradition bill since June 9, 2019, have been arrested. Of these, 18 percent were secondary school pupils, and 25 percent were post-secondary students, making a total of 2,847 students altogether.1 Many of these protesters were reported to have suffered injuries of varying degrees, and it is generally believed that their injuries were caused by excessive use of force by the police. In addition, many cases identified by the police as “suicides” have aroused public suspicion. An attack by thugs in Yuen Long on July 21, 2019, was one of the most significant incidents of the series of protests. On that night, ordinary people and protesters were beaten by thugs. The police explained that it was a clash between people holding different political views, but there was much evidence to show that the thugs attacking people had the endorsement of the police. Another crucial incident was an attack on August 31, 2019, when police indiscriminately attacked and beat passengers in a stationary subway train car. These incidents have accelerated protesters’ militancy. Thus far, the government has refused protesters’ requests to set up an independent investigation commission to scrutinize incidents like these. This background is the context to my theological assessment below. Since young people have played a significant role in the protests, my concerns are to explore how the experience of young protesters as a social determinant can shape our theological reflection and to articulate the role of theology in responding to their experience. Here I argue that a Christian theology of the “crucified people” and “messianic time” is a point of contact between protesters and the Christian faith.

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YOUNG PROTESTERS At first glance, the protest appeared to be about the Extradition Law Amendment Bill itself (hereafter referred to as the bill), but the fact that the protest has been ongoing tells us more about the underlying issues. These include a mistrust of the “one country, two systems” policy of the Chinese government, a demand for more participatory governance by the people, a protest against poor and unaccountable governance, and social discontent with economic injustice.2 This series of regular and continual demonstrations has been the first largescale political protest to cross the boundaries of age, economic background, social status, and ethnicity since 1997, but this time there is also a significant presence of youth activism. Moreover, the protest is not dominated by political elites. Rather, people in the protest are something like what Antonio Gramsci calls the “organic intellectual.” In short, the organic intellectual “gives its class homogeneity and awareness of its own function in the economic field and on social and political levels.” In the current protest, it is more identical to the civil society than that they are used to identify with the dominant classes as what Gramsci said.3 Because the protest has been leaderless, it has provided young people, women, professionals, laborers, and others a platform in which they can take an active role and utilize their creativity. Their innovative ideas are reflected in their holding of conferences, delivering high-quality propaganda, effectively using technology for communication, introducing new ideas into the protests, and more. Many youths are on the frontline of the protests, challenging and even confronting police. Their direct confrontation with police successfully pressured the government to suspend the bill on June 15, 2019, and their uncompromising attitude and strong moral appeal to the public successfully pressured the government to withdraw the bill altogether on September 4, 2019. Their passion and commitment as well as their anguish have moved many “adults” (a term introduced by young protesters for people aged fifty or above) who would otherwise be inclined to take a moderate and nonviolent approach toward protests. Shu Kei, dean of the School of Film and TV of the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts, wrote, Young protesters have awakened the so-called adults to reflect their social responsibility. . . . During the British colonial rule and the special administration under the Chinese government, the people of Hong Kong became selfish and indifferent to others and to society. In the protests we have seen people getting injured. The first thought of young people is to protect others so they are not hurt, not for their own safety. Their altruism makes adults ashamed.4

Deanie Ip, an actress aged seventy-two, joined a rally of more than eight thousand people organized by the elderly in support of young people on July



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17, 2019. She said, “Most of the so-called adults are people with vested interests. I believe people joining this rally are moved by the youth. We come out to support them and their requests.”5 Lawrence Ying-kam Lok, senior counsel, wrote, “We must remember that it is the government that is at fault in passing the bill without public consensus. Young people have used force blocking the entrance to the Legislative Council and afterwards this has led to conflict with police. Because of these events, the government is unwilling to suspend the bill.”6 Many adults share these views. They feel guilty that they have not done enough to build up a more democratic and just society over the past twenty years. As a result, young people have taken up the responsibility to transform Hong Kong. They regret that they have to spend time in school, not on the streets in protests. In order to protect young people from injury, groups have been formed, such as an organization called Protect Our Kids (守護孩子). In the early stage of the protests, people from Protect Our Kids chose to stand between protesters and the police in order to prevent clashes between them. Apart from this, many adults are contributing different kinds of resources to support and protect young people. These have included legal support, transportation, short-term housing, protective equipment, food, and more. It is not overstating the case to say that the determination and commitment of young people have aroused the consciences of the adults. Nevertheless, the government typically views youth activism as a crisis of social instability and disorder. Youth activism is considered to be an irrational expression of social dysfunction in the community. As a result, young people are targeted and labeled as the usual suspects for arrests by the police when chaos or violence erupts during the protests. There is now a saying, “It is a sin to be young” (年輕有 罪), to describe how young people are being unfairly treated by the police. It is important to note that there has been a debate between nonviolence and militancy since the Umbrella Movement in 2014. People inclined to militancy are often young people. The escalation of protest militancy has resulted from the interactive effects of protest agency, contingencies, and contextual factors. More specifically, protester experiences of political authoritarianism, police repression, and gang violence have provided rich soil for protest militancy.7 Such militancy has expressed itself through clashes with the police and through vandalism (albeit without looting) and, to a lesser extent, as violence against people deemed to oppose the protests. However, public opinion polls reveal that many people are generally tolerant of youthful militancy in the protests and condemn police brutality against protesters.8 Youth activism is a global civil movement, and it is always the voice and the eye of society in that it produces alternative futures for society. The involvement of young people in the protest is not a sudden development. Young

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people have played a major role in previous protests, such as against urban development in 2007 and the construction of the high-speed railway in 2009. Protests against the introduction of national education in 2012 sparked the involvement of pupils from secondary schools. The role of young people (university students) in the so-called Umbrella Movement in 2014 was remarkable. One of the catchphrases at the time of the Umbrella Movement was “We are the people chosen by the times” (被時代選中的我們). This phrase carries a very strong sense of vocation, responsibility, mission, and vision. One of the authors of the book We Are the People Chosen by the Times critically reflects, To be honest, the times do not choose us. Rather, we are born and locked into this generation. We cannot avoid it or be indifferent and neutral to injustice. We are thrown into this generation. Being baptized into the Umbrella Movement, we have seen the penetration of the Chinese government into Hong Kong affairs and the rise of political struggle. Everyone has to reflect on our role at this moment of time.9

Edward Tin-kei Leung, twenty-eight, who was convicted of rioting and assaulting a police officer during the Mong Kok unrest in 2016 and sentenced to jail for six years, said, “Anyone in this community under persecution is my own persecution; anyone who has suffered from injustice is my own suffering. I have to resist injustice and speak up for them.”10 Another example is Brian Kai-ping Leung, twenty-five, one of the protesters who broke into the Legislative Council chambers on July 1, 2019. He was the only one to take off his mask to make a statement. In a video conference, he said, “I think this is what it means to call ourselves a community, that we are able to imagine others’ suffering, and are willing to shoulder one another’s burdens.”11 They have a strong sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and they do not want Hong Kong to be ruined. They do not care about their own future but instead the future of the people of Hong Kong. Through participating in the demonstrations, protesters have established a sense of solidarity and a political subjectivity that binds them together in what has been called “a community of common destiny” (命運共同體) by both Edward Leung and Brian Leung. It is a great mistake for the government to condemn protesters as rioters. The government will definitely lose the younger generation, which could turn out to be a leviathan. Edward Tin-kei Leung’s case reminds protesters that they can be charged with rioting, and the maximum sentence is ten years if found guilty. Despite the possibility of a long prison sentence, young protesters do not regret their actions. A quote from Tao Te Ching has been painted on walls: “People won’t fear death; therefore intimidation doesn’t work” (民不畏死，奈何以 死懼之). Some young protesters have written their wills. A young woman of



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twenty writes, “If I cannot return home safely, don’t cry for me. Your daughter departs with conviction. . . . I hope you can understand my insistence and be proud of my courage.”12 A young man of twenty-four conveys these potentially last words to his parents: My dad and mum, when you discover this letter, I may have been arrested or killed. I always want to be a “useful person” in your eyes, no matter whether I am studying or working. But the most important thing is to be a conscientious person, not a selfish person. . . . To be honest, I am afraid, but I can’t give up. I am 24 now, but many protesters on the street are 17 or 18. I am an adult. . . . Every time you have opposed my participation in protests, it was because you didn’t want me to be injured. Dad, I am not a good boy, and won’t be able to go along with you. Once I have left, you will have to take care of yourself, getting your meal on time.13

Since there have been a number of suspicious suicide cases, these worries are not groundless. The last wills of young protesters should not be read as overreacting or being too radical. Rather, we have to ask what has happened in a society that pushes young people to consider the option of self-sacrifice. A saying, “The city is dying,” from a TV drama in 2011 called Heaven and Earth (〈天與地〉) has found an echo in the protests. The city is dying because Hong Kong is no longer a place for the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is serving China more than meeting the needs of the people of Hong Kong and allowing them to dream about their future. Hong Kong has lost her soul. “One country, two systems” is only a lie. In a closed meeting with ten young protesters taking a militant approach to protests, many of them shared that they are desperate about their futures. They believe that there are no prospects for education or employment. They are struggling for survival because their income cannot sustain a decent life. In addition, they complain that they are deprived of participating in decision-making for the future of society. Their discontent cannot be explained away as pessimistic personalities. The reality is that the Gini-coefficient figure in 2015 was 0.539, and 15 percent of people were living below the poverty line. Their grievances are well grounded. The theory of post-materialism attempts to explain that young protesters give priority to freedom of speech, more say in important government decisions, and a more humane society over a stable economy and a high rate of economic growth.14 However, an overemphasis on post-materialism on the part of young protesters may be romanticizing the protests. In fact, there are large numbers of young protesters who are socio-economically deprived. Their life experience is why the thought that “there is nothing to lose when we fight because we have nothing at all” is widespread among young protesters. However, the

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government is wrong to interpret the protests as simply an issue of socioeconomic deprivation, for freedom and bread are inseparable. I find Hannah Arendt’s idea of natality helpful in articulating young protesters’ experience. In short, natality is the condition of having been born, and our natality is the “source” or “root” of the “human capacity to begin.”15 By “capacity to begin,” Arendt means the capacity to break with the status quo and to initiate something new. It is to begin a political revolution. The site of engagement need not be national; it can be your own neighborhood or your workplace. Two questions then follow: Who is the natality? How can the natality be expressed in society? Every human being is natality, but not every natality can actualize its capacity because many of them are occupied by labor and work rather than action. In Arendt’s understanding, natality is action contributing to a polity in which mutual and genuine relationships between peers occur, corresponding to the polis life and citizenship characterized by freedom and individuality.16 Arendt puts it this way: Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men . . . corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition—not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam—of all political life.17

Young protesters are exercising their action in contributing to an interactive political life. They refuse to retreat to a selfish social contract society. On the other hand, they are eager to change and to initiate a revolution in order that the status quo can be challenged. This explains why “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution in our times” (光復香港，時代革命) is one of the core slogans of the protests. The government understands very well that, without the exercise of natality by young people, there is no future for society, but paradoxically, it puts the youth in prison. THE CRUCIFIED PEOPLE Employing the framework proposed by Robin Gill in his book Theology in a Social Context,18 I consider that the protests are the social context of my theological reflection and the young protesters’ experience is the social determinant of my theological construct. The follow-up questions are what a contextual theological construction would be and what the social significance of such a theological construction would be. I am saddened to read the news that young protesters are being arrested, imprisoned, beaten, prosecuted, and exiled and are committing suicide. On



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the other hand, their suffering has been turned into hope for Hongkongers because the consciences of adults have been aroused by them. Theologically, I find that the young protesters’ experience is not alien to the Christian experience. Jesus Christ is the one who was betrayed, arrested, beaten, and crucified because he was committed to the Kingdom of God and challenged the anti-Kingdom. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ is not the end of his story because God resurrected him. Jesus’s resurrection is not just giving life back to a corpse but bringing justice back to a victim. The meaning of the fact that the Risen One is the Crucified One is that justice prevails. An attempt to correlate the relationship between the oppressed people and the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is fully expressed in liberation theology. Ignacio Ellacuría refers to the suffering and the oppressed as the crucified people, and indeed, he himself was assassinated on November 16, 1989.19 The crucified people are more than simply people being killed unjustly: they are participating in the suffering of Jesus Christ. “I [the author] am now rejoicing in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I am completing what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions for the sake of his body, that is, the church” (Col. 1:24). They share Jesus’s suffering as well as his glory. In Latin America, the crucified people are those who “are denied a chance to speak and even to be called by name, which means they are denied their own existence.”20 They are “generated by unjust structures—institutionalized violence”—and are put to death. But it is not just any death.21 It is also the resistance of the oppressive powers and the struggle for liberation bringing them to persecution and death. The crucified people are witnesses to the reality that the sin of the world continues to violate human dignity and that the powerful of this world continue to rob the poor and the marginalized. Theologically, the crucified people are the actualization of the crucified Jesus because Jesus is there wherever suffering people are to be found (Matt. 25:31–46). Suffering under injustice is not just the sufferers’ story; it is Jesus’s story as well as God’s story. The emergence of the crucified people does not call into question the presence of God. Paradoxically, they are the sign of God’s presence in our world. The crucified Jesus continues to live in the midst of people’s suffering. The appearance of the crucified people does not permit a reading of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as if it were removed from history. The churches cannot avoid passing through the passion of Jesus Christ and the crucified people when they proclaim Jesus’s resurrection. There is no history of salvation without salvation in history. Any attempt at the privatization of the death of Jesus Christ is a betrayal of Jesus Christ. A theology of the crucified people does not focus on their suffering but rather on their saving role.22 The crucified Jesus is not simply a victim; he is Yahweh’s servant. This role is reflected in the Servant Songs in the Book of

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Isaiah (42:1–4; 49:1–6; 50:4–7; 52:13–53:12). First, the servant is killed for establishing right and justice (Isa. 42:1, 4, 6–7). Second, the servant is chosen by God for salvation (Isa. 42:1; 49:3–7). Third, the servant bears the sins of the world (Isa. 53:5–6, 11–12). Fourth, the servant is the light of the nations (Isa. 42:6; 49:6). Fifth, the servant brings salvation (Isa. 53:10–12).23 It is the resurrection of Jesus through which we come to know that Jesus Christ is Yahweh’s servant. Young protesters would not see themselves as Yahweh’s servants, but like Yahweh’s servant, they sacrifice themselves to establish a right and just society. They do not claim themselves as the people chosen by the times but take up responsibility for the people of their time. Nevertheless, they are condemned as rioters. Ellacuría and Jon Sobrino explain that the light the crucified people bring is to unmask the lies and the violence behind the so-called stability.24 The salvation the crucified people bring consists of the values of the Kingdom of God. “The poor have evangelizing potential. This potential is spelt out as the gospel values of solidarity, service, simplicity, and readiness to receive God’s gift.”25 These experiences are not alien to Hongkongers. First, young protesters witness to us that Hongkongers should not look down upon themselves; they deserve to have a better Hong Kong. Second, adults have experienced conversion due to the “evangelizing” power of the young protesters. The metaphor of the crucified people, as developed by Latin American liberation theology, is not intended to romanticize the crucified people. The crucified people are also people of selfishness and violence. In fact, some young protesters are arrogant, militant, short-sighted, exclusive, and emotional. Nevertheless, these human frailties do not stop our commitment to the crucified people because Jesus’s resurrection denounces the need for sacrifice found in crucifixion. We have to prevent people from being crucified and bring down people from the crosses. A large number of people (protesters and observers), in fact, are suffering from varying degrees of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).26 It is not easy for young protesters to seek help. They are afraid of being arrested when they tell their stories. Moreover, many young protesters’ relationships with their families are seriously broken due to different political viewpoints. They have nowhere to stay, and they are in a vulnerable situation. We are called to heal and embrace them. I consider that the metaphor of the crucified people can be enriched by a correlated metaphor, namely, the suffering messiah. Like the crucified people, the metaphor of the suffering messiah shares the experience of suffering caused by injustice. Unlike the crucified people, the metaphor of the suffering messiah speaks to us about eschatological expectations and the emergence of “messianic time.”



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The word messiah means anointed in Hebrew. Kings, high priests, and prophets are all anointed. In the Hebrew Scripture, messianic figures usher in an eschatological turning point (a definite new state in the world), have a soteriological function (bringing salvation to Israel), and achieve charismatic status, towering above other human beings by virtue of their nearness to God.27 Since the failure of the kings, the eschatological expectations of a messiah gained more weight in messianic thought. Jesus repudiated the conviction expressed in the usurping of messianic expectation by political rulers (Mark 8:29, 33), but he did not completely reject eschatological expectations of himself. He reinterpreted them. For instance, he was a suffering messiah, which was not found in the Jewish tradition. The kingdom that was breaking in was not a new political organization but an overcoming of the evil, supposedly demonic, power that brought so many afflictions to human life. In addition, Jesus desired to exercise the role of messiah not exclusively but along with his disciples, whom he saw as a messianic collective to rule Israel.28 Ordinary people, fishermen, and farmers were to rule as representatives of the twelve tribes, exercising a representative popular rule. The eschatological promise given in the resurrection of Jesus Christ brings about the emergence of the church. Jürgen Moltmann calls the church a messianic fellowship, and Gerd Theissen refers to it as group messianism. Here messianic means Christological,29 that is to say, the church is both the church under the cross and also the church of the celebration of freedom and joy. The church lives between this world and the future world, between immanence and transcendence. This understanding is why early Christian communities described themselves as sojourners or resident aliens rather than as permanent citizens of the cities in which they dwelt. Theologians have focused on the emergence of the church as a messianic community while Giorgio Agamben focuses on the emergence of a messianic time. Different from apocalyptical time and chronological time, “messianic time does not consist of a measurable chronological duration; it is a state of expectation that produces a qualitative change in how time is experienced.”30 Messianic time opens up, not in some time after time, but precisely within regular time. Agamben explains that this messianic time exists in all time but needs to be brought about and grasped, that the messiah has already arrived, the messianic event has already happened, but that its presence contains within itself another time, which stretches to its parousia—not in order to defer it but to make it graspable. For this reason, each instant may be, to use Walter Benjamin’s words, the “small door through which the messiah enters.”31 Messianic time allows people to imagine the unimaginable and to embrace and become themselves even though their lives are still governed by chronological time.

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Young protesters are not messiahs, but like the messiah, they bring in messianic time for the people of Hong Kong. First, whether or not we agree with Edward Leung and Brian Leung’s concept of the suffering community for the people of Hong Kong, the people of Hong Kong have been thrown into a time in which they are being asked to rethink the identity of Hongkongers. Second, the people of Hong Kong have the courage not to follow the routine set by chronological time but to design and arrange their own lives. An example of this commitment and their creativity is the formation of the so-called yellow economic circle,32 a politics of lifestyle. Along with the idea of the suffering messiah, I consider that the light and salvation that the crucified people bring is a witness to the emergence of messianic time. They are not the observers of messianic time, but they are in it. The significance of messianic time will not be defined by whether the five demands of the protesters are met.33 Rather, it is a time that opens itself up to a new model of community. MARTYRDOM One of the striking concerns of the protests is that many young protesters have been prepared to sacrifice themselves for the future of Hong Kong. Some have been prepared to be sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, some have been prepared to give up their career opportunities, and some have been prepared even to die. People killed and arrested in the protests are called the Righteous (義士). In association with the ideas of crucified people and the suffering messiah, the righteous in Christian tradition are the martyrs. In the light of the crucified people and the suffering messiah, the martyrs are not only the victims but also the saviors. The original meaning of martyrdom is to “bear witness” (from Greek, martyria), to bear witness to the truth of faith to the point of laying down one’s life. It is what we witness to that matters, not simply dying. The fundamental act of witness is to bear witness to the truth. In reply to Pilate’s question, Jesus said, “You say that I am a king. For this I was born, and for this I came into the world, to testify to the truth. Everyone who belongs to the truth listens to my voice” (John 18:37). Jesus was crucified because he did not compromise the truth. Protesters in Hong Kong are martyrs witnessing to the truth. During the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the core slogan was “We need genuine universal suffrage” (我要真普選) because the Chinese government introduced a restricted form of universal suffrage to the people of Hong Kong instead of keeping its promise to implement genuine universal suffrage. During the protests in 2019, protesters demanded that the government withdraw the ex-



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tradition bill, but the government first offered a suspension of the bill instead. Protesters demanded an independent inquiry commission to examine the police’s use of excessive force during the demonstrations, but the government assigned the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC), which does not have authority to carry out investigations, to follow up the issue. There can be no toleration of lies in truth, and this intolerance to lies is what young protesters bear witness to. The metaphor of the crucified people reminds us that their suffering must not be forgotten and covered up. A commitment to truth-finding is our promise to the crucified people. One of the five demands of protesters is to set up an independent commission of inquiry into police conduct and the use of force by the police during protests. Many people consider that this demand is an impossible mission because the government needs the support of the police in order to maintain its governance. However, the experiences of many countries tell us that truth-finding is the only way to move society forward. Truth-finding is not about revenge but is rather a path leading to transformative and restorative justice. Young protesters use the word condom to remind us that they should not be seen as disposable. No matter how impossible it is, there can be no compromise in truth-finding. The truth is more than a matter of true or false “facts.” Rather, truth should set us free (John 8:31–32). The five demands are precisely a concern about freedom. They are about defending the value of the rule of law, democracy, and government accountability. The 2019 World Report of Human Rights Watch notes that “Beijing’s assault on Hong Kong’s freedoms, particularly the rights to free expression, association, and political participation, worsened considerably in 2018.”34 However, there are people who consider that economic prosperity and social stability are more important than freedom. They complain that their businesses and their living standards are affected by the protests, but they have no concern for social injustice. There are people who are patriotic and believe that the protests are against China. However, the meaning of truth that should set us free is not only confined to concern for human rights but also to freedom from the possession of egoism, materialism, and militant patriotism. Apart from witnessing to the truth, martyrs are people living in truth. Living in truth could simply mean to live in accordance with what one believes. But for Jesus Christ, living in the truth is not to live by one’s own truth but to be responsible to something ultimate, beyond one’s psyche, one’s community or society. This is the Kingdom of God. Living in truth requires one to be self-critical and attentive to others in order that one is not living simply by one’s own truth but is subject to ultimate Truth. The leaderless aspect of the protests not only gives flexibility to the protests, but it also encourages

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different kinds of participation. This diversity in forms of dissent should be appreciated, but we have to admit that the connection between radical young protesters and adults is very weak, and there is a lack of dialogue between them. Living in truth demands us to be attentive to others so that we do not see ourselves as the truth representatives. Moreover, there have been reports of protesters’ militancy, such as blocking roads; setting fires; damaging shops, traffic lights, and public transport; and attacking people who have different political views. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the issue of protesters’ militancy.35 Protesters, however, have to be open to criticisms and challenges so that they are aware that they are called to live in truth and bear witness to truth. Martyrs are people willing to sacrifice themselves for a higher cause, but they never use violence to punish people not on their side nor would they force people to join their protest. Youth protesters are very much like the little child of Hans Christian Andersen’s story of the emperor’s new clothes. They witness to what truth is and reveal what has gone wrong in society. The martyrdom of youth protesters is a kind of light recalling our conscience. Hannah Arendt makes a good remark, “That even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination, and that such illumination might well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given to them.”36 CONCLUSION A consul general from a member of the European Union shared with me that he is pessimistic about the development of the protests because there is no identified party with which to negotiate if, indeed, there will be negotiations. My concern is not how and when the protests will end. Rather, I am concerned with how the experiences of the crucified people, messianic time, and martyrdom can be turned into resources for Hongkongers to seek a community of shared destiny. Many people, in fact, have said that Hongkongers will no longer be the same as before the protests. Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong, quoted Jack London’s “Credo” in his last policy address in 1996: I would rather be ashes than dust; I would rather my spark should burn out in a brilliant blaze, Than it should be stifled in dry rot. I would rather be a superb meteor, With every atom of me in magnificent glow, Than a sleepy and permanent planet.



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Patten continued to say, “Whatever the challenges ahead, nothing should bring this meteor crashing to earth, nothing should snuff out its glow.”37 “I would rather be ashes than dust” (寧化飛灰，不作浮塵) is exactly one of the phrases painted on walls around Hong Kong by protesters. This is what young protesters are witnessing to—for our sakes. NOTES 1.〈鄧炳強：6月反修例至今7019人被捕約4成為學生〉[Tang Ping-keung, “Since June 7019 were arrested due to the anti-extradition bill protests, around 40 percent were students”], RTHK, January 16, 2020, news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/ k2/1503124-20200116.htm. 2.  Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (2019): 465–87. 3. John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), 204. 4.〈香港銀髮族與中學生舉行跨代集會抗議警察暴力〉[An assembly between the elderly and the youth, a protest against police’s violence], RFI, last modified November 30, 2019, www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20191130-%E9% A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E9%93%B6%E5%8F%91%E6%97%8F%E4%B8%8E%E4 %B8%AD%E5%AD%A6%E7%94%9F%E4%B8%BE%E8%A1%8C%E8%B7%A 8%E4%BB%A3%E9%9B%86%E4%BC%9A-%E6%8A%97%E8%AE%AE%E8% AD%A6%E5%AF%9F%E6%9A%B4%E5%8A%9B. Translation mine. 5.〈葉德嫻：「銀髮族」受年輕人感動〉[Deanie Yip: The elderly are moved by the youth], Facebook, RTHK VNEWS, July 17, 2019, www.facebook.com/RTHKVNEWS/posts/2672082499566456?comment_id=2672091386232234&comment_ tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A%22R%22%7D. Translation mine. 6.〈駱應淦「香港家書」︰要求有勢力、有公權、有武器者問責，並不 羞恥〉 [Lawrence Lok’s letter to Hong Kong: It is not shameful to demand the powerful, the people with public power, and people with weapons to be responsible], Standnews, October, 26, 2019, www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E9%A7 %B1%E6%87%89%E6%B7%A6-%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E5%AE%B6%E6 %9B%B8-%E8%A6%81%E6%B1%82%E6%9C%89%E5%8B%A2%E5%8A%9B -%E6%9C%89%E5%85%AC%E6%AC%8A-%E6%9C%89%E6%AD%A6%E5%9 9%A8%E8%80%85%E5%95%8F%E8%B2%AC-%E4%B8%A6%E4%B8%8D%E 7%BE%9E%E6%81%A5/. Translation mine. 7.  Agnes S. Ku, “New Forms of Youth Activism: Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in the Local-National-Global Nexus,” Space and Polity 24, no. 1 (2020): 111–17, doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2020.1732201. 8.  Francis Lee, “Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong,” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (2020): 18–32. 9.  傘下的人著：《被時代選中的我們》(香港：白卷出版社，2015) ，頁 7。[People under the umbrella, We Are the People Chosen by the Time (Hong Kong: Empty Page, 2015), 7]. Translation mine.

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10.〈梁天琦給香港抗爭者的一席話〉 [Remarks from Edward Leung to protesters], YouTube, June 18, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFmhUWHCZ2w&fea ture=share&fbclid=IwAR17iek2-FmVCHj2dpTB9ga5uD-E8QeJlaVfyJ1zfzIn4OU foznSPJ6wz-Y. Translation mine. 11.〈我是梁繼平7 月 1 日當晚其中一位進入立法會的抗爭者〉[I am Brian Leung, one of protesters entering the Legislative Council chamber on July 1st], Standnews, August 17, 2019, www.thestandnews.com/politics/%E6%88%91%E6%98%A F%E6%A2%81%E7%B9%BC%E5%B9%B3-7-%E6%9C%88 1-%E6%97%A5%E 7%95%B6%E6%99%9A%E5%85%B6%E4%B8%AD%E4%B8%80%E4%BD%8 D%E9%80%B2%E5%85%A5%E7%AB%8B%E6%B3%95%E6%9C%83%E7%9A %84%E6%8A%97%E7%88%AD%E8%80%85/. 12.〈港女示威者遺書曝光 只求家人為她驕傲〉[The last will of a woman protester revealed. Her hope that her family will be proud of her], Vision Times, October 1, 2019, www.secretchina.com/news/b5/2019/10/01/909082.html. Translation mine. 13.〈對未來絕望的年輕人！〉[Young people with a hopeless future], NOW News, October 19, 2019, www.nownews.com/news/20191019/3700370/. Translation mine. 14. See Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Center, Public Policy Research Center, Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-up Study (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015); Sonny Shiu-hing Lo and Jeff Hai-chi Loo, “An Anatomy of the Post-Materialistic Values of Hong Kong Youth: Opposition to China’s Rising Sharp Power,” in Youth: Global Challenges and Issues of the 21st Century, ed. David Trotman and Stan Tucker (New York: Nova Science, 2019), 95–126. 15. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), 8, 247; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1965), 211. 16. Arendt, The Human Condition, 32–33. 17. Arendt, The Human Condition, 7. 18.  Robin Gill, Theology in a Social Context, vol. 1, Sociological Theology (London: Routledge, 2016). 19.  Ignacio Ellacuría, “The Crucified People,” in Systematic Theology: Perspectives from Liberation Theology, ed. Jon Sobrino and Ignacio Ellacuría (London: SCM, 1996), 257–78; Jon Sobrino, Companions of Jesus (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). 20.  Jon Sobrino, No Salvation Outside the Poor (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008), 4. 21.  Jon Sobrino, “The Crucified Peoples: Yahweh’s Suffering Servant Today,” in 1492–1992 The Voice of the Victims, ed. Leonardo Boff and Virgil Elizondo (London: SCM, 1991), 121–22. 22.  Ellacuría, “The Crucified People,” 259. 23. Jon Sobrino, Jesus, the Liberator (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 258–64. 24.  Ellacuría, “The Crucified People,” 268–78; Sobrino, “The Crucified Peoples,” 125–26. 25.  Sobrino, “The Crucified Peoples,” 127.



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26. Michael Y. Ni et al., “Depression and Post-Traumatic Stress during Major Social Unrest in Hong Kong: A 10-Year Prospective Cohort Today,” The Lancet 395 (2020): 273–384. 27.  Gerd Theissen and Annete Merz, The Historical Jesus (London: SCM, 1998), 532. 28.  Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, 561. 29.  Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit (London: SCM, 1977), 13. 30.  See also Giorgio Agamben, The Church and the Kingdom (London: Seagull, 2012), 4–5. 31.  Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 71. 32.  The idea of the “yellow economic circle” is to create a business network that is supporting the protest. 33.  The five demands are: to withdraw the extradition bill, to stop labeling protesters as “rioters,” to drop charges against protesters, to conduct an independent inquiry into police behavior, to implement genuine universal suffrage for both the legislative council and the chief executive. 34. “China: Events of 2018,” Human Right Watch, www.hrw.org/world-report/ 2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet. 35.  Kung Lap-yan, “Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Movement and an Emergence of a Community of Common Destiny: Churches’ Participation and Inquiry,” Interkulturelle Theologie (forthcoming). 36.  Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 21. 37. “Hong Kong and China Are Not the Same,” Facebook, January 14, 2016. www.facebook.com/hknotch/posts/chris-pattens-speech-on-his-last-policy-address -in-hong-konggovernors-have-lived/1079379782113743/.

Chapter Nine

Is Dialogue in the Church Still Feasible after the Hong Kong Protests? Albert Sui-hung Lee

During the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement in 2014, a majority of young people became disappointed with many churches’ silence, low participation, and insufficient support with regard to the movement. Hence, after learning from the social movement, more churches, pastors, and Christian laymen actively participated in the 2019 protests against the government’s proposed amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance.1 A significant number of well-known Catholic and Protestant Christian leaders and pastors participated in, and even led, some protests by holding large crosses and singing Christian hymns in addition to issuing public statements.2 Some of them stood between the young protesters and the police to seek the latter’s patience with the former. Their embracing actions to demonstrate support and engage the young protesters highlighted their Christian or pastoral identities. Furthermore, their active participation in a peaceful, rational, and nonviolent manner caused the classic Christian hymn “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord” to become the anthem of the protests, especially in the early stages of the movement.3 On one hand, their devotion to the protests subverted many young protesters’ negative perception of churches, which is a positive sign of reconnecting Christianity to the young generation. On the other hand, their high-profile participation broadcast by the mass media and social media caused a significant number of conservative Christians and their leaders to question their “radical” activities as poor witness. SOLIDARITY OF THE CHURCH Christianity’s participation in the 2014 and 2019 protests was not limited to individual Christians; it involved major theological educational institutions, 149

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which used to avoid direct involvement in politics. In the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the Hong Kong Theological Education Association (HKTEA) took the first step to respond to a difficult political situation—the serious conflicts between the protesters and the police. Moreover, HKTEA issued a general statement to implore the Hong Kong government and police to recognize the right of protesters, to condemn all violent behaviors, and to ask every party to dialogue with patience.4 However, this statement neither specified any event and concrete action nor dramatically changed the seminaries’ passive role in social issues. But in 2019, a petition of fourteen seminaries of the HKTEA not only expressed similar requests but also explicitly asked the government to postpone the amendment to the extradition ordinances.5 Although many Christian protesters still consider the 2019 petition of HKTEA as conservative and vague, it is a crucial milestone to have the majority of theological education institutions and teachers step out together to speak against a specific proposal of the government. Consequently, this breakthrough rekindles the theological debates on the relationship between religion and politics among the conservative churches in Hong Kong. More importantly, the extradition bill and the protests connected the diverse theological institutions to achieve theological consent on the social movement and promote their union in expressing their common beliefs. By contrast, the solidifying effect of the protests was not realized among local churches and denominations prior to 2019. In 2014, solidarity was present among protesters on their occupied streets,6 but not yet among churches during Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) or the Umbrella Movement. Only around sixty Protestant pastors and theological students formed the pastoral caring team to support the movement in 2014.7 However, their caring voices and actions had not yet moved the majority of Christians toward the young protesters. Only some progressive mainline churches, such as the Methodist Church, were compassionate and shared the same political views as the protesters.8 Nonetheless, the Methodist Church claimed to neither support nor oppose civic disobedience. Contradictorily, pro-government Christian leaders, such as the Rev. Daniel Ng of the Kong Fook Church, the Evangelical Free Church of China (EFCC); Archbishop Paul Kwong; and the provincial secretary-general of the Hong Kong Anglican Church, the Rev. Peter Douglas Koon Ho-ming, spoke much more explicitly to oppose OCLP.9 Overall, the churches held polarized political positions. The situation took a dramatic turn in 2019. First, more pastors joined the pastoral caring team and thus intensified the supportive Christian voice to protesters by actively participating in all major protests, launching multiple petitions, and initiating small-scale pastoral protests and prayer meetings.10 Second, small local churches put these positive initiatives into a series of



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well-organized and effective actions at the frontline. For instance, Good Neighbor North District Church summoned parents, silver-haired people, disabled people, clergies, social workers, lawyers, and medical staff to launch the campaign Protect Our Kids in different protests starting from July 2019.11 Under the church’s leadership, more than one hundred participating parents and elderly—they included non-Christians—put on their helmets and held flowers, singing the Christian hymn “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord” and persuading the riot police not to hurt the young protesters. Dividing into small groups, they stood between the protesters and the riot police in a bid to mediate and act as a buffer to reduce conflicts. In many protests throughout the second half of 2019, these benevolent volunteers appealed to the riot police, shouting, “Beat us; don’t beat the kids.” The volunteers tried their very best to obtain the names of the arrested protesters to protect their human rights, including their safety in detention and access to voluntary legal support.12 Their courageous and peaceful actions attained some initial success and appreciation in the media, but it became more difficult when more clashes and violence broke out in an uncontrollable manner. Consequently, some of the peaceful volunteers of the campaign were violently beaten by the riot police. The organizing church even received critical phone calls from some conservative Christians. After encountering all these challenges and risks, the organizing church arranged training to the campaign’s volunteers to make the campaign more sustainable. In spite of these difficulties, their experience at least demonstrated the feasibility of uniting Christians to support a campaign to implement the biblical values of mercy and justice and even to engage non-Christian citizens. Furthermore, progressive churches and conservative churches have closer positions on the 2019 protests. On one hand, progressive mainline churches quickly responded, starting in May 2019. For instance, the Hong Kong Council of the Church of Christ in China (HKCCCC) announced its support for postponing the amendment.13 Similarly, the Methodist Church issued several statements and letters with strong positions to oppose the amendment and support the protests. On the other hand, there was a change of position among other mainline and evangelical churches and Christian leaders. Archbishop Paul Kwong and other bishops of the Anglican Church publicly described the government’s attitude as stubborn and partial, although they made no specific request to the government.14 Some evangelical churches also issued strong official statements with concrete requests to the government. In particular, the Baptist Church15 and the Alliance Church 16 issued their own statements to request the withdrawal of the proposed amendment and the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry into the police’s response to the protests respectively. As another one of the top three Christian denominations

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in Hong Kong, the EFCC did not issue any statement, but their largest church publicly expressed similar requests.17 In the past, these three large evangelical denominations publicly championed their moral concerns on same-sex marriage but seldom on political topics.18 Their new strong position against the government’s policy symbolizes a dramatic change in the evangelical community. Further, many congregation members of different evangelical churches even petitioned more strongly against the ordinance amendment and the riot police’s action. As such, the mainline and evangelical churches were surprisingly connected by their common ground of opposition to the extradition bill. At the same time, Hong Kong churches were reconnected to the young people. The reconnection between the mainline and evangelical churches was not limited to their public statements against the extradition bill but also included their active role in sheltering the protesters. Some local churches opened their venues to the protesters and citizens as places of shelter, rest, and prayer. Since the initial protests occurred in the central area on Hong Kong Island, all nearby local churches that first opened their venues publicly to the protesters mainly came from the Catholic Church and two mainline Protestant denominations: the Methodist Church and HKCCCC.19 This pattern echoed the Umbrella Movement in 2014, but more evangelical churches shared this sheltering function when the protests spread to different districts. For example, the churches or institutions that provided shelter to the protesters came from the Baptist Church, the Peace Evangelical Center, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church as well as the Catholic Church.20 This witness of the churches, though, was not without criticism as the China-sponsored media condemned even education institutions of the Alliance Church and the Salvation Army for sheltering the “mob.”21 The widespread protester shelters, publicly announced or quietly provided, of different local churches, especially those conservative churches and evangelical churches that were silent on politics previously, caused further tensions and debates in the media as well as Christian communities.22 In spite of the controversy, their common biblical values and compassion in giving mercy to neighbors and loving young people brought many conservative churches and progressive churches together to reflect the unity of the church, offering shelters of peace and love together for the people during the 2019 protests. DIVISION IN THE CHURCH In spite of the unexpected unity among various church denominations, many Christians with different political positions, and most of the local churches,



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sank into a controversy on the role of the churches in the protests. Conservative Christians challenged the legitimacy of those “aggressive” pastors who were holding the cross and singing Christian hymns among the protesters. These activities were considered symbolic of God’s participation in the protests, connecting them to the image of the ancient Israelites bringing the ark of Yahweh to the battleground. The carrying of the ark under Yahweh’s commands made the Israelites’ crossing of the Jordan River smooth and brought victory to them against the Canaanites in Joshua 3–4, 6.23 However, they lost the battle to the Philistines when they did the same without divine instructions in 1 Samuel 5.24 In conservative Christians’ eyes, those “radical” pastors were taking God as a hostage to the political battlefield without God’s consent similar to what happened in 1 Samuel. Conversely, in Christian protesters’ eyes, God was present with the protesters since many non-Christian protesters sang Christian hymns together to maintain their peaceful, rational, and nonviolent manner. Furthermore, the large crosses were not a sign of clashes but a peaceful sign of Jesus calming the protesters and the police and preventing serious conflicts.25 Consequently, Christians split into two camps while criticizing each other through social media. This heated debate reflects the persistent theological controversy on the separation of church and state. Progressive church leaders have been performing a prophetic tradition of monitoring the government while pro-establishment church leaders began supporting the government right before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997.26 However, most evangelical churches still kept themselves away from any political participation but focused on evangelistic programs.27 Unfortunately, some conservative Christians have confused or distorted concepts to replace the separation of church and state with that of religion and politics. They request churches to be “neutral” on politics by not appreciating or mentioning any protests and even expect pastors to be mute on politics in both congregational gatherings and private life. On the other side, younger Christian leaders and laymen in both mainline and evangelical churches increasingly embrace the universal values of democracy and human rights and highlight the prophetic role of the Church and consider “silence” on social and political injustice as being complicit in the injustice. The 2019 protests became the catalyst for this long-standing controversy. The ideological conflicts become more disquieted when verbal attacks turned into threats against people’s lives. Some progressive pastors and seminary teachers received intimidating messages on social media asking them to stop supporting the protesters, whom the bullies considered as “cockroaches,” or criticizing the government and the police. However, the intimidation neither changed the prophetic attitudes of those who were threatened nor terminated the online controversies. The majority of Christians from the

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two camps condemned the evil intent of the intimidators. Nevertheless, some conservative Christians considered these coercive criticisms as demonstrating the danger of engaging in politics and reinforcing their misconception of separating the church from politics. Division circulated not only on social media but also in large church denominations. For example, as mentioned earlier, the Baptist Church had issued a statement against the government’s proposed ordinance amendment on June 4, 2019. However, sixty-nine board members requested the withdrawal of the statement on June 6 (some of them later said, though, that they didn’t endorse such a request).28 Some lay members petitioned to support the statement on social media on June 11. Similarly, internally conflicting positions existed in the EFCC Yan Fook Church, the largest Hong Kong church. Their senior pastor criticized the extradition bill publicly and claimed he would persuade the chief executive to withdraw the proposal on June 10, 2019. However, he portrayed political parties as misleading people to support the protest on August 13.29 In a turn of events, the church’s board of deacons and pastoral leaders issued a public statement to reinstate the original position on November 14.30 These two examples demonstrate contradicting voices or vacillating positions in a church during the 2019 protests. The disagreement has existed widely, though, in many local churches. The Bethel Bible Seminary organized focus group studies with forty-four pastors from different churches and found their congregation members with different political positions held different expectations on their churches’ response to the 2019 protests. In spite of these pastors’ efforts to be objective and to respect different political positions, they always received complaints and reminders from their congregations.31 Moreover, congregations’ polarized attitudes caused arguments and division in many local churches. Consequently, solidarity, mutual respect, and dialogue became increasingly difficult. DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT The divergence in the church was also concerned with the morality of dialogue with the government. On September 10, 2019, fifteen representatives of the three largest denominations met with the chief executive to dialogue on the protests. With the proclaimed objective of restoring the original peace and truth, the representatives issued a meeting summary.32 Some representatives privately reported that the chief executive merely listened attentively without any response to their suggestions. However, these representatives’ solidarity and reconciliatory attempts divided their communities. Some congregation members expressed strong objections to the meeting and their summary.



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Many other believers also questioned on social media whether their representatives had evil objectives. Most leaders in both the conservative and progressive denominations suggested peaceful dialogue with the government regardless of whether they supported social movements and civic disobedience. However, the government ceased to give positive feedback even after dialogue with the three denominations. Furthermore, the effectiveness and morality of the dialogue were widely questioned; for example, should churches still be mute or at least avoid prophetic condemnation against the riot police’s violent arrest of the protesters in order to maintain dialogue with the government? In light of the above, the problem is not only related to the trust between all parties but also more about the fundamental nature of “changes” in dialogue. Mikhail M. Bakhtin suggests, “The idea lives not in one person’s isolated individual consciousness—if it remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of others.”33 Therefore, by applying Bakhtin’s ideas to a social movement, a true dialogue should enable the ideas of different parties to interact with each other for overall transformation, resulting in changing positions and new ideas. However, the government did not aim at changing its position on the democratic development of Hong Kong. Moreover, the protesters even tried to dialogue with the government during the Umbrella Movement.34 However, they failed to narrow the gap because the government insisted on the unchangeability of the decision of the Chinese government. Furthermore, the Hong Kong government maintained such a resistant attitude toward the 2019 protests that the chief executive continued to reject the five demands of the protesters.35 For example, she suggested the establishment of an independent review committee without statutory authority to call witnesses instead of the independent commission of inquiry requested by the protesters. This posture reflects the government’s determination to avoid any significant change in its positions. Another crucial feature of true dialogue is the objective of solidarity and peace. However, this beautiful objective was always mixed with hidden evil intentions, as evident in the nonpeaceful exclusion of others in the ancient Near East. For example, Old Assyrian ideology portrayed foreign neighbors as abnormal and even demonized foreign enemies to justify the rule of the Assyrian kings.36 The concept of “foreignness” could cause a treaty between two parties that is meant to achieve a “peaceful” relationship to put others into potential conflict. For instance, in Hittite treaties, a vassal king was always requested to treat the more powerful king’s enemies as his own enemies

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to acquire protection.37 The Succession Treaty of Esarhaddon even forced the vassal states to have “absolute honesty,” loyalty, and love and to obey, serve, and protect the new incoming Neo-Assyrian king without stating any obligations of the latter.38 However, the solidarity and peace of both treaties were founded on armed threats and unequal power. The dominant party “peacefully” oppressed the vassal states and skillfully established a hostile alliance against his own enemies. By contrast, Yahweh’s covenant with the Israelites in Deuteronomy expresses mutual love (Deut. 5:10) and obligations (Deut. 11:13–15) of both covenantal parties. Yahweh conditionally promised to fight against Israel’s enemies (Deut. 20:4; 23:14) but did not ask Israel to do the same. The covenant was aimed at ultimate peace and blessings for all nations (Gen.18:18; 28:18; Isa. 52:10). Yahweh continued dialoguing with the Israelites and other nations through the prophets even when the Israelites broke the covenant. As such, it meant that, although God is the Creator, God was still willing to dialogue with the disobedient humans. Yahweh stepped forward to reconcile with the covenant-breakers and offered a new covenant to cover all nations. Unlike Yahweh’s aim of embracing all humans, the Hong Kong government’s dialogue activities echo those of Hittite or Assyrian treaties. Additionally, the chief executive held several meetings with different groups and proclaimed the dialogues were aimed at seeking reconciliation in society. This proclaimed objective is false since the government never included protesters as the major target for dialogue but instead quickly invoked a colonial-era law to ban the use of masks by protesters at public assemblies.39 The chief executive once described protesters as having no stake in society, which worsened the situation.40 According to the ancient Near Eastern ways, all these meetings were not true dialogues since the Hong Kong government just attempted to convert different groups into obedient “vassals” to follow her dominant policy and to marginalize the masked protesters as “foreign enemies.” In order to determine whether and how the churches can still dialogue with the government, the church should further understand the Hong Kong as well as the Chinese governments’ attitude toward Hong Kong’s churches and other religions. Moreover, other religions’ leaders attempted to distance themselves from the protesters. Six leading religious leaders of different religious traditions in Hong Kong jointly requested citizens to express opinions in a rational and peaceful manner and called on the government and anti-protest people to communicate with the opposite voices.41 After meeting the chief executive, the group tried to maintain a neutral position by sincerely asking the chief executive to apologize to the citizens and the latter to accept the former’s apology in their joint statement.42 They even expressed their willingness to send representatives to resolve the conflicts between the police and the protesters at a



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university.43 Overall, the government tried to maintain a peaceful relationship with other religions’ leaders in exchange for their support. However, both Catholic and Protestant Christian leaders criticized the government and the police more strongly. The progressive Christian leaders’ criticism of police brutality provoked the Chinese government’s intensified rhetoric that portrayed Hong Kong churches as part of “foreign hostile forces” aimed at subverting China’s one-party rule.44 Indeed, Christianity, and especially the Catholic Church, has been playing a liberating role in raising civic consciousness and supporting different social movements.45 The prominent role of Hong Kong Christianity in the 2019 protests was sufficiently visible that even the Western media recognized it.46 All of these supportive words and actions for the protesters intensified the Chinese government’s ire and suspicion, seeing Christianity as a heretical influence on Hong Kong society.47 Furthermore, the pro-China media in Hong Kong condemned the role of Christianity in the protests. Some Christian schools were named as spreading anti-China thoughts. Overall, Hong Kong Christianity was labeled as destructive. Because of the pro-China camp’s strong criticism against Hong Kong churches, the chief executive’s unresponsive attitude toward Christian leaders’ suggestions, and the government’s unwillingness to reconcile with protesters, the churches’ dialogue with the Hong Kong government is no longer an effective way to persuade Chief Executive Carrie Lam to change her policies. Instead, churches should never give up their prophetic role to criticize the government according to biblical values in exchange for the opportunity of dialogue. Isaiah had peaceful dialogues to encourage Hezekiah, the Judahite king, (Isa. 36–39) but still gave prophetic curses to Hezekiah’s descendants (Isa. 39:5–8) and proclaimed judgment against Judah (Isa. 22 and 28). Jeremiah condemned Zedekiah for the Judahite king’s evilness but still dialogued with him in Jer. 37–38. They demonstrate that the prophetic role and dialogue with rulers should not be mutually exclusive. True dialogue is based on the involved parties’ willingness to engage others with humility. If the government is unwilling to listen to opposing voices, there can be no true dialogue with it. Furthermore, churches do not need to give up or reject any dialogue with the government but should fulfill their prophetic roles for the sake of the city’s citizens, including the protesters. DIALOGUE IN THE CHURCH Division in the church exists, but it is necessary to distinguish two types of division: among local churches or denominations and among the congregation

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in an individual local church. Protestant churches have been encountering the first type of division, and the spilt of a single church or denomination into multiple smaller ones continues to reoccur because of different controversial topics.48 This poses the question: should any local church or denomination be split because of Hong Kong’s protests? As mentioned earlier, congregations were spilt, and some members left in many local churches because of their dissatisfaction with the churches’ response to the protests. Some new churches were then formed to assemble these believers. For example, Umbrella City Cyberchurch was formed for Christians who were disappointed with the detachment of most churches from social issues.49 Similarly, Flow Church maintains politics in the pulpit to win believers who have left other churches.50 In another political camp, Trinity Theological Church was established in 2019 for pro-government Christians or for those who reject any politics from the pulpit.51 Therefore, many observers wonder whether political segregation could be a ministry solution for Hong Kong churches that have been losing members since the Umbrella Movement. First, other churches could now eschew politics for the sake of unity because disappointed members could go to these newly established churches. Second, local churches could assign their members to different groups according to their political positions for easier pastoring. However, it is controversial whether political segregation in the church is biblical. The main supporting argument suggests that God willed diversity because of the rich variety, diversity, and plurality in God’s Creation.52 Nevertheless, diversity and variation are different from division and schism. It is true that God commanded humans to multiply and fill the earth (Gen. 1:28).53 God also stopped the building of the Tower of Babel, which humans had originally aimed toward the centralization of all localities,54 and scattered humans upon the whole earth (Gen. 11:1–9). However, centralization is not equal to unity since it could be a way of oppression in terms of the Hittite or Assyrian treaties. Additionally, scattering is not equal to division or separation since it could be circulating divine blessings to all nations in the sense of Yahweh’s blessings to Abraham (Gen 1:18). Moreover, racial boundaries are broken in the New Testament. Ephesians 2:11–22 and Romans 9:24–26 suggest that the separation of Gentiles and Jews no longer exists in one church.55 From another perspective, the apostles and disciples, who originally stayed in Jerusalem, were scattered so that they preached from place to place (Acts 8:4). When these biblical passages are brought together, the biblical principle could be understood as a tension or paradox: diversity in unity and unity in diversity. Accordingly, diversity and unity are closely correlated for the church.56 God aims at uniting the diversified believers in one new community but scattering



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the one community to spread out blessings everywhere and keeping them as one church simultaneously. In this sense, the pro-government Christians and pro-protester Christians should be united with diversity in one church, which is not limited in one spatial location. The application of this biblical principle to the context of Hong Kong’s churches could be elaborated through a reference to two concepts: communion and interfaith dialogue. In the eschatological sense, there will be communion between the triune God and the church, which is the eschatological substance of all local churches as a whole. On one hand, believers assemble in countless different places, traditions, or denominations, “living doxologically and diaconically” to respond to their unique local contexts. On the other hand, they all find their common identity in Christ as their interrelation to each other in the same one church eschatologically.57 However, this unity in communion should be not only eschatological but also present and earthly since God’s Kingdom has already come but not yet fully realized on earth.58 Furthermore, the ecclesial community is founded on continuous sharing and common participation in this world.59 John D. Zizioulas says, “A Eucharist which takes place in conscious and intentional isolation and separation from other local communities in the world is not a true Eucharist.”60 In Zizioulas’s definition of Eucharist, diversity in the church neither destroys unity and oneness of the church nor causes separation and schism.61 Thus, the eschatological universality and earthly unity of the church and the particularity or locality of each individual believer, church, or denomination are not mutually exclusive. Instead, unity and diversity could work together to achieve full communion among believers and churches, realizing the eschatological church on the earth. In order to practice and realize true communion in the church in the present world, individual believers or local churches should be related to each other in “equality, mutuality, sharing, and participation” through their “mutual dialogue, co-operation, and toleration.”62 Under this concept of communion, political segregation is not biblical once it destroys the unity in the church. If segregation could encourage sharing, dialogue, and cooperation between the segregated believers or churches and others, then their diversity would not hinder the unity of the church. However, if the politically segregated churches could not dialogue or cooperate with other churches with different attitudes toward a social movement or tolerate them, then it could not fulfill the unity in the church in the present world. As such, unity in the church will be more likely to become a proclaimed but unrealized statement mainly for the eschatological hope. By contrast, there seems to be more practical opportunities for politically segregated cell groups, fellowships, or pastoral zones to dialogue and tolerate each other in the same local church. The comparison is admittedly theoretical with certain

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presuppositions for an initial analysis, and the actual results of two scenarios depend on the vision and operation of the respective communities. The experience of interfaith dialogue offers another perspective to explore whether political segregation could facilitate or hinder dialogue and diversity in unity because politically segregated Christians could be as hostile to each other, at least on social media, as believers in different faiths. Moreover, interfaith dialogue is an ongoing process of different religions talking, interacting, challenging, disagreeing, agreeing, learning, and growing with each other to transform both parties’ understanding of the common truth and to build a new common future together.63 This transformation process could produce more commonalities for the participating parties to appreciate and lead them to love each other and peacefully live together. The more common ground they share, the more successful the interfaith process will be.64 In order to increase the common ground, each religious party should prepare itself to step out from its closed system, minimize prejudices, and enter into another party’s world to seek transformation and rebirth.65 Accordingly, everyone should humbly recognize their own potential for growth and discover the goodness of others in the dialogue.66 Similarly, Christians or churches with different attitudes toward Hong Kong’s protests could also cultivate the commonalities to prepare for dialogue and to develop their own humbleness to grow the fruits from the dialogue. On September 21, 2019, around sixty Christians of different political views joined a guided activity, and each of them participated in a group with at least one police officer or a family member of an officer to practice listening to different views with patience as a starting point for reconciliation with police siblings-in-Christ.67 It would be ideal if a church could mobilize its members of different political views to engage in a similar dialogue to realize unity in diversity and vice versa. The churches also need to develop the openmindedness of their members to accept its prophetic role in social movements and to nurture peaceful action to engage in dialogue with the government whenever necessary. This transformation could bring reconciliation to the local churches that encounter division and heal any believers who have suffered from broken relationships caused by political controversy. However, political segregation could reduce the commonalities for dialogue. On one hand, this limitation could be overcome if the segregated community could encourage its members to dialogue and to join in communion with another community of different political views. However, it could be difficult for those churches established to attract believers who left their original churches because of different attitudes toward the social movement. On the other hand, if anyone has an inevitable difficulty with engaging in such dialogue and communion, political segregation could be one of the practical



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and unideal but acceptable options. Overall, Hong Kong churches still face the challenge of maintaining the unity of their believers who have different attitudes toward the protests, and the division among believers will last for a long period. Dialogue is still possible, but also difficult. Conversely, the unity of different denominations has improved since the 2019 protests. The progressive and conservative church leaders have more commonalties than before, although they are still varied in their attitudes, tones, and content when they respond to the social movement. However, this diversity may not threaten their unity as it did during the Umbrella Movement. Consequently, their increased commonalties simplify their dialogue, cooperation, and communion with each other. Their dialogue will bring fruitful learning and transformation. For instance, both the progressive and conservative church leaders have been using their religious resources to construct their model of the relationship between the church and social movements.68 The more dialogue they have, the more perspectives they will contribute to theological reflections. This process is not only a good opportunity for churches to approach the ideal of diversity in unity and unity in diversity but also a beautiful witness for believers to learn true dialogue and communion. CONCLUSION Through theological discussion, public statements, and participation in protests, Hong Kong Christians and churches had a vital role in the 2019 protests. As a result, the social movement brought theological institutions and churches toward closer positions. Although it is a good opportunity for meaningful dialogues to develop new ideas and cooperative relations, political controversies caused division among congregations in many local churches. Therefore, political segregation will probably hinder dialogue and hurt the unity in diversity of the church. Division in the church seems to be unavoidable, but humbleness and respect in more dialogues will give us hope for future reconciliation. Furthermore, churches should cultivate dialogue among churches and be open to any necessary dialogue with the government but never give up the prophetic role to respond to the context of Hong Kong. NOTES 1.  Megan Briggs, “The Vital Role Christians Play in the Hong Kong Protests,” Church Leaders, August 29, 2019, churchleaders.com/news/358105-the-vital-role -christians-play-in-the-hong-kong-protests.html.

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2. “Christian March Joins Hong Kong’s Protest,” Premier Christian News, August 31, 2019, premierchristian.news/en/news/article/christian-march-joins-hong -kong-s-protest. 3.  Javier C. Hernández, “With Hymns and Prayers, Christians Help Drive Hong Kong’s Protests,” New York Times, June 19, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/ world/asia/hong-kong-extradition-protests-christians.html. 4.〈神學教育協會聲明:強烈譴責任何暴力行為〉[Statement of Theological Education Association: Condemn any violent behaviors], Christian Times, October 5, 2014, christiantimes.org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=85755& Pid=21&Version=0&Cid=1018&Charset=big5_hkscs. 5.  田淑珍，〈神學教育協會十四院校聯署譴責暴力，深望暫緩修例〉 [Tin Shuk-chun, “Petitions by 14 seminaries from Hong Kong Theological Education Association: Condemn violence and hope for postponement of ordinance amendment”], Christian Times, June 14, 2019, christiantimes.org.hk/Common/Reader/ News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=158380&Pid=102&Version=0&Cid=2141&Charset= big5_hkscs. 6.  Mary Yuen, “Solidarity and Division among Hong Kong People in the Occupy Movement: Reflection from a Hong Kong Catholic Perspective,” in Theological Reflections on the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement, ed. Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 78–80. 7.  Wu Chi-wai, one of their key representatives, referred to the concept of Martin Heidegger about the “world as the presence of humans” as their vision of having the pastoral caring team present among the crowd of protesters. He said, “Pastors should be present with the crowd wherever the crowd is, and provide the pastoral care needed by them.” 胡志偉，〈走進現場的「教牧關懷團」〉[Wu Chi-wai, “Pastoral caring team walks into the scene], Christian Times, September 26, 2014, christiantimes. org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=85548&Pid=6&Version=0&Cid =150&Charset=big5_hkscs. 8.  循道衛理聯合教會牧師部，〈 香港循道衛理聯合教會牧師部對《二零一 七年行政長官及 二零一六年立法會產生辦法諮詢文件》的意見〉[The Ministerial Session of Hong Kong Methodist Church, “Our opinions on the consultation document on the methods for selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for forming the Legislative Council in 2016”], April 15, 2015, www.methodist.org.hk/media/ filehotlink/2014/04/15/OurResponse-March2014.pdf. 9.  Shun-hing Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 389; Kung Lap-yan, “In Search of Trueness: Dialogue Between Political Localism and Theological Ecumenism in PostUmbrella Movement,” International Journal of Public Theology 11, no. 4 (December 2017): 443–44. 10.〈教牧關懷團發聲明 譴責「8.11」警方濫暴與濫捕〉[Pastoral caring team issues statement to condemn police’s violence and excessive arrest on August 11], Gospel Herald, August 12, 2019, www.gospelherald.com.hk/news/soc_2754.htm. 11.  The church was established in 2014 with concerns about poverty and social injustice with an emphasis on concrete actions and raising prophetic voices. They launched a campaign to protect the young protesters in Admiralty on July 21, 2019,



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and in Yuen Long on July 27, 2019. Facebook posts of the Good Neighbor North District Church, July 20, 2019, and July 24, 2019, www.facebook.com/pg/Good Neighbournd/posts/?ref=page_internal. 12.  Andrew Jacobs, “Behind Hong Kong’s Protesters, An Army of Volunteer Pastors, Doctors and Artists,” New York Times, last updated November 25, 2019, www .nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html. 13.〈中華基督教會香港區會神學牧職部職員會就香港特區政府修訂《逃犯 條例》的聲明〉[Hong Kong Council of the Church of Christ in China (HKCCCC), “Theological Ministry Committee’s statement concerning Hong Kong government’s proposed amendments for fugitive offenders ordinance”], HKCCCC, May 13, 2019, www.hkcccc.org/News/viewNews.php?aid=1284. 14.  “Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui House of Bishops Pastoral Letter,” Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui, June 18, 2019, echo.hkskh.org/news_article_details.aspx?lang= 1&nid=6258. 15.〈香港浸信會聯會就修訂《逃犯條例》之聲明〉[The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong, “Statement on amending the fugitive offenders ordinance”], The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong, June 4, 2019, www.hkbaptist.org.hk/acms/content.asp ?site=bchk&op=showbyid&id=75451. 16.  羅民威，〈聲明關注特區政府道德危機, 宣道會籲設獨立委員會調查〉 [Law Man-wai, “Statement concerning moral crisis of Hong Kong government: Alliance churches call for the establishment of independent commission of inquiry”], Christian Times, July 26, 2019, christiantimes.org.hk/Common/Reader/ News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=158985&Pid=102&Version=0&Cid=2141&Charset= big5_hkscs. 17.  高思憫，〈恩福堂發公開呼籲促請政府成立獨立調查委員會〉[Ko Szeman, “Yan-fook Church issues public statement to request the government to establish independent commission of inquiry”], Christian Times, November 15, 2019, christiantimes.org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=160271&Pid=102 &Version=0&Cid=2141&Charset=big5_hkscs. 18.  Beatrice Leung and Shun-hing Chan, Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Culture and Society, 2003), 140. 19.  麥世賢、陳盈恩，〈「反送中」示威持續, 教會開放予公眾及信徒〉[Mak Sai-yin and Chan Ying-yan, “‘Anti-extradition Bill’ protest continues, churches are opened to the public and believers”], Christian Times, June 12, 2019, christiantimes .org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=158304&Pid=102&Version=0& Cid=2141&Charset=big5_hkscs. 20.  麥嘉殷，〈沙田「反送中」遊行教會及機構開放休息空間代禱支援〉 [Mak Ka-yan, “Shatin ‘Anti-extradition Bill’ protest, churches and institutions are opened for resting space and prayer support”], Christian Times, July 14, 2019, chris tiantimes.org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=158799&Pid=102&Ver sion=0&Cid=2011&Charset=big5_hkscs. 21. Christian schools and churches were condemned for offering shelter to the “mobs”; see 〈宗教界應導人向善 勿淪暴徒「庇護所」〉[Religion should guide people to be virtuous, don’t be “shelters” for the mobs], Wenweipo, September 20, 2019, paper.wenweipo.com/2019/09/20/WW1909200002.htm.

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22.  Josephine Ma, “Hong Kong’s Protest Pastors: As Violence Escalates, Churches Struggle to Find a Place between Religion and Politics,” South China Morning Post, November 16, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3037977/ hong-kongs-protest-pastors-violence-escalates-churches. 23.  The presence of Yahweh’s ark signals the significance of the crossing of the Jordan River by echoing Yahweh’s deliverance of the Israelites across the Red Sea in Exodus, and carrying Yahweh’s ark to circle Jericho to bring about a military victory then echoes the crossing of the Jordan River. These events of Yahweh’s presence with the Israelite army contribute to the military importance of Yahweh’s ark and demonstrate that Yahweh is the divine warrior. Joshua emphasizes the ark as “the ark of the covenant of the Lord of all the earth” (3:11), which also implies the scene was aimed to make the nations and Israel understand Yahweh as the Creator of the world. See Richard D. Nelson, Joshua, OTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 59–60, 94; Thomas B. Dozeman, Joshua 1–12: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes and Commentary, AB 6B (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 288–89, 328; David Toshio Tsumura, The First Book of Samuel, NICOT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 191. 24.  The ark of Yahweh was the visible sign of Yahweh’s holy presence and thus a battle palladium for the Israelite army in the ideology of Israelite warfare. It implies that Yahweh is fighting for Israel. See P. Kyle McCarter, I Samuel: A New Translation with Introduction, Notes & Commentary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 109; Tsumura, The First Book of Samuel, 191. 25.  The presence of God in a social movement is not to justify any specific protesting actions but to show God’s providence and caring for humans. See Kung, “In Search of True-ness,” 446. 26. As early as the 1970s, some Christian organizations had become socially active and engaged in evangelism simultaneously. When Hong Kong was still a British colony, some progressive church leaders had already begun to engage in social issues and had attempted to lobby or criticize some government policies. Such experiences offered a foundation for the progressive churches to develop a prophetic tradition of monitoring and lobbying the government. However, upon the handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese government, some pro-establishment leaders in the mainline churches began to mobilize the clergy and lay Christians to express a strong national sentiment and identity in order to establish a more cooperative relationship between the government and the churches. During the 1980s and 1990s, some evangelical churches actively attempted to influence government policy on moral issues related to the social culture but not political topics. The Society for Truth and Light was established in May 1997. Leung and Chan, Changing Church and State Relations, 131, 140. 27.  Nancy Ng and Andreas Fulda, “The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” Journal of Church and State 45, no. 3 (2016): 384. 28.  鄧力行，〈浸聯會69名理事要求擱置反送中聲明 有牧師fb澄清從未同意 聯署〉 [Tang Nik-hang, “69 board members of the Baptist Convention request to withdraw the statement against the extradition bill, pastors clarified on Facebook that



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they did not cosign the statement”], Apple Daily, June 10, 2019, hk.news.appledaily. com/local/realtime/article/20190610/59700314. 29.  He took this opposite position when he preached in another church.〈蘇穎智 指反修例抗爭出於政黨誤導：「這只是政黨的遊戲！」〉[So Wing-chi claimed that the protest opposing the ordinance amendment was misled by political parties: “This is only the game of political parties”], Apostles Media, August 13, 2019, apostlesmedia.com/20190813/19016. 30.  They also requested that the government establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate any violence used by the riot police during the protests. See Ko Sze-man, “Yan-fook Church issues public statement.” 31.  Many of their conservative church members opined that the church should not even mention politics in sermons and public prayers. Since many churches have different responses to the proposed ordinance amendment and conflicts between riot police and radical protesters, these conservative Christians complained or even left their churches. By contrast, progressive Christians, who emphasize democracy and justice, expect their churches to have more and stronger responses. See 〈「反修例與教會 牧養」焦點小組研究初步報告〉[Ray Bakke Centre for Urban Transformation of Bethel Bible Seminary, “Preliminary report of focus group study on anti-ordinance amendment and church pastoring”], Christian Times, December 6, 2019, christiantimes .org.hk/Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=160516&Pid=104&Version= 0&Cid=2243&Charset=big5_hkscs. 32.  The representatives jointly suggested the principle of nonviolence, asked both the government and the protesters to be patient and stop violence, supported the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the truth, and sought to persuade the government to have mercy and love on the young people. 33.  Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 88. 34.  Five government officials and five student leaders had a meeting to discuss the protests and their requests on October 21, 2014. SCMP Reporters, “Talks Fail to Narrow Gap between Student Leaders and Hong Kong Government,” South China Morning Post, October 21, 2014, www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1621694/ talks-fail-narrow-gap-between-student-leaders-and-government. 35.  The five key demands are the official withdrawal of the proposed ordinance amendment, the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate alleged police brutality and misconduct, the release of arrested protesters, the retraction of the official characterization of the protests as “riots,” and the resignation of Carrie Lam as the chief executive as well as democratic reforms leading to universal suffrage to elect the chief executive and Legislative Council. The first demand was eventually met after the chief executive’s attempts to use other terms to replace the word “withdrawal” were seriously criticized. 36.  Mu-chou Poo, Enemies of Civilization: Attitudes toward Foreigners in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 68–71, 80–81. 37. The Hittite treaty between the Hittite king Mursili II of Hatti and another weaker king, Tuppi-teshShup of Amurru, states that “whoever is [my Majesty’s]

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enemy shall be your enemy. [Whoever is My Majesty’s friend] shall be your friend.” See Derek S. Doson and Katherine E. Smith, eds., Exploring Biblical Backgrounds: A Reader in Historical & Literary Contexts (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2018), 39. 38.  Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, eds., State Archives of Assyria Vol. II: Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths (Helsinki, Finland: Helsinki University Press, 1988), 28–58. 39.  Jasmine Siu, “Anti-mask Law to Quell Hong Kong Protests Ruled Unconstitutional by High Court,” South China Morning Post, November 18, 2019, www.scmp .com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3038184/anti-mask-law-quell-hong-kong-pro tests-ruled. 40.〈林鄭月娥：少數人不介意破壞經濟，非社會持分者〉[Carrie Lam: The minority who don’t mind destroying the economy have no stake in the society], RTHK, August 9, 2019, news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/k2/1473729-20190809.htm. 41. The religious leaders include leaders of the Buddhist, Catholic, Confucian, Muslim, Protestant, and Taoist traditions. See “Interreligious Leaders Plea for Calm in Hong Kong,” UCA News, July 2, 2019, www.ucanews.com/news/interreligious -leaders-plea-for-calm-in-hong-kong/85550. 42.  “Religious Leaders Plead for Healing,” The Standard, June 18, 2019, www .thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/129891/Religious-leaders-plead-for -healing. 43.  “Urgent Appeal from the Colloquium of Six Religious Leaders of Hong Kong on the Rapid Escalation of Confrontation at Hong Kong Polytechnic University,” Sunday Examiner, November 18, 2019, www.examiner.org.hk/2019/11/18/urgent -appeal-from-the-colloquium-of-six-religious-leaders-of-hong-kong-on-the-rapid -escalation-of-confrontation-at-hong-kong-polytechnic-university/. 44.  The Chinese government has been criticizing Western forces for using Christianity to subvert its rule in China. The criticism was extended to Hong Kong’s churches. AFP, “Anti-China Western Forces Are Using Christianity to Subvert Beijing, Official Claims,” Hong Kong Free Press, March 13, 2019, www.hongkongfp .com/2019/03/13/anti-china-western-forces-using-christianity-subvert-beijing-offi cial-claims/; Verna Yu, “As Protests Continue in Hong Kong, Beijing’s Criticism of Churches Grows Louder,” America (The Jesuit Review), January 6, 2020, www .americamagazine.org/politics-society/2019/12/13/protests-continue-hong-kong-bei jings-criticism-churches-grows-louder. 45. Catholic participation in social movements includes the African American civil rights movement in the United States, South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement, Solidarity in Poland, and Cardinal Jaime Sin’s involvement in ousting the corrupt president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, as well as democratization in several Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. Ng and Fulda, “The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,” 380–81. 46.  Briggs, “The Vital Role Christians Play.” 47.  Yu, “As Protests Continue.” 48.  The controversies include the ordination of female pastors, homosexuality, and the attitude toward other religions; see Christiaan Mostert, “The Church as an Echo



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of the Triune God,” in The Unity of the Church: A Theological State of the Art and Beyond, ed. E. van der Borght (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 23. 49. Anna Kam, “Hong Kong ‘Cyberchurch’ Equipping Christians to Push for Democracy,” Religion Unplugged, September 5, 2019, religionunplugged.com/ news/2019/9/5/hong-kong-cyberchurch-equipping-christians-to-push-for-democracy. 50.  Wu, “Politics and the Pulpit.” 51.  麥嘉殷、 李靜蕙，〈曾聲稱有100%藍絲會友「三一臨在浸信會」少談 政治多講信仰〉[Mak Ka-yan and Lee Ching-wai, “Ever Proclaimed to have 100% pro-government members, Trinity Theological Church talks less about politics and more about belief”], Christian Times, December 12, 2019, christiantimes.org.hk/ Common/Reader/News/ShowNews.jsp?Nid=160526&Pid=102&Version=0&Cid= 2141&Charset=big5_hkscs. 52.  J. H. (Amie) van Wyk, “‘Is Christ Divided?’: An Analysis of the Theological Justification of a Church Schism,” in The Unity of the Church, ed. van der Borght, 64. 53.  This divine mandate is aimed at blessings of fertility instead of any purpose of division. Bernhard Lang, The Hebrew God: Portrait of an Ancient Deity (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 2002), 181. 54.  José Míguez-Bonino, “Genesis 11:1–9: A Latin American Perspective,” in Return to Babel: Global Perspectives on the Bible, ed. Priscilla Pope-Levison and John R. Levison (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 15–16. 55. Abraham van de Beek, “One God and One Church: Considerations on the Unity of the Church from the Perspective of Biblical Theology,” in The Unity of the Church, ed. van der Borght, 251–52. 56. Erin Brigham, Sustaining the Hope for Unity: Ecumenical Dialogue in a Postmodern World (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2012), 106; Barry A. EnsignGeorge, Between Congregation and Church: Denomination and Christian Life Together (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 146; and Harald Hegstad, The Real Church: An Ecclesiology of the Visible (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013), 209. 57.  Mostert, “The Church as an Echo,” 303. 58.  Geerhardus Vos, Pauline Eschatology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 1979), 25–26; George Eldon Ladd and Donald Alfred Hagner, A Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993), 368, 622, 661. 59. Philip Kariatilis, Church as Communion: The Gift and Goal of Koinonia (Hindmash, Australia: St Andrew Orthodox Press, 2011), 51–52. 60.  John D. Zizioulas, “The Local Church in a Eucharistic Perspective: An Orthodox Contribution,” Mid-Stream 33, no. 4 (1994): 429. 61.  John D. Zizioulas, “The Church as Communion,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1994): 9. 62. Kung focuses on theological ecumenism in terms of the diversity in unity among the churches. See Kung, “In Search of True-ness,” 448, 450. 63.  Paul F. Knitter, “Inter-religious Dialogue and Social Action,” in The WileyBlackwell Companion to Inter-religious Dialogue, ed. Catherine Cornille (Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 133; and Samuel Ngun Ling, Communicating Christ in Myanmar: Issues, Interactions and Perspectives (Yangon, Myanmar: Association for Theological Education in Myanmar, 2005), 190.

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64.  On the contrary, the absence of commonalities reduces both the incentive to dialogue with each other and also the fruits to be derived from the dialogue. Paul F. Knitter, One Earth, Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995), 56. 65. Knitter, One Earth, 76; and Raimundo Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 63. 66.  Catherine Cornille, “Conditions for Inter-Religious Dialogue,” in The WileyBlackwell Companion to Inter-religious Dialogue, ed. Cornille, 21. 67.  The organizing committee of the activity “Listen—to others, self, and God” was made up of two seminary professors, two university professors, a police officer, a retired police officer, and a university Christian fellowship staff member. Wu, “Politics and the Pulpit.” 68.  Progressive church leaders and action groups used biblical stories, ideas, images, and symbols to promote their political theology and application during the Umbrella Movement. Similarly, conservative church leaders and organizations also used religious resources and cultural works to support the government and their proposals. Chan, “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement,” 382–83.

Part III

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Chapter Ten

When the Minjung Events Erupt Protests from Korea to Hong Kong Nami Kim

A Hong Kong protester singing an iconic Korean protest song, “March for the Beloved,” in front of a large crowd of protesters who assembled on June 14, 2019, went viral on YouTube. The singing took place after a mass protest that demanded the complete withdrawal of the extradition law amendment bill that was proposed by the Hong Kong government in March 2019. Before singing the song, the protester introduced the song as “the anthem for the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement” and “the song sung by a million Koreans in 2017 as they protested against former president Park Geun-hye.”1 The song was originally composed to commemorate those who were massacred during the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, but it became one of the most widely sung protest songs in contemporary South Korea. It was both surprising and moving for me to watch the chorus of protesters singing together “March for the Beloved” because it never dawned on me that a Korean protest song would resonate with the protesters in Hong Kong in 2019. Observing the mass demonstrations in Hong Kong that have been unfolding since March 2019, people in Hong Kong, South Korea, and other places have quickly pointed out the resemblances between the Hong Kong protests and South Korea’s democracy movement—also known as the minjung (the people or the masses in Korean) movement2—during the 1980s. By no means has the “democratization” achieved through multiple decades of the democracy movement in South Korea been complete or sufficient—far from it. Thus, what Hongkongers saw in that long struggle of the Korean people might be a glimpse of hope without necessarily being “optimistic” about their own political future. They perhaps saw their uncertain “present” in South Korea’s “past” when they invoked Korea’s democracy movement. What has resonated with Hongkongers may not be a seemingly prosperous, democratic, neoliberal subempire after achieving democratization but 171

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instead the embodied, persistent struggle of the people even with the serious threat of a violent response from the state. If there are, indeed, some similarities between these two mass movements, might the minjung theology that emerged in the 1970s in South Korea also be able to provide a theological witness to Hongkongers’ struggle for democracy? Minjung theology served as a theology of witness to the reality of the minjung, the Korean term interchangeably used with “the people, or the masses,” whose suffering was primarily caused by state violence, economic injustice, and violations of human rights under the ruthless military regimes that fortified authoritarianism, economic developmentalism, and rapid urbanization from the early 1960s until the 1980s. By drawing some parallels between South Korea’s democracy movement in the 1980s and Hong Kong’s protests in 2019, this chapter reflects on the unfinished tasks of minjung theology as a theology of witness in light of what has been occurring in Hong Kong. Given that South Korea’s democracy movement spanned more than two decades, this chapter, however, does not attempt to provide a comprehensive comparison between the two mass movements. Instead, after looking at some of the strikingly similar ways in which state violence has been deployed against the protesters across spatio-temporal boundaries, this chapter briefly explores how Hong Kong’s protests can be regarded as a liberative “minjung event” from a minjung theological perspective. It concludes with the possibility of forging transborder solidarity in relation to the eruption of “minjung events” across the globe and beyond various boundaries. I hope that this cursory reflection on minjung theology in relation to Hong Kong’s protests can serve as an invitation for further reflection. STATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PROTESTERS Although Hong Kong is not a nation-state, it has maintained its own autonomous governing system under the constitutional principle of “one country, two systems” since its sovereignty was transferred from Britain to China in 1997. The concept of state violence can be deployed when examining Hong Kong’s current political situation, which has turned into a police state. The understanding of the nature and practice of state violence varies, ranging from political violence, juridical violence, and genocide to structural inequalities and the use of new technologies for surveillance and policing.3 In their introduction to State Violence in East Asia, Sung Chull Kim and N. Ganesan employ the term “state violence” to refer to “the state’s utilization of its apparatus—the military, the police, and security agencies—in order to maintain the unilaterally defined order of the society in question.”4 State violence has



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both instrumental and exemplary purposes. As Vince Boudreau maintains in the same volume, instrumental violence is deployed primarily “to pacify people,” not necessarily to “teach” them, whereas exemplary violence has both “primary targets” on whom it has instrumental effects and “secondary audiences” who take lessons from it and are not directly involved in the violence either as victims or perpetrators.5 However, Boudreau argues that distinctions between these two modalities of violence are almost never definite.6 As was the case with South Korea during its democratization movement for two decades, the ways in which state violence has been deployed in Hong Kong also show both modalities: some are instrumental, and others are a combination of instrumental and exemplary violence. Since March 2019, an alliance of protesters—black-clad youths, college students, workers, activists, pro-democracy politicians, and other citizens from various walks of life—have persistently and unyieldingly protested, without centralized leadership, against the Hong Kong government’s proposed extradition bill that could send criminal suspects, both local residents and visitors, to mainland China to stand trial. The underlying causes have to do with the grave concern over the erosion of Hong Kong’s judicial independence and the potential infringement of Hong Kong people’s civil liberties under China’s increasing political and economic influence on Hong Kong. The protesters have been tear-gassed, pepper-sprayed, water-cannoned, beaten, dragged, and arrested by riot-geared police. By the end of 2019, more than seven thousand people had been arrested with many seriously injured. One university student died during the protests in November 2019, and a number of “suicides,” or “a series of mysterious disappearances,”7 were reported in relation to the turbulence in Hong Kong. The police also targeted the protesters who barricaded the Chinese University of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Polytechnic University. In the latter case, heavily armed Hong Kong police officers used excessive violence on the university campus where more than six hundred protesters remained, using 1,458 tear gas canisters, 1,391 rubber bullets, 325 bean bag rounds, and 265 sponge grenades in one day alone, November 18, 2019.8 Those who “surrendered” were arrested immediately and charged with rioting, which can carry a maximum sentence of ten years unless they are minors. This violent clampdown on protesters at Hong Kong Polytechnic University was intended to “punish” the protesters resisting from the inside of the university campus and to “teach” other protesters and those who support them behind the scenes that their resistance is futile. The fierce protests at Hong Kong Polytechnic University ended after two weeks of the police siege. Despite this seeming defeat, Hongkongers assembled again and have continued their protests against state power.

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The police brutality against protesters in tear-gas-filled university campuses and the streets in Hong Kong evoked both painful and proud memories of the June Democracy Movement in South Korea, which marked the peak of the democracy movement in the country in 1987. During the intense demonstrations in June of that year, university students, in particular, led fierce protests against the military regime that sought to prolong its authoritarian rule and that attempted to conceal the killing of a university student who was tortured to death by the police during interrogation. During the June protests, another university student, Lee Han-yeol, was hit by a tear gas canister shot by riot police and later died. The June Democracy Movement finally ended on June 29, 1987, leading to the June Declaration by then-presidential hopeful Roh Tae-woo in which Roh promised to amend the Constitution to assent to the protesters’ eight demands, which included direct elections for president, freedom of the press, and amnesty to political prisoners. A series of juxtaposed photos that highlight the intensity of the student protests against heavily armed police at the university campuses and in the streets in Hong Kong and in South Korea across spatio-temporal borders look undeniably similar. What should not be overlooked, however, are other cases of state violence and the protests against those incidents, particularly the protests against the sexual torture of Kwon In-sook, who was a labor organizer and a university student, in June 1986. Owing to the tremendous courage of Kwon and the relentless efforts of human rights lawyers who took up her case, the sexual torture and physical assault of Kwon during interrogation at a police station was disclosed to the public. Like other numerous cases of the torture of dissidents, the military regime attempted to fabricate and cover up Kwon’s case. However, these attempts only mobilized public outrage and more protests. As such, the June Democracy Movement was the culmination of the democracy movement lasting for two decades against the brutal military dictatorships that deployed state violence rather than a distinctive or a unique moment in South Korea’s democracy movement. THE UNFINISHED TASKS OF MINJUNG THEOLOGY Minjung theology emerged in the midst of the minjung’s enduring suffering under the military dictatorship in South Korea in the 1970s. This period was also the time when various liberation theologies started bourgeoning in Latin America, North America, Africa, and Asia, responding to authoritarianism, economic injustice, racism, neocolonialism, and state violence in their respective contexts. What served as a wake-up call for the first generation of minjung theologians was the death of Jeon Tae-il, a labor activist, who set



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himself on fire at the age of twenty-two in protest of the horrendous working conditions of the sweatshops in the Seoul Peace Market in November 1970. This incident became a historical turning point, not only for workers and university students in their fight for democracy but also for minjung theologians. Minjung theology challenged dominant Western theology by placing the minjung at the center of theological reflection and defining them as the subjects of history. It also engaged the religio-cultural resources of the minjung, such as folklore, masked dancing, shamanism, and the notion of han.9 Minjung theology was a liberative praxis that sided with the suffering minjung, unlike mainstream Christianity, which maintained a compliant stance or was complicit with the authoritarian military regime. As they realized that theology can no longer preoccupy itself with the problem of individual sin, minjung theologians defined their task as bearing witness to the reality of the minjung and “resolv[ing] the han of the people.”10 Although the term minjung is associated with the particular history of the masses of Korea, whose modern history has been shaped in the larger geopolitical context of Japan’s colonialism, U.S. militarism, and military dictatorships in South Korea, the conceptualization of minjung has been a theological matter in minjung theology. First-generation minjung theologian Ahn ByungMu connected ochlos (“multitude,” “people,” or “crowd”) in the Gospel of Mark to the minjung as the most marginalized people, people who are not protected by the nation or people who are deprived of “belongingness” and experience “nonexistence.”11 Second-generation minjung theologians emphasized class in their depiction of the minjung whereas feminist theologians have urged the use of gender as an analytical category when defining the minjung.12 Third-generation minjung theologians view the minjung as “minorities” who are deemed “non-citizens” and who include, but are not limited to, LGBTQ people, migrant workers, homeless people, unemployed people, and people with disabilities.13 Regarding the notion of minjung, scholars agree that ochlos or minjung is not a homogeneous concept and that its exact definition should be left undetermined because the fixed identity categories are often unable to describe the minjung who are excluded, alienated, marginalized, and disproportionately or arbitrarily exposed to street violence, sexual violence, state violence, injury, illness, and premature death. Those who were deeply involved in the democracy movement in the 1970s and 1980s believed that democratization would prevent the state from committing violence against the minjung and depriving them of their rights. When democratization, a major objective of Korea’s democracy movement, was finally achieved, however, it did not bring the expected changes to the reality of the minjung. South Korea had to continue to deal with the long-lasting effects of state violence that were perpetrated by the three decades of dictatorial

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military rule as well as new sets of problems largely produced by the nation’s neoliberal capitalist aspirations and policies. The minjung continued to bear the brunt of exploitation and social alienation in the post-democratization (the post-1987) era, followed by the post-1997 period during which South Korea went through a major financial and corporate sector restructuring demanded by the International Monetary Fund after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The minjung’s reality has not changed much even after the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye. Hence, the third generation of minjung theology has focused on exposing and examining the “multilayered reality” of the minjung’s site of pain and suffering as its major task, not because the phenomenon of the minjung’s suffering is new, but because “the intensity of pain and techniques of exclusion [are] much larger and complex than ever” in a globalized society.14 As minjung theology is carrying on its unfinished tasks in the changing political, economic, and social milieu, it begs the following questions: How can minjung theology be relevant beyond the confines of Korea in this intricately interconnected global situation? In what ways can minjung theology be a theology of witness to the reality of the minjung at both regional and global levels, including that of the Hong Kong minjung who are voluntarily fighting for democracy in their politically precarious situation? How, when, and where do liberative minjung events erupt? A THEOLOGY OF WITNESS: WITNESSING TO THE MINJUNG EVENTS IN HONG KONG AND BEYOND First-generation minjung theologian Suh Nam-dong, who defined minjung theology as a theology of witness, said theologians’ echoing of the cry of the minjung is what frames minjung theology.15 Ahn Byung-Mu also declared a core task of minjung theology as witnessing to minjung events. The context of minjung theology is the concrete reality of the minjung, and it is also where “the potential for minjung events already exists.”16 How then does a minjung event occur? The minjung events take place when the minjung are “awakened to all other minjung’s suffering through the experience of his or her own suffering, and struggle not only for her- or himself but also for all other Minjung.”17 As Ahn has stated, however, the minjung can “succumb to instincts and be selfish, and sometimes they go astray.”18 Because of their circumstances, they can be fraudulent and sometimes betray other people. Ahn did not idealize or glorify the minjung. The minjung are not necessarily innocent or unselfish. However, Ahn affirmed that the minjung are “capable of self-transcendence,”19 which “involves transcending your own interests



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and abilities” and which is “the ultimate state of liberation.”20 Seeing their suffering in others’ suffering as well as others’ in theirs, the minjung realize that their struggle is not just for themselves but for others as well. Such selftranscendence in the minjung is “an event.”21 Ahn asserted that the minjung’s self-transcendence takes the form of liberation events, such as events in Jesus’s life and Jeon Tae-il’s activism, and that these liberation events are the “minjung events.” Ahn also argued that Jesus and the minjung become one in these minjung events. Jesus is part of the minjung. The minjung and Jesus participate in the minjung events “together and equally,” and they influence and change each other without exception, including Jesus, experiencing self-transcendence.22 Instead of Jesus representing or saving the minjung, the minjung themselves experience self-transcendence, and they themselves become the “agents for the salvation of the world.”23 Then can Hongkongers’ protests be viewed as a minjung event that takes the form of liberation? In what ways is it liberative? The Hong Kong minjung’s protests against state power in the larger geopolitical context of China’s encroaching imperial force can be considered a minjung event that is liberative based on two interrelated grounds. First, the Hong Kong minjung have shown that they, as the subjects of history, are not just “powerless” or “selfish.” They have risen up against their own government, which sides with China’s authoritarian regime. As was stated earlier, the participants in the minjung events affect and change each other. This phenomenon has been the case with Hong Kong’s protests in which people influence and transform one another to the extent that Hongkongers who were depoliticized in the past have shown tremendous force in their mass protests against Hong Kong’s pro-China government. The Hong Kong minjung have been tenacious in their collective struggles despite the fact that they may face police brutality and serious legal consequences for their actions. Another indication of such transformation was seen in the ongoing tangible and intangible support from varied constituencies in Hong Kong, which have been crucial in continuing the protests against state power. People who were not necessarily seen in the waves of protesters have lent support to the prodemocracy movement behind the scenes by providing supplies, giving rides to protesters from the streets to their homes to avoid arrest by the police, boycotting pro-China businesses, and voting for pro-democracy candidates in the most recent district council elections. They have been affected and transformed by the unyielding struggle of fellow Hongkongers who are risking their lives and futures. The Hong Kong minjung’s resistance against the violent strategies of the government demoralized its pro-China leaders and drove extensive “countermobilization” from allies, distant sympathizers, and even bystanders who initially stayed away from the protests.24

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Second, the Hong Kong minjung’s protests can be regarded as a minjung event that is liberative because it lays bare what it means to be liberated from the “imperialist desire,” the desire to “identify with the empire and support imperialist projects.”25 The majority of Hongkongers are Chinese who have maintained different kinds and levels of relations with China. As a leader of the Hong Kong democracy movement, Benny Tai attests that the “Hong Kong dream” for many generations of Hongkongers who were migrants from mainland China was to have an affluent life for oneself and one’s family.26 As he puts it, Hong Kong was “just a transit or stepping stone” for migrants from mainland China who, with their “opportunistic and pragmatic mindset,” were seeking to find settlement.27 This observation indicates that Hong Kong’s full democracy was not a priority for the majority of Hongkongers and that some Hongkongers have been in proximity to the dominant power of China in comparison to other Hongkongers. In the face of an encroaching imperial force, however, the majority of Hongkongers must have realized that pursuit of the “imperialist desire” or maintaining the “close” and “cozy” relationship with imperial China won’t necessarily guarantee Hong Kong’s autonomy in the future or automatically bring full and genuine democracy to Hong Kong. What this implies for the current political situation of Hong Kong is that the possibility of achieving what Hongkongers want in their aspiration for full democracy cannot come true without freeing themselves from the “imperialist desire.” The Hong Kong minjung’s persistent, collective protests have shown that they are a liberative event that is counterimperial, rejecting the lure of the imperialist desire. A critical task of minjung theology is to keep such a counterimperial struggle and memory alive and to spread them by witnessing to the minjung events, or the people’s liberative events, without letting the imperialist desire eclipse the people’s yearning for full democracy and freedom. THE PRAXIS OF TRANSBORDER SOLIDARITY Bearing witness to and critically reflecting on Hong Kong’s protests against its pro-China government and imperial China is a way of standing in solidarity with the Hong Kong minjung, who have pleaded that their stories of struggle be shared as widely as possible since March 2019, especially the stories of those who were physically brutalized, sexually assaulted, arrested, detained, tortured, and disappeared. Now might be a much-needed historical moment to continue to forge transborder solidarity with the Hong Kong minjung, as well as with other minjung who struggle around the globe or across various boundaries, without conflating the context-specific, place-based movements. When Hongkongers rallied in solidarity with the Uyghurs in China, they saw



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their common “struggle for freedom and democracy and the rage against the Chinese Communist Party.”28 Such a praxis of transborder solidarity, hopefully, will be also extended to the non-Chinese foreign domestic workers whose struggle has often been ignored in Hong Kong so that they also can partake in the Hongkongers’ newly envisioned society of a fully actualized democracy. After all, undercutting or freeing oneself from the imperialist desire would mean living a life that is not premised on others’ pain and suffering. Hong Kong’s protests that aim at full democracy may further influence and transform the people, the minjung, in mainland China because, as much as China’s decisions or choices affect the political situation of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong minjung’s pro-democracy movement may also influence the Chinese people and therefore China’s choices. This proposition is not an unfeasible idea because, as Tai has pointed out, what inspired Hongkongers en masse to recognize the significance of democracy was not the internal dynamics in Hong Kong, but the student movement in Beijing in 1989 that demanded democracy.29 The Hong Kong protests that surprised the world in 2019 for their tenacity and fierceness, undaunted by the terrifying force of state power, are a minjung event that is connected to the eruption of other “minjung events” across the globe as well as beyond various boundaries. From Chile to Colombia to the United States, from Palestine to Lebanon to India, people have been rising up against state violence, militarized violence, white supremacy, anti-black racism, Islamophobia, gendered violence, economic injustice, tyranny, corruption, and the destruction of the environment. In particular, women are globally at the forefront of fighting against misogyny, patriarchy, sexual violence, discrimination, and state suppression. Minjung events, as liberation events, are not limited to a few places or historical moments. We are witnessing the explosion of minjung events around the world. Witnessing to the ways in which people’s struggles converge can help us to see how the minjung have risen up against the root causes of suffering that are undeniably interconnected. It might be the case that we have already entered a new era of transborder solidarity that cannot be stopped. The praxis of transborder solidarity through bearing witness to and critically reflecting on the minjung events will need to persist even after achieving full democracy in Hong Kong or in other places because there will still be another minjung who are calling for witnessing and solidarity from different corners of the world. NOTES 1.  “‘March for the Beloved’ Sung at the Hong Kong Protests,” YouTube, June 17, 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=2s3H_t6cTfg. See also T. K. Park, “South Korean

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Protest Music Is Inspiring Hong Kong’s Demonstrators,” The Nation, July 3, 2019, www.thenation.com/article/hong-kong-protest-south-korea-music/. 2.  One of the reasons this movement is also called the minjung movement is that the minjung culture that arose in the 1970s provided “master symbols and narratives that structured the discourse of the movement.” See Paul Chang, Protest Dialectics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), Kindle Location 180–81. 3.  M. Gabriela Torres, “State Violence,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Problems, ed. A. Javier Treviño (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 381. 4.  Sung Chull Kim and N. Ganesan, “Introduction: Conceiving State Violence, Justice, and Transition in East Asia,” in State Violence in East Asia, ed. N. Ganesan and Sung Chull Kim (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 3. 5.  Vince Boudreau, “Interpreting State Violence in Asian Settings,” in State Violence in East Asia, ed. Ganesan and Kim, 25. 6. Boudreau, “Interpreting State Violence in Asian Settings,” 25. Kim and Ganesan, however, contend that the modality of state violence in Asian contexts, including the state violence committed in Korea’s Gwangju and China’s Tiananmen Square, was “basically exemplary and demonstrative as lessons to challengers, even if combined with an instrumental element in varying degrees.” See Kim and Ganesan, “Introduction,” 1. 7. Sebastian Skov Andersen, “Hong Kong Protesters Are Declaring ‘I Won’t Kill Myself’ Just in Case They Disappear,” Vice News, December 20, 2019, www .vice.com/en_in/article/7kzpa4/hong-kong-protesters-declaring-not-suicide?fbclid= IwAR0UaIOholR-IKMQQnonrpACaqlH44y3jO2YCggnizYpEcAOkzHiaY7CIBY. 8.  See “Hong Kong Polytechnic University: Protesters Still Inside as Standoff Continues,” BBC, November 19, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50465337. 9. According to Suh Nam-dong, han is “a feeling of unresolved resentment against injustices suffered.” See Suh Nam-dong, Minjungshinhakui tamgu [An exploration of minjung theology] (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1983). 10. Suh, Minjungshinhakui tamgu, 243. Suh maintained that “sin” is the language of the oppressor and “han” is the language of the minjung. 11. Jin-ho Kim, “The Hermeneutics of Ahn Byung-Mu,” in Reading Minjung Theology in the Twenty-First Century: Selected Writings by Ahn Byung-Mu and Modern Critical Responses, ed. Yung Suk Kim and Jin-Ho Kim (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 21, Kindle. 12. For instance, see Keun-joo Christine Pae, “Minjung Theology and Global Peacemaking: From Galilee to the US Military Camptown (kijich’on) in South Korea,” in Reading Minjung Theology in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Kim and Kim, 165. 13.  Yong-yeon Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by the Robbers Is Christ’: An Exploration of Subjectivity from the Perspective of Minjung Theology,” in Reading Minjung Theology in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Kim and Kim, 225. In general, the genealogy of minjung theology includes the following theological developments: first generation in the 1970s, second generation in the 1980s, and the third generation after 1997. 14. Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by Robbers Is Christ,’” 213, 210. Thirdgeneration minjung theologian Jin-ho Kim calls this task “the phenomenology of wretchedness.”



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15.  See Suh, Minjungshinhakui tamgu. 16.  Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by the Robbers Is Christ,’” 222. 17.  Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by the Robbers Is Christ,’” 221. 18.  Ahn Byung-Mu, Stories of Minjung: The Theological Journey of Ahn ByungMu in His Own Words, ed. Wongi Park, trans. Hanna In (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2019), 78. 19. Ahn, Stories of Minjung, 171. 20. Ahn, Stories of Minjung, 173. 21. Ahn, Stories of Minjung, 172. 22.  Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by the Robbers Is Christ,’” 222. 23.  Hwang, “‘The Person Attacked by the Robbers Is Christ,’” 161. 24.  The relationship between the targets of violence and other political communities can influence state violence. See Boudreau, “Interpreting State Violence in Asian Settings,” 21. 25.  Kuan-hsing Chen, Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), xiv. 26.  See Benny Y. T. Tai, “From Past to Future: Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement,” in Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong: Localism after the Umbrella Movement, ed. Wai-man Lam and Luke Cooper (London: Routledge, 2017), 154. 27.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 154. 28.  “‘We’re Next’: Hong Kongers Rally for China’s Uighurs,” MSN News, December 22, 2019, www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/we-re-next-hong-kongers-rallyfor-china-s-uighurs/ar-BBYeZrp?ocid=ob-fb-enus-580&fbclid=IwAR2gavFgooNJjf 2QLK2lklbPL-IWy8_peaHnHKHMRr9yVNC7NAPNWIfJKS0. 29.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 154.

Chapter Eleven

When the Stones Cry Out in Palestine Protesting Empire Mitri Raheb

As I sat in Bethlehem in mid-2019 watching TV, the Hong Kong protests caught my attention. As a Palestinian, I have developed an affinity for people protesting empires, injustice, or oppression. The scenes of the Hong Kong youth protesting on the streets reminded me immediately of the Palestinian Intifada. The tools and tactics were almost the same: sit-ins, marches, human chains, roadblocks, religious gatherings, boycotts, strikes, arts of resistance, but also Molotov cocktails. The standoff at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University in the city reminded me of the standoff at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. For the police and army, the tools were not so different either: tear gas, rubber-coated bullets, excessive and disproportional use of force, and imprisonment. The debate in Hong Kong between the different groups on the best tactics to use reminded me of the debate between different Palestinian parties: to stick to exclusive peaceful means or to allow for the use of force? Can one avoid violence when facing state terror? It is this debate in Hong Kong and Palestine that creates the background for this chapter. PALESTINE: THE LAND OF CONTINUING REVOLTS Palestine and protests are nearly synonymous. From antiquity to modernity, protests have continuously erupted in Palestine. These protests are a result of consistent occupation at the hands of both regional and global empires. Palestine has been occupied by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Crusaders, Ottomans, and British and is currently occupied by Israel.1 In most of these cases, the indigenous people, regardless of their religion (Canaanites, Samaritans, Judeans, Christians, or Muslims), have tried to resist the occupation. Protests have been one form of this 183

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resistance. Some of these protests might be better known than others, having become historical markers. In ancient times, the first Jewish Revolt2 (66–70 CE) was such a marker. Despite its name, it was, historically speaking, not the first revolt. In fact, there were many other revolts in the previous century and many more even before that. Then there was the second Jewish Revolt3 under Bar Kokhba (132–135 CE). Both of these revolts were organized by Judeans resisting the Roman Empire. When I was growing up in Palestine, students protested on a regular basis against the Israeli occupation. Yet the so-called first Intifada (1987–1991) and the second Intifada (2000–2003) became historic markers in the history of modern Palestine. As a pastor who witnessed both uprisings very closely, I observed, analyzed, and tried to understand what was happening around me. For the past thirty-five years, I have been observing the geopolitical and socio-religious situation in Palestine on a daily basis, and as a pastor, I had to walk to the pulpit Sunday after Sunday to “translate” the scriptures to those sitting in the pews. I refused to separate the reality of this world from the reality of the Bible by preaching a “cheap gospel” that neither challenges reality nor is challenged by it. On the contrary, I believe that living the struggle of Palestine, as a Christian who wrestles daily with scripture, and being an academic, who seeks to analyze and understand what is going on in and around oneself, has provided me with a unique environment and setting for hermeneutics. The parameters for this hermeneutic are living on Palestinian soil, under Israeli occupation, as a Christian. I came to learn to look at the history of Palestine, ancient and modern, as a continuous history with diverse and unique contexts with one recurring theme: occupation. Roman occupation in the first and second century and Israeli occupation in the twentieth and twenty-first century constitute the continued theme of occupied Palestine. In this sense, the first and second Palestinian Intifada stand in relation to the first and second Jewish Revolt. While I appreciate the telephoto lens, which enables us to take a closer look at historical incidents, I want to use the “longue durée”4 lens to look at history as a continuum. For me, as a historian, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an inseparable aspect of European colonial history. It was, after all, the British Empire who planted Israel in the Middle East. Furthermore, it is the Western world, especially the American Empire, that continues to sustain Israel militarily, financially, and ideologically. Yet I also see how the Bible, both the Old and New Testament, wrestles with how to best negotiate the various and recurring occupying powers and empires. As powerful empires continue to be a recurrent theme in the history of Palestine, the question of resistance remains crucial and challenging. With a combination of historical-critical



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knowledge and firsthand experience, I will analyze how Christians have navigated the reality of living under imperial rule or occupation. Using a longue durée lens, I will look at how Luke in his Gospel approached the reality of the Roman Empire and how Palestinian Christians resisted the Israeli occupation during the two Intifadas. Toward the end of this chapter, I will present the lessons learned from a Palestinian Christian response to empire. NAVIGATING EMPIRE Jesus’s entry into Jerusalem, or what is known in the Christian tradition as Palm Sunday, has been much too idealized. Like so many biblical theologoumena, this “entry into Jerusalem” has been domesticated to fit a middle-class Christianity that is sociopolitically numb, to say the least. In this context of a relaxed Western Christianity, liberation became salvation, and the political dimension of the Bible was lost. However, in the past twenty years, the theme of empire has become dominant in Christian theology, and the sociopolitical dimensions of the Bible have gained much attention.5 These new approaches can help us develop a new approach to the story of Jesus’s triumphant entry into Jerusalem. The story of Jesus’s triumphant entry into Jerusalem is one of the few stories that we find in all four Gospels (Matt. 21:1–11; Mark 11:1–10; Luke 19:28–40; John 12:12–19). However, Luke’s narration is unique and distinct.6 The Gospel of Luke was written toward the end of the first century within the context of the Roman Empire. The relationship of Christians to the Roman Empire is a prominent theme in Luke’s Gospel as well as in Acts.7 In Jesus’s entry into Jerusalem, Luke navigates this relationship in a unique way that differs significantly from the other Gospels. Luke describes Jesus’s entry into Jerusalem as a staged demonstration. This entrance into the city wasn’t so much a religious procession, but rather a distinct political demonstration. Luke portrays it to resemble similar royal Roman parades, indicated clearly by the participants of this demonstration who were not the great crowd, like in other Gospels, but the crowd of the disciples (Luke 19:37). Both Matthew and John use the Greek word ochlos for the great crowd, which connotes something akin to a mob. Luke employs the more neutral word plythos, meaning a multitude, thus speaking more highly of the crowd. This multitude was an inner group of like-minded and convinced followers of Jesus, who knew exactly what they were doing and what they stood for. For Luke, it was important to show that this demonstration was joyful (another unique feature of the Lukan story) as well as peaceful. This spirit of peaceful demonstration corresponds to that of the first Jerusalem Christian

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community, which refused to participate in the first Jewish Revolt that was led by the zealots John of Gishala and Simon Bar Giora. The Jewish zealots gained control of the temple and the whole city of Jerusalem and forced people into armed resistance. Within Luke’s Gospel, however, which was being written at the time of the first Jewish Revolt, he describes the disciples as chanting, “Blessed is the King who comes in the name of the Lord” (Luke 19:38). Here Luke leaves out any reference to David’s kingdom (Mark 11:10), the son of David (Matt. 21:9), or the king of Israel (John 12:13). In neglecting to mention David or Israel, Luke clearly wants to distance himself from a narrow Jewish national and political agenda. His resistance to the empire is not nationalistic. This stance becomes very clear in the next verse. Instead of hosanna (save us), the disciples were chanting “Peace in heaven and glory in the highest” (Luke 19:38). Again, this last sentence is found only in Luke and stands in clear relation to Luke 2:14: “Glory to God in the Highest heaven and peace on Earth.” Again, the peaceful character of the protesters is underlined, though the peace proclaimed here stands in contrast with the imperial claim of Pax Romana. The protestors were seeking a different sort of peace, one in opposition to Roman peace, which was achieved through domination and oppression. Their desired peace points to an obvious contrast between the Kingdom of God and the empire. Then Luke adds another distinct feature: “Some of the Pharisees in the crowd said to Jesus, ‘Teacher, rebuke your disciples!’ ‘I tell you,’ Jesus replied, ‘if they keep quiet, the stones will cry out.’” Mentioning the Pharisees is another unique aspect of Luke. The Pharisees are critical of the disciples and their agenda. This scene reflects not only the tense relationship of the Christian community to a type of rabbinic Judaism that began to emerge post70 CE but also stands as a critique of the Pharisees submitting to the Roman Empire. Luke might be hinting here at those Pharisees who gathered around Rabbi Jonathan ben Zakkai in Jabneh.8 This group of Pharisees developed a kind of submissive theology and were opposed to any kind of resistance against the Roman Empire. Submission, however, is not an option for Luke. If the disciples keep silent, the stones will cry out. Luke’s mention of the stones is another unique element of his Gospel. Wherever there is oppression and injustice, “the stones of the wall will cry out, and the beams of the woodwork will echo it” (Hab. 2:11). If the peaceful outcry of the oppressed is not heard, the stones will cry out. If the demands of the peaceful demonstrators are ignored, stones will start to fly. Throwing stones was a symbol of resistance to oppression in the Bible. Armed with a slingshot and five stones, David fought Goliath, who wore a bronze helmet and a coat of bronze and wielded a sword, a spear, and a javelin (1 Sam. 17:4 and 45). Stones were



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used repeatedly to resist occupiers in antiquity as exemplified by the Judean people in the first Jewish Revolt. Likewise, the stone was a symbol of the first Palestinian Uprising, which became known as the Intifada of the Stones. This is a recurring feature of many protest movements. Often, they start peacefully, but the longer they are ignored, the more likely that they will resort to violence and even armed resistance. The failure to listen to the peaceful outcry of the disciples led Jesus to weep, and he then proclaimed that the “days will come upon you when your enemies will build an embankment against you and encircle you and hem you in on every side. They will dash you to the ground, you and the children within your walls. They will not leave one stone on another, because you did not recognize the time of God’s coming to you” (Luke 19:43–44). This scenario was exactly Rome’s response in 70 CE when Titus approached Jerusalem from the north with four legions of soldiers. Titus surrounded the city, destroyed all three wall strata, set the temple on fire, captured both zealot leaders, and did “not leave one stone on another.” The city and its inhabitants were not able to read the signs of the time. Thus, when approaching his relationship to empire, Luke positions himself between the violent and nationalistic attitude of the Jewish zealots, on one hand, and the submissive attitude of the Pharisees and Rabbinic Judaism, on the other. Between armed resistance and submission to empire, Luke seems to opt for what we might call today nonviolent resistance. The aim of this resistance is not to create a nationalistic kingdom but to proclaim a different possibility where those occupied are uplifted (Luke 1:46–56) and the poor, oppressed, and marginalized achieve liberation and gain their rights (Luke 4:18–19). NAVIGATING OCCUPATION In 1967, Israel occupied Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians were put under an Israeli military regime that controlled all aspects of their lives. Resistance to the Israeli military occupation has been an ongoing feature of the Palestinian struggle. In this second part, I will explain how the Palestinian Christians in the West Bank have navigated the reality of the Israeli occupation, especially during the two Palestinian uprisings known as the first and second Intifadas. The first Intifada (literally, shaking off) started on December 9, 1987, at a time when no one expected it. The situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip seemed calm. An Israeli secret report in 1987 confirmed that there was no reason to worry since the Palestinians had reconciled themselves with the Israeli occupation. The calm in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was decep-

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tive, much like the calm before a storm. Then the unexpected happened. The storm of the Intifada broke out suddenly, unexpectedly, and unpredictably. It first raged in Gaza, spreading quickly then to the West Bank, and its effect was felt throughout the world. It all began with a traffic accident on December 8 at the Eretz Crossing, the military roadblock where Israeli soldiers check all vehicles with Gaza license plates before they are allowed either to enter or leave the territory of Israel. A number of Palestinians were returning from their work in Israel and were stopped at this particular checkpoint, waiting to be allowed to drive through and return home. Suddenly, an Israeli military transport truck crashed into these cars. Two cars were destroyed, leaving four Palestinians killed and seven severely injured. Three of the dead were from the Palestinian refugee camp Djabalia. Djabalia is the largest camp in Palestine, which had a population of more than sixty thousand Palestinians in 1987. When Israel was created in 1948, these Palestinians were driven from their homes and forced to live in extremely crowded, slum-like conditions. The funeral of the three Palestinians from the refugee camp turned into a mass demonstration that continued through December 9. During this demonstration, a fifteen-year-old child was shot in the heart by an Israeli soldier. He died the same day and became the first “martyr” of the Intifada. Demonstrations quickly spread to the whole of the Gaza Strip and then to the West Bank. This incident was not, of course, the cause of the Intifada, but it was the spark that set fire to a pile of dry tinder that had been accumulating for a long time. The suffering, fury, and humiliation caused by twenty years of occupation suddenly ignited. Palestinian Christians were not spectators in this first Intifada but an integral part of it. Christians were active in both orchestrating the uprising and challenging Israeli soldiers on the ground. However, one distinct Christian form of resistance deserves special attention. East of Bethlehem lies a small Christian town, Beit Sahour,9 where, according to tradition, the shepherds were watching over their sheep when they heard the angels proclaim the birth of Christ. Beit Sahour was, and is, a predominantly Christian town with a good percentage of well-educated people in addition to a strong manufacturing industry. In the autumn of 1989, when the Intifada was at its peak, the people of Beit Sahour decided to implement a radical boycott of their tax payment to the militaristic Israeli government. This action was recommended by the executive committee of the Intifada, arguing for “no taxation under occupation” and “no taxation without representation.” They explained their position in detail in a circulated handbill: We consider the occupation of one people by another people a clear violation of international law and religions. It is contrary to simple human rights and to democracy. The Israeli policy of collecting taxes contradicts international



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agreements, the Geneva and the Hague conventions in particular. . . . We firmly believe that every citizen should pay taxes to his national government so that it can carry out its duties and obligations. . . . For these reasons—and as a consequence of our conviction that the money taken in by the high taxes we pay is spent on ammunition and tear gas used to kill our children—we have decided not to pay taxes anymore.10

The inhabitants of Beit Sahour were punished for their civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance. Although the people of Beit Sahour refused to see this form of resistance as distinctly Christian, it was nevertheless related to their secular-Christian worldview and level of education, which is revealed in their approach to human rights. One important feature of the first Intifada was that it united the Palestinian people, whether in Gaza, the West Bank, or Jerusalem and even within Israel. Christians were as active as Muslims. Another feature was its nonviolent character. No arms were used by the Palestinians. While Palestinians were using strikes, civil disobedience, and stone blockades, the Israeli army was using rubber-coated bullets alongside live ammunition. The first Intifada was a well-organized and orchestrated movement. Weekly pamphlets written by leading political intellectuals were distributed throughout the occupied territory directing the people’s struggle and protest. All Palestinians were willingly and voluntarily involved in this uprising, demonstrating a high level of social responsibility. The Intifada was a movement with a clear goal: “Two people in two states” was the motto of the Intifada. This motto found its expression in the Declaration of Independence of the state of Palestine. The Palestinian National Council proclaimed the establishment of the state of Palestine on November 15, 1988. Palestinians used this declaration to transform their Intifada into a political process that culminated in the Madrid conference in 1991, which eventually led to the Oslo Accords in 1993. Palestinians hoped that a Palestinian state, in accordance with the 1967 borders, would emerge within five years of the Oslo Accords. The Israeli goal, however, was to grant the Palestinians a kind of autonomy under Israeli sovereignty. These two perspectives were irreconcilable, which ultimately resulted in the collapse of the so-called peace process and led to the second Intifada. The second Intifada started on September 28, 2000, when Ariel Sharon, Israel’s opposition leader, marched with one thousand Israeli police into alAqsa compound, provoking Muslim sentiments and shouting, “The Temple Mount is in our hands.” This incident gave the second Intifada the name alAqsa Intifada. Compared to the first Intifada, the second Intifada was unorganized. For the most part, it was led by armed individual fighters, and there were no clear political goals associated with it. It comes as no surprise that most Palestinian Christians and many Muslim intellectuals were detached

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from, and disenchanted by, the second Intifada. The use of arms by a few Palestinians gave the Israelis an excuse to shell entire Palestinian neighborhoods with heavy artillery. Many Palestinian Christians were not supportive of this kind of armed resistance, which they viewed as counterproductive. They voiced their concern through a candlelight march on December 9, 2000, under the theme of “The Light of Right, not the Power of Might.” In this march, they proclaimed: We are marching tonight, Palestinian Christians and Muslims, children and adults, men and women, locals as well as internationals, to break the silence of the world toward an injustice that is committed against our civilians held hostage to Israeli might and aggression. We are marching tonight to take back our streets, which have been haunted with fear and death in the past few months. We are marching tonight to tell the world of our continuing fifty-year struggle to realize our self-determination and freedom. We are marching tonight for the families who have lost their homes to missiles and are now refugees, sleeping in a different place each night. They have joined the millions of Palestinian refugees waiting to return home. We are marching tonight for our children, who are traumatized by the Israeli helicopters invading our skies and armed Jewish settlers, roaming our cities. We are marching tonight to protest the military closure imposed on us, causing poverty, misery, and hunger. We are marching tonight to give a message of hope and light to people around the world seeking justice and freedom. We are marching tonight to overcome fear and to light a candle of hope. We are marching in Bethlehem, the birthplace of Christ, to call upon all of you to break the silence and play an active role for the cause of peace and justice, so that the light of the resurrection would shine again upon Jerusalem.11

The second Intifada will not be the last Palestinian protest.12 The situation in occupied Palestine continues to worsen. Israel has been seizing Palestinian land to build Jewish settlements, leaving less than 10 percent of historic Palestine for more than five million Palestinians. Israel controls all the water resources of the West Bank, including underground aquifers, the water of the Jordan River, and the Dead Sea and its minerals. Israel also controls everything above ground in the territories it occupies: aviation, electromagnetic fields, and so on. Israel also controls the borders: Palestinians have no direct access to the outside world, nor can they enter occupied East Jerusalem or move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the situation in the West Bank is one of settler colonialism based on Israeli supremacy and segregation, Gaza continues to be the largest open-air prison in the world with more than two million Palestinians confined to an area of 365 square kilometers, or 141 square miles, of unlivable conditions.



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LESSONS LEARNED We can draw several important lessons from the history of Palestinian resistance: 1.  Wherever there is oppression, there will always be resistance. Oppressive systems provoke movements that call for liberation. No wonder that liberation (later spiritualized as salvation) is such a central theme throughout the Bible, both in the Old and New Testaments. The question is never if resistance is coming, but when and how. Most of the time life under oppressive systems appears to be “business as usual.” To outsiders and insiders, it might seem as if the oppressed have surrendered to the empire, but this impression has always proved to be deceitful. “Out of the blue,” the situation gets out of control. The straw that breaks the camel’s back and leads to organized resistance is a result of different factors: excessive use of brutal force by the occupiers, increased taxation, religious insult, or simply a growing sense of unrest in the face of constant pressure. The reaction of the people becomes a type of popular protest. The motivation of the protests can vary depending on context. Sometimes it is based solely on a strong sense of nationalism, other times on religion or on a combination of both. Often economic injustice plays an important role. Whenever people feel that their national identity, religious belonging, basic human rights, economic prosperity, or liberties are questioned or suppressed, they will resist. The more they feel that the space around them is shrinking, and the more they feel suffocated, the more likely they are to revolt. 2.  The response of the empire has, for the most part, been uniform: military mobilization, invasion, and even greater force. Historically, whenever something like this scenario occurred, it was a sure indication that a violent response was on its way. Zealous fighters begin to appear, who believe they must respond and fight back, thus teaching the occupiers a lesson. Such groups have appeared in ancient and in modern times. For them, armed resistance is the only way to liberation. They are ready to fight and even die for their country and its liberation. “Ironic as it may seem, Roman practices produced the very groups that continued and prolonged the war. That is, the methods used by the Roman forces in reconquering Jewish Palestine created the conditions which gave rise to epidemic banditry and escalating peasant revolt, precisely what they were trying to suppress.”13 In studying the history of Palestine over the centuries, very few of the Intifadas or revolts brought liberation. Most of the revolts were brutally crushed. Revolts against empires have generally only succeeded when

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backed by support from another empire. Today media backing plays an important role in sustaining protests. 3.  However, this armed response to the harshness of occupation and empire is never the response of the majority but of a tiny minority. Other groups within the empire tend to acclimate themselves to empire. Their main interest is survival. Others might even go a step further and opt to collaborate with the oppressors. They want to benefit from the system, even if it comes at the expense of their own people. The longer an uprising continues, the more it becomes a liability for the oppressed population. The average life span of an uprising is three to five years. Examples include 40–37 BCE, 4–1 BCE, 66–70 CE, 132–135 CE, 1936–1939, 1987–1991, 2000–2003, 2018–2019. It seems this time frame is the capacity that the people (in this case of Palestine) have for enduring direct military confrontation. 4.  When negotiating empire and occupation, the Christians in first-century Palestine and the Palestinian Christians in twenty-first-century Palestine opted for a third way between armed resistance and accommodation. Luke, the first Christian community in Jerusalem, and the contemporary Palestinian Christian community have been arguing for creative forms of nonviolent resistance. Luke was writing “to promote an allegiance to a divine kingdom that was at cross-purposes with the imperial world order”14 while Palestinian Christians were fighting to achieve their rights based on international law and conventions. In both cases, the values of the empire based on exploitation, suppression, and persecution are challenged by the values of the “kingdom” based on human dignity, flourishing, and liberation. Facing the “power of might,” they were putting their faith in the “light of right.” NOTES 1.  Mitri Raheb, Faith in the Face of Empire: The Bible through Palestinian Eyes (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014). 2.  Steve Mason, A History of the Jewish War: AD 66–74 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 3.  Peter Schäfer, The Bar Kokhba War Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Second Jewish Revolt against Rome (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 4. The longue durée is an expression used by the French Annales School of historic writing that gives priority to “long term historical structures over events.” See John Potts, Ideas in Time: The Longue Durée in Intellectual History (Aix-en-Provence, France: Presses Universitaires de Provence, 2019).



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5.  See, for example, Richard A. Horsley, Jesus and the Politics of Roman Palestine (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014); Richard A. Horsley, ed., In the Shadow of Empire: Reclaiming the Bible as a History of Faithful Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008); Richard A. Horsley, Jesus and Empire: The Kingdom of God and the New World Disorder (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002); Richard A. Horsley, Paul and the Roman Imperial Order (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2004); Warren Carter, Matthew and Empire: Initial Explorations (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001); Warren Carter, The Roman Empire and the New Testament: An Essential Guide (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006); and John Dominic Crossan, God and Empire: Jesus Against Rome, Then and Now (San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2008). 6.  Brent Kinman, Jesus’ Entry into Jerusalem: In the Context of Lukan Theology and the Politics of His Day (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1995). 7.  Raymond Pickett, “Luke and Empire: An Introduction,” in Luke-Acts and Empire: Essays in Honor of Robert L. Brawley, ed. David Rhoads, David Esterline, and Jae Won Lee (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 1–22. 8.  Jacob Neusner, First Century Judaism in Crisis: Yohanan Ben Zakkai and the Renaissance of Torah (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1975). 9.  Charles M. Sennott, The Body and the Blood: The Middle East’s Vanishing Christians and the Possibility for Peace (New York: PublicAffairs, 2002), 135–66. 10.  Mitri Raheb, I Am a Palestinian Christian (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 109–10. 11.  Mitri Raheb, Bethlehem Besieged: Stories of Hope in Times of Trouble (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 102–3. 12.  On March 30, 2018, which is known as the Land Day commemorating another major protest by Palestinians in Israel in 1976 against Israeli land confiscation, a group of independent activists from Gaza organized the Great March of Return, mobilizing tens of thousands of Palestinians to march toward the Gaza-Israel border and demand the end of the blockade and their rights including the right of return. Israel responded again with rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition, which was condemned by a United Nations General Assembly resolution on June 13, 2018. The protest marches continued every Friday until December 29, 2019, week after week, trying to get the attention of the world to their situation, but in vain. Because most of the international journalists have been covering these events from inside Israel, the stories get twisted, and these protests were often portrayed as a threat to Israel. 13.  Richard A. Horsley, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), 223. 14.  Pickett, “Luke and Empire: An Introduction,” 19.

Chapter Twelve

Armenia, Hong Kong, and Political Change Tamar Wasoian

How does the public unrest in Armenia or Hong Kong force us to rethink our faith? What if we read the biblical narrative of Jesus’s movement through the lenses of social unrest, popular protest, or the revolution of the people? What if we see the masses following Jesus as the crowds filling the streets today, maybe with curiosity and expectation, but more as people taking their fate in their own hands and saying enough with existing in the shadows? What if we read the tension between Jesus and the local authorities as a glimpse of the tension to come between the marginalized and the political center that draws people to the street? What if Jesus was a symbol of all the young people walking to their death for the dignity of the many, and not a one-time act of sacrifice? What if we study physical locations, not only as geography, but as a map to trace what is central to the collective’s communal consciousness? What if theology is a verb and praxis? What if, instead of theologizing, we pay attention to how theology could inspire the masses to live it out by putting their bodies in the street? I am a descendent of Armenian genocide survivors. My grandparents lived through the death marches and made it to Aleppo, Syria. From 1915 to 1918, Aleppo hosted the surviving refugees from western Anatolia and became a cradle for one of the most devoted diaspora communities to preserve Armenian national identity, language, and history. I grew up in this vibrant ancient city. In 1998, I moved to the Republic of Armenia. My move to my motherland was ten years after the first demonstrators marched on the streets of Yerevan, the capital city of the Republic of Armenia. In those days, all Armenian hearts pulsed together, our collective consciousness focused on our motherlands of Armenia and Karabagh, as only these two were left for us after 1918 and we were determined to preserve our claim to these lands. 195

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Armenians take pride on being the “first” in many aspects in history, and accepting Christianity as the state religion in 301 CE is central to Armenian national consciousness. Throughout the centuries to come, suffering and martyrdom for the Christian faith became the central meaning-making mechanism of Armenian existence. The beginning of the twentieth century and the genocide further reinforced this Armenian mindset, but the popular revolution at the end of the century brought a new experience that demands a new naming. As Armenians have struggled against the Soviet Union, there are lessons to be learned as Hong Kong protesters want to fight against the pressure from Communist China. ARMENIANS CANNOT ESCAPE HISTORY History is at the center of the Armenian worldview, and it is at the heart of our national consciousness. On the one hand, being the first nation to accept Christianity and having and preserving a national church, language, and culture are essential to the Armenian self-understanding. On the other hand, the Armenian genocide is a central experience through which all past and present experiences are imagined. Suffering for one’s faith is the backdrop of Armenian history, just as the biblical Mount Ararat is the backdrop of the capital city, Yerevan. A historical review of the background of the genocide will help further clarify the development of this tragedy. The twentieth century was an unprecedented turning point for Armenians. The unfolding of World War I and the Allies’ attack on the Ottoman Empire provided a long-awaited cover for the nationalist Young Turks’ genocidal plans to empty the heartlands of the empire of their Christian inhabitants. As a result, 1.5 million Armenians, as well as Greeks and Assyrians, were massacred. The survivors scattered to form Armenian diaspora communities around the world. As the fronts of the Western Allies, Ottomans, and Russians pushed and pulled, the Armenian historical lands were passed from one hand to another, and finally, in 1918, when the Russian army withdrew from the South Caucasian fronts, these lands were lost to Turkey—never to be returned. The surviving segment of the Armenian historical lands united with Georgia and Azerbaijan to create the Transcaucasian Federative Republic. Unfortunately, this federation did not continue, and each member declared its independence. The young independent republic did not last long either, and soon after the Soviet Revolution in Russia, Armenia became a member of the Soviet Union.1 During the subsequent years, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Turkey, and Iran finalized their borders, and the external border



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issues between the republics were solved. The internal borders between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were harder to solve, however. The disagreement involved five territories: Lori, Akhalkalak, Nakhijevan, Zangezur, and Karabagh. A certain ethnicity comprises the majority of the population of these territories but is enclaved in a different state. Of the five regions, the conflict in Karabagh was the hardest to resolve. Between 1918 and 1920, both Armenia and Azerbaijan fought to gain control of this territory. The Armenian population and the region’s history made it Armenian while geographically it was within Azerbaijan’s territories. Azerbaijanis are ethnically Turks. For Armenians, losing Karabagh to Azerbaijan meant losing more Armenian lands to the Turks, and this prospect evoked a deeper sense of victimization. Under the Soviet Union, the region was officially made an autonomous region (oblast) within Azerbaijan in July 1923. This resolution remained disputed and became, as Razmik Panossian states, the roots of the post-1988 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the demands of the contemporary Armenian nationalist movement lie in Moscow’s “solution” to opposing land claims. This issue is hard to abandon, and subsequent generations of Armenians, both in Karabagh and Armenia as well as those in the diaspora, have never ceased to demand the return of Karabagh to Armenia.2 ARMENIA UNDER THE SOVIET UNION In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. Soon after he took office, he restructured the economic and political system (perestroika), loosened state control on expression (glasnost), and allowed relative political freedom (demokratizatsiya). He promised the non-Russian people greater autonomy and respect for their national identity but opposed any separation from the Soviet Union.3 At the same time that Gorbachev came to power, Armenia was burdened with many important issues: a severe ecological problem due to its reliance on nuclear energy to power its industries, corrupt and arrogant local Communist leadership, and, most importantly, the issue of mountainous Karabagh. Since the 1960s, Armenians in Karabagh have reported cultural and economic discontent with the Azerbaijani authorities, which is reflected in the population’s steady decline.4 Fearful of losing its majority status and its rightful claim to the land, Armenians blamed the Azerbaijani authorities. Encouraged by Gorbachev’s openness, on February 20, 1988, the Regional Parliament of Karabagh voted for unification with Armenia-proper. Soon after, in the majority Azerbaijani-populated industrial town of Sumgait,

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Azeris killed twenty-six Armenians, wounded many more, and sent three thousand refugees fleeing to Armenia. For Armenians, this incident evoked the memories of the Armenian genocide, fed on the already existing mistrust between the two peoples, and solidified the conviction that a peaceful solution was not possible. The dispute has become increasingly aggressive since that time.5 The atrocities in Sumgait marked the beginning of the demonstrations in Yerevan with people gathering in the park surrounding the opera house. Although these demonstrators were deterred by the local Armenian authorities, they trusted Gorbachev’s initiatives of openness and were hopeful that Moscow would respond positively to their rightful demands. Moscow, however, took a cold stance toward them and was dismissive of the Armenian demands. In March 1988, the local Armenian authorities banned all public meetings, and Soviet troops under the Ministry of Internal Affairs arrived in Yerevan. To ease the tensions created by the conflict and calm the demonstrations, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) decided on a cultural and economic program of 400 million Rubles (about US$5.4 million) on March 24 that Azerbaijan would administer in Karabagh. Karabagh categorically rejected this proposal, though, because of its distrust of Azerbaijan and feelings of insecurity after Sumgait.6 Following this further disappointment from Moscow, demonstrations swelled in the streets. If Sumgait was the initial tipping point that instigated the demonstrations, the second tipping point occurred in Yerevan itself. Airports for the Soviet Union were considered military installations with national security significance, and at this point of the unrest, Soviet forces were deployed to the Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan. On July 5, during a limited strike, the workers closed the airport. This action triggered forces of the Ministry of the Interior, which are trained in riot control, to evict the strikers. During this operation, a twenty-two-year-old university student was killed and many others wounded. This killing led to the first funeral of the movement and intensified the anti-Russian, anti-Soviet stand of the demonstrators to the point of no return. On July 18, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR categorically rejected Karabagh’s demands for unification with Armenia. The Armenian resistance continued to grow into inter-ethnic clashes, which sent refugees fleeing the violence on both sides. People’s growing disillusionment with Gorbachev’s alleged promises of perestroika and Azerbaijanis’ anti-Armenian nationalist movement led them to further solidify their stand.7 In the meantime, two committees were formed: the Karabagh Committee in Yerevan and the Krunk (Crane) Committee in Stepanakert, the capital



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of Karabagh. These two committees became the most influential political power centers in both Armenia and Karabagh and led the people through the coming changes.8 THE EARTHQUAKE As if these politically earth-shattering events were not enough, a devastating earthquake hit northern Armenia on December 7, 1988. Towns and villages disappeared, and large industrial cities were ruined. More than twenty-five thousand people died, and thousands became homeless in severe winter conditions. For days and weeks, Armenia was at the center of the world’s attention, and Armenian hearts pulsed in unison with the surviving victims of the earthquake. This tragic incident further injured Armenian pride and evoked the spirit of victimization after months of claiming agency and standing up for their rightful national demands. For many Armenians, this moment became a turning point in their national self-consciousness, and many people of the diaspora poured into Armenia to help cope with the aftermath of the earthquake. Feelings of belonging and the national roots felt by millions of Armenians further crystallized in the Armenian consciousness, setting the stage for the next chapter of the Karabagh saga. As the world’s attention was focused on Armenia, Gorbachev flew in for support but was given a hostile reception for his irresponsive stand on the Karabagh issue. Soon after, the Communist Party arrested the Karabagh Committee along with members from the Krunk and transferred them to Moscow. Karabagh was placed under Moscow’s direct authority. With this decision, the local Armenian authorities and Soviet leadership miscalculated the popular will and further escalated the situation. INTERLUDE: PUBLIC MOVEMENT EXPLORED No revolution is equal, and yet there are common threads in human experience. The Armenian experience under Soviet rule was not so different from many other nations that are caught in the “shadow of empires.”9 In some sense, the Armenian revolution is not different than Hong Kong people’s experience of social unrest in recent years or that of the Jewish people under Roman rule at the time of Jesus. After witnessing numerous modern-day revolutions, one cannot miss certain fine threads that run through them all. To understand these public movements, it helps to explore the fine threads of resemblance.

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People Filling the Streets Nora Dudwick, who was an ethnography student in Armenia when the public demonstrations erupted in protest at the Sumgait massacres, writes, On February 20, a demonstration took place at the Spendiarian State Theater of Opera and Ballet (usually called the opera), not five minutes from my dormitory. By the end of the week, as many as half a million people were packed into Theater Square (the plaza in front of the Opera) and adjacent streets.10

Half a million is a significant number considering the total population of Armenia is only three million. In Hong Kong, millions took to the streets to demonstrate against an extradition bill, and many of them were young people. Dudwick, who notes the similarities between the carnival-like atmosphere in public protests, observes, “The festivity, gaiety, laughter, even violence and excess joined people together, rooted them to the earth, to their own past and future.”11 In her book about the protests against racial injustice in the streets of Ferguson, Missouri, after the shooting of a black teen by a white police officer, Mai-Anh Le Tran uses the term “mimetic ecstasy” to describe the state of the bodies witnessing and protesting violence.12 The atmosphere of festivity and ecstasy is not missed in the images of protests on social media regardless of their origins. It is, indeed, a festive undertaking of claiming what is rightfully the people’s space. Dudwick explains that this reviving energy in community helps in shaping the demonstrations as the birthing space of hope for a different future. It is the liminal space that makes change possible. This is the in-between time—of the regrettable past and of the hopeful future. On the streets, this newly created community threatens the status quo of the authorities. In the Armenian scenario, it was the local Soviet authorities; in Hong Kong, it was the local authorities collaborating with China. In recent revolutions, these local authorities collaborating with the modern-day empires are usually dubbed as the “regime.” Regimes of authority serve as antagonists to the people and act as the opposing forces to pressure and further consolidate peoples’ identity. Dudwick states, “They strengthened the popular resistance, encouraged an oppositional solidarity, and stimulated a peculiar mixture of carnivalesque euphoria, seriousness, even fear, which together created the feeling of stepping out of ordinary time and space.”13 Location The location where the gathering started is not coincidental. People gathered at the Theater Square, or the Opera Square, rather than the Lenin Square, which was the official site of state commemorations. The park surround-



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ing the opera house was relatively small but held significant meaning for the people. Instead of the grand statue of Lenin as in Lenin Square, two moderate-sized statues of the fathers of Armenian culture adorn Opera Square: Alexander Spendiarian and Hovhannes Tumanian. This space has another significance as well. Upon joining the Soviet Union, Armenia was not permitted to commemorate the genocide on April 24, the date Armenians hold as the beginning of the genocidal process. In April 1965 on the fiftieth anniversary, the state planned a modest commemoration in the opera house. The word spread, and thousands gathered at the area surrounding the opera house. This event marked the beginning of subsequent pan-national genocide commemorations in the diaspora and motherlands. Protesters standing in this space, Dudwick points out, “defined their collective identity as Armenians, rather than Soviet, and defined the demonstrations as an expression of cultural and ethnic concerns.”14 As the numbers swelled and gatherings intensified, protesters were dispersed by the local authorities. In the following weeks, Moscow dispatched its forces to Yerevan to keep people under control. Theater Square became inaccessible, and the crowds spilled out to the nearby Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, or the Matenataran, which is another jewel of national pride of the people. This location further connected the individuals, helped in deepening the sense of unity, and validated the demands for unification with Karabagh.15 Moreover, the location itself where the popular movement was born has significant meaning to the collective’s identity. Usually this location represents the nuclear conflict around which the protests evolve. In Hong Kong, it was the city’s financial center during the Umbrella Movement, and protesters called the open space in front of the central government building “Civic Square,” an area where protests and demonstrations often took place. In the Occupy Wall Street Movement in New York City, Zuccotti Park became the symbol of the protests, and Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul became the focus for the Turkish revolution. Further, when physical gatherings were not allowed, protesters filled walls in public spaces with colorful Post-it notes expressing their hopes and demands. The Youth Throughout the recent Middle Eastern revolutions, young men and women emerged as leaders and were dismissed to be replaced by older men. The tension between the young and old in popular unrest is striking. Young university students play an important role in demonstrations. Reflecting on this phenomenon in Armenia, Dudwick says, “People ascribed the leveling of age distinctions to the fear the older generation still felt compared to the

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psychological freedom of the post-Stalin generation.”16 But there is more than fear, or its absence, in this development. Emerging adults and university students are on the brink of asserting their identity. They have the ambition and stamina to stand the pressure in the streets, and they are driven by the ecstasy of hope for a better future.17 In Hong Kong, young people and students were on the frontline in the popular protests. They saw Hong Kong as their home, and they wanted to stand up to protect the values and way of life of Hong Kong. Although young people were the vanguards of the protests, the popular movement in Hong Kong and Armenia encompassed people from all generations and genders. Knowing the composition of Armenian society, this aspect of the movement stands in juxtaposition with Armenian culture, for Armenians are very traditional when it comes to gender and age practices. Elders are almost venerated, and the gender divide is strongly marked. Nevertheless, the elderly and youth followed the leadership of the young, and men and women alike filled the streets with protest with the young generation leading the way to independence. REVOLUTION CONTINUED AND VICTORY ACHIEVED In the spring of 1989, while the popular movement leaders were still in jail, people boycotted a general election held to reform state government that was proposed by Gorbachev. In May, massive demonstrations filled the public spaces once again demanding the release of the leaders. Unable to control or deny people’s demands, the government released the prisoners. The young men emerged as the undeniable leaders of the movement with Levon Ter Petrosian, a philologist of Syrian-Armenian origins, as the head. At this point, Ter Petrosian and the rest of the leaders were determined to widen the scope of their demands to include complete independence from the Soviet Union, adopting democracy as the political system of the state.18 While the local Communist Party was in decline, the popular opposition successfully rallied the people. In the spring and summer of 1990, the popular opposition won a parliamentary majority, and Levon Der Petrosian was chosen as its chairman. With the Communist Party in the minority, Armenia marched forward as an independent democratic state. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Karabagh, Armenia, and Azerbaijan started acting independently from Moscow. The leadership in Karabagh changed their initial demand of transferring to Armenian jurisdiction to declaring full independence instead. The people of Karabagh made their voice heard by holding a referendum on December 10, 1991, in which they overwhelmingly voted for independence. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist,



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which pushed the young Armenian Republic into a downhill spiral of inflation, recession, and total collapse.19 This political situation left Armenia, Karabagh, and Azerbaijan to settle their own score. Arms were easy to find as the Soviet forces retreated and left behind great stockpiles of arms. Direct military actions began between Azerbaijan and Karabagh with Armenia directly supporting the Karabagh forces. The military actions continued until 1994 when finally, the sides agreed on signing a ceasefire mediated by Moscow. At this point, the Armenian armycontrolled 15 percent to 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, including almost the whole of Karabagh itself.20 POPULAR UNREST, A REVOLUTION Since ancient times, people have been on the streets demanding dignity and affirming their humanity. During these times, young men and women emerge as leaders and very often are sacrificed for such causes, followers carry the torch and reflect, and epochs of victory are born by reimagining those sacrifices. Intergenerational remembering and reimagining elevate these epochs to unifying narratives of peoples. On the streets, these narratives are lived and reconstructed through symbolism and performance. Regardless of the religiosity of the people, demonstrations tend to act in a religious-like “dramaturgical performance” of a ritual, as Mai-Anh Le Tran states. Tran explains that the demonstrators in Ferguson did not make their faith tradition or their personal faith explicit but acted out their faith and theology by putting their bodies on the streets of Ferguson. Theology very often is an afterthought, is a reflection on lived experience, but living theologies, acting theologically in the street, are an act of claiming, not the god-talk but the god-walk.21 People occupying public spaces from the Middle East to Hong Kong should laser-focus our attention on the multitudes’ need of life-giving and sustaining hope on what is beyond the past oppression and the current unrest. Refusing marginalization and exploitation, people in the streets are demanding meaning and value beyond their painful existence. This path is the trajectory of hope as it materializes in the streets. Tran calls this “resurrectional consciousness” that emerges from people realizing “that the world is in need of repair.” Christian faith is centered on this “resurrectional imagination” that reclaims hope against a death brought about by the “regimes” of the time. Jesus may have been put to death, “but he lives, and his spirit is in the multitude.” Popular unrest is the ritual, the act of reclaiming hope. “Such proclamation of resurrectional hope is born out of the ability to

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see reality not as it is but as it could and should be.” Tran concludes, “After all, the Christian faith is built-upon such resurrectional imagination: the outright refusal to let death-dealing imperial power have the final say against hope.”22 In the epilogue of Occupy Religion, the authors Joerg Rieger and Kwok Puilan write, “A theology of the multitude is never finished.”23 A theology that is lived and relived on the streets and public spaces is never finished because the act of claiming dignity and humanity is never finished. This endeavor is the unending act of encountering resurrectional hope and affirming the humanity of each other—hope in action coming to life in the street day after day. THE VELVET REVOLUTION Time creates habits, and people fall into a trap of complacency and apathy and forget to question the hegemony of power that never ceases to conspire in the background. Time passes, streets are emptied, and people get used to the status quo. Until one day, they are not. Thirty years after the protests and frozen war in Karabagh, the Armenian people woke up and filled the streets again in protest. This revival was not about Karabagh or demanding Moscow’s attention. This awakening was a protest against Armenians who fell numb to the habit of exploitation of the country and of Soviet-style subjugation of their Armenian sisters and brothers. In April 2018, protests filled the streets of Yerevan once again, led by Nikol Pashinyan, who was a member of Parliament. This outpouring of discontent was in reaction to Serzh Sargsyan’s nomination for a third term as prime minister. Protests erupted very often in earlier elections, but the unrest was always put down by the army and special forces. The timing of this protest was significant, however, for April weighs heavy on the communal consciousness as April 24 is the commemoration date of the Armenian genocide. On April 22, Pashinyan was arrested. Crowds swelled in the streets of Yerevan and filled all the public spaces, starting with the area surrounding the opera house. Popular anger, ignited by the memories of the genocide and frustrated with the imprisonment of Pashinyan, was uncontrollable. The next day—April 23, 2018—Pashinyan was released, and Sargsyan resigned. In his resignation, he proclaimed to the people: I turn to you as the country’s leader for the last time. Nikol Pashinyan was right. I was wrong. There are few solutions to the current situation, but I am not one of them. I am resigning as the country’s leader and leaving the post of Armenia’s Prime Minister. The movement in the street is against my leadership, and so I am fulfilling your demand.24



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Pashinyan, on the other hand, wrote on his Facebook page: “You have won, proud citizen of the Republic of Armenia. And no one can snatch this victory from your hands.”25 On May 8, Pashinyan became the prime minister of the Republic of Armenia and successfully continues in this position of leadership. Armenian stories begin with “there was and there was not.” The Armenian popular movement “was not” for some long thirty years until one day, on the eve of the genocide commemoration day, Armenians woke up to unite in hope for a better future. And thus, revolution continues, not only in the streets of Yerevan, but in every decision made on any level. Similarly, the protests continue in Hong Kong, where many people recognize that the fight for freedom and democracy is a long journey. Protesters have faith that the struggle will continue, and they call upon the global community to stand in solidarity with them in defending democratic values. The struggle is to be continued everywhere that hope resides. NOTES 1.  Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 244–46. 2. Panossian, The Armenians, 250. 3.  Ronald Grigory Suny, “Soviet Armenia, 1921–91,” in The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity, ed. Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 121. 4.  In 1920 the region had a population of 131,000, of which Armenians made up 94.4 percent, while the Azeries were 5.6 percent. By 1979, the Armenians made up 76 percent and the Azeries 24 percent. Suny, “Soviet Armenia,” 121. 5.  Suny, “Soviet Armenia,” 121. 6. Nora C. Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1994), 269. 7.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 271–73. 8.  Suny, “Soviet Armenia,” 121–22. 9.  Referring to Richard A. Horsley, ed., In the Shadow of Empire: Reclaiming the Bible as a History of Faithful Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Know Press, 2008). 10.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 3. 11.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 166–67. 12.  Mai-Anh Le Tran, Reset the Heart: Unlearning Violence, Relearning Hope (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2017), 16–17. 13.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 168. 14.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 309. 15.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 307–12.

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16.  Dudwick, “Memory, Identity and Politics in Armenia,” 174. 17. Tran, Reset the Heart, 8. 18.  Suny, “Soviet Armenia,” 122. 19.  Suny, “Soviet Armenia,” 124. 20.  Marina Kurkchiyan, “The Karabagh Conflict: From Soviet Past to Post-Soviet Uncertainty,” in The Armenians, ed. Herzig and Kurkchiyan, 156–59. 21. Tran, Reset the Heart, 19. 22. Tran, Reset the Heart, 111–12. 23.  Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan, Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 133. 24.  “Serge Sarkisian’s Statement of Resignation (English Translation),” The Armenia Weekly, April 23, 2018, armenianweekly.com/2018/04/23/serge-sarkisians -statement-of-resignation-english-translation/. 25.  “Breaking: Serge Sarkisian Resigns as Prime Minister.” The Armenia Weekly, April 23, 2018, armenianweekly.com/2018/04/23/breaking-serge-sarkisian-resigns -as-prime-minister/.

Chapter Thirteen

Hong Kong and Ireland Protests and Post/colonies Stephen D. Moore

In 1999 I read with interest Archie C. C. Lee’s “Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong” in the published proceedings of a special session that had been convened at the 1997 annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in San Francisco to reflect on the British handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1 of that year. Lee began his article by recalling the lowering of the Union Jack “in a solemn ceremony that marked the end of the British crown colony of Hong Kong . . . and . . . the birth of a new Hong Kong.”1 Lee’s words automatically reminded me of a similar ceremony that marked the official birth of the Irish Free State, subsequently renamed the Republic of Ireland, the nation in which I myself lived for the first thirty-two years of my life.2 Every Irish schoolchild of my generation heard more than once in the classroom, chuckling obligingly with different degrees of understanding, that when the Union Jack was lowered over Dublin Castle on January 16, 1922, and the British viceroy, Lord Fitz­Alan-Howard, chided Michael Collins, the Irish nationalist leader, for arriving seven minutes late to the ceremony, Collins retorted, “We’ve been waiting over seven hundred years; you can have the extra seven minutes!”3 Other details of the Hong Kong handover, recounted by Kwok Pui-lan in her response to Lee, also evoke the Irish experience: “There had been intense discussion [in pre-handover Hong Kong] on whether to change the names of King’s College and Queen’s College, how to deal with royal symbols inscribed on government buildings, and where to put Queen Victoria’s statue once the British flag was lowered.”4 The most notable Irish response to its own British monument conundrum was both violent and belated with a splinter group from the Irish Republican Army blowing up in 1966 the 134-foot-high column topped with a statue of Vice Admiral Lord Nelson that dominated Dublin’s main thoroughfare, thereby completing the process 207

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that had begun in 1924 with the post-independence renaming of the street: no longer would it be known as Sackville Street, named after another British lord; henceforth, it would be known as O’Connell Street in honor of a nineteenth-century Irish nationalist hero. Decolonization is never simply a matter of a political handover, as Kwok notes; it also entails “complicated, controversial, and contested changes in cultural and signifying practices.”5 No two processes of decolonization are comparable, moreover, except at the level of generality. Once we descend into the details, differences abound. The most obvious difference between Hong Kong and Irish decolonization concerns the role of nationalism. The Irish struggle for independence from British colonial rule was, quintessentially, a nationalist struggle. In one corner, the British Empire stood, Goliath-like and seemingly invincible; in the other corner, the Irish rebels, slings in hand, invoked “the dead generations from which [Ireland] receives her old tradition of nationhood” and “summon[ed] her children to her flag [to] strike for her freedom,” as the 1916 proclamation of the Irish Republic, read publicly by the rebels as they began their armed revolt, styled it. Hong Kong in 1997, however, was enmeshed in a decolonizing drama involving not two but three actors: Hong Kong itself, the departing British Empire, and the advancing PRC. And the locus of nationalist fervor, by all accounts, was not Hong Kong so much as Beijing.6 For the PRC, July 1, 1997, marked the long-awaited repossession of a Chinese territory that had been seized 156 years earlier by a foreign people from half a world away. Impeding a happy ending to this nationalist saga of colonial appropriation and decolonial repossession was the fact that Hong Kong had, during its long colonial occupation, developed an intricately nuanced and thoroughly hybrid cultural identity that was neither exclusively Chinese nor unambiguously British. As Lingchei Letty Chen, yet another observer of the fateful, symbolic drama staged at midnight June 30, 1997, succinctly phrases it: “I remember how emotional I felt when the British flag disappeared in the air: more than a century of Western colonialism in China was finally over. But as soon as the red Chinese flag went up, my patriotic feeling was quickly taken over by a shiver: authoritarian rule over Hong Kong!”7 Many Hongkongers continue to inhabit that fraught, conflicted, ambivalent moment between the lowering of the British flag and the raising of the Chinese flag.8 In the anti-authoritarian struggle in which Hongkongers are now embroiled, Beijing has, paradoxically, become the new locus of empire. Chinese nationalism and nativism have transmuted into colonialism and imperialism. More precisely, Chinese nationalism and nativism, as they touch on Hong Kong, have transmuted into internal colonialism and domestic imperialism.



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The biblical terms of reflection on the Hong Kong handover that Lee invoked in his 1999 article are still entirely apt.9 The motif of exile and return in the Hebrew Bible takes the form of hybridized Judeans being summoned to leave Babylon physically in order to return to a homeland no longer native to them. Exile and return in the case of Hong Kong takes the form of hybridized Hongkongers being summoned to leave Babylon (the British Empire) psychically in order to return (culturally) to a homeland (the PRC) no longer native to them—more precisely, that was never native to most of them. In consequence, many Hongkongers now experience Beijing as, in effect, the new Babylon. To make this claim is, of course, to impose a biblical metaphor on a Hong Kong population in which only a small minority of people identifies as Christian; but since I have been commissioned to write this essay, not just from an Irish perspective but also from a biblical-scholarly perspective, such projections are perhaps inevitable, beginning with the Babylonization of Beijing. For Christians, Babylons have always abounded, with every oppressive imperial power begging the Babylon label, beginning with imperial Rome (see 1 Pet. 5:13; Rev. 14:8; 16:19; 17:1–19:5). But Christian empires too have often been denounced as reembodiments of Babylon. For Rastafarians, to take but one contemporary example, Babylon names both the British Empire and the U.S. Empire, both being particularly associated in their respective histories with the imperial oppression of people of African descent. For admirers of these empires, of course, other Babylons conveniently come into view. As 11:00 p.m. on January 31, 2020, approached—the hour when Britain would officially exit the European Union—a tellingly small crowd of around fifty people waved Union Jacks outside Northern Ireland’s seat of government in Belfast. As the clock struck 11 o’clock, a local unionist politician10 “led cheers of ‘Freedom’ and shouts of ‘Who here is British?’” He announced to the crowd, “This is the day our nation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, moves out from the bondage of Europe!” Earlier a unionist clergyman had led the crowd in a prayer thanking God “for delivering Northern Ireland from the ‘Babylon’ of the EU.”11 The consolidation of the remnants of the British Empire represented by Brexit threatens to reopen the wound inflicted on Ireland in 1921 when the island was torn in two—Northern Ireland remaining part of Great Britain when the Irish Free State was established. Northern Ireland became a colony ruled by a British-identified Protestant majority that discriminated against an Irishidentified Catholic minority in such matters as employment, housing, education, and voting. These systemic injustices eventually led in the late 1960s to civil rights marches by the Catholic community and to violent suppression of

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them by the sectarian police force, more than 90 percent of whose officers were Protestant. All of which brings us back to Hong Kong. I am not the first to reflect on Hong Kong–Northern Ireland parallels. Mike Chinoy’s “Could Hong Kong Become Belfast?” begins: “The crowds surged through the streets, demanding basic political rights. They were met by clubwielding riot police firing teargas and rubber bullets. The clashes became routine, reflecting the gap between an aroused populace and an isolated and unresponsive government. This sounds very much like Hong Kong, where I live, in the summer of 2019, but in fact describes Northern Ireland fifty years ago.”12 Brian Dooley, in an article written some months after Chinoy’s and titled “What Hong Kong Can Learn from Northern Ireland,” spells out some “basic lessons” that Beijing might learn from Britain’s mishandling of the civil rights protests in Northern Ireland: “First, sending in an army to suppress protests won’t necessarily work. It risks fueling a long guerrilla war of attrition, and a deepening cycle of attacks and revenge attacks by protesters and security forces. Second, you might as well cut a political deal now as later. The British government agreed in 1998 to more or less what protesters had been demanding in 1968.”13 Among their Hong Kong–Northern Ireland parallels, both Chinoy and Dooley emphasize the essentially peaceful nature of their respective protest movements, at least at the outset. Emblematic of this phase in the Hong Kong trajectory was the nonviolent Umbrella Movement of 2014, which, however, failed to achieve its goals of electoral reform. As a New Testament scholar, I cannot resist triangulating the Hong Kong–Northern Ireland parallels with a third counterimperial resistance movement, albeit an ancient one. Firstcentury Jewish resistance to Roman rule also featured, in its incipient stages, if not public demonstrations in the modern mode, then something arrestingly akin to them. Particularly notable in this regard is Josephus’s account of Jewish reaction to the action of Pontius Pilate early in his tenure as prefect of Judea attempting to install in Jerusalem banners bearing the images of the Roman emperor, the “divine” Tiberius, thereby violating Jewish monotheistic sensibilities—and also, if I might venture a Hong Kong analogy, disregarding the “one empire, two systems” principle on which the peaceful administration of the province of Judea depended. Seeing their cherished convictions “trodden underfoot,” Josephus tells us, Jews flooded into Caesarea, Pilate’s administrative headquarters, demanding that he remove the banners. At Pilate’s refusal, the protesters, in an action strikingly anticipatory of contemporary die-ins, “fell down prostrate upon the ground, and continued immovable in that posture for five days and as many nights” (Josephus, Jewish War 2.171). When Pilate eventually commands his soldiers to surround the protesters with drawn weapons, the latter bare their necks and cry out that they are ready to



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die rather than have the idolatrous banners desecrate their holy city. Pilate, astonished at their resolve, yields and orders the banners removed (2.172–74; see also Josephus, Antiquities 18.55–59). This singularly effective instance of nonviolent resistance, of course, by no means set the stage for what was to follow. Decades later, increasingly violent protests against Roman (mis)rule, provoking increasingly brutal suppression, provoking even more violent protests, in turn, in the all too familiar spiral from nonviolent demands for withheld rights to outright armed revolt, would lead inexorably to the empire’s symbolic obliteration of its subject people’s most determinative cultural icon, the Jerusalem temple, attended by catastrophic loss of life (Josephus, Jewish War 6.252–88, 414–22; Matt. 24:1–2, 15–22; Mark 13:1–2, 14–20; Luke 19:41–44; 21:5–6, 20–24), leading to Rome becoming the new Babylon (1 Pet. 5:13; Rev. 14:8; 16:19; 17:5; 18:2, 10, 21; 4 Ezra 3:1–2, 28–31; 2 Baruch 10:1–3; 11:1; 67:7). The Jewish Revolt, 66–73 CE was, in contemporary terms, an anticolonial uprising that was also a religious war. The Northern Ireland “Troubles” (as they are called), 1968–1998 (although they really began in 1609 and continue to the present), were similarly an anticolonial uprising that was also a religious war. The Hong Kong protests, 2014 to the present, are a far more complex sociopolitical phenomenon. They also constitute an uprising, although not by the colonized against the colonizer, for those who are rising up are a people who have recently been “liberated” from 156 years of colonization by what was formerly the largest empire the world had ever seen. No, the Hong Kong protests constitute an uprising against the nation eager to reclaim Hong Kong from the colonizer’s political control and cultural influence and draw it fully into its bosom. The protests are not an uprising against a colonial power but against a nationalist power—a nationalist power, however, that harbors colonizing ambitions toward Hong Kong and thereby anomalously blurs the boundary between the normally antithetical phenomena of colonialism and anticolonial nationalism. The Hong Kong protests then, notwithstanding their notable parallels to the Northern Ireland protests of fifty years ago, are not an anticolonial resistance movement in the ordinary sense of the term. Neither are they a religious war. Yet they are a struggle that demands a Christian taking of sides. A letter published on October 29, 2019, in the South China Morning Post, a prominent Hong Kong news outlet, begins: “As a Christian minister, I am somewhat mystified by the level of support offered to the Hong Kong protesters by some of my Christian peers. It would seem to me that the Bible is very clear in its recommendation that Christians are to support and uphold the civil powers and authorities that have been established over a territory, even when such powers may not be to their liking.” The author, David John Eason, goes

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on to quote 1 Timothy 2:1–4 (“I urge . . . that petitions, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for . . . all those in authority, so that we may live peaceful and quiet lives”) and Romans 13:1 (“There is no authority except that which God has established”) and to cite the example of Jesus himself who, during his Roman trial, informed Pontius Pilate that his authority over Jesus was bestowed “from above” (John 19:11). The letter concludes: “May I suggest that our current troubles could have been considerably lessened had Christians followed the example of Jesus and the teaching of the Bible by submitting to those in authority and praying for them, instead of supporting a path to protest and rebellion?”14 An altogether different letter might have been written had the author taken his lead, not from the accommodationist, empire-affirming end of the New Testament political spectrum, but from the separatist, anti-imperial end as epitomized by the Book of Revelation in particular. Even some deeper reflection on the Johannine passion narrative, moreover, might have revealed that its Jesus is far from raising a regal hand in blessing over civil authorities. The very next verse after the one Eason quotes “sets [Jesus] over against the emperor” (John 19:12), which is precisely why Pilate sentences him to death. In effect, the Jewish religious authorities persuade Pilate that Jesus’s words and actions can only be construed as “protest and rebellion” (to borrow Eason’s terms). Earlier they observed, “If we let him [Jesus] go on like this, . . . the Romans will come and destroy both our holy place and our nation” (11:48). Furthermore, even the “quietist” Paul and pseudo-Paul of Romans 13:1 and 1 Timothy 2:2–3 whom Eason invokes is counteracted by the Paul of Acts, who, together with his fellow agitator Silas, is accused by their opponents in Philippi, “a Roman colony” (Acts 16:12), of “disturbing [the] city” and, indeed, the status quo (16:20–21); later in Thessalonica they cause “an uproar” (17:5) and are accused of “turning the world upside down” (17:6). As such statements indicate (and many more like them might be adduced), there is a protesters’ New Testament, a canon within the canon, that is more than capable of countering the antiprotesters’ New Testament. Prominent in the protesters’ New Testament would be the Jesus, attested in all four gospels, who enters Jerusalem at the head of a large crowd shouting antigovernment slogans (e.g., “Blessed is the kingdom of our father David that is coming!”—Mark 11:9; see also Matt. 21:9; Luke 19:37–38; John 12:13) and who performs a violent act of protest in the institution that epitomized the socioreligious status quo, disrupting its commercial activities (Matt. 21:12; Mark 11:15–16; Luke 19:45–46; John 2:14–16). Such antigovernment actions were what provoked the historical Jesus’s arrest and death sentence, not suffering the little children to come unto him or praying for those who persecuted him.



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I hasten to add, however, that holding up the moth-to-flame, death-drawn Jesus(es) of the gospel narratives as a model for the Hong Kong protesters, even the Christian ones, is not something I have the least interest in doing from my comfortable armchair eight thousand miles away. That would be obscene. What concerns me, indeed, what fills me with apprehension no less than admiration, is the willingness expressed by many of the protesters to lay down their lives for their democratic convictions. It runs like a refrain, for example, through Time magazine’s February 3, 2020, cover story on the protesters, “I Absolutely Will Not Back Down.” “Maybe I will die for this movement,” a fifteen-year-old protester (who, like his peers, assumes a pseudonym for the article) is reported as saying. Another young protester declares, “I would rather die than be arrested. If I die at least the fury would sustain this movement.” The article also reports that protesters chant “We are not scared of dying!” during their incessant confrontations with the phalanxes of police in riot gear and that a highway divider displays “a line of graffiti spell[ing] out the front liners’ ultimatum: Freedom or death.”15 The poignant courage of these young protesters, the readiness of many of them to sacrifice life and limb for freedom, also evokes pre-independence Ireland and the extent to which its own anti-imperial struggle against a militarily superior adversary needed to be a sacrificial rite and a cult of martyrs—so much so, indeed, that the theme of blood sacrifice was explicitly inscribed in the Proclamation of Independence, mentioned earlier, that the Irish rebels declaimed publicly in Dublin on April 24, 1916, thereby inaugurating the armed uprising (the seventh “in the past three hundred years,” as the proclamation noted) that eventually led, six years later, to the establishment of the Irish Free State. The proclamation announced: “In this supreme hour, the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.” The readiness of Hong Kong’s children to sacrifice themselves for a free society should constitute for democracies everywhere such a moving and motivating witness as to make that sacrifice unnecessary. Like the Irish rebels, the Hong Kong rebels are asserting their “freedom and sovereignty . . . in the face of the world” (quoting again from the Irish Proclamation of Independence), and the world needs to intervene resolutely and effectively on their behalf. More precisely, the democratic world, and most of all the United States and its Beijing-obsessed president, needs to interpose its own potentially ponderous bulk more decisively between the fragile bodies of the Hong Kong protesters and the vicious edge of the immense PRC machine represented by the Hong Kong police.16 Let Hong Kong’s freedom, unlike Ireland’s, not require a martyr host or a massive blood sacrifice to appease the gods of empire.

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NOTES 1.  Archie C. C. Lee, “Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong,” Biblical Interpretation 7, no. 2 (1999): 156. 2.  The Irish Free State, comprising twenty-six of the thirty-two Irish counties, was a “British Dominion,” meaning that it had been granted semi-independent status within the British Empire. The twenty-six counties became the Republic of Ireland, with a status entirely independent of the British Crown, only in 1949. 3.  “Ireland was England’s oldest colony, as well as its first postcolony; Northern Ireland was its last colony.” Kevin Whelan, “Between Filiation and Affiliation: The Politics of Postcolonial Memory,” in Ireland and Postcolonial Theory, ed. Clare Carroll and Patricia King (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 94. I return to the complex issue of Northern Ireland below. 4.  Kwok Pui-lan, “Response to Archie Lee’s Paper on ‘Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong,’” Biblical Interpretation 7, no. 2 (1999): 182. Kwok’s is one of four responses to Lee’s article in this issue of Biblical Interpretation. 5.  Kwok, “Response,” 182. 6.  The role of nationalism in PRC–Hong Kong relations seems to have become ever more complex in the decades since the handover; see Chan Chi Kit and Anthony Fung Ying Him, “Disarticulation between Civic Values and Nationalism: Mapping Chinese State Nationalism in Post-handover Hong Kong,” China Perspectives 3 (September 1, 2018): 41–50. 7.  Lingchei Letty Chen, Writing Chinese: Reshaping Chinese Cultural Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 77. 8.  Such ambivalence has yielded at least one scene “anachronistic and perplexing to Western observers. For a few brief moments on July 1, 2019, the 22nd anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to China, the British colonial flag made an appearance on the lectern of the Hong Kong legislative chamber. For the young protesters who had stormed and occupied the building, it was a symbolic way to simultaneously express their unique Hong Kong identity and showcase their discontent with Chinese rule.” Melissa Chen, “Why Postcolonial Theory Is Not Helping Hong Kong,” Areo, July 17, 2019, areomagazine.com/2019/07/17/why-postcolonial-theory-is-nothelping-hong-kong/. 9.  See Lee, “Returning to China,” 160–64, 167–73. His focal text is Isaiah 56–66. 10.  Unionist is the term used in Northern Ireland for people who profess loyalty to the British Crown and want the province to remain indefinitely within the United Kingdom. 11. As reported in Patrick Reevell, “Few Cheers in Northern Ireland as Brexit Finally Happens,” ABC News, February 1, 2020, abcnews.go.com/International/ cheers-northern-ireland-brexit-finally/story?id=68685258. 12. Mike Chinoy, “Could Hong Kong Become Belfast?” YaleGlobal Online, October 1, 2019, yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/could-hong-kong-become-belfast. The article appeared simultaneously in the South China Morning Post under an alternative title, “From Peaceful Protests to Violence to Terrorism: Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ Could Show Where Hong Kong Is Heading,” www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/arti-



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cle/3030912/peaceful-protests-violence-terrorism-northern-irelands-troubles. On November 19, 2019, the article was reprinted in The Irish Times under the title, “Could Hong Kong Go the Way of Belfast?” www.irishtimes.com/opinion/could-hong-konggo-the-way-of-belfast-1.4088369. Charles Mok elaborates on Chinoy’s reflections in his own article, “We Must Prevent Hong Kong from Becoming Another Belfast,” trans. Alan Lee, EJ Insight, October 16, 2019, www.ejinsight.com/20191016-we -must-prevent-hong-kong-from-becoming-another-belfast/ (originally published in Chinese in the Hong Kong Economic Journal, October 8, 2019). 13.  Brian Dooley, “What Hong Kong Can Learn from Northern Ireland: Three Steps to Avoid 30 Years of Tragedy,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 15, 2019, www.hongkongfp.com/2019/12/15/hong-kong-can-learn-northern-ireland-three -steps-avoid-30-years-tragedy/. Dooley’s “third step” is: “Tell the truth about what’s happened. Britain’s official inquiry into Bloody Sunday [the mass shooting of unarmed protesters by British soldiers in Derry, Northern Ireland, in 1972] was such a whitewash of its military’s culpability it had to be redone decades later.” 14.  David John Eason, “Hong Kong Christian Minister Left Puzzled by Support for Protests and Rebellion,” South China Morning Post, October 29, 2019, www .scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3035180/hong-kong-christian-minister-left-puz zled-support-protests-and. The author is identified as a resident of Tai Po, one of the eighteen districts of Hong Kong. 15.  Laignee Barron, “‘I Absolutely Will Not Back Down’: Meet the Young People at the Heart of Hong Kong’s Rebellion,” Time, February 2, 2020, time.com/longform/ hong-kong-portraits/. 16.  President Donald Trump did sign into U.S. law on November 27, 2019, two bills supporting the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. The problem? The previous week Trump had announced in a call-in interview on the TV news/talk show Fox & Friends: “We have to stand with Hong Kong, but I’m also standing with President Xi. He’s a friend of mine. I’d like to see them work it out, okay?”

Chapter Fourteen

The Power of Nonviolent Direct Action Sharon D. Welch

In 2020, Joshua Wong, one of the leaders of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, published a clarion call for global awareness and global action. Wong is direct; Wong is clear. Democracy is under threat in Hong Kong, and democracy is under threat throughout the world. He challenges all of us to recognize three things—the rising forms of authoritarianism that threaten democracies worldwide, the values of democratic societies, and what it takes to both fight for democracy now and maintain it over the long haul. As a teenager, Wong founded the student activist group Scholarism and was active in the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and then the pro-democracy party Demosistō. He remains a leader and was one who spoke to the U.S. Congress in 2019 and was pivotal in persuading them to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. In his 2020 book, Unfree Speech: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now, Wong states that the challenges facing the people of Hong Kong are an “early warning signal” and template for resilient creative action. He ends the book “with an urgent call for all of us around the world to defend our democratic rights. . . . If multinationals, international governments and indeed ordinary citizens do not start paying attention to Hong Kong, and treating our story as an early warning signal, it won’t be long before everyone else feels the same invasion of civil liberties that Hong Kongers have endured and resisted every day on our streets for the past two decades.”1 I find it ironic, and yet profoundly significant, that while U.S. flags were held in some of the 2019 Hong Kong protests as a symbol of the democracy to be achieved, our democracy in the United States is also endangered and under fundamental assault by rising forms of voter suppression and authoritarian governance.2 What does it take to create, sustain, and defend democracy? In the reflections of Benny Tai, another leader of the pro-democracy movement, we see 217

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an equally clear call to join in working to achieve this goal through nonviolent direct action. Benny Tai was a professor of law at the University of Hong Kong and, along with Chan Kin-man, an associate professor in sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Chu Yiu-ming, a social activist and retired Baptist pastor, was one of the founders of a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign for full democracy—Occupy Central with Love and Peace.3 In an essay published in 2018, “From Past to Future: Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement,” Tai shares the lessons learned in this movement and their implications for ongoing work for genuine democracy in Hong Kong and throughout the world. Tai states that what is blossoming now in Hong Kong “in this Post-Umbrella Era” is that people are rejecting “hierarchical social relationships” and are finding a form of community that values not just individualism, not just community, but free individuals within community.4 As a student and practitioner of strategic nonviolence, and as one who is working to maintain U.S. democracy under escalating assaults, I find that we can strengthen our work for democracy worldwide as we learn from what compels and sustains the resilient and innovative activism of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. STRATEGIC NONVIOLENCE—THEORY AND PRACTICE In looking at the Umbrella Movement and its ongoing impact on the mass protests of the movement for democratic citizenship in 2019, we can see the core values and practices, as well as the core ethical and political challenges, of strategic nonviolence. In his analysis of the role of nonviolent direct action in the democracy movement in Hong Kong, Tai cites the work of two political scientists, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, whose work I will also explore in terms of what they tell us about the power and challenges of strategic nonviolence. Chenoweth and Stephan looked empirically at every resistance movement from 1900 to 2006. The results of their study are clear. First, nonviolent direct action was more successful than violent resistance. Second, they were able to clearly delineate the key factors that led to the success of nonviolent action, and thirdly, they identified areas where the data are not clear. Applying their analysis to the unfolding work for democracy, human rights, and freedom in Hong Kong provides valuable lessons in what we can learn from the courageous and creative actions of this pro-democracy movement. In 2011, Chenoweth and Stephan published Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. In this book, they share the results of their analysis of “323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns



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between 1900 and 2006.”5 These were campaigns for regime change, against occupation, and for secession. Their findings are surprising, heartening, and challenging. They found that nonviolent resistance movements were far more likely to be successful than violent resistance campaigns. In fact, they found that “between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts.”6 The successful nonviolent movements that they studied are diverse geographically and temporally, ranging from the 1931 resistance in Chile to the Carlos Ibáñez regime, the People Power movement in the Philippines against the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship from 1983 to 1986, and the “Singing Revolution” in Estonia in 1989 against the Communist regime. They also analyze the failed anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa from 1952 to 1961 and then the successful anti-apartheid campaign from 1984 to 1994.7 In addition to discovering the fact that nonviolence has been more effective than violent resistance in achieving fundamental social change, Chenoweth and Stephan also examine why nonviolence has been more effective than violence. Nonviolent campaigns attract more participants and thereby obtain a wider range of support of people from across the social, political, and economic spectrum. Nonviolent campaigns have a membership that is both numerically larger and more ideologically and culturally diverse than violent campaigns. Having a “more diverse membership” leads to the following factors that are all equally important in the success of nonviolent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns 1.  produce “higher levels of civic disruption”; 2.  are “more likely . . . to win meaningful support in the international community”; 3.  are “more adept at developing tactical innovations”; 4.  are “better at evading and remaining resilient in the face of regime repression”; 5.  and, finally, with nonviolent campaigns, “regime repression . . . is more likely to backfire.”8 Chenoweth and Stephan found that while repression by regimes is frequent, occurring in 80 percent of nonviolent resistance movements, it rarely leads to failure of the movement. On the contrary, violent repression often backfires, breeding resilience among activists and leading to more, not less, support from a wider array of the public. What then leads to the failure of nonviolent campaigns? Chenoweth and Stephan found that one in four nonviolent campaigns failed, and the causes of that failure are straightforward: lack of persistence,

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loss of unity, and the inability to employ new and different tactics.9 What leads to the loss of unity and the inability to employ new tactics is also clear. Ideological and tactical rigidity, not repression, leads to the failures of strategic nonviolence. Ideological purity limits the number of participants. Tactical rigidity limits the quantity and quality of participation. In the face of repression, tactical innovation and the creation of new strategies are essential. Further, multiple strategies enable the movement to attract the sympathy of more pillars of support against the oppressive and unjust regime. Some of those pillars may be reached by demonstrations and vigils, others by boycotts, and still others by phone calls, letter-writing campaigns, and conversations at public meetings. The key insight from Chenoweth and Stephan is that strategic nonviolence fails most often through its internal conflicts and lack of creativity rather than through its external repression: [Just] because a campaign is nonviolent does not guarantee its success. Just as on a battlefield, poorly managed campaigns are more likely to fail. Campaigns that constantly update their information, adapt to conditions, and outmaneuver the adversary are more likely to succeed than campaigns that expect to succeed merely by virtue of their causes and methods.10

Chenoweth and Stephan identify a sixth key factor in the long-term success of nonviolence: strategic nonviolence is more likely to be followed by democratic governance when it is democratic in the very forms of resistance. Strategic nonviolence is not merely resisting injustice. At its best, nonviolence is also living out a culture that corresponds with the political practices of democracy. In addition to providing widespread resistance to injustice, successful campaigns create alternative democratic and peaceful forms of collective political, economic, and cultural life. In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan found that when violent campaigns do succeed—for example, the Russian Revolution (1917), Chinese Revolution (1946–1950), Algerian Revolution (1954–1962), Cuban Revolution (1953–1959), and Vietnamese Revolution (1959–1975)—they are characterized by many of the same factors that lead to the success of nonviolent movements: large numbers of participants, a wide range of activities, and the creation of alternative and peaceful forms of governance and community. Chenoweth and Stephan claim that it may well be that the cause of their success is their similarity to the strongest and most innovative nonviolent campaigns.11 It is vital that there be a resonance between all dimensions of social change—exposing and dismantling unjust systems, including all stakeholders, and building inclusive and democratic institutions: “[Mass] participation in nonviolent political change, we suggest, encourages the development of



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democratic skills and fosters expectations of accountable governance, both of which are less likely when transitions are driven by opposition violence.”12 There is, however, one matter of heated debate among activists where the political science is only partially clear. While it is demonstrable that nonviolent campaigns are more successful, is there a role for violent elements in the campaign? Does a more radical and violent fringe element lead to greater success or to failure? Here Chenoweth and Stephan are blunt: “The data is inconclusive. In some incidences, a violent fringe element leads to the entire social movement being discredited and losing support. In others, the repressive regime chooses to negotiate with the nonviolent campaign as a way of disempowering the violent fringe.” Chenoweth and Stephan find that “there is no consensus among social scientists about the conditions under which radical flanks either harm or help a social movement.” While it is thus not clear if a radical, violent fringe helps or hurts a movement for social change, one thing is certain: if there is violence, it needs to remain on the margins rather than becoming central to a campaign.13 The lessons here for activists are clear and resonate with my lifelong experience as a political activist. I participated and helped plan demonstrations against the war in Vietnam in high school and college. While in college, I also began working for economic justice as a member of Democratic Socialists of America. In graduate school, I studied theologies of liberation (Latin American, black, and feminist) and participated in anti-apartheid protests and the nuclear weapons freeze campaign. I was also involved in the women’s movement and ongoing work for racial justice. As a professor and scholar, I continued my work in these movements and saw clearly both the strengths and challenges of nonviolent direct action. Chenoweth and Stephan found that nonviolent social movements have a “participatory advantage” over violent social movements, and that advantage is “both qualitative and quantitative.” Not only are more people involved, but there is a greater range of actions. They also found a fundamental paradox that I have experienced throughout my life as an activist. All too often key strengths are the cause of debilitating infighting. In all of the movements in which I have been involved, too often I and others tried to get mass numbers of participants but insisted on limiting the number of actions to those that we personally found most compelling. Rather than welcoming multiple strategies, all too often we sought to impose our preferred strategy. Rather than encouraging both low-risk and high-risk activities, we often pushed people to move from low to high risk rather than seeing the need for a wide range of activities. Chenoweth and Stephan highlight another key challenge that I have encountered in my life as an activist. It is not enough to protest injustice. We

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must also build just institutions and practice justice in all dimensions of our lives as citizens, workers, managers, neighbors, and members of families.14 I encountered this challenge most directly in my work with the peace movement. After more than a decade of protesting war, I began to study the work of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Their challenge was life changing. They asked of us all a simple yet definitive question: “If war is not the answer, what is?”15 Taking up that challenge, I began work with Global Action to Prevent War, an organization committed to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and disarmament. We realized that disarmament and saying no to war was not enough and thus worked with others on three related tasks of (1) peacekeeping—early intervention to stop genocide and prevent large-scale war, (2) peacemaking— bringing hostile parties to agreement, and (3) peacebuilding—the creation of long-term structures for redressing injustice and resolving ongoing conflicts.16 At the core of my experience as an activist is learning how to build just institutions and policies in my work as an academic administrator and as a citizen working to expand and defend democracy in the United States. Both factors—working with differences in strategies and tactics, building just structures and resisting unjust ones—are at work in the Hong Kong prodemocracy movement. In this movement, nonviolence is not just protesting against injustice or demonstrating for justice. Rather, at its core, strategic nonviolence is living out now what is demanded and desired. THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP In the work of Benny Tai and Joshua Wong and their reflections on the Hong Kong democracy movement, we can see what is required for a democracy to be created and sustained. The Occupy Central Movement did not achieve its immediate political goals in 2014, yet Tai states that what was achieved was of utmost significance—a new “political culture” that continues to be expressed in the institution building and protests of the present and future: In the twenty months’ work of OCLP in organizing the “Occupy Central” action and the unprecedented 79-day occupation, a solid groundwork is now in place. The political culture of Hong Kongers has irreversibly changed. People are much more receptive to civil disobedience. Many are also ready to make more sacrifice for Hong Kong’s democracy. Seeds of hope for democracy have been deeply planted in Hong Kong’s soil.17

How were these “seeds of hope” planted, what is ongoing, and what can we all learn from this movement? The Umbrella Movement amplified a commit-



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ment to an expansive democracy and was a catalyst for expanding forms of civic engagement. This commitment was publicly expressed in mass protests in the summer and fall of 2019 against a proposed extradition bill by the Hong Kong government. With the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, there was a cessation of public protests but a continuation of both government repression and citizen activism. In April 2020, Isaac Cheng, one of the leaders of the pro-democracy student group Demosistō, said that “this is a rest time, but it’s definitely not the end of the movement.” Another organizer in the pro-democracy movement, Ventus Lau, said that this was a time to “recharge and strategize.”18 Just as the members of the pro-democracy movement remain committed to implementing genuine democratic reforms, the Community Party of China and many of the political authorities in Hong Kong remain determined to defeat this movement. On April 18, 2020, authorities in Hong Kong arrested fifteen leaders of the pro-democracy movement on charges related to the protests in August and October of 2019. On April 21, the office in charge of Hong Kong affairs in Beijing issued a statement criticizing two prominent activists, Joshua Wong and Jimmy Lai, and a pro-democracy lawmaker from the legal sector, Dennis Kwok. The commitment to freedom of speech, human rights, and full democracy remained strong and would have a clear test in the legislative election in September 2020, but the election was postponed due to COVID-19.19 What has happened in Hong Kong, and what is happening now? Tai states that people value their freedoms that are under assault and are determined to protect them. In order to defend their freedoms, he and others studied the practice and theory of nonviolence in the work of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and Gene Sharp and applied that work to the protection of those freedoms. As a result, Tai and other members of the pro-democracy movement reached a vital conclusion: there are multiple strategies in nonviolent direct action; it is not simply masses of people suddenly appearing in the street, resisting injustice, and demanding change. In his analysis of nonviolent direct action, Tai identifies what leads both to mass protests and to the ongoing challenges that may lead to failure. Chenoweth and Stephan found that internal tactical rigidity and infighting over tactics often lead to failure. Tai states that in the seventy-nine days of the Occupy Central Movement he saw just the opposite. The leaders of Occupy Central accepted changes to their original plan, and there was ongoing creativity in how people expressed their commitment to a genuine democracy in Hong Kong. Moreover, there was a second key factor in the protests for democracy: democracy was lived out in daily actions, in relationships built, and in risks taken. Tai is clear. In this occupation,

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a new generation of democrats was born. Compared with their predecessors, they are more assertive, resilient, flexible, pluralistic and innovative. Their style of civil disobedience was not the same as the one advocated by the OCLP. Protesters preferred not to sit on the street passively waiting to be removed and arrested by the police. Armed with defensive “weapons,” like plastic wrap, upturned umbrellas, medical masks, and foam mat shields, they stood firm to defend every barricade at the front.20

As Tai states, following the initial success of Occupy Central, the government moved from repression to a “waiting game.” They no longer violently attacked the protesters, and the public did tire of the inconvenience of the massive shutdowns. As Joshua Wong also points out, internal divisions among those protesting grew. When a court declared in December 2014 that the occupied areas be cleared, the protesters complied.21 While the specific political aims were not achieved in the fall of 2014, a crucial ingredient of possible change in the present was firmly established: an increased politicization and commitment to democracy; a willingness to sacrifice for democracy by practicing civil disobedience; and, in the very practice of civil disobedience, adherence to the principles of deliberative democracy. Tai states that the goal of Occupy Central was deliberative democracy, not simply competitive democracy. In a deliberative democracy, people “[make] decisions after a detailed and well-designed deliberative process in which they receive adequate and balanced information on the options and are facilitated to understand the underlying ideas and viewpoints of people holding different opinions.”22 Tai sees the continuation of deliberative democracy in the ongoing pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong in which active members, rather than single charismatic leaders, play the key roles in connecting and activating various networks. Tai is well aware of the potential power, and the ongoing challenges, of this form of “leaderless” organization. He names what Chenoweth and Stephan have also seen—what is most destructive for nonviolent movements is the ongoing danger of internal division. As he states, “[This] new phenomenon Post-Umbrella Era can release much political energy for the democratic movement but may also generate more internal conflicts dissipating its political energy if there is not good coordination among the different democratic forces.”23 For this movement to flourish, Tai highlights the need for two kinds of covenants that will enable resilience and creative working with differences and conflicts. The personal covenant entails the embrace of the values that are essential to the operation of deliberative democracy—”nonviolence, equality and fairness in people’s personal and public lives.” The social covenant is one that values learning from, and with, differences and follows procedures that



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nurture the free exchange of ideas, a process in which conflict and disagreement, honestly engaged, can lead to wiser and more creative decisions.24 Tai also points to the need for a range of nonviolent actions. Like Chenoweth and Stephan, he sees the value of multiple forms of both indirect and direct action. Drawing on the work of Gene Sharp, he highlights the power of direct actions: “Direct actions are those that are public, political and confrontational, disturbing social order, like a demonstration, rally, sit-in and occupation. . . . Its purpose . . . is to challenge the authorities and, should they respond by inflicting violence against peaceful protests, undermine their legitimacy.”25 Tai sees the equal power of indirect actions that cause no direct disturbance to social order, “like symbol wearing, street performance, exhibition and community organization.” He states that indirect actions can have three effects: “First, the legitimacy of the unjust regime or system can continue to be weakened. . . . Second, indirect actions can further consolidate and develop the organization of the opposition forces. Third, indirect actions can bring further cultural transformation.”26 There are other forms of nonviolent action being undertaken in Hong Kong that are described well by Ben Siu-pun Ho in his chapter in this volume. As Gene Sharp knew so well, and as many activists miss, the political goals of the movement can be expressed in our daily lives as consumers, professionals, business owners, and managers. As Ho states, “Protesters have been assimilating the protest into their daily lives,”27 and he gives as one example patronizing businesses that support the pro-democracy movement and boycotting those that do not. At the core of the Hong Kong movement is a commitment to a form of community based on openness and respect. This dimension of the movement is clearly manifest in Wong’s descriptions of the demonstrations of 2014. In his book about the catalytic power and ongoing lessons of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, Wong describes just this—the type of community that was not just envisioned and demanded in the protests but that was created in the very nature of the protests themselves: The Umbrella Movement [in 2014] . . . brought out the absolute best in us. Everywhere we looked we saw citizens of all ages and professions handing out free food, water and medical supplies to protesters. Office workers showed up during their lunch breaks with cash donations; parents and retirees took shifts to manage the provisions; students sat for civic lessons that no class could teach them. The crowds at the three main sites—Admiralty, Mongkok and Causeway Bay—were ten times bigger than those at the anti-national education campaign [two years earlier]. The movement’s symbol, the yellow umbrella, captured both the humility and humanity of the non-violent protest.28

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Wong described how this was also seen in the tent city that was established on Harcourt Road where people moved in and began to spend the night: To support a self-sustaining community, amenities like supply stations and medical centres grew up like mushrooms. I was particularly inspired by a makeshift library . . . where row upon row of secondary school students, still wearing their uniforms, read and did homework under the supervision of volunteer tutors. . . . The Western press called us the world’s politest protesters, but in my mind we were also its most resourceful, creative and disciplined.29

Wong, like Tai and Chenoweth and Stephan, highlights the power of resilience and creativity rather than ideological rigidity and tactical purity. He states that his “biggest takeaway [is that we] did it without precedent or a manual to follow. We did the best we could under the circumstances. . . . What mattered was what we would do with this transformative experience. . . . We needed to turn our frustration into resolve and rebuild our trust and respect for each other.”30 A final factor for us to consider is the role of a violent dimension to protests. Tai acknowledges that there are those who think that authorities may be more willing to negotiate if there is a radical flank, and yet, there is a danger that such violence will alienate moderate supporters of democratic change.31 What can make violent action a valued component? Chenoweth and Stephan did not find clear answers, finding that at times a radical flank was helpful while at others it led to the movement being discredited. I am not aware of any definitive answers to this question but posit that, in the case of the Hong Kong movement, we see key factors that may lead to ongoing success. First, the violence by protesters in Hong Kong only occurred after significant violent repression by the police, violence that has continued and for which the government and the police have not been held accountable. This violence has alienated many people in Hong Kong and has increased support for the pro-democracy movement. Secondly, vandalism against property is limited to businesses that support the authoritarian government or government barriers to free access and assembly.32 However, some people who have disagreed with the protests have been beaten by the protesters, and it is this type of violence that may discredit or at least weaken the movement. In his chapter in this volume, Ben Siu-pun Ho describes how the violence in 2019 by protesters emerged and how it was exercised in a way that has, thus far, led to greater success of the pro-democracy movement. We can see in his analysis three key factors in the successful correlation of violent and nonviolent strategies. First, the violence is a response to governmental violence and repression and the failure of the government to respond to nonvio-



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lent demands. Wong said that after the demonstrations of millions of people failed to bring the government to scrap the extradition law, peaceful rallies turned to full-scale guerilla warfare. He said, A more militant breed of protester emerged, dressed in black and wearing yellow hard hats and half-face respirator masks, and the movement grew in size and organization. Faceless and leaderless, it self-mobilised using crowdsourcing apps and began clashing with police and vandalizing properties of businesses perceived to be pro-establishment. Some dug up bricks from the pavement and hurled them at the police, while others threw Molotov cocktails and set subway exits on fire. . . . [There was this] anti-government graffiti [that encapsulated the rationale of the protesters toward more violent demonstrations]—“It was YOU who taught us that peaceful protest doesn’t work.”33

In September, three months after nonstop violent clashes turned Hong Kong into an urban war zone, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, Hong Kong’s chief executive, finally relented and announced the full withdrawal of the extradition bill. Even then, public anger continued, and more demands were made, including the “creation of an independent commission to investigate police misconduct, amnesty for arrested protesters and universal suffrage.”34 There are two more factors at work in Hong Kong that are highly significant. First, there is a balance between violence and nonviolence, and second, far more people are involved in nonviolent direct actions of multiple types. Ho describes the ability of groups to work together using these very different tactics: Social movements in Hong Kong in the past few years were usually divided internally because of disputes on the various strategies employed, for instance, protesters argued whether peaceful demonstrations or militant vandalization should be used. Nevertheless, the strategy of “no splitting, no severing of ties and no snitching” (不分化、不割席、不篤灰) is embraced by both peaceful and militant protesters in the anti-extradition bill movement. . . . In addition, protesters have experienced the effectiveness of a “division of labor”—a strategy of “brothers climb a mountain together; each has to make his own effort” (兄弟爬山，各自努力). Peaceful protesters have witnessed how the storm brought about by militant protesters caused the government to concede to a certain degree, and peaceful protesters have played their roles by participating in various campaigns to arouse international attention.35

These lessons are fundamental components of the Hong Kong prodemocracy movement that is valuable for us to understand, to honor, and to expand. We clearly see in this movement what Chenoweth and Stephan have found at the core of successful movements: large numbers of people, multiple forms of action, and, in these actions, creatively living out the

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values of freedom, of respect, of deep and joyous community that underlie genuinely expansive and inclusive deliberative democracy. Nonviolent movements often fail in terms of short-term gains but create and expand forms of community that are reactivated at a later date. As with the Umbrella Movement, the goal of universal suffrage was not achieved in 2019, but what was achieved, and is continuing, is the respect for a culture of both individual freedom and collective belonging. There is a vibrant local culture in Hong Kong—a sense in which one of the core values is a form of localism that is open to the global.36 Wing-sang Law, in “Decolonization Deferred: Hong Kong Identity in Historical Perspective,” describes this unique combination of localism, cosmopolitanism, and openness to growth and change, stating that since the 1990s there has been a “struggle to preserve Hong Kongers’ commitment to universal values, developing a diverse, vibrant civil society, so as to safeguard press and academic freedom.” While all political gains have not yet been achieved, this culture of “diversity, hybridity and subversive tendencies” is “resolutely expressed, honored, nurtured.”37 There is a final point to explore—vital for the movement in Hong Kong and vital for all of us who are working to expand democratic practices in the face of authoritarian movements. As Chenoweth and Stephan stated, strategic nonviolence succeeds when it builds what it demands. Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement is not only opposing authoritarian forms of Chinese nationalism; it is also sustaining an alternative democratic form of civil society that other nations can support and emulate. It is increasingly clear that we are in a global crisis where authoritarian movements are expanding, and many political scientists are clear about what activates authoritarianism. This analysis is challenging in what it discloses and profoundly evocative in what it fails to see. First—what it discloses: Throughout the world, there is a small part of the human population (roughly 25 percent) that remains authoritarian. Authoritarians value community based on hierarchy, order, and sameness and respect leaders who are “simple, powerful and punitive.” Authoritarians also take deep satisfaction in violence against those perceived as threatening and inferior. There is a larger subset of the population, roughly 50 percent, whose authoritarianism is episodic, not constitutive, only evoked under conditions of threat and extreme fear. There is another 25 percent that remains committed to individual liberty, freedom, fairness, diversity, and rights. The choice that is portrayed in this scholarship is between cohesive authoritarian communities or expanding individual rights and freedoms.38 Authoritarianism is now on the rise throughout the world, and the verdict of one leading political scientist is grim. Karen Stenner, author of The Au-



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thoritarian Dynamic, argues that gains in civil rights, equality for women, protections for people who are LGBTQI, more rights for those with disabilities, and increasing racial, cultural, and religious diversity will inevitably produce authoritarianism. She goes so far as to conclude that the pace of social change must be curtailed and that democracy itself has to be limited in order to survive, and she moreover asks us to forego the “religion of democracy for the science of democracy.”39 While this political science is clear in its diagnosis of what activates the resurgence of authoritarianism, its findings are also fundamentally flawed and intrinsically limited, and here is our hope; here is our task. The major flaw in this research is that the data does not draw on alternative understandings of community and individuality held by people of color. In fact, in their 2018 study, the political scientists Marc Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler excluded people of color because “their politics and world views do not align in the same way that white voters do.”40 This conclusion is of utmost significance because we find in much of the work of people who are African American, Asian American, Latinx, and Native American a very different view of social order. Here we find traditions in which the choice is not cohesive community or diversity, not coherent communities or emancipated individualism. The real choice is that of a cohesive community based on diversity, creativity, and collective problem-solving or a cohesive community based on hierarchy, violence, control, and sameness.41 The work of these political scientists misses, therefore, what we see in Hong Kong—an alternative form of individual freedom and communal belonging that can counter and replace authoritarian rule. What we see in Hong Kong is a yes to individual freedom and a yes to an expansive form of community and belonging. Wai-kwok Benson Wong, for example, in exploring the artistic components of the pro-democracy movement, found the ways in which protest art emphasized “liberalism, openness, and creativity.”42 The people of Hong Kong are not alone in valuing, nurturing, and expressing communities of generative interdependence. Joshua Wong asks the international community for our support, and I would say that we can do that as we welcome and learn from their inspiration. We are in this experiment together—a community, a polis—that correlates local grounding and pride with cosmopolitan openness, that embodies individual freedom and collective accountability. Wong is certain that “the city will achieve political maturity and reach its full potential as a beacon of resilience and defiance around the world.”43 While I am not certain that democracy will prevail in either the short term or over the long haul, I wager that, if it does, it will be because we learn from such “beacons of resilience and defiance” as we see now in Hong Kong.

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Again, the challenge we face, the opportunity we are given, is expressed with clarity by Wong: “In supporting Hong Kong in its resistance against the Communist regime, the international community is contributing to a broader fight against the spread of tyranny that, like climate change and terrorism, threatens the way of life and liberty everywhere. That’s why to stand with Hong Kong is to stand with freedom.”44 And, as we learn from, and stand with, Hong Kong, we are challenged to live out a fundamental paradox. In nonviolent movements, what is most often seen and covered by the press are the massive direct actions. What is not seen and covered are the ongoing efforts of deliberative democracy, of resilient community and building relationships, that make those actions possible. Here is the challenge: Can the strengths that now exist in Hong Kong be supported internally and externally? Can we learn from this nonviolent movement and from others in the past what it takes to build resilient and creative communities of expansive and self-critical belonging? We are not alone in this struggle. There have been many who have gone before us, and we can both learn from them and find new ways of living the values of generative interdependence, creating communities that fully value diversity and connection, that nurture creativity and scientific rigor, that embody responsibility for others and the freedom to find new and better ways of living out and creating expansive communities of connection, respect, and cooperation. NOTES 1.  Joshua Wong with Jason Y. Ng, Unfree Speech: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now (New York: Penguin Books, 2020), xvii. 2.  I explore the rising threats to democracy in the United States in After the Protests Are Heard: Enacting Civic Engagement and Social Transformation (New York: New York University Press, 2019). For further examinations of the threats to democracy in the United States, see also Carol Anderson, One Person, No Vote: How Voter Suppression Is Destroying Our Democracy (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018); Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017); Cass R. Sunstein, #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than it Looks/Was: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, new and expanded ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2016); E. J. Dionne Jr., Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas E. Mann, One Nation After Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned, the Desperate, and the Not-Yet Deported (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017). 3.  Benny Y. T. Tai, “From Past to Future: Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement,” in Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong: Localism After



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the Umbrella Movement, ed. Wai-man Lam and Luke Cooper (New York: Routledge, 2018), 155. 4.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 164. 5.  Maria J. Stephan directs the Program on Nonviolent Action at the U.S. Institute of Peace and holds an MA and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Erica Chenoweth is professor and associate dean for research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and associate senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. She holds a PhD and an MA in political science from the University of Colorado. Chenoweth and Stephan build on prior well-known and influential studies of nonviolence by the political scientist Gene Sharp and by Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, the founders of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. Chenoweth and Stephan add a key dimension to this earlier scholarship. Sharp, Ackerman, and DuVall identify the principles and tactics common to successful nonviolent social movements. Chenoweth and Stephan empirically test which tactics are most salient in the success or failure of nonviolent and violent social movements. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 6.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 69, 7. 7.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 233–36. 8.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 220–21. 9.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 11, 91. 10.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 197. 11.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 59–60. 12.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 207, 213–14. 13.  Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 43. 14.  I explore this multifaceted work for justice in After the Protests Are Heard. 15.  Friends Committee on National Legislation, Peaceful Prevention of Deadly Conflict: If War Is Not the Answer, What Is? (Washington, DC: Friends Committee on National Legislation, 2004). 16.  I describe the ethical challenges and rewards of this work in After Empire: The Art and Ethos of Enduring Peace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004) and in Real Peace, Real Security: The Challenges of Global Citizenship (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). 17.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 160. 18.  Vivian Wang, Maria Abi-Habib, and Vivian Yee, “Taking (Most) Protests Off the Streets,” New York Times, April 24, 2020. 19.  Austin Ramzy and Elaine Yu, “With a Coronavirus as Cover, Hong Kong Is Targeting Activists,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. 20.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 159. 21.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 159. 22.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 156. 23.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 164. 24.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 164. 25.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 166.

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26.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 166–67. 27.  Ben Siu-pun Ho, “A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019,” chapter 1 in this volume, 29. 28. Wong, Unfree Speech, 48. 29. Wong, Unfree Speech, 50. 30. Wong, Unfree Speech, 53–54. 31.  Tai, “From Past to Future,” 167. 32. Wong, Unfree Speech, 211. 33. Wong, Unfree Speech, 214. 34. Wong, Unfree Speech, 215. 35.  Ho, “A Critical Review of Events,” chapter 1 in this volume, 27–28. 36.  Lam and Cooper, eds., Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong. 37.  Wing-sang Law, “Decolonization Deferred: Hong Kong Identity in Historical Perspective,” in Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong, ed. Lam and Cooper, 26–27. 38. According to Hetherington and Weiler, “There are. . . fewer Americans at the nonauthoritarian pole than at the authoritarian pole and the center of gravity of the distribution remains on the authoritarian side of the scale.” In their 2006 study, only about 25 percent of the population was solidly nonauthoritarian. Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 51, 61–62. Amanda Taub, “The Rise of American Authoritarianism,” Vox, March 1, 2016, www.vox .com/2016/3/1/11127424/trump-authoritarianism. 39.  Karen Stenner, The Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 330. 40.  Marc J. Hetherington and Jonathan Weiler, Prius or Pickup? How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America’s Great Divide (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), 51–54. 41.  For a rich description of the ethical challenges and political power of cohesive communities based on interdependence and collective problem-solving, see Miguel De La Torre, Latina/o Social Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010); Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Monica A. Coleman, Making a Way Out of No Way (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008); Karen Baker-Fletcher and Garth Kasimu Baker-Fletcher, My Sister, My Brother: Womanist and Xodus God-Talk (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997); Thomas King, The Truth about Stories: A Native Narrative (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants (Minneapolis, MN: Milkweed Editions, 2013). 42.  Wai-kwok Benson Wong, “Visual and Discourse Resistance on the ‘China Factor’: The Cultural Formation of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong,” in Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong, ed. Lam and Cooper, 147. 43. Wong, Unfree Speech, 231–32. 44. Wong, Unfree Speech, 247.

Suggested Further Reading

HONG KONG POLITICS Augustin-­Jean, Louis, and Anthea H. Y. Cheng. The Economic Roots of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong: Globalization and the Rise of China. New York: Routledge, 2018. Cai, Yongshun. The Occupy Movement in Hong Kong: Sustaining Decentralized Protest. New York: Routledge, 2017. Chan, Chi Kit, and Anthony Fung Ying Him. “Disarticulation between Civic Values and Nationalism: Mapping Chinese State Nationalism in Post-­ handover Hong Kong.” China Perspectives 3 (September 1, 2018): 41–50. Chan, Debby Sze-­wan, and Ngai Pun. “Economic Power of the Politically Powerless in the 2019 Hong Kong Pro-­Democracy Movement.” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (2019): 33–43. Cheng, Joseph Yu-­shek. New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2014. ———. Political Development in Hong Kong. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2020. Cheung, Gary Ka-­wai. Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009. Dapiran, Anthony. City on Fire: The Fight for Hong Kong. Minneapolis, MN: Scribe, 2020. Fong, Brian C. H. “One Country, Two Nationalisms: Center-­Periphery Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 1997–2016.” Modern China 43, no. 5 (September 2017): 523–56. doi.org/10.1177/0097700417691470. Fong, Brian C. H., and Tai-­lok Lui, eds. Hong Kong 20 Years after the Turnover: Emerging Social and Institutional Fractures after 1997. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Goodstadt, Leo F. A City Mismanaged: Hong Kong’s Struggle for Survival. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020. 233

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Hong Kong Institute of Asia-­Pacific Center, Public Policy Research Center. Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong: A Follow-­up Study. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. Hui, Victoria Tin-­bor. “Beijing’s Hard and Soft Repression in Hong Kong.” Orbis 64, no. 2 (January 1, 2020): 289–311. doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.010. Ibrahim, Zuraidah, and Jeffie Lam, eds. Rebel City: Hong Kong’s Year of Water and Fire. Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 2020. Ip, Iam-­chong. Hong Kong’s New Identity Politics: Longing for the Local in the Shadow of China. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ku, Agnes Shuk-­mei. “In Search of a New Political Subjectivity in Hong Kong: The Umbrella Movement as a Street Theater of Generational Change.” The China Journal, no. 82 (2019): 111–32. ———. “New Forms of Youth Activism: Hong Kong’s Anti-­Extradition Bill Movement in the Local-­National-­Global Nexus.” Space and Polity 24, no. 1 (2020): 111–17. doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2020.1732201. Lam, Wai-­man, and Luke Cooper, eds. Citizenship, Identity and Social Movements in the New Hong Kong: Localism after the Umbrella Movement. New York: Routledge. 2018. Lam, Wai-­man, Percy Luen-­tim Lui, and Wilson Wong, eds. Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics, 2nd ed. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012. Lam-­Knott, Sonia. “Understanding Protest ‘Violence’ in Hong Kong from the Youth Perspective.” Asian Anthropology 16, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 279–98. doi.org/10 .1080/1683478X.2017.1374622. Lee, Ching Kwan, and Ming Sing, eds. An Eventful Sociology of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2019. Lee, Francis L. F. “Solidarity in the Anti-­Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong.” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 18–32. doi.org/10.1080/14672 715.2020.1700629. Lee, Francis L. F., Gary Tang, Samson Yuen, and Edmund W. Cheng. Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-­Extradition Bill Protests. Hong Kong: Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 2019. www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/en/pdf/ENG_antielab%20survey%20 public%20report%20vf.pdf. Lee, Francis L. F., and Joseph M. Chan. Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: The Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Lee, Francis L. F., Samson Yuen, Gary Tang, and Edmund W. Cheng. “Hong Kong’s Summer of Uprising: From Anti-­Extradition to Anti-­Authoritarian Protests.” China Review 19, no. 4 (2019): 1–32. Leung, Lisa Yuk-­ming. “Online Radio Listening as ‘Affective Publics’? (Closeted) Participation in the Post-­Umbrella Movement Everyday.” Cultural Studies 32, no. 4 (2018): 511–29. Lim, Adelyn. Transnational Feminism and Women’s Movement in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Solidarity beyond the State. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2015.



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Liu, Xin. “‘Too Simple and Sometimes Naïve’: Hong Kong, between China and the West.” In Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics, edited by Olivia Rutazibwa and Robbie Shilliam, 255–67. New York: Routledge, 2018. Lo, Sonny Shiu-­hing, ed. Interest Groups and the New Democracy Movement in Hong Kong. New York: Routledge, 2018. Lo, Sonny Shiu-­hing, and Jeff Hai-­chi Loo. “An Anatomy of the Post-­Materialistic Values of Hong Kong Youth: Opposition to China’s Rising Sharp Power.” In Youth: Global Challenges and Issues of the 21st Century, edited by David Trotman and Stan Tucker, 95–126. New York: Nova Science, 2019. Lo, Sonny Shiu-­hing, Steven Chung-­fun Hung, and Jeff Hai-­chi Loo, eds. China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong: Penetrative Politics and Its Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Lui, Tai-­lok, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep, eds. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong. New York: Routledge, 2019. Ma, Ngok. Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2007. ———. “The Rise of ‘Anti-­China’ Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012 Legislative Council Elections.” China Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 39–66. Ma, Ngok, and Edmund W. Cheng, eds. The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019. Pang, Laikwan. The Appearing Demos: Hong Kong during and after the Umbrella Movement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020. Poon, Kit. The Political Future of Hong Kong: Democracy within Communist China. New York: Routledge, 2008. Purbrick, Martin. “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests.” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (October 2019): 465–87. doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1672397. Sing, Ming. Hong Kong’s Tortuous Democratization: A Comparative Analysis. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Tai, Benny Yiu-­ ting. “Hong Kong No More: From Semi-­ Democracy to Semi-­ Authoritarianism.” Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations 4, no. 2 (2018): 395–430. Wong, Joshua, with Jason Y. Ng. Unfree Speech: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now. New York: Penguin Books, 2020.

HONG KONG POLITICS AND CHRISTIANITY Chan, Che-­po, and Beatrice Leung. “The Voting Propensity of Hong Kong Christians: Individual Disposition, Church Influence and the China Factor.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 39, no. 3 (2000): 297–306. Chan, Judy. No Strangers Here: Christian Hospitality and Refugee Ministry in Twenty-­First-­Century Hong Kong. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2017. Chan, Shun-­hing. “Christians and Civil Society Building in Hong Kong: The Case of the Occupy Movement.” In Citizens of Two Kingdoms: Civil Society and Christian

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Religion in Greater China, edited by Shun-­hing Chan and Jonathan Wilson Johnson. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, forthcoming. ———. “The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong.” Inter-­Asia Cultural Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 380–95. ———. “The Role of Christian Activism in Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement.” In The Role of Religious Culture for Social Progress in East-­Asian Society, edited by Juan Martinez and Kwang Suk Yoo. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publisher, forthcoming. Chia, Philip P. “Occupy Central: Scribal Resistance in Daniel, the Long Road to Universal Suffrage.” In Interested Readers: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David J. A. Cline, edited by James K. Aitken, Jeremy M. S. Clines, and Christl M. Maier, 247–63. Williston, VT: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013. Cruz, Gemma Tulud. “Em-­body-­ing Theology: Theological Reflections on the Experience of Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong.” In Body and Sexuality: Theological-­Pastoral Perspectives on Women in Asia, edited by Agnes M. Brazal and Andrea Lizares Si, 61–74. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007. Hao, Zhidong, Shun-­hing Chan, Wen-­ban Kuo, Tam Yik-­fai, and Jing Ming, “Catholicism and Its Civic Engagement: Cast Studies of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong, Macao, Taipei, and Shanghai.” Review of Religion and Chinese Society 1, no. 1 (2014): 48–77. Kung, Lap-­yan. “The Cultural Dimension of Liberation Theology: The Case of Hong Kong.” Ching Feng 38, no. 3 (1995): 213–26. ———. “In Search of True-­ness: Dialogue between Political Localism and Theological Ecumenism in Post-­Umbrella Movement Hong Kong.” International Journal of Political Theology 11, no. 4 (2017): 431–54. ———. “Parent-­Child and Center-­Edge Metaphors: A Theological Engagement with the Social Imaginary of ‘One Country, Two Systems.’” Political Theology 20, no. 5 (2019): 392–410. ———. “Politics and Religions in Hong Kong after 1997: Whether Tension or Equilibrium Is Needed.” Religion, State & Society 31, no. 1 (2004): 21–36. Kwok, Wai-­luen. “Reconsidering Public Theology: Involvement of Hong Kong Protestant Christianity in the Occupy Central Movement.” Journal of Dharma 40, no. 2 (2015): 169–88. Lai, Pan-­chiu. “What Has Athens to Do with Hong Kong: Christianity and Chinese Religions in the Perspective of the Christian Attitudes toward Greek Culture.” Theology & Life 21–22 (1998): 225–50. Lee, Archie C. C. “Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong.” Biblical Interpretation 7, no. 2 (1999): 156–73. Lee, Peter K. H. “Contextual Theology: The Hong Kong 1997 Question as a Case Study.” Ching Feng 37, no. 3 (1994): 147–67. Leung, Beatrice. “The Catholic Church and Post-1997 Hong Kong: Dilemma in Church-­State Relations.” In China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future, ed. Stephen Uhalley Jr. and Xiaoxin Wu, 301–19. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001.



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———. “Church-­State Relations in the Decolonisation Process: Hong Kong and Macau.” Religion, State & Society 20, no. 1 (1998): 17–30. ———. “Joseph Cardinal Zen Ze-­kiun of Hong Kong.” In People, Communities, and the Catholic Church in China, edited by Cindy Yik-­yi Chu and Paul P. Mariani, 61–77. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Leung, Beatrice, and Shun-­hing Chan. Changing Church and State Relations in Hong Kong, 1950–2000. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003. Nedilsky, Lida V. Converts to Civil Society: Christianity and Political Culture in Contemporary Hong Kong. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014. Ng, Nancy, and Andreas Fulda. “The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement.” Journal of Church and State 60, no. 3 (2017): 377–97. Shen, Philip. “Concerns with Politics and Culture in Contextual Theology: A Hong Kong Chinese Perception.” Ching Feng 25, no. 3 (1982): 129–38. Smith, Carl T. Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. Tse, Justin K. H. “‘Sing Hallelujah to the Lord’: Secular Christianities on Hong Kong’s Civic Square.” The Immanent Frame, April 15, 2020. tif.ssrc.org/2020/04/15/sing -­hallelujah-­to-­the-­lord/. ———. “Under the Umbrella: Grounded Theologies and Democratic Working Alliances in Hong Kong.” Review of Religion and Chinese Society 2, no. 1 (2015): 109–42. Tse, Justin K. H., and Jonathan Y. Tan, eds. Theological Reflections on the Umbrella Movement. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Wolfendale, Stuart. Imperial to International: A History of St. John’s Cathedral, Hong Kong. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2013. Wong, Wai-­ching Angela. “Negotiating Between Two Patriarchies: Chinese Christian Women in the Postcolonial Hong Kong.” In Gendering Chinese Religion: Subject, Identity, and Body, edited by Jia Jinhua, Kang Xiaofei, and Yao Ping, 157–79. New York: State University of New York Press, 2014. ———. “Negotiating Gender Identity: Postcolonialism and Christianity in Hong Kong.” In Gender and Change in Hong Kong: Globalization, Postcolonialism and Chinese Patriarchy, edited by Eliza Lee, 151–76. Vancouver: British Columbia University Press, 2004. ———. “The Politics of Sexual Morality and Evangelical Activism in Hong Kong.” Inter-­Asia Cultural Studies 14, no. 3 (2013): 340–60. dx.doi.org/10.1080/146493 73.2013.801606 ———. “Postcolonialism and Hong Kong Christianity.” In Asian Theology on the Way: Christianity, Culture and Context, edited by Peniel Jesudason Rufus Rajkumar, 56–64. London: SPCK, 2012. Wu, Rose. A Dissenting Church. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Christian Institute, 2003. ———. Liberating the Church from Fear: The Story of Hong Kong’s Sexual Minorities. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 2000. ———. “A Story of Its Own Name: Hong Kong’s Tongzhi Culture and Movement.” In Off the Menu: Asian and Asian North American Women’s Religion and Theology,

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edited by Rita Nakashima Brock, Jung Ha Kim, Kwok Pui-­lan, and Seung Ai Yang, 275–92. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007. Yuen, Mary Mee-­yin. “Cross-­Cultural Solidarity in the Pro-­Democratic Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong.” In Doing Asian Theological Ethics in a Cross-­Cultural and Interreligious Context, edited by Yiu Sing Lúcás Chan, James Keenan, and Shaji George Kochuthara, 97–110. Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2016. ———. “Promoting Women’s Dignity in the Church and Society in Hong Kong—Inspirations from Church Leaders and Women Christians as Leaders.” In Feminist Catholic Theological Ethics: Conversations in the World Church, edited by Linda F. Hogan and Agbonkhianmeghe E. Orobator, 123–36. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014. ———. “Social Virtues in the Hong Kong Catholic Community: Examining Catholic and Confucian Ethics.” New Theology Review 27, no. 2 (2015): 27–37. ———. Solidarity and Reciprocity with Migrants in Asia: Catholic and Confucian Ethics in Dialogue. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020

POLITICS AND THEOLOGY Agamben, Giorgio. The Church and the Kingdom. London: Seagull, 2012. Ahn, Byung-­Mu. Stories of Minjung: The Theological Journey of Ahn Byung-­Mu in His Own Words. Edited by Wongi Park. Translated by Hanna In. Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2019. Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958. ———. On Revolution. New York: Penguin, 1965. Ateek, Naim Stifan. A Palestinian Theology of Liberation: The Bible, Justice, and the Palestine-­Israel Conflict. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017. Brazal, Agnes M. A Theology of Southeast Asia: Liberation-­Postcolonial Ethics in the Philippines. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2019. Brennan, Jason. When All Else Fails: The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. Butler, Judith. The Force of Non-­violence: The Ethical in the Political. New York: Verso, 2020. ———. Notes toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015. Carroll, Clare, and Patricia King, eds. Ireland and Postcolonial Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. Carter, Warren. John and Empire: Initial Explorations. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2008. ———. Matthew and Empire: Initial Explorations. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001. Chang, Paul. Protest Dialectics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. Chen, Kuan-­hsing. Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.



Suggested Further Reading 239

Chia, Philip P. “Biblical Studies in the Rising Asia: An Asian Perspective on the Future of the Biblical Past.” Sino-­Christian Studies, December 12, 2011, 33–65. ———. “Differences and Difficulties: Biblical Studies in the Southeast Asian Context.” In Ways of Being, Ways of Reading: Asian American Biblical Interpretation, edited by Mary F. Foskett and Jeffrey Kah-­Jin Kuan, 45–59. St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2006. Chow, Alexander. Chinese Public Theology: Generational Shifts and Confucian Imagination in Chinese Christianity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Collins, Patricia Hill. Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Commission on Theological Concerns, Christian Conference in Asia, ed. Minjung Theology: People as Subjects of History. Singapore: Commission on Theological Concern, Christian Conference in Asia, 1981. Crosby, Emilye, ed. Civil Rights History from the Ground Up: Local Struggles, A National Movement. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011. Crossan, John Dominic. God and Empire: Jesus against Rome, Then and Now. San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 2008. De La Torre, Miguel. The Politics of Jesús: A Hispanic Political Theology. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. ———, ed. Faith and Resistance in the Age of Trump. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017. Delmas, Candice. A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Dionne, E. J., Jr., Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas E. Mann. One Nation After Trump: A Guide for the Perplexed, the Disillusioned, the Desperate, and the Not-­ Yet Deported. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017. Ellacuría, Ignacio. “The Crucified People.” In Systematic Theology: Perspectives from Liberation Theology, edited by Jon Sobrino and Ignacio Ellacuría, 257–78. London: SCM, 1996. Fernandez, Eleazar S. Toward A Theology of Struggle. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994. Ganesan, N., and Sung Chull Kim, eds. State Violence in East Asia. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013. Gill, Robin. Theology in a Social Context, vol. 1, Sociological Theology. London: Routledge, 2016. Herzig, Edmund, and Marina Kurkchiyan, eds. The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan Weiler. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Hill, Lance. The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. Horsley, Richard A. Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999. ———, ed. In the Shadow of Empire: Reclaiming the Bible as a History of Faithful Resistance. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008.

240

Suggested Further Reading

———. Jesus and the Politics of Roman Palestine. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014. Jeferies, Hasan Kwame. Understanding and Teaching the Civil Rights Movement. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019. Joseph, M. P., Po Ho Huang, and Victor Hsu, eds. Wrestling with God in Context: Revisiting the Theology and Social Vision of Shoki Coe. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2018. Kim, Nami. The Gendered Politics of the Korean Protestant Right: Hegemonic Masculinity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Kim, Nami, and Wonhee Anne Joh, eds. Critical Theology against U.S. Imperialism in Asia: Decolonization and Deimperialization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Kim, Sebastian C. H., ed. Christian Theology in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Kim, Sebastian C. H., and Pauline Kollontai, eds. Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008. Kim, Sungmoon. Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Kim, Yung Suk, and Jin-­Ho Kim, eds. Reading Minjung Theology in the Twenty-­First Century. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013. Kingston, Jeff. The Politics of Religion, Nationalism, and Identity in Asia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019. Knitter, Paul F. One Earth, Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1995. Kwan, Simon Shui-­man. Postcolonial Resistance and Asian Theology. New York: Routledge, 2013. Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown, 2018. Ling, Samuel Ngun, Communicating Christ in Myanmar: Issues, Interactions and Perspectives. Yangon, Myanmar: Association for Theological Education in Myanmar, 2005. Liu, Jieyu, and Junko Yamashita, eds. Routledge Handbook of East Asian Gender Studies. New York: Routledge, 2020. Lloyd, Vincent, ed. Race and Political Theology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. MacDonald, Mark. “Systemic Evil and Christian Discipleship.” Ecumenical Review 72, no. 1 (2020): 108–15. Mbembe, Achille. Necropolitics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019. Mitchem, Stephanie Y. Race, Religion, and Politics: Toward Human Rights in the United States. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019. Moltmann, Jürgen. The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit. London: SCM, 1977. ———. The Crucified God. London: SCM Press, 1974. Moore, Stephen D. Empire and Apocalypse: Postcolonialism and the New Testament. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2006. Raheb, Mitri. Faith in the Face of Empire: The Bible through Palestinian Eyes. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014. ———. Palestinian Christians: Emigration, Displacement, and Diaspora. Bethlehem: Diyar Publishers, 2017.



Suggested Further Reading 241

Raikumar, Peniel Jesudason Rufus, ed. Asian Theology on the Way: Christianity, Culture and Context. London: SPCK, 2012. Rhoads, David, David Esterline, and Jae Won Lee, eds. Luke-­Acts and Empire: Essays in Honor of Robert L. Brawley. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011. Rieger, Joerg, and Kwok Pui-­lan. Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Roces, Mina, and Louise Edwards, eds. Women’s Movements in Asia: Feminism and Transnational Activism. New York: Routledge, 2010. Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Trans. George Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985. Sennott, Charles M. The Body and the Blood: The Middle East’s Vanishing Christians and the Possibility for Peace. New York: PublicAffairs, 2002. Snyder, Timothy. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017. Sobrino, Jon. “The Crucified Peoples: Yahweh’s Suffering Servant Today.” In 1492–1992 The Voice of the Victims, edited by Leonardo Boff and Virgil Elizondo, 120–29. London: SCM, 1991. ———. Jesus, the Liberator. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993. Starr, Chloë. Chinese Theology: Text and Context. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016. Stenner, Karen. The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Sunstein, Cass R. #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017. Tillich, Paul. “The Demonic: A Study in the Interpretation of History.” In Paul Tillich on Creativity, edited by Jacquelyn Ann Kegley, 63–91. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989. Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Torres, M. Gabriela. “State Violence.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Social Problems, edited by A. Javier Treviño, 381–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Tran, Jonathan. The Vietnam War and Theologies of Memory: Time and Eternity in a Far Country. Malden, MA: Wiley-­Blackwell, 2010. Tran, Mai-­Anh Le. Reset the Heart: Unlearning Violence, Relearning Hope. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2017. Welch, Sharon D. After Empire: The Art and Ethos of Enduring Peace. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004. ———. After the Protests Are Heard: Enacting Civic Engagement and Social Transformation. New York: New York University Press, 2019. ———. Real Peace, Real Security: The Challenges of Global Citizenship. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008. Wong, Wai-­ching Angela. The Poor Woman: A Critical Analysis of Asian Theology and Contemporary Chinese Fiction by Women. New York: Peter Lang, 2002. Yong, Amos. In the Days of Caesar: Pentecostalism and Political Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010.

Index

Agamben, Giorgio, 141 anti-apartheid campaign, 219, 221 Arendt, Hannah, 144 Armenian, 195–205; authorities, 198–99; genocide, 195–96, 198, 204; popular movement, 197–98, 205 Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women, 120 authoritarian, 21, 27, 30, 40, 47, 57, 60, 68, 75, 78, 83, 119, 174, 175, 177, 208, 218, 226, 228–29 Babylon, 209, 211 Bakhtin, Mikhail, 155 Basic Law, the, 2–3, 16–17, 41–42, 48 “be water,” 62, 68 Black Lives Matter, 9, 85 Brennan, Jason, 93, 95, 105 “brothers climb a mountain together, each has to make his own effort,” 28, 62, 227 Butler, Judith, 7 Chan, Kin-man, 218 Chan, Yin-lam, 23 Chenoweth, Erica, 83–84, 218 China, 1–4, 6, 8–9, 15–18, 20–21, 26, 28, 30, 41–42, 48–50, 58, 60, 64–68, 75–79, 86, 98–99, 102–5, 119, 128,

137, 143, 150–52, 157, 172–73, 177– 79, 196, 200, 207–9, 211, 223 Chinese Communist Party, 15, 102, 179 Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1, 25, 82, 94, 119–20, 173, 218 Chow, Alex, 59 Chow, Tsz-lok, 24 Christian(s), 4–5, 8, 10, 97, 98, 111, 124, 133, 139, 141–42, 149–53, 157, 158–61, 184–86, 188–89, 192, 196, 203–4, 209, 211, 213; community, 4, 8, 10, 98, 141, 144, 152, 185–86, 192; conservative, 9, 98, 112, 149–50, 161; denominations, 4, 151, 152; evangelical, 10, 151–53; hymn(s), 4, 149, 151, 153; leaders, 4, 149–51, 153, 157, 211; progressive, 112, 150–53, 155, 157, 161; protesters, 133, 149, 150–51, 153, 183, 202; teaching, 8, 97, 111, 196, 203–4; theology, 133, 185 #ChristToo, 124 Chu, Yiu-ming, 218 #ChurchToo, 124, 128 Civil Human Rights Front, 10, 20 coronavirus (COVID-19), 9–10, 26, 28–29, 64, 67, 86, 102, 110, 223 crucified people, the, 10, 133, 139–40, 142–44 243

244

Index

crucifixion, 124–25, 126, 128, 139–40 cyberspace, 56

Irish, 10, 207–9, 213; Free State, 207, 209, 213; Republic, 208

Delmas, Candice, 8 democracy, 3, 5–7, 9–10, 17, 19, 21, 25, 29–30, 48, 57, 59–60, 62–63, 77, 111, 117, 119, 143, 153, 171–79, 188, 202, 205, 217–18, 220, 222–26, 228–30 demonic, the, 9, 111–15; possession, 113–14, 143; structures, 111–15 dialogue, 5, 10, 24, 66, 144, 150, 154– 57, 159–61 digital media, 62, 67 Dudwick, Nora, 200

Jesus, 5, 10, 111, 114, 117, 124–26, 139–43, 153, 177, 185–87, 195,199, 203, 212–13; death, 139; movement, 5, 10; passion, 125, 139, 212; resurrection, 126, 139–41, 190 Jewish, 141, 184, 186–87, 190–91, 210– 12; religious authorities, 212; Revolt, 184, 186–87, 211 June Democracy Movement, 174 justice, 7–8, 10, 18, 23, 81, 85, 104, 109, 115, 123, 130, 139–40, 143, 151, 165, 190, 221–22

Ellacuría, Ignacio, 139 eschatological, 140–41, 159 Eucharist, 159 exile, 209

King, Martin Luther, Jr., 8, 85, 103, 223 Kwok, Pui-lan, 1, 207

feminist, 4–5, 119, 175, 221; activism, 119; groups, 119 five demands, 20, 63, 142–43, 155; not one less, 63 freedom, 2, 4, 10, 16–17, 30, 46, 59–60, 75–76, 85, 93, 98, 109–14, 117, 123, 137–38, 141, 143, 174, 178–90, 197, 202, 205, 208, 213, 218, 223, 228–30 Global Action to Prevent War, 222 “Glory to Hong Kong,” 28 Hong Kong Polytechnic University, 25, 82, 173, 183 Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, 84 human rights, 5, 17–18, 26, 30, 59, 61, 66, 79, 122–23, 127, 143, 151, 153, 172, 174, 188–89, 191 “If we burn, you burn with us,” 60 imperialist desire, 178–79 injustice, 7–9, 84, 95–97, 101, 109, 134, 136, 139–40, 143, 153, 172, 174, 179, 183, 186, 190–91, 200, 220–23

Lam, Carrie Cheng Yuet–ngor (Carrie Lam), 18–21, 24–28, 79, 157, 165, 227 Law, Nathan, 61 leaderless, 9, 61–63, 118–19, 134, 143, 224, 227 Lee, Archie C. C., 207 Lee, Martin, 6, 66 Legislative Council (LegCo), 16, 18–21, 29, 35, 42, 48, 55, 62, 79, 80, 135–36 Lennon Walls, 23, 56, 64, 118 Leung, Brian Kai-ping (Brian Leung), 62, 136, 142 Leung, Edward Tin-kei (Edward Leung), 59, 78, 136, 142 Leung, Ling-kit, 20, 67 “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times,” 59, 78, 94, 138 Malcolm X, 85 martyrdom, 142, 144, 196 messianic time, 133, 140–42, 144 #MeToo, 122, 124, 128 minjung, 5, 10, 171–72, 174–79 minjung event, 172, 176–79



Index 245

minjung theology, 5, 172, 175–76, 178 Molotov cocktails, 8, 75, 80, 82, 84–85, 183, 227 Moltmann, Jürgen, 141

217–18, 223–26, 229; camp, 19, 25, 29, 57, 63, 111; movement, 179, 217–18, 223–26, 229 #ProtestToo, 122, 124, 128

national security law, 6, 10, 15, 28–30, 50, 67–68, 105 nationalism, 60, 66, 112, 191, 208, 211, 228 New Institutional Economics (NIE), 39–40, 42, 49–50 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 109 Ng, Sonia, 20, 27 “no splitting, no severing of ties, and no snitching,” 28, 75, 227 nonviolence, 8, 10, 82, 84–85, 135, 218–20, 222–24, 227–28; strategic, 218, 220, 222, 228 nonviolent, 8, 57, 64, 75–78, 83–86, 95, 113, 134, 149, 153, 187, 189, 192, 210–11, 218–21, 223–27, 230; campaigns, 84, 218–21; direct action, 85, 218, 221, 223, 225, 227; social movements, 76, 86, 220–21, 224, 230

RainLily, 120, 127 resistance, 4, 6, 8, 25, 49, 57, 59, 60, 63–64, 67–68, 75–76, 78, 83–86, 94–98, 106, 114, 117, 126, 139, 173, 177, 183–84, 186–92, 198, 200, 210–11, 218–20, 230 resurrectional consciousness, 203 riots, 1967, 28, 76–78, 80

Occupy Central with Love and Peace (Occupy Central), 150, 218, 222–24 Occupy Wall Street Movement, 201 one country, two systems, 1–2, 6, 15–17, 20, 30, 67, 84, 134, 172 Oslo Accords, 189 Palestinian, 183–85, 187–92; Intifada, 183–84; National Council, 189; occupation, 184; state, 189 Pax Romana, 186 “Peaceful and valiant resistance are inseparable,” 76 People’s Republic of China, 207–8 Pilate, 210–12 postcolonial, 3–4 pro-democracy, 10, 17, 19, 21, 25, 29, 57, 83, 77, 111, 119, 173, 177, 179,

Schmitt, Carl, 6 sexual, 10, 58, 84, 117, 120–28, 174–75, 179; abuse, 117, 121; harassment, 112, 120, 122–24; violence, 10, 58, 84, 117, 120–28, 174–75, 179; violence victim, 117, 122–28 Sharp, Gene, 223, 225 sin, 109–11, 114, 135, 139, 175 “Sing Hallelujah to the Lord,” 4, 148, 151 Sino-British Joint Declaration, 41, 66 Sobrino, Jon, 140 social media, 4, 8, 21, 56, 58, 94, 104, 118, 149, 153–55, 160, 200 solidarity, 5, 7, 10, 20, 24, 28, 30, 56, 66, 76, 118, 125, 136, 140, 150, 154–56, 172, 178–79, 200, 205 South Korea, 5, 7, 10, 171–76 South Korea’s democracy movement, 171–72, 174 state violence, 83, 172–75, 179 Stephan, Maria, 218 suffering messiah, 10, 140–42 Tai, Benny, 178, 217–18, 222 theology of the multitude, 204 Tillich, Paul, 109–15 Tran, Mai-Anh Le, 200, 203 transborder solidarity, 172, 178–79 Trump, Donald, 9, 26, 66–67, 103, 215

246

Index

Umbrella Movement, the, 2, 5, 8, 17, 22, 29, 48, 59–63, 77–79, 83, 118, 135–36, 143, 149–50, 152, 155, 158, 161, 201, 210, 217–18, 222, 225, 228 United States, 8–9, 18, 26, 28, 66–67, 79, 84, 179, 213, 217, 222 valiant, 61, 76, 78 vandalism, 76, 79, 81–82, 109, 135, 226 vigilante, 81 violence, 8–10, 15, 21, 50, 58, 76, 78, 80–86, 94, 96–97, 109–11, 113–14, 117, 119–28, 135, 139–40, 144, 151, 172–75, 179, 183, 187, 198, 200, 215, 219, 221, 225–29

women in Galilee, 10, 117, 126–27 Wong, Joshua, 2, 59, 61, 66, 217, 222–24, 229 Xi, Jinping, 15, 17, 19, 27, 72, 83, 102 yellow economy, 56, 63–67 youth, 8, 24, 55–61, 67, 118, 134–35, 138, 144, 183, 202; activism, 55, 58–59, 134–35; -led movement, 56, 61; participation, 55, 58–59; protesters, 1, 24–25, 55–60, 63, 67, 75, 94, 118, 133–40, 142–45, 149, 151, 173, 213 Yuen Long attack, 21–22, 80–81, 94, 133

About the Contributors

Philip P. CHIA is professor of Hebrew Bible at the Graduate School of Religion, Chung Yuan Christian University, Taiwan, Republic of China. He is the author and editor of several Chinese books. His English articles include “Occupy Central: Scribal Resistance in Daniel, the Long Road to Universal Suffrage” in Interested Readers: Essays on the Hebrew Bible in Honor of David J. A. Clines, and “Biblical Studies and Public Relevance: Hermeneutical and Pedagogical Consideration in Light of the Ethos of the Greater China Region (GCR)” in Transforming Graduate Biblical Education: Ethos and Discipline. Ben Siu-pun HO is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He was a North American Paul Tillich Society Fellow and was selected for the Fulbright Research Award 2020–2021. Ho was a journalist and has published a popular Chinese book, My Journey to God: Theological Reflection of 10 Local Lectures. His research interests include systematic theology, political theology, public theology, continental philosophy, cultural studies, and Hong Kong studies. HUNG Shin-fung is a PhD student in world Christianity at Duke University. After graduating from the University of Hong Kong with dual degrees in law and politics, he served for six years in a mission agency that provides leadership training for China’s churches. He received his master of divinity from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research focuses on the history of Christianity in Hong Kong, China, and the Chinese diaspora in the twentieth century. His award-winning master’s thesis studied how the Chinese Methodist Bishop Z. T. Kaung responded to the forming of the Communist regime in the late 1940s. 247

248

About the Contributors

Alex Hon-ho IP is assistant professor at the Divinity School of Chung Chi College at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, teaching New Testament and related subjects. His research is mainly on the Roman economy and its relevance to New Testament interpretation. His recent publication includes A Socio-Rhetorical Interpretation of the Letter to Philemon in Light of the New Institutional Economics. Nami KIM is professor of religious studies and chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Spelman College. She is the author of The Gendered Politics of the Korean Protestant Right: Hegemonic Masculinity and the coeditor of Feminist Praxis against U.S. Militarism and Critical Theology against U.S. Militarism in Asia: Decolonization and Deimperialization. KUNG Lap-yan has taught at the Divinity School of Chung Chi College at the Chinese University of Hong Kong since 1996. He has received four book awards, namely, A Tearless Grief (2001), An Abnormal Faith (2008), The Cross of Homosexuality (2013), and God-Talk in Darkness (2018). His current research is on memory and religion, yoga and spiritual fervor in China, and justice and peace in world Christianity. Kung is the honorary general secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Institute, a nongovernmental organization committed to human rights and democracy. KWOK Pui-lan is Dean’s Professor of Systematic Theology at Candler School of Theology, Emory University. She is a past president of the American Academy of Religion. An internationally known theologian, she is author and editor of many books, including Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology and Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude (with Joerg Rieger). Her most recent edited volume is Asian and Asian American Women in Theology and Religion. LAI Tsz-him is a PhD student in Christian social ethics at the Theological School of Drew University. He holds a master in theological studies from Boston University and a master of divinity from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interests include liberation theologies, social movements, and Hong Kong Christianity. He has presented papers on antitotalitarianism, the civil rights movement, and Hong Kong theology at the American Academy of Religion and other conferences. Albert Sui-hung LEE is assistant professor of biblical studies at Evangel Seminary, Hong Kong. He received his PhD in religious studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is a board member of Tao Fong Shan Christian



About the Contributors 249

Centre and the chairman of Tao Fong Shan Life Ministry and Tao Fong Shan Christian Cemetery Management. He specializes in the Old Testament and Apocrypha and the application of Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogism in biblical studies. He has presented papers at professional gatherings including the Society of Biblical Literature, and is the author of Dialogue on Monarchy in the GideonAbimelech Narrative: Ideological Reading in Light of Bakhtin’s Dialogism. Stephen D. MOORE is Edmund S. Janes Professor of New Testament Studies at the Theological School, Drew University. He is author or editor, coauthor or coeditor, of around thirty books. Recent examples include the monographs Untold Tales from the Book of Revelation: Sex and Gender, Empire and Ecology and Gospel Jesuses and Other Nonhumans: Biblical Criticism Post-poststructuralism and the collection (coedited with Karen Bray) Religion, Emotion, Sensation: Affect Theories and Theologies. Mitri RAHEB is the founder and president of Dar al-Kalima University College of Arts and Culture in Bethlehem, Palestine. The most widely published Palestinian theologian to date, Raheb is the author of twenty-one books, including Faith in the Face of Empire: The Bible through Palestinian Eyes. His books and numerous articles have been translated into eleven languages. Jessica Hiu-tung TSO is assistant executive secretary of the Hong Kong Christian Council. Her work focuses on gender justice ministry, which is committed to eliminating sexual violence within the churches through advocacy and education. She works closely with local women’s organizations and ecumenical groups to help Christians to work for women’s empowerment and gender sensitivity. She obtained her master of arts in Christian studies from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Tamar WASOIAN is an Armenian educator and theologian from Syria. She received her PhD from Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary and is an independent scholar, teaching in several theological seminaries in the United States. Her interests and expertise include “storied learning,” nationalism, communal memory, faith, and identity formation. She is actively involved with the Armenian community and the Presbyterian Church (USA). Sharon D. WELCH is a lifelong activist who has worked for many decades within the peace movement and women’s movement and is now addressing the challenges of systemic racism and rising explicit racial violence and racism as a writer, professor, and board member of several organizations. She has begun work with the League of Women Voters in order to enact criminal

250

About the Contributors

justice reform and to counter rising authoritarianism by restoring and expanding the core strengths of the democratic system in the United States. She is the author of six books, her most recent being After the Protests Are Heard: Enacting Civic Engagement and Social Transformation. Francis Ching-wah YIP is associate professor and director of the Divinity School of Chung Chi College at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He received his doctorate from Harvard University. His research interests include the theology and social thought of Paul Tillich, Hong Kong Christianity, and Chinese Protestant theology and practices. His publications include Capitalism as Religion? A Study of Paul Tillich’s Interpretation of Modernity and Chinese Theology in State-Church Context: A Preliminary Study (in Chinese).